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MEASURES TAKEN BY THE KING TO FORTIFY AND
MUNITION THE ROYAL CASTLES OF ENGLAND
BETWEEN THE YEARS 1327 AND 1346.

BY

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LIST OF PRINCIPAL AUTHORITIES CONSULTED.

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* CCR. and CPR.

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CHAPTER 1.

The Royal Castles and their Personnel.

A necessary preliminary to any detailed study of the royal castles during the first half of the fourteenth century is obviously the identification beyond doubt of those fortresses which did in fact belong to the king and whose economy was controlled by the Crown. It has been estimated that there have been at some time or other on different sites in England some fifteen hundred castles, but by no means all of these belonged to the Crown or were controlled by it. It is necessary to make this further distinction between possession and control, as the degree of supervision exercised by the king over individual foundations, royal or otherwise, varied considerably.

In an age when a Percy or a Neville was made responsible under the king for keeping the northern marches of the realm safe from any sudden incursion, it was understood that in the performance of this task he should be free to administer his family strongholds as he chose. Nor indeed dare the king meddle with the quasi royal prerogatives of the Bishop of Durham within his franchise; and his royal kinsmen the Lancasters were virtually masters of the Palatinate. Lesser families too claimed lordship

over castles which they had either built themselves or which had been granted to their ancestors. On the other hand it was clearly expedient that the king should have more immediate control of the strategic castles of the realm than was furnished by a theoretical feudal allegiance. Because of the long continuance of the Scottish wars for example, the crown maintained in Warkworth castle at its own cost 4 men-at-arms and 8 hobelers,* though after 1328 the fortress was not a royal possession. A further instance of variation is that in many of the castles where the king was lord, the garrisons were not supplied by him, but by a baron paid by his royal master to do so. The king was however ultimately responsible directly or indirectly for the maintenance and repair of the fabric of his own castles, and the ownership of a castle though perhaps not immediately apparent otherwise can be established by the employment of this criterion. A number of castles, some ninety, are mentioned in the Close and Patent Rolls as being garrisoned and otherwise maintained and repaired by the king between 1327 and 1346.† Nevertheless that total does not remain stable throughout the period. Castles are constantly being granted out, or resumed by the crown, or indeed simply "borrowed". For example

*Bates: Border Holds of Northumberland. (Arch. Aeliana.)

†See list at App.1.

the ownership of Wark castle in Northumberland fluctuated perpetually.* It was good policy for the king to endeavour to acquire a castle that he was frequently in the habit of borrowing, and on the 25th. Sept., 1317 William de Ros agreed to surrender Wark in exchange for lands between Thames and Tees.+ In 1333 it was granted by Edward III to Sir William Montagu with the consent of Parliament. / Again in 1328 Edward III made over his reversionary interest in Warkworth and the other northern estates of Lord Clavering to Percy of Alnwick in lieu of the hereditary custody of Berwick and an annuity of 500 marks. | Nonetheless, where the king supplies or more usually, pays the garrison, or is responsible for the repair of the castle, it is well-nigh certain to be a royal possession. It would seem therefore not inappropriate to discover at this point the way in which the royal castles were garrisoned, and to inquire in some detail into the type of official responsible for their security.

In the early days of feudalism each military tenant was bound to provide 40 days castle-guard every year in one of the castles of his overlord, or the king - or sometimes both. Very soon however this feudal duty was commuted for a money payment. Dr. Lapsley has

*Bates: op.cit. +Bates: op.cit.

/Cal.Doc.Scot.ii p.192. | Bates:op.cit.

shown that even in the twelfth century the military institutions of England rested upon a double foundation.* To feudal tenure was added the principle of money payment. In the important Marcher county of Northumberland, castleward silver paid in lieu of service became a fixed item in the sheriff's accounts from 1221, the money in each case going to the constable of the appropriate castle for its safe-keeping.+ The sum was 48 marks 4s. for Newcastle and 5 marks for Bamburgh. Thus it was a short step from a simple money payment to the fully developed system of indentures on which Edward III relied for the garrisoning of the majority of his castles. For the proper safeguard of an important fortress, a definite garrison strength was deemed absolutely essential, especially in the Marches where lightning forays by a marauding army were designed to take the Border strongholds by surprise. Thus a prospective governor engaged with the king to maintain the requisite strength of defenders on condition of the receipt of the stipulated wages and other dues. Occasionally, arrangements as to the provisioning were inserted, and if sufficient victuals were not forthcoming, the contracting party was declared free to depart without blame. In case he was besieged

*Some Castle Officers
of the Twelfth Century.
EHR. Vol. 33.

+Northumbrian Pipe Roll in
Hodgson's History of
Northumberland. col.125 ff.

by an enemy and was not relieved within a stated period, (usually three months) the leader was empowered to make a truce or other conditions, suiting his own interests. Moreover if payment was lacking he was free to depart "without reproach" and go wherever he wished after giving due warning of, say, 40 days. Sometimes a party contracting with the king had to find guarantors that he would fulfil all conditions and covenants contained in the indenture.* There are numerous examples of such indentures in the first years of Edward III's reign. In fact the advantages of the indenture system, first applied to the defence of a certain castle or region, became so obvious that it was then adopted for general service in the field. In February 1327 Henry Percy undertook the custody of the Scottish Marches with at least 100 men-at-arms and as many hobelers.† In view of the fact that the royal fortresses comprised an integral part of the defences, it is fairly certain that their custody would be included in the contract, though no specific mention is made of them in this instance. In September of the same year, the Earl was paid £330 3s. 4d. for accompanying the king on the

*A.E.Prince : The Indenture System under Edward III. Historical Essays in Honour of James Tait.

†CPR.1327-30 p.18.

Marches of Scotland with 159 men-at-arms and 200 hobelers for 25 days in the preceding July and August.* In the same month that Henry Percy undertook his custody (Feb. 1327) Anthony de Lucy was appointed to the custody of the city and castle of Carlisle " - provided that with the aid of the citizens there he keep the said city and castle safe for the king's use, at his peril, in accordance with the indenture made between him and the king."† He was paid £577 10s. in the following year for his wages and those of his men-at-arms and hobelers in that task, and in keeping the Marches of Cumberland and Westmorland.‡ A grant of the manors of "Penereth, Soureby and Oulfsdale" is also made, though it is not clear whether this is meant to be permanent or simply to last until the terms of the indenture have been satisfied from their issues. Such contracts were by no means limited to the North, or to the first year or so of the reign. William de Clynton, Earl of Huntingdon, was paid in 1338 the wages of 20 men-at-arms, 40 armed men and 40 archers whom he had retained for the garrison of Porchester castle, at the king's wages of 12d. daily for the men-at-arms, 6d. daily for the

* Cal.Doc.Scot.
Vol.111 p.169.

† C.P.R. 1327-30.
p.6.

‡ C.P.R. 1327-30.
p.245.

armed men and 3d. for the archers.* In the following year, the Earl, having assumed the governorship of Dover castle is ordered to retain an identical garrison at the same wages.+ Richard, Earl of Arundel, is responsible for Porchester, whose garrison has been reduced to 10 men-at-arms and 40 archers, the wages remaining unchanged.7

Now although all the indentures with which we are concerned specified the safe-keeping of some royal castle, sometimes including a town or an area, they were not made only with tenants-in-chief or men who would be able to provide the required garrisons from their own personal retinues. The terms "keeper" and "constable" are used somewhat indiscriminately throughout the documents, and no assumption as to status can be made on this basis. For example, in March 1337 John de Glanton is referred to as "constable of Carlisle castle"8 and three months later as "keeper of Carlisle castle"± The Lords Warden are referred to as "keepers" of the Marches, but again no special status is conferred by the term ipso facto as compared with the definition of "constable". The Earl of Huntingdon is in 1332 "constable" of Dover castle and also Warden of the Cinque Ports, an appoint-

* CCR.1337-39.
p.557.

+ CCR.1339-41.
p.11.

7 ibid.
p.65.

8 CCR.1337-39
p.5.

± ibid.p.75.

ment of no small moment.* We find however that in 1339 a grant for life was made to John de Hethey, king's yeoman, in consideration of his long service, of the office of constable of the castle of Shrewsbury, with wages of 7½d. a day from the sheriff and the usual fees,† while John de Kendale held the custody of the castle of Restormel and its lands in 1337 at the fee of a robe worth a mark, or a mark every year, and daily wages of 3d.‡ This would seem to be a very different type of agreement from that made with a Percy or a de Lucy: yet both Earl and yeoman in fact received the same wages when performing duties as constables of castles.⁄ A difference does exist between them nevertheless, for while one would certainly use his own followers to perform his duties as constable* the other, not having a permanent retinue would be more in the nature of supervisor of a garrison regulated directly by the king

*CPR. 1330-34
P. 347.

†CPR. 1338-40
P. 335.

‡CPR. 1334-38
P. 383.

⁄CPR. 1340-43
P. 521.
Thomas Cary,
king's yeoman
was given the

custody of Corfe
castle"with such
wages and fees
as Wm. de Monte
Acuto, earl of
Salisbury, rec-
eived when he
had it."

*The men of the
keeper of Carlisle
castle in 1337
are expressly
described as

being "of his
retainers" and
the commission-
ers of array
are ordered "not
to intermeddle
with them."
CPR. 1338-40.
P. 143.

and paid his wages. This is well illustrated by an entry on the Close Roll for the 8th. June 1339 whereby the constable of Windsor Castle informs the king that having been ordered to retain 10 men at arms and 20 archers in the castle he has done so. But "-no payment or satisfaction has been made to them hitherto wherefore the men intend to depart from the castle-" In the order to retain them* the treasurer and barons of the exchequer had been expressly ordered to pay them "reasonable wages" but had apparently not done so. Obviously Thomas de Foxle, the constable, was unable to pay them. They were not his men who ate at his table and wore his livery, but were simply engaged through him by the king, whose responsibility it was to pay them.+ The garrison at the Tower in 1337 was also paid directly from the Exchequer} and in 1339 John de Wyndesore, a king's clerk, held the appointment

*CCR.1339-41

P. 143.

+Constables supplying garrisons from their own retinues who were unlikely to depart were often kept waiting for full settlement of their claims. John de Glanton, keeper of Carlisle is paid 10 marks in 1337

"in part recompense for the expenses incurred by him in retaining armed men for the safe keeping of the castle for a long time."

CCR. 1337-39.

P. 98.

}CCR. 1337-39.

of paymaster to the garrisons in the Isle of Wight* In both types of custody however, the numbers of the garrison, the length of time for which the men were to be engaged and most important of all, the pay which they were to receive became rigidly specified. William de Clynton, constable of Dover castle was ordered in 1339 to cause that castle to be supplied with 12 armed men and 34 other men, each of the former receiving 6d. daily, twenty of the latter 3d. and the others 2d. daily from the Purification to the 8th. March and from that date 20 men at arms, 40 armed men and 40 archers, each of the men at arms receiving 12d. daily, the armed men 6d. and the archers 3d. each according to the king's ordinance made by the advice of the council.+ This garrison strength was confirmed in June ¶ and again in July/. No divergence from this pay scale was sanctioned, though occasionally a constable was allowed to claim for a slight increase in establishment if he considered it essential for the safe custody of the castle.

With regard to the responsibility of the constable for the carrying out repairs to a castle, the documents show a considerable diversity of practice. Almost invariably the king was ultimately

*CCR. 1339-41. +CCR. 1339-41. ¶ibid.P150 /ibid. P.285
P. 32. P. 22.

responsible for the cost of repairs to one of his own castles, but the constable was usually involved in some capacity in the task of carrying them out, and was excluded only when the sheriff was put in charge of the whole operation.⁺ It is therefore proposed to consider at this juncture only the question of the responsibility of the constable in the matter of repair. The significance of the repairs themselves and any conclusions which may be drawn from them are to be dealt with at a later stage.

The usual procedure as far as the administration was concerned was for the constable to be ordered to carry out a certain repair up to a stated sum[#] which was to be obtained from the issues of the castle, and accounted for at the Exchequer, by the view and testimony of one or more persons specifically appointed for the task. Examples of this method occur throughout the period under review, and illustration may be made from a mandate to Walter de Creyk, constable of Bamburgh castle, who in 1335 was ordered to " - expend up to £40 by the view and testimony of William de Bedenhale, from the issues of the castle, in repairing the defects of the houses, walls, turrets, bridges and other erections of the castle -."§

+CCR.1333-37.
13th.Sep.m.13.

*John Rudolf, "- the king's fermor at Porchester -" was allowed his expenses in carrying out certain repairs to the castle in 1334 notwithstanding that the said costs and expenses were incurred without the king's order -". The phraseology demonstrates that this procedure was unusual.
CCR.1333-37.p.236.

§CCR.1333-37.
p. 386.

Repairs carried out in Scarborough castle by the keeper in the same year were to be paid for by " - the bailiffs and lawful men of Scardeburgh " out of the " - £917 which they ought to pay to the king for the ferm of that town -"*

The various items which made up the ferm of a castle and honour sometimes included with it, are of importance and deserve mention here. It was from these that the constable obtained money to meet the expenses of his various duties, and for which he had to account yearly at the Exchequer. Guy Brian was constable of the castle of St. Briavels and keeper of the Forest of Dene in 1341. He apparently could not meet his expenses and still render the necessary amount at the Exchequer, since he beseeches the king either to release him from the responsibility of payment (the alternative would presumably be a new indenture on different terms) or decrease the amount due. He goes on to show that whereas he is required to produce £160 every year, now " - divers commodities and profits anciently pertaining to the castle and forest have been withdrawn by grants made by the king and his progenitors to divers men, so that the keeper cannot answer for the entire ferm without suffering great damage, or by excessive destruction and waste of the forest." A commission was appointed to investigate, and discovered that all the profits

* CCR. *ibid.*
p. 426.

pertaining to the castle and forest "are extended at £117.4.5 $\frac{3}{4}$ d." whereas previously they had brought in £160. It then goes on to specify the nature of the items producing the revenue. Certain great forges with other smaller royal forges in the forest rendered £26.19.3d., but had been destroyed at the king's orders to avoid destruction of the forest: Henry, "sometime king of England" gave a fishery of the River Severn to Edmund his son "which fishery used to be worth £18 yearly to the fermor of the forest": that charters were granted by Edward I and Edward III in respect of certain lands in the forest, for which they now received £33 yearly, but that in consequence "the forest is diminished by a fourth, and the issues and the profits of the forest are diminished owing to the causes aforesaid." The commission decided that "Guy shall hold the said castle and forest during good conduct, rendering £120 yearly."* This sum, although a considerable reduction, would seem not to be entirely to Guy's liking, for in his original petition in 1320⁺ he had tried to convince the king that "the entire issues (of the castle) are not extended at more than £84.13s.0 $\frac{1}{4}$ d. - " Apparently the king drove a hard bargain. This is not the only case of a ferm having to be re-assessed or temporarily reduced. The

*CCR. 1341-43. p.153.

⁺CPR. 1340-45. p.495.

constable of Knaresburgh was excused payment of £678.2s.1 $\frac{3}{4}$ d. arrears of the ferm of 800 marks due in 1329 as he had been unable to collect it "on account of the poverty of the tenants ruined by the invasions of the Scots and attacks by Andrew Harcla and his men."* Occasionally the keeper was obliged to settle the cost of repairs from his ferm, and then apply for allowance to be made in his account at the end of the year. Thomas de Bradeston in 1333 was allowed various expenses incurred in carrying out certain repairs in the castle and town of Gloucester. He had been allowed to expend up to 100 marks on this account, the amount being testified by the prior of Lantone and two others. Afterwards, although it was discovered that 100 marks were insufficient for the work, yet another writ was necessary, and viewers were again appointed before an additional sum could be claimed for in the keepers account. It would certainly appear therefore that the procedure of appointing a committee to testify as to the necessity for the repairs and their cost, was no mere formal act, but an essential part of the administrative system, in default of which the keeper was unable to claim any allowance. This point is illustrated even more forcibly when in the same year Giles de Bello Campo petitioned the king to allow him a certain sum since Edward 11 had ordered him, then constable of Scarborough castle, to carry out repairs where necessary from the issues of that bailiwick by the

view and testimony of the bailiff Robert Waweyn. Robert has since died, and Giles has been unable to claim his refund* Sometimes the sheriff was ordered to carry out the repair by the view and testimony of the keeper and in this instance the amount incurred would be paid for out of the ferm of the county and appear in the sheriff's account for the year.+ Conversely the constable carried out the repair and his expenditure was testified by the sheriff. In the case of some of the royal castles the king was entitled to certain aid in the cost of their repair from the barons who owed castle-guard to them, regardless of whether this duty had been commuted or not. Two inquisitions held in Newcastle in 1334 and 1336 make it clear that the barons who owed castle-guard to Newcastle kept houses in the castle.† These were not merely temporary lodgings for their soldiers, but part and parcel of their manors, which were liable for the support of the houses. At Launceston too, certain lands were responsible for the repairs of the walls and battlements of the castle. An inquisition of 1337 reported "There is a certain castle there, the walls of which are very ruinous, and ought to be repaired, as it is said by the tenants of the military fees belonging to the Honour of the said castle.‡ It also stated that there were 233 of these. In 1336 Wodeford was held as of the manor of Totnes by service of 8¼ knight's fees, and doing suit of court of the castle and repairing

*CCR. *ibid.*
p. 135.

CCR.
+1333-37.
p. 200

‡ Arch. Aeliana
iv. 46-8. CCR.

‡ Peter: History of
Launceston and
Dunheved. p. 248.

two battlements of the said castle whenever necessary.* A similar service known as "heckage" was due from many of the knights who owed castle-guard to Pevensey. This implied the obligation of keeping up a certain portion of the palisades on the ramparts of Pevensey, but was commuted in 1254 when those liable for the service compounded for it at the rate of 12 marks for each heckage.+ There is abundant evidence that Edward III by no means allowed such responsibilities to lapse, but was well aware of their incidence, and quite ready to demand their fulfilment from any who by accident or design failed in their duties. The existence of barons' houses at Newcastle has already been mentioned and in 1337 the king demanded that those who held their land by barony as of this castle and who were bound by reason of such tenure to repair and maintain certain houses and buildings within it, should cause them to be erected and repaired, as a part of it was ruined and another totally fallen down. The sheriff was ordered to compel such tenants by distrains or otherwise, to carry out the repairs. When completed, the doors of the buildings were to be locked and the keys delivered to John de Thyngden, the surveyor of the king's works in that castle; presumably he was to carry out an undisturbed inspection of the work done, and report to his master. In 1339 Hastings castle was entered by the French due to the default of "many men holding lands and

+Sussex Archaeol Collec-
tions xlix. pp. 3 & 4.

*Inquisitions ad
quod damnum vii
494.

CCR. 1337-39
p. 100.

rents of the castle by the service of making ward thereof -" It was reported that had "-for some time withdrawn these services -" and the irate king appointed a commission "-to compel by distrainments and other ways the fulfilment of all services due."* Thus, though the king was ultimately responsible for the cost of repairs at his castle, there still remained various feudal dues which were used to defray a part of the cost of repair and upkeep of certain of them.

