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ABSTRACT

The study of Greek politics must begin with study of friendship in the Greek world as the two are inextricably intertwined. The first chapter devotes itself to considering what friendship was for the Greeks, and who they considered their friends to be, and this becomes the basis for considering friendships in political contexts.

This thesis is concerned with Greek interstate affairs in the years between 435 and 336, and considers the Greeks and their friends in other states and the impact this had upon domestic and foreign policy. The rôle of the institution of *προξενία* is considered, as the official medium for liaison between *poleis*, as well as the unofficial contacts. Domestic appointments are also studied, and the effect that "foreign" friendships had on selection for magistracies.

Yet the Greeks did not only deal with Greeks, but, within this century, were compelled to look outside their own world and interact with states outside Greece, such as the Persian Empire or Thrace, as well as those on the fringes of their world, particularly Macedon. But these other cultures did not always have the same understanding of what friendship was and what duties and rights were due to friends as the Greeks did, and this led to misunderstandings and difficulties in the relations between Greeks and non-Greeks. The differences that could exist were exemplified by the Greeks' dealings with Philip of Macedon, and the Greeks' failure to realise this contributed largely to their ultimate defeat at Philip's hands.

Appendices list holders of diplomatic and military appointments during the period 435-336 for whom we have evidence.

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The Greeks and their Foreign Friendships, 435-336 BC

Lynette Gail Mitchell

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Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy,
Department of Classics, University of Durham

1994



22 NOV 1994

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ABBREVIATIONS

Many books are cited by short titles in the body of the thesis; full titles are given in the bibliography. Periodicals are abbreviated as in *L'Année Philologique*, with the usual English divergences (eg. *AJP* for *AJPh*).

Most abbreviations for collections of inscriptions will be readily understood, but notice:

ML	R. Meiggs & D.M. Lewis <i>A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the end of the Fifth Century</i>
W.	M.B. Walbank <i>Athenian Proxemies of the Fifth Century</i>

When referring to epigraphical sources, "=" does not always mean direct equivalence, but that the section of the inscription being discussed can be found in both places.

I list below the abbreviations for ancient authors which are most likely to cause confusion:

Aesch.	Aeschylus
Aeschin.	Aeschines
Ar.	Aristophanes
Arist.	Aristotle
Athen.	Athenaeus
Dem.	Demosthenes
Diod.	Diodorus Siculus
Eur.	Euripides
Hdt.	Herodotus
<i>Hell. Oxyrh.</i>	<i>Hellenica Oxyrhynchia</i>
Lys.	Lysias
Paus.	Pausanias
Plut.	Plutarch
Th.	Thucydides
Xen.	Xenophon

In citing Pausanias, I divide the chapters into sections as in the most recent Teubner edition of M.H. Rocha-Pereira; in citing Plutarch's *Lives*, I divide the chapters into sections as in the Teubner edition.

The following abbreviations for modern sources have been used in the text of the thesis (for full publishing details, refer to the Bibliography):

Beloch G.G. ²	K.J. Beloch <i>Griechische Geschichte</i> (2nd ed.)
Bruce <i>Comm.</i>	I.A.F. Bruce <i>Historical Commentary on the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia</i>
CAH V	<i>Cambridge Ancient History</i> V
CAH V ² /VI ²	<i>Cambridge Ancient History</i> V ² /VI ²
Davies <i>APF</i>	J.K. Davies <i>Athenian Propertied Families 600-300 BC</i>
<i>FGrHist</i>	J. Jacoby <i>Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker</i>
Jacoby Supp. I/II	<i>op. cit.</i> Dritter Teil b (Supplement) I/II
<i>HCT</i>	A.W. Gomme, A. Andrewes, & K.J. Dover <i>A Historical Commentary on Thucydides</i> 5 vols
<i>HM</i>	N.G.L. Hammond & G.T. Griffith <i>A History of Macedonia</i> II
Hornblower <i>Comm.</i>	<i>A Commentary on Thucydides</i> vol. 1
Kock	T. Kock <i>Comicorum Atticorum Fragmenta</i> 3 vols
Krentz <i>Comm.</i>	P. Krentz <i>Xenophon. Hellenika</i> I-I.3.10
Lewis <i>S&P</i>	D.M. Lewis <i>Sparta and Persia</i>
McKechnie and Kern <i>Comm.</i>	P.R. McKechnie and S.J. Kern <i>Hellenica Oxyrhynchia</i>
<i>PA</i>	J. Kirchner <i>Prosopographia Attica</i> 2 vols
Pareti	L. Pareti "Ricerche sulla potenza marittima degli Spartani e sulla cronologia dei navarchi" <i>Studi minori di storia antica</i>

PCG	R. Kassel & C. Austin <i>Poetae Comici Graeci</i>
PL	P. Poralla <i>Prosopographie der Lakedaimonier bis auf die Zeit Alexander des Großen</i>
RE	<i>Real-Encyclopädie der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft</i>
Rhodes <i>Comm.</i>	P.J. Rhodes <i>A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia</i>
Underhill <i>Comm.</i>	G.E. Underhill <i>A Commentary on the Hellenica of Xenophon</i>

Section A

Chapter One: *Introduction*

"You acted very naturally", said he. He seemed thoughtful, and after a few moments added: "All the same, I don't think much harm would have come of accepting."

"No harm, of course. But we could not be put under an obligation."

"He is rather a peculiar man." Again he hesitated, and then said gently: "I think he would not take advantage of your acceptance, nor expect you to show gratitude ... He has rooms he does not value, and he thinks you would value them. He no more thought of putting you under an obligation than he thought of being polite ..."

E. M. Forster *A Room with a View*

The Greek world was built upon webs of friendship, and friendship connections were important in both domestic and foreign politics. The anthropological study of friendship has grown apace in this century, and, latterly, interest has grown in the way in which modern anthropological studies can be used in understanding friendship in the Greek world. No examination of gift-theory can begin without Mauss, but, equally, there have been many developments and further insights into the way gifts functioned in societies since the appearance of *Essai sur le don* in the 1920s. Finley was the first to see the implications of gifts and reciprocity in the Homeric world,¹ and many others have developed this theme. From the work of Finley and others, it has become clear that no study of Greek society and the way it worked can really begin without first understanding the place of reciprocity and Greek friendship.

This is also true for Greek politics. Gabriel Herman has done the most important recent work on the place of gift-exchange, particularly in the fifth and fourth centuries (though his work spans a longer period than that), with the publication of his book, *Ritualised Friendship and the Greek City*,

¹ Finley *World of Odysseus*.



and a number of articles which carry on ideas and themes raised in the book. As will become obvious from this thesis, Herman's work has been very important to my own study of Greek friendship in fifth- and fourth-century politics. However, although it was an important beginning, I do not agree with all Herman's conclusions, as will also become obvious. I have three main objections to Herman's position, and this has had a profound effect on the direction in which I have gone. Firstly, I do not believe, as Herman does, that personal connections abroad in the fifth and fourth centuries were still only the domain of the old aristocratic families. Rather, the evidence suggests that the *noui homines* of the fifth and fourth centuries, who had no inherited connections of their own, had the facility and willingness to form these connections themselves, and that this was one vehicle for obtaining political importance.

This leads to my second objection. Herman suggests that the interests of personal connections abroad were inherently opposed to the interests of the *demos*; but I would prefer to argue that the *demos* used these connections for its own advantage. That does not mean that there could not sometimes be a conflict of interests between one's friends overseas and one's countrymen, but the Greeks were aware of this possibility, and these conflicts resolved themselves in different ways at different times. This also involved the subjective judgement of what *was* best for the state, and what may have seemed best to one man may not have seemed best to his political opponent: such was the nature of Greek politics.

My third objection concerns reciprocity itself and how it operated in different cultures. It will be the contention of this thesis that reciprocity must be culturally defined, and that, although different societies practised reciprocity, its manifestation was often different and bore different implications in different societies. This means – a fundamental point on which Herman and I must disagree – that Greeks did not understand non-

Greek friendships. Although they entered into relationships like *ξενία* with non-Greeks, they did not realise that the non-Greeks did not have the same expectations of the relationship as they did. To all appearances the relationship was what they knew and understood, but the assumptions that each party made about the relationship were radically different.

This thesis is about Greeks and their friends outside their own state, and concerns those both within the Greek world and outside it, and the implications of these friendships for foreign affairs. I have confined myself for the purposes of this thesis to considering the century between the events leading up to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War and the death of Philip. This was an important period in the history of the Greek *poleis*, and, while being a manageable portion for a three-year thesis, it is a period in which there were many significant events and developments.

It is also a period of history with many problems. I have not been able to deal with all the issues that arise from these years, but I hope that I have dealt with those difficulties which are most relevant to this thesis, and have indicated where there are other uncertainties.

On the theoretical side, I have started from the work of Marshall Sahlins,¹ who developed a typology of reciprocity for primitive societies. I have adapted his model for the way in which I believe the sources tell us Greek society worked. This model fundamentally provides the “language” with which we can discuss reciprocity, and a way of looking at Greek society. But it is no more or less than that: a tool for describing Greek social structures.

* * *

In this introductory chapter, I will, firstly, provide a brief account of the years 435 to 336 to provide a historical context within which the thesis

¹ *Tribesmen; Stone Age Economics*.

can be placed;¹ secondly, I will look at the theory of reciprocity and develop a model for reciprocity in Greek society; and, finally, consider the implications of this for political friendships.

The Greek World 435-336

It would take too long to give a full history of these years, and that is not the concern of this thesis. What follows, instead, is a brief overview of the major political and diplomatic events which took place, in order to provide a context for the discussion of particular events and to highlight the major themes for this period.

435-404

During the years of the Peloponnesian War, Greece was divided into two major blocs: one centring upon Athens and the Delian League, and the other upon Sparta and the Peloponnesian League. Most of the contact between states arose out of the conflict between these two groups. The major theatres for the war in the earlier years were Attica and the Peloponnese, the marginally Hellenic areas in north-western Greece and the western islands, the Thraceward parts and Sicily.

After declaring war in 431, Sparta made almost annual raids on Attica until 425, while Athens undertook regular naval excursions around the Peloponnesian coast. From 432, Poteidaea was a sore point, and, after forcing the city to surrender in the winter of 430/29, Athens lost it to Brasidas in 424 as well as her northern colony of Amphipolis. Towards the end of the summer of 427, the Athenians interfered in Sicily in a first attempt to establish control over the island. Athens' guard over Naupactus and her

¹ Various chapters will look at these periods in more detail. This will simply serve as an introduction.

friendship with the Acarnanians became important, as first Phormio, then Demosthenes, and, finally, Conon concentrated in these areas.¹

All was not necessarily well in the Spartan and Athenian camps, however. Athens was forced to deal with the revolts in subject states, such as Poteidaea and Mytilene, and tensions in Corcyra reached fever pitch. Likewise, in 424, Brasidas narrowly averted the betrayal of Megara to Athens.²

In 421 peace was made between Athens and Sparta and, although many of Sparta's Peloponnesian allies did not approve of the peace and refused to take part, an Athens/Sparta alliance was formed. A new alliance was also then formed between Argos and dissident members of the Peloponnesian League, and the new ephors in Sparta, who were not in favour of the peace, agitated privately for an alliance with the Boeotians.³ Relations between Athens and Sparta disintegrated, and the Athenians formed an alliance with Argos,⁴ which led to a confrontation between Spartan and Athenian troops at Mantinea. In 415, matters were further complicated by the Athenians' expedition to Sicily. Allegedly supporting the Egestans, the Athenians sent a large force to attack Syracuse,⁵ which in turn sought the support of Sparta, and was given a Spartan commander, Gylippus. A likely Athenian victory was turned into a devastating defeat, and the Athenians lost ships, men, experienced generals and prestige.

In 412, the Persians were drawn into the war and the complexion of the campaigns was changed.⁶ The Persian satraps, Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, along with the Athenian allies of Asia Minor, variously

¹ Personal friendships were an important way of interacting with these more remote parts: see Chapter Four.

² On this, see Chapter Three.

³ For the events after the Peace of Nicias and the negotiations behind this proposed alliance, see Chapter Three 67-73.

⁴ For Alcibiades' involvement, see esp. Endnote 2.

⁵ On kinship as a pretext for meddling in the affairs of other *poleis*, see Chapter Three 74-6.

⁶ For Persian involvement with the Greeks, see Chapter Five.

sought Spartan support for revolts against Athens in Asia Minor. Tissaphernes' bid was successful, and although he proved a treacherous and unfaithful ally, the Spartans negotiated for an alliance securing Persian funding in return for the cities in Asia Minor. After a varied friendship with the Persians, and after revolution and counter-revolution in Athens, the Spartans finally managed to vanquish the Athenians in 404 with the support of the younger son of the Persian King, Cyrus.¹

404-386

The major theme of the years after the war in Greece was Sparta's involvement in Persia and the vexed question of the Asiatic Greeks.² In 401, on the death of the Great King and accession of Artaxerxes, Cyrus, the younger son, decided to contest the throne and revolted against his brother using an army built upon Greek mercenary troops.³ After the death of Cyrus, Tissaphernes acquired the western provinces which had been Cyrus', and demanded that the Greek cities should submit to him. The Spartans' response was to defend the cities' independence, and they continued to be active in Asia until 394.⁴

In 397 the Persian, Pharnabazus, decided to stir up trouble for Sparta in Greece and sent Timocrates, the Rhodian, to the Greek cities with gold to incite war. An alliance was formed between Athens, Thebes, Argos and Corinth. Agesilaus, the Spartan king at the head of the army in Asia, was forced to return to Greece to deal with the problems at home. Meanwhile, the Persian fleet, with Conon the Athenian and Pharnabazus at its head,⁵

¹ On this personal friendship between Cyrus and Lysander, see Chapter Five 209-10.

² See esp. Chapter Five 191-3.

³ On the ξενία relationships which formed the basis of the army, see Chapter Five 211.

⁴ For the apparent connections of the harmosts in the Hellespont and Asia Minor, see Chapter Four 148-51, 152.

⁵ On the implications of this friendship for later magisterial appointments for Conon and Timotheus, his son, see Appendix B: *Athenian Strategoi* (under 367/6).

troubled the Spartans first in Asia then in Greece. Finally, however, after an attempted peace between Persia and Sparta in 392, the Spartans, at the cost of conceding the cities in Asia Minor to the King, made a peace with Artaxerxes in 386: the first "common peace" in Greece.¹

386-360

The years that followed, up to the battle at Leuctra in 371, were dominated by Sparta as she "enforced" the peace of 386. While undertaking supposedly disciplinary action, Sparta interfered with her allies, Phleius and Mantinea, with the federation which had formed itself in northern Greece around Olynthus, and in Thebes by taking the Cadmeia.² The Thebans ejected the Spartans in 379. Meanwhile Athens, in response to Spartan aggression, built up a second naval league.

In 375/4 a Persian-initiated peace was made.³ War soon broke out again, but in 371 a peace conference was held at Sparta. When the Thebans wished to swear on behalf of the Boeotian Federation, hostilities resumed. Cleombrotus led the Spartan army into Boeotia and the Thebans defeated him at Leuctra.⁴ After the battle, the Athenians called a new peace conference at Athens.

In 369 there was a realignment of the major states. Athens was increasingly afraid of the growing Theban power and forsook her alliance with Thebes for an alliance with Sparta. Another attempt at peace, initiated by the Persians, was made in 368 but came to nothing. In 367, the Spartans sent an ambassador to the Persian court. When they heard of this, the other cities also sent ambassadors, though the Theban, Pelopidas, won the King's

¹ See Chapter Five 193.

² On the way in which Sparta dealt with her allies in this period, see Chapter Three 86-7.

³ See Chapter Five 194.

⁴ On Cleombrotus' relations with Thebes, see Chapter Three 93-4.

favour.¹ This attempt at common peace was unsuccessful, but a limited peace which included Thebes and Corinth was made in 366/5.

Meanwhile, the power of a new federation, the Arcadian Federation, had grown. A split in this federation led to war again, and Sparta and Athens were called in to help one side and Thebes the other. An inconclusive battle was fought at Mantinea in 362/1 where both sides claimed victory. Afterwards, a peace was made, though Sparta refused to join as she refused to recognise the independence of Messene.

359-336

In 359, Philip II came to the Macedonian throne.² After securing his own seat, Philip began to threaten other northern states, Greek and Thracian, including Athenian strongholds.³ After Philip had taken Amphipolis in 357, Athens declared war on him. The Sacred War brought Philip south into mainland Greece, but, in 348, Philip sent messages to Athens offering peace.⁴ A settlement was finally reached in 346, which brought the Sacred War to an end, though not without harm to Athens' ally, Phocis.⁵ Though Athens and Macedon were technically at peace, hostilities were provoked between the states again soon afterwards. Philip attempted a renegotiation of the terms of the peace, beginning in 344, but this came to nothing.⁶ Athens formally declared war on Philip in 340 after the Macedonians captured the corn fleet in the Hellespont, and remained at war with Philip until his final conquest of the Greeks at Chaeronea in 338.⁷

¹ On Pelopidas, the Theban, Timagoras, the Athenian, and Antalcidas, the Spartan, at the Persian court, see Chapter Five 214-6.

² See Chapter Seven.

³ On Athenian interests in Thrace, see Chapter Six 222-5.

⁴ For Philip's diplomatic strategy in dealing with the Athenians, see Chapter Seven.

⁵ On this settlement, see Chapter Seven 250-6.

⁶ See Chapter Seven 256-62.

⁷ On Philip's settlement of Greece after Chaeronea, see Chapter Seven 263-7.

In 337, the Hellenic league was founded with Philip at its head, but by 336, Philip was dead.

Friendship and Reciprocity

Before considering the part that friendship played in Greek politics, we must establish what, in Greek society of the fifth and fourth centuries, was understood by friendship and whom one considered to be one's friends. As Aristotle remarks,

Concerning friendship (φιλία) – what it is and of what kind, and who is a friend (φίλος), and whether “friendship” has one meaning or many, however many there are, and also how one must treat a friend and what is just in regard to friendship – these call to be considered no less than the things that are fair and desirable in the characters of men.¹

The Greeks were very interested in who their friends and enemies were, a concern which manifests itself in their earliest writings, and the ethos of helping one's friends and harming one's enemies was fundamental to Greek thought, so that Solon wrote about 600 BC:

Grant that I may always have happiness at the hands of the blessed gods
and a good reputation at the hands of all men;
and thus that I may be sweet to friends (φίλοις) and bitter to enemies
(ἐχθροῖσι),
and respected by the former, but for the others terrible to behold.²

Isocrates, in the fourth century, highlights the moral value of this ethic when he says,

¹ Arist. *Eud. Eth.* 7. 1234 b 18-22.

² Solon (West) 13.3-6; cf. Homer *Od.* 4.691-2; Hesiod *Op.* 342, 349-56. On this principle of helping friends/harming enemies, see also, for example, Dover *Greek Popular Morality* 180-4; Blundell *Helping Friends and Harming Enemies* esp. 26-31; Goldhill *Reading Greek Tragedy* 79-106.

Similarly consider it disgraceful to be beaten by your enemies in doing evil, and surpassed by your friends in benefactions.¹

Central to the concept of friendship was the notion of reciprocity. Aristotle writes that “a man becomes a φίλος whenever, being loved (φιλούμενος), he loves in return (ἀντιφιλή) and this is known to both.”² Something was given and something received in return as one’s duty and one’s right. This pattern of giving and receiving is amply attested throughout Greek literature and was fundamental to the way in which society functioned and hence to its stability. Xenophon’s Socrates sets out clearly the principles of the exchange in his discussion with Chaerecrates over his quarrel with his brother. When Chaerecrates says that he does not know how to make his brother treat him as a brother should, Socrates replies:

“Tell me,” he said, “If you wished to prevail upon one of your acquaintances (τινὰ τῶν γνωρίμων)³ to invite you for dinner when he is sacrificing, what would you do?”

“Of course, I would begin by inviting him myself when I sacrificed.”

“And if you wished to persuade one of your φίλοι to take care of your property when you were away, what would you do?”

“Of course, I would first undertake to look after his property when he was away.”

“And if you wished to get a guest-friend (ξένος) to entertain you when you came to his city, what would you do?”

“Of course, I would entertain him first when he came to Athens; and if I wished him to be eager to negotiate on my behalf for that which I had come, of course it would be necessary to do this first for him also.”

¹ Isoc. 1.26.

² Arist. *Eud. Eth.* 7. 1236 a 14-15. See also Arist. *Nic. Eth.* 8. 1155 b 27-1156 a 5; and Plato *Lysis* 212 d: Οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶ φίλον τῷ φιλοῦντι οὐδὲν μὴ οὐκ ἀντιφιλοῦν; (It must be admitted, however, that this premise is ultimately found to be unsatisfactory and the argument is left unresolved). It should be noted that in both the Plato and Aristotle passages cited there is an explicit acknowledgment of reciprocity in the ἀντι- compounds of φιλέω; cf. Xen. *Mem.* 2.6.28; Arist. *Nic. Eth.* 8. 1156 a 8, 1157 b 30.

³ For οἱ γνωρίμοι = “acquaintances” here rather than nobles (for which see Stanton *Athenian Politics* 67 n. 3), cf. Xen. *Mem.* 2.3.1.

“Can it be that you have long kept your knowledge of the magic spells of men a secret?” Socrates said, “Or are you afraid that you might disgrace yourself if you do your brother a good turn first? Indeed, a man who anticipates his enemies (ἐχθροί) in doing harm and his friends (φίλοι) in doing benefactions seems to be worthy of the highest praise.”¹

Yet not only was the giving of a service the surest way of making the return certain, it was also one’s duty to make a return if a service was given. Euripides’ Orestes exclaims to the errant Menelaus,

Give to me, Menelaus, not of that which is your own,
but give back to me what you have received, having received it
from my father –
I am not talking about possessions. If you save
my life, you save my dearest possession.
Am I unjust? I ought to receive some unjust thing from you for
this evil.
For even my father, Agamemnon,
having mustered Greece unjustly, went under the walls of Ilium,
not himself doing wrong, but healing
the wrong deed and injustice of your wife.
You must give me this, one for one.
He gave his life truly, as friends (φίλοι) ought for friends (φίλοι),
labouring for you beside the shield,
so that you might take back your wife.
So since you received this there, pay back the same to me,
since you will have laboured and stood as a saviour
on my behalf for one day, not filling out ten years.²

When a service was done for someone, that person was placed under a moral obligation to pay it back. This ethic of *quid pro quo* underpinned Greek social life in the classical period, as it had in previous periods, and was openly and unabashedly proclaimed as such.

Yet the ideology of reciprocity was not confined to Greek society. Other cultures with which the Greeks came in contact also practised reciprocal exchange as a social norm, though not always within the same

¹ Xen. *Mem.* 2.3.11-4.

² Eur. *Or.* 643-57.

value systems or based upon the same division of society into friends and enemies. Other societies, for instance, divided their communities on the basis of kinship, where the interaction of individuals depended on their “kinship distance” from each other. That is, in such societies, a brother would have different rights and obligations within society from a fellow-tribesman. Among the Greeks, on the other hand, although kinship networks were widespread, for practical purposes the emphasis was on one’s place not in a kinship network, but in a *φιλία* network, so that social distance was not dependent upon whether one was ‘kith and kin’, but whether one was a *φίλος* or an *ἐχθρός*. This is a distinction which becomes important when considering how Greeks in a *φιλία*-based system interacted with non-Greeks within a kin-based system; and it will be one of the fundamental propositions of this thesis that this phenomenon can be used to explain the social and political “dysfunctions” in the fifth and fourth centuries BC.

Reciprocity and Models of Exchange

Since the beginning of this century, anthropologists and sociologists have recognised the importance of reciprocity and economic systems of exchange as an ideology underpinning societies.¹ Reciprocity, writes Gouldner, has a rôle in maintaining social stability, and is also a “starting mechanism” in that it helps “to initiate social interaction and is functional in the early phases of certain groups before they have developed a differentiated and customary set of status duties”.² Gifts and services of

¹ This bibliography is by no means complete, but see, for example, Mauss *The Gift*; Malinowski *Argonauts of the Western Pacific* esp. ch. 14; Homans *American Journal of Sociology* 63 (1958) 597-606; Gouldner in *Friends, Followers and Factions* 28-9 (= *American Sociological Review* 25 (1960) 161-78); Sahlins *Tribesmen*; id. *Stone Age Economics*; Bell *Journal of Quantitative Anthropology* 3 (1991-1992) 251-60.

² Gouldner *Friends, Followers and Factions* 37, 39. Here Gouldner is drawing a distinction between reciprocity and “complementarity”, which, he claims, is sometimes confused with

various kinds and functions form the substance of this exchange. Moses Finley was the first to consider the implications of this for the ancient Greek world,¹ and since then there has been an increasing interest in interpreting and understanding the history, economics, and literature of the Greeks in terms of reciprocal exchange.² The main focus of the present discussion is to consider how this social phenomenon affected the politics of fifth- and fourth-century Greece. To this end, it will be useful to develop a working model of the general "shape" of reciprocal relationships as a starting point for an understanding of reciprocity as it functioned in classical Greece.

Sahlins' model of reciprocal exchange³

Marshall Sahlins, in his study of tribal culture, writes that "there is an economic aspect to every social relationship. Father-son, maternal uncle-nephew, chief-follower: each implies a mode of exchange of one kind or another, consistent in its material terms with its social terms."⁴ He sees the

reciprocity and is usually emphasised as the stabilising force in society. Complementarity, he says (*ibid.* 33-4) has four distinct meanings:

1. "that a right (x) of Ego against Alter implies a duty (-x) of Alter to Ego".
2. "that what is a duty (-x) of Alter to Ego implies a right (x) of Ego against Alter".

"On the *empirical* level, while this is often true, it is sometimes false. For example, what may be regarded as a duty of charity or forbearance, say a duty to "turn the other cheek", need not be *socially* defined as a *right* of the recipient."

3. "that a right (x) of Alter against Ego implies a duty (-y) of Alter to Ego".
4. "that a duty (-x) of Ego to Alter implies a right (y) of Ego against Alter".

"Only the last of these two are also reciprocal."

¹ Finley *World of Odysseus* esp. 64-6, 95-105; *Economy and Society in Ancient Greece* 233-45; *Politics in the Ancient World* esp. 24-49.

² See, for example, Hands *Charities and Social Aid in Greece and Rome*; Donlan CW 75 (1981/2) 137-75; Herman *Ritualised Friendship*; Blundell *Helping Friends and Harming Enemies*; Millett *Lending and Borrowing*; as well as a number of books and articles dealing with the interpretation of fifth century tragedy: for example, Scodel HSCP 83 (1979) 51-62; Goldhill *Reading Greek Tragedy* 79-106; Greenberg HSCP 66 (1962) 157-92; Konstan *Philologus* 129 (1985) 176-85; Stanton *Hermes* 118 (1990) 42-54; id. "Aristocratic Obligation in Euripides' *Hekabe*" [forthcoming in *Mnemosyne*]; Schein *Métis* 3 (1988) 179-206; id. in *Cabinet of the Muses* 57-3; Goldfarb GR&BS 33 (1992) 109-26; Roth *Mnemosyne* 46 (1993) 1-17.

³ What follows is a highly abbreviated form of Sahlins' theory, highlighting only those features most pertinent to this study.

⁴ Sahlins *Tribesmen* 81.

tribal exchange system as “constructed from the scheme of social segmentation” and claims that “each sector implies appropriate norms of reciprocity. Differences thus appear in the way people deal with each other, according to the way they are socially divided from each other.”¹ To illustrate this, he describes the variations in “the directness and equivalence of exchange” as a continuum, placing what he terms as “generalized reciprocity” at one end, “negative reciprocity” at the other, with “balanced reciprocity” in the middle. In brief, he defines generalised reciprocity as a giving which is “putatively altruistic”, where there is no reckoning and “the direct expectation of a return is unseemly, at the most implicit.”² He adds, however, “Not that there is no obligation to reciprocate, but the expectation of a return is left indefinite, unspecified as to time, quantity and quality ... the time of reciprocation and the value of return gifts are not only conditional on what the donor gave, but also on what he needs and when, and likewise what the recipient can afford to give him and when.”³ Negative reciprocity, on the other hand, he defines as “the attempt to get something for nothing”, “requited only by an equal and opposite reaction on the principle of *lex talionis*.”⁴ At the mid point, balanced reciprocity is “direct exchange: the return is made straight off and is equivalent in value to the goods received ... Balanced reciprocity is ‘less personal’ than generalized reciprocity, so from our distorted vantage, ‘more economic’.”⁵

Against these three broad categories of exchange, Sahlins places the “sectoral plan” of tribal society which is graded in relation to “kinship distance”; starting with the household, and working out through those of

¹ *Ibid.*


² *Ibid.* 82.

³ *Ibid.* 82-3.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.* 83.

the same lineage, village and tribe to those of other tribes.¹ Sahlins says that in most tribal societies “ ‘nonkin’ connotes the negation of community (or tribalism); often it is the synonym for ‘enemy’ or ‘stranger’.”² He illustrates this pattern with the following diagram³:



Reciprocity and kinship residential factors

Along with the *caveat* that this model is only hypothetical, and, of course, is a wildly over-simplified representation of society, Sahlins points out other considerations that should be taken into account. Firstly, that different societies will display these kinds of reciprocities to different degrees.⁴ “To adjust our standardized conception to the variations posed by real societies, it will be necessary to move the balanced reciprocity ‘mid-point’ inward in

¹ *Ibid.* 84. Sahlins points out (*ibid.*), however, that “The play of sectoral distinctions on reciprocity is complicated by the influence of spatial distance on measures of ‘kinship distance’. Close kinsmen live nearby and distant kinsmen far away, because kinsmen who live nearby are reckoned in a sociological sense whereas those who live at a distance are distant kinsmen. The rule is subject to several exceptions; eg. fellow-clansmen or genealogically close relatives who happen to reside in other places. These may be treated economically as if in a nearer social sphere.” See also Sahlins *Stone Age Economics* 197-8; cf. Service *The Hunters* 14-21.

² Sahlins *Stone Age Economics* 196-7.

³ Sahlins *Tribesmen* 85.

⁴ *Ibid.* 84.

some cases, outward in others, reflecting narrower or wider fields of generalized exchange. Indeed, just such pulsations of generosity may materialize within the same tribe over a period of time and changing circumstances.”¹

A second factor which needs to be considered is the moral dimension.² Gouldner writes, “we may suggest that each side lives up to its obligations, not simply because of constraints imposed by the division of labour with its attendant mutual dependency, but also because the partners share the higher level *moral norm*: ‘You *should* give to those who give you benefits’.”³ Sahlins writes that “It ought to be recognised from the beginning that the distinction of one type of reciprocity from another is more than formal. A feature such as the expectation of returns says something about the spirit of exchange, about its disinterestedness or its interestedness, the impersonality, the compassion. Any seeming formal classification conveys these meanings: it is as much a moral as a mechanical scheme.”⁴ One thing that flows on from this, though Sahlins himself does not state it, is the requirement of a greater moral force to propel the return as the exchange becomes more abstract in character and quantity. As the initial gift itself becomes more abstract, so the obligation to repay also becomes more abstract and a greater sense of the moral force of the exchange is required to maintain the flow.

Finally, rank in the community and wealth also play an important part in the reciprocal arrangements, and are often closely bound to each other.⁵ “Not the least among the nobility’s privileges is the economic one, the lord’s due; nor is *noblesse oblige* the least of obligations. Thus the dues

¹ *Ibid.*

² Sahlins *Stone Age Economics* 198-200.

³ Gouldner *Friends, Followers and Factions* 35. Compare here Mauss’ “spirit of the gift” (*The Gift* esp. 10-3) and Sahlins’ critique of this (*Stone Age Economics* 149-83).

⁴ Sahlins *Stone Age Economics* 192.

⁵ Sahlins *Tribesmen* 86-95; *Stone Age Economics* 204-15.

and duties fall on both sides of a relation of rank: both high and low have their claims on each other ... in tribal society social inequality is more the organization of economic equality, and high position often only secured or maintained by over-crowding generosity."¹

This "chiefly generosity" has two main manifestations. The first of these occurs where there is an established system of rank and the position of the chief is secure by virtue of his being chief.² Here, by a system of giving more than can be returned, the giver keeps the receiver perpetually in his debt. "An unrequited gift, as Bushmen would say, 'creates a something between people.' At least it engenders a continuity in their relation, during all that period it is not reciprocated. More than that, the recipient of a favour is in an equivocal position – in debt."³ Thus "over-giving" can play an important function in maintaining loyalty, by keeping the relationship in a constant state of indebtedness, the receiver in a constant state of debt. The second of the functions of chiefly generosity, "chiefly redistribution", exists in societies where "dominance is a personal capacity rather than a constituted position" and the redistribution by the chief back down through the social hierarchy of the gifts given to him is required to maintain his precarious position.⁴ Motivation marks the difference in the two kinds of generosity. "In the first case, the existing rank order evokes certain economic relations; in the second, certain economic relations are used to evoke rank. The first is the way of true chieftainship, operating on the principle, "to be noble is to be generous." The second is the way of the big-man, working from the corollary proposition that "to be generous is to be noble."⁵

¹ *Sahlins Tribesmen* 86-7; cf. *Powis Aristocracy* 27-31.

² *Sahlins Tribesmen* 88.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*

The Greek World

Sahlins' model was designed to describe systems of exchange in primitive societies, and has been used by Walter Donlan as a way of considering Homeric society, categorising the various reciprocal exchanges in the Homeric epics as "generalized", "balanced" or "negative" reciprocities.¹ His stated aims are, firstly, to describe economic exchanges in Homer; secondly, "to show that the epics have an internal unity" by demonstrating the consistency of these exchange patterns; and, thirdly, "to 'fix' Homeric society along the continuum of ideal types of social organization."² His main concern is with balanced and generalised reciprocities, however, and he dismisses negative reciprocity as being of limited importance in this context, writing that, "Because almost all such exchanges occur at the inter-tribal level, their connection with the internal structure of Homeric society is peripheral."³ He divides the relationships evidenced in the epics neatly into the remaining two categories: among the the balanced reciprocities he includes "compensatory exchanges" such as the payment of debts and fines and "compactual" exchanges such as peace-making and friendship agreements, hospitality and gift-exchange, and among generalised reciprocities all economic transactions within the *oikos*, and he emphasises the redistributive rôle of the "chief" figures, such as Telemachus, Odysseus and Agamemnon.⁴ After a thorough survey of the epics, he concludes that two conflicting types of distribution are at work within the framework of both generalised and balanced reciprocity, and that this "favors the thesis that Homeric social organization consisted in

¹ Donlan CW 75 (1981/2) 137-75.

² *Ibid.* 137.

³ *Ibid.* 141.

⁴ *Ibid.* 154-172.

‘imperfect’ chiefdoms, displaying elements associated with the egalitarian tribal model.”¹

However, this kind of discussion of Greek society will not work for the fifth and fourth centuries. The society of the classical world, though still having kinship and the *oikos* at its heart, was based not only on kinship but also on a set of ties other than kinship ties, though in some ways like them. The reason why this confusion arises is that, as Millett points out in his study of the fourth-century economy, Sahlins’ model cannot be transferred directly on to a Greek society. For, as Millett observes, it is *φιλία* “that emerges as the Athenian [though we could even say Greek] equivalent of Sahlins’ kinship, extending along the spectrum of reciprocity as far as the zone in which balanced merges into negative reciprocity.”² Therefore, it is necessary to look at the *φιλία* relationship more closely and consider how it might affect any model of reciprocal exchange in Greek societies:

Φιλία

It is widely accepted that the Greek word *φιλία*, and its cognate *φίλος*, cover a wider range of meaning than our word “friendship” or “friend” and could have little or nothing to do with intimacy or affection.³ As well as the modern English idea of friends as companions and associates with whom one was intimate – for example, Orestes and Pylades: Pylades says that the affairs of *φίλοι* are common to *φίλοι* and that he can only show he is a *φίλος*

¹ *Ibid.* 154, 173-4.

² Millett *Lending and Borrowing* 111; see also Humphreys *Anthropology and the Greeks* 70.

³ See, for example, Millett *Lending and Borrowing* 113; Blundell *Helping Friends and Harming Enemies* 39-49; Strauss *Athens after the Peloponnesian War* 21. Examples of all the different types and kinds of *φιλία* relationships pervade the literature, so I will only include one or two of the most representative types here. For further surveys of the scope of *φιλία* relationships, see Blundell *loc. cit.*; Millett *Lending and Borrowing* 113-6. This is not to say that *all* *φιλία* relationships were bereft of affection, but that, while there could be affection, the word *φιλία* itself does not necessarily imply it. For the place of affection in *φιλία* relationships, see Foxhall “The Politics of Affection: Friendship in Greek Societies” [unpublished].

by helping Orestes¹ – one also numbered among one's φίλοι one's family: mother, father, brothers, sisters, grandparents, children,² and so on.³ In Euripides' *Orestes*, Helen numbers her sister, Clytemnestra, among her φίλοι;⁴ Helen accuses Electra of not talking in a manner befitting a φίλος (φίλως);⁵ Electra addresses Orestes as φίλτατε;⁶ Tyndareus, the father of Clytemnestra, and Menelaus are φίλοι;⁷ and Menelaus is a φίλος to Orestes,⁸ as he was to Agamemnon.⁹ Φιλία also encompassed a broader range of less "personal" relationships, including simply "functional" relationships. Aristotle remarks that soldiers and sailors address their companions as φίλοι.¹⁰

Attempts have been made since antiquity to classify the types of φιλία. The stoics used the idea of a series of concentric circles to describe the levels of relationship, with the self in the innermost circle, parents, brothers, wife and children in the next, then uncles and aunts, grandparents, nephews, nieces and cousins, then other kinsmen, demesmen, tribesmen, then fellow-citizens and neighbours (ἄστυγείτορες) and those of the same race (ὁμοεθνεῖς), with the last and largest circle, encompassing all the other circles, being the whole human race.¹¹

¹ Eur. Or. 735, 802-3.

² The question of parents and children is a particular one and will be discussed in more depth later on.

³ Nineteenth century English was not unfamiliar with this idea, though it has lost its currency in late twentieth century usage. Mrs Bennet, for example, in Jane Austen's *Pride and Prejudice*, says when her newly married daughter, Lydia, has gone north to be with her husband's regiment: "I think ... that there is nothing so bad as parting with one's friends. One seems so forlorn without them (vol. 3, ch. 11)." Mrs Bennet clearly includes family among the circle of her friends, where we would now prefer to differentiate between the two: family and friends.

⁴ Eur. Or. 97.

⁵ Eur. Or. 100.

⁶ Eur. Or. 217, 1045.

⁷ Eur. Or. 475.

⁸ Eur. Or. 449-50; cf. 371-2.

⁹ Eur. Or. 482.

¹⁰ Arist. Nic. Eth. 8. 1159 b 27-9.

¹¹ See Hierocles in Stobaeus (Wachsmuth and Hense) 4.671-3.

This model has been picked up in modern times, but the pattern of the levels of relationship varies significantly. For Earp, "the Greek is surrounded, as it were, by a series of fortifications against the outer world."¹ In the "innermost fortress" Earp places nearest kin and friends and at the "outmost wall all Hellenes"; then, for the Athenian, making "intermediate defences" of phratry, demes, tribes and citizenship, and weaker ties with allies, colonists and Ionians.² Dover, on the other hand, writes that "an Athenian felt that his first duty was to his parents ... his second to kinsmen, and his third to his friends and benefactors; after that, in descending order, to his fellow-citizens, to citizens of other Greek states, to *barbaroi* and to slaves."³ Again, Blundell, while admitting that "There are many levels and varieties of *philia*, with degrees of closeness extending out from the self, overlapping and intersecting like ripples on a pond", discusses the degrees of relationship under three main headings: the family, fellow citizens, and "personal friends bound by reciprocal favour and often, though not necessarily, by mutual esteem and affection."⁴

Aristotle, while maintaining that there are essentially three different species of *φιλία* (*φιλία* based on affection, pleasure, and utility),⁵ discusses many different kinds of *φίλοι*, and says that the claims upon these different groups are not all the same.⁶ In the *Eudemian Ethics*, he says that the different groupings of *φιλία* are: kinship (*συγγενική*), comradeship or intimacy (*ἐταιρική*), partnership (*κοινωνική*) and civic friendship (*πολιτική*).⁷ In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle himself refines and changes these categories and says that partnerships (*κοινωνία*) are elements

¹ Earp *The Way of the Greeks* 32.

² *Ibid.* 32-3.

³ Dover *Greek Popular Morality* 273-8.

⁴ Blundell *Helping Friends and Harming Enemies* 39-49.

⁵ Arist. *Nic. Eth.* 8. 1156 a 6-10; *Eud. Eth.* 7. 1236 a 15-33.

⁶ See Arist. *Nic. Eth.* 8. 1157 b 1-5, 1159 b 31-1160 a 8, 1165 a 14-6; *Eud. Eth.* 7. 1241 b 32-4; cf *Nic. Eth.* 8. 1159 b 35-1160 a 3.

⁷ Arist. *Eud. Eth.* 7. 1242 a 1-2.

of the state (πολιτικὴ κοινωνία), making a general category for all political associations based on “utility”, and he adds ritualised-friendship (ξενία) as another category, because it is a similar kind of relationship to political κοινωνία.¹ Thus he ends up with four distinct groups of φίλοι (which he himself places in two different categories): kinship and comradeship; and partnership based on utility and ritualised friendship.²

The next thing we must do is look at these groups of φίλοι and try to pin them to some broader generalisations and consider how they might fit into some kind of Sahlins-esque model of generalised, balanced or negative reciprocity.

Kin (συγγενεῖς, οἰκεῖοι and ἀναγκαῖοι)

Kin were one's closest φίλοι, those to whom one owed the greatest obligations. Euripides' Admetus claims it is his due that his parents should give their life for his, and when they refuse, claims that “in word, but not in deed, they were φίλοι.”³ Blundell writes, “One is tied to other family members by a presumptive bond of natural affection, arising from blood ties and common interests.”⁴ One has a natural duty to one's family because they are family.

It may, however, be an unequal relationship. Aristotle writes concerning such unequal relationships, as between the ruler and the ruled:

Among this kind belong the relationship between father and son and benefactor and beneficiary. And among these there are differences. The φιλία of a father for a son is different from that of a man for his wife, the first being like the ruler and the ruled, and the second like the benefactor and beneficiary.⁵

¹ Arist. *Nic. Eth.* 8. 1160 a 8-14, 1161 b 15-6; cf. 1156 a 10-12.

² Arist. *Nic. Eth.* 8. 1161 b 11-6.

³ Eur. *Alc.* 339.

⁴ Blundell *Helping Friends and Harming Enemies* 40.

⁵ Arist. *Eud. Eth.* 7. 1238 b 22-5; cf. *Nic. Eth.* 8. 1158 b 15-9.

But he then goes on to point out that just as the relationship is unequal, so the return may be unequal: he says, "in these φιλίαι the 'befriending in turn' (τὸ ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι) is either equal or unequal."¹ In these kinds of relationships such inequalities are based on a different kind of justice, for it is equal according to proportion, but not according to quantity (καθάπερ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἕτερον, κατ' ἀναλογίαν γὰρ ἴσον, κατ' ἀριθμὸν δ' οὐκ ἴσον).²

In addition, different kinds of kinship each have different levels of closeness.³ Aristotle recognises the special relationship between parents and children and the part affection has to play in this kind of φιλία.⁴ He says that "φιλία seems to be more in befriending (ἐν τῷ φιλεῖν), than in being befriended (ἐν τῷ φιλεῖσθαι)," giving as an example the mothers who send their children out to be nursed, and though they love (φιλοῦσι), do not seek love in return (ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι).⁵ However, this is an extreme and altruistic relationship, and in the common order of things Aristotle says that "whenever children assign to parents what is necessary for those who have given them life and parents to sons what is necessary for children, the φιλία of such as these will be fitting."⁶ There is a giving and receiving on both sides.

Yet a son is also always in his father's debt, as there is nothing he can do which is worthy of what has been done for him.⁷ Similarly Xenophon's Socrates asks,

Whom could we find who has received benefits at the hands of others more than children at the hands of their parents? Parents made them to have existence from that which has no substance and to know as much as is noble and share in as much as is good of what the gods provide for men. These things seem so

¹ Arist. *Eud. Eth.* 7. 1238 b 26.

² Arist. *Eud. Eth.* 7. 1238 b 20-1.

³ Cf. Arist. *Nic. Eth.* 8. 1161 b 16-7.

⁴ Arist. *Nic. Eth.* 8.1161 b 16-30, 1162 a 4-15.

⁵ Arist. *Nic. Eth.* 8. 1159 a 27-33.

⁶ Arist. *Nic. Eth.* 8. 1158 b 21-3.

⁷ Arist. *Nic. Eth.* 8. 1163 b 18-21.

altogether worthwhile that all of us shrink from abandoning them more than anything else. Cities counting it among the greatest crimes have made it an offence punishable by death, on the grounds that they could prevent the wrong-doing through fear of no greater evil.”¹

The relationship between parents and children is the closest and most profound: while the child will always be indebted to the parent for giving him life, so the parent is also capable of the “pure gift”, to act in absolute altruism for the child.

On the other hand, friendship between brothers, according to Aristotle, is like that between a group of comrades (ἡ ἑταιρική), since brothers are of similar age and rank, and for the most part, similar in feeling and temperament,² though to a greater degree, since brothers, Aristotle says, love each other because they come from the same source.³ Cousins and other relatives, however, derive their relationship by their descent from a common source, and “some are more intimate, and some are more distant according to whether the ancestor is near or more remote.”⁴

Thus, familial relationships have degrees of greater or less closeness. Close family relationships are based upon a generalised reciprocity. Not all kin have the same claim, but among one’s closest kin – perhaps defined by the limits of the household⁵ – there is no accounting of services which have been given or paid back; in fact the giving and receiving are often dissimilar, for such φιλία, Aristotle says, seeks what is possible, not what is due.⁶

¹ Xen. *Mem.* 2.2.3.

² Arist. *Nic. Eth.* 8. 1161 a 25-7, 1161 b 33-1162 a 1, 1162 a 9-15.

³ Arist. *Nic. Eth.* 8. 1161 b 30-2.

⁴ Arist. *Nic. Eth.* 8. 1162 a 1-4; cf. 15-6.

⁵ Foxhall “The Politics of Affection: Friendship in Greek Societies”[unpublished] 3-5. There are problems even in defining the household: Admetus’ wife, Alcestis, was θυραῖος, “outside” the household (Eur. *Alc.* 805, 828, 1014; cf. 811 where she is described as ὀθνεῖος), despite the fact that she had borne children (compare Lys. 1.6, which Foxhall (*ibid.* 3-4) discusses).

⁶ Arist. *Nic. Eth.* 8. 1163 b 15; cf. Sahlins *Tribesmen* 83.

Intimates (ἑταῖροι, φίλοι, ἐπιτήδευοι)

The group I am calling “intimates” were those most closely approximating to our modern ideas of friends. Like kin, they belonged among those to whom one owed a bond of affection, and those whom one loved for their own sake, rather than for the sake of their usefulness.¹ In order to define more precisely the bounds of this class, we should discuss and try to disentangle the terminology for intimate relationships.

Three words could be used to signify those with whom one was intimate: φίλοι,² ἐπιτήδευοι or ἑταῖροι. The semantic range of each of these words is broad, and φίλοι and ἐπιτήδευοι were often used more generally than with this narrow meaning of “intimates”. However, it is evident that sometimes that is precisely what they did mean, and this can lead to considerable confusion. It will make the way clearer to look at each of these terms in turn and to define some wider limits to their various connotations.

ἑταῖροι

One’s ἑταῖρος, in the most basic sense, referred to someone who was of the same age and status as oneself, with whom one was on terms of intimacy. In epic, ἑταῖρος referred to the close relationship between members of the elite.³ Aristotle, as noted above, compares ἑταῖροι to brothers as being of equal age and rank and sharing all things in common.⁴ In tragedy, Pylades

¹ This would most closely approximate Aristotle’s τελεία φιλία: see Arist. *Nic. Eth.* 8. 1156 b 7-32.

² I am here referring to a more specific usage for the word than the generic usage of φίλος which embraced all those within one’s φιλία network. One of the difficulties in discussing the language of φιλία is the number of levels on which various terms worked. Since we are dealing with a language which was still alive and dynamic, this should not surprise us, and for this reason it is impossible to tie words rigidly to specific meanings. One example, which will be discussed in more detail later, is ξένος, which could mean “guest”, “host”, “stranger”, and a range of meanings in between. In dealing with the language, we must allow for this flexibility and lack of precision, and avoid the temptation to apply strict categories which the language itself cannot sustain.

³ Calhoun *Athenian Clubs in Politics and Litigation* 15.

⁴ Arist. *Nic. Eth.* 8. 1161 a 25-7, 1161 b 33-1162 a 1.

is presented as the *ἑταῖρος* *par excellence* to Orestes, and the emphasis is on his “brother-like” qualities. When Iphigeneia, in Euripides’ *Iphigeneia in Tauris*, asks Orestes whether he and Pylades are “brothers from one mother,” Orestes replies, “In friendship (φιλότητι), yes. But we are not related by blood, woman.”¹ Pylades says that he numbers Orestes among his *ἥλικοι*, those companions of the same age and status,² and Orestes says of Pylades,

The saying goes: obtain *ἑταῖροι*, not family alone.
As a man who is welded in your ways, though he be outside the
family,
is of more worth as a *φίλος* than countless brothers.³

Although Pylades is kin of sorts,⁴ being a distant cousin to Orestes and the betrothed of Electra,⁵ Orestes still considers him as *θυραῖος*, as one “outside the threshold” and not part of the inner circle of family.⁶ Yet a *ἑταῖρος* was ideally a man “welded in the ways” of his *φίλοι*.⁷ Pylades claims that the affairs of *φίλοι* are of common concern to *φίλοι*,⁸ and says to Orestes,

How will I show that I am a *φίλος*,
if I don't help you now when you are in terrible trouble?⁹

All this is consistent with the analysis we find in Aristotle of intimate friends whose first concern is to look after the best interests of their *φίλοι*, and who share all things in common.¹⁰

¹ Eur. *IT* 497-8.

² Eur. *Or.* 732-3.

³ Eur. *Or.* 804-6.

⁴ Eur. *Or.* 732-3.

⁵ Eur. *Or.* 1078-9.

⁶ Cf. *Alcestis* as *θυραῖος*, 24 n. 5 above. See also Th. 6.30.2 (where Thucydides marks off *ἑταῖροι*, *ξυγγενεῖς* and *υἱεῖς* as three separate categories: compare Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.21: πρὸς θεῶν πατρῶν καὶ μητρῶν καὶ συγγενείας καὶ κηδεστίας καὶ ἑταιρίας, πάντων γὰρ τούτων πολλοὶ κοινωνοῦμεν ἀλλήλοις, αἰδοῦμενοι καὶ θεοὺς καὶ ἀνθρώπους παύσασθε ἀμαρτάνοντες εἰς τὴν πατρίδα ...)

⁷ Eur. *Or.* 805; see Price *Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle* 110-20.

⁸ Eur. *Or.* 735.

⁹ Eur. *Or.* 802-3; cf. 1093-6.

¹⁰ See esp. Arist. *Nic. Eth.* 8. 1156 b 7-24, see also 8. 1159 a 33-1159 b 1, which emphasises τὸ φιλεῖν as a virtue and the essential part of a lasting *φιλία*. Note the irony of this in relation to

A ἑταῖρος could also be a more technical term for a member of a group of ἑταῖροι, known as a *hetaireia*. Hutter writes of *hetaireiai*:

Adapting itself to various constitutional forms, it alternately played the roles of aristocratic drinking club, bodyguard to tyrants, law firm of democratic leaders, oligarchic conspiracy, and electoral campaign committee.¹

They were usually small,² and the emphasis was on equality of age, rank and common interest.³ Such groups could take on a political flavour, and Herodotus suggests their importance in the seventh century in the attempted seizure of the acropolis at Athens by Cylon, though they were not always political.⁴ In the fifth century, Thucydides writes that *synomosiiai* at Athens, which were a similar style of organisation to *hetaireiai* (though at the more political end of the spectrum),⁵ were associations for use in law courts and appointments,⁶ and these groups were influential in the oligarchic coups of 411 and 404.⁷ They also clearly played an important part in the civil war in Corcyra,⁸ and in Thebes, Ismenias and Leontiades are both said to be leaders of their own *hetaireiai*.⁹ However, Connor rightly warns that,

Pylades, who, though a good φίλος, is ultimately presented by Euripides in the *Orestes* as a bad man.

¹ Hutter *Politics as Friendship* 27-8; see also Connor *New Politicians* 26.

² See Arist. *Nic. Eth.* 9. 1171 a 14-5; cf. Connor *New Politicians* 28 n. 43.

³ Arist. *Nic. Eth.* 8. 1157 b 19-24, 1159 b 32-4, 1161 a 25-7, 1161 b 33-1162 a 1, 9-10, 9. 1165 a 29-30; Calhoun *Athenian Clubs in Politics and Litigation* 29.

⁴ Hdt. 5.71.1; Connor *New Politicians* 26.

⁵ As the name suggests, however, they were bands of individuals who swore oaths to each other, so probably a more formal group. It must be made clear, however, that they were not absolute synonyms: not all *hetaireiai* were *synomosiiai*, as *hetaireia* covered a greater range of associations, just as not all *symposia* were *hetaireiai* (on the connection between *symposia* and *hetaireiai*, see Murray in *Symptotica. A Symposium on the Symposium* 150-1). Calhoun (*Athenian Clubs in Politics and Litigation* 6) suggests that *synomosiiai* could be made up of a few *hetaireiai*.

⁶ Th. 8.54.4.

⁷ 411: Th. 8.48.3-4, 65.2, 92.4; 404: Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.46. On the importance of these as political associations in Athens, see below.

⁸ Th. 3.82.5, 6.

⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.25; see also *Hell. Oxyrh.* (Bartoletti) 17.1 = (Chambers) 20.1.

It is important not to overinterpret the evidence concerning these clubs. They were perhaps very informal gatherings, often largely social. Surely they were not essentially or inevitably political, still less conspiratorial. Their activities were as varied as the disposition of the members – some of whom were content, no doubt, to dally in the amiable company of flute girls. Others helped each other out financially or supported members who were in trouble in the courts. Others talked politics and argued about which measures and which individuals they would support. And under circumstances which encouraged the politicization of all action, and bred in some frenzy and fanaticism, certain *hetaireiai* might be led to sedition, assassination and conspiracy to overthrow the government.”¹

It must also be stressed that to be a *ἑταῖρος* or have *ἑταῖροι* did not necessarily mean that one belonged to a formal or political *hetaireia*. Socrates undoubtedly had *φίλοι* who were known as his *ἑταῖροι*,² and although these *ἑταῖροι* would have formed an informal coterie, Plato can still write in Socrates’ defence that he did not belong to a *synomosia*.³ Conversely, to be a *ἑταῖρος* could simply be a technical term indicating that one was part of a recognised group.⁴

To conclude, the word *ἑταῖρος* could cover a sliding scale of meaning from a “brother-like” companion to a political associate, but the class of *φίλος* I am including among one’s “intimates” was principally a companion of the same age and rank with whom one shared common interests. It was a fraternal relationship as between brothers, with similar duties and rights attached. If one was a *ἑταῖρος*, one could also belong to a *hetaireia*, whether of drinking partners or of political confederates. At the more distant and political end of the scale, a *ἑταῖρος* as a member of a political *hetaireia*

¹ Connor *New Politicians* 26-7 & see also 26 n. 40.

² See, for example, Xen. *Mem.* 2.8.1, 10.1; Plato *Phaedo* 118.

³ Plato *Apology* 36 b.

⁴ The Macedonian *ἑταῖροι* are a separate issue, but they were certainly not men who were equal in rank or status to the Macedonian kings. For a general discussion of the development of the *ἑταῖροι* in Macedon, see Cawkwell *Philip* 32-3, 38-9.

belonged to the class of φίλοι defined by utility, not intimacy, and so belongs in the class I am calling κοινωνοί.

ἐπιτήδαιοι and φίλοι

Φίλος can be the general term for any person bound to another in the reciprocal relationship of φιλία. However, in certain contexts, it can take on more specific connotations. It can be used as a synonym for ἑταῖρος, as when Xenophon has Cyrus say about men who hide their wealth:

Indeed these men seem to be mean (πονηροί) to their φίλοι, for often, through not knowing what their possessions are, φίλοι, though they are in need, do not say anything to their ἑταῖροι, but are left suffering.¹

However, it also seems to be used for a spectrum of those who, though among one's circle of friends, are not, strictly speaking, ἑταῖροι. Thus Xenophon says to the Thracian, Seuthes,

O Seuthes, I give you myself and these, my ἑταῖροι, to be your faithful (πιστοί)² φίλοι, and none are unwilling, but all, even more than I, wish to be your φίλοι.³

Here to be φίλος to Seuthes is obviously quite different from being ἑταῖρος to Xenophon; for in calling them ἑταῖροι, Xenophon is saying something about the closeness of the relationship that he is not saying when he offers them as φίλοι to Seuthes.

Ἐπιτήδειος, like φίλος, is another general word for those with whom one has a relationship of φιλία. The base meaning of the word is something like "fitting", "suitable" or "appropriate": thus there can be an ἐπιτήδειος

¹ Xen. *Cyr.* 8.4.33; cf. Xen. *Mem.* 2.6.15-6.

² On a suggested etymological connection between the noun, φιλότης, and the adjective, πιστός (πιστός certainly belongs to that "significant" group of words which are connected with φιλία), see Taillardat REG 95 (1982) 1-14.

³ Xen. *Anab.* 7.3.30.

χωρος for pitching camp.¹ Flowing on from this, it could also be a relatively neutral designation for one's sympathisers, whether this was based upon an individual personal relationship² or a general inclination towards a political persuasion, such as οἱ ἐπιτήδαιοι ἐκ Τεγέας.³ Similarly, in 431, the Spartans thought that Archidamus seemed to be "soft" (μαλακός) and ἐπιτήδειος to the Athenians,⁴ and, in 407, Alcibiades, when he saw there was goodwill for him ([τὴν πόλιν] εὖνουν οὖσαν) and that his ἐπιτήδαιοι were summoning him privately (ἰδίῳ), sailed back to Peiraeus.⁵

It could, however, refer to an intimate personal relationship, either of kinship or comradeship. For example, Thucydides writes of the Athenians that, during the plague, "some became forgetful ... and did not recognise themselves or their ἐπιτήδαιοι."⁶ When the Sicilian campaign came to its bitter end, Thucydides writes that, "since the corpses were unburied, when anyone saw one of his ἐπιτήδαιοι lying there, he became grief-stricken with fear."⁷ Thus ἐπιτήδειος was also a word that covered a broad range of meaning, from merely "suitable", through political association, to a close personal relationship.

In fact, with this breadth of meaning, ἐπιτήδειος in a large number of its uses seems to have been little more than a synonym for φίλος, so that Callistratus, the Athenian, could ask of the Spartans, "Indeed who could disturb us by land, if you were our φίλοι? And again who could do you any harm by sea, if we were ἐπιτήδαιοι to you?"⁸ This equivalence in meaning is

¹ Th. 2.20.4; see also 6.66.1, 8.66.2.

² Such as ξενία, προξενία or even ἑταιρεία.

³ Th. 5.64.1; see also 5.76.2, 7.73.3.

⁴ Th. 2.18.3; see also 4.78.2, 4.113.3, 5.44.3, 6.46.2, 6.64.2, 7.86.3, 8.17.2, 8.70.2; cf. 8.65.2.

⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.12.

⁶ Th. 2.49.8.

⁷ Th. 7.75.3.

⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.14.

most striking when Isocrates uses a formulation of ἐπιτήδαιοι καὶ ἐχθροί in place of the common φίλοι καὶ ἐχθροί.¹

Like φίλος, ἐπιτήδειος could also be differentiated from ἑταῖρος. For example, Lysias writes: "This man Theocritus was ἑταῖρος and ἐπιτήδειος to Agoratus."² Though ἑταῖρος and ἐπιτήδειος here amount to virtually the same thing, they give two different shadings to the relationship, ἑταῖρος here perhaps emphasising the political colour and ἐπιτήδειος the personal.³ Another combination, φίλος καὶ ἐπιτήδειος, also becomes a relatively common phrase in the orators: for example, "Sostratus was ἐπιτήδειος καὶ φίλος to me."⁴ Here, rather than contrasting with one another, the two words seem to reinforce each other. Alcibiades, on his return to Athens, being afraid of his ἐχθροί, comes on deck to look for his ἐπιτήδαιοι and is reassured when he sees his cousin Euryptolemus and his other οἰκεῖοι and φίλοι.⁵ Here his ἐπιτήδαιοι would appear to be the sum of his οἰκεῖοι and φίλοι, that is, his family and "sympathisers".⁶

What conclusions can be drawn from this? Firstly, ἑταῖρος refers to someone of the same age, station and social group with whom one could have an intimate personal and fraternal relationship. Secondly, φίλος and

¹ Isoc. 16.8.

² Lys. 13.19. Compare combinations of φίλος and ἑταῖρος: Dem. 54.35; Isoc. 1.24, 8.112, 15.96.

³ The range of use of the two words, as we have seen, could even allow ἑταῖρος to emphasise the personal and ἐπιτήδειος the political, but this does not disturb the central point: that there is a difference implied by using both words together. Perhaps the combination of the ἑταῖρος καὶ ἐπιτήδειος as a unit gives this sense, and there is no point in trying to be too precise about which is giving political colour and which personal. Another common combination is φίλος καὶ ξένος, though this becomes a *topos* relatively early to designate ritualised friends as distinct from other kinds of ξένοι. Originally, however, the two words probably conveyed the two senses of personal and political. I do not think as some do (see for example, Stanton *Hermes* 118 (1990) 42-54) that these phrases are referring to two separate relationships (that is, φιλία and ἑταιρεία, or φιλία and ξενία). Rather the two words are a hendiadys describing one relationship, each word contributing a shading to the overall meaning.

Compare also the usage of φίλοι καὶ σύμμαχοι: Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.26; IG i³ 76.17; cf. IG i³ 75.21-2.

⁴ Lys. 1.22; see also 13.92; Dem. 45.60, 50.27, 59.23; Isaeus 2.3.

⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.18-9.

⁶ Compare, however, Xen. *Hell.* 1.7.16, where Pericles' status as kin to Euryptolemus is combined with his intimacy as ἐπιτήδειος, and Diomedon is then named φίλος, though this perhaps less to mark any difference between Pericles and Diomedon as to emphasise Pericles' closeness to Euryptolemus.

ἐπιτήδειος can sometimes share this meaning, but can also represent a wider circle of friends without bearing the connotation of similarity of age and class. Thirdly, φίλος and ἐπιτήδειος themselves may be synonymous, but are not always so; in fact, ἐπιτήδειος, from its derivation, can have more overtones of being one who is "suitable", whereas φίλος can perhaps be more personal or relational. I trust that this has not been just a lexicographical exercise, but has shown how, though there are areas of common meaning, and all these words can at some point along their spectrum refer to a personal and intimate relationship, they do not always have this sense, but each could have more specific meanings exclusive to themselves.

So who are one's "intimates"? I would suggest that they are those for whom one feels affection, whose best interests are one's first interests, who may be among of the same age and rank, but not necessarily so; and those with whom one has a relationship based upon generalised reciprocity.

κοινωνοί

Aristotle writes that "all φιλία takes part in κοινωνία."¹ However, he says, the φιλία of kin and comrades may be set apart, and the φιλία of citizens (πολιτικάί) and tribesmen (φυλετικάί) and fellow-sailors (συμπλοϊκάί) are more like the φιλία between associates (κοινωνικάί); "for these seem to be, as it were, according to an agreement."² So the kind of relationships that exist between fellow-citizens, fellow-tribesmen, and other κοινωνοί have a different basis from those of a more intimate kind. Aristotle explains what this is, and I will quote him almost in full:

All κοινωνοί seem to be parts of the πολιτική [κοινωνία]; since people journey together for some advantage and for procuring

¹ Arist. *Nic. Eth.* 8. 1161 b 11, see also 1159 b 31-2.

² Arist. *Nic. Eth.* 8. 1161 b 14-5.

something as a means of living. The πολιτικὴ κοινωνία seems to have originally come together and to have kept going for the sake of advantage; the law-givers also aim at this and say that the common advantage is just. So other κοινωνίαι aim at a share in advantage, like sailors aiming at the advantage in sailing for earning money, or some such thing, or comrades-in-arms aiming at the advantage in war in loot or victory or the conquest of a city, and similarly also tribesmen (φυλῆται) and demesmen (δημόται). Some κοινωνίαι seem to exist for pleasure, like religious groups (θιασῶται) and dinner clubs (ἐρανισταί). These exist for the sake of sacrifices and company. All these seem to be subordinate to the πολιτικὴ [κοινωνία]; for the πολιτικὴ [κοινωνία] aims not at an advantage in the present, but at an advantage for the whole of life ... Indeed all κοινωνίαι are portions of the πολιτικὴ [κοινωνία], and all such φιλίαι go with such κοινωνίαι.¹

The basis of such κοινωνίαι, then, is the common advantage. Elsewhere, Aristotle defines these kinds of φιλίαι as those of utility.² Such φίλοι, he says, are in relationship with each other not for themselves, but because of the good that may accrue to them because of each other,³ and such friendships are easily broken off, as the partners might cease being of use to each other if the relationship does change, or the motive for the φιλία might pass away, so that the φιλία comes to an end, as it only existed for this reason.⁴

The crucial factor in this sort of association is that it is based on an “agreement” for the exchange (καθ’ ὁμολογίαν ... τί ἀντὶ τίνος), whether this is a moral or legal obligation.⁵ Even when the favour itself is difficult to value, the giver expects to receive either an equal or a greater return,⁶ so, Aristotle warns, one must take care at the outset from whom one receives a benefaction and for whom one does a benefaction (εὐεργετῆται) and on what conditions, so that one may accept these conditions or not.⁷

¹ Arist. *Nic. Eth.* 8. 1160 a 8-30.

² Arist. *Nic. Eth.* 8. 1156 a 14-30; *Eud. Eth.* 7. 1236 a 33-4.

³ Arist. *Nic. Eth.* 8. 1156 a 14-9.

⁴ Arist. *Nic. Eth.* 8. 1156 a 19-24; see also Foxhall “The Politics of Affection: Friendship in Greek Societies” [unpublished] 7.

⁵ Arist. *Nic. Eth.* 8. 1162 b 27-8.

⁶ Arist. *Nic. Eth.* 8. 1162 b 31-3.

⁷ Arist. *Nic. Eth.* 8.1163 a 1-8.

ξενία

The term ξένος also covers a broad range of meaning, from the ξένος who is a “stranger”, to the ξένος who is a “guest at dinner”, to the ritualised friend. All these ideas are bound up inextricably with each other. In each case, the ξένος starts as a man outside the other’s community. But the ξένος/stranger has the right to be drawn into the other’s community, and so into his φιλία network,¹ because of the protection of Zeus ξένιος.² So the ξένος/stranger has the potential to become the ξένος/guest, which may lead, by a ritualised exchange of tokens (ξένια),³ to his becoming the ξένος/ritualised friend. The other use of ξένος for a mercenary soldier also derives from this inside/outside distinction, as the mercenary is an outsider who has been brought in, albeit in return for money. The ambiguity of the ξένος/mercenary is made clear by Cyrus’ Greek army, where he used ξένοι/ritualised friends as commanders, who were given money to hire men as ξένοι/mercenaries.⁴

The relationship between ξένοι dates from the Homeric period, and remained substantially unchanged into the fifth and fourth centuries. Endius son of Alcibiades, the Spartan, and Alcibiades son of Cleinias, the Athenian, are among the better known of the fifth century ξένοι.⁵ One may

¹ So there is always a positive discrimination towards someone becoming a φίλος: the stranger can choose to be ἐχθρός, but he can be a φίλος by right; cf. Odysseus who returned to his home as a beggar and was brought in and offered hospitality by Telemachus (Homer *Od.* 17.336-55).

² Note that Odysseus sought the protection of “Zeus ξένιος, the avenger of suppliants and ξείνοι” (Homer *Od.* 9.270-1) when he met Polyphemus (though the Cyclops respected neither aegis-bearing Zeus nor the blessed gods [*Od.* 275-6]). For Zeus’ rôle as the protector of ξένοι, see Lloyd-Jones *The Justice of Zeus* 5, 7, 27; Herman *Ritualised Friendship* 124-5.

³ This word also refers to the meal of hospitality given to strangers: it is no accident that non-Athenians visiting Athens were invited to the *prytaneion* for ξένια, while Athenians were given δείπνον. Note the very interesting inscription honouring Arybbas of Molossia (IG ii² 226 [Tod 173]). Arybbas’ grandfather was a naturalised Athenian citizen, and this decree confirms Arybbas’ own citizenship. Arybbas is invited to the *prytaneion* for δείπνον (as a citizen), while those with him (Molossians, so non-Athenians) are invited for ξένια: see Rhodes *ZPE* 57 (1984) 193-9.

⁴ See Chapter Five 211. The usage of ξένος and its cognates could also fall in between some of these more distinct usages: see also Chapter Six 225 n. 3.

⁵ Th. 8.6.3. On Alcibiades and Endius: Chapter Three 102-3; Chapter Four 173-4; Endnote 2.

turn, then, to epic to see how this institution functioned and what expectations attached to it. In the *Iliad*, Homer describes the meeting of Diomedes son of Tydeus and Glaucôn son of Hippolochus and the renewal of the ancient ξενία of their fathers:

[Diomedes] planted his spear on the bounteous earth
and said with gentle words to the shepherd of the people,
“Indeed you are the ancient ξείνος of my fathers;
for divine Oeneus once entertained blameless Bellerophon in his
halls, keeping him twenty days.
And they gave to each other beautiful ξεινήϊα.
Oeneus gave a belt splendid with scarlet,
while Bellerophon gave him a double cup of gold
and I left it in my halls when I came here.
I do not remember Tydeus, since he left when I was still a child,
when the people of the Achaeans were destroyed in Thebes.
So now I am your dear ξείνος in the middle of Argos,
and you are mine in Lycia, whenever I go to the people of that land.
And let us avoid the spears of each other even through the crowd.
For there are many famous Trojans and allies for me
to kill, whoever a god should give me or I overtake with my feet;
and there are many Achaeans for you to kill, whoever you can.
But let us exchange armour with each other, so that even these may
know
that we boast to be ξείνοι of our fathers’ houses.¹

The relationship between Diomedes and Glaucôn was a hereditary bond of ξενία, of “guest friendship”, or “ritualised friendship”, which was passed from father to son.² Such relationships were a means of forming cross-community ties among the aristocracy of early Greece. By means of a ritualised exchange of gifts two individuals of different communities were able to enter into a non-kin relationship which brought with it a series of kin-like rights and obligations. At the most basic level, one’s ξένος could be expected to provide hospitality, just as Oeneus did for Bellerophon; but one could also be expected to look after the welfare of one’s ξένος in a wider

¹ Homer *Iliad* 6.213-231.

² For the most thorough analysis of the institution of ξενία, see Herman *Ritualised Friendship*.

sense, and one could be called upon in times of need to come to the assistance of one's ξένο.¹

But although the rights owing to a ξένο were *like* those owing to a kinsman, they differed in one significant respect: the giving and receiving was ritualised and institutionalised, and like was expected for like; in short, it was balanced rather than generalised reciprocity. Finley points out that the defining line between a social connection and a political relationship was fine. He writes:

The stranger who had a *xenos* in a foreign land ... had an effective substitute for kinsmen, a protector, representative and ally. He had a refuge if he were forced to flee his home, a storehouse on which to draw when compelled to travel, and a source of men and arms if drawn into battle. These were all personal relationships, but with the powerful lords the personal merged into the political and then guest-friendship was the Homeric version, or forerunner, of political and military alliances.²

The assumption behind the relationship was that an equal or better return for any gift or service was expected and could be demanded, and this was represented at the initiation of the relationship by the exchange of tokens, where the gift and counter-gift followed immediately on each other.³

¹ This, of course, was the ideal. Aeschines accused Demosthenes of torturing and murdering his own φίλος and ξένο, Anaxinus of Oreus (Aeschin. 3. 224). Demosthenes apparently replied by saying that the salt of the city was of more value than the table of his ξένο [Anaxinus, according to Demosthenes, was a spy of Philip] (Aeschin. 3.224; Dem. 18.137). On the conflict of interests which could occur when the interests of one's ξένο apparently clashed with the interests of one's state, see Endnote 4.

² Finley *World of Odysseus* 102.

³ On the ritual which established a ξενία relationship, see Herman *Ritualised Friendship* 58-69. On the inequality of the gifts of Glaucus and Diomedes, see Donlan *Phoenix* 43-4 (1989-90) 1-15. Compare Roman *hospitium* which was originally an institution which, Badian says, implied "an equivalence and near equality between the hospitable arrangements awaiting each party ... However, these relations of equality did not long continue. As Rome increased in importance, the Roman *hospes* increased in stature as against his foreign partner. In public *hospitia*, where formal engagements are recorded, we have formal proof that *hospitium* merged into *clientela* (*Foreign Clientelae* 11-2)." For the difficulties when supposedly equal relationships of ξενία are actually unequal, see Chapters Five esp. 220 and Seven esp. 276-8.

Until we come to ξενία, we have a model of society which looks very much like that of Sahlins: household at the centre, “intimates”/comrades next, and then a group encompassing fellow-citizens, political associates, and so on. These were all members of the community. Ξένοι, on the other hand, were from outside the community. It is with this group of φίλοι that we must realign the model, and redefine those who are “inside” or “outside”. Now, in contrast to Sahlins’ model, those “outside” the community (who, on Sahlins’ model, are enemies) can be “inside” the friendship network.

Kinship and Intimacy; κοινωνία and ξενία Generalised and Balanced Reciprocity

Kinship, comradeship/“intimacy”, κοινωνία and ξενία are the four main friendship areas in the Greek world, which, in turn, can be divided into two main sectoral groups: kinship and intimacy; κοινωνία and ξενία. In addition, there are ἐχθροί, who may be from outside these areas, or even originate from within them. Just as in Sahlins’ model, these sectoral groups can be matched with the different types of reciprocal giving. Aristotle marks off kinship and comradeship as relationships unlike κοινωνία and ξενία.¹ Whereas κοινωνία and ξενία are based on mutual profit and are maintained by an equal exchange, that is, balanced reciprocity, kinship and comradeship work in the way of generalised reciprocity, where there is giving and receiving according to the needs and best interests of one’s φίλοι.

ἐχθροί

Finally, we must consider the place of enemies, and the fundamental dichotomy between friends and enemies needs to be made clear. One knew

¹ Arist. *Nic. Eth.* 8. 1161 b 11-6; cf. 8. 1156 a 24-31.

well who one's friends were, and who one's enemies were. This was a basic division which cut across barriers of "social distance". A personal enemy for a Greek could as easily be a kinsman or fellow citizen as any one else.¹ Orestes calls Menelaus a κακὸς φίλος because he refuses to repay the debt Orestes believes he owes,² and henceforth responds to him in a negatively reciprocal manner by killing Helen and taking Hermione hostage.³

Just as one repaid a friend good for good, so one paid one's enemy bad for bad. Xenophon's Socrates says to Critobulus that,

If ever you give me permission to say on your behalf that you are concerned for your φίλοι and you gratify no one so much as good friends (οὐδενὶ οὕτω χαίρεις ὥς φίλοις ἀγαθοῖς) ... and that you realise that it is a virtue (ἀρετή) for a man to surpass his friends in doing good, if ever you give me permission to say about you that you are concerned for your friends (ὅτι ἐπιμελής τε τῶν φίλων εἶ)... and that you recognise that a virtuous man excels in doing good to his friends and harm to his enemies (ἀνδρὸς ἀρετὴν εἶναι νικᾶν τοὺς φίλους εὖ ποιῶντα, τοὺς ἐχθροὺς κακῶς), I think I would certainly be suitable as a fellow-hunter of good φίλοι for you.⁴

Blundell writes: "The question of who started a quarrel is crucial. It is common to argue that one's opponent is responsible for initiating hostilities, thus giving oneself the right to retaliate."⁵ One of the worst positions that one could find oneself in was to be humiliated at the hands of one's enemies. Medea, as she plans the death of Glauce and Creon, crows, "Now I will be triumphant over my ἐχθροί, friends, and am on the way to it, now there is hope that ἐχθροί will pay the penalty."⁶ This policy of avenging oneself on one's enemy falls squarely into the category of negative reciprocity: "self-interested seizure, appropriation by chicane or force

¹ See Earp *The Way of the Greeks* 34.

² Eur. *Or.* 740, cf. 748.

³ Eur. *Or.* 1129-30, 1143-5, 1191-3, 1296-310, 1323-48.

⁴ Xen. *Mem.* 2.6.35.

⁵ Blundell *Helping Friends and Harming Enemies* 37.

⁶ Eur. *Med.* 765-7.

requited only by an equal and opposite reaction on the principle of *lex talionis*.”¹

Here, again, we diverge from Sahlins’ model. While Sahlins classed as enemies all those outside the community, for the Greek there was a defined group of people whom he classed as his personal enemies, or *ἐχθροί*, who could come from inside the community.² By the same token, those who *had* been *φίλοι* could become *ἐχθροί*. For example, the speaker of [Lysias] VIII complains of the treatment meted out to him by fellow-members of a religious society, saying that it is impossible not to speak when one has been badly treated contrary to expectation (*ἐναντίον τῆς ἐλπίδος κακῶς πάσχω*) and discovers one has been wronged by those who seem to be one’s *φίλοι*.³ In Lysias IV, the speaker asserts that he and his accuser are friends – the proof of this is the favours he has done the man⁴ – though his accuser insists they are enemies.⁵ Even kin could become *ἐχθροί*, as the speeches of inheritance cases illustrate. The speaker of Isaeus I (*On the Estate of Cleonymus*) says:

My opponents and I, gentlemen, do not have the same feelings towards one another, for I think that the worst part of my present troubles is not that I am unjustly in danger, but that I am contesting against kinsmen (*οἰκεῖοι*), against whom it is not “nice” to defend oneself. For I would not think it was less of a misfortune to harm them in defending myself, since they are kinsmen, than to have originally suffered harm at their hands. But these men do not hold such an opinion, but they have come against us, having summoned their *φίλοι*, prepared orators and spared none of their resources, as though, gentlemen, they were

¹ Sahlins *Tribesmen* 82.

² There is an important distinction between a private enemy (*ἐχθρός*) and a public enemy (*πολέμιος*). A private enmity could carry over into the public sphere (see Rhodes “Enmity in Fourth Century Athens” [unpublished]), but one could have personal friends among the public enemies of one’s state. The Greeks were aware of this difficulty, and Xenophon has Agesilaus talking about this conflict in his meeting with Pharnabazus at Dascyleium: see Endnote 4.

³ [Lys.] 8.2; cf. 8.1. The speaker ultimately left the association ([Lys.] 8.19).


⁴ Lys. 4.3–4.

⁵ Lys. 4.5; see also Rhodes “Enmity in Fourth Century Athens” [unpublished].

punishing ἐχθροί, and not doing harm to relatives and kinsmen (ἀναγκαῖοι καὶ συγγενεῖς).¹

Anyone could become an ἐχθρός, just as anyone could become a friend. But because the set of one's ἐχθροί was an enclosed group, and there was also a definable set of φίλοι, there must also be a grey area, including those who are neither φίλοι nor ἐχθροί, but could potentially belong to either set and could become one or the other.²

On this basis, we can construct a new model of reciprocal giving, retaining Sahlins' typology of reciprocal exchange, but replacing the kin-based structure for one based upon φιλία.



Reciprocity in Greek Society

Among kin and intimate companions, there is generalised reciprocity; between "associates", whether fellow-soldiers, mess-mates, fellow-citizens or tribesmen, and ξένοι, ritualised friends from outside the community, there is balanced reciprocity; and between ἐχθροί, enemies, negative

¹ Isaeus 1.6-7.

² However, as we have seen, because the stranger/outsider/ξένος had the right to be drawn inside one's friendship network, since Zeus ξένιος ensured that it should be so, someone outside either circle would more easily become φίλος rather than ἐχθρός, though he could always make the positive choice to become an ἐχθρός.

reciprocity. As I have already stated, the essential difference between this model and that of Sahlins is that, whereas Sahlins places those within the tribal sectors inside the framework of generalised or balanced reciprocity, and “non-kin” or strangers without and in the realm of negative reciprocity, this model redefines those who belong *inside* the friendship network, and those who belong *outside*. Individuals from either inside or outside the *community* structure can be drawn inside the *φιλία* network and experience positive reciprocity. This has the implication that anyone can enter into a friendship relationship with all its rights and duties, but equally anyone, whether kin or demesman, can become an enemy. Let a man be ever so close a kinsman, if he is a bad φίλος, he is an ἐχθρός, and will experience negative reciprocity.¹

χάριτες and δῶρα

A word needs to be said at this point about the substance of these *φιλία* exchanges. Reciprocal giving took the form, generally speaking, of an exchange of χάριτες (favours)² or δῶρα (gifts).³ Aristotle writes that the reason why men set up shrines to the Graces (Χάριτες) in public places was so that they might make a repayment (ἀπόδοσις) of χάριτες, and that this is the thing that makes the χάρις distinctive: that it is necessary both to do a service in return to the man who did a favour (τῷ χαρισσάμενῳ), and also to be the initiator oneself in doing a favour again.⁴ Orestes says to Menelaus,

Give a share of your good fortune to your φίλοι,

¹ There are a whole host of figures from tragedy who should have been φίλοι, but because of their actions became ἐχθροί and suffered negative reciprocity: Jason at the hands of Medea (Eur. *Medea*); Menelaus at the hands of Orestes (Eur. *Orestes*); Agamemnon at the hands of Clytemnestra (Aesch. *Agamemnon*), to name a few.

² A word whose meaning could range from simply “joy” or “pleasure” and “gratification” to “favour”: Hewitt CP 22 (1927) . 142-161; Blundell *Helping Friends and Harming Enemies* 33-4; Bergson *Eranos* 83 (1985) 14-6.

³ Or its cognates.

⁴ Arist. *Nic. Eth.* 5. 1133 a 3-5. On this passage, and χάρις in general, see Millett *Lending and Borrowing* 123-6.

since you have come as one who is fortunate,
 and having received what is good, do not keep it to yourself,
 but also take your fair share of troubles
 paying back the χάριτες of my father to those whom you ought.
 For they are φίλοι in name, not in deed,
 who are not φίλοι in times of misfortune.¹

Δῶρα, on the other hand, were the tangible representations of the return, and could be exchanged to mark the conclusion of pacts such as ξενίαί. For example, Xenophon writes that those who wanted to make a φιλία with Medocus, king of the Odrysians, brought δῶρα.² Just as the giving of χάριτες makes φίλοι, so does the giving of δῶρα: Xenophon says to another Thracian, Seuthes, “For my part, I think that all believe it is necessary to show goodwill (εὐνοία) to the man from whom one has received δῶρα.”³

Although both χάριτες and δῶρα are legitimate mediums of exchange in the system of reciprocal giving, there are important differences in their nature, which produce significant differences in the type of exchange. For as δῶρα are tangible and χάριτες are more abstract, so δῶρα are more quantifiable and the value of a χάρις is more ambiguous and more open to interpretation.⁴ Δῶρα have a specific and recognised value so should fittingly belong to those kinds of exchange where there is an account taken of the value of the gift and a return of equal or greater value is required; that is, balanced reciprocity. Χάριτες, on the other hand, since it is more difficult to assess their exact value, would be more suitable in a generalised reciprocal exchange where there is not the same emphasis on an exact accounting of the value of the service.⁵ These are two generalisations which it is

¹ Eur. Or. 449-55.

² Xen. Anab. 7.3.16.

³ Xen. Anab. 7.7.46.

⁴ See Arist. Nic. Eth. 8. 1163 a 10-21.

⁵ For a similar kind of argument, see Arist. Nic. Eth. 8. 1162 b 21-1163 a 23.

important to bear in mind when one turns to interstate relations and the way in which different cultures interact.

Equality in Friendship

It also needs to be emphasised that friendship in the Greek world was perceived as basically an equal relationship, where a roughly equal return was given for any service. Aristotle says that, in friendship among the good,

In befriending (φιλοῦντες) their φίλος, they befriend (φιλοῦσιν) good for their own sake, for the good man in becoming a φίλος becomes good to that man who is his φίλος. So each man befriends (φιλεῖ) the good for his own sake, and they make an equal return (τὸ ἴσον ἀνταποδίδωσι) with purpose and pleasure. For it is said, 'Friendship (φιλότης) is equality (ἰσότης)', and this is particularly true in friendships among the good."¹

Even among close companions – those who come closest to this perfect friendship, and who experience generalised reciprocity – there is an understanding that the exchange will be roughly equal. But among the largest group of φιλίαι – those we have characterised as balanced relationships, but Aristotle calls friendships based on pleasure and utility – friendships are based, according to Aristotle, on equality (εἰσὶν ... φιλίαι ἐν ἰσότητι).²

Aristotle also recognises that there are other relationships which are unequal in status, such as that between father and child, husband and wife, ruler and ruled.³ He says that in these unequal friendships what both parties are entitled to receive from the other is not the same,⁴ but these relationships should be proportionate, and the superior partner should be befriended more than he befriends (μᾶλλον φιλεῖσθαι ἢ φιλεῖν), "for

¹ Arist. *Nic. Eth.* 8. 1157 b 33-1158 a 1; cf. 1163 a 1-2; *Eud. Eth.* 7. 1238 b 14-6.

² Arist. *Nic. Eth.* 8. 1158 b 1. This accords, as we have seen, with our definition of balanced reciprocity.

³ Arist. *Nic. Eth.* 8. 1158 b 11-9.

⁴ Arist. *Nic. Eth.* 8. 1158 b 20-1.

whenever the 'befriending' (φίλησις) is according to worth, then somehow there is a sense of equality (ἰσότης), and equality seems to be a part of φιλία."¹ So, whether the reciprocity was balanced or generalised, it was important to the Greeks that there was a sense in which the relationship was equal, even if this was really only notional. This does not disturb our distinction between balanced and generalised reciprocity, however, since balanced reciprocity was a consciously equal relationship, whereas with generalised reciprocity it was only necessary that it was generally felt to be so.

The model we have developed describes Greek social structures. What we need to do now is look at its application in the political sphere.

Political Friendship

Political friendships both at home and abroad worked from a similar model – though they needed to be adapted to suit the needs of that developing entity, the *polis* – and political friendships were rooted in the same basic assumptions as social friendships.

In domestic political activity, groups of φίλοι and ἑταῖροι (and here I am being deliberately ambiguous) clustered in various ways to negotiate for power. This is best described in terms of a "vertical axis" which penetrated "down" through society, and a "horizontal axis" which linked individuals of similar power and status both within communities and between them. It should be pointed out at the outset that these political friendships, stemming as they do from the third and fourth categories of φιλία on our model above (that is, κοινωνία and ξενία), were, by and large, balanced relationships.

