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THE REVEREND STANLEY P. FLETCHER, B.A.

THE CHRISTOLOGY OF NESTORIUS

AND

THE CHALCEDONIAN SETTLEMENT

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS

IN THE

UNIVERSITY OF DURHAM

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THE CHRIStOLOGY OF NESTORIUS AND THE CHALCEDONIAN SETTLEMENT - ABSTRACT

The assessment of Nestorius' Christology begins with a consideration of his indebtedness to Paul of Samosata, Diodore of Tarsus and Theodore of Mopsuestia. The tradition of Alexandria is reviewed, referring primarily to Athanasius, Apollinarius and Cyril.

The historico-political background is outlined and an account of the Theotokos affair given. The subsequent fall of Nestorius at Ephesus 431 is recounted.

An examination of the christological vocabulary of the period, followed by a detailed study of the terminology and metaphysics of Nestorius, concludes that his foremost concern was the diagnosis of duality in the Incarnation but assesses him a moderate Dualist thinker. No conclusion is made on whether he provided satisfactorily for the unity of Christ's person.

An account is given of the reconciliation of Cyril and John of Antioch on the basis of the Formulary of Concord. It is recounted how Dioscorus repudiated this and, following the affair of Eutyches, enforced his views at the Latrocinium only for the sudden death of the Emperor to lead to another General Council: Chalcedon.

The proceedings of Sessions 1 - 6 are recorded, describing the condemnation of Dioscorus and the promulgation of the Chalcedonian Definition. This composition is examined to show that, while defining little, it was the means of reconciling Cyril and Leo. Moreover, it rehabilitated moderate Eastern dualism and set guide-lines for future christological speculation.

It is considered whether the Christology of Nestorius falls within the permitted limits of Chalcedon. The anti-Nestorian temper of Chalcedon is noted and the verdict is given against Nestorius.

The conclusion examines the judgement passed on Nestorius' Christology by Loofs, Hodgson and Grillmeier. Cyril and Nestorius are contrasted, showing how the former, despite shortcomings of character, had the sounder position theologically.

Abramowski's critical analysis of the Treatise is discussed in the Appendix.
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CHAPTER ONE - THE ROOTS OF THE CHRISTOLOGY OF NESTORIUS

The heresy of Arius, the presbyter from Alexandria, was to deny full divinity to Jesus Christ. As his great opponent Athanasius records in his De Synodis this Arius taught:

For He (the Son) is not eternal, or co-eternal, or co-unoriginate with the Father...

This teaching was condemned at the Council of Nicaea in 325, which went on to formulate a standard of faith as a safeguard for the future. Thus the Council received a creed in which was introduced the great phrase which no Arian could accept or explain away, namely that the Son is ὅμοουγον τῷ Πατρί.

This creed of the Council of Nicaea, though primarily a landmark in orthodox Trinitarianism, may be taken also as a landmark in the development of precision in orthodox Christology. Henceforth, all discussions on the person of Jesus Christ must accord with the clear postulate of the Council of Nicaea. This is that Jesus Christ is truly God.

However, Arianism did not vanish overnight, and in 381 we find the Emperor Theodosius summoning a great council to Constantinople with an intent to put an end to the long drawn-out Arian controversy. This council also proves to be a landmark in the development of precision in orthodox Christology. This is so because the first canon of the Council of Constantinople reads thus:

That the faith of the 318 Fathers who assembled at Nicaea in Bithynia, is not to be made void, but shall continue established; and that every heresy shall be anathematized, and especially that ... of the Apollinarians.

This specific condemnation of Apollinarianism brings a second postulate into all discussions on the person of Jesus Christ. This is that Jesus Christ is truly man. To these two postulates, that Jesus Christ is truly

God and truly man, is to be added a third. This is the clear picture derived from Scripture that Jesus Christ is one person. So we arrive at the problem of orthodox Christology which is how can these two statements (that Jesus Christ is truly God and also truly man) be true of one person. It is a problem that can be stated in at least three ways:

How could God and man be united in one person?

How could God, remaining God, become also man?

How could man, remaining man, become also God?

These questions, immediately above, reveal for us the two basic approaches possible to the problem of Jesus Christ. The one is to stress that in Jesus Christ we meet with God. This approach would appeal particularly to those who wanted and needed to have from their religion a physical presence of the divine. A.C. Headlam thus describes this need:

The Egyptian monk or devotee who gave up everything for Christ, and lived in the desert an ascetic life, hoping more and more to gain some union with God, had his mind overborne by the fact that in Jesus Christ he saw the Godhead on earth; that God thus incarnate in man had taken frail human nature capable of sin and had glorified it by union with Himself and made it divine; and he lived always with the vision that just in the same way, his own weak and imperfect and frail nature might be made divine. 1

Paul Tillich explains how this need may be filled:

Imagine a simple-minded human being who wants to have God. If you tell her: "There is God, on the altar; go and have Him there." then she will go. But how is this possible? Because of the incarnation, for in the incarnation God became something which we can have, whom we can see, with whom we can walk, etc. 2

Clearly such a need would dictate that the christological problem be approached from the side of how God, remaining God, became also man.

This, the approach of the Alexandrian School of Theology, is to be seen in the writings of Cyril, Bishop of Alexandria. For him the given position is that redemption is an act centred in God and wrought by God in

the flesh. God remains God. Nothing in the act of Incarnation does anything to change the Logos. Cyril writes:

We do not say that the nature of the Word was changed in order to become flesh, nor that it was transformed into a complete man of soul and body: but rather this, that the Word united to Himself in an objective reality, ineffably and incomprehensibly, flesh ensouled with a rational soul, and thus became man.

With this theory that the Logos asarkos is self-identical with the Logos ensomatos it follows that Cyril was unable to accept any doctrine of kenosis which would involve a loss of attributes on the part of the Logos. Later in this dissertation we shall see Cyril defending the term Theotokos against Nestorius. His reason for so doing is that just outlined above. It is not that he wishes to deify the Virgin Mary or to assert that she, creature as she was, brought forth God the Logos, but that the Incarnate and Discarnate persons are in essence and in principle one and the same. Again, for the same reason, we find Cyril able to speak of God the Logos as suffering in the flesh:

He Himself, who is the Son begotten of God the Father and is God only-begotten, though He is impassible in His own nature, suffered in flesh for us according to the Scriptures; and in the crucified body He was making His own, impassibly, the sufferings of His own flesh.

Being united to manhood like ours, He could, impassibly, endure human sufferings in flesh that was His own.

While his opponents dismissed such paradoxical statements as ridiculous quibbles or compared them to the antics of children building and destroying sand castles, Cyril defended them as corollaries of the ineffable and incomprehensible mystery of the Incarnation.

His opponents adopted the other possible approach to Christology. They pointed to the historical picture of Christ and found there the true focus for Christology. This would perforce lead to an acknowledgement

2. Cyril Ep. XVII ad Nest. 3 (A.C.O.I, i, 1 p.37).
3. Cyril Orat. ad Augustas De Recta Fide. 31 (A.C.O.I, i, 5 p.50).
of the absolute reality of all that was human in Christ. He was a baby; He became a boy, growing in wisdom and stature. His childhood was spent in Galilee, and He grew up and reached manhood just as other men do. But more than this - He presented a beautiful model of what man should be.

This approach of the Antiochene tradition in Christology differed from their rivals in two main respects. First, there is the positive religious valuation which it gives to the humanity of Christ. Unlike the rival tradition, this assigns to the human experiences of our Lord a very important function in the economy of redemption. For example, Paul of Samosata (whose introduction here is not meant to prejudge his influence on the subject of this dissertation) is recorded to have said:

\[ \text{Maria étenu évësropov eivn isov ... krestov} \]

\[ \text{de kath tetryta} \]

Again Theodore of Mopsuestia attaches decisive importance to the homo assumptus, as may be seen in the following quotation:

Mais nos pères bienheureux mirent en garde sur tout cela, en disant : qui s'est incarné et devint homme, afin que nous croyions qu'il est un homme parfait, celui qui fut assumé et en qui demeura Dieu le Verbe, - lui qui fut parfait en tout selon la nature humaine et dont l'état résultait d'un corps mortel et d'une âme intelligente, car c'est "pour l'homme et pour son salut qu'il descendit du ciel". À bon droit, ils dirent qu'il prit un homme semblable à ceux d'entre lesquels il fut pris; car l'homme qu'il assuma, étant semblable à Adam qui introduisit le péché dans le monde, il abolirait le péché par ce qui lui était connaturel.

Finally, we may notice the decisive place which Nestorius gives to the humanity in the plan of redemption:

God the Word was made man that he might therein make the humanity the likeness of God and that he might therein renew (the likeness of God) in the nature of the humanity

But if he has not been made man in man, he has saved himself and not us; but if he has saved us, he has been made man in us and has been in the likeness of men

4. Ibid.p.205.
The second distinguishing feature is the accent on will in Antiochene Christology which stands in contrast to the preference for christological ontology in the rival tradition. Paul, Theodore and Nestorius may again be used to demonstrate this:

\[
\text{οὕτως δὲ, ὡς ἐλέγει οἰκεῖος ἐνεργοῦντος ὡς λόγος ὡς καὶ θεὸς ἦν, δὴ ὁ πατὴρ τὰ πάντα πεποίηκεν, ὡς ὡς δὲ ὁ γεγένημεν ὡς ὡς ὁ ἐνεποίηθης ἀνυποστάτου.}
\]

\[
\text{διὸν οὖν ὡς εὐδοκίας ἔλεγεν γίνεσθαι τὴν ἐνοίκιας προσέκει. εὐδοκίας ἔλεγεν ἡ ἐρώτησι ὡς καλίτης ἐλεοῦσα τῷ θεῷ ἦν ἐν ποιητῇ ἐρωτῆσι τῶν ἑκατέρων ἀυτῶν ἐπουσθέασιν κἀπε τόν ἐν καὶ καλὰ δοκεῖν αὐτῶν περὶ αὑτῶν.}
\]

For (to have) the prosōpon of God is to will what God wills, whose prosōpon he has. 3

That briefly, then, is an indication of the position adopted by the two rival schools of theology. We shall have occasion to look more closely at these positions as we proceed to focus attention on the main subject of this dissertation.

Nestorius was, before his elevation to the see of Constantinople in 428, priest and superior of the monastery of Eupreprius, in the neighbourhood of Antioch. He came to be one of the leaders of the Antiochene Tradition of Christology. It is appropriate that we turn first to the consideration of some of his antecedents in this school who may be said to have influenced his teaching.

Socrates in his history of the Church tells us:

Nestorius acquired the reputation among the masses of asserting that the Lord was a mere man, and attempting to foist on the Church the doctrine of Paul of Samosata ... 4

Certainly we may readily identify a geographical connection between

1. G. Bardy, Paul de Samosate p.15.
Nestorius and Paul of Samosata since the latter was Bishop of Antioch between 260 and 264. Before this he had been at Samosata (hence his title) in the Kingdom of Palmyra where he associated with King Odenatus and his wife Queen Zenobia. Zenobia, who favoured Judaism, and indeed was possibly a Jewess, encouraged a 'school' at her court to which Paul belonged.

It has been suggested that the Queen's Judaism may have been influential in the Adoptionist teaching which Paul came to advance, and which, in effect, made Christ just another prophet (albeit the greatest). Be that as it may, when Paul was Bishop of Antioch his teaching was held to deny the divine nature of the Saviour and he was deposed.

As to what exactly Paul's system was, it is difficult to ascertain. The sources are few and problematic. Consequently, the observations which follow have been based only on those fragments accepted as authentic by H. de Riedmatten in his Les Actes du Proces de Paul de Samosate. From these three features of particular interest in Paul's teaching emerge. First there is his dislike of an ontological Christology. The encyclical letter from the Synod at Antioch which condemned Paul made it known:

Il connoit autrement la conjonction à la Sagesse (τῆς ζωῆς Σοφίας), selon l'amitié et non selon l'usée (οù Ματ' οὕτως ᾿αὐτοῦ).²

At this Synod the priest Malchion, who was chosen to lead the examination of Paul, said to him as follows:

Tu vero videris mihi secundum hoc nolle compositionem fateri, ut non substantia sit in eo Filius Dei, sed sapientia secundum participationem.³

The reason for Paul's refusal to confess 'compositio' is revealed in a record of the confrontation between Paul and Malchion:

1. C.E. Raven in his book Apollinarianism considers the most important to be five fragments of Paul to Sabinus. These discourses (though accepted by Harnack) are almost certainly not authentic. They certainly reflect the interest of the much later Monothelite controversy and are more developed in their Christology than the third century. While F. Loofs in his Paulus von Samosata (p.339) thinks that they have a genuine kernel, G. Bardy in his Paul de Samosate (pp.181-96) and H. de Riedmatten in his Les Actes du Procès de Paul de Samosate (p.14) dismiss them completely.


3. Ibid. S.25 pp.149 - 50.
Paul dit : Le Verbe ne peut être composé, sinon il perd son rang.

Malchion : Le Verbe et son corps ne sont pas composés ?

Paul : Qu'à aucun prix il ne soit composé ni mélangé !

The dignity of the Logos seems to have been of prime concern for Paul :

\[ Δοι τοίνυν ἐν τοῖς ὑπομνήμασιν, — ἡς περὶ Παύλου λέγουτες —, τῷ εἶν τὸ ἄξιόν τις σοφίας. \]

Because he held that the status of the Logos would be destroyed by a substantial union, he preferred to speak of a qualitative bond and allow only a participation of the Logos with the man Jesus :

\[ ὁ γὰρ συνηγενεῖαι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τῆς σοφίας ἢς ἡμῶν τιαστοῦμεν, οὐσίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ ποιήσας. \]

\[ Τίν ἐὰν συνήφθην ἐτέρως πρὸς τὴν σοφίαν νοεῖν, κατὰ μάρτυριν καὶ μεταφορὰν, οὐχὶ οὐσίαν οὐσιασμένην ἐν σωματί. \]

The picture that emerges seems to be as follows. Paul considered Jesus, though born of a virgin, to be a man like other men who however was the recipient of a special gift of divine force and was thus elevated to the position of Christ. Certainly we are left in no doubt that Paul excluded any conception of a divine Christ descended from on high. Rather the direction of movement is upwards of a man raised up to a special position and purpose in the plan of God. Jesus was a man inspired from above with the power of the Logos, which inhabited him just as men live in houses. Such teaching was inevitably condemned. It made Christ but another prophet, and it entertained no idea of a union of the human and the divine in the one person of Jesus Christ.

These ideas indicate that Paul presented a divisive Christology and Leontius of Byzantium, in a passage referring to Theodore of Mopsuestia, says of these ideas:

1. Ibid. S,22 p.147.
5. It is to be noted, however, that Paul says the Logos is \[ ἀνωθεν \] (from above) and the man \[ ἐνθεοῦ \] (from here). See H. de Riedmatten, op.cit. S,26 p.155.
This charge, which would involve Nestorius being indebted to Paul of Samosata, does not seem to us to stand since Nestorius must at least be acquitted of the charge that Jesus Christ was just a man, as will be seen when we come to a consideration of Nestorius' Christology. Put briefly, we would not ascribe to Paul of Samosata any decisive influence in the teaching propounded by Nestorius. At the most their common connection with Antioch might hint at a common mould and a community of outlook; it cannot support direct indebtedness.

Socrates, whose opinions generally are valued for their impartiality, takes the same view as that just expressed. He writes of Nestorius: "I cannot then concede that he was a follower of ... Paul of Samosata." However it must be said that all judgements expressed on the relationship between Paul and Nestorius are conditioned by the scant material available to us regarding the teaching of Paul. As A. Grillmeier says:

There can be no doubt that the 'Affair of Paul of Samosata' is a distinctive event in the history of Christology. Unfortunately the necessary critical conditions for its interpretation have not yet been created.

Cyril of Alexandria observed on more than one occasion that the sources of Nestorianism could be found in the teaching of Diodore. From the other side, in the translation by Abbé Martin of a sermon by Narses the

4. The controversy about Paul of Samosata was 'recontexted' in four successive ways: first he was connected with Artemon, then in the fourth century he was dragged into the Homoousion controversy by the Semi-Nicenes, then in the fifth century he was used as a stick with which to beat Nestorius and finally, in the sixth century, used by the Monothelites against their Dyothelite opponents.
Nestorian there is this sentence:

Une foi invincible a été prêchée par les justes, Diodore, Théodore et Nestorius.¹

Diodore came from a noble family in Antioch where he was for a time a priest and head of the catechetical school there. Subsequently he became Bishop of Tarsus where he served until his death about 394. Before his elevation to the episcopate he had won for himself the reputation of an apologist for the Nicene faith. This he did in the opposition he conducted to the teaching of the Arianizing Leontius who was Bishop of Antioch 344-357. Also his support of the Nicene faith brought him into opposition with the teaching of Apollinarius in the nearby see of Laodicea. It was in the course of this opposition, according to B.J. Kidd,² that Diodore gave to the doctrine of Christ's person at Antioch that direction in which it was to move from his day forward. This was so to stress the completeness of the human nature in Christ, which, of course, Apollinarius denied, and so to separate it from the divine nature that his opponents could charge him with teaching two Sons. For example, in the fragments of his writings which have been preserved for us we find him stating:

Τέλειος πρὸς αἰώνων ὁ Βιός, τέλειον τὸν ἐκ Δαβίδ ἀνείλθου Βιός ἐκ Θεοῦ Βιόν Δαβίδ.³

Again we find him writing:

Χάριτι Βιός ὁ ἐκ Μαρίας ἄνθρωπος, φύσει δὲ ὁ Θεὸς Λόγος.⁴

¹. vide Journal Asiatique 1900 p.486.
³. Diodore Fr. 1. (P.G. XXXIII 1560A).
⁴. Diodore Fr. 3. (Ibid. 1560C).
As a final quotation we may cite:

ne Mariae filius Deus Verbum existimetur .... duas navitates Deus Verbum non sustinuit, unam quidem ante saecula, alteram autem in posterioribus temporibus : sed ex Patre quidem natura genitus est, templum vero, quod ex Maria natum est, ex ipso utero sibi fabricavit.  

This evidence leaves us in no doubt that Diodore was at pains to preserve the distinction of the two natures in Christ. His detractors would say that the language of this distinction was tantamount to teaching a separation; that his Christology was divisive; that he taught two Sons. Thus Cyril pointed to Diodore as the fons et origo of Nestorianism.

The sharpness with which he distinguished the natures in the Incarnate Lord has traditionally been held to make him a forerunner of Nestorianism. In recent times, however, a different interpretation has been proposed. A. Grillmeier urges that Diodore's Christology has been judged far too much in the light of his opposition to Apollinarianism and so placing it exclusively in the stream of Antiochene theology. He also claims that Diodore should be distinguished from Theodore of Mopsuestia since the theology of distinction in Diodore reveals traces (particularly in the early stages) of a logos-sarx framework, while Theodore uses the Logos-man framework exclusively. In support of this Grillmeier points to the Syriac fragments relating to Diodore which was edited by R. Abramowski in ZNTW for 1931. He quotes fragment 36:

(a) Jesus, he (Diodore) says, increased both in age and in wisdom. But this cannot be said of the Word of God; because he is born perfect God of the perfect (Father), Wisdom of Wisdom, Power of Power. Therefore he himself does not increase; indeed he is not incomplete so as to need additions (incrementis) for his completion. (b) But that which grew in age and wisdom was the flesh. (c) And as this had to be created and to be born, the Godhead did not impart to it all wisdom, but bestowed it upon the body in portions (particulatim).

1. Diodore Pr. 3. (P.G. XXXIII 1560 f).
This, he argues, showed that Diodore used a Logos-sarx framework. He draws a similar conclusion from fragment 39:

But how do you have one worship? Perhaps as with the soul and body of a king? For the soul by itself is not the king and the body by itself is not the king. (The two, then, cannot be separated in honour and are the subject of one action. But not so Christ.) But the God-Logos is king before the flesh and therefore what can be said of body and soul cannot be said of the God-Logos and the flesh.

If this thesis of Grillmeier is accepted, then Diodore is not to be contrasted with the Logos-sarx framework of Alexandria as had been supposed. As evidence, he quotes Jerome to show that there was a spiritual teacher-pupil relationship between Eusebius of Emesa and Diodore:

Diodorus, Tarsensis episcopus, dum Antiochae esset presbyter, magis claruit. Exstant eius in Apostolum commentarii et multa alia ad Eusebii magis Emiseni characterem pertinentia, cuius cum sensum secutus sit, eloquentiam imitari non potuit propter ignorantiam saecularium litterarum.'

Eusebius of Emesa was an exponent of Alexandrian theology who is known to have lived at Alexandria and also, significantly, at Antioch.

If Grillmeier's interpretation is accepted, it would appear that Diodore used a Logos-sarx framework and may have been subjected to Alexandrian influence. His opposition to Apollinarius did not arise from the diminution of the humanity of the Lord but in the threat to his divinity which would arise from the acceptance of the formula of natural unity (μία φύσις τω θεο λόγου συμφρακτής) adopted by Apollinarius. This led him to write so strongly against any confusion of natures in Christ that he sometimes seems to talk of two persons.

It is difficult to believe that Grillmeier has completely made out his case. Unfortunately the fragments of Apollinarius's treatise against Diodore (Apollinarius Fr. 117-46 H. Lietzmann pp.235-42) do not enable us to determine precisely the views of Diodore. They strongly suggest however that what was at issue between the two was the presence or absence of a human soul in Christ without enabling us to decide the wider theological context in which Diodore is to be placed. Grillmeier's case cannot be regarded as at present more than non-proven.

1. JEROME DE VIR. ILLUS. 119 (P.L. XXIII 750 A).
So, to conclude, the view of Narses the Nestorian which would see no vital difference between Diodore, Theodore and Nestorius does not go unchallenged. What may be said is that Diodore in his opposition to any natural or substantial union of the two natures in Christ was preparing the ground for a Christology which, while preserving the natures unimpaired, would give fuller consideration to the unity of the person. This was provided by Theodore of Mopsuestia to whom we now direct attention.

Theodore was born at Antioch about 350. He was a student of Libanius, the most famous professor of rhetoric of his day. Socrates and Sozomen tell us that he was going at first to practise law, but eventually followed Chrysostom, also a student of Libanius, into the monastery of Diodore and Carterius. At one point he left the monastery, intending to marry, but Chrysostom, who was obviously a great influence in his life, persuaded him to return. Eventually, when over thirty years of age, he was ordained priest by Flavian, Bishop of Antioch. Ten years later he was appointed Bishop of Mopsuestia in Cilicia, where he continued till his death some thirty-six years later.

In a long life of nearly eighty years he wrote much and his extant writings are sufficient to pronounce him the greatest of Antiochene teachers. From his

1. Socrate H.E. vi 3 (P.G. LXXVII 665); Sozomen H.E. viii 2 (P.G. LXXVII 1513)
2. The last forty years has seen a great increase in our knowledge of the works of Theodore. Previous to 1932 there was available of his commentaries only that on the Twelve Minor Prophets in complete form, together with fragments on Genesis, Psalms, the Gospels and the Major Epistles. There was also a complete commentary on the Epistles from Galatians to Philemon, but in a Latin translation only. Similarly with regard to his dogmatic works there was a complete text (in Syriac) of his Controversy with the Macedonians and besides fragments only of his De Incarnatione, Contra Apollinarem and Contra Eunomium. Then in 1932 A. Mingana discovered a Syriac text of Theodore's Catechetical Homilies which he published with an English translation. K. Staab followed this in 1933 with his Pauluskomentare aus der griechischen Kirche which provides parts of Theodore's commentary on the Major Epistles: Romans, I and II Corinthians, and Hebrews. R. Devreesse added further to our knowledge in 1939 when he published considerable sections of Theodore's commentary on Psalms I-LXX. Finally 1940 saw the appearance of a Latin translation by J.M. Voste of the complete Syriac text of Theodore's Commentary on the Gospel of St. John.

This wealth of material now available shows Theodore to have been both a systematic theologian and an exegete of distinction. The premier place among Antiochene teachers goes without serious challenge to the Bishop of Mopsuestia who knew his way so very well around the whole field of systematic theology.
writings we see that he began with certain premises. The universe, for example, was made up of 'sensible phenomena' together with intelligible beings. Man, with his body made up of earth, air, fire and water was clearly linked to the realm of sensible phenomena. At the same time he possessed an invisible soul which gave him a place in the realm of intelligible beings. So man is a unity of two different elements: body and soul. As an illustration of this teaching, we may instance the following quotation:

Quoniam autem et iuxta nos homo dicitur ex anima et corpore constare, et duas quidem huas dicimas naturas, animam et corpus, unum uero hominem ex ambobus compositum:1

With regard to the soul certain things are axiomatic in the thought and teaching of Theodore. First, it is a substance in its own right. It is capable of an independence separate from the body and, though normally associated with a body, it transcends it. This is made clear in the following passage:

Or en ceci seulement diffère l'âme humaine de celle des animaux, que cette dernière n'a pas d'hypostase propre ... Quant aux hommes, il n'en va pas ainsi: mais l'âme existe dans son hypostase propre, et fort élevée au-dessus du corps ...2

Second, the soul, though enjoying substantiality, is incorporeal:

6 Θεός ... ἐν τοῖς θεαματοις, ἐκ δεικτοῦ μὲν συγκεκριμένοι τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ συγκεκριμένοι τῇ φυσικῇ κτίσει ... ἐν θανατώ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ ἁπλά ἐν τοῖς ἐνθαρρυντικοῖς 3

Third, the soul is immortal:

Elle dure en son hypostase, parce qu'elle est immortelle4

It follows for Theodore that because the soul is immortal, therefore, it is rational:

L'âme des hommes ... est immortelle; et nécessairement la croit-on aussi intelligente5

1. Theodore C. Apollin. BK IV Fr. 1 (Swete II p. 318)
2. R. Tonneau, Les Homelies Catechetiques de Theodore de Mopsueste p.121
3. Theodore Com in Rom. VIII 19 (P.G. LXVI 824e )
4. R. Tonneau, op. cit. p.123
5. Ibid.
This composite of body and soul which is man is made, as Scripture teaches, in the image of God. In Theodore’s thought this man, by virtue of resembling God, stands as a representative of God before all creation and so is entitled to receive the homage of all creation. Creation, the realm of sensible phenomena, exists to meet man’s need. It is in the service of man, their Maker’s image, that the creatures of God are held together in unity and harmony. This explains why man is a composite of body and soul i.e., made up of sensible phenomena and an intelligible being. It is that he might unite in himself all the elements of the created order and be the bond of creation.

We see this expressed by Theodore in the following passage:

fabricauit autem animal unum, id est, hominem, qui et ad inuisibles naturas propinquitatem sibi anima uindicaret, et visibilibus naturis corpore iungeretur. ex quattuor enim integris elementis, terra, inquio, et aere et aqua et igne, corpus composuit nostrum; et quasi quoddam amicitiae pignus totius creaturae fecit esse hominem, utpote omnibus in eum coadunatis.

Here we are introduced to Theodore’s idea of the cosmic function of man.

By failing to fulfil his office as the image Theodore holds that Adam introduced death into creation. Similarly men’s sins made them subject to mortality.

1. This idea of man as the pignus amicitiae (Greek ὁ Κυρήνου σύνθεσις) is unique to Theodore and leads Dorner to describe man in the teaching of Theodore as a ‘cosmical God’. The rival tradition (though in a rather different context) would seek to lay stress upon the Logos as the linch-pin of creation.

2. Theodore Com. in Eph. i.10 (Swete I. p.129).

3. Theodore’s approach to the Fall and its consequences is equivocal. In his Catechetical Lectures and his Commentary on Romans he is conservative but minimalist by Western standards. However, he also wrote a lost treatise 'Against those who say that men fall by nature (φύσει) and not by will (γνώσει)' of which the fragments are edited by H.B. Swete, op. cit. II pp. 332-37. The problem of the two streams of thought on the subject in the writings of Theodore is fully discussed in Julius Gross’ Entstehungsgeschichte des Erbsundendogmas I pp. 190-205.
Christ the second Adam, is the remedy for the consequences stemming from this failure. ( If it be asked how, if the soul is immortal, can men be subject to mortality, then Theodore would say that man dies when his soul is separated from his corruptible body. Man, as distinct from his soul, will become immortal when his body receives the gift of incorruptibility. )

Turning now to Theodore's teaching with regard to God, we may state the axioms in his thoughts briefly as there is little here which distinguishes him from the patristic tradition as a whole. God, then, is conceived first and foremost as the Creator. He is unlimited in nature and transcends his creation. God is thought of as a purely spiritual being. Finally, we may mention that against Arianism with its teaching of a changeable Godhead, Theodore, in company with Oriental theologians generally, approached his studies with the understanding that God is immutable.

Theodore's doctrine of the Trinity only calls for brief mention since it has few distinctive features. It was in any case not directly involved. 1 In the Ecthesis he writes:

εὐφοροφοῦσιν δὲ πατερικὴ τελείων προσωπῆς καὶ ὑδὸν ἐνωσάς καὶ πνεύμα δὲ ἄγων ὄνοσμας, ἐσόμενον τοῦ λόγου τῆς εὐφοροφίας ἔν τῷ πατερίῳ καὶ ὑδὸν ἐνωσάς καὶ πνεύμα ἄγων μῆ πρὸς τινὶς ὄφοσος ὄνοσμάς πολισάν, ἀλλὰ μίαν τῇ ταύτῃ τῆς θεοτοκίας οὐαρισμέναι 2

He believes, then, in one Divine substance revealed in three persons. While his use of οὐσία here for substance is perfectly regular, the same may not be said for the use of προσωποῦ for person. Sabellius before him may have used this term ( though the point is disputed ) in the sense of a merely temporary aspect or function and we should have expected Theodore to have preferred ὑπόσωσις which was the regular term in use for person in the East since the Cappadocian Fathers. A possible explanation may lie in the suggestion that he preferred to use ὑπόσωσις to express the

1. It is known that he wrote against both the Arians and the Pneumatochi though his works are lost.
2. Theodore Ecthesis (Swete II p.328).
distinct or concrete existence of God or man. So he would turn to \textit{νοητή} as a better word for expressing a particular form or manifestation of the one divine being.

Two ideas, then, predominate in Theodore's teaching about man's relation to God. The first is that man resembles God and is God's representative on earth. Man was created in the image of God and it is in serving man that the creatures of God are held together in unity and harmony. This representative status of man entitles him to the homage of all creation. The second idea is that this position of man demands that man should live in obedience to God. If he is disobedient, then he remains the image of God without performing the role of God's image. This in fact is the situation that was produced by Adam's disobedience and has in turn produced the disunity in creation. Theodore expresses the situation thus:

\begin{quote}
propter hominum etenim malitiam omnis, ut ita dixerim, creatura disrumpi uidebatur. auertebant enim se a nobis angeli et omnes invisibles uirtutes, propter indeuotionem nostram quam erga Deum exercebamus.\footnote{Theodore Com. in \textit{Col.} i. 16 (Swete I pp. 267-8).}
\end{quote}

If then the relation between man and God at the time of the creation is to be restored, a relationship involving man's perfect obedience to God must be initiated. Perhaps his thought here may be summarised in this way. As it was by the man Adam that death was introduced, so then must the remedy be introduced by God initiating immortality with a man. This has been done by the man Jesus in whom God dwelt. It will readily be seen, then, how important both the category of will and the full humanity of our Lord were in the theology of Theodore.

In line with the Antiochene tradition Theodore saw the Incarnation as a union of Logos with man and so found himself in opposition to the Logos-sarx framework of Alexandria. The whole scheme of salvation-history as understood by Theodore, and as indicated in the preceding paragraph,
demands that man in the full sense be present in the Incarnation. For
Theodore, if the humanity is limited in any way or its importance minimised,
then redemption goes lame. For redemption is not so much divinization, as
at Alexandria, but the saving of man from the consequences of sin. Now while
Theodore sees Christ as paying the debt for sin, much more prominent in his
thought is it that Christ initiates a New Age in which sin is not just
forgiven but abolished. In order to understand what is meant by the New Age
in the teaching of Theodore it is necessary to probe somewhat deeper into the
Christian understanding of man at the time.

R.A. Norris, in his book Manhood and Christ observes:

... Christian theology of the fourth and fifth centuries owed to
Middle Platonic and Neo-Platonic thought much of the conceptual
structure in terms of which it interpreted the Church's gospel ....

Thus, for example, the Christian thinker, while he tended to
reject any equation of matter with evil, nevertheless found a useful
instrument in the fundamental Platonic distinction between intelligible
and corporeal substance.... The fact that the same sets of terms were
used to explain the contrast between Creator and creature on the one
hand, and 'spirit' and 'flesh' (soul and body) on the other, made it
quite natural to suppose that God and the soul were somehow of the
same 'kind'. Though certainly a creature, the soul was nevertheless
'more divine' by reason of its intelligible nature than the creatures
whose substance was merely material or visible. Thus the doctrine of
the image often appears as a Christian restatement of the Platonic
conception of the continuity of the soul with its divine Source: ...

When we turn to Theodore we find him imposing a certain
modification upon this view 2 by linking mutability and rationality. He sees
these two qualities as dependent on one another:

Nam si quidem statim ab initio immortales nos fecerit et immutabiles,
nullam differentiam ad irrationabilia habemus, proprium nescientes
bonum. Ignorantes enim mutabilitatem, immutabilitatis ignorabamus
bonum : nescientes mortem, immortalitatis lucrum nesciebamus :
ignorantes corruptionem, non laudabamus incorruptionem : nescientes
passionum gravamen, impassibilitatem non mirabamur. Compendiose
dicere, ne longum sermonem faciam: nescientes malorum experimentum,
bonorum illorum non poteramus scientiam mereri. 3

2. A.Harnack, C.E. Raven, R.V. Sellers and J.N.D. Kelly have argued that
Theodore's philosophical outlook is Aristotelian rather than neo-Platonist.
R. Arnou (Nestorianisme et Neoplatonisme) has questioned this generally
accepted position, maintaining that Theodore is also neo-Platonist in outlook.
Attention is drawn to R.A. Norris' comment on these two opposing views
(Manhood and Christ pp. 250 - 2).
While he thus sees mutability and rationality dependent on one another he at the same time holds to the connection between rationality and immortality:

> rationabiles nos enim faciens Dominus, ipsamque rationabilitatem in nobis efficacem expedire uolens, quia nec aliter uideri possit, nisi discretione contrariorum, ex quibus et meliorum electio adquiri potest - haec enim summa est cognitio rationabilium omnium; ...

R.A. Greer comments thus on the same passage:

> Man's rationality is exercised in the discretio contrariorum; and while the discretio or choice can and often does involve us in pain, our mutability can also be exercised in the meliorum electio and in the right course of life. And so our lives in this age become a sort of training to prepare us for the perfect obedience and immutability of the age to come.

At this point we might summarise Theodore by saying that man in this age has chosen the way to sin that was open to him and that this choice was necessary if man were to be rational. At the same time the destiny of immortality in the second age is possible to man only through the effective use of rationality in this age.

The two ages just referred to relate to the two stages in which God's plan is to be worked out for the whole of creation:

> Quod quidem placuit Deo, hoc erat, in duos status dividere creaturan: unum quidem qui praesens est, in quo mutabilia omnia fecit; alterum autem qui futurus est, cum renovansomnia ad immutabilitatem transferet: quorum principium nobis ostendit in dispensatione Domini Christi, quem ex nobis existentem resuscitavit ex portuis, et immortalem corpore, et immutabilem fecit animam: per quod demonstravit, quia circa universam creaturam hoc futurum est.

R. Greer has a useful definition of the two ages:

> The First Age is (a) mutable and (b) present. It is mutable because of the necessity of allowing man free choice. The Second Age is (a) immutable and (b) future. Yet an immediate qualification must be made of the assertion that the Second Age is future, for Christ has ushered in the Second Age.

