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Abstract.

In Peru in the late 1950's and early 1960's widespread agrarian unrest prompted the passing and implementation of a far reaching land reform programme. (1969-70) Peasants had been disputing titles to land in the courts, forming cooperatives, taking strike action and invading lands, often making use of complex and costly bureaucratic channels to attain their ends.

These recent activities have been interpreted as being characteristic of "peasant movements" but the use of this term obscures the fact that agrarian struggles have been an on-going feature of Peruvian rural life. Explanations of this kind are closely linked to "modernization" theories of economic development which tend to stress the importance of the diffusion of cultural change from the cities rather than changes in other aspects of local level social structures. Consequently, emphasis has been given to the way in which migration to mined and cities opens up new experiences to peasants, especially as they come into contact with syndicate organizations, liberal ideologies and outsiders who act as "charismatic" leaders.

An examination of five case studies suggests that this kind of approach exaggerates the relationship of dependency of peasants on landowners and middlemen, and fails to explain how markedly different social situations produced similar kinds of organized activities. I examine the possibilities of developing an approach which will combine an analysis of the structures underlying observed social action with a consideration of the social constraints on decision-making amongst individuals and groups. This does not allow for the formulation of a consistent model for the interpretation of organized peasant activities, but suggests that analysis should look to the interplay of sets of relationships at the local level with developments in the structure of the wider society which at the present time have produced an environment conducive to the success of peasant strategies.
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CHAPTER 1.

PEASANT PROTEST - PROBLEMS AND ORIENTATIONS.

"The process of modernization begins with peasant revolutions that fail, it culminates in the twentieth century with peasant revolutions that succeed. No longer is it possible to take seriously the view that the peasant is an "object of history", a form of social life over which historical changes pass but which contributes nothing to the impetus of these changes. For those who savour historical irony, it is indeed curious that the peasant in the modern era has been as much an agent of revolution as the machine, that he has come into his own as an effective historical actor along with the conquests of the machine".

(Barrington Moore, 1973. edn. 453).

The study of peasant protest is a relatively neglected field in Anthropology. The studies that do exist tend to give rather a distorted picture of the phenomenon of protest as a whole, and have been limited to the study of cargo cults, millenarian and messianic movements in the context of primitive societies undergoing the social dislocations of colonial rule and among the most oppressed and impoverished strata of the peasantry (for example, Burridge, 1969; Cohn, 1957; Lawrence 1964; Worsley, 1957). Studies of less idiosyncratic forms of protest taking place under the impact of economic modernization are few and far between, notable exceptions being Epstein's work on the development of trade unions in the Copper Belt of Zambia and studies by Mangin (1967) and Turner (1967) concerning urban land invasions and the setting up of squatter settlements on the peripheries of Latin American cities. Apart from these studies, the tendency has been to be concerned with the major revolutions of the twentieth century (Wolf, 1969; Huizer, 1973; Barrington Moore, 1966), though in fact the majority of peasant protest actions have been scattered and uncoordinated attempts to bring about an improvement of day-to-day conditions of life and work. These have failed to bring about a
restructuring of social relations, and so have passed unnoticed and undocumented.¹

Nevertheless, in recent years there has been an upsurge of academic and journalistic interest in the field of peasant protest, particularly in the light of the successes of peasants in bringing about major revolutionary changes in society in the Soviet Union, China, Mexico, Cuba, Algeria and Vietnam. In most third world countries the potential for revolutionary political activity is never far away since "no social structure can be totally immune to the revolutionary tendencies set up in the process of modernization". (Barrington Moore: 457). Furthermore, the types of changes currently affecting peasant societies have been brought about by the incorporation of peasants into the market economy, and thus differ substantively from the conditions such as wars, plagues and famines that historically produced upheavals in Europe. This requires a new conception of the peasantry actively involved in bringing about change.

The twentieth century is seeing a new kind of phenomenon which can be considered as a local expression of more profound changes affecting the very fabric of the wider society, changes brought about by industrialisation and the movement to the cities, and hence it is relatively easy to make the conceptual leap from localised protest to a fully coordinated and ideologically directed revolutionary movement (Wolf, 1969). However, the failure of peasants to bring about significant social and cultural change in the past

¹ Jack Stauder (1974) takes a more extreme view of the situation, arguing that the lack of anthropological study of these phenomena can be explained by the lack of relevance to governments or capitalist enterprises.
should not be taken as indicative of social harmony and a "passive" peasantry. This is an assumption based on a structural-functionalist model of society which assumes that stability results from harmonious rather than conflictive social relations.

Peasants have frequently been viewed as "passive" masses, having no group identity or defined class role in the wider social system. They are poor material for revolution because the very system of economic relations in which they are involved means they are unable to comprehend the totality of capitalist relations and so advance them or transcend them (Lukács, 1923). Nor can they evolve their own ideology, it is always borrowed from outside. Consequently, in the study of peasant protest, there has been a tendency to focus on alliances with other classes and political parties and on the role of intellectuals and revolutionary activists, to the exclusion of any initiative form the peasants themselves. Hence, the role of the intellectual performing a leadership function has attracted attention "wholly out of proportion to (its) political importance" (Barrington Moore, 1973; edn. 480). The reason for this can perhaps be attributed to the fact that literary sources of material than oral traditions are more readily available to researchers. The activist leaves behind his political writings to be processed by the historian, the peasant's actions survive only in folk memory. Furthermore, at the perceptual level, the fears of the dominant classes will often crystallise around the threat from traitors within the gates, members of their own class who question the status quo and who are capable of coordinating organisations, rather than the more diffuse threat from a distant and amorphous mass. It is at this point that, in their own minds, the situation takes on aspects of a class struggle. As a result of all this, leadership from the peasant ranks and initiative
in organisation have been played down - even though most peasant conflict stems from local conditions and envisages, initially at any rate, only local change.

This kind of misconception is also related to "index" methods of understanding the problem of social change and economic development, whereby the general features of a developed economy are abstracted as an ideal type and contrasted with those of a poor economy and society. In this, the attitudes and institutions of a 'traditional' society are construed as obstacles or barriers to development, (e.g. Foster, 1962; Hoselitz, 1960), which can be overcome by the injection of the appropriate amounts of education, achievement orientation, investment and a desire to economise. This conceptualization of socio-economic change fails to appreciate that underdeveloped societies are far from 'traditional' and have been radically transformed by the penetration of capitalism (Frank, 1971). Consequently, it is the total structure of the national society itself, not the backward characteristics of the peasantry which fails to bring about "development", and, if the purpose of "development" is viewed not as the achievement of the needs of a particular class but as the elevation of the entire mass of oppressed persons, then it is the elites, not the masses that are revealed as resisting change (Horowitz, 1970).

Theoretical Issues.

For present purposes I do not wish to become involved in the debate over the characteristics of a peasant society. Evidence suggests that generalisations from one culture or society to another are suspect, so I shall briefly outline the major types of peasant social organization which are found in Peru. Conceptually, the
peasants can be divided into small proprietors living on indigenous communities, or small village settlements, tenants tied to the hacienda system of landholding and labour obligations, and landless labourers working either within the cash nexus of employment on commercial plantations on the coast or in relation to other peasants in one of the non-capitalist forms of agricultural organisation. 

Since this study is concerned with the Central Sierra of Peru, the commercial agricultural enterprises on the coast are excluded from the analysis, except as they exist as an alternative source of employment and cash income to the peasants in the villages.

It is important to understand the distinctions between the different categories of peasants, according to their relation to the land, to landlords and to the means of production since this has implications for class alliances and the types of benefits they stand to gain through political action. For instance, the attitudes and interests of smallholders will be markedly different from those of the tenant or landless labourer. Even so, it is not easy to talk about the class consciousness of peasants as a category even at the level of a village community, since a single peasant may be involved

1. A hacienda is a large estate on which there is a resident labour force. In return for a small plot of land, and sometimes wages, the tenants are expected to fulfill various labour obligations which might include agricultural work, herding, public works and domestic tasks for the hacendado.

The hacendado is the owner or renter/administrator of the estate. In Peru, large estates were owned by individuals, by institutions or by the State itself.
in multiple ways in the production process and with other peasants. The systems of arrangements tying a peasant to a *hacienda* may allow him to sub-let some of his land in order to fulfill his obligations to the *hacendado*. He is thus in a dependent relationship to the *hacendado*, yet at the same time in a dominant relationship to other peasants.

Certain macro-structural variables are also important in determining the economic interests and consciousness of the peasants. These are related to the objective opportunities existing in the wider society as well as the impingement of ideologies on local systems of ideas. At the local level the degree of penetration of the capitalist economy has implications for the interaction of capitalist and non-capitalist modes of production, and for weakening the dependence of the peasant on the *hacendado* by providing sources of cash income. Opportunities for employment outside the local community in mines, coastal plantations and cities modify but do not diminish the interests of the migrants in their communities of origin. In this the push and pull factors for migration need to be considered, as well as the precise way in which new experiences, values and investments feedback into the village. Evidence seems to suggest that this is not just the simple one-way flow of innovation from the cities.

As for the types of activities the Peruvian peasants have been involved in in recent years, there exists a certain confusion in the terminology. The terms "peasant movement", "solidarity movement", "syndicate movement", have all been used but since they have slightly different implications, their indiscriminate application to a variety of actions, orientations and groups has not contributed much to the understanding of the phenomena concerned. Stavenhagen (1970) uses
the term "peasant movement" to cover Indian uprisings and slave rebellions of the colonial era, the Mexican revolution, social banditry, millenarian and messianic movements as they use either existing legal systems to attain their objectives or resort to direct action, as in the invasion of landed estates, mass meetings and guerrilla warfare.

This kind of all-embracing definition is misleading since it gives the impression that discrete phenomena form a continuum, and in some of the writing on the topic the idea that one type of occurrence can somehow be miraculously transformed into another comes across with alarming regularity. For example, Huizer writes:

"The peasants' awareness of the need for overall change is expressed in some cases spontaneously in their adherence to messianic and millenarian movements created both by outsiders and by people from the peasantry. The difficulty is that, although peasants may see or feel the need for overall change, they do not clearly visualize ways and means through which this can be realized. It is at this crucial point that either peasants with urban experience, such as Zapata and José dos Prazeres, or urban leaders, such as Juan Guerra (the teacher in Qucureña) and Hugo Blanco become important. They can channel the vague awareness of a need for change into a more concrete awareness for ways and means of change through organised effort". (1973:115).

In fact, I would argue that the use of a term like "peasant movement" is an arbitrary method of classifying as an isolated event, an ongoing process of protest and struggle. The peasants of the valley of La Convención did not have a "vague awareness of a need for change" but had set up a syndicate organization and had taken strike action before Hugo Blanco ever appeared on the scene. Blanco subsequently articulated their local struggles in the ideology of the class struggle.

It is also debatable as to the extent that concepts and arguments from the study of one area of protest can be successfully applied elsewhere. There is an obvious need to examine the structural situation in which such movements take place and the peasants' evaluation of that situation as well as the subsequent course of action.
A consideration of scale and timing is crucial in explaining the relative "success" and spread of the phenomena, and why, under some circumstances rebellion can bring about far reaching changes in society, and in others, endemic revolt maintains the status quo. Speculation could meaningfully be directed towards the question of why one group of peasants effectively organised themselves, yet a neighbouring group, presumably living under precisely the same environmental conditions in terms of national economic and political setting failed to do so. It is at this level that anthropological analysis could profitably be applied in order to understand the internal dynamics and conflicts behind organised political action.

Blumer has defined collective behaviour as that which "lies outside the area of cultural prescription" which develops new forms of interaction to meet "undefined or unstructured situations" (quoted in Smelser, 1962:6), and Smelser has emphasised that it is a "mobilization on the basis of a belief that redefines social action". (1962:6). It is in this sense that we are concerned with an uninstitutionalised mobilization for action which is a response to modify a certain kind of strain or contradiction in the social structure. Smelser considers this as an anomic situation, but, since Merton (1952) defines this as a situation in which there is an "acute disjunction between cultural norms and goals and the socially structured capacities of the members of a group", this would not be entirely accurate for all the empirical situations under study. This is particularly the case where peasants have successfully attained their objectives through an established legal system, or by reference to laws existing in letter at the national level, but not in practice at the local level. Smelser's view also implies that the activities are simply a response to external environmental conditions, which later I shall argue against.
In trying to set out the relationships between different types of social movements there seem to be several main areas of distinctions: at the structural and perceptual levels, in the formulation of goals and strategies, in the methods of communication, and in the organisational scale. Attempts have been made to categorize them in terms of having a political or a religious orientation or being revolutionary or reformist: such distinctions, I believe, are somewhat arbitrary and represent categories imposed by outside "scientific" observers and bear little relation to the changing goals and strategies of the participants.

There is no satisfactory means of distinguishing between movements of a political or religious orientation. This is particularly evident in the study of relatively unstructured political activities since most definitions of politics relate to formal structures of government and administration. Both types of movement involve reference to an ideology, a paradigmatic system of thought which seeks to provide both an interpretation of social reality and a plan for action. Whether this system involves a belief in spiritual beings or in a capitalist conspiracy against the working classes, it provides an internally consistent scheme of ideas which is based on a faith in the inherent truth of certain assumptions. I have not made a thorough examination of the definitional problem in religion, but both Geertz's and Burridge's definitions refer to religion as a conceptual system and somehow fail to make the distinction between religion and other kinds of ideology. For Geertz, religion is:

"A system of symbols which acts to establish powerful, pervasive and longlasting moods and motivations in men, by formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and clothing these conceptions in such an aura of factuality that the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic".

(Geertz: 1966:4).
And for Burridge it is:

"The redemptive process indicated by the activities, moral rules, and assumptions about power which, pertinent to the moral order and taken on faith, not only enable a people to perceive the truth of things but to guarantee they are indeed perceiving the truth of things".

(Burridge, 1969:7).

Furthermore, Burridge denies the usefulness of making any distinction between religious and political ideologies, "for not only are religions concerned with the truth about power, but the reverse also holds: a concern with the truth about power is a religious activity". (1969:7).

However, the comparison between a modern political movement and, for example, a millenarian movement shows several fundamental points of contrast which makes some kind of distinction expedient. A major point of contrast seems to be how the participants' definition of their situation relates to their objective position and capabilities in the system of social relationships. Since the way in which people comprehend and define their present structural situation has consequences for their actions, it is important to understand how the symbolic definition of the present is influenced by past experiences, and by inferences about the future (McHugh, 1968). In a situation of rapid social change, for example the imposition of colonial rule on a tribal population, existing systems of knowledge may be inadequate for understanding vast influxes of new information. In this sense, Burridge's "concern for the truth about power" is an experimental system for ordering this new information, which can be tested and rapidly validated or discarded. This is not so much a question of the rationality of the people under examination, for this must be taken as given, but of the apparent rationality of the system of relationships.
in which they are involved (cf. Godelier, 1965). The two main
elements in this are their comprehension of the situation and the
objective opportunities for changing it. Touraine and Pecault (1970)
maintain that "for a goal to exist, an individual must be able to
glance beyond his present horizon, that is to live in the present as
a function of a certain idea about the future". Where the social
situation is so hopeless that people are unable to render their
actions meaningful "they define their future in utopian terms bearing
no relation to actual possibilities".

The material on relative politicization would seem to substan-
tiate such a distinction. In "Primitive Rebels", Hobsbawn (1959)
compares "primitive" or "archaic" forms of social movement with more
"modern" forms of political expression such as labour and socialist
movements. According to him, "pre-political" people are only just
beginning to find a specific language with which to express their
aspirations about the world, and he sees these kinds of movements as
a "blind and groping" acquisition of political consciousness (1959).
Quijano (1967) makes this same distinction between a pre-political
period and a period of modernization. In the former, the movements
"dealt with the real situation in a fragmented way" or "were only able
to see limited aspects of the problem without understanding the most
important factors which actually conditioned the peasant situation".
Needless to say, the dichotomy of "archaic" and "modern" is not
directly equivalent to "religious" and "political". There is no
reason why a "religious" movement should not also be politically
effective. The early labour movements such as the Chartists had a
clearly defined religious ideology, and in Peru many of the peasant
organisers in La Convención were Protestant fundamentalists. This
really leads to the question of the manipulation of ideologies by
individuals and groups which can not readily be discussed without reference to specific social situations.

Smelser makes a further distinction between "norm-" and "value-oriented" movements. The norm-oriented movement envisions the "restoration, protection, modification or creation of social norms" (Smelser, 1962:109), and agitation in the name of a cause related to a certain aspect of the existing structure of society. On the other hand, the value-oriented movement rejects this structure and formulates a new system of values by which society should be reorganised. In many cases, the development of a movement from reformist to revolutionary goals can be identified. Most protests are against specific abuses, regarded as unjust, of what is otherwise thought of as an acceptable system of relationships. It is only when there is a strong reaction against the protest that a radical re-evaluation of the entire system of relationships may take place. Similarly, with a revolutionary movement:

"Except at the rare moments just preceding or during profound crises, the most extreme revolutionaries must also have a policy about the existing world in which they are obliged to live. If they want to make it more tolerable while preparing for revolution, or even if they want to prepare effectively, they must also be reformists, unless they abandon the world altogether by constructing some communist Zion in the desert or in the prairie, or - like many religious bodies - transfer their hope entirely to the hereafter".

(Hobsbawn, 1959:11 - 12).

These categories, religious/political/primitive/archaic and reformist/revolutionary have been used extensively in analysis and it is only at this level that these distinctions are meaningful. However, if these terms are applied to the actors' situation they suggest the existence of a coherent ideology guiding social action, which I would argue is not the case. In fact, Hobsbawn has stated
elsewhere (1974) that the types of mass activities that the Peruvian peasants have been involved in can have revolutionary consequences, independent of the subjective intentions of the actors themselves. A case in point would be the invasion of land$. To the peasant this represents a recovery of lost communal lands, though the hacendado and the revolutionary activist would have quite different perceptions of the potential of the situation.

Historical background.

The history of Peru has seen a variety of forms of protest throughout its post-conquest history, and possibly before under the indigenous civilizations. In the sixteenth century three types of movement can be distinguished (Mates Mar, 1967). Firstly, those attempting to restore the Tahuantisuyo (the Inca State) as in pre-Spanish times in the sense of a war of reconquest. Secondly, at the break up of the state organisation of the Incas the distinct tribes and confederations which had constituted the Tahuantisuyo undertook local autonomy movements, which in their early states were encouraged by the conquerors in order to integrate them into the Spanish colony. Thirdly, throughout the vice-royalty there were messianic movements headed by religious leaders announcing a new era in which the social order would be reorganised in favour of the oppressed. Sporadic, isolated incidents between landlords and peasants have been a more or less continuous feature of rural life particularly with regard to disputes over community lands. The last great insurrection took place in the Department of Ancash in the northern Sierra at the end of the nineteenth century, which obtained certain military successes for a brief period, and posed a serious threat to the white landownership, after which it was totally liquidated by government forces. In the present century, the Southern Sierra in the departments
of Puno and Ayacucho there were isolated rebellions which resulted in cruel massacres.

Present day movements are distinguished by the fact that they have been far from isolated and lasted, uninterrupted from 1955 to 1965 on a national scale, and alarmed the national government sufficiently as to bring the passing of a land reform law. Activities such as land invasions, legal suits and strikes took place throughout the country, often irrespective of the allegiance of peasants to political parties and peasant federations which existed at the national and regional levels. In some regions peasants were able to take almost total control of power through a coordinated syndicate structure. Thus was the case with the peasant activities in the valleys of La Convención and Lares.

However, not all peasants have responded in the same way to the evident changes which have been occurring in local and national power structures through the process of modernisation. The dramatic events of La Convención obscure to some extent the fact that the peasants have been taking concerted action to improve their conditions of life and work since the end of the last century. These actions have differed according to the categories of peasant concerned and their precise structural context. These activities can be considered as:

1. Organization into production and marketing cooperatives.
2. Legal suits to determine ambiguous ownership of land or the right to rent it.
3. Invasions of property.
4. Strike action.
5. Evolution of syndicate organisations and recognition of class interests.
The first four categories of activities can develop into the fifth category and Smelser has likened this development process to the concept of "value-added" from economics, whereby certain conditions and series of events are necessary to the process to bring about the end product. However, whether all the categories of activities can realistically be called "peasant movements" is debatable.

If the aims of the different actions are analysed, this problem becomes more apparent. The formation of cooperatives is a means of improving the peasants' bargaining position within the local power structure. It is typical of smallholding communities, which are often considered to identify their class interests with those of landholders and private property, hence envisages no reorganisation of production on an egalitarian basis. It tends to benefit the already economically advantaged peasants, though often these organisations will draw on communal or cooperative values. The activities in categories 2 to 4 arise through a change in the external socio-economic environment which permits a questioning of the landholder's rights to the peasants' labour or former communal lands, though in many cases these rights may never have been considered legitimate. The strike is a form of direct action in protest to unwarranted labour obligations, and the legal suit and the invasion of property a means of laying claim to the control of land. In both cases, reference may be made to national laws or the electoral promises of politicians. The unpaid labour obligations of hacienda tenants were abolished under the 1947 Law of Yanaconaje and many land invasions

1. Yanaconaje (like colonato and peonaje) is one of several terms referring to the relationship between the hacendado and his tenants.
have occurred in response to promises of land reform from liberal political platforms. In each case, what Bailey (1960) calls a "bridge action" occurred, that is, that reference was made to a system of values external to the local social system. This behaviour is innovatory, in that it manipulates discrepancies in local and national systems, but it only seeks an improvement in conditions, not a complete restructuring of relations. Furthermore, action is taken against individual landholders, not landholders as a class. Finally, where these more moderate claims are systematically refused, the peasants are likely to resort to more coordinated methods of action against landholders who, at the local level, form a bloc whose wealth and connections allow them to effectively manipulate at other levels. It is at this point that the conflict begins to take on the aspects of a class struggle, especially as political activists and intellectuals begin to take an interest in it. Basically it is a question of the political implications of the actions as they are (a) evaluated by observers and (b) result in a change of consciousness amongst the peasants themselves.

The above phenomena have been occurring in peasant societies throughout the third world, though structural conditions make some societies more prone to revolutionary tendencies than others. The kinds of questions raised by their study have been addressed to the following types of problem:

1. Under what circumstances do the mobilizations take place?
2. How is the particular form of expression determined?
3. What determines its relative success and spread?
Review of the material on "peasant movements".

In the analysis of the material on peasant political activities two main theoretical orientations can be identified. Both are concerned with the impact of industrialization and urbanization in the national society on the peasant communities, but the main distinction between the two approaches is in their relative emphasis on cultural and economic factors in bringing about social change at the local level. The former standpoint is based on "modernization" theories of economic development, \(^1\) whereby it is assumed that economic development will occur once the appropriate incentives are instilled in the "traditional" population. Hence this kind of analysis draws heavily on the idea of the diffusion of information and values from the centres of "modernization" in the cities and in the developed world. On the other hand, the economically-oriented kind of analysis stresses the kinds of transformations brought about in local level economic systems by the penetration of the market economy to the countryside, and the opening up of new sources of cash employment in the towns and in the mines which are fed into the local economy. This kind of analysis is more inclined to emphasize economic differentiation among peasants and the conflicting interests which bring about political action. Both approaches, however, are concerned with a fairly general level of analysis and to date have not been widely applied in empirically-based anthropological study.

Cotler (1969), LaMond-Tullis (1970) and Alberti (1970) have made use of the modernization/information theory approach in their studies of peasant political mobilization. The peasants are almost caricatured

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1. See Chapter III for a fuller discussion of modernization theory.
as being ignorant, withdrawn, competing for the patron's favours (c.f. Foster's (1965) "image of limited good") and lacking information about alternative forms of organisation. The investigators turn to the external environment to explain how peasants are brought out of their isolation and provided with alternative channels of access to control of political and economic resources, usually stressing the replacement of old patron-client relations with new patterns of client-age through adherrance to political and syndical organisations. At this stage, the reader is presented with the customary platitudes concerning charismatic leadership, new models of organisation brought from the mines and towns by returned migrants, and the stimulus of intellectuals and "revolutionary" ideologies.¹

This type of analysis clearly puts across the "social movement" thesis. The peasants' activities are regarded as a response to an anomic situation - the source being the undermining of the existing structure of relations ideologically, politically and economically, through modernisation. Mobilisation is seen as contingent on the frustration of the peasants, either as they become aware of their increased capacity to improve their economic position, which is not matched by their opportunities (LaMond-Tullis, 1970), or as an objective or anticipated deterioration of conditions takes place (Alberti, 1970). The impression is given that the peasants suddenly "see the light" and become aware of these new opportunities as the

¹ c.f. Landsberger and Hewitt's (1970) simplistic listing of the necessary ingredients for a successful peasant movement. Lehman (1973) criticises them for taking no account of the different social groups, goals and forms of organisation in different movements. He also argues that by limiting their analysis to the formal problems of bureaucratic effectiveness, they ignore the types of relationships which bind members to an organization, such as clientage and pre-existing loyalties.
monopolistic control of the "broker" or "middleman" over information is broken. Unfortunately, the empirical material refutes this conceptualisation of peasants. In many Peruvian villages there has been a long history of struggle for lost lands, yet their lack of achievement does not indicate passivity and failure to organise. The precise impact of modernisation, (that is: improved communications media, opportunities for employment outside agriculture, new sources of wealth and integration into the cash economy) on local social systems is a far more complex process than information theory would suggest, requiring a subtle understanding of the interplay of those external factors with internal community dynamics.