In another respect also, that of the responsibility of the constable in the victualling of the castle, the indentures of this period varied, at least in their practical application. In most cases the king himself through his purveyors provided the victuals. The sheriff of Somerset and Dorset was commanded in March 1346 to deliver to the constable of Corfe Castle "all the victuals which the king ordered him to have purveyed -"+ In 1329 the sheriffs, of Berkshire, Surrey and Buckinghamshire are each required to deliver vast quantities of victuals by indenture to John de Insula, constable of Windsor.¶ Yet again in 1339 Hugh de Ulesby, the king's butler was ordered to deliver four tuns of new wine by indenture to John de Langeford, constable of Carisbrooke castle in the Isle of Wight.⁄ In all these cases the responsibility for actual provision seems to be that of the king and not of his constables. Sometimes however it appears that the constable himself was responsible for securing victuals and then indenting

*CPR 1338-40. +CCR. 1343-46. ¶CCR.
p. 287. p. 16.

⁄CCR. 1339-41.
p. 26.

with the king for their value. Although in 1338 there was a receiver of victuals in Dover Castle, William de Clynton, the keeper, was ordered to cause it to be provisioned with victuals with all possible speed and to certify the chancellor and treasurer concerning the deliberation taken thereupon, the nature of the victuals and their price.* The keeper of Gloucester castle was ordered in the following month to cause " wheat, wine and other victuals to the sum of £40 to be bought and purveyed, and placed in the castle for its munition, so that answer for these victuals shall be made to the king."† A more detailed account of the system involved is provided in an order to the constable of Bristol in 1338 also " - to purvey 100 quarters of wheat and 20 quarters of salt for victualling the castle in view of dangers now imminent. He is to make indentures to those from whom the victuals are taken, containing the price and description of such victuals, and forward to the Exchequer without delay the part of the indenture retained by him, and the king will settle the debts within a month of Michaelmas."‡ In these examples the keepers are allowed a little freer hand, though the Exchequer is still charged with the cost.

*CCR.1337-39.
p.568

†CCR.1337-39.
p.571

‡CPR.1338-40.
p.118

Another official connected with the commissariat arrangements in some of the royal castles was the receiver and keeper of the king's victuals. He was usually of the status of a king's clerk and often was associated with the wardrobe and the household. In 1333 William de Stansale, king's clerk, was appointed to survey the victuals " in the king's castles and manors towards the north, and to make purveyances of corn and other victuals against the king's arrival there."* More properly however, the receiver of the victuals in a specific castle was appointed to receive by indenture the victuals collected by the purveyors, to store them, and finally to make disbursements of quantities of them when required to do so. There are instances during the period of provender being given to individuals in lieu of payment of wages, especially in order to account for extra service not stipulated in the original indenture between them and the king. Thus in 1327 Anthony de Lucy was granted victuals to the value of £200 from Carlisle castle, in part payment of wages due to him.+ A mandate to this effect was sent to Robert de Cheshenhale, the keeper of the victuals at Carlisle. The constable of Bamburgh received 20 quarters of wheat and 2 tuns of wine from Berwick in 1333 in part payment of his expenses in following the king in the Scottish campaign. |

*CPR.1330-34.
p.420

+CPR.1327-30.
p.164

|CCR.1327-30.

The receiver usually received his supplies through the sheriff as purveyor, as in the case of the sheriff of Berkshire who in 1329 was ordered to cause 150 qrs. of wheat, 150 qrs. of malt, 150 qrs. of oats, 15 oxen, 50 swine and 67 sheep to be bought and purveyed and to cause them to be carried to Windsor castle, there to be delivered by indenture to John de Insula, the constable, for the munition of the castle.* In addition to these official purveyors, merchants also furnished the receivers with provisions, testifying the conditions of sale. Such measures of checking the transactions were particularly necessary wherever the buyer (be he sheriff, purveyor or the receiver himself) was unable to make payment on the spot. In these cases satisfaction at the Exchequer was promised. The seller presented there his half of the indenture, and if funds were available, he was paid. Often however he was compelled to wait a considerable time before his claims were met, and merchants showed increasing reluctance to part with goods in return for a mere indenture which might entail a journey from their own district up to the Exchequer at Westminster before they obtained satisfaction. This is clearly shown by an entry in the Patent Rolls for January 1339 whereby the king, having appointed John de Soles, the receiver of victuals at Dover castle, to purvey

* CCR.1327-30

16 tuns of wine "at Sandwich or elsewhere in the county of Kent, and the said John going to Sandwich would have executed his commission, Peter Barde and others of the town having wines for sale in no wise permitted him to have sight of these or to take any for the king's use, in contempt of the king and to the great danger of the castle -."*

The constable himself therefore, the Earl of Huntingdon, was appointed "to take the said wine or more if necessary at Sandwich, of the wines of the said Peter or others having a greater supply, by indenture between these and those whom he shall depute to take the same, and to appoint a day for the delivery of these at the Exchequer, where the king will have prompt payment made." In August of the following year, the treasurer and barons are actually ordered to settle the account, so that Peter and his fellows had had to wait more than eighteen months for the "prompt payment."⁺

On examining the various mandates in more detail, a considerable diversity of commodities is discernible. The staple requirements seem to have been wheat and wine. These are often mentioned specifically as being most necessary, along with "other victuals." They seem to have been regarded as the basis on which all other stocks of food were built. Thus 4 tuns of wine and 24 qrs. of wheat were

*CPR.1338-40.p.174.

⁺CCR.1337-39.p.522.

ordered for Rochester in 1336 "because the king has learned that there are several defects in that castle and that there are no victuals therein."* Huge quantities of wheat and wine were ordered for the Tower in 1338. No less than 700 quarters of wheat and 50 tuns of wine were to be purveyed and brought to the Tower for its munition during the absence of the king in France.⁺ Porchester is again mentioned in the same year as being in need of 400 quarters of wheat and 5 tuns of wine.[‡] In the case of wine the delivery is often made directly from the king's butler to the keeper or receiver of the victuals instead of being purveyed. This is true in 1338 when Michael Mynot, the king's butler is ordered to deliver 8 tuns of wine in his custody to the constable of Bristol castle.[⁄] Provision is made for a substitute for Michael in the port of Bristol, but the responsibility clearly devolves on him. A similar command is issued to Hugh de Ulseby for 4 tuns of new wine in 1339 for the munition of Carisbrooke.[‡] The treasurer of Ireland was to have 200 qrs. of wheat and 20 tuns of wine bought and purveyed in that land in 1344 for delivery to Carlisle.^{**} It is clear however that even though mention of them is not always made specifically, many more commodities were used where space was

* CCR.1333-37. p.591. + CCR.1337-39. p.445. ‡ Ibid. p.446. ⁄ Ibid. ‡ CCR.1339-41. p.26.

** CCR.1343-46. p.413.

available for storing, and the strength of the garrison warranted the extra expenditure. Even in the fourteenth century Windsor held a favoured place among the royal castles, and the list of purveyances in 1329 is formidable. The sheriff of Berkshire was to provide 150 qrs. of wheat, 150 qrs. of malt, 150 qrs. of oats, 15 oxen, 50 swine and 67 sheep. The sheriff of Surrey is called upon for 20 qrs. of salt, 10 oxen, 2,000 stockfish and 30 tuns of wine. The sheriff of Buckinghamshire had to find 150 qrs. of wheat, 150 qrs. of malt, 150 qrs. of oats, 15 oxen, 50 swine, 67 sheep and 20,000 bundles of firewood.* As well as the wheat and wine for the Tower in 1338, 100 qrs. of beans, 100 qrs. of peas, 20 tuns of great and small salt and 200 qrs. of sea coal were ordered.⁺ Four hundred qrs. of malt are mentioned for Porchester in the same year,[‡] and 30 tuns of cider for the munition of the "king's castle in Jereseye" in 1340.[†] The castle of Carisbrooke in the Isle of Wight was especially important in the defences against France. The purveyances of food for 1344 comprise 30 qrs. of good wheat, 40 qrs. of oats, 20 qrs. of beans and peas, 30 bacon hogs, 10 live oxen, 200 salted fishes of conger, 200 cod, 30 qrs. of gross salt, 30 qrs. of sea coal (usually from Newcastle)[‡] 30 wagons of hay, 40

*CCR. 1327-30. p.354. †CCR.1337-39. p.445. ‡CCR. 1339-41. p.358.

‡CCR. 1341-43. p.420.

loads of litter, a roundlet of sour wine and a roundlet of honey.* This very considerable quantity of stores would no doubt be intended to last for several months. Whenever possible, the practice was to victual castles with lesser quantities at more frequent intervals. Receivers and constables were averse to storing perishable goods for any longer than was necessary. Where victuals had to be supplied in great bulk, elaborate measures were taken to preserve them.+ Nevertheless stores did on occasions become unserviceable and had to be disposed of. The receiver of the victuals at Dover was ordered to cause 10 tuns of wine "which are so weak that they cannot be kept longer" to be sold without delay.† In the following year 12 tuns of wine in the same castle "are almost putrid" and are to be sold with all possible speed.‡ The receiver of the victuals was clearly an official of considerable importance, whose shortcomings, if inefficient, might result in a considerable loss to the exchequer, and perhaps for this reason he was often appointed "during pleasure" or "during good behaviour."

*CCR.1343-46.+ The medieval custom of salting was most carefully applied, whilst the wheat ground into flour, was packed into thick barrels with salt and tree twigs on top so that it "would keep a year or so, or if necessary two." Chapter by A.E.Prince in "The English Govt.at Work." note p.366.

†CCR.1339-41.
p.161.

‡CCR. ibid.
p.561.

In addition to the officials already mentioned, and of course the soldiers who were maintained in the royal castles, there were several other individuals of varying degrees of importance to be found in most castles. The establishment varied according to the size of the castle and its function. For example, provision was made in some of the royal castles for the retention of malefactors awaiting trial by the justices, Thus a gaoler became necessary, as at York, where in 1339 John de Tesdale was given custody of the king's gaol to hold during good behaviour, in recompense for good service in Scotland and beyond the seas.* He was to receive "the same as others have had in the office." In every castle there was a gate-keeper who like the gaoler was often appointed in return for good campaign service. The usual wages were 2d. per day with an additional sum every year for a robe† In 1339 however, the keeper of the gate of Carlisle castle was to receive 4d. per day from the sheriff, though no mention is made of a yearly lump sum.‡ The position was obviously regarded as being of some importance, as the yeoman appointed was expressly permitted to employ a deputy, he himself being attendant upon other business. At York also the cost of the

* CPR. 1338-40.
p. 344.

† passim. ‡ CPR. 1338-40.
p. 443.

custody of the gate of the castle was charged to the sheriff's account, and the sheriff apparently held also the privilege of appointing the custodian.* Where a watchman was employed he received the usual 2d. per day, and was responsible for maintaining a general surveillance of the body of the castle, and acting as assistant to the gate-keeper. Once more the post seems to have been given to old soldiers with considerable campaign service. Thomas Trusselove, watchman of Winchester castle was to be paid 1d. per day for life,* from the account of the sheriff of Southampton.† Another office which approximated to the foregoing was that of porter which also carried daily wages of 2d. sterling. Indication of the considerable standing which any of these offices conferred, is shown by the fact that although Thomas Foune of Knareburgh who was appointed porter of Knaresburgh castle in 1332 had served not only under Edward III but also under his father and grandfather, Thomas was still required to provide a security for himself to the constable before being admitted to the office.‡ At Newcastle the porter, an ex-"king's messenger" also had custody of the prison there.‡

*CPR.1330-34. This reduced amount was probably due to the length of time for which it was granted.
 p.392. †CCR.1343-46. CPR.1330-34. p.33. p.344.
 ‡CPR.1334-38. p.544.

Both porter and watchman were often combatants and were reckoned as part of the castle garrison in which they would be counted as serjeants or light armed troops. Many castles included chapels within their precincts, and then there was a chaplain included in the establishment, whose induction was sometimes one of subsidiary duties of the constable. Often too there was a clerk of the works who lived permanently in the castle. As Dr. Lapsley has pointed out* the proper function of the 'capellanus' was the supervision of work done on the fabric of a castle, and the keeping of an account of all expenditure in connection with it. This account was rendered at the exchequer, and the clerk was reimbursed for his outlay. John de Lenne clerk of the king's works at Berwick was paid £20 in 1337 for divers works there.+ Sometimes this official acted in conjunction with the constable. Both Walter de Weston the surveyor, and the constable of the Tower were responsible for the outlay of 100 marks paid to them in 1341 "for repairing the king's engines there."¶ The wages of the clerk of the works at Newcastle in 1337 were 3s. daily/ - quite a considerable sum. Dr. Lapsley

*Some Castle Officers of the 12th. Century. EHR XXXI.11.
 +CCR.1337-39. p.223.
 ¶CCR.1341-43. p.294.

/CPR.1334-38.
 p.322.

points out that though the fees varied, the rate at Worcester in the 12th. century was 30s.5d. per annum, which approximated to the normal amount. A considerable increase is thus shown by the 14th century, though the importance of Newcastle as a Border fortress would no doubt transcend that of Worcester.* Ralph de la More at Windsor received only 2d. daily in 1341+ possibly because that castle was nearer the centre of administration and even in the 14th century was beginning to assume the role of a royal residence rather than a fortress, and the responsibilities of the surveyor would again not be so great as those of his colleague in a castle of great strategic importance. Other officials at Windsor seem to have been paid the usual rate of 4d. daily for the janitor (cf. Carlisle. supra.) and 2d. for the watchman.

Some mention must be made here of the Tower of London which was in a special category. During the reign of Edward III it was the central depot for arms and munitions of war under the supervision of the clerk of the Privy Wardrobe. † Large engines of war were both

*Peter de Pulford, overlooker and clerk of the works at Porchester in 1341 received 17gns. per annum or 12d. a day. Hartshorne 'Porchester Castle in Proceedings of Archaeological Inst. 1846.

†CCR. 1341-43. p. 312.

‡Chapter by A.E. Prince in "The English Govt. at Work." Medieval Academy of America. p. 366.

made and kept there, to be dispatched wherever necessary at the king's behest.* To this end there were employed in the Tower a host of smiths, carpenters and masons not usually found on the establishment of other castles. Mr. Hunter has shown⁺ that as early as 1347 bills were paid for the manufacture, probably two or three years earlier, of "pulvis pro ingenis"; and in 1346 "ad opus ipsius Regis pro gunnis suis" 9cwts. 12lbs. of saltpetre and 886 lbs. of quick sulphur were had; so that gunpowder was then no doubt manufactured in the Tower. The king's jewels and armour were also there. In 1340 certain jewels are described as "En la Blaunche Tour deinz la Tour de Londres" and four years later there are mentioned "Claves interioris camerae juxta aulam nigram in Turre Lond^a ubi jocalia Regis privata reponuntur."[‡] John de Flete was responsible in 1337 for the safekeeping of "the king's jewels, armour and other things in the Tower of London."[§] - he was to have 12d. a day for wages.

Such was the personnel of the royal castles of Edward III, and such the system by which they were garrisoned and maintained. Although varying in particulars, the overall procedure was to obtain men by indenture for a specific period and to perform specific duties. It remains

*CCR.1339-41. p.179. †Archaeologia. XXXII.p.380. ‡Kal. of the Exchequer. iii.pp.197.208.

§CPR.1334-38. p.82.

to be seen how effective this system proved in the face of the constant threats from beyond the borders of the realm, and especially from Scotland. At least the narrow seas of the English Channel provided a bulwark against French aspirations, but for the defence against her northern neighbour England was entirely dependent upon the strength of her border fortresses and the fortitude of the garrisons which kept them.

CHAPTER 2.

The Royal Castles and the Scottish Wars.

To the Scots, who in 1327 were on the eve of obtaining the independence for which they had fought for so many years, the deposition of Edward 11 was a heavy blow. During his dispute with Queen Isabella, he had written to Bruce, freely giving up not only the land and realm of Scotland, to be held independently of any king of England, but also a great part of the northern lands of England, including Cumberland, upon the sole condition that the Scots should assist him against his queen, her son and their French confederates. Fortunately for England, the barons became aware of his intention and frustrated his design. Nevertheless, though his peace was proclaimed on the 24th January, 1327, and he was crowned with due solemnity on the 1st. February, Edward 111 was king only in name - he was but fourteen years old - and real power, such as it was, lay with Mortimer and the unspeakable Isabella who mismanaged the affairs of the nation just as effectively as the man whom they had deposed. It is not surprising therefore that the existing truce was not sufficient to make the Scots resist the temptation of what they considered a favourable opportunity for obtaining their desires. In June 1327 they began by invading England

in three columns. Once more the beacons flared along the Border, to signal the approach of the dreaded enemy, as they penetrated through the wild frontier of Cumberland and Northumberland, and came down upon Weardale.

There were in fact three routes by which the Scots commonly made their frequent invasions of the Marcher counties. They were obviously decided by the various topographical features of the Border, and the defences, natural and otherwise, which had to be encountered. The first route involved crossing the Tweed near Berwick and advancing down the east coast where eventually the Tyne became a serious obstacle. A second route lay by the Roman road called Watling Street, down the north Tyne to Hexham and across the county of Durham. On this route the Tyne, Wear and Tees were considerable impediments, especially if they should be in flood. A third route was open, via Carlisle and the valley of the South Tyne. (See appendix 2.) The fact that these routes well-nigh assumed the proportions of high-roads during the early years of the fourteenth century becomes obvious if it be remembered that scarcely a single year passed from 1315 to 1323 without a Scottish raid. It was not always that these invasions had, as in 1327, some political objective; many of them owed their origin to the love of adventure and of plunder, on the part of a bold, hardy and warlike

race. On many occasions they took the form of punitive expeditions, when, travelling light and fast, the Scots would advance and lay waste all villages and homesteads which they encountered, then, on meeting stubborn and valid resistance, retire as quickly as they had come. To this type of warfare the Scottish soldier of the fourteenth century was admirably suited. Jean de Bel, who accompanied the English force sent against the Scots in 1327 has provided a detailed account of his antagonists' habits and equipment. They did not use carts or waggons "for the diversity of the mountains they must pass through in the county of Northumberland" - and are reported as commonly travelling twenty four miles in as many hours. Their commissariat arrangements must have been much simplified by the fact that "they take with them no purveyance of bread or wine; for their usage and soberness is such that they will pass in the journey a great long time with flesh half sodden, without bread, and a drink of river water without wine.- they seethe beasts in their own skins. They are ever sure to find plenty of beasts in the country that they will pass through." This last comment was not always entirely true, as the Border lands became more and more impoverished by the frequent incursions, so that the king himself and the whole English force with him were in 1327 in dire straits for provisions. Further-

more, steps were taken to ensure that as far as practically possible unprotected stock and moveable possessions were withdrawn from the danger of molestation. In 1333 the sheriffs of Northumberland, Cumberland and Westmorland were ordered to proclaim that all men of those counties who wished to withdraw for their safety from them with their goods, chattels and animals, should come to the South where they would be allowed to settle down and pasture their animals "by the king's pastures and wastes and those of others - without giving anything therefor to anyone."* To return however, to the Scots, we are told that they carried with them "a broad plate of metal" each one on his horse, on which they made oatmeal cakes "to comfort withal their stomachs." In view of all this, the chronicler remarks that "it is no great marvel that they make greater journeys than other people do."† Nor is it remarkable that during the later years of Edward 11 such fierce and determined men caused great ravage and destruction in the northern Marches. A brief exposition of their incursions will serve to indicate the seriousness of the threat from England's northern neighbour.

