Durham E-Theses

The political thought of F. D Maurice

Lindsay, David W.

How to cite:
Lindsay, David W. (1968) The political thought of F. D Maurice, Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/9869/

Use policy

The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:

• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
• the full-text is not changed in any way

The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.

Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF

F. D. MAURICE

by

DAVID W. LINDSAY. B.A.

A THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF LETTERS

IN THE UNIVERSITY OF DURHAM

DECEMBER 1968

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author.
No quotation from it should be published without
his prior written consent and information derived
from it should be acknowledged.
This study is largely based on the "Life of Frederick Dennison Maurice, Chiefly Told In His Own Letters" edited by Maurice's son Sir Frederick Maurice. The edition used was that published by MacMillan & Co. in 1886. In the text it is referred to as "Life."

I am conscious of my debt to Henry Tudor who guided me with great patience in the preparation of this thesis. I would also like to express my thanks to my wife for her encouragement and to Mrs. D. J. Ainsley for her very considerable secretarial help.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1. BIOGRAPHICAL & BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH. PAGE 1.

" 2. THE INTELLECTUAL FRAMEWORK. " 34.

" 3. CONSERVATISM & NATIONALISM. " 98.

" 4. DEMOCRACY. " 147.

" 5. CHRISTIAN SOCIALISM. " 179.

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF MAURICE'S MAJOR WORKS. " 218.
CHAPTER ONE

BIOGRAPHICAL AND BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH.

Frederick Dennison Maurice was born on August 29th, 1805 at Normanston, near Lowestoft. His father, Michael Maurice, was a Unitarian minister. In his youth Maurice found himself interested in the intellectual, social and political problems which were very much a part of life of a Unitarian Household. In his letters he remarks that things social and political grasped his imagination much more than the wonders of nature.

In 1812 the Maurice family moved to the West Country, first to Clifton and then a year later, to Frenchay, near Bristol. This move was important for young Maurice because it resulted in his spending the impressionable years of his adolescence in an area which was a social, intellectual and cultural centre, and one of the major centres of Evangelical Christianity. As a result of this move the Maurice family, and especially Maurice's mother and elder sisters, were brought into an atmosphere of intense religious fervour which was to cause their defection from the cause of Unitarianism to that of Evangelical Christianity. A series of family misfortunes, including the deaths of Maurice's orphaned cousins Edmund and Ann Hurry, no doubt helped to cause the change in faith amongst the family. So complex was the problem of faith in the Maurice family that each of the three members who had given up Unitarianism
attended different places of worship. Writing of this time in his life Maurice said "These events in my family influenced me powerfully; but not in the way in which either of my parents or my sisters would have desired, not in a way to which I can look back with the least complacency. These years were to me years of moral confusion and contradiction."(1) It is difficult at this distance in time to analyse fully the psychological pressures and their consequences for Maurice but there can be little doubt that the "moral confusion and contradiction" were to play some part in his later abhorrence of "parties" and "systems", in both religion and politics.

In 1823 Maurice went to Trinity College, Cambridge. He was critical of the education he received at the University and seems to have had little advantage from it except for the lectures on Plato, delivered by Julius Hare. As we shall see, Plato was to exert a most important influence on Maurice's political thought. While at Trinity Maurice became friendly with John Sterling, Alfred Tennyson and others, along with whom he founded the Apostle's Club. It was also during his time at Cambridge that Maurice was influenced by the writing of S. T. Coleridge. He adopted, and to some extent modified Coleridge's Romanticism. Certainly he incorporated Coleridge's dichotomy between the Reason and the Understanding, into his own philosophical beliefs. As a result of the influence (1) Life. Vol.1 p.21.
of Plato and Coleridge, and his own understanding of the Bible. Maurie found himself leading the opposition to Benthamite Utilitarianism among the undergraduates of his time. Maurie was able to develop an approach to political philosophy which was essentially Idealist and Romantic, but he was able to ally this to a form of political radicalism. He did not, however, entirely reject that element of Conservatism which is normally associated with a Romantic view of politics. He built his politics on a philosophy of history which, itself, derived from a concept of continuous and continuing Divine Revelation.

Maurie left Cambridge in 1826 without taking a degree, since he was not prepared to subscribe to the Thirty Nine Articles. He went to London to prepare for his Bar Examinations but soon decided not to proceed into the legal profession. In May 1828 he, along with some friends, bought "The London Literary Chronicle" and became its editor. When the paper was merged with the "Athenæum" in July of the same year Maurie acted as editor, until the middle of 1829. During this period Maurie wrote a series of articles on great contemporary writers and a number of reviews in which his own Romantic and Idealist standpoint becomes clear. According to this, Man is capable of making contact with the Divine Being by means of the faculty of Reason. Reason is concerned solely with Truth and is the mechanism by which man intuits moral
Truths. It permits man to understand God's Will and thus appreciate the real purposes of human life, in a world which only imperfectly mirrored the Divine. The real world in this view is the world of the Divine Will, not the world of human action. Maurice held consistently to this point of view throughout his life.

The political expression of Maurice's philosophical standpoint is found in his advocacy of cooperation and in his assertion of the value of gradual change. Along with a belief in the organic nature of society they form the central themes of Maurice's political thought. But they only do so because they reflect, in his view, a conformity to the divine Will and an understanding of the Divine Education of the human race.

In 1828 Maurice returned to Bristol for some months where his sister was dying of consumption. Again he was brought face to face with the deep religious problems which beset his family. He himself began to have doubts about the Unitarian faith in direct communion between God and man. He found himself seeking new explanations and came eventually to the view that God bridged the gap between the Divine and the secular by Himself taking on human form in the shape of Christ and actively intervening in human life through the Holy Spirit. In this way man's faculty for grasping the divine Will was activated. With these views Maurice
could no longer be a Unitarian and on March 29th, 1831 he was baptised into the Anglican Church. In 1830 he went to Exeter College, Oxford to prepare himself for eventual ordination in the Anglican Church. In 1834 he was ordained and went to the Parish of Bubenhall in Warwickshire as Curate.

While he was at Bubenhall Maurice became involved in his first major theological controversy. He wrote a pamphlet on "Subscription No Bondage" in which he upheld the need for subscription to the Thirty Nine Articles in the Universities. The main thesis of the work was that subscription to the articles was essential for the proper control of study, and was a defence of liberty. He regarded subscription to the Articles not as a test of doctrinal orthodoxy on behalf of the student but as a declaration by the University of the conditions within which it would teach. It is fairer, he argued, to declare these conditions formally rather than to allow them to be implicitly accepted. The argument partly centred round the fact that Oxford University demanded subscription before an undergraduate was accepted while Cambridge demanded a formal declaration of Bona Fide membership of the Church of England before graduation. (This incidentally explains why Maurice as Unitarian, was able to study, and obtain a first in Civil Law at Cambridge but could not graduate.) In general, Maurice saw subscription as a way of ensuring that study could continue in the light
of what he regarded as the certainties of religious faith. He did not see it as a barrier to a large number of people from any worthwhile study. As Torben Christenson has put it "He had perceived that subscription stood for a great principle and therefore he defended it in complete disregard of the general conception of it, and also quite oblivious to its general effect."(2) Maurice was later to recognise his mistake and to withdraw his support for subscription. In a letter to his son in 1870 he wrote "All this I have been compelled by the evidence of facts sorrowfully to confess I give the Liberals the triumph which they deserve."(3)

Nevertheless Maurice only gave way because he realised that the interpretation generally given to subscription was quite different to that which he held.

In 1834, Maurice had published a novel, "Eustace Conway," This is not a major work but it is, perhaps worth noting that, according to John Sterling, S. T. Coleridge spoke of the book "with evident and earnest interest".(4)

At Bubenhall Maurice also began what became more or less a life's work by starting work on what eventually became his book, Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy. In fact this began as an article for the Encyclopedia Metropolitana. It was first published in that work in 1850 and further parts

were added later. The first part was called "Ancient Philosophy". It was followed by "The Philosophy of the First Six Centuries" in 1853, "Medieval Philosophy" in 1875 and a final part "Modern Philosophy in 1862. The four parts were put together to form one of Maurice's major contributions to scholarship as "Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy", published in 1871-72 at the end of Maurice's life. In this work Maurice tries to summarise the major movements in philosophy. The work reflects the great care which Maurice habitually put into his writing. It represents an enormous amount of study. Perhaps, for us, the most interesting feature of the book is the fact that it illustrates Maurice's basic philosophical approach. He sees all the authors of whom he writes as having some part of the truth. Truth to him was to be found as much in the Persian writers as in the Christian, albeit they might not, in his eyes, have quite so much of the truth.

In 1836 Maurice gave up his curacy at Bubenhall on being appointed Chaplain of Guy's Hospital, a post which gave him the opportunity to lecture to medical students on Moral Philosophy. His teaching career was greatly strengthened when, in 1840, he was appointed professor of English Literature at King's College London. When a Theological department was founded at the College in 1846 he became one of the professors. As we shall see this appointment was to become one of the greatest tests of his life.
On October 7th, 1837 Maurice married Anna Barton, the sister of his friend John Sterling's wife. The couple lived very happily until, in 1834, Mrs Sterling died. The following year Sterling himself died, after having been carefully looked after by Mrs. Laurice. Then in 1845 Maurice's first marriage came to an end with the death of his wife, who had like Sterling, been suffering from tuberculosis.

Meanwhile he had published his most famous book, "The Kingdom of Christ". This book, first published in 1838, and revised in 1842 takes the form of the justification to a Quaker of the religious truths enshrined in the Anglican Church. The book is divided into two parts. In the first part Maurice looks at each of the major denominational branches of Christianity and asks the question "What truths does it contain?" (He applies the same kind of technique to the contemporary philosophical, religious and political movements.) Maurice's conclusion is that in every case the positive claims which the various denominations and movements make are generally valid but that they fail in their search for the truth by their refusal to accept the truths of other denominations. What they affirm is generally true. What they deny leads them into falsehood. And, arising from this, Maurice attacks the exclusiveness of denominationalism and parties in all social and religious activity. The truths held by denominations were always liable to be swamped by their sectarian adherence.
to their own insight at the expense of a more universal Truth.

The second theme of the book is that only in a Church which adheres to the ancient creeds and traditions and is sufficiently broad in its coverage of the spiritual, political and philosophical yearning of men, could a real grasp of the truth be maintained. In other words at least as far as England was concerned, only the Church of England was capable of representing Truth. It alone could proclaim the liberty and brotherhood of men, and thus give meaning to the political organism in which every man's distinct and personal characteristics could be used to the cooperative benefit of all.

The "Kingdom" expressed quite clearly the groundwork of Maurice's politics, as of his theology. Put briefly, the position which Maurice now adopted, and to which he held until he died, was this, There is in nature a Divine Order, which applies to social as well as to natural phenomena. This order is revealed to man by Divine Revelation and any emphasis on sectarian or party grounds will tend to obscure it. For this reason, one must always go behind the demands of sect or party to arrive at the truth. Thus Maurice consistently refused to allow himself to be attached to any party within either Church or Politics. He has been called (e.g. by C. R. Sanders) a Broad Churchman, but this title is really as inadequate and as misleading as that of Christian Socialist which Maurice himself devised.
Maurice, nevertheless went further than a mere apology for the Church of England. He was defending national churches in general. The Church he held to be the Universal Society, an institution as natural as the nation or the family. As such it was open to all. But its manifestation in any particular nation would differ from that in another. On this we may quote a letter he wrote to a friend, in July 1834. "I only wish to live and die for the assertion of this truth; that the universal Church is as much a reality as any particular nation is; that the latter can only be believed real as one believes in the former; that the Church is the Witness for the constitution of man as man, a child of God, an heir of heaven, and taking up his freedom by baptism; that the world is a miserable, accursed, rebellious order which denies this foundation, which will create a foundation of self-will, choice, taste, opinion; that in the world there can be no communion; that in the Church there can be no universal communion; communion in one body, by one Spirit. For this, our Church of England, is now, as I think the only firm, consistent witness. If God will raise up another in Germany or elsewhere, thanks be to him for it, but for the sake of Germans, Dutchmen, Frenchmen, Spaniards, Italians - for the sake of Baptists, Independents, Quakers, Unitarian, for the sake of Jew, Turks, Infidels, for the sake of Men, I will hold fast by that Church which alone stands forth and upholds
universal brotherhood, on the only basis on which brotherhood is possible. We stand on the voluntary principle, we voluntarily come into God's order. We refuse to stand on the slavish foundation of self will."(5)

This is basically the conclusion reached in the Kingdom of Christ. The Universal Society then becomes a society tailored to the needs of the social conditions in which it exists. Maurice is well aware, of course, of the restrictions which, in practice it placed on his "voluntary principle". As we saw, he realised, though some time later, that the process of subscription was not so simple as he had imagined. And he himself was to feel the power of intolerance in the Church of England when he was removed from his Chair of Theology at King's College, London, on the grounds of his allegedly unorthodox views on Eternity. Certainly he recognised that the Church of England was not the peaceful, voluntary association to which he refers, but was in fact divided into parties. The Church of England was as much an exclusive organisation as any of the other denominations. It rejected the values of the other churches as much as they rejected its values.

At this stage in his career Maurice appears already to have developed some of his characteristic attitudes. The family, the nation, the Church he regards as natural. There is a close relationship between all three. Maurice: seems also

to suggest that a true member of the Church should oppose all sectarianism within and without the Church. Parties in Church or State he abhorred, although he recognised their existence. Men did have genuine differences which led to the creation of separate institutions. The test was whether these institutions gave rise to benefits or disadvantages to society as a whole. This followed from Maurice's theological outlook which regarded the sacrifice of Christ as a condition of redemption not only for Christians but for all men. "I have endeavored in my tracts to prove that if Christ be really the head of every man, and if He really have taken human flesh, there is ground for a universal fellowship among men, (a fellowship that is itself the foundation of those particular fellowships of the nation and the family, which I also consider sacred.) I have maintained that it is the business of a Church to assert this ground of universal fellowship that it ought to make men understand and feel how possible it is for men as men to fraternise in Christ; how impossible it is to fraternise except in Him ---. This universal fellowship in Christ I believe that the Church of England asserts by its ordinances and believing this (rightly or wrongly) I feel that I am bound as a good member of that Church not to narrow my terms of intercourse. I meet men as men because I feel that I have a ground on which I can meet them, and that this is the deepest, safest ground of all." Thus Maurice's defence of the Church of England is (6) Life. Vol. I. Ch. XV. p. 258.
not that it has a special truth, or knowledge about Christ but
that it somehow represents Christ. In the letter just quoted
Maurice goes on to say "--- just as I meet Englishmen, not
on the ground that I agree with them in thinking a limited
monarchy the best form of government (though I may think that),
but on the ground of our being Englishmen, of our having the
same Queen, the same laws, the same ancestors, recollections,
association, language, so I meet Churchmen on the ground of
our being Churchmen, of our having one head, of our having the
same relation to an innumerable company of spirits that on
the earth and have left the earth."

Maurice seeks the widest, most fundamental source of
unity. Unity on doctrine, he claimed, was insufficient. The
trouble with this point of view is that what one believes
about Christ (or about any other source of unity) is not
always separable from belief in Christ. Thus Maurice sets
up a position in which he says "I believe in "X", but refuses
to accept the validity of the question "What do you mean by
"X"? The reason for this lies in his belief in two things.
First he is utterly convinced of the existence of a personal
God, that is a God who has the attributes of personality and
under whose will history unfolds. Second he believes in the
power of moral perception through the process of Reason.
One is forced to accept Maurice as an Idealist if one is
going to make any sense at all on his writings on either
theology or politics.
In 1854 Maurice was invited to give two series of lectures. The first was the Boyle lectures which he later published as the "Religions of the World". The work was an early excursion into the field of comparative theology, a field which is only now beginning to be adequately covered. His thesis was that religions other than Christianity may have elements of truth which can give Christians insights which they themselves have missed. At the same time Christianity can supply the necessary additions to other faiths to make them complete. His technique is, in fact similar to that used in his analysis of Christian sectarianism, only this time "Christianity" takes the place of the Universal Church.

His other lecture series came from an invitation from Arch-bishop of Canterbury to deliver the Warburton Lectures. These he published as the "Epistle to the Hebrews". The lectures are, perhaps rather less important than the preface of the book in which Maurice attacks Newman's "Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine". Maurice agrees with Newman that there is an Authoritative teaching by the Church but takes issue in the kind of authority which is relevant. He could not accept that the Church had received an infallible authority to interpret the Scriptures and teaching of the Church. This would be to put an infallible power into the hands of fallible men. The infallibility of authority could only rest with Christ. The historical fact of the Risen Christ
and the continuing presence of God in the world through the Holy Spirit was the limit of authority which Maurice would accept. This closely follows his belief in the continuing revelation of Truth by God, in secular, as well as in church life and history. Considering his philosophy of history as a Divine education Maurice was merely being consistent with his fundamental beliefs.

The next year, 1846, Maurice was elected to the Chaplaincy of Lincoln's Inn and resigned his post at Guy's Hospital. This gave him the opportunity to preach regularly. He used the pulpit as a means of expounding his views on a wide variety of topics, as his published sermons show. Many of his published works are based on the sermons he preached at Lincoln's Inn and elsewhere.

At this time too, Maurice became interested in the question of education - an interest which he maintained to the end of his life. His educational work can be divided into three parts. He was a university teacher, an innovator of higher education for women and the founder of the London Working Men's College. Of his work as a university teacher little need be said here.

His professorships included chairs in English Literature, Theology and Philosophy and he was proposed for, but did not get, the chair of Political Economy in Oxford. His work in the other two fields, however, was of considerable value.

About 1830 Maurice's family had suffered a financial set back as a result of which he sister Mary had set up a school
in Southampton. She soon realised the need for a better education for the young women who were to go to work as governesses than was then usually possible. Both Frederick and Mary Maurice became associated with the Governess's Benevolent Institution. They recognised the need for a properly conducted examination and a rigidly maintained standard of achievement for governesses. By 1847 Maurice had persuaded the professors of King's College, London, to form a committee to examine prospective governesses. From this Committee a group was formed in 1848 which became the Board of Directors of Queens College, London. The College was to provide education as well as examinations for young women. It was not exclusively for those women who wanted to be governesses but was open to any young women who wanted general education.

In a series of lectures about Queen's College, published in 1849 Maurice discussed the general nature of the work undertaken by the College. He pointed out the impossibility of simply teaching people how to teach. The aim of the College courses was not only to provide a professional qualification for prospective governesses but to give a general education in the principles of the subjects which they were to teach. In effect the College was faced with the need to educate as well as to train. This was, in any case, the essence of Maurice's theory of education. Students were not to be taught
facts about their subjects but were to be encouraged to search for the underlying principles. In his lecture Maurice said, "The teachers of a school may aim merely to impart information; the teachers of a College must lead their pupils to the apprehension of principle." (7) This neatly sums up Maurice's view of education. He was always aware of the dangers of imparting knowledge about a subject apart from the understanding of it. He also abhorred the tendency to teach subjects in isolation from each other. The underlying harmony to be found in natural and social phenomena, on which he placed so much emphasis, was the criterion he used in his teaching as much as in his theology and politics. He regarded education as part of his wider concept of the Divine education of the human race. There was no real distinction in his mind between secular and sacred education. Both were part of the same process. Maurice expounded this belief to a group of students at the Working Men's College in 1870 but the elements of this thought on the subject are to be found in his book "Has the Church or the State the Power to Educate the People". (1839) In 1839 Maurice argued that the Church had the right to educate the people because only the Church could provide an education free from the sectarian bias which was inevitable in state controlled education. Only the Church had the ability to

proclaim the universal bond of fellowship both between nations, and between members of the same nation. In his early days Mauric...e of England was the only instrument for this kind of education. Later he realised that the state of the English Church at the time made this a forlorn hope. In his lecture of 1870, "A few Words on Secular and Denominational Education," he spoke of Foster's Education Bill. He supported it because though he disagreed with details, its general principle, that of "not destroying the forces which exist in the land, of utilizing them to the utmost, seems to me a sound and honest one". (8)

It was through the process of education and not through that of legislation that Mauric... believed it possible to improve social conditions. He did not, of course, deny the need for good legislation, nor the need to provide satisfactory social institutions to allow men to lay their full part in social and political life. He did however believe that only when men had reached a satisfactory level of education would they be able to use such legislation and institutions properly. He saw Foster's Bill as introducing a very much needed reform. At least an elementary school education was to be made possible for most British children. And further, the education was, in general, to be backed by the religious denominations so that the Church at least had some say in the process.

(8) A Few Words on Secular and Denominational Education. p. 17. London 1876.
The year 1848 also saw the beginning of the Christian Socialist movement. The history of this movement has been well documented in two important books, Canon Raven's "Christian Socialism" (1920) and Professor Thorben Christensen's "History of Christian Socialism. 1848-1856" (1962). Maurice acted as the intellectual leader of the group of men, including J. M. Ludlow, Charles Kingsley, Thomas Hughes and J. Vansittart Meale, who sought to establish cooperative workshops among the workmen, especially the tailors, in London. Christian Socialism was an attempt to replace the spirit of competition by the spirit of cooperation. As a political movement it achieved remarkably little success. There was, however, one exception to this. The evidence provided by the Christian Socialists, along with that of John Stuart Mill, resulted in the passing of legislation in 1852 which legalised, and protected the funds of Cooperative and Friendly Societies.

Maurice's connection with the Christian Socialists resulted in an attempt to remove him from his chair at King's College. In defence of his position he wrote to Dr. Jelf, the Principal of the College, "We did not adopt the word "Christian" merely as a qualifying adjective. We believe that Christianity has the power of regenerating whatever it comes into contact with, of making that morally healthy and vigorous which, apart from it, must be either mischievous or inefficient."
We found, from what we know of the working-men in England, that the conviction was spreading more and more widely among them, that Law and Christianity were merely the supports and Agents of capital. We wished to show them by both words and deed that Law and Christianity are the only protectors of all classes from the selfishness which is the destruction of all. So far as we can do this, we are helping to avert those tremendous social convulsions, which as recent experience proves, may be the effect of lawless experiments to preserve property, as well as violent conspiracies against it".

Maurice here shows that his brand of socialism is quite distinct from any other, and indeed in some respects can hardly be justifiably called Socialism. He wanted to see the working men attain their just place within a society in which could evolve towards conditions of justice and fair play. He did not envisage any form of class struggle, nor did he consider the creation of a working class party. In fact to have done so would have been quite contrary to his basic social principles. In a recent book Canon S. G. Evans says that the Christian Socialists "Never joined the movement; never marched with the working class. There is no evidence that they ever read a word of Marx ---". This is perfectly true but they could not have marched with the working class. The concept of class implied by Canon Evans is quite contrary to that of

Social Orders used by Maurice. Cooperation between all sections and interests with the aim of the national, not the class, benefit was the aim of Maurice's Christian Socialism. He could never have engaged in party politics because he abhorred any form of sectionalism, which he regarded as a divisive element in society. To set one class against another would have been as bad as to set one man against another. This is not to say that the working class had no part to play in politics, but the part was to accept their responsibility as an element in the total organic political body. Maurice's somewhat unusual politics can only be explained by reference to his consistent application of the overriding policy of cooperation. At every level from the government of the country to the government of small production units his criterion for the good society was cooperation. All citizens should be involved in the machinery of government with only the benefit of the whole society as the purpose and the aim of politics.

Canon Evans also makes the interesting comment that the importance of the Christian Socialists "does not lie in the political sphere at all. Sociologically it lies in their perpetual insistence on the importance of human beings; theologically it lies in their re-assertion of the New Testament insistence of fellowship and their re-creation
of a realistic theology which is made possible for others the growing renewal of an authentic Christian social tradition." There is some truth in this but it is misleading to draw such a sharp dividing line between the political and the sociological. Maurice's politics were greatly influenced by his study of the Old Testament, as well as the New. His political ideas are determined by the concept of a Covenant between God and His People. Thus it is true that Maurice insisted on the value of individual human beings, but the individual's value was dependent upon his acceptance of his social responsibilities. The Covenant was not between the individual and God alone, but also between the People and God. How this has clearly political implications. The form of social organisation and the control of the society are inextricable. Maurice's attitudes towards both of these aspects of social life are built on his belief in a divine historical revelation, which revealed, not the details of politics but the underlying principles. His specifically political contribution is, therefore, not found in proposals for political organisation, though these may be deduced from his writings to some extent, but in his assertion of the necessity of cooperation. In as much as this determines the relationships between men and groups it is clearly a social theory. But in as much
as it also determines the qualifications for access to the rights of citizenship, including the right to vote, it is a political theory. That Maurice considered it as such can be seen from his "Representation and Education of the People", published in 1866 at the height of the discussion on the reform of the Franchise.

Much of Maurice's political writing (though by no means all of it) can be found in the two publications of the Christian Socialists. These were "Politics for the People" and the "Tracts for the People". In the prospectus for the former he wrote "Politics have been separated from household ties and affections - from art, science and literature. While they belong to parties, they have no connection with what is human and universal; when they become politics for the people they are found to take in a very large field; whatever concerns man as a social being must be included in them. Politics have been separated from Christianity. Religious men have supposed that their only business was with the world to come. Political men have declared that the present world is governed on entirely different principles from that. So long as politics are regarded as conflicts between Whig and Tory and Radical; so long as Christianity is regarded as a means of securing selfish rewards they will never be united. But politics for the people can not be separated from Religion. They must start from Atheism, or from the acknowledgement
that a living and righteous God is ruling in human society not less than in the natural world" (11)

Maurice played little part in the formation of the Producers Associations created by the Christian Socialists. He held a position of great authority amongst the members of the group however, and they inevitably gave way to his wishes in the matter of what to publish in their journals. He was an intellectual leader rather than an activist. At the same time he was well aware of the limitations of the Movement.

In Maurice 1850 he wrote to a friend "We shall certainly not be able, if we wished it, to apply the principle (i.e. of producer associations) except to those trades which do not require those long waitings for returns, or where these merely lead to extravagant and ruinous speculations. If a healthy tone is restored to those occupations by the unspeculative labourer taking the main interest in them I must think that the benefit to morality will very considerable.

If great commercial enterprises require the cooperation and predominance of the capitalist, as I am not at all disposed to deny that they do, then the capitalist will find his proper field. He will be obliged, I believe, in due time to admit his workmen to a share of his profits, but I question exceedingly whether he will find those workmen at all disposed to contravert his judgement about the best way of realising

ultimate advantages, if he gives them an adequate support commensurate with their services, such support of course to be deducted from their future gains. In the meantime, so far as I can observe, the workmen are most glad, only too glad, to defer to the experienced and intelligent capitalist, if they see he has their interest at heart as well as his own". (12)

A number of interesting points emerge from this quotation. In the first place the author appreciated the economic limitation of the cooperative associations which the Christian Socialists set up. They could apply to a small range of activities where no large investment of capital was needed. He did not envisage the elimination of the capitalist. The Associations were intended to instil a sense of moral worth in the workers in those occupations in which skill rather than capital investment was the important factor. The Associations were merely one instrument by which the principle of cooperation could be allowed to find its place in economic life. In the second place, Maurice hoped that, by showing that cooperation worked, the capitalist as much as the worker, would be brought to realise his social responsibility. Maurice was not trying to turn back the clock to a pre-capitalist society. He wanted capitalism to base its activities on the good of the whole society, not on the private gain of the individual. Thus he saw the need for a more equitable

distribution of the increase in output, and therefore of wealth, which capitalism could produce. His socialism was based on policies of redistribution of the product of industry, not on a reorganisation of the control of industry. He was quite prepared to accept a differentiation of function between capitalist and worker, provided he could be certain that the interests of all the participants in industry were cared for. At the same time he strongly deprecated the way in which men were used merely as another factor of production by the capitalists of his day.

