Post war Japan: study in political geography

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# POST-WAR JAPAN

## A STUDY IN POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY

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1. **POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY**

A study in Political Geography presents problems as there are no clearly defined and generally accepted limits to its subject matter. Professor Moodie suggested that "the field of study of Political Geography is concerned with two basic considerations. First, and of fundamental importance, is the analysis of the relationships between community and physical environment". (1) His second basic consideration was that states are subject to change in their internal conditions and in their external relationships. The first consideration might equally well be a loose definition of Human Geography and Professor Moodie readily admits that "Political Geography is an aspect of the even wider study known as Human Geography". (2) However, he draws a distinction between Human and Political Geography in that the area unit of the former is the geographical region, and that of the latter is the state. This is perhaps an over-simplification, for the regional geographer cannot ignore the political and administrative divisions of the area with which he is concerned; indeed, regional geography must concern itself inter alia with political considerations and political units, thus recognising their claim to "regional character". (3) The distinction is one of emphasis and in view of the growing tendency for the state to play the dominant role in human society, this distinction becomes intelligible. Professor Fisher, in the introduction to his work of S.E. Asia, sums this up by saying, "For many years now it has been my conviction that the most effective level at which geographical synthesis can be made is that of the political unit rather than that of the natural region for, fundamental though the latter concept undoubtedly is to comparative geographical study it is primarily as a member
of a nationally organised society that the modern man comes to terms with his physical environment". (4) One may ask whether or not this type of study of Japan could not be done equally well by the Political Scientist. This may well be, but the state has a territorial area and a space location, both of which are unique in many respects, and other things being equal, the political geographer, by his training as a geographer, is better equipped to understand these.

The Political Geographer comes into close contact with geographical and non-geographical specialism. Woodridge and East write: "Whilst he must be a geographer in outlook and training, he must needs be conversant so far as it is profitable to him, with politics and history (economic and political) of the countries with which he is concerned", (5) The danger here, whilst admitting that he cannot achieve a deep specialisation, is that the political geographer will dabble in the specialisms and fail to derive much from them. The inter-relations between the politics and economy of a country are often profound and demand deep understanding. The Political geographer should have - apart from his geographical training - a good grounding in political science, in economics and in history. A case in point is the study of the mode of production in a state and its impact on political affairs. Opinion ranges from the Marxian extreme where the economic sub-structure of the state governs the social and political super-structure to a more generally accepted view that the economic factor has an important influence on the political. This latter view is summed up by Rostow when he writes, "Men do not usually fight and die for finite economic gains. They are, more generally, moved by a loyalty to ideas. These ideas, in turn, may be largely generated from economic life, and from a social life substantially shaped by the economy". (6)
As Professor Miller has pointed out, there is a danger in ignoring factors which do not seem to be remotely connected with the economy. He writes, "Again, in estimating the origins of political ideas, we should leave a place for those which are deeply embedded in a community's consciousness and do not alter much in spite of economic, political and social change. Ideas about what is right and proper have not changed much in India and Japan, for example, in spite of the immense impact which the technology and political example of the West has had on these countries in the past century" (7). Professor Miller's viewpoint should act as an effective warning to Western Statesmen who assume too readily that Western type political institutions and capitalism put Japan irrevocably into the Western camp.

Although we sometimes arbitrarily distinguish between the internal and external affairs of a State for the convenience of study, a close inter-relationship obviously exists between them. For instance, the slump in world trade and the resulting economic distress in Japan in 1929 was, in large measure, responsible for the rise to power of the military at the expense of the democratic elements at that time; the full consequences of this take us to Pearl Harbour.
(1) Geography behind Politics. Hutchinson 1959 P.7
   A.E. Moodie.
(2) Ibid. P.12
   S.W. Wooldridge and W.G. East.
(5) The Spirit and Purpose of Geography. P.127
(6) 'Economic Factors and Politics' in British
    P.168.
2. INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF POST-WAR JAPAN.

The complete and utter defeat of Japan left her a thoroughly devastated and demoralised land. In his estimate of the condition of post war Japan Edwin Reischauer, a former U.S. Ambassador to Japan, writes: "Probably none of the other participants (in the Second World War) suffered proportionately such heavy damage, and no other industrialised country was so slow in starting to show signs of recovery. Approximately half of the urban housing of Japan had been burned to the ground by American air raids. Tokyo's population had shrunk by more than half, Osaka's by almost two thirds. With the destruction of the cities and the virtual disappearance of the merchant marine, which had maintained the flow of Japan's economic life blood, industrial production had plummeted, standing in 1946 at a mere seventh of the 1941 figure. The people were clothed in rags, ill fed and both physically and emotionally exhausted." (1) This chaos existed equally in both urban and rural areas, for Japanese farms had been worked by depleted man power because of the heavy recruitment for the Armed Forces, and there had been a serious shortage of fertilisers and capital investment during the war years. The rural scene was depressing but at least the physical indestructibility of the land, with its quick recuperative powers, meant that agricultural output was never the same problem as industrial output. Japan, with her severely limited farm lands, had not been able to achieve self sufficiency in food production in the inter-war years and the position after the war was further aggravated by the loss of territories which had provided foodstuffs and by the return of some six million soldiers. In common with many other belligerent powers,
Japan experienced a 'baby boom' with return of her soldiers after a long separation. A runaway inflation caused special difficulties for wage and salary earners when the yen fell to less than one hundredth of its pre-war value.

The position was unrelievedly gloomy and in a land with such limited resources, it seemed doubtful if Japan would ever attain a viable economy. The urgent problem for most Japanese was simply to exist and if it had not been for massive United States help, there would have been widespread famine in Japan. However, the Japanese people have a great resilience, stemming from frequent efforts to deal with the devastation caused by earthquakes and typhoons and after a brief period of apathy, caused by the shock of defeat, they began recovery work with a characteristic vigour.

The statistics of Japan's post war economic growth are most impressive: her gross national product rose from 3.9 billion pounds in 1950 to 19.2 billion pounds in 1962. Her rate of economic growth cannot be matched by any country in the world and her industrial and commercial techniques are now being closely studied by Western economists. The Economist published a symposium of essays by correspondents and one of these wrote that Japan, apart from possessing a vast reservoir of adaptable labour, inherited three great advantages from her pre-war years (2). These were first, mass literacy (which distinguished her from other Asian powers), second, the interaction of Government and private industry in achieving a war economy with its production plans and the third inherited advantage "was that even before 1945 Japan's topography had (perhaps accidentally) impelled it into what now seems to have been exactly the right transport system for the early
stages of its development. The main secret was that Japan's long narrow coast strips had made it natural that all the main industrial activity should cluster around a few main railway lines, which ran along the coast linking one inlet and natural harbour with the next one. Those main railway lines (although not those harbours) are in superb shape today." (3) This is not the place to go into a detailed discussion of the strength of the Japanese economy, but it is well to remember that economic strength is perhaps of more vital concern to a nation than ever before in the present nuclear age. One cannot avoid the conclusion that Britain has not paid enough attention to her economic growth in the post war world and has been misled too long with delusions of imperial grandeur. Japan has been spared the heavy cost of defence because of her alliance with the U.S. For instance she plans to spend 301,400 million yen (£301,400,000) on defence during the fiscal year 1965-66, which is a comparatively modest total. The Guardian bitterly criticized her for this in an article (March 14, 1966) which seemed harsh, as few countries have given such genuine cooperation to the West in the matter of defence. It is to Britain's detriment that she has blundered into such wasteful military expenditure without getting very effective weaponry. Of the further charge made by the Guardian that Japan has not done her share in contributing to economic development in the Far East, there is more substance. The Guardian quoted the Japanese Prime Minister, Mr. Sato, as saying that his country "was in a position to contribute vitally to peace and stability," adding however, that it could not afford to set aside one per cent of national income for aid purposes, even in the fiscal year 1966. The Guardian also pointed out that only four countries in the non-Communist world have a higher gross national product than
Japan - the U.S., Britain, France and West Germany - all of which are doing far more to help other countries to develop. The Japanese, it is true, stand only twenty-second in the per capita income table, but against that must be set their relative freedom from defence expenditure. In 1962 the following countries contributed these totals to aid developing countries: U.S. $4,520 millions; Britain $836.7 millions; West Germany $681.4 millions; Japan $281.9 millions. On grounds of equity alone one would expect Japan to contribute more for the welfare of the poorer Asian countries but because of her vital dependance on world trade, it is surely in her interest that the non-Communist governments of S. East Asia develop peacefully and are not victims of Communist blandishments because of their own dire poverty.

Japan is a powerful country and she seems likely to play a more independent role in international affairs in the next decade. There have been signs recently that this will come about - her attempts at mediation between Indonesia and Malaysia have been an example of this - but it is difficult to see her being able to dispense with the American alliance, in view of her proximity to the two super-powers, the U.S.S.R. and China. Much of Japan's trade is with the U.S. but her skills and technical knowhow are vitally needed in S.E. Asia. Some Western economists have pointed out that China is the natural market for Japan - and indeed some Japanese right-wing businessmen, who are resentful of U.S. hegemony in the Far East, have expressed a wish for the development of trade with Communist China, but this is a naive point of view. We have few examples of extensive trade between Communist and non-Communist countries and China has perhaps a greater suspicion of capitalist countries than has Soviet Russia. The trade
links with the U.S. have provided an extensive market for Japanese cameras, radios and other consumer goods, but it remains to be seen whether or not Japan can afford to ignore the potential market in South East Asia.

Japan's 'economic miracle' is a fact, but she still has great economic problems: her greatest is in her dependence on the outside world for much of her foodstuffs (soya beans, wheat and other cereals), virtually all her oil requirements (which is replacing coal as the major source of power), and most of the raw materials of industry. As in the case of Britain, this makes her more vulnerable than the super-powers, the U.S.A. and Russia, who have considerable sources of raw materials within their own territories. To pay for her raw materials Japan must export on a vast scale and the question always remains whether foreign markets can keep up with her extremely rapid rate of growth. There is always a danger of a balance of payments crisis but the Japanese have shown great skill in avoiding these and have not been plagued with the 'stop-go' methods we have used in Britain. What have been the ingredients of Japan's incredible success? Briefly, these would seem to be the tremendous energy and application of her people. Her emphasis on education, particularly technological education, has been the right one if we are restricting our enquiry to the material welfare of her people. However, these qualities of resourcefulness and industry existed before the war and there is no simple explanation for her economic success in the post-war world. Inextricably mixed up with economic problems are the social and political ones and there is the additional fascination in studying post-war Japan in that it is a period when "democracy, western created
with a Western developed concept of government and politics, could become rapidly and firmly rooted in a nation that not only had not democratic history and tradition of its own but had developed a modern governmental system of an authoritarian character." (4) Democracy in Japan was not the product of an evolutionary growth, as in the West, but was the result of a vast social revolution. What made the revolution successful was a combination of factors, the primary ones being a lost war, with all the chaos and dislocations of defeat, a reasonably enlightened occupying power, a society equipped with the basic institutions of the modern nation state, and a population disillusioned by a former authoritarian form of government that had let them down. In spite of occasional crises, the future of democracy seems to be reasonably secure in Japan and it is perhaps mainly in some period of acute economic distress, caused by a dislocation of foreign trade, that a resurrection of the old right-wing militia could occur.

This study is concerned with the significant features of Japan's economic recovery and her external and internal political developments in the post-war period. The inclusion of a chapter on education is perhaps a little unusual in a work on political Geography. The main justification for this rests, in the writer's view, on the value of the work of the schools and universities in helping to create a democratic society in Japan, and in promoting Japan's economic growth.

Although the chapter headings suggest a somewhat arbitrary division of subject matter, it is hoped that there will be considerable cross reference between these.
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DISTANCES BY AIR FROM CHINESE AND RUSSIAN CONTROLLED TERRITORIES AND FOUR CHIEF JAPANESE INDUSTRIAL NODES.

- Kurile Isles
- U.S.S.R.
- Hokkaido
- Tokyo
- Yokohama
- Nagoya
- Osaka
- Kobe
- Nagasaki
- China
- N. Korea
- S. Korea
- U.S.S.R.

Distances:
- China to China: 410 Miles
- China to N. Korea: 520 Miles
- China to S. Korea: 420 Miles
- China to U.S.S.R.: 500 Miles

Scale: 0 - 200 Mls
JAPAN'S LOST TERRITORIES.

- U.S.S.R.
- Kurile Is
- Manchuria
- Jehol
- Peking
- Korea
- China
- Formosa
- Okinawa
- Ryuku Islands
- Bonin Is.
- Volcano Is.
- Sea of Japan
- Territories lost in 1945 shaded RED

Note U.S.A. has only 'provisional administration of Bonins and Ryukus.

(Marianas, Carolines and Marshalls excluded)
3. SOME GEO-POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Location

Y.M. Goblet, in his book 'Political Geography and the World Map' writes: "The drawbacks of position are a yoke from whose burden no state can escape but an advantageous geographical position may favour a state as much as the development of an optimum territory." (1) Although we would not disagree with this statement, it is nevertheless true that the comparatively recent rise to world dominance of the 'super powers', based on enormous territorial strengths, has made the position of nations such as Britain and Japan, which possess small homelands, relatively worse. Nuclear power has brought about dramatic changes in world strategy and has undoubtedly weakened the position of nations with small homelands, no matter how important their position is. Both Japan and Britain have entered the sixties of this century as good 'second class powers', although in the case of Japan, the success she has enjoyed in the economic sphere has been tempered strategically by the fact that the nearby mainland of Asia is dominated by Communist China and Russia. Britain, at least, is spared the embarrassment of a neighbouring, hostile continent.

In many ways Japan's defensive position is weak; her territory consists of an arc of islands stretching for a thousand miles off the Eastern shores of Asia. Her proximity to the mainland can be seen from map 11b. The main island, Honshu, is only 160 miles from Korea and her territories are only 250 miles from the Soviet mainland. Her major industries are highly concentrated and would be vulnerable to air attack even by conventional weapons. However, this proximity to the
mainland has been, on balance, a great asset, for this has permitted effective cultural contact with China but at the same time her surrounding seas have given her some protection. Trewatha - almost inevitably - compared Japan with Britain when he wrote: "Japan's history has been one of alternating periods of seclusion and communication with the mainland of East Asia. Each developed (Britain and Japan) industry earlier than did the adjacent continent; and the resulting need for overseas raw materials in turn stimulated the acquisition of a colonial empire. Japan, at the gateway to populous East Asia, has a strategic position both in an economic and in a military sense". (2)

In the main, Japan has capitalized on her geographical assets in the past: her islands have been relatively free from invasion from the mainland and yet she has been able to launch vigorous attacks on the mainland from her islands. The Korean Peninsula - the so called 'dagger aimed at the heart of Japan' - represented an obvious strategic threat and it is not surprising that the control and conquest of Korea always featured prominently in Japan's 'imperialist priorities'. Professor C.A. Fisher reminded us of the real significance of Korea to Japan when he suggested that the attempted control of Korea and the Straits of Tsushima were positive aims of Soviet Russia in bringing about the Korean War of the early 1950's. (3)

The Japanese have a long tradition of maritime skill and this has obviously helped them to repel invaders and to create a modern fleet. The sea so obtrudes itself on to the Japanese that it is hardly surprising that they have always
enjoyed a good reputation as sailors. From the 12th Century onwards there has been considerable Japanese maritime enterprise as far as the shores of Malacca and Siam. Although maritime ventures beyond home waters were officially discouraged from the 17th to the 19th Centuries her coastal fisheries continued on a large scale and Japan lost none of her maritime skills. Without being unduly deterministic, it is difficult to conceive of a populous nation, with Japan's geography, not being involved in maritime ventures. Even her relatively small plains have locations near the sea so that all marine matters are forcibly thrust upon her. The high concentration of industry on these littoral plains represents something of a strategic weakness but nevertheless is economically right for a nation so dependent on raw materials from overseas. Her ratio of linear miles of coastline to square miles of territory (1 to 8.5 sq. miles) is even higher than Britain's (1 to 13 sq. miles). Unfortunately Japan lacks good natural harbour sites near the major centres of population. The shallow seas near the coastal plains present something of a problem, although improved dredging techniques have helped to circumvent these problems. Where rivers enter the shallow seas near such sites of Yokohama and Osaka, silting still presents something of a problem.

Even in a brief chapter on Japan's geo-political problems it would be unwise not to mention the significance of Japan's fishing industry. Her fishing industry is by far the largest in the world and includes both intensive inshore fishing and deep water fishing in many parts of the Pacific. Only by understanding the importance of fish and marine products in the diet of the average Japanese can we understand the degree of bitterness brought into Russo-Japanese relations when the former appropriated important fishing grounds, tied to the
territories of Sakhalin and the Kuriles, which were acquired by Russia at the end of the Second World War. Many of the exceedingly bitter disputes between South Korea and Japan have their origins in disputes over fishing grounds.

In the post-war era, Japan has depended on U.S. forces for her defence. Although Japan has a large merchant navy and a superb ship building industry she has not built a fleet to replace her broken war-time navy. In the early post-war years the U.S. would not have permitted any extensive Japanese naval shipbuilding programme and the Japanese left the main defensive problem with the U.S., which freed Japan from heavy national defence expenditure.

The loss of Southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles to the U.S.S.R. after the Second World War has greatly weakened Japan's strategic position and the U.S.S.R. has now virtually assumed control over the Sea of Okhotsk. Perhaps of greater strategic significance for Japan is her position in the Sea of Japan, which, although it is not completely dominated by Soviet Russia, can give Japan little security because of her lack of control over the Soya Strait. (See map) Moreover, the tremendous submarine programme that the Soviet Union has followed in recent years can give the Japanese small consolation, especially as numbered among these are submarines capable of delivering atomic missiles. Indeed, so great has been the strategic advantage of the U.S.S.R. vis-a-vis Japan that Professor Fisher quotes W. Macmahon Ball who argues "Japan may be driven to align itself with the Soviet Union rather than the Western Bloc as the only possible means of ensuring national survival in the event of a third world war". (4) This highly perspicacious statement was made before there were apparent strains in Sino-Soviet relations and long before China had begun testing atomic weapons!
Shorn of her overseas possessions, Japan now lacks a defensive screen of islands in the Pacific but this is of little consequence as the main threat to her security is from the Asian mainland. Japan-like Britain - would, because of her limited means of industrial deployment, be highly vulnerable to a nuclear attack, delivered by rockets. The fact that China now has nuclear weapons, has caused some pessimism in Japan in recent months as she has every reason to dread a nuclear war.

Japan as a base

Japan clearly lacks a sound raw material base and many of her pre-war policies are only intelligible in the light of her frantic search to make up these deficiencies. The Map 77(a) shows the extent of Japan's territorial expansion up to 1943 and lists some of the raw materials she hoped to obtain from this empire. Japan's economy was grossly overstrained in the pre-war years; she scraped together raw materials from all over Asia and developed her territories so that she could squeeze the last ounce out of them. This lack of raw materials is still a source of weakness but in economic terms, Japan has been able to minimize this problem by achieving cheap, bulk transport of raw materials and by maintaining a high standard of industrial and commercial efficiency. The real significance of a nation in world affairs depends upon a complex number of factors. Some of these, the geographical position, the level of economic development, as we have seen, are important, but equally significant is the demographic factor. As we shall see in detail later in this work the demographic factor is by no means as depressing as it seemed in the immediate post-war years. Japanese industry has benefited by a steady influx of adaptable, reasonably well educated workers from the land and moreover these have been available at just the right stage in her economic
development. Her crude birth rate has fallen dramatically in the fifties and sixties but prognostications about birth rate are notoriously difficult and it would be unwise to rule out a 'demographic explosion'.

One of the pressing problems facing Japanese statesmen before the war was the difficulty of producing enough foodstuffs to feed this rapidly increasing population, but this problem has been alleviated both by a fall in birth rate and by an increasing productivity in Japanese farming. Improved techniques have led to a net increase in foodstuffs with a rapidly decreasing labour force and in this, Japan has followed a trend familiar in Western Europe and U.S.A. Although Japan is now self sufficient in rice production, it should be borne in mind that the greatly increased purchasing power of the Japanese worker has meant that he has been able to buy a wider variety of foodstuffs. However, arable land in Japan is limited to a mere 17% of her total area and it is difficult to conceive how Japan can greatly increase her agricultural output. The essentially mountainous topography of Japan is disadvantageous. Her mountains make communications difficult and, of course, have limited land use - apart from silviculture. Some economic advantage in the sphere of hydro-electric power augments Japan's slender fuel resources but Japan's mountainous terrain gives great natural beauty but little else. The mountains would make Japan a difficult country to invade in a conventional war and one of the strongest arguments advanced by the Americans in the Second World War for dropping nuclear bombs on Japan was the high casualty rate which would have been inevitable in any invasion of Japan.

On balance, Japan is favoured by her climate. Macro-climate is perhaps of more significance than anything else in
a country consisting of mountainous islands. Japan's climate is essentially a composite of continental and marine elements with the former predominating. Her climate gives her extreme winter and summer temperatures with relatively high ranges in temperature but she is blessed with an adequate rainfall. Her climate is somewhat modified by the influences of oceanic currents but these effects are sometimes exaggerated by geographers. For example, the Kuroshio current has a warming effect but because it is on the leeside of Japan during the winter monsoon its direct effect on temperatures is minimized. The cold 'Oyoshio current tends to reduce temperatures and causes much coastal fog along the coast of N.E. Hokkaido and Honshu. Nevertheless the climate permits of an astonishing variety of crops ranging from two crop rice production in the extreme south to typical cool temperate crops of Hokkaido.

The Japanese have always shown a marked disinclination to migrate to areas which experience marked winter cold and this accounts for the relatively small population on Hokkaido. This lack of development has concerned successive Japanese Governments, especially when the Soviet Union emerged as a major threat to Japan. Undoubtedly the most significant strength in Japan lies in the quality of her people: she has proved to the world that her people are well disciplined, quite prepared to undergo protracted hardships if necessary and that they have a rare quality of toughness. It is not surprising that the United States looks upon Japan as one of her chief allies, a choice dictated partly by the significance of Japan's geographical position and her dynamic economy and partly from a respect for the quality of her peoples.
Far Eastern politics are concerned with a vast triangular struggle for power involving China, the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., and it needs little imagination to appreciate Japan's significance to any one of these major powers. The loss of such territories as Southern Vietnam would represent a serious breach in the policy of U.S.A.'s containment of Communist China but the economic potential of such countries is not great. Japan, however, is a very different kettle of fish. Her military potential is great and her loss would make America's position in the Far East extremely critical.
1. Political Geography and the World Map.
   Y.M. Goblet. P. 202 George Philip 1956

2. Japan. Trewatha. P. 16 Methuen

   G. East and A.E. Moodie. p.547 World Book Co.,

4. Nationalism and Communism in East Asia.
   W. Macmahon Ball. p.29 C.U.P. 1952
4. Historical Background

The period up to the outbreak of the Second World War.

In a study of political geography covering almost thirty years there is a danger that, having the benefit of the hindsight of history, we may fail to appreciate how world problems must have seemed to statesmen at that time. This pitfall is a dangerous one in the case of Japan where the impact of Western technology, so obviously apparent today, may obscure the basic continuity of past tradition.

K.S. Latourette, the distinguished American historian of the Far East writes: "It is so axiomatic as to be a banality to say that present day Japan is a continuation of the old Japan. Yet it needs emphasizing. To the casual observer from the West, especially to one who has come to Japan by way of India and China and has visited only the large cities, Japan has seemed so thoroughly transformed by its contacts with the Occident that a complete gulf is assumed to exist between the old and the new. This is almost the exact opposite of the truth. It is less than a hundred years since Commodore Perry ended the Tokygawa seclusion. That time has not been sufficient for the elimination of institutions and still less the basic attitudes of a people as tenacious of their inheritance as are the Japanese. Behind the facade of Western dress, buildings, factories, electric lights, railways, and automobiles the pre-Perry Japan lingers. It not only lingers, it is still potent." (1)

The brief study of the early history of Japan is therefore germane to this work. The really significant aspect of the modern history of Japan, however, is in the response she made to the intrusion of the Western World in
the last century. Japan was the first country in Asia to become industrialised and therefore the first in Asia to use the weapons of the West against the West. Japan, reciprocally, had a great impact on the Western World and of this, Richard Storry writes: "The Western World, feeling through the agency of Japan the first intrusion by the East, responded with emotions not fundamentally different from those experienced by the Japanese. This powerful interaction, much of it all the harder to grasp, has shaped Japanese history over the last nine or ten decades." (2) The major part of this historical outline will therefore be concerned with Japan after her contact with the West, but to place this in historical perspective, a brief summary of significant phases in her early history will be necessary.

Japanese history up to the outbreak of the Second World War may - somewhat arbitrarily - be divided into the following periods:

1. Japan; before her effective contact with China.
2. The Transformation through China: Nara (710-794) and Heian (794-1185) periods
3. Military Dictatorship to 1600: Kamakura (1185-1333), Muromachi (1333-1568), and Momoyama (1568-1600) periods.
4. The Tokugawa Period (1600-1868).
5. The Meiji Period, in which Japan emerges from her seclusion (1868-1912)
6. Japan becomes a World Power (1894-1930)

1. Japan, before her effective contact with China.

As with so many other peoples, the story of the beginnings of the Japanese is enshrined in myths and legends. These, however, have had real significance to the Japanese as they
were considered to be factually true and as such were taught in the schools and Universities up to the end of the Pacific War. Storry mentions the fact that more than one teacher in the academic world of pre-war Japan lost his livelihood for questioning the accuracy of the ancient legends. (3)

There is no recorded history in Japan until the Chinese characters were adopted in the fourth century and it is not until this period that native chronicles become reasonably accurate. Most scholars, however, combining a nucleus of fact from some of the legends and archaeological findings are agreed that from the beginning of the Christian era, two centres of culture existed in Japan. One was at Izumo, on the south west of the main island, opposite Korea, and the other was at Yamato, also on Honshu, south of present day Kyoto. Yamato was the nucleus of the later centralized government of Japan. This nucleus is said to have been founded by conquerors from Kyushu, who, led by Gimmu Tenno, made their way along the eastern shore of that island and then along the Inland Sea until they established themselves in Yamato. The racial composition of these people is uncertain and speculation has been made that they derived in part from islands in the south, and part from the continent, by way of Korea. Archaeological evidence, however, is more helpful and we know that these people had advanced beyond the primitive stages of civilisation. They made iron implements, cloth and pottery and were capable of making quite intricate pieces of jewelry. Rice was the basic crop produced by this essentially agrarian people, but the presence of distinct occupational groups shows a somewhat diversified economy.

When we turn to the social and political organisation of these people we find that they did not possess a highly centralized monarchy but had an Imperial Family, which was in effect,
the most important clan. These clans were made up of a number of households which claimed a common ancestor; they worshipped a common god, and were under a common chieftain. Each clan had its own lands. The head of the dominant clan, who was termed Emperor, had a certain authority which he exercised through the heads of the other clans. What is perhaps the most interesting aspect of this social structure is that it was stratified in hereditary layers and was unlike the relatively fluid society which developed in China. The rulers of the clans constituted the aristocracy and below these were occupational groups, also with hereditary membership and on the bottom rung of the social ladder were the slaves.

The religion of these people was the predecessor of the present Shinto faith. To these early Japanese all objects and plants were considered to have life and the word 'kami', usually translated as 'god', was not closely defined, and embraced a great variety of objects and beings. Before contact with China, ancestor worship was not an integral part of this religion. This religion had within it no profound theology; it was a religion of ritual and ceremonial but was in no way obsessed with sin. There were professional priests but their numbers were small and this limited need for them seems to have been dictated more by genuine theological considerations and not by the economic difficulties of supporting an ever larger priesthood. This brief comment on the early Japanese is not a profitless one, for today, much of this primitive religion, much modified by contacts with other faiths, survives.

The early Japanese state with its centre at Yamato gradually extended its borders by conquest and eventually conquered the southern tip of Korea. However, it should be remembered that although territorially this state occupied no more than perhaps a third of Honshu and a relatively small
part of the Korean peninsula, it was aggressively expansionist and rejoiced in military exploits. This adulation of the warrior has been a constant factor in Japanese history, although we in the West are not blameless on this score! When we come to ask what were the most important features of this early state and what is their relevance to us today - attempting a study in political geography - they seem to be as follows:-

(a) the existence of a highly statified society whose economy was centred on rice growing.

(b) the development of a religion which continues to exert influence on millions of Japanese today.

(c) the growth of an expansionist state which extolled martial exploits.

2. Transformation through China.

Most scholars are agreed that the transformation of Japan by Chinese culture is the most significant phase in Japanese history. The absorption of ideas constituted a revolution far more thorough going than that which came from contact with the West centuries later. In a very real sense the revolution in Japanese life which came from the contact with China in the sixth, seventh and eighth centuries was a precursor to the revolution which came from contact with the West: it accustomed the Japanese to take from a foreign culture just what they felt they needed and they did this over a long period of time. When we examine this transformation of Japan, the later dramatic changes in Japan after the Meiji Restoration, when Japan ended a long period of seclusion and then readily accepted Western ideas and techniques, cease to become an unintelligible volte face, which they often seem to be in any superficial study of
Japanese history. Japan was thus for many centuries the pupil and China the teacher. China, to her detriment, has never easily accepted the role of pupil and it is interesting to see how quickly in the present century she has quickly assumed the role of the teacher in the Communist world. The really interesting point, however, in discussing the relative degrees of receptivity to new ideas of China and Japan is that in the case of the latter, two revolutionary phases of contact with other parts of the world - the Chinese and the Western - were engineered by the ruling classes whereas in the case of China, her major revolution was brought about by the under-privileged classes, which completely upset her class structure. This difference is of basic importance. It meant that Japan has retained this stratified society which we mentioned in the previous chapter and while changes seemed - and were - revolutionary, they did not completely sweep aside the past.

No logical order seems to exist for the changes brought about in Japan by her contact with China even if, in the interests of clarity, we try to separate them. We may identify three major aspects of the Sinicisation of Japan; the first concerns the introduction of Chinese Literature and Language, the second is the introduction of Buddhism and the third is concerned with political changes.

It should be remembered that Chinese first came into Japan as a totally foreign language and to use Chinese characters to write Japanese was as much a tour de force as it would be to write English with them. Difficult as it was for scholars to master the Chinese language, it gave the Japanese when they had mastered it 'the vast and varied products of the Chinese mind'.
Not only did it give the Japanese new techniques but it meant that a rich literature was available for the relatively few, literate people. "The Japanese studied Chinese architecture, sculpture, and painting, founded schools on the continental pattern, and learned medicine, astronomy (and a fixed calendar), better methods for casting metals and fashioning tools, and Chinese music". (3a) By slow stages, the Japanese introduced simplification of Chinese characters with more phonetic writing, but they never effectively freed themselves of the burden of the awkward Chinese characters. Although the Chinese language linked Japan with a great civilization it has not been an unmixed blessing: in the last century it has made contact with the West extremely difficult and the sheer effort of achieving literacy by young Japanese takes far too long.