However, not only has Christ as principium ushered in the Second Age, He is also, by virtue of His union with our nature, our link with that Second Age:

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1. **Theodore Com. in Gal.** ii 15-6 (Swayne I p. 27).
2. R.A. Greer, Theodore of Mopsuestia p. 17.
4. R. Greer, op. cit. p. 73.
The things that the ancients held as figures and shadows came now into reality when our Lord Jesus Christ, who was assumed from us and for us died according to the human law, and through His resurrection became immortal, incorruptible and for ever immutable, and as such ascended into heaven, as by His union with our nature He became to us an earnest of our own participation in the event. In saying: "If Christ rose from the dead, how say some among you that there is no resurrection from the dead." (the Apostle) clearly showed that it was necessary for all to believe that there is a resurrection, and in believing in it we had also to believe that we will equally clearly participate in it.

R. Greer, again, has a useful comment on the passage just quoted:

The word 'earnest' probably represents arrabôn or pignus. Just as man was the earnest or pledge (pignus) for the universal harmony of the created order, so Christ is the pignus for the general resurrection and for man's salvation.

It will readily be seen that Theodore has a greatly developed sense of salvation history and of eschatology. It is a veritable extra dimension to his thinking as compared to the Alexandrians. It comes over strongly, for example, in his doctrine of Baptism which for him is not the beginning of deification but something which points as an arrabôn to future fulfillment.

To sum up we may say that Theodore sees man's trouble in this present age as a combination of his sinful soul (manifested in his wilful disobedience) and his natural mortality. So salvation will be the bringing of moral 'invertibilitas' to the soul and immortality to the body in a New Age. God as immutable possesses this 'invertibilitas' by nature. Through the action of God in the Incarnation this 'invertibilitas' is now made available to man 'by grace'. But this by itself is not sufficient, for man's salvation must mean the establishment of a relationship of free obedience to God. This Christ achieves through his work as a man. It will be seen, then, that only if the Incarnation involves a union of Logos with man, will it support the scheme of man's salvation as Theodore teaches it. He sees Christ

2. R. Greer, op. cit. p.74.
3. This term is fairly frequent in the Latin translations of Theodore's commentaries. See for example his commentary on Galatians II, 15-6 and 1 Timothy I, 9-11 (H.B. Swete, op. cit. I p.29 and II p.76 respectively).
as playing two rôles. He is at once the locus of divine intervention and the locus of man's conquest of sin.

This strong emphasis upon the co-presence of two complete natures not unnaturally raises the question whether he taught two sons or two persons in the Incarnation. Theodore strenuously denies this:

neque adsumens quod adsumptum est, neque quod adsumptum est adsumens; unitas autem adsumpti circa adsumptem inseparabilis est, secundum nullum modum incidi ualens. ¹

Nevertheless the problem remains whether the bond of union is sufficiently strong to bear the weight of duality which it is required to support. It is to this problem we now direct attention.

A start may be made with the following quotation:

Here we see Theodore using Assumption language. This, while much preferred by non-Antiochene theologians, was not eschewed completely by Antiochenes for we can find the idea in Origen and Athanasius on the one hand, and in Diodore and Chrysostom on the other. Clearly everything depends upon what was assumed and the total evaluation of the assumption.

We move a stage deeper in Theodore's thought when we note his use of the term οὐσίασεια. He writes for example:

Unlike assumption, οὐσίασεια would seem to be used only at Antioch in connection with the theology of the Incarnation. We may instance its use

1. Theodore c. Apollin. Bk. IV Fr. I (Swete II p. 319),
2. Theodore Ecthesis (Swete II pp. 328-9),
3. Ibid. (Swete II pp. 329-30);
by Paul of Samosata and Flavian, Bishop of Antioch; and note, too, that Cyril was the first to criticise it explicitly.

We come to the deepest point in Theodore's thought with the term εναχθος (in dwelling) - and come, incidentally, firmly within the realm of Antiochene thought also. Eustathius, Diodore and Chrysostom had all used the term before him, but it is Theodore who gives the term a careful definition. In his De Incarnatioine he asks what is the mode of this indwelling. First he considers it as being by substance:

καὶ πρότερον γὰρ ἐκεῖνο διόλογά ὑμῖν ἐρόικεν...

Clearly, he observes, it would be improper to limit the substance of God who is omnipresent, yet equally clearly God dwells not in all men but only in His saints. So indwelling, he concludes, is not by substance. This rejection of εναχθος is not altogether surprising. Theodore is at one with the Antiochenes in their dislike of ontology.

Next indwelling by activity (ἐναχθικός) is considered:

τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ ἐν τοῖς εὐσεβεῖς καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐναχθηκαίς.

This again is rejected for much the same reasons as led to the rejection of indwelling by substance. While it is absurd to limit the activity of God who is present in all His works, yet the operation of God must be limited to the saints. This rejection of εναχθικός does seem to be surprising.

Certainly we may say it is a term which Paul of Samosata would have accepted with alacrity. Theodore, however, clearly finds it, along with εναχθος,

1. Theodore de Incarn. VII (Swete II pp.294).
2. Ibid.
inadequate to indicate the uniqueness of God's indwelling in Christ.

Theodore sees only one other mode remaining. God must dwell in man by goodwill (eudokia):

οἵλον οὖν ὑς εὐδοκίας λέγειν γίνεσθαι τῷ ἐνοικίζον προσέχει.

In the same place Theodore goes on to say what he means by eudokia:

εὐδοκία ἢ λέγεται ἢ ἁριστή καὶ καλήτη
θέλεις τοῦ θεοῦ

In this definition the emphasis on will is to be noted. This may in fact derive from Ephesians i. 5 and not simply Theodore's own concern about will. However that may be, eudokia refers to God's will which is exercised by God towards those who fear him. That is to say, those who are disposed to fear God are become indwelt by God. While, as has been mentioned earlier, the substance of God is omnipresent, nevertheless His good-will is near to some and far from others, depending upon their disposition towards God. The visible evidence of this is, of course, the righteous men in whom God dwells and the wicked men who enjoy no such divine presence. At the same time there are to be recognised differences of degree regarding eudokia as one can recognise that some men are more righteous than others. In regard to Christ, says Theodore, this eudokia is of such a high degree as to constitute in fact a difference in kind rather than degree. So he defines the indwelling of God in Christ as a ἐνοικίζον καὶ εὐδοκίαν ὃς ἐν ὑμῖν. And, lest it be thought that this does not establish a difference in kind, we find Theodore writing the following:

Mox autem in ipso plasmato Deus Verbum factus est ... erat autem forte in ipso et nascente, et cum in materno utero esset a prima statim plasmatione ...³

1. Theodore De Incarn. VII (Swete II p. 294).
2. Ibid.
With Christ the union goes back to the very first moment of human existence. This union is original and absolute, so the difference is one of kind as there is no comparable kind of union to which one can point.

In conclusion, it may be said that the Christology of Theodore, as the leading exponent of the Antiochene School, has an affinity to his predecessors in that milieu. Diodore, who must have taught him in his monastery, is to be mentioned in this respect. More problematic is the extent of his indebtedness to other names in the Antiochene tradition (Paul of Samosata and Eustathius) because we have no evidence to posit a real institution at Antioch with a progressive development in thought such as was the case with the Catechetical School of Alexandria. What may be said is that there was centred upon Antioch a tradition which perforce had to deal with the Arian and Apollinarian heresies. Against Apollinarius, Theodore emphasised that in Christ there is a perfect nature of man in union with the perfect nature of God. He disliked any suggestion that the Logos became flesh and preferred to think in terms of the Logos taking on humanity. This, then, was his problem: how to preserve the unity of Christ while at the same time preserving the human and the divine sides of Christ. Theodore claimed that the problem was not insuperable. His reasoning was that if we fasten attention upon the two natures in Christ, both of which are personal, then we do observe two persons: but if we keep in mind the perfect and harmonious union of will into which they have entered, then we have only one person.

While this problem may not have seemed insuperable to Theodore, his opponents are most sceptical about the means whereby he claimed to have overcome it. Particularly unfortunate, in their view, is his use of the analogy of the relation of a man and a woman in marriage:

Ce n'est pas, en effet, parce que nous disons deux natures que nous sommes contraints de dire deux maîtres ou deux fils, ce qui serait d'une naïveté extrême: car tous ceux qui en quelque chose sont deux et un en quelque chose, leur conjonction, qui les fait un, n'anéantit pas la distinction des natures, ni la distinction des natures ne s'oppose à ce qu'ils soient un... Et ailleurs il est dit de l'homme et de la femme qu'ils ne seront pas deux, mais un seul corps (Mt. 19 v.5)
et ce n'est pas parce qu'ils sont un seul corps que l'homme et la femme ne sont pas deux. Mais ils demeurent deux en ce par quoi ils sont deux, et ils sont aussi un ence par quoi ils sont un et non pas deux. 1

The most Theodore can point to in this analogy is a moral union, while the persisting distinct personalities of the man and the woman are a distinct embarrassment to his argument. F.A. Sullivan is not disposed to treat this embarrassment lightly. It is for him indicative of the basic inadequacy of Theodore's position which he outlines as follows:

Theodore's "One Son" is not the Divine Person, but a common term including both the natural Son of God and an adoptive son. There is "One Son" because the name "Son" includes both him who is Son by nature, and him who shares in this title by adoption, by conjunction with the true Son. ... Strictly speaking, the name "Son" belongs only to Him who is Son of God by nature, but the "inhabitation by good pleasure" involves the sharing of the honours and titles of the natural Son with the man whom He assumed. Hence, when we say: "the Son of God", our thought includes not only the Divine Son, but also the homo assumptus who shares this title. 2

Sullivan concedes that Theodore's system unites the Word and the homo assumptus in one prosopon, but denies that this prosopon is the Divine Person of the Word:

There is one "Son of God", but this is because the one who was born of the Virgin Mary is an adoptive son of God, and shares in the title of the true Son who dwells in him by "good pleasure". 3

Despite the vigour with which Sullivan advances his adverse conclusions on Theodore's Christology a less pessimistic view is taken here. It is that Theodore's understanding of the Incarnate Lord is not to be reduced to a mere moral union and that he does not intend to endorse a view that in Christ there persists two distinct personalities. Nevertheless, his language and theological conceptions do not sufficiently allow him to promote the former or escape the latter. Had Theodore and the Antiochene school been able to accept, as the Alexandrians did, the Platonic notion of "man", then they would have come to a Christology which preserved the unity. That they could not was part of their Aristotelian heritage. They could not comprehend the abstract

3. Ibid. p. 283.
concept 'man' having a reality of its own. Because they could not, the
'homo assumptus' became a logical consequence for them. Theodore insists
that manhood involved in its very essence existence as a man:

\[ \text{o} \text{udē γὰρ ἁπόθεμέν ἐστιν ἁπόθεσιν εἰτεῖν} \]

So to insist is inevitably to present oneself with the problem of the unity
of Christ in its most acute form.

The opposite tradition of Alexandria which was cradled in
Christian Platonism\(^2\) laid greater stress on the unity of Christ. If however
they avoided the principal problems of the Antiochene tradition, the
establishment of the uniqueness of Christ and an over-emphasis upon duality
which might put the unity of Christ in danger, their equal and opposite danger
was a reduction of the human status of our Lord and an under-valuation of his
human experiences.

This Christian Platonism was an attempt with mingled elements
of loss and gain for the Church. It is not in doubt that the Biblical Faith
rested on the Hebraic premise of an all-holy and all-loving Creator active in
history. The Biblical doctrine of the transcendency is never so phrased as to
set this conviction at risk. When, however, Christianity moved into a
Hellenistic environment the task of communication led inevitably to the attempt
to restate the Gospel in terms which a reasonable, educated man could accept.
The dominant strand in contemporary philosophical thought owed much to the
thought of Plato whose strongly emphasised contrast between the Eternal and
the Temporal when applied to the idea of God led to a sharply expressed
transcendency of an ontological kind. While Stoicism, a system of a
different type exerted some influence (particularly in the West) either as
a system in its own right or as an important ingredient in an eclectic
philosophy drawn from a different system, the dominant tradition was becoming
Middle Platonism (and later Neoplatonism) in which the mystical elements in

1. Theodore De Incarn. VIII (Swete II p.299).
Plato were emphasised at the expense of the more strictly philosophical parts of his system.

The whole movement is discussed by Henry Chadwick¹ in Early Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition with reference to Justin, Clement and Origen. Justin together with the other apologists do not belong properly to this thesis. He uses a number of philosophical proof-texts drawn from various sources and the whole layout of his Logos doctrine owes much to current Platonic thought. Clement of Alexandria is not inaptly described by Bigg as 'the father on whom the spirit of Hellenism brooded most heavily'. His knowledge of the Greek philosophical writings is more extensive than that of Justin and his Logos doctrine is even more fully developed though he still claims that it is Christianity which gives men knowledge of the divine.²

Yet Clement can also write as if Greek philosophy was almost a third Testament addressed to Greeks. The movement reached its climax in Origen. Whether Origen himself had been trained in the philosophical schools of Ammonius Saccas (Eusebius H.E. VI.19.6) is disputed,³ but at least the impression left by Origen on Porphyry is indisputable:

While his manner of life was Christian and contrary to the law, in his opinions about material things and the Deity he played the Greek...⁴

Certainly in his theological writings the philosophical and the Christian theological interests lie side by side.⁵

The same general background recurs in the earlier thought of Athanasius, though perhaps he became increasingly a Biblical theologian the older he grew. However, while in his De Incarnatione (one of his earliest works) the appeal to man the reasonable being is detectable, yet there is no doubt that Athanasius begins his approach with man the sinful being.

1. See also A.H. Armstrong and R.A. Marcus, Christian Faith and Greek Philosophy.
4. Eusebius H.E. Vi.19.7.
5. "We hold that the great God is in essence simple, invisible, and incorporeal, Himself pure intelligence, or something transcending intelligence and existence ...." Origen c. Cels. VII 38 (G.C.S. II p.188).
While it is accepted that man is a reasonable being capable of knowing God, yet his starting point is that man is a fallen creature. Therefore, what man primarily needs in a means of release from the bondage of sin with a concomitant restoration of incorruptibility and a state of being "in God" which was man's before the Fall.¹

Here in 'incorruptibility' and the state of being 'in God' we meet with two ideas which are fundamental in the Athanasian doctrine of Redemption. He taught that man shares with the irrational creatures a nature subject to corruption (ἀθανασία) but that God gave man an additional gift, making him in His own image and giving him a portion of the power of His own Word. So man became a rational being. Further, because the 'will of man' could sway man God secured grace for him by a law. So then if man kept the law, he would be preserved and would have the promise of incorruption in heaven. If, on the other hand, man did not keep the law, then he would forfeit the grace and the promise of incorruption and so incur corruption in death which was his by nature. Since man has transgressed and forfeited the grace of God he is accordingly involved in corruption. Athanasius taught that repentance on the part of man was powerless to reproduce incorruption (ἀθανασία). For this the grace of God must be restored and this requires the action of the Word of God who made everything at the beginning. So the Word of God came and took a body of like nature with man and give it over to death and as an offering to the Father. Athanasius saw a twofold purpose in this. First, that all being held to have died in Him, the law involving the corruption of man might be undone and, second, that man appropriating His body and the grace of the Resurrection might be turned from corruption to incorruption. Athanasius is clear about the reason for the

¹. A valuable discussion of the Athanasian doctrine of Redemption is to be found in J. Gross 'La Divinisation du chrétien d'après les pères grecs' pp.201-18 and H.E.W. Turner 'The Patristic Doctrine of Redemption' pp.70-96.
2. See Athanasius de Incarn. 3,4 (P.G. XXV 1010).
3. See Athanasius de Incarn. 7 (P.G.XXV 109D) 8 (Ibid.109D) and 20 (Ibid.190C).
bodily appearing of the Word: only He who made all things out of nought had the power to turn the corruptible to incorruptibility; only He who was the image of the Father could create anew the likeness of God's image; only He who is the very Life could render the mortal immortal.

A further development in Athanasius' doctrine of Redemption is to be seen in his Four Discourses against the Arians. 1 Here he taught that Christ is the First-born because His flesh (as the Word's body) was saved before all others. Man now 'becoming incorporate with it' are saved after its pattern. For in it the Lord become our guide to the Kingdom of Heaven and the Father. He is the way and the door and through Him all must enter. While in Adam we all die, now, our origin and infirmity of flesh being transferred to the Word, we rise from the earth. This is so because in Christ we are all quickened and because the flesh is no longer earthly but henceforth made Word, by reason of God's Word who for our sake became flesh. This, it seems, indicates the way to interpret the two famous Athanasian statements on deification:

\[
\text{Aútops ýàp énuvérwthōne, év ÿis ñeówthén.}
\]

\[
\text{Kéáov ýàp ãvθýmòs, ÿis ïúsc ev ãowthi ñeówthén.}
\]

As H.E.W. Turner points out:

The Logos who deifies cannot be of the same substance with those whom He deifies; He cannot therefore be, like us, a creature. Nor could He deify Christians if He were God by participation and not by full identity of substance. 2

To which, to quote the same author again, must be added:

Man would have failed of his deification if... the Logos had not become flesh. 3

1. See Athanasius Orat. c. Arian. II.61 (P.G. XXVI 277) III.31 (Ibid. 397) III.33 (Ibid. 383) and II.70 (Ibid. 296).
2. De. Incarn. 54 (P.G. XXV 192).
3. Epist. ad Adelph. 4 (P.G. XXVI 1077).
5. Ibid.,p.89.
It will be readily apparent that in the teaching of Athanasius only the Incarnation of the Logos who is fully divine can achieve the redemption of man. This theme, already present in his earlier writings, is a constant theme in his anti-Arian apologetic. This is abundantly clear from the expositions and applications of the doctrine in the Orations against the Arians to which reference has already been made. The point is summarised briefly in the de Synodis 51:

Whence, if He was Himself too from participation, and not from the Father His essential Godhead and Image, He would not deify, being deified Himself. For it is not possible that He, who merely possesses from participation, should impart of that partaking to others, since what He has is not His own, but the Giver’s; and what He has received, is barely the grace sufficient for Himself.  

But Athanasius cannot be acquitted of an undervaluation of the humanity of Christ; indeed it is arguable whether he accepted the existence of a human soul in Christ. There may be reasons to explain this. Athanasius contended long in his life with Arianism which argued against the full divinity of Christ. The Arians had instanced the sufferings of Christ as proof of his inferiority to the deity. The way to victory against Arianism was to establish unequivocally the full divinity of Christ. It is nonetheless surprising that Athanasius did not employ the concept of the human soul of Christ to ease his explanation of the sufferings of Christ had it been available to him.

J.N.D. Kelly in Early Christian Doctrines pp. 287-9 gives the case of those who doubt whether Athanasius accepted the existence of a human soul in Christ. This interpretation of the evidence is disputed by A. Grillmeier in Christ in Christian Tradition pp. 210-7 where he concludes that it is possible that he accepted the human soul of Christ as a physical (psychological) fact but not as a theological factor to which any special importance is assigned. The question turns, first on the assessment of the silence of the Orations against

1. Athanasius de Synod. 51 (P. G. XXVI 784).
the Arians where the use of the concept would have been most relevant, and
the equivocal character of a passage in the Tome to the Antiochenes\(^1\) where
the reference is put in a negative form:
\[
\Omega\mu \lambda \alpha \beta \gamma \nu\alpha\mathrm{r} \kappa \iota \tau \sigma \tau \kappa \sigma \mathrm{t} \alpha \varsigma \iota \varepsilon \rho \mathrm{o} \sigma \mu \mathrm{n} \\
\alpha \nu \mu \kappa \alpha \mathring{o} \mathrm{v} \ldots \varepsilon \iota \chi \varepsilon \nu \sigma \varepsilon \omicron \tau \omega \gamma \eta \rho.
\]
This could either be a somewhat indirect allusion to the human soul of Christ
or at least leave open the view that the Logos Himself served as the nous of
the Incarnate Lord. While a conclusive answer to this problem is impossible
the probabilities tend in the direction taken by Kelly. All that Grillmeier
provides is a sustained plea for stay of execution. Meanwhile Grillmeier
himself writes:

> The Athanasian picture of Christ is clearly centred on the Logos ....
> The human element in Christ is governed by the Logos, and the Lord
> is 'flesh-bearing Logos', but not 'God-bearing man'.\(^2\)

This emphasis, which some would see as a weakness, Athanasius bequeathed to
the thinking of Alexandria. It is met, for example, in the teaching of
Apollinarius.

While, in company with Athanasius, the opposition of
Apollinarius to Arianism is not in doubt, his Christology, unlike that of
Athanasius, tends strongly in a similar direction to that of Arianism. His
thought on the Incarnation is that it is primarily and centrally as act of
God. Thus we find him referring to Christ as \(\sigma\alpha\rho\kappa\omicron\omicron\omicron\phi\omicron\omicron\omicron\mathrm{os}\)\(^3\) and
\(\sigma\alpha\rho\kappa\omega\theta\omicron\varepsilon\mathrm{is}\)\(^4\). This thought is seen in the following fuller
statement:

\[
\Theta\varepsilon\omicron\sigma\lambda \iota \beta \iota \iota \iota \delta \sigma\alpha\rho\kappa\omicron\sigma\varepsilon \iota \nu \sigma\alpha\rho\kappa \iota \phi\alpha\nu\varepsilon\rho\alpha\theta\omicron\varepsilon\mathrm{is}.\]

These leave us in no doubt that Apollinarius thought of the Incarnation in

1. Athanasius Tom. ad Ant. 7 (P.G. XXVI 804B).
2. A. Grillmeier, op. cit. p. 219.
3. Apollinarius Fr. 109 (Lietzmann p. 233).
5. Apollinarius Ibid. 31 (Lietzmann p. 179).
terms of a divine irruption. For him the Parousia of Christ was an epidemic of God and not merely the genesis of a man. The reason for this emphasis in the writings of Apollinarius is not difficult to find. His chief christological opponents were the Antiochenes Paul of Samosata and (probably) Diodore. He objected strongly to their teaching:

"οὐκ ἔσται τῷ ἁναλίσθενει γένος ὁ ἀνθρώπινος, ἀλλὰ οἱ προσεχθέντες σωμάτων ἔθεος ἐν εὐρύστατων ἀνθρώπων ἀνατελεῖται προφήτης Ἰηνον ἀποτολος, οὗ σωμάτη κόσμου."

The second thing to be noticed in the Christology of Apollinarius is his insistence upon the fact that the action of God upon mankind in the Incarnation issues in a unitary person and that the Logos is the directive principle in this unitary person. To quote Hooker, the position of Apollinarius is 'One Christ and He divine'. So against the duality of Diodore, Apollinarius insisted upon μία φύσις, μία ἐνδότοκος, μία ἐνεργεία καὶ ἐν προφήτη. In this case, the fuller statement to be quoted is his great formula:

"μία φύσις τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου σωματικῶς" 4

Two things are implicit in this formula. First, Apollinarius rules out of court a dyad of sons which he said would involve substituting a Tetrad for the Trinity. Second, it excludes the acceptance of a human nous in Christ. Apollinarius considered he had strong reasons for the second rejection. First of all a human nous would set up two directive principles in the Incarnate Lord, while we have already seen that Apollinarius held that to the Logos as the sole directive principle. Second, and what is worse, Apollinarius held that a human nous in the Incarnate Lord would lead to the

1. Apollinarius Fr. 70 (Lietzmann p.220).
2. Apollinarius Fr. 76 (Lietzmann p.222).
5. Apollinarius Fr. 74 (Lietzmann p.222).
setting up of two contrary principles: the 'unconquerable soul' of the Logos and the human nous which is for him the seat of sin and 'the prey of sinful thoughts'. The assumption of a human nous in Christ is therefore to be rejected for it would lead to civil war in the Incarnate Person.

Strong though Apollinarius' reason may have been for rejecting the human nous and however strongly he may have urged the inadequacy of a humanly orientated person for redemptive purposes, this precisely is where his difficulties began from the standpoint of redemption. The deficiency of a human nous in Christ rebounds to make Apollinarius' system itself defective. His Cappadocian opponents, particularly, were quick to seize the point:

There is some evidence that Apollinarius himself saw the problem inherent in his system. It has often been noted that his psychological statements fall into two groups so making it difficult to determine his standpoint in psychology. Some of the statements are dichotomous, others trichotomous, depending upon whether man is classified as body and soul or as body, soul and spirit. The suggestion was made as early as Rufinus that Apollinarius switched from the first to the second in order to 'undergird the ship'. The suggestion is, at least, attractive. However, scholarly opinion is divided on the point. But, whatever may be the final appreciation of

1. Apollinarius KMF 30 (Lietzmann p.178).
5. Gregory Nyss. C. Eumen. II, 175 (P.G. XLV 545). This reference is not against Apollinarius but against an Apollinarian type Christology.
6. For example, C.E.Raven, Apollinarianism, argues that his theory of human nature is consistently trichotomistic while H. Lietzmann, Apollinaris, is for original dichotomy and later trichotomy. Differing again, G.L. Prestige, Fathers and Heretics, takes Apollinarius' normal view to be definitely dichotomistic.
Apollinarius' Christology in the light of further study, the fatal weakness of his system with regard to the assessment of the humanity will remain. At the same time it is to be admitted that his system - his pioneer system - set the current of Monist Christology. From him many, orthodox as well as heretics, were to draw material for their views in the centuries to come. To one of these, Cyril, the great adversary of Nestorius, we now turn our attention.

Cyril was made Bishop of Alexandria in 412 and for the first seventeen years of his episcopacy his writings reveal primarily the influence of Athanasius, his great predecessor. With Athanasius his conception of redemption is in terms of deification (Δενήσις) and is therefore an act centred in God and wrought by God in the flesh. 'One Christ and He Divine' equally indicates the standpoint of Cyril for whom the Logos asarkos is self-identical with the Logos ensomatos. It follows from this that Cyril rejects any doctrine of kenosis which involves loss of attributes on the part of the Logos. This may be seen in his understanding of Philippians ii. 5-11 where for Cyril, as with the Monist school generally, the subject of this kenosis passage is the Discarnate Logos. This being so, the kenosis for Cyril is the addition of the human experiences of the Logos which is rightly, if paradoxically, to be understood as a subtration. The added flesh which is present with the Logos in the Incarnate Lord involved physical limitations for the Logos - limitations which the Logos was pleased to impose upon Himself:

We assert that the very Word out of God the Father in the act whereby he is said to have been emptied for our sake by taking the form of a servant lowered himself within the measures of manhood.¹

He who lowered himself for our sakes to a voluntary kenosis, on what grounds could he reject the principles proper to kenosis?²

It will readily be seen that Cyril conceived of kenosis as residing in the will of the Logos. So when the Incarnate Lord professed

ignorance of some matter this was really an act of will whereby, out of respect for the limitations which the Incarnation imposed, He refused to make use of what he knew as Logos. This is a position, of course, which strongly contrasts with that adopted by the Antiochenes with respect to the Incarnate Lord. While Cyril was in difficulty with such passages as Luke ii, 52 and Mark xiii, 32, interpreting them in terms of the gradual unfolding of the Logos to the beholder, the Antiochenes accepted them at their face value and handled them realistically. As Dorner observes the Antiochenes find a positive value in progress which the starting point of Cyril excludes and rests rather in the static perfection of the Logos.

Before the outbreak of the Nestorian controversy Cyril was mainly engaged in anti-Arian polemic and therefore, at that period, the christological question of how God and man are one in Christ was not acute for him. J. Liebaert, La Christologie de saint Cyrille d'Alexandrie avant la querelle nestorienne, calls attention to the fundamental identity of approach between Athanasius and Cyril and finds few genuine traces of an acceptance of the human soul in Christ. Accordingly it would seem that during this period Cyril thought of Christ as a combination of Logos and sarx. In the years 429 and 430, in his controversy with Nestorius over the term θεοτόκος, Cyril gave himself to deeper theological study than hitherto. It is at this time that Cyril, as a means of expressing his belief in the fundamental unity of the Incarnate Word, took over the formula from Apollinarius believing it to be Athanasian. While J. Liebaert and others hold that this put him on the wrong track for understanding his Dualist opponents, H.M. Diepen takes a different view. He urges that while Cyril used Apollinarian formulas, the use he made of them

1. However, H.M. Diepen, Aux origines de l'anthropologie de saint Cyrille d'Alexandrie, argues otherwise, but with dubious success.
was orthodox. It is to be acknowledged that Cyril did not think as Apollinarius did for, after the outbreak of the Nestorian controversy, we find him writing with increasing confidence of a rational soul (ψυχή λογική) in Christ. Indeed in his later writings we find ψυχή νοερή and G.M. de Durand makes the convincing suggestion that Cyril substitutes noeros for logikos in order to provide a more direct head-on clash with the rejection of the human nous by Apollinarius.

Nevertheless, it is curious, to say the least that Cyril could at once assert the presence of a human soul in the Incarnate Lord and at the same time use the Apollinarian formula μία φύσις. Yet Cyril, deceived by the Apollinarian forgers, continued to do so thinking that it was an expression approved by the Church. Thus, no little confusion ensued. Cyril, meanwhile, continued to argue that the person of Christ was a unity of Logos and sarx and soul. Nor was the confusion relieved at all by Cyril stating that the Logos is flesh without being changed into flesh - a statement he made without demonstrating his argument in clear terms or explaining how such a statement could be made. However, some measure of demonstration and explanation may be forthcoming from a consideration of the terms used in the East in the search for a doctrine of Christology.

First there was the term προσωπον which we have already seen was used by Theodore of Mopsuestia for expressing the concept of person. The original meaning of the word is 'face', and it is therefore a non-metaphysical term. From this original meaning it came to express the external being as seen by an onlooker - in other words, the person. Apollinarius, the Cappadocian Fathers, and Cyril joined with Theodore of Mopsuestia in using the term in this way.

It has been observed that Theodore of Mopsuestia probably looked upon ὑπόστασις as a term to be used of the distinctive existence of God or of man. He was seeing the word as active in meaning, having the

sense of 'that which gives support'. It can, however, be taken as being passive in meaning, having the sense of 'that which underlies'. It is clear that in the former sense, although Theodore preferred \textit{πρῶτων}, \textit{ὑπότατος} is nevertheless very close to it in meaning. In the latter sense of 'that which underlies' it obviously means the basis of something and is the equivalent of the Latin term substantia. There are, then, two senses in which the term \textit{ὑπότατος} could be used and Cyril does not make it any easier to follow his thought when we find him using the term in both senses:

\begin{quote}

\begin{small}

\textit{Εὐι τοις ἔν τοῖς έστη ἐν τοῖς ἕπεμφον ἀνθετόν ροώς, οἴκοι έν ίκει τῇ τῷ Λογῷ σεοργημένου σύνοδος πραγμάτων ζην ιν πρωτότατον.}

\end{small}

\end{quote}

To add to the possibility of confusion we find there is another term which is equivalent to the Latin term substantia. This is \textit{όνοια}. Aristotle had spoken of a primary \textit{όνοια} and a secondary \textit{όνοια}, referring in the former case to the particular existence of an individual, and in the latter case to substantial existence. In the latter case \textit{όνοια} is equivalent to substantia and thus it came to be used in the main. But we find that Greek theologians were still capable of using \textit{όνοια} in the Aristotelian sense, namely in the sense of \textit{πρῶτων}.

Here, obviously, is another source of confusion and this is compounded when \textit{όνοια} gave way in popular usage to the term \textit{φύσις} (nature). Since \textit{φύσις} now replaced \textit{όνοια}, the Alexandrian School took to using \textit{όνοια} also in the two senses of individual existence (\textit{πρῶτων}) and nature (substantia).

So in their search for a doctrine of Christology the Alexandrian School had four terms at their disposal. Of these \textit{ὑπότατος}, \textit{όνοια} and \textit{φύσις} could all equal each other in the sense of 'substantia', and the same three terms could also equal \textit{πρῶτων} in the sense of person. It was inevitable that confusion should arise and that

2. Cyril Apol. XII Capit, d. Thdt. 1 (A.C.O. I, i, 6 p.112).
the schools of Alexandria and Antioch should each become suspicious of the others' teaching. It was not primarily this, however, that led to the clash between Cyril and Nestorius. More mundane reasons reveal themselves when we turn to consider the history of the period up to the Council of Ephesus in 431.
CHAPTER TWO - THE TRAGEDY OF NESTORIUS

The Acts of the Apostles tells the story of how St. Paul moved from city to city on his missionary journeys, preaching in the synagogues at first and, later, wherever men would give him audience. So Christianity took root in the cities. Subsequently, the churches in these cities sent evangelists into the countryside about them. That this was a subsequent movement is revealed by the word pagan. This came to denote non-Christian but originally meant merely a countryman or villager. So the churches in the countryside were founded by and owed their origin to the great city of their area. As these cities held the status of provincial capitals in the Roman Empire administering themselves and the immediate countryside which made up the province, so the church in these cities became the mother church of the churches in the province. Thus the Church adopted, albeit unconsciously, the same territorial divisions as appertained in the Roman Empire. The Christian communities in a civil province became an ecclesiastical unit.

But this is not to suggest that the pattern of development was everywhere the same. J. Zeiller shows that the need for teaching these remote churches of the countryside and the difficulties of communication between them and the main city church was a problem resolved in various ways by the Church. In certain regions visiting priests (περιοδευταί) were resorted to, while in others, where the church membership justified it, a resident priest would be provided. (In the latter case, of course, is to be seen the origin of the parish system.) Yet again there was another solution. This was to multiply the number of bishoprics - a solution favoured particularly in Africa where the numbers ran into many hundreds. While this particular solution provided the region everywhere with the full benefits of episcopacy it led inevitably to a devaluation in the office of a bishop, especially as at the beginning the

1. For the first part of this chapter I am particularly indebted to "Alexandria and Constantinople" by N.H. Baynes in his Byzantine Studies and Other Essays.  
holders of lesser bishoprics were accorded the same powers as the city-bishops. Eventually the ἐπίσκοποι ἐν τοῖς χωρίσι, as they came, disrespectfully, to be known, had their powers and numbers reduced and, by the end of the fourth century, were largely a thing of the past. With all of this in mind it was however wholly natural as the Church came to develop a more integrated world-wide organisation that this should follow the lines of civilian administration. The very terms diocese and vicar were taken from the imperial reorganisation of Diocletian and the right of the Bishop of Alexandria to confirm eleven episcopal appointments in Egypt, which antedates the rise of patriarchal jurisdiction, reflects the predominance of Alexandria in the civil province of Egypt.

As Christian numbers and influence grew, so came the need for the church leaders to confer on matters of common interest. We see this in the second century when bishops gathered in councils, and usually this was a gathering of bishops of a civil province in the capital city of the province. Further development took place in the third century when these gatherings, hitherto ad hoc affairs, became regular provincial synods meeting annually in the provincial capital. It will readily be understood that this development contributed to the prestige and authority of the bishop of the provincial metropolis as he became the standing president of the synod – a decisive position for influencing the election of bishops in the province. What had become generally accepted became laid down by the Council of Nicaea in 325. Here it was agreed that in future provincial councils should meet twice yearly under the presidency of the metropolitan and that no episcopal election in the province was to be valid without his approval. Thus was the form of Church organisation determined. As each imperial province had a civil head, the governor, so the Christian communities in that province had an ecclesiastical head, the metropolitan.

The provincial councils, mentioned above, were subject later to further development. This was the gathering together of bishops from many
provinces which took place, naturally, in the great cities of the Empire e.g., Antioch, Ephesus and Alexandria. Inevitably the prestige and authority of the bishop located in such great cities was further increased. He became over-metropolitan and took the title of patriarch. Moreover, as we have seen that the metropolitan came to have the right of approving the election of a provincial bishop, so the patriarch's approval became a pre-requisite for the election of metropolitan. And, distinguishing Alexandria in a special way, the patriarch of that see came to have the right to approve the election of all bishops within the several provinces of Egypt. In this further development of Church organisation the underlying basis continued to be the territorial divisions of the Roman administration. As the metropolitan had corresponded to the governor, so the patriarch corresponded to the vicarius of the praetorian prefect. Thus a definite principle of Church organisation in the eastern provinces was that the importance and precedence of a bishopric depended upon the importance and precedence of the bishop's city in the Empire.

