Durham E-Theses

The bearing of modern analytical philosophy on educational theory

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Abstract of M.Ed. Thesis

'The Bearing of Modern Analytical Philosophy
on Educational Theory'

A critical exploration of the literature from 1942 to
1965 reveals the nature of the 'bearing' in question. In
the pioneering work of C.D.Hardie, in the present sustained
contribution to educational thinking of many philosophers
and in the writings which steadily accumulated during the
years between, there is ample evidence that the main division
within pure analytical philosophy is reflected in the app-
lied field. The rival 'positivistic' and 'linguistic' app-
roaches are clearly discernible in each of the broad areas
of interest which have emerged during this short period.

In ethics, the early 'positivistic' position persists
in the form of arguments for ultimately irreducible moral
differences; but it is opposed by the majority view of the
most influential group of educational philosophers, a 'ling-
uistic' view best expressed by R.S.Peters. A similar oppos-
ition is seen in the related literature on the teaching of
morality.

Current examinations of the characteristics of educat-
ional discourse show these opposed emphases. The largely
'linguistic' elucidation of the role of definitions and
other language elements given by I.Scheffler is criticized
from a scientifically-orientated 'positivistic' standpoint
in very recent contributions, particularly in those of G.R.
Eastwood.

A central issue, that of the nature of educational theory,
is similarly debated by representatives from each of the

branches of analytical philosophy. The 'linguistic' P.H.
Hirst argues that educational theory is a complex 'field'
and not a distinct 'form' of knowledge as a counter to the
simpler 'means-ends' interpretation developed by such 'pos-
itivists' as D.J.O'Connor.

The resolution of this conflict in analytical philosophy
of education must await a settling of the basic issue in the
pure philosophy from which the new discipline is derived.
There are signs that a solution of the problem can be ex-
pected which will show that the two analytical approaches
are in fact complementary and not contradictory.

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THE BEARING OF MODERN ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY
ON EDUCATIONAL THEORY

A Critical Exploration Of The Literature:
1942 - 1965

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CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Theoretical Orientation: Preview Of Method And Content.

There is little doubt that the activities denoted by the terms 'modern analytical philosophy' and 'educational theory' are, these days, quite familiar to the majority of those whose work lies within the academic sphere. What is less certain is the extent to which it is known that there exists a connection between these two activities - the first enterprise bears impressively on the second - and that the fact and the manner of this connection is something which has been demonstrated and developed quite recently in the intellectual life of the English-speaking community.

The establishment of this relationship has been such a very recent event that controversies abound as to its precise nature and no one interpretation commands universal respect. At the present time, much is being written on the subject: more and more individual philosophers are coming to devote the whole of their professional energy to describing, analysing and clarifying the relationship and its consequences; and there is now in existence even a type of corporate investigation, involving the syst-

ematic and sustained co-operation of thinkers within a discipline traditionally associated with a dedication to egocentric performance and personal viewpoint. Nevertheless, doubt remains as to the more exact effects of that twentieth century revolution which enables us to talk intelligibly of 'modern analytical philosophy' on the serious thinking about education which is known, at least by those who are not disposed to exaggerate its traditional achievements, as 'educational theory'.

It would be possible to ignore this doubt; to accept, for example, what appears to be almost the 'official' interpretation of the relationship in question, as it is developed perspicuously in a recent article by Paul Hirst (1), and to examine this philosophically, enquiring into its internal consistency, tracing its elements to their origins in contemporary 'pure' philosophy and so displaying its limits as the limits of the sources demarcated by this process. But to do this initially would be unilluminating, for it would clarify a viewpoint implied in a proportion only of the ongoing work in this area - that being undertaken by certain British philosophers. This will be attempted later, once the fact of diversity within analytical philosophy, both in

(1) Hirst, P. H., 'Philosophy and Educational Theory', British Journal of Educational Studies, Vol. 12, pp. 51-64, November 1963.

its pure form and in its educational derivatives,
has been outlined and illustrated with reference to
writings other than those having influence in this
country at this time and with reference also to asp-
ects of the philosophy/education nexus barely pro-
claimed and not argued in any detail by Hirst (2).

Such a procedure would be unilluminating, too,
in the emphasis it would immediately place upon
purely philosophical matters, an emphasis consequent
on the nature of the argument presented in the Hirst
article. What is needed, to put things in proper
perspective, and afford weight to as many as poss-
ible of the aspects that have been revealed during
several decades of the bearing of one enterprise on
the other, is a mode of entry into the rapidly-
accumulating literature which will provide cues and
directions for sampling, comparison and cross-refer-
ence within the corpus available, so that the result-
ant discussion is both philosophically _and_ education-
ally pertinent. Such a mode of entry is at hand in
the availability of writings old enough to afford
some possibility of chronological, if not historical,
comparison with current ideas, compendious enough to
enable the selection of points of enquiry which will
lead to a fair sample of later commentaries, critic-
isms and developments and yet recent enough to carry

(2) Surnames are used in the body of the text
following the first reference to each writer.

philosophical weight within the relatively young
movement of analytical philosophy, the doctrines of
which are still very open to the kind of debate engen-
dered by the reinterpretation of earlier positions
as a counter to the latest commitments.

However, though 'old' expositions will be re-
called to provide starting points for enquiry, it is
philosophical positions which retain some life, and
not mere historical surveys of dead issues, which
will provide the theme and variations of this acc-
ount. To offer history and not philosophy would be
to repeat the error of traditional 'philosophy of
education' as taught to generations of students.
Against this passive transmission of inert ideas, un-
enlightened by the act of philosophising, all analyt-
ical educational thinkers , of no matter what more
detailed persuasion, have argued, distinguishing
their own intentions and activities as genuinely
philosophical and, in this sense, revolutionary.
Thus, any historical element discernible in the pres-
ent account will be no more than the chosen frame-
work within which the confrontation of philosophical
positions can be arranged: it will be history in a
sense coming to be appreciated within pure philosophy
in its many branches, for example the philosophy of
science; that is, critical history in which the crit-
icism is from one standpoint (often but not necess-
arily a later one) to another, a crisscrossing proc-

edure the management of which is itself a philos-
ophical activity.

It follows that there will gradually emerge, to
superimpose itself on the initial and recurrent
chronological structure, a second type of order,
that of the major themes and areas which the compar-
isons of position delineate as they are made from
philosophers writing at various points on the limit-
ed time scale of this enquiry. First will appear
ethics, in its fundamental bearing on educational
thinking and the practical consequences of this bear-
ing for moral education, of primary importance in
any account, no matter what mode of entry into the
literature is used: and so is it in this account
which chooses to start with the earliest of analyt-
ical investigations into educational theory. A second
theme to appear, originating also in early work but
of great importance in the most recent publications
as well as throughout the quarter of a century under
review, is the nature of the metaphorical expressions
which pervade attempts made to talk of education in
meaningful and illuminating terms to a wide and heter-
ogeneous audience interested in it as a social process.

From a study of metaphor, an aspect of language
of great attraction to the philosophical analyst, it
is a logically short step to the examination of both
wider and narrower aspects - those concerned, firstly,
with the roles of the many kinds of definition to be
found in serious writing, and the part played in more

popular educational discourse by slogans. These
themes, too, are approachable chronologically, in
that they can be discovered in rudimentary form
early in the stated period, but, in this account,
they occur at a point where the original mode of
entry, the element of history, has served its purp-
ose of providing some initial structure: and so the
themes and areas, the superimposing second type of
structure, take over and furnish centres of inter-
est within which the sampling of opposed viewpoints
operates with more weight attaching to the contemp-
orary controversies and less to the 'older' ones.

Against this background, which weaves a pattern
of relationships out of the views and positions of
the major philosophers who have contributed to the
twenty-five year long debate, the 'official' inter-
pretation of the nature of educational theory pron-
ounced by Hirst is examined, at a stage in the acc-
ount where it is possible to make more fruitful ref-
erence to other names and other interpretations than
would have been possible had the examination taken
place earlier. And from this central discussion
there emerges a fundamental point about the sources
which vitalise it, a point which has been implied
constantly in building up the background, but which
is made fully explicit as a preliminary to the final
stages of the thesis - that, broadly speaking, there
are two branches within the 'family' of analytical

philosophy - the formal and the informal. Between
those philosophers who value above all the precision
of the languages of science and mathematics and those
who prefer the flexibility of ordinary language there
exists a certain tension which can be seen reflected
from the pure philosophical scene into the education-
al areas where such philosophers are now at work.

The nature of philosophy, of language and, part-
icularly, of knowledge, is investigated from these
two apparently conflicting points of view (labelled,
for convenience and without implications which could
be read into the names from the history of recent
philosophy, 'positivistic' and 'linguistic'); with
special reference to one area of knowledge chosen
from the many available - that of social science,
taken to include history. This epistemological enqu-
iry, together with the related investigations into
the philosophy of mind, is seen to be of an import-
ance to educational theory almost equal to that of
the enquiry into ethics with which the post-intro-
ductory part of the present account begins, a fact
which emerges from detailed analyses of the concept
of 'knowing' given as an example of the rigour
introduced into educational theorisiing by anal-
ytical philosophers.

Finally, these instances of philosophy in act-
ion amongst restricted conceptual problems leads
into an attempt to forecast the resolution between

the two kinds of analysis which will possibly be found - first within pure philosophy and then, as a consequence, within the new philosophy of education. This resolution, it is suggested, will perhaps come about once it is more widely grasped that the 'positivistic' and 'linguistic' approaches are complementary and not contradictory, that they emphasise different aspects of the phenomenon of language in ways which can be without tension accommodated in a wider view, according proper weight to each of the sectors of language-study - the syntactics, semantics and pragmatics of C.W.Morris's semiotic, concerned with the embracing study of the uses, meanings and modes of combining signs. (3)

To the suggested starting point of our enquiry we can now move, having sketched the path which leads from it in sufficient detail to explain the recollection of the 'oldest' exposition in existence as a logical beginning. The first (and still intellectually stimulating) attempt at showing 'the bearing of modern analytical philosophy on educational theory' is the work of C.D.Hardie, dating from the early nineteen-forties and, consequently, of at least the historical interest that we have previously mention-

(3) Morris, C. W., <u>Signs, Language and Behavior</u> (Prentice-Hall, 1946)

ed in order to renounce as the sole object of this enquiry. (4) That the philosophical arguments developed in this book are still worthy of serious attention, even if only to direct investigation towards philosophers who have argued on similar topics but with more contemporary power and greater effect, is a contention which this thesis hopes to justify in some measure by sifting what have proved to be the fruitful themes from the barren.

C.D.Hardie: Barren Themes And The Nature Of Analysis.

In Hardie there can be immediately and clearly distinguished the two enterprises, analytical philosophy and educational theory, under present discussion. The author as much as says: Before us we have several examples of educational theory, chosen as typical of the genre and created by thinkers whose conception of the nature of philosophy bears little resemblance to the revolutionary conception of its nature developed in recent times by analytical philosophers. We shall reveal the deficiencies and limitations of these theories, employing for our task of criticism tools and techniques of analysis devised by philosophers become, of late and for the first time, fully conscious of the nat-

(4) Hardie, C. D., _Truth and Fallacy in Educational Theory_, (Cambridge University Press, 1942).

ure of their discipline. As a result of this crit-
ique, we shall make clear to ourselves what are the
defining characteristics of an educational theory,
what are the logical bones which any such theory
must reveal, under the new kind of philosophical
scrutiny, if it is to be professionally acceptable.

This implied intention and explicit procedure of
examination, to be found in Hardie, has the merit of
simplicity. His uncomplicated, straightforward app-
roach has made his views the object of occasional
commendation by a few amongst later philosophers
working in the area charted in this book (5). But
his simplicity, rooted in the view that theories are
specimens to be put under a simple philosophical
magnifying glass, may seem to border on the naive
when compared with later investigations. Certainly
this method of srutinising 'standard' theories is
one of the least fruitful elements in Hardie, if
lack of heirs is anything to judge by: it is not a
method which has proved to be even a minor occupat-
ion of those who have subsequently been concerned to
use analysis in educational thinking. No one has
produced, following his lead, a similar critique of
the traditional educational theorists left , from
Plato onwards, to add to his three; and, of these

(5) See Tubb, A., 'C.D.Hardie - Forgotten?',
Education for Teaching Vol. 70, pp. 32-5, May 1966

three - concerned with the 'nature' theorists, Herbart and Dewey - only the Dewey critique has remained a living issue, Hardie having defended at a later date his early refutation against attacks made by American philosophers wielding very sophisticated tools of analysis and eager to show Dewey's capacity for survival even in the age of analysis(6)(A professional eagerness which gives some warrant to the earlier remark that the very relationship between analytical philosophy and educational theory is open to many interpretations and subject to continuing controversies.)

However the pursuit of Dewey in relation to analysis would remove us too far from our main theme, being in itself a topic for voluminous commentary; and it is therefore not the cue in Hardie which we will take. What is , is the fact that analysis of 'standard' theories appears in this, the earliest of investigations, as the paradigm procedure; and that it consists in the juxtaposition of two elements: the

(6) Fen, S. N., 'A Critical View of the Educational Theory of John Dewey by C.D.Hardie', <u>Educational Theory</u> Vol. 14, pp. 294-9, October 1964.
        Hardie, C. D., 'Language, Pragmatism and Dewey', <u>Educational Theory</u> Vol. 14, pp. 305-7, October 1964
        Hood, B. L., 'Some Comments on C.D.Hardie's Refutation of Dewey', <u>Educational Theory</u> Vol. 14, pp. 300-4, October 1964.

theories, which we can for our purposes ignore, and
the philosophical analysis itself, about which we
can ask a number of questions designed to elicit its
nature, its sources, its effectiveness, its influence
on later writers in the field and its relationship
to aspects of the philosophising of such later writ-
ers which originate in pure philosophical investig-
ations not available to Hardie himself. The very
reference to areas in which questions can be asked
implies, in fact, the kind of answers which will
probably be found. Selected details of Hardie's
early analysis must point in the direction of later
analyses, enabling us to establish links and relat-
ionships and so to illustrate the 'bearing' we are
attempting to elucidate: the very concept of the
'bearing' of one enterprise upon the other is being
defined, in fact, in terms of whatever varied inst-
ances such a flexible scrutiny, passing from one
writer to another, does reveal.

Hardie sets out his first object-theory for ex-
amination in describing the influential view that a
child ought to be educated according to Nature; and
the manner in which he does this is instructive for
anyone wanting to identify his precise position with-
in analytical philosophy. It reveals in action the
techniques closely associated with 'the Cambridge
anlytical school' to whom he makes reference in his
Introduction, acknowledging them as his pure philos-

ophical mentors (7). Hardie's technique (and their's)
is easy to grasp: the substance of his analysis can
be précised with ease or set out in note form in
such a manner as to reveal its tidy, almost predict-
able shape. The end-product is a series of classif-
ied propositions carved out of the body of the
object-theory, commented upon, broken down into sub-
propositions and eventually disposed of to the phil-
osophical satisfaction of the author. The effect of
this exercise is a type of clarification by dissec-
tion of an almost surgical nature, the bones of the
original position being revealed for inspection.
The vagueness of the original proposition concerning
the education of children according to Nature is
replaced by the more manageable precision of four
propositions offered in its place, each one of which
can be examined in a piecemeal fashion in order to
establish its truth or falsity (Though not its truth
or _fallacy_ - the illogical dichotomy chosen, presum-
ably with conscious but nevertheless puzzling intent,
for the title of the book.)

The question for us is: What kind of analysis is
this? Can it be that this apparently mechanical pro-
cedure is the whole of the much-vaunted activity
which is widely acknowledged as having revolution-
ised the mother of disciplines? The answer, prev-
iously implied, is that there are indeed other forms of

(7) Hardie, C. D., op. cit., p. ix

analysis than this characteristic product of the times which Hardie practised. While a fully explicit description of them, particularly as they group themselves into the 'positivistic' and 'linguistic' approaches previously mentioned, must be postponed until sufficient movement around the <u>educational</u> literature has provided a background against which the description will be meaningful, a preliminary sketch of the two broad views of the nature of analysis is essential to ensure that this movement has direction. And so, in this we find the first fruitful element of Hardie for our purposes: the cue which takes us from his limited kind of analysis to an adumbration of analysis in its various aspects, as seen from our vantage point in the middle of the nineteen-sixties.

He derives his techniques from the accepted practice of philosophers working without the benefit of a thorough acquaintance with the later, second-phase philosophical investigations of Ludwig Wittgenstein (8) - this is the simplest way of putting it. The Wittgensteinian slogan, 'the meaning is the use', and its far-reaching implications for analysis are not part of the background from which this writing draws strength; and, consequently, .the 'meaning' of what the Nature theorists assert

(8) Wittgenstein, Ludwig, <u>Philosophical Invest-igations</u> (Oxford, 1953).

has to be made clear by Hardie, to himself as much
as to his readers, not by analysing its use in the
social context of its typical utterance, but by a
form of translation, of substitution for the original
of supposedly clearer, expanded expressions. He
gives meaning to what he regards as a hopelessly
vague proposition by providing a series of new prop-
ositions which are supposed to be, collectively, the
logical equivalent of the old without its incompre-
hensibility.

If we think of the two broad views concerning the
nature of analysis as lying on different sides of a
dividing line created by Wittgenstein's mature rej-
ection of his own youthful theory (9) and cognate
systems, then this Hardiean technique falls clearly
within the first view. His introductory acknowledge-
ment to G.E.Moore is superfluous in view of the evi-
dence presented by his actual manner of philosophis-
ing, which is Mooreian in temper and detail through
and through. During the course of a long life's
work Moore displays several views about what anal-
ysis is, that is, about knowing the meaning of an
expression in the technical sense; and Hardie draws
upon the most consistently used of these views for
his own work - that which asserts that analysis is
concerned with being able to state what the constit-

(9) Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Tractatus Logico-Phil-
osophicus (London, 1922).

uent concepts are into which a concept under scrut-
iny can be divided and which compose it (or the con-
stituent propositions, when the expression being anal-
ysed is a complete sentence). Such a view is also
predominant in the early work of Wittgenstein and
is based on the concept theory of meaning, that is
of meaning as a peculiar sort of entity which the
mind can view and understand, which he came to rej-
ect in his later work, of which Hardie clearly has
little knowledge.