There are, broadly speaking, two approaches to social and political reform. One is to seek to change the environment in which people live and work by altering the social and political structure of the community. Generally this is the approach of socialists such as Owen or Marx. Behind this approach lies the belief that people are products of their environment. It may or may not be associated with some form of historical necessity. The other approach is to change the nature of personal responsibility by converting the individuals in society to a more humane attitude towards their fellow citizens, thus maintaining that the people themselves must be changed before a more just society can be created. This second attitude was that adopted by most Christians in nineteenth century England. Maurice rejected this second point of view because it seemed
to suggest too severe an emphasis on the value of the isolated individual in society. What he sought was neither a change of environment, nor individual conversions but a change in the underlying philosophy of political and social action which would simultaneously accomplish the necessary structural changes and the necessary individual conversions. Nor did he regard his philosophy of cooperation as something new. In his eyes it had existed throughout the whole of history. God had revealed it to the ancient Hebrew Societies and had, in the life of Christ, shown the ideal of service as the essence of human social life. In Maurice's theology, and therefore in his politics, the individual and his society were equally the subject of God's promise and covenant. The divine promise of a good life was not given to individuals in isolation but to the people of God. Maurice's Christian Socialism was therefore concerned with individual responsibility within a social structure based on the divinely revealed concept of necessary social cooperation.

In July 1849 Maurice married Georgina, the half sister of his friend and ex-tutor Julius Hare. Miss Hare had been a friend of the Maurice family at the time of his first marriage to Anna Barton. She was to be Maurice's faithful companion for the rest of his life.
Maurice's professorship at King's College had already been attacked unsuccessfully because of his involvement in Christian Socialism. In 1853 he again came under fire but this time for the theological views expressed in his "Theological Essays". This time the attack was successful and Maurice was forced to resign his chair at the College. The theological point at issue was the nature of Eternity. The question devolved round a concept of Eternity as an endless future state - i.e. one in which time, albeit infinitely long time, is the essence of eternity. This point of view was regarded as orthodox by Dr. Jelf, the College Principal, and the contributors to the Record, the religious newspaper which continually attacked Maurice. Maurice rejected such a concept of eternity. To him eternity had no connection with a future life in the sense of time. Instead eternity meant a relationship with God in which time was irrelevant. The real controversy was about a secondary consideration. If eternity was considered as a projection into future time, the notion of eternal punishment and reward could be used by preachers to instil a "fear of the wrath to come", and thereby to obtain conversion. Such an approach to preaching was quite contrary to the whole of Maurice's theology which was based on the idea of a loving God, who could make himself known to men, and by love bring them to a fuller understanding of their real,
originally righteous, nature. Maurice did not deny the possibility of eternal punishment but he meant by it separation from God caused by man's deliberate rejection of God's promise. Man punished himself by the consequences of his own actions. He was punished, as indeed Dr. Jelf and the Record believed, by God. It is rather difficult to see how Dr. Jelf could have missed this essential difference between himself and Maurice if he had carefully read Maurice's earlier works. Like all his ideas this one is implicit in his early writings, even if it took the publication of the Theological Essays to bring it out into the open.

The argument over the Essays foreshadowed another controversy in 1858. This time the discussion arose out of the Bampton Lectures given by Dr. Hansell, later Dean of St. Paul's. In these, Hansell made the point that it was impossible actually to know God and that God did not directly reveal himself or his will to man. Man could only learn about God by deducing fact from certain revealed evidence. Leslie Stephen has said that Hansell's assertions were the first principles of agnosticism, though Hansell himself believed that his point of view was consistently orthodox. This controversy is important for the present purpose mainly because it resulted in Maurice's two books: "What is Revelation?" (1859) and the "Sequel to the Enquiry, What is Revelation?" (1860)
The point which Maurice stressed was that God had revealed his nature in the person of Christ and that sacred and secular history are, not rival, but are complementary. The manifestation of God's nature in Christ enables man to commune with God directly. Since man's nature was essentially like God's, Revelation was God's way of leading men to a knowledge of the Divine Laws through a knowledge of God himself. In fact, Maurice believed that all knowledge came from Divine Revelation.

In 1860 Maurice was appointed to the Chaplaincy of St. Peter's, Vere Street. Again the Record raised its voice against the appointment, mainly because the incumbency was in the gift of the Crown, through the Board of Works. The Evangelical Churchmen represented by the Record, in fact carried on a continual campaign against Maurice. In this case, they were quite unsuccessful, and, according to Maurice's son, lost much of their power as a result.

Maurice's next, and last, major theological controversy took place in 1862 with his friend, Bishop Colenso. The discussion centred around the inconsistencies apparent in the Bible and the analytic Biblical Criticism, which was an important theological issue at the time. Colenso was particularly concerned about the credibility of the Pentateuch. Maurice's attitude was to look at the Bible as a whole and
to seek the underlying principles which it revealed. He was not concerned with questions about the accuracy of particular parts of it but he was greatly upset at the thought of rejecting a large section of it because it not seem to fit into current beliefs about evolution. He regarded such criticism as being concerned only with literary and historical matter, to the detriment of the more important theological questions. As a result of his argument with Colenso, during which Colenso alluded to the opposition to Maurice's holding the Vere Street incumbency, he considered resigning from this post, but was dissuaded from doing so.

Towards the end of his life Maurice was appointed to the Knightsbridge Professorship of Casuistry, Moral Theology and Moral Philosophy at Cambridge, in 1866. In the following years he produced two important books, "The Conscience" in 1868 and "Social Morality" in 1869. These two works set out Maurice's considered beliefs on the nature of man both as an individual and as a social being. The latter book is especially important as a source for the study of his political beliefs. It is a collection of lectures delivered at Cambridge. In the lectures Maurice draws out the connections between family and national life. He states his belief in the social nature of man, and, taking a historical perspective, develops his concept of the interrelation between the individual, the family the nation and the universal society.
His closing sentences illustrate clearly his attitude to politics. "So there will be discovered beneath all the politics of the Earth, sustaining the order of each country, upholding the charity of each household, a City which has foundations, whose builder and maker is God. It must be for all kindreds and races; therefore with the sectorianism which rends Humanity asunder, with the Imperialism which would substitute for Universal fellowship, a universal Death, must it wage implacable war. Against these we pray as often as we ask that God's Will may be done in Earth as it is in Heaven."(13)

At this time the major political issue was the question of the reform of the franchise. Maurice in 1866 made one of his rare excursions into the field of everyday politics with his book the Workmen and the Franchise. In this he discussed the nature of political participation. He considered the problem as one in which the vote should be tied not to the ownership of property but to the ability and willingness of the various interests in society to submerge their own gain in the benefit of the society as a whole. He saw representation as being necessarily linked to political education and responsibility. He also warned against the dangers of refusing the vote to any group once they had achieved the required standards. Such refusals he regarded as the source of destructive revolution.

(13) Social Morality. Lect. XXI. London 1872
We have already mentioned Maurice's final book, his *Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy* published in 1872. It is certainly a work which Maurice had pieced together over the years, and which illustrates the breadth and depth of his studies. By the time it was published, however, Maurice had exhausted himself. On doctors' orders he had given up his work at St. Peter's, Vere Street in 1869. After that he suffered from more or less continuous ill health. On Easter Day 1872, Maurice died in his own home. He was buried in a family vault at Highgate on April 5th 1872 where his parents and sisters had already been placed.

F. D. Maurice died leaving a legacy of theological insight which can still be felt. If he did not start a Christian political movement he certainly gave the Church in England the basis of a social conscience which still has some effect. His specifically political contribution has, however, been neglected, probably because he himself disavowed expertise as a political philosopher during his lifetime. Nevertheless he did have some important insights which political thinkers seem to have ignored. No doubt his politics would be now regarded as unfashionable. He was essentially a preacher, with a prophetic tinge. As such he was a professional persuader - a man with an ideology.
Maurice's political thought can best be understood in the context of his beliefs about the nature of man, and God. Removed from this context his writings on politics appear to be confused and inconsistent. They certainly must have appeared so to J. S. Mill when he wrote "I have always thought that there was more intellectual power wasted in Maurice than in any other of my contemporaries. Few of them, certainly, have had so much to waste". (1)

A glance at Maurice's Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy will indicate the exceptional variety and depth of his reading. The encyclopedic nature of his studies, nevertheless, should not obscure the particular debt which he owed to three main sources, Plato, the Bible and S. T. Coleridge, although it must clearly put a student of Maurice on his guard against accepting too simple a survey of Maurice's frames of reference. Within the bounds set by these three elements of his thinking Maurice adapted to his own use many ideas from other writers. The ideas which he took from Plato, the Bible and Coleridge became the foundation upon which Maurice constructed his own brand of socialism. They form, as it (1) J. S. Mill. Autobiography. p. 107. New York 1944.
were, the skeleton which he clothed with his interpretation of the needs of nineteenth century England.

(1) **THE PLATONIC ASPECTS OF MAURICE'S THOUGHT**

 Some idea of Maurice's debt to Plato may be gained from a quotation from his Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy, published late in his life. Speaking of Plato's Republic he wrote "It teaches that far beyond this consciousness of power lies the contemplation of truth and goodness, and the assimilation of the soul to these. It shows that far beyond the mere feeling of energy to dare, to act, to revenge, lies the perception of order and harmony, an intimate fellowship with a Being above us, and the beings around us. It teaches that there is a universal ground, this perception of order and harmony the life, of which this fellowship is the result and the realisation."(2) This description of the Republic echoes a major theme of Maurice's writing.

 In his book "Plato, the Man and his Work", A.E. Taylor wrote "Plato --- definitely believes in a divine purposive activity."(3) For Maurice, of course, the divine purposive activity came from the Christian God. Along with Plato Maurice believed that man was to some extent capable of grasping the truth of this activity. The divine Being is the source of order in both natural and social affairs.

(3) A.E. Taylor. Plato, the Man and his Work. p.492. London. 1960
He not only contemplates the ideal forms but also creates them in the sensible world which humans can perceive. In Maurice's words every earthly form and idea "has its ground and its termination on one higher than itself and --- there is a supreme idea, the foundation and consumation of all these, even the idea of the absolute and perfect being, in whose mind they all dwell and in whose eternity alone they can be thought or dreamed of as eternal."(4) There is something in man which reflects the nature of the Divine Being. The actual man may be a corruption of the Divine Being but his ideal self can be recognised only by reference to this Divine Nature. True human nature can not be perceived by examination of the distorted image which actual men perceive in each other, but only by contemplating the "Author of our Being". The relationship between God and Man is in some respects similar to that between the ideal form and the existent perceived objects.

Maurice uses the word "notion" to describe the distorted perceptions normally available to man. The notions which men perceive, although distortions of the real, or the ideal, act as signposts to the true nature of men and of ideas. Man's task is to search for the indicators. This is equally true if we consider not only our sensible impressions of the world around us and our ideas concerning concepts such

as justice; it is also true of our understanding and knowledge of the Divine Being who is our Author. "The mind is capable of beholding the Being, the One. But of this Being, of this One, all the notions, imaginings premonitions of the sensual understanding offer most miserable and counterfeit resemblances." (5) Nonetheless in spite of the distortions which take place within the human mind "There is that in this Being, this One, which does and must answer to these notions". (5) In other words the impressions which the mind forms are indicative of the permanence of the truths which they represent. Maurice makes a comparison with the purely physical world. When we hear a sound we know that something must have caused the sound. The sound is not in the ear of the person who hears it; not is it in the instrument which originated the sound. It is in the relationship between them. "At all events there can be no presumption against the doctrine that as a sound cannot, by the very nature of language and of things, be referred only to that from whence it proceeds, but likewise involves the supposition of an ear which receives it, so there may be such a presentation of that which actually is, of the substance or essence of each thing, as can neither be understood merely in reference to that thing, nor merely in reference to that whereunto it is made, but must by its nature pertain one and the same moment to both." (5)

Now this doctrine which Laurice believes to be central to Platonic thought can be carried further. The realities which he is discussing are to be found in all things, though we may perceive but distorted images. And each has its "grand" in an idea higher than itself, so that eventually they derive from the idea of an absolute and perfect Being. There must therefore be in man something which corresponds to the ideas which he perceives. When man uses his senses and his brain to search for the truth, he intuits what Laurice describes as a witness to the idea.

Now, by accepting that the idea is within man, and attainable by him Maurice does not at all imply that it has its ground in man. This aspect of the situation has to be taken in conjunction with the previous statement that all objects and concepts have a reality but that the archetypal form or ideal "has its ground and termination in one higher than itself". It follows that acceptance of the existence of ideas in man, far from proving man's self-sufficiency, proves the opposite — that there is a Being superior to man, that there is a Being who is of a higher order than man, and in whom is to be found the ground idea.

Acceptance of the belief that ideas have an existence in man also disposes of the concept that individual men have only their own notions of reality, and that there can
therefore be no possibility of arriving at truth. The
Heraclitean concept of flux, excluding all hope of permanency
or order has no place in the thought of either Plato, or
Maurice. Indeed such concepts are contrary to the philosophical attitudes of both men. So also is the denial of sense experience maintained by the Eleatic philosophers - Parmenides and Zeno. This school of thought maintained that reality was a unity only to be discovered by the activity of the mind, unaided by the perceptions of the senses, whereas Heraclitios suggests that man can never be sure of his convictions since every thing is continually in flux. Maurice believed that the Platonic explanation is able to reconcile these two points of view and thus to enable man to arrive at an understanding of truth. It involves a realisation that man's "notions" are signposts to truth and that knowledge of ultimate reality can only be reached by abandoning "notions". Nevertheless without their use in the first place the ultimate reality would be quite beyond the grasp of men. Maurice, himself, used very similar reasoning when he dealt with the question of revelation as a means of man's understanding the Divine Order of nature and society. It would appear that his acceptance of this aspect of Platonic thought greatly influenced his own philosophic method, although he extended and modified it in the light of his Christian theology.
One other part of the Platonic method of which Maurice made use is seen in a quotation from his Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy where he writes "Not to frame a comprehensive system which shall include nature and society, man and God, and its different elements, or in its different compartments, and which therefore necessarily leads the system-builder to consider himself above them all, but to demonstrate the utter impossibility of such a system, to cut up the notion and dream of it by its roots, this is the work and glory of Plato."(6) Of his own work Maurice wrote "My business is not to build but to dig, to show that economics and politics must have a ground beneath themselves, that society is not to be made new by arrangements of ours, but is to be regenerated by finding the Law and ground of its order and harmony, the only secret of its existence."(7)

One of the most consistent themes of Maurice's writings in Theology, Philosophy and Politics, was his fear of system builders. This was true whether he was considering his position in the Church or his activities among the poor of London.

If one is not to build systems but to search for the grounds of order and harmony a method, as distinct from a system, is required. Maurice believed that Plato had found a satisfactory answer in his use of the dialectic method.

This method presupposes the view that there are real entities as opposed to their shadows or phantoms which man, through his senses, can perceive. It also requires that men shall be able to behold these realities and thus understand the truth. It was, however, no part of the philosopher's task to declare these truths. Instead his function ought to be to explain methods which could be adopted by men to attain the Truth for themselves. Thus, says Maurice, Plato's dialogues are in no sense a declaration of truths; they are a mental exercise to arrive at truth— an exercise which men have to carry out for themselves. The dialectic procedure is based on the assumption that one can treat the initial postulates of any theory as starting points from which it is possible, by asking the right kind of questions, to derive more basic premises. Ultimately one will be able to arrive at premises which are self evident. At this stage one will have achieved an understanding of the reality of everything. The point of this exercise is to avoid the dangers of setting up theories which are mere superstructures based on a set of so called principles. Such "principles" would, in themselves, give rise to instability and contradiction as a result of which any theory would be untenable. It was just such kinds of systems which Maurice abhorred. They gave rise to parties and factions in every sphere of knowledge,
mainly because their foundations had not been properly prepared. The dialectic method would take the postulates of such systems and push them backwards, questioning their "self evident" nature. Such postulates may not be false. They may simply be the results of some more fundamental truth. In the end one would arrive at what Maurice calls the "ground of our existence". Once such a ground had been identified the dialectic would make possible the rebuilding of one's understanding of a situation.

Applying this method to his political philosophy Maurice describes the ground on which society must be founded as some form of cooperation rather than, as was the case in his day, competition. He regarded the development of a society based on competition as resulting from a misunderstanding of the nature of man. Superficially it might seem that self interest was the mainspring of human activity. Yet if one asks the question "What is the nature of man?" Maurice would reply, "Man is like God". Maurice uses this kind of argument to illustrate the nature of the dialectic process. Men have acted on the false postulate that man's nature was self centred way the true nature of man is quite different. Assumptions based on the apparent selfishness of man miss the point that man has a divided nature and that original righteousness is anterior in time and in principle to original sin. Thus all social systems which are based on an apparently
Maurice adopts a particular point of view on the question of what is, or is not, self evident. The whole of his political philosophy depends on the assumption that the final degree of self evidence is the revelation of God to man by various forms of Divine intervention in human history. Maurice sees evidence of this intervention in the study of history (especially in the Old Testament, but also in modern and secular history); in the life of Christ; and in the capacity of Reason by the use of which men are able to proceed beyond the preconception of logic to the fuller appreciation of mystical realities. The dialectic process which Maurice adopted from platonic philosophy, tends in his hands to lean rather heavily on the dichotomy between Reason and Understanding which he learned from the writings of S. T. Coleridge. This dichotomy will be considered in greater detail later in this chapter. Maurice seems to suggest that only the knowledge gained by Divine revelation can be self evident, although he suggests that man may not be conscious of the act of revelation as such.

The premises of any argument should not only be self evident. If they are to fit into the dialectic scheme they must also be necessary. Maurice uses this argument against the supporters of doctrinaire systems. Supporters of particular ideas may be forced into unnecessary support of the system itself instead of expressing the truths which the
system is intended to uphold. Facts may be forced to support
the system instead of the system being made to fit the facts.
If, however, the final premises of the dialectic are both
self evident and necessary, and if we see the dialectic
process as pushing arguments back to what Iaurice regards
as the grounds of Being, this relieves the process of the
charge of being yet another system and makes it essentially
a moral argument.

Iaurice, then, sees the end product of the dialectic
process as the fusion of fact and value. Two aspects of
human nature, the physical and the moral are brought together.
Thus the physical side of human life, represented by the
necessary political, economic and social institutions, are
reconciled with the spiritual and moral necessities of
fellowship and cooperation. The ultimate reality which Iaurice
sees in God is a reality in which the driving force is love
and co-responsibility between God and man, and between man
and man. The political attitude which Iaurice displayed in
his Christian Socialism was his reaction to what he took
to be the process of the dialectic, as far as he could
understand it.

Iaurice was, therefore, suggesting that the ultimate
realities of life could be known. With Plato he seemed to
be prepared to say that "virtue is knowledge". In any
given historical context this may not be true, indeed will not be true; in such circumstances the best combination of fact and value will fall short of excellence but there will still be a tendency for the two to merge, so that any social organisation, which best suits the given environmental circumstances in terms of order, peacekeeping etc. will also be morally best in the given circumstances. It was this aspect of Plato's dialectic which attracted Maurice. He wrote of the dialectic "The development of the method by which the truth is perceived and ascertained is inseparably interwoven with a moral culture ---. Without the feeling of this connection and intertwining of the ethical with the intellectual discipline, the most beautiful Dialogues are unintelligible."(8)

The dialectic approach is fundamentally concerned with the attainment of truth by creating distinctions which will allow the philosopher to see those "images which the mind shapes for itself out of the objects of sense when it is sense-ridden and sense-possessed" and to distinguish them from "that reality which it is capable of perceiving when it has sought to purge itself of its natural and habitual delusions"(9). The method permits distinctions between sense-perceived "notions" and the more fundamental truths which man can intuit. Secondly, once a distinction has

been made it allows man to accept those items which tend towards self-evident truths and to reject those which appear to be the result of distorted sense perception. The possibility of distinction and choice in its turn is dependent on three assumptions which were, for Maurice, self evident. These are that there is in every man the capacity to apprehend and to recognise truth; that truth is continually within the grasp of every man; and that this truth is always distorted by what he describes as the "phantoms" which are presented to his sense. Two elements can be traced in the process by which man apprehends the "truth" and rejects the "phantoms" which are represented to his sense. One factor is intellectual. Intuition alone is not usually sufficient to grasp the truth. Man must use his intelligence to make the necessary distinctions. Neither, however, is intellect alone capable of performing this operation. A moral factor is also involved. The point of view which Maurice would seem to hold is that virtue is only virtue "as it becomes formed in a man."(10) Maurice seems to infer that there is no such thing as virtue or goodness except as a quality of human life. There is an ideal state towards which man may strive; the state of being Ideal, or perfectly like God. This state implies the attainment of goodness or righteousness since God is good and righteous. Now man, in Maurice's view is part of a moral

(10) F. D. Maurice. Social Morality. p.18. London 1872
order. He is also part of a natural order. The moral order relates to such qualities as goodness, justice etc. The natural order relates to the physical and intellectual well being of man. Just because the moral and the physical are found represented in man one cannot separate morals from life; nor, therefore, can one separate moral and intellectual activity. The moral, however, Maurice regards as the higher form of human activity. The intellectual capacity helps man to understand the truth. It is not essential for the undertaking of good acts. Since the moral order is so important Maurice regards all "purely intellectual" exercises as irrelevant and merely playing with words. It may be interesting but unless it sheds light on the nature of life and encourages a closer approximation to the perfect Being it is of little value. Unless men are prepared to search behind words for their latent meaning the words themselves are useless. So long as words represent some real experience they are of inestimable value.

Thus Maurice says that Plato was right to use the dialogue form in presenting his thought. Not only so but he was particularly right to introduce real people into his discussions. Indeed Maurice looked upon this as one of Plato's greatest insights. No explanation could be given in writing which could equal the insights which the Dialogues
provide. "His dialogues are literally an education, explaining to us how we are to deal with our own minds, how far we are to humour them, how far to resist them; how they are to resist the glimpses of light which sometimes fall upon them; how they are to make their way through the complications and darkness in which they so often feel themselves." (11)

Maurice believed that much could be learned from the ordinary conversations of ordinary men. It is from such conversations that eternal truth is likely to emerge. He himself presented some of his work in dialogues usually with himself as one of the speakers. "When men explain their own experience they are in some degree explaining the truth."

From the point of view of its influence on Maurice's own political thought it is interesting to see how he reacted to Plato's use of the Dialectic method in the Republic. Maurice regarded this book as a study of the relationship between the mind of man and the constitution of society. Maurice puts his point thus "--- there are eternal principles involved in the constitution of society itself, to which the individual members conform themselves, not because they are content to sacrifice their own personality, but because they have no other way of asserting it." (12) In the Republic Plato is trying to understand the nature of the dignity of

individual man but he finds that this can only be done in terms of each man's relationships with his fellows. In other words, man can never exist as an individual apart from the network of social relationships in which he must find himself. The base of society does not lie in the individual but in the group. For Maurice, of course, this group was the family, as we shall show in a subsequent chapter. The source of man's individuality is to be found, not in a justice which gives each man his due, but rather in a justice which explains the relationship between men. Nevertheless the concept of justice as a social or political phenomenon is not separate from that of justice as a ruling principle in individual men. The name justice which describes man's dealings with his fellows, describes the harmony within the life of an individual. Justice is, in fact, the meeting point between individual and political ethics.

Maurice seems to me by justice that "eternal principle involved in the constitution of society itself" of which he writes in the passage quoted above. This principle he regarded as far from being utopian. If one looks at society one sees it at work. Plato recognised it in the necessary principle of the division of functions within any social organisation. Man is not individually self sufficient. In the case of supplying his physical and material needs he must necessarily cooperate with his fellow-men. Different
needs arise and men have different capacities to deal with them. From this comes the principle of the division of functions which in its turn gives rise to the need for distinct occupations and thus to the natural development of order in society. Just as some men have more aptitude for making shoes than others, so some men have more ability to rule than others. The concept of order in society is, therefore, not an artificial pattern prescribed by some men simply to ensure the continuance of power in their own hands. It is much more a "natural carrying out of the intentions of providence." This point of view is of fundamental importance for an understanding of Maurice's attitude towards democracy. He had a fear of democracy, at least in the classical interpretation, based on the possibility of the wrong men being given, political power. For him the rule of the majority was anathema, mainly because it controverted the intentions of providence. The existence and continuance of society depended upon the continuance and existence of the proper classes in society, but only in as much as these classes represented not privilege but the divinely ordained order and harmony of society.

Maurice saw much to be praised in the threefold class structure of Plato's republic. Each class illustrated a fundamental principle of social order. The philosopher kings or magistrates as Maurice calls them represent Wisdom;
the lower Guardians represent Fortitude; and the lower classes represent Temperance. Further each class carried out certain duties in society by virtue of its own special understanding. The Magistrates are responsible for superintending and arranging the affairs of the state; the Guardians are responsible for sustaining and defending the state; and the other classes have the task of supplying the necessary economic and material needs of the state. This last class, being the most numerous, illustrates the need for self-restraint, by accepting their place in the orders of society, thus showing that degree of submission and temperance which is necessary for the maintenance of order.

Now the three classes in society represent certain fundamental moral grounds upon which society is based. These grounds of wisdom, fortitude, and temperance are not entirely separate and independent of each other. Indeed, if society is not to crumble under the pressure of internal dissension they must, to use Maurice's own phrase, interpenetrate each other. If this is the case some other, coordinating, principle needs to be postulate; a principle, or a ground of society, which will refer not only to the particular, separate classes, but to society as a whole. Plato illustrates this from the principle of the division of functions, but it is the concept of order itself which is the final ground of society. It
equally refers to harmony within the individual in whom the three elements of Reason, Energy or Will, and Cupidity parallel the classes in society. Further, the harmonic principle in both society and the individual is what H.J. calls Justice. It is this concept of justice, (or Order to use Maurice's terminology) which explains the apparent paradox that only in his social relationships can the individual man achieve the full expression of his personality. Man is at one and the same time an individual, and a member of society. As an individual he needs to satisfy certain psychological needs, including a sense of achievement. The demands of personality, however, intermingle with those of society.

Man's reliance on social support is by no means confined to the field of economics. He also depends on human interaction for the satisfaction of his psychological needs. This process of interaction represents, for Maurice the working out of the principle of Order in society in so far as it is concerned to uphold the common good, rather than the unnecessary privileges of the individual. Maurice did not by any means suggest that his concept of Orders should require the abolition of all privilege. The criterion was the common good, not egalitarianism. Advantages, deriving from either natural talents or social status, exist and should be used for the common good. The existence of orders
especially as represented by an aristocracy) was therefore quite acceptable to Mauricce's political thought. The over­
riding factor was that of harmony. When individuals are
seeking the common good within the framework of their society they are able to satisfy both their own needs and those of
the social group. Mauricce, thus, rejects a philosophy of
individualism. He also rejects a politically static society
since he maintains the necessity for a continually increasing
political role for the classes at present underprivileged.
Indeed his perfect society would seem to be one in which the
roles and functions of various groups were dependent not only on birth and economic status but also on inclination
and ability. The opportunity, in the good society, must
exist for the individual to satisfy himself by service to the
whole community.

