Existentialist themes in the interpretation of faith: by Bultmann and Tillich

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EXISTENTIALIST THEMES IN THE INTERPRETATION OF "FAITH"
BY BULTMANN AND TILLICH

ABSTRACT

The aim of this thesis is to assess the influence of existentialism on the interpretation of faith presented by Bultmann and Tillich and evaluate their use of this existentialist thought.

First, we show that the general character of existentialism may be classified into two broad themes: the Place of the Individual, which shows his concern for his understanding of himself and his relation to others; and Existentialia, which describe the various modes of existence of the individual, his feelings and experiences. We then show that Bultmann and Tillich are particularly indebted to four existentialists: Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Jaspers, and Heidegger. We therefore proceed to outline the relevant doctrines of these philosophers, thus discovering numerous existentialist themes. Next, we use the broad themes discovered in Chapter One as the framework for our analysis of Bultmann's and Tillich's existentialist interpretation of faith. In this analysis, we elicit several existentialist themes used by Bultmann and Tillich, noting that these have similarities with those of the four existentialists reviewed previously. We argue that all these existentialist themes of Bultmann and Tillich are derived from, or parallel to, those of our four existentialists; the interpretation of faith offered by Bultmann and Tillich is thus existentialist both in general approach and in particular historical derivation. This result is confirmed when a brief comparison is made with the concepts of faith held by Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Jaspers and Heidegger.

We argue that it is both valid and positively helpful to formulate an existentialist interpretation of faith such as is expounded by Bultmann and Tillich. Despite some criticism of such an approach, we conclude that Bultmann and Tillich have in fact made a valuable contribution to our analysis and understanding of faith.
EXISTENTIALIST THEMES IN THE INTERPRETATION OF "FAITH"

BY BULTMANN AND TILLICH

A Thesis submitted for the degree of

Master of Arts

in the University of Durham

by

ANTHONY JOHN REES

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October
1976
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Footnotes are given at the end of each chapter. They are deliberately limited to bibliographical references only, and are quoted in abbreviated form only. Full bibliographical details are to be found at the end of the thesis.
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PREFACE

This thesis is an investigation into the existentialist influences apparent in Bultmann and Tillich and their interpretation of faith. As such, we are concerned with the concept of faith rather than its contents, i.e. with fides qua creditur (the faith by which it is believed), rather than fides quae creditur (the faith which is believed). This distinction has long been made in the study of religion and in philosophical theology, but it is often blurred both in discussion and experience. Its clarity will be reasserted in this thesis, but we will find that Tillich, as a systematic theologian, succeeds better in this respect than Bultmann, who is primarily concerned with analysis and exposition of the New Testament. Our thesis, then, is not concerned with religious doctrines, but rather with the attitude, act, and experience of faith.

Because of this it is highly appropriate that we should examine the existentialist influence and its results in Bultmann's and Tillich's interpretation of faith, since existentialism is largely concerned with the attitudes, acts and experiences of man. In other words, existentialism is probably the best approach one could take in analysing the nature and character of faith, and it will be seen that both Bultmann and Tillich rely on existentialism to interpret faith, using existentialist themes which are either directly borrowed or derived from existentialists, or are similar or parallel to the concepts of contemporary existentialists. This thesis, then, is a study in the philosophy of religion. It is an attempt to demonstrate the application of existentialism to the concept of faith and to see whether faith can be validly and successfully interpreted in terms of existentialist themes.
The method and argument of this thesis will be based on an exposition of the nature of existentialist philosophy, so in the first chapter we will describe the general character of existentialism. From this initial review and analysis, two main broad themes of existentialism are discovered; the Place of the Individual, and Existentialia. These two themes will be used as the framework for our analysis of Bultmann's and Tillich's existentialist interpretation of faith. Next, in our second chapter, we find that not only are Bultmann and Tillich indebted to existentialism in general, but are by their own admission also particularly indebted to Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Jaspers and Heidegger. We will make, therefore, a brief review and analysis of their respective existentialist philosophies, and draw out a number of particular terms and concepts which we will also find to be the existentialist themes relevant to our study of Bultmann and Tillich on faith.

In our third and fourth chapters on Bultmann and Tillich respectively we analyse their interpretation of faith not only within the two broad existentialist themes found in Chapter One, but also more with reference to the particular detailed existentialist themes found in Chapter Two. When examining the existentialist themes used by Bultmann and Tillich, we observe that these themes have their antecedents in those themes we have already discovered in Chapter Two, so thereby initially justifying our identification of these themes used by Bultmann and Tillich as being existentialist. This identification is analysed in some detail to show that the thought of Bultmann and Tillich is derived from, or parallel to, the thought of the existentialists. In our final chapter we also show that the existentialists' concepts of faith are also harmonious with those of Bultmann and Tillich.
We argue that it is not only valid to interpret faith in terms of philosophy, but that existentialism in particular is the most appropriate means by which to make this interpretation, because the interests of both existentialism and faith have so much in common in terms of the life of the individual man. We conclude that Bultmann and Tillich are not only indebted to existentialism in their interpretation of faith, but that this influence is both valuable and enlightening in our understanding of the nature of faith.

As such, this thesis provides not only a contribution to the systematic study of faith and an analysis of existentialism, but also describes and analyses in some detail the extent and nature of existential influence on Bultmann and Tillich in their understanding of faith. From this we find that for Bultmann Kierkegaard is more important than is often realised, and that there are some positive similarities of thought with Jaspers. Then with regard to Tillich, we find that Schelling and Nietzsche are also similarly under-rated, and again there are some striking similarities of thought between Tillich and Jaspers. Again with Bultmann, we find that Heidegger is not the sole influence, whilst in Tillich's case, though he speaks of an indebtedness to Heidegger, Heidegger's influence on him is negligible.

Above all, however, we find that Bultmann and Tillich see existentialism only as a tool for analysis and not as a corrective for theology. Their use of it, then, is initially quite modest, for regarding it even as a method for evangelism and apologetic, they provide for us a valid interpretation of the nature of faith in terms of existentialist themes which ordinary men may understand.
Chapter One

THE NATURE AND CHARACTER OF EXISTENTIALIST PHILOSOPHY

Introduction

Existentialist philosophy is a term used to classify the work of so many divergent thinkers who applied their philosophy to different subjects of interest, that a consensus of method or content in their thought is barely possible. Each existentialist has another interest which coincides with his particular existential philosophy, so that his existentialism gives support to this other interest both as a philosophical basis and as a philosophical analysis of that particular interest. As with the term "philosophy" itself, it is easier to describe the scope of existential philosophy ("Existential" here being understood as describing particular philosophies rather than the attitude of the philosophers) than to define what existential philosophy actually is. It is, therefore, useful to see whether it would be possible to give a general review of the nature and character of existential philosophy, and seek some broad themes which may be safely described as "existentialist", such that a framework for our study will emerge and the use of the term made clear. All this helps to demonstrate the significance of existentialism as related and relevant to man, but it also serves to remind us that existentialism as such is a mode of thought which analyses human life, rather than a set of doctrines which should govern it.

One approach to discovering the nature and character of existential philosophy is to look at the etymology of the word "existential". This approach may be deemed valid in this instance because this very approach itself has been employed by some existentialists themselves, especially Heidegger and Tillich, besides
Husserl, to whose phenomenology we will refer to later. "Existence" comes from the Latin *ex-sistere*, which involves the state and relative place of being, i.e., to emerge, appear, proceed, be visible or manifest, to be out(side), apart from, take up a position, to (cause to) stand, place, be placed, be, and become. This etymology is in fact viewed with suspicion by philologists, and it is in any case a most misleading way of answering the question. However, it is possible to glean something about existentialism from this analysis for it makes clear the point that these thinkers have certain motives in common. These are the desire to view human existence as separable from the world of nature and society and to commend a certain status of man as a goal for human life. It is this technical meaning of "existence" and "existential" we shall call "status". Existential philosophy, then, is concerned with "status"; the status of the individual both in his own right and also in relation to others.

A more promising method of discovering the nature and character of existentialist philosophy is to look at the history and development of such thought concerning existence as the complex status and relationship of the individual. The first point to be noted here is that existentialist philosophers have the common characteristic of being concerned with the problems and concepts of existence, rather than with those of essence. Right from the opening of his huge work *Being and Time*, Heidegger points out that the question of being, of existential analysis, once broached by the ancient Greek philosophers, was dropped and neglected throughout the history of philosophy, and that it must now be taken up once again. Traditional philosophy as far back as the classical Greeks has distinguished between existence and essence, and has concentrated its study almost exclusively on essence. By contrast, existential philosophy is concerned with people and
things in existence, investigating and analysing situations and circumstances, and probing the origin and significance of the human predicament. And here we notice that whereas traditional philosophy was more concerned with the essence of things, existential philosophy is more concerned with the status, the existence, situation and predicament of the individual human being and society as found in the world with all the pressures of life - both external and internal - influencing them.

Bearing these comments in mind, we may say that existential philosophy has its starting point with individual meditations on life, although existential philosophy is more than just that. Whenever an individual muses on his personal existence as being in relation to himself, others, and the world, and thereby comes to grips with human problems, experiences, and emotions, he may be embarking on existential philosophy. But to make it characteristically existentialist, however, such meditation must be conducted in individualistic, subjective, terms, with the subject-object dichotomy of traditional philosophy broken down, as the object of reflection is the reflecting subject himself. The theme of the meditation, then, is the self and others in actual existence, not any remote philosophical essences. From such meditations come the asking of ultimate questions, and the formulating of a peculiar vocabulary to account for the concepts and terms raised thereby.

Many commentators on existentialism have developed this idea of the historical heritage of existential thought. Jaspers spoke of the "axial age", that period round about 500 BC when Hebrew prophets, Greek philosophers, the Indian Upanishads, Zarathustra of Persia, and the Chinese Confucius and Lao-Tse all flourished. Jaspers said that this early period displayed the characteristics of existential
philosophy in that

... man becomes conscious of being as a whole, of himself and his limitations. He experiences the terror of the world, and his own powerlessness. He asks radical questions .... He experiences absoluteness in the depths of self-hood and in the lucidity of transcendence.³

In similar vein, Bultmann finds such existential philosophising about life in the Christian era; Jesus lived existentially in the face of death, speaking of decision, commitment, obedience, and authentic existence; Paul witnessed to religious conversion experience and self-understanding; Gnosticism, in its terminology and character of ultimate dualism, was also called "existentialist" by Bultmann.⁴ This whole mode of thought reached a climax in the "Philosophies of Life" of the nineteenth century. These meditations and philosophies attempted to get behind the subject-object split to a fundamental concept of life. In existentialist terms, they tried to unite man as an individual personality, and unite him with the world. Now whilst this background may be historically important for existentialism, there is a certain danger in labelling all this mode of thought "existentialist"; the term begins to lose its significance and meaning. It is therefore of limited value to refer back to purely a mode of thought. There are other factors which go to make up existentialism, and we must look at these now.

Phenomenology was developed by Edmund Husserl⁵ (from the idea of Franz Brentano) as a "descriptive psychology" or "descriptive science" (not as an empirical enquiry, pace Brentano), and this was adopted and adapted by many existentialist philosophers including Heidegger, during this century. The object of the exercise was to re-establish the ancient relation between Being and Thought, and to abolish the subject-object dichotomy. Just as Descartes had a method of
systematic doubt in order to reach the indubitable, so Husserl had a method of "bracketing" (the *epoche*), by which he suspended judgement regarding superficial empirical assertions with their doubtful presuppositions and fallible deductions. Intuition of the essence is to be attained by this suspension of judgement. This is the phenomenological "reduction", whereby an object which is present to consciousness is reduced to the pure phenomenon by putting in brackets, i.e., excluding from further interest, those elements which do not belong to the universal essence. If this procedure is followed completely, one is said to come to "the things themselves", which are quite pure, being freed from human distorting factors.

Copleston provides the following illustration:

Suppose, for example, that I wished to develop a phenomenological analysis of the aesthetic experience of beauty. I suspend all judgement about the subjectivity or objectivity of beauty in an ontological sense and direct my attention simply to the essential structure of aesthetic experience as "appearing" to consciousness.

It is this "appearing" which provides the etymological background to the word "phenomenology", which was exploited by both Husserl and Heidegger. Phenomenology thus shows that all meaning and significance the world has is the product of, and is bestowed by, man. The resultant anthropocentricity is also a mark of existentialist philosophy.

There are, however, differences between Husserl's phenomenology and existential phenomenology. Whereas Husserl was concerned with essences, existentialists are concerned with existence; and whereas Husserl tended towards Idealism, existentialists decisively reject Idealism. Furthermore, whereas Husserl employed the *epoche* in his phenomenology, Heidegger (and others) rejected this method. As a result of all this, Heidegger's phenomenology was somewhat different.
from Husserl's, being more descriptive, employing the approach of etymology to remove presuppositions, and seeing phenomonology more in terms of a revelation of experience in existence (enlightenment) rather than a deduction through method to essences. Nevertheless some of the objections to phenomonology may also be applied to existentialism. Both invoke an individualism which encourages solipsism, and treat external objects as being over and against the individual person, with both their existence or relevance at the manipulation or disposal of the individual.

Seen in philosophical perspective, existentialism is an aspect of ontology, which in turn is a type of metaphysics. Metaphysics may be defined as the systematic reflection by man on various aspects of the world as he knows it. Thus there were speculative metaphysics in the seventeenth century, Kant could speak of "a metaphysic of morals" and Idealists of the last century and this were also in fact constructing metaphysics. The same applies to ontologists who study the nature of "being". Existentialism as the study of the nature of "existence", is obviously closely related to ontology, being that part of ontology concerned with the details of "being", pertinent to the existence of man. As such, existentialism contains more records of man's basic experiences of existence than ontology which still retains its abstract character. The difficulty, however, is that existentialism, which opposes the principle of the system would appear thus to be in conflict with the systematic nature of metaphysical thought. This tension was never resolved by Kierkegaard, who wrote systematically about the unsystematic nature of man's existence; whilst the tension was avoided by Tillich, who preferred to speak of ontology rather than metaphysics, but who then wrote in a very
systematic way, and so balanced his interest in existentialism by a deep-seated sympathy for essentialism. Heidegger, always avowedly an ontologist, first investigated the existentialist aspects of ontology, but then later switched to other broader aspects of ontology and metaphysics. Jaspers wanted to avoid the term "ontology", but in the end found himself speaking of "periechontology". For our purposes here, however, we should just notice that existentialism is an aspect of ontology and so should be seen in that light.

So far, we have seen that existentialism deals with the "status" of the individual (the etymological approach), and is conducted in terms of subjective meditations on existence and its human experiences of the meditative individual in question (historical approach). Also we have noted that rejection of the subject-object split, exemplified by phenomenology, is also characteristic of existentialism, whilst ontology, because like existentialism it reflects on being, is also a factor which makes up the nature and character of existentialism. From all these factors, and dominating them all, however, is the major characteristic of any existentialist; his infinite passion and involvement with the subject at hand. This is not just enthusiastic interest, it is the life blood of the existentialist which not only throbs through his words but actually writes them. In this chapter we aim to show that existentialist philosophers have some common characteristics, some broad themes, and that - as we shall show later - Bultmann and Tillich belong to this tradition, both historically and philosophically.

Philosophically this tradition is maintained by an essential element of personal involvement, for, as D.E. Roberts said:-
Every existentialist writer attempts, in his own fashion, to formulate the difference between the kind of truth which can be appropriated without personal commitment, and the kind of truth which cannot.

Truth for the existentialist is what he knows for himself accounts for man and his being in actual existence. Our two broad overall existentialist themes, then, are "the Place of the Individual", and "Existentialia" - a Heideggerian term denoting those feelings and experiences of the individual in his existential predicament just expounded.

The Place of the Individual.

The place (status) of the individual has two aspects which we must examine in turn; one is that of the relationship between the individual and himself, the other is that of the relationship between the individual and others. For each aspect we shall see how Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Jaspers, and Heidegger treat the place of the individual. Before we do, however, we should make clear that this existentialist orientation does not necessarily imply "individualism", or "subjectivism" in the narrow sense of those words. This common accusation against existentialism will be shown in this study to be grossly exaggerated, especially in the case of Bultmann and Tillich, if not quite unfounded.

(a) The Individual and Himself

There are two aspects in the relationship between the individual and himself. The first is self-assertion, involving a personal ethic and courage, the other is self-reflection and analysis, i.e., introspection or subjectivity. We shall look at these in turn.

(i) Self-assertion.

By self-assertion, we are referring to those motives, forms, and aspects of an existentialist attempt to assert the individual status
of a particular person. We may usefully begin with Kierkegaard's reference to the "Individual", "the Unique"; the fact that "The paradox of faith is this, that the individual is higher than the universal..." For him, the individual is the person who stands out from the crowd, the person who asserts himself with dignity and personal ethic. The individual, however, does not make his self-assertion a cause to exult over others; Kierkegaard's individual was, like Kierkegaard himself, a humble man, a solitary man but privately self-confident of this status as an individual in relation to society. With the concept of projection, Heidegger (and Sartre) said that this existential individual should in fact attempt to thrust out into society, and challenge its mediocrity, and investigate the possibilities life opens up for the individual.

Two aspects are raised here. First is the thrusting assertiveness of the individual, and here Nietzsche spoke in very strong terms. The basic motivating force in life, he said, is "The Will to Power", when the individual strives not only to survive but also to conquer. The self-assertive individual must make the effort to achieve superiority, and this would result in the formation of an elite which constantly asserts itself. The individual is, then, to have the courage to go it alone. The other aspect is that of the possibilities which confront the individual, and through which he asserts himself. Jaspers developed this aspect of the individual in the context of "Choice". When I am faced with a choice, it is then that I realise that it is my decision alone ultimately and my choice is my self-assertion. Another context in which individuality is realised is in "Boundary Situations", when one is at the limit or boundary of one's existence and human capabilities or possibilities. Such points of crisis remind one that one is alone in life ultimately,
and that any step forward into the unknown or towards "Transcendence" is a personal individual decision and act. We shall be looking at this aspect in greater detail later.

Arising from all this is the ethical aspect of an individual's self-assertion, involving a personal ethic and courage, which existentialists call "Authentic Existence". "Authentic" comes from the Greek \( \alpha \dot{\nu} \theta \varepsilon \nu \tau \eta \xi \), meaning an absolute ruler or master (by destroying all opposition), and the reflexive pronoun \( \alpha \dot{\nu} \tau \alpha \xi \). This etymology helps to explain the individual existentialists' opposition to and contempt of public mediocrity. Also, of course, there is the existential interpretation of "ex-sist"; stand out. As a result, it is characteristic of existentialism to advocate individualism and subjectivity in a positive sense to many things in life. For all existentialists, the ethical motive for self-assertion is important, because of their distrust of the public morality. This distinction was made by Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, whose importance for existentialism is seen by one commentator as providing the "Ethical Origins" for existentialist philosophy.\(^{14}\) We will consider the ethical implications of individualism in existentialism in a separate section of this chapter, but we should note here that the idea of conscience being the voice of authentic existence in the self-assertive individual opposing society and its degenerate morality (e.g. Heidegger\(^{15}\)) presupposes that the individual is superior to society, at least in questions of morality and integrity. This, too, will be investigated later.

(ii) Self-reflection

By self-reflection, we are thinking here of introspection with analysis; a type of subjectivity, when the individual reflects on
himself and his status. The principle involved here is that one should stand outside one's self and examine one's self as an individual person, and also to see one's self as others do. It could be called "the phenomenological approach in practice", for one is looking at one's self as a whole ("bracketed"), as an existent reality, and asking such questions as "Who am I", "What is my body?", "What is my mind?".

Kierkegaard revelled in this attitude of self-reflection as it expresses the status of the individual over and against all else in a peculiar way by making the reflective individual the criterion and judge of all. His characteristic declaration "It is impossible more strongly to express the fact that subjectivity is truth and that objectivity is repellence, repellent even by virtue of its absurdity"\(^{16}\) teaches us that all knowledge and truth is subjective; for unless I know something myself, know that something is true for me, there is no real knowledge and truth of significance there. One has to appropriate all knowledge and truth for oneself, produce it, and take interest in it. On self-reflection, James Collins said

For Kierkegaard, subjectivity means inwardness or the existential attitude of the individual soul. A man's subjectivity is his personal, inward condition in respect to the moral law and religious life, a phase of human reality which is not open to scientific inspection. In this sense, existential knowledge must be both subjective and edifying.\(^{17}\)

or, as Wahl interpreted subjectivity: "... true existence is achieved by intensity of feeling".\(^{18}\)

Kierkegaard and Nietzsche were described by Jaspers as sharing a common feeling of personal failure, exceptionality, and loneliness.\(^{19}\) Unlike Kierkegaard, however, Nietzsche's self-reflection was restless, critical to the point of nihilism, and involved a psychological battle
between the lower instincts (which include mediocrity) and the higher instincts (which include virtue and supremacy). This psychological battle of self-reflection led to the eventual insanity and the death of Nietzsche. We have mentioned previously another type of battle to do with self-reflection; that of the subject-object. Jaspers made a distinction between "Truth-Objectivity" and "Truth-Subjectivity", and by this sought to relate the two opposing views. As the latter is a realisation of the former, and the former a crystallisation of the latter, he argued, you cannot have one without the other. Indeed, Jaspers united the two, which is what we would have expected from our previous references to the phenomenological method. The psychological aspect is still present with Jaspers, however, for by his analysis, self-reflection by the individual makes him realise his finiteness against Existenz and Transcendence, which is emphasized at the boundary situation of human knowledge, experience and endurance.

The significance of subjectivity for the establishing of the truth was also emphasised by Heidegger. Using the etymological approach we would have expected, he points out that "truth" is in Greek ἀλήθεια, which, having distinguished the alpha-privative, is ἀλήθεια, which means "that which is unveiled, unhidden". Truth, then, is something which I as an individual discover and appropriate by personal self reflection. Thus, as with Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Jaspers, truth for Heidegger is subjective, or at least must be accepted as such. Connected with this are Heidegger's two key concepts of the understanding and the pre-understanding. Understanding, being of the truth, would be subjectively ascertained, as we have just seen. However, pre-understanding (prior understanding) refers to those personal, subjective, presuppositions any individual
necessarily brings to bear on his understanding as such. This pre-understanding is the result of self-reflection, and both are deemed natural and right by Heidegger in order to interpret the world, i.e., understand it, at all.

(b) The Individual and Others

Kierkegaard, the father of modern existentialist philosophy, developed his individualism mostly as a reaction against the Hegelian system which denied the place and potential of the individual. It has also been noted that the etymological meaning of the term "to exist" and "existential" is "to stand out", "to stand apart from". However, this is only the semantic source of existentialist individualism; we must now emphasise that this individualism is possible only given that there is society, the world, against which an individual may assert himself. Thus existentialism broadly holds the ideal of individual human existence in contradistinction from mere social existence. Each existentialist has his own version of that ideal, as we shall see shortly, but possibly underlying that ideal is the often unquestioned assumption that individuals preceded society historically, that individuals only later formed society, so that individualism is therefore justified. That assumption may or may not be actually correct (and many anthropologists challenge it today), but we cannot discuss this point further here.

(i) The Individual

As we have seen already, it was largely on ethical grounds that Kierkegaard and Nietzsche promoted the status of the individual. Common observation was - and is - sufficient in order to discern the difference between public and private morality. The individual has
his own personal moral standards and reputation (which the individual would want to rank high) to maintain whilst he lives - and is seen to live - as an individual. But the crowd, the public, does not - indeed, cannot - have such moral standards. The result is that the individual tends to let his behaviour decline when he is part of the crowd. Whereas Kierkegaard's existentialist call to individualism then is a call to the individual either to maintain his private morality in public places, or to withdraw from the public altogether, Nietzsche rather calls on the individual to impress his superior ethic on the public.

Another aspect of the individual is that of choice and freedom. But this apparent freedom of the individual is deceptive, for as Jaspers pointed out, it is somewhat limited. His observation that "I am autonomous but not self-sufficient" asserts the status of the existential individual, but adds, almost with some regret, that this status does not carry with it the independence that the individual would like.

We can go further into the existentialist view of the relationship of the individual to society by looking at Heidegger, whose ethical views are similar to those of Kierkegaard outlined above. Heidegger, well known for his criticism of society, nevertheless never forgets that the individual can exist only with society there. His view of the relationship under discussion is always balanced:- man is "being-with-others" and "being-in-the-world". Indeed, all this is included in what Heidegger calls our "facticity"; that is, the facts of our present situation. The relationship of the individual to society and the world is characterised by "Care" (or "Concern"), which has three factors: facticity, possibility, and
fallenness. Possibility is what lies open to us in our facticity. Fallenness, a rather different type of category, denotes the succumbing of the individual to society and the world. Besides this practical concept of "Concern", Heidegger sees the world in practical terms in relation to the individual; the world and its contents are "being-ready-to-hand". This is the everyday world, seen in human terms and utilitarian values.

This view that the individual, although he must assert himself and stand out from the crowd, must also live in relationship to society existentially, is expounded by Tillich. Alongside the "self-affirmation" of the individual, there must be "the courage to participate" in society, which is the "courage to be - in spite of non-being". Clearly, with this view we have moved away from Kierkegaard's solitary individual to a more balanced social individual, but in all these views we notice the existentialist preoccupation with the status of the individual.

(ii) Society

We must now look at the generally derogatory views the existentialists have of society. For the most part, they regard society and the world as amorphous bodies which impinge on the freedom, ethic, and personality of the individual.

It was for a lack of moral propriety that Kierkegaard and Nietzsche especially attacked society. This attack may well be justified in terms of the responsible individual, as well as justified against the nineteenth century European background. However, it is only right to notice that society can impose an ethic which raises the moral standards of many individuals; e.g. by laws against petty theft,
assault, and bribery. Nevertheless, as a warning against, and a condemnation of, the crowd mentality, this existentialist theme is justified. Of more doubtful justification — though not without it — is Nietzsche's advocacy of an "elite" which should rise supreme above society and govern it, imposing its superior ethic.

Kierkegaard and Nietzsche had little respect for society as a whole. Kierkegaard referred to Aristotle's "Multitude", and called society the "crowd" and the "public" in contradistinction to the individual and the personal. Nietzsche called society the "herd", and condemned its mediocrity, lack of initiative and self-respect. But this rough treatment of society was ameliorated by Jaspers, who, although he called it the "mass" and the "public", did not condemn it out of hand. His view of the mass of people was not so much derogatory as just simply patronising; the individual would be the salvation of society.\(^{28}\) He appears almost sad for the human prospect: "All ideals of man are impossible, because man's potentialities are finite. There can be no perfect man."\(^{29}\) Men are obviously not equal.

The other main existentialist criticism of society is that it is amorphous, nebulous, insidious, pervasive in influence and power; and, because of all this, is difficult to pin down and repel effectively. Heidegger attacks the anonymous powers of others, whom he called "Das Man".\(^{30}\) He notes that in our common parlance we speak of "they"; how "they" say and do things which impinge on the individual, who himself is unable to identify or control these forces, be they people or systems. The world is a snare for the individual, who is enticed into its amorphous impersonalisation and systematisation: i.e., inauthentic existence. Heidegger's existentialism is a warning to all about
society and the world, and a call to the individual to rise above it all and not be dragged down into it, and so lose his personal identity. Heidegger described society and this inauthentic existence of the subservient person in relation to the world in terms of idle chatter (rather than useful discourse), curiosity (rather than study), and ambiguity (rather than clarification). Society has of itself no standards for which to aim or maintain. 

**ADDENDUM - ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS**

**Authentic Existence: Personal aspects.** We have seen that knowledge, understanding, truth, experience, responsibility, and freedom are all personal and subjective in character. At least, this would be so for the individual who was living and authentic existence, i.e., who truly stands out and asserts his status. Secondly, we saw that this individualism and subjectivity can take different forms and emphases. Thus Kierkegaard thought nothing of himself, but even less of the public, so that at the end of the day he could never be arrogant, only humble. Not so with Nietzsche, who, being more consistent on this matter, claimed personal superiority over others because to his mind he was just being honest; for him, his ethic and intellect were superior, and this position he asserted in true existentialist style, with relish. Thirdly, there is the essential personality, privacy, and loneliness of the existent individual. This is inevitable when the existentialist purports to stand out and assert himself; he does inevitably become - or try to become - independent of others. Thus it is true to say - as did Kierkegaard, with his theory of "indirect communication" - that one can never really know another person, because there is always that private, lonely part which cannot be disclosed, and if it were, it would not be understood properly, e.g.,
secrets, emotions, and prejudices. Fourthly, there is the existentialist picture of the individual standing alone, not, here, against society, but against what one can only call "life itself". But just what is this enigmatic life-force? For Kierkegaard it was God; for Nietzsche it was an amalgam of the Abyss, Nothingness, or just Life; for Jaspers it was divine Transcendenz and Existenz; whilst for Heidegger it is, paradoxically, alternately Being or Nothing. All this, of course, has ethical implications, for it is important on both a philosophical and religious level that even so called nihilists and atheists still recognise that man is faced with an ultimate, on which life depends, before whom he stands and to whom he is answerable.

Problems of Authentic Existence: Practical Aspects. From the above brief review, it can be seen that certain personal practical problems of authentic existence arise for the individual. Kierkegaard, for example, noted that life does not proceed in an orderly progress, but rather in a series of disjointed events, which may be experienced as discontinuous "leaps". Life is essentially risky. The first of the existentialist problems is possibility, which for the individual presents the problems of choice and responsibility. Secondly there is contingency in life, which presents the problems of risk and uncertainty. Thirdly there is dilemma, which demands - frustratingly - decisions. Fourthly there is tension, which, because it is such a perennial existential problem, can be regarded only in terms of paradox, since these tensions cannot be resolved. Fifthly, there arise with a personal care in the world, and with others, the problems of the feelings of despair, failure, guilt, and "Angst". Finally, there is the problem of the self in its solitude, an introspective relationship which becomes so loathsome to even the most conceited individual.
These personal problems are important, especially for the existentialist. The whole philosophy of existentialism is based on a discourse on personal feelings and experiences. We might add that the "failure" of existentialism to provide solutions to these problems is not only in the best tradition of philosophy but serves to emphasise the basically descriptive and analytic character of existentialism. (Both Bultmann and Tillich re-emphasise this very point). The validity and usefulness of existentialism depends on the quality and accuracy of its description and analysis of the human situation, together with its pointers towards new possibilities and ethics.

