(Dis)uniting the Diversity:
The European Banking Union and the Non-Eurozone EU Member States

Abstract

The European Banking Union (EBU) has introduced many important features of banking governance and contributed to restoration of confidence in European banking. However, two institutional pillars of the EBU, the Single Supervisory Mechanism and the Single Resolution Mechanism, were designed as mandatory for the Member States using the Euro as their currency, but optional for all other Member States. The majority of them have chosen to decline participation, while a handful have joined. A number of important components of the EBU are consequently unavailable or inapplicable to the non-participating States.
This thesis uncovers the reasons why the majority of non-Euro States are not participating, analysing the legal reasons for such choice, as well as national economic and banking sector predispositions of potential signatories. Its findings reveal that a significant number of States are likely to permanently opt-out of the EBU. Moreover, it argues that in the absence of solutions to the problems discouraging participation, the long-term non- participating States are likely to grow increasingly distant from the institutional components of the EBU and the Eurozone, which will deepen the fractures in the EU Single Market. As an answer to this conundrum, this thesis seeks to provide potential solutions for bridging the gap between the two groups of Member States and two banking supervision and resolution systems that have emerged. This thesis is the most detailed and multifaceted interdisciplinary study on all non-Eurozone EU Member States to date. It involves qualitative and quantitative research, blending the methodologies of legal research, data analysis and political economy.