The main problem with this kind of explanation is that it makes use of descriptive ideal-types rather than an analytical model. The reader is presented with a representation of the structural relationships between the peasants and the wider society, before and after mobilisation, but is given no indication as to how these transformations take place. Reference may be made to "charismatic leaders" in the social field, but as Worsley (1957) has pointed out, this is a rather fashionable term, derived from the study of cargo cults and other mass movements which has often been used as a substitute for the careful analysis of political organisation and ideology. As I have endeavoured to indicate earlier, the "peasant movements" in Peru have not developed from millenarian and messianic movements, but from political and entrepreneurial strategies, hence the term is of dubious utility.

The economically-oriented approach to the study of peasant political mobilisation is concerned with a class analysis of the
different categories of peasant and how their economic position is affected in the process of economic development. A consideration of the class interests of the different categories of peasant, as determined by their relationship to the land and to landowners, leads to an evaluation of their potential for taking revolutionary political action. This has resulted in a tendency to concentrate on the analysis of societies in which revolutionary upheavals of the social structure have taken place, (for example, Wolf, 1969; Alavi, 1967) but has also been applied, somewhat less satisfactorily to Peru and Chile by Cotler (1970) and Petras and Zeitlin (1970) respectively.

These kinds of analysis represent an attempt to consider the kinds of developments that "peasant movements" bring about in the class structure and status of those who participated in them. However, Wolf (1969), for instance, concentrates on the similarities in alliances between the different social groups in revolutions that have already occurred and so ignores the differences in causes and outcomes. Lefman (1974) argues that although in many cases peasant uprisings in the twentieth century have been caused by the expansion of commercialism and the disruption of traditional social and economic arrangements, there are innumerable cases where this has not been the sequence despite the presence of these same conditions. The analysis of the impact of economic modernization on the different categories of peasant is indeed valid for the understanding of their potential for political activity, but a distinction must be made between these analytical categories and the classes they could be, if organized. If we turn to the village level of social relations, this categorical analysis fails to recognize the complexity of production and power relations, and how "consciousness" and the resulting political action
are produced through the interaction of individuals and groups with widely differing economic rationales.

These generalisations of broad scale are also prone to forget that peasant culture has always been an idiosyncratic interpretation of the cultural "great tradition" of the cities. Wolf notes that "the transcendental ideological issues appear only in very prosaic guise in the villages". In studying the localized rather than the more widely coordinated movements, which sometimes develop from them, this discrepancy becomes more apparent. The study of peasant activism is plagued with ethnocentric assumptions about the "petit bourgeois" mentality of the peasants, and their lack of an indigenous ideology, hence their relatively fickle allegiance to wider causes. Whether the peasants' demands in their own minds ever goes beyond a desire for change in purely local conditions is open to debate. It is possible that their allegiance to wider political causes and syndicate federations is merely instrumental, denoting no change in political consciousness, nor a recognition of class interests. An obvious area of enquiry is the way in which individuals can pursue the same course of action with widely differing objectives. In this, the negotiating and bargaining process between different sections would be of interest, not just at the level of pragmatic action but also at the level of individual consciousness.

Outline of thesis.

Having briefly reviewed the material, I now intend to outline the plan for this thesis. I shall tackle it by means of an actor-oriented approach, making reference to case material where possible. This is particularly appropriate for the interpretation of social life through the study of individuals and groups as manipulators and innovators,
creating and defining the social world around them. I am aiming to understand something about the dynamics of political action and group formation, taking as my central problem what Swartz has described as "how people relate their currently private and/or sub-group goals to announced public goals with which they are associated, "and the values, meanings, resources and relationships employed during the process" (1969:3).

Consequently, I am concerned primarily with political action organized at the village level, such as land invasions, strike action, the formation of cooperatives and the pressing of legal suits against landowners. These, I believe, do not constitute "peasant movements". There is a case for arguing that the political activities of the peasants of the Valley of La Convención did constitute a "peasant movement", but for the purposes of the present analysis this term bears connotations which do not seem appropriate in the light of the empirical material.

In Chapter II I shall be looking at the development of the Peruvian agrarian structure from pre-Incaic times onward. The two major issues would seem to be the relative control of the state over the autonomy of the large landholders and their response to commercialization and subsequent relationship with the bourgeoisie.

In Chapter III I shall be examining and evaluating the "social movement" interpretation of peasant political activities. This will be particularly concerned with the way in which the relationship between the peasants and large landholders is depicted before and after political mobilization, and how this mobilization occurs.

Chapter IV will be concerned with the examination of political consciousness, particularly in the way that different categories of
peasants perceive their interests. The analyses of broad scale will be discussed, but I am mainly interested in the way that anthropological analysis could be applied to a rigorous study of land tenure arrangements, economic interests within and outside the community, and the local interpretations of ideologies as they affect the individual's perception of his interests, and from this point of departure focus on the negotiation of strategies between groups.

Chapters V and VI will be devoted to the empirical material on the Peruvian sierra, and in the Conclusion I shall be evaluating how far this material allows for the examination of the problems that are significant in the field of peasant politics.
CHAPTER 2.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE PERUVIAN AGRARIAN STRUCTURE.

The following chapter is concerned with the evolution of the Peruvian agrarian structure from pre-Incaic times to the present day. Land tenure arrangements can not simply be understood in terms of "traditional" or "modern" forms of organization since even the organization of indigenous communities has undergone a series of transformations due to national legislation and through their relationship with other forms of agricultural enterprise. This historical examination is justified by the need to understand the forms from which contemporary land tenure arrangements developed, as well as to demonstrate the operation of different modes of production and their corresponding ideological support structures. Moreover, a historical analysis can locate the sources of grievance in present-day conflicts. For instance, the process of expansion of the haciendas, of church property and, more recently, of commercial plantations and ranches, has involved encroachment on Indian lands. Conflict therefore arises between the European conception of the individual's rights to land and to the profits from its exploitation, and the Indians' conception of their inalienable and jointly held rights to lands which they have used for cultivation and pasture since time immemorial.

I also want to examine the wider context in which these developments took place, notably the structural relationship between the provincial authorities and power-holders and the centralized organization of the state. At the local level, I am concerned with the types of exchanges which took place between the large landowners and the peasant villages, whether this was between haciendas and independent
indigenous communities, or between haciendas and the villages they dominated which supplied them with labour.

The penetration of the rural areas by the market economy affects various aspects of existing patterns of organization. Barrington Moore (1969) emphasizes the significance of the response to economic modernization as it affects production relations on the land, and the types of linkages that develop between the traditional landed elite in the countryside and the commercial class of the urban bourgeoisie. In Peru, an important dimension of economic modernization has been the repercussions on the more backward areas of the penetration of the market economy through the proximity of mining centres, and the development of capitalist forms of export-oriented agriculture in other parts of the country.

For the purpose of this chapter I shall limit the discussion to macro-structural features. Local patterns of social relationships will be examined in the case studies, constituting Chapters V and VI.

Pre-Conquest Agrarian Organization.

There exists relatively little detailed material on Pre-Conquest modes of social organization. The sources are mainly taken from the accounts of the Spanish conquerors and thus reflect their own perceptions of the native population. The material is largely deduced from these accounts and, where available, from archaeological

1. The settlements of the Sierra have long been incorporated into a wider social unit, for example, the Inca empire, the Spanish colony. By "macro-structural features", I mean those institutions, structural characteristics and socio-economic conditions which influenced or were common to local-level communities throughout the Sierra. For the purpose of this chapter, analysis is restricted to developments in the Sierra, coastal agriculture has evolved in a different pattern.
evidence. A further problem is that of the general applicability of material based on relatively specific accounts, since the great extensions of the Inca empire mean that it incorporated many different populations into its administrative structure, whose environments and corresponding socio-economic organization differed considerably. Furthermore, the fact that the native populations had only recently been conquered by the Incas themselves makes it difficult to distinguish how far aspects of the indigenous organizations were modified by the imposition of the organs of administration by the Inca state.

The organization of the early civilizations was based on the ayllu, and though this was the basic unit of local social organization, it is one of the poorest documented Andean institutions. It was a local social group formed by all the people living within a certain territory considered as the property of the ayllu. A large ayllu could contain several smaller ones. It has often been thought of as a kinship unit, but Zuidema (1962) maintains that this was not necessarily the case. The kinship group connotations seem to have been derived from the fact that the word "ayllu" has a phallic significance and has consequently been translated as "family" or "lineage".

Each ayllu inhabited a clearly delimited territory known as a marca. In the Sierra the marca would often include a variety of different climates and soil types due to the presence of river valleys and considerable differences in altitude within a relatively short distance of each other. In their attempts to dominate their environment, the native populations developed a system of control whereby the different ecological niches could be exploited and vertical exchanges of goods take place between the valley floor settlements and small colonies in the highlands, (Murra, 1972). The institutional
form that this system of vertical control took varied from one group to another throughout the Andes.

Within the ayllu the ownership of land was collective and impartible, the plots being redistributed periodically among the family groups of the community. Men and women could possess property within the ayllu as well as in a community where they were not resident. However, they could only occupy a post in the religious or political hierarchy of the settlement in which they lived, and it is in this sense that the territory of the ayllu was communal and inalienable.

Each member of the ayllu also had usufructory rights to the use of pastures, to woodland for firewood and construction, and to water for irrigation. Members could expect to have access to land sufficient for a living, and to a dwelling constructed with the help of others. Labour was collectively performed on each family tract of land, and thus provision was also made for widows and the elderly. There was no remuneration for these services, thus the mode of production was based on the "cooperation of direct producers linked together by ..... the reciprocal obligations which existed between kinsmen and neighbours" (Godelier, 1974:64).

The patrimony of the ayllu included in addition to its lands, gold, silver and copper mines, aqueducts, bridges and roads. Labour was required as a public service to construct and repair the irrigation works and roads. Each man had to work in turns, mitas, in the agricultural and in the service sectors. Workers were organized according to the quarters of the village in which they lived, the men of each quarter constituting a group called a chunca which was assigned specific tasks (Castro Pozo, 1963).

Under the indigenous civilizations each ayllu or group of
avllus formed a governmental unit (curacazgo) ruled by a curaca. There was no uniformity of the curacas' rights and duties, and this office varied considerably in its power and responsibility depending on whether the chief ruled a few settlements in a small valley or an entire kingdom like Chimu. The curaca had the same usufructory rights to land as other members of the avllu, but in addition had access to a variety of services from households and craftsmen, such as farming, weaving, herding, house-building and hauling. The curaca was also in charge of civil, political and administrative matters. The distribution of the lands of the avllu, the division of water resources, the arbitration of disputes and the punishment of crimes against the group all fell to him. In these cases he consulted elders and friends, though it is possible that some kind of communal assembly existed, whereby he conferred with all the members of the community (Castro Pozo, 1963).

The avllu remained the basic unit of socio-economic organization under the Inca Empire, though in its incorporation into the state it lost its autonomy, and the power of the curaca was curtailed. Though leadership of the avlus was still selected along kinship lines, and later confirmed by community members, it was only once the sanction of the Inca had been received that a new curaca formally assumed office. A local governor or representative of the Inca actually confirmed the position. Though some of the privileges of the curacas were lost, such as the initiation of warfare, documentary evidence suggests that there was no immediate change in their rank and status (Murra, 1961). However, a curaca could be removed for serious offences against the state, such as disregarding orders from an Inca governor, attempted rebellion, neglect in the collection and forwarding of crops raised on state lands, or for exacting more than
the customary labour services from the peasants. The powers of
the curaca were also curtailed in judicial matters and officials
from Cuzco frequently intervened, confirming decisions or acting on
appeal and deciding the punishment for different offences.

Property rights in land were now invested in the Inca emperor,
the Sun god, the curacas and the ayllus themselves. Each member of
the ayllu still enjoyed sufficient land for his needs and the trad­
itional cultivation of land and pasturing of flocks continued.
However, some industry was carried out in workshops rather than on
a craft basis in the home, such as the weaving of cloth, and this
specialization in manufacture brought about a division of labour
between villages. Consequently, some ayllus specialized in gold and
silver metallurgy, others in the production of ceramics, artifacts
or in herding or fishing. Barter exchanges between individuals took
place at fixed places which became the sites for markets and fairs.
Trade on such a scale required a standard of value, such as salt,
red pepper or coca, and instruments such as the huarcau (scales) to
give a standard measurement of weight, volume and size (Castro Pozo,
1963). An organized system for the storage of grains, tubers, fibres
and hides also developed. The goods kept in these public storehouses,
tambus, were distributed to those who needed them.

The model for the state revenues was that of the revenues of
the curaca (Murra, 1961). No contributions were made in kind, but
in time or in labour. The mita, or obligation to perform public
work, was rigorously imposed where the services were for the empire,
which consequently had vast contingents of men at its disposal.
State labour was directed towards the construction and improvement of
acqueducts, bridges, roads, temples and fortresses, much as it had
been prior to the conquest. However, the imperialist policies of
the state also required men to fight its wars of conquest. Neverthe­less, the reciprocal obligations attached to the mita continued; the state provided the work parties with tools and seeds, good and drink, and the workers were encouraged to sing and play musical instruments as they had done under the previous civilizations. Thus the previous forms of economic reciprocity and the ideology and ritual which corresponded to them now served the functioning of the direct relations of production and economic servitude (Godelier, 1974:66).

This was also a period of population increase, and groups of mitmaq (settlers) were frequently transferred from one site to another for strategic purposes or in order to exploit the agricultural or mineral potential of particular environments. A form of slavery, yanaconaje, was also introduced. The yanae were full-time servants or retainers assigned to the curacas or to the care of shrines to the Sun or to local deities.

On the eve of the Spanish Conquest, then, a centralized state had been established, which through its administrative machine was able to control its subject populations both directly and indirectly. Ideologically, it had established the cult of the Inca throughout its territory, and it was able to appropriate a surplus sufficient to support an army capable of putting down uprisings and independence movements.

The Colonial Period.

The Spanish conquest of Peru was undertaken by means of a contract between Pizarro and his group of conquistadors, operating on a free enterprise basis, and the Spanish Crown. The conquest group left Panama for Peru in 1531. Pizarro was appointed governor
and captain general of the colony and was conceded the right to allot lands (repartimiento), appportion Indians (comienda) and appoint public officials in his territory. All lands by means of the Conquest became property of the Royal Crown of Spain, which subsequently had the right to issue property titles to individuals. Ordinances issued between 1513 and 1596 by the Kings of Spain recognized in principle the property rights of the Indians, but in practice were more concerned with the organization of new towns and repartimientos. The rural properties belonging to the cult of the Sun and to the Inca emperor, and the yanconas who lived on them were the first objects of the division, reparto. The policy of colonization is made clear in a royal decree of May 1534, which is essentially a homestead policy:

"..... for the present (time) I give you full faculty to allot to persons who are of the Conquest (expedition) and the present population of the said province, as well as to those who go to live there in the future, towns plots on which they can establish houses and gardens, and peonías and caballerías which they can work and sow, following the order and moderation that we have commanded to be followed on similar allotments, (and if) the citizens to whom you thus apportion them reside on them the five years which they are obliged to, we will make a grant of them and allow (the citizens) to own them just as the residents of our Indes own and may own the caballerías and (other) properties and house plots that were allotted to them at our command and commission".


In actuality, the conquistadors did not want land and were more interested in exploiting the rich mineral wealth that was known to exist in the country, for which they needed labour. This was obtained

1. Peonía - plot of land of a stipulated size granted to a foot soldier (peon).

Caballería - plot of land granted to a gentleman, (caballero).
through concessions of jurisdicctional rights over segments of the Indian population, available under the *encomienda* system.

The *encomienda* was a political and administrative unit. It was not a land grant, but constituted the right to receive tribute from the Indians in money, kind or services (Larson & Bergmen, 1969). In return, the *encomendero* was charged with the instruction of the Indians in catholicism and with their protection. This institution sought to limit the autonomy of the military entrepreneurs by converting them into town dwellers, not directly involved with the process of production at the community level. It also facilitated the assimilation of the "infidels" into the *hispanic* culture as a subordinate stratum.

The *encomienda* and the *repartimiento* both represented to the conquistadors a means of acquiring a *señorio* or feudal fief, which would give them a degree of autonomy from the centralized authority of the Crown (C.I.D.A., 1966). A running battle was waged by champions of the Indian cause, such as Padre Bartolomé de las Casas, to abolish the *encomienda*, though in Peru it was permitted to continue longer than in the other colonies, probably as an incentive to new settlers. It was this concern with the welfare of the Indians, coupled with a desire to limit the autonomy of the Spanish settlers that prompted the promulgation of the New Laws of the Indies in 1542-3. This stipulated that the natives were free persons and subjects of the Crown who could not be forced to work against their will. All illegal *encomiendas* were to be returned to royal control, as well as those belonging to religious orders and government officials. No new *encomiendas* were to be awarded and all existent legal *encomiendas* were to be returned to the Crown on the death of the incumbent (C.I.D.A., 1966).
It was in order to enforce these regulations that Viceroy Toledo was appointed in 1569. He placed all encomenderos under his supervision and ordered that all Indians not previously assigned to some Spanish administrator should be placed in controlled villages, reducciones, for the purpose of indoctrination. In fact this cloaked an attitude towards the natives which considered them as objects to be appropriated or instruments with which to achieve economic ends (Castro Pozo, 1963). The conquerors wanted to place these populations in accessible locations near farms and mines, and, in the guise of aiding them and instructing them, their reduction (reducción) was ordered. They were compelled to abandon the villages located on their marcas and were moved to the flat, open sites selected by the conquerors. The inhabitants of two or three ayllus were often reduced to one new settlement.

These new settlements were created without reference to native agricultural practices or land use. Traditional agriculture was adapted to the irregular topography of the Andes and so, in bringing together arbitrary groups of individuals, native flocks were left untended, and crops and irrigation works abandoned. Thus through erosion and negligence native land systems deteriorated or reverted to forest. In other instances, where the ayllus were furthest from their marcas, the colonizers laid claim to the vacated lands.

The Indians continued to pay royal tribute and were also subject to labour draft, mita, for work in the mines and weaving factories, obrasjes. But whereas under the Inca regime all the workers' necessities had been provided, under the Spanish conquerors, the native populations were placed in a form of virtual slavery, debt-peonage. They were paid wages, but deductions were made from them to the King, the mayors and other officials, and so the
Indian was in a permanent state of indebtedness and unable to escape his labour obligations because of it.

The Spanish colonization of Peru represented a systematic attack on the lands of the ayllus. In the first instance, the lands of the Inca and the Sun had been divided among the conquerors, (repartimientos) and although the lands still belonging to the ayllus had been entrusted to (encomendados) or divided among (repartidos), the Spaniards, these both tended to become the private property of individual colonizers, despite all the laws prohibiting this. Land was expropriated by legal ploys and land grants as well as by surreptitious usurpations. Laws of Composition (Composición) legalized this despoilation of the ayllus and created a system whereby the native populations could buy back their land from the Crown if those who had seized it had not been in possession of it for more than ten years.

During the colonial period, two distinctive forms of agrarian organisation and exploitation had begun to evolve: on the one hand, a system of large estates controlled by the Spaniards, the haciendas, had arisen in the 16th and 17th centuries out of the need to supply the mines with labour, provisions, hides and beasts of burden, while "free" Indian communities continued to exist, though in somewhat modified form. On the haciendas there were a variety of quasi-servile relations of production involving different kinds of debt-peonage and tenure arrangements, such as colonato, yanacona, gente propia. The landlord would be the sole legal authority on his land. The "free" communities were subjected to the conquerors in other ways (Piel, 1970). A political frame-work, the corregimientos was set up for the economic exploitation of the Indians, with a nominal responsibility for their well-being. This was a system of administrative
regions whose head, the corregidor, collected taxes, protected the Indians from illegal exactions and provided for their material and moral welfare. Furthermore, he had an exclusive right to trade with them, being buyer, seller, employer and legal judge for them. This relative autonomy of the corregidor was open to abuse and constituted the main sources of grievance behind early peasant rebellions (Piel, 1970). The rebellion of Tupac Amaru in Southern Peru in 1780 was against taxation levies set up under this system. Thus, the hacienda system and the corregimiento brought about a creation of a monopoly of political and economic power in the countryside, the formation of alliances amongst the local landed elites and the dependence of the Indians on their exploiters.

At the same time, it is worth noting that although the colonization of Peru was urban-centred, the cities did not grow up as centres for commerce and industry, but as instruments of domination of the Indians on the peripheries of the towns and in the countryside (Larson and Bergman, 1969). The fragmentation of power into the de facto jurisdictions gained by each hacendado on his estate brought about (in the rural towns), economic stagnation and the autonomy of the local elites. Ford (1953) puts this failure to develop a colony of prosperous, middle class agriculturalists down to the fact that the early conquistadors were adventurers and fortune-seekers who had had little status in Spain, and that it was social status, not a modest livelihood that they were seeking in the New World. Moreover, the great quantities of mineral wealth in Peru promised the making of a quick wealth through mining, and for this cheap native labour was required.

The failure of a dynamic bourgeoisie to emerge in the colony was itself a reflection of the state of industrial underdevelopment in
Spain at that time. There was a greater concern with a primitive accumulation of capital and luxury goods than with commercial and industrial expansion. Consequently, the towns did not act as centres of change and commercial diffusion but were stagnant and parasitic, serving rather as centres of political control (Larson and Bergman, 1969).

To summarize, the dissolution of the Inca civilization by the Spanish conquest brought the disruption of native social systems: the Iniards became the victims of disease, overwork and starvation through the dislocations to their agricultural systems; many fled to the south and to the east, while others fled to the reducciones to live as gratuitous labourers (yanaconas). In many cases, the conditions on private haciendas were less arduous, where they were at least free from the extortions and oppression of petty officials. A process of concentration of property ownership had occurred to the detriment of the Indians and the poorer and landless Spaniards. Though attempts had been made by the government to protect the Indians' lands, their theft was tacitly condoned by the extension of land grants to individuals and the payment of composition fees.

The Republican Period.

Peruvian Independence was declared by San Martin in 1823 after fifteen years of uninterrupted warfare, in which the Indians had borne the burden of providing food and horses for the army, and had been heavily taxed to provide military equipment (Piel, 1970). From the outset, the new state was greatly indebted to European, particularly English merchants, and, due to the devastations of the war, had little revenue with which to repay them: the mines and the plantations had run down and the sectors of agriculture producing for
the export market were in a crisis. Land was consequently the only source of wealth and basis for capital formation in the country. To this end, the land was freed from judicial constraints by decree.

While the war of Emancipation was still in progress San Martin had issued several decrees (1821) proclaiming the Indians to be full citizens of the new state. Personal tribute and involuntary servitude were specifically abolished - in principle. In 1824, it was decreed that all lands except those occupied by the Indians were to be offered for sale, and that the lands of the reducciones and the Indian communities were to be distributed amongst the occupants as private property. The communal lands were to become a part of the public domain or to come under private ownership, thus assisting the economic recovery of the country. The "creole" state created in this way a source of landed wealth which, lacking other capital, could be used to reward its supporters with concessions and gifts of land.

Behind this legislation was the intent to create from the Indian peasantry a class of independent smallholders, who would contribute towards the end of the political and legal domination of the countryside by the metropolis. As with the freeing of the Indians on the haciendas from the obligation of performing gratuitous services, this was based on the misplaced assumption that their transactions would involve active participation in the money economy, which at that time did not extend to the sierra. The legislation misfired disastrously, and the despoilation of the Indian lands became so excessive that in 1828 and 1830 missives were sent to local authorities instructing them to limit the redistributions and attempting to ensure that the contracting Indians at least knew how to read and write (Fiel, 1970).
At this time there was a growth in the political power of new social groups, notably those who had supported the campaigns for liberation, and were rewarded for it when the lands of the supporters of the Crown were confiscated. The political and economic power of these groups was based on landholding and this accumulation of land was aided by the fact that the Indian lands were no longer protected as they had been under Spanish law. Though the laws concerning Indian lands were violated by the orígenes (elite of European descent), the Indians frequently sold the same private property many times over or sold away their communal lands. Thus considerable confusion exists over present-day boundaries, which has laid the seeds for disputes between landlords and Indians as well as amongst the Indians themselves. The result of this was the increasing concentration of lands under the hacienda system. Indigenous communities persisted, but their communal lands in particular were encroached on by the hacendados, the Church and the mining companies. The Indians made attempts to fight their cases against these institutions, but in most instances lost their lands.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, Peru became increasingly involved in the international capitalist economy. Despite attempts to create a national Peruvian market among Indian smallholders by protection from outside by tariffs, and a policy of free trade within the country, neither the economic situation nor the state of development of the social structure permitted this. Instead the neo-colonial elite would experience periods of prosperity and investment according to world trade fluctuations. When conditions were favourable they indulged in speculative latifundism, and when unfavourable, would turn to compradorismo, the buying up, at low prices, of surpluses produced by smallholders, who would otherwise be outside the market economy (Piel, 1970). This can be seen, for example, in
the wool exports from the sierra, produced by both the haciendas and the peasants themselves, whose surplus of wool was either levied as rent by the hacendado, or sold direct to commercial agents.

