Rethinking the Motivation for Russellian Panpsychism: An Investigation into Russellian Monism, Conceivability Arguments, and the Evolution of Consciousness.

Abstract

This thesis proposes that Russellian panpsychism provides a better solution to the Mind-Body Problem than the currently dominant approach: physicalism. While dualism and physicalism have been the most traditionally popular forms of response, Russellian panpsychism is proposed to harness the virtues of both, whilst avoiding their vices (Chalmers, 2016a). Unfortunately, Russellian panpsychism suffers its own problem – the Combination Problem – which is often understood to diminish its appeal (James, 1890; Seager, 1995; Chalmers, 1996; Goff, 2006; Rosenberg, 2004; Coleman, 2016). I shall propose that even with the Combination Problem looming, Russellian panpsychism can still offer the best available solution to the Mind-Body Problem.
While the ‘Conceivability Argument’ against physicalism is typically used to help motivate this conclusion, I shall argue that Russellian panpsychism is vulnerable to its own version of the argument, and that Conceivability Arguments are fundamentally flawed in-and-of-themselves (Goff, 2009; Cutter, 2019; Chalmers, 1996; 2010; Goff, 2017). With this in mind, and after recommending that they are relinquished from the debate, I shall structure a new argument for Russellian panpsychism and against physicalism, concerning the evolution of consciousness. This argument will serve two functions: (1), it shall serve as a safeguard to Russellian panpsychism, such that even with the Combination Problem looming, Russellian panpsychism can still provide a more attractive theory of consciousness than physicalism; (2), future responses to the Combination Problem can build from the logic of my argument, such that this thesis can serve as a foundation for later authors to tackle the problem effectively.