¹ Arist. *Nic. Eth.* 8. 1158 b 23-8; cf. 1159 b 1-3; 1162 a 34-1162 b 4.

The Vertical Axis

The vertical axis is the upward and downward flow of goods and services through the layers of society. One of the most obvious expressions of this was patronage. The *Athenaion Politeia* talks about Cimon in the early fifth century opening up his estates to his demesmen "so that it was possible for those who wished to enjoy the harvest."¹ Similarly, Lysias has examples of men giving financial help to their demesmen.² By giving freely to one's demesmen, tribesmen, or fellow-citizens, one was not merely winning distinction but buying good will which could be paid back in terms of political support.³ One was forming a relationship, a "friendship", based upon the principle of giving for a return. And the relationship was a balanced and equal one. Though not quantitatively the same, the exchange was qualitatively equal in real value to each partner in the relationship. So what we have on this theoretical "vertical axis" is a pyramid, or system of superimposed pyramids, embracing the layers of society with individuals interacting in exchange relationships of equal benefits.

What is more, connected to this vertical flow, there were other networks one could tap into. There were also other exchange relationships going on of a more "generalised" kind: of brothers interacting with brothers, fathers with sons, men with their neighbours. Each member of the pyramid had a whole network of relationships of his own which could be invoked at need. Xenophon tells the story that before the assembly at which the fate of the generals at Arginusae was to be decided, Theramenes and his friends made arrangements with large numbers of people wearing black cloaks and with their heads shaved at the festival of the Apaturia, to come to the assembly, as though they were kinsmen of the dead, and so try to excite

¹ [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 27.3.

² See Lys. 16.14, 31.15-6.

³ Cf. Rhodes *JHS* 106 (1986) 136.

public feeling against the generals.¹ Whether this story is true or not is disputed, but it is a story which seemed plausible to a contemporary. There was a complex “meshing” of reciprocal activities which could all be called on, and which could all be motivated for political profit. This was not rallying a regular political party, as Hansen remarks,² but it was probably using other networks, “friendship” networks, for a political purpose.

That is not to say that political, or politicised, groups did not exist, despite Hansen’s objections.³ There is abundant evidence both from Athens and from other Greek states of groups which clustered around prominent individuals. The focus of these groups were the political leaders: Pericles, Alcibiades, or Demosthenes, for example.⁴ Hansen has argued that these men did not have political groups or followings whom they could call into action to vote on their behalf in the assembly or the courts, but this is to deny the evidence.⁵ There is evidence for these groups in many Greek states, and they are described in the sources as “those about Theramenes”; or “those with Xenares and Cleobulus”, to give a Spartan example. These groups, it seems, were modelled on the *hetaireiai*, which, as we have seen above, were in origin groups of men of the same age and status who met together for *symposia*. Yet they were not rigid parties as we would understand them. Rather, there was a certain fluidity in their composition. As Rhodes has recently written about such groups in Athens,

In Athens there were political leaders with policies, and the leaders did have supporters who helped them to get their policies adopted and acted upon; but they were working within a system in which there was no party programme or party discipline and even the most popular leader could not be sure of success on every occasion, in which today’s decision might reverse or

¹ Xen. *Hell.* 1.7.8.

² Hansen *Athenian Democracy* 284; Hansen mistranslates and misinterprets Xen. *Hell.* 1.7.8.

³ See above on *hetaireiai* 27-8.

⁴ See Calhoun *Athenian Clubs in Politics and Litigation* 7.

⁵ Hansen *Athenian Democracy* 266-87 (contra Calhoun *Athenian Clubs in Politics and Litigation* 128; cf. Connor *New Politicians* 25-9).

obstruct yesterday's decision, in which Nicias and Alcibiades might both have enough support for both to be appointed to the command of the great Sicilian expedition.¹

The element that bound these groups together was *φιλία*, friendship. The members were *φίλοι* to each other and so were bound to each other by the rights and duties attendant upon the *φιλία* relationship.

Pericles and Cleon

However, Connor writes that in the late fifth century there was a new style of politics, which turned away from individual relationships to forming "mass alliances" between political leaders and the state.² Plutarch says that Pericles on entering public life withdrew from his *φίλοι*, only being seen on one street, and that the one that led to the *agora* and the *bouleuterion*, and that he turned down all private invitations to dinner, except for the marriage of his cousin, when he stayed only until the libations were made.³ As Connor explains, there are two ways in which this would win him the support of the *demos*: "The first is by presenting Pericles as the indispensable expert in the complexity of public business, the second is by presenting him as an impartial public servant, without dangerous obligations to *philoi*."⁴ Connor believes that Pericles was the forerunner to Cleon, who developed this new style of politics which "deemphasizes the power of the friendship groups and stresses the mass allegiance which skilful and eloquent leaders can win."⁵

Yet it is not entirely a new development, but an adaptation of the existing pattern. For Pericles, by withdrawing from his *φίλοι* and using state funds for jurors' salaries and his building projects,⁶ was simply changing the

¹ Rhodes "The 'Acephalous' Polis?" [unpublished] 12.

² Connor *New Politicians* 117-8.

³ Plut. *Per.* 7.5.

⁴ Connor *New Politicians* 121-2.

⁵ *Ibid.* 135.

⁶ See [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 27.3-4; Plut. *Per.* 9.2-3, 11.4-12.1.

range and scale of his *φιλία* network. Now, rather than forming relationships with individual *φίλοι*, he was effectively, and ostentatiously, making all the citizens his friends. He was doing no more than any other patron for his clients.¹ The change is one of scale. The stage is larger, but the process is the same.

Liturgies

Public liturgies were also an extension of this giving by the rich to the less well off. Liturgies were, in effect, an institutionalised version of the patronage system.² The honour that accrued to the liturgist has, in the past, not been sufficiently valued as honour, but it also has less abstract implications. The orators argue that one's liturgies ought to be taken into account in legal decisions.³ The speaker in Lysias' *Against Aristophanes* says,

concerning my father, since the accusations have been made as of a man who has done wrong, forgive me if I say what he has spent on the city and on his *φίλοι*, for I don't do this for the sake of glory (*φιλοτιμία*) but as a proof that he is not the kind of man who must be forced to spend a great deal and to desire to have something of the public property with the greatest danger. ... Indeed my father has not ever desired to hold public office, but he produced all the choruses and performed seven trierarchies, and has made many large contributions.⁴

There was a return for services such as these. A man who performed a liturgy with distinction would gain enhanced *time*, and no doubt the support of those who had benefited from his liturgy. The relationship was again not with an individual, but with a collective, yet it still conformed to

¹ Compare the Persian kings, for example, and their use of gifts: see Chapter Five 197-200.

² See Finley *Politics in the Ancient World* 36-7.

³ See Makris "The Expectation of *Charis* from the Performance of Liturgies in Classical Athens" [unpublished].

⁴ Lys. 19. 56-7. On *φιλοτιμία*, see Whitehead *C&M* 34 (1983) 55-74.

the same pattern of giving for a return. Something was expected back for what had been given.

The Horizontal Axis

Political activity along the “horizontal axis” can take place with those both within the community and without. Within the community, the leaders of political groups could band together for greater political leverage. For example, Plutarch says that when the vote for ostracism looked likely to fall on either Alcibiades, Nicias or Phaeax, Alcibiades and Nicias united their respective *hetaireiai* and turned the vote against Hyperbolus.¹ Likewise, when Peisander was agitating for support in 411, he visited all the *synomosi* in Athens.²

Contacts could also be made between communities, and it is with this kind of inter-*polis* activity that this thesis is primarily concerned. These occurred basically on two levels: an individual level, and a *polis* level. On an individual level, men in one *polis* could interact with other men from another *polis*, either through their pre-existing social networks (for example, ξένοι), or through groups which were sympathetic, at least in their political ideologies, and this will be discussed more extensively in Chapter Three.³ Obviously, *poleis* also negotiated with each other as units. But before we study *how* they interacted, we should look at two assumptions, which are, paradoxically, different but intrinsically entangled in each other, about what the *polis* was and how civic identity was defined.

¹ Plut. *Alc.* 13.4-7; *Nic.* 11.1-5; *Arist.* 7.3-4. Hansen rejects this story (eg. *Athenian Democracy* 280-7) but it is defended by Rhodes (“The Ostracism of Hyperbolus” [forthcoming]).

² Th. 8.54.4.

³ In Chapters Two and Three, the material will be collected and presented as “Unofficial” and “Official” Contacts. This division cuts across the categories outlined here of individual contacts or *polis* contacts, but is a valid and useful way for collecting and looking at the evidence.

On one model, citizenship and civic identity are linked to the idea that the state is the sum of its parts and citizenship is essentially participatory:¹ ἄνδρες γὰρ πόλις, καὶ οὐ τείχη οὐδὲ νῆες ἀνδρῶν κεναί, as Thucydides' Nicias said.² The other model views the "state" as an abstract; as merely an institution. Neither of these is entirely true for the Greek *polis*, but both can be true at different times, even in a single *polis*, and this reflects the *polis*' development from operating on a purely personal level as we find in the Homeric world, to acting as an impersonal, abstract unit.³

This has implications for the way in which the *polis* dealt with its world. On one level, it behaved, in a sense, as a "corporate citizen". Thus where an individual citizen would use *ξενία* as the vehicle for drawing someone from outside the community into his *φιλία* network, the *polis* translated this into *προξενία*.⁴ Increasingly in the fifth and fourth centuries, naturalisation in Athens of those outside the community whom the Athenians wanted brought inside their *polis* structure became a significant part of their foreign policy.⁵ In this way, those from outside the community could potentially – at least in theory – become residents and active participants in the community itself, prospects which were limited for the *πρόξενος* who was essentially non-resident.⁶

On another level, the *polis* formed impersonal arrangements – treaties and alliances – as an entity (the *Polis*) with other *poleis*. These were

¹ For discussions of the "old" and "new" paradigms for citizenship in Athens, see Manville in *Athenian Identity and Civic Ideology* 21-33, though I do not entirely agree with his assertion that "there is no abstract 'state'; citizenship and polis are one and the same, growing out of a dynamic and constantly evolving association of families and kinship groups." While his second point is correct, in the classical period in any case, the *polis* could act as an abstract entity, as I will argue below.

² Th. 7.77.7.

³ One indication of the ambiguous nature of the *polis* is the language for referring to individual *poleis* in the fifth and fourth centuries. For example, the Spartan state is οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, just as Athens is often οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι. While οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι and οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι behave as units, the very terms used imply the parts.

⁴ The rôle of *προξενία* in inter-*polis* relations will be discussed in Chapter Two.

⁵ See esp. Chapter Six 234-43.

⁶ On the problems and possibilities in regard to Thucydides of Pharsalus, see Endnote 1.

simply balanced reciprocal agreements, where each side of the agreement had corresponding and answering terms.¹ It is significant that states which swore to become allies swore to have “the same friends and enemies” (οἱ αὐτοὶ φίλοι καὶ ἐχθροί).²

The rôle of kinship ties between *poleis*, whether actual or perceived, will be discussed in Chapter Three.³ It should be noted, however, that as with individual personal friendships, kin of this kind could also join the numbers of a *polis*’ enemies. For example, although Corcyra was a colony of Corinth, it was openly hostile in the period leading to the Peloponnesian War. Likewise, Amphipolis, a colony of Athens, went over to the Spartan, Brasidas, in 424.⁴ It is significant that the Amphipolitans named Brasidas as their founder in place of their actual founder, Hagnon.⁵ They were re-establishing and realigning their “personal” affinities.

To draw this together, we should note the following points. Firstly, the basic model for political relations in the Greek world derives from the model for social relations, and in many ways political activity was conducted on a purely social level. What is more, when it was translated to the civic sphere, it often followed patterns based upon social patterns. Finally, the assumptions that underpin the social friendship network also underpin the political friendship networks.

¹ For example: the alliance between the Athenians and the Spartans (Th. 5.23.1-24.1); see Hooker *Hermes* 102 (1974) 166-7.

² See for example: Th. 3.70.6; Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.20; cf. Th. 1.44.1.

³ That, in fact, there was no clear-cut distinction between the two extremes is perhaps illustrated by the awarding of citizenship (which should be personal) to *all* the Plataeans in 427 ([Dem.] 59.104; for discussion, see Osborne *Naturalization* 2.11-6), and *all* the Samians in 404 (IG ii² 1 = ML 94 + Tod 97: see Osborne *Naturalization* 2.25-6).

⁴ Th.4.106.2-4.

⁵ Th. 5.11.1.

Φιλία in the Greek World

To conclude, Greek friendship was founded upon the embedded ideology of reciprocity, and we can use Sahlins' typology of generalised, balanced and negative reciprocity as a way of describing the exchange process. In contrast to other societies, however, the primary sectoral division in the Greek world was defined by friends and enemies, rather than kin and non-kin. The implication of this was that people from outside the community were not regarded necessarily as enemies, but, through the medium of ξενία, could be drawn into the Greek's φιλία network and experience a positive reciprocity. This applied to non-Greeks as well as other Greeks. A Persian could as easily become the ξένος of an Athenian as a Spartan, at least as far as the Athenian was concerned.

Friendship in the Greek world was also in the classical period essentially an equal relationship in a roughly egalitarian society. Even among the innermost circles of φίλοι with whom one was in a relationship of generalised reciprocity, it was important to the Greek, as Aristotle emphasises, that the relationship should be seen as roughly equal, with an inequality in affection making up the inequality in position. Equality was also the hall-mark of ξενία: hospitality was given in exchange for hospitality, and gift was given in exchange for gift. The relationship thus became an institutionalised kinship, and its stability was maintained by reciprocal equality.

But the non-Greeks whom the Greeks dealt with did not necessarily view their world in the same light. Not all non-Greeks saw equality, even a notional equality, as being essential to the relationship. In fact, some societies, such as Persian society, were based upon strict inequalities. In the same way, not all societies were willing to treat those outside the community as if they were part of it just because they had contracted a friendship agreement. On the contrary, such friendships tended to be brittle

and to break easily when the non-Greek partner had had enough of the relationship; that is, the non-Greek did not necessarily approach the relationship as something of mutual benefit, but, primarily, as something of benefit to himself, so that when it was no longer useful it could simply be laid aside.

These factors had a profound effect on the way in which Greeks dealt with both Greeks and non-Greeks, and the expectations that they had of these relationships. In Section B of the thesis, I will look at the place and importance of personal connections in Greek politics on both the inter-*polis* and the domestic fronts. Chapter Two will consider the official contacts between *poleis* by considering the rôle of *πρόξενοι* in interstate relations. Chapter Three will consider the ways in which Greeks developed and executed foreign policy unofficially through their friends in other *poleis*, and discuss general trends, and particularly the extent to which personal connections were used in inter-*polis* affairs in Athens and Sparta. Chapter Four will discuss how international friendships may have affected the appointment of magistrates in the *poleis*. It will be argued that magistrates with personal connections were used particularly on missions to states on the fringes of the Greek world, and methods of election will be discussed (particularly for the election of generals at Athens) which would allow for selection on this criterion. Finally, Chapter Four will pick up one of the themes of Chapter Three concerning the relative usage of personal connections by Athens and Sparta, and it will be shown that the Spartans elected a relatively larger number of magistrates on the basis of their overseas connections than the Athenians did, thus highlighting the greater importance of personal connections in foreign affairs to Spartan.

In Section C, I will turn to international relations between Greeks and non-Greeks. Chapter Five will look at Persian contacts with the Greeks and the reasons for the successes of these contacts and the failures. Persian gift-

giving will be considered, to show how this differed from the Greek conception of reciprocity and why this often led to “socio-political dysfunctions” in Greco-Persian affairs. Chapter Six will examine Athenian dealings with Thrace. It will look at the Thracian version of gift-giving (which was both supplicatory and prospective in character) and show how this affected the Athenian response to the Thracians, particularly in regard to their awards of citizenship to the Odrysian kings. Finally, Chapter Seven will look at the dealings of Philip of Macedon with the Greeks. I will argue that Philip manipulated the Greeks’ cultural expectation of reciprocal relationships in order to fool them into believing they were in a relationship with him, then abused their trust. It will be suggested that many of the events of Philip’s reign can be explained in terms of Philip’s exploitation of the friendship ethic.

The two most important points, I think, that will be raised by this thesis, are, firstly, that personal friendships, and particularly personal friendships abroad, were fundamental to inter-*polis* affairs in the fifth and fourth centuries BC; and, secondly, that reciprocity – “giving for a return” – is culturally defined. What this dictum meant differed from society to society, and culture to culture. This affected the way in which cross-cultural friendships worked, or did not work, as the case may be. Because the Greeks failed to realise this, and respond to it, they experienced failure upon failure in international affairs, and, ultimately, defeat at the hands of Philip of Macedon, who understood this all too well.

Section B. When Greeks deal with Greeks

Chapter Two: The Official Representatives - πρόξενοι

The only reward of virtue is virtue; the only way to have a friend is to be one.

Ralph Waldo Emerson *Friendship*

In the years between 435 and 336 BC, the Greek world was a volatile hotbed of war and dissension. In their struggles for dominance and power, the more powerful states – first Athens and Sparta, then Thebes as well – with their retinues of allies kept Greece in a nearly continual state of instability. What is more, the smaller states tended to look towards the more powerful ones for help in their wars against each other, and civil wars ensured that local politics were as volcanic as interstate relationships. The political persuasion of a *polis* could change as rapidly and as constantly as its relations with its neighbours.

Within this intensely political context, there are a number of questions which we should ask when considering how Greeks interacted with one another in the political field. Most basically, we should consider what mechanisms there were, both formal and informal, through which states were able to keep in contact and deal with one another. What was the place of personal friendships, both at the level of kinship and at other levels? How did men strike the balance between ideology and “personal” politics? In what way did personal friendships, and particularly friendships with those abroad, affect one’s loyalties? What was the place of *hetaireiai* and political groups in interstate relations? And to what extent did interpersonal relationships act against the interests of the *polis*?

In this chapter, we will deal with one of these questions, and look at the institution of *προξενία*, a formal relationship between an individual and a state which the Greek *poleis* had developed for conducting diplomatic negotiations between states, and at *πρόξενοι*, those specially appointed men who served as resident “sympathisers” for the patron state in their own *polis*.

Προξενία and Ξενία

From at least the seventh century,¹ the Greek states had established an institutionalised and politicised version of the ancient *ξενία* relationship, that is *προξενία*, whereby men who were citizens of the state in which they lived were appointed by another state to act as representatives of the appointing state.² Herman writes, “*Proxenia* was a communal invention using as a model *xenia*.”³ Thus, these were men who acted on an official level to provide the services one might expect from a local *ξένος*. However, unlike *ξενία*, which was a personal connection between individuals, *προξενία* existed between an individual and a state.⁴

¹ ML 4: this is the cenotaph of a Corcyraean *πρόξενος*, a Menecrates of Oeanthea. Meiggs and Lewis comment on the “fascinating tension between its Homeric echoes and the political circumstances of a new age, δῆμος or a form of it four times repeated, and above all the *πρόξεμος*, the earliest known to us”.

² Mosley *Envoys and Diplomacy* 4-7; Herman *Ritualised Friendship* 130-42; M.B. Walbank *Athenian Proxeny* 1-9; Adcock & Mosley *Diplomacy in Ancient Greece* 11; Wallace *Phoenix* 24 (1970) 189-208.

³ Herman *Ritualised Friendship* 132.

⁴ A rather striking exception is the grant of *προξενία* made by Mausolus of Caria to all the people of Cnossus (Hornblower *Mausolus* M7 = *Labraunda* III 40), probably in the 350s (see Hornblower *Mausolus* 40). This is not true *προξενία* but is playing a different kind of game within the rules of *προξενία* in the fifth and fourth century, and anticipates the purely honorific proxeny grants that were made in the Hellenistic period. It looks very much like a grant of citizenship (compare the citizenship grants made by the Athenians to the Plataeans and Samians: see Chapter One 51 n. 3), although there was no such thing as citizenship of Caria. Mausolus may be misinterpreting a Greek institution (see Chapters Five, Six & Seven for these kind of cultural misunderstandings), or may be being very clever and making a statement which does actually anticipate later grants of *προξενία* as a pure honour without a duty to be performed, or may simply be making do with the Greek institutions which are available. In any case, this is very unusual and outside the normal bounds of proxeny grants.

Like ξενία, προξενία was often established, at least in the first instance, on a *quid pro quo* basis, and grants were sometimes made for services rendered to the state,¹ and the principal duty of the πρόξενος, once appointed, was to look after the interests of the nominating state and visiting citizens of that state.² For example, in 427, the Corcyraean hostages taken in the naval battles off Sybota were released after their Corinthian πρόξενοι had supposedly pledged eight hundred talents as surety for them (though, in fact, the Corcyraeans had been bribed to bring Corcyra over to the Corinthians).³ Again, the newly made πρόξενος of the Athenians, Nymphodorus, brought Sitalces, the Thracian king, and Perdiccas, the Macedonian king, into an alliance with the Athenians,⁴ and some of the πρόξενοι of the Athenians at Mytilene, being of the opposite faction to the those leading the rebellion, informed the Athenians of the revolt at Mytilene in 428.⁵

There are even examples of πρόξενοι who actively support their honouring *polis*, when this is in direct opposition to the policy of their own state. For example, during the Third Sacred War, the Tenedian πρόξενος of

¹ See for example: W. 39, 40, 44, 49.

² Mosley *Envoys and Diplomacy* 4-5.

³ Th. 3.70.1; see also Th. 1.55.1. The nationality of the πρόξενοι is not agreed by all. If, as Kagan (*The Archidamian War* 175-6) does and I think is more natural to the sense, one understands the πρόξενοι to be Corinthian, this is a straightforward example of how the Corcyraean representatives in Corinth helped the Corcyraeans in need (albeit τῷ λόγῳ rather than τῷ ἔργῳ). It would presumably mean that the Corinthians were privy to the plot against their patron state, but since the Corcyraean prisoners were the “foremost citizens” in Corcyra, this is not exceptional. Other scholars (Gerolymatos *Espionage and Treason* 64-70; Losada *The Fifth Column in the Peloponnesian War* 96-8) have taken the πρόξενοι to be Corcyraeans, and have used this as evidence for the clandestine work of the fifth column in Greek societies. One difficulty with this thesis is that Thucydides attributes no such part to the πρόξενοι, and, except for their part in raising bail for the the prisoners, does not mention them again in relation to the conspiracy. If one is to argue the point of view of ideology and faction, either interpretation could be true: Corinthians helping their Corcyraean friends or Corcyraeans helping their patron state.

⁴ Th. 2.29.4-7.

⁵ Th. 3.2.3; Arist. *Pol.* 5.1304 a 9-10; see also Gerolymatos *Espionage and Treason* 53-8. Note, however, that one of the Mytilenean πρόξενοι who gave information to the Athenians later repented and went to Athens with others to try to persuade the Athenians that there was no cause for alarm (Th. 3.4.4); cf. M.B. Walbank *Athenian Proxenes* 200-1.

the Boeotians made a contribution to the Boeotian war fund, despite his city's "unwavering loyalty" to Athens.¹ In 349/8, an Athenian taxiarch, Mantitheus, collected money in Mytilene from the Athenian πρόξενος there, Apollonides, and from the Athenians' φίλοι there,² although Mytilene was also under the control of the tyrant, Cammys, who was an enemy both of Athens and of Mantitheus.³

As a counter-example, however, Callias, the Athenian πρόξενος of the Spartans, though he had served on a number of embassies to Sparta,⁴ effectively led the Athenian hoplites against the Spartans at Corinth in 390.⁵

In return, the πρόξενος not only enhanced his personal status within his own community, but also privileges were often extended to the honorand by the honouring state, which included assurances of protection from harm, access to the courts, or simply an invitation to a meal in the *prytaneion*.⁶ The position of πρόξενος also had other benefits for the honorand. For example, Nicias of Gortyn was able to use his influence with the Athenians to persuade them to sail against Cydonia.⁷

Πρόξενοι were also sometimes used by their own state as ambassadors to the state which awarded the προξενία, presumably because they would receive a more sympathetic hearing.⁸ For example, the Spartan Lichas son of Arcesilaus, πρόξεμος of the Argives, was sent twice to Argos as *presbeutes*,⁹ and, in the same way, it was the Spartan πρόξεμος at Plataea, Lacon son of

¹ IG vii 2418.14-15 (= Tod 160); see also Tod's commentary to the text.

² Dem. 39. 17 (for the date), 40.34, 36.

³ Dem. 40.37. Note that Mantitheus' father had been honoured by Mytilene previously, so was an "appropriate" choice for this mission: see also Chapter Four below.

⁴ See Chapter Four 163-4.

⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 4.5.13.

⁶ See for example, W. 29, 45, 64.

⁷ Th. 2.85.5; see Davies *Democracy* 71. For supposed difficulties with this passage, see Hornblower *Comm* 366; M.B. Walbank *Athenian Proxeny* 174-6; Gerolymatos *Chiron* 17 (1987) 80-5 *contra* Connor *AJAH* 1 (1976) 61-4.

⁸ Cf. Chapter Four 108.

⁹ Th. 5.22.2; 5.76.3. For a more detailed discussion of ambassadors and their foreign connections, and Lichas in particular, see Chapter Four 159-77 below (Lichas: 174).

Aiemnestus, who was appointed as spokesman before the five Spartan δικασταί.¹

Πρόξενοι could also provide hospitality for ambassadors visiting a state. For example, the Spartan ambassadors to Athens in 378 stayed at the home of their πρόξενος, Callias.² The efforts of a πρόξενος did not always ensure the success of a diplomatic mission, however. Xenophon tells how Agesilaus ignored the Boeotian ambassadors in 391 when they came for peace, even though Pharax, their πρόξενος, was standing beside them in order to introduce them.³

Πρόξενοι could also be used as intermediaries in forming relationships between states. For instance, Thucydides writes that in the summer of 431 the Athenians made Nymphodorus, the brother-in-law of Sitalces of Thrace, a πρόξενος, though they had previously considered him as πολέμιος.⁴ The προξενία was granted as a purely political expedient in order that the Athenians could then form an alliance through him with Sitalces,⁵ but he also brought about a reconciliation between Perdiccas of Macedon and Athens.⁶ Another example, perhaps, of a πρόξενος being used as a “go-between”, though in a slightly different way, is Strophacus, the πρόξενος of the Chalcidians at Pharsalus and one of Brasidas’ ἐπιτήδαιοι, who accompanied Brasidas through Thessaly when he went to Thrace at the invitation of the Chalcidians.⁷ Πρόξενοι who were influential in their own communities could also serve to keep the more far-flung parts of Greece faithful to their honouring city. For instance, the Sicels and Geloans were far

¹ Th. 3.52.5. For the origin of the προξενία, see Hdt. 9.72.2; Hornblower *Comm.* 444.

² Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.22.

³ Xen. *Hell.* 4.5.6.

⁴ Th. 2.29.1. See Graham *JHS* 112 (1992) 66.

⁵ Th. 2.29.1. Hornblower (*Comm.* 286) suggests that Thucydides himself, given his specialist knowledge of the north Aegean region and the expansive style in which he recounts the events, may have been involved in promoting the προξενία.

⁶ Th. 2.29.6.

⁷ Th. 4.78.1. At least Thucydides thinks it worthwhile to point out that Strophacus was the πρόξενος of the Chalcidians.

more eager to go over to the Spartans once Archonides, who was a φίλος of the Athenians¹ and may have been an Athenian πρόξενος,² was dead.

Appointment of Πρόξενοι

There seem to be a number of ways in which a man could be appointed as πρόξενος. Firstly, προξενία, like ξενία could be inherited from father to son,³ and perhaps originated from an earlier εὐεργεσία to the conferring state.⁴ For example, the *progonoi* of Sthorys, possibly of Thasos, were πρόξενοι of the Athenians,⁵ and Apollodorus son of Empedus of Selymbria was made πρόξενος as his father had been.⁶ Callias, the Athenian πρόξενος of the Spartans, says that not only he has held the προξενία, but also his father's father, who received it from his father.⁷ It is also noteworthy, however, that Alcibiades did not inherit his family's hereditary προξενία with the Spartans, which his grandfather had renounced, though Alcibiades tried to reactivate it by courting (θεραπεύων) the prisoners from Pylos.⁸

In Sparta, Herodotus says, the king appointed the πρόξενοι of other states.⁹ This is, at best, unusual, as it is usually the prerogative of a *polis* to award its own προξενία in other states, and it seems unlikely as a way of accounting for all προξενία in Sparta, given the basic understanding of the προξενία relationship: that is, mutual ξενία-like sympathy, though on a *polis* rather than a personal scale, between the awarding state and the

¹ Th. 7.1.4.

² IG ii² 32; Dover *HCT* 4.379-80, M.B. Walbank *Athenian Proxenes* 354-8. The naturalisation of Sadocus, the son of Sitalces, was probably for this purpose (Th. 2.29.5, cf. 67.2); see Hornblower *Comm.* 288-9; Osborne *Naturalization* 3.26-7, see also Osborne *Naturalization* 3.29-30 for naturalisation of Tharyps of Molossia for similar purposes.

³ M.B. Walbank *Athenian Proxenes* 7; Herman *Ritualised Friendship* 135, 137.

⁴ M.B. Walbank *Athenian Proxenes* 5.

⁵ W. 78; see also W. 15, 25.

⁶ W. 86. 37,44-5.

⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.4.

⁸ Th. 5.43.2, 6.89.2.

⁹ Hdt. 6.57.2.

honorand. And, after all, Lichas the Spartan πρόξενος of the Argives did have men in Argos, who were ἐπιτήδαιοι to the Spartans, with whom he was able to work closely: perhaps they were even ξένοι, though Thucydides does not say so.¹ Indeed Plato has Megillus, the hereditary Spartan πρόξενος for the Athenians, talk about the affection even children must feel for the state they are to represent as πρόξενοι.² Mosley has explained this discrepancy, pointing out the importance of the kings and their ξενία relationships in providing hospitality,³ by arguing the Spartan king did not appoint all πρόξενοι, but merely supplemented the arrangements made by other states.⁴ However, if Herodotus is right, and the kings did in fact appoint all πρόξενοι, this might explain the relatively small number of πρόξενοι who are known and seem to be involved in Spartan interstate relations.⁵

In Athens, the method of appointing πρόξενοι to other states was more firmly in the public domain, since πρόξενοι could be appointed directly by the assembly at the nomination of a citizen.⁶ Herman claims that “the most natural person” to make such a recommendation was a ξένος, and that “to the users of the language it simply seemed self-evident that

¹ Th. 5.76.2-3. As will be argued below, however, they would not need to have such a particular connection with Lichas.

² Plato *Laws* 1.642 b-d.

³ On the importance of the personal connections of the kings, see also 89-94 below.

⁴ Mosley *Athenaeum* n.s. 49 (1971) 433-5; cf. Cartledge *CQ* n.s. 32 (1982) 251.

⁵ See also 64-5 below.

⁶ See for example, W. 39; Herman *Ritualised Friendship* 137. See also Peithias the Corcyraean ἐθελοπρόξενος of the Athenians (Th. 3.70.3). Hornblower suggests that he was a voluntary πρόξενος and so called in order to distinguish him from a hereditary πρόξενος (*Comm.* 468); see also Rhodes (*Thucydides III* 229-30) who suggests that either the previous πρόξενος had died and Peithias stepped into the breach and/or he had not been appointed πρόξενος by the assembly, though one should expect there to have been a πρόξενος in Corcyra since 433. Davies (*Democracy* 70) translates ἐθελοπρόξενος as a “self appointed” πρόξενος. Whatever his actual status, the Corcyraeans at least felt that the Athenians should know what had happened to Peithias (Th. 3.71.2), which suggests that the “protection” clauses of regular proxeny decrees applied to Peithias in spirit, even if there was no actual decree to ratify this for Peithias himself.

proxenia implied *xenia*.”¹ This is difficult to test as so few of the proposers of decrees are known or can be restored with any degree of certainty. One secure name we do possess is Thrasycles, who proposed the προξενία of Asteas of Aleia.² The decree is securely dated to 421/0,³ and Walbank suggests that the context is the negotiations that led to the Peace of Nicias and that the Thrasycles of the decree is the Thrasycles who swore the oath to the Peace.⁴ Walbank suggests that the nature of Asteas’ service was hospitality to the embassy negotiating the Peace and the ensuing alliance,⁵ pointing out that Aleia lies on the overland route to Sparta.⁶ If this is so, it may be possible to conjecture that Thrasycles and Asteas were ξένοι.

In 418, just as the Argives and Spartans were about to join in battle, Alciphron, the Argive πρόξενος for Sparta, went with Thrasyllus to Agis, the Spartan king and came to terms for a truce, though the rest of the Argive camp was unaware of it.⁷ Gerolymatos argues that this episode shows the development of πρόξενοι into *ad hoc* diplomatic envoys.⁸ Herman,⁹ in his interpretation of the incident, claims that the key to this peculiar situation was Alciphron’s προξενία, and suggests that, firstly, Alciphron and Agis were ξένοι and, secondly, Thrasyllus and Alciphron belonged to the same pro-Spartan faction. “They therefore prevailed upon Agis, who represented the Spartan end of the network and happened to be, at the same time, the leader of the Peloponnesian army, to do his best to avert the battle –

¹ Herman *Ritualised Friendship* 139-40; see also Herman CQ n.s. 39 (1989) 87, though the specific argument here seems improbable and built on too many uncertainties and assumptions (see Hornblower *Comm.* 365) *contra* Marek *Die Proxenie* 134 who argues that proxeny grants served the political interests of the community and were largely independent of private interests. The answer, as I will argue below, lies somewhere in between these two extremes.

² W. 49.

³ W. 49.6-7.

⁴ M.B. Walbank *Athenian Proxenies* 279; see also 276.

⁵ See W. 49.9-12.

⁶ M.B. Walbank *Athenian Proxenies* 279.

⁷ Th. 5.59.5

⁸ Gerolymatos *Espionage and Treason* 116.

⁹ *Ritualised Friendship* 146.

explaining, probably, that such a battle would run against his own interests, too. And as a favour to a *xenos*, Agis averted the battle.”¹

As an explanation of this difficult episode,² this is rather neat, but, I think, assumes too much. First of all, Thucydides does not say that Agis and Alciphron were ξένοι. If they were, one might expect him to describe their relationship in these terms, rather than as the more distant προξενία, and, as I have argued above, it is too simplistic to assume that *every* προξενία has a ξενία behind it; but simply because Agis did make terms without the sanction of the assembly, does not necessarily mean he was doing a ξένος a favour. Agis’ position in Sparta is an interesting one: he was a king who seemed willing to test his own power and make decisions on his own initiative, as he did in his command at Deceleia, and who was in conflict with the ephors.³ One could easily imagine that if, according to his judgement, victory was not certain, he would have made terms. It is interesting that the Spartan response to his actions was to curb his powers further and reproach his judgement by appointing *symboloi* without whose permission he was not able to leave the city with an army.⁴

One could imagine, however, that at this late stage in the fifth century the recommendation of a ξένος would not be necessary for an award. If the *demos* could recognise a benefaction of an individual, any member of the assembly would be able to stand up and nominate him, though, again, this could have been a ξένος where there was one. But there may sometimes have been no ξένοι to call upon. For instance, if Corcyra really had kept herself to herself, there may have been no Athenian connections in Corcyra

¹ *Ibid.*

² See also Andrewes *HCT* 4.82-3; Kagan *The Peace of Nicias* 99-102.

³ Note also that Alcibiades persuaded Endius to send the ships to Chios and come to terms with Tissaphernes in order that he should reap the glory rather than Agis (Th. 8.12.2).

⁴ Note, however, the possible emendation of Th. 5.63.4: πόλεως] πολεμίας Haasse, supported by Andrewes (*HCT* 4.91-2); more appropriate with ἀπάγειν and to what Agis had done in 418.

before Corcyra's approach to Athens in 433.¹ In all probability, there was a pre-existing ξενία in some instances, but in others προξενία was granted to fill a political need, as with Nymphodorus of Abdera, or to recognise a benefaction.

Προξενία as an Effective Relationship in Inter-state Politics

One cannot deny that the προξενία relationship had a degree of importance in the late fifth and early fourth centuries as a means of forming contacts between states; the examples of the Spartan Lichas, and the Athenians, Alcibiades and Callias, acting as ambassadors have already been given. However, despite the fact that we have the names for a large number of πρόξενοι from decrees, in our literary sources we hear of relatively few of them actively involved in the dealings between states, and this seems to be as true for one *polis* as for another.² Four Spartans are known to have held proxenies in this period: Megillus, Lichas, Clearchus and Pharax. Megillus may have taken part on an embassy to Athens in 408/7,³ Lichas was the ambassador to Argos in 421 and 418,⁴ Clearchus was harmost of his "honouring state" (I use this advisedly in the light of Herodotus' assertions concerning the appointment of Spartan πρόξενοι), Byzantium,⁵ and Pharax represented the Boeotians in Sparta.⁶ Three of these four held magisterial positions awarded, apparently, on the basis of their connections, but these were not the only "appropriate" magisterial appointments that were made.

¹ This may be part of the answer to the Corcyraean ἐθελοπρόξενος, Peithias (see 61 n. 6 above).

² See Appendix A: *Literary Πρόξενοι*. However, see Mosley (*Envoys and Diplomacy* 6), who writes: "The actual known instances where proxenoi gave help to states which they represented are but few in number, but the importance attached by states to their proxenoi may be confirmed by the lengths to which they are prepared to go to secure the safety of their representatives."

³ See Appendix C: *Spartan Presbeis* 370.

⁴ See Chapter Four 174.

⁵ See Chapter Four 149-50.

⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 4.5.6.

Endius son of Alcibiades was appointed to numerous embassies to Athens on the basis of his ξενία with the family of Alcibiades son of Cleinias.¹

In Athens, although Callias son of Hipponicus does represent Athens on three embassies to Sparta, he also leads the army against Sparta.² Alcibiades' lapsed προξενία with Sparta is pointedly not made use of, and Lacedaemonius son of Cimon is sent on a mission which was allegedly designed to embarrass him because of his Spartan connections.³

There were many occasions when states interacted through the medium of individuals to form alliances, incite revolts, and so on, other than through προξενία. As we will see in the following chapter, such interstate relationships could also be conducted through the medium of the informal contacts of φίλοι and ξένοι. And there were also other official channels – the *strategoi*, *presbeis* and other magistrates – through which states interacted. Sometimes these utilised the formal contacts of προξενία, but, as often as not, informal relationships were employed, and we will consider in Chapter Four the appointment of magistrates in the *poleis* and consider to what extent they were affected by personal connections.

¹ See Chapter Four 173-4.

² See above 58.

³ Plut. *Per.* 29.1-2; but there is no evidence that Lacedaemonius inherited his father's pro-Spartan attitude.

Chapter Three: *The Unofficial Contacts*

Foreign policy demands scarcely any of those qualities which are peculiar to a democracy; on the contrary, it calls for the perfect use of almost all those qualities in which a democracy is deficient. Democracy ... cannot combine its measures with secrecy or await their consequences with patience. These are qualities which are more characteristic of an individual or an aristocracy.

Alexis de Tocqueville, 1805-1859.

Προξενία was not the only way of maintaining contacts between *poleis*. As well as the official representatives, the πρόξενοι, there were the unofficial contacts: kin and colonists, political sympathisers and ξένοι. This chapter will attempt to consider the informal mechanisms that existed through which interstate relations were conducted, looking at personal relationships – racial kinship links, political groups¹ and individual friendships – and their rôle in determining and carrying out foreign policy; and, then, to draw some conclusions about the way in which interpersonal relationships affected interstate politics in the Greek world in the years 435 to 336 and compare the ways in which the different states, particularly Athens and Sparta, conducted their political relationships with one another.

The Greeks and their φίλοι

Personal friendships played an important part in the formation and prosecution of foreign policy and political activity abroad. This operated on a number of levels, and various types of personal relationships could be exploited in interstate affairs: racial kinship, political and ideological sympathies, as well as private φιλία networks, such as *hetaireiai* and ξενίαί.

The events that took place after the Peace of Nicias provide a good illustration of how a variety of personal friendships could affect interstate

¹ On the nature of *hetaireiai* see Chapter One 27-8.

politics. If we focus on these years, we can see how almost all the different kinds of *φιλία* connections could be employed in inter-*polis* matters. It will be useful to look at a narrative sequence of events, placing these relationships in a context, before we turn to study the many other examples of these friendship ties in the century between the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War and the death of Philip.

After the Peace of Nicias

A great deal has been written in past years describing the events after the Peace of Nicias in terms of internal tensions between oligarchs and democrats in Argos, war parties and peace parties.¹ There is no denying that there was a body of men in Argos who were democrats and another who were oligarchs; Thucydides tells us so. But he does not tell us this until the narrative concerning Argos is almost finished. Whether these men were democrats or oligarchs is not immediately important. What is at the heart of Thucydides' description of the events after the Peace of Nicias is personal politics, where individuals and their connections make policy.² It was more a matter of whom they knew than of what their political ideology was.

Cleobulus, Xenares and the Boeotians

Thucydides writes that after the conclusion of the fifty years' peace, the Corinthian ambassadors, who were unhappy with the Spartan settlement, went to Argos and suggested to some of the Argive magistrates³

¹ See for example, Kagan *AJP* 81 (1960) 291-310; id. *CP* 57 (1962) 209-218; Kelly *CP* 69 (1974) 81-99; cf. Westlake *AJP* 61 (1940) 413 n. 3; id. *CQ* n.s. 21 (1971) 315-25 (= *Studies* 84-96); Seager *CQ* n.s. 26 (1976) 249-69.

² For a partial recognition of this, see Kelly *CP* 69 (1974) esp. 93; see also id. *Historia* 21 (1972) 159-169.

³ τῶν ἐν τέλει ὄντων as interpreted by Andrewes *HCT* 4.23; *contra* Griffith *Historia* 1 (1950) 237 who translates this as "certain important Argives" – which bears slightly different connotations.

that they should form an alliance among the Peloponnesian states.¹ The Argive magistrates, in turn, persuaded the *boule* and the *demos* of the Argives to elect men with whom any state that was willing,² except the Athenians and the Spartans,³ could negotiate for an alliance.⁴ So the Argive alliance was set up, and the Mantineians were the first to join.⁵ The Corinthians did not attach themselves to the alliance straight away, however, but only after the Spartans had tried to interfere.⁶ It seems that the Corinthian ambassadors approached the Argives on their own initiative, and had then to persuade their own *polis* to agree.⁷ The Corinthian ambassadors may or may not have been personal φίλοι of the Argive magistrates,⁸ but the point is that a group within the *polis* was prepared to act in a personal capacity to manipulate public matters, and that the initial offer to the Argive magistrates was made at a personal level.

Over the summer Elis, Corinth, and the Chalcidians also joined the alliance, though the Tegeates would not, and the Boeotians prevaricated (though they did agree to accompany the Corinthians to Athens and to help in the Corinthian negotiations for a truce).⁹ Relations between Athens and Sparta also worsened,¹⁰ and, in the following winter, some of the new ephors at Sparta were opposed to the Peace.¹¹ A conference was held in

¹ Th. 5.27.1-2. For the possible Corinthian motives, that is, to try to renew the Archidamian War, see Westlake *AJP* 61 (1940) 413-21. The Mantineians, not the Corinthians, were actually the first in joining the alliance with the Argives (Th. 5.28.3-29.1).

² This had all been part of the Corinthian plan (Th. 5.27.2), which was accepted almost unaltered: see Kagan *Peace of Nicias* 37-8.

³ Only the *demos* of the Argives could ratify an alliance with either Athens or Sparta (Th. 5.28.1).

⁴ Th. 5.28.1.

⁵ Th. 5.28.3.

⁶ Th. 5.30.5.

⁷ See Kagan *Peace of Nicias* 37.

⁸ Probably not in this case, since both held official positions – though certain φίλοι may well have helped to bring the meeting about (compare the Mytilenean supporters in Athens who helped the Mytilenean ambassadors gain an audience with οἱ ἐν τέλει [Th. 3.36.5]).

⁹ Th. 5.31.1, 6, 32.3-4, 6. For an analysis of what the Corinthians were up to, see Kagan *Peace of Nicias* 44-5.

¹⁰ Th. 5.35.2.

¹¹ Th. 5.36.1.

Sparta at which embassies from the Athenians, Boeotians and Corinthians were present, though nothing was achieved.¹

Cleobulus and Xenares, the two ephors who particularly wished to bring the Peace to an end, and their φίλοι,² made private proposals to the Boeotians to join the Argive alliance.³ Plutarch actually states that the φίλοι were a group known to be inclined towards the Boeotians (τῶν βοιωτιαζόντων):⁴ individuals exploiting personal sympathies to influence public politics.

The Argives also had Boeotian aspirations. As the Boeotian ambassadors were on the way home from the conference in Sparta, two high-ranking Argives met them and also suggested that the Boeotians join the Argive coalition, though the Argives were not intending to give the alliance a pro-Spartan direction.⁵ The Boeotians were pleased, since the Argives happened to want the same thing as their φίλοι at Sparta had done,⁶ and, on the ambassadors' return, the boeotarchs were pleased also, as their Spartan φίλοι seemed to want what the Argives did.⁷ The arrangements came unstuck, however, as the council of the Boeotians would not agree to an alliance with Corinth on the grounds that it would be overtly anti-Spartan, since they did not know that it was Cleobulus and Xenares and their φίλοι who had suggested it, or that the intention was to align the alliance with Sparta.⁸ Thucydides suggests that it was important that the

¹ Th. 5.36.1. Kagan (*Peace of Nicias* 51) suggests that the conference was convened "presumably to try once more to achieve a general acceptance of the peace."

² There is, perhaps, a question whether they were personal φίλοι to these particular men, or simply looking to the interests of the Boeotians and/or Corinthians in general. Probably the latter in the light of Plut. *Nic.* 10.7.

³ Th. 5.36.1-37.1; Xenares was probably the more important of the two, despite the order of their names at 36.1 – note that they are switched about at 37.1 (Andrewes *HCT* 4.38).

⁴ Plut. *Nic.* 10.8; see also Th. 5.38.3 (here described as "Cleobulus and Xenares and the φίλοι") and Th. 5.46.4 (τῶν περὶ τὸν Ξενάρη).

⁵ Th. 5.37.2.

⁶ Th. 5.37.3.

⁷ Th. 5.37.4.

⁸ Th. 5.38.3.

Boeotian council should be aware (as it was not)¹ that it was actually their sympathisers in Sparta, and particularly those associated with Cleobulus and Xenares, who had proposed the alliance. The point to be gained from this for our purposes is that contacts were made through private representations of men who were φίλοι from political groups in each *polis* which were “friendly” to each other. This serves to illustrate the ways that the system of bridging between political groups in two *poleis* could work, although it is shown not working here. The leaders of one political group made contact with the leaders of another like-minded political group, in order that they might put into action a joint policy.

Alcibiades, Argives and Spartans

After the pro-Boeotian group in Sparta had failed to effect the Boeotian/Argive alliance, the Spartans made a private alliance with the Boeotians on the condition that the Boeotians returned Panactum and the prisoners to the Athenians.² At the beginning of the following spring, however, the Argives, now afraid of being alienated,³ sent envoys, who they thought would be προσφιλέστατοι to them, to Sparta as quickly as possible to make peace.⁴

Meanwhile, the Athenians and the Spartans were now quarrelling over Panactum,⁵ and there were those in Athens who wished the Peace to be broken and were eager for an Argive alliance.⁶ Alcibiades son of Cleinias

¹ Thucydides does not go very far towards explaining why this apparently simple misunderstanding was not cleared up: he claims that the boeotarchs simply thought the *boule* would simply follow their lead (Th. 5.38.3). Seager (CQ n.s. 26 (1976) 257-8) suggests that the boeotarchs needed to keep their true intentions secret in order to deceive the Argives.

² Th. 5.39.2-3. The Athenians would only restore Pylos to the Spartans if they, in turn, received back Panactum.

³ Th. 5.40.1-3.

⁴ Th. 5.40.3-41.3. On the whole question of the appointment of ambassadors and other magistracies for their “friendliness”, see Chapter Four below.

⁵ Th. 5.42.2.

⁶ Th. 5.43.1-2.

was one of these,¹ and he sent private messages to Argos for the Argives to come as quickly as possible (he had ξένοι there),² and invite the Athenians into an alliance.³ Thucydides says that Alcibiades genuinely thought it was better to side with the Argives, but that he was also opposed to the treaty with the Spartans because the Spartans had negotiated the treaty through Nicias and Laches.⁴ This was a blow to Alcibiades' pride, as the Spartans had apparently overlooked him because of his youth, and had not honoured his hereditary προξενία with Sparta.⁵ Alcibiades' grandfather had renounced this προξενία, but Alcibiades had tried to renew it by paying court (θεραπεύων)⁶ to the Spartan prisoners from Pylos.⁷

When the Argives realised that the alliance had been made between Boeotia and Sparta without the Athenians' knowledge, they gave no more thought to their ambassadors in Sparta but turned their attention to Athens.⁸ Since they believed that Athens was not only a democracy, as they themselves were, but that she also had been φίλιος for a long time and would fight with them if they became involved in war,⁹ they sent ambassadors at once.¹⁰ The Spartans, afraid that the Athenians would make an alliance with the Argives in their anger over Panactum and the Boeotian

¹ Th. 5.43.2.

² See 102 below.

³ Th. 5.43.3.

⁴ Th. 5.43.2.

⁵ Th. 5.43.2.

⁶ There is a collection of "buzz" words which can indicate "friendly" activity. *Θεραπεύειν* (when it means "to pay court to") is one of these, and often relates to the activities which precede a *φιλία* relationship, that is, those activities that one hopes will be recognised as a *χάρης*. Of course, this refers to less personal, and probably more unequal relationships. *Χαρίζεσθαι* (cognate of *χάρης*) is also significant and indicates, as one would expect, that the *χάρης* is being performed, and that the relationship is being entered into. This may seem a very stiff use of the language, and the context must always determine the meaning, but these are important pointers to "friendship texts", and I will generally indicate when they are used in the sources.

⁷ Th. 5.43.2; see also Th. 6.89.2; Plut. *Alc.* 14.1.

⁸ Th. 5.44.1.

⁹ Th. 5.44.1.

¹⁰ Th. 5.44.2.

alliance, also quickly sent ambassadors to Athens, choosing men who seemed to be ἐπιτήδαιοι to the Athenians.¹

When the Spartan ambassadors addressed the *boule*, they said that they had come with full powers.² Afraid that if they said this to the *demos* the Athenians might be persuaded and reject the Argive alliance,³ Alcibiades played a trick on the Spartan ambassadors – even though one was his own ξένος, Endius⁴ – by convincing them not to tell the assembly the extent of their remit, then denouncing them.⁵

But the decree ratifying the Argive alliance was never made, on account of an earthquake,⁶ and, on the next day, Nicias seized the opportunity and urged the Athenians to become φίλοι of the Spartans, proposing that an embassy be sent to Sparta with himself as one of the ambassadors.⁷ The Spartans, however, refused to give up their alliance with the Boeotians, since οἱ περὶ τὸν Ξενόρη τὸν ἔφορον had secured control in Sparta.⁸ The Athenians flew into a rage and made an alliance with the Argives, who happened to be present and whom Alcibiades brought forward.⁹

The events after the making of the Peace highlight the rôle that individuals could play and the importance they could have in determining the course of events, and in forming and implementing foreign policy. The political group of Xenares in Sparta, through private negotiation with other

¹ Th. 5.44.3.

² Th. 5.45.1.

³ Th. 5.45.1.

⁴ For the ξενία, see Th. 8.6.3.

⁵ Th. 5.45.2-4; Plut. *Alc.* 14.7-12. On the difficulties with this episode, see Endnote 2.

⁶ Th. 5.45.4.

⁷ Th. 5.46.1; note that not only had the Spartan ambassadors been with Nicias (was he then acting as their πρόξενος?), he had also shown pro-Spartan tendencies on other occasions; on this, see Chapter Four 162.

⁸ Th. 5.46.4.

⁹ Th. 5.46.5.

individuals in Boeotia, tried to make a connection between the Spartans and the Boeotians. Other Argive individuals tried to form an alliance with Sparta; then, when this did not work, sent as ambassadors to Sparta the men who seemed the "most friendly" to the Spartans, to try to form an alliance there. In turn, Alcibiades in Athens exploited all his private connections to discredit the Spartan ambassadors and to make an alliance with Argos.

What is more, it was not always those in official positions who influenced the direction of foreign relations. Alcibiades worked privately through his personal relationships to form the Argive alliance. Similarly, it is not clear whether the Argives who met the Corinthians and Boeotians "on the road" were official representatives of Argos, but probably not.

Finally, even the regularly appointed officials did not feel it necessary to work through the official channels. Cleobulus and Xenares, though ephors, were not following a plan approved by the assembly of the Spartans, but were acting on their own initiative. How much one *could* circumvent official procedure would depend, of course, on the particular state and on the individual's position within the state. The boeotarchs apparently felt that the council would follow their lead in decision-making, though this turned out not to be the case. This places the picture of foreign relations in a different light. Rather than seeing events completely in terms of politics, party and internal dissension (though that is not to say that these things were not influential), we should also look at the individuals and the part they played in inter-*polis* affairs, and the way they played it.

Similar patterns to these are apparent throughout the hundred years under discussion in this thesis. The next section will consider such "non-official" personal contacts under three broad headings: firstly, racial kinship links; secondly, sympathy groups; and, finally, personal friendships, including *hetaireiai*, political groups, and the private friendships of individuals and of the Spartan kings in particular. It will compare the extent

to which different *poleis* made use of personal friendships, particularly Sparta and Athens, and, finally, draw conclusions about the way different states conducted their international affairs.

Racial Kinship

On a broadly state level, members of the same racial group were counted among one's kin. Such kinship connections, distant as they were, could have a important effect on foreign policy.¹ The Greeks were not averse to using the argument of kinship in their dealings with other states, and claims of kin could be used to try to draw states into alliances or procure their assistance in war. For instance, after Argos had gone over to Sparta in the winter of 418/7,² the Spartans also tried to bring Perdiccas of Macedon into alliance with them.³ Thucydides says that he did not rebel from the Athenians straight away, but considered it when he saw that the Argives had seceded, because he himself was of Argive ancestry.⁴ Again, Syracuse sought aid at Corinth in 415 on account of their kinship.⁵ In the summer of 411, some Methymnian exiles brought fifty hoplites (who were *προσεταιρίστοι*)⁶ from Cyme, and mercenaries from the mainland to attack Methymna and bring about the revolt of Eresus.⁷ Thucydides says that

¹ Though contrast Th. 7.57.1.

² Th. 5.80.2.

³ Th. 5.80.2.

⁴ Th. 5.80.2. For Perdiccas' motives and his seeming fickleness, see Cole *Phoenix* 28 (1974) 55-72. As Andrewes (*HCT* 4.146) notes, "Considerations of race and origin are often advanced by ancient authors as motives for political action, and they may have been more effective than we are inclined to imagine: Thucydides certainly suggests that the attitude of Argos helped to determine that of Perdiccas, though there can have been few other occasions when Argos was relevant to his designs."

⁵ Th. 6.88.7. Corinth was also the mother-city of Syracuse, so the kinship link was relatively strong.

⁶ Andrewes thinks that the description of the soldiers as *προσεταιρίστοι* "probably distinguishes these men as volunteers 'brought in as companions in the enterprise' from the hired men next mentioned" (*HCT* 5.345). They were possibly, then, troops who were recruited through personal contacts of the exiles (compare the Corinthian, Aristeus, whose army consisted of a large body of men who had joined out of *φιλία* for him; Th. 1.60.2).

⁷ Th. 8.100.3.

Anaxarchus, the Theban, commanded them "because of kinship" (κατὰ τὸ ξυγγενές).¹

The kinship link could also be expressed in terms of "Ionian" and "Dorian" affinities.² Though the connection was weak, this racial tie could be used as a means of canvassing for support. Towards the end of the summer of 427, when the Leontines and the Syracusans were at war with one another, the Leontines sent to Athens and tried to persuade them to send ships both on the basis of their "ancient alliance" and because they were Ionian.³ Thucydides says the Athenians responded by despatching ships and men to help them, using their kinship as a pretext (οἰκειότητος προφάσει), but actually wishing both to prevent corn being brought to the Peloponnese, and to see whether they could gain control of Sicily.⁴ Likewise, when the Athenians decided to undertake the campaign in Sicily in 415, their objectives were not only to conquer the whole of Sicily (in fact, this was, according to Thucydides, the ἀληθεστάτη πρόφασις), but also to help their kinsmen and allies;⁵ and when the Athenian generals were trying to drum up support in Sicily and southern Italy later in the campaign, they used the claims of kinship as an argument: Thucydides says that they were unable to persuade the Rhegians, though they were kinsmen of Leontines and ἐπιτήδαιοι of the Athenians.⁶ Indeed the kinship link with fellow Ionians, though rather tenuous, may have been one of the few real connections left between Athens and their Sicilian "cousins". Racial kinship

¹ Th. 8.100.3. The kinship link originated in the founding of Methymna by the Boeotians (Th. 7.57.5; cf. 8.5.2).

² The Greeks had a professed dislike of fighting against their own racial group. One of the themes of Thucydides' list of the allies at Syracuse at 7.57.1-59.1 is that Ionians were ranged against Ionians and Dorians and against Dorians. For the contrast and traditional hostility between the racial groups, see Th. 1.124.1, 5.9.1, 6.80.3, 82.2, 8.25.3-5 (see also Dover *HCT* 4.220).

³ Th. 3.86.1-3.

⁴ Th. 3.86.4.

⁵ Th. 6.6.1.

⁶ Th. 6.46.2.

could be invoked as a valid relationship, or at least a good excuse, on the basis of which one *polis* could involve itself in the affairs of another.

Sympathy and Ideology

It cannot be denied that there could be elements in the various *poleis* which were simply "pro-democratic" or "pro-oligarchic", and that this could be important in determining the actions of political groups. For example, in 365, when there was civil unrest in Elis, Xenophon writes that those about Charopus, Thrasonides and Argeius (οἱ περὶ Χάροπόν τε καὶ Θρασωνίδαν καὶ Ἀργεῖον) were trying to lead the state into δημοκρατία, while those about Eualcas, Hippias and Stratolas (οἱ περὶ Εὐάλκαν τε καὶ Ἰππίαν καὶ Στρατόλαν) were trying to bring it into ὀλιγαρχία.¹ There was the concept of sympathy with a political ideology.²

But there were also groups who were not so much "democratic" or "oligarchic" as friendly to another leading state, such as Athens or Sparta.³ The emphasis was not on revolt, for example, to change the political ideology of the state, so much as to align the state with, say, Athens or Sparta, and to put the leaders of that sympathy group into power. But these "sympathies" were not necessarily based just on opportunism or power-mongering, but sometimes on a genuine conviction that the state would be benefited by the patronage of that particular *polis*. For example, at Megara in 424, Thucydides writes that the people in the city were being pressed both by the Athenians who invaded their territory each year, and by their own exiles

¹ Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.15.

² See, for example, Th. 5.31.6, 44.1: the Boeotians not wanting an alliance with Argos because she is democratic; Argos wanting an alliance with Athens because she is democratic. However, because of the nature of such groups, they could never be so rigidly defined or their membership as secure as in modern political parties: see Rhodes "The 'Acephalous' Polis?" [unpublished].

³ Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.4. Of course, there were also *poleis* who sought the help of Athens or Sparta precisely because they did represent democracy and oligarchy respectively (cf. Th 3.82.1).

in Pegae.¹ As a result, the φίλοι of the exiles in the city urged the citizens to receive back the exiles.² The leaders of the *demos*, on the other hand, became frightened, and made overtures to give up the city to the Athenian generals, since they thought that this would be the least dangerous course of action.³ But the whole plan went astray, when the Athenians only managed to take the long walls, falling back on Nisaea in the hope that Megara would soon surrender, if that was under siege.⁴

At this point, Brasidas, who had been in the region of Sicyon and Corinth making preparations for his northern campaign, sent to the Boeotians for help and went to Megara with a select group of his own men.⁵ The two factions in the city were afraid: one that he would bring in the exiles and drive them out, and the other, that the *demos* might attack them.⁶ Neither faction would admit Brasidas, but both decided to wait and see what would happen.⁷ In the end, there was no battle between the Peloponnesian and Athenian forces, but the φίλοι of the exiles in Megara took heart and opened the gates to Brasidas and his men, while those who had negotiated with the Athenians were cowed.⁸ Neither group were particularly interested in democracy or oligarchy. Rather they looked for that help which they believed would most further their own interests, which they probably identified with those of their *polis*.

Similarly, in Thebes in 395, there were two political groups: οἱ περὶ Leontiades, and οἱ περὶ Ismenias.⁹ Those with Leontiades were sympathised with the Spartans, but those with Ismenias were accused of atticising

¹ Th. 4.66.1.

² Th. 4.66.2.

³ Th. 4.66.3.

⁴ Th. 4.66.3-69.1.

⁵ Th. 4.70.1-2.

⁶ Th. 4.71.1.

⁷ Th. 4.71.2.

⁸ Th. 4.73.4.

⁹ *Hell.Oxyrh.* (Bartoletti) 17.1 = (Chambers) 20.1.

(ἀττικίζειν), because of their support for the *demos* when it had been removed from power, although they did not in fact sympathise with the Athenians.¹ While the group led by Ismenias may have cared more for the support of the *demos* than for Athens, it would appear that Leontiades' group identified itself more with Sparta than with oligarchy as such.² Yet both groups were probably pursuing what they perceived to be the best interests of their group, and probably they themselves identified the interests of their group with the interests of the *polis*. But what was in the interests of the *polis* was not always self-evident, and their opponents might equally sincerely believe that they had given the interests of their group priority over the interests of the *polis*.

Personal Friendship

Before turning to the specific instances of personal friendships in inter-*polis* affairs, we need to clear the ground about how personal friendships operated in the political arena. As has been discussed in Chapter One, political activity in the *poleis* operated on vertical and horizontal axes. The horizontal axis represents the link between equals, particularly ξένοι, whereas the vertical axis extends down from the leading political figures to their actual and potential supporters. All full citizens, by definition, held the franchise, so all citizens had the power to affect policy by casting their vote in one way or another; so much is obvious. Herman has concentrated on the relationship of leading figures with their ἑταῖροι at home and their ξένοι abroad, and has contrasted these upper-class relationships with a *demos* which he regards as being outside them.³ He has then supposed that a

¹ *Hell.Oxyrh.* (Bartoletti) 17.1 = (Chambers) 20.1; cf. (Bartoletti) 18.1 = (Chambers) 21.1.

² See also McKechnie and Kern *Comm.* 161-2.

³ Herman *Ritualised Friendship* esp. 150-6; cf. id. *PCPS* n.s. 36 (1990) 91-4.

leader's loyalty to his upper-class friends would conflict with his loyalty to his *polis*.¹ As he writes,

In sum, throughout its history, the Greek world was torn by conflict between upper-class factions who derived their power and resources from foci of power which lay outside its boundaries. Networks of alliances linked factions from several cities and radiated from the great empires located at the fringes of the world of cities, creating a system of external friendships that could offer rewards – wealth, fame, position – even more tempting than those of the city itself. It was a system which had not changed significantly since the days of the epos By the same token, however, there emerged a class of men who, unlike the aristocracy, the rich and their clients, were free of such ties of dependence and uninvolved in the alliance system.²

This class-based dichotomy is, in my view, a mistaken step in Herman's argument, and it is at this point that we must take essentially different paths. Firstly, many of the men who were not political leaders were, to a greater or lesser extent, committed to following one of the leaders and caught up in their leader's network of connections. Secondly, while the leaders needed to win the votes of the citizens in the assembly, the citizens in the assembly were glad to make use of the leaders' connections for the city's benefit.³ Thirdly, there were those in the emergent class of powerful non-aristocrats who sought to form personal connections of their own on an international level. Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes, Phormio son of Asopius and Iphicrates son of Timotheus, all *noui homines*,⁴ made personal friendships abroad which they exploited for the benefit of the state

¹ Herman *Ritualised Friendship* esp. 156-61.

² *Ibid.* 155-6, see also 130.

³ Compare Arnheim, who writes concerning Athens: "the masses were not only prepared to choose noble leaders, but they valued birth as such ... For, to put it in a nutshell, democratic Athens was simultaneously anti-aristocratic in government and aristocratic in ethos" (Arnheim *Aristocracy in Greek Society* 156). Herman himself (*PCPS* n.s. 36 (1990) 92) admits that the community was prepared to harness these aristocratic connections, but at a price.

⁴ On Demosthenes: Davies *APF* 112-3; on Iphicrates (in the tradition, his father was a cobbler): *Plut. Mor.* 186 f; *Suidas s.v.* Iphicrates (I 772); Davies *APF* 248-9. Phormio's antecedents are unknown, but he is not known to belong to the propertied classes.

as well as themselves.¹ Finally, upper-class connections were not inherently opposed to the interests of the state.² Indeed, men often persuade themselves that they have no conflict of loyalty, but that what is good for themselves and their friends is good for the state as a whole; and what is good for the state as a whole is in fact a question on which the citizens may legitimately disagree.

Political groups and political sympathisers from different *poleis* could be linked by ties of personal and individual friendships. As we saw above, these personal *φιλία*, often by their nature *ξενία*, could form a bridge between a group in one *polis* and another *polis* itself, or a like-minded group in another *polis*. Individuals were able to mobilise their political, or politicised, groups by making contact with another individual in another state, usually his *φίλος*, who was then able to mobilise his own political group.³ Demosthenes declared in 351 when he was pleading the case of the Rhodians, that

I would never have said these things, if I thought it would advantage the *demos* of the Rhodians alone, for I am neither the *πρόξενος* of the men, nor am I the private *ξένος* of any individual among them.⁴

Though Demosthenes claims he is neither their *πρόξενος* nor their *ξένος*, he implies that this is the rôle a *πρόξενος* or *ξένος* could be expected to play; that they could be expected to form the link between *poleis*.

¹ See Chapter Four. Though, of course, there were others (Cleon, for example) who pointedly did not attempt to form such connections: see Connor *New Politicians* esp. chapter 3.

² For a full discussion of this, see Endnote 4.

³ On the mobilisation of political groups by an individual, see Th. 8.48.4, 54.4 (where *ξυνωμοσία* = *ἐταιρεία*).

⁴ Dem. 15.15. Compare Herman (*Ritualised Friendship* 140) who cites this passage for a different purpose and infers, erroneously, that this implies a link between *προξενία* and *ξενία*. There may well be a connection in many cases between the two (see Chapter Two), but this passage suggests almost a contrast between them: Demosthenes says that he is neither one nor the other; he has no link with the Rhodians at all.

There are many examples from many *poleis* of individuals using their personal connections in various ways.¹ In 431, Naucleides and οἱ μετ' αὐτοῦ betrayed Plataea to the Thebans through Eurymachus the son of Leontiades.² Although there is nothing specifically to imply any connection between Naucleides and Eurymachus, a *ξενία* relationship would be an obvious point of contact between them.³

Hermocrates of Syracuse was also a man with connections which he was prepared to use both in his own interest and in what he probably perceived to be the interest of the state. His career in Syracuse was chequered and his position there was never entirely secure. His first known election as general was at the time of the Athenian attack on Syracuse,⁴ though he was later deposed on account of the defeat at Epipolae.⁵ He was influential in 413, but does not appear to have held office then.⁶ He was elected general again in 412,⁷ and was possibly re-elected in 411, but was banished probably in mid-summer of this year.⁸

Hermocrates was not without networks of friends both at home and abroad. In Syracuse itself, Hermocrates belonged to an *hetaireia*, some of

¹ For a "special relationship" between Sparta and Samos in the archaic period which probably arose out of *ξενία* connections between aristocrats, see Cartledge CQ n.s. 32 (1982) 243-65.

² Th. 2.2.2-3.

³ Eurymachus' family had a history of treacherous dealings with other states. Leontiades, the father, brought Thebes over to Persia at Thermopylae (Hdt. 7.233.1-2; cf. Aristophanes of Boeotia *FGrHist* 379 F 6. On the reconciliation of these two sources, see Gomme *HCT* 2.3 n.1), and Eurymachus' son, also Leontiades, surrendered the Cadmeia to the Spartans in 383-2 BC (Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.25-36; Plut. *Pelop.* 5.1-3; cf. *Hell. Oxyrh.* (Bartoletti) 17.1 = (Chambers) 20.1; Bruce *Comm.* 111-2). Gomme writes: "A long-lived and mischievous family" (*HCT* 2.3-4),³ and Kagan (*The Archidamian War* 46), that he was "a man well suited to the task, being one of a line of traitors and scoundrels." It may be that Eurymachus' pro-Spartan tendencies made him seem a suitable and approachable go-between for the Plataean conspirators, so there may be no need for a personal connection, but it still prompts the question why he was specifically chosen, and specifically named by Thucydides.

⁴ Th. 6.73.1.

⁵ Th. 6.103.4.

⁶ Th. 7.21.3, 73.1-3; Dover *HCT* 4.396.

⁷ Th. 8.26.1.

⁸ Th. 8.85.3; see Appendix B: *Military Commanders of other States (Syracuse)* 350 n. 1; cf. Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.27.

whose members he used to trick the Athenians besieging the city.¹ Xenophon also elaborates on Hermocrates' personal following in the army and relates how he used to gather together his ἐπεικέστατοι at dawn and in the evening and instruct them in what he was going to do and say, and taught them oratory.² Hermocrates also had a personal φιλία with Pharnabazus,³ from whom he obtained money "before he asked for it",⁴ with which, with the help of his φίλοι at home, he tried to take Syracuse.⁵ Just as Alcibiades utilised friendship networks at home and abroad to try and effect his homecoming,⁶ so did Hermocrates.

Again, the father of Jason of Pherae had been a φίλος to the Thebans, while Jason himself was πρόξενος.⁷ After Leuctra, the Thebans sent for Jason to help in case they decided to make an attack on Sparta.⁸ Although he came with men and ships, he dissuaded them from the campaign, and made a truce with Sparta on their behalf⁹ – though this was probably intended to further his own interests rather than the interests of Thebes.¹⁰

In Sicyon in the winter of 367/6, Euphron, the most influential of the citizens with the Spartans, wished to become most influential with their enemies, because of the Spartans' arrogance.¹¹ Accordingly, he told the Argives and Arcadians that, if the the richest men remained in control of Sicyon, the city would go over to the Spartans when the chance arose; but if there was a democracy, the city would remain true to them, and he would

¹ Th. 7.73.3.

² Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.30; on Xenophon's eulogy of Hermocrates and its Socratic quality, see Krentz *Comm.* 104.

³ Diod. 13.63.2.

⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.31; cf. Diod. 13.63.2.

⁵ Diod. 13.63.3.

⁶ See 200-3 below.

⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.24.

⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.20.

⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.22-25.

¹⁰ See Tuplin *The Failings of Empire* 118.

¹¹ Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.44.

rally the city as a *pistis* for them if they would support him.¹ So the Argives and Arcadians lent him their help, and Euphron announced to the citizens in the presence of the Argives and Arcadians that the government was to become a democracy.² He and his son were chosen among the new commanders, and Xenophon says that Euphron made some of the mercenary troops *πίστοι* straight away by treating them well.³ He seized the property of those whom he banished for laconising, and made himself a tyrant.⁴ The allies allowed him to do this, Xenophon reports, both because he used his money to their advantage and because he eagerly accompanied them with his mercenary army when they went to war.⁵

These were all individuals who were prepared to form and use personal connections for their own ends and the perceived ends of their state. Although there is evidence of many *poleis* making use of such relationships, the degree of exploitation of these connections seems to have varied from *polis* to *polis*. In particular, there seems to be a striking difference between the use of such connections in Sparta and Athens, our two best attested *poleis*.⁶ Cleobulus and Xenares *should* have had more success with the Boeotians because of their Boeotian connections. It was because communications broke down that their plans went astray.

Sparta

Just as in the rest of Greece, the ethic of helping friends and harming enemies was fundamental to Spartan thought, and the Spartans publicly

¹ Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.44.

² Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.45.

³ Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.45-6.

⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.46.

⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.46.

⁶ This perhaps should not be surprising since the *demos* in oligarchic Sparta was made up of a privileged minority, whereas in democratic Athens the *demos* encompassed a larger spectrum of the community.

espoused a policy of helping φίλοι for help received. Dercylidas said to the people of Abydus in 394,

O men, now it is possible for you, although you were formerly φίλοι for our city, to seem εὐεργέται of the Spartans. For being faithful (πίστοι) in good fortune is not wonderful, but whenever people remain steadfast in the misfortunes of their φίλοι, this is remembered for all time.¹

Yet Sparta not only had a policy of helping φίλοι but, as a state, tended to conduct her interstate affairs through those in the cities who were φίλοι, and lent assistance to those who were sympathetic to her. For example, in 412, Alcibiades and Chalcideus were sent by the ephors to Chios, where they brought about a revolt.² When discussing the earlier Athenian mistrust of Chios before the revolt, Thucydides does refer to οἱ πολλοί and οἱ ὀλίγοι in Chios,³ but, later in 412, the point is not so much that it was the oligarchs who colluded with Alcibiades and Chalcideus, but that these two negotiated with Chian conspirators, who were οἱ ὀλίγοι.⁴ Thucydides writes:

Chalcideus and Alcibiades on their voyage seized all they met so that news of their approach might not precede them. After they had attacked Corycus on the mainland and deposited the prisoners there, they made contact with some of the Chians who were conspiring with them. The Chians told them to put in without giving notice of their arrival to the city, they arrived at Chios unexpectedly. And the many (οἱ πολλοί) were amazed and in a state of consternation. It had been arranged by the few (οἱ ὀλίγοι) that there happened to be a meeting of the *boule*. Since speeches were made by Chalcideus and Alcibiades to the effect that many ships were on the way and they did not elucidate the news about the blockade of the ships in Speiraeum, the Chians and

¹ Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.4. Compare here the Spartan response to Cyrus' request for help on the basis of his former aid to the Spartans (Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.1).

² Th. 8.11.3-12.2. On the Chian government prior to the establishment of the oligarchy by Pedaritus in 412, see Jones *Athenian Democracy* 67-8, 69; Bradeen *Historia* 9 (1960) 265; Bruce *Phoenix* 18 (1964) 276; Andrewes *CAH V*² 465; *HCT* 5.22; Forrest *BSA* 55 (1960) 180; Quinn *Historia* 18 (1969) 22-30; Kagan *The Fall of the Athenian Empire* 43.

³ Th. 8.9.3.

⁴ Th. 8.14.1-2. They may have also been personal connections of Alcibiades, but as we shall see, could have as easily been friends of Sparta. For Alcibiades' supposed connections in Chios: Plut. *Alc.* 12.1, Satyrus *ap. Athen.* 12.534 d, [Andoc.] 4.30 and 103 below.

Erythraeans detached themselves from the Athenians straight away.¹

We also have independent evidence for Spartan φίλοι in Chios, for an inscription recording contributions to the Spartan war fund, probably dating to about 427,² records a contribution by "the exiles of the Chians who were φίλοι of the Spartans" (τοὶ φεύγοντες τῶν Χίων τοὶ φίλοι τῶν [Λακεδα]ιμονίων).³ Whoever they were, the group of Chians in 412 must have had contact with Alcibiades and Chalcideus to coordinate their arrival with the meeting of the *boule*.⁴ It was then left to the persuasion and deceit of Alcibiades (it is not surprising that friends of Alcibiades should have been oligarchs) and Chalcideus to bring the Chians over, which they did with surprising ease considering the conspirators' initial fear that "the multitude" would be hostile if told of the plans to revolt.⁵ Indeed, as Quinn points out, it was probably the assurances of the coming Peloponnesian fleet that brought them over.⁶

In 418, the ἐπιτήδαιοι of the Spartans in Tegea sent a message to Sparta to report that the city had all but gone over to the Argives and her allies,⁷ and Thucydides says that, in the winter of 418/7, the men in Argos who were ἐπιτήδαιοι of the Spartans wished to overthrow the *demos*.⁸ Again, in 374, some of the φίλοι of the Spartans in Corcyra revolted against the *demos*

¹ Th. 8.14.1-2.

² See also Th. 3.30-31, when a secret group of conspirators from Ionia make overtures to Alcidas.

³ Loomis *The Spartan War Fund* esp. 46-7; see also Barron *Chios* 101; Quinn *Athens and Samos, Lesbos and Chios, 478-404 BC* 40.

⁴ For the need for the coincidence of the Spartans' arrival with the meeting of the *boule*, see Quinn *Historia* 18 (1969) 24-5.

⁵ Th. 8.9.3.

⁶ Quinn *Historia* 18 (1969) 24-5, 27, 28 on Th. 8.14.2.

⁷ Th. 5.64.1; cf. the revolt of the Mytileneans (Th. 3.2.3; Arist. *Pol.* 5.1304 a 9).

⁸ Th. 5.76.2-3. But when, in 417, a counter-revolution took place, Thucydides says that the Spartans did not come, though their φίλοι kept sending for them (Th. 5.82.3).

and sent to Sparta for help, and Sparta responded by sending triremes under the command of Alcidas.¹

Even less subtle than these are the Spartans' methods in 386, when they wished to punish the Mantineians for their unfaithfulness during the Corinthian war. Diodorus writes that when the Spartans decided to make war on the Mantineians, they immediately set about stirring up trouble in the cities and established factions in them through their ἴδιοι φίλοι.²

Even more interesting is the Spartan interference in Phleius. After the Mantineians had been punished, the Phleiasian exiles, since they thought the time was right, went to Sparta and said that, while they had been in Phleius, the city had received the Spartans within the city and the people had taken part in campaigns with them, but after the exiles had gone, the Phleiasians would no longer have anything to do with Sparta.³

So the ephors responded by sending to the Phleiasians and saying that the exiles were φίλοι of the Spartans and so should be returned to the city.⁴ The Phleiasians were afraid that there were some within their walls, both those who were kinsmen of the exiles and well-disposed to them, and others who were keen for a change of government, who would betray the city to the Spartans.⁵ So, because of their fear, the Phleiasians voted to recall the exiles and return their property to them, rather than face Spartan intervention.⁶

Later, however, because Agesipolis had marched north to Olynthus and because they believed that Agesilaus would not march out against them

¹ Diod. 15.46.1-2.

² Diod. 15.5.1-2; cf. Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.1-3.

³ Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.8. Notably, however, the Spartans had *not* chosen to restore the exiles when the Phleiasians summoned the Spartans to protect the city from the attacks of Iphicrates during the Corinthian War, even though, Xenophon says, the Spartans were well-disposed to the exiles (καίπερ εὐνοϊκῶς ἔχοντες τοῖς φυγάσιν) (Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.15).

⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.9.

⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.9.

⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.10.

(since this would mean that both kings would be away from Sparta at the same time), the Phleisians decided not to act justly to the exiles.¹ As a result, the exiles and their supporters went to Sparta to complain about their treatment.² The dénouement finally came when Agesilaus, who had ξένοι among the exiles,³ marched on the city, laid it under siege, and, when the city surrendered, set up a commission to draw up a new constitution and settle the affairs in the city.⁴ The friends of Sparta finally won through Spartan aid.

These groups of φίλοι were not always just indefinable gatherings of pro-Spartan sympathisers, but some can actually be identified as definite political groups with leaders we can name. For example, in the winter of 412/1, Hippocrates, a Spartan, sailed from the Peloponnese to the Hellespont with ten Thurian ships, under the command of Dorieus son of Diagoreus and two colleagues.⁵ Dorieus, originally a Rhodian, had been expelled from his own city during a conflict and had subsequently become a citizen of Thurii.⁶ The Spartans had it in mind to sail to Rhodes, since they had received overtures from the δυνατώτατοι there (a group who are identified in the revolt of 395 by the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* as the Diagoreioi)⁷ and cause them to revolt from the Athenians.⁸ Though Thucydides does not say so, Dorieus was probably one of the party which sailed from Cnidus to

¹ Xen. *Hell.* 5.3.10.

² Xen. *Hell.* 5.3.11.

³ Xen. *Hell.* 5.3.13 and see 93 below.

⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 5.3.14-7, 21-5. Note also that, although the Phleisians tried to surrender to the authorities in Sparta, Agesilaus' φίλοι at home ensured that Agesilaus himself would make all decisions regarding the Phleisians (Xen. *Hell.* 5.3.24): further evidence that Spartan foreign policy was influenced by personal politics.

⁵ Th. 8.35.1. On Dorieus, see Appendix B: *Commanders of Other States (Thurii)* 352.

⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.19; Paus. 6.7.1-6; Hornblower *Comm.* 389-91; Krentz *Comm.* 87; cf. Th. 3.8.1; Andrewes *HCT* 5.77.

⁷ *Hell. Oxyrh.* (Bartoletti) 15.2 = (Chambers) 18.2; see also Andrewes (*HCT* 5.91): "The word [δυνατώτατοι] does not by itself identify these men as oligarchs, but in the context this is inevitable".

⁸ Th. 8.44.2-3.

Rhodes and helped to bring them over.¹ Xenophon certainly implies that he was present after the fall of the city when he says that Dorieus sailed from Rhodes to the Hellespont.² Diodorus adds that Mindarus, on hearing a group of Rhodians were gathering together to stage a counter-revolution, despatched Dorieus to Rhodes with his thirteen ships.³ In their dealings with other states, the Spartans used every connection at their disposal.

There are other similar examples: in 377, Xenophon writes that those about Hypatodorus (οἱ περὶ Ὑπατόδωρον), φίλοι of the Lacedaemonians, had control of Tanagra.⁴ In 371 the Tegeans followed Archidamus zealously since those with Stasippus (οἱ περὶ Στάσιππον) were still alive and λακωνίζοντες and clearly in control.⁵ In the following year, οἱ περὶ Callibius and Proxenus were making efforts for the unification of all Arcadia,⁶ while οἱ περὶ Stasippus made it their policy to leave the city undisturbed.⁷ A battle took place between the two groups, and of those with Stasippus about eight hundred fled to Sparta.⁸ Just as the Spartans had political groups in their own city, such as that led by Cleobulus and Xenares, so they were in contact with such groups in the other *poleis*, and it was through these groups which were sympathetic to the Spartans that the Spartans were able to interfere in the politics and policies of these states. Political persuasion could clearly be important, but this was not always the primary concern. Personal relationships could be influential, perhaps even more so, as well.

¹ David *Eranos* 84 (1986) 161.

² Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.2.

³ Diod. 13.38.5.

⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.49.

⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.18.

⁶ For the founding of Megalopolis, see Diod.15.59.1 (noting the mistake of Lycomedes "the Tegeate", for Lycomedes, the "Mantineian": see Underhill *Comm.* 256); Paus. 8.27.1-8; Plut. *Pelop.* 24.8.

⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.7.

⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.7-10.

Spartan Kings and their φίλοι

As we have seen, contact with political groups and the like could and often did take place through the agency of private individuals. As prominent members of the upper class, the Spartan kings in particular had friendships abroad. Mosley notes that the kings could have "obligations of hospitality to specific states or their leaders and rulers", stemming from the practice of cementing alliances by a personal relationship of ξενία.¹ Coupled with this, they still held some influence on policy in Sparta,² and it was obviously still considered a worthwhile thing to be the friend of a king.

Archidamus

That the friendships of the Spartan kings could at least be *perceived* to influence the way that they acted, is demonstrated by the events surrounding the first Peloponnesian invasion of Attica in 431. Thucydides writes that Pericles suspected that Archidamus, the Spartan king, who also happened to be his ξένος, might leave his fields unravaged during the invasion, either because he wished to gratify (χαρίζεσθαι) Pericles in private or even because the Spartans had commanded him to in order to make Pericles unpopular.³ Therefore, before the Peloponnesians launched their attack on Attica, Pericles announced to the assembly that Archidamus was his ξένος and made over his land as public property so that he might not come under suspicion.⁴ When, in fact, the Spartan army under Archidamus' command were on the point of attacking Attica, they delayed about Oenoe on the border of Attica and Boeotia.⁵ Thucydides goes on:

¹ Mosley *Athenaeum* n.s. 49 (1971) 434. This makes Agesilaus' refusal to make a ξενία with the Persian King in 386, which Xenophon reports, even more pointed (Xen. *Ages.* 8.3-4; cf. *Plut. Mor.* 213 d).

² On the powers of the Spartan kings, Lewis *S&P* 43-9 *contra* de Ste. Croix *Origins of the Peloponnesian War* 138-49.

³ Th. 2.13.1.

⁴ Th. 2.13.1.

⁵ Th. 2.18.1-2.

Archidamus received considerable blame for it, since he seemed even in the mustering for war to be soft and ἐπιτήδειος to the Athenians, and not eagerly encouraging them to go to war. When he had collected together an army, he was slandered because of the waiting about on the Isthmus and the leisurely progress on the march, and particularly for the hold-up at Oenoe, for the Athenians brought everything inside during this time. The Peloponnesians thought that if they attacked quickly they would have taken them when they were still outside, if it were not for his delays. Thus the army was angry with Archidamus during the siege. Archidamus held his hand, as it is said, since he expected the Athenians, while the land was still untouched, to yield in some way and shrink from allowing it to be cut up.¹

While most commentators see this dilatoriness on the part of Archidamus as part of his general moderate attitude to war,² Herman argues that Archidamus' motives in this episode are founded on his ξενία with Pericles.³ But although it is true that Thucydides did have in mind the ξενία relationship between the two men, he does not mention it here, and, so far from thinking, or guessing as Herman would have it, that this was the real cause for Archidamus' slowness, he tries to distance himself from this idea. In fact, by putting the accusation of sympathy for Athens in the mouths of the Peloponnesians he seems to be indicating that he himself does not believe in it.⁴ In fact, Thucydides goes on to suggest another reason why Archidamus delayed, a reason unconnected with his ξενία but consistent with his original reluctance: Archidamus hoped that the Athenians would not allow their land to be ravaged.⁵ It must be noted, however, as Herman does point out,⁶ that it was believed by both the

¹ Th. 2.18.3-5. For the varied vocabulary describing his dilatoriness, see Gomme *HCT* 2.69.

² Kagan *The Archidamian War* 50; Lewis *S&P* 46-7.

³ Herman *Ritualised Friendship* 143-4.

⁴ See Hornblower *Comm.* 271-2.

⁵ Th. 2.20.1-5. On the use of ὡς λέγεται to show "that the expectations on which it [Archidamus' dilatoriness] was said to have been based were, though unfulfilled, by no means unreasonable": Westlake *Mnemosyne* 30 (1977) 345-62, esp. 352.

⁶ Herman *Ritualised Friendship* 143-5, 159-60.