Buddhism was first brought to Japan from China by aliens towards the end of the sixth century. As a religion it never supplanted Shinto which was the dominant faith in Japan at that time. After some years Buddhism was firmly established and widely disseminated throughout Japan. When Buddhism was introduced into Japan it encountered a good deal of opposition but its espousal by the Soga clan, the dominant clan at that time, led the Imperial family - after some vacillation - to accept it. In the seventh and eighth centuries Buddhism flourished in Japan. Well endowed monasteries were established and like their Christian counterparts in medieval Europe, they were great centres of learning. Not only did the Buddhist monasteries provide spiritual culture and help for the poorer people but they also helped to build dykes, roads and bridges. Buddhism had a more sophisticated philosophy than Shintoism and as usually happens when a more advanced faith,
connected as it was with a great culture, comes into contact with a more primitive religion, it makes great headway. Storry also points out that "not only Buddhist but also Confucian influence is to be detected in what the Japanese call the 'Constitution of 17 Articles' - it was a set of ethical maxims - promulgated by Prince Shotoku is alleged to have stated, 'cannot be achieved unless it is based on knowledge, and the sources of knowledge are Confucianism, Buddhism, and Shinto". (4).

In the sphere of government, the Japanese failed to reproduce in their new state some of the more important institutions of the Chinese system. The Chinese bureaucracy was in theory - at any rate - open to anyone, regardless of social position, if they qualified in the competitive civil service examinations but this never applied in Japan; the higher offices of the central administration being occupied by the scions of the most powerful clans. The position of Emperor was enhanced and attempts were made at centralising power under the crown but these were not successful. A significant development was the shift of political power to a hereditary regency, or civil dictatorship, of the powerful Fujiwara family between the ninth and twelfth centuries. Though emperors continued to reign, their Fujiwara ministers, taking advantage both of the fact that the emperor was often a minor and required an interpreter of the divine emperor's will, assumed powers that were virtually sovereign.

Meanwhile, in the provinces, land that the seventh and eighth century law codes from China had placed in the hands of the many small landowners tended to become concentrated in large estates. These new, enlarged holdings were tax free and constituted virtually autonomous states. The
landowners came in time to form a new aristocracy, often called feudal from the dual political and economic nature of their tenure. These feudal heads were essentially militaristic and were often engaged in internecine wars. It was during this period that the Japanese frontiers of settlement were extended to the north at the expense of the Ainus, probably the oldest inhabitants of Japan.

About 1150, two families of provincial nobility contended for supremacy. A general of the Taira clan first usurped civil authority previously reserved for Fujiwara ministers. After a civil war, the Minamoto clan replaced the Taira clan and a new age of centralised military dictatorship began.

Military Dictatorship to 1600:

Kamakura (1185-1333) Muromachi (1333-1568) and Momoyama (1568-1600) Periods.

Yoritomo, the successful general of the Minamoto clan, established himself in Kyoto which had become the new capital in the Heian period, and set up the institution of the Bakufu, or "tent government", which superseded the civil bureaucracy. Yoritomo reigned under the Shogun or Commander-in-Chief. The capital was again moved, on Yoritomo's instigation, to Kamakura, to the east of Kyoto, near the site of present day Tokyo. In theory he was a military officer of the crown but he was, in effect, the de facto ruler of the state. The state was Minamoto clan law writ large but even though the existing government was shorn of much of its power, it continued to co-exist with Yoritomo's system. The centralised dictatorship of Kamakura was effective in repelling invasions by the Mongol hordes under Kublai Khan. The second and most important victory, over the Mongols, aided by a typhoon (the now legendary Kamikaze, or "divine wind") in the Strait of Tsushima, was so costly that it weakened the Bakufu and led to its downfall.
A new dynasty of shoguns, the Ashikaga, provided fifteen rulers from 1338 until late in the sixteenth century, but most of them failed in the attempt to give unified, secure government. An idea of the confusion which existed in the fourteenth century may be obtained from the fact that for a considerable period there were two Emperors, both backed by considerable forces and both claiming - or rather, their supporters were claiming - that each was the one and only lawful emperor.

International trade, particularly with China, was encouraged by the central government and by the daimyo, or feudal lords, and this attracted Portuguese traders who landed in Kyushu in 1542. The Portuguese and Spaniards brought superior muskets and had advanced ideas about building fortifications, all of which were well received in Japan. Missionaries from these countries made great headway and in some cases, Japanese nobles, no doubt hoping to facilitate trade or perhaps obtain military advantage over rivals, positively encouraged Christian missionaries.

These unsettled times made military prowess more important than ancestry as a measure of social prestige. The older families lost lands and status, and power was gained by upstarts who obtained the backing of the merchants in the towns. The new overseas trade and the need for expensive fortifications gave birth to cities where the merchants, using both coin and credit, grew in importance.

Between 1565 and 1600, three military men led the re-unification of Japan. The first of them was Oda Nobunaga who conquered many of the provinces and broke the power of the formidable Buddhist monasteries. Oda Nobunaga was murdered in 1582 and his successor, Hideyoshi was a man of peasant stock. Hideyoshi pacified and unified the
the nation and prompted by the need for keeping his vast armies occupied, launched an attack on Korea. During this unsuccessful invasion he died in 1598 and his successor, Tokugawa Ieyasu, consolidated his position by naming himself hereditary Shogun in 1603.

The Tokugawa Period (1600-1868)

When Ieyasu assumed power he did not revolutionise the forms of government. The Imperial House was preserved with the old kuge, or court nobility, but they were completely removed from any effective power and performed purely a ceremonial role. The capital of the Shogun was established at Yedo and a huge castle was built there. The daimyo (feudal lords) were tightly controlled by the Shogun in the Tokugawa period; their wives and families had to be left in the capital as hostages when the daimyo were in their fiefs and by compelling these lords to undertake public works in their lands, they could be kept in check.

The Tokugawa period saw Japan regimented as never before under autocratic direction. This was a period of peace which lasted for almost two and a half centuries but it depended upon a skilful balance of forces - political, military and economic. The persecution of Christians which had begun under Hideyoshi's rule was intensified in Tokugawa Japan and led to the complete proscription of Christianity. Foreign influences were feared and Japan was sealed more effectively against Western contacts than any other major land in the Far East. Internally the Tokugawa was a period of urban expansion and within the cities there was a great increase in the merchant class. Some of the less successful daimyo even engaged in trade which, however, still resulted in loss of social standing. In the main, the daimyo resented the rise of the merchant class.
but often they depended on the merchants for their support.

The peasants suffered greatly from the exactions of the land lords and being at the bottom of the social system, they suffered more in proportion than any other class and their despair often led to futile revolts. The money economy which replaced the old one, based on rice, favoured the merchants against the military, for the incomes of the latter were traditionally drawn from the land and its produce.

Chinese political theory had been increasingly studied as an aspect of Confucianism and this theory taught loyalty to the Emperor but did not take cognizance of either Shogun or Bakufu. All unconsciously, the Tokugawa period was preparing Japan for her entry into a world of powerful nation states. The Tokugawa efforts at unifying Japan were successful and were accustoming the Japanese to centralised control. Military traditions were still an important feature in Japanese life, indeed military feudalism survived as it had not in Europe. Moreover Japan's isolation had bred an intense nationalism, and this, allied to her military tradition, was to make her a formidable power once she obtained Western techniques later in the century.

The main changes brought about by the Meiji Restoration.

The appearance of the American Commodore Perry and his squadron forced the Japanese into trade treaties which 'snowballed' when the major western powers realised that the Americans had stolen a march on them. The repercussions in Japan were great. The restoration to power of the Meiji Emperor was nominal but as part of this process, the Shogunate was abolished by a coalition of western feudatories who then assumed power. The new government accepted relations with other world powers as normal and expressed a willingness to
conform to treaty commitments.

The Emperor turned out to be extremely able and although he did not come to dominate his government, he lent his support to the movement to abolish feudalism. Financially, and inevitably socially, the daimyo and the samurai suffered with the abolition of feudalism but the peasants were undoubtedly better off. Payments of rice as rent were commuted to money payments and the whole system of land tenure was revised. The old distinction between the Kuge, or court nobility and the Samurai was destroyed and one collective nobility took their place. An effective bureaucracy was established and although the Samurai were prominent in this, admission to the civil service was controlled by examination and it was mandatory for a civil servant to serve away from the fief in which he had been born.

Japan also introduced a Constitution and Parliamentary government - even if these did seem more impressive on paper they were, than in fact. She introduced compulsory primary education and developed secondary and higher education along Western lines. In four decades after the arrival of Perry, Japan had factories, railways, a telegraph system and a merchant navy. The Shinto religion was revived and this became a vehicle of Japanese patriotism. The whole transformation of Japan was staggering and by the end of the nineteenth century she had become the most powerful, truly Asian state, in the world.

When we come to examine the innovations we find that there was not such a profound revolution in Japanese society that we might expect. The ruling classes in Japan were the ones who engineered these changes. In Japan the leadership was taken chiefly by the samurai and a few of the Kuge but
the revolution was not one of the proletariat, peasantry or middle class. This, indeed, may well have been the reason why liberal democracy did not succeed in Japan. The economic changes were interesting in that the state was a very active participant in industrial and commercial expansion, a feature which is common in Japan today. However, in establishing the economic revolution the state made extensive use of existing economic concerns. It developed model industries and then turned them over to leading industrialists at bargain prices. Within this system, the enormously powerful family concerns, the Mitsui, the Mitsubishi and the Zaibatsu came to power. Concomitant with the changes in commerce, the reform of Japanese currency and banking were important steps forward. As military preparedness - the humiliation of the treaties forced upon Japan by the West was a constant reminder to the rulers about the need for this - was the principal aim of industrialisation, munitions plants, heavy industries, and communications facilities were the first to be established. It is interesting to note that Russia, after the 1917 Revolution, sensing the danger of intervention by Capitalist powers, followed a similar course of action in giving heavy industries priority in her economic development. Many goods for domestic consumption continued to be produced under the domestic system, though within a few decades consumer goods were being produced by the factories on a large scale. Before 1894 foreign commerce was not great but this increased enormously at about the turn of the century.

Taken at their face value, Japan's political and constitutional changes, her economic revolution and legal reforms were most impressive. Few people can have realised that the traditional spirit and basic institutions of Japan had been
intensified rather than weakened. Japanese nationalism, often denigrated in the West, where nationalism was just as pernicious, had been strengthened during the long period of Tokugawa peace and was responsible for the change. Now, with the hindsight of history, we see massive world conflict as almost inevitable for Japan.

**Japan becomes a world Power 1894-1930.**

The Japanese showed an unusual ambivalence in their attitude to the West: in a sense they considered they were a superior race headed by a descendant of the gods, and yet they resented the patronizing airs of their Western mentors who had imposed the unequal treaties on her. The significance of the date 1894 is that it was the year of the renunciation of an unequal treaty by Great Britain. The year 1894 also was the year in which Japan began her territorial expansion.

**The causes of Japanese Expansion.**

In view of the significance of the governing classes in Japan in bringing about the revolutionary changes in the second half of the nineteenth century it is possible to regard the territorial expansion of Japan after 1894 as the work of a handful of chauvinists. This is an over-simplification of a very complex problem. Japan was a vigorous nation, rapidly increasing in population and wealth; the very weakness of her neighbour, China, accentuated her strength. Moreover, she occupied a highly strategic position which commanded the sea approaches to the east of Asia. The Western powers had nearly all acquired empires by force or the threat of force and so the example of realpolitik was thrust upon her. When Japan, too, embarked upon war as a major instrument of policy,
it worked - in the early wars. She gained recognition as a Far Eastern power after the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95, and the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5 made her a world power. Both conflicts concerned foreign influence in Korea and Manchuria. The former war gained for Japan Western admiration of her progress; it gave her Formosa and the Pescadores and won her several commercial advantages in China. The peace treaty originally granted Japan the Liao-tung Peninsula (on the Manchurian coast) but the so-called Triple Intervention of Russia, France and Germany forced her to cede this. The deep resentment felt in Japan over the Triple Intervention undoubtedly confirmed beliefs about Western duplicity. China's anti-foreign, Boxer Rebellion gave Japan a further opportunity of sending troops and helped to confirm her status as a power. The Rebellion also worked to Russia's advantage by giving her an opportunity to occupy Manchuria when the other powers were pre-occupied with the suppression of the Boxers. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902, apart from its practical use in a period of intense friction with Russia, meant much to Japanese esteem and not a little in the early years of the century, to an isolated Great Britain. The war against Russia in 1905 assured her "paramount, political, military, and economic interests" in Korea, secured in Southern Manchuria the special railway and commercial rights which had been Russia's, and gave her southern Sakhalin.

Although Japanese colonial conquests looked impressive it is doubtful if they were real assets to her economy. On the credit side she used them as sources for raw materials and as outlets for her exports. On the debit side, the wars which brought these possessions were a great strain on her economy and all the colonial conquests required help from the
Imperial Treasury to preserve viable economies. For a variety of reasons the colonies never proved a satisfactory outlet for Japanese settlement.

The population of the islands of Japan was rapidly multiplying. Between 1872 and 1894 it had risen from approximately thirty five millions to forty one millions. In 1930 it was sixty four millions. The pressure of population was a potent argument in favour of Japan's territorial expansion. The expansionists could claim that the bulk of the most suitable lands had already been seized by Western powers and were closed to settlement by Asiatics and so Japan was entitled to grab what she could get. More cogent reasons for the territorial expansion of Japan, at least in the eyes of the apologists of this course of action, were the inadequate natural resources of Japan. The industrial development of Japan depended upon slender mineral resources; her production of iron ore was small and her coal production was inadequate for her needs. This is not the place in this study to dwell upon Japan's limitations in natural resources but this, plus the fact that she had a rapidly increasing population to support in a country desperately short of arable land, makes a good argument for territorial expansion.

The First World War 1914-1919

The outbreak of World War I in 1914 was a golden opportunity for Japanese expansion. The European powers were unable to extend their holdings in the Far East and Japan was able to obtain concessions from them that she would never have gained in peace time. Although Japan became a belligerent in accordance with her treaty with Great Britain, she did not need to do much fighting. She
occupied the German islands in the Pacific – the Marianas, Carolines and Marshalls and assisted in the convoying of allied forces through the Pacific and Indian Oceans, but her armed intervention was insignificant. The Pacific islands were held by Japan as a mandate from the League of Nations and in theory were not to be fortified. On grounds of resources the islands were not of great value – although Palau in the Carolines had large phosphate deposits which were of great value to Japan – but their strategic value was enormous. The islands constituted a shield against a hostile approach from the south and east and could be stepping stones for further expansion.

The war was a period of great industrial expansion and Japan's shipbuilding capacity increased enormously. However, Japan was not entirely successful in her expansionist aims in the war. When she sought to impose the infamous '21 Demands' on China her plans were to get control of Fukien, Shantung, Southern Manchuria and Inner Mongolia and acquire what was virtually a protectorate over the remainder of China. The U.S.A. rejected the Japanese approach as being contrary to its 'Open Door' principle and this principle was re-affirmed in the Lansing-Ishii Agreement of November, 1917 which did, however, recognize somewhat nebulously, special Japanese interests in China. The U.S. also baulked Japanese efforts to annex to northern part of Sakhalin and the ports bordering on the Amur River and the Pacific Ocean. Japan had had serious disputes with the United States in the years before World War I over immigration problems and these were continued in the post-war years. The United States proved to be anything but helpful over naval re-armament and this, plus an acute American sensitivity about any outside interference in China, made America the real enemy. The older Western powers had
had their imperialist ambitions blunted by the devastating effects of the war and were not seen as major threats. Communist Russia presented a different problem; by the thirties she had become relatively strong and hindered Japanese ambitions in Manchuria.

Economic Developments 1894-1930.

Throughout this period Japan's industrial potential increased enormously. Her national wealth increased but her prosperity was unevenly distributed. The Zaibatsu, in particular, flourished and became more potent in economic life and politics. Agriculture remained the black spot on the nation's economy, the land being grossly overpopulated and farming techniques, although superior to most in South East Asia, were backward.

In the industrial sphere, the production of textiles was greatly expanded. The competitiveness of her textile industry troubled the Western powers who could not match the incredibly low labour costs of Japan. In the textile industries approximately four fifths of the workers were women, and these could be employed at even lower wages than could men. Most of the women so employed were from families of farmers, and their earnings relieved that sorely pressed element of the population. In 1928 the production of silk in Japan was two-thirds that of the entire world and the bulk of this was exported to the United States but the depression of 1929 in the United States had a disastrous effect on the Japanese economy. Although the production of relatively cheap cotton and woollen goods had risen, Japan's dependence upon raw silk, a luxury item and in demand chiefly in one country, made her highly vulnerable. Moreover, India and China were fairly certain to
become serious competitors in the textile trade in the not too distant future.

The Railway System

In 1906 and 1907 the State bought the large majority of privately owned railway lines in Japan. Private ownership of minor link lines was permitted but it is fair to say that the railways were state controlled from a fairly early stage in their development. Japan has an extremely good record in the building and operation of railways and even in the period of despair after World War II, the railways in Japan were quickly restored to a high level of efficiency. It has been said that the high operating efficiencies of Japanese railways caused the Japanese to neglect their roads in the inter-war years.

Shipping

The wars with China and Russia, with their serious transport problems, greatly stimulated the shipbuilding industry in Japan. World War I gave a further stimulus to this industry. The demand for ships to replace those sunk by German 'U' Boats led to almost a doubling in the tonnage launched in Japanese Shipyards between 1914 and 1917. In the mid-1890's Japan purchased more from Great Britain than any other nation but by 1930 the United States had replaced Britain as Japan's most important trading partner and in that year, China was a more important market for Japanese goods than Britain. In those years her imports of raw materials and machinery were of the highest importance. The fact that the import of machinery is very much subordinate to the import of raw materials in Japan today is the measure of the advance and sophistication of her industrial structure.
Agriculture

Although the expansion of Japanese industry was perhaps the outstanding feature of her economy in these years, nevertheless, agriculture was the major single occupation of her people. The system of tenantry combined with absentee landlords had been a feature under the Tokugawa. In becoming an industrialized country, Japan chose to develop her manufactures and for this, she needed cheap food for her factory workers. She did not give tariff protection to her farmers and her whole tax structure favoured the industrialists and merchants at the expense of the landlords and peasant proprietors. But the position was not one of gross governmental neglect of the land. The government provided many schemes whereby technical assistance was made available to the farmers and extensive use of fertilizers was advocated. The position was anything but wretched and the urban prosperity brought higher prices for farm products so that the years of the First World War were very favourable indeed for the farmer but unfortunately, this was followed by a great agricultural depression in the immediate post-war period. The gains in agriculture, however, like those of industry, were absorbed by the rising population and permitted no perceptible improvement in the standard of living for the masses. At the same time there was no mechanization of agriculture as there had been of industry, and small scale cultivation continued to be the rule. The pressure of people on the land, though lighter at times of great industrial expansion, was always sufficient to make it less profitable to use machines than men. Moreover there were particular difficulties of the type of agriculture in Japan about which Michael and Taylor write: "Irrigated
agriculture presents a difficult problem for the modernizer, even where there are both the will to mechanize and the necessary capital". The peasants blamed most of their troubles on the cities and developed a marked hostility to them. They saw the influence of the West in the cities with the changes in dress and in the attitudes to the family and to women, and this confirmed any initial suspicions they had and made them most receptive to any anti-foreign propaganda put out by the government.

The Zaibatsu

Before we go on to discuss briefly political aspects, it is essential to mention that peculiar Japanese growth, the Zaibatsu, because their role in the economy inevitably led to their growing political significance. The Zaibatsu were family corporations which had played a prominent part in Japan's industrial expansion both in the early years of the Meiji restoration and in the twentieth century. Their growth of power in the years of the First World War was phenomenal. They expanded their operations in industry, trade and finance and in their control of capital, through large holdings in banks and insurance companies, they were also outstanding. The Mitsui and Mitsubishi became associated with leading political parties. In the cabinet which was in office in 1924-1925, both the Premier and the Minister of Foreign Affairs were related by marriage to the Mitsubishi interests and there was even a Mitsubishi clique in the royal household.

So great was this identity of Zaibatsu and political interests that the efforts of the Army to set up an independent
capitalist organisation in Manchuria, in the 1930's, become intelligible and can be seen as a reaction against what the Army considered was an effete political-Zaibatsu grouping. In general, the Zaibatsu favoured peaceful economic penetration of China, which characterized Japan's foreign policy in the 1920's and was anathema to many of the militarists who favoured military action there.

The Political Scene 1894-1931.

After the Emperor had granted the Japanese people their constitution in 1889, parliamentary government made much progress in Japan. The basis of franchise by which the lower house of the Diet was elected was widened and the struggle centred on the Diet's efforts to achieve power similar to that of the British House of Commons by which it could effectively control the cabinet. Japan never really curbed the power of the armed forces but it seemed that goal might have been achieved in the 1920's. The imperial ordinance of 1889 gave ministers of the army and navy direct access to the Emperor on 'military affairs of secrecy and grave importance', without necessarily discussing these with the Premier. Another ordinance stipulated that both ministers of war and the navy must be senior officers, and as these ministers were automatically cabinet ministers, it meant that the armed forces had great influence in the actual government, for it was seldom that a high ranking officer would take up this office without the consent of his colleagues. Unfortunately the Parliamentary control of the purse strings was not strong enough because the constitution laid down that in the event of Parliament refusing to pass a budget then the one for the previous year was to be repeated.
In addition to the imperial institution and the power of the armed forces, both continuations from Japan's past, there were other factors which vitally affected the working of the new constitution. The clan oligarchs continued to dominate the cabinet and further strengthened their position through two extra-parliamentary bodies. The first of these, the genro, or elder statesmen, consisted of past servants of the Imperial cause who came with advancing age to enjoy the special trust of the Emperor and the government. The second body, the Privy Council, came into being in 1888 to approve the new Constitution before its promulgation. It had powers of review and veto as well as advisory functions, and, like the genro, became a centre of great influence.

In the years following, the Second World War we have had many instances of failure where the Westminster type of parliamentary government has been applied to newly independent countries in Africa, which have no long tradition of this type of government. Admittedly, the Japanese constitution was an abstract from the constitutional theory of many countries but it was essentially an imposition on Japan and it failed. Yet in spite of the machinations of the Armed Forces, the Zaibatsu and the Genro it really looked in the 1920's as if Japan might achieve parliamentary democracy. However, serious reverses early in the 1930's irreparably damaged the democratic cause. Hence the significance of the date of the next section in this chapter.

The Militarist Control of Japan 1930-41

The years 1930-41 were years in which the Japanese economy, particularly between the World Depression of 1929-31
and the Sino-Japanese War of 1937, passed through a period of extremely rapid economic growth. Japan demonstrated her command of new skills and technologies; she made extensive additions to her capital equipment at home and she invested heavily in regions beyond her shores. "At a time when international trade as a whole was stagnating, her efforts flourished. In a wide range of products and in a diversity of markets she became a formidable competitor of the older industrial countries of the West, while to the countries of Asia she made available a variety of consumption goods at prices which their impoverished inhabitants could afford to pay. These remarkable achievements were not, of course, fortuitous. The ground had been well prepared for many previous decades". (1)

One of the cogent reasons why the military interests managed to gain more power in this period was this very prosperity which Professor Allen describes above. Precisely the same economic resurgence favoured the Nazis in Germany from 1933 onwards. Before we go on to describe in some detail how the military interests gained power it is interesting to see how they brought about changes in the economy. The military cliques, as we have seen, were antagonistic to the Zaibatsu and were intent on weakening their power. The Zaibatsu in Army eyes, were associated with 'decadent' liberal elements that had weakened Japan in the 1920's and the Army wished to break their power. Both in Manchuria and Japan proper they turned to new capital groups (Shinko-Zaibatsu) to provide capital for strategic industries. They also used their influence to strengthen the associations of small manufacturers and traders with the object of freeing these enterprises from the domination of the merchant companies.
owned by the old Zaibatsu. The military elements in the Government assisted and promoted schemes for nationalization in the large industries; the electric power industry was nationalized in 1938 and in the same year the National General Mobilization Law gave the Government far-reaching powers of economic control - in short, it was the economic preparation for war.

When we turn to more political affairs - although sometimes the distinction between the economic and the political is somewhat arbitrary - we are faced with the problem of how and why did the military elements assume power in Japan.

The critical point at which Japan turned towards a military solution of her problems was the so called Manchurian Incident of September, 1931. A group of soldiers of the Kwantung or the Japanese Manchurian Army, imbued with the idea that Japan could be saved only by expansion on the Asiatic continent and 'reform' at home, presented Japan and the world with a fait accompli. On the night of September 18th, 1931, they exploded a bomb on the railway near Mukden, and used this alleged Chinese provocation as an excuse for taking over the city of Mukden, and embarking upon the conquest of the three north-east provinces of China. The plan had the ultimate aim of making Manchuria a colony of the Army. Manchuria had been ruled as a virtual condominium of China, Japan and Russia but sooner or later it was inevitable that short of partition, the most powerful nation would oust the others. Manchuria possessed vast areas of fertile soil, was relatively thinly populated, and it had strategic significance in that its southern ports were well placed for the control of the
northern part of China proper. The population of Manchuria was mainly Chinese, largely because of settlement in the early part of the twentieth century and legally, Manchuria belonged to China. At the time, the Three Eastern Provinces, as the Chinese called Manchuria were ruled by Chang Hsueh-Liang who was disposed to co-operate with the Nationalist government of China, which was anything but pro-Japanese. It will be remembered that as a result of the Russo Japanese war of 1905, Japan gained special railway and commercial rights in Southern Manchuria and in addition to these, Japan had gained concessions in Manchuria from China in 1915. Japan had gained an extension of her twenty-five year lease to Liaotung (Kwantung) in 1915 and China claimed that this was obtained under duress, which was indeed true. In 1931 the Kwantung army began the annexation of Manchuria. This action had tremendous world-wide repercussions; it flouted the authority of the League of Nations, proved to the militarists that the other major world powers would not effectively check aggression, and was done with complete disregard of the home government.

The Mukden Incident was no mere flash in the pan. Extreme right wing elements, usually in the form of some picturesquely named society had long been active in Japan. Their actions were strengthened by the apparently moderate approach to China in the 1920's by the Japanese Government and by the disappointing results of the London Naval Disarmament conference of 1930. The depression in 1929 had added to the general malaise, and rural discontent, a steady feature of Japanese life, was important because the Army was largely recruited from peasants and landowners.
Richard Storry who made a detailed study of Japanese nationalism, points out that until the end of the First World War there were few important nationalist associations and that their proliferation and strengthening came in the 1920's and 1930's. Storry isolated three essential elements of Japanese nationalism which were common to most right wing societies: "The three elements - loyalty to the Throne, sense of mission, and belief in the possession of superlative inborn qualities - constituted the essential national character or policy of Japan". This nationalism is termed 'Kokutai' and he goes on to say, "Many other factors - economic, political and social - played a part. Nevertheless, in the last resort, the grotesque ideology of the kokutai was at the source of the complex manifestations of Japanese Nationalism." (6) The extremists, often members of young officer movements, pursued a course of assassination of leading political figures whom they considered opposed to their chauvinistic ends. "All the combinations and permutations which took place in government between 1936 and 1941, however, could not alter the process, which really began with the Manchurian Incident of 1931. (7)

Before we leave the Manchurian Incident, the commonly accepted view of this has been that the military took the initiative at Mukden and that many politicians connived at this. Recent work suggests that rather more onus should be placed on the politicians in Japan than has been done in the past.

Takehiko Yoshihashi, in a work published in 1963, claimed that Mori Kaku, the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs was the real villain. Mori advocated
Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations and attempted to create a highly centralized form of government based on close relations between the politicians and the army. Yoshihashi excuses the weak Foreign Minister, Tanaka, and writes he (Tanaka) "was neither chauvinist nor expansionist. He was in a large measure a victim of his subordinates - men like Mori Kaku and his firebrands of the Kwantung Army, who stopped at nothing to fulfill their expansionist ambitions". (8)

After the Manchurian incident the military extremists had the bit between their teeth. A clash between Japanese and Chinese troops at Marco Polo Bridge near Peking in July, 1937 precipitated hostilities and the Tokyo government was forced to back her armies in China by dispatching more troops. The Japanese troops made great progress in China but never completely subjugated the Chinese Nationalist forces. Protestations about Japanese aggression failed to stop the war and Japan, like Hitler Germany, regarded the Western powers as decadent and incapable of decisive action.

When Britain and France entered World War II Japan had further opportunities for aggression. In 1940, Japan forced the Vichy government to give her military privileges in Indo-China, which helped to blockade Nationalist China. Her militarist's dream, however, was to create an economic and political empire based on Japan, to embrace the whole of East Asia - the so called Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Scheme. In June, 1937, Arita the Foreign Minister, announced that the countries of East Asia and the South Seas were 'geographically, historically, socially and economically very closely related to each other." There was, therefore, a historical determinism about this and it seemed logical that
Japan should organize and dominate the "New Order" or "Co-prosperity Sphere". Japan, quite clearly, was interested in making up for her deficiencies in raw materials and oil, which the Netherlands East Indies, in particular, possessed in fair quantities. In spite of her totalitarian affinities with Italy and Germany which led Japan to sign the Tripartite Pact in September 1940, Japan was not disposed to enter a full scale war with Russia. Her main interest was in expansion in South East Asia and the Pact gave Japan, as far as the Axis Powers were concerned, a free hand in that part of the world.

It is an extremely difficult task to compress the salient points of a decade of intense political activity into a brief introductory study. We will therefore examine briefly, Japan's relations with the three major powers, Britain, the U.S.A. and Soviet Russia.

**Britain and Japan 1930-41.**

At the time of the Manchurian Incident, Britain went off the Gold Standard and was obsessed with her own economic difficulties but nevertheless, she was stoutly opposed to the Japanese occupation of Manchuria. In later years of this decade, Britain resented the loss of her political and economic influences in China to Japan and to the intense annoyance of the Japanese, gave some support to the Chinese Nationalist government. The Japanese, quite rightly, assessed the real weakness of Britain in the Far East and knew that the British were pre-occupied with the Axis Powers in Europe.