Hardie reveals his indebtedness to this 'div-
ision' view of analysis when he asserts that 'it
is necessary always to state each theory in the
clearest possible way so that no ambiguity may be
allowed to flourish undiscovered' (10), implying
that analysis is concerned with putting an unruly
house in order rather than more tolerantly invest-
igating the possible legitimate reasons for the un-
ruliness. He identifies vagueness and substitutes,
at greater length, precision: he translates and ex-
pands, proffering terms and propositions the refer-
ents for which are less open to doubt and dispute;
and in this way he banishes the lurking ambiguities
which bar theoretical progress in education. Such,
at any rate, is his intention. What remains for us
to develop, in order to complete this preliminary

(10) Hardie, C. D., op. cit., p. ix.

sketch, is the contrary view of the nature of anal-
ysis, which is characteristic of the philosophising
done on the other side of the dividing line ident-
ified above and which, though strongly associated
with the Wittgenstein of the 'Philosophical Invest-
igations', can be described at this stage with ref-
erence to Moore, in that his writings show some signs
of its presence. ('It is, I think, possible and of
some interest...to characterise Wittgenstein's...
later "Philosophical Investigations" as Mooreian'
(11)).

The 'distinction' view of analysis is concerned
with being able to say how a concept or proposition
under scrutiny is related to and distinguished from
other concepts or propositions which are embedded in
the same or different expressions. We shall find
this view implied in much of the philosophising about
education to be considered; and it is a view which,
in contrast to the approach of Hardie, lays great
emphasis upon the patient disentanglement of mean-
ings by taking seriously what is actually stated in
the context of its statement instead of an eager dis-
missal of apparently ambiguous expressions in favour
of the establishment of a more easily acceptable
translation, which is Hardie's method. 'The mean-

(11) White, A. R., 'G.E.Moore', in A Critical
History of Western Philosophy, O'Connor, D. J. (Ed.),
(London, 1964), p. 464.

ing is the use' sums up, in slogan form, this lat-
er approach, with its dedication to a naturalistic
observation and description of the forms language
takes in actual use, with its emphasis on looking to
see what is actually there rather than mining beneath
the surface of language to find some deep logical
bedrock.

In the light of this conception of analysis,
Hardie's procedure of taking literally a vague exp-
ression such as 'a child ought to be educated accord-
ing to Nature', seeing in it no literal sense and
then translating it into a number of supposedly
constituent expressions the truth-claims of which can
be judged, appears misconceived. It is an unsympath-
etic and illiberal stance to adopt towards language
- so the proponents of the contrary view of analysis
would contend. It overlooks the necessity of asking
what meaning a proposition has for the person stating
it; what intention such a person has in using it;
what linguistic and social context it appears in as
a legitimate attempt at communication. This kind
of delicate probing, a careful separation of express-
ions designed to distinguish the various uses within
a context which contains manifold human intentions
and language conventions is very different from -
though not necessarily superior to or a contradict-
ion of - the blunt, simple analytical enquiry fav-
oured by Hardie in outlining his programme: '...if

two educational theorists disagree I think it
should be made clear whether the disagreement is
factual or verbal or due to some emotional conflict.'
(12)

 We can enter into this programme, having sketched
in the main lines of both views of analysis, the more
and the less formal, using it as a gateway into the
branch of philosophy which has, perhaps, the great-
est relevance of any for education; and which, in
its contemporary developments, reveals clearly the
workings of both types of philosophical analysis -
the branch called moral philosophy or ethics. Hardie
begins by rejecting the proposition that a child
ought to be educated according to Nature on grounds
that we would, by now, expect: characteristically he
states that it 'is so vague that it is not important
to decide what it implies' (13), and confidently sub-
stitutes four propositions of his own which are less
perplexing and easier to break down and handle in the
'division' manner. From our point of view, it is the
casual bypassing of an 'ought' here that is signif-
icant, that relates to his previous reference to
'emotional conflict' being behind certain disagree-
ments in educational theory and gives the first point-
er to his ethical position, which we can now follow
through, identify and compare with other positions
taken by philosophers working in the field of education.

(12) Hardie, C. D., op. cit., p.ix.
(13) Ibid., p.1.

CHAPTER II

MORAL PHILOSOPHY AND EDUCATION

Hardie - The Hesitant Emotivist.

That Hardie looks at the problems of moral phil-
osophy from the standpoint of an emotivist seems, so
far, clear enough. But this fact tells us very
little if we are not to know what sort of an emotivist
he is; for this position has taken a variety of forms
in recent philosophy, some of which appear so gross-
ly simple and philosophically untenable that to link
Hardie with them would be to dismiss him as an object
of worthwhile enquiry, while others are subtle and
qualified enough to have remained alive and close to
the centre of ethical discussion: and so, for us to
uncover any relationship of Hardie with such a more
sophisticated approach would be to establish his rel-
evance to the ongoing debate.

There is certainly little in the way of evidence
at the required level of detail in the early parts of
his book. The first chapter, for example, shows a
conspicuous reticence in developing the kind of anal-
ysis of the ubiquitous 'ought' which a reader with
ethical interests might expect to find in an author
dedicated to the job of clarification. Each one of
the substituted propositions contains, as does the
discarded original proposition, a value judgment

expressed either in an 'ought' or a 'should' or con-
cealed in some other form of words: yet there is, as
yet, no recognition of the need to give an analysis
of its meaning.

It may be that Hardie's interests are directed
temporarily elsewhere, as the result of a decision
made by him about priorities in discussion: in which
case it is the order of priority which is possibly
questionable, if we accept the heavy emphasis laid
upon the relevance of ethics to educational theory
by most later writers. For instance, Hardie, in
discussing his first substituted proposition, 'A
child's education ought to be such that it is free
to develop according to the laws of its own nat-
ure'(1), ignores the all-important 'ought'and em-
barks on a brief investigation within another, and
almost certainly less important, sector of analyt-
ical activity, a sector with which we shall be con-
cerned, in this account, later, in accord with the
emphasis it receives in the literature under scrut-
iny. Similarly, the equally important 'should'
contained in his own fourth alternative proposition,
'The education of the child should be a process
which is similar to that through which mankind has
passed in the course of evolution'(2), is left un-

(1) Hardie, C. D., op. cit., p. 2.
(2) Ibid., p. 19

analysed, as is, too, the clearly implied value-judgment contained in his second substitute-proposition: 'Sense-impression of Nature is the only true foundation of human instruction, because it is the only true foundation of human knowledge'(3). They are ignored in favour of an immediate epistemological enquiry of the kind which, in the present account, does not take precedence over ethical enquiry - again, in accord with the trend and the emphasis discernible in the literature.

It is only with reference to his third substituted proposition, 'A child is to be morally educated by exposing it to the natural consequences of its own acts'(4), that Hardie begins to show any sign of a grasp of the importance to educational theory of an ethical viewpoint, and to present arguments in sufficient detail to allow the building up of the background necessary for an identification of his particular position within the broad emotivist area. He contends, with the utilitarian Spencer, that 'All theories of morality agree that conduct whose total results, immediate and remote, produce pleasure is good conduct', giving this as the type of justification which could back the prescription contained in his own third proposition. He then refutes the contention at some length(5), giving us for the very

(3) Ibid., p. 5
(4) Ibid., p. 13
(5) Ibid., pp. 14-9

first time an extended piece of the analysis we are seeking, and revealing, in the process, the roots in pure philosophy from which his emerging ethical position has grown.

The roots lie in familiar ground. The most significant move in his argument derives from a well-known technique of Moore (6), used by him to counter such statements as 'Pleasant results are what we mean by good conduct', which is one of the interpretations that can be given to Spencer's assertion. As Hardie says, in naming the technique he employs, such statements 'can, I think, be proved false by the familiar type of argument known as the open question' (7). What the 'open question' is must be explained in more detail, for its use played an important part in causing an impasse in the so-called 'descriptivist' ethics which predominated in English-speaking philosophy until very recent times, and so in creating the intellectual conditions in which some such position as that of the emotivists had to emerge.

To any person asserting that 'pleasant' (or any other natural property) is what is <u>meant</u> by 'good', it is sensible to put the perfectly straightforward question 'Is pleasure good?', and hence by the imp-

(6) Moore, G. E., <u>Principia Ethica</u> (Cambridge, 1903), Ch. 1
(7) Hardie, C. D., op. cit., p. 17

lication of the accepted definition the strange
question, 'Is pleasure pleasant?', which is clearly
not what such a person intends to ask. So argues
Moore, maintaining that the fallacy arises because
things which possess what he insists is the simple,
unique, indivisible quality of goodness, also have
other qualities - qualities which exist in the time
and space of nature: natural properties - which are
mistakenly taken as defining 'good' because they are
always found with it. But good, according to Moore,
is not a natural property. Though certainly it is
a property, and therefore is what the term 'good'
names, it is a non-natural, unanalyzable property,
not located in time and space, which we can have
before our minds (in whatever dimension that entity
can be said to exist!) for direct inspection, and
against which we can measure the value-claims of
ordinary natural properties by asking such a simple
but meaningful question as that given above: 'Is
pleasure good?'

The necessity of creating a non-natural world in
which to locate goodness and to which we can have
only some form of intuitive access is a necessity
following only from the premiss that value-terms
have purely 'descriptive' meaning, a premiss which
the emotivists, dissatisfied with the mystifying

(8) See Ayer, A. J., Language, Truth and Logic
(London, 1936). ***
     *** See p. 25, infra.

talk of non-natural qualities, challenged in a variety of ways, ranging from the crude assertions of the original Logical Positivists(8) to the more careful pronouncements of later writers who were genuinely interested in finding new approaches within ethics. It is Hardie's position amongst this class of moral philosophers that we are attempting to establish. So far, in looking at his first chapter, we can not find sufficient development of a positive viewpoint for a sure identification to be made, so we must turn to the following chapter, that on Herbart, in the hope of finding the kind of systematic exposition which the sketchy comments so far made by Hardie imply.

Unfortunately, our previous judgment that Hardie is postponing his full statement on ethics because of a decision about priorities in unfolding his theme is confirmed in the second chapter. There are indeed hints and clues which can be interpreted in such a way as to warrant the placing of him amongst the emotivists; but these elements are merely incidental to his main argument, which, being non-ethical, is not of present interest. And these pointers are also open to other interpretations which, if given, blur the simple, clear picture of Hardie the moral philosopher which would otherwise begin to emerge.

(8) See p. 24, supra.

On the one hand, for example, he comments on Herbart's opinion that it is meaningless to talk about justifying moral judgments - an opinion based on the belief that we have knowledge by intuition or insight of the rightness or wrongness of our acts of will - in terms which strongly recall his Introductory remark that value questions are closely linked with emotional conflicts and are to be elucidated by attention to emotive meaning in language. His comment is: 'The great difficulty about such a theory is to explain why people disagree so violently on ethical questions'(9); and this manner of speaking does not surprise us.

But, on the other hand, Hardie concludes a substantial section of argument for the compatibility of a belief in determinism with a faith in what the process of education can achieve(10) in such a manner as to throw doubt on his being the emotivist he has hitherto seemed, for he uses terms such as 'should', 'proper' and 'important' with an assurance which would be puzzling coming from a philosopher who claims that value-terms express mere personal preferences. He says: 'It seems to me to be important that educationists should hold a determinist theory of some kind, not only because of its

(9) Ibid., p. 32.
(10) Ibid., pp. 42-7

truth, but also because of the tendency at the present time which leads some educationists to urge that teachers should be much less active than Herbart advocated.' (11). That Hardie favours teacher-activity and teacher-intervention is clear, as indeed is the end to which this teacher-involvement is a means and by which it is justified by him in commenting on two of the technical terms used by Herbart: '... we have seen that we cannot separate the self from the desiring self, and it is therefore of the utmost importance that the teacher should secure the proper desires in each child' (12). In view of this statement, what is not now at all clear is whether he is an emotivist in ethics at all; and, if he is, what odd sort of a more detailed position is it which allows him to talk without contradiction, or at least without sounding logically odd in a more informal sense, of the 'proper desires' that the 'desiring self' must be taught to have.

Whether Hardie's delaying of a firm ethical pronouncement is merely the impression given to a reader who is too sure of the primary importance of ethics for education because he is prejudiced by knowledge of later developments or whether it is a fact, symptomatic of Hardie's whole approach to the

(11) Ibid., p. 46
(12) Ibid., p. 47

bearing of analytical philosophy on educational
theory may be judged best by having an example
before us of such later developments: with this we
can then compare the indefinite Hardie view which
we have so far encountered, as well as the more def-
inite position of his which we shall find and scrut-
inise later. We turn, then, to as good an example
as any in the work of R.S.Peters, moving thus from
one end to the other of the period in question,
and to a philosopher who does not hesitate to state
his ethical views and his own strong belief in the
great relevance of ethics for educational theory.
We can attempt to answer the question, 'What is
Peters' position in moral philosophy?', before com-
ing back to Hardie and asking a similar question
with reference to later parts of his work.

Peters And The Autonomy Of Ethics.

Peters' most substantial work in this area is
so very recent - May, 1966 (13) - that its assimil-
ation into the present thesis is not possible; though,
as will be seen, some of its main arguments were to
be expected, having been anticipated in the various
parts of his significant though hitherto scattered
contribution to the discussion which we are in the
process of investigating. In one such part, an earl-

(13) Peters, R. S., Ethics and Education (Lond-
on, 1966).

ier offering, we can find what we need at this
point - a brief indication of an ethical viewpoint
to contrast with that of Hardie: and in other parts
we shall find, later, other valuable material for
our theme. The unity given so very recently to
Peters' views is, in fact, less of an example of
the bearing of analytical philosophy on education-
al theory as we are displaying it than it is of the
success of that bearing in one of its interpretat-
ions - that which we have elsewhere and with refer-
ence to another English philosopher labelled the
'official' view ('...with deliberate abusiveness..
.' ?).

In the earlier offering - broadcast talks to a
Third Programme lay audience - Peters examines the
effect on public thinking about a central moral con-
cept, 'responsibility', of the widespread misunder-
standing of the theories of Marx and Freud. (14).
In doing so, he clearly shows his ethical hand, for
he is concerned to alleviate what he considers to be
the morally bad consequences of the public swallowing
half-truths, and he can only do this by going firmly,
if briefly, into ethical theory. He refers to '...
a denial of responsibility coupled with a story
about the causes of actions and standards' (15),

(14) Peters, R. S., <u>Authority, Responsibility</u>
<u>and Education</u> (London, 1959), Chs. 4, 5 and 6.
  (15) Ibid., p. 57.

using a philosophical technique which is of partic-
ular interest because of its contrast with that of
Hardie. It illustrates what an acceptance of Witt-
genstein's later views - those to be found on the
near side of the dividing line mentioned earlier
(p. 15) - and an adoption of his practice has done
for philosophical analysis. Phrases of a certain
kind abound: '...there are occasions when it would
be reasonable to say', '...these, we might say, are
unusual cases', 'the fact that we single out such
odd cases...suggests that we believe that in gener-
al', and so on (16).

This appeal to what we ordinarily say, to the
usual and the non-odd expressions of reasonable men,
in order to disentangle meanings, is characteristic
of modern analytical philosophers. It is a gentle,
probing, non-doctrinaire technique which gives a
clear impression of being an art in itself. To note
that this kind of clarification is, like Hardie's,
'analysis', is to be struck by the vagueness of that
term, for the fluidity of Peters and the almost math-
ematical rigidity of Hardie stand in great contrast
as methods of enquiry.

What theoretical point Peters is attempting to
communicate, using this technique, is that <u>causes</u> of
actions and <u>reasons</u> for actions are logically dist-

(16) Ibid., pp. 57-8

inct: the description of them involves two separate
ways of talking which should not be, but often are,
confused. Consequently, we suffer from needless
anxieties generated by a failure to take this into
account when pondering the 'revelatians' of Freud
and Marx, both of whom _seem_ to have stripped men
of responsibility for their own actions. On the
contrary, Peters says, '...a revelation of the
causes of our actions should increase rather than
decrease our responsibility fot them' (17), for
'causal' explanations of human behaviour are bound
to show themselves as incomplete - why, otherwise,
should men have developed and constantly used a
whole language to do with motives, dispositions and
reasons for actions? The answer is quite clear.

He stresses that he is talking about the _meaning_
of 'responsibility' - this is the philosopher's job
in these days of language-awareness - and that the
meaning can only be grasped by inspecting our ordin-
ary use of the term, the standard cases and the odd
cases, in such a way as to eventually arrive at the
sense of what we are constantly and unhesitatingly
saying. The view of language implied in all that
Peters is doing becomes quite explicit at one point(18)
when he states: 'Our language has developed in no
haphazard way; and it enshrines the commonsense con-

(17) Ibid., p. 59.
(18) Ibid., p. 60.

viction that in general men can help doing what they do.'

From the analysis carried out on the basis óf this assumption about language there emerges a fundamental point about causality and morality: causes in general must be distinguished from those causes having effects which are apparently unavoidable in a limited range of circumstances. It is to the latter that we must look, '...not just in anger but with a dis criminating empirical eye' (19); that is, we can, on the basis of sound, detailed empirical knowledge of the relationship between events, make decisions of our own, about which all talk of a general nature concerning causes and all vague references to 'determinism' in human affairs is completely irrelevant, belonging as it does to a different language not intended to cope with the realities of human choice and will.

We can, at this point, recall that Hardie reaches not dissimilar conclusions when he discusses determinism and argues for the activity of the teacher in implanting the 'proper deszires' in the child ; and he does so, as we saw, without the benefit of the kind of analysis available to and demonstrated by Peters. The interesting fact is that he argues in

(19) Ibid., p. 68.

this way while apparently holding an ethical position far removed from that of Peters, a fact which throws doubt on the consistency of his approach. He writes, for example, in Peters-like terms in this passage: '... there may be a law to the effect that a human mind under certain conditions will make a certain choice, but if the conditions are altered then that particular law will not have a chance to operate. Now it is precisely this that education has to achieve, that is, education has to alter the conditions to such an extent that when each individual is confronted with a choice then he will choose that alternative which is considered best.' (20).