Spartan army and by Pericles that this relationship could have affected Archidamus' actions, that the tie of ξενία could override that of state.¹

Agis

Agis also seemed to have direct contacts abroad through personal friends. Xenophon tells us that when Agis attacked Elis in 402, οἱ περὶ Xenias tried to bring the city over to the Spartans.² Pausanias provides the information that Xenias and Agis were also ξένοι.³

Pausanias

In 403, Pausanias, the king, marched out against Athens, after the Thirty at Eleusis and the Three Thousand in the city had sent to Sparta for help against the *demos*.⁴ Although Pausanias did mount an attack on those in the Peiraeus when his original attempts to persuade them to disperse had failed,⁵ Xenophon claims that he was sympathetic to them,⁶ and that he sent to them secretly and advised them to send ambassadors to himself and the ephors, giving them instructions on what to say.⁷ In Lysias' *On the Confiscation of the Property of the Brother of Nicias*, the speaker says that Pausanias' sympathy for those opposed to the oligarchy was aroused when Diognetus, the brother of Nicias, reminded Pausanias of his bonds of φιλία and ξενία by placing the grandson of Nicias on his knee.⁸ As a result, the

¹ However, see Endnote 4.

² Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.21-31, esp. 27-9.

³ Paus. 3.8.4.

⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.28-30. Lysander had also arranged for himself to be sent as harmost and his brother, Libys, as *Nauarchos* (Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.28).

⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.31-4.

⁶ Xenophon says that he only went to the point from which the battle-cry is given, but he did this so that it might not be apparent that he was εὐμενής to them (Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.31).

⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.35.

⁸ Lys. 18.10-1. This clearly suggests a ξενία between Nicias and Pausanias (see also Herman *Ritualised Friendship* 181), but the origins of the relationship are obscure, though perhaps it was a product of the negotiations for the Peace of Nicias in 421 with Pleistoanax, the father of Pausanias.

speaker says, Pausanias rejected the ξένια of the Thirty, and accepted those of Diognetus.¹

Agesilaus

Agesilaus also had and made use of both hereditary and newly formed connections. For example, in 395 Agesilaus sent word to the cities and islands on the coast to build triremes, and the private citizens did this, wishing to do him a favour (χαρίζεσθαι).² Again, in 386, when the Spartans decided to punish the Mantineians, while Diodorus tells us that they set up factions in the city,³ Xenophon says that they decided to attack it.⁴ Agesilaus requested that he be relieved of the command since the city had served his father many times in the war against the Messenians.⁵ Agesipolis therefore led the army, though his father Pausanias was well-disposed (φιλικῶς ἔχειν) to the leaders of the *demos* in Mantinea.⁶ When the city was taken, those who were "argolisising" (ἀργολιζόντων) and the leaders of the people thought they would be put to death, but Pausanias negotiated with Agesipolis and secured their safety.⁷ Here we are presented with two sides of the same coin: the king with connections who is able to "beg off" in order to avoid a conflict of duty; and another, less influential king, whose connections could not influence his actions in the first instance, but was still able to allow mercy at the end. From this incident we can see the importance of such

¹ Lys. 18.12.

² Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.28. Compare, however, the treatment of Agesilaus and Lysander in 396 by the cities in Asia Minor. Agesilaus was greatly put out that people paid court (θεραπεύων) to Lysander rather than himself. He responded by publicly humiliating Lysander and sending him away to the Hellespont (Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.7-10; Plut. *Ages.* 7.1-5).

³ See 86 above.

⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.1, 3; Diod. 15.5.2-4.

⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.3. Agesilaus is referring to the Third Messenian War of 464 (see Underhill *Comm.* 179); on Agesilaus and the Mantineians, cf. Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.3-4. For other possible connections between Agesilaus' family and a family in Mantinea, see Tuplin *LCM* 2 (1977) 5-10.

⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.3.

⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.6.

connections, though it also produced difficult conflicts and tensions as to which obligations were the greater.¹ There is an *addendum* to this story, however: when the Spartans decided to make an expedition against the Mantineians in 370, Agesilaus, who had been sent to them in 371 to negotiate with them (though unsuccessfully),² did not quibble, but marched against them.³ The Mantineians had pushed too far for any "hereditary feeling" to endure.

Agesilaus also had ξένοι in Phleius. As we have already seen, in 381, Phleius refused to grant any rights to the exiles, so the ephors decided to attack.⁴ Xenophon reports that Agesilaus was not displeased, since οἱ περὶ Podanemus were ξένοι of his father and were then among the restored exiles, and οἱ ἄμφι Procles the son of Hipponicus were ξένοι of his own.⁵

Agesipolis

Despite his apparent lack of influence, it was clearly still felt to be profitable to form a connection with Agesipolis. In 381, when Agesipolis was sent to Olynthus on the death of Teleutias, horsemen from Thessaly also went who wished to become known to him.⁶ Presumably, this was a connection which the Thessalians expected might be useful later on.

Cleombrotus

Cleombrotus was at least thought to have sympathies for Thebes, and not without cause. In the winter of 379/8, Cleombrotus was sent out against Thebes after the liberation of the Cadmeia.⁷ He set up camp in Theban

¹ On the questions of loyalty and patriotism, see Endnote 4; for general comments on the conflicting obligations by Agesilaus to the Persian, Pharnabazus, see Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.34.

² Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.4-5: he was thought to be a πατρικὸς φίλος to them.

³ Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.10-20.

⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 5.3.10-13.

⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 5.3.13.

⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 5.3.8-9.

⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.13-14.

territory, but, after about sixteen days, fell back on Thespieae, where he left Sphodrias with a garrison, and returned home.¹ Again, in the spring of 376, since Agesilaus was ill and so was unable to lead the now annual raid on Boeotia, Cleombrotus was sent.² When he came to Cithaeron, he sent his peltasts ahead, but they were repelled by Thebans and Athenians who occupied the heights.³ After this rather paltry attempt, he concluded that he was unable to cross Cithaeron and turned back.⁴ In 371, after the general peace was made, the Spartan assembly sent word to Cleombrotus to attack Thebes, if the Thebans did not leave the Boeotian cities independent.⁵ The φίλοι of Cleombrotus warned him that unless he expelled the Thebans, he would risk the extreme penalty at the hands of the Spartans; but his ἐχθροί declared that he would now make it clear whether he cared for the Thebans as it was said.⁶ Xenophon says that, when he heard this, Cleombrotus was eager to go to war;⁷ though, ironically, he led them to his death at Leuctra.⁸

Yet the Spartan Kings were not the only Spartans to have international connections which could be exploited. Individual Spartiates had ties of φιλία and ξενία with other Greeks in other states which they were more than willing to use if the opportunity arose. For example, Brasidas had ἐπιτήδαιοι in Pharsalus in Thessaly whom he called upon when he was making his way north to the Chalcidians in 424.⁹ Endius son of Alcibiades was the ξένοϛ of Alcibiades son of Cleinias, and was used on a

¹ Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.15-16. Diodorus (15.29.5) gives the main responsibility for Sphodrias' attack on the Peiraeus to Cleombrotus.

² Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.58-9.

³ Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.59.

⁴ Xen. *Hell.* Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.59.

⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.3.

⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.4-5.

⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.6.

⁸ Diod. 15.55.5; Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.13-4.

⁹ Th. 4.78.1. Thucydides even gives us their names: Panaerus, Dorus, Hippochides, Torylaus and Strophacus who was πρόξενος of the Chalcidians. Thessaly had a reputation for being difficult territory to cross without an escort: see Th. 4.132.1-2.

number of diplomatic missions to Athens.¹ When, according to Diodorus, Lysander planned to do away with the hereditary kingship and, instead, to make it an elected post from all the Spartiates, he sought the support of Delphi through bribery.² When he met with no success, he travelled to Cyrene and tried to bribe the oracle there, since Libys, the king of those parts, was a ξένοϛ of his father.³ Many others had connections which then influenced their selection on certain missions, such as Clearchus the son of Ramphias to Byzantium or Dercylidas to Abydos.⁴

Sometimes we can follow the making of such connections. For example, in 421, after the Peace of Nicias had been concluded with the Athenians, the Spartans sent Ischagoras, Menas and Philocharidas as ambassadors to Thrace to tell Clearidas, the young *archon* in the area,⁵ to give up Amphipolis.⁶ But Clearidas did not give up the city, thus gratifying (χαριζόμενος) the Chalcidians.⁷ By doing them a favour, he would bring them into his debt, for one never knew when such a connection would be helpful. Similarly, one of the first things Lysander did on his arrival in Asia Minor as *Nauarchos* in 407 was to establish new friendship networks among the cities there.⁸ When Lysander returned to Asia Minor with Agesilaus in 396, Plutarch writes that his reputation and influence in Ephesus were problematic for him, since a crowd was always visiting him, accompanying him and paying court to him (πάντων παρακολουθούντων

¹ See Chapter Four 173-4.

² Diod. 14.13.2-3.

³ Diod. 14.13.5-6. Diodorus also tells us the interesting piece of information here that Lysander's brother had been named Libys after his father's ξένοϛ. On this name-sharing, compare Endius the son of Alcibiades, the ξένοϛ of Alcibiades the son of Cleinias; see also Herman *Ritualised Friendship* 19-22; id. CQ n.s. 39 (1989) 83-93 (though here Herman bases too much on apparent name exchange).

⁴ See Chapter Four below.

⁵ On his position, see Parke *JHS* 50 (1930) 42-3.

⁶ Th. 5.21.1.

⁷ Th. 5.21.2.

⁸ For a full discussion, see Chapter Four below on *Spartan Nauarchoi* 155.

καὶ θεραπεύοντων ἐκεῖνον).¹ This did him little good in the eyes of Agesilaus, who began ignoring Lysander's advice and neglected those who sought his help through Lysander.² As a result, Lysander told his φίλοι that they were being dishonoured because of him and advised them to go to the king and pay court to him (θεραπεύειν) and those more influential than himself instead.³ The friendship of an influential man was an important thing, both to him who gave and him who received.

From this survey of the Spartans and their overseas connections, it is clear that friendship networks were an important factor in the way they dealt with the world. Through their friends and sympathisers abroad, the Spartans meddled in the affairs of other states and brought about revolts, such as those at Tegea and Argos, or, at least their φίλοι in these states felt the confidence to bring about revolution with promises of Spartan backing. At least some of these were contacts brought about through personal relationships between individual Spartans, whether king or commoner, and individuals in the *poleis*: Brasidas had his ἐπιτήδαιοι in Pharsalus, Agesilaus his ξένοι in Phleius. However, difficulties could sometimes arise when there was a perceived clash of loyalties. One could too easily be accused of working in the favour of one's φίλοι in another state, especially in hindsight.⁴ It was a difficult line to tread. Sometimes such accusations could be justified, but not always. Some were able to excuse themselves from this conflict of obligation, others simply had to juggle their various responsibilities as best they could.

¹ Plut. Ages. 7.1-2; Xenophon declares that it came to the point that Agesilaus appeared to be the man in private station and Lysander the king (Xen. Hell. 3.4.7); cf. Tuplin *The Failings of Empire* 57.

² Plut. Ages. 7.4-7.

³ Plut. Ages. 7.8.

⁴ Similarly, officials who failed on their missions could also be accused of receiving bribes: see Chapter Five 216; cf. Chapter Seven 267-74.

Athens

The Athenians also made use of personal friendships, though, it would seem, to a lesser degree than the Spartans did. This should not surprise us, as the style of politics in Athens was more corporate and *demos*-centred than in the non-democratic *poleis*. None the less, personal friendships played a part. For example, there was a group in Chios who were pro-Athenian. In his discussion of the political groups in Chios in 412, Quinn writes that it is wrong to think of these as a democratic party, and that "it is possible that some or all of these Chians were democrats, but it is equally possible that they were simply a group of men who foresaw defeat at the hands of the Athenians and were afraid of any retribution that might be visited upon the city".¹ This may be so, but it is also possible that they may have had specifically Athenian connections.

There was certainly a group in Chios which had specific ties to Athens. The leader of this "pro-Athenian" group was Tydeus son of Ion, and there is evidence to suggest that this may have been a hereditary connection.² Barron observes that in the Ionian settlements of the Asia Minor coast, there was an interest in the "myth-historical" basis of their kinship, which "differed in detail from place to place and time to time", but is attested in Chios in the naming of Ion of Chios, born a few years before 480.³ We know that Ion of Chios was present when Sophocles visited Chios in connection with the revolt of Samos in 440/39.⁴ In the winter of 425/4, the Athenians suspected the Chians of being about to revolt, so made them exchange *pisteis* and take down their walls.⁵ Barron asks: who warned Athens and who negotiated the *pisteis*?⁶ A decree of 425 survives in which

¹ Quinn *Historia* 18 (1969) 28.

² Th. 8.38.3.

³ Barron *Chios* 91.

⁴ Ion *FGrHist* 392 F 6; Barron *Chios* 101.

⁵ Th. 4.51.1.

⁶ Barron *Chios* 101.

Athens honours two Chians for services rendered and refers to maintenance of *pisteis*.¹ The two Chians are Philippus and Ἀχ [–].² Meritt suggested “Achilles”, but heroic names are noticeably rare in the fifth century, in Chios as elsewhere.³ Barron suggests the Chian family in which heroic names were revived, that of Ion and Tydeus, and says that “it cannot be altogether fanciful to suggest that the loyalist of 425 with the most heroic of all names was an elder son of the same father [as the loyalist of 412], Ion.”⁴ Consequently, there may have been a long-term connection between the family of Tydeus son of Ion and the Athenians. One should also notice the description of the followers of Tydeus as οἱ μετὰ Τυδέως τοῦ Ἰωνος,⁵ which, as we have seen above,⁶ probably identifies them as a political group. Tydeus, being a friend of Athens, would have his own band of sympathetic friends in Chios whom he could motivate to pro-Athenian activity.

Athens, or Athenians, also probably had connections in Thebes in the 370s. In 379/8, when the Thebans ousted the Spartans from the Cadmeia, since they were expecting a large army from Sparta, they sent to Athens reminding them that they had helped to restore the *demos* of the Athenians when they were enslaved by the Thirty.⁷ According to Diodorus, the Athenians voted at once to send out as large an army as possible as they wished both to pay back the favours they owed (ἀποδιδούς τὰς χάριτας) and to win over the Boeotians.⁸ Though Xenophon’s account is rather different,

¹ IG i³ 70 (though note Lewis’ reservations: “Non cum Meritt consentimus hic de Chiis vel etiam de Chio quodam necessarie agi, si quidem Chii hic solum exemplum status, qui Ach[illi]? datur, praebent.”).

² IG i³ 70.6-9; see also Meritt *Hesperia* 14 (1945) 115-9, esp. 118.

³ Meritt *ibid.*; Barron *Chios* 101.

⁴ *Ibid.* 102.

⁵ Th. 8.38.3

⁶ Note also that Tydeus and his band were put to death ἐπ’ ἄτυκισμῷ (Th. 8.38.3).

⁷ Diod. 15.25.4.

⁸ Diod. 15.26.1.

since in his version the help the Athenians gave was unofficial,¹ the point remains that support of a kind was offered to the Theban exiles out of sympathy for the Theban cause.

Individual Athenians also had connections with states, individuals and pressure groups within states, which were used as the need arose. For example, there was a group of Athenians in Athens with Mytilenean sympathies, of whom Diodotus son of Eucrates was probably one,² who worked to have the decree for the death of the Mytileneans reconsidered;³ and it was through men in Syracuse with whom he was in contact and who regularly reported to him that Nicias hoped in 413 to bring about the downfall of that city.⁴

Conon and Euagoras

Conon son of Timotheus is another example of an Athenian whose private connections influenced interstate policy, through his friendship with Euagoras of Salamis. Euagoras himself had had earlier contacts with Athens, as he was granted citizenship in a decree variously dated between 411 and 407, possibly in connection with negotiations with Tissaphernes.⁵ He also supplied a grain shipment to Athens in 407, when the Spartans were trying to cut off the supply routes from the north.⁶ After the defeat at Aegospotami in 404 Conon fled to Euagoras.⁷ Diodorus says this was on

¹ Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.10, 12; see Cawkwell CQ n.s. 23 (1973) 56-8 (who prefers Diodorus' version); Buck *AHB* 6 (1992) 103-9 (who prefers Xenophon supplemented by Deinarchus (1.38-9) over Diodorus).

² He spoke on behalf of the Mytileneans in the assembly which revoked the decree for the massacre at Mytilene (Th. 3.41.1).

³ Th. 3.36.5.

⁴ Th. 7.48.2, 73.3.

⁵ IG i³ 113; Costa *Historia* 23 (1974) 45-6; Osborne *Naturalization* 1.31-33; 2.22-4; Krentz *Comm.* 179.

⁶ Andoc. 2.20.

⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.29.

account of his *φιλία* with him,¹ so the friendship could have its roots in Euagoras' earlier associations with Athens.

The connection continued. Conon married a Cypriote woman, perhaps a relative of Euagoras,² by whom he had a son.³ His association with Pharnabazus may well have originated in his relationship with Euagoras (Euagoras at least provided the greatest part of the force, according to Isocrates),⁴ and the Athenians voted both Conon and Euagoras special honours for Pharnabazus' assistance in rebuilding their long walls.⁵ In addition, Conon tried to arrange the marriage alliance between Euagoras and Dionysius of Syracuse, in an attempt to detach the Syracusan tyrant from Sparta.⁶

Thrasybulus and the Thracians

As will be suggested in Chapter Four, Thrasybulus of Steiria may have had Thracian connections which influenced his selection to the board of *strategoi* between 410 and 407. In addition, D.F. Middleton has suggested that Thrasybulus effected his pro-democratic *coup* in 404 with the help of Thracian forces.⁷ He suggests that the type of fighting involved was Thracian,⁸ and that, in a decree honouring the heroes from Phyle,⁹ the name of one of the honorands, Gerys, is Thracian, and the name Bendiphanes "is an open statement of an association with the [Thracian]

¹ Diod. 13.106.6; cf. Isoc. 9.53.

² Davies *APF* 508.

³ Lys. 19.36.

⁴ Isoc. 9.56; cf. Diod. 14.39.1; Dem. 20.68.

⁵ Paus. 1.3.2; Isoc. 9.56-7; Dem. 20.68-70; *IG* ii² 20 (for later corrections, additional fragments and comments, see Lewis & Stroud *Hesperia* 48 (1979) 180-93, esp. 186-7).

⁶ Lys. 19.19-20; see also Costa *Historia* 23 (1974) 51-2. For the ambassadors involved in this mission, see Chapter Four 163.

⁷ CQ n.s. 32 (1982) 298-303; see also Herman *Ritualised Friendship* 153.

⁸ Middleton CQ n.s. 32 (1982) 299; see also Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.12, 15, 25, 33 (compare Th. 7.27.1); on peltasts, see: Anderson *Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon* 112-4.

⁹ *IG* ii² 10 + *Addendum* 665 = Tod 100 + *IG* ii² 2403 + SEG 12.84; Osborne *Naturalization* 1.37-41.

goddess.”¹ Middleton claims that this confirms that at least individual Thracians were present in the democratic forces at Peiraeus, and from this concludes that,

A combination of the evidence from names with the known location of the Bendideion and certainty that a style of fighting compatible with Thracians was employed by some of Thrasyboulos’ troops makes stronger the possibility of such a Thracian group.²

Thrasybulus maintained his contacts with Thrace. In 390, on an expedition to the Hellespont, he reconciled the Thracians, Medocus and Seuthes, and made them friends and allies of the Athenians, since he thought that if they were φίλοι they would pay more attention to the Athenians.³

Alcibiades

Alcibiades son of Cleinias belongs in a category almost of his own. Though Athenian, and for some time the darling of Athens, by 415 he was in Sparta advising the Spartans how best to defeat the Athenians. He had many friends across the Greek world, and many friendships which he was prepared to use to help the Athenian cause at some times, the Spartan cause at others, but his own at all times. Whereas Pericles was willing to lay aside the claims of personal connections, as part of the “new style” of politics,⁴ Alcibiades worked vigorously within the “old aristocratic” networks of φίλοι

¹ Middleton CQ n.s. 32 (1982) 300; see Hereward BSA 47 (1952) 117. Middleton (CQ n.s. 32 (1982) 299) also suggests that the situation of the Bendideion, temple of the Thracian goddess, Bendis, in the region of Munychia, makes it “tempting to suggest that this part of the Peiraeus was an area where those Thracians who had settled in Athens might live, in much the same way as the Plataeans did elsewhere, even if their residence was not concentrated there.”

² Middleton CQ n.s. 32 (1982) 300.

³ Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.26; cf. Diod. 14.94.2.

⁴ For example, his ξενία with king Archidamus (Th. 2.13.1; cf. Plut. *Per.* 7.5: he allegedly gave up public associations with his φίλοι; see also Connor *New Politicians* 121-2).



and ξένοι abroad.¹ Alcibiades' politics was personal, with the emphasis on creating and exploiting personal connections for state (and personal) gain.

Alcibiades and Argos

Alcibiades seems to have established his public career in Athens by making and using his personal connections in Argos. Thucydides tells us that he had ξένοι in Argos,² and that the Argives and Mantineians joined the campaign to Sicily in 415 on account of their friendship for him.³ Although Alcibiades was born with many advantages which would naturally launch him in a political career, he used his Argive connections as a vehicle for making himself a leading political figure in Athens by bringing about an alliance with the Argives and continuing to support them and represent them when war was breaking out again with the Spartans.⁴

Alcibiades and the Spartans

Argos was not the only state where Alcibiades had the benefit of personal connections. At Sparta, Endius son of Alcibiades was his ξένος,⁵ and his grandfather had been the Spartan πρόξενος in Athens, a connection which his grandfather had renounced, but Alcibiades tried to re-establish in the 420s.⁶ When events turned sour in Athens for Alcibiades in 415 and he was forced to escape from the Athenians, he first turned to Cyllene in Elis, but then went to Sparta and sought a refuge there.⁷ In addition, it was on account of Alcibiades' encouragement that the Spartans decided to support

¹ Cf. Herman *Ritualised Friendship* 116-8.

² Th. 6.61.3.

³ Th. 6.29.3; cf. 6.61.5.

⁴ For a full discussion of Alcibiades and his Argive connections, see Chapter Four 117-8.

⁵ Th. 8.6.3.

⁶ Th. 5.43.1, 6.89.2.

⁷ Th. 6.88.9. Note, however, the alternative tradition in Isoc. 16.9 and Plut. *Alc.* 23.1-2 that Alcibiades had gone to Argos first (an appropriate place, as we have seen), but was forced to go to Sparta when the Athenians demanded that the Argives give him up.

Tissaphernes' and the Chians' request for help in 412 rather than that of Pharnabazus.¹ When the Spartans hesitated over actually despatching this expedition,² Alcibiades pressed Endius and the other ephors not to shrink from the expedition since he would easily persuade the cities because he was more trustworthy (πιστότερος), and urged Endius to take the credit.³ Andrewes writes that Alcibiades had "confidence in his persuasive powers as great as ever",⁴ but this was no empty boast. He was ἐπιτήδειος to the leading men in Miletus,⁵ and was said to have friends in a number of other Greek cities in Asia Minor, including Chios.⁶

Alcibiades and Pharnabazus

Alcibiades not only made use of hereditary connections, but he was also not averse to forming new relationships on his own initiative. Although he was unsuccessful in his attempt to form a formal friendship with the Persian, Tissaphernes, he did manage to establish a friendship with Pharnabazus, the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia. Xenophon says that Alcibiades and Pharnabazus exchanged oaths through their representatives, declaring that they had made a "common oath" (κοινὸν ὄρκον) and "private pledges of faith with each other" (ἰδίᾳ ἀλλήλοις πίστεις).⁷ According to Nepos, when Alcibiades withdrew from the Chersonese after Aegospotami, he went, firstly, deep into Thrace, and then to Pharnabazus, "whom

¹ Th. 8.6.3.

² Initially because of an earthquake (Th. 8.6.5), then the news of the trouble at Speiraeum disheartened them (Th. 8.10.1-4, 11.3).

³ Th. 8.12.1-2.

⁴ *HCT* 5.25.

⁵ Th. 8.17.2.

⁶ Plut. *Alc.* 12.1, Satyrus *ap.* Athen. 12.534 d, [Andoc.] 4.30; although these are probably romanticised, they still doubtless contain the essence of truth; see Andrewes *HCT* 5.26: "there is no difficulty believing that the Ionian cities paid court to him in the days of his power at Athens."

⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.12. It is perhaps noteworthy that one of Alcibiades' representatives was his cousin, Euryptolemus, who was also among his political φίλοι (Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.19). Alcibiades was master of the art of using all his personal connections, whether at home or abroad.

Alcibiades so caught by his charm, that no one could surpass him in friendship (*amicitia*)", and who gave him Grynium, a fort in Phrygia.¹ Alcibiades' friendship with Pharnabazus proved ill-founded, however, as Pharnabazus organised Alcibiades' death a few years later.²

Alcibiades and the Thracians

Alcibiades, like other Athenians,³ also had ties with the Thraceward district and the Thracians. He had made use of Thracians in his army in 409 when he laid siege to Byzantium,⁴ and when the Athenians were at Lampsacus in 404, Alcibiades, once again exiled from Athens, came from his castle in the Chersonese to warn the Athenians of their position.⁵ Diodorus claims that Alcibiades offered to bring land troops from Thrace from Medocus and Seuthes, saying that they were φίλοι to him.⁶

Alcibiades was a man of infinite resource, who freely made use of his personal connections in the interests of Athens (or whichever *polis* was currently granting him residence) as well as himself, and was always keen to form new relationships and renew old ones when the opportunity arose. Thus, fresh from his failed approaches to Tissaphernes, he seized the opportunity for exchanging private pledges of faith with that other Persian, Pharnabazus. In the same way, it is perfectly in character that, when the Athenians once more grew disillusioned with him, he turned to his overseas friends again. Just as he had gone to Endius and Sparta in 415, he

¹ Nepos, *Alc.* 9.3.

² Diod. 14.11.1-4; Plut. *Alc.* 39.1-7. On the different accounts of Alcibiades' death, see Ellis *Alcibiades* 95-7.

³ Notably Thucydides son of Olorus and Thrasybulus son of Lycus.

⁴ Diod. 13.66.4.

⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.25. Nepos claims that Alcibiades had three forts in the area (*Alc.* 7.4); cf. Xen. *Anab.* 7.3.19, which must be an oblique reference to Alcibiades.

⁶ Diod. 13.105.3; cf. Plut. *Alc.* 36.6-37.3; *Lys.* 10.5-7; Nepos *Alc.* 7.5, 8.2-3; Krentz *Comm.* 176 (who believes in Diodorus' Thracian troops). In support of Diodorus' version of Aegospotami: Ehrhardt *Phoenix* 24 1970 225-8; for a more even-handed treatment: Strauss *AJP* 104 (1983) 24-35.

went to his Thracian φίλοι in the Chersonese in 406. What is more, when it seemed the time was right to curry favour again with the Athenians, he offered to use the troops of his Thracian φίλοι to help Athens, as he had done before. It is ironic that he finally met his end at the hands of one of the friends he had made.

When Greeks deal with Greeks

In the Greek world, inter-personal relations played a part in implementing and, to some extent, determining foreign policy. Racial kinship, or supposed kinship, could provide a good excuse for entering into, or being drawn into, the affairs of another *polis*. Political groups could appeal for help to the major powers in their internal revolutions because of their personal sympathies, and personal friends, such as ξένοι, could form the link between a *polis* and a political group, or any two such groups.

This was a phenomenon which occurred in many Greek communities, yet one gains the impression, though it is difficult to quantify, that it was more marked in Sparta than in Athens. In Sparta, it seems, the “smoke-filled room” of nepotism and personal intrigue was the venue for the formation of foreign policy. What was important was who one’s friends were. In Athens, personal friendships were used to a lesser degree as a means of effecting international negotiation, but when they were used they were used overtly by the *demos*. This difference in political “style” will be investigated further in Chapter Four in terms of magisterial appointments in the *poleis*.

Such relationships could also create tensions and conflict between loyalties. The Greeks themselves were only too well aware of the conflicting obligations to φίλοι and the state, and to φίλοι of different states, particularly when they were at war together. What has sometimes been mistaken as

irony in the shifting of *φιλία* relationships,¹ may reflect a Greek ambiguity when dealing with these confused and, in some ways, artificial relationships. The Greeks did believe in these relationships, but were also aware of their inconsistencies, and, as is reflected in drama,² were troubled by them. These years of turmoil and upheaval, when so much was changing so fast, seem to be rather a period of flux, with interpersonal relationships in interstate affairs were being tested against the needs of the day. Sometimes they were found to be wanting, but often they could be used for the state and by the state.

¹ See Wilson *G&R* 36 (1989) 147-51.

² See esp. Euripides' *Hecuba*.

Chapter Four: **Magisterial Appointments**

Friendship is a disinterested commerce between equals; love, an abject intercourse between tyrants and slaves.

Goldsmith *The Good-Natured Man*

The general trends which were described in the last chapter are also reflected in the domestic politics of the Greek *poleis* in the appointment of magistrates to overseas posts. The overseas friendships of individuals could affect their selection for overseas appointments, though, again, the degree to which this occurred varied from state to state. If one considers the differences in appointment patterns in Athens and Sparta as the two best attested states, one sees that Sparta tended to appoint more men than Athens to overseas posts because of their personal connections with the state to which they were being sent.

This chapter will look at the incidence of this phenomenon in the magisterial appointments of the city-states, considering the selection of military commanders, ambassadors, oath-takers and other miscellaneous positions. It will consider how often personal connections affected selection for overseas posts and offer suggestions about how these results can be explained in terms of the appointment procedures and the style of political activity in the state concerned. Finally, a comparison will be drawn between the relative frequency of this phenomenon in Athens and Sparta.

The statistics to be given below are of limited reliability. We do not know all the office-holders in Athens or elsewhere, and some of those whom we do know may have had foreign connections which are not attested. Equally, we do not know how large a pool of men with foreign connections there was in Athens or in any other state (though we may guess that in Athens after fifty years of the Delian League there was no shortage of

such men). Nevertheless, the difference which will emerge between Athens and Sparta is striking, and in view of the shortage of evidence for Sparta, the true difference is likely to have been even greater.

The first question is why an individual's personal connections abroad could be a determining factor in magisterial appointments. One can easily understand why ambassadors would seem to be more appropriate if they had connections in the state to which they were being sent, for not only would they have a more sympathetic reception, but they could more easily secure an introduction to the governing powers. For example, it was through their Athenian sympathisers that the Mytileneans gained a hearing in the Athenian assembly and managed to have the sentence of death repealed.¹

The point of military commanders with personal connections abroad is not so obvious. However, the rôle of generals in the field did not simply entail directing battles, but could involve *ad hoc* diplomacy of various kinds required by the exigencies of the situation, in which personal relationships could be an advantage, and sometimes the distinction between the rôle of a general and the rôle of an ambassador becomes unclear. The duties performed by military commanders where inter-personal relations would be advantageous included, for example, the collecting of troops, as when Demosthenes used his connections with the Acarnanians and Messenians as a means of acquiring more troops;² making new or renewing old treaties and alliances, as when the Spartan Chalcideus made the treaty with Tissaphernes in 412;³ bringing about the revolt of cities, for example, Nicias'

¹ Th. 3.36.5.

² Th. 3.107.1, 4.9.1, 30.3, 36.1, 41.2, 7.31.5; compare Th. 6.29.3.

³ Th. 8.17.4. On these treaties, see Chapter Five 180-90, 189 n. 3.

attempts to cause a revolt in Syracuse through his contacts there;¹ impromptu diplomatic negotiation, as when Alcibiades negotiated a settlement with the people of Selymbria in 408 which was later ratified at Athens;² or other services in the field, as when Brasidas secured an escort through Thessaly by sending a message to his personal contact at Pharsalus.³

The origin of these connections will only be discussed incidentally in those cases where it is known, as, for the most part, it is only relevant to this present discussion that a connection seems to exist; how it came about is only of secondary importance. It should be noted, however, that there are a number of ways that personal connections could be made. Firstly, personal friendships could be hereditary. Endius' ξενία with Alcibiades⁴ and Megillus' προξενία with Athens provide two examples of this.⁵ Secondly, they could be personal connections formed in a private capacity in the present generation, such as the attempted friendship between Agesilaus and Pharnabazus negotiated through the medium of their common friend, Apollophanes of Cyzicus.⁶ Thirdly, the connection could be formed through contacts made on official missions. The connection of Phormio, the Athenian, with the Acarnanians, and almost certainly a particular Acarnanian family, probably arose out of the alliance he made between Athens and the Acarnanians sometime in the 430s.⁷ Since the Spartans were known for their dislike of travelling,⁸ the Spartan connections in the Hellespont probably came about through missions to the region in the

¹ Th. 7.48.2; cf. 7.73.3.

² Plut. *Alc.* 30.2-10; *IG* i³ 118 (= ML 87).

³ Th. 4.78.1.

⁴ See 175-6.

⁵ Plato *Laws* 1.642 b-d.

⁶ See Chapter Five 203-6.

⁷ See below 111-3.

⁸ Dercylidas was thought to be a notable exception (see 150-1 below).

current generation, though Clearchus' προξενία with Byzantium may have been hereditary.¹ Likewise, the official business of the Delian League in the fifth century must have brought many Athenians into contact with people and states they had not encountered before. Connections could also be made through trade,² or travelling to the panhellenic festivals. What is important is that connections were made between individuals, which, though essentially private in nature, played a significant part in public affairs, so that the public and the private were inextricably intertwined.

Military Commands

Athenian Generals

Most magistrates in Athens were elected by lot; there were only three popularly elected magistracies in which outside influences, such as foreign connections, could be a determining factor in an appointment: generals, ambassadors and oath-takers.³

The *strategoi* at Athens were the group of popularly elected military commanders. Annual elections were held in the spring and ten generals were elected to the board.⁴ Further votes were held as the need arose to decide which generals should be sent on a given campaign.⁵ Although many of the *strategoi* were undoubtedly elected for their military prowess or

¹ On Clearchus, see 149-50 below.

² On the connection between trade and προξενία, see Amit *Athens and the Sea* 128-35.

³ Oath-takers will not be classified simply among the ambassadors, but as a separate category. Not all those who negotiated treaties were elected to receive the oaths. On some occasions, the generals received the oaths, as was the case in 357/6, on others the same men who negotiated the terms were elected again, as was the case in 346, but sometimes another group was elected, perhaps even made up from among both the board of generals and the negotiating embassy, as perhaps occurred for the Peace of Nicias in 421. On this see also Mosley *PCPS* n.s. 7 (1961) 59-63.

⁴ [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 22.2, 44.4, 61.1. For a more detailed explanation of the election of generals at Athens, see 126-43 below.

⁵ See, for example, the sequence of elections which sent Nicias, Alcibiades and Lamachus to Sicily in 415 (Th. 6.8.2; *IG* i³ 93 [= ML 78 b]).

personal influence in Athens, there is evidence to suggest that some, at least, of the *strategoi* were elected to the board because of their specialist interest or personal connections in a particular area. That is not to say that one's international connections were always utilised, but that in some cases they were. The catalogue below includes a selection of those generals from the years 435 to 336 who seem to have personal relationships which influenced election in a particular year.¹ Some clearly have formal ties of *προξενία* or *ξενία*; others are more loosely connected, and for some the suggestion that there may be a personal link can only be inferred.

Phormio son of Asopius and Asopius son of Phormio

Phormio is first known to have served as a *strategos* in 440/39.² At some time probably in the 430s,³ the Ambraciots expelled the Amphilochians from Amphilochian Argos.⁴ Thucydides says that the Amphilochians put themselves into the hands of the Acarnanians, and both then appealed to the Athenians for help, who responded by sending their general Phormio and thirty ships.⁵ It was after this that the alliance between Athens and Acarnania began,⁶ and, apparently, an ongoing relationship between Acarnania and Phormio himself.

At the end of the summer of 431 there was once again trouble in this

¹ For a complete list and discussion of all possible and probable cases in these years, see Appendix B: *Athenian Strategoi*.

² Th. 1.117.2.

³ The date of the expedition and alliance is controversial. Hammond (*Epirus* 496-7) places them before Pericles' campaign of the 450s, and Gomme also (*HCT* 2.416) favours a date in the 450s or 440s. Likewise, Salmon (*Wealthy Corinth* 422-3), who sees the alliance as an attempt by Athens to apply pressure to Corinth, would date it between 454 and 446. Rhodes (*Thucydides II* 248), however, thinks it should be placed "a few years before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War." Hornblower (*Comm.* 353-4) sees the episode as "relevant to the build-up of tension between Corinth and Athens" and thinks a date in the early 430s best (see also id. *Greek World* 88-9), as does Lewis (*CAH V*² 145 n.110).

⁴ Th. 2.68.6.

⁵ Th. 2.68.7.

⁶ Th. 2.68.8.

region, when the Ambraciots and as many of the barbarians as they could raise attacked Amphilocheian Argos and the rest of Amphilochia.¹ In the winter of 430² the Athenians sent Phormio to Naupactus to keep watch in case anyone sailed in or out of Corinth or the Crisaeian Gulf.³ It would appear from the way that Thucydides uses the one event – that is the trouble in Amphilocheian Argos – as the backdrop for the other – Phormio’s despatch to Naupactus – that one is expected to infer their causal relationship. Because Phormio has had positive dealings previously with the region, he is sent there again as one who is, at the least, in sympathy with the people there.⁴

Again in the following summer, when the Ambraciots and Chaonians with the help of the Lacedaemonians made advances against Acarnania, the Acarnanians appealed to Phormio to come to their aid, though he refused not unreasonably to leave Naupactus unguarded.⁵ Yet, in that winter, after the Lacedaemonian fleet had dispersed, Phormio did then make a largely successful campaign in Acarnania before returning in the spring to Athens.⁶

Even after Phormio himself was unavailable, either through death or perhaps through disqualification for election, the connection between the Acarnanians and the family of Phormio continued. In the following summer, when the Acarnanians requested that “either a son or kinsman” (ἢ υἱὸν ἢ ξυγγενῆ) of Phormio be sent to them, the Athenians despatched his

¹ Th. 2.68.1.

² Phormio was also *strategos* in 432/1 and served at Poteidaea (Th. 1.64.2; cf. 2.29.6, 58.2; 3.17.4; Diod. 12.37.1; Isoc. 16.29).

³ Th. 2.69.1.

⁴ See also Jacoby Supp. I 131.

⁵ Th. 2.81.1; cf. 80.1

⁶ Th. 2.102.1, 103.1.

son, Asopius, as *strategos* in command of thirty ships.¹

What is more, in about 400, the Athenians passed a decree reaffirming Athenian citizenship for Phormio, the Acarnanian, which he had inherited from his grandfather.² *Ξενία* relationships were often marked by giving the name of one's *ξένο*s to one's son.³ It seems reasonable to infer from the citizenship grant to the Acarnanian that Phormio, the Athenian, formed a *ξενία* relationship with an Acarnanian, probably at the time the alliance was made. So it would appear that there was a strong personal tie between Phormio, the Athenian *strategos*, and an Acarnanian family, making him a suitable choice for an appointment to this area.

Hagnon son of Nicias

Hagnon son of Nicias of Steiria,⁴ of tribe III, was also one of the generals in Samos in 440/39, where he is first known to have served as *strategos* with Phormio.⁵ In 437/6 Hagnon was sent to Thrace as *oikistes* of Amphipolis, thus establishing a personal connection with the city which was maintained until Brasidas took Amphipolis in 424.⁶ Then in 431/0 Hagnon was sent with Cleopompus son of Cleinias to lay siege to Poteidaea, being, as Hornblower remarks, "something of a northern expert".⁷ This expedition began in the summer of 431, and Hagnon returned with the fleet

¹ Th. 3.7.1; see also Hornblower *Comm.* 387-8. Asopius was killed on this campaign (Th. 3.7.4).

² IG ii² 237.15-21 (= Tod 178); see Osborne *Naturalization* 3.44.

³ On this, see Herman *Ritualised Friendship* 19-21. In this way names would be passed down the generations. A notorious example from the fifth century is Alcibiades son of Cleinias of Athens and his Spartan *ξένο*s, Endius son of Alcibiades.

⁴ The demotic is inferred from that of his son Theramenes: see esp. Pesely *Athenaeum* 67 (1989) 191-209.

⁵ Th. 1.117.2; see Fornara *Generals* 49-50; Develin *Officials* 91.

⁶ Th. 4.102.3, cf. 5.11.1.

⁷ Th. 2.58.1; Hornblower *Comm.* 329.

about forty days later in the new archon-year of 430/29, after the start of the new *strategia* for that year, and presumably remained in office.¹ In 429 Hagnon was again to be found in Thrace with Sitalces, acting as *hegemon*, probably of the Athenian troops which were expected.² Hagnon's last known involvement in international affairs was when he appears as one of the signatories to the Peace of Nicias in 422/1.³

Hagnon's international career centred on Thrace. Having a strong connection with the Thraceward parts as the founder of Amphipolis, he was an obvious choice for a general to work in this region, where he was prominent from 431 to 429.

Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes

Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes of Aphidna (tribe IX) probably first held the *strategia* in 427/6.⁴ Late in the archon-year of 427/6 Demosthenes and Procles were sent on an expedition around the Peloponnese.⁵ Early in the new archon-year of 426/5,⁶ their first action was to ambush and to destroy a Leucadian garrison in Ellomenus,⁷ before marching on Leucas with the help of all the Acarnanians (except Oeniadae), and the Zacynthians,

¹ Th. 2.58.3; see also Gomme *HCT* 2.164; Fornara *Generals* 54-5; Develin *Officials* 119. For discussion of the year of office for the *strategoi*, see Pritchett *AJP* 61 (1940) 469-474, *contra* Mayor *JHS* 59 (1939) 45-64.

² See discussion 133-4 below.

³ See also Andrewes & Lewis *JHS* 77 (1957) 177-80.

⁴ There are two possibilities. Since the spring elections for the year 426/5 had already taken place, either he was a regularly elected general for the year 427/6 and had already been elected for the year 426/5, so had been sent out on a campaign late in the year in the knowledge that it would continue into the next year, or he was elected in the spring of 426/5 and sent out early as one of the incoming generals on a campaign that would continue into the new year.

⁵ Th. 3.91.1.

⁶ Demosthenes was definitely a general in this year: see Lewis *JHS* 81 (1961) 119-20; Rhodes *Thucydides III* 255 *contra* Fornara *Generals* 57-8; Develin *Officials* 127.

⁷ Th. 3.94.1.

Cephalenians and Corcyraeans.¹

The Acarnanians wished to wall in the city, but Demosthenes was persuaded instead by the Messenians of Naupactus to attack the Aetolians.² Though Demosthenes' main reason for being won over to the Messenian plan was perhaps that this would provide him with a route to Boeotia,³ he was also persuaded by the χάρις this would bring for the Messenians. By acceding to their wishes, albeit pleasing to himself, and so performing a χάρις for the Messenians, Demosthenes was laying the building blocks for a relationship with them which was to bring him returns later on. However, when Demosthenes sailed on to Sollium and made his plans known to the Acarnanians, they, in a fit of petulance, remained behind because he had refused to gratify them.⁴ In the end, the attempt on Aetolia was disastrous, and Demosthenes remained at Naupactus rather than go home, for, Thucydides says, he was afraid of the Athenians because of what had happened.⁵

It is probable that he was deposed before the end of the year 426/5,⁶ though he remained at Naupactus and called on Acarnanian troops when he heard of the impending attack of the Spartans.⁷ The Acarnanians came, though reluctantly, and the Spartans withdrew.⁸ When, in the same winter, the Ambraciots made an attack on Amphilochean Argos, the Acarnanians called on Demosthenes to be the *hegemon* of the allied Acarnanian and

¹ Th. 3.94.1.

² Th. 3.94.2-3.

³ This has been much discussed: see most recently Rhodes *Thucydides III* 252.

⁴ Th. 3.95.1-2.

⁵ Th. 3.96.1-98.5.

⁶ See Th. 4.2.4: Demosthenes is described as *idiotes* though it is still in the archon-year 426/5; see Rhodes *Thucydides III* 255; Lewis *JHS* 81 (1961) 119-20; *contra* Gomme *HCT* 3.437-8; Fornara *Generals* 57.

⁷ Th. 3.102.3.

⁸ Th. 3.102.3-7.

Amphilochian army, as well as summoning the two Athenian generals who happened to be off the coast of the Peloponnese.¹ Demosthenes arrived, significantly, with two hundred Messenian hoplites and sixty Athenian bowmen.² Despite these unpromising beginnings, it would seem from later events that this was also the start of a continuing relationship between Demosthenes and the Acarnanians. For when in 424/3 Demosthenes was *strategos* once more in Naupactus, engaged in negotiations for revolution in Boeotia, he recruited troops from among the Acarnanians and other allies there.³

Demosthenes also developed a strong Messenian connection. At the beginning of the following summer, after his return from Acarnania, though now *idiotes*, Demosthenes was given the use at his discretion of the forty ships which were sent to Sicily with the elected *strategoï*, Eurymedon and Sophocles.⁴ Thucydides writes that as they were sailing about Laconia on the way to Corcyra, Demosthenes requested that they put in at Pylos.⁵ But the two generals were unwilling, though in the end they were forced to do this because of a storm.⁶ Again, when Demosthenes wished to fortify the place (for, Thucydides writes, this was the reason he had sailed with them), Eurymedon and Sophocles were reluctant, as they thought there were other headlands along the Peloponnesian coast which he could fortify if he wished to put the city to the expense.⁷ However, Thucydides says, this place seemed better than any other to him not only because there was a harbour

¹ Th. 3.105.3, 107.2.

² Th. 3.107.1.

³ Th. 4.76.1-2, 77.

⁴ Th. 4.2.

⁵ Th. 4.3.1.

⁶ Th. 4.3.1.

⁷ Th. 4.3.1-3. Note, however, that Thucydides may have exaggerated the reluctance of Eurymedon and Sophocles to make the success at Pylos appear more accidental than it actually was.

but also because it was the ancient home of the Messenians, which they regarded as their fatherland.¹ Later, after Pylos was fortified, other Messenians, who happened to be present, were brought in as hoplites.² Demosthenes was able to exploit his earlier favour for them, and it seems a reciprocal relationship had followed. He did what they wished at Leucas, so they provided troops and ships for him. In addition, Thucydides makes it plain that Demosthenes intended to fortify Pylos when he left Athens, and states twice that this place was once part of Messenia. By choosing Pylos from among other places which would be equal in terms of their other advantages, as Sophocles and Eurymedon point out, Demosthenes chose the place which would gratify the Messenians and ensure their assistance.

Demosthenes was *strategos* again in 414, when he went once more to Acarnania on his way to Sicily, taking up Cephallenian and Zacynthian hoplites and sending for the Messenians from Naupactus.³ What is more, in the catalogue of Athenian allies at Syracuse, Thucydides writes that some of the Acarnanians came for pay, but the majority were allies because of their *φιλία* for Demosthenes and good-will (*εὐνοία*) for the Athenians.⁴ Demosthenes provides us with an example of a man who, it seems, in order to facilitate his rôle as general, first formed and then continued to exploit personal relations he had made in an international context.

Alcibiades and Argos

Alcibiades had *ξένοι* in Argos,⁵ and his early magisterial career centred upon Argos. In 420 he was instrumental in forming an alliance

¹ Th. 4.3.3, 41.2.

² Th. 4.9.1; see also 4.41.2.

³ Th. 7.31.2.

⁴ Th. 7.57.10.

⁵ Th. 6.61.3. See also Chapter Three 102.

between Athens and Argos, and was subsequently elected to the board of generals for 420/19.¹ In 419/8, as a regularly elected general and in concert with the Argives, he marched into the Peloponnese.² Later in the same year he was sent to help the Argives at Epidaurus.³ In 418/7 he was sent with the Athenian forces to Mantinea to help the Argives, perhaps as a *strategos*, but certainly as *presbeutes*.⁴ And when, in this year, Lichas the Spartan πρόξενος of the Argives arrived in Argos with proposals for peace, Thucydides says that he was hindered by the presence of Alcibiades.⁵ In 417/6, after an attempted coup in Argos, the Athenians sent Alcibiades to Argos with twenty ships to take into custody as many of the Argives as still seemed to be suspicious and looking to the interests of Sparta,⁶ and in 415 Thucydides says that the Argives and Mantineians took part in the war against Sicily because of Alcibiades.⁷

Iphicrates son of Timotheus⁸

Perhaps there is little that can be said conclusively about Iphicrates, but the evidence perhaps suggests that his election in the 380s and again in the mid-360s and his subsequent despatch to the north (though these were by no means the only commands he held in his long career) may be attributed to his connections with the northern kings.

Iphicrates' origins may have been humble, and his father is known in the tradition as a cobbler.⁹ Despite this, he inherited, or, more probably

¹ Plut. *Nic.* 10.9; see Th. 5.43.1-47.12, esp. 43.2; for chronology, see Andrewes *HCT* 4. 69.

² Th. 5.52.2.

³ Th. 5.53.

⁴ Th. 5.61.2; perhaps also to be restored in IG i³ 370.17 (= ML 77). See also Appendix B: *Athenian Strategoi* 313 n. 2.

⁵ Th. 5.76.3.

⁶ Th. 5.84.1.

⁷ Th. 6.29.3.

⁸ On Iphicrates' relations with the Thracians, see Chapter Six 232-4.

⁹ Plut. *Mor.* 186 f; Suidas s.v. Iphicrates (I 772); Davies *APF* 248; cf. Arist. *Rhet.* 1367 b 17-8; Plut. *Mor.* 187 b.

developed on his own account,¹ connections with the royal families of the north, becoming the adopted son of Amyntas, the Macedonian king,² and marrying the daughter or sister³ of Cotys, one of the kings of Thrace, in the 380s.⁴

Iphicrates' first known command (though possibly not as a *strategos*), probably from 393 until 390,⁵ was at Corinth, where he was in charge of mercenary forces,⁶ which may have been recruited in Thrace by Conon.⁷ In 389, the Athenians sent Iphicrates to the Chersonese against the Spartan *Nauarchos*,⁸ Anaxibius, and Iphicrates eventually ambushed him at Abydos.⁹ It may well have been desirable to have someone in this sensitive region¹⁰ with the right kind of connections, and, indeed, Iphicrates seems to have lent assistance to the Thracian, Seuthes II, while in the area.¹¹

From 368 to 365, Iphicrates again served in the north, this time against Amphipolis.¹² Once again, while he was in the region, he assisted in the local monarchic disputes, driving out Pausanias, the pretender to the Macedonian throne, at the request of Eurydice, the wife of the dead king

¹ Rehdantz (*Vitae Iphicratis, Chabriae, Timothei Atheniensium* 29) conjectures that Iphicrates had a family connection with Thrace, and both Parke (*Greek Mercenary Soldiers* 52) and Davies (*APF* 249) tentatively support this. Yet there is no reason to suppose that Iphicrates did not form these relationships on his own initiative. He was not the only *nouus homo* of the fourth century: Chares son of Theochares is probably also a self-made man who created his own destiny. In the fifth century, Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes seems to be another who established his credentials by launching his career from the north-west; cf. above.

² Aeschin. 2. 28.

³ See Davies *APF* 249.

⁴ Dem. 23.129; Anaxandrides *ap.* Athen. 4.131 a-f; Nepos *Iph.* 23.4. On the date, see Davies *APF* 249.

⁵ See Appendix B: *Athenian Strategoi* 321.

⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.9; Diod. 14.86.3.

⁷ Parke *Greek Mercenary Soldiers* 50-1; see also Nepos *Iph.* 13-4.

⁸ I am using *Nauarchos/Nauarchoi* to refer to the supreme command of the fleet, and *nauarch* to refer to the subordinate commander of a squadron of ships.

⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.33-9.

¹⁰ See Chapter Six 223-5.

¹¹ Nepos *Iph.* 2.1.

¹² Dem. 23.149; Aeschin 2.27; Nepos *Iph.* 3.2. Aeschines implies he was elected specifically for this campaign (ἐχειροτόνησαν Ἀθηναῖοι στρατηγὸν ἐπ' Ἀμφίπολιν Ἰφικράτην), though he is probably referring to the votes which appointed the members of the annual board of generals to specific commands.

Amyntas.¹ When the Athenians replaced him with Timotheus,² he retired to Cotys and the Thracian court, where he gave Cotys his help against the Athenians.³ It is not possible to prove that Iphicrates was elected to the board because of these northern connections, yet his associations with these northern kingdoms, though they may indeed have been formed with his own interests more than with the interests of Athens in mind,⁴ may have seemed convenient to his fellow countrymen at the time when war was clearly brewing in these northern parts.

Charidemus son of Philoxenus

Charidemus was a Euboean from Oreus,⁵ and was granted Athenian citizenship, probably in 357/6, as a return favour to the Thracian king, Cersobleptes, after the conclusion of the peace with Chares.⁶ He served as an Athenian general in 351, perhaps continuing into 350, and in 349/8.⁷ Charidemus' early career was chequered, and shows more his propensity for looking to his own survival than any loyalty to a king or country. He had served as a mercenary commander in the north, first with Iphicrates at Amphipolis,⁸ then with Cotys against the Athenians,⁹ before joining Timotheus at Amphipolis.¹⁰ After he had been discharged from Timotheus'

¹ Aeschin. 2.26-9.

² Dem. 23.149.

³ Dem. 23.130; see also Parke *Greek Mercenary Soldiers* 127.

⁴ Iphicrates went so far as to fight with Cotys, his ?father/brother-in-law, against the Athenians (Dem. 23.130), in an ultimately misguided and ill-judged loyalty to his royal relation.

⁵ Dem. 23.213

⁶ Parke *Greek Mercenary Soldiers* 132; Davies *APF* 571; see also Appendix B: *Athenian Strategoi* 327 n. 2. On the treaty, see Dem. 23.167-76.

⁷ See Develin *Officials* 310, 312-3. Note, however, that Develin's conjectured *strategia* in 361 is unlikely to be correct; see Appendix B: *Athenian Strategoi* 327 n. 2.

⁸ Dem. 23.149.

⁹ Dem. 23.131-2.

¹⁰ He was captured by Timotheus on his way from Cardia to Amphipolis to help them against the Athenians. Timotheus, in his extreme need, we are told, took him into his service (Dem. 23.150).

service, he hired himself and his troops out to Memnon and Mentor, the sons-in-law of Artabazus, who were gathering troops to release their father-in-law.¹ But when he found the cities of Scepsis, Cebren and Ilium unguarded, he captured them.² On his release, Artabazus collected an army and came against him, so Charidemus turned to the Athenians and promised in a letter that he would hand over the Chersonese to them if they came to his aid.³ Yet when Artabazus unexpectedly let Charidemus go, he crossed to the Chersonese and once more entered the service of Cotys, and laid siege to the last remaining Athenian strongholds in the Chersonese.⁴ On Cotys' death, Charidemus remained in the service of Cersobleptes, married his sister, and continued to make war on the Athenians until peace was at last successfully negotiated in 357.⁵

Charidemus was undoubtedly a man with strong northern connections, though rather dubious loyalties. In 351, the Athenians sent him to Thrace to meet the expected attack of Philip, though the expedition was abandoned when news came that Philip was either ill or dead.⁶ Again, in spring 348, when the Chalcidians sent to Athens for help, Philochorus says they despatched Charidemus, their general in the Hellespont (τὸν ἐν Ἑλλησπόντῳ στρατηγόν).⁷ It is likely that he won election and the Hellespont command through his northern expertise.

Three main factors emerge from this discussion. Firstly, *strategoi* could be elected because of their personal connections. The ethos of personal

¹ Dem. 23.154.

² Dem. 23.154-5.

³ Dem. 23.155-6.

⁴ Dem. 23.157-8.

⁵ Dem. 23.129, 163-7, 169-74; IG ii² 126 (= Tod 151); see also Parke *Greek Mercenary Soldiers* 130-2.

⁶ Dem. 3.5.

⁷ Philochorus *FGrHist* 328 F 50.

friendships abroad developed out of ancient aristocratic networks of ξενία, but, in the fifth and fourth centuries, non-aristocrats, such as Demosthenes and Iphicrates, and even naturalised citizens, such as Charidemus, were able to develop personal connections abroad and use them as a means of acquiring high office. This implies that the *demos* was willing, at least to some extent, to work through connections of this kind, and that these connections were not perceived to be, by their nature, opposed to the interests of the *demos*.

Secondly, if one looks at where the *strategoi* whose connections were utilised were sent, it will be noticed that personal connections consistently influenced election when the theatres for the war were at the fringes of the Greek world, particularly the north-west and the Thraceward parts. Contrary to the general opinion that special competencies were only regularly given to particular generals in the latter part of the fourth century, Fornara argues that it was after the defeat at Syracuse and the revolution in 411 that instances occur of "the apportionment of particular commands to certain generals", and cites as examples of this movement the practice of assigning particular generals to Naupactus and Thrace.¹ He writes: "The oligarchic movement probably had something to do with the new system of apportionment apparently adopted, for it is a notable step away from the thoroughly democratic procedure of election of generals without regard to prospective duties."²

Two comments should be made in response to Fornara's assessment of the situation. Firstly, the apportionment of commands to Thrace and the north-west demonstrably pre-dates the disaster in Sicily. For example, Phormio held the command at Naupactus in 430/29 and 429/8 and was succeeded in his command in 428/7 by his son Asopius. Eurymedon son of

¹ Fornara *Generals* 79-80.

² *Ibid.* 80.

Thucles served on campaigns to Corcyra and Sicily in 427/6, 426/5, 425/4, 414/3 and 413/2. Hagnon was active in Thrace in 431/0, 430/29 and 429/8, Thucydides son of Olorus in 424/3, and Dieitrephes son of Nicostratus in 414/13 and 411. What is more, all these men appear to have been elected to these commands because of their personal connections with the area. But this specialisation by region is not quite the same thing as the specialisation of functions of *Athenaion Politeia* 61.1.¹ The emphasis is on a different aspect of the command: in the *Athenaion Politeia* the emphasis is on the function of the office and there is a specific post to be filled each year, whereas here the point is that the link is with a particular region and that no one place regularly had to have, by constitution, a *strategos* appointed to it.

This suggests the second point, which is a theme which will be developed throughout this thesis: that it was easier to deal with states and *poleis* on the fringes of the Greek world by means of personal connections. As will be seen in the following chapters, the Athenians did not always deal with these outlying communities as successfully as they might have done. But they did attempt to deal with societies who were not institutionalised in the same way as they were by personal rather than institutional means.

The third point that arises from this discussion of the Athenian generals is that, although the Athenians did sometimes use personal connections as a basis of selection, they did not do this in every case, or even in most cases. The table below gives a list of all *strategoí* who seem to have been elected on the basis of their connections:²

¹ Fornara sees these long-term commands to Thrace and Naupactus as the forerunner of commands such as ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν, for example (*ibid.* 79-80). On [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 61.1, see Rhodes *Comm.* 678-9.

² For a discussion of all cases, see Appendix B: *Athenian Strategoi*.

Athenian Strategoi with relevant connections(These are marked with † in Appendix B. For a discussion of all cases, see Appendix B)¹

<i>Strategos</i>	<i>Connection</i>	<i>Years of Relevant Appointment</i>
?Diotimus son of Strombichus	Corcyraeans/Southern Italy	433/2
Hagnon son of Nicias	Thrace/Amphipolis	431/0, 430/29, 429/8
Phormio son of Asopius	Acarnanians/Naupactus	430/29, 429/8
Asopius son of Phormio	Acarnanians	428/7
Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes	Acarnania/Messenians	(427/6), 426/5, 425/4, 414/3
Eurymedon son of Thucles	Corcyra	(427/6), 426/5, 425/4, 414/3
?Pythodorus son of Isolochus	Sicily/Southern Italy	426/5
Lamachus son of Xenophanes	Black Sea area	425/4, 424/3
Thucydides son of Olorus	Thrace	424/3
Alcibiades son of Cleinias	Argos	420/19, 419/8, 417/6
?Laches son of Melanopus	Sparta	418/7
Dietrephes son of Nicostratus	Thrace	(414/3), 411 (under 400)
Conon son of Timotheus	Naupactus/Acarnania	(414/3), 411 (under 5000)
Thrasybulus son of Lycus	Thrace	(410/9), 409/8, 408/7
Phanosthenes (from Andros, but naturalised Athenian)	Andros	407/6
Iphicrates son of Timotheus	Thrace	389/8, 388/7, 367/6, 366/5, 365/4
Timotheus son of Conon	Corcyra/Acarnania/satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia	375/4, 374/3, 367/6, 365/4
Aristophon son of Aristophanes	Ceos	363/2
Charidemus son of Philoxenus	Thrace	351/0, 350/49, 349/8
Phocion son of Phocus	Byzantium	340/39

¹ ? indicates those cases where the connection is more tentative.

() indicates that a connection may be either pre-existing or established in this year, but there is no evidence that it already existed. This year will not be included in the statistics.

Out of three hundred and sixty-two individual attested appointments in the years of this study, only forty, about eleven per cent, show any sign of having been made on the basis of personal connections.¹ Of course, other cases may have been affected by personal connections of which no evidence survives – but the same can be said of Sparta, where the proportion of appointments which appear to have been affected by personal connections is much higher.² Although personal connections are an influence in the election of generals which must be taken into account, they are obviously not the only criterion for selection.

What other factors affected selection? Obviously men with military prowess, established military careers, personal influence and charisma, men such as Pericles, Alcibiades, Iphicrates or Chares, secured election more readily than those without. However, there seems to be an element of the “democratic spirit” in each man having his turn in the *strategia*. Fifty-eight out of the ninety-five attested generals during the years of the Peloponnesian War (excluding 411), the best attested years, are known to have served on the board of generals only once.³ Fourteen of these were prevented from serving a second time either through death, exile, or some other misfortune. Only fifteen men are known to have served on the board for four years or more, and twelve of these were eventually killed or otherwise prevented from serving on the board again. So most known generals served for less than four years, and the bulk of these for only one year, and the majority of these are not known to have died in battle. There are a large number of men who served as *strategoi* without, seemingly,

¹ There is no point in calculating more precisely when the evidence is so far from complete. 362 is the total of appointments listed in Appendix B: *Athenian Strategoi* as possible or certain (excluding the italicised “unofficial positions” on 312, 318-9).

² See 152-3 below.

³ For a summary of the *strategoi* during the Peloponnesian War, the years they served, and the reason (when it is known) for not being re-elected, see Appendix F: *Strategoi During the Peloponnesian War*.

developing their military career. Like the archons and petty magistrates chosen by sortition, are they simply having their turn?

How do we reconcile all these factors with what we know about the actual procedure of appointing magistrates? Is it possible to reconstruct a way of doing things that takes all this into account and is consistent with the other evidence for the election of generals?

Election of Generals

It is known from the *Athenaion Politeia* that, unlike most other magistrates, the ten *strategoi* at Athens were elected by show of hands in the *ecclesia*, originally one from each tribe, but later ἐξ πάντων.¹ It is thought that, as an interim change to non-tribal representation, the tribal system of election was modified at some point around the mid-fifth century² so that a single tribe could elect more than one representative in any one year. It used to be assumed that nine generals were elected by tribe, and the tenth chosen from all tribes.³ This tenth general was supposedly given extraordinary powers over his colleagues, as a στρατηγὸς ἐξ πάντων, either to provide a commander-in-chief or chairman of the board, or to confer a special honour upon someone, or to allow another member of Pericles' tribe to stand as well.⁴ The formulation of this theory of a στρατηγὸς ἐξ πάντων was largely due to the fact that the earliest certain cases of double representation involved a doubling with Pericles. The first example of such double

¹ [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 22.2, 44.4, 61.1.

² If the evidence of Plut. *Cimon* 8.8 is to be accepted, any modification of strictly tribal representation probably postdates 469.

³ See for example, Hignett *A History of the Athenian Constitution* 348-54.

⁴ As summarised by Fornara *Generals* 21; see for example, Hignett *A History of the Athenian Constitution* 352; Jameson *TAPA* 86 (1955) 63-87; Dover *JHS* 80 (1960) 61-77; Lewis *JHS* 81 (1961) 118-123 (though Lewis concedes that "few would wish to admit that 'double-doubles' are impossible" [118 n. 7]).

representation may have been as early as 460/59,¹ but it at least occurred in 441/0 when Pericles son of Xanthippus, of Cholargus, and Glaucon son of Leagrus, of Cerameis, both represent Acamantis.² Glaucon and Pericles again both represent their tribe in 439/8,³ in 435/4⁴ and in 433/2.⁵ In 432/1⁶ and possibly 431/0⁷ Carcinus son of Xenotimus, of Thoricus, was paired with Pericles. According to this view, these were the only cases of double representation before Pericles' death, and the only other certain occurrence of double representation was in 407/6, when Alcibiades was doubled with Adeimantus from tribe V.⁸ Thus it was assumed that no tribe could supply more than two generals in a single year and that only one tribe in each year could supply two generals, one of these being a στρατηγὸς ἐξ πάντων.⁹

Tribal elections

However, in recent years this view has come under serious attack. Fornara rejects outright this theory and the limitations it imposes upon the multiple election of generals from one tribe, finding instances from 433/2 of double-doubles and even a triple representation from one tribe.¹⁰ He goes so far as to claim that the tribal basis for election was completely abandoned at some time between 469/8 and 460/59.¹¹ The fact remains, however, that not all his demotics and tribal affiliations in these crucial cases are secure, and

¹ Fornara *Generals* 19, 44. For an attempt to place this even earlier (in 479/8), see Bicknell *Studies in Athenian Politics and Genealogy* 101-10.

² See Androtion *FGrHist* 324 F 38. For problems raised by the eleventh name on Androtion's list and further references: Jacoby *Supp.* I 148-50; Fornara *Generals* 49; Develin *Officials* 89.

³ *Plut. Per.* 16.3; *IG* i³ 48.44 (= *ML* 56.30); see Fornara *Generals* 50; Hignett *A History of the Athenian Constitution* 349.

⁴ *Per. Per.* 16.3; *IG* i³ 464.105.

⁵ *Plut. Per.* 16.3; *IG* i³ 364.19-20 (= *ML* 61).

⁶ *Th.* 2.13.1, 23.2.

⁷ *Th.* 2.31.1; Fornara *Generals* 53.

⁸ Hignett *A History of the Athenian Constitution* 349.

⁹ *Ibid.* 354.

¹⁰ Fornara claims, rather strongly, that, "They are make-shifts supporting a make-shift theory": *Generals* 22-27, 51 (433/2), 52 (432/1), 53 (431/0), 57-8 (426/5).

¹¹ *Ibid.* 22-7.

there are a number of years during the Peloponnesian War, and even as late as 357/6, when, despite possible doubles, there appears to be a relatively even spread of representation across the tribes.

If one considers years in the period 435 to 336 where seven or more generals are known, one finds that the number of tribes covered is more than would be likely if selection was purely random. For example, in 433/2 there are nine known *strategoi* representing at least seven and perhaps eight of the ten tribes, and in 424/3 there are nine *strategoi* from at least seven tribes. Similar tribal distributions are evident throughout the years of the Peloponnesian War.¹ In the fourth century, there are few years when enough of the *strategoi* are known, but in 357/6 there are eight known generals representing seven tribes; again too many, one would suppose, for a random spread across the tribes. Thus in years between 435 and 357 when we have a high proportion of the *strategoi* and their demotics are known, there is also a high coverage of tribes. We know that tribally based elections were abandoned by the time the *Athenaion Politeia* was written,² but the earliest date for non-tribal election must post-date 357/6. It seems clear, therefore, that in this period, although there may have been no limitation on the number of doubles in any one year, the election of generals remained tribally based.³

Modified Tribal Election

Despite the fact that the election of *strategoi* seems to have been still largely by tribe, the system of election was modified at some point in the fifth century so that double representation of a single tribe could occur, at

¹ See also 425/4, 414/3, 410/9.

² [Arist.] *Ath Pol.* 61.1: Χειροτονοῦσι δὲ καὶ τὰς πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἀρχὰς ἀπάσας, στρατηγούς δέκα, πρότερον μὲν ἀφ' ἐκάστης φυλῆς ἓνα, νῦν δ' ἐξ ἀπάντων.

³ See Rhodes *GR&BS* 22 (1981) 130. This is not to say, however, that the *strategos* elected from a tribe led a contingent in battle from the corresponding tribe: see Hammond *CQ* n.s. 19 (1969) esp. 113-4 (= *Studies in Greek History* esp. 350); cf. Rhodes *Comm.* 264.

least throughout the period of Periclean dominance, and even double-doubles seem likely.

Doubles and the alleged στρατηγὸς ἐξ ὁπάντων

It has been argued by Hignett, among others,¹ in an attempt to explain the double representation of tribes that the innovation of electing a second general from any one tribe was “introduced during the ascendancy of Perikles to overcome the difficulty created by his continuous tenure of the *strategia* for several years ... As long as he monopolized the representation of Akamantis on the board, other candidates from his tribe, however worthy, would find the *strategia* barred to them” and “the choice in any particular year of a single general ἐξ ὁπάντων was simply an expedient to surmount the difficulty created by the continuous re-election of Perikles.”² He also argues that Pericles was given exceptional powers in the early years of the Peloponnesian War, on the grounds that Thucydides describes him as δέκατος αὐτός in 431.³

Dover has convincingly argued against this last contention.⁴ While not questioning whether there could be one or more doubles in a year, he effectively demonstrates that, if there was election ἐξ ὁπάντων, it conferred no special authority on the man so elected. More recently, scholars have tried to account for the doubles by looking at voting procedure, and reconstructing a voting procedure which might allow the election of two men from one tribe.

¹ Eg. Wade-Gery *Essays in Greek History* 115; Jameson *TAPA* 86 (1955) 63-87.

² Hignett *A History of the Athenian Constitution* 352.

³ *Ibid.* 248-9 on Th. 2.13.1.

⁴ Dover *JHS* 80 (1960) 62-77; contra Bloedow *Chiron* 11 (1981) 71; cf. Harding *Androtion and the Atthis* 145-6.

Piérart & Hansen

We know from the *Athenaion Politeia* that *strategoi* were elected by the assembly and that the presiding officials “judged the show of hands” (τὰς χειροτονίας κρίνουσιν).¹ Some have taken this to mean that the hands were counted precisely.² Others have seen that the verb [κρίνειν] “has added point, if ... votes were not precisely counted when taken by show of hands.”³ This second alternative is more reasonable given difficulties of counting such large numbers.⁴ This would exclude any suggested method for election which requires an accurate count of votes.⁵ If we assume that the votes were estimated, the easiest method of determining selection would be by making a choice between two alternatives.⁶

Piérart has suggested a system whereby tribes were called up one at a time and nominations put forward for candidates.⁷ Votes would then be invited both for and against each candidate in turn. If the majority voted against, the candidate would be defeated and they would then move on to the next candidate for that tribe. The process would then be repeated until one candidate was successful.⁸ This would mean a tribe might not be represented if no candidate was able to achieve a positive majority. In the period when there had to be one *strategos* representing each tribe, the candidates from those tribes which failed to approve a candidate would have to be voted on again until one was elected. After tribal election was modified, however, Piérart suggests that the vote was then taken on the

¹ [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 44.4, 61.1 (election of generals), 44.3 (κρίνειν).

² Boegehold *Hesperia* 32 (1963) 366-74.

³ Rhodes *Comm.* 535; cf. Hansen *The Athenian Democracy* 147-8.

⁴ Cf. Hansen *The Athenian Ecclesia* <1> 207-26.

⁵ Eg. Staveley in *Ancient Society and Institutions* 275-88.

⁶ Rhodes *GR&BS* 22 (1981) 132.

⁷ Piérart *BCH* 98 (1974) 125-46.

⁸ However, notice a decree from Delphi in 160/59, which says that officials are elected according to who gets the largest number of votes (SIG³ 671.B = *Fouilles de Delphes* III.iii.239, 14-9 [with improved restorations by Wilhelm *Griechische Inschriften rechtlichen Inhalts* 2 51-2 = id. *Akademieschriften zur griechischen Inschriftenkunde* 3.445-6]). Delphi was a much smaller state.

pool of all those candidates who were unsuccessful in the first round until enough had gained a majority so that the full board of ten was made up.

Hansen, while agreeing in essence with this system, suggests that candidates were proposed one by one and the assembly voted for or against that candidate.

As soon as ten candidates had secured a majority, any new candidates could only be proposed in opposition to one of those already elected, and the vote was between those two. If the new opponent got the majority, he ousted his opponent. The proceedings were terminated as soon as no more candidates come [sic] to the fore. If a board had to comprise one representative from each tribe, the process was possibly as follows. A candidate from tribe I was proposed, and the people voted for or against him. The first candidate to get a majority was elected unless a named opponent to him was proposed, in which case the vote was a vote between the two of them. When no more candidates were proposed, the people proceeded to the next tribe, and so on.¹

Both theories do account for a tribally based system and work equally well if more than one general is required from some tribes to make up the number, but both fail to meet all the requirements which the evidence demands. There is a fundamental problem with both these solutions. Piérart's system assumes that, if there are two generals elected in a tribe, one of the generals was elected in preference to the other; that one is, in effect, a second choice. That neither of the *strategoi* in a double was elected as second choice can be shown from the careers of Phormio and Hagnon, about whose activities in the years 431 to 429 we know a reasonable amount.

Phormio and Hagnon

There are twenty years over the period 435 to 336 when doubles seem to have occurred.² In the years where doubles are attested with reasonable

¹ Hansen *The Athenian Democracy* 235.

² 435/4, 433/2, 432/1, 431/0, 430/29, 429/8, 426/5, 425/4, 424/3, 423/2, 418/7, 414/3, 407/6, 373/2, 372/1, 357/6, 356/5, 349/8, 338/7.

probability, there are seventeen years in which Pericles was not on the board of *strategoi*. There are five years in particular, 430/29, 429/8, 426/5, 425/4, and 424/3,¹ in which there are doubles which do not appear likely to be the result of a desire to elect one general to a privileged position.²

In 431/0, 430/29 and 429/8 Phormio son of Asopius and Hagnon son of Nicias were colleagues on the board of generals, as well as probably being fellow tribesmen. There are two problems in connection with Phormio and Hagnon: firstly, Phormio's demotic, and secondly, the question of Hagnon's στρατηγία in 429/8.

Phormio son of Asopius probably came from the deme Paeania, and so tribe III. The evidence for the demotic comes from a fragment of Pausanias which records how Phormio withdrew to the deme Paeania to live,³ and there has been lively debate as to whether this indicates that this was his deme.⁴ The demotic is perhaps supported by *IG* i³ 48,⁵ if the restoration by Wade-Gery of the oath-takers at Samos is accepted.⁶ Jacoby thinks that such a reading of Pausanias is correct but has difficulty with the doubles such an assignment would entail with Hagnon, though this is his only doubt.⁷ Fornara argues that one can infer the demotic with "great likelihood" from Pausanias, given that the main argument against it is the "orthodox" theory of representation,⁸ and Whitehead concurs.⁹ Lewis has reservations about the demotic which, despite his disclaimer, centre largely

¹ 338, though the only fourth-century example that is not excluded by these criteria, should also be omitted as it may belong to the period when elections were ἐξ ἀπάντων. For the peculiarities of this year, see Appendix B: *Athenian Strategoi* 330 n. 1.

² This excludes years when Chares, or Iphicrates, for example, could have been the privileged man in a pair.

³ Paus. 1.23.10.

⁴ Eg. Jacoby *Supp.* I 127 *contra* Hignett *A History of the Athenian Constitution* 350-1; cf. Harding *Androtion and the Atthis* 146.

⁵ = *ML* 56.28 and see esp. their commentary on 153.

⁶ See Jacoby *loc. cit.*

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ Fornara *Generals* 77-8; Develin *Officials* 91.

⁹ Whitehead *The Demes of Attica* 325 n. 126.

upon the question of double-doubles.¹ If we are prepared to admit that double-doubles might be possible, it then looks probable that Phormio was from tribe III. Hagnon's demotic, on the other hand, presents no problems, as it can be inferred from that of his son, the oligarch, Theramenes.² Thus it would seem that, if we accept the evidence of Pausanias, Phormio and Hagnon came from the same tribe.

Phormio and Hagnon were both *strategoi* in 431/0 and 430/29, and probably in 429/8, but the *strategia* of Hagnon in 429/8 has been questioned. At the beginning of the winter of 429, Sitalces, the Odrysian king of the Thracians, went to war against Perdiccas, the king of the Macedonians, in fulfilment of a promise he made to the Athenians.³ He took with him Amyntas son of Philip of Macedon, Athenian *presbeis* "who happened to be present for this reason", and Hagnon as *hegemon*, presumably to lead the Athenian troops who were expected.⁴ This apparently means that Hagnon was one of the *strategoi* elected for this year, given that he was expecting to lead Athenian troops, but not all agree.⁵

Although Thucydides describes him as *hegemon* rather than using the technical term *strategos*, it is not an unreasonable guess that, because of his specialist knowledge and connection with the area,⁶ he had been sent ahead of the troops by the assembly with the Athenian *presbeis* to help with their negotiations and was to later lead the army. They had been appointed

¹ Lewis *JHS* 81 (1961) 118-19 & n. 7; see also Hignett *A History of the Athenian Constitution* 350-1. More recently, Mattingly is not willing to accept Paeania as Phormio's deme (*Antichthon* 25 (1991) 20 & nn. 103, 107).

² See esp. Pesely *Athenaeum* 67 (1989) 191-209.

³ Th. 2.95.1-2.

⁴ Th. 2. 95.3. Though in the end, the Athenians lost confidence in Sitalces and did not send them (Th. 2.101.1). See also Gomme *HCT* 2.241.

⁵ See for those who do regard Hagnon among the generals for this year: Rhodes *Thucydides II* 263; Davies *APF* 228; Develin *Officials* 121. Those who do not: Fornara *Generals* 55; Hammond *CQ* n.s. 19 (1969) 120 (= *Studies in Greek History* 360).

⁶ See discussion 114-5 above, although, admittedly, it was Phormio who had previously dealt with Sitalces (Th. 2.29.6). At this time, however, Phormio was engaged at Naupactus (Th. 2.102-3), his specialist area.

by the Athenians for the very purpose of joining the expedition against Perdiccas, and so it is likely that Hagnon was sent as *strategos* also. There is little to suggest, as Hammond supposes, that Sitalces may have "intended to impose Hagnon as commander on the as yet unassigned Athenian force, which the Athenian Assembly was proposing to vote no doubt with its own chosen generals for the campaign."¹ Thucydides makes it clear that, at the time Hagnon and the ambassadors were in Thrace, the Athenians fully intended to send a fleet and troops as well (ἔδει γὰρ καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ναυσὶ τε καὶ στρατίᾳ ὥς πλείστη ἐπὶ τοὺς Χαλκιδέας παραγενέσθαι),² so presumably they had appointed Hagnon to lead them. Therefore it would seem highly likely, almost to the point of certainty, that Phormio and Hagnon both belonged to tribe III and formed a double in 431/0, 430/29 and 429/8. However the likely reasons for the election of either Hagnon and Phormio, as will be suggested below, were not to privilege one over the other or over their colleagues, but because of their suitability for the task required.

In 426/5, Hipponicus son of Callias is doubled with Aristoteles son of Timocrates.³ Hipponicus' demotic of Alopece is certain, which places him in tribe X.⁴ Aristoteles as general has been restored in *IG* i³ 366.6, where the deme is given as Thorae. As Wade-Gery asserted,⁵ and Lewis later agreed,⁶ this is almost certainly right. It would seem, then, that there is a strong case for arguing for a double in tribe X in this year.

But could either Hipponicus or Aristoteles have plausibly been elected στρατηγὸς ἐξ πάντων? Lewis writes, "If this case of double

¹ Hammond *CQ* n.s. 19 (1969) 120 (= *Studies in Greek History* 360).

² Th. 2.95.3.

³ On Aristoteles' status in this year (which I see no reason to doubt), see Appendix B: *Athenian Strategoi* 310.

⁴ Lewis *JHS* 81 (1961) 120.

⁵ Wade-Gery *JHS* 50 (1930) 292.

⁶ Lewis *JHS* 81 (1961) 120-1; see also Gomme *HCT* 2. 417-8.

representation is accepted, it is nearly fatal to any theory which regards the practice as maintained for the purpose of being fair to the second man in a tribe."¹ The Aristoteles who probably was *strategos* 431/0 and certainly was in 426/5,² is probably also to be identified with the *hellenotamias* of 421/0, and the Aristoteles who was a member of the Thirty,³ but this would not raise him to the calibre of a Pericles. Likewise, though Hipponicus was of a distinguished family,⁴ he is only known to have held public office twice: as secretary in 444/3 and as *strategos* in 426/5.⁵ Neither of these men suggest themselves as having been specially elected over and above their colleagues.⁶

In 425/4 and possibly in 426/5,⁷ Lamachus son of Xenophanes and Sophocles son of Sostratides may form a double in tribe VI. The evidence for Sophocles' tribal affiliation is problematic as it is based upon the list of the Thirty given at Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.2. Although Loeper originally postulated that the list was in tribal and even trittyal order,⁸ Whitehead has since raised doubts concerning the question of tribal trios, though he is prepared to accept that the list may be in tribal order.⁹ Although I agree in principle with Whitehead that the Athenians may not have felt themselves obliged to appoint three of the Thirty from each tribe, it remains possible that they did,

¹ Lewis *JHS* 81 (1961) 121.

² *IG* i³ 366. 6; Th. 3.105.3.

³ *ATL* list 34; Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.2; see Lewis *JHS* 81 (1961) 120-1; on *strategia* in 431/0, see Develin *Officials* 118. As Lewis points out, if one believes in trios in tribal order in the list of the Thirty at Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.2, this would place him in Antiochis, tribe X. On this see Appendix B: *Athenian Strategoi* 310 n. 1.

⁴ He was from a extremely wealthy family, inherited the *dadouchia* from his father (Andoc. 1.115), and married the ex-wife of Pericles (Plato *Protag.* 314 e; see Davies *APF* 262-3).

⁵ *IG* i³ 455.5; Th. 3.91.4; see also Davies *APF* 262-3.

⁶ Note that Nicias was on the board of generals for this year. Lewis (*JHS* 81 (1961) 121) suggests Hipponicus as the στρατηγὸς ἐξ ἀπάντων, but he was not influenced by Dover's article, which was published in the preceding year; ultimately, he only comes down on the side of Hipponicus because of his family connections.

⁷ See Appendix B: *Athenian Strategoi* 310.

⁸ Loeper *JM(R)I* 305.5-6 (May-June 1896), *Otd. kl. Fil.* 90-6, 97-101 (my knowledge of this is based on Whitehead's article).

⁹ *JHS* 100 (1980) 208-13.

and (whether or not they did) that the list is in tribal order. The argument tends to be circular and the evidence circumstantial, but in 414/3 Charicles, whose tribe is also derived from Xenophon's list, may have served as suffect in place of Lamachus.¹ It is not unreasonable, I think, to conjecture that Sophocles was from tribe VI, and that he and Lamachus formed a double in these years.²

Nicostratus son of Dieitrephes and Thucydides son of Olorus appear to form a double in 424/3. MacDowell has now shown that Nicostratus Σκαμβωνιδής of Aristophanes *Wasps* can be identified with Nicostratus son of Dieitrephes, the general of 424/3,³ and so was a fellow tribesman of Thucydides son of Olorus when they were on the board of generals in 424/3. Thucydides is not known to have been *strategos* in any other year, and because of his failure to save Amphipolis in this year he was exiled from Athens.⁴ The career of Nicostratus, on the other hand, was longer than most,⁵ as he held the *strategia* in 427/6, 425/4, 424/3, 423/2 and 418/17.⁶ He was obviously a man of competence, as his success in bringing the warring factions of Corcyra to a settlement indicates.⁷ However, his career is not otherwise noted for its brilliance, as he shares commands with the more distinguished Nicias in 425/4, 424/3 and 423/2.⁸ He does not present an outstanding figure such as Pericles, and would not have been elected to a special position over and above his colleagues. The very fact that he had

¹ See Appendix B: *Athenian Strategoi* 315 & n. 2; on tribe: 310 n. 1.

² Note, however, the objections by Lewis to this identification of the tribe (*JHS* 81 (1961) 121), which are based on the very fact that he would form a double with Lamachus. If we allow doubles, then we can allow this.

³ See Appendix B: *Athenian Strategoi* 309 n. 2.

⁴ Th. 5.26.5.

⁵ Of generals from the same period, Pericles was exceptional for holding the *strategia* for at least twenty-two years (though not all in succession), Phormio for seven years, Demosthenes for six years, Hagnon for five years.

⁶ Th. 3.75.1; 4.53.1, 119.2, 129.2, 5.61.1.

⁷ Th. 3.75.1.

⁸ Nicostratus was killed at the battle of Mantinea in 418, his only subsequent known year serving on the board (Th. 5.61.1, 74.3).

served for two years before being doubled with Thucydides in 424/3 would suggest that Thucydides was the extra in that year and, as has already been pointed out, he had probably not served before. It is unlikely that Thucydides was selected for his personal eminence so much as for his Thracian connections.¹

Admittedly, these doubles are not without their problems. Yet if they are to stand – and the doubles of Phormio and Hagnon, Nicostratus and Thucydides and Hipponicus and Aristoteles look almost certain – then there is nothing which would characterise any of these men as a *strategos* selected over his colleagues. Indeed there seem to have been other good reasons to elect Phormio, Hagnon and Thucydides.

Double-doubles

The most telling evidence against the position of a στρατηγὸς ἐξ ὁπάντων would be the existence of double-doubles. It is difficult to maintain that one person was granted special privileges above his colleagues because he was specially elected, if in fact more than one tribe was in this special position of being doubly represented. Unfortunately, the three cases where double-doubles seem to have occurred, in 432/1, 431/0 and 426/5, have all been questioned and none can be irrefutably proved.² But while there is positive evidence in favour of the tribal assignments, the main argument telling against them is the theory of only one double in a year. For example, Eucrates' demotic for 432/1 also seems very reasonable, though it still admits

¹ See Appendix B: *Athenian Strategoi* 312.

² There is a fourth possibility in 433/2, but I do not think the grounds for attaching Archestratus to Phlya are anything like certain. Archestratus was the son of Lycomedes (Th. 1.57.6). A Lycomedes son of Aeschraeus is connected with Phlya (Plut. *Them.* 15.3; cf. Hdt. 8.11.2). Cleomedes son of Lycomedes almost certainly belongs to Phlya (see IG i³ 370.31-2), so the argument depends on Archestratus and Cleomedes being brothers, which Hignett (*A History of the Athenian Constitution* 350) doubts, though Fornara (*Generals* 78 & n. 13) thinks the evidence of the inscription "should be decisive." I am not convinced: Lycomedes is a common name in Athens, and appears in a number of tribes. If he does come from Phlya, he would be doubled with Proteas son of Epicles (Th. 1.45.2).

of some doubt,¹ and the tribal affiliation of Sophocles son of Sostratides, and Lamachus' *strategia* in 426/5, are not certain.² Nevertheless, if we accept that there is a high probability, as demonstrated above, that Phormio and Hagnon were fellow-tribesmen, we are forced to accept as the corollary of this that there was at least one double-double, in 431/0: Phormio and Hagnon, and also Pericles and Carcinus.