**Inauthentic Existence: Ethics.** By way of providing a corollary to the foregoing, we must notice that whereas authentic existence was conceived in terms of both individualism (in contra-distinction to society) and personal ethics, inauthentic existence is seen mostly in terms of ethics alone. Thus Kierkegaard said that it is wrong and bad to regard the public morality as objective. In fact the public ethic is bad in itself, and an individual would be wrong to participate in it. The individual retains his authenticity by his independence and becomes inauthentic when he succumbs to this public ethic. Nietzsche, as we have seen, said something very similar in effect with his concept of the morality of slaves. This morality is of the submissive public, the herd. The individual, to assert his authentic self, his authentic existence, must rise above this morality - and mentality - of slaves, reject it, and adopt the stance of the mentality and morality of the masters, the lofty individual, and the elite. Heidegger, following Kierkegaard, also described inauthentic existence in terms of "Everydayness", irresoluteness, and loss of personal
identity and status, and deliberate forgetfulness, which is dishonesty with oneself. Inauthentic existence is the one thing which existentialists primarily warn us against, for it represents the demise of the individual.

Existentialia

(a) Existentialism and Ontology

As we have seen earlier in this chapter, existentialism is an aspect of ontology. We shall now see that a set of ontological categories dealing with existence may be formulated, giving rise to a peculiar existentialist terminology and vocabulary which is sometimes known as "existentialia". Ontology has been defined as the philosophy or discourse on "being" itself as such; the study of what existence itself is, considered apart from any question as to the nature of any particular existent. It is the attempt to discover the fundamental categories of all being. Of ontological categories, Tillich says

It is not the function of these concepts to describe the ontological nature of reality in terms of the subjective or the objective side of our ordinary experience. It is the function of an ontological concept to use some realm of experience to point to characteristics of being-itself which lie above the split between subjectivity and objectivity...

It is fitting that Tillich says this with reference to Nietzsche, because we can see the close connection between what Tillich said here and what we said earlier about the "philosophies of life" which so attracted Nietzsche. In a different place and context, Tillich distinguished four levels of ontological concepts. The first is the ontological structure of subject-object which is the implicit condition of the ontological question. The second level examines the elements which constitute the ontological structure of being (as compared with
the concepts of the elements). The third level of ontological concepts expresses the power of being to exist and the difference between essential and existential being. The fourth level deals with those concepts which traditionally have been called categories, that is, the basic forms of thought and being.

It is in these last two levels of ontological concepts especially that we find an inter-relation with existentialist concepts, because it is in these levels - which Heidegger calls "existentialia" and Jaspers calls "existenzen" - that we are dealing with an analysis of human life and experience. It is possible to produce a vocabulary or glossary of such existentialist-ontological concepts as used by existentialist philosophers. These concepts refer to human experiences, to human feelings, and to the reactions of the individual to himself, other people, and the world. Thus whilst ontologies categorise factors of being, existentialism describes those factors in terms of human experiences. This distinction is not just one of detail but also of method; whereas ontology is a branch of philosophical theory, existentialism is more a description of human experiences. Ontological categories are either to be analysed and tested existentially, or to be derived from a philosophy of existentialist description and analysis. In either case the interrelationship is close, but ultimately the validity of ontology must be tested by existentialism. We shall now look at some major ontological-existential concepts, for it will be in such terms that Bultmann and Tillich will be seen to describe "faith" in existentialist themes.

(b) **Basic Existentialia**

(i) **Being and Nothing.**

For ontology, on the one hand, the concepts of "Being" and
"Nothing" are purely theoretical. Ontological discourse is thus able to range into their logical status. Aristotelians distinguished real being from conceptual being. All negative entities came in the realm of conceptual being because no empirical test is possible. On the other hand, existentialists, especially Heidegger, claim that Being and Nothingness can be experienced, as both are in fact real entities of a sort. Being is realised and experienced by individual beings. This is not Platonic metaphysics but an acknowledgment that all beings owe their existence to the fact and vitality of Being. Nothingness is more obviously experienced. Existentialists may employ their technical word "angst", but it is also experienced in terms of emptiness, boredom, apathy, lack of purpose, and basically the psychological perception that there is really Nothingness in the future because there is no being there yet, and that even the present world would be - and actually is - Nothing if man did not give it the significance he does. His very failure to live up to this responsibility also makes for the reality of the experience of Nothingness for many people today.

For Kierkegaard, Being is the "Wholly Other", which though it attracts us, it is basically elusive. Jaspers distinguished, formally, Being as object, Being as subject, and Being in itself, but as his whole existentialist ontology is rather complex, we will discuss it later in our next chapter. For Heidegger, "Sein" (Being as such) and "Dasein" (Being-there; human being) are not just inter-related (the first represents ontology, the second existentialism, in Heidegger's "Ontic-Ontological" distinction), but are inter-dependent. In his existential analysis of Being, Heidegger also distinguishes things which exist as part of the world inanimate or undeveloped by
man, from things which are moulded by man for his use, as well as many other modes of being, which will also be discussed later in the next chapter. We may note here, though, that for Heidegger Being has the character almost of the divine, which reveals itself by its absence.

As for Nothingness, most existentialists experience and describe it by the term "angst", which, however, has different connotations for different philosophers of existence, as we shall see below. Of "Nothingness" itself ontologically, Heidegger speaks in existentialist terms of finitude, death and guilt. Nothingness is not the result of negation, rather, according to Heidegger, we can negate only because Nothingness makes it possible. By contrast, Nietzsche, having spoken of the death of God, declared "Do we not now wander through an endless Nothingness?" Nietzsche, although regarding life in nihilistic terms, was exhilarated by the challenge now before men, especially in regard to the transvaluation of all values.

(ii) Freedom, Possibility and Projection.

These metaphysical-ontological categories also rest on existential experience, as we will now show.

Kierkegaard formulated his doctrine of individual human freedom against the Hegelian system which denied it. For Kierkegaard, freedom is man's greatness and his grandeur. On the other hand, as a Christian, Kierkegaard felt obliged to speak of grace as God working on and through this freedom. But in the last resort, with or without the grace of God, man is responsible for his use, delegation, or misuse, of his own freedom. For Nietzsche, man became free as soon as he realised that God was dead - but this new found freedom brings
aweful responsibilities and a void which few men can equal. For Jaspers, man has freedom because Transcendence is concealed. (Jaspers' doctrine here could be regarded as the believer's answer or corrective to Nietzsche). If Transcendence were revealed to us directly, says Jaspers, it would dominate us morally and effectively, so we would not be free. Jaspers makes four points here. First, human freedom vanished as divine Transcendence appears, so that eventually we are compelled to do the right. Secondly, this "non-choice" is superior in effect to choice as such because the decision and result is that of Transcendence. Thirdly, our freedom is limited by our situation, being "consigned" to myself and my world and my apprehension of Transcendence; i.e. freedom is always in relation to something else which makes this point more existential than ontological. Finally, there is Jaspers' doctrine of "repetition", the concept that I must take personal responsibility for my freedom myself. For Heidegger, freedom is ultimately an illusion, for our freedom and its possibilities are limited by facticity, and our lives by death. On the other hand, we do have some freedom, and this should be exercised with "resolute decision".

Following on from freedom is the concept of possibility. One of Kierkegaard's complaints against Hegel was that his system left no room for possibility; and that simply this is not true to life. In fact every man is continually faced with all sorts of possibilities, of which some are progressive and others are regressive. Jaspers often spoke of "possible existence", meaning that existence is not ready made but is always about to be. Heidegger introduced the experiential limiting fact to possibility, that of what he called "facticity". All our possibilities are possible only within the limits of the circumstances. Heidegger has been accused of not allowing
for such limiting factors on possibility, but in fact... he urges that the individual should assert himself over and against what would otherwise limit his possibilities.\(^3\)

Connected with possibility is the concept of projection, developed mostly by Heidegger. According to him, "projection" is a synonym for "ex-sist"; the individual should assert himself—almost as an extrovert—and proceed in self-confidence and determination. For Heidegger, projection of oneself is a resolute acceptance of one's "thrown-ness" into the world, and a bold taking up of those possibilities laid open before one.\(^4\) Discussing projection, we can see that the existential interpretation is in terms of psychology rather than ontology. Existential analysis recognised incapacity, impossibility, and failure, as aspects of projection and its working out, and it is in such experiences that we will see Bultmann and Tillich couch their discussion of faith in existentialist themes.

(iii) **Finitude and Death.**

These categories, commonly taken for granted, are taken seriously by most existentialists.

For Jaspers, finitude is realised in two ways. One is when we come up against, or simply acknowledge, Transcendence. It may be that man meets Transcendence and so admits his own finitude, or it may be that man realises his own finitude and recognised Transcendence beyond it. The first is more religious, the second more reflective, even philosophical, but either way, the fact is man is finite. The other way man recognises his finitude is in "limit situations". These are moments or periods of personal crisis when the individual has reached his limits, or the boundary, of his experiences; his ultimate possibility. Here, in this extreme situation, he realises that he is
finite and acknowledges the infinitude of Transcendence over his imminent situation. For Heidegger, man's finitude is a basic existential concept. Man is "thrown" into the world, and to that extent is neither master of himself nor of his situation. That alone is evidence of his finitude, whilst his consequent attitude to the world - "Care" - also implies this. Care is composed of facticity, possibility, and falling. Our facticity is our situation in which we are limited, and which also limits our possibilities. Falling is what happens when an individual fails to exist, stand out, take advantage of his possibilities, and descends to the level of the world. We cannot escape our finitude.

It has often been said that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to give an existentialist analysis of death. As Heidegger admitted, death is such a personal thing; the only death I can really know is my own when it happens to me. Human experience is "being-towards-death". Man must live in full and constant awareness of his death. Death, for Heidegger, is the ultimate possibility, but still paradoxically a possibility, because man can either seize this possibility positively or shy away from it negatively. Death is part of life, but is loss of being. So unless we know about death we cannot speak of "life after death". In all this, Heidegger is not a nihilist because of his positive approach to death, for he wants to provide a realistic perspective to life, and also provide a clue to the meaning of life (i.e., "being").

The point about existentialist interpretation of finitude and death is that psychologically and philosophically these factors should affect people's lives. They enforce the essential loneliness, or
individualism, of men which the existentialists characteristically emphasise, and should influence people's conduct whilst they are alive. This will affect any existentialist interpretation of faith.

(iv) "Angst"

Resulting from the common existentialist attitude to society and the world, there are the existentialist concepts of estrangement and "Angst". The feeling of estrangement is due partly to individualism, and partly to adverse views of the world and society. Existentialism is a call to the individual to stand apart from the world and society, the implication being that the individual can do better for himself by so doing. Clearly, the existentialist feeling of estrangement from the world and society naturally soon follows. In its ontological form, this estrangement is linked with the existentialist concept of "Angst". In this context, "Angst" arises as the individual reflects on his own being and the world, in face of the possibility of non-being, i.e., nothingness, and death. This "Angst" is a general anxiety, uneasiness, apprehension, which is experienced mentally and spiritually. Unlike fear, from which it is distinguished, "Angst" is not directed at a particular object. Fear can be assuaged by dealing with its object, but this is not possible with "Angst" as it is a general feeling of anxiety and not a specific fear.

Kierkegaard's views on "Angst" are set out in his book translated 'The Concept of Dread'. According to Kierkegaard, "Angst" is due partly to choice, which gives rise to temptation and the possibility of error. Connected with this, "Angst" is also partly due to the basic ambiguity of life, when one becomes anxious about contingencies and the uncertainty of the future - and indeed, also of
the present. "Angst" is also partly due to the elusiveness of Being. The way in which "Angst" is experienced is described by Kierkegaard as "giddiness". This concept is meant to convey the psychological whirlwind and pressures "Angst" exerts and to show that it is active and not passive. This, of course, means that there is an objective reality to "Angst" (though it is not a thing, but an experience) in life. "Angst" is experienced in face of many things, and coming to terms with "Angst" is regarded as disciplinary.\(^{47}\)

Nietzsche described "Angst" as the abyss which faces the individual. But instead of speaking of anxiety, he spoke of facing it with courage which overcomes fear with pride by grasping the abyss.\(^{48}\) His philosophy of life did not deny "Angst", but challenged it with a view to overcoming it. By contrast, Jaspers described the individual as "surrounded", "captivated", "hemmed in"; this is the power and influence of "Angst"; it is insidious and pervasive. "Angst" is also the ontological choice between Being and Non-Being (Nothingness). Jaspers distinguished "vital dread" from "existential dread". Vital dread is about life, whereas existential dread is about our existence, the experience of being in limit (boundary) situations. Jaspers also spoke of the giddiness of dread, but that man must triumph over this dread. He must have the courage, in a world without guarantees, to live on and by the values that he creates for himself—a doctrine which was anticipated by Nietzsche.\(^{49}\)

Heidegger attached great significance to "Angst" although he was quite prepared to describe it in terms of human feelings such as boredom or nervousness. "Angst", he says, is inspired by the recognition of what it means to be a "being-in-the-world", with its frustrated possibilities, and, of course, the ultimate unavoidable
possibility, death. "Angst" is also over whether one can have authentic existence or not. Most people never face up to "Angst", says Heidegger, so never make ultimate existentialist decisions, and thus remain lost in the inauthentic life of "Das Man". "Angst" is also the real sense of the experience of Nothing, because "Angst" removes all the props to this life, and by so doing, also emphasises the existential, even lonely, place of the individual.  

Conclusions

The object of this chapter is to describe the general nature and character of existentialist philosophy, in order to see what would make for an existentialist interpretation of anything. Having realised the variety of ideas contained within the philosophy of existentialism, it can be seen that there are two major themes of existentialism; the place of the individual, and existentialia (the feelings and the experiences of the individual). These two broad themes will be used as a framework for our review of Bultmann's and Tillich's discussion of "faith", and will serve to identify general existentialism in their thought. Within these two broad existentialist themes, subsidiary themes have been seen, where there was a limited amount of agreement amongst the four existentialists discussed. Their thinking, as described, does however reflect the general nature and character of existentialism, and reference will be made in later chapters to these subsidiary existentialist themes as they recur in the thought of Bultmann and Tillich on "faith".
CHAPTER ONE

FOOTNOTES

   Tillich *The Courage To Be* pp.5-6,39.
   Tillich *Systematic Theology, Vol.1* p.162.
   Husserl *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*


5. Husserl *Ideas*.


8. Roberts *Existentialism and Religious Belief* p.95.


10. Kierkegaard *Fear and Trembling* p.80; c.f. Kierkegaard
    *The Sickness Unto Death* p.142.


15. Heidegger *Being and Time* Part 1; Div.2; Sect.II.


18. Wahl *A Short History of Existentialism* pp.3-4.


20. Jaspers *Philosophy II* Part IV, Section 10. c.f. Part I,
    Section 2 on 'Self Reflection'.


23. Blackham *Six Existentialist Thinkers* p.59.

24. Heidegger *Being and Time* Division One.

25. Tillich *The Courage To Be* pp.81ff.


27. Nietzsche *Thus Spoke Zarathustra & Beyond Good and Evil*.


31. Heidegger *Being and Time* Division One, Sections IV & V.

32. Kierkegaard *Training in Christianity* pp. 136, 139, e.t.c.

33. Kierkegaard *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* pp. 86-97.

34. Heidegger *Being and Time* Division Two, Section IV.


37. Kierkegaard *The Concept of Dread* pp.96-8, 123ff.


41. Kierkegaard *The Concept of Dread* p.139ff.
   *The Sickness Unto Death* pp.168-175.

   *Philosophical Faith & Revelation* pp.234-237.
45. Jaspers *Philosophy III* Chapter One
47. Kierkegaard *The Concept of Dread* Chapters III & V.
48. Nietzsche *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* p.298.
Chapter Two

THE HERITAGE OF PARTICULAR EXISTENTIALISTS AND THEIR DOCTRINES

Having examined the general character of existentialist philosophy, and noting its broad themes, we now have to see the precise nature of Bultmann's and Tillich's indebtedness to existentialism, and also examine in some detail the relevant doctrines of those existentialists whom Bultmann and Tillich acknowledge.

BULTMANN

Introduction

Bultmann responded enthusiastically to the German translations of Kierkegaard in the 1920s, and studied these works keenly. About this same time he also read Nietzsche with interest. Bultmann also met existentialism in the person of Heidegger, who was a professor of philosophy at Marburg and published his Being and Time whilst Bultmann was a professor of theology there. These two men organised joint seminars at which Bultmann would have learned much of Heidegger's existentialism. Bultmann retained his high regard for this particular philosophy, although this regard was limited only to the early Heidegger he knew at Marburg. However, as we shall now see, Bultmann's view of existentialism was much wider, but in terms of historical perspective and influence on his work he has been accused, rightly, of losing sight of these other perspectives, and so unduly limiting himself to just one man's views in just his early stage of philosophical thought.

Existentialist Philosophers acknowledged by Bultmann

Bultmann makes regular, but brief, references and allusions to Kierkegaard. For him, Kierkegaard was a seminal influence not so
much directly but indirectly, for Kierkegaard was an important influence on Jaspers and Heidegger.¹

Bultmann's relationship with Jaspers has varied - and oscillated - from one of great respect to one of irritation.² What promised to have been a fruitful and clarifying dialogue degenerated over the years into an argument, mostly because their exchanges were really a confusion of issues. Jaspers expected Bultmann to be more philosophically orientated, whereas Bultmann expected Jaspers to be more sympathetic to the Christian evangelical task at hand. The overall influence as such of Jaspers on Bultmann is therefore minimal.³

The influence of Heidegger on Bultmann, however, is almost completely positive, and in many discussions with him Bultmann learned to appreciate the existentialist viewpoint.⁴ When Bultmann said that he sought to answer the question "How does the New Testament understand human existence?" he answered "... I seek to show the fruitfulness of the ontological analysis of Heidegger..." though, Bultmann claims, without being dependent on him.⁵ Existentialism, he says, is based on Christianity, and is therefore a valid way of interpreting faith and theology.⁶ For example, "... 'existence' must be the methodological starting point of theology, since the latter's theme is existence in faith..."⁷

General Acknowledgement of Existentialism by Bultmann

Bultmann's debt to existentialism is a fundamental feature of his theology. This is often noted by his critics, and is freely admitted by Bultmann himself. Clearly this raises the problem of the validity of allowing philosophy to influence theology.
Bultmann realises this, but declares "The theme of philosophy is unbelieving existence; that of theology is believing existence." The common theme is "existence"; the two disciplines are therefore talking about the same thing, Bultmann goes on to argue, but from different standpoints. Theology neither supplements nor corrects philosophical analysis, it is the interpretation which differs. Inasmuch as they correlate, Bultmann says, we have a "Natural Theology". In his famous 1941 Demythologising essay, this controversy, simmering for some years, reached a climax when Bultmann declared "... our task is to produce an existentialist interpretation of the dualistic mythology of the New Testament..." Bultmann observed that

Some critics have objected that I am borrowing Heidegger's categories and forcing them upon the New Testament. I am afraid this only shows that they are blinding their eyes to the real problem. I mean, one should rather be startled that philosophy is saying the same thing as the New Testament, and saying is quite independently.

Jaspers then accused Bultmann of virtually closing his eyes to other types of philosophy and metaphysics. Existentialism, especially as represented by Heidegger, Jaspers pointed out, is hardly representative of "philosophy" as a whole. However, Bultmann, in fact, makes it quite clear that whilst existentialism can give a correct analysis of man, and pinpoint the problems of his existence, it neither seeks nor offers any solutions. Existentialist philosophy may rightly analyse the plight of man, but it cannot provide the solution of redemption required which the Christian Gospel offers. Rather, it is faith and theology which alone can provide the correct solutions to man's existential predicament by declaring the gospel of salvation and reconciliation. This self-imposed limitation on the influence of existentialism in his thoughts (a limitation criticised by Jaspers
and his theological colleague Heinrich Ott\textsuperscript{13} should be recognised when discussing Bultmann's theology.

Thus for Bultmann, existentialism, the predominant influence on his theology, is only a means and not an end:

Existentialist philosophy, while it gives no answer to the question of my personal existence, makes personal existence my own personal responsibility, and by doing so it helps to make me open to the word of the Bible. ... existentialist philosophy can offer adequate conceptions for the interpretation of the Bible, since the interpretation of the Bible is concerned with the understanding of existence.\textsuperscript{14}

The content of mythology must therefore be seen to correspond to real human experiences spoken of by the existentialists. Faith in God is myth unless it is given an existentialist interpretation. Bultmann thus argues that although he has thereby regarded man and his situation or existence existentially without reference to God, this is right because...

... it is grounded in the existential insight that the idea of God is not at our disposal when we construct a theory of man's existence. ... I cannot find God by looking at or into myself.\textsuperscript{15}

Bultmann thus still retains the concept of revelation, its offence and its crisis, as the answer to the problems of man analysed by existentialism.

TILLICH

Introduction

Intelliectually, the major influence on Tillich was Schelling, on whom he did his early research work (Ph.D. and L.Th. dissertations).\textsuperscript{16} But there were other influences, such as Nietzsche, whom Tillich found challenging and exhilarating, and also depth psychology, which he found easy to place alongside general existential analysis.\textsuperscript{17}

Tillich was always a philosopher as well as a theologian. His
philosophical expertise may well have played a part in his cautious approach to existentialism, (and Heidegger in particular), - a factor which was lacking in Bultmann.

Existentialist Philosophers acknowledged by Tillich

Perhaps it is because of Tillich's interest in the history of religious and philosophical thought that not only are more existentialists acknowledged, but also their influence is more evident. Besides some references to Pascal, whom Tillich regarded as the one characteristic precursor to existentialism, 18 Tillich also mentioned Lessing, Marx, Hamann, and Holderlin.

Tillich's greatest interest, however, was in Schelling, and he was greatly influenced by him. His close affinity to Schelling is extremely important for our purposes, because Schelling fell between the two stools of essentialism and existentialism. Whereas on the one hand Schelling was critical of Hegel, on the other hand Kierkegaard was disappointed that Schelling's criticism did not go far enough. Tillich himself always had a high regard for all three thinkers, and this balance of sympathies has resultantly qualified his sympathy for existentialism. He regarded Schelling's criticism of Hegel to be decisive for existentialism, 19 especially in its influence on Kierkegaard. 20 Tillich described the doctrines of Schelling in some detail; 21 pertinent points would include his rooting philosophy in life, his asking of philosophical questions, followed by offers of religious answers, and he taught all this in his lectures, some of which Kierkegaard attended. Tillich acknowledged that Schelling influenced him greatly in formulating Christian doctrine, and enabled him to accept existentialism later. 22
Tillich naturally acknowledges the place of Kierkegaard in the history and development of existentialism, and of his own interest in the subject. The actual heritage of Kierkegaard, Tillich noted, was first his criticism of Hegel, second his views on ethical existence and the human situation (anxiety, despair), third the nature of faith as leap and existential truth, and finally, his criticism of theology and the church.

The influence of Nietzsche on Tillich has often been underestimated. Tillich not only accords Nietzsche a place in the development of existentialism, but he refers to Nietzsche often with undisguised enthusiasm. This influence came to the fore in his The Courage to Be, where Tillich not only develops a key concept of Nietzsche, but makes explicit and positive references to him. It was in fact Tillich's personal opinion that "Christian theologians can learn very much from him."

Tillich made little reference to Jaspers, and did not claim to have been influenced at all by him. However, there are striking similarities in their thought, which we shall examine later. At this point, we may mention just three areas of similarity; their moderate but not excessive existentialism (including their common use of the term "boundary situation"), which still retains a place for existentialism; their willingness not to be restricted by the Bible in terms of expounding Christianity and religion in general; and their transcendent concept of God with all its attendant vocabulary.

Tillich's references to Heidegger are comparatively limited. He naturally acknowledged Heidegger's place in the development of existentialism, but he was wary of Heidegger's influence on him:
It took years before I became fully aware of the impact of this encounter on my own thinking. I resisted, I tried to learn, I accepted the way of thinking more than the answers it gave.\(^{30}\) We shall see, therefore, that the influence of Heidegger on Tillich is minimal.

From this brief survey, it can be seen that Tillich is influenced more by nineteenth century existentialist thought than by that of the twentieth century. Yet it has been argued, by his production of an existentialist systematic theology, Tillich alienated himself from the spirit of Kierkegaard.\(^{31}\) This clearly raises problems regarding the nature of Tillich's existentialism, and this will now be examined in more detail.

**General Acknowledgement of Existentialism by Tillich.**

Tillich's meeting with existentialism was gradual rather than sudden, as was the case with Bultmann. The background to Tillich's existentialism is wider than that of Bultmann inasmuch as it extends to literature as well as religious and philosophical thought. For example, he cites *Hamlet*; "My instinctive sympathy today for what is called existentialism goes back in part to an existential understanding of this great work of literature."\(^{32}\) The philosophical background, as we have seen already, is to be found in Schelling, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche. Also, Tillich said that he could see existentialism in the Pauline description of man's estrangement.\(^{33}\) We should, however, be very careful in speaking of Tillich's existentialism in view of his own cautious estimate of it:— "Often I have been asked if I am an existentialist theologian, and my answer is always short. I say, fifty-fifty. This means that, for me, essentialism and existentialism belong together."\(^{34}\)
Tillich, seems to have thought it inevitable for a theologian to be sympathetic to existentialism. The existential thinker must have passion and interest, he observed; "The thinking of the Existentialist Thinker is based on his immediate personal experience." But, all this must apply to the theologian too: "The attitude of the theologian is 'existential'... The theologian, in short, is determined by his faith." Tillich was speaking of himself as well when he said of the theologian:-

Being inside the circle, he must have made an existential decision; he must be in the situation of faith.... Every theologian is committed and alienated; he is always in faith and in doubt; he is inside and outside the theological circle.

The theologian "... acknowledges the content of the theological circle as his ultimate concern.... it does not depend on the intensity and certitude of faith..." Tillich also describes his existentialism in terms of another spatial metaphor - the "boundary" or "limit" situation; a term possibly derived from Jaspers' General Psychopathology (1913).

Tillich has been unusually clear about his understanding of what existentialism is - but it is very broad. "Existentialism gives and analysis of what is means to exist", he said, using "to exist" in the technical sense of the word we noted the existentialists implied in Chapter One. Existentialism "... looks at man in his predicament of time and space, and sees the conflict between what exists in time and space and what is essentially given."

Like Bultmann, Tillich distinguished between the problems which existential analysis of man raise, and the answers which only faith and theology can provide. Thus "Existential philosophy asks
in a new and radical way the question whose answer is given to faith in theology.\textsuperscript{43} Theology must use existential analysis, but then provide Christian answers.\textsuperscript{44} Of himself, Tillich has said "As a clergymen and theologian, I cannot be anything other than a layman and philosopher who has tried to say something about the limits of human existence."\textsuperscript{45} On the other hand he declared "nevertheless I was and am a theologian, because the existential question of our ultimate concern and the existential answer of the Christian message are and always have been predominant in my spiritual life."\textsuperscript{46} Theology and philosophy share a common concern for Being,\textsuperscript{47} for the existential analysis of man is identical with that of Christianity:— the essential goodness of creation, the fall, and potential salvation.\textsuperscript{48}

**KIERKEGAARD**

Briefly, the philosophical background of Kierkegaard may be said to be a revolt against the prevailing Hegelian essentialist system, and an early enthusiasm, (which was later deflated) for Schelling, who also attacked Hegel, but not hard enough for Kierkegaard. His philosophical hero and model was Socrates; first because of his method of persistent questioning, and second because Socrates lived out his philosophy, and did not separate philosophy from life. Kierkegaard's existentialism is thus a philosophy of personal experience, which in his particular case, was couched in a particular Christian setting.

Underlying the philosophical tenets of Kierkegaard's existentialism is his declaration "Logical system possible; Existential system impossible."\textsuperscript{49} This was not just an attack on the Hegelian system, but a demonstration of the impossibility of tying down and systematising the existent individual and his
existentialia (to use our phrases). For Kierkegaard, existentialism describes the ups and downs of life, its variety of experiences and emotions, all of which change with the moods and circumstances of the individual; how then can these be systematically set out? Life itself cannot bear this, for only an existing individual could possibly write a system: "But a philosophy of pure thought is for an existing individual a chimera, if the truth that is sought is something to exist in. To exist under the guidance of pure thought is ... impossible." 50

When Kierkegaard comes to describe life, then, we find not a logical system but a complex picture of process (in contradistinction to the static nature of the Hegelian- and logical - system). For example, he never speaks of someone being a Christian, but rather always of someone becoming a Christian.

My idea is that if Christianity is the highest good, it is better for me to know definitely that I do not possess it, so that I may put forth every effort to acquire it; rather than that I should imagine that I have it, deluding myself, so that it does not even occur to me to seek it. 51

The emphasis here is on the fact of development in the faith; development which would work itself out in terms of conduct, the living in freedom, and the striving towards a realisation of the ideal.

Such development in life Kierkegaard described in terms of three spheres of existence: the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious. By a "sphere" or "stage" of life, he meant the outlook and conduct, i.e., the general attitude, of the individual towards life. The aesthetic sphere of life is basically secular and natural, with ordinary human motives and goals within their human limitations; in short it is bondage to the world. The ethical
sphere of life is experienced when moral principles are brought to bear on outlook and conduct. Standards of behaviour are introduced, which raise life and its values above that of the aesthetic stage, although the world is still the context of life. The third sphere of existence is the religious stage of life. This lifts the outlook of the individual above and beyond the limitations of this world giving him wider perspectives with duly corrected values. Such is the qualitative difference between these stages of life (or spheres of existence), there can be no smooth transition between them but only a "leap" from one to another. The nature of this decisive act, however, we will look at in greater detail below, because it forms part of Kierkegaard's description of the nature and character of faith. We may note at this point, though, that this general idea implies the strivings and struggles in life and faith; another instance of the fluidity of existence for which Hegel's system refused to allow.

In connection with this last main point in Kierkegaard's concept of time, which revolves round his twin themes of "the Instant" and "contemporariness with Christ". The Instant is a moment in eternity, not a moment in time, in that this moment is of eternal significance. Collins put it in this way, that the act of faith "... occurs in the Instant, a kind of synthesis of time and eternity, in which the believer is rendered contemporaneous with Christ." This concept of contemporaneity is a good instance of Kierkegaard's existentialism, for, as a description of the state of the believer, it emphasises the closeness of the believer to the object of belief, and so picturesquely portrays the degree of involvement and passion of this individual believer, which thereby
tends to dissolve the normal distinction between subject and object.

From this dynamic view of existence and time, we can see how Kierkegaard placed such stress on the concept of possibility:—

"Possibility means I can." Possibility thus arises because of the freedom enjoyed by the individual. However, this freedom and its attendant possibilities raise such a plethora of decisions and responsibilities that the individual is overcome by a general sense of dread:

In a logical system it is convenient enough to say that possibility passes over into actuality. In reality it is not so easy, and an intermediate determinant is necessary. This intermediate determinant is dread, a determinant of ... trammeled freedom ...