**The U.S.A. and Japan.**

The aggressions of Japan were of more concern to the U.S. than they were to Britain. The United States Secretary
of State, Stimson, attempted to pursue the traditional 'Open Door' Policy of the United States. After the Manchurian Incident he wished to apply economic sanctions to Japan and in view of the significance of United States trade to Japan, these might have been effective but he claimed Britain lacked resolution and would not support him. There is some element of truth in this for Britain had been smarting over anti-British riots which had taken place in China the previous year and anyway, Manchuria was very much on the periphery of British interests. The failure of Sir John Simon, the British Foreign Secretary, to assist the United States in the application of economic sanctions was widely held to be a cause of the marked failure of Britain and the U.S.A. in checking Japanese aggression. (9). Lord Avon (Sir Anthony Eden, as he then was) claimed to have studied Foreign Office papers and suggested that Stimson's proposals were quite nebulous and gave Simon little to go on. (10) Both governments seem to have been equally guilty of timidity in their relations with Japan. After 1937, when Japanese forces attacked the U.S. gunboat Panay, United States opposition to Japan stiffened considerably. In 1936, the Japanese government denounced the treaty signed at the Washington Conference 1921-22 which limited naval armaments and the building of certain fortifications on islands in the Pacific. This probably worked to the disadvantage of Japan as the United States began on an intensive naval ship-building programme. In 1939, certain strategically important raw materials were placed on an embargo, and were not permitted to be exported from the United States to Japan. The United States Government was
really alarmed at the way Japan took advantage of the embarassment of the French government in 1940 and declared that it was unfriendly to the substitution of Japanese for French Authority. Finally, on July 25th, 1941 the United States President ordered both Chinese and Japanese assets in the United States to be frozen. In retrospect, United States actions were not strong enough; the Japanese army leaders, in particular, believed, that the Americans had no real will to fight and they had seen few actions from the United States government at this time to disabuse them of the notion. The Japanese Navy had a fair idea of the real strength of the United States Navy and right up to the declaration of war against the United States, it opposed all out war.

Japan's Relations With The U.S.S.R.

At the outset of the Mukden incident and Japanese aggression in Manchuria, Russia — surprisingly enough — was not hostile towards Japan. Russia was most unhappy about the Kuomintang's attitude to the Communists in China and indeed had engaged China in a brief undeclared war over the Chinese Eastern Railway in 1929. Russia was concerned that Japan would not control anti-Soviet White Russians in Northern Manchuria, but when the Japanese appeared reasonable, and even politely requested permission from the Russians to move troops on the Chinese Eastern Railway, relations improved and in 1932, diplomatic relations were re-established between the two countries. However, friction over the boundaries between Manchuria and Russian territories to the north soon increased, and Japanese interference in Outer Mongolia further exacerbated these relations. Clashes between Russian and
Japanese forces along the border were fairly frequent - almost annual events - from 1935 onwards. In 1938, a minor defeat of the Japanese forces by the Russian caused concern in Tokyo in view of the big involvements of the bulk of her army in China.

Japan increasingly came to view Russia as the greatest menace to her and this is one of the reasons why she signed the anti-Commintern pact with Germany in 1936. Hitler never really admired the Japanese and his indifferent attitude to them may be seen in the way he never even informed the Japanese beforehand of his proposed attack on Russia in 1941 and the Japanese reciprocated by not informing the Germans of their proposed attack on Pearl Harbour. (11). Hitler never failed to appreciate a bit of honest to goodness aggression but he certainly did not counsel Japan to attack the United States, although he did urge her to attack Singapore.

The war in China was not completed according to schedule and Japan had to be cautious not to antagonize the U.S.S.R., specially as trouble with the U.S.A. and Britain was looming up. It was really these heavy commitments both by Japan in China and later by the U.S.S.R. in the war against Germany that led to a status quo between these countries, only to be broken by Russia's declaration of war against Japan in 1945.

**The Reasons for the Attack on the Western Powers in 1941**

We have emphasised the significance of the Manchurian Incident as being the time when the army gained control of Japanese foreign policy. Many writers have stressed the
deficiencies in Japan's economy, in particular her deficiencies in raw materials and her population problem, as being the really decisive factor in bringing about Japanese Imperialism. There is obviously a good deal in this argument and certainly the effects on the economy of the slump in 1929 helped to predispose Japanese public opinion to army leadership. There is much, too, in the argument that the army leaders - more than the Naval chiefs, as we have seen - really believed that they could win the war, but this is looking at the problem from the wrong end. We must try to determine why the army got control of the government. In this, political immaturity played a part and the tradition of Kokutai (national honour) which Storry mentions, was undoubtedly strong. The lack of cohesion in government gave the chauvinistic military leaders far too much scope. Shigemitsu, who was jailed by the Allies for his work in the Japanese government before Tojo's rise to power, wrote a very perspicacious comment: "Countries such as Britain, once they establish a new policy, are in a position to act precisely on lines laid down. Enviable indeed is the excellence of their political and executive machinery. However splendid Japan's policy might be, her organs of government lacked co-ordination. The Army was self-willed in its interference and political parties were unversed in foreign diplomacy and no solid support was coming from public opinion". (12) The real danger came from the ultra-nationalist groups which could force weak governments to follow aggressive policies.
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5. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Second World War and the Occupation

This chapter will not be concerned with the detailed aspects of strategy and accounts of campaigns as this is more the task of the military historian but nevertheless, the main outline of the war is relevant to this study.

The internal developments of Japan - even though they are closely related to war policy will be dealt with as a separate section. There will be a further section on the Armistice, which was signed by the Allied Powers and Japan in 1945, and an account of the main aims of the Allied Powers in controlling Japan up to the signing of the Peace Treaty in 1952.

The final section, will give some account of the territorial losses which Japan suffered and which were agreed to at the Yalta Conference and confirmed in the Peace Treaty.

The Second World War 1941-45.

Although the Japanese militarists manipulated internal politics most skilfully, planned the economy well, and astutely carried out the military campaigns, they lacked judgment in the international field. As Sir Eslor Dening has pointed out, one of their errors was to appoint as ambassador to Berlin a general to whose opinions they were inclined to listen, thus forming an erroneous conception of the prospects of a final German victory. (1) But the graver error was to make war on the United States, as an uncommitted power with greater resources than any other power in the world.
The successes of the Japanese forces in the first six months of the war were truly astounding. A major part of the United States Pacific Fleet was crippled at Pearl Harbour and Malaya and the Dutch East Indies were seized, with their rich supplies of oil, rubber, tin, bauxite and other raw materials. Most of the indigenous peoples of these territories genuinely looked upon the Japanese as liberators but by a combination of high handedness in dealing the local populations and because of ruthless economic exploitation, this good will was dissipated, and the true hollowness of the Co-Prosperity Sphere was brought home to the people in these lands.

Once the initial victories were won, the Japanese forces were dispersed over a vast area of the Pacific and complete control of the sea and air was necessary for her both to exploit these territories and to develop her strategy. This control did not last for long. Six months after the outbreak of war the Japanese Fleet suffered a check in the Battle of the Coral Sea and a month later, at the Battle of Midway (June 1942) the United States inflicted a severe defeat on the Japanese.

When the Japanese war effort came under some strain, her economic planning was rigid and lacked co-ordination. The militarists refused to face the facts and when even they were prepared to concede in 1944 that Japan could not win the war, they hoped that the very heavy losses which the Americans had sustained in capturing island bases in the Pacific would be multiplied greatly when the Allied forces invaded Japan and she would consequently obtain better terms than those of unconditional surrender.
Fortunately for the Japanese people, the utter futility of continuing the war, brought home to them in the holocausts of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, meant that there was a strong enough combination in governing circles to overrule the generals and to secure the Imperial sanction for Japan to surrender. So much time and attention has been given to the Atom bomb attacks on Japan, perhaps quite rightly in view of the fact that they mark a completely new phase in warfare, that it is often forgotten how much damage had been inflicted on Japanese cities by conventional aerial attack. Japan was economically in ruins and completely demoralized at the time of her surrender.

Internal Developments in Japan during the War Years.

As might be expected, the fighting services became increasingly dominant in political life in war-time Japan, especially in view of Japanese authoritarian traditions in this respect and the persistent drift in this direction in the 1930's. With the rise to power of Tojo and the replacement of the gentlemanly Konoye, rougher and more jingoistic men came to the fore. Efforts were made to merge political parties to preserve a common front and the Imperial Rule Association was created in effort to do this. The trades unions were called upon to accept a government sponsored labour front which was called the Patriotic Industrial Society. However, the efforts by the military to completely emasculate parliamentary government were not entirely successful. The Constitution had been a gift to the people from the Meiji Emperor and to destroy this would have been an affront to the Emperor's revered memory. The
Emperor was not happy about the military extremists and could always plead filial piety when refusing to approve of a change of the constitution. Japan, in wartime, presented a pretty fair picture of a totalitarian power at war and with a massive propaganda campaign, the government did not suffer from any lack of enthusiasm on the part of the populace. State Shintoism was stressed but it is interesting to note that serious persecution of Christians was not a feature of wartime Japan. (2)

The heavy emphasis on the development of the iron and steel industry continued with greater intensity. Efforts were made to develop the economic potential of Manchuria especially when the shortage of shipping favoured the shorter sea haul. The shortage of shipping presented a persistent problem to Japanese war leaders who had grossly underestimated the offensive power of U.S. submarines. In 1944 it has been estimated that war losses of shipping exceeded replacement building several times and by the time of the Armistice, Japan had little more than one million tons of merchant shipping afloat out of the ten million tons with which she started the war. The shortage of fertilisers, when foreign sources were cut off, was a persistent problem and what was particularly galling to the Japanese, was the existence of supplies of rice from traditional exporting countries (Burma, Thailand and Indo China) who were obviously denied access to their traditional markets, which could not be shipped on a large scale to Japan.

Tojo, the Prime Minister, believed that the country was well prepared for war. Ten years of planned industrial development from 1931 to 1941 had brought very considerable
results and industrial output had risen from six billion yen to thirty billion yen. There was the emphasis on heavy industry to the detriment of textiles and other light industries. Textiles, which accounted for 34% of total industrial production in 1930 were down to 12% in 1942. The shabbiness of both the Japanese people and her army was one of the things which struck observers when they visited Japan at the end of the war. Japanese production of aeroplanes had risen from 400 planes in 1930 to 5,000 planes a year in 1941. Aluminium production rose from 19 tons to 71,000 tons a year in the same period; steel rose from 1.8 million tons to 6.8 million tons; coal from 27.9 million tons to 55.6 million tons and electric power more than doubled. (3) The acquisition of this great empire required a tremendous organisation which the Japanese did not have. The control of political life and the economies of these territories was under effective control of the Army which could not possibly discharge these functions and fight effectively. By 1945, because of shortage of supplies and the bombing of plants, Japan's steel production was reduced from seven million tons in 1939 to one and a half million tons. Supplies of oil became so low that many Japanese ships were unable to go to sea in 1944. The peak in Japanese industrial output was reached in 1944, but by 1945 total industrial output was down to 40% of that peak year.

The inescapable fact is that Japan did not effectively organize her economic resources in the war; she lacked a central agency to plan her resources - the cabinet planning board, which was dominated by the army, had to have its policies implemented by the various ministries which were often at loggerheads with each other. The Cabinet Planning Board was abolished in 1943 when Tojo emulated Asquith in a
previous war and set up a Ministry of Munitions. Tojo himself was to be the Minister and even if he did have the dynamism of a Lloyd George, his other heavy commitments hindered him. His main plan was to attempt to resolve the struggles of the Army and the Navy, who were at each other's throats to obtain more of the slender supplies of raw materials which were available. When the real outcome of the war was not in doubt, a group of former premiers brought about Tojo's fall in July 1944.

Japan was thus a broken nation when she was assailed by the Atom bombs. Apart from the human tragedy implicit in this act the importance of 'nuclear sensitivity' has vitally affected Japan in her relations with other powers, not the least with the U.S.A., but the implication of this will be discussed later in this work.

The Occupation of Japan

The Allies had come to several decisions about the principles under which Japan would surrender. The Cairo declaration (1st December 1943) signed by Churchill, Roosevelt and Chiang Kai-Shek, and later approved by the U.S.S.R., covered only territorial questions, laying down that Japan should lose islands she had obtained since 1914, and providing independence for Korea and the return of former Chinese possessions to China. Other parts of the Japanese Empire were dealt with at Yalta (11th February, 1945) when Stalin acted as host to Roosevelt and Churchill. At this conference it was secretly agreed that the U.S.S.R. should obtain Southern Sakhalin, the Kuriles and certain rights in Deiren, Port Arthur and Manchuria. The gain of Sakhalin and the Kuriles would effectively give the U.S.S.R. control of the
Sea of Okhotsk and the demand for Port Arthur brought into focus the similarity of political design of both Czarist and Communist Russia. The acquisition of these territories was contingent on the declaration of war by the U.S.S.R. on Japan. Further talks at Potsdam in July, 1945, between the U.K., U.S.S.R., U.S.A. and China laid down that Japanese sovereignty should be restricted to the islands of Japan proper, that Japan should be disarmed and that militarism should be extirpated and democracy substituted for this. Japan's war industry was to be destroyed and she was to remain in Allied occupation until these objectives had been completed. The terms of the Proclamation were undoubtedly harsh, the nub of it being the loss of territories seized by violence and greed since 1895.

Aims of the Allied Powers.

On September 6th 1945, President Truman approved a document 'United States Initial Post Surrender Policy for Japan' which had been drawn up by the American State, War, and Navy Departments. A Far Eastern Commission was established in Washington D.C. which had representatives of the United States, Britain, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the U.S.S.R., the Netherlands, China, India and in 1949 representatives of the Philippines, Burma and Pakistan were brought into the Commission. This commission was "to formulate the policies, principles, and standards in conformity with which the fulfillment by Japan of its obligations under the terms of surrender may be accomplished" and these decisions were to be implemented by the U.S. government through its agency in Japan, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. From the American point of view it was much better to leave the control of Japan in Japan rather than to have representation on committees nowhere near
the country. Russia was not happy about the exclusive position that the U.S.A. had obtained and as a result of her representations, an Allied Council for Japan was set up in Tokyo and this was to have an American Chairman but was to have U.S., Russia, Chinese and British representation. The Supreme Commander of the Allied forces, the 'pro-consul' MacArthur, never allowed this council to become anything other than a formal body without real power.

The aims of the occupation were: the elimination of militarism in Japan; the prosecution of war criminals - but this was not to include the Emperor - the elimination of leaders responsible for Japan's aggressive policies; the payment of reparations in kind; the destruction of war industries and the initiation of social, political, economic and educational reforms to create a viable democracy in Japan. The U.S. planners had a basic faith in democracy perhaps expressed with more ardour than the British themselves would have used. So often they believed that the imposition of tried and proved American institutions would be the panacea for Japan, sometimes neglecting the background of particular problems created by a very different environment; but nevertheless the basic idea to give Japan democracy has proved to be a sound one. The Americans believed that if the militarists were exterminated and that the Zaibatsu were dismantled - here we see honest to goodness American Trust Busting at work - then the scene would be set for real democratic developments to take place. The main thesis of the argument here is that in spite of obvious errors, S.C.A.P. (Supreme Commander, Allied Powers) did remarkably well in Japan, but like so many developments in government, it takes a long time to assess the real effects of this.
The disarmament of Japan was carried through very quickly; most army units abroad surrendered without too much difficulty, and the soldiers were brought home as shipping became available. The Ministries of War and Navy and the Imperial General Staff were abolished. Tojo and six other leaders were sentenced to death at an International War Crimes Trial which was set up in Tokyo and similar courts were set up in territories formerly held by Japan. The Tokyo tribunal had a panel of judges of the main Allies and was set up to deal with cases of alleged major war crimes.

The basic plan for government was that the Japanese themselves should carry out the reforms in their government, on the direction of S.C.A.P. What was important about the changes is summed up by J.M. Maki: "What American policy conceived and what American action accomplished found an immediate response in the Japanese - one that arose either from acceptance of the fact of Japan's temporary immobility to resist the occupation or from a more positive welcome for the changes inspired by it"

**THE OCCUPATION OF JAPAN**

The Emperor of Japan possessed divine attributes as far as most Japanese were concerned and the Americans were faced with the problem of demoting him but they did not particularly wish him to leave office. The Emperor emerged from the war with some dignity. Undoubtedly he had not used his office to the full in curbing the military, but then he had been in a most difficult position. The mystique surrounding the Emperor was dissipated both by the efforts of S.C.A.P. and by the Emperor himself who expressed a wish to abdicate in favour of his son. Hirohito's
advisers suggested that he should not abdicate as this would do irreparable harm to the Imperial House as it would appear to the Japanese people that this was done at the behest of General MacArthur. Many Japanese thought the Emperor behaved with magnificent dignity as he completely associated himself with the misery of his people. To further emphasize his 'demotion' the Emperor issued a rescript in 1946 in which he formally renounced any claims to divine or semi-divine status. He deliberately tried to make himself more accessible to his people to help break up the remote image he possessed. MacArthur hoped that the Emperor would fill the role something like that of a monarch in a Western democracy, and the Emperor accepted this view and thus the monarchy, tarnished and battered, survived.

In the affairs of Civil government the powers of the Cabinet were drastically reduced, especially those involving control of the people. Government controls over the police, education and local government were quickly removed. The Privy Council and the influential but informed Council of Former Prime Ministers, both advisory organs to the Emperor, were abolished. Some of the actions in devolution were later seen to have gone too far. The Japanese police, virtually an arm of the military, had a reputation for corruption and brutality and so great were the efforts to present a change of attitude of the police, that in later years the police lost a good deal of morale and efficiency and were often found to be incapable of dealing with a higher level of crime and sometimes with spirited student demonstrations, which were features of post-war Japan. In place of the authoritarian structure, the occupation created an executive with diminished powers and a legislative branch which was to be supreme. A judicial branch was created to protect the rights and freedom
of the people. When we look at the relative significance of these major points of government it is easy to see the influence of American Constitutional theory. The occupation stressed the participation of the people in local government as being a most suitable training ground for people in democratic practice.

Probably the most important action by S.C.A.P. was the creation of a new constitution for Japan. A committee of the Japanese cabinet produced an amended constitution but this failed to satisfy the Supreme Commander. His staff worked on three basic principles: first, that the monarchy in a constitutional reform should remain, secondly, war as an instrument in pursuing national policy was to be foresworn for ever and thirdly, 'all forms of feudalism' were to be abolished. The constitution was accepted by the Diet with slight amendments and became the New Constitution in October, 1946. Perhaps the most interesting single feature of the Constitution was that this was not considered to be a magnanimous gift of the Emperor to his people but that sovereignty rested with the people; and the Diet became the highest organ of the state. The old constitution laid emphasis on the duties of the citizen but the emphasis was on the citizens' rights in the new constitution. Women were effectively emancipated - in law, at least and Junken (human rights) became a phrase much bandied about but not taken too seriously by the Japanese. One of the fundamental features about this constitution was the fact that it was imposed by a victorious power on a beaten power and the Japanese showed a good deal of apathy in accepting it. However, so thorough was the American 'shake up' of Japanese Society that many of these reforms insinuated themselves into Japanese life and became most acceptable features of the new Japan. For instance, few Japanese would wish to see the
reappearance of the highly centralized Ministry of Education and most would prefer the control of School Boards, locally elected. The bi-cameral legislature was preserved but the House of Peers was replaced by a House of Councillors and was very much subordinate to the Lower House. A majority of members of the cabinet must be members of the Diet — this is a departure from U.S. Constitutional practice — and the premier and all the ministers must be civilians.

In the economic sphere the Zaibatsu were soon attacked by S.C.A.P. We mentioned the Zaibatsu in the earlier part of this chapter as being dominant in the Japanese economy from the early days of the Meiji Restoration. G.C. Allen compared their powers with the Fuggers of Medieval Augsburg. These concerns played a vital part in the development of the Japanese economy and assumed a power far greater than any combine or trust in a Western country. Their power dates from the time after the Meiji Restoration when the bureaucracy wished to implement its policies of modernisation but lacked an effective middle class with the capital and skill to carry it out. (5) Allen writes: "It was not enough to strike off the shackles of the old regime; positive measures had to be taken to ensure that the opportunities for development were seized and that the strategic interests of the country were observed in any industrial growth that occurred". These business families had been engaged in banking and commerce on a large scale, and had served as agents of the daimyo in the management of their revenues. The close dependency of the Government on the Zaibatsu inevitably led to abuses of this privileged position. "During the Meiji era close connections were
established between particular statesmen, who had definite policies to carry out, and particular business families who could provide resources and means to assist them. In return for the financial assistance they gave to the Government, the Zaibatsu from time to time acquired State properties at low prices and received valuable contracts." (6) They reached the peak of their powers in 1929 when Party government was making headway and the power of the Diet was strong. It should not be thought, however, that the Zaibatsu were the only business concerns in Japan of any status - Okura in mining and textiles, Ansano in cement, Furukawa in copper, were just a few - but the Zaibatsu occupied a special position not only because of their close relations with the government but also because of the wide range of their interests. The various Zaibatsu were often keen rivals but nevertheless this did not prevent them from investing in each other. The military looked with great suspicion upon the Zaibatsu, contending that their close and in their eyes corrupting relationship with parliamentary leaders led to a decay in national moral fibre. We have seen the military control over Manchuria as an effort to redress the evils which existed in the homeland. In 1931 the depression discredited the Minseito government and brought violent attacks upon the Zaibatsu and these culminated in the assassination of Baron Don, the chief executive of Mitsui, by the 'Young Officer' group. The Zaibatsu, in keeping with most vast industrial enterprises (the Krupps combine in Germany showed great adaptability both under Hitler and still managed to survive Allied attempts to dismember its empire after the war), showed rare powers of adaptability. Allen writes: "The Mitsui, which was the main target of criticism, withdrew from trade in minor agricultural products and sold to the public large holdings of shares in
some of its leading companies. It made a donation of three million Yen for the relief of distress, and it established in 1933 a fund of thirty million yen for the promotion of social services. After the 1936 "February Incident" members of the Mitsui family announced their intention of giving up their business interests and the Zaibatsu ostentatiously involved itself in new enterprises of strategic importance, such as synthetic oil production. The Zaibatsu in the pre-war years realised that they could not directly oppose the militarists with their demand for the quasi war-time economy (Junsenji Keizai) and so co-operated with them but it is difficult to believe that they did with much enthusiasm. But it would be wrong to believe that the Zaibatsu were dragged willy-nilly into Japan's aggressive policies and were not culpable in any assessment of war guilt; for the Zaibatsu were an indispensable aid to development of newly conquered territories and, as Maki writes(7): "in spite of their different characters and motivations, there was abundant reason for the military, the bureaucracy, and the Zaibatsu to stand together and serve as the driving forces of Japan's authoritarianism and aggression" (8)

The Zaibatsu offended the good American sense of free enterprise, apart from their obvious implication in Japanese aggressions, and with a 'Trust busting' zeal, S.C.A.P. set about dismantling these institutions. They were officially dissolved and stockholders were compensated with ten year, non-negotiable bonds. The Zaibatsu, although never quite achieving their former dominance, have recovered from these assaults. American policy to Japan, influenced by her need for a reliable ally in the Far East, changed considerably after - and during - the Korean War. The only serious threat to the Zaibatsu in Japan today would be the return to power
of a strong socialist government.

The complete defeat of Japan not only shattered her war making potential and distorted ideas of national invincibility but it also resulted in the serious loss of territories which we have already outlined. The Political Geographer must be concerned here with the effects of these losses of territory both on Japan's economy and on her strategic position. We will therefore examine these territories.

**JAPAN'S LOST TERRITORIES**

**Manchuria (Manchukuo)**

Japan had invested heavily in the industrial development of Manchuria. As was stated earlier in this chapter, the Kwantung Army hoped to create an example of state capitalism that would be an example to the mainland after Manchuria was occupied by the Army in 1931. Although the plans for settlement never materialized, Manchuria was the scene of great industrial development between 1931 and 1945. "Japanese capital investment had brought about spectacular progress in mining, manufacturing; the building of hydro-electric works on the Sungai and the general development of the area as a market for Japanese manufactured goods." In 1945 there were 750,000 Japanese administrators and industrial workers in Manchuria: all were repatriated under the terms of the peace settlement." (9) The Soviet Forces, which occupied Manchuria in 1945, pretty well stripped the country of all moveable capital but some of this plant and machinery returned when Manchuria fell under Chinese administration. Mainly because of the 'international sparring' that had taken place in the previous century, Manchuria had a good railway network. Both Japan and Russia had preserved a very active interest in these railways and for a time, private American interests were involved in them.
In losing Manchuria Japan lost a lot of capital that would obviously have been better invested in Japan proper. Manchuria had never been adequately settled by the Japanese but Japan had benefited by imports of raw materials, both industrial and agricultural. The loss of Manchuria represents the loss of a highly strategic base on the mainland but this view pre-supposes a pattern of further Japanese Imperialism. Manchuria possesses a population of thirty million Chinese and recent nationalist movements in colonial territories have shown how worthless are territories with large indigenous populations. Moreover, the retention of Manchuria would give Japan most vulnerable frontiers with two enormous powers, China and the U.S.S.R. Few Japanese politicians have expressed much genuine regret at the loss of Manchuria.

CHINA

The loss of her position in China was serious for Japan but in view of the established power of the Communists there, any form of occupation would have resolved itself into a war of attrition. The complete loss of the market in China for Japanese products was perhaps the greatest long term loss for her but in view of the hostile relations between the two nations, there does not seem to be any immediate solution to this problem. In many ways this situation is tragic because, Japanese capital goods and technical 'know-how' would be tremendously valuable to China at this stage in her development.

SOUTHERN SAKHALIN AND THE KURILES

The Japanese resent deeply the loss of these territories.

Southern Sakhalin was obtained from Russia by the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905. Most of Sakhalin has at least
five months of the year with average temperatures below freezing point and, as might be expected, it had few Japanese settlers. The loss of Sakhalin means the loss of coalfields which, under Japanese control, produced 500,000 tons of coal a year and the loss of a considerable source of soft wood supply and most important of all, valuable fishing grounds. Strategically, the loss of Sakhalin is great and with the extravagant claims to territorial waters that the Russians invariably make, it brings Russia very close to Hokkaido. In addition to Sakhalin, the loss of the Kuriles leaves Russia in complete command of the Sea of Okhotsk. The Kuriles are still claimed by Japan, as vigorously as any other lost territory, for she occupied them in 1875 as a result of a compromise agreement with Russia over the occupation of Sakhalin. The loss of these territories represents a serious problem for Japan's defence and the loss of their fishing grounds is quite serious to a nation so dependent on fishing.

**FORMOSA (Taiwan)**

Formosa was acquired from China at the end of the war of 1894-5. From a geographical point of view, it is part of the double-cropping rice area of Southern China. In spite of having a considerable mountainous eastern section there are areas, particularly in the west, of arable land. Formosa was important to Japan in two ways; first, despite a large population, it could produce a surplus of rice for export and secondly, it could produce tropical crops which Japan could not. The growing of sugar cane was important and over a million tons of sugar were produced before liberation.

The Japanese pursued a sensible agricultural policy in Formosa during their occupation. They undoubtedly inspired new farming techniques on the island but Japanese
farmers never established themselves on the island because they could not compete with the hard working Chinese.

The Japanese developed the coal reserves which are of poor quality and about one and a half million tons of coal were mined in 1945. Of the hydro-electric potential 3,300,000 kw, about 10 per cent was developed.

On balance, it would seem that Japan is better without Formosa. The island is obviously of enormous strategic importance, but the population is predominantly Chinese and will probably, in time, be incorporated in Chinese territory. The situation on the island is complicated by the existence of Chiang Kai-Shek's forces but few observers can doubt that this island will ultimately pass into Chinese rule. The American fleet is the one reason why it has not done so already. The fantastically rapid increase in population (the population of nearly eight millions has practically trebled itself in the last fifty years) means that Formosa would have little rice for export, and the fact that Japan is now self sufficient in rice production also militates against its usefulness to Japan.

KOREA

Korea always loomed large in the plans of Japanese leaders. The peninsula has obvious strategic advantages and, in particular, was a bridgehead for continental expansion. As early as 1875, Japan forced the Koreans to sign a treaty which opened up Korean ports to Japanese trade. From this time onwards, Japanese policy was directed towards the occupation of Korea, which was achieved in 1910. Apart from the strategic aspect, the Japanese saw Korea as an under-populated country with considerable scope for economic
development.

Japanese control of Korea was generally repressive. Japan was always extremely nervous about Russian interests in the peninsula up to the war with Russia in 1904 and after this, she feared Korean nationalist movements, often claiming some affinity with China. The north of Korea had good deposits of iron ore and anthracite but in general, the industrial development of Korea was not great. The railway system was well developed, conforming to a sound strategy which the Japanese usually showed in their railway building.

The nett loss to the Japanese, viewed in economic terms only, is quite considerable. In the thirties Japan imported relatively large amounts of rice and coal (7m. tons in 1943) was the most important mineral. The Koreans provided a source of labour in the coalfields of Japan and were often driven into the less agreeable occupations as a result of poor conditions in Korea. The post war problem of territorial waters has been acute, especially from a fishing point of view, and has led to much bitterness between the two governments in recent years. The loss of Korea could be most serious for Japan if the peninsula fell under the influence of Communist China. This does not seem likely in view of American support of the South Korean government but affairs in Korea are of particular concern to Japan and are likely to remain so. If the whole of Korea had fallen to the Communists in the early 1950's then the position would have been critical for Japan. Korea possesses good, ice-free harbours that could be a source of offensive action - the type of action which has been applied by Indonesia against Malaysia recently - where small scale, hit and run tactics maintain a high state of tension. Whichever way one looks at it, a dagger pointed to the heart of Japan or a springboard for continental invasion,
Korea retains its importance for Japan.

THE JAPANESE SOUTH SEA ISLANDS

After World War I Japan was given the mandate over former German possessions of the Marianne, Marshall and Caroline Groups which had been occupied by a Japanese Naval Force. Economically, these islands were not important to Japan although they did provide phosphates, copra and sugar for the Japanese economy. Strategically, they were most important, providing a defensive screen in the Pacific. These islands have now been taken over by the United States as trusteeships under the United States Charter. Public opinion in Japan has long favoured the return of the Ryuku group of islands and in 1953, the Americans returned the northern group to Japan but retained the Southern Group. The Americans have tried to give as much internal freedom to the Okinawans as possible but their bases have cost a great deal and the use of them - this is of particular significance - falls under her jurisdiction and is not subject to Japanese approval. Charles Fisher wrote the following about the significance of these islands (all the islands, which were former German possessions and were lost after the war). "Strategy and sentiment apart, however, none of these lesser islands has any great value, and their restoration to Japan would be of negligible economic importance." (10)

SUMMARY OF THE LOSS OF TERRITORIES

The loss of these territories has meant that Japan has lost valuable sources of raw materials which were under her direct political control. However, the loss of these is not entirely bad. Many of these territories would have had intractable problems caused by having large populations for whom the Japanese were hated imperialist masters. As the
terms of trade in the post-war world have not favoured the producers of primary products, Japan has been able to obtain her raw materials without much difficulty. The main loss to Japan is essentially in the sphere of strategy - and in the case of the Kuriles or Sakhalin - this is defensive, not offensive strategy.
(1) Japan.
   Sir E. Dening P. 73 E. Benn. 1960
(2) A Short History of the Far East.
   K.S. Latourette P. 636 Macmillan 1949
(3) Japan's Economy in War and her Reconstruction
   J.B. Cohen P. 293 Minneapolis 1949
(4) Government and Politics in Japan
   John M. Maki P. 33 Thames & Hudson 1962
(5) A Short Economic History of Modern Japan
   G.C. Allen P. 125 Allen & Unwin 1946
(6) Ibid P. 125
(7) Ibid P. 148
(8) Government & Politics in Japan
   John Maki P. 28 Thames & Hudson 1962
(9) The Monsoon Lands of Asia
   R.R. Rawson P. 195 Hutchinson 1963
(10) The Prospect for Japan. The Changing World
     East and Moodie.
Japan should, according to her leaders, have augmented her meagre supplies of raw materials and foodstuffs by her conquests but her loss of effective control of the seas frustrated these plans.

