An analysis of the generalship of Alexander 111 of Macedon: undermining or underlining greatness?

Abstract

The purpose of this thesis is to present a more balanced interpretation of Alexander’s worth as a general. Chapter One considers what shaped Alexander's campaign aims and strategies throughout his reign and how successfully he pursued these aims and strategies. Chapter Two deals with Alexander's major battles, focusing upon the battles of Issus and Gaugamela. For each battle Alexander's strategic and tactical generalship is analysed. Chapter Three considers Alexander's sieges. It concentrates on Alexander’s conduct at the siege of Tyre, but also examines his command performance at numerous other sieges. Chapter Four looks at how Alexander handled hostile tribesfolk, national uprisings and guerrilla warfare: his small wars. Three areas are discussed: the Balkan and Illyrian campaigns of 335, the Persepolis campaign of 331/0 and Alexander's operations in the north-east of the Persian empire in the period 329-327.Chapter Five examines how well Alexander led his men on and off the battlefield. The conclusion reached is that while Alexander was undoubtedly a fine general, there are many examples that one can cite, which undermine the notion that he was a commander who was unsurpassed in his brilliance.