The bearing of modern analytical philosophy on educational theory

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Abstract of M.Ed. Thesis
'The Bearing of Modern Analytical Philosophy on Educational Theory'

A critical exploration of the literature from 1942 to 1965 reveals the nature of the 'bearing' in question. In the pioneering work of C.D. Hardie, in the present sustained contribution to educational thinking of many philosophers and in the writings which steadily accumulated during the years between, there is ample evidence that the main division within pure analytical philosophy is reflected in the applied field. The rival 'positivistic' and 'linguistic' approaches are clearly discernible in each of the broad areas of interest which have emerged during this short period.

In ethics, the early 'positivistic' position persists in the form of arguments for ultimately irreducable moral differences; but it is opposed by the majority view of the most influential group of educational philosophers, a 'linguistic' view best expressed by R.S. Peters. A similar opposition is seen in the related literature on the teaching of morality.

Current examinations of the characteristics of educational discourse show these opposed emphases. The largely 'linguistic' elucidation of the role of definitions and other language elements given by I. Scheffler is criticized from a scientifically-orientated 'positivistic' standpoint in very recent contributions, particularly in those of G.R. Eastwood.

A central issue, that of the nature of educational theory, is similarly debated by representatives from each of the
branches of analytical philosophy. The 'linguistic' P.H. Hirst argues that educational theory is a complex 'field' and not a distinct 'form' of knowledge as a counter to the simpler 'means-ends' interpretation developed by such 'positivists' as D.J. O'Connor.

The resolution of this conflict in analytical philosophy of education must await a settling of the basic issue in the pure philosophy from which the new discipline is derived. There are signs that a solution of the problem can be expected which will show that the two analytical approaches are in fact complementary and not contradictory.

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October 1966
THE BEARING OF MODERN ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY
ON EDUCATIONAL THEORY

A Critical Exploration Of The Literature:
1942 - 1965

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October, 1966
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Theoretical Orientation: Preview Of Method And Content.

There is little doubt that the activities denoted by the terms 'modern analytical philosophy' and 'educational theory' are, these days, quite familiar to the majority of those whose work lies within the academic sphere. What is less certain is the extent to which it is known that there exists a connection between these two activities - the first enterprise bears impressively on the second - and that the fact and the manner of this connection is something which has been demonstrated and developed quite recently in the intellectual life of the English-speaking community.

The establishment of this relationship has been such a very recent event that controversies abound as to its precise nature and no one interpretation commands universal respect. At the present time, much is being written on the subject: more and more individual philosophers are coming to devote the whole of their professional energy to describing, analysing and clarifying the relationship and its consequences; and there is now in existence even a type of corporate investigation, involving the syst-
ematic and sustained co-operation of thinkers within a discipline traditionally associated with a dedication to egocentric performance and personal viewpoint. Nevertheless, doubt remains as to the more exact effects of that twentieth century revolution which enables us to talk intelligibly of 'modern analytical philosophy' on the serious thinking about education which is known, at least by those who are not disposed to exaggerate its traditional achievements, as 'educational theory'.

It would be possible to ignore this doubt; to accept, for example, what appears to be almost the 'official' interpretation of the relationship in question, as it is developed perspicuously in a recent article by Paul Hirst (1), and to examine this philosophically, enquiring into its internal consistency, tracing its elements to their origins in contemporary 'pure' philosophy and so displaying its limits as the limits of the sources demarcated by this process. But to do this initially would be unilluminating, for it would clarify a viewpoint implied in a proportion only of the ongoing work in this area - that being undertaken by certain British philosophers. This will be attempted later, once the fact of diversity within analytical philosophy, both in

its pure form and in its educational derivatives, has been outlined and illustrated with reference to writings other than those having influence in this country at this time and with reference also to aspects of the philosophy/education nexus barely proclaimed and not argued in any detail by Hirst (2).

Such a procedure would be unilluminating, too, in the emphasis it would immediately place upon purely philosophical matters, an emphasis consequent on the nature of the argument presented in the Hirst article. What is needed, to put things in proper perspective, and afford weight to as many as possible of the aspects that have been revealed during several decades of the bearing of one enterprise on the other, is a mode of entry into the rapidly-accumulating literature which will provide cues and directions for sampling, comparison and cross-reference within the corpus available, so that the resultant discussion is both philosophically and educationally pertinent. Such a mode of entry is at hand in the availability of writings old enough to afford some possibility of chronological, if not historical, comparison with current ideas, compendious enough to enable the selection of points of enquiry which will lead to a fair sample of later commentaries, criticisms and developments and yet recent enough to carry

(2) Surnames are used in the body of the text following the first reference to each writer.
philosophical weight within the relatively young movement of analytical philosophy, the doctrines of which are still very open to the kind of debate engendered by the reinterpretation of earlier positions as a counter to the latest commitments.

However, though 'old' expositions will be recalled to provide starting points for enquiry, it is philosophical positions which retain some life, and not mere historical surveys of dead issues, which will provide the theme and variations of this account. To offer history and not philosophy would be to repeat the error of traditional 'philosophy of education' as taught to generations of students. Against this passive transmission of inert ideas, unenlightened by the act of philosophising, all analytical educational thinkers, of no matter what more detailed persuasion, have argued, distinguishing their own intentions and activities as genuinely philosophical and, in this sense, revolutionary. Thus, any historical element discernible in the present account will be no more than the chosen framework within which the confrontation of philosophical positions can be arranged: it will be history in a sense coming to be appreciated within pure philosophy in its many branches, for example the philosophy of science; that is, critical history in which the criticism is from one standpoint (often but not necessarily a later one) to another, a crisscrossing proc-
edure the management of which is itself a philos­ophical activity.

It follows that there will gradually emerge, to superimpose itself on the initial and recurrent chronological structure, a second type of order, that of the major themes and areas which the comparisons of position delineate as they are made from philosophers writing at various points on the limited time scale of this enquiry. First will appear ethics, in its fundamental bearing on educational thinking and the practical consequences of this bearing for moral education, of primary importance in any account, no matter what mode of entry into the literature is used: and so is it in this account which chooses to start with the earliest of analytical investigations into educational theory. A second theme to appear, originating also in early work but of great importance in the most recent publications as well as throughout the quarter of a century under review, is the nature of the metaphorical expressions which pervade attempts made to talk of education in meaningful and illuminating terms to a wide and heterogeneous audience interested in it as a social process.

From a study of metaphor, an aspect of language of great attraction to the philosophical analyst, it is a logically short step to the examination of both wider and narrower aspects—those concerned, firstly, with the roles of the many kinds of definition to be found in serious writing, and the part played in more
popular educational discourse by slogans. These themes, too, are approachable chronologically, in that they can be discovered in rudimentary form early in the stated period, but, in this account, they occur at a point where the original mode of entry, the element of history, has served its purpose of providing some initial structure: and so the themes and areas, the superimposing second type of structure, take over and furnish centres of interest within which the sampling of opposed viewpoints operates with more weight attaching to the contemporary controversies and less to the 'older' ones.

Against this background, which weaves a pattern of relationships out of the views and positions of the major philosophers who have contributed to the twenty-five year long debate, the 'official' interpretation of the nature of educational theory pronounced by Hirst is examined, at a stage in the account where it is possible to make more fruitful reference to other names and other interpretations than would have been possible had the examination taken place earlier. And from this central discussion there emerges a fundamental point about the sources which vitalise it, a point which has been implied constantly in building up the background, but which is made fully explicit as a preliminary to the final stages of the thesis. — that, broadly speaking, there are two branches within the 'family' of analytical
philosophy - the formal and the informal. Between those philosophers who value above all the precision of the languages of science and mathematics and those who prefer the flexibility of ordinary language there exists a certain tension which can be seen reflected from the pure philosophical scene into the educational areas where such philosophers are now at work.

The nature of philosophy, of language and, particularly, of knowledge, is investigated from these two apparently conflicting points of view (labelled, for convenience and without implications which could be read into the names from the history of recent philosophy, 'positivistic' and 'linguistic'); with special reference to one area of knowledge chosen from the many available - that of social science, taken to include history. This epistemological enquiry, together with the related investigations into the philosophy of mind, is seen to be of an importance to educational theory almost equal to that of the enquiry into ethics with which the post-introductory part of the present account begins, a fact which emerges from detailed analyses of the concept of 'knowing' given as an example of the rigour introduced into educational theorising by analytical philosophers.

Finally, these instances of philosophy in action amongst restricted conceptual problems leads into an attempt to forecast the resolution between
the two kinds of analysis which will possibly be found - first within pure philosophy and then, as a consequence, within the new philosophy of education. This resolution, it is suggested, will perhaps come about once it is more widely grasped that the 'positivistic' and 'linguistic' approaches are complementary and not contradictory, that they emphasise different aspects of the phenomenon of language in ways which can be without tension accommodated in a wider view, according proper weight to each of the sectors of language-study - the syntactics, semantics and pragmatics of C.W. Morris's semiotic, concerned with the embracing study of the uses, meanings and modes of combining signs. (3)

To the suggested starting point of our enquiry we can now move, having sketched the path which leads from it in sufficient detail to explain the recollection of the 'oldest' exposition in existence as a logical beginning. The first (and still intellectually stimulating) attempt at showing 'the bearing of modern analytical philosophy on educational theory' is the work of C.D. Hardie, dating from the early nineteen-forties and, consequently, of at least the historical interest that we have previously mention-

(3) Morris, C. W., Signs, Language and Behavior (Prentice-Hall, 1946)
ed in order to renounce as the sole object of this enquiry. (4) That the philosophical arguments developed in this book are still worthy of serious attention, even if only to direct investigation towards philosophers who have argued on similar topics but with more contemporary power and greater effect, is a contention which this thesis hopes to justify in some measure by sifting what have proved to be the fruitful themes from the barren.


In Hardie there can be immediately and clearly distinguished the two enterprises, analytical philosophy and educational theory, under present discussion. The author as much as says: Before us we have several examples of educational theory, chosen as typical of the genre and created by thinkers whose conception of the nature of philosophy bears little resemblance to the revolutionary conception of its nature developed in recent times by analytical philosophers. We shall reveal the deficiencies and limitations of these theories, employing for our task of criticism tools and techniques of analysis devised by philosophers become, of late and for the first time, fully conscious of the nat-

ure of their discipline. As a result of this critique, we shall make clear to ourselves what are the defining characteristics of an educational theory, what are the logical bones which any such theory must reveal, under the new kind of philosophical scrutiny, if it is to be professionally acceptable.

This implied intention and explicit procedure of examination, to be found in Hardie, has the merit of simplicity. His uncomplicated, straightforward approach has made his views the object of occasional commendation by a few amongst later philosophers working in the area charted in this book (5). But his simplicity, rooted in the view that theories are specimens to be put under a simple philosophical magnifying glass, may seem to border on the naive when compared with later investigations. Certainly this method of scrutinising 'standard' theories is one of the least fruitful elements in Hardie, if lack of heirs is anything to judge by: it is not a method which has proved to be even a minor occupation of those who have subsequently been concerned to use analysis in educational thinking. No one has produced, following his lead, a similar critique of the traditional educational theorists left, from Plato onwards, to add to his three; and, of these

three — concerned with the 'nature' theorists, Herbart and Dewey — only the Dewey critique has remained a living issue, Hardie having defended at a later date his early refutation against attacks made by American philosophers wielding very sophisticated tools of analysis and eager to show Dewey's capacity for survival even in the age of analysis(6)(A professional eagerness which gives some warrant to the earlier remark that the very relationship between analytical philosophy and educational theory is open to many interpretations and subject to continuing controversies.)

However the pursuit of Dewey in relation to analysis would remove us too far from our main theme, being in itself a topic for voluminous commentary; and it is therefore not the cue in Hardie which we will take. What is, is the fact that analysis of 'standard' theories appears in this, the earliest of investigations, as the paradigm procedure; and that it consists in the juxtaposition of two elements: the

theories, which we can for our purposes ignore, and the philosophical analysis itself, about which we can ask a number of questions designed to elicit its nature, its sources, its effectiveness, its influence on later writers in the field and its relationship to aspects of the philosophising of such later writers which originate in pure philosophical investigations not available to Hardie himself. The very reference to areas in which questions can be asked implies, in fact, the kind of answers which will probably be found. Selected details of Hardie's early analysis must point in the direction of later analyses, enabling us to establish links and relationships and so to illustrate the 'bearing' we are attempting to elucidate: the very concept of the 'bearing' of one enterprise upon the other is being defined, in fact, in terms of whatever varied instances such a flexible scrutiny, passing from one writer to another, does reveal.

Hardie sets out his first object-theory for examination in describing the influential view that a child ought to be educated according to Nature; and the manner in which he does this is instructive for anyone wanting to identify his precise position within analytical philosophy. It reveals in action the techniques closely associated with 'the Cambridge analytical school' to whom he makes reference in his Introduction, acknowledging them as his pure philos-
ophical mentors (7). Hardie's technique (and their's) is easy to grasp: the substance of his analysis can be précised with ease or set out in note form in such a manner as to reveal its tidy, almost predictable shape. The end-product is a series of classified propositions carved out of the body of the object-theory, commented upon, broken down into sub-propositions and eventually disposed of to the philosophical satisfaction of the author. The effect of this exercise is a type of clarification by dissection of an almost surgical nature, the bones of the original position being revealed for inspection. The vagueness of the original proposition concerning the education of children according to Nature is replaced by the more manageable precision of four propositions offered in its place, each one of which can be examined in a piecemeal fashion in order to establish its truth or falsity (Though not its truth or fallacy - the illogical dichotomy chosen, presumably with conscious but nevertheless puzzling intent, for the title of the book.)

The question for us is: What kind of analysis is this? Can it be that this apparently mechanical procedure is the whole of the much-vaunted activity which is widely acknowledged as having revolutionised the mother of disciplines? The answer, previously implied, is that there... indeed other forms of

(7) Hardie, C. D., op. cit., p. ix
analysis than this characteristic product of the times which Hardie practised. While a fully explicit description of them, particularly as they group themselves into the 'positivistic' and 'linguistic' approaches previously mentioned, must be postponed until sufficient movement around the educational literature has provided a background against which the description will be meaningful, a preliminary sketch of the two broad views of the nature of analysis is essential to ensure that this movement has direction. And so, in this we find the first fruitful element of Hardie for our purposes: the cue which takes us from his limited kind of analysis to an adumbration of analysis in its various aspects, as seen from our vantage point in the middle of the nineteen-sixties.

He derives his techniques from the accepted practice of philosophers working without the benefit of a thorough acquaintance with the later, second-phase philosophical investigations of Ludwig Wittgenstein (8) - this is the simplest way of putting it. The Wittgensteinian slogan, 'the meaning is the use', and its far-reaching implications for analysis are not part of the background from which this writing draws strength; and, consequently, the 'meaning' of what the Nature theorists assert

has to be made clear by Hardie, to himself as much as to his readers, not by analysing its use in the social context of its typical utterance, but by a form of translation, of substitution for the original of supposedly clearer, expanded expressions. He gives meaning to what he regards as a hopelessly vague proposition by providing a series of new propositions which are supposed to be, collectively, the logical equivalent of the old without its incomprehensibility.

If we think of the two broad views concerning the nature of analysis as lying on different sides of a dividing line created by Wittgenstein's mature rejection of his own youthful theory (9) and cognate systems, then this Hardiean technique falls clearly within the first view. His introductory acknowledgement to G.E. Moore is superfluous in view of the evidence presented by his actual manner of philosophising, which is Mooreian in temper and detail through and through. During the course of a long life's work Moore displays several views about what analysis is, that is, about knowing the meaning of an expression in the technical sense; and Hardie draws upon the most consistently used of these views for his own work - that which asserts that analysis is concerned with being able to state what the constit-

uent concepts are into which a concept under scrutiny can be divided and which compose it (or the constituent propositions, when the expression being analysed is a complete sentence). Such a view is also predominant in the early work of Wittgenstein and is based on the concept theory of meaning, that is of meaning as a peculiar sort of entity which the mind can view and understand, which he came to reject in his later work, of which Hardie clearly has little knowledge.

Hardie reveals his indebtedness to this 'division' view of analysis when he asserts that 'it is necessary always to state each theory in the clearest possible way so that no ambiguity may be allowed to flourish undiscovered' (10), implying that analysis is concerned with putting an unruly house in order rather than more tolerantly investigating the possible legitimate reasons for the unruliness. He identifies vagueness and substitutes, at greater length, precision: he translates and expands, proffering terms and propositions the referents for which are less open to doubt and dispute; and in this way he banishes the lurking ambiguities which bar theoretical progress in education. Such, at any rate, is his intention. What remains for us to develop, in order to complete this preliminary

sketch, is the contrary view of the nature of analysis, which is characteristic of the philosophising done on the other side of the dividing line identified above and which, though strangely associated with the Wittgenstein of the 'Philosophical Investigations', can be described at this stage with reference to Moore, in that his writings show some signs of its presence. ('It is, I think, possible and of some interest...to characterise Wittgenstein's... later "Philosophical Investigations" as Mooreian' (11)).

The 'distinction' view of analysis is concerned with being able to say how a concept or proposition under scrutiny is related to and distinguished from other concepts or propositions which are embedded in the same or different expressions. We shall find this view implied in much of the philosophising about education to be considered; and it is a view which, in contrast to the approach of Hardie, lays great emphasis upon the patient disentanglement of meanings by taking seriously what is actually stated in the context of its statement instead of an eager dismissal of apparently ambiguous expressions in favour of the establishment of a more easily acceptable translation, which is Hardie's method. 'The mean-

ing is the use' sums up, in slogan form, this latter approach, with its dedication to a naturalistic observation and description of the forms language takes in actual use, with its emphasis on looking to see what is actually there rather than mining beneath the surface of language to find some deep logical bedrock.

In the light of this conception of analysis, Hardie's procedure of taking literally a vague expression such as 'a child ought to be educated according to Nature', seeing in it no literal sense and then translating it into a number of supposedly constituent expressions the truth-claims of which can be judged, appears misconceived. It is an unsympathetic and illiberal stance to adopt towards language - so the proponents of the contrary view of analysis would contend. It overlooks the necessity of asking what meaning a proposition has for the person stating it; what intention such a person has in using it; what linguistic and social context it appears in as a legitimate attempt at communication. This kind of delicate probing, a careful separation of expressions designed to distinguish the various uses within a context which contains manifold human intentions and language conventions is very different from - though not necessarily superior to or a contradiction of - the blunt, simple analytical enquiry favoured by Hardie in outlining his programme: '...if
two educational theorists disagree I think it should be made clear whether the disagreement is factual or verbal or due to some emotional conflict.'

(12)

We can enter into this programme, having sketched in the main lines of both views of analysis, the more and the less formal, using it as a gateway into the branch of philosophy which has, perhaps, the greatest relevance of any for education; and which, in its contemporary developments, reveals clearly the workings of both types of philosophical analysis - the branch called moral philosophy or ethics. Hardie begins by rejecting the proposition that a child ought to be educated according to Nature on grounds that we would, by now, expect: characteristically he states that it 'is so vague that it is not important to decide what it implies' (13), and confidently substitutes four propositions of his own which are less perplexing and easier to break down and handle in the 'division' manner. From our point of view, it is the casual bypassing of an 'ought' here that is significant, that relates to his previous reference to 'emotional conflict' being behind certain disagreements in educational theory and gives the first pointer to his ethical position, which we can now follow through, identify and compare with other positions taken by philosophers working in the field of education.

(13) Ibid., p.1.
That Hardie looks at the problems of moral philosophy from the standpoint of an emotivist seems, so far, clear enough. But this fact tells us very little if we are not to know what sort of an emotivist he is; for this position has taken a variety of forms in recent philosophy, some of which appear so grossly simple and philosophically untenable that to link Hardie with them would be to dismiss him as an object of worthwhile enquiry, while others are subtle and qualified enough to have remained alive and close to the centre of ethical discussion: and so, for us to uncover any relationship of Hardie with such a more sophisticated approach would be to establish his relevance to the ongoing debate.

There is certainly little in the way of evidence at the required level of detail in the early parts of his book. The first chapter, for example, shows a conspicuous reticence in developing the kind of analysis of the ubiquitous 'ought' which a reader with ethical interests might expect to find in an author dedicated to the job of clarification. Each one of the substituted propositions contains, as does the discarded original proposition, a valuable judgment
expressed either in an 'ought' or a 'should' or concealed in some other form of words: yet there is, as yet, no recognition of the need to give an analysis of its meaning.

It may be that Hardie's interests are directed temporarily elsewhere, as the result of a decision made by him about priorities in discussion: in which case it is the order of priority which is possibly questionable, if we accept the heavy emphasis laid upon the relevance of ethics to educational theory by most later writers. For instance, Hardie, in discussing his first substituted proposition, 'A child's education ought to be such that it is free to develop according to the laws of its own nature' (1), ignores the all-important 'ought' and embarks on a brief investigation within another, and almost certainly less important, sector of analytical activity, a sector with which we shall be concerned, in this account, later, in accord with the emphasis it receives in the literature under scrutiny. Similarly, the equally important 'should' contained in his own fourth alternative proposition, 'The education of the child should be a process which is similar to that through which mankind has passed in the course of evolution' (2), is left un-

(1) Hardie, C. D., op. cit., p. 2.
(2) Ibid., p. 19
analysed, as is, too, the clearly implied value-
judgment contained in his second substitute-prop-
osition: 'Sense-impression of Nature is the only
ture foundation of human instruction, because it is
the only true foundation of human knowledge'(3).
They are ignored in favour of an immediate epistem-
ological enquiry of the kind which, in the present
account, does not take precedence over ethical en-
quiry — again, in accord with the trend and the em-
phasis discernible in the literature.

It is only with reference to his third substit-
uted proposition, 'A child is to be morally educat-
ed by exposing it to the natural consequences of its
own acts'(4), that Hardie begins to show any sign
of a grasp of the importance to educational theory
of an ethical viewpoint, and to present arguments in
sufficient detail to allow the building up of the
background necessary for an identification of his
particular position within the broad emotivist area.

He contends, with the utilitarian Spencer, that 'All
theories of morality agree that conduct whose total
results, immediate and remote, produce pleasure is
good conduct!', giving this as the type of justific-
ation which could back the prescription contained
in his own third proposition. He then refutes the
contention at some length(5), giving us for the very

(3) Ibid., p. 5
(4) Ibid., p. 13
(5) Ibid., pp. 14–9
first time an extended piece of the analysis we are seeking, and revealing, in the process, the roots in pure philosophy from which his emerging ethical position has grown.

The roots lie in familiar ground. The most significant move in his argument derives from a well-known technique of Moore (6), used by him to counter such statements as 'Pleasant results are what we mean by good conduct', which is one of the interpretations that can be given to Spencer's assertion. As Hardie says, in naming the technique he employs, such statements 'can, I think, be proved false by the familiar type of argument known as the open question' (7). What the 'open question' is must be explained in more detail, for its use played an important part in causing an impasse in the so-called 'descriptivist' ethics which predominated in English-speaking philosophy until very recent times, and so in creating the intellectual conditions in which some such position as that of the emotivists had to emerge.

To any person asserting that 'pleasant' (or any other natural property) is what is meant by 'good', it is sensible to put the perfectly straightforward question 'Is pleasure good?', and hence by the imp-

(6) Moore, G. E., *PrincipiaEthica* (Cambridge, 1903), Ch. 1
(7) Hardie, C. D., op. cit., p. 17
lication of the accepted definition the strange question, 'Is pleasure pleasant?', which is clearly not what such a person intends to ask. So argues Moore, maintaining that the fallacy arises because things which possess what he insists is the simple, unique, indivisible quality of goodness, also have other qualities - qualities which exist in the time and space of nature: natural properties - which are mistakenly taken as defining 'good' because they are always found with it. But good, according to Moore, is not a natural property. Though certainly it is a property, and therefore is what the term 'good' names, it is a non-natural, unanalyzable property, not located in time and space, which we can have before our minds (in whatever dimension that entity can be said to exist!) for direct inspection, and against which we can measure the value-claims of ordinary natural properties by asking such a simple but meaningful question as that given above: 'Is pleasure good?'

The necessity of creating a non-natural world in which to locate goodness and to which we can have only some form of intuitive access is a necessity following only from the premiss that value-terms have purely 'descriptive' meaning, a premiss which the emotivists, dissatisfied with the mystifying

*** See p. 25, infra.
talk of non-natural qualities, challenged in a variety of ways, ranging from the crude assertions of the original Logical Positivists (8) to the more careful pronouncements of later writers who were genuinely interested in finding new approaches within ethics. It is Hardie's position amongst this class of moral philosophers that we are attempting to establish. So far, in looking at his first chapter, we can not find sufficient development of a positive viewpoint for a sure identification to be made, so we must turn to the following chapter, that on Herbart, in the hope of finding the kind of systematic exposition which the sketchy comments so far made by Hardie imply.

Unfortunately, our previous judgment that Hardie is postponing his full statement on ethics because of a decision about priorities in unfolding his theme is confirmed in the second chapter. There are indeed hints and clues which can be interpreted in such a way as to warrant the placing of him amongst the emotivists; but these elements are merely incidental to his main argument, which, being non-ethical, is not of present interest. And these pointers are also open to other interpretations which, if given, blur the simple, clear picture of Hardie the moral philosopher which would otherwise begin to emerge.

(8) See p. 24, supra.
On the one hand, for example, he comments on Herbart's opinion that it is meaningless to talk about justifying moral judgments - an opinion based on the belief that we have knowledge by intuition or insight of the rightness or wrongness of our acts of will - in terms which strongly recall his Introductory remark that value questions are closely linked with emotional conflicts and are to be elucidated by attention to emotive meaning in language. His comment is: 'The great difficulty about such a theory is to explain why people disagree so violently on ethical questions'(9); and this manner of speaking does not surprise us.

But, on the other hand, Hardie concludes a substantial section of argument for the compatibility of a belief in determinism with a faith in what the process of education can achieve(10) in such a manner as to throw doubt on his being the emotivist he has hitherto seemed, for he uses terms such as 'should', 'proper' and 'important' with an assurance which would be puzzling coming from a philosopher who claims that value-terms express mere personal preferences. He says: 'It seems to me to be important that educationists should hold a determinist theory of some kind, not only because of its

(9) Ibid., p. 32.
(10) Ibid., pp. 42-7
truth, but also because of the tendency at the present time which leads some educationists to urge that teachers should be much less active than Herbart advocated.' (11). That Hardie favours teacher-activity and teacher-intervention is clear, as indeed is the end to which this teacher-involvement is a means and by which it is justified by him in commenting on two of the technical terms used by Herbart: '... we have seen that we cannot separate the self from the desiring self, and it is therefore of the utmost importance that the teacher should secure the proper desires in each child' (12). In view of this statement, what is not now at all clear is whether he is an emotivist in ethics at all; and, if he is, what odd sort of a more detailed position is it which allows him to talk without contradiction, or at least without sounding logically odd in a more informal sense, of the 'proper desires' that the 'desiring self' must be taught to have.

Whether Hardie's delaying of a firm ethical pronouncement is merely the impression given to a reader who is too sure of the primary importance of ethics for education because he is prejudiced by knowledge of later developments or whether it is a fact, symptomatic of Hardie's whole approach to the

(11) Ibid., p. 46
(12) Ibid., p. 47
bearing of analytical philosophy on educational theory may be judged best by having an example before us of such later developments: with this we can then compare the indefinite Hardie view which we have so far encountered, as well as the more definite position of his which we shall find and scrutinise later. We turn, then, to as good an example as any in the work of R.S.Peters, moving thus from one end to the other of the period in question, and to a philosopher who does not hesitate to state his ethical views and his own strong belief in the great relevance of ethics for educational theory. We can attempt to answer the question, 'What is Peters' position in moral philosophy?', before coming back to Hardie and asking a similar question with reference to later parts of his work.

Peters and The Autonomy Of Ethics.

Peters' most substantial work in this area is so very recent - May, 1966 (13) - that its assimilation into the present thesis is not possible; though, as will be seen, some of its main arguments were to be expected, having been anticipated in the various parts of his significant though hitherto scattered contribution to the discussion which we are in the process of investigating. In one such part, an earl-

ier offering, we can find what we need at this point - a brief indication of an ethical viewpoint to contrast with that of Hardie: and in other parts we shall find, later, other valuable material for our theme. The unity given so very recently to Peters' views is, in fact, less of an example of the bearing of analytical philosophy on educational theory as we are displaying it than it is of the success of that bearing in one of its interpretations - that which we have elsewhere and with reference to another English philosopher labelled the 'official' view ('...with deliberate abusiveness...').

In the earlier offering - broadcast talks to a Third Programme lay audience - Peters examines the effect on public thinking about a central moral concept, 'responsibility', of the widespread misunderstanding of the theories of Marx and Freud. (14). In doing so, he clearly shows his ethical hand, for he is concerned to alleviate what he considers to be the morally bad consequences of the public swallowing half-truths, and he can only do this by going firmly, if briefly, into ethical theory. He refers to '...a denial of responsibility coupled with a story about the causes of actions and standards' (15),

(14) Peters, R. S., Authority, Responsibility and Education (London, 1959), Chs. 4, 5 and 6.
(15) Ibid., p. 57.
using a philosophical technique which is of particular interest because of its contrast with that of Hardie. It illustrates what an acceptance of Wittgenstein's later views - those to be found on the near side of the dividing line mentioned earlier (p. 15) - and an adoption of his practice has done for philosophical analysis. Phrases of a certain kind abound: '...there are occasions when it would be reasonable to say', '...these, we might say, are unusual cases', 'the fact that we single out such odd cases...suggests that we believe that in general', and so on (16).

This appeal to what we ordinarily say, to the usual and the non-odd expressions of reasonable men, in order to disentangle meanings, is characteristic of modern analytical philosophers. It is a gentle, probing, non-doctrinaire technique which gives a clear impression of being an art in itself. To note that this kind of clarification is, like Hardie's, 'analysis', is to be struck by the vagueness of that term, for the fluidity of Peters and the almost mathematical rigidity of Hardie stand in great contrast as methods of enquiry.

What theoretical point Peters is attempting to communicate, using this technique, is that causes of actions and reasons for actions are logically dist-

(16) Ibid., pp. 57-8
inct: the description of them involves two separate ways of talking which should not be, but often are, confused. Consequently, we suffer from needless anxieties generated by a failure to take this into account when pondering the 'revelations' of Freud and Marx, both of whom seem to have stripped men of responsibility for their own actions. On the contrary, Peters says, '...a revelation of the causes of our actions should increase rather than decrease our responsibility for them' (17), for 'causal' explanations of human behaviour are bound to show themselves as incomplete - why, otherwise, should men have developed and constantly used a whole language to do with motives, dispositions and reasons for actions? The answer is quite clear.

He stresses that he is talking about the meaning of 'responsibility' - this is the philosopher's job in these days of language-awareness - and that the meaning can only be grasped by inspecting our ordinary use of the term, the standard cases and the odd cases, in such a way as to eventually arrive at the sense of what we are constantly and unhesitatingly saying. The view of language implied in all that Peters is doing becomes quite explicit at one point (18) when he states: 'Our language has developed in no haphazard way; and it enshrines the commonsense con-

(17) Ibid., p. 59.
(18) Ibid., p. 60.
viction that in general men can help doing what they do.'

From the analysis carried out on the basis of this assumption about language there emerges a fundamental point about causality and morality: causes in general must be distinguished from those causes having effects which are apparently unavoidable in a limited range of circumstances. It is to the latter that we must look, '...not just in anger but with a discriminating empirical eye' (19); that is, we can, on the basis of sound, detailed empirical knowledge of the relationship between events, make decisions of our own, about which all talk of a general nature concerning causes and all vague references to 'determinism' in human affairs is completely irrelevant, belonging as it does to a different language not intended to cope with the realities of human choice and will.

We can, at this point, recall that Hardie reaches not dissimilar conclusions when he discusses determinism and argues for the activity of the teacher in implanting the 'proper desires' in the child; and he does so, as we saw, without the benefit of the kind of analysis available to and demonstrated by Peters. The interesting fact is that argues in

(19) Ibid., p. 68.
this way while apparently holding an ethical position far removed from that of Peters, a fact which throws doubt on the consistency of his approach. He writes, for example, in Peters-like terms in this passage: '... there may be a law to effect that a human mind under certain conditions will make a certain choice, but if the conditions are altered then that particular law will not have a chance to operate. Now it is precisely this that education has to achieve, that is, education has to alter the conditions to such an extent that when each individual is confronted with a choice then he will choose that alternative which is considered best.' (20).

On the evidence of this and similar assertions, we would expect to find Hardie somewhere declaring an early version of an ethical position similar to that of Peters, one which stresses the autonomy of ethics and the production of reasons for actions within a logically distinct moral discourse. However, such a view does not appear in the early parts of his work, as we have seen, and most of the evidence points to the eventual disclosure of a position which will be, to say the least, completely dissonant with any of this obfuscating talk of education ensuring the choice of 'that which is considered best'.

(20) Hardie, M. D., op. cit., p. 43.
However, before returning to Hardie, there is more yet in Peters concerning the all-important distinction between reasons and causes. To find this Ryleian distinction developed in philosophy addressed to parents and educators is in itself a sign that progress has been made in the 'bearing' under review - progress which is not unconnected with the movement of 'analysis' from the technical to the more ordinary aspects of language.

Peters insists that it is pointless to speculate about whatever causes there may be for beliefs which already have good, acceptable grounds to support them. He puts forward this central point of his with force and humour: 'If there are, in general, good reasons for keeping promises - as there obviously are - and someone suggests that our duty to keep them was drummed into us at a public school, or at our mother's knee, the appropriate answer is: "So what?", or: "How thoughtful of them."' (21). This kind of emphasis on there being genuine good reasons for moral action must be encountered, it is now clear, in any philosopher who is prepared to write in a certain way about ethical matters - if he is to be consistent. Hardie, for instance, is prepared to state his belief in the 'utmost importance' of the teacher in ensuring the 'proper desires' in

(21) Peters, R. S., op. cit., p. 72.
the child; but he does not back this belief, so far, in the manner we would expect.

This way of speaking implies that there are certain things of value which education ought to ensure are passed on to the next generation. It implies, too, that the value placed upon these things can be justified in some way; that is, that 'justification' makes sense in this area. What we see in Peters even at first glimpse, and what we shall note further when we look at other parts of his contribution, is ample evidence of the acceptance of a moral philosophy in which it makes clear sense to talk of 'justification' and 'reasons' for moral choice. On the other hand, there is as yet no comparable evidence in Hardie, though there should be if the 'moral' tone of his argument about the role of the teacher is not to be dismissed as an inconsistency within an emotivist approach. We must return now to examine the later parts of his work against the background provided by this first brief glimpse of a later philosopher.

The Tolerance Of The 'Persuasive' Theory.

In Hardie's next chapter, on Dewey, there are some intriguing little asides but nothing substantial or more satisfying than that which has gone before. He remarks, for example, that '...an interest in Greek literature or in differential equations or in medieval history is often acquired, and it is
surely the case that an interest in such a subject for its own sake is extremely valuable.' (22). This makes us eager to encounter the moral philosophy which can satisfactorily accommodate the free use of terms such as 'extremely valuable', particularly when Hardie makes a point, in the same context, of appreciating the classical blunder of John Stuart Mill's use of the related term 'desirable'. Mill's failure to distinguish, to the satisfaction of his critics, between 'that which is desired' and 'that which ought to be desired', is hardly the sort of weakness which Hardie has the right to indicate, on the strength of the unclear position he has so far developed.

However, in the substantial fourth chapter, 'The Basis Of Any Educational Theory', we come at last to what we have been patiently seeking - an unblurred declaration of what, in Hardie's opinion, ethics is about. In a position of importance at the end of the long, varied argument of this chapter, for which the other chapters with their disappointing scarcity of the material we need for our theme have served as a critical prologue, we find the plain recognition of the primary importance of ethics which we have been demanding of Hardie: 'This leads us to the consideration of what is perhaps the most important of the

(22) Hardie, C. D., op. cit., p. 59.
conceptions in the definition of education - the idea of value, because on that depends what changes we decide should be produced in the child.' (23).

The core of Hardie's exposition of moral philosophy in relation to education follows an unconvincing excursion into arguments for and against a 'religious theory of education', which raise hopes but, in sum, turn out to be one of what we have called Hardie's 'barren' elements; and this core is, as we shall see, the most 'fruitful' part of the whole work, in the sense of presenting ideas which can be related without strain to the work of Peters and other later writers in the field.

He identifies the problems: 'The educationist has, I think, two problems in this region to solve. The first is, what is meant by such a term as "good" or "valuable". The second is, how do we come to know and hence how can we teach the meaning of such a term? For the valuable changes in behaviour which education has to secure must include the description of it as such. Education would clearly have partly failed if individuals behaved perfectly but did not know it. The solution of the second problem will, however, probably depend on the solution of the first.' (24).