Instead of obtaining rich supplies of oil from the Dutch East Indies, tin and rubber from Malaya and rice from South East Asia, she was faced with the intolerable burden of supplying her armies, dispersed throughout a vast territory.
1. South Sakhalin had been obtained from Russia by the Treaty of Portsmouth 1905.

2. The Kurile Islands were obtained from Russia by the Treaty of 1876.

The Japanese are deeply resentful about the loss of the Kurile Islands. In 1956 the Russians rejected the idea of returning even the Southern most Kurile Islands, Kunasiri and Etorofu but promised to hand over Shikotan and Habomai if the U.S. Forces left Japan and the Ryukyus.
Korea is an area of great political instability and is a source of danger to Japan. Apart from the possibility of further conflict between North and South Korea, with the inevitable involvement of the Great Powers, relations between South Korea and Japan have been strained. The main problems in the post-war era have been over the definition of territorial waters and from problems concerning the repatriation of Koreans from Japan.
6. THE POLITICAL SCENE

The main purpose of this chapter is to try to assess whether or not Japan is a viable democracy. The constant anxiety found in dealing with Japanese politics is that a major economic or international crisis could bring to the fore right wing, reactionary elements. This is precisely what happened in Japan in the early thirties and although the internal politics of any major power - not the least Japan - are highly complex, the political geographer must take account of them. Our main problem then is first, to judge whether or not the Constitution has a widespread acceptance in Japan because this constitutes a formal statement of democratic purpose and second, what is equally important, to try to assess the strengths of the extreme parties of the left and right, as these must constitute the greatest potential threat to liberal western democracy in Japan. Finally, to bring the study up to date, we will write about Sokagakkai, which, although it is primarily a religious conception, stemming from Buddhism, exercises an increasing degree of political power.

Constitutional and Political changes in Japan.

The basic framework for the United States policy after the Japanese surrender was laid down in the policy paper "United States Initial Post-surrender Policy". The Policy was well prepared and - what proved to be most important - it was ready before the first U.S. soldier set foot on the mainland of Japan. The Policy stated definite goals and also the means by which they could be achieved. The Japanese Government, besides most of the Allied Powers, gave it acceptance - albeit somewhat grudgingly at times. The Policy reads as follows, the first objective being a negative one but the second promising the creation of a new society:
(a) "To insure that Japan will not again become a menace to the United States or to the peace and security of the world."

(b) "To bring about the eventual establishment of a peaceful and responsible government which will respect the rights of other states and will support the objectives of the United States as reflected in the ideals and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The United States desires that this government should conform as closely as may be to principles of democratic self-government, but it is not the responsibility of the Allied Powers to impose upon Japan any form of government not supported by the freely expressed will of the people."

These aims were to be reached by the following means:

(a) "Japan's sovereignty will be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, and such minor outlying islands as may be determined, in accordance with the Cairo Declaration and other agreements to which the United States is or may be a party."

(b) "Japan will be completely disarmed and demilitarized. The authority of the militarists and the influence of militarism will be totally eliminated from her political, economic and social life. Institutions expressive of the spirit of militarism and aggression will be vigorously suppressed."

(c) "The Japanese people shall be encouraged to develop a desire for individual liberties and respect for fundamental human rights, particularly the freedoms of religion, assembly, speech, and the press. They shall also be encouraged to form democratic and representative organisations."

(d) "The Japanese people shall be afforded opportunity to develop for themselves an economy which will permit the peacetime requirements of the population to be met."
The Policy also laid down that the Occupation would be directed by a U.S. Commander for an indefinite period and that the Emperor and the Government would be subordinate to the Supreme Commander who was to utilize the existing machinery of the Japanese Government. There was to be complete disarmament, former militarists were to be barred from holding public office, and war criminals were to stand trial. Political parties were to be encouraged and political prisoners were freed from prison and the large industrial combinations (Zaibatsu) were to be dismantled. The whole Policy was quite revolutionary and may be summed up as the programme of the three 'D's - demilitarization, disarmament and democratization. The Japanese themselves were fully aware that the basic method of working was for "the Occupation, by means of directives issued under the authority of the Supreme Commander, to order the Japanese Government to do certain things designed to achieve the objectives of the occupation; the Japanese Government then instituted the required action!" (1)

Most American writers - with some justification - are proud of the Occupation Period in Japan. They admit mistakes by the Occupying Power but on the other hand they rightly praise the reasonable behaviour of the U.S. Army of Occupation and are generally laudatory about the supreme commander, General MacArthur. MacArthur, who developed a mystique in Japan, appealed to the Japanese, as much as any Westerner could. He was the great pro-consul, remote and detached who disposed justice and followed his mandate.

The Americans were probably wise in not removing the Emperor from office. Constitutionally, the Emperor is now "the symbol of the state and of the unity of the Japanese people;" politically, although he is without real power, he
is a constitutional monarch but culturally he is a link with the historic past. He is no longer a demi-god - certainly in the eyes of most Japanese - but is a well respected, dignified and studious monarch.

The executive branch of Japanese Government had, with the Militarists and Zaibatsu leaders, obtained far too much power in pre-war Japan but nevertheless the apparatus of bureaucracy was reasonably efficient and was vital for the execution of the Supreme Commander's plans. One would hardly say the Japanese Civil Servants went about their work with a reforming zeal but it was rather from an ingrained sense of duty that they carried out their tasks. The bureaucracy provided that continuity which was necessary from the old government to the new.

The reaction of the Japanese people against militarism and authoritarianism in the post-war world is sometimes underestimated by Western writers. When military writers have complained about the relatively small Japanese arms expenditure in recent years they would be wrong to wholly ascribe it to Japanese cupidity and self interest. Pacifism has a genuinely strong hold in Japan - no matter how strange this may seem to Westerners - and this Pacifism is a compound of many experiences, which include those of the war and a realisation of the horrors of atomic warfare. Many of the older generation in Japan (youth is not entirely in the saddle in Japan) remember the arrogance of both police and military and are careful to prevent a resurgence of these evils, which is, of course, a commendably healthy attitude in a democratic society.

The really vital document in Post War U.S. Japanese relations is the Constitution which is the embodiment of the Supreme Commander, Allied Powers' ideals. U.S. writers
who are 'constitution minded' are perhaps a little more laudatory about it than other Western writers and the Japanese themselves. The constitution of Japan was imposed upon her by a power which had defeated her in war. The U.S. Military Government, dissatisfied with the attempts of the Japanese themselves, who were reluctant to alter radically the role of the Emperor, imposed the constitution on the Japanese people. Although the Constitution was formally passed by the Diet in October, 1946, there is no doubt in the minds of most Japanese that it was imposed upon them, even if they derive advantage from it. Ivan Morris writes: "This constitution can, in a sense, be regarded as the epitome of all ideological, political, and economic reforms that were carried out during the early post-war years with the aim of undermining the traditional structure and of providing the foundations of a modern democratic society in Japan!" (2) One of the great drawbacks in any defence of the Constitution is that it did not come as a result of widespread popular demand but rather as an imposition from above, by a foreign power. Most of the reforms introduced by the Occupation remain on the Statute Book but "a far more important question for Japan's future is whether the democratic ideals which they embody can become an integral part of the nation's symbolism instead of foreign imports linked in people's minds with defeat and occupation." (3) Professor Maryama has written: "democracy in this country has not yet infiltrated into the daily lives of the people, although it has accomplished the outward legal and constitutional changes in the Japanese state structure. In other words, democracy is still an imported product and has not yet developed to the stage where it has become a positive symbol to regulate the Japanese way of life, completely displacing the old nationalism." (4)
It is not within the province of this study to go into elaborate details about the Japanese Constitution but nevertheless some outline of Government would seem to be necessary. These paragraphs are not primarily concerned with the defects of the Constitution but rather with the machine itself. The framers of the Constitution were alarmed at the prospect of a legislative body becoming weak and subordinate to the executive and they gave all possible strength to the legislature. The National Diet was to be representative of the people, its members being chosen in free elections, based on universal suffrage. The House of Councillors, the Upper House, has 250 members, 150 elected from local constituencies and 100 from the nation at large. The House of Representatives has 467 members elected from 117 constituencies, each returning from 3 to 5 members. The wholly elected, non-nominated Upper House, with half the seats being contested every three years, fits in with U.S. constitutional ideals but if anything, the House of Councillors in Japan has rather less power than the Senate in the U.S. political framework. The Constitution specifically states that the Lower House, the House of Representatives, is the dominant partner. This latter point is emphasised in the control of the Lower House over all budgetary matters. The important principle of supremacy of the Diet is seen in its monopoly of all legislation. All powers emanate from legislative measures made by the Diet and even the exercise by the executive of the right of discretionary action is possible only if authority has been granted under law. This emphasis on the law making functions of the Diet was an effort to prevent a recurrence of the pre-war system whereby a wide range of ministerial orders and Imperial ordinances had the force of law and could not be challenged in the Imperial Diet. The Japanese constitution is a strange hybrid; it has a predominance of U.S. practice
in it. Both Houses have standing committees for the major affairs of government, ranging from the Cabinet itself to the Audit Committee. The main standing committees are, however, obviously related to the cabinet and the main ministries and this has led to a strengthening of the executive branch at the expense of the legislature. The Prime Minister and the Cabinet must be members of the Diet, a situation nearer the British than the U.S. practice, and the power of the Diet is repeatedly stressed. We, in Britain, have been most concerned about the relative weakness of the legislature and with the rise of the party caucus and the bureaucrat to effective power, and recent events in Japan have shown that she too has this problem, even in spite of a rather more 'defensive' constitution than the British.

The Japanese police under the Ministry of Home Affairs were repressive agents under the old government. In 1947, control of the police was dispersed to local levels but this proved to be inefficient. The attempts to centralise the police once more stirred up the old memories of pre-war and war-time repressions among many Japanese. The police were put under prefectural jurisdiction in 1954 but the National Public Safety Commission still has overall power and its chairman must be a Minister of State and is thus responsible to the Diet. The powers of the Armed Forces are strictly circumscribed and are subject to very effective civilian control.

The Japanese legal system was completely overhauled and there emerged four basic national codes: the Criminal Code, the Civil Code, the Code of Criminal procedure, and the Code of Civil Procedure. The Supreme Court has the power to declare legislative and executive acts as unconstitutional but has consistently refused to do so, maintaining that the
remedy for legislature that may be unconstitutional is through political action in the legislature. The framers of the Constitution had hoped that the Supreme Court in this respect would act like the U.S. Supreme Court which does declare acts as 'unconstitutional' but it has maintained a usage more in common with British practice in preserving - in theory at any rate - the unqualified supremacy of Parliament. The Supreme Court controls the training of potential lawyers and works through the Legal Research and Training Institute. The Chief Justice is designated by the cabinet and appointed by the Emperor and the fourteen other justices are appointed by the cabinet but their appointment does not require formal approval of the Emperor. Justices of the Supreme Court are subject to occasional votes of confidence by the electorate but this measure has not been particularly successful. Some observers would contend that the Japanese Constitution sometimes goes a little too far to preserve the paramountcy of the legislative or electoral processes.

There is no doubt that the bulk of Japanese opinion would favour the retention of the Constitution although we might not hear paeons of praise to the Americans for presenting it to the Japanese people.

POLITICAL PARTIES

The continued existence of a viable democracy in Japan is of vital interest to the Western Powers. The liberal-democratic cause throughout Asia would suffer an irretrievable setback were democracy to fail in Japan. So many of the smaller nations in Asia have succumbed to military dictatorships that it is difficult to see much hope for survival for democracy in Asia if Japanese democracy failed.
Although the main threats to Japanese democracy come from the extreme Left and Right Wings, there have been a number of internal strains on the Japanese system. For instance, the emergence of splinter parties, where personalities have outweighed principles, bloc voting in rural areas where village leaders have been influential enough to wipe out effective opposition, and violence, have all been threats to the stability of the political machine. But the biggest problem, however, has been to maintain a two party system. The two main parties, the Liberal-Democratic and the Socialist, although differing in political philosophy, are basically in favour of democracy and their dominance has helped the cause of democracy. Any great diffusion of power brought about by the loss of power by either of the major political parties would have favoured smaller extremist groups, to the detriment of political stability.

The Liberal Democratic Party

The Liberal-Democratic Party, which is admittedly torn with factional rivalry, represents a strong conservative tradition in Japan. It was created by a merger of the Liberal and the Democratic parties in 1955. Although it stands for the maintenance of a political status-quo it represents a very different brand of conservatism from that which was put forward by right wing parties in the thirties. Maki writes: "Thus, in the early 1960's conservatism means something far different from what it meant only two decades earlier. It is important therefore, to note a few of the things that the new conservatism does not stand for: the old practice of emperor worship; the subjugation of women; the omnipotence of the male head of the family; the concentration of economic power in the hands of the Zaibatsu; a single party system; the authoritarian state
with its police suppression and denial of freedom; and, finally militarism and aggression." (5) A disturbing feature of this party has been the way in which the pre-war politicians have dominated affairs in the post-war era, but as these are now a diminishing band of old men, a younger, more dynamic type of leader has emerged. The party too, has uneven support, which is not unusual for conservative parties in modern industrial states, in that it has a predominant strength in the country and is relatively weak in the major industrial centres.

The Socialist Party

Socialism was introduced to Japan towards the end of the nineteenth century but it never really took a firm hold in Japanese politics, partly because of the tremendous conservatism in outlook of most Japanese before the war and partly because of the repressive measures taken against it by Japanese governments. Freed from these restraints the Socialist party grew rapidly in the post war years and indeed, ruled the country for a short time in 1947 and 1948. Although the party has strong support from trades-unions, from students and teachers and from those Japanese who were hostile to U.S. influence, it has never been a truly powerful party because of serious ideological conflicts. It has been bedevilled with the conflict between the Marxist-Leninist faction and the social-democratic side of the party. The fear of the revolutionary side of the Party has alienated support from many people, particularly tradespeople, who were nevertheless not wholly satisfied with the alternative party, the Liberal Democratic. The main enemies of the Socialist party therefore have been internecine strife and the continuance of general prosperity in Japan which must inevitably help the more conservative Liberal Democrats to retain power. Within the
party, the Soviet-Sino breach and the possession of nuclear weapons by China has weakened the Marxist faction.

We will now examine the extremist parties which obviously represent the main threat to democracy.

Parties of the Extreme Right

Japanese nationalism that was used in perverted ways by so many of the right wing parties and pressure groups before the war has numerous historical characteristics to differentiate it from that in most other countries. "It was originally built up from provincial sentiments and depended on traditional local loyalties, paternalistic failings, and quasi-religious myths. The Meiji oligarchy succeeded by means of state education and propaganda in mobilizing this pre-modern form of nationalism to break down feudal barriers and to create a sense of national unity, loyalty to the central government, and enthusiasm for a national mission of aggrandizement". (6) With the collapse of the Japanese 'mission', nationalism suffered a heavy blow but it has re-emerged in a different guise. Delmar Brown warned against underestimating the force of Nationalism in post-war Japan for "the sense of loyalty to the nation has not changed but rather the expressions and manifestations of that loyalty. A review of Japan's history during the last three decades shows how potent the force of nationalism became - even driving the nation to adopt policies and to take steps that ran counter to its own best interests, for nationalism was charged with emotionalism that left no room for the adoption of measures dictated solely by reason. It is therefore of vital concern to all those who support the ideals of freedom and peace to see that Japan's new nationalism does not merge with the Communist advance and does not revert once more to the old emotional ultranationalism that was based on
fear and that was whipped up to a fanatical height by a government bent on the achievement of state goals by the use of force against foreign enemies". (7)

Pre-war Japanese leaders repeatedly stressed the dangers of attack from other imperialist powers and so maintained a highly charged nationalism. Many Western observers still consider the Right wing to be a far more serious menace than the Left wing because the extreme rightists are more in tune with Japanese traditions in general than are the Communists. Brown points out that: "many of the right wing societies today do not derive from the 1930's but have their historical roots in the Edo and Meiji Periods". (8) He instances Tokugawa Confucianism and the agrarian xenophobia of the Bakenatsu period which still find echoes in post war right wing societies. The extreme right is strongest in provincial and rural areas where their element of conservatism finds more support than the iconoclastic 'foreign' ideas of revolution, which communism teaches.

The Party of the Extreme Left

This is synonymous with the Communist party and as such would appear to have greater unity than the fissiparous Right. However, this is not entirely true as doctrinal policies have weakened the Communist party. The Communists enjoyed a 'honeymoon' period in the immediate post-war period. The party had never been numerically strong and had suffered severe repression from successive pre-war Japanese governments but its organisation was quickly established during the Occupation and it got off to a flying start. A climax was reached in the general election in 1949, when the Communists won just under 10 per cent (slightly less than three million) of the popular vote of thirty five seats in the House of
Representatives. And in a more positive sense we have the familiar penetration in the trades unions where a power was established which was out of all proportion to their numerical strength. One faction in the Party led by Nosaka insisted on the acquisition of power by democratic means but there was a greater faction, ideologically purer and conforming more with Marxism, that insisted on violence and revolution. This tended to discredit the party and with its thunder stolen by the Socialists in their opposition to Japan's subordinate role to the U.S.A., the party has not increased in strength but has decreased in the last decade. The party has appealed to the younger people - the students in particular - who were naturally less respectful of old institutions and to whom revolution had an appeal but Russia's intransigence over the prisoner of war problem, and the territorial gains made by Russia at the expense of Japan, have not helped the Communist cause. The split between Russia and China has further weakened Communism in Japan and finally, the comparative economic wellbeing of Japan after the Korean war, has been a disincentive to the spread of communism. The fact that Communism is wedded to revolution makes it impossible for the party to work in a liberal-democratic state. Maki suggested that the Communist party represented the only serious threat and discounted the ultra nationalist groups who were, he claimed, out of step with the times - but this may well be his American obsession with Communism.

**SOKAGAKKAI**

In Japan, Sokagakkai exerts a growing influence on politics because of its hold over about one-tenth of the country's population.

Sokagakkai was established in 1928, by a Japanese
philosopher and scholar, Mr. Tsunesaburo Makiguchi, but it was only after the end of the second World War that it attracted followers by the thousands. The faith fitted the vacuum left by the destruction of standards and values which were suddenly no more in the despair of defeat. Sokagakkai philosophy is derived from Buddhism and offers the Japanese happiness by doing away with "egoistic thoughts". Its official pamphlets state: "Sokagakkai aims to bring faith, individual happiness and construct a peaceful society by practising the true religion. We must therefore change the egoistic thoughts of individuals by a character revolution". Sokagakkai claims that it is not ultra-nationalistic nor fascist but nevertheless, it is well organised and enjoys particular support from the young people. The movement supports the political party Komeito which is essentially a moderate, middle of the road party. It is this moderate role, plus its emphasis on internationalism and world peace which does not, in spite of its rapid growth, make it a disturbing feature of modern Japanese political life. One cannot avoid the conclusion that many young people give it support because they have no great faith in either of the two major political parties.

SUMMARY

Japan had many advantages over neighbouring countries of S.E. Asia in her attempts to introduce democracy after the Second World War: first, she had a literate population; second, a large number of her people had had some experience of voting even if it had not been of a very exciting nature and third, she had what was — in spite of the dislocation of war — a good system of mass communication. The relative prosperity of post-war Japan has in the eyes of many Japanese
been associated with the present effective political machinery and it seems unlikely that they would willingly wish to change it. Perhaps only massive unemployment could cause a degree of instability that would lead to the destruction of democracy, and the development of economic thinking, from Keynes onward, makes this highly unlikely. The only other major upset which could bring extremist government into power would be world war and there does not appear to be any significant section of Japanese public opinion that would lightly support aggressive action by the Japanese government.
(1) Government and Politics in Japan.
   J. Maki
   P. 49
   Thames & Hudson 1962.

(2) Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan.
   I. Morris
   P. 16
   O.U.P. 1960

(3) Ibid
   P. 16

(4) Thought and Action in Japan in Current Politics 'Nationalism in Japan'
   Maryama Masso
   P. 14
   Tokyo 1956

(5) Government and Politics in Japan
   J. Maki
   P. 162
   Thames & Hudson 1962

(6) Ibid.
   P. 22

(7) Nationalism in Japan.
   Delmar Brown
   P. 276
   Univ. of California 1955.

(8) Ibid
   P. 414

(9) Quoted by Reuter: Yorks. Evening Post. Sept. 11th, 1965
APPROXIMATE NORTHERN LIMITS OF CROPS IN JAPAN

Limit of sweet potato
Limit of rice
Limit of Mulberry
Limit of Winter crops in Paddy Fields
Limit of Tea
Limit of Orange
Limit of 2 successive crops of rice in a year

Source: Trewartha (1965 Ed)
Yield of Rice (tons per hectare)

Note: Relatively high yield of N.W. Honshu and low yield of Hokkaido

After a map by Takane Matsuo
This chapter will be concerned primarily with the major post-war changes in Japanese agriculture. Agriculture still remains the most significant part of the Japanese economy but it has undergone some quite revolutionary changes since the war. In order to make intelligible any discussion of post-war reforms it will be necessary to describe briefly the conditions which prevailed before the war and to give an account of the main agricultural regions and the principal crops grown therein.

The Meiji Restoration in 1868 destroyed feudalism but there still remained a rigid, inflexible system of land tenure in Japan. As a result of the reforms at the time of the Restoration, the ownership of the land became vested in those who had paid rice dues to the feudal lords. In place of this tribute the new owners were obliged to pay a land tax in cash to the national government. Many of these landlords, who also had tenants, received a rice payment from them. However, the steady inflation of the 1870's favoured the landlords, as their taxes to the government were fixed but the value of the rice payments which they received, increased rapidly. There were still many working farmers who had become peasant proprietors but the tendency during the modern era was for the number of these to decline. G.C. Allen writes: "Throughout the modern era, and especially during periods of agricultural depression, the proportion of the arable land held on tenancies increased. By 1936, 46 per cent of all farm households consisted of peasant proprietors, 42 per cent of farmers who leased some of their land from landlords and owned the rest, and 27 per cent of tenant farms pure and simple". (1) It has been estimated that in pre-war days the
peasant paid on average two fifths of the value of his produce to the landlord. The whole system therefore was very much in favour of the landlord class and the life of the peasant was onerous. Often the tenant rented land from a number of landlords and the difficulties caused by this dispersion of holdings are obvious.

The typical Japanese landlord was not a great landowner of the type that existed in Central and Eastern Europe before the war. There were in the whole of Japan only 3,000 landlords who owned more than 50 chobu (120 acres) and the majority of these were in Northern Japan. Many landlords were absentees - nearly one million before the war - and many had interests and occupations outside agriculture. The holdings of the peasants were very small indeed, nearly half were less than $1\frac{1}{2}$ acres and 94 per cent were under 7 acres and almost invariably, these holdings were split up into small parcels of land.

The main crop was rice which occupied nearly 60 per cent of all cultivated land. There was little double cropping of rice in Japan and second crops of wheat, barley or roots were the general rule. In some ways, Japanese agriculture was highly efficient and the rice yield per acre was the highest in the world. However, the method of farming was labour intensive with very little use of machinery or draft animals and the yield per person was consequently low. The Japanese schools in the twenties and thirties taught improved methods of agriculture and in these years productivity greatly increased. The use of fertilizers became much more widespread and apart from sources such as the South Sea islands with their phosphates, the production of artificial fertilizers increased rapidly in Japan after World War I. Many of the Japanese peasants

Note: 1 chobu equals 2.4 acres.
engaged in fishing and silk production and this naturally augmented their incomes, but the fact remains that they were badly off in the pre-war years and relatively much worse off than the average worker in the urban areas. This was responsible for the drift of population to the towns but nevertheless there was still chronic rural overpopulation in Japan. The oppressed peasants looked upon the industrial capitalists as their main enemy. There had always been a close contact between the Army and the land - it is hardly surprising that in view of the economic hardship which existed in the country areas that these areas were such good recruiting grounds. The peasants looked to the militarists, who were opposed to the industrial capitalists, to rescue them from their plight. The basic problem of Japanese agriculture was too great a farming population on too little land and in spite of an energetic programme of industrialisation it existed both before and after the Second World War.

**JAPANESE AGRICULTURE IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD**

With the gradual return of her soldiers after the war and the failure of her shattered industries to absorb them, the over-population on the land was exacerbated.

The Occupation authorities rightly took the view that a major land reform was necessary if Japan was to progress towards democracy. The old system, with its long suffering tenants, would always be a source of instability and revolution. It is clear that the reform may have been instigated by a conquering power but in the main, many Japanese (not the least the peasants) believed that fundamental reform of land tenure was necessary and so the Occupation was giving impetus to a long felt need for action. It is really surprising that the landlords remained so comparatively docile when they lost so
much. However, it should be emphasised that no matter how much the change in land tenure was desirable politically and socially, the fact remains that the root cause of Japan's problem on the land at that time - namely too many people with too little land - could not be solved. Paradoxically, it was industry, the traditional enemy of the rural interests, which was to provide a partial solution to this perennial problem from the late 1950's onwards. Before we discuss this let us look at one of the best very simple divisions of Japan into Agricultural regions which will make some of the decisions taken by Supreme Commander, Allied Powers in the Land Reform more intelligible.(3)

**AGRICULTURAL REGIONS**

(1) **Hokkaido**

Hokkaido differs from the rest of Japan in that winter cropping is impossible, because of her intensely cold winters. Upland fields are more significant and farmers are less dependent upon rice. The population is relatively sparse but it is increasing, but it remains essentially a pioneer zone with limited agricultural possibilities. The Japanese governments both before and after the war have always been concerned about the sparsity of population of Hokkaido - more on grounds of the strategic dangers of a weak zone of contact with the U.S.S.R. F.C. Jones in his excellent work on Hokkaido writes: "The agricultural possibilities of Hokkaido have always been limited. The ratio of cultivable land to the total area is small. The soil is in general of mediocre or poor quality and needs particularly large amounts of fertilizer to produce adequate crops. This, combined with a short growing season, prescribes a larger area for profitable - or even subsistence - farming
than is necessary in most of mainland Japan. That, in turn, limits the number of farming families the land can hold. Much of the land which official estimates include as potentially cultivable, although as yet untilled, is so unfavourably situated and so poor in fertility as to offer at best a hand-to-mouth existence for the settler........" (4) The idea that millions of the existing surplus farm population could be re-settled on the land in Hokkaido is fallacious. The enormous increase in demand for meat and dairy produce in Japan in recent years has greatly stimulated cattle rearing in Hokkaido in the last decade.

(2) Northern Honshu

Northern Honshu is a mountainous, transition zone. Here also dry fields are important and millet often takes the place of rice. The farms are relatively large and draft animals and small tractors are frequently used.

(3) The littoral of the Inland Sea

This area is cut off by mountains and is given over to subsistence agriculture. Rice is the major crop but double cropping is rare except in the extreme South. In recent decades the population of this area has decreased.

(4) The Interior of Central Honshu

The basins of the mountainous interior of Central Honshu are isolated. Agriculture is predominantly of the dry field type on the lower mountain slopes. The silk industry was relatively important and still is today, to a lesser extent.

(5) The Kwanto Plain

This plain is one of the most intensively cultivated in Japan. Proximity to the urban market and the presence of alluvial terraces causes specialisation in upland crops, especially cereals, potatoes and vegetables.
(6) The Pacific Coastlands stretching westwards from Tokyo, to the Inland Sea.

This area is especially well suited to agriculture of the typical Japanese variety. The level basins along the coast are adapted to rice cultivation and can be easily drained for subsidiary crops of barley and wheat during the mild winter. Vegetables, fruit and tea are grown in special areas.

(7) The Margins of the Inland Sea.

This region is even more favourable for agriculture than the previous one. Mountains protect the area from excessive rainfall and winter snow, while marine influences prevent extreme changes in temperature. Large industrial cities provide markets to which products can be readily transported by sea or canal. All the characteristic Japanese crops can be easily cultivated. In this region and the previous one, living conditions are most satisfying to the Japanese.

(8) Kyushu

Kyushu suffers from isolation. Climatic differences between north and south lead to a greater production of rice in the north and of cereals and sweet potatoes in the Upland fields of the volcanic southern part.

(9) The Shorelands of Kyushu and Shikoku.

This is the only part of Japan where the double cropping of rice is possible. Because of isolation and the small amount of fertile land, however, this region lacks importance.

THE MAIN CROPS

Rice is still the paramount crop of Japan. It still provides, according to a recent nutrition survey, 57 per cent
of the calories of an average Japanese diet. (5) Rice is used by the Japanese in a wide range of culinary arts and the people are fastidious about its quality. "It (rice) has acquired a whole mystique of connoisseurship and given many metaphors to the language". (6)

The growing of rice poses certain difficult problems. Japan has no word for field but there are two words, one ta means a flooded rice field and the other, hatake means a dry, upland field. About .55 per cent of the total cultivated land consists of flooded paddy fields, often fed by extensive irrigation works. Work in the fields ranges from hand digging in the smallest fields to mechanical rotor cultivators, which are becoming increasingly common. Weeding the crop is done by hand-pushed hoes but hormone weed killers are now in widespread use. Rice requires a great deal of careful cultivation as it is important to ensure an even level and a gradual change of water in the rice field until, after the ears have formed, the field is drained. Harvesting is still done by hand but threshing is usually a mechanical process. An idea of the greatly improved efficiency of Japanese agriculture can be gained from the fact that Japan is self-sufficient in rice production today in spite of losses of valuable rice producing parts of her Empire, such as Korea and Formosa.

Cereals are important in Japanese agriculture and wheat, barley and oats have a planted acreage of about half that of rice. Maize, sorghum and millet are less important than the previous crops but this can be understood in the light of Japan's relatively small number of livestock. Among pulses, soya beans are most important and with fish provide a high proportion of protein in the traditional diet. Sweet potatoes, a crop capable of producing a high yield of calories per acre, are grown in the South but the normal type of potato,
of rather less importance, is restricted to the Northern parts of Japan.

Japan's industrial crops, pyrethrum (insecticide), rape (for oil) and tobacco have a combined acreage of about a tenth of that of rice. Mulberry has decreased in importance since the advent of man-made fibres. Tea growing is important along the Southern coasts and so too is the production of oranges in this region.