On the evidence of this and similar assertions, we would expect to find Hardie somewhere declaring an early version of an ethical position similar to that of Peters, one which stresses the autonomy of ethics and the production of reasons for actions within a logically distinct moral discourse. However, such a view does not appear in the early parts of his work, as we have seen, and most of the evidence points to the eventual disclosure of a position which wil be, to say the least, completely dissonant with any of this obfuscating talk of education ensuring the choice of 'that which is considered best'.

(20) Hardie, C. D., op. cit., p. 43.

However, before retuning to Hardie, there is
more yet in Peters concerning the all-important
distinction between reasons and causes. To find
this Ryleian distinction developed in philosophy
addressed to parents and educators is in itself a
sign that progress has been made in the 'bearing'
under review - progress which is not unconnected
with the movement of 'analysis' from the technical
to the more ordinary aspects of language.

Peters insists that it is pointless to specul-
ate about whatever causes there may be for beliefs
which already have good, acceptable grounds to sup-
port them. He puts forward this central point of
his with force and humour: 'If there are, in gener-
al, good reasons for keeping promises - as there
obviously are - and someone suggests that our duty
to keep them was drummed into us at a public school,
or at our mother's knee, the appropriate answer is:
"So what?", or: "How thoughtful of them."' (21).
This kind of emphasis on there being genuine good
reasons for moral action must be encountered, it is
now clear, in any philosopher who is prepared to
write in a certain way about ethical matters - if he
is to be consistent. Hardie, for instance, is prep-
ared to state this belief in the 'utmost importance'
of the teacher in ensuring the 'proper desires' in

(21) Peters, R. S., op. cit., p. 72.

the child; but he does not back this belief, so
far, in the manner we would expect.

This way of speaking implies that there are cer-
tain things of value which education ought to ensure
are passed on to the next generation. It implies,
too, that the value placed upon these things can
be justified in some way; that is, that 'justific-
ation' makes sense in this area. What we see in
Peters even at first glimpse, and what we shall note
further when we look at other parts of his contrib-
ution, is ample evidence of the acceptance of a mor-
al philosophy in which it makes clear sense to talk
of 'justification' and 'reasons' for moral choice.
On the other hand, there is as yet no comparable
evidence in Hardie, though there should be if the
'moral' tone of his argument about the role of the
teacher is not to be dismissed as an **inconsistency**
within an emotivist approach. We must return now
to examine the later parts of his work against the
background provided by this first **brief** glimpse of
a **later** philosopher.

The Tolerance Of The 'Persuasive' Theory.

In Hardie's next chapter, on Dewey, there are
some intriguing little asides but nothing substant-
ial or more satisfying than that which has gone be-
fore. He remarks, for example, that '...an interest
in Greek literature or in differential equations or
in medieval history is often acquired, and it is

surely the case that an interest in such a subject
for its own sake is extremely valuable.' (22). This
makes us eager to encounter the moral philosophy
which can satisfactorily accommodate the free use of
terms such as 'extremely valuable', particularly
when Hardie makes a point, in the same context, of
appreciating the classical blunder of John Stuart
Mill's use of the related term 'desirable'. Mill's
failure to distinguish, to the satisfaction of his
critics, between 'that which is desired' and 'that
which ought to be desired', is hardly the sort of
weakness which Hardie has the right to indicate, on
the strength of the unclear position he has so far
developed.

However, in the substantial fourth chapter, 'The
Basis Of Any Educational Theory', we come at last to
what we have been patiently seeking - an unblurred
declaration of what, in Hardie's opinion, ethics is
about. In a position of importance at the end of the
long, varied argument of this chapter, for which the
other chapters with their disappointing scarcity of
the material we need for our theme have served as a
critical prologue, we find the plain recognition of
the primary importance of ethics which we have been
demanding of Hardie: 'This leads us to the consider-
ation of what is perhaps the most important of the

(22) Hardie, C. D., op. cit., p. 59.

conceptions in the definition of education – the idea of value, because on that depends what changes we decide should be produced in the child.' (23).

The core of Hardie's exposition of moral philosophy in relation to education follows an unconvincing excursion into arguments for and against a 'religious theory of education', which raise hopes but, in sum, turn out to be one of what we have called Hardie's 'barren' elements; and this core is, as we shall see, the most 'fruitful' part of the whole work, in the sense of presenting ideas which can be related without strain to the work of Peters and other later writers in the field.

He identifies the problems: 'The educationist has, I think, two problems in this region to solve. The first is, what is meant by such a term as "good" or "valuable". The second is, how do we come to know and hence how can we teach the meaning of such a term? For the valuable changes in behaviour which education has to secure must include the description of it as such. Education would clearly have partly failed if individuals behaved perfectly but did not know it. The solution of the second problem will, however, probably depend on the solution of the first.' (24).

(23) Ibid., p. 113.
(24) Ibid., p. 118.

The first of his problems is of immediate concern: the second - that of moral education - will be examined in a separate chapter, being in itself a very large question. Hardie is at last asking about the <u>meaning</u> of moral terms: his problem is that of accounting for moral language by stating a satisfactory ethical theory . It is hardly possible to read him at this point without being reminded of Peters and the central interests of other philosophers now working in this region. The identification of the problems and even the manner of the suggestion of the link between them is what warrants the judgment that he is still of some contemporary significance.

He clears the ground efficiently for a demonstration of his own leanings: the sense of good-in-itself or intrinsic good is quickly differentiated from other senses as that which requires elucidation ; and he then relates the question of its meaning to some of his previous remarks on definition (to which we shall return in another context), before distinguishing 'non-naturalistic' from 'naturalistic' approaches in ethics, claiming that all such latter theories can be refuted by the 'open question' argument of Moore, already described. And finally, left with a non-naturalistic position, he declares his hand by denying any assumption that moral terms are intended to convey information.

He says: 'We have assumed so far that in such a
proposition as "knowledge of Greek literature is
good" the intention is to convey information; that
is, we have assumed that "good" is the name of a cer-
tain characteristic which we predicate of a number
of things or mental states or what not, and we have
been attempting to get clearer about the nature of
this characteristic. Now I propose to deny this ass-
umption. Our intention is rather to arouse a certain
attitude in our audience...when we make value judge-
ments we are using language emotively rather than
scientifically.' (25). In the face of this, we
must immediately wonder whether Hardie recognised
that he was himself merely using language 'emotive-
ly' at the moment of writing the passage which con-
demns 'educationists' for leading teachers astray
down the path of passivity! (See p. 27, supra.)

He does, however, go further than a simple acc-
eptance of an unqualified emotivism by distinguish-
ing, within an 'emotive' use of language, two com-
ponents: an 'expressive' function and a 'persuas-
ive' function. The former, unsurprisingly, refers
to the fact that language of this sort expresses
a person's feelings about a certain state of affairs
and is so not open to contradiction. The latter is
a dimension necessary, Hardie maintains, to account
for the often violent disagreement about value judg-

(25) Ibid., p. 123.

ments which is encountered in everyday life and
which would be entirely pointless and misplaced if
the purely 'expressive' interpretation were true:
feelings are not the sort of thing that can be reas-
onably disputed, and yet it is generally _felt_ that
moral disagreement is a reasonable enough phenom-
enon. The only kind of solution to this paradoxical
situation is that found in the 'persuasive' theory.
So Hardie contends. The pity is that he does not
appear to realise that this solves nothing - it only
leaves things even more 'open' than before, as his
own words, written with specific reference to 'val-
ue' disagreement as it shows itself in educational
theory, indicate in startling fashion.

He says: 'The disagreement /among education theo-
rists_7has not been in _what_ has been said, but in the
feelings which each educationist has had for the diff
erent activities of life, and each has attempted to
persuade others to feel the same way as he does.
If we realize this we can be tolerant of all their
theories, for no one is right and no one is wrong.
It is true that some may be said to be "better" than
others in the sense in which one poem may be better
than another, but when we realize that much of the
sting has gone out of educational controversy.' (26).
The tolerance of the 'persuasive' theory is apparent-
ly limitless!

(26) Ibid., p. 127

If no one is right and no one is wrong as Hardie
asserts, there seems no point in writing a book
such as his own in which teachers are urged to
take on a certain role on the grounds that this
will be 'better' for the children, for if 'better'
means 'what I prefer and wish to persuade you to
prefer too', the seriousness of whatever 'argum-
ents' are produced to make the persuasion effect-
ive is bound to be suspect - so it must appear to
anyone who has had access to the kind of writing
such as Peters produces, in which the possibility
of there being genuine <u>reasons</u> for moral choices
is emphasised.

It may be that Hardie uses the analogy of moral
with poetic judgments in order so to persuade, for
most of us accept unthinkingly that 'poetry' is
'good' and that there are many styles to be found
within this class of 'good' things. But this is
merely to push the problem back on to aesthetic
theory, within which the distinction between 'good'
poetry and cheap verse is just as philosophically
difficult to make as is the distinction between
'different activities of life' embodied in rival
educational theories, particularly when it is noted
that one such activity could be, for example, the
total, blind acceptance of a totalitarian state
such as was found in Nazi Germany. Presumably the

educational theories of that time and that place
would be tolerated as just another 'poem' which
most of us do not happen to prefer.

This unsatisfactory position is the implication
of Hardie's version of an emotivist theory: it app-
ears to make nonsense of the critical assertions he
has himself made about other theorists in the early
part of his work. Herbart, Dewey and the 'Nature'
theorists were only, after all, expressing their
own feelings for a particular way of life; and there
is little point in attacking them for that. It is
small wonder that even admirers of Hardie see in
his incautious expression of a difficult ethical
theory an unacceptable element of his otherwise
carefully stated views. G.H.Bantock, one of the
few educationists to have sympathetically remember-
ed Hardie's· early work during the quarter of a cen-
tury of its existence comments in words which re-
call the emphases in Peters which contrast sqstrong-
ly with those we have just seen in Hardie:

'One can merely urge that educational value
judgments are matters for rational argument and
that choices ought to be justified by good reasons;
weare not, that is to say, abandoned to the posit-
ion that preferences are questions simply of person-
al taste or express merely the emotions and per-
suasions or exhortations of the writer, as Profess-
or C.D.Hardie seems to have thought in his other-

wise important "Truth and Fallacy in Educational
Theory"' (27)

It may be that , in identifying a weakness here
in Hardie, we are in danger of underestimating the
type of theory which he propounds. His position
of 1942 is in fact derived almost wholly from the
original work of the most adventurous moral phil-
osopher of his day, the American C.L.Stevenson (28).
A brief look at his work is necessary in order to
ensure that there are no aspects of it which Hardie
has overlooked and which would make a 'persuasive'
theory more acceptable. This will be followed by
a comparison of views on ethics currently held by
a variety of modern analytical 'pure' philosophers,
particularly those which can be related to the work
within education of interested philosophers such as
Peters, in order to underline the inadvisability,
mentioned earlier, of accepting any single interpre-
tation of the bearing of analytical philosophy on
educational theory merely because it happens to be
the latest to appear and to have widespread support
of the moment within the field of education. This
will carry further our procedure of defining the
'bearing' under examination in terms of what can be
discovered by journeying around the relevant lit-

(27) Bantock, G. H., Education and Values (Lon-
don, 1965).
(28) Stevenson, C. L., Ethics and Language (Ox-
ford, 1944).

erature and contrasting examples from what is an
ongoing and essentially unfinished activity.

Rationality In 'Pure' Ethics: Stevenson
And After.

Stevenson presents a version of the emotivist
theory which is far more subtle than the account giv-
en of it by Hardie: developed in massive detail, it
is very 'persuasive' indeed and is hardly recogniz-
able as a linguistically sophisticated version of
the crude iconoclastic emotivism associated with
the Logical Positivists. He attempts to clarify
the meaning of ethical terms, as we have seen Hardie
making plain enough; but he also attempts to show
the methods by which value judgments are justified
 - not an aspect of his work which Hardie brings
out in his own peculiar manner of expression.

Stevenson distinguishes disagreements in beliefs
from disagreements in attitudes, stressing, at the
same time, their complicated entanglement with each
other in actual practice. When we believe something
to be the case it quite clearly influences our attit-
udes towards that state of affairs: attitudes are
dependent upon knowledge and this knowledge can be
false 'knowledge' which can be replaced by a true
account of how things are. Furthermore, our bel-
iefs can be shaped by our attitudes - by what we
feel towards an object. So that, in this complex

situation, moral controversy inevitably involves disagreement in belief and attitude, with the possibility of resolution only by altering both.

Consequently, in ethics, both the notions of descriptive meaning and emotive meaning of the terms we use are important: the cruder emotivists unduly emphasised the importance of emotive terms. Moreover, the emotive meaning of our value terms have the persuasive component which we have noted Hardie describing. This is closely related to an imperative, so that we express our own attitudes on the basis of our beliefs and try to redirect the attitudes of others who are morally disagreeing with us when we call something, for example, 'good'.

These quasi-commands are justified by offering 'reasons' for obeying them in the form of descriptions of states of affairs - statements of our beliefs - which can be accepted by others and will thus form their new beliefs and will engender their new attitudes. The assumption is that agreement in belief causes agreement in attitude, since most of us get satisfaction from the same kind of thing, we being built of psychologically similar material. To those who will not grant this assumption's validity all along the logical line Stevenson has nothing further to offer: if the 'reasons' do not appeal, and if the beliefs of both sides in dispute are the same,

nothing can be done by the use of reason to resolve any continuing disagreement.

This fundamental point has been put plainly by R.F.Atkinson, one of the interested 'pure' philosophers who contribute to the most recent of the very few volumes of readings in philosophical analysis and education. He says: 'Stevenson...follows Hume on the main point. He too, despite some few appearances to the contrary, maintains that there can be logically irreducible differences on moral matters. He is prepared to allow that moral judgments may be held to be 'true', but it turns out that he regards this as merely an idiomatic, perhaps debased usage in which the word functions simply as a mark of assent.' (29). So, the sophistication of the 'persuasive' theory does not conceal the 'emotivist' logic of its central contentions.

Stevenson, then, and Hardie as an educationist disciple, allows little real scope for rationality in moral disagreement: he remains fundamentally an emotivist, in spite of some ingenious and original attempts to find a place for 'reasons' with his talk of altering attitudes by working on beliefs. The history of ethics, from the time of his early work of the late nineteen thirties to the present day, reveals an intense effort made by many philosophers

(29) Atkinson, R. F., 'Instruction and Indoctrination', in Archambault, R. D. (Ed.), Philosophical Analysis and Education (London, 1965), p. 177.

to differentiate moral discourse from all other
types; to distinguish its own unique canons of rat-
ionality. An emphasis upon the meaning-fulness of
moral language and the worthwhileness of moral dis-
cussion has progressively replaced the extreme 'sub-
jectivism' which followed the abandonment of the
search for a viable 'non-natural' rationale. This
emphasis, as typically found in current 'pure' phil-
osophy, must be briefly described, being partic-
ularly consonant with the position taken by Peters,
whom we are taking as the philosopher of an analyt-
ical kind who best offers a contrast with Hardie,
and who, with him,reflects within the area of educ-
ational interests an aspect of moral philosophy .
Then we shall be in a position to return to Peters
and others within education to establish what meas-
ure of agreement there can be said to be.

In turning to the problem of the justification
of value judgments as this is understood and tack-
led in the latest philosophy, we must be clear about
the sheer mass of work that is being done - so much
that any attempt to summarise the main position that
is emerging must be treated as very much a simplific-
ation designed for present purposes only. The just-
ification is commonly seen to involve a number of
stages. First, we justify an action by an appeal
to standards or rules: an action is of a particular
kind, all of which are right actions by common acc-

eptance - disagreement at this level is always
about whether the particular action is of the
stated kind or not, and never about whether the rule
or standard is a right one.

This comes at the next level, at which reasons
for the acceptance of rules and standards are prov-
ided in the description of a value <u>system</u> within a
whole way of life. But questions can be asked about
the justification of a particular way of life; and
specifically the ultimate question: What reasons are
there for choosing one way of life rather than anoth-
er? A passage from one of the most persistent and
respected of contemporary moral philosophers, R.M.
Hare, shows well the extensive nature of the just-
ification required for a particular moral choice,
provided that the question is pursued to the logical
end: and, in Hare's case, the end is not nearly as
far as some would locate it, as we shall see.

He says: 'A complete justification of a decision
would consist of a complete account of its effects,
together with a complete account of the principles
which it observed and the effects of observing these
principles...Thus, if pressed to justify a decision
completely, we have to give a complete specification
of the way of life of which it is a part.' (30).
But, of crucial importance to the nature of ethics

(30) Hare, R. M., <u>The Language of Morals</u> (Ox-
ford, 1952), p. 69.

is the answer to the question put above: whether one choice of a way of life is more 'rational' than another; that is, whether 'rationality' can be defined in such a way as to enable 'good reasons' to be produced for accepting one way of life rather than another. Only with reference to a _rational_ way of life can any value judgment be _really_ true and completely justified.

The answer given by many contemporary analytical philosophers is that the preference for one way of life rather than another need not be arbitrary; need not, that is, be mere preference in the sense in which we have seen Hardie asserts that it is ('... we can be tolerant to all their theories, for no one is right and no one is wrong'; see p. 40, supra) The most thorough exposition of this viewpoint is contained in the work of P.W.Taylor, who argues in great detail that a _meaning_ can be given to the concept of rational choice of the type necessary for the 'ultimate' justification of a value judgment (31).