In 1314 the eastern border had been devastated by fire, and the towns of Brough, Appleby, Penrith and

*CCR.1333-37.
p.101.

†John de Bel. Ch.10.
Froissart.Ch.17.

Kirkoswald burnt. In the following year the city of Carlisle was invested for eleven days by King Robert who with his forces trampled down all the crops, wasted the suburbs, and drove in from Allendale, Coupland and Westmorland a great number of cattle to provision his army. The failure of the siege of Carlisle redounds to the credit of Sir Andrew de Harcla and the townsmen of Carlisle.* On the 24th. June 1316, the Scots came again via Richmond, and turning westward laid waste everything "as far as Furness, whither they had not come before."† About the 1st. November 1319 the raiders crossed the border once more and destroying all the barns filled with the year's hay, they marched through the barony of Gilsland to Brough-under-Stainmore, from whence they continued through Kirby Stephen, Orton and Shap, and so up again into Cumberland, Causing as much wanton destruction as they could. On the 17th. June 1322, King Robert broke into Cumberland with a large division, burned the Bishop's palace at Rose, and thence plundered the abbey of Holm Cultram. From there he proceeded to waste and plunder Copeland, and so on towards the abbey of Furness, where the Abbot met him and paid ransom not to be pillaged again. After ravaging round Cartmel Priory the Scots crossed Morecombe sands and burned ancient Lancaster to the ground."so

*Chron. Lanercost. †ibid.

that the cattle alone survived the fury."* For eighteen days they remained, destroying the villages of Hornby, Salmesbury and other places.+ Collecting on their way prisoners and cattle, and piling their wagons with valuables, they returned to Carlisle and lay before the city for five days, trampling and destroying as much of the crops as they could, and finally re-entered Scotland on the 24th. July.

Such a summary provides very monotonous reading, but nothing can give any adequate notion of the utterly defenceless condition into which the northern counties had been allowed to fall. It is not remarkable that one account of Northumberland at this period runs "Scarce a soul dared to live here, unless it was near to some castle or walled town."} - or that a petition was sent to Edward 11, telling how the sufferings of the people were so dreadful that they had nothing but their naked bodies to give to his service. / Domestic buildings at this period were entirely of wood, so that it was no very difficult matter to destroy a town, and the timber houses of knights and squire's were constantly burnt to the ground. The tenant farmers, likewise, were rendered desperate by the loss of their cattle, the trampling of their crops and the destruction of their farmsteads, whilst those of lesser standing died in great numbers from sheer famine and pestilence.

*ibid. +CCR.17.
Edw. 11
m.16.

{Harrison.Hist.
of Northumber-
land & Durham.
p.19.

/ Cal.Doc.Scot.
iii. 48.

Throughout it all, one point made itself manifestly felt, and that was that the flaming brand was the chief weapon used against them. Apart from the occasions when they were engaged in the then comparatively rare full-scale campaign, the enemy preferred to speed forward, setting light to gathered hay, ripened corn or thatched dwelling, rather than draw up his forces in regular array. It became increasingly obvious that the best solution to such a problem lay in the fire-resisting capabilities of stone walls. The vast number of licences to crenellate issued throughout the reign of Edward III in respect of the northern counties, indicate that the Border dwellers were not slow to realise this fact. Nevertheless, despite the notherners' evident eagerness to defend themselves and their possessions, the ultimate responsibility for the defence of the North in its broader aspects clearly lay with the king himself, and his lieutenants, the Lords Warden.

Though Edward III, by reason of his age, was deemed at his accession incapable of supervising the administration of the realm, no such restraint was placed upon his activities in the field of battle. Indeed, though a boy, he was already showing the predilection for warfare which was to make his reign remembered for the brilliant victories of Crecy and

Poitiers. Thus he could hardly fail to appreciate the perpetual danger from Scotland, and it was natural that his particular concern in combating this threat should have been for the border fortresses. The opinion has been expressed that in the whole of the military history of the period from the coming of the Normans to the battle of Crecy, the most striking features are the importance of fortified places, and the ascendancy assumed by the defensive.* Certainly it is true that a single well-placed stronghold could often serve as the key to an entire district. On the Scottish border, where the mountainous nature of the country denied to the invader many otherwise suitable routes, it was doubly true. It has already been seen (App.2.) that there were three main ways by which the Scots were accustomed to enter England. The most general route, that by the Tweed and the lowlands in the east of Northumberland, was protected in the extreme north by the castles of Berwick, Norham and Wark-on-Tweed. The

*Oman. Art of War.

On the other hand the initiative at least seems to lie with the attackers. Nevertheless though mere passive strength was of little avail against a persistent and well conducted siege, it must be borne in mind that the purposes of walled defence were varied and manifold. The protection of lines of communication, provision of time for mobilisation and disposition, as well as the checking of the enemy's advance were all encompassed by the role of the medieval castle.

ownership of Berwick was constantly changing. Through the carelessness of the mayor, bailiffs, and community of the town, both town and castle had been lost to the Scots by treachery in 1318. Edward 11 had made a determined effort to recover Berwick in 1319, but his attempt achieved no success, and indeed that castle continued to be occupied by the Scots until after the battle of Halidon Hill in May 1333 when it was ceded to Edward 111 by Edward Baliol. Thus, before that date, Berwick was the springboard for Scottish advance rather than the vanguard of English defence. The castle of Wark was perpetually being borrowed by the Crown until 1333 when it was granted to Sir William Montagu.* Norham, with its surrounding shire formed a detached portion of the county palatine of Durham. The whole was a great franchise or immunity over which the Bishops of Durham as lords palatine ruled with almost royal powers. The castle of Norham belonged therefore to the Bishops of Durham, but standing on the Marches towards Scotland, and guarding one of the principal fords of the Tweed, it was a very important fortress, and in times of national danger was often taken into the king's hands.+ It was always stipulated that this was done without prejudice to the Bishop, and that immediately after danger, the castle

*Cal.Doc.Scot
iii. 192.

+Arch. Aeliana.

will all its rights and privileges should be returned. Further south, the way was blocked by the strongholds of Bamburgh, Alnwick and Warkworth, of which the first was one of the greatest royal castles in the area. Its permanent garrison in 1319 consisted of 15 men at arms and 30 foot soldiers, in addition to which the king was to provide 15 men at arms over and above the indenture.* The deplorable condition however, into which it had been allowed to fall will shortly be seen. The king maintained some measure of control over Warkworth by furnishing a portion of its garrison. In 1319 for example, the castle had its own garrison of 12 men at arms, and the king agreed to place in it at his own cost 4 men at arms and 8 hobelers or light horsemen.+ Although Edward III transferred his interest in Warkworth to Percy of Alnwick in 1328,† the close connection of the Percy family and the defence of the north ensured that the castle continued to be used more or less as a royal fortress. Before any really considerable penetration into England could be said to have been achieved, the great fortress of Newcastle had to be dealt with. This stronghold, royal since its

* Exch. QR. Misc.
Army $\frac{37}{8}$ P.R.O.

+ Bates; op.cit.
p 136.

† CPR. 1327-30.
p 243.

foundation, was always, unless it happened to be in the hands of the Scots themselves, a formidable obstacle to invasion. Further East lay Tynemouth - a combination of priory and castle - where the Prior maintained his own armed force just as the Bishop of Durham did. The garrison consisted in the first half of the Fourteenth Century of 80 men.* As the coastal plain was the most obvious route for invasion, it was also the best defended. Across the Tyne the invaders had to reckon with the castles of Durham and Bishop Auckland, which although administered by the Bishops of Durham were in the last resort in the nature of royal fortresses.

It was by the East Coast route that the Scots first invaded England about the middle of June 1327, laying waste all before them. As Berwick was then in their hands, it was to be supposed that having crossed the Tweed the first apparent danger to their army might be expected from Bamburgh and its garrison. The young Edward had not been slow to appreciate the importance of this fortress, and one of his first acts on accession was to appoint Robert de Horncliff constable of Bamburgh, with a commission to survey the whole castle and report on its condition.† In such a deplorable plight did he find it that all his efforts at munitioning and repair were insufficient to

*Northumberland County
History. p 150. vol.8.

†Bates: op.cit.

render it of any value in halting the Scottish advance. The task of restoring the castle to a satisfactory degree of efficiency extended over several years, and provides a valuable guide to the state into which at least one border castle had been allowed to fall during the reign of Edward 11. Horncliff found that the lead with which the Great Tower was covered was so old and decayed that the rain had caused the main beams to rot, and the Tower was threatened with ruin; the roof of a tower called "Davytoure" which had been covered with stone, had been carried right off by a tempest; the "Belletoure" had suffered in the same way and its timbers were rotten; several other integral parts of the castle were in equal decay, the result of the fact that former constables could not make any allowance for repairs in the accounts they returned to the Exchequer. Nor were the stores contained in this tumble-down castle of anything but the most poverty-stricken nature. Horncliff's inventory from Michaelmas 1328 to Michaelmas 1329 comprised four casks of wine that had turned bad; a pipe of Greek wine no better; one jar full of honey and another with some honey in it; seven targets, broken and not repaired; one aketon (coat of plate) of no value; five bassinets of no value; seven ballistae with screws, "one of them made of whalebone, provided with a case of new work";

a dozen ballistae of one foot; four bucketfuls of bolts for ballistae; one bow and five sheaves of arrows, and seven baskets for bows. The account goes on to designate almost every article, whether useful or not, which Horncliff found on taking over the responsibility of maintaining the fortress. Coppers, jars, tubs, tables, torches and tapers are all noted, and of particular interest in view of the position of the castle, are two sail yards and four ships' cables. Of this totally inadequate stock, four screw ballistae, four one foot ballistae, a bucketful of bolts, the bow and five sheaves of arrows were expended in defending the castle from the assaults of the Scots during the months of October, November and December 1328.*

In view of the deplorable state of this important fortress, it is not surprising that the Scots were able to advance to within three or four miles of Newcastle itself, the garrison of which remained inactive, though it included one thousand men-at-arms. The English historians attributed this inactivity to "the unskilfulness of the English leaders in war."† Before the middle of the following month however, that is in July 1327, an even more formidable band entered England by way of Carlisle. This army consisted of 24,000 horse, and they marked their way with the usual devastations, penetrating through Cumberland

*Comptus of Roger de Horncliff. Ministers' Accounts. Bamburgh.

†Leland; Collect. i.

into the south-western parts of Northumberland. Crossing the South Tyne by a ford near Haydon Bridge they progressed into the western parts of the Palatinate. The abortive attempt of the young king to bring them to battle at Stanhope Park is well known. It is a sad commentary on the state of the northern defences that within easy distance of Newcastle, the easternmost key to England, which should have been a firm and well-founded headquarters, adequately victualled and prepared for any eventuality, the English troops were almost reduced to starvation for want of supplies, though they scoured all the country round. Despite Leland's description of this force as "the fairest host of Englishmen that ever was seen -"* the Scots were able to return safely to their own country by a round-about way. The only measure of satisfaction remaining to the English was that although during this hasty retreat the Scots laid siege to several Northumbrian castles, all were able to resist successfully. The constable of Norham, Robert de Maners, by a successful sortie discomfited the guard which the enemy under Robert Bruce himself had set before the gates, and three Scottish knights were slain.+ Murray and Douglas meanwhile appeared before the castle of Alnwick, where they jousted and held tournaments, presumably as a mark of contempt for the English garrison.

* Leland. op.cit.
p 475.

+Bates; History of Northumberland
p. 167 et seq.

Henry Percy however maintained so resolute a defence for a fortnight or more, that the Scots left for Warkworth. Foiled here again they returned to Bruce at Norham. It is perhaps significant that none of these castles which resisted successfully was administered directly by the Crown. Had they been so, and taking Bamburgh as an example, the story might have been rather different.

The desultory nature of these campaigns, and the ultimate failure of the English to deal effectively with Bruce and his adherents, led inevitably to the Treaty of Northampton in April 1328, whereby the king of England renounced all claim to sovereignty over Scotland, the boundaries of which were to be restored as they had existed in the reign of Alexander III.

Such a peace, regarded by many Englishmen as disgraceful, and connected by them with the detested supremacy of the inept Mortimer, was predestined to failure. It proved impossible to carry out all the provisions of the treaty, and consequently in July 1332, Henry Beaumont and others fitted out a private expedition which, invading Scotland by sea, proved so unexpectedly successful as to place Edward Baliol on the throne. The king of England at first opposed the enterprise, though he took no effective steps to prevent it. The wonderful success of that expedition however, led him by degrees to the avowal and open prosecution of measures with which

he had not wished to be initially associated. Mutual incursions began again about this time. The Close and Patent Rolls for March 1333 provide abundant evidence that Edward was preparing to take positive action against Scotland. Sheriffs, mayors and bailiffs are required to array men, purvey supplies and provide all the paraphernalia of war for an expedition "as the king has learned that the Scots are preparing to invade his kingdom and he wishes to provide for the defence of his people." William de Stransale, a king's clerk, was appointed to survey the victuals in the king's castles and manors "towards the north" and to make purveyances of corn and other victuals against the king's arrival there.* We have seen that arrangements were made for the withdrawal of men and animals from the threatened areas. The sheriff of Cumberland was ordered to cause repairs to be done to the houses, walls, turrets and bridges in Carlisle castle by the view and testimony of William de Stransale, to the sum of £20 " - as the king understands that the said houses etc. are so ruinous and broken that he may easily suffer harm unless they are speedily repaired."† Finally, the Archbishops and Bishops of his realm were requested to pray and offer Masses for the king and his lieges in their expedition against the Scots, and to exhort the clergy and people,

* CPR.1330-34. p 420.

†CCR.1333-37. p 23.

abbots, priors and other men of religion of their dioceses to pray for the success of the king's enterprise.*

By this time the Scots, more than three thousand strong, and under the leadership of Lord Archibald Douglas had made an inroad into Gillesland and the estates of the Lord Dacre where they spread desolation to the extent of thirty miles.† Retaliation was soon made however by Sir Anthony Lucy who penetrated some twenty miles into Scotland, and the king himself was at Newcastle by St. George's Day. He arrived before Berwick in the second week in May, and it is a further comment on the effectiveness of stone walls at this period that even with such a formidable array as he had collected, the king failed to take the place and led part of his army into Scotland. On his return, Edward found the garrison of Berwick still holding out in the hope of relief by their fellow-countrymen who, they felt, could not regard lightly the loss of the key to the kingdom. In this hope they were not altogether deceived, for the Lord Douglas, having collected "a very numerous army"‡ led it to the neighbourhood of Berwick where they crossed the Tweed in full view of the English army. Having passed Sir William Keith with men and a supply of victuals into the town across the Tweed, Archibald Douglas proceeded to attack Bamburgh.

* CCR. *ibid.* p 107.

† Ridpath: *Border History.* p 209.

** Chron. de Melsa
(Rolls ed. i. p 369)
says 90,000 men.

Now Horncliff had set to work in 1328 and laid out £25-15-3d. on the most pressing repairs, but an enquiry held at Bamburgh in 1330 resulted in a report that it would take £300 to put the castle in order, and that the great Tower and all the other towers, the hall, the chambers, the grange and all the other houses and gates were roofless and so decayed that unless something were done very speedily the whole fortress would be nothing less than a heap of ruins.* The urgent language of this report must have led at anyrate to a partial restoration of the castle, as the Lord Douglas was quite unable to reduce the fortress, and was forced to withdraw his army to take part in the decisive battle of Halidon Hill. It is significant that the English king had chosen Bamburgh as an apparently secure retreat for Queen Philippa during this period and must therefore have had considerable faith in its ability to withstand any attack. On the day following Halidon Hill, the castle and town of Berwick were surrendered to Edward, and in gratitude for his aid Edward Baliol ceded to the king of England Berwick and all Lothian, to be annexed for ever to the southern crown. Henry Percy was appointed governor of the castle, and received a commission with the Earl of March to act as "joint wardens of the Border."†

*Inq. Ad Quod Damnum
4 Edw. 111 No. 13 P. R. O.

†Ridpath; op. cit. p 215.

The fact that Edward Baliol was the mere tool and agent of the king of England became increasingly obvious to and hated by all Scotsmen who desired a free and independent country in the tradition of Robert Bruce. Thus, by Michaelmas 1334 Edward III was once more preparing to march north to the aid of his vassal. The collectors of the tenth granted by the clergy for the expedition were urged to expedite their work " as the king is in great need of money by reason of his expenses through the magnitude of his army now crossing with him to Scotland, for the defence of the realm and of the king's other lands, which the Scots have seditiously presumed to invade. -".* Ignoring a somewhat ineffective sortie via Berwick in November 1334, Edward's main attack came in July 1335 when he invaded Scotland by way of Carlisle, and Baliol who had come by Berwick, met him at Glasgow. Both armies committed great ravages, reaching Perth on the 13th. August.⁺ Edward III returned to Berwick by way of Edinburgh where he gave orders for the re-building of the castle, the dismantled condition of which had caused its surrender on the 30th. July previous. Although Edward's star was at this time clearly in the ascendant, he was too good a soldier to allow his own defences to become untrustworthy through neglect, and although Bamburgh castle had been able to

* CCR.1353-37.p 354.

⁺ Cal.Doc.Scot. iii. xliv.

hold out against the host of Douglas two years previously, it seems that in April 1335 its condition was again far from satisfactory. Whether this was the result of neglect, or whether the repairs undertaken by Horncliff (*supra*) had not been completed, is a matter for conjecture; for on the 10th. April 1335 a mandate was issued to Walter de Creyk who had supplanted Horncliff, ordering him to expend up to £40 from the issues of the castle "in repairing the defects of the houses, walls, turrets, bridges and other erections of the castle where necessary, and amending the houses which threaten ruin, because the king has been informed that several houses in the castle have fallen down, and other houses threaten ruin, and that there are several defects in divers other houses, walls, turrets etc. of that castle, whereby the king may easily suffer damage unless they are quickly repaired."*

From this time until the departure of Edward III for France in 1338, the course of military operations on the Border, consists of a series of desultory contests in which the advantage generally lay with the English, who managed by and large to retain what they had gained. Nevertheless Edward was not neglectful of the state of his own defences. In 1336, mandates were issued for the repair and survey of both Carlisle and Newcastle.

*
CCR.1333-37. p 386.

A survey of Carlisle was carried out in January* and as a result the constable was ordered in March to carry out repairs to "the houses, walls, turrets and other buildings of that castle - spending thereupon the sum of 40 marks." † This sum was increased in the August by another 20 marks‡ and by a further £10-19-0d. in November.¼ John de Thyngden was ordered in the February to repair at the king's charges the castle of Newcastle upon Tyne "where some of the buildings, bridges and turrets are in a ruinous state." ≠ The sheriff of Northumberland was to see that all those responsible for the upkeep of houses in the castle (see above p 15.) did not neglect their duties‡ and presumably at the request of John de Thyngden the sheriff of Nottinghamshire was commanded to cause twelve wagon loads of lead to be brought and carried with all speed to Kyngeston upon Hull for transmission to Newcastle "for works in the king's castle there."‡ It would appear however that the state of affairs at Newcastle was still not satisfactory either in a military sense or in respect of general decency and good order, for in July 1336 an order was sent

* CPR.1334-38. p 219. † CCR.1333-37. p 555. ‡ Ibid.p 610. ¼ Ibid.p 621.