It is important to note that the instances of double representation particularly involve certain tribes, or indeed certain men, and there are tribes which for runs of years seem unable to produce an attested general.³ This raises the possibility that for a number of years some of the tribes may have been unable to produce candidates strong enough to win election.⁴ For example, if we turn to the years of the Peloponnesian War (though excluding 411 as an abnormal year), tribe I had no known representative between 432/1 and 426/5, and again between 424/3 and 413/2 (though there is the possibility that it was represented in 414/3), tribe IX is represented seven times and only by Demosthenes, and tribe VIII is represented only four times and has no representative on the board between 433/2 and 414/3. Again, although tribe III is strong in its provision of *strategoi* between 432/1 and 422/1, it does not provide a known candidate between 421 and 412. It seems that, while some tribes were notoriously weak at providing representatives, others were compensating for this shortfall. It may well

¹ Doubled with Proteas son of Epicles (Th. 2.23.2). For demotic, see PCG Aristophanes 149 (= Kock 143); Fornara *Generals* 76 & n.1, 77; Develin *Officials* 102 *contra* Hignett *A History of the Athenian Constitution* 350.

² See 135-6 above.

³ For a summary of tribal representation during the years of the Peloponnesian War, see Appendix F: *Strategoi During the Peloponnesian War*.

⁴ There is also the possibility that the generals who represented certain tribes did not figure enough in the events of the day to appear in the sources. It is probably a combination of both factors which produces the results we have. However, the years of the Peloponnesian War are well documented years, so particular gaps in attested tribal representation are more significant.

have been that double-doubles were not only possible, but were necessary in order to maintain a full board of ten *strategoi*.

Fornara's triple and double in 432/1, however, is less than sure, since it depends on a very insecure tribal identification. Fornara places Callias son of Calliades in tribe VII, creating a triple representation for that year. He claims, "That Callias son of Calliades is the same person as Callias son of Calliades Αἰξωνεύς ... is more likely than the current theory about election ἐξ ἀπάντων, and that is the only objection to the identification."¹ However, Lewis cites an example of a Callias son of Calliades from Paeania (III) from an inscription dating to about 320,² and on this basis Develin has not given Callias a demotic "as the commonness of the name makes that speculative."³

Yet Piérart's theory that one man in a double was elected as a second choice is also untenable. Hagnon and Phormio provide a good illustration of this. In 432/1, Phormio had been the elected candidate for tribe III. When the crisis came up in the north Phormio was sent with 1600 troops.⁴ However, in the following year, Hagnon, a specialist in Thrace, was elected to the generalship. In the summer of 431/0 Phormio was still in the north, and Thucydides writes that he joined forces with Perdiccas, after the alliance was formed with Sitalces, king of the Thracians, and marched against the Chalcidians.⁵ In the summer of 430, but before the beginning of the new archon-year, Hagnon was sent to Poteidaea.⁶ On his arrival, Phormio had

¹ Fornara *Generals* 53.

² Lewis *Hesperia* 28 (1959) 215 (253), 228; id. *JHS* 81 (1961) 118.

³ Develin *Officials* 101. It should perhaps be pointed out that if Callias were to belong to III, it is then possible that he is forming another double with Phormio, who almost certainly came from Paeania (see also Bicknell *Studies in Athenian Politics and Genealogy* 108-9). Despite the fact that there is no certain evidence for a triple, there is no reason why they could not exist on the model for electoral procedure suggested below.

⁴ Th. 1.64.2, 65.2; cf. Diodorus who claims that Phormio was sent as a replacement for Callias, who had died (Diod. 12.37.1).

⁵ Th. 2.29.6.

⁶ Th. 2.58; Develin *Officials* 117.

already withdrawn.¹ This might suggest that Hagnon was elected specifically for the campaign in Thrace. At the elections of 431/0, Phormio was, in effect, the sitting candidate. He would probably be re-elected, according to Piérart's system, as the first choice. This would make Hagnon, the northern expert, second choice. It seems preferable to assume that the assembly elected Hagnon alongside of Phormio, being well aware of the difficulties in Thrace and his expertise.

Hagnon's campaign at Poteidaea continued into the new archon-year of 430/29.² His election for this year must have taken place not long before his departure in the summer of 430 (at the end of the archon-year 431/0). That the election of new generals must have pre-dated his despatch (though preparations for the expedition could well have begun before the election) suggests that he was elected with the campaign to Poteidaea and its continuation into the new year in mind, this being the first Athenian action after the elections of 430. He must have been elected in the full knowledge that the campaign, which was sent out so late in the previous archon-year, would still be in progress; that is, he must have been a "first choice". But Phormio does not seem a likely "second choice", as we next hear of him when he is sent in the winter to Naupactus, a strategically important place, and an area with which Phormio had special connections.³ Similarly, in 429/8, Phormio was at Naupactus and Hagnon in Thrace.⁴ Both remained in the regions with which they were specially competent to deal. Both have the appearance of having been elected to their commands because they were the ones suited to them. Under such circumstances it is anomalous to speak of first and second choices. Both these men must have been elected by a system which allowed the right man to get the job.

¹ Th. 2.58.2.

² Gomme *HCT* 2.164; Develin *Officials* 117; Fornara *Generals* 53-4.

³ Th. 2.69.1.

⁴ Th. 2.80.4, 83-95, 102-3, (for difficulties with Th. 2.95.3, see 133-4 above).

This gains extra support from the election of Asopius the son of Phormio in 428/7. Presumably because Phormio was no longer available, the Acarnanians requested that either a son or a kinsman of Phormio be sent to them. The Athenians complied and sent Asopius.¹ Apparently, the electoral system was such that Asopius' election could be assured. If nominations were called from the floor at the assembly, as they would be under the Hansen system, and if other candidates were permitted to stand against an already successful candidate, there does not seem to be a high enough probability that the "appropriate" person would secure appointments.

To summarise the points made so far, there are a number of criteria which need to be met in any reconstruction of the election of *strategoi* at Athens. Firstly, the generals could be elected because of their specialised knowledge or connections which would make them appropriate for a particular command when it was known that such a command would be necessary in the coming year. Secondly, while tribal representation in election was maintained for the most part, any system of election must also allow for doubles or even double-doubles. Thirdly, as a corollary to this, some tribes could also be unrepresented. Finally, neither candidate in a double was necessarily privileged over the other. So how might the *strategoi* at Athens have been elected?

One possibility is that there was a pre-selection of candidates made by the tribes themselves.² The tribe would choose from within their own number candidates they considered suitable for election, and a tribe with two strong candidates could put forward both of them. This model has two

¹ Th. 3.7.1. It is interesting that the Athenians, before the end of the previous archon-year and probably around the time of the spring elections, were preparing another fleet to sail around the Peloponnese under Cleippides. This, however, was diverted to Lesbos (Th. 3.3.1-2).

² Bicknell (*Studies in Athenian Politics and Genealogy* 105-6) has suggested a similar system of tribal pre-selection, though I am less convinced concerning his "alternates".

main attractions as far as the evidence is concerned. The first argument is from an analogy in the selection for magistracies, such as the archonship chosen by sortition. The *Athenaion Politeia* attributes to Solon a system of pre-selection in the tribes,¹ and, in a controversial passage, writes of pre-selection in the demes.²

Secondly, one can imagine that powerful individuals within tribes were able to amass enough of a following within the tribes to secure this pre-nomination. Rather than simply selecting candidates from the floor, the tribe would put forward their selection of suitable candidates. The function and importance of *hetaireiai* and groups modelled on the *hetaireiai* in politics and political activity has already been discussed.³ Although there has been debate about how extensively, and in what ways, such political influence was exercised in Athens, there is evidence for the importance of tribes and demes, and it might be easier to advance the cause of a particular candidate through a tribal pre-selection than in an assembly attended by several thousand citizens.

This leaves one difficulty which still must be accounted for, and that is double representation. If we are not going to have a system of election where one candidate is elected in a first round and one as a second choice, there seem to be two alternatives.

The first possibility is that a tribe with two strong candidates put forward both in the hope that another tribe would be unable to produce any candidate. But this does not necessarily work, for it would depend on the order in which *strategoi* were elected. For example, if generals were elected in tribal order, the assembly would know that there were no candidates for tribe I, for example, if they were then to elect two from tribe II; but they

¹ [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 8.1.

² [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 22.5; see Rhodes *Comm.* 272-4; Whitehead *The Demes of Attica* 271-77.

³ See Chapter One 27-8, 27 n. 5, 46-7.

could not know in advance to elect two strong candidates in tribe II if there were a dearth of candidates from tribe III.

The second possibility is that one of the candidates in the double may have persuaded another tribe, who did not have a candidate, to nominate him. The other side of this, and perhaps the most likely, is that a tribe who could not put forward a candidate may have asked someone from another tribe to represent them.¹ This might be plausible seeing that there are a number of tribes who do not seem able to produce a successful candidate from among their own ranks, and might be achieved through exploiting wider friendship networks; and it is credible that, when the Athenians decided to modify the tribal principle, they decided to modify it in this way.

This model does not answer all the questions. For it does not explain whether tribes put forward a number of candidates, or whether the assembly was given no choice but merely "rubber-stamped" the tribal nominations; and we simply do not seem to have the evidence to resolve this. However, what I have tried to suggest is that, in the light of the election of "appropriate" men as generals, it is necessary to re-think the problem and construct a model which allows for this possibility.

¹ Jones (*Athenian Democracy* 127) first suggested a system like this, and was followed by Bicknell (*Studies in Athenian Politics and Genealogy* 104-7). There may be a parallel for this among representatives on the council of five hundred. Sealey (*Demosthenes and His Time* 145) suggests as an explanation for Demosthenes' term on the council in 347/6 (Aeschin. 3.62): "It could happen that a deme did not have enough volunteers to fill its seats in the council and invited an outsider to one of its places." There is an interesting parallel to this tribal double representation in a late fourth century inscription from the sanctuary of the Cabiri on Lemnos outside the city of Hephaestia (see Accame ASAA 19-21 = n.s. 3-5 (1941-3) 76-9). Nine *proedroi* are elected, and there should be one from each of the ten tribes except the current prytany, as in Athens (Lemnos was for much of its history an Athenian cleruchy). Of the nine, however, two are from one tribe, Pandionis, and none are from Erechtheis. This was an assembly of initiates (3-4), and Accame suggests the regular assembly of Hephaestia with non-initiates excluded. One could suppose that there were no *bouleutai* from Erechtheis who were initiates, so the vacancy was filled by a second man from Pandionis.

Sparta Non-royal Commands

Personal overseas connections also seem to have influenced the appointment of Spartan non-royal commanders. This will be considered in two general categories: firstly, harmosts, archons and commanders of squadrons, troops and ships; and, secondly, the regularly appointed annual *Nauarchoi*.¹ Although the appointment procedures for both these categories of officer are parallel,² the number of foreign posts prompted by foreign friendships varies significantly and they must be explained in different ways.

Selection of Spartan Non-royal Military Commanders

Spartan military magistrates seem to have been selected in either of two ways.³ Firstly, it was clearly the right of the supreme commander of the expedition, whether the King or the *Nauarchos*, to appoint subordinate commanders. For example, Brasidas appointed Polydamidas as archon of the Mendaean and Scionians in 423.⁴ Likewise, Agis sent for Alcamenes son of Sthenelaedas and Melanthus to be the archons for Euboea.⁵ Eteonicus was sent by the *Nauarchos*, Astyochus, to Antissa and Methymna as archon,⁶ and left by Callicratidas, when he was *Nauarchos*, as archon at Mytilene.⁷

Appointments could also be made through formal procedure at Sparta, though it is unclear whether this was direct appointment by the ephors or election by the assembly. Xenophon tells us that Agesilaus received orders ἀπὸ τῶν οἴκοι τελῶν (probably the ephors),⁸ that he was to have control of the fleet and to appoint as nauarch whomsoever he

¹ Though on the regularity of the appointment, see Appendix B: *Spartan Nauarchoi* 331 n. 1.

² Hodkinson in *War and Society in the Greek World* 160.

³ See especially Hodkinson *War and Society in the Greek World* 159-61.

⁴ Th. 4.123.4, 129.3.

⁵ Th. 8.5.1-2.

⁶ Th. 8.23.4.

⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.26.

⁸ On this expression, see Andrewes *HCT* 4.23.

wished.¹ Similarly, Eudamidas asked the ephors to allow Phoebidas, his brother, to bring troops to him at Olynthus.² Xenophon says that Dercylidas was replaced as harmost of Abydos through no fault of his own, but that Anaxibius negotiated to become harmost there because the ephors were his φίλοι.³ This suggests that it was the prerogative of the ephors to make such decisions about leadership, or that they played an influential part in the decision-making process. Finley claims, highlighting the position of elites in Spartan society, that the "primary principles of selection were appointment and cooptation" and that only the ephors and the gerousia were elected in open competition.⁴ However, as Lazenby points out, at least for the *Nauarchoi*, the annual tenure of the position implies election.⁵

Other passages, however, suggest that selection was made by the assembly of the Lacedaemonians. For example, Callicratidas, in response to the plotting of the friends of Lysander, said to an assembly of Lacedaemonians that he had been sent by the state to command the fleet (ὕπὸ τῆς πόλεως ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς πεμφθείς).⁶ This may mean no more than ratification by the assembly of a decision made by the ephors, or that the Spartan assembly voted on a list prepared by the ephors.⁷ Perhaps the solution is selection by the ephors and ratification of the choice by the assembly.

The circumstances of Anaxibius' appointment as harmost at Abydos lead us to the next point. As Hodkinson has shown, whatever the

¹ Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.27; see also Plut. *Ages.* 10.9; Paus. 3.9.6.

² Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.24. For a different account of the story (reversing the rôles of the brothers) see Diod. 15.19.3, 20.3.

³ Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.32.

⁴ Finley *Economy and Society in Ancient Greece* 29; see also Hodkinson *Chiron* 13 (1983) 263.

⁵ Lazenby *Spartan Army* 23.

⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.5; see also Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.20.

⁷ See Finley *Economy and Society in Ancient Greece* 33, whose views on the probable docility of the Spartan assembly are approved by Lewis *S&P* 38; though, as Lazenby notes, the opposite may equally be true: that the impression that the ephors decided the appointment may indicate no more than their influence in such appointments (*Spartan Army* 23).

procedure, appointees were drawn from the Spartan elite,¹ and private influence and patronage could play a part in securing appointment.² Lysander, a *mothax*,³ was of noble birth, being a Heraclid, though his family was impoverished.⁴ Cartledge attributes Lysander's rise to high office to the patronage of the kings. He suggests that Lysander, given his *mothax* status and his intimate connections with Agesilaus, may have been launched on his public career under the patronage of Archidamus II and that Agis may have inherited him as a client from his father.⁵ Cartledge then concludes that "Lysander's appointment as *nauarch* presumably therefore had the support of Agis, if indeed it was not actually made on Agis' personal recommendation."⁶ Using the "network" in a similar way, Agesilaus is said to have been responsible for the *Nauarchy* of Teleutias, his brother,⁷ and Lysander to have arranged for himself to be sent as *harmost* against those in Peiraeus, and for his brother, Libys, to be *Nauarchos* of the fleet.⁸ Hodkinson writes that,

The rôles of patronage and inherited social status will have been an important reason for the tendencies ... towards the limitation of access to foreign commands and the iteration of posts for those few men who were selected.⁹

In his examination of Spartan non-royal military appointments, Hodkinson has noted three important elements: firstly, that there were a

¹ Hodkinson *War and Society in the Greek World* 157-9.

² *Ibid.* 161.

³ Phylarchus *FGrHist* 81 F 43; Aelian *VH* 12.43. The *mothakes* are a group whose exact definition is unknown, but probably covered a large group of different types of classes, ranging from *nothoi* to the poor sons of Spartiates; see Lotze *Historia* 11 (1962) 427-35; Lazenby *Spartan Army* 19-20; Cartledge *Sparta and Lakonia* 314-5.

⁴ Plut. *Lys.* 2.1; see also Krentz *Comm.* 134.

⁵ Cartledge *Agesilaos* 79; cf. de Ste. Croix *Origins of the Peloponnesian War* 145, 147.

⁶ Cartledge *Agesilaos* 79; on patronage in Spartan society, see Hodkinson *Chiron* 13 (1983) 263-4.

⁷ Plut. *Ages.* 21.1; Cartledge *Agesilaos* 145-6; see also Hodkinson *War and Society in the Greek World* 161.

⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.28.

⁹ Hodkinson *War and Society in the Greek World* 161.

limited number of men who served on commands abroad; secondly, that those who were appointed to foreign commands often served abroad for a number of years; and, thirdly, that they were men from the highest stratum of Spartiate society.¹ There was, however, a fourth factor which influenced selection for commands: foreign friendships.

Harmosts & Archons

Below are set out the best examples of harmosts, archons and squadron commanders who seem to have gained appointment because of their personal connections.²

Brasidas

Brasidas son of Tellis³ first appears in Thucydides when he came to help against an Athenian attack on Methone in Messenia.⁴ He was elected eponymous ephor for the year 431/0,⁵ perhaps as a reward for his successes at Methone.⁶ He served in a number of other positions in the following years: as one of three *symbouloi* to Cnemus in 430/29,⁷ as a single *symboulos* for Alcidas in 427⁸ and as a trierarch at Pylos in 425.⁹

In 424, we find him preparing an army for Thrace around Sicyon and Corinth.¹⁰ Brasidas' position in Thrace is interesting. His ostensible motive was the liberation of Hellas from the Athenians.¹¹ Parke suggests that his

¹ *Ibid.* 153-9.

² For a complete list, see Appendix B: *Harmosts & Archons*.

³ Tellis was one of the signatories to the Peace of Nicias and subsequent alliance (Th. 5.19.2, 24.1).

⁴ Th. 2.25.2; Diod.12.43.2.

⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.10.

⁶ *PL* 177.

⁷ Th. 2.85.1.

⁸ Th. 3.69.1.

⁹ Th. 4.11.4.

¹⁰ Th. 4.70.1.

¹¹ Th. 4.85.1, 86.1; see also Lewis *S&P* 68-9.

rôle was essentially that of harmost.¹ Thucydides gives two reasons for his selection to this command: firstly, because Brasidas himself wanted to go, and, secondly, because the Chalcidians were eager for him to come (αὐτόν τε Βρασίδαν βουλόμενον μάλιστα Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἀπέστειλαν (προυθυμήθησαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Χαλκιδῆς)).² As Hodkinson points out, despite his earlier brilliant career, which “would seem to be an excellent demonstration of the significance attached to personal merit in the choice of Spartiate leaders”, Brasidas was not sent through the positive choice of the Spartans.³ Brasidas was also known to have ἐπιτήδαιοι in Pharsalus, with whose escort he crossed Thessaly.⁴ Hodkinson suggests that Brasidas’ advancement may have depended partly on hereditary factors, saying that: “One’s suspicions are, however, aroused by the fact that Brasidas had friends in Pharsalos in Thessaly in 424.”⁵ This is perhaps supported by the fact that not all who wanted to cross Thessaly were able to do so as easily.⁶

However, the request of the Chalcidians was possibly a more important consideration. Although Thucydides says nothing directly about a personal connection between the Chalcidians and Brasidas, he perhaps implies this when he says that the Chalcidians were eager for him to come, and presumably, they had sent ambassadors to Sparta requesting his despatch. Though he is not known to have had a prior connection with the Chalcidians, he does have friends as far north as Pharsalus and the origin of this friendship is also obscure.

¹ Parke *JHS* 50 (1930) 42.

² Th. 4. 81.1.

³ Hodkinson *Chiron* 13 (1983) 261.

⁴ Th. 4.78.1

⁵ Hodkinson *Chiron* 13 (1983) 263.

⁶ Th. 4.132.1-2.

Clearchus son of Ramphias

Clearchus son of Ramphias followed a career based upon Byzantium. Although it is unknown whether his family was otherwise connected with the Byzantines,¹ he was the Spartan πρόξενος of Byzantium.² In 412 Thucydides says that he served as a commander in the Hellespont.³ In 411, he was sent to Pharnabazus in the Hellespont with ships,⁴ and in 410 King Agis thought it best to send him, as the πρόξενος of Byzantium, both to Byzantium and to Chalcedon to try to prevent the corn supply getting to Athens.⁵ In 408, Clearchus was the *harmost* in Byzantium.⁶

There are two versions of what Clearchus did after the end of the Peloponnesian War. Xenophon writes that Clearchus persuaded the Spartans that the Thracians were harming the Greeks in Asia Minor, and so set sail to make war upon the Thracians living about the Chersonese and Perinthus.⁷ Although the ephors changed their minds after he had gone and tried to turn him back from the Isthmus at Corinth, he did not pay any attention to them, but kept sailing for the Hellespont.⁸ In 403, Cyrus befriended him, gave him a thousand darics for an army and made him his ξένος, and Clearchus used the Chersonese as his base, making war upon the Thracians until Cyrus summoned him for his Persian campaign.⁹

Diodorus' account is rather different. He says that the Byzantines, owing to internal trouble and a war with the neighbouring Thracians, asked the Spartans to send them a commander, and Clearchus was despatched.¹⁰ However, Diodorus reports, he set himself up in the city as a tyrant, exiling

¹ Andrewes *HCT* 5.21.

² Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.35.

³ Th. 8.8.2.

⁴ Th. 8.39.2, 80.1.

⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.35.

⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.15-20; Diod. 13.66.5-6.

⁷ Xen. *Anab.* 1.1.9, 2.6.2-5.

⁸ Xen. *Anab.* 2.6.3.

⁹ Xen. *Anab.* 2.6.4-5; cf. Polyaeus 2.2.6-10.

¹⁰ Diod. 14.12.2.

some citizens and putting others to death for their money, and establishing a large mercenary army.¹ When the Spartans heard, they sent ambassadors to him ordering him to behave, and then sent troops against him under the command of Panthoïdas.² Since Clearchus did not think that Byzantium would remain friendly after his treatment of the citizens, he moved to Selymbria, and finally escaped to Cyrus, who provided him with money for mercenaries.³ Whichever way one reads the story,⁴ Clearchus still had on-going connections with the Byzantines which seem to have led to his selection for office there in 412, 411, 410, 408 and possibly 403.⁵

Dercylidas

Xenophon describes Dercylidas as a very resourceful man (μάλα μηχανητικός)⁶ and a man who liked foreign travel (φιλαπόδημος).⁷ Dercylidas' career seems to be linked with Abydus.⁸ In 411 he was sent with a small force to cause the revolt of Abydus,⁹ and he was also the harmost of Abydus during the Nauarchy of Lysander in 407.¹⁰ From 399 to 397 he commanded the Spartan forces in Asia Minor,¹¹ perhaps remaining in Asia after the end of his command as one of Agesilaus' *symboloi* in 396.¹² He commanded again in 394, after he had been sent back to the Hellespont by

¹ Diod. 14.12.3. For Clearchus' reputation for harshness, cf. Xen. *Anab.* 2.6.6-13.

² Diod. 14.12.4.

³ Diod. 14.12.5-9.

⁴ I do not think the two stories are entirely incompatible (see Grote *History of Greece* 8.310 n. 3), though the anonymous author in *RE* (vol. 11 (1922) col. 576) treats them as two separate series of events with Xenophon's account preceding that of Diodorus.

⁵ Though, if we believe Diodorus, his treatment of the Byzantines might well lend support to Herodotus' assertion that the king appointed Spartan πρόξενοι (see Chapter Two 60-1).

⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.8. See also Ephorus *FGrHist* 70 F 71: ἦν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἐν τῷ τρόπῳ Λακωνικὸν οὐδ' ἀπλοῦν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ τὸ πανοῦργον καὶ τὸ θηριῶδες, διὸ καὶ Σίσυφον αὐτὸν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι προσηγόρευον.

⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.2.

⁸ Cf. Andrewes *HCT* 5.149.

⁹ Th. 8.61.1.

¹⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.9.

¹¹ Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.8, 3.2.6.

¹² Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.6; cf. Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.2; Plut. *Ages.* 6.5; *Lys.* 23.4. On the status of the Thirty as *symboloi*, see Appendix E: *Other Magistracies* 390 n. 2.

Agesilaus,¹ and, basing himself at Abydus,² he rallied at Sestus and Abydus the Spartan harmosts who had been ejected by Conon and Pharnabazus from the cities after the battle of Cnidus.³ It is difficult to say whether a connection with Abydus preceded the revolt of 411, but it looks if he may have had a connection with the city from that time on. Given his other qualifications, this connection almost certainly earned him the post of harmost at Abydus and may have been a factor in his selection for other Asian commands.⁴

Eteonicus

According to the received text of Xenophon, Eteonicus was harmost of Thasos, but was expelled along with the Spartan sympathisers in the summer of 410.⁵ Some have questioned the reliability of the MSS, however, and many have accepted Kahrstedt's emendation of Thasos to Iasos on the grounds that this was a city in Tissaphernes' satrapy, and he was accused of being involved in the coup.⁶ Krentz, however, argues in favour of keeping the text on the grounds that Lysander later sent Eteonicus to the Thraceward region after the battle of Aegospotami, where he was said to have brought over everything there to the Peloponnesians,⁷ saying that this assignment "could be explained by Eteonikos' experience in the area."⁸

¹ Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.1-3.

² Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.3.

³ Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.3-6.

⁴ See Westlake (*Historia* 35 (1986) 413 (= *Studies* 245)), who writes that Dercylidas had "considerable experience in Asia" prior to being given the command of the expeditionary forces in the 390s.

⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.32.

⁶ Meiggs *The Athenian Empire* 577-8; Krentz *Comm.* 105.

⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.5.

⁸ Krentz *Comm.* 105; compare Hodkinson (*War and Society in the Greek World* 156) on Eteonicus: "a kind of all purpose, often subordinate commander, loyally performing a variety of services."

The selection for office on the basis of foreign connections was not confined to these four examples. Below is a table of all harmosts and archons who seem to have won selection on the basis of their connections.

*Harmosts & Archons with relevant connections*¹

(These are marked with † in Appendix B. For a discussion of all cases, see Appendix B)²

<i>Harmost/Archon</i>	<i>Connection</i>	<i>Years of Relevant Appointment</i>
Brasidas son of Tellis	Thraceward parts	424
?Pasitelidas son of Agesander	Thraceward parts	423
?Xenares son of Cnidis	Boeotia	420/19
Clearchus son of Ramphias	Byzantium	412, 411, 410, 408
Eteonicus	Thraceward parts	(412), 410, 405
?Pedaritus son of Leon	Chios	412
Dercylidas	Abydos	(411), 407, 399, 394
?Leon	Chios	411
?Agesandridas	Thraceward parts	408
?Herippidas	Thebes	(399), ?382-379
?Eudamidas	Olynthus	382
?Phoebidas	Olynthus	382

For the harmosts and archons, eighteen of the ninety-six attested appointments, that is about nineteen per cent, seem to display connections of this kind which affected their selection.³ Although this is not an enormous proportion, and a number are not secure, it is significantly higher than is found for the Athenian military appointments, and, owing to the

¹ In contrast to Athenian *strategoi*, who have to be re-elected annually, I have only counted the first year of selection for continuous appointments.

² ? indicates those cases where the connection is more tentative.

() indicates that a connection may be either pre-existing or established in this year, but there is no evidence that it already existed. This year will not be included in the statistics.

³ Again, there would be no point in a more precise calculation. 96 is the total appointments listed in Appendix B: *Spartan Harmosts & Archons* as possible or certain. An appointment continued beyond one year is counted as a single appointment. Men listed as second- or third-in-command on 336 are not included.

dearth of Spartan prosopographical information, probably under-represents the truth to a greater extent than the figure for Athenian military appointments.

It is not surprising that one finds men appointed for their foreign friendships within this context of social connections. First of all, it was, by the nature of the institution, the men of the social elite who had ξένοι overseas. Secondly, one can glimpse how these appointments could be made within this nexus of relationships, where high-level friends help high-level friends to high positions; but even more, this is happening within a society where such high-level friendships abroad are also considered important, and so easily become one of the criteria for appointment. The fact that the man with connections with Abydos or Byzantium was generally given the post there also goes some way towards explaining why there was such a select group of men sent abroad. One of the criteria for the selection was their foreign friendships.

Nauarchoi

The same cannot be said for the *Nauarchoi*, particularly in the fifth century. As will be argued below,¹ Antalcidas was selected as *Nauarchos* in the year 388/7 because the Spartans thought this would please the Persian satrap, Tiribazus,² but this is almost an isolated example. Lysander represents the only other naval commander who was selected because of his connections, but this was in his year as *epistoleus*, when he could not be re-elected as *Nauarchos*. That does not mean that foreign personal friendships were not important for such a command. In fact, the charge was made by the allies on the appointment of Callicratidas that often, in place of men who were suitable (ἀντ' ἐπιτηδείων γιγνομένων) and just coming to understand

¹ Chapter Five 213.

² Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.6.

naval matters and who knew well how men must be dealt with, the Spartans ran the risk of disaster by sending men who were inexperienced in naval matters and who were ignorant of the people in that place (ἀγνώτας τοῖς ἐκεῖ).¹ Just how important foreign connections could be is highlighted by the careers of three of the *Nauarchoi* – Astyochus, Lysander and Callicratidas – and it will be instructive to look briefly at the terms of office of these men to see how they tried, or did not try, to use foreign friendships.

Astyochus

Though apparently incompetent in his leadership,² Astyochus tried to propagate a personal friendship with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades (who was with Tissaphernes at the time and was supposed to have great influence with the Persian).³ Whether he ultimately intended to exercise such a friendship for the benefit of Sparta is unknown. Perhaps, Lewis suggests, Pedaritus did not think so since he wrote to Sparta to accuse Astyochus of doing wrong.⁴

It is unclear whether Astyochus was involved in the making of the second treaty with Tissaphernes,⁵ but he is later found to be ingratiating himself with the Persian satrap by betraying the letters of Phrynichus to Alcibiades, and, on this basis, allegedly trying to attach himself for personal gain to Tissaphernes, thus causing friction between himself and his men.⁶ Nevertheless, whatever the truth of the accusations, it seems that once the mood in Sparta had turned against Tissaphernes, Astyochus, who does not seem to have obtained any significant gain by the contact and could only

¹ Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.4 (The text is corrupt, but the meaning is clear enough).

² Lichas was given the power to replace him if he thought it necessary (Th. 8.39.2).

³ For the apparent friendship of Tissaphernes and Alcibiades, see Chapter Five 200-3.

⁴ Th. 8.38.4; Lewis *S&P* 96.

⁵ Andrewes *HCT* 5.79; Wilamowitz-Möllendorff *Hermes* 43 (1908) 598-9.

⁶ Th. 8.50.2-4, 83.3; Lewis *S&P* 98-9; for an analysis of this episode, see Westlake *JHS* 76 (1956) 99-104.

lose by further contact with him,¹ was more than willing to jettison the friendship by backing Hermocrates' accusations against Tissaphernes in Sparta.²

Lysander

Almost as soon as he had succeeded to the Nauarchy in 407/6, Lysander formed a private friendship with Cyrus, the son of the Persian King, and this was one of the most successful Greco-Persian friendships of the period.³ Yet Lysander also established other friendship networks in Asia Minor. Diodorus writes that, after visiting Cyrus at Sardis, Lysander's next act as *Nauarchos* was to go to Ephesus and, calling together the most influential men of the cities,⁴ divided them into *hetaireiai*, and promised that, if he was successful, he would put each in charge of the cities.⁵ It was through this means, Diodorus claims, that these men gave greater assistance than was needed by competing with each other, and Lysander was quickly supplied with all the equipment necessary for prosecuting the war.⁶ It was also these φίλοι of Lysander who plotted against Callicratidas⁷ and, on his death, sent to Sparta asking for Lysander's return.⁸ Lysander's success in his Nauarchy was based upon his willingness to initiate such friendships abroad with Greek and barbarian alike, exploiting these networks for his own ends as, no doubt, his newly-made friends also did for theirs.

¹ Lewis *S&P* 113-4.

² Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.31. On Astyochus' feebleness and incompetence (or at least Thucydides' portrayal of him as such) see Westlake *Individuals in Thucydides* 290-307.

³ See Chapter Five 212-3.

⁴ From Xenophon, we know that these included men not only from Ephesus, but also Chios and the other allies in Asia Minor (Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.6).

⁵ Diod. 13.70.4.

⁶ Diod. 13.70.4; Plut. *Lys.* 5.5-6; on difficulties with chronology, see Krentz *Comm.* 137.

⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.4.

⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.6.

Callicratidas

Callicratidas held the Nauarchy between Lysander's two terms of office.¹ Diodorus says of him – though his tone is generally more favourable to this young commander – that he was inexperienced of foreign peoples (οὐπω τῶν ξενικῶν ἡθῶν πεπειραμένος),² and this fact is reflected in his dealings with the Persians and the peoples of Asia Minor. For, unlike Lysander, he was unable to secure the help of the people of Ephesus and the other cities which supported Lysander, and instead was actively hindered by them.³ In addition, he was not prepared to wait upon Cyrus, but declared instead that the Greeks were fools to pay court to barbarians for money, and that he would do his best to reconcile Athens and Sparta, if he were to arrive home safely.⁴ When Cyrus sent him troops for use in the battle which was to take place at Mytilene and a personal gift, he apparently declined the gift, saying that there was no need for a private friendship between himself and Cyrus.⁵ It was this attitude to foreign friendships that largely marked the difference between the Nauarchies of Lysander and Callicratidas.⁶

But why were the *Nauarchoi* not, for the most part, selected according to this principle? In the early years of the war, when Spartan experience of the sea was limited, there must have been difficulty finding candidates with suitable experience. Brunt has pointed out the inferior experience and training of the Peloponnesian fleet compared to the ships of Athens,⁷ and Sealey has argued that the Nauarchy did not become a regular office with

¹ Though note that Lysander's second term of office was not as *Nauarchos* (Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.7; Diod. 13.100.8).

² Diod. 13.76.2, noting, however, that it is Callicratidas' moral characteristics that Diodorus applauds.

³ Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.4.

⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.7; Lewis *S&P* 117.

⁵ Plut. *Mor.* 222 e; Krentz *Comm.* 150.

⁶ For a further discussion of the relationship between Callicratidas and Cyrus, see Chapter Five 210-1.

⁷ Brunt *Phoenix* 19 (1965) 259-60.

annual tenure until approximately 409, when large fleets were operating for long periods of time at a great distance from Sparta.¹ In this way the problem came to perpetuate itself, for until the Spartans were regularly able to maintain a fleet where men could, in turn, gain leadership experience, the difficulty of selecting suitably qualified men remained.

Hodkinson suggests a tension between birth and merit as the factors influencing a man's career, contrasting the brilliant if somewhat slow rise of Brasidas with the undistinguished career of the *Nauarchos*, Alcidas.² However, naval ability does not seem to have been a distinguishing characteristic of the *Nauarchoi* of the earlier years of the war when Spartan experience at sea was limited.³ Three of the *Nauarchoi* in the years 435-404 – Cnemus, Alcidas and Astyochus – were thought to have conducted themselves so badly that *symbolouloi* were sent to them to advise them.⁴ It is perhaps worthy of note that of the *symbolouloi* we know, Brasidas, a man of known energy and ability, was one of the three sent to Cnemus and the single *symboloulos* sent to Alcidas,⁵ and Lichas the son of Arcesilaus, a well-respected Spartiate who had served as an ambassador,⁶ was sent to Astyochus.⁷ Men of talent and experience in warfare and diplomacy, though admittedly not in naval matters, were used to supplement the shortcomings of their commanders.

In later years, the *Nauarchoi* were men of military experience who had held a number of commands both on land and sea. Pollis held the

¹ Sealey *Klio* 58 (1976) 335-58; see also Andrewes *HCT* 5. 454-5.

² Hodkinson *Chiron* 13 (1983) 260-3.

³ Hodkinson *Chiron* 13 (1983) 261-2; cf. Lazenby *Spartan Army* 20.

⁴ Th. 2.85.1, 3.69.1, 76, 8.39.2; compare the *symbolouloi* sent to Agis (Th. 5.63.4); on *symbolouloi*, see below 182-3, 389-90 (Appendix E).

⁵ Th. 2.85.1, 3.69.1.

⁶ See Lewis *S&P* 97, who writes of Lichas: "the wealthiest man in Sparta, a member of the *gerousia* of long standing, seasoned by diplomatic negotiations at least with Argos, and provided, it might be hoped, with useful relationships with foreigners won by his generosity to visitors to Sparta"; see also below on Spartan *presbeis* 174.

⁷ Th. 8.39.2. Note that the team of advisers with Astyochus were even given the power to depose him, if they thought it necessary, and put a certain Antisthenes in his place.

Nauarchy in 396/5, perhaps also in 376/5, and was *epistoleus* for Podanemus in 393/2.¹ Similarly, Teleutias served in a number of commands on land and sea, as well as doing his tour of duty as *Nauarchos*, probably in 390/89.² The case of Lysander and then, later, Antalcidas suggests that selection on the basis of foreign friendships *could* be an influencing factor in the selection of *Nauarchoi*, even if was not in all appointments. In the earlier years, however, one wonders about the accusation of the Ionians – that the *Nauarchoi* were men who were inexperienced in naval matters and who were ignorant of the people – and one might suppose that the Spartans were not really interested in naval matters themselves or the commanders. It was not until Lysander and Cyrus transformed the Spartan fleet into a force to be reckoned with that Spartans really concerned themselves with its form or leadership.

Military Appointments in Other States

We know very little about military appointments in states other than Athens and Sparta, and we have a very small number of names of commanders. But we know that these states also had and made use of their overseas connections; Hermocrates of Syracuse and his friendship with Pharnabazus has been discussed in the previous chapter.

There is also an example of a Corinthian *strategos* who won his command because of his foreign friendships. Aristeus the son of Adeimantus led the Corinthian contingent sent to Poteidaea after the revolt in 432.³ That he was a man of influence in Corinth is attested by the fact that most of the soldiers from Corinth followed him willingly and not least out

¹ See Appendix B: *Spartan Nauarchoi* 333, 335 & n. 1.

² See Appendix B: *Spartan Nauarchoi* 334-5, 334 n. 2, *Harmosts & Archons* 342, 343.

³ Th. 1.60.2. See also Westlake CQ 41 (1947) 25-30; de Ste. Croix *Origins of the Peloponnesian War* 211-2.

of a *φιλία* for him.¹ He was an “appropriate” choice as commander for a campaign to Poteidaea, as Thucydides also writes that he was always *ἐπιτήδειος* to the Poteidaaeans.² Moreover, when he had given up hope of the rescue of Poteidaea, Aristeus escaped but remained among the Chalcidians and negotiated with the Peloponnesians about bringing relief to the city.³ In the other *poleis* as well, foreign friendships could affect appointment to foreign commands.

Presbeis

As noted above,⁴ one would expect personal connections to be an influencing factor in the selection of ambassadors. Selection for a *presbeia* at Athens was by popular election, a process which automatically favoured the upper classes⁵ and a fact reflected in how few of the most prominent politicians failed to take part in embassies.⁶ Similarly at Sparta, *presbeis* were chosen from among the privileged families of the Spartiates.⁷

There was the expectation that a city would be represented on a *presbeia* by men of repute. Isocrates wrote that “the Athenians sent to the more factionalised [of the cities] those of the citizens with the greatest repute among them”.⁸ Herodotus says that Megabazus sent as messengers the seven Persians who were *δοκιμώτατοι* after himself,⁹ and Diodorus writes that the Spartans sent as ambassadors to Athens in 369 the most illustrious (*ἐπιφανέστατοι*) men.¹⁰

¹ Th. 1.60.2. His father, Adeimantus, commanded the Corinthians in 480: Hdt. 8.59.1-61.3, 94.1-3; schol to Th. 1.60.2.

² Th. 1.60.2.

³ Th. 1.65.1.

⁴ 108 above.

⁵ Herman *PCPS* n.s. 36 (1990) 93; cf. Ober *Mass and Elite* 15.

⁶ Adcock & Mosley *Diplomacy in Ancient Greece* 158.

⁷ Mosley *Envoys and Diplomacy* 52.

⁸ Isoc. 12.164.

⁹ Hdt. 5.17.1.

¹⁰ Diod. 15.67.1.

Wealth was a desirable attribute also.¹ For example, Tellias, ambassador to Centoripa, was the richest man in Acragas,² and Aneristus and Nicolaus, Spartan envoys to Persia, were from families of noble birth and great wealth.³ Plutarch also advises that one should take a good orator as one's colleague on an embassy,⁴ and Gorgias, the rhetorician, was sent on a mission to Athens on the grounds that he was the most able of all the Leontines.⁵

Personal connections could also play an important part in the selection. The main qualification for prospective ambassadors could be that they were pleasing and "friendly" (ἐπιτήδειος) to the state to which they were being sent.⁶ For example, the Argives sent Eustophus and Aeson to Sparta to make a treaty with the Lacedaemonians in 420 on the grounds that they seemed to be προσφιλέστατοι to the Spartans.⁷ In 346, the Thebans sent an embassy of Philip's ξένοι to Macedon.⁸ In 426, the people of Heracleia Trachinia sent as a *presbeutes* to Sparta one Teisamenus.⁹ Hornblower suggests that he may have been chosen deliberately because of his name in order to excite Spartan sympathies,¹⁰ since the Spartans had brought the bones of the mythical Teisamenus, son of Orestes, from Helice to Sparta.¹¹ In the fourth century, Aeschines rejects Demosthenes' claim to have made

¹ Though elective magistracies were paid at higher rates than those chosen by lot: see Ar. *Acharn.* 66, 90, 596-617; Jones *Athenian Democracy* 49.

² Diod. 13.83.1-4.

³ Th. 2.67.1; Hdt. 7.134.2.

⁴ Plut. *Mor.* 819 c; cf. Phaeax son of Eristratus, ambassador to Italy and Sicily in 422 (Th. 5.4.5), of whom it was said ὥς λαλεῖν ἄριστος, ἀδυνάτατος λεγεῖν (PCG Eupolis 116 = Kock 95).

⁵ Plato *Hipp. maior* 282 b; Diod. 12.53.2; cf. Prodicus, Plato *Hipp. maior* 282 c.

⁶ Mosley *Envoys and Diplomacy* 44-5.

⁷ Th. 5.40.3.

⁸ Dem. 19.140.

⁹ Th. 3.92.2.

¹⁰ *Comm.* 504; id. *ΦΙΛΟΛΑΚΩΝ* 151-2.

¹¹ Paus. 7.1.8. Leahy suggests that the Spartans engineered this so that, after their similar success at bringing Tegea into alliance with the bones of Orestes, they might bring Helice into an alliance and that the other Achaean states might follow (Leahy *Historia* 4 (1955) 30-4). The attempt, however, seems to have failed.

the alliance with Thebes in 338 on the strength of their sympathy for him¹ saying that in the past many men “who were particularly intimate with them (οἱ μάλιστα οἰκείως ἐκείνοις διακείμενοι)”, had been sent to Thebes without making them friends of the Athenians.² Mosley writes that, since ambassadors were wealthy and politically influential, they frequently developed contacts abroad on a personal level, as well as obtaining appointments as πρόξενοι.³ Herman, on the other hand, reverses the order of this, claiming that:

factually and conceptually private alliances and inter-state treaties were inextricably woven – so much so that it sufficed to mention the one to imply the other. Inter-state treaties, as well as the diplomatic moves that preceded them, went hand in hand with the alliances out of which they sprang.⁴

Yet is this a general truth? Did all interstate negotiations always presuppose personal connections? Was this true for all states? If we compare trends in Athenian and Spartan appointments once more, we will see that there is a marked difference in the extent to which personal connections appear to have been influential in determining selection.⁵

Athens

If we turn first to Athens, we can see that there were clearly instances where selection seems to have been influenced by an individual's connections.⁶ And, as with the Athenian *strategoi*, ambassadors with

¹ Demosthenes was the Theban πρόξενος (Aeschin. 2.141, 143).

² Aeschin. 3.137-9. Mosley notes (*Envoys and Diplomacy* 59) that it is “in the case of Thebes that individual Athenians are known to have the strongest connections with the state to which they were sent.”

³ Mosley *Envoys and Diplomacy* 44.

⁴ Herman *PCPS* n.s. 36 (1990) 94.

⁵ See Mosley *TAPA* 96 (1965) 262.

⁶ Mosley notes (*Envoys and Diplomacy* 58): “Frequently envoys did have specific connections with the state to which they were being sent, and many instances may be cited.” That connections did sometimes play a part cannot be refuted; that this was a “frequent” phenomenon is not so clear, as will be shown.

personal connections were often sent to those states on the edges of Greek influence where there was a greater emphasis on personal politics.¹ Listed below are some of the best examples from the years 435 to 336:

Nicias son of Niceratus

Nicias was one of the three generals who swore to the armistice with Sparta in 423.² The Spartans also conducted their negotiations for peace in 421 through Nicias and Laches, to the disgust of Alcibiades, who was trying to renew his ancient connections with Sparta,³ and Nicias is known to have had a *ξενία* with the family of Pausanias son of Pleistoanax, the Spartan king, perhaps as a result of these negotiations.⁴ In addition, when the Spartan envoys tried to prevent the Argive/Athenian alliance supported by Alcibiades in 420, Thucydides' narrative makes it clear that the Spartans again were working primarily through Nicias.⁵ What is more, after the earthquake prevented the Athenians making the alliance with the Argives, Nicias persuaded the Athenians to send ambassadors to Sparta, with Nicias himself as one of them.⁶ Given his recent relations with Sparta, he was a suitable choice.⁷

¹ Humphreys *The Family, Women and Death* 26-7.

² Th. 4.119.2.

³ Th. 5.43.2.

⁴ Lys. 18.10. The point is that Pleistoanax was also an oath-taker to the Peace of Nicias and subsequent alliance (see Appendix D: *Oath-takers* 380, 382). Events suggest that the connection may pre-date these negotiations, however, and may have, in fact, been used to further them.

⁵ Th. 5.45.3. Given that the ambassadors who came to Athens in the summer of 420 to stop Athens forming an alliance with the Argives were said to be *ἐπιτήδευτοι* of the Athenians, and that the Spartan ambassadors who came seem to have been working particularly through Nicias, we might guess that either Leon or Philocharidas had some personal connection with Nicias, since Endius was the *ξένος* of Alcibiades (Th. 8.6.3). Philocharidas seems a likely candidate since he was an oath-taker for the armistice with Athens in 423 and swore to the Peace in the following year. In both cases he would have been directly involved with Nicias in the negotiations (see Th. 4.119.2, 5.19.2, 24.1).

⁶ Th. 5.46.2.

⁷ See Mosley *Envoys and Diplomacy* 59. For the Spartans' general regard for Nicias, see also Th. 7.86.3-4.

Aristophanes son of Nicophemus

Aristophanes had connections with Cyprus through his father Nicophemus (who lived there with his Cyprian wife and their children),¹ and eagerly supported the interests of Cyprus and Euagoras, king of Salamis, in Athens. When Conon wanted to send someone to Sicily, probably in 394/3, to persuade Dionysius, the tyrant of Syracuse, to make a marriage alliance with Euagoras,² Aristophanes offered himself and went with Eunomus, the φίλος and ξένος of Dionysius.³ In a delicate matter such as this and so intimately concerned with Euagoras, Aristophanes was an appropriate choice, just as Eunomus was.

As further evidence of his Cyprian interests, in 390/89 Aristophanes entertained the *presbeis* from Cyprus,⁴ who had come to seek Athenian assistance for Euagoras, and supplied them with a large amount of money in addition to the fleet despatched by the Athenian assembly.⁵ He was then elected as an ambassador to Euagoras; a suitable appointment.⁶ However, his connection with Euagoras also had its price. When the expedition was captured by Teleutias on its way to Cyprus, the Athenians in anger recalled Aristophanes and his father, Nicophemus, and they were executed without trial.⁷

Callias son of Hipponicus

Callias son of Hipponicus was the hereditary πρόξενος of the Spartans in Athens, which honour, he boasted, his grandfather had received from his

¹ Lys. 19.36, 44; cf. Isoc. 9.57; see also Davies *APF* 200-2.

² Lysias writes that the primary purpose was to detach Dionysius from Sparta and make him the φίλος and σύμμαχος of Athens.

³ Lys. 19.19-20.

⁴ Lys. 19.27.

⁵ Lys. 19.21, 43, cf. 24-7.

⁶ Lys. 19.23.

⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.24; Lys. 19.7. On their execution, see Pritchett *The Greek State at War II* 25; Seager *JHS* 87 (1967) 113-4.

father.¹ His grandfather had served on an embassy to Sparta in 446 to negotiate to secure peace,² and Callias himself entertained the Spartan ambassadors in his rôle as πρόξενος in 379/8.³ Despite the rather cautious political stance of his family,⁴ Callias served on three embassies to Sparta to try to make an end of the war, one of these being in 371 when he made a conciliatory speech before the Spartan assembly for peace.⁵ His selection was obviously based upon his Spartan link.

Thrasybulus son of Thrason

Aeschines describes Thrasybulus son of Thrason as a man trusted in Thebes as no other (ἄνθρωπος ἐν Θήβαις πιστευθεὶς ὥς οὐδεὶς ἕτερος).⁶ He was probably the maternal uncle of Thrason of Erchia⁷ (the Athenian πρόξενος of the Thebans),⁸ and was accused of raising a revolution in Boeotia and robbing the Athenians of that alliance.⁹ He was elected as ambassador to Thebes in 378/7 presumably because of his connection.¹⁰

The following table sets out all Athenian ambassadors who seem to have been elected on the basis of their connections.

¹ Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.22, 6.3.4.

² Diod. 12.7.1.

³ Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.22.

⁴ See Davies *APF* 259-63.

⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.2, 4. Note, however, that he did lead the Athenian army against Sparta at Corinth in 390 (See Chapter Two 58).

⁶ Aeschin. 3.138; see also Mosley *Envoys and Diplomacy* 59.

⁷ Davies *APF* 238-40.

⁸ Aeschin. 3.138.

⁹ Lys. 26.23.

¹⁰ IG ii² 43.77 (= Tod 123); cf. Aeschin. 3.138.

Athenian Presbeis with relevant connections

(These are marked with † in Appendix C. For a discussion of all cases, see Appendix C)¹

<i>Presbeutes</i>	<i>Connection</i>	<i>Years of Relevant Appointment</i>
Nicias son of Niceratus	Sparta	420/19
Alcibiades son of Cleinias	Argos	419/8
Archeptolemus son of Hippodamus	Sparta	411 (under 400)
Antiphon son of Lysonides	Sparta	411 (under 400)
Euryptolemus son of Peisianax	Pharnabazus	409/8
Aristoteles son of Timocrates	Sparta	404/3
Aristophanes son of Nicophemus	Euagoras of Cyprus	394/3, 390/89
Eunomus	Dionysius of Syracuse	394/3
Conon son of Timotheus	Persia	393/2
Callias son of Hipponicus	Sparta	387/6, 375/4, 372/1
Thrasybulus son of Thrason	Thebes	378/7
Pyrrhander	Thebes	378/7
Aristophon son of Aristophanes	Thebes	??
Leodamas son of Eristratus	Thebes	??
Demus son of Ppyrilampes	Persia	??
Aristodemus (of Metapontum but working for Athens)	Macedon	(348/7), 347/6, 343/2
Phrynon	Macedon	347/6
Iatrocles son of Pasiphon	Macedon	347/6
Ctesiphon	Macedon	(348/7), 347/6
Aeschines son of Atrometus	Macedon	346/5, 346/5, 338/7
Demosthenes son of Demosthenes	Thebes	339/8
Demades son of Demeas	Macedon	338/7
Thrason	Thebes	??
Archdemus of Peleces	Thebes	??

¹ ? indicates those cases where the connection is more tentative.

() indicates that a connection may be either pre-existing or established in this year, but there is no evidence that it already existed. This year will not be included in the statistics.

Of the one hundred and sixty-three known appointments, thirty, about eighteen per cent, are of men for whom specific connections are attested; not a large part of the total appointments.¹ Conversely, not all those with personal connections with a particular state were appointed to all the embassies to that particular state, nor did it restrict their appointment on embassies to other states.² For example, Mosley cites Callias son of Hipponicus, who did not take part in the peace negotiations with Sparta of 392/1.³ Demosthenes is another who served on a large number of embassies to the Peloponnese, Byzantium and Macedon, but is only known to have gone to Thebes once, though he was their πρόξενος.⁴

So what other factors could affect selection? Political affiliation was sometimes a factor.⁵ A notable example is the ambassadors of 372/1 who were sent to Sparta to make peace.⁶ Callias son of Hipponicus, the first of the three speakers, was the hereditary πρόξενος of the Spartans, as we have seen above.⁷ The second speaker, Autocles, made a speech which would not have found favour with the Spartans.⁸ Callistratus, the third speaker, was looking for a compromise between the two states.⁹ Thus, on this particular embassy, all the colours of the political spectrum were represented.

There were sometimes also a number of ambassadors on a single embassy from an identifiable political group in Athens. For example, in

¹ These figures can only be approximate owing to the nature of the evidence.

² Mosley *Envoys and Diplomacy* 58-9.

³ *Ibid.* 59.

⁴ See Develin *Officials* for Demosthenes' particular embassies.

⁵ Mosley *Envoys and Diplomacy* 59-60; id. *TAPA* 96 (1965) 263-6.

⁶ *Xen. Hell.* 6.3.2-17. For a likely emendation of the text, see Tuplin *LCM* 2 (1977) 51-6 (which I have accepted in Appendix C: *Athenian Presbeis* 359 n. 1). See also Mosley *TAPA* 96 (1965) 264-5; id. *PCPS* n.s. 8 (1962) 41-6. Compare this embassy with the generals chosen for the expedition to Sicily in 415, each of whom represented a different political group.

⁷ *Xen. Hell.* 6.3.4.

⁸ Davies (*APF* 161) makes Autocles a member of a consistently anti-Spartan family, but the revision of Tuplin (*loc. cit.*), which Rhodes finds "attractive" (*CAH* VI² 579 n. 55), would eliminate this link.

⁹ *Xen. Hell.* 6.3.10-7.

409/8, Euryptolemus, the cousin of Alcibiades and one of his ἐπιτήδαιοι,¹ and Mantitheus, who was also associated with Alcibiades,² went on an embassy to Persia with Pharnabazus.³ In 346, Philocrates and Demosthenes, and Nausicles and Aeschines, who seem to be pairs from two political groups (whatever their differences later on), were all elected for the embassy to negotiate peace with Philip.⁴ This suggests the influence of those specific groups in the assembly at that time.⁵

These results are intelligible in terms of what we know or can deduce about the way political groups worked in Athens⁶ and the nomination and election of ambassadors. The actual procedure for election seems to have varied to a large extent from case to case and may have been affected by the particular requirements of particular cases. The first step in the selection of an embassy was to decide the number of envoys which was to be appointed,⁷ then how the nominations were to be taken: whether the candidates were to be drawn from all citizens,⁸ or whether there were to be any limitations on nomination, such as age restrictions or selection from a particular board,

¹ Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.18-19; Thompson *TAPA* 100 (1969) 583-86; Bicknell *Athenaeum* 53 (1975) 177; see also Appendix C: *Athenian Presbeis* 356 & n. 1.

² He escaped with Alcibiades to Clazomenae after being imprisoned by Tissaphernes (Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.10).

³ Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.13.

⁴ See Appendix C: *Athenian Presbeis* 362-3 and Chapter Seven 253 below.

⁵ It is noteworthy that four of the other members of the embassy to Philip had some kind of personal connection with him, however tenuous.

⁶ See Chapter One 27-8, 46-7.

⁷ IG i³ 61.16-18 (= ML 65); IG ii² 16 b.10-13 (= Tod 103.17-20); IG ii² 204.5-6; see Rhodes *GR&BS* 22 (1981) 130.

⁸ IG ii² 31.17 (= Tod 117), IG ii² 116.21-2 (= Tod 147); IG ii² 360.36-7, 555.18-9, 653.43-4; see Kienast *RE Supp.* 13 (1973) col. 527; Mosley *WS N.F.* 6 (1972) 141.

such as the *boule*.¹ In some cases it could be delegated to the *boule* to elect them.² The election itself was conducted by a show of hands in the assembly.³

Most known Athenian embassies in the fifth and fourth centuries were made up of two, three, five or ten men.⁴ Mosley claims that, ordinarily, only one man was elected from each tribe when there was more than one envoy to be elected.⁵ This is rather difficult to assess when our knowledge of whole embassies is so incomplete, and embassies that were elected from two separate groups, such as the citizen body and the *boule*,⁶ could not easily have a tribal basis, nor does there seem to be the need. In any case, we do have examples of embassies which are obviously not based upon tribal representation.⁷ In 384/3, the five-man embassy to receive the oaths of the Chalcidians was doubly represented in tribe X, as was the embassy to Byzantium in 378/7. Large embassies of ten suggest tribal representation,⁸ and the possible board of negotiators among the oath-takers for the Peace of Nicias and alliance with the Spartans may well be tribally

¹ See, for example, IG i³ 61.16-7 (= ML 65); Sinclair *Democracy and Participation in Athens* 32; five to be elected from the *boule* and five from all citizens: IG ii² 16 b.10-2 (= Tod 103.17-20); Dem. 18.164-5 gives two examples of decrees where ambassadors were limited to the *boule*, but the decrees in the speech *On the Crown* are regularly thought to be inauthentic; see, for example, Goodwin *Demosthenes. On the Crown* 351.

² IG ii² 16 b.10-1 (Tod 103.18-19); IG ii² 548.5-6.

³ Aeschin. 2.18.

⁴ Mosley *TAPA* 96 (1965) 255, 258-60.

⁵ Mosley *WS* n.f. 6 (1972) 140; cf. Kienast *RE Supp.* 13 (1973) col. 528.

⁶ See IG ii² 16 (= Tod 103).

⁷ Mosley himself discusses these (*WS* n.f. 6 (1972) 141-2) but is not convincing. He begins his argument from the principle that the rubric "from all Athenians" must have some equivalence with the statement made by [Aristotle] that the *stratego*i were elected "from all" (*Ath. Pol.* 61.1: see 126 above), but surely the ἐξ Ἀθηναίων πάντων of the inscriptions is a contrast to the other kinds of limitations which could be placed upon selection (whether age or membership of the *boule*), and not referring to tribally based election.

⁸ But see also Tuplin *LCM* 2 (1977) 54-5.

represented,¹ but the only embassy where we know a reasonable number of the ambassadors and their tribes,² the first embassy of 347/6 to Macedon, has tribe V represented twice, and tribe VI represented three times. This could be explained away if one argued that tribal representation had been abandoned by this time, as it possibly had been in the election of *strategoi*,³ but without more positive evidence for tribal election of embassies, the case is difficult to argue.

Nomination for election seems to have taken place on the assembly floor. In his speech *On the Embassy*, Aeschines writes:

When these things had been said, Philocrates proposed the decree to elect ten men as ambassadors, who would discuss peace with Philip and things of common advantage to the Athenians and to Philip. Ten men were elected by show of hands; I was nominated by Nausicles, and Demosthenes, who now brings charges against Philocrates, was nominated by Philocrates himself. Demosthenes was so eager for the business that he put forward a proposal in the *boule*, so that Aristodemus might be our fellow-ambassador without harm to himself, to elect ambassadors for the *poleis* in which it was necessary for Aristodemus to compete, who would intercede over the penalties on his behalf.⁴

As this demonstrates, members of the same political group were able to nominate each other: Nausicles nominated Aeschines,⁵ and Philocrates nominated Demosthenes. It is not surprising then that there are often clusters of different political groups represented on embassies. It was also possible for an individual to nominate himself. For example, Xenophon writes that Theramenes offered himself in the assembly to go to Lysander to

¹ See Appendix C: *Athenian Presbeis* for the year 422/1; though it is by no means certain that they were negotiators.

² The embassy of 372/1 to Sparta displays too many difficulties with names and demotics to be of use for this purpose; see Appendix C: *Athenian Presbeis* 359-60, 359 n. 1.

³ See Appendix B: *Athenian Strategoi* 330 & n. 1.

⁴ Aeschin. 2.18-19.

⁵ For their friendship, see Aeschin. 2.184.

find out the Spartans' intentions for the city,¹ and, in 420, Nicias offered himself as an ambassador to Sparta.² Often, however, ambassadors were not known to have had relevant connections but were either men who were well known public figures, such as orators:³ Demosthenes, Lycurgus or Aristophon of Azenia; or men who are otherwise unknown: Lycaethus who went to Sparta in 371 or Ameiniades son of Philemon, ambassador to Sitalces in 430.

The passage in Aeschines highlights another point: that the actual process of nomination appears to have taken place at the same meeting of the assembly at which nominees were voted on.⁴ Sinclair, following Briant, argues that the normal procedure followed was that, after the initial decree by the assembly fixing the number of envoys and any special requirements, the *boule* was left to consider nominations and present a list to a subsequent meeting of the assembly. The passage from Aeschines does not seem to bear this out. Rather, it deals with a normal *probouleuma* in favour of Aristodemus.⁵ There is no mention made of the *boule* putting forward names for the consideration of the assembly.

Sinclair goes on to say:

That meeting 'voted' or 'appointed' the envoys. Acceptance of the names recommended by the Boule was probably usual, but it was not automatic ... the chief value of the Boule's role was that it was fully informed about relations with foreign states and it could consider the question in detail in the light of the debate in the Ekklesia, but with less restrictions in terms of time, weighing the various considerations – the qualifications, experience and availability of particular individuals (especially the mover of the decree) and the range of opinions on relations with the state concerned.⁶

¹ Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.16.

² See 162 above.

³ This seems particularly true of the mid-fourth century.

⁴ Piérart *BCH* 98 (1974) 130-139 *contra* Briant *REA* 70 (1968) 7-31; Sinclair *Democracy and Participation in Athens* 99.

⁵ Kienast *RE Supp.* 13 (1973) col. 526.

⁶ Sinclair *Democracy and Participation in Athens* 99-100.

Although the Aeschines passage may be a narrative shorthand and not concerned with correct procedure, it does not bear this picture out. On the contrary, it would seem that on most occasions there was a lack of consideration about who would be suitable, except in the most limited sense. Sometimes the man with the right personal or political associations was elected, but not always. This is what one would expect if the assembly were both to nominate and elect candidates and if the means of nominating candidates was so variable. One would expect a larger cross-section of the citizen body to be represented. Therefore the inconsistency of the electoral procedure at Athens seems to justify the results we have. It was the men of distinction, wealth and ability, generally men with public careers who were easily seen and identified, who were selected. Equally, other citizens, depending on what special limitations might be required, might find themselves representing Athens abroad on diplomatic missions. Not all embassies, or even most, were selected because of private friendships and connections; there were also other factors involved.

Sparta

In Sparta, Mosley points out that one criterion for selection was evidently an attempt to maintain continuity of service between a particular ambassador and a state, and that selection could be made on the basis of personal ties.¹ Yet this can be taken a stage further, as those who do serve as ambassadors to a particular state more than once are often also known to have personal connections with that state, so that both appear as two parts of the same phenomenon. The following table sets out all Spartan ambassadors who seem to have been selected because of their connections:

¹ Mosley *Envoys and Diplomacy* 51.

Spartan Presbeis with relevant connections

(These are marked with † in Appendix C. For a discussion of all cases, see Appendix C)¹

<i>Presbeutes</i>	<i>Connection</i>	<i>Years of Relevant Appointment</i>
?Melesippus son of Diacritas	Athens	(432/1), 431
Aneristus son of Sperthias	Persia	430
Nicolaus son of Bulis	Persia	430
Athenaeus son of Pericleidas	Athens	423
Philocharidas son of Eryxilaïdas	Athens	(422/1), 421, 420, 408/7
Ischagoras	Thraceward parts	421
Lichas son of Arcesilaus	Argos	421, 418/7
Leon son of Anticleidas	Athens	420
Endius son of Alcibiades	Athens	420, 410, 408/7
Gylippus	Thurii	414
?Pasippidas	Persia	408
Megillus	Athens	408/7
Aristomenidas	Thebes	396
Antalcidas son of Leon	Persia	(393/2), 387/6, 375, 367
Etymocles	Athens	(378/7), 370/69
Ocyllus	Athens	(378/7), 370/69
Agesilaus	Mantineia	371
?Euthycles	Persia	367
Lysander son of Aristocritus	Dionysius of Syracuse	??

Twenty-six out of a total of seventy attested appointments, about thirty-seven per cent, appear to have been selected on the basis of a personal connection – a markedly higher number than for the Athenian ambassadors, and all the more startling since we know so little about

¹ ? indicates those cases where the connection is more tentative.

() indicates that a connection may be either pre-existing or established in this year, but there is no evidence that it already existed. This year will not be included in the statistics.

Spartan affairs.¹ Below is set out a selection of the Spartan ambassadors who seem to have connections with the state to which they are being sent:

Aneristus son of Sperthias and Nicolaus son of Bulis

Aneristus and Nicolaus were sent to Persia in 430 along with other envoys from Sparta, Corinth, Tegea and Argos (though the Argive was acting in a private capacity), seeking finance for the war with Athens.² Their selection for this mission does not seem to have been indiscriminate. In 480, both of their fathers, Sperthias son of Aneristus and Bulis son of Nicolaus went to Persia to offer their lives to the Persian King in atonement for Persian envoys who had been killed.³ Far from putting them to death, however, Xerxes decided to show greater mercy than the Spartans had displayed, by sparing them.⁴ Although they possibly had no connections with Persia or Persians before this episode,⁵ some kind of bond at least seems to have been formed as a result of their action, so that their sons are then seen to be appropriate envoys to gain a sympathetic hearing at the Persian court. In the end, Aneristus and Nicolaus did not arrive at the King's court, but were handed over to the Athenians by the Thracian, Sadocus, and were put to death.⁶

Endius son of Alcibiades

Endius was the ξένος of the Athenian Alcibiades.⁷ In 420, the Spartans sent to Athens Philocharidas, Leon, and Endius because they seemed to be ἐπιτήδαιοι to the Athenians,⁸ and the basis for this, at least in the case of

¹ The figures can only be approximate owing to the poor nature of the evidence.

² Th. 2.67.1; Hdt. 7.137.2-3.

³ Hdt. 7.133-6.

⁴ Hdt. 7.136.2.

⁵ Though they may have had a ξενία connection with Hydarnes (Hdt. 7.135.1).

⁶ Th.2.67.2-4; Hdt. 7. 137.3.

⁷ Th. 8.6.3.

⁸ Th. 5.44.3.

Endius, was presumably personal connection with individual Athenians.¹ Again, in 410, Endius was sent as the leader on a mission to Athens after the battle of Cyzicus to sue for peace.² Since his earlier ambitions to collaborate with Athens' recalcitrant Asian allies and Persia, fostered by Alcibiades,³ had come to nothing, Lewis asks the question: "Is he now returning to sponsor the old Athens-Sparta collaboration, or is he simply here as an Athenian specialist?"⁴ Whatever the answer to the former, the latter at least appears to be true. In 408/7, we probably find Endius in Athens once more, with Philocharidas and Megillus, who is probably to be identified with the Athenian πρόξενος,⁵ to ransom the prisoners of war.⁶ This is clearly an instance when Athenian expertise is being used.

Lichas son of Arcesilaus

Lichas son of Arcesilaus was the Argive πρόξενος in Sparta.⁷ He was an Olympic victor⁸ and was one of the *symboloi* to Astyochus in 412/1 and renegotiated the treaty with Tissaphernes.⁹ He was sent to Argos in 421 to renegotiate the Argive alliance,¹⁰ and again in 418 to negotiate for alliance.¹¹ Clearly his selection for these Argive embassies was dependent upon his προξενία.

¹ For a rather tentative suggestion of a personal relationship between Philocharidas and Nicias son of Niceratus, see 162 n. 5 above.

² Diod. 13. 52.2.

³ Th. 8.12.1-3.

⁴ Lewis *S&P* 114 n. 44.

⁵ See Appendix C: *Spartan Presbeis* 370.

⁶ Androtion *FGrHist* 324 F 44. On the emendation which produces the names of the three ambassadors, see Jacoby *Supp.* I 152-3.

⁷ Th. 5.76.3. His family also seems to have had connections with Thasos: see Cartledge *LCM* 9 (1984) 102.

⁸ Th. 5.50.4; Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.21; Paus. 6.2.1-3.

⁹ Th. 8.39.2, 43.3-4, 52; cf. 57.1, 84.5, 87.1.

¹⁰ Th. 5.22.2.

¹¹ Th. 5.76.3.

Aristomenidas [Aristomelidas]

Aristomenidas was one of the five *dikastai* sent from Sparta to try the Plataeans in 427¹ – an occasion when a pro-Theban may have been desirable – and an ambassador to Thebes in 396.² Pausanias describes him as “being friendly” (ἔχειν ἐπιτηδείως) to the Thebans, and Mosley writes that his place on the panel of judges at Plataea “gave him as good a claim as anyone to go to Thebes in 396, especially as Pharax, who was the Theban proxenos, was on service away from Sparta at the time.”³

Selection for *presbeia* in Sparta

There seem to be two ways in which *presbeis* could be appointed, depending on whether the appointment was made on the field of battle or was by a formal election in the assembly of the Spartans. Ordinarily, it seems, ambassadors were appointed by the assembly, probably after a resolution had been drawn up by the ephors.⁴ Xenophon writes that when the representatives from the Peiraeus came to Sparta in 404 to make terms, “after they had heard all of them, the ephors and the assembly (οἱ ἔκκλητοι) sent fifteen men to Athens.”⁵ The decision does not seem to have rested with the ephorate alone, but in combination with the assembly, as at Athens.⁶ It is not known how one was nominated, but it is not inconceivable, given their powers, that the ephors put together a list which merely had to be ratified by the assembly. The importance of a “personal

¹ Paus. 3.9.3; cf. Th. 3.52.2-3.

² Paus. 3.9.3.

³ See also Mosley *Envoys and Diplomacy* 52.

⁴ Kienast *RE Supp.* 13 (1973) col. 526.

⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.38; see also Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.23.

⁶ Cf. Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.9, where the ephors are said to have sent the embassy. This is probably analogous to passages such as Plut. *Per.* 29.3, where Pericles is said to have done this or that, as if on his own initiative (perhaps also Th. 2.22.1). This amounts to a kind of shorthand, where the figure or figures who have influence in the decisions are said to have made them, whereas in fact the final decision was ultimately the prerogative of the assembly.

style" in Spartan politics has already been discussed,¹ and one could easily imagine that the "appropriate" man or his *hetaireia* might be able to apply to or exert their influence upon members of the ephorate to have their names included, or indeed that the ephors themselves could hand-pick the men with the right kind of qualifications.

In the field, it seems that the power to select envoys rested with the king, whose prerogative it was to lead the army. Xenophon explicitly states in his treatise on the Spartan constitution, when discussing the power of the king in the field, that "the sending of embassies, both friendly and hostile, is also the king's prerogative" (τὸ μέντοι πρεσβείας ἀποπέμπεσθαι καὶ φιλίας καὶ πολεμίας, τοῦτ' αὖ βασιλέως).² However, some have found such a statement inconsistent with the usual powers of the ephors in diplomacy, leading Weiske to emend αὖ to οὐ.³ But the emendation is unnecessary. Hamilton, in his discussion of this passage, cites a number of instances when Agesilaus, leading the army, both sent and received envoys,⁴ and we need look no further than Book II of Thucydides to find an instance when Archidamus sent Melesippus son of Diacritas to the Athenians with a final warning immediately before his first invasion of the plains of Attica.⁵ There are also parallels among the military commanders and harmosts who are appointed as the need arises.⁶ It would be a simple enough choice to make,

¹ See above esp. 105-6.

² Xen. *Lac. Pol.* 13.10.

³ For argument against emendation, see Hamilton *Agesilaus and the Failure of Spartan Hegemony* 47 n. 39. It should be noted that Michell, though he does not discuss this passage, has a different view of the two ephors who accompanied the king while he was on a campaign. While Hamilton (*ibid.* 45-6) claims that "they did not interfere with his exercise of military command" and they "merely observed matters, unless the king invited them to contribute advice" (see Xen. *Lac. Pol.* 13.5), Michell (*Sparta* 127) writes that "Once war was declared the powers of the ephors became greater ... When one of the kings went on campaign, two of the ephors accompanied him, like the political commissars of Soviet Russia."

⁴ *Agesilaus and the Failure of Spartan Hegemony* 46-7.

⁵ Th. 2.12.1.

⁶ One such example is particularly pertinent. When, in 394, Dercylidas brought to Agesilaus news of the victory in mainland Greece, Agesilaus sent Dercylidas himself back to the Hellespont to spread the report. Not only was he the "appropriate" man, as Agesilaus tells

as long as the king was given the right information, perhaps even from the ephors who were there to advise him.

Thus the elections are consonant with and provide no difficulty for the conclusion that, at Sparta, election to the position of *presbeutes* seems to have been influenced by personal, even hereditary, connections. This is consistent with the style of politics prevalent in Sparta in the fifth and fourth centuries, where personal connections were all-important. In so far as Sparta is concerned, there was a relationship on a personal level behind many diplomatic advances, and this is reflected in the types of men who were elected to conduct them.

Oath-takers

Those who were involved in the swearing of oaths, as opposed to the ambassadors who received the oaths of the other party, were, in most cases, a different group from those who negotiated the treaties.¹ Those who swore the oaths, the "oath-takers", were generally the domestic officials of the *polis* who swore on behalf of the whole *polis*.² In Athens, for example, the *boule* and the generals were usually among those designated to swear.³ During the period of the Second Athenian Confederacy, the members of the *synedrion* of the allies were also required to swear.⁴ In 367, in the alliance between Athens and Dionysius of Syracuse, Dionysius himself as well as the magistrates, the *boule*, the *strategoi* and the trierarchs swore on behalf of the Syracusans.⁵ The main objective seems to have been to obtain the best

him, because he actually took part in the battle, but he was also a man who seems to have had links with Asia Minor and Abydus in particular (Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.1-3).

¹ Mosley *PCPS* n.s. 7 (1961) 59-63.

² See Adcock & Mosley *Diplomacy in Ancient Greece* 216.

³ See Appendix D: *Oath-takers*; see also Rhodes *The Athenian Boule* 43-4.

⁴ See, for example, IG ii² 48.14-5 (= Tod 122); on oath-takers for the Second Athenian Confederacy, see also Cargill *The Second Athenian League* 102-9.

⁵ Tod 136.35-7 (= IG ii² 105 + 523).

possible representation of the *polis*. So in 408, in the treaty Alcibiades made with the Selymbrians, those who swore were the *strategoi*, the trierarchs, the hoplites and any other Athenian who was present.¹

Generally, the actual men who swore the oaths remain unknown to us, though, as rare exceptions, Thucydides gives us the names of all those who swore to the armistice with Sparta in 423,² and the Peace of Nicias and alliance with Sparta in 421.³ Sometimes lists of names of oath-takers appended to decrees have been preserved, or partially preserved,⁴ so that, on the decree recording the alliance between Athens, Perdiccas II of Macedon and Arrhabaeus of Lyncestis, we have a detailed list of Perdiccas' family who swore the oaths,⁵ and we have a list of Thessalians who swore to a treaty with Athenians in about 361/0.⁶

Because of this lack of evidence, it is difficult to say very much about the selection of particular individuals as oath-takers, and comments must again be confined to Spartan and Athenian examples, though even here little real difference can be discerned.

There is some evidence for selection on the basis of foreign connections, however. For example, in 423 Nicias swore to the armistice with Sparta as one of the Athenian *strategoi*, as well as to the Peace of Nicias in 421. His possible connection with Sparta has already been noted above.⁷ Although the primary criterion in both cases was probably his position as *strategos*, his selection from among the members of the board may have

¹ IG i³ 118.28-30 (=ML 87); see also Appendix D: *Oath-takers* 384 n. 1. Compare Chabrias in 363/2 who swore to the people of Iulis in Ceos on behalf of the Athenians (IG ii² 111.17-18 [= Tod 142]) when he came to them after a revolt.

² Th. 4.119.2.

³ Th. 5.19.2, 24.1

⁴ Though it seems more usual on the whole, at least in Athens, to record the names of ambassadors sent to receive the oaths.

⁵ IG i³ 75.

⁶ IG ii² 175.

⁷ See 162 above.

been because of his personal interests. This is supported not only by the fact that he was a primary figure in the negotiations for the peace and gave it his name, but by the fact that Laches,¹ who was also involved in the armistice, as the proposer of the decree,² also appears as an oath-taker for the peace and the alliance, probably as one of the generals.

If one turns to Spartan oath-takers, the results are more promising. Two of the three Spartan oath-takers for the armistice of 423 have known Athenian connections. Apart from his suggestive name,³ Athenaeus son of Pericleidas had other links with Athens, as his father had been the ambassador sent to Athens in the third Messenian war to ask for help.⁴ Then, in 423, Athenaeus appeared himself as an oath-taker, and was the Spartan representative sent to Brasidas in Thrace with the terms of the agreement.⁵ Philocharidas son of Eryxilaïdas, another of the oath-takers of 423 and also of 421, served on embassies to Athens,⁶ and was reputed to be ἐπιτήδειος to the Athenians.⁷ Again in 396, when Tissaphernes and Agesilaus swore to a treaty, Dercylidas, who had recently himself exchanged oaths with Tissaphernes,⁸ appears as one of the oath-takers representing Agesilaus.⁹ However, it should be noted that the oath-takers for the Peace of Nicias included the two kings, probably the five ephors, and ten others. Likewise, a Spartan decree possibly restoring to the Delians their control of the sanctuary on Delos about 403 is followed by the names of the two kings

¹ For his possible Spartan connections, see Appendix B: *Athenian Strategoi* 313 & n. 3.

² He does not appear to have been a general in this year, so would have been discounted from selection as an oath-taker on this basis.

³ See Gomme *HCT* 3.604; compare Lacedaemonius, the son of Cimon, who was named for his father's philo-Laonian persuasion (Plut. *Cimon* 16.1). Cf. Kagan *Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War* 267-8.

⁴ Plut. *Cimon* 16.8; Ar. *Lysis*. 1138-41 (described here as ἰκέτης).

⁵ Th. 4.122.1.

⁶ See Appendix B: *Spartan Presbeis* 368.

⁷ Th. 5.44.3.

⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.19-20.

⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.5-6.

and the five ephors, who were probably the oath-takers.¹ The extent to which “appropriate” connections could be used was thus limited. The ten men who receive the oaths for the Peace of Nicias and alliance appear in a more interesting light as the only group out of the seventeen oath-takers who *could* have been selected for their connections, but only one, Philocharidas, shows any evidence of being selected for the connection.²

There is not enough evidence to make a comparison between Athens and Sparta, but it may be noted that for both *poleis*, those who swore to the Peace of Nicias and the alliance – almost without exception our largest groups of named oath-takers – are not notable for any known personal connections with the other state. All that can be said, it would seem, about Spartan and Athenian oath-takers is that within the more general and representative selection of public officials, individuals with personal connections could sometimes be chosen among the oath-takers.

Other Magistracies

Oikistai

Alcidas

In his time as *Nauarchos*, he was notable, like his predecessor Cnemus, for his timidity, dilatoriness and incompetence.³ However, despite his apparently poor showing as *Nauarchos*, in 426 he was one of the *oikistai*

¹ *Inscriptions de Délos* 87 (= Tod 99). It is not clear whether these are oath-takers or not, though it seems less likely that they are included for dating purposes, since it is normal Spartan practice to use only the eponymous ephor to date decrees (cf. Th. 5.19.1; 8.58.1). The names are, however, appended in Ionian (presumably by the Delians) though the rest of the decree is in Laconian, which may alter the way we should interpret them.

² Indeed, the connection may have arisen from this office.

³ See Westlake *Individuals in Thucydides* 142-7; Hornblower *Comm.* 400 [who describes him as a “disastrous figure”]; Hodkinson *Chiron* 13 (1983) 261; see also Lateiner *GR&BS* 16 (1975) 175-84, who shows how Thucydides uses similar language to link thematically Cnemus and Alcidas, and highlight his censure of Spartan faintheartedness; for a more favourable view of Alcidas, see Roisman *Historia* 36 (1987) 385-421, who defends Alcidas as prudent rather than slow and cowardly; cf. Badian *JHS* 107 (1987) 23.

of Heracleia in Trachinia.¹ As Hornblower notes he was “not a man whose performance in the East Aegean waters in the earlier part of the book [Bk 3] was so brilliant as to prepare us for his further employment in this way”.²

So why was he given this appointment? Westlake claims that the position was a sinecure,³ and Gomme that he was “rewarded with an easy post in the aristocratic manner: perhaps as a compromise between Brasidas and his political enemies.”⁴ Roisman⁵ argues that he was sent there as the expert in maritime warfare, given that the colony was intended as a naval base,⁶ though this seems unlikely since his period of service there was so short.⁷ Hornblower, however, argues that his appointment was due to his Heraclid associations.⁸ Diodorus claims that the Spartans decided to make Trachinian Heracleia a great city “both by reason of kinship and Heracles, who was an ancestor of theirs” (καὶ διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν καὶ διὰ τὸν Ἡρακλέα, πρόγονον ἑαυτῶν ὄντα).⁹ “Kinship” presumably refers to the Spartans’ alleged kinship with the Dorians of neighbouring Doris; as for Heracles, Hornblower points out, one of the names of Heracles was Alcidas, and “what was more appropriate than for the Spartans to send a real-life Alcidas to bring the colony luck?”¹⁰ However, perhaps we can press this further and say that by creating the added impression of a kinship link, the tie between the colonists and the mother city was made even stronger.

¹ Th. 3.92.5.

² ΦΙΛΟΛΑΚΩΝ 151-2.

³ *Individuals in Thucydides* 147.

⁴ HCT 2.395.

⁵ Roisman *Historia* 36 (1987) 385-421.

⁶ Th. 3.92.4.

⁷ Th. 5.51.2-52.1; Graham *Colony and Mother City* 38-9.

⁸ Hornblower ΦΙΛΟΛΑΚΩΝ 151; id. *Comm.* 506-7.

⁹ Diod. 12.59.4.

¹⁰ Hornblower ΦΙΛΟΛΑΚΩΝ 151-2.

Spartan Symbouloi

The *symbouloi* were men appointed to oversee events and advise commanders in the field.¹ As discussed above, the *symbouloi* tended to be men of ability, such as Brasidas, or of age and diplomatic experience, such as Lichas, and were generally chosen more for their skills than their connections. Yet Ischagoras, who was sent to Thrace with Ameinias and Aristeus in the summer of 423 "to oversee the affairs of the Spartans",² was also sent to Thrace as a *presbeutes* in spring 421 to tell Clearidas to hand over Amphipolis to the Athenians,³ so already has or else develops a connection with the area. Lysander, one of the thirty sent in 396,⁴ had φίλοι among the Greeks of Asia Minor and had had great success on his campaigns in the area.⁵ This may have influenced his selection, though Xenophon gives Lysander the credit for prompting the expedition to Asia on the grounds that he wished to re-establish his decarchies.⁶ Antisthenes and Aracus, two of the *symbouloi* to Dercylidas in 398,⁷ had prior experience in the Hellespont:⁸ Antisthenes in the winter of 412/1;⁹ and Aracus had served as *Nauarchos* (though only in name, not in deed) in 405/4,¹⁰ and was to be *presbeutes* in the winter of 370/69.¹¹ Of the thirty who succeeded Lysander's contingent in the following year, Herippidas had military experience,¹² and Xenocles and Scythes were to serve as

¹ On *symbouloi*, see Cartledge *Agasilaos* 212; Westlake *Historia* 35 (1986) 417 n. 33 (= *Studies* 257 n. 33); Hodkinson *Chiron* 13 (1983) 268; Pritchett *Greek States at War* II 36-8; for a different view of their rôle, see Roisman *Historia* 36 (1987) 419-21.

² On his status, see Appendix E: *Other Magistracies* 389 n. 1.

³ See Appendix C: *Spartan Presbeis* 368.

⁴ On their status as *symbouloi*, see Pritchett *Greek States at War* II 37-8.

⁵ See above under *Nauarchoi* 155.

⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.2.

⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.6.

⁸ See Westlake *Historia* 35 (1986) 417 n. 32 (= *Studies* 257 n. 32).

⁹ Th. 8.39.1-2, 61.2.

¹⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.7.

¹¹ Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.33.

¹² Harmost of Heracleia Trachinia in 399 and, later, of Thebes in the period when the Spartans held the Cadmeia (see Appendix B: *Spartan Harmosts & Archons* 341, 343); took

ambassadors to Thessaly in 394/3.¹ Ramphias, the *symboulos* to Thrace in summer 422, had also been an ambassador to Athens in 432/1.² By the nature of the position, one would expect men of experience – whether this was in terms of military or diplomatic skill, or even knowledge of an area and connections with the people – so it would not be surprising if some from among the *symbouloi* were selected for their foreign friendships.

Magisterial Appointments and Foreign Friendships.

Appointment to a whole range of magisterial appointments could be affected by one's foreign friendships. Not only could men be selected as foreign diplomats because of their personal connections, but also as military commanders, on land and sea, and *oikistai* of new colonies. The continual selection of the same men can also be explained on this basis, as men with connections with another state were often sent to that state more than once. Yet this was not the only criterion for selection, and the proportion of appointments made on this basis varied from state to state.

A comparison of the relative percentages of appointments on this basis in Athens and Sparta is very interesting. We do not know all the men who were appointed to magistracies in this period, and we probably do not know all the foreign connections, but the difference between Athens and Sparta is so striking that it is unlikely to be due to the chance of available evidence. This difference is also consistent with the patterns discussed in Chapter Three: that there is a tendency for Spartans to make a greater use of their foreign friendships than Athenians. In military appointments, the Athenians elected about eleven per cent of their *strategoi* for their overseas

over the command of the fleet on the death of Podanemus in 393/2 before the arrival of the *epistoleus*, Pollis (see Appendix B: *Spartan Nauarchoi* 333 & n. 2).

¹ Plut. *Ages.* 16.5.

² Th. 1.139.3.

friendships, whereas about a quarter of the Spartan harmosts and archons (laying aside the *Nauarchoi*) were influenced by this. Among the ambassadors, a magistracy where one would expect to find relatively high percentages, only eighteen per cent of Athenian ambassadors as opposed to the thirty-eight per cent of Spartan ambassadors gained selection because of their overseas connections.

This is not to say that all men with connections undertook magistracies directly related to their connections, or that these were the only magistracies they performed. Alcibiades did not take part in the negotiations with Sparta in 421, despite the lapsed *προξενία* which he wanted to renew.¹ The only thing we know about Boeotius, the Spartan, whose name clearly implies Boeotian links, is that he served on an embassy to Persia.² But we do not know what other embassies he may, or may not, have served on: such is the nature of the evidence. Not all those with connections used them, nor were all those with connections used. Indeed, it is impossible to know how many men *did* have private connections: again, the evidence simply fails us. What we can say is that there was a predisposition, more marked in Sparta than in Athens, to select men because of their connections, and this points to the meshing of the public and the private in the Greek world.

The difference in the proportions of foreign friendships affecting foreign posts also highlights some more significant points about the styles of political activity in Athens and Sparta and the ethos which underpinned their versions of oligarchy and democracy respectively. Spartan political activity was clearly conducted within the framework of personal connections, and this is not inconsistent with an oligarchy of elites. It was easier to take account of relevant connections when appointments were

¹ Th. 5.43.2.

² Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.2; cf. Libys, the brother of Lysander, whose name implies Libyan connections, is only known as the *Nauarchos* of 403 (Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.28).

made *ad hoc*, as was the case with Sparta's non-royal commanders, than when there was a regular annual election, as was the case with Athens' *strategoi*. The same kind of personal associations which secured the acquittal of Sphodrias in 378¹ could also procure the election of magistrates. Personal friendships with men in other states, such as ξενία and προξενία, form part of this same pattern, and so it is not surprising that these were also exploited and one finds the πρόξενος of a particular state serving as the magistrate to that state, or ξένοι in different states acting as the mediums of interstate diplomacy.

In Athens, the case is different. Athens was a democracy, and, as such, had supposedly undermined the power of the aristocracy. "Suitable" appointments seem to have been made far less often in Athens than in Sparta – although there must have been many Athenians with overseas connections after half a century of the Delian League. Nevertheless, "suitable" appointments were sometimes made. Despite what has been said above about annual elections, the Athenians would know to some extent where they were likely to need generals in the coming year, so relevant connections could be taken into account in giving particular postings to men already elected as generals, and in the *ad hoc* appointment of ambassadors. Thus it would seem that the *demos* was willing to work to a limited extent through the aristocratic ethos of friendships and networks of friends, to harness its potential for their own ends, rather than to work against it. The age of the aristocrat may have been passing away, but it had not yet out-lived its usefulness to the Athenian *demos*.

Particular problems could arise when the Greeks had to deal not only with their fellow Greeks but with non-Greeks, and these will be discussed in the following chapters.

¹ Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.25-33; Diod. 15.29.5-6; Plut. *Ages.* 25.1-10.

Section C. When Greeks deal with Non-Greeks

Chapter Five: Persia and the Greeks

Then the king placed Daniel in a high position and lavished many gifts on him. He made him ruler over the entire province of Babylon and placed him in charge of all its wise men.

Daniel 2.48.

Relations between the Greeks and the Persians were constantly changing throughout the late fifth and early fourth centuries, as Persia supported first one then the other of the major Greek powers. Though relegating the Persians to the category of *barbaroi*,¹ the Greek world continued to look for the support of the King in their wars against each other. The ultimate success of the Spartans in the Peloponnesian War was largely dependent on the friendship they contracted with Persia. Likewise, the impetus for the Corinthian War in the 390s came with Persian gold, and the earlier Common Peace treaties in the fourth century were made with Persian backing.

Nevertheless, Greco-Persian relations were never without their difficulties, and a number of questions need to be asked. For example, when an ancient writer claims that a Persian and a Greek were φίλοι, what would the Persian have understood by this?² The question is important when one is trying to understand the treachery of Persians. Despite the familiar “friendship” terms used by ancient authors, with the concepts of reciprocal relationships and the expectations of a just return that they implied for the Greeks, individual Persians appear to be singularly faithless and unreliable

¹ For the connotations of “otherness” and inferiority attached to such an appellation from the fifth century onwards, see Starr *Iranica Antiqua* 11 (1975) 50; Baldry *The Unity of Mankind in Greek Thought* 22-4; Bacon *Barbarians in Greek Tragedy* *passim*; Starr *Awakening of the Greek Historical Spirit* 49-56.

² Just as “friend” is an inadequate rendering of the term φίλος into English, the question needs to be asked what a Persian would mean if he called someone a friend.

in maintaining their end of the bargain. The ἀπιστία of Tissaphernes has often been noted,¹ displayed most prominently by his treachery towards the commanders of the Greek mercenary army.² Pharnabazus, also, though often contrasted with the treacherous Tissaphernes as a faithful Persian,³ proved untrue to the Spartan Anaxibius when someone more useful came along.⁴ The rules of friendship as understood in the Greek world do not necessarily seem to hold true when Greeks are dealing with Persians: Persians do not seem to have the same expectations of the relationship as the Greeks do and, as a result, often seem unscrupulous and treacherous.⁵

This chapter will attempt, firstly, to give an overview of Greek contact with Persia during the period; secondly, to consider Persian gift-giving and how this may have affected the Persians' dealings with the Greeks; thirdly, to look at the individual cases of Greeks and their Persian friends; and, finally, to draw some conclusions about the way in which the Greek world was able to interact with the Persian empire, and the reasons for both the difficulties with the relationship and the successes.

Greek contacts with the East

435-404

Persia provided the economic backing necessary for Sparta to bring the Peloponnesian War to an end and secure her domination in Greece.

¹ Starr *Iranica Antiqua* 11 (1975) 51; Hirsch *The Friendship of the Barbarians* 21-9; Lewis *S&P* 151. On Tissaphernes' high-handed treatment of the Greeks, see also Westlake *CQ* n.s. 35 (1985) 51-2 (= *Studies* 174); id. *Historia* 31 (1981) 257-79 (= *Studies* 289-309).

² Xen. *Anab.* 2.5.27-6.1; 3.2.4.

³ Hirsch *The Friendship of the Barbarians* 22; Starr *Iranica Antiqua* 11 (1975) 51. Note, however, Pharnabazus' claim at Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.32.

⁴ Xen. *Anab.* 7.1.2, 2.7; see Cook *The Persian Empire* 210.

⁵ Although there may be superficial similarities to Greek friendship relationships in the ritual of Persian and other non-Greek friendship ceremonies (see Herman *Ritualised Friendship* 44 fig. 9, 51 fig. 4), this thesis will argue that the attitudes to the relationship and expectations of it, and so the relationship itself, were profoundly different from one culture to the next.

From the resources of the Peloponnesian League alone, the Spartans were unable to maintain a fleet for long enough periods to train rowers and develop new strategies adequate to deal with the Athenian fleet.¹ The only clear way that sufficient funds could be amassed was through contracting a friendship with Persia, a policy difficult for the Spartans, who, Lewis writes, held the conviction "that for more than a hundred years they had stood for the integrity of all Greek cities against Persia."²

Despite this, Archidamus suggested in 432 that Persia should be approached for money and ships.³ Indeed, in 431 both the Athenians and the Spartans were contemplating Persian aid,⁴ and in 430 an embassy from the Peloponnesian League was sent to Persia,⁵ though this party was intercepted by the Athenians at the Thracian court of their ally, Sitalces.⁶ Again, in the winter of 425/4, one of the Athenian generals arrested a Persian ambassador, Artaphernes, on his way to Sparta with a message from the Persian King, declaring he did not know what the Spartans wanted, for although they had sent many embassies to him, none had said the same thing.⁷ Athenian ambassadors accompanied Artaphernes to Asia, but, when they heard at Ephesus that the King had died, the Athenians returned home.⁸ But the cost of Persian support was the cities in Asia Minor; a heavy price for the "liberators" of Greece which they were not yet prepared to pay.⁹

Perhaps about 423, the Athenians contracted a "φιλία for all time" with the Persians – the Peace of Epilycus.¹⁰ In 413/2, however, Tissaphernes

¹ Brunt *Phoenix* 19 (1965) 259-60.

² Lewis *S&P* 62.

³ Th. 1.82.1; Lewis *S&P* 63.

⁴ Th. 2.7.1; Lewis *S&P* 64; Brunt *loc. cit.*

⁵ On the Spartan members of this contingent, Aneristus and Nicolaus, see Chapter Four 173.

⁶ Th. 2.67.1-4; Lewis *S&P* 64.

⁷ Th. 4.50.1-2; Lewis *S&P* 64 n. 93.

⁸ Th. 4.50.3.

⁹ Brunt *loc. cit.*; see also Lewis *S&P* 65-8.

¹⁰ Andoc. 3.29. The Peace itself is confirmed by an inscription honouring Heracleides of Clazomenae. On the restoration and joining of the inscription (*IG* i³ 227 and *IG* ii² 65), see M.B. Walbank *ZPE* 48 (1982) 261-3; id. *ZPE* 51 (1983) 183-4. Wade-Gery (*HSCP* Supp. I

and Pharnabazus made independent approaches to Sparta promising Persian support,¹ and Sparta was ready to relinquish her high moral position and accepted the offer of Tissaphernes.² After the revolt of Chios and Miletus, the first treaty with Persia was made,³ though the Spartans grew discontented with this treaty and a second was made.⁴ However, after the eleven *symboloi* assigned to assess the performance of Astyochus, the current *Nauarchos*, had arrived, Lichas son of Arcesilaus, the leader of the team, repudiated the first two treaties, claiming that the clauses dealing with the King's territory would enslave all the islands, Thessaly, Locris and everything as far as Boeotia, and that, "instead of freedom, the Spartans would impose upon the Greeks Persian rule."⁵ Tissaphernes was offended and departed in anger.⁶

Alcibiades defected from the Spartans to Persia, and was acting as an adviser to Tissaphernes; he approached the Athenians and suggested that, if they overthrew the democracy and took him back, he could obtain Tissaphernes' support for Athens.⁷ When negotiations with the Athenians broke down, Tissaphernes made a third treaty with the Peloponnesians.⁸ This third treaty declared: "All the King's land in Asia belongs to the King"

(1940) 127-32 = *Essays in Greek History* Oxford 1958 207-11) argues for a date in 424/3, but it appears from Babylonian evidence discussed by Stolper (*AMI* 26 (1983) 223-36) that it may be hard to fit a treaty with Darius II into that year (cf. Lewis *CAH* V² 422 n. 132). Other suggestions are: 425/4: Murison *Phoenix* 25 (1971) 24-6, 30; 424-18: Thompson *Klio* 53 (1971) 119-24; 422/1: Blamire *Phoenix* 29 (1975) 21-6; just before 415: Raubitschek *GR&BS* 5 (1964) 155-7 (= *The School of Hellas* 6-8).

¹ Because of Athens' support for Amorges (Andoc. 3.29)? Andrewes (*Historia* 10 (1961) 3-4) thinks Andocides is right, but Westlake (*Phoenix* 31 (1977) 319-29 (= *Studies* 103-12)) and Kagan (*The Fall of the Athenian Empire* 29-32) place the change in Persian policy before the change in Athenian policy.

² Th. 8.5.4-6.2.

³ Th. 8.17.4-18.3. The main thrust of the treaty was that the cities of Asia Minor should stop paying the Athenians tribute, and, as Lewis writes, for Tissaphernes it was "an essential preliminary to their starting to pay him, a point on which the treaty has nothing to say" (*S&P* 90-1). On the status of the successive treaties, see Andrewes *HCT* 5.142-6.

⁴ Th. 8.29, 36-7.

⁵ Th. 8.43.3.

⁶ Th. 8.43.4.

⁷ Th. 8.45.1-46.5; 52.1, 56.2-4.

⁸ Th. 8.57-8.

(Χώραν τὴν βασιλέως, ὅση τῆς Ἀσίας ἐστί, βασιλέως εἶναι).¹ This, coupled with Lichas' statement that it was necessary for the Milesians and other peoples in the King's country to be dependent on Tissaphernes in a reasonable way and serve him until the war should come to a good conclusion, amounted to the handing over of Asia to the King.²

In the following years down to the fall of Athens and the end of the Peloponnesian War in 404, Spartan/Persian relations see-sawed. Tissaphernes continued to show himself unreliable in his maintenance of the Peloponnesian fleet, and until 407 the Athenians continued to hope that they could obtain his support; in 411 Mindarus, the incoming *Nauarchos*, headed for the Hellespont, where Pharnabazus was offering assistance.³ In 407, Xenophon reports the return of a Spartan embassy from Persia, which was led by Boeotius, and claimed that they had received everything they wanted from the King.⁴ Lysander, the most successful *Nauarchos* of these years, struck up a personal friendship with the Persian, Cyrus, as well as with the leading citizens of the cities in Asia Minor;⁵ this brought Lysander the resources he needed for ultimately winning the war.

¹ Th. 8.58.2.

² Lichas' statement: Th. 8.84.5. See also Lewis *S&P* 107 & n. 100; see also Brunt *Phoenix* 19 (1965) 263. It is unclear, however, what exactly the position of the Greek cities in Asia was after this treaty: see Lewis *S&P* 110-4; Andrewes *CAH* V² 478.

³ Th. 8.99; Diod. 13.38.4-5; see also Th. 8.87; Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.14, 24-5. It does not seem, however, that Mindarus was averse to accepting Tissaphernes' help when it was offered (Diod. 13.45.6, 46.6, 49.4; for Pharnabazus as an error for Tissaphernes in Diodorus, see Lewis *S&P* 113 n. 42), though associations with Tissaphernes were now frowned upon at Sparta (Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.32; see also Krentz *Comm.* 106).

⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.2-3. Lewis (*S&P* 124-5) sees in this a fourth treaty with the King in which the autonomy of the Greek states was secured. Kagan (*The Fall of the Athenian Empire* 332 n. 28) rejects this, as does Tuplin (*Achaemenid History II* 133-53), but Andrewes (*CAH* V² 489) writes that: "Xenophon says nothing of any further concession, but the form of the negotiations suggests that the doubtful status of the Greek cities was now regulated: they were to be autonomous while they paid tribute to Persia."

⁵ Diod. 13.70.3-4; Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.1-7, 2.1.6; Plut. *Lys.* 5.5-6.

404-386

In the next period of Greco-Persian relations, Sparta changed in her attitude to the King and pursued a course of open hostility, first of all in 401 by backing the attempted coup of Cyrus.¹ On the death of Cyrus, Tissaphernes was sent as satrap to the provinces Cyrus had previously ruled and demanded straight away that all the cities should be subject to him.² Consequently, the Spartans sent Thibron in open war against Tissaphernes after an appeal for help by the Asiatic Greeks.³ Finding Thibron unsatisfactory, the Spartans sent Dercylidas to take over the command of the army in 399.⁴ Perhaps in 397, Timocrates, a Rhodian, was sent to the Greek cities, probably by Pharnabazus, with gold to incite war against the Spartans.⁵

In 396, Agesilaus, the Spartan king, was sent to lead the Spartan forces in Asia when reports reached Sparta that Tissaphernes and the King were assembling a fleet of Phoenician ships.⁶ During the years of Spartan activity in Asia, a series of truces was made in which the Spartans promised to withdraw if the Persians left the Greek cities autonomous,⁷ but these came

¹ Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.1; Diod. 14.19.2, 4, 21.2; Lewis *S&P* 138 & nn. 14, 16; Dandamaev *A Political History of the Achaemenid Empire* 286. On Cyrus' mercenary army, see 213-4 below. I accept the chronology of Funke (*Homónoia und Arché passim*) for the years 404-386.

² Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.3; Diod. 14.26.4, 35.2; see also Lewis *S&P* 119 n. 78, 138-9; cf. Andrewes *Phoenix* 25 (1971) 208. On the status of Tissaphernes, see Westlake *Historia* 31 (1981) 257-8, 262 & n. 16 (= *Studies* 289-90, 293, 307 n. 16).

³ Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.4; Diod. 14.36.1; Lewis *S&P* 139. On why the Spartans went to the aid of the Asiatic Greeks, see Hamilton *Sparta's Bitter Victories* 107-9, 111-2; Westlake *Historia* 35 (1986) 406-10 (= *Studies* 240-3). On the Greeks in Asia, see Seager & Tuplin *JHS* 100 (1980) 141-54.

⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.8; Diod. 14.38.2; Lewis *S&P* 139-40.

⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.1-25; *Hell. Oxyrh.* (Bartolletti) 7.2, 5 = (Chambers) 10.2, 5, which claims that Pharnabazus sent Timocrates to Greece with the gold in 397 (not Tithraustes and not in 395, as in Xenophon's account). This finds support at Polyaeus 1.48.3, though Paus. 3.9.7-8 agrees with Xenophon in making Tithraustes the author of the mission: see Bruce *Comm.* 58-60. Note that the author of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* indicates that the cities were already spoiling for war with Sparta: *Hell. Oxyrh.* (Bartolletti) 7.2 = (Chambers) 10.2.

⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.1, 3, 5; Diod. 14.79.1-3; Lewis *S&P* 141-2 & n. 45; Dandamaev *A Political History of the Achaemenid Empire* 287. Note also the influence of Lysander in this phase, and his relationship with Agesilaus: Xen. *Hell.* 3.3.3, 4.2, 4.7-10; Plut. *Lys.* 22; cf. Diod. 14.13; Hamilton *Agesilaus and the Failure of Spartan Hegemony* 7-9, 16, 19-20, 27-30, 32-7; Gray *The Character of Xenophon's Hellenica* 46-9.

⁷ For example: 397 – Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.20; Diod. 14.39.6; 396 – Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.5.

to nothing, and Agesilaus was recalled to the war at home.¹ In 394, Pharnabazus, together with Conon the Athenian, who was in command of the Persian fleet, sailed along the coast of Asia Minor and drove out the Spartan harmosts, after defeating the Spartans in a naval battle, then crossed to Laconia and made raids along the coast.²

At this point, Sparta looked like winning neither the war in Asia nor the Corinthian War, so tried to get a settlement instead.³ Having discovered that the Persians, through Pharnabazus, were funding the rebuilding of the walls at Athens and maintaining their fleet, the Spartans decided to send Antalcidas to inform Tiribazus, the King's general,⁴ of this in the hope of bringing him over to their side and making peace between Sparta and the King.⁵ Ambassadors from Athens, Boeotia, Corinth and Argos also came to the talks, which broke down when the Athenians, Thebans and Argives refused to agree.⁶ Tiribazus did not think it was safe to support the Spartans openly without the King's approval, but gave money to Antalcidas in secret, so that a fleet might be manned,⁷ and imprisoned Conon.⁸ Another attempt at peace was made later the same year in Sparta, but, although this time the terms were more favourable for the Greeks, the negotiations failed.⁹ The King, moreover, maintained his anti-Spartan stand, and, when Tiribazus went back to the court, he sent Struthas to take care of the places by the sea.¹⁰

¹ Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.2.

² Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.1, 7. For Pharnabazus, Conon and Euagoras of Cyprus: Chapter Three 99-100.

³ Lewis *S&P* 144.

⁴ Underhill (*Comm.* 157) writes that, as the satrap of Western Armenia during the retreat of the Ten Thousand (Xen. *Anab.* 4.4.4) and one of the royal benefactors (Diod. 15.10.2-4), he seems to have succeeded Tithraustes as satrap of Ionia (Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.28) and as commander of the Persian forces in Asia Minor.

⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.12.

⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.13-5.

⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.16.

⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.16; Isoc. 4.154; Diod. 14.85.4.

⁹ Andoc. 3 *passim*; Philochorus *FGrHist* 328 F 149; see Ryder *Koine Eirene* 31-3. For a different view, see Badian in *Georgica* 25-48, esp. 26-34.

¹⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.17; Diod. 14.99.1.

Athens, although the King was her φίλος, began sending aid to Euagoras who was now making war on the King, and made an alliance with Egypt.¹

In 388/7, the Spartans made Antalcidas *Nauarchos*,² and sent him on an embassy to the King.³ He made terms and returned with Tiribazus.⁴ With the help of Tiribazus and Antalcidas' ξένος ἐκ παλαιοῦ, Ariobarzanes, Antalcidas now took control of the sea.⁵ The Athenians and the Argives were now also eager for peace, and in 386 the King's Peace was made.⁶ The cities in Asia and Clazomenae and Cyprus were given up to the King, and all the other Greek cities, except Lemnos, Imbros and Scyros, were declared independent.⁷ Sparta had again conceded the Greeks in Asia to the King – this time finally – in order to buy supremacy in Greece.⁸

386-362

In about 380, despite the Common Peace agreement and their new pro-Persian stance, Diodorus records that Sparta made an alliance with Glos, the Persian admiral, who was in revolt against the King.⁹ In the second half of the 380s, the Egyptian king, Acoris, fought against Persia, and enlisted the services of the Athenian, Chabrias.¹⁰ Pharnabazus was appointed as the commander of the King's forces, and sent ambassadors to Athens to

¹ Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.24; Ar. *Plutus* 178; Diod. 14.98.3; see also Lewis *S&P* 147 n. 73.

² Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.6.

³ Diod. 14.110.2-3.

⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.25.

⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.28.

⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.29, 31; Diod. 14.110.4.

⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.31. In a recently discovered inscription, we have evidence suggesting that one Ionian state, Erythrae, did not want to be handed over to Persia (SEG 26 1282).

⁸ See Ryder *Koine Eirene* 36, 39.

⁹ Diod. 15.9.3.3-5. Glos supposedly offered them large sums of money and made many other great promises (Diod. 15.9.4), and the Spartans, according to Diodorus, were seeking a plausible excuse for making war on Artaxerxes since they were unpopular in Greece for betraying the Asiatic Greeks (Diod. 15.9.5). Glos and his son, Tachos, soon died, however, and the alliance was never implemented (Diod. 15.18.1, 19.1). Hornblower (*Greek World* 203) writes that this is "a curious but not incredible episode"; cf. Ryder *CQ* n.s. 13 (1963) 105-9. Cawkwell (*CQ* n.s. 26 (1976) 70), though he does not seem to doubt Glos made the offer of an alliance, finds it impossible that the Spartans accepted.

¹⁰ Diod. 15.29.1-2. Chabrias was back in Athens to be elected general in 379.

denounce Chabrias, and asking to be given Iphicrates.¹ The Athenians, according to Diodorus, were eager to gain the favour of the King and Pharnabazus, and so recalled Chabrias from Egypt and despatched Iphicrates.² In 375, another Common Peace was concluded among the Greek states on the initiative of the King,³ supposedly so that he could acquire Greek mercenaries for his war against Egypt.⁴

In the winter of 369/8, Ariobarzanes sent Philiscus of Abydus to Greece with large amounts of money to make peace.⁵ When the Thebans would not agree that Messene should be under the control of the Spartans, Philiscus collected a large mercenary army so that he might make war on the Spartan side.⁶ Because of this support, Sparta's position was improved, and she remained a threat to Thebes.⁷

In 367, another peace conference gathered at Susa.⁸ Pelopidas, the Theban, won the King's favour, but terms were laid down that were unacceptable to most of the Greeks. In 367/6, Athens and Sparta retaliated by joining in support of the rebel satrap, Ariobarzanes, though the Athenian general, Timotheus, was sent with orders not to break the Common Peace.⁹ Another attempt at peace was made in Greece in 366/5,¹⁰ but, despite

¹ Diod. 15.29.3

² Diod. 15.29.4.

³ Diod. 15.38.1; Philochorus *FGrHist* 328 F 151 (see also Jacoby Supp. I 522-3). Antalcidas, the Spartan, was again involved in the negotiations in Persia (on this, see 217 below). Diodorus (Diod. 15.50.4) also claims that the King was involved in the peace settlement of 372/1 (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.2-20; Plut. *Ages.* 27.5-8.4), but this is probably a confusion with the peace of 375: see Ryder *Koine Eirene* 124-5; Jacoby Supp. I 522-3. On Antalcidas' possible presence at the Persian court in 371 (though this is unlikely), see Ryder *Koine Eirene* 127.

⁴ Ryder accepts that this may well have been the King's actual motive (*Koine Eirene* 58).

⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.27.

⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.27; see also Ryder *Koine Eirene* 79-80, 134-5.

⁷ See Hornblower *Greek World* 229: he thinks Sparta "remained a threat to Thebes".

⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.33-40; Plut. *Pelop.* 30.1-8; Diod. 15.76.3; see Ryder *Koine Eirene* 80-2, 136.

⁹ Timotheus: Dem. 15.9; Isoc. 15.111; Nepos *Tim.* 1.3; Agesilaus: Xen. *Ages.* 2.26; Nepos *Tim.* 1.3; see also Hornblower *Greek World* 230-2, 237; id. *Mausolus* 172-4, 198, 201.

¹⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.6-11.

Diodorus,¹ the King was not involved.² In the following years, Persian involvement in Greece diminished as the focus of attention changed to Macedon.

362-344

After Mantinea, Agesilaus went to Egypt to command the mercenary forces of the Egyptian rebel king, Tachos, against Artaxerxes.³ Chabrias, the Athenian, commanded the naval contingent, but was not sent officially by Athens.⁴

Greek involvement with dissident satraps continued into the 350s. In 355, Chares, in order to raise money, joined Artabazus, the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, when he revolted from the King, and defeated the King's army.⁵ Artabazus, paying back the favour, gave him a large sum of money as a gift (Ἀρτάβαζος ἀποδιδούς τῆς εὐεργεσίας χάριτας ἔδωρήσατο πλῆθος χρημάτων)⁶, from which he bought provisions for the whole army.⁷ The King, however, sent ambassadors to Athens to denounce Chares, and threatened to join Athens' allies in their war against her.⁸ According to Diodorus, it is this which led the Athenians to bring their war with the allies to an end.⁹ In 353, after the retraction of Athenian assistance,

¹ Diod. 15.76.3.

² Ryder CQ n.s. 7 (1957) 199-205; id. *Koine Eirene* 137-9 contra Cawkwell CQ n.s. 11 (1961) 80-6.

³ Diod. 15.92.2-3.

⁴ Diod. 15.92.3; see also Hornblower *Greek World* 237. Note that the Greeks, including the Athenians (the inscription comes from Argos, but the reply to the satraps is in Attic), refused any official help to the satraps in an inscription possibly dating to 362/1 (Tod 145).

⁵ Diod. 16.22.1.

⁶ This clause is loaded with now familiar "friendly" language. As we shall see below, it is probably significant that the Persian "gave gifts" (ἔδωρήσατο) to the Greek as a means of "repaying the χάριτες".

⁷ Diod. 16.22.1-2.

⁸ Diod. 16.22.2.

⁹ Diod. 16.22.2; cf. 34.1; schol. Dem. 3.31, 4.19; see Hornblower *Greek World* 242-5.

Artabazus asked the Thebans for help, and they sent Pammenes and five thousand soldiers.¹

In 344, the King once more planned a campaign against Egypt, and sent envoys to all the Greek states inviting them to take part.² The Athenians and Spartans declined,³ though they reaffirmed their *φιλία* with the King, whereas the Thebans, Argives and Asiatic Greeks despatched troops.⁴ In 340, Philip of Macedon moved against Perinthus, and besieged the city.⁵ Perinthus, however, resisted him, receiving reinforcements from Byzantium, and, in addition, the Persian King ordered his satraps to the assistance of the city.⁶

Philip, not the Persian King, was the major preoccupation in Greece in the period.⁷ It is not until 337 that Persia figures again in Greek affairs, and this time as the victim of Philip's, then Alexander's, imperialism, not the protagonist.

The Greeks and their Persian *φίλοι*

Relations between the Greeks and the Persians in these hundred years were interlaced with the interactions of individuals. Diplomatic activity between Greece and Persia was not conducted, by and large, on a state level, but between individuals, and generally individuals with personal connections.⁸ This is only natural, perhaps, when one party was a monarchy supported by a hierarchical system of command, but one must then look at

¹ Diod. 16.34.1-2; see also Hornblower *Greek World* 247.

² Compare Diod. 16.44.1, but Diodorus narrates Persia's successful campaign not c. 343, where it belongs, but under 351/0 and 350/49.

³ Philochorus *FGrHist* 328 F 157; [Dem.] 12.6.

⁴ Diod. 16.44.1-2.

⁵ Philochorus *FGrHist* 328 F 54; Diod. 16.74.2; on date, see Jacoby *Supp.* I 331.

⁶ Diod. 16.74.3-76.3; Paus. 1.29.10; Arrian 2.14.5.

⁷ Whatever Philip's own intentions were concerning Asia.

⁸ As we have seen in Chapter Four, the Greek states often dealt with those on the fringes of their world or outside on a personal level.

the nature of the relationship between these individuals and investigate on what terms the relationship was founded and sustained.

Persians and Gift-giving

Before we move on to looking at specific instances of Greco-Persian friendships, we should consider the Persian form of reciprocal giving, and how it differed from the Greek exchange. Although the evidence is not as abundant as it is for the Greek world, Persian gift-giving is reasonably well documented in the ancient sources.¹ Not only do we have the Persepolis relief illustrating the gifts that could be brought to the King,² but a number of Greek writers refer to gifts given by the King to others.³ Gifts flowed out from the King on special occasions and at feasts,⁴ such as the King's birthday,⁵ or on his accession,⁶ and gifts were a normal part of the hospitality offered to ambassadors.⁷ Careful account was taken of those who performed good deeds, and lists of benefactors were kept so that each could be rewarded according to his due.⁸ There was probably a ranking of benefactions, and accordingly gifts were given by the King in return.⁹

¹ Though care must be used when using Greek sources describing Persian customs: see Endnote 3.

² Hdt. 3.89-97 distinguishes tribute in cash levied by Darius from gifts given before Darius and by peoples outside the satrapies; but the Persepolis reliefs show gifts in kind continuing to be brought; cf. Theopompus *FGrHist* 115 F 263; Sancisi-Weerdenburg *Yauna en Persai* 149-50 (who discusses the difficulties of distinguishing between "gifts" and "tribute"; Lewis *REA* 91 (1989) 227-8. Note that not all gifts received by the King were thought to be of high enough value: Hdt. 3.13.4.

³ There are many examples of this; for a selection: Hdt. 7.26.2, 106.1, 116, 8.10.3, 120, 9.110.2; Ctesias *FGrHist* 688 F 15.49; Th. 2.97.4; Strabo c 733 (15.3.17); Plut. *Artax.* 22.1-2; cf. P. Briant *Achaemenid History II* 5-6. For the kinds of gifts that could be given by the King, see Knauth with Nadjmabadi *Das altiranische Fürstenideal von Xenophon bis Ferdousi* 189-95.

⁴ *Esther* 2.18.

⁵ Hdt. 9.110.2; cf. Plato *Alc.* 121 c; on the *tukta*, see esp. Sancisi-Weerdenburg *Yauna en Persai* 147-50.

⁶ Plut. *Artax.* 26.5; Ctesias *FGrHist* 688 F 15.49.

⁷ See, for example, Timagoras, the Athenian ambassador: Plut. *Artax.* 22.9-12; *Pel.* 30.9-12; see also Perlman *GR&BS* 17 (1976) 223-33; Lewis *REA* 91 (1989) 227-235.

⁸ Hdt. 3.140, 154.1, 160.1-2, 6.30.1, 8.85.3, 90.4; *Esther* 6.1; Th. 1.129.3; see also Sancisi-Weerdenburg *Yauna en Persai* 157-8.

⁹ Plut. *Pelop.* 30.7; *Esther* 6.1-11; Diod. 17.14.2; Hdt. 3.160.2, 7.106.1; see Lewis *REA* 91 (1989) 228; Knauth *loc. cit.*

What did the King receive in return? Not only did he receive counter-gifts and tribute, but he also secured the loyalty of his subjects¹ and their military service.² The function of the gifts was to “fix” the King in his regal superiority. As Sancisi-Weerdenburg points out, the man who can give away the most valuable gifts is the most powerful man in the community, so that those who receive the gifts from the King receive not only an object of value, but also status.³ In addition, the King always took care to give a gift in return that was of greater value than the gift given, thus putting the giver in a state of debt to the King.⁴

But how did this kingly gift-giving differ from the Greek version of reciprocity? Firstly, and perhaps foremost, the Persian kingdom was just that: a kingdom ruled by a monarch whose personal status was almost equal to that of the god himself.⁵ While Greek reciprocity was stabilised by a rough equality of exchange among those outside one’s most intimate circle,⁶ Persian reciprocity is marked by inequality. The King gave more than anyone else, which, by keeping the recipients in his debt,⁷ created a power imbalance in the relationship.⁸

This kind of imbalance had a number of profound effects. Firstly, the King was the dominant partner in any relationship and was able to direct

¹ Cf. Kent *Old Persian* 119 (DB I §8 1.20-4), 132 (DB IV §63 4.61-7).

² Hornblower *Mausolus* 157; id. *Comm.* 373; Briant *Achaemenid History II* 5-6.

³ Sancisi-Weerdenburg *Yauna en Persai* 146.

⁴ See Sancisi-Weerdenburg *Yauna en Persai* 74.

⁵ Cook *The Persian Empire* 132-135.

⁶ Even among those relationships which were unequal (for example, between parent and child), Aristotle felt that there should be a kind of equality, since equality (ἰσότης) was a characteristic of φιλία (Arist. *Nic. Eth.* 8. 1158 b 27-8).

⁷ Cf. Sahlins *Tribesmen* 86-8 (for a summary, see Chapter One 13-7).

⁸ This kind of power imbalance is not exclusively Persian, and could also be used in interstate politics to assert a state’s dominance. Solomon reinforced his superiority over the Queen of Sheba by giving her, as a return for her gifts, everything she asked for, and more than she had given him (2 *Chronicles* 9.9-12). Thucydides’ Pericles talks about a similar kind of “unbalanced relationship” at Th. 2.40.4-5, where Athens by her generosity keeps the allied states in her debt (following Hooker’s interpretation of this passage (*Hermes* 102 (1974) 164-9) contra Missiou *The Subversive Oratory of Andokides* 114-21); see also Makris “The Expectation of *Charis* from the Performance of Liturgies in Classical Athens” [unpublished]).

the relationship and to abandon it whenever he wanted to. Secondly, the Persian exchange of “gifts” bears different connotations from exchanging “favours”.¹ A gift is quantifiable and a value can be attached to it. A service is more ambiguous, and it is more difficult to assess its value. More importantly, the value of a service depends on its context, and the value can be reassessed when the circumstances change: a service that might be important, and hence valuable, today, might be of no worth because of a change in circumstances tomorrow.² It is noteworthy that the Persians laid great store by recording benefactions as they were performed, and giving a value to them, and there was a set scale of rewards for particular services. The Greeks, on the whole, did not have this strict accounting, though they certainly expected a roughly equal return for services, and did place a value upon certain services, which were then rewarded by grants of *προξενία* or citizenship, though even here there were inconsistencies in the type of service which were repaid by such honours, particularly over time.³

¹ See also Chapter One 41-3.

² Finley (*World of Odysseus* 64) writes: “The word ‘gift’ is not to be misconstrued. It may be stated as a flat rule of both primitive and archaic society that no one ever gave anything, whether goods or services or honours, without proper recompense, real or wishful, immediate or years away, to himself or to his kin. The act of giving was, therefore, in an essential sense, always the first half of a reciprocal action, the other half of which was a counter gift.” I am not trying to deny this basic creed – that the act of giving, whatever the substance of this, was the “gift” – but to investigate some of the subtleties of this.

³ It is difficult to pin down exactly what constituted a service which could be rewarded by a *προξενία*, as the formulae in the decrees are not always specific concerning the services rendered. Among Walbank’s collection, however, W. 40 (though heavily restored) may be a grant of *προξενία* to a man who helped the Athenian army in Sicily (6-7), and W. 44 a grant to a (?)family of Illyrians who helped the “*demos* and the army of the Athenians” (9-10) [cf. W. 55.3-5]. W. 47 praises a certain Heracleides (cf. 191 n. 3 above) who assisted the Athenian ambassadors to the Great King (15-8). W. 90 is a grant of *προξενία* to Archelaus of Macedon for his assistance in ship-building (25-32) [cf. W. 60]. Yet one cannot be too rigid in defining the kind of service that would be rewarded by a grant of *προξενία*, since they could be used prospectively to produce services, rather than as a reward for services (for example, Nymphodorus of Abdera [Th. 2.29]), and, as time went on, the grants became increasingly more frequent and linked to other honours (see F.W. Walbank *The Hellenistic World* 148-9), so that the honour of *προξενία* itself decreased in value. Citizenship, on the other hand, as Osborne notes (*Naturalization* 4.186-204), was awarded for a wide range of activities, and could be either honorific or practical, depending on whom the grant was made to. This basic difference in the award is best illustrated seen by the grant made by the Athenians to Cotys, king of the Odrisians, ([Dem.] 12.9 (for the emendation: Osborne *Naturalization* 3.49, 122);

Thirdly, the attitude of the Greeks and Persians to a common relationship seems to differ. As we have discussed above,¹ as far as Greeks were concerned, anyone, whether from within the community or not, could enter into a balanced relationship (and the ξενία relationship is the obvious point of contact for those from outside the community). But the Persians did not necessarily view those outside their community in the same light. In fact, they usually seem to act in a negatively reciprocal way (that is: getting the most that they could at the least cost to themselves) towards non-Persians,² though they could and did enter into reciprocal relationships with non-Persians. What is striking is how often these seemingly balanced relationships of a kind between Greeks and Persians end disastrously for the Greek concerned. The answer must lie in the inherently “unbalanced” nature of the seemingly balanced relationship: the Persian is only willing to engage in the relationship for as long as it is of service to himself. In effect, he is trying to get the most that he can at the least cost to himself: negative reciprocity.

Greco-Persian Partnerships

At this point, we will turn to the specific instances of Greek and Persian friendships and see what information about such relationships can be extrapolated.

Alcibiades and Tissaphernes

The partnership between Tissaphernes and Alcibiades was never actually formalised in a relationship with a clear understanding of the

Dem. 23.118) with whom they hoped to maintain a friendly relationship (see Chapter Six 236-7, 240-3 for a detailed discussion of this), and then their later grants of citizenship and gold crowns to Python and Heracleides of Aenus, who assassinated Cotys, on the grounds that they were εὐεργέται (Dem. 23.119; cf. 127).

¹ See Chapter One 34-7, 40-1.

² This matches more closely Sahlins’ original model: see Chapter One 15.

obligations; Alcibiades' negotiations with the Athenians merely required that it appear that this was so. Citing Th. 8.47.2 (βούλεται [Alcibiades] ... καθελθὼν καὶ παρασχὼν Τισσαφέρνην φίλον αὐτοῖς ξυμπολιτεύειν), as evidence of ritualised friendship terminology, Herman lists Alcibiades among the ξένοι of Tissaphernes and implies that this was a connection of long standing.¹ However, Tissaphernes and Alcibiades were not ξένοι, nor even φίλοι, as a Greek would have understood this.² Rather, Alcibiades, though he tried unsuccessfully to establish a permanent connection with Tissaphernes, made an appearance of friendship with the satrap in order to convince the Greeks. Tissaphernes, on the other hand, was not averse to using the connection, such as it was, for his own purposes when the need arose and abandoning it when it was no longer useful to him.

Alcibiades' first known contacts with Tissaphernes are when Alcibiades used his influence in Sparta on behalf of the Chians and Tissaphernes in 412.³ Alcibiades later fled to Tissaphernes when Sparta

¹ Herman *Ritualised Friendship* 153 & n. 95, 183, where Herman claims that Alcibiades' relationship with Pharnabazus was the only one he started with a view to co-operation, but that "in most cases he availed himself of well entrenched connections".

² At face value, the relationship between them might appear to be one of long standing. Firstly, Alcibiades' negotiations with Tissaphernes over the assistance to the Athenians were based upon an apparent intimacy with him (Th. 8.46.1, 47.1, 2, 48.1, 52.1, 56.2, 82.2). Secondly, in 413 the Spartans favoured the appeal of Tissaphernes and the Chians because Alcibiades used his influence on their side (Th. 8.6.3: note also Alcibiades' ξενία with the Spartan, Endius). Thirdly, Alcibiades' overseas connections were many and various and could conceivably have included the Persian satrap. Although Alcibiades himself is not known to have had earlier dealings with Tissaphernes, it is possible that the connection may have been hereditary, for Alcibiades was known to have other φίλοι on the Asia Minor seaboard at Miletus and Chios (Th. 8.12, 17.2; Plut. *Alc.* 12.1, Satyrus *ap.* Athen. 13.534 d, [Andoc.] 4.30). Tissaphernes himself may have had a distinguished ancestry, perhaps being the son of Hydarnes (*Tituli Asiae Minoris* I 44 c 11-2; Lewis *S&P* 83-4, 83 n. 4; cf. Cook *The Persian Empire* 167; Westlake *CQ* n.s. 35 (1985) 43 n. 6 (= *Studies* 177 n. 6)). Although he is said to have received his satrapy after the successful quelling of the revolt of Pisouthnes in Sardis around 416 (Ctesias *FGrHist* 688 F 15.53; for chronology, see Lewis *S&P* 80-1 & n. 198), Lewis suggests that Tissaphernes may have had estates near Sardis (Lewis *S&P* 83-4), and Xenophon writes that his home was in Caria (Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.12-3). It is conceivable then that there were earlier contacts between the two families. There is perhaps support for this in the fact that when the Spartans grew suspicious of Alcibiades and put a warrant out for his execution, he fled to Tissaphernes (Th. 8.45.1). For doubt that Alcibiades was still with the Spartans when the warrant was put out for his execution, see Lewis *S&P* 96 & n. 62, but also Andrewes *HCT* 5.95-6.

³ Th. 8.6.3.

became too hot for him,¹ but such retreats to Persians by Greeks were not unprecedented.² In addition, although Alcibiades used a proposed friendship between the Athenians and Tissaphernes to bring about his own recall to Athens in 411, Thucydides emphasises that, between the two men themselves, there was only an apparent intimacy (πεῖσαι δ' ἄν ἐνόμιζε μάλιστα ἐκ τοιούτου, εἰ Τισσαφέρνης φαίνοιτο αὐτῷ ἐπιτήδειος ὢν [Th. 8.47.1]; ... τὰ δὲ τοῦ πολέμου πρῶτον ἔφη ... πλεύσας ὡς Τισσαφέρνην πράξειν. καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς ἐκκλησίας εὐθὺς ὄχρετο, ἵνα δοκῇ πάντα μετ' ἐκείνου κοινοῦσθαι [Th. 8.82.2-3]), that Alcibiades magnified his influence with the Persian (ὑπερβάλλων ἐμεγάλυνε τὴν ἑαυτοῦ δύναμιν παρὰ τῷ Τισσαφέρνῃ [Th. 8.81.2]), and that, in fact, his relations with Tissaphernes were not secure (οὐ γὰρ αὐτῷ πάνυ τὰ ἀπὸ Τισσαφέρνους βέβαια ἦν [Th. 8.56.2]).³

Alcibiades was an adviser to Tissaphernes, and suggested how he should conduct the war to Persia's advantage.⁴ Tissaphernes, at first, acted on his advice, and "gave his confidence (πίστις) to Alcibiades."⁵ He was willing to go along with Alcibiades largely because of the trouble over the alliance with the Spartans and, Thucydides writes, "Alcibiades, because he was contending for great things, eagerly attached himself to Tissaphernes and courted (θεραπεύων) him."⁶ This is not the language of an existing φιλία relationship, though it does suggest that Alcibiades was trying to form one.

Furthermore, Tissaphernes' treatment of Alcibiades was of a courtier, a minion, not a φίλος, with all the equality that that would imply.⁷ Indeed,

¹ Th. 8.45.1.

² For example, Hippias (Hdt. 6.102, 107.1) and Themistocles (Th. 1.137.3-8.2).

³ See also Lewis *S&P* 92.

⁴ Th. 8.45-46.

⁵ Th. 8.46.5.

⁶ Th. 8.52.

⁷ As Cook notes (*The Persian Empire* 209), in reference to the Spartan/Persian negotiations of 412/11, "These Persian grandees were men of dignity and noblesse. They were only too easily affronted by bluff egalitarian Spartans. So when the grand Athenian aristocrat Alcibiades

when Alcibiades did try to cement the relationship and make it a formalised friendship by coming to the Hellespont with ξένια and δῶρα,¹ Tissaphernes responded by not only refusing to receive the gifts, but also imprisoning Alcibiades.² The relationship between Alcibiades and Tissaphernes depended on flattery and utility. When Alcibiades wanted Tissaphernes' help he took up an attitude of courtly blandishments, but, when he lost his usefulness, Tissaphernes simply got rid of him. In order to convince the Greeks, however, Alcibiades pretended to an intimacy and φιλία which did not exist. He tried to play the game by double rules and was ultimately unsuccessful.

Agesilaus and Pharnabazus

Xenophon recounts the meeting of Agesilaus and Pharnabazus as a charming vignette in his *Hellenica*.³ As Gray points out, the theme of this story is friendship.⁴ Agesilaus, having been encouraged by Tithraustes to lead his army against the country of Pharnabazus,⁵ came to Dascyleium.⁶ Apollophanes of Cyzicus, who happened to be an ἐκ παλαιοῦ ξένος of Pharnabazus,⁷ and who had just become a ξένος of Agesilaus, came to the Spartan king and told him that he thought he could bring Pharnabazus to negotiate about a φιλία with him.⁸ Accordingly, Apollophanes brought

presented himself as an adviser, Tissaphernes was quick to recognise a more congenial spirit and perceive the advantage of a two-faced policy ...".

¹ Herman discusses how a compact of friendship was formally concluded by means of an initiation ritual, key elements of which were ξένια or δῶρα, a highly specialised category of gift; *Ritualised Friendship* 58-69, esp. 60.

² Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.9.

³ Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.29-40. See also Gray (*The Character of Xenophon's Hellenica* 54) who writes: "There are elements in the episode right out of the storytelling manner of Herodotus."

⁴ Gray *The Character of Xenophon's Hellenica* 52.

⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.26.

⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.15.

⁷ Note how Pharnabazus seems to collect Cyzicenes: see also Th. 8.6.1.

⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.29.

Pharnabazus to Agesilaus at the appointed place where Agesilaus sat waiting with the Thirty on the grass.¹

There Pharnabazus reminded Agesilaus of his friendship and alliance with the Spartans in the Peloponnesian War, comparing his honesty and trustworthiness with the double-dealing of Tissaphernes.² Looking around at the destruction of Dascyleium, Pharnabazus said, 'If I do not know what is holy or just, teach me how these are the deeds of men who know how to pay back χάριτες.'³ Xenophon says that Agesilaus' Spartan advisers were ashamed,⁴ and remained silent, but Agesilaus replied by pointing out that men in the Greek states also become ξένοι of each other, and are forced to fight against each other when their states are at war.⁵ Pharnabazus replied in turn that if the King sent another as general and subordinated him to this man, he would become a φίλος of the Spartans; but if the King assigned the command to Pharnabazus himself, he would prosecute the war to the best of his ability.⁶ Hearing this Agesilaus took hold of his hand and said,

O best of men, since you are such a man, may you be a φίλος to us. Indeed I know one thing: that now I will go away from your land as fast as I can, and in future, and if there is war, while ever we are able to march against another man, we will keep away from you and your family.⁷

When the meeting broke up and Pharnabazus rode away, his son by Parapita remained behind and ran up to Agesilaus saying, "O Agesilaus, I

¹ Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.30. Xenophon tells us that Pharnabazus came wearing a robe of great value, and when his attendants began laying rugs down for him, he was ashamed to indulge himself seeing the simplicity of Agesilaus (*ibid.*). The image is striking: the young triumphant Spartan king not requiring the pretensions of the old Persian lord; see also Gray *The Character of Xenophon's Hellenica* 56. For an analysis of the preliminaries to the making of a friendship, see Herman *Ritualised Friendship* 46-7, 51-2.

² Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.32.

³ Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.33. It is interesting, even ironic, that this Persian, who on other occasions has chosen to forget the friendship of others and has also been engaged in the war against the Spartans now complains that he is being wronged, that his favours are not being returned.

⁴ On their status, see Appendix E: *Other Magistracies* 390 n. 2.

⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.34. See also Endnote 4.

⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.37; on the φιλονικία of the Persian, see also *S&P* 150-1.

⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.38; compare Homer *Iliad* 6.224-31.

make you my ξένος.”¹ Agesilaus accepted, and the boy gave to him a beautiful javelin and Agesilaus gave in return (ἀντέδωκεν) a bridle;² then, leaping on his horse, the boy followed his father.³ Xenophon also recounts how Agesilaus took care of the boy when, later, his brother had deprived him of his satrapy and made him an exile.⁴

Taken at face value, this seems fairly straightforward. Pharnabazus recognises that he has “paid” favours which ought to be paid back. He refuses to engage in a friendship with the Spartan king, but his son does enter into a ξενία relationship with Agesilaus. To all intents and purposes, there seems to be a perfect understanding between them of the terms on which friendships are made. The first question to answer is whether Pharnabazus’ reaction to Agesilaus is regulated by their relative social positions. As Gray points out, Pharnabazus is of inferior social rank to Agesilaus the Spartan King and behaves with the deference appropriate when a lesser man is addressing royalty.⁵ A large part of the point of the story is the grace and dignity with which Pharnabazus, being of inferior status, declines such an offer.⁶ One is left to wonder how this affects their relative positions in the story and their responses to each other. Is Pharnabazus’ refusal tempered by his relatively lower status? If he accepted the Spartan’s offer, would he, to his mind, be merely changing one master for another?

Secondly, and more importantly, the type of friendship they are discussing is ξενία. Although Pharnabazus begins by saying, in conventional Greek friendship-language, that the Spartans have not paid back the χάριτες

¹ Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.39.

² For the formulaic ritual of this scene, see Herman *Ritualised Friendship* 58-9.

³ Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.39.

⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.40.

⁵ Gray *The Character of Xenophon's Hellenica* 54-5.

⁶ Gray says that, “A man so moved by the desire for honour could not properly be called a slave of the king when he so clearly was his own man and had the freedom of choice his reply indicated” (*Ibid.* 55-6.).

they ought, Agesilaus replies by explaining the conflict of loyalties which can occur in terms of ξενία relationship. The tone of the story is typically Greek, and there is perhaps an inherent anomaly or irony in the fact that the egalitarian ξενία is discussed between apparent unequals.¹ We have already seen how Alcibiades tried to cement his relationship with Tissaphernes through ξενία, and the importance of ξενία in Greek relationships with Persians is again emphasised here, and is reinforced by the fact that the story concludes with the ξενία between Agesilaus and Pharnabazus' son.

Alcibiades and Pharnabazus

Not long after his failed attempt to formalise the relationship between himself and Tissaphernes,² Alcibiades succeeded in establishing a friendship with Pharnabazus. Xenophon records that Alcibiades made oaths to the representatives of Pharnabazus and Pharnabazus, in turn, made oaths to Alcibiades' representatives, declaring that they had made a common oath (κοινὸν ὄρκον) and private pledges to each other (ιδίᾳ ἀλλήλοις πίστει).³

Immediately after this, Pharnabazus went to the Great King, taking ambassadors from Athens.⁴ Two of the members of the mission were Alcibiades' men: Euryptolemus, who was also one of Alcibiades' representatives at the oath-taking, and Mantitheus.⁵ One might guess that, although this is an official embassy of the Athenians,⁶ it is "Alcibiades' mission", engineered by him, or, at least, heavily influenced by him.

However, just as Tissaphernes had proved treacherous, Pharnabazus also proved himself a faithless φίλος. When, it must be supposed,

¹ On the one hand, as noted above, Xenophon points out their inequality of rank, though he then implies an equal exchange in the relationship. This apparent contradiction may be an indication of Xenophon's own confusions regarding Persian society: see Endnote 3.

² Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.9.

³ Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.12.

⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.13.

⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.10.

⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.8.

Pharnabazus found Alcibiades to be dispensable a few years later, he organised his death.¹

Hermocrates and Pharnabazus

The ill-feeling between Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus was well known:² the two satraps were often trying to out-bid each other in the right to help the Greeks,³ and in 412 the Spartans decided in favour of Tissaphernes.⁴ However, there was hostility between Hermocrates and Tissaphernes over the payment of wages,⁵ which resulted in Hermocrates' returning to Sparta and laying charges against Tissaphernes.⁶ Xenophon writes that it was because of this that, when Hermocrates was exiled by the new democratic government in Syracuse in 410⁷ and was preparing to lead an army against the city,⁸ Pharnabazus gave him money before he asked for it.⁹ Diodorus, though he does not provide this background to the friendship, also asserts that Hermocrates accepted money from Pharnabazus because of their *φιλία*.¹⁰ It is interesting, though perhaps not surprising, that we find Hermocrates, though an exile, a member of the embassy which Pharnabazus conducted to the King in 408.¹¹

¹ Diod. 14.11.1-4; Plut. *Alc.* 39.1-7.

² Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.9.

³ See, for example, Th. 8.5.4-6.3.

⁴ Th. 8.6.3.

⁵ Th. 8.85.3.

⁶ Th. 8.85.4; Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.31.

⁷ For problems with chronology, see Krentz *Comm.* 105.

⁸ Diod. 13.75.2-8.

⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.31. See also Chapter Three 81-2.

¹⁰ Diod. 13.63.2.

¹¹ Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.13. Because of his status, it is unlikely that he was an official ambassador of the Syracusan government. With him, however, was his brother, Proxenus (Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.13). It could be that Proxenus was the representative of the Syracusans and Hermocrates was present because of this double connection.

Anaxibius and Pharnabazus

Pharnabazus is generally portrayed in both the ancient and modern literature as more reliable and trustworthy than Tissaphernes.¹ Whether he necessarily was is another matter. His dealings with Anaxibius show a certain want of faithfulness, and he is simply prepared to discard the *Nauarchos* when he no longer needs his help.

Xenophon recounts how Pharnabazus sent to the Spartan *Nauarchos* and asked him to carry the remains of Cyrus' mercenary army out of Asia, promising to do whatever was needful.² Anaxibius then called the generals to Byzantium, where he happened to be, and promised them regular pay if they would bring their army to the city.³ On the arrival of the soldiers, however, he refused to pay them, but announced instead that he was sending them home and shut them out of the city.⁴ When news came to Anaxibius that the army was breaking up after their departure from Byzantium, he was pleased, since he thought that this would particularly gratify (χαρίζεσθαι) Pharnabazus.⁵

While Anaxibius was sailing home from Byzantium, however, he met Aristarchus, the successor to Cleander as harmost of Byzantium, at Cyzicus, and Aristarchus reported to him that his own successor to the Nauarchy, Polus, was almost at the Hellespont.⁶ Anaxibius then sailed along the Asia Minor coast to Parium, and sent word to Pharnabazus as they had agreed.⁷ Yet when Pharnabazus learned that Aristarchus had come as harmost of Byzantium and Anaxibius was no longer *Nauarchos*, he ignored Anaxibius and began negotiations with Aristarchus about the same

¹ See 187 above.

² Xen. *Anab.* 7.1.2.

³ Xen. *Anab.* 7.1.3.

⁴ Xen. *Anab.* 7.1.7, 12.

⁵ Xen. *Anab.* 7.2.3-4.

⁶ Xen. *Anab.* 7.2.5.

⁷ Xen. *Anab.* 7.2.7.

arrangements for the army.¹ Anaxibius was nonplussed when the relationship was betrayed in this way.² The relationship which Anaxibius thought he had established with the Persian was easily forgotten when someone more immediately useful to Pharnabazus appeared. Anaxibius, however, in typical Greek fashion, proceeded to betray his betrayer. His retaliation followed quickly, as he summoned Xenophon and arranged for him to bring as large a part of the army as he could back into Asia.³

Lysander and Cyrus

One of Lysander's first acts as *Nauarchos* was to establish a personal relationship with Cyrus, the young son of the Persian King.⁴ Diodorus writes that Lysander, when he was chosen as *Nauarchos*, sailed to Asia Minor.⁵ When he heard that Cyrus, who had been dispatched by his father to join the war with the Spartans, was at Sardis, he went to him and, "stirring up Cyrus' youthful enthusiasm for the war", received from him a thousand darics for pay for the soldiers.⁶ Cyrus accordingly told him, according to Diodorus, to ask for more without reserve, since he had been enjoined by his father to provide whatever the Spartans asked for.⁷

Xenophon is more expansive about this meeting, and his language is instructive. He writes that Cyrus originally refused the Spartan ambassadors' request for more pay, but that after dinner, after drinking Lysander's health,

¹ Xen. *Anab.* 7.2.7; cf. 7.2.12.

² See, however, Hirsch (*The Friendship of the Barbarians* 33-4) who, in his analysis of trust and deceit as recurring themes throughout the *Anabasis*, writes that at this point "Xenophon does not revive the familiar refrain of 'Persian treachery' when the Persian satrap cheats Anaxibius of the promised reward. The theme is no longer a concern. And it would appear all too hypocritical when seen in the context of so much Greek treachery."

³ Xen. *Anab.* 7.2.8.

⁴ For the attitude of an earlier *Nauarchos*, Astyochus, to Persian friendship, see Chapter Four 154-5.

⁵ Diod. 13.70.1-2; Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.1.

⁶ Diod. 13.70.3.

⁷ Diod. 13.70.3.

Cyrus asked how he could gratify (χαρίζοιτο) the Spartan.¹ Lysander's reply was to ask for more pay for the troops.²

This is the language of friendship-making and marks only the beginning of the partnership between the two. When, on the death of Callicratidas, the Chians and the other allies sent *presbeis* to Sparta to ask that Lysander be returned as *Nauarchos*, *presbeis* and *angeloi* also went with them from Cyrus requesting the same thing.³ Again, when Lysander returned to command the fleet in 405,⁴ he went to Cyrus for money. Although Cyrus had already given to the other *Nauarchoi* all the money he had from his father, he still gave him some.⁵ Then, when a message came to Cyrus from his father saying he was ill, Cyrus sent for Lysander, refused to allow him to join battle unless he had more ships, and assigned to him the tribute from the cities which were his personally, reminding him of his *φιλία* with the city of the Spartans and his private *φιλία* with Lysander himself.⁶ It was largely through this friendship and the unlimited wealth it provided that Lysander and the Spartans finally won the war.

Callicratidas and Cyrus

As we have already seen,⁷ Callicratidas, who held the Nauarchy in the year between Lysander's terms of office, took a hard line against Cyrus and Persian aid. It should be emphasised here that Cyrus tried to form a private *ξενία* with Callicratidas, though Callicratidas refused. Plutarch writes that when Cyrus sent Callicratidas pay for the soldiers and *ξένια* for himself,

¹ Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.6.

² Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.6; on Lysander's response, see Krentz *Comm.* 136.

³ Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.6-7.

⁴ According to Xenophon, he was *epistoleus*, Diodorus says he went as an *idiotes*. Aracus was officially appointed *Nauarchos*, though subordinated to Lysander's command (Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.7; Diod. 13.100.8).

⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.11; Andoc. 3.29; Isoc. 8.97.

⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.13-14; Diod. 13.104.3-4.

⁷ See Chapter Four 156.

Callicratidas accepted the pay, but declined to make a private friendship between himself and Cyrus, sending back the ξένια, and saying that it was not necessary for them to have a private friendship, but that the public φιλία with all the Spartans was enough.¹ Once more it is the ξενία relationship which features in the attempted friendship.

Cyrus and the Ten Thousand

Cyrus' mercenary army was built upon a web of ξενία friendships,² as Cyrus enlisted the help of his Greek ξένοι.³ To Clearchus, a Spartan exile, he gave ten thousand darics, with which he kept an army in the Chersonese.⁴ Aristippus, Cyrus' Thessalian ξένος, being hard pressed at home, came to Cyrus for three months' pay for two thousand mercenaries.⁵ Proxenus, his Boeotian ξένος, came to him with as many men as possible, as did Sophagenetus, the Stymphalian, and Socrates, the Achaean, these men also being his ξένοι.⁶

Others also joined the army or gave their help because of friendship connections. For example, Xenophon himself was there because of his ξενία with Proxenus, the Boeotian,⁷ for Proxenus had sent for him and promised he would make him a φίλος of Cyrus.⁸ Similarly, Menon, a Thessalian, was a φίλος and ξένος of Ariaeus, the commander of Cyrus' barbarian troops.⁹ Thus many of the Greek commanders in Cyrus' army were the ξένοι of Cyrus himself and his companions.¹⁰

¹ Plut *Mor.* 222 e; Krentz *Comm.* 150; Lewis *S&P* 117; cf. Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.18.

² See also Herman *Ritualised Friendship* 45.

³ On Cyrus' army and its recruitment, see Roy *Historia* 17 (1967) 285-323, esp. 296-309.

⁴ Xen. *Anab.* 1.1.9, 3.3.

⁵ Xen. *Anab.* 1.1.10.

⁶ Xen. *Anab.* 1.1.11.

⁷ Xen. *Anab.* 3.1.4, 5.3.5.

⁸ Xen. *Anab.* 3.1.4.

⁹ Xen. *Anab.* 2.1.5; for Ariaeus, see Xen. *Anab.* 1.8.5, 9.31, 10.1.

¹⁰ Another interesting question is whether the separate armies themselves were made from personal connections with the individual Greek commanders. Consideration of the profiles of the individual commanders put to death by Tissaphernes yields some interesting points.

Agesilaus and Spithradates

Spithradates was a rebel Persian whom Lysander brought back from the Hellespont to Agesilaus.¹ When Agesilaus arrived in Phrygia in 395, Spithradates offered to take Agesilaus to Paphlagonia and bring the king of the Paphlagonians to a conference in order to make him an ally.² Xenophon says that Agesilaus went eagerly, as he had long desired that he might detach a state from the King.³ Accordingly, an alliance with the Paphlagonian king, Otys,⁴ was made, and Otys, on the persuasion of Spithradates, left behind peltasts and cavalry for Agesilaus' use.⁵

Agesilaus, "realising the χάρις of this" (χάριν ... τουτῶν εἰδώς), decided to arrange the marriage of the daughter of Spithradates to Otys,⁶ and set about persuading Otys of the advantages of such a match, arguing that just as Spithradates was a man who could take vengeance on his enemies, he was also a man who could benefit (εὐεργετεῖν) his φίλοι.⁷ In this way, Agesilaus brought Spithradates, a Persian, under the umbrella of the friends/enemies dichotomy, making assumptions for the Persian based on his own understanding of the relationship. In addition, by counting him among his own φίλοι, Agesilaus imputed the same value system to Spithradates.

Clearchus, it seems, was not the man to be able to raise an army of men adhering to him personally through φιλία or εὐνοία (Xen. *Anab.* 2.6.13). Proxenus, the Boeotian, however, went with Cyrus thinking himself competent both to command and, through friendship with the foremost men, to confer benefits (εὐεργετῶν). Thus he was capable of commanding the καλοί and ἀγαθοί, but was not competent at inspiring fear or respect in the soldiers (Xen. *Anab.* 2.6.16-19). This perhaps suggests that those immediately under his command may have been attached to him in some way, but not the ranks themselves. This would follow Cyrus' own model. He was directly connected to his immediate commanders, but not to those under him. For an analysis of the social structure of the army on the move, see Nussbaum *The Ten Thousand*.

¹ Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.10. Presumably this was a "gift" to appease Agesilaus after his disgrace.

² Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.2.

³ Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.2.

⁴ On the difficulty with the name, see Underhill *Comm.* 118.

⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.3.

⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.4-15. For an analysis of the moral theme of this story, see Gray *The Character of Xenophon's Hellenica* 49-52.

⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.8, cf. 10.

Yet it actually took very little for Spithradates to betray his friendship with Agesilaus. When Herippidas captured one of Pharnabazus' outposts, with the help of Spithradates' men, Herippidas took all the booty Spithradates and the Paphlagonians had seized.¹ Spithradates and the Paphlagonians were angered by this, and, feeling they had been wronged and dishonoured, went away to Sardis to Ariaeus, another Persian who had revolted from the King.² Xenophon claims that nothing more distressing happened to Agesilaus during the campaign than the desertion of Spithradates, his son, Megabates, and the Paphlagonians.³ This is an unexpected ending to this episode. The apparent intimacy between Agesilaus and the Persian suddenly seems rather flat. The connection does not have the strength Xenophon implies. Like Anaxibius, Agesilaus seems to be caught unawares. One can only wonder whether these Greeks really understood the Persians as they thought they did; and whether Xenophon attributes values to the Persians to which they themselves would not necessarily subscribe.

Antalcidas and Tiribazus

The Spartans selected Antalcidas as the *Nauarchos* in 388/7, thinking in this way particularly to gratify (χαρίζεσθαι) Tiribazus.⁴ The connection between Antalcidas and Tiribazus may well have begun when the Spartans learned that the Persians were funding the rebuilding of the long walls at Athens and maintaining the fleet. They thought that if they informed Tiribazus, the King's general, of this fact, they could either bring Tiribazus over to their side or at least put a stop to the maintenance of Conon's fleet.⁵

¹ Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.24, 26.

² Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.27.

³ Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.28.

⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.6. See Chapter Four 153.

⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.12.

So, in 392, they sent Antalcidas to Tiribazus to tell him of these things and to try and make peace with the King, though this was unsuccessful.¹

During his Nauarchy, Antalcidas went to the King at Susa in another attempt at peace.² Antalcidas returned from the King with Tiribazus with an agreement for an alliance if the Athenians and their allies would not come to terms, but peace was made in 386, after he had obtained the necessary leverage by gaining control of the Hellespont.³

Antalcidas and Artaxerxes

Antalcidas played an important part in the negotiations for the Common Peace treaties in which Persia was involved. Not only was he sent to Susa in 387, but Philochorus also provides the information that he was at the Persian court in 375.⁴ Indeed, Plutarch says that as long as the Spartans were pre-eminent in Greece, Artaxerxes made Antalcidas his ξένοϛ and called Antalcidas his φίλος,⁵ and tells how Artaxerxes honoured Antalcidas more highly than any other Greek by taking a garland, dipping it in perfume, and sending it to him.⁶

After the Spartans had been defeated at Leuctra, when they were in need of money, they sent Agesilaus to Egypt (in 362) and Antalcidas to Persia (in 367);⁷ but Artaxerxes ignored Antalcidas and overlooked him.⁸ Plutarch says that Antalcidas was so ashamed and afraid of the ephors that he went home and starved himself to death.⁹ Although the anecdote itself may not be true, its sentiments are clear enough. Antalcidas was the ξένοϛ of the King

¹ Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.124

² Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.6, 25; Diod. 14.110.2-3.

³ Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.25-32.

⁴ Philochorus *FGrHist* 328 F 151.

⁵ Plut. *Artax.* 22.6.

⁶ Plut. *Artax.* 22.2; *Pelop.* 30.6.

⁷ Plut. *Artax.* 22.6.

⁸ Plut. *Artax.* 22.7.

⁹ Plut. *Artax.* 22.7.

and had certain expectations of the relationship. But Artaxerxes did not see the relationship in the same light. As soon as it was no longer serviceable to himself, he simply abandoned his φίλος, and he had the power to do that. The result for Antalcidas was disgrace and death.

Pelopidas and Artaxerxes

At the conference of 367 at Susa, Pelopidas was present as the representative of Thebes.¹ Pelopidas won the King's favour, according to Xenophon, because the Thebans alone of the Greeks had fought on the Persian side at Plataea, because they had never yet fought against the King, and because the reason for the Spartans' war with Thebes was the Theban refusal to join them in their campaign against Persia or to allow Agesilaus to sacrifice at Aulis.²

Plutarch writes that the King was pleased with Pelopidas because of his reputation and the fact that he had defeated the Spartans in the Peloponnese.³ He also thought his proposals were more sure than those of the Athenians and simpler than those of the Spartans.⁴ Plutarch says the King did not hide his regard for Pelopidas from the other ambassadors, and, although he did not indulge Pelopidas as he had Antalcidas,⁵ he sent him the most splendid and greatest of the customary gifts, and yielded to his demands that the Greeks should be autonomous, that Messene should be inhabited, and that the Thebans should be the πατρικοὶ φίλοι of the King.⁶ Plutarch says that Pelopidas went home with these answers, although he

¹ Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.33; Plut. *Pelop.* 30.1; *Artax.* 22.8; cf. Diod. 15.76.3.

² Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.34.

³ Plut. *Pelop.* 30.3-4.

⁴ Plut. *Pelop.* 30.5.

⁵ See above 214-5.

⁶ Plut. *Pelop.* 30.7; cf. Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.36.

had not received any other gifts (δῶρα) than were a token of the χάρις and the King's kindness.¹

Timagoras and Artaxerxes

Others of the ambassadors, however, at this peace conference, received generous gifts from the King. The Athenians had two ambassadors present, Leon and Timagoras.² Xenophon says that Timagoras supported Pelopidas in everything he said, and was put to death on his return home.³ Plutarch tells a more colourful tale (which is not necessarily true, but well reflects the nature of Persian gift-giving). He recounts how the King gave Timagoras not only gifts of gold and silver, but also an expensive couch and servants to spread it (since Greeks did not know how), eighty cows and cowherds (as he needed cows' milk for an ailment), and, finally, litter-bearers and four talents to pay them.⁴ Elsewhere, Plutarch adds that Timagoras was also sent the most splendid dinner while he was at court, so that Ostanes, the King's brother, said, "O Timagoras, remember this table, for it has not been adorned for you in this way on slight conditions."⁵ Plutarch says that this was more a reproach for Timagoras' treachery⁶ than a reminder of the χάρις.⁷ The receipt of these gifts caused the death of Timagoras on his return home.⁸

¹ Plut. *Pelop.* 30.8.

² Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.33; Plut. *Pelop.* 30.9.

³ Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.35, 38; cf. Plut. *Pelop.* 30.9.

⁴ Plut. *Pelop.* 30.10-2.

⁵ Plut. *Artax.* 22.11.

⁶ Plutarch says he had sent a secret message to the King (Plut. *Artax.* 22.9).

⁷ Plut. *Artax.* 22.12.

⁸ Plut. *Pelop.* 30.9.

Agesilaus and Artaxerxes

Xenophon tells the story of how his hero, Agesilaus, once received a letter from the King asking for a ξενία and φιλία.¹ Xenophon claims Agesilaus' answer as a mark of his high-mindedness, since Agesilaus did not accept the ξενία of the King, but was content that the King should be a φίλος to Sparta and show goodwill to Greece.² Although this is a story essentially about the goodness and foresight of Agesilaus in putting the interests of Greece above his own possible gain (that is, Xenophon says, he was not overcome by the desire for gifts (δῶρα) or the strength of the King)³, it points again to the ξενία relationship, and the security that was perceived to be inherent in the relationship. The King himself wanted Agesilaus to be confirmed as his φίλος through the ξενία, but Agesilaus laid aside this private relationship so that he would not be bound by the obligations of the relationship, but could detach as many satraps as possible from the King.⁴

The Relationship between Greeks and Persians

A number of points arise from this discussion about Greco-Persian relationships. Firstly, interstate relations and diplomatic activity with Persians took place, by and large, on a personal and individual level: Cyrus and Lysander, Cyrus and Clearchus, Alcibiades and Tissaphernes. State friendships did take place – Cyrus reminded Lysander that he had a φιλία with the Spartan state⁵ – yet it was his private friendship with Lysander which formed the continuing basis for and drove this state relationship.

Secondly, the Spartans seem to have formed more personal connections with the Persians than the Athenians did, and, on the whole,

¹ Xen. *Ages.* 8.3; Plutarch gives a version of the anecdote at *Mor.* 213 d-e.

² Xen. *Ages.* 8.3-5.

³ Xen. *Ages.* 8.5.

⁴ Xen. *Ages.* 8.5. Note the "conflict of interests" that Agesilaus is choosing to avoid.

⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.14

were far more successful in dealing with the Persians. This is not surprising in the light of what we have discussed in earlier chapters about the way in which Spartans and Athenians used personal connections in interstate affairs. As Lewis has noted, the Spartans were more “like” the Persians, and he says: “it was repeatedly found perfectly possible for Greeks, and, I think, particularly Spartans, to get on the same wavelength as the Persians with whom they came into contact.”¹ It may, however, be fairer to say that the Athenians were more “unlike” the Persians than the Spartans. The Athenians, to a greater extent than other *poleis* in the Greek world, had, in the development of their democratic practices, institutionalised many aristocratic practices of earlier periods, and much that had occurred on a private level in former times was translated to a civic level.² This does not mean that they had lost the facility for dealing with other states through individual and personal friendships – indeed, it has already been shown that they did tend to deal with those on the fringes of their world in this way – but they did not always do so, or even tended not to.³ As we have seen, this personal approach was still a stronger feature of Spartan interstate relations, and so perhaps the Spartans had more “active” personal relationships with Persians which they could call upon,⁴ as well as the propensity to create new ones.⁵

Thirdly, Persians gave gifts in ways and circumstances that the Greeks did not understand. For example, the Persian King gave gifts as a normal

¹ *S&P* 148-52, esp. 151; cf. Hirsch *The Friendship of the Barbarians* 12.

² For example, *ξενία* became *προξενία* (though this, of course, was not confined to Athens), patronage became liturgies.

³ In fact, as will be shown in the following chapter, one of the features of Athenian relations with the Thracian kings was a civic and corporate approach.

⁴ That such relationships could, and did, lapse hardly needs to be stated: for example, Alcibiades’ lapsed *προξενία* with Sparta (Th. 5.43.2, 6.89.2).

⁵ Most of the relationships discussed in the previous chapter between various Spartans and communities in the Hellespont must almost have originated with that particular generation, rather than being inherited connections.

concomitant of hospitality. This could be, and was, misunderstood by the Greeks and considered to be bribery, as Timagoras discovered to his cost.¹

Fourthly, the Greeks felt the moral force of a return of service for service, whereas the Persians did not necessarily feel bound in this way, or did not value the service in the same way. Pharnabazus revalued the service performed for him by Anaxibius when the new harmost for Byzantium came to the Hellespont. Spithradates no longer felt bound by his relationship with Agesilaus after he felt he had been tricked.

Fifthly, the Greeks had, and could extend to non-Greeks, a formal institution that was essentially based on gift-exchange: ξενία. It seems that the most successful relationships between Greeks and Persians were ξενία.² The Persian nobility had many ξένοι among the Greek community. For example, Antalcidas was the ξένος of Ariobarzanes,³ Apollophanes was a παλαιὸς ξένος of Pharnabazus,⁴ and Cyrus' mercenary army was built upon ξενία. Alcibiades' attempt to form a ξενία with Tissaphernes suggests that it was important to him to formalise and validate their relationship in this way, just as Tissaphernes' rejection and imprisonment of Alcibiades also speaks volumes about the importance of the ritual of ξενία, as does Callicratidas' and Agesilaus' refusal to contract ξενία.

However, not even formalised friendships could ensure that the relationship would work. Pharnabazus, despite his "private oaths" with Alcibiades, probably engineered his death. Herman argues that ξενία contracted with those inside the Greek world, and with those outside – non-Greeks – followed an identical pattern, and that "the non-Greek partners

¹ On this misconception see Lewis *REA* 91 (1989) 227-35; on a similar misunderstanding in Greco-Macedonian affairs, see Chapter Seven esp. 270-4.

² This is perhaps not surprising considering that ξενία was primarily a mode of friendship between individuals who did not belong to the same communities (see Herman *Ritualised Friendship* 31). Note also the added significance of the ambiguity of ξένος, which can mean "stranger". Who was more of a stranger than a Persian? Cf. Chapter One 34-7.

³ Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.28.

⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.29.

seem to have shown as profound an understanding of this pattern as the Greek.”¹ Yet the basic attitude to the relationship seems to be different for the Greeks and for the Persians.

To begin with, the Greek, by forming a *ξενία* relationship with a Persian, brought the Persian into his network of *φίλοι*; that is, the Persian no longer belonged to that amorphous mass of potential friends and enemies, but was drawn inside the Greek’s friendship network. He then treated the Persian in a positively reciprocal way, not as an enemy. The relationship between Cyrus and Clearchus, the Spartan mercenary commanders, is particularly illuminating. Clearchus tricked his own men, fellow-Greeks, so that he might not have to betray his *φιλία* with the Persian.² He had certain obligations that he owed his *ξένος*, since he was his *ξένος*, even though he was a barbarian.

Secondly, as we have seen in Chapter One, *ξενία*, as understood in the Greek world, was an egalitarian relationship based upon balanced reciprocity: equal gift was given for equal gift, equal service for equal service. But this is not necessarily the way in which the Persian viewed the relationship. Persian society was a hierarchical society, which was reinforced, as we have seen above, by an imbalance of power and imbalance of gift-giving. So when the Persian entered the relationship, even of *ξενία*, he did not necessarily view the relationship as an equal one. He could, and did, abandon the relationship when it was simply no longer of use to him. Thus, Artaxerxes called Antalcidas his *ξένος*, which implied equality to the Greek, but the King had the power, since it was actually an imbalanced relationship, to ignore Antalcidas when the Spartans were no longer a state to be flattered.

¹ Herman *Ritualised Friendship* 12. Herman is followed by Hall *Inventing the Barbarian* 15 & n. 51.

² Xen. *Anab.* 1.3.5-6; for a full account of this incident, see also Endnote 4.

Moreover, the Persians seem to approach these relationships in an attitude of negative reciprocity. While the Greek thinks he has drawn the Persian *inside* his friendship network, the Persian is responding as if he were still *outside*, and among the Greek's enemies. For the Persian, the Greek is always essentially "outside the community", and the Persian is only in the relationship for as long as he can still get something out of it. The Greek, on the other hand, can bring the Persian inside his network of positive relationships, even though the Persian is non-Greek. The Persian feels no obligation to keep responding in a positive way; the Greek does. That is not to say that Greco-Persian *ξενία* could not and did not work. Some even seem to have been hereditary.¹ But it is not surprising that relationships between Greeks and Persians often did not work, and often ended in disaster for the Greek, as Alcibiades and Antalcidas found out.

¹ Apollophanes and Pharnabazus; Antalcidas and Ariobarzanes. See also Humphreys *The Family, Women and Death* 27.

Chapter Six: *Athens and the Thracians*

*A gift opens the way for the giver
and ushers him into the presence of the great.*

Prov. 18.16.

During the fifth and fourth centuries, Athens was greatly concerned with events in the Thraceward region and the Thracian Chersonese. This led her to follow a policy of trying to form close links with members of the Thracian royal households through gifts of citizenship. However, the awarding of such honours did not always produce the desired results, and even placed Athens in the embarrassing situation of being openly at war with her own honorands. On the whole, the manner in which the Athenians dealt with the Thracian kings was clumsy and highlighted their own weaknesses and insecurities, and it particularly points to their lack of sensitivity to a culture not like their own. This Chapter will look at the traditional links which existed between Athens and Thrace; at the reasons why she sought to maintain links with Thrace and how she tried to do this in the late fifth and fourth centuries; then, finally, at some of the ways the Athenians misunderstood the Thracians or failed to take account of their different culture and how this affected Athens' northern policy.

Athenian Links with Thrace

Athens had a tradition of connections with Thrace and the Thraceward region which began in the sixth century and continued throughout the fifth and fourth centuries, particularly with the Thracian royal families.¹ Peisistratus, in the sixth century, in his second exile from the

¹ The Thracians themselves claimed to have Athenian connections, through Tereus, but this was spurious, as Thucydides himself makes clear (Th. 2.29.3; cf. Xen. *Anab.* 7.2.31).

tyranny, is reported by the *Athenaion Politeia* as first having colonised Rhaecelus in Chalcidice, then the region about Mt Pangaeus; and Herodotus notes that he was able to draw revenue from the region about the River Strymon.¹ The mother of Cimon son of Miltiades was a Thracian princess, the daughter of king Olorus, and Thucydides son of Olorus, the historian, was connected with the same family.² Thucydides also owned gold mines in Thrace and was known to have influence with the leading men there.³ Hagnon son of Nicias was sent to Thrace as *oikistes* of Amphipolis in 437/6, and much of his military career centred on the region.⁴ Alcibiades son of Cleinias also seems to have had some kind of ties with the Thracian rulers, Seuthes and Medocus,⁵ as did Thrasybulus son of Lycus,⁶ and it was allegedly suggested to him that he should marry the daughter of the Thracian king, Seuthes, in order to escape trouble at home.⁷ Iphicrates son of Timotheus did in fact marry either the daughter or the sister of Cotys, the Odrysian king,⁸ and may have had family connections with Thrace antedating 393.⁹

The Importance of Thrace

One need not go far to understand the importance of Thrace to Athens and the great Athenian families. In the fifth century, Thrace extended from the River Strymon to the Black Sea and from the Danube to

¹ [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 15.2.; Hdt. 1.64.1; Rhodes *Comm.* 207-8.

² Plut. *Cimon* 4.1-2.

³ Plut. *Cimon* 4.2; Th. 4.105.1. On Thucydides' *strategia* in Thrace in 424/3, see Appendix B: *Athenian Strategoi* 312.

⁴ For selection as *oikistes*, see Th. 4.102.3, 5.11.1; for *strategiai*, see Chapter Four 113-4.

⁵ See Chapter Three 104.

⁶ See Chapter Three 100-1.

⁷ Lys. 28.5-6.

⁸ Dem. 23.129; Anaxandrides *ap.* Athen. 4.131 a-f; cf. Nepos *Iph.* 3.4; on his relationship to Cotys as *κηδεστής*, see Davies *APF* 249.

⁹ See Chapter Four 118-20.

the Aegean, and Thucydides says the kingdom was greater than ever before under Sitalces son of Teres, the Odrysian king of the Thracians.¹

Thrace was an important source of natural resources. Not only was the Strymonic Plain rich in timber and metals,² but Thrace was also an important source of grain for Athens and the Thracian Chersonese was influential in controlling the passage of grain from the Black Sea.³ The Athenians had tried to settle colonies and cleruchies in the region from the sixth century. The Hellespont region was colonised in the time of Peisistratus and his sons and the settlement in the Chersonese was under the control of the Philaidae in the late sixth and early fifth centuries.⁴ Cleruchies were also settled in the Chersonese in the later fifth and fourth centuries.⁵

Athens also established colonies along the Aegean coast, first at Brea, perhaps in 446,⁶ then at Amphipolis in 437/6.⁷ However, this influence was not lasting. In 424, Amphipolis revolted from Athens and set up Brasidas as its founder, and Athens never managed to recover it.⁸ Amphipolis was finally taken by Philip in 357, being crucial for his own plans in the north-east.⁹

Yet the Athenians not only tried to maintain their influence in Thrace through the establishment of colonies and cleruchies, but they also tried to deal more directly with the local monarchs. As has been noted

¹ Th. 2.97.1-2; cf. Hdt. 4.99.1; Diod. 12.50.1-3; Th. 2.29; Casson *Macedonia, Thrace and Illyria* 194-5; Cawkwell *Philip* 43.

² Cf. Th. 4.105.1; Hopper *Trade and Industry in Classical Greece* 166; Ellis *Philip II* 32.

³ Hopper *Trade and Industry in Classical Greece* 72, 74-7; Hornblower *Greek World* 41, 46; for the fertility of Thrace, see Isoc. 8.24; on the need for importing grain to Athens, see Dem. 20.31; Garnsey *Crux* 62-75.

⁴ Hdt. 6.34-41; on the Athenian settlement of the Chersonese, see Ehrenberg *Aspects of the Ancient World* 119-28; Graham *Colony and Mother City* 32-3.

⁵ See Plut. *Per.* 19.1; Diod. 16.34.4; Cawkwell *Philip* 72.

⁶ ML 49; Graham *Colony and Mother City* 34-5.

⁷ See schol. Aeschin. 2.31.

⁸ On Athens' obsession with Amphipolis and attempts to recover it: Chapter Seven 247-50.

⁹ Diod. 16.8.2-3; Dem. 1.5, 20.63. On the strategic importance of Amphipolis, see Th. 4.108.1; Livy 45.30.3; Cawkwell *Philip* 72-6.

above, individual Athenians had family and private connections in the Thraceward parts through marriage and presumably other personal ties. In the fifth century, however, as I have argued elsewhere, Athens was not as likely as other *poleis* to use her personal connections and, with the rise of the *demos* as an effective political unit, there is a change in Athenian policy in Thrace. Rather than individual Athenians having contacts in these parts, the Athenians themselves as a *polis* made contacts with the Thracian rulers and awarded them civic honours, thus drawing these Thracian potentates into the Greek network of obligation on a state level.

The Thracians and Gift-receiving

The Thracians, like the Persians, were a gift-giving culture. Just as there was an up-and-down flow of gifts from King to subjects and subjects to King in the Persian kingdom, so it was among the Thracians.¹ But despite general similarities between the two cultures, gift-giving as an institution among the Thracians differed in significant ways from gift-giving in Persia, and this affected the way in which relationships flowed from the exchange and expectations were created by the exchange.

It has been noted in the previous chapter that gifts were given by the Persian King at banquets and feasts.² Gifts also featured at Thracian feasts, but not as tokens given by the king, but rather received by him. Xenophon describes a feast of the Odrysian king, Seuthes, to which he was invited.³ It was suggested to the guests before the dinner that it was customary for

¹ On Thracian gift-giving generally, see Marazov in *The Rogozen Treasure* 90-137.

² See Chapter Five 197.

³ Xen. *Anab.* 7.3.21-33. It is interesting to note that Xenophon called the guests at the feast ξένοι (22). Xenophon surely cannot mean "ritualised-friends" in the fullest sense, nor "strangers". The implication is certainly hospitality, and the usage provides an indication of the range of meaning between these two extremes: that is, one does not have to be a stranger, nor does one have to be a ritualised-friend, in order to be called a ξένος.

Seuthes to be given gifts (δωρεῖσθαι) by those he invited to dinner.¹ The gifts Seuthes was given at this feast included a white horse, a silver *phiale* and a carpet worth ten minae, and each giver drank the king's health.² Heracleides of Maroneia encouraged Xenophon to give generously, as, he said, it was worthwhile to honour Seuthes most lavishly, since he would then make a return with even more lavish gifts.³ Although it was the same kind of unequal exchange as was noted in Persia, the actual process of the exchange is reversed.

The archaeological record supports this pattern. The so-called Rogozen Treasure was discovered in north-western Bulgaria in what had been the kingdom of the Triballians. Thirteen *phialai* and one jug are inscribed with anthroponyms which are recognised to be the names of Odrysian kings, including Cotys and Cersobleptes.⁴ A number of the *phialai* also give a toponym, which has been identified as the source of the vase or the metal (for example, ΚΟΤΥΟΣ ΕΞ ΒΕΟ [*cat.* 28]).⁵ In this hoard, there are five different toponyms assigned to *phialai* belonging to Cotys.⁶ The Thracian kings did not have one capital city, but several settlements, each of which the king was required to visit according to an Orphic kind of ritual.⁷ The hoard may then represent gifts given by locals, such as those Xenophon describes, as the first part of a reciprocal relationship,⁸ or, as Marazov rather

¹ Xen. *Anab.* 7.3.18.

² Xen. *Anab.* 7.3.26-7. On the significance of the white horse, see Fol & Marazov *Thrace and the Thracians* 56-7.

³ Xen. *Anab.* 7.3.19-20. Thracian forts featured among the gifts Seuthes promised Xenophon (Xen. *Anab.* 7.3.37; cf. 7.2.36, 3.19, 5.8, 7.50).

⁴ On the inscriptions, see Fol *Papers of the Anglo-Bulgarian Conference* 33-7; Hind *Papers of the Anglo-Bulgarian Conference* 38-48; Painter *Papers of the Anglo-Bulgarian Conference* 73-81; Mihailov *The Rogozen Treasure* 46-71.

⁵ Fol *Papers of the Anglo-Bulgarian Conference* 33; Mihailov *The Rogozen Treasure* 50.

⁶ Beus: *cat.* 28, 29, 40; Aprus: *cat.* 30, 31; Suthaba: *cat.* 41; Ergiske: *cat.* 42, 43, 46; Geistum: *cat.* 45, 47.

⁷ See Theopompus *FGrHist* 115 F 31; Fol *Papers of the Anglo-Bulgarian Conference* 33; Mihailov *The Rogozen Treasure* 35; Marazov *The Rogozen Treasure* 105.

⁸ Perhaps as a form of tribute or tax: on the merging of "gifts" and tribute, see Chapter Five 197 n. 2.

ingeniously suggests, they were gifts given to the king, not as the receiver of guests, but as the "dear guest" himself.¹ In either case, it is clear that the Thracian kings received gifts from the settlements in their kingdom.