Going as far as it is logically possible to go, he refutes the sceptical demand for an even more fundamental 'reason' for choosing a rational rather than a non-rational life in terms which demonstrate that this debate finds its limits in the very language that has to be used to argue it: 'No reasons _can_ be

(31) Taylor, P. W., _Normative Discourse_ (Prentice Hall, 1961), pp. 164-75.

given, it is true. But no reasons need be given;
For knowing that a certain way of life is rational
is knowing that one is wholly justified in committ-
ing oneself to it. To know that it is rational is
already to have all the reasons one could possibly
have for living it...the decision to commit oneself
to a way of life which is rationally chosen over
others ways of life...is the most reasonable, least
arbitrary, and best founded decision of all. It is
the decision to live the way of life one is most
justified in living, all things considered.' (32)

There is little doubt that all the philosophers
mentioned in this section - and they stand for many
more, as do their views for many others - are very
close to the same philosophical 'point': in a sense,
they hold the 'same' position and differ more in
the ways in which they wish to describe that position
ition - in their various insistencies on using par-
ticular forms of words to describe facts of moral
life which they undoubtedly 'see' in the same way
- than they do in what can only be termed their
'metaphysical' standpoints. Even Stevenson and
Taylor work in the same philosophical climate of op-
inion, compared, for example, with the differences
that obtained before 'non-descriptivist' insights
about language began to bear fruit. In a sense,
differences are now seen to exist at the level of

(32) Ibid., p. 188.

language and the interpretations put on its meaning and significance in relation to an independent 'reality'.

This becomes plain in the work of Peters and other philosophers working now in education who think like him; so plain, that it can be fairly said that much of what they write is less a reflection of 'pure' philosophical developments from outside to within educational theory than it is original philosophising in ethics carried out with 'educational' material rather than with less concrete material. We can, then, return to Peters to note what other parts of his (unconsolidated, see p. 28, supra.) contribution read like against the background now sketched of current moral philosophy; and to amplify a position which not everyone in education, as we shall see immediately following the further exposition of his views, is prepared to accept.

The 'Autonomous' View Amplified.

Peters is concerned to stress, in the source which we have already used, that by 'morality' we mean conforming to standards which we have seriously thought about before accepting as our own: the point he is making is similar to that made by Hardie when he says 'Education would clearly have partly failed if individuals behaved perfectly but did not know it.'(See p. 37, supra.). He wishes to establish, with this emphasis, that loose talk of 'rat-

ionalisations' and 'ideologies' by those who are
overimpressed with a particular (and false) inter-
pretation of the theories of Freud and Marx as these
bear on human moral conduct is the result of semantic
confusion. If every 'reason' is a rationalisation -
which is the implication of such deterministic talk
- then no clear sense can be given to the term 'rat-
ionalisation at all: it loses all meaning by being
used without a frame of reference which can provide
the necessary contrast. Unless there are genuine
reasons, there can be no rationalisations; just as -
to use an analogy powerfully developed in a seminal
work of contemporary ethics (33) - there ɯ can be
no weeds unless there are flowers, shrubs and plants
tended by human gardeners!

Peters puts this in terms which characteristically
display his orientation towards common experience and
the ordinary language in which it is articulated,
when he comments: 'Terms like 'rationalisation' and
'ideology', which casts aspersion on beliefs, are
verbal parasites. They only flourish because com-
mon experience has provided hosts in the form of
rational beliefs and genuine principles.' (34) He
thus reiterates in a different form the distinction
between reasons for behaviour, which is the concern
of ethics, and causes of behaviour, which the various
human sciences attempt to describe and explain.

(33) Nowell-Smith, P. H.X, Ethics (Penguin, 1954)
(34) Peters, R. S., op. cit., p. 76.

He thus falls clearly into one of the two classes of moral philosophers who have emerged from our enquiry - those who accept that there can be a rational justification of moral judgments, and that the reasons produced within an autonomous moral discourse are objective reasons and not merely attitudes dressed up in sophisticated and persuasive attire. We can look for more evidence of this allegiance in a context other than that from which his views have so far been taken; that is, popular talks addressed to a lay audience who are not expected to appreciate the subtleties of an academic argument. Though, even at this level, the emphasis upon the place of reason in arriving at and justifying moral beliefs, an emphasis of clear importance to the educators in his audience, stands in marked contrast to the contrary kind of emphasis which he have seen Hardie make in addressing what must be, in part, a similar audience of people concerned with education.

A hint in the first source can lead us to the kind of amplification to be found in a second, more academic part of his work: he says, 'People who say that moral principles are self-evident often mean that no further reasons can be given for them. But perhaps they sometimes mean that the reasons for them are so obvious that they hardly need mentioning.' (35)

(35) Ibid., p. 78.

The term 'obvious' is important here. What is
obvious to one man is often an impenetrable mystery
to the next - this is **particularly the** case with
scientific **explanations** and the like, which can
often only be understood after long training.
What is **obvious depends** on one's knowledge: but cer-
tain knowledge is so common, so much a part of liv-
ing at all, that what is **obvious** about it is clear
to all. Peters' point is that knowledge of the use
of moral language comes into this category: the <u>fact</u>
of its use provides, in a sense, reason enough for
accepting that the use is meaningful and not in need
of explanation in other terms, as, for example, in
terms of a vague psychology of emotion.

In the second source, Peters developes this idea,
that moral discourse has an obvious <u>point</u> and that
its use <u>as</u> moral discourse rests on certain presup-
positions which are justified by that very use and
are not in need of any 'further' justification. The
closeness of this view to that expressed by Taylor,
when he implies that the rational objectivity of
morality is implicit in the language used to debate
it, is unmistakeable. (See p. 49, supra.) A consid-
eration of the main idea put forward in the chapter
on moral theory in this source - a standard work on
social philosophy - will indicate how current argum-
ents for rationality in ethics are related to some of
the great philosophical positions of the past.

The fact that passages from this chapter echo
sections of the broadcast talks is not unimportant
from the point of view we are adopting. It illus-
trates the meshing of social theory, educational
theory and ethics which is one of Peters themes in
bringing analytical philosophy to bear on education.
This composite sector is, in fact, one the three
philosophical areas - the other two are the theory
of knowledge and the philosophy of mind, with both
of which we shall be concerned later - which he and
others of his 'school' take to be most clearly rel-
evant to education and which feature very largely
in the philosophising of parties to what we have
called the 'official' theory (see pp. 2 and 29,
supra.).

Peters argues that certain basic criteria for
moral rules, criteria which moral philosophers have
long endeavoured to state, are in fact implied in
the fact of the attempt itself. This is so because
a serious, that is, a rational and critical, invest-
igation is one which must accept certain normative
standards - by definition. A respect for truth at
all costs is presupposed by such an investigation:
arguments must be heeded and personal wielders of
arguments ignored if the process is to merit the
above description. As Peters puts it: 'The very
idea of searching for truth takes for granted, then,
a norm of _impartiality_ which holds that issues
should be decided according to _relevant_ criteria and

that exceptions should not be made on irrelevant grounds.' (36).

What he is saying is that to do moral philosophy at all - to ask seriously for the criteria according to which a rule can be judged a moral ruls - is to be committed already to that rational discussion which is founded on impartiality, in that discussion can only be rational discussion when arguments and evidence are the norm, and personal characteristics are irrelevant: only in arguments, and the language in which they are expressed, is found the inter-personal articulation of experience which we term 'objective'. In a sense, any right to participate in serious publie discussion of moral principles and their justification is earned by the obligation to accept the presuppositions of the public language in which that discussion is carried on. The place of reason in ethics (Peters acknowledges his indebtedness to S.E.Toulmin, whose book with that title (37) was the first full-scale attempt by an analytical philosopher to erect a post-Stevensonian position of this type) is ultimately to be found in the uniqueness of moral discourse, which has emerged as man has developed to regulate human behaviour within a network of its own legitimate 'rationality'.

(36) Peters, R. S.and Benn, S. I., Social Principles and the Democratic State (London, 1959), p. 31
    (37) Toulmin, S. E., An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics (1950).

Peters adopts the unusual procedure (for a con-
temporary analytical philosopher) of buttressing his
position by commentaries which show how aspects of it
are contained in several classical viewpoints on
ethics: he goes back beyond emotivism in order to
reveal the strong foundations of his post-emotivist
standpoint. To show what he means by 'moral reason-
ing', for example, he penetrates deeply into Hume's
psychological theory of the passions, laying bare
essential _logical_ points about 'rationality' as he
wishes to interpret it - not in any narrow sense
tied to the notions of deduction and induction as in
these are associated with the sciences, but in the
wider, more liberal interpretation which links it
with the 'rational being' who is virtually created
by the separate and unique discourses in which he
publicly partakes.

Peters says: '...Hume made a great contribution
to moral theory in showing that moral distinctions
do not derive from reasoning in the sense in which
this is used to describe scientific or mathematical
calculations. There is a logical gap between state-
ments of fact and normative judgments, and moral
rules are quite unlike mathematical axioms in many
respects. But in sketching the moral sense from
which he thought our moral distinctions are derived
he introduced the normative criterion of impartial-
ity which we have claimed to be necessary for explaini-

ing what is meant by a rational being. For on our account a rational being is one who abides by the norm of impartiality in assessing arguments and claims.' (38).

Another classical philosopher interpreted in such a way as to underline the main contention is Kant, the _form_ of whose arguments in moral philosophy is welcomed by Peters as follows: 'He was here stating the impartiality principle which is basic to moral-ity. This is that if we maintain that a principle is a _moral_ principle, then part of what we _mean_ is that it is a principle which holds for _anyone_ in a similar situation.' (39). And again, just to take a last example from many available, he examines Utilitarianism and finds it not lacking in elements which add weight to his own contemporary thesis. His conclusion of this section admirably summarizes what he is attempting to say throughout; and to say, not as an isolated voice but, in keeping with the content of the position he presents, as a sort of 'public' speaker for a rooted philosophical tradition.

He ends: 'Our contention is, therefore, that there is a sense in which moral philosophy or ethics, which is the attempt to make explicit the criteria in terms of which rules are morally justified, itself exemp-

(38) Peters, R. S., op. cit., p. 44
(39) Ibid., p. 49.

plifies, in a minimal degree, the acceptance of the
criteria which it attempts to make explicit. For
philosophy, like science, is a clear example of rat-
ional discussion, and is conducted in accordance
with the norms of impartiality and respect for truth.
Philosophers flourish only in societies where the rat-
ional tradition has taken root. And though, as phil-
osophers, they are not committed to any particular
maxims...they are, as philosophers, committed to
the very abstract procedural criteria implied in
being reasonable...Being moral is a species under
the genus of being reasonable.' (40).

But it can also be said that philosophy can
flourish only when convincing arguments on one side
are confronted by convincing arguments on the other
- this is the presupposition of the present thesis.
Peters presents a formidable case which only an
equally formidable critic would dare attempt to
shake: fortunately there are such critics, which
makes the situation philosophically interesting
even if somewhat inconclusive, the price of phil-
osophy even in the age of the blanket-term 'Analysis'.
One such is the 'pure' moral philosopher Atkinson,
already mentioned (see p. 46, supra.); and another
is J.D.O'Connor who, though not arguing directly
against the position adopted by Peters, does in fact
present another ethical point of view within the
context of education which is important for the

(40) Ibid., p. 56.

question of 'bearing' we are exploring

We shall return to Peters in the next chapter
on moral education, for other parts of his pre-1966
contribution are of singular importance for that
theme, the second element, it will be remembered,
arising out of the pioneer comments on ethics and
education made by Hardie (see p.p. 37-8, supra.)
There we shall see the 'application', as it were, of
the high level theorising we are pursuing - the
point of it all for the educationist. As Peters
himself puts it there: 'Bacon once said that the
discourse of philosophers is like the stars; it
sheds little light because it is so high. But
when it is brought nearer the earth, as I hope it
has been in this paper...' (41) For the moment,
however, we must remain at star level!

The Wary - Atkinson And O'Connor.

Atkinson has, in the important article mention-
ed above, some sobering comments on what he describes
'...a prominent theme in recent moral philosophy
whose implications for moral education are, it
seems to me, insufficiently appreciated in much
that is written on the topic.' (42). He thinks it
important to stress, in comparison with much being

(41) Peters, R. S., 'The Paradox of Moral Educat-
ion' in Niblett, W. R.(Ed.), Moral Education in a
Changing Society (London, 1963), p. 65.
(42) Atkinson, R. F., op. cit., p. 171.

written along what we have termed the 'Peters'
lines, the sense in which there are open options in
morality; the sense, that is, in which disagreement
is possible, even probable, and quite legitimate.
In order to do this, he has to elucidate the consept
of 'instruction': his conclusion is, briefly, that
it is essentially that rational process which demands
the production of adequate support for any content-
ions being made to another. This entails the giv-
ing of proofs, evidence and reasons appropriate to
the particular area of instruction, and conviction
on the part of the recipient only to the extent that
such support warrants. In this way, conviction
must be justified and assent must be rational in the
process of 'instruction'.

In any area, it will be seen, what Atkinson
means by 'instruction' presupposes certain approp-
riate criteria of truth, cogency and correctness:
without these, it is not legitimate to use the con-
cept - which is clearly related to what other phil-
osophers with like interests, including Peters, call
'education', as we shall seemlater. It must be noted
that the presuppositions concern <u>criteria</u> and not
anything more substantial, a fact of some signific-
ance in determining to what extent the 'wariness' of
Atkinson constitutes total disagreement with the views
he is examining. He makes this point in saying: 'It
is not required that there should be a body of estab-

lished truths, facts, laws, practices in the field,
only that there should be criteria for determining
what is and what is not acceptable.' (43).

Atkinson is, in this way, leading in to the key
question - whether there are moral <u>truths</u> to be
discovered, and so whether there can be moral educ-
ation (or 'instruction' in the sense in which he
defines it) based upon the kind of reasoning on
which such truths depend: as he puts it, '...the pres-
ent concern is with...the question whether there is
a possible content for moral instruction' (44). At
root, the answer he himself gives is that the opp-
osite of any moral position can be maintained with-
out logical error or factual mistake, because there
have not been demonstrated any criteria of truth in
this field.

At first sight, this assertion sets him up in
complete opposition to the position of those who
argue for the place of reason in ethics; but the
plain-ness of it becomes adorned with the kind of
blurring qualification which we have noted in much
of the philosophising on morals. He establishes
a distinction betwwen a criterion for moral <u>truth</u>
and a criterion for the correct application of
moral <u>language</u> which brings him back into the fold

(43) Ibid., p. 173.
(44) Ibid., p. 175.

which we described above (see pp. 50 and 51). He
is not blind to the insights into language functions
gained from the philosophical investigations of,
say, the last ten years; but he is concerned to
place the _emphasis_ in a way different from that in
which it is commonly being placed by moral philos-
ophers working in the context of education. He
distinguishes the two criteria in this way: 'There
is no one who seriously entertains the hope of
being able to establish a substantial moral crit-
erion, a touchstone of moral truth. The possibil-
ity of formulating a criterion for applying the
term 'moral' is, of course, another and less mom-
entous affair.' (45).

Starting from the problem posed by Hume's classic
distinction between 'is' and 'ought' (the 'logical
gap' which enters into Peters' argument - see p. 57,
supra.), Atkinson comments on the various attempts
made recently to show that moral decisions can be
completely justified. He reviews Hare, Toulmin and,
finally, Taylor - all of whom we have had to cite
in giving the essential background to what we can now
best term the 'cognitivist' approach - appreciating
their subtlety in exploring the nuances of language
use, but remaining adamant in his assertion that 'No
recent moral philosopher has found a way round the

(45) Ibid., p. 176.

the point that irreducible differences are possible
in morality and that "justifications" in this field
have the remarkable property of failing to exclude
opposed alternatives' (46).

Atkinson grants that Taylor's discussion of the
question of ultimate justification is as thorough
as any could be - as indeed it is, being as compre-
hensive an enquiry as even the Americans are likely
to demand - but insists that, as Taylor's conditions
for a choice of a way of life to be a rational choice
(the absolute conditions for the chooser of 'freedom',
'enlightenment' and 'impartiality') can never in prac-
tice be <u>known</u> to be fulfilled, it: '...seems in the
end to amount to no more than a more elaborate re-
statement of Hare's position.' (47).

He then turns to other settings of questions
about justification in morality and so comes to
Peters, for such settings are those designed to av-
oid the difficulty of ultimate justification by
putting the questions in such a way as to blur the
normal distinction between means and ends, a dist-
inction which makes it easy to show justification
<u>within</u> a framework but impossible to show justif-
ication <u>of</u> a framework, that is, the <u>ultimate</u> just-
ification which is the object of the search. Atkinson
refers, in this context, to the outstanding character-

(46) Ibid., p. 179.
(47) Ibid., p. 179.

istic of Peters' most recent work, expressing the
kind of doubt about its effect on the discussion
which is in line with stress put on the 'open' nat-
ure of the bearing of modern analytical philosophy
on educational theory to be found throughout the
present account.

He says: 'Peters' recent discussion of moral
education ...will bear examination from this point
of view. Not that he was, as I understand him, so
much concerned with questions of justification as
with emphasising the possibility of appraising the
manner of education as well as its aims and content.
It is all the same worth enquiring whether this re-
direction of emphasis affects the matter of justif-
ication.' (48). And the result of his examination,
of importance here, in the next chapter and for our
general thesis, is a feeling of unease about the
change in emphasis: the stress on the manner rather
than the matter in moral education may obscure the
fact that decisions have to be made - about the man-
ner itself. The rules and the methods necessary
for the guidance of practical choices are, Atkinson
seeks to remind us, adopted on the basis of decisions
that we must make.

His conclusion merits comparison with that of
Peters (see pp. 58 and 59, supra.) and leaves the

(48) Ibid., p. 180.

impression that, with such tenacious doubt in the
face of undeniably strong commitment, ethics cannot
be far away from some major, enforced resolution.
He declares: 'It might well be thought that the im-
possibility of establishing an ultimate moral crit-
erion has received at least as much emphasis as it
deserves in recent moral philosophy. I have, how-
ever, been struck by the absence of much reflection
of it in most of the discussions of moral education
I have seen. There is undeniably a widespread bel-
ief in the importance of moral education and some
attention is given to questions of method and app-
roach, but it seems to be assumed that there is no
room for serious dispute about what is to be taught.
This assumption - but perhaps it is really a con-
spiracy of silence - needs very little considerat-
ion to be seen to be quite extraordinary. There
is obviously widespread disagreement on the moral
issues of daily life, on the 'details' of morality,
and, as I have tried to show, there is little enough
reason to suppose that a greater measure of agree-
ment can be reached on fundamentals.' (49).