It will be appreciated, however, that the importance of the bishop's city in the Empire tended to attract to the bishop an importance and precedence in the civil sense. Importance and precedence in the christian sense, that is in the eyes of the Church generally, depended upon the christian connections to which the bishopric could point. Hence the importance of the succession lists leading to an apostle or an apostolic name. Here Rome and Antioch had undisputed origins but Alexandria, of which the origins are obscure, could only trace its descent from a hypothetical connection with St. Mark. This legend, which makes St. Mark the founder of the Church of Alexandria can point, by way of support to the close historical connection between the Churches of Rome and of Alexandria. This, however, raises the query as to why St. Mark should be chosen in preference to St. Peter. H.E.W. Turner\(^1\) wryly suggests that it may have been an unusual degree of modesty on the part of the Church of

Alexandria occasioned by the lack of any reference to this church in the New Testament. Another suggestion for the tradition of St. Mark as founder is the specially close relationship between Alexandria and the Second Gospel. In this case the query is why St. Mark rather than St. John, for it can be shown that the Fourth Gospel has even closer ties with the Church in Egypt. Without doubt, in the ecclesiastico-political struggles that went on between Rome, Alexandria, Antioch and Constantinople, the Church in Egypt needed to be able to point to distinguished beginnings. But reality was far from this, for, as H.E.W. Turner observes:

Nothing forbids the view that in the early Alexandrine scene the most prominent figures were Gnostic rather than orthodox. The absence of significant names in the early part of the succession list almost necessitates this conclusion.

The working out of these principles regarding precedence, in a crucial instance, is to be seen in the case of the see of Byzantium. Hitherto a small Greek city with its bishop subject to the Bishop of Heraclea, Byzantium became Constantinople and, in 330, the seat of imperial government. It would have run counter to principles of Church organisation and commonsense alike to have persisted in making the Bishop of Constantinople subject to Heraclea - an unimportant bishopric. Such an anomaly was handsomely corrected when it was declared in the third canon of the Council of Constantinople, held in 381, that the Bishop of Constantinople should stand second in honour only to the bishop of old Rome upon the Tiber, because the city of which he is bishop is new Rome. This, however, was to establish the see only in the civil sense referred to previously. The lack of standing in the Christian sense would prove an embarrassment to so important a bishopric. If Alexandria was handicapped then Constantinople was even more so. Possibly the description of Constantine as Isapostolos (the equal of the apostles) was intended to cover the point.

This creation of a new patriarch - and not just a new patriarch, but one who was to take precedence over all others in the East - provoked

varying reactions in the patriarchal cities of Rome, Antioch and Alexandria.

Rome, which undoubtedly owed much of its de facto position to its position as the Church of the capital city of the earlier Empire, could not reasonably object to the new precedence assigned to the capital see of the Eastern Empire, especially as her own precedence was safeguarded by the canon referred to earlier. In practice, however, it was obviously not in her interests to allow the new patriarchate to become too powerful. Hence arose a diplomatic alliance between Rome and Alexandria which culminated in the virtual appointment of Cyril as Cælestinian's proxy in the condemnation of Nestorius. It was a major defect of the policy of Dioscorus to dissipate the fruits of this alliance by his tactless action in refusing to allow the Tome of Leo to be read at the Robber Council of Ephesus in 449.

Nor could Antioch object when Constantinople became the capital city of the Eastern half of the Empire. She herself lay too far to the East and insufficiently central to keep in close touch both with Macedonia and Greece on the one hand and Asia Minor on the other. Further, she lay much too close to the trouble spots of the Eastern frontier. A city that had once been lost to the Empire (in the third century) made a most doubtful location for one of its two capitals. Consequently there was no overt rivalry between Antioch and Constantinople. But there was a longstanding rivalry between Antioch and Alexandria and it was this which determined the former's attitude to Constantinople. While Antioch could do little to Alexandria directly she could try and influence Constantinople against her. In fact, much of the ecclesiastical history of the fourth and fifth centuries can be interpreted as a struggle between Antioch and Alexandria to get their man in to the see of Constantinople and thus try to mould the traditions of the new see to their

1. Antioch might have claimed and been accorded precedence because of its prominence in the New Testament despite its political and geographical disadvantages. It had, of course, more Christian centuries to its credit than Alexandria.
2. This was no doubt facilitated by the special importance which Egypt had for secular Rome as the granary which supplied the panem, if not the circuses in which the Roman plebs delighted. That is why the Prefect of Egypt was an imperial appointment from the times of Augustus onwards.
liking. So the Asiatic Gregory of Nazianzus and the Antiochenes John Chrysostom and Nestorius found themselves opposed by Alexandrian candidates.

Constantinople, however, was not just a pawn for Alexandria in her rivalry with Antioch - she was seen as a challenge to the position of Alexandria. The leaders of Alexandria pointed to the six centuries of pagan and Christian history of their city and asked how could pride of place by denied her and given to the city of Constantine, which was but the city of yesterday. So were initiated the conditions whereby Alexandria resented the growing power of Constantinople and whereby the relations between the patriarchs of these great cities would so often become so much less than friendly. Athanasius, whose many sufferings and triumphs increased the reputation of Alexandria much in the eyes of the orthodox, would refuse a summons to appear before Constantine at Caesarea and remained in a watchful Alexandria, though he did in fact later present himself to the Emperor at Tyre. Later, Peter, Patriarch of Alexandria, would make an unsuccessful attempt to have a certain cynic philosopher, Maximus, appointed Bishop of Constantinople. Similarly, Theophilus, Patriarch of Alexandria, would try to have his personal friend, Isidore, elected Bishop of Constantinople. The same Theophilus, subsequently, would engineer the downfall of Chrysostom, Bishop of Constantinople. The same bitter rivalry between the two patriarchal sees is reflected in the Tragedy of Nestorius and ensured that it would be played out to the end.

The Patriarch Atticus of Constantinople died in October 425 and the question of a successor revealed a division of opinion between clergy and people. The former were for Proclus or Philip while the latter favoured a certain old priest named Sisinnius. The wish of the people prevailed and Sisinnius was enthroned. His short patriarchate ended with his death in 427. Again the clergy let it be known that they would have Proclus or Philip for their patriarch but the court decided to look outside the ranks of the clergy of Constantinople for the next occupant of the see. Nestorius was chosen, who at

1. V. H. L. Bell, Jews and Christians in Egypt p. 53 ff.
that time was a superior of a monastery close to Antioch. He was enthroned in April 428. The clergy of Constantinople, twice baulked in their desire to see either Proclus or Philip elevated, must have had some feelings of resentment against their new bishop. His immediate actions did nothing to help assuage their feelings. He began by sending police to demolish an Arian chapel in old Constantinople. A fire broke out in the chapel, started, says Socrates, by the Arians themselves. Be that as it may, the fire was soon out of control resulting in the destruction of several nearby houses. This unhappy incident earned for Nestorius the title of "Incendiary" which was used of him by the heretics and faithful alike. This inauspicious start to his patriarchate, which brought him some unpopularity, did nothing to restrain Nestorius. Socrates wrote:

...he could not rest, but seeking every means of harassing those who did not embrace his own sentiments, he continually disturbed the public tranquillity.

Quartodecimans, Macedonians, Novatianists: all in their turn received attention from Nestorius who enjoyed the support of the government and a new law promulgated against heretics. But what was to kindle most resentment, and worse, against Nestorius was the ΘέοΤόκος affair. Before proceeding to give an account of this, it will be appropriate to give an account of the word ΘέοΤόκος itself.

Apart from a number of references of dubious authenticity in Hippolytus the earliest use of the word is in Origen where it is found in his Sel. in Dt. 22, 23 (P.G. XII 813) and Hom. in Lk. 7 (G.C.S. IX p.50). Compare also Socrates H.E. vii, 32 (P.G. LXVII 812). Afterwards the term became common

2. Ibid.
3. Nestorius, in what may have been an official almost ex cathedra utterance, had said to the Emperor: Give me the earth purged of heretics and I will give you Heaven as a recompense. (Socrates, H.E. vii, 29, 6).
4. In the note which begins here I would acknowledge my indebtedness to G.W.H. Lampe's A Patristic Greek Lexicon.
currency at Alexandria as the following list shows: Pierius in Philip of Side Fr. 7; Peter Fr. (P.G. XVIII 517), Alexander Ep. XII (P.G. XVIII 568), Athanasius Orat c. Arian III, 14 (P.G. XXVI 349), III, 33 (ibid. 393), Vit. Anton. 36 (ibid. 897), Didymus de Trin. I, 31 (P.G. XXXIX 421), II, 4 (ibid. 481), III, 6 (ibid. 848), III, 41 (ibid. 988). As one would expect the term is also to be found in writers under Alexandrian influence e.g., Eusebius of Caesarea, Cyril of Jerusalem and the Cappadocian Fathers. It is also found three times in the preserved fragments of Apollinarius: de.fid. inc. 4 (Lietzmann p. 195), 5 (ibid. p. 196, 6 (ibid. p. 198).

Evidence of the term spreading beyond the borders of theological writings is provided by the charge of the Emperor Julian that Christians were continually repeating the title - see Cyril c. Julian. VIII (P.G. LXXXVI 901).

While the term increased in use there were those who objected to it. This objection antedates the time of Nestorius. It was, for example, dismissed by Paul of Samosata whose position is Μαρία τον λόγον ούκ ἐτέκε and Μαρία ἑτεκεν ἀνεβαίνον ἐν τὸν ὅμον. Also we may suspect Diodore to have been unhappy with the term judging by the reserve with which he approaches the twofold Generation of the Logos. Further, the sole reference in Eustathius is probably not authentic. Also ranged against the term, according to Socrates, was Theodore of Mopsuestia as may be seen in his de Incarn. Book XV fr. 2. (Swete II p. 310). All of which reveals Nestorius to have been thoroughly in line with his own tradition in his dislike of the word.

Coming now to the attitude of Nestorius, we may note first of all that Socrates, who defends Nestorius against the cruder charges made against

1. The Cappadocians though from Asia Minor show strong Alexandrine i.e. Origenistic influence.
2. Apollinarius though from Syria also displays strong Origenistic thought pressures.
4. Ibid. S, 4 p. 136.
5. see F. Sullivan, The Christology of Theodore of Mopsuestia p. 189 citing Fr. 2 from Cyril adv. Diodorum et Theodorum (P.G. LXXVI 1483d) and from the Syriac Brière Fr. 28 (p.270) and Fr. II (p.263) indicating denial of the twofold Generation of the Logos and therefore of the Theotokos. Compare τὸν Λεοντίου Fr. 4 (P.G. LXXXVI 1388a) where the communicatio idiomatum can only be used ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ in a turn of language.
him, considers that Nestorius made a bugbear (μαρλυκις) of the word
(Socrates H.E. vii, 32 (P.G. LXVII 809)). This is hardly fair on Nestorius for
a veritable barrage of theological objections, amounting to a powerful case, can
be derived from his writings. His objections may be listed under five heads as
follows:

1. It is unscriptural (Ep. I ad Caelest. (Loofs Nestoriana p. 167)) and in
particular it contradicts Hebrews vii, 31 (Serm. IX (ibid. p. 252)).
2. It is unknown to the Fathers (Ep. I ad Caelest. (op.cit. p. 167)). Here,
while Nestorius may have been right so far as the suspicions of his own tradition
are concerned, he ignores or does not know of its use in the Alexandrian
tradition. This observation is made by Socrates (Socrates H.E. vii, 32
(P.G. LSVII 809)).
3. In his view the term is unsound theologically. For the Virgin did not give
birth to the divinity of the Incarnate Lord nor is it possible for a creature
to give birth to the Creator (Serm. IX (op.cit. p. 252)). Similarly, no one
gives birth to one older than herself (Fr. 1 a. (op. cit. p.351)) and that which
is born (nativitas) ought to be homoousios with the parent (Fr. 1 d. (op.cit.
p. 351)). Consequently, the Father alone should be called Theotokos (Serm. X
(op. cit. p. 276)).
4. He argues that the term had Apollinarian or Arian implications (Ep. III ad
Caelest. (op.cit. p.181); Serm. X (op.cit. p.270); Serm. XVII (op.cit. p.300)).
Here, at least as far as Apollinarius was concerned, Nestorius was undoubtedly
right.

1. Cyril interprets this text of the twofold Generation of the Logos thus:
in eternity he is ametor, in time (by the Virgin Birth) apator.
2. Nestorius even suggests a neat reductio ad absurdum based upon the soul-body
relationship. A human being is composed of body and soul, the former derived
from the parents, the latter from God. (this is the view known as Creationism).
But we should not call the mother psuchotokos because she gave birth to an
ensouled human being. Nor should we describe the Virgin as Theotokos because
of the co-presence of the divinity with the humanity (Fr. 1 f. (op.cit. p.352)).
5. He was anxious about the pagan overtones he saw in the term, fearing that its use would tend to elevate the Virgin into a goddess (Fr. 3 (op. cit. p. 353)).

This list of objections readily reveals that it was more than just an unreasoned dislike which brought Nestorius to speak against the term Theotokos. Granted the Virgin Birth it seemed to one of his tradition to be saying too much too quickly. While the exegetical device of the Communicatio Idiomatum could be taken for granted by the other tradition, it seemed to him to blur the distinctness of the natures. His position was that since 'God' and 'being born' were linguistic and theological incompatibles, a term which conjoined them had better be avoided. Nevertheless, despite his devastating critique of the term, Nestorius seems to have been irenic. Thus he suggests as alternatives Christotokos (which begged no questions), theotokos kai anthropotokos which from his point of view was exact but was rather a mouthful for a term presumably used in devotional or even semi-liturgical contexts. He even suggests Theodochos (she who received Him that was God) which was formally closer to the offending term. Still more to the point it seems that in the last resort he was prepared to allow the use of Theotokos, particularly for simple folk who could not rise to the subtleties of technical theology (Ep. I ad Caelest. (op. cit. p. 168); Ep. VII ad Joann. Ant. (op. cit. p. 185); Ep. III ad Caelest. (op. cit. p. 181); Serm. XVII (op. cit. p. 312)).

To return now to the history of the ΘΕΟΤΟΚΟΣ affair, two accounts are current of the outbreak of the controversy. In one Nestorius takes the initiative as follows. He had, as bishops still do today, brought

1. Bethune Baker (Nestorius and his Teaching p. 55 and 66-8) evidently finds this objection attractive, but finally comes down against it as a major motif. Certainly we may say that the question at issue was christological rather than mariological.
with him into his new diocese colleagues from former spheres. One such was his chaplain Anastasius who one day in a sermon said:

Let no one call Mary Theotokos: for Mary was but a human being; and it is impossible that God should be born of a human being.¹

When protests were raised against this teaching, Nestorius hastened to support his chaplain. So a controversy flared. Nestorius preached insistently in support of the position of Anastasius and seemed to his opponents to be adopting the position of Paul of Samosata. Some ventured to insult the patriarch—but not with impunity. In the strained atmosphere thus engendered Nestorius made one step that was to prove particularly unfortunate for him. This was to turn on a deputation of monks, have them scourged and cast into prison. As Duchesne remarks: "Holy men never pardon these things: Nestorius had been very unwise."²

The other account of the controversy comes from Nestorius himself—hinted at in a letter to John of Antioch³ and in his Tragedy⁴ and confirmed in the Treatise of Heracleides.⁵ Here Nestorius asserts that when he arrived at Constantinople he found a quarrel over the question as to whether Mary was to be called Θεοτόκος or Ἰωτόκτονος. The parties to the quarrel, who had been calling each other "Manicheans" or "Photinians", were received by Nestorius at his palace when they asked for his advice. The resulting discussion revealed to Nestorius that those who adhered to Θεοτόκος were not Manicheans any more than those who upheld Ἰωτόκτονος were followers of the heretic Photinus and his advice to them was that, while both terms, rightly understood, were not heretical, the term Χριστοτόκος was safer than both. To this both parties agreed and were reconciled. So, according to Loofs⁶, they remained until Cyril of Alexandria intruded himself into the matter with a letter⁷ of intrigue to his own clergy at Constantinople.

3. F. Loofs, Nestoriana p. 185.
4. Ibid. p. 203.
It is not possible to decide which of the two accounts more accurately reflects the beginning of the Ἰησοῦς affair. However, they both indicate that the term Ἰησοῦς was just being introduced into the religious life of Constantinople when Nestorius became its bishop. Not unnaturally this term of the moment figured largely in the sermons of Nestorius and, confident in his theological and ecclesiastical position alike, he unwisely sent copies of his sermons far and wide: to Rome as well as to Alexandria. But if this was unwise, Nestorius now proceeded to make two mistakes in his relations with Rome, one fatal, the other impolitic. He made enquiries1 about the ecclesiastical status of some Pelagian exiles from the West who had taken refuge in Constantinople. This was fatal, for Nestorius must have known full well the attitude of religious authorities in the West to the followers of Pelagius. Not surprisingly, then, Rome cooled towards him as the reply2 he received from Caelestin indicates. So Nestorius prejudiced his case at Rome and stultified the theological affinities between Western and Antiochene Christology. Nor could his position have improved at all when Pope Caelestin turned to the Deacon Posidonius, who was an envoy of Cyril at Rome, with his queries regarding the views of Nestorius. The less serious error of Nestorius was to send the relevant material at the stage of explanation untranslated to Rome whereas Cyril in his correspondence with Caelestin always provided the necessary translation of his own dossier. So he placed himself at the disadvantage of a tardy exchange of views with Rome, since Caelestin could plead somewhat disingenuously the delay which translation occasioned, while Cyril had the benefit of more speedy communication.

While Caelestin consulted Posidonius regarding Nestorius, Leo,3 Archdeacon of Rome, sought the views of John Cassian, Abbot of St. Victor in Marseilles, who was well acquainted with the East. Cassian's submission4 on

3. It is ironical that Leo, the future Pope who was to intervene decisively against Dioscorus and in favour of Flavian, was already Archdeacon of Rome.
4. De Incarnatione contra Nestorium. C.S.E.L. vol.XVII.
the ease of Nestorius is discussed by O. Chadwick (John Cassian pp. 138-47).
This writer shows that Cassian evaluated the opinions of Nestorius in terms of Pelagianism. This evaluation was made on no adequate basis and may not unfairly be seen as a natural tendency, on the part of Cassian, to evaluate the unknown or partially known in the light of what was for him the familiar. Nevertheless, from the point of view of Nestorius' standing at Rome, nothing could have been more unfortunate than this imputation that Nestorianism was a disguised Pelagianism.

Meanwhile, things were happening on the Alexandrian scene. There there was much talk about the sermons Nestorius was preaching and when in 429 this talk reached the monks of Nitria they became most disturbed. It is to be noted that the importance of the monks of Egypt in the Realpolitik of the Patriarchate of Alexandria can hardly be overestimated. While an alliance between bishop and monks had been cemented under Athanasius, relations between them had deteriorated in the time of Theophilus, the predecessor of Cyril. So in writing now to allay the monks' fears, Cyril may also have been playing for their support. If this is the case, he was completely successful. We find, however, that this letter of Cyril made its greatest impact at Constantinople where the contents were eagerly received and used by the opponents of Nestorius. Not surprisingly Nestorius was incensed by this Alexandrian intrusion into Constantinople affairs and he instructed one of his priests, Photius, to prepare a refutation of Cyril's letter. But before this refutation reached Alexandria, Cyril, who was now aware of the resentment which Nestorius was feeling towards him, wrote the first of his letters to Nestorius. In this he argued that Nestorius was responsible for the trouble existing between them and he warned Nestorius that his sermons were being viewed suspiciously at Rome. Cyril's

1. F. Loofs (Nestorius p. 43) is most indignant that so strongly an anti-Nestorian work could be based on three sermons and one letter of Nestorius.
counsel was that Nestorius should stop attacking Mary's title of Ἑτοτόκος and then peace might be restored.

At this time diplomatic relations between the two patriarchs were strained: they were soon to become much worse. Nestorius now took an interest in the complaints and accusations against Cyril which certain deposed Alexandrian clergy were making at Constantinople. Cyril's reaction was to write again to Nestorius in which he made light of the accusations being made against him and attached far more weight to the dogmatic differences between Nestorius and himself. But that Cyril was concerned lest he should have to face accusations may be gathered from what he wrote to one of his secretaries on the matter:

Let not this poor creature imagine that I shall allow myself to be tried by him, whatever may be the type of accusers that he will hire against me. The roles will be reversed: I shall refuse to recognise his jurisdiction, and I shall know well enough how to compel him to make his own defence.2

Cyril in fact did two things preparatory to turning the tables on Nestorius. He was well aware that the activities of Nestorius were being viewed critically at Rome and Cyril saw in this an opportunity to strengthen his own position. Accordingly he wrote3 to Pope Caelestine a letter phrased to show his deference to Rome and respect for the traditional authority and power of Rome. So Cyril addressed Caelestine as 'Most Holy Father' though he, Cyril, had been ten years longer in episcopal orders than the man to whom he was writing. He recalled the tradition that serious questions were to be submitted to the Holy See (something which was conveniently forgotten at Alexandria at the time of the Chrysostom affair) and asked for Caelestine's advice on the position of the Church at Constantinople, where many were refusing communion with Nestorius. He remarked also that Bishop Dorotheus, a supporter of Nestorius, had pronounced anathema

3. Cyril Ep. XI ad Caelest. (A.C.O. I,1,V pp.10-2). A letter which Loofs (Nestorius p.42) judges to be 'as untrue as it is clever'.
on any who termed Mary to be Ἐκτόκος. In this the power of Rome was weakened since the Macedonian bishops, who held office from Rome, found themselves included in the condemnation of Dorotheus. The position was serious; Cyril had attempted, without success, to reason with Nestorius; Alexandria accordingly turned to Rome for advice.¹

This letter of Cyril, coupled with the interpretation of Nestorius which Caelestine was obtaining from the Deacon Posidonius and the Abbot John Cassian brought about all and more for which Cyril could have wished. At a synod in Rome in August 430 Nestorius was condemned as teaching contrary to the common faith and violating the honour of the Virgin Birth. Moreover, Caelestine replied to Cyril stating that the teaching of Nestorius was unacceptable and that the excommunications pronounced by Nestorius are not only to be ignored, but that Nestorius must retract by accepting the doctrine of the Churches of Rome and Alexandria or be himself excommunicated. In the execution of this decision Cyril was appointed the Pope's representative to whom Nestorius must respond within ten days.

With Rome now firmly turned against Nestorius, Cyril tried to produce the same position in the Court at Constantinople. Accordingly he wrote a triad of treatises² and sent one each to the Emperor Theodosius II, the virgins Arcadia and Marina, and the Empresses Pulcheria and Eudocia. These had a very different effect. He received an imperial letter of great severity which rebuked him for causing trouble in the Church and for trying to provoke discord in the Court by his triad of treatises. At the same time he was informed that

1. With this request for advice Cyril also despatched to Caelestine a Latin translation of a work in which he denounced 43 quotations from the sermons of Nestorius as heretical. This is Cyril contra Nestorium libri IV (A.C.O. I,1, vi pp.13 - 106).

The Augustas were Arcadia and Marina. The Dominas were Eudocia the Empress and Pulcheria the sister of Theodosius who later succeeded him and was responsible for the Council of Chalcedon.
the present vexed questions of doctrine were to be settled at an ecumenical council at which he, Cyril, must be present if he would avoid the displeasure of the Emperor.

Cyril thus disappointed of his hope of turning both the Church at Rome and the Court at Constantinople against Nestorius, determined to make the most of the one part which had succeeded. Hence Cyril acted in accordance with Pope Celestine's letter empowering him as his representative and wrote\(^1\) to Nestorius. This is the third letter of Cyril to Nestorius known as Cum Salvator in which he refers to the decisions regarding Nestorius which had been taken at the Rome Synod. Cyril, however, indicated not only that Nestorius must retract within the prescribed ten days, but concluded his letter with Twelve Anathemas to which Nestorius must assent. Meanwhile the Emperors Theodosius II and Valentinian III had determined that Ephesus should be the scene of the coming Ecumenical Council. The imperial letter\(^2\), peremptory and ungracious in its terms, summoning Cyril to Ephesus at Whitsun next year crossed with his Cum Salvator which he had sent to Constantinople by the hand of four Egyptian bishops. Nestorius did not reply within the prescribed time, possibly feeling himself to be discharged from any necessity to do so by the approaching Ecumenical Council which the Emperors had summoned.

We have just recounted how an original dispute between Nestorius and Cyril was widened to place Nestorius at enmity with the western division of the Church and proceeded finally to the summoning of an Ecumenical Council. While the process is clear, what is not clear is why precisely a Council was called. Loofs\(^3\) argues that it was Nestorius who persuaded the Emperor to call it. Certainly the Emperor's sacra indicated that at the Council Cyril's conduct was to be subject to investigation and it is reasonable to assume that Nestorius had urged upon his Emperor the need for this. Cyril's conduct was,

2. Sacra ad Cyrilium et metropolitas qua synodus Ephesum convocatur (A.C.O. 1,1,1 pp. 114-6).
however, not subject to investigation and Loofs, further to his argument, claims to show how Cyril was clever enough to change his position at Ephesus from anvil to hammer. This is an interesting and nearly conclusive interpretation. If it is a true one, then it meant that Nestorius travelled to Ephesus with all confidence - a confidence that was to be rudely shattered.¹

But whoever or whatever it was that prompted the Ecumenical Council, it was clear to all that it would be the stage on which the confrontation of Nestorius and Cyril would take place.² Accordingly the bishops and officials that came to Ephesus came as supporters of the one or the other. Supporting Cyril were the fifty Egyptian bishops that travelled with him. In addition he was able to look for support from two other sources: First, Juvenal of Jerusalem hoped that Jerusalem might be raised to a patriarchal see, which hope could only be realised if Antioch were made to accept a reduction in its status. Juvenal saw that the realisation of his hope depended on the support and influence of Cyril whom, therefore, he was careful to please. A similar consideration brought Ephesus to the side of Cyril. It was a town of great importance in the imperial diocese of Asia but no recognition of headship was accorded to its bishop. Memnon, Bishop of Ephesus, hoping also for patriarchal status came with one hundred neighbouring bishops to the side of Cyril. Indeed, the past attempts of the bishops of Constantinople to bring the two imperial dioceses of Asia and Pontus under their control, combined with the recent attacks of Nestorius against Quartodecimans and Macedonians in Lydia and the Hellespont, respectively, made Memnon firmly pro-Cyril. He was to show this in no uncertain manner by closing the churches of Ephesus to Nestorius and his party.³

1. It is interesting to note that both Nestorius and Cyril looked forward to the outcome of the Council with every confidence though for different reasons, Nestorius because of his Emperor's support, Cyril because of the Roman proxy vote.
2. Loofs (Nestorius p.53) raises the question whether it was not rather two rival splinter groups rather than an Ecumenical Council. As a matter of historical fact Loofs is right. Probably Ephesus gains its authority by being accepted at Chalcedon.
3. Nestorius testifies that the populace proved even more hostile so that he and his party had to use soldiers as bodyguards. (Bazaar of Heracleides pp.108, 134-5, 266-7).
The three groups mentioned earlier combined to give Cyril a majority over the allies of Nestorius. Nevertheless, if Nestorius lacked the dominance in numbers, supporting him would be certain figures of authority. Notable among these were John of Antioch who was satisfied with the teaching of Nestorius but shocked by the Twelve Anathemas of Cyril, Andrew of Samosata who attacked the Twelve Anathemas in the name of the Orientals, and Theodoret of Cyrnhus who wrote a refutation of them.

Finally, we may mention, as a figure of importance, the man deputed as imperial representative to be at Ephesus with instructions to see that matters were debated in orderly fashion inside the assembly and that order was kept outside it. This was the Count Candidian.

Turning now to the events of the Council, we notice first that it did not begin on the appointed day of June 7. The papal delegates were still on the road and the bishops of Macedonia were still waiting to accompany them. The same was true for John of Antioch and the Syrian bishops who had been delayed by accidents to their caravan. Cyril, however, was not prepared to wait indefinitely for the late-comers. By virtue of the rank of his see and his commission from Pope Caelestine Cyril proceeded to have himself made President of the Council and, on June 21, summoned it to assemble the next day. Nestorius bitterly recalls the position that Cyril usurped to himself:

3. Undoubtedly the delay was involving the punctual bishops in unexpected and costly accommodation charges and it is even recorded that some died during the period so that Cyril may have been under some pressure to get the Council under way. However, John did send him a letter saying that he had been travelling incessantly for a month and hoping to arrive within a few days. This letter would reach Cyril about June 21. But, to confuse the matter, two of John's neighbouring bishops came on to say that John was agreeable for the Council to proceed without him if he continued to be delayed.
And I was summoned by Cyril who had assembled the Council, even by Cyril who was the chief thereof. Who was judge? Cyril. And who was the accuser? Cyril. Who was bishop of Rome? Cyril. Cyril was everything. Cyril was the bishop of Alexandria and took the place of the holy and saintly bishop of Rome, Celestinus.¹

Cyril's call to assemble was met with protests from sixty-eight bishops and the Count Candidian who said that no commencement should yet be made. Cyril ignored these protests and sent Nestorius a second and a third summons to attend the opening of proceedings. When Nestorius did not accept, Cyril opened the debates without him. Under Cyril, and with the Count Candidian still protesting, the Council proceeded to the conclusion that Nestorius was a heretic and should be deposed. Shortly afterwards its deliberation was conveyed to the absentee:

To Nestorius, new Judas. Know that by reason of thine impious preachings and of thy disobedience to the canons, on the 22nd of this month of June, in conformity with the Rules of the Church, thou hast been deposed by the Holy Synod, and that thou hast now no longer any rank in the Church.²

News of what had transpired was conveyed to John and his entourage when they arrived on the 26th June. A meeting was now held with the other bishops who had not been at the Council with Cyril. It heard from Count Candidian the imperial instructions given to him and how he had protested that these instructions were not fulfilled by the meeting of the 22nd June under Cyril. Whereupon the meeting³ under John proceeded to pass sentence of deposition on Cyril and Memnon and declare their adherents excommunicated until such time as they repudiated the Twelve Anathemas of Cyril.

1. Bazaar of Heracleides p. 132. It is not necessary to take this passage as telling against the view of Loofs (Nestorius pp.45-6) that Nestorius was behind the summoning of the Council by the Emperor. That Cyril assembles the Council and acts as its chief is an act ultra vires. Moreover, earlier in the same passage Nestorius says of Cyril: He did all things with authority, after excluding from authority him who had been charged by the Emperor, and he exalted himself.... Further, while the passage is a sharp statement of the fact that Cyril behaves throughout as if he had the Roman proxy vote in his pocket, the absence of Caelestine from the Council is not significant. Since the accident of the non-attendance of the Pope at Nicaea through illness or old age, it had become a principle that the Pope did not attend General Councils, cp. Leo at Ephesus 449 and Chalcedon 451.
2. Gesta Ephesina 63 (A.C.O. 1,1,2 p.64).
Meanwhile, Candidian had kept his Emperor informed of the turn of events at Ephesus. On June 29 an imperial rescript\(^1\) reached Ephesus disapproving of the events of June 22 and commanding that no bishop should leave Ephesus, but await a new imperial commissioner who would arrive shortly.

July 10 saw new arrivals at Ephesus in the form of the papal delegates. In view of the preceding negotiations between Cyril and Cælestinian they naturally joined Cyril's synod where they gave their assent to the deposition of Nestorius. With this further support now on his side, Cyril proceeded to move against John of Antioch. He summoned John to appear before him and his assembly. John refused and Cyril had him and his adherents excommunicated. The date was the 17th July.

Early August saw the arrival of the new imperial commissioner. This was the Count John who carried an imperial letter\(^2\) accepting the deposition of Nestorius, Cyril and Memnon. He placed the three bishops under guard. Next John attempted to reconcile the followers of Cyril and the Orientals, hoping thereby to institute acceptable proceedings and thus salvage something of value from this gathering of bishops. It was not to be. Though the Orientals did draw up a statement\(^3\) on \textit{αιτωκος} which was to become very important later as the Formulary of Concord, the rift between them and the supporters of Cyril continued. Nothing remained but for John to refer the matter to the Emperor.


As mentioned in the text above this statement of the Oriental bishops is obviously the basis of the Formulary of Concord but is not quite identical with it. That Theodoret played a large part in its formulation is proved by letters to him from John of Antioch (A.C.O. I, iv pp.124-5) and Alexander of Hierapolis (A.C.O. I, iv pp. 133-4).
Interest now switched to Constantinople where the Emperor tried to make peace between the two parties. Thither the Count Irenaeus was sent by the Orientals to state their case and use his considerable influence. Cyril sent his physician John and ensured that he would be influential by loading him with considerable treasures from Egypt with which to sway the Court. But possibly more influential than both was a procession of monks, led by a holy man from the monastery of Isaac, which marched through Constantinople to the imperial palace in support of Cyril and against Nestorius. In the face of all this the Emperor still sought to bring about a reconciliation if he could. With this in mind he ordered each side to send eight delegates to debate before him at Chalcedon.

The two issues of debate were the term ΘΕΟΤΟΚΟΣ and the Twelve Anathemas of Cyril. The Orientals were prepared to accept the former but wanted the latter condemned as heretical. The supporters of Cyril, however, were not prepared to allow any discussion on the Twelve Anathemas and it became clear that no agreement was possible. However, it was as intolerable for Theodosius as it was dangerous for the Empire that the matter should be allowed to drift on with no hope of a settlement. Accordingly, Theodosius determined upon his own course of action. He ordered that Nestorius should be expelled from Constantinople and sent back to his monastery at Antioch.

As we have noticed there is a problem concerning who was responsible for the calling of the Council of Ephesus so now we meet a problem regarding why Theodosius should thus suddenly abandon and lose interest in Nestorius. Was it out of disgust for Nestorius who had lamentably failed after he himself had prompted the Emperor to call the Council? Was it disappointment because the Emperor had expected Nestorius to achieve some diplomatic purpose for

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List of presents from Cyril to people in Constantinople (A.C.O. I, iv pp.222-4).
him at Ephesus? Did Pulcheria\(^1\) seize the opportunity offered by the situation to influence Theodosius against Nestorius? Or was Nestorius\(^1\) offer to quit Constantinople and return to Antioch\(^2\) eagerly grasped by the Emperor as a means of relieving a difficult situation? It is not possible to say which one or combination of these things, coupled certainly with the bribing activities of Cyril, caused Nestorius so precipitately to lose the Emperor’s favour and his bishopric. But lose them he did.

When the Emperor summarily closed the debate of the delegates at Chalcedon he returned to Constantinople for the installation of a successor to Nestorius, inviting the Cyrilline delegates to accompany him. On his return to the capital, the Emperor pronounced the dissolution of the Council and ordered the bishops, with the exception of Cyril and Memnon who were to remain under arrest, to return home. But by the time this pronouncement came Cyril had already escaped and was then on his way back to Alexandria. All the Emperor could do was to accept the fait accompli which he did by issuing a rescript\(^3\) that Cyril might remain at Alexandria. Thus the course of events revealed the bishop of old Alexandria to have scored another triumph over the new see of Constantinople.

1. Pulcheria had a grievance against Nestorius because, doubting her virtue, he did not pay her the ceremonial honours which she as a virgin demanded (Bazaar of Heracleides pp. 96-7).
CHAPTER THREE - THE CHRISTOLOGY OF NESTORIUS

"To Nestorius, new Judas. Know that by reason of thine
impious preachings ... thou hast been deposed by the Holy Synod, and that thou
hast now no longer any rank in the Church." So read the sentence of deposition.
What were the impious preachings? For answer we turn now to a consideration of
the Christology of Nestorius.