From this period on, agriculture on the coast and in the sierra began to evolve in distinct forms. The sierra was characterized by extensive cattle breeding, a low yield activity requiring relatively little capital investment. Peasant villages were also penetrated by the market economy, wool, leather and skins being sent to export houses in Lima and Arequipa. By 1866 the contradictions induced by the capitalist penetration of agriculture came to a head in the Indian uprisings in Puno, led by Juan Bustamenta (Piel, 1970). Agriculture on the coast was in decline after the War of Independence until capital became available for investment. In 1840 the exploitation of guano deposits on the coast had begun, but since most of the profits went to the agents of British companies there was insufficient capital accumulation to have an effect on agriculture. However, by the 1860's agricultural mechanisation was being introduced, and a new and wealthy bourgeoisie was emerging, having profited from the guano trade. Plantation agriculture experienced a boom period from 1866 - 1876, with the aid of the indemnities received from the state for the emancipation of negro slaves, and a profitable system of debt-bondage, involving Chinese coolie labour. As a result of the war of Secession in the United States and the consequent dislocation of the Southern cotton economy, Peruvian agriculture on the coast was able to enjoy a cotton boom, and French and British capital and technical investments enabled the large scale production of sugar cane. With the modernization and mechanization of agricultural production, came also the expansion of property and the subsequent expulsion of yanaconas and colonos from their rented and usufruct plots, and the Indian
communities from their irrigated lands. Thus the Indians, Chinese and mulattos were turned into a landless proletariat, and savage conflicts between ethnic minority groups ensued.

By the end of the 1870's, there was a financial collapse, and Peru and Chile became involved in a dispute, provoked largely by European financial interests over areas containing saltpetre and guano. Apart from the destruction that the War of the Pacific caused to the countryside, it provoked major Indian uprisings as the contradictions induced by the penetration of the rural economy by market relations were deepened (Piel, 1970). In 1886 the revolt of Ataspura in the Callejón de Huaylas was used by General Caceres against President Iglesias. Between 1890 and 1896, in Huanta, Ayacucho, 2,000 Indians rose up against the salt tax, and assasinated the prefect in a vendetta. It took some 800 soldiers several months to finally put down this rebellion. Furthermore, there were conflicts in the Northern and Central Sierra, which suggest that the peasants interpreted the war with Chile as a war against the haciendas (Hobsbawn, 1974; Smith and Cano, 1974, f/c).

In this situation of economic and political instability, the great landed estates were making an unprecedented assault on the last of the Indian lands and the smaller haciendas on the coast. Klaren (1973) documents the process of foreign intrusion and consolidation of property which took place on the coastal plantations, which continued well into the twentieth century, the most notable cases being those of the sugar empires of the Gildemeister and Grace companies. (c.f., the C.I.D.A. report, on the expansion of the Cerro de Pasco company in the sierra). In the Andes, the numbers of smaller haciendas increased considerably from the last decades of the nineteenth to the early twentieth century (Chevalier, 1966). Many of the Indians,
Driven by scarcity of land, were contracted into a form of debt-bondage, enganche, to work on the coastal plantations by agents from the coast operating in the sierra. The concentration of sugar workers in wage-based economy under oppressive conditions of work, created an environment predisposed to the outbreak of labour unrest, which erupted, violently, in the first decades of the twentieth century. It was not until the outbreak of war in Europe and the ensuing outbacks in the production of foodstaples to make way for greater profits from yet another sugar boom, that the modern unions began to take shape.

Throughout the present century there has been an increasing investment of foreign capital into basic transportation and productive industries. This has had the double effect of opening up the sierra, economically, and has also introduced sanitation and medical facilities. The resultant increase in population - roughly 50 per cent between 1900 and 1950, has exacerbated the shortage of land and the fractionalisation of landholdings at a time when the haciendas were turning to extensive sheep and cattle ranching, and thus cutting their labour demands. Consequently, there has been a strong stimulus for the peasants to migrate to the pockets of modernisation in the sierra, such as the copper complex at La Oroya, and to coastal plantations and cities.

The Present Situation.¹

The Peruvian agrarian structure is highly complex and is currently undergoing a process of increasing socio-economic differentiation as

¹. By "the present situation", I mean the situation up until the military government's land reform policy of 1969-70. As yet there is relatively little information on the results of the reorganisation of agricultural landholding.
villages are drawn into production for the market and peasants make
use of labour opportunities outside the local social system.
Broadly speaking, two main patterns of social organization can be
distinguished: that of the hacienda system and that of the small-
holding peasant communities. The former is based on the control by
a landholder (or by an administrator on behalf of an individual or an
institution) of large extensions of land which are worked by a resident
population. This usually involves the exchange of a stipulated number
of days labour for the hacienda in return for usufruct rights to a
plot of land. The communities, on the other hand, are based on
individual freehold rights to land, though much of their communal
pasture land may have been usurped by neighbouring haciendas or their
agricultural land taken over by the Church. The villagers may supple-
ment their livelihood from agriculture by working for these instit-
utions. Thus, in both systems, contradictions may arise in the
relationships between those who control the land and those who
actually make use of it through their labour.

No rigid system of social stratification has been built up in
the villages. Differences in the control of economic resources have
not resulted in certain family groups retaining a dominant economic
position within villages. Rather, there have always existed oppor-
tunities for building up resources by migration and by hard work.
Nor has there been any consistent practice of marrying into families
of similar land resources (Roberts, 1973).

In Peru, economic opportunities were opened up in two main ways
with the development of an economy geared towards the export of
minerals and tropical agricultural produce. In the Central Sierra
a market for agricultural produce was created by proximity to mining
centres, and, indirectly, in the coastal cities as the coastal lands
were converted to the production of export crops. Moreover, pay in the mines and on the coastal plantations was relatively high compared to what could be obtained through farming alone. The types of opportunities available to peasants, together with the traditions of mutual aid between kinsmen and neighbours has meant that migrants could leave their families in the villages on a temporary basis and eventually return to settle there. Consequently, ties to the village tended to be reinforced and, in the sierra, there was relatively little development of a landless proletariat.

These changes have resulted in the emergence of new social groupings within the villages which have different interests and economic rationales. However, they all have an interest in improving their economic opportunities, and haciendas and Church properties, especially when these are inefficiently farmed, are often seen as a bar to peasant activities. Hence strategies are organized on a village basis on behalf of different interest groups.

The political structure of Peru has not been characterized historically by a high degree of centralized control, nor by a well organized and articulated bureaucratic structure. The very size and topography of the country, the civil and foreign wars has allowed for the development of considerable regional autonomy. In their pursuit of economic opportunities peasants have lobbied courts and governmental offices for the settlement of local issues, often by-passing ineffective provincial offices and approaching directly the politicians and governmental offices in Lima. Formerly, the local elites tried to actively maintain this regional autonomy, but their power has now been debilitated vis-a-vis the emerging sectors of the commercial bourgeoisie and an agricultural elite based on the commercial, coastal plantations. The traditional elite of the sierra are not involved in a capital-
intensive agriculture and hence are viewed as an impediment to national economic development by the more commercially-oriented elites of the cities and the coast. Consequently, governmental authorities have not automatically favoured the landholders when claims against them were brought to offices in Lima, and individual requests made by groups of peasants have been evaluated on their own merit.

The development of the Peruvian agrarian structure has created ambiguities in boundary arrangements and conflicting claims to land based on different concepts of an individual's or a group's rights to the use of land. Moreover, inefficient land use on the part of large landholders is seen as wasteful by peasant villagers. In their strategies to improve their economic opportunities peasants have been manipulating these ambiguities, and have drawn on the support of political personalities and national institutions to further their interests in the local level arena of relationships.
CHAPTER 3.

PEASANT ACTIVITIES - A SOCIAL MOVEMENT INTERPRETATION.

If peasant protest is understood as a response to the impact of socio-economic change in the wider society, then the starting point of analysis must be with the peasant society itself and the way it is related to the wider system. In this chapter I look at the structural relationships of peasants with outsiders or other critically placed individuals who control transactions between the local and wider system, and thus perform the important role of communicating information from one level to another. I consider how "information theory" has attempted to explain peasant movements as a response to economic and social development. This is an approach explicitly linked to "modernization" theories of social change whereby the characteristics of "traditional" and "modern" societies are abstracted and juxtaposed, as marking the beginning and the end of a sequence of development. "Social movements" are considered as part of the process of adjustment and integration as economic and cultural change is diffused to the villages from the centres of modernization in the cities and the developed world. Consequently, we are here concerned with an explanation of the ways in which the so-called "traditional" society takes on the attributes of a modern society and culture.

The inadequacies of "information theory" become apparent when the a priori assumptions of the "modernization" approach to social change are investigated. It is presumed that "modernization" is a universal process, yet the model is taken from European societies.

1. This systems approach has been used by Cotler (1969), LaMond-Tullis (1970), Weldon (1968), Craik (1967), and Albertini (1970).
whose precapitalist social structure was "traditional". In contrast, social structures in the Third World have long been penetrated by capitalist relations produced by the industrial expansion of the Western World, and which have thus caused the underdevelopment of their traditional societies. (Frank, 1969). Definitions of "modernization" as, for example, "the process towards those types of social, economic and political systems that have developed in Western Europe, and North America" (Eisenstadt, 1966:1) are ethnocentric and take a particular historical experience as the ideal against which developing countries can be studied in terms of shortfall from the norm. (Bernstein, 1970:147), The ideal-typical dichotomies of the characteristics of "traditional" and "modern" societies are thus not only simplistic, but also present a negative emphasis on the "obstacles" to development. The theory as a whole is related to structural-functional assumptions about social organization, which exclude the possibility of internally generated change, and hence give precedence to the role of "modernizing elites" and charismatic intellectuals in bringing about change from the outside. Consequently, "social movements" are perceived as disturbances in the social structure marking movement towards a new level of equilibrium, namely a functionally integrated national political system on the Western model.

Peasant Society as a "Part Society".

Peasant society has long been recognised as a "part" culture. Kroeber wrote in 1948 that "peasants are definitely rural, yet they

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1. For example, Hoselitz (1969) characterises developed countries as exhibiting pattern variables of universalism, achievement orientation and functional specificity, and under-developed ones as exhibiting their opposites - particularism, ascription and functional differences. Frank (1971) demonstrates that the developed countries are only normatively universalist, and that in practice they reveal substantial particularism. Frankenberg (1969) has fully argued the case for regarding these ideal types as a morphological, not developmental continuum.
live in relation to market towns. They form a class segment of a wider stratificatory system, within which they are far from being the dominant group. They lack the isolation, political autonomy and self-sufficiency of tribal populations, yet their local units retain much of their old identity, integration and attachment to soil and cult, to parochial custom and folk art". (284). Geertz (1961) discusses the ways in which various studies have illustrated and examined the fractional, incomplete nature of peasant society in the cultural, occupational and jural spheres. While Redfield (1956) for example, stresses the distinctive cultural status of peasants in relation to the "great tradition" of the gentry, Steward (1955) and Wolf (1955) emphasize the occupational aspects of this category "peasant", the main axis of contrast being between the agricultural producer and the overlord. Wittfogel (1957) in turn, emphasizes the patterns of political domination, links to the outside world being traced through political obligations to the lord, the bureaucrat, the priest or the king, relationships which are usually implicit in the system of tenure by which the peasant gains access to land. However, there is a common focus of interest on towns as the cultural and economic centres through which connections are made between different regions, classes and groups, thereby integrating the otherwise dispersed sectors of the peasantry into an identifiable wider system (Mintz, 1960).

Various techniques have been developed to investigate this relationship between the peasant society and the wider system of which it is a part. For instance, central place theory (Lösch, 1954, Haggett, 1965) looks at the hierarchical arrangement of settlements and the linkages that develop between villages, towns and cities to take advantage of the economies of scale resulting from the agglomeration of human activities at a focal point. Alternatively, and possibly complementary to this, dependency theory conceptualizes these relationships
in terms of a chain of satellite-metropolis relationships linking even the most remote rural community to the world capitalist system through a series of unequal exchanges between countryside and town, town and colonial city, colonial city and world metropolis (Frank, 1969).

However, for the analysis of social and political relationships, I believe it is more significant to look at the ways that the different systems are interrelated by focussing on individuals acting as brokers or middlemen. These brokers may mediate political, economic or cultural relations connecting the local level with the wider system. Boissevain (1974) defines a broker as "a professional manipulator of people and information who brings about communication for profit. He thus occupies a strategic place in a network of social relations viewed as a communications network". (48). Boissevain makes a further distinction between "patrons" and "brokers". The patron disposes of or manipulates "first order resources" such as land, jobs, scholarship funds or specialized knowledge which he controls directly. The broker, on the other hand, manipulates "second order resources", which are strategic contacts with people who control the aforementioned resources directly or who have access to persons that do. From this it is evident that the power of individuals acting as brokers is derived from their ability to manipulate resources directly within the local level system as well as from their control of access to individuals and resources outside this system. Moreover, the broker's access to the wider society has two aspects; firstly his ability to make use of direct personal contacts with other influential individuals, for example, politicians, doctors and lawyers; and secondly, his capacity to operate in a context of impersonal bureaucracies and national institutions. In contrast, peasants are often characterized as being incapable of dealing with relationships which are not face-to-face
and guided by particularistic values and norms (see footnote on p.46). In Peru, their lack of education and frequent inability to speak anything other than the native languages, Quechua and Aymara mean that they are dependent on a broker for nearly all dealings in the external cultural context. Thus a broker's operations may connect economic, political or cultural gaps between the local and the national society.

In any political system where there is devolution of authority there will be an individual performing the brokerage role, acting as a buffer between the community and the wider society. Even at the tribal level, we find that the village headman is the personality in whom both the domestic-kinship system and the tribal political organisation intersect (Gluckman, Barnes and Mitchell, 1942). He must be a symbol of community consensus and represent its dealings with other political units. At the same time, he is responsible to a higher political authority and will be required to perform tasks delegated to him from above. With the imposition of colonial rule he is incorporated into an additional level of political organisation, assuming new roles, responsibilities and functions. In a complex society, the tension between the community and the wider unit is intensified, as the broker becomes involved in overlapping, often conflicting cultural systems. Gluckman (Swartz, Ed., 1969) has called this an "intercalary" or "interhierarchical" role. It is a situation in which "administrative levels of social relations, organised in their own hierarchies gear into each other ..." and where "distinct subhierarchies .... within a total hierarchy meet in one person, who is the lowest member of the superior hierarchy and the highest of the subordinate hierarchy" (71). In the situation Gluckman describes, the superimposition of a national political system on tribal political organisation, the two hierarchies represent totally different values systems, with diametrically opposed methods of dealing with the administration of political affairs.
In Peru, as I have already indicated, colonial policy was directed towards the incorporation of the native populations into the state unit, not just through investing traditional leaders with new functions but mainly through the assignment of native communities to the protection of the Spanish colonizers. Thus, owing to the relative isolation of these populations, it was possible to isolate the Indians culturally as well as to tie them in relatively deprived relationships to those who controlled the means of production or who had the right to exact tribute from them. Furthermore, it was possible for the colonizers to exercise almost complete autonomy in the countryside, with little compulsion to carry out national reformist legislation at the local level. There was no way of enforcing laws to improve or protect the lot of the Indians, since the political authorities at the regional level were often the same individuals whose power came from control of the land.

Accepting Wolf's definition of brokers as "those who stand guard over the critical junctures and synapses of relationships that connect the local system to the larger whole" (1956:1075), I would follow Silverman (1965) in emphasizing the following points: firstly, that the junctures are "critical" in that they are of direct importance to the basic structures of either or both systems; Secondly, that the brokers do indeed "guard" these functions, insofar as the number of mediator statuses is limited. Although relations of domination and patronage exist in every social structure, a monopoly of channels of access to the wider social system by an individual or group of individuals, would seem to be possible only at certain levels of technological and societal development. Hence, we are led to consider how external socio-economic change affects the content and form of brokerage relationships.
There are basically three ways in which socio-economic change in the wider society is manifested in the brokerage role: firstly, the content of the role can change, as for instance with Silverman's (1965) Italian patrons who became incorporated into the bureaucratic structure of the new Italian state and accordingly, were able to perform new functions for their clients as the state increasingly impinged on their activities; similarly the Javanese religious teacher, the kijaji, studied by Geertz (1960) could take on the somewhat contradictory role as exponent of secular education and nationalism, by virtue of his traditional and highly respected role in the villages; secondly, the group performing the brokerage role can change. Wolf (1956) maintains that a characteristic of Mexican society is the formation of cliques monopolizing channels of economic and political advancement. These types of changes can not really be considered as structural change, but rather as changes in limited aspects of the social structure. Heath, (Strickon and Greenfield, Eds., 1972) has argued that in the Yungas region of Bolivia, the imposition of a syndicate structure and land reform from above after the 1953 revolution did little to change the existing structure of clientage relations. The former small-time hacendados simply became middlemen, buying and reselling the peasants' produce, something the peasants themselves were unable to do due to their lack of contacts and experience. Furthermore, peasants were assimilated into a syndicate structure which provided them with new channels of access to political resources, but these relationships were mediated by syndicate officials who were outsiders and so the old patterns of clientage were perpetuated.

"Modernization" can properly be considered as the changing of the relationship between the part society and the whole. As the part society becomes increasingly incorporated into national life through
improved transport and communications media, widespread literacy and the participation of nation-oriented groups such as doctors, lawyers and teachers in life at the local level, the broker loses his exclusive control of relationships with the outside. His interpretation of events in the national political arena no longer moulds that of the peasants, who increasingly turn to horizontal linkages with similar interest groups to speak for them in the political bargaining process. We are here concerned, then, with the changing patterns of domination of the peasants by the brokers, the "traditional" form being characterized by an almost monopolistic domination by a single individual or group, the more "modern" form by more diffuse patterns of relationships.

Patterns of Domination and Social Change.

If we look closely at the Peruvian agrarian structure, brokerage roles can be ascribed to hacendados, mestizo middlemen, and in the case of the indigenous communities administrators such as the alcalde (mayor and leading district authority) and gobernadores (district officer responsible for law and order). Cotler (1969), Alberti (1970), and Lamond-Tullis (1970) have found it useful to characterize this relationship by use of a diagram, the "triangle without a base".

Figure 1. The Triangle Without a Base (Tullis: 1970:42).

Accordingly, the lack of the horizontal line signifies that the group of peasants finds itself in a situation of atomization in which conflict relationships prevail and there are strong feelings of suspicion, rather than a tendency to cooperation and organization.
landlord or middleman is more favourably connected to significant sectors of the national and regional power structure than the peasants who must go through the broker in their external relationships. This latter, in his position of patron, is the unique interpreter and monopolistic intermediary between the peasants and the external world.

Figure 2. The Completed Triangle (Tullis: 1970:43).

In the second diagram new alternatives are opened up such as the possibility of working for a state programme such as the construction of highways, temporary work in the coastal plantations or in the mining centres, contact with urban political parties, syndicates and students, general exposure to mass communications media and contact with more modernized areas. These new alternatives undermine the value and normative aspects of the dependent relationship and introduce the first changes in the patron-client relationship. This represents the beginning of an attempt to close the base of the triangle through the recognition of common interests, in order to confront the patron with a demand for substantial changes in the exchange relation. This can vary from the sending of representatives to national offices in Lima asking for the intervention of officials in the peasants' favour, to the stoppage of work in the fields and the invasion of land. A further factor is the debilitation of the power of the patron at the regional and national levels of society.

As an ideal model, this represents concisely the structural relationship between the peasants and their exploiters. However,
the degree of oversimplification of social relations implied in the model of the "triangle without a base" undermines its analytical usefulness. The main criticism is that it neglects the relations of domination and exploitation among the peasants themselves. Since any individual is involved in a variety of work arrangements, he can be both exploiter and exploited at the same time. The presence of different modes of production side by side means that the peasants are not kept divided amongst themselves purely by the machinations of the hacendado, but by differential access to resources, the ability to manipulate kinship and other systems of relations.

Moreover, the model fails to take into account different social structures and different land tenure arrangements. For example, the work arrangements on a hacienda are often complex, and the tenure arrangements involve a variety of different statuses and tenure arrangements. Huizer (1973) noted the following as typical of haciendas in the La Convencion region. The landlord was an absentee, leaving a group of blanco (white) administrators to act as a buffer between the peasants and himself, and take care of the supervision of work. From among the peasants, foremen would be chosen to supervise smaller work parties. Tenants (arrendaires), occupied idle lands in return for working between five and fifteen days a month on the hacendado's land, and would perform tasks, such as acting as night watchmen over crops, taking produce to market, performing household tasks. Often part of the arrendaire's plot would be leased out to an allegado (sub-tenant) who would help with the fulfillment of gratuitous labour services for public works. The allegado, in turn, might have attached to him manual labourers bound by various tenancy and sub-tenancy agreements (for example, habilitados, agregados, manipures, terms which all denote slightly different obligations and tasks). This pattern is found
throughout the Andean zone (c.f. Barnes de Marschall, 1970, on the regions of Chuquisaca and Potosí in Bolivia), though it varies considerably in structure and content of obligations from one region to another.

There is also a tendency to restrict analysis to haciendas, thus excluding a consideration of the political activities of the communities. In colonial times they were also obliged to render personal services and public works at the request of the colonial officials. In the present day, the communities are internally stratified as a result of parcelization through inheritance, and differential use of communal pasture lands. Moreover, within the haciendas and communities there are prestigious offices such as that of the mayordomo and mayorales, associated with the sponsoring of fiestas on Saint's days. Nor are internal relationships quite so conflictive and atomistic as the "triangle without a base" suggests. Communal work parties (faenas) are held for the benefit of the settlement as a whole, and individual peasants enter labour exchange agreements (minka or minga).

A further problem with this model is that it overstresses the isolation of the peasants. It would seem empirically probable that kinship and affinal ties could be traced to neighbouring settlements, and that the movements of traders and peasant pilgrims visiting shrines would similarly keep peasants in touch with events and the general political climate of the wider society. Since in Peru small-holding communities and haciendas are often found in the same localities, it is not for lack of alternative models of organization that peasants fail to mobilize until migrants return with experience in the mines and cities in other parts of the country. Furthermore, rather than enlightening peasants to new opportunities available to them, it is just as likely that the interests of the migrants would conflict with
those of individuals who were still able to support themselves in agriculture. This model also fails to show the coalition of landlords and other members of mestizo society at the local level.

Having discussed the merits and limitations of Cotler's model, it needs to be pointed out that it is essentially descriptive and ideal-typical rather than analytical. It simply depicts two extremes of a continuum. The "closing of the base of the triangle" is brought about by the occurrence of a "solidarity movement", which is the process whereby the system moves from one stage to another.

Information Theory.

The most frequent form of theory used to account for the development of peasant organizations is information theory, which has been utilized in varying ways by Lamond-Tullis (1970), Cotler (1969) and Wesley Craig (1967). This in turn is closely related to the theory of collective behaviour, as propounded by Smelser (1962) which considers social movements to be one of many disturbances reflecting lack of adaptation to change. This transitional stage between traditional and modern societies is viewed as anomic, marking a lack of adaptation between the disintegration of the original system and a lack of adjustment between structural differentiation and reintegration. Information theory provides an explanation of the processes which allow for the accommodation of radically new "information" in relatively undifferentiated social and conceptual systems. The focus is consequently on changes in the external environment and the way in which they are interpreted and acted upon at the local level, i.e., how they affect cultural and value systems rather than relations.

In a village social system, information and symbolic structures will be relatively undifferentiated and expressed in a cultural idiom.
specific to the group concerned. "Information processing capacity" (Young, 1966) can thus be considered as the ability to understand, use and take advantage of information fragments or symbols to which the group has access. "Modernization" is interpreted as the ability to process information which transcends strictly localised symbolic nuances. This process involves participation in wider systems of relations as well as an increased specialisation of information and skills on the part of individuals. Information only achieves value by being matched to the receivers pre-existing data otherwise it is random nonsense and irrelevant. The degree to which new information is valuable is partly dependent on the amount of pre-existing information against which it can be matched, but, whereas a complex, organised system can cope with large amounts of new information, an unorganised system tends to become more unorganised.

Lamond-Tullis tries to develop a predictive model for the understanding of peasant movements, understood as expressions of solidarity. He does this in terms of the interplay of three variables: "information-processing capacity", "solidarity" and "relative centrality". 1 Actions, objects, sounds behaviour and artifacts all serve as information symbols or structures which function as norms or formulas for an entire village. For example, a school, a social club, an agricultural, transport or consumer cooperative are all symbolic representations of certain existing and rather complex "meaning structures", which have the ability to evoke meanings and imply values to the people associated with them. Through the processing of information and values, communication

1. I use Lamond-Tullis's terminology to summarise his argument. Up to a point it is useful, but in places it deteriorates into a string of rather meaningless jargon.
becomes dynamic, "as connotated by terms like strategies, policies, programs and rhetoric" (Young 1966:47). In terms of the measurement of "capacity" as Tullis understands it, it is the "number of meaning sectors that a given village or intervillage system publically discriminates, and these may be found by a count of organisations, institutions, roles and so forth: which the village discriminates". (1970:14).