THE LAND REFORM

The land reform undoubtedly removed the worst evils of land tenancy which we mentioned briefly in the first half of this chapter. An outstanding change in the country's agricultural life was in the re-distribution of farm income between tenant and landlord; which was long overdue. The Staple Food Administration Law of 1942, enforced the substitution of money rents for rents in kind and in a period of wartime inflation this proved helpful to the tenants. After the war when there was a chronic shortage of foodstuffs, many landlords attempted to dispossess the tenants to farm the land themselves. The Occupation Authorities stopped this and insisted on a general change from tenant status to peasant proprietorship. Absentee landlords were completely dispossessed and landlords were only allowed to retain a small amount of cultivable land. "The vast and complicated transaction was almost completed by the end of 1949. By June 1952 the government had acquired nearly 4 million acres of cultivated land and 1 million acres of pasturage and had resold most of this to the former tenants. By this process the proportion of land farmed by tenants to the total cultivated area had been reduced from 46 to about 8 per cent. Japan had become a land of peasant proprietors". (7)
The Owner - Farmer Establishment Law of 1946, which provided the main framework for the reform, provided compensation in money for the landlords but this did not amount to much because of the existing inflation.

The shortage of food in the early post-war years brought high prices to the farmers and agricultural production continued to rise. When the Japanese industry began to recover after the war, the problem of over-population in rural areas was eased by the demand for labour from the factories. Japanese industry provided highly efficient machines for the farmers - for which there was an increasing demand - and provided pesticides and fertilizers. But more important still, it provided a vast, lucrative market in the towns for farm products. Rural society in Japan has been shaken by the post-war reforms and although the farmers are conservative in outlook, they more readily accept new ideas than they did before the war.

The extravagant claims of the United States land reformers that by vigour and sensible planning they had carefully remoulded a system of land tenure may be taken too far. R.P. Dore quotes one of the most capable United States officials concerned with the reform, Wolf I. Ladejinsky, who writes: "Without underestimating the drive and single-mindedness of the Occupation, it should be noted that its principal role was that of midwife to a healthy reform which had been in its pre-natal stage. The reform idea was Japanese in origin; it was not a policy imposed by a conqueror on the conquered". (8) Nevertheless the Occupation must be credited with bold initiative in putting the scheme through, although its success depended on the effective co-operation of the Japanese bureaucracy.
In spite of the vast changes in Japanese farming, there are still serious problems today: the size of farm holdings militates against the effective use of machinery and the divided holdings hinder efficiency. Agriculture has been diversified and livestock farming is relatively more important today. The incomes of farm households have risen, and although the farmer is better off, he still compares unfavourably with the city dweller in his standard of living. The terms of world trade have continued to move in favour of exporters of manufactured goods and against agricultural producers. The writers of the book (Consider Japan) are of the opinion that because of political motives, the Government of Japan has attempted to keep too many farmers on the land. They write: "Some foreign observers in Tokyo told your correspondent that Japan's greatest achievement is that it has made itself self-sufficient in rice, but in fact this has surely been one of the most obvious errors. Its policy of agricultural support has been concentrated on encouraging an expanded cultivation of rice and wheat, just when the Japanese public are starting to eat less of the old staples and move over towards more meat and dairy products instead. It would be logical for Japan to buy more of its rice from other Asian countries, particularly if it wants these countries to open their doors to more exports of Japanese manufactured goods". (9) This argument is sound economically but ignores political realities and perhaps, too, ignores the marked preference that the Japanese have for home produced grain over the softer rice from Indo-China and Burma.

There are striking parallels between the problems facing both Japanese and British Agriculture. In both countries, strictly from the point of view of economic
doctrine, (which is only part of the argument) fewer resources should be put into agriculture and more should be put into industry. The strategic problem of preserving a great home produced farm output is less vital in the 'nuclear age' but no democratically elected government, can ignore the social problems which would be caused by a deliberate neglect of agriculture. The solution to Japan's major problem - too many farmers on too little land - must come through the gradual transfer of man power to industry. Agriculture must retain a real flexibility in providing the type of crop required both by industry and by the more affluent city dwellers. The small size of the farms is uneconomic and this problem is even more acute than it is in Western Europe today, and this no doubt, will be the subject for the next major reform in agriculture.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Full Time</th>
<th>Part Time I</th>
<th>Part Time II</th>
<th>Estimated number of persons engaged in agriculture and forestry.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>5,661</td>
<td>4,164</td>
<td>1,447</td>
<td></td>
<td>14,160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>5,480</td>
<td>3,771</td>
<td>1,709</td>
<td></td>
<td>13,650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>5,698</td>
<td>3,056</td>
<td>1,667</td>
<td>974</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>6,176</td>
<td>3,086</td>
<td>1,753</td>
<td>1,337</td>
<td>16,530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>6,043</td>
<td>2,106</td>
<td>2,274</td>
<td>1,663</td>
<td>16,040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>5,980</td>
<td>1,854</td>
<td>1,854</td>
<td>2,272</td>
<td>13,910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>5,880</td>
<td>1,529</td>
<td>1,940</td>
<td>2,411</td>
<td>13,110</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Households classified as Part I are households in which agriculture is the main occupation, whereas households Classified Part II are those for which agriculture is a subsidiary occupation.
The increase in the number of farm households (219,000) between the years 1935 and 1962 should be seen in the light of a total population increase of 27,498,000.


**PRODUCTION OF PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES IN JAPAN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rice</th>
<th>Wheat</th>
<th>Barley</th>
<th>Soya</th>
<th>Mandarin</th>
<th>Orange</th>
<th>Eggs</th>
<th>Milk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>8,239</td>
<td>1,374</td>
<td>2,091</td>
<td>429</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>5,150</td>
<td>712</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>10,899</td>
<td>1,375</td>
<td>2,340</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>6,638</td>
<td>1,154</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>12,858</td>
<td>1,531</td>
<td>2,301</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>894</td>
<td>9,559</td>
<td>1,887</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>12,812</td>
<td>1,716</td>
<td>758</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>974</td>
<td>15,302</td>
<td>2,769</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: The great increase in the consumption of milk and eggs probably reflects a combination of American influences on taste and the greater prosperity of people in the towns. There has been an increase in the import of feeding stuffs (not shown here) and this accounts for the fall in the production of barley. Rice production shows a slight decrease, probably due to a more varied diet eaten by an increasing number of Japanese.
(1) Japan's Economic Expansion.  
G.C. Allen  
P.79  
O.U.P. 1965

(2) Ibid.  
P.79

Guy H. Smith & Dorothy Good based on the work of Nasu.  
Institute of Pacific Relations

F.C. Jones  
P.132  
O.U.P. 1958

(5) Land Reform in Japan.  
R.P. Dore  
P.8  
O.U.P. 1959

(6) Ibid  
P.8

(7) Japan's Economic Expansion.  
G.C. Allen.  
P.85  
O.U.P. 1965

(8) Land Reform in Japan.  
R.P. Dore  
P.147  
O.U.P. 1959

(9) Consider Japan. (correspondents of the Economist)  
P.78  
Duckworth 1964
Thousands of Tons

Agricultural Production.

Barley

Milk

Wheat

Slaughtered Cattle

Thousands of Tons

1950 1957 1963

DAIRY CATTLE
thousands

1,145

Source: Statistical Survey Of Japan 1964

FISH CATCHES IN 1962

Source: Yearbook of Fishery Statistics

F.A.O.
"Short on land but long on people", (1) it was inevitable that Japan should turn to the sea to supplement her food supplies. Conditions of both physical and human geography favoured the growth of the greatest fishing industry in the world.

The islands of Japan lie in the midst of one of the richest fishing areas in the world. The seas around these islands are areas of convergence of ocean currents of different temperatures and salinity, and they are rich in plankton. These facts, plus the existence of large areas of the continental shelf, all favour the breeding of fish. The Southern coast is washed by the warm Kuroshio current which flows northward from the tropics and turns north eastward just north of the Chiba Prefecture to take a course across the North Pacific. The northern, Pacific coast is under the influence of the cold, southward flowing Oyoshio ("Mother Current") and the entire west coast is washed by the warm Tsushima Current, a branch of the Kuroshio, which flows north of the Ryuku Islands and passes through the Tsushima Strait. In the Sea of Japan, the cold Liman current flows along the coast of the Soviet Union and Korea. Japan has therefore an incredible variety of marine habitats for fish, and it is hardly surprising that more than four hundred kinds of fish are caught and eaten by the Japanese. Her coastline, deeply indented with many bays, gives protection to her fishermen and the relatively shallow bays support hundreds of species of edible molluscs. Moreover the great pressure of resources brought about by the concentration of population of small coastal plains, plus a natural predilection for fish on the part of the people has made fishing an important industry. In spite of a fivefold increase in the number of dairy cattle between the years 1950 and 1963, (2)
the fact remains that most of the protein in the diet of
the average Japanese is provided by fish.

Trewartha wrote before the war: "Japan's fishing
industry today is a curious combination of old time indigenous
methods and some of the most modern methods and equipment in
use anywhere". (3) This is still true today but there has
been an incredible advance in the use of the powered fishing
boat in off-shore and distant waters. Statistics about the
number of men and women engaged in off-shore fishing in
Japan are unreliable because so many villagers combine both
fishing and farming, but it is probably true to say that the
number of people engaged in fishing has decreased considerably
in the last decade. The reasons for this, put as succinctly
as possible, are (a) the rising demands for labour in industry,
(b) improved efficiency in the fishing methods, (c) the use of
other foods.

Japan's fishing industry suffered in the post-war period
from the dislocation and damage of the war and by the territorial
losses imposed upon her, which meant the loss of valuable
fishing grounds. Her industry quickly recovered and its
productivity helped Japan to avert famine at that time. Her
main emphasis is still on fishing her coastal waters - almost
80 per cent of the total catch comes from these - but she has
a significant fleet which fishes as far away as the South Sea.
The accident which befell the fishermen in the region of the
'Bikini' atomic test was a reminder of this. A considerable
part of Japanese opposition to the testing of nuclear devices
in marine areas stems from the fear of contaminating fish with
radio-active fallout. The loss of the rich fishing areas off
Formosa, Korea and Sakhalin, complicated by increased claims of
territorial waters by both South Korea and the Soviet Union,
have been tremendous handicaps to the deep-sea fishing industry.

The basic philosophy of the Japanese as regards fishing is summed up by the phrase, "If it is alive, catch it, if you catch it, eat it; if you can't eat it, use it for fertilizer." This basically ruthless approach, sometimes not understood by nations who are better off economically, has led to over-fishing in some areas. Fish catches in 1962 totalled over six and a half million tons, and now the Japanese government has begun to apply itself seriously to the problem of over-fishing in breeding areas. This more reasonable attitude may be seen this year (1965) in the fact that Japan has, for the first time, subscribed to international agreements over whale fishing. Many countries, including Britain and Norway have been seriously concerned at the increasing slaughter of whales in the Antarctic and the main culprits have been the Soviet Union and Japan. Japan bought a number of whaling vessels, including factory ships from Britain and Norway and between the years 1953 and 1963 her production of whale oil increased from 53,000 tons to 165,000 tons.\(^4\) The disregard which Japan had for international agreement on catching whales smacked of the old Imperial Japan, and although one has to remember her comparative shortage of animal and vegetable oils and the fact that she had invested heavily in capital equipment, this type of intransigence did her little good in world opinion.

The cultivation of fish and other aquatic products is a very old activity in Japan. The numbers of Japanese involved in the production of clams, oysters, sea cucumbers and seaweed is perhaps in the region of 150,000. The rearing of carp in rice fields and reservoirs has provided useful food
supplies but it is difficult to see how these could be greatly expanded. Fishing is likely to continue as the main source of protein in Japan in the foreseeable future. Her manpower involved in fishing is likely to decrease still further because of the demands for labour in industry but her total catches need not necessarily fall off because of the use of improved techniques. However, off shore fishing is highly specialised and the very scale of operations make it heavy in its demands for labour and this may well see a relative decline.

The significance of Japanese exports of tinned fish and fish products should not be ignored. In 1963, fish products to the value of 3.7 per cent of the total volume of exports exceeded the value of radio sets which were exported. (3.5 per cent). (5)

Japan, in common with most countries with large fishing fleets, will in the future have to support more actively marine research and come to sensible international agreements on fishing techniques and quotas. Her government is actively supporting experiments in aquaculture and this could become a profitable development.

From a strategic point of view, any massive pollution of fishing grounds in a nuclear war would make Japan vulnerable, depending as she does so much on fish as a source of food but this does not seem a real source of anxiety to the writer, for such pollution would only be incidental to the massive devastation of her islands, a much more vital problem!
(1) Fishing in Japan. Case Studies in World Geography
   Ed. R.M. Highsmith       P.95     Prentice & Hall 1961

(2) Statistical Survey of Economy of Japan 1964.
   P.12     Min. of Foreign Affairs.

(3) Japan. Trewartha       P.247     Methuen 1945.

(4) Statistical Survey of Economy of Japan.
   Ministry of Agriculture and Fishing.
   P.15

(5) Statistical Survey of Japan.
   External Trade Figures.    P.52     Ministry of Finance
111a

EXPORTS OF PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES 1961 AND 1963

IMPORTS OF PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES 1961 and 1963

Source: Statistical Survey 1964 Min. of Foreign Affairs.
8. **INDUSTRIAL GEOGRAPHY**

In economic growth Japan has outstripped all the other major industrial nations of the world. This has been stressed often in this work but so great has been her progress, that she has important lessons to teach the rest of the world.

Japan is now the world's largest ship building nation, the largest producer of cameras and optical goods and is a leading producer of steel, machine tools, motor cars, electronics and textiles. Her gross fixed capital formation reached the astonishing level of 34.7 per cent of the gross national product in 1961, or roughly twice the level obtained in Britain. (1) Since 1959, productivity per worker has risen each year by an average of 10 per cent. We come repeatedly to the question of how does she manage to achieve a rate of economic growth which is more than three times that of this country? This is, of course, a complex problem but undoubtedly the high level of education and training possessed by the top executives in industry and commerce has had an important part to play in this. These executives are highly receptive to new ideas and their high level of education, which more often than not includes a sound training in mathematics and statistics, helps them to understand industrial techniques more rapidly than their British counterparts. Japanese education is highly competitive and the cream of her young men go into industry. It has been estimated that close on 80 per cent of her top industrial management have had a university training whereas the figure for Britain has been estimated at 35 per cent.

Another vital factor has been the comparative freedom from labour problems. This is not to say that she has been
completely free from them - the coal miners have fought a spirited rear-guard action to defend their industry from the inroads made by cheap, imported oil - but it is true to say that the Japanese worker does not oppose technical change and re-organization. In many ways the Japanese worker does not suffer the fears of redundancy which bedevils the British worker - close on 35 per cent of all Japanese workers with the larger combines are assured of jobs for life. This element of paternal care has always been strong in Japanese industry. All the big companies follow the policy of 'life-time commitment', and recruit 90 per cent of their labour on this basis. It is unusual for a worker to transfer to another firm making a similar product to the one he has been helping to make, but within the firm, transfer is common and re-training schemes are excellent. The long drawn out apprenticeship which evolved in a leisurely age when long skill training was essential has no counterpart in Japan. This power to transfer and re-train workers is of inestimable benefit today when there is such rapid technological change in most industries. The structure of the Japanese trades unions is a help rather than a hindrance in this as the union organisation is usually based on the firm and not the industry.

The unions have been in the forefront of political controversy but they do not attempt to interfere in disputes in particular firms. Before the end of the war the Japanese worker was never permitted to organize freely; the government and the Zaibatsu were afraid of possible subversion and, although they permitted some innocuous unions, it is fair to say that union activities were carefully controlled and often suppressed. The Occupation powers insisted that the new Japanese government should remove any restrictions on unions and indeed, insisted
that unions should be encouraged. There are two large federations in Japan, the General Council of Japanese Trade Unions (Sohyo) and the Japan Trade Union Congress (Zenro). The former is the larger and is militantly associated with the Socialist Party. Zenro, formed in 1954 to partly counterbalance the extremism of Sohyo, is smaller and tends to be more moderate in its activities.

The average Japanese worker tends to identify himself with the firm - and on balance, he receives less supervision than his counterpart in Britain, probably for the simple reason that he does not require it. This situation is achieved by the important elements of paternalism and group consciousness that exist in the cultural pattern of Japan. The Japanese wage structure makes for a flexible use of labour. The workers are not paid according to their occupations nor are wages based on the work output of the individual. The workers are paid roughly the same rate, no matter what job they are doing but, of course, their rate of pay, negotiated with the firm, depends upon the profit achieved by the firm. The worker receives yearly increments and this induces firms to favour the recruitment of the young. Rural over-population has always provided a source of labour but so great is the economic expansion of Japan, that she even suffers temporary shortages of labour in some industries.

In Japan, wages are increased annually following negotiations between union and management in each enterprise and once settled, wages remain unaltered until the next round of negotiations. This absence of piece rates avoids much acrimonious dispute and also obviates the tendency, wherever piece rates are used, for wage earnings to creep up between agreements on rates of pay. The profit bonus and many fringe benefits, such as hostel accommodation for the
single, cheap canteen meals, marriage and funeral grants, also add greatly to the real wages of the Japanese worker. The Japanese worker has benefited by this productive upsurge in industry but there are signs that the economy is beginning to 'over-heat'. Nevertheless it should be stated at the outset that western economists have been saying for the last decade that the bubble would burst but they have not proved to be right. Japanese prices for her exports have remained remarkably stable but increases in the cost of raw materials, wages and labour shortages could well bring about substantial increases in prices. The Government of Japan and the Japan Central Employers Federation, Nikkeren, have pressed for a national incomes policy but these have understandably been opposed by the unions who point out that proportionately, wage increases have been a good deal less than company profits. Nothing short of a balance of payments crisis (which at least had some effect in Britain) will bring the employers and unions into some form of agreement on this.

Japan seems to have benefited from the fact that unions have been active only for a comparatively short time. In Britain there has been a big legacy of mistrust between unions and management which unfortunately hinders attempts to reach higher productivity. Japanese unions do have their reasons to mistrust the employers but demarcation disputes and mobility of labour within the firm have not been a major problems. It is greatly to the credit of the Japanese that this progress has been made in a country which is highly traditional and culturally conservative: the Japanese, the humble pupils of the West in the early years of this century, have much to teach us.
No study of Japanese industry can afford to ignore the problems connected with her sources of raw materials. A major justification for her entering a war in 1941, and indeed as early as 1931, with the so called Manchurian Incident, was the need for two things: raw materials and markets. In the pre-war period she was faced with the problem of dwindling markets, often brought about by the Western powers with strong interests in Asia and Africa and by rising costs of raw materials and production. In effect, she tried to control her destiny in those years; but she is now no longer a first class power, and to a much larger degree, her political and economic destiny lies beyond her control.

Her competitive power in industry, especially now that she has placed more emphasis in her economy on heavy industry seems to be relatively better than it was before the war. The dependence on the U.S.A. both as a source of raw materials and as a market for her goods means that she is too subject to political pressure from the U.S. but it is difficult to envisage a safe future for Japan without effective links with that country. The logical step would seem to be for her to obtain more of her raw materials from South East Asia and in return, export machinery, machine tools and technical 'know-how' to these countries. Ginsburg writes: "Geographically Japan provides an ideal complement for the primarily agricultural and slowly industrializing countries of Asia. For example, in exchange for food from the three rice exporting nations of South East Asia - Burma, Thailand and the former Indo-China - and in return for raw cotton, rubber, ores, vegetable oils, and tropical hardwoods from other tropical Asian nations, Japan can supply the necessary manufactured goods both for immediate consumption and for industrialization. Also, with the independence of these countries from Western domination, Japan may well be able to provide many more of those invisible account items - shipping services, banking services, insurance -
that were taken almost completely out of her hands at the end of the war. In short, Japan can be conceived of as a regional industrial and commercial centre for the other Asian countries, political conditions permitting. Ginsburg goes on to point out what Japanese industry could do to help the development of the Chinese economy and contends that until such time that she has re-established normal political relations with Communist China she will be unable to perform "the functions that her geographical position and stage of industrialisation define for her in East Asia." (2) These are ideals that both the geographer and the economist strive for, but their attainability, in a world split up into rigidly defined power blocks, is impossible now that 'free trade' is an archaism. Japanese industry has done incredibly well in the post war years; it has shown that it has vital powers of creativity and adaptability and that these key qualities will ensure future success. It is not so much in the impressive increases in productivity that we can learn from Japanese industry but rather in its superb adaptability to changing market demands.

Japan's changing industrial structure, her new trade and other factors overseas have resulted in a distinct shift both in the substance and distribution of the country's foreign trade. Before the war, textile raw materials accounted for 32 per cent of total imports, and textiles made up more than half of the total exports. By 1961, textile raw materials accounted for only 16.9 per cent of the total imports, while textile imports had fallen to 27.30 per cent of the total export trade. Raw materials and fuels still account for the bulk of Japanese imports but Japan now imports more manufactured goods, particularly from the United States, than she did before the war. There has been a sharp increase in the imports of oil, scrap iron and iron ore, reflecting the importance of Japanese
heavy industry.

Exports of metal products, machinery and chemicals, which before the war amounted to an average of 16 per cent of the total exports, had risen by 1961 to 44 per cent. (3) Particularly striking advances have been made in the export of sewing machines, ships, radios, cameras and transistor radios. These goods represent good value on the world market and are not characterized by the shoddiness which used to mar many Japanese goods in pre-war years.

In terms of distribution, the post-war years have seen the decline of Asia as a market and the substitution of the United States for this market. Japan's biggest single trading partner today is the United States, which takes about 25 per cent of Japan's total exports. Japan in turn is the United States' second biggest customer, after Canada. In 1961, North America accounted for 27.6 per cent of Japan's exports and 41 per cent of its imports. Asia took 37 per cent of Japan's total exports and supplied 25.4 per cent of its imports.

Not surprisingly, in view of the similarity of their trade structure, Japan's exports to European countries accounted for a mere 12.5 per cent of her total exports. In 1962 the Japanese government eased its very restrictive import controls but it still remains a difficult market for European businessmen.

The Japanese economy has not been plagued with the 'stop-go' phases which have been so much a feature of British economic development. There have been mild crises - such as happened in 1961 when Japan's foreign exchange and gold reserves fell from the £700 million level in April to £500 million in November of the same year but the tightening of credit by the
government was effective, without drastically slowing down economic growth. The obvious factor in Japan, compared with Britain, was the staggering increase in the productivity of labour and capital.

Before we examine some of Japan's key industries in detail we may summarise some of the main factors in her economic re-birth. They are as follows:

(1) The special procurements of the United States in the Korean War, which stimulated industry and commerce.

(2) A programme of heavy capital investment.

(3) The intelligent fiscal policy carried out by the Central Government.

(4) The abundance of hard working and adaptable labour. (Between 1950 and 1963, the number of persons engaged in manufacturing industry rose from 6,150,000 to 11,290,000).

(5) A high standard of technical education in schools and universities.
(1) Sunday Times, May 9th 1965.
    Professor B.C. Roberts

(2) Pattern of Asia.
    Ginsburg P.128 Constable 1958

(3) The Japan of Today.
    Public Information and Cultural Affairs
    Bureau. P.48 Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

(4) Japan's Economic Expansion.
    G.C. Allen P.105 O.U.P. 1965
IRON AND STEEL

Japan's Iron and Steel Industry may be regarded as a barometer of her economic strength. Her post-war expansion in the output of iron and steel has been remarkable, especially in view of her poverty in the raw materials of this industry. Japan's output of steel has now exceeded that of Western Germany and she ranks third in the world, being exceeded by the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. The success of the Japanese Steel industry is not found simply in its massive output but is found also in its technical inventiveness and overall efficiency.

Historical Background.

In 1887 the first blast furnace in Japan began to function in Kamaishi in Northern Japan and this was followed by the building of an open hearth furnace at Yokasura Naval yard in 1890. The first integrated iron and steel plant was brought into operation, under government management, in 1901. Shortly after this, impressive developments came in the industry largely because of private investment and these increased greatly in World War I. Despite the inter-war slump, the Japanese steel industry continued to expand up to the Second World War when the physical war damage to plant and the destruction of shipping cut off supplies of raw materials and greatly reduced output. In 1934 the government operated steel plant merged with six steel makers to become the Japan Iron and Steel Company. This company dominated Japan's iron and steel industry for the following sixteen years until 1950 when it split into two companies, the Yawata Iron and Steel Company and the Fuji Iron and Steel Company. These two giants with four other major companies are called the "Big Six" with a combined capital which amounts to over £5,000,000,000. Iron and steel works are widely distributed
throughout Japan but the huge complexes are situated in four main areas: (1) Yawata on Kuishu, (2) Kamaishi and Muroram in Hokkaido (3) Tokyo-Yokohama and (4) Osaka-Kobe area in Central Japan.

Japan has a chronic deficiency of iron ore; her estimated reserves of workable ore were put at 40 million tons in 1931 with an additional 40 million tons of low grade magnetite, not commercially profitable to work. (1) These deposits are not only small but they are also widely distributed in hilly and mountainous regions. A large proportion of her iron deposits consists of iron sands, associated with former beach lines and found now near the coasts and these were widely exploited in the last war when Japan was handicapped by a shortage of shipping.

Japan's fuel resources are also poor. Coal deposits in Japan are often difficult to work because of faulting and being Tertiary in age, they contain a high percentage of ash and volatile matter. The supplied of good coking coal are inadequate and her industry imports 60% of its present day needs, largely from the U.S. Her steel industry has long used considerable quantities of scrap steel, again much of this coming from the United States. In 1961, the industry consumed 17.4 million tons of scrap iron, of which 6 million tons came from the U.S.A. But to reduce the consumption of scrap iron, which has become scarce, Japanese mills are laying greater emphasis on the use of oxygen top blowing converters which were first developed in Austria.

Geographers have often stressed the fact that the Japanese steel industry was based on incredibly slender resources. It is no surprise that the Japanese politicians and militarists were obsessed with the ideas of assuring Japan of supplies of
coking coal and iron ore from areas under her political control. The pre-war conquest of Manchuria and the wartime occupation of the Philippines and Malaya were considered necessary for any development of her iron and steel industry. Even when we take into consideration the desperate plight of Britain during the first half of the Second World War and the obvious military advantages of surprise attack when Japan struck the U.S.A., one is staggered at the effrontery of her strategists in taking her into an international conflict with a total steel production of only seven million tons (plus 4 m. tons of pig iron) in 1941.

Japan's iron and steel industry was slow in recovering from the scars of the last war. The Korean War in 1951 greatly accelerated the growth of the industry and the worldwide economic recession after that war had little adverse effect. In 1961, the industry registered an all-time record; producing 28.3 m. tons of crude steel, 15.8 m. tons of pig iron, 20.4 m. tons of ordinary rolled steel and 1.5 m. tons of hot rolled steel. Of her total steel production, 60% of her 1961 output was produced in open hearth furnaces, 20% by electric furnaces — a significant increase here — and the remaining 20% by converter. By 1963 Japan's crude steel output had risen to 31.5 m. tons. (2) The large-scale production of good quality steel — entirely competitive by world standards — has played a large part in the successful development of Japanese shipbuilding and engineering. The success is even more remarkable in view of the fact that Japan has such long hauls both for her raw materials and for her finished products. The development of bulk carriers has decreased the economic disadvantage of the long haul of bulky raw materials — a three or four thousand miles haul for iron
ore is a commonplace in the world today. One important advantage which minimizes the economic disadvantages of the long haul from her sources of iron ore is the "locational advantage of having all of its large integrated steel mills situated on the coast so transportation costs are minimized. At each large integrated plant ships of 10,000 ton capacity can dock directly at the berths." (3) The post-war era has likewise seen a greater proportionate expansion in steel output in the great engineering and shipbuilding areas which emphasises the role of the large markets in the economics of iron and steel.

Japan, is, of course, vulnerable in her dependence on foreign sources for her iron and steel industry but, in some ways, this is less of a problem in a nuclear age. It seems likely that the huge destructive capacity of the major world powers will lessen the likelihood of a world conflict and this inevitably means greater economic stability. Japan needs a stable economic world order. Her businessmen have been negotiating long term contracts for the supplies of iron ore, especially in politically stable countries. Australia (Consolidated Zinc and Consolidated Goldfields) has contracted to supply 82 m. tons of iron ore to Japan for £A355 million over the next 17 years. Both groups - the Australian and the Japanese - anticipate an even greater volume of trade: Hammersley Mining Co. in Australia plans to spend £30 million on developing its deposit (including a 180 mile standard gauge railway to the coast) and anticipates an annual demand of 15 million tons of ore from Japan. Quite clearly these long term contracts in politically stable countries are advantageous to Japan.
Summary of the Iron and Steel Industry in Post War Japan

1. Japan was compelled to find other sources for her raw materials after the war and as a result, she has applied herself intelligently to cutting transport costs to the minimum both by the use of huge ore carriers and by high speed unloading at the blast furnaces.

2. By improved techniques and excellent organisation she has emerged as one of the world's great low cost producers of steel.

3. Her industry has shown an intelligent combination of state planning and the flexibility of privately owned steel combines.

4. The vast expansion of Japanese engineering and ship building provided a stable home demand for steel.

The fact that Japan has achieved this incredibly strong position as a steel producer in spite of tremendous disadvantages is a lesson to orthodox economic geographers. Not long ago "it was a commonplace to assert that her lack of the essential raw materials and high cost of fuel would inevitably put narrow limits on her accomplishments in this industry" (4) but she has shown the world how clever changes in technique and organisation can overcome great natural disadvantages.
(1) Economic Trade Notes No. 232 (MS) dated May 21st 1931.
   William S. Dowd. (U.S. Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce)

(2) Japan. Trewartha.  P.285  Methuen 1965

(3) Ibid. P.285

(4) Japan's Economic Expansion.
   Allen.  P.158  O.U.P. 1965
JAPAN'S STEEL INDUSTRY.

New and integrated steelworks after 1950.

- Operating in 1963
- Under construction 1963
- Planned 1963

After a map by S. Yamaguchi.
SHIPBUILDING

The success of the Japanese shipbuilding industry has been one of the outstanding features of her post-war economic development. The period dating from 1955 has seen an incredible expansion of the shipbuilding industry whereas in Britain, this period has been one of depressing decline. These completely contrary trends make a close examination of the Japanese formula for success an interesting one because the old prejudice against Japanese 'cheap labour' cannot possibly account for this success. Both countries have sound economic bases for the development of a shipbuilding industry and yet their development is very dissimilar.

Japan was a comparative late comer as a shipbuilding nation in the modern world; it was not until 1890 that her first steel ship was launched. Wars, especially those in which she has not been too active a participant - such as the First World War and the Korean War - have acted as a great stimulus to Japanese industry. During the First World War when Allied shipping losses were heavy, tremendous progress was made in shipbuilding in Japan. Her shipbuilding techniques continued to progress after the war and her yards were capable of building ships which ranged from the most sophisticated modern warship to simple fishing vessels.

During World War II Japanese shipyards were badly damaged but generally speaking, the damage was proportionately less than that suffered by other branches of her engineering industry. The Japanese merchant marine had been shattered in the war and in the early stages, S.C.A.P. was not inclined to let the Japanese do much to remedy this situation. There were for the Allied powers some disturbing aspects of Japanese pre-war marine development. It will be remembered that
Japanese Imperialism, in spite of the power of the army, depended on a naval hegemony in the Pacific and to this end, Japan entered the war with a most powerful navy and a large merchant marine. These had been the main instruments of her aggression and the loss of naval supremacy in the war very quickly isolated her colonial conquests and led to her defeat. The Allied Control Government was disturbed by the extreme monopolistic position of heavy industry in Japan which was epitomised by the shipbuilding combines and so the Allies were hardly likely to be enthusiastic about giving immediate support to this industry.