(23) Ibid., p. 113.
(24) Ibid., p. 118.
The first of his problems is of immediate concern: the second — that of moral education — will be examined in a separate chapter, being in itself a very large question. Hardie is at last asking about the meaning of moral terms: his problem is that of accounting for moral language by stating a satisfactory ethical theory. It is hardly possible to read him at this point without being reminded of Peters and the central interests of other philosophers now working in this region. The identification of the problems and even the manner of the suggestion of the link between them is what warrants the judgment that he is still of some contemporary significance.

He clears the ground efficiently for a demonstration of his own leanings: the sense of good-in-itself or intrinsic good is quickly differentiated from other senses as that which requires elucidation; and he then relates the question of its meaning to some of his previous remarks on definition (to which we shall return in another context), before distinguishing 'non-naturalistic' from 'naturalistic' approaches in ethics, claiming that all such latter theories can be refuted by the 'open question' argument of Moore, already described. And finally, left with a non-naturalistic position, he declares his hand by denying any assumption that moral terms are intended to convey information.
He says: 'We have assumed so far that in such a proposition as "knowledge of Greek literature is good" the intention is to convey information; that is, we have assumed that "good" is the name of a certain characteristic which we predicate of a number of things or mental states or what not, and we have been attempting to get clearer about the nature of this characteristic. Now I propose to deny this assumption. Our intention is rather to arouse a certain attitude in our audience...when we make value judgements we are using language emotively rather than scientifically.' (25). In the face of this, we must immediately wonder whether Hardie recognised that he was himself merely using language 'emotively' at the moment of writing the passage which condemns 'educationists' for leading teachers astray down the path of passivity! (See p. 27, supra.)

He does, however, go further than a simple acceptance of an unqualified emotivism by distinguishing, within an 'emotive' use of language, two components: an 'expressive' function and a 'persuasive' function. The former, unsurprisingly, refers to the fact that language of this sort expresses a person's feelings about a certain state of affairs and is so not open to contradiction. The latter is a dimension necessarily, Hardie maintains, to account for the often violent disagreement about value judg-

(25) Ibid., p. 123.
ments which is encountered in everyday life and which would be entirely pointless and misplaced if the purely 'expressive' interpretation were true: feelings are not the sort of thing that can be reasonably disputed, and yet it is generally felt that moral disagreement is a reasonable enough phenomenon. The only kind of solution to this paradoxical situation is that found in the 'persuasive' theory. So Hardie contends. The pity is that he does not appear to realise that this solves nothing - it only leaves things even more 'open' than before, as his own words, written with specific reference to 'value' disagreement as it shows itself in educational theory, indicate in startling fashion.

He says: 'The disagreement among education theorists has not been in what has been said, but in the feelings which each educationist has had for the different activities of life, and each has attempted to persuade others to feel the same way as he does. If we realize this we can be tolerant of all their theories, for no one is right and no one is wrong. It is true that some may be said to be "better" than others in the sense in which one poem may be better than another, but when we realize that much of the sting has gone out of educational controversy.' (26). The tolerance of the 'persuasive' theory is apparently limitless!

(26) Ibid., p. 127
If no one is right and no one is wrong as Hardie asserts, there seems no point in writing a book such as his own in which teachers are urged to take on a certain role on the grounds that this will be 'better' for the children, for if 'better' means 'what I prefer and wish to persuade you to prefer too', the seriousness of whatever 'arguments' are produced to make the persuasion effective is bound to be suspect - so it must appear to anyone who has had access to the kind of writing such as Peters produces, in which the possibility of there being genuine reasons for moral choices is emphasised.

It may be that Hardie uses the analogy of moral with poetic judgments in order so to persuade, for most of us accept unthinkingly that 'poetry' is 'good' and that there are many styles to be found within this class of 'good' things. But this is merely to push the problem back on to aesthetic theory, within which the distinction between 'good' poetry and cheap verse is just as philosophically difficult to make as is the distinction between 'different activities of life' embodied in rival educational theories, particularly when it is noted that one such activity could be, for example, the total, blind acceptance of a totalitarian state such as was found in Nazi Germany. Presumably the
educational theories of that time and that place would be tolerated as just another 'poem' which most of us do not happen to prefer.

This unsatisfactory position is the implication of Hardie's version of an emotivist theory: it appears to make nonsense of the critical assertions he has himself made about other theorists in the early part of his work. Herbart, Dewey and the 'Nature' theorists were only, after all, expressing their own feelings for a particular way of life; and there is little point in attacking them for that. It is small wonder that even admirers of Hardie see in his incautious expression of a difficult ethical theory an unacceptable element of his otherwise carefully stated views. G.H. Bantock, one of the few educationists to have sympathetically remembered Hardie's early work during the quarter of a century of its existence comments in words which recall the emphases in Peters which contrast strongly with those we have just seen in Hardie:

'One can merely urge that educational value judgments are matters for rational argument and that choices ought to be justified by good reasons; we are not, that is to say, abandoned to the position that preferences are questions simply of personal taste or express merely the emotions and persuasions or exhortations of the writer, as Professor C.D. Hardie seems to have thought in his other-
wise important "Truth and Fallacy in Educational Theory"

It may be that, in identifying a weakness here in Hardie, we are in danger of underestimating the type of theory which he propounds. His position of 1942 is in fact derived almost wholly from the original work of the most adventurous moral philosopher of his day, the American C.L. Stevenson (28). A brief look at his work is necessary in order to ensure that there are no aspects of it which Hardie has overlooked and which would make a 'persuasive' theory more acceptable. This will be followed by a comparison of views on ethics currently held by a variety of modern analytical 'pure' philosophers, particularly those which can be related to the work within education of interested philosophers such as Peters, in order to underline the inadvisability, mentioned earlier, of accepting any single interpretation of the bearing of analytical philosophy on educational theory merely because it happens to be the latest to appear and to have widespread support of the moment within the field of education. This will carry further our procedure of defining the 'bearing' under examination in terms of what can be discovered by journeying around the relevant lit-

erature and contrasting examples from what is an ongoing and essentially unfinished activity.

**Rationality In 'Pure' Ethics: Stevenson And After.**

Stevenson presents a version of the emotivist theory which is far more subtle than the account given of it by Hardie: developed in massive detail, it is very 'persuasive' indeed and is hardly recognizable as a linguistically sophisticated version of the crude iconoclastic emotivism associated with the Logical Positivists. He attempts to clarify the meaning of ethical terms, as we have seen Hardie making plain enough; but he also attempts to show the methods by which value judgments are justified - not an aspect of his work which Hardie brings out in his own peculiar manner of expression.

Stevenson distinguishes disagreements in beliefs from disagreements in attitudes, stressing, at the same time, their complicated entanglement with each other in actual practice. When we believe something to be the case it quite clearly influences our attitudes towards that state of affairs: attitudes are dependent upon knowledge and this knowledge can be false 'knowledge' which can be replaced by a true account of how things are. Furthermore, our beliefs can be shaped by our attitudes - by what we feel towards an object. So that, in this complex
situation, moral controversy inevitably involves disagreement in belief and attitude, with the possibility of resolution only by altering both.

Consequently, in ethics, both the notions of descriptive meaning and emotive meaning of the terms we use are important: the cruder emotivists unduly emphasised the importance of emotive terms. Moreover, the emotive meaning of our value terms have the persuasive component which we have noted Hardie describing. This is closely related to an imperative, so that we express our own attitudes on the basis of our beliefs and try to redirect the attitudes of others who are morally disagreeing with us when we call something, for example, 'good'.

These quasi-commands are justified by offering 'reasons' for obeying them in the form of descriptions of states of affairs - statements of our beliefs - which can be accepted by others and will thus form their new beliefs and will engender their new attitudes. The assumption is that agreement in belief causes agreement in attitude, since most of us get satisfaction from the same kind of thing, we being built of psychologically similar material. To those who will not grant this assumption's validity all along the logical line Stevenson has nothing further to offer: if the 'reasons' do not appeal, and if the beliefs of both sides in dispute are the same,
nothing can be done by the use of reason to resolve any continuing disagreement.

This fundamental point has been put plainly by R.F. Atkinson, one of the interested 'pure' philosophers who contribute to the most recent of the very few volumes of readings in philosophical analysis and education. He says: 'Stevenson...follows Hume on the main point. He too, despite some few appearances to the contrary, maintains that there can be logically irreducible differences on moral matters. He is prepared to allow that moral judgments may be held to be 'true', but it turns out that he regards this as merely an idiomatic, perhaps debased usage in which the word functions simply as a mark of assent.' (29). So, the sophistication of the 'persuasive' theory does not conceal the 'emotivist' logic of its central contentions.

Stevenson, them, and Hardie as an educationist disciple, allows little real scope for rationality in moral disagreement: he remains fundamentally an emotivist, in spite of some ingenious and original attempts to find a place for 'reasons' with his talk of altering attitudes by working on beliefs. The history of ethics, from the time of his early work of the late nineteen thirties to the present day, reveals an intense effort made by many philosophers

to differentiate moral discourse from all other types; to distinguish its own unique canons of rationality. An emphasis upon the meaning-fulness of moral language and the worthwhileness of moral discussion has progressively replaced the extreme 'subjectivism' which followed the abandonment of the search for a viable 'norm-natural' rationale. This emphasis, as typically found in current 'pure' philosophy, must be briefly described, being particularly consonant with the position taken by Peters, whom we are taking as the philosopher of an analytical kind who best offers a contrast with Hardie, and who, with him, reflects within the area of educational interests an aspect of moral philosophy. Then we shall be in a position to return to Peters and others within education to establish what measure of agreement there can be said to be.

In turning to the problem of the justification of value judgments as this is understood and tackled in the latest philosophy, we must be clear about the sheer mass of work that is being done—so much that any attempt to summarise the main position that is emerging must be treated as very much a simplification designed for present purposes only. The justification is commonly seen to involve a number of stages. First, we justify an action by an appeal to standards or rules: an action is of a particular kind, all of which are right actions by common acc-
ceptance — disagreement at this level is always about whether the particular action is of the stated kind or not, and never about whether the rule or standard is a right one.

This comes at the next level, at which reasons for the acceptance of rules and standards are provided in the description of a value system within a whole way of life. But questions can be asked about the justification of a particular way of life; and specifically the ultimate question: What reasons are there for choosing one way of life rather than another? A passage from one of the most persistent and respected of contemporary moral philosophers, R.M. Hare, shows well the extensive nature of the justification required for a particular moral choice, provided that the question is pursued to the logical end: and, in Hare's case, the end is not nearly as far as some would locate it, as we shall see.

He says: 'A complete justification of a decision would consist of a complete account of its effects, together with a complete account of the principles which it observed and the effects of observing these principles...Thus, if pressed to justify a decision completely, we have to give a complete specification of the way of life of which it is a part.' (30).

But, of crucial importance to the nature of ethics

is the answer to the question put above: whether one choice of a way of life is more 'rational' than another; that is, whether 'rationality' can be defined in such a way as to enable 'good reasons' to be produced for accepting one way of life rather than another. Only with reference to a rational way of life can any value judgment be really true and completely justified.

The answer given by many contemporary analytical philosophers is that the preference for one way of life rather than another need not be arbitrary; need not, that is, be mere preference in the sense in which we have seen Hardie asserts that it is ('... we can be tolerant to all their theories, for no one is right and no one is wrong'; see p. 40, supra) The most thorough exposition of this viewpoint is contained in the work of P.W. Taylor, who argues in great detail that a meaning can be given to the concept of rational choice of the type necessary for the 'ultimate' justification of a value judgment (31).

Going as far as it is logically possible to go, he refutes the sceptical demand for an even more fundamental 'reason' for choosing a rational rather than a non-rational life in terms which demonstrate that this debate finds its limits in the very language that has to be used to argue it: 'No reasons can be

given, it is true. But no reasons need be given; For knowing that a certain way of life is rational is knowing that one is wholly justified in committing oneself to it. To know that it is rational is already to have all the reasons one could possibly have for living it...the decision to commit oneself to a way of life which is rationally chosen over other ways of life...is the most reasonable, least arbitrary, and best founded decision of all. It is the decision to live the way of life one is most justified in living, all things considered.' (32)

There is little doubt that all the philosophers mentioned in this section - and they stand for many more, as do their views for many others - are very close to the same philosophical 'point': in a sense, they hold the 'same' position and differ more in the ways in which they wish to describe that position - in their various insistencies on using particular forms of words to describe facts of moral life which they undoubtedly 'see' in the same way - than they do in what can only be termed their 'metaphysical' standpoints. Even Stevenson and Taylor work in the same philosophical climate of opinion, compared, for example, with the differences that obtained before 'non-descriptivist' insights about language began to bear fruit. In a sense, differences are now seen to exist at the level of

(32) Ibid., p. 188.
language and the interpretations put on its meaning and significance in relation to an independent 'reality'.

This becomes plain in the work of Peters and other philosophers working now in education who think like him; so plain, that it can be fairly said that much of what they write is less a reflection of 'pure' philosophical developments from outside to within educational theory than it is original philosophising in ethics carried out with 'educational' material rather than with less concrete material. We can, then, return to Peters to note what other parts of his (unconsolidated, see p. 28, supra.) contribution read like against the background now sketched of current moral philosophy; and to amplify a position which not everyone in education, as we shall see immediately following the further exposition of his views, is prepared to accept.

The 'Autonomous' View Amplified.

Peters is concerned to stress, in the source which we have already used, that by 'morality' we mean conforming to standards which we have seriously thought about before accepting as our own: the point he is making is similar to that made by Hardie when he says 'Education would clearly have partly failed if individuals behaved perfectly but did not know it.' (See p. 37, supra.). He wishes to establish, with this emphasis, that loose talk of 'rat-
ionalisations' and 'ideologies' by those who are overimpressed with a particular (and false) interpretation of the theories of Freud and Marx as these bear on human moral conduct is the result of semantic confusion. If every 'reason' is a rationalisation — which is the implication of such deterministic talk — then no clear sense can be given to the term 'rationalisation at all: it loses all meaning by being used without a frame of reference which can provide the necessary contrast. Unless there are genuine reasons, there can be no rationalisations; just as — to use an analogy powerfully developed in a seminal work of contemporary ethics (33) — there can be no weeds unless there are flowers, shrubs and plants tended by human gardeners!

Peters puts this in terms which characteristically display his orientation towards common experience and the ordinary language in which it is articulated, when he comments: 'Terms like 'rationalisation' and 'ideology', which cast aspersion on beliefs, are verbal parasites. They only flourish because common experience has provided hosts in the form of rational beliefs and genuine principles.' (34) He thus reiterates in a different form the distinction between reasons for behaviour, which is the concern of ethics, and causes of behaviour, which the various human sciences attempt to describe and explain.

He thus falls clearly into one of the two classes of moral philosophers who have emerged from our enquiry - those who accept that there can be a rational justification of moral judgments, and that the reasons produced within an autonomous moral discourse are objective reasons and not merely attitudes dressed up in sophisticated and persuasive attire. We can look for more evidence of this allegiance in a context other than that from which his views have so far been taken; that is, popular talks addressed to a lay audience who are not expected to appreciate the subtleties of an academic argument. Though, even at this level, the emphasis upon the place of reason in arriving at and justifying moral beliefs, an emphasis of clear importance to the educators in his audience, stands in marked contrast to the contrary kind of emphasis which he have seen Hardie make in addressing what must be, in part, a similar audience of people concerned with education.

A hint in the first source can lead us to the kind of amplification to be found in a second, more academic part of his work: he says, 'People who say that moral principles are self-evident often mean that no further reasons can be given for them. But perhaps they sometimes mean that the reasons for them are so obvious that they hardly need mentioning.' (35)

(35) Ibid., p. 78.
The term 'obvious' is important here. What is obvious to one man is often an impenetrable mystery to the next - this is particularly the case with scientific explanations and the like, which can often only be understood after long training. What is obvious depends on one's knowledge: but certain knowledge is so common, so much a part of living at all, that what is obvious about it is clear to all. Peters' point is that knowledge of the use of moral language comes into this category: the fact of its use provides, in a sense, reason enough for accepting that the use is meaningful and not in need of explanation in other terms, as, for example, in terms of a vague psychology of emotion.

In the second source, Peters develops this idea, that moral discourse has an obvious point and that its use as moral discourse rests on certain presuppositions which are justified by that very use and are not in need of any 'further' justification. The closeness of this view to that expressed by Taylor, when he implies that the rational objectivity of morality is implicit in the language used to debate it, is unmistakeable. (See p. 49, supra.) A consideration of the main idea put forward in the chapter on moral theory in this source - a standard work on social philosophy - will indicate how current arguments for rationality in ethics are related to some of the great philosophical positions of the past.
The fact that passages from this chapter echo sections of the broadcast talks is not unimportant from the point of view we are adopting. It illustrates the meshing of social theory, educational theory and ethics which is one of Peters themes in bringing analytical philosophy to bear on education. This composite sector is, in fact, one the three philosophical areas — the other two are the theory of knowledge and the philosophy of mind, with both of which we shall be concerned later — which he and others of his 'school' take to be most clearly relevant to education and which feature very largely in the philosophising of parties to what we have called the 'official' theory (see pp. 2 and 29, supra).

Peters argues that certain basic criteria for moral rules, criteria which moral philosophers have long endeavoured to state, are in fact implied in the fact of the attempt itself. This is so because a serious, that is, a rational and critical, investigation is one which must accept certain normative standards — by definition. A respect for truth at all costs is presupposed by such an investigation; arguments must be heeded and personal wielders of arguments ignored if the process is to merit the above description. As Peters puts it: 'The very idea of searching for truth takes for granted, then, a norm of impartiality which holds that issues should be decided according to relevant criteria and
that exceptions should not be made on irrelevant grounds.' (36).

What he is saying is that to do moral philosophy at all - to ask seriously for the criteria according to which a rule can be judged a moral rule - is to be committed already to that rational discussion which is founded on impartiality, in that discussion can only be rational discussion when arguments and evidence are the norm, and personal characteristics are irrelevant: only in arguments, and the language in which they are expressed, is found the inter-personal articulation of experience which we term 'objective'. In a sense, any right to participate in serious public discussion of moral principles and their justification is earned by the obligation to accept the presuppositions of the public language in which that discussion is carried on. The place of reason in ethics (Peters acknowledges his indebtedness to S.E. Toulmin, whose book with that title (37) was the first full-scale attempt by an analytical philosopher to erect a post-Stevensonian position of this type) is ultimately to be found in the uniqueness of moral discourse, which has emerged as man has developed to regulate human behaviour within a network of its own legitimate 'rationality'.

(37) Toulmin, S. E., An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics (1950).
Peters adopts the unusual procedure (for a contemporary analytical philosopher) of buttressing his position by commentaries which show how aspects of it are contained in several classical viewpoints on ethics: he goes back beyond emotivism in order to reveal the strong foundations of his post-emotivist standpoint. To show what he means by 'moral reasoning', for example, he penetrates deeply into Hume's psychological theory of the passions, laying bare essential logical points about 'rationality' as he wishes to interpret it - not in any narrow sense tied to the notions of deduction and induction as in these are associated with the sciences, but in the wider, more liberal interpretation which links it with the 'rational being' who is virtually created by the separate and unique discourses in which he publicly partakes.

Peters says: '...Hume made a great contribution to moral theory in showing that moral distinctions do not derive from reasoning in the sense in which this is used to describe scientific or mathematical calculations. There is a logical gap between statements of fact and normative judgments, and moral rules are quite unlike mathematical axioms in many respects. But in sketching the moral sense from which he thought our moral distinctions are derived he introduced the normative criterion of impartiality which we have claimed to be necessary for explaini-
ing what is meant by a rational being. For on our
account a rational being is one who abides by the
norm of impartiality in assessing arguments and
claims.' (38).

Another classical philosopher interpreted in such
a way as to underline the main contention is Kant,
the form of whose arguments in moral philosophy is
welcomed by Peters as follows: 'He was here stating
the impartiality principle which is basic to moral-
ity. This is that if we maintain that a principle
is a moral principle, then part of what we mean is
that it is a principle which holds for anyone in a
similar situation.' (39). And again, just to take
a last example from many available, he examines
Utilitarianism and finds it not lacking in elements
which add weight to his own contemporary thesis. His
conclusion of this section admirably summarizes what
he is attempting to say throughout; and to say, not
as an isolated voice but, in keeping with the content
of the position he presents, as a sort of 'public'
speaker for a rooted philosophical tradition.

He ends: 'Our contention is, therefore, that there
is a sense in which moral philosophy or ethics, which
is the attempt to make explicit the criteria in terms
of which rules are morally justified, itself exemp-

(38) Peters, R. S., op. cit., p. 44
(39) Ibid., p. 49.
plifies, in a minimal degree, the acceptance of the criteria which it attempts to make explicit. For philosophy, like science, is a clear example of rational discussion, and is conducted in accordance with the norms of impartiality and respect for truth. Philosophers flourish only in societies where the rational tradition has taken root. And though, as philosophers, they are not committed to any particular maxims...they are, as philosophers, committed to the very abstract procedural criteria implied in being reasonable...Being moral is a species under the genus of being reasonable.' (40).

But it can also be said that philosophy can flourish only when convincing arguments on one side are confronted by convincing arguments on the other - this is the presupposition of the present thesis. Peters presents a formidable case which only an equally formidable critic would dare attempt to shake: fortunately there are such critics, which makes the situation philosophically interesting even if somewhat inconclusive, the price of philosophy even in the age of the blanket-term 'Analysis'. One such is the 'pure' moral philosopher Atkinson, already mentioned (see p. 46, supra.); and another is J.D.O'Connor who, though not arguing directly against the position adopted by Peters, does in fact present another ethical point of view within the context of education which is important for the

(40) Ibid., p. 56.
question of 'bearing' we are exploring

We shall return to Peters in the next chapter on moral education, for other parts of his pre-1966 contribution are of singular importance for that theme, the second element, it will be remembered, arising out of the pioneer comments on ethics and education made by Hardie (see p.p. 37-8, supra.)

There we shall see the 'application', as it were, of the high level theorising we are pursuing - the point of it all for the educationist. As Peters himself puts it there: 'Bacon once said that the discourse of philosophers is like the stars; it sheds little light because it is so high. But when it is brought nearer the earth, as I hope it has been in this paper...' (41) For the moment, however, we must remain at star level!

The Wary - Atkinson And O'Connor.

Atkinson has, in the important article mentioned above, some sobering comments on what he describes '...a prominent theme in recent moral philosophy whose implications for moral education are, it seems to me, insufficiently appreciated in much that is written on the topic.' (42). He thinks it important to stress, in comparison with much being

(42) Atkinson, R. F., op. cit., p. 171.
written along what we have termed the 'Peters' lines, the sense in which there are open options in morality; the sense, that is, in which disagreement is possible, even probable, and quite legitimate. In order to do this, he has to elucidate the concept of 'instruction': his conclusion is, briefly, that it is essentially that rational process which demands the production of adequate support for any contentions being made to another. This entails the giving of proofs, evidence and reasons appropriate to the particular area of instruction, and conviction on the part of the recipient only to the extent that such support warrants. In this way, conviction must be justified and assent must be rational in the process of 'instruction'.

In any area, it will be seen, what Atkinson means by 'instruction' presupposes certain appropriate criteria of truth, cogency and correctness: without these, it is not legitimate to use the concept - which is clearly related to what other philosophers with like interests, including Peters, call 'education', as we shall seem later. It must be noted that the presuppositions concern criteria and not anything more substantial, a fact of some significance in determining to what extent the 'wariness' of Atkinson constitutes total disagreement with the views he is examining. He makes this point in saying: 'It is not required that there should be a body of estab-
lished truths, facts, laws, practices in the field, only that there should be criteria for determining what is and what is not acceptable.' (43).

Atkinson is, in this way, leading in to the key question — whether there are moral truths to be discovered, and so whether there can be moral education (or 'instruction' in the sense in which he defines it) based upon the kind of reasoning on which such truths depend; as he puts it, '...the present concern is with...the question whether there is a possible content for moral instruction' (44). At root, the answer he himself gives is that the opposite of any moral position can be maintained without logical error or factual mistake, because there have not been demonstrated any criteria of truth in this field.

At first sight, this assertion sets him up in complete opposition to the position of those who argue for the place of reason in ethics; but the plain-ness of it becomes adorned with the kind of blurring qualification which we have noted in much of the philosophising on morals. He establishes a distinction between a criterion for moral truth and a criterion for the correct application of moral language which brings him back into the fold...
which we described above (see pp. 50 and 51). He is not blind to the insights into language functions gained from the philosophical investigations of, say, the last ten years; but he is concerned to place the emphasis in a way different from that in which it is commonly being placed by moral philosophers working in the context of education. He distinguishes the two criteria in this way: 'There is no one who seriously entertains the hope of being able to establish a substantial moral criterion, a touchstone of moral truth. The possibility of formulating a criterion for applying the term 'moral' is, of course, another and less momentous affair.' (45).

Starting from the problem posed by Hume's classic distinction between 'is' and 'ought' (the 'logical gap' which enters into Peters' argument — see p. 57, supra.), Atkinson comments on the various attempts made recently to show that moral decisions can be completely justified. He reviews Hare, Toulmin and, finally, Taylor — all of whom we have had to cite in giving the essential background to what we can now best term the 'cognitivist' approach — appreciating their subtlety in exploring the nuances of language use, but remaining adamantly in his assertion that 'No recent moral philosopher has found a way round the

(45) Ibid., p. 176.
the point that irreducible differences are possible in morality and that "justifications" in this field have the remarkable property of failing to exclude opposed alternatives" (46).

Atkinson grants that Taylor's discussion of the question of ultimate justification is as thorough as any could be — as indeed it is, being as comprehensive an enquiry as even the Americans are likely to demand — but insists that, as Taylor's conditions for a choice of a way of life to be a rational choice (the absolute conditions for the chooser of 'freedom', 'enlightenment' and 'impartiality') can never in practice be known to be fulfilled, it: '...seems in the end to amount to no more than a more elaborate restatement of Hare's position.' (47).

He then turns to other settings of questions about justification in morality and so comes to Peters, for such settings are those designed to avoid the difficulty of ultimate justification by putting the questions in such a way as to blur the normal distinction between means and ends, a distinction which makes it easy to show justification within a framework but impossible to show justification of a framework, that is, the ultimate justification which is the object of the search. Atkinson refers, in this context, to the outstanding character-

(46) Ibid., p. 179.
(47) Ibid., p. 179.
istic of Peters' most recent work, expressing the kind of doubt about its effect on the discussion which is in line with stress put on the 'open' nature of the bearing of modern analytical philosophy on educational theory to be found throughout the present account.

He says: 'Peters' recent discussion of moral education ... will bear examination from this point of view. Not that he was, as I understand him, so much concerned with questions of justification as with emphasising the possibility of appraising the manner of education as well as its aims and content. It is all the same worth enquiring whether this redirection of emphasis affects the matter of justification.' (48). And the result of his examination, of importance here, in the next chapter and for our general thesis, is a feeling of unease about the change in emphasis: the stress on the manner rather than the matter in moral education may obscure the fact that decisions have to be made - about the manner itself. The rules and the methods necessary for the guidance of practical choices are, Atkinson seeks to remind us, adopted on the basis of decisions that we must make.

His conclusion merits comparison with that of Peters (see pp. 58 and 59, supra.) and leaves the

impression that, with such tenacious doubt in the face of undeniably strong commitment, ethics cannot be far away from some major, enforced resolution. He declares: 'It might well be thought that the impossibility of establishing an ultimate moral criterion has received at least as much emphasis as it deserves in recent moral philosophy. I have, however, been struck by the absence of much reflection of it in most of the discussions of moral education I have seen. There is undeniably a widespread belief in the importance of moral education and some attention is given to questions of method and approach, but it seems to be assumed that there is no room for serious dispute about what is to be taught. This assumption - but perhaps it is really a conspiracy of silence - needs very little consideration to be seen to be quite extraordinary. There is obviously widespread disagreement on the moral issues of daily life, on the 'details' of morality, and, as I have tried to show, there is little enough reason to suppose that a greater measure of agreement can be reached on fundamentals.' (49).

We turn lastly to the other philosopher of a doubting turn of mind mentioned in the title of this section - O'Connor. This is an appropriate point at which to make a first reference to his work,

(49) Ibid., p. 181.
for it stands at the chronological midpoint between that of Hardie and that of Peters, whose writings have provided the origin and focus for the exploration carried out so far; and it thus enables us to sample ethical theory as it has been developed by philosophers with an interest in education at a point midway between the extremes of the short period during which the 'bearing' under examination has developed. We can ask of O'Connor where he stands philosophically, both in relation to the other two 'co-workers' and to the more general background in 'pure' ethics which has been sketched. The answers will be interesting on two counts: first, as yet another example of the amazing variety to be found within whatever unity ethics may be said to possess; second, as coming from a philosopher who is of great significance for the 'historical' approach to the question of 'bearing', in that his work preceded that which is currently proliferating and is, in fact, the only major contribution to appear between Hardie and the 'present' (liberally interpreted) — albeit it a contribution in which many now interested see more 'philosophy' than 'education'.

O'Connor's book leaves us in no doubt as to the importance he attributes to ethics. There is a whole chapter on the justification of value judgments, the bibliographical notes are loaded with references to the standard and analytical approaches to the problem,
and the author often repeats what he clearly regards as a central part of his theme: 'The nature of value judgments and the logic of their justification is thus the most important and most obvious point of contact between philosophy and education and I shall discuss this in some detail.' (50). He does, but, as much of the detail has already been covered with reference to other philosophers in the present account, we can reduce the space spent on O'Connor to the minimum, in a chapter already swollen with contrasting theories.

He clears the ground, as does Hardie, of the instrumental sense of moral terms by making '...the commonplace distinction between things that are good as means and those that are good as ends.' (51). He thus, as an orthodox means/ends distinguisher, falls into the non-Peters class mentioned above (see p. 64). Next, the status of philosophers' questions of value is clarified: they are '...not questions that can be finally answered by the collection and assessment of factual evidence. We must indeed take account of all the facts that may be relevant; but these facts, though they may be necessary to resolve such a dispute, are not usually sufficient.' (52). This initial orientation leads him, through a review of 'objectivist'

(51) Ibid., p. 53
(52) Ibid., p. 55.
and 'subjectivist' theories, both of which presuppose a fact-stating use of language, to the point at which he issues a Hardie-type invitation: 'Let us therefore look at some of the other uses of language to see whether we may not get a more satisfactory view of value statements by taking account of these uses.' (53).

Soon, there is familiar talk of the 'expressive' and 'persuasive' uses of language, with critical reference to the original, crude form of the emotive theory and the refinements of Stevenson. O'Connor at this point reads far more convincingly than does Hardie, with whom comparisons can be made on the grounds of mutual sources. He seems far more aware than Hardie of the attempts made to indicate the part played by reasons in supporting the public claims of moral judgments when he says, for example: 'We have somehow to show that as well as being expressive, moral judgments are (a) interpersonal and (b) capable of rational support. An attempt to develop the expressive theory to meet these defects has been worked out in some detail... (the original version... is due to... Stevenson)... In this way, a careful and detailed study of the complexities of actual moral discourse and the relations between the informative, expressive and persuasive uses of language can throw new light on the central problem of moral

(53) Ibid., p. 62.
philosophy, the problem of showing how our value judgments can be justified.' (54).

Unfortunately, to state that light can be thrown is not in itself to throw light. O'Connor's account lacks the positive effect of either Hardie's 'no one is right and no one is wrong!' or Peters' insistence on the objectivity of morality. Writing in 1957 he suffers from the uncertainty consequent upon a rejection of the 'old' at a time when the 'new' has not been fully formulated. Like Atkinson, who has the advantage of knowing what later developments have to offer, O'Connor believes, nevertheless, that the role of reason in ethics is problematical: he says, 'It can not be said that any philosopher has yet given a solution of it that is both convincing and complete.' (55).

His conclusion takes the form of a warning against dogmatism in ethics - a warning which the course this account has had to take must underline. The very complexity of the problem, he argues, revealed by the work of Stevenson and displayed by those following him who have attempted to disentangle the various elements in moral discourse, should make us wary of a simple answer. Like Atkinson again, his tone is unenthusiastic in asserting that '...the constructive parts of recent moral theories have not been

(54) Ibid., pp. 66 and 67.
(55) Ibid., p. 67.
and thus placing himself, without at the time knowing it, in opposition to those like Peters whose most evident intention is to be 'constructive' and who would, no doubt, vigorously deny Atkinson's contention that '...the most thorough discussion of the topic that has appeared...though it is clearly intended to advance the discussion...seems in the end to amount to no more than a more elaborate re-statement.' (57).

From our point of view, the implications for education of O'Connor's position on the justification of value judgments seem, in short, negative when compared with those of both his most notable predecessor and his most active successor: Hardie, in the end 'tolerant of all their theories' (58), has at least the merit of delivering such a rough blow that we are moved, as we have been, to find civilized ways of countering it; Peters is indisputably thorough, tenacious, convinced and contemporarily forceful. What O'Connor has to offer is less substantial but, nevertheless, of value at another level; for he concludes by stressing what must appear to us by now to be the obvious, but which he thinks - and we must agree - well worth stressing because of its obviousness; and it is a considered philosophical opinion

(56) Ibid., p. 71.
(57) Atkinson, R. F., op. cit., p. 179.
which, even today, as we have documented, does not lack formidable professional support - '...the problem of how to justify our value judgments is still an unsolved problem of philosophy. To realize this will save us from dogmatism and at the same time encourage us to go on looking for an answer.' (59).

Certainly the review given so far of the bearing of modern analytical philosophy on educational theory - a lengthy review to be given of only one, the ethical, aspect, but short enough on consideration of the prime importance of that aspect - suggests that dogmatism is unlikely to survive in the climate of critical awareness to be discovered amongst the variety of viewpoints that have been illustrated. The sampling of positions which has arisen from Har­die's first problem('...what is meant by such a term as "good" or "valuable"?' (60)) has embraced philos­ophising done within an educational context and without; and throughout this sample, limited though it is in comparison with the massive contribution being made (particularly in the minor periodical literature listed in the bibliography), the debate is lively, with no position able to claim, as yet, a consensus of philosophical opinion and the power which commands acceptance. To a similar, but of necessity shorter, type of exploration of the literature, which flows

(59) O'Connor J. D., op. cit., p. 71.
(60) Hardie, C. D., op. cit., p. 118.
from Hardie's second problem (see p. 37, supra) we can now go - to the problem of moral education.
CHAPTER III

EDUCATION AND MORALITY

Hardie And The 'Second Problem'

Hardie is not very illuminating on the 'second problem', that of moral education. But, at least, his views, for all their limitations, give us another point of entry into the later literature in which the problem is more thoroughly discussed; and they are linked, as the later discussions are, with the more theoretical questions of ethics just surveyed. One of the main reasons, in fact, for the enquiry into ethics by educationally-minded philosophers is that firm findings there will have implications for moral education - a point which Hardie, it will be remembered, was the first to make. While making it, he provides, unwittingly, the excuse for his lack of illumination on the problems of educating for morality, for he states that the 'solution of the second problem will, however, probably depend on the solution of the first' (1): and we know now that his own particular solution is, even comparatively, not very successful.

The guidance he offers to parent and teacher concerned with the moral education of children is what

(1) Hardie, C. D., op. cit., p. 118.
we can expect from a philosopher adopting a weakly-developed version of the Stevensonian theory in ethics. An emphasis is placed upon their ensuring that children are presented with plenty of situations in which they are likely to experience the emotions which value judgments are said to express. This is the burden of the very general piece of advice given by Hardie (before taking it himself and sketching in its implications!). He says '... the educationist should adjust the ostensive definitions which he gives according to the alternatives which he accepts.' (2).

The method of moral education advocated fits the ethical 'alternative' which Hardie accepts: it stresses the arousal in the child of the sorts of feeling for things which the parent or teacher himself experiences. According to Hardie, this in fact happens, for many parents in practice employ the very technique of encouraging their children to like what they themselves think is virtuous behaviour by telling them constantly that they, the children, do like it, until the statement becomes true within the emotional complex of the relationship. In this way children are, and should be, trained while quite young to have, as he puts it, '...certain feelings about objects and situations, and indeed to have learned the use of "good" so as to influence other people's feelings' (3).

(2) Ibid., p. 122.
(3) Ibid., p. 126.
This advice is of little use to educators. It is doubtless one description of what does take place within families, but what is wanted is a way of distinguishing methods within the context left unanalysed beneath terms like 'feeling'; otherwise moral 'education' cannot be identified amongst the 'indoctrination' or the plain, unthinking conformity to be found in the family situations which Hardie describes. He is certainly logical, in that the advice, for what it is worth, follows from the ethics, for what that is worth; but such emotivist theory and its implications for practice seem to have the very grave defect of being compatible with any content of moral education we care to name, and this, we sense, can't be right. In any event, Hardie's method would lead to the very situation which he elsewhere condemns, for, as he says, 'Education would clearly have partly failed if individuals behaved perfectly but did not know it' (4); and having the 'right' feelings is not knowing why they are right.