How is the dread raised by freedom and possibility to be overcome? Kierkegaard is clear that these challenges must be seized and wrestled with, and that they can be overcome only by faith:—

But in order that the individual may thus absolutely and infinitely be educated by possibility, he must be honest towards possibility, and must have faith. By faith I mean what Hegel in his fashion calls very rightly 'the inward certainty which anticipates infinity.' When the discoveries of possibility are honestly administered, possibility will then disclose all finitudes and idealise them in the form of infinity in the individual who is overwhelmed by dread, until in turn he is victorious by the anticipation of his faith.

Faith is thus seen to be personal conviction which faces the unknown and triumphs over all possible trials and circumstances.

Although we have already previously glanced at Kierkegaard's concept of "angst" (variously translated as "dread" "anxiety", etc.) we must now look at it in more detail, for it is the fundamental
emotion and experience which he saw underlies human existence and
the life of the individual:- "If at the beginning of his education
he misunderstands the anguish of dread, so that it does not lead
him to faith but away from faith, then he is lost." Dread, for
Kierkegaard (and the other existentialists) is a peculiar thing:-

... it is different from fear and similar concepts
which refer to something definite, whereas dread
is freedom's reality as possibility for possibility...
Dread is a sympathetic antipathy and an antipathetic
sympathy."

In his Concept of Dread, Kierkegaard in fact inserts a religious
interpretation of dread in terms of sin, and expounds dread mostly in
this way. In a more philosophical vein, however, he saw dread in
terms of ontology, which is more characteristic of the existentialists.
His view of dread takes an even more sombre character in his later
work The Sickness unto Death, when he speaks in terms of despair.

Finally we come to Kierkegaard's concept of faith, which is
both detailed and complex. First there is the aspect of faith as
self-understanding, or as he put it "Faith is the immediacy after
reflection", for as we would expect with an existentialist, the
self-understanding of faith would not be a passive, uninvolved, non-
inspiring attitude of mind, but an action in life. The self-
understanding of faith includes a process of humbling oneself
under despair and an acceptance of despair in faith. Kierkegaard
thus says that his definition of faith is "By relating itself to its
own self and by willing to be itself, the self is grounded
transparently in the Power which constituted it." As we shall see,
faith exists in spite of our understanding, and in fact gives us a
new self-understanding.

Secondly, for Kierkegaard, faith is passion. Tillich himself
quotes Kierkegaard's "famous definition of truth" which Kierkegaard also said "is the definition of faith": "An object of uncertainty held fast in the most passionate and personal experience is the truth, the highest truth attainable for an existing individual." In fact, in a true existentialist style, Kierkegaard declares that passion is necessary for life anyway; "Every moment of infinity comes about by passion, and no reflection can bring a movement about." This is further emphasised with respect to faith: "Faith is a miracle, and yet no man is excluded from it; for that in which all human life is unified is passion, and faith is a passion." In fact Hegel had a doctrine of the passions, as did Kierkegaard; but whereas for Hegel the passions are deceptive and external to the individual, for Kierkegaard the passions are internal, expressive of, and external from, the individual: "A believer is one who is infinitely interested in another's reality. This is a decisive criterion for faith..." Clearly this makes Kierkegaard's description of faith as passion very typically existentialist.

Thirdly, we may note at this point that faith was also described by Kierkegaard in terms of "infinite resignation" i.e., renunciation; "In the infinite resignation there is peace and rest and comfort in sorrow - that is, if the movement is made normally." Just as he speaks of "the movements of faith", so Kierkegaard also speaks of "the movements of infinity". Its existentialist character is discernible immediately:

The infinite resignation is the last stage prior to faith, so that one who has not made this movement has not faith; for only in the infinite resignation do I become clear to myself with respect to my eternal validity, and only then can there be any question of grasping existence by virtue of faith.
Kierkegaard himself notes nevertheless that this infinite resignation of faith is still a positive act; it is not passive but active.

We have already mentioned the "leap" as the mode of transition between the stages of life as described by Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard got the term from Lessing\(^7^4\), and he used it to attack Hegel, saying "For the leap is neither more nor less than the most decisive protest possible against the inverse procedure of the Method."\(^7^5\) The leap, however, is also a mark of faith itself, and is often mentioned as such by Kierkegaard, but the movement also describes the qualitative leap into sin.\(^7^6\) The leap of faith is described in dramatic terms:

The dialectic of faith is the finest and most remarkable of all; it possesses an elevation, of which indeed I can form a conception, but nothing more. I am able to make from the spring board a great leap whereby I pass into infinity, my back is like that of a tight-rope dancer, having been twisted in my childhood, hence I find this easy; with a one-two-three!\(^7^7\)

Elsewhere, the leap of faith is described as a necessary, though brief, act of the individual, when proofs are left behind, and faith comes into its own.\(^7^8\)

The fifth aspect of faith as described by Kierkegaard is risk, a very real risk in that in faith, as in the leap, there is no area of certainty towards which to aim.\(^7^9\)

Without risk there is no faith. Faith is precisely the contradiction between the infinite passion of the individual's inwardness and the objective uncertainty. If I am capable of grasping God objectively, I do not believe, but precisely because I cannot do this I must believe. If I wish to preserve myself in faith I must constantly be intent upon holding fast the objective uncertainty, so as to remain out upon the deep over seventy thousand fathoms of water, still preserving my faith.\(^8^0\)

Sitting quietly in a ship while the weather is calm is not a picture of faith; but when the
ship has sprung a leak, enthusiastically to keep the ship afloat by pumping while yet not seeking the harbor; this is the picture. And if the picture involves an impossibility in the long run, that is but the imperfection of the picture; faith assists. While the understanding, like a despairing passenger, stretches out its arms toward the shore, but in vain, faith works with all its energy in the depths of the soul; glad and victorious it saves the soul against the understanding.

Elsewhere, Kierkegaard comments "For without risk there is no faith, and the greater risk, the greater the faith..." Whilst we should beware of under-estimating the extent of the risk (and leap) of faith, it would be a misinterpretation of Kierkegaard's argument to protest that his description of the risk of faith makes faith foolhardy and irrational. Rather, it shows the fervour and non-rationality of faith, that in real life faith is not comfortable but challenging, not the result of passivity but the working out of inner tensions and conflicts; and interpretation realised only by existential experience and analysis.

This understanding of faith brings us to our sixth aspect of faith as expounded by Kierkegaard; that of the absurd and the paradox. Making an oblique reference, in fact, to his former fiancee Kierkegaard said that the knight of faith says 'I believe nevertheless that I shall get her, in virtue, that is, of the absurd, in virtue of the fact that with God all things are possible.' The absurd is not one of the factors which can be discriminated within the proper compass of the understanding: it is not identical with the improbable, the unexpected, the unforeseen.... the only thing that can save him is the absurd, and this he grasps by faith. So he recognises the impossibility, and that very instant he believes the absurd...

Kierkegaard saw further a "tremendous paradox", and indeed he stressed the existential necessity for paradox in life:

However, one should not think slightingly of the paradoxical; for the paradox is the source of the
thinker's passion, and the thinker without paradox is like the lover without feeling: a paltry mediocrity. And this same paradox characterises faith and "the Moment".

Finally, we must look at Kierkegaard's "Knight of Faith", which is so vividly portrayed in Fear and Trembling. This individual is a rare breed, and yet is an ordinary man... at least apparently ordinary for Kierkegaard wanted to stress that anyone could become a knight of faith if only he lived by faith. By his conduct, the knight of faith in fact

... has made and every instant is making the movements of infinity. With infinite resignation he has drained the cup of life's profound sadness, he knows the bliss of the infinite, he senses the pain of renouncing everything, the dearest things he possesses in the world... He resigned everything infinitely, and then he grasped everything again by virtue of the absurd. He constantly makes the movements of infinity, but he does this with such correctness and assurance that he constantly gets the finite out of it, and there is not a second when one has the notion of anything else.

Later, Kierkegaard emphasises the solitariness of the knight of faith, with its attendant feelings, experiences, responsibilities; he is "absolutely nothing but the individual, without connections or pretensions". The knight of faith, sums up and embodies all those aspects of faith we have found described by Kierkegaard; his character will be seen later to influence Bultmann's and Tillich's concept of the individual believer.

NIETZSCHE

Our review of Nietzsche will follow three main themes, first, his psychological concepts, second his social concepts, and finally his religious concepts. Again, we will restrict ourselves only to those doctrines relevant to Bultmann and Tillich.
Nietzsche's psychological concepts are threefold; the Apollo-Dionysian dichotomy, the will, and that of virtue and courage, which reflect the respective influences of Greek mythology, Schopenhauer, and the philosophies of life current in the nineteenth century.

Two points should be observed about Nietzsche's concept of Apollo-Dionysius; first is that these figures were interpreted - and also misinterpreted - by him, and represent outlooks on life; second is that the character of Dionysius as expounded by Nietzsche changes, the earlier Dionysius being the antithesis of Apollo, the later Dionysius being the synthesis of Apollo and the earlier Dionysius, and, in this hybrid form is the antithesis of Christ. In the earlier phase, as represented by The Birth of Tragedy, Apollo represents the traditional idea of Greek culture as beauty, art, harmony, and wisdom, whereas Dionysius represents the orgiastic drunkenness and abandon which arises from carefree living, but which results in a general threat to order and decency, and to impending destruction without discrimination. Nietzsche argued that both elements are required for the birth of tragedy, and in this early work he kept the two forces in balance, seeing the creative effect of the dichotomy in drama and life. This balance of power between the two forces forms the basis of the later hybrid Dionysius of 'Dionysius versus the Crucified'. Here Dionysius represents the rebirth of vitality, the re-affirmation of life, the sublimation of passion, that is, a fully mature - humanistic - man. It is this latter concept of Dionysius which Nietzsche extolled, and allied himself to, and its significance as a figure for emulation may be compared - and contrasted - with that of the knight of faith portrayed by Kierkegaard.

Man is motivated by the will to power; indeed, life is the
the will to power. Hollingdale comments "One has misunderstood Nietzsche completely unless one realises that he visualised the overcoming of the self as the most difficult of all tasks, as well as the most desirable; that he considered the will to power to be the only drive alive in man; that a strong will to power was needed for the hardest task..."\(^{90}\) This is illustrated by Nietzsche's observation that "Wherever the will to power declines in any form there is every time also a physiological regression, décadence."\(^{91}\)

The same critical approach is applied by Nietzsche to his concept of courage: "A very popular error; having the courage of one's convictions; rather it is a matter of having the courage for an attack on one's convictions!!!"\(^{92}\) Nietzsche presents this radical courage in this way:

> Do you possess courage, O my brothers? Are you stout-hearted? Not courage in the presence of witnesses, but hermits' and eagles' courage, which not even a god observes any more? I do not call cold-spirited, mulish, blind, or intoxicated men stout-hearted. He possesses heart who knows fear but masters fear; who sees the abyss, but sees it with pride. He who sees the abyss, but with an eagle's eyes - he who grasps the abyss with an eagle's claws: he possesses courage.\(^{93}\)

Here, then, is the courage that only the true existential individual could display.

We now turn to the social concepts of Nietzsche. We shall look first at his attack on society, and then we will look at his positive ideas; the concepts of the Higher Man, the Elite, and Superman.

In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Nietzsche presents a poor picture of society. In the famous section "Of the Rabble", he does not attempt to hide his disgust at society: "Life is a fountain of delight; but where the rabble also drinks all wells are poisoned."\(^{94}\)
Nietzsche's attack on society is closely linked with his attack on Christianity:

- At this point I shall not suppress a sigh. There are days when I am haunted by a feeling blacker than the blackest melancholy - contempt of man. And so as to leave no doubt as to what I despise, whom I despise: it is the man of today, the man with whom I am fatefully contemporary... be it called 'Christianity', 'Christian faith', 'Christian church'...95

Nevertheless, Nietzsche's critical and hard view of society is mitigated in his last works:- When the exceptional human being handles the mediocre more gently than he does himself and his equals, this is not mere politeness of the heart - it is simply his duty."96 Nietzsche urges man to rise above mediocrity.97 Nietzsche portrays "Superman" (more literally translated "Overman") conveying the emphasis in the concept which is "overcoming" - overcoming oneself and overcoming all others:- "I teach you the Superman. Man is something that should be overcome. What have you done to overcome him?"98 Man must overcome himself, rise above himself and his animal nature; it is a process and a struggle: "And life itself told me this secret: 'Behold', it said, 'I am that which must overcome itself again and again."99

We now come to the religious ideas and concepts of Nietzsche; these will be considered within two broad themes or sections, first his criticism of Christianity with its attendant consequences, second his positive views on faith.

For Jesus as a man, Nietzsche had great respect, for he was the only real Christian who has ever lived.100 "This 'Bringer of glad tidings' died as he lived, as he taught - not to 'redeem mankind' but to demonstrate how one ought to live."101 This popular theology of redemption was a revival of pre-Christian myths by Paul, what Nietzsche called "Ecclesiastical crudities", and is in fact what Jesus came to
counter in his personal teaching. On the other hand, Nietzsche had little respect for the teachings of Christ as such; his religio-ethical ideas promote a denigration of man as they take from him the glory of being an animal in nature with its rugged strength and beauty, and make man decadent; indeed, Christianity brought sin into the world through its preoccupation with it. Besides attacking Paul for deviating from Jesus, Nietzsche also attacked the church for emulating and expanding this false Pauline theology, and for not adhering strictly to the teachings of Jesus.

In his Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche makes his first mention of the distinction between the morality of the masters and the morality of the slaves. The master morality rises above the slaves, it creates the values which the slaves look up to, it is in control of the situation by disciplining the slaves who are subservient to the masters. From this we see the pride and self-respect of the masters in contrast to the poor humiliated slaves. These respective moralities are the outworkings of two respective mentalities; Nietzsche attacked Christianity for teaching a slave mentality and morality rather than a master mentality and morality. The doctrine of resentment arises out of the dichotomy between these two mentalities and their moralities, for whenever an individual realises that he has been forced into a slave situation he resents it.

The message that God is dead had many complex factors in the mind of Nietzsche. For example, at one point he says "'God is dead; God has died of his pity for man" whilst a little later he appears to have considered that in fact God never really existed:- "The spirit of their Redeemers consisted of holes; but into every hole they had put their illusion, their stop-gap, which they called God."
In a later work, Nietzsche saw unbelief in terms of maturity of thought, because the traditional view of God has not worked out in practice (e.g. as judge, rewarder), so people reject Theism. Nevertheless Nietzsche not only declared the death of God but also the death of the devil and hell; the over-riding emphasis is really on the autonomy of man who is now free of these extra-terrestrial interferences. In certain respects, Nietzsche's message that God is dead is true, and he was right to say so: in fact he attacked false concepts of God, and showed that more enlightened men had realised the falsity of these concepts; in this way he sums up most of the modern arguments against Theism and Christianity.

But for Nietzsche this was not an event or fact of no consequence; indeed, in the person of his Madman, Nietzsche actually experienced the death of God, and this experience - as a good existentialist - he relayed to man. For Nietzsche, the death of God was not a disaster but a relief and joy, and also an invigorating challenge. The relief and joy was in the sense of freedom, not just from the strictures of religion as such, but also from the puritanical ethic which Theism and Christianity imposed on man. The autonomy of man could once again be expressed. The invigorating challenge is that now that God is dead, the Christian ethic is discredited, and in their place stands a gaping nothingness, an abyss; man is seen to be the creator of values, and the great challenge is for man to rebuild his world humanistically and secularly. With the death of God, man is challenged to transvalue his previous values, that is, to create new values of his own. Revaluation, rather, is process of self-criticism, to see how much old morality is hypocrisy, dishonesty, and blatantly immoral as such by its own
standards. As Kaufmann puts it:

The revaluation culminates in the claim that the so-called goodness of modern man is not virtuous, that his so-called religion is not religious, and that his so-called truths are not truthful.\textsuperscript{109}

Finally, we come to Nietzsche's concept of faith. In The Anti-Christ, his basic view is that faith occurs because there is a weakness of will and a lack of intellectual enquiry. Thus Nietzsche declares

The pathos that develops out of this is called faith: closing one's eyes with respect to oneself for good and all so as not to suffer from the sight of incurable falsity.\textsuperscript{110}

Similarly religious faith inevitably attacks the dignity and autonomy of man by pretending to refer him to something beyond himself:

The 'Christian', that which has been called christian for two millennia, is merely a psychological self-misunderstanding. Regarded more closely, that which has ruled in him, in spite of all his 'faith', has been merely the instincts - and what instincts! 'Faith' has been at all times, with Luther for instance, only a cloak, a pretext, a screen, behind which the instincts play their game - a shrewd blindness to the dominance of certain instincts.... 'Faith' - I have already called it the true Christian shrewdness - one has always spoken of faith, one has always acted from instinct.\textsuperscript{111}

In short, faith is abhorrent: "... there is today still no lack of those who do not know how indecent it is to 'believe' - or a sign of decadence, of a broken will to live..."\textsuperscript{112} Like Kierkegaard, Nietzsche also attacks childish Christianity:

Heaven belongs to children; the faith which here finds utterance is not a faith which has been won by struggle - it is there, from the beginning, it is as if it were a return to childishness in the spiritual domain.\textsuperscript{113}

Besides the commonplace elaborations Nietzsche makes to these positions, we should note three positive themes he expounds on faith: the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence, amor fati, and what Hans Vaihinger has called The Will to Illusion. The doctrine of Eternal Recurrence
probably came to Nietzsche through his classical studies, with special reference to the Greek cyclical view of history. However, he did not take over this ancient idea without some critical modifications, nor without some reference to other exponents of the idea. It is not without historical as well as philosophical significance, however, that the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence has been called the "Dionysian Faith". These factors combine to refute the argument that Nietzsche may have been a romantic; rather the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence is ultimately tragic, whilst the Dionysian faith is austere. Hollingdale says

Nietzsche arrived at the theory of the eternal recurrence as a consequence of two philosophical requirements; the need to explain the world and the need to accept it.

This doctrine inevitably leads to a resignation to fate, an acceptance of life with both its good and its bad sides together, and the hard discipline which this necessitates on the individual.

Here there is no glimmer of hope or progress; it is the negative (or at least neutral) side to his attitude of amor fati, it is, as Hollingdale says,

... the Lutheran acceptance of the events of life as divinely willed, with the consequent affirmation of life as such as divine, as a product of the divine will, and the implication that to hate life is blasphemous.

The doctrine of Eternal Recurrence, and the motto of amor fati, present a passive accepting faith which takes things as they are. By contrast, but still held in tension by Nietzsche, is his recognition of the place of illusion in life and faith. In an essay entitled Nietzsche's Will to Illusion, Vaihinger argues that Nietzsche bears out the thesis of his whole volume The Philosophy of "As If" that there are fictions, that they are recognised as such, but
they cannot be discarded because they are necessary for the function of human life and thought. Nietzsche, therefore, can speak of "lying, in the extra-moral-sense", art and drama as an aesthetic illusion, religion and the freedom of the will also as illusions — but necessary ones; indeed, living in illusion is the ideal, so even moral responsibility is only an illusion, though of course, a very necessary one for a stable society. Truth is not the antithesis of error, but the relation of one error against another; "truth is the most expedient form of error", for it is that which functions in the circumstances. The Anti-Christ attacks much that is illusion (cf. "In spite of"), but cannot deny the security that illusion produces. This whole philosophy of "As If" is clearly an important aspect of an existentialist analysis of faith as it deals with the theory, practice, and experience of faith in terms of the life of the believer.

JASPERS

Jaspers was the co-founder with Heidegger of German existential philosophy, and was in fact quite explicit about the existential nature of his philosophy, although he himself admitted the great difficulty he had in communicating the concept of Existenz, because it is so ineffable. Existenz cannot be objectively defined or expressed, Jaspers argued, because Existenz is to do with being; "... Existenz is not a concept; it is a sign that points 'beyond all objectiveness'". He contrasted Existenz with mundane existence, and declared "I am Existenz if I do not become an object for myself." Jaspers went even further: "Existenz warns me to detach myself from the world lest I become its prey". Such detachment, such elucidation of Existenz results from personal dissatisfaction with mundane existence
in the world. Individual freedom, then, for Jaspers, is analoguous with Existenz. We may therefore say that Existenz refers to the individual person, but not to his objective, imminent, physical state, but to his free transcendent sphere of life; it is the mark of an individual's authenticity. Experiences of Existenz may be distinguished, as Hoffman commented:-

Since Existenz thus cannot be defined, but only circumscribed, Jaspers resorts to a set of 'existential' categories, vaguely analagous to Heidegger's Existenziale, and derived from the Kantian categories, over against which they stand.

Thus the Existenzen of Jaspers is parallel to the Existentialia of Heidegger to which we have already referred, and on which we will partly base our study of Bultmann and Tillich.

One of the great features and characteristics of Jaspers' philosophy is the breadth as well as the depth of his overall perspective. This breadth is nowhere better illustrated than with his concept of the Encompassing, which seeks to go beyond the small world of the individual to see everything as a whole. What each person normally regards as a horizon, a surrounding boundary of perspective, is in fact a limited horizon, for more horizons lie beyond that one, and larger ones too. The Encompassing, for Jaspers, is that (theoretical) sphere within which all horizons are enclosed, so that no horizons remain visible in its comprehensiveness.

Within this perspective of Encompassing, however, Jaspers recognises those human horizons of finitude which each individual has and experiences. These human limitations he called "Boundary" or "Limit" or "Ultimate" situations. There are always different situations and these situations are always in a state of flux but boundary situations strike us by their general solidarity.
Situations like the following: that I am always in situations; that I cannot live without struggling and suffering; that I cannot avoid guilt; that I must die—these are what I call boundary situations. They never change, except in appearance. There is no way to survey them in existence, no way to see anything behind them. They are like a wall we run into, a wall on which we founder. We cannot modify them; all that we can do is to make them lucid, but without explaining them or deducing them from something else. They go with existence itself.  

As a result, one should not avoid these boundary situations, but seize and embrace them as part of one's own Existenz, an act which demands a sense of maturity to leap from existence to Existenz. Jaspers pointed out the richness in life of tension in situations and values, in fact, "To experience boundary situations is the same as Existenz", and both are stepping stones to Transcendence, because both emphasise the finitude and hence immanence of the individual. In boundary situations, the existential character of the individual is displayed as he faces situations alone, and his faith is tested.

Another thing which may arise from boundary situations is choice and decision. In fact Jaspers deals with these related concepts in terms of freedom, but in either approach, the emphasis is typically existentialist, being a common reference to the role and responsibility of the individual. Thus he says "Philosophical faith, on the other hand, is the faith of man in his potentialities. In it he breathes his freedom." From the fact of this freedom, Jaspers faces up to its attendant responsibilities and guilt: "I know I am free, and so I admit I am guilty. I answer for what I have done. Knowing what I did, I take it upon myself." From this, Jaspers comes to the profound realisation that this freedom is thereby limiting and limited; limiting in that it reveals responsibilities which restrict one, limited in that it makes assumptions about the self and one's capabilities which in practice are not borne out. It
is no wonder then that freedom is a product of the will.

We now turn to the more specifically religious concepts of Jaspers: Transcendence, Faith, Catholicity, Ciphers, and Foundering. These concepts nevertheless are still integrally related to those other ideas previously discussed. Transcendence, as its name implies, is the supreme, ineffable, realm within the Encompassing. Indeed, man is man simply because there is Transcendence, for there is a leap from immanence to transcendence.

The elusiveness of Transcendence is the same thing as the elusiveness of Being. It is of ultimate significance but cannot be objectified, it is the indispensable companion of Existenz but cannot be seized or realised by the individual. Jaspers is thus left saying "Transcendence must be present where I seek it" for it is a boundary situation experience.

We shall therefore now consider first Jaspers' treatment of "Existential Relations to Transcendence", then his connection made between Transcendence and the divine, and then finally his concept of faith and the final climax of his Philosophy - "Foundering".

The first existential relation of the individual to Transcendence is through boundary situations which point the human limitations and finitude of the individual over and against the transcendence and death of life itself, with the individual seeking to understand the role of Transcendence in such difficult situations by means such as theodicies, and so acting in defiance or surrender in response. The second existential relation of the individual to Transcendence is by rising or falling: "I do not relate to Transcendence by thinking of it, nor by dealing with it in the sort of action that might be repeated according to rules. I am soaring toward it or declining from it".
The third existential relation of the individual to Transcendence is far more complex, referring to the "law of the daytime" and the "passion of the night". Normally, these two are contrasted as reason versus passion, but as each are seen to have their own existential validity, each in turn points to an aspect of Transcendence; as Jaspers said, "It is a phenomenon of awful ambiguity". The temptation to see areas of transcendence must be resisted; there is one Transcendence, and therein lies paradox and tension, mystery and the divine. Finally, the fourth existential relation of the individual to Transcendence is what Jaspers calls "the One"; "To Existenz, it is the One in which Existenz has its being; to Existenz, the One is everything". The One may be sought transcending reason or by embracing the world; it is, either way, a process of looking beyond imminence but not forsaking it.

Jaspers was both a philosopher and a Christian in the Protestant tradition and he therefore emphasises the place of the individual in faith. It is not surprising then that Jaspers did not hesitate to show how God fitted into his philosophy, although he admitted, however, that

As a concept, the one God necessarily leads to absurdities which are to make me feel him as I transcend them; but in an existential sense he is the hand that answers me wherever I am really and truly myself. He is the nearby God who justifies me with the distant one.

In this discussion on the "Transcendence of the One Deity", Jaspers, having established the embracing paradoxes in the concept of Transcendence, goes on to identify them - and Transcendence - with God. Transcendence - God - cannot be evoked independent of the believer; if there is a failure to believe in God, it is the failure of the individual to be authentic Existenz: "How can the being of
transcendence be doubted at all? It may be doubted because our sense of being has strayed into the blindness of mere existence: there has been a failure of Existenz". Jaspers developed a considerable concept of faith and philosophical faith over the years, from his Philosophy, dated 1932, to his Philosophical Faith and Revelation, dated 1962. He argued that "only the faith that withstands doubt is real faith... there is no faith unless there is unbelief... Only he who can see unbelief as a continuing possibility for himself is a true believer". For Jaspers, faith is a relationship made by an Existenz (an authentic existential individual) with another Existenz or with Transcendence, and is not reflective but active. In faith, nothing is sure or definite so little can be said with certainty; hence "I do not know whether I believe". There is a truth which is beyond the pragmatism of worldly immanence, it is the truth of transcendence, so that "Existence experiences truth in faith".

In Existenz there is faith and despair. Opposed to both stands the desire for the peace of eternity, where despair is impossible and faith becomes a vision, that is to say, the perfect presence of perfect reality.

We thus find that philosophical faith is the individual philosophising about his Existenz, and so it cannot by nature be dogmatic.

In his late work Philosophical Faith and Revelation, Jaspers expounds a philosophical faith and a philosophy of faith independent of any particular revelation, and compares and contrasts with religious faith in a particular revelation, particularly that of Christianity. Philosophically,

Faith is not a knowledge I have, but a certainty that guides me. In faith I live by the source that speaks to me as I think what I believe... Faith is the strength in which I am sure of myself, on grounds I can keep but not make.
Philosophical faith criticises faith in revelation for limiting one's view of God, and revelational faith criticises philosophical faith for a lack of objectivity, certainty, and content. Jaspers is unable to defend revelational faith, but defends philosophical faith because it respects the transcendence of God. 158

Connected with his distrust of revelational faith is Jaspers' condemnation of what he calls "catholicity". Jaspers criticised catholicity as representing closed authority in contrast to open authority or even any authority at all which rejected philosophical enquiry. Catholicity (and this is not just limited to the Roman church) is condemned as arrogant and totalitarian, and as unreasonable in its revelational and exclusive claims. 159 160

Jaspers, like Kierkegaard, recognised the place of risk in faith; for it is necessary if there is to be freedom although this will result in subjective insecurity. 161 Furthermore, there is the ontological discussion of the risk of faith, the nihilistic threat, which is existentially experienced when pride overtakes faith. 162

The conclusion and climax of Jaspers' Philosophy is his concept of "Foundering", which he describes as "The final cipher". If "Existenz" is the cipher of "Transcendence", then "Foundering" is the cipher of "Being" or "Existenz". 163 "Foundering is the ultimate", Jaspers perceived. As Thyssen put it, "Foundering signifies the fruitlessness of all endeavours to reach, from a finite basis such as consciousness— as-such or even from self-sufficient Existenz, a satisfactory access to Being, i.e., to arrive at the absolute." 164 Later Thyssen makes another interpretative point:— "... foundering becomes the new great cipher for the philosophical experience of
Transcendence. But it is not only a cipher. Rather is it the
experience of foundering which is fundamental". That is,
"Foundering" is not just a way of expressing "Existenz", but the
actual experience of "Existenz" itself. This basic fact of Foundering,
as Jaspers sees it, is really the essence of the transitoriness and
tragedy of life itself. As such, then, it is not to be run away from,
but to be faced with acceptance and embrace.

Jaspers closed his magnum opus in reflective philosophical
serenity - "Peace in reality".

In view of foundering, it seems impossible to live....
The leap from fear to serenity is the most tremendous
one a man can make. That he succeeds in it must be
due to a reason beyond the Existenz of his self-being.
Undefinably, his faith ties him to transcendent being.

In these circumstances life appears intolerably senseless to a man,
"... but sufferance means that he will cling to being in spite of
his foundering, where the cipher of foundering fails him." At
this moment he gains transcendence, and with it, peace.

**HEIDEGGER**

The major philosophical influence on Heidegger was Edmund
Husserl, whose pupil he was in the Freiburg University, where he
learned Husserl's phenomenological method. We have already noted
in our first chapter the significant contribution phenomenology made
to existentialism, so the influence of Husserl may be traced through
the philosophy of and into the thought of Bultmann and Tillich.
In fact Heidegger's *Being and Time* was dedicated by Heidegger to
Husserl, and was first published in 1927 in the *Jahrbuch für*
Phänomenologie und phänomenologische Forschung edited by Husserl.

Heidegger himself disclaimed the label "Existentialist", and
when Sartre published his essay, *Existentialism is a Humanism*.

Heidegger repudiated the equation. Heidegger himself was much influenced directly and indirectly by Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, whilst his concept of *Dasein* is not unlike the concept of *Existenz* propounded by his contemporary and fellow founder of German existentialism, Karl Jaspers. We will limit our references to Heidegger's philosophy to his work *Being and Time*, as it was this book which influenced Bultmann most, and so is most relevant to this thesis.