We turn lastly to the other philosopher of a
doubting turn of mind mentioned in the title of
this section - O'Connor. This is an appropriate
point at which to make a first reference to his work,

(49) Ibid., p. 181.

for it stands at the chronological midpoint between that of Hardie and that of Peters, whose writings have provided the origin and focus for the exploration carried out so far; and it thus enables us to sample ethical theory as it has been developed by philosophers with an interest in education at a point midway between the extremes of the short period during which the 'bearing' under examination has developed. We can ask of O'Connor where he stands philosophically, both in relation to the other two 'co-workers' and to the more general background in 'pure' ethics which has been sketched. The answers will be interesting on two counts: first, as yet another example of the amazing variety to be found within whatever unity ethics may be said to possess; second, as coming from a philosopher who is of great significance for the 'historical' approach to the question of 'bearing', in that his work preceded that which is currently proliferating and is, in fact, the only major contribution to appear between Hardie and the 'present' (liberally interpreted) - albeit it a contribution in which many now interested see more 'philosophy' than 'education'.

O'Connor's book leaves us in no doubt as to the importance he attributes to ethics. There is a whole chapter on the justification of value judgments, the bibliographical notes are loaded with references to the standard and analytical approaches to the problem,

and the author often repeats what he clearly regards
as a central part of his theme: 'The nature of value
judgments and the logic of their justification is
thus the most important and most obvious point of
contact between philosophy and education and I shall
discuss this in some detail.' (50). He does, but,
as much of the detail has already been covered with
reference to other philosophers in the present account,
we can reduce the space spent on O'Connor to the min-
imum, in a chapter already swollen with contrasting
theories.

He clears the ground, as does Hardie, of the in-
strumental sense of moral terms by making '...the
commonplace distinction between things that are good
as means and those that are good as ends.' (51). He
thus, as an orthodox means/ends distinguisher, falls
into the non-Peters class mentioned above (see p. 64).
Next, the status of philosophers' questions of value
is clarified: they are '...not questions that can be
finally answered by the collection and assessment of
factual evidence. We must indeed take account of all
the facts that may be relevant; but these facts, though
they may be necessary to resolve such a dispute, are
not usually sufficient.' (52). This initial orien-
tation leads him, through a review of 'objectivist'

(50) O'Connor, J. D., An Introduction to the Phil-
osophy of Education (London, 1957), p. 13.
    (51) Ibid., p. 53
    (52) Ibid., p. 55.

and 'subjectivist' theories, both of which presuppose
a fact-stating use of language, to the point at which
he issues a Hardie-type invitation: 'Let us therefore
look at some of the other uses of language to see
whether we may not get a more satisfactory view of
value statements by taking account of these uses.'(53).

Soon, there is familiar talk of the 'expressive'
and 'persuasive' uses of language, with critical ref-
erence to the original, crude form of the emotive
theory and the refinements of Stevenson. O'Connor
at this point reads far more convincingly than does
Hardie, with whom comparisons can be made on the
grounds of mutual sources. He seems far more aware
than Hardie of the attempts made to indicate the part
played by reasons in supporting the public claims
of moral judgments when he says, for example: 'We
have somehow to show that aswell as being expressive,
moral judgments are (a) interpersonal and (b) cap-
able of rational support. An attempt to develop
the expressive theory to meet these defects has
been worked out in some detail...(the original ver-
sion...is due to...Stevenson)...In this way, a care-
ful and detailed study of the complexities of actual
moral discourse and the relations between the inform-
ative, expressive and persuasive uses of language
can throw new light on the central problem of moral

(53) Ibid., p. 62.

philosophy, the problem of showing how our value
judgments can be justified.' (54).

Unfortunately, to state that light can be thrown
is not in itself to throw light. O'Connor's account
lacks the positive effect of either Hardie's 'no one
is right and no one is wrong' or Peters' insistence on
the objectivity of morality. Writing in 1957 he suf-
fers from the uncertainty consequent upon a rejection
of the 'old' at a time when the 'new' has not been
fully formulated. Like Atkinson, who has the advant-
age of knowing what later developments have to offer,
O'Connor believes, nevertheless, that the role of
reason in ethics is problematical: he says, 'It can
not be said that any philosopher has yet given a sol-
ution of it that is both convincing and complete.' (55).

His conclusion takes the form of a warning
against dogmatism in ethics - a warning which the
course this account has had to take must underline.
The very complexity of the problem, he argues, reveal-
ed by the work of Stevenson and displayed by those
following him who have attempted to disentangle the
various elements in moral discourse, should make us
wary of a simple answer. Like Atkinson again, his
tone is unenthusiastic in asserting that '...the con-
structive parts of recent moral theories have not been

(54) Ibid., pp. 66 and 67.
(55) Ibid., p. 67.

so obvious or so effective as the critical parts,'
(56) and thus placing himself, without at the time
knowing it, in opposition to those like Peters whose
most evident intention is to be 'constructive' and
who would, no doubt, vigorously deny Atkinson's
contention that '...the most thorough discussion of
the topic that has appeared...though it is clearly
intended to advance the discussion...seems in the
end to amount to no more than a more elaborate re-
statement.' (57).

From our point of view, the implications for educ-
ation of O'Connor's position on the justification of
value judgments seem, in short, negative when com-
pared with those of both his most notable predecessor
and his most active successor: Hardie, in the end
'tolerant of all their theories' (58), has at least
the merit of delivering such a rough blow that we are
moved, as we have been, to find civilized ways of
countering it; Peters is indisputably thorough, ten-
acious, convinced and contemporarily forceful.
What O'Connor has to offer is less substantial but,
nevertheless, of value at another level; for he con-
cludes by stressing what must appear to us by now
to be the obvious, but which he thinks - and we must
agree - well worth stressing because of its obvious-
ness; and it is a considered philosophical opinion

(56) Ibid., p. 71.
(57) Atkinson, R. F., op. cit., p. 179.
(58) Hardie, C. D., op. cit., p. 127.

which, even today, as we have documented, does not lack formidable professional support - '...the problem of how to justify our value judgments is still an unsolved problem of philosophy. To realize this will save us from dogmatism and at the same time encourage us to go on looking for an answer.' (59).

Certainly the review given so far of the bearing of modern analytical philosophy on educational theory - a lengthy review to be given of only one, the ethical, aspect, but short enough on consideration of the prime importance of that aspect - suggests that dogmatism is unlikely to survive in the climate of critical awareness to be discovered amongst the variety of viewpoints that have been illustrated. The sampling of positions which has arisen from Hardie's first problem('...what is meant by such a term as "good" or "valuable"?' (60)) has embraced philosophising done within an educational context and without; and throughout this sample, limited though it is in comparison with the massive contribution being made (particularly in the minor periodical literature listed in the bibliography), the debate is lively, with no position able to claim, as yet, a consensus of philosophical opnion and the power which commands acceptance. To a similar, but of necessity shorter, type of exploration of the literature, which flows

(59)O'Connor J. D., op. cit., p. 71.
 (60) Hardie, C. D., op. cit., p. 118.

from Hardie's second problem (see p. 37, supra) we
can now go – to the problem of moral education.

CHAPTER III

EDUCATION AND MORALITY

Hardie And The 'Second Problem'

Hardie is not very illuminating on the 'second problem', that of moral education. But, at least, his views, for all their limitations, give us another point of entry into the later literature in which the problem is more thoroughly discussed; and they are linked, as the later discussions are, with the more theoretical questions of ethics just surveyed. One of the main reasons, in fact, for the enquiry into ethics by educationally- minded philosophers is that firm findings there will have implications for moral education - a point which Hardie, it will be remembered, was the first to make. While making it, he provides, unwittingly, the excuse for his lack of illumination on the problems of educating for morality, for he states that the 'solution of the second problem will, however, probably depend on the solution of the first' (1): and we know now that his own particular solution is, even comparatively, not very successful.

The guidance he offers to parent and teacher con- cerned with the moral education of children is what

(1) Hardie, C. D., op. cit., p. 118.

we can expect from a philosopher adopting a weakly-
developed version of the Stevensonian theory in
ethics. An emphasis is placed upon their ensuring
that children are presented with plenty of situations
in which they are likely to experience the emotions
which value judgments are said to express. This is
the burden of the very general piece of advice given
by Hardie (before taking it himself and sketching in
its implications!). He says '... the educationist
should adjust the ostensive definitions which he gives
according to the alternatives which he accepts.' (2).

The method of moral education advocated fits the
ethical 'alternative' which Hardie accepts: it stress-
es the arousal in the child of the sorts of feeling
for things which the parent or teacher himself exper-
iences. According to Hardie, this in fact happens,
for many parents in practice employ the very tech-
nique of encouraging their children to like what
they themselves think is virtuous behaviour by tell-
ing them constantly that they, the children, do like
it, until the statement becomes true within the emot-
ional complex of the relationship. In this way chil-
dren are, and should be, trained while quite young to
have, as he puts it, '...certain feelings about objects
and situations, and indeed to have learned the use of
"good" so as to influence other people's feelings' (3).

(2) Ibid., p. 122.
(3) Ibid., p. 126.

This advice is of little use to educators. It is doubtless one description of what does take place within families, but what is wanted is a way of distinguishing methods <u>within</u> the context left unanalysed beneath terms like 'feeling'; otherwise moral 'education' cannot be identified amongst the 'indoctrination' or the plain, unthinking conformity to to be found in the family situations which Hardie describes. He is certainly logical, in that the advice, for what it is worth, follows from the ethics, for what that is worth; but such emotivist theory and its implications for practice seem to have the very grave defect of being compatible with <u>any</u> content of moral education we care to name, and this, we sense, can't be right. In any event, Hardie's method would lead to the very situation which he elsewhere condemns, for, as he says, 'Education would clearly have partly failed if individuals behaved perfectly but did not know it' (4); and having the 'right' feelings is not <u>knowing</u> why they are right.

As with moral theory (see p. 28, supra) we turn from the disappointing early work of Hardie to the more recent work of Peters; and with even greater promise, in that, as we have seen, the main purpose of Peters' work in ethics has been to see it reflected in the process of education, of which moral education is, in his view and on the proportional evid-

(4) Ibid., p. 118.

ence of his writings, one of the most important asp-
ects. Further, it is in Peters' philosophy, with its
unorthodox blurring of the means/ends dichotomy,
that we find questions of value being built into the
general concept of 'education', so that whatever he
has to say about moral education will lead impercept-
ibly into the less restricted questions about educ-
ation under its other aspects, which we need to ex-
plore in this account. For this reason the chapter
is called 'Education and Morality' and will contain,
towards the end, a first sketch of the concept of
'education', to be amplified later, as with the pre-
liminary sketch of the nature of analysis (See p. 14,
supra).

Peters And The 'Language' And 'Literature' Of Morality

Peters, too, refers to the child-parent relation-
ship; but his parent, unlike that of Hardie, is not
any old begetter of children involved in the job of
passing something on and doing it in the 'natural'
way. He is a thoughtful, seriously-minded parent,
rather like the famous philosopher-father mentioned
by Peters in his talk of the two necessary kinds of
rules which are found at the core of moral education.
He says in a source not yet tapped by us: 'From the
point of view of moral education it would be partic-
ularly important to pass on procedural rules and

basic rules. Hence, presumably, the importance which Hare attaches to the question to which he thinks moral philosophers should address themselves very seriously: "How should I bring up my children?"' (5).

The necessity of passing on procedural rules is the fundamental point of Peters' thesis, and one which, once fully grasped, considerably softens the paradox of reason and habit in moral education which he describes. Believing firmly in the autonomy of morality and the possibility of moral action being validated by the production of reasons within what he terms '...a distinctive form of discourse which has developed to answer distinctive forms of questions' (6), he seems more fortunately placed than is Hardie to give advice on the methods of moral education; for he is not inhibited by any such view as that which rates moral beliefs as nothing more than elaborate and refined versions of mere personal preferences. He can talk of <u>rules</u>, which are inter-subjective and identifiable by the serious enquirer.

Moral rules can, in Peters' view, be applied '... intelligently in the light of relevant differences in circumstances' (7) because there are certain higher-order principles which, as we have seen him

(5) Peters, R. S., 'Reason and Habit: The Paradox of Moral Education' in Niblett, W. R. (Ed.), <u>Moral Education in a Changing Society</u> (London, 1963), p.52
(6) Ibid., p. 47.
(7) Ibid., p. 51.

maintain, can be rationally justified. These principles, '...presupposed by the very activity of giving reasons in practical discourse' (8), are those of impartiality, liberty, truth-telling and the consideration of interests. Clearly, any philosopher who thinks in this manner must have much to offer on the <u>teaching</u> of morality, for he is taking morality and the facts and presuppositions of moral language very seriously indeed and not handicapping himself for this role, as does Hardie, by interpreting the problem in terms of complex expressions of emotion. As Peters declares, reminding us of his 'ordinary language' position within analytical philsophy, '...if we ceased to use these words and still wanted to get people to do things by means other than twisting their arms, hypnotizing them or giving them orders, we should have to devise a new family of words to do this job.' (9).

Procedural principles are those which can be retained even though the content of lower level rules is changed. Their possession ensures that the moral code of any person holding to them is <u>rationally</u> maintained. Peters looks to science for an analogy: morality, like science, is an autonomous activity; and both activities show various levels of rules, principles and procedures, an awareness of the dis-

(8) Ibid., p. 59.
(9) Ibid., p. 48.

tinctive nature of which makes a person, respect-
ively, a rationally moral person or a scientist - and
the teaching of each will be similarly based upon
producing this awareness. As Peters says, '...in a
rational code there would be procedural rules which
could be regarded as presupposed by the very activity
of giving reasons for rules; there would then be bas-
ic rules which would be those which could be justif-
ied under any conceivable social conditions; then
there would be more relative rules which would dep-
end, for their justifiability, on more contingent
facts about particular social, economic and geo-
graphical conditions. From the point of view of
moral education it would be particularly important
to pass on procedural rules and basic rules.' (10).

So far our level has remained somewhat theoret-
ical, related to the last chapter and an illustrat-
ion of the pervasiveness of theory in this important
aspect of the 'bearing' in question. Peters' prelim-
inary remarks are of this kind, but he passes event-
ually to the less abstract concern and makes an imp-
ortant point which is connected with the title chosen
for this section. He says: '...moral education will
be as much concerned with the promotion of good act-
ivities as it will be with the maintenance of rules
for social conduct, with what ought to be as well as

(10) Ibid., p. 52

with what men ought to do.' (11). A distinction
similar to that made between the procedural and sub-
stantial aspects of a rational moral code is here
suggested. It originates in the influence upon Peters,
to be noted at many points in his recent work, of
Michael Oakeshott's now-famous description of the
relationship between what he calls the 'language'
and the 'literature' of the areas of human experience.
(12).

Peters makes reference to this when he states
that, 'The business of moral education consists large-
ly in initiating people into the "language" so that
they can use it in an autonomous manner. This is
done largely by introducing them to the "literat-
ure"' (13). By the use of one of his favourite terms,
'initiation', he shows that his thinking about moral
education is of a piece with his thinking about educ-
ation in general such as appears most cogently ex-
pressed in his inaugural lecture (14). Young chil-
dren have to be initiated into morality. Early ex-
perience is of very great importance for later moral
development, a fact for which evidence continually
accumulates from a variety of directions; but this
experience is had at an age when the child cannot

(11) Ibid., p. 53.
(12) See Oakeshott, M., Rationalism in Politics
(London, 1962).
(13) Peters, R. S., op. cit., p. 54.
(14) Peters, R. S., 'Education as Initiation' in
Archambault, R. D. (Ed), Philosophical Analysis and
Education (London, 1965).

grasp the reasons embedded in morality. Unfortunately, by the time a child reaches an age at which such reasons can be accepted, the-y will not be unless the appropriate early experience has been provided. This is the paradox of moral education!

As Peters puts it, young children '...must enter the palace of Reason through the courtyard of Habit and Tradition' (15). Built into them must be certain habits of behaviour which will leave open the possibility of the later development of a rational code; which will not psychologically prevent it. They must, in other words, learn the 'language' of morality through its 'literature' in such a way as to give them the power, later, to evaluate the very 'literature' which has nourished them. In plainer terms, those who have, as children, been morally educated are 'free' persons, capable of criticizing the code which has been the substance of their moral education in a manner not possible for those who have been indoctrinated: they will have been taught the procedural rules which enable them to develop codes of their own out of those given - codes of which they see the point, being now, to use a phrase dear to Peters, 'on the inside' of morality.

The paradox comes about because, in developing reasonable attitudes to rules of conduct, reason it-

(15) Peters, R. S., op. cit.(p. 78, supra), p. 55.

self can play little part during the essential early
stages; and there is consequently the big question
which Peters puts: '...does the use of...extrinsic
techniques militate against intelligent, spontaneous,
and intrinsically directed behaviour later on?' (16)
Fortunately, the most important of the motivations
which underlie the best of these 'extrinsic tech-
niques' - love and its withdrawal, approval and dis-
approval - are better classed as 'intrinsic': so Peters
thinks, having in mind the kinds of situation which
create the habits that do not incapacitate a person
from living on the plane of reason.

Clearly, 'habit' is a central concept, the dis-
entanglement of which is necessary if the paradox
is not to prove intractable; and Peters spends some
time doing this, giving, in the process, a paradigm
of the role of the philosopher, at work wherever
there is a <u>conceptual</u> problem. He pinpoints the
specifically philosophical task within the situation
in this way: 'The formation of sound moral habits in
respect of, for instance, what I have called basic
moral rules might well be a necessary condition of
rational morality. It can, however, seem to be an-
tagonistic to rational morality because of an inter-
esting sort of conceptual confusion' (17). In other
words, the basic moral rules(the <u>content</u> of early

(16) Ibid., p. 58.
(17) Ibid., p. 59.

moral training; that is, the 'literature' already
mentioned) may seem to rule out a later rational mor-
ality (the application of procedural principles to a
received code in order to create a new personally acc-
epted one; that is, the use of the 'language') because
of a confusion in our use of the key term 'habit';
there is need of the philosopher's particualr skills.