Within every society there is a hint of the ideal; an
indication of what society ought to be. Mauricce believed
that Plato saw this far but was unable to go on to analyse
this in detail. While he was dealing with the problems of
an actual nation in the Laws, he used the normal relations
between human beings as a source of social cohesion. In
the Republic where he deals with an ideal state he can not
see how distinct relationships, such as exist in normal
family life, can be possible, at least for those charged
with the highest functions of political life. Thus, in the
Republic, "Perfect community seems the law of its (the state's) being; whatsoever interferes with this seems to frustrate its intention". (13) It would, therefore, seem that Plato was unable to move from a national, existent society to an ideal universal society. And this, Maurice suggests, is his main limitation. However, it was a limitation which was to be removed by the Hebrew and Christian doctrine of society which was later to show how the relationships of the family could grow into the relationship of the nation and finally into the relationship of the Universal Society. Plato saw through the glass darkly, but at least he saw something.

One problem which both Maurice and Plato had to face was the incompatibility of a perfect society with the fact of the selfishness of men. Both found a solution to the problem by declaring that the self-centred aspect of man's life is a deviation from his true nature. Maurice refines his discussion by reference to a Christian theology in which he suggests that righteousness rather than sin is the true nature of man, but he takes from Plato the belief that selfishness in man leads to destruction of order and is, therefore, not the source of a true political system but must lead to the confusions and disorders which deny the sense of social life. "There is," he says "something higher which is not

satisfied with itself, but which seeks after converse with the Good."(14) In the organisation of the state this is represented by the functions of the Philosopher Kings. The philosopher would be concerned only with true ends, with substance, not with shadows. He alone can find the Good by use of his reason. Other men, however, are also seeking the Good, although they are unable, because of their limited ability and education, to attain it fully. The philosopher must try to lead them towards the truth. The adoption of such an attitude explains some of Maurice's own activities. Certainly it is reflected in his work in the field of education, and in his writings he seems to lay particular stress on the need to lead people to the point where they can see the truth for themselves. He certainly tries to bring out his belief in the Dialectic method - "which directly leads to the contemplation of truth as truth, of good as good, in its pure essence."(15) If a nation can be guided by wisdom of this kind then it will achieve the true end of society, and its members their full stature as individual personalities. If this is so then the existence of selfishness does not prove the impossibility of the true society. It may prevent it from coming into existence at a given point in time, but it does not necessarily mean that the true society can not exist in some other place, at some other time. The eventual

end of history, with man made perfect will result in the perfection of society. From his study, and his interpretation of the Bible, Maurice adopts a philosophy of history, which, as we shall see in a later section, could envisage just this happening. The forces in society which prevent a nation reaching the perfect state are just those which are sometimes wrongly regarded as the mainspring of social action. The motive of self seeking, whether in man as an individual, or in society, results in disruption of the Divine order in nature and in society. Forms of government such as Tyranny, oligarchy and democracy are deviations from the true forms, and these deviations are connected with degeneration in individual men. But they exist because men have not understood the original model of the true Republic, rather than because the true Republic is not attainable.

The elements of Platonic thought which have been outlined, form a basis for much of Maurice's own writings. He accepted Plato's approach as a general method of analysis. From it Maurice derives his great fear of systems and parties. They interfere with the dialectic necessity to seek the truth even if this means discarding many previously strongly held views. Systems seem to have a built-in defence mechanism. Perhaps parties have this characteristic even more strongly. Maurice's fear that he would be regarded as an "authority"
is no doubt due to this deeply felt need to lead men to see the truth for themselves rather than to accept his words with blind devotion. He also seems to have accepted the Platonic concept of a hierarchy of being into his own approach to the problem of the relationship between man and God. He does, of course, take the matter further by referring to God as the ground of man's existence, transferring the discussion to a rather different plane. Nevertheless underpinning Maurice's Biblical approach is the methodology which he found in his study of Plato.

**THE INFLUENCE OF THE BIBLE ON MAURICE'S THOUGHT**

Above all else Maurice regarded himself as a theologian. If Plato taught him to dig rather than to build, the Bible became the ground of his excavations. For Maurice the Bible was a source of knowledge of God's revelation of Himself to mankind. He regarded it as illustrating a Divine education of the human race. This education Maurice considered to be the one hope of humanity. The whole point of the scriptures is lost unless one realises that they are a record of the undolding by God of the relationship between Himself and his creature, Man. "A Divine education then, is assumed as the regular basis of human life and human fellowship. God teaches man what he is, Man knows what he is; he fulfills his appointed task just so far as he receives this instruction." 

Maurice sees God's revelation of Himself to man as the normal, even necessary, condition of human life. But the revelation is progressive, not sudden. It began with the creation and it will finish with a "complete day of revelation when everything that has been hidden shall come forth; every creature shall be made manifest in God's sight." (17)

The process of revelation requires not only that God should reveal Himself but also that man should have the capacity to accept and acknowledge such a revelation. That God could do this without creating a capacity in man to know and to communicate with His archetype seemed to Maurice to be a contradiction. It would be equally so for God to create man without giving him the capacity to reach the goal intended for him. Man must therefore be capable of something more than the selfish use of material objects. From the Bible Maurice derives the belief that God acts in history to draw men towards his real ends. He finds considerable evidence in the Bible to support this contention. Indeed one of the most important influences which the Bible had on his thought was to provide a framework for his philosophy of history.

It would be true to say that, for Maurice, history is the continuing revelation of God's will to man. History then becomes not only a series of events but an educational process.

In his book "Theories of the Political System", William T. Bluhm writing about St. Augustine noted that "--- to the Christian, reason and natural experience alone could provide no complete and fully satisfying answers to the great questions, for he believed that God had intervened in the life of the empirical world to communicate directly, in a special way with his creature man. And it was to this Revelation that the Christian political theorist naturally turned for a frame of reference and starting point; or as we would put it today for orienting concepts. To think significantly about politics or about any large question, he would have to see what God Himself had revealed, which might open up a path to the questions puzzling him. And the record of this Revelation was to be found in the extensive body of writings which we call the Judeo - Christian Bible. (18) In this sense one could say that F. D. Maurice forms part of what Wm. Bluhm has called Augustinian Bridge, for certainly Maurice used the revelation of divine will as shown in the Bible as a frame of reference. But he goes further than this and it would be more accurate to say that Biblical Revelation was one element in his frame of reference, since he regards secular revelation as equally important. God, in other words reveals Himself not only in that record of mainly Hebrew history which we know as the Bible; he reveals himself in all history. His revelation is available universally. In

(18) W.T. Bluhm Theories of the Political System p.155.
the introduction to his Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy he writes "All nations have been engaged in this search for wisdom — Buildings, poems, pictures, mechanical arts, above all Politics, have indicated the direction which different periods, countless individuals have taken in the pursuit." (19) In his Preface to the second edition of the same book, he says that even heathen philosophers have had an actual Divine guidance, and that insofar as they follow this guidance they assist in the process of Divine Revelation.

The purpose of history is to bring men gradually to a fuller understanding of God's nature, and, since man is made in God's image, of their own nature. This raises the question of man's essential nature. Maurice's interpretation of the scriptures drives him to the conclusion that original sin is not the essence of man's being. He can not deny that sin exists. But he denies that evil is more powerful than goodness. One need only look around the world to see evidence of the power of evil. It derives from a tendency in man to put himself in the centre of existence. But righteousness is stronger than sin. God is more powerful than the devil, and since man is made not in the Devil's image but in God's he is "originally righteous" not "originally sinful". It is clear that Maurice is not thinking of "original" in terms of time, but in terms of

the nature of man. Even, then, if there is evidence that
man has always in the past retained the genius of evil
within himself, it does not follow that this must always
be the case.

This argument raises another fundamental issue in
Maurice's philosophy of history. Truth exists whether man
discovers it or not. If this is so, then, even if man never
realises that the human race is essentially good, its goodness
still exists. Evidence to the contrary is simply part of
man's imperfect understanding. From this sort of discussion
Maurice derives the concept that study of the past is only
valuable if it throws light on the conditions of the present.
If truth exists whether or not man realises it, it is also
the case that truth therefore rests upon eternal foundations.
These eternal truths have something to say for men of all
ages, past, present and future. From this Maurice can argue
that there has never been a "Golden Age of Man's Existence."
Maurice is careful to differentiate "eternal" from any ideas
concerning time. Eternal truths are those which are based
upon what Thomas Aquinas would have described as universal
law. That is to say they are eternal by virtue of being
ordained by God. They are, it is true, valid for all time,
but it is God's ordination, and not time, which makes them
eternal. Thus although Maurice is prepared to say that there
has been no evidence of a Golden Age he does not go on to claim that such an age will necessarily come at any time in the future. Anaand society are Divine Realities as they are now, not as they may become in the future. Christ, Maurice would say, speaks of eternal life, not of future life. This of course, is not to say that present society, or the present moral state of man are perfect, but they are images of perfection. In the Platonic sense they are shadows of the ideal form. What the Bible tells us is not the condition which man is going to achieve at some future unspecified date, but what man is capable of achieving now.

There is, however, an apparent contradiction in Maurice's philosophy at this point. Clearly he regards the Bible as a gradual Revelation of God's nature to man. This would seem to infer a progression towards better and better states of understanding until the perfect condition is achieved. Now then can we say that man can be perfect now, and presumably at any time in the past. The answer seems to lie in the suggestion that what man could achieve is not necessarily what he does achieve. There are two sides to man's nature, the true, good nature, and the false, evil nature. Man is, unlike the other parts of creation, capable of self direction. He must choose to accept the truth which God reveals to him. By his own nature God has restricted his own powers over man.
God can only show men how they may achieve perfection. The decision to do so is a matter of will. Maurice believes that man is to some extent free to choose good or evil. His essential nature should make him choose good but that other part of his nature, which Maurice regards as an aberration, inclines him towards self centredness which is the main source of evil. Man is therefore always faced with a choice. The real difficulty is that man's imperfections result in the choice being blurred. God's part in the process is, then, to assist man by giving him indications of the right course. Man is imperfectly seeking the truth. God guides him towards it by a series of revelations. Thus in history God has chosen the Hebrews to act as the main source of inspiration in man's quest for knowledge of his real nature, although other nations may also have glimpses of it. Man is potentially good, he has the capacity to choose the right road. But God can not make the choice for him.

By study of the Bible man may achieve an understanding of those laws on which the whole nature of the universe is founded. Maurice traces the development of society through the revelation to the Jews of the universal laws. Thus the Jewish nation has its roots in the striving of Abraham to grasp the relationship between God and Man. Abraham is called out from his father's house to go into a foreign land.
He feels that God is speaking to him and he learns the first lesson when he realises that he must obey the call if he is to retain his ability to become like God. The real point, for Maurice about the story of Abraham is that he learns the lesson of trust. He is faced continually with situations in which he is forced to have faith in the God who calls him. The barreness of his wife - and the eventual provision of a legitimate heir; the order to sacrifice his son and the provision of an alternative are examples of the proper relationship between God and an. But this story is not only the story of an individual; it is also a metaphor of humanity's relationship with it's creator. Abraham founded a family, and on that family the whole of the Chosen Race was built. Thus, says Maurice God's covenant is not only with the individual. It is a social covenant. But even in the Old Testament God does not restrict himself to communication with the Jews. God speaks also to Pharaoh (20) and to Abimilech (21).

The Jews, however, have learned their lessons only partially and they continue to commit the sins which are peculiar to a fairly primitive tribal nation. But gradually out of the punishments which the Jews bring upon themselves, the Jewish family develops into a Jewish nation. The same principle apply to the Covenant between God and the nation as a

(20) Genesis Ch. 41.
(21) ibid Ch. 20. v2.
between God and the family. God shows himself to the Jews. If they can respond by choosing to make their will conform to God's will all is well. If they allow their will to become separate from God's will the nation suffers. Maurice, however, does not draw the conclusion that God is deliberately punishing the Jews because they have been disobedient. The reason for the suffering is that the Jews have broken one of the laws of man's existence. Not to live in conformity to God's Will and therefore to their own true nature, automatically induces evil results. The suffering which results from breaking the covenant was not seen by Maurice as the direct action of an angry God. In his book the Doctrine of Sacrifice Maurice shows that attempts to placate God by offerings of gifts and sacrifices are characteristic of the heathen religions which has a false conception of God. The true nature of sacrifice was that it was a token of men's realisation that they were made in God's image. It was a way in which they could express their acceptance of the revelations which God had given them.

One other important lesson which Maurice draws from the early books of the Old Testament is that the nation grows out of the family. It must preserve the distinctions of personalities which are found in the family - a concept which is central to much of what Maurice had to say about politics.
The nation, however, is not merely a collection of individual families bound together by some mutual contract of agreement. The Jewish nation was a witness to order in society. It stood against all forms of disorder. The nation, as much as the family or the individual, represents the relationship in which men stand to God. God has shown men a more advanced education than he could give to Abraham. The social concern, the need for an acceptance of social responsibility is indicated by the laws which the Jewish nation accepts. The Decalogue lays down in formal language a new order, or rather a development of an old order. In one sense it is positive law; it is laid down. But it is essentially a moral law because it states the principles on which all other legislation is to be based. Maurice saw in the Ten Commandments a law revealed to a nation. They were, he would say, strictly a national code revealed to the Jews not as individuals but as a nation. The adoption of the Decalogue as the basis of Jewish political culture marks a step in the Divine education of man. In the Commandments the Jews find a code which takes them a stage further in their understanding of the social nature of humanity. Not only are they to belong to families, they are also to belong to a wider group of which the family is the seed. The Jewish nation of Old Testament times illustrated for Maurice that part of Divine education whereby God led men to understand their relationship to Himself.
and their relationship to each other in a wider context than
had been shown to the earliest Patriarchs. Here a social
concern was expressed beyond that which one might reasonably
expect to be shown to those related by family ties. This
concern is shown to go out to people because they are members
of the nation. The area of social responsibility is widened.
It is extended to people one may never meet and certainly would
not know intimately. It was however, still kept within the
bounds of the nation. The Jews, as a people were being set
apart to receive God's education. They must therefore recognise
themselves as a distinct national entity. In Maurice's political
writings he stresses the importance of nations values. Just
as individuals are different from each other, yet related to
each other, so nations have individual characteristics, yet
may also be interdependent. The members of a nation are bound
together by common experiences, by common laws, by common
language. Each in time develops its own culture which is
expressed in its political institutions and attitudes. That
God was teaching the Jewish nation was a common responsibility
for the care of the poor, the value of the individual within
the common good and above all the common acceptance of the
proper relationship between God and man from which all other
responsibilities spring.

From the Old Testament Maurice derives the concept that
God is the "Great Actor" in history. The laws which man uses
to govern his social relationships not only reflect God's will. If man is to achieve his full stature he must understand that they are given directly by God. The covenant which God establishes with the Hebrews is initiated by God. In other words God gives the law. It is up to men to act according to that law if they are to gain social harmony. For their institutions the Hebrews could claim no novelty. The Egyptians had a similar set of institutions. They had priests, sacrifices, temples, laws. One might even argue that the Jews imitated the institutions of the land in which they had been held captive. They might just as easily have rejected them as idolatrous. What Moses had done for the Jews, however, was to analyse the relationship between man and God in a way which was quite different to the Egyptian Beliefs. The Egyptians regarded their institutions as bribes intended to convert God's will to man's will. Moses proposed just the opposite - that human institutions should be derived from what God has shown man of His will so that human will could be led into conformity with Divine Will.

Man was not left in the dark, groping for the right thing to do. He was shown how to act. In the Exodus, natural agents in the form of plagues are shown to obey a moral law, in which a righteous Being punishes the tyrant and delivers the oppressed people. God is seen here as the real deliverer of the Hebrews.
He is the source of their liberty and his actions sets them free. The Egyptians could see law only as the dictates of the monarch who took on a Divine personality. Thus their laws were either totally irreversible or else could be changed only at the will of the monarch. For the Jews the law was totally irreversible only in as much as it could be seen to represent the Divine Will as expressed in God's covenant with the nation. Bearing in mind Maurice's belief in the gradual revelation of the Divine Law to men it is clear that Maurice did not believe that the laws revealed to the early Jewish nation encompassed the total knowledge of Divine Will. Men were, and are, continually learning that changes in our understanding of the Divine Will bring about new interpretations by society of the Covenant which God made with the Jew.

In Maurice's scheme Divine Will is eternal and immutable. What changes is man's grasp of it and therefore his grasp of the proper relationships between man and God. Maurice's philosophy of history is always looking for new understanding of the unchangeable Divine Will and God is always active in history to lead men nearer to the situation in which the human and the Divine will shall coincide.

There are, then, three elements in the history of man. One is the unaltering and the unalterable Divine Will. In a sense this can be regarded as similar to the Ideal forms of Plato.
A second factor is man's will which is, in many ways, a shadow of Divine will but which also represents man's tendency to self-centredness. These two wills could coincide, and in a perfect state should and do coincide. This means, of course that Maurice is to a large extent optimistic. Since he believes in essential righteousness, and not in original sin as the nature of man he is bound to be an optimist - at least in the long run. In the short run, however, man is liable to be extremely destructive of the order which God has ordained for both the natural and the social worlds. Maurice is therefore faced with a dilemma. Man's nature is good, therefore his will must also be good, when in its perfect state; but equally man's nature is evil, and therefore his will must be evil, when in its imperfect state. If man is to reach his eventual goal of harmony between his will and God's a third element must be found in history. This third element is, of course, God's intervention into human affairs. Man is thus faced with certain evidence placed before him by the deliberate action of God.

God, of course, does not force men to act upon the evidence which he produces. He merely states a case. The Egyptians did not act upon the evidence of God's will. Therefore they perished. In the Bible, time and time again, Maurice sees the intervention of God throwing light on how men ought to
The Jews disobey the Laws and are punished; the Philistines oppose God and they are defeated. Equally the Jews follow the commands of the covenant and they prosper. History teaches men that conformity with the Divine will brings certain results - non-conformity brings others. Thus Maurice faces the problem of free will and determination. To ask whether or not man is free is, in a sense, to ask the wrong question. There is no doubt that man is free to make a choice between obedience and disobedience to God's will. The problem comes down to the question of whether or not man is capable of accepting the evidence which God places before him. Whether or not he does so, will depend upon whether man's real nature is such as to incline him towards conformity with God's will or towards total self-satisfaction. Maurice recognises that a dilemma exists. Man has an evil streak in him, of that he is in no doubt. He will tend, unaided, therefore, towards self-centredness but this tendency is in opposition to, not in conformity with, his own true self. A paradox exists whereby man, when he seeks only to satisfy himself, as an individual, is acting contrary to his own real self as a creature of God. However, if man seeks not his own individual self gratification, but conformity to God's will he finds himself acting in such a way as to attain his proper place in God's created order. This will result in the righteousness which Maurice regards as being the consequence of man's creation in God's own image. Only by
acting in this way can man be "free". This concept of freedom is the result of Maurice's acceptance of a teleological view of man and society. Man's purpose is to be like God, but he can not be like God unless he is free to choose otherwise. Yet if he chooses otherwise he is denying his real self.

What Maurice seems to say is that God gives man a frame of reference against which to make his choice. That frame of reference is to be discovered by the study of history, which shows man, not the power of God to force man to be good, but the criteria by which he can judge how near or far he is from understanding his own nature. History, therefore, is useful precisely in as much as it illustrates the present. In this context man perceives the truths, which are themselves immutable, more and more clearly. Since these truths are eternal, and since God is continually illustrating his, and therefore man's real nature, he must be expected to provide some final means by which man can come to a recognition of himself. For Maurice this means is, of course, provided by Jesus Christ. Through Christ, God gave man a link with Himself. But Christ was also the bond which joined men to each other. "It was the great witness to them and demonstration to them that they were spirits having bodies, that they were not bodies, into which a certain ethereal particle, called spirit, was infused. That which conversed with God was not something accidental to them, but their substance. And this too was that by which they held
converse with each other. Without this there was no possibility of their feeling together, suffering together, hoping together" (22)

Here Maurice is speaking of Christ's relation with his disciples. The point which is so clear to him is that Christian Gospel as much as the older Jewish history is part of the Divine Education. But a new element has been introduced. In the past God had brought his message to the Jews by, as it were, contact with their leaders, but with Christ God had himself come into the world in a human form.

For Maurice this had several important implications. In the first place it meant that God's special education was no longer confined only to the Jew. One of the most important features of Maurice's theology is his universalism. The Divine education is offered not to one special nation but to all men. The whole human race was the object of God's intervention in the world. This did not mean that all men were equal or even that there were not great and important differences between nations. Maurice's view of politics reflects a view of theology in which order rather than uniformity was the basis of human society if not the whole creation. However the Incarnation meant that God and humanity were being brought together in such a way that God was uniting man to man. A bond of fellowship was being created greater than any bonds of race, class or nationality. This bond Maurice saw as the

(22) F. D. Maurice, Theological Essays. p. 264. London 1853
Universal Society which represented the common humanity of man and which was essentially typified by the Church. This universal society was spiritual in nature, based on that part of man's nature which seeks superhuman signs of Divine guidance. These signs, however, are never to be found in the "wonders and signs" that some men look for. Instead they are found in those aspects of human society which seem to endure. In fact there is evidence in history long before Christ, that the Divine education was universal. The Incarnation only made this more apparent. Thus in the Kingdom of Christ, Maurice wrote: "The Greeks and Romans were remarkably distinguished from each other. But they were both alike distinguished from the slaves and barbarians of whose existence we became aware chiefly through them. Wherein lay the difference; Apart from all intellectual superiority it is quite evident that they had a clear sense of certain great landmarks and boundaries in human society, the violation of which was an evil; that they believed these unseen landmarks to have been fixed by an awful Unseen Power, and to be preserved by that Power." (23) The ancient classical states were the objects of Divine education, although they only partially understood what it was all about. And in modern societies men still find evidence of the Divine education. Certain Jewish ideas and institutions

such as the ordering of a day of rest at the end of the week have become part of modern social culture. The institutions of modern society, such as property and marriage, are generally found to be widespread in all Christian Societies. The Christian understanding and use of these institutions which form part of the structure of social and political life are evidence of the widening of the education originally given to the Jews and now passed over to the whole human race.

A second result of Christian teaching for Maurice is that the secular becomes just as important as the sacred. In this case, however, we have to be careful to realise that the New Testament does not supcede the old. The laws given to Moses on Mount Sinai were of the same general character as those in the sermon on the Mount. Thus the Laws of the Old and the New Testament are complimentary. Above all they are not intended to help man to forget his secular and build up his spiritual life. Maurice regards the Ten Commandments as referring particularly to secular things. Clearly they are in some sense rational laws given to the Jews to help them build a good society. Equally clearly they represent a recognition that the earthly characteristics of man's existence are important, that because man is both body and spirit, he has to care for the body as much as for the spirit. The realisation of the Incarnation of Christ is vitally important
for getting away from Manicheism. "Above all they are able
to rid ourselves of the Manichaean notion (which it should
be remembered has been always connected with a low notion
of the Old Testament), that the outward and visible universe,
and ordinary social relations, are the creation of an
evil spirit, to be esteemed lightly by all who have attained
to the perception of a higher economy."(24) This acceptance
of the value of worldly as well as spiritual values is the
source of Maurice's political concern. Once you start to
value secular abilities and functions their proper ordering
becomes an essential point of your framework of thought.
For Maurice, as for all the Christian Social Reformers who
followed him, the distinction between secular and spiritual
disappears. It is not so much that he regards one as more
important than the other as that he sees no relevance in the
distinction. Maurice regarded himself as both Christian and
Socialist and he regarded himself as a socialist because he
was a Christian. This is the result of his understanding of
the Scriptures. There are two strands in Maurice's thought
in this field. The first is his belief that the Christian
doctrine creates a fellowship. A bond between God and Man,
and between men, necessitates a cooperative rather than a
competitive base for social relationships. But equally

important is the belief that the Divine is essentially involved in the secular.

Although Maureice seems to deny the distinction between the spiritual and the secular there is also a sense in which he accepts that there is a distinctly secular and distinctly spiritual world. If the secular is regarded as the corrupt, then a clear dichotomy exists between that world and the spiritual. The Manichean heresy is a heresy precisely because it claims that all secular activity is the result of evil, not just because it is different from the spiritual as "absorbing all influence into one paramount, transcendant influence" (25). The secular world exists and will continue to exist. What Christ did was not to destroy the secular world but to bring it under an eternal law. Christ's claim to have fulfilled the law should be seen as a claim to have freed it from the formalising effects of the Scribes and Pharisees. In the sermon on the Mount, Christ is heard to say "--- except your righteousness shall exceed the righteousness of the Scribes and Pharisees, ye shall in no way enter the Kingdom of Heaven". (26) Maureice argues in the Kingdom of Christ that this can be interpreted in two ways. It can mean that righteousness can be either different in degree, or different in kind. Maureice believes that if the

(26) Gospel According to St. Matthew. Ch. 5. v. 20
former case holds then Christ has altered the Mosaic Law and
replaced it by a new Law. In which case his concept of the
gradual unfolding of a Divine purpose would collapse. The
concept would now simply be one of replacing a strict adherence
to the letter of the law, by an even stricter adherence.
This, to Maurice was quite unacceptable. If, however, what
Christ meant was a quite different kind of righteousness to
that of the Scribes and Pharisseses, what he would be doing
was to lead his disciples back to the original intent of the
Divine Education, and then to show men how they could build
on to the Mosaic Law, by obtaining a deeper insight into the
spiritual nature of man, while at the same time grasping the
reality of the relationship between the spiritual and the
secular. Because man was spiritual he had to accept responsi-

bility for the bodily needs of his fellows. He had, in
other words to love his neighbour as himself.

The third, and in some ways most important implication
of the Incarnation, for Maurice, was the belief that the
Kingdom of Christ was not a happening which was to occur at
some 'indefinite future date. It was in existence now. This has
important consequences for Maurice's beliefs. In some ways his
polities can be described as utopian. His ideal was certainly
that of a perfect society, in which the inhabitants of this
world would seek each other's good, and in which personal, and even national, aggrandisement would disappear. He did not, however, see this as depending on the perfecting of human nature through historical time, not through the discovery of some natural paradise in which man was taken back to his pre-fall condition. He believed that God was not only giving man a divine education but through the incarnation had given man an instrument for personal and social regeneration now. The perfection of man's nature was not dependent on God taking the initiative and finding his true nature by searching for the clues which God gave in the scriptures and in human history and by accepting the Divine power which God had given in Christ.