≠ CPR.1334-38. p 223. ‡ CCR.1333-37. p 602. ¼ Ibid.

to the mayor and bailiffs "to cause all dung, offal and other refuse made before the gate of the castle there, and in the ditches and upon the mote, to be taken away with all speed, and to cause proclamation to be made in that town that no-one shall make paths upon the mote, or in the ditches, or use them, or permit pigs or other beasts to go there: and that no dung or other refuse shall rest upon the mote, or in the ditches, or before the door of the castle upon a penalty which befits, because the king has been informed that the men of that town throw dung, offal and other refuse before the door of the castle and into the ditches and upon the mote; and that there are many bad smells there by pigs and other beasts, and that certain of these men have made paths upon the mote for no small time, as if it were a high-road, and they use them hitherto to the king's prejudice and that of his ministers dwelling within the castle, and to the infection of the air there."*

The good people of Newcastle, it would seem, were no great respecters of either persons or property, though the importance of the place was not lost upon the king, who in the following April ordered the mayor and bailiffs to expend up to £40 in repairing and constructing

* Ibid. p 697.

with all possible speed the Westgate " and the drawbridge there, which gate is in the weakest place of the enclosure of the said town, and is in great part destroyed and broken."*

It has been remarked[†] that it was fortunate for the Scots that Edward III, becoming so much occupied with the continental war, relaxed his military operations against Scotland. The result of this relaxation is seen by the recapture by the Scots of several of the more important fortresses which Edward had taken from them. Perth was surrendered by Sir Thomas Ughtred on the 17th. August 1339. The English Council, in Edward's absence, seem to have neglected this important place, for Ughtred had repeatedly complained of shortage of supplies,[‡] and before he capitulated from famine had made a stout defence. Sir Thomas Rokeby was forced to surrender Edinburgh to the Scots on the 16th. April 1341 and Stirling on the 10th. April 1342 "from defect of victual."[§] Roxburgh had been lost to the English on the 30th. March in the same year, and no reason is given in the constable's computus for the fall.[¶] Such a course of events was probably foreshadowed by the apparent lack of attention paid to the northern fortresses by the Council during the absence of the king in France. In the Summer of 1337 Edward was

* CCR.1337-39.
p 39.

† Fordun: Gesta Annalia.

¹/₂ Cal.Doc.Scot.
111. p 238.

§ Ibid. p 252. ¶ Ibid.

himself in the north of England, aware perhaps of the likely results of his impending absence on the Continent, and endeavouring to secure the Border as far as lay in his power. Twice, during the course of this year, he appointed assemblies of the northern barons to be held at York, and once at Newcastle to receive information regarding the resolutions of his Council and his own intentions with respect to the present state of the country. Commissioners were appointed to treat and agree with the chief men of the country, men-at-arms and others, about marching in his service towards Scotland and the Border, about their continuance in that service, and the wages to be paid them while engaged in it; as also concerning the safe keeping of the king's towns and places in those parts, and erecting fortifications for their security.* More immediately he ordered the constable of Carlisle to expend 50 marks in repairing the houses, walls, turrets and other buildings⁺ and forbade his arrayers to levy men from its garrison for service in Scotland.† This latter edict was presumably a timely comment on the strategic importance of the castle, its safe-keeping transcending even the necessity for obtaining men for service in the field. In December of the same year, the king ordered divers sums of money to be paid to individuals

* Rymer: Foedera
Vol. 1V. pp. 762.
772 and 817.

⁺CCR. 1337-39.
p. 5.

† Ibid. p 75.

for the restoration of the castle and town of Berwick, still suffering from the siege to which it had been subjected by the king himself five years previously. Altogether, nearly £119 were to be expended on works there, and Thomas de Burgh was to cause all his engines there to be repaired according to the ordinance of John Crabbe the chief carpenter. *We are reminded that not only the Scots, but also the elements contrived to bring about the fall of these fortresses of the Fourteenth Century, for shortly before his departure for France in 1338, Edward was forced to allow the keeper of Carlisle £40 to repair damage caused by "a sudden tempest of wind on the feast of St. Matthew last (21st. Sept. 1337) in which several ramparts, houses, towers and other buildings were thrown down." The entry in the Close Roll authorising the expenditure is dated the 12th. March 1338. This comparatively prompt action on the part of the medieval administration illustrates the solicitude which the king felt for his northern strongholds and forms a contrast with the lax procedure of his father † and the deterioration which was allowed to follow his departure, with regard at anyrate to the newly won Scottish castles. During his absence in France, from the Summer of 1338

* Ibid. p. 223.

† In 1322, only five years before his deposition, and after a lapse of several years, Edward 11 sent word to all the royal castles to see that their garrisons, arms and provisions were being properly maintained.

until the Spring of 1340, only one instance of castle maintenance is recorded in either Close or Patent Rolls, and this is at Newcastle where in July 1339 John de Thyngden is enjoined to carry out "certain works" to the cost of £137-16-8d.* As a result of the ineptitude of the Council, nothing remained by the end of 1339 of Edward's conquests in Scotland except the castles of Stirling, Edinburgh, Roxburgh and some inconsiderable fortresses. Furthermore, during the early part of 1340, the Scots so far regained the initiative as to make several successful incursions as separate bodies into the northern counties of England, carrying their ravages and devastations as far as Durham.† Nor indeed was this a mere token show of force, as is testified by the complaint of the men of twenty-four parishes in Northumberland four years later, that the whole of their crops, stock, etc. were destroyed in this raid.‡

The measures taken by king Edward to stem the rising tide of Scottish recovery at his Parliament in the Spring of 1340 are of interest insofar as they are related to the castles under English rule. The Lord John Mowbray was entrusted with the government of Berwick, having engaged by indenture to remain there for a year, with a

*CCR.1339-41.
p. 160.

†Cal. Doc. Scot.
iii. p. 262.

‡Ibid.

garrison of 120 men-at-arms, 100 hobelers and 200 archers.* To Roxburgh were appointed 36 men-at-arms and 40 hobelers.† These are very considerable garrisons, especially at a time when Edward's principal object was to make provision for carrying on with vigour his war against the French king. But notwithstanding all these preparations, and despite other measures in providing men for general service against the Scots, all three principal Scottish fortresses were lost to the English, as we have seen, within the course of the following two years. The fall of Roxburgh seems to have been particularly unexpected, as only one month before its loss, William de Felton is allowed various sums of money which he has expended " for the making of walls and other edifices of the castle of Rokesburgh" and again, less than a week before his surrender William is described as " making continual stay upon the munition of Rokesburgh castle."‡ Furthermore, in his comptus, made up to the 30th. March 1342, William shows that his garrison consisted of 5 knights, 70 to 80 men-at-arms, and about 50 hobelers and archers, the numbers varying from time to time, and being considerably greater than the garrison ordered by the king in 1340.¼

* CCR.1341-43. p.499.

† Ridpath: op.cit. p.229. who wrongly gives "halberdiers" for hobelers.

‡ Ibid.p.228.

¼ CCR.1341-43. p.376.

As Edward became more deeply involved in the prosecution of his claim to the French crown, so the situation of the Scots improved. A numerous army, declared by Froissart to consist of sixty thousand foot and three hundred horse, entered England in 1342 by the eastern border, and laid waste once more the counties of Northumberland and Durham. Even the fortress of Newcastle itself was on this occasion besieged, but was defended with such vigour by Sir John Neville that the Scots were soon obliged to retire from it. Apparently the royal castle and the defences of the town itself were in a better state than when their condition had called down the king's censure six years previously. Thus was seen the absolute necessity for maintaining the key defences of the realm at all times, and of making good any sign of decay or misuse however small. The city and castle of Durham however were not so fortunate. King David, marching thence, captured both, and there gave full vent to his revenge against the English, sparing neither priests nor sacred edifices.* As the Scottish army was returning homewards with great plunder, it passed within sight of the castle of Wark which, it will be remembered, had been granted by Edward III in 1333 to Sir William Montagu, the Earl of Salisbury. On seeing the returning

*Ridpath: op.cit.

Scots, laden with the spoils of England, the indignation of the garrison was aroused, and part of it, consisting of forty horse with the Governor at their head, sallied suddenly forth, and attacking the rear of the Scottish army, killed two hundred of them and carried one hundred and sixty horses laden with booty into the castle. The young king David, provoked at this insult, immediately led up his army against the castle, and attempted to force it by a general assault. Being everywhere repulsed with great loss, the Scottish king prepared to fill up the ditch and to batter the walls with engines. Fortunately for Wark, a large English army was by this time approaching, and the Scots, faced with the prospect of a full scale engagement, which it had always been their policy to avoid, were reluctantly obliged to raise the siege, which they did only six hours before the English army came in sight.* As the French war continued to be the chief object of Edward's attention, he concluded a truce for two years with David Bruce in the Summer of 1342. This agreement was confirmed and prolonged in 1343 when Edward concluded a general truce with France for three years.

* Despite popular accounts of the relief of Wark by Edward himself, considerable doubt exists as to whether indeed Edward did come to raise the siege. He was at this time occupied in preparing for a major expedition into Brittany, and in August 1342 asked for public prayers to be said on this account. In the same order he stated that he himself intended to lead this expedition, and that he was sending an army to Scotland.

It was however easier to sign a truce in the fourteenth century than to prevent a headstrong and over-mighty baronage from pursuing the redress of various personal inequalities and resentments in defiance of it. In fact this agreement was kept no better than others had been. The Scots especially were not eager to turn from the sword when their fortunes seemed so patently to be in the ascendant. Edward returned from France in February 1344 and summoned all his forces to attend him at Berwick at Easter to take vengeance on the Scots for their frequent infringements of the truce. A further treaty was signed, but this did not prevent the Scots from invading again in the Autumn of 1345 when they entered Westmorland, burning Carlisle, Penrith, and several other towns in the neighbourhood. The royal castle at Carlisle was able to hold out, as a result of the frequent attention paid to it in respect of fabric, victuals and men. The Scots, as was their custom, returned to their own country on the approach of an English force. One year later, in October 1346, the fortunes of David Bruce were laid low at Neville's Cross, and a truce was drawn up which by several renewals was prolonged for eight years.

There remains one document of considerable interest relating to the repair of a royal castle at this period. Presumably as a result of the visit of the king to Berwick at Easter 1344, the constable was ordered on the 29th. April

1344, to hold an inquisition to discover what repairs and amendments were necessary in the fortifications there and what their cost would be. A very full account is given, dated the 26th. May, in which the necessary repairs and their cost are detailed. They are largely confined to the walls and towers of the castle, and " they say these defects have come, some of old time by war, some at the time of the siege by the king, some by gales and storms, rottenness of walls; and unless soon done they will get worse." Three thousand "estlande bordes" were said to be necessary to cover the houses, some nineteen thousand nails, nine hundred stones of lead, fuel for "founding it", twenty pounds of solder and eight stones of iron. Not only masons but also carpenters, plumbers and smiths were to be engaged in the work.*

Consideration of the foregoing would seem to indicate that although the Border castles, whatever their condition, were not able entirely to prevent Scottish incursions, they were nevertheless of considerable importance as factors whereby an enemy could be seriously discomfited, even though he might be in possession of the surrounding area. Furthermore, in the event of a full-scale counter operation, such as the English often contrived, they were vital as strong points round which the expedition could be organised.

* Cal.Doc.Scot.iii.p.261.

If neglected, or captured by the enemy, it often followed that the fortunes of an entire campaign were materially influenced by their annexation and use as headquarters for victualling or re-grouping an army. The royal castles on the Scottish border were the keys of the kingdom of England, and the care taken by Edward III to see that by and large they continued to be adequately victualled and repaired bears sufficient testimony to the fact that the English king was fully aware of their importance. The Scottish danger was not, however, the only one by which the realm was confronted at this period. By the prosecution of the war across the Channel Edward accepted too the possibility and even likelihood that the French king would retaliate by an invasion of England. The first line of defence in the event of such an attempt would be the castles set round the coast of this island, and those in the Channel Islands. The following chapter is devoted therefore to a consideration of the measures taken by the medieval administration to ensure that the coastal defences were maintained in such a manner that they might be capable of providing an efficient bulwark against sea-borne invasion.

CHAPTER 3.

Coast Defences and the threat from France.

In at least one respect, the opinions of the medieval military architects were well-nigh unanimous. It was a commonly accepted principal that if a castle were to be able to survive a well-directed and prolonged assault by a determined foe, it must be provided with some external defence-work upon which the ardour of the enemy could be blunted, and his energies exhausted, before the main structure were called upon to withstand the full force of his weapons. If the natural lie of the land could be utilised for this purpose, so much the better - and lofty crags were often a powerful deterrent to an otherwise invincible enemy. If no such natural defence were available, then a man-made alternative had to be provided, and this usually took the form of a moat which the enemy had to negotiate before he could even reach the walls which it was his intention to storm. Having once done this however, it was the main defence-work which had to bear the brunt of the attack, and immediately dependent upon its ability to do so rested the final decision as to whether the castle would stand or fall. The military situation of medieval England was therefore not unlike that of a huge castle, surrounded by the colossal moat of the sea; and it was upon this castle that Philip VI of France was to make an attempt. The 'moat' itself was formidable enough an obstacle,

but the possibility of its being surmounted could not be ignored, and in that contingency some other considerable barrier must be readily available to hamper the invader. In the England of Edward III this was provided by the coastal castles which guarded the shores of this island against invasion by her continental enemy.

The defences on the eastern coast of England consisted of an extremely important series of fortresses and in addition a number of walled towns, whose role in the repulse of an invader was equally effective with that of the castles, but which do not lie within the scope of this work. (Appendix 3.) The northernmost castle of the realm was at Berwick, a fortress which featured principally in the light of the Scottish Wars of Independence, but which also served to protect the town against an enemy approaching by sea. Bamburgh, on its bold headland also proved of more importance against the Scots than against sea-borne invasion, but its ability to provide an effective defence against any such attempt, if properly maintained in food and victuals, is undisputed. Dunstanburgh, the largest castle in Northumberland, and again built on a rugged headland, though not royal during the period under review, was the next in this line of coastal defences. Further inland was Warkworth, and returning to the very sea-shore itself, the priory and castle of Tynemouth - a building of great solidity and strength which was approached

by a barbican, the passageway being vaulted and furnished with a gate at each end.* The royal castle at Scarborough on its cliff-top site three hundred feet above sea-level, was entrusted by the king to the governorship of Henry Percy, the Lord Warden of the Marches. It was thus apparently regarded as being of importance in the defence of the north against the Scots, though like Bamburgh it was obviously capable of filling two roles. Continuing southwards, no important castle can be described as defending the coast until that at Orford in Suffolk is reached, though Hull, King's Lynn and Yarmouth were well defended with walls. Strictly speaking, Orford, though royal, was little more than a keep built on a mound partly natural and partly artificial, in the middle of a swamp. It commanded a view of the sea two miles distant, and its prime purpose was to serve as an outpost for observation and defence of the coast. Colchester, situated on the river Colne, and perhaps not too far from the shore to take some part in the protection of the coast, was a place of great importance and formidable strength, while the great value of the royal castle of Rochester, guarding the approach to the Thames estuary, is obvious. Perhaps most important of all in the defence of England against foreign aggression, was

*Northumberland County History. viii.150.

the fortress of Dover - at least it has been so considered for the past eight centuries. Its site is remarkable for more than one reason. The steepness of the chalk cliffs towards the sea and the abruptness of the other slopes, natural and artificial which encircle it on the land side, give a particularly difficult, indeed impregnable, character to the fortress. The height of the hill on which the castle stands close to the narrowest part of the Channel, makes it a site of unusual importance for the purpose of observing the approach of an enemy coming across the Straits of Dover. The degree of importance of this castle was doubtless realised by both the king and the Council, as it was kept consistently in order throughout the fourteenth century, and huge sums were spent on its maintenance and victualling. At Rye, a wall and gates were built by Edward III, and Winchelsea was also walled and defended by strong gates. The next royal castle was at Hastings, with Pevensey nearby, which between them defended an open frontier to the sea of some twenty-two miles. Arundel came temporarily into the possession of the Crown in 1330, when the king appointed a constable there.* Carisbrooke was of great importance in the defence of the Isle of Wight, and although no town of any importance was built at Portsmouth until the twelfth century, yet the convenience of this part of the coast

* CPR. 1327-30. p. 499.

as furnishing excellent harbourage was fully recognised, as the royal fortress of Porchester was situated at the head of Portsmouth harbour, while further west Southampton, the chief point of departure for Normandy possessed not only particularly strong defences of its own, but also a castle contained within them, which occupied nearly the whole of the north-western corner of the area within the town walls, as also the higher ground. The great castle of Corfe was placed on a conical hill rising in the centre of the only gap penetrating the range of high chalk Downs which completely cut off the southern half of the Isle of Purbeck from the rest of England. The significance of this site in the defence of England had been exploited from the earliest times, as Corfe castle is reputed to contain a portion of masonry which may possibly be of Anglo-Saxon origin,* and in support of this is the fact that it certainly stands on the site of an early Saxon stronghold. Further west, where the widening Channel ostensibly lessened the fear of French invasion, coast castles were less frequent. Perhaps the most threatened areas, in view of their close proximity to the enemy, though not strictly speaking contained within the English coast-line, were the Channel Islands. In Guernsey, Jersey, Alderney and Sark, the English king possessed several castles which it was

* Harvey; Castles and Walled Towns
of England. p.27.

his responsibility to fortify and maintain in the face of French attack; nor indeed did he neglect this duty, and much money and many men contributed towards its fulfilment, though with only a moderate degree of success.

The royal castles indicated above, are those which would appear to be most directly concerned in the imminent threat from France. The fact that other castles and fortified places more remote from the coast would be forced to take precautions against the foreign foe at a later date, was not apparent in 1327, and was a result of the success of the enemy at Portsmouth and Southampton in 1338. Certainly a considerable degree of attention was paid to the coastal castles on the administrative level, and fairly consistent efforts were made especially in times of great danger, to maintain them in an efficient state. It remains then to see what was done, and with what result.

Though the prosecution of the war against France cannot be said to have been undertaken in earnest before 1338, when the English king landed at Antwerp on the 22nd. of July, war had become inevitable between the two countries as long as ten years previously when Philip VI's policy towards Flanders was seen to be causing considerable injury to English trade; when his privateers continually harassed English shipping in the Channel, and when his efforts to

absorb the great fiefs into the French crown threatened Edward's possessions in Guienne and Gascony. Being thus, as it were, predisposed towards war, it was essential that even though no immediate descent were contemplated on the Continent, the defences of England against a reciprocal attack, should be efficiently kept. As the prospect of war became more imminent, and as Edward's attention turned from Scotland to France, it will be seen that in like manner, the attention paid to the coast defences also increases. One of the first writs of the reign relating to castles, is for the completion of certain works in Dover, originally ordered by Edward 11. These comprise the construction and repair of engines of war as well as houses and other buildings within the castle. Carpenters, carters and other workmen were to be employed, and the works were to be completed as soon as possible "for the king's convenience and the safety of the castle." *

In 1327 also, a custodian was appointed for Porchester, and a gate-keeper at Carisbrooke,† but Dover is the only coastal castle at which any actual new work was carried out. Throughout the period indeed, scarcely a year passes without mention in some respect or other of the maintenance of this supremely important castle.

