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Walters, Brian G.

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Abstract of a Thesis Investigating Moral Sanctions Operative
in Adolescence with Special Reference to Religious Factors.

This study examines some social morality issues among adolescents in the North East of England. These moral situations are posed in the form of questionnaire in Kohlburg's moral dilemma forms where possible; responses are open ended in some cases and rank order or single responses in other cases. The tests were administered to 180 adolescents in schools and church groups in the area by teachers and student teachers. The secondary variables of sex, age and social class were obtained for each respondent. The principal variables were religious denomination, church attendance, religious social group and type of religious education in school.

Analysis of the results obtained consisted of the type of sanctions operating in the differing moral situation tests. These tended to be confined to the prudential, authoritarian, ego ideal and reciprocal areas. However, guilt in various forms was obvious, particularly in the stealing situations and these were categorised on the basis of a scale of guilt dimensions as used by Kohlburg.

The primary and principal variables were compared by a process of cross tabulation, using Chi Squared and Kendall's Tau, with the sanctions operating in the differing moral situations. Developmental factors supporting Piaget and Bull's work were operative throughout in the type of sanctions used. However, there was some difference according to the social setting of the test, whether in school, at home or 'out in society'.

The overriding null hypothesis was that there was no

relationship between the religious factors and the type of sanction operating. It could cautiously be said that this null hypothesis was not proven with these results. Although the numbers were small, there was some relationship shown between the religious groups and the moral sanctions operative, particularly with the religious social group, which could point to further study.

Brian G. Walters.
Master of Arts Thesis,
Durham University,
1975.

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An Investigation of the Sanctions
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Introduction

"The overriding problem in Moral Education", says Loukes (41: p.22), "is motivation, unless children want to do right no amount of skill in moral thinking will be of any use." This study is an attempt to explore the field of motivation in moral decision making by concerning itself with the sanctions that operate or control action in the lives of adolescents. Particularly, the study attempts to investigate whether religious factors produce different sanctions in moral action or attitude. The question, of course, whether there is any relationship between morality and religion is an age old one and some of the age old arguments will be resurrected in this study, but the debate shows little sign of abating, especially in this area of motivation. L. Kohlberg (36: p.14) recently posed the basic problem again of why be moral in the first place? Or why be just in a universe which is largely unjust? He considers that to ask the question 'why be moral?' brings in the ultimate question of 'why live?' Suggesting that ultimate moral maturity requires a consideration of the question of the meaning of life. Such questions and answers, he suggests, are metaphysical in their nature.

It would be rash to suggest that many adults, let alone young people, reach the peak of moral maturity to face such questions about the meaning of life independently. It may be that religious teaching or religious guidance points people along that path at certain times. Shoben (60: p.145) has suggested that there are forces at work in society (in most societies) which conduct moral tuition of the young through religious sanctions and that the family is the primary agency in this work. He considers that much of the moral relativism, that is

one of the straightforward and inescapable facts of anthropology, seems to be associated with variations in religious belief. He suggests that, "our understanding of human activity in the moral sphere could be profitably deepened by a more intensive study of this correlation".(p.138).

In this area of sanctions, it seems that a not inconsiderable number of adolescents and adults retain from earlier days a conviction, often hard to define, that religion can and should assist in the maintenance and development of moral conduct. This was a conclusion which Hilliard reached in studies with training college students in 1959. (27: p.58). Kuhlen and Arnold (39) also found that 70% of their adolescents accepted the rather crude interpretation of a basic belief in God as the upholder of the sanctity of the moral law. An Independent Television Authority Survey of 1970 (29), concluded that 89% of the population felt that religion helped to maintain the moral standards of society.

It could be suggested that such dependence upon religious sanctions fosters immature moral responses in both the adolescent and the adult, that is, there is reliance upon an authoritarian or heteronomous attitude, which may be proper and natural in the development of the child, but not necessary for mature moral development. It could also be suggested that some aspects of Christian teaching are conducive to childish attitudes, "Unless ye become as little children, ye cannot enter the Kingdom of God". In fact the idea of heteronomy is common in religious morality. Abraham must be prepared to sacrifice Isaac and the only answer to why? is to have faith.

If religion invades morality, so does morality invade religion. The believer may begin to doubt the existence of good, or God, because of the suffering or death of someone close to him. Similarly, the unbeliever through his own moral failure, may begin to wonder if there is something important after all in the idea of forgiveness. Religious practices for many would not have the importance they do hold unless they were connected with practices which were not specifically religious. When a man prays, his prayers would be worthless if they could not be brought to bear upon the problems he has in relationships with others.

This study, therefore, although it will be considering the range or dimension of moral sanctions in general, will also be concerned with the religious effect upon those sanctions and the existence of a religious sanction itself. Williams (69: p.84) who would not agree that one could call religion a sanction or a motive, would agree that a given attitude (whether a religious attitude or not) sensitises its possessor to certain actions. The conforming and the conscientious person differ from each other not only in motive and attitude but also in the sanctions to which they respond; their actions may be the same, that is, neither steals when tempted but under which sanction do they operate? It would be difficult if not impossible to categorise children into personality groups for analysis of their sanctions, although McPhail (46: p.55) has attempted this in part and Havighurst and Taba (26) produced a study which is usually described as being concerned with motivation.

Wilson (73: p.46) suggests that many different motives may impel one individual to benefit another. Helpful behaviour may stem from social pressures, or 'honesty is

the best policy', or the hope of making personal gain. It would be difficult to categorise sanctions in a rank order of acceptability and say that this sanction is better than another or that those either of a religious nature or influenced by religion, are any more worthy. Such could be followed out of fear or guilt as well as out of love for others. One can do the right thing perhaps for the wrong reason. Aristotle, (5: p.61) suggested that "virtuous action is not done in a virtuous way merely because such action has the appropriate quality". "The doer must be in a certain frame of mind." "A doer is just not because he does just things, but when he does them in the way of just and temperate persons."

Shoben (60: p.138) attempts to cut through the complexities of defining sanctions and questions of value of sanctions by simply asking "if the more orthodox in their expressed religious beliefs and observances are less likely to offend the moral laws of their communities". Such a simple question he considers is open to empirical investigation. Glueck (16: p.138) has used the method of comparing a religious variable with a moral variable and looking for some form of correlation, finding that delinquent subjects attended church far less frequently than non-delinquent control groups. Wright (71: p.231) suggests that "this is all that really can be done in this field". Although we might be ultimately accused of doing no more than correlating a religious with a moral variable, the attempt of this study is to do more than that, especially on the interaction of sanctions and the differences of sanctions in differing moral situations.

It must be taken into consideration that sanctions can be said to operate on a developmental level as Kay (33: p.131) has pointed out, and they may well be influenced by the level of moral maturity reached by the adolescent. Conversely, the sanctions dominant in the life of the child may well inhibit the level of development in terms of moral character.

It must also be noted that certain sanctions operate with certain types of morality. Wright and Cox (76: p.139) suggested that religious sanctions operate more strongly with what Middleton and Putney (49: p.142) describe as 'ascetic morality issues', as opposed to 'social morality issues'. Amongst the former are such questions as sexual relationships, gambling, drinking, and smoking which could be said to produce an ascetic response especially from the Judaeo Christian tradition. On the social morality front, such issues as lying, stealing, cheating and the value of life could be said to be embodied in a more biblical code, the Ten Commandments for instance. Although that is not to say that the ascetic morality attitude cannot find any basis in the biblical record. For example, monastic celibacy is partially derived from the New Testament injunction of Jesus that, "some shall be eunuchs for the Kingdom of God's sake". (Matthew, Ch.19 v.12. R.S.V.).

For the purpose of this study in view of the wide age sample taken in adolescence as opposed to Wright and Cox 's sample of sixth formers, it was felt that ascetic morality issues would not be central or personal problems so much and that the social morality categories would be more productive in terms of 'a meaningful response'.

Before we leave this problematical area, it must further

be conceded or at least suggested, that certain moral issues, whether ascetic or social, could be influenced in the same person on different occasions by different sanctions, or that different social situations, at school or at home, produce different sanctions (this idea is developed at length by Kay⁽³⁴⁾). Adults are not consistent in their moral stances, let alone children. Further, not all types of moral violations are interrelated. One who fiddles his income tax is not necessarily given to violence (unless it be against the tax man). Neither are all moral responses governed necessarily by the same sanction. It could be conceived that at one time an authoritarian sanction operates (perhaps depending on the social set), at others, a prudential sanction. However, to overcome some of these problems, a set range of moral issues or moral situations are constructed for this study from the social morality sphere and responses to these will be measured against a variety of variables. The general null hypothesis will be that there is no significant difference between the responses allowing for age, class, sex and other variables, between the religious or non-religious groupings, although there will be several dimensions to the latter groupings, and a wide range of different sanctions measured. Our analysis will, therefore, also compare different types and levels of moral sanction operating in the adolescent and between the adolescents.

The different religious groupings are church attendance, with or without parents, and some measure of frequency. The type of church attended with an attempt to differentiate between conformist or ritualistic churches and non-conformist groups. The control group for these

categories would be those children not attending church and therefore not having a denominational grouping. A further factor would be the type of religious education received in school, whether bible centred or open ended child centred. All of these factors with previous researchers have shown some measure of correlation with moral factors. One further religious variable was the religious social group category, containing adolescents belonging to church based social groups, making their responses to the questionnaire from within the church based situation. It was felt that there maybe a degree of social pressure and group expectancy from such groups, giving a response to a moral situation influenced by the religious set. Shoben's researches seem to bear this out. It must be conceded, however, that unless we put our subjects into real moral situations rather than contrived or imaginary ones we can only hypothesise how they will really act 'on the day'. However, as will be seen later from the details of the test construction, there is a deliberate attempt to involve the respondents in 'real life situations', which in pilot tests were found to be genuine adolescent difficulties and problems, and thus an opportunity is given for self-identification with the characters concerned.

A considerable number of issues have been raised in this introduction, both of a practical and theoretical nature. The intention is to explore these issues in developing this study in comparison with previous research and debate in this field.

Our basic intention to examine motivation in terms of appropriateness or type rather than efficiency, echoes Wilson's (74: p.25) desire that "we ought to be concerned

with people's reasons for doing things as well as what they do".

Chapter 1.

The Religious Sanction in
Moral Activity

The traditional argument for the independence of morality over against religion is that no information about the nature of reality or knowledge that there is a God and that he issues commands, will by itself tell us what is good or what we ought to do. The statement that God will us to do X is not a moral pronouncement. Before we know whether we ought to do X, we must know that what God wills is good. In order to know what he wills is good, we should have to judge independently that it is good. That something is good is not entailed by God's willing it, for if that were so, it would not be necessary to ask "Is what God wills good?"

Many philosophers would say that genuine moral judgment is necessarily prior to any religious assent. However, in recent years, the autonomy of morality over against religion has come into question not least by the Oxford School. Waring(67:p.52) has suggested that "there can be no morality if God does not issue commands from a burning bush". That is, morality can have no theoretical justification until God is brought into the picture. This is supported by De Graaf(12: p.36) who puts the Kantian view, "that although morality has no need of God, the nature of morality is such that it demands God to validate it". Once we start reflecting upon what is implied by our way of life when we are involved in moral situations, then we step towards to God to complete the picture or give reasons for it, otherwise ethics remain merely an idea. In Kantian terms, the argument would proceed that "to be obliged to do something is not necessarily to want to do it but to be commanded to do it", that is, "the ought bids me". The inescapability of this moral imperative

posits the moral artificer from whom the law originated". Religion is connected with morality in this argument as giving basis for and value to moral action and thinking and the prompter of moral effort. Although this seems like an expression of faith, it suggests what God has to do with morality. This finds some echo in Kohlberg's⁽³⁶⁾ faith stages and moral stages, particularly his final stage of development which he reserves for men of faith. He says^(p.13) that "the rare persons who may be described by this stage have a special grace that makes them more lucid, more simple and yet somehow more fully human than the rest of us". However, to say 'I couldn't have done it but for God' may be as true of a mediocre performance as it is of a winning performance. It is worthwhile to mention that it is not possible, according to the Judaeo-Christian tradition, to say "God commands me to do this but I ought not to do it". In fact it could be suggested that it is a mistake to treat the commands of God as if they were of the same logical type as political or practical commands. In fact, to say "that God commands me to do such and such", Rees^(58:p.86) suggests, "does not mean that there is any intended reference in the use of language to right action". However, to counteract this, it has often been said that in reality God's commands result in right action, although we could say, in the name of God, some very dubious stances have been taken in the history of religion. J. S. Mill⁽⁵⁰⁾ has drawn attention to this fact. He says^(p.248) that if ever there were a group of people who were under a moral obligation of the law of God it was the Jews, and if ever there were a people who dismally failed to obey that moral law, it was that self same group".

To overcome the criticism that this is turning into a debate on historical theology, we return to the motivation factor of the 'ought' and suggest that it is not what a person does which makes him good or bad but what it is they are attempting to achieve which makes their action good or bad. It could be argued that a person is not engaged in moral action when that person sees everyone else only as a potential server of their own ends (for example, following a Dale Carnegie course). This basis for the operation of morality would be in McPhail's terms "concern for others" or "Phil and Emp" in Wilson's terms. A quasi religious phrase in this regard is 'agapeistic' referred to by Anders-Richards⁽³⁾ who suggests^(p.129) that "it is that quality of love which overrides the barriers of self interest, self concern or self advantage". To be moral in this view is not to obey a list of commands or even have an idea of 'the good' but it is to have a moral set or stance or intention in whatever one does.

This meets Wilson's^(73: p.12) requirements in part when he suggests "that there can be no content to morality". This idea of a moral set or intention fits in with Jeffrey's^(31: p.1) definition of morality which he considers to be "character or disposition", from the Latin "mores", "character or manner".

To posit such a selfless character or disposition might seem a little optimistic. Freud, who takes a more pessimistic view of human nature, sees the psyche as an egocentric system of quasi mechanical energy whose natural attachments are sexual and hard for the subject to handle or control. Introspection only reveals the deep tissue of ambivalent motive and suggests that objectivity and

and unselfishness are not natural to human beings. It must be conceded that to identify mental data such as motive or intention is philosophically if not psychologically very difficult. It would be easier to say a person is morally the set or sum total of his actual choices and that the strongest motive is the strongest motive.

However, there has been some support from philosophical psychology for the view that the essence of morality lies in loving relationships (whether agapeistic or not). Wright(75:p.212) has suggested in Buber's terms that the "I Thou" relationship is at the heart of moral activity. People become more human in such a relationship of friendship or loving than in the collective experience of the crowd.

The difficulty with philosophic statements, whether from Wright, Wilson or Oxford dons, is that they rarely find an echo in the minds of the man in the street, let alone the child in the classroom. For our practical purposes, whilst it is useful to consider a philosophic or religious argument to support our themes or findings, ultimately we are faced in reality with far from ideal situations or ideal development. In practice, our adolescents are not fully morally developed and they are influenced or inhibited by all manner of considerations besides intellectual ones. Very rarely do they stop and ask "have I a good will" or "what is the motive for my action". That fact has to be inferred from the observer or researcher on the basis of introspective inference or objective analysis. It would be nice to imagine moral activity operating in a vacuum unfettered by social

pressure, prejudice or religion, but unless we can do our research on a posse of moral philosophers, it is just imagination. We may have to admit that what we call moral activity, whether it be social or ascetic, is not moral activity at all but mere responses to social taboos or rules. However, my pessimism is jolted as I write these words as my own nine year old son has come in from school to announce that a class mate whose father has died needs some special help which he is going to provide and that also he is going to participate in a sponsored walk for the elderly in the area.

It would be reasonable to examine briefly the claims that are made on behalf of religion as a motivating force or sanction in the moral sphere. Wright(75:p.14) tries to pinpoint its contribution further by suggesting that the most distinctly moral experience the individual has is the conflict between inclination and duty that we express in the words "I want to but I ought not to". He suggests that this kind of experience is one of the mainsprings of religious activity in that one of the purposes of the religious discipline is so to train the personality that this conflict is resolved. This seems to be echoed by Allport's(1:p.149) idea that all religious acts try in some way to close the gap that exists between the actual state of one's values and the possibility of their fuller realisation. That is, both are suggesting that religious activity or sanctions give support to moral activity.

It is fairly obvious to the observer that all religions have a code, a cult and a creed. The Ten Commandments are a prime example from the Judaeo

Christian tradition of the moral obligations binding on the faithful. Davis and Moore (11:p.244) have supported the traditional relationship of morality to religion from the sociological point of view by suggesting that human society achieves its unity primarily through the possession by its members of certain ultimate values and ends which they have in common. However, while there has been the attempt to create absolute standards in most religions, there has been some considerable differences of opinion about moral issues. Middleton and Putney (49:p.142) have suggested that one of the reasons for such differences of opinion has resulted not only from different interpretations of religious writings but from a failure to distinguish between the different types of ethical standards, namely the ascetic and the social. It seems from the New Testament teaching of Jesus that one could infer both of these standards. From the Sermon on the Mount, the Ten Commandments' social requirements concerning lying, cheating, stealing, murder, false witness are extended into the realm of motive and inclination. The impulse or thought is as morally responsible as the act itself in the social sphere. But in the personal sphere, which Middleton and Putney have not clearly spelt out, the New Testament is also very specific, enjoining the disciple to personal holiness. Paul extends these ideas to include evil habits (Colossians Ch.3,v.28. R.S.V.) and personal purity (1 Thessalonians. Ch.v vv.3-8. R.S.V.). Failure to obey these maxims could be said to produce a feeling of guilt (Romans Ch. 7 v.19. R.S.V.). It could be posited that here lies the source of the religious

sanction in moral issues. That is, the individual adult or child acknowledging the religious ideal or aware of the consequences of disobedience in terms of judgement, guilt or self dissatisfaction, obeys the moral imperative through his religiously 'inspired' conscience. Differences of opinion have also resulted from different religious traditions. For instance, some religious groups, as Smart(62:p.42) suggests, consider the 'giving up' of certain pleasures as being conducive to virtue. Not all religious groups, however, emphasise asceticism as being desirable for virtue. Fiske(15:p.71) differentiates between sacramentalist and non-sacramentalist groups suggesting the latter as being more ascetic with a higher degree of guilt feelings in the former group. He considers that there is a type of Christianity which concentrates in its moral teaching on developing a sense of sin, that is a "super ego religion".