However, the realisation that the U.S. was going to need a dependable ally in the Pacific, especially one in a peripheral position to the Asian land mass, brought about a reversal of U.S. Policy. As early as 1948, S.C.A.P. gave the Japanese permission to rebuild their merchant navy and a steady expansion of shipbuilding followed only to be stimulated even more by the Korean War. Japanese shipyards are now building and selling vessels for at least 10 per cent, and sometimes 20 per cent, less than their British and European competitors. No other shipbuilding nation in the world can compete properly with Japan and wild accusations that Japanese shipbuilders receive massive subsidies from the government or that her labour is ridiculously cheap can soon be disproved. The reasons for the success of Japanese shipbuilding are well worth a close examination for not only do they illustrate some of the unique features of a combination of competitive capitalism with rigid state planning, but they show principles that could be applied to other industries with equal success.

It is well to remember that shipbuilders are essentially assemblers and are consequently dependent on a number of suppliers
and this is the general pattern throughout the world but not, it must be emphasised, in Japan. The major shipbuilders in Japan such as the Mitsui and Mitsubishi are giant combines capable of producing the whole range of components in shipbuilding. In a series of articles in the Guardian, (1) Kim Willenson, Tokyo correspondent of the British United Press, claimed that Japanese ships were cheaper than Western ships because of the following reasons:

(1) They are built faster, and the capital costs per ton are therefore correspondingly lower.  
(2) They are built in volume, which means lower prices for materials and parts.  
(3) They are standardised, bringing further savings in fittings and other accessories.  
(4) They are — the Japanese claim — better designed. This, it is claimed, enables ships to be built with less steel and smaller engines but without sacrificing speed or capacity.  
(5) They are built by a labour force so efficiently organised that although its wages are on a par with those in Europe, the labour cost is lower on a per ton basis.  
(6) This labour force is not troubled by inter-union problems that sometimes hold up work in British and European yards.  
(7) The ships are built under a Government programme that provides no subsidies, but maintains orders at a level high enough to keep the yards working efficiently.  
(8) They are financed at interest rates that compare with those that European builders must pay, but which are between 3 and 5 per cent cheaper than ordinary commercial borrowing in Japan. He also contended that this incredibly efficient organisation was likely to be applied to other fields of industrial endeavour such as steel, textiles and electronics with an equally strong impact on the Western countries. In the construction of ships, the Japanese were not the first to develop "block construction" but it has now advanced to such
a degree in Japan that a large yard can build a 50,000 ton ship in three months.

The Japanese admit that in general her climate favours constructional work in the shipyards. A second factor is the development of advanced metal cutting and welding techniques. The Japanese shipbuilders have encouraged the steel companies to develop high tensile steels that lend themselves to thinner construction and which makes possible the one-sided welding of joints. They have also developed automatic welders which cut down manpower needs and have developed optical techniques for projecting designs directly on to metal plates awaiting fabrication, thus eliminating the cost of producing full-scale paper master shapes for plates. Recently they have begun to couple the optical images through electron valves to computer-directed cutting machine torches, making possible virtually automatic production of plates and shapes. Another saving lies in the field of standardisation which has been most beneficial in an industry which has specialised in the building of bulk carriers and tankers. Japanese shipbuilders do undoubtedly pay less for their steel than their European counterparts. However, the steel makers do not sell steel at a loss for they are among the most efficient and cheapest producers of steel in the world today. This is quite remarkable in a country which has to import iron ore with a considerable haul and which lacks really good coking coal. The Japanese shipbuilders have experimented with ship design and use considerably less steel in ship construction than European builders. Willenson claimed that the new principles applied to cargo-vessels in the 10,000 ton - 15,000 ton range have made it possible to build ships that cruise at 20 knots on the same amount of power required for an ordinary ship to sail at 14. This
claim does seem a little extravagant and I am reliably assured by a British ship designer that this is quite impossible!

An equally potent factor which has led to the success of the Japanese shipbuilders has been the fact that just as much effort has been put into shipyard architecture as has been put into ship design. Mitsui has under construction a yard outside Tokyo in which material will move in a straight line from a receiving dock through fabricating sheds and assembly shops, directly to two building docks, each capable of berthing a 150,000 ton vessel. The company says that the yard eventually will be used to build large tankers in self contained halves that can be joined in the water after launching, thus reducing still further the time such vessels will spend on the slipways.

The Japanese say the average shipyard worker earns about £17-10s. a week but he also obtains valuable fringe benefits in most yards. A bachelor usually lives in a company dormitory where he pays a rent of about 5s. a week. The worker might be provided with a flat at a low rental and he - and his family - can rely on free medical treatment from the company. The small yards do not provide the same extensive fringe benefits and generally speaking, the larger the company the wider range of benefits. The Japanese claim that their workers are less conservative than European and are quite ready to accept new methods and procedures. The unions in the industry are industrial in organisation and this really is a great advantage. Modern unions developed in Japan after the Second World War and there was no previous background of craft separation or guild organisation; consequently Japan has not been troubled by the demarcation disputes which have
been a feature of British shipbuilding industrial relations. Japan, too, has lost less time from strikes in her shipbuilding industry than any other shipbuilding nation. In fact, Willenson gives such an impressive record of success on all fronts that it makes depressing reading for us in Britain. It may well be however, that the writer is a little too laudatory in his praises of Japanese shipbuilding. It is a mistake to assume that the paternalism of Japanese management, which seems to stem from the humane qualities of a pre-industrial past, necessarily brings about harmonious relations between management and labour. Reighauer has pointed out: "Industrial labour and management also view each other with a degree of suspicion and hostility that is almost unknown in the industrialized West today, although it was common there a few decades ago". (2) Government departments and the leading businessmen have, however, achieved a very fruitful form of co-operation. Japan has married the virtues of long range government planning with those which come from the efficiency of capitalism.

The Japanese have pioneered the most recent developments in shipbuilding, ranging from the building of huge tankers to a cleverly devised system of ship surgery which increases the cargo carrying capacity of existing ships. But several of the nineteen leading shipbuilders, which account for 90% of the ships built in Japan, have entered new fields of allied industry in anticipation of a possible decline in demand for ships. Japanese experience in world trade has been bitter and she can expect retaliatory action by Western Governments to help their own shipbuilders. The Japanese shipbuilders have started a widely diversified industrial expansion; these
shipbuilders now produce bulldozers, motor cars and lorries, agricultural machinery and prefabricated buildings. This planning gives some idea of the rare dynamism of Japanese industrialists.

Perhaps the most significant feature in the Japanese shipbuilding industry has been the successful estimate of the type of ships i.e. the huge bulk carriers and tankers which would be required by world commerce and then the planning on their construction with rare expertise. They appear to have had a better sense of overall planning than many Western shipbuilders and the present state of their order books is proof of this.

Apart from the lower costs of construction of ships and accurately fulfilled delivery dates, the Japanese have applied themselves to reducing the manning of their new ships. David Fairhall, the Shipping Correspondent of the Guardian, somewhat acidly pointed out in the midst of the British Seaman's strike that Japan's first 200,000 ton tanker would have a crew of twenty-nine compared with the crew of forty-three on Britain's first 100,000 ton tanker. (3) The message for our shipbuilders is clear: We must study Japanese innovations and methods and in particular, we must shake off conservatism and attempt to create a more dynamic industry. At least the British Government is now beginning to accept its role in the industry and as a result of a recent Government inspired report - the Geddes Report - considerable mergers have begun to take place, which, it is anticipated, will give greater economies of scale.

(2) Japan: Past and Present. 

(3) Guardian, Tuesday, 31st May 1966.
THE TEXTILE INDUSTRIES

The very mention of Japanese textiles evokes feelings of resentment among the older generation in Britain today. There are memories of cut-throat Japanese competition in the African and Asian markets in the twenties and thirties in which the Japanese, with their low labour costs, were at a great advantage. There are accounts, some of them apocryphal, of the brazen copying of British patterns by Japanese textile designers. All these conspired to deepen the economic malaise of the British textile industry. However, the story is anything but one of unparalleled expansion in the production of Japanese textiles. The Japanese had experience of a bitter, widespread distress both in rural and urban areas as a result of the collapse of the silk market in the United States and the Colonial powers did not hesitate to use the tariff and the quota to protect their markets against Japanese imports in the territories which they controlled.

Within the Japanese economy, the greatest emphasis in the post war period - as in the thirties - has been on heavy industry at the expense of light. But it should not be assumed that the textile industry is relatively unimportant in Japan. Textile production still employs more workers than any other industry. (1) Although the production of rayon increased in the decade after the war, far more than cotton or wool, pride of place from 1955 onwards must be given to the synthetic textiles. A major change in all branches of the textile industry has been the change in markets; the main Japanese market today is the home market.

The Silk Industry

The silk industry, although it is a much more efficient industry than it was before the war, has suffered permanently
from the competition of man-made fibres. Silk production in 1963 was less than half that of 1937. During the last war, the production of silk fell drastically as a result of a policy of uprooting mulberry trees to provide space for food crops and to a lesser extent, from the destruction of plant which adversely affected the reeling branch of the industry. In view of the virtual collapse of the U.S. market for silk it is perhaps surprising to find a post-war production as high as it is, especially as the silk industry was very much an 'export' industry in pre-war years.* The answer to this question lies in the high home consumption of silk and in a greater technical efficiency of the industry. A further factor militating against Japan's success in international trade in silk has been the effective entry of Communist China into the world market. In more recent years the competition for land for alternative uses has inevitably increased the costs of the cocoon producers. Labour costs have also increased because the agricultural labour supply has moved from a condition of surplus to one of scarcity. Both the cocoon production side of the industry and the reeling side have experienced the use of new techniques. In the case of the latter, automatic reeling machines have brought improvements both quantitatively and qualitatively in the silk produced.

Professor Allen, in his recent work on the post-war Japanese economy, points out that apart from the technical changes in the industry, there have also been important structural changes in the industry. Before the war the optimum sized filature was one with 150 to 300 basins "for this type of establishment was able to secure economies of scale and also to exercise sufficient supervision over cocoon suppliers to ensure uniformity in materials." (2)

* In 1955 home consumption of silk equalled the pre-war level.
There were very few large firms owning a number of mills in the pre-war period but there was a considerable number of hand reelers who could always concentrate on food production in hard times. The medium sized firm of pre-war days has been the main casualty in the post-war era. The hand reeler who perhaps hired a few part-time workers was not affected by the provisions of the Labour Standards Law but in time, even he has had to give way to the large scale producers. The medium producer has been unable to use the highly expensive machinery to effectively combat increased labour costs and so has gone to the wall. In 1960, over four fifths of all raw silk was produced by 220 fully mechanized mills, most of them owned by large concerns.

The Cotton Industry

Before the war, the main markets for Japan's cotton goods were in Asia. Even then, the threat of effective competition from Indian mills was growing and their position was strengthened in the war years. Besides the loss of most of the market in India, the former market in China - which had been quite significant - was completely lost in the post-war period. In Japan today the home market is easily the most important, which is hardly surprising in view of Japan's vast population and her relatively high standard of living.

As in the case of the silk industry there have been important changes in the structure of both the cotton and the synthetic fibre industries. The pre-war cotton industry was controlled by a few integrated mills which combined both the spinning and weaving processes and by specialist spinning and weaving firms which were quite separate. This very complex organisation was flexible and well suited to the pre-war markets. During the war, the Japanese Government
insisted on amalgamation of firms, and although this did not mean there was any real increase in integrated firms it did mean that both spinning and weaving firms became much bigger, in an effort to capture economies of scale. The S.C.A.P. Control, favoured the large units in the industry, (not of the size of the Mitsui combines) presumably because of convenience in dealing with fewer units, but after the Korean war when Japanese industry generally was beginning to recover, there emerged a situation a little more in keeping with the pre-war pattern in cotton textiles. There were now more specialist spinning and weaving firms than there had been. This did not mean that the large firms disappeared - in fact these firms often entered the man-made fibre industry in an impressive scale, besides continuing to produce cotton goods. For instance, "The Tokyo Spinning Company in 1962 was one of three leading firms in the spinning and weaving section of the cotton industry. Apart from its output of cotton yarn and fabrics, it was one of the largest producers of woollen and worsted yarn woollen fabrics, rayon filament, staple fibre, and spun-rayon yarn, and it has largely taken up the manufacture of synthetic goods." (3)

**Synthetic Fibres**

The major producers of synthetic fibres have technical agreements with overseas firms engaged in the production of these fibres, for instance I.C.I. Ltd., have an agreement with Teijin. The latter combine concentrated on rayon production before the war but now is concerned almost exclusively with the production of synthetic fibres. Since the war, synthetic textiles have grown in importance and next to the U.S., Japan leads the world in chemical fibre output,
accounting for one sixth of total world's production in 1961. Her production of chemical fibres in 1961 amounted to 599,000 tons while the production of cotton yarn was 551,000 tons. (4)

Woollen and Worsted Industry

The output of wool yarn in 1963 was more than double that of the peak pre-war years but exports of woollen cloth today are little more than they were before the war. The more affluent Japanese, who have been consistently following Western styles of dress, have greatly increased the home consumption of wool in the post-war years. As in the West, there has been an increasing use of synthetic fibres in combination with wool.

Summary

Although, the textile industry is assuming a proportionately declining role in the economy, as the emphasis shifts from a light to a heavy industrial base, the general picture is one of a healthy, flexible industry. With its dependence on a more affluent home market, the industry is not as vulnerable to a trade recession as it was before the war. Much of the equipment in Japanese mills was destroyed in the war and consequently there has not been the effort to struggle on with inefficient machinery. The main sources of raw materials, wool from Australia, cotton from the U.S. and oil from the Middle East, are - apart from the last - relatively reliable. The great tragedy is that so many millions of people in Asia could benefit from the products of Japanese mills but they are debarred from doing so because of the ideological differences which exist between nations.
(1) 1,168,090 people were employed in the textile industry in 1961. (Ministry of International Trade and Industry 1964)

(2) Japan's Economic Expansion
    G.C. Allen
    P.119  O.U.P. 1965

(3) Japan's Economic Expansion.
    G.C. Allen
    P.128  O.U.P. 1965

(4) Ibid.
    P.128
FUEL AND ENERGY RESOURCES

Although Japan is relatively worse off than most of the other major industrial nations of the world with regard to energy resources, her position in this respect is by no means as depressing as many geographers would suggest. Her coal deposits are mainly of Tertiary origin, of a low bituminous quality and are often found in thin, broken seams but nevertheless, they are quite considerable in extent. Japan's utilization of hydro-electric power is considerable and is exceeded by only two nations, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. Her oil resources are slender but so indeed are those of Britain, West Germany and France all of which are major industrial powers. Before we go on to examine her energy resources in detail we may elaborate on the guarded optimism contained in this introductory paragraph.

At the present time there is on the world market a relative abundance of cheap oil and the geologists maintain that world resources, pre-supposing a continued increase in world consumption of oil, seem to be adequate for the next fifty years or so. If there is no war in the major oil producing areas, which are admittedly none too stable politically, it would seem that the future prospects of a widespread use of nuclear power and natural gas in this century are sufficient to ensure that adequate quantities of oil will appear on the world market for some time to come. Japanese industry has availed itself of these supplies of cheap oil in full measure. Her leading economists and industrialists have looked at the problem with a ruthless clarity, a quality which has characterized a good deal of her post-war economic thinking, and have committed Japan to a massive use of oil in her economy. The use of the super tanker, which was largely her invention and further emphasis on coastal location of industry are all evidence of this.
She has deliberately grappled with the problem of running down her high cost coal production in a vigorous way and yet this deep economic and social problem has still to be faced in the major Western countries.

The cutting back of her coal production has caused much bitterness and industrial unrest but she has fairly and squarely faced the problem that a country, forced to sell her products in a very competitive world market, must use the cheapest forms of power. Her coal production reached a post-war peak of 65.7 million tons in 1961 but has declined by an annual average of 2 million tons since that year. (1) In Britain, where there are much more accessible high quality coals, the relative superiority of the use of cheap oil in many industries is not as great as it is in Japan but nevertheless the use of oil, not burdened by any form of tax, as opposed to coal, would represent a net economic gain for those industries. The problem in Britain constitutes a much wider social problem than it does in Japan but all the same the use of coal in British Industry has caused much cloudy thinking.

An energetic Chairman of the National Coal Board has not been an unmixed blessing Britain. A leading newspaper quoted Lord Robens as saying that a joint crusade of the National Coal Board and the Atomic Energy Authority could lead to the virtual elimination of oil as a major source of energy for Britain's industry. (2) The logic and purpose of this alliance is difficult to see because at the same time he admitted that the most advanced coal-fired power station could produce a unit of electricity for 0.54d while the new, second generation, advanced gas-cooled reactor could produce the same for 0.49d. Oil represents a reasonably cheap fuel which can be easily transported and has clear economic advantages over coal as a fuel. When Britain's competitors in world markets
are making an increased use of oil it would seem unwise for Britain to be over-dependent on coal.

Geo-politicians are very much aware of Japan's vulnerable position in world trade and readily point out that Japan's inability to control the Pacific Ocean was a major factor in her downfall in the last war. Geographers have often stressed the weakness in the economy which stems from Japan's lack of home-based raw materials and fuel. But in this respect Japan is little inferior to Britain and indeed other significant European industrial powers. By virtue of the fact that Japan lacks huge territories and a large measure of economic self-sufficiency she finds herself out of the 'league of the superpowers' but few nations have the potential to aspire to membership of this exclusive league. Japan can import fuel and raw materials relatively cheaply and her weaknesses are probably great viewed only in pre-war strategic terms. The advent of nuclear strategy must reduce the possibilities of world conflict but if a conflict did occur it would be a terrible prospect for nations which import such huge supplies of raw materials. However, if there should be a nuclear war then the prospect for nations such as Britain and Japan with tremendous densities of population and concentration of industry would be well nigh hopeless.

Oil Production

The domestic output of petroleum in Japan is less than two per cent of her total annual consumption. Her known deposits are concentrated primarily in North Western Honshu in Niigata, Yamagata and Akita Ken. Japan has been subjected to an intensive geological survey and there would seem to be little prospect of a major 'find' in either natural gas or oil. Perhaps it is less possible to be dogmatic about the former as has been seen in Holland, where the extent of her natural
gas field in Grünigen surprised many people, but there seem to be few grounds for optimism in Japan. Japan has wisely built most of her oil refineries in Japan Proper which obviously gives her more freedom in choosing the source of her oil imports but any move by the major oil producing countries to insist on oil refining in their own territories would present her with an awkward problem. A good deal of Japanese capital has been invested in the Persian Gulf area and to a much smaller extent in Sumatra in Indonesia.

Wood

Wood is one of Japan's major energy sources. The charcoal stove plays an important part in the Japanese way of life and Japan is well endowed with timber, most of her forests being extremely well run. "About 21 per cent of the total energy in thermal equivalents, produced in Japan, is derived from wood. Almost every village in Japan has its local source of fuelwood. Thousands of charcoal kilns are found throughout the country and even in the markets of the largest cities bundles of faggots or of charcoal are a conspicuous article of commerce." (3) Most of the fuel is derived from coppice stands which are not suitable for timber production. These coppice stands, which account for about 35 per cent of all productive forests, are increasing at the expense of tall timber as the demands for coppice wood are exceeding their natural reproduction rate. In the towns, however, the electric stove is becoming more common in the Japanese home and it seems likely that the use of charcoal will decrease in the future.

Coal and Lignite

Coal is still an important source of energy in Japan and it is still second in importance to oil. Before the Second
World War the annual production of coal was more than 50 million tons, but there was a marked decrease in production in the immediate post-war period, partly because of general industrial dislocation and partly because of the repatriation of Chinese and Korean miners which has resulted in a diminished labour force. The pre-war level of production was attained in the late 1950's but coal production has always been difficult because of thin, crooked seams and the problem of water in the pits. She has a marked shortage of good coking coal and still imports much of this.

The two major regions of coal production are northern Kyushu and western Hokkaido. The northern part of Kyushu produces about 55 per cent of the total national production, much of which is consumed in that area or is transported by coasters to the eastern end of the Inland Sea. Hokkaido contains considerable reserves of coal and at the present time accounts for about one third of the total national production. The main Hokkaido mines are in West Central parts of the island at Ishikan but there are workable deposits of coal in the east near the port of Kushiro. Most of the coal produced in Hokkaido is sent to the towns of Northern Honshu and the industrial areas of Kanto, the Nobi plain and as far as the Eastern Sea.

A third field, the Joban Field in north eastern Honshu provides most of the coal which is consumed in Tokyo. Shikoku, however, lacks coal deposits. The loss of Sakhalin (Karafuto) was a major loss to Japan as this produced almost 14 per cent of her total coal production before World War II. About one and a half million tons of lignite are mined in Japan and this is either used for domestic fuel or is used in the thermal power stations. The deposits of lignite are widely scattered throughout Japan.
Japan made the mistake in the post-war years of an attempted autarky; for some time she spent vast sums inducing her industries to use Japanese coal instead of switching to more modern efficient forms of energy. But the Government has altered this policy in recent years, albeit at the cost of violent strife and strikes in the coal mining areas. "Japan's planners now appear to recognise that coal mining is one of the primary industries that should be run down pretty ruthlessly as reserves switch more and more into manufacturing industry" (4)

Electric Power

The combined output of electricity, both thermal and hydro-electric, has trebled since the beginning of World War II (See Table 2). This is due partly to an increase in the industrial use of electricity but, in common with other countries with a reasonably high standard of living, the extensive use of domestic appliances has brought about a greatly increased consumption.

Japan is well suited for the generation of hydro-electric power; she has abundant rainfall, although the seasonal variation in rainfall presents problems, and her terrain is mountainous. In general, she lacks natural water storage facilities and in areas which lack winter rainfall, this seasonal variation presents a great problem. The typical Japanese installation consists of a low dam that deflects water into twin penstocks. These penstocks carry water down the mountain slopes, sometimes through sizeable tunnels, and thence into the plant itself. "Such installations are known are known as "run of stream" plants and are relatively uncommon in the U.S.A. , for example, where storage facilities are planned for and constructed." (5) Most of the Japanese hydro-electric installations are small. Of some 1,450 hydro-electric stations
in the country, 88 per cent have an installed capacity of less than 1,000 kilowatts. There are few really great installations and these are situated in Central Honshu. A good point which emerges from this widespread dispersal of hydro electric plant throughout the country is that few parts of Japan are without electricity, indeed all but 0.36 per cent of her houses have electricity which gives her the highest rate of household electrification in the world. (6) From a strategic point of view, the agglomeration of small stations represents an advantage over her having fewer large stations. The latter provided comparatively easy targets (for aerial bombardment) towards the end of World War II.

The lack of huge power dams is not because the Japanese are unable to construct these - she had plenty of experience in constructing these in Manchuria and Korea before the war - but rather is it in response to her peculiar conditions. A number of huge dams have been built in the last decade but the loss of fertile land in the valleys and the inability to use these valleys for communications, has to be balanced against the advantages accruing from the construction of these dams. Another real problem of dam construction has been caused by rapid silting of reservoirs as most of the rivers and streams carry a heavy load of silt.

A conservative estimate of Japan's hydro-electric potential, on the basis of a six month minimum flow, is 12 million Kilowatts. The Japanese have already developed 75 per cent of this potential and the main sphere of expansion has been in the thermal plant. In the thermal plant, increasing use of oil and greater thermal efficiency in the use of coal, has given the most rapid increase in the generation of electricity. In 1955, 70 per cent of the country's electric power was derived from hydro-electric generation but by 1960, the generation of
electric power from thermal plant had equalled this and now easily exceeds it. In 1961 Japan had 2,058 power plants, of which 1,539 were hydro-electric and 519 were thermal, with a combined generation capacity of 25,954,000 kw.

The smaller thermal power stations are often used as a standby or auxiliary plants for the hydro-electric system, but the really large plants are in areas where the demand is greatest and where hydro-electric stations are unable to meet the demand for power. Northern Kyushu and the Kinki region, which includes Osaka and Kobe, are major centres for thermal electric power generation and so too are Kanto (Tokyo) and Nobi (Nagoya). The greatest building programmes of thermal power stations have been in Kanto and Nobi in the last decade.

Atomic Energy Development

Development in the sphere of Atomic Energy in Japan has not been overly ambitious. This is rather surprising in a country which lacks home based sources of power and which posses an industrial potential exceeded only by the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. This may be explained in two ways: the first is the really traumatic effect which nuclear power, even in its peaceful guise, has had on Japanese life and the second, has been the availability of relatively cheap supplies of oil on the world market. This is not to say Japan has truly neglected the development of nuclear power for her present day developments are almost comparable with the major advanced powers of Europe but rather that the development has not been as sensational as has her development in other spheres of her economy.

Her atomic energy development programme began in December 1955, when the National Diet passed legislation laying the basis for research and development. An Atomic Energy Commission was established as the supreme organ to undertake the overall planning
and the execution of these plans was to be undertaken by the Atomic Energy Bureau. No country has been able to leave development of atomic energy to the private sector of industry as the task is altogether too big and perhaps too vital a part of national interest. Japan has achieved a familiar balance of government and private industrial development which has worked effectively in, for instance, her steel industry.

In June, 1956 the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute was set up with a 495 million Yen fund, as a centre for development and research and half of this capital was provided by the government. The main centre is at Takai, some 100 miles North east of Tokyo. She now has two reactors working there and in addition, at least four of her major universities have installed research reactors. Japan gave a great deal of thought to the type of reactor she would use for her first reactor for practical use and she decided to instal an improved Calder Hall type from Great Britain, and this is now in use. In March, 1963 it was estimated that Japan had 5,000 well trained nuclear engineers, a figure which the Public Information and Cultural Officers Bureau admitted was too low. (7) Japan has imported uranium from both Canada and the United States but recently, a small deposit of uranium was discovered in Western Honshu, The exploitation of the ore is in the hands of the Atomic Fuel Corporation, a state sponsored agency.

Japan, as the leading shipbuilding nation, has made considerable progress in the development of atomic powered vessels but it should be remembered that both the United States and the Soviet Union have already sailed these ships for some years. Her first atomic powered ship, built at a cost of 6,000 million yen is due to be launched in 1966 and will make its maiden voyage in 1969. The ship will be of 6,300 tons gross
and will have a cruising speed of 17 knots. The entire cost of the project has been undertaken by the Government and the private sector of industry has not been directly involved in it.

The overall picture of nuclear development in Japan is not a sensational one. Her present plans are to build atomic power stations capable of generating 100,000 kw. by the end of 1970 and between 7 million and 9½ million kw. by 1980. The plans are almost comparable with those of Western Germany and Britain but they would undoubtedly be radically revised if atomic power became a good deal more economical because of subsequent technical developments and any threat to her oil supplies would obviously accelerate the expansion of the production of nuclear power.

**SUMMARY**

Japan is unlikely to experience any major development of her hydro-electric resources. Hydro-electric power supplies roughly one quarter of all power consumed in Japan today but this proportion is likely to fall in the future (see table 1). The declining relative importance of water power for generating electricity and the growing importance of oil has meant that over one third of the total energy consumed in Japan has been derived from imported fuel, and it is likely to increase to something like two fifths by 1970. Perhaps in the distant future, atomic energy may become a serious economic proposition but it is inevitable that oil will be the main pillar of support of her industry for the next decade.
### TABLE I

**SOURCES OF ENERGY AS PROPORTION OF TOTAL SUPPLY**  
*(in percentages)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>1959</th>
<th>1970 estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Water Power</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>28.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>49.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Gas, Lignite etc.</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** This table ignores the output of atomic energy

**Source:** Fuji Bank B., June 1961, P. 21  
*Quoted by G.C. Allen*  
*Japan's Economic Expansion*  
P. 172.  
*O.U.P. 1965.*

### TABLE 2

**CONSUMPTION OF ENERGY BY SOURCE IN JAPAN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Coal and Lignite</th>
<th>Electricity</th>
<th>Petroleum and Nat. Gas</th>
<th>Fuel wood and Charcoal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>79,127</td>
<td>49,386</td>
<td>14,237</td>
<td>9,015</td>
<td>6,489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>83,061</td>
<td>43,435</td>
<td>23,851</td>
<td>9,471</td>
<td>6,304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>133,912</td>
<td>51,359</td>
<td>37,025</td>
<td>40,238</td>
<td>5,290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>213,083</td>
<td>61,977</td>
<td>41,498</td>
<td>104,906</td>
<td>4,702</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Ministry of International Trade and Industry.  
*Statistical Survey of Economy of Japan*  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1964.
(1) Statistical Survey of the Economy of Japan. 1964
   p.29 Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

(2) The Guardian. Thursday, May 27th 1965

(3) The Pattern of Asia.
   ed. Ginsburg P.70 Constable & Co. 1958

(4) Consider Japan.
   Economist Research Unit. P.80 Duckworth 1964

(5) The Pattern of Asia.
   Ginsburg P.82

(6) The Japan of Today.
   Public Information and Cultural Affairs Bureau
   P.39 Min. of Foreign Affairs. 1963

(7) Facts about Japan.
   Public Information and Cultural Affairs Bureau.
   No. 15-C3. Min. of Foreign Affairs. (March 1963)
COAL AND OIL FIELDS OF JAPAN

SOURCE: University of Wisconsin Catographic Laboratory.
Per Capita Consumption of Energy in Japan
1951-62.

(Tons coal Equivalent.)

Consumption of Energy by Source
in Japan, 1963

Wood and Charcoal

Oil and Natural Gas

Electricity

Coal and Lignite

Source: Statistical Survey of Japan 1964
The study of a nation's system of education is a profitable one for any student of political geography. A detailed study of the system can not only give some indication whether or not that country can play a part in modern technological expansion but can also be a good guide to its political health.

Even a brief study of the development of education in Japan shows a pattern that fits in with her fortunes. We see a system which admirably served the purpose of achieving widespread literacy but which failed to develop into anything more than a reasonably efficient mirror to official ideology. There is no cause for us in the West to assume a patronising understanding of this course, for we have seen in Germany how well established freedoms in education can be utterly destroyed by an authoritarian government. Japan needed strong central control over her education system if she was to develop quickly into a strong industrial nation, but this system became the tool of authoritarianism. This problem is not a new one. China has had to create a rigid, national programme for the development of her schools. The release from degrading poverty must be the first step, but then we have the problem of how can freedom emerge from a long conditioned authoritarianism? Japan is particularly interesting because she has had a long period of centralised control, broken by the upheaval of war and then twenty post-war years' effort at achieving a democratic society.

