The end of German classical philosophy an interpretation of the doctrines of Hegel and Marx

Abstract

In this dissertation I trace the fate of a traditional philosophical problem,' the problem of knowledge' in the writings of Hegel and Marx. My aim has been to refute the thesis that their ultimate rejection of the problem was without a positive outcome and, in particular, the thesis of Habermas that in rejecting the problem they, in effect, negated the; achievements of previous epistemology. My aim has not been to deny that Hegel and Marx transform the problem of knowledge on their writings. Rather, I have attempted to bring out the positive aspects of their criticism of previous epistemology. The theme of their criticism is that previous theories of knowledge had given an inadequate account of experience. In its place they offer what I believe to be new and important accounts of experience. Furthermore, Hegel and Marx's criticisms of previous epistemology are far from being identical. Hegel, on the one hand, directs his criticisms at the sceptical attitude of his forerunners He is for this reason particularly blunt with the Empiricist philosophers. Marx, on the other hand, concerns himself more with the abstractness of the philosophical approach in general. In his view philosophy itself is the obstacle to a correct notion of experience. But what Marx means by philosophy is German Idealist philosophy and, in particular, that of Hegel. It is further my thesis, therefore, that the differences in the manner in which Marx and Hegel carry out their criticism of traditional epistemology constitutes the End of German Classical Philosophy.