As far as the adolescents in this study are concerned, we shall employ ourselves to analyse the social morality factors for that is what they seem to be engaged in most of the time. If they are from a certain religious tradition or grouping, we will look for the interaction of that factor on the social moral response. As far as the analysis of guilt is concerned, we shall attempt to analyse its evidence and type both for religious and non-religious persons alike and again look for the interaction of various factors, including the religious dimension, upon the type of guilt observed.

It is fairly clear already that many researchers into attitudes in the field have come up with the conclusion that children consider themselves to be influenced by

religious factors in the moral area. Kay(33: p.124) has shown that the majority of children believe explicitly that God upholds the moral law. Wright and Cox(76:p.142), with sixth formers, have found that indices of religiosity were related to severity of moral judgement, although tending to the ascetic moral issues. Edwards'(14:p.90) studies with children between the age of seven and fifteen, showed that 100% of 7-8 year olds and 91% of 14-15 year olds considered the church as one of the main moral influences in their lives. We have asked this type of question in our study but certainly not found this kind of emphatic response.

Not only adolescents but teachers also consider that there is an inherent relationship especially in the field of religious and moral education. May(44: p.217) reports that 46% of teachers who were asked, regarded the teaching of Christian ethics as being their first or second choice as the content of moral education lessons in schools. These findings are also borne out by Loukes(40: p.14). In this field of education, Wilson(71) also sees a strong relationship between religious and moral teaching, particularly in the area of the emotions. He considers(p.204-5) that education in the emotions, in those components necessary for moral development, that is Phil, Emp, Gig, Krat etc., are the self same qualities which the religious education teacher must inculcate. Thus homo moralis becomes homo religiosus.

Goldman(17:p.158) has applied Piaget's developmental theories to religious development and suggested that the Piagetian pattern is followed there also. Correlations between the scoring of the same five operational items

on psychological and theological criteria separately are sufficiently high to assume that normal logical and rational processes occur in theological judgements and that religious thinking can be developed by children only as far as their current levels of operational thinking will allow. Bull, (7:p.15) has also confirmed and extended Piaget's operational scheme for moral development although disagreeing with Piaget's analysis of the development of the autonomous stage arising out of reciprocity with peers. The fact that Piaget ended his researches with twelve year olds left a gap in his research system. "If he had continued", suggests Bull (7:p.16) "he would have found in adolescents strict 'tit for tat' reciprocity still strongly in evidence as it is in many adults".

We would suggest in this connection that neither religious or moral thinking and development exist at separate levels of operational development. There is evidence however, to suggest that although moral development is related to moral behaviour and moral behaviour is related to the maturing of moral sanctions, religious and conscience derived factors appear at every stage and in forms appropriate to that level of development.

Kay (33: p.129, footnote) suggests that although children proceed developmentally from prudential and authoritarian sanctions to reciprocity and social factors, to personal morality, conscience and religious factors operate at every stage. It could also be suggested that the religious sanction could be classified under most of the headings.*

* Williams (69:p.93) suggests, however, that to classify a child's response or thinking as religious is saying something about the source of the judgement rather than about the type of thinking.

Much, of course, relies on the degree of sophistication of the test procedures and the method of interpretation and analysis of the results obtained. These elements will be spelt out in detail later in this study.

Some elements of this test allowed for open ended responses to be made giving respondents an opportunity to put into their own words the reasons for the courses of action they, or the person in the story, followed. This allowed for a degree of interpretation of responses according to the actual words used by the respondents. Other elements of this test were of the Likert type scale responses where the respondent ticks a response in either an order of priority or as their strongest opinion. This type of recording of responses does restrict the freedom of the respondent to a degree but allows for some measure of interaction of factors. Swainson(64: p.82) has shown that children can list motives in an order of priority and that motives need not be mutually exclusive but can be dependent upon one another.

From this theoretical field we now turn to the practical considerations of the construction of the test and the factors influencing its construction.

Chapter 2.

The Test Construction Factors.

The construction of these tests on moral sanctions was developed through several pilot runs with adolescents in the North East of England, to ascertain the type of situations that seemed relevant and meaningful to their experience and which, in the social morality area, were in the forefront of their thinking. This initial development also considered previous tests done in this area, not necessarily on sanctions but in the general field of moral development where sanction factors may have been overlooked or not specifically noted. A study of earlier research revealed a gap in terms of the age groupings studied.

Piaget(56:1930) had worked with children up to twelve, Swainson(64:1946) from five to early adolescence; Wright and Cox(76:1967) with sixth formers and Hilliard(27:1959) with late teens and students. Loukes(40:1973) has looked at teenage morality generally but without any empirical research and certainly not in the area of sanctions.

This gap in research in terms of age has partly been filled by Bull(7:1969) in terms of developmental levels, but again not in the area of moral sanctions. Kay(33:1968) has certainly plotted the course in the field and so have McNight(48:1950) and Williams(69:1970) but non have been concerned to look specifically at the interaction of the religious sanction, although Kohlburg and Swainson have drawn attention to it.

It has been suggested by Kay(33:p.103) that the adolescent (for our purposes from ten to seventeen), is progressing generally towards intuitive moral judgements which tend to discount the rigid rule of the law, although we would add that it often depends on the social set in which the adolescent finds himself which dictates his responses to moral situations. There could be a school morality

conditioned by rigid authoritarianism and an 'outside' morality of social orientation or group expectancy. There could be a religious morality based on a church orientated social grouping. Davies (10:p.49) has recently suggested that children are considerably influenced by the social setting in which they find themselves and Hartshorne and May (24) in the late 1920's, concluded that children adopt different moral stances in different situations. In fact, it could be said that so much emphasis has been placed on Piaget's developmental scheme that social factors, intelligence and personality factors* have been largely overlooked. The social factor is a component element in this study in looking at social class and the type of grouping in which the child was found.

The type of school was used in the pilot run and some differentiation made between grammar, comprehensive and single sex schools but no significant factors emerged. As far as intelligence is concerned, although it is certainly felt, as Cattell (8:p.366) shows, that there is a strong correlation between intelligence and conscientious control and between unintelligence and aggression, it was not easy to pinpoint this factor. Class teachers involved in the experiment did score their respondents A, B, C, grade intelligence, according to their own estimates of the child, but as many respondents came from large mixed ability groups in comprehensive schools, abilities tended to level out.

However, putting some of these considerations aside for the moment, it can be suggested that the adolescent period

* However, R. Havighurst and Taba (1949) have investigated the personality dimension as a factor in moral attitudes.

is a time for fruitful study in terms of motivation. It could be said that the earlier problems seen in external tensions are now developing into inner tensions. The adolescent could be said to be looking far more to motivation within for resolving problems rather than without.

Kay(33:p.102) suggests that "the adolescent is looking for a true morality and for his true self and for ultimate meaning", this is a more fruitful time for religious questions to be asked as well as moral ones. It was thus felt that the adolescent period was a rich source for our study purposes in terms of sanctions when all the earlier childhood constraints are still possible but also when the individual is attempting to work out a more personal set of moral constraints by which to organise his life.

It is intended in the formulation of these tests, to consider earlier research findings and attempt to overcome their difficulties by using finer instruments than used by Swainson, for example, and a different approach to the results than used by Bull.

The developmental factor which was strong in Bull's research, although taken into consideration, was not dominant. The age range in this study is not as wide as his and although developmental factors are inevitable from 10 - 17 that factor is not a principal one. In fact, the acceptance of stages in moral growth, according to Wilson, poses problems of meaning. What in fact are the stages, stages of?

Wright(75:p.15) suggests that "we are talking about the child's understanding of rules which reaches a level of autonomous maturity in late adolescence". Piaget(56) adds weight to this idea by observing children's development in terms of 'the rules of the game!.

Peters(53:p.242) can further be brought to add to this idea, suggesting that "man is basically a rule keeping animal". This relates to the individual's progressive understanding of certain types of rules. In this study, the rules we will be concerned with contain elements of social morality as set out by Middleton and Putney(49:p.142). We shall, of course, be investigating the sanctions which seem influential in the observance of these moral rules, taking particular note, as we have said, of the interaction of the religious factor if any, upon the observance of these rules and also the interaction of the religious sanction upon other sanctions in this observance.

For example, a sanction may not on the surface or at first observation, have any specific religious overtone or connection, e.g., social concern or ego ideal, but it may be influenced by church attendance or denominational difference or a specific type of religious instruction given in the school.

Swainson(64:p.190) who found four sequential stages in development, also found a quite strong religious sanction operating throughout those stages. A factor probably influencing her responses was that of one thousand respondents, 687 attended church, chapel or Sunday school regularly, whilst only 128 did not attend at all.

Quite a high proportion of Bull's(7:p.64-5) respondents too, in the West Country, had some form of religious affiliation, a point which he seems to overlook.

We will be looking at adolescents' responses at schools and churches in the North West and North East of England at a period which is considerably changed from the days of Swainson and in areas perhaps where church attendance is not so common as in Bull's locality.

However, as a criterion group, we have decided to include responses from adolescents given in church based groups. We are aware, however, that there might be conflicting factors, as Graham(20:p.253) suggests here between the social function of religion in the church community (and the school for that matter) in promoting morality by its concern with moral questions which are kept alive as local issues, (i.e., certain church groups in the North Eastern locality have identified themselves with the Festival of Light movement), and the personal or individual function of religion in promoting a higher level of morality in the believer. There is some evidence for group rather than individual responses amongst adolescents. Church attendance has been investigated by various researchers with regard to moral issues. Hartshorne and May(25:1930) found that children who went to Sunday school were more honest than those who did not. Maller(43:p.102) also supports this view in terms of honesty with Jewish children who attended special religious schools. A survey of Muslim boys at a school in Batley(61) in Yorkshire, found them to be less delinquent than English boys in the same school. In fact, only one Muslim boy had been in trouble with either school or police authorities (later found unproven) over a period of three years, whilst a considerable number of cases were reported against English boys. However, as already mentioned by Graham, family and social factors could play as significant a role here as religious factors, although it would be difficult in a tight knit Muslim or Jewish community to isolate group from individual responses. Bull(7:p.65), using church attendance, found some support to the theory that church attendance was a factor in lying and value of life situations, (confirming, in part,

Hartshorne and May's earlier work). Wright and Cox(76:p.143) found that the more religious pupils tended to be, the more severe they became in their judgements. Many of their religious respondents considered that all behaviour was the provenance of God. Hilliard(27:p.58) some fifteen years ago, sought the influence of religious education had upon the development of moral ideas. He concluded that his College of Education respondents looked to religious education and religion in general as an aid to them in the development and maintenance of their moral ideas and standards of conduct. It is difficult to ascertain from his study whether the religious influence of the school or the church was the contributing factor or how if any they interacted.

Shoben(60:p.141) mentions some studies of Jewish children which suggest that a religious community setting for children contributes to a considerable degree to their moral attitudes. For the purposes of this study we can separate the church-going population of the school from the non-church-going and also differentiate, as we shall see later, between the type of religious education given in the school.

Before we turn to the details of the methods used in this study, it would be well to spell out in a little more detail, what we shall include as moral situations. Middleton and Putney(49:p.143), as we have mentioned already, define two areas of morality as the ascetic and social. The latter are those which forbid things harmful to the social group such as cheating, lying and stealing. The ascetic standards are defined as abstinence from gambling, alcohol, sex and so on, which are derived from the ascetic Christian tradition. They found that "believers" are more likely

than non-believers to regard anti-ascetic actions as wrong. They suggest that religion is more a reflection of social morality than a source of it. However, all of the items on their social ethics scale could be said to be biblical, especially with Ten Commandment overtones.

With the exception of the ascetic smoking dilemma which is really a question of divided loyalty in the home, projected test number six, all of the projected tests are concerned with social morality questions, some in the Kohlburg type transgression completion form. There are three basic social sets also for most of the tests, they either are the home, the school and outside both of these situations.

The details of construction and the format and types of analysis are considered in the following chapter.

Chapter 3.

The Principal Variables in
the Test Construction.

Sugarman(63:p.6) and Williams(70:p.17) give some useful guidelines for the construction of tests in this field. Williams calls the test used for ascertaining reasons or motives in the moral sphere a 'Dik' test. Their suggestions have partly been followed here.

Various researchers have investigated the social morality field in some or all of the different components of this test. Hartshorne and May(24:1928) studied, amongst other things, cheating and lying in adolescents; Piaget's studies(56:1932) included cheating, lying and various rule observations, whilst Swainson(64:1949) covered various social factors. In recent years, Bull(7:1969) investigated social morality issues including lying, cheating, stealing and the value of life. The developmental factor, however, has been of prime importance, in particular with Bull and Piaget.

Some comparison where possible will be made with these and other researchers in the social morality field, especially where sanctions are considered.

A personal data inventory occupied the first five questions in the test, to ascertain the principal and secondary variables, Appendix 1.

The first item, sex difference, has been shown at times to be a factor in moral judgement tests. Wright and Cox(76:p.139) with 2,276 sixth formers, showed that girls were more severe than boys on all the moral issues they investigated except stealing and smoking.

Kohlberg(38) has shown that adolescent boys were significantly more mature than girls in moral judgements suggesting that girls were more rule conforming in their attitudes.

Although this study is being undertaken with secondary school children, it was felt that the age range of ten to seventeen years was wide enough to allow for maturity or developmental factors to be possible. Therefore, respondents were grouped into three age categories, ten to twelve - early adolescence, thirteen to fourteen - middle adolescence and fifteen to seventeen - late adolescence. Wright and Cox(76:p.139) could find no relationship between moral judgement and age in their sample, but it was a very restricted group. Kuhlen and Arnold(39:p.299) suggest that there are some significant changes in development over this age range. Again, the influences of the school situation may well interact with developmental factors. An attempt was made in the pilot test to introduce the school type factor with a differentiation between single sex and grammar and comprehensive schools. However, although this is a tempting field for investigation, early results did not pose any real differences and in the final test most respondents were from large mixed comprehensives and therefore this factor was eliminated.

After some difficulties in analysing free responses on the pilot run on class differences, it was decided to differentiate two separate social classes, working class and middle class, by parental occupation. The Joint Industry Committee for National Readership Survey(13) on class differences, was used here and respondents were divided on the basis of the father's (if alive) occupation.

Kohlburg(37:p.406) suggests that middle class and working class children proceed through the same moral developmental stages but that middle class children move faster. This factor was more significant than differences

in class, cultural values or beliefs.

Swainson, (64:p.190) considers that the most popular explanation for the sense of "ought" or "right" was acquired from parents. However, in her day, she felt that social background was reflected in the type of school attended.

So far then, we have sex, age and class differences on our personal data inventory and those will be regarded as 'secondary' variables for our study.

The principal variables were now ascertained in questions five and six and from teachers' replies (see Appendix 1). They were firstly, church or Sunday school attendance. This was split into attendance regularly or irregularly, with or without parents, or not at all. Various studies have used this index for analysis. Hartshorne and May(24) showed that Sunday School children were more honest than those who did not attend but suggested that social class was also an influential factor.

Bull(7) used church attendance as his measure of religious influence and found the strongest relationship between lying and the value of life situation. He suggested (p.284) that such a raw measure as church attendance however, did scant justice to the intricate and subtle differences that religious effects had upon the child at home or at school.

Graham(20:p.254) suggests that strongly held religious convictions might well be associated with a moral attitude both in the negative sense of avoidance of wrong doing and in the positive sense of sympathetic consideration for others. It was with considerations like these two latter in mind that both a measure of church attendance and denominational grouping were used. Together with these, a group of adolescents who met regularly with religious groups in the area were also considered. These would be used as a criterion group to

compare with the church attenders and non church attenders who responded from within the school set to those responding from a different social set. Davies(10:p.50), Sugarman(63:p.27) and Kay(34:p.181) have all studied the effects of group pressures upon the expression of moral beliefs and all suggested that the social set has some influence upon the response made to moral questions. On the relationship between church attendance and non church attendance, Wright and Cox(76:p.143) found their non religious pupils to be less severe in their moral judgements but mainly in ascetic issues. Fiske(15:p.374) with college students, found that Christian respondents scored higher in social morality judgements than control groups of non believers, concluding that Christians are expected to be "good people", who have certain role expectations which demand good living or at least the manifestation of a favourable moral and personal self assessment.

With regard to the denominational differences, there has been some evidence that different religious groups have a different attitude to some moral questions. Argyle(4:p.9) considers that Protestants have a higher level of guilt than Catholics but on the other hand, Catholics have a higher delinquency rate than non-Catholics.

For our purposes, religious denomination will be divided between conformist (Church of England, Catholic) groups and nonconformist (Baptist, Methodist, United Reform and Pentecostal). The former could be said to be more sacramentalist and have a greater concentration on liturgical form than the latter. It could be suggested that this is really a class difference although it would be difficult to equate the Church of England with the Roman Catholic church on class grounds. However, there maybe some

correlation, for instance, a high proportion of Pentecostal respondents listed parents as "unemployed". Packard(51:p.173)' with American churches, has attempted to show the close proximity of religious affiliation and social class.