A modern system of public education was established in Japan by the Government Order of Education in 1872. Under this system, education was organised into three progressive stages - primary, middle school and university - and by 1886...
three or four years of elementary education had been made compulsory. This system was clearly based upon those of the West but as Michael and Taylor point out, 'the dominant pattern of Japanese life was the official orthodoxy created by the Meiji Restoration and the government took great pains to discourage ideas which might present people with alternatives to this official ideology'.

The Imperial Rescript on Education of October, 1890 was designed to make education a servant of the State and to prevent ideological invasion from the West. The Rescript laid down that moral education was the real aim of education and that the inculcation of 'national virtues' was the first responsibility of the educational system. The definition of what is a moral education presents problems: educationists in Britain have glowingly praised administrators in the nineties of the last century who stressed 'character building' as being the real aim of education in this country and perhaps this was not so very different from 'moral education' in Japan but the 'inculcation of national virtues' meant virtues of obedience and discipline which were much stronger meat than was given to the British. It is interesting to note, too, that the Japanese Ministry of Education was so worried about discipline and irreverence to authority that in 1958, it re-introduced 'ethical teaching' into schools. However, this has not become a method of political indoctrination as in pre-war days but it is an aspect of school life that will require careful observation. In pre-war years great emphasis was laid upon the teaching of loyalty and filial piety to Japanese youth. The curriculum was rigidly enforced and text books were prepared under supervision of the Ministry of Education. The training of teachers was completely dominated by the Ministry and here also, the virtues of obedience and discipline were stressed.
John Embree, the American sociologist who lived in a Japanese village for a number of years before the Second World War, gives us an interesting description of a village school which must have been typical of rural Japan. (2) The village school was paid for partly by village taxes and partly by prefectural and central government funds. The schoolmaster was appointed by the Prefectural Education Bureau, and although the main part of his salary came from village taxes, the villagers had no control over his appointment. Embree writes: "The schoolmaster of the Primary school sets as his aims the Rules for Primary Education of the Department of Education in Tokyo, the schoolmaster of the Middle School sets as his aim the rules of Middle School Education of the Department, and so also for the agricultural school, girls' high school and so on.... The schoolmasters vary from the sacred word of the Department only on the side of greater nationalism". The education he describes is rigidly utilitarian, interspersed with special days - such as the Emperor Meiji's Death Day, 'when there is a general assembly with a solemn reading of the Imperial Rescript on Education while all present bow their heads, followed by an uplifting lecture by the schoolmaster and by singing of the National Anthem'. The school was clearly a great unifying force in the community. Parents' days when parents could visit the school when it was working were common and even military parades of the 'reservists' were held in the school playground. It is hardly surprising that the bulk of the Japanese soldiery, who were largely recruited from the countryside showed such stubborn loyalty to the Emperor in the last war.

The child was obliged to bow towards a niche in the main auditorium which housed the Emperor's portrait when he entered the school grounds and his classroom was festooned with maps and charts showing how small Japan was, compared
with the surrounding nations of Asia, and how eminently reasonable it was for her to expand. However, I suppose on these grounds we should not be too critical for we had our share of 'Mercator' maps with the British Empire splashed in red across the globe.

A superficial comparison of the development of the educational systems of Japan and Britain would show Britain's to be one of steady growth of centralisation whereas this process, more strongly marked in Japan, was abruptly altered by the post-war political changes. The tremendous process of devolution in educational matters, inspired by American educationalists, went too far in the eyes of many Japanese. One of the interesting features of the Japanese educational scene in the last few years has been the attempts at re-assertion of ministerial control, with the inevitable opposition to this process from the Left Wing parties, much of this opposition centering on the Japanese Teachers' Union, Nikkyoso, and the equally extreme Students' Union, Zengakuren.

The political geographer is concerned with two main points in a study of Japanese education: the first is the degree to which a system of education has been developed which is truly democratic and the second, is the level of efficiency which has been reached in the whole system, with the ultimate emphasis on the Universities and schools of technology, which will assist the industrial advance of Japan. Our main problem therefore is mainly with post-war Japan, but before we pass on to this, it is worth quoting 'John Maki's summary of Japanese education before the war: "The Education Ministry played a major role in the growth of authoritarianism. It created the national, government-controlled system of universal education, which led to mass literacy but was also used as a powerful and effective instrument of mass indoctrination. Reverence toward
the Emperor, the supremacy of the state, the subordination of the individual to the requirements not only of the state but of the family, the glorification of military tradition, chauvinism and the acceptance of aggression were some of the themes of the singularly successful indoctrination programme carried out through the schools". (3)

The basic principles of the 'new education' are found in both the Constitution and the Fundamental Law of Education, 1947. The Constitution (Article 26) states: "All people shall have the right to receive an equal education correspondent to their ability, as provided by law. The people shall be obliged to have all boys and girls under their protection receive ordinary education as provided for by law. Such compulsory education shall be free". The Fundamental Law of Education sets forth in more detail the aims and principles of education in accordance with the spirit of the Constitution. The preamble of the Fundamental Law states: "We shall esteem individual dignity and endeavour to bring up people who love truth and peace, while education which aims at the creation of universal yet highly individualistic culture shall be spread far and wide". A basic principle enunciated in the Law is equality in educational opportunity for all, in keeping with their abilities. The Law prohibits discrimination based on race, creed, sex, social status, economic position or family background. The Law also emphasises the importance of political knowledge and of religious toleration in the development of sound citizens but it specifically prohibits any link between political parties or religions and education. It would be naive to suggest that claims of fundamental freedoms embodied in Constitutions and Laws always lead to freedoms for the citizens of those states - some of the most savage autocracies have had academically inspiring written constitutions, but
nevertheless many of these basic ideas in the Japanese Constitution and the Law of Education have been achieved.

The bare bones of the Japanese system of public education are as follows: Primary education begins at the age of six and continues for six years to be followed by three years of secondary education. The High School course, which is not compulsory, lasts for three years and most university first degree courses last for four years. The 1961 figures of the Ministry of Education show that 63.8 per cent of the boys and 60.7 per cent of the girls who left secondary schools continued with further education. (4) This figure seems incredibly high but may be explained by the fact that High School education in Japan consists both of full-time and part time education. Part-time education at the secondary level was a feature of pre-war Japan and seems to work effectively with both general and vocational education. In comparing the Japanese and British systems, the Japanese success in developing part-time education marks out the failure of the British to develop their Young People's Colleges which were authorised by the 1944 Education Act. The British might well emulate the Japanese Ministry of Education in developing correspondence courses.

Higher Education

Japanese higher education has played a vital role in the development of an efficient bureaucracy and in the training of capable technologists. Junior Colleges and Technical Colleges offering courses lasting two or three years have had an important part to play in this, whilst the Universities, freed from the pre-war political pressures, have effectively educated an elite. Japanese Universities have not been characterized by the massive enrolment which exists in America,
presumably because of limitations imposed by her economy, and in consequence, there has been fierce competition for University places. The examination system is considered by many educationalists to be the greatest single problem throughout the entire education system of Japan. A good performance in an examination determines whether or not a Japanese will pass on to a good secondary High School or University. For years it has been charged that this system undermines the health of the student, produces too much strain on both him and his family, stresses mere memory work, creates too intense competition not only in the classroom but among schools, and places an undue premium on entry into the 'right' schools. This academic competition is in essence West European and, in spite of its imperfections, has trained a corps of specialists which are necessary in such a complex society as Japan's. Many American educationalists are not so vociferous in their condemnation of this system as they were before Russia's technological greatness was epitomised in its 'Sputnik' achievement! No doubt they are concerned about the lack of academic rigour in many of the U.S. High Schools and State Universities and although they would eschew the ludicrous excesses of competition which appear in Japan, nevertheless would like to see more competition in their own system.

Statistical evidence of the Japanese public system of education is impressive, (1962 figures are given at the end of this chapter) but what is important is that the bulk of the children in these figures have received their education in a liberal, re-organized educational system. The problem in the occupation period was not to introduce universal education, because this already existed, but to re-organize it and to change its content. Much of this change was effected by Japanese who, demoralized by the war, had to conform to the demands of S.C.A.P.
but who later saw the essential virtues of the new system. Text books in schools had to be re-written and all references to the unique quality of Japan and 'its mission' and to subservience to authority were removed. The main thesis here is that - in spite of its many mistakes - the work of S.C.A.P. in education was highly successful. The success can only be measured by the way the Japanese themselves not only accepted, but participated in building a democratic system of education.

One can see a certain rigidity in the thinking of some of these advisers in that they perceived the introduction of a system, basically American, with elected local School Boards, etc., would solve the problem even when they were working on a highly complex society with vastly different traditions from their own. Some of these measures have been subsequently changed by the Japanese; School Boards are now appointed by Prefectoral Administrators (1958) and ethical teaching was also re-introduced in schools in the same year. When we attempt to decide whether or not these new measures are mainly because of right wing pressures or are due to the fact that they were uncongenial to Japanese society, we enter a very complex and confused problem. Since the end of the occupation, many Japanese political leaders and government officials have been attempting to revert to a system more like the old one. They have been concerned in attempts to have a more chauvinistic line taken in text books and to curb the indiscipline of many Japanese teachers. The leaders of this movement claim that their goal is to re-introduce true Japanese culture, condemning - by inference - American influence in education, and many of them are worried by new social freedoms, especially in the sphere of the family. It is difficult to assess the impact of the new educational system on the young people of Japan:
the Student's Union, Zengakuren, has strong left wing tendencies and its active communist element is extremely vociferous, but as has been previously stated in this paper, their youth precludes any first hand knowledge of the previous regime. Professor Kawashima Tokeyoshi of Tokyo University summed up the position when he said - "We are all extremely sensitive to this problem of constitutional revision, because we lived under the old system and we know what it is not to have the freedoms that we now enjoy under the new constitution. But all young people have really known nothing but freedom. They accept it merely as a matter of course, and how can you expect them to get excited about it". (5) However, the fact remains that the majority of Japanese students are politically conscious and the writer sees this not as a matter for despair, as some American writers have done, but for hope - notwithstanding the extreme left wing tendencies of the students. A United States point of view is expressed by J. Cary in Japan Today, who rather tartly suggests at the end of a chapter in his book which he devotes to Zengakuren, that Government, parents and public would be well and advised to regard the leaders of Zengakuren as the "unruly, foolish children they are". (6) The bitterness of some American writers results from the active opposition of the student body to the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty, which led to the famous cancellation of President Eisenhowers' visit to Japan. Japan suffered greatly in the last war and her really profound abhorrence of nuclear weapons is often under-estimated in the West. There is a good deal of feeling amongst Japanese students, who attribute the good relations which the U.S.A. requires with Japan purely to the U.S.A.'s need for an effective 'aircraft carrier' in the Far East. Apart from political problems, the living conditions of the Japanese students - which are,
however, improving yearly - are uniformly poor. A high percentage have to work to support their families and their living conditions are inadequate. They are subject to a fiercely competitive examination system where failure will mean that they will probably be relegated to poor, wage earning jobs for the rest of their lives. It is hardly surprising that the Japanese students are radical under these conditions. The desperate involvement of Japanese students in Japanese politics is a fair guide to the robust health of the political system. Japan's student movement dates mainly from the first World War when Western liberal thought began to permeate the country but it has always had a characteristic radical quality which led to its suppression by the militarists in the 1930's. Its disturbing features today are its violence and the influence of Communism in the movement, but these will not be cured by repressive measures, and greatly improved living standards, plus the quandary that many Japanese found themselves now in as a result of the rift between Russia and China, have done much to quieten the extreme left wing element of Zengakuren. The acquisition of the Atom bomb by China has also tended to lessen agitation against the Security Pact with the U.S.A.

The same left wing criticisms which have been levelled at the students have also been made against the teachers in the schools and Universities. The teachers' Union, Nikkoyoso, is numerically strong - it has 6,000,000 members - and has shown great vigour in post-war Japan. In pre-war Japan, the teacher was basically an agent for government propaganda but this role has been radically changed after the war. The spread of communist and 'fellow traveller' influence in the teachers' union has caused Japanese governments a great deal of concern. Undoubtedly there have been many cases of political
advantage taken by teachers, who are in a peculiarly influential position in the community—but some of the attacks on the teachers by the right wing are simply an effort to re-assert centralised control. In 1954 a law was passed which prohibited teachers from taking part in political activities but this has not been entirely successful because many Japanese assume this is an effort by the right wing to gag progressive elements. The resentment felt over the proscription of political activity on the part of the teacher was nothing compared with that which was caused by a Government attempt to establish efficiency ratings for teachers. The teacher's union maintained that this was a barely disguised method of penalising the 'politically awkward' teachers by passing them over in promotion. So great was the furore that this caused, that the government was compelled to withdraw the measure.

Many writers about post-war Japanese education are most concerned about the communist influence among teachers and students. Americans sometimes see the massive teachers' and students' unions as the spearhead of the attack on the vital treaty between Japan and the U.S. and are pessimistic about so-called subversion of most forms of public education in Japan. Other European writers who are—rightly or wrongly—not so perturbed about communist influence, see the dynamic role of the teachers and students as a valuable counterbalance to the old autocratic tendencies in Japan. At all events, the situation today is infinitely more hopeful than it was in pre-war days, for although political activities by teachers, when they become methods of unfair influence over the immature, are wholly wrong, an indifferent approach to political life by teachers is dangerous. When so much of educational policy is determined by central government it is nonsense to suggest that teachers should become political eunuchs.
The next problem we have to examine is the degree to which Japan is succeeding in her higher education to further her expansion in commerce and industry. In common with most powerful countries, Japan is short of scientists and technicians. Her government estimates that in order to maintain the present growth of the economy she will require an additional number of 170,000 engineers and 440,000 technicians in 1970. A plan drafted by the Ministry of Education in 1960 called for a 16,000 increase in the number of students in engineering departments in the Universities and for an increase in 85,000 students in the technical high schools. This target has already been reached. The highly competitive system in Japanese education ensures that a trained elite is coming from the universities but her government has been equally aware of the need for training her skilled workers to as high a level as possible. To these ends the Ministry of Education Revised Curricula for High Schools in 1963, placed more emphasis on professional and technical training and more technical high schools were established. In the confused social pattern, women are emerging with rare new freedoms: they have invaded higher education and although the percentage of women in the Universities and Colleges is still well below that of men, it is certainly a most significant incursion.

The White Paper on Education (1963) shows that 70% of the children who have completed their compulsory education at the age of 14 continue their education in High Schools and nearly 16% of the High School graduates continue their education at Higher institutes of learning such as Universities, Junior Colleges and professional schools (semmon gakko). These figures are surprisingly high and the latter figure of 16%, compares very favourably with a figure of 8.4% for Britain. There is, however, a disturbing disparity between the percentage
of children who continue their education in Senior High Schools between urban and rural areas - for example, the figure 47.8% in Miyazaki Prefecture in Southern Kyushu is considerably below the figure of 84.3% in Tokyo. This overall patchiness in the success of achieving and developing satisfactory 'further education' is not peculiar to Japan and we in Britain have significant regional differences in the numbers of children who are continuing their education beyond the legal minimum school leaving age.

The large firms have developed their own training schemes and provide adequate day release for their young workers. These schemes are in the true tradition of paternalism, which has always existed in Japanese industry. A fair measure of the success of the Japanese shipbuilding industry is due to this training of labour in centres owned and run by the firms concerned. The enormous economic strength of the shipbuilding combines has enabled Japan to do far more in this respect than the British shipbuilders have done, who have not the resources of the former.

In spite of the tragic confusion of politics with education in Japan which has been the biggest problem, there has been tremendous progress in all aspects of Japanese Education. The Economist correspondents who visited Japan in 1962 were greatly impressed by what they saw of Japanese education but they were worried by the bellicosity of students and teachers. They wrote: "Several bold and far-seeing education ministers have combined Japanese energy with the Japanese talent for skilful adaptation. In a recent survey of Japanese education over the past five years, the claim was made that recommendations contained in the Crowther Report in Britain and Dr. James Conant's report on U.S. high schools had been incorporated, along with Russian and French practices, in Japanese education policy. As part of the overhaul of
the educational system, a cabinet economic council is drafting long-range training plans for engineers and technicians. The government's plan for again doubling the national income within ten years will demand constant technological progress and a mounting supply of technicians. Increased enrolments will be encouraged in science and technological faculties at universities. More scholarships will be offered and training centres have already been established for technological instruction in nine famous universities."

When one makes the comparison with some of the problems that have faced the British in the post-war era and attempts at their solution some highly significant factors emerge. The cataclysm of the war shocked the Japanese into revolutionary and dynamic thinking far more than the British. The Japanese were quicker to realise the full significance of the needs for technologists in quality and quantity in an expanding economy. They were far quicker than the British to adopt ideas from other nations, which may have been due to a long tradition of incorporation of foreign ideas and techniques. British complacency and tradition have been in many ways a strait-jacket to much of our thinking in education. On the other hand, one has the feeling that some of the almost frenzied efforts to achieve technological expansion in Japan may not give the stability in some of the more basic, ethical values in society which the British are less likely to lose in their steadier, more traditional approach. This can only be opinion and it will take many years to judge its validity.
## SCHOOLS AND UNIVERSITIES 1962

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kind</th>
<th>Schools</th>
<th>Teachers (1,000)</th>
<th>Students (1,000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary</td>
<td>26,615</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>26,379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schools</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior High</td>
<td>12,647</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>11,951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Schools</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior High</td>
<td>4,637</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3,534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Schools</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior Colleges</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colleges &amp;</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: 'Public' has the U.S. interpretation of State Schools.

Elementary Education is for 6 - 12 years
Junior High School is from 12 - 15 years
Senior High School is from 15 - 18 years

Most University Courses are for four years.
   Michael and Taylor  
   P.472  Methuen 1956

(2) A Japanese Village. Suye Mura  
   John Embree  
   Kegan Paul 1946

(3) Government and Politics in Japan.  
   J. Maki  
   P.20  Thames and Hudson 1962

(4) Education in Japan.  
   Public Information and Cultural Affairs Bureau. March, 1963  
   Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan

(5) Government and Politics in Japan.  
   J. Maki.  
   P.122

(6) Japan Today.  
   J. Cary.  
   P.108  Pall Mall Press 1963

(7) Consider Japan.  
   P.99  Duckworth 1963
POPULATION DENSITY BY PREFECTURE

Per Sq. Km.

- 2,000 + (Tokyo and Osaka)
- 1,000 - 1,999
- 500 - 999
- 300 - 499
- 200 - 299
- 100 - 199
- 99 -

In any study of Japan the unsolved problem of population pressure is of paramount concern to the political geographer. In his paper 'The Prospect for Japan' Professor Fisher gave the major part of his attention to demographic problems and his conclusions were pessimistic. (1) Perhaps there are greater grounds for optimism in the sixties in view of Japan's sharply declining birth rate (17.1 per thousand in 1963 as opposed to 34.3 per thousand in 1947) (2) and in the increasing demand for labour by her industry which possesses the highest growth rate in the world.

But the basic facts of Japan's geography speak for themselves: with a population density of 253 people to the square kilometre (1960 Census) in a land of which no more than 16 per cent of its total area is suitable for habitation or cultivation, which chronically lacks raw materials, and occupying a position near the Asian land mass which is dominated by two hostile 'super' powers, the prospect does look bleak. Moreover, the decreasing birth rate does not mean by any means that the total population of Japan is not increasing at a fairly rapid rate - her population increased from 89.3 million (1955 Census) to 93.4 million (1960 figures) - and shows a growth rate increase of 1.1 per cent.

Geographers writing in the immediate post-war period were concerned about the loss of territories outside the main islands of Japan, which had been so vital to her economy, and with the complete dislocation of both her industry and of international trade as a result of the war.

The population problem of Japan is a complicated one and it is proposed to deal with it under the following headings: (a) Population Statistics, (b) Density and distribution, (c) Emigration (d) Summary.
(a) Population Statistics

The population of Japan before the Meiji Restoration has been estimated to have been about thirty millions and to have been fairly static at this figure for many years prior to the Restoration. We have no really accurate figures before 1920 when a proper census started but the following figures show a remarkable annual increase of one million over a period of twenty years: 1920 - 55.96 m., 1930 - 64.45 m., and 1940 - 73.11 millions. During this period of twenty years, the crude birth rate was between 30 and 36 per thousand population but there was a definite decline in birth rate in the thirties.

The general pattern of decline has continued in post war years but as the following figures show, the year or two immediately after the war was a period of high birth rate when the servicemen were demobilised and returned home.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Crude Birth Rate</th>
<th>Death Rate(per 1,000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The decline in death rate was due to improved medical services and sanitation. Japan's death rate is more in line with a western country than with a typical Asiatic country. A distinguishing feature about the Japanese population is its relative youthfulness compared with that of Britain. Japan, like Britain had a 'baby boom' after the war and this could have presented a real problem had not Japan been undergoing a period of rapid industrial expansion in the sixties. It has been estimated that as a result of
this increased post war birth rate, 1.6 million boys and girls required work or entry into higher education in the years 1961-1964. The following table illustrates the essentially youthful nature of the Japanese Population.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Under 14</th>
<th>15-59</th>
<th>60 and over</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>25,309 (36.8)</td>
<td>38,254 (55.8)</td>
<td>5,100 (7.4)</td>
<td>68,662</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>28,024 (29.2)</td>
<td>57,582 (61.3)</td>
<td>8,290 (8.8)</td>
<td>93,900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This means, in effect, that Japan will not feel the full effects of declining fertility for many years. There has been more widespread use of contraception in Japan and this, with the emancipation of women, which is more effective in the towns than the country, has helped to reduce birth rate. The extremely high post-war birth rate led to the passing of the Eugenics Protection Law in September, 1948 which legalized abortion. All these factors are important in bringing about a decline in the birth rate but it would be a dangerous thing to assume a further decline.

Professor Fisher mentions the estimates of Shimojo and other Japanese demographers which suggested that the statistics showed that Japan was repeating the pattern of West Europe, with a time lag of between thirty and fifty years. Shimojo discerned the decline of birth rate, mainly as a result of later marriage in the towns, and he estimated that the Japanese population would reach a maximum of 85,542,100 by 1970. (4) This is clearly an underestimate as it seems most likely that the population will reach the 100 million mark in the next two or three years. However, Shimojo's main point about there being a decline in birth rate over the next thirty years was
substantially true—with the odd exception, such as the immediate post-war period. But the general belief that there would be a continuation of the low birth rate which obtained in the thirties in most of Western Europe and, to a lesser extent the U.S.A., is not accurate. The assumption was that the material conditions of life would improve slowly and that parents would limit their families in order both to preserve a high standard of living and provide a good education for their children. It would appear, therefore, that partly because of the major breakthrough in achieving high industrial and agricultural productivity, which has characterised the Western World since the war—and Japan since the Korean war—and then the imponderables, such as the general desire to have larger families, the pattern of declining birth rates is not a feature of Western Europe today. Indeed, the American rate of increase in total population 1.7 per cent compares with a rate of increase of 1.1 per cent in Japan and although this is well below the figures of most of the populous lands of South East Asia, the figure is a high one. (5) The increasing prosperity of Japan could well be a factor in causing the increase in birth rate and this prosperity may well lead to an attitude of government, which can be important in demographic matters, where the increase in population is regarded with tolerance or even encouraged. The forecasting of trends in population is notoriously difficult and there are no grounds for assuming that Japan's birth rate will fall.

Density and Distribution

In 1963 Japan had a population density of 280 per square kilometre. This is a density of population which is roughly equal to Britain's but it is all the more remarkable because so much of Japan consists of uninhabitable terrain. When we
examine the density of population on the alluvial lowlands we find a fantastically high figure - 581 per square kilometre. This figure includes alluvial lands over the whole of Japan and would certainly exceed this figure if we restricted the area to the Southern half of Japan, south of latitude 37°N. Trewatha estimated that the population of these lands would reach the figure of 1,200 per square kilometre. (6)

Agriculture remains Japan's most important single industry and employs 37% of the working population compared with about 42% before the war. The ratio of farming population to land under cultivation is 324 to the square kilometre, which is the highest in the world. The following table shows the population based on landforms.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Area 1,000 sq. km.</th>
<th>Population 1 million</th>
<th>Density per sq. km.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alluvial lands</td>
<td>46.4(13%)</td>
<td>26.9(45%)</td>
<td>581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uplands</td>
<td>40.4(11%)</td>
<td>11.7(20%)</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hill land</td>
<td>41.6(11%)</td>
<td>7.4(12%)</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piedmont Area</td>
<td>13.0(4%)</td>
<td>1.4(2%)</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountain</td>
<td>20.3(55%)</td>
<td>12.3(20%)</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volcano</td>
<td>23.7(6%)</td>
<td>8(1%)</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(7)

The increase in urban population has been remarkable in recent years. "Dwellers in towns with more than 10,000 inhabitants, in 1920, numbered 18 millions; in 1940, more than 36 millions." This figure would be nearer 45 millions today and the continued prosperity of industry in Japan means that there is still a marked tendency for population to move to the towns, from the over-populated countryside. The population has increased in twenty prefectures, particularly in a belt centred in the 35th parallel; but there has been a drop
in the population of the other prefectures because of this constant migration to urban areas. This move to the towns has been encouraged by the government, since the Land Reform Law of 1946, to combat rural poverty.

Not only are there great differences in the densities of population based largely on topography but so too are there great differences between the islands. **Hokkaido**, which now has a population in the region of 4½ millions, was not adequately settled until this century. Her total population was only about 60,000 in 1868. The colder climate inhibited settlement, particularly in a land where settlers traditionally preferred to grow rice, although varieties of rice can now be grown successfully in Hokkaido. The population of Hokkaido averages 61 to the square kilometre which is easily the lowest of all the islands.

With the loss of overseas possessions Hokkaido became a vital part of the national plan to develop resources and there has been marked urbanisation. Sapporo, the capital, now has a population of half a million and Hakodate now has 300,000 people. **Shikoku** is much more densely populated than Hokkaido but it is essentially a rural population on the island. The total population is 4.2 million. No large cities have developed in Northern Shikoku although there are six towns with populations of between 25,000 and 100,000 and these are mainly ports and local business centres. There are no shipyards of any consequence on the island but the smaller harbours, particularly in the south coast of the island are engaged mainly in fishing. Both Tokushima (140,000) and Matsuyama(135,000) are ports concerned with domestic trade, although the former which is an ancient castle town, has needed an outport at Komatushima because of the shallowness of the river. **Kyushu** has a population of 13 millions. The island
is geologically and morphologically very complex and consequently the human geography is equally complex. Apart from having a high rural population there is a great concentration of population centred on the towns of Yawata, Tobata and Kokura, all of which are associated with the iron and steel industry. The town of Nagasaki is the centre of the next most important industrial complex. Nagasaki has been completely rebuilt since it was shattered in the atom bomb attack in the last war, and although the pre-war years were a period of decline for it as a port, it has since recovered quite dramatically. The Mitsubishi combine has an important shipyard there. Fukuoka (544,000), originating around a feudal castle is an important industrial centre and port. Honshu is the real heart of Japan. The island possesses sparsely populated mountain areas and at the other extreme, the greatest connubiations in Japan. Many of these towns are situated on coastal plains and have been old nuclei, based on feudal castles, markets or shrines but exceptions to this are the ports of Kobe and Yokohama, which are comparatively recent in origin. On the shores of the Inland Sea, the Settsu plain has fourteen cities including (Kyoto (1½ millions), Kobe (1 million) and Osaka 3½ million. The lowland behind Ise Bay has thirteen cities including Nagoya (1.4 million). The Kwanto plain has no fewer than twenty eight cities, including Tokyo (9.7 million), Yokohama (1.1 million) and Kawasaki 390,000.

Migration to cities

The rapid growth of the major urban areas, which was a feature of the thirties - apart from an abnormal break towards the end of the war and immediately after it - has continued and is likely to continue. The continued expansion of industry and the limited opportunities which exist on the
land have assisted this movement. There has been a steady decrease in rural population since the war and yet total production of agricultural produce has increased in spite of the loss of farm workers. The social freedoms of the towns and higher wages there have helped to draw workers from the countryside.

**Emigration**

The Japanese Government openly advocated emigration as a means of easing the population problem in the period between the wars. There were two main motives in this: the first was simply to reduce the number of people living on the slender resources of Japan, and the second was to further Japan's imperialist aims. Most Japanese governments preferred to support emigration to lands which were either directly or indirectly under Japanese control. Quite clearly in the case of Manchukuo, the aim was to develop a secure base on the mainland of Asia with a strong Japanese element in its industrial and agricultural development. From the purely strategic point of view this was a correct one. Since the war, we in Britain have seen in so many cases, (Aden, Cyprus etc.) that an alien population can make a military base virtually useless. The strength of post-war nationalist movements cannot have forecast by many, but these have proved to be so potent that they have been responsible for the dismemberment of most of the pre-war Colonial empires. Japan - apart from many of the islands obtained from Germany after the First World War - was attempting to control large indigenous populations in Korea, Formosa and Manchuria. Neither Korea nor Formosa with their high populations was favourable to Japanese agricultural settlement. Manchuria obviously was, but the Japanese showed a marked disinclination
to settle in lands which experienced intense winter cold. In general, the Japanese have not been an 'internationally mobile' people. In Manchuria the bulk of the Japanese settlers lived in the towns and were concerned with industrial or commercial development.

Despite the government's encouragement to emigration the number of Japanese resident abroad in 1940 was little more than one million and large scale re-patriation after the war has reduced this figure. After 1934, Japanese emigration to foreign countries fell sharply although the government hoped to settle five million settlers in Manchuria in a twenty year period from 1937 onwards, for both economic and strategic reasons.

Among foreign countries Brazil has the highest Japanese population although Argentina and Peru have sizeable Japanese colonies. Most countries applied restrictions to immigrants from Japan and this gave a great blow to Japanese dignity. The U.S. restrictions, it will be remembered, caused great bitterness in both countries. One can be sympathetic to both sides on this problem; the Japanese, vividly aware of the pressure of population saw relatively undeveloped lands which would be all the better for Japanese settlement, but many of these countries feared an unassimilable element in their populations which would owe allegiance to an imperialist Japan. This was quite clearly the fear of both New Zealand and Australia.

In September, 1960 there were 680,000 foreigners registered in Japan and of these nearly 590,000 were Korean. Many of these Koreans came to Japan during the war when the conditions of work and pay were attractive to them and now they present quite a sizeable minority problem. A difficulty from the Japanese point of view is the cleavage of political opinion between the
Koreans, in view of the division of their country, but this was alleviated somewhat by the Repatriation Agreement with North Korea, by which 50,000 North Koreans were repatriated in 1959.

Summary

When he examined the demographic problem of Japan in 1940, Trewatha (8) suggested that there were five possible solutions which might ease the problem. The first two he called negative solutions and they were: (a) reduction of birth rate and an increase in death rate; and (b) emigration. The remaining three were positive solutions which were: (a) an increase in agricultural efficiency and attempted land reclamation schemes, (b) acquisition and colonisation of some empty lands in the Pacific and (c), further industrialisation.

Of the negative solutions, the birth rate has declined sharply - which has helped - but the death rate has also decreased. This decrease in death rate is to be expected and short of an application of Malthusian conditions, is likely to decrease even further.