Of course, the Thracian kings gave gifts as well as receiving them. This is perhaps the best explanation for the presence of these Odrysian gifts among the Triballian hoard: they were given again by the Odrysians to the Triballians as one half of the reciprocal exchange.²

Nevertheless, the Thracian kings placed the emphasis on receiving gifts, in the first instance, rather than giving them. This had two main effects on the relationship. Firstly, it was essentially supplicatory: the gift-giver, who was of inferior status, was asking to be brought into a relationship by offering a gift, rather than being brought into a relationship by being given gifts by someone with superior status.³ This gives the receiver, that is, the king, the right to accept or reject the gift, and so accept or reject the relationship. It is the status imbalance which creates the power imbalance. Secondly, the relationship was generally prospective: the gift was given in the hope that at some time in the future it would be returned, and returned with interest.⁴ But again, the power imbalance is important. The more powerful partner is able to choose when he wishes to leave the relationship, whether it has been fulfilled or not.

Thus it is clear that, while there are some similarities between Persian and Thracian gift-giving, there were also differences which affected the

¹ Marazov *The Rogozen Treasure* 105.

² *Ibid.* 106, though Marazov's detailed reconstruction of the ritual, wherein visiting rulers accompanied the Odrysian rulers on their "royal rounds" of the settlements and received the gifts as they entered the city is, I think, unnecessary. Hind (*Papers of the Anglo-Bulgarian Conference* 42) suggests that the hoard may also have travelled north "as loot, or as possessions of refugees from Philip of Macedon's invasions in 346 or 342." Either of these are viable possibilities and should not be excluded.

³ An important parallel is supplication in the Greek world as opposed to ξενία: again supplication is asking to be brought inside the relationship, while ξενία is being brought inside the relationship: see Gould *JHS* 93 (1973) 73-103.

⁴ Compare here Xen. *Mem.* 2.3.11-13 (see Chapter One 10-1).

structure of the relationship that was formed. We are then left to ask how the Greeks, and especially the Athenians, dealt with this.

On Misunderstanding the Thracians

The first question which we must ask is how far they understood and could make allowances for a culture which was different from their own. The Athenians held the Thracians in contempt for their wildness, drunkenness and barbarity,¹ yet they still awarded their kings the greatest honour that was available to them, citizenship, only to see them disregard and abuse it. One is left wondering how far the Athenians understood what the Thracians were about.

The following section will turn to four episodes which serve to highlight some of the ways in which the Athenians managed and mismanaged their Thracian concerns: Thucydides' account of Thracian customs, Xenophon's dealings with Seuthes, Iphicrates' support of Cotys against his fellow countrymen, and Thucydides' account of Athenian involvement in Sitalces' campaign in Macedon. We will then consider how Athens dealt with Thrace and tried to keep the Thracian kings loyal through grants of citizenship. From this we should see what the Athenians thought they were doing, and where they went wrong.

Thucydides 2.97.3-4.

Thucydides, in a digression describing the extent of the territory and customs of the Thracians, says,

¹ See for example, Anaxandrides *ap.* Athen. 4.131 a-f; Dem. 23.114; cf. Xen. *Anab.* 7.3.21-33; Casson *Macedonia, Thrace and Illyria* 203-4.

All the tribute from all the barbarian territory and the Greek cities as was paid in the reign of Seuthes,¹ who was king after Sitalces and brought it to its peak, was valued at about four hundred talents of silver, paid in gold and silver. Δῶρα in gold and silver no less in value were also contributed and, apart from this, brocaded, plain and other furnishings. These were given not only to the king, but also to the minor kings and nobles of the Odrysians. And they had established a custom opposite to that of the kingdom of the Persians – and this was a custom which existed for the rest of the Thracians as well – to receive rather than to give (it was more shameful for the one who had been asked not to give than for the one who had asked not to receive). But, nevertheless, the Odrysians carried it to greater lengths, for it was impossible to achieve anything unless one gave them gifts. Consequently, the kingdom became great in strength.

As we have seen, Thucydides' assessment that the kings received gifts rather than gave them is not accurate.² Though Thucydides is right in emphasising the *receiving* of gifts, the Thracians also *gave* gifts. This passage points to the profound misunderstanding that the Greeks bore in regard to the cultures of their neighbours. Despite the knowledge that one such as Thucydides should have had, given his own Thracian connections, even he failed to see past the surface appearances. This is indicative of the fundamental problem regarding the reciprocity ethic in different cultures: although the embedded ideology remained the same, the manifestation differed from one society to another. As a result, one culture did not always understand what another was doing.

Sitalces

The Athenian response to Sitalces highlights the general insecurity inherent in Greco-Thracian relationships, and the tentative way in which the Athenians seemed to approach the Thracians. In 431 the Athenians

¹ Though note the emendation of ὅσον προσήξαν to ὅσων περ ἤρξαν, which Rhodes includes in his text (*Thucydides II*): see Gomme *HCT* 2.244-5. It would then read: "The tribute from all the barbarian territory and the Greek cities which Seuthes ruled."

² See Hornblower *Comm.* 372-3; Briant *Achaemenid History II* esp. 5-6.

made an alliance with Sitalces.¹ One of the aims of the alliance was to make war on the Chalcidians and on Perdiccas, though Perdiccas himself was in alliance with the Athenians,² though the campaign did not actually take place until the winter of 429/8.³ Yet, although Sitalces took Athenian ambassadors with him (who were there for the purpose), and Hagnon⁴ as commander,⁵ the promised Athenian troops did not arrive. Thucydides says that the Athenians did not believe that the Thracians would come, even though they had sent gifts (δῶρα) and ambassadors to him.⁶ Gomme claims that this is “not at all surprising mistrust” on the part of the Athenians, “not perhaps because Sitalces had waited two years since the alliance (95.1), but because this year he had not moved until winter – an inconvenience for his own troops and a greater one for Athens.”⁷ Yet obviously their mistrust was ill-founded. Sitalces did undertake the campaign. One suspects that the Athenian mistrust was based more on their own insecurity about how one dealt with Thracians, despite the δῶρα and *presbeis*.

Xenophon and Seuthes

Xenophon in his *Anabasis* describes his contact with Seuthes as he was trying to lead the army of the Ten Thousand out of Thrace.⁸ Anaxibius, the Spartan *Nauarchos*, had urged Xenophon to collect together the army that was then scattered around Perinthus and to take them back to Asia, though Seuthes sent a message to Xenophon asking that he bring them to

¹ Th. 2.29.4-5.

² Th. 2.29.4; Hammond *HM* 127-8.

³ Th. 2.95.1-2.

⁴ See Chapter Four 113-4, 139-40.

⁵ Th. 2.95.3.

⁶ Th. 2.101.1.

⁷ Gomme *HCT* 2.248.

⁸ As with Xenophon's descriptions of Cyrus (see Endnote 3), it appears that Xenophon is “hellenising” Seuthes. His speeches in the *Anabasis*, as reported by Xenophon, do not always seem to make sense or tally with what he actually does. What we have in the *Anabasis*, I think, is Seuthes often acting and reacting as one would expect a Thracian to do, but speaking Greek sentiments.

him.¹ However, the new governor at Byzantium, Aristarchus forbade the army to cross, threatening to sink any ships that set sail, so Xenophon decided to lead the army to Seuthes after all.²

Xenophon describes his first introductions to Seuthes with colour and detail. After the negotiations had been completed for the army to fight with Seuthes in order that he might recover his ancestral territory,³ Xenophon relates how he was invited to dinner with the king at a nearby village.⁴ When they arrived at the house and were about to go in, Heracleides of Maroneia came up to people who he thought could give Seuthes a present, saying to Timasion, a Dardanian exile, that "it is customary, whenever Seuthes invites people to dinner, for those who have been invited to give him a gift (δωρεῖσθαι). If ever Seuthes becomes great, he will be in a position to send you home or to make you rich here."⁵ When Heracleides came to Xenophon, he said,

You are from the greatest city and your name is very great at Seuthes' court. Perhaps you will think it worthwhile to receive forts and land in this country just as others of your countrymen have done. So it is worth your while to honour Seuthes lavishly. I advise you since I wish you well. I know truly that the more gifts you give (δωρεῖν) him, the more you will experience good things at his hands.⁶

The emphasis is upon prospective giving, where one gives so that, in the future, one may receive much more.⁷ One gives things to increase the power of the Thracian king, who, once he comes into this power, will repay in kind.

¹ Xen. *Anab.* 7.2.8-11.

² Xen. *Anab.* 7.2.12-7; cf. 7.1.5.

³ Xen. *Anab.* 7.2.20-3.14.

⁴ Xen. *Anab.* 7.2.15.

⁵ Xen. *Anab.* 7.3.18.

⁶ Xen. *Anab.* 7.3.19-20.

⁷ Compare the way Persians *give* in order that they may bring people under their control through the excess of their giving; see Chapter Five 198-9.

Indeed, when Seuthes had regained his kingdom, and the relationship between himself and Xenophon had soured, Xenophon accused him of injustice, saying to him,

Before I served you, you received me pleasantly with your eyes and voice and gifts of hospitality (ξένια) and you could not make enough promises of how things would be. But when you have achieved what you wanted and have become the greatest I could make you, now do you dare to allow me to be dishonoured among the soldiers in this way? But indeed, I trust that it will seem best to you to repay your debt and that time will teach you and that you yourself will not bear to see those who have freely given to you a benefaction (εὐεργεσία) accusing you. So I ask you, when you pay back your debt, to be keen to make me such a man among the soldiers as you found.¹

Liberally sprinkled with good Greek morality, this speech still serves to highlight the “forward” perspective of Xenophon’s giving, and the reasons for which it was given in advance: so that when Xenophon had made Seuthes great, the king might then make the return he ought. The emphasis, then, is upon an initial giving, and any reward that was ultimately given in return was contingent upon this initial gift.²

Iphicrates and Cotys

Dem. 23.129-132.

I see in regard to Cotys that he was a marriage relative (κηδεστής) to Iphicrates in the same way that Cersobleptes was to Charidemus, and I see that the things that have been done by Iphicrates for Cotys are far greater and worthy of a larger χάρις, than that which has been done by Charidemus for Cersobleptes. Let us consider it thus. You know, of course, O men of Athens, that Iphicrates had a bronze statue in the city and maintenance in the prytaneum, gifts (δωρεαί) and other honours, because of which he was fortunate. Nevertheless, he dared to fight on behalf of Cotys’ affairs on the opposite side to your generals in the

¹ Xen. *Anab.* 7.7.46-7.

² As Gauthier notes (*AncSoc* 4 (1973) 13) the relationship between Seuthes and Xenophon is not a ξένια in the true (Greek) sense of the word, though he does not go so far in explaining *why* there is a difference.

sea-battle, and he placed the salvation of Cotys above the honours which existed for himself among you ... But nevertheless, Cotys, having been saved by Iphicrates, and having experienced the *φιλία* of this man, when he thought he was securely safe and sound, did not exert himself to repay the *χάρις* to Iphicrates, and he did not do any kindness to you through Iphicrates, so that he might obtain pardon for what had happened, but, quite the contrary, he decided that Iphicrates should join him in besieging the rest of your strongholds. Although Iphicrates did not want to, Cotys, taking a barbarian force and the force collected by Iphicrates, and having taken into his hire this very Charidemus, attacked your strongholds. He put Iphicrates at such a loss, that as a result he went away to Antissa to live and later to Drus, thinking that he could not honourably come to you, whom he had placed after Thrace and the barbarian, but that it was not safe to remain with Cotys, who he saw made so small account of his safety.

The case of Iphicrates and Cotys is indicative of the cultural differences and misunderstandings which took place between Athenians and Thracians. Iphicrates married either the sister or daughter of Cotys.¹ So when Cotys became an enemy of Athens, it is not altogether surprising that Iphicrates chose the Thracian's side, though this undoubtedly placed him in an interesting position: either to betray his *φιλία* to his adopted family, who were also barbarians, or to betray his own country.

But while Iphicrates may have felt the pull of these familial obligations, Cotys certainly did not. Demosthenes says that having made trial of Iphicrates' *φιλία*, Cotys was not eager to pay back the *χάρις*, but rather took advantage of Iphicrates' position. Iphicrates was then reduced to such a state that he would not return to Athens, thinking that he could not when he had favoured Thrace and a barbarian, yet feared for his safety among those whose friendship he had chosen to protect. Things do not look right.

¹ On this see 223 n. 8. This is interesting in its own right. For Iphicrates' son could be, and in fact was, maligned for not being a true Athenian citizen, that is, with two Athenian parents, though Cotys and his family may have been granted citizenship before the marriage; see Davies *APF* 250. Note also that Iphicrates was the adopted son of the Macedonian king, Amyntas (Aeschin. 2.28), so he had strong "northern" connections; see also Davies *APF* 250.

Iphicrates appears to have badly miscalculated. Cotys does not seem to honour the same obligations as him, or feel the same burden towards his φίλοι. Perhaps they live by different rules.

Just as Seuthes proved unreliable in giving his return for Xenophon's services, so Cotys did not make the return that was expected for what had been given or for what was expected by a Greek of a kinship relationship. Though the Greeks feel the great weight of such relationships and obligations, the Thracian kings do not.

The Thracians and Athenian Citizenship

In the fifth and fourth centuries, the Athenians adopted the policy of awarding citizenship to the kings of the Odrysians, the most powerful of the dynasties which dominated south-eastern Thrace,¹ and, occasionally, to their commanders or advisers.² The first such grant was to Sadocus, son of Sitalces, and heir apparent to the Odrysian throne at the outset of the Peloponnesian War in 431.³ Having first made the brother-in-law of Sitalces, Nymphodorus of Abdera, a πρόξενος,⁴ the Athenians despatched him to Sitalces to form an alliance, as they wanted him to attack Perdiccas and the neighbouring territory to Thrace.⁵ Then, Thucydides writes, Nymphodorus came to Athens and concluded the alliance between the Athenians and Sitalces and had Sitalces' son, Sadocus, made a citizen.⁶

¹ On the development of Thracian tribes into political groupings, see Fol & Marazov *Thrace and the Thracians* 149-50.

² Note that Athens also pursued this policy with other royal families in the north, eg. the kings of the Bosphorus and Molossia (Osborne *Naturalization* 3.41-4, 49, 80, 85, 87, 112-3), though, as will be seen, there were differences between the construction of these relationships and those with the kings of Thrace.

³ Th. 2.29.4-5, 67.2; Ar. *Acharn.* 141-50; cf. Osborne *Naturalization* 3.26-7.

⁴ On this proxeny, see Chapter Two 59, 64.

⁵ Th. 2.29.1-4.

⁶ Th. 2.29.5; though Osborne (*Naturalization* 3.27) notes that it is unclear whether the grant of citizenship influenced Sitalces, or "whether it merely signifies the conclusion of the pact". For the suggestion that Sadocus may have actually exercised his citizen rights, see Osborne *Naturalization* 3.27 & n. 39.

The purpose of this grant of citizenship was probably twofold: to secure the grain supply, and to secure Thracian military assistance.¹ Indeed, the grant reaped rewards almost immediately. When in 430 Peloponnesian ambassadors on their way to Persia to see the King stopped at the court of Sitalces to try to persuade him to give up his alliance with Athens, two Athenian ambassadors, who were present, persuaded Sadocus to hand the Peloponnesians over to them.² Sadocus agreed, and the Peloponnesians were taken to Athens and put to death.³ This award of citizenship was made in advance and in anticipation of benefits received.⁴ From giving such a high honour the Athenians expected a just repayment, which Sadocus respected. This award of citizenship was to set a pattern followed throughout the fourth century, though not necessarily with similarly positive results.⁵

Sadocus may not have succeeded Sitalces,⁶ and the kingdom went to Sitalces' nephew, Seuthes (I),⁷ who pursued, it would seem, a more pro-Macedonian policy, marrying the sister of Perdiccas, Stratonice.⁸ Though, according to Thucydides, Seuthes brought his kingdom to a financial peak,⁹ he focused his expansion upon the Thracian Chersonese and away from the south-west and Macedon and the Athenian colonies there.¹⁰

¹ Hopper *Trade and Industry in Classical Greece* 72; Osborne *Naturalization* 3.27; cf. Th. 2.95.2.

² Th. 2.67.1-2.

³ Th. 2.67.3-4.

⁴ Osborne *Naturalization* 4.188.

⁵ *Ibid.* 4.188-9.

⁶ Fol (*Papers of the Anglo-Bulgarian Conference* 33-4) suggests that Sadocus may in fact have held the Thracian throne, however briefly; *contra* Archibald CAH VI² 454.

⁷ Th. 4.101.5. On the succession, see Höck *Hermes* 26 (1891) 82-3; Archibald CAH VI² 454.

⁸ Perdiccas promised Seuthes the hand of his sister complete with a dowry if Seuthes persuaded Sitalces to give up his campaign in Macedon (Th. 2.101.5-6); cf. Casson *Macedonia, Thrace and Illyria* 197-8 (though I see no evidence for the claim that Seuthes (I) was awarded Athenian citizenship); Hammond *HM* 104, 129, 153.

⁹ Th. 2.29.2.

¹⁰ Fol & Marazov *Thrace and the Thracians* 152.

In the 390s the Odrysian kingdom was divided between Medocus (Amadocus), the king of the Odrysians, and the *archon* in the coastal region, Seuthes (II).¹ Xenophon writes that, when on his tour of duty of the Hellespont in 391/0, Thrasybulus found no opposition, he decided to do his city a good turn and reconciled Medocus and Seuthes to each other and made them friends and allies of the Athenians.² When Hebryzelmis succeeded to Medocus' throne in the 380s, the Athenians granted him honours which had also been granted to his forefathers.³ Osborne recognises that "the honours in question are obscure", but hypothesises that, "given the regularity with which citizenship was extended to the subsequent kings of Thrace, it is a clear possibility that citizenship was involved. The decrees for the Bosporan kings, which are cast in similarly vague terms, present a clear analogy."⁴ Since the honours given to Hebryzelmis were also awarded to his forefathers, it is a strong possibility that Seuthes and Medocus were also given grants of Athenian citizenship.

Cotys succeeded to the throne in 384/3, and, Osborne notes, was probably awarded citizenship soon after.⁵ But he was not reliably pro-Athenian, and when he was assassinated in 360, the Athenians honoured the assassins, Python and Heracleides of Aenus, with citizenship.⁶ This highlights the ridiculous position in which the Athenians had placed

¹ Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.26. Hammond (*HM* 195) claims that the Odrysian kingdom was divided into three parts at this stage, and ruled by Medocus (I), Seuthes (II) and Hebryzelmis. However, Osborne (*Naturalization* 3.111), following Tod (comm. on 117) and Höck (*Hermes* 26 (1891) 453-462), makes Hebryzelmis the successor of Medocus, as, most recently, does Archibald (*CAH VI*² 458). Casson (*Macedonia, Thrace and Illyria* 199) suggests on the basis of Diod. 14.94.2, where Medocus and Seuthes are both called kings (Μήδοκον και Σεύθην τοὺς τῶν Θράκων βασιλεῖς συμμάχους ἐποίησατο), that there may have been a dual kingdom.

² Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.26.

³ IG ii² 31 (= Tod 117); see also Xen. *Anab.* 7.6.43 for Ἀβροζέλμης, the envoy, who has been identified by some scholars as the Thracian king of the inscription (cf. Casson *Macedonia, Thrace and Illyria* 199).

⁴ Osborne *Naturalization* 3.111.

⁵ Osborne *Naturalization* 3.50; for citizenship, see [Dem.] 12.9 (noting also Osborne *Naturalization* 3.122); Dem. 23.118.

⁶ Dem. 23.127; cf. Dem. 23.119; see also Osborne *Naturalization* 3.49-50, 58-9 (under Python of Aenus).

themselves by their policy of granting citizenship to these northern kings: they found themselves honouring with citizenship those men who had killed the man whom they had honoured with citizenship.

On Cotys' death, the kingdom was divided into three parts ruled by Berisades, Amadocus and Cersobleptes.¹ Osborne notes: "The Athenians appear to have tried to maintain relations with all three rival kings, but they paid special attention to Kersobleptes whose kingdom included the vital Chersonese."² We know that Cersobleptes was awarded Athenian citizenship in about 360,³ that Amadocus probably was, since Teres (his likely successor) certainly was,⁴ and, in view of this, Berisades and his successor, Cetriporis, probably were also.⁵

The Athenians laid so much importance on keeping Thrace secure for Athens that they even went so far as to award citizenship to the Thracian commanders of these kings. Thus Simon and Bianor, commanders under Medocus, were naturalised citizens.⁶ Charidemus, Cersobleptes' kinsman and general, had probably already acquired citizenship by the time it was awarded to Cersobleptes himself,⁷ but, as Osborne remarks, "in the early 350s the importance of relations with Kersobleptes is emphasised by the proposal to grant Charidemus inviolability."⁸ Charidemus, however, though he served as a *strategos* on the Athenian board, was notorious for working for

¹ Dem. 23.8; IG ii² 126 (=Tod 151) + ATL II 104 T 78 d.

² Osborne *Naturalization* 3.59.

³ Dem. 12.8; 23.141.

⁴ This supposes that Amadocus was the father of Teres, a king of Thrace who held Athenian citizenship in the 340s, who also had a brother, Amadocus. Simon and Bianor, generals in the service of Amadocus (I) were certainly granted citizenship (Dem. 23.12; cf. 23.180), which increases the probability that Amadocus was also; for this see Osborne *Naturalization* 3.62 (under Simon of Thrace), 65-6 (under Teres son of Amadocus).

⁵ *Ibid.* 3.59-60.

⁶ Dem. 23.12.

⁷ Dem. 23.65, 89, 141, 145, 187, 188; Theopompus *FGrHist* 115 F 143; Osborne *Naturalization* 3.57-8.

⁸ Osborne *Naturalization* 3.59.

the interests of his master, Cersobleptes, rather than for the interests of Athens, and often fought openly against her.¹

In 357, despite initial difficulties in coming to an agreement,² the Athenians made an alliance with the three Thracian kings.³ On the death of Berisades, however, Cersobleptes began to wage war upon the sons of Berisades and Amadocus, against the interests of Athens, in order to unite the three kingdoms into one.⁴ He laid siege to the Thasian colony of Crenides within the territory of Berisades, which gave Philip of Macedon the opportunity to come to the aid of the city and take control.⁵ In 356 Cetriporis, the son of Berisades, made an alliance with Athens and the kings of Paeonia and Illyria against Philip,⁶ but Diodorus records that while the Thracians, Illyrians and Paeonians were gathering their forces, Philip appeared before they had drawn up their battle lines, and forced them to join the Macedonians.⁷ In 353 Philip moved east and came to Maroneia in central Thrace, but, although Amadocus prevented him moving further eastward, he could not prevent him making contact with Cersobleptes.⁸ Macedonian influence waxed, while Athenian influence waned.

In 352 the Athenians took Sestus, killing the adults and enslaving the rest.⁹ Cersobleptes, now fearful of the Athenians, renewed his alliance with Athens and his hostility to Philip, turning over the city of Cardia to the

¹ Dem. 23 *passim*.

² Dem. 23.170-3.

³ IG ii² 126 (=Tod 151)+ATL II 104 T 78 d; cf. Hornblower *Greek World* 249.

⁴ Dem. 23.1-15, 179; cf. 103; Griffith *HM* 248.

⁵ Steph. Byzant. s.v. Φίλιπποι; Diod. 16.8.6; cf. 16.3.7. On the probability that it was Cersobleptes who was responsible for the attack on Crenides, see Griffith *HM* 247-8; Archibald *CAH VI*² 465-6. On Philip's timing in his annexation of the city, see Griffith *HM* 246-7.

⁶ IG ii² 127 (=Tod 157) + SEG 21.250.

⁷ Diod. 16.22.3; see also Plut. *Alex.* 3.8; Justin 12.16.6.

⁸ Dem. 23.183; though see also Ellis (*Philip II* 76-7, esp. 77, cf. 80) for his suggestion that Chares' presence in the area may also have acted as a deterrent; cf. Griffith *HM* 264-7.

⁹ Diod. 16.34.3.

Athenians with promises to regain Amphipolis for them.¹ However, Amadocus, (Amadocus (I) had probably died, and this was his son, Amadocus (II))² appears to have allied himself with Philip in a war with Perinthus and Byzantium against Cersobleptes.³ Cersobleptes, however, was defeated by Philip and Amadocus (II), and compelled to send his son to Macedon as a hostage.⁴ Amadocus and Cetriporis also seem to have been deposed,⁵ and Teres (the son of Amadocus) and Cersobleptes were given control of Thrace, though they were reduced to vassal status.⁶

In 346 Philip resumed his attack on Thrace and captured a number of key forts along the Aegean coast and the Chersonese.⁷ Cersobleptes tried to have himself included among the signatories of the Peace of Philocrates, but without success, and he was abandoned by the Athenians and left to the mercy of Philip, in spite of his citizen status.⁸ 342 saw a concerted attack by Philip on the remaining Thracian kingdoms.⁹ According to Diodorus, Philip overcame the the Thracians and ordered them to pay a tithe to the Macedonians,¹⁰ and Cersobleptes and Teres were driven out of their kingdoms.¹¹

Athens' attempts at controlling the north-east through the Thracian kings had failed, not, in the end, necessarily through her own fault, but because the policy she had followed had led to insecurity and weakness. The Thracian kings did not always see the awards of citizenship as the Athenians

¹ Diod. 16.34.4; Dem. 23.14; Ellis *Philip II* 80-1; Griffith *HM* 282.

² Griffith *HM* 282-3, though Archibald (*CAH VI*² 467) assumes that this is still Amadocus (I).

³ Schol. Aeschin. 2.81; *FGrHist* 115 F 101.

⁴ Aeschin. 2.81 & schol; cf. Griffith *HM* 283.

⁵ Dem. 1.13; Archibald *CAH VI*² 467.

⁶ [Dem.] 12.8; cf. 10; Cawkwell *Philip* 44; Archibald *CAH VI*² 467.

⁷ Dem. 8.64, 9.15, 18.27, 19.150, 156, 334; [Dem.] 7.36-7; Aeschin. 2.90, 3.82.

⁸ Aeschin. 2.82-4; 3.73-4; see also Chapter Seven 254.

⁹ Diod. 16.71.1.

¹⁰ Diod. 16.71.2.

¹¹ [Dem.] 12.10.

expected and wanted them to; it did not bind them to the Athenians as it ought. As Demosthenes himself said:

O men of Athens, I believe that all who were eager to become citizens because they desired our ways and customs, obtain these things and live among us and have a share in that which they desired. But for all those affected by neither desire nor zeal for any of these things, but who love the advantage which they enjoy because they seem to be honoured by you, these people, I believe – rather I *know* – whenever they see hope of greater advantage from another quarter, will pay court to (θεραπεύσειν) this without having given you another thought.¹

Citizenship as an Honour

But why grants of citizenship? In the first place, there were, broadly speaking, two kinds of honours that could be conferred by the *demos* on an individual from outside the community: προξενία and citizenship.² In the fifth century, grants of προξενία were by far the more common,³ and awards of citizenship were relatively rare.⁴ Walbank remarks: "Their rarity is not just an accident of preservation: citizenship was the ultimate accolade and seldom awarded in the fifth century while Athens was at the height of her power. Only those states whose citizenship was of little or no value to outsiders were prodigal in granting in it."⁵

And the Athenians did indeed value their citizenship,⁶ as is evidenced by the limitations placed on citizenship in Athens by Pericles' law in the mid-fifth century and its re-enactment towards the end of the

¹ Dem. 23.126; cf. 23.114; [Dem.] 12.8-9.

² Though within the terms of these, of course, there were other honours which could be given, such as the proposal of inviolability sought for Charidemus (see Dem. 23 *passim*), or the privileges, such as *ateleia*, sometimes given with grants of προξενία.

³ Though the only sure grant of προξενία to anybody in Thrace in the fifth and fourth centuries was that made to Nymphodorus of Abdera.

⁴ See for the lists and analyses of naturalisations, Osborne *Naturalization*, esp. the summary 4.210-21; see also M.B. Walbank *Athenian Proxeny* 7; Manville *The Origins of Citizenship in Athens* 3; Herman *Ritualised Friendship* 141. On the differences between προξενία and citizenship, see Osborne *Naturalization* 4.146 & n.25; Hornblower *Comm.* 288-9; Manville *The Origins of Citizenship in Athens* 207.

⁵ M.B. Walbank *Athenian Proxeny* 7.

⁶ See for example, Dem. 59.88.

century.¹ But the main emphasis in citizenship was the active involvement in the “business” of state.² Manville writes, “To be an Athenian citizen, as an Athenian himself might say, was to be someone who *metechei tes poleos*: someone who ‘shares in the polis’.”³ In addition, Blundell writes that, for the citizen,

The fatherland must be cherished like a real father, and like a parent it must be ‘repaid’ for the benefits of birth and nurture which it has, metaphorically, bestowed upon us ... In return, the *polis* has ways of rewarding the service of its most devoted ‘children’ which go beyond the benefits it provides.⁴

Some naturalised citizens did take part in the *polis*, such as Phanosthenes the Andrian, who seems to have served as a *strategos* in 407,⁵ and Charidemus, who was on the board of generals in the mid-fourth century and served as a trierarch perhaps in the 330s.⁶

Although it was not always practical for grants of citizenship to be implemented, they were made on the assumption that they would, or at least could be.⁷ Some, such as the Thracian kings, simply lived too far away from Athens to make this feasible, though Sadocus, the son of Sitalces, may have exercised his citizenship.⁸ The practical difficulties of exercising citizenship notwithstanding, the award of citizenship made the recipient liable to the rights and obligations due to an Athenian citizen.⁹ As an Athenian citizen, there were rights and privileges one could draw upon,

¹ For Pericles’ decree. see [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 26.4, *Plut. Per.* 37.3; *Ael. VH* 6.10, 13.24, *Suidas s.v.* δημοποίητος (Δ 451); for the re-enactment, see *Dem.* 57.30; *Eumelus FGtHist* 77 F 2, *Carystius ap.* *Athen.* 13. 577 b-c; on both decrees see *Rhodes Comm.* 331-4.

² Manville *The Origins of Citizenship in Athens* 3-7.

³ *Ibid.* 7.

⁴ Blundell *Helping Friends and Harming Enemies* 43 & esp. 44 and references there.

⁵ For citizenship: *IG* i³ 182; for *strategia*: *Xen. Hell.* 1.5.18; *Plato Ion* 541 c-d; *Develin Officials* 174; see also Appendix B: *Athenian Strategoi* 319.

⁶ For citizenship, see 237 above; for his civic career in Athens, see *PA* 15380; *Davies APF* 570-2; *Develin Officials* 268, 291, 310, 312, 313, 343.

⁷ *Osborne Naturalization* 4.148-9, 187-92.

⁸ *Ibid.* 3.27.

⁹ *Ibid.* 4.189.

but, conversely, there were duties that one was also expected to perform. As Herman notes, grants of citizenship “not only convert the grantees into external allies but effect their actual incorporation into the communal group.”¹ Citizenship drew the recipient – or was supposed to – into the network of duties and obligations that one owed to one’s fellow countrymen and to one’s *polis*. What was expected was that the individual would become part of this web of obligation and would respond in kind through services to the Athenian *polis*.

Sometimes, such awards were made in response to initial benefactions, as were grants of *προξενία*, with a view to receiving other benefactions.² The kings of Bosphorus were rewarded with citizenship for their benefactions to the city in maintaining the corn supply.³ But, in the case of the Odrysian kings, the awards were prospective, looking for benefactions in the future.⁴ This is in accord with the pattern we have already seen for the accepted method of dealing with Thracians: to offer them a “gift” which was prospective in nature.

However, as has been shown above, the Thracian kings were notorious in their disregard for Athens and Athenian interests. They did not place the same value on the “gift” as the Athenians thought they should, or, at least, they did not unless it suited them to do so. Sadocus accepted the citizenship, and responded as he was expected to, but his father also expected Athenian help for his Macedonian campaign.⁵ Cersobleptes, on the other hand, only felt the weight of his Athenian citizenship when he

¹ Herman *Ritualised Friendship* 140-1.

² Osborne *Naturalization* 4.146, 148-50, 189-90.

³ See Dem. 20 *passim* (esp. 29-35); Osborne *Naturalization* 3.41-4. The Bosporan kings were not only faithful, but quickly become hellenised, so much so that some time in the second half of the fourth century which records how Paerisades (Athenian citizenship: IG ii² 212 [= Tod 167]; citizenship of his father, Leucon, and grandfather, Satyrus: Dem. 20.30) and his sons made grants of *προξενία* (*Corpus Inscriptionum Regni Bosporani* (1965) 1 (= SIG³ 217); also 2, 3, 5). Very Greek indeed.

⁴ Osborne *Naturalization* 4.188.

⁵ See 229-30 above.

was being threatened by Philip. Athenian citizenship was not a gift which could hold its value, as this depended very much on whether it was useful to the recipient or not. Osborne says: "The grants indeed are more a mark of desperation on the part of the Athenians, whose willingness to accord such honours was matched only by their optimism about their effects."¹ Philip is supposed to have written mockingly to the Athenians,

When <Cotys>² died, to whom you had given a share in the citizenship, you straight away made a *φιλία* with the man who killed him. And you chose to go to war on Cersobleptes' behalf, in the full knowledge that none of those who receive such *δωρεαί* pay any attention to your laws and decrees.³

The weakness of the Athenian position is plain. They were in the position of suppliants, offering a gift which the Thracians could accept or not as they chose.

The Problems with Athens' Thracian Policy

There were a number of problems with the in way in which Athens dealt with Thrace and the Thracians. Firstly, they were forced to approach Thrace as suppliants. The loyalty and goodwill of the Thracian kings was important to Athens' interests in the north, so she was in the weaker position. "Giving" to the Thracians was also the acknowledged means of receiving from them.

But this created further complications. The purpose of this "gift" was not only a supplicatory offering, but it also carried baggage of its own. Citizenship supposedly tied the recipients closely within the Athenian network of duties and obligations. The Athenians offered a "gift" – citizenship – which only carried a value relative to the circumstances.

¹ *Naturalization* 3.59.

² See Osborne *Naturalization* 3.49, 122 (under Sitalces of Thrace).

³ [Dem]. 12.9.

Citizenship was useful to the Thracians some of the time, and then they were happy to share in it (with all that it entailed). At other times, it was of no use to them at all, and then they simply ignored it. The Thracians were in a position to accept or reject the gift as they chose. The Athenians were dependent upon their accepting it.

Further, the "gift" was prospective: it anticipated future benefits. But again, this depended on the goodwill of the Thracians. If they ultimately chose not to respond to the gift, they were in a position not to, and there was nothing the Athenians could do. The power balance was in the Thracians' favour, and the Athenians were forced to accept what they were given.

The Athenians failed to understand fully the way Thracian society worked; so much is clear from Thucydides. Because of this they failed to respond creatively to the problem of Thracian loyalty. They kept doing the same thing over and over again. This failure to appreciate the differences fully produced difficulties, if not disasters, for the Athenians in the fourth century. However, though the loss of control in Thrace could be sustained by the Athenians, their general lack of insight into the way non-Greek, or at most marginally Greek, societies worked and differed from their own was to prove their absolute undoing when they also misunderstood and underestimated Philip and the Macedonians.

Chapter Seven: *Philip and the Greeks*

Philip was a man of broad vision. He drank a great deal and had eight wives. He subdued the Greeks after they had knocked themselves out in the Peloponnesian War and appointed himself Captain General so that he could uphold the ideals of Hellas. The main ideal of Hellas was to get rid of Philip, but he didn't count that one.

W. Cuppy *The Decline and Fall of Practically Everybody*

*Odi dolosas munerum et malas artes:
imitantur hamos dona: namque quis nescit
avidum vorata decipi scarum musca?
quotiens amico diviti nihil donat,
o Quintiane, liberalis est pauper.*

Martial *Epigrams* 5.18.6.

This chapter will discuss some of the main events in Philip's reign, looking at how Philip dealt with the Greeks and how they dealt with him. It will consider his policy of gift-giving, and the relationship between gift-giving, bribery and ξενία, before looking more specifically at how the significant events of this period can be analysed in terms of these phenomena. Finally, it will draw conclusions about the way Philip was able to use the reciprocity ethic to his own advantage, exploiting its subtleties, inconsistencies and ambiguities, in order to create the expectation of a relationship which he had no intention of maintaining.

Philip brought himself from being the small-time ruler of a semi-barbarian kingdom to become the most influential man in the Greek world. His growth in strength and influence was dependent not only upon his successful conquests in northern and central Greece, but also to a large degree upon his diplomatic tactics and the manner in which he dealt with the Greek states, particularly the Athenians. Supposedly of Argive descent,¹

¹ Hdt. 8.137.1; Th. 2.99.3, 5.80.2.

he certainly spent three years of his adolescence as a hostage in Thebes.¹ There he may well have learned military skills from Epameinondas,² but he also seems to have learned a great deal about the way the sophisticated and educated southern Greeks thought – not only their philosophy, but also the subtleties of their codes of friendship. It seems that it was largely through his appreciation of this code of behaviour and his shrewd ability to manipulate and exploit it that he brought the Greek states to their downfall.

Philip and Gift-giving

[Philip] was courteous in his dealings with others, and tried to bring the multitudes to the greatest goodwill (εὐνοία) through both gifts (δωρεαί) and promises, and tried to counteract cleverly the crowd of impending dangers.³

Philip's methods of dealing with others were not untypical of other gift-giving societies: in order to win loyalty, he gave gifts, and he did this on both a state and a personal level. There are many examples of Philip giving gifts in one form or another for the purpose of winning individuals and *poleis* over to himself. Demosthenes recounts how Aeschines, on his way home from Arcadia, met with a certain Atrestidas to whom Philip had given thirty of the Olynthian captives as a δωρεά.⁴ Likewise, Olynthus made an alliance with him when he promised to give them Poteidaea and Anthemous,⁵ and later the Aetolians seem to have negotiated a treaty with Philip on the understanding that he would give them Naupactus, possibly in exchange for an alliance.⁶ Demosthenes recounts the reception of the

¹ Plut. *Pelop.* 26.5; Justin 6.9.7, 7.5.2-3; Diod. 15.67.4, cf. 16.2.2; see Griffith *HM* 204-5.

² Plut. *Pelop.* 26.7; Diod. 16.2.3.

³ Diod. 16.3.3.

⁴ Dem. 19.305-6.

⁵ Diod. 16.8.3; Tod 158 (Robinson *TAPA* 65 (1934) 103-22); Dem. 2.7; 6.20; 23.107-8. On the pro-Macedonian element and expulsion of the pro-Athenians in Olynthus, see Dem. 9.56, 66, 19.265. Note that the pro-Macedonians in Olynthus were supposedly won over by bribes.

⁶ Dem. 9.34; Strabo 9 c 426-7; see Griffith *HM* 508-9; Ellis *Philip II* 158; cf. Theopompus *FGrHist* 115 F 235.

Theban ambassadors at Philip's court, saying that when the Theban ambassadors arrived,

Philip wished to give them money, and a very large sum, they said. But the Theban ambassadors did not accept it or take it. After this, at a sacrifice and banquet, while he was drinking with them and being kindly (φιλανθρωπεύόμενος) to them, Philip offered them many other things, such as prisoners and the like, and, finally, gold and silver cups. They kept on refusing all these things and never giving in. Finally one of the ambassadors, Philo, spoke ... He said that he was pleased and rejoiced to see Philip being magnanimous and kind to them, but they were indeed φίλοι and ξένοι to him even without these δῶρα. However, the ambassadors called on Philip to direct this kindness towards the affairs of the city [Thebes], in which he was then engaged, and do something worthy of himself and the Thebans. Then they promised that in this way the whole city as well as themselves would be inclined towards him.¹

The Thebans might have required that he direct his benevolence towards a public cause rather than a private one, but it is still a form of exchange. He would have the goodwill of the Thebans, if he gave them what they wanted. Philip was more than happy to comply.²

Philip, Athens and Amphipolis

Philip's first task as king was to consolidate the kingdom he had and try to settle the problems on his borders. Philip executed one of his half-brothers, and later pursued to Olynthus the other two, who were also rival claimants for the throne.³ He took an Illyrian bride, probably in 359/8,⁴

¹ Dem. 19. 139-140.

² Dem. 19.141-2. On the implicit bribery involved, which Demosthenes commends them for declining to accept, see below. It would seem that the Theban ambassadors were not willing to take the risk that Aeschines did; and which did not produce the results he had hoped for.

³ Justin 7.4.5, 8.3.10; Ellis *Philip II* 44-47; Griffith *HM* 208 & n. 2, though see Ellis (*Philip II* 46; id. *Historia* 22 (1973) 350-4) who places the death of Archelaus about 352. On Perdiccas' earlier attempt to seize the Macedonian throne, see Aeschin. 2.26-9.

⁴ Satyrus *ap.* Athen. 13. 557 b-d; see also Polyaeus 8.60. Ellis (*Philip II* 47-8) suggests that the marriage sealed the negotiations for an armistice between Philip and the Illyrians, though Griffith (*HM* 211) considers that though there may well have been negotiations, "certainly no treaty was made now". Both Ellis and Griffith, however, see the need to explain the inactivity of Bardylis and his failure to press home his advantage.

persuaded the Paeonians to keep peace, “having corrupted some with gifts, and having persuaded others with benevolent promises” (τοὺς μὲν δωρεαῖς διαφθείρας, τοὺς δὲ ἐπαγγελίαις φιλανθρώποις πείσας), and won over the Thracians in a similar way.¹

Philip dealt with Argaeus, a pretender to the throne, and the Athenians by exploiting the Athenian desire to regain control of Amphipolis. In 359, Amphipolis was garrisoned with Macedonian troops put there by Perdiccas to defend the Amphipolitans against the Athenians.² The Athenians’ backing of Argaeus was centred on their ambitions to recover Amphipolis, and they presumably hoped to obtain it with his help once he was on the throne.³ Philip withdrew the garrison and gave the city its autonomy, and made overtures for peace with the Athenians.⁴ The Athenians prevaricated over their support for Argaeus,⁵ and Philip despatched a letter to the Athenians saying that he was ready to make an alliance and renew his πατρικὴν φιλίαν with them.⁶ According to Diodorus, he renounced all claim to Amphipolis, and thus persuaded the Athenians to make peace.⁷

In 358/7, however, Philip laid siege to Amphipolis, supposedly under provocation by the Amphipolitans.⁸ Envoys were sent by the people of Amphipolis, inviting the Athenians “to come and receive the city”, but the Athenians refused.⁹ The Olynthians also came to Athens wanting to open negotiations, but Philip won over the Athenians, negotiating in secret with

¹ Diod. 16.3.4.

² See Aeschin 2.29; Griffith *HM* 187; Cawkwell *Philip* 73.

³ This seems to be implicit in Diod. 16.3.3; see also Griffith *HM* 236 & n. 3.

⁴ Diod. 16.3.3, 4.1; Polyaeus 4.2.17. On the question of the autonomy of Amphipolis, however, see Ellis *Philip II* 48-9.

⁵ Diod. 16.3.5.

⁶ Dem. 23.121.

⁷ Diod. 16.4.1.

⁸ Diod. 16.8.2; see also Griffith *HM* 237.

⁹ Dem. 1.8; Theopompus *FGrHist* 115 F 42; see also Griffith *HM* 238 & n. 1; Ellis *Philip II* 64, 66.

the Athenian ambassadors, Antiphon and Charidemus, who promised to give up Pydna in return for Amphipolis.¹ A letter was also sent by Philip to the Athenians during the siege, reassuring them that Amphipolis was theirs and that he would restore it to them.² Yet when Amphipolis was taken, Philip did not hand it over,³ but immediately reduced Pydna as well, probably through the treachery of some of those within the city.⁴ The Athenians, not for the last time, were taken in by the hints and promises of the Macedonian.

The first thing to understand about this incident is the importance of Amphipolis to Athens. Amphipolis was a colony founded by the Athenians in 437/6 at the place called Ennea Hodoi on the River Strymon.⁵ The city was significant because of its access to timber for ship-building and the mines of the north.⁶ In 424, however, the Amphipolitans went over to the Spartan, Brasidas, whom they named as their founder in place of Hagnon, the actual *oikistes*.⁷ Into the fourth century, the Athenians' lack of influence in Amphipolis remained a matter of grave concern to them, yet, despite their best efforts, they were unable to win it back.⁸ Even after Philip had taken the city decisively, the Athenians were still arguing their claims to it in the negotiations of 346 and later in 344.⁹ In the early 350s the Athenians were so obsessed with the city that they were ready to be duped.

Philip also wanted Amphipolis, but was quite prepared to use it as a bargaining point, at least for appearance's sake. At first, the mere withdrawal of Macedonian troops from Amphipolis was enough for the Athenians to

¹ Theopompus *FGrHist* 115 F 30 a-b; Dem 2.6; see also de Ste. Croix *CQ* n.s.13 (1963) 110-9; Griffith *HM* 238-42.

² [Dem.] 7.27; Dem. 23.116. However, see Ellis *Philip II* 52.

³ Polyaeus 4.2.17.

⁴ Diod. 16.8.3; Dem. 1.5, 8, 20.63.

⁵ Th. 4.102.3, 5.11.1; see also schol. Aeschin. 2.31.

⁶ On the importance of Amphipolis and the Thraceward parts, see Chapter Six: 223-5.

⁷ Th. 5.11.1.

⁸ Aeschin. 2.32; [Dem.] 7.28-9; Cawkwell *Philip* 71-2; Griffith *HM* 230-3.

⁹ Aeschin. 2.31-3.

think twice about their support for Argaeus. When, however, Philip laid siege to the city, a more substantial agreement needed to be made. The advantages for Athens in the exchange of Pydna for Amphipolis are clear. They would regain Amphipolis at the cost only of a small allied city and without an expensive northern battle. They must have been convinced, if only through wishful thinking, that the deal with Philip was secure, since they refused the Amphipolitans' offer to give them the city.¹ It was a simple and straightforward exchange. Philip, however, did not honour his undertaking. Not only did he fail to hand over Amphipolis, but he took Pydna as well. The Athenians had no option but to declare war,² and that when it was too late.

Philip and the Athenians in 346

In late 357 or early 356 Philip turned to the Olynthians for an alliance.³ In 355 the Social War between Athens and her allies came to an end,⁴ and the war was declared against Phocis.⁵ In 353, trouble also flared up in Thessaly. Philip entered the war by supporting the Thessalians against the Pheraeans, who brought in the Phocians under the command of Onomarchus.⁶ Initially, Onomarchus defeated Philip, who retired to Macedon.⁷ This encouraged the Olynthians to look towards less threatening allies and to make an approach to Athens.⁸ In 352, Onomarchus was killed

¹ Though, if they had accepted this offer, this would have undoubtedly brought them into direct conflict with Philip.

² Aeschin 2.70.

³ See 250 n. 5.

⁴ Diod. 16.22.1-2.

⁵ For the opening stages of this nine year war, see Diod. 16.23.1-31.5; on the chronology of the war, I follow Hammond *JHS* 57 (1937) 44-77 (= *Studies in Greek History* 486-533).

⁶ Diod. 16.35; though on the chronology, see Griffith *HM* 267-8. On the relations between Philip and the Thessalians prior to the Phocian intervention in Thessalian affairs, see Westlake *Thessaly in the Fourth Century BC* 160-8.

⁷ Diod. 16.35.2-3.

⁸ Dem. 3.7, 23.107-9.

in the battle of the Crocus Field,¹ and was succeeded by his brother Phayllus.² Philip advanced south, intending to make war on the Phocians, but the Athenians prevented him from coming south through the pass at Thermopylae.³ Unable to get through, Philip returned to Macedon and went to fight against Cersobleptes.⁴

In 349, Philip attacked Olynthus.⁵ The Olynthians sent envoys to Athens asking for an alliance, and, after some hesitation, an alliance was made and forces sent.⁶ But Philip, having first dealt with problems in Thessaly,⁷ took Olynthus itself in 348, despite extra relief sent by the Athenians.⁸

During the siege of Olynthus, ambassadors came from the Euboeans to Athens with the news that Philip wanted to make peace.⁹ Again, when Ctesiphon was sent to Macedon to recover ransom money for a certain Phrynon of Rhamnous, who was captured by pirates during the Olympic truce, he returned with the report that Philip wanted an end of the war.¹⁰ On the proposal of Philocrates, the *demos* voted that Philip be asked to send a herald and ambassadors to negotiate for peace, though the motion was attacked as unconstitutional.¹¹ Despite this reception to Philip's advances, in 347 Eubulus passed a decree in the Athenian assembly to send ambassadors

¹ Diod. 16.35.3-6; Dem. 4.35; but against the emendation of Pagae to Pagasae in Diodorus, see Ehrhardt CQ n.s. 17 (1967) 298-301; Ellis *Philip II* 260 n. 95.

² Diod. 16.36.1.

³ Diod. 16.38.1-2; Justin 8.2.8; Dem. 19.84.

⁴ Diod. 16.38.2; schol. Aeschines 2.81; cf. Chapter Six 238-9.

⁵ Justin 8.3.10; see also Ellis *Historia* 22 (1973) 350-4.

⁶ Philochorus *FGrHist* 328 F 49-51; Dem. 3.7-8.

⁷ Dem. 1.22, 2.11.

⁸ Dem. 21.197; Philochorus *FGrHist* 328 F 50-1; Diod. 16.53.2.

⁹ Aeschin. 2.12; see also Ellis *Philip II* 99.

¹⁰ Aeschin. 2.12-3.

¹¹ Aeschin. 2.13-4, 3.62. It should also pointed out here that it was Demosthenes, who was later to vilify Philocrates and his moves for peace, who defended him at the trial.

to the Greek cities to see whether they could organise a common resistance to Philip, though little was achieved.¹

Meanwhile, in central Greece, the Phocians, under the command of Phalaecus, seized a number of large cities in Boeotia.² However, the Phocians removed Phalaecus from his command and replaced him with a triumvirate,³ while the Thebans sent envoys to Philip, who sent a few troops.⁴ The three Phocian generals decided to hand over to the Athenians and Spartans Alponus, Thronium and Nicaea, and so the control of Thermopylae.⁵ In addition, the pro-Athenian Thessalian town of Halus, on the coast south of the Crocus Field, was at war with Pharsalus, and Athens was in a position to help it and therefore strengthen her control of Thermopylae.⁶ But when the Athenian general, Proxenus, and the Spartan, Archidamus, arrived in Phocis to receive the Phocian towns, the Phocians refused to hand them over.⁷

Aristodemus, an actor, had been sent to Philip concerning the Athenian hostages who had been captured when Olynthus was taken.⁸ Before Aristodemus reported to the *boule* on his return, one of the hostages, having been released by Philip, returned to Athens with the news that Philip was ready for peace.⁹ Aristodemus then gave his report, according to Aeschines, to both the *boule* and the assembly that Philip even wished to become an ally.¹⁰ Thereupon, Philocrates moved the resolution that ten

¹ Aeschin. 2.79; Dem. 19.10-11, 303-6; on the date of this decree, see Ellis *Philip II* 265 n. 51; Griffith *HM* 330 & n.1 *contra* Cawkwell *REG* 73 (1960) 418-25.

² Diod. 16.56.1-2.

³ Diod. 16.56.3.

⁴ Diod. 16.58.2-3.

⁵ Aeschin. 2.132-3.

⁶ Dem. 19.36 & schol., 39, 159, 163, 174, 334.

⁷ Aeschin. 2.133. It would appear that the Phocian, Phalaecus, had regained control of Phocian affairs; see Cawkwell *REG* 73 (1960) 428; Ellis *Philip II* 105-6, 266 n. 67; Griffith *HM* 333 & n. 2, 334.

⁸ Aeschin. 2.15.

⁹ Aeschin. 2.16.

¹⁰ Aeschin. 2.17.

ambassadors be sent to Philip to enter into discussions concerning peace and the common interests of Philip and the Athenians.¹

The First Embassy

The members of the first embassy to Philip included Aeschines, Demosthenes and Philocrates.² The ambassadors arrived at Pella just as Philip was about to set out on his Thracian campaign, but Philip gave assurances to the ambassadors that he would leave the Chersonese alone.³ On the return of the embassy to Athens, the ambassadors gave a brief report to the *boule* and delivered a letter from Philip, suggesting that there were benefits which would come to the Athenians if or when they made an alliance with him.⁴

Demosthenes then proposed that, when the ambassadors came from Philip, the *prytaneis* should call a meeting about peace and alliance on two successive days.⁵ The terms finally agreed were:⁶ that each party should keep what it held;⁷ that there should be peace and alliance with Philip and his descendants;⁸ that it should be a defensive alliance;⁹ that it should be binding on the allies (though the whole question of who were the allies of each became one of the bones of contention);¹⁰ and that neither party should support the operation of pirates.¹¹ The *synedrion* of the allies put forward an alternative *dogma* proposing, firstly, that there should be peace without alliance, and, secondly, that within a limit of three months any Greek state

¹ Aeschin. 2.18, 3.63; Dem. 19.12.

² Aeschin 2.18-19.

³ Aeschin. 2.81-2; see also Ellis *Philip II* 267 n. 78.

⁴ Aeschin. 2.45, 50; Dem. 19.40: "ἔγραφον δ' ἂν καὶ διαρρήδην ἡλιχ' ὑμᾶς εὖ ποιήσω, εἰ εὖ ᾗδεν καὶ τὴν συμμαχίαν μοι γενησομένην".

⁵ Aeschin. 2.53, 55, 61.

⁶ See Griffith *HM* 338-9.

⁷ [Dem.] 7.26.

⁸ Dem. 19.48.

⁹ Dem. 19.143.

¹⁰ Dem. 19.159, 321; Aeschin. 2.82-4.

¹¹ [Dem.] 12.2; 7.14.

Greek state that wished could have its name added to the treaty.¹ This was not going to be acceptable to Philip, however, as his ambassadors made clear; there could be no peace without alliance, and no alliance if the Phocians, Halians and Cersobleptes were included.² After warnings of what would happen if peace was not made,³ the *demos* accepted the terms and elected the same ambassadors to return to Macedon and administer the oaths, and the ambassadors were also to do ἄλλ' ὅ τι ἂν δύνωνται ἀγαθόν.⁴

The Second Embassy

It was Philip's policy to keep everyone guessing, and the Athenians were not the only ambassadors waiting on him at Pella.⁵ When the second embassy reported to the assembly, Aeschines claimed that he had persuaded Philip in everything that would benefit the city, both in the matters concerning the Amphictyony and everything else.⁶ According to Demosthenes, Aeschines went on to report that within a few days Philip would lay siege to Thebes, repopulate Thespieae and Plataea, exact reparations for the shrine at Delphi from the Thebans, not the Phocians, give up Euboea in exchange for Amphipolis, and restore Oropus to the Athenians.⁷ A letter from Philip was also read to the assembly, in which, as Demosthenes reports with disgust, Philip, who had previously intimated that there would be great rewards for the Athenians if they made an

¹ Aeschin. 3.69-70; Dem. 19.15. On *koinai eirenai* in general, see Ryder *Koine Eirene*.

² Aeschin. 2.82-9, 3.65, 71-4; Dem. 19.36, 69, 159, 174, 321, 334, *Hypoth.* 2.5.

³ Dem. 19.291.

⁴ Dem. 19.15-7; Aeschin. 2.82, 104, 120.

⁵ Aeschin. 2.120, 136-7.

⁶ Dem. 19.20.

⁷ Dem. 5.10, 19.19-23, 35, 42, 53, 63, 74, 112, 220, 325-7; cf. Aeschin 2.119-29; on the promises and Aeschines' defence, see Markle *CQ* n.s. 24 (1974) 253-4.

alliance, now said that he did not know what he could do to gratify (χαρίσαιο) the Athenians.¹

Eventually, at Pherae, the Athenians administered the oaths to Philip, and those of his allies whom he chose to include.² Philip's exact plans seem to have been unclear to all except Philip. By the time the embassy had returned to Athens, Philip was at Thermopylae and making assurances to the Phocians.³ The Athenians extended the peace to Philip's descendants and added in obedience to Philip that, if the Phocians did not do what they ought and hand over the sanctuary to the Amphictyons, then the Athenian *demos* would come to help against those who were preventing this from happening.⁴ Most of the same ambassadors were then elected to bear the news of this decree to Philip, though Demosthenes refused to go and Aeschines was left behind on a plea of ill health.⁵

Philip sent two letters to the Athenians calling them to take the field against the Phocians.⁶ By the time the letters from Philip had arrived, the mood in Athens had changed. Troops were not sent, since, according to Aeschines, those who were agitating for war were alleging that Philip would take any soldiers as hostages.⁷ Philip next made an agreement with Phalaecus, who was to withdraw with his men, and the Phocians surrendered themselves into the hands of the Macedonian.⁸ Philip convened a meeting of the Amphictyonic Council and referred the matter to them.⁹

¹ Dem. 19.41. One should not, however, acquit Philip too readily here of a charge of duplicity. If he was not in fact deceiving the Athenians, he was certainly manipulating them, *contra* Markle CQ n.s. 24 (1974) 253, 256-60; Griffith HM 345-6.

² Dem. 19.158.

³ Dem. 19.58.

⁴ Dem. 19.48-53.

⁵ Dem. 19.121-5.

⁶ Aeschin 2.137; Dem. 19.50-1.

⁷ Aeschin. 2.137.

⁸ Diod. 16.59.3; Dem. 19.62-3; see also Griffith HM 346; cf. Ellis *Philip II* 120.

⁹ Diod. 16.59.4.

The Amphictyonic Council decided that the cities of the Phocians should have their walls removed and that the Phocians would no longer be able to participate in the sanctuary at Delphi or be members of the Amphictyonic Council, and their votes in the Amphictyonic Council were transferred to Philip.¹ The Sacred War was brought to an end without a battle being fought. The Council meeting came to an end; Philip was appointed to hold the next Pythian games, and then returned to Macedon.²

The events of 346 follow a similar pattern to those surrounding Amphipolis: on the basis of suggestions and hints of benefits that would be received, the Athenians let Philip enter central Greece and take the cities of their allies, the Phocians. As noted above, Philip sent letters back to Athens with the first and second embassies, intimating benefits. Aeschines gave substance to these hints by reporting to the Athenians the alleged “promises” of Philip. Philip himself, it must be noted, was all too careful not to make any definite statements himself as to his intentions. He only made suggestions of possibilities; Aeschines was left to make the hints into promises.³ Thus when the promises were left unfulfilled, the responsibility was deflected from Philip on to Aeschines: it was Aeschines who actually told the “lies”; Philip himself had said nothing firm.⁴

Epanorthosis

Even after the disappointment of the Phocian settlement,⁵ there were some in Athens still willing to believe in Philip. Aeschines attended the celebration banquet to mark the end of the war, and continued to speak of

¹ Diod. 16.60.1-2; Dem. 19.325; Paus. 10.3.3, 8.2.

² Diod. 16.60.3-5; on the meaning of this passage see also Griffith *JHS* 59 (1939) 71-9; Ryder *Koine Eirene* 145-9.

³ See Dem. 19.38-9, 68.

⁴ See Dem. 19.68-9, 328; [Dem.] 7.33.

⁵ Athens refused to send delegates to the Pythian games that year (Dem. 19.128).

the fulfilment of the promises that had been made,¹ and when, possibly early in 345, the Delians lodged an appeal at the Amphietyonic Council against Athens' control of the temple of Apollo on the island, the assembly elected Aeschines to defend their claim, though this was vetoed by the Areopagus and Hypereides was sent instead.² Even Demosthenes urged the Athenians to accept the peace they had and not to give the Amphietyons any cause to declare war, though not in order to gratify Philip.³

In 344, Philip possibly interfered in the Peloponnese in a war between Messene, Argos and Sparta.⁴ In response, the Athenians, at the instigation of Demosthenes, sent embassies to the Peloponnesians, warning them against the Macedonian.⁵ Philip replied by sending Python of Byzantium and representatives from his allies to Athens to attempt to revise the existing peace settlement, and the Athenians were given a free hand to amend any clause they wished.⁶ The Athenians proposed two amendments. The first required that each side should retain what belonged to them by right (ἐκατέρους ἔχειν τὰ ἑαυτῶν), which was aimed specifically at reclaiming Amphipolis; and the second, that there should be a common peace.⁷ At the same time as some of Philip's ambassadors were in Athens, an embassy was present from the Persian king, requesting support for an Egyptian campaign.⁸ The Athenians, none too politely, refused, passing a decree that

¹ Dem. 19.111-3, 128.

² Dem. 18.134; on the date (placed variously between 345 & 343): Ellis *Philip II* 131-2, 274 n. 25, puts it in 345; Osborne *Eranos* 72 (1974) 176-7 n. 19 is non-committal; Sealey (*AJP* 79 (1958) 72-3 = *Essays* 184-5) suggests 340/39 for an episode which precedes this one; on Aeschines' selection and subsequent termination of his appointment, see Ellis *Philip II* 131.

³ Dem. 5. 13-4, 24-5. Ellis (*Philip II* 274 n. 10) conjectures that this speech was made at the time the Thessalian ambassadors were in Athens from the Amphietyony (Dem. 19.111).

⁴ Dem. 6.15; see Griffith *HM* 474-84.

⁵ Dem. 6. 19-25, 18.79.

⁶ Dem. 18.136; [Dem.] 7.18-23; [Dem.] 12.18.

⁷ [Dem.] 7.18-23, 30-2; [Dem.] 12.20-2; on the common peace, Ryder *Koine Eirene* 100-1; cf. Cawkwell *CQ* n.s. 13 (1963) 132 & n. 5 (Cawkwell argues, wrongly, from the supposition that Philip, and not the Athenians, proposed the common peace; see Griffith *HM* 490 n. 3; Brunt *CQ* n.s. 19 (1969) 262 n. 2).

⁸ Philochorus *FGrHist* 328 F 157; Diod. 16.44.1; [Dem.] 12.6; see Cawkwell *CQ* n.s. 13 (1963) 133.

there would be reprisals from Philip and the Greeks if the King attacked any Greek cities.¹ The chances of reconciliation between Philip and the Athenians seemed good. The Athenians elected Hegesippus and others to represent them before Philip, but he was not well received.² Philip was so incensed by the demands of Hegesippus and his colleagues that Xenocleides, the poet, was banished for entertaining them during their time in Pella, though they were fellow-citizens.³

By 343, the mood in Athens had turned against Philip. Hypereides impeached Philocrates,⁴ and Philocrates, assessing public opinion, fled from Athens.⁵ Demosthenes, in the same year, also impeached Aeschines, though he was acquitted.⁶ In the same summer, before the trial of Aeschines, there was internal trouble in Megara and Elis which Demosthenes blamed on Philip's intervention, though this was possibly unjustified.⁷

Yet, despite this apparent negative feeling in Athens,⁸ Philip sent to Athens again at the end of 343 or early 342 for a revision of the peace.⁹ Although he was not prepared to give up Amphipolis to them as they demanded, he was willing to accept a common peace.¹⁰ In addition, he was prepared to submit to arbitration the ownership of the forts in Thrace, to compel the Cardians to submit to arbitration over the Chersonese, and to give the Athenians the island of Halonnesus as a *δωρεῖά*, though it had

¹ [Dem.] 12.6; Dem. 10.34.

² Dem. 19.331; see also [Dem.] 12.20-22.

³ Dem. 19.331.

⁴ Hypereides *Euxen.* 29-30; Dem. 19.114, 116, cf. 145.

⁵ Aeschin. 2.6, 3.79.

⁶ Dem 19; Aeschin. 2; Plut. *Dem.* 15.5; [Plut.] *Vit. X Or.* 840 c.

⁷ Dem. 19.87, 204, 260, 294-5, 326, 334, 9.17-8, 27; 18.71, 295; Paus. 4.28.4; 5.4.9; see Ellis (*Philip II* 151), who believes that Philip probably did not intervene either directly or indirectly; Griffith (*HM* 497-501) sees it as opportunism on Philip's part, rather than casting him as the "arch-initiator"; Cawkwell (*Philip* 126), despite Demosthenes' accusations of directly breaking the peace, suggests that there were a number of occasions, such as these, when Philip broke the spirit, if not the letter, of the peace; see also Cawkwell *CQ* n.s. 13 (1963) 200-5.

⁸ Which, however, must have looked more favourable in the light of Aeschines' acquittal.

⁹ See especially [Dem.] 7, where Hegesippus in turn advises the Athenians as to how they should respond to the letter from Philip; see also Griffith *HM* 510-12.

¹⁰ [Dem.] 7.30-2; [Dem.] 12.20-2.

formerly belonged to them, or at least to submit the question of ownership to arbitration.¹ He also proposed setting up a commercial treaty (*symbola*) between Athens and Macedon, and requested that the Athenians should join Philip in clearing the sea of pirates.² What is more, while disclaiming that he had made any promises of benefits in the past, he assured the Athenians that if they trusted his φίλοι in Athens and punished those who slandered him, he would confer great benefits upon them (ὥς μεγάλα εὐεργετήσει).³ But again the attempt at reconciliation came to nothing. In late 343, suspecting that there would be an end of the peace, the Athenians contracted alliances with the Achaeans, Arcadians, Mantineians, Argives, Megalopolitans and Messenians.⁴

The proposed revision of the peace of Philocrates also demonstrates Philip's skill in manipulating the principles of gift-giving. In 344, Philip found it expedient to patch up the peace with Athens which was still, though only nominally, in operation. Of the two amendments proposed by the Athenians, the one concerning common peace was acceptable to Philip, but the other demanding that each were to have what was their own was not. Philip was to make it abundantly clear that he was not going to relinquish Amphipolis.⁵

In 343/2 it seems that Philip was prepared to make some concessions. Yet it appears that the main issue, and the one on which the others ultimately hinged, was the question of Halonnesus.

¹ [Dem.] 7.2-7 (on Halonnesus, see below), 36-7, 39-44; [Dem.] 12.12-5.

² [Dem.] 7.9-15.

³ [Dem.] 7.33-4.

⁴ Schol. Aeschin. 3.83; IG ii² 225.

⁵ [Dem.] 12.20-1.

Halonnesus

Halonnesus had been an island port of the Athenians in the central Aegean. It had been occupied by the pirate Sostratus, from whom Philip, in turn, wrested it.¹ It was now, Philip claimed, his,² so that in the negotiations of 343/2 Philip was willing to offer the Athenians Halonnesus as a gift, a δωρειά. But the Athenians would not accept it on these terms. They would not receive it as a gift (λαβεῖν), but would only receive back (ἀπολαβεῖν) what had been their own.³ Hegesippus, in his speech to the Athenian assembly, exclaims,

it does not escape him that with both terms, whichever you use, you will have the island, whether you receive it (λαβεῖν), or receive it back (ἀπολαβεῖν). So what is the difference to him, if he does not use the just expression and “gives it back” to you (ἀποδοῦναι), but uses the unjust expression to “have given you a gift” (δωρειά δεδωκέναι)? Not so that some benefaction (εὐεργέτημά τι) might be credited to you (for this benefaction would be laughable), but so that he might show to all the Greeks that the Athenians are happy to receive naval bases from Macedon.⁴

As Hegesippus was well aware, Philip was offering the Athenians a double-edged sword.

The first difficulty had to do with the technicality of receiving the island as a gift or receiving back from him that which was their own. As Hegesippus complains, in either case the Athenians would have the island, so what difference was it going to make? All the difference in the world. For if they received it from Philip as a gift, this would be an admission that it was, in fact, his own property to give away. By extension, this would mean that all territory which Philip had taken from them and from others was his

¹ [Dem.] 12.13. It was later to be occupied by Peparethians, from whom Philip captured it again. The Peparethians then called on the Athenians to demand retribution from Philip ([Dem.] 12.12-5).

² [Dem.] 7.2.

³ [Dem.] 7.5; [Dem.] 12.14.

⁴ [Dem.] 7.5-6.

property. This was not an admission the Athenians could, or would want to, make, and it had a direct bearing upon Amphipolis.

Philip's justification for holding Amphipolis was that the Peace of Philocrates confirmed his right to keep what he held.¹ Later in the same speech, Hegesippus says,

He [Philip] says Amphipolis is his, for you passed a decree that it was his, when you passed the decree that he was to have what he held (ἔχειν αὐτὸν ὃ εἶχεν). You passed this decree, but you did not ever pass a decree that Amphipolis was his. For it is possible to "hold" that which belongs to others, and not all those who "hold" have that which is their own, but many are in possession of that which is another's. So this piece of wisdom of his is silly.²

If then the Athenians accepted that Philip had a right to give away Halonnesus, which he held, as a δωρεῖά, then they must also give up any claim to Amphipolis, as well as any other territory they wished to claim from him. Secondly, if they accepted Philip's gift and took Halonnesus, they would be putting themselves in his debt, despite Hegesippus' ridicule. Peace treaties, like alliances, are a particular kind of "balanced" relationship where each party "gives" the other promises which are returned promise for promise, according to the terms. The stability of such formalised "state friendships" depends upon the giving and receiving being symmetrically equivalent. Hegesippus realised that if they did accept the δωρεῖά, they would be indebted to Philip for a benefaction. What was even more galling is what the acceptance of *this* gift would mean: that Athens, who prided herself on her sea power, would be tacitly accepting Philip's control of the Aegean. Hegesippus claimed that this was Philip's true purpose, that he would be responsible for maintaining Athens' influence in the Aegean, and that the Athenians were happy to accept this as a gift. This would not be a

¹ [Dem.] 7.24-6.

² [Dem.] 7. 26; see also [Dem.] 12.21-2.

balanced relationship. The Athenians would be doubly obligated to Philip, firstly for his δωρεία, and secondly for the control it would restore to them in the central Aegean. But it would only be a nominal control; Philip, as the giver of the gift, would hold the real power.

What is more, Philip was in a morally stronger position. Not only was he willing to submit the matter to arbitration, but the Athenians had also refused to go to arbitration and come to terms. As Philip argued over Amphipolis, the Athenian position was not strong in any case. He says,

If it [Amphipolis] belongs to its original owners, how do we not hold it justly, for my ancestor, Alexander, first occupied the place? Or if someone disputes this, and claims it belongs to those who had control of it later, this also is justice in my favour. For I besieged those who cast you out and accepted the Lacedaemonians as their founders, and captured the place. Indeed we all dwell in cities either inherited from our forefathers, or conquered in war. You neither acquired it first, nor have it now, but having remained in the place for the least time, you claim the city back, and this after giving most secure assurances in our favour.¹

One is left wondering, as Griffith does,² how much Philip truly wanted to be reconciled with Athens, or indeed how much Athens wanted to be reconciled with Philip. His attempts to make peace in 344 were probably quite sincere, whatever his reasons. But by 342 the matter appears in quite a different light. Perhaps weary with their ridiculous demands for Amphipolis, he presented Athens with Halonnesus as a test case. If they accepted the gift, they must relinquish their claims to Amphipolis, Poteidaea, and perhaps the forts in Thrace.

¹ [Dem]. 12.21-2.

² Griffith *HM* 513.

After Chaeronea

In 340, under severe provocation, the Athenians declared war on Philip.¹ The Fourth Sacred war also broke out, when, at a meeting of the Amphictyonic council at Delphi, the Amphissans tried to bring a *dogma* against the Athenians, claiming that they should be fined for affixing golden shields to the new temple at Delphi and dedicating them before the temple had been consecrated.² Aeschines, who was one of the Athenian delegates, replied to the charge by claiming that the Amphissans had broken the oath which had been sworn not to till the plain of Cirrha or rebuild the harbour.³ The Council subsequently brought charges against the Amphissans, and it was decreed that all the *hieromnemes* should assemble at Thermopylae at a designated time with a *dogma* for the punishment of the Amphissans.⁴ When the meeting took place at Thermopylae, war was declared on the Amphissans, and they were ordered to pay a fine by the Pylaea of autumn 339.⁵ The fine was not paid, and the war was placed in Philip's hands on his return from the Scythian campaign.⁶

Thebes seized Nicaea, the town which controlled the pass at Thermopylae, but Philip marched south and avoided Thermopylae by fortifying Cytinium and seizing Elateia in Phocis.⁷ He then sent an embassy

¹ For Philip's activities in the Hellespont, see: (investment of Perinthus) Philochorus *FGrHist* 328 F 54; Diod. 16.74.2-5, 75.1-76.3 (on the date, see Jacoby Supp. I 331); (Persian involvement) Paus. 1.29.10; Arrian 2.14.5; (Philip's first letter) [Dem.] 12; see also Griffith *HM* 714-6; (investment of Byzantium and Selymbria) Diod. 16.76.3; schol. Dem. 18.76; Philochorus *FGrHist* 328 F 54, 162; (capture of corn ships) Dem. 18.139; Justin 9.1.5-8; Theopompus *FGrHist* 115 F 292; (Philip's second letter) Diod. 16.77.2; Philochorus *FGrHist* 328 F 55a, b; schol. Dem. 18.76; cf. Dem. 18.73 & the forgery of Philip's letter 77-8.

² Aeschin. 3.115-6; on problems with the chronology of the Fourth Sacred War, see Ellis *Philip II* 291 n. 31; Griffith *HM* 585-8, 717-9.

³ Aeschin. 3.106-13, 116-21; cf. Dem. 149-50.

⁴ Aeschin. 3.124.

⁵ Aeschin. 3.128-9.

⁶ Aeschin. 3.129; Dem. 18.152.

⁷ Dem. 18.152; Aeschin. 3.140; Philochorus *FGrHist* 328 F 56a, b; Diod. 16.84.1-2; Plut. *Dem.* 18.1; see also Cawkwell (*Philip* 143) for Philip paving the way for entry into Phocis through Elateia by rumours that he would restore and fortify the city.

to Thebes demanding that they hand over Nicaea to the Locrians.¹ Demosthenes urged the Athenians to mobilise all men of military age and to appoint ten envoys to negotiate an alliance with Thebes.² Demosthenes himself went as a member of the embassy.³ Although they found ambassadors from Philip there as well, demanding that the Thebans join Philip in attacking Attica or, at least, giving the Macedonians the right of passage through Boeotia in order to pay back a favour to him (χάριν ἀποδοῦναι), Demosthenes brought Thebes into an alliance with Athens.⁴

In 338, a pitched battle was fought with Philip on the plain near Chaeronea and Philip won the day.⁵ However, he did not march on against Athens as the Athenians themselves expected, but the prisoners returned to Athens with the news that Philip wanted peace.⁶ The Athenians sent a return embassy, which included Aeschines, Demades and possibly Phocion, all of whom were favoured at the Macedonian court.⁷ The settlement was remarkably favourable to the Athenians, but disastrous for Thebes. Thebes itself was to have a Macedonian garrison and Philip installed a government that would be inclined to him from among the Theban exiles.⁸ Oropus was

¹ Philochorus *FGrHist* 328 F 56b.

² Dem. 18.173-8.

³ Dem. 18.179, 211; Plut. *Dem.* 18.1; cf. Diod. 16.85.1 (though see Jacoby Supp. I 332). For this kind of "appropriate connection, see Chapter Four.

⁴ Diod. 16.85.1; Dem. 18.211, 213-4 (on the speech of the Macedonian ambassadors, see below); Plut. *Dem.* 18.1-2; Justin 9.3.5. On Philochorus *FGrHist* 328 F 56, see Jacoby Supp. I 332-3.

Note, in addition, that Demosthenes was the πρόξενος of the Thebans, which would have facilitated negotiations (Aeschin. 2.141, 143). The alliance that was formed was advantageous to Thebes: it repudiated all former support for the autonomy of the Boeotian cities; Thebes was given the command by land and shared the command at sea, but only asked to pay a third of the costs, the war council was to be located on the Cadmeia in Thebes (Aeschin. 3.141-5, cf. 106); but see also Mosley *Historia* 20 (1971) 508-10.

⁵ Diod. 16.86.1-6; Polyaeus 4.2.2, 7; Plut. *Dem.* 19.2; Plut. *Alex.* 9.2; on Lebedeia, see Ellis *Philip II* 294 n. 68.

⁶ Diod. 16.87; Polybius 5.10.1-5; Justin 9.4.6; cf. [Demades] *On the Twelve Years* 9.

⁷ Aeschin. 3.227; Suidas s.v. Demades (Δ 415); Dem. 18.282-5; [Demades] *On the Twelve Years* 9-10; see also Hypereides F 76; cf. Justin 9.4.1-5 (on this, see Griffith *HM* 605 n. 4). On the reception of this embassy, see Theopompus *FGrHist* 115 F 236; Plut. *Mor.* 715 c. On Phocion as a possible member of the embassy, see Plut. *Phoc.* 17.6; Nepos *Phoc.* 1.3, but this is not conclusive evidence for the appointment (see Appendix C: *Athenian Presbeis* 366).

⁸ Diod. 16.87.3; Justin 9.4.6-9.

taken from the Boeotians and given to the Athenians.¹ The Athenian naval league was dissolved, but her ownership of Lemnos, Imbros and Scyros was confirmed and also Delos and Samos.² Most significantly, Athens retained her freedom.³

In 337, Philip summoned ambassadors from all the Greek states to attend a meeting at Corinth.⁴ Representatives came from all the Greek states except Sparta.⁵ Philip called for a common peace, which was accepted.⁶ Probably at another meeting of the league,⁷ Philip himself was elected στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ, and plans were discussed for a Persian campaign.⁸

Philip returned home and began preparations for a Persian War, and married a Macedonian woman, Cleopatra.⁹ He then gave his daughter by Olympias, the mother of Alexander, in marriage to Olympias' brother, Alexander king of Epirus, at Aegae.¹⁰ However, at the celebrations after this wedding Philip was struck down and killed by a certain Pausanias at the entrance to the theatre.¹¹ So came the untimely end of Philip of Macedon, ruler in deed, if not name, of all mainland Greece.

Although his death came too soon to show what he would have made of his position in Greece, Philip's subsequent settlement of Greece after Chaeronea suggests that he was setting up a situation not unlike that which he had wanted in 346. In 338, however, Athens was neither in a position to deny him, nor did she want to, so great was the Athenians' relief that they had escaped so lightly.

¹ Paus. 1.34.1; schol. Dem. 18.99; [Demades] *On the Twelve Years* 9.

² Paus. 1.25.3, [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 61.6, 62.2; Diod. 18.56.6-7.

³ Paus. 7.10.5.

⁴ Justin 9.5.1; Diod. 16.89.3; see also Plut. *Phoc.* 16.5.

⁵ Plut. *Mor.* 240 a; Strabo 8 c 365; Justin 9.5.3.

⁶ Plut. *Phoc.* 16.5; Justin 9.5.2. For the terms of the peace, see IG ii² 23 b (= Tod 177); [Dem.] 17.4, 8, 10, 15, 16, 19, 26. On the common peace, see Ryder *Koine Eirene* 150-4.

⁷ See Griffith *HM* 626-8.

⁸ Diod. 16.89.3; Justin 9.5.4-5.

⁹ Satyrus *ap.* Athen. 13. 557 b-d; Plut. *Alex.* 9.6-7; cf. Beloch *G.G.*² 3.2.70-1.

¹⁰ Diod. 16.91.4.

¹¹ Diod. 16.92-94.

In contrast to Thebes, which was garrisoned, Athens was privileged by Philip's treatment of her. Though her naval empire was broken up, Philip left her free and in possession of Oropus and the islands. The Athenian reaction was joyful gratitude. The speech *On the Twelve Years*, written in the name of Demades, is a late composition, but it is true to fourth-century attitudes when it says:

I admit it. I also decreed honours for Philip. I do not deny it ... but the bribery (δωροδοκία) of the Macedonians did not take hold of the hand that drafted it, as those liars say, but the opportunity, the need, the interest of my country and the generosity (φιλανθρωπία) of the king. For he entered the danger as an enemy (ἐχθρός) but has come out of the struggles as a φίλος, conferring upon the conquered the prize of those who have won.¹

The ἐχθρός had become φίλος through his benefactions. From being the recipient of a "negative" reciprocity, Philip, by honouring the Athenians rather than vanquishing them, was again to be the recipient of a "positive" reciprocity.

Philip did not retain his favoured position long. When he summoned the Greeks to form the League of Corinth, the Athenians agreed, though not without the misgivings of some. Plutarch writes that

Phocion thought that it was necessary to accept the other policy and generosity of Philip, but when Demades decreed that the city should take part in the common peace and the synod of the Greeks, he tried not to allow it before they knew what Philip would demand the Greeks do for him. But his opinion was overridden because of the situation. When he saw that the Athenians were repenting because it was necessary to provide triremes and cavalry units for Philip, he said, "I feared this and opposed you, but since you have agreed, you must not bear it badly nor be down-hearted, remembering that your forefathers both ruled and were ruled, but acting nobly in both situations, they saved the city and the Greeks."²

¹ [Demades] *On the Twelve Years* 9-10; compare Diod. 16.89.2, where Diodorus says that through his goodwill (εὐνοία) – though here it is a promise to punish the Persians for their transgressions against the temples – Philip made the Greeks "his own" (ἴδιοι).

² Plut. *Phoc.* 16.5-7.

There was a cost to making Philip a φίλος. He did not give gifts for nothing. On his death, Plutarch says the Athenians offered sacrifices for the good tidings.¹ This was their response to the man who had “entered the danger as an enemy (ἐχθρός) but come out of the struggles as φίλος”, for he did not give away prizes of victory without expecting a just return.

Gift-giving and Bribery

Philip was well known for his gifts to ambassadors, and allegations of bribery were rife against those who lent their assistance to Philip, albeit at a price.² Not only were Philocrates and Aeschines charged with bribery at Athens, but Demosthenes alleges that the Olynthians, Lasthenes and Euthykrates, also received gifts in return for betraying their city.³ Mecyberna, Torone, and later Megara and Elis, were also allegedly won through bribery, and, in his speech *On the Crown*, Demosthenes put together a black list of traitors among the cities.⁴ Diodorus sums up the situation when he says,

Not even the city [of Demosthenes] was able to keep in check the citizens in their impulse for treachery; for such a rush of traitors had appeared at that time in Greece. Thus they say that whenever Philip wished to take a city excelling in its strength and one of the inhabitants said it could not be taken by force, he asked if not even gold would be able to scale the wall. For he had learned by experience that what was impossible to subdue with arms, was easy to conquer with gold. So, cultivating traitors in the cities by gift-receiving (δωροδοκίαι) and calling those who received the gold ξένοι and φίλοι, he corrupted the morals of men by his wicked dealings.⁵

¹ Plut. *Phoc.* 16.8.

² Though as de Ste. Croix notes (*The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World* 298-9), following Markle (*JHS* 96 (1976) 80-99, esp. 98-9), there were others, such as the oligarchs and intellectuals in Athens, who would have been ready to support Philip without any persuasion.

³ Dem. 19.265; cf. Diod. 16.53.2.

⁴ Diod. 16.53.2; Dem. 18.295 (the “black list”), 19.260; Paus. 4.28.4.

⁵ Diod. 16.54.2-4.

This raises two issues: the relationship between gift-giving and bribery; and their relationship to ξενία and φιλία.

To begin with it is necessary to try to understand the Greek view of bribery.¹ The language of bribery and gift exchange is similar in some aspects, particularly in relation to δῶρον and its cognates, which means both a "gift" and a "bribe".² As Perlman has demonstrated, the classical Greek view of bribery was different from our own twentieth-century notions. He says,

Though it is pointed out that bribery is a malpractice, the prevailing attitude was that accepting bribes is a crime only when it is connected with activity detrimental to the city. Even the wording and the interpretation of the νόμος εἰσαγγελτικός indicate that it is bribe-taking resulting in treason or activities harmful to the state which should be punished. Accusations of bribery are, therefore, always connected with accusations of treachery, thus turning into political trials in which the accusation of bribery serves to bring forward conflicting political views and to decide political conflicts between opposing political parties.³

As Harvey has shown, the evidence does not suggest that other kinds of bribery were condoned,⁴ but that the Athenians regarded

taking bribes against the interests of the state as being particularly heinous (indeed it was only this type of *doron* that was actually illegal), and this attitude was not confined to the late fourth century, but can be discerned in the fifth century as well.⁵

¹ For a discussion of bribery in elections and in the law-courts, see Staveley *Greek and Roman Voting and Elections* 108-13.

² Harvey *Crux* 82-3; Herman *Ritualised Friendship* 73-81, esp. 75-9.

³ Perlman *GR&BS* 17 (1976) 224.

⁴ On the punishment for bribery, see [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 54.2; Deinarchus 1.60, 2.17; Hypereides *Contra Dem.* col. 24; see also Rhodes *Comm.* 599.

⁵ Harvey *Crux* 76-117, esp. 112. See Dem. 19.7, 21.113. For the Athenians' willingness to interpret failure of their magistrates as guilt, especially of bribery, see Roberts *Accountability in Athenian Government* 9-10.

What is more, Harvey points to the major weakness in this view of "catapolitical" bribery, that is, that it relies upon a subjective judgement of what is the best for the state.¹ As Harvey says,

Some things – for example, the annihilation of oneself and all the inhabitants of one's *polis* – were obviously undesirable, and policies unmistakably leading to such results were clearly catapolitical. But outside this area, and the corresponding area of uncontroversial benefits, practically anything might be asserted to be for or against the interests of the *polis*. A politician might have sincerely believed that it was advisable for Athens to be on good terms with Philip of Macedon, and might have taken money from Philip to persuade the Athenians to pursue a pro-Macedonian policy. Demosthenes of course would have attacked this as 'taking money against the interests of the city'; his opponent would have retorted that, on the contrary, it was *in* the interests of the city.²

What may be seen as legitimately receiving gifts by one man, may be condemned as bribery by another.

Particular problems arose when Greeks came into contact with the courts of kings. Perlman concludes that

There is ample evidence ... that the offering of gifts to ambassadors was part of the reception of embassies at the courts of kings of Persia and Macedon. The acceptance of these customary gifts was also a sign of proper diplomatic relations ... Though there may have been general consensus that there was no harm in accepting customary gifts, this may have served as an excuse for accusations of accepting bribes by ambassadors.³

Thus the connection between receiving gifts and receiving bribes is problematic. In the same way, the establishment of a relationship based upon a gift exchange, such as ξενία, may be seen as either innocent or

¹ Harvey *Crux* 112-3; see also Herman *Ritualised Friendship* 76-8.

² Harvey *Crux* 112-3.

³ Perlman *GR&BS* 17 (1976) 228; for the Persian attitude to gifts in relation to the Greek attitude to bribery, see Lewis *REA* 91 (1989) 227-235.

treacherous, depending on whether or not it is perceived to be against the interests of the community.¹

Diodorus writes that those who received bribes from Philip were called his φίλοι and ξένοι.² Demosthenes also refers to those who are the traitors in the *poleis* as those who consider themselves worthy to be called φίλοι and ξένοι of Philip,³ and brags that he himself did not ever prefer the δῶρα and ξενία of Philip to the common advantage of the Greeks.⁴ But ξενία itself was a complex relationship which entailed certain rights and obligations. By the act of receiving gifts from Philip and entering into a ξενία relationship, these supposed traitors were also signing themselves up for these rights, duties and obligations. Just as Philip could expect certain things from them on the basis of this relationship, they could also now have similar expectations of him.