"Solidarity", the second significant variable, represents the degree to which the residents of a given village tend to interpret available information and symbols in diverse or similar ways. Interpretation according to a "single-value format" indicates a high degree of solidarity and a remarkably similar perception of issues, problems and solutions. He uses the following ranking system for the measurement of solidarity:

**Solidarity ranking** (Lamond-Tullis, p.16).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Increasing Solidarity</th>
<th>Decreasing Solidarity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 - Paranoia (Only one shaft of truth in the world, and the group has it).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 - Nationalism, Communityism, brotherhoodism, and so forth.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - High morale.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 - Humdrum societies, apathetic groups.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - Dualistic societies (Negro-white, Mestizo-Indian, Modern-traditional, and so on).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 - Amoral groupism (The completely group fragmented society).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 - Secret combinations (Internal banditry, Predatory raids).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The third variable, "Relative centrality" is the relative participation of villages in the symbolic communications network of which they are a part. For some villages it may be possible to have a capacity to process complex symbol structures but be prevented from
doing so by some natural or artificial impediment, such as geographical remoteness or restraint by a landlord. Alternatively, some villages may have access to complex symbol structures but be incapable of processing them. Others may be able to freely exercise their information-processing capacity. Relative centrality, then, is the village's relative position in the wider symbolic system of which it is a part; and "high relative centrality" indicates a greater opportunity to process information and symbols commensurate with capacity. Tullis argues that a "solidarity movement" develops when there is a "structural bind", a discrepancy between information processing capacity and opportunity. When there is a high structural bind the dynamic patterns of communication (i.e. the "strategies, policies, programs and rhetoric") are liable to be intense. Peasants process symbols according to a single-value format, tending to convert this processing into visible physical energy, which results in social cohesion, a unified purpose and a willingness to work towards articulated goals. It is significant that the participants should have the perception that they are working for something within the village structure itself as well as against something outside it. Where the village is relatively subordinated, the larger society places energy blocks on the village through coercive means. Energy conversions take place when the wider society blocks or is perceived to block or suppress these conversions. In this situation a catalyst or "accelerator", such as a charismatic leader may convince the villagers that the power of the traditional rural elite may be abnegated. Energy conversions if they occur at all may reflect any of several extremes: radical or non-radical, revolutionary or non-revolutionary, violent or non-violent - the difference between an intense or a moderate movement.

The charismatic leader is supposed to act as an "information interpreter" for crucial ingoing and outgoing symbolic meanings. As
a result the entire movement processes information, derived from the symbolic structures, according to a single format which is then often articulated, reinforced and given conscious direction by the charismatic leader himself. At this stage, a single root message may become an appropriate symbol and give the movement ideological focus: for example "reivindicación" (reclamation) is the cry for the return of stolen communal lands, just as "tierra o muerte" (land or death) was the slogan of the guerilla movement of La Convención in 1963-66.

Taking these three variables into account and their appropriate developmental sequences, LeMond-Tullis sets out the following hypotheses:

I. In cases where a village displays signs of high structural bind and is highly subordinated by the national culture, energy expressions of solidarity - programs, policies, strategies and rhetoric - if they occur at all will tend to be intense.

II. In cases where a village displays signs of a structural bind but is not highly subordinated by the nation or national culture, energy expressions of solidarity - programs, policies, strategies and rhetoric - will tend to appear in moderate and non-radical forms.

III. Villages presenting conditions of high relative centrality or opportunity but low capacity will not tend to be characterised by high solidarity. Consequently, village solidarity movements generally do not develop among them.

Critical Analysis of Information Theory.

My criticism of Tullis's explanations are manifold from the theoretical as well as the methodological point of view. He often fails to define the types of activities implied by the term "peasant movement", and uses concepts such as "charismatic leadership" loosely. I also question the utility of the three variables, "information processing capacity", "solidarity" and "relative centrality" in
explaining peasants' ability to mobilize for political action. To the anthropologist certainly the scale of analysis is questionable, as well as the depth of understanding possible to obtain from studying two intervillage systems, comprising in total forty-four villages. This makes Tullis's analysis susceptible to generalizations about peasant attitudes which are not verified empirically, and his comments in the appendix (discussed later) concerning the peasants' suspicion of foreign research workers, demonstrate his failure to examine rather obvious contradictions in his conclusions.

A major shortcoming of Tullis's analysis is his failure to define the term "peasant movement". There are two distinct aspects to this; firstly, that he gives no indication of the specific types of activities different groups of peasants were involved in. They consequently fall under a general category of "social movement" which is radical, non-radical, revolutionary, non-revolutionary, violent or non-violent and so on. I would suggest that these terms represent Tullis's and other outside investigators' categorization of these activities and not categories of action which were meaningful to the peasants themselves. This is in turn related to his failure to define what he means by "peasant" except as someone who is in a subordinate position to other sectors of society. Lehman (1973) maintains that "rural social movements can not be defined without a specification of the agrarian structure in which they take place and the class alliances they imply". That is, that in ignoring the different types of economic relations and tenure arrangements that peasants are involved in, Tullis fails to recognise their implications for the kinds of economic changes the peasants are experiencing under the impact of commercialization, and for the types of activities different categories of peasant are likely to indulge in. At a very high level of generalization it is possible to ascertain that small-
holders are more likely to form production and marketing cooperatives and tenants or sharecroppers are more inclined towards strike action as a protest. However, all three categories may invade lands, but the motivating factors behind this may be different in each case, and not necessarily related to the degree of subordination they experience in reference to other sectors of society. For instance, Tullis states "revolutionary movements may only succeed when the participants are persecuted, but there is the problem of being persecuted to extinction" (1970:35). Yet smallholders, such as those of Huasicancha (case study no. 2) in the Mantaro valley were not suffering extreme domination when they invaded the lands of neighbouring hacienda Tucle. Nor was the hacienda system in the Central Sierra as a whole characterized by extreme domination as it was in the jungle region of La Convención. This by no means precluded political activity among the peasants. To me, this brings into question the validity of Tullis's initial characterization of the relationship between the peasants and the broker, as well as his concept of "structural bind".

Furthermore, the three variables that Tullis considers to be significant for the understanding of rural social movements are also of questionable analytical usefulness. I have already suggested that it is direct economic change at the local level that influences peasants' varying propensities to take political action. This is a topic I discuss in greater detail in Chapter 4. Though there are obvious grounds for considering the significance of change in cultural systems, these can not be separated from changes in other types of relations. Thus, "information-processing capacity" with its cultural emphasis fails to indicate the full implications of economic modernization at the local level and in relation to the wider system of relations.

The concept of "solidarity" on the other hand, assumes that
political action can only occur through a recognition of joint interests and like-thinking among the peasants. From a purely methodological point of view, a list of named institutions seems rather a dubious means of measuring solidarity, especially in an underdeveloped society such as Peru, where institutions often exist on paper but not in practice, or were built by an outside agency rather than through communal efforts and initiative. A simple list gives no indication as to whether they are operative. Furthermore, the notion of schools and voluntary associations being "symbols" of solidarity suggests to me the very opposite, namely that the essence of symbols lies in their multivocality (Turner, 1967), and often ambiguous or conflicting meanings. Likewise, the existence of formal groupings is a means of designating who is a member and derives the benefits, and who is not. He also assumes that the villages are far less differentiated than they in fact are. Not only are there richer and poorer peasants, landed and landless peasants, but individuals are also investing in education and small scale businesses in the cities. "Solidarity", then is a rather spurious means of measuring the capacity of a group of individuals to take organised action. People may well have different or conflicting economic rationales or world views, but a lack of unity of purpose by no means precludes joint action through the negotiation of strategies. As Strauss et.al. have indicated (Friedson, Ed. 1963), the bases for concerted social action are being continually reconstituted:

1. Alberti and Sánchez (1973) in their study of Pucará in the Mantaro valley cite the case where the traditionally dominant group of peasants supported the building of a church, while the emerging sectors of the community were lobbying for a school.

2. Again, in the case of Pucará, the formation of cooperatives benefitted only certain sectors of the community. (See case study no.1).
all contracts, understandings, agreements and rules have a temporal clause appended. Furthermore, if specific social situations are studied through the analysis of the actor's networks of relationships, a far more complex picture of affiliations, "social investments" and political support can be seen at play (c.f. Kapferer's study of a dispute in an African factory. Mitchell, Ed., 1969).

In dealing with "solidarity movements" themselves one is again struck by Tullis's lack of empirical material. He makes statements such as "such movements may have a sense of charisma attached to them" and speaks of charismatic leaders acting as catalysts or accelerators, again failing to define what he means by the term. Weber defined charisma in the following manner:

"A certain quality of individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities. These are not accessible to the ordinary person, but are regarded as of divine origin or as exemplary and on the basis of them the individual concerned is treated as a leader".


This theme of the charismatic personality has been followed up by other writers, and Buckley (1967), for example, makes a very precise distinction between what might be called charismatic power and charismatic authority. Charismatic power is a form of psychic coercion, the result of the hypnotic force of some high prestige figure over groups of people who are led to do things which "in a real sense are against their will" (1967:194). "Charismatic authority on the other hand, is based on a more clear-sighted recognition and acceptance of the leader's ability and a concern to promote the goals of the whole collectivity. He suggests that both types of charismatic force operate in an empirical situation, but that one or other type dominates.

Worsley (1968) argues that the charismatic personality has to be
recognised, socially validated and accorded the right to formulate policy, especially when this is in markedly innovatory ways. He is only charismatic insofar as this characteristic is recognised by his followers, i.e. it is a function of a social relationship and not a personal attribute. Consequently, the followers do not follow because of some abstract mystical quality, but because the leader puts certain values into action. Since the charismatic leader can not resort to conventional sources of legitimacy, he is dependent on being accepted by his followers, by virtue of having a relevant message and a potential for fulfilling the unsatisfied wants of his hearers. This would seem to substantiate what Merton (1968) and other "middle range" theorists have found in leadership studies. Leaders were shown to be more accurate judges of the attitudes of the total membership of the group than non-leaders, on relevant but not on non-relevant items. This ability is derived from their relations with other influential and opinion-forming individuals within a group, which can be traced out through their interpersonal networks. Moreover, authority is a patterned social relationship, and is based on the acceptance of group norms and values. Mechanisms of the social structure provide those in authority with needed information about the norms and values of the group, and the role performance of the members. Consequently, it does not follow that outsiders can more readily fill these positions - it is often intimated that peasant leadership and ideology must come from outside of the ranks of the peasants themselves. Too few statistics are available on the relationship between migratory experience and leadership to substantiate such a proposition. In the case of the peasant movement of La Convencion, urban leaders such as Hugo Blanco arrived on the scene only after the peasants had been organising themselves for some length of time. This indicates that the peasants had been actively organising themselves independently of leaders from outside their own
ranks, at least on a local basis. Blanco was for them primarily a communicator between peasants in different parts of the valley. Moreover, he translated their individual village-based actions into the ideology of the class struggle.

Consequently, the concept of charisma must be clearly defined before it can meaningfully be applied to a given situation. Talmon (1962) clarifies the issue, stating that:

"Leaders function as a symbolic focus of attention rather than sources of authority and initiative. In some regions, millenarianism is an endemic force, and when it reaches a flash point it may seize on any available figure. The initiative in such a case comes primarily from the community which sometimes imposes the leadership position on its leader. Some of its leaders are, in fact, insignificant and their elevation to such a position seems to be accidental - they happened to be there and fulfilled an urgent need for a mediator. ... in some notable instances the influence of a leader and his integrating power have increased enormously after he left or was removed from the scene of operations. Death, imprisonment or mysterious absence have increased their stature and enhanced their authority. Only when absent did they begin to loom large as prophetic figures". (Quoted in Worsley, 1970 edition, 292. Worsley's italics).

This stresses the dispensability of leaders, which was certainly the case in both Huasicancha (Alderson-Smith and Cane, 1974, f/c), and in Vicos (Barnett, 1960). It also demonstrates that the attribution of charismatic qualities to leaders is something related to the mythologising of past events in the minds of the peasants. Charisma, then, and charismatic leadership, in the sense that Tullis uses these concepts, are fairly inappropriate to the Peruvian material.

Theoretical and Methodological Criticism.

The following remarks are related to the ideological implications of Tullis's work which are derived from his assumptions based on "modernization" approaches to the study of economic development and social change. These are in turn substantiated by his material which
was collected at a level which did not allow him to investigate
some of the a priori assumptions of his frame of reference.

One of the main shortcomings of Tullis's work is, in the final
analysis, his failure to explain satisfactorily the origins of peasant
movements. This is evident in his resort to the attribution of "energy
conversions" among villagers to psychological factors. Tullis writes:

"Although the stage for any movement must be set within the
social system itself (by creating those conditions which lead
to solidarity) the fact that energy conversions occur at all
under conditions where energy blocks exist must be attributed
to dramatic psychological factors".

(1970:33; my italics).

Moreover, he footnotes this statement with "this is the conclusion
that Henry Landsberger 'The Role of Peasant Movements' reaches in his
structural-functional paradigm. It seems that he is trying to suggest
through his use of the concept of charisma and these structural functional
assumptions that it takes a psychological change in the population to
spark off a movement, and that these movements can not be generated by
the internal dynamics of social systems nor by conflictive relation­
ships played out within them. This implies that he is working on the
basis of notions of a "modern" man who is a rational "economic" being
as opposed to "traditional" men who is in some way irrational. I
would argue that since he theorizes without reference to the economic
structure and the different kinds of production relations and how
they are altered in the process of economic modernization, he takes
no account of the social constraints on decision-making. Consequently
he concentrates on the process rather than on the causes of rural
social protest, and thus tends to produce the usual platitudes (c.f.
Landsberger and Hewitt, 1969) about leaders with education and experience
of the mines and towns as being essential for a successful movement.
As Lehman has indicated (1970) this fails to consider the different
social groups, goals and forms of organization of the different movements. Moreover, the analysis is limited to problems of bureaucratic effectiveness which does not consider the types of relationships which bind members to an organization, such as clientage, pre-existing loyalties, impersonal or instrumental relationships.

If we now turn to the unit of analysis selected by Tullis for his research, further problems in his analysis are encountered, which bring into question the reliability of his field data. Tullis characterizes the peasants as competing amongst themselves, distrustful, and so on, yet some of the comments he makes in his appendix illuminate the conditions under which he was working. The main point is that he spent less than a year studying forty-four villages - this is an insufficient period to gain the confidence of informants especially on the sensitive issues of politics. However, he also mentions that students had encouraged peasants to reject foreign investigators, and that while he was in the field, disclosures that research and development projects had been financed by C.I.A. front foundations had made sensational headlines in the press. He comments that "the effect on my own research was quite nearly to torpedo it" (1970:261). Yet he does not investigate the contradiction implied by his comment (1970:266) that the disclosures were taken "extremely seriously .... and it (was) surprising how far down the 'literacy' ladder one (could) go and still find people who (could) talk intelligently of the implications". This suggests that his original characterization of the peasantry as distrustful and competitive was related to specific social situations in which he encountered them and not a characterization of their general attitudes and actions. Moreover, it seriously underestimates their sensitivity to and cognizance of national and international affairs.
Concluding Remarks.

In the preceding pages I have examined an interpretation of peasant activities which considers them to be evidence of "peasant" or "social movements". I find this unsatisfactory on theoretical and methodological grounds, as well as on the basis of the ideological assumptions such a theory makes and the kinds of implications this might have on governmental and international policy.

The "social movement"/"information theory" explanation of peasant activities emphasizes the transformation of culture and personality insofar as this is influenced by culture rather than some other aspect of social organization or human ecology. (Stephenson, quoted by Bernstein, 1970:141). It is also explicitly linked to theories of modernization and the notion of diffusion of culture and technology from urban centres and from the developed world. This approach fails to attribute any initiative to the peasants themselves, it also tends to fall into facile platitudes concerning the necessity for leadership and ideology from outside the ranks of the peasants. This upholds the notion of "modernizing elites", and rests on the postulate that development will occur once effective incentives are perceived. Evidently, such an argument acts as an ideological support structure for incremental economic policies for development as opposed to structural reforms. It is assumed that economic development will occur through the injection of the appropriate amounts of education, technology and the "will to economize" into a traditional society, rather than through change in the structure of a society which is already penetrated by capitalist economic relations.

Writers such as LaMond Tullis (1970) do not define the types of activities they understand by the term "peasant movement", nor do they
distinguish between different categories of peasants, such as *hacienda* workers, smallholders and landless labourers and the implications of their involvement in different types of production relations for political action. The only relationships considered are those of domination of peasants by brokers such as *hacendados*, and mestizo middlemen and officials, and all activities are simply classed as "solidarity movements". I would argue that it is fundamental to the understanding of these phenomena that distinctions should be made between the different kinds of activities peasants have been involved in, and the differential involvement of the different categories of peasants in them. Political activities can not be examined without reference to the social context in which they take place, since this has important repercussions on the peasants' perception of their interests, and the type of action taken through the negotiation of strategies between groups with conflicting interests. The political climate of the wider society is, as Tullis and others suggest, an important factor in considering the relative success of peasant actions in bringing about changes in their life situation. However, it provides a sufficient but not an adequate explanation of the peasants' ability to take political action.
CHAPTER 4.
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL BASES OF POLITICAL ACTION.

In the preceding chapter I discussed the usefulness of an approach that treated village systems in terms of structural relations which change from a "traditional" to a more modern form under the impact of external economic forces. In this chapter I consider approaches which have concentrated instead on the internal differentiation of the peasantry and how peasants involved in different kinds of production relations (e.g. landless labourers, smallholders and tenant farmers) have responded to changes in the external socio-economic environment. These external forces produce a modification in the relations of the peasants to the land, to their landlords and to the means of production. Wolf (1971), Alavi (1965), Cotler (1970), and Petras and Zeitlin (1970) have used this method of analysis to study major revolutions and peasant wars and to explain the propensity of different categories of peasant to organise rebellion.

This type of class analysis suggests that involvement in different types of production relations produces different forms of consciousness among the peasantry. However, such an approach can not explain why villages involved in the same production relations exhibit different degrees of political mobilization. Nor can it explain why one group of hacienda workers successfully organised themselves to invade hacienda lands while others did not.

At this point it is important to make the distinction between large-scale "peasant movements" which can have important repercussions at the national level and which therefore can constitute a revolutionary force for change, and peasant activities organised on a local basis which
could have revolutionary implications but which in most cases remain independent of wider, more co-ordinated movements. An example of the latter would be land invasions organised in order to recover lost communal lands, but which are made without reference to a wider structure or political ideology. It is my view that many of the analytical shortcomings of work on peasant political activities can be ascribed to the indiscriminate application of macro-theory to explain micro-level situations and problems.

In this chapter, I intend to abstract from these macro-type studies, material on the determinants of class consciousness and to attempt to apply this to the problem of consciousness of interests at the local level. I shall thus be concerned with the complex pattern of production relations in village systems, and how consciousness can be understood as the product of involvement in these sets of relations and regular social interaction. This leads me to develop an approach which combines an analysis of the structures underlying observed social action, with an actor-oriented perspective which isolates the social constraints on decision-making amongst individuals and groups.

**Peasant Economy and Consciousness.**

To understand the class nature of peasant society and the potential for the development of class consciousness amongst peasants, economic relations must be examined at the local level, and the ways in which the peasant economy is connected to the wider system explored as well. Lukács (1923) has argued that, economically speaking, pre-capitalist peasant-type societies have incomparably less cohesion as a single entity than capitalist ones. This is because the different parts are relatively independent and are only transiently and precariously
involved in commodity exchange due to their being predominantly oriented to subsistence production. Since peasants' experience of their social world is mainly confined to production and social relations within the village and seldom beyond, they may not be aware of the wider system of relations to which they are tied by the processes of distribution, nor be aware of the existence of other people involved in the same sets of economic relations, who consequently are in a similar class position. Since they have only a partial vision of the total structure of relations in which they are involved, they neither perceive their class interests, nor are they aware of their subordinate position within that system. Marx's description of the French peasantry in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte illustrates this lack of interchange and identification of interests between the different sectors of peasant society which ostensibly stand in the same class relationship to other sectors of society:

"The small peasant proprietors form an immense mass, the members of which live in the same situation but do not enter into manifold relationships with each other. Their mode of operation isolates them instead of bringing them into mutual intercourse ...... Their place of operation... permits no division of labour in its cultivation, no application of science and therefore no diversity of development, variety of talent, or wealth of social relationships. Each individual peasant family is almost self-sufficient; it directly produces the greater part of its own consumption and therefore obtains its means of life more through exchange with nature than through intercourse with society...... Thus the great mass of the French nation is formed by the simple addition of isomorphous magnitudes, much as potatoes in a sack form a sack of potatoes. In so far as millions of families live under economic conditions of existence that separate their mode of life, their interests and their cultural formation from those of other classes and bring them into conflict with those classes, they form a class. In so far as these small peasant proprietors are merely connected on a local basis, and the identity of their interests fails to produce a feeling of community, national links or a political organisation, they do not form a class".

Anthropological studies of peasant societies disagree as to the degree of self-sufficiency of their economies. Dumont (1957) criticises anthropologists for taking the village community as their framework of study. He maintains that as a result of the tradition of tribal studies and an over-emphasis on local territorial ties, the study of the connections and interrelations of different systems has been neglected. Nash (1966), for instance, considers peasant economies to be a "special case" of tribal economies. More realistically, Wolf (1966) has seen the peasant economy as a sector of the national economy beset by fluctuating prices and capital shortage, while Bohannan and Dalton maintain that it is a form of economic organization in which the market principle prevails, "but does not determine the acquisition of subsistence or the allocation of modes of production". (1962-3).¹

Attempts have been made to formulate more precisely the nature of operation of the peasant economy. Thorner (1963) believes that peasant economies can be considered as a general socio-economic category preceding capitalism, as opposed to feudalism which is often used ahistorically, when in fact it was an historical stage of development which pertained to a limited portion of Europe in a circumscribed period of time. ¹³ Godelier (1966) defines a mode of production as the combination of production forces and the relations of production. "Productive forces" are understood as the factors of production, i.e. resources, tools and men, characterizing a determined society at a determined epoch which must be combined in a specific way to produce the material goods necessary to that society. The "relations of production" are the functions fulfilled by individuals and groups in the production process and in the control of the factors of production.

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from the concept of production. He claims that it is possible to find different sets of combinations; for example, peasant systems of production together with capitalist systems of appropriation. Thus peasants can be considered as being involved in traditional, non-capitalist relations of production, yet also as involved in the capitalist economy by the process of distribution and appropriation.

However, not only is there this interaction between capitalist distribution systems and non-capitalist relations of production, but capitalist modes of production are often found operating in close association with non-capitalist ones. Attempts have been made (Long, 1974) to analyse how the capitalist mode of production articulates with and eventually comes to have a controlling influence over the non-capitalist modes of production. But, whereas the development of capitalism gave rise to the contradiction between workers and capitalists in the factory situation, creating a consciousness of class interests and thus providing the possibility of the replacement of capitalist social relations by a 'higher' form of social rationality (i.e. socialism), the peasants do not experience the opposition of class interests in day-to-day relations. It has been found that in certain contexts, the capitalist mode of production can indirectly contribute to the persistence of non-capitalist modes of production (Dupré and Rey, 1973). Moreover, Mintz argues (1974) that the involvement of individuals in more than one mode of production allows for a kind of "oscillation" between the two (or more) adaptations. For instance, if the labour commitment of a peasant family enterprise is compared with that of a capitalist enterprise, we find in capitalist systems of production labour is a commodity to be hired and dismissed by the enterprise according to changes in the scale of organization, the degree of mechanization and the level of market demand for its products. In a peasant economy, the entrepreneur is committed to the utilization
of the total labour supply, the scale and intensity of operation of the enterprise being adjusted according to the labour available.

Hence, the existence of capitalist and non-capitalist modes of production in close association means that the capitalist enterprise can adjust to price fluctuations and seasonal labour requirements by drawing on a labour supply which can always withdraw to peasant modes of production when redundant (c.f. Franklin, 1965).

The significance of this is that if "production" is understood as "the totality of relations aimed at procuring for a society its material means of existence" (Godelier, 1972:263), then the economic aspect of production in a non-capitalist society is just one among many aspects of a complex social process. For instance, where the head of a family calls upon his relations by blood or affinity, or other persons dependent upon him, the work performed is at the same time an economic, religious and political act, and is thus experienced as having many different meanings and functions. This is true where the family or the extended family is the basic unit of production, but it also holds for any situation where wages are paid not in cash, but in services and in kind. A case in point would be on traditional haciendas in Peru, where the hacienda was often linked by ties of co-parenthood (compadrazgo) to his tenants, which set the seal on a vertical exchange relationship between the patron and his clients, which primarily involved the provision of labour and services in return for land.

Consequently, where individuals are involved primarily in non-capitalist modes of production they are unlikely to develop an awareness of the totality of the relationships in which they are involved, since the effects of capitalist systems of production are counterbalanced by the persistence of non-capitalist enterprise, which can expand or contract in scale of operation according to the requirements of the labour force.
The Effect of Commercialization on the Peasant Economy.

North Atlantic capitalism is characterized by a social organization in which land is rented, labour is sold and capital is freely invested. That is, land and wealth are commodities, and goods are produced not for use but for sale (Wolf, 1971). In other societies rights to land are specific to social groups, like lineages, clans, extended families, and the utilization of the land denotes the existence of specific social relationships. As land is incorporated into the capitalist economy it is separated from more general social obligations, based on kinship, affinity or locality, and leads to the alienation of men from the process of production and from the product of their work (i.e. cash return). They are, moreover, alienated from their fellow men who become their competitors in the market. Involvement in a capitalist market system usually threatens the traditional peasant’s means of access to land, indeed outright seizure or encroachment may drive peasants on to lands insufficient for their needs or may disrupt the balance between settled and nomadic populations.