Attention has already been directed in the first chapter to the
view of Leontius that the "ideas which originated with Paul of Samosata were
handed down in succession and descended upon Diodore who became Theodore's guide
along these evil ways," as well as to the comment of Narses the Nestorian linking
Diodore, Theodore and Nestorius as proclaimers of one invincible doctrine. We
have seen that these views do not go unchallenged though many of the time would
have regarded them as unchallengeable. Evidence of this was the action of
Eusebius, later to be Bishop of Dorylaeum, in affixing a poster to the wall at
St. Sophia comparing the teaching of Nestorius with that teaching of Paul of
Samosata which the Council at Antioch held in 268 had condemned. This comparison
was also received at the Council of Ephesus in 431 and was held to show that
Nestorius was of the same opinion as Paul of Samosata. Indeed, sayings of Paul
and of Nestorius were placed side by side to show that the latter was at one
with the former in teaching that He who was born of Mary was only a man. And,
if further proof were needed, Theodotus, Bishop of Ancyra, was able to provide
it. He reported to the Council, when at last its meetings began, that during
the days of delay he had heard Nestorius state that one could not say of a child
of two or three months that he is God.

However, the term which played the most important part,
initially at least, was ΘΕΟΤΟΚΟΣ. As Theodore of Mopsuestia had done
before him, Nestorius objected to this term. Not ΘΕΟΤΟΚΟΣ but ΧΡΙΣΤΟΤΟΚΟΣ

1. A.C.O. I, i, pp. 102-3 (Greek); I,iii pp. 18-20 (Latin).
3. Theodore de Incarn. ... XII Fr. (Swete II p. 310).
said Nestorius. He argued that He who was born of Mary should not be called either 'God the Word' or 'Man', but rather 'Christ' or 'Son' or 'Lord' because these terms preserve the distinctness of the two natures in the person. But while Nestorius' purpose was to preserve the two natures in Christ, his accusers saw his purpose producing a different result. They charged him with so distinguishing between Godhead and Manhood in Christ as to make Christ not one but two persons. In this they could readily contrast Nestorius, who spoke of two hypostases in Christ, with Cyril and his Μονογενής. To determine whether Nestorius was guilty or innocent of the charges we shall look more closely at the vocabulary available to Christologists of the period and then, with this background, go on to examine the terminology and metaphysics of Nestorius' own Christology.

The vocabulary available to the Christologists of our period was determined to a remarkable extent by Apollinaris. This is partly due to the fact that he was the first to see the possibilities of applying terms already in use in Trinitarian theology to Christology and partly to the 'fraudes Apollinistarum' which gave to some of his writings a spurious orthodox authority. However, this vocabulary, as had happened in Trinitarian theology, was subject to a period of considerable experimentation and the technical terms did not achieve an agreed scaffolding before Chalcedon. In particular the two traditions used the terms in different senses to express their fundamental insights while even within the traditions the nuances conveyed by the terms can differ from writer to writer. Add to this the questions of authority which arise with regard to important passages and it will be understood that a precise, unequivocal evaluation of the terms is not possible.  

1. A brief reference to this vocabulary was first made at the close of chapter one of this dissertation.  
2. While full-scale studies of particular terms are regrettably lacking, the Patristic Lexicon devotes long and informative articles to the main terms. A. Grillmeier, too, has much valuable information in the course of his study. Attention is drawn to two important articles on the term hypostasis by Marcel Richard which are to be found in Mélanges de science religieuse, Vol.II (1945) pp. 1-30 and pp. 243-70. Studies on prosopon/persona will be noted later.
(I) **Hypostasis**

This word became part of the accepted Trinitarian vocabulary in the formula μιᾷ οὖσα, τρεῖς ἐνοχμένοις. Its subsequent introduction into Christology, especially by those who saw in the Incarnate Lord the conditioned Logos, was wholly natural. The term denoted concrete existence.

We are indebted to M. Richard for establishing its Apollinarian origin. It was current among the moderates but not the extremists of his school. Fourth century orthodox writers only use the word in anti-Apollinarian contexts.

In Antiochene circles there is insufficient evidence to establish its use by Diodore. The sole passage is found in a Syriac fragment directed against Apollinarius and this does not enable us to know whether he used the term to express his own views nor whether (had he done so) he would have spoken of two hypostases or of one. A similar uncertainty attaches to Theodore of Mopsuestia. Here the question turns largely on an appended note in the Greek text of a fragment of the de Incarnatione which does not occur in the Syriac version. Richard expresses preference for the Syriac text and is supported in this by Devreesse. On the other side may be quoted H.M. Diepen, F.A. Sullivan and L. Abramowski. However, a recently discovered fragment of the contra Eunomium makes it clear that Theodore accepted two hypostases. The meaning of the term in the Christology of Theodore is to be seen in the context of the concreteness of both natures which he taught.

Cyril's use of hypostasis raises a well-known problem. The word seldom occurs in his writings before the outbreak of the Nestorian controversy.

1. Apollinarius de Fid. et Incarn. 3 (Lietzmann p. 194); 6 (op. cit. p. 199); 8 (op. cit. p. 201); and possibly 36 (op. cit. p. 176).
2. Theodore de Incarn. VIII Fr. όδος ηθνοδοκίον ετων ἐνοχμένοις (Swete II p. 299).
and the few instances where it is found are all disputed on strong critical
grounds. Its earliest uses are found in the Second Letter against Nestorius in
the form of the \textit{\textit{f\nu\nu\nu\iota\iota\iota\iota\iota\iota\iota\iota}}. It is also found in the Third Letter
against Nestorius and the second and third appended Anathemas where it is
identified with \textit{phusis}. In the last of these Anathemas \textit{hypostasis} appears to be
equated with \textit{prosopon}. In the controversial treatises of the period up to 433
the term is to be found frequently. While it would be tempting to group together
the writings of Cyril which use \textit{hypostasis} and those which restrict themselves
to \textit{phusis} and to try to draw doctrinal or chronological inferences from the fact,
it is doubtful if it would lead to well-founded conclusions. In any event, Cyril
clearly uses the word in the sense of concrete reality to express the ontological
bond of union which he deemed necessary if the unity of the Incarnate Person was
not to be destroyed or lost. It is just possible that some dissatisfaction with
the \textit{phusis} terminology was forming in his mind but no clear distinction between
the words can be detected in his writings. Where Cyril found his opponents
teaching a doctrine of two \textit{hypostases} in Christ, he held this to be equivalent
to teaching a doctrine of two Sons.

The reaction of the Orientals is interesting. Diodore against
Apollinarius had already complained that the word was an innovation\textsuperscript{2}. The same
charge was repeated against Cyril. Thus Theodoret in his comments on the second
Anathema finds the formula \textit{\textit{f\nu\nu\nu\iota\iota\iota\iota\iota\iota\iota\iota}} strange and unprecedented.
He fears that it implies mixture or confusion. If it does not, then the single
word 'union' would serve as well. Cyril, for his part, does not deny the charge
of novelty but claims that new heresies require new terms for their exclusion\textsuperscript{3}.
Theodoret, for all he believes in two natures, does not himself speak of two
\textit{hypostases}. Evidently, at this stage \textit{hypostasis} did not form part of his

1. Cyril Ep. IV ad Nestor. II.6 (A.C.O. I,i,1 p. 28); Ep. XVII ad Nestor. III.
4. (op. cit. p. 35), 5 (op. cit. p. 36); Anathemas 2, 3 and 4 (op. cit. pp. 40-1)
2. Diodore in P. Lagarde Analecta Syriaca p. 98.
christological vocabulary. In the Latin version of Cyril's Apology to the Orientals the objector (who may be Theodoret) only uses hypostasis when he is criticising the opinions of Cyril. Otherwise he uses the term natura. Although Cyril does not give the full comments of Andrew of Samosata, the latter does seem to accept with Cyril the equivalence of hypostasis and phusis, and on this basis cites Cyril against himself. He also seems to agree with Cyril that all the attributes of the Incarnate Lord are to be ascribed to one hypostasis. Nestorius never comments on the word in his letters of reply to Cyril nor is it used in his homilies. That at least later he accepted two hypostases is established by an unedited letter to Rabbula of Edessa. The evidence of the Treatise of Heracleides will be discussed later.

It can thus be seen that hypostasis was a word used in a christological sense by both schools. Moreover, in both schools there was a virtual equation of hypostasis with phusis. The source of the distinction between the two terms is to be found in two documents emanating from Constantinople, the Tome of Proclus to the Armenians and the Confession of Flavian. Both of these were intended as compromise documents, but the use made of the distinction at Chalcedon was entirely the Council's own.

(II) Phusis

Three main meanings are to be found:

(a) The common generic character shared by all members of a class. So in Trinitarian contexts phusis and ousia are used in a generic sense. Thus is the equivalent of .

(b) The essence of a person or thing viewed descriptively with the attributes attaching to or inhering in it.

3. Ibid.
(c) The source, origin or constitution of a person or thing - the principle of movement or of rest - the driving force or organising principle of what is so described. This is obviously a much more dynamic use than the ontological application of the word.

Two further comments may be added to the above analysis of meanings. First, phusis can also be used of nature manifest in the physical world, creation, or even creature in a derogatory sense. Second, wherever it is used it implies fact or reality.

Although there are occasional uses of two phuseis to express the two natures (or realities) of Christ in the pre-Nicene period, the decisive contribution was made by Apollinarius. For him Christ is one phusis no less than one hypostasis. Indeed Apollinarius was the author of the famous phrase μία φύσις τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου σεαρκίσμενής. It was the merit of de Riedmatten to recover the appropriate context for this usage. The dynamic quality of the thought of Apollinarius, the concept of the Logos as in Christ, the biological and zoological metaphors and his interest in problems of motion and direction (στοχιστό, ἐτεροκινζτο) all suggest the meaning of phusis as constitutive principle, driving force, almost 'growing point'.

From Apollinarius Cyril took over the disputed formula as of Athanasian origin. It fitted his Logos-centred Christology exactly. But the real question is not the origin but his application of the language of one phusis. Cyril and Apollinarius had the same intention: to stress the unity and identity of the Incarnate Lord, but the problem had moved on a stage since the time of Apollinarius. Not only did Cyril accept the existence of the human soul

1. e.g. Melito of Sardis 8 (if. genuine); Irenaeus Fr. 8 (Harvey ii p. 479); Origen c. Cel.s.III,28 (G.C.S. I p. 226); Com. in John XXXII 16,(9) (G.C.S. IV p. 451), de Princ. I,ii,1 (G.C.S. V p. 27).
of Christ but he is also concerned to offer an account of the union of the two elements out of which Christ is constituted against opponents whom he believed to set this unity at risk. He therefore rejects anything amounting to συνήχεος, συνήχεος or φύμος, while he equally rejects any view of the two entities in Christ as έὔερος καὶ έὔερος. Against both errors he accepts a ἐνώσις or συνόρος (concurrence) ἐκ δύο φύσεων. Significantly these are described as Τότῳ κοινωνοῦν, that is neuter, not masculine. 1 Christ is ἐκ δύο πρᾶγματων. 2 Quite apart from the awkward use of the same term phusis for that wherein Christ is one and that wherein he is out of two, the comment of Richard on the δύο πρᾶγματα 'comme chose, non comme sujet d'attribution' is discerning. 3 Thus phusis in Cyril is used concretely, but after the union the Logos is still the only subject of attributes. The analogy of soul and body which still only form one phusis (concrete reality) even if the elements are disparate is of frequent occurrence. While this is more than merely corrected Apollinarianism, as Loofs maintained, 4 it still has two main defects: the untidiness in his use of phusis and his failure to integrate the human soul of Christ into his one phusis formula.

In the Antiochene tradition the assertion of two complete and co-present natures formed the starting point of their Christology. It led directly to their suspicion of the communicatio idiomatum, their use of the homo assumptus language and the charge against them of teaching a doctrine of two Sons. The ἐν δύο φύσεων formula became as characteristic of them as the ἐκ δύο φύσεων formula was for Cyril. Phusis is certainly used in a concrete sense but it is always an entity to which attributes or ιδιωματα can be convincingly attached.

While many ideas and expressions characteristic of the Antiochene tradition occur in Diodore, it is something of a surprise to find him

2. Cyril Ep. I ad monachi. 18 (A.C.O. I,1,1 p. 18); Apol. ad Oriental. 3 (A.C.O. I, i,7 p. 40); Orat. ad Theodos. 44 (A.C.O. I,1,1 p. 72).
making little, if any, use of phusis terminology. This is part of the notoriously difficult problem as to where Diodore is to be placed christologically. 1 Theodore of Mopsuestia presents no such problem. Here the sole question is whether the assertion of two natures implies two subjects as well. On this the authorities are divided. Sullivan and Norris argue strongly that two subjects are implied in Theodore's use of two natures. 2 Similarly Diepen summarises Theodore's teaching on the two natures as distinguishing in Christ not merely a double quid but also a double quis. 3 Others, however, give less unfavourable estimates of Theodore's interpretation of phusis, of whom may be mentioned Amann, Devreesse and Galtier. 4 Nevertheless, the present state of the evidence tends to support the more radical conclusion.

(III) Ousia

Despite its great significance in trinitarian theology ousia had only a limited use in Christology. Among early instances are Melito of Sardis (if the passage is genuine), Hippolytus and Tertullian. 5 The passage referred to in Tertullian (see footnote below) which runs Adeo salva est utriusque proprietas substantiae is particularly important because it proves that for Tertullian substantiae is the subject of attributes, and also because of its influence (whether directly or not) on the Tome of Leo. As in Stoic logic the όοςώ is the substratum of the Κοίνή Κοίστις.

1. The problem is reflected, for example, in the contrasting discussions on Diodore to be found in A. Grillmeier's Christ in Christian Tradition, pp. 260-70, and F.A. Sullivan's The Christology of Theodore of Mopsuestia, pp. 172-96.
5. Melito of Sardis Fr. 6 (Otto IX p. 46); Hippolytus de Ben. Jacob. 27, 2 (Texte und Untersuchungen Vol. XXVI (1899) p. 44); Tertullian adv. Prax. 37 (C.S.E.L. XXVII pp. 281-2).
The Synod of Antioch in 268 affirmed the \( \text{ἐνωσὶς ὄθω} \) of the Incarnate Lord against Paul of Samosata who in a fragment (probably derived from the Disputation against Malchion) asserted a mode of union not substantially but attributively.¹

Not unnaturally the term is found in Apollinarius though there is no reason to suspect that he introduced it into Christology.² Further, there is nothing in Apollinarius to indicate the relation between ousia, hypostasis and phusis. This is not surprising for his interest lies rather in the proclamation of unity in every conceptual framework than in the distinction of the terms involved. Against the Arian Eunomius who accepted only a unity of power (\( \text{δύνασις} \)), Nemesius of Emesa asserted a union in ousia.³ The term may mean little more than a real or 'substantial' union.

It is not surprising that the notion of a union in ousia should be rejected by Theodore of Mopsuestia. In his letter to Domnus⁴ he makes the valid point that such a bond of union can only be predicated of entities which are homoousia with each other. An extended passage from the de Incarnatione⁵ rejects an \( \text{ἐνωσὶς ὄθω} \) on the rather surprising ground for him that this would imply a flat immanence since the ousia of God cannot be limited or circumscribed and therefore it cannot provide for his special or preferential indwelling in Christ.

The first objection might seem more decisive but here the distinction between participation (\( \text{μετουσίω} \)) and ousia may be in his mind. The importance of \( \text{μετουσίω} \) in the Christology of Theodore is stressed by L. Abramowski.⁶ It should however be noted that \( \text{εὐδοκία} \) and not \( \text{μετουσίω} \) occurs in his description of the mode of union. The new fragment

1. Paul of Samosata Fr. 7 (Loofs Paulus von Samosata p. 332: Ὠθω ὄθι).  
2. Apollinarius c. Diodor. Fr. 117 (Lietzmann pp. 235-6), Fr. 119 μὲ πάντα ὄθω ὀφείλεται καὶ ἑαυτῷ ὅσα ἐσμέναι (op. cit. p. 236) op. \( \text{ἐνωσὶς ὄθω} \) Fr. 12 (op. cit. p. 208).  
3. Nemesius of Emesa de nat. hom. 3 (P.G. XL. 605).  
5. Theodore de Incarn. VII Fr. (Swete II p. 284).  
of the contra Eunomium brings together prosopon, hypostasis, ousia and phusis without however explicitly locating the ousia. It may nevertheless be inferred that ousia and phusis are identical.

While then ousia occasionally occurs in christological contexts, nothing prepares us for its preponderance in the Christology of Nestorius.

(IV) Homoousios

The double Θεο-και-εσθήτης of Christ is a theme which again has not been fully studied. It is an obvious implicate of the formula 'Perfect God and perfect man'. The Θεο-και-εσθήτης τοῦ Πατρός was the achievement of Nicaea, the Θεο-και-εσθήτης Ἰησοῦς was slower in achieving currency in Christology.

Apollinarius apparently accepted the Θεο-και-εσθήτης Ἰησοῦς in so far as he recognised the humanity of Christ. Yet he finds the need for careful qualifications. The flesh is ψυχικόν Θεο-και-εσθήτης but by its union with God the Logos it is divine (είναι). The Logos and the flesh are not Θεο-και-εσθήτης Θεο-και-εσθήτης for we must not confuse the visible and the invisible.

The living Logos of God assumed the flesh which is Θεο-και-εσθήτης Ἰησοῦς by union with the divinity. The two entities out of which Christ is composed are therefore neither consubstantial with each other nor equipollent within the one Christ. The significance of the phrase is still further reduced by the statement that Christ is Θεο-και-εσθήτης Ἰησοῦς δύο δύος since he is not Θεο-και-εσθήτης μητρόν τού Κυρίου

In view of these qualifications it is not surprising that the double homoousios became an anti-Apollinarian slogan. It is in this sense that Cyril could accept it in the Formulary of Reunion.

1. Apollinarius de unione 8 (Lietzmann p. 188), Tom. Synod. (op. cit. pp. 262-3).
3. Ibid. Fr. 162 (op. cit. p. 255).
5. Ibid. Fr. 45 (op. cit. p. 214).
6. Cyril can sometimes even speak of Christ as Θεο-και-εσθήτης τοῦ Πατρός (Dial c. Nest. P.G. LXXVI 252). The exegetical background here is interesting. It derives from the description of Melchisedek as 'without-mother and father' applied to the double generation of the Son rather than to the double 'solidarity'. Eutyches therefore had Cyrilline precedent for his preferred expression Θεο-και-εσθήτης τοῦ Πατρός.
For the Antiochene tradition the double formula expressed a
fundamental trait in their Christology, the full co-present duality of the two
natures. Thence it passes into the Formulary of Concord. Possibly it is one of
the points at which Cyril's agreement is more with the letter of the Formula, than
its spirit.

Unexpectedly, and somewhat unfairly, the double formula is twice
used against Nestorius himself. Against his objection to the Theotokos
'Homoousios parienti debet esse nativitas', John Cassian quotes the full double
formula. The broadside misses its target completely since Nestorius was far
from denying the double formula. Similarly in his discussion of Nestorius'
sermon on Christ our apostle and high priest for which he is qualified as

Cyril quotes the full formula (which Nestorius is far from
denying). He adds, however, an important qualification. The

denotes identity (Tauto tis) of essence whereas the merely implies similarity (O0107S
with ourselves in accordance with Hebrews xiii. 8.

Cyril returns to the subject of the formula in the second epistle
to Successus. One crucial question emerged from his acceptance of the
Formulary of Concord. 'If the same Christ is conceived as perfect God and
perfect Man, homoousios with the Father as touching his divinity and homoousios
with us as touching his humanity, where is the perfection if the human nature no
longer has hypostasis, and where is the homoousios with us if our ousia, that is
our phusis, no longer remains?'. Cyril would not dissent from the equation of
ousia and phusis but his extended reply nowhere meets the real point of the
objection, the consistency of the double formula with Cyril's main christological
teaching.

1. Diodore Com. in Psa lxx.23 (P.G. XXXIII 1611 A), Theodore c. Eunom. Fr. cited
Grillmeier op. cit. p. 353, Nestorius Hom. V (Loofs Nestoriana p. 235),
Theodoret Ep. LI (P.G. LXXXIII 1414-40).
The double formula occurs fairly frequently between the Act of Concord and Chalcedon. It is found in Paul of Emesa and the Tome of Proclus. The hesitations and changes of front of Eutyches about the formula are discussed elsewhere in this thesis. The formula is found in the Confession of Faith of Flavian. It comes probably from the Formulary of Concord. Thereafter it travels to the Chalcedonian Definition.

(V) Prosopon (persona)

Here the literature is more plentiful than with the other technical terms.

As for context, a number of possibilities have been suggested: the dramatic (actor's mask or role), the grammatical (first, second or third person), the legal (subject or object of an action at law) and the prosopographical or exegetical (in which a text is expounded as ex persona or of the Father or the Son). In recent scholarship the legal context (though favoured by Harnack) has lost ground and the importance of the exegetical use has been given wide prominence. More generally prosopon could be used of face or appearance but it can also have a more concrete ring as a person or party. The vice of castigated in the New Testament might possibly mean taking a person at face value but more probably it signifies 'showing partiality to individuals'. Thus a more plastic and a more concrete usage can be found but the margin between them need not be very large. Often the context alone determines the shade of meaning. The use of prosopon and its virtual replacement by hypostasis will not concern us here.

In the West the use of persona in Christology goes back to Tertullian. The passage runs as follows:

Videmus duplicem statum non confusum sed conjunctum in una persona.

Despite its importance as an ultimate source of the Tome of Léo, too much should not be read into the term here. Presumably its origin is the Stoic doctrine of the ens concretum. It is, however, remarkable that its use in the West did not take firm hold for two centuries.

In the East the word prosopon first assumes importance in Apollinarius. The key passage reads 'there is no distinction between the Logos and his flesh but there is μὴ ὁμοτάξισι, μὴ φύσις, μὴ ἐνεργεία, ἐν ἀπόστασιν.' No indication of the distinction between the terms is given. Apollinarius, commenting on John xvii. 19, equates τὸ ἐν ἀπόστασιν and τὸν ἀμεμβροτὸν ἐνόπλων ὑποστάσεων (manifestation or showing forth). The last is possibly an echo of the exegetical usage. In the first letter to Dionysius he appears to equate phusis and prosopon.

The first recorded use of two prosopa is found surprisingly enough in Didymus of Alexandria. His recently discovered Psalm Commentary is directed both against the Arians and Apollinarius. To describe the divinity of Christ (against the Arians) and his humanity (against Apollinarius) he employs prosopon.

Difficulties beset the use of prosopon by Theodore of Mopsuestia. The long fragment of the eighth book of the de Incarnatione to which reference has been made above is again relevant. In the Greek version the two phuseis are brought together through the union to form one prosopon. As in marriage man and wife are no longer two prosopa but one (Matthew xix.6), so after the union there are no longer two prosopa but one. Yet in neither case is the distinction of phuseis destroyed by the unity of prosopon. When we distinguish the natures we speak of the perfect nature and prosopon of God the Word (for it is impossible to speak of hypostasis without a prosopon) and similarly with the human nature. But when we look at the conjunction then we speak of one prosopon. The verb ἀπόδημεν might suggest a unity in the eye of the beholder but as with

1. Apollinarius de fid. et incarn. 6 (Lietzmann pp. 198-9).
2. Ibid. de unione 9 (op. cit. p. 189).
Cyril's "θεοπρασία μονή" this would be a superficial judgement. The Greek text then clearly implies a duality of prosopa belonging to the phuseis out of which the one prosopon of unity is constructed. The Syriac text however omits any reference to the two prosopa together with the explanatory note in brackets. Earlier in this section we have summarised the authorities on either side of the debate. The issue of authenticity is certainly not closed. Sullivan argues strongly for the exegetical interpretation of prosopon as a defence and explanation of the Greek text.¹

A passage from the previous book of the de Incarnatione² speaks of one prosopon in the context of indwelling κατ' εὐδοκίαν whereby the Logos united the homo assumptus to himself to share his own dignity and authority without lessening the difference in the characteristics of the two natures. Unity of prosopon is related with indwelling and participation in dignity and honour. But is the unity in prosopon the ground of the union or its consequence? We cannot tell from this passage.

The third key passage is the Syriac fragment of the contra Eunomium. This treats directly of the term prosopon. It can be used in two senses: (I) the hypostasis (as Peter and Paul signify the hypostasis and prosopon of each of them). Here prosopon and hypostasis are closely related in a way which confirms the authenticity of the note in the Greek text of Book VIII of the de Incarnatione. This meaning is the closest approximation of prosopon to person in the writings of Theodore. The possibility that he is giving a use of the term of which he knows but does not accept might be worth exploring. (2) The prosopon of our Lord Christ means honour, greatness and worship conferred by God the Logos on the homo assumptus. The prosopon of Christ is a prosopon of honour, not of the ousiai of the two natures.

2. Theodore de Incarn. ... VII Pr. (Swete II p. 296).
The interpretation favoured by Grillmeier¹ (based on L. Abramowski) takes both meanings of prosopon as acceptable to Theodore and can be paraphrased roughly as follows. The Logos has his own hypostasis and prosopon in a perfectly matching situation, but the Logos and the homo assumptus have no community of hypostasis and, if the prosopon of the Logos is to be shared by the homo assumptus, it can only be in terms of honour and worship. The Nestorian example of the king and the purple robe would fit in well with this point of view. The passage ends on an anti-Apollinarian note. On this interpretation of the passage the implication of two prosopa is clear enough. For what it is worth it throws some light on the two fragments from the de Incarnatione.

Sullivan notes the importance of the prosopographic or exegetical sense of prosopon for Theodore. The discrimination of texts or even portions of texts as referring to one or other nature or to the common prosopon of Christ is characteristic of his exegesis as a whole. The link between the exegesis and the Christology of Theodore is close. In exegesis the divinity and humanity of Christ can be separately diagnosed while other texts refer to the prosopon of the unity. In his Christology there is also a strong presumption that each of the two natures have their own prosopon but there is also a prosopon of unity. The interpretation of the natures as two subjects is however hotly disputed.

Norris² concludes that unity in prosopon is not a type of union parallel to hypostatic union but a way of describing an underlying unity which rests on other grounds. The mode of union is not given in the term itself but in the thinking which precedes its use, or with which it is associated. If this is the case, Theodore probably differs from Nestorius.

In view of Cyril's emphasis on phusis and hypostasis it is not surprising that he makes relatively little use of prosopon. Hodgson³ notes the

1. A. Grillmeier, Christ in Christian Tradition.
wide variety of uses ranging from the prosopographic to the colloquial sense of person. It is interest that 'at least ten cases' occur of the word to replace the more usual hypostasis in trinitarian contexts. In Christology prosopon naturally occurs in his exposition of Nestorius' views. But it occurs occasionally anywhere in his writings. Thus in the fourth Anathema prosopon is equated with hypostasis and the use occurs in two other passages. We should expect to find prosopon and phusis equated but explicit statements are not easy to discover. The word is also used in contexts where the Formulary of Concord is plainly in mind. In both cases it is attached to the double homoousios formula. No secure inference of its meaning in these contexts can be drawn.

The equation of prosopon and hypostasis in the Chalcedonian Definition was prepared for in the East in the period after the Formulary of Concord. While the background and theology of Theodoret strongly Antiochene (e.g. the prosopographic use of prosopon and the use of the term homo assumptus) he works towards a formula of two natures and one prosopon and hypostasis. The use of prosopon first occurs in his work de Incarnatione. In the Dialogue he expressly rejects a doctrine of two prosopa. Similarly Andrew of Samosata moves in the same direction.

The conjunction of prosopon and hypostasis is also found in the Tome of Proclus and the Confession of Flavian.

Two points must be made in conclusion:

(i) The background of the use of prosopon in the Dualist tradition differs widely from its use (however limited) in Monist circles.

(ii) Neither prosopon nor any other term which we have discussed is an exact equivalent of the modern concept of person or personality.

1. Cyril Ep. XVII ad Nestor. III (the letter to which the anathemas are appended) (A.C.O. I,i,1 p. 38; Apol. c. Oriental. 45 (A.C.O. I,i,7 p. 43).
3. Theodoret de Incarnat. 21,31,32 (P.G. LXXV 1456,1472,1473).
4. Theodoret Dial. 3 (P.G. LXXXIII 280).
5. Andrew of Samosata Fr. preserved by Anastasius of Sinai on which see L. Ambramowski, Oriens Christianus Vol. XLI (1957) pp. 55–60.
Equipped with this background we can now direct our attention to the Christology of Nestorius.¹

We may begin by noticing that Nestorius firmly believed in his own orthodoxy. His previously quoted words to the Emperor 'Give me the earth purged of heretics and I will give you heaven as a recompense'² may be an episcopal purple patch but his conviction comes out strongly in the Treatise.³ He constantly appeals to Scripture, especially to Phillipians ii. 5-11 and the Epistle to the Hebrews. He calls the Nicene Creed as a principal witness in his support against Cyril (pp. 142- 51). In his own support he calls St. Athanasius (pp.192,201,227,255,261), St. Ambrose (pp. 191-2,199,215,227,245,255,261), the two Gregories (pp. 215,220-1,223,227,245,255) and even Theophilus of Alexandria (p.231) though it is uncertain whether they would have welcomed his approbation with unmixed delight. In a letter to the people of Constantinople preserved by Philoxenus and quoted by Loofs he claims an identity of views with Flavian and Leo.⁴ In the Treatise he certainly hopes to be vindicated at the forthcoming Council summoned by the Emperor. He can even rephrase Cyril's doctrine of hypostatic union in terms of his own view of prosopic union as if that would make it fully orthodox (pp. 155-7).

Nestorius certainly believed that he had provided satisfactorily for the unity of the Person of Christ. Indeed, the unity of Christ is described by Scipioni as the first, the fixed and the undiscussable starting point of his thought. For this reason the charge that he taught a doctrine of two Sons was so abhorrent to him. There is no distinction of place between the two natures

3. A discussion of L. Abramowski's critical analysis of the Treatise is given in the Appendix.
4. F. Loofs, Nestorius and his Teaching pp. 24-6.
and not for a single moment was the humanity, however complete he conceived it
to be, separate from God the Word. Not even in abstraction can the two natures
be conceived apart from each other.¹

Yet within this unity there is a full duality of natures, complete
in itself and self-sustaining. Nestorius accumulates technical terms expressive
of duality as his exposition proceeds. This contravenes the Apollinarian maxim
apparently confirmed by common sense that 'two complete entities cannot form one'
and inevitably leads to the charge of teaching two Sons. His basic criticism of
the Cyrilline doctrines of natural or hypostatic union is that they lead either
to the truncation or the destruction of the humanity either by the formation of
a composite nature or to the attenuation of the humanity to make it suitable for
attribution to the Word.

Reference has already been made to the claim of Scipioni that the
real starting point of Nestorius is the unity of the Person of Christ and that
whatever duality is contained within it is an important but subsequent question.
Loofs similarly, though for different reasons, claims that his starting point is
the Christ of the Gospels and not as in Cyril the person of God the Word. But
others are inclined to find the true starting point in the twofold Christ and to
see him struggling to reach a viable and satisfactory bond of union which can
bear the necessary weight of duality. His preference for concrete technical
terms to express the duality seems to support this approach. Duality even invades
his discussion of prosopon, the term on which he relies to provide for the unity
of the Person of Christ. The unity is often affirmed on the basis of the Creed
and Scripture, the duality is diagnosed at a more technical level of theological
discourse. The vital question for the success of his enterprise is whether the
diagnosis of duality can or cannot be contained within his affirmation of unity.
While the excellence of his intention is not in doubt, and while his defence

1. L.I. Scipioni, Richerche sulla cristologia del 'Libro di Eraclide' di
Nestorio p. 170.
against the charges raised against him together with his counter attacks on Cyril are equally vigorous, the basic question at issue is whether Nestorius' positive solution will stand up. Here all depends on the technical terms Nestorius employs and the content which he gives to them. Accordingly we must now turn to the technical terms of Nestorius and consider their content.

(1) Nature. This is used in a concrete and realist sense. Moreover, a complete nature is autonomous, exists sui juris, independent or, as Nestorius describes it, self-sustaining. 'Every complete nature has no need of another nature that it may be and live, in that it has in it and has received its whole definition that it may be' (p. 304). In contrast body and soul are incomplete natures which need each other that they may be and subsist. Together by composition they make up the complete nature of man.

For Nestorius, then, a nature is complete in virtue of its definition, its differentia and its properties, and if these are absent we can only speak of an incomplete nature. At the same time, for Nestorius, these properties, distinctions, differences and the like are real and physical and not merely notional or nominal. They determine the nature, make it recognisable, and distinct from any other thing. They persist after the union (pp. 155, 167, 310).

In particular, with respect to the Incarnate Lord, the two natures, human and divine, persist after the union. As to what the properties of a human nature comprise, Nestorius would answer anything which distinguishes human nature from any other nature such as operation on the level of will, suffering, the physical sensations of the body; birth, growth, education, natural development (pp. 208, 211-2). Some of these may be shared with the animals but in human nature they have a specifically human texture.

Thus without doubt the term nature has a concrete ring in the thought of Nestorius despite the use of abstract terms like humanity and human nature. This is demonstrated by the fact that Christ is said to be and not to have two natures. By contrast we do not say that an individual man is but merely that he possesses
humanity. We can therefore safely conclude that nature for Nestorius has a
determinate and concrete sense.

(2) ousia. The term ousia was no newcomer to Christology. The Synodal
Letter of the Council of Antioch in 268 affirmed a ἐνυσις ὀουσίας against
its denial by Paul of Samosata.1 Apollinarius2 asserted a μὴ ὀουσία of
Christ whereas Theodore3 denied an ἐνυσις κατ' ὀουσίαν. Nothing
however prepares us for its frequent use in the Treatise even when it is absent
in the Cyrilline passages which Nestorius is criticizing. This lends some
support to Grillmeier's assumption4 that phusis and ousia are identical. That
however is debatable and the more pertinent question to be asked at this point
is whether ousia is virtually equated with phusis, whether it is an element in
the res concreta additional to phusis or perhaps the phusis considered from a
particular standpoint. Frequently in the Treatise a discussion which begins on
the level of phusis ends with a rephrasing in terms of ousia without a detectable
break in the sense.

The polemical pointing of the term ousia and the opinions which
it is used to exclude raise few problems. They fall well within the general
limits of the Christology of Nestorius.

(i) The ousia of God the Father and our own ousia are alien to each other
(p. 298). The ousia of God is not the same as the ousia of the child (p. 233).
The ousia of the child and the Maker of the child cannot exist in the same ousia
(p. 231). The ousia of God cannot receive any addition (p. 212, 298, 301) or
diminution (p. 144). Passible and impassible (pp. 98, 151, 164), mortal and
immortal (p. 151), corporeal and incorporeal (p. 155) cannot be predicated of the
same ousia. Even though the revelation is made by little and little the ousia of
God is not subject to beginning, growth and completion (p. 194).

1. F. Loofs, Paulus von Samosata Fr. 7 p. 232.
2. Fr. 119 (Lietzmann p. 236); Fr. 158 (Lietzmann p. 249).
3. de Incarn. ... VII Fr. (Swete II pp. 293-4); Ep. ad Domn. (Swete II p. 339).
(ii) In the Incarnation, therefore, there can be no change of one ousia into
another (pp. 87, 138, 220, 326-7). This would amount to mere heathenism (p. 177)
and would be useless for the purpose of redemption (p. 87). It would amount to
the suppression of one ousia in favour of the other (p. 90) and destroy the
kenosis-exaltation rhythm vital to the Incarnation (p. 90).

(iii) There can be no union of the two natures in one ousia so that one ousia
results from their union (p. 88). This would lead to the destruction of the
human nature or to the unreality of the human qualities (pp. 88, 157). It
would destroy the voluntary character of the sufferings of Christ (p. 179).