As with moral theory (see p. 28, supra) we turn from the disappointing early work of Hardie to the more recent work of Peters; and with even greater promise, in that, as we have seen, the main purpose of Peters' work in ethics has been to see it reflected in the process of education, of which moral education is, in his view and on the proportional evid-

(4) Ibid., p. 118.
ence of his writings, one of the most important aspects. Further, it is in Peters' philosophy, with its unorthodox blurring of the means/ends dichotomy, that we find questions of value being built into the general concept of 'education', so that whatever he has to say about moral education will lead imperceptibly into the less restricted questions about education under its other aspects, which we need to explore in this account. For this reason the chapter is called 'Education and Morality' and will contain, towards the end, a first sketch of the concept of 'education', to be amplified later, as with the preliminary sketch of the nature of analysis (See p. 14, supra).

Peters And The 'Language' And 'Literature' Of Morality

Peters, too, refers to the child-parent relationship; but his parent, unlike that of Hardie, is not any old begetter of children involved in the job of passing something on and doing it in the 'natural' way. He is a thoughtful, seriously-minded parent, rather like the famous philosopher-father mentioned by Peters in his talk of the two necessary kinds of rules which are found at the core of moral education. He says in a source not yet tapped by us: 'From the point of view of moral education it would be particularly important to pass on procedural rules and
basic rules. Hence, presumably, the importance which Hare attaches to the question to which he thinks moral philosophers should address themselves very seriously: "How should I bring up my children?" (5).

The necessity of passing on procedural rules is the fundamental point of Peters' thesis, and one which, once fully grasped, considerably softens the paradox of reason and habit in moral education which he describes. Believing firmly in the autonomy of morality and the possibility of moral action being validated by the production of reasons within what he terms '...a distinctive form of discourse which has developed to answer distinctive forms of questions' (6), he seems more fortunately placed than is Hardie to give advice on the methods of moral education; for he is not inhibited by any such view as that which rates moral beliefs as nothing more than elaborate and refined versions of mere personal preferences. He can talk of rules, which are intersubjective and identifiable by the serious enquirer.

Moral rules can, in Peters' view, be applied '...intelligently in the light of relevant differences in circumstances' (7) because there are certain higher-order principles which, as we have seen him

(6) Ibid., p. 47.
(7) Ibid., p. 51.
maintain, can be rationally justified. These principles, '...presupposed by the very activity of giving reasons in practical discourse' (8), are those of impartiality, liberty, truth-telling and the consideration of interests. Clearly, any philosopher who thinks in this manner must have much to offer on the teaching of morality, for he is taking morality and the facts and presuppositions of moral language very seriously indeed and not handicapping himself for this role, as does Hardie, by interpreting the problem in terms of complex expressions of emotion. As Peters declares, reminding us of his 'ordinary language' position within analytical philosophy, '...if we ceased to use these words and still wanted to get people to do things by means other than twisting their arms, hypnotizing them or giving them orders, we should have to devise a new family of words to do this job.' (9).

Procedural principles are those which can be retained even though the content of lower level rules is changed. Their possession ensures that the moral code of any person holding to them is rationally maintained. Peters looks to science for an analogy: morality, like science, is an autonomous activity; and both activities show various levels of rules, principles and procedures, an awareness of the dis-

(8) Ibid., p. 59.
(9) Ibid., p. 48.
tinctive nature of which makes a person, respectively, a rationally moral person or a scientist — and the teaching of each will be similarly based upon producing this awareness. As Peters says, '...in a rational code there would be procedural rules which could be regarded as presupposed by the very activity of giving reasons for rules; there would then be basic rules which would be those which could be justified under any conceivable social conditions; then there would be more relative rules which would depend, for their justifiability, on more contingent facts about particular social, economic and geographical conditions. From the point of view of moral education it would be particularly important to pass on procedural rules and basic rules.' (10).

So far our level has remained somewhat theoretical, related to the last chapter and an illustration of the pervasiveness of theory in this important aspect of the 'bearing' in question. Peters' preliminary remarks are of this kind, but he passes eventually to the less abstract concern and makes an important point which is connected with the title chosen for this section. He says: '...moral education will be as much concerned with the promotion of good activities as it will be with the maintenance of rules for social conduct, with what ought to be as well as

(10) Ibid., p. 52
with what men ought to do.' (11). A distinction similar to that made between the procedural and substantial aspects of a rational moral code is here suggested. It originates in the influence upon Peters, to be noted at many points in his recent work, of Michael Oakeshott's now-famous description of the relationship between what he calls the 'language' and the 'literature' of the areas of human experience. (12).

Peters makes reference to this when he states that, 'The business of moral education consists largely in initiating people into the "language" so that they can use it in an autonomous manner. This is done largely by introducing them to the "literature"' (13). By the use of one of his favourite terms, 'initiation', he shows that his thinking about moral education is of a piece with his thinking about education in general such as appears most cogently expressed in his inaugural lecture (14). Young children have to be initiated into morality. Early experience is of very great importance for later moral development, a fact for which evidence continually accumulates from a variety of directions; but this experience is had at an age when the child cannot

(11) Ibid., p. 53.
(13) Peters, R. S., op. cit., p. 54.
grasp the reasons embedded in morality. Unfortunately, by the time a child reaches an age at which such reasons can be accepted, they will not be unless the appropriate early experience has been provided. This is the paradox of moral education!

As Peters puts it, young children '...must enter the palace of Reason through the courtyard of Habit and Tradition' (15). Built into them must be certain habits of behaviour which will leave open the possibility of the later development of a rational code; which will not psychologically prevent it. They must, in other words, learn the 'language' of morality through its 'literature' in such a way as to give them the power, later, to evaluate the very 'literature' which has nourished them. In plainer terms, those who have, as children, been morally educated are 'free' persons, capable of criticizing the code which has been the substance of their moral education in a manner not possible for those who have been indoctrinated: they will have been taught the procedural rules which enable them to develop codes of their own out of those given - codes of which they see the point, being now, to use a phrase dear to Peters, 'on the inside' of morality.

The paradox comes about because, in developing reasonable attitudes to rules of conduct, reason it-

self can play little part during the essential early stages; and there is consequently the big question which Peters puts: '...does the use of...extrinsic techniques militate against intelligent, spontaneous, and intrinsically directed behaviour later on?' (16) Fortunately, the most important of the motivations which underlie the best of these 'extrinsic techniques' - love and its withdrawal, approval and disapproval - are better classed as 'intrinsic': so Peters thinks, having in mind the kinds of situation which create the habits that do not incapacitate a person from living on the plane of reason.

Clearly, 'habit' is a central concept, the disentanglement of which is necessary if the paradox is not to prove intractable; and Peters spends some time doing this, giving, in the process, a paradigm of the role of the philosopher, at work wherever there is a conceptual problem. He pinpoints the specifically philosophical task within the situation in this way: 'The formation of sound moral habits in respect of, for instance, what I have called basic moral rules might well be a necessary condition of rational morality. It can, however, seem to be antagonistic to rational morality because of an interesting sort of conceptual confusion' (17). In other words, the basic moral rules (the content of early

(16) Ibid., p. 58.
(17) Ibid., p. 59.
moral training; that is, the 'literature' already mentioned) may seem to rule out a later rational morality (the application of procedural principles to a received code in order to create a new personally accepted one; that is, the use of the 'language') because of a confusion in our use of the key term 'habit'; there is need of the philosopher's particular skills.

These skills, used to give a Ryleian analysis which is familiar from our first chapter, equip Peters to analyse 'habit' as a higher order term, used to describe characteristics of human actions which are extra to what we can observe them doing. By such terms we pick out the sort of thing we could have reasons for doing and which we could stop doing if we were to think about them: when we talk of a 'habit' of a person, we postulate a tendency for him to act in a certain way, doing a thing he has done before and doing it automatically in order to get on consciously with the art of living. For then, as Peters says, '... the mind is set free to pay attention to things that are interesting, novel and worthwhile' (18).

Habits of this sort are the component parts of intelligent 'skills'; the component habits, being capable of operating within a range of variations and so in co-ordination with each other, permit many very different complex actions. In Peters' words,

(18) Ibid., p. 60.
'The concept of "action" is "open-ended" in many dimensions' (19); that is, there are not only mechanical actions such as are commonly associated with the term 'habit', there are also the skilled, intelligent actions in which the component habits '...are conceived of as variable and adaptable in the light of some more generally conceived end' (20). These actions are taught with reference both to the wider conception and to the particular, elemental moves as they relate to it, so that the conditions of teaching - the kinds of involvement of the teacher with his pupil - are those which the Peters' term 'initiation' implies. As he puts it here, an 'on-the-spot apprenticeship system' (21) seems necessary for moral education (and, indeed, for education generally) to succeed - a system for which the most obvious model is that found in the learning of philosophy (and golf) by people like himself!

The importance of this philosophical analysis for handling the paradox of moral education is undeniable, particularly in comparison with the weak attempt made by Hardie. Reason or intelligence in moral choice can come about only through the formation of habits analogous to these described skills; that is, habits which reveal themselves in a wide variety of actions and so count as legitimate moral

(19) Ibid., p. 61.
(20) Ibid., p. 61.
(21) Ibid., p. 56.
habits. The learning of such complex habits takes time, dependent as it is on the development of the appropriate concepts in endlessly different situations, for the child has to learn to see that a vast range of very different actions and performances can fall under a highly abstract rule which makes them all examples of a type of action.' And, as Peters continues, giving the core of his solution of the paradox, 'If the child has really learnt to act on a rule it is difficult to see how he could have accomplished this without insight and intelligence' (22).

This demonstration that there exists no contradiction between reasoning and habit formation in morality raises the question of why so many people should be deluded into thinking that there is; and, in answering this, Peters shows how necessary it is in 'ordinary language' philosophy to have a 'feel' for what is important and central in common usage, giving an illustration of what is most characteristic of this branch of analytical philosophy - its skill-like nature (see pp. 17 and 18, supra), of the very kind that Peters has been discussing. He sees that, in ordinary language, the term 'habit' does occur very frequently in expressions which purport to explain courses of action in such a way as to suggest

(22) Ibid., p. 62.
that they are stereotyped, that the person in question is acting in an instrumental, unspontaneous sort of way. And, in fact, many actions are, of necessity, carried out in this manner.

Peters' concern, however, is not to deny this, a fact of nature, but to stress that 'Habits need not be exercised out of force of habit' (23), which is a philosopher's fact discovered by conceptual analysis of the kind we have just described, and his particular contribution to solving the problem. Other disciplines must make their specific contributions, the nature of which the philosopher can only suggest - the conditions in early childhood and the methods of upbringing which will ensure that the right habits are learnt in a non-compulsive fashion are open to empirical enquiry, that '...careful examination of cognitive development and the role of extrinsic and intrinsic motivation in childhood' (24) of which Peters speaks. Only out of inter-disciplinary research can there be developed a positive theory of rational child-rearing, a limited though essential aspect of which is this kind of philosopher's cogitation exercised on the conceptual problems involved. In this way does modern analytical philosophy bear upon one sector of educational theory. And for another way, in harmony with that of Peters, we can now turn briefly to the work of a powerful American philos-

(23) Ibid., p. 64.
(24) Ibid., p. 64.
of the philosophers so far considered, the three whose work lies 'in' education — Hardie, O'Connor and Peters — do not constitute a fair sample, for much of the most significant philosophising is being done across the Atlantic. Not all of it is the work of Scheffler, but he can stand as representative of the best, particularly at this point, for his work is complementary to that of Peters and shows an interesting variation of the 'ordinary language' approach in dealing with the limited points we have time to examine.

Before the appearance of his substantial writings on philosophy 'in' education, Scheffler had already made a significant contribution to the debate in 'pure' philosophy, on the nature and status of value judgments, by taking up the sceptical challenge which we noted in our first chapter. Concerning the validity and cognitive status of value judgments, his position involved establishing the impossibility of distinguishing, in any clear-cut way, moral from non-moral vocabulary in the normal context of everyday language, and showing that, for a sceptic to maintain the ultimate irrelevance of a cognitive analysis on the grounds that the distinctive feature of moral language is that of directing, persuading and prescrib-
ing, the distinction would have to be made. At the level of theory, he is thus to be classed with Peters and against, say, Atkinson on the evidence we have examined earlier.

These theoretical considerations extend into more practical spheres in Scheffler's influential book on the language of education (25), from which we can select for comment certain emphases, different from but related to those already considered. One is his brief but telling analysis of a distinction not usually made in the unphilosophical discussions of moral education found abundantly in educational writings; and one which, once grasped, illuminates the discussion from a direction somewhat different from that of Peters but, in the end, having the same effect. In his final chapter, while attempting to clarify the concept of 'teaching' by contrasting its ordinary use with that of 'telling', he uses an example from moral teaching which we can inspect.

Scheffler maintains that the evidence we require of success in teaching a student that, say, honesty is the best policy can be of more than one kind, depending upon what we have in mind and expect. In one sense, it is the same kind of evidence as that which is appropriate when we are teaching a fact — say, that Columbus discovered America. But there is an-

other sense, in which success is shown by honest behaviour on the part of the student, and not merely by his verbal report of the meaning of the words. This distinction is used by Scheffler to clarify the longstanding issue between those who claim that virtue can be taught and those who deny it.

He says: 'The ambiguity under discussion may be related to an ancient problem of philosophy, the question whether virtue can be taught. Socrates is interpreted as having supposed...that we need merely to succeed in teaching people to know what is good, and virtuous conduct is guaranteed...most other philosophers have held that men frequently do reject what they believe to be good and knowingly choose evil...Western religions have...held that knowledge is not sufficient for virtue...we need also to strengthen the will and to sensitize the conscience...Since, however, the opposition of views, as thus construed, rests on different interpretations of an ambiguous notion, it is mistaken to suppose that they are really in conflict...both views allow that intellectual apprehension of moral principles and intellectual avowal of them may go together with a rejection of such principles in conduct' (26).

What is required in moral education, as we saw with Peters, is both intellectual apprehension of

principles, that is, a rational acceptance of them, and a manifestation of them in conduct; for without a grasp of the reasoned connection between principle and conduct, the conduct can not be termed 'moral' but at best 'conventional'; and without a showing in conduct, any known principle is a piece of mere intellectual luggage. So Scheffler's disclosure of the ambiguity is very important for elucidating moral education and the problem of linking knowledge with conduct. He demonstrates it in detail by using certain philosophical schema which uncover characteristics of ordinary usage, establishing himself thus as a more formal analyst than Peters.

The first schema is 'X teaches Y that...', into which it is possible to insert norm-stating as well as fact-stating sentences, the former, of importance in this context, capable of being given either an 'active' or a 'non-active' interpretation according to whether we take them to refer to behaviour or to the mere repetition of certain words delivered by the teacher - as with the above example, 'honesty is the best policy'. It is the ambiguity of this expression which must be resolved to avoid the nurturing of a dangerous fallacy responsible for undesirable practical consequences which Scheffler names: 'The fallacy here...is perhaps one root of the "verbalism" in moral education that believes success in the development of moral character to be the necessary prod-
uct of success in the (non-active) teaching of ethical formulas' (27). Those who have experienced long years of the English headmaster's morning homily will be in no doubt as to what he means!

A second schema, 'X teaches Y to...', provides analyses for comparison with those supplied by 'X teaches Y that...', and furnishes a distinction of special importance for moral education - one which is closely related to the work of Peters examined in this chapter, to the emphasis he places elsewhere on the 'manner' in which education is undertaken and to a similar emphasis to be noted in Scheffler's own more general analysis of the concept of 'teaching', to which we shall shortly move. It is that moral conduct is not just behaviour according to any independently specified norm supported by any rationale. In Scheffler's words, 'Its rationale must, in a certain sense, be "objective", "impartial" or "disinterested" in its support of the norm. What this means is notoriously difficult to characterize, but it is reflected in the general and impersonal language of moral judgment (e.g., "ought") which is normally used to express some rationales but not others. The rationale of a man's moral conduct, we may perhaps say, needs to be expressible by him in the language of moral judgment' (28)

(27) Ibid., p. 83.
(28) Ibid., p. 94.
In other words, our moral conduct is that which we do, not unreflectingly even though within an approved code, not as a means to some other end, but because we believe that we ought to do it—we express ourselves naturally about it in the serious language of morality, at our disposal as the result of a lifelong initiation into its use. This is a philosophical viewpoint not at all dissonant with those of Peters, Taylor and others within the area we have been examining. It stresses that, inssofar as moral conduct is a goal of moral education, the teacher is trying to achieve not only the acquisition of certain norms but also the serious, thoughtful backing of these norms in an 'objective' or 'impartial' way. Moral conduct based upon moral conviction which flows from moral beliefs is a different thing from naively 'moral' conduct learnt unreflectingly.

Scheffler, in making this point, is, like Peters, as aware of the practical difficulties implied by it as he is of the ease with which it can be overlooked because of the existence of easier forms of the teaching of conduct. He says: 'The distinction here is fundamental to moral education, for to ignore it is to run the danger of confusing the teaching of honesty for example, with the teaching of safety rules or conventional forms of courtesy, while to acknowledge it is to be confronted immediately with the delicate educational problem of attempting to develop at once
patterns of action and impartial reflection on such patterns' (29). His 'patterns of action' and 'impartial reflection' are so close to Peters' 'basic rules' and 'procedural rules' that we cannot but accept the coincidence of independent assertion as evidence of the philosophical entrenchment of this position, particularly as Scheffler leaves us in no doubt - again, like Peters - that the 'delicate educational problem' of which he speaks must be tackled with the skills and knowledge of specialists other than philosophers, whose distinct job is to do what is done (so admirably) here.

And what is done, the conceptual analysis to be found in Scheffler, has wider significance than the restriction of it to moral education can bring about. We must, at this point, move, as promised, from a consideration of reasons in morality to a brief preliminary examination of the concepts of 'teaching' and 'education' at a more general level, as these are interpreted by Scheffler and Peters, both of whom see built into the very meaning of the terms, as ordinarily used, the notion of respect for the pupil's moral right to understand what he is taught. As one of them puts it, teaching always implies 'restrictions of manner, requiring acknowledgement of the pupil's sense of reasons' (30); and, as the other

(29) Ibid., p. 106.
(30) Scheffler, I., op. cit., p. 104.
says, education is always effected in 'a way that involves at least a minimum of understanding and voluntariness' (31). Both are concerned to show that education essentially creates and exercises rationality.

**Education For Rationality**

It almost goes without saying, now that we have gathered a wider sample of the work of analytical philosophers who show an interest in educational theory, that this preoccupation with rationality is pervasive in the writings of those who are, at the present time, the most influential. It is a preoccupation which contrasts strongly with that of Hardie, from whose work our own investigation began and to whom we must continue to give credit, at least for being the first in this particular field—though to what extent developments have passed him by is made clear by the kind of ethical pronouncements he is still making at a time when there is, on both sides of the Atlantic, this emphasis on the impartiality and objectivity of moral reasons. He says very recently for example: 'It is essential for teachers and parents to concentrate on establishing good moral habits. Moreover, the criterion of good in such cases is simply what is approved by the teacher or parent' (32), rev-

(31) Peters, R. S., op. cit. (see p. 81, ref.(14), supra), p. 97.

ealing, with this 'simply', the philosophical gap which separates him from those who lead in the work which he pioneered. Their emphasis upon the possibility, the necessity even, of rationality obtaining in all genuine teaching situations is alien to his mode of thought; though to what extent it is superior to that mode of thought as manifested in philosophers other than Hardie remains yet to be decided.

At the heart of what we can call, for this occasion, the 'Peters-Scheffler' position is the idea that education's basic task is to civilize; to create human beings out of the material of each new generation by confronting them with and initiating them into the great modes of man's experience, of which the morality we have been hitherto discussing is but one. Science, art, religion, history and so on are, taken together, in a sense what man is. They are the 'forms of knowledge' powerfully identified by the Hirst whom we mentioned earlier in this account, 'the complex ways of understanding experience which man has achieved, which are publicly specifiable and which are gained through learning' (33). In achieving them man, as it were, makes himself - or makes the mind which is the better part of himself; and, in passing them on through an education in them, he ensures the

continuation and development of this 'self'.

Civilization consists of the products of varied, distinctive habits of mind which education transmits while at the same time passing on the procedures, the skills and the disciplines which have created them, so that the children of each new generation are formed into autonomous, mindful participants, capable of re-creating, refining and adding to their heritage. This is the general theme of which one variation is the approach to moral education we have described above. And at the general level this conception of education carries, too, an analysis of the teacher's role and his relationship with his pupils in the teaching situation which is claimed to be the essence of what 'teaching' means, though it appears to contradict many common notions on the subject.

A real teacher is not a mere trained servant of society, a sort of midwife-technician aiding at the birth of an even more complex industrial way of life than exists in the West at present. He adopts an independent attitude to current pressures, for if 'mind' is to be defined in terms of schooled intelligence - as is argued by Gilbert Ryle, from whose work some of the main lines of much contemporary educational thinking of this type derives (34) - then the teacher must, by definition, play a major part in determin-

ing the nature of education. Certainly, what he is as well as what he does affects his students; and what he asks as well as what he states is important, so that he needs to be himself educated rather than merely trained, a person possessed of a flexible mind of his own, an ability to examine his subject with his pupils, a respect for the developing minds of his charges and a propensity towards encouraging the free flow of ideas, questions and genuine perplexities in the teaching situation. The notion of such a lively, questioning, educated person is built in, so it is suggested, to the concept of education for rationality.

This central concept of 'rationality' is defined, not in the narrow terms commonly associated with the deductive and other processes found in the prestigious disciplines of mathematics and the natural sciences, but in broad terms as the capacity to grasp principles and to judge them critically in the light of reasons which can be advanced in public discussion in any of the areas of human experience for which there has been developed a distinct discourse. This is what Louis Arnaud Reid, the doyen of British analytical philosophers of education, means when he says: '...what is already apparent in the use of "rational" (is) that this term has a wider range of application than can be established deductively' (35); and this is what

Peters' 'initiation' is initiation into - the comprehensively rational life.

In education, so conceived, the pupil is involved by the teacher in a wide variety of open 'conversations' which embrace civilization in all its aspects - the morality we have examined in detail and the others we have mentioned. Curiosity, judgment and responsibility for personal choices of belief and conduct are encouraged within a pervasively rational atmosphere, an ethos in which, characteristically, reasons are expected and forthcoming in all the realms of study. This is the substance of this particular analytical position, of which more will be said later. And nowhere is it expressed more vividly than in words of Scheffler to be found in one of those obscure places he is fond of illuminating, the existence of which bears witness to the growing influence of analytical philosophy as it bears on even the most peripheral sectors of educational theory - in this case, on the topic of 'guidance'.

He says: 'The relevance of rationality to character seems to me very great indeed. To learn to be critical while respecting your colleagues in discussion, to learn to recognize your fallibility, to commit yourself to following the argument on its merits and to take the consequences, to be sensitive to the standpoint of other persons with conflicting claims and different centers of experience, to learn to
judge fairly and to take the responsibility for your own judgments - these are lessons of morality and character no less than cognitive virtues. They are lessons that are relevant to all phases of education, and they cannot be taught by machine, for they grow out of rational intercourse with other persons. The teacher as agent in this process is not primarily an expert authority on some realm of fact, nor a technician in an industrial enterprise. He is a person who can, in the exercise of his special authority, show his respect for his students' minds, his willingness to entertain their serious questions, and his commitment to high standards of impartial and critical judgment' (36).

Abstentions From The Cognitivist View

If we are, in Scheffler's words quoted above, 'to be sensitive to the standpoint of other persons', we must not allow this 'cognitivist' view, so powerfully argued by such influential philosophers, to go unchallenged, for that would be to reflect in a false way the bearing on education of what is happening in philosophy. We have only to remember Atkinson's scepticism in the ethical sphere to know that there are those who see things in a different light, and

we shall have occasion to sample more of their work in the chapters which follow. At this point we can note that, for example, Scheffler's philosophical technique used to develop such views as we have seen, to point to the proper goal of education as the development of rationality, is not accepted by all competent thinkers, even as it is set forth in his powerful new book (37). The definition of 'rationality' there given - '...rationality is co-extensive with the relevance of reasons' (38) is not so convincingly argued for or so philosophically obvious that it commands the assent of all, even of those professing analytical sympathies.

One particular abstention from the 'ordinary language' brand of analysis favoured by Scheffler is that made by a reviewer of his work, J.W. Yolton, who says: 'Scheffler follows a familiar contemporary technique of drawing distinctions and analysing the uses and functions of our cognitive vocabulary...it is important to ask whether that method reveals anything about the nature of knowing, learning and believing' (39), and then answers in terms which show his greater sympathy for what we have called the

(37) Scheffler, I., Conditions Of Knowledge: Introduction To Epistemology And Education (Chicago, 1965)
(38) Ibid., p. 107
'positivistic' kind of analysis (see p. 7, supra) than for the 'linguistic' variety developed from Wittgenstein, Ryle and Austin, and encountered frequently in Scheffler (Though it must be noted that Scheffler has another role as a prominent philosopher of science, and in his work here veers oddly towards the 'POSITIVISTIC' sector!)

A second negative reaction to the cognitivist position, this time with reference to Peters' main thesis as expressed in his now-famous 'Initiation' lecture, is given by J.E.McClellan, an American thinker not to be lightly dismissed when talking on either philosophy or education: he says, 'I am not convinced that his three criteria define the concept of education', and suggests that Peters is offering no more than a Stevensonian 'persuasive definition', which is entirely different from the intended disclosure of the essential meaning of the term. He continues: 'I am persuaded that his conservative ideals would promote a good education but not that they define the term' (40).

A final example, taken from many available, can be linked with this charge, that 'conservatism' in education is being concealed within the revolution in philosophy: and it is the comment of one who sees himself less as a philosopher of education than as a

humble 'educationist' concerned lest innovation in educational theory, made on no matter what impregnable philosophical grounds, has reactionary practical effects. T.W. Eason comments on the cognitivist position of Hirst, as delivered to a gathering of educationists, expressing admiration at the power of this performance within what we have termed the 'official' position, and at the same time suggesting certain dangers: 'But we must plainly watch like hawks to ensure that the new stress on the structure of knowledge, on the importance of environmental stimulation, and on the costly effort which achievement demands, does not father a new dreariness and formalism. Especially any theoretical flaw which might in later days and cruder hands exaggerate any such tendency to the steriley academic is to be guarded against. My fear is that Professor Hirst's otherwise impeccable account of the "forms of knowledge" left no place for "personal knowledge" - the kind that he himself had of his audience - and for that matter that his audience, as they listened, had of his scintillating exposition. A blind spot here would have interesting theoretical consequences. Professor Hirst is a very distinguished English philosopher: but I am still wondering if he is wrong or right about this' (41).

The basis of Eason's doubts, and his determination to be vigilant in case there are 'theoretical flaws' not at the moment apparent in this position, lies in his different philosophical commitment, which has clearly existentialist aspects to it and so cannot be pursued here. What it is important to learn from these examples of abstention from the viewpoint which is currently fashionable is that being commonly accepted cannot be equated, so far as philosophy is concerned, with being true; and that there do exist other commitments, analytical as well as existentialist, which generate alternative viewpoints on the philosophical problems of education. We have previously suggested (See p. 59, supra) that this is a good thing, if truth is the sole object of enquiry; so that, on the basis of this belief, we can, to end this chapter, return to the ethical sector, from which we digressed to make some more general points about rationality in education, in order to recall the 'open' nature of the debate. We can remind ourselves of the sceptic's position, a not insubstantial alternative to that which, emphasising the place of reason in ethics, tends to dominate educational thinking and so, by an enthusiastic consensus, to run the risk of obscuring any of Eason's 'theoretical flaws' that may exist.

It is argued that in justifying value judgments we appeal to rules and standards which are themselves justified by a further appeal to higher rules and
standards, and so on. We involve ourselves in a process that has an either/or outcome: it either goes on forever, logically speaking, or it comes to an end at some point. But if it goes on, there can be no logical justification, by definition; and if it ceases, someone in the discussion must make the decision as to where it ceases, and is thus making an arbitrary decision, and that it is always possible for another person to deny the reasonableness of stopping there. This is the point at which the cognitivist talks of the presuppositions of the very language we are using and the definition of 'rationality' in terms of its limits, and at which the sceptic maintains that, wherever there are different people, people will differ in their valuations; that the way of life advocated, for example, by the later Nietzsche idolizing force cannot be demonstrated by rational means to be inferior to that of, say, a moderate, non-aggressive Spinoza.

The sceptic's assumption, which the cognitivist denies, is that the reasoning involved in reaching this ultimate point at which irreducible differences show, is the kind of deduction familiar in mathematics and logic, which eventually, in this process, becomes exhausted, leaving fundamental decisions and commitments to be declared, with all the possible variety of fundamental preferences to be expected amongst human beings whose life experiences are un-
ique. The cognitivist responds by placing the emphasis differently - on the similarity of human experience, the public articulation of which is the language or languages in which knowledge of various sorts is 'stored': he argues that the serious use of any of these languages, including moral language, commits a person to the presuppositions of their very existence, that is, in this context, to the possibility of obtaining non-subjective moral knowledge and the possibility of resolving moral conflict by argument.

Both philosophical positions are tenable, though at the moment the cognitivist is heard most in educational circles. His counterarguments to the sceptic do not, however, assume the same preponderance in the world of 'pure' philosophy for, at their core, they involve a rejection or 'loosening' of the firmest distinction to be found in modern philosophy - the analytic/synthetic dichotomy. The cognitivist denies that 'reasoning' can only take place according to the two two ways enshrined in that dichotomy - the ways of mathematics and science. He denies that verification must be a form of scientific verification and that validation must be according to the pattern of mathematical validation. In his view, the models provided by these disciplines blind us, because of their great success, to the unique characteristics of reasoning as it actually takes place in other areas - for example in moral discussion.
Preconceptions, taken over from mathematics and science, about what constitutes an acceptable logical pattern, force us into the error of attempting to fit moral reasoning into that restricted pattern: what we should be doing is to look for the pattern as it actually exists. This is the core of the argument; but to pursue it further (it has already been minimally developed in a different context during the examination of Taylor's views in the first chapter) would be to stray too far from the theme of philosophy's analytical involvement in education and into the heart of philosophical controversy about the acceptability of post-Wittgensteinian views on the nature of language.

Suffice it to say that what educational thinking receives from analytical philosophy, now that the interest of philosophers is aroused, depends upon the totality of views which that kind of philosophy has to offer; and that, in the mid nineteen-sixties, it offers no less variety than that which continuing internal disputes necessitate. Any other impression given by the fact that those philosophers most keenly interested in the educational relevance of their work tend to hold the similar cognitivist position which has hitherto featured largely in our account, would probably be, in the long run, a false one; for in philosophy there is always the possibility, or even the probability, of the undiscovered
'theoretical flaw' which only critical philosophising between conflicting viewpoints can reveal. In the important sector of ethics and morality which we have been considering at some length there is clearly plenty of room for continued debate.

So we pass to another aspect of our theme, one which, because it is centred upon characteristics of educational discourse, will not initially involve us in reference to the pure philosophical background on which we have had to draw in our investigation of ethics and morality. Nevertheless, we must remember that there is always this background to be taken into account, no matter how restricted the enquiry may seem to be, and that what we have just emphasised about its varied nature is indirectly important even where its implications for a particular chapter of our account is not stressed. We turn then to examine the use of analogy, metaphor and models in educational theory.
Early Identification Of The Use -
Hardie And Black

We return to Hardie once again for our point of departure into this sector of enquiry, with the same intention of sampling later work on a topic which he was the first to identify as important, in order to continue showing the 'bearing' by a cross-referencing of examples. The names with which we are now familiar will, of course, reappear in this chapter; for any account which apportioned less than a major portion of its substance to this handful of philosophers would be misleading. Nevertheless there are others who have developed and are continuing to develop, in increasing numbers, the important ideas with which this chapter is concerned; and two of their contributions, one from the early and one from the later stage, of the period in question, will be briefly mentioned as typical instances.

In recalling the point in Hardie at which the investigation into ethics began (See p. 21, supra), we note that the original bypassing of an 'ought' occurred during his analysis of the 'Nature' theory of education; and it is from this that we can abstract a theme which has received considerable attention
during the last few years. Hardie considers the truth of the first of his own substituted propositions and, in so doing, identifies for the first time the use of analogy in educational theory. He says: '...those educationists who put forward the proposition which we are considering maintain... that the initial state of the child and the laws which govern the interaction between the state and the environment are analogous to the seed of a plant and the laws which govern the interaction between the seed and the environment... They regard the process of education as analogous to...certain natural processes...as analogous to certain processes which occur in the World of Nature. The teacher should thus act as a gardener who affords a plant every opportunity for "natural" growth, and should not act like a gardener who attempts to do something "unnatural" with a plant. The crucial question for such a view of education is how far does the analogy hold?.' (1).

This question - How far does the analogy hold? - is of great importance for the philosophical clarification of educational theories, for such theories, as held in the minds of educationists, are almost always analogical in nature - a fact not commonly understood by enthusiastic practitioners too imm-

(1) Hardie, C. D., Truth And Fallacy In Educational Theory (Cambridge, 1942), pp. 3-4
ersed in activity to be critical of the language they use to justify it. Hardie does a service to educational theory by disclosing the problem; though this service is not equalled, for reasons connected with the limitations of his philosophical background which we have already stated, by a similar service in showing where this particular analogy breaks down. But to reveal philosophy's role here is a praise-worthy contribution and we can pass from it, ignoring the rather mechanical and limited procedure of Hardie's own analysis of the 'Nature' theory, to other answers given to the general philosophical questions: What is the part played by analogy, metaphor and models in educational theory?; Which types are most common and what can be said for and against them as explanatory devices?

The first question - concerning the role of, say, metaphor in educational language - receives its most thorough answer from Scheffler, who notes that the professional philosopher's attention can be most appropriately directed to such language for the purpose of '...a cool examination (which) may facilitate the discovery of...controlling analogies usually suppressed in practice' (2). His views, expressed in a fully developed form quite recently, must constitute the core of any findings in this sector; but there are

(2) Scheffler, I. (Ed.), Philosophy and Education (Boston, 1958), p. 13
earlier contributions, one of which is so close in time to that of the pioneering work of Hardie, and so close, too, in the attitude it takes to traditional educational 'philosophy' and, particularly, to the 'Nature' theorists examined by Hardie, that it warrants mention.

Writing independently in an American philosophical journal of 1944, Max Black suggests that some sense can be made of the '...elastic generalities' and resounding platitudes' (3) of traditional educational theories only if it is understood that they contain certain persuasive analogies which serve to give direction to the thought expressed in the theories and which are accepted because the similarities which they highlight - between the educational process and some other familiar activity - are so obviously correct. Black argues that the suggested likenesses are in fact valid but are limited in each particular case: by means of them it is possible to organize reflection in a preliminary sort of way, but this reflection is bound to be one-sided. He suggests the deliberate creation of a variety of analogies which together will elucidate the nature of the educational process in question by providing views of it from many directions and so by giving an overall picture of its uniqueness.

The 'Nature' theorists' analogy, identified by Hardie, which emphasises the likeness of a child to a 'natural' biological organism such as a garden plant, is partially valid; that is, it is part of the whole truth about the child's situation. Particularly is this the case when its use is appraised in the historical context of its appearance in educational theory; for, as Black says, 'Emphasis upon non-interference with "natural" growth was once the fitting expression of revolt against a repressive authoritarianism'. But it is not, by itself, such a large part of the truth as its 'child-centred' proponents believe, for, as Black adds, '...today it is all too often a symptom of the abdication of the teacher's responsibility. It may well be that the overworked analogy of the biological organism has served its purpose and that the time has come to experiment with alternative "root" metaphors' (4).

Black thus gives what can be called a 'contextual' interpretation of the use of analogy in educational discourse, an interpretation based upon the understanding mentioned above (See p. 18, supra) - that the meaning of an expression is its use and can therefore be comprehended only by going beyond the words themselves into the intentions of the users of the expressions as they function in a particular social context. This is a great improvement on Hardie's

(4) Ibid., pp. 32-33
approach, as is shown by the inferiority of Hardie's restricted non-contextual analysis of the 'Nature' analogy to that of Black from the point of view of the theoretical implications each has. There is nothing in Hardie to equal the constructiveness of Black's own suggested analogy of education as art and discipline, a most impressive example of a philosopher of some subtlety experimenting with an alternative 'root metaphor' and anticipating by fifteen years one of the surest avenues into education taken by later analytical philosophers. And to these we can proceed, leaving the details of a particular analogy for a systematic account of analogy in general.

Later Investigations Of The Logic Of Analogy

In a sense, both Hardie and Black, working without a tradition to guide them, act as philosophically orientated educational theorists in spite of their awareness that philosophy has a distinctive role to play and their attempts to define it. That is, their work lacks, in comparison with that of later writers, a systematic and specifically philosophical account of the logic of analogy, being concerned primarily with criticizing old or creating new analogical theories of education. In contrast, Scheffler is a more consciously philosophical commentator, intentionally developing a 'second order' view of this aspect of
educational discourse along with the many other aspects subsumed under the comprehensive title ('The Language Of Education') which his influential book bears. (5).