I have already indicated the process of land appropriation which took place in Peru in Chapter 2. Wolf notes that the following features result from the increasing involvement of peasants and landowners in the market economy:

(a) Greater communication between peasants.
(b) Growth of corporate ownership of land.
(c) Mechanization of production and specialization of labour.
(d) Cash payments replacing payments in kind.
(e) Rural-urban migration.
(f) Commercialization of agriculture.

From this it can be assumed that commercialization and socioeconomic development brings about a consciousness of membership of
wider groups through increased geographical mobility and communications. Changes in attitudes towards the maximization of economic rewards amongst peasants and those who control the means of production tends to result in the "depersonalization" of economic relations, which then cease to be experienced as social realities with many-sided significance. For instance, studies of entrepreneurs (e.g. Barth, 1963; Long, 1968), document the process whereby individuals neglect their obligations to the wider family group in preference for economic gain. In order to attain business efficiency the content of the relationships is rephrased or redefined, strategic relationships are mobilized while others are played down and eventually neglected. Furthermore, the landowner's response to commercialization, for example a change from payments in kind to payments in cash, constitutes a threat to the security of tenant farmers who formerly controlled plots of their own. Petras and Zemelman (1972) argue that this rationalization of one dimension of social relations is made at the expense of the traditional benefits. That is, the system of mutual benefits accruing from patronage relationships becomes inoperative and, in the absence of the possibility of resort to protection and petty privileges, peasants are disposed towards collective action as a method of self-help.

At the same time that those changes are taking place, the power structure at the national level may be modified. The ownership of land loses its power base as landowners engage in other, more dynamic sectors of the economy, and agriculture, stripped of its non-economic functions of prestige and security is seen essentially as a source of capitalist investment. In Peru, strong links between the commercial agricultural elite based on the coastal plantations and the modern bourgeoisie have undermined the power of the traditional elite in the Sierra. Consequently, the peasants' activities face less opposition
than previously, and may even receive positive support as developmental and more radical ideologies become influential in national policy.¹

Commercialization and the incorporation of peasants into the national economy therefore affect the political position of peasants at two distinct levels. At the micro-level, commercialization alters the relation of peasants to the means of production and also provides new sources of income and investment. It thus affects their perception of their economic and political interests. At the same time, changes at the macro-level in the power structure of the nation undermine the strength of the traditional rural elites, thus increasing the objective possibilities for bringing about changes in the system. Consequently, I would argue that it is through changes in these spheres that peasants become capable of "modern" forms of political expression (c.f. Hobsbawn, 1959; Quijano, 1967) and not simply through a sudden awareness of alternative forms of organization brought about by the opening up of new channels of information through migration to the cities and mines.

Peasants and Revolution.

In this section I am concerned with examining approaches to the problem of under what circumstances peasants rebel and what roles the different sectors of the peasantry play. This is not a question of whether they are revolutionary or not, because as I have already indicated, they are capable of autonomous political action, which can, if coordinated, contribute towards class struggles. Moreover, as Wolf argues, there is no evidence to suggest that the peasants would

¹. In Peru, the military junta that took power after the coup of 1968 has put into effect land reform law that previous civilian governments were unable to activate due to their lack of organizational structure reaching down to the villages. See Quijano (1971) and Hobsbawn (1971).
be at rest if it were not for the presence of outside agitators.

"On the contrary, the peasants rise to redress wrong, but the inequities against which they rebel are but, in turn, parochial manifestations of great social dislocations. Thus rebellion issues easily into revolution, massive movements to transform the social structure as a whole".

(1973, edn. 301).

The crucial point is that peasants are not capable of setting up the channels of communication required for a revolutionary change in a national society. Thus the role of intellectuals and outside political activists is primarily communicative and coordinative.

Alavi (1965) and Wolf (1973) both define their categories of peasants in the following manner: "poor peasants" include tenant farmers, sharecroppers and landless labourers involved in some kind of production relationship with a landlord, "middle peasants" are independent small-holders, and "rich peasants" or commercial farmers. Alavi and Wolf are both concerned with reconstructing the conditions under which revolutions occur. The same kind of analysis has been applied to the Latin American situation by Cotler in his study (1970) of Peruvian haciendas and traditional communities, and by Petras and Zeitlin in their work (1970) on agrarian radicalism in Chile.

Neither the poor peasants nor the rich peasants are particularly militant in the initial stages of rebellion, since their social perspectives are limited by their class position. The poor peasants' livelihood is dependent on being able to get land from the landlord for cultivation, who appears as a benefactor and distributes his favours paternally. The inherently weak position of the tenant renders him open to intimidation, and setbacks can easily demoralize him. Alavi maintains that poor peasants only finally and irrevocably take the road to revolution when they are shown in practice that the
power of their master is broken and the possibility of an alternative mode of existence becomes a reality. Wolf also indicates that the poor peasants need to rely on some external power to challenge the power constraining them. He cites the case of the presence of the Constitutionalist army in Yucatan during the Mexican revolution, and the creation of the Red Army in China.

Rich peasants are also unlikely to embark on the course of rebellion because they exercise local power in alliance with the external power holders. They only lend support to uprisings when, for example, in the Chinese case, the Red Army proved itself capable of destroying superior power domains.

Thus it is argued that it is only the middle peasantry that has some internal leverage, since they are not dependent on a landlord. They have secure access to lands of their own and hold communal rights to pasture and woodland, which allows them minimal "tactical freedom" to challenge their overlords (Wolf). Anthropological and sociological analysis would seem to indicate that the middle peasantry are culturally the most conservative stratum, but paradoxically, they have been the most instrumental among the peasantry in bringing about change in the social order. Alavi notes that in Russia they were often "indifferent" or hostile" to the agrarian movement against the feudal estates (1965:248) and were antagonistic towards the agricultural proletariat and sharecroppers. However, middle peasants are also the most vulnerable to changes brought about by commercialism, such as population growth, encroachment of landlords, loss of rights to grazing, forest and water, and unfavourable market conditions. Moreover, they represent the stratum most dependent on traditional relations of kin and mutual aid, and so suffer most when these are abrogated. Wolf puts forward the thesis that the middle peasants are most exposed to influences from the developing
proletariat. When the tenant farmer or landless labourer goes to town, he cuts his link with the land, while among middle peasants part of the family retains a footing in agriculture, and later receives political ideas and news of urban unrest from those who have undergone the "training of the cities". From this he postulates that it is not so much the development of an industrial proletariat that produces revolutionary activity, but the development of an industrial work force still closely geared to life in the villages.

Turning to the Latin American material, Cotler, analysing traditional haciendas and communities in the Peruvian Sierra, proposes that the most significant aspect of economic "modernization" as it affected this region were the new consumption and aspiration levels aroused by migration to the cities. That is, he argues the case for the importance of factors producing social and cultural change at the local level which are indirectly the result of wider economic developments (c.f. information cascade theory). He maintains that small-holding communities have greater contact with the outside world, and so can draw on a wide variety of occupational and organizational experience. They are more likely to take state services and improvements for granted, but reach a point where they can only achieve further change in their life situation if there is a basic modification of the national system. He compares them to hacienda tenants who are only just experiencing incremental change and can still potentially benefit enormously from it. Under these circumstances, the government satisfies peasant demands with non-radical changes in education, communications and land tenure. Cotler's real concern seems to be with whether groups involved in conditions leading up to revolutionary situations were among the worse off, or whether the demands were stimulated because they had already experienced some socio-economic improvement which later deteriorated. He suggests
that the circumstances which lead groups to revolutionary demands or extreme frustrations are to be found further along in the process of breakdown of the traditional system than has at present been reached in Peru (c.f. Hagen, 1962, who has a similar argument for explaining entrepreneurship).

This seems to be rather a contrived argument, which tries to conform to the case for the middle peasantry as being the backbone of revolution. It could have benefitted from a more detailed look at the way in which the two forms of landholding (if indeed only two forms can be identified) were being affected in their economic relations, by the impingement of the capitalist economy.

In contrast, Petras' and Zeitlin's analysis of the Chilean situation (1970) seems to contradict the thesis of the middle peasantry as initiators of revolutionary activity. They argue that there is a tendency amongst small agricultural proprietors to consider themselves as part of the propertied classes and consequently identify their interests with those of the landholders and private property. They may also be separated ethnically and socially from other sectors of the peasantry, and so it is the wage labourers working in commercial agriculture who give the greatest support to radical political ideologies. This is a category of some importance which none of the other analyses have tackled, though evidence from Peru on the appeal of APRA (Alianza Popular Revolucionario Americana) to the unionized labour force of the coastal plantations substantiates their conclusions. It would appear that the objective conditions of an agricultural labour force and their subjective response to them make such workers more

1. For a full account of the development of the APRA party and its support from the plantation workers, see Klaren (1973) and Hilliker (1971). The relationship between the party and the rural proletarians has passed through several stages, too complex to document in the present analysis.
likely to adhere to left wing political ideologies. The other aspect of Petras and Zeitlin's argument is that while rural proletarians may indeed be the most receptive towards radicalization, they are also the groups most likely to be selected by extremists as targets for politicization.

The problems of these analyses of broad scale is that they assume that peasant society can be analysed exclusively in class terms. Because they are interested mainly in the construction of the historical sequence of conditions leading up to revolutions, they try to find in the empirical material the same build up of conditions. Bourricaud (1967) remarks that Peruvian political life between 1956 and 1965 was striking for the fact that highly explosive events such as agrarian violence and police repression did not contribute to class struggles leading to a revolutionary change in power. He suggests that the communication system which could have brought knowledge of these events to interested parties was lacking or ineffective. Furthermore, empirical material (see case studies) indicates that the categories of both common and opposing interests were not a reality in the minds of the peasants themselves. Therefore, we can only assume that the peasants were not prompted by class consciousness, but some other kind of awareness of their interests.

A further problem is that the writers make use of a conception of the peasantry which is essentially European in origin, regardless of its applicability to other societies. Mintz (1974) maintains that this has led to a confusion in terminology and a misunderstanding of class roots and class consciousness. He gives the example of Huberman and Sweezy's *Cuba: Anatomy of a Revolution* (1960) in which the authors discovered after two years research that landless, wage-earning cane
cutters did not want land, and so the image of the European agricultural smallholder with his "petty bourgeois" aspirations to land were inapplicable in this case. Mintz also suggests that class membership only influences yet does not wholly determine class consciousness. A typology of groups, based on ranking systems such as class, ethnic and racial origins would indicate the interplay of different groups and group interests. He cites the case of three Puerto Rican communities, a group of recent migrants living on the beaches and two other groups living by the road. However, because of their different "racial" features, style of life and willingness to accept certain conditions of work they did not consider themselves as a group, although they could all be classified as "rural proletarians", and as having the same class interests. Touraine and Pecault (1970) have similarly stated that a class-oriented study assumes that the actors define themselves in homogenous terms, but in fact there may be many different ranking systems. The heterogeneity of reference groups, and in Peru, certainly the ethnic/cultural distinctions would be a case in point, mean that individuals do not consider themselves or their associates solely in terms of a class framework.

It is also wrong to assume that a smallholder or tenant lives under the same conditions as his equivalent in Europe. Tenant farmers may have greater security and be economically better off than smallholders, whose lands tend to become increasingly fragmented over time and also suffer the predations of neighbouring estates. Consequently, the scheme of "middle", "rich" and "poor" peasant evolved by Alavi and Wolf has little equivalency in the Latin American context. Furthermore, the class interests of individuals with only usufruct rights to land

1. See Martinez-Alier (1974), "Los Huachilleros del Peru".
is problematic. Evidently, economic differentiation does occur, but it is through the differential use of land rather than through its control. Mintz suggests that in this situation, the differences between the land rich and the land poor may be at least as significant for the understanding of rural social structures and class consciousness as the differences between the land poor and the landless (1974).

**Anthropology's Contribution to the Analysis of Political Consciousness.**

Detailed anthropological analysis would suggest that though a single village may be organized on the basis of a smallholding or hacienda system of relationships, this does not preclude the involvement of individuals in a multiplicity of different production relations and statuses. Categories of peasant such as "rich", "middle" and "poor" are not applicable so much to the village as a unit but to groups and individuals within it. Logically, this requires a consideration not only of the class position and political consciousness of individuals, but also the types of linkages between them which can be identified through interpersonal networks of relationships which cross-cut class alliances. Study could be directed towards, on the one hand, the analysis of individual involvement in various capitalist and non-capitalist modes of production affecting the village system, as well as the ways in which the perception of interests is modified by other loyalties and affiliations which may not be class-based.

If a single village is taken as the unit of study, a variety of different interests and economic rationales can be seen acting on decision-making among members of the community. Four non-capitalist modes of production have been identified in rural Peru: (Montoya, quoted by Long, 1974. f/c).
(1) The traditional hacienda.
(2) Smallholder, private property type.
(3) Share-cropping type (several variants, see Chapter Two).
(4) The indigenous or peasant community type.

These are by no means distinct and unrelated to each other; indigenous or smallholding communities are often found side by side with haciendas, and the seasonal requirements of the hacienda may call for additional labour, enforced or voluntary, from the communities. This will vary according to the type of production, for example the cultivation of food crops rather than cash crops for export, sheep or cattle ranching.

Furthermore, within a village, the distribution of economic and social resources among individuals will vary, so that one family unit could perhaps operate within a single mode of production, capitalist or non-capitalist, while another would operate in several. This becomes particularly significant where there is migration to external sources of employment or production for the market.

Migration to the towns and mines, whether on a seasonal, temporary or long-term basis has not coincided with the severing of ties with the village of origin. Rather, an active interest is often maintained in village affairs with a concern for continuing or future investments in the local economy. Thus, not only are kinship and friendship links continued to safeguard these investments, but voluntary associations are formed in the towns on the basis of village membership, which protect and lobby for the interests of the settlement of origin. The activities of these organizations have been documented by Mangin (1970), Doughty (1970) and Long (1973) for Peru. Moreover, the increasing articulation of the villages with the wider society has created a demand for certain services, such as the transportation of goods and people to market. This has given rise to various economic "brokerage" activities (Long, 1972) connecting the communities with
the national society.

One further point pertaining to the peasant economy and class consciousness is the question of landless, even wage-earning individuals in the villages. While rural proletarians living and working on plantations do have, as Petras and Zeitlin (1970) suggest, a sturdy awareness of their class membership, Mintz (1974) argues that these groups are also to be found in peasant communities but that their presence is often concealed by the many relationships they have with the landed. Where they are kinsmen of landholders, sometimes even occupying the same household, and exchanging goods and services rather than receiving payment in cash, these relations will be cloaked, and under these circumstances, the development of a consciousness of class interests unlikely.

Concluding Remarks.

My argument, then, is that the types of activities that have been occurring in rural Peru in recent years do not seem to indicate any development of class consciousness except where these actions have been precipitated by the unionization of an industrial labour force. This requires a concerted effort and a recognition of peasant interests against those of landlords as a class. This was the case in the valley of La Convencion. The majority of peasants' activities, such as the formation of production and marketing cooperatives, and the invasion of land would seem to indicate rather that they are pragmatists acting jointly in entrepreneurial efforts which are not inspired by any permanent recognition of their interests against those of another class.

The social environment in which peasants operate itself precludes the development of class consciousness. Where the distinction between employer/employee is unclear or expressed in terms other than the purely
economic, an awareness of class interests is unlikely. Even within a village, peasants are involved in a multiplicity of production relations. It therefore seems more significant to focus on conflicting interests and the negotiation of strategies rather than to try to construct a hypothetical common situation which the peasants themselves in fact do not experience. An intensive anthropological study of this type would indicate who were the leaders and the ones most likely to benefit from a particular set of activities, it would also examine the content of the relationships binding supporters to the leaders, and what the supporters themselves stood to gain from the activities.

It seems that an actor-oriented approach would be capable of locating not simply the sources of peasant initiative and interaction between different group interests but would also destroy some of the fallacies concerning their passive acceptance of leadership and ideologies from outside. The ensuing case studies indicate to me that peasants are strategists and manipulators who will make use of formal syndicate structures, political parties and politicians when it suits their aims, but are quite capable of bargaining for themselves and making autonomous decisions. Furthermore, they are sensitive to the external political environment. The case studies demonstrate that peasant activities have been most frequent and most successful in the more liberal Presidential periods, which implies that they are cognizant of the limits to their activities and the reactions they can expect.

Though in some instances, it may indeed be possible to argue that peasants suddenly become aware of alternative forms of existence through increasing communications and new experiences in the mines and cities, this does not appear to have been the case in Peru. In the central Sierra peasants have not been highly subordinated by the hacienda system, in fact, there is a very strong case for suggesting that they
have never accepted the political authority of the hacendados, nor the legitimacy of their claim to land. This has manifested itself in the reluctance of tenants to reciprocate for their use of hacienda resources (see Martinez-Allier, 1972; Barnett, 1960) and the dubious legality of the property titles. For example, Hobsbawn (1974) describes how the peasants of Huasicancha (see case study No.2) knew from their folk tradition the boundaries of their lands which conformed with those of property titles dating back to 1607. Moreover, it is possible to demonstrate that though migrants may have new types of organizational experience, this does not necessarily result in the radicalization of peasants in the home community. In the case of Huasicancha, again, (Alderson-Smith and Cano, 1974, f/c) migrants in regional associations in the cities deradicalized peasant strategies because they had an interest in delaying direct action, consequently they insisted on the use of conventional channels of protest to which they, as opposed to the villagers, had access.

The significance of commercialization therefore seems to lie in the way that it broadens peasant systems of interactions and gives them an increasing sophistication in their dealings with different cultural environments. However, these inter-relations between the towns and the villages are made primarily through the media and migrants and result in a greater identification with the national culture rather than a development of a group social consciousness (Petras and Zemelman, 1972). Hobsbawn has said of peasant activities that "the unit of their organized action is either the parish pump or the universe. There is nothing in between" (1971:9). I propose that the problem of individual consciousness and the negotiation of joint action is the sphere to which the anthropologist can usefully apply his discipline. Class consciousness and revolution are related to these, but are quite different academic problems.
CHAPTER 5.

POLITICAL ACTIVITIES IN TWO PEASANT COMMUNITIES.

The material for the following case studies has been taken from secondary sources, namely monographs and articles, rather than from direct study in the field. Consequently, information is not always sufficiently detailed for the type of analysis I would wish to make, moreover, the material has been selected on the basis of the interests, and theoretical and ideological assumptions of the original investigators. However, it seems that the sort of analytical approach that I am suggesting is useful for the understanding of this material, and can indicate areas of enquiry for future research.

Case Study No.1 - Pucará.

(Taken from Alberti and Sánchez, 1973).

Pucará is typical of settlements in the Mantaro valley insofar as it is not part of the characteristic complex of an all-powerful landlord and dispossessed peasants found elsewhere in the Andes. Its independent status of comunidad (indigenous or peasant community) goes back four hundred years to the alliance between the conquistadores and the Huanoas, whereby special status was conferred on the Huanoas allowing them to continue holding a greater proportion of their lands than in other Inter-Andine valleys. The level of authority and prestige of their leaders was also maintained. The mode of domination and exploitation of the population was therefore more subtle than the type of economic and social exploitation found under the hacienda system.

1. Native populations living in the Mantaro valley under the Inca empire at the time of the conquest.
of relationships. In Pucará, peasants had rights to individual plots of land (parceles) as well as usufruct rights to communal lands. The local elite in Jauja, with the aid of their representatives in the district seats of power were able to control the native population through their position in the political and administrative systems, and through a series of institutional mechanisms which assured the social, economic and political domination of the area.

Though economic and social mobility were not restricted to the same extent as under the hacienda system, the native populations had to render the following to the local elite:

1. Personal tribute imposed by colonial rule.
2. To perform collective labour for the benefit of the towns, for example, cleaning the streets, participation in public works, construction of roads.
3. To provide construction materials for public works in the towns.
4. To pay a tariff, pontasgo, for the use of roads and bridges.

Until 1918, Pucará was a part of the administrative district (distrito) of the neighbouring village of Sapallanga. At this time, changes taking place at the regional level prompted the peasants to demand more direct participation in the nomination of district authorities and a greater autonomy from the traditional authorities. In 1916, Pucará presented a candidate to be elected to the Municipal Council (concejo municipal), who, in the primary elections gave the impression of being able to attain a majority over the candidate of Sapallanga. The ensuing fierce electoral struggle gave rise to the development of a separatist solidarity spirit amongst the Pucarinos and two years later, in 1918, the separate district of
Pucará was created. Simultaneously, increased politico-administrative relations with the provincial capital of Huancayo meant that the village was increasingly by-passing the mediation of Sapallanga in all its external affairs.

This rise in status and the consequent increased autonomy allowed the village to take advantage of the new economic opportunities which were opening up in the Mantaro valley in the 1920's. This process was facilitated by the building of the Pucará-Huancayo road in 1925 and from the 1930's onward, the community was closely linked to the market and society of the valley. 1935-40 saw an intensification of these links through migration to Lima and the regional mining centres, which was stimulated by demographic increase and a scarcity of land. To give some idea of the scale of outmigration, in 1954 Alers-Montalvo found that 90 per cent of a sample of heads of families declared that they had left the village to work during their youth.

Official recognition of the Community, 1941.

The significance of the legal recognition of the village as a comunidad indígena is considerable since it allowed for the enlargement of the lands under the control of the community and also resulted in an identification of like interests amongst the peasants, which was later the basis for the initiation of collective projects. The community achieved its registration with the Ministry of Labour and Indian Affairs (Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Indígenas), as a consequence of the conflict between the village and the parish of Sapallanga under whose ecclesiastical jurisdiction Pucará had been. In 1941 the municipal authorities took hold of a parcela belonging to the church with the intention of using it as the site for a school. The parish of Sapallanga reacted by attempting to sell the
lands of the cofradias (religious guild) and the transactions were under way when the community, led by the district council became involved in an energetic protest, which eventually took the case to the provincial and departmental authorities. At first, the governor (prefecto) of Huancayo, supported the church, disregarding the authority of the district council, to make these kinds of claims on the grounds that it was the concern of the community, not the municipality. Disarmed by this, the peasant leaders were advised by lawyers of the provincial capital and opted to ask for the official recognition of their communal organisation.

After a prolonged period of negotiations, the community was able to sign a public document countering the one the church had submitted, placing the entire lands of the cofradias in the hands of the community. The newly acquired lands were passed to the control of the community council and were either rented out to shepherd comuneros (members of the community) or were used for the collective benefit. The construction of the school site proceeded without further difficulties.

The most important outcome of the conflict was that as a result of the village's new legal status, new channels of relations were established with the national government. From 1941 the control of the collective lands and pastures passed from the hands of the municipal council to the community council, as did the right to call the community to work for the public benefit (faena).

**Intervention of State Agencies for Development.**

Since 1940 some of the inhabitants of Pucará had been establishing individual relations with the Banco Agrícola which made loans to peasant agriculturalists. This office gave collective support to the
community for the first time in 1945 for the formation of a collective sheep farm. Pucará became the first community in the valley to organise an enterprise of this nature and also the first to make contact with agencies for technical assistance and credit.

The establishment of the sheep farm with 81 founder members was possible because of two factors: firstly, the community wanted to utilise natural pastures in the higher section of its territory where they were in danger of being occupied by a neighbouring hacienda; secondly, a national policy existed which aimed to organise agriculture and livestock farms of a cooperative type among the peasant sectors of Peruvian society. The intervention of outside agencies took two channels: the Ministry of Indigenous Affairs took care of the transactions for the creation of the cooperative, while the Department for the Development of the Wool Industry of the Agricultural Bank (Departamento de Fomento de la Industria Lanar del Banco Agrícola) took care of technical assistance and credit.

**Diversification of Social Structure.**

Until 1954, 77 per cent of the population of Pucará were still involved in agriculture. As a result of increased contacts with the external society a process of economic and occupational diversification began to take place. Through this, different sectors of the community found their relative position in the power and prestige structure changing and conflicts began to develop between the traditionally influential groups and those emerging through their access to new economic opportunities. These changes can be ascribed to improved communications, the commercialization of agriculture, temporary migration to work centres, the availability of supervised credit and formal education.
In the contemporary social structure of Pucará various interest groups can be distinguished which represent the conflict between the traditional and emerging sectors of the community. In the following section I shall indicate their perception of change in the external socio-economic environment, their use of formal organizations and the types of references made to political and communal ideologies in furthering their interests.

The Transporters.

The opening of the Huancayo-Pucará road in 1925 created a need for vehicles to make transportation possible. A small group of the most prosperous farmers in the community invested in some 'buses and established a permanent service to Huancayo. The service benefitted the Pucarinos themselves, the annexes of the district, and neighbouring villages situated along the road.

The company, called MARISCAL CÁCERES, had little competition in the area and in several years had increased its capital and the number of 'buses it possessed, and had attracted new partners, so that in 1955 it possessed a fleet of eleven vehicles. The four proprietors abandoned agricultural activities entirely for the administration of the business, while various drivers, mechanics and conductors alternated work in the fields with work for the company.

Vegetable Gardeners.

Though vegetables had long been cultivated in Pucará, until about 1945, traditional agricultural techniques had been used and low levels of production allowed a relatively small amount of produce to be sold at the Huancayo market. Since then there has been an increase in technification and in the number of species of vegetable grown. On
irrigated land three harvests are possible annually, and this increase in production has permitted an intensification of market participation, a widening of the market to Lima as well as the creation of permanent contacts between individual farmers and restauranteurs in Huancayo.

