Sorgner, Stefan Lorenz (1998) Metaphysics without truth. Masters thesis, Durham University.
The thesis deals with the question: Is there any good reason to believe in Nietzsche’s metaphysics even though he himself claims that it is not THE TRUTH in correspondence with the world? The traditional replies given by Danto, Nehamas, and Poellner are that Nietzsche’s metaphysics is only valid for Nietzsche himself, and they, thereby, turned his philosophy into a form of relativism. However, this answer does not take into consideration Nietzsche's claim for the general superiority of his philosophy. In addition, Nietzsche's view seems inconsistent - on the one hand he claimed all perspectives are equally false in respect to THE TRUTH, but on the other hand he regarded his views as superior. I explain in which respect Nietzsche justifies his claims, that Nietzsche's position is not inconsistent, and why consistency is important for him. In the first chapter, I present Nietzsche's metaphysics of the will to power and the eternal recurrence of everything. In the second chapter, I show how Nietzsche's metaphysics led him to his perspectivism, i.e. that all views are interpretations, his denial of THE TRUTH, that all perspectives are equally false in respect to THE TRUTH, that it is essential for human beings to have a defined perspective (e.g. to have a consistent worldview) and his presentation of nihilism. These claims, however, seem to contradict the claims in main part one. In chapter three, I explain why Nietzsche thinks that his metaphysics will come to be regarded as superior for a certain period of time, as transcending the long dominant but declining world-view of Christianity. The claim for the superiority of his philosophy is supported by the belief not that it is true, but that it contains elements which will appeal to people in the future.
|Item Type:||Thesis (Masters)|
|Award:||Master of Arts|
|Copyright:||Copyright of this thesis is held by the author|
|Deposited On:||13 Sep 2012 15:55|