His analysis of the logic of analogy contains, as we shall see, the 'contextual' element which we have noted in the work of Black, and this suggests one of those common but always interesting situations in philosophy in which a viewpoint can be brought to bear upon itself, with paradoxical results. (As P.W. Bridgman puts it: '...whenever we have a system dealing with itself we may expect to encounter maladjustments and infelicities, if not downright paradox' (6)). We can briefly note this before describing the details of Scheffler's analysis. He stresses throughout all his work the use of language in a particular context; and this is an emphasis which binds together the various aspects of his work and links him, as we have seen, with Peters. Thus, the 'cognitivist' approach to education which we have already examined under its ethical aspect and which, as we have seen, centres upon Scheffler, Peters, Hirst and their talk of 'initiation' and 'forms of knowledge' can be interpreted 'contextually' as an expression of the revolt against the excesses of child-centred educationists, who themselves, according to the same 'con-

textual' view, were at one time legitimately reacting against authoritarianism in education. Eason's doubts (see p. 103, supra) perhaps express the intuitive feelings of one who senses the paradox!

But to return to Scheffler's present work: he carefully distinguishes metaphors from the two other kinds of linguistic expressions which occur frequently in educational discourse and to which they are related - the more formal definitions and the less formal slogans - in order to clarify the logic of their operation. He says: 'Metaphors are not normally intended to express the meanings of terms used, either in standard or in stipulated ways...Metaphorical statements often express significant and surprising truths, unlike stipulations which express no truths at all, and unlike descriptive definitions, which normally fail to surprise...Like slogans in being unsystematic and lacking a standard form of expression, they nevertheless have a much more serious theoretical role. They cannot generally be considered as mere fragments crystallizing the key attitudes of some social movement, or symbolizing explicit parent doctrine' (7).

Metaphors are thus, in a sense, logically 'intermediate' between definitions, which purport to give meanings in a non-figurative, straightforward way,

(7) Scheffler, I., op. cit., p. 47
and slogans, the linguistic phenomena from the other end of the scale, which feature as literally 'meaningless' symbols for beliefs justified elsewhere. Being midway they are, as it were, in touch with both the language and the people using the language. Significant parallels are suggested by metaphors which, unlike slogans, attempt to state truths and are so open to the kind of examination which can reveal how successful they have been and what their limitations are. As any and every two things in the universe are alike in some way, merely to state a similarity is not by itself to make a serious contribution to clarity: what distinguishes the kind of metaphor Scheffler has in mind is that the likeness it suggests is a non-trivial one which tends to generate practical activity along particular lines in those who accept the parallel it suggests. For example, if it is an important truth that children are like plants, as the analogy built into the 'Nature' theory suggests, then the clear implication for practice is that there be set up educational situations in which 'natural' growth can take place and that teachers intervene no more than do gardeners in this kindergarten process.

An important philosophical task is the probing into such metaphors in order to reveal limitations not obvious to those whose thought and action are structured by them. The perspective of any metaphor
can be supplemented by the perspectives provided by other, equally limited metaphors designed by the philosopher conscious of this creative aspect of his role. This is what Black asserts and what Scheffler repeats in a more emphatic way when he suggests that '...a comparison of alternative metaphors may be as illuminating as a comparison of alternative theories, in indicating the many-faceted character of the subject. Such a comparison may also provide a fresh sense of the uniqueness of the subject, for to know in what ways something is like many different things is to know a good deal about what makes it distinctive, different from each...where a particular metaphor is dominant, comparison helps in determining its limitations, and in opening up fresh possibilities of thought and action' (8).

Scheffler follows this explanation of the function of metaphors, and of the possibility of gaining insights into education from a conscious attention to this function, by inspecting several common ones in order to note the limitations they must have. He examines what he calls the 'growth' metaphor, identified, as we have seen, by Hardie; the 'moulding' metaphor, whose different emphasis is obvious enough from the term itself; the 'art' metaphor, one form of which Black persuasively constructs during the body

(8) Ibid., pp. 48-9
of his article, throwing light on the educational process from an unusual direction; and the 'organic' metaphor, which, it can be noted, is of unusual contemporary significance because of the (unconscious) influence it has within the new and dominant sociology of education.

Scheffler's findings, of the more philosophical kind which is our concern, are interesting for the clear view they give us of his general position - that of attempting to balance scientific with ordinary language interests. First, there does not appear to be, in his opinion, a progression amongst these metaphors from the less to the more adequate: they do not develop cumulatively as do the models used to great effect in scientific theory. Second, the adequacy of a metaphor can not, in Scheffler's view, be judged apart from the complex practical context in which it appears; so that the procedure of, say, Hardie in isolating a metaphor for literal analysis is too superficial. The context must be taken into account - an analytical directive which emerges as a major item in this as in other work of Scheffler, and which he constantly repeats: '...education, as we have stressed, is the common ground of a variety of contexts. It is thus wise to be critical about accepting metaphors in a given context that have proved illuminating elsewhere...The transplantation of metaphors may, indeed, be misleading inasmuch as
it may blur distinctions vital in the new context though unimportant in the old' (9).

The distinctions which Scheffler fears may be blurred are those between, on the one hand, moral and practical questions and, on the other, a variety of empirical and conceptual questions. In using metaphorical expressions it is so easy to confuse logically distinct types of questions, to introduce value judgments unwittingly while talking in pictorial terms and to do so without a realization of the vast problem of their justification such as we have discussed in previous chapters. However, enough has been said on this topic to give an idea of how it appears to analytical philosophers. Enough, too, has been given to indicate Scheffler's views on the role of metaphor in educational discourse and to make his point about the complementarity of metaphors, a point which others have taken up in more detail.

Of these, C.J. Brauner and H.W. Burns, for example, can be briefly sampled in continuation of our policy of building up a composite picture of the 'bearing' in question. They give a penetrating description of the different ways of conceiving education, the school and the child which are built in to the four analogies of society and man which they identify and label.

(9) Ibid., pp. 52-3
The Beast in the Herd, the Noble Savage in the Jungle, the Shopper in the Market Place and the Shaper within an Organism are '...simple analogies which liken the unexaminable whole of an almost unknowable complex called "society" to something so simple and commonplace that everyone can grasp the basic principles that are supposed to be operating. These analogies are not necessarily separate or mutually exclusive. Frequently two or more are combined to account for a different aspect of what seems to occur'. 

They re-emphasise this point later, this time with reference to the 'man' rather than the 'society' aspect of their analogies: 'Each analogy of human nature...has something to say about what order is necessary by virtue of man's being what he is. Each of these analogies about the nature of human nature seeks to set out the pickets to mark how far order must extend' (11). So the insight of Black, developed by Scheffler, now appears in an introductory text for student teachers of the sixties, developed and illustrated in massive detail - a fact which is strong evidence of the growing influence of the relationship we are investigating in at least one of its dimensions.

For confirmation of this influence we turn, again,

(10) Brauner, C. J. and Burns, H. W., Problems In Education And Philosophy (Englewood Cliffs, 1965), p. 90
(11) Ibid., pp. 132-3
to Peters, leading the field on this side of the Atlantic and offering, in his inaugural address, thoughts that are easy to relate to those we have been considering. A large part of the address consists of careful analyses of certain analogies, metaphors or models which have played a major part in traditional educational theory and practice, and which display, according to Peters, objectionable limitations when considered from the point of view of the practising teacher in the classroom. To this person he offers what we can call the 'complementarity' thesis, stressing the limitations of any single analogy - 'Conceptually speaking...the "growth" model of education, like the instrumental or moulding model, is a caricature; though like all effective caricatures, it distorts a face by emphasising some of its salient features' (12).

The implication is a familiar one to us - that we begin to see the face by studying many caricatures. We are warned that for an educationist to '...shut his ears arbitrarily to such different accounts is to limit his view of the world - to take refuge in a kind of monadic myopia' (13). Everything is what it is and not some other thing says Peters, following Bishop Butler, and what this thing is - its unique characteristics - may perhaps best be found by attend-

(13) Ibid., p. 87
ing to the similarities which aspects of it have to other things: education is, in a sense, all that the many pictures painted of it reveal.

But in another sense it is not, for what education is cannot be found from pictures. Peters' intention is to construct, eventually, a positive account of education on the basis of his criticism of the onesidedness of the models that he is examining. In order to elucidate the concept of 'education', that is, to unravel its essential meaning in ordinary usage (an objective which he frankly states in spite of the disrepute in which certain forms of 'essentialism' are held by philosophers), he has a prior involvement in the examination of the more important educational metaphors. But he is not, he says, therefore committed to the fabrication of an improved model which will transcend the limitations of all the others by combining only what is correct in each.

For Peters, like Scheffler, finds no progressive improvement in the models which he inspects; and so, again like Scheffler, he concludes his characteristic dialectical argument on this topic not with the producing of a metaphor to outshine all other metaphors, but with a declaration of non-analogical intention in keeping with the emphasis already noted in the general points about 'education' to which his work in ethics also leads. He says: 'Of course this account will not itself present yet another model; for to pro-
duce such a model would be to sin against the glimmerings of light that may so far have flickered over my treatment of the concept of 'education'. For, I have claimed 'education' marks out no particular type of transaction between teachers and learners; it states criteria to which such transactions have to conform' (14).

Having thus reached a point in this section of our enquiry which is similar to that reached in an earlier chapter, we can summarize our findings about the role of metaphor before looking at the limitations of one in somewhat greater detail. It seems that metaphors in educational discourse are to be judged, on the evidence of the closely related analyses that we have taken as our sample, as 'unstable'. They can, on the one hand, quickly degenerate in use to the slogan level once the social context which endows them with meaning has changed beyond the point of their relevance: they become anachronisms, not worth serious attention. On the other hand, given analytical attention of the kind practised by Peters and Scheffler, they eventually lead such interested philosophers to talk in non-metaphorical, non-figurative terms; that is, to undertake as a main activity to which analogy-inspection has served as preliminary, the fully professional analysis of the concepts of

(14) Ibid., p. 102
'education' and 'teaching' as these are ordinarily used; to become involved in what Scheffler describes, in an earlier chapter of his which we shall examine in our next, 'descriptive definition'.

Metaphor is thus, as has been said, 'intermediate' between definition and slogan as these are described in current work. It can perhaps be forecast that its use in educational writings will be, now that philosophical scrutiny is forcing a greater self-consciousness about language, either greatly diminished or more purposefully increased in one direction - that which serves as an approach to the serious type of conceptual clarification of which the philosophisings of Peters and Scheffler which we have sampled are instances. To ask more persistently which it will be would be to poach arguments from a later chapter to which they more properly belong - the chapter concerning the closely related but wider question of the nature of educational theory.

What can be done here is to select one influential metaphor for closer scrutiny. The total of those already mentioned plus others which appear in the literature analysed by the already named philosophers and others pursuing similar investigations is too great to allow an examination of all, interesting as that would be from the educational point of view. For our purposes the important philosophical point has been made - that metaphorical expressions abound
in educational writings, and that the characteristics
and use of such expressions are as have been stated:
these need to be recognised, so that the limitations
of metaphors in the theory have as few bad practical
consequences as possible.

The example taken will serve to show what such
consequences can be, for it is an example taken from
educational thinking which is currently widespread,
originating outside education in the rapidly expand­
ing and vigorous discipline of sociology, which is
so enthusiastically attempting to solve the problems
of society, including its educational problems, that
its pronouncements often lack the caution that a
philosopher looks for. As Peters says, drawing att­
tention to the dangers of sociological concepts operat­
ing in the minds of lay people: 'Sociologists assure
teachers that they have a role of acting as a social­
isng agency in the community...Teachers may be aff­
icted by a conceptual blight if they think too much
in terms of their socialising role...Education is
different from social work' (15).

For a detailed probing of sociological talk which
often relies heavily upon the acceptibility of the
'organic' metaphor and has, because of this reliance,
the hidden and unwelcome implications for the practice
of teachers of which Peters warns, we can go first to

(15) Ibid., pp. 87 and 88
Scheffler, who, it will be remembered, includes this metaphor, which he regards as a more complex version of the 'growth' metaphor (to be found in Hardie), amongst the important ones that the interested philosopher can identify in educational theory.

The 'Organic' Metaphor: Sociology and Education

In the 'organic' metaphor, the culture of a society is taken as analogous to life in an individual organism, both the society and the individual maintaining themselves by a form of renewal and both displaying certain processes by means of which this equilibrium and continuity is effected. In the case of society, education is the 'life' process and its function is the transmission of the culture to new members of the group, particularly the young. Scheffler puts it thus: 'The organic metaphor assimilates education to the processes by which individuals take on the envirormng culture' (16), using the technical term 'assimilates' to forewarn us that everything is not philosophically satisfactory.

It is not that he is unwilling to see the point of the analogy in certain contexts; for example, in the context of anthropological, historical and psychological investigations designed to discover scientif-

(16) Scheffler, I., op. cit. (p. 115, supra), pp. 53-4
ic laws he is as content as any philosopher of science to accept the use of this model-like device, for its theoretical role is quite clear and are appropriately guarded against. His concern is for the use of the 'organic' metaphor in contexts where the distinctions he has mentioned earlier are of the greatest importance and yet will not be made because of the blurring effect of the metaphor. As he says: 'Nevertheless, when the organic metaphor is transplanted into practical contexts in which social policy is at stake, it may become positively misleading, since it makes no room for distinctions that are of the highest importance in practical issues.' (17).

Moral distinctions cannot be made amongst the biological regenerative processes which give force to the analogy: but it is precisely such moral distinctions which lie at the heart of social controversy about which cultural processes shall be used to maintain continuity - whether it shall be 'teaching' in the sense in which Scheffler defines it on the evidence of common, standard usage, or some other form of cultural transmission such as force, threat, propaganda or the indoctrination that we touched upon earlier, all of which are very effective in maintaining some type of 'life' in a society analogous to that of an organism.

(17) Ibid., p. 54
As we by now expect, this observation can be related to the work of Peters, amplifying the 'Peters-Scheffler' approach that we have previously adumbrated. The English philosopher is also eager to mark out the difference between education considered in its essence and other forms of socialisation: he lays a similar stress on the necessity of interpreting any pronouncements about education made by experts whose interests are mainly descriptive and theoretical in the context of practical activity, and underlines the dangers inherent in the lay interpretation of sociological talk.

He says: 'In the context in which the sociologist is speaking it may be quite clear what specific aspect of the teacher's role is being picked out. But the fact is that when these notions get noise abroad they are not always understood in the specific sense in which the sociologist may be using them. The teacher who hears that he is an agent of socialisation may come to think of himself as a sort of social worker striving in a very general sort of way to help children fit into society. He may get the impression that the teacher's task is not to educate children, in the sense in which I will later define it, but to concentrate on helping them to get on with others and to settle down contentedly to a simple job, healthy hobbies, and a happy home life' (18)

(18) Peters, R. S., op. cit. (p.122, supra), p. 90
The very meaning of what the sociologist says when his views are expressed in terms of, for example, the 'organic' metaphor, is different for the non-sociologist - and this includes the teacher and, more particularly, the student teacher in training who picks up a smattering of knowledge from the new sociology of education - than it is for other sociologists, trained in the proper use of this particular language. The teacher interprets, according to this view, the scientific concepts he comes across as best he can in terms of whatever practical implications he can derive from them; and he will, in this case, come to think of his job in too simple and amoral terms.

Social processes are not as the 'organic' metaphor implies they are - as little subject to choice and control as biological processes. But the misled teacher will make this mistake in thinking, resting content with a limited task that has nothing to do with education and teaching as these appear from the 'Peters-Scheffler' viewpoint, and will not be active in choosing alternatives to the particular process he finds being urged upon him in the name of social science. In this way, discussion, argument and controversy over social policy will be reduced because of a false belief, engendered by metaphorical expressions, in the minds of those who should contribute above all others to the debate. Misguided teachers will be less disposed to offer a personal, critical voice
to the necessary talk about what education should be attempting and about the content of the culture and the methods of its transmission. They will come to regard as inevitable a particular kind of schooling, on the assumption that what the sociologists say about the function of education and the role of the teacher is true; and in this way the assumption will become classically self-fulfilling, as we shall presently see with a notable case in contemporary English education.

Scheffler himself reaches the main conclusion towards which both he and Peters invariably move—that the manner in which modes of behaviour and belief are acquired is of the utmost importance—following a detailed and incisive analysis of the 'organic' metaphor which we can follow for the example it sets of the philosophical analyst at his most capable. He starts with the notion of 'cultural continuity', an essential element in the analogy. Unless, he argues, we can state a standard for cultural continuity at least as clear and uncontroversial as that used by biologists to measure the continuity of an individual organism, we just cannot be clear as to how education contributes to continuity at all, for we do not really know what we are talking about. It is a simple case of questions of meaning preceding questions of truth in a language situation where this fact is likely to be hidden from view.
What do we mean by 'same' when, for example, we say that a culture remains the same or ceases to be the same; that is, when we claim either that there is or there is not cultural continuity? Unless we are clear about this, unless we can specify 'sameness', we cannot meaningfully talk of the education which is supposed to ensure the continuity - it could be anything from brainwashing to morally sensitive rational procedures. As Scheffler puts it: 'The continuity of any culture may be furthered in different, and conflicting ways, in accord with different standards of continuity that may be chosen. It is such differences between standards that are of moral, hence practical significance, though all such standards are compatible with talk of cultural continuity in the abstract' (19).

Further, even if we do specify cultural continuity, the use of the term 'function' in stating that the function of education is to maintain cultural continuity involves us in other difficulties, in that we have not a clear notion of the 'normal' working of a culture implied by that term, whereas we do have such a notion, in biological science, of the 'normal' working of an individual organism sufficiently acceptable to investigators in the field, whose interests are descriptive and not moral. Even if we make a further specification and make the notion of 'function' as clear

(19) Scheffler, I., op. cit., p. 55
in the cultural situation as it is in the biological situation, we are still bedevilled by the ordinary language overtones of the term which Scheffler identifies - '...Nevertheless the moral distinctions that are uppermost in issues of educational and social policy contexts are omitted from the picture. What is worse, the positive moral connotation of the term "function" (which derives, perhaps, from its relation to biologically satisfactory working which is generally favoured) suggests that the notion of social function also implies moral value' (20).

It is interesting to note that Scheffler here states a truth which is well enough known to the more philosophically minded of sociologists, eager to establish their discipline on a conceptually sound basis, but one which unfortunately tends to be ignored in the writings of enthusiastic sociologists of education as they make their confident contribution in ignorance of its philosophical naivety. (21) We can confirm this by quoting an admirable passage from one such 'pure' sociologist, T.B. Bottomore, who is as alive as any to the need for restraining claims of a science which is still methodologically in its infancy and thus dependent on the philosopher for conceptual guidance.

(20) Ibid., p. 56
(21) See, for example, Musgrave, P. W., The Sociology of Education (London, 1965), for a persuasive introductory text which adopts a suspect 'functionalist' approach.
He says: '...because the concept of function is based upon an analogy between social life and organic life, it may be argued that the analogy is not sufficiently close for functionalism, so far as it provides explanations at all, to provide valid explanations of social phenomena. The analogy presents several difficulties: societies change their structure while organisms do not; it is impossible to determine the health or sickness of societies in the way that can be done for organisms, and consequently it is impossible to speak precisely about the "normal" and "pathological" functioning of the "organs", or about "function" and "dysfunction" (in fact, all such ways of speaking about societies involve value judgments); it is difficult to determine the function of a social activity or institution with the same precision as the function of organs is determined in biology by the examination of numerous instances (and in the organic world there is, moreover, a one-to-one correspondence between organ and function which does not seem to hold in the social world) (22).

We can take a concrete example to illustrate the point of such critiques of the 'organic' metaphor. In a totalitarian state, for instance, cultural 'continuity' could be defined (perhaps in the 1984 'Newspeak' dictionary!) in terms of a consistently docile

attitude on the part of the people; that is, as long as there are no complaints in word and action about the way things are it can be said that the culture remains the 'same'. 'Normal' working of the culture is that in which there is no opposition to the dictatorship: there are no strikes, demonstrations, demands for a free press, subversive organisations etc. In such a social situation the processes necessary to maintain this state of affairs - that is the process of 'education' on the 'transmission of culture' analogy - will include all those evils familiar enough to any spectator of twentieth century history: the methods of terror and indoctrination associated with the Nazi regime, the 're-education' of Spanish anarchists and Russian deviationists and all the paraphernalia of mind control described by Koestler, Orwell and others.

Most certainly the function of education under such totalitarian circumstances is to ensure continuity, for the processes defined as 'education' and the 'continuity' as specified are set up together, making any argument about education and the transmission of culture logically impregnable: if any process which is indispensable for the achievement of prescribed goals is to be called 'education', then 'education' by definition has the function of transmitting culture. But all this misses the point urged from the 'Peters-Scheffler' position, for it obscures
and blurs the all important distinctions between different processes of transmission which can only emerge, in their view, from an awareness of what 'education' means in its ordinary usage. As Scheffler says, with reference to this, his own, totalitarian example: 'It does not follow that such processes ought to be employed or approved. It does not follow, either, that dictatorships ought to work normally or satisfactorily in the specified sense, i.e., that they ought to be unopposed. The moral issues are not only not stressed in social "function" statements, but are often confused by the socially irrelevant connotation of value surrounding the term "function"' (23).

There are examples of a less extreme nature than this totalitarian one chosen by Scheffler to make his point in as stark a way as possible; and, particularly, there is the example from contemporary English education mentioned above (p. 131). This concerns the brief history and inglorious fate of the Secondary Modern school in a society geared to industry, competition and education-based social mobility. From the late nineteen fifties onwards these schools increasingly used methods of 'education' of a narrow, unthinking sort under the pressure from parents, industrialists and pupils themselves for examinations designed

(23) Scheffler, I., op. cit., p. 56
to provide the paper qualifications which a competitive society equates with educational success. Very many of the teachers in these schools showed either their 'fear of freedom' or their acceptance of the social values implied by the pressures in willingly allowing themselves to be involved in the kind of examination dominated system which rapidly evolved, taking often a leading part in the extension of it, within schools, from the level of higher-ability pupils down to the less able for whom examinations would appear, on any sane view, to be totally irrelevant.

This whole phenomenon has been described by the sociologists as the inevitable movement back on to a course dictated by social realities of schools set up in a post-war ethos of educational 'idealism' and experimentalism. The function of the school and the educational system as a social ladder to success will determine, they argue, the sort of education demanded; and unrealistic objectives such as were originally set up for the Secondary Modern schools when there was much fine talk of giving a meaningful education to less able children are bound to be overwhelmed by the working out of the facts of social life. (24).

The phenomenon can, however, be described in an

alternative way, in keeping with the philosophical points made above about the teacher's job. If too many teachers fail to grasp that, in Scheffler's words, '...the teacher has obligations that are independent of social continuity in various prevalent senses', (25), of which one is that which is presupposed in the pressure for certificates of success in a competitive school system, they will not be intellectually armed to resist such pressures, will come to believe what lies behind them and will, perhaps without really knowing it, abdicate the moral responsibility that - so it is argued on this philosophical view - is built in to the very notion of 'teaching'. If a Secondary Modern teacher believes that he can personally do nothing about the mode of education which his school is adopting under pressure from outside and with, initially, some sympathy within, then he will, in fact, do nothing and what was assumed to be inevitable fulfils itself and becomes inevitable.

At the present time in England there is an attempt originating at a high level to recall teachers to the responsibilities they have to be educators and to bring their own critical, rational selves to the business of setting up objectives, framing syllabuses and devising teaching methods. The creation of the Cert-

(25) Scheffler, I., op. cit., p. 57
ificate of Secondary Education, the theoretical work backing it and the subsequent investigations and publications of the Schools Council can be taken as a contemporary illustration of what Scheffler would favour in denying that, '...teachers ought, by any means and above all, to adjust students to the prevailing culture (specified in any way you like) and to ensure its continuity (no matter how specified)' (26).

For whether teachers ought or ought not to adjust, say, Secondary Modern pupils to our prevailing culture defined in terms of technological foundations, industrial production, vocational training, competition in and after examinations and all the other characteristics suggested by the apt term 'rat-race', is a moral question which requires the constant, serious attention of those most concerned, along the lines which, as we saw at length in earlier chapters, it is possible to give it. Such a question receives no emphasis in the 'organic' metaphor which is embedded in, at least, much of the sociologically influenced thinking done in and around education during recent years; and for that reason the metaphor is, as Scheffler shows with the lucidity that goes only with philosophical analysis, inappropriate in the practical contexts in which it is too often found.

To have revealed the limitations of the 'organic'

(26) Ibid., p. 58
metaphor is to have demonstrated the bearing of modern analytical philosophy on educational theory in an area that clearly has need of the philosopher's special skills, an area that vibrates with the activities of another and less cautious kind of specialist. As Scheffler makes plain at the outset, educational discourse is different from, say, sociological discourse and the latter cannot be transplanted wholesale into the former without the 'sea change' that only the philosopher can describe, for it is a peculiarly complex discourse which '...embraces a number of different contexts, cutting across the scientific, the practical, and the ethical spheres, which lend a variety of colors and emphases to ostensibly common notions. A fundamental task of analysis would thus seem to be the disentangling of different contexts in which education is discussed and argued, and the consideration of basic ideas and appropriate logical criteria relevant to each' (27)

Once again, we find here the expression of ideas arising out of one part of our enquiry — the use of analogy, metaphor and models in educational theory — which are, being more general, best left for discussion in another part; that is, in the later chapter which, as mentioned (see p. 125, supra), investigates the nature of educational theory from positions altern-

(27) Ibid., p. 9
ative to that implied in the last quotation and labelled, for convenience, the 'Peters-Scheffler' position. But before pursuing that wider topic we can make an immediate extension from what we have considered in this chapter into closely related themes which enable us to redress the philosophical balance of this account, in that there is post-Schefflerian work of some importance being undertaken on the two language features which he examines in conjunction with metaphor - slogans and definitions - that presents a different emphasis to that of the predominant 'Peters-Scheffler' approach, an emphasis more in keeping with the 'positivistic' element in Hardie and O'Connor, but developed more rigorously.

The following chapter - mainly on definitions and concepts in education, rather than on the associated theme of slogans which have received sufficient incidental mention - will, towards the end, give greater weight to the scientifically orientated 'positivistic' approach, not because it occupies a major part of the current literature but because of its possible importance for the future development of the new discipline away from the 'official', 'linguistic' emphasis which characterises it and the account we have been giving of it at the present moment. We can continue to follow the procedure which has enabled us to enter the literature with some profit by returning once more to Hardie for a brief cue into later developments: and this will be found at the point at which we commenced our investigation into the use of analogy.
CHAPTER V

TWO PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACHES TO DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS IN EDUCATION

The Predominant 'Linguistic' Approach

In Hardie there are many cues to be found for introducing later developments of this theme, cues which occur at points in his argument all the way from the last place at which we used him to the final chapter of his book. And it is to this, the positive end-product of all his earlier criticisms, that we can go to find, within his discussion of what elements any educational theory must contain, remarks on definitions in education which provide an effective springboard for a further comparative study, particularly of the work of Scheffler, taken as representative of the 'linguistic' approach, one of the two approaches with which this chapter will deal.

Hardie is conscious of the numerous definitions of education that have been given, three of which he has analysed before coming to the point of suggesting the 'second order', philosophical investigation which must precede any additional definition being offered as superior and more comprehensive than the rest; he says, '...we must find out how we decide whether a definition is right or wrong. It is, for example, sometimes held that we can define words as we please, so long as we do not depart from our defined meaning."
On the other hand, it is sometimes held that it is not words that we define but things or concepts, and definitions therefore cannot be arbitrary' (1).

He tries to mediate this controversy through an analysis of one type of what he distinguishes as 'biverbal definition' (2), arguing that such definitions - for example, 'man is a rational animal' - consist of two kinds of proposition in conjunction, a proposition of what he chooses to call 'social history' and a proposition which expresses the 'command' of the person giving the definition (3). To state how you think a word has been used in the past - that is, to define in terms of a word's 'social history' - is to risk being wrong, for there are no grounds for disputing the facts of past usage. But to express one's own intentions about the definition of a word is to do something entirely different: no one can object to a word being used in an odd fashion, without reference to its social history, provided that the use is consistent.

Hardie then relates these preliminary remarks, which it will be noted neatly dispose of the problem by interpreting 'real' definitions in terms of social conventions, to the problem of defining education. For a completely satisfactory definition, he says, 'we must give all the marks which have been thought

(2) Ibid., p. 67
(3) Ibid., p. 68
characteristic of it, and then agree to use the word "education" only for a process having those characteristic marks" (4). In other words, we must survey the social history of the term 'education', identify the main features of that history, bring them together and make the decision to limit the use of the term to what we find as the 'essence' of past usage.

This analysis, simple though it is, constitutes a first step along the path that Scheffler that was to tread more surely much later: we can attempt to relate the two with reference to what Scheffler calls 'general definitions' (5), to be distinguished from scientific definitions for much the same reasons that metaphors in educational theory are to be distinguished from models in scientific theory, as we have seen. He says: 'We are interested, broadly, in non-scientific discourses in which definitions of educational notions are offered... It makes no difference whether the definitions offered in such contexts are put forward on scientific authority or not; the important fact is that they are presented not as technical statements interwoven with special scientific research and for theoretical purposes, but rather as general communications in a practical context' (6).

Scheffler is quick to isolate a type of definition - the 'stipulative' - which at first sight appears to be partly equivalent to the second kind of proposition that Hardie says is present in a def-

(4),(5),(6) See p. 145, infra
inition, that which expresses a command or volition. If the two types were equivalent we could give Hardie more credit for early originality than is possible as things stand, but they are not, as we shall see in shifting the examination to Scheffler, whose analysis reveals strongly the influence of those developments in 'pure' philosophy which have taken place, as was mentioned earlier, since Hardie's early days.

A stipulative definition is, according to Scheffler, '...a piece of terminological legislation that does not purport to reflect the previously accepted usage of the defined term' (7); that is, it has no connection with what Hardie calls 'social history', being often, in fact, an invented term and free of entanglement, even when it is not invented, with common usage - which Hardie's 'arbitrary' element (see pp. 142-3, supra) is certainly not. The motive for making such definitions is purely the convenience of having abbreviatory terms for the sake of economy; as, for example, with the shorthand terms of teachers such as 'pass' or 'credit', which are handy equivalents of rather complicated descriptions that could be given in full for the papers in question.

(4) Ibid., p. 70
(6) Ibid., p. 12
(7) Ibid., p. 13
In what sense 'stipulative' definitions can be said to be arbitrary Scheffler makes clear, for it is a point of some importance to the exposition of other kinds of definition later, which are of great importance in education and which must be distinguished from those that he identifies at first. He says: 'What is fundamental with regard to all stipulative definitions is that they do not purport to reflect the predefinitional usage of the terms they define... Once it is established that a stipulative definition is formally coherent and pragmatically well-chosen, it is irrelevant to argue against it further on the ground that it fails to reflect the normal meaning of the defined term. In this special sense, stipulative definitions may be said to be matters of arbitrary choice' (8).

That this 'arbitrary' choice is different from the 'arbitrary' element noted by Hardie can be seen in considering the next type of definition that Scheffler distinguishes, for this type—the 'descriptive' definition—is connected with previous usage in a way that Hardie attempts in his too crude a fashion and with his too restricted analytical tools to uncover. Descriptive definitions, according to Scheffler, purport to give an account of the prior usage of the terms in question; they clarify meanings by look-

(8) Ibid., p. 15
ing at 'social history', genuinely explaining and not merely, as 'stipulative' definitions do, abbreviating. Scheffler puts the difference in this way: 'If we visualize the definition as a formula, after the fashion of modern logic, in which the defined term...appears at the left and the defining...set of terms appears at the right..., then we may also visualize the difference...as a difference in the direction of interest in the formula as a whole. Whereas the interest in stipulation moves from right to left, that is towards more condensed utterance with increased vocabulary, the interest in descriptive definition moves from left to right, i.e., towards expanded explanatory utterance with a smaller vocabulary' (9).

Hardie's 'social history' is thus roughly equivalent to Scheffler's 'descriptive' definition, and his 'command or volition concerning the use of words' is an element which he correctly identifies but which he fails to account for satisfactorily: it draws attention to the fact that a particular aspect of an often complicated prior usage is to be understood—something which is extensively elaborated by Scheffler, as we shall see in examining further his 'ordinary language' approach to the definition of 'teaching'. So, as with metaphor, we find here an example of the earlier writer providing a first attempt at analysis

(9) Ibid., p. 16
in an area deemed to be of great importance by the later writer; and doing so in a manner which appears as comparatively unsophisticated and yet as not lacking certain virtues of rough approximation to the analytical truth.

Scheffler's contemporary analysis is too thorough to be followed in full, so that, for our purposes, it will be best to select those aspects of it which can be most easily related to the work of other philosophers, particularly Peters. His (and Peters') continual emphasis upon the context in which the language under examination appears is immediately in evidence, designed to correct any false impression given (by talk of 'formulae') that the analysis of definitions is a mechanical affair. He warns, '...a given definitional equation may serve either as a stipulation or as a descriptive definition, depending on the context in which it is offered and the purposes which it is intended to serve; the difference is thus not a formal or purely linguistic one but relates rather to the pragmatic environment of the definition. If and only if the definitional equation purports to mirror pre-definitional usage is it descriptive' (10).

Such mirroring of usage is precisely what he himself claims to be doing, at a later stage of the argument of this book, with the concept of 'teaching',

(10) Ibid., p. 17
aspects of which we have already noted when they arose in our discussion of metaphor. He is there showing in use a philosophical technique, the logic of which he is here describing when he says: '(Descriptive definitions) may be formulated in cases where the term is already being applied proficiently to instances, the point being to distil the guiding principle of such application and to show its inter-connection with others. This last sort of enterprise is characteristically philosophical, exemplified in the work of many thinkers since Socrates, whose attempt was precisely to formulate general characterizations covering known instances of important terms' (11).

Thus, a consideration of definition soon brings us to the same emphasis upon a general philosophical position that we have been brought to on a number of occasions before - to the predominant 'linguistic', 'ordinary language', 'official', 'Peters-Scheffler' or call it what you will position which is ubiquitous in the literature. The very terms used are pointers to its presence; for Scheffler's 'distil' brings to mind Peters' 'essence' and the moment when he, too, stakes out the philosopher's claim with a similar emphasis on contextual considerations. He asks, '... (I)s a philosopher who embarks on such a task (i.e., conceptual clarification) committed to the suspect conviction shared by Socrates that there is some "ess-

(11) Ibid., p. 17
ence" of education which conceptual analysis can ex-
plicate?...have I already put my foot on the primrose
path that leads to essentialism?...Frankly I do not
mind if I have. What would be objectionable would
be to suppose that certain characteristics could be
regarded as essential irrespective of context and of
the questions under discussion' (12).

Both Scheffler and Peters are thus concerned with
explicating ordinary, standard usage; and they both
make plain their awareness of the fact that such usage
is not completely consistent or exhaustive, so that
in appealing to it there can be allowed considerable
leeway or choice to the philosopher - the skill shown
in exercising this is, in fact, what makes him a philos­opher. Many descriptive definitions meet the demands
of accuracy in mirroring prior usage, making some meas­ure of definitional legislation inevitable. As Scheff­ler says: '...where prior usage clearly applies a term
to some object, the definition may not withhold it;
where prior usage clearly withholds the term from
some object, the definition may not apply it. But
with respect to undecided cases, the definition may
serve to legislate in any manner' (13).

That the manner of legislation is important - the
manner which results in, for example, Peters defining
'education' in the way he does and Scheffler defining

(12) Peters, R. S. 'Education As Initiation', in
(13) Scheffler, I., op. cit., p. 18
'teaching' in a similar way - will become clear as we pass to the third type of definition that Scheffler identifies - 'programmatic' definition - and then to the most important questions concerned with the possible overlapping in actual contexts of the different types of separately identified definitions.

A 'programmatic' definition is one which gives expression to a practical programme, appearing as it does on a particular occasion in a particular context and used often to indicate a serious moral choice. There is clearly no 'programmatic' formula but only a 'programmatic' use: Scheffler derives his views on this type of definition to a great extent from the Stevenson we examined in the chapter on ethics, and makes his debt clear in an important footnote where he states what he conceives to be the difference between a 'persuasive' and a 'programmatic' definition in terms which confirm our placing him amongst the 'cognitivists'. He says: 'The emphasis on programmatic rather than persuasive definitions is not a denial of the importance of the latter, but, at least in part, an attempt to stress the "cognitive" import of definitions for social practice, which has, it seems to me, been unduly neglected recently despite its significant role in general discourse' (14).

What he is saying is that a 'programmatic' definition expresses a moral choice for which arguments

(14) Ibid., p. 20, footnote 9
can be produced, of the sort that we investigated earlier. However, the importance of 'programmatic' definition becomes clearer from Scheffler's analysis of the cases of overlap, the most interesting of which is that between 'descriptive' and 'programmatic', particularly the situation in which, as he says, '...undecided instances are involved and in which two equally accurate definitions may yet be programmatically opposed' (15); that is, in which alternative definitions of a term are possible, each legitimately claiming to be accurately 'descriptive' since, as we have noted, prior usage is not exhaustive - the language of the past cannot possibly account for all the non-linguistic changes that will have to be described in the then future.