The cause of these developments has not been a question of individual access to the Banco Agrícola. The industry has grown up largely as a result of the migratory experience of a group of young people who left Pucará in 1935 for Lima, where they worked in market gardening for Asiatic immigrants. Returning to the villages, the six key persons applied their knowledge, and by 1960 a total of twelve individuals had become one of the strongest economic groups in the village. The main factor favouring this group was the possession of irrigable land through inheritance and through the investment of savings from migration.

The Enrichment of Traditional Farmers.

From 1953 the community and the Bank of Agricultural Development (Banco de Formento Agropecuario) agreed to establish a scheme of supervised credit. The Bank was not able to make a loan to the community because the lands were inalienable and the organisation granting credit would not have been able to recuperate its money in the case of financial failure. An agricultural co-operative, the Sociedad Agrícola Pucará, was set up independently of the community, whose members made over their individual holdings as a guarantee. Membership was limited to those who were able to fulfill the conditions and were prepared to pledge their lands. In the first year only fifteen persons participated though an additional six joined in the second year, the membership comprising almost exclusively the local elite.
The success of the cooperative led the members to invest part of their profits in the acquisition of a nearby hacienda with an extension of 700 hectares, 200 of which were cultivable. In the village itself they became the largest landholders, though using traditional not modern agricultural techniques and crops. A work force of 30 yanaconas was employed to work and live permanently on the farms in exchange for the right to work on a small plot of land, though the system was later substituted by wage labour, to the protests of the workers.

The economic success of this group signifies that a sector of the traditional elite of Pucara had strengthened its political position through the acquisition of economic resources.

The Case of the Transporters' Cooperative.

The emergence of new social sectors in the community linked to new economic activities created tensions in the existing social system which came to a head in the following conflict.

In 1955 the first confrontation occurred between the transporters of MARISCAL CÁCERES, representing the emerging forces of Pucara and the village authorities, representing the power of the traditional elite. The precipitating factor was a proposal to increase the fares on the 'buses, which came after a long period of price stability. Not only were the local leaders opposed to it, but the poorer peasants of the village also felt the need to defend their economic interests.

The movement against the company was led by the group of landholders who controlled the Municipal Council and the Community Council. The dispute was taken as far as the Prefecture of Huancayo, which eventually authorized the increase in fares.
By this time it had been decided that the only effective way to break the company's monopoly was to create a community-based cooperative of transporters. Comuneros of the five quarters of the village contributed funds for the purchase of the first vehicle. However, MARISCAL CÁCERES, fearing competition, pressured the Transport Headquarters (Jefatura de Tránsito) of Huancayo through personal links, and succeeded in delaying the traffic authorization for several months. When it was finally granted, it was with the proviso that the service should be gratuitous. In 1957 a second 'bus was purchased with communal funds and later individual members of the cooperative bought additional vehicles.

The provincial authorities, under pressure from members of MARISCAL CÁCERES were continually sanctioning the cooperative for infractions of the gratuitous service. Using the support of a prestigious political leader of Huancayo, the cooperative took their case to the Department of Transport (Dirección de Tránsito) in Lima, where they eventually obtained legal permission to collect fares. This success prompted the acquisition of three new vehicles.

Nevertheless, the communal enterprise entered a period of crisis due to accidents to two of the vehicles and the bad state of repair and maintenance of the others. The service only continued through the efforts of two members who invested their private capital, converting the communal organisation into a company operating along the same (but competing) lines as MARISCAL CÁCERES.

Postscript.

During the 1950's peasant communities in the Mantaro region experienced tensions in their socio-political organization which were related to the emergence of new groups within the villages who were
engaged in non-traditional economic activities, and so were brought into conflict with more traditional sectors. Simultaneously there were changes in the national political configuration, as the Apra party moved towards the right between 1956-1962. In the rural sector, the creation of Acción Popular, a party proposing modernization through a series of reforms aimed at national integration was of considerable influence. Electoral reforms introduced by Belaunde instigated an unprecedented level of political participation in the villages, and had the result of sharpening latent conflicts between the different sectors of the communities and throwing local government in crisis.

In Pucará, the process of socio-economic differentiation and the ensuing conflicts of the 1950's brought into opposition the interests of the traditional elite of the village whose power was based on control of large extensions of land with those of groups whose economic position was based on links with the external market. For various reasons, the emerging sector identified its interests with the Aprista party, while the traditional sector supported the Acción Popular, not for ideological conviction but as a means of opposing its competitors. The elections of 1963 brought about an open confrontation between the different forces of the village, which were later played out in other issues. The most notable case was that of the building of a new church, which was supported by the traditional group and opposed by the emerging sector of the community which itself was lobbying for the construction of a secondary school. Though the national government supplied the funds for the church, the traditional group was unable to persuade the community to contribute their labour (faena) to the construction of the church and was forced to employ wage labour. Thus, although the emerging sector was not able to prevent the building of the church, its construction in no way reflected their support for the project.
Case Study No. 2 - Huasicancha.
(Taken from Smith and Cano, 1974, f/o, and Hobsbawn, 1974).

Huasicancha is a legally recognised Indian community (comunidad de indígenas) of 1250 people (1963) which is situated on the West bank of the Mantaro valley. Traditionally the peasants have grown wheat, barley, broad beans and potatoes on their subsistence plots on the sheltered mountain slopes. In the past, the extensive grazing lands above Huasicancha also belonged to the community, but in 1963, apart from a small piece of land owned by the community, most of the land was held by a neighbouring hacienda, Tucle. Thus, in addition to subsistence production, the community members supplemented their living with sheep and cattle pasturage as well as selling their labour to the hacienda.

The owner of the hacienda was an absentee, and left a resident administrator in charge of the estate who was skilled in animal husbandry. There was also a permanent staff of mayordomos and caporales (foremen and assistants) who were not employed from the village itself. The hacienda employed pastores (shepherds) mainly from the village, who, in return for their work on the hacienda were permitted to graze a number of their own animals (huacchas) on the hacienda's pastures. The precise arrangements were intricate and a pastor would often graze other villagers' sheep or would occasionally send a substitute to work for him.

As well as having the opportunity to supplement their income from their subsistence plots by working on the hacienda, the villagers are increasingly under the influence of the commercial prosperity of the Mantaro region. This affects not only the sorts of crops they grow and the availability of cash income, but it also
means that many Huasicanchinos live or have spent some time living and working in the national or provincial cities and mining centres. Consequently, we are not dealing here with an undifferentiated peasant community, but one which has many contacts with a wider system of relations and communications.

**Historical Background.**

Huasicancha has always possessed communal pastures on the high puna (the cold, arid tableland of the Andes) above 4,000 metres, which were apparently usurped by Juan Iparraguire and against whom the villagers obtained an expediente (certificate, business papers) in 1607 from the Viceroy of the Republic, as local tradition has it. (Hobsbawn, 1974:132). It can be assumed from this that the legal battle for the lands had begun some years previously. The boundaries of the land that the community claimed in the 1960's are those defined in this legal document. Hacienda Tucle was formed towards the end of the sixteenth century and expanded onto the lands of the neighbouring Indian communities as a vast cattle ranch. A situation developed whereby the hacienda reduced the communities to a subsistence economy dependent on marginal lands, and drew on their labour for the herding of livestock on its own property. Thus, on one hand, there was a degree of coexistence between the communities and the hacienda.

On the other hand, hacienda Tucle formed a bloc with four other haciendas: Laive, Antapongo, Rio de la Virgen and Ingahuasi, which concerted their policy towards the communities which bordered on their lands, which in turn also maintained an interest in concerted their strategy towards the estates.

Under Colonial rule, Huasicancha was able to obtain judgements against hacienda Tucle in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
However, these were never put into practice. During the Republican period, the creation and expansion of the estates was favoured by legislation which attempted to convert the Indians into smallholders, which effectively put an end to the protection of Indian lands until the twentieth century when it became possible to acquire the legal status of comunidad indígena (indigenous community).

During the War of the Pacific (1879 - 84) peasants from the high puna around Huasbancha were recruited against the Chileans. The band that was based in Huasiancha never actually confronted the invading Chileans. The peasants, once armed, occupied and sacked the neighbouring haciendas. It was reported (Hobsbawn, 1974:133) that hacienda Tucole was reduced to 3,000 sheep, as more than forty thousand had been carried off by the villagers from nearby. By 1886 the haciendas were back in the hands of their original owners, many of whom had taken the opportunity to expand their properties amidst the confusion. Though the community of Huasiancha managed to confirm some of its rights in 1889 and 1902, the Civilista decades which followed the War of the Pacific were some of the least favourable to the Indian communities in the history of Peru.

After 1919 the situation became more favourable for the Indians. Under President Leguía (1919 - 30) provisions were made for the legal recognition of the communities and a Department of Native Affairs (Asuntos Indígenas) was set up. Huasiancha was quick to register its most indisputable titles in the Public Registers (November 1919) and immediately initiated the formal reclamation of lost lands, which comprised half of Tucole, all of Rio de la Virgen, a large part of Antapongo, the hamlet (caserio) of Palaco and some of the village of Chongos Alto. However, Huasiancha was not formally registered as a comunidad indígena until 1936.
The recognition of the advantages of registering as a comunidad indígena marks a stage in the development of communal political consciousness (Hobsbawn 1974). In the Central Highlands this crucial phase was reached between 1935 and 1945. It affects communal agitation in three main ways. Firstly, it gives more formal standing to the elected officers of the de facto community insofar as that until 1963 the comunidad indígena was the only official administrative unit of government in which the local election of officers was sanctioned and permitted. Secondly, it required the community's recognition of its collective patrimony and thus frequently grew out of communal land claims. Thirdly, the process of registering was complex and expensive and necessitated the formation of a cadre of campaigning leadership, drawn from emigrant and resident villagers, and a mechanism for collecting funds.

From the 1930's onwards the relations between the community and the hacienda began to change. Already, in the first few decades of the century the market for wool had favoured the establishment of an extensive ranching economy which introduced the cash economy to the livestock raising highland communities like Huasicancha. Sales to the market subsequently replaced the traditional barter trade with communities in different ecological zones lower down the slopes of the valley, thus cutting the reciprocal links and interdependence of the different communities. The post-war fall in the price of wool made the position of the livestock producers in the highlands extremely precarious and increased their political sensitivity.

These forces of economic modernization and demographic pressure combined to produce a process of mass migration to the cities. There seems to be a definite correlation between the growth of migration and the frequency of land invasions. However, the increased numbers
of migrants created increasing contradictions between the interests of the outresidents, the returned migrants and the permanent villagers. It provided new sources of income which could be invested in the village or in furthering village interests. It also resulted in the out-migrants' acquisition of political acumen and education. In Huasicancha migratory experience was derived from various sources, such as conscription into military service, labouring on highway construction (1934) and jobs available in Huancayo, such as carrying sacks in the market. The latter were usually paid in kind rather than in cash (e.g. in sugar) and neither military service nor jobs in highway construction allowed migrants to earn sufficient cash to buy into commerce or small businesses. Work on the coastal plantations, the mines and in the cities did, however, allow for some accumulation of cash, and it was from the organized communities of migrant comuneros in Lima that the finance for costly legal proceedings was derived.

The Land Invasions.

Huasicancha's application, in 1936 for legal recognition as a comunidad indígena was accompanied by a strategy of concerted trespassing by the peasants onto the lands they claimed. This trespassing was led by a fifty-five year old peasant who had no experience of migration but who had worked on the hacienda for some years and consequently knew the lay of the land extremely well. For this reason he was regarded with some suspicion by the Huasicanchinos. The pasturing of flocks on hacienda lands resulted in the hacendado reaching an agreement with the leader, who was allowed the use of an extent of land that he had staked out. This invasion was considered unsuccessful by the majority of the villagers since little land was
gained and the leader was the only one to benefit from it although the campaign had been waged in the name of the community.

From 1945 on labour relations between the community and the hacienda were rapidly deteriorating. At this time it seems that Huasicancha and Chongos Alto were the two main centres of activism in the area. This was a period of great labour shortage since peasants had the alternative of working in the mines, thus Tuole and the other haciendas formed a pact to concert their strategies towards the communities by not employing each others' pastores. On Christmas Day, 1946, the peasants of Huasicancha invaded an extensive part of the hacienda with their livestock, destroyed the boundary walls and refused to evacuate the land. The rest of the communities in the area followed suite, until on January 23rd, 1947, a number of peasants were massacred by the army. The Huasicanchinos, after haggling and bloodshed, made an agreement with the hacendado that they were to be "sold" a piece of land in return for the digging of a trench which would divide this land from that of the hacienda. The conflict took place out of court and the sale was never registered in the Huancayo Registry of Properties since such exchanges were not legally recognised under the Constitution of 1933. Hacienda Tuole sold this land to the community on the assumption that in return the Huasicanchinos would forgo their other claims to its lands. However, at the same time, the community claimed it had documents dating back to 1607 which showed they had rights to virtually all the pasturage of the hacienda.

The most recent campaign (1963) for land waged by the community of Huasicancha clearly demonstrates that the action taken was the product of conflict between the different groups of Huasicanchinos and that decisions and strategies were formulated independently of the policies espoused by the two main peasant federations. FENCAP
(Federaión Nacional de Campesinos del Perú) and FEDECOJ (Federación Departmental de Las Comunidades de Junín). Furthermore, the events leading up to the invasion this time demonstrate the interrelationships of the national political environment with the arena of local level decision-making. Firstly, in the elections of 1962 and 1963, the peasants of the Sierra were considered by the main parties to hold the balance of the votes, hence in their election campaigns promises of land reform were prominent. Secondly, the wave of agrarian unrest which had begun in the late 1950's reached the Central Highlands in 1963, and invasions in this region began in the summer and reached a climax towards the end of the year.

The campaign of the Huasiachinos started on September 2nd, 1963 when the personero of the community, Demetrio de la Cruz Lazo, on behalf of the comuneros who had elected him to office, drew up a petition to the President of the Republic concerning the community's lost lands. He then went to Huancayo and Lima where in a number of gatherings he read out the petition to the out-residents of Huasiachana. Few of the Lima residents were in favour of presenting the petition since to them it implied a lack of faith in the Government's promise to deal with the peasants' problems over land. They argued that the document should only be presented once all the out-residents of the community had heard and approved it. De La Cruz maintained that the villagers were equally capable of judging the national situation as were the city residents and that the present state of rural unrest would, if anything, push the Government towards land reform. Thus the petition was presented by the more sophisticated Lima residents without resort to violence on the part of the villagers.
In this episode the dichotomy between the interests of the out-residents and the villagers can be seen at play. The villagers saw the situation in terms of an environment that favoured land reform, and, moreover, politicians like Belaunde were advocating peasant initiative. They saw this as an opportunity to regain their lost communal pasturage on the basis of their own initiative. The city-dwellers, on the other hand, did not want the villagers to proceed with their plans, since the villagers already had flocks of sheep which could make use of the pastures, while they, the out-residents, needed time to build up flocks of their own. The city-dwellers were close to bureaucratic channels and so were in a position to influence a Government administered Land Reform programme. However, an invasion initiated by the peasants would make it difficult to maintain control and to stake their claims to the communal land. As a result, the city-dwellers tried to delay any direct action.

These conflicting relationships can be seen again in the attitudes of the different groups of Huasicanchinos to the peasant federations and their organizers, Elias Tacunan and Elias Yaurivilca (FEDECOJ and FENCAP respectively). \(^1\) The fact that FEDECOJ had no party allegiance made Tacunan a politically very powerful man in the elections of 1962 and 1963, and Belaunde, in his electoral campaign stressed his close friendship with him. Consequently, the

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1. In fact both men were Huasicanchinos by birth. Tacunan had been a member of APRA from 1930, later an organizer in the mines, and founded FEDECOJ in 1958, which he had built up on the basis of Huasicanoha, Chongos Alto and a few other neighbouring communities. Tacunan broke with APRA in 1959, disappointed with its betrayal of the peasant movement, and founded an independent "Communal Party". Yaurivilca and FENCAP were also supported by APRA. The federation was mainly based on the plantations on the coast, and, in contrast to FEDECOJ, suffered from a notoriously centralized control.
the city-dwellers, in their patronage relationship with Tacunan were in a position to influence Belaunde. In Huasicanoha however, the villagers were in favour of small, localized confrontations rather than diffuse, ineffective bargaining through the federation. Tacunan, then, was never considered by the peasants as an outstanding and inspirational leader. In fact, he had been ousted from the position of personero by De La Cruz. Moreover, the federations supported a policy of moderation in accordance with the Government's promises of land reform.

In November 1963, the community of Huasicanoha once again lodged a claim against hacienda Tucle. When this legal ploy failed they invaded 3,000 hectares of pasture with 4,000 beasts and eventually occupied some 15,000 hectares of land. This time the estates no longer wielded the political power to bring in the army for reprisals, and in spite of judgements against them, the Huasicanchinos remained on the land until the Agrarian Reform Law was declared in 1969. They finally received a judgement recognizing their claims in 1970.
CHAPTER 6.

POLITICAL ACTIVITIES ON THREE HACIENDAS.

Case Study No. 3 - YANAMARCA.

(Taken from Alberti and Sánchez, 1973 and Alberti, 1970).

Yanamarca is situated on the boundary of the village of Acolla, a district capital, in the province of Jauja and possesses some of the most fertile irrigated land in the Yanamarca valley. Since the last century, the hacienda has been the property of the state and its rent destined for the upkeep of educational centres. The usufruct rights to the hacienda have been contracted to a succession of tenants for a stipulated period at a time. The rent includes the right to use the labour of the peasants living on the land and the relations between them and the patron is similar to those on other haciendas.

In 1645 a native cacique bought the hacienda from the King of Spain and almost immediately sold it to the Dominican convent of St. Thomas of Aquinas of Lima. Until 1825 it was rented out to individuals in emphyteusis, when the state took possession of the hacienda and arranged for its rents to go to various educational institutions; firstly to the Colegio de Artes y Ciencias de Ocopa in Huancayo, then to a secondary school in Huancayo and finally, in 1907 to the Colegio San José in Jauja.

Internal Structure of the Hacienda.

The renter was usually an absentee and charged an administrator with the management of the property. He in turn relied on a Manager (Mayordomo), a warehouseman (almancero) and two foremen (csporales), under which there were approximately one hundred workers comprising 55 tenants with full-size plots of land (faeneros completos).
The principal obligation of the faeneros was to work four days a week on the lands of the hacienda, though an assistant was often sent instead, and to provide draught animals. In exchange, a small plot of land (parcela) was received, which varied in size according to the category of faenero and a system of favouritism and rewards for loyalty set up by the hacendado. The peasants also had the free use of pastures in exchange for a male sheep each year. In addition to labour obligations the peasants also had to supply their own tools, carry water and firewood for the hacienda house (casa hacienda) and fertilize the pastures with the manure from their flocks. Though there was little opportunity for economic and social advancement, a small group of privileged peasants existed amongst those with larger plots of land and holding positions of authority.

The hacienda remained under conditions of apparent acceptance conformity on the part of the peasants until 1928 when the renter changed and the ensuing harsher conditions of work elicited the first organised protests from the peasants, and the foundation, in 1931, of a syndicate, the Sociedad Unión Agricultores de Yanacmarca. This signified that the group of peasants was acquiring a consciousness of the need to organise themselves as a front against the power of the tenant. Furthermore, evidence suggests that the faeneros received help and collaboration of urban political groups, notably in the ideological influence of APRA party, which was active in Jauja during that period.

The Movement of 1945.

The original concern of the peasants was an improvement in the conditions of work and the end of the exchange of services with the
hacienda and its substitution by wage labour. This basic plaint of the peasants was brought forward at a time when working conditions were exacerbated by other factors, namely an increase in population (in 1933-40 it increased 12 per cent from 515 to 577 inhabitants), without a corresponding increase in the amount of land available for production. Moreover, the hacienda had opposed the building of a village school. This occurred at a time when there was a feedback of experiences from the mines and cities and a national and local climate of political support for peasant organisations through the ideology of APRA.

Despite the sensitivity of the situation on the hacienda, the hacienda adhered rigidly to traditional modes of control, trying to prevent the education of peasant children in the school of Acolla, insisting on the performance of personal services and that young people should enter the labour force of the hacienda. In this context, the tenants called a general meeting in the first months of 1945 in which they elected a group of delegates to confront the hacienda with their grievances. For the first time too, the jumamasquis turned to the administrative offices of the government for intervention, which forced the hacienda to adopt an attitude of conciliation. In the presence of a representative of the Labour Office (Dirección de Trabajo) of Lima, they made the following agreement (10th May, 1945), to abolish the obligation of supplying two animals a year for the rights of pasturage, and the obligation to work with assistants and to supply pack animals and work implements. On their part, the faeneros would comply with all the remaining obligations.

However, the hacienda failed to fulfill the agreement, and in November 1945 the jumamasquis sent a petition to the Ministry of Justice and Labour (Ministerio de Justicia y Trabajo) in which they
denounced the hacendado for failing to fulfill his part of the agreement. This time the conflict was taken beyond the offices in the provincial capitals, as far as the national offices in Lima. As a result of the petition, the Office of Indian Affairs (Dirección de Asuntos Indígenas) called the hacendado and the workers to the complaints office in Lima (December 1946). Though both parties appeared, the hacendado argued that there existed between himself and the tenants an agreement made in the Labour Office, and that nothing could be discussed while this agreement was unfulfilled. The documents were returned to the tenants and the Office's intervention in the case abandoned. The faeneros promptly denounced the hacendado's maneuvering, and asked once more for the Office's intervention. At the same time, they applied to take their claims higher to the Ministry of Justice and Work. These efforts were frustrated when the Ministry declared (July 1947) that the papers should pass to the Office of Labour (Dirección General de Trabajo) which favoured the hacendado, since it was in this office that the original agreement had been made, in which the faeneros had agreed to fulfill their obligations.

Undeterred, the leaders denounced the patron for his failure to fulfill the agreements of 1945 and asked the Ministry of Government and Police (Ministerio de Gobierno y Policía) to protect those that the patron had branded as agitators. They took the same arguments to the Labour Office in Lima and finally took their protests to the President of the Republic. The outcome was that the Ministry of Government ordered six of the leaders to be dismissed from the hacienda for being agitators. The peasants asked for the annulment of the decree, claiming that these six leaders were not the only ones to make the petition, but that they had all been concerned with it. The six leaders personally solicited the hacendado not to apply the
sanction, who agreed on the condition that they signed a statement that they would not indulge in subversive activities. This they did, and as a result the peasants rejected their leadership. New leaders took over, and their strategies were intensified with the aid of the APRA parliamentary representative. They were on the point of gaining concrete benefits when parliament was dissolved by the coup, which installed General Odría in 1948. The subsequent persecution of APRA supporters cut the external support on which they had been relying, and popular mobilisation throughout the country was controlled.

In 1950, the contract for the hacienda was signed with the new renter, the former APRA parliamentary representative (diputado), who intended to increase production through the introduction of modern agricultural techniques and the cultivation of industrial crops. The new renter knew the aspirations of the workers and consented to the following:

1. A reduction of the services of the assistants (ayudantes) except for sowing and harvesting.
2. Payment of jornaleros for labouring on holidays.
3. Payment for use of mules in the service of the hacienda.

These terms were laid down in a contract that each faenero had to sign, marking the beginning of the rationalization of production relations.


The tensions leading up to the movement were similar to those of 1945 except that the problems had become more acute. The population had increased 30 per cent, from 577 in 1940 to 757 in 1960, which had not been accompanied by an increased access to resources. New perspectives from experience in the mines and cities were more widespread amongst the
villagers. Furthermore between 1955-59 a *patronato escolar* (board of trustees concerned with educational matters) had been organised for the construction of a new school. This was significant mainly as it intensified collective life, for example in the construction of the premises through *faenas*, reunions to celebrate the opening and closing of the school year, and on the basis of these activities, the registration of the village as an indigenous community was first considered.

The roots of this second movement were in the labour ideology brought back by young migrants which found a receptive audience among the discontented *faeneros*. Furthermore, the circulation of propaganda from miners' unions suggested the organisation of a syndicate on the *hacienda* to the *faeneros*. This proposal was received with enthusiasm by those who had been least favoured by the *patrón*, while the group *faeneros* and other employees who had obtained certain benefits from *hacienda* system opposed the idea, and felt that those who were promoting it wanted to evade work or were communists.

The factor precipitating action this time was the bankruptcy of the *hacienda*. The *hacendado* had obtained a loan from the Agricultural Development Bank (*Banco de Fomento Agropecuario*) for his programme of modernisation. The failure of the crops two years running meant that he was unable to cover the loan from the bank and the acuteness of the financial problems affected the *faeneros* insofar as the *hacendado's* functionaries tried to make them work harder. Moreover, the more privileged tenants had succeeded in monopolizing the disposable resources, especially land, which increased the general level of discontent. The higher ranking employees (*empleados*) had formed their own small farms within the *hacienda* and had taken the opportunity to use tractors, fertilizers, insecticides and the labour of the *faeneros*.
for their own benefit.

Under these conditions the ideological teaching of the leaders had a greater impact than before, and at an assembly on 10th April 1961, even those who had previously been indifferent to the formation of a syndicate began to identify with the movement. The mere foundation of the syndicate was insufficient to initiate the struggle against the patrón, this required official recognition from the Regional Office of Labour (Subdirección Regional de Trabajo). The leaders were at first refused recognition on the grounds that the workers did not receive wages. Furthermore, the Unión Sindical de Junín, the centre for syndicates in the department, was affiliated to APRA and refused to help the faeneros since the hacendado had been a parliamentary representative for the party.

