China’s engagement in conflict management in Middle Eastern conflicts since 2011 – a self-interested developing country participates as the permanent member of the United Nations Security Council

Abstract

This thesis examines China’s rise as a global power through its engagement in conflict management in the Middle East, focusing on the Libyan and Syrian conflicts since 2011. While some scholars argue that China, as a revisionist power, has shown a tendency to challenge the existing international order, this study critically assesses the extent to which China’s rhetorical ambitions align with its actions beyond its core national interests. Specifically, it explores China’s national role conceptions, the actions it has taken to address Middle Eastern conflicts, and the factors that contribute to the alignment or misalignment between its stated roles and actual behaviour.

Using role theory as the analytical framework, the study adopts an inductive approach, analysing primary and secondary sources in Chinese and English. The findings reveal that China primarily perceives itself as a developing country focused on securing and maximising economic interests for self-development rather than as a major power capable of shaping political and security developments or establishing spheres of influence in the Middle East. In cases where economic interests are limited, China defends its political interests by promoting developing-country solidarity, opposing foreign interference, and advocating for self-determination. However, beyond its veto power and discursive influence as a permanent member of the UNSC, China lacks the knowledge, resources, and tools to translate its aspirations into actionable practices.

The findings of this thesis contribute to understanding China’s evolving role in global governance and conflict management, shedding light on its rhetoric-versus-reality gap and offering insights into its implications for international norms and great power competition.