Philip and Aeschines

This leads us to the question of Aeschines' conduct in 346. First of all, was Aeschines duped, or was he bribed and party to the whole plot?⁵ The

¹ Though compare Dem. 19.7.

² Diod. 16.54.4; see also [Dem.] 7.17. Compare Phocion, who was admired by Philip, according to Plutarch, and made the φίλος and ξένος of Alexander (Plut. *Phoc.* 17.6-9), but was said to have refused money (munera magnae pecuniae) offered to him by the ambassadors of Philip (Nepos *Phoc.* 1.3).

³ Dem. 19.294-5.

⁴ Dem. 18.109.

⁵ Griffith (*HM* 344-6): "Of actual duplicity in the conduct of the formal exchanges with the *demos* Philip must certainly be acquitted", though he does concede that Philip sent the ambassadors back home ignorant of his plans. Of the ambassadors themselves, Griffith writes: "The positive encouragements were given by those ambassadors who had become his agents whether wittingly or not ... Whether from conviction, or for money, or from despair and fear of the possible consequences to themselves if they were to tell nothing but the truth, they still fed the optimism of the *demos* up to the very moment, it seems, when the news came from the north that Phalaecus had surrendered Thermopylae and that Philip 'had given the Thebans a free hand'." Ellis *Philip II* (101-3): Philip was serious (see also Markle *CQ* n.s. 24 (1974) 254 & n. 1); Cawkwell (*Philip* 105-6, 123): Aeschines was not bribed nor did he actually make any "promises", though he reported to the assembly "various encouraging conversations" (see also Cawkwell *CQ* n.s. 13 (1963) 204: "there is no reason to believe that Aeschines' policy was in any way due to corruption."). Though perhaps of little real value, it is of interest that Philocrates was also impeached for bribery, and fled before the case came to trial, so condemning himself to death (Dem. 19.114, 116-9, 145; Hypereides *Euxen.* 29-30;

answer seems to lie somewhere in between. Though Demosthenes can produce little positive evidence, and even this is probably worthless,¹ it would appear that Aeschines did receive gifts from Philip.² The strongest evidence for this, in the light of what has been discussed above, is the references by Demosthenes to the bribes themselves being given as ξένια and to the ξένια between Aeschines and Philip. First of all, Demosthenes says of the second embassy,

While we were there sitting about in Pella, consider what each of us chose to do. I to seek out and rescue the prisoners, and both to spend my own money and to ask Philip to ransom the prisoners from the ξένια he gave us. But you will hear now what Aeschines kept on trying to bring off. And what was this? For Philip to give us money all together in common! So that you may not be ignorant, this man sounded us all out. In what way? By sending to each one in private, O men of Athens, and giving much gold. And since he was unlucky in some cases (for it is not necessary for me to speak of myself, but the deeds themselves and what has been done will make it clear), he considered that what had been given in common could be received good-naturedly. Thus there would be security for those who had sold themselves in private, if we all shared even a little of what had been received in common. He gave it in this way, and using ξένια as the pretext! When I prevented this, they divided it up again among themselves.³

The important point to gain from this is that the “bribes” were, even notionally, offered as ξένια. As discussed above, giving gifts to ambassadors was a customary part of the ritual associated with receiving ambassadors at

Aeschin. 2.6, 3.79, 81). Demosthenes claims that Philocrates openly admitted to accepting “bribes”, and Aeschines implies that he did; though this possibly holds little weight considering that both had formerly approved the Peace of Philocrates, and were now trying desperately to distance themselves from him and it.

¹ Dem. 19.145 refers to houses, grain, timber (on this as “unreliable evidence” for bribery, see Harvey *Crux* 94), and an estate in Thrace worth thirty minas a year, which, as Griffith points out, is at least specific (*HM* 337 n. 4).

² Compare Cawkwell *Philip* 123: “Philip certainly offered gifts to ambassadors quite openly, but this was probably conventional, though the Thebans ostentatiously refused them. No serious evidence for the wild allegations against Aeschines was ever advanced and his policy is wholly explicable without recourse to the hypothesis of bribery.”

³ Dem. 19.166-8. Notice that this is one of the accusations for which Demosthenes is able to produce witnesses.

the Macedonian court, so it was not unusual that Philip should give gifts to the Athenian ambassadors. Ambassadors to Athens also received ξένια, though this was only a state dinner party in the *prytaneion*, and Demosthenes arranged for front row seats in the theatre for the Macedonian ambassadors.¹ The difficulty lies in the spirit in which the ambassadors received them, and this is essentially what Demosthenes is attacking. He has no objection to the ξένια, he says, if they are to be used for the ransoming of the prisoners, but if the ambassadors are to become creatures of Philip (and this is what he claims they are to be) and act in his interests and not in the interests of Athens, then they are traitors, and the ξένια are not gifts, but bribes.

Secondly, Aeschines claimed to have a ξένια with Philip and Alexander, and complains that Demosthenes taunts him with this.² Demosthenes' reply is telling. He says in his speech *On the Crown*,

Indeed he [Aeschines] calls it φιλία and ξένια, and just now spoke of "the man who reproaches me for my ξένια with Alexander." I reproach you for a ξένια with Alexander? Where did you get it? Or how were you worthy of it? I would not say you are the ξένος or φίλος of Philip and Alexander – I am not so crazy – unless I must also call the harvesters who do something for pay φίλοι and ξένοι of those who hire them. But this is impossible. How could it be? Far from it. But I call you the hired-hand first of Philip and now of Alexander, and all these men do as well. And if you don't believe me, ask them, or rather, I will do it for you. Men of Athens, do you think that Aeschines is the hired-hand of Alexander or his ξένος? You hear what they say.³

Demosthenes claims that there is a clear difference between a ξένος and a paid traitor. Again, in the same speech, he says,

As soon as news of the battle was announced, thinking nothing of what had gone before, you admitted straight away, or even laid claim to, a φιλία and ξένια between yourself and Philip, having

¹ Aeschin. 2.110-1, 3.76.

² Aeschin. 3.66; Dem. 18.284.

³ Dem. 18.51-2.

swapped these names for “paid labour” (μισθαρνία). For from what kind of equality and justice could Philip admit to being the ξένος, φίλος or even acquaintance (γνώριμος) of Aeschines the son of Glaucotea, the drummer-girl? I do not see it, but you were paid to destroy the best interests of these men.¹

In both these passages the idea of ξενία is contrasted with payment to harm the interests of the state. Yet again, in his speech *On the False Embassy*, Demosthenes accuses Aeschines of valuing his ξενία and φιλία with Philip above the state.² For Demosthenes, ideas of receiving gifts and establishing ξενίαι are bound up with ideas of bribery. As he makes plain, one of the main issues is whether or not it was against the interest of the state.

Demosthenes also points to another important factor in such ξενίαι, that is that they should have been based upon equality. One of the hallmarks of the ξενία relationship in classical Greece is its equality at all levels. Not only was the relationship itself a balanced relationship, where roughly *equal* “payment” was made by *both* parties, but, for the relationship to work effectively, the individuals involved should also have been of *equal* social rank and influence. This was manifestly not the case between Philip and Aeschines. The main difference between the two men was that Philip politically had the upper hand. He could betray the relationship when he had achieved what he wanted from it. This inequality is most clearly demonstrated by the fact that Aeschines pursued the relationship, as Demosthenes tells us, after Chaeronea with the full knowledge that he had been used. The point about 346, however, is that he obviously did not realise that this inequality existed, whereas Philip did.

If Aeschines did accept gifts from Philip and establish a ξενία relationship with him, as it seems was the case, what then are the implications of this for the events of 346? As well as giving him gifts, Philip

¹ Dem. 18.284.

² Dem. 19.248.

also gave Aeschines certain assurances in secret,¹ of which he seems to have had other confirmation, that Thebes would be diminished and the Phocians saved. All the indications would have been that Philip was going to do as he said. Not only had Philip told him that things would be so, but some of Philip's *hetairoi* had confirmed it, and even the Thebans were unsure what was happening.² As Philip's ξένοϛ, it was Aeschines' obligation to look after the interests of Philip, just as Philip should look after his. This does not mean, however, that Aeschines would, or in fact did, put the interests of his ξένοϛ before the interests of his *polis*, as Demosthenes claimed he did. It may have seemed that he could advantage both ξένοϛ and *polis* through the relationship. This is the risk that Aeschines took, based upon the reciprocal obligation of his ξένοϛ to do as he had said he would. For if things did not work out as they should, and the assurances Aeschines made to the Athenians for his ξένοϛ were not actually fulfilled, then he could face charges of bribery; which he did. But Aeschines would have had no reason to suspect his ξένοϛ and every reason to expect that his ξένοϛ would keep his word, so the risk may have seemed very remote at the time.

Philip: Balanced and Negative Reciprocity

But what of Philip? Why did he behave as he did? The simplest explanation is because it worked. The Greeks were taken in time and again by this same ploy of giving gifts to establish a relationship of trust, which Philip could then choose to betray or not, as it suited him. So why were the Greeks, and especially the sophisticated Athenians, duped? Were they really so naïve?

¹ Aeschines denied the charge, rather unconvincingly, that he had held secret talks with Philip, which Demosthenes declares the ambassadors had been forbidden to do, though such secret private negotiations may have been interpreted as doing "whatever good thing they could" (Dem. 19.175-6, 278; Aeschin. 2.124-7).

² Aeschin. 2.137.

There are a number of reasons why the Athenians were so easily deceived. Firstly, Philip always told the Athenians things they wanted to hear. It would have been easy to believe that Philip would hand over Amphipolis when that is exactly what they wanted. Again, in 346 it would have been easy to believe that the Phocians would be saved, the Thebans crushed and the Athenians' place in central Greece secured by their friendship with Philip, since that was the thing they really needed to happen.

Secondly, Philip was always in the superior position; one can afford not to honour one's promises with the subsequent loss of τιμή when one has τιμή in excess of everyone else, or when the loss of a certain amount of personal honour would result in an increase in power on a wider scale. Though we tend to write of Philip as a king, it is uncertain whether Philip himself ever used the title βασιλεύς.¹ But he was not a king of the same kind as the Persian King, nor were his ancestors, who were never even as powerful as Philip became. It must have been very difficult for the Greeks to assess his relative strength at any one time or to know what to make of him. When they had positive proof of his strength and influence, there was little that the Athenians could do to prevent him. Not only was the north too far away for them to react spontaneously,² but the Athenians did not have the power or resources to stop him.

On a more personal level, in his ξενία with Aeschines, the implicit assumption in the relationship in order for it to work was that it was equal. As Demosthenes jeered, Aeschines was no equal for the Macedonian king.

¹ For the debate on how early the Macedonian monarchs took the title βασιλεύς, see, most recently, the exchange between Hammond and Badian, based on the probability of the restoration πρὸς βασιλέα in an inscription which is possibly to be dated early in Alexander's reign: Hammond *CQ* n.s. 38 (1988) 382-91; Badian *ZPE* 79 (1989) 64-70; Hammond *ZPE* 82 (1990) 167-75; Badian *ZPE* 95 (1993) 131-9; Hammond *ZPE* 100 (1994) 385-7; Badian *ZPE* 100 (1994) 388-90.

² There were many times when the Athenians simply arrived too late (Dem. 4.35).

The relationship was not just socially unequal, but there was also inequality in personal strength and capability. When Philip betrayed his ξενία, there was nothing that Aeschines could do, except to hang off the coat tails of his patron.

Thirdly, and most fundamentally, the Athenians did not appreciate the subtleties of their dealings with Philip, just as the Greeks generally failed to understand or appreciate the subtleties of dealing with cultures which did not operate within the same ethical and value systems. Philip operated within a gift-giving culture where the giving of a gift brought one into a relationship where there was an expectation of a return. That much would have been clear. The Persians and Thracians also operated along similar lines. But the giving and receiving of gifts could take place between unequals, such as a king and his subjects, as well as between equals. The Greeks also gave gifts, but generally within the context of ξενία, which was in the classical period a balanced relationship between equals.¹

There are two ways of looking at the relationships between Philip and the Athenians and Philip and Aeschines. Firstly, Philip made certain gifts to Aeschines in order to establish what was supposedly an equal and balanced relationship of ξενία, and made certain assurances to the Athenians. However, when Philip summoned the Athenians to Thermopylae in 346 “to come with all your forces to give help to those who were just”,² the Athenians decided not to go. Thus, on the one hand, Aeschines could be seen to have broken his side of the bargain, and made the whole void, and on the other, the Athenians had not responded with the “initial gift”, so there was to be no relationship and no benefits forthcoming.

¹ At least in its most basic sense. As has been discussed above, this could also be exploited in various ways.

² Aeschin. 2.137.

If one stopped here, this would, I think, lead to the view held by Markle and Ellis, who see that Philip had two alternatives: Philip made the assurances to the Athenians in all earnestness, but when they did not come when he summoned them, he had an alternative plan to defeat the Phocians with the support of Thebes, and simply put this into action instead.¹ However, I think there is another possibility which is more consistent with Philip's earlier dealings with the Athenians.

But first, there is a certain theoretical background which needs to be understood. As has been said, gift-giving within a Greek context was generally a balanced relationship conducted between equals where the gifts exchanged were also commensurate. In addition, on the Greek model of society, one is defined as friend or foe by whether one belongs to a friendship network or not, but other societies were based upon other divisions. So when a Greek in this period drew someone into the network of reciprocal exchange, or *φιλία*, or believed that he had done so, then he interacted with them in terms of generalised or balanced reciprocity, depending on the degree of friendship. Thus when the Athenians yielded Amphipolis up to Philip in exchange for Pydna, or Aeschines made certain promises to the Athenians on Philip's behalf as his *ξένος*, they would have understood the relationship to be operating on the basis of a balanced reciprocity. Philip, on the other hand, well aware that this is how they understood the relationship, responded by behaving in a negatively reciprocal way, that is, getting the most that he could with the least loss to himself. Philip set up an *expectation* of a balanced relationship, but actually operated in a negative way. He was in the position where he could imply that he had established equal and balanced relationships when this suited his needs. When such relationships were no longer advantageous to

¹ Markle CQ n.s. 24 (1974) 253-68; Ellis *Philip II* 113-20.

himself, he could exploit his actual superiority in the relationship,¹ and simply disregard it. Similarly, in his ξενία with Aeschines, Philip set up the expectation of an equal relationship, by the very fact that it was a ξενία. Yet, it was not truly an equal relationship and Philip did not conduct it on equal terms. Aeschines had every reason to expect that Philip would keep up his side of the bargain, but Philip simply did not.

Again, in 342, when Philip was negotiating with the Athenians for a revision of the peace of 346, he was able to play with the Athenians and their ideas of gift-giving; offering them a gift they did not want to accept, since, they claimed, it was not his to give. Acceptance, or non-acceptance, of his terms would put the Athenians in a position they did not want to be in: either they must forsake Halonnesus, the Thracian forts and chances of common peace altogether, or effectually give up all claim to Amphipolis, Poteidaea and the Chersonese. It would seem that Philip was mocking them with his semantic dexterity.

It was the Athenians' failure to understand that he would or could do this that led to their undoing. That is not to say that an Athenian could not act in a similar way – in fact it seems that Alcibiades did so in his treatment of Endius in 420² – but that this was acting in a manner contrary to their general cultural expectations. What must have been galling for the Athenians was the fact that they were not in a position to retaliate in an equally negative manner.

Philip and the Athenians – an Experiment in Social Dysfunction

To conclude, the interaction between Philip and the Greeks, and particularly the Athenians, can be understood in terms of a social

¹ Which was highlighted by the fact that he could actually get away with it.

² See Endnote 2.

dysfunction, a misunderstanding of the true nature of the relationship. This is not simply a clash between two different cultures, it is a difference in understanding which was engineered and exploited by Philip. Philip led the Athenians to believe that they were entering into an equal and balanced relationship with him, and he then exploited their expectations to lull them into a false sense of security and inactivity. On the level of personal relationships, he contracted *ξενία* with certain ambassadors who were sent to him, again creating a certain expectation of the relationship, as he did with Aeschines. When Philip chose not to honour the relationship, Aeschines was left open to charges of bribery – the risk he took when he contracted such a personal relationship – because the formation of such a relationship, and the receiving of gifts which is part of its formation, could be interpreted as bribery if it was commonly perceived that the relationship was formed against the interests of the state, whether it actually was or not.

The problem with the Athenians' dealings with Philip was not so much that they were too stupid or too naïve, but that he was too clever. He understood the ambiguities of their social constructs and was able to manipulate this for his own ends. Not only did the Athenians fail to appreciate these, but, when they did understand, it was too late and there was nothing they could do to stop him.

Chapter Eight: Conclusion

“Ἦδε ἡ τελευταία, ὃν Ἐχέκρατες, τοῦ ἐταίρου ἡμῖν ἐγένετο, ἀνδρός, ὡς ἡμεῖς
φοῖμεν ἄν, τῶν τότε ὧν ἐπειράθημεν ἀρίστου καὶ ἄλλως φρονιμωτάτου καὶ
δικαιοτάτου.

Plato *Phaedo* 118.

Friendship was important in the Greek world, not just socially, but also politically. Indeed the models for social friendships were adapted to suit the needs of political relationships. What this thesis has set out to do is to show that in inter-*polis* affairs, friendships played an important part in the creation and execution of foreign policy; and particularly in the years 435 to 336 BC.

We began by looking at what friendship in the Greek world was, and we saw that, principally, the Greeks saw their world divided into two camps: friends and enemies. At the heart of friendship there was also an embedded ideology of reciprocity – giving for a return. This, in turn, could be broken down into generalised, balanced and negative reciprocity, and correlated with groups of friends, so that φίλοι (members of the household, companions, associates and ξένοι) experienced positive reciprocity, while enemies, ἐχθροί, experienced negative reciprocity. In contrast to other models of friendship and reciprocity, those from outside the community were not considered, *per se*, to be enemies, but could become friends through institutions such as ξενία.

On a state level, friendship could be institutionalised in the form of προξενία. In this way, an individual and a state could enter into a relationship with each other. Just as with social friendships, these essentially political – or politicised – relationships, were also built upon reciprocal exchange, and *poleis* generally awarded προξενία in return for services rendered and in the expectation of services in the future. However,

although πρόξενοι were the official friends in other states, they were by no means the only φίλοι through whom *poleis* dealt with each other, but there were a wide range of other friendship networks through which *poleis* could interact.

Racial kinship could be a sufficient excuse for one *polis* to involve itself in the affairs of another. There were also groups in states which were sympathetic to other states, either because of a general ideological belief in a form of government, or because another, more powerful state would help them enforce one kind of political régime or another.

Yet there were also more personal contacts. Political groups in different *poleis* could contact each other through personal friends, and influence political activity in each other's *polis* through these links. We have a number of specific examples of such personal contacts, and the Spartan kings, in particular, cultivated and made use of such connections. What is more, these friendship links were particularly important when *poleis* had to deal with states on the outer-edges of their world.

We observed, however, that Sparta used such connections in inter-*polis* relationships more than Athens did, and that this was consistent with their different styles of politics. An oligarchy, by its nature largely aristocratic, would have, and would be willing to make use of connections which had risen out of the ancient aristocratic networks of friends. Democratic Athens, though using them to a lesser degree, did not feel that the ethos of these aristocratic connections was incompatible to her own ideals. Instead, when she did use them, she tended to adapt them to her more democratic needs; that is, it was not only the aristocrats who now formed such connections, but anyone could, and some did in order to pursue their political careers.

Such connections could be particularly relevant for magisterial appointments. Not only were ambassadors appointed on the basis of

friendships in other states, but there is also evidence that military commanders, *symbouloi*, and *oikistai* were as well. Oath-takers, on the other hand, were generally public officials who represented a cross-section of the community, and, although there is some evidence in the fourth century that Spartan *Nauarchoi* were selected for their connections, this does not seem to be the case in the fifth century. Again, the numbers of Spartans selected for magisterial appointments because of their personal connections were significantly higher than for their counter-parts in Athens. This provides an interesting, though not surprising, insight into the democratic and oligarchic styles of government, because it demonstrates that even in a democracy of the classical period such connections were influential at this level, but that an oligarchy used these more.

But Greeks did not only have to deal with other Greeks with the same cultural expectations. Because of the Greeks' internal wars, Persia became involved. The Athenians, in particular, also had interests in Thrace, and Philip of Macedon expanded his power and influence south into central Greece in the fourth century.

These non-Greeks and fringe-Greeks did not always work within the same cultural framework as the Greeks of the south. They did not necessarily consider friendship and reciprocal relationships in the same light as the Greeks, and the Greeks themselves did not appreciate this, and so relations between Greeks and non-Greeks often became strained and broke down owing to these cultural misunderstandings. This socio-political dysfunction came to a head with Philip of Macedon, who understood these differences all too well and exploited them for his own ends.

* * *

This is not the last word on this subject, and there are many other questions which could be pursued, but not within the constraints of a three-year thesis. To begin with, the time period could, and should, be expanded. If we go backwards in time, it would be interesting to see how such friendship connections were involved in the development of the *polis*, and the democratic *polis* in particular. If we go forwards in time, through the life of Alexander into the Hellenistic period, it would be thought-provoking to apply similar kinds of questions to those I have asked for the classical period to a Greek world dominated by Macedon, and to a Hellenistic world ruled by a Greco-Macedonian elite (indeed, what was a "Greco-Macedonian" culture going to be?).

More work could be done on defining social relationships in the classical period, both within the *oikos*, considering not so much the rôle of gender, but the limits of who was "inside" and who was "outside", when being inside mattered and when it did not; and the political significance of such questions (the structure of the *oikos* in the Homeric period is clear enough, but in the classical period, was the wife inside or outside, or even on loan to the *oikos*?).

On specific questions, in Athens an explanation of the apparently non-hereditary political leadership of ῥήτορες in contrast to the hereditary nature of the στρατηγοί may be found in personal connections. We should also look more closely at the concept of patriotism in the classical period. Demosthenes certainly knew what he thought patriotism was (or what it ought to be), but as I have tried to show, questions of loyalty were not always straightforward.

So this is not an ending. I hope it will be a beginning. Φίλοι in the Greek world, especially in international relationships, were important; but the questions of who one's friends were, and how one should respond to

them, were not always obvious. Beware of Greeks bearing gifts? Or let the Greeks beware.

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Endnote 1

Thucydides, the Athenian πρόξενος at Pharsalus (Th. 8.92.8)

Thucydides, the Athenian πρόξενος at Pharsalus, presents a difficulty, as it is unclear exactly what relation he may have had to other Pharsalians who are roughly contemporaneous and what his position was at Athens. I have set out the relevant evidence below:

A. *Thucydides*

a) Th. 8.92.8.

μόλις δὲ τῶν τε πρεσβυτέρων διακωλύοντων τοὺς ἐν ἄστει διαθέοντας καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ὄπλα φερομένους καὶ Θουκυδίδου τοῦ Φαρσαλίου τοῦ προξένου τῆς πόλεως παρόντος καὶ προθύμως ἐμποδῶν τε ἐκάστοις γιγνομένου καὶ ἐπιβοωμένου μὴ ἐφεδρευόντων ἐγγὺς τῶν πολεμίων ἀπολέσαι τὴν πατρίδα, ἡσύχασάν τε καὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν ἀπέσχοντο.

b) Androtion *FGrHist* 324 F 57 (= Marcellinus *Vit. Thuc.* 28).

μὴ ἀγνοῶμεν δὲ ὅτι ἐγένοντο Θουκυδίδαι πολλοί, οὗτός τε ὁ Ὀλόρου παῖς· καὶ δεύτερος δημαγωγός, Μελησίου, ὃς καὶ Περικλεῖ διεπολιτεύσατο· τρίτος δὲ γένει Φαρσάλιος, οὗ μέμνηται Πολέμων ἐν τοῖς περὶ Ἀκροπόλεως, φάσκων αὐτὸν εἶναι πατρὸς Μένωνος.

c) Schol. B Ar. *Wasps* 947.

Θουκυδίδης Μελησίου υἱός, Περικλεῖ ἀντιπολιτευσάμενος· τέσσαρες δὲ εἰσι Θουκυδίδαι Ἀθηναῖοι· ἱστοριογράφος καὶ ὁ Γαργήτιος καὶ ὁ Θετταλὸς καὶ οὗτος, ῥήτωρ ἄριστος τυγχάνων ... ἐξωστρακίσθη.

d) Schol. C Ar. *Wasps* 947: Koster's text, which differs from that of Androtion *FGrHist* 324 F 37.

... ὁ γενόμενος ὀστρακισμὸς ἐμφαίνει τὸν Μελησίου. Θεόπομπος μέντοι ὁ ἱστορικὸς τὸν Πανταίνου φησὶν ἀντὶ τούτου ἀντιπολιτεύσασθαι Περικλεῖ· ἀλλ' οὐκ Ἀνδροτίων, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸς τὸν Μελησίου καὶ τὸν ὀστρακισθέντα.

B. Menon

a) Th. 2.22.3.

ἡ δὲ βοήθεια αὕτη τῶν Θεσσαλῶν κατὰ τὸ παλαιὸν ξυμκαχικὸν ἐγένετο τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, καὶ ἀφίκοντο παρ' αὐτοῦς Λαρισαῖοι, Φαρσάλιοι, Πειράσιοι*, Κραννώνιοι, Πυράσιοι, Γυρτώνιοι, Φεραῖοι. ἡγοῦντο δὲ αὐτῶν ἐκ μὲν Λαρίσης Πολυμήδης καὶ Ἀριστόνους, ἀπὸ τῆς στάσεως ἑκάτερος, ἐκ δὲ Φαρσάλου Μένων· ἦσαν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κατὰ πόλεις ἄρχοντες.

b) Dem. 23.199.¹

ἐκεῖνοι Μένωνι τῷ Φαρσαλίῳ δώδεκα μὲν τάλαντ' ἀγυρίου δόντι πρὸς τὸν ἐπ' Ἡρόνι τῇ πρὸς Ἀμφιπόλει πόλεμον, τριακοσίοις δ' ἵππεῦσι πενέσταις ἰδίοις βοηθήσαντι, οὐκ ἐψηφίσαντο, αὐτὸν ἂν τις ἀποκτείνῃ, ἀγώγιμον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πολιτείαν ἔδοσαν καὶ ταύτην ἱκανὴν ὑπελάμβανον εἶναι τὴν τιμὴν.

Andrewes² suggests that Thucydides was the son of Menon (II) of Th. 2.22.3 and great-grandson of Menon (I) of Pharsalus who helped Cimon against Eion according to Dem. 23.199. Walbank likewise argues that he was probably the son or great-grandson of the Menon (II) and that the proxeny was hereditary, making Menon (II) a πρόξενος also.³ Phillips finds it likely that Thucydides was the son of Menon (I) of Pharsalus who was granted citizenship in the 470s (thus, an Athenian citizen himself) and goes so far as to suggest that "If Thucydides Menonos was an Athenian citizen, and this ... must remain a possibility for the period in question, then he could have been of an age to be a general in 440/39 and a respected elder statesman in 411."⁴ However, he does not consider any relationship with the Menon (II) or adequately deal with the problem of a πρόξενος being so involved in the affairs of the patron state and indeed resident there so that he was a general

* Πειράσιοι Π⁸, accepted by Rhodes

¹ Compare [Dem.] 13.23 (οὐκ ἐψηφίσαντο πολιτείαν, ἀλλ' ἀτέλειαν ἔδωκαν μόνον), although Osborne (*Naturalization* 3.21 n. 2) argues that this variant is falsified by the other evidence which supports naturalisation.

² HCT 5.312-3.

³ *Athenian Proxeny* 385.

⁴ *Historia* 40 (1991) 392-3.

and “respected elder statesman”. Hornblower claims that it is impossible that either Menon (I) or his grandson was the father of Thucydides as “a man acting as the *proxenos* for a given city was by definition not a citizen of that city”, and they may have been closely related, “but that is as far as we can go.”¹

Yet we can go further, and although we cannot come up with conclusive proof, we can still produce a likely scenario. It is arguable that Menon (I) was the same man as Menon (II), and was the father of Thucydides. Since Thucydides is co-operating with the older Athenians in Th 8.92.8, it is more likely than not (though of course it is not certain) that he was himself an older man. If Thucydides is not an old man in 411, we then return to the possibility that Menon (I) and Menon (II) were grandfather and grandson – but what I say below about proxeny and citizenship will not be invalidated. Menon son of Menecleides could have been made a citizen after 476, been ostracised in 471,² come to the assistance of the Athenians as an old man in 431, and have a son who was an old man in 411 (if Thucydides was born in the 470s, he would be approaching sixty in 411).

But first we need to clear the way through some of the assumptions that seem to underpin the analyses described above. Firstly, naturalisation did not necessarily imply residence. Some grants of citizenship may have been made in the knowledge that they would never actually be taken up.³ Some grants of citizenship could be exercised intermittently, as Sadocus son of the Odrysian king, Sitalces, seems to have done.⁴ The point is that, if Thucydides did inherit Athenian citizenship from his father (if his father

¹ *Comm.* 277; Mattingly also does not believe in Thucydides’ citizenship: *Antichthon* 25 (1991) 17.

² See Osborne *Naturalization* 3.22-3; and cf. below.

³ See, for example, the awards made to the Bosporan kings (see Osborne *Naturalization* 3.41-44).

⁴ Osborne *Naturalization* 3.27.

was Menon (I) who helped Cimon), then he would not necessarily have been resident in Athens.

This leads to my second point. If Thucydides only visited Athens rather than was resident,¹ though he exercised his citizen rights while he was there, it is not impossible, despite Hornblower's objections, that he could also have been, and have been popularly regarded as, the Athenian πρόξενος in Pharsalus. This seems more probable when one considers that grants of προξενία usually preceded grants of citizenship (which were very rare in the fifth century in any case). Walbank is probably right in guessing at a προξενία for Menon (if he is Thucydides' father), and this may have prompted his help for Cimon in the first place, and have been up-graded to citizenship after Eïon.

It will be useful to turn aside for a moment and consider Menon. Menon (I) of Pharsalus was granted citizenship after Eïon in 477. Raubitschek,² followed by Osborne,³ argues that Menon came to Athens after he was naturalised, and was later ostracised.⁴ This would in fact make him Menon son of Menecleides of Gargettus.⁵ If Menon was ostracised,

¹ Thucydides (the historian) seems to imply, in fact, that Thucydides the Pharsalian was not resident in Athens in 411, but happened to be there (Θουκυδίδου τοῦ Φαρσαλίου τοῦ προξένου τῆς πόλεως παρόντος), making his appearance particularly noteworthy as far as Thucydides (the historian) was concerned. For a possible reason for his being in Athens, see Morrison CQ 36 (1942) 66, 74.

² *Hesperia* 24 (1955) 286-9.

³ *Naturalization* 3.20-3.

⁴ The actual ostracism itself depends upon on Hesychius (s.v. Μενωνίδα). Although Lang (*Athenian Agora*: vol. 25, *Ostraka* 96) accepts that the Menon of the ostraca is probably Menon (I), she is more cautious in accepting an ostracism for Menon: "The number of ostraka is sufficient to indicate that there was considerable sentiment against him but hardly enough to prove that he was actually ostracized."

⁵ An inference strengthened by the connection of a Thucydides with Gargettus, and Raubitschek (*Hesperia* 24 (1955) 287-8) is probably right in assuming that the four Thucydides in the scholium are actually three, and that the Thucydides from Gargettus and the Thucydides from Pharsalus are one and the same man. The name Menecleides is not common in Athens, but it does appear in two demes other than Gargettus. There are two Menecleides attested in Thessaly (though they may be the same man) in a late third century inscription (IG ix (2) 517.73-4): Menecleides son of Simmus and Aristomachus son of Menecleides of Crannon were among the men living in Larisa who were made citizens of the city after the Social War (220-217).

although it would not necessarily invalidate his citizenship, it would obviously restrict it, and, if he returned to Pharsalus, it may have been forgotten.¹ Presumably, after he was ostracised, he returned to Pharsalus, then came to the aid of Athens in 431.²

To return to Thucydides: we know his father was Menon. If his father was Menon son of Menecleides of Gargettus, a πρόξενία could easily have been the honour that was generally recognised. Thucydides may have spent enough time in Pharsalus to be considered an Athenian πρόξενος rather than a citizen, but enough time in Athens (with a real citizenship in his – or at least his father's – past) to be considered among the Athenians when a list, such as the list of Marcellinus, was being drawn up.

¹ Compare the reaffirmation of citizenship for Phormio son of Phormio (IG ii² 237.15-21 = Tod 178).

² Osborne *Naturalization* 3.23.

Endnote 2

Alcibiades, Endius and the Embassy of 420.

In 420, Spartan ambassadors came to Athens to try to prevent an Athenian alliance with Argos.¹ One of the ambassadors was Endius, the ξένοϛ of Alcibiades. Alcibiades tricked the Spartans so that they did not reveal their full powers to the Athenian assembly (although they had already told the *boule* that they were *autokratores*), and then were denounced by Alcibiades, so the Athenians decided to go ahead with the Argive alliance.

There are, however, problems with the story. Hatzfeld argues that the main difficulties are, firstly, why the Spartans should listen to Alcibiades, secondly, how did Alcibiades persuade the Spartans that their denial of being *autokratores* would help, and, thirdly, the resumption of friendly relations between Alcibiades and his ξένοϛ, Endius.² Andrewes,³ though he generally follows Hatzfeld,⁴ rejects the explanation of Plutarch that the assembly, in contrast to the *boule*, was unreasonable, on the grounds that, firstly, the rest of the passage is unreliable; secondly, that "Plutarch, to make his point, has to stress the just and reasonable character of the Spartans' proposals, but neither he nor Thucydides indicates any proposals that would meet Athens' complaints"; thirdly, that Alcibiades' proposals entailed reference back to Sparta and therefore delay the Spartans could ill afford.

Ellis argues that the Spartans knew that they had no substantial concessions to offer, though they wanted to regain Pylos and prevent an

¹ See Chapter Three 70-2.

² Hatzfeld *Alcibiade* 89-93.

³ HCT 4.51-3.

⁴ With the reservation (*ibid.* 53) that his case "is built on facts taken from Thucydides and on probabilities which Thucydides can estimate better than we can."

alliance between Argos and Athens, and so had everything to gain and nothing to lose; Endius, on the other hand, restored his relationship with Alcibiades because it was politically expedient.¹ Kebric² claims that Endius and Alcibiades were in collusion, arguing that their later friendship is “improbable had Endius in fact been humiliated in 420”,³ and that Alcibiades’ purpose to acquire personal power and that Endius’ purpose to weaken the kingship. Brunt regards Alcibiades as Thucydides’ source for this episode, and believes that Thucydides has exaggerated the importance of the incident and Alcibiades’ rôle in it, but he does not deal with the apparent difficulty of Alcibiades’ treatment of Endius.⁴

However, despite all the scholarly debate about why Alcibiades was able to get away with this trick, Alcibiades himself knew quite well and was willing to admit later to the Spartans that what he had done was a breach of good faith, though he claims he did it justly.⁵ Presumably the Spartan ambassadors were initially introduced to the *boule* by Nicias, and Plutarch *Nic.* 10.5 implies something of the sort, for he says they changed from Nicias to Alcibiades, and Alcibiades introduced them to the assembly. What is happening here is the exploitation of inter-personal relations on various levels: Alcibiades no doubt used his connection with Endius to gain access to the ambassadors, then, although seeming to comply with the “rules” by giving them a *pistis*,⁶ he duped them, with or without Endius’ knowledge. Perhaps what is more surprising than his later friendship with Endius is his later friendship with the Spartans, and the ease with which they seem to accept his explanation. Despite the surprising sequel, however, when we consider the ways in which men did sometimes try to manipulate

¹ Ellis *Alcibiades* 39-40.

² *Mnemosyne* 29 (1976) 72-8 (= *Historia* 25 (1976) 249-252)

³ *Ibid.* (*Mnemosyne*) 73 = (*Historia*) 250.

⁴ Brunt *REG* 65 (1952) 65-9 (= *Studies in Greek History and Thought* 22-5).

⁵ Th. 6.89.3.

⁶ On which see Andrewes *HCT* 4.51.

friendship obligations, the story as told by Thucydides may be substantially correct.

Endnote 3

Cyrus the Greek?

If Xenophon is to be believed, Cyrus the younger acted on the principle of binding his subordinates to himself by acts of benevolence.¹ In his encomium of Cyrus, Xenophon writes at length of Cyrus' constancy and faithfulness to his φίλοι. According to Xenophon, Cyrus considered it of the utmost importance not to lie if he made a treaty or came to terms or made a promise to anyone.² He also tried to outdo any good or harm that was done him.³ He judged his φίλοι to be co-workers with himself (συνεργοί), and just as he thought he needed friends in order to have co-workers with himself, so he tried to be the best συνεργός for his φίλοι.⁴ He outdid his friends in the greatness of his benefactions.⁵ In addition, he received more δῶρα than anyone else, but he distributed δῶρα most generously among his φίλοι, and surpassed his φίλοι in solicitude (τῇ ἐπιμελείᾳ) and eagerness to do them favours (τῷ προθυμεῖσθαι χαρίζεσθαι).⁶ When he marched anywhere and many were likely to see him, he would summon his φίλοι and discuss things with them, so that it would be clear whom he honoured.⁷ Xenophon concludes that no one had been loved (πεφιλησθαι) by more people among Greeks and barbarians alike.⁸

¹ For similar sentiments, see also Xen *Cyr.* 8.2.7-9, 13-15, 19. Note Hirsch: "It is hard to resist the conclusion that Xenophon's portrayal of the character, conduct, and personal relations of the elder Cyrus is largely based on the personality of his [Xenophon's] one time patron Cyrus the prince" (*The Friendship of the Barbarians* 75).

² Xen. *Anab.* 1.9.7; compare Hdt. 1.136.2.

³ Xen. *Anab.* 1.9.11.

⁴ Xen. *Anab.* 1.9.21.

⁵ Xen. *Anab.* 1.9.24.

⁶ Xen. *Anab.* 1.9.22-4.

⁷ Xen. *Anab.* 1.9.28.

⁸ Xen. *Anab.* 1.9.28.

Before this is accepted, however, as a true picture of Persian practice and social expectation, a few points need to be taken into account. First of all, Xenophon's representation of Cyrus is of an idealised figure, a man and leader who is nearly too good to be true.¹ He follows a similar model in his description of other leaders he wishes to eulogise. For example, in his description of Hermocrates, Xenophon emphasises his ἐπιμελεία, προθυμία and κοινότης to his associates, and says that he gathered together each day in the morning and at night the best of those he knew and told them what he was going to do or say and instructed them in speaking.² Krentz notes that care, enthusiasm and accessibility are "qualities of Xenophon's ideal commander."³ The picture he draws is a stereotypical image of what a good commander should do or be.

What is more, the description of Cyrus' egalitarianism is suspicious. The Persian court was hierarchical, with the King high above his subjects and almost divine.⁴ It is interesting then that Xenophon claims that Cyrus regarded his φίλοι as συνεργοί. Is this consistent with a Persian, or is this a Greek ideal? The real truth is perhaps reflected in Xenophon's praise of his superiority in both giving gifts and conferring benefits and in his admission that this is probably due to Cyrus' greater resources. There would have been few who could have come near Cyrus in his position in the west, in either wealth or prestige. He would, perhaps, not have been looking for equals among his friends so much as courtiers willing to do his bidding. Although Xenophon attributes to this Persian common Greek ethical standards, one must be careful in accepting too readily that they are also Persian. The conclusion that should be drawn here is that caution must be exercised

¹ See Xen. *Oeconomicus* 4.18-9; Anderson *Xenophon* 69, 71; cf. 95-6.

² Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.30-1; see also Anderson *Xenophon* 65; Gray *The Character of Xenophon's 'Hellenica'* 152-3.

³ Krentz *Comm.* 104: concern: *Hell.* 4.5.4; *Anab.* 4.5.7-9; *Cyr.* 1.6.16; enthusiasm: *Hell.* 4.3.14; *Cyr.* 1.6.13, 19; openness: *Anab.* 4.3.10; *Cyr.* 7.5.46.

⁴ Cook *The Persian Empire* 132-5.

when dealing with Greek sources which purport to describe Persian ethics and values.¹

¹ On Greek "invention" of the barbarian, and the Persian in particular, see Hall *Inventing the Barbarian*.

Endnote 4

Conflict of Interests

In 395 Agesilaus, the Spartan King, as part of his Persian campaign, proceeded against the territory of the Persian satrap, Pharnabazus. After making successful raids upon Pharnabazus' encampment, Agesilaus, through the efforts of their common ξένος, Apollophanes of Cyzicus, agreed to a meeting with Pharnabazus in order to negotiate for a friendship.¹ After obtaining a truce, they met on the lawns at Dascyleium. Once they had exchanged greetings and clasped each other's right hands, Xenophon reports that Pharnabazus began (for he was the older):

"O Agesilaus and all you Spartans who are present, I was your φίλος and ally when you made war on the Athenians, and by providing money I made your fleet strong, and on land I myself fought on horseback with you and pursued the enemy into the sea. And you could not ever accuse me of treachery as you did Tissaphernes in either what I have done or said for you. Although I was such a man, I am now brought to this pass at your hands that I cannot have a meal in my own land, unless I pick up some of what you leave, like the wild beasts. And the beautiful houses and parks full of trees and animals which my father left me and in which I took pleasure, I see have all been cut down and burnt. So if I do not know what is holy and just, you teach me how these things are the deeds of men who know how to pay back χάριτες."

Thus he spoke. And all the Thirty [Spartiates] were ashamed before him and were silent. But after a time Agesilaus said, "I think you know, Pharnabazus, that even among the Greek cities there are men who are ξένοι of each other. And these men, when the cities are at war, fight with their fatherland even against those who were their ξένοι, and sometimes, so it would chance, they even kill each other. We now are at war with your King and are forced to consider everything of his as hostile ..."²

¹ See Chapter Five 203-6.

² Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.32-4.

Thus Agesilaus summed up the problem that was constantly facing the Greeks: what happened when those who were formerly φίλοι were made ἐχθροί by circumstances beyond their control?

This note will look at Greek friendships and how they affected the politics of war in the late fifth and early fourth centuries BC. It will consider the conflicts and tensions that arose when Greeks were forced to fight against their φίλοι and had to make decisions about conflicting obligations. Finally, suggestions will be made as to how the Greeks responded to these difficulties and tried to resolve their conflict of interests.

Almost unending war among the Greek *poleis* in the fifth and fourth centuries meant that loyalties were brought into conflict and had the effect of testing the strength of obligations as states which were formerly friendly could become hostile; φίλοι could be forced to fight against φίλοι, or ξένοι against ξένοι. The moral dilemma of who were one's friends and what private friends could expect of public enemies was a question which reared its ugly head over and over again. Where did one's primary loyalty lie? With one's state? Or with one's friends? Could the two ever be reconciled?

There are many examples of such conflicts of interest. For example, before the first invasion of the Spartans in 431, Pericles, fearing that his ξένος, Archidamus, might leave his fields unravaged in order to gratify him (χαρίζεσθαι) in private or that he might have been ordered to do so in order to raise doubts about him, declared publicly that he and Archidamus were ξένοι and made his private holdings public property.¹ And indeed, Archidamus himself was accused by the Peloponnesians of lingering about Oenoe on the borders of Attica, since he seemed to be reluctant in the prosecution of the war and "friendly" to the Athenians.

¹ On this episode, see also Chapter Three 89-91.

When Endius, the Sparta ξένος of Alcibiades, served on an embassy to Athens in 420, he and his colleagues were tricked and humiliated by Alcibiades, if we can believe the story told by Thucydides, and Alcibiades proceeded to make a new treaty between Athens and Argos – yet this did not cause a permanent breach between the two men, but we find them co-operating again in 413/2.¹

Πρόξενοι were also sometimes faced with the question of where their greater obligation lay: with the awarding city or with their fatherland. In 428, the Mytilenean πρόξενοι of Athens initially chose to betray their city to the Athenians and reveal the plot for revolt.² One of the πρόξενοι later recanted, however, and became part of the embassy which was sent to Athens to try to prove that there was not, in fact, anything for the Athenians to worry about.

Again, the question of “paying back” what was owed could be exploited and manipulated, in order to create an almost “notional” obligation which should have been negated by a more recent enmity. The Corinthians in their speech to the Athenians in 433 cannot claim to be friends of Athens, but state that they are at least ἔνσπονδοι with Athens, while Corcyra has never had any diplomatic relationship with Athens.³ They then refer to their help to Athens against Aegina before the Persian Wars (when Corinth and Athens were friends) and claim that they have benefited Athens more recently, by voting against Sparta’s proposal to support Samos in 440.⁴ So they demand that the Athenians make an equal return (τὸ ... ἴσον ἀνταπόδοτε).⁵ The essential hypocrisy of their position does not seem to concern them, and they sum up the ambiguity of the situation when they say,

¹ See esp. Endnote 2 above.

² On this episode, see Chapter Two 57 & n. 5.

³ Th. 1.40.4; cf. 31.2.

⁴ Th. 1.40.5.

⁵ Th. 1.43.2.

So we have a perfect right to these things from you according to the customs of the Greeks, and we have a recommendation and claim for this kind of χάρις, which, though we are not ἐχθροί so as to do you harm, nor φίλοι so as to be of use to you, we say you ought to return to us in the present circumstances ... For men consider both him who is of service a φίλος, even if he was formerly an ἐχθρός, and him who stands in opposition as hostile, even if he was a φίλος, since even their close concerns are down-graded because of the present struggle ... Make an equal payment in return, having realised that this is the very time at which he who is of service is particularly a φίλος, and he who stands in the way an ἐχθρός.¹

The Corinthians are playing upon the idea of reciprocity. In order to score political points, they try to argue there is a debt which must be paid back, a moral obligation which must be met, trying to skirt around the initial difficulty of a present enmity through a past friendship and the rights which could be demanded from this friendship; trying to create a conflict of interest. So how then did the Greeks try to deal with this problem? What did they do when faced with opposing loyalties?

The Greeks were aware of this dilemma, as Agesilaus made clear on the lawn of Dascyleium, and the question itself was as old as Homer.² What did a fifth-century Greek do when faced with the practical choice? Clearchus, the Spartan ξένος of Cyrus and commander of one of the mercenary armies, found his own answer. When Clearchus' army discovered that the true purpose of the campaign was to fight against the Persian King, they rebelled and wished to leave Cyrus' employ, saying that they had not been hired to fight the King.³ Clearchus tried to force them to go on, but they refused, so Clearchus called them together and said to them:

Men, do not be amazed that I bear these present troubles badly. For Cyrus was my ξένος, and when I was an exile from my fatherland he both honoured me in other respects and gave me

¹ Th. 1.41.1, 3, 43.2.

² See Homer *Iliad* 6.224-31.

³ Xen. *Anab.* 1.3.1.

ten thousand darics, which I did not put aside for my private use, or squander, but spent it on you ... And when Cyrus summoned me, I went to him with you, so that if he needed anything, I might help him in return for the ways in which I was well-treated at his hands. But since you do not want to journey with me, I must either betray you and have his *φιλία*, or be deceitful to him and be with you. I do not know whether I am acting justly, but I will indeed choose you and I will comply with you in whatever is necessary. And no one will ever say that, having led you among the barbarians, I betrayed the Greeks and chose the *φιλία* of the barbarians. But since you do not wish to comply with me, I will follow you, and I will comply with you in regard to whatever is necessary. For I consider you to be my fatherland, my *φίλοι* and my allies.¹

This is the old problem of conflicting loyalties, but with the added complication that one of the parties is also a barbarian. Clearchus' response to this follows conventional Greek morality: he has a conflict of duty between what he owes to fellow-countrymen and what he owes to a *ξένος*; he says his fellow-countrymen can claim ties of country and friendship (they may not all have been Spartan, but were at least all Greek). To leave his *ξένος* is deception, but abandoning the Greeks is betrayal of countrymen for a mere barbarian. Whose claim is the stronger? Clearchus asserts that no one will say that he betrayed Greeks for the *φιλία* of a barbarian.

Yet the story does not end here. For Cyrus did not understand what was happening and kept sending to Clearchus.² He well understood what was due to him. Clearchus refused to go to him, but sent to him in secret, telling him not to be discouraged, but that he would settle the matter, and he told Cyrus to keep on sending for him, though he would keep refusing to go.³ By means of this ruse, Clearchus was able to persuade the Greeks to continue, though still not openly against the King.⁴ Despite his claims to the contrary, Clearchus had remained faithful to his *ξένος*.

¹ Xen. *Anab.* 1.3.5-6.

² Xen. *Anab.* 1.3.8.

³ Xen. *Anab.* 1.3.8; cf. 1.3.10.

⁴ See esp. Xen. *Anab.* 1.3.15-20.

But this was not always possible. In 385/4 when the Spartans resolved to chastise their allies who had been more faithful to the enemy, they ordered the Mantineians to pull down their walls.¹ When the Mantineians refused, the Spartans called out the army against them. However, Agesilaus requested that he be relieved of the command because the city had served his father in many ways in the war against the Messenians. Therefore Agesipolis, the other King, led them, though his father, Pausanias, was himself friendly (φίλως ἔχειν) to the leaders of the *demos* in Mantinea. Thus while one king was able to avoid the conflict in his obligations, the other was forced to choose state over friends. Yet even Agesipolis was able to some extent to honour his obligations to the people of Mantinea. For those of the Mantineians who were sympathetic to Argos and the leaders of the people thought that they would be killed, but Pausanias negotiated with his son on their behalf and obtained their safety from Agesipolis as they departed from the city.

Where does all this leave us? Herman believes that ties of ξενία meant more to the upper-class Greeks than ties of patriotism, and that this explains why Endius co-operated with Alcibiades in 420 against the interests of Sparta.² In our own century, E.M. Forster has written: "I hate the idea of causes, and if I had to choose between betraying my country and betraying my friend, I hope I should have the guts to betray my country."³ Alcibiades was willing to betray Athens in 415, and then to desert the Spartans in 412, though he seems to have been thinking of his own interests, rather than those of any ξένοι. Pericles, in 431, had ostentatiously put his loyalty to Athens above his ξενία with Archidamus. But it is easy for people to persuade themselves that what they want to do is what is right for them to

¹ On this episode, see Chapter Three 86, 92-3.

² *Ritualised Friendship* 149.

³ *Two Cheers for Democracy* 78.

do, and that what is best for them is best for their country and their friends too. Perhaps, by redefining their obligations, Greeks could persuade themselves that they were not having to choose between betraying their country and betraying their friends; perhaps even Alcibiades in 420 believed that his trickery would be good for Athens and yet would not be bad for Endius.

However, the essential point is clear. Because the political world of the fifth and fourth centuries was, at least in part, built upon friendship networks and ideas of repaying favours, and because the alliances and relationships between states were constantly shifting and changing, old friends could be forced to become new enemies. Old loyalties could be challenged and superseded by new ones; old obligations manipulated in order to score new points. It was a juggling act and a game that could not be played by consistent rules. For some it was easy to evade the issue altogether, as Agesilaus did at Mantinea in 385. Others had to find the best compromise they could. But in whatever way the situation was dealt with on each occasion, it is important for our understanding of what was happening in the world of the fifth and fourth centuries to realise that this was one of the issues the Greeks had to face, that ξένοι could be forced to fight against ξένοι, and that sometimes it chanced that they killed each other, and that this “reciprocal tension” affected decisions that were made and things that were done. Paying backing the χάριτες was not always as straightforward as it seemed.

Appendix A

Literary Πρόξενοι¹

	ΠΡΟΞΕΝΟΣ	HOME STATE	SOURCE
<i>Argos</i>	Lichas son of Arcesilaus	Sparta	Th. 5.76.3
<i>Athens</i>	Aristonus	Larisa	W. 29 ²
	Nymphodorus	Abdera	W. 30
	Nicias	Gortyn	W. 32 ³
	Dexandrus of Mytilene and other Mytileneans	Mytilene	W. 38
	Peithias (ἔθελοπρόξενος)	Corcyra	Th. 3.70.3 ⁴
	Menon	Pharsalus	Th. 2.22.3 ⁵
	Archonides	Sicily	W. 66 ⁶
	Artas	Messapia	W. 70 ⁷
	Thucydides	Pharsalus	W. 74 ⁸
	Megillus	Sparta	Plato <i>Laws</i> 1.642 b-d
	Archebius	Byzantium	Dem. 20.60
	Heracleides	Byzantium	Dem. 20.60

¹ I have listed all the named πρόξενοι of the years 435-336 to be found in the literary sources. There are, of course, also a great number of πρόξενοι to be found in inscriptions, but as the only information we have concerning many of these is their names and perhaps their citizenship, their usefulness is limited for my purposes. Other πρόξενοι from inscriptions are referred to in the various discussions as they arise. For a complete list of προξενία (though he does not give men's names), see Marek *Die Proxenie*.

² Though Thucydides does not call him πρόξενος.

³ See also Chapter Two 58 & n. 7.

⁴ See Chapter Two 61 n. 6.

⁵ Not called a πρόξενος by Thucydides, but see Endnote 1.

⁶ Thucydides does not mention that he was πρόξενος, but does say that he was a φίλος of the Athenians (Th. 7.1.4).

⁷ Here, again, Thucydides himself does not spell out the προξενία, but says Artas had a παλαιὰ φιλία with Athens (Th. 7.33.4).

⁸ See also Endnote 1.

	Lycidas	?Thrace ¹	Dem. 20.131-3
	Dionysius		Dem. 20.132
	Apollonides	Mytilene	Dem. 40.36
	Arthmius	Zeleeia	Aeschin. 3.258
	Euthykrates	Olynthus	Hypereides F 76
	Alcimachus	Macedon	Hypereides F 77; Anaximenes of Lampsacus <i>FGrHist</i> 72 F 16
	Antipater	Macedon	Hypereides F 77; Anaximenes of Lampsacus <i>FGrHist</i> 72 F 16
<i>Boeotia</i>			
	Pharax	Sparta	Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 4.5.6
	Jason	Pherae	Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 6.4.24
	Demosthenes son of Demosthenes	Athens	Aeschin. 2.141, 143
	Thrason	Athens	Aeschin. 3.138
<i>Byzantium</i>			
	Clearchus son of Ramphias	Sparta	Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 1.1.35
<i>Chalcidice</i>			
	Strophacus	Thessaly	Th. 4.78.1
<i>Corcyra</i>			
	Corinthians	Corinth	Th. 3.70.1
<i>Eretria</i>			
	Meidias ²	Athens	Dem. 21.200
<i>Heracleia</i>			
	Callippus	Athens	Dem. 52.5, 9, 10, 24

¹ The slave of Chabrias. His citizenship, which Marek gives as Thrace (*Die Proxenie* 9), can only be inferred from Chabrias' tours of duty in the north.

² He was also the φίλος and ξένος of Plutarchus (Dem. 21.110).

	Strammenus	Argos	Dem. 52.10
<i>Mossynoeci</i>	Timestheus	Trapezous	Xen. <i>Anab.</i> 5.4.2
<i>Paphlagonia</i>	Hecatonymus	Sinope	Xen. <i>Anab.</i> 5.6.11
<i>Sparta</i>	?Lacedaemonius son of Cimon ¹	Athens	Perhaps implied by a combination of his name and the προξενία of his father: Andoc. 3.3; Aeschin. 2.172 ²
	Alcibiades' grandfather	Athens	Th. 5.43.2, 6.89.2; cf. Plut. <i>Alc.</i> 14.1
	Lacon son of Aiemnestus	Plataea	Th. 3.52.5 ³
	Alciphron	Argos	Th. 5.59.5
	Callias son of Hipponicus	Athens	Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 5.4.22, 6.3.4
	?Nicias son of Niceratus	Athens	Perhaps implied by the events of 420. ⁴
	Polydamas	Thessaly	Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 6.1.4
<i>Syracuse</i>	Nicias son of Niceratus	Athens	Diod. 13.27.3

¹ A family connection with Thessaly can probably also be inferred from the name of his brother, Thessalus (Plut. *Cimon* 16.1), though there is no specific evidence of προξενία.

² Note, however, the confusion of Miltiades son of Cimon for Cimon son of Miltiades.

³ See also Chapter Two 58-9, 59 n. 1.

⁴ See Chapter Three 72 & n. 7.

Appendix B

*Athenian Strategoi*¹

435/4

Pericles son of Xanthippus of Cholargus	V *
?G[lacon] son of Leagrus of Cerameis	V *
?[Pro]teas son of Epicles of Aexone	VII

434/3

Pericles son of Xanthippus of Cholargus	V
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433/2

†Diotimus son of Strombichus of Euonymon	I
Despatched to Corcyra; also known to have visited Neapolis in southern Italy and founded a torch race there, perhaps in the 430s (Timaeus <i>FGrHist</i> 566 F 98; though on the date cf. Davies <i>APF</i> 161).	
Archena[utes] possibly of Icarium	II
Glaucou son of Leagrus of Cerameis	V *
Pericles son of Xanthippus of Cholargus	V *
Lacedaemonius son of Cimon of Laciadae	VI
Proteas son of Epicles of Aexone	VII
Archestratus son of Lycomedes (??of Phlya) ²	??VII
[Metag]enes of Coele	VIII
Draconti[des] son of Leogoras of Thorae	X

¹ I have used Develin (*Officials*) as my starting point, since his is the most recent list for generals of these years. I have included comments where I have disagreed with Develin, or where other comments seem appropriate over and above those of Develin, but within the limitations of this thesis I have not been able to discuss every problem. Refer to Develin throughout for discussion and references.

* indicates possible cases of double representation.

† indicates possible election on the basis of connections.

? indicates those men whose office is not entirely secure or who may not belong in that year.

?? indicates those men whose office is very insecure or who are only very tentatively placed in that year. (Those marked ? and ?? are nevertheless included in my statistics.)

{ } enclose those generals included by Develin, but who I believe should be omitted.

Unfortunately, limitations of space prevent full discussion of all the possible doubles or "suitable" elections. The most noteworthy examples are discussed at Chapter Four 111-21.

² For the tribe and the possibility of a double, see Chapter Four 137 n. 2.

432/1

Socrates son of Antigenes of Halae	II
Phormio son of Asopius of Paeania ¹	III
Pericles son of Xanthippus of Cholargus	V*
Carcinus son of Xenotimus of Thoricus	V*
Proteas son of Epicles of Aexone	VII*
Eucrat[es] of Melite	VII*
Callias son of Calliades ²	

431/0

Socrates son of Antigenes of Halae	II
Phormio son of Asopius of Paeania	III*
†Hagnon son of Nicias of Steiria	III*
See main discussion 113-4.	
Pericles son of Xanthippus of Cholargus	V*
Carcinus son of Xenotimus of Thoricus	V*
Cleopompus son of Cleinias of Scambonidae or Thria	IV or VI
Proteas son of Epicles of Aexone	VII
?[Aristot]eles son of Timocrates of Thorae	X

430/29

†Phormio son of Asopius of Paeania	III*
See main discussion 111-3.	
†Hagnon son of Nicias of Steiria	III*
See main discussion 113-4.	
Pericles son of Xanthippus of Cholargus	V
Cleopompus son of Cleinias of Scambonidae or Thria	IV or VI
Xenophon son of Euripides of Melite	VII
Melesander	
Hestiodorus son of Aristocleides	
Phanomachus son of Callimachus	
Calliades	

¹ For demotic, see Chapter Four 132-3.

² For problems with demotic and possible triple representation, see Chapter Four 139.

429/8

†Phormio son of Asopius of Paeania	III*
See main discussion 111-3.	
†Hagnon son of Nicias of Steiria ¹	III*
See main discussion 113-4.	
Pericles son of Xanthippus of Cholargus	V
Cleippides son of Deinias of Acharnae	VI

428/7

†Asopius son of Phormio of Paeania	III
See main discussion 111-3.	
Paches son of Epicurus	
Lysicles	

427/6

Nicias son of Niceratus of Cydantidae	II
Nicostratus son of Diitrephes of Scambonidae ²	IV
Laches son of Melanopus of Aexone	VII
†?Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes of Aphidna	IX
See main discussion 114-7.	
Charoeades son of Euphiletus	
?Procles son of Theodorus	
See main discussion on Demosthenes (esp. 114 n. 2), though, as with Demosthenes, there is perhaps little doubt that he was <i>strategos</i> in this year.	
†Eurymedon son of Thucles ³	
Sent to Corcyra, see also 426/5, 425/4, 414/3, 413/2.	

426/5

Nicias son of Niceratus of Cydantidae	II
Hippocrates son of Aripbron of Cholargus	V

¹ For Hagnon's *strategia* in this year, which I accept, see Chapter Four 133-4.

² For the demotic of Nicostratus son of Diitrephes, in addition to Develin, see Fornara *CQ* n.s. 20 (1970) 41; Hornblower *Comm.* 473.

³ Develin tentatively accepts the attribution to the deme Myrrhinous, but I think the evidence against the demotic (see Gomme *HCT* 3.627-8; Davies *APF* 334; Fornara *Generals* 78; see also Lewis *JHS* 81 (1961) 119; Mattingly *BSA* 65 (1970) 137-8) outweighs the evidence for it (Wade-Gery *CQ* n.s. 24 (1930) 34-5; MacDowell *CQ* n.s. 15 1965 44 n. 4; Thompson in *Phoros* 147; see also (restoring the name in the inscription *IG* i³ 369 of 423/2) Lang and Meritt *CQ* n.s. 18 (1968) 90).

Sophocles son of Sostratides ?of tribe VI ¹	VI*
?Lamachus son of Xenophanes of Oe	VI*
Not included by Develin, rejected by Fornara (<i>Generals</i> 58; see also Sommerstein <i>Acharnians</i> 185-6), but I tentatively include him, following Lewis (<i>JHS</i> 81 (1961) 121); see Ar. <i>Acharn.</i> 593-619, but cf. 1073-8.	
Laches son of Melanopus of Aexone	VII ²
†Pythodorus son of Isolochus	VII ³
Sent to Sicily; seems to have connections with the philosophers, Parmenides and Zeno, from Elea in Italy (Plato <i>Parm.</i> 126 b, 127 a-d; identification secured by his father's name in [Plato] <i>Alc.</i> 1.119 a).	
†Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes of Aphidna ⁴	IX
See main discussion 114-7.	
Hipponicus son of Callias of Alopece	X*
Aristoteles son of Timocrates of Thorae	X*
Develin calls Aristoteles and Hierophon nauarchs (following Jordan <i>TAPA</i> 101 (1970) 238 = <i>The Athenian Navy in the Classical Period</i> 128-9), though he admits that their status is not secure. Fornara (<i>Generals</i> 38) includes them among the generals for this year, and Rhodes (<i>Thucydides III</i> 261-2) sees no reason to doubt that they were <i>strategoi</i> .	
Simonides	

¹ Fornara has placed Sophocles in tribe VI (*Generals* 58), though Develin is not prepared to attribute tribes on the basis of Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.2. On Xenophon's list of the Thirty, see Rhodes (*Comm.* 435), who is prepared to believe in trios in tribal order, and Whitehead (*JHS* 100 (1980) 208-13), who is willing to believe in tribal order, but not necessarily trios. See also Krentz *The Thirty at Athens* 51-5; M.B. Walbank *Hesperia* 51 (1982) 78-87.

² He was probably deposed and recalled on charges of embezzlement (see schol. Ar. *Wasps* 240) and replaced by Pythodorus, though he was probably not prosecuted since his career continues in 422/1 (see Rhodes *Thucydides III* 268).

³ Pythodorus will probably not form a double in this year, but will rather be suffect. It argues in favour of tribal elections, if indeed, as I think, Pythodorus replaced Laches in the mid-winter of this year on Laches' recall, since Pythodorus was also from tribe VII.

⁴ For his office as *strategos* in this year (*contra* Fornara *Generals* 58; Develin *Officials* 127), see Chapter Four 115-6.

Procles son of Theodorus¹

Not included by Develin (with Demosthenes (see entry under Demosthenes above), see Th. 3.91.1; though he died at the beginning of this year: Th. 3.98.4, so will probably have been replaced.)

Hierophon son of Antimnestus.

Called a nauarch by Develin; see Aristoteles above.

†Eurymedon son of Thucles

Sent to Sicily with orders to stop off in Corcyra (see Lewis CAH V² 413: "Eurymedon was the expert on Corcyra"). See 427/6.

425/4

Demodocus of Anagyrous

I

Nicias son of Niceratus of Cydantidae

II

Nicostratus son of Dieitrephes of Scambonidae

IV

†Lamachus son of Xenophanes of Oe

VI*

Led a military force to Sinope in the Black Sea 436/5 (Plut. *Per.* 20.1-2); sent to collect tribute in this region 425/4-424/3.

Sophocles son of Sostratides ?of tribe VI (see 310 n. 1 above)

VI*

{?Hyperbolus son of Antiphanes of Perithoedae

{VI²}

Included by Develin, but the evidence probably does not justify it.}

Pythodorus son of Isolochus of Phlya

VII

†Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes of Aphidna

IX

On the possible circumstances of his re-election in this year, see Gomme *HCT* 3. 437-8, 470-1, 504-5; Lewis *JHS* 81 (1961) 120.

Autocles son of Tolmaeus of Anaphlystus

X

Aristeides son of Archippus

¹ *Contra* Fornara *Generals* 58; Develin *Officials* 127; see Lewis *JHS* 81 (1961) 119-20; see also discussion on Demosthenes' *strategia*: Chapter Four 115-6.

² If indeed Hyperbolus did hold the *strategia* for this year, it may well have been as the replacement for Sophocles, one of the generals who was deposed and exiled in this year. This would eliminate the difficulty of eleven attested *strategoi*.

†Eurymedon son of Thucles

The campaign to Sicily left Athens in the spring so it is likely that Eurymedon was re-elected in the spring for 425/4 with this campaign in mind. See also 427/6.

*Cleon son of Cleaenetus of Cydathenaeum*¹

III

424/3

Nicias son of Niceratus of Cydantidae

II

Cleon son of Cleaenetus of Cydathenaeum

III

†Thucydides son of Olorus of Halimous

IV*

Command in Thrace (see Gomme *HCT* 3.577); he had interests in Thracian gold mines and influence with the leading Thracians (Th. 4.105.1); descended from Olorus, king of Thrace (Plut. *Cimon* 4.1-2).

Nicostratus son of Dietrephes of Scambonidae

IV*

Hippocrates son of Ariphron of Cholargus

V

†Lamachus son of Xenophanes of Oe

VI

See 425/4 .

Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes of Aphidna

IX

Autocles son of Tolmaeus of Anaphlystus

X

Eucles

423/2

Nicias son of Niceratus of Cydantidae

II

Cleon son of Cleaenetus of Cydathenaeum

III*

[-³¹-] of [Myrr]hinous

III*²

Nicostratus son of Dietrephes of Scambonidae

V

422/1

Nicias son of Niceratus of Cydantidae

II

Cleon son of Cleaenetus of Cydathenaeum

III

?Laches son of Melanopus of Aexone

VII

?Euthydemus son of Eudemus

¹ This was a special position, so is not included in the tribal count of the generals.

² The demotic is in the inscription, so the double must stand.

421/20

Nicias son of Niceratus of Cydantidae II

420/19¹

{Nicias son of Niceratus of Cydantidae {II}

Tentatively included by Develin, but I do not think that
Plutarch implies a generalship.}

†Alcibiades son of Cleinias of Scambonidae IV

See main discussion 117-8.

419/8

†Alcibiades son of Cleinias of Scambonidae IV

See main discussion 117-8.

418/7

Nicias son of Niceratus of Cydantidae II

Nicostratus son of Dieitrephes of Scambonidae IV

{[?Alcibiades son of Cleinias of Scambonidae]² {IV}

Tentatively included by Develin.}

Cal[istr]atus son of Empedus of Oe VI

†Laches son of Melanopus of Aexone VII*

Proposer of the armistice with the Spartans (Th.
4.118.11); oath swearer to the Peace of Nicias in 421 (see
Oath-takers 383); general to Argos in this year.³

¹ I do not agree with Develin's assignment of Nicias to this year, since Plutarch *Nic.* 10.9 does not seem at all to necessitate his inclusion here.

² His *strategia* is accepted by Fornara (*Generals* 62-3 & 63 n. 105). Develin does not agree that Th. 5.61.2 is "a conclusive bar to it", following Gomme (*HCT* 4.88), but Meiggs and Lewis do not accept Wade-Gery's restoration in their commentary for 77. Other than Alcibiades' prominence in these years the restoration is not compelling of itself. Though there seems to be no bar to a general performing the duties of an ambassador in the course of his command (see, for example, Th. 7.33.4, Dem. 23.173), the use of the specific title *presbeutes* does seem to suggest that he was just this, and Mosley (*Envoys and Diplomacy* 46) notes there was a tendency against pluralism in Athens and holding more than one office at a time (see Dem. 24.150).

³ Kagan (*Peace of Nicias* 103-4 on Th. 5.61.1-2) argues that Laches and Nicostratus were sent to Mantinea in 418/7 in the expectation that, if the Spartans were victorious, they would be able to begin negotiations. Different pressure groups in Athens did tend to be represented on the same embassy or board of generals, even though the interests of the constituent members might be in open conflict with each other; compare the embassy to Sparta in 372/1 (Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.2 -17) and the generals selected for Sicily in 415 (Th. 6.8.2). I see no reason why Nicostratus should be at all connected with a pro-Spartan policy, but Laches may well have

?C[leomedes] son of Lycomedes of Phlya ¹	VII*
Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes of Aphidna	IX
Autocles son of Tolmaeus of Anaphlystus	X
Euthydemus son of Eudemus	

417/6

Nicias son of Niceratus of Cydantidae	II
†Alcibiades son of Cleinias of Scambonidae	IV
See main discussion 117-8.	
Teisias son of Teisimachus of Cephale	V
Cleomedes son of Lycomedes of Phlya	VII

416/5

Nicias son of Niceratus of Cydantidae	II
Alcibiades son of Cleinias of Scambonidae	IV
Teisias son of Teisimachus of Cephale	V
Lamachus son of Xenophanes of Oe	VI
Cleomedes son of Lycomedes of Phlya	VII
Philocrates son of Demeas	

415/4

Nicias son of Niceratus of Cydantidae ²	II
Alcibiades son of Cleinias of Scambonidae	IV
Lamachus son of Xenophanes of Oe	VI
Telephonus	

been. We may then have a situation where different members of the “team” despatched to Argos (on Alcibiades’ status, see 313 n. 2) represent different pressure groups in Athens.

¹ Ventured by ML, accepted by Develin, though not by Fornara (*Generals* 62-3), and not restored in IG i³.

² Diodorus says that Nicias was the πρόξενος of the Syracusans (Diod. 13.27.3). This may go part of the way to explain his hesitancy for undertaking the expedition, and his contacts when he arrived (Th. 7.48.2, 73.3), but I can see no plausible reason why it would have affected his election. More reasonable is the supposition that he was elected as a counter-balance to Alcibiades (see note on Laches (under 418/7) above).

414/3¹

Euetion ?of Cephisia or Sphettus	I or V
Nicias son of Niceratus of Cydantidae	II*
Pythodorus ?son of Epizelus of Halae	II*
†Dietrephes son of Nicostratus of Scambonidae	IV

Escorted Thracian mercenaries home. See also 411 (under the 400).

Lamachus son of Xenophanes of Oe	VI
Charicles son of Apollodorus ?of tribe VI (see 310 n. 1 below)	VI ²
Laespodias son of Andronymis ?of Coele	VIII
†?Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes of Aphidna	IX

See main discussion and n. 1 (on 414/3) below.

†Conon son of Timotheus of Anaphlystus	X
--	---

For *strategia* see n. 1 (on 414/3) below. *Strategos* based at Naupactus; see also 411 (under 5000).

Demaratus

[Mel]es[a]ndr[us]

†Eurymedon son of Thucles

Sent to Corcyra. See 427/6.

Menander

On status, see Develin *Officials* 152-3.

Euthydemus son of Eudemus

On status, see Develin *Officials* 152-3.

¹ This is a difficult year, with too many attested generals, if they are all to be accepted, and many of the demotics are unsure or unknown. Develin suggests a number of solutions to the difficulty of twelve regular generals, though none satisfactorily reduce them to the required ten (he is dealing with Fornara's difficulty of eleven regular generals, but does not explain away the twelfth, [Mel]es[a]ndr[os], whom he himself adds). Following Develin, however, I reject Fornara's hypothesis that *autokratores* was a special status which set Nicias and Lamachus (as well as Alcibiades before his flight) apart. It is more probable that, as Develin suggests, one of the attested generals replaced Lamachus on his death (possibly Charicles?). That leaves us with still one general to dispose of, however. I am not convinced that Conon was simply a nauarch. It is perhaps more likely that Demosthenes and Eurymedon were specially pre-selected for 413/2 (*contra* Develin) as Dover (*HCT* 4.393) suggests.

² I think Develin is right here in making him a general (*contra* Jordan *TAPA* 101 (1970) 233 = *The Athenian Navy in the Classical Period* 124, who makes him nauarch). His known activity as *strategos* comes very late in the magisterial year (that is, in spring, 413), so he is probably suffect on the death of Lamachus.

413/2

{?Strombichides son of Diotimus of Euonymon {I}

Develin tentatively includes him here, following Fornara (*Generals* 65-6), but I do not think Fornara's inference is necessary.)

Nicias son of Niceratus of Cydantidae II

Aristocrates ?son of Scellias ?of Trinemeia VII

Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes of Aphidna IX

Menander

Euthydemus son of Eudemus

Diphilus

Develin questions whether he may have been nauarch, but I think not; see 315 n. 1 above in relation to Conon.

Eurymedon son of Thucles

?Hippocles son of Menippus

Though he may belong in 412/1; see Andrewes *HCT* 5. 32-3 (with 23-4).

412/1

Strombichides son of Diotimus of Euonymon I

Eucrates son of Niceratus of Cydantidae II

Phrynichus son of Stratonides of Deiradiotae IV

Onomacles ?of tribe VIII (see 310 n. 1 on Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.2) VIII

Thrasycles

Diomedon

Leon

Scironides

Charminus

Euctemon¹

411

Athens -- Appointments made under the 400 (summer 411)

Theramenes son of Hagnon of Steiria III

†Dietrephes ?son of Nicostratus of Scambonidae IV

Elected ἐς τὰ ἐπὶ Θράκης ἄρχειν (Th. 8.64.2). Cf. 414/3.

¹ Develin suggests Cephisia as a possible demotic by association with PA 5798, but Euctemon is not an uncommon name in the fifth century, and there are too many possibilities for certainty.

Thymochares ?of Sphettus	V
Aristarchus ?of Deceleia	VIII
Aristoteles son of Timocrates of Thorae	X
Alexicles	
Melanthius	
?Antiphon ?son of Lysonides	

Samos - Democratic (summer 411)

Thrasybulus son of Lycus of Steiria	III
Alcibiades son of Cleinias of Scambonidae	IV
Thrasyllus	

Period of Co-operation between Samos and Athens Under the 5000

Theramenes son of Hagnon of Steiria (from the city)	III
Thymochares ?of Sphettus (from the city)	V
Chaereas son of Archestratus ?of Phlya (democrat from Samos)	VII
†Conon son of Timotheus of Anaphlystus (<i>strategos</i> of the Athenians) Brought aid to the Corcyraeans from Naupactus; see also 414/3 above.	X
Simichus/Symbichus/Strombichides (<i>strategos</i> of the Athenians)	
Eumachus (from the city) ¹	

410/9²

E[.....] of Euonymon (see n. 1 above on Eumachus)	I
Eucleides ?of tribe II (see 310 n. 1)	II

¹ Develin suggests the demotic Euonymon on the basis of *IG* i³ 375.35-6 (= ML 84), where the name is unrestored; Andrewes (*JHS* 73 (1953) 4 n. 13) says there are too many possibilities for restoration; see also Fornara *Generals* 68.

² If one discounts Alcibiades and Theramenes, whose position in this year is unclear, this year bears the clearest testimony in these six years to tribal election, there being seven out of a possible ten tribes represented.

†Thrasybulus son of Lycus of Steiria ¹	III
Arrived back at the Hellespont from Thasos and Thraceward region; probably continued there until 407; see also 390/89. After he had served in this region, Middleton (CQ n.s. 32 (1986) 298-303) suggests he may have effected his pro-democratic coup in 404 with the help of Thracian forces: see Chapter Three 100-1.	
Pasiphon of Phrearrhii	IV
Aristocrates son of Scellias ?of Trinemeia	VII
Oenobius of Deceleia	VIII
Dexicrates of Aegilia	X
Thrasyllus	
<i>Theramenes son of Hagnon of Steiria</i>	III
See n. 1 above on Thrasybulus.	
<i>Alcibiades son of Cleinias of Scambonidae</i>	IV
See n. 1 above on Thrasybulus.	
409/8	
Anytus son of Anthemion of Euonymon	I
†Thrasybulus son of Lycus of Steiria	III
See 410/9 & n. 1 above on Thrasybulus.	
?Peri[cles] son of Pericles of Cholargus	V
Leotrophides	
Thrasyllus	
Timarchus	
<i>Theramenes son of Hagnon of Steiria</i>	III
See n. 1 above on Thrasybulus.	

¹ For the supposition that Thrasybulus, Alcibiades and Theramenes held an "unofficial position", see Andrewes *JHS* 73 (1953) 2-9; see also Develin. Fornara (*Generals* 69) maintains that the presence of Pasiphon does not imply that fresh elections were held after the restoration of full democracy, though undoubtedly Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.10-1 suggests that Alcibiades' position previous to this had not been regular. However, Andrewes' assessment (*JHS* 73 (1953) 4) that in the years 410-404 Thrasybulus' "associations were all with Alkibiades and Theramenes, whose equivocal position he may be presumed to share" is probably not fair. His absence from activities in the Hellespont, except Cyzicus (Diod. 13.50.1) does not necessarily mean that he was not still engaged on official Athenian business. I prefer, then, to leave him as one of the regularly appointed generals in this year.

Alcibiades son of Cleinias of Scambonidae IV

See 318 n. 1 above on Thrasybulus.

408/7

†Thrasybulus son of Lycus of Steiria III

See 410/9 & 318 n. 1 above on Thrasybulus.

Thrasyllus

Theramenes son of Hagnon of Steiria III

See n. 318 n. 1 above on Thrasybulus.

Alcibiades son of Cleinias of Scambonidae IV

See n. 318 n. 1 above on Thrasybulus.

407/6

Thrasybulus son of Lycus of Steiria III

Alcibiades son of Cleinias of Scambonidae IV*

Adeimantus son of Leucolophides of Scambonidae IV*

?P[ericles] son of Pericles of Cholargus V

Aristocrates ?son of Scellias ?of Trinemeia VII

Conon son of Timotheus of Anaphlystus X

†?Phanosthenes

Probably an Andrian by birth, though now a naturalised Athenian (IG i³ 182; Walbank *Hesperia* 45 (1976) 289-5; MacDonald *Hesperia* 50 (1981) 141-6; on the *strategia*: Develin; Osborne *Naturalization* 3.31-3; cf. Krentz *Comm.* 144; Jordan *TAPA* 101 (1970) 232), he was sent to Andros to replace Conon.

406/5

Archestratus of Phrearrhii IV

Adeimantus son of Leucolophides of Scambonidae IV¹

Pericles son of Pericles of Cholargus V

Aristocrates ?son of Scellias ?of Trinemeia VII

Conon son of Timotheus of Anaphlystus X

Diomedon

¹ He and Philocles were chosen "in addition" as colleagues for Conon after the deposition of the eight generals after Arginousae.

Lysias¹

Leon²

Not included by Develin.

Erasinides

Protomachus

Thrasyllus

Aristogenes

Philocles (see 319 n. 1 above)

405/4

Eucrates son of Niceratus of Cydantidae II

Adeimantus son of Leucolophides of Scambonidae IV

Tydeus ?son of Lamachus of Oe³ VI

Conon son of Timotheus of Anaphlystus X

Philocles

Menander (see n. 3 above on Tydeus)

Cephisodotus (see n. 3 above on Tydeus)

404/3

No known *strategoi* for this year (Rule of the Thirty)

403/2

Rhinon ?son of Charicles of Paeania III

402/1–397/6

No known *strategoi* for these years

¹ Diodorus has Lysanias, but this is probably a mistake for Lysias (most recently Krentz *Comm.* 143) whom Xenophon names at 1.6.30, 7.2 and Philochorus at *FGrH* 328 F 142. He was probably the suffect for Archestratus [see under Leon].

² Neither Fornara nor Develin include him on their lists, since Fornara, followed by Develin, claimed that this was probably a mistake for Lysias (*Generals* 70 & n. 124). Krentz (*Comm.* 143) allows this as a possibility, but also suggests, following McCoy (*AJP* 96 (1975) 193) and Rhodes (*Comm.* 423), that Lysias replaced Archestratus after his death at Mytilene (Lys. 21.8), while Leon either remained at Mytilene with Conon or sailed out on a ship captured by the Spartans (Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.16–22).

³ Three generals, Menander, Tydeus and Cephisodotus, were chosen “in addition” (προσείλοντο): Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.16. Krentz (*Comm.* 173) suggests that either the fleet chose the generals, following the precedent of 411, or the assembly elected and dispatched additional generals at the spring election of 405, and, I think, rightly concludes that this second alternative is more likely since the elections were held in the spring. Fornara (*Generals* 70) and Develin do not doubt the patronymic, but Krentz (*Comm.* 173) has reservations. He finds it more likely that this was the Tydeus who was a commander at Catana in 413 (Lys. 20.26).

396/5

{Demaenetus son of Demeas of Paeania¹

{III}

Included by Develin, but see n. 1 & entry for 390/89}

395/4

Thrasybulus son of Lycus of Steiria

III

?Ctesicles

?Hieronymus²

394/3

Thrasybulus son of Lycus of Steiria

III

Mnesicles

VI

[Tho]ucle[ides]

IX

?Polystratus

393/2

{Iphicrates son of Timotheus of Rhamnous

{IX}

Included by Develin, but I am inclined to think that Iphicrates was not a *strategos* while he was commanding the mercenary forces at Corinth, partly because of the distinction made by Xenophon at *Hell.* 4.5.13, and partly because of the difficulties concerning his age (see Develin for references); see Thompson *GR&BS* 26 (1985) 51-7, whose arguments I find appealing.}

¹ Develin makes Demaenetus a general in this year on the basis of *Hell. Oxyrh.* 6.1, but this is a secret mission of which he is simply described as κύ[ρ]ι[ος] (see Bruce *Comm.* 50-1; McKechnie & Kern *Comm.* 132-3), though Develin finds no difficulty with this. Demaenetus is known to have held a generalship, probably before 388 (see Hansen *Ecclesia II* 40 revised from *GR&BS* 24 (1983) 163), with Cleobules (Aeschin. 2.78), but this was against the Spartan *Nauarchos*, Cheilon, who could not have been *Nauarchos* in this year. Cawkwell (*CQ* n.s. 26 (1976) 272 n. 14) suggests 390/89 as a possible year when Cheilon could have been *Nauarchos*, but, I think, Teleutias must be the *Nauarchos* in this year (*Spartan Nauarchoi* 334 & n. 2). Develin inclines to think that the Milon of *Hell. Oxyrh.* is the Cheilon of Aeschines, but this does not resolve the problem of an extra *Nauarchos* for the year 396/5. If one is looking for years around this time when a nauarch could be fitted in, 392/1 (where Cawkwell would like to place Teleutias, but I do not think this can be so; again, see *Spartan Nauarchoi* 334) offers itself as a possibility.

² See the reasonable objections of Bruce to Hieronymus holding an official position in this year (*Comm.* 99); though Hansen (*Ecclesia II* 49 revised from *GR&BS* 24 (1983) 169) places him in this year.

392/1

??Demaenetus ?son of Demeas of Paeania	III
[396/5 Develin. See 321 n. 1 above.]	
??Cleobulus son of Glaucus of Alopece	IV
[396/5 Develin. See 321 n. 1 above.]	
{?Iphicrates son of Timotheus of Rhamnous	{IX}
See entry for 393/2.}	

391/0

{?Iphicrates son of Timotheus of Rhamnous	{IX}
See entry for 393/2.}	
Callias son of Hipponicus of Alopece	X

390/89

Thrasybulus son of Lycus of Steiria	III
Chabrias son of Ctesippus of Aexone	VII
{?Iphicrates son of Timotheus of Rhamnous	{IX}
See entry for 393/2.}	
Philocrates son of Ephialtes	
Ergocles	
?Diotimus	

389/8

Agyrrhius of Collytus	II
Thrasybulus son of Lycus of Steiria	III
Pamphilus of Ceiriadae	VIII
†?Iphicrates son of Timotheus of Rhamnous	IX

Like Develin, I think his *strategia* for this year is almost certain. He had by now proved himself to be a competent commander in the field, so any difficulties with his age may have been waived. On his Thracian connections, see main discussion 118-20.

?Diotimus

388/7

Demaenetus ?son of Demeas of Paeania	III
Chabrias son of Ctesippus of Aexone	VII

†?Iphicrates son of Timotheus of Rhamnous IX

See entry for 389/8 and main discussion 118-20.

Diotimus

387/6

Thrasybulus son of Thrason of Collytus II

There is no need to doubt the *strategia*, as does Develin.

Demaenetus ?son of Demeas of Paeania III

?Iphicrates son of Timotheus of Rhamnous IX

See entry for 389/8 .

Dionysius

Leontichus

Diotimus

Phanias

386/5-380/79

No known *strategoi* for these years

379/8

?Chabrias son of Ctesippus of Aexone VII

Demophon

378/7

Chabrias son of Ctesippus of Aexone VII

Callistratus son of Callicrates of Aphidna IX

Timotheus son of Conon of Anaphlystus X

377/6

Chabrias son of Ctesippus of Aexone VII

376/5

Chabrias son of Ctesippus of Aexone VII

Timotheus son of Conon of Anaphlystus X

375/4

†Timotheus son of Conon of Anaphlystus	X
Sent around the Peloponnese, brought the Corcyraeans under control, won over the cities there (Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 5.4.64), persuaded the cities of Acarnania to come over to Athens and made Alcetas, the king of the Molossians, his φίλος (Diod. 15.36.5). Compare the commands of his father, Conon, in 414/3 and 411. See also 374/3.	

374/3

†Timotheus son of Conon of Anaphlystus	X
Timotheus again sent to help the Corcyraeans; see 375/4.	
Ctesicles	

373/2

Thrasybulus son of Thrason of Collytus	II
Chabrias son of Ctesippus of Aexone	VII
Iphicrates son of Timotheus of Rhamnous	IX*
Callistratus son of Callicrates of Aphidna	IX*
Timotheus son of Conon of Anaphlystus	X
Ctesicles	

372/1

Chabrias son of Ctesippus of Aexone	VII
Callistratus son of Callicrates of Aphidna	IX*
Iphicrates son of Timotheus of Rhamnous	IX*

371/0

?Chabrias son of Ctesippus of Aexone	VII
Iphicrates son of Timotheus of Rhamnous	IX

370/69

Iphicrates son of Timotheus of Rhamnous	IX
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369/8

Chabrias son of Ctesippus of Aexone	VII
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368/7

Autocles son of Strombichides of Euonymon	I
?Chabrias son of Ctesippus of Aexone	VII
Iphicrates son of Timotheus of Rhamnous	IX
Phormio	
Spoudias	

367/6

Chares son of Theochares of Angele	III
Timomachus of Acharnae	VI
†Iphicrates son of Timotheus of Rhamnous	IX
See main discussion 118-20.	
†Timotheus son of Conon of Anaphlystus	X

Timotheus sent to help Ariobarzanes. Ariobarzanes was probably the brother of Pharnabazus (Beloch G.G.² III 2.146-7, 151; cf. Hornblower *Mausolus* 173; Sealey *Demosthenes and His Time* 43. Weiskopf (*The So-called "Great Satraps' Revolt" 366-360 BC* 27-31) would make him Pharnabazus' eldest son; Sealey (280 n. 134) notes: "that is possible, but not more likely."), with whom Euagoras of Salamis found Conon a place as commander of the Persian mercenary fleet. Pharnabazus gave Conon money to maintain the fleet and rebuild the long walls at Athens.