The alternative and equally accurate 'descriptive' definitions may differ in legislating for hitherto undecided cases - as they may without losing their claim to be 'descriptive' - and the manner of this legislation, the way in which undecided cases are brought within the definitions or excluded from them make up the differences in programme if alternatives of practice are involved: the different definitions are programmatically different. The most familiar context for this phenomenon is, of course, in law, as Scheffler says: 'Legal contexts provide clear instances of definitions that legislate on practical matters while

(15) Ibid., p. 27
purporting to sum up prior (legal) usage' (16). But it occurs in social thought generally, and particularly in educational discourse at a time when rapid change is creating the borderline instances of old terms which require legislation in Scheffler's sense and which, consequently, become defined programmatically: 'secondary education' is an obvious example of such a term on the contemporary English scene.

If we apply this definitional scheme to the term 'education', we can see that to give it a definition is to incidentally convey a programme while attempting to reflect previous usage: even with accurate definitions we are still left with the main problem, for, as Scheffler says: '...such accuracy cannot be used as a measure of the worth of the expressed educational program. Different programs are compatible with accuracy and the justification of any program is thus an independent matter' (17). In this way he 'unblurs' the distinctions that he is continually mentioning.

It appears that Scheffler is providing just the kind of analysis that can equip us for a critical return to Hardie, who, it will be remembered, seeks to identify all the marks which have been thought characteristic of education before defining the term for agreed use (see pp. 143-4, supra). According to

(16) Ibid., p. 28
(17) Ibid., p. 31
Scheffler, it is not possible to give, in any useful sense, all the marks, i.e., to give the totality of predefinitional usage; so that whatever marks are finally chosen by Hardie must, if they are to represent the achievement of his intention according to his own beliefs, be described at such a high level of generality as to be practically useless as they stand, and in need of further definition, a process that will inevitably involve him in implying a programme.

Hardie does, in fact, pursue further the constituent, abstract terms that make up his eventual definition of 'education', apparently unaware of the practical programme he is suggesting with the interpretation he chooses. The characteristic marks which he uncovers are, '...four conceptions...(1) the original nature of man; (2) the production of changes in behaviour as, for example, the formation of habits; (3) the environment; (4) the idea of value' (18); and these are built into the definition: 'Education is a process involving the action of the environment on the original nature of man in such a way as to produce valuable changes in behaviour' (19).

But this is not a great help to educationists, particularly as we already know how he goes on to further define the most promising element - concerning what is 'valuable' - in the definition. It will

(18) Hardie, C. D., o. cit., p. 73
(19) Ibid., p. 73
be remembered that he defines 'valuable' in emotive terms and bases his conclusions about the practicalities of moral education upon the definition; he supplies a programme, but, in any event, the definition he offers is 'programmatic' and the programme in either case receives no independent justification in the sense that Scheffler uses.

Similarly, in examining what Hardie does with the second element in his definition, the 'original nature of man', we note the lack of that awareness that a Scheffler-type analysis would have cured, had there been one developed at the time. He is drawn into a lengthy account of what is known about the modifiability of behaviour which is a good example of the sort of educational discussions which Scheffler charges with, '... failing to take account of the several points noted above regarding definitions that are both descriptive and programmatic. There are an indefinite number of alternative definitions of "man", indefinitely many ways of dimensionalizing his structure and capacities, all equally accurate. To choose one such dimensionalization on the basis of its accuracy and to proceed to read off curricular counterparts to each dimension, as is often done, is to beg the whole question. One basis of choice of a definition for educational purposes must be a consideration of the very consequences for educational practice to be expected as a result of adoption of such a definition' (20).

(20) Scheffler, I., op. cit., pp. 33-4
And if it is argued, as it well might be, that Hardie's 'positivistic' intention is to introduce relevant scientific information into the discussion - an impression given by both his early and later writings - this still leaves him open to another of Scheffler's strictures, aimed not, of course, directly at him, but as an object for which he can certainly stand. Scheffler says: 'An analogous point holds for the transfer of definitions from science to education...They cannot be fitted into our stipulative, descriptive, and programmatic categories without serious distortion...to take a scientific definition for programmatic use is not to avoid the need for evaluation of the program such use conveys. The scientific adequacy of a definition is no more a sign of the practical worthwhileness of such a program than accuracy with respect to prior usage' (21).

In sum, Hardie's achievement, inspected from the viewpoint of a much later philosopher, able to draw upon rigorous enquiry within the philosophy of language, is diminished at the level of philosophical appraisal if not at the level of historical interest - assuming, that is, the acceptability of the more contemporary work. The confrontation of the two philosophers affords us, too, a further stroke for the picture we are painting of the 'bearing' as this has developed over the years; and it has allowed us to detail,

(21) Ibid., p. 34
by substantial quotation, one contemporary part of that picture which is as significant as any. Just how significant it is we can now try to show by bringing the Scheffler analysis to bear, not upon a dated Hardie, but upon a currently influential Peters, and, in the manner which produces the paradoxes - mentioned above (see p.115) - upon Scheffler's own attempt to define 'teaching'.

This procedure, of making 'the predominant "linguistic" approach' of our section heading into the work of two of its leading practitioners, will enable us to develop criticisms of our own to an extent and of a type not hitherto attempted, in preparation for the more positive and less literature-bound parts of the thesis to come later; and it will allow us to bridge the two philosophical approaches mentioned in the title of this chapter, carrying us into an account of a minority, 'scientifically orientated' view of definitions and concepts in education which combines a closeness in spirit to the Hardie we have just seen dismissed with a more impressive, contemporary analytical vigour.

The Ordinary Language Definition Of 'Education'
And 'Teaching'

Peters defines 'education' in his latest work (see p.28, supra) with a specific purpose in mind, and defines it in his inaugural address as a separate and
self-contained piece of philosophy: it is to the latter that we turn. What sort of definition is it that he offers? How does it fit into Scheffler's scheme? Is it stipulative?; or programmatic?; or descriptive?; or does it illustrate one of the possible overlappings of these types? Our previous references to Peters' work tell us that the definition, no matter what kind it is, results from Peters' concern to get clear about education in such a way as to make sense of the teacher's task and to make sense to the teacher as he sees his task, engaged in the enterprise.

If we look at another part of his contribution, delivered in a transatlantic symposium on the possibility of a discipline of education, we find a clear admission of his desire both to keep teachers in mind while philosophising in education ('...most philosophers regard this field as a philosophical slum. But it need not be so. There are genuine and exciting philosophical problems in this field. Indeed there is enough work to keep a company of trained philosophers busy for half a century. And such work could contribute much to the clear-headedness of teachers on the job' (22) ) and to gain benefit in philosophy from the concrete, real problems that teachers have to face ('I find that taking the concrete situation of the teacher in a school system is often an admirable

way of trying out conceptual analyses and theories of justification and bringing them down to earth! (23).

This belief, that the teacher's position is clarified by philosophy and his concrete situation is a testing ground for philosophical theories which otherwise would float too freely, is shown in Peters' manner of defining 'education'. He takes, it will be recalled, various one-sided views which are to be found condensed into metaphors, and after examining their limitations makes '...three conceptual points about "education" which are necessary for the explication of its essence' (24). The 'essence' must, of course, account for what the dedicated teacher believes himself to be doing.

The first of these points is '...that "education" implies the intentional bringing about of a desirable state of mind' (25); the second is '...that to be "educated" implies (a)caring about what is worthwhile and (b)being brought to care about it and to possess the relevant knowledge or skill in a way that involves at least a minimum of understanding and voluntariness' (26); and the third, concerned with the cognitive aspect of education that Peters is always at pains to stress, is added to that which emphasises the value of what is passed on and that which underlines the manner of

(23) Ibid., p. 20
(24) Peters, R. S., 'Education As Initiation' (see p. 150, supra), p. 90
(25) Ibid., p. 91
(26) Ibid., p. 97
its assimilation, is expressed negatively with reference to the kind of person who is highly trained but not 'educated' - '...he has a very limited conception of what he is doing. He does not see its connection with anything else, its place in a coherent pattern of life. It is, for him, an activity cognitively adrift' (27).

These three criteria, together with the insights gained from an examination of the popular but limited models of his preliminary critique, equip Peters to, as he puts it, 'construct' a more positive account of education. The question for us is to what extent such talk of 'construction' can be fitted into the definitional scheme suggested by Scheffler. For this 'construction' is undoubtedly understood by Peters himself as revealing what '..."Education" involves essentially' (28) and '...what is meant by "education"' (29); and is thus, apparently, both an attempt to explicate the ordinary usage of the term 'education' and an effort towards reconstructing, dialectically, a more satisfactory account of what education is.

According to Scheffler, there are many possible descriptions of the ordinary usage of any term, each one with a legitimate claim to be mirroring predefinitional usage accurately; so that, on this account, if Peters' main preoccupation, in what appears to be a double exercise, is with the first aspect, with what

(27) Ibid., p. 98
(28) Ibid., p. 102
(29) Ibid., p. 108
'education' does in practice mean, then his second aspect, in which he talks of 'essential' meaning, hardly fits into what Scheffler asserts about the in-exhaustive nature of 'descriptive' definition and the possibility of equally valid definitions of this type. He must be defining 'programmatically': in which case, the programme he is expressing stands in need of the 'independent justification' that Scheffler refers to. In fact such independent justification of a programme of moral education is what we have seen Peters sketching in another context; and this he continues in the latest of his contributions, which we have not, unfortunately, been able to assimilate more than marginally into this account.

But, as far as the inaugural lecture is concerned - and this is the object of our present examination - the above questions and perplexities about the nature of Peters' definition of 'education' remain. Scheffler and Peters, hitherto very much in harmony, appear to clash. We can perhaps best proceed by re-establishing the harmony and dealing with the 'felt' difficulties by examining them in Scheffler's work, taken as representative of the whole 'Peters-Scheffler' approach. And the re-establishment of harmony is easily effected by interpreting Peters' 'education' as equivalent for our purposes, to Scheffler's 'teaching'. For this economical procedure there is some warrant in the emphasis, already noted, which Peters places, when discussing the nature of education, on the teach-
er'on the job'. Also, we can note, in his account of 'education as initiation', the hesitation about discarding the term 'teaching' as a suitable label for what he has in mind. (30).

So, we can put it this way: Peters describes as the ordinary meaning of 'education' - i.e., what its standard use implies - just one of the equally valid meanings that can be analysed out of ordinary language: and this meaning is very close to the meaning of 'teaching' as this is analysed out of ordinary usage by Scheffler. In short, the essential meaning of 'education', the core of its use, is 'teaching' in Scheffler's sense of the term. Our questions about Peters (see p. 158, supra) then become questions about Scheffler. To what extent is his 'teaching' defined 'descriptively' according to his own account of 'descriptive' definitions? How does the definition in the later part of his book withstand the force of his own earlier analysis in which it is shown that there are always several, equally valid 'descriptive' definitions for any term?

Clearly, there is at the heart of this problem, which is simplified to make it manageable within the confines of this enquiry but which is nevertheless difficult enough to see into, the very large philosophical question which has been implied at several

(30) Ibid., p. 102
points hitherto, in discussing the 'linguistic' approach. It is to what extent 'ordinary language' analysis is self-sufficient, granted that it is a sound starting-point for conceptual enquiries. As we shall see better in the final section of this chapter, there are those who object to what they consider to be the stultifying effect on conceptual creativity of a total commitment to 'ordinary language' analysis - an effect briefly touched upon in our comments below.

Turning to the details of Scheffler, we read that his purpose is, '...through an application of philosophical methods to clarify certain pervasive features of educational thought and argument' (31): it is clear that his 'philosophical methods' are those of 'ordinary language' analysis and that it is clarification of what exists that concerns him and not invention of something new. But it can be argued that description of usage can and should be followed by prescription, that the disentanglement of the common language confusions should be a preliminary task to that of creating more precise definitions and concepts, with clear practical implications, for use in education. In fact, if Scheffler's own definitional scheme is accepted, this cannot but happen, for situations in which his 'descriptive-programmatic' overlapping obtains are almost inevitable in a complex discourse.

like that of education.

However, he insists that his own clarification of 'teaching' is of '...its everyday ***, standard use', of '...ways in which it is typically applied, and that to which it typically refers' (32); and by this insistence he leaves no doubt that he believes himself to be offering a descriptive definition. Presumably, he would deny that his method here could be described in the words he uses on another occasion; and yet they seem to fit admirably what he does with 'teaching' when we consider the constant use by so very many people of that term. Scheffler says:

'...mention must be made of "explicative" methods, whose object is not primarily to describe standard uses of current concepts, but rather to refine and explain these concepts systematically so as to render them unambiguous, precise, and theoretically adequate. The refined products of explicative methods must be similar in certain basic respects to their natural originals; they must be, recognizably, precision-made idealizations of these originals. Yet for the sake of superiority in expressive or theoretical power, "explication" feels free to deviate considerably from the actual uses of concepts in ordinary language' (33).

But this is what Scheffler appears to be doing with 'teaching'. If he is not—and it is foolish

(32) Ibid., p. 60
(33) Scheffler, I., Philosophy and Education (Boston, 1958), pp. 8-9
to be dogmatic in an area where puzzlement is respectable - then it is difficult to know why his analysis is so thought-provoking; for to state that to 'teach' is to submit to the requirement of the pupils' understanding, to his demand for reasons and adequate explanations, does not appear, on the face of it, to be the mere giving of a description of the term's ordinary usage. It seems more appropriately classed as an 'explication', made, as is quoted above, '...for the sake of superiority in expressive...power', and implying a programme in its defining as 'teaching' only those aspects of pedagogical relationships that are found in a small proportion of teaching (in another sense) situations.

For if we think of teaching in Scheffler's way, we must favour great changes in the schools that we have at present; and, of course, there is the same implication in any acceptance we give to Peters' notion of 'education as initiation' with which we entered this phase of the discussion. And that this programme of change is not to the liking of everyone, we have seen in reporting Eason's doubts (see p. 103, supra) expressed on behalf of an older generation of educationists, who would no doubt define 'teaching' in a manner different from that of Scheffler and, in their view, preferable to his because of the very consequences for practice implied. It would appear then that his definition cannot be other than 'programmatic'. 
Yet Scheffler insists that he is describing without legislating; and this, in view of his philosophical standing, makes our critical remarks open to doubt, for whatever force they have derives in fact from Scheffler's own earlier insights into definitions. It will be as well to speculate on the kind of move he would make against the contention that he constructs rather than reports in his analysis of 'teaching'. We can summarize the objection to his views by stating that 'descriptive' definitions must be (a) selective with respect to the totality of past usage, and (b) legislative or constructive, because each use of a word contributes to new usage or meaning - that is, the meaning of, say, 'teaching' is changed for us on reading Scheffler's account, and if it is changed for us it is changed for everyone with whom we have conversational contact in which 'teaching' occurs; and similarly with them.

To this we can reply, taking Scheffler's part, that his framework of definition is a relatively sophisticated and subtle tool with which to investigate language and that it is in the hands of a skilled philosopher. It is not a case of anyone's opinion on language usage being equal to anyone else's. A Scheffler only defines after extensive preliminary sorting and judging of usage, calculated to develop a 'feel' for the concept - for its important, central uses in ordinary language. The resulting definition
mirrors this usage and so falls within the 'descriptive' class. Without such reflection of the ordinary applications of the terms in question by a language-conscious, skilled philosophical investigator, definition would be completely arbitrary, for it is only the control by initially accepted cases of application that distinguishes a 'descriptive' definition from a 'stipulative' definition, as these are presented by Scheffler.

In plain terms (which no doubt modesty prevents philosophers from using), any fool can give a definition but only a philosopher can give one that captures what can only be called its 'essence'. And the reason for this is the sheer complexity of the task, for which few are fitted—a fact that a recent picture of the philosopher at work, sketched by Ryle, makes one hesitate to deny. He says, '...the philosophical examination of a concept...can never be the examination of that concept by itself, but only the examination of it vis-à-vis its numerous neighbour-concepts, and then vis-à-vis their innumerable neighbours too. It follows...that the procedure of the philosophical examination of a concept is necessarily an argumentative or, if you prefer, a dialectical procedure. The philosopher has done nothing at all until he has shown the directions and the limits of the implication-threads that a concept contributes to the statements in which it occurs; and to show this
he has, so to speak, to tug these threads through their neighbouring threads, which, in their turn, he must simultaneously be tugging' (34).

It is this skill that Scheffler claims to be exercising, showing what Ryle distinguishes, in the mentioned article, as the philosopher's 'afternoon' concern with the language that we all use unconcernedly in the 'morning'. Scheffler's purpose is, above all, to make clear what a 'programmatic' definition is; and, particularly, to warn us that such a definition appears, as it were, 'in disguise' and needs, in every case, to be unmasked and shown for what it is — a departure from initial usage made for practical and moral purposes and hence to be evaluated by appropriate moral and practical criteria. His own concept of teaching is not intended to be programmatic in this carefully distinguished sense, for teaching is, Scheffler maintains, normally distinguished by the giving of honest reasons such as he has stated in his analysis.

In answer to the objection that 'teaching' as we know it is most plainly not so distinguished, Scheffler clarifies his position by isolating the 'activity' sense of the term from all other senses. He does this so well — in reply to a critic voicing similar doubts to those we expressed above — that it is worth leaving it as his last say in this section of the discussion.

He says: 'It is true that we often employ a role-
notion of teaching, as referring to whatever teachers
(an institutional class) do in fact. Insofar as this
may be true, the ordinary word is ambiguous, and I
have chosen to explain the activity-sense of the word,
using other means to talk about schools as institu-
tions and the role of functionaries in them. This
choice brings out the option of considering how far
teaching (in the distinctive activity sense) is to be
used in society as a model of cultural renewal. To
blur the distinction would, in effect, (I think) tend
to conceal this option. But I hope I did not beg the
moral issue; there may be good reasons for using other
than rational methods in given circumstances, for in-
stance. My point is that the option, as a moral, not
linguistic, issue, needs to be clearly exposed' (35).

We can leave Scheffler on this note of restraint,
perhaps not wholly convinced that 'whatever teachers
do in fact' can be excluded from the discussion by
talk of ambiguity. Teachers - those '...quiet men
working at the job at which they have always worked'
(36), as Peters puts it, disarmingly, for their ears
- do many things: hundreds of thousands of them eng-
age in a variety of activities, all of which they
would unhesitatingly call 'teaching'. And most of
these activities, measured against the standards
implied in Scheffler's 'teaching' and Peters' 'edu-

(35) Scheffler, I., Studies in Philosophy and Edu-
cation, Vol.IV No.I, pp. 135-6, Spring 1965
(36) Peters, R. S., op. cit., p. 87
ation', fall short; so that it is still hard to see how these philosophers' emphases can be claimed as descriptions of what is the case. There remains the suspicion that the work of Scheffler and Peters is best interpreted as the sophisticated plea, of philosophers with a particular analytical commitment, to view education and teaching in a special way. However, to show any less restraint in voicing this suspicion than Scheffler shows in developing the object of it would be inappropriate. We can, instead, turn to report on a philosopher with a different analytical commitment who does not hesitate to be blunt.

The Alternative 'Positivistic' Approach

This approach is as well represented by G.R. Eastwood as by any philosopher currently working in education. And in turning to him we can give an instance of the 'bearing' under scrutiny which originates, unlike those we have been considering, in a more peripheral part of the English-speaking world. Eastwood is a Canadian working in an area hitherto dominated, so far as our account goes, by a small group of philosophers with a particular commitment; so that he is, geographically and philosophically speaking, an outsider who argues in the manner we have called 'positivistic' and who is thus closer in spirit to Hardie and O'Connor than to the philosophers who have tended to take up our time.
His views, as expressed in the bulk of his work, are radically opposed to those who would rest content with an 'ordinary language' approach; but, as we shall see, the degree of his opposition is difficult to determine finally, and the grounds of it even more difficult to state, because in parts of his writings he appears to reveal a contradictory sympathy for the procedures he attacks. However, we can start by reporting the 'new' element to be found in his contribution. In a number of articles published during the nineteen-sixties he pursues the theme that educationists must attempt to develop a precise, technical language - what he calls a 'P-language', for professionals. A quotation from one of these articles, notable for the specific reference to the views of Scheffler discussed above, will serve to show both his blunt demand for thoroughness and system and his philosophical sympathies and antipathies.

He says: 'The language analysis of philosophical activity is largely, but not entirely, therapeutic. Understanding current usage and current meanings is an initial stage but unless it is followed or accompanied by the substitution of the precise for the imprecise and the clear for the vague, little is achieved. Language does not function according to rules. Rules summarize usage. To follow a rule means to understand the rule. Most of the work so far done in analysis of the language of education displays a
tendency to accept it as it is and therefore does not proceed beyond the elementary therapeutic level...Definition is essential for precise usage in any language though it remains largely unexplored with specific reference to education and the only published work [reference to Scheffler] on the topic is limited in scope and makes little attempt to explore the possibilities of many types of definition that have been developed in other contexts. This alone constitutes a field in which there is hope for a great deal of philosophical activity and it may well be that new ways of defining are necessary. The act of defining may be largely the responsibility of the worker in a specialist field (e.g., curriculum) but clarification of use and interpretation, the establishment of satisfactory criteria for use and the appropriateness or relevancy of the concept associated with the term are philosophical problems. The degree to which they are performed determines the degree to which an adequate P-language is established' (37).

This is a clear demand that we go beyond clarification or therapy to the creation of precise concepts for effective professional intercommunication. It also appears to be a simple demand, unflattering in its implication that philosophers such as Scheffler have been remiss in not seeing to it. The tone is such as

to make us wonder either how we could ever have been impressed by the 'Peters-Scheffler' approach or how Eastwood can be blind to their delicately argued subtleties. There is no doubt that he is scientifically orientated, like Hardie: he talks of educational philosophy 'moving towards greater utilitarian value and practical applicability' (38), away from its scandalously limited past.

The careful separation of slogan, metaphor and definition to which Scheffler devotes many pages, and which we have reported as a substantial portion of the 'bearing' of philosophy, is practically ignored by Eastwood, who disparages the whole of traditional views as though it were just a gigantic, self-perpetuating slogan, a philosophical free-for-all. He says: 'The concept of educational philosophy as one grand slogan interpreted by a system of subsidiary slogans leaves those responsible for interpretation and application free to do anything or nothing and yet claim to "follow the rule". The result is that whatever X chooses to think is life adjustment is life adjustment. A slogan means whatever it is taken to mean' (39).

This passage, the content of which is plainly derived from the less iconoclastic work done by the Americans Komisar and McClellan (40), illustrates Eastwood's

(38) Ibid., p. 29
(39) Ibid., p. 30
(40) Komisar, B. P. and McClellan, J. E., 'The Logic Of Slogans', in Smith, B. O. and Ennis, R. H. (Eds), Language and Concepts in Education (Chicago 1961)
main weakness, particularly evident at this point in our account, following a consideration of more moderate opinion; for there is an element of tongue-in-cheek about his source which he has obviously missed. In contrast to them, Eastwood will have none of the inadequately defined terms and vaguely expressed ideas that pack educational discourse. He is disturbed at the acceptance of slogans as legitimate features of such language, for a situation in which a term means whatever a user of it thinks it means outrages the scientist in him. We are reminded of Hardie's jibe at a similar acceptance of an undesirable feature of educational theory - 'It has been customary to consider that disagreement in such a subject is quite respectable' (41) - and his determination to dispose of it with a new solution for old problems.

The 'P-language' is Eastwood's solution. This will embody accurate description and explanation and will demand of its professional users the precise statements and consistent interpretation of terms that characterises any technical language. For the first time professional educators will be able to communicate with each other in terms that accurately convey beliefs, leaving the expression of attitudes as the task of the 'L-language', intended for communication with and amongst laymen, for whom attitudes are more

(41) Hardie, C. D., Truth And Fallacy In Educational Theory (Cambridge, 1942), p. ix
necessary. The old terms will thus have a double role, one of which, the P-role, is made possible by the deliberate creation of a completely new scientifically precise usage for the terms.

Eastwood puts it in this way: 'The difference exists in the precision of the concepts associated with them. The use of the term "activity" in the P-language implies, or should imply, a concept clearly defined for the particular context or use and based upon an adequately developed set of criteria so that it is capable of universally consistent interpretation. Its use in the L-language permits emotive-persuasive connotations designed to facilitate acceptance of a kind or quality of programme the criteria for which are a professional concern. Currently terms such as "activity", "curriculum", "growth", "individual differences", "progress", "achievement" and others are no more clearly defined and understood and no more consistently used or interpreted among professionals than in lay discussion. The educator cannot speak or write precisely or assume that he is being interpreted as he means to be because the language does not allow' (42).

To this diagnosis of the communication disease amongst educationists anyone in the business, experiencing its effects daily, will be tempted to give

(42) Eastwood, G. R., op. cit., p. 32
immediate assent. So much discussion of educational topics at all levels in the system seems to be semantically anarchic: conversation in staff room and in committee often resembles the dialogue of a Pinter play. But a diagnosis is not a cure. What Eastwood offers as a remedy, his constructive proposal for the creation of a new, vigorous use of educational concepts, seems a little too clear-cut and straightforward. We are reminded again of Hardie with his mechanical substitutional analysis that seemed inadequate to the proposed task. And one of Eastwood's own favourite phrases comes to mind as an appropriate label for what we suspect: he talks of 'naive specialisation', and we sense that such is the weakness of his own proposal, for surely only a naive person could fail to see that such a simple solution rests upon an assumption of simplicity in educational discourse.

If we recall that Scheffler and the 'ordinary language' analysts assume a complexity in such discourse, we realize that once more we are touching on the general problem of the nature of educational theory that we have twice before approached in dealing with subsidiary matters. Eastwood's solution - as opposed to his identification of the problem, which is uncontroversial - assumes that 'education' in one of its senses is or could be a 'discipline' possessed of an autonomous discourse in which key concepts could be refined by professional agreement and effort. Such, at any rate, is the impression that his over-
Now this is an assumption very much open to challenge, as we shall see in detail during the next chapter. For the moment it can be said that the nature of educational theory is a debatable issue in which one of the crucial questions is whether Eastwood-type assertions such as the one given below are acceptable in the face of the arguments of a Scheffer or, even more, a Hirst (see p. 2, supra). Eastwood says, for example, linking his views on 'theory' with the attack on slogans that we have noted: 'An educational theory does not differ in principle from a theory in any other field and the use of the word "theory" in the weak sense to mean a speculative generalisation based on what someone believes to be the case and the appropriate way of dealing with it stems from inadequate development of the concept. In this weak sense a theory is no more than a generalized set of beliefs designed to create an attitude and deriving effectiveness from the degree to which emotive language and sloganistic expressions can advance the opinion of the advocate' (43)

To return to the more restricted topic: we have still to enquire a little more closely into Eastwood's proposals for clean and tidy definitions. How exactly does he suggest that concepts can be developed

(43) Ibid., pp. 39-40
and a 'P-language' created? What are the details of any procedures he may have for giving concrete form to what might be called his Carnapian aspirations for educational language? How effective a defence of his procedures can he erect against the inevitable criticisms that will come from the 'ordinary language' school, whom he acknowledges by name in the following passage, where his own (predominant) approach is also briefly described? — '...contemporary philosophy is, in part, at least, empirically based and concerned in some way and degree with language. The language component may be ordinary language which is the distinguishing characteristic of one type or strand; or it may be one of the forms of ideal language typical of another which attempts to achieve a greater degree of expressional clarity by use of symbolic systems of logico-mathematical form' (44)

The answers to these questions can be found, if at all, in the three stages that Eastwood suggests for progressing from the analysis of language as it is currently used to the more constructive activities that he favours. In describing them as stages necessary for the creation of satisfactory educational concepts, he charges both groups of contemporary theorists — the 'progressive' educationists and their cognitive critics — with an equal failure in precision;

(44) Ibid., p. 28
for terms like 'structure', essential to the arguments of one group, are as unsatisfactorily defined as the terms like 'activity' which crowd the writings of the other group, the 'child-centred' theorists, against whom the structuralists are reacting. Clearly Eastwood thinks that a Bruner (45) represents no philosophical advance on a Dewey!

The first stage, his 'explication' (46), calls for a survey and classification of the meanings of terms as they are used in various normal contexts, with the objective of establishing a precise and consistent meaning for each context. This seems a reasonable starting point; but as Eastwood, unlike the philosophers whom he tends to indict, expresses himself tersely, without the illuminating examples encountered in, say, Scheffler, his own meaning for the key term 'context' is not at all clear. If he means by it what Scheffler means, for example, then his first stage is no more than an 'ordinary language' clarification. If, on the other hand, he means something different, then his compacted exposition of the stage stands in obvious need of the 'ordinary language' technique it purports to replace.

Fortunately, the obscurity of his position is slightly diminished by Eastwood's account of stage two. Criteria are to be specified for each context

(45) See Bruner, J. S., The Process Of Education (harvard, 1961), Ch.2, for 'The Importance Of Structure'
(46) Eastwood, G. R., op. cit., p. 35
in which a term may be used; so there will be available what he calls a 'criteriaset' (47) for each situation in which terms like 'activity' and 'structure' can legitimately occur. Presumably the specifications and instances of situations, agreed between the now 'professional' educationists (at a convention?) will provide the content of the professional course ∈ the 'literature' (to use the Peters' vocabulary in an alien place) into which young aspirants are 'initiated'. The pity is that Eastwood provides us with an attractive college brochure but little in the way of schemes of work; for while we might agree with him in what he says in, for example, the following quotation, we can not really say what it is we are agreeing with until his terms become more expanded. The situation is similar to that in which Hardie's definition of 'education' was found acceptable because of its generality and the impossibility of unforced dispute (see p. 154, supra). We long for a detailed example of a 'criteriaset' when he says: '...the essential point is that each criteriaset designates a separate concept so that for any term there is not an associated concept but a "family" of concepts. It does not make sense to ask "What does...a...mean?"! The question must be phrased in some such way as "In this context for this purpose what does X mean by the use of...a...?"' (48).

(47) Ibid., p. 35
(48) Ibid., p. 35
The allusion to the 'family' notion of the later Wittgenstein puzzles us further, coming as it does from one whose main object of attack is the kind of 'laissez faire' philosophy that stems from the *Philosophical Investigations*. If what Eastwood describes in this way as stage two is not another aspect of the kind of enquiry to which Petrs and Scheffler devote themselves, it is, as with stage one, difficult to say what it is. And if it is the same, we wonder why there is all the initial fuss about the 'elementary therapeutic level' and 'limited scope' of, for example, Scheffler (see pp. 171-2, supra); for already two of the three stages have been described without anything recognizably new being offered.

Several years later than the 'P and L language' article Eastwood still displays this disconcerting ambivalence towards the 'linguistic' branch of analytical philosophy when he says: 'Since the publication of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* the concept of "families of meanings" instead of "meaning" has been debated but not questioned. Awareness of this situation in language usage is an essential preliminary step, but it does not constitute an effective solution to the problem' (49). He again implies the iconoclastic intention of his own work, written against the orthodoxy which is 'debated but

(49) Eastwood, G. R., 'Categories, Concepts And Ostensive Learning', *Canadian Education And Research Digest*, Vol.5 No.3, p. 175, September 1965
not questioned', again acknowledges 'ordinary language' analysis as 'an essential preliminary step' but fails, once more, to give a post-preliminary step which reads as convincingly as the detailed writings of those whom he criticizes.

Lack of detail is his strength and his weakness: his contribution cannot be dismissed, for its large claims may, we feel, turn out to be justified; and yet the justification is presently lacking. At times he comes close to admitting that his role is the negative one of diagnosing a philosophical ailment without the power, at the moment, to write out the full prescription for a remedy: as, for instance, when he says, 'The clarification of the language of a discipline is not a task to be undertaken with hopes of reaching finality. Even if precision could be achieved now it would, without further development, be short lived. The results that accrue stem not so much from the definitions provided, the usages established and validated and the criteria developed, as from creation of awareness that there is a continuing problem. The solution comes not by creating a precise language but by creating a precise attitude towards its use. Changing the form and/or elements of a language is not a sufficient condition for effective establishment of precise and consistent use' (50).

The more we read such passages in Eastwood—characterised by vague talk of the need for precision—the more we suspect that the 'alternative "positivistic" approach' of our section heading is a little optimistic for the nineteen sixties. In this area, at least, the thorough investigations of Scheffler, Peters and others occupy pride of place not only in terms of bulk, which we have reflected in our account, but also in terms of quality; for this turning from the main path to follow the Eastwood track does not seem to have provided us with a satisfactory alternative route. Perhaps this is a judgment conditioned by the state of the discipline at the time of writing and the sheer influence of the central emphasis in the literature. Perhaps these views on concept development should be appraised more for their potential than for their achievement: there are signs in the above passage that Eastwood himself would be content with such a reception.

We can, then, inspect the third stage with its potentiality rather than its accomplishment in mind, asking ourselves how it might be developed, given time and intellectual labour, and remembering how short has been the period of philosophical activity that we are surveying. This final stage is one of 'intersubjective explication' (51), in which the families of concepts from stage two are corporately ex-

(51) Ibid., p. 36
examined with reference to the range of contexts in which they occur and the range of persons who use them in those contexts; presumably with the purpose of exposing individual interpretation by users and deciding upon consistent interpretation by professional users.

The whole enterprise has the sound of an empirical investigation for which the scientist in Eastwood is more responsible than the philosopher. (It was suggested above — see pp. 166-8 — that one of the defining characteristics of a philosopher is that 'feel' for the central uses of a concept which cannot be trivialized into scientific enquiry.) His own words will confirm this impression of scientific eagerness, for they are littered with the impressive-looking symbolism that has bulldozed genuine philosophical discussion out of many an argument. He seeks '...to determine if, even though the concept in each appropriate context is founded upon adequate criteria, it is in fact used by all informed individuals both appropriately and consistently... Adequate understanding is dependent upon universally consistent interpretation which can be achieved only if concept \( C_i \) (where "i" goes from 1 to \( n \) and designates the family of concepts), is interpreted by subjects \( S_j \) so that if particular subject \( S_1 \) uses a term and associates with it a particular concept \( C_1 \) it will be interpreted with an acceptable degree of probability as \( C_1 \) by \( S_2, S_3 \ldots S_n \). The level of probability of appropriate inter-
pretation that is acceptable is, in principle at
least, empirically determinable' (52).

Such a manner of expression provokes questions.
If this type of 'meta' language is required for the
clarification of educational discourse, where do we
turn for confirmation that the concepts in it are,
as Eastwood himself puts it, 'used by all informed
individuals both appropriately and consistently'? The
imprecision which he sees as a problem in his
'object' language (the language of education), and
which he attempts to solve by using such a language
as that exemplified above, is surely a problem, too,
in that language (our 'object' language - the language
of Eastwood), for the solution of which a third, 'higher
order' language is required. Are we not caught
in an infinite regress which we can break out of only
by using, at some point, ordinary language in as con­
scious and critical a manner as we are able? But are
we not then attempting to do what philosophers like
Scheffler and Peters were doing in the first place?
(And doing it well; which is what makes them philos­
oplers).

Again, we cannot be dogmatic in evaluating the
part that Eastwood is playing in an ongoing and as
yet short lived enterprise. The fact that he follows
the quoted 'symbolic' passage by an attempt to relate

(52) Ibid., p. 36
his own views to Wittgenstein's second thoughts on language is cause enough for hesitation in identifying his position. Exactly where he stands, to what degree he really favours 'ideal language' over 'ordinary language' (his own terms for our 'positivist' and 'linguistic' approaches), to what extent his remarks on Scheffler imply a bias towards the former language and his direct references (here and elsewhere) to Wittgenstein imply a contradiction of this bias - these are questions not really answerable on the evidence provided by the article we have concentrated upon and his other always-brief expositions.

What can be said is best left to Eastwood himself, to a pronouncement so remarkably neutral, so universally accommodating in its conclusion that we are left with the sort of continuing doubt that only a full scale statement of his position, equivalent in detail to those of a Scheffler or a Peters, could resolve. He says: 'Two approaches to the task seem to be possible. On one hand there is the more formal way which begins with the definition of terms and the delineation of appropriate modes of expression and attempts to build a P-language of an ideal form. On the other hand there is available the less formal approach that has been widely applied in (particularly) ethics which operates upon existing language and endeavours to achieve clarification by explicating appropriate meanings and uses, designating definitional criteria and
establishing syntactical forms. Each has its place and one of two situations might prevail - either some will use one and others the other, or preferably, all will use both and allow the particular context to determine on which form the greater stress should be' (53).