In the following year more attention seems to have

* CCR.1327-30. p. 86.

† CPR.1327-30. p. 7.

been paid to the Channel Islands than to the castles actually on the coast line. There was apparently at this time one keeper responsible for all the islands, with six men-at-arms as his immediate lieutenants. In addition, there was a constable and garrison at each of the individual castles. Castle Cornet in the island of Jersey had a garrison of fifty men, and Gorri in the same island, one of thirty.* Their future status seems to have been somewhat uncertain in 1328, possibly because of the recently concluded treaty with France, for the keeper, John de Roches, prays the king "to signify his will concerning the keeping of these men in the future." On this point he is left in no doubt, even by the inept administration headed by the infamous Mortimer, for treaty or no, he is ordered to retain them there and pay them their wages (2d. per. day) out of the revenues of the islands.+ Nor indeed is John left unaware of the continued importance and responsible nature of his post, or of the standard of conduct required from him, as he is informed by the same letters that the king, from whom, all such mandates legally came, is well aware that there are many defects in his castles and mills in the Channel Islands, and that unless they are speedily repaired "greater damage will accrue hereafter." Furthermore it appears that these defects

*CCR.1327-30.p.317. +Ibid.

happened in the time of Otto de Grandissono, late keeper of the islands, through default of him and his bailiffs. For this reason it was ordained that they ought to be repaired out of his goods and the issues of the islands pertaining to him and his executors. John de Roches is consequently ordered to carry out the necessary repairs and pay for them out of Otto's goods and chattels found in the islands, and from the revenues thereof. The late keeper seems to have been thoroughly remiss in the execution of his duty, for not only was the fabric of the castles in a dilapidated condition, but also the victuals, arms and other necessaries were below the standard required to ensure the safe-keeping of the area, "whereby danger may arise to the king and those parts." * In a mandate of the same day as the others regarding garrisons and repairs, John is ordered to set this to rights, and is informed that the king has ordered the sheriffs of London to cause one hundred and twenty shields, one hundred foot-crossbows and twenty other crossbows with windlasses to be bought. The sheriff of Southampton was made responsible for the provision of "a hundred thousand of small fire-wood and two thousands of charcoal." The sheriffs are to arrange conveyance of all these stores to Portsmouth and subsequent delivery to John de Roches for the munition of

* CCR. 1327-30. p. 320.

the Channel Island castles. Lastly, as if to dispel any lingering doubt, if such could possibly remain after what had gone before, as to the continued importance of the islands, Edward orders the completion, as speedily as possible, of a castle called "Girburgh" lately begun in the island of Jersey "for the greater safe-keeping of those parts."* Explicit and urgent though these mandates were, they would appear to have been insufficiently so in one respect or other, for the sheriffs of London and Southampton - or perhaps for John de Roches, waiting uneasily within a stone's throw of the coast of France, who was unwilling to allow the sheriffs the customary time for the prosecution of such an order. At anyrate, nine months later, in December 1328, as nothing has yet been accomplished by them, and since "the king understands that John is now able to buy and purvey the said bows to the king's greater convenience and at a cheaper rate elsewhere," he orders them to pay to John as much money as the value of the bows in order to make the necessary provision. Shields were apparently more difficult to procure in the Channel Islands, for they were to be provided according to the former order.†No mention is made of the fire-wood or charcoal, which may in fact already have been sent.

* Ibid.

† CCR.1327-30.p.355.

The possibility of danger to Dover castle appears to have been foreseen in this year also. The sheriff of Kent was warned to be ready to provide as many men from his bailiwick for the supplementation of the garrison of that castle as the constable might require at any time, and also to be prepared " to aid the custody of the castle with the posse of the county whenever summoned by the constable."* The store of victuals was to be kept up, and new supplies purveyed with money obtained from the sale of those no longer fit for consumption.†

In 1329 no relevant entry appears, except one authorising repairs to the "houses and other things within Dover castle that most need repair, up to the sum of £40.‡ In July 1330, more than two years after the initial order for the better defence of the Channel Islands, the defences there still appear to be in an unsatisfactory condition, for in an order dated the 13th. of that month, the king commands that further repairs be carried out in his castles in those islands. It appears that there remain "many defects in the castles and mills, and that unless they be speedily repaired it may be to the king's greater damage hereafter."§ In view of this, and indeed perhaps because of it, the replacement of John de Roches as keeper

*Ibid. p. 353.

†Ibid. p. 255.

‡Ibid. p. 489.

§CCR. 1330-33. p. 44.

two months later, is of considerable significance. Whether he found the task too much for him and was removed at his own request, is not clear. There is no trace of any such petition from John, but he was ordered by a mandate of the 9th. September to deliver by indenture to Peter Bernard de Pynsole and Laurence du Galars of Bayonne, the islands and the armour, victuals and other things in the castles there.* It would seem that the failure on John's part to amend the shortcomings in his defences after such a long period, was too much even for such an inefficient administration as was then responsible for the conduct of affairs. On the mainland, Arundel castle, which was in the gift of the crown was in August granted to Queen Isabella as tenant of the castle and honour for life⁺ but Richard, Earl of Arundel was responsible for its maintenance, as appears by a writ of 1336.†

The degree of attention paid to the coastal castles continues to be normal but not excessive, until 1335, when the French threat became more pronounced, and from then until 1346 a marked increase in the scale of repair and maintenance is noticeable. Even before that however, several individual entries are worthy of mention. An order was made in February 1331 for an extensive survey of the Channel Islands, as apparently the extent of the repairs

*CPR.1330-34.p.3. †Ibid.p.12. ‡CCR.1333-37.p.679.

necessary there, and the liability of the previous keeper Otto de Grandissono for such, had still not been assessed.* The castle at Scarborough was to be repaired up to the sum of 100 marks, especially as regards the walls, turrets and bridges, "since the king is given to understand that they greatly need repair."† Finally, in that year, ten oak trees were to be delivered by the keeper of the forest in the Isle of Wight, to Carisbrooke castle for repairs to houses within the castle.‡ A very serious matter was brought to light in 1332, when William de Clynton, who was both constable of Dover castle and Warden of the Cinque Ports, was ordered to make a careful inquiry for the names of certain people who had stolen armour, victuals and other things belonging to the king, from Dover castle.‡ That such a thing could occur within one of the most important fortresses of the realm must have been disquieting indeed for those in authority, and gives a hint that despite the care and money lavished upon the security of this vital stronghold, all was not well within its walls. The shortcomings of certain officials responsible directly for the defences of the south-east coast were to be shown up only too clearly when the French achieved

* CPR. 1330-34. p. 130.

† CCR. 1330-33. p. 214.

‡ Ibid.

‡ CPR. 1330-34. p. 347.

such a measure of success in their raids some years later. In June 1332 a further commission was appointed to survey the defects in the Channel Islands, in respect of the castles and mills "which are reported to be greatly in need of repair," and to inform the king by whose default, and when they fell into decay.* Although in 1333 Edward was chiefly concerned with his Scottish expedition and the prosecution of the war on the Border, yet in July he ordered the ration store at Dover to be implemented without delay "for certain reasons" no doubt connected with his absence in the north with all his forces, and the consequently vulnerable state of the south.† A year later Dover was to be further strengthened by works costing £40, which were to be carried out by the constable himself at the king's order and without the usual preliminary survey.‡

By the year 1335 it was becoming obvious to Edward that despite his extensive territorial acquisitions in Scotland, he could not hope permanently to subdue the ever resurgent spirit of Scottish nationalism and the fervent hatred of his creature Baliol. Furthermore, it was also becoming increasingly obvious that before long a much more serious danger would threaten England from abroad than had ever done so from Scotland, and for both these

* Ibid. †CCR.1333-37.p.68. ‡ Ibid.p.242.

reasons the principal interest of the military leaders began to move from Scotland to the Continent. The first move leading to the final breach between England and France came however from the French side, when in the Spring of 1336 Philip sent his Fleet round from the Mediterranean and settled it threateningly in the ports of Normandy.* Both Edward and his Council interpreted this as a threat to invade England, and it is difficult to see what other interpretation could have been placed on it. Clearly the danger itself was apparent, even before this positive move on the part of the French, for in August 1335 a mandate was issued for the array of all the men of the Channel Islands "both knights and esquires and other defensible men", and for the drawing up of an overall plan by the keeper and those responsible under him "for the safe and secure keeping of the islands and of the castles and fortalices in the same - so that no danger or damage may come to those islands or to the king's people there by their negligence - because the king has learned that a great fleet is assembled upon the sea to harass him and his people."† The disquietude of the administration with regard to these islands is understandable in view of the uninspiring records of their late keepers Otto de Grandisson and John de Roches.

* Burne; The Crecy War.
p. 21.

† CCR. 1333-37.
p. 525.

Indeed only a month previously the castles and other defences of the islands had been reported as still in great need of repair. The usual mandate for their amendment without delay had been issued* but the king cannot be blamed for the doubts which he certainly had as to its effectiveness. Indeed so obvious was the danger, even in 1335, that all the sheriffs of England had been commanded to issue a warning order for all the men between sixteen and sixty to provide themselves with arms as laid down in the Statute of Winchester and to be ready to set out for the defence of the realm against all invaders "as it has reached the ears of the king that divers fleets of ships of war, manned with divers men-at-arms and others of parts beyond the sea, are upon the sea, and that these men intend to invade the realm with those ships."† Of the same date is an order to the constable of Carisbrooke castle to increase his vigilance and see that his castle is prepared in every respect "- men, victuals and armour -" to resist an attack. His duty as an efficient constable is to see that the neighbouring parts are strengthened and defended by his ward, so that no danger shall threaten them. The "men beyond the sea" are again mentioned as preparing ships of war to invade the realm while the king is at a distance, and this time also reference is

* Ibid. p. 426.

† Ibid. p. 516.

made to definite alliances and confederacies between them and the Scots, "wherefore the king has appointed certain lieges to all parts and sea-shores throughout the realm to resist the said enemies."* In the previous month a survey of Scarborough castle had been ordered, whereby the cost was to be ascertained of amending certain shortcomings in armour and victuals, as well as material defects in the structure of the castle itself.† Henry Percy, the keeper, was absent in the north and his duties were being performed by his deputy.

Throughout 1336, preparations for full scale warfare went ahead. Subsidies were voted, funds and military stores were sent to Gascony and the garrisons on the south coast were strengthened. General mandates for safe-keeping were issued to the constables of Corfe castle and eleven other royal castles, as well as to Richard, Earl of Arundel for his castle at Arundel and the Earl of Surrey for Lewes.‡ They were all ordered to cause their castles "to be securely guarded and to show such diligence in the custody thereof that no harm shall happen thereto by any crafty deceit, hostile attacks or otherwise, but that the people of the adjacent parts may be strengthened and defended by the good custody of the castle." Particular attention was again paid to the Channel Islands. Their garrisons

*Ibid. p. 521. †CPR. 1334-38. p. 206. ‡CCR. 1333-37. p. 679.

were to be supplemented because of the imminent threat of invasion "so that the malice of the king's enemies, if they presume to go to those parts may be manfully repelled."^{*} The necessity for proving their ability for the performance of this task was not long in coming, for in September 1336 an attack was actually made by French galleys upon the Isle of Wight and the Channel Islands.⁺ The defenders of the islands appear to have acquitted themselves, on this occasion at anyrate, with a considerable degree of success, but as a direct result of this raid, a further fifty armed men were transferred to Guernsey, Jersey and Sark, and with them too went two knights specially deputed to make provisions of armour and other necessary stores, for which they were granted 10 marks and £10.[‡] The Isle of Wight also proved too well guarded for the raiders. Carisbrooke castle had been re-victualled during the first week in September[‡] and the constable was left in no doubt as to the imminence of danger. In a lengthy order of the 24th. June 1336, the sheriff of Southampton was ordered to cause certain defects in the structure of Porchester dastle to be amended by the view and testimony of Richard, Earl of Arundel. By the same order, arbalests and other engines in the castle were to be repaired and made ready for action, and supplies

* CCR.1333-37. p. 586.
 † Ibid. p. 587.
 ‡ CPR.1334-38. p. 324.

+ CCR.1337-39. p. 159.
 ‡ CCR.1333-37. p. 610.

of wheat and wine were to be delivered there "because the king has learned that - there are no victuals therein."* In December, further repairs up to the sum of £20 were authorised at Scarborough.†

On the 24th. May 1337, Philip took the decisive step. He solemnly confiscated all the territories of his English vassal. This was tantamount to a declaration of war, and this date may be conveniently accepted as the official commencement of hostilities. French troops who were already stationed on the border, invaded Gascony, and the French fleet raided Jersey and Sark,‡ following up with a raid on Portsmouth and the south coast.¼ Edward III responded in October by repudiating his homage and addressing his rival as 'Philip'. He also described himself as the rightful occupant of the French throne.** The absence of any reference in the official records to this south coast raid seems to indicate that it was

* CCR. 1333-37. p. 591.

† Ibid. p. 639. ‡ CPR. 1334-38. p. 101.

¼ Burne; op. cit.
p. 23.

** By a nice legal point Edward avoided designating himself 'king of France'. This claim was not put forward until nearly two years later.

beaten off, though some authorities state that Portsmouth was burnt and the country round about laid waste. * The Channel Islands raid resulted in an order, directed to yet another keeper, Thomas de Ferariis, for the general array of all the men of those islands. Furthermore, in consideration of "their constant fidelity and their burdens in the defence of their islands", the islanders were given exemption for two years from the payment of certain customs. † If the many entries during this year relating to the state of military preparedness of the castles in the Channel Islands are to be believed, there were still many defects in their condition. Again and again there occur the words "-as it is in great danger from these defects-" or "-because the king has learned that they are in great danger from lack of such provision-." In August 1337, three months after the French attempt, such descriptions relate in one and the same order to an overall shortage of garrisons, lack of provisions and material defects in the structure of the castles. ‡ On the mainland of England divers defects of Dover castle were to be repaired and certain new works were to be constructed therein up to the cost of £20. Twenty tuns of wine were to be provided for its garrison. § The arrayers, sheriffs

* Warburton; Edward III. p.63. seems to have confused this raid with that of 1338.

† CPR.1334-38.p.416.
‡ CCR.1337-39.p.159.
§ Ibid.pp.2 and 4.

and keepers of the sea coast of the East Riding of Yorkshire were warned that a large fleet was being fitted out "by aliens" to make a descent upon Holderness and that there was a grave risk of invasion there. Consequently no men from that area were to be compelled to go into service elsewhere.* It so happens that an order two months later for a general tightening-up of the incidence of castle-ward and military service in the Isle of Wight[†] was nearer the mark, as it was on the south coast that the next enemy attack was to be made. The constable of Carisbrooke castle was ordered to compel all those of the Isle of Wight who were bound by services to that castle, to do them, "as the king has learned that several who hold lands of that castle by certain services, both in time of peace and war, refuse to do them." As will appear later, there was, not unnaturally, no great desire on the part of the individual, to do more towards the upkeep of the royal castles and national defences, than he was compelled to; and the result of this general reluctance to serve, even in the face of direct attack, was to be seen in the following year. Shortly after this mandate relating to the Isle of Wight, the keepers of the maritime land around Southampton were ordered to have beacons prepared upon the hills, and to arrange to have them guarded by

*CPR.1338-40.p.57.

†CCR.1337-39.p.141.

several armed men at all times, so that if need be, they could be lit and the people of the surrounding counties warned in time of a hostile attack.*

As far as the scope of this work is concerned, the most significant event of 1338 was the spectacular success of just such an attack by the French on the south coast. Because of the constant attention paid to that area over a period of several years, and the considerable build-up of resources there, the raid forms a useful yard-stick with which to measure the effectiveness or otherwise of such preparations. The attack took place in the Autumn of the year, about September or October, and though the French may have achieved an element of immediate local surprise, Edward was well aware that an attack on some part of his realm was imminent, and as he himself sailed from Orwell for Flanders with two hundred ships in July 1338, he took every precaution to see that his own realm was not invaded during his absence. Mandates referring to this likelihood had been issued with regard to Yorkshire more than twelve months previously; the keepers of the castles and lands along the south coast had been alerted, and in July of 1338 itself commissioners of array were appointed for the whole of England to array men "to repel invasions of the French at the request or summons of the keepers of the

*Ibid. p. 179.

coast."* In the following month the constable of Bristol castle was ordered to make extra purveyances of victuals for his castle "in view of dangers now imminent."⁺ The threatened area was thus extended, at least by implication, even to the west coast. It was however one thing to give an order in the fourteenth century, but quite another to have it executed properly and promptly. If all these counter-measures had in fact been put into immediate operation by those to whom the mandates were addressed, the matter might have ended very differently. Unfortunately, it must be assumed that they were not. Indded Richard de la Pole, by March 1338 had not even delivered to Dover castle the wine which he had been ordered to send in February 1337.[‡] If orders regarding matters of more immediate import were similarly disregarded, it is no great wonder that when the French did make their attack on Southampton and other parts of the south coast, they were able not only to land, but also to sack the town and pillage the area.

The circumstances under which the damage occurred, as well as some of the reasons why the counter-measures failed, are given in a commission to Richard, Earl of Arundel, and two others to inquire further as to the names of those principally to blame.[‡] According to the context

* CPR.1338-40.p.134.

⁺Ibid.p.118.

[‡]CCR.1337-39.p.335.

[‡]CPR.1338-40.p.180.

of the writ, the enemy had plundered and burnt the towns of Portsmouth and Southampton as well as other places, and then retired to their galleys without encountering any resistance. The keepers of the coast and arrayers of men in the county, although they knew that an attack was to be made, had not only neglected entirely to provide for the defence of the parts threatened, but had "basely fled with the men of the said town on sight of the enemy." The same keepers and their deputies had accepted bribes from the men arrayed, and had allowed them to return home. Nor had they found the necessary men-at-arms and archers for whose pay they had been given money. The commissioners were to discover by whose default the town of Southampton had been taken, how the keepers and arrayers bore themselves when the galleys came in sight, and the names of those who had fled. The most guilty were to be imprisoned in the Tower.

The outspoken text of this commission leaves no shadow of doubt as to the reasons for the French success. It was made obvious once again, as it had been obvious on the Scottish Border, that castles of themselves were not an adequate means of protection against the lightning raid. They had to be supported by ground troops, and unless placed in particularly strategic positions which afforded the enemy no opportunity of by-passing them, were unable to provide certain protection, even for a

limited area outside their immediate vicinity. The coastal castles themselves generally remained intact, but were unable to extend their protection far enough to prevent the passage of the enemy. Only one castle was specifically mentioned as having been entered by the French. At Hastings in July 1339 a commission was appointed to inquire whether "in view of the late entry of the castle of Hastings by the foreign foe - many men holding lands and rents of the castle by the service of making ward in the castle, or payment of sums for the ward thereof, have for some time withdrawn these services -."* Once again it appears that the defensive system itself was not at fault, but the private individuals and officers upon whom devolved the responsibility for seeing that the various liabilities for defensive service were shouldered.

