President George W. Bush’s Policy Towards Iraq:
Change or Continuity?

Abstract

A substantial amount of commentary has been dedicated to George W. Bush’s policy towards Iraq, with many perceiving it as a departure from traditional US foreign policy practice. The objective of this research is to address and challenge this contention. This thesis takes 1979 as the launching point from which to examine this assertion, as it is both the year in which Saddam Hussein gained power as president of Iraq and also the year when the United States began tilting favourably towards, and reviving its relations with, this country.

To embark on this study a descriptive and analytical narrative of the evolution of US foreign policy towards Iraq is presented, ending with the George W. Bush terms of office. This study contends that US policy towards Iraq has two major dimensions: the first is US policy towards Arab Iraq and the second its de facto policy towards Iraqi Kurdistan; both are defined by US strategy at the supra-national level. To guide this study, continuity and change were used as guiding concepts for analysing US Iraq policy at the national and sub-national levels.

The study argues that US Iraq policy is primarily one of continuity rather than change, as US national interests and security, as regards Iraq, are defined by the same fundamental concerns, regardless of the nature of the American administration in office. The research concludes that, from the inception of the Bush administration, and the attacks on 9/11 that followed, the actual invasion of Iraq and US actions in its aftermath were all guided by the same considerations and goals.