Eastwood does, in fact, himself attempt to 'use both' in the later article mentioned above (54); but it supplies little to alter the general point we have been making about his position in relation to the more influential philosophers working in this field, it being a further expression of viewpoint, concentrated to the extent of defying clear interpretation. The final word on this aspect of his work must be that its fuller development (not only by Eastwood but also by others who accept his strategy for concept development) will possibly be of as much importance to some future investigation of the bearing of analytical philosophy on educational theory as its present adumbration has been intriguing for our own. But how long we will have to await this development and to what extent it will prove to be the creation of a precise language of education rather than part of the normal improvement of the social science languages that underpin education is a question which transports us to the more comprehensive problem that has been inevitably mentioned several times during the exploration of this and other more restricted topics - to the problem of

(53) Ibid., p. 33
(54) Eastwood, G. R., 'Categories, Concepts And Ostensive Learning', Canadian Education And Research Digest, Vol. 5 No. 3, pp. 175-89, September 1965
the nature of educational theory.

We can suggest, as a preliminary to the examination of that problem and as a final word on this phase of our report, that Eastwood, in attempting to force the development of the new discipline beyond what is currently feasible, in seeking to transcend an 'ordinary language' approach, displays the practical naivety implied in the quotation which follows. Ernest Nagel, a powerful philosopher of science whose writings have influenced the more 'scientific' aspect of Scheffler's work and a proponent of views that are of importance in a later chapter, comments on the hazards of any premature attempt at 'reducing' one science to another: this comment, mentally translated so as to embrace the 'reduction' of ordinary educational concepts through three stages to scientific-educational concepts, identifies the flaw we have sensed in Eastwood's work.

Nagel says: '...the possibility should not be ignored that little if any new knowledge or increased power for significant research may actually be gained from reducing one science to another at certain periods of their development, however great may be the potential advantages of such reduction at some later time. Thus, a discipline may be at a stage of active growth in which the imperative task is to survey and classify the extensive and diversified materials of its domain. Attempts to reduce the discipline to another (perhaps theoretically more advanced) science,
even if successful, may then divert needed energies
from what are the crucial problems at this period of
the discipline's expansion, without being compensated
by effective guidance from the primary science in the
conduct of further research' (55).

Our contention is that, during the present 'active
growth' of a new philosophy of education, Eastwood's
approach may 'divert needed energies from what are
the crucial problems at this period of the discipline's
expansion', and that the first 'philosophical approach'
of our chapter title, that of Scheffler and Peters,
is the more appropriate (and hence the more convinc­
ing) now, no matter how much it may require complem­
ting at some future time when the social sciences
have outgrown their infancy and the relationship be­
tween formal and informal languages has been philos­
ophically illumined. To what extent this contention
is a strong one or whether it needs modification and
a change in emphasis we shall see in exploring the
central area of 'educational theory'.

(55) Nagel, E., The Structure Of Science: Problems
In The Logic Of Scientific Explanation (London, 1961),
p. 362
CHAPTER VI

RIVAL THEORIES OF 'EDUCATIONAL THEORY'

Hirst's 'Field'Thesis

In examining this very recent contribution, the most explicit expression of the London school's 'official' view, we keep the promise, made early in our Introduction (see p. 2, supra), to view Hirst's influential thesis against a previously drawn background of varied 'bearings': such a background is provided by our first five chapters. We also cease to use Hardie's text as the starting point for the separate avenues of exploration, having done this sufficiently to establish his relationship with current, accepted philosophising - as was also promised (see p. 9, supra) - as that of precursor, and to expose the limitations that he inherited from the philosophical masters of his day while establishing his firm right to an important place in the history of this mid-twentieth century enterprise.

Hirst's article on philosophy and educational theory is of major importance, whether viewed as the most lucid of statements for those inclined to accept the 'linguistic' position or as the most incisive of criticisms for those who are 'positivistic' about theories and their role. In a sense, he attempts both to do more and to do less than is attempted in this account.
The scope of his contribution is greater than ours in that only one of its parts is specifically concerned with the relation to educational thought of analytical philosophy, of, as he puts it, 'The more analytical view that philosophy has a purely critical and clarificatory function for educational discussion' (1). Other sections take him beyond the bearing of philosophical analysis to an examination of the traditional claim that speculative systems of thought, the various conflicting 'isms', have educational implications, a claim that we have ignored in order to concentrate on what seems more important in the new approach.

But Hirst's views on the topic that is of specific concern to us are more restricted than our own enquiry, in that we are attempting to show the 'bearing' by contrasting examples of work that has been and is being undertaken in fact; and his contribution is merely one such example, albeit one that, in the firmness of its pronouncements, could, if it were to be widely accepted, cause the variety we have encountered in the literature to be replaced by a more unitary approach - the possibility and the unwelcome consequences of this we have implied in using the term 'official' for the views of Hirst and those with whom he is associated.

In comparing his delineation of 'educational theory'

with those of others who have given thought to the problem of describing it, we necessarily overlap with the content of our other chapters, particularly the last one which, it will be remembered, flowed from Hardie's identification of the four characteristic marks of education as a process. A systematic account of these marks is, to the earlier writer, what makes an 'educational theory', one element in such a theory being the 'idea of value' that we discussed at some length in the first chapter. Alternative theories consist, to him, of the integration of alternative accounts of these elements; that is, '...when educational theories differ, they must do so in the accounts they give of one or more of these basic conceptions' (2).

Somewhat similarly in Hirst, we find that 'educational theory' is viewed as the complex rationale for the practical process of education and has within it an important ethical component necessitated by the involvement of the theory with such practice; this links him surprisingly with Hardie, replenishing to some extent the by now diminished philosophical standing of the latter. We find, too, that Hirst establishes the logical status of 'educational theory' by discussing the possibility of there being a discipline of education: this connects his work with that reported in the last chapter and thus emphasises the interrelated nature of all that we are exploring in this

(2) Hardie, C. D., Truth And Fallacy In Educational Theory (Cambridge, 1942), p. 73
account and the possibility of other than our own division of the subject matter being made on the basis of alternative modes of entry into the literature listed in the bibliography.

Hirst employs a Peters' technique: he positively declares his own position only after an analysis of the positions of others in which limitations are exposed after the fashion familiar to us from Peters' construction of 'education as initiation' on a basis of metaphor-scrutiny. The traditional view, that there exists a direct relationship between philosophy and education, is the first to be rejected. Philosophical beliefs cannot, in Hirst's view, form premises from which educational principles are logically deduced. Logically, the relationship is 'looser' than that.

What such beliefs can provide are some of the reasons for the educational judgments made within a complex area lying midway between the high level abstractions and the concrete practice, the area in fact of 'educational theory' conceived as what Hirst calls a 'field' of knowledge. This notion of a 'field', characterized by complexity because of the many different disciplines (including philosophy as belief rather than analysis) that enter into its creation, is part of Hirst's epistemological position, which he progressively discloses throughout this article until it is made explicit in giving his own view of the nature
of educational theory and which he develops more fully elsewhere, as we shall see.

He makes this point early, clearly conscious of the need to introduce some consistency into the terminology and taking the opportunity of making it a logically based consistency. He says: '...between philosophical beliefs themselves and educational practice we must envisage a domain of theoretical discussion and investigation concerned with forming these principles. To this domain, which I shall refer to as educational theory, philosophical beliefs make their own distinctive contribution alongside social theory, psychological theory and so on' (3).

Next, having contended that there is a place for educational theory against those who plunge straight from philosophy to practice, Hirst argues that this domain is not autonomous, that 'education' is not a discipline. Clearly, his willingness to assert what is a 'discipline' and what is some other kind of theoretical enterprise must be justified as more than a mere preference for a particular use of the term, and he does, in fact, further develop his basic epistemological position from which such judgments proceed, arguing that, 'It is in fact in terms of distinctive types of judgment that disciplines are usually said to be autonomous' (4), giving us with the 'usually said' the clue to his philosophical commitment.

(3) Hirst, P. H., op. cit., p. 52
(4) Ibid., p. 56
Historical judgments and, as we would expect in the light of our own early chapters, moral judgments are 'distinctive' in Hirst's sense; and there are no analogous educational judgments, for they are, logically speaking, examples of the wider class of practical judgments which are 'not unique to educational theory for in everyday affairs and in political and social theory, for example, the same process is to be found' (5). Educational theory is thus one of several related theories, all of which answer questions about intentional practical activities by making similar forms of judgment: it does not develop criteria of its own for assessing the wide range of knowledge and beliefs, from a variety of intellectual sources, out of which it is created. We must look to the varied sources of educational and similar theories to find the disciplines.

They are found outside, develop outside and are only justifiable outside. Hirst says, using his alternative name for 'discipline', 'These forms of understanding are valid in their own right and must therefore be accepted into the theory as they are. As their function is to provide a wider knowledge of what is involved in educational practice and so promote more responsible judgments, it is difficult to see how the knowledge itself can be assessed by criteria within the theory. The theorist has to recognise or

(5) Ibid., p. 57
discover the relevance of other specialist studies for education, taking these into account when he forms his principles' (6).

It can be noted that Hirst's refusal to allow that education can be a discipline is a more thorough version of his colleague Peters' slightly earlier rejection of an American claim published in a volume entitled, nevertheless, 'The Discipline Of Education'. Peters says: 'I just cannot grasp the thesis that education could ever be a discipline in any ordinary sense; it is rather a focus or meeting place of disciplines... A discipline develops when there are some reasonably well-worked-out and structured answers to... questions which come to form a body of knowledge, together with techniques and procedures for developing better answers or for dealing with new problems which these answers give rise to... These various disciplines are concerned with quite different sorts of questions, and if the case of education is considered it is absurd to think that the various disciplines that have bearing on education could ever be co-ordinated into one discipline' (7).

However, the existence of and the arguments in the book that contains this confident pronouncement are testimony to the strength of an intellectually respectable 'open' discussion in which the Peters-Hirst

(6) Ibid., p. 57
position is just one element. Scheffler, for example, supplying in the same volume the most sustained philosophical analysis of the problem, places his emphasis in such a way as to reveal the more scientific of his varied intellectual traits, and thus introduces a discordant note into the harmony that we have perceived between him and Peters in another context. He equates 'discipline' with 'scientific discipline' and thus draws away from the epistemology of a Hirst towards that of an O'Connor, an alignment that we shall presently describe with reference to his more substantial writing and one that is clearly shown in this conference report when he says:

'A crucial issue, it thus seems to me, is whether we can establish reliable principles to explain how and why children learn, schools develop, curricula change, ideals conflict, perceptions alter, societies differ, standards of taste and culture are formed. That any discipline is likely to be developed capable of answering these questions systematically and reliably is still a matter of some controversy... The problem, it seems to me, is thus to advance the state of social inquiry - in particular, of all those studies which seem likely to yield explanatory principles relevant to the concerns of education' (8). Scheffler clearly has 'social inquiry' of a recognized scientific kind in mind rather than some hybrid 'domain of theor-

(8) Scheffler, I., 'Is Education A Discipline?' in op. cit. (see p. 196, supra), pp. 60-1
ethical discussion and investigation' as the answer to educational problems.

But to return to Hirst: so far he has built up a partial picture of what he conceives 'educational theory' to be out of the positive aspects of his criticism of two well known positions. But it is the third position, the analytical, which allows him to develop his own views to the full, and his criticisms here are of the greatest importance for a number of reasons: the philosopher under attack is O'Connor, the position under attack is 'analytical' in one of the two broad senses that we have defined, and the manner of attack is 'analytical' in the other sense. In Hirst v O'Connor we have, then, the intra-analytical dispute at its most elemental.

Elsewhere the analytical alignments, a major theme of our account, are becoming less clear cut as we accumulate examples. We have already seen that the Scheffler of 'educational theory' is not quite the Scheffler who analysed 'teaching' in the 'ordinary language' manner. We have seen, too, that the Hardie of 'educational theory' is closer to what we so far have seen of Hirst's views than would have been imagined on the evidence of the ethical Hardie (see p. 192, supra).

Before reporting the simple confrontation of Hirst and O'Connor, it will be perhaps best to briefly confirm this blurring of the clear lines of our main theme as a warning against oversimplification of issues that
this key article of Hirst invites in the context of this account with its personal sampling.

We can easily do this by quoting from a recent lecture by (the so far 'positivistic') Hardie on the 'educational theory' topic of research and progress and bearing it in mind while following how Hirst comments on O'Connor. Hardie says: 'Closer attention to the different uses of language in communication would make possible a different sense for "theory" in the phrase "theory of education". In this sense a theory of education would not be a deductive pattern correlating different empirical laws, but a collection of sentences that had a variety of functions. Some of them would be analytic, functioning as definitions; others would be empirical generalizations from observations and experiments; still others would be prescriptions leading to evaluative sentences; and so on. In the formation of these sentences logical words such as "if...then", "true", "not", "all" would be used as well as extra-logical or empirical words. The latter would be either terms from commonsense or technical terms, linked to observation by means of definitions. An educational theory would then be considered satisfactory if it was successful in correlating a wide range of experience. The construction of an educational theory in this sense would make coherent the kind of talk in which we indulge when we write articles or talk about our work either with
our colleagues or on more solemn occasions such as lectures and conferences' (9).

Hardie's thinking has certainly moved in a Hirstian direction. The phrase 'would make coherent' made with reference to 'a collection of sentences that (have) a variety of functions', and his rejection of the idea that an educational theory displays a 'deductive pattern' show this. When he talks of the success of a theory in terms of 'connecting a wide range of experience' we cannot but be reminded of Hirst's view, as so far described, that an educational theory attempts 'to build together whatever knowledge, values and beliefs are relevant to practical issues'. The similarities are close enough to make the point mentioned above and make an interesting preliminary to the Hirstian view of O'Connor that we can now take.

This view is dominated by the objection that O'Connor is obsessed with scientific theory as the paradigm for all theories, and that he has not been able, in consequence, to discover the job that educational theory actually does. O'Connor has excluded for separate treatment the metaphysical statements and value judgments - the non-scientific elements in educational discourse that he certainly identifies as of importance - and thus artificially reduced the complexity of the discourse to a much simpler scientific level. In short,

(9) Hardie, C. D., Research And Progress In Education', Australian Journal Of Education, Vol. 9 No. 3, p. 238, October 1965
educational theory is concerned solely with the means by which separately justified ends are achieved; and such theory is or could be or should be scientific: so comments Hirst.

His own position obliterates the 'ends-means' division by creating the middle domain. He says: 'If we accept O'Connor's classification of the two main senses of the word "theory" that are important for education, it is surely the first of these that gives the primary meaning here, not the second as he suggests. Educational theory is in the first place to be understood as the essential background to rational educational practice, not as a limited would-be scientific pursuit. Even when O'Connor momentarily recognizes this, he nevertheless fails to realize the complex kind of theory that is necessary to determine a whole range of practical activities. He therefore falls back on his scientific paradigm maintaining that the theory must be simply a collection of pieces of psychology' (10).

Hirst's criticism is that O'Connor has overlooked the important difference between scientific theories and theories of practical activity: the first aim at explaining what is while the second aim at guiding and controlling what is done: the first are the result of investigation while the second determine activities. Confusion of the two is a philosophical sin, of which

(10) Hirst, P. H., op. cit., p. 59
O'Connor is guilty - 'To try to understand the nature and pattern of some practical discourse in terms of the nature and pattern of some purely theoretical discourse can only result in its being radically misconceived' (11). Radical misconceptions on the part of philosophers of O'Connor's standing are, it must be noted, less common than plain differences of commitment! We can recall Atkinson's comment: '...the classical statement of the view that all practical problems have this form /that is, are means/ends problems/... is followed in all essential respects by so recent and philosophically sophisticated a writer as O'Connor. Such scepticism as O'Connor expresses...about the adequacy of the education/applied science analogy does not derive from any doubts about the appropriateness of applying the means/ends category here, but rather from his doubt whether the social sciences have developed to a point at which they are clearly of more use to the educator than is commonsense, "psychological" lore' (12).

But to Hirst empirical investigation and practical activity are radically different so far as their theories are concerned; and education is just one sector of the latter. The 'education/applied science' analogy is alien to his way of thinking rather than merely to him, a fact that clearly emerges from his

(11) Ibid., p. 60
reference to the work of a philosophical friend whose very individual and thorough expression of an anti-O'Connor point of view is well known. We can turn to Arnaud Reid for a moment to sample the background to the Hirst thesis. He devotes a chapter in the book that sums up his long years of experience in educational philosophy to the notion of 'application' of theory to practice; and this is founded on a central prescription the very phrasing of which reveals the distance at which he operates from the more scientifically-orientated analytical philosophers: 'We have, I believe, to work from the idea of applying theories and concepts, as such, to practice, towards the idea... of a person, charged with ideas, deciding and acting in an enlightened way in the individual situation' (13).

His scale of 'application' examples ranges from engineering (favoured in analogies by both O'Connor and Scheffler) to educational philosophy, and is designed to persuade us that, at the latter end, '..."application" tells us hardly anything and becomes the wrong word' (14); for there is an increasing complexity of situation in which imponderables multiply. In a complex situation, he argues, it is not meaningful to talk of, for example, 'applying' principles of scientific psychology to particular instances: rather, we must conceive the situation as '...the use of

(14) Ibid., p. 88
science by a teacher who has assimilated it, in helping him to come to terms with his practical problems' (15).

Moreover, there is implied in every application of theory to practice, according to Reid, a judgment of value — very often this is a simple looking judgment (for example, '...we want in education to teach better, to help children' (16)), but its presence is precisely what makes talk about education the complex phenomenon that it is. Reid's position is thus consonant with that of Hirst, for he holds that the theory of the activity that is education must draw upon many different kinds of knowledge, that it involves the making of value judgments and the utilisation of beliefs of the metaphysical and religious kind which O'Connor dismisses as an irrelevance in educational theory. To Reid, this complex theory can only be effective in the thought and action of a person who is indivisible into the philosophic 'ends' chooser and scientific 'means' investigator and applier that O'Connor's position suggests.

Hirst's 'field' thesis, seen against this background, is thus the careful elaboration of the logical status of 'educational theory' as this appears to philosophers of a certain persuasion. But O'Connor's scientific model for educational theory is not lacking

(15) Ibid., p. 91
(16) Ibid., p. 92
various allies in the philosophical background, and to these we can turn before resuming the report on Hirst in a context within which he gives his fully developed position, the context of a direct examination of O'Connor's contribution. We thus follow the Hirst technique itself in reporting in stages with incidental cross-reference to related and alternative views; and continue in this way the established procedure of our own account.

Eastwood's Scientific Model

Eastwood bewails "...the failure of educational philosophy to be influenced by contemporary scientific philosophy" (17), by which he means the failure to distinguish, within the complex discourse that attends education, those elements that are capable of scientific improvement from those that are non-scientific in character: he is a 'means/ends' thinker, eager to isolate, concentrate upon and refine the theory of the 'means' and is thus in complete opposition to the kind of view developed by Hirst.

He talks in terms of theories rather than theory; that is, of explanation within limited areas of phenomena rather than of rationally illuminating practice through general discussion which integrates the findings of a variety of disciplines with respect to educ-

ation. To Eastwood 'theories' are scientific, derived from experimental research and refined in practice to describe, explain and predict phenomena in the familiar manner of other areas of enquiry: to him, 'educational theory' implies a piecemeal, cumulative understanding of what goes on, it '...implies the formulation of a systematically related set of theories to explain the educative process and facilitate the development of coherent practices' (18).

As we would expect, from what we know of Eastwood's work on concepts, he is concerned with what is in principle possible and not with what exists to be seen in the achievements to date of even the most scientific parts of educational theory. His vision is of a scientific discipline of education, the eventual construction of a set of related laws and established hypotheses which are specific to education - 'Undefined terms and terms defined in the system and the axioms established by means of them are as capable of development in education as in any other field' (19). Though this view, the antithesis of Hirst's, is expressed with the reminder that a very long way has to be trod before the vision becomes the reality - '...it must not be expected that a set of satisfactory theories can be easily and quickly evolved' (20).

An example of a theory such as Eastwood's 'system-

(18) Ibid., p. 39
(19) Ibid., p. 40
(20) Ibid., p. 40
atically related set' would consist of is that of individual differences, one for which he claims scientific maturity. The development and inter-relating of such theories is possible, he argues, if the task is approached positively, if resources and scientific 'know how' are made available so that it is accepted by those involved that it is possible to structure adequate scientific theories in the context of education, just as it is in the context of the more familiar factual sciences. Eastwood's point (always slightly obscure, as was shown in our last chapter) seems to be that hindrances of resource and will hold back education more than hindrances of principle; and that as much can be expected of education as of the other social sciences, once these hindrances are overcome: his assumptions, that social sciences in general have impressive records and that education can be made into another social science and so partake in this record, are so controversial as to make us hope once again; for an extended exposition of his views.

When he says, 'Such development has not occurred in the case of educational theories and one of the initial tasks of the contemporary scientific philosopher is the modification of this structure to suit education or the development of an entirely new structure' (21), he would seem to be substituting his own wishes for a realistic assessment of what is possible at the

(21) Ibid., p. 40
moment in the social sciences and what is in principle possible for 'educational theory' viewed under its scientific aspect. Certainly there are well-financed attempts being made, particularly in America, to realize what we can identify as Eastwood's vision, but these, for example the series of papers by Elizabeth Maccia listed in our bibliography, are open to the charge of methodological naivety and the pseudo-use of symbolism such as we noted in our last chapter with reference to Eastwood himself. A typical comment from a leading philosopher of science on such attempts to anticipate the genuine, slow progress of social research is the following: 'To the logician it is clear that in educational research...there is still a pathetic tendency to identify the use of jargon with the possession of a science...It could almost be said that, outside of statistics, terms which have been introduced specifically for educational research have done more to confuse than to clarify' (22).

Confusion rather than clarity seems to result, for example, from Eastwood's introduction of the terms 'first order theories' and 'second order theories' to develop his present views, for, as we shall see, similar terms are used in a much more straightforward sense by Hirst: the two senses and the contexts of their use symbolize, in fact, what much of our account is

about. First order theories describe and explain selected aspects of the educational process and thus have their origin in observation, practice and experiment within the school situation: they are developed by researchers who are, presumably, close enough to the classroom to be thought of as educational researchers. The English Schools Council is currently initiating work that probably meets some of Eastwood's demands at this level, particularly in its emphasis upon putting the curriculum on a more rational basis.

Second order theories are closer to the 'human sciences' of Hirst's analysis of the forms of knowledge in that their construction depends upon a linking of first order theories with those derived from such sciences. As Eastwood puts it: 'Their development necessitates the establishment of cross-connection laws and is primarily a logico-philosophical task. The difference between first-order and second-order theories is one of degree or scope rather than structure. The former function predominantly in the process of education while the latter are directed toward the discipline' (23). It cannot go unnoticed that Eastwood is as bound to ordinary terms such as 'link' and 'relate' for the exposition of central parts of his thesis as is Hirst to terms like 'build together' and 'composite' for his.

(23) Eastwood, G. R., op. cit., p. 40
Both levels of theory require philosophical attention: but, in stating this, Eastwood means the attention of what he himself calls 'scientific philosophy' and what we can take to be the philosophy of science. The comment already given from that quarter indicates to what extent this bold demand for structuring research and developing theory within 'the context of education' stands much chance of being implemented in the near future. The whole analysis derives from a hopeful interpretation of what the logic of science could make possible predated into an assertion of what it does make possible provided the exhortations of those like Eastwood who make the claim are widely acted upon.

It is a view completely antithetical to that of Hirst, a view that can be rated as a 'tough minded', less restrained version of the O'Connor position on metaphysically-unencumbered scientific theory in education which draws Hirst's fire. And its answer to the question of 'application' of theory to practice, to the problem of 'building together' what is with what ought to be is expectedly unsubtle. The issues raised by Hirst and Reid concerning the complexity of the theory-practice relationship are not even recognized by Eastwood: they are ruled out by his defining 'theory' in the way that he does. He says, boldly: '... the contention that theories in education function as descriptive and explanatory devices precludes the poss-
ibility of the question of derivation of practice from theory from arising' (24).

The whole of this question of what we educate for is banished from the area in which 'theory' is to be clarified into a separate realm of 'ends' which is no concern of the scientific philosopher. Eastwood quotes Scheffler in passing on the problem, obviously having little interest in the traditional type of discussion which is so open to the kind of non-rigorous sloganizing that he has elsewhere condemned. He says: 'For those who wish to cling to the concept of the educational philosopher as a determiner of values and a designator of goals this view has little to offer and little to say other than as a reminder that value-determination cannot "plausibly be considered the exclusive responsibility of any specialist"' (25). The alternative which he offers to the Reidian notion of a 'person charged with ideas', one in whom the Hirst 'field' can be said to operate, is the characteristically impersonal one of '...an interpretational agency which must function at the level of the practising educator and be capable of translating research findings into practical activities' (26).

However, there must be more than a suspicion that Eastwood is overstating a case here, and that it is the overstatement rather than the case that is at fault.

(24) Ibid., p. 41
(25) Ibid., p. 29
(26) Ibid., p. 41
Decisions about ends have to be taken, whether they are taken in such a way as to establish the truth of the Hirst 'field' thesis or in a manner that needs an O'Connor 'means-ends' view for its description. If the latter, there is need for the decisions to be made in the light of what philosophy can offer: it is not the case, as Eastwood contends, that 'this view has little to offer', as we shall see when we examine O'Connor's position directly. But for the moment we can take up the reference to Scheffler in order to indicate that a philosopher who values what philosophy can contribute to general discussions of education (We have seen him in his non-scientific role in earlier chapters) can also appreciate the need for scientific theories somewhat similar to those for which Eastwood so singlemindedly calls.

Scheffler insists time and again on the need to recognize that both teacher and researcher, both pedagogue and scientist have legitimate interests in education and that each should accept the claim of the other. As he says: 'If inquiry is to be effectively related to the practice of teaching, the divergence of goal between teacher and educational researcher needs to be recognized as legitimate and as calling for different working distances from the world of practice. There needs, of course, also to be a relation of mutual and sympathetic interest between teachers and educational researchers. Teachers must not only understand the researcher's divergence of aim
and his difference in practical orientation; they must also be able to comprehend the implications of his results for their own work. For their part, the researchers must not only appreciate the goals inspiring teaching; they must also understand the peculiar problems in diverse situations and be willing to take these as starting points for research and as endpoints to which research results may be applied' (27).

This is, as is to be expected, a much more restrained emphasis upon scientific theory in education than that typically encountered in Eastwood: nevertheless, the emphasis is there. Scheffler clearly conceives educational theory as providing better and better means for achieving the practical teacher's goals as scientific knowledge replaces the less than scientific. The goals themselves are another matter, of more concern to the other Scheffler whom we have watched disentangling the pervasive features of general educational discourse, the discourse which is closer to Hirst's middle domain than that of the scientist.

As has been mentioned on a number of occasions, Scheffler appears to combine in one philosopher the two approaches ('scientific' and 'humanistic') to be found respectively, in the present context, in Eastwood and Hirst. This is a fact that is coming to be noticed in the literature and one which holds out some hope for the eventual realization of that complementarity.

which we suggested earlier. G.F. Kneller says very
recently, for example, '...if we choose to analyze
pedagogical discourse seriously, we are not likely to
find the formalist approach helpful. Israel Scheffler,
for example, who writes as a logical empiricist on
the philosophy of science, adopts the method of inform­
al analysis when he considers some major concepts in
pedagogy' (28)

The term 'pedagogy', contrasted by Kneller with
'research', is that branch of the study of education
'...which is largely prescriptive...It consists basically
of recommendations for educational practice...
and it includes much ethical and general philosophic­
al writing...Although it also involves descriptions
of practice, its language is for the most part norm­
ative...Pedagogy tends to be expressed in an ordinary
language, or the language of educated speech...
So-called pedagogical theories...are not explanations
in any scientific sense;' (29). 'Pedagogy' is thus
what Hirst wants to improve by making us conscious of
its logical role, what Scheffler examines in his 'ordi­
ney language' moments, what Eastwood closes his eyes
to in concentrating on the 'science' of education and
what has been created and re-created by thinkers from
Plato to Dewey.

However, our immediate concern in this section is

(28) Kneller, G. F., Logic And Language Of Edu­
cation (New York, 1966), p. 154
(29) Ibid., pp. 153-4
with the scientific model for theory which is commonly contrasted with 'pedagogy', and, at the moment, with Scheffler's emphasis in this direction. He points, for example, to the resemblance between teaching and other practical arts such as engineering and medicine (and cooking!) in a way that sets him off from the thinking of a Reid, who, as we saw, notes significant differences between the enterprises - 'The relation of educational research to teaching may thus be compared with the relation of physical research to engineering, or, better, with the relation of medical research to the clinical practice of medicine' (30). He reminds us that this relationship is complex, as it is between any practical art and underpinning science; it is such that educational research must be a common focus of many sciences - sociology, anthropology, economics as well as psychology - but he does not, as Reid does in his talk of 'application', cease to look from the underlying sciences towards the practical activity as he moves along the 'continuum': to Scheffler, the relationship is logically the same no matter how complex the situations are in which it obtains.

His purpose is clear when he says: 'Though no unique science underlies each of the major practical arts, the degree to which some body of theoretical science underlies an art is an important factor det-

(30) Scheffler, I., op. cit., p. 72
ermining its degree of professionalization' (31). This is not the impossible demand for immediate rig­
our of an Eastwood, though it carries a similar mes­sage of faith in what the social sciences could, in

time, empower teachers to do and a similar scepticism
about the possibility of achievement in education
without proper scientific knowledge of the most eff­
teive means. It is the voice of one who, having
demonstrated his sympathy for a proper philosophical
analysis in the more general 'Hirstian' domain, still
wishes to urge the strong claims of scientific inquiry
for a large place in the educational enterprise. His

conclusion from another discussion gives, in fact, in
two sentences an answer each to the assertions of
Hirst and Eastwood and an admirable summary of his
moderate position - "The problem, it seems to me, is
thus to advance the state of social inquiry - in part­
icular, of all those studies which seem likely to
yield explanatory principles relevant to the concerns
of education. Whether, however, it turns out that
one or several theoretical disciplines develop, and
whether any of these is a discipline of education
specifically, seem to me quite unimportant issues' (32).

We return now to Hirst for the final developmaat
of his position as it is given in criticism of the
analytical views of O'Connor. And in doing so we can

(31) Ibid., p. 73
(32) Scheffler, I., 'Is Education A Discipline?'
in Walton, J. and Kuethe, J. L. (Eds), The Discipline
Of Education (Madison, Wisconsin, 1963), p. 61
note that this section has dealt with the 'means' aspect of the 'ends/means' position and that the next section, when it reaches the direct examination of O'Connor, must deal, in addition, with the 'ends' aspect if the alternative to the complex 'field' view is not to appear unacceptably remote from education as a purposeful activity. It is in O'Connor's book that the 'Ends/means' thesis is most plainly stated and it is that statement, so influential in the disagreement it has provoked, which must occupy a not insignificant place in our report of the main lines of discussion.

O'Connor's 'Means/Ends' Thesis

That this thesis de-emphasises the importance of philosophy in its demand for scientific theory in education is a main contention of Hirst - 'If we reject the scientific model as thoroughly false and artificial, with it there can go too the idea that philosophy is of only peripheral significance, even if by philosophy we still mean an analytical activity' (33). His object is to show that educational thinking has at its centre a philosophical component, even on a limited analytical view of what philosophy is; and that, on a less restricted view of philosophy, philosophy enters into educational theory in more than one way.

(33) Hirst, P. H., op. cit. (see p. 191, supra), p. 60
He distinguishes 'first order' subjects from 'second order' (see Eastwood, p. 208, supra); that is he emphasises the difference between those subjects, the sciences and the humanities, which explain the world and ourselves and which give us knowledge about them directly, and, particularly, philosophy which has a different kind of object for investigation - which, in fact, '...can be said to be a second order subject because it seeks to describe and explain the way in which first order subjects do their job' (34). His point is that, if scientific theory is taken as the model for education, philosophy will be 'second order' in the sense of being of second importance (or, as we could add, remembering Eastwood's singlemindedness, of no importance at all). He says, 'If educational theory is thought of as scientific in character, then this kind of understanding may well seem of only fringe significance. If however the theory is as complex as has been suggested above, it may well be of quite central importance after all' (35).

In fact, Hirst makes a case for the twofold importance of philosophy. First there is its 'second order' contribution, such as O'Connor, for example, favours - and valued even more highly by Hirst himself because of the very complexity of the first 'level' situation which is the object of the philosophical

(34) Ibid., p. 60
(35) Ibid., pp. 60-1
analysis. This is the 'formal' contribution, in which the philosopher brings his skills in a sense from the outside to bear upon educational discourse. Presumably, such discourse will have a cumulative benefit from conscious philosophical scrutiny, becoming less open to the more obvious philosophical criticisms as time goes on and the 'second order' activity becomes more widely practised and known to be practised.

Then, the other contribution of philosophy, its 'substantial' contribution as philosophical belief, will - again, presumably - become more consciously built in to educational discourse as an essential element of what is inevitably composite. In short, the effect on 'educational theory', in the complexity of which philosophical belief is always to be found, of the analytical activities of interested modern philosophers, will be the improvement which knowing more clearly what one is doing always brings. Such, at any rate, appears to be the implication of Hirst's going beyond O'Connor's confined analytical position.

Even on the assumption that philosophy is purely analytical, argues Hirst, its importance cannot be restricted to what O'Connor has in mind: his scientific paradigm for educational theory would make negligible philosophy's role, whereas a correct assessment of the complexity of this domain reveals the central importance of philosophy - '...the significance of philosophical work in these two fields is
very different. Generally speaking the sciences depend little on this kind of clarification for it is part of the scientific pursuit itself to construct and refine the concepts used so that they clearly express what is understood about the world. This they do directly against the empirical evidence. As has been repeatedly stated, educational theory is not developed in this monolithic manner, but depends upon bringing together of many diverse elements of understanding to form a composite theory in which practical judgments are made. In such a complex activity, serious problems of meaning frequently occur and in particular a failure to understand the relations between different fields of discourse befogs many educational issues' (36).

Hirst's estimate of the dependence of the scientist on the philosopher of science must be judged as grossly inaccurate, unless the 'scientific pursuit' is intended to cover the conceptual clarification achieved for science by any person whatsoever, no matter what disciplinary allegiance he owes; but, in this case, the estimate is true by definition. However, the main point is to underline the significance of philosophy, even in its restricted analytical aspect, for educational theory if such a domain is the composite phenomenon that Hirst declares it to be: its importance in this respect is hardly increased by asserting that

(36) Ibid., p. 61
it would be less were there no such domain and 'educational theory' was simply scientific.

Hirst's thesis places, then, great store by the formal, second order, analytical function of philosophy - its clarificatory value in a domain where many typical phrases are of uncertain meaning. Educational discourse is littered with such expressions as 'equality of opportunity', 'freedom of the individual', 'the education of character' which stand in need of skilled analysis. There are so many of them, from such a variety of sources, that even when philosophy is conceived only in this way, as an accessory to existing educational talk, it must be of major importance for the success of the enterprise: in Hirst's words, '...it would seem to be rather like some crucial tool without which it is hard to see how the various bits of the machine can be put together' (37).

But, in addition, there is philosophy's second contribution, identified by Hirst in going beyond the mere analytical position of O'Connor ('...in general his view of the nature of philosophy seems to me acceptable as far as it goes' (38)). He argues that an important ingredient in the characteristically composite educational theory is that provided by philosophy itself in making available philosophical analyses leading to philosophical beliefs. The judgments of

(37) Ibid., p. 62
(38) Ibid., p. 58
educational principle made within the domain of theory are warranted by, amongst other things derived from other disciplines, what philosophers working in areas other than education have found out in their own unique way. We have seen at some length the example of 'pure' ethics providing the analysis of the nature and justification of value judgments which has such a strong bearing on questions of moral education.

Other parts of 'pure' philosophical investigation provide the substance to be mixed into the theory of education: and, as we have observed, philosophers themselves will probably enter education more directly as the place of this kind of contribution is made clear; and do some of their philosophical work within a pedagogical context rather than in seclusion as has been the case. Further, non-'philosophers' within education will possibly be moved by the force of Hirst's and others theory of educational theory to equip themselves with the necessary skills to improve the job of theorising that they would be doing in any case, so that there will be a great increase in the amount and variety of philosophical analyses which, as Hirst contends, '...constitute one of the diverse elements that are brought together as the material out of which educational theory is built' (39).

Hirst's thesis thus lays great stress on the need for philosophy in educational theory, on the understand-

(39) Ibid., p. 62
ing peculiar to it and on the direct contribution that it can make. He does this finally by building his theory while showing the inadequacies - as he sees them - of O'Connor's position. But the latter has so far been described only on the basis of second hand information derived from accounts which are hostile, as with Hirst's, or in friendly relation, as with Eastwood's. In view of its influence in arousing interest in, as O'Connor himself puts it, '...important contemporary ideas...still unfamiliar to educational theorists' (40), it will be as well to go to the original, leaving further consideration of Hirst until the next chapter.

O'Connor's philosophical stance in relation to the fact of education is easier to perceive than that of Hirst. Educational problems are simply 'ends-means' problems, each aspect of which requires separate philosophical treatment. The 'ends' are the '...set of values or ideals embodied and expressed in the purposes for which knowledge, skills and attitudes are imparted and so directing the amounts and types of training given' (41). A satisfactory attempt at stating such ideals must involve the direct use of several branches of philosophy, argues O'Connor, for it must discuss questions of value and the nature of human experience.

