A Phenomenological Investigation into the Formation of Primary Delusion

Abstract

In this thesis, I seek to provide a systematic phenomenological account on the formation of the delusion characteristic to schizophrenia, i.e., primary delusion. Although there has been a strong phenomenological research tradition that identifies the altered basic self experience and mood experience as the precursor experiences that underpin the formation of primary delusion, comparatively few investigations have been carried out with respect to their underlying affective dimension. In this thesis, I employ Husserl’s phenomenology to clarify the nature of the altered affective experience present in the early stage of schizophrenia. To be precise, I focus on the kind of experience wherein a person experiences pervasive ‘attraction’ or ‘pull’ coming from different temporal modes of experience (past, present and future) and from every insignificant details of one’s familiar surroundings. In this thesis, I term this kind of experience as ‘affective dysregulation experience’. By carefully demonstrating how such an experience could globally alter the way one experiences time, oneself, and world, I aim to provide an affective centred phenomenological account that can coherently chart out the development of primary delusion from its identified precursor experiences. In developing this affective centred account, I critically assess and refine the predominant phenomenological accounts of primary delusion formation and further chart out a possible way toward a mutual commerce between phenomenologically oriented research and neurobiological research into delusion formation.

This thesis is organised into two parts. The first part consists of three chapters. Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 clarify, respectively, the theoretical and the methodological orientation of current research. Chapter 3 addresses the enduring challenge in providing a phenomenological account of primary delusions; the challenge that primary delusion is, in principle, un-understandable. The second half of this thesis critically assesses the predominant contemporary phenomenological account and proposes an affective centred account regarding self-fragmentation (Ch.4), delusional mood (Ch.5), and primary delusion (Ch.6).