Heidegger begins *Being and Time* with an analysis of *Dasein*, noting "two characteristics of *Dasein*... - the priority of *existentia* over *essentia*, and the fact that *Dasein* is in each case mine". In fact, "The essence of *Dasein* lies in its existence... when we designate this entity with the term 'Dasein', we are expressing not its 'what' ... but its Being." Dasein may be authentic or inauthentic, authentic Dasein having the property of personal possession, i.e. personality, possibility, choice, and decision. Dasein then is dealing with the everyday situations of the individual human being. To describe the circumstances of these situations, Heidegger says

All explicata to which the analytic of *Dasein* gives rise are obtained by considering *Dasein*'s existence-structure. Because *Dasein*'s characters of *Being* are defined in terms of existentiality, we call them 'existentialia'.

It is this technical term "Existentialia" used by Heidegger which we have adopted to characterise a basic aspect of existentialism and its analytic. There is no satisfactory translation of "*Dasein*"; strictly the word means "Being-there", but it could easily mean "Being-here"; the emphasis is on the actuality of being as such - like Jaspers' "Existenz", it does not actually represent an individual human being, but rather represents those ontological and existential
characteristics of that individual person. In fact Heidegger calls man "Dasein". The reasons for this are to emphasise the "Who" of man (not his "What"), and his place in the world, to emphasise the individual personality of man, and to emphasise the possibilities of existence open to such a being.

Heidegger then proceeds to speak of "Being-in-the-world in general as the basic state of Dasein". This serves an immediate balance to the note of individualism struck in the first chapter; the individual Dasein exists in the world - in fact, Heidegger later makes much of the fact of Dasein "being-in" and being in relation to others, as we shall see. We find another good example of Heidegger's existentialism in his distinction between entities which are "present-at-hand", untapped resources in the world, and entities which are "ready-at-hand", those resources viewed for utilisation by man. This distinction reflects the existentialists' interest in those aspects of life which come within the experience and feelings of the individual person, i.e., which "involve" the individual. Dasein encounters other entities in the world, and exists alongside them.

Heidegger is very concerned about the independence of Dasein, and the "distantiality" it should have when being with others. Dasein loses its essential independence when it is among others (the "they"):- "We call this everyday undifferentiated character of Dasein 'averageness'". The Dasein which hides behind the "they" loses its sense of personal initiative, responsibility, and decision; thus this "they-self" must be sharply distinguished from the "authentic Self". This concept of authentic existence as the individual, the Dasein, asserting itself, maintaining its status, is a recurring
theme in Being and Time, as we shall see.

Heidegger argues that understanding is not a disinterested reception of the facts, but a participating practical knowledge in existence, involvement being a characteristic mark of existentialism. Understanding is always projecting into possibilities, never resting in any of them, so that the understanding, by projecting, represents new possibilities in itself. All understanding is interpreted by our pre-understanding (prior-understanding). As a result, we cannot understand anything in its authentic purity, but only as we interpret it by our pre-understanding. This existentialist idea refutes Hegel's Idealist doctrine that presuppositions could be abolished, and also refutes his Essentialist doctrine that the mind can exist independent of the body. Heidegger says that as the understanding projects itself on possibilities, a development takes place which is called "interpretation". In fact, he says, all understanding involves interpretation, for all comprehension involves pre-understanding. "Like any interpretation whatever, assertion necessarily has a fore-having, a fore-sight, and a fore-conception as its existential foundations." This is what gives "meaning" its significance.

According to Heidegger, communication by Dasein may be authentic or inauthentic. Authentic communication, or "articulation", to use Heidegger's word, is personal: "Discoursing or talking is the way in which we articulate 'significantly' the intelligibility of Being-in-the-World." There is, on the other hand, communication by the "they" which is adopted by Dasein when living an inauthentic existence. Inauthentic communication takes various forms, all of which betray the decline ("falling") of Dasein:
This 'absorption in...' has mostly the character of Being-lost in the publicness of the 'they'. Dasein has, in the first instance, fallen away from itself as an authentic potentiality for Being its Self, and has fallen into the 'world'. 'Fallenness' into the 'world' means the absorption in Being-with-one-another, in so far as the latter is guided by idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity. Through the interpretation of falling, what we have called the 'inauthenticity' of Dasein may now be defined more precisely.\textsuperscript{185}

Heidegger sees Dasein as having been "thrown" into a situation, and from the "facticity" of that situation Dasein may become authentic or inauthentic.\textsuperscript{186}

With this situation of mind it is easy to see why Heidegger could say that it is "... as 'care' the Being of Dasein in general is to be defined".\textsuperscript{187} Care is analysed thus; "It comprises in itself facticity (thrownness), existence (projection), and falling."\textsuperscript{188} Heidegger, in order to master the provisional task of exhibiting Dasein's Being, sought "... for one of the most far-reaching and most primordial possibilities of disclosure - one that lies in Dasein itself".\textsuperscript{189} His answer is "As a state-of-mind which will satisfy these methodological requirements, the phenomenon of anxiety will be made basic for our analysis."\textsuperscript{190} This anxiety is distinguished from fear; anxiety has no actual object, whereas fear does.\textsuperscript{191} Heidegger expounds on anxiety as an experience of Dasein thus:- "That in the face of which one has anxiety is Being-in-the-world as such".\textsuperscript{192} The object of anxiety is thus nothing yet everything, nowhere yet everywhere.

According to Heidegger, the perceptive man, authentic Dasein, is "Being-toward-death" which is the attitude of seizing death as the ultimate possibility, and of gauging one's whole life to face it.\textsuperscript{193} Inauthentic, everyday Dasein refuses to face or accept this challenge,
treat it as a fact when it is a possibility, but later treating it as unreal when this possibility has passed over into fact;\textsuperscript{194} "The 'they' does not permit us the courage for anxiety in the face of death".\textsuperscript{195}

This leads to an important implication, however, that anticipation, being unfulfilled, is towards possibilities in the future.\textsuperscript{196} It therefore follows that: "Anticipation turns out to be the possibility of understanding one's ownmost and uttermost potentiality-for-Being - that is to say, the possibility of authentic existence".\textsuperscript{197} But this authenticity brings its own tensions; with external threats, internal facing of death, and overall anxiety.\textsuperscript{198} Another significant aspect of Heidegger's existential anticipation into the future is that of the "not-yet":- "... there belongs to Dasein, as long as it is, a 'not-yet' which it will be - that which is constantly still outstanding".\textsuperscript{199} In this phrase lies the kernel of anticipation and potential, and the challenge of authenticity.

We now turn to Heidegger's discussion of authenticity. Heidegger first raised the subject - which is very important for him - in his discussion of Dasein, where, characteristically fond of puns, he emphasised the connection between \textit{eigentlich} (authentic, real), and \textit{eigen} (own).\textsuperscript{200} This authenticity is twofold; a rejection of public values, and a self-assertion by choice.\textsuperscript{201} The voice of conscience appeals to Dasein to fulfil its potentiality authentically, and the authentic response is "resoluteness".\textsuperscript{203} The result is that "In resoluteness we have now arrived at that truth of Dasein which is most primordial because it is authentic."\textsuperscript{204} Heidegger sums up "Resoluteness, however, is only that authenticity which, in care, is the object of care, and which is possible as care - the authenticity of care itself",\textsuperscript{205} and goes on to argue for "Anticipatory Resoluteness
as the way in which Dasein's potentiality-for-Being-a-whole has existential authenticity.\textsuperscript{(206)}

Heidegger's views on time are found only in a truncated form in \textit{Being and Time}, but he makes his position clear in that he wants to view Being in the context and perspective of Time. This is seen by him in terms of possibility, both in the present and in the future, and in terms of anticipation and projection. Of particular interest for us in this thesis, however, is another concept which appears in the closing chapters of \textit{Being and Time} — Augenblick:— "moment of vision". For Heidegger, this term enfolds his concepts of time and ecstasy, and possibility, and of resolution and authenticity, and provides for theologians a glimpse of revelation from a devout philosopher; for this moment of vision may be seen to be almost a movement of faith:

That Present which is held in authentic temporality and which is thus authentic itself, we call the 'moment of vision'. (Augenblick). This term must be understood in the active sense of an ecstasy. It means the resolute rapture with which Dasein is carried away to whatever possibilities and circumstances are encountered in the Situation as possible objects of concern, but a rapture which is held in resoluteness.\textsuperscript{(207)}

We must now see what Heidegger himself had to say about God and faith. God certainly had a place in his ontology,\textsuperscript{(208)} but as such had no existential significance. Existentially, Heidegger (like Jaspers) preferred to speak in terms of Transcendence,\textsuperscript{(209)} a theme which he developed in his essay "On the Essence of Cause (or Ground)" which was written in honour of Husserl, dated 1943. Collins commented that for Heidegger, the infinite God is separate

... not only from the realm of things-that-are but also from the entire meaning of being as such and hence from all philosophical discourse. As far as the philosopher is concerned, God cannot come within the range of our reflective thought....
Heidegger himself places his philosophy beyond the issues of atheism and theism. Heidegger reminds us that theology is the systematic development of a primordial religious faith. As such it is concerned with expressing the existential relationship between man and God, not with constricting and defending dogmas:

Theology is seeking a more primordial interpretation of man's Being towards God, prescribed by the meaning of faith itself and remaining within it. It is slowly beginning to understand once more Luther's insight that the 'foundation' on which its system of dogma rests has not arisen from an enquiry in which faith is primary, and that conceptually this 'foundation' not only is inadequate for the problematic of theology, but conceals and distorts it.

Heidegger himself said that only existential terms could make faith intelligible. Also, Faith is not to be misapplied: for something that is impossible to prove to "be taken merely on faith" is a "perversion of the problem". Heidegger thereupon makes his existentialist definition: "... to have faith - a way of behaving which itself is always a founded mode of Being-in-the-world."

CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter we have noted the principal themes and doctrines of those four existentialists whose influence Bultmann and Tillich personally acknowledge. These existentialist themes will be found to recur frequently in our treatment of 'Faith' as expounded by Bultmann and Tillich which now follows in our next two chapters. Their interpretation of 'faith' will be seen to be existentialist in that they both use terms and themes we have just seen in this chapter to be those of our four existentialists and it is quite clear that Bultmann and Tillich are formulating their respective concepts of 'Faith' with the thought of these existentialists in mind.
CHAPTER TWO

FOOTNOTES


Bultmann Existence and Faith p.118.


Bultmann Autobiographical Reflections of Rudolf Bultmann in C.W. Kegley Theology of Rudolf Bultmann, p.xxv.


6. ibid p.260

ibid p.272


10. ibid p.25.


Ott "Rudolf Bultmann's Philosophy of History" in Kegley The Theology of Rudolf Bultmann, pp.51-64.

Ott "Objectivication and Existentialism" in Bartsch Kerygma and Myth II pp.306-335.

Bultmann *A Reply... in Bartsch Kerygma and Myth I*, p.105.


17. Tillich *Theology of Culture* Chapter VIII.


19. ibid p.141.

20. ibid pp.87-88.

21. ibid pp.141-152.


ibid p.324; cf. Tillich *Autobiographical Reflections in Kegley and Bretall Theology of Paul Tillich* p.4.


24. ibid p.163.

25. Tillich *On the Boundary* p.322

ibid p.324.


27. Tillich *Perspectives on Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Protestant Theology* p.207.


Tillich *On the Boundary* p.319.


33. ibid p.319.

34. Tillich Perspectives on Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Protestant Theology p.245.

35. Tillich Theology of Culture pp.88f, 91.


37. ibid p.13.

38. ibid p.13.


ibid p.179.

Tillich Systematic Theology I p.46.

Tillich On the Boundary p.297.

40. Tillich Systematic Theology II p.28.

41. Tillich Perspectives on Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Protestant Theology p.244.


43. Tillich On the Boundary p.325.

44. Tillich Theology of Culture p.49.

45. Tillich On the Boundary p.334.

46. Tillich Autobiographical Reflections in Kegley and Bretall The Theology of Paul Tillich p.10.

47. Tillich The Protestant Era p.98.


50. ibid p.109.


52. Kierkegaard Concluding Unscientific Postscript p.448 (inter alia)

54. Collins The Mind of Kierkegaard p.171. c.f. Kierkegaard Journals 104; Philosophical Fragments Ch.4.


57. ibid pp.140-141.

58. ibid p.142.

59. ibid p.38.

60. ibid p.23.

   ibid p.47; c.f. chs. II & III.

61. ibid p.55; c.f. p.86.


63. Kierkegaard Concept of Dread p.104.

64. Kierkegaard The Sickness Unto Death p.209.

65. ibid p.262.

66. Tillich Theology of Culture p.90.


69. Kierkegaard Fear and Trembling p.77; c.f. Philosophical Fragments pp.73,76; Concluding Unscientific Postscript pp.28,30,53.


71. Kierkegaard Fear and Trembling p.56.

72. ibid Problemata: Preliminary Exploration.

73. ibid p.57. c.f. Sickness Unto Death pp.194-200.

74. Kierkegaard Concluding Unscientific Postscript p.86.

75. ibid p.96.

76. Kierkegaard Concept of Dread pp.29,37,43.

77. Kierkegaard Fear and Trembling p.47.
78. Kierkegaard *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* pp. 86-87.
79. Kierkegaard *Philosophical Fragments* pp. 101, 103 (footnote 2).
80. Kierkegaard *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* p. 182.
81. ibid p. 202 (footnote).
82. ibid p. 209.
83. Kierkegaard *Fear and Trembling* pp. 57-58.
84. Kierkegaard *Fear and Trembling* pp. 64, 65.
85. Kierkegaard *Philosophical Fragments* p. 46.
86. Kierkegaard *Fear and Trembling* pp. 49-52, 88-91.
87. ibid p. 50; c.f. pp. 57, 77.
88. ibid pp. 88-91 (Esp. pp. 89, 90).
89. Nietzsche *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* p. 136 cf. ibid pp. 138-139.
90. Hollingdale *Nietzsche* p. 195.
93. Nietzsche *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* p. 298 (Tillich quotes this text in his *The Courage To Be* p. 29).
94. ibid p. 120; c.f. p. 122, 229.
95. Nietzsche *The Anti-Christ* No. 38, p. 149.
96. ibid No. 57, p. 179; c.f. Nietzsche *The Will to Power* p. 893.
97. Nietzsche *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* p. 298; c.f. *Beyond Good and Evil* 257, 258 (pp. 173-174).
98. Nietzsche *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* p. 41.
99. ibid p. 138.
101. ibid 35, p. 147.
102. ibid 34, p. 146.
104. Nietzsche Thus Spoke Zarathustra p.114.
105. ibid p.116.
108. ibid p.297.
110. Nietzsche The Anti-Christ p.120.
111. ibid p.151.
112. ibid p.166.
113. ibid p.144
114. Kaufmann Nietzsche p.320.
117. Hollingdale Thus Spoke Zarathustra p.28; c.f. Nietzsche Ecce Homo.
118. Vaihinger The Philosophy of 'As If' pp.341-362.
119. Jaspers Reason and Existenz p.75.
    Jaspers Philosophy of Existence p.3.
120. Jaspers Reason and Existenz pp.121-122.
121. Jaspers Philosophy I p.66.
122. Jaspers Philosophy II p.3.
123. Jaspers Philosophy II p.5.
124. ibid pp.10f. cf. p.4.
126. Hoffmann in Schilpp The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers.
130. ibid p.181; cf. 193-195.
131. ibid p.220.
132. ibid p.179.
134. ibid p.75.
   cf. Jaspers Philosophy II p.154
   ibid p.158.
139. Jaspers Philosophy III p.5; cf. ibid p.9.
140. ibid p.13.
141. ibid Ch.3.
142. ibid p.74.
143. ibid p.62.
144. ibid p.102.
148. ibid p.111.
151. ibid p.256.
153. ibid p.137.
155. ibid p.41
156. ibid pp.88ff.
158. ibid p.325.
160. Jaspers & Bultmann *Myth and Christianity* p.82.
161. Jaspers *The Perennial Scope of Philosophy* p.73.
162. ibid p.139.
165. ibid p.333.
167. ibid p.206.
168. ibid p.207; cf. ibid p.208.
169. Heidegger *Being and Time* H 43; p.68.
170. ibid H 42; p.67.
171. ibid H 42; p.68.
172. ibid H 44; pp.69-70.
173. ibid H 44; p.70.
174. ibid H 52ff; pp. 78ff; cf. ibid H 54; p.80.
175. ibid H 113-125; pp.149-163.
176. ibid H 43; p.69; cf. H 126, p.164; H 127, pp.164-165.
177. ibid H 129; p.167.
178. ibid H 143; p.183.
179. ibid H 145; pp.184-185
180. ibid H 148; p.188; H 149; p.189; H 150; pp.191-192.
181. ibid H 157; p.199.
182. ibid H 151; p.193.
183. ibid H 161; p.204.
185. ibid H 175; p.220. cf ibid H 175; p.219.
186. ibid H 179; p.223.
187. ibid H 121; p.157.
188. ibid H 284; p.329.
189. ibid H 182; p.226.
190. ibid H 182; p.227.
191. ibid H 184ff; pp.228ff.
192. ibid H 186; p.230. cf. H 186; p.231.
193. ibid H 250; p.294.
194. ibid H 252ff; pp.296ff.
195. ibid H 254; p.298.
196. ibid H 236; p.279.
197. ibid H 262-3; p.307.
198. ibid H 265; p.310.
199. ibid H 242; p.286; cf. H 243; p.287.
200. ibid H 42-43; p.68.
201. ibid H 268; p.313.
202. ibid H 268; p.313.
ibid H 269; p.314.
203. ibid H 269-270; p.314.
ibid H 296-297; p.343.
204. ibid H 297; p.343.
205. ibid H 301; p.348.
207. ibid H 338; p.387, cf. H 328; p.376.
208. ibid H 93; p.126 (for example)

209. ibid H 49; p.74; What is Metaphysics? (for example)


211. Heidegger Being and Time H 10; p.30.

212. ibid H 180; p.224.

213. ibid H 205; p.249.

214. ibid H 206; p.250.
Chapter Three
BULTMANN'S EXISTENTIALIST INTERPRETATION OF "FAITH"

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter it is not our intention to make a full study of Bultmann's treatment of faith, though we shall be obliged to consider most of what he has to say on this subject. Very often in the works of Bultmann the existentialist themes in which we are interested are addenda to or continuation of the exegesis of the particular text in question. However, we shall for the most part ignore this Biblical exegesis and the historical work of Bultmann as we attempt to expound the existentialist themes in Bultmann's interpretation of faith.

We have already discovered the two main broad themes of existentialism in our first chapter: "The Place of the Individual" and "Existentialia"; these will now form the framework for our discussion of Bultmann's existentialist interpretation of faith. But there are also subsidiary existentialist themes which Bultmann employs here; some we met in the first chapter, most we discovered in the second chapter. It will be shown that Bultmann is either indebted to our four existentialists, or he is thinking in the same terms as they. In this chapter we shall give an exposition of Bultmann's use of existentialist themes in his interpretation of faith, and show the extent of the influence of existentialism with reference to what we have described in Chapters One and Two.

In our first chapter we noted D.E. Roberts' remark that existentialists characteristically seek to expound the truth which can be known only by personal commitment. Now Bultmann is quite emphatic about this, rejecting all abstract descriptions and
expositions of faith. In one of his earlier theological works, Bultmann declared that faith is not "theoretical speculation" for the believer, but "the activity of God in his own life".\(^1\) In emphasising - as an existentialist - the aspects of personal commitment, involvement, and participation in faith, Bultmann has at least three clear lines of thought.

First, faith is not the disinterested, or even academically responsive, acceptance of points of doctrine and dogma. One cannot believe in a doctrine, only accept it academically, or perhaps submit to it resolutely but not sympathetically.\(^2\) Rather, faith is primarily submission to God.\(^3\) In more distinctively existentialist terms, faith is not a blind acceptance of dogma, but "... the illumination of existence in that authentic self-understanding that knows God".\(^4\) The "submission to God" that Bultmann realises is part of faith is in fact the acceptance of the \(\kappa\epsilon\rho\upsilon\kappa\alpha\),\(^5\) but as we have seen, this acceptance is of existential experience and involvement, of personal commitment, not a disinterested learning of dogma.

Secondly, faith is not a human attitude of mind, for this does not invoke the passionate interest which existentialists extol. Bultmann is quite clear about this:- "The concept of faith is therefore defined eschatologically; that is, faith does not denote a human attitude which could be timeless and could be assumed at will..."\(^6\) Consequently, faith "... does not have the unequivocal character of a spiritual or psychological attitude".\(^7\) Faith, then, is not an attitude of mind, nor a general feeling of confidence in God.\(^8\) Closely connected with this is the rejection of faith as Weltanschauung: "world-view". As such, faith would be an uncommitted disinterested view of life and the world, which though seeing a
place for God in the situation and system does not invoke the response and passion that faith should have according to the existentialists.\(^9\)

Thirdly, faith is not a theory or abstract view:— "... one cannot have an abstract faith in general..."\(^{10}\) for "theoretical conviction" is not sufficient to be deemed "faith".\(^{11}\) Faith is not a theory but existential knowledge, not abstraction but experience.\(^{12}\) All this emphasises the existentialist view and theme that truth involves personal experience, interest, and commitment, and rejects as not substantial and in fact invalid those claims which do not have the personal witness of the particular individual concerned.

On the other hand, faith can take the form of a more quiet, or even passive, experience of God:— "... the silent and reverential submission to the power calling me into life and making me finite..."\(^{13}\) However, faith is not a general trust in God, but it is founded on past experiences of God.\(^{14}\) Faith is man's relation to the divine, the attitude which governs his whole life, so that faith is man's awareness that he is under divine grace.\(^{15}\) This description of faith as an attitude towards life does nevertheless have some basis in existentialist thought, especially as expounded by Bultmann.\(^{16}\)

In all this, we notice that the two major themes of existentialism - the place of the individual, and his personal experiences (existentialia) - recur continuously. Bultmann's discourses on faith not only may be classified within these two broad existentialist themes, but they also display some of the details of existentialist themes in terms of subjectivity, concrete experiences, and passionate participation. Having said all this, we shall now trace the existentialist themes in Bultmann's
interpretation of 'faith' in greater detail.

THE PLACE OF THE INDIVIDUAL

1. The Private Individual.
   a) Status of the Individual

   Here we have two aspects to consider: self-assertion, and personal responsibility.

   The self-assertion of faith is a characteristic of the authenticity of the individual, seen in his personal decision of faith and its enaction in terms, for example, of love. Faith gives a man special status before and with God; first it is an acknowledgement that man is a child of God, secondly it brings us into closer relationship with God. Bultmann comments

   ... a paradox is now disclosed. Community with God, which is intended to be the basis of all true human community, first of all tears man out of every human community and places him in a radical loneliness before God.... The way to God, in fact, means withdrawal from the world...

   Faith is not ideally self-assertion but the assertion of Christ in oneself. This existentialist interest in the status of the individual is seen in Bultmann's interpretation of Romans 11:20 which, he says, "... does not mean: you stand in the faith, but you have won your position through faith - which in this context denotes through faith alone ..." This individual standing in the faith, though existentialist, Bultmann also finds to be quite Biblical, being Pauline in character.

   The other aspect of personal status in existentialist individualism is personal responsibility: faith is not just a privilege, it is also a responsibility. Existential responsibility
is the product of freedom and possibility, and so "Consequently, faith can be made easier or harder and it lies within our power to make faith easier or harder for others." Existential personal responsibility is also a mark of the finitude of man, and "... implies that ... the man who wishes to escape from himself is only flung back on himself." Belief in God is yet another sign that man is a responsible being. Man cannot exist apart from God, and any ideas of such independence are simply deceptive. On the other hand, man's personal responsibility before God involves dignity and potentiality; "It expects of the man of faith that, even with the most frightful destiny, God believes man capable of something grand and wants to make him completely free and noble." b) Measure of Faith

As a private individual, each believer has his own measure of faith which makes both for responsibility of faith and potential progress of personal faith. Like Kierkegaard, who saw the individual's progress in faith in terms of "becoming a Christian", Bultmann uses existentialist phrases to describe the measures of faith spoken of by Saint Paul. God recognises the individuality of each believer by the measure of faith each has been given by his Spirit. Furthermore, there are degrees of faith: weakness, strength, lack, greatness, progress, increase; and associated with this is the "weak conscience" and the responsibility of existentialist ethics as a working through of the measure of one's faith. Another aspect of the measure of faith is the consciousness and striving by the individual believer. Thus Bultmann shows that the New Testament in fact contains references to these existentialist themes in faith, and to effort and development and perseverance in
faith as well. 31

The individual must respond personally, that is subjectively, to the objective acts of God: "Faith cannot generate itself in man; it can only arise as man's answer to the Word of God in which God's judgement and God's grace are preached to him." 32 On the other hand, "... if a man will speak of God, he must evidently speak to himself." 33 Bultmann's respect for the place of subjectivity in faith clearly reflects his existentialist attitude when he argues that "... if we wish to speak of God, evidently we cannot begin by speaking of our experiences and our inner life, for both of these lose their existential character as soon as we objectify them." 34 Rather, "Faith ... is something that we are to realise precisely in our experience and action as obedience to our Lord." 35 And this is the measure of our faith.

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Inasmuch as the individual believer should personally assert Christ within himself against society, Bultmann agrees with the views of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Heidegger. All four emphasise the resultant importance of authenticity and ethics. Bultmann uses existentialist terminology when he speaks of encounter, loneliness, personal responsibility, self-assertion, and the decisions of faith. Furthermore, all these ideas are to be found in the New Testament.

Kierkegaard's emphasis on "becoming a Christian" rather than regarding oneself as a Christian is paralleled by Bultmann in his emphasis on striving in the faith, that life in the Spirit is to be laid hold of continuously, and that faith is both a quality and a quantity. Thus the individual believer, according to both
Kierkegaard and Bultmann, must strive personally to improve his standing in the faith - and this is clearly an instance of a familiar existentialist theme.

2. Self-Surrender

At first sight, self-surrender may appear to be the antithesis of the self-assertive aspect of the individual as developed by the existentialists and Bultmann. However, this self-surrender is a conscious and deliberate act by the individual, who is still in full control of the situation. There are two types of self-surrender; the first is a surrendering of one's self to the inner or whole self, in psychological terms the overcoming of split motives and intentions, or even the overcoming of a split personality into a unified person; the second type is a surrendering of oneself to another, or, in terms of faith, a surrendering of oneself to the object of belief which claims the individual.

Bultmann refers to both types of self-surrender, but, as we shall see, argues that it is by the self-surrender of the self to the self that the individual in fact surrenders himself to God; partly because this is a response to God, and partly because it is in the self that God is to be found. Faith is the turning of an individual towards a divine source or being, when he surrenders himself to God in an act of obedience, confession of faith, and confidence in God rather than of personal pride and boasting. Faith, then, means the abandonment by the individual of his pretensions to autonomy in favour of the rule of God: "This simple surrender to God's grace in renunciation of the desire for recognition is faith." Bultmann then asks the question "How can faith be at the same time both self-surrender and obedience?" and
he answers "Faith is obedience, because in it man's pride is broken."³⁹

The self-surrender of faith is limitless, and involves "one's whole existence... one's whole life..." and such utter self-surrender is called "radical self-surrender" by Bultmann.⁴⁰ For example, "... the man of faith utterly surrenders to God's care and power, waiving all care and power of his own and all security that might be at his disposal."⁴² Such is the nature of radical self-surrender by the believer; a rejection of the sin of unbelief with its attendant anxiety and illusion of autonomy.⁴³

That Bultmann regards this self-surrender aspect of faith as existentialist may be seen when he says "Belief in the almighty God is genuine only when it actually takes place in my very existence, and I surrender myself to the power of God who overwhells me here and now."⁴⁴ It is existentialist because, first, self-surrender is still a deliberate act of the individual in his own right, and, secondly, self-surrender is an existentialist experience as such of the act and life of faith. Thus Bultmann can speak of faith both as the "renunciation of both fear and self-reliance"⁴⁵ and as "a response to God's act ... by which a man hands himself over completely."⁴⁶ Bultmann sums up: "It is just this, the renunciation of the world; i.e., a man's renunciation of himself, which is the basic meaning of faith. It is a man's self-surrender, his turning to the invisible, to that over which he has no control."⁴⁷

That this self-surrender is to affect the whole man is existentialist in character itself, for we have seen already that existentialism is based on the experiences and feelings of the individual at the depths of his existence. As a result, faith
is "... to be understood as the attitude which through and through governs the life of the religious man." Through his faith in God, "... a man hands himself over completely. It is an act in which the whole man is himself involved."*8

* * *

The element of self-surrender in faith demonstrates the existentialist theme of the finitude of man, that there are powers beyond his own which he may surrender to in the form of a religious faith. Bultmann's "self-surrender" of faith has similarities with Kierkegaard's idea of "infinite resignation" in faith, as well as his idea of the act of renunciation in faith. Furthermore, Nietzsche, the arch-proponent of self-assertion amongst the existentialists could also conceive of amor fati - a resignation and embracing of life as fate. Bultmann's view of self-surrender in faith is more positive of course, since the believer surrenders himself to God, but Nietzsche's amor fati is still a religious resignation in the context of Lebensphilosophie when life is held to be sacred and to be submitted to absolutely.

3. Self-Understanding

For Bultmann, the existentialist theme of self-understanding is useful for describing faith because through it the individual perceives the nature of his relationship with the world, God, and himself, and the necessary inter-relationships between the three. Bultmann variously describes faith as understanding, and at one point we shall see that he argues that self-understanding as such can lead to faith.

Faith in response to the preaching of the Gospel is really
an understanding of what was announced, and this in turn involves
a pre-understanding of the message. Furthermore, "Understanding
the Word is therefore not an apprehension of content; it is faith." In other words, faith is not just understanding; true understanding
is faith. How is this possible?

The fact that the Christian proclamation can be understood
by a man when he is confronted with it, shows that he
has a pre-understanding of it. For to understand
something means to understand it in relation to one's self, and means to understand one's self with it or in it.

Faith as understanding is an existentialist interpretation of one's situation in terms of the divine rather than the secular causal interpretations of life.