Thus Maurice's whole approach to the Bible was aptly described in a passage in his Theological Essays "For the Bible is a book in which God is teaching his creatures induction, by setting them an example of it. Nothing is there taught as it is in the Koran by mere decree; everything by life and experiment. It offers us the surest tests of its own credibility. It meets the facts of human life and the difficulties of human speculation; it undertakes to interpret the one, and to show us the source of the other."(27) Maurice is sure that there are clues to be obtained from study of the scriptures as to the nature of life. But man has to look for them Further, (27) F.D. Maurice. Theological Essays p.139. London. 1853.
man has to create the good life and the good society to some extent by his own actions. He can not expect God to do for him that which he is capable of doing himself. It was this concept which convinced Maurice of two things. In the first place it brought him to the belief that he must first and foremost be a theologian. And that being a theologian he must not construct theoretical structures and models about the good life but must rather dig into the foundation of human existence. Allied very closely to this is his second belief that the function of the theologian, if not of all Christians, is not to discuss ideas about God but to try to know Him. This, for Maurice, was possible because he believed in God rather than believed theories about God. In much of his writing there is evidence of his belief that truth was available if only man could reach out and take it. God is continually near to man. Man has a capacity to find Him. And belief in Christ as Being was the link which man found so elusive. Maurice, however, was in no doubt that such a link existed. It was the basis of all morality, social and personal. It was, moreover the difference between modern man's opportunity and ancient man's perplexity. The ancients could only refer to some process of thought in their search for the good life. Maurice wrote "Aristotle's was an imperfect treatise, a treatise containing plenty of errors.. But if it were a perfect treatise,
one in which there were no errors at all, it would not be
the standard I wanted; still less would it enable me to follow
a standard. The standard must be a LIFE. It must be set
forth in a living PERSON. If it is to do me any good his
life must in some way act upon my life ---. If the Bible was
merely a book, though it might be the best of all books, though
it might be a book without a flaw, I could not hope to find
in it that which I was seeking."(28) What Maurice believed
was that the Bible led him beyond the written page. It gave
him reason to believe in God's action in the world and in
the existence of Christ, but it was only one means of doing
so. It was authoritative but it was not authority itself.
In face Maurice was influenced by the Bible in a similar way
to that in which he was influenced by Plato. He saw in it
evidence for truths which were verified from inductive reasoning
and from experience.

The Bible, as it were reinforced and added weight to
Platonic Ideas. But it perhaps did more than that. It gave
substance to the philosophical approach. It illustrated for
Maurice the idea that words themselves mean nothing unless they
embody some truth which is based on experience. In it the
connection between the social and the individual is made clear
by reference to the Eternal truth of God's existence. In it
God is trying to show man how his normal human relations in

family and state are dependent on the relation between God and man. In the first lecture of the Epistles of St. John, Maurice discusses his use of the Scriptures, "I use them because I think they will show us what is the ground of those affections, of that conscience, of that reason and will, which we have to do with because we are human beings, and which we must have to do with supposing there were no scriptures at all. I do not use them because I look on them as substitutes for these affections, or conscience, or reason, or will. I use them because I look upon them as God's revelation to us of ourselves, who are made in His image, and of Himself, who has made us in His image. I do not use them as if they would mean anything to us, or be of any worth to us, supposing we were not made in His image, supposing it were not possible for us to be acquainted with Him. I use them because I conceive they set forth Christ as the Son of God, and the Lord of every man. I do not use them because I think they set forth some standard for a set of men called Christians who are different from other men, and who have not the same God with other men. I use the Scriptures to show us what I believe is the Law and life for all of us, that law and life of which men in the old world had only a partial glimpse. I should not use them if I thought then less universal and more partial that the books of heathens or of later moralists."(29)

It would appear, then, that Maurice's ideas were very greatly determined by the influence of the Scripture. Indeed the Bible was probably the major framework by which he was led to understand the social nature of man. This was so because he regarded it especially a teaching library. It was the record of God's intervention in human affairs. As such he could use it to dig for the foundations of society. From it he learned the necessity of connecting the past with the present and the future, of connecting the Divine with the secular, of connecting the individual with the social. It was on these three relationships that the whole of Maurice's social and political thought was founded.

MAURICE AS A FOLLOWER OF S. T. COLERIDGE

If Maurice owed much of his thought to Plato and the Bible he equally owed much of his method of social philosophy to Coleridge. As C. R. Sanders has pointed out, however, he did not simply accept Coleridgean thought in its entirety. He accepted certain basic methods and modified them as and when he thought necessary.

Perhaps Coleridge's main contribution to Maurice's thought was the distinction between Reason and Understanding. It was fundamental to all Maurice's writing on Ethics, Theology Metaphysics and Politics. Man has two quite distinct capacities. One is represented by the functioning of his Understanding.
This refers solely to man's intellect. By Understanding, man is able to perform logical deduction, and is thus able to analyse and discover means of achieving a given end. Understanding allows man to create logical systems of thought. It is basically a mental exercise. As such it is of course useful in helping man to understand his environment and, in some measure, to modify it. Yet the powers of the intellect were of limited use to man so long as he confused them with the powers of Reason. It was into just such a confusion that the supporters of the rights of man had fallen, and Maurice accepted Coleridge's separation of the two powers as an essential starting point for his political thought. In the Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy Maurice, referring to Coleridge, wrote. "That distinction explained, he thought, the confusions into which the authors of the French declaration of rights and their English admirers had fallen. They had mixed together the universal and the particular laws of Reason and the deductions of the Understanding. The maxims belonging to the one sphere, which were local and temporary, were invested with the sacredness and largeness of the other". (30) This was really the essential difference between the Understanding and the Reason. The former was concerned with the local or the temporary, certainly the temporal, aspects of life.

The Reason was concerned with the permanent, eternal truths of existence.

A further distinction arises from the consideration of experience. The understanding is the mode of thought which man uses to rationalise his experience. As such it refers to the experience of the individual. Just because of this its use is particularly vulnerable to the danger of eclecticism. Men are tempted to accept such evidence as fits into their particular theory or system, regardless of the Truth; equally they are tempted to reject evidence and experience which tells against their system. Here we have one important source of Maurice's fears of systematisin. It was not that he thought any particular system wrong so much as that he believed that they rested upon a purely human mental activity. Such products of the Understanding were liable to severe limitations because men would be prepared to defend them for the sake of the system, which was a particular element in human affairs relevant only to the attitudes and beliefs of particular schools of thought at the expense of the universal principles which underlay all existence.

Maurice, was much influenced by Coleridge's concept of Reason as the faculty which could set man free from the dictates of Understanding. In the Dedication of the Kingdom of Christ to Rev. Derwent Coleridge Maurice wrote that the
former's father had taught him to distinguish "that which is factitious and accidental, or belongs to our artificial habits of thought, and that which is fixed and eternal, which belongs to man as man, and which God will open the eyes of every humble man to perceive."(31) It was the function of Reason so to open men's eyes. Reason, is at it were the mechanism by which men are able to apprehend truth even when they can not comprehend it. Clearly for Maurice Reason was not solely concerned with intellect. Its working did not depend on the ability to construct logical systems or to analyse particular systems. It was the faculty which allowed man to make direct contact with a higher Being. It facilitated the link between man and his creator. Maurice did regard Reason as a faculty of human beings - thus going a stage further than Coleridge. Its method was receptive rather than intellectual. In an interesting passage in the Kingdom of Christ, (32) Maurice elaborates this theory. "There is an organ in man which speaks of that which is absolute and eternal." Further this organ "is distinct from the one that merely forms notions and affirms propositions". In this discussion rests the hub of Maurice's attitude to Reason and Understanding. Maurice is here suggesting that Reason and Understanding performs their separate functions in quite different ways. Reason is not

concerned with propositions, as is the Understanding. It is concerned with something which is in one sense external to the person who is using his Reason. It grasps this external existence "as the eye affirms an object" - in other words, as we have already noted, by a process of perception. But what is it that Reason perceives? It perceives truths, or, as Maurice variously puts it, principles or the ground of man's being. These truths were eternal and referred to every aspect of human existence.

A necessary feature of these truths, arising from man's perception of them was that they had to be in existence before man could perceive them. In other words the truths were antecedent to experience. Thus, although the five senses of man perceived his physical environment as it existed the eternal truths perceived by the Reason are revealed to man's Reason by a source which is above man yet homogenous with him. Physical senses reveal an external world while Reason reveals something which is part of man's existence. It reveals that which transcends space and time. This is what Maurice means by eternal. The Reason exposed man to something homogeneous with himself - in other words with an Absolute Reason. For Maurice this meant exposure not to an absolute but to another Being of a higher order. Reason could not exist on its own. Neither could human Reason exist without connections
with that Higher Absolute Reason which is itself required to be embodied in a higher Being. The result of Reason is then the revelation of the living God. Reason does not just divulge abstract principles. The principles which it does divulge are nothing less than the Will of God. Since obedience to the Divine Will was, for Maurice man's principle end, Reason is essentially concerned with discerning ends and not means. It would appear that the Reason and the Understanding are quite independent. Yet for Maurice this is not quite true. Problems only arise when the Understanding is used in such a way as to usurp the prerogative of Reason.

The Understanding and the Reason both have to do with fact. God reveals himself to man through the Reason but often he has to do so by means of facts. Since the revelation is one of a living Being, events in history are not purely accidental. "Facts may be only the drapery of doctrines; but they would seem to be the only possible method of manifestation for the Being, the essential Reason."(32) How this revelation of facts may present itself to the whole man. The Reason is one faculty of man but it is not the only one. It would be strange if the Being, who can transcend space and time, limited himself to only one faculty in man. "And seeing by the hypothesis, this Being of whom the reason speaks is one who transcends the conditions of space and time; seeing that this one faculty in man has the power of beholding that which is

not under these conditions, but that all the other faculties are subject to them, it would be nothing strange or contradictory if the facts which embodied the Revelation, should be such as at once presented him to all the faculties which we now possess, and enabled that highest one to realise its own peculiar prerogative of looking through them. In this way one might perhaps discover all hope of reconciling the law of the affections and the law of the reason, without that contrivance of separating them under two departments and supposing that a mere scholastic boundary could keep them really apart." (32)

From this passage it would appear that Maurice believed that while the Reason was capable of direct contact with the Divine Will it normally works through the other human faculties. Thus he seems to suggest that Reason had some controlling effect on the Understanding so that while one might separate them in terms of their functions both were essential to man and had the effect of combining to give man a full grasp of Divine Revelation.

Maurice saw man and society as part of a unified order. This order was connected to the Divine Will by Reason. Man as an individual was only in a perfect state when his particular individual capacity for intellectual attainment was working in conformity with his universal capacity for communion with the Divine Being. Equally, society was only in its perfect condition when the individual was following the same path as

the society, in obedience to the same Divine Will. It was Reason, following the Revealed Will of God, which allowed man to attain such a condition, simply because Reason was a universal principle built into human nature. Thus all the faculties of man, social and personal, demonstrate that his nature is unitary and social and, through the functioning of Reason is also a unity with God.

This approach which Laurice develops from Coleridge's distinction between Reason and Understanding is clearly associated with the two other influences, Plato and The Bible, which have been discussed in earlier sections of this chapter. He is here discussing the link between the shadow and the ideal which is so much the concern of Platonic philosophy; and equally he finds a means of support for his Biblical Interpretation of the relationship between man and God.

Laurice used the distinction as the basis of his arguments in the dispute with H. L. Mialsell over the nature of Revelation, about twenty years after the publication of the Kingdom of Christ. In this Mialsell had argued that man's knowledge of God was limited by the finite nature of human intellect. It was impossible, therefore, for man to have an direct knowledge of the Divinity. Thus all we could have was knowledge about God derived from the critical faculties of intellect. This knowledge clearly only comes from the standard sources of orthodox Christian teaching i.e. from the Bible and the
Church Fathers. Haurice argued that Reason enabled man to have a more direct Revelation; that God was able to call out from man a response which required the whole man to come into contact with Him. Maurice's position about the relationship between Reason and Understanding is illustrated by a passage in his "Sequel to the Enquiry: What is Revelation?: "It is this

the possession of the Logic of the Understanding upon the Conscience and the Reason, arising from a disbelief in their distinct objects and obligations, which I think we are bound to resist to the utmost. It was against this I spoke; not against any application of what is taught as Logic at Oxford, within its own sphere."(33)

As R. C. Sanders has pointed out (34) Maurice agreed with Coleridge in believing that the value of the Understanding had been too highly rated. Thus he felt that the empiricism and rationalism of the eighteenth century, as well as that of the Utilitarian school was not sufficiently counterbalanced by a transcendental approach. As a result he reacted against the power which the theories of John Locke seemed to hold over many of his contemporaries. Locke had determined to begin his studies (In the Essay on Human Understanding) not in a study of the concept of Being, but of understanding. Locke believes that to attempt to study problems of Being before studying the

(33)F.D. Maurice. Sequel to What is Revelation. p.198. Lon. 1860
(34)C.R. Sanders. The Broad Church Movement. p.p.219 London. 1379
limitations of the Understanding is to let one's thoughts
"wander into the depths wherein they can find no sure footing."
Maurice appreciated this point of view but felt that it
neglected the transcendent nature of man. He also felt that
laying emphasis on the sense-perception aspects of nature
limited the objectives which man might gain. Perhaps even
important it resulted in the structure of Lockean systems,
even though Locke himself was not guilty of this. The
problems arose because Locke had been regarded by his followers
as beyond reproach. "His dogmas have become part of our
habitual faith; they are accepted without study as a tradition."
This was the trap into which any philosophy which started
from the supposition of experience as the base of human
nature was always liable to fall. It was Coleridge's great
merit that he had brought British philosophy in a way out
of this dilemma.

Maurice recognised, of course that Coleridge had taken
much of his thought from the German thinkers, especially
Kant. But he had been able to apply it to a particularly
British situation. There had been a tendency in German
Philosophy to create abstractions and dreams; Coleridge did
no such thing. In spite of the complications of his language
he was, in Maurice's terms a practical philosopher. Instead
of creating an abstract Absolute Law to which all things are related he had led men to see the possibility of making contact with all living Being. Probably Maurice was impressed by Coleridge's apparent desire to investigate rather than to build theories. It was this same characteristic which also attracted him to Socrates. Maurice saw in Coleridge's writings the possibility of reconciling the "experimental wisdom for which Burke contends in his Reflections, with deep moral convictions respecting human rights". It was in this sense that Maurice was influenced most by Coleridge rather than by the German Romantic philosophers.

Coleridge had been regarded by some as an impractical transcendentalist. What Maurice did was to claim that his transcendentalism was practical because it set man in his proper place in the Divine order. Maurice used Coleridge to connect man to his original source, and to relate man's individual existence to his social nature. He claimed to have learned from the Statesman's Manual the idea that the Prophets and Kings of Israel were in all respects political. They were concerned with the continuance not only of their religion but also of their nation. They saw that the two were inextricably interwoven. "Now I had learnt, partly from
Coleridge's "Statesman's Manual" to consider the Prophets of Israel especially Politicians, as men who were profoundly concerned in the well being and continuity of their nation; who watched with intense anguish the influences which were detaching its present from its past, and both from its future; who believed it would be held together, through all generations, amidst all its crimes and follies, by Him who is, and was, and is to come."(35) Maurice was, then, able to see the necessity of historical continuity in the existence of nations and, like Coleridge, he recognised the political importance of the religious institutions in society. Thus he seemed to accept Coleridge's concept of the Clerisy, though with some modification.

Maurice and Coleridge both believed the state to be a moral unit, with a life of its own. Thus the state was an organic whole which consisted of closely interelated parts. Coleridge's construction of the Proprietage - i.e. the landed gentry and the commercial interests - and the Clerisy, is not quite the same as Maurice's concept of orders in society though there are some points of common interest. Even so Maurice was prepared to say that those who were able to support themselves might well perform the same functions as the Clerisy. In other words they should form a source of higher learning for the good of the population at large. Maurice was concerned that the

that the National Church should accept responsibility for education within the state since only the Church could keep a true perspective between the spiritual and the secular aspects of human life. Maurice's concept of the role of the clergy was broadly based on notions similar to those of Coleridge's Clerisy. They were basically educators, but not solely teachers of the religious beliefs of the Christian Church. Indeed Maurice's position made the separation of religious and secular teaching impossible. If man is a unity, the religious and the secular must interpenetrate. The one complements the other, but since man is a spirit with a body, and not simply a body with a spiritual content, and since it is through the spiritual that he is able to meet the Divine Being then the spiritual institutions in society should be charged with man's education. For Maurice this was merely an extension of his belief in the process of Divine Education. Maurice was at one with Coleridge in the belief that man needed mystery. There is something in the constitution of man which makes him look for a meaning deeper than his own immediate experience. For Maurice this expression of the mystical was not confined to the religious sense. In his novel, Eustace Conway, he makes his hero see his faith being expressed in a very wide range of science, philosophy and the arts. Man's will appears to be free; he can choose
between many interpretations of his feelings. But it is most free when it is united with a higher Being. Now the function of education is to help man to reach this latter level of freedom. Maurice's own life was largely spent in Education, and as we shall see in a later chapter his views altered somewhat during his lifetime - but only insofar as he was concerned with who performed the function of education, and not in so far as he was concerned with the purpose of education.

On one fundamental point Maurice parted company with Coleridge. He could not accept Coleridge's distinction between the subjective and the objective. He felt that such a distinction could not be held alongside the view that man's nature was in some way connected with that of the Divine Being. For him the word subjective was irrelevant if not misleading. He was concerned that the use of such terms would result in the idea that the individual man was quite separate from the principles on which his existence was founded. If, as Maurice believed there was a set of universal principles of life connecting man to God, and if all men were capable through their Reason of apprehending these principles, then the polarity of subjective - objective was not a true distinction. That which is within man and that which is outside man are not two separate principles but are one and the same. Truth could not be grasped by the use of abstract principles and distinctions. It was found by reference to facts. Maurice found Coleridge's work deficient in this respect. In a
letter to Edward Strachey he wrote "But I believe also that we are come upon an age in which truth without facts will be as impossible as facts without truths; and that the attempt to set up either exclusively must be conducted in quite a different spirit from that which animated Coleridge or the good men of the preceding age, however the results may at times correspond". For this reason much of Maurice's work is concerned with history. He tries to assess historical processes in terms of the Divine Education of Revelation. In a sense, however, he is much more concerned with the principles which lie behind the facts. Facts of themselves are of very little value. Thus he tends to see the development of history as a series of events which illustrate certain facts. The facts, for Maurice, become not the events themselves so much as the revelation which is embodied in them. What he appears to be doing is to deny the possibility, or at least the value, of abstract speculation. Metaphysics for its own sake is nonsense. The only true metaphysical investigation is that which relates man's experience, and this must include his feelings, to the Reality of a higher Being. Facts and Philosophy are not to be set in opposition to each other. Only by combining the two can a true understanding of man's nature be discovered. Maurice indeed regarded man's intellectual and moral progress as dependent not upon the creation of new facts and ideas but upon the discovery through the relation of facts and philosophy of pre-existent principles.
F. D. Maurice's beliefs about Nationalism are more akin to the political traditions of Conservatism, than they are to those of socialism. For Maurice, Nationalism stems from the existence of a national spirit. The desire for a common brotherhood of men, breaking down the barriers of national boundaries has no place in Maurice's politics, despite his belief in the universality of the Divine Education of Man. Indeed Maurice sees the National boundary as the limiting case in the formation of social and political organisms partly because of his interpretation of Hebrew history as described in the Bible. For him the nation is part of the Divinely instituted order of society. In itself it is complete - but of itself it is senseless. It takes its place in the order which God has ordained for human affairs. Such a theory sees the nation as the natural result of human relations. It is not created artificially by the will of men, but grows out of previously existing social institutions. Men do not opt to join it. They simply find themselves born into it, accepting the inherited culture of their nation, which answers the social and political needs of their own time and place. Thus nations are organic entities. The organic state, a phrase which Maurice tends to use synonymously with the nation, may best be considered as the
political expression of all the social forces, political and non-political, which are part of the national spirit.

The state, in Maurice's view, is a natural product of particular patterns of development of the social relationships found in the family, the Church, and the folk lore of the people. As such it is the result, rather than the creator, of social forces. Nevertheless it is not by any means a passive entity. The nation has a life of its own, taking up the history of the past and linking it with both the present and the future. In this Maurice is at one with Burke, who wrote in his Reflections on the Revolution in France, "--- it," (the original contract and thence the nation,) "becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead and those who are to be born." (1)

In this Maurice kept to the traditionalist theories of society. His concept of the State stems in short, from his own Philosophy of History.

MAUROGEO'S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY.

As was suggested in a previous chapter, Maurice saw history as the unfolding of a divinely ordained plan. History is the gradual process by which man comes to a clearer understanding of God's purpose, and which brings to man a knowledge of the Laws by which the Universe functions, so that a study of the past is useful only in so far as it helps man to understand.

the present. The truths which history reveals are relevant not only to the historical occasions in which they occur; they have eternal and absolute meanings. History is, therefore concerned not so much with particular facts or events as with the relationships which men have with God and with other men.

At any given time in history man has to accept his condition and to use the knowledge of the past to learn the lesson relevant to his own time. Each age may add to the total knowledge of humanity but the lessons of the past are the foundation of the knowledge of the present. In this sense Maurice seems to adopt Burke's beliefs about the continuity of the "social contract". In Maurice the connection between past, present and future lies in his acceptance of history as the continuing revelation, by God to man, of the Divine purpose of human life. In the first chapter of his Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy Maurice says "A Divine education then, is as used as the regular basis of human life and human fellowship. Man knows what he is; he fulfills his appointed task just so far as he receives this instruction. The instruction proceeds from an invisible Being, and is addressed to something else in man than that which connects him with the visible world. He is always ready to forget God, to bow down before visible things. So far as he does this, he becomes a slave and an animal. So far as he does this, the society in which he lives becomes corrupt and untenable."(2) It would appear, then, that there is an element (2) F.D. Maurice. Moral & Metaphysical Philosophy. Vol.1. ch.1.p.7. London 1886.
of struggle in human history. The Divine education is not always readily acceptable to man. The element of tension between the worldly, self-centred part of man's nature, and the need to seek truth, to realise his spiritual self, is part of the history of the human race.

The main enquiry of history, for Maurice, was concerned with the relation between the human and the Divine. "Assumi s, as we have assumed throughout, that man is under a higher teaching than his own, and that no question respecting the visible or invisible world, respecting nature, or himself, or God, would have been stirred in him if it had not been so, we are bound to submit this doctrine, from which so many will dissent, which few, perhaps are willing to apply to the whole course of human history and inquiry, to the same tests which were deemed necessary in the earlier portion of our sketch. We are bound not to separate the debates in the schools from the business of the world. We are bound to seek in the progress of events for something answering to that which passed in the hearts of men. We cannot hope to understand the man who has scorned the profane vulgar and kept them at a distance, except by comparing his speculations with the feeling and inspiration of that very vulgar, by learning what impulses in them were also working in him, and which he was trying successfully, or unsuccessfully, to satisfy. If we look upon God as the guide
of our race we must look upon the race as more grand and imp­
ortant than the particular men who have faithfully or unfaith­
fully acted as his ministers to it. A history which should
exhibit the relations of one to the other in fair and reason-
able proportions would carry its own evidence with it. The
thinker and the doer would each interpret the othe... That
is called the spirit of the age would be seen in each of the
individuals belonging to that age. A higher spirit than this
would be found to be working in all ages and to the uniting
them."(3)

This somewhat lengthy quotation contains the main strands
of Maurice's philosophy of history. The unfolding of the
purpose for human existence is not to be found only in the
thinking of the philosopher. Nor is it seen only in the deeds
of the activist. Each plays his part. But the parts are
complementary. The truth, therefore, does not lie in the
realms of Marxist economic determinism (Maurice, incidently,
does not seem to have any knowledge of, or contact with,
Marxist writings. He nowhere refers to any of Marx's works
and appears to be singularly ignorant of this side of socialist
thought.) Equally, however, the truth is not secured only by
the philosopher. Economic activity and metaphysical specu lation
are only relevant to man's, and therefore to society's, aims

London 1886.
in as much as they support each other. It would appear that Laurice, accepting the original premises that the state, as much as the individual, is under a divine education, looks for his evidence in the historical development of political and national structures, in patterns of social behaviour, and in the philosophical explanation, or solution, of the problems of society. His objections to the atomistic philosophies of the Utilitarians are very similar to those of Coleridge. Such philosophies deny the divine education, destroy the idea of order and harmony and disavow the supernatural and eternal purpose of society. They are mechanical, artificial contrivances setting aside the historical evolution of society and discounting the organic nature of political and social entities.

The evidence of history was for Laurice, able to illustrate the growth of social relationships. Each age has its own "spirit". But each age's spirit contributed to the spirit of succeeding ages, laying down principles on which future ages could build. Laurice's political thought in this field falls into the category which Crane Brinton has described as that of the Philosophical Conservative. "He is the man who works out a consistent and timeless generalisations applying to the behaviour of men in politics. The details of his scheme must vary with the political conditions to which he applies it. But the central point is the same. The philosophical conservative
distrusts his fellow men. He is therefore on the side of authority as opposed to liberty. Since any given authority usually has its foundations in the past, he is commonly a defender of the past. But it is not resistance to change so much as the conviction that any change will destroy authority and free the way to untrustworthy individual desire: that marks him out as a conservative."(4) Maurice's authority stemmed from God. True to one element of British conservative thought, he saw religion as a fundamental part of politics. But it would be untrue to say that he subordinated politics to religion. His problem was how to avoid "sinking the divine in the human" or "crushing the human under the divine". As a result he saw the religious and the political as inextricably intertwined. His history was the history of the divine revealing itself to, and becoming part of the secular. This was the only cure for man's selfishness. Yet Maurice was no simple admirer of the past. As we have seen he rejected the idea of a "Golden Age". He wants to learn the lessons of history, as a means to progress in the future.

Such lessons as history teaches, however, cannot always be accurate guides to necessary immediate decisions. In a recent article Arthur Schlesinger Jnr. makes the point that "Most useful historical generalisations are statements about massive social and intellectual movements over a considerable

(4) C. Brininton, English Political Thought In the 19th Century. New York. 1962
period of time. They make large scale, long-term predictions possible. But they do not justify small scale, short-term predictions."(5) It was in this light that Maurice interpreted history. The lessons he derived from the study of history were large scale, and long term. He saw in history the slow progression from family to tribe to nation. Yet Maurice would not have been satisfied with a philosophy of history which was mainly concerned with prediction of events. The lessons which he drew from the study of history were concerned more with the appreciation of human relationships than with the adoption of particular policies. The events of history illustrate the relationships which exist between men, and between men and God. These relations are embodied in the social and political institutions of society. The improvements in the understanding of them are illustrated by the changes in the nature of political and social organisation. Thus Maurice saw human society developing through patriarchal and tribal organisations to the nation state of the nineteenth century. His interpretation of this development by reference to the guiding hand of providence relies, to a large extent, on his belief in the essentially social nature of man.