The final primary variable was concerned with the type of religious education the child received in the school or group. Although every child is expected to receive some form of religious education in school in compliance with the 1944 Act, the type of education varies from area to area, syllabus to syllabus. The majority may be said to be confessional and biblically based, allowing moral education to proceed from the bible centred pattern. Other syllabi are more open ended, child centred, attempting to reflect the levels of the child's concept development. It has been shown by Greer and Brown(21:p.78) that different syllabi elicit different responses to questions set to children, especially in the primary school. Although the majority of respondents in this study were of the former type, a significant number came from schools following the latter approach and thus these differences were noted and recorded.

The last question on the personal data inventory was a self evaluation one. Respondents were asked to consider themselves as "more bad than good", "more good than bad" or neither. It must be conceded that the concept of badness has overtones of sin and guilt for some children, especially for the religious and for the non-religious it may have a more social connotation in terms of material things. However, most children, even if in their own way, have some concept of being bad in terms of naughtiness, 'bad boy, bad girl' or even 'bad dog'. This question was asked by Swainson(64:p.185)

to ascertain whether her respondents were prone to guilt.

Fiske^(15:p.316) also used this measure but with a more sophisticated technique. He found that committed Christians were more moralist and more prone to guilt and feelings of 'self badness' than non-Christians. However, in the pilot test, the respondents who regarded themselves as more bad than good were mainly from the working class social group which could be indicative of the fact that they felt 'bad' to mean 'more badly off', but that is pure conjecture.

The first investigatory test on sanctions was an attempt to elicit some initial insight into the respondent's assessment of his own motivation in moral situations, the details of this question are set in Appendix 1. The initial question was "what do you consider are a young person's motives for being good?". Again we have the difficulty of what is to count as goodness or what good means, but with a series of possible responses for interpretation it was felt that the question could stand. It was not an open ended question in that five responses were possible but only one tick allowed. There are various ways of looking at these options. They could be regarded as having developmental overtones in terms of moral maturity, or as differing sanctions in moral behaviour or even as practical examples of Wilson's moral components. The second of these three alternatives was regarded as the most relevant for our purposes. In fact, there is an element of Swainson's five primary sanctions here of fear (prudential), love (social), law (authoritarian), religion and self regard (ego ideal or prudential). The brackets are mine as Swainson would probably not agree that they can all be interpreted in these terms.

Our first response, "fear of the consequences" was

regarded as a prudential sanction.

The second, "because of love for others" allowed for an element of altruism or 'Phil' concern for others in Wilsonian terms.

The third response, "which considered respect for rules of home and school" was regarded as an authoritarian sanction.

"For religious reasons" was the fourth choice and this option, together with option two on "the value of life situation test" are the only explicit religious references in the actual tests. Open ended responses do give an opportunity, however, for specific religious references.

The final response, "so that you don't make life difficult for yourself", could be also regarded as prudential or at least "self regard", as mentioned by Swainson. We have, thus, two forms of the prudential sanction in this test, one with fear overtones, the other with self regard.

It is possible for interaction to occur between these sanctions and also the responses we get here are reasons for moral action which may disguise a deeper motive. For instance, to illustrate both points, a respondent could respond to "for love of others in a desire not to hurt them" for religious reasons. The decision was made, however, to eliminate a rank order of responses after the pilot run with this test, as the respondents may feel obliged on that basis to score them all when in fact some of them may have no real relevance.

The first of a series of situational projections now occurs, most of which are based on similar earlier research

projects which have indicated those areas which adolescents are concerned about or which adolescents consider to be concerned with morality in the social sense.

Macauley and Watkins(42), a considerable time ago, reported that there were four main groups of concern reported by adolescents and it does not appear to have changed much since their day. These were concerned with offences against persons and property, offences against parents and acquaintances, school offences and offences against religion. From trial essay tests done with a number of children, most of these categories were listed by children in the North of England. It was felt that offences against religion could be eliminated as we are using several religious controls. However, Peel(52:p.99) has done some study on children's moral judgements using religious and historical situations. There is an attempt here to situate these tests in school, the community and home and to include offences such as listed by Macauley and Watkins above.

The saving of life situation projected test number one is set outside both school and home (see Figure 1). This is a moral situation also posed by Bull(7) in pictorial form(p.70-1) and uses both boys and girls in both roles. There is an opportunity for self identification with the characters in the story to occur for both sexes in this test. It was found from the pilot test here that adolescents could identify reasonably well without the sex roles being reversed, thus in this test, "Brian saved Anita". It could be suggested that the saving life is instinctive for most people and all would regard the action as right, even if they could not bring themselves to do it (perhaps a respondent cannot swim). Therefore, in the light of this, it is seemingly justifiable

to pose the dilemma of the value of life to elicit the sanction. Brian did save the girl and therefore the factors involved in getting him "to get up and do something about it" are our principal concern here.

Bull's (7 :p.69) analysis of this situation is on developmental grounds; we are more concerned with sanctions, although it must be conceded that these can be influenced by development.

There is a rank order of responses included here to consider the strength of a response in terms of first or second choice and perhaps interaction of responses.

The first option (see Figure 1), was "he was afraid of what people would say if he did not help". This was regarded as a prudential sanction similar to response one on the previous test.

The next response was specifically religious, suggesting that Brian "knew that God would want him to save her". It could be suggested that most people in any way influenced or in contact with religion would concur with the view that "life is sacred" and the saving of life a moral imperative on the injunction perhaps that "thou shalt not kill", although the watching of violent gangster and cowboy films has never really seemed to affect many children's choices in television, but perhaps that issue could be investigated. Perhaps some of our religious groups, especially the religious social group, are specifically looking for some religious explanation for moral activity and this is an obvious opportunity.

The third response "he knows everyone would think he was brave" fits the ego ideal, self concept sanction. Perhaps this is more amenable to boys in this section than

Figure 1

Two friends, Brian and Anita, were going for a walk by the river when Anita, who could not swim, fell in. Brian jumped in and saved her from drowning. Later people suggested the four following reasons for Brian's action. Show which reasons you think best by numbering them 1 to 4 in order.

- | | | |
|----|--|--------------------------|
| 1. | He was afraid of what people would say if he did not help Anita. | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 2. | He knew God would want him to save her | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 3. | He knows everyone would think he was brave | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 4. | He had always been told that it was right. | <input type="checkbox"/> |

Sanctions considered

1. Prudential
2. Religious
3. Ego ideal
4. Authoritarian

girls as it may be that they are not seeking roles in which they can express bravery which could 'mistakenly' be regarded as a male domain. Kay(35:p.67) suggests that this particular sanction of the self or ego ideal is quite a complex one related in part with guilt and the development of conscience. We shall be looking at the development of guilt in the next situational stealing test.

The final response available was "he had always been told that it was right", which was regarded as law or authoritarian; it can refer to the influence of parents or school. On a pilot run, many felt that moral values were largely learnt from parents. The rank order of responses will enable analysis to look at relationship, if any, between these various sanctions.


The next test is a well tried one on stealing, here from a satchel in a cloakroom scene, similar to the situation used by Bull(7:p.145)(See appendix 1 and Figure 2). There is a girl pictured in the rather indistinct scene, which leaves the situation a little ambiguous. She could be stealing, she could be just looking. It gives a chance to redress the imbalance of the previous situation where a boy occupied the principal role. For girl respondents some element of identification is possible on the ego ideal level; would they steal from the cloakroom if it was them? The scene is set suggesting that the person is all alone in cloakroom, an opportunity for temptation. Someone has left their bag, it is open, do you think they will take anything out of it?. The respondents are invited to tick "yes" or "no" to this initial question. For the girls involved, it would be reasonable to suggest that they would say "no, not if it was me" because "I don't steal" or "girls don't steal". Or conversely "yes, because no one would

Figure 2

Here is a picture of someone in the cloakroom at school, they are all alone. Someone has left their bag in the cloakroom. It is open. Do you think they will take anything out of it and keep it?

Yes

No



- (i) If yes
 - Would that be stealing?.....
 - Is it all right to take what belongs to someone else?.....
 - How do you think the person might feel after they take it.....
- (ii) If No
 - Why not take anything?.....
 - Would it be all right to keep something you found in the street, say a purse?.....
 - Why?.....
 - Why not?.....

Guilt Sanctions Operative:

- Fear
- General Conscience Feeling
- Specific guilt
- Punishment
- Confession

ever know or I couldn't resist the temptation. For boys, the former alternative might be more difficult in terms of association or identification. In fact, in the pilot exercise, more boys than girls said the girl was stealing and mostly boys of about thirteen. But a more mature response from both boys and girls might be "no, it is difficult to tell", or "temptation to steal is not stealing" or "it depends on the circumstances, perhaps the girl is hard up or something". These would be included under the 'no' response.

Two series of questions were then to be asked about this test. If the respondents answered yes to the first question, then they were invited to reply to the question "would that be stealing" to differentiate perhaps in their minds a difference between stealing or 'just taking'. Taking from peers or friends is often held as more sinful by some groups than stealing from strangers or Woolworths. A later test sets the situation away from friends and posits stealing from a shop. Reactions to that situation can be compared with reactions to this situation which is in a different social setting.

The next question in the series was "Is it all right to take what belongs to someone else?" With the final question "How do you think the person might feel after they take it?" This last question in this series was the first really open ended response available, apart from 'yes' and 'no' replies, to the respondent. The operative word was "feel", and it was intended that the replies should be categorised wherever possible, according to a measure of guilt or guilt feelings which the respondents indicated. This was to be measured against the dimension of guilt levels that Kohlburg (37:p.425)

has suggested, but perhaps without the sophistication of interpretation of responses which Kohlberg suggests. He refers to four main levels of guilt response which children make: fear - which sometimes includes punishment and hiding and declines with age, conscience feelings, real guilt or self blame and confession. These dimensions will form the basis of our analysis of this question and also the question on the stealing from the shop situation. We will discuss the method of plotting the different dimensions in the analysis of results in the next chapter.

For the moment, it could be conceded that criticism could be levelled at this type of analysis as not being concerned with morality in the evaluative sense. Williams (69:p.57) suggests that "guilt and non rational inhibition although they are the most frequent governors of actual behaviour, at least in our society, that does not entitle us to equate them with moral behaviour". "In fact, no matter how closely conscience is connected with moral behaviour" he says, "if we evaluate behaviour as moral in so far as it implies responsibility for the consequences of our actions, the very non rationality of guilt must disqualify it as moral behaviour in the fullest sense of that term." However, he does agree that the scope of discussion concerning moral behaviour needs to be extended to include negative as well as positive aspects of behaviour.

In support of the type of analysis suggested here is the reference by Wright (75) to the examination of story completion test responses in terms of dimensions of guilt. He suggests (p.113) that we can treat all responses that might conceivably indicate guilt as equivalent and thereby extract a total guilt score, or we can consider each type of response separately. We, as indicated, are taking the latter approach

both in this test and in the shop based stealing situation described later in this chapter. It seems that there is a high degree of individuality in the kinds of response that people favour on the guilt dimension, as Kohlburg has shown. However, Wright(75:p.114) says "the people who show concern about this transgression in one situation will do so in others but the way that this concern is expressed will vary both between people and between situations". There is some evidence from Grinder and McMichael(22) that children, especially girls, who resist temptation, for instance in this cloakroom scene, by saying 'no' to the situation, are more likely to exhibit guilt responses of the confessional kind in story completion measures. Wright(75:p.116) again looks at the correlation of guilt to various factors including age, sex and intelligence, but not to any religious factors.

The second half of the question is directed towards those whose first response was "no" to the stealing situation. If 'no' - "why not take anything?" which resulted in some attempt on the part of the respondent to classify their reasons for honesty. Various responses on the pilot run covered self evaluation, ego ideal from the girls and the reciprocal factor from the boys, to straight "it wouldn't be honest or it is wrong". We will discuss the analysis of this in the next chapter. An extension was attempted to the stealing dilemma for these respondents, by asking them if they felt it would be all right to keep something they found in the street. This was an attempt to ascertain whether their honesty or refusal to accept the situation in the cloakroom as stealing, was extended outside the school to a situation of anonymity. The majority, in the

initial trials, were consistent in saying "no". Therefore, finally, a further attempt was made to elicit their reason why they would not keep or steal something. It was expected that the responses would generally cover the range of feelings in the guilt dimension on the "yes" responses, as mentioned earlier.

The findings of this group of questions, based in school, could be compared with the out of school scene in question 11.

The next situation projection, question ten, (Appendix 1 and Figure 3), was again school based, suggesting a rule keeping authoritarian school scene. Piaget⁽⁵⁶⁾ has investigated the rule keeping dimension of children's moral behaviour in progressing from the rules of a game to the specific moral rules which adults lay down. He suggests^(p.41) that "by about the age of ten to eleven, children seem to be interested in rules for their own sake". There seems to be an element of respect for persons and the group in this rule keeping scheme and an approval of certain rules from the environment in which the child finds itself. He further suggests^(p.43) that "only in this kind of situation are rules accompanied by a feeling of obligation, particularly when the child sees a rule emanating from someone he respects". However, he says^(p.56) that "children, after the age of eleven, appear to regard the rules of the game no longer as external laws sacred in so far as they are laid down by adults but as the outcome of a free decision and worthy of respect only in so far as it has enlisted mutual consent". Is this suggestive that democratic rule making is necessary in the school situation? Ungood Thomas^(65:p.92-3) has drawn attention to this factor, especially with regard to motivation.

Figure 3.

There was a school rule that no one ran in the yard though
 no one knew why this rule had ever been made. Peter always
 kept it, because as he said, a rule is a rule, but David
 broke it because he saw no reason to keep it. What would
 you do in this case?.....

 Why?

Sanctions examined: Authoritarian
 Personal Social
 Prudential, Self interest
 Personal independent.

For our situation, we are suggesting that the rule has no obvious reason behind it. Respondents were invited to identify themselves with the situation of running in the playground and the observance of the school rule which forbade running. There was the intention with this test to introduce a moral dilemma of observing rules which seemingly have no valid reason, a situation not unknown to adolescents.

Peter always kept the rule because, as he said, a rule is a rule, but David broke it because he saw no reason to keep it. The dilemma, in fact, is that for Peter rules are sacrosanct but for David, they must have reasons. There is a developmental factor involved in that David is developing a more personal approach to the problem by asking "what is the reason for this rule?" The respondents were asked what they would do in this case. The responses would be scored group one, following Peter's example, or group two, following David's example. The second part of the question was an attempt to explore the sanction in this type of rule observance by asking why they did what they did. Responses could well be affected by the type of school in which the children found themselves, whether it was an authoritarian regime or one which questioned rules. Further, some children might see this question as an opportunity to 'cock a snook' at the school under the cover of their anonymous response to get their own back or be deliberately provocative. However, it was felt that most responses could be categorised under one of the following sanctions:- (i) self interest, prudential keeping out of trouble, (ii) authoritarian rules are rules, (iii) personal social spirit rather than letter of the law should be investigated, but gave a reason why the rule should be kept, e.g., concern for others. Finally (iv) independent, rational personal, which could include deliberate rule

breaking for the sake of it.

The final school based situation was the well tried cheating test. This was introduced by the picture of two boys in the classroom, one looking over or across at the one sitting at the next desk. Again, as with the cloakroom scene, there was an element of ambiguity with the set. It was suggested that he was looking that way (See Appendix 1 and Figure 4) and the respondents were asked whether they thought he was or was not going to cheat. From the earlier test it was felt that the girls would have little difficulty with identification with this story, even though the two characters involved were boys.


In one sense, cheating could be regarded as an artificial form of social morality as it is a product of a competitive educational system which is itself immoral. However, Middleton and Putney's (49:p.100) studies reveal that cheating in examinations is regarded as ethically wrong by 92.5% boys and 95.1% of girls. Piaget (56:p.101) although suggesting that mutual co-operation was preferable to competition, studied cheating in the classroom as well as cheating at games. Bull (7: p.116-144) also studied cheating and measured it in terms of a developmental scaling similar to his stealing tests. Respondents here were invited to respond under two different categories, both intended to elicit attitudes to cheating and the reason why they held those attitudes.

"Yes" respondents to the situation that the boy was cheating were asked "do you think it is all right to cheat?" "No" respondents, suggesting that the boy was not cheating, were asked "what do you think about cheating?" (See Appendix 1 and Figure 4).

The open ended element of the question in both categories

Figure 4

10. Here is a picture of two boys. They are sitting next to one another. One is looking over toward the other. He might be looking that way. Do you think he is going to try to cheat and to copy from the other boy?



(i) if Yes

Do you think it is all right to cheat?.....

Do you think it is wrong?.....

Why?.....

(ii) if No

What do you think about cheating?.....

.....

Is it right or wrong?.....

Why?.....

Sanctions examined:

1. Authoritarian
2. Social group
3. prudential self interest
4. self interest (guilt feelings)
5. personal independent.

asked why they felt it was wrong to cheat or right in some cases. This free response was categorised under the following sanctions:-

(i) Authoritarian, (ii) Social group orientated concern for others, (iii) Self interest prudential "you don't learn anything", "they might be wrong", (iv) guilt self interest feelings "I would feel conscience" or "feel bad", (v) Personal independent "You have to stand on your own two feet".

The next projected test was an out of school situation, a typical Kohlburg transgression story, to elicit guilt responses (Figure 5). There is a considerable amount of temptation here for the adolescent, many of whom might regard this as no more than "winning" something or "nicking" something. The situation of taking the boots and walking out of the shop is to be completed by the respondents in their own words in an attempt to analyse the type, if any, of guilt feelings discernable from the replies. Again the "types" of guilt will be examined under the headings mentioned in test eight on stealing from the cloakroom. We ought to qualify our remarks concerning guilt here by suggesting that this type of projective test measures appropriate guilt rather than unconscious guilt or genetic guilt.

