How moral knowledge motivates: a practical reason account

Abstract

When we make moral judgements and act morally we recognise and respond to reasons that are there whether we recognise them or not. This is the claim defended in this thesis. It has two aspects. The first is that acts of moral judgement aspire, sometimes successfully, to moral knowledge. This is moral cognitivism. The second is that moral truths report reasons for action. In responding appropriately to these reasons we are motivated to action. This is the practicality of morality. Hence, it is claimed, there is a
moral reality that we respond to in both cognition and action. Adopting a practical reason approach, I argue that the objectivity and practicality of morality are not in
conflict, but are linked by the idea of a practical reason. The moral truths that we can have knowledge of are the truths about the reasons for action that morality provides. I argue for this claim by showing why we should reject Humean ways of thinking about motivation and practical reason and embrace a broadly Kantian account. I argue that this account is compatible with seeing moral reasons as contributory rather than decisive or overriding. I also show how this account enables moral cognitivists to respond
convincingly to arguments advanced by non-cognitivists.