So we come to faith as self-understanding. The proclamation of the Gospel, Bultmann says, "opens our eyes to ourselves" to see the possibility of faith. Thus "... faith is a way of life. Faith, therefore, does not understand the revelation as a new thing; faith is understood only when the man understands himself anew in it." Existentially, faith is self-understanding when the individual believer sees himself in relation to his God, when he sees that what God has done for him makes him understand himself in a new light. Faith questions man's understanding of himself and God, and thereby produces authenticity, for faith is "the illumination of existence in that authentic self-understanding that knows God." This knowledge of God through faith is seen in terms of existential self-understanding in that faith in God illuminates our understanding of ourselves. Therefore, the self-understanding of faith is that

... in which man understands himself anew under the word of encounter.... so too the self-understanding granted by faith never becomes a possession, but is kept pure only as a response to the repeated encounter of the Word of God....
According to Bultmann, there are two possible views that may be taken by the self-understanding: to see oneself as autonomous and independent of God, or to see oneself as being a child of God and the object of his love and mercy; i.e., the possibilities of a secular or of a religious understanding of oneself. It is important to notice again, however, that existentially one's understanding of God and self-understanding are one and the same thing in faith: "Faith as man's relation to God also determines man's relation to himself, for human existence, as we have seen, is an existence in which man has a relationship to himself." \(^{61}\)

The final aspect of faith as self-understanding is its novelty for the believer, for Bultmann often speaks of faith as a "new self-understanding". \(^{62}\) The novelty of this new self-understanding which is faith is that it is theocentric, not anthropocentric. Yet there is a paradox in this, for the interest of the believer is still there, but it is secondary; and the believer must be prepared to surrender his previous understanding of himself in favour of a new theocentric self-understanding. \(^{63}\) New self-understanding produces a new understanding of God; for faith is the "... growing out of that new understanding of God, the world, and man which is conferred in and by faith - or, as it can also be phrased: out of one's new self-understanding" \(^{64}\) and the novelty of new self-understanding is the novelty of a new understanding of God, and this novelty is found in the life of faith. It is not just that in faith, man understands himself anew, but that his new understanding undergoes constant renewal: "For my new self-understanding, by its very nature, must be renewed every day, so that I understand the imperative self which is included in it." \(^{65}\)

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Self-understanding is both a religious interpretation of faith and a specifically existentialist interpretation of faith. As a religious interpretation, Bultmann says that when one understands the proclamation of the Gospel one has faith. Another religious interpretation given by him is that one understands oneself in faith in relation to God. The first idea is Lutheran, the second is from Kierkegaard (where man stands in humility before God).

As an existentialist interpretation, Bultmann adopts the Heideggerian idea of understanding and pre-understanding. He accepts Heidegger's view that understanding is an existential participation in the facts which are known, and that understanding, therefore, also appreciates existential possibility. Thus in order to understand anything, one must first understand oneself, and understand oneself in relation to others. Self-understanding becomes faith in that one understands oneself existentially, i.e. with personal involvement, in relation to the object of faith (the Gospel). Indeed, self-understanding is necessary before faith is possible, in that one has to understand one's own condition before realising what God has done about it in Christ. One must have a pre-understanding of oneself and the Gospel, says Bultmann, taking up the terminology of Heidegger, before one can accept the word and believe (i.e. have faith).

4. Freedom

Bultmann accepts the existentialist assumption of the ideal of freedom, and uses it to interpret faith. Freedom is given by God and should be seized positively by the believer. Freedom is from those things which separate one from God, e.g. angst, the cares of the world, and oneself. With this existentialist freedom, the
individual is to maintain his independence and integrity amongst others, and so be free for God.

Through faith "Man becomes free from himself" and this is a mark of authentic existence. Such freedom is invigorating; it is also satisfying when it frees one for God - as Bultmann says, "But this faith ... is also confidence because it is freedom from self and communion with him on whom he believes." This freedom is from many things, including sin, wickedness, law, men, social conventions and standards, death, and, above all, from the old self. Positively, "The man of faith is free for the tasks of the day ... is free for love." There is also freedom for the future (which we shall examine later), and freedom from the past, and from illusion, in order to be our real selves. In short, the freedom of faith is freedom to live as an authentic individual existentially, fully aware of possibilities, decisions, and responsibilities, and the holding of such faith and freedom is a mark of maturity.

There are three aspects which are typically existentialist which Bultmann develops: besides freedom from oneself (which we have already noted), there is freedom from the world, freedom from Angst, and freedom for decision.

We shall look at these aspects later in this chapter, but here we should note that the freedom from the world is possible because of the freedom of faith: "It is in this attitude of 'as if not' that Christian freedom from the world consists ... It is a freedom that has the right to dispose of everything in the world." What we wish to emphasise here is the power and authority which such freedom of faith bestows - and it is this power and authority which makes for the place of the individual for the existentialist. The
freedom of faith as freedom from angst was taken from Kierkegaard. Thus Bultmann using similar terminology says that the man of faith "is free from dread". And why? He replies "The man of faith is free from anxiety because he fears God, and for the rest, fears nothing in the world."

Faith, and its freedom, is a gift of God conferred on the individual, giving the benefits of freedom from the self, the world, and from existential angst. But with this freedom are presented choices, decisions, and responsibility. We shall look later at the aspect of decision as an existentialist theme of faith, but for now we must see that this too is a product of the freedom of faith. Faith is a decision given by man in and because of his freedom, for faith is "a free act of decision." For Bultmann, not only is the content of the Christian faith freedom, but the decisive act of faith itself is a mark of freedom.

* * *

Freedom may be an existentialist theme, but there are still many different interpretations that have been placed on the whole concept of freedom by existentialists. Clearly, Bultmann does not follow Nietzsche's freedom which arises with the death of God, nor does he follow Jaspers' freedom which arises by virtue of the distantiality of God, rather his view is more akin to that of Kierkegaard (which is also found in the Bible) that freedom is the gift of God which gives man personal responsibility.

The things from which the freedom of faith sets the believer free are similar to those things renounced by the existentialists: angst, threats to one's personal existence and authenticity, and temptation. Bultmann is following Paul, Augustine and Luther, as
well as Heidegger, when he says that freedom is attractive but ultimately deceptive. Freedom is a positive opening to various possibilities for the good, and is for Bultmann an existentialist interpretation of faith.

5. Detachment from the World

Bultmann reflects existentialist criticisms of society and the world when he interprets faith as rejection of the world. God and the world are different spheres entirely, but faith can convert the world to God. The transition is necessary because a gulf separates them at present and it is for this reason that the world is to rejected by the faithful. The believer should be aware of the snares of the world, its false values and deceptions, and aware also of the nothingness of the world and himself.

When the understanding of faith realises the sinfulness of the world an interpretation has been made, and by faith the world is rejected. Thus

... there is also given to faith through revelation and the Gospel a definitive 'clarification' of profane existence that is not visible to philosophy. It is a 'clarification', namely, that does indeed permit 'profane' existence to appear as 'always already graced'.

The world is still therefore the theatre of God's activity; it is a matter of faith both to see and to exercise that fact, for faith "is a fundamental attitude to life". But this attitude brings about a rejection of the world: "... to live beyond the world, to have passed from death to life."

According to Bultmann, faith's rejection of the world may take two forms: one is withdrawal from it, the other is to gain victory over it. Bultmann also uses another phrase to describe this
rejection of the world; desecularisation. Indeed, "Faith is desecularisation, transition into eschatological existence." Rejection of the world is a process of faith, because "faith as the act of believing constantly brings about this desecularisation." Rejection of the world may take the form of the believer withdrawing from the world in order to serve God. Withdrawal from the world is described as eschatological existence so that the place of the individual in faith's rejection of the world is still strictly under and before God. It is clear, then, that Bultmann sees faith as renunciation of the world. Although this included a renunciation of oneself, this worldly renunciation is more; it is "a miracle", and we may "... describe faith itself as the act of removal out of this world." This act of faith in rejecting the world is not a once-for-all act, but a continuous act of removing oneself from the power of the world.

The other way of rejecting the world is to overcome it by renouncing evil, and to improve the criteria of the world's judgements. "Outwardly everything remains as before, but inwardly his relation to the world has been radically changed, the world has no further claim on him, for faith is the victory which overcometh the world." Again, this overcoming of the world is a continuous process, not a unique act. Bultmann finds the New Testament criticism of the world the same as that of the existentialists, but as he says, "This does not mean that faith has a negative relation to the world, but rather that the positive relation that it has to it and to its ordinances is a critical one."

* * *

Bultmann sympathises with the existentialists' criticism of
society and the world in sociological terms as inhibiting the individual's authenticity and initiative, in ethical terms as lowering personal standards, and in psychological terms with reference to the concept of Angst. This shows that man is not at home in the world, whilst Jaspers' concept of "transcendence" directs us to look beyond our own small world. Furthermore, we have seen that Jaspers explicitly advocated detachment from the world by the individual. But Bultmann's criticism of the world is just as much indebted to John (and the rest of the New Testament), whilst his emphasis on the transcendence of God and the corresponding implications about the nature of man were taken from Kierkegaard and Barth before Jaspers had developed his concept of Transcendence. He does not develop Heidegger's ideas on the threat to Dasein, nor his concept of Das Man, although Biblical precedents such as Satan and temptation could have been referred to in this context. Suffice it to say that Bultmann found existentialism a useful source in interpreting faith as rejection of the world.

6. "The Man of Faith"

"The Man of Faith" is Bultmann's term to describe the epitome of the existentialist believer, and we shall see in this individual the various existentialist themes of faith we have examined and will examine shortly. The Man of Faith stands out in true existentialist style as the one who "is in the world but not of the world", one who retains his independence because his life rests in this faith in God and not on the cares of the world. We shall therefore first examine the status of the Man of Faith, and then turn to examine his conduct.

The distinct status of the Man of Faith, Bultmann says, is bestowed by God: "The man who has faith is therefore the man whom
God has transformed, the man whom God has put to death and made alive again; he is never the natural man. Nevertheless, the Man of Faith is still in the natural world:

Even the man of faith remains in existence; he does not have a new structure of existence created for him. As a human being, the man of faith always comes out of unbelief; he always remains in the paradox of 'I believe, Lord help my unbelief'.

The Man of Faith has a peculiar detachment from the world so his conduct should be determined by faith through "walking by the Spirit". In other words, the man of faith lives in the fear of the Lord, for he is always conscious that his whole life depends on the grace of God.

Various existentialist implications follow from this status of the Man of Faith. For example, he has existential possibilities in his historical life. There is tension and paradox in his life, mostly because of the provisional character of the world (usually seen by Bultmann with reference to I Cor 7:29-31).

For the Man of Faith, therefore, "dying also has become for him a 'dying as though he did not die'" because of the character of his faith. Like the true existential individual, the Man of Faith has personal freedom. In fact, the Man of Faith has what is known as existential ethics:

Hence there are no special practices designated for the man of faith...' but faith working through love' (Gal. 5:6). Accordingly, 'faith' both as to degree and to kind realises itself in concrete living; in the individual acts of the man of faith.

It is significant to notice that in personifying the Man of Faith, Bultmann was following the example of his existentialist predecessors. How does the Man of Faith compare with Kierkegaard's "Knight of Faith", with Nietzsche's "Apollo-Dionysius" and "Superman",
and with Heidegger's "Dasein"?

Like Kierkegaard's Knight of Faith, Bultmann's Man of Faith is an ordinary person, but who by virtue of his faith in God is able and does - conduct himself distinctively in the world. Both characters are appropriately humble before God; just as the Knight of Faith lives in the realms of "infinity", giving up the world to lay hold of it by God's strength, so the Man of Faith's life is "provisional", but here Bultmann still quotes the New Testament to confirm this existentialist theme. But Bultmann does not reproduce the extreme individualism of Kierkegaard's Knight, for the Man of Faith has still to weep with those who weep, e.t.c., and again Bultmann finds Biblical support for a moderate existentialist interpretation of faith.

Bultmann's description of God's expectations of the Man of Faith - that he is capable of something good, to be completely free and noble - is strikingly similar to that ideal of Nietzsche's Apollo-Dionysius (later the hybrid Dionysius who appears as the Antichrist): the rebirth of vitality and reaffirmation of life, with the passions decently sublimated. The reality of the existentialist analysis of the human situation by both Nietzsche and Bultmann could not see the original Apollo alone as the ideal, the Man of Faith has a certain tension and ruggedness in his character, a maturity which is moulded by the demands of life... and of God.

The basic attitude of Heidegger's Dasein includes being towards death, which is paralleled by openness to the future adopted by Bultmann's Man of Faith. The very individuality of these two characters is evidence of their existential significance. Bultmann's indebtedness to Heidegger becomes explicit when he refers repeatedly
to *Being and Time* as he analyses the Man of Faith under the alternative title "The Man of Love": "Thus the determination that the man of love acquires from the thou is exactly analogous to the threefold determination of man by death, which is made visible by existential analysis." Bultmann quotes Heidegger as he has been doing throughout this particular essay of his) to show that there is a "not yet" always in front of the Man of Faith; existence does not really belong to him, for each man has his own individual personality.

7. "Authentic Existence"

Bultmann adopts the existentialist concept of authenticity when he sees it as the ideal to be achieved, the goal of salvation. But it is also a state of living to be practised here and now in that each individual should assert himself in the power of his faith. For example, "Authentic freedom can only be freedom to do what one ought. But this freedom is authentic freedom because in it man does what he really wants to do, namely, to achieve his authenticity." Here we see the etymological import in the existentialist concept of existence - that authentic existence is the asserting of oneself here and now, and consciously realising it: "For existence in the moment is his authentic being."

But Bultmann also describes a peculiarly Christian existential authentic existence, when one's life is completely under the control of God, and the individual seeks to do the will of God for him. In other words, authenticity for the Christian is not gained by existentialist self-assertion but by living in that authentic way which God has set out. Authenticity in faith is not egocentric self-assertiveness as such; that is sin. Rather, authenticity in faith is a matter of being true to God in one's own life, so that
"... the authentic I is set over against the factual one" – in as much as I am ruled by my faith. Authentic existence, then, is the true life of faith, and it is here that we see the ethical significance of the existentialists' authentic existence for Bultmann; the individual's authenticity is measured not so much by the self, but by God.

What are the marks of faith as authentic existence, according to Bultmann? One such feature is the decisiveness of the believer as an individual, for its enactment tests his authenticity. Thus "It is rather that in each individual concrete case a true decision of love now takes place and it alone proves whether that decision of faith, prior in time, was authentic." This authenticity itself is tested by its constancy in life; what Bultmann calls "abiding" as opposed to "provisional, unauthentic faith". The authentic life is the life of faith, the life of faith is authentic existence: "This is what the New Testament means by 'life after the Spirit' or 'life in faith'."

Bultmann argues that according to existential analysis, faith as freedom for the future is a mark of authentic Being. He takes this view directly from Heidegger, who is quoted later by Bultmann in his exposition, which again demonstrates that authentic existence is an existentialist theme he employs to interpret faith.

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Although the existentialist background to the concept of authentic existence is extensive, as we have seen in our first chapter, Bultmann admits that he took the term Authentic Existence direct from Heidegger. We may thus see to what extent Bultmann uses Heidegger to interpret faith in this way.
For Heidegger, authenticity is a simple reference to one's conscience, a being true to oneself. The non-religious type of authenticity is liable to become self-centred, though doubtless Heidegger would wish to avoid that pitfall. Certainly Bultmann saw this potential danger, for he described authenticity as being authentic towards God rather than towards men. The individual is authentic not when he is true to himself \textit{per se}, but when he is true to God and to what He believes God intends himself to be. On the one hand Bultmann adopted the Heideggerian, existentialist, term and theme of authentic existence, but so adapted it that it lost its original egocentric meaning. On the other hand, it could be said that Bultmann adopted the existentialist term, but idealised it in his adaptation of it, so that man could be true to himself only in that he should be true to the genuine, authentic man God intends him to be. In the last resort, Bultmann drops the existentialist tendency to anthropocentricity in favour of Christian theocentricity. Once again we see Bultmann happily adopting an existentialist theme and term, but not fully developing the idea to any extreme, only making it serve his purpose of interpreting faith.

EXISTENTIALIA

1. Decision

Decision is a basic characteristic of faith,\textsuperscript{122} but Bultmann also expounds on the decision of faith in existentialist terms. Decisions, he says, have to be made in "the moment" (the right time), with awareness of the "potentialities for the future" which lie ahead, and which "possibilities" require a "decision" for which full "responsibility" must be taken.\textsuperscript{123} The existential import can be seen clearly here, but Bultmann makes this existentialism pointed
by his reference to the "either-or" nature of the decision of faith.\(^{124}\)

Bultmann introduces other existentialist motifs in his interpretation of faith as decision; for example "Faith is only faith in so far as it is a decision, and decision is only decision when it is free."\(^{125}\) The decision of faith is therefore described as "... a new understanding of myself as free from myself by the grace of God."\(^{126}\) The decision of faith is utterly personal and is therefore a way of coming to self-understanding, which, as we have already seen, is another existentialist facet of faith,\(^{127}\) especially in the face of "nothingness".\(^{128}\) Furthermore, the decision of faith rejects the world,\(^{129}\) as well as the safety of empirical evidence: "... it is only when there is no such objective guarantee that faith acquires meaning and strength, for only then is it authentic decision."\(^{130}\) This existentialist interpretation of the decision of faith is seen in terms of authenticity through self-understanding: "... the word which claims to be the revelation must place each man before a decision - the decision as to how he wants to understand himself: as one who wins his life and authenticity by his own resources, reason, and actions, or by the grace of God."\(^{131}\)

More important for our study is Bultmann's indebtedness to Heidegger's concept of "resolve" or "resolution" to interpret faith as decision. To be sure, in an essay published in the same year as *Being and Time*, Bultmann does in fact refer to "resolution" in a manner very much unlike Heidegger, saying that "... faith does not depend on a resolution about which I can deliberate. Faith is immediate decision."\(^{132}\) Thereafter, however, Bultmann's use of "resolution" in connection with faith is consistently Heideggerian;
for example he says "... faith is truly the seizing of his potentiality of being, the anticipating of his future beforehand in resoluteness." Faith may be seen as response to revelation, as an act of decision. Thus "The new life is a historical possibility created by the saving event and it is a reality wherever it is grasped in the resolve to act.... Precisely this resolve is faith, the faith which believes..."

Bultmann speaks of faith as resolve with direct reference to Heidegger in a positive way: - "According to Heidegger, man freely chooses his possibility of existing authentically.... the man who is to resolve necessarily exists... to resolve in his actual being-there." Resolution is the realisation of one's personal finitude and its possibilities, and Bultmann regards this as an act of faith. Faith is from the outset an ontological possibility of man that appears in the resolve of despair. It is this that makes it possible for man to understand when he is encountered by the kerygma. For in willing to resolve man wills to believe and to love.... theology is able on the basis of existential analysis to interpret faith and love in their formal ontological essence as resolution.

Bultmann has various existentialist ideas in mind when he interprets faith as decision. Kierkegaard characterised the decisive nature of following two ways of life (the aesthetic and the theoretical) in terms of "either-or"; decisions have further implications which may not be discerned immediately, so that decisions always affect the whole of one's life. Bultmann says that the Christian always faces the decision of "either-or", and he emphasised the possibility of a completely new life which a decision for Christ could mean. Kierkegaard's "dread" and Jaspers' "boundary situations" are also existential challenges to the
individual to make a decision which is basically a religious one of faith, and Bultmann has this in mind when describing faith as decision. Jaspers sees choice and decision in the context of freedom, and Bultmann explicitly shares this view, as we have seen.

More significant, however, is to compare and contrast the "decision" of Bultmann with the "resolution" of Heidegger. For Heidegger, resolution comes in a situation of disclosedness, when one's conscience gives a decision or value-judgment on one's feelings and conduct. Its self-searching guarantees the authenticity of resolution and decisive character. For Heidegger, then, resolution is a decision of the conscience concerning matters of ethics. Bultmann also sees decision as referring to oneself, indeed, faith is a decision to be authentic, that is, true to oneself. We have already seen that Bultmann explicitly reiterates Heidegger's views on "resolution" when he discusses the decision of faith. But the anthropocentricity in "resolution" may well misrepresent the essential character of faith, which is theocentric. Bultmann guards against the danger by seeing decision in terms of a response to and a resolution for God. This is the nature of faith. Resolution, according to Bultmann, is not just an instance of Heideggerian self-authenticity, but is also the realisation by man of his personal finitude and limitations before God, and so is an aspect, indeed an existentialist interpretation, of faith.

2. Openness to the Future

Faith is forward-looking and is open to the new things the future holds;"...it constantly stands before him and he becomes himself only in constant openness for what he encounters."
Bultmann comments "Now such openness and readiness is believing faith.... and places him in a radical loneliness before God." The openness of faith is that attitude which allows for renewal based on dependence on God. It includes openness to death for with faith one can have "hopeful trust" in God. In other words, "... it means being determined by the future." Such an outlook holds steadfastly to faith, but is prepared to question everything. This openness of faith requires a degree of personal boldness, "For faith is truly the seizing of his potentiality of being, the anticipating of the future beforehand in resoluteness." Indeed, faith anticipates every possible future; but in faith, not foreknowledge. In short, "This is what is meant by 'faith': to open ourselves freely to the future." Significantly, Bultmann points out that "Certainly existential analysis may assert that freedom for the future is a mark of authentic Being.... that if we want to attain authentic existence we must be free for the future."

An example of this existential analysis may be seen in Bultmann's description of the hope of faith: "This 'hope' is the freedom for the future and the openness toward it which the man of faith has because he has turned over his anxiety about himself and his future to God in obedience." The believer can be open to the future because he has committed it to God in faith; his life of faith must therefore be open to what God will do to him and for him in the future. Bultmann makes it very clear that openness to the future is an existential theme for interpreting faith, because it is an essential characteristic of man himself.
Bultmann adopts the existentialist analysis of man as being open to the future to describe faith which is openness towards God. But how are these two ideas interrelated?

Nietzsche's openness to the future, the Eternal Recurrence, is really a form of fatalism, with, of course, the alleged absence of God. But Bultmann can also speak of the believer allowing himself to be determined by the future, and accept it. Like Nietzsche, Bultmann sees this openness by the individual to be a very personal, lonely attitude, but whereas Nietzsche sees the individual to be alone before a great nothingness, Bultmann sees the individual facing God. For Bultmann, openness to the future means openness to God, and that is faith.

This same religious interpretation is given by Bultmann to Heidegger's concepts of "Being-towards" and anticipation; the believer is one who faces God in anticipation of him, in openness to the future wherein God is to be found. Bultmann also interprets the existentialist openness to the future as freedom from all those things in the future which so agonise existentialists: anxiety and nothingness. This attitude of openness to the future is the positive act of confidence in God which is an interpretation of faith.

3. Possibility and Venture

Bultmann does not so much argue that faith opens up possibilities, but that faith itself is a possibility. As such, faith is in fact coupled with unbelief, and each is a distinct possibility. As a result, faith itself is the only authentic existential possibility for the individual if he is to be an authentic being.

As we have seen, for the believer "... faith is truly the
seizing of his potentiality of being..." Bultmann explains its existentialist character in these terms: "This is true because faith as possibility of existence can be understood even by the believer as a possibility of existing and understanding." Theologically and practically, faith is a possibility which must be seized constantly anew. The believer exists only by seizing faith as he does his other existential possibilities, just as faith is the possibility which is necessary in order to be (exist) at all in the face of despair. Either way, faith is a very real possibility for the individual:—

As new possibility faith is the newly opened way of salvation.... the concrete realisation of the possibility of faith in the individual's decision of faith is itself eschatological occurrence.... the believer experiences the possibility of the faith-decision as grace...

Thus faith is the possibility of new life with God. Faith offers the individual the two possibilities of his self-understanding: recognition of his need for salvation and acceptance of it as offered by God through Christ.

Possibility, of course, is temporal, and Bultmann followed the existentialists in discussing it in the context of time and history. Faith is historical possibility, not only in that God has done something for man through Christ, but also that man's response and reaction is also seen in the temporal act of faith.

As a result, we are conscious of our own responsibility, because faith is not a general possibility but an historical possibility.... Faith is in reality directed towards something which does not lie within those possibilities of life under my control.

In later writings, Bultmann emphasised the eschatological element in the possibility of faith, because faith is a present possibility. But the whole of the life of faith is eschatological, as we shall see:
"... every instant lies the possibility of being an eschatological instant, and in the Christian faith this possibility is realised."\(^{165}\)

This challenge lies behind Bultmann's interpretation of faith as "bold venture"\(^{166}\) and his equating eschatological existence with the new venture of faith.\(^ {167}\) In a small article entitled "Faith as Venture", Bultmann discusses the validity of this interpretation.\(^{168}\) The venture of faith, he agrees, is not a blind and risky groping in the dark (although it may be a leap in the dark), because such talk "... contradicts Christian faith's peculiar certainty. Therefore, talk of faith as venture is legitimate only when what is meant by it is that faith 'ventures something'. 'Not to venture faith itself, but to venture in faith'\(^{169}\).

But Bultmann, having said this, is not satisfied, and what he in fact produces is an existentialist reaction; a reaction which is possible only because the debater is actually participating fully in the subject itself - venture in faith. Bultmann therefore asks: "For if I venture something in faith, do I not at the same time venture faith itself? Do I not at the same time and for the first time venture to believe?\(^ {170}\) The antithesis, then, is false. The person who ventures in faith and who makes what he does a venture of faith is in fact doing the same thing.\(^ {171}\)

Faith, then is an activity, not a static state of being; it is an activity of possibility and venture which is an existentialist theme of faith: "To believe means not to have apprehended but to have been apprehended. It means always to be travelling along the road between the 'already' and the 'not yet', always to be pursuing a goal."\(^ {172}\)

# # #
Bultmann follows Kierkegaard in saying that possibility is the result of freedom. For Kierkegaard, the dread which possibility produces can be overcome only by faith; similarly Bultmann sees faith as a very real possibility in these circumstances. Adopting this existentialist theme, he says that faith is a possibility in life, and that faith also provides a way through the problem brought about by existential possibilities.

For Heidegger and Bultmann, possibility (and projection) is one of the main characteristics of existence. Human life has potentiality for existence or Being, according to Heidegger; similarly, Bultmann says that faith is the taking hold of this potential. This possibility includes that of salvation, which is both a present and a future possibility according to Bultmann.

4. Abandonment of Security

Bultmann says that faith involves the abandonment of security because of the existence of doubt, risk and Angst. Not only does existential analysis expose these factors, faith in fact presupposes them, for faith is the Christian answer to these problems... although insecurity remains. Indeed, Bultmann never really succeeds in balancing this idea with that of the assurance of faith.

The key to Bultmann's understanding of faith in terms of the abandonment of security lies in his remark that "Faith would be cheated of its purpose if the believer were to consider himself insured by it." One believes because of - and in spite of - the absence of insurance and security: "Faith is the abandonment of man's own security and a readiness to find security only in the unseen beyond, in God." Man is not self-sufficient as natural science would claim. Faith is the abandonment of such pretensions
and false senses of security.\(^{175}\) There are no certainties in faith, there are no secure possessions, the assurance of faith is given only to the believer who realises that his whole existence is provisional on God.\(^{176}\)

The authentic life... would be a life based on unseen, intangible realities. Such a life means the abandonment of all self-contrived security. This is what the New Testament means by 'life after the Spirit' or 'life in faith' .... The old quest for security, the hankering after tangible realities, and the clinging to transitory objects, is sin... for faith means turning our backs on self and abandoning all security. It means giving up every attempt to carve out a niche in life for ourselves, surrendering all our self-confidence, and resolving to trust in God alone...\(^{177}\)

There can be no security in face of the necessary uncertainties in the content of faith either. The object of faith cannot, by definition, be susceptible to proof, or else God and the realm of the divine would be brought down to the level and comprehension of man.\(^{178}\) Faith cannot be logically proven:

For faith is always in danger, exposed to doubt; it has its certainty only as the positive correlative to uncertainty. But this certainty, as authentic certainty, requires uncertainty as its correlative. It is certainty only as faith beset by attack and doubt, and yet maintained.\(^{179}\)

Everything must be subject to doubt, both the object of belief and the ability to believe, as well as the confidence of the believer himself.\(^{180}\) Authentic faith exists when man has no security in himself and no certainty in God, for then faith will mean what it says, and its true character will be realised. Doubt is overcome only through faith.\(^{181}\)

In abandoning all security, there is the risk of faith, which may be seen in terms of perplexity and darkness\(^{182}\) and in terms of our facing ontological nothingness.\(^{183}\) The whole existence of the believer is therefore at risk: "... we really abandon ourselves to
God by existing for him and giving him the glory.\textsuperscript{184} The risk of faith, then, is not foolhardy, but a supreme reliance on God.\textsuperscript{185} This reliance on God should be a direct personal matter (as would be expected by any existentialist); indirect belief is not authentic. For example, one cannot believe in the resurrection on the basis of the first disciples' faith, but only believe on the basis of the story itself.\textsuperscript{186} The individual's standing in the faith "... is not a static condition, but... takes place amidst the vicissitudes of each man's life..."\textsuperscript{187}

Our third aspect of the existentialist theme of the abandonment of security used by Bultmann to interpret faith is \textit{Angst}. The finitude of man as exposed by existential analysis is adopted by Bultmann to explain how the gospel message speaks to man's condition. According to Bultmann, the Christian faith affirms the existentialist view that man has no earthly security:-

... affirms that man is not at home in the world, that here he has 'no lasting city'. It affirms that he is under an illusion when he imagines that he can dispose of himself and can outwardly and inwardly secure his life. It points out to him that he has not brought himself into existence and does not dispose of his end. It reminds him that human life stands under the shadow of death.\textsuperscript{188}

Bultmann proclaims that the Christian gospel - indeed faith itself - is the answer to \textit{angst} and the finitude of man, "For such faith knows that nothing in the world can ultimately claim me and also that nothing in the world can destroy me. The man of faith is free from anxiety because he fears God, and for the rest, fears nothing in the world."\textsuperscript{189}

Faith still involves "fear of God"\textsuperscript{190} and is still "readiness for dread"\textsuperscript{191} but all this is to be surrendered to God. Thus
the man of faith turns over his anxiety about himself and his future to God: "The man of faith is relieved of this fear because in faith he has let anxiety about himself go."\(^{192}\) On the other hand, fear "is an indispensable constitutive element in 'faith', inasmuch as it guarantees the centering of the believer's attention upon God's 'grace'."\(^{193}\) Faith is violated if it is regarded as insurance, for faith comes with the abandonment of security.

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Existentialism is by nature very suspicious of security and of people's claims for it and of it, and this is exemplified in Kierkegaard's rejection of Hegel's system. Whilst there is little evidence for Bultmann adopting the idea of the "leap" from Kierkegaard, he certainly followed him in including risk in his interpretation of faith. This risk is not of the trivial foolhardy type of act, but is a mode of living which exists when there is no security or knowledge at hand. For both Kierkegaard and Bultmann, the risk of faith is that which exists when man abandons his self-security and his own strength, and relies instead entirely in the power of God.

In his concept of the boundary situation, Jaspers pinpointed those circumstances where man's finitude and limitations are most pressing on the individual, where there is no security for man at all. Bultmann also scorns security in the transitory world, and says that man should look to ultimate situations and concerns. Furthermore, Bultmann agrees with Jaspers that even the ultimate, the boundary, has no security in itself, and it is here that faith begins. Jaspers' concept of foundering is paralleled by Bultmann's view that man must despair in his doubt about himself (a view also
previously stated by Kierkegaard), and abandon all yearnings for security.