Smoking is a problem with most adolescents in terms of parental and school disapproval and more so perhaps in recent years with medical disapproval. The next test, however, is not only about smoking, which is marginal really, but about the moral dilemma of loyalty to peers, brothers and sisters in this case, and loyalty to parents. Claire has broken a family rule whilst her parents are out. Should her younger sister Joan tell her parents or keep it a secret? The respondents are again invited to suggest, in a few words,

Figure 5.Transgression Projection on Stealing

John saves up £3 for a pair of football boots. When he goes into the sports shop the assistant is going into the backroom. He sees the boots he likes and reaches in his pocket for the money but he has lost it. The boots would fit under his jacket so he hides them and walks out of the shop.

Now you finish the story in a few words

.....

- Guilt sanctions examined:
1. Fear
 2. General conscience feelings
 3. Specific guilt
 4. Confession (remorse)
 5. Punishment (inevitable or necessary)

what they would do in this situation, that is, what are the overriding factors or sanctions to which they would respond (Figure 6).

This is a different social setting from any of the previous sets and is a test of loyalty to parents or peers. The sanctions found to be operative in the pilot test were (i) authority, "parents must be obeyed", (ii) reciprocal social, love, "I wouldn't want anyone to tell on me" or "it's for her own good", (iii) prudential self regard, "what if my parents found out, I would be in trouble for not telling", (iv) independence, personal, "it's up to Claire", "she is old enough", or "things like that are her concern, not mine". It must be conceded that there is an element of ascetic morality in the details of this situation as envisaged by Middleton and Putney(49:p.145).

The next test had no social setting in school or home but was a general examination of adolescents' attitudes to lying. Each category of response, one of which had to be ticked, had a different sanction inherent within it (Figure 7). The first question was "do you think it would be all right to tell a lie if you were not caught and no one punished you for it?" The respondents merely had to tick "yes" or "no". This would produce a general attitude score to lying in principle.

Then a series of questions concerning lying were asked, (see Appendix 1 and Figure 7), to elicit any differences in sanctions on lying. The first question "is it worse to lie to an adult?" if ticked, could indicate an authoritarian approach to lying with overtones of fear of punishment if caught.

The next "is it worse to lie to a child?" could indicate an element of reciprocity peer involvement. The final

Figure 6."At Home" transgression test of loyalty

Claire, aged fifteen, is smoking in her bedroom when her parents, who forbid her to smoke, are out. Her younger sister Joan sees her and says she will tell her Father. Claire says she should keep it a secret.

What do you think Joan should do? in a few words

.....

- Sanctions examined:
1. Authority
 2. Social peer reciprocity, love.
 3. Prudential self regard
 4. personal independent.

category in this section was "Is it just as bad to lie to either?" This could indicate a personal sanction.

The next two questions posed the dilemma of "lying to help a friend" or "is it always wrong to tell lies?" Respondents were again asked to tick "yes" or "no".

The classic study on lying was that of Hartshorne and May(24) in 1928 and involved more than 10,000 school children. There were low correlations in this study between cheating, stealing and lying. Piaget(56:p.168) attempted to differentiate between lying to parents and children, as did Bull(7:p.197) and both suggested that attitudes changed with age in connection with lying. Lying to parents was regarded by younger children as being worse than lying to children whilst the opposite was the case for the older age group. Loukes(40:p.28) found quite a proportion of his respondents prepared to concede on casuistic terms that lying can sometimes be valid in helping a friend.

The final series of questions were concerned with punishment after a moral misdemeanour centred on the home social situation. The respondents were asked "what would be a fair response in terms of punishment to the situation of John failing to run an errand with the consequence that there was no bread for tea?" The following suggestions for punishment were offered and the respondents were asked to either to tick one or put down their own suggestion (Figure 8).

The first response was physical deprivation "make him go without his tea", tit for tat response. The second was "stop him going out that evening", that is punitive detention. The third response was verbal castigation "tell him off". The last response was withdrawal of co-operation or deprivation of love, "not help John when he wanted something done". The open ended response allowed the respondents to put their own point of view and, as there was no physical

Figure 7Lying Projection Test

(i) Do you think it would be all right to tell a lie
if you were not caught and no one punished you for
it?

Yes

No

Please tick which you think

(ii) Is it worse to lie to an adult	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
or Is it worse to lie to a child	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Is it just as bad to either	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(iii) Is it always wrong to tell lies	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
or Is it all right to lie to help a friend	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Sanctions Examined: Authoritarian
Ego ideal/peer reciprocity
Personal

punishment suggested, an opportunity was given here for respondents to suggest one if they felt it necessary.

All of the responses could be termed as "negative reinforcement" which motivates the respondent to avoid them in future.

In this test it is suggested that the respondents will tick or indicate that negative reinforcement which acts as a sanction in their moral behaviour and thus something they try to avoid. It seems that most children expect punishment as a natural outcome for misdemeanours and in some situations, fear of the consequences if caught, is an efficient sanction for "right" behaviour. Wright(77:p.228) has drawn attention to the various types of punishment listed here and categorises them under three headings, power assertion, love withdrawal and indirection where the adult reasons with the child. The latter is only available under the free response element of these adolescent replies.

Wheeler(68:), has made a study of punishment as a negative sanction, both in home and the school. He suggests(p.119) that adolescents' attitudes towards punishment in school are a reflection of their attitudes towards punishment in the family. To use Piaget's terms, he also suggests that(pl26) "negative sanctions or a morality of constraint should be modified or replaced by co-operation if we want to develop true morality". It seems that, on the whole, according to Loukes(40:p.82) "children do not demand total permissiveness, they ask for order but they want it to be just and compassionate and personal".

It was found difficult to include a religious sanction with the open ended responses in questions eight to fourteen. It was felt that unless the words used by the respondents were specifically religious, it would be difficult to label

Figure 8

Punishment Projection Test - At Home

Situation

What would be fair?

John was playing in the garden when his mother asked him to go to the corner shop for some bread. He said "I'll go" but he didn't. When his father came in for tea and there was no bread, he was angry. He wondered what was the best way to punish John. What do you think? Tick one.

Make him go without his tea

Stop him going out that evening

Tell him off

Not help John when he wanted something done

None of these - if not, what do you think?

.....

<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

- Categories of punishment sanctions:
1. Deprivation (physical)
 2. Detention
 3. Verbal castigation
 4. Deprivation (love)
 5. Physical (imposition)

it as a religious sanction. Also, religious responses could be classified under the headings of other sanctions listed, i.e. "God said we should" or "the Ten Commandments say we should" as authoritarian; or "God would punish me" as fear or prudential; or "the bible says we should love our neighbour" as social or group orientated or even authoritarian. However, the converse could also be the case that some responses not specifically religious in tone, could be relying on religious stimulation. Bull(7:p.103) makes this point when he says that "many religious virtues or attitudes could be expressed under other headings. Concern or love, for religious reasons, could be seen as "altruism", acknowledgement of external absolute laws and values could be called "authoritarian". Kay(33) also suggests that the religious sanction can be classed under other sanctions in this way. It is easier, of course, with specific responses to be ticked as in question 7 "he knew that God would want him to save her" to get a religious sanction response.

We now turn to the application of the tests and the analysis of results obtained.

Chapter 4

Analysis of Results

Various methods have been employed by researchers in this field for eliciting children's responses to moral situations. The use of tape and interview has been used by several, including Loukes and Goldman. Free expression essays and drawings have been used by Swainson, and the completion of transgression stories and moral dilemmas by Kohlburg.

It was decided early on this study to use the questionnaire type of approach which has been standard practice for many researchers as Shaw and Wright⁽⁵⁹⁾ have shown. However, into the questionnaire format, some elements of other approaches are included such as the use of pictorial scenes, the completion of transgression stories and free response answers. Wright^(75:p.231) suggests that "the only way to test the relationship between children's moral behaviour and other factors would be to randomly assign children to two different kinds of upbringing" in which, for our purposes, "one was given intensive moral or religious education and the other given none at all. Then any difference in moral behaviour could be attributed to the presence or absence of the control factors." However, he does suggest a more practical test which we have tried in part to follow here. That is, comparison can be made of different groups, matched for age, intelligence and content of moral belief, and then we can compare and assess their moral behaviour. We have already conceded that intelligence and personality have been left on one side for various reasons but as many controls as possible have been applied.

The questionnaire was given in a controlled experiment by teachers and church youth leaders, to one hundred and eighty adolescents between the ages of ten to seventeen in

the North West and the North East of England. Nearly twenty sets of results were spoiled or incompleated and therefore discarded.

The relative and cumulative frequencies obtained for the secondary variable of age, sex and class differences are seen in Figures nine to eleven. Overall, there are more girls than boys; more 15-17 year olds than the earlier age groups and more working class than middle class children. However, with each set of numbers, a percentage score is also obtained to show the relative differences. We will take into consideration some of these numerical differences in later analysis.

The scores for four main religious variables are given in Figures twelve to fourteen. The religious social group has been added to Figure 12 of the church or non-church attenders. The denominational differences are seen in Figure 13 and the type of religious education seen in Figure 14. Again, there were numerical differences between the denominations, more conformist than nonconformist and more again of non-attenders and thus no religious denomination. However, over half expressed some denominational preference.

There were also numerical differences between the type of religious education, by far the largest proportion, 79.5% receiving bible centred religious education. These differences in groups will be considered when using this variable.

Relative and cumulative frequencies together with histogram representations were obtained for all the variables measured. Some record was made from the respondents open responses in questions eight to fourteen on the questionnaire

of any particularly pointed remarks, especially if they were of a specifically religious nature. Trends were also looked for in individual questionnaires for repeated references to such elements as fear or authority.

The null hypothesis in each of the different tests is that the total adolescent response to any of the moral situations is not significantly influenced by any of the religious variables but can be attributed to the secondary variables or other factors.

The method used for this study by computer analysis is the system of cross tabulation of each of our religious variables against the scores obtained on each of the moral situation tests. It is also reasonable to cross tabulate the social variables of sex, age and social class, against the moral situation results to vindicate the null hypothesis and perhaps show that trends in responses are a function of any one or all of the social variables. This latter method of analysis has been used where it is felt relevant. For instance, the school based playground rule keeping results would, after being cross tabulated with any one of the religious variables, be also compared with the age factor to show that such responses are influenced by developmental levels as a function of age, rather than the religious factors.

The first two sets of results were based on personal evaluations by the respondents of themselves and of the factors involved in their own motivation.

The self evaluation test scores for the total sample are given in Figure 15. In this only 9.3% of the total considered themselves as "more bad than good"; 42.9% considered themselves as "more good than bad" and 47.8% considered themselves as neither. It was not felt worthwhile

comparing these results with Swainson's (64:p.188) as only 13% of her respondents did not attend church. However, it is reasonable to examine Fiske's (15:p.35) suggestion that Christians are more prone to guilt feelings and self depreciation than non-Christians. Religious denomination is compared with these results in Figure 16 and although nonconformists scored highest on the first category, conformists scored lower than the non church attenders. The numbers involved are so small that no interpretation can be given. Conformists scored 47.3% in considering themselves as "more good than bad" as against 42.9% of the total, again the differences are very slight. It could not be suggested either that the 47.8% who considered themselves "as neither" is indicative of a large section of the adolescent population who are unfeeling about "goodness". It is probable that at that particular stage of replying to this questionnaire with no specific moral constraints or feelings operating, that their response to this question was negative. Perhaps if this question had been placed at the end of the questionnaire, after the various moral dilemmas had been posed, the reactions might have been different.

The social class factor was also compared with this variable, 46% of working class children considered themselves as more good than bad with only 34% of middle class children. The scores are seen in Figure 17, however, with more working class children in the total sample, than middle class, this could be said to affect the differences here. In conclusion, therefore, there were no real significant factors with this first self evaluative question.

The second personal evaluation test was concerned with

the emphasis respondents placed on different sanctions in moral activity. They were put into verbal form as seen in Appendix 1. The relative and cumulative responses to this test are given in Figure 18. The highest response was response five, 40.4% indicating the prudential personal sanction that they obeyed to ensure that "they didn't make life difficult for themselves". The other prudential (fear) sanction "because of fear of the consequences" scored 29.1% of the total response. On first appearances, the majority appear to have taken a rather superficial prudential attitude to moral motivation. However, Swainson (64) also found (p.189) that self regard was the most important "self confessed" sanction in moral behaviour. She found "love for others" or the social sanction as being of second most importance. In these responses "love for others" was also second at 16.8% but a long way behind the prudential element. The fact that two opportunities were given to score a prudential type response shifted the emphasis in that direction. Religion only scored 5.6% or 9 of the total replies but all of these came from the religious social group (Figure 20.). The age factor did not seem to have any coherent influence upon these results (see Figure 19) although all but two of the religious sanctions responses came from the 15-17 yearsold age group, the numbers involved were too small for analysis.

The authoritarian sanction certainly was more prominent at 18.4% with the younger age group compared with 8.1% of the whole, but this is to be expected in developmental terms.

The overall comparison of religious groupings with these motivation factors, gave a Chi square of 40.059 with 12 degrees of freedom and a significance of 0.0001. However,

as already indicated with Figure 20, the numbers were very small in some categories, especially with the religious sanction being only 5.6% of the total. It could be suggested that religious subjects are looking for a religious outlet or explanation for their actions and this gave the opportunity. We will note this also on the value of life situation test.

It is very possible that, with younger children who attend church with parents, sanctions, though religious, may be invested in the rules of the home or authority. For example, one middle class child of twelve who attended the Church of England with her parents, scored respect for rules of home first here and followed an authoritarian pattern of responses throughout her replies.

On the sex differences, Figure 21, 24.1% of the girls listed love but only 8.1% of the boys. The age factor, when compared further, showed that there was a slight increase in love or social sanction with age. Swainson has also shown that this social sanction both increases with age and is favoured by girls.

The next test was the first situational set, an out of school saving of life story. We have called it situational projection number one. From the outset it could be criticised, as Bull says (7:p.69) that "any reaction to such a situation as seen in Figure one is instinctive and not moral". The urge or desire to save life could be said to be innate and no deliberate moral attitude or decision is necessary on such an occasion. However, "action speaks louder than instinct" and as in this case, the deed has been done, the reactions were sounded out. In fact, not a single blank reply form was received

for this projection. The relative and cumulative scores and percentages for each of the possible sanctions are given in Figures 22 to 25.

It is immediately apparent from Figure 23 that the religious sanction ranked highly in the respondents' replies. It was first choice of 34.8% and second choice of 28.6% of the respondents. Over 62% considered it as either first or second in importance in relation to saving life. As this was the only overtly religious reference in the whole questionnaire, it is worthy of further study. The response suggests that there is a religious undertone in the minds of some respondents when given the opportunity for expression. The response of the religious groups to this sanction are given in Figure 26. All but one on the religious social group scored it as first or second choice and 84.2% responded as first choice. Can we suggest that the social set in which they make this response, the church or youth club, has some effect upon their response; the church attenders without parents were next highest on this category at 42.9% but well below the religious social group, the former response, of course, was made from the school situation. The Chi square with these results was 36.95 with 9 degrees of freedom giving a significant score of 0.000. The Kendall's Tau B of the rank relationship gave a score of -0.226 with a significance of 0.000 and Kendall's Tau C -0.211 with a significance of 0.000. A note of caution needs to be introduced here, however, as there is some evidence for both sex differences and age influences on these results. Figure 27 shows that girls favoured this response at 40.2% more than boys at 28.4%; it was second choice for girls at 35.6% compared with boys at 20.3%. Overall, girls scored this either first or second at 75.8% compared with boys at 48.7%. The age

factor also is influential here, Figure 28. There is a decrease over the three age groupings over every one of the rankings in reverse order of priority. That is, as the age increased, the respondents gave less credence to this sanction. Bull(7 :p.89) also came to this conclusion saying "explicit religious references decrease markedly in the responses of older age groups", but he does suggest that religious influences may have helped to shape attitudes now consciously expressed in non-religious terms.

The other sanctions have not been analysed apart from the scores given in Figures 22 to 25. It should be noted, however, that the biggest single response to this situation was through the authoritarian sanction, Figure 25, 47.2% of all respondents giving this first choice.

The next series of questions were centred on the school based projections. The first was the cloakroom "stealing" scene, projected test number two. The response to the set of whether the girl was stealing or not was 56.5% said "she would not take anything" and 43.5% said "she would". The ego ideal sanction could be said to shine through these responses because girls seemed to identify with the girl in the picture more readily than the boys as 66.7% of girls considered that the subject was not taking anything and only 44.6% of the boys. These results are seen in Figures 29 and 30. This accords in part with Bull's(7:p.172) findings, The social class factor was also introduced here; 46.8% of working class children said she was stealing and only 36% of middle class children said she was, Figure 31.

The religious groupings were also compared with these results. The religious social group had 84.2% who said that she would not (and therefore they would not) steal.

The Chi square with this result is 8.64 with 3 degrees of freedom giving a significance of 0.034, Figure 32. The Kendalls Tau B is 0.183 giving a significance of 0.0002. However, more non-church attenders said "no" than church attenders with parents.

The following question whether they considered that taking like this was stealing, produced a 73% response that it was. Of those who considered the girl was not taking anything, 50% considered that she wasn't "because stealing was wrong". A more positive approach was taken in these free responses by 32% who said that "the girl in the picture was honest" or that "the contents of the satchel would be needed by someone else". A further question of "is it all right to take what belongs to someone else" produced a unanimous "no" and only 20% of the other group who said "yes" originally to the scene would "keep a purse if found in the street". There were a few who suggested that finders were keepers. Most of these 20% were boys in the 13-14 age group.