Since it is impossible that both of them should be in the same
ousia when the one ousia is not as the other, or perhaps become non-existent
(p. 327), it follows that there must be two ousia in the Incarnate Lord. 'Two
then they are whereof is formed one Son and Lord Jesus Christ, two also in the
union and the natural diversities wherein they are conceived as two are not
suppressed since the one is not the other, nor the other the one in ousia
(p. 303). This is implied in the double consubstantiality of the Incarnate Lord
with the Father and with ourselves (pp. 155, 298-9) or more widely the affirmation
that He is both God and Man (p. 326). 'The Son of God created and was created,
the same but not in the same (ousia); the Son of God suffered and suffered not,
the same but not in the same (ousia); for (some) of these things were in the nature of
the divinity and (others) in the nature of the humanity. He suffered all human
things in the humanity and all divine things in the divinity' (p. 138). Such
passages could easily be multiplied, making it clear, therefore, that whatever
is said about the union, the distinction of ousias must be firmly maintained.

We must now return to the crucial question as to whether for
Nestorius nature and ousia are or are not identical terms. Already we have
noticed his tendency to combine both terms in the discussion of particular topics.
Also, there is little in the quotations cited above that could not be rephrased
in terms of nature. Yet in a number of important passages a distinction between
the terms is stated or implied. We find for example the following: 'For the union is in the prosopon and not in the nature nor the ousia' (p. 145) which is closely followed by the statement that 'the two natures remain in their own ousia and the diversities are not made void by the union of the natures'. Similarly he writes that 'the union came into being as touching the prosopon of the Son of God and neither the ousia nor the nature, but by means of the natures' (p. 158). The doctrine of two Sons implies 'each one of the natures by itself in its own ousia' (p. 159) without any mention of the union in prosopon. 'For he took the likeness of a servant for his own prosopon and not for his nature by change either of the ousia, of the ousia in the nature of the humanity, or of the humanity in the nature of the divinity' (p. 179). However cumbersome the mode of expression the passage suggests a distinction between the terms. 'The man in respect of ousia and of nature is of the Jews and not God the Word in respect of nature' (p. 202). Cyril is not 'content to predicate the ousia and activity of man in the existence of two natures, each of them with properties and hypostases and ousia.' (pp. 208-9). Here the analysis of what it means to be a complete nature is pushed very far. Nestorius asks whether God the Word is two ousias in nature (p. 212) and can also speak of 'one nature of the ousia' (p. 216). Against the charge of distinguishing the natures Nestorius replies 'For in the formula they are known as ousias without confusion, without mixture, in such wise that in the union both the natures are preserved with their natural attributes and naturally with the properties of the ousia, so that the divine nature is conceived in nature of God and the human nature is conceived in the nature of the humanity in the ousia' (pp. 217-8). This is hardly lucid as it stands but it does imply a distinction between nature and ousia.  

1. Hodgson (p. 321 n.1) observes that Nestorius speaks indifferently of nature and ousia, though in his Essay on the Metaphysic of Nestorius (p. 414) he writes 'It looks as if in the metaphysis of Nestorius everything that exists may be analysed into ousia, phusis and prosopon'. This ambiguity well represents the state of the evidence. Scipioni (op. cit. p. 53) concludes that ousia and nature are identical in reality but not in meaning: 'There is a material identity but a formal difference'.
(3) Hypostasis. In view of Nestorius’ opposition to Cyril’s theory of hypostatic unity, it would not have been surprising if he had avoided the term completely in his own Christology. This is not the case for, while it is far less frequently used than either ousia or nature, it certainly occurs.

It will be useful first to summarise his arguments against Cyril’s theory, which may be itemised as follows:

(i) The hypostatic union involves the liquidation of the ousia of man. This strongly suggests, incidentally, that for Nestorius hypostasis and ousia are identical.

(ii) Nestorius sees Apollinarian or even Arian implications in Cyril’s view which would allow antithetical predicates such as the impassible and passible to be predicated of a single hypostasis.

(iii) It prejudices the double consubstantiality of Christ, that with the Father by ascribing human qualities to God the Word, that with ourselves by denying the completeness of the human ousia in Christ. Again the identity of ousia and hypostasis seems to be presupposed.

(iv) It is no improvement on Cyril’s doctrine of natural union. ‘As the soul and the body result in one nature of the man, so also God the Word is united with the humanity, and this thou callest the hypostatic union.’ (p. 161). Thus Nestorius shrewdly criticises Cyril and anticipates the modern view that there is no discernible difference in Cyril’s two views.

(v) If God the Word is united hypostatically or naturally to the flesh, his sufferings are necessary and not voluntary and therefore lack saving efficacy.

Coming now to Nestorius’ use of hypostasis, we find it is one

1. Scipioni (op. cit. pp. 53-6) holds that in practice hypostasis is identified with complete nature though it is distinct in meaning, laying the accent on the completeness of the complete nature. The nature is made complete by its attributes or properties, hypostasis merely expresses it as such. When applied to the human nature of Christ it expresses its completeness in every respect. Alternatively it might be suggested that normally for Nestorius ousia and hypostasis are identical as that wherein the properties which constitute a complete nature are earthed or grounded. While ousia and hypostasis would both express the logical pin cushion into which the pins of the properties inhere or are stuck, hypostasis might have a greater air of concreteness and particularity which could explain the use of both terms in the same context. Neither interpretation is ideal and the impression that the term is somewhat of an intruder into the thought of Nestorius remains strong.
more term used by him to express concrete reality. Moreover that Nestorius believed in two hypostases is proved by M. Richard on the basis of the Nestorian fragments and accepted by L. Abramowski. This is also confirmed by the Treatise. For example, in Nestorius' criticism of Cyril's doctrine of hypostatic union he speaks of the hypostasis of the humanity and of God the Word in his own hypostasis and nature (p. 162). In a catalogue of Christological alternatives he distinguishes a union in schema without hypostasis which suffers impassibly (Cyril's Ἰησοῦς ἐκδέξωσε) and which he regards as docetic, a union which results in a hypostasis of natures (Cyril's hypostatic union) and his own view of hypostatic union in which each set of attributes is grounded in its appropriate hypostasis (pp. 181-2). Cyril assigns to Christ a body in name without hypostasis and activity and fails to predicate two natures each with properties, hypostasis and ousia. St. Ambrose, like Nestorius himself (p. 218), posits the human and divine natures each with prosopon and hypostasis (p. 216).

Clearly, then, Nestorius uses the terms ousia, phusis and hypostasis to express the completeness of the two components within the one Christ. He writes:

In every respect remember the many words in which I have made a distinction between the two natures of the Lord Christ.

Now I have said that the name 'Christ' is indicative of two natures, of God indeed one nature and of man one nature. (p. 209).

This distinction and basic difference, moreover, is always to the forefront with Nestorius and is used by him as the key to his interpretation of Christology. Thus he also writes:

He suffered all human things in the humanity and all divine things in the divinity; for birth from a woman is human but birth from the Father is without beginning, whereas the former is in the beginning, and the one is eternal while the other is temporal. (p. 138).

Never at any time will Nestorius allow that these two natures have been altered in any way and it follows then that what he says of Christ he says of one who is

the sum of these two distinct natures.

Nestorius' second guiding principle, which he saw quite clearly and maintained, is that two complete natures unite in Christ:

Infolge dessen, der erkannt ist als ein Christus in zwei Naturen, der göttlichen und der menschlichen, der sichtbaren und der unsichtbaren, wird das zukünftige Gericht abhalten.¹

The task of Nestorius, then, was to construct a Christology which would contain these two positions outlined above. As L. Abramowski writes:

Nestorius versucht, von den beiden Naturen aus zu ihrer Einheit zu gelangen. Dazu mussten die Naturen, die vom Begriff ihrer selbst her nicht miteinander kommunizieren konnten, soweit bestimmt werden, dass ihr Zusammenschluss zu einer untrennbaren Einheit verstanden werden konnte.²

Whether in fact Nestorius achieved what he set out to do, it was certainly his attempt to do so which led to his condemnation as a heretic because of the sharpened Antiochene formulas he employed. In this attempt Nestorius sought to indicate the levels on which the unity and the distinction in Christ was to be sought. To distinguish the human from the divine in Christ he used the metaphysical terms we have just discussed. To recapitulate what has been said we may take the words of M.V. Anastos who writes:

Thus, usia and nature are correlative terms, each of which implies and requires the other. But neither the usia nor the nature is fully present or effective without a third equally indispensable element, the prosopon. None of the three can be separated from the other two, nor can the usia and the nature be recognized externally apart from the prosopon which reveals them.³

Grillmeier comments on Nestorius' use of these terms thus:

If he is concerned to lay the foundations of the distinction in Christ, he refers to the essence (ousia), the nature (physis), the hypostasis and finally to the prosopon.⁴

Again some words of Anastos may be appropriate here:

Neither God the Word nor the human nature of Christ was combined with the other in its own nature or usia. They were mutually exclusive, or 'alien to one another', so that neither could have served as the basis of union for the other.⁵

1. F. Loofs, Nestoriana p. 330 XXI e.
2. L. Abramowski, op. cit. p. 229
So the question is raised as to how Nestorius indicated the unity in Christ. We shall let the two scholars we have been quoting give the answer:

If it is necessary to demonstrate the unity in Christ he only refers back to the prosopon.¹

Hence it was impossible for them to be joined together except through a third medium, the prosopon. For, according to him, this was the only vehicle of union that was capable of preserving the properties of the two usiai and natures of Christ inviolate.²

To this term prosopon, with its rich and complex associations, we now turn our attention.

(4) Prosopon. Its non-technical senses of 'role' or 'function' and of 'person' or 'party' need not detain us. Both are found in the Treatise (role pp. 76, 199, 203); (person pp. 132, 133, 264). Its use in trinitarian contexts is of greater importance. Nestorius tries to trace a connection between trinitarian and christological terminology in the form of an inversion. A typical passage may be noted:

But further in the Trinity there is one ousia of three prosopoa and three prosopoa of one ousia, so here there is one prosopon and two usiai and two ousias and one prosopon. Thus the prosopon exists not without ousia, nor yet again the prosopon without nature. (p. 247 cp. pp. 261-2 and 308-9)

It is noteworthy that in this passage he uses prosopon for that wherein the Godhead is threefold in place of the more customary hypostasis.³ It is also worth noting that apparently in trinitarian contexts ousia and nature are convertible terms.

The use of prosopon in christological contexts varies from the nearly Chalcedonian to more complex and more disquieting formulae. Typical passages of the former type are the following:

the two natures are united in one prosopon (p. 14, 3, 146)
one prosopon of two natures (p. 148)
one prosopon in two ousias (p. 150)
the indistinguishable union of two natures in one prosopon (p. 161)
one prosopon in two natures and two natures in one prosopon (p. 236)

3. Nestorius, however, is certainly no Sabellian for he makes the relevant objection to Sabellius that he makes the prosopa without hypostasis and without ousia (p. 228) and he can also use the normal term in speaking of the eternal subsistence of God the Word as hypostasis. Scipioni insists that prosopon in christological contexts in Nestorius must have the same meaning as with the doctrine of the Trinity (Scipioni Richerche pp. 58, 170) but the selection of the term in place of hypostasis may be little more than to give status to his christological terminology and to point up better the contrast between the two doctrines.
To be ranged alongside these is the fact that the four sentinal adverbs of Chalcedon occur in Nestorius applied to the one prosopon. One prosopon without separation and without division (p. 310 cp. p. 182). The union is without confusion, without change of nature and ousia, without mixture and without composition, yet in one prosopon (p. 171 cp. p. 313). There is not one and another in the prosopon (p. 171) but 'we speak of one and another with regard to the natures but of one prosopon in the union' (p. 207).

Other general expressions used in this connection are the prosopon of the union (pp. 144-5, 153, 166, 252, 299), the prosopon of the Economy (pp. 171, 301), the common prosopon (pp. 171, 318-9) and the voluntary prosopon (p. 181). The last two terms will concern us more fully later on.

For prosopic union Nestorius makes wide claims. It is scriptural explicitly in the Kenosis passage in Philippians ii, 5-11 where (unlike his opponents) Nestorius regards the two morphai as simultaneous and not successive. Granted the dualist tendencies of Antiochene exegesis it is the natural clarification of the assertion of one Christ, one Son, one Lord (pp. 138, 158-9). It harmonises better with the structure and content of the Nicene Creed than Cyrilline views (pp. 142-4). The title 'one Lord Jesus Christ' points to the one prosopon and not to the one hypostasis of God the Word. Athanasius, Gregory and Ambrose all imply or are groping after this theory (pp. 236, 246). Cyril can rescue himself from the suspicion of heresy if by hypostatic union he really means prosopic union (pp. 157, 162-4). The fact that Christ, while one and another thing in the natures is not one and another in prosopon (pp. 220, 260) is sufficient proof that he does not teach a doctrine of Two Sons (pp. 153, 159-60, 201, 215, 218, 220, 225, 235, 237-8, 245-6, 260, 295, 302, 314, 317). While prosopon and will are closely related Nestorius can evade the charge of a purely moral or relational union on the ground that moral union is an implicate or consequent and not a strict definition of prosopic union. Further, equality of honour and worship issue from and do not make up prosopon unity.

1. OIKONOMIA or dispensation had become almost a technical term for the Incarnation by the fifth century.
For Nestorius prosopic union replaces Cyril's natural union on good theological grounds. Natural union can only describe a composite union in which two disparate parts such as soul and body, not in themselves complete, result in a nature and the prosopon of a nature (pp. 164,179). A similar example of a natural union is to be found in an animal (p. 309). The general principle is stated as follows:

For every union which results from a natural composition in the completion of the natures results from incomplete natures but that which results from complete natures results in one prosopon and subsists therein. (p. 313)

Further the natures which result in the Incarnate Person are not merely complete but diverse, even contradictory in their attributes. 'One prosopon in the diverse natures' is a familiar theme in Nestorius. Both maintain the properties of their own natures (p. 89). The union without confusion is preserved in the diversity of the natures and the prosopon of the union of the natures is individual (p. 174). If the diverse natures are to be complete the human nature must not be superfluous (p. 262) or its qualities unreal (p. 157). But equally the attributes of the humanity, passibility, corruptibility and mortality, cannot be predicated of the divinity (pp. 178,181,217) and once again the doctrine of a natural union is excluded. The diversities of the natures either of divinity or humanity have not been made void by reason of the union because they have been combined in one prosopon which belongs to the nature and the prosopon (p. 246).

A final and decisive objection to natural union is that, while the Incarnation demands a voluntary union between divinity and humanity, the soul in the body endures of necessity the sufferings of soul and body (p. 179). The voluntary union (a corollary of prosopic union) is neither changeable nor passible (p. 179). The Incarnate Lord accepts sufferings voluntarily though there is a subsidiary sense in which he suffered them voluntarily by a natural property and by perception. In contrast Nestorius speaks of a voluntary prosopon (p. 181). For Nestorius the position is clear:
I am not persuaded of any other hypostatic union with other natures nor of anything else which is right for the union of diverse natures except one prosopon, by which and in which both the natures are known, while assigning their properties to the prosopon. (p. 157)

If Nestorius had had to meet the criticism that he could not provide for prosoponic union an analogy similar to that of the union of soul and body for the natural union, he could have replied that the mode of union was unique because the Incarnation itself was unique.

The prosoponic union validates the communicatio idiomatum or the interpredication of attributes which Cyril sets against a wholly different context. It is a question of Cyrilline or Antiochene exegesis. Cyril ascribes all the properties predicated of Christ in the New Testament to God the Word with the consequence that he reduces the human qualities to the scale appropriate to God the Word incarnate. In the interests of biblical realism the Antiochenes ascribe some properties to the divine or to the human natures and can therefore take them at their face value. But other sayings the Orientals make common and: 'Those indeed which are made common they attribute as unto one prosopon...' The common prosopon of the two natures is Christ, the same prosopon whereof the natures make use even likewise (p. 319). For Christ 'the same yesterday today and for ever' is the same in prosopon but not in the same nature (p. 309). It will be recalled that for Cyril 'one and the same' is a catchword for his doctrine of the self-identity of God the Word both within and without the Incarnation. Nestorius would have had no difficulty with the repeated use of the phrase 'One and the selfsame' in the Chalcedonian Definition, though the context in which he set it would have been decidedly his own.

So far, then, 'two natures, one prosopon'. But Nestorius, it seems, takes a further step when he uses a parallel formula 'two ousias, one prosopon'. This is necessary for him if he is to do justice to a cherished Antiochene doctrine, the double consubstantiality of the Incarnate Lord, 'consubstantial with the Father as touching his Godhead and consubstantial with ourselves as touching his manhood'. The Chalcedonian parallel is unmistakeable.
There is the ousia of God the Word and the ousia of the flesh (p. 145). The ousia remains and suffers not when it is in the ousia of the flesh and the ousia of the flesh remains in the ousia of the flesh when it is in the nature and the prosopon of the divinity (p. 89). The ousia of the likeness of God and the ousia of the likeness of the servant remain in their own hypostases (p. 172). But in ousia God the Word is of God the Father and the flesh is the flesh which he put on from the Virgin that it might come to be (pp. 200-1). The double consubstantiality requires two complete ousias if it is to work successfully.

A union in ousia is therefore excluded no less than a union in nature (pp. 145, 158, 218, 230, 233, 262) and for precisely similar reasons. It would lead to unreality in the human qualities (p. 157). Cyril suppresses the humanity as that which is without prosopon and without its own ousia (p. 246). The union cannot involve any change of ousia (pp. 171, 179). The general principle is stated as follows:

It is not indeed that one ousia without hypostasis should be conceived, as if by union into one ousia and there were no prosopon of one ousia, but the natures subsist in their prosopon and in their natures and in the prosopon of the union. (pp. 218-9)

Again the alternative is prosopic union. There is indeed a union of ousias but not in the ousia (p. 145). The union took place not according to the ousia but according to the prosopon (p. 158). The prosopon is not identical with the ousia but makes known the ousia (p. 158). The prosopon is not in the ousia for although the prosopon exists not without ousia the ousia and the prosopon are not the same (p. 170). One and the same is the prosopon and not the ousia (p. 172). All things which constitute the prosopon constitute not the ousias. I indeed unite the ousias but by the union of the ousias I assert one prosopon (p. 230). That which is known by the ousia is one thing, that which is known by the prosopon is another thing (p. 262). In the unity of the Incarnate Lord the ousia of the humanity makes use of the prosopon of the ousia of the divinity but not of the ousia and the ousia of the divinity makes use of the prosopon of the ousia of the humanity similarly and not of the ousias (p. 309).

So far all is fairly clear. Nestorius is working with the formula two natures and/or ousias in one prosopon which could fall within the
limits of the Chalcedonian Definition. But there is more to be said with regard to the prosopon.

Each nature or ousia has its own prosopon - the φυσικόν. The following quotations may be taken to indicate this aspect of Nestorius' teaching:

that which is in the nature is compulsorily that which the prosopon is. (p. 327)
Neither are the natures without prosopa nor yet the prosopa without ousia (p. 309)
the union of these (i.e., soul and body in man) results in a nature and the prosopon of the nature. (p. 164)
Neither of them (i.e., the two natures of the Incarnate Lord) is known without prosopon and without hypostasis in the diversities of the natures (p. 218)
the prosopon of the natures is not one nature, but it is in nature and is not nature. (p. 189)

In other words for Nestorius a concrete entity consists at least both of a nature and a prosopon. A nature would be incomplete without a prosopon but a prosopon is not a further or additional nature. The term 'natural prosopon' covers this meaning. In the Incarnate Person use is made not of the natures but of the natural prosopon (p. 301).

For this union of natural prosopa Nestorius uses the terms prosopon of union or common prosopon (κοινὸν φύσικόν). There are two natures but not two prosopa of union but only one belonging to both the natures (p. 252). Nestorius apostrophises Cyril: 'Predicate then a common prosopon and predicate of one prosopon the things that they make common' (p. 318).

Apparently then their properties can be predicated of this common prosopon (cf. p. 241). 'The common prosopon of the two natures is Christ, the same prosopon whereof the natures make use - even likewise, that where and whereby both of them, the divinity and the humanity, are known in ousia without distinction and with distinction (i.e., both as diverse and yet as united).

Neither the divinity nor the humanity exists (by itself) in the common prosopon, for it appertains to both the natures so that therein and thereby both natures are known' (pp. 319-20).

Thus in the one Christ in addition to the common prosopon or the prosopon of union there are two natural prosopa. Each nature has its own
prosopon (τὸν ἰδιὸν προσώπου) or natural prosopon (προσώπου φυσικοῦ) (p. 214). There are two prosopa of the one who is clothed and the One Who clothes (p. 218). From him therefore who assumes the prosopon it is his who has been assumed to have the prosopon of him who assumed it (p. 238). There is the prosopon of the humanity and the prosopon of the divinity (pp. 246, 251, 262, 309) or the prosopon of the humanity and the prosopon of God (p. 252) or the prosopon of the humanity and God the Word in his prosopon (p. 260-1). The differences are marginal and non-significant. The prosopon of one nature is matched by the prosopon of the other (pp. 301, 317) or more frequently in long discussions telescoped into 'the one' and 'the other' (pp. 218, 219, 301, 317).

The formula 'one prosopon in two prosopa' is therefore inescapable (p. 312) and seems to be superimposed upon the simpler and more orthodox 'two natures, one prosopon'. Duality has invaded the very term expressive of unity.

Thus we come to the crucial question as to how Nestorius can speak at the same time of two prosopa and of a unity of prosopon. On the answer to this the whole matter depends. And Nestorius is content for it so to depend, for we find that throughout his career he is at pains to explain this unity of prosopon which for him is the exclusive basis of unity in Christ.

First, it is to be noted that Nestorius' concept of prosopon is largely determined by the Bible and, within the Bible, especially by the passage Philippians ii. 5-8. An example of his use of the passage is as follows:–

> ὃς ἐρχομένου εἰς τὰς ἀνθρώπους, μορφὴν ἐντέθη σοι· ὃς ἐκ θεοῦ ἐμφανίζεται· ὃς ἐστὶς θεοῦ τῆς παντὸς προσώπου. ὃς ἐς παρθένον ἐγεννήθη, παρθένος ἐγεννήθης· ὃς ἐγεννήθης τῷ πατρὶ, ὃς ἐγεννήθης ἐκ τοῦ προσώπου. ὃς ἐκ τοῦ προσώπου ἐγεννήθης· ὃς ἐγεννήθης τῷ πατρὶ. Παρθένος ὁμοίως ἐγεννήθης· ἐς παρθένον ἐγεννήθης· ὃς ἐγεννήθης τῷ πατρὶ, ὃς ἐγεννήθης ἐκ τοῦ προσώπου. Παρθένος ὁμοίως ἐγεννήθης. ὃς ἐγεννήθης τῷ πατρὶ, ὃς ἐγεννήθης ἐκ τοῦ προσώπου. Παρθένος ὁμοίως ἐγεννήθης. Παρθένος ὁμοίως ἐγεννήθης.

These three concessive clauses (ὅτι...) are placed side by side as one might draw parallel lines. What Nestorius is saying is that what is seen i.e.,

1. The distinction between the Robe and the Wearer and the contrast between the Assumer and the Assumed are both found in the Greek fragments. The analogies are here rephrased by Nestorius in terms of the two prosopa.
'the form of the servant' and that which is 'visible in the flesh' is the prosopon. This is one and it is at this point that the unity in Christ is to be comprehended.

On another occasion he refers to the two eyes present in the single countenance of a person to illustrate the two natures and the but one prosopon in Christ:--

Christus ist unteilbar in dem Christus-sein, er ist aber doppelt in dem Gott-und Mensch-sein; er ist einfach in der Sohnschaft; indem, welcher angezogen hat, und in dem, welcher angezogen ist, doppelt. In dem Προσωπος des Sohnes ist er ein einziger, aber, wie mit zwei Augen, geschieden in den Naturen der Menschheit und Gottheit. Denn wir kennen nicht zwei Christi oder zwei Söhne oder eingeborne oder Herren, nicht einen andern und einen andern Sohn, nicht einen ersten und einen neuen Eingebornen, nicht einen ersten und einen zweiten Christus, sondern einen und denselben, der erblickt worden ist in geschaffener und ungeschaffener Natur ... 

So far, however, none of the references quoted have indicated how this unity of prosopon was brought about. The following reference introduces us to one of Nestorius' thoughts regarding this aspect:--

unus enim filius quod visibile est et invisibile, unus Christus et iste, qui utitur, et id, quo utitur; naturae duplices, sed filius singularis.2

Here Nestorius is saying that the two natures, the visible and the invisible element in Christ, are brought together by virtue of the former (the divine) using the latter (the human) as an instrument. Two comments are called for. First, this 'use' excludes the idea of any human function being taken over or suspended. The unity of Christ, Apollinarius taught, depended on the Logos replacing the human spirit and using the human body, and to any such teaching Nestorius was utterly opposed. For Nestorius the 'use' took place only on the level of the prosopon. Second, the concept of 'use' introduces the idea of active and passive elements in the person of Christ. Since the active part is the Godhead and the passive part the manhood, the unorthodox idea of the man Jesus earning the honour of Sonship would seem to be excluded.

1. F. Loofs, Nestoriana p. 280. 5-16.
2. Ibid. p. 299. 19-21.
Clearly the idea of 'use' is important and it is an idea that we meet with again in the Treatise when Nestorius has had time to develop his ideas. For example, he writes:

the oüsia of the divinity makes use of the prosopon of the humanity ... (p. 320)

But now, lest the unorthodox idea, referred to at the close of the last paragraph, should still be charged against him, Nestorius spells out that with regard to the unity of Christ the action is 'from above':

He took the likeness of a servant: and the likeness of the servant was not the oüsia of a man, but he who took it made it (his) likeness and his prosopon. And he became the likeness of men, but he became not the nature of men, although it was the nature of a man which he took; he who took it came to be in the likeness of man, whilst he who took and not that which was taken was found in schema as man; for that which was taken was the oüsia and nature of man, whereas he who took was found in schema as man without being the nature of man. (p. 165)

In this action there is no room for the man Jesus to merit, through obedience and love, his acceptance by the Godhead. There is no human action which gains for the man Jesus the right to worship and honour. It is rather something which happens to him and corresponds with the action of kenosis on the part of the divinity:

the prosopon of the divinity and the prosopon of the humanity are one prosopon, the one on this hand by kenosis, the other on that by exaltation. (p. 246)

Now we are brought to the point of asking of Nestorius by what means the prosopon of the divinity and the prosopon of the humanity may be considered one prosopon. He would reply by directing us again to the thought of the Philippians' passage:

so that the likeness of a servant which was taken should become the likeness of God and God the likeness of a servant and that the one should become the other and the other the one in prosopon, the one and the other remaining in their natures; (p. 183)

What Nestorius is saying here is that the prosopic union is a result of the mutual compensation of the two prosopa involved. He says as much in another passage:

But in the prosopa of the union, the one in the other, neither by diminution nor by suppression nor by confusion is this 'one' conceived, but by taking and by giving, and by the use of the union of the one with the other, the prosopa take and give one another but not the oüsias. (p. 252)
It is, then, the action of mutuality and reciprocity that enables Nestorius to speak at once of two prosopoi and of a unity of prosopon.

But what kind of union will this prosopic union, the result of mutual compensation, sustain?

(i) External undivided appearance

Both Loofs and Hodgson, though with different theological and philosophical backgrounds, find here the root meaning of the word prosopon in the Christology of Nestorius. Hodgson emphasises that the term appearance has nothing to do with the contrast between Appearance and Reality of later thought. Whatever Nestorius was he was neither a Platonist nor a Hegelian. Prosopon for him was an objectively real element in a res concreta. On this point Scipioni agrees:

This form, image, appearance is something real, a physical reality, not a mere appearance in imagination.¹

There is certainly evidence in the Treatise which supports this interpretation.

Prosopon and likeness are frequently connected in a single phrase. For he made use of the likeness and the prosopon of a servant (p. 147). God the Word is said to have become flesh and the Son of Man after the likeness and prosopon of the flesh (p. 158). Indeed, in one passage likeness and prosopon are equated. For the likeness is the prosopon (p. 166). For this reason God also was in him whatsoever he was himself in such wise that he also became in God whatsoever God was in him for the forming of his coming into being in his likeness (i.e.) the prosopon of God (p. 251). Even more frequently likeness and prosopon taken together are contrasted with nature and ousia (pp. 147, 165-6, 179).

Two typical examples of prosopon-likeness exegesis may be cited in full:

But God took upon himself the likeness of a servant, and that of none other, for his own prosopon and for his sonship ... He took the likeness of a servant: and the likeness of the servant was not the ousia of a man, but he who took it made it (his) likeness and his

¹ L.I. Scipioni, op. cit., p. 66.
prosopon. And he became the likeness of men, but he became not the nature of men, although it was the nature of a man which he took; he who took it came to be in the likeness of man, whilst he who took and not that which was taken was found in schema as man; for that which was taken was the ousia and nature of man, whereas he who took was found in schema as man without being the nature of man. For the nature he took not for himself but the likeness, the likeness and schema of man, in all things which indicate the prosopon: as touching the poverty of the schema, he (Paul) relates: He condescended unto death, even the death upon the cross whereby he emptied himself, in order to show in nature the humiliation of the likeness of a servant and to endure scorn among men; for they shamefully entreated him, even him who displayed infinite condescension. He made known also the cause wherefore he took the likeness of a servant when: He was found in the likeness of men in schema as a man and humiliated himself unto death, even the death upon the cross. But he suffered not these things in his nature but made use therein of him who suffers naturally in his schema and in his prosopon in order that he might give him by grace in his prosopon a name which is more excellent than all names, before which every knee which is in heaven and on the earth and beneath the earth shall bow; and every tongue shall confess him, in order that by his similitude with God and according to the greatness of God he may be conceived as Son who took the likeness of a servant and was in the likeness of a man and was found in schema as a man and humiliated himself unto death, even the death upon the cross, and was exalted in that there was given unto him a name which is more excellent than all names in the schema of the likeness of a servant which was taken with a view to the union. But he was the likeness of a servant not in schema but in ousia, and it was taken for the likeness and for the schema and for the humiliation unto death upon the cross. For this reason it was exalted so as to take a name which is more excellent than all names. (pp. 164-6)

The above passage is followed by a long but important application:

For this reason the Apostle lays down the prosopon of the union (in Christ Jesus) and next the things from which the union results (the two morphai). He says first the likeness of God, which is the similitude of God and next it took the likeness of a servant, not the ousia nor the nature but the schema and prosopon, in order that he might participate in the likeness of a servant and that the likeness of the servant might participate in the likeness of God so that of necessity there might be one prosopon from the two natures. For the likeness is the prosopon, so that it is the one by ousia and the other by union in respect to the humiliation and the exultation. He who took the likeness of a servant is the property solely of the likeness of God, whereas that which was taken concerns uniquely the likeness of the servant; but the one belongs to the other and the other to the one through the union of the prosopon and not through the ousia, in that where the one is in ousia, the other is in union and not another.

1. Phil. ii. 7-8.
2. Phil. ii. 8.
3. Phil. ii. 9-11.
4. Phil. ii. 7-9.
5. Phil. ii. 9.
That which is in ousia the likeness of God is consubstantial with this ousia, in that it is a natural likeness; but by union the likeness of God took the likeness of a servant and the likeness of God, which is naturally God's, became in schema the likeness of a servant. But the likeness of the servant, which is naturally the likeness of the servant and in the union the likeness of God is not naturally God's, so that we understand severally in nature the several qualities of each one of the natures and the natural distinctions of each of the natures; and the properties of the union are understood (as belonging) uniquely to the union and not the ousia. (pp. 166-7)

Here themes which have already been expounded in terms of prosopon and likeness are more closely related to nature and ousia. Christ Jesus is the subject of the union, the description of the total incarnate Person, human and divine. There is a mutuality or reciprocity of prosopa, but each is the natural prosopon of one ousia or nature and belongs to the other not in ousia or nature but by the union.

A further theme - the image - is brought into connection with likeness and prosopon in a passage describing Christ as the Second Adam. It is of importance as indicating the broad lines of Nestorius' doctrine of the Atonement. The passage (pp. 182-3) opens with a discussion of the relation between the prosopon and the natures and uses the properties of the natures in developing the following argument:

they were closely united unto one and the same with a view to the dispensation on our behalf, since men were in need of the divinity as for our renewal and for our formation anew and for (the renewal) of the likeness of the image which had been obliterated by us: but (men had need also) of the humanity which was renewed and took its likeness anew; for the humanity was congruous, so as to preserve the order which had existed. For he (Adam) who was honoured with the honour which he gave him and rendered not unto him his (due) honour for the honour which he received showed that he had lost the honour wherewith he had been honoured. For the one (Adam) also was honoured as the other (? Christ); and he accepted him not for himself but regarded him as an enemy. When the other (Christ) was in these (circumstances) he thus preserved himself, making use of the things belonging to the other as if of his own; he truly preserved the image of God and made it his own: that (it is) which is the image and the prosopon. For this reason there was need both of the divinity to renew and to create and to give unto itself the likeness, so that (it might be changed) from its own type to the likeness of a servant; and there was also need of the humanity, so that the likeness of a servant which was taken should become the likeness of God and God the likeness of a servant and that the one should become the other and the other the one in prosopon, the one and the other remaining in their natures; and he preserves an obedience without sin because of his supreme obedience, and because of this he was given unto death for the salvation of all the world.
But what else besides external undivided appearance, image and likeness did Nestorius include in the expression unity of prosopon?

(ii) Unity in will and activity

He speaks frequently of voluntary and involuntary union, the former being satisfied by prosopic union alone, the latter a principal defect in Cyril's theory of natural union. Scipioni however warns us¹ that the distinction may have a metaphysical rather than a psychological context. By voluntary union is meant a mode of union which respects the integrity of the component natures while in an involuntary union they are either modified or destroyed (pp. 161-4).

Yet clearly, especially as applied to the sufferings of the Incarnate Lord, the transition from an ontological to a volitional approach could easily be made (pp. 179,181).

Scipioni himself admits that as a secondary meaning a volitional or psychological sense is found, though unfortunately the bulk of the passages to which he refers are found in the parts of the Treatise attributed by Abramowski to Pseudo-Nestorius. Here the clearest and most succinct is the statement 'To have the prosopon of God is to will what God wills' (p. 59).

In view of the strong emphasis upon will as a category and especially the insistence upon the integrity of the human will of Christ it is somewhat surprising that more use of the term is not found in the Treatise. This is partly explicable on two grounds. First, the pigeon-holing of will into the general metaphysic of a concrete person proved a problem for Patristic Christology as a whole. The Chalcedonian Definition avoids the question and the main Dyothelite-Monothelite controversy which presupposes that will is included in phusis still lay in the future. The controversial context of Nestorius must also be taken into account. As compared with Theodore, whose preserved writings are mainly exegetical, Nestorius in controversy with Cyril is primarily a systematic theologian; indeed he might

¹ L.I. Scipioni, op. cit., pp. 88-93.
be described not unjustly as the Scholastic of the tradition. His allusions to and inductions from exegesis, though scanty, are sufficient to establish that there is no essential difference between him and his fellow Dualists.¹

Second, Nestorius must have realised that any special emphasis he gave to will would be a source of embarrassment to himself for it was Cyril's particular charge against him that he was teaching a purely moral union (pp. 163, 189, 196).²

But in any case Nestorius' main task is to demonstrate the superiority of prosoponic union to the Cyrilline alternatives of natural or hypostatic union and so he is normally content to include will in prosoponic union without further special reference to it. His real answer to the charge of teaching a unity in will is not to deny the fact but to include it in the wider and to him more satisfactory framework of prosoponic union.