Social relationships derive not from the need for men to defend himself from attacks by his neighbours, nor from the desire to improve his material wealth. They arise because men

need them in order to be men. Because of this Maurice sees political systems as growing rather than as being made by men. In this he follows a line of thought suggested by Coleridge in a letter to Lord Liverpool. In the letter Coleridge suggests that the troubles of the time (i.e. 1817) were caused by a false, mechanistic philosophy. "It is high time, my Lord, that the subjects of Christian Governments should be taught that neither historically or morally, in fact or by right, men made the State; but that the state, and that alone, makes them men; a truth that can be opposed by those only who confound the State with the few individuals who have taken on themselves the troublesome and thankless duty of guarding it against any practical exhibitions of their new found statecraft, that the name of the country is but a sound of it be not true; that the flux of individuals in any one moment of existence is there for the sake of the state, far more than the state for them though both positions are true proportionally, that the just divinum of the supreme magistracy is a tenet that has been discredited only by a gross perversion of its sense; lastly that states and kingdom grow and are not to be made; and that in all political revolutions, whether for the weal or chastisement of a nation, the people are but sprigs and boughs in a forest, tossed against each other, or moved all in the same
direction, by an agency in which their own will has the least share."(6)

In the paragraph from his Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy previously quoted, Maurice draws a rather similar conclusion when he writes, "If we look upon God as the guide of our race we must look upon the race as more grand and important than the particular men who have faithfully or unfaithfully acted as his minister". Both writers appear to make the point that the state, or at least the Christian state, is the medium God uses to develop particularly human, as distinct from animal, qualities. The state is superior to the individual in that the individual needs the state, and cannot be fully human without the state. This cannot, however, be interpreted as an appeal for absolute power for the state. Neither Maurice nor Coleridge are in any sense totalitarian. The state can not control all aspects of human life. Nor do men exist in order to serve the state. There is a paradox in this approach to the state since the state is both superior to the individual. This can be explained by suggesting that man has two complementary sides to his nature - the private and the public. In their private life individual men seek to know God and to attain a degree of realisation. The state may act in a negative way by abolishing obstacles to this process so that man may work out his own salvation. On the other hand man's public life is concerned

with his relationships with other men, which take the form of relationships between groups or orders in society. To maintain and foster such relationships the state may take a more positive part by controlling the institutional arrangements which become necessary in complex societies. But such institutions are not created by man. They grow from the relationships which underly them. The institutions represent natural orders in society, giving rise to a degree of hierarchy. Maurice, however, does not regard the hierarchy as static and eternal. New orders appear from time to time and these must be taken up into the structure of the state. They must not, however, completely supercede the old orders. As new groups show their competence to consider the good of the whole rather than their narrow self interest, so they can be safely incorporated into the body politic. Indeed if they are not incorporated they will tend to become dangerous to the life of the state. This side of Maurice's thought will be considered at greater length on the chapter on Democracy.

Maurice's politics are conservative in the same way that his history is conservative. At any given time society will have learnt certain lessons, have formed certain institutions. In so far as these lessons are part of the Divine Education, they are to be held dear. But they are not the end of the way. They form the foundation for future revelations of the Divine Will. Similarly the institutions of the state enshrine divinely
ordained principles. What has been received from the past must be preserved so long as it has real meaning for the present and promise for the future. This does not mean that every institution from the past is automatically upheld. Some institutions may be superceded, but those which hold relevant truths concerning human relationships can not easily be replaced. Thus Maurice's philosophy of history can be seen to provide a basis for both Conservatism and change. Change in the political sphere is necessary because of the growth of society. Groups which had previously been inarticulate, irresponsible factions develop social responsibility and may become genuine orders in society. They therefore become entitled to a place in the government of the state. But they are additions to, not replacements for, the old orders.

Maurice has an evolutionary concept of history. His evolution follows well defined lines. There is a ruling principle in society, the principle of cooperation. He believes this to be historically demonstrated by the lessons of the past. The relationships in which men find themselves to each other are those of dependence and interdependence. Economic production as well as social improvement can result only from cooperation. Struggle and competition between men appear to Maurice as a contradiction of the social nature of man. Competition represents man's self will. Since this is opposed to the Divine
Will it is not of the true nature of man. The process of evolution must be a movement towards greater degrees of cooperation, towards the acceptance of responsibility for the good of the whole rather than the desire for the benefit of self.

How Maurice also believes that man can grasp the Divine Will intuitively. In Coleridge's terminology, Reason, the capacity to intuit moral standards, is superior to Understanding, the capacity to see logical relationships. Since, for Maurice politics is essentially a matter of morals rather than of logic, the process of political improvement is a matter of intuitions rather than of rationality. He necessarily, therefore, lays stress on such factors as loyalty, tradition and natural order of society at the expense of philosophical radicalism.

Yet it is not so much his morality as his belief in an external "Guiding Hand" which places him in the ranks of Conservatism. At the same time his acceptance of the role of human beings as the instruments of the Divine Will gives him the chance to adopt a radicalism which can probe deeply into the nature of political society. His desire to change society by changing the principles on which it seemed to work in the nineteenth century, was conservative only in as much as it brought man back to the "true order". Maurice felt that the economic and social forces of his day were wrongly associated with the
competitive principle. Such a principle destroys the relationship between men and between the orders in society. It is contrary to the lessons of the Divine Education, which lead men towards a closer relationship of cooperation and interdependence. It destroys the past and by its insistence on immediate gain prevents the proper development of future social relationships.

Within the context of Maurice's philosophy of history the economic competition of the mid nineteenth century is an example of man's rejection of God's teaching. Man is showing his self will, refusing Divine Guidance and stressing the self centred, corrupt part of his nature. The result of such human stubbornness will be, as it has been in the past, social disruption and strife until men somehow are brought back to acceptance of the true social principle of cooperation. The nation, instead of being a unity will be a group of warring factions. But even so the strife caused by the spirit of competition was seen by Maurice as a chastisement by God. It is however the natural consequence of man's self centred action not a direct interference by God. Part of the Divine Education brings man to realise that he must accept the consequences of his actions and in doing so learn from his mistakes. Deviations from the natural order in social life, as in the world of nature, are destructive. Man can only create satisfactory societies when his will is in accord with the Divine Will. What Maurice seeks to do is to conserve those aspects of social organisation which are in
line with the revelation of God's purpose and to change radically those which are not.

NATIONALISM

Maurice seeks to encourage the creation and maintenance of a national unity. There is, he believes, a national spirit which stems from the historical growth of particular nations. Each nation has its own distinctive qualities of law, language, custom and government. Because of the unique nature of the history of every state, no two states are alike. Men ought to recognise this fact, and accept the qualities which each nation produces in its members, in much the same way as society recognises and uses the particular qualities of individuals. This part of Maurice's work gives rise to an element of patriotism in his political thought.

In a chapter on War in his Social Morality, Maurice wrote: "We cannot forget that every nation now existing in Europe became a nation through war."(7) He saw war as the instrument by which indistinct masses of people became organic units. Thus Maurice regarded the Saxon wars as the source of new life for the English Nation. Previous to these wars England had been a mere collection of feuding groups. The result of the Saxon conquest was a more stable

society, capable of producing Law and Government. Not only did Maurice regard this as true of England, it applied equally to all the other European Nations. Nationhood is an essential part of the Divine Social order. Social powers, such as the Roman Empire, or the Medieval Church, which seek to impose an "unnatural" supernational order by denying the life of separate nations can run the danger of creating conditions of violence. Nations have to rebel against such powers, and since persuasion is not usually effective in such conditions armed force is the only possible solution. Supernational systems attack the moral basis of society. They are artificially created, binding together units of differing qualities and histories. They rely on force either of a military or a religious nature. They restrict, if they do not prevent, the growth of national spirit. "There may be a Civilization which is destructive of Social Morality, of social existence. War may be - so far as we know, has been - the only means of reforming it. There may be a Civilization which, like that of Rome, means a huge camp, an enormous military system. The dissolution of such a system, however effected by whatever hard hands, may be the road to a truer peace as well as to a truer life". (8) War becomes a justifiable action only because it is a protest

against the destruction of Divinely ordained Social Morality. Because nationhood is part of God's order — in Maurice's view the nation appears as the largest, final organic social unit in which man may express his freedom and his individuality — men have a duty to protect it. War may be the only protection when nationhood is attacked either from above by supra-national bodies, or from the side by other nations.

The only justification for war is, therefore, a moral justification. It is allowable if it defends the Divine Order of society. The only just war is a war of principles. Wars must not be fostered to protect or to increase trade. They may only be waged to defend the inheritance of the nation. A just war is one in which men protect Law against force, and this only because the life of a nation is expressed in the Laws, the Government, the customs of a nation. These are peculiar to each nation. Attempts to impose a foreign law, a foreign will must be opposed. Maurice thus justifies the military profession, and honours it, only for its defence of the national morality. He recognises the brutality of war and regrets it, yet he regards appeasement and peace at any price as a greater sin. The Sermon on the Mount can be easily misinterpreted when national good is seen as a phantom. For Maurice the national spirit is the moral basis of social life, and therefore a reality.
The blessings of the peacemaker are due only to those whose peace produces a moral benefit. Submission to an invader whose aim is territorial expansion, the advancement of his own trade, or even the upholding of a religious principle can never bring real peace.

In his attitude to war, and in his historical perspective of it, Maurice consistently holds to his philosophy of history - that man is under a moral obligation to uphold the God-given order of society. Having been taught by the Divine Education that national life is essential to his true nature man must take care to foster and protect it.

THE DETERMINANTS OF NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS.

There are two broad schools of thought on the question of national character. One school may be described as the naturalist or objective school. Writers of this category include, for example, Bodin and Montesquieu. In general, they explain national character by reference to geographical and climatic factors. The other school which may be termed the Romantic or subjective school attributes national character to the organic, historical development of societies. Maurice clearly falls into the latter school. A significant difference between the two approaches is found in the fact that while the former recognises that natural conditions lead to a similarity of behaviour and outlook in members
of the nation, the latter explains national character in
terms of national consciousness, resulting not only in a
similarity or outlook but the recognition of the existence
of the nation as an independent organic unit of society.
For the Romantic explanation of nations, similarity gives
way to psychological unity. The national character is thus
explicable only in terms of the national consciousness.
The life of the nation is historically determined, and within
the boundaries of the state, it derives from the development
of the language, the religion, the law and the forms of
government which are both the institutional representation
of the national character at a given time and the determinants
of its future development. In effect, Maurice implies that
the national character is inherited from past generations
and cannot be shaken off.

Maurice develops his nationalism from his concept of
of the family. When a nation comes into existence it comes
from the growth of the family. In some ways he seems to
regard the nation as an extension of the family. Certainly
the relationships which he saw in the family, such as
Authority, Trust and Consanguinity, are equally represented
in the nation. He proceeds, of course, by analogy rather
than by direct extension. To say that the nation enshrines
the same principles as the family is not to say that all
members of the nation are physically related. The im ortant
point is that in the nation, as in the family, it is the relationships within the social unit, rather than the existence of individual human beings, which gives the community its distinctive character. The family is the basic unit of society but man craves for wider associations. They may be found in all kinds of social units such as schools, clubs, churches, business. But for Maurice the limiting social organisation is the nation. Beyond that contacts take a similar form to that between individuals. Beyond the limits of the nation organic unity is impossible because each nation has achieved its national spirit by different historical development. Each nation has its own national consciousness.

Nationality expressed in such terms is necessarily exclusive. A common feature of certain types of nationalism is the desire of one nation to demonstrate its superiority over the other nations by conquest and domination. Maurice, however, carefully avoids this trap. His concept of national consciousness, though it is exclusive, does not demand, indeed it flatly rejects, a belief in the superiority of one nation over another. In his Social Morality he wrote, "If I, being an Englishman, desire to be thoroughly an Englishman, I must respect every Frenchman who strives to be a thoroughly a Frenchman, every German who strives to be thoroughly a German. I must learn more of the worth and grandeur of his position the more I estimate the worth
and grandeur of my own. I can not shift my colours to please him, I shall honour him for not shifting his colours to please me. If I retain my distinctive characteristics, he may learn something from me. If he retains his, I may learn from him. Parting with them we become useless to each other, we run in each other's way; neither brings his quota to the common treasure of humanity. --- I cannot deny that my country has boundaries; that my speech is not the speech of Spaniards or Frenchmen or Italians; that my laws are in many respects different from theirs; that I am under a Queen who is not their Queen. But this very exclusiveness forbids the desire that their nation features should be the same as ours. I abdicate all rights to determine what is best for those who have their own battles to fight, their own ground to maintain". (9) Just because each nation has its own territorial boundaries, its own language, its own laws, its own form of government the exclusive nature of national consciousness exists. And because of this exclusiveness Maurice conceives the nation as the final organic social unit. Any agreements between nations is thus an agreement between morally equal but separate entities. To go beyond this is to create Empires which depend on force and not social cohesion. It is interesting that Maurice had little to say about the British Empire.

At the time of the Indian Mutiny he wrote to J. H. Ludlow, "... I do feel that those unspeakable horrors are more a message to Englishmen than even to Anglo-Indian. We, who send out our young men and young women have immeasurably more to answer for than they have for any failures they may commit. They are suffering for us."(10)

Maurice's attitude to the exclusiveness of nations is entirely consistent with his general concepts of social order and cooperation. His definition of social orders includes the necessity of a morality which places the good of the community as a whole above that of particular sections. Thus a social group must accept a responsibility for the wider community if it is to be considered capable of political participation within the nation. Further such a group must have an organic life of its own within the wider community. Clearly Maurice applies similar criteria to his definition of nationhood. To reverse the order, a nation must be an organic unity. As we have seen it is the final organic unit. But as such it must recognise the organic unity of other nations. It must not place its own illegitimate desires for territorial or economic expansion above the legitimate claims of the independence of other nations. As within a nation, power involves responsibility, the same relationship must exist between nations. Now Maurice

conceived this responsibility as being expressed by the principle of cooperation, as much in international as in intra-national affairs. The bonds of international association in Maurice's politics are moral bonds, which stem from the common Humanity of mankind. This theme will be discussed in greater depth later in this chapter. Meanwhile we must consider the sources of rational unity which have already been mentioned.

(a) GEOGRAPHICAL BOUNDARIES.

Earlier in this chapter we noted that Maurice considered that most modern nations had been created as the result of wars. He seems to accept this historical fact as part of the process of nation building. Each nation, as we have seen, gets its national consciousness from its history. The territorial boundaries are partly the result of the struggle for power of the ancestors of the existing members of the nation, and partly the consequence of phenomena as mountain ranges, rivers and sea coasts. In any case as far as contemporary politics were concerned he takes for granted existing boundaries and does not concern himself with the problem of the geographical limits of nation states, beyond the statement that a nation is confined by territorial limits.

(b) LANGUAGE.

One of the most important elements in the cultural
mixture which goes into the creation of a national consciousness is a common language which is used by all members of the community. In a lecture on Language, Maurice wrote "The distinction of Nations is represented by the distinction of Languages. All attempts to overthrow the distinction of nations have been accompanied by attempts to introduce some common language which shall efface the national language. The use of Latin in the Middle Ages, the diffusion of French in the age of Louis XIV, indicates the weakening of nations." (11)

Communication is impossible without a common language. It produces the power of making oneself understood and of understanding other people. Now, purely on the level of a means of communications language allows the individual to express his convictions and his beliefs. In other words language is a social phenomenon. As Maurice put it, "--- it ought to be the bond of intercourse and communion between citizens." (12) The existence of a common language not only indicates a common ancestry among the people, it actively encourages the development of common interests.

Maurice infers two processes in the use of language. The first is part of the process of socialisation of the individual into the particular culture and values of his society. He writes "All this might be merely a peculiar

(12) ibid. p. 133
family jargon, certain signs of intelligence between brother or sister, the mother and the child. But others, not of the family, appear. They utter the same kind of speech, they give a sense to that which they hear from us. Somehow or other all who dwell within that circle, larger or smaller, which we call a neighbourhood speak—not in the same tones and inflection of voice, not always in the same order—yet on the whole the same words; we know what they mean, or at least a little of what they mean; they know what we mean more or less. It is the same with those who come from any city, London, Liverpool or Exeter, not strictly in our neighbourhood. It is so with women as well as with men; with children as well as with the grown up."(13) At the level of passing on information we accept our language without thinking about it. Maurice compares this bland acceptance of language to a man who has never suffered from indigestion—he hardly recognises his good digestion. The individual simply accepts this language and uses it to disseminate thoughts and ideas. It forms a boundary between one nation and another simply by making it difficult to transfer such thoughts and ideas into different languages. Maurice does not pursue this side of the question at any great length. The socialising effects of language

are more or less accepted at face value. More important in his political philosophy is the second process by which language contributes to the development of a national consciousness. Language is a national symbol. It represents a psychological urge towards unity within the nation's boundaries by encompassing some form of national saga.

Mr. K. R. Minogue makes the point in his book Nationalism. "A nation needs a literature - including some anonymous saga from bygone days and a gallery of talented writers of more recent times. The centrepiece of cultural nationalism is some dominating figure who can be cast in the role of the great national poet. It is no doubt best if your national poet celebrates your national virtues but, in this field, distinction has to be taken where it is to be found, and, nationalism takes the form of lopping off unsuitable sentiment here and highlighting convenient ones there."(14) Maurice's approach is considerably less cynical than this but the issue is the same. Within the context of a national language and literature, sentiments are developed which have the force of social myths. These myths are greatly strengthened if the nation has its own language. The existence of the language, as well as exercising the function of internal communication within the society, also acts as a barrier to external cultural pressure from other nations. If a nation has a language different

from that of its neighbours it is in a much stronger position to repel attacks on its national culture.

In addition to the effect language has on a nation's cultural heritage, it also gives the appearance of a more natural boundary if the nation is linguistically as well as diplomatically separated from its neighbours. The existence of a language, common to the nation but different from that of neighbouring nations, Maurice tends to regard as evidence of historical development of all the parts of the nation. Since the language is both the vehicle of cultural continuity and the instrument for expressing new ideas it is essential that it must be clearly understood within the nation. Maurice, however, is concerned more that it should be possible for members of the same nation to understand each other when they are expressing the basic social ethos, rather than that there should be a common syntax. Clearly allowance must be made for local variations of dialect. Nevertheless, he holds to the view that a nation's language is a concrete expression of the metaphysical spirit of the nation. The greatest poets and writers are therefore concerned to express, for example, what Maurice calls "The English manner".

Maurice's position on the question of the importance of language as a determinant of nationality is in line with that of the German Romantic writers of the late eighteenth
and early twentieth centuries in as far as he sees language as an expression of national spirit. Dr. E. Kedouri puts an almost identical point of view in his book "Nationalism" when he writes "Language is not only a vehicle for rational propositions, it is the outer expression of an inner experience, the outcome of a particular history, the legacy, of a distinctive tradition". (15) Maurice agrees with the German writers that national society has a life of its own. In the "Conscience" he speaks of Fichte as the philosopher of Individuality par excellence, yet a philosopher for whom individuality depended on the fact of belonging to a nation. National life, and national language as the expression of that life, was for Fichte the only possibility milieu in which individual men could be free. The importance of a national language for the continuance of the "Volksgeist" had been fully demonstrated by Herder. Fichte, Schelling and the other German philosophers had expanded the proposition into a theory of nationalism which was to have revolutionary consequences which Maurice could never condone. Although the concept of language as a bond of cultural unity is common to Maurice and the Germans, the divergence of viewpoint comes with the interpretation of the function of the national spirit and, one might say, the corruption of the original German Romantic position into a cult of national superiority.

The difference between the two points of view is more than one of the emphasis. From Herder's original concept of the Volk the German Romantics developed a political theory in which the national spirit became self-determining. Not only was the nation a social organism, it was a self-controlled social organism. As such the nation may become a source of political instability within an international system. The concept of nationalism in which the self-determining spirit of the Volk becomes the sole criterion of political activity, or is used by politicians for their own purposes in the struggle for power, ignores one essential element in Maurice's theory. Maurice believed, with the Romantics, that each nation had particular attributes of its own which gave it an organic nature. He also believed that language was an important element in the creation and development of a national spirit. He did not, however, believe in the concept of total self-determination. His belief in the "Divine Education of Man" forbade this. While he accepted the differences between nations his theological explanation rested on the assumption of an external control over human affairs. Nations could therefore no more be entirely self-determining than could individual men. To claim such a power was to deny the divine order of society. Language and culture may well represent different histories and different attributes in organic nations. It does not,
however, follow that nations could attain the fullest expressions of their own existence by acts of collective self will. In Maurice's admittedly theocratic view of politics the national spirit, illustrated by separated languages and culture, could only reach its full self realisation by obedience to the external will of the Divine creator and controller of life. The leaders of a nation might justify aggressive action on the score of a special Divine mission, but Maurice rejects this on the grounds that, while national life may be exclusive, men of all nations are part of a universal society under a Divine rule. In this sense Maurice was a universalist. Nationhood may be the final political goal. It is not the final social or theological goal.

Language is a determinant of national consciousness in as far as the need for a common medium of communication and the expression of historically developed social and cultural norms are both met by the use of a particular language common to the people of a nation. The German Romantics or at least their followers, carried this further and claimed that all the people who spoke the same language should be members of the same nation. This was not carried out in practice so that when Germany was unified under Bismark, a large proportion of German speakers were omitted from the nation by the exclusion of Austria. The reaction
to this became apparent much later in the 1930s when Hitler used the spirit of nationalism as part of his argument for the annexation of Austria. To say that a language illustrates a national spirit, however, is not necessarily to say that all peoples speaking that language will be members of the same nation. Maurice's writing is not clear on this subject, but it is quite consistent with his ideas that the same language or at least variations of the same language may enshrine slightly different national spirits. Thus the Americans are distinct from the British though they speak more or less the same language; their social habits are similar to but not the same as the British. Starting from the same source they have developed in rather different ways so that eventually even their language will take on different characteristics. Maurice therefore regards a common language as an essential part of a nation's spirit without at the same time inferring that all who speak the same language must be members of the same nation.

(b) LAW

If language is one determinant of the boundaries of national spirit, Law is another. Maurice believes that all people who live in any form of society must exist under some condition of Law. Indeed it is a condition of civilisation for him that social relationships are based on Law. Law is indentified rather than made. It derives from the
social conditions of the community. The fact that men live together in societies is the source of the Law which governs them. Since a nation is the optimum organic social unit and since Law is the source of order in a society it follows that the national boundaries co-exist with the area of obedience to a given Law. "When we contemplate men in a Nation, we contemplate them as under a Law. The expressions are interchangeable."(16)

Maurice seems to consider Law in two ways. First there is law as a moral and political force, emanating from the social relations with the society. Second there is a law as a series of regulations which are imposed on the community by some legislative body which is itself sovereign but which voluntarily submits to the Laws which it passes.

The former type of law appears in Maurice's scheme as a part of the natural life of a nation in the sense that it is not created by men. We have mentioned the idea that law is identified, not made. This is the core of Maurice's belief in the power of law. In this sense the talks not so much of legal procedures as of moral and social imperatives. In Social Morality he writes "There may be a great many theories about the making or unmaking or remaking of laws; who are to be the agents in making or unmaking or remaking; what principles employ the agents. But apart from all

these disputes, there is for each of you and for me this fact. There is a Law; it claims us as its subjects; we learn by degrees that we are subject to it. That is a very great discovery. We are slow in arriving at it; very slow in confessing the full force of it. Just so far as it is brought home to me I know that I am a distinct person; that I must answer for myself; that you cannot answer for me. I perceive also that each of you is a distinct person; that each of you must answer for himself". (17) The point here is that Maurice distinguishes between the making of positive law and the discovery or identification of normative law. The relation between the two we shall discuss later. 

Normative law, as Maurice explains it, rests on an ultimate moral command. The problem is to discover who issues the command. Certainly Maurice does not see Law as the will of the majority. The majority could be wrong. Suppose the majority decides to abolish Law and to live in a state of anarchy. "And if in the midst of that Anarchy some two or three should proclaim the dignity of Law and say 'We at least will obey it,' those one or two would constitute a State and till the majority joined with them, the majority would be no State at all." (18)

Maurice gives a clue to his answer to this problem in an article in the "Tracts for Priests and People" (1861.)


(18) ibid. p. 123.
He is discussing the question "Do Kings Reign by the Grace of God?" The sovereign does not reign by his own self-will, nor by the will of the people but by the grace of God. If a power is held by grace then it cannot be an inalienable right. It can only refer to some superior power. In effect Maurice says that the power to rule i.e. the power to enact positive law stems from a more basic law which he equates with the Will of God. Knowledge of this will is not given to only one man, or a group of men. It is discovered by the process of historic revelation to the people as a whole. If it is ignored Maurice sees "No hope of growth, nothing but endless vicissitude; a continual return to the point from which we started; republics succeeding monarchies; empires swallowing up republics; theories trying to do duty for facts; facts overwhelming theories; men crying for liberty of thought then crying loudly for an iron despotism which shall crush all thought."(19)

If, the law does not come from the will of the majority or from the will of a sovereign, where does it come from? Maurice's answer is that it comes from a Divine Revelation of God's Will. It comes from an understanding of the nature of human relationships. We saw in an earlier chapter that Maurice places great emphasis on the role of the family as a socialising agency. There the relationships (19) F.D. Maurice. Tracts for Priests and People. Nox London 1861
between individuals are seen as revelations of the nature of man as a social animal. As society becomes more complex the family can no longer be the agency which impels men to act in a social way. At this stage law "stamps an obligation on the Relationship." The law has to consider not only the individual but also the relationship which exists between individuals. In the family the corporate ties are apparent. In the larger society law brings out the nature of these ties. It shows that human life is different from other forms of life. It extends the recognition of the corporate responsibility of men from the obvious responsibilities of family life to the less obvious responsibilities of the wider society.

Maurice seems to suggest that the process by which all this takes place is a form of social moral intuition. Along with development of a social organisation more complex than that of the family goes the development of a system of social control in which Law takes the place of the authority of the father. The particular form which Law takes in a nation depends on the particular form which the national life takes. It is, therefore, an essential part of the total force which moulds the national spirit. Since questions of property are those which are most liable to disturb the peace of a nation law is most often concerned with the regulation of property. This is not to say that property upholds and conditions law. For Maurice Law is the
force which regulates the economic forces. It is beyond the control of property because it represents the Divine Will which determines the nature of all social relationships. It is especially concerned with property only because the ownership of property is the most significant difference between national and family life. Normative law represents normative justice. It makes men appreciate their own failings and greed. It deters men from selfish actions but it also shows that there is no wrong if there is no right.

In this sense Laurice looks on Law as a moral force. It is a force which protects the stability of the organic society by recognising the social coherence of the community. Law must be maintained not for the benefit of the individual or of any special group in the nation but for the nation as a whole. The community perceives in Law something which stands above all tendencies towards individualism. It takes no account of the individual's wealth or status. If it is to be a true representative of justice, the institutions of the state must come under the state's authority. If Law is not upheld, the state itself is liable to collapse. In effect Laurice maintains that Law is a natural phenomenon of social life, by which men are led to recognise a sense of obligation to the society in which they live.
Law, though it is both a natural consequence of the social order and a force which may determine the particular forms of social life in a nation, does not directly affect men's character. It can only regulate acts, not beliefs or feelings. In other words by the action of law men may feel the need to act in particular ways towards their fellows, though law can in no way cause them to like each other. As language helps to create a feeling of social unity, Law helps men to act as if they were socially united.