At that time a new syndicate centre was being formed, controlled by leaders of the left on the basis of a federation of bank employees. In order to get legal recognition they had to increase the number of organisations in their ranks. It was here that the leaders of Yanamarca found the necessary support and the syndicate was duly inscribed on the registers of the Labour Office of Huancayo, receiving official recognition in 1962.

Subsequently, the peasants had an instrument of support for revindicative activities, and their first action was to present a petition (May 1963) demanding the payment of salaries and the resolution of problems discussed in 1955. The hacendado was given three days to resolve the problems after which the protests were presented to the Labour Office, and two days later the Office notified the renter to initiate a discussion of the petition. At the end of the month the tenants denounced his failure to do this, giving 72 hours
notice of their intention to go on an indefinite strike. On the 9th July the strike was declared, work on the hacienda being paralyzed until pressure from the authorities in Huancayo forced a discussion of the petitions.

The hacendado and the peasant leaders came together for a discussion in the presence of a representative of the Labour Office. The renter refused to pay a minimum wage but made a few minor concessions. The leaders, dissatisfied, arranged three more meetings with the hacendado and still failed to modify his position. It was at this stage that the peasants realised that the only way to improve conditions on the hacienda was through the expulsion of the hacendado.

In September 1963 the peasants held a general assembly and elected a commission to take a petition to the President of the Republic asking for the expropriation of the hacienda in their favour. A month later they sent a further document requesting an answer from the President, reiterating their demands. Eventually a reply came from the National Office of Agrarian Reform (Oficina Nacional de Reforma Agraria) suggesting that they waited for the promulgation of a land reform law.

During this period of waiting the financial crisis of the hacendado reached the point where he owed two years rent and had forfeited the renewal of the contract. The faeneros asked to rent the hacienda themselves and the college merely imposed the conditions that they formed a cooperative. For this purpose they were put in touch with the National Institute of Cooperatives (Instituto Nacional de Cooperativas) in Huancayo to advise them on the formation of an organising committee. The rent was subsequently reduced from 70,000 to 35,000 soles per annum.
In May 1964 the Agrarian Reform Law was passed and the peasants became the proprietors of the hacienda. In December a livestock cooperative was founded, the "Cooperative Agrícola - Ganadera Yanamarca Limitida", and 50 hectares of land were allocated for the collective cultivation of wheat, and 4 hectares for the subsistence needs of each family.

Postscript.

Until the expulsion of the hacendado, the faeneros had acted together to achieve this end despite the conflicting interests arising from their internal stratification. Once the question of the distribution of lands arose, the concrete interests of both groups were brought to light. The group that had received benefits through the patronage of the hacendado wished to maintain their plots, whereas those that had not access to his favours preferred a redistribution of lands. This induced a wave of tensions and conflict, the former group pressuring for the creation of a comunidad de indígenas in accordance with the model of neighbouring communities in which equality of landholding was not the norm, thereby preserving their advantageous position. The latter sector of Yanamarquinos supported the formation of a cooperative which would be organised with the aid of state agencies which would enforce an equitable division of land.

The problem was only decisively resolved after the installation of the Military junta, brought to power by the coup of October 1968. The position of the cooperativists was officially backed and the opposition group lost its external support with the suppression of parliamentary activities.
Case Study No.4 - Tingo.

(Taken from Alberti and Sanchez 1973 and Alberti 1970).

**Hacienda** Tingo is located in one of the highest parts of the Yanamarca valley, close to the urban centres of Jauja and Huancayo. Documents indicate the existence of the hacienda as early as 1753, though legal battles over inheritance and the invasion of hacienda lands by neighbouring communities have resulted in considerable confusion over the titles to the land.

Under the hacienda system approximately 70 peasants lived on the land under the customary arrangements between tenant farmers and their landlord. The colonos worked five days a week for the hacendado in return for the usufruct rights to small plots of land, usually the least productive land on the hacienda. They were only allowed to construct a certain type of housing made from adobe in which six to ten persons lived. The family worked on this plot of land and kept a few animals for themselves. No wages were paid for services to the hacienda. The men had to sow and collect in the hacendado's crops, and for certain months of the year were obliged to live in temporary settlements so that their livestock could manure the hacendado's land. The women performed domestic tasks in the hacienda house and children between the ages of six and twelve had to mind the herds of the hacendado. Each peasant was obliged to supply his own animals and tools for agricultural labour. They also had to transport the commercial crops to Jauja for sale in the market. During the periods of heaviest labour obligations the hacendado had coca distributed or supplied a meal a day to the labourers. Consequently, the colonos had very little time to work for their own subsistence, and rather than taking what little surplus they had from their crops to market, they exchanged goods with traders who
came to the hacienda from other areas.

Generally labour relations were not conflictive at Tingo and there is no documentation of discontent and protest among the peasants prior to the 1940's. The hacendado usually had a network of informants which allowed him to anticipate problems and to intervene in awkward situations with the appropriate benefits or sanctions.

**Historical Background.**

In the 1920's and 1930's, the inheritance problems of the hacienda became increasingly complex, so that when the hacendado died in 1944, the litigation had still not been settled. He had obtained the land as a trustee (depositario) but after paying the rent for 30 years had unilaterally declared the property to be his own. He left his possessions to his two sons and after two years of legal disputation an agreement was reached in a tribunal as to whom the property should fall. By a judicial decision the eldest son took over as a trustee of the property, but the original problem of an uncle's share in the inheritance had still not been solved.

The new hacendado lived in Jauja and only rarely visited the property. His expensive style of life combined with a relatively small income from the hacienda forced him to mortgage his lands in order to cover the cost of administering the hacienda. For several years the hacendado took relatively little interest in the agricultural work and only visited the property to collect the annual harvest.

It was during these years that the peasants were able to enjoy greater freedom on the hacienda and took advantage of travelling to the lower part of the valley and to the city of Jauja. Before this period, only the hacendado's favourites had been allowed to leave the
property. Now some of the young men went to work in the mines of La Oroya, others travelled through the towns and villages of the area as musicians. It was thus that the peasants of Tingo came into greater contact with the neighbouring communities which were not tied to a hacienda and whose inhabitants consequently enjoyed greater social mobility through a wide range of economic opportunities and by giving their children an education. These kinds of contacts suggested to the colonos of Tingo the idea of having a school of their own on the hacienda.

At this time a young man arrived in Tingo who had married a girl from the village. He took on a small plot on the boundary of the hacienda, assuming the same obligations and the same status as the colonos. This young man was of peasant origins but had migrated from his own village to work in the foundry of Cerro De Pasco in La Oroya where he had managed to save some money and to study in his spare time. He had then been a student at the University of San Marcos in Lima, where he had been active in the student body of APRA. After the military coup in 1948 which brought Odría to power, members of the Aprista party were persecuted and many of its members fled to Chile or went into hiding in the Sierra. After working once again in La Oroya, the student arrived in Tingo where he concealed his identity from the peasants.

The student did not immediately assume an influential position in the village, but in 1945 the peasants became concerned with the issue of education and how to get a school built in the village. The student was in an excellent position to advise them and give them information on this subject. He knew the national system of education and the legal procedures that had to be taken in order to receive attention from the ministerial offices. In 1945 an education committee
was elected, whose members presented their request to the District Inspector of Education in Acolla. This inspector presented them with two alternatives: either they could contract a school teacher whom they would pay with their own funds, or they could try to persuade the owner of the hacienda to install a school. In fact, under the law, the hacendado was obliged to provide a school for his tenants. When they approached the hacendado he argued that his property was too small to be classified as a hacienda. It was only a fundo (farm) and so he was not obliged to comply with the law.

Consequently, the peasants had to finance the project themselves. They collected dues with which to pay the school teacher, gave him eggs, potatoes, meat and firewood for subsistence, and constructed somewhere for him to live. The first class for fifteen children took place in an abandoned windmill.

Nevertheless, the colonos continued in their attempts to obtain a subsidy from the Ministry of Education, since by 1946 they were already finding it increasingly difficult to finance their children's education. They decided to organize a formal governing body of the village, with an elected president, treasurer and other officers so that they could present their request with greater authority to the Ministry. The delegate who took the request to the Ministry returned with a promise of help on the condition that the school mistress employed should be properly qualified. In 1947, the school was properly registered and inaugurated, and the village was consequently able to call on the assistance of the political and educational authorities of the district when needed.

At the same time the district authorities approved the elevation of Tingo from the status of oasario (hamlet) to anexo
(annexe), which gave it the advantage of having direct political links with the capital of the district. Three weeks later the village decided to organize an educational board of trustees (patronato escolar) to supervise educational matters.

The hacendado, on his rare visits to Tingo, was surprised by the interest the peasants demonstrated towards education. His attitude shortly changed from indifference to total opposition and in 1948 he refused to maintain the school on his property, thus forcing the peasants to build a school for themselves. They turned to a sister of the hacendado for help, asking for some land in the cemetery which was registered in her name. Eventually a price was negotiated and they obtained a small plot of land for the school.

In addition, the peasants had decided to try to obtain legal recognition as an indigenous community from the Ministry of Labour and Indigenous Affairs (Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Indígenas). The fact that the hacendado's property titles were not in order seemed to be good grounds for making the claim.

The Political Activities of the 1950's.

These changes in organization among the peasants coincided with the financial crisis of the hacendado who was obliged to mortgage the hacienda. He subsequently tried to exhort more work from the colonos by increasing the sanctions on those suspected of avoiding their work obligations. He began to visit the hacienda more frequently and dismissed some of the peasants who complained of their excessive work load. In return, the peasants began to work less productively, which contributed to the further deterioration of the hacendado's financial position.
In order to ensure that the agricultural work was carried out during his absence the hacendado appointed an administrator (caporal) to supervise agricultural activities. As was usually the case, the position was taken up by one of the colonos.

However, the greater the pressure of work on the colonos, the greater was their discontent, since they had now lost some of the benefits they had enjoyed in previous years. The functioning of the school was practically interrupted by the reimposition of pastoral duties on children, and the peasants' capacity to make autonomous decisions and interact with the external world was almost eliminated. Moreover, the hacendado resorted to coercion to enforce his orders. He imprisoned peasants, confiscated their animals and expelled people from their lands for disobedience.

On May 10th, 1952, a meeting was called in which it was decided to register Tingo as an indigenous community, with the aim of furthering the "material and moral progress" of the village (Alberti and Sanchez, 1973:171). Ten days later in a general assembly, the indigenous community of Tingo was founded extra-officially. The provisional president of the Junta Comunal (community council) stressed the importance of taking a petition to the Ministry of Labour and Indian Affairs for the legal recognition of the community, and, at the same time, six leaders were elected to the Junta. The most important position went to the ex-student who had the responsibility of representing the community in legal transactions. Since he had some familiarity with national legislation he was best suited among all the colonos for this position.

In a third meeting of the Junta Comunal the colonos were informed of the necessary prerequisites for the legal recognition
of Tingo as an indigenous community. One of these was that the group of people who were presenting the petition should have performed in collective work parties for the benefit of the community. In order to comply with this stipulation a *faena* (work party) was called to make repairs to the church. At a fourth meeting it was decided that all men over the age of eighteen should attend the general assemblies, and that a fine would be imposed for non-attendance.

At this point the *hacendado* heard about these events through the network of informers. His reaction was to try to reimpose the former conditions of work by force. However, the peasants were by now more aware of their rights and knew which laws and government offices they could call on if in need of help. When the *hacendado* tried to tighten his control over the *colonos* by breaking up their organizational activities, they reacted by demanding payment for the services they had performed in previous years. A legal battle ensued, and after a year's litigation the following agreement was reached:

1. The *colonos* would work one day less a week for the *hacendado*.
2. They would not be obliged to take their animals to fertilize his lands.
3. They would be allowed two free days three times a year for the celebration of *fiestas* without having to pay the *hacendado* for absenting themselves.

Despite these substantial gains the *colonos* were still not satisfied with their situation and began to think in terms of eliminating the *hacendado-colono* relationship altogether.

In the months following the litigation a neighbouring *hacendado* appeared on the scene with whom the *hacendado* of Tingo had had a running battle for many years of the possession of the *fundo*. They were distantly related and, hearing of the conflict at Tingo, he had made contacts with the peasant leaders, with a view to recovering his
inheritance. He invited the leaders to Jauja, where he informed them that he held the legal titles to the land and that he was offering them for sale. At this point (1954) no definite agreement was reached concerning the purchase of the land.

Meanwhile, the hacendado of Tingo found his financial situation deteriorating still further as the colonos enjoyed less arduous labour obligations. Once again he resorted to hard tactics and announced that anyone disobeying his orders would be expelled from the fundo. He subsequently gave the one of the peasant leaders fifteen days to leave the property. However, the peasants were now sufficiently experienced in legal matters to go directly to a lawyer in Jauja to advise them in this matter. They were immediately recommended to buy the lands offered to them the previous year. At the beginning of 1955, twenty-nine colonos purchased these lands, thus transforming themselves into bona fide proprietors.

1955 marked the climax of the efforts of the peasants to obtain their independence from the hacendado and to obtain the status of an indigenous community. In May 1955, the villagers decided to work in communal parties outside the hacienda to obtain money for community projects such as the building of an altar for the church. It was later decided that each member of the community should contribute 35 soles towards the expenses of sending representatives to Lima with a petition. It was also agreed that the appointment of the village head should be confirmed by the Justice of the Peace in Acolla, a move which was aimed at increasing his status vis-à-vis government officials. This first trip to Lima appears to have been a preliminary, information-seeking expedition, and on its return to Tingo the delegation arranged a collection of a further 800 soles for further trips to the capital.
At this stage the extra-official organization of the village was gaining impetus and people from the neighbouring area who previously had not participated in the colonos' efforts to obtain independence from the hacendado were now seeking the advantage of membership of the community. The admission of two of these people to the community was approved on payment of 100 soles, a sheep and a pig each. The peasants also decided to fine members of the village, to the tune of 500 soles, for failure to participate in communal activities.

Just as events appeared to be going in favour of the colonos, all the hacendados of the area formed an alliance which caused a sudden setback to the peasants' activities. Rumour had spread to Jauja that the colonos did not only want the lands of Tingo but were intending to extend their claims to the neighbouring haciendas. The reaction of the hacendados was to arrange for the peasant leaders to be arrested under the pretext of having used an illegal form of the official titles, an infraction that was punishable by imprisonment. The community's official documents were subsequently confiscated.

The peasants were not easily subdued and called on the Ministry of Government and Police (Ministerio de Gobierno y Policía) through a diputado (parliamentary representative) of the province to help them. At the request of the diputado the police made an investigation of Tingo, but concluded that the colonos had no right to the lands they claimed and that they had no grounds for petitioning for their recognition as an indigenous community, since they could not fulfill the requisites set down by the law. The colonos were not deterred, and subsequently sent a petition to the President of the Republic, in which they explained their problems and laid out the basis of their claims.
During this time the hacendado of Tingo took steps to make the judge of Jauja intervene in the intended purchase of the hacienda from the heir apparent, by the peasants. Somewhat surprisingly, the judge requested him to present his own titles, legally regularized, and bound him to do this within fifteen days.

On Christmas Day 1955, the peasants celebrated in a general assembly, the release of the president of the Junta from prison, and affirmed their intention to continue pressing their petition. The final confrontation between the peasants and the hacendado took place a few months later. The peasants unanimously refused to continue working for the hacendado and took possession of the lands that they had purchased. It was harvest time, and as the bank was waiting to confiscate the produce anyway, the hacendado decided to abandon the scene.

Post-script.

Thus the peasants of Tingo took charge of the hacienda and made an agreement with the Agricultural Development Bank (Banco de Fomento Agropecuario), that they would pay the hacendado's debts, with the production from the land. Even so, the peasants were still determined to obtain legal recognition as an indigenous community, and sent a petition requesting this to President Prado.

In 1957 the affair was peacefully resolved with the former hacendado in the Office of Indigenous Affairs of Huancayo. In 1958, a contract was signed with the following conditions:-

1. The ex-hacendado would regularize the property titles at the end of the year.

2. The workers would have the lands measured out and would then pay for their value.

At the end of the year the hacendado had still not fulfilled his
part of the contract which produced a series of very expensive legal suits for the peasants. By 1968, the peasants were still waiting to obtain the property titles to the land in order to make their purchase. However, the *hacendado* was unable to present them since his litigation with the joint heir was still pending.

In spite of these continuing legal problems, the peasants of Tingo maintained their possession of the land, and succeeded in improving their economic situation considerably, through the cultivation of commercial crops and the use of fertilizers and improved agricultural technology. Moreover, high levels of communal participation were maintained in public works, and in this way a cement bridge, a school, a sports stadium and a plaza were constructed.

1. The year the study was made.
Case Study No.5 - VICOS.
(Taken from Barnett, 1960; Holmberg, 1960 and Vasquez, 1965).

_Hacienda_ Vicos is located 270 miles to the north east of Lima in the north-south running valley of Callejón de Huaylas in the Andes. The region contains both haciendas and small-holding communities, with which the 1785 Indians (1950) of the hacienda are linked through intermarriage. The hacienda was owned (at the time Barnett studied it) by the Public Benefit Society of the nearby town of Huarás, an institution operating under the Peruvian Ministry of Health.

In 1952 there were 252 peones working on the hacienda. In return for the use of their small plots of land, chaoras, on which they cultivated corn, potatoes, and wheat, each head of household had to contribute three days a week of his own or a substitute’s labour to the patron (the renter). In addition to work in the fields of the hacienda, approximately nineth other workers were given tasks. Among these were hortelanos who worked in the hacienda garden, tapacos, who guarded the hacienda fields and irrigated them at night, guardianos who guarded the store room and the area surrounding the casa hacienda (the hacienda house), a mulero who was on call twenty-four hours a day to supply horses to the patron and his staff, and a repuntero, who kept account of the cattle pastured on the puna (cold tableland), and collected a small toll fee from peasants transporting supplies to and from neighbouring villages. There were also six to seven mayorales (foremen) who were generally older and more prestigious than the majority of the peasants. It fell to these men to call the coca breaks and to report non-attendance.

1. The year the Cornell project took over and rented the hacienda as part of a research programme of "guided change".
Though until 1952 the economy of Vicos was largely subsistence, certain peasants had managed to accumulate sufficient wealth to possess cattle. Large amounts of cash could be readily obtained by these individuals by selling their livestock to dealers outside the hacienda. Other Vicosinos obtained cash by selling their labour from Thursdays to Saturdays in the neighbouring town of Huaras, but were poorly paid. Some villagers migrated seasonally to the coastal plantations as contract workers, while others served as "harvest nomads" in the Casma River valley, exchanging their labour for a share in the grain harvest. The women often hired themselves out as domestic servants to the Mestizos. A few men sold baskets, charcoal and ice in the local markets.

Consequently, social stratification and differentiation did exist to some extent on Vicos. The wealthy Vicosinos who possessed cattle could obtain additional human labour to cultivate their fields in exchange for lending their oxen or beasts of burden to other peasants. They also had more free time to attend to their own crops and animals and were not dependent on the good graces of others for the initiation of ploughing or planting. Furthermore, they could obtain cash by hiring out their cattle, sufficient to provide for the subsistence needs of their families. The most important aspect of their position was, however, their ability to have cash on hand at short notice. In this sense they acted as local bankers and were able to tie other peasants in dependent, debt relationships to themselves. They were also in a position to bribe the Mestizo officials in the towns and to place themselves in relatively favourable relationships vis-à-vis the employees and administrators on the hacienda.

Though Barnett stresses the lack of initiative and lack of a feeling of community among the Vicosinos, there is evidence of co-
operation between individuals, and on a wider basis, a certain consensus on attitudes towards the hacienda system. Minka (exchange labour) relationships existed between individuals and occasionally involved some twenty men in jobs such as building a house or ploughing a large field. These larger scale events were accompanied by music played by a band and liberal quantities of chicha (maize beer), coca and food. Moreover, there appears to have been some kind of structuring of activities against the hacienda system. Barnett (1960:42) mentions that there were standard forms for evading the work obligations to the patron and that the Vicosinos indulged in a large amount of sanctioned and unsanctioned theft which allowed them to beat the system without actually challenging it.

Historical Background.

The material I have examined on Vicos (Barnett, 1960; Holmberg, 1960 and Vasquez, 1965), does not deal in any depth with the historical development of the relationship between the Indians and the hacienda prior to the twentieth century. Therefore, it is not possible to know at which stage the Indian lands were taken from them, nor the method by which this was achieved. Furthermore, nothing is indicated concerning the Indians' political activities prior to this period. Barnett merely mentions that the Vicosinos were not involved in the rebellion led by Atasparia in the Callejon de Huaylas in 1885, even though his forces controlled the town of Huaras for some time. Consequently, the account is limited to the present century. At the turn of the century there was a series of contracts with different renters who were rarely on time with payments, and who petitioned for the lowering of the rental price. In 1911 the contract with Don Manuel Lostenau ran out, who justified his failure to pay on the grounds that
the Indians were insubordinate and had refused to work in the fields of the hacienda. Accordingly, he charged the Society with failure to fulfill the contract which had specified that a certain number of peons would be available for work. However, in his report the Director of the Public Benefit Society stated:

"It is certain that the inhabitants of the fundo (farm) are exploited. They are rented out to work on other fundos or in the mines, at some distance away and under very difficult conditions". (quoted in Barnett, 1960:88).

In 1912, the Society received an offer from one Fidel Larco to exchange Vicos for property he possessed in Lima. Two representatives of the Indians, Colonia and Francisco Sánchez, appealed to the central government to declare improper the barter of the hacienda for this property and petitioned for their own right to acquire the land by making payments over time. The petition was presented to the government through the offices of the Asociación Pro-Indígena (Pro-Indian Association), which existed between 1909 and 1917, which was organised by a group of intellectuals and provided free legal aid to the Indians. This Association was particularly concerned with organised, cooperative Indian communities, and sponsored legislation on their behalf.

According to the petition presented in 1912, the projected change in ownership would have resulted either in "the mass expulsion of the Indians from the hacienda" or "the continuation of slavery". (La Cronica, October 4th, 1912, quoted in Barnett, p.89). In a petition, the Association argued that the inhumanity of Losteanaus treatment of the Indians had made them resolve to bid for the rent or sale of the hacienda, and requested the government the facilitate such a move. Furthermore, they cited documents dating from 1644 and 1870 purporting that the lands had been usurped from the Indians by
Spanish colonizers, and appointed a doctor in Huara's to act as advisor to the Vicosinos.

The Judicial Department found that there was no law giving preference to the vicosinos over others in the acquisition of the hacienda, and declared that the sale must take place through competitive bidding within the terms of sale established by the Society. The Director of the Public Benefit Society suggested that the best solution to the problem would be the expropriation of the hacienda by the government and payment of the value to be made to the Society. The lands would then be divided out in proportion to the number of people in each family and the plots would be amortized over a period of time. Such a solution would have required an Act of Congress, and consequently never materialized. Vicos was not exchanged for the property in Lima, and Lostenau gave up the lease, owing the Society more than 5,000 soles.

In 1913, Emilio Villa took over the property as agent of the Society, and the following year the hacienda was again rented for ten years to Emil Godenzi and Benjamin Valverde. When Villa returned over the property to the Society he lauded his own efforts to rehabilitate the property and complained that most of the cultivated land had been usurped by the Indians, but that he had recovered most of the land and sown it for the hacienda. The low levels of production, he maintained, were due to the insubordination of the Indians and their pride in having forced Lostenau out - against which he had no sanctions. In 1916 once more the Society was forced

1. In fact, the precedent that the Association hoped to establish was not given the status of law until 1946.
to find new renters because payments had not been met, and this
time the property was rented to Victor Vardes and Jose Ferreya for ten
years, with the proviso that they must purchase the movable capital
of the hacienda, namely the cattle. By the following year they had
failed to make both rent and capital payments and the contract was
rescinded. The hacienda was then let to a Moises Estremaduro for
ten years on condition that the Society could terminate the contract
without prejudice if it found a buyer.

In 1925, the Vicosinos again sent a delegation to Lima, but
whereas the protest of 1912 had been concerned specifically with
the abuses of the patron Lostenau, this time they were aiming at the
disposal altogether of the patron and the creation of a comunidad de
indígenas (indigenous community), that is, they wanted the hacienda
lands divided up for the use of each family and the puna to be kept
for common pasture. According to the account of Adolfo Garcia, a
mestizo of Aprista affiliation and mayor of the district capital of
Marcara, the events leading up to the protest were as follows (p.102-111):

He himself was interested in getting back some of the lands and
rights his father had lost and moreover was the political rival of
one of the hacienda employees. When a surveyor came to make a road
through the valley in 1921, he learnt from him about the Indian
movements in Central Peru, where this man had intervened on behalf
of the government. Through this encounter he began to understand in
a fuller sense the conditions of exploitation that the Indians had
suffered at the hands of the hacendados. In Vicos, the peons had
been harshly treated under Lostenau (1902-13) and their persecution
had increased after an incident in which the Lostenau had been
wounded by a bullet.
In 1925, García had a lawsuit against the patrón and met Ignacio Colonia and Francisco Sánchez, the two delegates who had been to Lima in the incidents of 1912-14, who were also at the court pressing protests against the patrón. He suggested that they went directly to the Ministry in Lima to get guarantees against the abuses and to organise themselves as a community. He told them to imitate the indigenous movements of the south and to try to recover their lost communal rights. He wrote out a statement for them describing the abuses committed by the patrón.