1. Hebrews v. 7-9 (pp. 207-8); Mark xv. 34 (p. 236); Luke ii. 52 (pp. 205-6) are made the subjects of detailed exegesis while itemized references in catalogue form to passages involving the human will are found on pages 183, 206, 214-5 of the Treatise. He uses a passage from Gregory of Nazianzus to the same effect with evident approval 'He who begins and gradually advances and is brought to fulness is not God although he is so called on account of his revelation which was made little by little' (p. 215). A passage on page 184 is particularly revealing here 'the completion of the nature of the man, being commanded and performing the things which are comprised in the wills commanded and enduring unwillingly the whole human conduct truly in observances difficult and painful and full of suffering, not doing what he willed through fear of transgressing the command, thirsting and hungering and fearing with human fear, willing with a human will'. This might be taken as a summary of Antiochene exegesis.

2. This charge does not stand for Nestorius is completely orthodox in maintaining that the unity of will is the consequence of the union but not its ground 'And such a conception (i.e., prosoponic union) as this consists neither in making void nor in the being made void nor in the extinction of one nature or of the properties of the two natures, but the several qualities in the natural qualities are distinct in purpose and in will, according to the distinction of the natures in the one equality, while there is the same will and purpose in the union of the natures, so that they may both or not will the same things' (p.163). Using quotations from A. Grillmeier, L. Abramowski (op. cit., p.213) makes the same point : Die 'freiwillige Vereinigung' der Naturen und die "Evangelische Einheit" ausgeschlossen, 'die so sehr im Sinne einer bloss moralischen Einheit ausgelegt worden sind', haben 'den eigentlichen Sinn', 'die Naturnotwendigkeit der Inkarnation und der Christuseinheit auszuschliessen'. 'Sie lassen an sich Raum für eine seinshaft, nicht bloss moralische Einheit'.

¹
²
There is however some evidence both indirect and direct for his teaching on the place of will in his Christology and its relation to prosopon:

(i) Nestorius conceives the whole rhythm of the Incarnation in terms of a double process of humiliation (kenosis) and exaltation (plerosis). The model of the Assumer and the assumed (in which the divine priority is always observed) equally plainly uses nouns of action. So with regard to prosopon 'the humanity takes the prosopon of the divinity, the prosopon of the humanity is taken by the divinity'.

(ii) His doctrine of the Atonement is clarified by the Adam-Christ parallelism. It combines the themes of vicarious victory and vicarious obedience. Words like combat (p. 173), obedience (pp. 187, 205, 247-8), fulfillment or observance of the commandments (pp. 173, 213) are of fairly frequent occurrence.

(iii) The emphasis on the voluntariness of the sufferings of Christ certainly has a voluntary as well as an ontological context.

(iv) His insistence against Cyril, but in full harmony with the Orientals generally (see the concluding section of the Formulary of Concord), that the scriptural distinctions or attributes of Christ are real and not merely nominal or notional involves the existence of a human will in Christ (pp. 318-9, 322). 'For the diversities (in the sayings) are those of the operations which are set before us and these diversities are based on the sayings: for when there is no diversity in the operations, the diversity also of the sayings is suppressed' (p. 307). Two wills in juxtaposition are implied here. God the Word 'carried out all the operations of his prosopon' (p. 147). Against Arius and Apollinarius 'the union of the natures, in fact, was neither without will nor without imagination' (p. 172). The humanity 'was not without activity in his own nature' (p. 233). Clearly, then, Nestorius was what would be called later a dyothelite.

So to conclude, while Scipioni looks chiefly to Pseudo-Nestorius for his evidence for a volitional or psychological interpretation of
the voluntary character of prosopic union, similar evidence is not lacking elsewhere in the Treatise. It is perhaps significant that Abramowski, who proposes the hypothesis of Pseudo-Nestorius, in writing of the genuine parts of the Treatise states roundly (though without adding any references) that "ethical relations belong to the prosopon".

(iii) The prosopon and the community of properties

At first sight the idea of a community of properties for Nestorius might seem to be excluded by his heavy accentuation of duality. At every point in his christological metaphysics, phusis, ousia, hypostasis and even prosopon, his first reaction is to describe as two rather than one. Even when he speaks of what is involved in the compensation of the prosopa, their mutuality or reciprocity, he describes it as making use of or of giving and taking. The natures are complete and self-sustaining. Should we not therefore expect them to be as it were hermetically sealed from each other as well? Clearly the weight of duality which his Christology is asked to bear is a heavy one.

Further the Theotokos controversy which opened the dispute with Cyril involved the principle of the communicatio idiomatum (the transference of attributes or properties), though allowance must be made here for his answer to the accusation of Theodotus of Ancyra (pp. 136-8) 'I did not refuse to call a babe God but only to call God a babe'. Does Nestorius object to the predication of common properties or to certain applications of this principle or to Cyril's contextualisation of this fact in terms of natural or hypostatic union, especially to his attribution of all the properties of the Incarnate Lord to God the Word rather than to the Incarnate Lord, Son or Christ? Does he in the outcome wish to substitute a communicatio prosopon (if the expression is permissible) for Cyril's communicatio idiomatum?

That a community of properties is not excluded for Nestorius on his premises seems established not only by indirect evidence but also by explicit quotations.

1. L. Abramowski, op. cit., p. 212.
(i) It is of course a truism that both Cyril and Nestorius are discussing the same thing, the Incarnation which involves a union of Godhead and manhood, however widely they differ on their interpretations both of the fact and its implications. This observation however does not solve our problem which concerns the place of properties or attributes in this union.

(ii) The second argument is presumptive and therefore disputable. Philosophically Nestorius is a realist and not a nominalist with regard to the titles and descriptions of Christ in the New Testament. His preference for concrete rather than abstract connotations for the terms he uses has already been noted. The differences in the attributes represents a difference of things as well as of names. It would be surprising (though not impossible) if his concept of prosopon did not include a more concrete content than mere likeness or image.

(iii) His approximation of the terminology of the Trinity and of the Incarnation (based upon an undeveloped hint in the Cappodocians) is a frequent theme. Grillmeier notes a passage (p. 207 cp. p. 309) where he not only contrasts the one ousia and three prosopa of the Trinity with the two ousias, one prosopon of the Incarnation but also claims that the two ousias in the person of Christ are related 'after the same manner as the manner of the Trinity'. Grillmeier's conclusion is unequivocal: 'This is an incontrovertible proof that he (Nestorius) is concerned with a substantial unity in Christ'.

(iv) While his mind is normally occupied with the many points at which he is at variance with Cyril, there are some expressions relating to unity which both can share. While this certainly does not apply to ουνομασία (conjunction) which is Nestorius' favourite theme, the frequent Cyrilline expression ουνομασία occurs in two passages of the Treatise (pp.144,166), once in a form 'the ineffable and incomprehensible concurrence of the divinity

1. A. Grillmeier, op. cit., p.448.
2. Ibid, p. 449.
and the humanity in the Union which Cyril would not have disowned. There is even an isolated use of mixture language (probably οἰκείωσις) (p. 260) though this should not be pressed. Nestorius even approves of the term ἀντίστοιχος in Athanasius for which the Cyrilline equivalent is οἰκείωσις (appropriation). One analogy, the Burning Bush, has the distinction of being used by both protagonists (pp. 156, 160) though Nestorius uses it as a model for union without confusion while Cyril uses it to express the permeation or interpenetration of the natures.

But there is also some evidence of a more direct nature, more substantial in fact than with regard to the relation of prosopon and will. Common properties or common qualities are asserted of the one prosopon though in a number of cases the word 'property' seems to be supplied by the English editors to fill in an elliptical expression in the Syriac. Possibly Nestorius lacked an appropriate philosophical term to express what was held in common between the divinity and the humanity less extensive in its implications than prosopon though this is unlikely in view of his less frequent use of quality in this connection, but more probably he avoided too frequent a use of idioma because of its use by Cyril with regard to the suspect word Theotokos.

The governing principle of Nestorius is that 'the properties of the two natures befit also one prosopon' but that 'the diversities of the natures are not destroyed because of the union' (p. 166). 'There is one prosopon of the union and .. the properties of the humanity belong unto God the Word and those of the divinity unto the humanity .. they were closely united unto one and the same with a view to the dispensation on our behalf' (pp. 182-3). They remain in their own natures and make 'the very properties common to him who acts (the man) and to him who is in his own ousia (God the Word) and he (Christ) possesses all those things which are made the common properties' (p. 221). 'For except the ousia he (the man) has all the properties of the ousia owing to the union and not by nature. For the divinity makes use of the prosopon of the humanity and the humanity of that of the
divinity; and thus we say one prosopon in both of them' (p. 240). Here properties and prosopon are brought close together. 'The orthodox (Nestorius and the Oriental Dualists) .. give in compensation the properties of the humanity to the divinity and those of the divinity to the humanity, and that this is said of the one and that of the other, as concerning natures whole and united, united indeed without confusion and making use of the prosopa of one another' (p. 241). 'It has indeed made our own properties its very own properties, conceding its own to him to whom all these things belong completely, except sin' (p. 247). 'Apart from the ousia he had all the properties of the ousia; he is one Son who exists in the union' (p. 251). 'Wherefore whatsoever God is by nature is said also by reason of the union in whatever is united, that is, man' (p. 253).

For his view Nestorius claims widespread and unexceptionable support. The Nicene Fathers begin with one Lord Jesus Christ because the properties of the divinity and the humanity are common (p. 169). In their Creed all the properties of God the Word and all the properties of the humanity are referred to one prosopon, the common prosopon, in that we see 'they began .. not with God the Word, but with one Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God' (p. 169). Athanasius indicates the common prosopon 'for he lays down the common name "Lord" which is conceived of nature and in nature, as well as the things which are indicative of the properties of the natures, indicating them both, the divinity and the humanity, the one from God the Father in nature and the other of a woman in nature' (p. 216). The common usage of the properties is the basis of what Athanasius calls the appropriation (ιδιονοίζοισι) from which Nestorius does not dissent (p. 221). Gregory of Nazianzus makes the same point. 'The flesh is outside (God the Word), participating not in the properties of the divinity in its own prosopon, but by a compensation consisting of the taking and giving of their prosopa he speaks of the union of the divinity and of the humanity' (p. 261).

Cyril on the other hand is wrong not in holding a community of properties but in referring them all to God the Word as the sole ousia,
hypostasis or nature and not to the common prosopon of the union (pp. 146, 154, 247). This would lead to the destruction of the properties of the flesh (pp. 166, 248–9) or to confusion and diminution (p. 252) or, more simply, to change (pp. 248–9). The common attributes appropriated not to God the Word but to the prosopon of the union (p. 247).

This community of properties arising from or resulting in the common prosopon or the prosopon of the union is described by Nestorius in terms of 'making use' (p. 219), of giving and taking of the prosopa or of the property of the prosopon (pp. 225, 252) or as compensation consisting of giving and taking of their prosopa (p. 261). Nestorius addresses Cyril as follows: 'Predicate then a common prosopon and predicate of one prosopon the things that they make common; for that which is made of things that are opposite in anything is made common, so that it is therefore not sole but common .... The common prosopon of the two natures is Christ, the same prosopon whereof the natures make use even likewise, that wherein and whereby both of them, the divinity and the humanity, are known in ousia without distinction and with distinction. Neither the divinity nor the humanity exists by itself in the common prosopon, for it appertains to both the natures, so that therein and thereby both the natures are known' (pp. 318–20).

There is therefore more approximation in the content of the thought of Cyril and Nestorius than might have been expected but still a wide difference in emphasis and in their conceptual framework. Nestorius accepts a community of properties without prejudice to full duality of nature; Cyril sets it against the background of natural or hypostatic union and even as evidence in support of his theories. Nestorius suspects the Theotokos as implying that every property of the Incarnate Lord must be attributed to God the Word rather than to the common prosopon of the Incarnate Christ.

Less frequently Nestorius speaks of qualities instead of properties. Both words seem to cover much the same ground. 'The inconfusion of the natures in the union, in making use of the qualities of the natures' (p. 153). 'I proclaim eagerly in every place that the things which are said
either about the divinity or about the humanity must be taken not of the nature but of the prosopon, so that there might be no unreality about the human qualities' (p. 157). 'We understand severally in nature the several qualities of each one of the natures and the natural distinctions of each single one of the natures; and the properties of the union we understand as belonging uniquely to the union and not to the ousia' (p. 167). Here property and quality, nature and ousia appear to be linked pairs of synonyms. 'Since the humanity is understood completely as the nature of man, it has completely all the qualities of the sons of man, acting and suffering, as the nature of men is wont to do' (p. 217). Against Cyril Nestorius urges: 'Thou ... confessest that the humanity and the divinity are not the same in ousia or, as thou sayest, in natural quality, - if it is right to call the quality nature? .... (But) thou confessest also these qualities in respect to the natures because they remain without confusion' (p. 309). Yet despite these admissions Cyril still speaks of natural rather than prosopon union. It appears then that Nestorius identifies property and quality.

Nestorius, then, like Cyril believed in a community of properties but preferred to ascribe them to the common prosopon which alone made his diagnosis of full duality of nature possible without either confusion or loss of completeness. His statements and the way in which they are expressed makes it clear that there is a close relation between the prosopon and the properties. Common properties imply a common prosopon.

Evidently, then, the content and implications of the term prosopon are exceedingly far reaching. The uses to which he puts it both polemically against Cyril and positively in his own Christology are clear enough. We pass now to making some assessment of the thought of Nestorius.

While it may be said that modern study has made the question of whether Nestorius was a Nestorian one to be dismissed with an emphatic no, it is nevertheless very clear from what has been written above that it is a difficult task for scholars to assign him his place, be it within the company of the orthodox or the unorthodox, or standing nearer to the one than the other.
Later some attempt to place Nestorius will be made, but for the present this chapter will draw to a conclusion with a cautious statement of his views which we believe our study to have revealed.

(i) Nestorius was a moderate and not, as he has normally been regarded, an extreme Dualist thinker.

(ii) The prime motive of Nestorius was the diagnosis of duality within the Incarnate Lord. Certainly he would not deny his unity as well and the common prosopon or the prosopon of union may well reflect a starting point in the Incarnate Lord.

(iii) The balance of Nestorius' thinking is reflected in his use of terms. Grillmeier¹ notes that he has four words for duality, phusis, ousia, hypostasis and prosopon and only one for unity, prosopon, in which elements of duality are already present. Whether the weight of duality which is thus implied can be satisfactorily sustained is problematic and this remains a difficulty whether the four terms are thought to describe constituent elements in a concrete entity or the four related but distinct logical inroads into the same entity. The second interpretation might work better if it were not for the odd man out, prosopon used both of the natural prosopon and the common prosopon or the prosopon of union.

(iv) Certainly for all his stress on duality Nestorius believed in the unity of the Person of Christ. He describes Christ (with Cyril) as one and even as the same (on the scriptural basis of Hebrews xiii, 8). The unity (though never detached from duality) comes out both in Scripture and the Creed, though unlike Cyril he finds its focus not in God the Word but in the total Incarnate Person. The empirical fact of the Incarnate Person establishes the possibility of the Incarnation. Whether it is his starting point or not, Grillmeier follows Scipioni in describing the unity of Christ as an undiscussable fact in the thinking of Nestorius.

¹ A. Grillmeier, op. cit. p. 435.
Yet, finally, we are constrained to ask the question which ever and again raises itself as one studies the Christology of Nestorius. Does his conceptual scaffolding, his logical mapwork, provide satisfactorily for the unity? Does he provide a working hypothesis which can supply a concrete subject for the Incarnate Lord? Whatever criticisms can be made by Nestorius and others of Cyril's natural or hypostatic union, the views which he rejects certainly provide such a subject. Is Nestorius equally successful here? The simpler formula 'Two natures in one prosopon' would probably serve even allowing for the uncertainty which exists over the content of prosopon. But this is qualified by the supplementary formula 'two prosopa in one prosopon' and it is by no means clear that this improves his position. Scipioni\(^1\) can go as far as to claim that Nestorius meant by prosopon what is usually covered by 'person' and that the prosopic union provides a single subject of attribution, a subject which is real and not purely nominal or logical. His case, however, would be a good deal stronger if Nestorius had not simultaneously spoken of two prosopa as well. Granted that no fifth century Christologian had a word which exactly corresponded to 'person' it seems as if Cyril had the edge on Nestorius here. If Cyril had more clearly distinguished nature from hypostasis and if Nestorius had identified prosopon with hypostasis they might well have jointly put the whole Church in their debt.

It will be recalled that the historical account of chapter two was concluded at the point where Nestorius, having been deposed, was returned to his monastery at Antioch, while Cyril, escaping from arrest, returned to Alexandria. The bitter feelings between the parties of Cyril and John persisted. They grew worse, first when sentences of deposition were passed on certain metropolitans who had supported Nestorius, and second when communion was broken off with John and his supporters. It was necessary for the Government to find some means of settling the situation. Cyril found this an opportune moment to try and remove the enmity between himself and the Emperor by writing his Apologeticus ad Theodosium. The Emperor's reaction was to send a peremptory letter summoning Cyril and John to Nicomedia for purposes of reconciliation. This failed and for the first architect of reconciliation we must look to the venerable Acacius of Beroea, a confessor during the last persecution. He had not been present at Ephesus owing to his great age. He had unbroken relations with both parties and was therefore the ideal mediator. His influence in moderating the attitude of John of Antioch may be significant. Meanwhile the Emperor followed up his unsuccessful letter by calling for the tribune Aristolaus and sending him to Syria and Egypt with a twofold task. In Syria he was to try and make the Orientals accept the condemnation of Nestorius whom they still held to be a colleague unjustly sentenced. In Egypt he was to try and make Cyril accept the condemnation of his troublesome Anathemas which Theodoret and Andrew of Samosata had set themselves to prove to be heresy.

The first step in the campaign of reconciliation was not auspicious. A conference between leading Oriental bishops, John of Antioch, Alexander of Hierapolis and Theodoret together with Acacius of Beroea drew up Six Propositions as a basis for peace to be communicated to Cyril by

1. Cyril, Apologeticus ad Theodosium, A.C.O. I,i,3 pp. 75-90.
2. A.C.O. I,i,4.
Aristolaus. The meeting reaffirmed its faith in the Nicene Creed without addition as containing the evangelical and apostolic doctrine. It accepted the letter of Athanasius to Epictetus as the authentic and complete exposition of this faith. It rejected emphatically the Twelve Anathemas of Cyril as an innovation which disturbed the common doctrine. The sting so far as Cyril was concerned lay in the last requirement (the fifth of the Six Propositions). His reply to Acacius of Beroea politely but firmly rejected this demand. He admits however that the Anathemas only had in mind the errors of Nestorius. Those who rejected his opinions ought therefore to find nothing objectionable in them. Once peace was restored to the Church it would be easy to reach an understanding on the subject. Cyril then preposed to hold his ground, but there seems just a hint here that he might be prepared to let them fade into the background.

The Orientals regarded the Anathemas as confirming their suspicions that Cyril was a thinly disguised Apollinarian (they certainly present Cyril as a theologian at his least conciliatory). The letters of Oriental bishops on receipt of the news of Cyril's refusal to abandon the Anathemas are preserved in most cases only in Latin. 2 Alexander of Hierapolis, the most intransigent of them all, roundly described Cyril as a heretic. The more moderate Theodoret was deeply distressed and spoke of vacating his see and retiring to the desert. Both Theodoret and Andrew of Samosata prepared refutations of the Anathemas which have been preserved with Cyril's replies 3.

More surprising is the attitude of John of Antioch. While in varying degrees his fellow Oriental bishops drew back after Cyril's refusal to accept the Six Propositions he moved steadily forward to the establishment of full communion with Cyril. Certainly it is surprising that the former

1. Epistle of Cyril to Acacius of Beroëa A.C.O. I,i,7 pp. 147-50.
3. Theodoret, A.C.O. I,i,6 pp. 107-46; Andrew of Samosata A.C.O. I,i,7 pp. 33-63. The Latin version of both documents with Cyril's replies is to be found in A.C.O. I, 5'pp. 116-65. The general impression left by these confrontations in the light of Cyril's explanation is of more common ground than might have been suspected. At one point the commentator Arethas suggests that the net difference is between six and half a dozen - A.C.O. I,i,6 p.114.
champion of Nestorius at Ephesus, the participant at the meeting which produced the Six Propositions, should continue negotiations which others would have broken off. Explanations vary from chronic infirmity of purpose, respect for imperial authority, embarrassment by (and possibly jealousy of) Nestorius, now returned to his monastery at Antioch, to genuine concern for the unity of the Church. None of these explanations is completely satisfactory and possibly they are not mutually exclusive. At any rate the negotiations continued with the visit of Paul of Emesa to Alexandria. The terms agreed and ultimately accepted by John of Antioch and the more moderate of his colleagues were the abandonment of Nestorius and the condemnation of his opinions by the Orientals and the acceptance by Cyril of the Formulary of Concord. In exchange for the acceptance of these terms John was to receive letters of communion from Cyril. The completion of the settlement evoked from Cyril his letter Laetentur Caeli containing the Formulary of Concord. This Formulary was, as we have seen, originally an Antiochene production without any thought of its use as an instrument of peace at the time of its compilation or at any later date.

At either stage its content is remarkable though for different reasons. As a statement of the basic theological position of the Orientals it insists upon the Incarnate Lord as perfect God and perfect man and asserts His double homoousia with the Father and with ourselves. It continues with the assertion Ἰδόν γὰρ ἑοεννὶ εἴσωσις ἡγεΐνει. This might seem strangely moderate for a school of thought which steadily preferred to speak of 'in two natures'. It is possible however that the continuation of the phrase 'wherefore we acknowledge one Christ, one Son, one Lord' may provide the key here. The Orientals are anxious to assure the Emperor that despite charges to the contrary they nevertheless hold the unity of the Person of Christ. More surprising is the acceptance of the Theotokos though with a typical Antiochene gloss which contains the expression τὸν ἐγὼ ἐκτιθέναι οὐκ ἔναν.

It has often been remarked that at this stage the Antiochenes were giving nothing away. The last sentence on Antiochene exegesis does not occur in the earlier statement and seems to have been added by John of Antioch to the original statement.

It was surely on the grounds of the acceptance of this statement that John of Antioch regarded the final terms of reconciliation as a victory - although merely a partial one since Nestorius was abandoned to Cyril. Theodoret held similar views but he could also write in a less lyrical vein about the settlement. A long and unfavourable letter complaining of the 'feigned repentance of the Egyptian' (Cyril) is extant. This is ascribed to Nestorius himself by d'Alès, but the matter seems uncertain and it is not included among the letters of Nestorius in Loofs' Nestoriana. A list of fifteen clergy who refused to accept the settlement of whom the most notable were Alexander of Hierapolis and Eutherius of Tyana has been preserved with brief biographical notes. The case was closed by an Imperial Edict against the Nestorians excluding them from the Church and ordering that they should be henceforth described as Simonians.

It has often been noted as strange that Cyril could bring himself to accept the Formulary of Concord. No doubt one major factor in the situation is that he had detached the Orientals from their support of Nestorius. Ecclesiastical and political factors of this kind were always at the front of his mind. Yet some theological self-justification cannot have been entirely absent. He may indeed have regarded it as little more than a gesture against the charge of Apollinarianism raised against him by his opponents. The firm stress on the unity of the Person of Christ (perhaps significantly placed second in the Formulary) would for him be primary. He had made a 'clear recognition of the soul of Christ'. The phrase 'with a rational soul' or 'rationally ensouled' is of frequent occurrence in his writings. He would prefer 'perfect

5. A.C.O. I,4,p. 204 Codex Theodosianus XVI.5.
in Godhead, perfect in manhood' to 'perfect God and perfect man' and the double homoousia of our Lord would require a mental gloss on the phrase δυοοοοοος ἔννοια. The double generation of the Logos eternally from the Father and temporarily through the Virgin was a leading theme of his own Christology. The phrase 'union of two natures' was in the historical context ambiguous. For the Orientals it would cover 'in two natures', for Cyril it might be reconcilable with the union κατὰ φύσιν or union out of two natures which he himself preferred. Above all there was the acceptance of Theotokos however carefully qualified. If the Anathemas represent the unconciliatory Cyril the acceptance of the Formulary of Concord harmonised better with the more positive and conciliatory moods of his Christology.

If John of Antioch had trouble with some of his supporters, Cyril was not without critics among his own followers who criticised him for having sold the pass by his acceptance of the Formulary of Concord. This criticism is reflected in a whole group of letters of which those to Acacius of Melitene, Valerian and Successus are the most notable. In addition the letter of Acacius to Cyril is preserved in Latin.

Both sides claimed a theological victory. John of Antioch claimed that Cyril had experienced theological conversion, Cyril in the last cited group of letters believed that the Orientals had seen the light and believed in the unity of the Person of Christ. He had secured his principal targets, the abandonment of Nestorius, the acceptance of Theotokos and withal his Anathemas remained intact. Yet the Anathemas now fade into the background and the Christology which he was now prepared to expound to his supporters had a wider outlook and in spirit and emphasis could not be easily harmonised with them.

The settlement produced by the Formulary of Concord afforded but an uneasy peace. And what peace there was may not have long endured had

2. A.C.O. I, iv pp. 118-9. T. Camelot, Chalkedon I p. 232 finds here the germ of Eutychianism, the intransigent fidelity to the formulas of Cyril, particularly the ἰδιὸς φύσις and the fear of anything savouring of Nestorianism.
not the Government, which had in fact forced reciprocal concessions from both sides, taken steps to see that the dissidents on either side were not allowed to undo what had been achieved. It was to underline its determination by banishing Nestorius to Oasis in the year 435. Further imperial disfavour almost certainly lay behind this new deterioration in his fortunes. After all Nestorius had already lost imperial support, and part of the bargain which led up to the Formulary of Concord was the abandonment of Nestorius by the Orientals. Loofs would seem to be amply justified in regarding the charge that it was due to the jealousy of John of Antioch as a Nestorian canard. Obviously this is how it must have appeared to Nestorius himself. Whether John of Antioch was as much to blame as Loofs makes out is perhaps disputable. Probably the utmost that can be fairly laid to the charge of John of Antioch is that in his efforts for the peace of the Church as a whole he would not be averse to be disembarassed of the presence of his former friend.

It is difficult to say precisely when Nestorius died in exile. The historical parts of the Treatise which might have provided a terminus post quern are unfortunately considered to contain several minor interpolations by Abramowski. Because of this we cannot be certain that he knew that the Emperor Theodosius had died in July 450 though he certainly did know of Leo's Tome and the prospect of a new Council. It would be ironical if he had known that the Council which he hoped would rehabilitate him was to be summoned on the initiative of the same Pulcheria who had been offended by Nestorius for refusing her the honours which she regarded as appropriate to her status as a consecrated 'virgin. This is mentioned by Nestorius himself

3. Celestine had petitioned the Emperor for the exile of Nestorius as early as 432 (A.C.O. I,ii pp. 88-90).
4. Two fragments from Nestorius to the Prefect of the Thebaid preserved by Evagrius belong to this period (Letters XIII-XIV in Loofs, Nestoriana pp. 198-201).
5. The interpolations are given by A. Grillmeier, op.cit., p. 499.
6. His hopes went unrealised as he died in exile. He did, however, outlive both John of Antioch and Cyril who died in 441 and 444 respectively.
in the Treatise. This was, however, as nothing compared with the feud of Pulcheria with Eutyches later on.

Dioscorus, who had been archdeacon to Cyril, was appointed his successor at the see of Alexandria and notified other bishops of his consecration. Two of their replies are preserved: Theodoret Ep. lx (P.G. LXXIII 1232), which is unexpectedly favourable, and Leo Ep. ix (P.L. LIV 524), which in papal idiom recalls the close association of their two sees. In this hope Leo was destined to disappointment. His episcopate began inauspiciously with financial demands from the relatives and friends of Cyril.¹ These are repeated with four testimonies at Chalcedon.² They were accepted by the Council and are probably to be accepted as historical. Dioscorus followed in ecclesiastical politics the normal line in inter patriarchal rivalries, opposition to Antioch and, when opportunity offered, intervention at Constantinople. Theologically he followed the opposition to the Antiochene tradition in general and Nestorianism in particular. He rejected any formula containing the expression Ḍ/ό ἄναθεσις because to him it involved the dyad of sons. His watchwords were Ἀμέν ἡ ἐπίσκοπος ἡμῶν and Μετὰ τὴν ἐνωσιν, μιᾶν φύσιν and these he stood by to the end.³ Throughout he followed the Cyril of the Anathemas rather than the Cyril of the letter to John of Antioch. Only a full acceptance of the Twelve Anathemas would serve as a sufficient test of christological orthodoxy. In this Dioscorus had the support of the monastic world which applauded Dioscorus' advocacy of the expression ἑκάκα τὴν ἐνωσιν, μιᾶν φύσιν. He had also taken care to bribe two important government officials: Chrysaphius (Grand Chamberlain) and Nomus (Magister Officiorum). The former had used his office to prevent Pulcheria exercising any power — and this was to Dioscorus' advantage for she would undoubtedly have been against him. Finally, also lining up behind

¹. Liberatus Breviarium 10 P.L. LXVIII 992.
³. A.C.O. II,1,i p. 120.
Dioscorus was the Empress Eudocia who, though now separated from her husband and living in Jerusalem, still retained some political influence.

It fell to Domnus, the nephew of John of Antioch and heir no less to his theological position than to his throne, to resist the activities of Dioscorus. He turned for guidance and for action to Theodoret, Bishop of Cyrhus, since the death of Cyril the leading theologian of the Eastern Church. Perhaps he saw in the role now given to him an opportunity to redress the wrongs done to Nestorius. At all events he acted with vigour. He directed the defence of the traditional teaching of the Antiochenes.

At that time there was a monk at Antioch, named Pelagius, who upheld the Alexandrian teaching of the \( \text{ωδω } \text{φυσις} \). Theodoret forced him to restrict his teaching and accept a confession in harmony with the Formulary of Concord which accordingly stressed the \( \text{ωδω } \text{φυσις} \).

Finally, mention may be made of Theodoret's Dialogue or Eranistes which, directed against Eutychian type opinions, was the most important theological contribution made at this stage of the controversy.

News of these actions of Theodoret which some regarded as renewed support for Nestorius soon reached Constantinople. There the pro-Alexandrian party, prominent among whom was a monk named Eutyches, determined some action on its own part. They informed Leo of Rome of the developments taking place and asked for his support in the possible ensuing conflict. Next they persuaded the Emperor to issue his "Sanctio" Edict of 448. This was uncompromisingly anti-Nestorian and included in it was the deposition of the twice-married Irenaeus, the former count and friend of Nestorius, whom Theodoret had consecrated Bishop of Tyre. Conflict was made

2. Theodoret Dialogue P.G. LXXXIII 227-318. In this the position of the interlocutor is described as: \( \text{ἐκ φυσιων λέγω, έδω λέγεσι } \), \text{cp. Dioscorus: } \text{τα } \text{ἐκ δυο δέσμασιν, τα } \text{δυο } \text{οδ οδ } \text{δέσμασι (A.C.O. II.1.1 p.120).}
3. A.C.O. I,1,4 p.66; Codex Justiniani I,1,3.
certain when at Antioch the bishops Domnus and Theodoret, with the people, refused to acknowledge the "Sanctic".

The action now passed to Dioscorus. He wrote, the year is 448, to Domnus criticizing his behaviour. Domnus, in his reply, refused the criticism. About the same time Dioscorus began to harass Theodoret and brought pressure on the officials he had bribed at court to influence the Emperor into confining Theodoret to his bishopric of Cyrrhus. With Theodoret removed from Antioch, Dioscorus renewed correspondence with Domnus at Antioch. He wrote urging him to accept the Twelve Anathemas. Domnus' reply pointed out that at the time of reconciliation Cyril had not mentioned the Twelve Anathemas and to insist upon them now would only bring turmoil to the East. Deprived of Theodoret's immediate support, Domnus now wrote to Flavian, Bishop of Constantinople, complaining of the hostile actions of Dioscorus and urging him to come forward and champion the Faith.

Flavian had succeeded to the see of Constantinople in 446 following two short episcopates since the deposition of Nestorius in 431. Duchesne writes of Flavian that he was "a man of moderate views, readily prone to hold himself aloof from theological parties". Therefore, though if anything he favoured the formulas of the East, he hesitated to be drawn by the appeal of Domnus. It would have been dangerous for him to do otherwise since at that time Eutyches and his supporters had the ear of the Emperor before whom they were accusing the Orientals of Nestorianism. But it was not possible that the occupant of the see of Constantinople should be unconcerned in the spreading crisis. Eventually, at a meeting of the Home Synod of Constantinople, Flavian was forced to play his part - a part which issued in tragedy for him.

1. P.G. LXXXIII 1258-1280.
2. P.G. LXXXIII 1256-1266.
3. Maximian (431-4) and Proclus (434-46).
5. The developing crisis was in fact initiated by Eutyches who wrote to Leo complaining of the outbreak of Nestorianism. Leo's reply was guarded but commended his zeal for orthodoxy (Leo Ep. XXI P.L. LIV 713).
The Home Synod

The minutes are included in the Acts of the Council of Chalcedon. The matter of Eutyches came up unexpectedly on the charge of Eusebius of Dorylaeum. He was no Nestorian sympathiser; indeed as a layman he had called attention to the views of Nestorius at the beginning of the controversy which led to the Council of Ephesus. He was a friend of Eutyches and had remonstrated with him in private. Flavian appears to have treated the erring archimandrite with every consideration. At the second session Eusebius suggests the reading of the second letter of Cyril to Nestorius and his letter to John of Antioch. The third letter of Cyril to Nestorius containing the Anathemas is passed over in discreet silence. Flavian's own confession of faith is based broadly on the Formulary of Concord but contains the phrase $\varepsilon \kappa \delta \iota \omicron \phi \omicron \sigma \tau \omega \nu$ which marks a retrogression behind the Formulary. Two metropolitans, Basil of Seleucia and Seleucus of Amasea expressed their preference for $\varepsilon \nu \delta \omicron \phi \omicron \sigma \tau \omega \nu$.

It proved difficult to secure the attendance of Eutyches and it is still more difficult to assess or deduce his exact opinions from the recorded evidence. In a statement from him communicated to the third session he declared himself willing to reaffirm the decisions of Nicaea and Ephesus and if the Fathers were at fault in any chance expression he could ignore it. He preferred to search the Scriptures as more reliable than the Fathers. After the Incarnation he adored one phusis of God incarnate. He rejected the phrase 'out of two natures united in one hypostasis'. Similarly, while he admitted that He who was born of Mary was perfect God and perfect man, he rejected the statement that He was consubstantial with ourselves. At the sixth session it was again reported that, while still admitting that Christ was perfect God and perfect man, he rejected two natures as not found in Scripture.

2. A.C.O. II,1,i p.102.
7. His reply to the objection that the term Homoousios was not found expressis verbis in Scripture is not recorded.
rigid Biblicism was added a refusal to undertake the speculative tasks of theology.\(^1\) Eutyches admitted the \textit{ἐὰν \ὸς \φυσις} but declined to admit that this phrase implied the \textit{ὑπὸ φυσις}.\(^2\) Later in his cross examination he was led to admit that our Lord was \textit{ὁμοωμολογοῖ \ἐμίν}, although he had not previously accepted the phrase. He had always maintained that the blessed Virgin was \textit{ὁμοωμολογοῖ \ἐμίν}. The point pressed against him that if the Mother is \textit{ὁμοωμολογοῖ}, so must her Son be \textit{κατὰ σάρκα}. The reason for his hesitation that he had been accustomed to call His body not the body of a man but the body of God. He makes it clear that he made the admission under pressure and returns to his formula; 'Out of two natures before the union, but after the union one nature'.\(^3\) He was sentenced by the Synod to be deposed from his priesthood as well as from his office of archimandrite. Sentence of excommunication was also passed on him and with it instructions forbidding anyone to have intercourse with him.\(^4\)

Eutyches, knowing that he had powerful allies and backers, was not prepared to submit to the sentence. Immediately he gave notice of appeal to Rome\(^5\), Alexandria, Jerusalem and Thessalonica.\(^6\) On Alexandria he could fully rely and the omission of Antioch was obvious enough. Together Dioscorus and Eutyches prevailed upon the Emperor to summon a General Council. A Rescript\(^7\) to this effect was issued in March 449. The Council was to meet at Ephesus in August that year and was charged with enquiring into the affair of Eutyches and with the establishment of a true and orthodox Faith.