The process by which Law is implemented is the enactment by some authoritative body within the state of a series of regulations. The normative law demands some form of administration to make it effective. maurice does not explicitly discuss the form which this takes, but one point is clear from his general political ideas. Since the organic political unit is the nation, the authority which applies the law is the institutionalised power structure of the nation, in other words, the state. The laws which a state administers are exclusive to that state. Because this positive law is the embodiment of the sentiment of the nation the application of the law is restricted to the boundaries of the nation. Thus a feature of any nation is the existence of an exclusive law within the nation. The positive law applies only to a particular nation and the positive law of another nation is not applicable within it. maurice takes the case
further by suggesting that within the nation law must be universally applied. There can be no exceptions to the rule of Law. The state itself is under the power of the Law. This is so because the positive Law should be as good an approximation as possible to the Revealed or Natural Law, which itself is the universal regulator of social relationships within the nation. The administrators of the law within a nation are under the same command to obey the law as are the ordinary people simply because the law is intended to uphold the national spirit of justice. Any attempt to use it to forward the claims of particular sections of the community denies its universal nature and must lead to discontent within the nation. For Maurice the Law is given to man from several main sources. The origin is Divine Will, which is entirely immutable and which man must obey if he is to become his ideal self. Man can not, in this world at least, fully comprehend the Divine Law, but he can grasp part of its meaning from Scripture, from the understanding of wise men, and from a study of the history of nations. Maurice believes in the Divine Education in Law as in other fields. From this education, including the intuitive responses which men make to their social conditions, men can understand the revealed or natural law. And from this they must contrive to create regulations in the form of positive law to regulate behaviour.
Positive and normative law are, therefore, essentially responses made to Divine Revelation. As such they fall into particular patterns depending on the experiences of the national society. They also may vary from place to place and from time to time. The feature common to all nations is that they must have some law, both normative and positive, and that law must represent the spirit of the nation.

(c) GOVERNMENT

There is a close relationship between Law and Government in Maurice's national theory. This relationship comes from the nature of positive law. Such law is put into effect by the process of administration by a sovereign body. At this level law is not an abstraction but a set of regulations which demand obedience. Thus law requires a degree of loyalty to a governing authority. In other words the law requires that the people of a nation obey their government, who put the law into effect, has one great danger. It threatens to make Law the servant of the government, thus giving rise to despotism.

How Maurice discusses this problem in terms of what he calls Loyalty. His concept of Loyalty is in fact similar to the modern concept of legitimacy. There are, he suggests three major forms of government. His typology of government is the traditional one of Monarchy, Aristocracy and Democracy. These are ideal types and in practice most governments are
a mixture of the three. Maurice suggests that each type can bring to bear its own form of loyalty, which ensures its continuance, but also that each form suffers from its own dangers. In some ways this aspect of Maurice's work, though it is extremely fragmented and not at all worked out in detail is quite similar to Max Weber's ideal typology of Charismatic, Traditional and Legal Authority.

Maurice's concept of loyalty is interesting because it suggests something more than a personal loyalty between one man and another. In effect he seems to believe that loyalty is to a type of government rather than to a personal leader, except in the case of Monarchy where loyalty may be to a person or to the institution of Royalty. Loyalty to the form of government is the political counterpart to the feeling of volkgeist within the nation. It represents a bond between the rulers and the ruled. Without it the government would be separated from the mass of the people and would have to rely on force to maintain power. In other words without Loyalty a nation is in a state of disequilibrium, liable to rapid and violent political upheaval. Loyalty is the force in society which forms a bulwark against revolution. Now Loyalty is a complex psychological phenomenon by which the members of a nation justify and internalise the political values of the society as expressed by the Government. Maurice expresses this in terms of reverence for law. This, of course, is reverence not for legal
institutions but for the natural law as it has appeared in the customs and ways of life of their society. A government is, therefore, acceptable to a nation only in as much as it appears to the citizens to be in accord with the national spirit. The degree of loyalty which it can command thus varies with the degree to which the people believe it represents the spirit of national unity. Loyalty as thus represented is a process of reciprocal trust between rulers and ruled. Speaking of the actions of the English Barons at Runnymede Laurice writes, "It was an act of apparent rebellion; it was in the strictest sense an act of Loyalty, John had been disloyal. He had undermined the foundations of his own authority; he had behaved as if choice and self will were the ground of it. Those who represented the old families of the Nation - those who kept alive the traditions of its permanence said that it could not be. It was a subversion of Loyalty to rend it asunder from Law." (20) One might object to Laurice's assumption of the impartiality of the Barons, but his point illustrates his case well enough. Law, or the retention of customary practices, justified the action taken against the King. John had broken faith, lost the loyalty of his people and was legitimately brought to heel, by the extraction of promises which illustrated the dependence of his right to rule on the legitimation of his powers by his subjects.

Maurice discusses the stress on loyalty in the three major types of Government. A feature of Monarchial government is the attachment of loyalty to the person of the King. In such a case the people may be loyal to the King because he represents the law of the nation. In general, people can not understand law as an abstraction. The monarch may embody the ancient traditions of the society. It is the institution which demands and gets the loyalty of the subjects. Nevertheless loyalty may be more easily achieved under such a government because it is psychologically easier to be loyal to the individual who represents the law than to a set of principles. Support for the individual may be more easily engendered even if the occupant of the role of King has personal failings which would be condemned in other men. Thus loyalty can be diffused throughout society by the acceptance of the role of the King by the educated classes on rational grounds and by its acceptance among the less well educated on emotional grounds. In effect the monarch is seen as representing the national spirit. So long as he retains this spirit he may retain his power to rule. The nature of the Monarchy, and especially the institution of direct descent has a stabilising effect. Nonetheless problems of succession may arise. Where rival claimants
to the throne exist political instability may arise. Such circumstances usually result in the attachment of loyalty absolutely to the persons of the rival claimants. Or such loyalty to individuals, rather than to the monarchy as such may arise even where a monarch is legitimately in power. If this happens then loyalty becomes social suicide. The society will be torn apart by political conflict which will inevitably result in a crisis in which the personal rule of the monarch has to be maintained or overthrown by force.

Similar attributes of loyalty may be found in Aristocracies. The old and powerful families in a society may act as a brake on the personal ambitions of monarchs. They, as much as the monarchy, may embody and protect the traditions of the nation. They may force the monarch to act only within the established Law. Rule by the members of the old families may well be an acceptable form of government within a nation. Aristocracies may engender loyalty by acting for the good of the nation. But the aristocratic form of government is liable to the same dangers as the monarch. Aristocrats may destroy their power to demand loyalty by internecine struggles and by the creation of privileged classes within society. Thus the French Revolution was a reaction against excessive privileges. Those who rebel may be seeking similar privileges for themselves, but the rebellion is justified if it seeks to destroy privilege. If one privilege
is simply replaced by another the result may be a series of rebellions.

In the case of both Monarchy and Aristocracy, Maurice takes as his criterion of loyalty the acceptance of a rule of law. He seems however, to use this term in two ways. In the first place he uses the term Law to represent the general consensus of opinion in the society particularly about political affairs. It is the national ethos with respect to the form of government encompassing the values and norms of the society - what we might today call the political culture. This set of values and norms are related to, and may come from, the more general social culture of the nation. It is the political side of the volksgeist. It is, therefore, necessary for the government to represent the historically developed pattern of life of the nation. The form of government is thus essentially a national matter and may vary from one nation to another.

The second use which Maurice makes of the term Law involves a concept of equality. He maintains that loyalty to government depends on the universality of the "Rule of Law". In this sense the legitimacy of the government, and thus its claim to loyalty from its subjects, depends on the equality of all men in the legal processes. Social and economic privilege may be acceptable. Legal privilege is not. Thus Maurice says that Democracy, equally with the
other two forms of government may demand Loyalty. The strength of a democratic government derives from its rejection of privilege. Its danger lies in the fact that it is especially prone to control by demagogues who may twist the people into accepting decisions which are only the will of the majority, which Maurice can not necessarily equate with the best interests of the people. The Democrat is liable to define law as the will of the majority, whereas Maurice sees Law as inherent in the social life of the nation. He does not consider the two as necessarily the same, Democracy can demand loyalty only if it acts to curb the illegitimate demands of sectional interests. The majority itself may be just such a sectional interest.

Maurice, however does not claim that all forms of government are equally good for all societies so that the best government is the one which is best administered. Referring to Pope's couplet:-

"For forms of Government let fool contest,
That which is best administered is best."

he wrote, "It is a latitude to say that if a Monarchy, an Aristocracy or a Democracy is well administered it is the best form of Government. That is merely to affirm that whatever country is well governed, is well governed. It is a falsehood to say that a Monarchy, Aristocracy, or a
Democracy is equally adapted to every country; that any
country under any one of these forms would be equally well
administered. The principle which I think Pope would have
expressed in some exquisite sentence if he had not been
perverted by a passion for epigram --- is that those who
dispute about forms of government are not aware that the
forms are determined for them; that the forms effect their
arguments and are not the least affected by them. Their
minds have been moulded by the order under which they have
grown up; they may be deformers or reformers but they must
confess a form which they wish to break or renew before
they are either. They may labour that that form shall be
well and not ill administered. To argue about the advantage
of some other is child's play not man's work. That doctrine
I deem to be very important to National Morality."(21)

What Maurice infers in the latter part of this quotation
is that there are particular forms of government especially
suited to particular types of society and that the best
form of government can only be determined by the development
of the society. "Best" forms of government can not be
discovered by a purely intellectual processes, they are a
function of the social structure of the national society.
This is quite in line with Maurice's concept of social
organisms. If the nation has a life of its own it will
develop its own forms of control. There is an element of Social Darwinism in this side of Maurice's thought. A nation's government is the result not of theories of government but of the evolution of the social organism. Just as a man can not understand his own body by reading a medical treatise so a nation can not determine its best form of government by reference to books on constitutional law. The form of government is the result of the society adapting to its own needs. Thus different nations adapt the three major forms to suit their own situation. The pure form need not exist.

MAURICE AS A NATIONALIST

Maurice's discussion of nationalism is open to all the arguments against the concept of the national spirit. One may protest that nationalism is a dangerous theory. Certainly it has been the source of many dreadful conflicts. Yet in his hands the concept is not open to this misuse. He does not exalt his own nation above others. His theory is specifically based on the concept of equality in diversity. What he suggests is that each nation has a contribution to make within the framework of co-existence. Thus he would say that part of being a good Englishman is to recognise the existence of good Frenchmen, good Germans, good Americans. Difference does not necessarily involve antagonism. Just
as individuals within a nation differ in their particular abilities, nations do likewise. The reasons for the differences are matters of temperament and socialisation. Maurice sees cooperation between nations as an essential feature of good society. He recognises the need for a unifying force. Between nations this is found in the natural order. God has ordained national life as the supreme political form but order demands conformity to God's laws. Obedience to God's Will, requires obedience to the law of cooperation. Maurice therefore sees Nationalism not as a source of militaristic expansion but as a bulwark against it. His reasons for adopting a nationalist point of view are essentially philosophical. They are the outcome of his understanding of the nature of social force. The socially cohesive force cannot extend beyond the national boundary simply because the prospects of organic growth are not present. He was to some extent a prisoner of his own time. The means of communication which he knew, precluded the development of social organism beyond the apparently natural range of social culture.

The political attitudes which Maurice adopted towards the problems of nationalism also made him appear to be a political conservative in many respects. Thus he defends the institutions which support the development of a national
spirit. He could not accept the necessary clash of interests on which socialism is often considered to be based. Nevertheless he could not either accept the maintenance of class privilege. In as much as both Nationalism and Conservatism have the same roots in their common recognition of the organic nature of society, the two are bound together in Maurice's politics.
Most of Maurice's ideas on Democracy are to be found in his book "The Representation and Education of the People" published in 1866 during the debate on the widening of the franchise. The opportunity to participate in politics is not, in his mind, an inalienable right conferred on men by virtue of their humanity. Instead, it is the culmination of a history of growth and development. When the conditions are ripe political participation, and thus the right to govern, or at least to vote for a government, can not be denied. Until then it may even be wrong to allow the franchise to be widely spread.

CITIZENSHIP AND FREEDOM

Maurice is concerned to distinguish between the total number of people in the state and those who have political rights and who may, therefore, be called citizens. His first task in discussing democracy, is to define the notion of citizenship. A number of criteria could be used. For example the ownership of land or property might be construed as that which confers the right of citizenship. Maurice seems to accept this as one, but not the only, criterion. He refers to Roman Citizenship as his example. It was true
that the Patricians who held land were citizens and that the Plebeians who did not, were not. Ownership of land gave a stake in the country. It meant that one had an economic reason for maintaining the country's best interests. Further it produced the great families who passed land ownership from generation to generation, permitting a continuing social framework to exist. Yet it was not the real basis of civil rights. One further condition was necessary. Maurice describes this as Freedom. In Roman society the citizen was a Free Man. To some extent the terms of freedom and citizenship appear to be interchangeable in Maurice's writings. The ranks of the citizens could consist only of free men.

But Maurice's concept of freedom requires careful consideration. In the first place he distinguishes between freedom and what he calls savage independence. The latter is self centred. It's aim is the preservation of the individual's life and interests against all attacks. The only law which is of any value is that of the survival of the fittest. In such conditions independence suggests the non-existence of society. Or to put it another way, it suggests that society consists solely of a group of individuals, each striving for his own ends in a Hobbesian existence. For Maurice such a view was utterly untenable. This kind of independence must result, not in the creation of a better
society, but in the total destruction of society. He thus sees freedom as quite distinct from purely personal independence.

Freedom, he claims, is not to be equated with the lack of control over individual, not even necessarily with the minimisation of such control. It is concerned with what he describes as law and discipline. All free men are under a law. Further they are all under the same law. How this law, which binds all citizens, can only be effective if it is accepted by all of them, and this applies equally to those who declare and administer it as it does to those whose only duty is to obey it. As Maurice put it, there must be a "living sympathy between those who obey it and those who administer it." In a previous chapter we have examined Maurice's view of the importance of law in society. The point to note here is that he considers the Laws as a social force, counteracting a tendency to selfishness in human affairs. He seems to give law the function of judging between men so that men do not have to judge themselves. This is not only a judgement in terms of litigation. It is a form of control. The unfree man is one who is under the control of another man while the free man is under the control only of the Law. The free man is thus one who can act freely, without the need for someone else's permission. He is the sole judge of his own actions, provided always
that he does not break the rules of the Law. Hence Maurice's desire of a living sympathy between the law maker, the law administrator and the people. Without such sympathy the law would degenerate into an instrument of control in the hands of some elite group. If this were to happen freedom would be lost and along with it the possibility of democracy.

Yet another factor necessary for freedom is what Maurice describes as discipline. If freedom means lack of external control and if one recognises the value of Law as a force to restrain selfishness, the concept of discipline fits in as the link between Law and Freedom. Without discipline freedom reverts to mere independence. The Law can apply sanctions but these have to be accepted if society is to continue. Under the Law the free man learns the value of service and obedience. The discipline which revolves round service and obedience gives rise to the feeling of membership of a common body.

The free man is the man who imposes upon himself a discipline which puts the good of his society above his own personal gain. It is this which makes the free man a good citizen. The stability of a political regime thus depends on the people respecting the generally accepted values of the society. Indeed Maurice seems to infer that such a respect is the major qualification for the status of political participation. He thus recognises the possibility
of privilege in society. There freedom is not tempered by discipline inequality of political rights is not only acceptable it is necessary.

Believing as he does in the evolution of the political integrity of a people Maurice inevitably demands the gradual incorporation of the various sections of society into the body politic. But he would refuse the status of citizenship to any group which has not achieved a high degree of responsibility for society as a whole. Within the overall structure of society groups exist, which have some more restricted but yet valid interest of their own. To these groups Maurice gave the title "Orders". In his book "The Representation and Education of the People" he contrasts Orders with what he calls "Fragments". Fragments are distinguished from Orders in a number of important ways. In the first place a Fragment is a section of society which is concerned solely with its own ends. An Order seeks its own ends but only within the context of the ends of society as a whole. A Fragment is, therefore a potentially revolutionary force. Clearly Maurice could never support such a group. An Order on the other hand, is a group which can be integrated into the larger society. An order is itself an organic social unit, with a life of its own and capable of contributing something to the life of the community at large. In general the members of an order must have some common core of belief
and some common aim or purpose. The members of an order have some kind of common cultural heritage. Normally this is reflected in a common code of behaviour and a common system of values. This gives rise to a cohesion within the order so that its members can be recognised as belonging to the same social group. This seems to be what Maurice means by "the bond of fellowship" a phrase which he frequently uses. The internal cohesion of the group is further strengthened by the use of a common language, or to be more accurate a common variation of the national language, though Maurice realises that there may be regional language variations within the order. In short, from the cultural point of view the idea of an Order is very similar to that of the national spirit which we have already discussed.

An Order represents some form of sub-culture within the whole community. As a general rule such sub-cultures are functional. In an earlier chapter we saw how Maurice accepted Plato's belief in the division of functions within society. His concept of Orders is his expression of the same idea, for not only is the internal structure of the group important in deciding whether it is an Order or a Fragment. So also is the function it performs within the total society. Maurice does not explicitly discuss any particular functions which might lead to the creation of an Order. Nevertheless one may draw certain inferences from his writings. Certainly
an economic function is one possibility. We have seen that
the ownership of property is an important social phenomenon
in even fairly primitive society. Clearly then one function
which can be performed by an Order is the control of property.
Any landed families must therefore be considered part of
an Order. Similarly it would seem that any group which can
have control of property, as distinct from ownership, must
also have a right to the title of Order. Thus Maurice would
support the claims of Medieval Guilds. Nevertheless if
the control of property is undertaken by a group a fairly
sophisticated organisation is necessary. Although Maurice
does not make it clear it may be assumed that the necessary
level of sophistication requires at least rudimentary
social and political institutions. Referring again to
ancient Rome Maurice says that the Plebeians could not have
shown their common mind except through the voice of their
elected representatives. He leaves open the question of how
these were elected, but is in no doubt that they did represent
the legitimate demands of their fellow Plebeians. A feature
of an Order is thus its capacity to create for itself
satisfactory institutions to channel its demands into the
political system.

We have therefore a number of criteria by which an Order
can be identified. There must be a degree of internal
consistency within the Order. This implies that the group must be a continuing association; it must persist through time and not be merely a temporary association for the satisfaction of a single objective after which it will disintegrate. It must be able to create institutions which can represent the will of its members. It must perform some necessary function in society. Because of these criteria an order must then be itself integrated into the institutional framework of the whole society.

This last condition is one which Maurice regards as vital if the society is to retain its equilibrium. If an Order is denied its rightful say in Government it is liable to become a danger to the society itself. Maurice poses a delicate balance between allowing an unruly mob the reality of power and refusing the legitimate demands of an Order. Both situations are liable to result in the revolutionary overthrow of the existing political institutions. If a government refuses the proper political demands of a section of the people it must risk changing an embryo order into a mob. In doing so it will leave the way open for demagogues and rabble rousers, thereby endangering the political stability of the whole society. The mob begins to demand its rights by non-constitutional means. And, in so doing it is likely to sweep into its orbit not only the legitimate
demands of the embryo Order, but the illegitimate demands of other fragments of society. A wise government will therefore see that the demands of those groups which have attained the semblance of an Order are dealt with by incorporating the groups in the body politic. Indeed it might be wise for governments to create conditions in which groups which have not yet attained the status of Orders can be given the necessary education to help them to develop satisfactory institutions. Political stability requires that all members of the society who have a contribution to make, should be brought within the scope of citizenship.

In "The Representation and Education of the People" Maurice gives an outline of the development of liberty and citizenship in England. The origin of the British system of representative government goes back to Saxon times, when the unit of society was the extended family. Maurice notes that such families made up the significant social unit because they recognised a common law, had similar religious rights, were led by common leaders and adopted a close relationship between land ownership and freedom. Though slavery existed, the nature and character of the society was determined by the condition of the free men. This freedom was nevertheless exercised within the limits of traditional and customary practises. Liberty within these limits was recognised as the
proper conditions of man. In general these limits took three forms. In the first place liberty was restricted by certain traditional modes of behaviour, which Maurice believed, originated in the family structures. Secondly liberty was restricted by the needs of the state. And thirdly liberty was limited by the personal ties which exist between the King and his subjects. Loyalty to the Crown was seen as a personal loyalty owed by the subject to the person of the King in return for the duty of protection. All of these ideas originate in Maurice's view of the role of the family in society.

After the Norman Conquest the notion of Kingship was extended to include the idea of a territorial limitation to sovereignty, but it retained the concept of ties of personal feudal loyalty. The Norman Kings brought the Great Barons into the system of Government but in so doing created a socially divided nation. This division, Maurice claimed, was illustrated by the existence of two languages. Yet the existence of a unifying language within the sections of society allowed the development of rudimentary forms of political representations. Under the Normans the common people kept their traditional forms of representation by jurors and rural chieftains. It was this which made it possible for the Earl of Leicester to introduce them into the system of English Government. This, Maurice claimed, was possible only because the commons had
the elementary form of an Order, and was more than just a crowd.

Under Henry III Parliament became a legitimate institution within our system of Government. As yet the Commons were of only minor importance. When they did obtain rights to grant supplies these were won for them by the nobles. Throughout the early part of English Constitutional history Maurice sees a struggle between the three orders in Parliament. But these orders, he says, represented those parts of the society which had a legitimate right of representation. Their right consisted solely in the fact that they were important, organic units of society. They were, in fact, Orders.

"The people" can only be those who are represented. The others in the society are not truly members of the people. There is always a tendency for those units, or orders, which are organised to attempt to exclude those groups who are not. The history of the development of our government system is a history of one group seeking to entrench itself while another seeks the aid of an aspiring order. The English constitution appears to Maurice as the product of a long history of emancipation from slavery - or rather of the extension of the quality of freedom to ever increasing numbers.

By the nineteenth century, England had a well developed set of institutions which were an essential feature of our system of Government. These Maurice regarded as a heritage from the
past which in some sense seemed to represent the accumulated wisdom of the race. A people was not something which existed solely in the present. How could it be, if it were an organic living society? The past was part of the ethos of the people and its worth was felt in the institutions which it had bequeathed to the present. Any attempt to abolish these institutions was to be stubbornly resisted not because they were the bastion of vested interest but because they represented the continuing life of society.

**THE IMPORTANCE OF EDUCATION**

Maurice believed that education was one of the major factors in the creation of new Orders in Society. If power were to be given the responsibility of political participation, this could only be properly used by an educated electorate. The kind of education he had in mind was far removed from nineteenth century spread of technical education. It was to be an education for citizenship.

Maurice, as we have seen, considered the state to be a moral entity. The state, or more exactly, though Maurice used the terms almost synonymously, the nation has a corporate responsibility for its actions. The Church seemed to a rice to be the natural source of moral education in society. In fact it was on the education question that he seems to have had particularly strong views of the Church's social function.

In his earlier works Maurice strongly supports the view that
it is the function of the Church alone to educate the people. Laurice made this point very strongly in his early book "Has the Church, or the State, the Power to Educate the People?" (1839) The point which Laurice tried to make was that the State needs an educated population if it is to become a cohesive social unit, but because of the legal nature of the State it is incapable of educating the people. It must, therefore, give this task up to the Church, which is ideally suited for the purpose. At this stage of his argument Laurice uses the concept of "the Church" in a particular way. To Laurice the Church was the human society restored to its proper relationship with God. "The Church is, therefore, human society in its normal state; the World that same society irregular and abnormal. The World is the Church without God, the Church is the World restored to its relation with God, taken back by him into the state for which he created it." (1) Clearly Laurice is not here thinking of the Church as an institution. This is his vision of what he called the Universal Church. At the same time he recognised that every nation would have a Church representative of that feeling of National Spirit to which we referred in the chapter on Nationalism and Conservatism. The Universal Church, in other words, would be particularised in particular situations. Thus in England the educational function of the Church would be not only to teach the truths of the Christian faith but (1) F.D. Laurice. Theological Essays. p.404 London 1853.
to foster the specifically English attitude to life. In addition, since all things were part of God's Revelation the Church was ideally suited to what might be called the non-religious, non-social parts of education. In performing this educational task the Church should be able to stimulate a sense of corporateness and fellowship in the nation's youth.

Maurice's policy of Church education fell down, however, on one major point, which he had to admit in later life. If the Church were to succeed in its responsibility for education it had to be a united Church. The plain facts of the case were against Maurice on this score. The Church in the real world was divided into various sects, and indeed some members of society did not accept it at all. As a result the education which the Church seemed to offer was based on sectarian principles. Each group was mainly concerned not with the broad stream of education which was common ground but with a determination to instil its particular interpretation of Christian doctrines into the mind of its children. Whereas Maurice never intended the Church schools to be centres of specifically religious teaching the sectarian movements cut each other's throats on this very point. Because of this Maurice was forced to retreat, in later life from the belief in the superiority of Church education
and to admit that where the Church has failed in its obligations the State, though theoretically, second best should step in to fill the breach. Thus in 1870 he wrote in an open letter to the Working Men's College: "Yes, but the statesman, what ought he to do? I answer he ought to get all the force he can get, all the force which there is in the land, to struggle against ignorance and the crimes of which ignorance is the parent. He ought to acknowledge facts, and to hope that if he does acknowledge them, the next generation will have better facts to deal with than he has. He ought therefore to claim all the belief of the land — the belief of English Churchmen, the belief of Protestant Dissenters, the belief of Romanists, the belief of Secularists — to conquer the enemies which are destroying us. He cannot conquer them by an Act of Parliament. He cannot stamp his foot and raise up a body of teachers armed to encounter them. He must take those which are in the land already. He must take them impartially, subject to all the contradictions which are impairing their efficiency. They will become better and less contentious if he appeals to the faith that is in them, if he calls that to his aid. They will become more and more contentious if he requires any of them to stifle their faith, or to keep it for Sundays and holidays, not for the weekday.
business of the world and the school"(12). Maurice's changed point of view did not mean the abandonment of his theory of Church and State relationships. He regarded both as expressions of Divine Revelation. His new position simply recognised the limitations of the institutions of the Church. The type of education which the state should provide was indentical to that which he had originally hoped the Church would give. Indeed he seems to regard the state's part in the process as the provision of the means whereby the Church could perform its proper task. The divisions within the Church prevented it from providing a truly "national" education. It had, therefore, to relinquish the organisation of education to the state. Each of the denominations had something to offer, none could claim an exclusive monopoly of right thinking. Maurice's aim was therefore, to prevent inter-denominational strife causing the destruction of true education and to make the best use of the talent available.

Irrespective of the insight which Maurice's educational views give on his ideas about the relationship between Church and state they also contain the germ of his beliefs about the development of democratic institutions. No group could attain the distinction of being an Order unless its members had at least an elementary level of education.

He himself contributed to the attainment of this ideal by the founding of the Working Men's College. Indeed after his disengagement from the work of the Christian Socialist Movement in the mid 1850s most of his time was spent in the field of education, as was noted in the first chapter of this work.

The implications of this attitude to education are far reaching for Maurice's concept of democracy. It implied that he could not envisage democracy deriving merely from a changed set of social institutions. Thus, the widening of the franchise was not, of itself, necessarily a good thing. If it resulted in bringing an uneducated irresponsible mob within the framework of the body politic it could do as much harm as good to the whole society. Maurice therefore regarded education as a pre-condition of democracy, though he does not seem to be on record as holding it to be a prerequisite of the franchise. He does not, that is to say, suggest an educational test as necessary to the granting of the vote. This may, perhaps, be due to his regarding political responsibility more as the function of groups than of individuals. Indeed, as we shall see, he did not consider democracy to be either a necessary or a sufficient condition for a satisfactory political regime.
THE WILL OF THE MAJORITY

According to Maurice Monarchical and Aristocratic government can exist through adherence of both types to the principles of the law. But what of a democracy? Can it also exist on the same basis. Maurice sees no reason why it should not. "The members of such a society may confess the supremacy of law over them one and all". (3) They may elect judges to declare what law is. They may profess loyalty to those who administer the law. They may elect and profess loyalty to the Head of State. This loyalty may engulf the whole people and so enrich the national life. This indeed is a true democracy".