(41) Ibid., p. 5
The 'means', the '...set of theories which purport to explain and justify the use of...techniques for imparting knowledge, skills and attitudes' (42), involve first, as we have seen asserted in a more extreme way, the positive sciences, for they deal broadly with questions of fact. But they also involve philosophy indirectly, for '...questions about the nature of theories and their explanatory function are philosophical questions' (43). He in this way places his emphasis where Hirst considers it to be inappropriate - on the philosophy of science and away from the philosophy of 'practice'.

There is no doubt that the education/applied science analogy already identified in Scheffler dominates those portions of O'Connor's book which distinguish it from any other primer in modern philosophy (i.e., without 'of education'). He, too, stresses that improved educational practice will come only with the substitution of adequate theory for pedagogical folklore, and that this theory waits upon the further development of the social sciences. His hope, like Scheffler's, is that the future development of psychology, sociology and the rest will narrow the gap between scientific educational theory and the confirming evidence for it; and in saying that '...this hope gives an incentive for developing these sciences' (44) he makes us wonder whether a criticism of Hirst by O'

(43) Ibid., p. 5
(44) Ibid., p. 110
Connor, if there were one, might not be such as to bring out what this statement implies - that an under-valuing of what science can contribute to education is itself part of the 'folklore', no matter how sophisticated its modern dress.

There is much in O'Connor that makes Hirst's condemnation of the 'scientific paradigm' appear somewhat hasty. In particular, his careful description and distinguishing of four principal ways in which scientific explanation is made provides the essential background to his remarks on educational theory and cannot be dismissed in the casual manner of Hirst's critique. They are included for the good reason that, without them, O'Connor's firm belief that the social sciences hold the key to greater educational efficiency could not be moderated by his equally firm realization that development along these lines will be slow.

He distinguishes the first type of explanation - of facts as instances of general laws - as '...clearly a fairly primitive level of explanation...more easily exemplified from the less developed sciences' (45); and the second type - of laws as instances of more general laws - as that found frequently in advanced sciences, and sometimes prematurely attempted '...in those social sciences relevant to education where the rules of method are not always so closely

(45) Ibid., p. 86
looked to as they must be in the sciences of nature' (46). These two types show the fundamental logical pattern of scientific explanation, according to O'Connor: a conclusion is true only when it is arrived at by valid deductive procedures from true premises.

O'Connor's point is that two other kinds of 'explanation' are not so logically basic, being more in the nature of ancillaries to the deductive type, and that educational theory at the moment patterns itself on these. The first, the constructing of a model to elucidate puzzling facts, is a characteristic explanatory device of (these days) the social sciences, being simply the putting of the unfamiliar in terms of what is familiar. It is only an aid to the development of 'real' theories, acting as a source for hypotheses designed to replace theories which their confirmation shows to be unsatisfactory. Consequently, it is used '...at lower levels of scientific thinking' where '...explanatory models are a very useful method of developing old and less adequate theories into new and more adequate ones' (47).

The use of such models in science was touched upon, it will be remembered, by Scheffler during his discussion of the role of metaphor in educational discourse. He says: 'The line, even in science, between serious theory and metaphor, is a thin one if it can be drawn at all...the initial metaphor must

(46) Ibid., p. 87
(47) Ibid., p. 89
lead to refinements in the comparison, expressed literally, and to experimental confirmation of predictions or other inferences derived from them...metaphors have often been said to organize reflection and explanation in scientific...contexts' (48). The same view is expressed by O'Connor: models enlighten us by suggesting arguments, '...But by themselves they are no more than a useful stimulus to the process of explanation' (49).

They may feature as an ancillary element in the last type of explanation, that which '...fills the gap' (50) between two facts which are separated by space, time or both in such a way as to reduce the puzzlement which the facts engender. O'Connor's careful analysis of types of explanation has been a preliminary to this one, the most important for educational theory because of its use in social science. He says: '...there are some sciences in which explanation at this level is basic and of the first importance. The so-called genetic or developmental sciences which include large parts of ...psychology...and almost the whole of studies like history and anthropology depend for the explanations which they can give us on gap-filling stories of this kind' (51).

Consequently, educational theory itself, being in

(49) O'Connor, D. J., op. cit., p. 90
(50) Ibid., p. 90
(51) Ibid., p. 91
O'Connor's view a focus for the social sciences, will rely heavily on such gap-filling explanations until such time as the parent sciences can provide a more satisfactory pattern; that is, explanation of the genuine deductive kind. This moderate appraisal of the situation contains no exaggerated claim for what is presently or even shortly possible in educational theory conceived as scientific theory. It is realistic in its acceptance that there are good reasons why the sciences in question have not achieved more than they can presently show; and, as such, it contrasts favourably with the extremism of Eastwood. Certainly, this aspect of O'Connor's work, fully argued and presented with restraint, stands up well to Hirst's brief attempt at dismissal. Given the possibility of a scientific theory or theories of education, it is very necessary to know in some detail what the philosophy of science has to say about theorising and explanation, and O'Connor makes a good provision of this knowledge for our benefit.

When he turns from this thoroughly explicated background to the primary enquiry into the place of educational theory, he uses that analogy to be found confirmed in Scheffler and rejected by Reid. Just as the 'growing points' (52) for the practical activities of medicine and engineering lie in science and its theoretical justification of practice, so too with education.

(52) Ibid., p. 93
History makes this plain: as O'Connor says, 'There were of course doctors, surgeons and engineers in the ancient and medieval worlds. They had to work without the scientific equipment of their present-day counterparts and, as a result, the scope of their work and its efficiency was immeasurably less than that of modern doctors and engineers' (53).

But O'Connor knows that he is using an analogy. He is not so foolish as to ignore obvious difficulties and his argument abounds with qualifications and caution. He expects no revolution from the systematic application to education of the modest advances made in the relevant human sciences, and chides the view that does - '...I think there are good reasons for supposing it is far too optimistic about the future and, moreover, far too pessimistic about the present' (54). An important point which he makes is that, of the natural regularities that the sciences seek to establish, some are much more easily known than others, are more quickly grasped by persistent and careful observers unaided by controlled experimentation: many of the regularities of the sciences of man on which education depends are of this type.

Consequently, intelligent and critical observation can teach us much: 'The rough regularities of behaviour and experience that we can all notice in our-

(53) Ibid., p. 93
(54) Ibid., p. 94
selves, our friends and animals are sufficient to give us all a modest stock of psychological knowledge' (55). On the basis of this rough-hewn knowledge we can operate successfully enough for everyday practical purposes in our contact with other people, particularly in a relatively uncomplicated social context. So, education has for thousands of years been a successful enterprise while lacking any scientific underpinning, for the teacher has known '...enough of the workings of human nature from common experience to enable him to teach effectively' (55). This sufficiency, it can be noted, is one of the causes of the 'average' teacher's scepticism in regard to demands that he should acquire greater professional knowledge, a scepticism currently centred upon the Schools Council initiative.

O'Connor emphasises that social conditions change; and in the case of education they have changed dramatically in recent times. There is now the need to educate the whole of the child population and to communicate the vast accumulation of modern knowledge. To cope with this problem it is necessary for teachers to recognize that practice depends upon theory in the O'Connor sense and that the theory needs to be as well-founded as the times can make it. Traditional methods of teaching, based upon unconsciously absorbed theory of a prescientific commonsensical kind, which is pick-

(55) Ibid., p. 96
ed up at best by intelligent reflection on wide experience, are not appropriate for a mass society undergoing a knowledge explosion, no matter how well they may have worked in the past or how well they may seem still to work when judged only by the same people who use them.

O'Connor's point, that every practitioner is also a theorist in his sense, appears a valid one and receives considerable support from investigations into the philosophy of research, an area which, it will be remembered, Hirst undervalues in his desire to construct his own theory of 'theory' at O'Connor's expense. For instance, one of the most respected contemporary model-makers in education has this to say: 'Yet, of course, all men...are theorists. They differ not in whether they use theory, but in the degree to which they are aware of the theory they use. The choice before the man in the street and the research worker alike is not whether to theorize but whether to articulate his theory, to make it explicit, to get it out in the open where he can examine it. Implicit theories - of personality, of learning, and indeed of teaching - are used by all of us in our everyday affairs. Often such theories take the form of folk sayings, proverbs, slogans, the unquestioned wisdom of the race. The scientist on the other hand explicates his theory' (56).

Nevertheless, O'Connor's desire to see the replacement of 'folk' theory by scientific theory is not expressed in ignorance of the differences between education and other analogous practical activities. The time we live in demands that what we know in the sciences of man - and he makes no exaggerated claims for the extent of this knowledge - be applied in place of the rules of thumb that are no longer effective in achieving objectives which he considers are decided outside 'theory' in this restricted sense. He concludes: 'Thus the analogy between education and applied skills like medicine or engineering is imperfect. Even to be efficient on a small scale, medicine and engineering must be based on natural science. But education demands this only when it has so increased in scale and complexity that the laws of human nature that are patent to intelligent observers prove an inadequate theoretical basis and need to be supplemented or replaced by the sciences of man' (57).

So, O'Connor on 'means' is a valuable contribution to the debate - certainly more valuable than could be guessed from only an indirect knowledge of him gained from between the lines of Hirst's critical article. But there is also the O'Connor of the separate 'ends' to be considered; briefly, for it is one of the characteristics of O'Connor's type of thesis that this aspect of it contains the possibility of a sort of

(57) O'Connor, J. D., op. cit., p. 97
'escalation': as he says in his peroration, '...the problems of the philosophy of education, if pressed far enough, become the traditional problems of philosophy' (58). Thus, an examination of the 'bearing' of analytical philosophy on education could entail an almost limitless series of enquiries into the contemporary state of 'pure' philosophy in all its varied aspects, for, as the quotation implies, all these aspects have some bearing, clear or obscure, on educational problems.

Particularly, two specialist areas within philosophy could easily be drawn within a thesis such as this one, if the O'Connell approach were to be examined thoroughly on the assumption of its superiority to rival approaches which attempt to make sense of this puzzling 'boundary' domain. These are the philosophy of religion, the scope of which is merely sketched by O'Connell ('...there is a set of basic questions in the philosophy of religion that have been discussed at a very elementary level' (59) ), and which could be explored with profit now that analytical philosophy has begun to penetrate theological discussion: and the philosophy of philosophy, similarly broached by O'Connell - '...there is the very difficult and controversial question of the nature of philosophical enquiry of which a rather superficial and admittedly partial account was given' (60).

(58) Ibid., p. 140
(59) Ibid., p. 138
(60) Ibid., p. 138
However, to assume the superiority of O'Connor's manner of displaying the 'philosophy of education' (the totality of his separate treatment of 'ends' and 'means') would be to sin against the stated objectives of this account as much as would have been an initial acceptance of Hirst's view - a course deliberately avoided (see p. 2, supra). Therefore the philosophy of religion can be passed over with just this mention of its importance, not only in connection with the elucidation of 'ends' which appear in the O'Connor scheme but also as a contributing source of Hirst-type beliefs to his composite domain. This avoidance of an important area is just as well from the point of view of setting some bounds to our account, for an examination of religion, its philosophy at a time of 'analytical' rejuvenation and the relation of these to the problems of education would demand the kind of space that only a separate thesis could provide. (61)

The philosophical investigation of the nature of philosophy itself is a somewhat different case and must be here included, if only to the extent of unifying the scattered remarks made about it hitherto.

It is in considering the question of the extent to which 'educational theory' mirrors the scientific model so carefully described in his preliminary excurs-

(61) See Religious Education, Vol. LX No. 1, Jan/Feb. 1965 for a whole issue devoted to 'Linguistic Philosophy And Christian Education' - an example of the bearing of modern analytical philosophy on educational theory in an indirect manner via theology
sion into the logic of explanation that O'Connor sorts out the distinctive areas to be found mixed into traditional 'philosophy of education'; and thus touches upon the nature of philosophy, particularly on the status of metaphysical statements which enter so profusely into the writings he has in mind. His intention is of course to isolate the empirical component, to make its importance clear and the possibility of its improvement as a separate element beyond doubt. In unscrambling the Hirst-approved mixture in this way, he distinguishes three kinds of statement - metaphysical, empirical and value statements - which, as he says, '...are different in the sense that they belong to distinct logical families and for that reason need to be supported in quite different ways' (62).

It is with reference to metaphysical statements that he makes clear his basic philosophical commitment, a hint of which we have already reported in presenting his contribution to the ethical debate (see pp. 66-72, supra). We can best classify it briefly in a negative way by giving a comment on it made by one whose commitment is that alternative to the 'tough-minded' neo-positivism which we have broadly classed as 'linguistic'. Though it is to be noted that this critic, Reid, is linguistic only in his own idiosyncratic way - a fact that can serve as one more warning that any unities of position which we impress upon the

varied nature of analytical bearing are tentative oversimplifications that future accounts will need to remedy.

Reid, in the first part of his book, draws upon those parts of 'pure' analytical philosophy which are least sympathetic to the science-bound anti-speculative viewpoint of an O'Connor. He draws attention, for example, to the notion of 'vision' in philosophy propounded by the ex-Vienna Circle Waismann in saying: 'This liberal view of philosophy as fresh vision, or as a case built up in rational, though not scientific ways, as accepting a flexible view of the nature and use of language, is an answer to the over-violent repudiation of "metaphysics" (or speculative philosophy) so evident some years ago...Professor O'Connor, for example' (63).

This emphasis upon 'rational' procedures being much wider than science dreams of, upon the limitations of the merely analytical approach, particularly in its early revolutionary manifestations such as live on in the 'dated' pronouncements of an O'Connor, is to be found throughout Reid's persistent contribution to the discussion and, in more orthodox and less 'personal' form, within other instances that we have already examined. As Reid says elsewhere: 'Metaphysics in particular was loudly pronounced to be dead,

though it wouldn't lie down' (64). But to what extent it can be said that 'linguistic' sophistication has replaced 'positivistic' vigour in the arena of contemporary philosophy (to say nothing of the very special fusion of the 'linguistic' with the religious to be found in Reid himself) is something to be left for the next chapter.

What can be stated in this context, that of an examination of 'theory', is that O'Connor deals minimally with the non-scientific elements in educational discourse in order to highlight the importance, in his view, of the scientific element. He says: 'Statements of this kind [metaphysical] are not believed, in the first place, just because they form part of educational theory. They are accepted rather because they feature in a philosophy or a theology which is already believed on other grounds' (65); and thus expels any discussion from 'educational theory' to the acknowledged philosophical and theological domains where the 'other grounds' can be properly debated.

To him, the proper procedure is to identify the metaphysical statements, sift them from the complex muddle of educational writings (66) and then subject them to appropriate philosophical criticism on, as it were, their home ground. As he says: 'It is important

(65) O'Connor, J. D., op. cit., p. 105
that, whether or not we suppose that such statements
are meaningful or provable, we should at least be able
to recognize them' (67). And it is clear from the
context and the emphasis to be found there that O'Connor
has what he would regard as healthy positivistic doubts
about metaphysics, especially when it is contained in
the 'urbane and cultural sermonizing' which is the
object of his most recent sceptical comment (see ar-
ticle cited at (66) ).

Nevertheless, he admits that metaphysical state-
ments would be of great relevance to a discussion of
the aims of education if they were true: and his rea-
on for admitting this is of present interest because
it echoes (or, rather, anticipates) an argument in
the rival Hirst thesis. Like Hirst, he denies the
possibility of logically deducing statements about
aims from statements that are metaphysical, but grants
that such statements, if true, provide reasons for
creating an educational system of a particular sort.
He says: 'There is a sense in which a practical policy
for education can "follow from" a psychological theory...
...if we know or think that we know something about
the motives governing human conduct, it would be fool-
ish not to take advantage of this knowledge in plann-
ing the educational system...In a similar way, philos-

(66) cont., but essentially unchanged position
than that found wanting by Reid and Hirst.
(67) O'Connor, J. D., op. cit. (see p. 223, supra),
p. 106
ophical statements which are metaphysical can have practical consequences for education just because such statements purport to be "factual as well as philosophical. The difficulty, as we have seen, is that these "facts" are of a peculiarly inaccessible kind" (68).

With talk of metaphysical "facts" we reach the point at which commitments clash. Hirst, in his theory of educational 'theory', assumes the existence of philosophical beliefs which, because they are a kind of knowledge, form part of the grist brought to the mill of general educational discussion. O'Connor, in his less 'tender minded' approach to 'theory', banishes all donors of purportedly direct philosophical contributions to that place where the gifts can be most properly examined; where, in fact, the possibility of there being such gifts to offer is itself an issue - to the self-questioning heart of 'pure' philosophy. What goes on there, the next chapter must briefly disclose, for an account such as this is drawn towards it, as we have seen, at every point where there is a pair of opposing viewpoints expressed in the context of educational discussion.

But before we leave the concept of an 'educational theory' or plain 'educational theory', we can make the sort of general comment which indicates that the discussion as reported here is a mere fragment of the

(68) Ibid., p. 106
available discussion and that the report itself is just one possible version. Reid, for example, ends his long professional association with the practical working out of some of the problems of educational theory in relation to philosophy by saying farewell with the theme of that very relationship; and presents a conceptual framework within which the Hirst thesis and the O'Connor thesis could perhaps merge without clashing. This is a possibility which must remain unexamined and merely suggested on the tone rather than the details of the Reid valedictory lecture as evidence - as when he expresses his final hope, '... not one voice only, but many, in concourse' (69).

Perhaps the normative and the explanatory aspects of the term 'theory', aspects which have received different emphases in the examples which this chapter has taken from the literature, can both be given due weight by some terminological agreement of the near future, forced on conflicting philosophers of education by the increasing volume of work in this area.

In any event, no matter what the ultimate resolution of the difficulties of which this chapter has made us aware, it will not come solely at the level of discussion connoted by the term which features largely in its title. From 'theory' we must move to 'philosophy' and so take up the fundamental questions of - to

quote our own introduction - 'The nature of philosophy, of language and, particularly, of knowledge' (see p. 7, supra). Perhaps at the end of this more thorough than hitherto scrutiny of the most fundamental sector of our field of enquiry we shall have become more capable than at present of suggesting avenues along which 'analytical' harmony may be found. For the moment, however, 'conflict' is the most appropriate term for the main characteristic of the scene that we have witnessed; and this term appears in the chapter title to follow as a reminder that, whatever cooperation the near future may bring, rooted disharmony is the mark of the present.
CHAPTER VII

THE CONFLICT IN ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY ABOUT
LANGUAGE AND KNOWLEDGE

The Basic Issue In 'Pure' Philosophy

Lack of unanimity amongst the analytically dis­posed has become familiar to us by repetition in several contexts with an 'educational' aspect. The reason, located outside such contexts, is not far to seek: it has been implied on a number of occasions, but not yet stated in the words of those most closely involved. It is, however, recognized by them. At one end of the spectrum of analytical shades of opinion O'Connor admits that he is '...putting forward a philosophical theory which, like all such theories, finds no general acceptance' (1). At the other end, Reid recognizes that 'The nature and function of philosophy is itself a kind of philosophical problem - over which there has always been controversy' (2).

Both thus look back to the ground in 'pure' philosophy of the issues with which they are involved when that philosophy is 'applied' to education. Small wonder that the very scope of analytical 'bearing', the manner in which it is said to operate and the results anticipated from it have been seen by us to present a rich variety to the investigator; for the authors

(2) Reid, L. A., Philosophy And Education (London 1962), p. 3
of our examples look back, like O'Connor and Reid, and see different views and so produce the varied material in terms of which we have chosen to define the 'bearing'. Nevertheless, we have been forced to notice a basic dichotomy within the literature - even within the sample of it that we have taken from that produced during a relatively short period of philosophical activity. This we can spell out in terms of; the 'pure' philosophical background which the 'educational' writings perforce mirror.

This procedure is now demanded if we are to avoid imbalance in an account that is drawing to a close; for, so far, in paying close attention to 'educational' manifestations of analytical philosophy, we have neglected (though not completely ignored) the reference in detail to the fundamental debate which stands behind what is being voiced in educational discourse. In our last chapter, for example, we have seen how the conflict between two broad points of view implies an underlying conflict that is being waged in less restricted territory than that provided by educational writings. The concepts of 'knowledge', 'discipline', 'theory' and so on to be found there are the markers of epistemological territory which is extensive enough to permit endless journeying.

We shall have to confine ourselves to a short excursion, just sufficiently informative to corroborate and give 'body' to the main presupposition of our sur-
vey - that two branches of analytical philosophy, the broadly 'positivistic' and the broadly 'linguistic', exist in fact, and that their existence and the characteristics of each can be inferred quite accurately from the body of literature which is a 'secondary' manifestation of 'pure' philosophising. In dealing with ethics we were closest to the original sources, a fact which illustrates that the more important a sector of 'pure' philosophy is for educational thinking the more non-educational work must be called upon. Similarly now, epistemology must be viewed, for it too is of great significance for education. Scheffler's latest book is evidence of this; though the mention of it (3) must, unfortunately, be all we give of it for the same reason as that offered to excuse our mere mention of Peters' latest contribution - lack of time to assimilate important and relevant writings that are only just beginning to appear in substantial form and that will, undoubtedly, occupy key points in the accounts still to be written.

So, we move to analytical philosophy and its views of language, knowledge and the relationship between them. We have already stated (see p. 15, supra) that the two-phase philosophical career of Wittgeinstein is the main source of, and the symbol for, both the continuity and the divergences within contemporary

(3) Scheffler, I., Conditions Of Knowledge: Introduction To Epistemology And Education (Chicago 1965)
analytical philosophy. The formal and the informal
branches, the 'positivistic' and 'linguistic' emphases
as we have called them, stem both largely from his
insights. And these insights concern language, as is
well known. Common to both branches of the 'family'
is the location of problems of knowledge, the core
of philosophical problems, in problems of language,
meaning and the analysis of these. This is the overall
picture, undistorted enough for our purposes if
not for the chronicler of fine distinctions.

As W.H.F. Barnes says of the first, vigorous analy­
tical phase (in a short impartial account written
for educationists less than ten years ago to fill an
obvious gap - a fact which illustrates the shortness
of the period with which this survey deals): 'Posit­
ivism gave philosophy a tilt by which words, sentences,
talking, language, etc., became the object of atten­
tion, rather than ideas, thoughts, thinking, theory,
and so on' (4). Of the later phase, Stuart Hampshire
comments: 'There are certain permanent or recurring
puzzles about the forms of our knowledge...What is
largely new in the philosophy of the last thirty years
...is that many philosophers are now satisfied to
trace these perplexities to their source in misunder­
standings of the common forms of language' (5).

(4) Barnes, W. H. F., 'Logical Positivism' in Judges, A. V., (Ed), Education And The Philosophic Mind
(London 1957), p. 125
(5) Hampshire, S., Spinoza (Harmondsworth 1951),
p. 219
Language occupies the centre of the philosophic-al scene, it is clear. But how and why? The 'positivist' can speak first. Put roughly, it can be said that language has two main uses: to communicate 'facts' and to establish agreements about the use of terms with which such facts are communicated. The philosopher would put it technically by stating that there exist two distinct types of statements - 'synthetic' and 'analytic' - and the positivist would insist that the synthetic aspect of language activity, the assertion of how things are, is of primary importance, the analytic aspect being necessary only to ensure that fact-communication is accomplished by means of a reliable vehicle.

Only if agreement is reached about word-use can language operate effectively as an instrument of communication: there must be a consistent inter-relationship established between the elements of a language, a set of rules for the game. Clearly, in such 'analytical' use, experience of the world of fact is irrelevant to the question of proper use: an analytical proposition says nothing about the experienceable, non-verbal world, but speaks only of men's 'agreement' as to how the elements of language shall be used. Though this is not to deny the importance of analytic statements, for the positivist values studies in logic and mathematics - the two most clearly demarcated areas in which such statements form the bulk of what is said. It is only to emphasise the primary function
of language, which is to convey information about something other than itself, to direct attention away from the language level towards the non-linguistic universe.

It is synthetic statements which give us knowledge of the world: the truth of such statements depends upon what is the case and they are to be tested, according to the positivistic view, against actual or possible sense experiences. This test distinguishes between analytic and synthetic statements, which between them account for all statements that can be said to be meaningful. If sense experience is appropriate to the question of truth the statement is synthetic, but if truth is determined only by an examination of the terms and agreements implied in their use the statement is analytic. If neither, the statement is, to the positivist, 'meaningless' in a literal sense.

The notorious principle of verifiability is the answer of this position to the question of the meaning of a proposition. That is, the meaning of a proposition consists in the logically equivalent propositions into which the original can be translated; and consists, ultimately, in derived statements about direct experiences - the so called 'protocol' statements which are, in a sense, their own justification. The philosopher of this persuasion penetrates (in theory) deep beneath the surface of language to this protocol-reflected bedrock, and if, in mining down from
a proposition or a kind of discourse, he fails to find the basic level, the immediately known 'reality' which affords a self-certifying sense experience, he typically uses phrases like 'literal nonsense', 'meaningless language', 'emotive meaning', or even 'metaphysical moonshine'.

The verification principle and its more guarded offspring, the principle of falsifiability, lies thus at the heart of the positivist theory of language and knowledge, attempting to anchor all language in the raw, common sensations which all human creatures possess and which the simplest terms of our language unmistakably 'reflect'. Its iconoclastic nature is clear, as is the sympathy of those who held it in its original form and those who have inherited its developments in contemporary philosophy of science for the positive achievements of science. These characteristics we have seen surviving, in various ways, in the work of 'educational' philosophers such as Hardie, O'Connor and Eastwood, all, to some extent, willing inheritors of this vigorous, 'no nonsense' tradition.

In contrast, the other, 'linguistic', branch of analytical philosophy eschews blatant idol-smashing and anti-metaphysical pronouncements. It is much more liberal in attitude, as we have seen where it appears in educational contexts: it de-emphasises the importance of formal logic and positive science, as is
clear from the writings of philosophers like Hirst. Barnes gives an admirable image of the contrast when he says: 'To have made this transition is to have escaped from a strait-jacket into an easy-fitting lounge suit' (6) - though, it must be said, he does not dwell on the unsuitability of lounge suits for the performance of many essential practical tasks: boiler suits are often made of straitjacket-like material.

With this approach, 'verification' as a slogan is replaced by 'the meaning is the use' mentioned earlier. The extraordinary variety to be found in the uses of language, a variety which is unclassifiable within the simple analytic/synthetic dichotomy, is appealed to; particularly in the seminal passage from the later Wittgenstein which concludes: 'It is interesting to compare the multiplicity of the tools in language and of the ways they are used, the multiplicity of kinds of words and sentence, with what logicians have said about the structure of language. (Including the author of the "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus")' (7).

If interest shifts, as it does with the 'linguistic' philosopher, to language as a natural phenomenon, of an almost organic complexity, there are not the grounds for excluding as 'meaningless' any uses - as there are when language is viewed 'positivistically'.

(6) Barnes, W. H. F., op. cit., p. 138
as functioning properly only in the communication of 'fact'. All uses have their 'natural' place, and are to be studied with patience rather than excluded because they do not measure up to a tidy but restricted scientific ideal. Language is a complex social product and should, in the 'linguistic' philosopher's opinion, be allowed to carry out its many functions and not be subjected to Procrustean assault: it should be carefully observed and not violently interfered with. This position lies behind Hirst's accusation that O'Connor '...has singularly failed to do what he set out to do - to discover the job educational theory performs' (8); and represents, perhaps, the 'gentler' side to this continuing domestic quarrel within the analytic-al family.

'Look and see' is the exhortation from this quarter: look for the meaning in the use, for it is not buried deep at the level of incorrigible protocols, themselves the product of an aberration in analytical philosophy caused by what is often known as 'scientism'. What can be seen is the actual use, the ordinary standard use such as we have seen Peters and Scheffler attempting to elucidate in an educational context. Their work illustrates several techniques which have emerged from linguistic philosophy as valuable probes for language exploration. For example, they show in action the so-called 'paradigm case' technique which,

in its simplicity, directness and wide applicability, is fruitful in many an 'applied' philosophical domain.

It can be put thus: whereever there is a piece of language whose use is not clear and is causing dispute, it can be clarified by finding another example which is quite clear in the sense that the disputants will accept either that or they are beyond any kind of convincing. The discovered example, the standard, unobjectionable, paradigm use, can be scrutinized and the characteristics established in this process (in a Peters sense, the 'essential' characteristics: see p. 123 supra) used to unravel the original use. The 'linguistic' presupposition is that a paradigm for each word, phrase and sentence in the language does, in fact, exist: the piece of language cannot appear at all without creating, by use, a genuine and legitimate (though not 'scientific') meaning - the meaning is the use!

Such a presupposition explains the frequent occurrence in the writings of, for example, Peters of statements like this, taken from an educationally relevant source which we have not time to explore: 'The paradigm case of a human action is when something is done in order to bring about an end' (9). It shows through, too, in a passage which will serve to bring this 'pure' philosophical stage of the dis-

cussion to amend by echoing Wittgenstein and so contrasting the two analytical approaches with which this section has been concerned.

He says: 'Ordinary language can convey...subtle suggestions; for one way in which it differs from scientific language is that its use is not simply to describe and explain. It may command, condemn, guide, express states of mind, announce, provoke, exhort, and perform countless other such social functions. Often a different word is used precisely because such a specific social function is to be performed. Scientific language, almost by definition, has no such subtleties' (10). We must now re-enter the 'applied' area to reconsider the basic issue as it appears there, bearing Peters' words in mind.

The Issue Reflected In An 'Educational' Context

What is reflected is the issue between the two analytical positions described admirably by P.F.Strawson, probably the most powerfully 'pure' philosopher alive, as having '...been of dominant importance in post-war philosophizing. One involves turning away from the forms of common speech, while preserving much of the apparatus of the original programme of analysis. The other involves continued close attention to the forms of common speech, together with a vastly altered and extended conception of the nature and techniques of

(10) Ibid., p. 29
analysis' (11).

Hirst can provide us with perhaps the best example of the latter approach, in the important article which complements his work on educational theory examined in our last chapter. Its level is best gauged from the comment of Archambault, who edits the volume in which it appears. He talks of '...an approach which is frankly epistemological and consequently relatively abstract; yet a major portion of his paper is concerned with the applications of the principles thus derived to the practical educational context' (12). Hirst makes explicit, in short, his views on the nature of knowledge which are presupposed by him in the earlier article. In the process, he leaves no doubt about the close relationship of the epistemological position he adopts to 'linguistic' insights within the philosophy of mind - a fact which will allow us to confine our investigation and excuse us from delving deeply into the latter sector of 'pure' philosophy (an appropriate sector for a separate and differently slanted account).

A key Hirstian phrase is 'forms of knowledge' (see pp. 193-6, supra) which he defines as '...the complex ways of understanding experience which man has achieved which are publicly specifiable and which are gained through learning' (13). He maintains that these forms

(12) see p. 254, infra.
(13) see p. 254, infra.
of knowledge are distinguished by their particular
ccepts and expressions and by the criteria they have
established for handling questions of truth within
their 'jurisdiction'. It can be noted how close this
way of thinking is to that behind the Wittgensteinian
notion of language games or universes of discourse, in
which and of which 'mindful' men partake. Hirst talks
of the development of mind being determined by the
forms of knowledge and, having defined the forms as
'publicly specifiable', thus implies that what is charac-
teristic of man is that he is the creature in which
many distinct languages achieve, in a sense, signifi-
cant 'embodiment'.

His exact words are as descriptively vague as those
in the last paragraph: he says that there is a '...
logical relationship between the concept of "mind"
and the concept of "knowledge", from which it follows
that the achievement of knowledge is necessarily the
development of mind - that is, the self-conscious
rational mind of man - in its most fundamental aspect'
(14). Mind is defined in terms of the conceptual
schemes, and the languages in which these are express-
ed, by means of which experience is structured and
articulated - '...it is by means of symbols, partic-
ularly in language, that conceptual articulation be-

(12) Archambault, R. D., 'Introduction. The Context
Of Educational Discussion' in Archambault, R. D. (Ed),
Philosophical Analysis And Education (London, 1965), p. 58
(13) Hirst, P. H., 'Liberal Education And The Nature
Of Knowledge' in op. cit. ((12) above), p. 122
(14) Ibid., p. 123
comes objectified, for the symbols give public embodiment to the concepts' (15).

His argument is that all the various domains of human knowledge have been acquired by using accepted tests on publicly agreed assertions; on the symbolic expressions which have empowered man in his probing of experience to find (or construct?) relations and distinctions of an increasingly fine nature. As Hirst puts it: 'To acquire knowledge is to become aware of experience as structured, organized and made meaningful in some quite specific way, and the varieties of human knowledge constitute the highly developed forms in which man has found this possible' (16). He offers a persuasive portrait of the development of man, achieving through countless and barely imaginable centuries these priceless forms of knowledge, creating for himself a mind, a many sided rationality which is embedded in the unique modes of understanding, in the distinctive languages which create sense out of a primordial experience.

We can pause for a sobering look at the work of a philosopher cast in a different mould, one whose 'positivistic' inclinations take him to the more 'tough minded' areas of contemporary philosophy of science and whose brief contribution to the educational debate of ten years ago cannot possibly be omitted from our

(15) Ibid., p. 123
(16) Ibid., pp. 124-5
sample if we are to do justice to the older branch of analytical philosophy. Herbert Feigl makes explicit the affinity for science which this branch continues to display even in its more moderate 'maturity' which philosophers such as he have brought about: as when he says, '...there are important educational aspects in the scientific humanism which, as a general and fundamental attitude, underlies the thinking of the logical empiricists' (17).

He talks boldly of the equation of knowledge and science in words that must make Hirst wince. To him, '...theological and metaphysical assertions...must be considered as nonscientific (or, as the logical empiricists generally would claim) noncognitive' (18); and are thus excluded from the realm of genuine knowledge which the 'linguistic' philosophers do not wish to see limited in this way. He discusses the semantics of the word 'belief' as it is used to make a knowledge claim only to isolate for acceptance that meaning '... which may be characterized as empirical because it is at least in principle capable of being examined as to its truth or falsity in the light of observational evidence' (19). Our discussion of 'protocols' comes immediately to mind (See pp. 247-8, supra).

(17) Feigl, H., 'Aims Of Education For Our Age Of Science: Reflections Of A Logical Empiricist' in Modern Philosophies And Education (Chicago, 1955), N.S.S.E. 54th Yearbook Part 1, p. 304
(18) Ibid., p. 312
(19) Ibid., p. 313
There is insistence on the putative analytic wisdom of

meaningful questions. (21)

- In turn and with not permitted the asking of the practice
- of criticism with not plead us into certain sorts of con-
- tent and understood in conformity with the
- draft and consistent with in the rectification that
- under the own structure. The rectification for the
- which states the meaning of criticism the standard of the
- position at the standard of criticism.

Thus there is a pragmatic defense of the positivist
- expected as a proposal at substantiation or working
- when the meaning of criticism which he describes is acceptable,
- such performativity does not occur, according to Peirce,

- by

decision enunciates unnecessary intellectual perplexity
- the just enunciate appears, it is a piece of prehistory
- formal enunciature and yet to not accepted as carry

A sentence can not be confirmed by
- are inferred. If a sentence that the objections

meaningful untunelness (20), but concluded that the objections
- contrary to existing empiricalism is in the criterion of factual
- essential but also the most respected and disputed primit-
- the most

He strikes to this view, quite aware that

stintenience, according to the do any factual meaning
- proof of an observational kind are merely of emotional
- To Peirce, better which are made safe against dis-

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posing pseudo-problems is in marked contrast with the 'liberalism' of Hirst, to whom the very term 'pseudo-problem' would no doubt smack of an unphilosophical obsession with science. For even when Feigl makes plain his awareness that things have changed in philosophy since the swashbuckling heyday of logical positivism of the Vienna dazzlement, he still urges that it is scientific knowledge that counts, as when he says: '...it is wise to proceed cautiously and conservatively. We certainly must not cavalierly repudiate as meaningless questions for which we have at the moment no technique of decision but where the discovery of such a technique and of relevant data is not logically excluded by the manner in which the question is proposed. There are countless unanswered questions in science and many of them may remain unanswered for all we know; mankind may not exist long enough to work out an answer. But a question which is so construed that it prevents any responsible answer whatsoever should be regarded as a pseudoproblem' (22).

To which Hirst would probably reply that such an implied continuing hostility towards the knowledge-claims made by religious and metaphysical (not to mention moral) 'believers' is the prejudice of a science-conditioned mind which is blinded to the obvious facts of man's total experience. Certainly Feigl shows an impatience with subtleties; and Hirst's

(22) Ibid., p. 317
writings are nothing if not subtle. Feigl says, for example: 'To make a very long story very short, it may be said that there is an empirical, cognitively meaningful concept of reality, used in common life and merely refined in science' (23). On the face of it, this is startlingly close to what Hirst says: 'The various forms of knowledge can be seen in low level developments within the common area of our knowledge of the everyday world. From this there branch out the developed forms which, taking certain elements in our common knowledge as a basis, have grown in distinctive ways' (24).

