Balancing Privacy and Free Speech: A Critique of English Privacy Law under the Human Rights Act

Abstract

This thesis explores the legal protection of private information in English law. In light of the developing ECtHR case law in this area, the thesis considers whether the protection currently achieved in domestic law does now reach the level of protection offered at Strasbourg. But, bearing in mind the influence of the margin of appreciation doctrine, the thesis will go on to ask whether the domestic level of protection aligns to an acceptable extent with the level of protection that the justifications underpinning the concept of informational privacy would demand. Finally, if disparity between the Strasbourg and domestic levels of privacy protection is found, the thesis will question why the instruments of the HRA (particularly sections 2 and 6) have not been utilised by English courts to afford greater protection to informational autonomy, based on current understandings of their operation. It is argued that while the re-balancing of privacy and free speech at Strasbourg may have resulted in an acceptable degree of alignment between the levels of privacy protection achieved by the Strasbourg and domestic courts, a significant gulf remains between the way in which the balance between privacy and free speech is struck by English courts and the balance demanded by the justifications underpinning the concept of informational autonomy.