The last question on this projection was the most important for this test on the levels of conscience or guilt obtaining in the stealing situation. The numerical frequencies and percentages are given in Figure 33 where the biggest single response is "real guilt" in Kohlburg's terms. 97/161 respondents scored this sanction. These results were compared with religious groups in Figure 34. The religious social group scored 84.2% on the real guilt dimension as compared with 60.2% of the total. These results give a Chi square of 17.90 with 12 degrees of freedom having a significance at the 0.118 level.

Nonconformists were 75.8% on the real guilt dimension, conformists 56.4%. These responses under these guilt

sanctions on this school based stealing projection will be compared with the out of school shop stealing projection test number five for comparison, as the punishment and confession elements are very low in this situation. However, it must be said here that for the majority of respondents, stealing had not taken place in this first projection, therefore punishment and confession do not really enter into the situation directly.

Amongst the specific religious responses were the following. A Church of England girl who attended regularly with her parents said "I would feel untrustworthy if I took it". A Salvation Army child, who had already indicated fear on previous responses and felt herself to be more bad than good, said "I would feel guilty and scared". Another girl, aged twelve, said "God would not be on my side if I took it". A thirteen year old boy said "no man has a right to take anything which does not belong to him". Amongst the more cynical replies was one from an older boy who, to the question of how he would feel, said "possibly no feelings with things as they are nowadays".

The school playground situation projection test number three produced a response of 61.5% following Peter's example and keeping the rule of the school, Figure 35. David's example was followed by 38.5%. The next question on this set was an attempt to ascertain the sanctions operative in this situation whichever of the two boys the respondents followed. The total analysis of responses in terms of sanctions is seen in Figure 36 where 37.9% followed the authoritarian pattern, many saying "rules are rules and should be kept". However, when compared with age, 52.6% of the ten to twelve years old children

took the authoritarian stance. This supports the researches of Kay, Williams, Swainson and others that the authoritarian sanction is most common in the earlier age groups. Figure 37 shows how authoritarian sanctions decrease with age whilst personal reactions increase with age, showing a developmental factor in terms of these sanctions. However, some of these responses, although scored as authoritarian, could have been given a religious import. For example, a twelve year old from Cumberland wrote "all rules are God's rules". Another, from a Pentecostal group said "as a Christian I'd keep that rule because it's been made for some reason". Another Pentecostal church attender replied "I must learn to obey rules because they are made to be kept and God wants people to obey rules for everything is made by Him". Perhaps a more personal or autonomous response was from a boy in the religious social group who replied that he would keep the rule but find out the reason as there is no need to cause trouble when the answer can so easily be found out.

The responses of the different religious groups to this situation are seen in Figure 38. The religious social group had the biggest personal independent response of 42.1% which was markedly different from both the church attenders groups who scored 12.1% and 2.9% on this sanction. The non-church attenders had a 28.4% response to this sanction but the majority of their responses, though personal and independent, were rather aggressive and of a different personal tenor or tone from the religious social group. Although there was a Chi square of 18.10 with 9 degrees of freedom giving a significance of 0.033, there was no real consistent pattern with these scores.

All groups responded fairly highly to authoritarian ideas and apart from the religious social group, all had a similar response to the prudential sanction. The numbers on the social sanction were rather too small for any differences to be apparent.

The type of religious education received was also analysed with this category in Figure 39. The majority of the personal independent category were found in the bible centred group, in fact only 6.2% of the "open ended" taught children scored in this category. The Chi square was 11.128, with 9 degrees of freedom, giving a significance at the 0.084 level. Kendalls Tau B was - 0.1136 giving a significance of 0.0156. However, the age factor intervened in these scores as most of the "open ended" taught children were from the earlier age groups.

The next transgression projection situation was the final one based on the school set. Again, as with the cloakroom scene, there was an element of doubt allowing respondents to answer 'yes' to the cheating situation or 'no, the boy was not cheating'. Here there was a greater clarity of response, the overwhelming majority, 90%, considered that the boy in the picture was cheating and of the 10% who said he was not, all but four were girls, surprisingly enough. Although this bore out the cloakroom response where again, the majority who said 'no' to stealing, were girls.

The final series of questions on this test were analysed according to the sanctions mentioned in Figure 4. The frequencies are recorded on Figure 41.

The majority of respondents, 62.7%, conceded that self

interest was by and large uppermost in their minds, "you don't learn anything" was a typical response. Another was "you have to learn to stand on your own two feet". A further factor was that the two main responses of self interest prudential and social group orientated, 26.7%, can be seen to be directly related to age, as seen in Figure 42. In this respect, it could be suggested that the social factor is less important when children are more "on their own", as they grow older in the competitive school situation, and the self interest factor, as far as cheating is concerned, becomes more important. When cross tabulated with the religious group, the "other regarding" group orientated response is more prevalent in both the church attenders and the religious social group than the non-church attenders, the respective percentages being 39% 25.7% and 31.6% for religious groups and 20.3% for non-attenders. For the self interest prudential factor, the converse takes place in that the non-attenders scored this as 77% whilst the religious social group were as low as 31.6%. It is suggestive that the 'other regarding' characteristic in cheating as opposed to the 'self regarding' is more prevalent in church attenders than non-church attenders. However, as the numbers are very low in some categories, see Figure 43, and 36.8% of the religious social group scored an authoritarian response, which was 50% of the whole, there are other factors at work. However, these results are interesting. The Chi square is 36.909 with 12 degrees of freedom giving a significance of 0.0002 and Kendall's Tau B was 0.029. Among the 'other regarding' social replies was the suggestion from a boy that "it was not right to take someone else's hard work to further your

own ends". Another practical response was "the other boy might be blamed for copying". A semi religious response here, with an echo of 'be sure your sins will find you out' was "your true ability will surely be found out".

The most blatant hypocrisy of all was derived from two 12 year olds, who had sat next to one another in class and had obviously copied each other's responses, even to spelling mistakes, who, when it came to this question of 'why is stealing wrong?' both replied "because you haven't tride".

An interesting cross tabulation was that, of the 'open ended approach to religious education in school' respondents, not one said that "the boy was not cheating": all of the 9.9% who said that "he was not" were found in the bible centred group.

The shop centred stealing projection test or completion of transgression story now followed. As already indicated, free responses were analysed according to the various guilt categories. The frequencies are seen in Figure 44. There is a marked change in the type of guilt responses from the cloakroom scene where the majority would not admit to stealing anyway! Now in this out of school situation where perhaps the arm of the law or a more penal authority is available, there is a greater tendency, because the transgressor is perhaps more likely to get caught anyway, to confession and punishment. Real guilt still takes a significant proportion of 21.7% but punishment takes off to 39.8% and confession to 21.7%, equal to real guilt. This bears out previous findings that responses differ with the social setting of the transgression, here, out of school. The largest single group for punishment were the

non church attenders at 44.6% but as there more of these anyway, the figures could therefore be distorted. However, the next largest group were those attending church with parents, a greater degree of parental control and a younger age group. Confession was highest with church attenders on their own at 31.4% with only 16.2% of non church attenders resorting to confession. The Chi square for these scores, see Figure 45, is 24.55 with 12 degrees of freedom, significance at 0.017, Kendalls Tau B 0,079. When cross tabulated with the denominational type, the greater degree of confessional responses were seen in the Roman Catholic and Church of England respondents at 32.7%, that is 11% above the average. But there were as many confessional respondents in the non church attenders as in the nonconformist group, Figure 46.

The age factor in developmental terms showed a tendency for real guilt to increase with age which bears out Kohlburg's findings, but confession decreased with age, only 11.6% of the 15-17 age group were prepared to confess. Punishment decreased with age also, but less than the confessional element. 37.7% of the 15-17 group were still prepared to concede to punishment, Figure 47.

The next projection was the at home situation test of moral dilemma in loyalty to peers, i.e., sister in this case, and loyalty to parents. The sanctions operative in such divided loyalty are mentioned in Figure 6 and the overall scores are given in Figure 48. Authority in the home situation seems to score only very slightly less here than authority in the playground situation, there 37.9%, here 34.2%. But the personal independence factor scores higher here than at school. Here it is 47.8%, at school 21.1%, but, of course, there is a greater sense of divided

loyalty in this situation in the home. The cross tabulation with denominational groupings showed that the nonconformist group only had 18.2% taking the personal independent line on smoking. They seemed to be generally against what could be called an element of ascetic morality, the only one recorded in this test. 39.4% of this group were concerned about the personal relationship with 'their' sister in terms of love identification, the average for the group as a whole was only 17.4%, Figure 49. The Chi square for these scores was 25.99 with 6 degrees of freedom giving a significance at 0.0002. The Kendalls Tau B significance was at 0.0003 and Tau C at 0.0006. Of these figures, the highest element of personal involvement with the peer was the religious social group at 42.1%, compared with the total of 17.4%. Again, 62.2% of the non attenders took the somewhat amoral approach categorised under response four, compared with the total response of 47.8%.

The general situational test of lying brought the total response of 39.1% for 'yes' and 60.3% for 'no', see Figure 50(a), with only one 'dont know'. Compared with religious groups, however, none of the religious social groups said 'yes' and the non-attenders scored higher on 'yes' than 'no', Chi square 22.37 with 9 degrees of freedom, significance being at 0.0004, Figure 50(b). Again the authoritarian sanction showed itself with the next projection with 28.6% considering that it is worse to lie to an adult than to a child, but the majority, 60.8%, considered "it was just as bad to either", Figure 51. The religious social group scored the highest response on this category, with all but four, 78.9%, scoring this response. When compared with the type of religious

education received, not one of the "open-ended" approach taught children considered that it was worse to lie to a child. In fact, all of the seventeen who scored this response were bible centred taught, Figure 52. Perhaps some element of the teaching "woe unto him who causes one of these little ones to stumble" is evident here. There is a greater emphasis in biblical teaching on the child like spirit "except ye become as little children". However, as the largest element in both cases took the personal independent approach, no great significance can be placed on these results.

The final lying projection situation posed the dilemma of "lying to help a friend"; 54.7% considered "it is all right to lie to help a friend", Figure 53. Again, of the religious groups, the church attenders with parents and the religious social group considered by 60.6% and 52.6% respectively that lying is always wrong, whilst only 36.5% of the non attenders made this response, Figure 54. The non church attenders were the largest group who considered it "all right to lie to help a friend". Overall therefore, although the majority considered it "all right to help a friend", two of the religious groups considered it "was always wrong to tell lies". The religious social group, without exception, considered it "always wrong to tell lies", whereas 52.7% of the non attenders considered it "all right if you were not caught or punished". However, as the religious social group had an older element within it, this could have affected these results.

Piaget (56:p.168) was mainly concerned with the age differences in lying as is Bull (7:p.197) to some extent and we would agree with both that one of the first signs of maturity in moral judgement is when the child sees

that telling the truth is necessary to the relationship of sympathy and respect between people. Whilst our results agree with both, that generally, children consider that lying to adults is worse than lying to children, 60.8% of our sample considered it just as bad to either. Whilst Bull (p.206) considered it worthwhile to differentiate between mother and father, we did not pursue this factor.

Compared with the type of religious education, there is a marked difference between the bible centred and the child centred taught children; 60.9% of the former considered it all right to lie to help a friend whilst only 28.1% of the latter scored this response. The Chi square with 4 degrees of freedom with these figures was 12.589, significant at the 0.01 level, Kendall's Tau B was -0.249 significant at 0.000 and Tau C -0.152 at 0.002 level. However, age probably entered into this again as open ended taught children tended to be of the higher age group, Figure 55.

The social class factor was also examined in this connection, Figure 56. Whilst there was an equal proportion of working class children who considered it "always wrong to tell lies", as opposed to "lying to help a friend", twice as many middle class children, 66%, considered it "all right to lie to help a friend", suggesting that in this respect, a working class child tends to be more severe in his moral judgements than a middle class child.

The Chi square with these results was, with 2 degrees of freedom, 4.02 with significance of 0.133. Kendall's Tau B -0.138 significant at 0.004 and Kendall's Tau C 0.128 at 0.004.

Black(6) suggests that children are less severe in the judgement of lying with the progression of age, which bears out Bull's findings. She suggests that the reason for the decline in severity is because older children take more account of motivation in their judgements. She differentiates between 'selfish' and 'unselfish' lies and suggests(p.138) that "unselfish lies are told out of consideration for other people's feelings". With this study, "lying to help a friend" could be regarded as an unselfish lie in her terms, as could some of the responses under 'personal' sanction in the divided loyalty situation over smoking in the home.

However, we would suggest that the religious sanction has some influence on the 'unselfish' sanctions, even with older children when faced with lying to help a friend. Although it was to be admitted that if there is a conflict of sanctions here, the unselfish sanction affects the religious sanctions also. This is seen in Figures 50b and 54. In the former, all the religious social group without exception, and a significant proportion of the other two religious groups, answered 'no' to the proposition "do you think it would be all right to tell a lie if you were not caught". But when faced with the moral dilemma of "lying to help a friend", the conflict occurs and 47.4% and 57.1% of the religious social group and the church attenders without parents have changed their stance. Although 60.6% of the church attenders with parents still say it is wrong, these are mainly from the younger age group and therefore, in Black's terms(6:p.139) these are still not concerned with motivation in this regard.

The final test was an in the home situation concerning punishment. The responses were categorised as stated in Figure 8. The raw results are seen in Figure 57. Verbal castigation is regarded as the most appropriate of the punishments for John to receive. Wright(77:p.224) suggested that the more severe the punishment, the greater it acts as a sanction. This has been borne out by Walters(66) and Parke(p.187). However, it is difficult to ascertain what children regard as severe. Perhaps here they could be said to be taking the easy way out by supporting verbal castigation, a 'telling off' is more preferable than physical pain. However, given the opportunity for a free response, which is a harder response to make than merely ticking, especially in the last question on the test, 11.2% in their own words, suggested physical punishment ranging from a 'good belting' to 'a clip round the ears'.

Hoffman(28) has suggested that there are various sanctions operative in adult punishment of children. The first is power assertion which contains physical punishment, verbal aggression and material deprivation, categories 1 - 3 in this test. The second is love withdrawal, category 4, and the third is induction which relies on appeals to the child's understanding to see for himself why he is wrong. The only positive relationship is between the latter and self control, he suggests. The former sanctions of power and love withdrawal could be regarded as negative sanctions whilst the latter of induction could be regarded as a positive sanction. All of our categories are in the former group mentioned here.

Wheeler(68:p.122) has shown that the majority of children experience negative sanctions in the home and the majority of children regard them in varying degrees as effective deterrents in moral misdemeanours or appropriate consequences for moral misdemeanours. He suggests(p.123)that "adolescent attitudes to punishment in school are a reflection of their attitudes towards punishment in the family".

The sex differences in attitude to type of punishment supports the findings of Wheeler(p.119) in that boys regard corporal punishment 17.6% more than girls 5.7%,and girls, deprivation of love 29.9% to boys 12.2% as more appropriate. Wheeler does not differentiate between deprivation of love and deprivation of physical thingsⁱⁿ as Figure 58. In fact, throughout, the boys tended to the more physical punishment whilst the girls the less physical, reflecting the apparent situation in the home.

The religious groups were compared with total reactions and results are seen in figure 59. The non church attenders tended to support the physical punishment at the expense of the three other groups and also the verbal castigation, whilst the three religious groups all scored higher on the physical deprivation and detention categories. The Chi square with 12 degrees of freedom was 11.57 with 0.48 significance, the Kendall's Tau B was -0.069 with significance of 0.09. The religious social group scored highest on detention and lowest on deprivation of love. These findings were partly supported by comparison with the denominational groupings, although nonconformists scored only 12.1% on deprivation of love, whereas conformists scored 25.5% and non attenders 23.3%, Figure 60.

Chi square here was 11.029 with 8 degrees of freedom, giving a score of 0.200 on significance; the Kendall's Tau C was 0.102 with a significance of 0.025.

The type of religious education category showed deprivation of love as 24.2% for bible centred and only 12.5% for child centred respondents, Figure 61. Punishment was more in evidence for the former than the latter, being 11.7% as compared with 9.4%. Again, deprivation of love figured stronger as a sanction with bible centred taught children, 24.2%, the "open ended" taught being 12.5%. The Chi square was 6.59 with 8 degrees of freedom giving an 0.581 significance. The Kendall's Tau B was -0.13, significance of 0.006.

Chapter 5

Conclusions

Wright (75:p.231) has agreed that there does seem to be a general assumption that religion makes people 'better' behaved than they would otherwise be, although that is not something we have been looking at. He does suggest that "it is possible empirically to test this assumption, by randomly assigning two kinds of upbringing to two different children in that the only respect in which they differed was that one was given intensive religious education and the other given none at all. Then any differences in moral activity could be attributed to the presence or absence of religion". That task is one which is too grievous to bear for this study. However, he does allow (p.231) for a more practicable though still difficult test "by comparing two groups matched for age, class, content of moral belief, intelligence and personality type, who differed in their religious background and teaching and then to carefully assess their moral behaviour". "If no differences could be found, then it would undermine any confidence we might have that religion played any part in moral development." We acknowledge that the test is difficult and open to error, it is also acknowledged that personality factors are set on one side as is intelligence, but there is some levelling out here.

It could also be said that religious background and teaching is also a very elusive category, but bearing in mind all of these factors, we have attempted something like the practicable test which Wright envisages.

We are probing an area in which harmony of research is difficult to achieve. It maybe that the subjective aims of the researcher ultimately influence the results and their analysis. Various researchers have shown, at different

times, that moral attitudes and sanctions are a function of age, or intelligence or personality or social setting, or sex, or religious background. Inevitably responses are not isolated but are a complex combination of many factors within the individual. To isolate any one at the expense of the others would do an injustice to the personality. However, we can make some guarded observations about the results obtained in this study. All of the results must be seen in the light of the fact that our secondary variables had uneven groups, that is there were more girls than boys, more of the older age group and more working class children. On the principal variables, there were more non church attenders than attenders and more bible taught than child centred taught. The religious social group was the smallest group of the religious groupings with only nineteen respondents. However, we have used percentage figures rather than basic numbers throughout.