Nevertheless, a democracy has very special temptations to remove such loyalty. It may argue that it creates the law by virtue of the "sovereignty of the people". Are not Presidents and Judges elected by the people, the servant of the people? May these ministers not be dismissed if in any sense they offend the people? The result may be to turn loyalty to the law into loyalty to the people. The result of such a course must always be to destroy government and to produce, first anarchy, then despotism. "Was it not so in Rome, and in France"? Maurice asks.

F. D. Maurice was not opposed to democracy as such. He had a high regard for the British institutions of

Government of his day. Inasmuch as these institutions gave an expression to the organic orders of society they were good institutions. In so far as they tended to exclude those orders which had grown from being mere fragments into being sections of society, with feelings of loyalty to law and the capacity of expressing their minds through representative institutions, they were unpatriotic and on a course of self-destruction.

Much of Maurice's writing on political ideas relates to his opposition to any philosophy which upholds the General Will or the will of the majority. As we have noted, a democracy has to face the special temptation of accepting the will of the people as the source of law and, therefore, as sovereign. Maurice repudiates this idea with considerable vehemence. "The sovereignty of the people I repudiate as at once the silliest and most blasphemous of all contradictions." Provided democracy was of such a nature that it represented the mind of an organic society acting under law, it was, or could be, a good form of government. The problem lies in defining what is the mind of a society.

Rousseau declares that the mind of society is to be found in the General Will. The General Will is in some sense derived from the fact that men, individual men, not Maurice's organic orders, have rights and powers of their
own. These rights exist apart from all social organisation and apart from all legislation. Not only so but if men are to break the hold of artificial societies and form societies in accord with nature they must claim those rights and exert those powers. Maurice agrees with certain parts of this standpoint. "There must be", he says, "somewhere or somehow a recognition of the truth that each man has a distinct sacredness, which does not depend on his national position, which is not created by law and cannot be destroyed by it." In this statement Maurice seems to go some way to accepting Rousseau's concept of the rights and powers of men. Man's sacred nature is not entirely dependant on society.

In effect, Maurice takes Rousseau to task not on the uniqueness of individual men but on the meaning of nature. Rousseau seems to see in nature an absence of restriction, an absence of law. The only law which Rousseau could recognise was the sovereignty of the people. There was no contract in the sense which Locke had declared. How could there be for there were no parties to create such a contract? The people was sovereign and could not abrogate its sovereignty. Any ruler they might choose was answerable only to them. The people could choose different forms of government to suit their need - but the only law was their
will. Maurice replies that he holds law to be a deliverance from nature. To abolish law is to return from civilisation to barbarism, to give up freedom in return for slavery. And yet he agrees that law cannot stand alone. The law is necessary for the life of the state and free men cannot exist outside civil society. The will of the people which Rousseau based on individual rights threatens law. Maurice counters this by saying that while law is the basis of all social ties in the state, there is a force which is higher than this kind of law. Rousseau's concept of Nature he describes as a distorted caricature of this other force. Law cannot stand alone. Without law there can be no state, but there is also something which is more universal than the state. This force Maurice recognises as a spiritual constitution which can be identified with the Universal Church. The purpose of the Universal Church is to teach men that God can deal with what Rousseau defines as the will of man. Self will must be given up or modified to conform to the divine will. As a result the separate members of this universal society give up their separate wills in exchange for conformity to that "certain order, which should make it most efficient for bringing men out of their selfish position into this true and divine position". In this way men become capable of "carrying out the purposes for which their society has been founded."
Here then we see Maurice approaching a definition and explanation of his concept of organic society's mind. It is not a will which can force its own desires but a will which can act upon other people's wills to form a mind. Its result is not a ruinous competition with the wills of other men but a cooperation to seek the good of all. It follows that what is sought is, not a computation of all the separate wills of men, but a united expression of a feeling.

Just as Maurice abhorred the concept of Rousseau's General Will, even more he detested the idea of allowing the will of the majority to prevail. His main argument seems to be that a reliance on a majority implies the idea that the majority is, or at least may be, no more than the sum of the unorganised, inorganic mass of individuals related to each other by nothing more than desire for their own aggrandisement. None of the qualities which give men a sense of the responsibilities of government need be present in the formation of such majority will. The chief of these qualities is the sense that those participating in government should feel themselves to be the servants of those whom they govern. "If servants they cannot be slaves; they must think and act as freemen; they cannot perform their duties on any other term".
The real "People" of any state, that is those who are citizens, do not form such a majority will. They consist, as we have seen, of orders. They have the right to let their voice be heard but only through properly elected representatives. Until all sectors of society can prove themselves to be capable of expressing their minds in this way there are bound to be "fragments" of society which exist within the territorial limits of the state and which come under the law of the state yet which are so far incapable of taking part in government. Until these fragments become orders democracy is a dangerous phenomenon. The will of the majority in such cases is particularly dangerous to the true government because it puts opinion on a higher plane than law. It will be wrong because it represents only the will of the individuals and claims for man a supremacy which is not rightly his. It denies the theocratic nature of the state. Maurice prefers the forms of government which "indicate that the highest ruler of the land, and every subordinate magistrate, derives his authority from an Invisible Person to whom he is under a fearful responsibility for the fulfilment of his duties". The rulers obtain their sovereignty not from the will of the majority, but from the divine nature of their calling. This cannot, however, be interpreted as a theory of divine rights of Kings. The rulers themselves should be under the same law as those whom they rule. In addition those orders of society
who have progressed beyond the stage of being fragments also appear to have certain divine authority. They form a check to tyrannical government. They even may force concessions from a king, or in extreme cases may force his abdication.

**MANHOOD SUFFRAGE AND UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE**

Who are to be regarded as the orders in society and who are to be regarded as citizens is illustrated by a discussion which Maurice introduces of the difference between Manhood Suffrage and Universal Suffrage. The two phrases, Maurice maintains, illustrate different attitudes an would produce different results if put into effect. The discussion is held within the framework of the proposal to extend the franchise by reducing the money qualification for voters.

The call for manhood suffrage is a protest against the conviction that possession of money or property determines the worth of an individual. That a man has must not be confused with what a man is. To deny this is both unjust and immoral. The "preciousness of manhood" cannot be measured by preciousness of money. A man who has been successful in business may be regarded as having shown himself able to exist without depending on the charity of others, to be capable of hard work and self restraint. Nevertheless the money which he has obtained is the reward for his struggle; it is not a measure of his worth. It
does not prove that he is a better man than his less wealthy fellows. His worth may lie in what his money represents but there is no real guarantee that this is necessarily so. Any theory therefore which awards the vote purely on possessions is wrong. The award of a vote in such circumstances may have two very unfortunate results. In the first place the poorer man may become jealous of the rich, which in turn may lead to demands for majority rule and to mob action and violence. In the second place the poorer man may feel that he has a smaller interest in the welfare of his country.

In the latter case this might result in a feeling of being excluded from the orders of society when in fact he may be a member of an order which is quite legitimately seeking recognition and acceptance. He might feel that his manhood is not recognised, that he has therefore no need to seek the welfare of his country before his own personal gain and the advancement of his order. Maurice suggests what the signs of manhood are when he discusses the qualities required of a man worthy of the vote. He should have free judgement, unhampered by intentions of personal or class gain at the expense of others. He must also be able to show wisdom and discernment in recognising the arguments of mobrousers for what they are. But his order must be
able to assist in this process by allowing the greatest possible opportunities for each person to express his views and learn the art of government in the government of the order itself.

Manhood suffrage, however, must not be confused with universal suffrage. Universal suffrage merely allows the vote to all who live within the boundaries of the state. This is another way of opening the doors to the will of the majority. Maurice is speaking here for his own time. He looks forward to the time when Manhood Suffrage and Universal Suffrage shall be coincidental. In the "Representation and Education of the People he says "I do not reckon it a dream to desire that all who dwell in the land should, in the fullest sense, be citizens of that land". Indeed Maurice believes that the whole history of England is pointing to the fact that this is what is happening. But before Universal suffrage becomes a reality, all men must have real freedom, become real citizens.

The difficulty lies in the fact that not all men have been accepted as citizens. The Reform Act of 1832 broke away from the English tradition of making free men into real citizens. It had the right effect, for it enfranchised that very group of middle class business men who had
demonstrated their capacity to be an order. Were not they the people who had made England great once more by their exertions? Did not their interests coincide with that of England? Did they not thereby bind themselves to the good of the nation? The results were in some measure satisfactory but the means of achieving these results were false. Money was being regarded as the direct measure of men's worth instead of the reward for his work. The result might well be to make the aspiring orders believe that they had no hope of becoming citizens, and thus allow them to be swayed by arguments in favour of universal suffrage.

If one allows universal suffrage without first ensuring that it coincides with manhood suffrage the aim of attaining the greatest quantity of manhood or citizenship representation will be subordinated to the second aim of allowing the greatest number of opportunities for expressing each person's views. This would be contrary to the nature of good government. It would result in the establishment of the rule of the majority. Anyone who could sway the votes by bribery or by demagogy would attain power and thwart the legitimate rule of those who form the body of true citizens. Votes thus cast would have no value because the true mind of the people could not be expressed. The opinions of the body as a whole would never be reflected in the legislation of the government. The convictions of the intelligent
minorities could not be taken into account by the legislators because they would not be able to elect their representatives.

A mere multitude will never be able to represent the views of the people. Maurice does not restrict the concept of a multitude to the unlearned masses of fragmented classes. It is not a matter of the lack of learning. Any multitude which accepts the temporary dominion of a leader is acting contrary to the best national interests. If one could persuade a multitude that there was an interest greater than its own selfishness, that it had a responsible position in society, a moral obligation, and that it belonged to an order, "the notions which it had adopted in blind submission to some foolish guide would be at one renounced or silently forgotten".

Maurice lays considerable stress on the concept of obligation. This is the only way in which to oppose the dangerous notions of privilege and rights. It is clear that many people decline to use the franchise even when they get it. This is indeed a sad reflection of the state of the land, a state which should be corrected without delay, for it leads just as much as the will of the majority to the rule of the temporary leader seeking only his own
interests. The damage will not be repaired by allowing
the six pound householder to vote, instead of restricting
the vote to the ten pound householder. That bond is there
between men because they pay the same rent to different
landlords? None at all. This represents no organic unit
in society. It is a mere collection of people who have
only one irrelevant fact in common — the size of their rents.
They have no common interest, no bonds of fellowship in
an order. Their rent cannot create any of those feelings
that make them seek representation as a body of men bound
in the common interest of the nation. They may have such
interests but it will be a matter of chance which has
nothing to do with the size of their rents.

If the numerical and the financial standards are not
acceptable, what is to be done? For there is no doubt that
men are clamouring for the vote. The answer must be to
seek for some sign that men are forming themselves into
organic orders; that they are controlling their own affairs,
that they are expressing a common mind. One must beware
of making concessions to certain classes in order to keep
them quiet. The duty of the government is to extend the
vote to those who are ready for it, not to try to keep a
noisy class quiet. Such a class will only be suspicious
of the government's motives unless they are given some real
say in government. If the intention is to enfranchise any
class in order to safeguard the position of the ruling classes the results can only be disastrous. If, however, the franchise is extended to cover all proper orders so that good government may be strengthened, then the government will wish each class to be as strong as possible so that its contribution to the nation may be at its maximum.

Certain classes in British society of the 1880s had shown themselves to be proper orders. Included among these were certain parts of the working class. The capitalists in industry had the vote and this was proper since they had become a real power in the land. Our country is dependent on industry but industry is not composed solely of capitalists. The workmen were showing that they too were an order with a mind of its own. They had shown that feature above all which was required of citizens, a feeling of devotion to the nation and of making a distinctive contribution to National life. They had organised themselves into cooperative associations; they formed the Volunteer Corps for the protection of the country. They had shown discipline and the bonds of fellowship. They therefore were ready to receive the power and the obligation to vote.

Harding turns his attention in the last pages of the "Representation and the Education of the People" to the problem of clashing interests in the House of Commons. It is true that if various orders are represented there they
may only strive for the interests of their own group. Any legislation which results from such clashes must be of the same nature as the rule of the majority. But he claims this is not necessarily the result of representation of various orders; if all classes are represented will it not be the case that a better understanding of the problems of each and a clearer grasp of the interests of the nation as a whole will result. The workers will not be in a preponderance but they will have a fair hearing. The previous thirty years' experience had shown great national benefits from the representation of the middle classes. Could the next thirty years not show an even greater improvement by introduction of the working class representatives? As the industrial and landlord classes had come to a better understanding could not the whole nation be brought together? If the best men of the working classes were represented in government their order would be further educated so that they would more and more seek the national rather than their own interests.

Maurice reverts to his argument that manhood should first be represented; that only those who represent an order of society should govern. Only after this has been attained should universal representation become the rule. Only when all the orders are clearly and unmistakably recognizable, when no fragments are left will there be a genuine universal
franchise. Does this then mean that the individual is not to be represented? Or that the opinion of a society is of more worth than the opinion of an individual? To Maurice, this was asking the wrong question. It worked back to individual rights which he could not accept. It suggests that the individual can exist apart from his society. Perhaps this gives us a clue to Maurice's belief in orders. There is a sort of interaction between the individual and his society. No man can attain the full stature of his individual dignity as a man except in his society. "He is most of an individual when he is most in association and communion with other men, when he feels most his dependence upon them and his obligations to them." Therefore so that each man may attain as much as possible of his individual manhood, Maurice would seek representation of his society in the legislature.

Democracy then depends upon men working in society for society's benefit. The greatest good for the individual is connected with the greatest good for the state but it would appear that the whole really is greater than the sum of its parts.
CHAPTER 5

CHRISTIAN SOCIALISM

Christian Socialism was a protest against the effects of the excessive competition of nineteenth century capitalism. It took the form of setting up associations of workmen, lending them sufficient capital to start up in business for themselves and allowing the middle class Christian Socialists only the part of advisors. The movement had got well under way by 1850 but was to come to a halt some six years later, for several reasons. Not the least of these was the decision by the government to refuse to grant legal protection for the funds of the Associations, or to allow them the protection of the Friendly Societies. Despite the support of J. S. Mill's evidence before the Slaney Committee and the request by the President of the Board of Trade to Ludlow to provide information, the Whig Government took no steps to help the movement. In all this work Maurice, however, was the provider of intellectual justification rather than the leader of men. In the end he insisted on giving up the work of the Christian Socialist movement to the care of Executive Committee of the Cooperative Conference while he turned to the education of the workers in the Working Men's College. Nevertheless much of what

Maurice wrote in this period remains the only positive writing on the principles of Christian Socialism.

**COOPERATION, COMPETITION AND CAPITALISM**

Maurice was not merely a utopian visionary. In his eyes Society was not to be made perfect as some future date. There already was in society a Divine Order which was being attacked by forces of dissension. "If I ever do any good work --- it must be in the way I have indicated, by roclaiming society and humanity to be divine realities as they stand, not as they may become and by calling upon priests, kings, prophets of the world to answer for their sin in having made them unreal by separating them from the living and eternal God, who has established them in Christ for His Glory." (1)

In this passage Maurice reveals his real aim in Christian Socialism. He had no intention of re-creating society according to a new political scheme. Above all he had no desire to create a state ruled by the working classes. Nor would he accept the identity of Socialism and Democracy, as we have seen in the preceding chapter. To do so was to go against the divine order of Society in which the Monarchy and the Aristocracy represented the rule of the "spiritual" over the animal aspects of men. They are "those in whom there is most of humanity. They furnish the rules and standards,

not the exceptions. European Aristocracy is founded on this principle." Maurice's Idealism is well illustrated in this point of view. The aristocracy as it exists at any time may well fall short of this but there is no doubt in his mind that what it enshrines is an important principle which must not be forsaken for any man-made political constitution which supplanted it by the rule of the masses. What was required was the raising up of the whole nation into a scheme of cooperative enterprise which could combat the destructive forces of competition. It was on the principle of cooperation, and on that principle alone, that Christian socialism was to be founded.

In order to develop any true Socialism, nations require an order of social life. This order can not be achieved by the total control of one section of the community by another. It requires a cooperative understanding of the needs of all parts of the community. One could not deny that there were important divisions within society but the divisions did not necessarily separate men from each other. Rather, they represented different functions in Society. In any real society God had given men special callings. Only by attending to these could men serve God, Society, and themselves in the most efficient way. In Maurice's use, Socialism was an extension of the existing Social order as shown by English history. It would result, not in the replacement of
the Monarchy and the Aristocracy by an all powerful proleteriat but would derive from an extension of the ruling powers of these two former bodies to include as many of the working classes as were fit to rule. Generations of experience had shown the Monarchy and the Aristocracy to be able to govern. To abolish this rich heritage would be folly. Indeed in doing so the working classes would be showing that they had not yet reached a maturity which would justify political power being placed in their hands.

In spite of his self-appointed title of Socialist, there was as we have already seen, much in Maurice that was conservative. The political power of the ruling classes was not theirs as a result of any form of contract. It was part of their natural right, as decreed by the Divine ordering of society. It follows from this that he did not regard the working classes as having any "rights" to govern themselves—and certainly none to dictate to their natural rulers. "Treat the sovereign and the aristocracy as not intended to rule and guide the land—and I anticipate nothing but almost accursed sacerdotal rule or a military despotism, with the great body of the population, in either case, morally, politically, physically serfs, more than they are at resent or ever have been."

(2) If Maurice was prepared to reject

(2) Life Vol. II. p. 129.
revolutionary overthrow of the traditional forms of government as a major part of socialist policy, he was at the same
time not prepared to accept the status quo as entirely satisfactory.
There is more to society than a series of orders for ever-
balanced and counter balanced with each other. The need for
balances of power only exists if the powers are in opposition
to each other. Society is held together, however, not by
opposing forces seeking to control each other, but by the
force of cooperation through which men seek to become members
of a political and social organisation which can meet their
need for fellowship.

At the root of all social structures is to be found
man's desire for common work and common worship with his
fellows. This gives rise to the need for social relationships,
which are originally met in the family and build up into the
nation or state, where the political nature of man exerts
itself. The forces which hold communities together are not
those based on the self interest of the individual members,
but are the sense of community spirit, of belonging to the
group, of needing the group in order to reach the full
potential of one's individuality. Without a sense of
fellowship any society is bound to be either unstable or else
under the domination of some man or group of men, who seek
power for their own glorification. In such a case there will
certainly be a tendency towards revolution, mainly because
the society will not be dynamic. It will contain no elements within it which can look forward to the awakening of political ideas, and the only purpose of cooperating in such a state would be to overthrow the despot.

The moral codes, on which social life is based, are firmly held and not easily destroyed. They represent the love of God for men. This love is for all men, not only for the elect. It is shown by the revealed and natural religion which is found in the Bible and in the creeds. Maurice did not regard revelation as opposed to nature. Revelation was the process by which God showed men how they should behave. It was most important for man that he should realise the lessons which God was teaching him — especially the basic lesson of fellowship as illustrated by the life of Christ. Fellowship between all men was the most important element of Maurice's Socialism. But it meant that past forms of fellowship, of cooperating for the national good should not be rejected in favour of some new system. It is the underlying philosophy of life rather than the system of government which, for Maurice, must be socialist. Where these moral codes are upheld by existing institutions then the institutions must be safeguarded, not for their own sakes but for what they stand for.

The mystique which Maurice attaches to the dynamic nature of society derives from his Romantic attitudes towards
political life. This he has accepted to a very large extent from S. T. Coleridge for whose work he had as we have seen, a very high regard. In some measure, however, he finds confirmation of his own ideas by direct reference to the German writers' themselves. Lessing seems to be favourably regarded by Maurice. In particular Maurice approves of the German writer's acceptance of the mystery of Society.

Referring to Lessing's Dialogues of Freemasonry, Maurice wrote "The hints they contain are even more valuable for our own (society). Whilst he sets forth the grandeur and preciousness of civic life; whilst he shows that its necessary limitations, and the strifes between nations, demand something deeper and more universal than itself, whilst he makes us feel that this deeper and more universal truth must be must be a SOCIETY and a MYSTERY; whilst he proves that it can not be expressed or described in words - that its power must be manifested in acts - that its power has been so manifested in all periods. Lessing leads us into one of the profoundest problems of political life, into the problem of it."(3) This belief that political life has to be experienced to be understood and above all that God was illustrating His Will for society to men in every period of history is fundamental to Maurice's Socialism. What he sought was not the establishment of a particular form of political structure but the development of existing institutions to

take cognisance of new political facts. The source of Christian Socialism is to be discovered in God's gradual unfolding of His mystical design for human society. What this Will is man can learn partly by looking at history. The Old Testament, in particular, illustrates this point. The Hebrew nation had been chosen by God to lead all men into righteousness. But man has to search for his revelations. The purposes of the philosopher, as indeed Maurice regarded the purpose for himself, was to dig into the grounds upon which society rests, to understand, not to build superstructures. All Maurice's researches into this aspect of philosophy seem to lead him to the same conclusion - that there was a consistent theme holding human society together, in many different forms. This theme was that cooperation was the force which alone could bind social orders to each other despite economic or class difference. It was the only source of real civic life.

Maurice, writing to Ludlow makes an important issue out of the problem of searching for the important aspects of human life which lead to social order. There is an important point of method here which he presses home in the letter. Maurice is all the time seeking for those aspects of society which will demonstrate the true nature of social life. He wants to show "society and human nature to be divine realities, as they stand, not as they may become."(4)

To remake society according to "Christian" teaching seemed to Maurice to suggest that people could only enter into fellowship by a social act of dedication, whereas he held that fellowship was of the very nature of man. The element of cooperation which was so important to Maurice's position had not entered the world with the coming of Christ. It had always been there, although Christ gave men the most clear and decisive illustration of what God was prepared to do for man, and gave man greater hope that the better side, which in some ways Maurice regarded as the original, of human nature could and would win the battle for control of humanity.

In mid-nineteenth century Maurice saw especially clearly the force of competition striving for control of civil life. Arising from the fiercely competitive nature of the capitalist society of the time, great poverty and accompanying misery was the lot of many working people, especially in the large centres of industry. It was this misery which Maurice attacked through the Christian Socialist movement.

Maurice's attack on the capitalist system, however, was not mounted solely because of the evil result which that system produced. He would have rejected the system on other grounds. The problem was one of accepting a proper principle on which to base any society. It was in fact, the battle between cooperation — representing the

\* See the Origin & History of Christian Socialism by Torben Christensen
Aarhus 1962
Divinely appointed order of society, and competition — representing the corrupt self-seeking nature of man. One could see something of the nature of competitive society from results which it produced.

A careful distinction should be made between capitalism and what Maurice called the competitive principle. They were related in that capitalism is based on the idea of competition. If by capitalism one means the control of the financial resources by a group of people expert in such activities as making profits within the confines of a market system Maurice has no criticism to make. He accepts that the skills of the capitalist are necessary under such conditions. What he objects to is the capitalist tendency to treat his workers as simply one of the tools of production at his command. Such an attitude pays scant regard to the needs and values of the men who work in the factories and offices. The objection which Maurice makes to capitalism is that it forces the two sides of the production process to compete with each other for the rewards of industry. In this competition the capitalist by virtue of his control of the finance involved has an unfair advantage and sees the results of all labour as his "natural" reward. As a result, unnecessary and dangerous competition is engendered in society.

Now Maurice's aim was not the overthrow of capitalism
by the workers, but the reformation of the attitudes of
the capitalists so that they would accept the principle of
cooperation in industry between capitalist and worker. He
recognised and accepted a differentiation of function between
the two but hoped for a reconciliation of aims. Greed and
exploitation he hoped, could be replaced by the aim of
production for the common good. Maurice aimed his attack,
as always, not so much at the institutions and organisations
of society as at its systems of values.

The competitive system of mid-Victorian England, however,
gave rise to symptoms which could not be ignored. The
depression of wages to a level which would not allow men
the common decencies of life aroused Maurice's wrath,
because such misery resulted in degradation which ruined
the relation between men as fellow creatures. Production
of the goods which are required by a modern community
requires the efforts of many people. There were, under the
19th century conditions, many different skills required
in industry. These ranged from the most important financial
skills of the capitalist to the humblest skills of the labourer.
Yet nothing could be produced without the combined work of
all the people involved. Nevertheless the capitalist
elements in industry, in order to keep the cost of production
as low as possible reduced the wages of the workers to a point
where they are abstracting "from the producer all but a starvation price for his labour." (5) The system of production in the sweated trades was creating a situation where the whole of family life was being destroyed by making a man’s wife and child the most dangerous rivals for his own job. The family in which men ought to be able to learn the ways of civil and social life is being strangled by the pressure of competition for starvation level wages. This raised a problem of great importance for society since it was destroying one of the most valuable of its own institutions, i.e. the family.

THE SOCIAL GOSPEL

Laurice was disturbed by the social conditions which accompanied nineteenth century British capitalism. He saw that it was no longer sufficient to rely on the consciences of high-minded individuals. Such actions were only suitable if the cause of distress was inherent in the individual. They were useless if, as he believed, the cause of distress lay, not in the individual but in the society. Paupers were being cared for, as far as possible by individual acts of charity. But this was nowhere near enough. In fact such individual acts of social welfare could have no effects on the problem at all. Because the cause of the misery was not some personal defect in the pauper himself but a serious fault in the social system in which the pauper

(5) F. D. Maurice, Tracts on Christian Socialism - Reasons for Cooperating, p.11. London 1850
had to exist. Even if one could raise wages, by the work of individual welfare visitors, one could not expect anything else in the existing condition but that the increase would go such things as do the poor people more harm than good. Besides, helping paupers and prisoners was a comparatively easy task. They were under sanctions applied by society. It was very much more difficult, yet also much more to the point to help those over whom society had no immediate control. The real answer to the problem of poverty could not be found in individual action. It could only be found in a social rejuvenation. The way to solve society's problems was by tackling them at their social roots. This meant attacking the competitive principle wherever it appeared and replacing it by the cooperative spirit. In short, although Maurice's Socialism was more concerned with people than with institutions he did not believe that individuals, by their own good works, could rescue the poor from their predicament. In a Tract for Christian Socialists Maurice argues his case on several grounds. In the first place if the poor people could be urged to work with each other as "friends and brothers, they would be more likely to feel as friends and brothers to the members of all classes, then while each regarded the man professing his craft as a rival and a foe, and all remembered who had been the instruments in awakening this feeling."

reason than self preservation, then it would be wise of the upper classes to encourage a brotherly feeling in the workers and to allow them to develop into an order in society. This could best be done by lending the poor what they had most need of i.e. money, so that they would be able to apply it in their own business and repay the loan with interest out of their profits. The lending of money was of infinitely greater value than simply giving help by charity. Secondly, in Maurice's eyes, the giving of alms was a self-perpetuating task. This is particularly brought out in Maurice's attitude to the way in which de Montalembert (who in 1849 came to power in France along with Louis Napoleon.) treated the problems of poverty and socialism. Maurice was utterly opposed to the right wing policies of the French ministers. He wrote to Julius Hare, "I can think of nothing more terrible than the combination of Louis Napoleon, the representative of the triumph of money and the sword over the law, order and faith, with Montalembert and the whole priest party. (7) Maurice attacked the

Charles Forbes René de Montalembert - son of an English mother and a French Emigre father was born in London in 1805. He died in 1870. He was the leader of the Roman Catholic anti-socialist party in France in the mid nineteenth century. "It is necessary to make war upon this evil (i.e.) socialism which increases daily, such war as is permitted by the Constitution - by all means sanctioned by justice, honour and the laws which govern us." For an account of his life see "Memoir of the Count de Montalembert" by Mrs Oliphant, J. Blackwood and Sons, Edin. 1872.