Heidegger's concept of "thrownness" also illustrates the predicament of man without security in this life, but here again we find that Bultmann, having accepted this existentialist analysis, proceeds to use it to interpret faith as a response to that situation: faith is turbulent in itself. With Heidegger's concept of "falling" (often compared with the Christian concept of sin), Bultmann again borrows this existentialist theme of the loss of security, but adapts it when interpreting faith to show that faith is a matter of inward movement (a movement away from sin, perhaps, which, following Luther, is itself lack of faith). Faith means the abandonment of human security, and the embracing of the fact of human uncertainty, which now develops as one lives in total and utter reliance on God.

5. Problems and Paradox

Problems in the life and act of faith were highlighted by Bultmann which he says amounts to "Crisis in Belief". The crisis is both in the credibility of the content of faith and also in the very act of believing. However, this crisis may well provide a good corrective to a superficial faith which asks no questions in its false security, and so faces no existential problems which faith should raise. In other words, the challenge has gone out of faith because its object has lost its very incredibility. Bultmann thus emphasised that the real crisis of belief is a continual one, a rumbling, pressing problem - it is the assault on the autonomy of man physically, mentally, and spiritually in the face of God who
who challenges these attitudes in man, for "... man's belief in himself always means a crisis for belief in God." 196

Bultmann sees the problems of faith include temptations and lifelessness which existential analysis expose: "Faith is the trust in God that arises precisely when to the eyes of man there is nothing but darkness and death." 197 There is also the problem that faith is not susceptible to proof; that one can only believe. 198 The problem as Bultmann sees it is the challenge of the content of faith - the overcoming of the offence of the gospel. 199 Another problem of faith is, as we have mentioned before, one of conduct in the world - How does one remain unstained, in the world but not of the world? This is not just a problem for Christianity but one for any religion. 200 Faith faces many problems existentially in a world which is out of touch with transcendence.

The paradox of faith basically is that the world of faith has no correspondence with the world of ordinary everyday man. Despite the claims of faith, little appears to verify it in the world. 201 "Faith is the supremely paradoxical cry: 'I believe, Lord help my unbelief!'". 202 It is the paradox of being in the situation between the "no longer" and the "not yet". 203 In the meanwhile, we are left with what Paul calls "the paradox of the interim" 204 which includes the paradoxical nature of freedom, the paradox that faith is both a motion of the will and a negation of the will, 205 the paradox of relations between the faithful and the world, 206 and the simple need just to endure paradox. 207 Bultmann is fond of quoting II Corinthians chapters 4, 6, 12, in this connection, 208 for there Paul portrays the existential paradox of the life of faith, when the world belies all that faith stands for. As Bultmann
says, "Faith stresses the paradoxical identity of an historical event and the eschatological event..."\textsuperscript{209}

Addenda

\textsuperscript{ω}ςμη - I Cor. 7:29-31

This aspect of faith Bultmann called "a peculiar detachment from the world".\textsuperscript{210} As such, it is part of the existentialist theme of "rejection from the world", but it also represented for Bultmann a Biblical example of the paradox of faith, for "The relation of the believer to the world is a \textit{dialectical} one, that 'having as if I had not' of which Paul speaks (I Cor. 7: 29-31)."\textsuperscript{211}

Faith "... acquires a peculiar relation of distance to the world - the relation, namely, to which Paul refers by the peculiar phrase \textsuperscript{ω}ςμη... (I Cor. 7: 29-31)\textsuperscript{,212} and which thereby takes a critical view of the world through the eyes of faith. Bultmann elsewhere calls it "that peculiar distance from life of which Paul speaks"\textsuperscript{213} but his commentary in fact shows that his interest is rather in the paradox of faithful living than in the rejection of the world which gave rise to the existential paradox. As usual with Bultmann, we find him quoting the Bible to reinforce the existentialist interpretation of faith which he has adopted:

... that, for the man of faith, everything worldly once again acquires the character of being provisional; he knows that 'the form of this world is passing away' (I Cor. 7:31; cf. I Jn. 2:17), and his having is a 'having as though he did not have' (I Cor. 7: 29-31).\textsuperscript{214}

For Bultmann, "as though not" describes the existentialist attitude of the believer; that although the world belies God, faith persists in spite of this paradox: - "It means preserving a distance from the world and dealing with it in a spirit of 'as if not' (\textsuperscript{ω}ςμη, I Cor. 7: 29-31)\textsuperscript{.215} It means: - this is how to endure the paradox of faith.
"Nevertheless" - Ps. 73:23

Bultmann occasionally speaks of the element of "nevertheless" which describes the paradox of faith with a Biblical term:

This is the paradox of faith, that faith 'nevertheless' understands as God's action here and now an event which is completely intelligible in the natural or historical connection of events. This 'nevertheless' (the German dennoch of Ps. 73:23; and Paul Tillich's in spite of) is inseparable from faith.216

The belief in "nevertheless" provides the assurance of faith in face of the problems and paradoxes that faith brings: "Belief in God is the courage which gives utterance to this 'nevertheless!' - 'nevertheless I am continually with thee: thou hast holden me by thy right hand'".217 This assurance is vital; "Faith cannot dispense with its 'nevertheless'".218 It is the mark of true faith, for "faith can become real only in its 'nevertheless' against the world."219

Like Kierkegaard, Bultmann definitely sees the place of paradox in faith, as well as the absurd, and the necessity of struggle in faith. For Kierkegaard, faith embraces the paradoxical, for this is the nature of believing that with God all things are possible; it is believing the absurd. Bultmann takes a similar viewpoint as we have seen. Just as Jaspers and Heidegger had terminology - "foundering" and "care" respectively - to describe the problems of life, so Bultmann uses the concepts of "crisis" and paradox from St John and St Paul respectively. For Bultmann, these Biblical ideas reflect those of his existentialist sources, and so he does not find it embarrassing to say that the paradox of faith means that faith does run counter to human knowledge and expectations. This he illustrates by using the two Biblical phrases
and "Nevertheless" to show that the Biblical and the existentialist understanding of the nature of faith are identical.

6. Imperative and Renewal

Bultmann is very concerned, as would be any existentialist, to emphasise the personal significance of imperative and renewal of faith for the individual. One cannot simply emulate the faith of former believers: "I can never base my faith in God upon the faith which someone else has." Faith is not the reproduction of another's ideas; rather, to be genuine, faith has to work a "transformation of the hearer's own existence." Therefore, faith is neither a once for all act nor a static experience, but something which has and gives imperative and renewal to the life of the believer.

Bultmann is aware of the existentialist problem that the demands of God on man amount to compulsion in faith, but says "We can only believe in faith that the must is a reality.... This and nothing else is the meaning of faith. But belief in the must does not exhaust the meaning of faith." Clearly, "... faith must also be a free act..." in order to preserve the existential freedom of the individual believer. Faith really is an imperative: a state in which one must exist, and also a state towards which one must exist. Thus the whole of the life of faith "... constantly stands under the imperative... and must constantly be laid hold of anew..."

The bridging point between the imperative and the act of renewal is the moment, for "faith is always won in the moment." Faith is not able to be held without constant renewal; it cannot be simply retained for a period of time, but must always be realised...
anew in every moment and situation of life:-

Real belief in God is not a proposition which one can have ready to hand in order to evade the challenge of the 'moment'. On the contrary, it must actually be grasped and confirmed in the 'moment'...

It is the "moment" which both inspires and produces faith, because it is the "moment" that faith is required; thus the need for renewal is also discovered in the "moment".

Renewal of faith is always necessary - and is a necessary part of faith - because faith is not static but alive, unless, of course, it dies through lack of renewal: "Even for ourselves, our own faith can never be a standing ground on which we can establish ourselves. Faith is continually a fresh act, a new obedience." Existentiually, the believer "... can only believe again and again - he may always believe again and again. For life is exactly that." For Bultmann and the existentialists, the possibilities of life necessitate constant renewal of faith: "Theologically expressed, faith is not a new quality that inheres in the believer, but rather a possibility of man that must constantly be laid hold of anew..." As a result, "The decision of faith is never final, it needs constant renewal in every fresh situation." An example Bultmann uses is that overcoming the world is a constant battle, a constant renewal of faith, carried out with courage and hope. But the underlying philosophy of Bultmann in stressing the renewal of faith is existentialist - theory and platitudes have no place in faith, for they are stultifying: - "Faith must always be won afresh in the battle against the working conceptions which would corrupt it."
Addendum

"No longer... not yet" - Phil. 3:12-14

There is a paradox in the theme of imperative and renewal in faith, it is "... the being in between past and future, the simultaneity of 'already' and 'not yet' - in the exemplary way in which Paul expresses it in Phil. 3:12-14". In other words, it is "... always to be travelling along the road between the 'already' and the 'not yet', always to be pursuing a goal." Bultmann clearly finds this text important for it recurs frequently:

For Christian existence in the historical life on earth, an existence in the 'no longer' and the 'not yet' at the same time, as it is described mostly in Phil. 3:12-14. 'No longer', for the decision of faith has cast aside the past of self-confidence and self-praise... 'Not yet', to the extent that the surrender of the old existence is just the surrender of the self-security which supposes that it can control its own existence.

For Bultmann, by his existential interpretation of this text, faith is that mode of existence which exists in between, in tension, the past and the future work of God in perfecting the faith of the believer. Hence there is always scope and need for imperative and renewal of faith.

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Kierkegaard found this existentialist theme of imperative and renewal necessary in discussing the nature of faith (and of the Christian faith in particular), especially in terms of "becoming a Christian". For Bultmann similarly, faith is not a possession but a possibility to be seized at all times with imperative and renewal. One never has faith, one always has to be reaching out for it. Nietzsche's motif of "the will to power" has this same idea of imperative and renewal, the existentialist sense of urgency and
motivation, which gives vitality to life and to faith.

It is, however, the temporal aspect of this existentialist theme which shows Bultmann's indebtedness to Kierkegaard and Heidegger when interpreting faith as imperative and renewal. Both philosophers, and Bultmann, saw the significance of the instant or moment in temporal terms as the realisation of ideals which are ultimate and eternal. As we recall Heidegger's concepts of "Being-towards", anticipation, and projection, we find Bultmann describing the imperative and renewal of faith which constantly looks forward to the future because faith is a driving force in itself.

7. **Eschatological Existence**

For Bultmann, eschatological existence is not just anticipation of the end, but a detachment from the world and the realisation of "the moment". In all this, we discover that eschatological existence is life before God, in God's gracious time, rather than secular historicity. It is the climax of the life of faith:—

> For the man who believes is indeed the living man whose now is never a fleeting moment, for his now has life, has future... For faith is truly the seizing of his potentiality of being, the anticipating of his future beforehand in resoluteness. 239

Here we see Bultmann's use of existentialist terms to describe faith as eschatological existence. Similarly, the present possibility of the righteousness of faith is eschatological. 240 In fact, "The concept of faith is therefore defined eschatologically; that is, faith does not denote a human attitude which could be timeless and could be assumed at will..."241 Yet faith is still within human bounds since it "stresses the paradoxical identity of an historical event and the eschatological event..."242 But the
paradox is superficial only, for it is resolved when eschatological existence is understood as living historically in the face of death in the assurance of faith. Obedience and surrender are part of the eschatological attitude of the believer, for eschatological existence is lived out in historical existence.

Nevertheless, there is tension between religious eschatological existence in faith and secular existence in the world. This tension is described, as we have seen before, as detachment from the world, for "Faith is desecularisation, transition into eschatological existence." But to live the faith of eschatological existence is a challenge which few are able to meet because of the existential difficulties involved: "... every instant has the possibility of being the eschatological instant and in the Christian faith this possibility is realised." Bultmann thus presents the existentialist challenge of faith to each one of us: "In every moment slumbers the possibility of being the eschatological moment. You must awaken it."

* * *

There are eschatological elements in Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling and Sickness unto Death, in Jaspers' view that death is a boundary situation, and in Heidegger's doctrine of Being-towards-death. For Kierkegaard, there is both the process and the moment of realisation in faith, of realising Christ in one's life, of being contemporaneous with Christ. Similarly, Bultmann emphasises the present moment, the Now, that the finality of Christ implies the eschaton for the believer, who now lives an eschatological existence.

Heidegger, by speaking of "Being-towards-death" is in fact
describing a form of eschatological existence. This basic attitude to life Heidegger regarded not only as realistic but also authentic; it maintains the existential tension of living on the brink of ultimate possibility. This state of anticipation is adopted by Bultmann to describe the way faith is the seizing of potentialities, the anticipation of the future beforehand with resoluteness which is at the heart of eschatological existence. This is seen again when Bultmann speaks of the Now just as Heidegger speaks of "the moment of vision"; each phrase illuminates the other as Bultmann gives his existentialist interpretation of faith as eschatological existence. This phrase neatly summarises Bultmann's position for in it we recognise other existentialist themes we have noted before: temporal doubt, imperative and renewal, anticipation, and possibility. Eschatological existence points man to beyond himself at every moment - and this is what Bultmann understands that faith really means existentially.
CHAPTER THREE

FOOTNOTES

   ibid p.133.
   ibid p.179.
3. ibid p.236.
5. Bultmann Faith p.87.
7. ibid p.179.
8. ibid pp.244, 314.
   Bultmann Essays Philosophical and Theological pp.7,9,11,12,18
   Existence and Faith pp.86,165.
   Essays Philosophical and Theological p.7.
   Bultmann Jesus Christ and Mythology p.64.
   Essays Philosophical and Theological pp.6-7.
   Existence and Faith pp. 64,244-247, 260,261.
   The Gospel of John p.274.
13. Bultmann *Essays Philosophical and Theological* p.14
   cf. ibid p.18.
14. Bultmann *Faith* p.43
   *Faith* p.95.
   *Faith* p.93.
18. Bultmann *Essays Philosophical and Theological* p.301.
21. ibid p.90.
24. ibid p.9.
25. ibid p.18.
   ibid p.169.
29. ibid pp.324-325.
   cf. ibid.
32. Bultmann *Faith and Understanding* p.47.
34. ibid p.56.
37. Bultmann Essays Philosophical and Theological p. 171.
38. ibid p. 173.
40. Bultmann Existence and Faith p. 199.
41. ibid p. 301
    ibid p. 312.
    ibid p. 316.
42. ibid p. 322.
43. ibid p. 320.
44. Bultmann Jesus Christ and Mythology p. 63.
45. Bultmann Faith p. 46.
46. ibid p. 91.
47. ibid p. 100.
49. Bultmann Faith p. 91.
    Essays Philosophical and Theological pp. 234ff.
    Existence and Faith pp. 342ff.
52. ibid p. 315.
54. Bultmann Faith and Understanding p. 140.
55. ibid p. 316.
    Existence and Faith p. 166
    ibid p. 246.
58. ibid pp.435ff.
59. Bartsch *Kerygma and Myth I* pp.41-42.
60. ibid p.204. cf. ibid p.203.
    *Theology of New Testament II* p.84.
    *History and Eschatology* p.152.
    *Faith* p.88.
64. ibid p.239.
65. Bultmann *Jesus Christ and Mythology* pp.75-76.
68. ibid p.64.
69. ibid p.245.
70. Bultmann *Jesus Christ and Mythology* p.29.
71. ibid p.215.
72. Bartsch *Kerygma and Myth I* pp.19, 205.
    Bultmann *Jesus Christ and Mythology* p.77.
73. ibid p.79.
75. ibid p.308.
76. Bultmann *Essays Philosophical and Theological* p.86.
   cf. Bultmann *Jesus Christ and Mythology* pp.77-78.

78. Bultmann *Essays Philosophical and Theological* p.176.
   cf. ibid p.177.

79. Bultmann *History and Eschatology* pp.149-152.

   cf. ibid p.64.


82. Bultmann *Faith and Understanding* p.315.
   cf. Bartsch *Kerygma and Myth I* pp.197f, 199.


84. Bultmann *Faith* p.93.

85. Bultmann *Jesus Christ and Mythology* p.81.


87. ibid p.86.

88. Bultmann *Essays Philosophical and Theological* p.86.
   ibid p.301.

89. Bartsch *Kerygma and Myth I* p.22.

90. ibid p.208.
   e.g. Bultmann *Theology of the New Testament II* p.85.
   Bultmann *Faith* p.85.

91. Bultmann *Jesus Christ and Mythology* p.41.
   Bultmann *Faith* p.44.

92. ibid pp.100-104.

93. ibid pp.101-102.

94. ibid p.107.

95. ibid pp.103-104. cf. *History and Eschatology* p.152.


98. Bultmann *Existence and Faith* p.188.


100. ibid p.329.


    ibid p.167.


105. ibid p.99.

106. ibid p.99.

    ibid p.128.

107. ibid p.215.


    cf. *Essays Philosophical and Theological* p.86.


    ibid p.351.

    Bultmann *Essays Philosophical and Theological* p.86.


111. Bultmann *Existence and Faith* pp.128-129.

112. ibid pp.68-69. cf. pp.72, 80.

113. ibid p.98.

114. ibid p.101.

115. ibid pp.178-179.

    ibid p.184.


121. *ibid* p.205.

122. Bultmann *Essays Philosophical and Theological* p.175.

*ibid* p.176.


123. Bultmann *Essays Philosophical and Theological* p.17.

124. *ibid* p.62.


126. Bultmann *History and Eschatology* p.152.


*ibid* p.141-42.


*ibid* p.198.


131. *ibid* p.192.

132. Bultmann *Faith and Understanding* p.139.

133. *ibid* p.181.

134. *ibid* p.236.

135. *ibid* p.276.


137. *ibid* p.126.

139. Bultmann Essays Philosophical and Theological p.300.
140. ibid p.301.
143. Bultmann Faith p.84.
144. Bultmann Faith and Understanding p.201.
145. ibid pp.180-181.
146. ibid p.181.
147. Bultmann Essays Philosophical and Theological p.86.
    cf. ibid p.106, p.205.
150. ibid p.205.
152. Bultmann Jesus Christ and Mythology p.31.
153. Bultmann Jesus Christ and Mythology pp.77-78.
155. ibid p.317.
156. Bultmann Existence and Faith p.112.
157. ibid p.126.
    Bartsch Kerygma and Myth I p.22.
162. ibid p.276.
    ibid p.277.
163. ibid p.142.
166. Bultmann *Faith* p.76.
169. *ibid* p.63.
170. *ibid* p.63.
171. *ibid* p.64. cf. *ibid* p.65.
175. Bultmann *Essays Philosophical and Theological* p.18.
   *ibid* p.99.
181. *ibid* p.144.
183. *ibid* p.209.
185. *ibid* p.64.
188. Bultmann *Existence and Faith* p.252.
190. *ibid* p.166.


196. *ibid* p. 19.


200. *ibid* p. 78.

Bultmann *History and Eschatology* p. 152.


206. Bultmann *Jesus Christ and Mythology* p. 85.

207. Bultmann *Existence and Faith* p. 86.


210. Bultmann *Essays Philosophical and Theological* p. 86.


Bultmann *Faith and Understanding* p. 331.

212. Bultmann *Existence and Faith* p. 188.

213. *ibid* p. 209.


216. Bultmann *Jesus Christ and Mythology* p. 65.
219. Bultmann *Jesus Christ and Mythology* p.41.

   cf. Bartsch *Kerygma and Myth I* p.204.
224. ibid p.63.


   Bultmann *Jesus Christ and Mythology* pp.75-76.
229. Bultmann *Faith and Understanding* p.64.
230. ibid p.179.


   *Existence and Faith* pp.165, 170.


   Bultmann *Existence and Faith* p.311.
243. Bultmann Faith p.94.
Bultmann Jesus Christ and Mythology p.81.
247. ibid p.155.
TILLICH'S EXISTENTIALIST INTERPRETATION OF FAITH

INTRODUCTION

Tillich sees faith more in existential terms than in existentialist terms, whilst his existentialist themes are couched more in general terms than in specific doctrines. This may be seen in Tillich's comment that cognition in faith is "completely existential, self-determining and self-surrendering" in character.¹

Like Bultmann, Tillich also employs the general existentialist themes of the rejection of the abstract and the aspect of faith as subjective experience when interpreting faith, but in addition Tillich speaks of faith existentially as the centred act of the whole personality.² Faith is not a disinterested attitude, but a very real experience of the individual, and so necessarily subjective. It is this rejection of the abstract which Tillich sees to be at the heart of existentialism; the contrast is made when he says "... we are pointing to an existential, not a theoretical, understanding of religion."³ The nature of this existential view is both involvement and commitment, for one must be determined by one's faith.⁴ Faith is not vulnerable to empirical testing, because by its very nature it cannot be proved.⁵ As Tillich says, "Faith is not a theoretical affirmation of something uncertain; it is the existential acceptance of something transcending ordinary experience. Faith is not an opinion but a state."⁶

For the existentialist, faith is a matter for the individual to formulate and express himself; in fact it is a form of self-expression:—Faith "... is an act of the total personality, including practical, theoretical, and emotional elements."⁷ That this is an
existentialist theme for Tillich can be seen when he says "The risk of faith is existential; it concerns the totality of our being..." Faith is part of the whole of a man's character, being "... a movement in, with, and under other states of the mind." This movement, expressed in religious terms, is the way the believer feels "consumed in the presence of the divine" for this is part of any real act of faith. Because of this, Tillich sought to move from the subjective meaning of faith as a centred act of the whole personality to the objective meaning of faith; to what is meant by placing one's faith in the Unconditional. Whatever criticisms have been levelled at his actual exposition, this at least was Tillich's intention - a balanced view of faith.

**THE PLACE OF THE INDIVIDUAL**

Tillich's view of the place of the individual is also carefully balanced, whilst everybody is an individual in his own right, he is not independent of the society in which he lives. We shall therefore see a balance between the independent individual and the participant individual, and the philosophical conclusions Tillich draws from this situation.

1. The Independent Individual
   a) Self-Affirmation

Self-affirmation is seen by Tillich to a certain extent in psychological terms, and this may also be found in his existentialist sources (especially Nietzsche), though of course without the technicalities of twentieth century psychology. On the other hand, Tillich is aware of the danger in regarding faith as self-affirmation in that its tendency towards anthropocentricity is sinful. Rather, what he has in mind is a self-assertion which lives up to
that ideal of human dignity bestowed on man by God at creation, so that separation and decision are existential elements in the self-affirmation and assertion which is faith. Thus, "Where there is faith there is tension between participation and separation, between the faithful one and his ultimate concern." By participation, Tillich means involvement in order to believe in the object of faith; by separation, he distinguishes the believer from his God, and refutes the idea of possessing the deity. For Tillich, "... there is a natural self-affirmation in a person which should not prevent the affirmation of others... Self-affirmation... is the basis of life." As such, this natural self-affirmation is a form of faith in response to God.

Tillich thus advocates a dynamic concept of faith, and this underlies the message of his book Dynamics of Faith. In his question "Is not the dynamic idea of faith an expression of Protestant individualism and humanistic autonomy?" (a question Tillich in fact never answers here), is the implication (also found in what he says later) that the answer is 'Yes', and furthermore, that this is rightly so. We notice again here that Tillich sees individualism just as much in Protestantism as in Existentialism. As we shall see, this dynamic concept of faith still allows for "restful affirmative confidence" as well as courageous self-affirmation.

Self-affirmation, as we saw in Chapter One, is a general feature of existentialism, and was developed by our four existentialists in Chapter Two. When Tillich speaks of self-affirmation however, he is always careful to present it in terms of the believer before God. The moral element, developed by Kierkegaard, is seen by
Tillich as obedience to God, which is what faith is about. The self-affirmation of faith is not, therefore, independence as such, but dependence on God, an affirmation that the self is in communion with God. As such, Tillich evolves an orthodox position using an existentialist term. Furthermore, he maintains a balanced position by saying that self-assertion should not be at the expense and prohibition of the assertion of others. Here Tillich repudiates the more extreme doctrines of Nietzsche and Heidegger.

Nevertheless, Tillich is indebted to Nietzsche when he interprets faith as self-affirmation, although he also acknowledges inspiration from the Protestant reformers. Tillich notes that "Nietzsche's will to power... designates the self-affirmation of life as life..." It is interesting to notice, however, that whilst Tillich sees Nietzsche as the "forerunner of the Existentialist courage to be as oneself" he also says that "In the courage of the Reformers the courage to be as oneself is both affirmed and transcended... This radically distinguishes the personalism of the Reformation from all the later forms of individualism and existentialism". Tillich the Lutheran therefore says "The Reformation pronounces... one can become confident about one's own existence only after ceasing to base one's confidence on oneself." This Protestant self-affirmation is the one found in Kierkegaard and Jaspers, but is missing in Nietzsche and Heidegger. Tillich never really decides for the former, however, because his sympathies are with Nietzsche, as any reading of The Courage To Be shows.

There are many features of Nietzsche's thought which are reflected in Tillich, but three especially present themselves here. First, there is Tillich's admitted acknowledgement to Nietzsche's doctrine of the will - a doctrine more extreme than that of
Schopenhauer, which Tillich also knew of. Secondly, Tillich also learned the challenge of self-assertion from Nietzsche, and the religious significance of the Nietzschean concept of self-sublimation and virtue. Thirdly, Nietzsche's concept of the autonomy of man, where he asserts himself in transvaluing his values in the face of the death of God, is adopted by Tillich in terms of autonomy and self-affirmation, and is adapted to take account of man's standing before God.

b) Subjectivity

Although faith involves acceptance, "It is not the Existentialist courage to be as oneself..." rather, it is acceptance by God. Immediately, then, we see that Tillich guards himself against anthropocentricity as such. Such activity is for him only one side of faith. Maintaining his balanced view, Tillich again criticises subjectivity in faith when he says "Faith as the state of ultimate concern claims the whole man and cannot be restricted to the subjectivity of mere feeling."

Yet subjectivism is an aspect of this existentialist theme whereby Tillich interprets faith. When he speaks of "...participating in the infinite... in a sacred structure of reality" he is speaking of faith, "For faith is the faith of man. It does not come from man, but it is effective in man." The nature of faith, then, is discovered by looking within oneself, not away from oneself; it is deeply personal in that "... being moved by the Spirit is the prius of faith..." It is this objective side of a subjective experience which Tillich emphasises and so avoids the charge of subjectivism. Subjective factors of faith are inadequate to describe faith, so Tillich is still concerned to show that faith
involves an outside force on man - Ultimate Concern; the Unconditional.

Tillich had indeed much to say about the subjective side of faith. Having noted that "The subjective state of the faithful changes in correlation to the change of the symbols of faith" Tillich goes on to say that both the truth of faith and the truth of history imply "total involvement". Here we are to notice not just the existentialist plea for "total involvement", but the interpretative role of such activity in faith. Involvement in the Spiritual Presence requires the obedience of faith, which "... is the act of keeping ourselves open to the Spiritual Presence which has grasped us and opened us. It is obedience by participation and not by submission (as in love relations)." This Spiritual Presence, although experienced subjectively, is also regarded objectively by Tillich: "Although created by the Spiritual Presence, faith occurs within the structure, functions, and dynamics of man's spirit. Certainly, it is not from man, but it is in man."

Faith, then, is still a subjective experience, according to Tillich, and so still within the realm of the existentialist theme of subjectivity, even though it is not existentialist subjectivity as such that Tillich actually propounds.

* * *

Although Tillich is not keen to expound the subjectivity of faith in existential terms, his attempt to maintain a balanced view was already preceded by Jaspers' distinction and union of truth-subject and truth-object. Furthermore, whilst Tillich could not share Kierkegaard's view on the primacy of subjectivity in faith, he does share with him some of his ideas on the place of self-understanding in faith, as well as the importance of self-appropriation in realising one's personal faith.
2. The Participant Individual

a) The Courage To Be

We shall now discuss parts of Tillich's book *The Courage To Be* to see how the existentialist theme of the participant individual is used to interpret faith. We are not directly concerned with 'courage' as such here rather than with the social and psychological bearings this attitude has on the believer.

Tillich sees participation as an essential theme of existentialism:-

The existential attitude is one of involvement in contrast to a merely theoretical or detached attitude. 'Existential' in this sense can be defined as participating in a situation, especially a cognitive situation, with the whole of one's existence.36

Ontologically, everything participates in being-itself, "and everybody has some awareness of this participation, especially in the moments in which he experiences the threat of non-being."37

More important for our present study is to see what Tillich says in his fourth chapter "Courage and Participation" ("The courage to be as a part"), where he speaks of "the individual self which participates in the world"38:- "For this is just what participation means: being a part of something from which one is, at the same time, separated".39 Nowhere in this chapter does Tillich mention Nietzsche, Jaspers, or Heidegger, but at one point he is clearly indebted to Suhler: "Only in the continuous encounter with other persons does the person become and remain a person. The place of this encounter is the community."40 As Tillich says, "Participation is partial identity, partial non-identity."41 To that extent, the individual in the community will be at home yet also will be
personally frustrated at the same time. Inasmuch as one feels at home in the community, participating in it, one requires "the Courage to Be as Oneself", inasmuch as one feels personally frustrated in society, one needs "The courage to be as a part."

We see, then, that courage is required for the individual to be able to participate with others. It is also an existentialist theme in that the individual, whilst retaining his integrity, should also participate in society to realise his full potential as a private person. The courage this requires, though, to put oneself at risk in this way, is an act of faith. This is what Tillich is really talking about: "The courage to be is an expression of faith and what 'faith' means must be understood through the courage to be." This existentialist understanding of faith by Tillich therefore includes 'the courage to be a part', that is, the faith of the participant individual. In all this, we notice his indebtedness to Nietzsche's analysis of courage in his interpretation of faith as the courage to be.

b) Community and Participation

The participation of faith is two-fold; participation of the believer in the divine, and participation of the believer in the community. In Tillich's exposition there is also the existentialist emphasis of participation by the total self in the subject at hand.

Participation by the individual believer in the community of the faith requires a common language of faith to participate with and in, for "... faith cannot remain alive without expressions of faith and the personal participation in them." Whilst it may be questionable whether acts of faith are dependent on language, we
can see that for Tillich the community has some influence and power over the individual in matters of faith, especially as illustrated by the formulation and recitation of creeds and in the manner of corporate worship. Tillich repeats all this in his discussion on "The Community of Faith and its expressions" when he says that "... faith is real in the community of faith, or more precisely, in the communion of a language of faith." Furthermore, "the condition of its continuation is the vitality of its faith." In the Spiritual Community there are tensions of faith between the individual believer and the rest of the membership, and to Tillich's mind, community faith is existentially inferior to personal faith. This is because there is a lack of the element of authentic personal faith of this individual, which is restrained by the demands of the community as a whole. On the other hand, Tillich recognises the stabilising, constant nature of the community's faith: "The faith which constitutes the Spiritual Community is a reality which precedes the ever-becoming, ever changing, ever disappearing, and ever re-appearing acts of personal faith."