The self evaluation test gave no indication that our null hypothesis was wrong; there was only a slight element of more 'conformists' considering themselves as 'more good than bad', against the total responses. As indicated in Chapter 4, on retrospect, it would have been more meaningful to leave this question until the very end.

It is useful to mention with the following test of motivation, that all of the nine who responded to the religious sanction came from the religious social group, but more than half indicated otherwise, but it is something to look for as the test proceeded. Although the Chi square gave a significant at 0.0001, only 5.6% of the total scored the religious sanction and, as already mentioned, this test could well have hidden factors in the other responses.

It might have been useful here to have had a rank order of responses or include a free response for their 'own reasons'. The social, love, sanction bears out earlier research that girls favour this more than boys.

Setting aside the criticism that the projected test number one has little to do with morality but is instinctive, there are some more interesting results obtained. We noted that the religious sanction was ranked first or second by 62% of the total. There was a Chi square significance at the 0.000 level with the religious comparisons to this response. However, we did suggest that sex and age factors were influential. Even with these facts, however, there seems to be some relationship of at least the religious social group to these scores. To balance this, it must be said that the authoritarian sanction was the largest single category at 47.2% on this test.

The religious social group on the cloakroom projection test number two were the highest percentage who considered that the girl was not stealing, 0.034 significance on Chi square, but age and sex and low numbers were probably factors influencing this result.

The guilt dimension could be criticised in terms of analysis methods. There could be a personal experimenter factor influencing the categorisation of responses. However, the 'real guilt' element figured highly on this school setting compared with the punishment and confession factors in the shopstealing projection. This suggests that a different social set could influence results but, as already indicated, 'real' stealing has occurred in the second situation. The religious social group scored 84.2% on the real guilt dimension as compared with 60.2% of the total,

and the nonconformists also scored higher than the conformists, suggesting a more developed conscience for the former group. The overriding factor in the sanctions analysis of the playground situation seemed to be a developmental one as the level of authoritarian responses increase or decrease by and large with age. The point should be made, however, that we have not allowed for a specific religious response with any of these tests. The verbal replies have shown that in some cases there are replies given in religious forms with mention of 'God' or 'biblical exhortations'.

The type of religious education showed through in some tests as it did on this. Only 6.2% of the 'open ended' taught children scored on the personal independent sanction, the majority on this sanction being found in the 'bible centred' taught group. The Chi square significance was at 0.084 and the Kendalls Tau B 0.015. However, we have suggested that the age factor influenced these results.

On the cheating situation, there was some evidence to suggest that the 'other regarding' social sanction was more prevalent amongst church attenders in general than non church attenders, as a reason why they do not or should not cheat. The numbers concerned in this respect were rather too low, however. The Chi square gave a significance of 0.0002 which is worthy of follow up in further study at least.

The differences between the setting of stealing transgression story responses can clearly be seen from the shop stealing replies. As mentioned already, punishment and confession are as important here as 'real guilt'. The non church attenders tended towards punishment here in the largest group, as they also did towards physical

punishment in the final test. Confession for church attenders on their own, figured highly with a Chi square significance of 0.017, and Kendall's Tau B on the groups of 0.079. The sacramentalist group also had a higher confessional element than the nonconformists, but again the numbers were disproportionate in terms of the two sets involved.

'Real guilt' tended to increase with age which confirms Kohlburg's findings, whereas the tendency for punishment to decrease with age was also found. The weakness being that we were not able to differentiate between the different types of punishment in this category.

The religious social group took the personal involvement stance with their sister in the moral dilemma loyalty test, compared with other groups, the Chi square significance was 0.0002 and Kendall's Tau B 0.0003. There does seem some evidence of love or personal identification with these scores by the religious social group, but on closer analysis, it amounted to only about nine of the group involved. The non church attenders, however, took a more amoral personal line than the church attenders.

The lying situation again brought the religious social group to the fore as more of them answered "yes", but as 60.3% of the total said "no", perhaps not too much weight should be given to these scores. However, it does suggest a greater degree of severity from this group than the others. The 'open ended' type of religious education respondents all considered it worse to lie to an adult. Although Piaget(56:p.168) and Bull(7:p.197) considered such an attitude was a function of age, this adds an interesting sidelight.

In lying to help a friend, the non church attenders were the largest group who considered it 'all right'.

There seems to be some cautious grounds for suggesting that our groups are influenced by the religious sanction in their lying projections and the type of religious education has some impact on the severity of judgement towards lying. Further consideration, however, needs to be given to the age and perhaps social factors. There is probably an interaction of various factors in this situation of lying to help a friend, especially for the religious groups, between concern for others and concern for law or authoritarian or 'truth' factors.

On the last test there seemed to be a tendency for religious groups to favour physical deprivation and detention rather than deprivation of love or physical punishment.

With denominational differences and type of religious education, there seemed to be some slight relationship. With the former, nonconformists regarded deprivation of love least favourably and the child centred taught group also favoured this punishment less than the bible centred.

Overall, there does seem evidence that religious factors play some part in the type of moral activity that adolescents engage in. Whether they are more 'other regarding' and less prudential, it would be difficult to say. We are not saying that moral conduct is related to the religious factor but the type of moral conduct or the sanction behind the moral conduct is seemingly related. The most promising group for follow up seems to be the religious social group, but whether the emphasis should be on 'religious' or 'social', it is difficult to say. In

some of our tests both religious and educational and denominational differences seem correlated with differing dispositions and differing sanctions. There is, however, a considerable interaction of other factors including age, social class and, to some extent, sex. The null hypothesis is not categorically disproved but there are reasonable pointers, as mentioned, for further investigation.

It would be reasonable to suggest that a failure to obey moral imperatives in religious terms would bring about a consequent feeling of 'falling short' or failure in moral terms. The 'ought' in this sense would mean "if I didn't go through with it I couldn't live with myself". In a group situation, the result would be "I couldn't face the group". Niblett⁽⁵¹⁾ has suggested that "in an age in which there is little authority left, group solidarity is looked to for comfort and guidance". He feels that one of the reasons why so many of our young people are still untemptable is because they belong to groups whose influence upon them is more potent than that of the outside world. Further, the fact that they have very deeply belonged during early years to a church or a school which has given them within themselves a different environment to live in than the one that is dominant outside.

This is a point which is really unexaminable by empirical investigation, but nevertheless, must be a potent factor for moral influence, especially in the religious sphere. One's upbringing, family influences, church connections, all mould and shape ideas and attitudes for the future. Religious teaching most likely passes on the assumption that we are living in a moral universe, that God is good and plays fair, that individuals matter, that

all men are brothers. Even though many do not attend, the function and role of the church through its members and various societies, can be far reaching in their influences. One of the distinctive marks of Judaeo/Christian thought is the identification of moral prompting with the voice of the Creator. That is, conscience, is the Spirit of God; whether this is true or not, it certainly is a widely held view.

Bull's confession^(7:p.287) that to associate religious class by church attendance with moral judgement was to use too blunt an instrument, has been heeded in this study. Together with church attendance, we have used those other religious factors as seen in Chapter 4 and also explored those areas of guilt and types of sanction operating to ascertain if religious factors cause different types of response. It seems we have gone some way to overcoming his dilemma.

Would it be a feasible proposition to build up a personality profile on interaction of the variables used and suggest that a twelve year old girl, regularly attending church of a nonconformist variety, with middle class parents, receiving a bible centred religious education, has a particular series of predictable sanction responses to moral situations? We might well be able to do so. But with seven conceivable variables interacting in this way, we would be very fortunate to find two such girls of this kind in our total group of 161.

It seems to some degree, that this study has borne out the findings of Kay⁽³³⁾ on developmental sanctions and Kohlburg⁽³⁷⁾ on types of guilt feelings. The findings of

Wright and Cox(76) are also confirmed, especially on the differences between boys and girls. Shoben's(60) studies, particularly with various religious social groups, are also partly supported and this could point to further study using these religious variables.

Shoben(60) points out a basic dilemma in this area of morality and religion by suggesting(p.140) that "one's moral values however 'inwardly pure' are determined to a large extent by the society or value system in which one grows up and such value systems can be conflicting". He quotes(p.140) the example of the boy who, hearing his minister deliver a persuasive sermon on the New Testament text 'the meek shall inherit the earth' makes a deliberate effort to live by 'turn the other cheek' behaviour. "His peers would ridicule him for his sissified behaviour, his parents would think him unmanly and psychologists discover numerous anxieties about his relationship with his father and a marked degree of masochism." The point being, that the culture in which the boy lives is almost surely at variance with 'official' culture of the church. With our studies, we have been involved in part in this dilemma of a school or church or home morality. It could be suggested, to bridge the gap, that the important function of religion is the social one in that 'it carried great traditions' as Graham(20:p.257) suggests 'for models of imitation'.

In the very last analysis, a study of this kind can only point in some general direction. It cannot support the rather polarised views of Brunner who says "that ethics without religion is not ethics and religion without ethics is not religion", or the Duke of Wellington when he suggests that "Education without religion makes clever devils".

The large majority of children have very common views in their attitudes to social moral questions, whether they are religious or not; it maybe that membership of certain, groups, whether school, family or church, gives a structure for the maintenance of moral values. It maybe that without such structures, in a 'Lord of the Flies' situation, the constraints could tumble. At worst, the feelings of guilt and conscience indicate that adolescents feel a little of Paul's problem when he confesses that "the good that he would, he does not, but the evil that he would not, that he does". At best, some of the religious responses indicate some of his feelings again when he concludes with "but thanks be to God who gives me the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ". (Romans 7¹⁹, 7²⁵. R.S.V.)

It could be suggested that morality tells people what they ought to do, perhaps religious influences effect the way some of those things are done.

Appendix 1

This is a survey to find out young people's views on various topics. We do not want to know your name.

Answer just what you think. Tick in the box provided or write your answer in the space provided.

1. Boy

Girl

2. Age in Years

3. What is your father's or parents job?.....

4. Do you attend church or Sunday school with your parents?

Sometimes

Often

Never

on your own

Sometimes

Often

Never

If you know the denomination please write here

5. Do you think of yourself as more bad than good

more good than bad

neither

6. What do you think are a young person's chief motives for being good?

Because of fear of the consequences if caught

Because of a love for others and a desire not to upset them

Because of a respect for the rules of home or school

Because of religious influence

So that you don't make life difficult for yourself.

7. Two friends, Brian and Anita, were going for a walk by the river when Anita, who could not swim, fell in. Brian jumped in and saved her from drowning. Later people suggested the 4 following reasons for Brian's action. Show which reasons you think the best by numbering them 1 to 4 in order.

He was afraid of what people would say if he did not help Anita.

He knew that God would want him to save her


He knows everyone will think he was brave

He had always been told it was right

8. Here is a picture of someone in the cloakroom at school, they are all alone. Someone has left their bag in the cloakroom. It is open. Do you think they will take anything out of it and keep it?

Yes

No




(i) If yes
Would that be stealing?.....
Is it all right to take what belongs to someone else?.....
How do you think the person might feel after they take it?.....

(ii) If No
Why not take anything?.....
Would it be all right to keep something you found in the street, say a purse?.....
Why?.....
Why not?.....

9. There was a school rule that no one ran in the yard though no one knew why this rule had ever been made. Peter always kept it, because as he said, a rule is a rule, but David broke it because he saw no reason to keep it. What would you do in this case?.....

.....
Why?.....

10. Here is a picture of two boys. They are sitting next to one another. One is looking over toward the other. He might be looking that way. Do you think he is going to try to cheat and copy from the other boy?



(i) If Yes

Do you think it is all right to cheat?.....

Do you think it is wrong?.....

Why?.....

(ii) If No

What do you think about cheating?.....

.....

Is it right or wrong?.....

Why?.....

11. John saves up £3 for a pair of football boots. When he goes into the sports shop the assistant is going into the backroom. He sees the boots he likes and reaches in his pocket for the money but he has lost it. The boots would fit under his jacket so he hides them and walks out of the shop.

Now you finish the story in a few words.

.....

12. Claire aged fifteen is smoking in her bedroom when her parents who forbid her to smoke are out. Her younger sister Joan sees her and says she will tell her father. Claire says she should keep it a secret.

What do you think Joan should do? in a few words.

.....

13. (i) Do you think it would be all right to tell a lie if you were not caught and no one punished you for it

Yes No

Please tick which you think

(ii) Is it worse to lie to an adult

or Is it worse to lie to a child

Is it just as bad to either

(iii) Is it always wrong to tell lies

or Is it all right to lie to help a friend

14. What would be fair?

John was playing in the garden when his mother asked him to go to the corner shop for some bread. He said "I'll go" but he didn't. When his father came in for tea and there was no bread he was angry. He wondered what was the best way to punish John. What do you think?
 Tick one.

Make him go without his tea

Stop him going out that evening

Tell him off

Not help John when he wanted something done


None of these - if not what do you think

.....

Appendix 2

Tables of Results.

Figure 9 - Sex Differences



Mean	1.540	Std. Error	0.039	Median	0.0
Mode	2.000	Std. Dev	0.500	Variance	0.250
Kurtosis	-1.974	Skewness	-1.162	Range	1.000
Minimum	1.000	Maximum	2.000		

Figure 10 - Age Differences

- 1. ***** (38) 23.6% 10-12 years
 - 2. ***** (54) 33.5% 13-14 years
 - 3. ***** (69) 42.9% 15-17 years
- I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
- Frequency

Mean	2.193	St. Error	0.063	Median	2.287
Mode	3.000	Std. Dev.	0.795	Variance	0.631
Kurtosis	-1.324	Skewness	-0.356	Range	2.000
Minimum	1.000	Maximum	3.000		

Figure 12

Church Attendance and Religious Social Group

Non Attendance Control

- 1. ***** (33) 20.5% Church Attendance with parents
 - 2. ***** (74) 46.0% Non Church Attendance
 - 3. ***** (35) 21.7% Church Attendance without parents
 - 4. ***** (19) 11.8% Religious Social Group
- 1.....I.....20.....I.....30.....I.....40.....I.....50.....I.....60.....I.....70.....I.....80.....I.....90.....I.....100


MEAN	2.248	STD ERROR	0.072	MEDIAN	2.142
MODE	2.000	STD DEV	0.915	VARIANCE	0.838
KURTOSIS	-0.577	SKEWNESS	0.422	RANGE	3.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	4.000		

Figure 13 - Religious Denominations

1. ***** (55) 34.2% Conformist (Roman Catholic, Church of England)

2. ***** (33) 20.5% Non-Conformist

3. ***** (73) 45.3% Non attenders



MEAN	2.112	STD ERROR	0.070	MEDIAN	2.273
MODE	3.000	STD DEV	0.887	VARIANCE	0.787
KURTOSIS	-1,687	SKEWNESS	-0.220	RANGE	2.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	3.000		

Figure 16 - Religious Denomination compared with Self Evaluation

VAR07	more bad than good	more good than bad	neither
1.00	4	26	25
Conformist	7.3	47.3	45.5
	26.7	37.7	32.5
	2.5	16.1	15.5
2.00	4	13	16
Nonconformist	12.1	39.4	48.5
	26.7	18.8	20.8
	2.5	8.1	9.9
3.00	7	30	36
Neither	9.6	41.1	49.3
	46.7	43.5	46.8
	4.3	18.6	22.4
	15	69	77
	9.3	42.9	47.8
			161
			100.0

CHI SQUARE = 1.02795 with 4 DEGREES OF FREEDOM SIGNIFICANCE = 0.9055
 KENDALL'S TAU B = 0.01844 SIGNIFICANCE = 0.3633
 KENDALL'S TAU C = 0.01678 SIGNIFICANCE = 0.3752

Figure 17 - Social Class compared with Self Evaluation

	1.00	2.00	3.00	Row Total
Working Class	12 10.8 80.0 7.5	52 46.8 75.4 32.3	47 42.3 61.0 29.2	111 68.9
Middle Class	3 6.0 20.0 1.9	17 34.0 24.6 10.6	30 60.0 39.0 18.6	50 31.1
Column Total	15 9.3	69 42.9	77 47.8	161 100.0

CHI SQUARE = 4.43116 with 2 Degrees of Freedom Significance = 0.1091

KENDALL'S TAU B = 0.15930 SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0013

KENDALL'S TAU C = 0.15864 SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0013

Figure 18 - Motivation in Moral Action

- 1. ***** (47) 29.2% Fear of the consequences. Prudential (fear)
- 2. ***** (27) 16.8% Love for others. Social
- 3. ***** (13) 8.1% Respect for rules of home and school. Authoritarian
- 4. ***** (9) 5.6% For religious reasons. Religious
- 5. ***** (65) 40.4% So that you don't make life difficult for yourself. Prudential (Personal)

I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

FREQUENCY

MEAN	3.112	STD ERROR	0.137	MEDIAN	3.000
MODE	5.000	STD DEV	1.736	VARIANCE	3.012
KIRTSOSIS	-1.747	SKEWNESS	-0.043	RANGE	4.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	5.000		

