Hybrid Republicanism: Freedom as Orthonomous Non-Domination

Abstract

In this thesis I defend the claim that a commitment to republican non-domination necessitates a further commitment to freedom understood as mutual recognition of discursive deliberative equality. I call this my hybrid account of freedom. On this view, republicanism necessitates holding two simultaneous views of freedom: freedom as non-domination and a particular conception of positive freedom, namely freedom as mutual recognition of orthonomy. To be non-dominated on such a view is to be recognised by others as an ontological equal, capable of, and actually engaging in deliberative discourse, and being treated as such by others.
The first chapter begins by setting out, briefly, some conceptions of negative and positive freedom, with a particular focus on Berlin’s distinction between such conceptions. I then offer some critiques of these conceptions, arguing that any account of freedom which is to be of the greatest benefit for political theorising should be responsive to these concerns. As negative and positive conceptions of freedom, as presented, are not responsive to these concerns, such considerations point to the conclusion that a different account of freedom is preferable.
In the second chapter, I sketch out a view of republicanism with reliance on Skinner, and principally, Pettit’s work. The chapter then goes on to argue that a commitment to non-domination understood in the way that Pettit puts forth necessitates a simultaneous commitment to positive freedom understood as mutual recognition of equal deliberative status. Further, that this commitment is part and parcel of what it means to be non-dominated; one cannot be non-dominated if one is not in fact and in treatment by others an equal discursive deliberative other. From this commitment, it being an essential element of being non-dominated, it follows that the State does, contrary to Pettit’s claims, have an interest in furthering just this positive freedom of agents. Finally, the second chapter replies to the critiques raised in the first chapter, providing an account of how my hybrid view can successfully respond to such.
The third and final chapter then proceeds to apply this hybrid account to demonstrate the account’s workability, and difference and similarity to Pettit, via an examination of free speech. In particular, the chapter begins with a justification of hate speech laws, arguing that given the necessity of equal recognition as a deliberative discursive other, hate speech laws are necessary in any society committed to my hybrid account of non-domination. Further, that such a concern with freedom provides reason to believe that positive speech rights are a necessary element of robust non-domination, and that the free marketplace of ideas is, in principle, ill-equipped to protect freedom.