When we turn to his positive solutions we can be more optimistic than many earlier geographers, even including those who wrote only ten years ago. (e.g. Professor Fisher in East and Moodie). The beneficial effects of land reform, allied to mechanization, improved techniques and better insecticides etc. have seen a farm population fall by 2.2 million (5.6 per cent) between 1955 and 1960 (a process which is still going on unabated) and yet obtain a total rice crop increase of 29 per cent. Today Japan is just about self sufficient in her production of rice but before the war, with a smaller total population, she had to import 25% of her needs. In short, the agricultural scene is much more reassuring than it was a
few years ago and although it is still characterised by
Asian labour intensive methods, we are now beginning to
see the development of capital intensive methods in
agriculture. The possibility of developing marginal
land is not good in Japan, apart perhaps for some parts
of Hokkaido, and in most cases the growing of new crops -
or alternatively new strains of old crops - on existing land
is the most we can expect in this sphere.

As regards Professor Trewatha's other solutions we
can easily discount emigration or the acquisition of new
territories. The lynch pin of the Japan's success has been -
and must be - in the industrial sphere. The agricultural
side of Japan's economy can only progress if there is a
comparable expansion in industry. This of course, is
precisely the position in Britain although the agricultural
element in her economy is nowhere near so important as it is
in Japan.

The extraordinary expansion of Japanese industry,
accompanied by a greatly increasing share in world trade,
is the really vital point. It could be strongly argued
that Japan is most vulnerable; international trade depends
on peace and stability and yet Japan is in one of the most
politically unstable areas of the world. Japan has had
bitter experience of the effect of tariffs and quotas imposed
upon her trade by other powers, and any concerted, protective
measures could again be serious. A further factor making
for possible instability in Japanese trade is the fact that
over thirty per cent of her exports enter U.S.A., which makes
her politically and economically dependent on that country.

In spite of the somewhat exposed position of Japan the
writer inclines to the optimistic view. Countries such as
India, Pakistan and Ceylon have great needs of the type of
low cost, high quality product of Japanese industry and these countries are not likely to discriminate against Japan any more than they are against any other country. Britain herself cannot hope to secure any preferential treatment for her own exports to these countries as she could in the past. If we were to go by previous experience, especially in the inter-war years we would be extremely worried about Japan's dependence on the state of U.S. economy. The chain reaction of the slump originating in the United States was a nightmare before the war. In view of the progress in thinking in economics, coming from the work of Lord Keynes, we may experience a recession in world trade but the paralysing slump of pre-war years is unlikely to happen. Japan would be stronger, in her own esteem if nothing else, if she were less dependent on United States trade but in her vulnerable military position, close relations with the United States make sense. Japan is not overburdened with military expenditure and her economy is better than it has ever been.

The demographic problem, therefore, is great, but assuming that she does not undergo a further population explosion, there are no grounds for being so pessimistic as earlier writers have been. However, long term forecasts of population are notoriously unreliable and the demographer usually devotes most of his attentions to changes of the recent past and of the next few years. We know too, especially in Britain, that any large scale war, fought with nuclear weapons, would cause such devastation that it makes speculation over national prospects quite fruitless in that eventuality and so Japan's rapid growth in her gross national product could well be her salvation!
(1) The Prospect for Japan. The Changing World
   Ed. W.G. East and A.E. Moodie
   World Book Co. 1956

(2) Japanese Statistical Source Book 1964

(3) Quoted in Bulletin 9 Understanding Japan
    Based on figures from the Japanese Statistical
    Year Book 1961.

(4) Prospect for Japan.
    East and Moodie. pp. 548 & 549

(5) United Nations Demographic Year Book Table 2

(6) Japan: A Physical, Cultural and Regional Geography 1950.
    P. 139 Methuen.


(8) Japan.
    Trewatha 1948, a cultural, Physical and Regional
    Geography.
POPULATION
AGE CONSTRUCTION

Note: This Pyramid stresses quite clearly the essential Youthfulness of Japan's Population.

1950 Census

1955 Census

1960 Census

Live Birth and Death Rate

Life Expectancy at Birth

Infant Mortality Rate

Source: Ministry of Health and Welfare
CRUDE BIRTH RATES 1963.

Per 1,000 Persons.

- Japan
- France
- United Kingdom
- West Germany
- Australia
- United States
- Canada
- Hong Kong
- Singapore

Source: U.N. Demographic Yearbook.

PERSONS PER SQUARE KILOMETRE

- Netherlands
- Japan
- West Germany
- United Kingdom
- India

Source: Statistical Yearbook U.N.
At the end of World War II, Japan, like Nazi Germany, was a pariah among the nations of the world. The smaller, non-communist countries of Southeast Asia had felt the oppressive weight of Japanese occupation and this left a profound suspicion of Japanese motives in the post-war world.

In her dealings with Soviet Russia, there were long memories of aggressive actions on the borders of Manchukuo by the Russian Far Eastern Armies and their culmination in the declaration of war by the U.S.S.R. on Japan towards the end of World War II - considered by most Japanese to be a stab in the back. All this militated against reasonable relations between the two nations. Japan was embittered by the loss of territories considered to be inalienable parts of the homeland, by the massive expropriation of capital plant in Manchukuo, and by the treatment of her soldiers who surrendered to Soviet Armies.

Ironically, Japan's closest ally since the late 1940's has been the United States, separated from Japan by more than 4,000 miles. This close relationship, often deeply resented by many Japanese, and to a lesser extent by the Americans, has had clear advantages for both nations. Much of the original American thinking about ways to break up Japanese heavy industry and transform her into a 'Switzerland of the Far East' was quickly revised because of the emergence of a Communist Government in China and because of the intransigence of the Soviet Government. American aid to Japan in the early post war years was vital to preserve life and it continued with sensible agrarian and social reform. The really startling economic progress which the Japanese economy made, brought about in great measure by U.S. purchases
in the Korean War in 1950, made Japan a powerful nation by the mid-fifties. Japan has not been troubled by the burden of heavy investment in her national defence, a problem that has plagued post-war Britain. Even in the early 1960's, only a little over one per cent of the gross national product went into military expenses. But the chief contribution of the United States to Japan's economic recovery has been through trade and economic co-operation. "As Japanese industry began to get on its feet again, technical know-how from the United States, embodied in hundreds of agreements on patents and affiliations between American and Japanese firms, made a huge contribution to the reviving economy. So also did an immense flow of American credit to capital-hungry Japan, in the form of corporate investments in Japanese securities. The United States has become Japan's greatest market, steadily absorbing about a quarter or more of its exports. In return the United States accounted for more of Japan's imports—roughly a third. In fact Japan has come to stand second only to Canada as an export market for the United States, and is its best market for agricultural products. Usually, United States exports to Japan exceed imports by a few hundred million dollars annually, though American military expenditures in Japan and the providing of capital tend to turn the balance of payments in Japan's favour. In this tremendous economic relationship there has constantly been a fringe of hotly contested trade problems, such as the levels at which Japan would limit its cotton textile exports to the U.S. But these problems are small compared with the overall size of the Japanese-American economic relationship. By the early 1960's trade between the two countries topped the $3 billion mark, making it by all odds the greatest transoceanic trade
the world has ever seen. In return for her generous economic assistance to Japan, America obtained a valuable base in the Far East and gained a fairly stable ally. Japan is a key to the U.S. defensive scheme in the Far East which has, as its main aim, the containing of Communist China and to a lesser extent, Russia. Without Japan, the United States would find it almost impossible to exert much influence in this part of the world as her main island bases would be far too vulnerable to attack and would lack strength in depth. Cynics could contend that the vital position of Japan in this defensive system has caused the U.S. to be generous in its treatment of Japan. Britain has fully realised that it is utterly impossible to hold a base that possesses a hostile indigenous population - after bitter experiences - and the U.S., profiting from this, has been a little more considerate to Japanese feelings.

The United States was largely responsible of getting the Peace Treaty signed in 1951 and its generous terms to Japan were largely a result of United States insistence. The very closeness of this relationship with the United States has caused many Japanese to react against it. Perhaps it was inevitable that there would be a reaction against the massive introduction of U.S. organisation and ideas after the war. Perhaps, too, Westerners can easily assume that Japan is simply a ruthless adopter of Western techniques and ideas, and they can easily underestimate the conservative xenophobia that is strong in most island peoples. In Japan the extremes of both the right and the left have argued that Japan is simply a colony of the United States, both economically and socially and the violence which broke out when the Mr Kishi's government signed the revised treaty with the U.S. Government in 1960 was a manifestation of this, Although much of the hostility was
centred on the part of the treaty which gave the United States the right to use bases in Japan, most observers agree that it was, in general, an inchoate resentment of American domination of Japan. The spearhead of this violence was the students' union, Zengakuren, which undoubtedly has strong Communist proclivities, and there is a much less significant force, the ultra-right Great Japan Patriotic Party, although it is diametrically opposed to the former. But it would be wrong to ascribe the disorders solely to extremists and to ignore a widespread resentment against the United States. What is perhaps really reassuring is to find that the extreme right had a minimal influence in the disorders when we recall how right wing elements shattered any vestiges of democracy in pre-war Japan. The question of nuclear weapons and tests has always provoked much illwill in Japan after her terrible experiences at Nagasaki and Hiroshima. There is, naturally, a genuine sentiment against atomic weapons even though this has been exploited by the Communist Party at times when the U.S. has carried out nuclear tests and particularly when the Japanese fishing vessel was contaminated by radioactive fall-out near Bikini. Esler Dening, a former British Ambassador to Tokyo, roundly condemns the Communist Governments of China and the U.S.S.R. which, working through the Japanese Communist Party, act on genuine feeling and then exploit it to undermine Japanese-American relations. He writes: "The element of spontaneity in Japanese demonstrations - if it exists - is hard to detect, though the Japanese temperament is susceptible to deliberate incitement, and in such circumstances can become both menacing and formidable." (2)

The continued military occupation of the Ryuku and Bonin groups of islands by the U.S. forces has been a sore
point with the Japanese. The United States government considers Okinawa, in particular, a valuable base which allows her aircraft to reinforce Korea and Japan. The U.S. goes to great lengths to assuage Japanese feeling but Article 3 of the Peace Treaty, which gives her the attributes of sovereignty without sovereignty itself over the islands, is particularly resented in Japan. The U.S. has done much to give local autonomy to the Okinawans and has given them a high standard of living but this has not satisfied either the Okinawans or the Japanese. The bases have a highly developed military potential and American military thinking seems to be that at least they cannot be taken away at will, as could her bases in Japan proper now that the latter is a sovereign power. The retention of these bases is a grim reminder to the Japanese that American forces can operate regardless of their sanction. But when we come to the whole problem of the Japanese-American relationship, while it is possible to sympathise with the Japanese when their amour-propre is offended by the Americans, it is difficult to see the logic of a possible break with America. China is not the weak neighbour torn by internal dissension but is a strong power, with proselytising intentions. Neutralism as a policy has proved difficult even for India, with little help from what was considered a safe Tibetan 'cordon sanitaire', and would prove to be even more difficult for Japan. Smaller nations such as Sweden and Switzerland have managed to preserve neutrality in world wide conflicts but it is difficult to see this as a feasible policy for Japan; she is potentially too powerful and too great a prize. She has thrown in her lot with the western world, and assuming reasonable attitudes towards her by her allies there are no grounds for thinking
she will deviate from this. This calls for great tact on the part of the Americans. One of the most perspicacious writers on Japan, Edwin O. Reischauer, showed how easy it is for the disparate movements in Japan to come together in a common cause of Anti-Americanism. He writes: "Every issue of political, economic, or social importance has its American aspect. Those who champion absolute neutralism, to say nothing of those who advocate a Communist alignment for Japan, find in the American military alliance and American bases the natural target of attack. Those with a dogmatic belief in primitive Marxism find the United States, as the leader of the capitalist camp, the obvious enemy. Those who disapprove of the purges or the economic, social, or educational reforms of the occupation period - and these are largely to be found among the Japanese conservatives - not unnaturally concentrate their blame on the United States. Those who look with disfavour on one or other of the great sociological changes sweeping Japan - and these include both leftists and conservatives - are all too prone to attribute whatever they consider to be the ills of the modern age to an excessive 'Americanisation' that is destroying the real Japan. These who have fears about Japan's external markets, an inflow of foreign goods, or future economic conditions, think in all cases primarily about the economic relationship with the United States. Japan's relationships with other countries, be they Communist, democratic or less developed, almost invariably involve Japan's relations with the United States, or at least so it seems to the average Japanese." (3) The extent of U.S. difficulties in her relationship with Japan are fully apparent from this.

This close relationship is, in a large measure, responsible for the poor relations between China and Japan. Under Article 26 of the Peace Treaty Japan was empowered to sign separate
treaties with nations who did not sign the original Peace Treaty and Japan inevitably concluded a treaty with the Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-Shek and ignored the Central Peoples' Government of the mainland. After this affront to Communist China's dignity and because of the close military relationship between the U.S. and Japan there is little immediate hope for an improvement of relations between the two nations. Odd overtures have been made between the Peoples' Government and the Japanese Government with a view to improving relations, but nothing less than the severance of the Japan-U.S. relationship would satisfy the mainland Chinese Government. Some Japanese prisoners of war were repatriated by the Communists but this, as was the case over Russian repatriation of prisoners to West Germany, failed to placate feeling in Japan as so many prisoners were still unaccounted for.

Even if influential businessmen in Japan talk nostalgically of old trade contacts with the Chinese mainland, they are sufficiently realistic to know that trade relations with a Communist Government could not be a substitute for the lucrative U.S. Market. Imperialist powers such as Britain and pre-war Japan had an attitude of superiority to China, purely and simply because of her lamentable weakness. Today, Japan regards China with a respect which stems from China's great military strength. The attack on the northern territories of India, confirming earlier aggressive intentions in Korea and Tibet, plus the confirmation of Communist China's possession of the Atom Bomb have all had a great impact on the Japanese. There is, however, a good deal of opinion in Japan — not solely orthodox Communist — which ascribes Chinese intransigence to the aggressive military attitude of the United States. They point
out, with some justification - in the opinion of the writer - that the fatuous recognition by the U.S. of the government in Formosa as the legitimate government of China and the aggressive sweeps of the U.S. Seventh Fleet are enough to antagonise any independent nation. Any unreflective, precipitate actions by the U.S. government towards Communist China may have very adverse effects on moderate opinion in Japan and it is well for the Americans to remember this. In the meanwhile, Japan is in the unenviable position that any conciliatory gesture to one Chinese Government is bound to incur the displeasure of the other. Both Formosa and the mainland of China are bound to be of close interest to Japan, both politically and economically, just as events in Europe are of vital interest to Britain.

Japan's relations with the U.S.S.R. have been strained in the post-war years but many observers contend that the rift between Communist China and the Soviet Union has brought about a general 'softening' of the Russian attitude to Japan. The Soviet Union is still vulnerable in the Far East and her main fears are not necessarily of the U.S. there but more of China, and to this extent the last thing that the Russians would want would be a rapprochement between China and Japan. The Americans dominated Japan after the Surrender, in the same way that Russia dominated Eastern Europe, and Russia was effectively excluded from any control over post-war Japan. The Soviet Government refused to sign the Peace Treaty which the U.S. and Japan negotiated and it was not until 1956 that the Russians proposed negotiations that would lead to a peace treaty. There was difficulty over the definition of sea boundaries between the Soviet territory of Sakhalin and the Kuriles and the island of Hokkaido and secondly, the Soviet Government wanted to exclude foreign warships from certain waters, a move which, in effect,
was an attack on Japan's Security Treaty with the U.S.

Under Article 2(c) of the Peace Treaty, Japan "renounces all right, title and claim to the Kurile Islands and to that portion of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty as a consequence of the Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5th, 1905" (which ended the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5). It is clear that this clause was inserted because of the Yalta agreement between the U.S.S.R., Britain and the United States, but as has been pointed out, the Kuriles were not acquired by Japan in the war with Russia but she had had her possession of these islands confirmed in the nineteenth century. Geographically Sakhalin stretches almost due north from the northern tip of Hokkaido and apart from its strategic value, it was economically of some importance because of timber, its fisheries and deposits of oil and coal. Russia also occupied the islands of Hobomai and the island of Shikotan and as these are not part of any territories lost by Japan by any agreement at Yalta or in any peace treaty, their occupation is unjustified. The rigid imposition of a twelve mile territorial limit on all the territories occupied by Russia has meant the loss of very valuable fishing rights by the inhabitants of North-eastern Hokkaido. The Soviet Union, as an additional pinprick, consistently vetoed the Japanese claim to membership of the United Nations but in 1956, Japan agreed to enter into formal diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, and as a result of this, the Russians did not oppose the application for membership on this occasion. Japanese resentment of the Soviet Union also ran high on other counts: the latter had been slow in returning Japanese prisoners of war, and many thousands never came back home, presumably victims of the conditions in Siberian prison camps. On balance, relations
between Japan and the Soviet Union are today as good as they have ever been since the end of World War II and although ideological differences between the two preclude a close association, undoubtedly Soviet problems with China have caused the Soviet Government to be a little more conciliatory to Japan than she had been formerly.

In the rest of Asia, Japan's chief difficulty in establishing friendly relations was in those territories which she had overrun in the war. Apart from sentiment engendered in the war, the main stumbling block was over reparations payments. During the years between 1952 and 1957, Japan made determined efforts to come to an equitable solution to these problems and most have now been settled. Although Japan participated in the Afro-Asian conference at Bandung in Indonesia her role has not been a dominant one in South East Asia. There were memories of the militarist role of Japan in the war to lessen her influence with other Asian nations, but this has not been a critical factor of recent years, but rather has it been because of Japan's Security Pact with the U.S.A., which puts her completely outside the neutralist camp. Many Western writers have complained that Japan should have done much more to assist the economic progress of poorer nations of south east Asia and there is some justification for this complaint. By the end of 1963 India had received aid from Britain in the region of 2,500 million rupees which was more than twice that provided by Japan.

Japan's relations with South Korea have been consistently bad in the post war era. Japan still has a large Korean population who came to Japan to work in the coalmines but when Korea obtained its independence, these Koreans automatically
lost Japanese citizenship and Japan wished to repatriate them. As many of these repatriates opted to return to North Korea this aroused the antagonism of the South Korean government. In addition to this problem the establishment of the Rhee line outside Korean territorial waters prevented the Japanese from fishing in traditional fishing grounds and this too caused bitterness. The United States was naturally embarrassed at this dispute between two Allies, especially as she had done much to train both their armed forces. There is little hope of any really cordial relationship between South Korea and Japan as the psychological background is so bad; Japanese occupation of Korea was far too long and far too harsh.

The war has completely changed relations between Japan and Britain. The decline of British influence in the Far East and the collapse of the Japanese Empire have removed the old bases for enmity. Britain is in direct competition with Japan in so many exports but there has not been the bitterness that marked this rivalry before the war. British exporters claim that Japan is over-protective to her home market and we hear the same complaint about the British market from the Japanese. The structure of Japanese economy is more favourable to a growth of trade with other Commonwealth countries, notably Australia and Canada with their abundance of primary products. In recent years, Australian wool, wheat and iron ore have all been imported by Japan in considerable quantities. Much of the rancour felt by the Australians towards the Japanese has been dissipated, and commercially, the high quality of Japanese goods has been appreciated by the Australians.

Japan could undoubtedly do more to help the poor
nations of Asia with her great technical skills and productive power. This has been re-iterated in this work but it is the realm of ideas and political philosophy that her greatest influence may lie in the future. Japan appears to have established a working democracy and she is the first Asian country to do this, with the notable exception of India. India, however, is troubled by chronic economic problems and appalling backwardness of her people and does not present the shining example that Japan does, with her economic success. What Japan has done is to demonstrate beyond question that there is life and vitality in this idea and practice of democracy in the second half of the twentieth century. This is not to say that Japan's experience with democracy can be extrapolated into situations of the new nations of Asia and Africa; her experience can give ideas and clues but should not receive literal interpretations, but democracy has always been a product of the West and as one of the first oriental nations to achieve success in democracy, this has real significance in the world. Japan's development of a democratic system of government is not a cast iron defence against future aggressive policies by her government but it is an enormous step in an evolution to peaceful government. (4)
(1) Japan Past and Present.  
E. Reischauer.  
P.243  
Duckworth.

(2) Japan.  
Sir Esler Dening.  
P.204  
Ernest Benn Ltd. 1960

(3) Japan. Past and Present.  
E. Reischauer  
P.272  
Duckworth

(4) Government and Politics in Japan.  
John M. Maki  
P.243
12. CONCLUSION

The two decades which span the period of this study are years of incredible political and economic achievement in Japan. Professor Charles Fisher subscribed to a commonsense view at the time when he was pessimistic about Japan's future when he wrote in 1954. Japan had the traditional disadvantages which geographers and economists maintained would condemn her to perpetual poverty; she was grossly over-populated, desperately short of cultivable land and poor in natural resources. What is particularly interesting is that she has actually turned these disadvantages into something very much in her favour. As we saw in the chapter on demography, the argument about her over-population postulated that medical science would bring about a decrease in infant mortality and increase longevity (which it has done) but also that a slight rise in living standards would send up the birth rate. This has not happened and the birth rate of 17 per 1,000, compared with 34 per 1,000 in 1947, is below that of most European countries. Presumably the strongest reason for this is that ordinary people could afford contraceptives because of their improved economic position but clearly the reasons for a change in birth rate are complex. The comparatively recent decline in birth rate has resulted in fewer babies to feed, but the high post war birth rate has provided a large supply of young workers, who required comparatively low wages, and who came on to the labour market at a time of industrial expansion. Japan's rural over-population has also provided her with a fund of labour, not requiring - as is the case in many Asian countries - a basic education.

Japan's shortage of land and raw materials has meant that agriculture and the extractive industries have been at a relative disadvantage compared with those of other countries.
This had made it logical to concentrate on making and exporting products of secondary industry in order to buy raw materials abroad and this has been done at a time when the terms of world trade were in favour of manufactured goods and against primary producers. Technological advance has meant that raw materials have had a less significant part of the cost of production of manufactured goods and the spread of synthetic substitutes has also helped to reduce the costs of imported raw materials. Important developments in the bulk transport of raw materials have similarly decreased the ill effects of her shortage of these in her own territory. But, as the Economist pointed out in the admirable work on Japan(1) the element of luck should not be ignored. The war in Korea was a tremendous boost to the Japanese economy, and many writers contend that her economic 'break through' began in that war when her industry received massive orders from the United States and when she herself was not burdened with defence costs.

The future then for Japanese industry appears favourable; her industries are highly competitive by any standards and show a good deal of innovation and adaptability. Her vital concern is that peace should be maintained and that world trade should not suffer a major upheaval, but it should be remembered that South east Asia, and not Europe, is now one of the most politically unstable areas in the world. Japan, quite rightly in the writer's estimate, eschewed heavy defence costs and gave her real attention to economic problems. She worked closely with the U.S., which was inevitable in her awfully precarious position in the post-war world. But the question may be asked, is she not rather smugly concerned with her economic well being and too little concerned about the welfare of other poorer nations in South East Asia. There is some substance in this charge but her methods have not
been extremely selfish. The countries of South East Asia have memories of the sinister "Mutual Co-prosperity Sphere" and have rebuffed Japan and hurt her pride. In 1959, a former Prime Minister, Mr. Yoshida, after a tour of South East Asia, reported bluntly: "It is useless just now to think of economic co-operation with these people of the South Seas, because the idea only raises their suspicions, makes them mistrust our intentions and withhold sympathy from our aims." Things have changed a good deal since then and Japan now exports almost 30 per cent of her total volume of exports to that part of the world. Her leading politicians and industrialists are more 'global' in thinking and are beginning to understand that Japan's own continuing prosperity depends upon prosperity elsewhere. At a conference of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East held in Tokyo in 1962 some of the delegates were mildly critical of Japan's contribution to the future welfare of South East Asia. Her share of foreign aid and investment amounts to little more than .5 per cent of her gross national product which is far less than that of the U.S.A. or any major Western Power. Aid for South East Asia has taken the form of loans, technical training schemes and investment, with a fairly generous reparations allowance but it has not been enough from such a relatively rich country. Her loans - £ 80 million for India's third Five Year Plan and £ 30 million for Pakistan's Second Plan - have not been princely and have high rates of interest attached to them. The crux of the problem has been discerned by the experts of the Institute of Asian Economic Affairs, under the direction of Professor Kiyoshi Kojima and it is briefly that both the United States and Japan should import more primary products from South East Asia and export more manufactured goods to this area. This applies particularly
to the United States, because Japan is admittedly a fairly large importer of raw materials from South East Asia. Japan should also reduce its volume of exports of "labour-intensive" light industry goods, in order to increase its export of "capital intensive" heavy machines and equipment. They consider that Japan and the United States should help to increase agricultural productivity in the poorer countries. It should be remembered that Japan, by scientific methods and a widespread use of fertilisers produces four tons of rice per hectare compared with a yield as little as one ton per hectare in many parts of South East Asia. The main efforts should be in creating large scale irrigation schemes and in making fertilisers and insecticides available. This could conceivably double the rice production of South East Asia in twenty years but this will only just keep pace with the increase in population. At the present time the senseless conflict in Indo-China, a land that would profit greatly by this scheme, rules out any chance of progress there. Japan is worried about the extension of the Indo-China war and her attempts at mediation in the dispute between Malaysia and Indonesia are testimony to her growing confidence and political presence in the world. The diverse political colours of the countries of South East Asia make it difficult for her to achieve a hegemony there and former pro-communist countries such as Indonesia for example have looked upon her as a 'stooge of Capitalist America'. But in spite of this, Japan's stable economy has a vital part to play in the future development of South East Asia and even if her Imperialist war ventures are long remembered there, she still remains the only truly Asian country which has achieved the capitalist 'break through' to a high standard of living for her people, and this alone makes a study of Japanese methods worthwhile.
The attitude of the Japanese government and her business men is by no means as enlightened as it should be in its relations with West European powers. Much of her trade is in direct competition with these powers but it is in some ways a short sighted attitude to close her home markets to competition. This report claims that the only commodities Japan wants from abroad are money and the knowledge needed for further modernisation. The report goes on to state that the planned economy of Japan is achieved without recourse to legislation by a group of powerful planners - among whom are the Bank of Japan, the Minister of Finance, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, and certain prominent businessmen. These elements influence, directly or indirectly, what may be imported, and in what quantity; what may be produced at home, and in what quantity, and the price that may be charged for various commodities. This attitude is clearly unwise now that more and more European powers are buying from Japan and will, inevitably, lead to retaliation on the part of these nations. It is vital for Japan to maintain a flexible, competitive industrial structure with a foot in many markets so that she can quickly cope with any restriction, possibly based on political grounds, in some of these markets and so avoid widespread economic dislocation.

The political geographer can understand the expansionist efforts of pre-war Japan but, as we have seen it would be unwise to ascribe these mainly to a lack of raw materials or to shrinking world markets. In other words he must avoid 'economic determinism' in a study of this nature. The post-war study of Japan shows that economic expertise can circumvent a poor raw material base but a cynic could argue that this success has only been possible provided that Japan was prepared to adopt a subordinate role to the United States. This argument
sees a mutually profitable Japan-U.S. trading arrangement under the protection of the air and sea forces of the superior power, namely the U.S.A.

This conclusion has given what amounts to an almost Marxist priority to economic matters but hardly less important and indeed inextricably mixed with these, is the political development of Japan. The period of this study shows a change in a society from autocracy to democracy of a particularly vigorous type. The governments of Japan in the thirties and in the war years were, as Professor J. Miller points out, inherently unstable. He writes that in pre-war Japan, civilian politicians were retained to do the bureaucratic workwork of government, while control of foreign and defence policy passed into the hands of one or other of the professional militarists. The conflict between them may have "deeper social roots than simply professional jealousy, as it did in Japan; and there may be extensive connexions between service and business interests within the community, which may see no way of influencing policy than to cultivate the army or navy. It is possible for a charismatic leader to emerge from this situation, but more likely that admirals and generals will jockey for position in professional, not popular terms. In any case, there is no stability in this sort of situation, except the stability of the see-saw". (2) Japan has achieved reasonably stable democratic government after having democracy imposed upon her by a conqueror. Perhaps this eliminates some of the enthusiasm for it but there is a general realisation that the system works.

Opinion varies in the West as to how stable this democracy is; some countries have viewed the traditionalist 'right' with caution and others have seen the main danger in left wing activities, mainly epitomized by the communist
inspired workers union Sojho and by the Zengakuren (Students' Union). Fortunately, Japan does not appear to be on the threshold of an economic crisis, for this could bring about the collapse of a democratic government and the longer she enjoys economic progress the more thoroughly democracy becomes assimilated by her. We may ask, in all fairness to totalitarian 'People's Democracies' why we are so insistent in seeing Japan saddled with a system of democracy. The simple answer is that, in general, democracies have tended to be less bellicose than out and out dictatorships and, what is more to the point, a decent life with dignity and freedom is possible for the individual in a liberal democracy. The stability of Japanese democracy is vital in a vast part of the world that has no experience of democracy.

"It must be remembered that what may broadly be true for one age group need not apply to another, a generation younger. For example, the education of any Japanese born after 1937 has been on the whole so different from the education that shaped his parents as to make him in a sense a stranger to them. Where he has been taught, in school at any rate, to attach supreme importance to the rights and aspirations of the individual, his elders on the other hand, were brought up to distinguish between human feelings and civic obligations: a distinction that exists also in Western societies but in a much milder form, generally speaking, than was common in Japan."(3) Story points out that the traditional morals have been badly battered in Japan and that the younger generation, with an outlook similar to that of the same age groups in Britain or the U.S.A., virtually speaks a different language from the older generation. In Japan, as in the case of Germany, we must put our faith in a re-educated youth.
In what must necessarily be a 'bread and butter' study we have been little concerned as such with so called 'national temperament'. So much nonsense is often talked and written about this that one must approach it with caution but it remains true that fundamental misconceptions of national traits often cause tragic international misunderstanding. The Japanese possess a highly volatile temperament and it has been suggested the extreme formalism of the traditional code of manners was adopted as an essential check on the socially disruptive consequences that could follow the free exercise of this temperament. Beneath their formalism, the Japanese are also a highly energetic, competitive people but they are not simply Asiatic 'go-getters', with a few quaint customs. They seem to have also what has been described as a quixotic sentimentality and this, combined with emotional realism, has often been compared with that of the French. In spite of the dreadful ugliness of vast urban areas their love of beauty is never crowded out by commercial or utilitarian considerations. Sir George Sansom wrote about Japan in much earlier period: "there seems to be a warmth and depth in their love of beauty which qualifies them as a race apart, or at least distinguishes them from other Greeks, as the features of a Buddhist image expressing love and mercy differ from cold marble countenances of an Apollo or Artemis." (4)

It is perhaps odd that we should conclude this work with a comment on Japanese Culture but at least it can serve as a cogent reminder that none of our specialisms will give us more than partial understanding of Japan.
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