But the similarity is nothing and the difference is all. Feigl's 'refinement' is the antithesis of Hirst's 'growth': to the younger philosopher it must appear more of a confinement (like Barnes' strait-jacket - see p. 249, supra), just as, to the older philosopher, Hirst's plural forms of knowledge must appear the sort of self-delusion that only the future development of a scientific psychology to the point where it can account for the strange beliefs of non-scientific philosophers can explain.

For Feigl propounds an empirical realism which combines the (to him justifiable) claims of the aforementioned criteria of meaning and validity with the sound elements of 'common sense' which science ident-

(23) Ibid., p. 318
(24) Hirst, P. H., op. cit., p. 128
ifies as the foundation upon which its own construction stands. Its opponents would call it a 'naturalistic metaphysic' underlying the 'positivistic' theory of knowledge; and this charge might very well be acceptable (ironically, in view of one of its terms) by the Feigl who is willing to write: 'Small parts of physical space and late arrivals in evolutionary time, this is the place of "homo sapiens" in the universe. An adequate theory of knowledge must reconstruct the relations of the knower to the known in such a manner that obvious naturalistic conclusions are not distorted' (25).

But we must return from this brief glimpse of the sort of statement of position which is, at the moment, not favoured by the majority of, at any rate, English participants to the most confident statement of the position which is - to Hirst, for a summary of the epistemological underpinning of the current 'official' pronouncements which spread far and fast from London. Scientific knowledge is, to Hirst, one amongst many kinds of knowledge, for science is only one of the many ways in which man structures and articulates his experience. Other kinds have equal or perhaps greater importance.

To recall his main contention: the various 'forms of knowledge' exist primitively in the interactions of everyday life and are found in developed form in

(25) Feigl, H., op. cit., p. 319
the distinctive disciplines achieved by civilized man. These disciplines are identifiable by their central concepts, by the particular logical structure each has developed to relate the concepts in certain limited but meaningful ways and by their distinctive procedures for testing their own expressions against experience, using different techniques and skills. We have, of course, examined such a form of knowledge while considering Peters' views on ethics, he being a Hirst-type epistemologist (for our purposes and according to our terms).

Not only is scientific knowledge to be viewed in this characterizing way - there is universal 'analytical' agreement on this - but also, according to Hirst, '...moral knowledge, and...the arts...Each form, then, has distinctive expressions that are testable against experience in accordance with particular criteria that are peculiar in the form' (26). There is the clear implication that the 'scientific' mind is a mind in blinkers; and Hirst leaves us in no doubt that the origins of this (by now familiar) view lie in the later Wittgensteinian quarter of recent 'pure' philosophy - though, it must be noted, the uninhibited tone of his exposition is such as to imply, too, that he believes himself to be advancing the discussion as a 'pure' philosopher himself.

The 'distinct worlds of discourse' (27) are, then, all we can know, being, in sum, all we can say. But

(26) See p. 262, infra
(27) See p. 262, infra
we can say a lot, in Hirst's view. There are more things in 'knowledge' than the scientist dreams of; and therefore the conclusion of the early Wittgenstein - the seventh proposition, 'Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent', of the 'Tractatus' - which the positivistically inclined have used to throw so much actual language into the abyss of 'meaninglessness' is true (because of the liberation effected by the later Wittgenstein) in a sense beyond the positivist's ken.

So, science and mathematics are not the only disciplines in the 'knowledge' sense. And even they are seen somewhat differently by Hirst, who claims that there is '...a good case, because of the nature of their empirical concepts, for regarding the human sciences separately from the physical sciences' (28), a contention that can be put alongside a typical statement of Feigl to produce a familiar dissonance. He says: 'The unity-of-science movement, which has been an important expression of the logical empiricist outlook ever since its inception, has stressed the essential unity of both method and subject matter of the sciences. The natural and social sciences differ in their special techniques, but the methods of validation are essentially the same. They delimit the range and the level of their analyses differently, but

(26) Hirst, P. H., op. cit., p. 129 (see p. 261, supra)
(27) Ibid., p. 129 (see p. 261, supra)
(28) Ibid., p. 130
there are good reasons to assume that these (superficially very striking) differences amount only to fruitful divisions of one unitary subject matter in its various aspects and levels of organization' (29).

In addition to 'knowledge' as understood by the positivists, there are the forms developed from other aspects of human experience: moral knowledge, historical knowledge, religious knowledge and knowledge from the arts - broad areas of understanding which divide into the various arts and sciences of civilized life. Such are 'first order' forms; but there are, in addition, the second order forms already mentioned (see p. 218, supra), of which philosophy is particularly important. As a famous ex-positivist (and present 'positivistic' sympathizer amongst Oxford philosophers) puts it: '...however uncertain they may be about the details, there is now a fair measure of agreement among philosophers that theirs is what is technically called a second-order subject...Philosophy, it has been said, is talk about talk' (30).

Furthermore, there are many 'fields' of knowledge, one of which we have explored in the last chapter while reporting the article of Hirst which is complementary, so far as the epistemology is concerned, to this one. A 'field' is an organisation of knowledge created by integrating findings of various root dis-

(29) Feigl, H., op. cit., p. 339
ciplines, with reference to specific objects or practical activities. Engineering and geography are examples; and so, of course, is educational theory—though in a significantly different way. Work within a 'field' does not entail the validation of any logically unique form of expression or with structuring experience in a particular way, as work within a 'form' does. In consequence, the number and nature of this kind of organization is not 'laid down' but will vary from time to time as practical activities and their more immediate theoretical justification demand.

The most philosophically interesting of the 'fields' are those in which the practical knowledge includes distinct moral elements: this is, in fact, how moral knowledge is subdivided, as opposed to the subdivision of the 'forms' into institutional disciplines. So we establish the place of educational theory, amongst similar theories with moral components—and, in so doing, help to explain the appearance in the history of educational theory of works ranging from Plato's 'Republic' to Peters' 'Social Principles', works which have an equally legitimate place in the history of political theory. For, as Hirst says: 'Political, legal and educational theory are perhaps the clearest examples of fields where moral knowledge of a developed kind is to be found' (31).

Hirst's summary of his rather neat epistemological

(31) Hirst, P. H., op. cit., p. 131
classification is so clear that it is worth recording before we hear a last voice from the opposition. He says: 'In summary, then, it is suggested that the forms of knowledge as we have them can be classified as follows: (I) Distinct disciplines or forms of knowledge (subdivisible): mathematics, physical sciences, human sciences, history, religion, literature and the fine arts, philosophy.

(II) Fields of knowledge: theoretical, practical (these may or may not include elements of moral knowledge).

It is the distinct disciplines that basically constitute the range of unique ways we have of understanding experience if to these is added the category of moral knowledge' (32). It is interesting to note the appearance, at about the same time as this unhesitant classification, another equally anti-positivistic, equally 'liberal', equally firm pronouncement of '...a philosophical theory of the curriculum for general education based on the idea of logical patterns in disciplined understanding' (33) - and to note how different it is!

With this summary in mind, we can pay a last visit to Hardie, giving us the opportunity to sample the 'second phase' work of one whose original contribution gave us a valuable starting point. He can be found

(32) Ibid., p. 131
(33) Phenix, P. H., Realms Of Meaning (New York, 1964), p. x (Note the significance of Chapter 16 for Eason's comment on Hirst - see p. 103, supra)
giving recent voice to 'positivistic' sentiments, as when he states bluntly: 'Scientific knowledge has come to dominate our way of life, not just because of its practical and theoretical successes but because it is in fact coextensive with the entire field of knowledge' (34). This assertion, of as unHirstian a kind as it is possible to make, must make us judge Hardie to be either plain inconsistent or fascinatingly varied in his views, for, on the last occasion we used his writings, he appeared to be moving in the direction of Hirst: here, he is in step with Feigl.

We will take him as we find him in this context, for it is a little late to do any other: and some of his own words, while they make it hard to get the whole of his long contribution into one focus, nevertheless are relevant to the issue we are presently discussing. He sounds like one of Feigl's 'logical empiricists' in this, for example: 'If, as is the case in most of the problems in traditional philosophy, we have no idea what the relevant evidence would even be like, then we must admit that such problems are not meaningful ones. This criterion for the meaningfulness of any question or problem, adopted by practising scientists, must now be accepted for the whole of knowledge' (35).

Again, he emphasises '...the knowledge of common-sense...of mathematics...of the sciences' (36) in prov-

(35) Ibid., p. 583
(36) Ibid., p. 583
iding the philosophical underpinning for a suggested curriculum. His brief excursions into the philosophies of language, mathematics, science and history - four subjects in which, as he says, '...there are problems that can be profitably be clarified by modern philosophical methods' (37) - show plainly how 'positivistic' his views are, in spite of his use of the Ryleian term 'category mistakes' (38) and his contention that 'In each of these four spheres...revolutionary changes have taken place in the last few decades' (39). For he places History squarely amongst the social sciences; and we have seen where the other side in the debate (e.g., Hirst) puts it.

If it was only Hardie who was currently arguing in this manner, we should naturally suspect that the alternative position to that of the 'linguistic' philosophers was a weak one, not really in tune with the sixties; for we have already noted that his historical importance probably exceeds his importance from a philosophical point of view. But, as we have seen, he is not alone in remaining 'positivistic' in spite of analytical developments of more recent years. We have drawn attention to Feigl here and to O'Connor and others elsewhere, and it would have been possible to establish the viability of the more scientifically centred position by scores of other samplings of the

(37) Ibid., p. 585
(38) Ibid., p. 586
(39) Ibid., p. 589
For, as we have constantly asserted, the only fair judgment that can be made on the evidence which accumulates from an enquiry such as this one is that the most recent philosophy is not necessarily the most acceptable, that 'linguistic' analysis is not obviously superior to 'positivistic' analysis, that Wittgenstein's professorial second thoughts do not have to replace the first thoughts of his earlier years, that Hirst's 'official' clarification is not uncontroversially safe from damaging counter-attacks originating in the analytical sector which he considers to be out of date. And to such an attack we can now go, selecting an assertion of Hirst and seeing to what extent it is contradicted by 'positivistic' views that still carry great weight in the philosophical world. This will involve reference to Nagel (as promised; see p. 188, supra), the slight 'deepening' of the argument in this limited sector, with less direct reference to specific works than hitherto, and the provision of a particular example of the 'issue' with which this section has been concerned (as, indeed, was the last - at the 'purer' level).

The Nature Of History: One Example Of The Conflict

On the one hand, Hirst proclaims the autonomy of History and, on the other, Hardie (taken merely as a spokesman for the 'positivistic' side) regards History
as a social science and, hence, part of Science. It must be said that neither philosopher goes much further than proclamation. In the case of Hirst, there is reference to the 'linguistic' work of Dray (40), so presumably this important work is to be taken as read and as providing the detailed case which Hirst has not space to give. As, however, we have tended to weight this account on the 'linguistic' side in terms of the detailed reference to arguments, we can choose to present here the 'positivistic' approach to the nature of History, leaving the view of the opposition to be inferred from that.

The 'positivistic' view of History cannot, in fact, be satisfactorily described without reference to the more general thesis of the unity of science which has been implied in many of the comments we have reported and which, it will be remembered, Feigl refers to (see p. 262, supra). Clearly, if this thesis can be substantiated, the 'forms of knowledge' view is mistaken. If, that is, it can be accepted that the whole range of institutional disciplines - from physics through biology, psychology, the social sciences to history - form one complex, interconnected tissue that cannot logically be bisected or cut in other ways, then the 'linguistic' case is in error.

In such an event, not only does the Hirst claim for the autonomy of the human sciences and, particu-

(40) Dray, W., Laws And Explanation In History (Oxford, 1957)
arly, for the uniqueness of History as a mode of understanding fall down, but, even more surely, his wider claim for the distinct 'knowledge' provided by religion and the arts collapses; and this will affect any judgment made on Hirst's work within 'educational theory', making an acceptance of the more scientifically-turned sympathies of such as O'Connor more likely. In a sense, then, the nature of History is a test case, the outcome of which is important for deciding between the many tentative judgments that have to be made during an exploration like this.

The 'unity of science', which, if established, would decide the case in favour of the 'positivistic' position, means something quite simple, particularly in comparison with the complex classifications of a Hirst (or a Phenix - see p. 265, supra). It denotes those features that all branches of knowledge have in common - so it is claimed - in spite of the recognized wide differences of methodology to be found in the separate disciplines. Particular emphasis is placed in the philosophical contexts within which this thesis is discussed on the logical unity which is claimed to embrace the natural sciences and the humanities; hence the importance of History for testing the claim.

A positivist would regard it as foolish to deny undoubted differences between disciplines or to assert the 'sameness' of, say, physics and history without carefully describing the logical similarity which
alone concerns him. Distinctions of subject matter and of methods between, for example, the sciences of meteorology, chemistry and botany are as acceptable to him as they are to Hirst. What he would want to ask, however, is why, if these sub-disciplines can be classed together as 'natural science' (one of Hirst's forms of understanding), the process of establishing similarities should cease at the particular points or boundaries indicated by a Hirst (or anyone, like Phenix, who cares to enter the epistemological arena).

He would want to question the contrasts between, say, physics and psychology which Hirst identifies in order to place them in different logical groups: for on what grounds are they judged to be more 'basic' than the undoubted contrasts between sciences which Hirst does classify together? Hirst's argument is carried on in the most abstract terms - talk of different modes of structuring experience, of different languages to be learnt, etc. - which are as inconclusive as they are undoubtedly persuasive. This will become clear when we sample the contrasting rigour of Nagel.

And in coming to him we can make the general point that the 'unity of science' view is often opposed by attempting to distinguish the natural sciences and the humanities by their supposed characteristics as 'generalizing' and 'individualizing' disciplines, respectively. Nagel describes this distinction with care:
he refers to '... a widely accepted distinction between two allegedly different types of sciences: the nomothetic, which seek to establish abstract general laws for indefinitely repeatable events and processes; and the ideographic, which aim to understand the unique and the non-recurrent. It is often maintained that the natural sciences and some of the social ones are nomothetic, whereas history (in the sense of an account of human events, as distinct from the events themselves) is pre-eminently ideographic. In consequence, it is frequently claimed that the logical structure of the concepts and explanations required in human history is fundamentally different from the logical structure of concepts and explanations in the natural (and other "generalizing") sciences' (41).

Nagel affords this distinction a painstaking and penetrating analysis, reaching the conclusion that historical explanations possess no absolutely unique logical features and that the methodological problems in this area have their counterparts in other branches of enquiry. This analysis is detailed and difficult, and so must be passed over (in its original form), just as the Dray position is merely cited by Hirst. We can, for our purposes, but state that it is a piece of philosophising which takes Dray's 'linguistic' views into account and yet reaches 'positivistic' conclus-

ions that are very widely accepted amongst the international philosophical community, before substituting some simpler observations of our own.

In commenting on the alleged distinction, the positivist could proceed thus: first, he could ask for general agreement that the course of history, taken as a whole, is a unique phenomenon; that is, time flows, as it were, in one direction and flows only once. Through time, the earth was formed and plant species evolved, creatures came into existence and 'culminated' in man whose total activities have taken place within the 'stream'. The whole of this happening we know as one individual event, in that it has happened only once. So, to be consistent with the definition of History as the individualizing discipline, every investigation carried out within the totality of this happening should be regarded as History.

Yet we do not, of course, so regard most of the investigations that men make. The normal procedure is to single out certain aspects of this total complex phenomenon, aspects which are approximately repeated so that we can ignore the differences between one occasion and another, and to emphasise these, creating thus what is meant by generalizing 'science'. A brief look at meteorology makes this clear. The weather is a unique individual occurrence: if we examine, say, temperature readings made over years at a particular place, we find that no month is exactly equal to the
'same' month of the previous year. Yet we have a generalizing science which describes this phenomenon by singling out approximately similar elements in it in order to state general laws, such as that it is hot in summer and cold in winter at the place in question.

Certainly this example is a simple one, but the logical point is valid (according to the positivist): what we are doing in this case is acting scientifically, creating science, that is, arriving at the formulation of general laws by abstracting from the unique, individual, immediately given phenomena under investigation. We simplify by neglecting the individual characteristics of the separate occasions, by arbitrarily cutting through most of the profusion of individual detail that a 'time-unfolded' 'reality' possesses to the common elements that science can theoretically manipulate.

In view of this, the positivist's fundamental question is: do the humanities, or can the humanities adopt any other procedure? His answer is that they do not and can not. There is the one basic procedure. If there were not - if the anti-positivistic distinction between 'generalizing' and 'individualizing' disciplines were valid in the sense intended - then, to be consistent, such sciences as palaeontology and the theory of evolution would need to be classed as humanities (being descriptive of aspects of the unique course
of events) and economics and linguistics, for example, would need to be put with the natural sciences.

The economist, for instance, states the law of diminishing returns, a general scientific statement; but he must begin with the observation of unique cases (there are no others), the individual differences of which he disregards in order to achieve his scientific objectives. The linguist, too, states laws: he states laws, for example, governing the shift of consonants with reference to the development of Romance languages from Latin. But this was a unique historical event which took place once only and thus provides us with a 'closed' episode; so that the linguists procedure has to be that which is said to be characteristic of the natural sciences - he examines separate events within our records of the episode, and eliminates individual details in order to generalize on the basis of the approximately repeated elements which he abstracts.

The inexorable positivistic conclusion is that this alleged criterion by means of which natural sciences and humanities are distinguishable - that the one generalizes by passing over individual variations while the other attends to what is individual - is invalid, at least with reference to the disciplines that can be thought of as 'intermediate' on the implied scale. Perhaps, though, it works with the 'extreme' cases; with theoretical physics as the model of a
generalizing discipline and History (say, pure chronicle) as the model of an individualizing discipline. We can recall, with reference to this conjecture, that while Hirst is in no doubt about the autonomy of historical understanding, he is more hesitant in classifying the social sciences (see p. 262, supra).

In inspecting extremes, the positivist would no doubt freely admit that there are sentences whose subject is a single individual and whose predicate is a unique action; and that there are, too, sentences that state something repeatable about a group of people or a 'plural' subject. But sentences of both kinds are to be found in both disciplines, invalidating the suggested criterion for logically distinguishing the two enterprises. A sentence is usually called 'general' because its content makes no reference to time and location; is independent of them, being, as we have seen, a description of what is abstracted from the infinitely varied flow of events. But such 'generality' is relative and is to be found in the statements of physics and History in varying degrees.

For instance, the physical statement that all bodies fall equally fast is a general statement. It is therefore, according to what we have said, a statement the content of which is independent of time and location. But is it? It depends on what is meant, in this case, by 'location'. The statement clearly refers to all bodies near to earth: it may not refer to bodies
elsewhere in a vast universe (just as even more general statements and established systems of statements within physics which seem of 'universal' application may be replaced when found to be limited - as with the work of Newton and Einstein). Its generality is relative, restricted by location.

There is thus no such thing as an unrestrictedly general statement. Physics certainly tends towards producing statements that are as general as possible, ones that cover as many cases as possible, but any conclusion covering a number of cases, be it many, few or even one, is, in this context, still a statement of physics. So, 'individualized' sentences, which are supposed to characterize History, are to be found in other disciplines, even physics. In fact, the distinction between 'generalizing' and 'individualizing' statements seems to be less appropriate than the notion of the relatively general content of statements - a matter of degree rather than of kind.

This is confirmed (says the positivist) if we look at History in a new light. Most certainly 'individual' statements are to be found there in abundance; that is, statements of the least possible generality, ones that are most dependent upon time and place. But they by no means form the whole content of historical writing; for even in 'pure' chronicle the choice of what is to be stated (and there must be choice) must be made on the basis of the writer's general conceptions
of a host of things that are the proper object of study of other disciplines (psychology for one) and so must implicitly transmit certain general propositions which are as much a part of the writing as the words that actually appear.

We can, at this point where the 'positivistic' position cries out for the kind of detailed advocacy that only a Nagel is capable of giving it, turn to him for at least a couple of typical paragraphs, before attempting to bring this stage of the discussion to a close, knowing that we have here another example of the way in which the 'bearing' we have been examining could at many points involve us in an 'escalation' into the far corners of philosophy. For it must be said that, had we substituted a simple account for Dray's position instead of for Nagel's, we should probably still feel the 'pull' towards the original sources which is itself some indirect evidence of the extent to which modern analytical philosophy has become involved in matters that are 'educational' in a wide sense.

Nagel says: 'Even a hasty inspection of treatises in theoretical science on the one hand...and of books on history on the other, suffices to reveal a striking difference between them. For by and large the statements occurring in the former are general in form and contain few if any references to specific objects, dates, or places, whereas the statements in the latter
are almost without exception singular in form and are replete with proper names, designations for particular times or periods, and geographic specifications. To this extent, at any rate, the contrast between the natural and some social sciences...appears to be well-founded. It would be a gross error, however, to conclude that singular statements play no role in the theoretical sciences or that historical inquiry makes no use of universal ones. As previous chapters have repeatedly noted, no conclusions concerning the actual character of specific things and processes can be derived from general statements alone; for theories and laws must be supplemented by initial conditions (i.e. by statements singular or instan­tial in form) if those general assumptions are to serve for explaining or predicting any particular occurrence...But neither can historical study dispense with at least a tacit acceptance of general statements of the kind cited in theoretical treatises. Thus, although the historian may be concerned with the nonre­current and the unique, he must obviously select and abstract from the concrete occurrences he is engaged in studying, and his discourse about what is unquestionably individual requires the use of common names or general descriptive terms. Accordingly, the historian's characterizations of individual things assume that there are various kinds of occurrences, and in consequence that there are more or less determinate regularities which
are associated with each other and which differentiate one kind from other kinds' (42).

Nagel's point about '...the use of common names or general descriptive terms' is one which is fundamental to the 'positivistic' view of the nature of History, proceeding as it does from a particular position on language. There is implied a basic property of language in its relation to 'reality': the description of an individual event must abstract from the uniqueness of that event by virtue of being a description. Or, as the father of the American general semantics movement, Korzybski, was never tired of proclaiming: 'The word is not the thing' (43).

In the act of using language the historian must reduce the unique to a combination of repeatable elements which are, as it were, 'stored' in the words at his disposal. He thus proceeds in an analogous manner to the physicist who, too, abstracts recurrent features from the equally unique stream of natural events. To the positivist, the logic of the procedures is the same, the physicist's abstraction and simplification of 'reality' being merely more thorough, obvious and easy to achieve, and his direction of interest different from that of the historian. One makes primarily general statements, leaving the inferences about individual cases to his readers; while the other uses

(42) Nagel, E., op. cit., pp. 548-9
(43) See Korzybski, Alfred, Science And Sanity, 3rd ed. (Lakeville, Conn., 1948)
general judgments in selecting and formulating the individual sentences that tend to dominate his actual writings.

Nagel refers to this difference in the direction of interest and resultant characteristics as '...an important assymetry' (44) between theoretical science and History. The historian's task, usually taken to be the assertion of individual statements, rests on the assumption and use of general laws, even though the establishment of such laws is no part of the historian's objectives. And this conclusion of Nagel is part of his 'positivistic' answer, reached after very detailed discussion, to the question with which we have been concerned in this very restricted section (Though Nagel, of course, is not directly answering our question): the question of the extent to which Hirst's alleged differences between his 'sub-divisions' of the 'forms of knowledge' are less radical, in a logical sense, than the differences between the 'forms' themselves.

Nagel's position is clear: there are no radical divisions! Or, as he puts it analogically: 'The distinction between history and theoretical science is thus fairly analogous to the difference between geology and physics...A geologist seeks to ascertain, for example, the sequential order of geologic formations,

(44) Nagel, E., op. cit., p. 550
and he is able to do so in part by applying various physical laws to his materials of study; but it is not the geologist's task, qua geologist, to establish the laws of mechanics or of radioactive disintegration which he employs in his investigations' (45).

To which we can add that the historian, too, is a scientist, on the 'positivistic' list of disciplined enquirers: a very special kind of scientist, of course, but then, so are they all. It is the fact that there is only the one list for such philosophers which causes the conflict reported in this chapter and assumed throughout this whole account; for, as we well know, there are those like Hirst who have not one but many!

So we leave the conflict as it appears at the three levels described in these last three sections, noting that it started with epistemology and ended with the philosophy of science; that is, it has ranged over an area which is both fundamental and controversial amongst philosophical activities, no matter what labels are used to identify it. For, as Nagel says: '...the term "philosophy of science" designates investigations continuous with those that have been pursued for centuries under such headings for traditional divisions of philosophy as..."theory of knowledge" ' (45). We must pass from the conflict itself to the possibility of its resolution (if there is a possibility); and,

(45) Ibid., p. 550
(46) Ibid., p. vii
before that, as a last quick glance at the voluminous literature in an account of it that has grown weighty enough to make its essentially simple point, to a mention of other sectors in which the same conflict between the two analytical approaches can be detected.

The Resolution Of The Conflict?

The philosophy of mind has received no special attention; and one reason for this has already been given (see p. 253, supra) - that it is inextricably linked with the theory of knowledge in the work of Hirst which gave us our most recent entry into a sector of the 'bearing'. To pursue it further would be to enter a vast domain. It would, for example, commit us to an examination of at least the Ryle whose writings have featured here and there in the account as sources for more direct 'educational' writings. We can only note in passing that Scheffler, in selecting material for what he calls his '...hypothesis about the kind of investigation philosophy of education might become' (47), overlooks neither this area nor this philosopher, and draws out from such work implications for educational thinking which we cannot pursue more deeply without embarking upon a separate account.

He emphasises both 'mind' and 'ordinary language' analysis in commenting on Ryle, bringing out the way

(47) Scheffler, I., Philosophy And Education (Boston, 1958), p. 10
in which revolutionary insights into the concept have been achieved by the use of certain (to us now familiar) philosophical techniques; and indicating how the whole procedure is of great importance to educationists, because, as he says: 'Education, it is thus normally said, is a matter of the imparting of truths, the transmission of knowledge, the enrichment of the mind' (48). We do not have to search far in our own account to see whom Ryle's 'pure' philosophising has influenced! We have seen in the writings of Hirst and Peters much that is in harmony with, for instance, this comment:

'...intellectual powers are the products of advanced schooling, of "didactic discourse", of higher education which constitutes culture and which is a condition of "all but the most primitive occupations and interests". In view of the predominant effort, by philosophers and researchers alike, to cast light on educational processes by applying to them theories of the mind, Ryle's diametrically opposite attempt, to construe the intellect in terms of schooling, has considerable significance and may appear to many to have the advantage of building upon a more concrete base' (49).

We are here presented neatly with one basis in 'pure' philosophy for Hirst's talk of 'harmony' between

(48) Ibid., p. 89
(49) Ibid., p. 91
the concepts of 'mind' and 'knowledge', which features prominently in his epistemological article. And we have a basis, too, for his contention that the knowledge out of which mind is built ('...construe the intellect in terms of schooling') '...must be learnt from a master on the job' (50), a contention with which the major emphasis in the work of Peters is in full agreement - for 'education as initiation' can be taken as a most appropriate slogan for developments in educational thinking that have the mark of Ryle all over them.

It would, them, be both interesting and instructive to journey through the neighbouring kingdom of 'mind', particularly those parts of it so well charted by Ryle. But this is not possible now. Attention can be drawn to the detailed and direct examination of a specific aspect of his work - the penetrating distinction between "knowing that" and "knowing how" - given in a recent book of American essays (51). This would (and at one time did) make an entry for us into an entirely different 'level' of the 'bearing' in question, the level of analysis in action with reference to specific concepts and restricted problems. For our own account has been pitched more at a 'second order' level, concerned primarily with discussing what analysis is about as this reveals itself in the

(50) Hirst, P. H., op. cit. (see p. 254, supra), p.129
(51) Smith, B. O. and Ennis, R. H., Language And Concepts In Education (Chicago, 1961). All 13 of the papers, and not just the 'Ryle' critique by Roland, are important examples of analysis in action.
literature.

At what might be called the 'working' level, at which the conflicts and controversies that we have identified are not evident (analytical tools being taken for granted in order to get on with the job) there is a mass of activity which could be explored within the terms of our assignment. To mention mere obvious fragments: Peters, with a firm foot in each of the psychological and philosophical camps, has criticized in a number of places the concept of 'mental health' which is often set up as an educational aim. This has elicited analytical responses of the type that would provide us with material for a survey many times the length of this which we are bringing to a close; particularly such examples as are appearing in the specialist American journal to which we have made some reference during our survey and with which the developments we have been charting come of age. (52).

In another direction, we could point without hesitation to the importance, at this 'working' level of uninhibited analytical activity, of philosophising about specific concepts such as 'learning' and 'adjustment' (and a hundred others) to be found in mimeographed form wherever philosophers of the persuasions and new interests that we have been describing are to be found gathered together, eager to contribute to and

to learn from the corporate and enthusiastic enterprise. All this could be brought within our terms of reference, had we decided upon an alternative (out of the many available - a point that we have tried to stress) mode of exploring the literature which was closer to the educational problems within our broad area than to the philosophical problems on which we have concentrated. As it is, we must merely mention such penetrating and currently relevant analyses of the form just described as those by Komisar and Macmillan (53) - an almost random dipping into an ever-broadening stream of 'concept' literature.

However, the termination of a survey should not consist solely of an apology for what it does not contain. It should, rather, attempt to draw some sort of conclusions about the material that has been examined. In particular, with reference to the major presupposition of our own account and especially in view of the title of this last chapter (and the question at the head of this section) we should make some comment on the possibility of a resolution of the 'conflict' that has occupied so much of our time. This was promised at the outset (see pp. 7-8, supra).

But, in view of this promise, we must be careful to distinguish the ending of a conflict with the actual finding of a solution from the suggestions that can be

made as to the direction in which a solution might lie. The former eventuality would, clearly, be the intellectual feat of the century (if not of all time), for the conflict in question is that between philosophers; and to arbitrate philosophical disputes such as are found amongst the 'big names' whose writings have occupied us is a job that awaits one of them — when one has reached the stature to accomplish it. All that can be suggested is that our own survey of the field leaves a very strong impression that there exist differences of emphasis that 'must' surely (?) be complementary; that must represent aspects of the truth as this will come to be seen at some future time; that are, in their own ways, enthusiastic but nonetheless tentative approaches to some philosophical 'Golden Mean'.

The conflict in analytical philosophy (and, hence, in its 'bearing' on education) is — because it is analytical philosophy — a conflict 'about' language. Is, then, the work of the only philosopher to have consciously attempted to describe and account for all the dimensions of language not relevant to its resolution? We must hesitate before asserting its relevance, if only on the grounds that his work (the work of C. W. Morris: see p. 8, supra) is rarely mentioned by either 'side' in the dispute we claimed to see and the citing of it may well bring no more than a tolerant smile to the face of any philosopher of the non-'scientific'
'ordinary language' kind.

Yet we can be encouraged to put out this suggestion — that Morris's three dimensions of language study contain the germ of a solution for analytical conflict — by the recent appearance of two philosophical comments in two entirely different contexts, both of which demonstrate that the framework which he provides is firm enough to bear the strains generated by partial analytical interests of a kind that we have repeatedly noted in 'educational' discourse and its immediate 'pure' philosophical sources. Mention of these two views is all that we can now allow ourselves; for an integration of them in order to apply them to our context would be (and perhaps will be) a mighty task indeed, for which the present survey work could act as prologue.

The first is in the context of theology, become, as we have ourselves noted, language conscious with the consequent appearance of conflicting viewpoints such as we have had to contend with in educational discourse. Ferre, drawing on the work of Morris, has attempted, as he puts it, to '...place the controversy over theological discourse within a wider understanding of linguistic signification' (54). His disentanglement of the 'manifold logic' to be found in the various philosophical contributions recently made by analytically orientated thinkers to theological dis-

course is lucid, convincing and of a simplicity that betokens the presence of a valuable insight: come to following the inconclusive wanderings of an account such as our own it 'feels' right, as the kind of solution to the problems that have emerged in this enquiry.

The second potentially relevant use of the Morris structure for language investigation is to be found in a little-known American journal devoted broadly to 'semantics', the kind of peripheral philosophical publication in which 'large' ideas that would find difficulty in taking root in more orthodox circles (because, perhaps, of the too-firm allegiances that we have been forced to notice in our subject matter) can be propounded. This is not to imply that this contribution is at all philosophically 'cranky', far, as we have noted, it is one which is very similar to that of Ferré, now become a standard work in the philosophy of religion. And its author is, in fact, a professor in educational philosophy (though this is mentioned as a credential: education does not come into the article at all).

Dettering enquires into the prospect for semiotic unity, ranging wide over the disciplines that have a current interest in language, moving rapidly from one to another while remaining 'on course' with the Morris 'dimensions' as a stabilizing device. From our point of view, his conclusion is a fascinating one; for he reaches a final point at which his references to the
conclusions of the later Wittgenstein strike familiar chords yet in a sense set up a minor cacophony. He sounds so like a spokesman for what we have called the 'linguistic' view and yet does so with the confidence of one who has appreciated and absorbed into an architectonic position that which we have called the 'positivistic' view, that we can only wonder what a detailed examination of this article with reference to our own accumulated material might produce.

He is worth quoting – as a substitute for any major conclusions of our own and as a justification for our stating that there might yet come a resolution of our 'conflict' along the lines that we have barely suggested, and that it might well be that Dettering is the philosopher to achieve it: at least as far as educational theory is concerned. After all, it is, as we have said, an educational philosopher who writes this: 'The hope of a new rational empire lies before us. If anyone questions this hope, let him then consider any fact of the external world or any known behavior of an organism. Could such a "fact" or "behavior", whether it be the discovery of America, or the sun having risen this morning, ... possibly be notarized merely by observation of some light and sound, or by the hearsay of people or the dull script of text-books? Or is not our strong conviction about the truth in such matters founded on the total conspiracy of our experience – including the collusion between our
"language game" and the empirical data which force themselves upon us? Would even most of our own acts make much sense without those same language rules?... These "language games", as Wittgenstein called them, perhaps create our greatest human dilemma. Those who think they have avoided them by finding some "pure reality"...have simply been caught more inextricably in some more engulfing, subterranean language which they mistake for pristine being. Naturally, further inquiry is needed into these vast and circular relationships, but for the moment it would seem that any such inquirer could only eschew the "game" by inventing a new one of his own. The frontiers opened by such new games may well be worth the effort of conceiving and playing them, however. They might keep the human intellect quick and alive for another century or so' (55).

And following the cues in such a passage might keep this account alive for another century or so! We must leave it, and with it any pretensions to be able to offer conclusions other than those tentatively reached during the exploration - with one exception. It is this: coming to know a literature is an exciting intellectual adventure. It can be recommended to the growing number of educationists whose work now involves them in the act of philosophising. Perhaps it should

be prescribed, for much that is being written (though not, of course, that which we have examined) displays an alarming ignorance that such a study would rectify - an ignorance of the short but richly varied history that these lively philosophical activities have behind them, a history that we have entered in just one simple way. Maybe this thought is a halfconscious echo of that Peters theme: one comes to know the 'language' only through the 'literature'! Certainly one at least gets to know the literature, and having 'heard great Argument About it and about' within that store, one feels (or hopes) that there is a separate exit for those who are the wiser for it.
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During the nineteen-sixties there has been an enormous increase in the number of articles (and a large increase in the number of books) which deal with the area surveyed in this thesis. Many of these are listed in the annual 'Reviews and Rejoinders' issue of the specialist American journal, *Studies in Philosophy and Education*, under 'Current Literature in Philosophy and Education Compiled' (e.g., 3rd annual review in Vol. IV, No. 1, Spring 1965). This journal is taken by the University of London Institute of Education Library (from the first issue, 1960); and taken, too, by the University of Durham Institute of Education Library from Summer 1966 (and available back numbers being sought by the Librarian, Mr F. Rutherford: this will give easy access to a vital source within the region in which this thesis was written).

Most of this literature is not, then, listed below, in order to limit the size of the bibliography. All the books and articles listed here have in some way entered into the preparation of this thesis. They have either been read or the contents known from other sources sufficiently well to justify their inclusion in a bibliography designed to be of use to others who may wish to sample the field in a different way from that revealed in this thesis (and in the 'List of Books and Articles Cited in the Text' – such a selection being determined by what is available in the North and by a
desire to scrutinize the antecedents of the current burst of activity, particularly as shown in the major contributions of the most important workers).

The bibliography is arranged chronologically, to fit the thesis; items within each year are listed alphabetically. No attempt is made to relate the literature to the various themes of the thesis; in consequence, it is heterogeneous and open to many different kinds of classification, e.g., the obvious distinction between writings about 'analytical' philosophy in education and writings showing analysis in action in an educational context. The works actually used in the body of the thesis show a similar heterogeneity and, though listed separately, are included in this bibliography, of which they represent a significant sample. As stated, the bibliography itself - particularly with reference to the fecundity of the sixties - is a sample, albeit as large as possible without making it a separate work in itself. An attempt has been made to cover important Australian as well as British and American contributions to this essentially English-speaking venture.

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