MERLUSSI, PEDRO (2017) Laws of Nature and Free Will. Doctoral thesis, Durham University.
|PDF - Accepted Version|
This thesis investigates the conceptual relationship between laws of nature and
free will. In order to clarify the discussion, I begin by distinguishing several questions with respect to the nature of a law: i) do the laws of nature cover everything that happens? ii) are they deterministic? iii) can there be exceptions to universal and deterministic laws? iv) do the laws of nature govern everything in the world?
In order to answer these questions I look at three widely endorsed accounts of
laws: "Humean" regularity accounts, laws as relations among universals, and the
dispositional essentialist account. I argue that there is nothing in the very nature of
a law - in any of the accounts surveyed - that implies a positive answer to questions (i) and (ii). I show that this has important consequences for the free will problem. I then turn to the compatibility of free will and determinism. I focus on the
Humean view and the dispositional essentialist account of laws. And the bulk of this discussion concerns the consequence argument, especially the question of whether the laws of nature are "up to us". I show that, on the dispositional conception of laws, there is no sense in which the laws of nature are up to us, contrary to the Humean view. However, this does not mean that there is no room for free will on the dispositional account. I argue that free will requires the laws of nature to be limited in scope, rather than being indeterministic. I conclude by showing that this allows one to resist the claim that indeterminism rules out free will.
|Item Type:||Thesis (Doctoral)|
|Award:||Doctor of Philosophy|
|Keywords:||Laws of nature; the consequence argument; the best system account of laws; dispositional essentialism|
|Faculty and Department:||Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Philosophy, Department of|
|Copyright:||Copyright of this thesis is held by the author|
|Deposited On:||25 Jan 2018 10:53|