This then, is the tension - that both individual and community have their benefits and their drawbacks. This tension is one the existentialists have discussed a great deal, usually favouring the individual as against society. Tillich refuses to make a judgment, but his interpretation of the tensions of faith in terms of individual and community is certainly existentialist as we have seen.

Clearly Tillich has little sympathy with the more extreme individualistic views of Nietzsche and Heidegger, nevertheless he
has views compatible with and similar to those of Heidegger on "Being-in-the-World". Here we see some realism expressed about the necessity of the individual to accept the world and society, and the personal need to participate in them to develop one's own character and individuality itself. Tillich is much more positive about the advantages of this participation than is Heidegger, though he does not disguise the fact that being with other Christians can have its own tensions simply "because of the polarity of individualisation and participation".\(^{52}\) But as this is Tillich's overall view of the community of faith, the inescapable conclusion is that Heidegger may not be so far in the background after all, thus influencing Tillich in this existentialist interpretation of faith.

3. "Unambiguous Life"

In this section we shall be looking at the existential status of the individual in his life of faith. This section may be regarded as an addendum to the previous two sections, as it expounds the answer Tillich gave to the problems of tension raised between the independent individual and the participant individual. In this section also may be seen most clearly the mystical strain in Tillich's concept of faith.

a) Criticism of "Unbelief"

Tillich's criticism of unbelief follows Luther and Kierkegaard. All three saw unbelief as sin, yet all still allowed for doubt and risk as necessary constituents of faith, as we shall see. Thus when Tillich says "In autonomous culture, belief-ful activity is replaced by unbelief-ful activity bound to form"\(^{53}\) what he means is that belief-ful activity is found in theo-centric culture, whereas unbelief-ful activity is found in anthropocentric,
autonomous culture, where it is governed by outward forms as opposed to inward fervour - something which was hinted at in his criticism of faith as found in the churches, which we noted above. Religiously speaking then, "Man's unbelief is his estrangement from God in the centre of his being".\textsuperscript{54}

On the other hand, Tillich does speak of unbelief in existentialist terms as well: "Faith is an essential possibility of man, and therefore its existence is necessary and universal".\textsuperscript{55} Clearly this existential statement is not entirely consistent with the religious assertions we have just noted:- existentially, faith must always exist in some form, religiously it is authentic only when it is theo-centric. Unbelief is when man turns in on his existential self and does not realise his essential self in relation to God, the ground of his being; there is a disruption of participation with God and a separation of wills.\textsuperscript{56}

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In itself, a criticism of unbelief would not normally be regarded as an existentialist theme, but Tillich allows it to become one by saying that both faith and unbelief are existential movements of man.\textsuperscript{57} Similarly Jaspers' defence of unbelief, however, should not lead us to suppose that Tillich is diametrically opposed to him; in fact we have here two different concepts of unbelief. For Tillich it is sinful anthropocentricity in the face of God, it is separation from God. For Jaspers, however, unbelief is that underlying doubt which makes faith what it is, and not certain knowledge; unbelief provides the necessary tension which makes faith so meaningful to the existence of each individual believer. But in fact Jaspers also pleads for man to be in communion with God, whilst Tillich, as we shall see below, also emphasises the place
of doubt, risk, and tension within faith. By using different terms, Tillich and Jaspers appear to be at variance with one another, but on investigation they are both found to be saying the same thing, and saying it in terms of existentialism.

Both Tillich and Jaspers contradict Nietzsche's condemnation of faith as a screen for man's natural instincts and as a deficiency of mind or just immaturity. On the other hand they would want, like Nietzsche, to attack immaturity and lack of reason in faith, and they would agree with Nietzsche that faith must be the outcome of an existential struggle or else it becomes simply decadence. Here we see a common feature of Nietzsche's influence on Tillich; his just criticisms, parodies, and distortions of faith and Christianity are readily taken and corrected by Tillich in his existentialist interpretation of faith.

b) "Transcendental Union"

Tillich often speaks of faith in terms of "transcending" or "transcendental union", and finally he calls this "transcendental union" "Unambiguous Life". There are various modes of "transcending" in faith, according to Tillich. One type is that "... the intention of faith always transcends the object of faith." This transcendent movement of faith is embodied in one of Tillich's definitions of faith:—"Faith, formally or generally defined, is the state of being grasped by that toward which transcendence aspires, the ultimate in being and meaning". Another form of the transcending nature of faith is that of the secular transcended and the divine reached. Thus for the believer, "Faith is not an act of any of his rational functions, as it is not an act of the unconscious, but it is an act in which both the rational and the non-rational elements of his
being are transcended. Tillich would go even further:

"Absolute faith and its consequents... transcends the theistic idea of God." 

There seems to be no limit to the vertical transcendence of faith, according to Tillich; an idea, we have seen, which is also shared by Jaspers. On what might be called the horizontal level, Tillich could also speak of the transcending of the different emphases in the courage to be, either of participation or of individualisation: "... if both poles are accepted and transcended the relation to being itself has the character of faith." In fact, "Faith transcends every conceivable reality" and can overcome sin by reunion.

Tillich expresses the relationship between "transcendental union" and "unambiguous life" in this way:

In the reunion of essential and existential being, ambiguous life is raised above itself to a transcendence that it could not achieve by its own power.... The 'transcendent union' answers the general question implied in all ambiguities of life. It appears within the human spirit as the ecstatic movement which from one point of view is called 'faith', and from another 'love'.... faith is the state of being grasped by the transcendent unity of unambiguous life - it embodies love as the state of being taken into that transcendent unity.

Tillich also gives another "material definition and concept of faith":- "Faith is the state of being grasped by the Spiritual Presence and opened to the transcendent unity of unambiguous life." Tillich goes on to explain that this "... is a description which is universally valid, despite its particular Christian background." (Elsewhere similarly he speaks of the "... basic definition of faith as the state of being grasped by the Spiritual Presence and through it by the transcendent union of unambiguous life." We must remember, however, that this transcendent movement is a
process, and unambiguous life itself is a goal to be aimed and
striven for continuously. There is, therefore, an emotional
element in faith, described by Tillich as "oscillation". We can
see, then, that transcendental union and unambiguous life are
existentialist themes used by Tillich to interpret faith, especially
in terms of the existential movement of faith in the believer.

There is clearly a similarity in terminology between Jaspers' "transcendence" and Tillich's "Transcendental Union". Both Jaspers
and Tillich retain the paradox of transcendence above and beyond
immanence, together with transcendence meeting immanence, when in
this life we can know and experience (though here Jaspers would
probably rather say "recognise") transcendence as a divine
protective presence. For both Jaspers and Tillich, transcendence
is on the boundary, reached by a rupture with immanence, and each
share the important idea of this transcending movement. For Jaspers,
transcending is the basic principle of life, by it we become
independent of the world and free for ourselves. Similarly for
Tillich, transcending is equally important and significant; it is
the act of faith. Nevertheless, for Tillich, transcending is an
act (a verb), whereas for Jaspers, Transcendence is the sphere
of the divine (a noun).

This movement towards transcendence is the religious antithesis
to Heidegger's idea of "falling". But all this still remains an
existentialist theme as all three are concerned about the spiritual
life of the individual in terms of experiences and feelings. The
meeting and co-existence of transcendence and immanence of which
both Jaspers and Tillich spoke is called "transcendental Union" by
our theologian.
His equation of "Transcendental Union" with "Unambiguous Life" is existentialist in character as Unambiguous Life has similarities with Heidegger's description of Authenticity. According to Heidegger, authenticity is about reality (compare Tillich's term "unambiguous"), and is to do with self-assertion (compare Tillich's exposition on the ways immanence meets transcendence). Just as Heidegger's authentic existence describes the individual living as a self-determining individual, independent of the pressures of the world, so Tillich's Transcendental Union and Unambiguous Life describe life which is transcended above the immanent and ambiguous; it is the life of faith and love which has broken the great existentialist estrangement of man from the ground of his being. Finally, both Heidegger's authentic existence and Tillich's Transcendental Union and Unambiguous Life are not states of serenity which can be achieved and held, but are goals towards which man can only continuously strive to grasp. Faith is such a movement of transcendence, according to Tillich, and is a life of personal authenticity, where ambiguity is banished in favour of an existentialist striving for Transcendental Union.

EXISTENTIALIA

According to Tillich, there are in relation to the Spiritual Presence three elements of faith: first, openness and passive reception; secondly, paradox, courage, and acceptance; and thirdly, anticipation, hope, and participation. "These three elements", he says, "express the human situation and the situation of life in general in relation to the ultimate in being and meaning."72 These elements also serve to point us to the "existentialia" by which Tillich interprets faith, and we now turn to examine them.
1. Ultimate Concern - The Unconditional

It was in his early writings mostly that Tillich spoke of the Unconditional and of faith as "Directedness toward the Unconditional". "It is directed immediately toward a holy object .... Faith reaches beyond the immediacy of all things to the ground and abyss upon which they depend." Thus God is referred to as the Unconditional, and "... faith is determined by its directedness toward the Unconditional... the act of grasping the Unconditional is an act of faith; without faith the Unconditional is not apprehensible." The Unconditional, God, has its antithesis in the conditioned which is lower than the divine; however, man can know the Unconditional only in such a conditioned form. Thus it is that "Faith is always based on revelation, for it is an apprehension of the unconditional import through conditioned forms." In faith, then, there is devotion to the unconditioned kernel, but some attention is also given to the conditioned symbols in which the Unconditional is found. The certainty of faith is of fundamentals only; there is certainty in the Unconditional, but not in its outward forms, so that "... faith means being grasped by the power of the unconditional." The significance of the ultimate for Tillich is highlighted in his saying "What concerns one ultimately becomes holy." Ultimate concern is in the sphere of the divine because finitude has been transcended thereby. It is important, therefore, for faith to recognise the position of symbol, and give the status of ultimacy to God. The existential perspective of the ultimate is shown in the following way by Tillich:
Man's faith is inadequate if his whole existence is determined by something that is less than ultimate. Therefore, he must always try to break through the limits of his finitude and reach what can never be reached, the ultimate itself. ... Faith must unite the tolerance based on its relativity with the certainty based on the ultimacy of its concern.  

It therefore follows that "The criterion of every faith is the ultimacy which it tries to express." Tillich is not advocating faith as being grasped by an ultimate (or being ultimately concerned) as a doctrine, (as he has been accused of, so presenting an inadequate doctrine of faith), but he is describing in existentialist terms the existentialist experience and practice of faith.

Discussing the relation between philosophy and religion with regard to the concept of ultimacy and ultimate concern, Tillich says "Philosophical truth is truth about the structure of being; the truth of faith is truth about one's ultimate concern." Also ... there is a point of identity between the ultimate of the philosophical question and the ultimate of the religious concern. In both cases ultimate reality is sought and expressed - conceptually in philosophy, symbolically in religion.

These different forms of expression, says Tillich, betray the difference of relationship to the ultimate. The religious relationship is in fact existential, as it is involved and concerned, whereas the philosophical relationship is detached and disinterested. Tillich, however, sees a basic unity in philosophy and religion, and it is found in the term "ultimate concern": "Where there is philosophy there is expression of an ultimate concern; there is an element of faith, however hidden this may be by the passion of the historian for pure facts." Speaking of the union of philosophy and faith which has been called "Philosophical Faith" by Jaspers, Tillich, whilst presumably in sympathy with the aims of Jaspers, criticises his term as "misleading" first because it confuses the
two elements of philosophical truth and religious truth, secondly because the term implies that there is and can be only one such philosophical faith.

"Ultimate Concern" is a key concept for Tillich, for as he once said in a dialogue "... religion is defined as a state of 'being grasped by an ultimate concern' - which is my definition of faith - ...". By this, Tillich means "... we are pointing to an existential, not a theoretical, understanding of religion". This existentialist interpretation of faith was expounded mostly in Dynamics of Faith, where we shall now follow Tillich's discussion.

The unconditional concern which is faith is the concern about the unconditional. The infinite passion, as faith has been described, is the passion for the infinite. Or, to use our first term, the ultimate concern is concern about what is experienced as ultimate.

The existentialist allusions in these statements will be elaborated later, but we may note here that for Tillich the term Ultimate Concern represents both the subjective act of faith and the objective goal of faith.

One of the ways in which ultimate concern is ultimately subjectively experienced is "The feeling of being consumed in the presence of the divine...". The ultimate itself is thus an existential experience, which may be one of tension: "Where there is faith there is tension between participation and separation, between the faithful one and his ultimate concern." However, according to the mystics, with whom Tillich has some affinities and sympathy, the ultimate is present in this finite world in the soul. Self-surrender is therefore necessary: "Faith, within this movement of the soul, is in a state of oscillation between having and not having the content of ultimate concern." It therefore follows that "Existential doubt and faith are poles of the same reality, the
state of ultimate concern.... But serious doubt is the confirmation of faith. It indicates the seriousness of the concern, its unconditional character." Reunion of the self and the ground of being is an existential possibility in the faith of ultimate concern, so that faith "... is participation in the subject of one's ultimate concern with one's whole being." More significant for our purpose of selecting those themes and ideas of Tillich which reveal his existentialism are his "two formal criteria for every theology" as each has a special prominent place for "ultimate concern" as an existentialist theme for interpreting faith. Later Tillich explains

In a short formula, one can say that faith is the state of being grasped by an ultimate concern. The term 'ultimate concern' unites a subjective and an objective meaning: somebody is concerned about something he considers of concern. In this formal sense of faith as ultimate concern, every human being has faith. Even granted that what Tillich really meant was "somebody is ultimately concerned about something he considers to be of ultimate concern" (i.e. the emphasis is on the ultimacy of the concern), his formula has attracted criticism for its unqualified breadth and extensive application. We should notice this point because both terms have existential significance for Tillich's interpretation of faith. It is this ultimacy which constitutes the essence of "ultimate concern" as an existentiale in Tillich's interpretation of faith.

For Tillich, "The fundamental symbol of our ultimate concern is God". Symbols of God have been placed in and taken from stories about God. However, Tillich stresses that "Faith is not the belief in such stories, but it is the acceptance of symbols that express our ultimate concern in terms of divine actions." This view is related to Bultmann's principle of de-mythologising. As Tillich says:-
This is the world of the myth, great and strange, always changing but fundamentally the same: man's ultimate concern symbolised in divine figures and actions. Myths are symbols of faith combined in stories about divine-human encounters. Because of this, "The conflict between religions is not a conflict between forms of belief, but it is a conflict between expressions of our ultimate concern." Thus we find Tillich remarks that the Enlightenment philosophers, modern humanists, etc., have a type of moral faith with their own ultimate concern. According to Tillich, then, for all religions the essence of their faith by which they believe is the ultimacy of their concern. The differences between the faiths in which people believe are the varying natures of their ultimate concerns.

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In this section we have noted many features of existentialism which appear in Tillich's interpretation of faith as ultimate concern. There are also interesting allusions to certain doctrines propounded by three of our existentialists in Chapter Two, and we shall now look at these existentialist ideas in turn.

The theme of the Unconditional and Ultimate Concern are existentialist only by indirect influence rather than by direct borrowing from particular existentialists, although they do have some idea of the Unconditional as that which faces the individual in his finitude. This particularly evident in Jaspers' and Heidegger's concept of Transcendence, which stands over and against the individual (Jaspers' "Existenz" and Heidegger's "Dasein"), and which is the object of man's concern. Similarly, Jaspers' concept of the Boundary Situation and Transcendence being on the boundary provides an existentialist parallel with Tillich's concept of ultimacy, but the parallel is not too close, especially as Tillich also had his own
concept of the boundary and boundary situations which do not feature directly in his concept of ultimacy.

Just as Tillich referred to God as "the symbol of the Unconditional" we find that Jaspers regards God as "a cipher of Transcendence." In this instance of common form of religious language, we find that both Tillich and Jaspers stress that faith is a matter of being stretched existentially to one's very limits, that faith is to affirm the Unconditional, to pursue the ultimate concern, to experience the Ultimate.

With his concept of Ultimate Concern, Tillich is emphasising that aspect of faith which is not just emotional concern, but also that concern about the Ultimate (the Unconditional). As far as the need for emotional concern is involved in faith, we may notice that this view is also shared by Kierkegaard and his insistence that faith is passion - a view which Tillich specifically endorses, though guarding himself against the hint of individualism implicit in Kierkegaard's statement. Indeed, Kierkegaard's term "infinite passion" is directly paralleled by Tillich's term "Ultimate Concern". This aspect of "Concern" is also found in Heidegger, with his concept of "Care"; just as Heidegger interprets life in terms of Care, so Tillich sees it in terms of Concern. But whereas Heidegger's Care (Concern) is centred on man (facticity, possibility, and falling), Tillich's Concern is directed at the Ultimate, God.

With Jaspers' concepts of Transcendence and Encompassing we find the same elevated line of thought as Tillich's Ultimate Concern and the Unconditional. According to them both, the individual's life has a divine perspective, and the experience and acknowledgement of this is known existentially as faith. Jaspers'
concept of the Boundary Situation is also to be found in Tillich's concept of Ultimate Concern, since the Jaspersian idea of the individual exploring the limits of his finitude is to be found in Tillich's concern for the individual to come to terms with the Ultimate which governs his life, although for Tillich "the boundary" is a metaphor, whereas Jaspers understands it literally.

2. Ecstasy and Mysticism

For Tillich, ecstasy is a quality both of the Holy and of the believer. For the believer, the self-transcendent aspect of faith is enacted by rational prayer or non-rational ecstasy. Faith is the ecstatic experience which is the visible ground of self-transcending realism. As such, "True ecstasy is united with faith, and faith transcends what seems to be real, because it is the presence of the really, the ultimately, real." In other words, faith "... is the existential acceptance of something transcending ordinary experience."

Faith is "ecstatic" in that it is the "centred act of the personality"; that is, of the authentic individual. This personal element is significant existentially:

In the ecstasy of faith there is an awareness of truth and ethical values; there are also past loves and hates, conflicts and reunions, individual and collective influences. 'Ecstasy' means 'standing outside of oneself' - without ceasing to be oneself - with all the elements which are united in the personal center. Tillich is careful to show that ecstasy in faith is not irrational (an accusation sometimes levelled also at existentialism): "Faith as the state of ultimate concern is reason in ecstasy." On the other hand, as we have already seen, ecstasy is a movement of faith working for Transcendental Union or Unambiguous Life.

Tillich has great sympathies with and leanings towards
mysticism, but found it difficult to accommodate with existentialism. Nevertheless, "In every mystical experience an act of self-transcendence or faith is implicit." Discussing faith and participation, Tillich says that mysticism and personalism are the two characters of the relation to being-itself which, if they are both accepted and transcended, the result is faith. Thus "Faith embraces both mystical participation and personal confidence." On the other hand, Tillich also had some reservations about the place of mysticism in faith, and in fact he says "... I do not think either mystical union or personal encounter fulfills the idea of faith." Rather, faith "... transcends both the mystical experience and the divine-human encounter.... Absolute faith includes an element of scepticism which one cannot find in the mystical experience." Tillich's real position regarding the place of mysticism in faith may be found in his discussion on the Protestant problem of the relation of mysticism to faith when he says They are compatible only if the one is an element of the other.... As an ecstatic experience, faith is mystical, although it does not produce mysticism as a religious type.... There is faith in mystical experience.... But the mystical experience is not identical with faith.

For Tillich then, ecstasy and mysticism are valid existential expressions of faith so long as they are kept in balance with other factors in faith. But given such qualifications, as Tillich does, ecstasy and mysticism remain for him a valid existentialist theme by which to interpret faith.

Tillich's exposition of faith as ecstasy and mysticism is thoroughly existentialist, especially as we see that he retains the
existentialist etymological interpretation of the word "ecstasy". As an English word derived from the same Latin root as "exist", ecstasy has a technical meaning in existentialism; the act and experience of standing outside of oneself both rationally and non-rationally. Heidegger spoke of the "ecstases" of temporality\textsuperscript{125} in terms of the future existence of the individual. The description Tillich gives of the movement of ecstasy is couched in Jasperian language:— "Whenever we transcend the limits of our own being, moving toward union with another one, something like ecstasy ('standing outside oneself') occurs."\textsuperscript{126} Also Jasperian is Tillich's defence of ecstasy and mysticism against the charge of irrationality. This defence may have been made with the criticism of Nietzsche in mind, that faith is a mark of a deficiency of the mental faculties. If this is so, Tillich clearly respected this criticism of faith, and sought to answer it without attacking the source of the criticism.

In the ecstasy of faith there is also the existentialist element of passion and complete involvement by the individual in ecstasy and also mysticism. In all this there are parallels in the thought of Kierkegaard with the ecstatic passion of faith, and the elements of self-reflection and self-assertion in the ecstatic individual.

3. Acceptance and Certainty

Acceptance of existential situations is the basis of the existentialist theme used by Tillich to interpret faith. Thus "Faith is not a theoretical affirmation of something uncertain, it is the existential acceptance of something transcending ordinary experience."\textsuperscript{127} Another example of such existential acceptance is "... that the acceptance of despair is in itself faith and on the boundary line of the courage to be."\textsuperscript{128} Tillich explains that "The faith which makes the courage of despair possible is the acceptance of the power of
being, even in the grip of non-being."\textsuperscript{129}

Tillich also speaks of what we may describe as "religious" acceptance: "In every act of faith there is cognitive affirmation, not as the result of an independent process of enquiry but as an inseparable element in a total act of acceptance and surrender."\textsuperscript{130} Similarly, the acceptance of revelation is also faith,\textsuperscript{131} because "The acceptance of the affirmative with the whole of one's being is called faith..."\textsuperscript{132}

As a result, the demands of acceptance in faith also extend to church discipline; if one accepts the faith, one also accepts the moral affirmations of the faith.\textsuperscript{133}

Faith is the experience of the power of self-affirmation, "But it is an experience which has a paradoxical character; the character of accepting acceptance."\textsuperscript{134} For Tillich, the acceptance of being accepted is an "element in absolute faith";\textsuperscript{135} it is "... the courage to accept that one is accepted in spite of sin, estrangement, and despair".\textsuperscript{136}

Furthermore, the believer "... must accept just this. He must accept that he is accepted; he must accept acceptance."\textsuperscript{137} The acceptance and certainty in faith by the individual believer is described by Tillich as "restful, affirmative confidence."\textsuperscript{138} The certainty of faith is also found in the believer participating in the community of the faith.\textsuperscript{139} For Tillich, "The certitude of faith is 'existential', meaning that the whole existence of man is involved."\textsuperscript{140} But he makes it clear that "Its certitude is not the uncertain certitude of a theoretical judgement."\textsuperscript{141} In fact Tillich says that the certainty of faith lies in the ultimate concern, for the life of faith itself is really one of relativity, doubt, and tension.\textsuperscript{142}

It is important to notice, then, that this certainty is limited to a certainty of faith about fundamentals only. There is certainty in the Unconditional but not in its forms; the object of faith is certain, the life of faith is uncertain.\textsuperscript{143} Tillich therefore raises the
question "Exactly what can faith guarantee? And the inevitable answer is that faith can guarantee only its own foundation, namely, the appearance of that reality which has created that faith."¹⁴⁴ This experience is his only certainty,¹⁴⁵ and even this is not unquestionable¹⁴⁶ as we shall shortly see. * * *

As an existentialist theme, acceptance and certainty is to be seen in the personal views of the particular existentialists we studied in Chapter Two, and these views can be compared directly with those of Tillich.

For Kierkegaard, "infinite resignation" is the act of faith which accepts whole-heartedly the supreme will of God, Tillich also sees faith as the acceptance, especially when he says "The acceptance of the affirmative with the whole of one's being is called faith."¹⁴⁷ Nietzsche's positive willingness to come to terms with life and fate is paralleled by Tillich's doctrine of "accepting acceptance". It is within this Nietzschean and Tillichian understanding of acceptance that the certainty of faith is possible. Because of this, it is also possible to see that the religious serenity of Jaspers' Philosophical Faith, tempered by struggle and tension in life, is also similar to Tillich; for each writer, certainty lies in the Ultimate, the Transcendent, whilst acceptance lies in admitting the supreme status of God. We may also note that the acceptance of Tillich has the same character as the anticipation of Heidegger in that each deliberately faced up to the realities of life and death in the same philosophical way.

4. **Doubt and Risk**

Alongside the acceptance and certainty of faith there is the existential doubt and risk in faith - a theme which Tillich develops more fully. As he says, "In every act of faith, there is risk, and the courage to take this risk, and the necessary doubt which distinguishes
faith from mathematical or empirical evidence. This idea occurs again as the third of Tillich's three principles of "Protestant formation": Doubt is not opposed to faith, but is a constitutive part of it: "Living faith includes the doubt about itself, the courage to take this doubt into itself, and the risk of courage." This marriage of doubt with faith is very existentialist in character, as it refers to the experience of faith and doubt by the individual: "... doubt is not the opposite of faith; it is an element of faith. Therefore, there is no faith without risk... Tillich also argues that doubt is not just part of faith, but that faith should function as a voice of doubt. Existentialism is a product of the anxiety of today, with doubt and meaninglessness challenging the whole validity of faith.

How is the faith through which justification comes to us related to the situation of radical doubt? Radical doubt is existential doubt concerning the meaning of life itself; it may include not only the rejection of everything religious in the narrow sense of the word but also the ultimate concern which constitutes religion in the larger sense.... It is the way in which the people of our time can be told that they are accepted with respect to the ultimate meaning of their lives, although unacceptable in view of the doubt and the meaninglessness which has taken hold of them. In the seriousness of their existential despair, God is present to them. To accept this paradoxical acceptance is the courage of their faith.

In other words, for Tillich, existential doubt is part of faith, and accepting this is an act of faith itself. It is important, therefore, for theology to "state the necessity of doubt which follows from man's finitude under the conditions of existential estrangement." This existential dimension of doubt and faith is equally a feature of the theological enterprise: "Every theologian is committed and alienated; he is always in faith and in doubt; he is inside and outside the theological circle."

Tillich is fond of saying that there is faith in every serious doubt, for such doubt reflects the faithful yearning after truth:
"Absolute faith includes an element of scepticism..." He explains that "The content of absolute faith is the 'God above God'. Absolute faith and its consequence, the courage that takes the radical doubt, the doubt about God, into itself, transcends the theistic idea of God." Faith involves a tension between certainty and doubt, between faith and doubt; yet all these factors are necessary for faith itself. It is in the existential experience of the life of faith that Tillich can speak of the inter-connection of doubt and faith. Tillich's argument is, then, that doubt in faith requires courage, and courage within faith enables a healthy doubt to subsist within, or even exist alongside, faith.

Risk in faith is the more physical side to the existential life of faith, doubt being on the mental side of faith. As Tillich says "The risk of faith is based on the fact that the unconditional element can become a matter of ultimate concern only if it appears in a concrete embodiment." Besides the risk that faith may be misplaced, there is the existential risk of faith in which the whole life of the believer is at stake: "The risk of faith is not arbitrariness, it is a unity of fate and decision." True Protestant faith... involves daring and risk; it has no safe standards, no spiritual guarantees; it cannot do other than venture and risk.... A daring act is demanded, an act which penetrates to the deepest level of reality, to its transcendent ground.

As with doubt, Tillich is thus able to say "Therefore, there is no faith without risk... The risk of faith is existential; it concerns the totality of our being." Yet in spite of his obvious indebtedness to existentialism for the theme of risk by which to interpret faith, Tillich is aware of a danger in this particular approach - that of "... undirected wilfulness, as we find more in
some Protestant and much Existentialist thinking."\textsuperscript{164}

Faith also contains religious risks, which are still existential because "Faith contains a contingent element and demands a risk."\textsuperscript{165} There is, for example, the risk of actually recognising, or not recognising, the genuineness of the ultimate concern; is it really of ultimate concern?\textsuperscript{166}

There is a risk if what was considered to be a matter of ultimate concern proves to be a matter of preliminary and transitory concern.... The risk to faith in one's ultimate concern is indeed the greatest risk man can run.\textsuperscript{167}

Another example of the religious and existential risk of faith is that of the individual believer asserting his personal faith within the Spiritual Community.\textsuperscript{168} Again, even the contents of faith may involve risk, especially in the problems of expressing that faith in adequate symbols.\textsuperscript{169} Furthermore, "The Christian church takes the 'risk of faith' in affirming practically and theoretically that this revelation cannot come to an end...."\textsuperscript{170} In other words, believers take the risk of claiming that their doctrines are true at all. Thus

Faith dares to assert its dependence on that event which is the criterion of all revelatory events. Faith has the courage to dare such an extraordinary assertion and it takes the risk of error. But without this courage and without the risk, it would not be faith.\textsuperscript{171}

\* \* \* 

Doubt and risk naturally arise within the existentialist interest in the contingency of life, and they are sometimes expressed ontologically in terms of Angst.

Kierkegaard spoke much on the place of doubt and risk in faith. This important element of faith gives power to the emotional fervour of faith, as faith is invigorated by doubt and risk, and they stir it to do great things. Similarly, Tillich says faith must have courage and daring because of the doubt and risk it contains. Just
as Kierkegaard posited faith in the "Absurd", so Tillich warns of the risk faith takes in recognising the genuine Ultimate Concern. For both, one believes although it may appear absurd, thereby taking the risk of faith.

Tillich's thoughts on doubt in faith are couched in the same language that Jaspers used earlier when describing the necessity of unbelief in belief. Tillich says faith must include scepticism and doubt. Jaspers used the term "foundering" to describe the existentialist doubt and risk in life and faith, whilst the same emphasis on the basic uncertainty in faith is to be found in Tillich's description of Absolute faith. This existentialist theme of doubt and risk is also seen in Heidegger's view that Angst is the ontological basis for Care (Concern), which is the basic characteristic of existence. Tillich sees faith as the answer to this existential depression, doubt, and meaningless, not by removing it, but by taking it into himself in faith. It is precisely Heidegger's analysis of facticity, possibility, and falling which constitute in all but name Tillich's doubt and risk in faith.