These skills, used to give a Ryleian analysis
which is familiar from our first chapter, equip Peters
to analyse 'habit' as a higher order term, used to des-
cribe characteristics of human actions which are <u>extra</u>
to what we can observe them doing. By such terms we
pick out the sort of thing we could have <u>reasons</u> for
doing and which we could stop doing if we were to
think about them: when we talk of a 'habit' of a per-
son, we postulate a tendency for him to act in a cer-
tain way, doing a thing he has done before and doing
it automatically in order to get on consciously with
the art of living. For then, as Peters says, '...
the mind is set free to pay attention to things that
are interesting, novel and worthwhile' (18).

Habits of this sort are the component parts of
intelligent 'skills'; the component habits, being
capable of operating within a range of variations
and so in co-ordination with each other, permit many
very different complex <u>actions</u>. In Peters' words,

(18) Ibid., p. 60.

'The concept of "action" is "open-ended" in many
dimensions' (19); that is, there are not only mech-
anical actions such as are commonly associated with
the term 'habit', there are also the skilled, intell-
igent actions in which the component habits '...are
conceived of as variable and adaptable in the light
of some more generally conceived end' (20). These
actions are taught with reference both to the wider
conception and to the particular, elemental moves as
they relate to it, so that the conditions of teaching
- the kinds of involvement of the teacher with his
pupil - are those which the Peters' term 'initiation'
implies. As he puts it here, an 'on-the-spot appren-
ticeship system' (21) seems necessary for moral educ-
ation (and, indeed, for education generally) to succ-
eed - a system for which the most obvious model is
that found in the learning of philosophy (and golf)
by people like himself!

The importance of this philosophical analysis
for handling the paradox of moral education is un-
deniable, particularly in comparison with the weak
attempt made by Hardie. Reason or intelligence in
moral choice can come about only through the form-
ation af habits analogous to these described skills;
that is, habits which reveal themselves in a wide
variety of actions and so count as legitimate moral

(19) Ibid., p. 61.
(20) Ibid., p. 61.
(21) Ibid., p. 56.

habits. The learning of such complex habits takes i
time, dependent as it is on the development of the
appropriate concepts in endlessly different situat-
ions, for'...the child has to learn to see that a
vast range of very different actions and perform-
ances can fall under a highly abstract rule which
makes them all examples of a type of action.' And,
as Peters continues, giving the core of his solution
of the paradox, 'If the child has really learnt to
act on a rule it is difficult to see how he could
have accomplished this without insight and intellig-
ence' (22).

This demonstration that there exists no contra-
diction between reasoning and habit formation in
morality raises the question of why so many people
should be deluded into thinking that there is; and,
in answering this, Peters shows how necessary it is
in 'ordinary language' philosophy to have a 'feel'
for what is important and central in common usage,
giving an illustration of what is most characteristic
of this branch of analytical philosophy - its skill-
like nature (see pp. 17 and 18, supra), of the very
kind that Peters has been discussing. He sees that,
in ordinary language, the term 'habit' does occur
very frequently in expressions which purport to ex-
plain courses of action in such a way as to suggest

(22) Ibid., p. 62.

that they are stereotyped, that the person in question
is acting in an instrumental, unspontaneous sort of
way. And, in fact, many actions are, of necessity,
carried out in this manner.

Peters' concern, however, is not to deny this, a
fact of nature, but to stress that 'Habits need not
be exercised out of force of habit' (23), which is a
philosopher's fact discovered by conceptual analysis
of the kind we have just described, and his partic-
ular contribution to solving the problem. Other dis-
ciplines must make their specific contributions, the
nature of which the philosopher can only suggest -
the conditions in early childhood and the methods of
upbringing which will ensure that the right habits are
learnt in a non-compulsive fashion are open to empir-
ical enquiry, that '...careful examination of cognit-
ive development and the role of extrinsic and intrin-
sic motivation in childhood' (24) of which Peters
speaks. Only out of inter-disciplinary research can
there be developed a positive theory of rational
child-rearing, a limited though essential aspect of
which is this kind of philospher's cogitation exer-
cised on the conceptual problems involved. In this
way does modern analytical philosophy bear upon one
sector of educational theory. And for another way,
in harmony with that of Peters, we can now turn
briefly to the work of a powerful American philos-

(23) Ibid., p. 64.
(24) Ibid., p. 64.

opher, Israel Scheffler.

Scheffler - Reasons In Moral Education

Of the philosophers so far considered, the three
whose work lies 'in' education - Hardie, O'Connor
and Peters - do not constitute a fair sample, for
much of the most significant philosophising is being
done across the Atlantic. Not all of it is the work
of Scheffler, but he can stand as representative of
the best, particularly at this point, for his work
is complementary to that of Peters and shows an inter-
esting variation of the 'ordinary language' approach
in dealing with the limited points we have time to ex-
amine.

Before the appearance of his substantial wriings
on philosophy 'in' education, Scheffler had already
made a significant contribution to the debate in
'pure' philosophy, on the nature and ststus of value
judgments, by taking up the sceptical challenge
which we noted in our first chapter. Concerning
the validity and cognitive status of value judgments,
his position involved establishing the impossibility
of distinguishing, in any clear-cut way, moral from
non-moral vocabulary in the normal context of every-
day language, and showing that, for a sceptic to main-
tain the ultimate irrelevance of a cognitive analysis
on the grounds that the distinctive feature of moral
language is that of directing, persuading and prescrib-

ing, the distinction would have to be made. At the
level of theory, he is thus to be classed with Peters
and against, say, Atkinson on the evidence we have ex-
amined earlier.

These theoretical considerations extend into
more practical spheres in Scheffler's influential
book on the language of education (25), from which we
can select for comment certain emphases, different
from but related to those already considered. One is
his brief but telling analysis of a distinction not
usually made in the unphilosophical discussions of
moral education found abundantly in educational writ-
ings; and one which, once grasped, illuminates the
 discussion from a direction somewhat different from
that of Peters but, in the end, having the same effect.
In his final chapter, while attempting to clarify the
 concept of 'teaching' by contrasting its ordinary
use with that of 'telling', he uses an example from
moral teaching which we can inspect.

Scheffler maintains that the evidence we require
of success in teaching a student that, say, honesty
is the best policy can be of more than one kind, dep-
ending upon what we have in mind and expect. In one
sense, it is the same kind of evidence as that which
is appropriate when we are teaching a _fact_ - say,
that Columbus discovered America. But there is an-

(25) Scheffler, I., The Language Of Education
(Springfield, Illinois, 1960).

other sense, in which success is shown by honest
behaviour on the part of the student, and not merely
by his verbal report of the meaning of the words.
This distinction is used by Scheffler to clarify the
longstanding issue between those who claim that vir-
tue can be taught and those who deny it.

He says: 'The ambiguity under discussion may be
related to an ancient problem of philosophy, the ᾳ
question whether virtue can be taught. Socrates is
interpret̶ed as having supposed...that we need mere-
ly to succeed in teaching people to know what is
good, and virtuous conduct is guaranteed...most other
philosophers have held that men frequently do reject
what they believe to be good and knowingly choose
evil...Western religions have...held that knowledge
is not sufficient for virtue...we need also to streng-
then the will and to sensitize the conscience...Since,
however, the opposition of views, as thus construed,
rests on different interpretations of an ambiguous
notion, it is mistaken to suppose that they are really
in conflict...both views allow that intellectual app-
rehension of moral principles and intellectual avowal
of them may go together with a rejection of such
principles in conduct' (26).

What is required in moral education, as we saw
with Peters, is both intellectual apprehension of

(26) Ibid., pp. 83-5.

principles, that is, a rational acceptance of them,
and a manifestation of them in conduct; for without
a grasp of the reasoned connection betwsen principle
and conduct, the conduct can not be termed 'moral'
but at best 'conventional'; and without a showing
in conduct, any known principle is a piece of mere
intellectual luggage. So Scheffler's disclosure of
the ambiguity is very important for elucidating mor-
al education and the problem of linking knowledge
with conduct. He demonstrates it in detail by using
certain philosophical schema^{ta} which uncover character-
istics of ordinary usage, establishing himself thus
as a more formal analyst than Peters.

The first schema is 'X teaches Y that...', into
which it is possible to insert norm-stating as well
as fact-stating sentences, the former, of importance
in this context, capable of being given either an
'active' or a 'non-active' interpretation according
to whether we take them to refer to behaviour or to
the mere repetition of certain words delivered by the
teacher - as with the above example, 'honesty is the
best policy'. It is the ambiguity of this expression
which must be resolved to avoid the nurturing of a
dangerous fallacy responsible for undesirable pract-
ical consequences which Scheffler names: 'The fall-
acy here...is perhaps one root of the "verbalism"
in moral education that believes success in the dev-
elopment of moral character to be the necessary prod-

uct of success in the (non-active) teaching of ethical formulas' (27). Those who have experienced long years of the English headmaster's morning homily will be in no doubt as to what he means!

A second schema, 'X teaches Y to...', provides analyses for comparison with those supplied by 'X teaches Y that...', and furnishes a distinction of special importance for moral education - one which is closely related to the work of Peters examined in this chapter, to the emphasis he places elsewhere on the 'manner' in which education is undertaken and to a similar emphasis to be noted in Scheffler's own more general analysis of the concept of 'teaching', to which we shall shortly move. It is that moral conduct is not just behaviour according to any independently specified norm supported by any rationale. In Scheffler's words, 'Its rationale must, in a certain sense, be "objective", "impartial" or "disinterested" in its support of the norm. What this means is notoriously difficult to characterize, but it is reflected in the general and impersonal language of moral judgment (e.g., "ought") which is normally used to express some rationales but not others. The rationale of a man's moral conduct, we may perhaps say, needs to be expressible by him in the language of moral judgment' (28)

(27) Ibid., p. 83.
(28) Ibid., p. 94.

In other words, our moral conduct is that which
we do, not unreflectingly even though within an app-
roved code, not as a means to some other end, but
because we believe that we ought to do it - we ex-
press ourselves naturally about it in the serious
language of morality, at our disposal as the result
of a lifelong initiation into its use. This is a
philosophical viewpoint not at all dissonant with
those of Peters, Taylor and others within the area
we have been examining. It stresses that, insofar as
moral conduct is a goal of moral education, the teach-
er is trying to achieve not only the acquisition of
certain norms but also the serious, thoughtful back-
ing of these norms in an 'objective' or 'impartial'
way. Moral conduct based upon moral conviction
which flows from moral beliefs is a different thing
from naively 'moral' conduct learnt unreflectingly.

Scheffler, in making this point, is, like Peters,
as aware of the practical difficulties implied by it
as he is of the ease with which it can be overlooked
because of the existence of easier forms of the teach-
ing of conduct. He says: 'The distinction here is
fundamental to moral education, for to ignore it is
to run the danger of confusing the teaching of honesty
for example, with the teaching of safety rules or con-
ventional forms of courtesy, while to acknowledge it
is to be confronted immediately with the delicate ed-
ucational problems of attempting to develop at once

patterns of action and impartial reflection on such
patterns' (29). His 'patterns of action' and 'impart-
ial reflection' are so close to Peters' 'basic rules'
and 'procedural rules' that we cannot but accept the
coincidence of independent assertion as evidence of
the philosophical entrenchment of this position, part-
icularly as Scheffler leaves us in no doubt - again,
like Peters - that the 'delicate educational problem'
of which he speaks must be tackled with the skills
and knowledge of specialists other than philosophers,
whose distinct job is to do what is done (so admirably)
here.

And what is done, the conceptual analysis to be
found in Scheffler, has wider significance than the
restriction of it to _moral_ education can bring about.
We must, at this point, move, as promised, from a
consideration of reasons in morality to a brief pre-
liminary examination of the concepts of 'teaching'
and 'education' at a more general level, as these
are interpreted by Scheffler and Peters, both of
whom see built into the very meaning of the terms, as
ordinarily used, the notion of respect for the
pupil's moral right to understand what he is taught.
As one of them puts it, teaching always implies 're-
strictions of _manner_, requiring acknowledgement of
the pupil's sense of _reasons_' (30); and, as the other

(29) Ibid., p. 106.
(30) Scheffler, I., op. cit., p. 104.

says, eduaction is always effected in 'a way that involves at least a minimum of understanding and voluntariness' (31). Both are concerned to show that education essentially creates and exercises rationality.

Education For Rationality

It almost goes without saying, now that we have gathered a wider sample of the work of analytical philosophers who show an interest in educational theory, that this preoccupation with rationality is pervasive in the writings of those who are, at the present time, the most influential. It is a preoccupation which contrasts strongly with that of Hardie, from whose work our own investigation began and to whom we must continue to give credit, at least for being the first in this particular field - though to what extent developments have passed him by is made clear by the kind of ethical pronouncements he is still making at a time when there is, on both sides of the Atlantic, this emphasis on the impartiality and objectivity of moral reasons. He says very recently for example: 'It is essential for teachers and parents to concentrate on establishing good moral habits. Moreover, the criterion of good in such cases is simply what is approved by the teacher or parent' (32), rev-

(31) Peters, R. S., op. cit. (see p. 81, ref.(14), supra), p. 97.
(32) Hardie, C. D., 'The Conflict In Western Education', The Educand, Vol. 4, p. 16, November 1960.

ealing, with this 'simply', the philosophical gap
which separates him from those who lead in the work'
which he pioneered. Their emphasis upon the possib-
ility, the necessity even, of rationality obtaining
in all genuine teaching situations is alien to his
mode of thought; though to what extent it is super-
ior to that mode of thought as manifested in philos-
ophers other than Hardie remains yet to be decided.

At the heart of what we can call, for this occ-
asion, the 'Peters-Scheffler' position is the idea
that education's basic task is to civilize; to create
human beings out of the material of each new generat-
ion by confronting them with and initiating them into
the great modes of man's experience, of which the mor-
ality we have been hitherto discussing is but one.
Science, art, religion, history and so on are, taken
together, in a sense what man is. They are the 'forms
of knowledge' powerfully identified by the Hirst
whom we mentioned earlier in this account, 'the com-
plex ways of understanding experience which man has
achieved, which are publicly specifiable and which
are gained through learning' (33). In achieving them
man, as it were, makes himself - or makes the mind
which is the better part of himself; and, in passing
them on through an education in them, he ensures the

(33) Hirst, P. H., 'Liberal Education And The
Nature Of Knowledge' in Archambault, R. D. (Ed.),
Philosophical Analysis And Education (London, 1965),
p. 122.

continuation and development of this 'self'.

Civilization consists of the products of varied, distinctive habits of mind which education transmits while at the same time passing on the procedures, the skills and the disciplines which have created them, so that the children of each new generation are form- ed into autonomous, mindful participants, capable of re-creating, refining and adding to their heritage. This is the general theme of which one variation is the approach to _moral_ education we have described ab- ove. And at the general level this conception of ed- ucation carries, too, an analysis of the teacher's role and his relationship with his pupils in the teaching situation which is claimed to be the essence of what 'teaching' means, though it appears to contra- dict many common notions on the subject.

A real teacher is _not_ a mere trained servant of society, a sort of midwife-technician aiding at the birth of an even more complex industrial way of life than exists in the West at present. He adopts an independent attitude to current pressures, for if 'mind' is to be defined in terms of schooled intell- igencē - as is argued by Gilbert Ryle, from whose work some of the main lines of much contemporary education- al thinking of this type derives (34) - then the teach- er must, by definition, play a major part in determin-

(34) See Ryle, Gilbert, _The Concept Of Mind_ (Lon- don, 1949)

ing the nature of education. Certainly, what he is
as well as what he does affects his students; and
what he asks as well as what he states is important,
so that he needs to be himself educated rather than
merely trained, a person possessed of a flexible mind
of his own, an ability to examine his subject with his
pupils, a respect for the developing minds of his
charges and a propensity towards encouraging the free
flow of ideas, questions and genuine perplexities in
the teaching situation. The notion of such a lively,
questioning, educated person is built in, so it is
suggested, to the concept of education for rationality.

This central concept of 'rationality' is defined,
not in the narrow terms commonly associated with the
deductive and other processes found in the prestigious
disciplines of mathematics and the natural sciences,
but in broad terms as the capacity to grasp principles
and to judge them critically in the light of reasons
which can be advanced in public discussion in any of
the areas of human experience for which there has been
developed a distinct discourse. This is what Louis
Arnaud Reid, the doyen of British analytical philos-
ophers of education, means when he says: '...what is
already apparent in the use of "rational" (is) that
this term has a wider range of application than can
be established deductively' (35); and this is what

(35) Reid, L. A., Philosophy And Education (Lon-
don, 1962), p. 12.

Peters' 'initiation' is initiation <u>into</u> - the com-
prehensively <u>rational</u> life.

In education, so conceived, the pupil is involv-
ed by the teacher in a wide variety of open 'convers-
ations' which embrace civilization in all its aspects
- the morality we have examined in detail and the
others we have mentioned. Curiosity, judgment and
responsibility for personal choices of belief and
conduct are encouraged within a pervasively rational
atmosphere, an ethos in which, characteristically,
<u>reasons</u> are expected and forthcoming in all the realms
of study. This is the substance of this particular
analytical position, of which more will be said later.
And nowhere is it expressed more vividly than in
words of Scheffler to be found in one of those obscure
places he is fond of illuminating, the existence of
which bears witness to the growing influence of anal-
ytical philosophy as it bears on even the most peri-
pheral sectors of educational theory - in this case,
on the topic of 'guidance'.