FIGURE 19 - Age Compared with motivation in moral behaviour

	Prudential (fear)	Social	Authoritarian	Religious	Prudential (personal)	Row Total
1.00	11	4	7	1	15	38
10-12 years	28.9	10.5	18.4	2.6	39.5	23.6
	23.4	14.8	53.8	11.1	23.1	
	6.8	2.5	4.3	0.6	9.3	
2.00	16	10	1	1	26	54
13-14 years	29.6	18.5	1.9	1.9	48.1	33.5
	34.0	37.0	7.7	11.1	40.0	
	9.9	6.2	0.6	0.6	16.1	
3.00	20	13	5	7	24	69
15.-17 years	29.0	18.8	7.2	10.1	34.8	42.9
	42.6	48.1	38.5	77.8	36.9	
	12.4	8.1	3.1	4.3	14.9	
Column Total	47	27	13	9	65	161
	29.2	16.8	8.1	5.6	40.4	100.0

Figure 20 - Religious Groups compared with Motivation

	Prudential (fear)	Social	Authoritarian	Religious	Prudential (personal)	Row Total
1.00	1.00	2.00	3.00	4.00	5.00	33
Church Attenders	7	7	5	0	14	20.5
with parents	21.2	21.2	15.2	0.0	42.4	
	14.9	25.9	38.5	0.0	21.5	
	4.3	4.3	3.1	0.0	8.7	
2.00	26	13	2	1	32	74
Non attenders	35.1	17.6	2.7	1.4	43.2	46.0
control	55.3	48.1	15.4	11.1	49.2	
	16.1	8.1	1.2	0.6	19.9	
3.00	11	7	4	2	11	35
Church attenders	31.4	20.0	11.4	5.7	31.4	21.7
without parents	23.4	25.9	30.8	22.2	16.9	
	6.8	4.3	2.5	1.2	6.8	
4.00	3	0	2	6	8	19
Religious	15.8	0.0	10.5	31.6	42.1	11.8
Social Group	6.4	0.0	15.4	66.7	12.3	
	1.9	0.0	1.2	3.7	5.0	
COLUMN	47	27	13	9	65	161
TOTAL	29.2	16.8	8.1	5.6	40.4	100.0

CHI SQUARE = 40.05917 with 12 degrees of freedom SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0001

KDNALL'S TAU B = 0.01114 SIGNIFICANCE = 0.4164

KDNALL'S TAU C = 0.01039 SIGNIFICANCE = 0.4219

Figure 21 - Sex Differences compared with Motivation in Moral Behaviour

Gender	1.00	2.00	3.00	4.00	5.00	Total
Boys	26	6	4	6	32	74
	35.1	8.1	5.4	8.1	43.2	46.0
	55.3	22.2	30.8	66.7	49.2	
	16.1	3.7	2.5	3.7	19.9	
Girls	21	21	9	3	33	87
	24.1	24.1	10.3	3.4	37.9	54.0
	44.7	77.8	69.2	33.3	50.8	
	13.0	13.0	5.6	1.9	20.5	
	47	27	13	9	65	161
	29.2	16.8	8.1	5.6	40.4	100.0

Figure 22

Situation Projection No. 1 - Out of School Saving of Life Completion Story

Sanction 1. Prudential - Rank Order

- 1. ***** (19) 11.8%
- 2. ***** (29) 18.0%
- 3. ***** (65) 40.4%
- 4. ***** (48) 29.8%

I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

MEAN	2.882	STD ERROR	0.077	MEDIAN	3.000
MODE	3.000	STD DEV	0.971	VARIANCE	0.942
KURTOSIS	-0.656	SKEWNESS	-0.544	RANGE	3.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	4.000		

Figure 23

Situation Projection No. 1 - Out of School Saving of Life Completion Story

Sanction 2 - Religious - Rank Order

1. ***** (56) 34.8%
 2. ***** (46) 28.6%
 3. ***** (17) 10.6%
 4. ***** (42) 26.1%

I.....I	10	I.....I	20	I.....I	30	I.....I	40	I.....I	50	I.....I	60	I.....I	70	I.....I	80	I.....I	90	I.....I	100
---------	----	---------	----	---------	----	---------	----	---------	----	---------	----	---------	----	---------	----	---------	----	---------	-----

MEAN	2.280	STD ERROR	0.094	MEDIAN	2.033
MODE	1.000	STD DEV	1.195	VARIANCE	1.428
KURTOSIS	-1.386	SKEWNESS	0.375	RANGE	3.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	4.000		

Figure 24

Situational Projection No. 1 Out of School Saving of Life Completion Story

Sanction 3 -Ego ideal - Rank Order

1. ***** (9) 5.6%
 2. ***** (43) 26.7%
 3. ***** (58) 36.0%
 4. ***** (51) 31.7%

I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

MEAN	2.938	STD ERROR	0.071	MEDIAN	2.991
MODE	3.000	STD DEV	0.899	VARIANCE	0.809
KURTOSIS	-0.835	SKENNESS	-0.344	RANGE	3.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	4.000		

Figure 25

Situational Projection No. 1 Out of School Saving of Life Completion Story

Sanction 4 - Authoritarian - Rank Order

- 1. ***** (76) 47.2%
 - 2. ***** (46) 28.6%
 - 3. ***** (20) 12.4%
 - 4. ***** (19) 11.8%
- I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

MEAN	1.888	STD ERROR	0.081	MEDIAN	1.598
MODE	1.000	STD DEV	1.031	VARIANCE	1.062
KURTOSIS	-0.461	SKEWNESS	0.877	RANGE	3.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	4.000		

Figure 26

Religious Group responses to Sanction 2 - "He knew that God would want him to save her"

	1.00	2.00	3.00	4.00	
Church Atten- dance with parents	9 27.3 16.1 5.6	14 42.4 30.4 8.7	4 12.1 23.5 2.5	6 18.2 14.3 3.7	33 20.5
Non Attendance	16 21.6 28.6 9.2	19 25.7 41.3 11.8	9 12.2 52.9 5.6	30 40.5 71.4 18.6	74 4.60
Church Atten- dance without Parents	15 42.9 26.8 9.3	11 31.4 23.9 6.8	4 11.4 23.5 2.5	5 14.3 11.9 3.1	35 21.7
Religious Social Group	16 84.2 28.6 9.9	2 10.5 4.3 1.2	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	1 5.3 2.4 0.6	19 11.8
	56 34.8	46 28.6	17 10.6	42 26.1	161 100.0

CHI SQUARE = 36.95171 with 9 DEGREES OF FREEDOM SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0000

KENDALL'S TAU B = -0.22630 SIGNIFICANCE 0.0000

KENDALLS TAU C = -0.21172 SIGNIFICANCE 0.0000

Figure 27

Sex by response to Value of Life Situation "He knows that God would want him to save her - Religious Sanction"

	1.00	2.00	3.00	4.00	
1.00	I	I	I	I	I
	21	15	12	26	74
	28.4	20.3	16.2	35.1	46.0
Boys	I	I	I	I	I
	37.5	32.6	70.6	61.9	
	13.0	9.3	7.5	16.1	
2.00	I	I	I	I	I
	35	31	5	16	87
	40.2	35.6	5.7	18.4	54.0
Girls	I	I	I	I	I
	62.5	67.4	29.4	38.1	
	21.7	19.3	3.1	9.9	
	I	I	I	I	I
	56	46	17	42	161
	34.8	28.6	10.6	36.1	100.0

Figure 28

Age Compared with Situational Test 1. Sanction - Religious

Age Group	1.00	2.00	3.00	4.00	Total
1.00	23	11	1	1	38
10-12 years	60.5	28.9	2.6	7.9	23.6
	41.1	23.9	5.9	7.1	
	14.3	6.8	0.6	1.9	
2.00	16	16	6	16	54
13-14 years	29.6	29.6	11.1	29.6	33.5
	28.6	34.8	35.3	38.1	
	9.9	9.9	3.7	9.9	
3.00	17	19	10	23	69
15-17 years	24.6	27.5	14.5	33.3	42.9
	30.4	41.3	58.8	54.8	
	10.6	11.8	6.2	14.3	
	56	46	17	42	161
	34.8	28.6	10.6	26.1	100.0

Figure 29

Moral Situation 2. - School Based Moral Situation Test - Stealing in the Cloakroom

1. ***** (70) 43.5% YES
 2. ***** (91) 56.5% NO

0.....I.....20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90I.....100

MEAN	1.565	STD ERROR	0.039	MEDIAN	0.0
MODE	2.000	STD DEV	0.497	VARIANCE	0.247
KURTOSIS	-1.931	SKEWNESS	-0.263	RANGE	1.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	2.000		

Figure 30

School Based Situation Test 2. Stealing in the Cloakroom

	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	
	1.00	2.00	
1.00	41	33	74
<u>Boys</u>	55.4	44.6	46.0
	58.6	36.3	
	25.5	20.5	
2.00	29	58	87
<u>Girls</u>	33.3	66.7	54.0
	41.4	63.7	
	18.0	36.0	
	70	91	161
	43.5	56.5	100.0

Figure 31

Social Class compared with responses to Cloakroom Stealing Scene

	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	
1.00	1.00	2.00	
	52	59	111
	46.8	53.2	68.9
	74.3	64.8	
	32.3	36.6	
2.00	18	32	50
	36.0	64.0	31.1
	25.7	64.0	
	11.2	19.9	
	70	91	161
	43.5	56.5	100.0

Working Class

Middle Class

Figure 32

Religious Groupings response to Cloakroom Stealing Projection

	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>
1.00	17	16
Church Attendance with parents	51.5	48.5
	24.3	17.6
	10.6	9.9
2.00	37	37
Non attenders	50.0	50.0
	52.9	40.7
	23.0	23.0
3.00	13	22
Church Attendance without parents	37.1	62.9
	18.6	24.2
	8.1	13.7
4.00	3	16
Religious Social Group	15.8	84.2
	4.3	17.6
	1.9	9.9
	70	91
	43.5	56.5
		161
		100.0

CHI SQUARE = 8.64731 WITH 3 DEGREES OF FREEDOM SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0344
 KENDALLS TAU B = 0.18383 SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0002
 KENDALLS TAU C = 0.21343 SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0000

Figure 33

Guilt Responses to the Stealing Cloakroom Projection

1.	***** (15)	9.3%	Fear							
2.	***** (40)	24.8%	General Conscience Feelings							
3.	*****									
4.	*** (2)	1.2%	Punishment							
5.	***** (7)	4.3%	Confession							
I.	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100
0	MEAN	2.665								
	MODE	3.000								
	KURTOSIS	1.357								
	MINIMUM	1.000								
			STD ERROR	0.066						
			STD DEV	0.836						
			SKÉWNESS	0.179						
			MAXIMUM	5.000						
			MEDIAN	2.763						
			VARIANCE	0.699						
			RANGE	4.000						

Figure 34

Religious Groups compared with Guilt Dimension responses in Cloakroom Stealing Situation

	Fear	General Conscience	'Real' Guilt	Punish- ment	Confession	
1.00	1.00	2.00	3.00	4.00	5.00	
Church attendance with parents	0.0	11	21	0	1	33 20.5
	0.0	33.3	63.6	0.0	3.0	
	0.0	27.5	21.6	0.0	14.3	
	0.0	6.8	13.0	0.0	0.6	
2.00	8	18	42	1	5	74 46.0
Non church attendance	10.8	24.3	56.8	1.4	6.8	
	53.3	45.0	43.3	50.0	71.4	
	5.0	11.2	26.1	0.6	3.1	
3.00	6	10	18	0	1	35 21.7
Church Attendance without parents	17.1	28.6	51.4	0.0	2.9	
	40.0	25.0	18.6	0.0	14.3	
	3.7	6.2	11.2	0.0	0.6	
4.00	1	1	16	1	0	19 11.8
Religious Social group	5.3	5.3	84.2	5.3	0.0	
	6.7	2.5	16.5	50.0	0.0	
	0.6	0.6	9.9	0.6	0.0	
	15	40	97	2	7	161 100.0
	9.3	24.8	60.2	1.2	4.3	

CHI SQUARE = 17.90524 with 12 DEGREES OF FREEDOM SIGNIFICANCE = 0.1186
 KENDALL'S TAU B = 0.00273 SIGNIFICANCE = 0.4794
 KENDALL'S TAU C = 0.00226 SIGNIFICANCE = 0.4829

School based Situational Projection No. 2.-Playground rule keeping transgression story

1. *****
 Following Peter's example - conforming
 ***** (98)

2. ***** (62) 38.5% Following David's example -
 disobedient

3. ** (1) 0.6% Spoilt Paper

I.....	I.....	I.....	I.....	I.....	I.....	I.....	I.....	I.....	I.....	I.....
0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100

MEAN

1.398

STD ERROR

0.040

MEDIAN

0.0

MODE

1.000

STD DEV

0.503

VARIANCE

0.253

KURTOSIS

-1.816

SKEWNESS

0.566

RANGE

2.000

MINIMUM

1.000

MAXIMUM

3.000

Figure 37

Age Differences in School Playground Projection compared with Sanctions

	1.00	2.00	3.00	4.00	
10-12 years	20 52.6 32.8 12.4	7 18.4 25.9 4.3	8 21.1 20.5 5.0	3 7.9 8.8 1.9	38 23.6
13-14 years	21 38.9 34.4 13.0	11 20.4 40.7 6.8	14 25.9 35.9 8.7	8 14.8 23.5 5.0	54 33.5
15-17 years	20 29.0 32.8 12.4	9 13.0 33.3 5.6	17 24.6 43.6 10.6	23 33.3 67.6 14.3	69 42.9
	61 37.9	27 16.8	39 24.2	34 21.1	161 100.0

N.B. "Authoritarian" reactions decrease with age.

"Personal" reactions increase with age.

Authoritarian

Personal

Figure 38

Religious Group compared with Sanctions operative in Playground Test

	Author- itarian	Social	Prudential	Personal Independent	
1.00	1.00	2.00	3.00	4.00	
Church Attendance with parents	12 36.4 19.7 7.5	8 24.2 29.6 5.0	9 27.3 23.1 5.6	4 12.1 11.8 2.5	33 20.5
2.00	25 33.8 41.0 15.5	10 13.5 37.0 6.2	18 24.3 46.2 11.2	21 28.4 61.8 13.0	74 46.0
Non Attendance					
3.00	17 48.6 27.9 10.6	7 20.0 25.9 4.3	10 28.6 25.6 6.2	1 2.9 2.9 0.6	35 21.7
Church Attendance without parents					
4.00	7 36.8 11.5 4.3	2 10.5 7.4 1.2	2 10.5 5.1 1.2	8 42.1 23.5 5.0	19 11.8
Religious Social Group					
	61 37.9	27 16.8	39 24.2	34 21.1	161 100.0

CHI SQUARE = 18.10829 WITH 9 DEGREES OF FREEDOM SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0339

KENDALL'S TAU B = -0.01653 SIGNIFICANCE = 0.3770

KENDALL'S TAU C = -0.0553 SIGNIFICANCE = 0.3842

Figure 39

Religious Education of Respondents compared with Sanctions in Playground
Projection Test

	Authoritarian	Social	Prudential	Personal	
	1.00	2.00	3.00	4.00	
	I	I	I	I	I
1.00	47	18	32	31	128
	I	I	I	I	I
	36.7	14.1	25.0	24.2	79.5
	I	I	I	I	I
	77.0	66.7	82.1	91.2	
	I	I	I	I	I
	29.2	11.2	19.9	19.3	
	I	I	I	I	I
2.00	14	9	7	2	32
	I	I	I	I	I
	43.8	28.1	21.9	6.2	19.9
	I	I	I	I	I
	23.0	33.3	17.9	5.9	
	I	I	I	I	I
	8.7	5.6	4.3	1.2	
	I	I	I	I	I
	0	0	0	1	1
	I	I	I	I	I
	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.6
	I	I	I	I	I
	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.9	
	I	I	I	I	I
	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6	
	I	I	I	I	I
	61	27	39	34	161
	I	I	I	I	I
	37.9	16.8	24.2	21.1	100.0
	I	I	I	I	I

CHI SQUARE = 11.12865 WITH 6 DEGREES OF FREEDOM SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0845
 KENDALL'S TAU B = -0.11369 SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0156
 KENDALL'S TAU C = -0.08321 SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0573

Figure 40(a)

School based Cheating Projection
Test 4

Type of Religious education in school compared with reactions to cheating situation. "Is the subject in the scene cheating?"

	Yes	No
	1.00	2.00
Bible Centred	113 88.3	15 11.7
	77.9	93.8
	70.2	9.3
Open ended, child centred	32 100.0	0 0.0
	22.1	0.0
	19.9	0.0
Sikh	0 0.0	1 0.6
	0.0	6.2
	0.0	0.6
	145 90.1	16 9.9
		100.0
		161 100.0

CHI SQUARE = 13.04710 WITH 2 DEGREES OF FREEDOM SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0015
 KENDALL'S TAU B = -0.10661 SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0216
 KENDALL'S TAU C = -0.05170 SIGNIFICANCE = 0.1635

Figure 41

Responses to Cheating Projected Transgression Test

Sanctions Operative

1. ***** (14) 8.7% Authoritarian
2. ***** (43) 26.7% Social, group orientated
3. ***** (101) 62.7% Self Interest, prudential
4. ** (1) 0.6% Self interest, guilt
5. ** (2) 1.2% Personal, independent "Cheating is all right if you don't get caught"

I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....	40	60	80	100	120	140	160	180	200
0									

MEAN	2.590	STD ERROR	0.056	MEDIAN	2.733
MODE	3.000	STD DEV	0.711	VARIANCE	0.506
KURTOSIS	1.152	SKEWNESS	-0.477	RANGE	4.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	5.000		

Figure 42

Age groupings compared with Sanctions operative in cheating

	Authoritarian	Social	Prudential self interest	self interest	self interest, personal	guilt	independent	
10-12 years	1.00	2.00	3.00	4.00	5.00			
	5	14	19	0	0			38
	13.2	36.8	50.0	0.0	0.0			23.6
	35.7	32.6	18.8	0.0	0.0			
	3.1	8.7	11.8	0.0	0.0			
13-14 years	2	17	34	1	0			54
	3.7	31.5	63.0	1.9	0.0			33.5
	14.3	39.5	33.7	100.0	0.0			
	1.2	10.6	21.1	0.6	0.0			
	7	12	48	0	2			69
15-17 years	10.1	17.4	69.6	0.0	2.9			42.9
	50.0	27.9	47.5	0.0	100.0			
	4.3	7.5	29.8	0.0	1.2			
	14	43	101	1	2			161
	8.7	26.7	62.7	0.6	1.2			100.0

In contrast to the pilot run, responses 4 and 5 did not score significantly in the actual test.