Realising that much depended on the forthcoming Council as far as he was concerned, Eutyches now made preparations to ensure a successful

\(^{1}\) A.C.O. II,1,1 p.136.
\(^{2}\) A.C.O. II,1,1 p.140.
\(^{3}\) A.C.O. II,1,1 pp.142-3.
\(^{4}\) A.C.O. II,2,1 pp.18-9.
\(^{5}\) The letter of Eutyches to Leo appears as Leo Ep.XXI (A.C.O. II,iv pp.143-5) P.L. LIV 713-20.
\(^{6}\) A.C.O. II,1,1 p.175.
\(^{7}\) Cunctis constitit (A.C.O. III,1,pp.68-9).
outcome. He sent off his libellus appellationis to the bishops of Rome, Alexandria, Jerusalem and Thessalonica seeking their support. He followed this up by getting Chrysaphius to persuade Theodosius to write to Pope Leo in support of his appeal. Then he complained to Theodosius that the minutes of the Home Synod had been falsified. Florentius, who had been present at the Home Synod in question, took part in the review of these minutes. With the information derived from this review Eutyches was to be presented at the forthcoming General Council as an upholder of Cyrilline orthodoxy. At the same time a charge was made that Flavian had drawn up the sentence on Eutyches before his trial had taken place. Whether or not the Emperor believed this, he saw fit to demand a profession of faith from Flavian. Such an action could not do otherwise than strain the relations between them. So Eutyches could be well satisfied with the way things were going. All that remained uncertain was the attitude that Pope Leo would adopt.

Though he was invited to the General Council, Leo opted instead to send legates, to whom he entrusted a whole series of letters. One of these, addressed to Flavian, has become known as the Tome of Leo. It plays an important part in the Council of Chalcedon, but at this point it is sufficient to notice that it, together with the other letters, showed that the traditional alliance between Rome and Alexandria was at an end. In no uncertain terms he condemned the teaching of Eutyches. He named Bishop Julius, Presbyter Renatus and the Deacon Hilary to be his representatives at the General Council. They would line up in support of those who confessed two natures and, in his letters to her, Leo urged Pulcheria to exert pressure in the same direction.

2. Leo Ep. XXIV (A.C.O. II, 4 pp. 3-4).
3. This review took place at a Council at Constantinople and the proceedings were confirmed (A.C.O. I, 1, 1 pp. 149-79).
4. Leo informed the Emperor of his decision (Ep. XXIX. A.C.O. II, 4 pp. 9-11), though in fact it was not the custom for the Pope to attend a General Council.
5. In addition to the Tome there were two letters to Pulcheria (Ep. XXX and XXXI. A.C.O. II, 4 pp. 10-5).
Doubtless the contents of these letters must have given heart to Flavian and his supporters. Nevertheless the pro-Alexandrian party came to the General Council with by far the greater advantages. Theodoret, Bishop of Cyrrhus and a leader among the Orientals, was required by the Imperial Rescript to be present at Ephesus but not to attend the Council unless specifically requested to be present. On the other hand the pro-Eutychian Abbot Barsumas was invited to the Council and, moreover, given a vote. Finally, in giving Dioscorus the presidency, the Emperor charged the Council with expelling the error of Nestorius once and for all. As the proceedings reveal, Dioscorus interpreted his task as one of putting down all opposition to the Alexandrian way of belief. Accordingly, the Formulary of Concord was ignored: there was to be no talk of two natures after the union.

The Second Council of Ephesus opened in the cathedral church of that city on the 8th August 449. Dioscorus presided and, aware of the pro-Flavian attitude of the papal legates, reduced the effectiveness of Leo's representatives by seating them at a distance from each other. This, however, did not stop the Deacon Hilary coming forward and presenting Dioscorus with Leo's letter to the Council. But while he received it, he did not cause it to be read. Later, when Bishop Julius again pleaded for the reading of Leo's letter, further imperial letters were produced to take precedence. Eventually, the Council moved from hearing the wishes of the Emperor to their implementation. Foremost was the question of Eutyches and whether his condemnation was correct. So Eutyches was brought and allowed to make his plea. Next the minutes of the Home Synod of Constantinople were read and served to incense the majority of those present when it was shown that Eutyches had been called upon to profess

1. He was invited slightly later, nominally as a representative of the monks of the East, but chiefly on his own account as a bitter anti-Nestorian (A.C.O. I,1,4, p.71).
the two natures. Though Eusebius, Bishop of Dorylaeum, the original accuser of Eutyches was present, no opportunity was given for him to speak. Had he been allowed to do so, he could only have delayed the inevitable by the length of his speech. The inevitable outcome was the complete re-instatement of Eutyches for which 111 of the 130 bishops assembled gave their vote.

This much achieved, Dioscorus then caused long extracts from the proceedings of the First Council of Ephesus to be read. When all present approved what they heard with its insistence that those who taught contrary to the Creed of Nicaea should be deposed, Dioscorus directed his gaze towards Flavian and Eusebius. He charged them with teaching contrary to the provisions of the First Council of Ephesus in that they supported the doctrine of the two natures and had attempted to force Eutyches into accepting the Formulary of Concord. Realising suddenly that Flavian and Eusebius were to be put on trial, Hilary and Domnus came forward to object - an action which brought many bishops to their feet. Disorder ensued. This gave Dioscorus an opportunity to further his purposes and, claiming that he was being threatened, summoned the counts and soldiers to his aid. Thus the military were introduced into the assembly and their presence was enough to compel the most reluctant to sign the condemnation of Flavian and Eusebius. They were then treated as prisoners and Flavian was apparently so roughly handled he died four days later.

Ten days later, on August 22nd, Dioscorus caused another sitting of the Council to be held. His object this time was to proceed against his enemies in the East. Sentence of deposition followed sentence of deposition. While Theodoret and others undoubtedly expected their fate, it was a surprise perhaps for Domnus, Bishop of Antioch, to find himself likewise removed from office. Finally, the Council moved to a solemn acceptance of Cyril's Anathemas and so ended its proceedings.

It should be noted that the Roman legates were not present at the second session on August 22nd. This must have been an embarrassment to Dioscorus who, knowing their reaction to what had taken place at Ephesus, tried to prevent their return to the West. But Hilary escaped to report in full to
Leo who, in turn, immediately objected to the Emperor. In his letter Leo aptly named the Second General Council of Ephesus the Latrocinium.¹

The protestations of Leo coming from afar did little to disturb the powerful alliance of Dioscorus with his Emperor which now came into being. And Dioscorus, now back in Alexandria, lost no time in enforcing and strengthening his achievements at Ephesus. He published an encyclical letter² demanding that the writings of Nestorius should be burnt and that only the treatises of the holy Fathers and those of others in harmony with the General Council of Nicaea and the First General Council of Ephesus should be received. Again he used his influence with Chrysaphius to get an imperial law published in the same sense and at the same time confirmed the depositions of Domnus, Theodoret and Flavian. He also insisted that all bishops through their metropolitan should subscribe to the teaching of Nicaea and Ephesus and that none should be ordained whose views corresponded to Nestorius and his supporters. Dioscorus could be well satisfied with his achievements; he had again demonstrated the supremacy of the Alexandrian see over that of Constantinople.

Theodosius, too, had reason to be well satisfied with the results of the recent General Council. He could claim that as a result of the removal of Flavian and other causes of disturbance, religious peace was again established throughout the whole Empire of the East, and that without any damage to the Faith. But it was a peace imposed by the soldiers of the Emperor who saw to it that the deposed bishops were in fact removed from their churches. In place of Flavian a certain Alexandrian named Anatolius, resident in Constantinople, was chosen as bishop. Because this was hardly a popular choice it was thought wise to follow the custom whereby a new Bishop of Constantinople

¹ In illo Ephesino non judicio sed latrocinio (Leo Ep. XCV A.C.O. II,4 p.51).
² This is preserved only in Syriac. S.G.F. Perry, Second Council of Ephesus pp. 375 ff.
should seek authorization from the Bishop of Rome. Leo replied that he was sending two bishops and two priests to Constantinople to see that Anatolius accepted an approved profession of faith whereupon he, Leo, would be happy to recognize Anatolius. So the affairs of Church and State progressed in a watchful tranquillity when fate suddenly took a hand to change things.

On July 28th 450 Theodosius II died as a result of an accident on horseback. There were no children to succeed him and so the reins of government passed to the Empress Pulcheria. She seized them eagerly, and among her first actions was the execution of the Grand Chamberlain, Chrysaphius. Less violently, she had Eutyches removed from his monastery and placed in confinement. Then she set herself to redress many of the injustices perpetrated at the Latrocinium. Much however needed to be done which lay outside the competence even of an Empress to achieve - nor yet an Emperor, for she had married a senator named Marcian whom she invested as a member of the imperial house with the insignia on August 24th 450. Accordingly, the joint rulers of the Empire, Valentinian III in the West and Marcian in the East, summoned a General Council and named Nicaea as the venue. However, the Emperor Marcian, who had promised to be present, found that military matters prevented him being so far distant from the capital and suggested Chalcedon as an alternative place. So we come to the celebrated Council of Chalcedon which opened there in the Basilica of St. Euphemia on the 8th October 451.

2. Pulcheria had of necessity kept quiet under the regime of Theodosius II. She had, however, tried to befriend Flavian and had corresponded with Leo.
The Council of Chalcedon was summoned by imperial decree in order to undo the wrongs of the Latrocinium and to initiate ecclesiastical unity in the East. The Emperor, though not present, signified his deep interest in the proceedings by sending an imperial commission of eighteen high officials of the state. They were present in the basilica and sat with their backs to the apse and so facing the long nave in which the bishops were assembled. The seating arrangement is interesting. On the left of the commission were placed the representatives of Leo, together with Anatolius of Constantinople, Maximus of Antioch, Thalassius of Caesarea in Cappadocia and Stephen of Ephesus. This meant that the bishops of Thrace, Asia Minor and Syria joined their leaders on the same side. To the right of the commissioners sat Dioscorus of Alexandria, Juvenal of Jerusalem and Anastasius, representative of the Bishop of Thessalonica, who likewise were joined by their supporters from the bishoprics of Egypt, Palestine and Illyricum. So arranged, the Council proceeded to its business.

The First Session - October 8th

Almost immediately Paschasinus, the leader of the papal legates, rose to demand that Dioscorus should be excluded from the assembly. The imperial commissioners, who were presiding, had some difficulty in persuading the papal legates that this could be in order only if it was resolved by the Council as a whole. Consequently, Dioscorus was ordered to a seat in the middle of the nave and his trial proceeded forthwith. Eusebius of Dorylaeum rose as an accuser. His charge was that the records of the Council of Ephesus would reveal Dioscorus to have acted unjustly and to be, indeed, a heretic. So the Council settled to hear the reading of the records. It listened to the imperial letter in which Theodosius had written to Dioscorus that Theodoret of Cyrrhus should not be allowed to attend at Ephesus except at the special request of the assembled bishops. The reading of this letter was

1. A.C.O. II, 1, i pp. 55-196.
used by the imperial commissioners as an opportune moment to bring Theodoret into the assembly. His entrance brought the supporters of Dioscorus to their feet with shouts of opprobrium. When quiet was restored the imperial commission signified that Theodoret should remain and that the reading should continue.

So it was disclosed how Dioscorus had kept the letters of Pope Leo from the assembly, how Eutyches had been re-instated, and how Flavian had been condemned. As the disgraceful story proceeded so more and more agitation was seen among those seated on the right. Several of the bishops rose to offer excuses for the part they played. Finally, Juvenal of Jerusalem rose to declare his belief that the late Bishop of Constantinople had been sound in faith. With that, the more clearly to show his position, he crossed over to the other side taking with him the bishops of Palestine and Illyricum and, most significant of all, four Egyptian bishops. Despite such changes of front on the part of many bishops Dioscorus remained firm, insisting that Flavian had been rightly condemned. The assembly disagreed and was clearly determined to rehabilitate Flavian posthumously, and to confirm the condemnation of Eutyches. To this the imperial commission added its opinion that Dioscorus, Juvenal, Thalassius, Eusebius of Ancyra, Eustathius of Berytus and Basil of Seleucia, the men primarily responsible for the aptly-named Latrocinium, should be deposed. The commissioners further stated that the bishops should come prepared to discuss the question of the right Faith at the next meeting and, with the singing of the Trisagion (its earliest quotation) the first session ended.

The Second Session - October 10th

It was no great surprise to anyone to find that Dioscorus and the other bishops named with him above absented themselves when the bishops next met. The commissioners, however, quickly reminded the assembly that they advised their deposition and then passed on to request, in the name of the Emperor, that the meeting should apply itself to drawing up a

1. A.C.O. II,i, pp. 266-80.
Definition of Faith. Here they met with resistance from the bishops who would have preferred to rest content with creeds already in existence. The commissioners gave way while the creeds of Nicaea and Constantinople were read, followed by the two letters of Cyril to Nestorius and John of Antioch, together with extracts from the Fathers in support of these. Finally the Tome of Leo to Flavian was read and described as a model of doctrinal statement. All were greeted with shouts of approval. But approval was not unanimous for the bishops of Illyricum and Palestine argued that there were three passages in the Tome of Leo that implied Nestorianism. Moreover, Atticus of Nicopolis did not hesitate to embarrass the assembly by suggesting that Cyril's third letter to Nestorius with its Twelve Anathemas should also be read for approval. Seeing that no unanimous expression of the Faith would be forthcoming that day, the commissioners closed the second session with the suggestion that Anatolius of Constantinople should call together some of the bishops with the purpose of preparing a statement of the Faith that might be acceptable to all.

2. A.C.O. II,1 p.274.
3. 'Peter has spoken through Leo, Cyril so taught, Leo and Cyril taught the same' (A.C.O. II,1 p.277).
4. The Illyrians asked for time to consider (A.C.O. II,i pp.278-9). General satisfaction was eventually recorded and this, presumably, included the Illyrians (A.C.O. II,i p.305).
5. Leo Ep. XXVIII ad Flavianum (P.L. LIV 755-82). This is best studied in T.H. Binder, The Oecumenical Documents of the Faith (revised by F.W. Green) pp.159-87. The three passages alleged to be Nestorian because they indicated two parallel spheres of being in Christ were:
   et ad resolvendum conditionis nostrae debitum, natura inviolabilis naturae est unita passibili : ut, quod nostris remediis congruebat, unus atque idem mediator Dei et hominum, homo Jesus : Christus, et mori posset ex uno, et mori non posset ex altero. (Section 3)
   Agit enim utraque forma cum alterius communione, quod proprium est ; verbo soliciet operante quod verbi est, et carne exsequente quod carnis est. Unum horum coruscat miraculis, aliud succumbit injuriis. (Section 4)
   Quamvis enim in Domino Jesu Christo Dei et hominis una persona sit; aliud tamen est, unde in utroque communis est contumelia, aliud unde communis est gloria. De nostro enim illi est minor Patre humanitas; de Patre illi est aequalis cum Patre Divinitas. (Section 4)
The Third Session - October 13th

At the previous session voices had been heard pleading for mercy to be shown to Dioscorus. Now, though the third session had been arranged for October 15th, the bishops came together again for the express purpose of considering the case against Dioscorus. In the absence of the imperial commissioners, the papal legate, Bishop Paschasinus, acted as president. Dioscorus twice refused to attend and was eventually proceeded against per contumaciam. The session listened to a recitation of the indictment against the Bishop of Alexandria:

quod Eutychen receperit et Flauianum deposuerit nec permiserit apostolicae sedis scripta in synodo recitari, ut hearesis nutrietur, quod criminaliter appetatur, quod contra canones ab aliis depositum ipse susceperit.

Anatolius then proposed the condemnation of Dioscorus. To this sentence all the bishops present, 185 in number, gave their approval. Order was then made for the sentence to be communicated to Pulcheria and Marcian and to the condemned himself. So concluded the third session.

The Fourth Session - October 17th

At this session the imperial commissioners were present once more and present with the firm desire to have a Definition of Faith from the bishops. They were interested then to hear what the meetings of bishops at the residence of Anatolius had produced. The legate Paschasinus spoke for these bishops and indicated that the Faith was contained in the creed of Nicaea which was confirmed at Constantinople, expounded by Cyril at Ephesus and set forth by Leo. This speech was acclaimed by the assembled bishops:

"O Οὐτώς ποιήσατε Ψευδήμονε ὅτι Οὐτώς ἔβαπτισα τῷ Εὐχάριστῳ κατά τὸν Οἶκον τῆς Πατρότητος." Subsequently many bishops speaking by turn went on to assert the agreement of Cyril and Leo. This was far from producing the kind of precise definition

1. A.C.O. II,1 pp. 199-238.
3. A.C.O. II,2,2 p.15. This shows, incidentally, that Dioscorus was impeached not for heresy but for misconduct.
6. A.C.O. II,1 p. 289. The close association of lex orandi and lex credendi is asserted here.
that the commissioners were seeking. So, in an attempt to bring precision into
the proceedings they asked that the bishops, one by one, declare whether or not
they accepted the Tome of Leo. One after another declared his acceptance of it.¹
Then, possibly to the disappointment of the commissioners, it transpired that
the five accomplices of Dioscorus were also in agreement with the Tome of Leo.
Moreover, some of their supporters had earlier petitioned the Emperor on their
behalf who had replied that the Council must be their judge. This came up for
decision at this session and the judgement went in favour of Juvenal, Patriarch
of Jerusalem, Thalassius, Bishop of Caesarea, Eusebius, Bishop of Ancyra,
Basil, Bishop of Seleucia, and Eustathius, Bishop of Berytus², who were
accordingly reinstated.

So the fourth session ended with the commissioners disappointed of their hope of a Definition of Faith. Hope was not extinguished, however, for the drafting committee (under the chairmanship of Anatolius) continued to meet at his house.

The Fifth Session - October 22nd³

On October 21st it was learned that agreement had been reached on a doctrinal formula. Accordingly the bishops gathered on the following day to hear the proposed draft. This pleased the majority of the bishops but not all. A determined supporter of the Antiochene school of thought, John of Germanicia in Commagene, said that a revision was necessary and in this he was supported by the papal legates. Though we do not possess this formula⁴, we may perhaps detect from the opposition to it, that it did not contain the expression ἐν οἷον φύσεων to which Leo attached so much importance. Almost certainly it contained the expression ἐκ οἷον φύσεων since, as the commissioners later pointed out, in support of the papal legates, this was acceptable even to the deposed Dioscorus. Be that as it may, a grave

¹. This significantly included the Palestinian and Illyrian bishops who had not been satisfied earlier on (A.C.O. II,1 p.305).
⁴. It was not minuted. v. A.C.O. II,1 p. 319.
disagreement arose in the Council and the papal legates showed themselves ready to return home if it was not resolved. But when the commissioners sought to appease the papal legates they found themselves provoking the anger of the majority of the bishops who argued that the formula was an orthodox definition and should be subscribed. In such a situation the imperial commissioners could do nothing but refer to the Emperor for instructions. His reply gave three possible courses of action. Either the committee of bishops should set to work again to revise the formula, or the bishops express their faith individually through their metropolitans, or, if neither alternative were acceptable, the Council was to be transferred to the West. This again provoked the anger of the majority. Their cry was 'Let the formula stand, or let us go. The other side are Nestorians! Let them go to Rome'. Now, not for the first time, the bishops were shouting at one another. Yet the commissioners were determined men and when they had restored order they addressed the direct question to the Council: 'Are you for Leo or Dioscorus?' This admitted of only one answer and the commissioners pressed home their point that the formula must be revised to accord with the standpoint of Leo as contained in his Tome. The way was now clear to set up a committee of bishops to carry out the revision. This was representative of the whole assembly and, joined by Anatolius, the papal legates and the commissioners it repaired to the oratory of St. Euphemia to conduct its deliberations in secret. On their return the Definition of the Faith of the Council of Chalcedon was read to the whole Council. The joyful reception it received on all sides indicated that a solution had at last been found.

The Sixth Session - October 25th

This was the imperial session for it was attended and addressed by Marcian. In his presence the Definition was read

1. 'Give us our passports and we return home' (A.C.O. II,1 p. 319).
2. A.C.O. II,1 p. 320.
3. The real question was the agreement of Cyril and Leo so often acclaimed at the Council, or rather, granting Leo, which Cyril could be harmonised with him, the Cyril of the Act of Union or the Cyril of the Anathemas.
again; received again with acclamation; and to it the assembled bishops appended their signatures. So was promulgated the Chalcedonian Definition of the Faith.

Although there were further sessions¹ to follow, we can now proceed to a theological examination of the Chalcedonian Definition.

Ironically neither of the two theological protagonists was present at the Council of Chalcedon. Cyril had died some years before and by custom the Pope did not attend a General Council in person though his legates were carefully briefed and their intervention at one point proved decisive. The theological reconciliation of Cyril and Leo was an important part of the Council's work which is carefully, though not wholly conclusively, studied by Galtier.² Cyril was, of course, no Eutyches however much the archimandrite of Constantinople appealed to Cyrilline Monism, nor was Leo a Nestorian despite the fears of the Illyrian bishops, however much he emphasises and starts from the duality of the two natures. We cannot, of course, conjecture how Cyril would have moulded his Christology if his principal opponent had been Eutyches and not Nestorius. Possibly he would have taken evasive action or not regarded a full scale collision to be worth while. We know that Leo in an early, though guarded, letter to Eutyches commended him for his opposition to Nestorian opinions.³

Galtier certainly offers a helpful approximation of the Christologies of the two men but it is surprising that he finds his task so relatively simple. The acceptance by acclamation of the faith both of Cyril and Leo is not in itself decisive evidence in view both of the hesitations of the Illyrian bishops (though these were seemingly resolved) and the evident preference for many for the ἐκ σωτῆρος ὀφειλεῖν formula. It required the

¹. These were the sessions 7-16 (A.C.O. II, 1 pp. 362-495) which are of less importance for our purpose.
³. Leo Ep. XX (A.C.O. II, 4 p.3).
intervention of the imperial commissioners and the threat of departure by the Roman legates to secure an advance to the *ἐν δύο φύσεων* formula without which the work of the Council would not have been complete. While (depending on his context) Cyril could give greater or less emphasis upon the manhood of Christ his unswerving emphasis upon the unity of Christ and his fear of anything which might lead to the separation of the natures led him to prefer the *ἐκ δύο φύσεων* formula. His insistence that after the union the two natures are differentiated *κατά μίαν* must be taken with the greatest strictness. It might be translated 'by abstraction alone' or 'under analysis alone' and indicates how far he was from the assertion of the *ἐν δύο φύσεων* formula. Evidently he could not go an inch beyond the 'union of two natures' of the Formulary of Concord and even this needed a mental gloss to be completely acceptable. While this would not completely destroy their significance some of his most positive statements on the humanity of Christ have a direct anti-Apollinarian intention. While *ἐκ δύο φύσεων* raised no problems for Cyril the overriding claims of the unity of Christ's Person under the conditions which he saw it made any richer emphasis on the duality of natures virtually impossible.

The position of Leo certainly differs from that of Cyril. While Cyril was an accomplished, if not wholly consistent Christologist, Leo is concerned to reiterate the Rule of Faith traditional in the West. Equal weight is placed both on duality and unity but (apart from the somewhat threadbare and certainly not distinctive device of the communicatio idiomatum) the Tome contains no hint of christological explanation. The Tome has been compared to a judge's summing up of a case. Be that as it may, the statement in balance of the ingredients of the problem could do nothing but good. It will be seen that the Council itself attempted something similar in its Definition with a richer content more closely in touch with Eastern christological explanations of the preceding generation. To describe the bulk of the Tome

1. Cyril Ep. XLVI ad Success. II (A.C.O. I, i, 6 p.162) and elsewhere.
with Dorner¹ as 'mere verbal conjunctions of enantiophonies which are imposing as paradoxes, but in no way clear up the difficulty' is somewhat harsh but conveys the overall impression of the work.

Even though the Pope was to be disappointed in his wish to see the Council restrict itself to the acceptance of the Tome and the condemnation and rehabilitation of individuals, the influence of his legates marked a turning point in the acceptance of the 'in two natures' formula at the Council. Leo and the West would be satisfied with nothing less; it is doubtful whether Cyril could have gone as far. The Eastern Dualists (in disarray after the Latrocinium) were content to avail themselves of the theological initiative of Leo and the political protection of the imperial commissioners. It is highly significant that many voices were raised from the Cyrilline part in support of the 'of two natures' formula from Dioscorus downwards and, as mentioned earlier, it is very probable (though in the nature of things undemonstrable) that the first draft of the Definition produced by Anatolius' committee contained 'of two natures' and not 'in two natures'.²

The same 'of two natures' formula is found in the two moderate Constantinopolitan formulae, the Tome of Proclus and the Confession of Faith of Flavian.³ It is found in two MSS of the Chalcedonian Definition of Faith itself, the two sister Greek codices Ba (Vindobonensis hist. gr. 27, twelfth century) and Bb (Vaticanus 831),. Older treatments went even further and spoke of a consensus of the Greek evidence in this sense. It was the merit of Schwartz to establish that no less than ten Greek MSS in all, including one of first class authority, read the more difficult reading 'in two natures'. It was never disputed that the Latin versions going back to Rusticus read in duabus naturis. This reading is also implied in the indirect evidence of other authorities both orthodox and monophysite.⁵ While then, both at the Council

1. I.A. Dorner, Doctrine of the Person of Christ II, 1 p. 90.
4. Evagrius H.E. ii,4 (Bidez-Parmentier p.49); Ps-Leontius de sect. (P.G. LXXXVI 1228).
itself and in the later evidence, the \( \textit{EK DIO PHO\EU\IC} \) formula did not go down without a struggle, the pressure both of the legates and the imperial commissioners overcame a strongly expressed preference on many members of the Council for the Alexandrine-Constantinopolitan formula. This was certainly one of the crucial issues which led to the Monophysite Schism.

But the reconciliation of Cyril and Leo, however important in its own right, was not the sole task of the Chalcedonian Definition. Ever since Ephesus 431 the approximation of the two main Eastern traditions had been a pressing theological and ecclesiastical concern. The Formulary of Concord had taken matters as far as possible in 433 but some progress (though not always in the same direction) had been made in the intervening period. Above all the Western contribution to Christology (though not on all fours with the Eastern systems of christological explanation) was now available and its weight was thrown on to the dualist side. It was a far cry from Ephesus 431, where Cyril had the Roman proxy vote in his pocket, to Chalcedon where by his ill-advised action at the Latrocinium, particularly his high-handed refusal to allow the Tome of Leo to be read, Dioscorus had virtually thrown away the advantage of the traditional alliance of Rome and Alexandria in ecclesiastical politics.

In the nature of the case the Chalcedonian Definition could not be expected to be a highly original document; indeed it would have failed in its purpose had it attempted such a task. I. Ortiz de Urbina aptly describes it:

The formula is no original creation but resembles a mosaic constructed of already existing stones.\(^1\)

The main sources are the Formulary of Concord (together with the second letter of Cyril to Nestorius), the Tome of Leo and, as a subordinate source, the Confession of Faith of Flavian which was also read at the Council. One phrase (the denial of two prosopap) is derived from Theodoret.\(^2\) It will be recalled

1. I. Ortiz de Urbina in Chalkedon I p. 398.
that Theodoret, though present at the Council was not a member of the drafting committee possibly because, like some others, he needed to be rehabilitated after the Latrocinium. Eastern dualism sheltered under the wings of the papal legates and the imperial commissioners.

The Greek Text of the Chalcedonian Definition of the Faith. 1

1. Ἐπόμενοι τοῖς τῶν ἁγίων πατράσιν
2. ἐνα καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὦμολογεῖν οὐν
3. τὸν κύριον Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν
4. οὐκ ἔχειν ἐπιτυγχανέν ἑκοίδαιοκεῖται
5. τέλειον τον αὐτὸν ἐν Θεότητι
6. καὶ τέλειον τον αὐτὸν ἐν ἀνθρωπότητι
7. θεὸν ἅλθος καὶ ἀνθρωπον ἅλθος
8. τῶν αὐτῶν ἐκ ψυχῆς λογικῆς καὶ σωματος,
9. ὄμοσσοι τοῦ Πατρὸς κατὰ τὴν Θεότητα
10. καὶ ὄμοσσοι ζητοῦν τῶν αὐτῶν κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα,
11. κατὰ πάντα ὄμοσσοι ἐν Χριστῷ ἑκατάρτις
12. ἔδρον καὶς ἐν καὶ τὸν Πατρὸς γεννηθεῖται κατὰ τὴν Θεότητα,
13. ἐπὶ ἑσαχάν δὲ τῶν ἑμελλον
14. τῶν αὐτῶν οἱ ἰμάς καὶ ἀνὰ τὴν ἑμερώςν σωματον
15. ἐκ Μαρίας τῆς φαρέθου τῆς θεοτόκου κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα,
16. ἐνα καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν Χριστὸν οὐν κύριον κοινονενεν
17. ἐν δύο φύσεων
18. ἡγουμένως ἀπαρήτως ἡγουμένως ἥγερτως γνωρίσθαι
19. οὐδὲν τῆς τῶν φύσεων διαφέρεις ἐνεργείας ὡς τὴν ἑνων
20. οὐσίας ἐν μόνον τῆς ἑδοτάς ἐκείνας φύσεως
21. καὶ εἰς ἐν προσώπων καὶ μίαν ὑποτάσσων συνθεωροῦσι
22. οὐκ εἰς δύο προσώπας μερισθομένοι καὶ διαρροϊμένοι
23. ἀλλ' ἐνα καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν οὐν κοινονενεν
24. Θεὸν λόγου κύριον Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν,
25. κατὰ πέτραν αὐλοῖσαν οἱ προφήται περὶ αὐτοῦ
26. καὶ αὐτὸς Ἰησοῦς Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸς ἐξεπαιδεύονεν
27. καὶ τῶν πατέρων ἐν κυρίω παραδόσεις σωμάτων.

1. A.C.O. II,1,2 pp.129-30 (Greek text); A.C.O.II,iii,2 pp.137-8 (Latin text).
With one exception the first fifteen lines raise no special problems. They follow closely the Formulary of Concord. In lines 7-8 however an important alteration occurs. The source reads 'perfect in Godhead, perfect in manhood' followed by 'perfect God and perfect Man'. The thrust here is clear enough. The Formulary juxtaposes the preferred Cyrilline and Oriental expressions of the same truth. T. Šagic-Bunić correctly notes that Cyril prefers to speak of two perfecta (Godhead and manhood), the Orientals of two perfecti (God and man). The Chalcedonian Definition keeps the Cyrilline phrasing heightening the unity of Person by repeating τὸν αὐτὸν, a typical Cyrilline touch, before each half of the phrase. In place of the Oriental formula 'perfect God and perfect Man' it translates into Greek a phrase from the Tome of Leo 'verus Deus, verus homo' substituting the adverb ἀληθεύω for the Leonine adjective. The anti-Apollinarian slant is clear enough and the phrase instead of repeating the previous line now goes with the following line 'of rational soul and body'. It is difficult not to find here a slight but perceptible weakening of the Dualist emphasis.

The next section represents substantially a new minting. Starting from a reaffirmation of the one Christ, it continues with the ἐν οἷς φάσιν formula (1.17) on which the imperial commissioners and the papal legates insisted. It will be recalled that it marks an advance on previous formulations whether of Cyril or of the Constantinopolitan formulae after Nestorius. Even the Formulary of Concord did not go beyond ἐνῶς οὖν φύσεως. The four negative adverbs are all polemically pointed. The first pair ἀγωγικάς, ἀγράμματα are directed against Monist heresies (Apollinarianism and Arianism), the second pair ἀχαρίστας, ἀδιάφροτας summarise the Cyrilline propaganda against Nestorius. Whether as adjectives or adverbs they are of frequent occurrence in Cyril. The fragment of Amphilochius of ἦσσωμεν (fourth century) which includes three of the four is now generally

regarded as of post-Chalcedonian origin. They have been described as four sentinel adverbs standing guard at the entrance of tempting by-paths of christological speculation or as four marker buoys marking out a channel safe for further navigation. They are certainly workmanlike. All four are of frequent occurrence in Cyril and the last two summarise his objections to Nestorius.

The next two lines (1.19-20) represent matching quotations from Cyril's second letter to Nestorius and the Tome of Leo and lead in to a terminology which is used to express the unity of person: ἐν πρόσωπῳ and μία ὑπόστασις. Both terms are found in the Confession of Faith of Flavian (though combined with the ἔν ἐνθρόνῳ). Theodoret was moving towards the equation of τῷ πρώτῳ and ὑπόστασις. The una persona of Leo is of course familiar. The next phrase denying τῷ πρώτῳ comes, as we have seen, from Theodoret. Well may Camelot comment:

On ferait ainsi ressortir l'habileté des redacteurs ... qui ont su heureuseusement fondre des elements d'origine si diverse ... 

But it may be argued that this cleverness is a source of weakness. While the Definition urges that manhood and Godhead are not comparable natures to be set side by side, yet it does precisely this. Moreover, while the two concepts are placed side by side, no attempt is made to say what they are. All that is said is that whatever manhood may be and whatever Godhead may be, then Christ is lacking in nothing that belongs to either.

To the above criticism it is often replied that nothing more could be hoped for from the Definition. Let it be admitted that the Chalcedonian Definition is a quite artificial compromise between diverse, or even contradictory, theologies. After all the Alexandrian and Antiochene

1. Amphilochius Fr. 15 P.G. XXXIII 113.
schools of thought each represented one side of the truth of the Church's doctrine, and only in some union of the two sides could the Church proclaim the full truth. Moreover, let it be acknowledged that these two schools of thought, by proceeding more and more one-sidedly to emphasize its own side of the truth, were presenting the Church with a possibly insoluble problem. The weakness of Chalcedon, in this view, lies not so much in its cleverness but in the fact that it was perforce obliged to use the inadequate categories of ancient thought. In the last resort, the Chalcedonian Definition is not perhaps a definition and is certainly not a solution. It is a preservation of the problem raised by the Alexandrian and Antiochene schools of thought.

Nevertheless, it is possible to affirm that there is positive achievement to be discerned in the Chalcedonian Definition. Certainly it brought more into a composite statement than any previous document. It incorporated material from the West into an ecumenical statement of faith. The Western contribution, while deficient as compared with the East in christological speculation, proved an invaluable checkweight against the lopsidedness of some Eastern speculation. Without surrendering the gains of Ephesus 431, it marked a victory over Eutyches and Dioscorus who represented the extreme forms of Cyrillinism. It rehabilitated moderate Eastern dualism after the debacle of the Latrocinium. These were no mean achievements despite the resultant Monophysite Schism for which political as well as theological reasons can be assigned. While these, then, were no inconsiderable achievements, yet the most significant contribution of Chalcedon lies beyond this.

This decisive contribution is to be found in the clarification of the terminology appropriate to describe both the unity and the duality of Christ: one hypostasis and prosopon in two phuseis. This may seem a barren achievement enough but it served an important warning to each of the main Eastern christological traditions.
Cyril had drawn no clear distinction between phusis and hypostasis and was at least equivocal on the status of the two natures after the union. Henceforth Monist Christologians must draw a distinction between the two terms, preserving phusis for that wherein Christ was twofold and hypostasis for that wherein He was one. They were invited to give a more realistic assessment of the humanity extending to a full duality of natures. For Dualists the full equivalence of one prosopon and one hypostasis contained an implicit warning to provide a more solid bond of union in their explanation of the Person of Christ. In particular they excluded two errors to which Nestorius was at least believed to be exposed: a carrying over the full duality of nature into the sphere of ousia or hypostasis with the result of teaching a doctrine of two Sons and predicating a mutuality or reciprocity of prosopa in a way which could only prejudice the one prosopon. Here the express denial of two prosopa taken from Theodoret became relevant. While Monists were not asked to abandon their emphasis on the unity of the Incarnate Person or Dualists to modify their belief in a full duality of the natures, both systems of explanation were henceforth required to deal more realistically with those elements in Christology which had previously proved most difficult to assimilate or to take into their own systems.