He says: 'The relevance of rationality to charac-
ter seems to me very great indeed. To learn to be
critical while respecting your colleagues in discuss-
ion, to learn to recognize your fallibility, to com-
mit yourself to following the argument on its merits
and to take the consequences, to be sensitive to the
standpoint of other persons with conflicting claims
and different centers of experience, to learn to

judge fairly and to take the responsibility for
your own judgments - these are lessons of morality
and character no less than cognitive virtues. They
are lessons that are relevant to all phases of educ-
ation, and they cannot be taught by machine, for they
grow out of rational intercourse with other persons.
The teacher as agent in this process is not primarily
an expert authority on some realm of fact, nor a
technician in an industrial enterprise. He is a per-
son who can, in the exercise of his special authority,
show his respect for his students' minds, his willing-
ness to entertain their serious questions, and his
commitment to high standards of impartial and crit-
ical judgment' (36).

Abstentions From The Cognitivist View

If we are, in Scheffler's words quoted above, 'to
be sensitive to the standpoint of other persons', we
must not allow this 'cognitivist' view, so powerfully
argued by such influential philosophers, to go un-
challenged, for that would be to reflect in a false
way the bearing on education of what is happening in
philosophy. We have only to remember Atkinson's
scepticism in the ethical sphere to know that there
are those who see things in a different light, and

(36) Scheffler, I., 'Concepts Of Education:Some
Philosophical Reflections On The Current Scene' in
Landy, E. and Perry, P. A. (Eds.), Guidance In Amer-
ican Education (Harvard, 1964), p. 26.

we shall have occasion to sample more of their work
in the chapters which follow. At this point we can
note that, for example, Scheffler's philosophical
technique used to develop such views as we have seen,
to point to the proper goal of education as the devel-
opment of rationality, is not accepted by all compet-
ent thinkers, even as it is set forth in his power-
ful new book (37). The definition of 'rationality'
there given - '...rationality is co-extensive with
the relevance of reasons' (38) is not so convincing-
ly argued for or so philosophically obvious that it
commands the assent of all, even of those professing
analytical sympathies.

One particular abstention from the 'ordinary
language' brand of analysis favoured by Scheffler is
that made by a reviewer of his work, J.W.Yolton, who
says: 'Scheffler follows a familiar contemporary
technique of drawing distinctions and analysing the
uses and functions of our cognitive vocabulary...it
is important to ask whether that method reveals any-
thing about the nature of knowing, learning and bel-
ieving' (39), and then answers in terms which show
his greater sympathy for what we have called the

(37) Scheffler, I., Conditions Of Knowledge: Intro-
duction To Epistemology And Education (Chicago, 1965)
    (38) Ibid., p. 107
    (39) Yolton, J. W., Harvard Educational Review,
Vol. 36, p. 72, Winter 1966

'positivistic' kind of analysis (see p. 7, supra)
than for the 'linguistic' variety developed from
Wittgenstein, Ryle and Austin, and encountered fre-
quently in Scheffler (Though it must be noted that
Scheffler has another role as a prominent philosopher
of science, and in his work here veers oddly towards
the 'positivistic' sector!)

A second negative reaction to the cognitivist
position, this time with reference to Peters' main
thesis as expressed in his now-famous 'Initiation'
lecture, is given by J.E.McClellan, an American
thinker not to be lightly dismissed when talking on
either philosophy or education: he says, 'I am not
convinced that his three criteria define the concept
of education', and suggests that Peters is offering
no more than a Stevensonian 'persuasive definition',
which is entirely different from the intended dis-
closure of the essential meaning of the term. He
continues: 'I am persuaded that his conservative
ideals would promote a good education but not that
they define the term' (40).

A final example, taken from many available, can
be linked with this charge, that 'conservatism' in
education is being concealed within the revolution
in philosophy: and it is the comment of one who sees
himself less as a philosopher of education than as a

(40) McClellan, J. E., Harvard Educational Review,
Vol 35, p. 100, Winter 1965

humble 'educationist' concerned lest innovation in educational theory, made on no matter what impregnable philosophical grounds, has reactionary practical effects. T.W.Eason comments on the cognitivist position of Hirst, as delivered to a gathering of educationists, expressing admiration at the power of this performance within what we have termed the 'official' position, and at the same time suggesting certain dangers: 'But we must plainly watch like hawks to ensure that the new stress on the structure of knowledge, on the importance of environmental stimulation, and on the costly effort which achievement demands, does not father a new dreariness and formalism. Especially any theoretical flaw which might in later days and cruder hands exaggerate any such tendency to the steriley academic is to be guarded against. My fear is that Professor Hirst's otherwise impeccable account of the "forms of knowledge" left no place for "personal knowledge" - the kind that he himself had of his audience - and fhr that matter that his audience, as they listened, had of his scintillating exposition. A blind spot here would have interesting theoretical consequences. Professor Hirst is a very distinguished English philosopher: but I am still wondering if he is wrong or right about this' (41).

(41) Eason, T. W., 'The Nature Of Educational Theory', Education For Teaching, Vol. 69, p. 52, February 1966

The basis of Eason's doubts, and his determination to be vigilant in case there are 'theoretical flaws' not at the moment apparent in this position, lies in his different philosophical commitment, which has clearly existentialist aspects to it and so cannot be pursued here. What it is important to learn from these examples of abstention from the viewpoint which is currently fashionable is that being commonly accepted cannot be equated, so far as philosophy is concerned, with being true; and that there do exist other commitments, analytical as well as existentialist, which generate alternative viewpoints on the philosophical problems of education. We have previously suggested (See p. 59, supra) that this is a good thing, if truth is the sole object of enquiry; so that, on the basis of this belief, we can, to end this chapter, return to the ethical sector, from which we digressed to make some more general points about rationality in education, in order to recall the 'open' nature of the debate. We can remind ourselves of the sceptic's position, a not insubstantial alternative to that which, emphasising the place of reason in ethics, tends to dominate educational thinking and so, by an enthusiastic consensus, to run the risk of obscuring any of Eason's 'theoretical flaws' that may exist.

It is argued that in justifying value judgments we appeal to rules and standards which are themselves justified by a further appeal to higher rules and

standards, and so on. We involve ourselves in a process that has an either/or outcome: it either goes on forever, logically speaking, or it comes to an end at some point. But if it goes on, there can be no logical justification, by definition; and if it ceases, someone in the discussion must make the decision as to where it ceases, and is thus making an arbitrary decision, and that it is always possible for another person to deny the reasonableness of stopping there. This is the point at which the cognitivist talks of the presuppositions of the very language we are using and the definition of 'rationality' in terms of its limits, and at which the sceptic maintains that, whereever there are different people, people will differ in their valuations; that the way of life advocated, for example, by the later Nietzsche idolizing force cannot be demonstrated by rational means to be inferior to that of, say, a moderate, non-aggressive Spinoza.

The sceptic's assumption, which the cognitivist denies, is that the reasoning involved in reaching this ultimate point at which irreducible differences show, is the kind of deduction familiar in mathematics and logic, which eventually, in this process, becomes exhausted, leaving fundamental decisions and commitments to be declared, with all the possible variety of fundamental preferences to be expected amongst human beings whose life experiences are un-

ique. The cognitivist responds by placing the emphasis differently - on the _similarity_ of human experience, the public articulation of which is the language or languages in which knowledge of various sorts is 'stored': he argues that the serious use of any of these languages, including moral language, commits a person to the presuppositions of their very existence, that is, in this context, to the possibility of obtaining non-subjective moral knowledge and the possibility of resolving moral conflict by argument.

Both philosophical positions are tenable, though at the moment the cognitivist is heard most in educational circles. His counterarguments to the sceptic do not, however, assume the same preponderance in the world of 'pure' philosophy for, at their core, they involve a rejection or 'loosening' of the firmest distinction to be found in modern philosophy - the analytic/synthetic dichotomy. The cognitivist denies that 'reasoning' can only take place according to the two two ways enshrined in that dichotomy - the ways of mathematics and science. He denies that verification must be a form of scientific verification and that validation must be according to the pattern of mathematical validation. In his view, the models provided by these disciplines blind us, because of their great success, to the unique charcteristics of reasoning as it actually takes place in other areas - for example in moral discussion.

Preconceptions, taken over from mathematics and science, about what constitutes an acceptable logical pattern, force us into the error of attempting to fit moral reasoning into that restricted pattern: what we should be doing is to look for the pattern as it actually exists. This is the core of the argument; but to pursue it further (It has already been minimlly developed in a different context during the examination of Taylor's views in the first chapter) would be to stray too far from the theme of philosophy's analytical involvement in education and into the heart of philosophical controversy about the acceptibility of post-Wittgensteinian views on the nature of language.

Suffice it to say that what educational thinking receives from analyticàl philosophy, now that the interest of philosophers is aroused, depends upon the totality of views which that kind of philosophy has to offer; and that, in the mid nineteensixties, it offers no less variety than that which continuing internal disputes necessitate. Any other impression given by the fact that those philosophers most keenly interested in the educational relevance of their work tend to hold the similar cognitivist position which has hitherto featured largely in our account, would probably be, in the long run, a false one; for in philosophy there is always the possibility, or even the probability, of the undiscovered

'theoretical flaw' which only critical philosophising between conflicting viewpoints can reveal. In the important sector of ethics and morality which we have been considering at some length there is clearly plenty of room for continued debate.

So we pass to another aspect of our theme, one which, because it is centred upon characteristics of _educational_ discourse, will not initially involve us in reference to the pure philosophical background on which we have had to draw in our investigation of ethics and morality. Nevertheless, we must remember that there is _always_ this background to be taken into account, no matter how restricted the enquiry may seem to be, and that what we have just emphasised about its varied nature is indirectly important even where its implications for a particular chapter of our account is not stressed. We turn then to examine the use of analogy, metaphor and models in educational theory.

THE USE OF ANALOGY, METAPHOR AND MODELS
IN EDUCATIONAL THEORY

Early Identification Of The Use -
Hardie And Black

We return to Hardie once again for our point of
departure into this sector of enquiry, with the same
intention of sampling later work on a topic which he
was the first to identify as important, in order to
continue showing the 'bearing' by a cross-referencing
of examples. The names with which we are now famil-
iar will, of course, reappear in this chapter; for
any account which apportioned less than a major por-
tion of its substance to this handful of philosophers
would be misleading. Nevertheless there are others
who have developed and are continuing to develop, in
increasing numbers, the important ideas with which
this chapter is concerned; and two of their contrib-
utions, one from the early and one from the later
stage, of the period in question, will be briefly
mentioned as typical instances.

In recalling the point in Hardie at which the in-
vestigation into ethics began (See p. 21, supra), we
note that the original bypassing of an 'ought' occ-
urred during his analysis of the 'Nature' theory of
education; and it is from this that we can abstract
a theme which has received considerable attention

during the last few tears. Hardie cosiders the
truth of the first of his own substituted propos-
itions and, in so doing, identifies for the first
time the use of analogy in educational theory. He
says: '...those educationists who put forward the
proposition which we are considereing maintain...
that the initial state of the child and the laws
which govern the interaction between the state and
the environment are analagous to the seed of a plant
and the laws which govern the interaction between
the seed and the environment... They regard the pro-
cess of education as analagous to...certain natural
processes...as analagous to certain processes which
occur in the World of Nature. The teacher should
thus act as a gardener who affords a plant every
opportunity for "natural" growth, and should not act
like a gardener who attempts to do something "un-
natural" with a plant. The crucial question for
such a view of education is how far does the anal-
ogy hold?' (1).

This question - How far does the analogy hold?
- is of great importance for the philosophical clar-
ification of educational theories, for such theories,
as held in the minds of educationists, are almost
always analogical in nature - a fact not commonly
understood by enthusiastic practitioners too imm-

(1) Hardie, C. D., Truth And Fallacy In Educat-
ional Theory (Cambridge, 1942), pp. 3-4

ersed in activity to be critical of the language
they use to justify it. Hardie does a service to ed-
ucational theory by disclosing the problem; though
this service is not equalled, for reasons connected
with the limitations of his philosophical background
which we have already stated, by a similar service in
showing where this _particular_ analogy breaks down.
But to reveal philosophy's role here is a praise-
worthy contribution and we can pass from it, ignor-
ing the rather mechanical and limited procedure of
Hardie's own analysis of the 'Nature' theory, to other
answers given to the general philosophical questions:
What is the part played by analogy, metaphor and mod-
els in educational theory?; Which types are most
common and what can be said for and against them as
explanatory devices?

The first question - concerning the role of, say,
metaphor in educational language - receives its most
thorough answer from Scheffler, who notes that the
professional philosopher's attention can be most app-
ropriately directed to such language for the purpose
of '....a cool examination (which) may facilitate the
discovery of...controlling analogies usually suppressed
in practice' (2). His views, expressed in a fully
developed form quite recently, must constitute the
core of any findings in this sector; but there are

(2) Scheffler, I. (Ed.), _Philosophy and Educat-
ion_ (Boston, 1958), p. 13

earlier contributions, ones of which is so close in
time to that of the pioneering work of Hardie, and
so close, too, in the attitude it takes to tradit-
ional educational 'philosophy' and, particularly,
to the 'Nature' theorists examined by Hardie, that
it warrants mention.

Writing independently in an American philosophical
journal of 1944, Max Black suggests that some sense
can be made of the '...elastic generalities'and resound-
ing platitudes' (3) of traditional educational the-
ories only if it is understood that they contain
certain persuasive analogies which serve to give
direction to the thought expressed in the theories
and which are accepted because the similarities
which they highlight - between the educational pro-
cess and some other familiar activity - are so ob-
viously correct. Black argues that the suggested
likenesses are in fact valid but are limited in
each particular case: by means of them it is poss-
ible to organize reflection in a <u>preliminary</u> sort of
way, but this reflection is bound to be one-sided.
He suggests the deliberate creation of a variety of
analogies which together will elucidate the nature
of the educational process in question by providing
views of it from many directions and so by giving
an overall picture of its uniqueness.

(3) Black, M., 'Education As Art And Discipline'
in Sceffler, I. (Ed.), <u>Philosophy and Education</u> (Bos-
ton, 1958), p. 33. (Originally in <u>Ethics</u> Vol. LIV,
pp. 290-94, 1944)

The 'Nature' theorists' analogy, identified by
Hardie, which emphasises the likeness of a child to
a 'natural' biological organism such as a garden
plant, is partially valid; that is, it is part of
the whole truth about the child's situation. Partic-
ularly is this the case when its use is appraised in
the historical context of its appearance in educat-
ional theory; for, as Black says, 'Emphasis upon non-
interference with "natural" growth was once the fit-
tinf expression of revolt against a repressive author-
itarianism'. But it is not, by itself, such a large
part of the truth as its 'child-centred' proponents
believe, for, as Black adds, '...today it is all too
often a symptom of the abdication of the teacher's
responsibility. It may well be that the overworked
analogy of the biological organism has served its
purpose and that the time has come to experiment
with alternative "root" metaphors' (4).

Black thus gives what can be called a 'context-
ual...ot interpretation of the use of analogy in educ-
ational discourse, an interpretation based upon the
understanding mentioned above (See p. 18, supra) -
that the meaning of an expression is its use and can
therefore be comprehended only by going beyond the
words themselves into the intentions of the users of
the expressions as they function in a particular soc-
ial context. This is a great improvement on Hardie's

(4) Ibid., pp. 32-33

approach, as is shown by the inferiority of Hardie's restricted <u>non</u>-contextual analysis of the 'Nature' analogy to that of Black from the point of view of the theoretical implications each has. There is nothing in Hardie to equal the constructiveness of Black's own suggested analogy of education as art and discipline, a most impressive example of a philosopher of some subtlety experimenting with an alternative 'root metaphor' and anticipating by fifteen years one of the surest avenues into education taken by later analytical philosophers. And to these we can proceed, leaving the details of a particular analogy for a systematic account of analogy in general.

Later Investigations Of The Logic Of Analogy

In a sense, both Hardie and Black, working without a tradition to guide them, act as philosophically orientated educational <u>theorists</u> in spite of their awareness that philosophy has a distinctive role to play and their attempts to define it. That is, their work lacks, in comparison with that of later writers, a systematic and specifically <u>philosophical</u> account of the logic of analogy, being concerned primarily with criticizing old or creating new analogical theories of education. In contrast, Scheffler is a more consciously philosophical commentator, intentionally developing a 'second order' view of this aspect of

educational discourse along with the many other asp-
ects subsumed under the comprehensive title ('The
Language Of Education') which his influential book
bears. (5).

His analysis of the logic of analogy contains,
as we shall see, the 'contextual' element which we
have noted in the work of Black, and this suggests
one of those common but always interesting situations
in philosophy in which a viewpoint can be brought to
bear upon itself, with paradoxical results. (As P.W.
Bridgman puts it: '...whenever we have a system
dealing with itself we may expect to encounter mal-
adjustments and infelicities, if not downright para-
dox' (6)). We can briefly note this before describ-
ing the details of Scheffler's analysis. He stresses
throughout all his work the use of language in a
particular context; and this is an emphasis which binds
together the various aspects of his work and links
him, as we have seen, with Peters. Thus, the 'cog-
nitivist' approach to education which we have already
examined under its ethical aspect and which, as we
have seen, centres upon Scheffler, Peters, Hirst and
and their talk of 'initiation' and 'forms of knowledge'
can be interpreted 'contextually' as an expression of
the revolt against the excesses of child-centred educ-
ationists, who themselves, according to the same 'con-

(5) Scheffler, I., The Language Of Education (Spr-
ingfield, Illinois, 1960)
(6) Bridgman, P. W., The Way Things Are (Harvard,
1959), p. 7

textual' view, were at one time legitimately reacting against authoritarianism in education. Eason's doubts (see p. 103, supra) perhaps express the intuitive feelings of one who senses the paradox!

But to return to Scheffler's present work: he carefully distinguishes metaphors from the two other kinds of linguistic expressions which occur frequently in educational discourse and to which they are related - the more formal definitions and the less formal slogans - in order to clarify the logic of their operation. He says: 'Metaphors are not normally intended to express the meanings of terms used, either in standard or in stipulated ways...Metaphorical statements often express significant and surprising truths, unlike stipulations which express no truths at all, and unlike descriptive definitions, which normally fail to surprise...Like slogans in being unsystematic and lacking a standard form of expression, they nevertheless have a much more serious theoretical role. They cannot generally be considered as mere fragments crystallizing the key attitudes of some social movement, or symbolizing explicit parent doctrine' (7).