The delegation went to an organization for the protection of the Indians (Junta Central del Patronato Indígena) in Lima which García described as "just a front organisation really, set up by the hacen-dados and their families and by priests who had haciendas" (p. 106). He was also able to direct them to a Vicosino residing in Lima who was educated and took the delegates to the governmental authorities.

A resolution was signed by President Leguía on November 6th, 1925, regarding Vicos and another hacienda in Ancash, Vilcabamba, commissioning the head of the Department of Indian Affairs (Sección de Asuntos Indígenas) and a surveyor to draw up a census and a topographic plan that would permit the division of the land into lots. In 1928 the government expropriated the hacienda, giving the Public Benefit Society land in Lima equivalent to the combined value of Vilcabamba and Vicos. This was almost brought to fruition, to the extent that the two leaders, Colonia and Sánchez were fighting to be patrón of the new organisation. Though the expropriation was carried out for Vilcabamba, the processing of Vicos was interrupted by the fall of the Leguía government in August 1930, and the following year Vicos was ceded to the Public Benefit Society of Huarás. Like the Lima society, it also had difficulty in holding
renters to the completion of the ten year lease and by 1946 the hacienda had been in the hands of an administrator and two different renters.

After the take-over of power by Sánchez Cerro (1930) agitation in the countryside was repressed, the Indians became frightened of the patron and meetings were forced to be held clandestinely. No permanent organisational structure was able to evolve, the only formal positions being those of the alcaldes (mayors), but there was little continuity in this position since the term of office lasted only one year. There was also a lack of information on organisational techniques, and though a local APRA party existed, many of the Indians were against it, being influenced by priests.

In 1946 the Huarás Public Benefit Society was forced to find a new renter. The Vicosinos again sent a delegation to Lima asking for a division of the hacienda. No official action was taken, and that same year the main body of the hacienda was rented to an industrial firm from Ancash, while the lower part was rented to the Tourist Corporation.

The Vicos delegation to Lima had consisted of four peasants accompanied by their advisor who was a lawyer from the Liga Campesina de Ancash. This peasant organisation was based in Huarás, between 1945-46 and had been influenced by the ideological programme of APRA, which sought the redemption of the Indian through reduced illiteracy, the elimination of abuses practised by the authorities and landlords and a reduction in the use of coca and alcohol.

In 1946 sufficient money had been collected for the Indians to rent the hacienda for themselves, but the effort was badly organised and the leader spent all the funds. This caused considerable anger
amongst the contributors. It had been intended that the individually held chaoras should remain intact and that the patron should be dispensed with. All the peasants were to work as under the hacienda system but the returns on the patron's lands would have been put towards the purchase of the hacienda. This would have been managed on this basis by a group of Vicosinos, similar to the mayoreses, at least until the debt had been paid off. The final disposition remained undetermined, that is the organisation could go on as it had during the period that it was being paid for, or it could revert to the goals of the second movement and become a comunidad de indígenas.

In 1948, Bustamante was elected and once more APRA was outlawed, the Liga Campesina de Ancash suppressed and its leader sent to jail.

Postscript.

The account of the peasants' activities in Vicos shows them to be closely integrated with and affected by political currents of the nation. All the protests occurred in periods during which national governments favoured the peasant cause, and in which institutions and political parties existed that could aid and support the presentation of their protests through complex legal and bureaucratic channels. The peones resisted the hacienda system as individuals by taking over hacienda land, stealing from the fields and by refusing to honour or avoiding their obligations to the patron. As a community, they were sufficiently organized on three different occasions to protest against an unjust patron and to raise money to rent or purchase the hacienda.
Barnett (1960) records a lack of community organization and an attitude of withdrawal on the part of the Indians towards the Mestizos. Yet, paradoxically, these were the people who, according to his account, were most instrumental in mediating the outside influence which enabled the Indians to make their protests. This would seem to suggest that the rather artificial conditions under which Barnett was studying Vicos were inimical to his obtaining information from the peasants themselves, and that his resort to Mestizo informants presented him with an account that over-stressed their own importance in the protests.
CHAPTER 7

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION.

The term "peasant movement" has ideological and theoretical connotations which I do not wish to impose on the case material without first evaluating the kind of explanation it entails. The term implies the presence of a clearly articulated ideology guiding group actions and that the members of the group have strong feelings of solidarity amongst themselves (c.f. Alberti, 1970). This would not always appear to have been the case in the empirical material. However, the second aspect of social movements emphasized by Alberti is empirically acceptable. The actions are oriented towards bringing about change in social relationships, and the character of the action is collective. Therefore I use "organized actions" or "political activities" in preference to the term "peasant movement".

In this chapter I set out the problems raised by the study of peasant political activities and discuss each of the case studies in turn. I examine how far the "peasant movement" interpretation provides a satisfactory explanation of the origins and development of these activities, and suggest additional and perhaps alternative factors which contribute to their understanding.

One of the first problems would seem to be the identification of the different kinds of actions peasants have been taking and how their strategies have changed over time. Long term goals and short term strategies can be identified; for instance, petitioning for recognition as an indigenous community gives a village a legal status which can then become the basis for making claims to extensions of communal pastures. These strategies should be related to the types of production relations the different settlements are involved in, and the changing relationships among peasants, between peasants and hacendados and between peasant
villages and neighbouring haciendas. In this, changes in the external environment such as opportunities for work in the mines and cities and the penetration of the market economy into the villages are closely related to these kinds of social relationships at the local level. The external environment is also significant insofar as the strategies are more likely to succeed during liberal presidential periods when peasants are able to draw on the support of reformist political parties and on legislation and institutions at the national level which are concerned specifically with peasant affairs.

Other factors to be taken into account would seem to be the size of the community and the degree of socio-economic differentiation within it. This is closely related to the numbers of migrants and returned migrants who identify their interests with those of the village. The types of migration experience are significant since they affect the amount of capital accumulated which may subsequently be invested in the village or in village affairs, and also determine whether relatively permanent settlements of out-residents are organized in the cities. Moreover, the factors inducing villagers to migrate, and the actual categories of villagers that do migrate are significant for the feedback of resources, skills and information to the villages.

Analysis of Case Material.

The case material is striking for the range of activities peasants in the five communities have been involved in and also for the varying lengths of time the conflicts have been in progress. For instance, peasants of Huasicancha obtained official papers to their lands in 1607, which suggests that the legal battle had begun some years previously. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries judgements were obtained against hacienda Tucle and during the War
of the Pacific (1879-1884) the villagers occupied and sacked the
neighbouring haciendas. Again, in 1889 and 1902 some of the community's
rights were confirmed, and consistently, in the present century they
have affirmed these claims both through legal channels and by tress-
passing and invasion. In contrast, peasants of Yanamarca and Tingo
only began to organize themselves in 1928 and 1945 respectively, when
they began to experience harsher conditions of work. However, it is
not possible to know if there really was no conflict prior to this,
or whether it simply was not recorded. If there was no conflict this
does not necessarily mean that the peasants were passively suffering
domination at the hands of their overlords. They may have obtained
certain benefits from the hacienda system, or expressed their disapproval
of the system of relations by stealing from the hacienda or in failing to
fulfill labour obligations as was the case in Vicos.

Pucará.

Pucará differs from the other settlements studied insofar as it
has always had the independent status of a community, and that if its
lands had been encroached upon in the past by neighbouring haciendas
sufficient lands still existed for all the villagers to make a livelihood.
In fact, the migration patterns suggest that most migrants left the
village in order to obtain additional capital to invest in village
agriculture and related service activities. The village is sited in
the Mantaro valley and benefitted as early as the 1920's from the
economic opportunities that were opened up with the commercialization
of the economy. Alberti and Sánchez (1973) note that in 1954 90 per
cent of a sample of heads of household had left the village in their
youth, yet 77 per cent of the population was still involved in agri-
culture. Consequently, political activities have been directed towards
the improvement of the socio-economic position of the village or groups
of peasants within the village, rather than against a specific hacienda or hacienda.

The organized activities described for Pucará all appear to be the product of the interests of different, sometimes opposing sectors of the community. Though it could be argued that the activities directed towards the raising of its administrative status and towards the acquisition of the lands of the cofradías were of a type that could be considered as indicative of a "peasant movement" and all that this implies, the later activities suggest that only certain sectors of the population organized and benefitted from these moves. This means that there was no commonly-held ideology prompting these actions, nor were the leaders representing the interests of the entire group. Within Pucará, Alberti and Sánchez (1973) identify a traditional elite and an emerging social group whose socio-economic position was derived from its links with the external market. Moreover, in their adherence to political parties in the electoral campaigns of 1962-3, the emerging group identified with the Aprista party, which between 1956 and 1962 had moved towards the right, while the traditional group identified with the more radical Acción Popular. It seems that these patterns of political support were not related to the ideological convictions of either of the groups concerned but rather to the political power play within the local arena of village affairs.

Huasiciancha.

Huasiciancha has also always had the relatively independent status of a community, but unlike Pucará its inhabitants lost more of their collectively owned pastures with the creation and expansion of neighbouring haciendas. However, the haciendas were livestock ranches and employed peasants from the community to pasture sheep and cattle.
Moreover, the peasants maintained flocks of their own on the marginal lands that still remained to them. As mentioned previously, the relationship between Huasicancha and the neighbouring haciendas has been one of more or less continuing conflict through the centuries. Consequently, when for the first time since the creation of the Republic, legislation was introduced by President Leguía (1919-30) to protect the Indian communities, Huasicancha was quick to register its most indisputable titles to land in the Public Registry of Huancayo and to initiate the formal reclamation of its lands.

The material on Huasicancha does not conform to many of the usual propositions concerning "peasant movements". The peasants' activities do not signify the existence of a coherent ideology transmitted by outsiders, nor do they signify a community of interests between the different social groupings of the village even on a temporary basis. Peasants were not given new models of organization by the experiences of the migrants in the towns, since they had always claimed the lands controlled by the hacienda as their own. Moreover, the migrants, rather than politicizing the peasants in the campaign of 1963 attempted to delay and deradicalize their strategies by trying to use government promises of land reform and bargaining through the syndicate federations. Though Lamond-Tullis (1974) has written of Taounan as being a charismatic leader, he seems to have had relatively little influence on the decisions of the peasants of Huasicancha. In fact, they were in a position to manipulate him because in order to maintain his reputation and influence it was important for him to stress his peasant origins and his good relations with his community. He had in fact been ousted from the position of village head on suspicion of having stolen community funds, and this was consequently an important aspect of the villagers' relationship with him. Likewise, the campaign of 1936 had not been led
by a charismatic outsider. Alderson-Smith and Cano (1974 f/o) have argued that rather than the peasant federations and their leader politicizing the peasants and prompting them to action, in Huasicoancha the case seems to have been that the history of successful conflict in the village provided a source of experience on which Tacunan and Yauriviloa (leaders of FEDECOJ and FENCAP respectively) could draw, thus enabling them to attain their positions within the federation.

Yanamarca.

The hacienda of Yanamarca was not owned by a private individual but by the state, and its rent contributed towards the upkeep of educational establishments. The property was consequently rented out to individuals who would act as hacendado and would normally leave an administrator in charge of the property while they themselves lived in a town or city. The hacienda was sited on very fertile irrigated land, close to the district capital of Acolla. Roughly 100 workers with a variety of tasks and statuses lived with their families on the hacienda. There was relatively little opportunity for social mobility, but through a system of favouritism and rewards for loyalty a small group of privileged peasants had emerged. Until 1928 there was apparently no conflict on the hacienda, but at this point the renter changed and the ensuing harsher conditions of work elicited the first organized protests from the peasants and the foundation in 1931 of a syndicate. There is evidence that some out-migration had occurred and that the peasants had received help from members of the Aprista party which was active in Jauja at that time.

In the case of Yanamarca there is a very clear relationship between the development of organized political activities and out-migration, harsher conditions of work and the availability of help from
individuals belonging to liberal political parties. However, the peasants could not rely on the continuing support of the APRA parliamentary representative since he took on the rather contradictory position of renter/hacendado and consequently, when the peasants required political support from the syndicates and political parties it was not unilaterally available to them. Moreover, their affiliation to a federation of bank employees was not a one way patronage relationship, but rather an exchange of political support.

We are not told of the social origins of the peasant leaders but particularly in the events of 1945 they were rapidly dispensed with and replaced when seen to lose their integrity. Furthermore, the identity of common interests between the different social sectors of the village was only temporary, and the divisions became apparent once the lands had been obtained. Although it can be argued that the peasants were suffering domination by the hacendados the fact that the college that received the rent from the land lowered the rent for the peasants indicates that this institution had some control over affairs on its property and was favourably disposed towards the peasants. A further point of interest is that the peasants were never aiming at owning plots of land of their own. Their original demands were for wage labour arrangements, which were later changed to the right to rent the land themselves. This would appear to be related to the production relations in which they were involved, which they accepted as a system, and the fact that land was scarce which made wage labour a more viable means of improving their socio-economic conditions.

Tingo

Tingo, in contrast to the other settlements studied, is extremely small, having only a total of 70 peasants living in it and very
little socio-economic differentiation among them except that conferred by favouritism and petty privileges. The peasants' plots were on relatively unproductive land and no wages were paid. There is no evidence of conflict on the hacienda prior to the 1940's, partly due to the presence of a network of informers, and also to the fact that the hacendados had been fairly benevolent (los amos benevolos) until that period. Through a series of inheritance disputes and the invasion of hacienda lands by neighbouring communities there was a longstanding situation of confusion over the titles to the property.

The case of Tingo is interesting in that the beginning of political activities on the hacienda coincided approximately with the arrival of the student in the community. However, it seems that rather than provoking the discontent and imparting an articulated ideology to the peasants, his influence and leadership were derived from his knowledge of and ability to deal with national institutions and offices. This is evident in the care with which the peasants cultivated their links with political authorities, for instance in the formal registration of the schools, in the elevation of the hacienda from the status of caserío (hamlet) to anexo (annexe), in their attempt to obtain the status of an indigenous community and in the confirmation of the position of the village head by the Justice of the Peace. It appears from Alberti and Sanchez's account that there were few permanent out-residents who could be relied upon to approach government offices in Lima and to provide funds for litigations. Consequently, there was a great stress on contributions towards the journeys of the delegations, and sanctions were actually imposed on members who failed to participate in communal activities.

There appears to have been no real shortage of land in Tingo even if the lands the peasants cultivated for themselves were not very
productive and only provided a subsistence livelihood. This perhaps explains why they originally aimed at spending less time cultivating the hacendado's lands and were content to purchase small amounts of land for themselves. They were able to take strike action against the hacendado because they were aware of his financially weak position. Moreover, they had long known that his own claims to the land were not legally validated. Of all the case studies, the conditions provoking political activities on Tingo most clearly conform to those of the "peasant movement" model.

Vicos.

Hacienda Vicos, like Yanamarca, was owned by a public institution rather than a private individual. The economy of the peasants living on the hacienda was largely subsistence, though some of the peasants had achieved a position of economic dominance through the possession of cattle and their ability to acquire ready cash by their sale. There was migration out of Vicos but it was generally on a temporary basis and not to the towns and mines. Some Vicosinos sold their labour three days a week in the town of Huaras, others migrated seasonally to the coastal plantations as contract workers or to the Casma river valley as harvest nomads. Neither of these labour opportunities allowed the peasants to accumulate much cash. Locally there was some employment in services, and a few products were sold in local markets. There seems to have been no apparent shortage of land but rather a problem of the amount of time individuals could devote to cultivating their own plots rather than the hacendado's land. Consequently, the wealthier peasants were able to employ others to carry out their labour obligations to the hacendado, and could thus spend more time on their own land or in building up their flocks.
The material on political activities in Vicos demonstrates the interrelationship of village affairs with the national political arena. In both 1930 and 1948 the peasants' efforts were cut short by a change in power at the national level, whereby their sources of external political support were suppressed. Also, their success in obtaining an order from President Leguía for the expropriation of the hacienda in 1925 would seem to be related to the legislation protecting the Indians that he promulgated during his office. It is also interesting to note that it was the Director of the Public Benefit Society which owned the hacienda, who first suggested the expropriation. There appears to have been no establishment of associations of permanent out-residents in the cities, since in 1925 and 1946 the delegations had to rely on the good offices of organizations supporting the Indian cause. On the latter occasion the mestizo, Garcia, had to direct them to an educated Vicosino living in the capital, who subsequently helped them. It is not possible to tell just how influential Garcia was in organizing the peasants since Barnett's account (1960) relies mainly on this man's personal narrative. However, this temporary alliance between the peasants and a mestizo is not surprising, since Garcia was interested in regaining some of his own lost lands and, moreover, was the political rival or one of the hacienda administrators.

In their campaigns the peasants of Vicos aimed to reorganize their system of relations on the model of the neighbouring communities or through a restructuring the hacienda system. The most extraordinary aspect of their activities is the resolution they obtained from President Leguía in 1925. Compared to the other case studies this represents a remarkably early order for the expropriation of the hacienda and suggests that Vicos was probably regarded as a particularly activist, problem community. This could perhaps explain why the Cornell project was set
up in Vicos in the first place, and possibly why Barnett failed to obtain information on political activities from the peasants themselves.

**Evaluation.**

The case study material provides examples of many different activities which could all be considered as indicative of "peasant movements". The material covers strike action (Yanamarca and Tingo), independence movements (Pucara'), attempts to buy or rent land (Pucara', Huasianocha, Tingo, Vicos), attempts to reduce labour obligations or to replace them with wage labour (Yanamarca, Tingo), and the invasion and/or occupation of land (Huasianocha, Tingo). Furthermore, the development of the activities through short-term strategies among the different groups of peasants were similar. In Pucara', Yanamarca and Tingo political strategies developed from organizations aimed at establishing a school or controlling educational matters. In all the settlements apart from Yanamarca, recognition as an indigenous community was an important aspect of attaining links to political authorities and laying claim to lost communal lands. In all the cases the pattern of manipulation of different bureaucratic levels was similar; when regional authorities proved ineffective, delegations of peasants took their petitions to Ministries and national offices in Lima, or called on the support of political parties, syndicate federations and often on the President of the Republic himself.

Despite these similarities in actions and outcomes, the situations that have provoked peasants to organize themselves have differed substantively from one case to another. It is at this point that the interpretation of organized peasant activities as "peasant movements" falls down, since it can not explain how markedly different structural conditions have produced the same kinds of activities.
According to Alberti (1970) a typical peasant movement develops from an initial situation in which one individual, the *hacendado*, is dominant and there is an extreme disequilibrium in the distribution of resources. The peasants are in a state of social fragmentation and have no knowledge of alternative forms of existence, since the *hacendado* acts as the exclusive mediator in all transactions with individuals and institutions in the wider society. However, an examination of the empirical material fails to demonstrate a correspondence between these conditions and the frequency and intensity of peasant activities. In Pucará and Huasicancha there was no dominant-dependent relationship between the peasants and a *hacendado*, yet Huasicancha in particular had a reputation for being a centre of political activism. Moreover, it is simplistic to view the peasants as completely atomized under the *hacienda* system since exchange labour agreements existed between individuals and groups and *fiestas* play an important part in community social life. Thus the formation of a *patronato escolar* (educational board of trustees) or the organization of a delegation to petition government offices should be viewed as the intensification of communal activities, rather than the first instance of them. It is assumed that organized activities can only take place when there is an identification of common interests between the peasants, yet in both Huasicancha and Pucará political action was generated by conflict between different social groups. Even on the *haciendas* there was some social stratification which indicates that not all the peasants had the same interests, for instance, in Yanama this there was a conflict of interest between those who had and had not benefitted from the *hacienda* system, though on a temporary basis they were able to agree on strategy.

The characterisation of peasants as culturally and socially
isolated from other sectors of society is also inaccurate. All the villages studied were located in areas in which both small-holding communities and haciendas existed, therefore there was probably inter-marriage between settlements and alternative models of organization did exist. There was also some movement of traders to the haciendas (Tingo), or sale of village produce in neighbouring markets (Vicos).

The "peasant movement" explanation of peasant activities lays great stress on the importance of out-migration, and the ways in which experiences in the mines and cities undermine the value and normative aspects of the dependent relationship of the peasants. This focusses particularly on the types of contacts migrants have with syndicate organizations and reformist ideologies. The case material suggests that these contacts did not necessarily result in a coherent articulation of new ideologies among peasants, but that political parties and syndicate federations were used as sources of support for peasant strategies. As for the syndicate organizations providing new models of organization, Vicos was the only hacienda to attempt to organize on this basis, and this was only at a very early stage in their campaigning. In fact, if the strategies of the villages are examined, Tingo and Vicos both wanted to form indigenous communities, and Yanamarca was aiming at the reorganization of the hacienda system, with the option of becoming an indigenous community. The Huasicanchinos lay claim to lands the had always considered as their own and the Pucarinos bought a hacienda and employed resident vanaconas in the traditional way. In fact rather than creating feelings of solidarity and radicalizing the villagers, the determination of the out-resident Huasicanchinos to use the diffuse bargaining techniques of the peasant federations was the major impediment to the villagers taking more immediate, direct action.
Before generalizing about the impact of migratory experience on village strategies and social configurations, a closer examination must be made of the types of migratory experience and the categories of peasants who migrated. In Pucará and Huasicanocha peasants tended to migrate to the mines and cities and consequently did come into contact with syndicate organizations and ideologies. In fact, the development of the different cooperative organizations in Pucará would seem to be linked to the peasants' relatively early exposure to the commercial economy, and the resources and new techniques that were subsequently available for investment in village agriculture and services. There is no evidence of the formation of regional associations of migrants from any of the three haciendas, yet it would seem that their ability to provide cash for costly legal suits to lobby political authorities on behalf of their villages of origin were the most important aspects of mass migration. In Vicos, the peasants took advantage of mainly local sources of employment or employment on a seasonal basis which did not allow for a significant accumulation of capital for investment, however, this did not prevent them from organizing for political action. Some of the Tinguénos did migrate to the mines, but contacts with neighbouring communities made by the musicians were probably more formative in suggesting organization on the basis of an indigenous community to them. There was also some migration to the mines and cities from Yanamarca, and there is evidence that the peasants obtained help from APRA members at quite an early stage. Nevertheless, their demands were initially derived from their grievances with the existing system of relations and not by the desire for an alternative mode of organization. It was not until the late 1950's that they began to consider organizing as a syndicate or registering as an indigenous community.
In the writing on "peasant movements" there has been a tendency to emphasize the importance of leaders from outside the ranks of the peasants or from peasants with experiences of the wider society. These leaders are often described as being charismatic. It is indisputable that peasants have drawn on the support of politicians and leaders of syndicate federations in furthering their aims, but these were not the organizers of the peasants' activities. Instead, the peasants, by reference to the liberal ideologies of these individuals could gain access to political resources. Rather than being leaders, they were mediators who had contact with other influential political leaders and could deal with the complex processes involved in approaching government offices. The role of the student in Tingo, for example, seems to be important mainly for his ability to deal with legal institutions and bureaucracies. There has been a tendency for outsiders to overemphasize their own importance in organizing the peasants to action, for the example, the mestizo in Vicos, and the out-residents and Tacunan in Huasicancha. However Yanamarca, for example, is striking for the way in which the six leaders who compromised themselves were rapidly replaced, thus indicating that the peasants were far from passive followers of leaders they failed to understand.

The case study material indicates that the external environment is not so important for creating the conditions under which organized peasant activities develop as their interpretation as "peasant movements" would suggest. This kind of explanation assumes that peasants will organize themselves only under the changed social conditions brought about by economic modernization. Although in the empirical material a correlation can be made between out-migration and the organization of political activities, this fails to explain why the peasants of Huasicancha had been engaged in conflict with hacienda Tucle.
since before 1607 and why the peasants of Vicos also had property titles dating from 1641 and 1870. This suggests that it is not the cultural impact of economic modernization that provokes organized protest among peasants, but rather the precise way in which existing contradictions in the social structure are deepened by the penetration of the market economy to the rural areas.

The external environment does not provide "new models of organization" for the villagers, since the model of the indigenous community with its extensions of jointly held land has always existed. The significance of the development of new ideologies would seem to be not so much in the way they change the peasants' perceptions of their situation, but rather in the way that political parties provide sources of external support for peasant strategies. Consequently, the importance of the changes brought about in the external environment by economic modernization lies in the way in which the position of traditional rural elites is weakened vis-à-vis other sectors of the national society, and how the development of liberal and developmental ideologies enable peasants to make "bridge actions" (Bailey 1960) to the national political arena in solving local level problems. Thus the most important aspect of economic modernization is the way in which it creates the conditions in which peasant strategies can succeed.

In conclusion, I would suggest that an analysis of organized peasant activities can not be made without reference to the wider social structure in which these activities take place. The material on the Peruvian Sierra indicates that peasants have played a far from passive role in bringing about changes in their social organization and have shown remarkable initiative in their manipulation of politicians, political parties as well as regional and national offices of government. The examination of five different communities does not provide a single
explanatory model for the development of organized peasant
activities but suggests that relationships should be sought between
the strategies of peasants, their involvement in different relations
of production and how both the strategies and the configuration of
different social groupings within villages change over time.
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