It has often been observed that the Definition of the Chalcedonian Fathers is not an explanatory but a dogmatic statement. The very fact that it is dogmatic and not explanatory is their way of saying that what happens in the God-man Jesus Christ is a mystery and must be left as a mystery. And since there is no other possible pattern of thought, the only means of approach to Jesus Christ is by faith. Given this, fundamental of approach, the Chalcedonian Fathers then proceeded to use metaphysical terms in such a way as to burst through all previous thought-forms. Nowhere is this made more clear than when the Definition records its belief thus:

\[
\text{ἐνα καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν Χριστῶν υἱὸν κυρίου μονογένη,}
\text{ἐν δύο φύσεων}
\text{κομμύκτυς άτρέπτως ἀδοξίτως. ἀληθεῖται μακροσκοπών}
\text{οὐδαμῶς τῆς τῶν φύσεων διάβολος ἀνεξαντίως ζῆν εἰναὶ}
\text{συγκεκριμένης σὲ μᾶλλον τῆς ιδιότητος ἑκάστης φύσεως}
\text{καὶ εἰς ἐν προσώπων καὶ μᾶρκον ὑπόστασιν ὑμνημοσύνης}
\]
As a statement this is perfectly clear and is of great value to the Church in its proclamation of the gospel. Nevertheless, as Πρωτουν and φυσις had been used hitherto in christological thought, the statement is clearly paradoxical.

But with this said, we should not be blind to the considerable significance of Chalcedon. This was its provision of guidelines for the future, a delimitation of the area for future christological enquiry, and the provision of a scaffolding of technical terms which would facilitate these tasks. The immediate agenda was indicated in the final sentence of Loofs' discussion of Chalcedon: 'How should Chalcedon be interpreted? According to Cyril? or according to Theodoret? or according to Leo?'.

Could a corrected Cyrillanism give a more realistic place to the human nature without loss of the unity of the Person? At first sight the rise of the Monophysite Schism which drew from the Church a considerable body of Cyrillines (not all of them extremists like Eutyches and Dioscorus) might render this unlikely, but the emergence under Justinian of a Cyrilline-Chalcedonian orthodoxy formed the basis of the Eastern Orthodoxy of John of Damascus.

A corrected dualism taking advantage of the considerable dualist elements in the Chalcedonian Definition remained an open but unfulfilled possibility. Unhappily the ablest dualist Christologist, Theodoret, was ill-placed to attempt a synthesis of this type. Until Chalcedon itself he had been under a cloud harried by the relentless Dioscorus and, in any case, had been undergoing a period of doctrinal evolution on his own account of which the full story has never been written. Despite the important contribution of the Tome of Leo to the Chalcedonian settlement and the important intervention of the Pope's legates, Leo himself had never wanted a new Definition of Faith and the Eastern style of Christology was scarcely his own. Later the West moved into the Cyrilline-Chalcedonian ambit.

1. F. Loofs, Leitfaden zum studien der Dogmengeschichte p. 301.
2. A start has been made in an important article by M. Richard, Notes sur l'évolution doctrinale de Théodoret. Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques Vol. xxv pp. 459-81.
CHAPTER SIX - NESTORIUS AND CHALCEDON

It has been mentioned earlier in chapter four of this dissertation that it is difficult to say precisely when Nestorius died in exile. All the indications are, however, that his death took place before it would have been possible for him to have known of the Chalcedonian Definition. But what if he had known of it? It is more than probable that he would have welcomed it and would have expressed himself ready to subscribe that document. While there may be little doubt of this, the question is whether, given Nestorius' wish to sign, he should have been allowed to do so. And here the problem really turns upon the compatibility of the new estimate of Nestorius' opinions made possible by the discovery and assessment of the Treatise of Heracleides with the limits laid down by the Chalcedonian Definition. In reviewing the question it is important to distinguish the intention of Nestorius and the success of his theories. The intentions of Nestorius were of the best; the more difficult problem is whether his views succeed in fulfilling his intentions. It is to this question that we now turn.

Mention was made at the beginning of the first chapter that there were three postulates that had to be acknowledged in any Christology. The first is that Jesus Christ is truly God and the second is that Jesus Christ is truly man. Now Nestorius would claim that he accepted and abided by these postulates and in support of his claim we may instance the following passage from his Treatise where he is arguing that Cyril contradicts the Nicene Fathers:

\[
\text{It was not therefore because I confessed not that Christ himself - who is also God, and none other than God the Word, consubstantial - is God, but because I confess that he is also man. If it were that this is so and I had not thus confessed, in teaching I should have added that Christ is God and consubstantial with the Father and at the same time also man consubstantial with us.}^1
\]

The third postulate is the clear picture given by Scripture that Jesus Christ is one person. Here again Nestorius would claim that he

taught nothing else:

For both natures of which our Saviour is (formed) are one thing and another, even as thou hast formerly agreed with them to say the same things: Diverse are the natures which have been combined in the union, but of both of them (there issues) one Christ....

If the claims of Nestorius indicated above are acknowledged then it would follow that his Christology was orthodox. Nestorius, indeed, would go further and claim that his Christology was in accord with the metaphysical ideas current in his time. But, however difficult it may be to discover the precise sources of the metaphysics of Nestorius, whether basically Aristotelian or Stoic or merely eclectic, it was certainly distinctive. Indeed, so distinctive in his metaphysic that it may be said that unless it is first mastered, then his Christology is beyond comprehension. It has been observed, too, that the prose style of Nestorius does little to help:

The repetitiousness of his great theological treatise, the Bazaar of Heracleides, is frustrating, wearisome and painful. It would have been vastly more effective if some expert rhetorician had pruned it of tautology, eliminated contradictions, added the necessary logical definitions, which Nestorius unhappily eschewed, and reduced its length by a half or three quarters. 2

Nevertheless, once his style and (more important) his metaphysic have been mastered, there is a coherence in his thought which serves to qualify Socrates' remark of him:

Being a man of natural fluency as a speaker, he was considered well educated, but in reality he was disgracefully illiterate. 3

Socrates comes nearer to the truth in the words which follow the above quotation:

In fact he contemned the drudgery of an accurate examination of the ancient expositors: and, puffed up with his readiness of expression, he did not give his attention to the ancients, but thought himself above them. 4

This was his weakness. Though his Christology revealed him to be a perceptive and original thinker; he was not the rounded scholar because he had not the self-discipline or inclination to make a careful study of what others had said.

2. M.V. Anastos, art. cit. p. 123. If, as Abramowski maintains, the Treatise of Heracleides is a composite work this criticism would be to some extent modified. But it remains valid for the longer and indubitably genuine part of the work.
4. Ibid.
But to return to what Nestorius said. Reference has been made to the coherence of his thought, the basis of which is as follows. Each of the two natures in Christ is to be taken concretely and in its individuality. This being so, the logical conclusion to Nestorius was that the unity in Christ can only come about by means of a compensation of prosopa. This, in turn, results in the basic christological expression of one prosopon in two natures:

If then neither thou preachest this, nor this man who has written these things, thou oughtest not to have accused me and calumniated me as not confessing one prosopon in two ousias or as defining them individually in distinction and in division, as things which are distant from one another.1

Here 'in two ousias' we clearly have a parallel to the Chalcedonian formula, which accordingly suggests that Nestorius is very close to the Chalcedonian position. Indeed, some scholars have concluded that he is so close that his right to subscribe the Chalcedonian Definition cannot be effectively challenged. As Bright concludes:

After all, if Christ is believed in as One, yet as both truly God and truly Man - however little we can comprehend the relation thus created - that belief is all that the Chalcedonian terminology implies: to hold it is to be at one with the Fourth Council.2

Yet, whatever some scholars may think about Nestorius' eligibility to subscribe the Chalcedonian Definition, there is abundant evidence from the Definition itself that the Chalcedonian Fathers intended to renew the exclusion of Nestorius achieved at Ephesus 431. Indeed the temper of the Council was just as resolutely anti-Nestorian as anti-Eutychian. This is amply illustrated both by the fears of the Illyrian bishops that the Tome of Leo contained Nestorian passages and also by the protests in favour of the first draft produced by Anatolius and his committee. Just as at this turning point of the Council the papal legates threatened to leave the Council and return home, so others cried out:'Aut definitio persistat aut imus'. The same Illyrian group exclaimed:

'Qui contradicunt Nestoriani sunt Romanam ambulant'.3

3. A. C. O. II, i p. 321 (Greek); II, iii p. 392 (Latin).
Some of the Chalcedonian Fathers would undoubtedly have wanted to renew the exclusion of Nestorius because he had taught two Sons, two persons in Jesus Christ. Undoubtedly, for some, this would have been the ground of their charge, but equally without doubt is it that Nestorius would have denied teaching any such thing. Moreover, the evidence favours Nestorius, for as Duchesne writes:

one could not attribute to him, without established proofs, a doctrine which had been solemnly repudiated by the Church of Antioch, and by which his contemporaries and friends, Theodoret and the rest, are assuredly unscathed.

However, while Nestorius might resist this accusation, the more acute thinkers among the Chalcedonian Fathers might have introduced a consideration more difficult for. This would be that while it may be granted that Nestorius does not teach two persons in Jesus Christ, nevertheless can Nestorius show that his teaching is in harmony with that implied in the Chalcedonian Definition? Here support would seem to leave Nestorius; for his link with Theodore and, more especially, Diodore leads many to conclude that his teaching, ipso facto, cannot have the intention to express the teaching about the person of Christ which the Church came generally to accept at Chalcedon. This consideration would argue that Nestorius' signature on the Chalcedonian Definition would be undesirable as it would tend to make Chalcedon endorse the teaching of Theodore and Diodore.

Side by side with this we may place another consideration. This is the weakness inherent in the Alexandrian and Antiochene theologies. The former, affirming a single hypostasis, concluded in a single nature. Similarly, the latter, as exemplified by Nestorius, affirmed two natures and concluded therefore (or seemed at least to conclude) in two persons. We may say of both theologies that they were true in what they affirmed, but false (or at least incomplete) in what they did not say expressly enough. It was the function of Chalcedon to examine both of these theologies and remove all ambiguity from the terminology they used. Thus Chalcedon affirmed one hypostasis in two natures.

1. L. Duchesne, op. cit. p. 312.
And of these two natures in the one hypostasis it affirmed that they were ἰδρυτικός, ἀστρέφως, ἀναβρέφως, ἕκνυμικός. As mentioned earlier, the first two of these adverbs are clearly directed against the Alexandrian-orientated teaching of Apollinarius and Eutyches, while the latter two adverbs are equally clearly directed against Nestorianism.

Yet another point may be mentioned which reveals the attitude of the Chalcedonian Fathers to Nestorius. When Theodoret wished to be received by them, they withheld his rehabilitation until he had publicly separated himself from Nestorius. Thus, far from abandoning the decision of the Council of Ephesus in 431, Chalcedon is seen to affirm it once more. From Ephesus to Chalcedon we may detect an intended and proclaimed unity. In its turn this consideration would argue that Nestorius' signature on the Chalcedonian Definition is inadmissible on the grounds that Chalcedon is seen still to stand by Nestorius' condemnation at Ephesus.

But perhaps the most important consideration of all is that the Chalcedonian Definition bears witness to itself that it is not, and that there never has been, an official explanation of the Incarnation. If, then, Nestorius had been allowed to sign the Definition, it would have been tantamount to giving official recognition to the explanation set forth in his Christology. It is not so much that he is to be singled out, as that he is excluded along with Apollinarius and Eutyches, for whatever was the true way of expressing Christian faith in the Incarnation, Chalcedon says that they had not found it. Indeed, it is inevitable that every attempt to explain the Incarnation shall be inadequate and with a tendency to mislead. Nestorius may not sign.
CHAPTER SEVEN - CONCLUSION

We concluded the previous chapter with the opinion that Nestorius' signature on the Chalcedonian Definition could not be justified. While this conclusion stands, it would seem inappropriate to conclude this dissertation finally without some expression of agreement with the attempts of many scholars in this century to vindicate Nestorius and give him a place of honour in the history of Christian dogma.

A beginning may perhaps be made with a quotation from Sidney Cave. Commenting on the discovery of the Treatise of Heracleides he writes:

This book makes it clear that the traditional account of Nestorius' teaching owes as much to Cyril's malice as to Nestorius' heresy, and that the condemnation of Nestorius was due less to his false teaching than to his own amazing tactlessness and the clever adroitness of Cyril, his great opponent.¹

There is truth here, for we have indicated in an earlier chapter the intense feelings that existed between ancient Alexandria and her great rival Constantinople, which she called the city of yesterday. Without doubt these feelings, not for the first time, became crystallised into bitterness in the time of Cyril and Nestorius. The former defeated the latter and, stemming from this defeat, the ancient writers saw to it that posterity was to know the worst of Nestorius. He became an object of odium and his name a term of abuse. Now in the light of the documents recently discovered, together with modern research, we must ask in what way the traditional adverse picture of Nestorius and his Christology has been modified. For this purpose we shall review the work of Loofs, Hodgson and Grillmeier.

Friedrich Loofs. It is the argument of Loofs that it is wrong to look for any form of christological metaphysics in Nestorius' theory of prosopic union. To understand Nestorius all thoughts of a substantial unity ought to be dismissed.

Neither God the Word nor the homo assumptus but the Incarnate Lord in His
totality is the right starting point for christological enquiry. But did
Nestorius make the unity of the natures of Christ intelligible? As long as
we start from God the Word on one side and from man on the other it is
comprehensible that a negative answer should be given. But if a substantial
unity is excluded the sole alternative is a unity on the spiritual plane—a
reciprocity of two personal actions in a relation of giving and taking which
becomes so close that the one presents himself as the other and the other as
the one. The bond of union consists in a reciprocity of personal actions.
Although for Nestorius prosopon did not precisely mean 'person' (we can never
completely free ourselves from our metaphysical presuppositions) he interpreted
the Incarnation as meaning that in the person of Jesus Christ not only did God
the Word reveal Himself in human form but also that the man of history was the
manifestation of God the Word in such a way that he exhibited himself as the
Eternal Logos. The one Incarnate Person is neither simply God the Word nor
merely a man. He is both the beginning of a new humanity and the personal
revelation of God: and He is the one because He is the other. Only redeemed
humanity could become the image of God but this again is only possible because
God the Word was acting here in the manhood by means of a union of giving and
taking. Thus Nestorius remarkably anticipates the doctrine of Martin Kähler,
a Ritschlian and former colleague of Loofs himself. Loofs defines prosopon as
'external undivided appearance' and emphasises the close relation between
prosopon and will in the Treatise.

Comment here can be relatively brief. Loofs rightly
emphasises the starting point of Nestorius from the Incarnate Lord in his double
character as divine and human and, above all, the place given to the human will
in the Christology of Nestorius. This however he shares with other members of
his tradition, especially Theodore. It is also clear that the place at which
will was to be placed in the language of his own day was by no means clear.
But his interpretation of Nestorius as an anti-metaphysical theologian falls short of conviction. Certainly Nestorius makes much of prosopon-likeness-image language and something of prosopon-will-activity and operation. Loofs has no explanation to offer of the community of properties which prosopon also involves. It would appear, then, that as with Harnack's History of Dogma, so Loofs' study of the Christology of Nestorius owes more to nineteenth century German theology than is tolerable. His parallel with the theology of Martin Kähler discloses more of Loofs' own theological standpoint than it illuminates the thought of Nestorius himself. It emphasises some points of real significance in the thought of Nestorius at the expense of detaching him from his historical context.

But the most conclusive evidence against the interpretation of Loofs is afforded in the Treatise itself. Time and again Nestorius rejects the charges of teaching a doctrine of Two Sons or a purely moral union precisely on the grounds of his theory of prosopic union. It is not that he rejects a full duality in Christ or an identity of will, activity or operation or an equality of adoration, glory and dignity. These are the consequences and not the grounds of unity. By his theory of prosopic union and as a counterblast to Cyril's rival system of ontology he seeks to provide a different but equally metaphysical theory to undergird these facts.

We may therefore legitimately conclude that Loofs has failed to provide the proper context for understanding Nestorius and has gravely oversimplified his methodology.

Leonard Hodgson. Hodgson begins with a criticism of Loofs' position. Unity in will implied in Loofs' view of 'reciprocal personal actions' is excluded, as no Greek Christologian accepted the identity of ousia and will. It is common ground to all Patristic scholars, that the Greeks had no term equivalent to the modern 'person' though he is right that probably hypostasis came as near to this
as the terminology of the period allowed. Further, while Hodgson accepts Loofs' definition of prosopon as 'external undivided appearance', he claims that this must be regarded as a metaphysical concept, one of a number of ingredients in a res or a persona concreta. For all Nestorius' emphasis upon will, his Christology implies a metaphysical analysis, though naturally this is widely different from that adopted by Cyril.

According to Hodgson Nestorius adopted a threefold stratification of a concrete entity which might be likened to three concentric circles. There is the ousia or hypostasis - the inner core of essence or substance. Ousia and hypostasis answer the question 'Is there anything or anyone there?' But if we stopped at this point we should be confronted by a bare and shivering 'Isnness'. Phusis or nature fills out this individual substratum; it represents the totality of attributes needed for a complete description. It converts a 'quis' or 'quid' question into a 'qualis' or 'quale' question. But beyond these two ingredients there is also the prosopon, the external undivided appearance, considered as a real ingredient in a res concreta. Appearance is here not contrasted with but included in reality. As a phusis is built up from attributes (ἰδιωματα), so a prosopon is built up of likenesses (οψωματα). Thus the three terms connote concrete essence, nature and appearance respectively and all are needed for the complete description of an entity.

As applied to his Christology it is established that Nestorius believed in two complete ousiai or hypostaseis and two complete phuseis. The weight of the duality to be carried by his Christology is serious enough. The union can only be in the realm of the prosopon, a real but the most 'external' of the ingredients of an entity. Even here however Nestorius sees only too plainly that the two ousiai and phuseis cannot lack their respective prosopa. Each must have its natural prosopon (φυωκον προωπον) if they are to be considered complete. Thus one prosopon of two prosopa, a mutuality or reciprocity of prosopa in a process of giving and taking is the resultant picture of the Christology of Nestorius.
Hodgson claims that this relatively simple meaning of prosopon provides the key to the understanding of the Treatise and allows the many and varied statements to be worked into a coherent whole. He sees it as completely clearing Nestorius of the charge of teaching two Sons though not completely so of the charge of providing a less than adequate presentation of the unity of the Person of Christ in view of the weight of duality which his theory of unity is asked to bear.

In two important respects, however, Hodgson's analysis is not fully supported by the evidence.

(i) While Nestorius can distinguish ousia and phusis, particularly in lists of technical terms, he can also pass indifferently from one to the other in extended passages which suggests that he may have identified the two. At least the use of the terms in the Treatise does not invariably indicate the clear switch of meaning which Hodgson's view demands.

(ii) Hodgson's interpretation of prosopon as 'external undivided appearance', taken over from Loofs but revalued as a metaphysical ingredient in the res concreta, is not fully borne out by the evidence. It is strongly supported by prosopon-image-likeness language. In view of the contemporary uncertainty as to where to pigeon-hole will it would not be impossible to place this in the prosopon though prima facie its connection with the undivided appearance might be too external to serve. It might also cover the giving and taking of the prosopa, their mutuality and reciprocity though the phenomenon of reciprocity does nothing of itself to establish the content of what is reciprocated. Hodgson's view fails completely to provide for the property content of the prosopa which extends to the ethical life. On his interpretation this should belong to the phusis and not to the prosopon at all.

For all its merits, therefore, Hodgson's interpretation (though an improvement on that of Loofs by recalling us to a metaphysical interpretation of the Christology of Nestorius) would still appear to be an oversimplification.
Alois Grillmeier. Before his treatment of him in "Christ in Christian Tradition" Grillmeier had already written an extended article on Nestorius. Together they reveal that Grillmeier accepts the source-criticism of Abramowski and, in the main, the philosophical analysis of Scipioni. The latter, in contrast with Hodgson, takes the various technical terms as so many logical approaches to a single entity and not as metaphysical ingredients from which a res or persona concreta is constructed. While Scipioni finds the thread through the labyrinth of the Christology of Nestorius in Stoic logic, Grillmeier for his part is less clear that Nestorius is directly indebted to Stoic logic and suggests that the Cappadocian Fathers are a primary source and possibly the 'carriers' of it to Nestorius. This needs a good deal of primary research before it can either be affirmed or denied.

Grillmeier takes Nestorius to start his analysis of the Person of Christ from the two natures, described indifferently as God the Word and the flesh or the man, Godhead and manhood, divine nature and human nature. These must be taken in a purely abstract and qualitative sense and any more personalised descriptions can be disregarded. Unlike body and soul which are incomplete natures forming one human being, Godhead and manhood are complete natures or, as Nestorius calls them, 'self-sustaining' and we must resist any tendency to read into self-sustaining anything other than their completeness as natures. Nestorius' second term ousia is not rigidly distinguished from nature and he can move indifferently in the same context from nature to ousia. It denotes the 'essential content' or specific being of a nature - perhaps the Godness of God and the manness of man. Hypostasis adds the note of concreteness or actual concrete reality to the two previous terms. It turns two complete natures into two complete individual natures.

The fourth element in the analysis, the prosopon, is the most complex of his terms. It covers everything that can be found in a concrete being over and above the generic nature held in common between all the members of a species. It is the appearance, the way in which a thing is seen and judged and honoured; it is also the way in which it acts or exists. This definition explains why properties, will and the ethical life are included in the prosopon of Nestorius. Prosopon is a collective term for all that pertains to the characteristics of a nature inwardly and outwardly. Thus both natures have their own natural prosopa since they are both concrete individual natures. But in Christ each prosopon makes use of the other by compensation and a mutuality or reciprocity of prosopa is presupposed. The two natures are united in a common prosopon or in the prosopon of the union.

Grillmeier notes that the concept of the reciprocity of the prosopa is absent both from the Nestorian fragments and from other Antiochene thinkers. It may therefore represent a second thought or an attempt (possibly unsuccessful) to 'undergird the ship'. He also notes the use of virtually Chalcedonian language by Nestorius and observes that the Chalcedonian equation of hypostasis and prosopon would have been to his advantage. However, it should also be added, something which Grillmeier does not record, that the Council firmly excluded any talk about two prosopa. He sees Nestorius as substituting a communicatio prosopon in place of Cyril's communicatio idiomatum. It is this which enables Nestorius to escape the charge of teaching two Sons or a merely moral union. Analysing the passages which refer to one Christ, Son and Lord, Grillmeier speaks of an 'additive subject' in the Christ of Nestorius. The viability of this phrase depends upon the interpretation given to the mutuality or reciprocity of the prosopa.

As indicated Grillmeier warmly defends Nestorius against the stock charges raised against him and generally his positive judgements on Nestorius are surprisingly gentle. But in the end the value to be placed on Grillmeier's assessment of the Christology of Nestorius turns on his phrase the
'additive subject'. Is this viable or not? Here, of course, we have in a nutshell the real problem of Nestorius.

As we might expect these three interpretations of Loofs, Hodgson and Grillmeier, indicate that modern scholars are not of one mind in their interpretation of Nestorius' Christology. Nevertheless they can be taken as indication that none writes today so adversely of his Christology as in the past, while the man himself has been rehabilitated to a degree that would seem incredible to the Church of the fifth century. Few, we think, would dissent strongly from the opinion of Foakes Jackson:

He bore the sufferings of his exile with patience, and the opinions which have covered his name with such infamy were neither originated nor even strongly held by him. It is by the irony of fate that Nestorius is branded with the name of a heresiarch, whilst those who held almost the same views have died in the odour of sanctity.

To turn now to Cyril is to meet with a contrast. Cyril, for all he enjoyed a reputation as the one who preserved the Church from the Nestorian heresy and died secure in his archiepiscopal see of Alexandria, yet

1. Other scholars who have written following the discovery of the Treatise of Heracleides reflect this diversity of opinions and judgements held on Nestorius: Bethune Baker was particularly charitable towards Nestorius and considered him never to have been a Nestorian; Jugie was less convinced and held Nestorius to teach that there was not only two complete natures in Jesus Christ but also two persons and considered Nestorius to envisage only a moral union of the two complete persons; for Junglas the great error of Nestorius lay less in the duality of persons than in his unacceptable idea of development in the person of Christ; Pesch took the traditional view and underlined that Nestorius, if not expressly, nevertheless implicitly distinguished two persons in Jesus Christ. (J.F. Bethune Baker, Nestorius and his teaching, M. Jugie, Nestorius et la doctrine nestorienne, J.P. Junglas, Die Irrlehre des Nestorius, Chr. Pesch, Nestorius als Irrlehrer).

received an obituary that would equal most, if not surpass all, in the
scathing treatment it gave to a departed bishop:

At last and with difficulty the villain has gone ... Knowing that
the fellow's malice has been daily growing and doing harm to the
body of the Church, the Lord has lopped him off like a plague ....
His survivors are indeed delighted at his departure, the dead, maybe,
are sorry. There is some ground of alarm lest they should be so much
annoyed at his company as to send him back to us .... Great care must then
be taken ... to tell the guild of undertakers to lay a very big heavy stone
upon his grave, for fear he should come back again, and show his
changeable mind once more ... On seeing the Church freed from a plague
of this kind I am glad and rejoice; but I am sorry and do mourn when I
think that the wretch knew no rest from his crimes, but went on ....

Without writing with the invective of a Theodoret, modern writers find much to
condemn in the life of Cyril. Foakes Jackson, to quote him again, has an
apposite comment on Cyril:

We are inclined to pronounce him an excellent theologian but a bad man;
and to regard this divorce of practice from theory as a specially odious
trait in his character. 2

But for all the shortcomings of Cyril and for all the redeeming
features of Nestorius, the conviction has persisted in the Church down the
centuries that the former was right and the latter wrong. Wherein lies the
orthodoxy of the one and the error of the other?

To take Nestorius first, we have seen how, following Theodore
of Mopsuestia, he sought to express the unity and the distinction in Christ on
different levels: the unity on the level of the prosopon and the distinction
on the level of the natures. We have seen also that the Council of Chalcedon
came to its concluding Definition along similar lines to those of Nestorius,
with the important difference that the Council was careful to include the
expressions which counteracted the dangerous weaknesses which led to Nestorius'

de l'Église III p. 390 notes however that it may be spurious. It is preserved
in the dossier of the Fifth Council of Constantinople and is addressed to
John of Antioch who died before the death of Cyril in 444. The editor in
Migne alters the name of John to that of Domnus his successor in the see
of Antioch but seems to have his doubts about the latter.
condemnation. These expressions safeguarding the oneness of the Incarnate Lord reveal the persisting influence of Cyril. Thus Chalcedon is the via media between the distinction argued by Nestorius and the oneness affirmed by Cyril.

The words 'affirmed' and 'argued' used in the previous sentence were chosen deliberately. For, without doubt, Nestorius is a careful thinker and a man who guided by loyalty to his concepts step by step to the Christology he proclaimed. Cyril, on the other hand, was a man to whom concepts and logical argument took second place to his intuition which led him to subordinate all else to the unity of Christ. Tixeront contrasts the two bishops in this way:

En somme, Nestorius restait, avec plus de nuance dans la pensée et de précision dans les termes, dans la voie tracée par Théodore de Mopsueste. Nestorien, on peut dire qu'il l'est moins violemment que Théodore. Il veut conserver les façons de s'exprimer de l'Église; et c'est sincèrement, qu'il doit le croire, qu'il proclame l'unité personelle de Jésus-Christ.

Au lieu de construire en quelque sorte artificiellement, comme les antiochiens, l'unité du Christ, le patriarche d'Alexandrie la saisit directement et en a le sens immédiat. Son point de vue est moins métaphysique que religieux.

Herein was Cyril right, and Nestorius wrong. The former, unlike the latter, was more concerned with preserving the dogmatic essentials than in advancing inadequate metaphysical solutions.

This finally is the judgement to be passed on Nestorius. It is not so much that what he taught was wrong and liable to 'misdirect' Christian thought, as that what he was trying to express could not be expressed with the concepts he employed. With this Grillmeier seems to agree:

In the time of Nestorius it is everywhere apparent that no adequate metaphysic of the substantial union of spiritual beings had been evolved. More than all others, however, Nestorius saw the problem of finding such a substantial unity which would leave intact the phusis qua phusis. This insight into the problem together with his inadequate solution explains his inability to justify his own theological positions or to think himself into others.

2. Ibid. p. 79.
So while Nestorius, in his own mind, was clear about the union and the duality in the Incarnate Lord, the way in which he presented the duality demanded a stronger bond of union than the prosopic union he advanced. G.L. Prestige puts the matter with admirable clarity in this way:

The unorthodoxy of Nestorius was not a positive fact but a negative impotence; like his master Theodore, he could not bring within the framework of a single, clearly conceived personality the two natures of Christ which he distinguished with so admirable a realism.

Nestorius could not bring the two natures within the framework of a single, clearly conceived personality because he worked with a conception that Godhead and manhood were in complete and eternal antithesis. In fact, what Nestorius could not do nobody could do. Nestorius, however, thought he could and believed he had done so. He was like the researcher, not unknown to the world of science, who, convinced of some truth, sets out to prove it. But the truth is but partly comprehended by the researcher himself and the proof he advances is not acceptable to his colleagues. Subsequently, others take up the work and, advancing further, acknowledge their debt to their disappointed predecessor.

No analogy is perfect and the above is, perhaps, less so than most. But it is used to suggest that Nestorius saw the truth that Godhead and manhood, both in their fulness, came together in the Incarnate Lord. He was however unable to express and explain this duality and oneness to the satisfaction of his contemporaries. Possibly he should be blamed for not realising that with the concepts of natures (divine and human) he employed he was embroiling himself in an overwhelming and insoluble problem. Yet they were not the concepts of Nestorius only but of Cyril also and of all Christendom. Faithful to these concepts, Nestorius constructed a scheme of prosopic union as a means of explaining how God could become a man. It failed, as it was bound to do. Many failures, however, prove to be the stepping-stones to greater insight. May we not say the same of the gallant failure which is the Christology of Nestorius?

A literary-critical analysis (Untersuchungen zum Liber Heraclidis des Nestorius) has recently been made by Dr. Luise Abramowski, Professor of Church History at the University of Bonn, which has led her to challenge its unity of authorship. She explains the disparity between the two halves of the Treatise by the hypothesis of dual authorship. In addition she detects a small number of interpolations to which she ascribes a Constantinopolitan origin. The analysis of the Treatise advanced by L. Abramowski (using page references in Driver and Hodgson) is as follows:

A. The greater part of the text is by Nestorius (pp. 87-380).
B. Interpolations: pp. 362^13 - 369^21
   370^3 - 370^19
   372^12 - 373^15
   378^11 - 378^24
   379^2 - 379^19
C. A Nestorian introduction in dialogue form (pp. 7-86).

The claim that the Dialogue emanates from another hand (called Ps.-Nestorius by Abramowski) is an attractive suggestion which would certainly illuminate the literary critical problems of the Treatise. It must however be tested by the normal criteria used in cases of this kind.

(i) Statistical analysis of vocabulary and sentence structure. If, as seems probable, both parts of the Treatise were written in Greek but subsequently translated as a unity into Syriac, this test is wholly inapplicable.

(ii) The provision of a possible setting for the composition of the Dialogue. Here the chronological limits are fairly precise. They fall between the last recorded incidents in the historical part of the book (450 or possibly the earlier part of 451) and the date of the translation of the Treatise into Syriac which Abramowski brings down to about 525. At first sight the production of a 'Nestorian' work in Greek after the Council of Chalcedon whose author (like the Interpolator) she locates at Constantinople would seem highly unlikely. She notes however the importance of the monastery of the Aköimetae.
at Constantinople. In 534, they were excommunicated for the Nestorian heresy. It was in their library that much of the material favourable to Nestorius was preserved. Earlier they were a vigorous centre of New Chalcedonianism with strong Antiochene leanings, a tendency represented by Gennadius, Patriarch of Constantinople 458-471. Of the two Nestorians recorded by the Byzantine tradition during this period, one, Basil of Cilicia, had links with this community. The possibility that Ps.-Nestorius could write a Dialogue with Nestorian leanings at Constantinople cannot therefore be excluded.

(iii) Internal evidence from the Dialogue itself. Like the Heracleides of the title of the whole work, the interlocutor Sophronius is a lay figure or possibly a pseudonym. The way in which he is addressed suggests that he was of episcopal rank. Those who maintain the unity of the work and the authorship of Nestorius assume that Sophronius represents Cyril. Indeed, I. Rucker (Das Dogma von der Persönlichkeit Christi und das Problem der Häresie des Nestorius) made the ingenious emendation Pharaonius which in Syriac is easier than in English. The difficulty is that the opinions credited to him are not a perfect fit with those which Cyril is known to have held. This is perhaps not a conclusive objection since what Cyril believed Nestorius to have taught and his actual teaching are not identical either. It would not, of course, necessarily follow that if Sophronius is a pseudonym, Nestorius must be as well.

In a more recent article in Volume LXXVII of the Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte (Pseudo-Nestorius und Philoxenus von Mabbug) Professor Abramowski returns to the problem of the identity of Sophronius. Following the researches of A. de Halleux into the life and work of Philoxenus of Mabbug (Philoxène de Mabbug, sa vie, ses écrits, sa théologie) she finds fairly close parallels between his views and those credited to Sophronius. Philoxenus was a leading Monophysite bishop of Mabbug (Hierapolis) whose dates run from about 440 to 523. His literary career of forty years (480-521) falls well within the date bracket for the composition of the Dialogue. At two periods of his life, in 484 and 507, Philoxenus found himself in controversy with the Chalcedonians and the Dialogue might represent
a critical comment on his views from somewhat further to the Nestorian left. The parallels between the views expressed by Sophronius in the Dialogue and those of Philoxenus listed by Abramowski are illuminating and significant but hardly decisive.

(iv) Discrepancies between the two parts of the book in content and style. The nature of the two halves of the Treatise, the one a dogmatic Dialogue and the other a personal historical Apology makes comparison particularly difficult. The discussion ranges over a wide variety of views (not all lucidly handled or readily identifiable). The tone is objective and impersonal and the two participants never take on flesh and blood. The rest of the work is an urgent historical and theological Apologia pro vita sua, the sole target being the actions and opinions of Cyril. Abramowski notes as a principal difference between the two parts of the book the differing attitude to the judgement of God. For Nestorius trust in the divine judgement is a matter of personal piety which enables him to bear his bitter lot, for Ps.-Nestorius it is specifically directed against Satan. The victory over Satan plays an important part in the Dialogue and has far-reaching christological, soteriological, cosmic and eschatological consequences. Perhaps more surprising for the advocate of the unity of the Treatise is the fact that, while in the historical part of the book the two favourite Cyrilline formulae \( \epsilon \nu \nu \sigma \iota \iota \kappa \alpha \tau \varepsilon \phi \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \nu \) and \( \epsilon \nu \nu \sigma \iota \iota \kappa \alpha \theta \' \iota \kappa \omicron \omicron \tau \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \OMICRON \) are clearly noted and critically discussed they are not prominent in the Dialogue.

While the case for dual authorship advanced by Professor Abramowski does not command universal assent it does seem probable. Consequently, the discussion of the Christology of Nestorius in chapter 3 of this dissertation has used those parts of the Treatise considered by her to be genuine.


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