366/5

Chares son of Theochares of Angele	III
Chabrias son of Ctesippus of Aexone	VII
†Iphicrates son of Timotheus of Rhamnous	IX
See main discussion 118-20.	
Timotheus son of Conon of Anaphlystus	X
?Lysistratus	

365/4

†Iphicrates son of Timotheus of Rhamnous	IX
See main discussion 118-20.	

†Timotheus son of Conon of Anaphlystus X

Took over Iphicrates' command at Amphipolis. Conon is said to have originally recruited the Thracian mercenaries stationed at Corinth (Nepos *Iph.* 1.3-4).

There may be a connection, though it is by no means certain.

364/3

Alcimachus of Anagyrous I

Laches ?son of Laches of Aexone VII

Timotheus son of Conon of Anaphlystus X

363/2

Hegesileus (Hegelochus) ?of Probalinthus III

Chabrias son of Ctesippus of Aexone VII

†Aristophon son of Aristophanes of Azenia VIII

General to Ceos in this year. He proposed a decree concerning the renewal of a treaty with Iulis, one of the cities on Ceos (*IG* ii² 111 [= Tod 142]). Tod (in his commentary on 142) says that Aristophon "was especially interested in Ceos." He was the πρόξευος of Carthaea (*IG* 12 (5) i 542.43), another city on Ceos, though he was accused of treating the inhabitants badly because of his love of money (φιλοχρηματία); schol. Aeschin. 1.64; cf.

Hypereides *Euxen.* 28; Aeschin. 3.194.

Timotheus son of Conon of Anaphlystus X

Ergophilus¹

Callisthenes

362/1

Autocles son of Strombichides of Euonymon² I

Menon of Potamus IV

¹ On Ergophilus' and Callisthenes' commands in this year, see now Sealey *Demosthenes and His Time* 253-4.

² For the commands of Autocles and Menon in this year, see also Sealey *Demosthenes and His Time* 254.

361/0

Chares son of Theochares of Angyle	III
Leosthenes of Cephale	V
Timomachus of Acharnae	VI
?Philon ?son of Callippus of Aexone	VII
?Theotimus ¹	
?[Charid]emus ²	

360/59

Mantias son of Mantitheus of Thoricus	V
Cephisodotus ?of Acharnae	VI
Timotheus son of Conon of Anaphlystus	X

359/8

?Chabrias son of Ctesippus of Aexone ³	VII
---	-----

358/7

?Chares son of Theochares of Angele	III
-------------------------------------	-----

357/6

Alci[machus of Anagyrous]	I
Cha[res son of Theochares of Angele] ⁴	III
Menon of Potamus	IV
Execestides son of Charias of Thoricus	V
[[Cha]brias son of Ctesippus of Aexone]	VII
Philochares of Rhamnous	IX*
[Iphicrates] son of Timotheus of Rhamnous ⁵	IX*
Diocles of Alopece	X

¹ Note that Sealey (*Demosthenes and His Time* 254) thinks it likely that his command was in the next year, 360/59.

² The date of decree and the identification are uncertain; see Whitehead *AHB* 3.5 (1989) 102-6; if the name is Charidemus, the man need not be the son of Philoxenus (who ought not to be an Athenian citizen as early as this: Dem. 23.141; see Parke *Greek Mercenary Soldiers* 128 n. 4, *contra* Kirchner *PA*, Osborne *Naturalization* 3.56-8).

³ Sealey (*Demosthenes and His Time* 255) places his command in 358/7.

⁴ Chares' name may be wrongly restored in *IG* ii² 124 (= Tod 153) (see Appendix D: *Oath-takers* 387 n. 1), but he was in any case a *strategos* in this year (Dem. 23.173).

⁵ The demotic is in the inscription, so the double must stand.

356/5

Chares son of Theochares of Angele	III
Menestheus son of Iphicrates of Rhamnous	IX*
Iphicrates son of Timotheus of Rhamnous	IX*
Timotheus son of Conon of Anaphlystus	X
?Antidotus	

355/4

Chares son of Theochares of Angele	III
{Melanopus son of Laches of Aexone	{VII}
Included by Develin, but Lewis dates the inscription (<i>IG</i> ii ² 150) to the fifth century (see Hornblower <i>Mausolus</i> 217 n. 291), and, given the uncertainties in restoring the names, it is best left out of account. He was certainly a <i>presbeutes</i> (Dem. 24.12-3).}	

354/3

?Alcimachus of Anagyrous	I
Chares son of Theochares of Angele	III

353/2

Chares son of Theochares of Angele	III
------------------------------------	-----

352/1

Nausicles son of Clearchus of Oe	VI
----------------------------------	----

351/0

†Charidemus son of Philoxenus of Acharnae	VI
See main discussion 120-1.	

350/49

†?Charidemus son of Philoxenus of Acharnae	VI
See main discussion 120-1.	
Ephialtes	

349/8

Chares son of Theochares of Angele	III*
Hegesileus ?of Probalinthus	III*

†Charidemus son of Philoxenus of Acharnae VI

See main discussion 120-1.

Phocion son of Phocus

348/7

Chares son of Theochares of Angele III

?Molossus (Molottus)

347/6

Chares son of Theochares of Angele III

Phaedrus son of Callias of Sphettus V

Proxenus son of Harmodius of Aphidna IX

346/5

No known *strategoi* for this year

345/4

Philochares son of Atrometus of Cothocidae VI

?Cephisophon son of Cephalion of Aphidna IX

344/3

Philochares son of Atrometus of Cothocidae VI

?Phocion son of Phocus

343/2

Chares son of Theochares of Angele III

Diopetithes ?son of Diphilus of Sunium IV

Philochares son of Atrometus of Cothocidae VI

Phocion son of Phocus

342/1

Diopetithes ?son of Diphilus of Sunium IV

Cephisophon son of Cephalion of Aphidna IX

341/0

Chares son of Theochares of Angele III

Diopetithes ?son of Diphilus of Sunium IV

Phocion son of Phocus

?Callias

340/39

Chares son of Theochares of Angele III

Cephisophon son of Cephalion of Aphidna IX

†Phocion son of Phocus

The Athenians sent Phocion and Cephisophon to the Hellespont. Leon of Byzantium was an acquaintance of Phocion's from Plato's Academy, and Phocion and his men were admitted to the city (Plut. *Phoc.* 14.6-8; IG ii² 1628.436-438, 1629.957-59; [Plut.] *Vitae X Orat.* 851 a; Tritle (*Phocion the Good* 52-3, cf. 92-3) says: "The key factor in Byzantium's defense [against Philip] was the bond of friendship between Phocion and Leon"; cf. Sealey *Demosthenes and His Time* 188.

339/8

Chares son of Theochares of Angele III

Proxenus son of Harmodius of Aphidna IX

Phocion son of Phocus

?Protomachus

338/7

Diotimus son of Dieitrephes of Euonymon I

Chares son of Theochares of Angele III

Charidemus son of Philoxenus of Acharnae VI*¹

Stratocles ?of Laciadae VI*

?Nausicles son of Clearchus of Oe VI*

[.....]τ[---] from tribe VI VI*

Lysicles

Phocion son of Phocus

¹ Although only Charidemus is sure here, we probably have double, if not triple representation from tribe VI. The change seems to have taken place after 357/6 but before the time of the *Ath. Pol.* (see 61.1). It is quite possible that this year may postdate the change from tribal representation, and that what we have is literally four generals elected from the same tribe.

337/6

Diotimus son of Diitrephes of Euonymon

I

Spartan Non- Royal Commands

*Nauarchoi*¹

Summer 430-Winter 429/8

Cnemus

PL 448

Summer 428-Summer 427

Alcidas

PL 62

Summer 425

Thrasymelidas son of Cratesicles

PL 378

Winter 413/12

Melanchridas

PL 517

Summer 412-Summer 411

Astyochus

PL 169

Summer 411-Summer 410

Mindarus

PL 536

(Hippocrates ἐπιστολεύς)

PL 391

¹ On the regularity and tenure of the appointment, see Sealey *Klio* 58 (1976) 335-58; Bommelaer *Lysandre de Sparte* 66-79; Hornblower *Comm.* 349; Andrewes *HCT* 4.38; 5.454-5. For *Nauarchoi* earlier than 408, I simply give the dates for which they are attested in terms of Thucydidean years. When the source reference is cited in *PL* I give sources references only when necessary for the discussion. I have based my list, for the most part, upon the list of Pareti, though I do not always agree with all his dates or assignments.

† indicates possible election on the basis of connections.

? indicates those men whose office is not entirely secure or who may not belong in that year.

?? indicates those men whose office is very insecure or who are only very tentatively placed in that year.

{ } enclose those generals included by Pareti, but who I believe should be omitted.

Unfortunately, limitations of space prevent full discussion of all the "suitable" appointments. The most noteworthy examples are discussed at Chapter Four 147-51.

410/9

?Pasippidas¹

PL 591

408/7 (Sealey)²

Autumn 409-Spring 407 (Bommelaer)

Cratesippidas

PL 456

407/6

Lysander son of Aristocritus

PL 504

406/5

Callicratidas

PL 408

(?Clearchus ἐπιστολεύς)

PL 425

406/5

{?Eteonicus

PL 283

Tentatively included by Pareti (74), but he was in command of troops, not of the fleet.}

405/4

Aracus³

PL 107

(†Lysander as ἐπιστολεύς

PL 504

See main discussion 153, 155 and Chapter Five 209-10.)

404/3

Libys

PL 490

403/2

{?Panthoïdas

PL 585

Included tentatively by Pareti (83), but the emphasis is on him commanding troops (Diod. 14.12.6).}

¹ Provisionally included by Pareti (59, 124), and he may well have been *Nauarchos* since Cratesippidas was sent to command the fleet which Pasippidas had collected from the allies, though Xenophon does not give him any title.

² On the dating for the Nauarchy, see 333 n. 1.

³ His position was only nominal. Lysander held the command (Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.7).

402/1

Samius/Pythagoras¹ PL 659

401/0

Anaxibius PL 86

400/399

Polus PL 653

398/7

Pharax PL 718

397/6

Archelaïdas PL 146

396/5

Pollis PL 621

395/4

Cheiricrates PL 758

{Peisander PL 601

This was a special position appointed by the king (who himself had been given command over the fleet and the power to appoint whomever he thought best (Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.27, 29)) and not a regular nauarchy. Xenophon does not always discriminate between his use of ναύαρχος meaning the regular office of *Nauarchos*, and his use when simply referring to the commander of a contingent of ships.)

393/2

Podanemus PL 616

(Pollis ἐπιστολεύς) PL 621

(Herippidas)² PL 349

¹ See Pareti 84; Poralla suggests that the Pythagoras mentioned at Xen. *Anab.* 1.4.2 is the same man as Samius under a pseudonym.

² Assumed the command of the fleet on the death of Podanemus (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.11).

392/1

?Cheilon (see *Athenian Strategoi* above under 396/5 n. 1) cf. PL 535

391/0

Ecdicus¹ PL 256

(Philodocus [=Philodicus]) PL 726

Perhaps he was ἐπιστολεύς; see Diod. 14.97.3; cf. Xen.

Hell. 4.8.20-1; Pareti 128.)

390/89

Teleutias² PL 689

389/88

Hierax PL 383

(Gorgopas ἐπιστολεύς) PL 193

388/7

†Antalcidas PL 97

Antalcidas was appointed *Nauarchos*, as the

Lacedaemonians thought this would gratify (χαρίζεσθαι)

Tiribazus. See Chapter Five 213-4.

(Nicolochus ἐπιστολεύς) PL 564

387/6

{Teleutias PL 689

Included here by Pareti (see 101), and Xenophon calls him

ναύαρχος (Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.13). There seem to be two

possibilities: either he held the command for a second

time, despite the prohibition on this (see Xen. *Hell.*

2.1.7; compare Pollis, though see Cawkwell (CQ n.s. 26

¹ See Pareti 100.

² Since he was sent to take over from Ecdicus, who is called ναύαρχος (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.20), and is replaced in the next year by Hierax, who is also given the title of ναύαρχος (Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.3), I think we should assume that he was the *Nauarchos* for this year, despite the difficulties of Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.13 *contra* Pareti (100-1) who regards Teleutias here as holding a special office, and would place his nauarchy in 387/6; Cawkwell (CQ n.s. 26 (1976) 272 n. 14) would like to make him the *Nauarchos* in 392/1. It is possible, since he took over the ships from Herippidas (who assumed the command on the death of Podanemus), but I think this year is more likely.

(1976) 272 n. 14) on this), the first time being probably in 390/89 (see note there); or this use of ναύαρχος does not refer to the annual regular command (see also entry on Peisander in 395/4). As there are difficulties with chronology and overlapping with Antalcidas (see Cawkwell *loc. cit.*) then this second possibility seems more likely.}

376/5

Pollis¹

?PL 621

375/4

Nicolochus

PL 564

374/3

?Aristocrates²

PL 128

?Alcidas

PL 63

373/2

Mnasippus

PL 538

(Hypermenes ἐπιστολύαφορος)

PL 711

¹ He is apparently serving for his second year as *Nauarchos* (see also 396/5), though Cawkwell thinks they may be different men with the same name (Cawkwell CQ n.s. 26 (1976) 272 n. 14).

² See esp. Pareti 106-7. One, or possibly both, of these was not the annually appointed *Nauarchos*. Pareti says (*ibid.* 107): "forse nè l'uno nè l'altro furoni navarchi, ma due duci straordinari e probabilmente armosti; ma si può anche supporre che uno di essi, e preferibilmente il primo, Aristocrate, sia stato il navarco del 374/3, e che Alcida fosse un duce straordinario."

Harmosts & Archons¹

Summer 431

Brasidas son of Tellis PL 177

Winter 428-Summer 427

(Salaethus)² PL 657

Autumn 426-Winter 426/5

Eurylochus PL 329

(Macarius PL 508

Second-in-command (Th. 3.100.2))

(Menedaius PL 526

Third-in-command (Th. 3.100.2); on the death of Eurylochus and Macarius, he took up the ἀρχή (Th. 3.109.1))

Summer 425

Epitadas son of Melobrius PL 275

(Hippagretas PL 386

Second-in-command (Th. 4.38.1))

(Styphon son of Pharax PL 675

Third-in-command, but assumed the leadership since Epitadas was dead and Hippagretas wounded (Th. 4.38.1))

Summer 424

Tantalus son of Patrocles PL 684

¹ I have attempted to collect all those holding non-royal commands, whether of expeditions, garrisons or small squadrons of ships. When evidence is cited in *PL*, I give source references only when necessary for the discussion of a problem. I have consulted the lists and discussions of Pareti, Parke (*JHS* 50 (1930) 37-79) and Bockisch (*Klio* 46 (1965) 129-239), and compiled my own list on the basis of these. Years are calculated for Thucydidean years in summers and winters, and I have tried to maintain this as far as possible throughout the succeeding years. Only the First-in-command is included in the statistics, though I have included the names of the Second- and Third-in-command where they are known. Only the original appointment of the archon/harmost is included in the statistics. I will indicate when a command is continuing into subsequent years.

† indicates possible election on the basis of connections.

² Not a commander of troops, but he was in charge at Mytilene; compare Gylippus at Syracuse; see Parke *JHS* 50 (1930) 43.

†Brasidas son of Tellis PL 177
See main discussion 147-8.

Summer 423

†Brasidas son of Tellis [continuation] PL 177
See main discussion 147-8.

Polydamidas PL 626

Clearidas son of Cleonymus PL 424

†Pasitelidas son of Agesander PL 592

The *archon* of Torone (Th. 4.132.3; 5.3.1-2); Agesandridas, who was probably his brother (Th. 8.91.2; Gomme *HCT* 1.451; *PL* (see under Pasitelidas and Agesandridas); on Agesander, see Th. 1.139.3) also held a command on the Thracian coast (Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.17; see under summer 408). This may be merely coincidental, but it may suggest family connections in the Thraceward parts.

Summer 422

†Brasidas son of Tellis [continuation] PL 177
See main discussion 147-8.

Clearidas son of Cleonymus [continuation] PL 424

†Pasitelidas son of Agesander [continuation] PL 592

See discussion above under 423.

Summer 421

Clearidas son of Cleonymus [continuation] PL 424

Winter 420/19

†Xenares son of Cnidis PL 567

He was involved with the Boeotians during his ephorate of 421 (Th. 5.36.1, 37.1, 38.3, 46.4; Plut. *Nic.* 10.8); harmost of Heracleia Trachinia in 420 (Th. 5.51.2). The Boeotians had an interest in Heracleia Trachinia as evidenced in their expulsion of the harmost of 419, Hagesippidas (Th. 5.52.1). There is a possibility he was selected for this command because of his Boeotian sympathies in what was evidently a sensitive area.

Summer 419

Hagesippidas (= Agesippidas [Th. 5.56.1]) PL 16

Winter 415/4

(Gylippus son of Cleandridas)¹ PL 196

Summer 414

(Gylippus son of Cleandridas) [continuation] PL 196

Eccritus PL 258

Summer 413

Alcamenes son of Sthenelaïdas PL 57

Melanthus PL 518

Winter 413/2

Chalcideus PL 743

Summer 412

†Clearchus son of Ramphias PL 425

See main discussion 149-50.

Eualas PL 291

Deiniadas (one of the perioeci) PL 221

†Eteonicus PL 283

See main discussion 151.

†Pedaritus son of Leon PL 599

A Leon took over the command of Pedaritus at Chios in 411. Thucydides does not point out a family connection, and Leon is too common a name for it to be sure. Poralla sees the connection as possible, but Andrewes (*HCT* 5.69) thinks it unlikely. Lewis (*S&P* 35 n. 65) doubts that this Leon is the father of Pedaritus, as do Whitehead (*LCM* 4 (1979) 192) and Cartledge (*Agesilaos* 145).

Philippus PL 725

Alcamenes son of Sthenelaïdas PL 57

Thermon PL 366

¹ "On loan" to the Syracusans against the Athenians. He remained with the Syracusans for the duration of their war against the Athenians (see Parke *JHS* 50 (1930) 43-4).

?Therimenes PL 371

Winter 412/1

Hippocrates PL 391

Antisthenes PL 104

Summer 411

†Clearchus son of Ramphias PL 425

See main discussion 149-50.

†Dercylidas PL 228

See main discussion 150-1.

†Leon ?son of Anticleidas PL 482

See entry for Pedaritus under 412.

Agessandridas son of Agessander (=Hegessandridas son of

Hegessander)

Hippocrates PL 391

Epicles PL 269

Summer 410

†Eteonicus PL 283

See main discussion 151.

†?Clearchus son of Ramphias PL 425

See main discussion 149-50.

Winter 409/8

Labotas PL 461

Summer 408

†Clearchus son of Ramphias PL 425

See main discussion 149-50.

Hippocrates PL 391

†Agessandridas PL 5

See entry under Pasitelidas in Summer 423.

Summer 407 (Nauarchy of Lysander)

†Dercylidas PL 228

See main discussion 150-1.

Summer 406

Eteonicus	PL 283
(Dexippus) ¹	PL 227

Summer 405

Thorax	PL 380
†?Eteonicus	PL 283
See main discussion 151.	
Sthenelaus	PL 665

Summer 404

Thorax	PL 380
Aristus [Aretes]	PL 135

Winter 404/3

Callibius	PL 405
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Summer 403

Lysander son of Aristocritus	PL 504
?Panthoidas ²	PL 585

Summer 401

{?Eteonicus	PL 283
Pareti includes him here, but he was not a commander, but served in some subordinate position to the <i>Nauarchos</i> , Anaxibius (Xen. <i>Anab.</i> 7.1.12, 20.)	
Cleander	PL 422

Summer 400

Aristarchus	PL 117
Cyniscus	PL 460
Bion	PL 174
Naucleidas	PL 550
Polynicus	PL 630
Charminus	PL 750

¹ Seems to be "on loan" to the Syracusans (Diod. 13.93.1-4); see Gylippus above. He was sent back to Sparta in spring 405.

² Sent to Byzantium against Clearchus; see also *Spartan Nauarchoi* under this year.

Summer 399

Thibron PL 374

†Dercylidas PL 228

See main discussion 150-1.

?†Herippidas PL 349

Sent to Heracleia Trachinia to restore order (Diod. 14.38.4-5); one of the harmosts in Thebes in the period during which the Spartans held the Cadmeia (Plut. *Pelop.* 12-3); given Theban interests in Heracleia Trachinia (see on Xenares son of Cnidis under 420/19), there is a possibility that his selection to both these commands was the results of some Theban connection.

?Nicander PL 556

Summer 398

†Dercylidas [continuation] PL 228

See main discussion 150-1.

Lysippus PL 506

Winter 398/7

Dracon of Pellene

Summer 397

Milon¹ PL 535

†Dercylidas [continuation] PL 228

See main discussion 150-1.

Summer 396

Lysander son of Aristocritus PL 504

Summer 395

?Alcisthenes (= Lacisthenes) PL 467

?Pancalus² PL 584

¹ Harmost at Aegina. See *Athenian Strategoi* 321 n. 1 for Milon possibly = to Cheilon of Aeschin. 2.78, but I think not.

² See Parke *JHS* 50 (1930) 67.

Summer 394

†Dercylidas PL 228

See main discussion 150-1.

Euxenus PL 310

393

?Alexander¹ PL 50

Summer 391

Thibron PL 374

Diphridas² PL 243

†Dercylidas [continuation] PL 228

See main discussion 150-1.

Teleutias PL 689

Summer 390

Therimachus PL 370

†Dercylidas [continuation] PL 228

See main discussion 150-1.

?Phylopidas³ PL 739

Summer 389

Anaxibius PL 86

Winter 389/8

?Eteonicus PL 283

Gorgopas PL 193

¹ Bockisch places him here (*Klio* 46 (1965) 218 n. 6), though Parke (*JHS* 50 (1930) 68) places him in 392/1 and *PL* in 391.

² Replaced Thibron when he was killed (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.19).

³ Bockisch places him here (*Klio* 46 (1965) 218 n. 6), though Parke (*JHS* 50 (1930) 68) places him in 393.

Summer 382

?†Eudamidas

PL 295

Whether one accepts the order of Xenophon or Diodorus (Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.24-5; Diod. 15.19.3, 20.1-3), both Eudamidas and his brother, Phoebidas, commanded troops for Olynthus in this year. It is perhaps suggestive of some kind of connection, though this is by no means sure.

?†Phoebidas

PL 734

See on Eudamidas above.

Teleutias

PL 689

Summer 380

Polybiades

PL 625

Winter 379/8

Sphodrias

PL 680

Period during which the Spartans held the Cadmeia (382-379)

?†Herippidas

PL 349

See above on 399.

Arcissus

PL 142

Lysanoridas

PL 505

Summer 378

Phoebidas

PL 734

Summer 377

Alcetas

PL 59

Theripides

PL 372

Panthoïdas

PL 585

375

Ischolaus

PL 401

Summer 371

Hieron

PL 384

Winter 370/69

Ischolaus PL 401

Summer 369

Polytropus PL 633

Winter 367/6

?Naucles PL 549

Before 371

Euphratas Aen. Tact. 27.7

Military Commanders of other States¹

Arcadia

Summer 427

Hippias Th. 3.34.3

Arcadian Federation

369/8

Lycomedes Diod. 15.62.1

366/5

Aeneas (Stymphalian)² Xen. Hell. 7.3.1

Argos

Summer 418

Thrasyllus Th. 5.59.5

366

Peisias Xen. Hell. 7.1.41

¹ This is not an exhaustive search of all possible texts, but I have attempted to collect all commanders of states other than Athens and Sparta from the major sources and as many others as I have come across in my reading.

† indicates possible election on the basis of connections.

² On his probable status as president of the Arcadian Federation, see Underhill *Comm.* 289.

?344 (but Diodorus' year 351/0)

Nicostratus	Diod. 16.44.2
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Ceos (Iulis)

362

Echetimus	IG ii ² 111.15-7 (= Tod 142)
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Nicoleu[s]	IG ii ² 111.15-7 (= Tod 142)
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S[a]tyrus	IG ii ² 111.15-7 (= Tod 142)
-----------	---

Glaucon	IG ii ² 111.15-7 (= Tod 142)
---------	---

Heracleides	IG ii ² 111.15-7 (= Tod 142)
-------------	---

Chaonia

Summer 429

Photius	Th. 2.80.5
---------	------------

Nicanor	Th. 2.80.5
---------	------------

Chios

Summer 412

Eubulus	Th. 8.23.4
---------	------------

Corcyra

432

Miciades	Th. 1.47.1
----------	------------

Aesimides	Th. 1.47.1
-----------	------------

Eurybatus	Th. 1.47.1
-----------	------------

Corinth

435

Aristeus son of Pellichus	Th. 1.29.2
Callicrates son of Callias	Th. 1.29.2
Timanor son of Timanthes	Th. 1.29.2
Archetimus son of Eurytimus	Th. 1.29.2
Isarchidas son of Isarchus	Th. 1.29.2

432

Xenocleides son of Euthycles	Th. 1.46.2
†Aristeus son of Adeimantus	Th. 1.60.2
See main discussion 158-9.	

Winter 431/0

Euphamidas son of Aristonomus	Th. 2.33.1
Timoxenus son of Timocrates	Th. 2.33.1
Eumachus son of Chrysis	Th. 2.33.1

Summer 429

Machaon	Th. 2.83.4
Isocrates	Th. 2.83.4
Agatharchidas	Th. 2.83.4

Summer 425

Battus	Th. 4.43.1
Lycophron	Th. 4.43.1

Summer 414

Pythen	Th. 6.104.1, 7.1.1
Gongylus	Th. 7.2.1
Erasinides	Th. 7.7.1
Alexarchus	Th. 7.19.4

Summer 413

Polyanthes	Th. 7.34.2
Pythen	Th. 7.70.1

404

Nicoteles

Diod. 14.10.3

Summer 394

Agathinus (*Nauarchos*)

Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.10

Summer 393

Proaenus (*Nauarchos*)

Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.11

Italian Locri

Winter 426/5

Proxenus son of Capaton¹

Th. 3.103.3

Summer 425

Demoteles

Th. 4.25.11

Megara

Summer 411

Helixus

Th. 8.80.3

Summer 408

Helixus

Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.15,
17, 21

***Phocis*²**

356

Philomelus

Diod. 16.23.1, 24.1

355

Philomelus

Diod. 16.28.1

¹ See Hornblower *Comm.* 516-7.

² Accepting Hammond's chronology for the Third Sacred War: *JHS* 17 (1937) 44-77 (= *Studies in Greek History* 486-533). For a slightly different chronology, see Buckler *Philip II and the Sacred War*.

354

Philomelus (killed: Diod. 16.31.4)

Diod. 16.30.1

Onomarchus

Diod. 16.31.5

353

Onomarchus

Diod. 16.33.2

352

Onomarchus (killed: Diod. 16.35.6)

Diod. 16.35.2

Phayllus

Diod. 16.36.1

351

Phayllus (killed: Diod. 16.38.6)

Diod. 16.38.2

350

Phalaecus

Diod. 16.38.6, 39.8

Mnaseas (guardian of Phalaecus)

Diod. 16.38.6

348/7

Phalaecus (deposed)

Diod. 16.56.3

347

Deinocrates

Diod. 16.56.3

Callias

Diod. 16.56.3

Sophanes

Diod. 16.56.3

346/5

Phalaecus

Diod. 16.59.2-3 (cf.

Aeschin. 2.142)

Samos

Summer 406

Hippeus

Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.29

Sicyon

Summer 414

Sargeus	Th. 7.19.4
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368¹

†Euphron	Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 7.1.45;
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Euphron and his son, Adeas, were elected commanders under the new regime sponsored by the Argives and Arcadians, probably because of his new Argive and Arcadian connections (see Chapter Three 82-3).	Diod. 15.70.3
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Hippodamus	Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 7.1.45
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Cleander	Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 7.1.45
----------	--------------------------

Acrisius	Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 7.1.45
----------	--------------------------

Lysander	Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 7.1.45
----------	--------------------------

†Adeas son of Euphron	Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 7.1.45
-----------------------	--------------------------

See above on Euphron.

Syracuse

Winter 415/4

Hermocrates	Th. 6.73.1, 96.3
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Heracleidas son of Lysimachus	Th. 6.73.1
-------------------------------	------------

Sicanus son of Execestus	Th. 6.73.1
--------------------------	------------

Summer 414

Hermocrates ²	Th. 6.99.2
--------------------------	------------

Heracleides ?son of Aristogenes ³	Th. 6.103.4
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Eucles	Th. 6.103.4
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Tellias	Th. 6.103.4
---------	-------------

Summer 413

Agatharchus	Th. 7.25.1, 70.1
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¹ With Buckler (*The Theban Hegemony* 243), I am following Diodorus' dating rather than Xenophon's.

² The original generals, including Hermocrates, were deposed on account of their defeat at Epipolae and three new generals were elected (Th. 6.103.4).

³ For Heracleides' patronymic, see Dover *HCT* 4.376.

Sicanus son of Execestus Th. 7.46, 70.1

Summer 412

Hermocrates Th. 8.26.1

Summer 411¹

Hermocrates Th. 8.85.3

Potamis son of Gnosis Th. 8.85.3

Myscon son of Menecrates Th. 8.85.3

Demarchus son of Epicydes Th. 8.85.3

Summer 409

Eucles son of Hippon Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.8

Heracleides son of Aristogenes Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.8

372

Crinippus Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.36

368

Cissidas Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.28

***Thebes*²**

431

Pythangelus son of Phyleidas (Boeotarch) Th. 2.2.1

Diemporos son of Ontoridas (Boeotarch) Th. 2.2.1

Winter 424/3

Pagondas son of Aeoladas Th. 4.91.1

Arianthadas son of Lysimachidas Th. 4.91.1

¹ I am following Andrewes (*HCT* 5.281-5), who defends Thucydides in putting Hermocrates' deposition here, though some think Thucydides has anticipated. Xenophon puts the deposition after Cyzicus in 410 (see Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.27, 29).

² I indicate the use of "Boeotarch" and "*strategos*" in the sources; usually, if not always, men designated *stratego*i will in fact be boeotarchs.

Summer 413

Xenon	Th. 7.19.3
Nicon	Th. 7.19.3
Scirphondas (Boeotarch)	Th. 7.30.3

Summer 408

Coeratadas (ἄρχων)	Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 1.3.15, 22
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371

Epameinondas (<i>strategos</i>)	Diod. 15.52.1
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370

Pelopidas (Boeotarch)	Diod. 15.62.4
Epameinondas (Boeotarch)	Diod. 15.62.4

369

Epameinondas	Diod. 15.68.1.
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368

Pelopidas	Diod. 15.71.2
Epameinondas ¹	Diod. 15.71.6

367

Epameinondas	Diod. 15.75.2; Plut. <i>Pelop.</i> 29.1
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366

Epameinondas	Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 7.1.41
--------------	--------------------------

364

Pelopidas	Diod. 15.80.2
-----------	---------------

362

Epameinondas (<i>strategos</i>)	Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 7.4.40
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¹ He was serving as a private soldier, but was elected by the men as *strategos* when Pelopidas was captured.

Pammenes (*strategos*) Diod. 15.94.2

353

Pammenes (*strategos*) Diod. 16.34.2

351

Cephision (*strategos*) Diod. 16.39.2

?344 (but Diodorus' year 351/0)

Lacrates (*strategos*) Diod. 16.44.2

?343 (but Diodorus' year 350/49)

Lacrates Diod. 16.47.2

Note: 1. Diodorus (under the year 375/4) says that Pelopidas, Gorgidas (or Gorgias) and Epameinondas were the most famous of the Theban *hegemones* and *strategoi* (Diod. 15.39.2; cf. 15.50.6);

2. Plutarch writes that Pelopidas was elected to a command every year, either as leader of the sacred band, or as one of the boeotarchs (Plut. *Pelop.* 15.4-5).

Thespieae

Summer 413

Hegesander Th. 7.19.3

Thurii

Winter 412/1

Dorieus son of Diagoreus Th. 8.35.1

See Chapter Three 87-8.

Winter 411/0

Dorieus son of Diagoreus Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.2

Winter 407/6

Dorieus son of Diagoreus Diod. 13.38.5

Appendix C

*Athenian Presbeis*¹

430/29

Learchus son of Callimachus

Ameiniades son of Philemon

426/5

Leogo[ras]

[Pl]eistias

?Lamachus son of Xenophanes of Oe

VI

?Megacles son of Megacles of Alopece

X

?Theorus

424/3

{Agac[les?]

Included by Develin, but he must be an ambassador of Halieis, not of Athens, see Appendix D: *Oath-takers* under 424/3 (the alliance between Athens and Halieis). Note also that IG i³ 75 only restores the λ, and three more letters seem to be required.}

Aristonymus

Epilycus son of Teisander

¹ Again, this list is based upon that of Develin (*Officials*), and, since my primary purpose is to identify those ambassadors whose appointment may have depended on their personal connections, I have otherwise restricted comments for the most part to those cases where I disagree with Develin's assignment to a particular year. Refer to Develin throughout for discussion and references. For a discussion of trends in ambassadorial appointments at Athens, see especially Mosley *Envoys and Diplomacy* 55-62.

† indicates possible election on the basis of connections.

? indicates those men whose office is not entirely secure or who may not belong in that year.

?? indicates those men whose office is very insecure or who are only very tentatively placed in that year.

{} enclose those *presbeis* included by Develin, but who I believe should be omitted.

423/2

Amynias son of Pronapes ?of Prasiae III

Phaeax son of Erisistratus of Acharnae VI

422/1

?Procles of ?Euonymon or ?Cephisia I

Andrewes and Lewis (*JHS* 77 (1957) 177-80) suggest that these ten men were the negotiating team for the peace and alliance (see also Diod. 12.75.4). However Nicias and Laches, who were oath-takers and whom Andrewes and Lewis consider to be representatives from the board of generals, are said by Thucydides to have negotiated the treaty (Th. 5.43.2). I am ready to believe that they were representatives of the ten tribes (though I take Develin's warning that the deme/tribe attributions were made up to show tribal order and that there are other possibilities), but less ready to accept that they were also the embassy of ten that negotiated the peace and the alliance. Note that Develin lists these men as oath-takers rather than as ambassadors.

?Pythodorus ?son of Epizelus of Halae II

?Hagnon son of Nicias of Steiria III

?Myrtilus ?son of Lysis IV

?Thrasycles

?Theogenes (?Theagenes) ?of Acharnae VI

?Aristocrates ?son of Scellias ?of Trinemeia VII

?Iolcius

?Timocrates

?Leon

420/19

†Nicias son of Niceratus of Cydantidae II

See main discussion 162.

419/8

- | | |
|--|----|
| †Alcibiades son of Cleinias of Scambonidae | IV |
| Ambassador to Argos. For his Argive connections, see Chapter Four 118-9. | |

415/4

Euphemus

412/1

- | | |
|---|----|
| Peisander son of Glaucetes of Acharnae | VI |
| These were two separate missions: one to Athens from the fleet at Samos (Th. 8.49); and one to Tissaphernes and Alcibiades from the Athenians (Th. 8.54.2). | |

- | | |
|--|----|
| Peisander son of Glaucetes of Acharnae | VI |
| See above. | |

411 (the Oligarchy of the Four Hundred)

- | | |
|---------------------------------------|------|
| Laespodias son of Andronymis | VIII |
| Melesias son of Thucydides of Alopece | X |
| Aristophon | |

- | | |
|---|---|
| †Archeptolemus son of Hippodamus of Agryle | I |
| Appealed for peace with Sparta after Pylos (Ar. <i>Knights</i> 794; cf. <i>Peace</i> 665-6); a member of the 400, he was an envoy to Sparta in this year. | |

- | | |
|--|------|
| Phrynichus son of Stratonides of Deiradiotae | IV |
| Onomacles ?of tribe VIII | VIII |

On Tribe, see Appendix B: *Athenian Strategoi* 310 n. 1.

- | | |
|-----------------------------|--|
| †Antiphon ?son of Lysonides | |
|-----------------------------|--|

Plutarch (*Mor.* 832 f-833 a) says that Antiphon was sent on every embassy to Sparta during the period of the 400. This at least demonstrates a consistency in the appointment.

409/8

†Euryptolemus ?son of Peisianax ?of Sunium¹

IV

He received the oaths of Pharnabazus on Alcibiades' behalf for that man's private friendship with the Persian (Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.12; cf. Thompson *TAPA* 100 (1969) 586 n. 21); then was part of the embassy which accompanied Pharnabazus to the Persian King (Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.13).

Dorotheus

Philocydes

Theogenes

Mantitheus

405/4

Theramenes son of Hagnon of Steiria

III

These should be treated as two separate missions: one to Lysander (Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.16); and one to the ephors (Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.17).

Theramenes son of Hagnon of Steiria

III

See above.

404/3

Aeschines ?of tribe VII²

VII

For tribe, see Appendix B: *Athenian Strategoi* 310 n. 1.

¹ As Krentz notes, this was presumably the cousin of Alcibiades (Krentz *Comm.* 121). The difficulty is that the embassy, according to Xenophon, did not return for three years (Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.7), so would have been unable to be a member of the group that greeted Alcibiades on his return to Athens, as Euryptolemus, the cousin of Alcibiades, did (Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.19). Krentz finds the emendation (see Andrewes *JHS* 73 (1953) 2 n. 1) of μῆνες for ἐνιαυτοί very attractive: "Only by changing the text can we have Mantitheos back in the Hellespont by 408 (1.10n.) and Euryptolemos back in Athens by 407 (3.12 n.)" (127), though Davies (*APF* 377), following the chronology of Beloch (*G.G.*² II 2.274) and Ferguson (*CAH* V 483-4), claims that "Euryptolemus could have returned from Persia well before Alcibiades reached Athens." The point is, given that Alcibiades had just exchanged oaths with Pharnabazus (Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.12), Euryptolemus, the *presbeutes*, whether he was the cousin of Alcibiades or not, was one of Alcibiades' men. His selection may well have been based upon this double connection: his friendship with Alcibiades, who, in turn had a friendship with Pharnabazus.

² Develin does not include Aeschines or his colleague Aristoteles among the *presbeis* for this year (though see Kienast *RE Supp.* 13 col. 599). This is presumably on the grounds that they were members of the Thirty. They are not called *presbeis*, but since their mission, to persuade Lysander to send a garrison, was ambassadorial, they should be included here.

†Aristoteles ?son of Timocrates of Thorae	X
Athenian exile with Lysander; then on the accession of the Thirty, sent by them to Lysander to ask for a garrison (Xen. <i>Hell.</i> 2.2.18).	
Cephisophon ?of Paeania	III
Meletus	
435-404 (unable to be precisely dated)	
None	
403/2	
Philon of Coele	VIII
397/6	
Telesagorus ?of Collytus ¹	II
Hagnias ?son of Polemon of Oeon	IV
394/3	
?Epicrates of Cephisia	I
?Phormisius	
†?Aristophanes son of Nicophemus	
See main discussion 163.	
†?Eunomus	
Φίλος and ξένος to Dionysus of Syracuse, to whom the embassy was sent (Lysias 19.19).	
?Euripides ?son of Adeimantus of Myrrhinous	III
393/2	
Dion ?of Lamptrae	I

¹ On the date of this embassy, see also now Harding *Androtion and the Atthis* 113.

†Conon son of Timotheus of Anaphlystus X

Commanded fleet of Greek mercenaries under Pharnabazus (see also Appendix B: *Athenian Strategoi* 367/6 [Timotheus]) from 398 (Diod. 14.39.1-4) to 393; after his return to Athens he was sent on this embassy to the Persian, Tiribazus [Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.13] (who seized and imprisoned him [Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.16]); in all likelihood he was sent on this embassy because he was one of the few Athenians ever to deal successfully with a Persian.

Hermogenes

Callisthenes

Callimedon

392/1

Epicrates of Cephisia I

Andocides son of Leagoras of Cydathenaeum III

Cratinus of ?Sphettus V

Eubulides son of Epicleides of Eleusis VIII

390/89

†Aristophanes son of Nicophemus

See main discussion 163.

387/6

†?Callias son of Hipponicus of Alopece X

See main discussion 163-4.

384/3

Cephalus of Collytus II

Aesimu[s]

Democleides

Athenion of Araphen II

Hermippus of Porus V

Phaenippus of Azenia VIII

Thrasycles of Pallene X

N[ic]ostratus of Thorae X

378/7

Alcimachus son of Cephisius of Angele	III
Orthobulus of Cerameis	V
Xenodocus of Acharnae	VI
Execestides of Pallene	X
Pyrrhander of Anaphlystus	X

?Ae[si]mus

†Thrasybulus son of Thrason of Collytus II

See main discussion 164.

[A]ristoteles of Marathon IX

†Pyrrhander of Anaphlystus X

He is described by Aeschines as being "particularly intimate" with the Thebans (Aeschin. 3.138-9).

Theopompus

375/4

†?Callias son of Hipponicus of Alopece X

See main discussion 164.

?[Democh]ares son of Demon of Paeania

Not included by Develin, but see *IG* ii² 102.19 (= Tod 129).

Tod places the embassy in either 375 or 373.

372/1

Strombichides ?of Euonymon ¹	I
Demostratus ?of Pandionis or Cytherrus	II or III
Cephisodotus of Cerameis	V
Melanopus son of Laches of Aexone	VII
Aristophon ?of Azenia	VIII
Callistratus son of Callicrates of Aphidna (see n. 1 above)	IX

¹ I am following here the emendation of the text suggested by Tuplin, that is, to keep Στρομβιχίδης of the MSS at Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.2 and emend Ἀριστοφῶντος to Ἀριστοφῶν. Among other things, if one keeps Callistratus as an ambassador, which I, with Tuplin and Mosley, see little reason to doubt, then we have a full complement of ten ambassadors for making peace (see main discussion 168). See Tuplin *LCM* 2 (1977) 51-6; Mosley *PCPS* n.s. 8 (1962) 41-6. For demotics and possible full tribal representation, see Tuplin.

†Callias son of Hipponicus of Alopece X

See main discussion 163-4.

Aristocles

Lycaethus

Autocles

368/7

Autolyc[us] of Thoricus V

T[i]monothus

A[r]istopeithes

Timagoras

Leon

361/0

[Th]e[ae]tetus from Erchia II

Not included by Develin (but see Kienast *RE* Supp. 13 col. 603). One of the ambassadors to Thessaly (Tod 147.45-6).

?[Em]pedus of Oe VI

Not dated by Develin. These ambassadors were concerned with Thessaly; Bengtson (*Staatsverträge* 257-8) dates this to 361/0; as does Hansen with some hesitation (*Ecclesia II* 45 revised from *GR&BS* 24 (1983) 159).

?Aeschine[s]

See above on Empedus.

403-360 (unable to be precisely dated)

†Aristophon son Aristophanes of Azenia VIII

Of those noted by Aeschines (Aeschin. 3.138-9) for Theban connections on embassies to Thebes.

†Leodamas ?son of Eristratus of Acharnae VI

See above on Aristophon.

†Thrason of Erchia

II

Thrason was πρόξευος of the Thebans (Aeschin. 3.138) and seems to have been one of those who helped the Theban exiles in the recapture of the Cadmeia (Deinarchus 1.38). Aeschines includes him among those who had been on embassies to Thebes (Aeschin. 3.138-9), and this may have been in 379.

†?Demus son of Pyrilampes

Demus' father, Pyrilampes, was a ξέυος of the King of Persia, and was sent on at least one embassy to him (Plato *Charm.* 158 a) and was possibly given a pair of peacocks (Plut. *Per.* 13.15; cf. Antiphon *ap.* Athen. 9.397 c; see esp. Cartledge in *Nomos* 41-61). MacDowell (*Wasps* 144) infers that Demus was later chosen for an embassy to the king on the grounds that he was presented with a gold *phiale* (Lys. 19.25); see Badian *JHS* 107 (1987) 14.

Callistratus son of Callicratidas of Aphidna

IX

Hagnias son of Polemon of Oeon

IV

358/7

Antiphon

Charidemus

357/6

Peisianax ?of Sunium

IV

356/5

[Thra]son of Erchia

II

Lysicrates of Oenoe

VIII or IX

Antimachus

355/4

Androtion son of Andron of Gargettus

II

Melanopus son of Laches of Aexone

VII

Glaucetes

?Melanopus son of Laches of Aexone

II

He may have also been ambassador to Egypt in this year (see Dem. 24.127), though Kienast (*RE* Supp. 13 col. 603) places this in 371.

348/7

†Ctesiphon

He was sent to Philip to negotiate concerning the ransom for Phrynon (Aeschin. 2.12-3; cf. Dem. 19.12).

†Aristodemus of Metapontum

Aeschines says that he was sent to Philip as ambassador διὰ τὴν γνῶσιν καὶ φιλανθρωπίαν τῆς τέχνης (Aeschin. 2.15).

347/6

Aeschines son of Atrometus of Cothocidae

VI

Demosthenes son of Demosthenes of Paeania¹

III

Philocrates son of Pythodorus of Hagnous²

V

Dercylus son of Autocles of Hagnous

V

Nausicles son of Clearchus of Oe

VI

Aeschines son of Atrometus of Cothocidae³

VI

Cimon ?of Laciadae

VI

¹ This embassy served twice on missions to the Macedonian court: the first embassy to negotiate with Philip for peace, and the second embassy to receive the oaths from Philip. Since the first board of ambassadors was simply re-elected to serve again, I think it is methodologically unsound to count them twice.

² He probably received gifts from Philip on the first embassy (see Chapter Seven 270 n. 5, 271 & n. 1), so probably also became the φίλος and ξένος of Philip. This was not a factor affecting his election to the second embassy, since the whole embassy was re-elected.

³ Became the φίλος and ξένος of Philip after receiving gifts at the Macedonian court on the first embassy (see Chapter Seven 270-4), but see n. 2 above on Philocrates.

†Phrynon of Rhamnous

IX

Bought his ransom from Macedonian pirates, then persuaded the Athenians to send Ctesiphon to seek reimbursement from Philip; he sent his son to Macedon (Dem. 19.230).

†Iatrocles son of Pasiphon

He was an Athenian prisoner taken by Philip at Olynthus, then released without ransom to bring the news back to Athens that Philip wanted peace (Aeschin. 2.16).

†Ctesiphon

See above on 348/7.

†Aristodemus of Metapontum

He seems to have been in favour of Philip (see Aeschin. 2.15, 17), and was certainly sent on the mission to Philip in 346 to make approaches concerning peace.

346/5

<Demosthenes son of Demosthenes of Paeania>

III

Elected, but did not accept the appointment (Dem. 19.121-2).

Dercylus son of Autocles of Hagnous

V

†<Aeschines son of Atrometus of Cothocidae>¹

VI

He was now the φίλος and ξένος of Philip; for the implications of this, see Chapter Seven 270-4.

Aphobetus son of Atrometus of Cothocidae

VI

Stephanus ?son of Antorides of Eroeadae

VIII

Dercylus son of Autocles of Hagnous

V

†Aeschines son of Atrometus of Cothocidae

VI

See above.

Stephanus ?son of Antorides of Eroeadae

VIII

345/4

?Eucleides

¹ Aeschines, though elected, claimed he was ill and did not go; Aphobetus, his brother, went in his place (see Aeschin. 2.94-5; Dem. 19.124).

344/3

Demosthenes son of Demosthenes of Paeania III

[Hegesippus son of Hegesias of Sunium IV

Develin includes him here, but I, with Hansen (*Ecclesia II* 47 revised from *GR&BS* 24 (1983) 161), place Hegesippus' mission in 343/2.]

[Aristodemus of Metapontum

If he is concerned with the *epanorthosis* and negotiations over Halonnesus as Develin conjectures, he should belong in the following year.]

343/2

Hegesippus son of Hegesias of Sunium IV
(344/3 Develin; see note there.)

†?Aristodemus of Metapontum

(344/3 Develin; see note there.) See 348/7.

Demosthenes son of Demosthenes of Paeania III

Hegesippus son of Hegesias of Sunium IV

Polyeuctus son of Sostratus of Sphettus V

Lycurgus son of Lycophron of Butadae VI

?Cleitomachus

341/0

Demosthenes son of Demosthenes of Paeania III

Ephialtes

?Hypereides son of Glaucippus of Collytus II

?Menelaus ?son of Menelochus of Myrrhinous III

339/8

†Demosthenes son of Demosthenes of Paeania III

He was πρόξενος of the Thebans (Aeschin. 2.141, 143); so an easy choice for this embassy to Thebes for an alliance.

338/7

†Demades son of Demeas of Paeania III

Released by Philip after Chaeronea to bring the terms of peace back to Athens; maintained a pro-Macedonian policy (see Chapter Seven 266).

Demosthenes son of Demosthenes of Paeania III

†Aeschines son of Atrometus of Cothocidae VI

See above on 346/5.

?Hypereides son of Glaucippus of Collytus

360-336 (unable to be precisely dated)

Euphrosynus of Paeania III

Before 350; see *IG* ii² 1128.39-40 (= Tod 162).

Andron of Cerameis V

See above on Euphrosynus.

†Archedemus of Peleces IV

Among those whom Aeschines says were intimate with the Thebans and went on embassies to Thebes (Aeschin. 3.138-9). Probably the nearest that his embassy can be dated is before Demosthenes' embassy to Thebes in 338/9.

Pythocles son of Pythodorus

Not included by Develin. Seems to have been sent on an embassy to Philip (see Dem. 19.225).

Hypereides son of Glaucippus of Collytus

Aphobetus son of Atrometus of Cothocidae VI
Mission to Persia sometime before 343.

Timarchus son of Arizelus of Sphettus V
Served on a number of missions before 346/5.

{Phocion son of Phocus

Included by Develin on the basis of Nepos *Phoc.* 1.3. This passage is generally taken to imply an embassy for Phocion (see, for example, Tritle *Phocion the Good* 114), but I do not think this is right. The point is that Macedonian envoys are urging Phocion to receive gifts. Surely this implies that the Macedonian envoys are in Athens, rather than that Phocion is at the Macedonian court.}

*Spartan Presbeis*¹

433/2

?Polyalces PL 623
Probably to be dated soon after the Megarian decree: on the date of the decree, see Kagan *Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War* 257-60.

432/1

Ramphias PL 654

¹ I have consulted Kienast's list of Spartan ambassadors (*RE* Supp. 13 col. 619-27), but because of certain difficulties and irregularities with this list, I have decided to compile my own. I have only included references where these cannot be found in Poralla (*PL*). Owing to the limitations of the thesis, I have, as elsewhere, normally included discussion only where the ambassador appears to have connections which influenced his selection.

† indicates possible election on the basis of connections.

? indicates those men whose office is not entirely secure or who may not belong in that year.

?? indicates those men whose office is very insecure or who are only very tentatively placed in that year.

†Melesippus son of Diacritas PL 522

He was sent to Athens again by Archidamus to issue a final warning (Th. 2.12.1), though this may have been as a *keryx* rather than a *presbeutes*.

Agesander (= ?Hegesander) PL 6

Summer 431

†?Melesippus son of Diacritas PL 522

See above; he does not have a known connection with Athens, but this at least demonstrates a continuity of service to a particular state.

Summer 430

†Aneristus son of Sperthias PL 95

See main discussion 173.

†Nicolaus son of Bulis PL 562

See main discussion 173.

Pratodamus PL 639

Summer 428

Meleas PL 519

Summer 423

†Athenaeus son of Pericleidas PL 32

See discussion of Oath-takers 179.

Winter 422/1 - Spring 421

?Daïthus PL 202

For the suggestion that these ten men were the negotiators for the Peace of Nicias and alliance with Athens, see Andrewes & Lewis *JHS* (1957) 177-80.

?Ischagoras PL 400

?†Philocharidas son of Eryxilaïdas

PL 731

He was thought to be ἐπαγγέλειος to the Athenians (Th. 5.44.3; see also discussion of Athenian ambassadors under Nicias son of Neiceratus (162 n. 5), and the rather tentative suggestion that Philocharidas and Nicias may have had some kind of personal connection); he was one of the oath-takers for the armistice between Athens and Sparta in 424/3 (see Appendix D: *Oath-takers* in 424/3); he was an oath-taker for the Peace of Nicias and alliance with Athens, and possibly also an envoy (see entry on Daïthus above); he was sent on an embassy to Athens in 421/0 (Th. 5.21.1) and perhaps also in 408/7 (Androtion *FGrH* 324 F 44; on the emendation: Jacoby *Supp.* I 152-3).

?Zeuxidas

PL 346

?Antippus

PL 103

?Tellis

PL 690

?Alcinadas

PL 65

?Empedias

PL 262

?Menas

PL 534

?Laphilus

PL 478

†Ischagoras

PL 400

Sent to Brasidas in Thrace, probably as *symboulos* (see Appendix E: *Other Spartan Magistrates* under 423); returned to Chalcidice in this year to tell Clearidas to give up Amphipolis (Th. 5.21.1): this at least shows a degree of continuity in appointments.

Menas

PL 534

†Philocharidas son of Eryxilaïdas

PL 731

As Harding notes (*Androtion and the Atthis* 163), he went to Thrace to see that Amphipolis was restored to the Athenians (Th. 5.21.1). An appropriate selection in view of his Athenian interests (see above).

Summer 421

Ampelidas

PL 74

†Lichas son of Arcesilaus PL 492
See main discussion 174.

Spring 420

Andromenes [Andromedes] PL 92
Phaedimus PL 714
Antimenidas PL 101

†Leon son of Anticleidas PL 482

These three men were selected to go to Athens to prevent an Athens/Argos alliance because they seemed to be ἐπιτήδαιοι to the Athenians (Th. 5.44.3).

†Endius son of Alcibiades PL 264

See main discussion 173-4.

†Philocharidas son of Eryxilaïdas PL 731

See 422/1 above.

Winter 418/7

†Lichas son of Arcesilaus PL 492

See main discussion 174.

Summer 414

†Gylippus PL 196

Sent on a mission (πρεσβευσάμενος) to Thurii καὶ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς ἀνανεωσάμενος πολιτείαν (Th. 6.104.2); note textual difficulties – of the MSS only B has this reading; the rest have κατὰ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς ποτε πολιτείαν: on this, see *HCT* 4.376; see also Badham *Mnemosyne* (1875) 244; Wade-Gery *Essays in Greek History* Oxford 1958 267 n. 5. With either reading of the text, Gylippus has a connection with Thurii through his father.

Summer 412

Chalcideus PL 743

Late Summer 412 - Winter 412/11

Therimenes PL 371

Winter 412/11 - ?Summer 411¹

Lichas son of Arcesilaus

PL 492

Summer 411

Philippus

PL 725

410 (After the battle of Cyzicus)

†Endius son of Alcibiades

PL 264

See main discussion 173-4.

Summer 408²

†Pasippidas

PL 591

He was accused of having colluded with Tissaphernes to bring about the downfall of Thasos, which entailed the expulsion of the harmost, Eteonicus, and οἱ λακωνισταί, and was subsequently expelled from Sparta in 410 (Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.32).³ Nevertheless, Pasippidas was sent in this year as an ambassador to the Persian king (presumably he had been recalled [Underhill *Comm.* 14; Krentz *Comm.* 121]) when the Athenian embassy set off with Pharnabazus (Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.13). If, indeed, this was an official embassy, which the use of πρέσβεις should signify (Underhill *Comm.*; Krentz *Comm.*), then it is possible that earlier Persian contacts influenced his selection.

408/7

†Megillus

PL 513=?514

He is probably to be identified with the Athenian πρόξενος in Sparta (Plato *Laws* 1.642 b-d); an appropriate choice for this embassy concerning the repatriation of Spartan prisoners in Athens (Androtion *FGrHist* 324 F 44; on the emendation, see Jacoby *Supp.* I 152-3); see also Mosley *Envoys and Diplomacy* 52).

¹ The third treaty between Sparta and Tissaphernes was made in the winter of 412/1 (Th. 8.58-59), but Lichas seems to continue liaising with Tissaphernes until the summer (Th. 8.87.1).

² On Xenophon's missing year and the difficulties with dating, see Andrewes *CAH* V² 503-5 (with Andrewes, I have followed the later dating).

³ See Chapter Four 151.

†Endius son of Alcibiades PL 264

See main discussion 173-4.

†Philocharidas son of Eryxilaïdas PL 731

See above on 422/1.

Spring 407

Boeotius PL 175

Winter 407/6

?Lysander son of Aristocritus PL 504

He was also *Nauarchos* in this year; accompanied the Spartan ambassadors to Cyrus, where he played a major part in the negotiations (see Chapter Five 209-10).

396

?Lysander son of Aristocritus PL 504

Sent by Agesilaus to the Hellespont and he brought back Spithradates; Plutarch calls him *presbeutes* (Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.10; Plut. *Lys.* 24.1).

†Aristomenidas [Aristomelidas] PL 134

See main discussion 175.

394

Epicydidas PL 273

?Diphridas PL 243

Ephor (395/4) who came to give new orders to Agesilaus in Thessaly in the summer of 394 (Plut. *Ages.* 17.1). He may not technically be a *presbeutes*.

Xenocles PL 569

Scythes PL 668

393/2

†Antalcidas son of Leon (also nauarch in this year) PL 97

See Chapter Five 213-4.

388

Pollis PL 621

387

†Antalcidas son of Leon PL 97

See Chapter Five 213-5.

Callias PL 404

378/7

†Etymocles PL 287

Ambassador to Athens in this year (Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.22)
and in 370/69 (Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.33).

Aristolochus PL 130

†Ocyllus PL 770

Ambassador to Athens both in this year (Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.22) and in 370/69 (Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.33).

375

†Antalcidas son of Leon PL 97

See Philochorus *FGrHist* 328 F 151; see also Chapter Five 214-5.

371

†Agesilaus son of Archidamus PL 9

Sent as *presbeutes* to Mantinea because he seemed to be a
πατρικὸς φίλος to them (Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.4).

Winter 370/69

Aracus¹ PL 107

†Ocyllus PL 770

See above on 378/7.

Pharax PL 718

†Etymocles PL 287

See above on 378/7.

Olontheus [Olyntheus] PL 576

¹ Mosley suggests that this embassy was composed of three Athenian specialists and two military specialists (*Historia* 12 (1963) 247-50).

369

Timocrates

PL 700

Phrixus

PL 736

367

†Antalcidas son of Leon

PL 97

See Chapter Five 214-5.

†Euthycles

PL 301=?302

Ambassador to Persia in this year (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.33) and is perhaps the same man who went to Persia again in 333 (Arrian *Anab.* 2.15.2).

Unable to be precisely dated

†?Lysander son of Aristocritus (sometime before his death in 395)

PL 504

Supposedly sent gifts by Dionysius of Syracuse, then later despatched to Dionysius as ambassador (Plut. *Lys.* 2.5), though Cartledge suggests that the embassy "may be simply an anecdotal invention" (*Agesilaos* 320; but compare Hornblower *Greek World* 188).

Eucleidas

PL 305

Presbeis of other States¹

Acanthus

Summer 382

Cleigenes

Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.12

¹ This is not an exhaustive search of all possible texts, but I have attempted to collect at least all ambassadors of states other than Athens and Sparta from the major sources and as many others as I have come across in my reading. States are listed in alphabetical order.

† indicates possible election on the basis of connections.

Acarmania

375

?[A]eschylus¹

IG ii² 96.25-6 (= Tod 126)

?Euarchus

IG ii² 96.25-6 (= Tod 126)

Aetolians

Summer 426

Tolophon of the Ophiones

Th. 3.100.1

Boriades of the Eurytanes

Th. 3.100.1

Teisander of the Apodoti

Th. 3.100.1

Amphipolis

358/7

Stratocles

Dem. 1.8;
Theopompus
FGrHist 115 F 42

Hierax

Theopompus
FGrHist 115 F 42

Arcadian Federation

367

Antiochus

Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.33

366

Lycomedes

Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.39

¹ The status of Aeschylus and Euarchus is unclear (see Tod in his discussion), but they may have been ambassadors.

Argos

430

[Pollis]¹ Th. 2.67.1

Summer 420

†Eustrophus Th. 5.40.3

The Argives sent Eustrophus and Aeson to Sparta, thinking they would be προσφιλέστατοι (Th. 5.40.1-3). See also Chapter Three 70.

†Aeson Th. 5.40.3

See above on Eustrophus.

Summer 408

Cleostratus Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.13

Pyrrolochus Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.13

Ceos

362

Demetrius IG ii² 111.51-2 (= Tod 142)

Heracle[ide]s IG ii² 111.51-2 (= Tod 142)

E[cheti]mu[s] IG ii² 111.51-2 (= Tod 142)

C[al]liphantus IG ii² 111.51-2 (= Tod 142)

Corinth

Summer 430

Aristeus (?son of Adeimantus) Th. 2.67.1

Summer 419

Euphamidas Th. 5.55.1

¹ Pollis went ἰδίᾳ, so does not, strictly speaking, belong here as an official representative of his state. However, he was still a member of the *presbeia* so is included for the sake of completeness; see Rhodes *Thucydides II* 247.

Elis

367

Archidamus

Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.33

Halieis

424/3

Neon

IG i³ 75

Agac[l...]¹

IG i³ 75

Heracleia Trachinia

Summer 426

†Teisamenus

Th. 3.92.2

See main discussion 160.

Leontini

433/2

Timenor son of Agathocles

IG i³ 54.4-5 (= ML
64)

Sosis son of Glaucus

IG i³ 54.5 (= ML 64)

Gelon son of Execestus

IG i³ 54.5-6 (= ML
64)

Macedon

375 or 373

Ptolemaeu[s]

IG ii² 102.6-7 (= Tod 129)

Antenor

IG ii² 102.6-7 (= Tod 129)

¹ Note that Develin restores this man as Agacles, and as an Athenian ambassador. This is impossible; see 353 & 380 n. 2.

346

Antipater

Aeschin. 3.72; Dem.
19.69; Dem. 19

Hypoth. 2.5

Parmenio

Dem. 19.69; Dem. 19

Hypoth. 2.5

Eurylochus

Dem. 19 *Hypoth.*
2.5

344

Python (of Byzantium)

Dem. 18.136.

Plataea

Summer 427

Astymachus son of Asopolaus

Th. 3.52.5

Lacon the son of Aeimnestus¹

Th. 3.52.5

Rhegium

433/2

Cleander son of Xen[---]

IG i³ 53. 2-3 (= ML
63)

Silenus son of Phocus

IG i³ 53. 3 (= ML
63)

Syracuse

Winter 415/4

Hermocrates (*strategos*)

Th. 6.75.4

Summer 408

[Hermocrates]²

Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.13

Proxenus

Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.13

¹ Note that he was also the Spartan πρόξενος (Th. 3.52.5).

² He would not have been an official ambassador of Syracuse, as Xenophon tells us that he was already an exile.

Tegea

Summer 430

Timagoras Th. 2.67.1

Thebes

Summer 428

Hermaeondas Th. 3.5.2

371

Epameinondas Plut. *Ages.* 28.1-3;
Nepos *Epam.* 6.4;
Diod. 15.38.3
(referring to 375);
just Θηβαῖοι at
15.50.4 (referring to
371).¹

367

Pelopidas Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.33

346

†Philo Dem. 19.140

He was the φίλος and ξένος of Philip.

Synod of the Allies of the Second Athenian Confederacy

346

Aglaocreon of Tenedus Aeschin. 2.20, 97,
126

Greeks sent by Persians

Winter 413/2 (from Pharnabazus)

Calligeitus son of Laophon (Megara) Th. 8.6.1

Timagoras son of Athenagoras (Cyzicus) Th. 8.6.1

¹ On Diodorus' confusion with the peace negotiations for 375 and 371: Chapter Five 194 n. 3.

402 (from the King)

Phalynus (Zacynthus)

Diod. 14.25.1

?397 (from ?Pharnabazus)¹

Timocrates (Rhodes)

Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.1;

Hell. Oxyrh.

(Bartoletti) 7.2, 5 =

(Chambers) 10.2, 5.

368 (from Ariobarzanes)

Philiscus (Abydus)

Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.27

Greeks sent by Thracians

346 (from Cersobleptes)

Critobulus (Lampsacus)

Aeschin. 2.83

¹ On the date and the satrap (Xenophon says Timocrates was sent by Tithraustes in 395), see Bruce *Comm.* 58-60.

Appendix D

*Oath-takers*¹

424/3

The Alliance between Athens and Halieis (IG i³ 75)

Athens: [the *boule*] and the *strategoi*

Haliaeans: [the Haliaeans]; [the *presbeis*]² –

Neon

Agac[1...]

The Armistice between Athens and Sparta (Th. 4.119.2)

Spartans:

Taurus son of Echetimidas

†Athenaeus son of Pericleidas

See main discussion 181.

†Philocharidas son of Eryxilaïdas

See main discussion of Oath-takers (179) and Appendix C:

Spartan Presbeis under 422/1.

Corinthians:

Aeneas son of Ocutus

Euphamidas son of Aristonymus

Sicyonians:

Damotimus son of Naucrates

Onasimus son of Megacles

Megarians:

Nicasus son of Caelus

Menecrates son of Amphidorus

Epidaurians:

Amphias son of Eupaeidas

¹ I supply patronymics and, in the case of Athenians, demotics wherever they are known.

² Meritt (*Hesperia* 14 (1945) 100-5) suggests that the Haliaeans swore the oath first, and did so as "the Haliaeans" in the same way as the Selymbrians in 409/8, but that the *presbeis* were required to swear again on their behalf in Athens (cf. the alliance between Athens and Methymna in 378/7). If the restoration is correct, the ambassadors must be Haliaean rather than Athenian (*contra* Develin *Officials* 133-4).

Athenians: strategoi

†Nicias son of Niceratus of Cydantidae	II
See main discussion of Oath-takers (178) and discussion under Athenian <i>Presbeis</i> (162).	
Nicostratus son of Dieitrephes of Scambonidae ¹	IV
Autocles son of Tolmaeus of Anaphlystus	X

423/2?*Alliance between Athens and Perdiccas II of Macedon and Arrhabaeus of Lyncetsus* (IG i³ 89)²*Macedon:*

Perdiccas son of [Alexander]	
Alcetes son of Alexander	
Archelas son of P[erdiccas]	
Menelaus son of Alexa[nder]	
Burginus son of Craston	
Agerrus son of Philip	
Eurylochus son of Bo[.....]	
[Ale]xander son of Pantapon	
Neoptole[mus]	Corratas
Euland[r]us	[Me]leager
Antigenes	Dirbe[a]s
Adimus	Arrhabaeus
Cleander	[L]imnaeus
Lycaeus	Boc[...s]
Nomenius	Autannius
Crasto[n]	[De]rdas
Stadmeas	[A]ntiochus (<i>basileus</i>)
Nicander	Attacinus
Gateas	Etharus
Callias	Cratennas
Corratas	[?Pau]sanias son of Machelus
Corrabus	[A]gerrus
Dad[.]nus	Botres
Idatas	Agathon

¹ For demotic, see Appendix B: *Athenian Strategoi* 309 n. 2.² For other dates between 435 and 413, see IG i³.

Misgon

422/1

Alliance between the Athens and the Bottiaeans (IG i³ 76)

Athenians: the *boule*, the [strategoi] and [the other magistrates (ἄρχαί)]

Bottiaeans: the *bo[u]le*, [the *strategoi* and the rest of the] magistrates ([ἄρ]χοντες) in [the cities of the Bot]ti[aeans]

Peace of Nicias and Alliance with Sparta (Th. 5.19.2, 24.1; Diod. 12.75.4)

*Spartans:*¹

Pleistoanax

Agis

Pleistolas

Damagetus

Chionis

Metagenes

Acanthus

Daithus

Ischagoras

†Philocharidas son of Eryxilaïdas

See above on *Armistice between Athens and Sparta* in
424/3.

Zeuxidas

Antippus

Tellis

Alcinadas

Empedias

Menas

Laphilus

*Athenians:*²

Lampon

¹ On the possible composition of this board of oath-takers (two kings, five ephors and ten negotiators), see Andrewes & Lewis *JHS* 77 (1957) 177-80.

² On these oath-takers, see esp. Andrewes & Lewis *JHS* 77 (1957) 177-80.

Isthm(i)onicus

†Nicias son of Niceratus of Cydantidae	II
See above on <i>Armistice between Athens and Sparta</i> in 424/3.	
†Laches son of Melanopus of Aexone	VII
See main discussion (178-9) and Appendix B: <i>Athenian Strategoi</i> under 418/7.	
Euthydemus son of Eudemus	
Procles of ?Euonymon or ?Cephisia	I
Pythodorus ?son of Epizelus of Halae	II
Hagnon son of Nicias of Steiria	III
Myrtilus ?son of Lysis	IV
Thrasycles	
Theogenes (?Theagenes) ?of Acharnae	VI
Aristocrates ?son of Scellias ?of Trinemeia	VII
Iolcius	
Timocrates	
Leon	
Lamachus son of Xenophanes of Oe	VI
Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes of Aphidna	X

420

Hundred Years' Alliance between Athens, Argos, Mantinea and Elis (Th. 5.47.9; cf. IG i³ 83)

Athenians: the *boule*, the state magistrates (ἐνδημοὶ ἄρχαί)

Argives: the *boule*, the "eighty" and the magistrates (ἄρτυνοι)

Mantineians: the *demiourgoi*, the *boule* and the other magistrates (ἄρχαί)

Eleans: the *demiourgoi*, those holding offices (οἱ τὰ τέλη ἔχοντες) and the "six hundred"

After 411

Treaty between Thasos and Neapolis (IG 12 (5) i 109 [=Staatsverträge 204])

Thasians:

Alceides

Aristarchus

Pytholeus

409

Treaty between Athenian Generals and Pharnabazus (Xen. Hell. 1.3.8-9)

Athenians: the *strategoi*

Pharnabazus

409/8

Treaty between Athens and Selymbria (IG i³ 118 [= ML 87])¹

Athenians: the *strategoi*, the [trierarchs], the hoplites and [any other Athenian] who is present

Selymbrians: all the Selymbrians

403

Spartan Decree Restoring Control of the Sanctuary to the Delians (Inscriptions de Délos 87 [= Tod 99])²

Spartans: the kings:

Agis

Pausanias

the ephors:

Thyionidas

Aristogenidas

Archistas

Sologas

Pheidilas

396

Armistice between Agesilaus and Pharnabazus (Xen. Hell. 3.4.5-6; cf. Xen. Ages. 1.10-11)

Spartans:

Herippidas

†Dercylidas

See main discussion 179.

Megillus

Tissaphernes

¹ Ratified at Athens in 407; see Andrewes *JHS* 73 (1953) 8.

² For a discussion of this decree, see Chapter Four 180 n. 1.

394

Alliance between Eretria and Athens

Athenians: the *strategoi*, [the *boule*] and the [hip]peis

Eretrians: [the *strategoi*], the *boule*, [the *hippeis*] and the [other] magistracies

389

Alliance between Athens and the Thracian kings, Medocus I and Seuthes II (Xen. Hell. 4.8.26; Diod. 14.94.2; IG ii² 21)

Athenians: the st[rategoi], [the *hipparchs*], the *taxiarchs* and [the *phylarchs*]

384

Alliance between Athen and Chios (IG ii² 34 [= Tod 118])

Athenians: the *boule*, the [strategoi] and [the ta]xiarchs

Chians: [the *boule*] and [the other] magistracies

378

Alliance between Athens and Byzantium (IG ii² 41 [= Tod 121])

Athenians: [the *boule*], [the *strategoi*] and the hip[parchs]

378/7

Alliance between Athens, the Thebans and the Mytileneans (IG ii² 40)¹

Mytileneans: seventeen men from each of the cities.

Alliance between Athens and Methymna (IG ii² 42 [=Tod 122])

Athenians: the *synedroi* of the allies, the *strategoi* and the *hipparchs*

Methymnians: the *presbeia* of the Methymnians in Athens, and the magistrates (ἄρχαι) in Methymna.

Between 377/6 and 352/2

Alliance between Mausolus and Phaselis (Staatsverträge 260)

Phaselians: [as many of the Phaselians as M]ausolus decrees

[Mausolus and ?Artemisia]

375

Alliance between Athens, Corcyra, Acarnania and Cephellania (IG ii² 96 [= Tod 126])

Athenians: the *boule*, [the *strategoi*] and the *hippeis* ; and the allies are to swear the oath

¹ See Andrewes & Lewis *JHS* 77 (1957) 177.

375 or 373

Alliance between Athens and Amyntas II of Macedon (IG ii² 102 [=Tod 129])

Macedon: Amy[ntas] and [Alexander]

368

Alliance between Athens and Leucas (IG ii² 104 [= Tod 134])

Athenians: two hipparchs; *strategoi* –

Phorm[io]

Spodias

Leucadians:

Isodemus

Olympiadas

367

Alliance between Athens and Dionysius I of Syracuse (IG ii² 105, 523 [= Tod 136])

Athenians: the *boule*, [the *strategoi*], [the hippa]rchs and [the taxiarchs]

Syracusans: [Dio]nysius, [the magistrates], [the *boule*] of the Syracusans, [the *strategoi*] and [the trie]rchs

363/2

Alliance between Athens and Ceos (IG ii² 111 [= Tod 142])

Athenians: i) Chabrias (17-8);¹ ii) the *strategoi* and the allies

362/1

Alliance between Athens, Arcadia, Achaea, Elis and Phleius (IG ii² 112 [= Tod 144])

Athenians: [the *strategoi*], the taxiar[ch]s, [the hipparchs], [the phylar]chs and [the *hippeis*]

Arcadians, Achaeans, Eleans, and Phleians: [the highest officials (τὰ μέγιστα τέλη) in each of the cities of the Peloponnesians²

361/0

Alliance between Athens and Thessalian koinon (IG ii² 116 [= Tod 147])

Athenians: the *strategoi*, the *boule*, the hipparchs and the *hippeis*

¹ Chabrias swore the oath on behalf of the Athenians as a “stop-gap” measure (cf: the alliance with Selymbria in 409/8); see main discussion 178 n. 1.

² Cf. Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.3.

Thessaly: Agelaus (the archon), polemarchs, the hi[p]parchs, the *hippeis*, [the hier]o[mn]emones and all the other officials in the *koinon* of the Thessalians; the ambassadors of the Thessalians

Treaty between Athens and Thessaly of a similar date (IG ii² 175)

Thessalians:

polemarchs –

Phthiotians:

Megalus

Hestiaeans:

Eiron

pezarchoi –

Philip

Polymides

Thibron

Cotimilas

Theodorus

Philolaus

Hippocrates

357/6

Alliance between Athens and the Euboean States: Eretria, Chalcis, Carystus and Histiaea
(IG ii² 124 [= Tod 153])

Athenians: the t[axiarchs], the *boule* and most of the *strategoi*
the following *strategoi* –

Alci[machus of Anagyrous]	I
Cha[res son of Theochares of Angele] ¹	III
Menon of Potamus	IV
Execestides son of Charias of Thoricus	V
[[Cha]brias son of Ctesippus of Aexone]	VII
Philochares of Rhamnous	IX
[Iphicrates] son of Timotheus of Rhamnous	IX
Diocles of Alopece	X

¹ For the suggestion that Chabrias' name was inscribed again at this point, see Cawkwell C&M 23 (1962) 38-9 n. 23.

Alliance between Philip II of Macedon and the Chalcidians (Staatsverträge 308 [= Tod 158])

Chalcidians: the public magistrates (ξυνοὶ ἄρχοι) and [?the *presbeis*]¹

Macedon: Philip and whomever the Chalcidians stipulate

356/5?

Alliance between Athens and Locris (IG ii² 148)

Athenians: [the *boule*], [the *strategoi*], [the *hipparchs*], [the *taxiarchs*] and the *phylarchs*

After 350

Alliance between Erythrae and Hermias of Atarneus (Staatsverträge 322 [= Tod 165])

Erythraeans: the Erythraeans

Hermias: the *angeloi* on behalf of Hermias and his *hetairoi*

341/0

Alliance between Athens and Eretria (IG ii² 230)

Athenians: the *boule* and the officials

Eretrians: [the *boule*] (the five hundred), [the *strategoi*] and all the other officials (including *hipparchs* and *hippeis*)

[Al]cias

Hipposthen[es] of Minthous

Xenotimus

Clearchus

Phileas of Za[r]ecus

taxiarchs –

De[mar]chus of Hermes

Era[sip]pus

D[e]m[ocra]tes

¹ See however Mosley *PCPS* 187 (1961) 59-60.

Appendix E

Other Magistracies

Symbouloi

429 (*Symbouloi* sent to Cnemus: Th. 2.85.1)

Timocrates	PL 699
Brasidas son of Tellis	PL 178
Lycophron	PL 500

427 (*Symboulos* with Alcidas: Th. 3.69.1)

Brasidas son of Tellis	PL 178
------------------------	--------

423 (?*Symbouloi* sent to Brasidas in Thrace: Th. 4.132.3)¹

†Ischagoras	PL 400
See main discussion 182.	
Ameinias	PL 71
Aristeus	PL 18

422/1 (?*Symbouloi* with Brasidas in Thrace: Th. 5.12.1)²

Ramphias	PL 654
Autocharidas	PL 171
Epicydidas	PL 273

418 (10 *Symbouloi* with Agis: Th. 5.63.4)

No names known.

412/1 (11 *Symbouloi* sent to Astyochus: Th. 8.39.2)

Lichas the son of Arcesilaus	PL 492
------------------------------	--------

¹ They are not specifically called *symbouloi*, Thucydides writes (Th. 4.132.3) that they were sent ἐπιθεῖν ... Λακεδαιμονίων τὰ πράγματα in Thrace: essentially the function of the *symbouloi* (see Westlake *Historia* 35 (1986) 417 n. 33 (= *Studies* 257 n. 33); id. *Individuals in Thucydides* Cambridge 1968 160.

² Also not called *symbouloi*, though they seem to have similar functions to Ischagoras and company in the preceding year.

398 (?*Symbouloi* to Dercylidas)¹

†Aracus PL 108

See main discussion 182.

Naubates PL 547

†Antisthenes PL 104

See main discussion 182.

396 (?Thirty *Symbouloi* to Agesilaus in Asia: Plut. *Ages.* 6.5; *Lys.* 23.4; cf. Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.2, 6)²

†Lysander son of Aristocritus PL 504

See main discussion 182.

?Herippidas³ PL 349

†?Dercylidas PL 228

On his connections in the Hellespont, see Chapter Four
150-1.

?Megillus PL 413=414

395 (?Thirty *Symbouloi* to Agesilaus in Asia: Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.20)⁴

Herippidas PL 349

Xenocles PL 569

Scythes PL 668

Mygdon PL 541

¹ On their status at *symbouloi*, see Pritchett *The Greek State at War* II 38 *contra* Cartledge *Agesilaos* 212-3.

² See Pritchett *The Greek State at War* II 37 *contra* Smith *Historia* 2 (1954) 279 n. 9; cf. Xen. *Hell.* 5.3.8: the Thirty Spartiatae sent with Agesipolis; Plut. *Ages.* 36.6: thirty *symbouloi* sent with Agesilaus to Egypt in 361/0.

³ Herippidas, Dercylidas and Megillus, who received the oaths from Tissaphernes (Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.6), must almost certainly be among the "Thirty", though it should be noted that Herippidas appears again in the next year among those who "succeeded" to the original Thirty.

⁴ These succeeded to the Thirty of the previous year (Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.20).

Appendix F

Athenian Strategoi During The Peloponnesian War

Men Appointed to the Strategia between 435 and 404.

(*Italics* indicate election in 411, which was an usual year, and will not be included in most of the statistics. The last column gives the reason for the ending of the man's career where known.)

Adeimantus son of Leucophides	407, 406, 405	Captured
Alcibiades son of Cleinias	420, 419, 417, 416, 415, 411 (<i>Democr.</i>), 407	Exiled
<i>Alexicles</i>	411 (400)	
<i>Antiphon son of Lysonides</i>	411 (400)	
Anytus son of Anthemion	409	
Archenautes	433	
Archestratus	406	Killed
Archestratus son of Lycomedes	433	
<i>Aristarchus</i>	411 (400)	
Aristeides son of Archippus	425	
Aristocrates son of Scellias	413, 410, 407, 406	Death Penalty
Aristogenes	406	Exiled
Aristoteles son of Timocrates	431, 426, 411 (400)	
Asopius son of Phormio	428	Killed
Autocles son of Tolmaeus	425, 424, 418	
Calliades	430	Killed
Callias son of Calliades	432	Killed
Callistratus son of Empedus	418	
Carcinus son of Xenotimus	432, 431	
Cephisodotus	405	
<i>Chareas son of Archestratus</i>	411 (5000)	
Charicles son of Apollodorus	414	
Charminus	412	
Charoeades son of Euphiletus	427	Killed
Cleippides	429	
Cleomedes son of Lycomedes	418, 417, 416	
Cleon son of Cleaenetus	424, 423, 422	Killed
Cleopompus son of Cleinias	431, 430	
Conon son of Timotheus	414, 411 (5000), 407, 406, 405	
Demaratus	414	
Demodocus of Anagyrous	425	
Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes	427, 426, 425, 424, 418, 414, 413	Killed
Dexicrates	410	
Dieitrephes son of Nicostratus	414, 411 (400)	
Diomedon	412, 406	Death Penalty
Diotimus son of Strombichides	433	
Diphilus	413	
Dracontides son of Leogoras	433	
Erasinides	406	Death Penalty
Eucleides	410	
Eucles	424	
Eucrates	432	

Eucrates son of Niceratus	412, 405	
Euctemon	412	
Euetion	414	
<i>Eumachus</i>	411 (5000)	
Eurymedon son of Thucles	427, 426, 425, 414, 413	Killed
Euthydemus son of Eudemus	422, 418, 414, 413	Killed
Glaucon son of Leagrus	435, 433	
Hagnon son of Nicias	431, 430, 429	
Hestiodorus	430	Killed
Hierophon son of Antimnestus	426	
Hippocles son of Menippus	413	
Hippocrates son of Ariphron	426, 424	Killed
Hipponicus son of Callias	426	
Lacedaemonius son of Cimon	433	
Laches son of Melanopus	427, 426, 422, 418	Killed
Laespodias son of Andronymis	414	
Lamachus son of Xenophanes	426, 425, 424, 416, 415, 414	Killed
Leon	412, 406	Captured?
Leotrophides	409	
Lysias	406	Death Penalty
Lysicles	428	Killed
<i>Melanthius</i>	411 (400)	
Melesander	430	
Melesander	414	Killed
Menander	414, 413, 405	
Metagenes	433	
Nicias son of Niceratus	427, 426, 425, 424, 423, 422, 421, 418, 417, 416, 415, 414, 413	Killed
Nicostratus son of Dietrephes	427, 425, 424, 423, 418	Killed
Oenobius	410	
Onomacles	412	
Paches son of Epicurus	428	Suicide (after <i>euthynai</i>)
Pasiphon	410	Killed
Pericles son of Pericles	409, 407, 406	Death Penalty
Pericles son of Xanthippus	435, 434, 433, 432, 431, 430, 429	Died
Phanomachus	430	Killed
Phanosthenes	407	
Philocles	406, 405	Killed
Philocrates son of Demeas	416	
Phormio son of Asopius	432, 431, 430, 429	
Phrynichus son of Stratonides	412	
Procles son of Theodorus	427, 426	
Proteas son of Epicles	435, 433, 432, 431	
Protomachus	406	Exiled
Pythodorus son of Epizelus	414	
Pythodorus son of Isolochus	426, 425	Exiled
Scironides	412	
<i>Simichus</i>	411 (5000)	
Simonides	426	
Socrates son of Antigenes	432, 431	
Sophocles son of Sostratides	426, 425	Exiled
Strombichides son of Diotimus	412	
Teisias son of Teisimachus	417, 416	

Appendix F: Athenian Strategoi During the Peloponnesian War

Telephonus	415	
<i>Theramenes son of Hagnon</i>	411 (400), 411 (5000)	
Thrasybulus son of Lycus	411 (<i>Democr.</i>), 410, 409, 408, 407, (395, 394, 390, 389)	Killed
Thrasycles	412	
Thrasyllus	411 (<i>Democr.</i>), 410, 409, 408, 406	Death Penalty
Thucydides son of Olorus	424	Exiled
<i>Thymochares</i>	411 (400), 411 (5000)	
Timarchus	409	
Tydeus son of Lamachus	405	
Xenophon son of Euripides	430	Killed

Minimum number of men appointed, 435-404 (ie. all men known to have held appointments)	104
Minimum number of men appointed, 435-404 excluding 411	95
Maximum number possible appointed, 435-404 (ie. all men known to have held appointments + total unknown appointments) ¹	227
Total men serving 1 year, 435-404 excluding 411	58
Number killed/exiled/captured/otherwise incapable of holding office a second time	14
Total men serving 3 years or less, 435-404 excluding 411	80
Number killed/exiled/captured/otherwise incapable of holding office again	26
Total men serving four years or more, 435-404 excluding 411	15
Number killed/exiled/captured/otherwise incapable of holding office again	12

Athenian Strategoi – A Summary of Tribal Representation During the Peloponnesian War

	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX	X
435/4					XX		X			
434/3					X					
433/2	X	X			XX	X	X ??X	X		X
432/1		X	X		XX		XX			
431/0		X	XX	?X	XX	?X	X			X
430/29			XX	?X	X	?X	X			
429/8			XX		X	X				
428/7			X							

¹ This assumes that all appointments to the board of generals where the name of the *strategos* is unknown were filled by different men and not either by men who had held office before or by unknown men holding office in multiple years.

Appendix F: Athenian Strategoi During the Peloponnesian War

427/6		X		X			X		X	
426/5		X			X	XX	X		X	XX
425/4	X	X		X		XX	X		X	X
424/3		X	X	XX	X	X			X	X
423/2		X	XX		X					
422/1		X	X				X			
421/0		X								
420/19				X						
419/8				X						
418/7		X		X		X	XX		X	X
417/6		X		X	X		X			
416/5		X		X	X	X	X			
415/4		X		X		X				
414/3	?X	XX		X	?X	X		X	X	X
413/2		X					X		X	
412/1	X	X		X				X		
411 ¹	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~
410/9	X	X	X	X			X	X		X
409/8	X		X		X					
408/7			X							
407/6			X	XX	X		X			X
406/5				X	X		X			X
405/4		X		X		X				X
404/3	<i>No known strategoi in this year</i>									

¹ This year is excluded because of the difficulties which arise because of the revolutions and counter-revolutions.

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