At the very time that the French were attacking the south coast, the same story of ineptitude and the slovenly discharge of duty was repeated in another sphere. The Council, acting in the name of the young Duke of Cornwall who in his father's absence had been created Warden of the realm, had occasion to address an order to the constable of Beaumaris castle in the Isle of Anglesey.⁺ He had been ordered at some earlier date to victual the castle and provide it with men and weapons so that it could be

* Ibid. p. 287. ⁺ CCR. 1337-39. p. 542.

regarded as a safe stronghold; in fact he had received fees from the king for that purpose. The writ goes on to say that "hitherto he has done little or nothing, and dangers are feared from a foreign invasion of those parts and from the lightness of head of the Welsh -." The constable of Beaumaris, together with those of four Welsh castles, is ordered to make the necessary arrangements without delay.

During the remaining months of 1338 a further expenditure was authorised for works in Dover castle* and for the payment of the garrison.+ William de Clynton, the constable, was ordered furthermore to provision the castle with victuals "with all possible speed."¹ Richard, Earl of Arundel, was to be paid for the wages of the garrison at Porchester, "the said castle being in his custody by the king's commission"‡ and the keeper of the forest of la Bere was ordered to cause as much timber "as is necessary for divers works ordained by the Council in Porchester castle-" to be delivered there.** The sheriff of Southampton was to be responsible for the required transport. The wages of certain archers in garrison at Corfe castle were to be paid to the constable, Walter de

* Ibid. p. 556.

+ Ibid. p. 557. See also this work. Ch. 4. p.

¹ Ibid. p. 568.

‡ Ibid. p. 564.

** Ibid.

Wydecombe.* Finally, the general alarm which must undoubtedly must have been felt as a result of the French descent on the south coast, was reflected in an order to the mayor, bailiffs and aldermen of London itself, to cause that city to be defended on the water side with stones or palisades with all possible speed, against hostile attacks, and to cause piles to be fixed across the river Thames.†

The Council was obviously determined that the initial success of the French should not be repeated, at any rate for lack of defence mandates. During 1339 orders were issued specifying in the minutest detail the measures to be taken to rebuild the fortifications of Southampton. Professor Hamilton-Thompson has stated that by the fourteenth century, the town with its citadel became all-important as the object of attack and the base of operations.‡* The truth of this assertion is clearly seen in the fortification of such towns as Southampton, London and other important boroughs on the east coast, to which attention has already been drawn. The castle was by no means entirely superseded in importance at this date, however,‡ and the records indicate that considerable attention was to be paid especially to the coastal castles for some time to come.

In February 1339, William de Clynton received

* Ibid. p. 605.

† Ibid. p. 612.

‡* Hamilton-Thompson; English Medieval Military Architecture.

‡ CCR. 1339-41. p. 22.
See also Ch. 43.

£260-10-0d. for the custody of Dover castle over a period of four months and was given a new garrison establishment.* Repairs to the value of £20 were carried out at Scarborough⁺ and six men-at-arms and twelve archers who formed the garrison of Carisbrooke castle were to be paid "reasonable wages,"[†] while the king's butler was ordered to deliver four tuns of new wine there.[‡] In contrast with the more usual entry dealing with some neglect of duty which is to be found all too often during this period, it is refreshing to discover an order for the payment of 100s. to one William de Kekyngewych, the king's serjeant at arms "for his good service in Caresbrok castle, and in recompense for his labours and expenses there, beyond his due and accustomed wages."** Although the castle of Old Sarum could hardly be described as coastal, apparently the Council considered that it was insufficiently removed from the sea to be safe from attack, for in April 1339 an order went out to the sheriff of Wiltshire to cause as many men-at-arms, armed men and archers to be placed in the castle of Old Sarum as were necessary for its defence "in case of an invasion", and to have the castle victualled with £20 worth of stores.*** At the same time, the keeper of the

* CCR.1339-41.p.22. ⁺ Ibid.p.24. [†] Ibid.p.26.
See also Ch.4.

[‡] Ibid.

** Ibid.p.32.

*** Ibid.p.35.

forest and park of Clarendon was ordered to have the underwood growing upon four oaks cut and delivered by indenture to the same sheriff for transmission to Old Sarum "because the king wishes it to be supplied, as his enemies propose to invade the realm."* Entries relating to Dover castle include another order to dispose of wine which is no longer fit for use⁺ and instructions to the keepers of the maritime land in Norfolk to supersede the exaction made on John Lovel for finding men for that custody "while he is staying in Dover castle with William de Clynton for the safety of the castle and the defence of those parts against the king's enemies."[‡]

In the light of the danger to which the mainland of England was exposed, it is not surprising that the situation in the Channel Islands was even more perilous. By a writ of the 1st. February 1339, protection was afforded to the men of the islands, their possessions and ships "against divers men of the king's realm and power, and of his friendship, who on the colour that the island of Guereneseye is held by French enemies, daily contrive divers grievances against the men of the said islands, both by land and by sea. This protection is not, however, to extend to any French enemies holding the island or passing to or from it -."[‡] Apparently then, the French

*Ibid.p.61. +Ibid.p.161. †Ibid.p.219.

[‡]CPR.1338-40.p.199.

had not been repulsed thence, nor had they ultimately withdrawn as from Southampton. On the contrary they appeared to be making an earnest endeavour to establish a foot-hold even nearer to the English coast, as a writ of protection in respect of the constable of Carisbrooke castle and keeper of the Isle of Wight, refers to "the attacks by foreign enemies who are trying to effect a landing in the island -."*

Its defences must have been conducted with a certain measure of success, as one month later, the enemy have been unable to land, though an instruction to John de Langeford "to purvey in the Isle of Wight with all speed, victuals, timber and other things necessary for the defence of the island against foreign enemies -"† indicates that the danger is by no means over. Nevertheless, the situation there was under control, as only a few days after this order, a ship was sent from the Isle of Wight with flour and other stores for the sustenance of "the king's lieges in the islands of Gereseye, Serk and Aureneye -"‡ which apparently were managing to hold out against attacks from Guernsey. The Isle of Thanet was in the forefront of the English coast defences. In October, one John de Kirryel was pardoned a debt of 100 marks "in consideration of his heavy expenses and laudable bearing in staying continually with men-at-arms and others to defend the

*Ibid. †Ibid.p.212. ‡Ibid.

island against foreign enemies who many times attempted an invasion -."* Even as far away as Cornwall there was danger in 1339. A commission of array was issued for all the men between the towns and places of "Saltessh and Fowey - as the king has learned for certain that the French and their adherents have assembled a large fleet of ships and galleys to invade the realm."+

The great English sea victory at Sluys in June 1340 no doubt achieved a great deal in the way of relieving the pressure on the coastal defences of the realm, though it does not seem to have influenced the French hold on the Channel Islands, where in August they were reported still to be holding Guernsey.† On the mainland itself, the more routine procedure of survey, repair, maintenance and garrisoning continued uninterrupted. Two surveyors were appointed for Rochester castle which was reported to be greatly in need of repair‡ and a new custodian was appointed to Corfe. - in this case a king's yeoman in place of the Earl of Salisbury.** Settlement was made with the Earl of Huntingdon, constable of Carisbrooke castle for the wages of certain men retained there by him beyond the customary garrison,*** and very large quantities of

* Ibid. p. 324. + Ibid. p. 279. † CCR. 1339-41. p. 499.

‡ CPR. 1340-43. p. 481. ** Ibid. p. 521. *** CCR. 1339-41. p. 354.

stores including coal and iron were sent there.* The sheriff of Somerset and Dorset was ordered to make good certain defects in the walls of Corfe castle, with the help of the constable there who had been newly appointed. He was also to provide wheat, malt, beans and salt, and to pay the wages of six men-at-arms and six archers.+ A misunderstanding was resolved over the cost of certain repairs on the castle of Porchester‡ and at Dover twelve more tuns of wine which were almost putrid, were to be sold with all possible speed.¶

In the face of this well-nigh perpetual solicitude on the administrative level for the coastal defences, it is hard to imagine that there could possibly be any laxity on the part of individuals. Yet such has already been noticed, and it seems that even after the lesson of 1338 certain very responsible people continued to exercise their duties in anything but an efficient manner. On the 30th. November 1340, infuriated by the necessity of having had to raise the siege of Tournai due to the defection of his allies, and lack of money from England, the king himself sailed unannounced up the Thames and landed at midnight under the Tower. His mood on landing was already bitter and savage, so that the discovery that the principal

* Ibid. p. 368. + Ibid. p. 411. ‡ Ibid. p. 345. ¶ Ibid. p. 561.

fortress of the realm was so ill-guarded that pirates or French marauders might have entered it as easily as himself, merely added to his passion. He instantly threw the constable and his officers into prison and on the following morning arrested the Lord Treasurer and the High Chancellor "for having neglected," as was alleged "to raise or duly transmit to the king the moneys granted by Parliament." The apparent shortcomings of the Council in the matter of finance may have been a subject for dispute, but the vulnerable nature of the Tower was manifestly demonstrated.

Before sailing for England Edward had signed a truce for nine months with France and Scotland, and possibly as a result of this and the subsequent lessening of the French pressure, no single entry in 1341 refers to a castle on the mainland of England. In the Channel Islands however, the danger was still near. By the truce of the 25th. September 1340, all parties were to be left in possession of what they then held, whereby it would seem that the French had relinquished their hold on Guernsey, as in March 1341 Thomas de Hampton was appointed by the king "to supervise the state of those parts, to direct the defence of the islands and the king's castles and fortalices -."* The notice of appointment is directed to "the lawful men of the islands of Gernerie, Jeresie, Serk and Aureneye" and is

*CCR. 1341-43. p. 117.

the result of a petition sent by them "showing the state of those islands and the dangers threatening them, unless speedy succour be sent." Three months later the sheriff of Southampton was ordered to cause oaks fit for timber for making engines necessary for the defence of the island Gernesey and the adjacent islands against the attacks of the king's enemies to be transported there.* Thomas de Hampton seems to have performed his duty well and efficiently and to have discovered that there were many individuals in his islands who, at the time of the French attacks and occupation, had done less than they were required to, towards their defence. He informed the king that many such men who had possessions in the islands which they were bound to defend, had in fact either not done so or indeed had departed altogether and gone over to the enemy. During the period of the truce they had returned, hoping that their treachery had either passed unnoticed, or that they would be forgiven. In this they were deceived, as the king ordered Thomas to confiscate all such lands and property which was to be forfeit to the crown.+ There is no doubt that Edward was extremely dissatisfied with the conduct of affairs in that area, for by the same order the regulations for the defence of Guernsey were rendered more strict. The keeper was to assign a place in the castle of "Gerebrok"

* Ibid. p. 179.

+ Ibid. p. 375.

in that island, to each man according to his degree and possessions. Each person was to be compelled to play his part in the scheme of defence under pain of forfeiture of his goods. Furthermore it is pointed out, not unreasonably, that "as for the safety of the lieges of those islands - the king has caused the said castle to be repaired at great cost - it is just that what is built for the common advantage - shall be defended at the common cost in time of war."*

Early in 1342 Edward talked of renewing the war, and on the 14th. April spoke of an intended expedition to Brittany under Sir Walter Manny as being undertaken "to recover our rights."† The attempt to attack France from the north-west was quite as much a failure as the earlier campaigns from the north-east. Yet the very fact that the initiative was being taken by the English did lessen the likelihood of a direct French assault on this island. Such seems at anyrate to have been the general consensus of contemporary opinion, for not only were certain defence regulations relaxed, but only routine repairs and surveys were carried out in the coastal castles. In March 1343 the king landed once more in England, having agreed to a truce which was to last for three years. Because of this truce, and because also of the desperate financial straits

* Ibid.

† Rymer; Foedera.ii.1193.

in which the king found himself at this time, it is not surprising that he was bent upon reducing expenditure in every possible way. In February, the constable of Carisbrooke had been ordered to dismiss his garrison and not to retain any men-at-arms and archers for the munition of the castle and island, since, as the writ naively states "the king does not wish the men-at-arms and archers who were retained in the castle or island by reason of the present war at his wages, to be retained during the truce."^{*} Even the Channel Islands were to have their garrisons reduced, though not so drastically as Carisbrooke. Three commissions were appointed to see that only so many men were retained "as may reasonably suffice - as the king has learned that more armed men and archers are retained at the king's wages in those castles (of the Channel Islands) than are necessary for the munition thereof during the truce."⁺ There is no entry during the year relating to the maintenance of any other coastal castle.

Little more than twelve months later, a very different situation existed. Edward had induced the Parliament of 1344 to grant supplies for two years and his financial problems were solved at least temporarily. He determined to carry out a full-scale invasion of France and redeem his miserable fortunes of the previous four years by one glorious

^{*}CCR.1343-46.p.50. ⁺Ibid.p.12.

campaign. How well he was to do this became apparent on the field of Crecy and before the walls of Calais. Such victories could not be achieved without great preparations and throughout 1344 and 1345 huge forces of men, tremendous quantities of material and considerable numbers of ships were impressed. In view of the extraordinary expenditure involved and of the aggressive nature of the expedition it is not surprising that little attention was paid to the matter of defence over this period. The castles were not, of course, completely abandoned. Such garrisons as remained were paid and victualled, but it is significant that the only traces of repairs to coastal castles during the years 1345 and 1346 are entries dealing with the building of a new chamber in Porchester castle and a mandate for the repair of "the hall, chambers and kitchen against the king's arrival there." The preparations for attack were all-important and the expenditure on defence was consequently reduced. It can be appreciated therefore that as a result of this recurring and surprisingly short-sighted policy, many of the coastal castles appear to have had serious material defects which only became apparent and received attention in time of danger, when they were subjected to a thorough scrutiny. Nevertheless this does not imply any deliberate abandonment of the coastal

castle as an efficient means of defence,* but only the application of limited financial resources to those measures considered at the time to be most urgent.

The financial resources available to Edward III for warlike purposes during the early years of his reign were by no means unlimited. This was especially so since those on whom the chief burden of taxation fell and those who would be most likely to benefit materially from any subsequent military conquests, were rarely the same. It is therefore unlikely that any part of those resources would be squandered needlessly on measures considered by either king or administration to be outdated or patently ineffective. Although it is not possible, because of the many varying factors concerned, to make an accurate estimate of the proportion of such revenue spent on the munition of all the royal castles over a given period, a more restricted comparison of amounts spent in the spheres of attack and of defensive fortification under similar circumstances, is possible and would seem to be of value as indicating the importance attributed to military architecture in an age which had already made the acquaintance of gunpowder and cannon.

*Queenborough, the only royal castle built during the fourteenth century, was intended to guard the coast against French invasion. So also were Cooling and Bodiam. See Ch. 5.

CHAPTER 4.Some Financial Considerations.

The task of computing with any degree of accuracy the amount of the annual revenue available to the Crown during the early years of the reign of Edward III is rendered the more difficult by several factors associated with the contemporary system of financial administration itself. While certain grants of a tenth or fifteenth might be made, the method of collection was such that there was no guarantee that the stipulated amount would in fact be collected and delivered to the treasury during the actual year in which the grant was made, or for some time thereafter. In 1337 for example, a somewhat complicated arrangement was made between the king and the merchants for the purveyance on behalf of the government of 30,000 sacks of wool at previously ordained and very favourable rates,* and for their subsequent sale abroad. For the greater convenience of the Crown, the merchants undertook to advance £200,000 in instalments from the proceeds of the sales. Although the king was relying on this financial measure for his subsidies to the allies, the whole scheme broke down within six months when only 10,000 sacks had been purveyed.+ Another circumstance

* Hughes: The Early Years of
Edward III. Ch. 3. p. 28.

+ Ibid. Ch. 3. p. 31.

tending to detract from the accuracy of financial calculations during this period was the practice of issuing writs of assignment to Crown creditors, whereby, instead of paying its creditors in cash out of the treasury, the government frequently tendered them writs of assignment in which the collectors of revenue were commanded to pay the amount due. The full payment due to the Crown from these collectors would not therefore be paid if several writs had been drawn on the account, and unless due notice is taken of all such documents, inaccuracy is likely to occur. For these reasons, the plan of anticipating the royal revenue available to Edward III, by consideration not of receipts, but of the relevant drafts and cash payments by the Exchequer to Crown creditors over a given period is more likely to be accurate than any other.* Professor Willard has shown that the Issue Rolls of the Exchequer for the financial year 1327-28 record disbursements amounting to nearly £34,000.+ For the year 1332-33, when active preparations for the Scottish war were under way, the expenditure may be deduced as being in the region of £37,000.‡ Whatever the theoretical income of the Crown may

* cf. Prof. T. F. Tout:
 Chapters in Medieval
 Administrative Hist.
 vol. ii. pp. 99-101.

+ Prof. J. F. Willard:
 The Crown and its
 Creditors. 1327-33.
 E. H. R. XLII. p. 15.

‡ Ibid. pp.
 15-17.

have been, these were the sums which were actually spent. During the years when the king was maintaining a large army on the Continent, there were obviously extraordinary grants by both clergy and laity alike, but as we have seen it was one thing to secure the promise of a grant and quite another to collect it. The total amount remitted by the Exchequer to the king during the seventeen months from December 1338 to May 1340 was less than £36,000.* It is in the light of such sums as these, two estimates of annual expenditure and one example of campaign expenses, however inadequate, that the significance of various items of expenditure on the royal castles must be considered.

There were in England during the period 1327-46, some ninety castles which were garrisoned and maintained by the king and can thus be called royal. Many of these were of course small or relatively unimportant and presumably apart from routine repairs to the fabric, made no great financial demands upon the Exchequer. Others were continually in the forefront of attack or defence, and their maintenance required the frequent expenditure of large sums of money. The cost of maintaining the garrison of Dover castle alone from October 1338 to October 1339

* Tout: op.cit.iii.p.91.note 3. The amount remitted during the first six months of the campaign had alone almost equalled this total.

was £835-5-6d.* On the 10th. November 1338 certain works up to the value of £50 were authorised† and on the 24th. the castle was to be provisioned with victuals to an unspecified sum.‡ It would be surprising therefore if the total cost of maintaining the castle over that period amounted to much less than £1,000.

The garrison at Winchester consisted of 10 men-at-arms and 20 archers[‡] whose wages on the usual scale amounted to 15s. per day. It is not definitely established that in this case the garrison strength remained constant over the period of a year, but it is not likely that it would fall much below that given above. Assuming that, the wages for twelve months for the men-at-arms and archers only would amount to £273-15-0d.

In 1338 the garrison of the Tower of London was 20 men-at-arms and 50 archers. The Tower, as the central depot for arms and all kinds of munitions of war, was in a rather exceptional position and there were very many more people employed there than were actually engaged in its defence. Apart from these overseers and workmen of various denominations, the constable was ordered to retain the men-at-arms and archers "continuously or by turns as he shall see fit,"** and once again therefore it is not

*For detailed account see end of chapter. †CCR.1337-39.p.556. ‡Ibid.p.568.

