The Other Side of the Limit: Nonsense and Therapy from Hume and Kant to Wittgenstein

Abstract

“What is nonsense?” is one of the most fundamental questions in philosophy and has been implicit since the subject’s origins. This thesis explores the role of nonsense in the work of Wittgenstein, the philosopher perhaps most critical of philosophy itself. Wittgenstein’s work, alongside that of Hume and Kant, is emblematic of the critical impulse in philosophy. This approach does not build philosophical systems or offer answers to philosophical questions. Rather, it interrogates whether the very questions asked are valid, useful, or clear. Though most philosophers are critical to an extent, some make especially broad critiques and distance themselves from other philosophical practices. Broad philosophical critiques, such as those found in Hume, Kant or Wittgenstein require a notion of nonsense with which to frame other philosophy. Through critical comparison, I argue that Wittgenstein’s notion of nonsense is more concrete than Hume's or Kant's, as is his method for addressing philosophical nonsense as it emerges.

I argue that Wittgenstein’s understanding of nonsense emerges in response to his biggest influences: Russell and Frege. Wittgenstein’s approach emerges from a reply to Russell’s language-adjacent philosophy and incorporates Frege’s understanding of sense. I argue that the early and later Wittgenstein have distinct methods but share a conception of nonsense as something which cannot have meaning. The later Wittgenstein’s therapeutic approach emerges from his dissatisfaction with the Tractatus’ response to nonsense. Understanding the later work requires engagement with the earlier. Finally, taking seriously Wittgenstein’s comparisons between psychotherapy, particularly psychoanalysis, I argue that Wittgenstein’s therapeutic approach uses arguments to dissolve philosophical problems. Further, appropriately incorporating Freud into my interpretation shows that Wittgenstein’s method does not put an end to philosophy – rather it creates a productive, reflective role for philosophical nonsense.