5. Tension, Struggle, and Paradox

Tillich saw tension, struggle, and paradox as an extended existentialist theme by which to interpret faith:-

In radical theocracy the tension arises between unfaith in face of all finite forms and faith in the unconditioned form. A struggle of faith develops which ends either in a compromise between faith and unfaith or in faith in the paradox. Faith in the paradox, which in recognition of the unconditioned demand affirms the presence of the unconditioned import in a conditioned form, is the solution of the inner antinomy of faith.\textsuperscript{172}

Tensions between the secular and the sacred should dissolve because they coexist within each other.\textsuperscript{173} Similarly, faith and realism,
although often contradictory, belong together, "For faith implies
an absolute tension." Other tensions of faith are those between
the individual believer and the doctrines of the church, and those
between the finitude of man and the infinitude of his ultimate
concern. Out of this tension the problem of faith and tolerance
arises... Faith must unite the tolerance based on its
relativity with the certainty based on the ultimacy of
its concern... Here more than anywhere else the
dynamics of faith become manifest and conscious; the
infinite tension between the absoluteness of its claim
and the relativity of its life.

Tension between the individual and the community of the faith in which
he attempts to participate exists "... because of the polarity of
individualisation and participation." As a result, in spite
of these tensions, "The Spiritual Community contains an indefinite
variety of expressions of faith and does not exclude any of them."

How is tension experienced in faith? Tillich replies "Faith,
within this movement of the soul, is in a state of oscillation
between having and not having the content of ultimate concern."
Tillich also uses the same phrase when speaking of the emotional
swaying in faith between anxiety and courage. However, when
speaking of some type of faith, the picture is of tension which goes
through and beyond oscillation to a struggle of faith:- "In the
experience of the holy, the ontological and the moral elements are
essentially united, while in the life of faith they diverge and are
driven to conflicts and mutual destruction."

Paradox is the other way of seeing and accepting tension,
especially the tensions of faith. Faith is essentially paradoxical
in character, both in its content and its working out in life,
especially as regards "the paradoxical symbolic character of
revelation." Two other aspects of faith are called paradoxical
by Tillich - Providence, and the "New Being". Another aspect of the paradox in faith is that of accepting acceptance, because ...

to accept this power of acceptance consciously is the religious answer of absolute faith, of a faith which has been deprived by doubt of any concrete content, which nevertheless is faith and the source of the most paradoxical manifestation of the courage to be.

Tillich puts it succinctly: "To accept this paradoxical acceptance is the courage of their faith."

Addendum

"In Spite Of"

The element of "in spite of" in faith by Tillich parallels the "nevertheless" of Bultmann which we saw in our last chapter. Whereas Bultmann's "nevertheless" was derived from the Old Testament, Tillich's "in spite of" is from Luther:

In spite of all the negativities he had experienced, in spite of the anxiety which dominated that period, he derived the power of self-affirmation from his unshakeable confidence in God and from the personal encounter with him.

Even for Tillich, though, "in spite of" is existential by nature, having been referred to by Kierkegaard ("In spite of despair") and is an instance of the paradox in the life of faith.

Faith includes intrinsically the attitude of "in spite of". The "in spite of" is the existential attitude of the individual believer in the face of doubt; so that "Faith accepts 'in spite of'; and out of the 'in spite of' of faith the 'in spite of' of courage is born." This "in spite of" is affirmed not only in the face of doubt, but also in spite of the finite status of the believer in face of the infinitude of his ultimate concern. One believes "in spite of the darkness of fate and of the meaninglessness of existence." Expressed existentially and religiously, Tillich
says "In the concept of faith an element of 'in spite of' is implied, the courage to accept that one is accepted in spite of sin, estrangement, and despair." 194 It is clear that the existential attitude of "in spite of" is intrinsic to courage and the courage in faith, 195 and as such, is an example of how a common phrase is used by Tillich to describe the existential attitude of how tension, struggle, and paradox are to be faced in faith.

* * *

The three existentialia - tension, struggle, paradox - form an existentialist theme which again arises from the contingencies and difficulties of life and faith. We shall now see how Tillich is influenced by particular existentialists.

Kierkegaard spoke of tension, struggle, and paradox in life and faith against systems, society, and the individual against himself. All this was portrayed in his description of "becoming a Christian", a journey of faith which Tillich also follows in his existential interpretation of faith in terms of tension, struggle, and paradox. Both Kierkegaard and Tillich stress the importance of paradox in faith; for each there can be no faith without it. Both thinkers develop examples of paradoxes of faith which show the inner tensions and struggles which go to make up the faith of the individual believer.

Nietzsche's concept of resentment portrays existential tension and struggle, whilst his idea of the will to power is based on the inevitability, indeed the necessity, of struggle - themes which clearly influenced Tillich. 196 Just as Nietzsche sees a struggle by the individual against others, so Tillich sees a tension and struggle by the individual believer against the community of faith. Nietzsche said that faith without struggle is not real faith at all.
Jaspers also spoke of tension, and he included "struggle" in his list of Boundary Situations, seeing this as characteristic of the whole of life itself. Jaspers also had his concept of Foundering which arises from the tensions, struggles and paradoxes of life. This existentialist experience is similar to Tillich's concept of "oscillation"; both ideas express both the tensions in the life of faith and the existentialist risk of faith.

6. **Courage**

Perfect courage, as a gift of the Divine Spirit, "... means that it is united with the specifically Christian virtues, faith, hope, and love. Thus a development is visible in which the ontological side of courage is taken into faith." With this concept of courage, Tillich says he seeks "... to preserve the larger meaning (of courage) and interpret faith through analysis of courage... because I believe that 'faith' needs such a reinterpretation more than any other religious term." Tillich therefore declares

We have avoided the concept of faith in our description of the courage to be which is based on the personal encounter with God. Faith is the state of being grasped by the power of being-itself. The courage to be is an expression of faith and what 'faith' means must be understood through the courage to be. We have defined courage as the self-affirmation of being in spite of non-being. The power of this self-affirmation is the power of being which is effective in every act of courage. Faith is the experience of this power.

Nevertheless, Tillich still makes it clear that courage is only one aspect of faith; furthermore, there are different types of courage, ... Tillich praises Luther's concept of courage in faith, and points out that the courage in faith of Protestantism is of a personal courage in and before God, as compared with the autonomous individualistic courage of the existentialists. In fact we find both types of courage in Tillich's interpretation of faith. Faith
and courage are inseparable:— "... faith as a total act must affirm itself through courage." Furthermore, "One cannot replace faith by courage, but neither can one describe faith without courage." Courage is necessary in order to witness to one's faith, and to submit to God:— "The courage to surrender one's own goodness to God is the central element in the courage of faith."

We shall now look at the more existential aspects of the courage of faith - doubt, risk, and Angst. Tillich introduces the idea of doubt and risk in faith by referring to the Thomist "discussion about the priority of intellect or will in the essence of being, and consequently, in the human personality.... The difference between the two lines of thought is decisive for the valuation of 'venturing courage' (in religious terms, the 'risk of faith')." Tillich sees objections to each tendency, and points out that the danger of the priority of the will (and "venturing courage" and the "risk of faith") "... is undirected wilfulness, as we find more in some Protestant and much Existentialist thinking." Nevertheless, for Tillich, "Living faith includes the doubt about itself, the courage to take this doubt into itself, and the risk of courage."

Faith is "A daring act" and a "daring self-affirmation." This is also described as "the daring courage of the Christian faith." Similarly, the courage of faith takes risks. Courage takes up the challenge of doubt in faith, and overcomes it because "The courage to be is rooted in the God who appears when God has disappeared in the anxiety of doubt." Tillich says that the doubt implied in faith accepts insecurity,

... and takes it into itself in an act of courage. Faith includes courage. Therefore, it can include the doubt about itself. Certainly faith and courage are not identical. Faith has other elements besides courage and courage has other functions beyond affirming faith. Nevertheless, an act in which
courage accepts risk belongs to the dynamics of faith.\textsuperscript{214}

Courage and doubt are interrelated, but in faith courage enfolds and overcomes doubt.\textsuperscript{215}

Another aspect of the courage of faith is the despair which courage counters. This is obviously an important existentialist theme which we have met before:- "... the acceptance of despair is in itself faith and on the boundary line of the courage to be."\textsuperscript{216} Ontologically this means "the acceptance of the power of being, even in the grip of non-being."\textsuperscript{217} Psychologically this means the accepting of doubt, despair, and meaninglessness in utter seriousness, and the courage to accept that one is accepted even in this nadir of life.\textsuperscript{218}

Faith envelops \textit{Angst}:-

Faith in almighty God is the answer to the quest for a courage which is sufficient to conquer the anxiety of finitude.... When the invocation 'Almighty God' is seriously pronounced, a victory over the threat of non-being is experienced, and an ultimate, courageous affirmation of existence is expressed. Neither finitude nor anxiety disappears, but they are taken into infinity and courage.\textsuperscript{219}

Nevertheless, it does seem that Tillich holds that courage banishes anxiety, for faith "... is the oscillation between the anxiety of one's finitude and estrangement and the ecstatic courage which overcomes the anxiety by taking it into itself...."\textsuperscript{220}

Another aspect of the courage of faith is that it continues in spite of various forms of opposition. This tenacity, as we have noted, has been described by Tillich in the phrase "in spite of."\textsuperscript{221} There is the courage of existential self-affirmation:- "The courage to be is the ethical act in which man affirms his own being in spite of those elements of his existence which conflict with his essential affirmation."\textsuperscript{222} Courage is not only ethical, but is also ontological in its stand against non-being.\textsuperscript{223} But above all it is existential:-
"one could say that the courage to be is the courage to accept oneself as accepted in spite of being unacceptable."\textsuperscript{224} Courage is the means by which acceptance in faith is possible: "This element of uncertainty in faith cannot be removed; it must be accepted. And the element which accepts this is courage."\textsuperscript{225} As Tillich says of God's despairing people, "To accept this paradoxical acceptance is the courage of their faith."\textsuperscript{226}

* * *

Courage is an attitude of existential self-assertion by which the individual is courageous when he asserts himself against those forces which would swallow him. In its general existentialist background, courage is a form of existentialist ethic, and a mark of authentic existence. In his book \textit{The Courage To Be} Tillich refers to three existentialists for their concepts of courage. In spite of his discourse on "The despair of willing despairingly to be oneself - defiance"\textsuperscript{227} Heidegger receives more attention, not just for his idea of the courageous anticipation of death,\textsuperscript{229} but also for his exposition of "the courage of despair."\textsuperscript{230} Tillich notes that Heidegger describes certain existentialia including "resolve", which is when the individual acts alone according to his own conscious, and clearly sees the philosopher as influencing his view of the life of faith existentially:--

One of Heidegger's historical functions was to carry through the Existentialist analysis of the courage to be as oneself more fully than anyone else and, historically speaking, more destructively.\textsuperscript{231}

It is Nietzsche, however, who is Tillich's main inspiration in \textit{The Courage To Be} and also in his general existentialist interpretation of faith as courage.\textsuperscript{232} Tillich refers to the "will to power"\textsuperscript{233} and to \textit{lebensphilosophie}\textsuperscript{234} which are both major
Nietzschean doctrines. Tillich's self-affirmation is a form of will to power, just as he equates courage and self-affirmation. As self-mastery, Tillich lauded the ethical aspects of Nietzschean courage as this is an integral part of faith. Again, both shares the ontological view of courage which sees it as the daring act of faith and self-affirmation, overcoming all forms of non-being. Tillich does not, of course, reiterate Nietzsche's negative comments about Christianity being the antithesis of courage, but he takes his positive comments on the courage of the individual to show that this courage should characterise the man of faith. In the face of the holy, nothing less than Nietzschean courage is required if faith is to survive, be strengthened, grow, and mature.
Chapter Four

FOOTNOTES

1. Tillich Systematic Theology p.60.
2. Tillich Dynamics of Faith pp. 4-8, 9-10.
5. Tillich Theology of Culture p.28
7. Tillich Systematic Theology II p.54.
8. ibid p.134. cf. Tillich Dynamics of Faith p.34, p.86.
17. ibid p.21.
18. ibid p.21.
20. ibid p.112.
22. ibid p.155.
23. ibid pp. 25, 31.
26. ibid p.156.
27. Tillich Dynamics of Faith p. 96.
28. ibid p. 39.
31. ibid p. 211.
32. Tillich Dynamics of Faith p. 55.
33. ibid p. 86.
34. Tillich Systematic Theology III p. 141.
35. ibid p. 141.
36. Tillich The Courage To Be p. 117.
37. ibid p. 148.
38. ibid p. 81.
39. ibid pp. 82-83.
40. ibid p. 85.
41. ibid p. 90.
42. ibid p. 107; cf. p. 106.
43. ibid Chapter IV pp. 81-106.
44. ibid p. 163.
45. ibid p. 32. cf. Tillich Systematic Theology I p. 238.
47. ibid p. 117.
48. ibid p. 119.
50. ibid p. 185.
51. ibid p. 232.
52. ibid p. 184.
55. Tillich Dynamics of Faith p. 126.
56. Tillich *Systematic Theology II* p.54.

57. Tillich *Systematic Theology III* Chapter XXIV; also see below.

58. Tillich *What Is Religion?* p.79


60. Tillich *The Courage To Be* p.164.

61. Tillich *Dynamics of Faith* p.6.


63. ibid p.148.

64. Tillich *The Protestant Era* p.67; cf. p.67, p.80.


66. Tillich *Systematic Theology III* p.137.

67. ibid p.139.

68. ibid p.139.

69. ibid p.155.

70. ibid p.165.

71. ibid p.141.

72. ibid p.142.


74. ibid p.77.

75. ibid p.79.

76. ibid p.97.

77. ibid p.105; cf. p.110.

78. ibid p.109.

79. ibid p.109.


82. ibid p.52.

83. ibid p.57.

84. ibid p.123.
85. Tillich *Systematic Theology II* p. 98
86. Tillich *Dynamics of Faith* p. 90.
87. ibid pp. 90-91.
88. ibid p. 91.
89. ibid p. 94.
90. ibid p. 94.
91. Tillich *Ultimate Concern* p. 4.
92. Tillich *Theology of Culture* p. 40.
93. Tillich *Dynamics of Faith* p. 9.
94. ibid pp. 9-10.
95. ibid p. 13.
96. ibid p. 99.
97. ibid p. 61.
99. ibid p. 112.
100. ibid p. 32.
101. Tillich *Systematic Theology I* p. 15.
     ibid p. 17.
102. Tillich *Systematic Theology III* pp. 138-139.
103. Tillich *Dynamics of Faith* p. 45.
104. ibid pp. 47-48.
105. ibid p. 49.
106. ibid p. 66.
107. ibid p. 69.
110. Tillich *Theology of Culture* p. 90.
     *Dynamics of Faith* p. 9.
     *Systematic Theology I* p. 15.
112. Tillich The Protestant Era p. 78
113. ibid p. 80.
114. Tillich The Courage To Be p. 164.
116. ibid p. 7.
117. ibid p. 77.
118. Tillich Systematic Theology III p. 137.
119. Tillich The Protestant Era p. 77.
120. Tillich The Courage To Be p. 148.
121. ibid p. 152.
122. ibid p. 163.
123. ibid p. 168.
126. Tillich The Protestant Era p. 79.
127. Tillich The Courage To Be p. 164.
128. ibid p. 166; cf. p. 167.
129. ibid p. 167.
130. Tillich Dynamics of Faith p. 7.
131. ibid p. 78.
133. ibid p. 169.
134. Tillich The Courage To Be p. 163.
137. ibid p. 206.
139. ibid p. 100.
140. ibid p.74.
141. ibid p.35.
142. ibid p.57.
144. Tillich *Systematic Theology II* p.131.
145. ibid p.179.
146. Tillich *Theology of Culture* p.155.
147. Tillich *Systematic Theology III* p.234.
150. Tillich *Dynamics of Faith* p.102.
152. Tillich *The Courage To Be* p.164.
    ibid p.165.
154. ibid p.255.
156. Tillich *The Courage To Be* p.168.
158. Tillich *Dynamics of Faith* p.100.
159. ibid p.20.
160. Tillich *Theology of Culture* p.28.
161. ibid p.28.
164. Tillich *The Courage To Be* p.7.
165. Tillich *Theology of Culture* p.27.
166. Tillich Dynamics of Faith p.35.
167. ibid p.17.
168. ibid p.29.
169. ibid p.47.
173. Tillich Theology of Culture p.41.
175. Tillich Dynamics of Faith p.99.
176. ibid p.57.
178. ibid p.165.
179. Tillich Dynamics of Faith p.61.
181. Tillich Dynamics of Faith p.69.

  The Protestant Era p.77.

  The Courage To Be pp.163, 167.

  Systematic Theology p.142.

184. Tillich Systematic Theology I p.293.
186. Tillich The Courage To Be p.168.
188. Tillich The Courage To Be pp.152–153.

  Dynamics of Faith pp.21–22.
192. Tillich Dynamics of Faith p.100.
193. Tillich Systematic Theology I p.293.
195. Tillich The Courage To Be p.3.
196. Tillich Perspectives on Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Protestant Theology pp.197-207.
198. ibid p.8.
199. ibid p.163.
200. ibid pp.152ff.
201. Tillich Dynamics of Faith p.103.
202. ibid p.103.
203. ibid p.104.
205. Tillich The Courage To Be p.7.
206. ibid p.7.
209. Tillich Dynamics of Faith p.17.
211. Tillich Theology of Culture p.155
Systematic Theology III p.248.
212. Tillich The Courage To Be p.172.
213. ibid p.186.
216. Tillich The Courage To Be p.166.
217. ibid p.167.


220. Tillich *Systematic Theology III* p.141.

221. Tillich *The Courage To Be* p.164.

222. ibid p.3.

223. ibid p.163.

Tillich *Dynamics of Faith* p.17.


225. Tillich *Dynamics of Faith* p.16.


228. Tillich *The Courage To Be* p.135.

229. ibid p.135.

230. ibid pp.140-143.

231. ibid p.141.

232. ibid pp.23-29.

233. ibid p.25.


235. ibid p.27.
Chapter Five

EXISTENTIALISM AND FAITH

1. Review of the Argument

In our first chapter we discovered that the ideas embodied in existentialism could be conveniently classified under two headings; the place of the individual, and existentialia. Existentialism, we found, is the mode of thought which analyses and describes the feelings and experiences of the individual in the world from a standpoint of involvement within this life (i.e. existence). In our second chapter we found that Bultmann and Tillich admitted that they had read - and were duly influenced by - the existentialists Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Jaspers, and Heidegger, although their indebtedness to each, by their own admission, varies considerably. We therefore briefly surveyed the thought of these existentialists, and noted their particular interpretations of faith, and all this served as a basis for the comparison with Bultmann and Tillich in the next two chapters.

When we examined what Bultmann and Tillich had to say about faith, we found that it was possible to analyse their thought on the subject under the two broad existentialist themes discovered in the first chapter. Furthermore, when we came to introduce each idea of Bultmann and Tillich on faith we noticed that their theological ideas could be correlated with some of the existentialist themes which we had discovered in Chapter Two. These ideas were pinpointed at the end of each section, so that we were able to see that Bultmann and Tillich either adopted and/or adapted these existentialist themes to write their theologies, or had themes parallel to those of the existentialists. In short, we were able to show the
existentialist themes in Bultmann's and Tillich's interpretation of faith both in general terms of vocabulary and terminology as well as in particular concepts and ideas.

We will now conclude the argument by briefly comparing the views of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Jaspers, and Heidegger, on faith, with the existentialist interpretations of faith held by Bultmann and Tillich, and finally conclude our thesis with an evaluation of our theologians' particular enterprise.

Both Bultmann and Tillich follow Kierkegaard closely in their interpretation of faith. Both Bultmann and Kierkegaard see faith in such existential terms as self-understanding, personal self-surrender or infinite resignation, loss of security in the leap of faith, the risk and venture in the possibilities of faith, and the problems and paradox of faith, and each characterises the believer with these qualities (the Knight or Man of Faith). Tillich shares with Kierkegaard the view that faith is passion and ultimate (infinite) concern, with its attendant ecstasy and mysticism, that faith involves personal resignation and assurance, but that there is also doubt, risk, and paradox in faith.

Nietzsche is generally critical of faith, regarding it as an affront to man's rationality, as a screen for his instincts, that if it is not won by struggle it is asserted with naivety, and is therefore decadent. Both Bultmann and Tillich would have known of these commonly held views when formulating their theology and interpretation of faith. Nietzsche's criticism of Christianity as crude ecclesiastical mythology is met by Bultmann's method of demythologisation. Tillich answers Nietzsche's criticism of faith by attacking the intellectualistic distortion of faith, showing that
faith is indeed the highest passion (or instinct), and is won by striving, not by passive assent. Tillich attacks 'unbelief', but part of his attack is couched in the same form as Nietzsche's; an attack on externals. Otherwise, Tillich corrects Nietzsche; faith is valid because it is an existential possibility of man.

Jaspers is fond of his Kantian and Protestant heritage; to Kant he owes his moral sense, to Protestantism he owes his value of the right to exercise freedom, both physical, mental, and spiritual. For Jaspers, faith consists in transcending paradox, and coming to terms with Transcendence - a dual idea which we have seen is shared by Tillich. Doubt and even 'unbelief' are therefore part of faith itself, as both Bultmann and Tillich agree along with Jaspers. (Tillich would also use the term "radical doubt" in this context, with which we may compare Jaspers' comment on "... doubt that might as well be resolved in favour of unbelief..."\(^2\)). Tillich also shares Jaspers' view that there is as a result, tension within faith.

It is clear that Bultmann's debt to Heidegger is greater than that owed by Tillich; virtually every existentialist theme we have noted of Heidegger has been used in some way by Bultmann in his interpretation of faith. It is significant to compare their respective definitions of theology:- Bultmann's definition, "Theology is nothing other than rational reflection about our own existence as that existence is determined by God",\(^2\) is indebted to Heidegger's definition, that "Theology is seeking a more primordial interpretation of man's Being toward God, prescribed by the meaning of faith itself and remaining within it."\(^3\) Both agree that only existential terms can give any meaning to theology or faith, but Tillich would not go that far. It is important to notice that
Bultmann is indebted to Heidegger for his temporal perspective in interpreting faith as openness to the future, possibility, imperative and renewal, and eschatological existence. Both Bultmann and Tillich agree with Heidegger that nothing can "be taken merely on faith" as nothing can be gained or known in this way. Heidegger's critical limitations on the sphere of faith, given its existential validity, are thus seen to be adopted by Bultmann and Tillich.

It may be seen therefore, that the interpretations of faith made by Bultmann and Tillich are in keeping with those views on faith held by Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Jaspers, and Heidegger. It should also be recognised, however, that both Bultmann and Tillich are also indebted to his Lutheran heritage. Many Lutheran views on faith appear initially to be similar to those existentialist themes used by Bultmann and Tillich. Lutherans (and our four existentialists shared this heritage, except, perhaps, Heidegger, who was a Roman Catholic) emphasise the response to the hearing of the word, progress and growth in faith, the paradoxes as well as the inner assurances of faith, the freedom of faith, and, of course, its individualistic aspect - pro me. Both Bultmann and Tillich would have held these views before meeting existentialism, but our thesis will have shown that both theologians, especially Bultmann, substantiated these Lutheran views with the existentialist themes we expounded in Chapters Three and Four. Moreover, they refer to these existentialists when they discuss faith rather than cite Luther or other Lutherans.

2. Evaluation of the use of existentialist themes in Bultmann's and Tillich's interpretation of faith.

We now have to discuss the validity of interpreting faith in terms of these existentialist themes we have examined in Chapters Three
and Four. The question is: To what extent are Bultmann and Tillich adopting and adapting these existentialist themes? Straightforward adoption of existentialist themes is usually found only in general terms. Thus Bultmann adopts broad existentialist themes when describing faith in terms of self-assertion, freedom, detachment from the world, possibility, and authenticity, whilst Tillich adopts broad existentialist themes when describing faith in terms of self-affirmation, subjectivity, and ecstasy. There are also instances of Bultmann and Tillich adopting particular existentialist themes as well; for example Bultmann reiterates Kierkegaard's theme of "self-understanding", and Kierkegaard's and Heidegger's theme of "possibility", whilst Tillich reiterates Nietzsche's theme of "courage", Kierkegaard's themes of "passion" and "risk", and Jaspers' theme of "struggle".

Just as important, however, is the extent to which Bultmann and Tillich are prepared to adapt existentialist themes, or take their cues from them. Thus, for example, Bultmann describes his Man of Faith in full knowledge of Kierkegaard's "Knight of Faith", Nietzsche's "Apollo-Dionysius", and Heidegger's "Dasein" - all of which contribute aspects to Bultmann's Man of Faith: e.g. his individuality, strength, and place in time and the world. Also, Bultmann describes faith with reference to Heidegger's authentic existence, resolution, understanding, and care, deriving from the existentialist thinker ideas which he inserts into his interpretation of faith. Similarly, Tillich describes faith in terms of community and participation with ideas which are parallel to Heidegger's theme of "being-in" and "being-with", and describes faith in terms of acceptance which remind one of Kierkegaard's "infinite resignation" and Nietzsche's amor fati - both particular existentialist themes. With each theologian, direct
reference to the existential thinker is often lacking, especially in the case of Jaspers, except for Bultmann's direct references to Heidegger. Nevertheless, we have shown in our thesis that they not only share the same existentialist concepts and themes, but their thought is in keeping with the general tenor of existentialism, both historically and philosophically. We have shown that Bultmann and Tillich both adopt and adapt existentialist themes in their interpretation of faith, and that their exposition runs parallel with both the general thought and the particular views on faith held by our four existentialists.

Many evaluations of the theological positions held by Bultmann and Tillich have been made by other commentators, and we can only hint at some of them here as we indicate our own views and evaluation.

Bultmann has been criticised as being too individualistic in his understanding and interpretation of faith (for example, by E.M. Good⁵). This is probably a fair comment when one considers Bultmann's interpretation of faith as self-surrender, self-understanding, decision, and detachment from the world. On the other hand, it should be said that whilst Bultmann admits that he approaches theology and faith from a personal, individualistic, standpoint, it is still related to wider perspectives such as freedom, openness to the future, possibility and venture, problems and paradox etc. Another common criticism (voiced, for example, by J. Macquarrie⁶), is that Bultmann is unduly influenced by just one phase of just one philosopher's thought, and is therefore narrow in his philosophical outlook. Our thesis has shown that this criticism, though not without foundation, cannot be pressed too far. Bultmann is very much indebted to Kierkegaard, shares not a few of the views of Jaspers, and
has a few allusions to Nietzsche. Furthermore, any reading of *Essays Philosophical and Theological* shows a wider philosophical knowledge than Macquarrie credits Bultmann.

Tillich has been accused (for example, by G. Tavard\(^7\)) of being too unduly influenced by philosophy and psychology when he interprets faith. Whereas Biblical faith separates man from the world (as Bultmann naturally does), Tillich does not. Rather, for Tillich, faith is a basic human attitude which underlies all that any individual may do. There is some truth in this criticism; for Tillich faith is a general phenomenon of ultimate concern which everybody has about something, but this ultimate concern may not even be in the divine. All this, of course, is opposite to what we have seen Bultmann teach. Our criticism is rather that Tillich, although he describes faith in useful existentialist terms, does not relate this sufficiently to God, possibly because he is too anthropocentric in his psychological and sociological considerations in interpreting faith in terms of community and participation, ultimate concern, and courage. Another complaint against Tillich is that in producing *Systematic Theology* etc., he has not followed Kierkegaard faithfully in his abhorrence of systems, and so has blunted the challenge of faith to the individual personally (thus K. Hamilton\(^8\) and J. Heywood Thomas\(^9\) argue). The first point cannot really be levelled as a criticism as such, for although Tillich admired Kierkegaard, he nevertheless never regarded himself as a pure existentialist, and therefore should not be expected to follow Kierkegaard in all things. The second point is a fair criticism linked with our first criticism of Tillich: because faith is general phenomenon for Tillich, its personal significance and religious fervour are lost. And this is not just a shortcoming of existentialist expectations,
but of any understanding of the nature of faith.

A general criticism sometimes levelled at theologians like Bultmann and Tillich is that they are wrongly influenced by prevailing philosophical thought, and so distort the purity of the Christian gospel. In reply to this it must be pointed out that philosophical influences are part of any culture and its language, including religion and the Bible. The Christian church has always debated the question of the relation of philosophy to theology, but the answer has always been that to some extent philosophical language and concepts are useful exegetical and hermeneutical tool. Bultmann and Tillich share this general conclusion, but they still differ in the extent to which they allow philosophy to influence their theology. Bultmann is quite convinced that existentialism (especially in the form propounded by Heidegger) is the best tool for interpreting faith, whereas Tillich balances this influence with that of other philosophies he knows, so acknowledging the limited value of existentialism as a tool for theology.

Is existentialism the best philosophy for interpreting theology, or specifically in our case, faith? Certainly, as Bultmann argues, it serves well in analysing human nature, thereby helping theologians to relate faith to man. But is existentialism still a valid analysis of man? It has been argued that twentieth century existentialism is essentially a product of the inter-war years, when Kafka, Camus, Sartre, Heidegger, and Jaspers were writing to Europeans disturbed by the aftermaths of the First World War. In those times of frustration and heartsearching, the existentialists' analysis of man was quite accurate and perceptive, but this is no longer relevant in an age of affluence, materialism, and self-confidence.
That existentialism is now just a historical phenomenon is argued, for example, by A. Kee and he applies this criticism to Bultmann and Tillich and their modern disciples. There may well be some validity in this argument, but it will not detract from the work and aims of Bultmann and Tillich inasmuch as they sought to express in terms relevant to their age and truths of faith.

Nevertheless, there are many timeless aspects of the human predicament which existentialism has highlighted, and this justifies Bultmann and Tillich in their interpretation of faith as courage, paradox, doubt, ultimate concern, self-understanding, openness to the future, and decisiveness, as has been argued by Macquarrie. If faith is to mean anything to a people who are estranged from God, only by speaking of faith in terms of existential estrangement, weakness, and loneliness, will these people relate faith to their personal situation, and see it as the answer to their needs. It is with this evangelistic motive in mind that Bultmann and Tillich wrote their existentialist theologies.

3. Conclusion

In the Preface to this thesis it was stated that the aim is to examine the existentialist influence on Bultmann and Tillich in their interpretation of faith in a systematic way. We have shown that Bultmann and Tillich belong to the existentialist tradition and wrote on faith conscious of that heritage. We have seen that their interpretations of faith may be analysed in terms of existentialist themes, and we have shown in some detail how in fact they do follow the themes, terms, and concepts of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Jaspers, and Heidegger. The indebtedness shown makes it clear that Bultmann and Tillich expound faith with the aid of existentialism, both adopting and adapting existentialist themes to suit their purpose.
We have argued that this interpretation, in spite of some historical criticism, not only does justice to the concept of faith, but positively helps to elucidate the character of the life of faith in terms of man's existential experience.
CHAPTER FIVE

FOOTNOTES

2. Bultmann Faith and Understanding p.120.
7. Tavard Paul Tillich and the Christian Message
8. Hamilton The System and the Gospel
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