Romanist point of view as expressed by de Montalembert on the ground that it did not recognise men as men. "He loves the poor as poor; as a means that is to say of calling forth and exhibiting the virtues, the self sacrifice, the saintship of the rich. Although, therefore, "ammon worship is naturally hateful to him, he must ally himself to those who are possessed by it, because he sees that they, in their fear for their idol, are willing to seek help from traditions in which they do not believe."(8) Maurice is suggesting that the benevolent charity of some Christians is equally as damaging to the relationship existing between the poor and the other classes, as is the spirit of competition in capitalist England. The reason is the same in both cases. The capitalist treats the workers as cogs in a machine; the Catholic treats them as a means of producing saintliness; neither treats them as men. One can not apply remedies suitable for the Age of Chivalry to the Age of Industry. The problems are immeasurably more complex. This means not only that there are more people but that their relationship is less direct. It is, therefore, useless in the long run, though it may have short run effects, to provide individual help for individual people. As we have already noted this is only satisfactory when the individual is at fault, not when the social system is wrong. What is required is some form of

assistance as a social level. But Maurice and the Christian Socialists do not seem to have grasped the full implications of such a policy. They made no real effort to change the structure of society except by advocating the opportunity for groups of workers to help themselves. They could offer no solution (but neither did anybody else for about a hundred years) to the problem of structural unemployment.

It would appear that Maurice's version of socialism is based on the assumption that a moral obligation is sufficient to produce fundamental social change. Speaking of the clash between Capitalism (which he here seems to equate with the ownership of property) he wrote: "Let it once be seen that property is connected with order in the true honest sense of the word, that it does not merely seek to preserve itself but to preserve the physical and moral well-being of the whole land; then there will be a real and solid hope of reconciliation. I conceive that a demand of this kind the working classes had a full right to make when they had first shown an earnestness to do something for themselves and to reform themselves. I conceive that the owners of property have the most direct interest in meeting this demand, because the present system of trade is not more destructive to the morality of the lower class than of the higher." (9) He envisaged a society in which the

institutions of Capitalism were not destroyed but were given a rather different function. There was no necessary conflict between the Capitalist and Labour provided both accepted their responsibility to society. Both must accept as their goal the welfare of the whole of society, rather than the exploitation of power for individual or class benefits.

The Social Gospel reflects a preoccupation with the moral predicament as it is expressed in social and political life. In effect this is represented in Maurice's thought by the position he gave to the Church in the social order. It is the function of the Church, as an institution, to instil a sense of responsibility for the whole of society into its members, and indeed into all the members of the nation. The Church, however, does not try to abolish social institutions such as the ownership of property. It only attempts to encourage the use of the power which derives from them in a responsible manner, stressing the importance of communal benefit over private gain. Maurice's attitude towards Church and State may be seen in a letter written to Ludlow in 1849. "The State, I think, can not be Communist; never will be; never ought to be. It is by nature and law Conservative of individual rights; individual possessions. To uphold them it may be compelled (it must be) to recognise another
principle than that of individual rights and property; but only by accident; only by going out of its own sphere, as it so rightly did in the case of the factory children. But the Church I hold is Communist in principle; Conservative of property and individual rights only by accident; bound to recognise them but not as its own special work, not as the chief object of human society or existence. The union of the Church and State, of bodies existing for opposite ends, each necessary to the other, should accomplish the fusion of the principles of Communism and property. (10)

In this way Maurice reconciles a respect for the ownership of property and a demand for Socialism. This is possible because he regards the state, not as the source of coercion on behalf of the economically strong but as the source of reconciliation between two or more equally important social forces.

But the state does not exist in order to protect any single individual, or, more important, any group or class of people. It is there to realise a balance, or a harmony between them. When Maurice is using the word state, as in his letter to Ludlow, he is, of course referring to the constitutional organisation of a nation. It is the purpose of this organisation to reach as high a degree of harmony.
Maurice considers the state as harmonizing the forces of society, so that, far from opposing each other, they would tend to move towards a common objective. Thus each of the groups or classes which make up a community have to be brought into the realization that what they must seek is not their own sectional interest, but the interest of the society as a whole. They will, in fact only really attain their own best end, in so far as they attain the best total end for their society. This being so it also follows that the capitalist ought to consider the poorer members of society as having a share in the property of the community. This will raise the poorer classes to the status of a real order. It will also allow them to recognize that they also must consider the total benefit of the country and not their own narrow interests. They should feel that they have a stake in the wealth of the nation so that they can be allowed a share in the real duties and responsibilities of civil life. This, again, develops the theme that the proper motivation for society is cooperation and not competition.

Maurice goes on to suggest that property is favourable to a true order of society because it does not seek to preserve itself but aims at the improvement of the physical and moral well-being of society as a whole. This, he says, may be the key to a reconciliation between capital and labour.
The principle of cooperation seeks to restore a good relationship between master and servant. Maurice agrees that there are good masters and good servants in industry. But he claims that they are so, inasmuch as they disobey the ruling tendency of competition. "That doctrine makes it impossible for the master to look upon his servant except as one who is wanting wages which he is not disposed to give, or the servant upon the master, except as one who is offering wages upon which he cannot exist." (11) This, says Maurice, destroys any real relationship of harmony which could exist between them. This is not to deny that there are differences of function in industry between labour and capital, but it suggests that it is the function of industry not only to make money, but also to improve the conditions of life for all members of the society.

**F. D. MAURICE AND J. S. HILL**

Maurice also faced an attack on Socialism which said that Socialism was opposed by the whole history of trade and the views of the modern political economists. He denied the validity of such an attack by pointing out that the origin of trade in England was to be found in the ancient guilds and corporations of towns. These very bodies came into existence because the landowners had misused property.

They were beginning to regard the land as their own, to be used for their selfish purposes, forgetting that they had only held the land in feudal terms from the King, in return for duties and services. The King in turn held the land not as the ultimate proprietor but as the vassal of God. In fact, says Maurice, this is the doctrine of property held by his form of Socialism that all property ownership is held not to be absolute but dependent upon its proper use. The trading bodies and the corporations which rose up to counteract the landowners were cooperative bodies. Trade therefore has its origins not in competition but in cooperation.

In time, however, the trading bodies which began as cooperative enterprises, became narrow, selfish and concerned only for the preservation of their own rights, and property. Because of this it became apparent that they were restricting the freedom of their fellows. At this stage the political economists asserted a demand for freedom of trade. The old restrictive ideas should be removed and men allowed to take part in trade who had previously been debarred. In principle, said Maurice, this was a good thing because it brought into the political and trading sphere a group of men who were ready and able to accept the responsibilities involved.
Unfortunately the early political economists had used the word competition in connection with their demand for freer trade. They claimed that men have a "right" to compete for trade, as Maurice rather testily pointed out, "an undoubted right, like the right of a man to cut his own throat, which must, except in certain cases be conceded to an Englishman, but which he may find it inconvenient, on many accounts, to use."(12) Nevertheless, lesser writers accepted the idea of competition without grasping its real meaning, until political economy began to be little more than an advocacy of competition. Maurice, however, has still some regard for economics; for he continues his quotation "But this miserable notion of a great science has been more and more repudiated by all the eminent teachers of it ... And the most comprehensive and logical of all the writers on the subject is the one who not only does not repudiate cooperation as contemptible but has uttered some very memorable words in commendation of it." He was, of course referring to John Stuart Mill.

In his Autobiography Mill wrote, "our ideal of ultimate improvements went far beyond democracy and would class us decidedly under the general designation of Socialism."(13) The aim of Mill's socialism was the increase of human welfare.

"Poverty, like most social evils exists because men follow their brute instincts without due consideration. But society is possible, precisely because man is not necessarily a brute."(14)

Han, in fact, can help himself; he can improve his own society. Certainly the complex nineteenth century industrial society requires more organisation than that of the middle ages.

Two factors have to be borne in mind. One is that an optimum degree of freedom must be attained. The other is that the optimum freedom must go along with the "common ownership in the raw material of the globe and equal participation in all the benefits of combined labour."(15) Mill recognised, however that this could not be achieved by a simple reorganisation "We saw clearly that to render any such social transformation either possible or desirable an equivalent change of character must take place both in the uncultivated herd who now compose the labouring masses, and in the immense majority of their employers."(16) Mill was therefore very close to Harrius in some of his political thinking. He recognised the value of such activities as the cooperative movement not only because it helped the "labouring masses" in their misery but also for their activities by the working classes - a point of view similar to that held by Harrius.

For Harrius it was only in such activities as organising (14) J.S. Mill. Principles of Political Economy. Vol. I p.456.
cooperative efforts that the workers could cease to be individuals at war with each other and with other classes and could become a dynamic unit of society, with the right to some say in civil life.

At the same time Mill also thought that one of the causes of the existing state of affairs, in the middle of the nineteenth century, was the lack of opportunity for unpaid public service. This gave rise to a great emphasis on selfishness, which was illustrated in the lack of interest in the public good compared with the vast amount of energy employed in the acquisition of private wealth. In fact this was not to be wondered at since the whole institutional organisation was based on private gain. A change of heart accompanied by a change of institutions would be required to effect a real improvement in social welfare.

The change of heart Mill also would have regarded as requiring a change in the religious, moral and intellectual climate of public opinion. "The old opinions in religion, morals and politics, are so much discredited in the more intellectual minds as to have lost the greater part of their efficacy for good, while they still have enough life in them to be a powerful obstacle to the growing up of better opinions on these subjects." (17) This is the point at which Maurice would have to part company with Mill. Mill's socialism was

a matter of arranging necessary social organisations and educating the people to understand what it was all about. Maurice's was a necessary inference from the acceptance of Christianity. Mill's socialism was a product of the nineteenth century. Maurice's belief in socialism was not. "The principle commends itself to us, not as a new one but as one of the oldest in the history of the world. If we have learned it anywhere but in the Bible it is from our English history and English Constitution."(18) Not only is socialism necessary to combat the evils of nineteenth century England; it has always been so. Mill speaks of man being more that brute; Maurice would agree. The nature of man is such that when he is being true to himself he needs the fellowship of other men. This applies to all parts of life, economic as well as social. When man, however, ignores his true self he inevitably ends up in conflict, self-abandonment and competition. This produces misery for most if not all men. All that socialism is doing, Maurice would claim, is getting back to original righteousness. The individualism of the nineteenth century may well have corrupted Christianity; it did not invalidate it. What Maurice was seeking was not a "new opinion in religion morals, and politics", as Mill demanded but a return to the original Gospel of Christianity. It is the nature of his interpretation of this Gospel which makes Maurice a Socialist.

Maurice had to face the criticism that what he was advocating was not socialism at all and that real socialists would reject his ideas. The first criticism which he had to face was that there is no connection between Christianity and Socialism. Maurice's answer was that what the socialist reject, and what many Christians seem to believe, is not Christianity at all. Nevertheless there is a sound Christianity which is not the result of the interpretation of Christ's words by Maurice, or any other theologian. It is this sound Christianity which is the source of Maurice's Socialism. It is sound because it is the truth about the relation between God and man and between man and man.

Christianity can be falsified in a number of ways. In the first place it can be interpreted for selfish ends. Men can claim that their particular interpretation is the only, the true interpretation. The result of this is to produce divisions between men. Maurice analyzed four movements to show the problems which arise. The Evangelical Union is not be a body for accepting all men, not even all Christians, into unity. It is too exclusive. It demands a particular interpretation of scripture. In fact, though it tries to produce a better state within the Church, it results only in narrow sectionalism. The Union has no organic life of its own,
no connection with the past, no Divine calling. That then of the middle way. The Church Movement tries this path but also finds difficulties. Men unite in it not as men, not even as Churchmen but as men with a particular common view of the Church. Within even such a wide body as the Church of England, then, there are differences of what Christianity means. As for the Roman Catholic Church it is Universal in the sense of being greater than any one nation. But it is exclusive of all who do not accept its views. What then of the Humanists. Are not they too exclusive? They have as much bickering and excommunication as any Church. If there are such flagrant uses of the Gospel for purely personal reasons within the Church, it is no wonder that outside the realms of theology men have interpreted the Gospels to suit their own selfish ends.

Secondly Christianity can be falsified by being interpreted as a purely personal religion, concerned only with the individual's need to save his own soul. God can be so excluded by men from anything else that they fail to see the connection between God and the whole order of society. One man can so use God that he can not recognize the needs of his fellow. Not only is this so but the result of such attitudes is to completely miss the most important part of the Christian faith "Peaceful cooperation, a living brotherhood of fellow-workers demands the recognition of a great elder brother, who is one
with that invisible Lord, and one with his creature and servant. A brotherhood to be real demands a Father. Therefore it is that we speak of Christian Socialism."(19) By concentrating too heavily on personal salvation one can miss what could be called the social gospel, but what for Maurice was simply The Gospel.

Thirdly, men can make Christianity into a scheme of competition. It can be so interpreted that, for example, success in business may be regarded as a sign of God's favour. In this case the Gospel is again being deprived of its full value. God is concerned not only with the things of heaven, it is true, but neither can it be said that God's rewards are to be interpreted by the success with which a man collects wealth, especially if it is collected at the expense of his fellow men. In this case competition between men is thought to be the true principle in Society and in religion.

As a result of this conception of Christianity by which it becomes a support of the competitive system men become confused. In fact competition represents selfish rivalry. Christianity represents the love of man for God and for his fellow men. Yet, these two opposite points of view have become indentified for the common man. The Socialists believes that since competition and Christianity are identified, if one perishes the other must perish also. The Socialists

therefore look upon Christianity as, at worst a bitter enemy, or at best a useless anachronism. They wish, therefore, to destroy it. However, if the Socialists could see the true nature of Christianity, with its, through Christ offering all men, not only believing Christians, a knowledge of the best form of society and the power to create it, they would side with Christians rather than oppose them. In fact, by destroying Christianity, the Socialists would be playing into the hands of their enemies. For Christianity has been the one force which has supported the cause of cooperation and opposed the force of competition, since the time of Christ. Not only so, but God, before the Christian era, showed the power of cooperation to the Jews. He built up a family first, then a nation and finally a Universal society. In the Bible, Maurice claims, are to be found the signs pointing to a true cooperating fellowship, and in the best Christian Societies are the living examples of Socialism, the only ones, moreover which have proved successful.

It could be argued against Maurice that the Christians may support the family as the basic unit of society. But the Socialists do not do so. They often seek to destroy family life and replace it with a more communistic organisation. Maurice's reply is that the principles on which the family is based are the ground of human fellowship. Whether or not the socialists accept the family as a unit they base their society
on the same principles. Cooperative enterprise in support of one's fellow man, the replacing of self interest by the interest of the whole community; these are the common ground of Socialism and Christianity. Moreover, says Mauriice, Owen, Fourier and Louis Blanc agree with Christianity that competition is divisive breaking Society into inconsistent units. They are seeking some order in society which will oppose the tendency towards self-will, So are the Christians.

It is at this point that Mauriice saw his most fundamental difference with the Socialists. The socialists hope to be able to create such an order of society that the cooperative principle will be encouraged and the competitive one abolished. They work on the principle that a change in environment will result in a change in attitude. What they therefore seek to do is to recreate society by destroying all the institutions which have, in the past, prevented working men from attaining to their full social, economic and political rights. They regarded man as what Mauriice calls "the creature of circumstances." Man is what he is because of the circumstances in which he lives and works. There have been many attempts to create communist societies by rearranging the circumstances in which people exist. Robert Owen's villages of cooperation, Fourier's "Phalanx", the state socialism of Louis Blanc, all have the same end, to create a cooperative socialist type of society. They also use the same basic method - a change in the structure
of existing society which would cause a change from the competitive to the cooperative system. While Maurice agreed with the aims of such socialists he felt that they could not be achieved by the methods proposed. A change of attitude could not be caused by an alteration of physical and social environment. The root problem of society was deeper than the wretched circumstances in which some men lived. These circumstances were symptomatic of a social malaise, but abolishing the symptoms does not necessarily mean that the disease has been cured. Thus Maurice argued that the only effective kind of social policy was one which came from a correct set of social values and he had no hesitation in claiming the necessary degree of correctness for his Christian Socialism. The change in social structures, if it were to effect any permanent change for the good must, therefore, be the result of a change of attitude to society. To hope that a change of environment would cause a change of attitude was, for Maurice, simply the wrong method.

How Maurice attributed the failure of past Socialist schemes to just this point. Past Socialists had not realised that they lacked the one thing necessary to affect their desired ends. They had no moral social force with which to change people's attitude to their society. It was just this very force which Christianity could bring to bear on social problems. In fact Maurice seemed to think that Socialists and
Capitalists alike believed in the power of changed circumstances. Writing of the Socialists he said "All the stoutest assertors of competition agree with them in their worship of circumstance. There is nothing in any of the maxims of the most corrupt systems the world has ever seen to make this tenet unpalatable."(20)

The supporters of both Socialism and Capitalism act on the same principle. They deny man the ability to rise above his circumstances. The Capitalist accepts the "sorry condition of the working classes as inevitable; the Socialists believe that by changing the environment they cause a change in social values.

Despite their failings, however, the socialists and the working men of England probably demonstrated at least part of God's will for social life, by their insistence upon a real sense of cooperation. They may not have recognised that their will was in conformity with the Divine Will, but this does not at all invalidate the possibility that God has been revealing His social gospel in their activities. By joining the power of Divine guidance to the creation of new circumstances man can overcome the pressures of environment. Man's will, provided it coincides with God's should allow him to control his social arrangements without being moulded by the creation of his own hands. This is the power which the socialists have never been able to find. By rejecting Christianity they are risking the loss of the one power which can achieve their goal. They rely

solely upon the creation of new external circumstances to build the new Society; Maurice says that this is putting the cart before the horse. More emphasis on creating the right spirit between men, by regulating the social relationship according to Divine or natural principles is necessary. One must, however, note that this is not a gospel of personal salvation. Maurice is here describing a social relationship. The relationship between men is not only a matter of personal relations it includes the whole range of political and legal sanctions which a society or a nation can take against those who offend its laws. In the dedication of his book the Prophets and Kings of the Old Testament, Maurice wrote to Mr. Thomas Erskine of Lintrathen, the "Proclamation that God Himself is the King of the Lawgiver, the Judge of a Nation; that his government over the Jews was not more an actual government than that which he exercised over Scotland; that His Will is the only source and ground of right will right acts in His creatures; this a Proclamation which, whatever form it may have taken, against whatever persons or institutions it may have been directed, whatever may have been the immediate or apparent results of putting it forward, I cannot but accept as true, beneficent; divine." (21) No matter what schemes or institutions which the socialist desired either to create or to destroy their work would be in vain unless it fitted into the Divine order by which God has decreed that men should live.

Maurice does not deny that men's will can create a new society; nor does he deny that the institutions which they create can help to make men better social creatures. That he is saying is that neither men's will alone nor the institutions alone can do so. They can only be successful if their wills and their institutions follow the Divinely revealed pattern. In this he claims to differ from the other socialists. Their aims coincide; to some extent their methods coincide, it is their motivation which is different.

**THE DANGERS OF REVOLUTION**

On the question of the methods which have to be used to introduce Socialism Maurice's most important point is the futility of revolution. Revolution, in the sense of a sudden overthrow of all previous institutions and their replacement by a new system is intolerable to him. This attitude is determined by two factors in his political thinking. In the idea of a revolution there is the concept of a complete break with the past. For Maurice such a break is unthinkable because it would mean the destruction of all the revelation of His Will that God has given to man. God, at any historical date, has shown man part of his Truth. This is part of an evolutionary process by which man is being educated into the secrets of the Divine Will. If one simply rejects the past then one loses everything which man has learnt up to the time of the Revolution. It is better, then if man can learn
from the past, but there are times when revolutions are almost inevitable because of the depravity of the ruling classes. When this happens all need not be lost. The revolution may be God's way of punishing a nation for its corporate sins; but this can only happen when a nation has gone a long way along the road to corruption.

Because a revolution breaks with the past, in destroying much of the evidence of God's teaching, it clashes with the second political idea, which Maurice held. Societies are not artificial creations which man can make, then destroy and remodel. They are living entities in their own right. To use Maurice's phrase they are dynamic. This means that they grow with the passing of time; that the lessons of the past are used as a basis for the creations of the future. Now, no living thing can just give up its life at one instant and spring back revitalised the next. The trouble with revolutions is that this is what they want to do. In a revolution everything of the past, irrespective of its value for the future, is destroyed. The life, which may have been corrupt, but yet must have been at least partially dynamic, is crushed. As a result demagogues and all manner of irresponsible people may stir up the uneducated mobs, not for the sake of getting power for themselves. Such activities often mean that a revolution originally begun for the sake of the downtrodden poor and the underprivileged ends in a
state, for them, which is more oppressive than the one they sought to end. The reason why this is so is that the underprivileged masses have tried to seek power before they themselves had become a dynamic order in their own society. They are therefore unable to control the forces which flow into the vacuum caused by the destruction of the old society.

The Socialists themselves, were beginning to recognise the futility of revolutionary action, according to Maurice. He agreed that the Socialist seemed to spend much of their energies creating new constitutions to replace old ones but this was only a symptom of their worship of circumstances. But he argued that the Socialists after 1848 expect less, and less from revolutions. Maurice points out that the outrages of the capitalist system are likely not only to produce revolutions but to give them their vicious character. Because they are genuine protests against genuine grievances, revolutions sometimes can not be avoided. The only real remedy is to prevent the conditions which give rise to revolutionary fervour. In other words, allow all the various sectors of one's society to have some say in the governing of the country. This obviously can not be done until all the parts of society are fit to play their part; but once a group is ready no time should be wasted in bringing it into the body politic.
CONCLUSIONS

Maurice asserts his claim to be a socialist rather more consistently than he proves it. Perhaps the only important socialist principle in his political thought is that of cooperation. But this by itself is not a sufficient ground for the claim to be valid. Indeed by his rejection of the necessity of democracy and by his willingness to retain the ancient privileges of class in British society, Maurice cuts himself off from the mainstreams of socialist thought. This is not to say that he had no concern over the fate of the working classes. Far from it. But it does allow us to distinguish between socialism on the one hand and what we may call the Social Gospel on the other.

The Social Gospel asserts the need for a high level of mutual responsibility between the members of a society, based on the assumptions of the Christian Teaching of both the Old and the New Testaments. But it does not lay down the form of the social institutions, through which this responsibility is to be exercised. It may therefore be equally exercised in a capitalist as in a socialist system. The Social Gospel is thus not really a political gospel at all. It is simply a set of moral assumptions which can be applied through a political medium. Clearly the Social Gospel itself may be better applied in some political situations than in others. But an enlightened despot could quite easily induce a set of responses in society which
admirably fit the Sosial Gospel. Yet this could never be called socialism.

Maurice leaves the definition of cooperation far too open to be regarded as a socialist. One of the main features of socialism is an insistence on the equality of man. Maurice, however, seems to accept only two forms of equality - that of equality in the eyes of God, and that of equality before the law. Neither of these is adequate for a socialist theory. In fact Socialism seems to be based on the idea of the inherent equality of all men, at least in the sense that each man's political opinions has equal weight with all others. Maurice could not have agreed to this.

What Maurice seems to protest against is the essentially Liberal concept of laissez-faire politics in which each man is left to work out his own salvation. But such a protest need not take the form of Socialism. In fact in Britain the protest has more often taken the form of Conservatism. Thus Conservative theory is essentially collectivist and pluralist - but it, like Maurice, places the emphasis of the responsibility of all groups and individuals in society for and to Society as a whole. Further Conservative theory like Maurice, also emphasises the great importance of continuity in social life. Thus the Conservative "non-rationality" in politics, based on historical traditions and the need to view the social order as given and to accept
change only slowly and reluctantly contrasts with the socialist desire to impose a radical set of changes and to do so rationally. There is no doubt that F. D. Maurice would greatly prefer the former.
DIBLIOGRAPHY OF MAJOR WORKS

1834 - Eustace Conway.
1835 - Subscription no Bonda e.
1839 - Has the Church or the State the power to educate the People?
1841 - Reasons for not joining a party in the Church.
1842 - Three letters to the Rev J. Palmer on the Jerusalem Bishopric.
1843 - Right and Wrong Methods of Supporting Protestantism.
1843 - Christmas Day and other Sermons.
1845 - The New Statute and Dr. Ward.
1845 - Thoughts on the rule of Conscientious Subscription.
1846 - Epistle to the Hebrews (with preface on Newman's Theory of Revelation.)
1847 - Letter on attempt to defeat the Nomination of Mr. Hamilton.
1847 - Thoughts on the duty of a Protestant on the Present Oxford Election.
1847 - The Religions of the World and their relation to Christianity.
1848 - The Lord's Prayer (nine sermons) - also 1830
1848 - Queens College London its objects and methods.
1849 - The Prayer Book also 1857 and 1880.
1850 - The Church a Family (twelve sermons at Lincoln's Inn.
1851 - The Old Testament.
1853 - The Sermons on the Sabbath Day. The character of the Warrior and the Interpretation of History.

1853 - Theological Essays (also 1854 with new preface and concluding essay.)

1853 - The word Eternal and the Punishment of the Wicked. (Letter to Dr. Jelf.)

1853 - Prophets and Kings of Old Testament (new ed. of The Old Testament. 1851.)

1853 - Doctrine of Sacrifice.

1854 - Ecclesiastical History of the First and Second Centuries.


1855 - "Learning & Working" bound with Rome and its influence on Modern Nationalism.

1855 - Lectures to Ladies on Practical Subjects.

1857 - The Epistle of St. John.

1857 - Eucharist.


1857 - The Indian Mutiny.

1859 - What is Revelation?

1860 - Sequel to the Enquiry "What is Revelation?"

1861 - Lectures on the Apocalypse.

1862 - Dialogues on Family Worship.

1863 - Claims of the Bible and Science.

1864 - The Gospel of the Kingdom of Heaven.

1864 - The Conflict of Good and Evil in our Day.

1866 - The Workman and the Franchise.

1866 - Casuistry, Moral Philosophy and Moral Theology.
1865 - The Commandments considered as Instruments of National Reformation.

1867 - The Ground and Object of Hope for Mankind.

1868 - The Conscience.

1869 - Social Morality.

1870 - A Few Words on Secular and Denominational Education.

1871/2 - Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy. (N.B. This work is based on earlier articles in the "Encyclopaedia Metropolitana" 1850, 1853, 1857 and 1862.)

1873 - Sermons preached in Country Churches.

1874 - The Friendship of Books and other lectures. (ed. by Tom Hughes.)