Figure 43

Church Attendance and Religious Social Group compared with the Sanctions Operative in Cheating Projection Test 4

	Authoritarian	Social love	Prudential self	Self interest guilt	personal independent	
1.00	1.00	2.00	3.00	4.00	5.00	I
Church Attendance with parents	3	13	16	1	0	I
	9.1	39.4	48.5	3.0	0.0	I
	21.4	30.2	15.8	100.0	0.0	I
	1.9	8.1	9.9	0.6	0.0	I
2.00	1	15	57	0	1	I
Not at all	1.4	20.3	77.0	0.0	1.4	I
	7.1	34.9	56.4	0.0	50.0	I
	0.6	9.3	35.4	0.0	0.6	I
	3	9	22	0	1	I
3.00	8.6	25.7	62.9	0.0	2.9	I
Without parents	21.4	20.9	21.8	0.0	50.0	I
	1.9	5.6	13.7	0.0	0.6	I
	7	6	6	0	0	I
	36.8	31.6	31.6	0.0	0.0	I
4.00	50.0	14.0	5.9	0.0	0.0	I
Religious Social Group	4.3	3.7	3.7	0.0	0.0	I
	14	43	101	1	2	I
	8.7	26.7	62.7	0.6	1.2	I
						I

CHI SQUARE = 36.90964 WITH 12 DEGREES OF FREEDOM SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0002

KENDALL'S TAU B = -0.09996 SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0290

KENDALL'S TAU C = -0.08014 SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0643

Figure 45

Religious Groups Compared with Dimensions of Guilt Sanctions operative in Situation Test 5.
Shop Stealing completion of transgression story

	Fear	General Conscience Feelings	Real Guilt	Punishment	Confession	
	I 1.00	I 2.00	I 3.00	I 4.00	I 5.00	I
1.00	I 1	I 4	I 5	I 13	I 10	I 33
Church Attendance	I 3.0	I 12.1	I 15.2	I 39.4	I 30.3	I 20.5
with parents	I 16.7	I 19.0	I 14.3	I 20.3	I 28.6	I
	I 0.6	I 2.5	I 3.1	I 8.1	I 6.2	I
2.00	I 2	I 9	I 18	I 33	I 12	I 74
Non attendance	I 2.7	I 12.2	I 24.3	I 44.6	I 16.2	I 4.60
	I 33.3	I 42.9	I 51.4	I 51.6	I 34.3	I
	I 1.2	I 5.6	I 11.2	I 20.5	I 7.5	I
3.00	I 3	I 7	I 2	I 12	I 11	I 35
Attendance without	I 8.6	I 20.0	I 5.7	I 34.3	I 31.4	I 21.7
parents	I 50.0	I 33.3	I 5.7	I 18.8	I 31.4	I
	I 1.9	I 4.3	I 1.2	I 7.5	I 6.8	I
4.00	I 0	I 1	I 10	I 6	I 2	I 19
Religious Social	I 0.0	I 5.3	I 52.6	I 31.6	I 10.5	I 11.8
Group	I 0.0	I 4.8	I 28.6	I 9.4	I 5.7	I
	I 0.0	I 0.6	I 6.2	I 3.7	I 1.2	I
	I 6	I 21	I 35	I 64	I 35	I 161
	I 3.7	I 13.0	I 21.7	I 39.8	I 21.7	I 100.0

CHI SQUARE = 24.55309 WITH 12 DEGREES OF FREEDOM SIGNIFICANCE \approx 0.0171

Kendall's Tau B = -0.07443 SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0791

Kendall's Tau C = -0.07016 SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0917

Figure 47

Age Differences compared with Guilt Sanctions operative in Completion of Transgression Story in Shop Stealing Projection No.5

	Fear	General Conscience	Real Guilt	Punishment	Confession
1.00	1.00	2.00	3.00	4.00	5.00
10-12 years	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	2 5.3 9.5 1.2	7 18.4 20.0 4.3	17 44.7 26.6 10.6	12 31.6 34.3 7.5
2.00	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	8 14.8 38.1 5.0	10 18.5 28.6 6.2	21 38.9 32.8 13.0	15 27.8 42.9 9.3
13-14 years	6 8.7 100.0 3.7	11 15.9 52.4 6.8	18 26.1 51.4 11.2	26 37.7 40.6 16.1	8 11.6 22.9 5.0
3.00	6 3.7	21 13.0	35 21.7	64 39.8	35 21.7
15-17 years					161 100.0

'Real' guilt incrases with age
 General conscience incrases with age
 Punishment decrases with age
 Confession decrases with age

Figure 49

Denominational Differences compared with the Sanctions operative in divided loyalties in the home - Projected Test No. 6

	Authority	Social Peer	Prudential	Personal Independent	
	1.00	2.00	3.00	4.00	
Conformist	23 41.8 41.8 14.3	7 12.7 25.0 4.3	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	25 45.5 32.5 15.5	55 34.2
Nonconformist	14 42.4 25.5 8.7	13 39.4 46.4 8.1	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	6 18.2 7.8 3.7	33 20.5
None	18 24.7 32.7 11.2	8 11.0 28.6 5.0	1 1.4 100.0 0.6	46 63.0 59.7 28.6	73 45.3
	55 34.2	28 17.4	1 0.6	77 47.8	161 100.0

CHI SQUARE = 25.99883 WITH 6 DEGREES OF FREEDOM SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0002

KENDALL'S TAU B = 0.018176 SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0003

KENDALL'S TAU C = 0.171175 SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0006

Figure 50

Religious Groups compared with Sanctions operative in Divided Loyalty in the Home
Projected Test No. 6

	Authority	Social Peer	Prudential	Personal Independent	
	1.00	2.00	3.00	4.00	
1.00	I	I	I	I	
Church Attendance	16	3	0	14	33
with parents	48.5	9.1	0.0	42.4	20.5
	29.1	10.7	0.0	18.2	
	9.9	1.9	0.0	8.7	
2.00	I	I	I	I	
Non Attendance	18	9	1	46	74
	24.3	12.2	1.4	62.2	46.0
	32.7	32.1	100.0	59.7	
	11.2	5.6	0.6	28.6	
3.00	I	I	I	I	
Attendance	15	8	0	12	35
without parents	42.9	22.9	0.0	34.3	21.7
	27.3	28.6	0.0	15.6	
	9.3	5.0	0.0	7.5	
4.00	I	I	I	I	
Religious	6	8	0	5	19
Social Group	31.6	42.1	0.0	26.3	11.8
	10.9	28.6	0.0	6.5	
	3.7	5.0	0.0	3.1	
	I	I	I	I	
	55	28	1	77	161
	34.2	17.4	0.6	47.8	100.0

CHI SQUARE = 22.37152 with 9 DEGREES OF FREEDOM SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0078

KENDALL'S TAU B = -0.06558 SIGNIFICANCE = 0.1069

KENDALL'S TAU C = -0.05720 SIGNIFICANCE = 0.1391

Figure 50(b)

	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Neither</u>
1.00	1.00	2.00	3.00
Church Attendance with parents	12 36.4 19.0 7.5	21 63.6 21.6 13.0	0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2.00	39 52.7 61.9 24.2	35 47.3 36.1 21.7	0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Non attenders	12 34.3 19.0 7.5	23 65.7 23.7 14.3	0 0.0 0.0 0.0
3.00	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	18 94.7 18.6 11.2	1 5.3 100.0 0.6
Church Attendance without parents	63 39.1	97 60.2	1 0.6
4.00			
Religious Social Group			
			161 100.0

CHI SQUARE = 24.71416 WITH 6 DEGREES OF FREEDOM SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0004

KENDALL'S TAU B = 0.18461 SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0002

KENDALL'S TAU C = 0.15948 SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0012

Figure 51

Lying Projection Test (ii)
Sanctions Operative

- 1. ***** (46) 28.6% Authoritarian "It is worse to lie to an adult"
- 2. ***** (17) 10.6% ego ideal reciprocity "It is worse to lie to a child"
- 3. ***** Personal Independent "It is just as bad to either"

I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I.....I
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

MEAN	2.323	STD ERROR	0.070	MEDIAN	0.0
MODE	3.000	STD DEV	0.892	VARIANCE	0.795
KURTOSIS	-1.391	SKEWNESS	-0.678	RANGE	2.000
MINIMUM	1.000	MAXIMUM	3.000		

Figure 52.

Religious Education compared with Lying Test (ii)

	<u>Worse to an adult</u>	<u>Worse to a child</u>	<u>Just as bad to either</u>
Bible Centred	1.00	1.00	3.00
	31	17	80
	24.2	13.3	62.5
	67.4	100.0	81.6
	19.3	10.6	49.7
Open ended	2.00	2.00	3.00
	15	0	17
	46.9	0.0	53.1
	32.6	0.0	17.3
	9.3	0.0	10.6
Sikh	3.00	3.00	3.00
	0	0	1
	0.0	0.0	100.0
	0.0	0.0	1.0
	0.0	0.0	0.6
	46	17	98
	28.6	10.6	60.9
			161
			100.0

* none of the open ended group regarded it worse to lie to a child but 53.1% regarded it as just as bad to either.

Figure 54

Religious Groups compared with Lying Attitudes in Lying Projection (iii)

	"Always wrong to tell lies"	"All right to lie to help a friend"	"Neither"
1.00	I	I	I
2.00	I	I	I
3.00	I	I	I
4.00	I	I	I
Church Attendance with parents	20 60.6 27.8 12.4	13 39.4 14.8 8.1	0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Non church attendance	27 36.5 37.5 16.8	46 62.2 52.3 28.6	1 1.4 100.0 0.6
Church Attendance without parents	15 42.9 20.8 9.3	20 57.1 22.7 12.4	0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Religious Social Group	10 52.6 13.9 6.2	9 47.4 10.2 5.6	0 0.0 0.0 0.0
	72 44.7	88 54.7	1 0.6
			33 20.5
			74 46.0
			35 21.7
			19 11.8
			161 100.0

CHI SQUARE = 6.84609 WITH 6 DEGREES OF FREEDOM SIGNIFICANCE = 0.3353
 KENDALL'S TAU B = 0.04883 SIGNIFICANCE = 0.1773
 KENDALL'S TAU C = 0.04294 SIGNIFICANCE = 0.2078

Figure 55

Type of Religious Education compared with Lying Attitudes in Lying Projection (iii)

	"Always wrong to tell lies"	"All Right to lie to help a friend"	"Neither"	
Bible Centred	1.00 49 38.3 68.1 30.4	2.00 78 60.9 88.6 48.4	7.00 1 0.8 100.0 0.6	128 79.5
Child Centred/ open ended	2.00 23 71.9 31.9 14.3	9 28.1 10.2 5.6	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	32 19.9
Sikh	3.00 0 0.0 0.0 0.0	1 100.0 1.1 0.6	0 0.0 0.0 0.0	1 0.6
	72 44.7	88 54.7	1 0.6	161 100.0

CHI SQUARE = 12.58923 WITH 4 DEGREES OF FREEDOM SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0135

KENDALL'S TAU B = -0.24990 SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0000

KENDALL'S TAU C * -0.15208 SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0020

Figure 56

Social Class compared with Lying Attitudes in Lying Projection (iii)

	"Always wrong to tell lies"	"All right to lie to help a friend"	"Neither"	
1.00	1.00	2.00	7.00	I
	I	I	I	I
Working Class	55	55	1	I
	49.5	49.5	0.9	I
	76.4	62.5	100.0	I
	34.2	34.2	0.6	I
	I	I	I	I
2.00	17	33	0	I
	I	I	I	I
Middle Class	34.0	66.0	0.0	I
	23.6	37.5	0.0	I
	10.6	20.5	0.0	I
	I	I	I	I
	I	I	I	I
	72	88	1	I
	44.7	54.7	0.6	I
	I	I	I	I
	I	I	I	I
				161
				100.0

CHI SQUARE = 4.02098 WITH 2 DEGREES OF FREEDOM SIGNIFICANCE = 0.1339

KENDALL'S TAU B = 0.13823 SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0044

KENDALL'S TAU C = 0.12809 SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0076

Figure 58

Sex Differences compared with Reaction to Punishment Sanctions, Projected

Test No. 7

	Deprivation	Detention	Verbal	Deprivation of Love	Physical Punishment
1.00	19	11	22	9	13
	25.7	14.9	29.7	12.2	17.6
	65.5	37.9	44.0	25.7	72.2
	11.8	6.8	13.7	5.6	8.1
2.00	10	18	28	26	5
	11.5	20.7	32.2	29.9	5.7
	34.5	62.1	56.0	74.3	27.8
	6.2	11.2	17.4	16.1	3.1
	29	29	50	35	18
	18.0	18.0	31.1	21.7	11.2
					161
					1100.0

Boys

Girls

Figure 59

Religious Groups compared with Reaction to Punishment Sanctions - Projected Test No.7

	Deprivation	Detention	Verbal	Deprivation of love	Physical Punishment	
1.00	1.00	2.00	3.00	4.00	5.00	
	6	7	10	7	3	33
	18.2	21.2	30.3	21.2	9.4	20.5
	20.7	24.1	20.0	20.0	16.7	
	3.7	4.3	6.2	4.3	1.9	
Church Attendance with parents						
2.00	12	7	27	17	11	74
	16.2	9.5	36.5	23.0	14.9	46.0
	41.4	24.1	54.0	48.6	61.1	
	7.5	4.3	16.8	10.6	6.8	
Non attendance						
3.00	7	9	8	9	2	35
	20.0	25.7	22.9	25.7	5.7	21.7
	24.1	31.0	16.0	25.7	11.1	
	4.3	5.6	5.0	5.6	1.2	
Church Attendance without parents						
4.00	4	6	5	2	2	19
	21.1	31.6	26.3	10.5	10.5	11.8
	13.8	20.7	10.0	15.7	11.1	
	2.5	3.7	3.1	1.2	1.2	
Religious Social Group						
	29	29	50	35	18	161
	18.0	18.0	31.1	21.7	11.2	100.0

CHI SQUARE = 11.57738 WITH 12 DEGREES OF FREEDOM SIGNIFICANCE = 0.4802

KENDALL'S TAU B = -0.06916 SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0949

KENDALL'S TAU C = -0.06738 SIGNIFICANCE = 0.1007

Figure 60

Denominational Differences compared with Reaction to Punishment Sanctions
on Projected Test No. 7

	<u>Deprivation</u>	<u>Detention</u>	<u>Verbal</u>	<u>Deprivation of Love</u>	<u>Physical Punishment</u>	
	I 1.00	I 2.00	I 3.00	I 4.00	I 5.00	I
1.00	10	13	13	14	5	I I I I I
	18.2	23.6	23.6	25.5	9.1	55
	34.5	44.8	26.0	40.0	27.8	34.2
	6.2	8.1	8.1	8.7	3.1	I
	I 7	I 9	I 11	I 4	I 2	I I I I I I
2.00	21.2	27.3	33.3	12.1	6.1	33
	24.1	31.0	22.0	11.4	11.1	20.5
	4.3	5.6	6.8	2.5	1.2	I I I I I I
	I 12	I 7	I 26	I 17	I 11	I I I I I I
3.00	16.4	9.6	35.6	23.3	15.1	73
	41.4	24.1	52.0	48.6	61.1	45.3
	7.5	4.3	16.1	10.6	6.8	I I I I I I
	I 29	I 29	I 50	I 35	I 18	I I I I I I
	18.0	18.0	31.1	21.7	11.2	161
	I	I	I	I	I	100.0

CHI SQUARE = 11.02972 WITH 8 DEGREES OF FREEDOM SIGNIFICANCE = 0.2000

KENDALL'S TAU B = 0.09715 SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0327

KENDALL'S TAU C = 0.10254 SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0259

Figure 61

Religious Education compared with Reaction to Punishment Sanctions on Projected Test No.7

	<u>Deprivation</u>	<u>Detention</u>	<u>Verbal</u>	<u>Deprivation of love</u>	<u>Physical Punishment</u>	
1.00	I 1.00	I 2.00	I 3.00	I 4.00	I 5.00	I
Bible Centred	I 20 15.6 69.0 12.4	I 22 17.2 75.9 13.7	I 40 31.3 80.0 24.8	I 31 24.2 88.6 19.3	I 15 11.7 83.3 9.3	I 128 79.5
2.00	I 9 28.1 31.0 5.6	I 7 21.9 24.1 4.3	I 9 28.1 18.0 5.6	I 4 12.5 11.4 2.5	I 3 9.4 16.7 1.9	I 32 19.9
Child centred/ open ended	I 0 0.0 0.0 0.0	I 0 0.0 0.0 0.0	I 1 100.0 2.0 0.6	I 0 0.0 0.0 0.0	I 0 0.0 0.0 0.0	I 1 0.6
3.00	I 29 18.0	I 29 18.0	I 50 31.1	I 35 21.7	I 18 11.2	I 161 100.0
Sikh	I	I	I	I	I	I

CHI SQUARE = 6.59031 WITH 8 DEGREES OF FREEDOM SIGNIFICANCE = 0.5814

KENDALL'S TAU B = -0.13090 SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0065

KENDALL'S TAU C = -0.09930 SIGNIFICANCE = 0.0299

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