[‡]CCR.1339-41.p.7.

**CCR.1337-39.p.446.

certain that they all remained for a whole year. Had they done so however, and remembering the importance of the place there is no reason to suppose that they did not, their wages for twelve months would have amounted to nearly £600.

There is no doubt therefore that the wages of the garrison represented the major item in the account of almost every constable. But when substantial repairs became necessary the expenditure must have been greatly increased. In June 1338, four months before the period audited at Dover* William de Clynton had spent £110 in repairing defects⁺ and a further £66-13-8d. on new buildings in the previous February.[‡] Taking the cost of repairs to the royal castles as a whole over the period of a year, insofar as this can be ascertained, we find that in 1335 for example, details are given of amounts expended in repairing seven castles, the total of which is £190. In addition, unspecified repairs to one other castle are mentioned.[‡] In the following year specified repairs were again carried out in seven castles for a total of £188-15-3d. There was work done at six others, the cost of which is not given, but which may well have almost doubled the previous sum.** Six castles were repaired in 1338 for

*See end of †Ibid.p.423. ‡Ibid.p.305. ‡See end of chapter. chapter.

**See end of chapter.

£204-18-10d.* In addition a considerable quantity of timber was ordered from the keeper of the forest of la Bere for certain works in Porchester castle.† No other details are given in the Close Rolls, but fortunately these are available elsewhere.‡ Apparently in 1338 the Council ordered the royal castle of Porchester to be thoroughly restored, and its constable, the Earl of Arundel was appointed to see that the ruinous parts were repaired. Queen Philippa's chamber was in a very dilapidated condition and details are supplied of the purchase of 10,000 slates at 12d. a thousand, the laths and lath nails, the padlocks and keys. The cost of repairing this particular room was £20. Next follow the materials for the repairs to another chamber called Knighton's Chamber, where there were used beams, wall-plates and liernes, chevrons, laces and boards. Among the general outlay for substantial defence, there occurs mention of the erection of "a fausse wall against the treachery of the French," of the barbican and the bretache, embattled walls and barriers. The provision of various engines of war is mentioned separately. Among these were lesser and greater springalds, with the coleria, bolts and forelocks. Horsehair was to be provided and of especial interest is the order for

*See end of chapter.
 †CCR.1337-39.
 p.564.

‡Hartshorne: Proceedings of the Archaeological Institute. Winchester volume.1846.

caps to discharge the missiles. It appears that not all the dilapidations had occurred from neglect, as one item of damage is specified as having happened in consequence of "the late high wind." Since obviously the cost of such a comprehensive renewal must have been considerable, it is strange that no indications of a likely total is given in the Calendars. At the same time it serves to emphasise the fact that the total cost of repairs to royal castles during years when a number of unspecified repairs were carried out (e.g. 1336.) may well have been considerably more than would otherwise appear.

Perhaps the most useful printed document giving information on the cost of repairs to a castle during this period, is one relating to Berwick in 1344.* It consists of an inquisition taken before no less than seventeen people, from the chamberlain of Berwick himself down to "Master Robert the carpenter, Master Patrick the mason, Master Henry the plumber and Master Gilbert the smith." Not only are the necessary repairs detailed, but the estimates of cost are also given. The majority of the work is to take place on the walls themselves; some are to be raised several feet, others re-built and the foundations of some are to be re-made. Five roods of wall fifty feet high, and varying in width from twelve feet at the bottom

* Cal. Doc. Scot. 1307-57. p. 261. No. 1434.

to eight feet at the kernels, can be renewed for £12 per rood. Four roods of the same wall required to be raised another ten feet, and this was to cost 66s.8d. per rood. The detailed cost of the repairs to other walls is also given, and apart from these there are also the expenses for nails, timber, lead, fuel for melting it, stones, solder and iron. The total cost of putting the whole castle in order was to be £310-6-0d.

Because of the obvious difficulties involved in obtaining exact details of every item of expenditure in nearly one hundred castles over a given period, no accurate assessment can be made of the degree of relationship between the total expenditure of the Exchequer and the particular amount expended on the royal castles. Nevertheless, such positive details of cost as are available are of some use in demonstrating that the castle had by no means been dismissed as a negative factor by the military commanders of the early fourteenth century. We have seen that the total expenditure of the Exchequer for all purposes in 1333 was some £37,000. Whatever the subsidies voted or the grants made five years later when the king was engaged in the continental war, they do not alter the fact that from 1338 to 1339 the wages of the garrison and one authorisation for repair at Dover castle alone amounted to nearly £1,000. We have seen too that the total amount remitted to the king

by the Exchequer for seventeen months of this period, came to less than £36,000. Compared with this sum, inadequate though it may have been, the smaller annual costs of castle repair considered separately from wages, appear paltry.

It must be remembered however that these charges were met, and the repairs carried out, at a time when the financial embarrassment of the king was such that he was compelled to put into pawn two crowns of his own and one of the Queen's in return for 61,000 florins from the Archbishop of Treves. Surely, in the face of such constraint, even a few hundred pounds would not be lightly spent by either king or council, and the significance of these figures must not be overlooked when a more general consideration is made in the following chapter of the status of the castle in the fourteenth century.

VARIOUS ACCOUNTS RELATING TO CASTLE MAINTENANCE1. The cost of garrisoning and repairing Dover castle from
October 1338 to October 1339.

	£.	s.	d.
7th.Oct.1338 - 2nd.Feb.1339 inc.*	260	10	0
3rd.Feb.1339 - 8th.Mar.1339 inc.†	21	6	8
9th.Mar.1339 - 6th.Oct.1339 inc.‡	520	0	0
Watchman)			
Porter)			
Gatekeeper)			
Warrener‡)			
	12	2	6
	<hr/>		
Repairs 10th.Nov.1338. **	813	19	2
	50	0	0
Victuals.(cost unspecified) ***			
	<hr/>		
	863	19	2
	<hr/>		

* CCR.1339-41.p.11.

‡ Ibid.p.22.
200men-at-arms
at 12d. 40 armed
men at 6d. 40
archers at 3d.† Ibid. 12 armedt-
mensat 6d.per
day; 20 others
at 6d. and 14
others at 3d.

‡ CPR.1334-38.p.258.

** CCR.1337-39.p.556.

Ibid.p.568.

2. The cost of repairs to royal castles in 1335.*

	£.	s.	d.
York. walls, palings and houses. (costs unspecified)			unspecified.
Cambridge. houses and walls.	20	0	0
Bamburgh. houses, walls, turrets and bridges.	40	0	0
Lincoln. gaol and Great Hall.	20	0	0
Windsor. houses.	40	0	0
Scarborough. towers, turrets, houses and bridges.	40	0	0
Windsor.	10	0	0
Carisbrooke. houses, walls, turrets and bridges.	20	0	0
	<u>190</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>

*Calendar of Close Rolls. 1335.

3. The cost of repairs to royal castles in 1336.*

	£.	s.	d.
Carlisle. houses, walls, turrets etc.	10 -	19 -	0
(two entries)	40 -	0 -	0
Windsor. houses, tower, walls and bridges.	16 -	13 -	4
Gloucester. Great Tower, walls, etc.	unspecified.		
Nottingham. houses, walls, turrets, etc.	unspecified.		
Somerton. works.	unspecified.		
Lincoln. gaol and Great Hall.	20 -	0 -	0
Porchester. houses, walls, turrets and bretaches.	20 -	0 -	0
Oxford. houses, gates and bridges.	26 -	13 -	4
Nottingham. houses, walls, turrets and mills.	29 -	6 -	9
Nottingham. alteration of place for high table.	5 -	2 -	10
Newcastle. lead.	unspecified.		
Tower. houses and buildings.	unspecified.		
Oxford. bridges and other buildings.	unspecified.		
Scarborough. towers, turrets, houses and bridges.	20 -	0 -	0
	<hr/>		
	188 -	15 -	3
	<hr/>		

* Calendar of Close Rolls. 1336.

4. The cost of repairs to royal castles in 1338.*

	£.	s.	d.
Windsor. houses, tower and bridges.	40	0	0
Dover. works.	50	0	0
Old Sarum. defects.	60	0	0
Porchester. timber.			unspecified.
Carlisle. houses, walls, turrets, etc.	50	19	0
Carlisle. bretaches, houses and turrets.		3	19 - 10
	<u>204</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>10</u>

*Calendar of Close Rolls.1338.

CHAPTER 5.The Status of the English Castle in the Fourteenth Century.

However precarious may have become the prospect of the continued military importance of the castle in the fourteenth century, it must be obvious from the preceding chapters that in the first half of that century at any rate it was far from being obsolete; nor indeed does it seem to have been immediately apparent that it was shortly to become so. When considering the factors which contributed to this eclipse of medieval military architecture, the significance of new weapons using gunpowder as a propellant charge for their missiles, springs readily to mind. Yet there were other reasons, over which gunpowder, with all its implications, at this period and for a considerable time to come, held only a slight predominance. The indirect nature of any influence does not necessarily detract from its effectiveness if sufficient time be allowed for the results to become fully felt. In this instance there was no time limit, and although the employment of gunpowder in military operations was the most revolutionary of these factors, there is no doubt that even had not military science developed as it did, the mighty keep and towering curtain which had loomed so large in the history of this country for two hundred years or more, would still have been a military and social anachronism long before Bosworth

Field. It is proposed therefore to study these other contributory factors in some detail, but before doing so we must recapitulate briefly the circumstances which had maintained the unchallenged supremacy of the castle not only in warfare but also as a social institution until the end of the fourteenth century.

In the first place the castle was a symbol of feudalism and thus one of the bases of the social structure for the greater part of the Middle Ages. As such it was the seat of the feudal baron and the principal manifestation of his power. His tenants owed him an often grudging allegiance in return for whatever protection his castle walls could afford them when danger threatened, and he in turn owed it just as unwillingly at times, to the king. The castle was therefore aimed initially against a potentially hostile populace, and later against overmighty rulers. Moreover, in the disordered times of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries it was frequently the one indispensable requirement of a powerful feudatory in the face of perpetual campaigns of personal aggrandisement waged against him by his jealous peers - a basic necessity in an unruly age when might was always right. Again, in a wider sense, a castle, if well placed, often constituted the key to a particular district, without the reduction of which no conquest was considered to have been made.

We have seen that whatever the tactical shortcomings of medieval commanders, they exercised a remarkable degree of ingenuity in the choice of strategical sites for their strongholds. The great castles of Edward I were due to his campaign for the final subjection of the ever turbulent Wales. By their positioning and strength they could be relied upon to complete the pacification of the Principality and to prevent the spread of any insurrection. We have seen too that the royal castles were utilised not only as instruments for the immediate discomfiture of the enemy in a particular campaign, but also as centres for mobilisation, supply, communication and administration. The castle was, in short, the key-stone of medieval warfare and of vital importance both socially and militarily. For this reason it necessarily bore the brunt of attack from all quarters where disaffection of any sort might exist.

It is not surprising therefore, that in England throughout the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, success in war depended upon the possession and defence of castles. Strategy took the form of devising the best route by which a castle might be surprised or relieved, and battle in the open avoided. Thus the civil wars of Stephen's reign, with their complicated details, were fought round castles and without any consistent plan of campaign. The wars of the Plantagenets in Normandy and the Angevin dominions

were concentrated upon the reduction or defence of single fortresses. It has been declared that in the whole of the military history of the period from 1066 to 1346 the most striking features are the importance of fortified places and the ascendancy assumed by the defensive.* Certainly by the end of the thirteenth century the castle builders had succeeded in pushing the enemy to a respectful distance. Against adequately flanked walls and machicolated battlements, the cumbrous operations of battering ram and scaling ladder were of little avail, and miners were at the mercy of a watchful garrison. The opportunity of the besieger lay in the improvement of engines for hurling missiles. The more formidable these became, the less probability was there of counter-acting them. However, up to this period, the missile machines, powerful as they were, were clumsy, and the damage which they inflicted upon the stonework was less than their menace to life and the perishable buildings within the walls.

It is clear therefore, that until the fourteenth century the military importance of the castle was unchallenged and its defensive superiority firmly established. In the concentric plan, as employed by Edward I in Wales, fortification attained its highest point. During the fourteenth century, refinements of castle planning

* Oman; The Art of War in the Middle Ages.

were frequent. But while foreign invasions and internal disturbances still maintained the old importance of the castle in the rest of Europe, it entered upon no further stage of development and indeed after the commencement of Beaumaris in 1295, no other great fortresses were built in this country, either as royal or private residences. The reasons for this cessation of castle building are, as previously indicated, diverse, and are themselves the result of a change in the social structure of the age as well as of a new conception of the art of war.

Perhaps the most effective single factor influencing the decline of the castle was the discovery during the second decade of the fourteenth century of the military potential of gunpowder. The progress of fire-arms in English warfare was retarded however by an excessive slowness, uncertainty of fire, clumsiness and extreme immobility which made the cannon for many years of little use, save for its effect on the enemy's morale. The earliest picture of a cannon is in a MS. at Christ Church, Oxford, written in 1326.* It shows a small object shaped like a bulbous bottle or flagon, loaded with an iron bolt like a large dart, and lying upon a four-legged stand. A soldier, standing at a respectful distance, as well he might, is in the act of firing it with a hot iron bar. Clearly here, as

* R. Coltman Clephan; The Progress of Firearms in England. A.J. vol. xviii. p.49.

yet, is no serious threat to the strength and supremacy of the castle. The earliest mention of a hand-gun in England appears to be in 1338,^{*} while the first example of the use of cannon by the English in a campaign was in 1327, when John of Hainault was in charge of those "crakys of war" which were to frighten the Scots by their newness and noise.⁺ Gunpowder and its ingredients were certainly used for military purposes in England during the years 1333-4. The Tower of London was the main arsenal of the country and contained, as far as is known, all the cannon in existence in the country at that time. They were under the charge of the Clerk of the Privy Wardrobe, and it is from this official's accounts that most of the extant information is obtained, regarding the early history of gunpowder and artillery in this country.[‡] Although no further information on the manufacture of gunpowder is recorded for several years after 1334, there is plenty of evidence that guns were employed, at anyrate by the French and by the continental allies of the English from the very beginning of the Hundred Years War.[§] There is no proof that the English ships used cannon in 1338, but there is testimony that the fleet equipped in that year in the

^{*} A.J. vol. lxvi. pp. 153-4.

⁺ A. E. Prince; The Importance of the Campaign of 1327. E.H.R. L. (1935) p. 301.

[‡] Printed in Tout; Firearms in England in the 14th. Century. E.H.R. XXVI. (1911) p. 688.

[§] Ibid. p. 699.

Norman ports for the invasion of England was provided with at least one piece of primitive artillery (un pot de fer a traire garros a feu.) * In 1339 cannon helped to save Cambrai from Edward III, and were used by the French in the siege of Puy-Guillhelm in Perigord. We are told that in the same year the men of Bruges constructed "niewen engienen die men heet ribaude" which were commanded by a "maitre des ribaudequins."⁺ To return to England, Mildenhall's Privy Wardrobe Account[‡] shows that as early as the 1st. February 1345, Edward III ordered the keeper of the Tower Wardrobe to repair and ship guns and pellets for the king's projected expedition in that year. On the 1st. October 1345 the king ordered Mildenhall to make a hundred "ribaldos pro passagio regis versus Normanniam." Professor Tout asserts that these were clearly the same class of instruments as the Bruges "ribaudequins"; groups of small cannon or bombards of which each unit was capable of being fired altogether or in rapid succession. Each collection of barrels was mounted on a single portable carriage, with two or four iron-hooped wheels. It is important in relation to our broader purpose of assessing the utility of artillery in employment against castles, to note that this type of weapon appears to have been not only exceedingly small, but also very untrustworthy, as James II of Scotland is

* Ibid. p. 670. + Ibid. ‡ Ibid. p. 688.

reported to have been killed by the bursting of an early cannon.* Nevertheless, their incipient danger to their users does not seem to have affected their growth in popularity to any marked degree, and as we have seen, Edward III had them constructed in considerable numbers in the Tower. In the Issue Rolls of the Exchequer⁺ between the 10th. October 1345 and the 13th. March 1346, Mildenhall received from the Exchequer £124-18-4d. "super factura ribaldorum et capitum quarrellorum ad opus regis." Walter, "faber regis in turri Londoniarum" made the ironwork, and Richard of St. Albans, the king's carpenter, the woodwork.

The question of whether these guns were used by the English at the battle of Crecy, is one over which there has been considerable controversy and speculation. Recent investigations however, seem to indicate that the likelihood of their employment is stronger than it was thought to be by the earlier historians.[‡] Edward III had himself suffered from the attentions of hostile artillery both at the siege of Tournai and at Cambrai, and had since exhibited great activity in amassing a force of cannon himself. The matter of the employment of artillery by the English king in the siege of Calais, is no longer in dispute. On the 1st. Sept. preceding his arrival before the town, orders were issued that all guns and engines then in the Tower should be

*The incident occurred at the siege of Roxburgh in 1460.

⁺Tout; op.cit.p.690.

[‡]Burne; op.cit.pp.192-202.

shipped along with "pellets", barrels for packing, saltpetre and gunpowder, and be taken to the king at Calais.* Considerable additional supplies of ammunition were also ordered for the siege.

There is no need, in view of the limited purpose of our inquiry into the adoption of cannon as weapons of war, to delve further into the question of the incidence of their early use. It is established without doubt that they were proving their worth in the field by the middle of the fourteenth century. At this experimental stage, it is in the field that they were chiefly used, and not against massive fortifications such as typified the true medieval fortress. At the siege of Calais, bombardrs were used to blockade the entrance to the harbour and to help prevent a relieving army from approaching the town on the landward side.†

We are informed by Professor Tout that the type of missile discharged by these early cannon lay somewhere between a bullet and a cannon ball as known during the last century. Such objects, though not conclusively proved to have come from guns used at Crecy, have been recovered from the site of the battle. These were of two to four inches in calibre and weighed about one and a half pounds.‡ Altogether five have been recovered, three of iron and two

* Tout: op.cit.p.688.

† Froissart: Works.
vol.iv.

‡ Burne: op.cit.
p.197.

of stone. It will be obvious therefore that missiles like these would have proved comparatively ineffective against walls twelve or fourteen feet thick. In fact it is well to remember that the great medieval siege engines, especially the comparatively recent trebuchet, insofar as they were used at all, continued to be employed long after the invention of gunpowder - even as late as the sixteenth century.* The stone balls hurled by these great engines are often found lying about the ruins of old castles. They weigh sometimes as much as two hundredweights, and it is known that stones half as heavy again could be thrown to a range as great as a quarter of a mile. Indeed, one fourteenth century manuscript shows a trebuchet loaded with a dead horse which might have weighed anything up to half a ton! Even so, as we have seen, these powerful weapons were much less than completely effective against a well defended fortress. It was in the years following the breach of the French treaty in 1369 that guns and gunpowder first became of real importance to the English armies.+ But although the potentialities of the weapon were undoubtedly realised by the fourteenth century engineer, if the velocity and size of the missile could be safely increased, it is by no means as certain, for the reasons given above, that the realisation struck immediate terror

* The late 15th. century Italian work upon military science, the De Re

+Tout: op.cit.p.674.

into the hearts of all fourteenth century military architects. The primitive ribaldos and ribaudequins of Edward III and his contemporaries were very different weapons from the guns of the Civil War which wrought such havoc on the Cavalier strongholds. Even then it is instructive to remember that many English castles, as well as many largely unfortified houses, held out long and heroically against the pounding of the Cromwellian guns. Indeed the artillery of the sixteenth century, when brought by the Parliamentary army against Corfe, a castle of particularly strong masonry, was powerless to reduce it, though the cannon battered away at its walls for nine months.

There was then no swift realisation that the day of the castle was over. We have seen that there was no substantial lack of attention to fortresses from the beginning of Edward III's reign, at least for reasons of apparent obsolescence, and in fact it appears that immediately before 1369 care was taken to equip the chief fortresses of the realm with the modern artillery weapon. In 1365 two great guns and nine small ones were sent from the Tower to the new castle of Queenborough in Sheppey - a large supply for a castle which was not one of the most important strongholds of the Crown.* In 1371 six guns, a barrel of

Militari of Robert Valturius, still gives drawings and descriptions of the trebuchet, as well as of cannons and bombards.

* Privy Wardrobe Account of John Sleaford printed in Tout. op. cit. p. 692.

saltpetre and one of sulphur were sent to Dover castle. Some of the king's castles supplied their needs from sources other than the Tower, as for example in 1379, when the keepers of Carisbrooke purchased two cannon and a supply of salt petre and sulphur,* and in 1382, when a gun was purchased for Southampton for 5s.8d.+ If it were intended, as would appear likely, to employ cannon inside the castles themselves for their defence, it would obviously be necessary to make some provision for firing them other than from the top of the fortifications where not only would they and their attendants prove exceedingly vulnerable to opposing artillery, but would also constitute a greater menace to the structure which they were intended to protect than the guns of the enemy himself. The first adjustment of the walls for the use of firearms was made in the design of the loop-holes, as seen at the main gateway of Bodiam castle and at the West Gate of the city of Canterbury.[‡] The base of the holes is circular for the mouth of the piece, while the upper part remains a vertical slot for sighting. The great gate-house at Cooling, built in 1380, also has ports for hand-guns in its lower storey, while at Warkworth in the eastern tower they were formed by blocking the ordinary cross-loops through most of their

* J. Hunter: Proofs of the early use of Gunpowder in the English Army. Archaeologia. xxxii. 384.

+ Tout: op. cit. p. 675.

‡ See end of chapter.

height. In addition to these provisions for the employment of artillery in castle defences, it was necessary also that some alteration be made in the structure of the walls themselves. As cannon became more powerful, the very height of the flanking curtain which had formerly been an essential factor in defence against the siege tower and scaling ladder, now became inherently dangerous if pounded repeatedly at the base by well-directed fire. Thus we find that those defensive works built specifically for defence against artillery, are much squatter and more solid than their predecessors.

It will be clear therefore, from what has gone before, that the introduction of gunpowder into general use did not mean an immediate abandonment of defence by stone walls. The increasing practice of fortifying important towns by walls was a significant development in the fourteenth century. The architectural reaction to the employment of gunpowder may be summed up as being one of respectful awareness of the advent of a new and revolutionary weapon. There was even at first some attempt on the part of the builders to employ it themselves, until the science of ballistics weighed the balance too heavily against them.

By the beginning of the fourteenth century there were less particular changes in warfare than the introduction of gunpowder, which were mitigating against the continued

importance of the castle. It has been observed that most of the military activity of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries consisted of a number of sieges in which the stronghold of a rival baron was the chief object of attack. From the time of Edward III's wars in France and even earlier, this was becoming less true of warfare in general. Such important battles as there were, though few, were being fought more and more in the open field and where a fortified place was threatened it was more likely to be a town than the fortress of an individual. The reason for this was to be found, as we shall see, in the increasing significance of the wealthy borough as the real strength of a realm. Then too, it was at this period that the more astute military commanders were beginning to appreciate the real value of the long-bow if used intelligently and with adequate support. Throughout the greater part of the Middle Ages, the feudal horseman was the chief power in battle; it had been the somewhat undisciplined but indubitably valorous charge of the mail-clad knight on his heavy destrier which had paved the way to so many victories. The appearance of the long-bow as a national weapon in the Assize of Arms of 1252, is the dividing line in the military history of medieval England. If covered from the impact of an enemy charge by mounted and dismounted knights on chosen ground, the longbowman could cut up and ruin the

wildly attacking feudal array as it lumbered onwards. The first full account of the scientific use of archery is that of the battle of Falkirk in 1298. The first attack of the English cavalry upon the solid clumps of Scottish pikemen was a complete failure. Then king Edward drew back his knights and brought forward his bowmen (most of whom were Welsh.). He concentrated their discharges upon certain parts of the hostile masses and when these were riddled with arrows, sent his cavalry into the demoralised ranks. The charge was completely successful and the Scots were ridden down and cut to pieces. Learning from the failure of Edward 11 to use his archers properly at Bannockburn, Edward Balliol and his English auxiliaries won a resounding victory over Davud Bruce at Dupplin Moor in 1332. Halidon Hill in the following year was an exact reproduction of Dupplin Moor on a larger scale. By the studied use of archers the stage was set for the advent of strategy and the deployment of forces in an open battle where the whole power of the enemy might be defeated at one blow. The full implications of this possibility were not at first realised, and it would not be true to say that the day of the strategist had fully arrived even by the end of the fourteenth century. Apart from the obvious set-piece engagements of Crecy and Poitiers, when the tactics of Dupplin Moor were transported to the continent, the

English campaigns in France were long processions of devastation with uncertain objectives, because the enemy had made up his mind to refuse pitched battles. Nevertheless, the seeds of change were sown, and aided by the development during the fifteenth century of the professional soldier on a large scale, came to fruition in the Wars of the Roses when the crown of England was won in a battle not against castle walls, but in the open field.

Although perhaps not so obvious in its effect as the changes wrought in warfare by the introduction of gunpowder or the development of strategy, much of the answer to the problem of the decline in castle building lies in the changing political and social structure of the realm. The castle stood primarily for lordship - local power. There can be no doubt that the steadily increasing royal power in the earlier Middle Ages resulted in an increasingly centralised state in which the private fortresses became something of an anachronism. The royal castles were admittedly in a rather different category, insofar as they stood usually at the head of administrative estates or districts, or were indirectly under the sheriff, the chief local officer of the Crown, and thus became the centres of county administration. The royal castles were also employed for a diversity of purposes for which the private fortress could not be used. By virtue of their

strength they were sometimes treasuries, sometimes armouries (as the Tower still is) and almost invariably prisons. Edward III turned Odiham into a stud for the breeding of the royal horses. The king's castles were not, then, so apparently influenced by the decline in feudal lordship as those of the great magnates, but obviously the obsolescence of one would necessarily result in the eventual eclipse of the other. It is again a striking fact that as Professor Stenton has shown " - between the Norman Conquest and the accession of Edward I there were only two periods when general peace was maintained in England for thirty consecutive years." Certainly the remaining centuries of the Middle Ages did not witness the end of rebellion or Civil War, but there was nonetheless an important change. From the thirteenth century onwards rebellion became less the result of personal grievance and more the expression of a wider political opposition. The undoubtedly personal grievances of the magnates who rose against king John in the last years of his reign were to some extent welded into the responsible programme of general reform embodied in Magna Carta; the baronial opposition to Henry III in the mid-thirteenth century was at first even more markedly united in the demand for specific reforms in the royal government. Again, the spread of political consciousness, and a little of political

power, downwards to the middle classes, increasingly rendered the ambitions of individual nobles ineffective against the Crown, without some measure of support by general political disaffection. These slow and subtle changes tending to the growth of political responsibility and stability within the realm tended also to decrease the importance of individual lordship. By the reign of Edward III, another powerful influence was working towards the same end. The Hundred Years War with France united king and magnates against a common enemy and directed the attentions of the baronage, and the martial energies of the more militant among them, beyond the frontiers of the kingdom. As a result of these and other causes, the more personal rebellions of the earlier Middle Ages were translated into something approaching closer to the clash of opposed parties divided by more fundamental differences within the community of the realm, and impossible of resolution by an isolated siege or solitary campaign.

Economic and social changes also were at work to render the castle obsolete. The rise of towns and the growth of a wealthy mercantile class hastened the decline of feudalism. The increase of trade and industry swelled the ranks of the middle classes who did not live in castles. The feudal baron was no longer the representative of an all-important aristocracy and his stronghold became of

minor importance compared with the walled boroughs which were symbolical of the real strength of the country. While the hated baronial castle was often the visible manifestation of subjection, the wall round the town reminded the burgesses of their rights as citizens and their community of interests. They looked on their allotted share in its defence as a privilege no less than as a duty, and the townsmen of open towns eagerly applied for and warmly welcomed the right to protect themselves with a wall. Towns grew in size and prosperity, and to some extent the declining strength of the castle was offset by the increasing fortification of towns, for their importance made them, rather than the castle, the objective of the warfare of larger armies.

It must be emphasised however, that these changes were slow, and though the great age of the castle should be placed in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, its importance in war and peace continued for a considerable period thereafter, augmented no doubt by long established outlook and habit. The cumulative effect of all the factors contributing to the ultimate decline of the castle as a primarily military structure was seen in its increasing development along two different lines. The domestication of the castle in the later Middle Ages had already emphasised its residential character, which became more

obvious and more luxurious as its defences were lowered. At the latter end of the fourteenth century and throughout the fifteenth, the military and domestic elements come more and more into sharp contrast, the attention paid to each varying in different parts of the country and according to different sets of circumstances.

In districts constantly harassed by war, such as the Scottish Border, the castle reverts from a walled and flanked enclosure to the state of a fortified house protected on the most vulnerable side by a walled courtyard. The ordinary landowner raised his pele-tower, trusting to the thickness of the walls and the immunity of the vaulted ground storey from fire. These towers formed the chief defensive structures of enclosures called "peles." The normal elevation was of three storeys; the ground floor may have been used as a stable and certainly was used as a store-room. The door was of wood, but its outer face was protected by a heavy framework of iron. The first floor was the main living room and the second provided the sleeping accommodation. The battlements at the top were generally machicolated.* Where a stone dwelling already existed, increasing recourse was had during the reigns of the Edwards and Richard II, to the process of crenellation. In the majority of cases, such fortification was not

*Belsay, built in the 14th. century is the most handsome building of its kind in the north of England.
Professor Hamilton-Thompson.

designed to withstand a siege, but to keep off casual marauders whose object was plunder rather than warfare. Against such minor fortifications however we must remember the instances where the process of crenellation definitely meant conversion into a castle. Dunstanburgh, which Thomas of Lancaster had licence to crenellate in 1315, is a military stronghold of the most pronounced type. On the 27th. January 1344, Edward III "of his especial grace" granted to his "beloved and faithful Thomas de Heton" a licence "to fortify his manor house of Chillingham with a wall of lime and stone, to crenellate it and to make it into a castle or fortalice."* In the previous year Robert Bertram had obtained a similar licence to turn his manor house at Bothal into a castle,† while in 1335 Ranulf de Dacre had erected his tower at Naworth and enclosed a court with a curtain wall which he received a licence to crenellate.‡ The substantial nature of this erection is indicated by the fact that when the Scots marched against Naworth in 1346, they found it too strongly protected to warrant an attack, and returned again without striking a blow. § William Strickland, Bishop of Carlisle, obtained a licence in 1397 to strengthen and crenellate his house within the town of Penrith. This would be a pele-tower standing alone as the solitary stone building amid the

* CPR. 1343-45. p. 191.

† Ibid. p. 30.

‡ Curwen; Castles and Towers of Cumberland and Westmorland.

§ Curwen; op. cit.

timber dwellings of the town. It was clearly not counted as a castle when "the manor and town" of Penrith were granted to Ralph Neville in the following year.* In 1399 however, a further licence was granted to build a curtain wall of stone and lime and join it to the said house, and it is significant that in 1471 Richard, Duke of Gloucester and Guardian of the West March, was granted "the lordship and castle of Penrith." The present stone castle of Piel seems to have been built by Abbot John Cockerham, who received a licence for the Convent of Furness to crenellate their dwelling-house of Fotheray.⁺ Bishop John Kirkby obtained a licence to strengthen and crenellate his dwelling place "de la Rose" in 1336, stating that it had lately been desolated by the Scots, and provided it with a curtain wall of immense thickness. However we regard these foundations, whether as castles, pele-towers or fortified manor houses, it is certainly true that they were built specifically for defence. Their fortifications were no mere concession to out-dated tradition, but were a matter of strict necessity. Indeed the pele-tower proper was far from being the acme of residential perfection. With the exception of Belsay, where some consideration was given to domestic comfort, there was rarely any concession to easier living which would have prejudiced

*Ibid.

⁺CPR.1327-30.p.169.

the defence in any way. Elsewhere in England also, the late fourteenth century produced a number of buildings fully and comprehensively fortified, which come nearer to being regarded as castles than they do either of the two other categories of contemporary works. John de Norwich, one of the king's admirals, obtained permission in 1343 to erect a castle at Mettingham in Suffolk. The reason given for the licence was that it was necessary to protect the local population in the event of a raid from the sea. The sole example of a royal fortress built in the fourteenth century was Queenborough in the Isle of Sheppey, the design of which was so advanced as to be unique. The castle was commissioned in 1361 by Edward III, again to guard the coast against the possibility of French invasion. For the same reason also, John de Cobham built Cooling castle on the Kentish shore of the Thames in 1380. Six years later, Sir Edward Dalyngrugge commenced his castle of Bodiam to provide against attack on the ports of Rye and Winchelsea. The licence gives permission to Sir Edward "to crenellate his manor of Bodiam by the sea and to make a castle thereof in defence of the adjacent country against the king's enemies."* For this reason it is a stout edifice, situated in an elaborately engineered artificial lake and sturdily built with walls and towers, looking much more like a

* CPR. 1385-89. p. 42.

castle of a century earlier. The labour and pains which were taken to strengthen this castle are shown by the revetting of the earthwork, not only of the main island, but also of the lesser islands in the moat, and of a portion of the causeways of approach. Both here and at Cooling, as we have seen, ports were provided for hand-guns. The Lord Chancellor's castle at Bolton in Wensleydale was another powerful castle built subsequent to a royal licence granted to him in 1379.

We see therefore that stonework was far from being abandoned as a defence measure, and castles were still being built at the end of the fourteenth century. It must be emphasised that these fourteenth century castles are not to be compared in sheer power and size with the Welsh fortresses of Edward I, yet they can be regarded in some respects as the last development of the castle proper, insofar as they combined almost to perfection its dual role of residence and stronghold. The residential buildings became for the first time an integral part of the whole, as opposed to miscellaneous structures placed here and there in the bailey. This development is important, because although at Bodiam, Cooling and the other strategic castles of the fourteenth century, residential comfort does not take priority over considerations of defence, elsewhere from this period onwards, as the military importance of

the castle declines, so castle building shows an increasing concentration on domestic amenities at the expense of fortification. While the outward facade of strength was maintained, there was an ever increasing desire to expand the hall, the living rooms and the offices, and to place those buildings in convenient relation to each other.

The tremendous works carried out at Windsor by Edward III after 1350, are typical of the increasing domestication of the castle at this time. The chronicler, Ranulf Higden, relates how "our lord the king at the instance of William Wickham, clerk, caused many excellent buildings in the Castle of Windsor to be thrown down, and others more fair and sumptuous to be set up. For almost all the masons and carpenters throughout the whole of England were brought to that building, so that hardly anyone could have any good mason or carpenter except in secret, on account of the king's prohibition."* Just how unmilitary were those works, we may see from references to bath-houses, the queen's "daunsyng chambre" and mews for the king's falcons as well as a great clock in the keep. Even in the more turbulent north are seen the far-reaching effects of this growing desire for comfort. In the important additions made to the castle of Warkworth about 1400, the compromise attained between the requirements of defence and comfort


*From W.H.St. John Hope; Windsor Castle.

is very striking. The keep, erected by the first Earl of Northumberland who died in 1407, contains all the accomodation of a first class residence of the period, and though obviously not on the same scale as Edward III's lavish works at Windsor, is a marvel of compact and skilful planning. Similarly Raby, built mainly in the last quarter of the fourteenth century, was no secondary work of a minor lord, but the seat of the princely Neville family, yet the place is emphatically first and foremost a residence, to which certain piecemeal defences have been added. There were numerous buildings of this type built from the beginning of the fourteenth century, and there were produced many beautiful examples of the skill of the medieval architect, which bore an outward resemblance to castles, but which were never designed to face a serious attack. As the military need for the elaborate defences of the castle proper declined, the fortified manor house ceased to be as it were a poor substitute for its larger predecessor and became the residence of the great as well as of those who, because of financial stringency, could afford nothing better. Hurstmonceaux, with its mimicry of defence, marks the transition from the military stronghold to the English manor house of the next century. Tattershall, provided with elaborate inner and outer moats and dominated by a lofty brick tower with machicolated

battlements, is a palace with the semblance of a fortress.

Thus, in the words of Professor Hamilton-Thompson, the castle had seen its day as a factor in the evolution of military science, and the future of fortification lay in a return, under new conditions and through gradual processes, to the system of defence by earthwork from which the castle had grown to maturity.

Ports for hand-guns in
Fourteenth Century Fortifications.



CANTERBURY FALAISE KIRBYMORLOE

APPENDIX 1.

The Royal Castles of England 1327-46.

Arundel*	Devizes	Melbourne
Bamburgh	Donington	Miere
Banbury	Dover	Newark
Beeston	Elmley	Newcastle
Berwick	Exeter	Newcastle-under-Lyme
Bolingbroke	Eye	Norham
Bolsover	Gloucester	Northampton
Bridgenorth	Hanley	Norwich
Bridgewater	Hadley	Nottingham
Bristol	Hastings	Odiham
Brough	Hereford	Okeham
Cambridge	Hertford	Old Sarum
Canterbury	Hodnet	Oxford
Carisbrooke	Holt	The Peak
Carlisle	Horsley	Pevensy ⁺
Chester	Kenilworth	Pickering
Clare	Kimbolton	Pleshey
Clitherhoe	Knaresborough	Pontefract
Clypston	Launceston	Porchester
Cockermouth	Leeds	Prudhoe
Colchester	Lincoln	Redcastle
Conisborough	Ludlow	Restormel
Corfe	Marlborough	Rochester

*Temporarily

⁺Held by Queen Philippa
for life. CPR.1338-40.
p.208.

Rockingham	Sleaford	Wallingford
Roxburgh	Somerton	Warkworth ⁺
Sandal	St. Briavels	Warwick
Scarborough	Tickhill	Winchester
Sherborne*	Tower of London	Windsor
Shrewsbury	Tremeton	York
Skipton-in-Craven	Tutbury	

*Returned to the Bishops of
Salisbury in 1337.

⁺Granted to Henry Percy
in 1328.

APPENDIX 3.

The Disposition of the Royal Castles.