Metaphors are thus, in a sense, logically 'intermediate' between definitions, which purport to give meanings in a non-figurative, straightforward way,

(7) Scheffler, I., op. cit., p. 47

and slogans, the linguistic phenomena from the other
end of the scale, which feature as literally 'mean-
ingless' symbols for beliefs justified elsewhere.
Being midway they are, as it were, in touch with
both the language and the people using the language.
Significant parallels are suggested by metaphors
which, unlike slogans, attempt to state truths and
are so open to the kind of examination which can
reveal how successful they have been and what their
limitations are. As any and everykh two things in
the universe are alike in some way, merely to state
a similarity is not by itself to make a serious con-
tribution to clarity: what distinguishes the kind of
metaphor Scheffler has in mind is that the likeness
it suggests is a non-trivial one which tends to gen-
erate practical activity along particular lines in
those who accept the parallel it suggests. For ex-
ample, if it is an important truth that children
are like plants, as the analogy built into the 'Nat-
ure' theory suggests, then the clear implication
for practice is that there be set up educational sit-
uations in which 'natural' growth can take place and
that teachers intervene no more than do gardeners in
this kindergarten process.

An important philosophical task is the probing
into such metaphors in order to reveal limitations
not obvious to those whose thought and action are
structured by them. The perspective of any metaphor

can be supplementd by the perspectives provided by
other, equally limited metaphors desdgned by the phil-
osopher conscious of this creative aspect of his
role. This is what Black asserts and what Scheffler
repeats in a more emphatic way when he suggests that
'...a comparison of alternative metaphors may be as
illuminating as a comparison of alternative theories,
in indicating the many-faceted character of the sub-
ject. Such a comparison may also provide a fesh sense
of the uniqueness of the subject, for to know in what
ways something is like many different things is to
know a good deal about what makes it distinctive,
different from each...where a particular metaphor is
dominant, comparison helps in determining its limit-
ations, and in opening up fresh possibilities of
thought and action' (8).

Scheffler follows this explanation of the funct-
ion of metaphors, and of the possibility of gaining
insights into education from a conscious attention
to this function, by inspecting several common ones
in order to note the limitations they must have. He
examines what he calls the 'growth' metaphor, ident-
ified, as we have seen, by Hardie; the 'moulding'
metaphor, whose different emphasis is obvious enough
from the term itself; the 'art' metaphor, one form of
which Black persuasively constructs during the body

(8) Ibid., pp. 48-9

of his article, throwing light on the educational
process from an unusual direction; and the 'organic'
metaphor, which, it can be noted, is of unusual con-
temporary significance because of the (unconscious)
influence it has within the new and dominant socio-
logy of education.

Scheffler's findings, of the more philosophical
kind which is our concern, are interesting for the
clear view they give us of his general position -
that of attempting to balance scientific with ordin-
ary language interests. First, there does not appear
to be, in his opinion, a progression amongst these
metaphors from the less to the more adequate: they
do not develop cumulatively as do the models used to
great effect in scientific theory. Second, the ad-
equacy of a metaphor can not, in Scheffler's view,
be judged apart from the complex practical context
in which it appears; so that the procedure of, say,
Hardie in isolating a metaphor for literal analysis
is too superficial. The context must be taken into
account - an analytical directive which emerges as
a major item in this as in other work of Scheffler,
and which he constantly repeats: '...education, as
we have stressed, is the common ground of a variety
of contexts. It is thus wise to be critical about
accepting metaphors in a given context that have
proved illuminating elsewhere...The transplantation
of metaphors may, indeed, be misleading inasmuch as

it may blur distinctions vital in the new context though unimportant in the old' (9).

The distinctions which Scheffler fears may be blurred are those between, on the one hand, moral and practical questions and, on the other, a variety of empirical and conceptual questions. In using metaphorical express-ions it is so easy to confuse logically distinct types of questions, to introduce value judgments unwittingly while talking in pictorial terms and to do so without a realization of the vast problem of their justification such as we have discussed in previous chapters. However, enough has been said on this topic to give an idea of how it appears to analytical philosophers. Enough, too, has been given to indicate Scheffler's views on the role of metaphor in educational discourse and to make his point about the complementarity of metaphors, a point which others have taken up in more detail.

Of these, C.J.Brauner and H.W.Burns, for example, can be briefly sampled in continuation of our policy of building up a composite picture of the 'bearing' in question. They give a penetrating description of the different ways of conceiving education, the school and the child which are built in to the four analogies of society and man which they identify and label.

(9) Ibid., pp. 52-3

The Beast in the Herd, the Noble Savage in the Jungle, the Shopper in the Market Place and the Shaper within an Organism are '...simple analogies which liken the unexaminable whole of an almost unknowable complex called "society" to something so simple and commonplace that everyone can grasp the basic principles that are supposed to be operating. These analogies are not necessarily separate or mutually exclusive. Frequently two or more are combined to account for a different aspect of what seems to occur'.(10)

They re-emphasise this point later, this time with reference to the 'man' rather than the 'society' aspect of their analogies: 'Each analogy of human nature...has something to say about what order is necessary by virtue of man's being what he is. Each of these analogies about the nature of human nature seeks to set out the pickets to mark how far order must extend' (11). So the insight of Black, developed by Scheffler, now appears in an introductory text for student teachers of the sixties, developed and illustrated in massive detail - a fact which is strong evidence of the growing influence of the relationship we are investigating in at least one of its dimensions.

For confirmation of this influence we turn, again,

(10) Brauner, C. J. and Burns, H. W., _Problems In Education And Philosophy_ (Englewood Cliffs, 1965), p. 90
(11) Ibid., pp. 132-3

to Peters, leading the field on this side of the At-
lantic and offering, in his inaugural address, thoughts
that are easy to relate to those we have been consid-
ering. A large part of the address consists of care-
ful analyses of certain analogies, metaphors or mod-
els which have played a major part in traditional
educational theory and practice, and which display,
according to Peters, objectionable limitations when
considered from the point of view of the practising
teacher in the classroom. To this person he offers
what we can call the 'complementarity' thesis, stress-
ing the limitations of any single analogy - 'Concept-
ually speaking...the "growth" model of education,
like the instrumental or moulding model, is a caric-
ature; though like all effective caricatures, it dis-
torts a face by emphasising some of its salient feat-
ures' (12).

The implication is a familiar one to us - that
we begin to see the face by studying many caricatures.
We are warned that for an educationist to '...shut
his ears arbitrarily to such different accounts is to
limit his view of the world - to take refuge in a
kind of monadic myopia' (13). Everything is what it
is and not some other thing says Peters, following
Bishop Butler, and what this thing is - its unique
charcteristics - may perhaps best be found by attend-

(12) Peters, R. S., 'Education as Initiation' in
Archambault, R. D. (Ed,), Philosophical Analysis and
Education (London, 1965), p. 95
    (13) Ibid., p. 87

ing to the similarities which aspects of it have to
other things: education is, in a sense, all that the
many pictures painted of it reveal.

But in another sense it is not, for what educat-
ion is cannot be found from pictures. Peters' inten-
tion is to construct, eventually, a positive account
of education on the basis of his criticism of the
onesidedness of the models that he is examining. In
order to elucidate the concept of 'education', that
is, to unravel its essential meaning in ordinary usage
(an objective which he frankly states in spite of the
disrepute in which certain forms of 'essentialism'
are held by philosophers), he has a prior involve-
ment in the examination of the more important educ-
ational metaphors. But he is not, he says, therefore
committed to the fabrication of an improved model which
will transcend the limitations of all the others by
combining only what is correct in each.

For Peters, like Scheffler, finds no progressive
improvement in the models which he inspects; and so,
again like Scheffler, he concludes his characteristic-
ally dialectical argument on this topic not with the
producing of a metaphor to outshine all other metaph-
ors, but with a declaration of non-analogical intent-
ion in keeping with the emphasis already noted in the
general points about 'education' to which his work in
ethics also leads. He says: 'Of course this account
will not itself present yet another model; for to pro-

duce such a model would be to sin against the glimm-
erings of light that may so far have flickered over
my treatment of the concept of 'education'. For, I
have claimed 'education' marks out no particular
type of transaction between teachers and learners;
it states criteria to which such transactions have
to conform' (14).

Having thus reached a point in this section of
our enquiry which is similar to that reached in an
earlier chapter, we can summarize our findings about
the role of metaphor before looking at the limitat-
ions of one in somewhat greater detail. It seems
that metaphors in educational discourse are to be
judged, on the evidence of the closely related anal-
yses that we have taken as our sample, as 'unstable'.
They can, on the one hand, quickly degenerate in use
to the slogan level once the social context which
endows them with meaning has changed beyond the point
of their relevance: they become anachronisms, not
worth serious attention. On the other hand, given
analytical attention of the kind practised by Peters
and Scheffler, they eventually lead such interested
philosophers to talk in non-metaphorical, non-figur-
ative terms; that is, to undertake as a main activity
to which analogy-inspection has served as preliminary,
the fully professional analysis of the concepts of

(14) Ibid., p. 102

'education' and 'teaching' as these are ordinarily
used; to become involved in what Scheffler describes,
in an earlier chapter of his which we shall examine
in our next, 'descriptive definition'.

Metaphor is thus, as has been said, 'intermediate'
between definition and slogan as these are described
in current work. It can perhaps be forecast that its
use in educational writings will be, now that <u>philos-
ophical</u> scrutiny is forcing a greater self-conscious-
ness about language , either greatly diminished or
more purposefully increased in one direction - that
which serves as an approach to the serious type of
conceptual clarification of which the philosophisings
of Peters and Scheffler which we have sampled are in-
stances. To ask more persistently which it will be
would be ito poach arguments from a later chapter to
which they more properly belong - the chapter concern-
ing the closely related but wider question of the nat-
ure of educational theory.

What can be done here is to select one influent-
ial metaphor for closer scrutiny. The total of those
already mentioned plus others which appear in the lit-
erature analysed by the already named philosophers
and others pursuing similar investigations is too
great to allow an examination of all, interesting as
that would be from the <u>educational</u> point of view.
For our purposes the important <u>philosophical</u> point
has been made - that metaphorical expressions abound

in educational writings, and that the characteristics
and use of such expressions are as have been stated:
these need to be recognised, so that the limitations
of metaphors in the theory have as few bad practical
consequences as possible.

The example taken will serve to show what such
consequences can be, for it is an example taken from
educational thinking which is currently widespread,
originating outside education in the rapidly expand-
ing and vigorous discipline of sociology, which is
so enthusiastically attempting to solve the problems
of society, including its educational problems, that
its pronouncements often lack the caution that a
philosopher looks for. As Peters says, drawing att-
ention to the dangers of sociological concepts operat-
ing in the minds of lay people: 'Sociologists assure
teachers that they have a role of acting as a social-
ising agency in the community...Teachers may be aff-
licted by a conceptual blight if they think too much
in terms of their socialising role...Education is
different from social work' (15).

For a detailed probing of sociological talk which
often relies heavily upon the acceptibilty of the
'organic' metaphor and has, because of this reliance,
the hidden and unwelcome implications for the practice
of teachers of which Peters warns, we can go first to

(15) Ibid., pp. 87 and 88

Scheffler, who, it will be remembered, includes this metaphor, which he regards as a more complex version of the 'growth' metaphor(to be found in Hardie), amongst the important ones that the interested philosopher can identify in educational theory.

The 'Organic' Metaphor, Sociology And Education

In the 'organic' metaphor, the culture of a society is taken as analogous to life in an individual organism, both the society and the individual maintaining themselves by a form of renewal and both displaying certain processes by means of which this equilibrium and continuity is effected. In the case of society, education is the 'life' process and its function is the transmission of the culture to new members of the group, particularly the young. Scheffler puts it thus: 'The organic metaphor assimilates education to the processes by which individuals take on the environing culture' (16), using the technical term 'assimilates' to forewarn us that everything is not philosophically satisfactory.

It is not that he is unwilling to see the point of the analogy in certain contexts; for example, in the context of anthropological, historical and psychological investigations designed to discover scientif-

(16) Scheffler, I., op. cit. (p. 115, supra), pp. 53-4

ic laws he is as content as any philosopher of science
to accept the use of this model-like device, for its
theoretical role is quite clear and/are appropriately
any dangers
guarded against. His concern is for the use of the
'organic' metaphor in contexts where the distinctions
he has mentioned earlier are of the greatest import-
ance and yet will not be made because of the blurring
effect of the metaphor. As he says: 'Nevertheless,
when the organic metaphor is transplanted into prac-
tical contexts in which social policy is at stake, it
may become positively misleading, since it makes no
room for distinctions that are of the highest import-
ance in practical issues'.'(17).

Moral distinctions cannot be made amongst the bio-
logical regenerative processes which give force to the
analogy: but it is precisely such moral distinctions
which lie at the heart of social controversy about
which cultural processes shall be used to maintain
continuity - whether it shall be 'teaching' in the
sense in which Scheffler defines it on the evidence
of common, standard usage, or some other form of cul-
tural transmission such as force, threat, propaganda
or the indoctrination that we touched upon earlier,
all of which are very effective in maintaining some
type of 'life' in a society analogous to that of an
organism.

(17) Ibid., p. 54

As we by now expect, this observation can be related to the work of Peters, amplifying the 'Peters-Scheffler' approach that we have previously adumbrated. The English philosopher is also eager to mark out the difference between education considered in its essence and other forms of socialisation: he lays a similar stress on the necessity of interpreting any pronouncements about education made by experts whose interests are mainly descriptive and theoretical in the context of practical activity, and underlines the dangers inherent in the lay interpretation of sociological talk.

He says: 'In the context in which the sociologist is speaking it may be quite clear what specific aspect of the teacher's role is being picked out. But the fact is that when these notions get noised abroad they are not always understood in the specific sense in which the sociologist may be using them. The teacher who hears that he is an agent of socialisation may come to think of himself as a sort of social worker striving in a very general sort of way to help children fit into society. He may get the impression that the teacher's task is not to educate children, in the sense in which I will later define it, but to concentrate on helping them to get on with others and to settle down contentedly to a simple job, healthy hobbies, and a happy home life' (18)

(18) Peters, R. S., op. cit. (p.122, supra), p. 90

The very meaning of what the sociologist says
when his views are expressed in terms of, for example,
the 'organic' metaphor, is different for the non-soc-
iologist – and this includes the teacher and, more
particularly, the student teacher in training who
picks up a smattering of knowledge from the new soc-
iology of education – than it is for other sociologists,
trained in the proper use of this particular language.
The teacher interprets, according to this view, the
scientific concepts he comes across as best he can
in terms of whatever practical implications he can
derive from them; and he will, in this case, come to
think of his job in too simple and amoral terms.

Social processes are not as the 'organic' meta-
phor implies they are – as little subject to choice
and control as biological processes. But the misled
teacher will make this mistake in thinking, resting
content with a limited task that has nothing to do
with education and teaching as these appear from the
'Peters-Scheffler' viewpoint, and will not be active
in choosing alternatives to the particular process
he finds being urged upon him in the name of social
science. In this way, discussion, argument and con-
troversy over social policy will be reduced because
of a false belief, engendered by metaphorical express-
ions, in the minds of those who should contribute ab-
ove all others to the debate. Misguided teachers will
be less disposed to offer a personal, critical voice

to the necessary talk about what education should be attempting and about the content of the culture and the methods of its transmission. They will come to regard as inevitable a particular kind of schooling, on the assumption that what the sociologists say about the function of education and the role of the teacher is true; and in this way the assumption will become classically self-fulfilling, as we shall presently see with a notable case in contemporary English education.

Scheffler himself reaches the main conclusion towards which both he and Peters invariably move - that the manner in which modes of behaviour and belief are acquired is of the utmost importance - following a detailed and incisive analysis of the 'organic' metaphor which we can follow for the example it sets of the philosophical analyst at his most capable. He starts with the notion of 'cultural continuity', an essential element in the analogy. Unless, he argues, we can state a standard for cultural continuity at least as clear and uncontroversial as that used by biologists to measure the continuity of an individual organism, we just cannot be clear as to how education contributes to continuity at all, for we do not really know what we are talking about. It is a simple case of questions of meaning preceding questions of truth in a language situation where this fact is likely to be hidden from view.

What do we mean by 'same' when, for example,
when we say that a culture remains the same or ceases
to be the same; that is, when we claim either that
there is or there is not cultural continuity? Unless
we are clear about this, unless we can specify 'same-
ness', we cannot meaningfully talk of the education
which is supposed to ensure the continuity – it could
be anything from brainwashing to morally sensitive
rational procedures. As Scheffler puts it: 'The con-
tinuity of any culture may be furthered in different,
and conflicting ways, in accord with different stand-
ards of continuity that may be chosen. It is such
differences between standards that are of moral, hence
practical significance, though all such standards are
compatible with talk of cultural continuity in the
abstract' (19).

Further, even if we do specify cultural continuity,
the use of the term 'function' in stating that the
function of education is to maintain cultural contin-
uity involves us in other difficulties, in that we
have not a clear notion of the 'normal' working of a
culture implied by that term, whereas we do have such
a notion, in biological science, of the 'normal' work-
ing of an individual organism sufficiently acceptable
to investigators in the field, whose interests are
descriptive and not moral. Even if we make a further
specification and make the notion of 'function' as clear

(19) Scheffler, I., op. cit., p. 55

in the cultural situation as it is in the biological
situation, we are still bedevilled by the ordinary
language overtones of the term which Scheffler ident-
ifies - '...Nevertheless the moral distinctions that
are uppermost in issues of educational and social
policy contexts are omitted from the picture. What
is worse, the positive moral connotation of the term
"function" (which derives, perhaps, from its relat-
ion to biologically satisfactory working which is
generally favoured) suggests that the notion of soc-
ial function also implies moral value' (20).

It is interesting to note that Scheffler here
states a truth which is well enough known to the
more philosophically minded of sociologists, eager
to establish their discipline on a conceptually
sound basis, but one which unfortunately tends to be
ignored in the writings of enthusiastic sociologists
of education as they make their confident contribution
in ignorance of its philosophical naivety. (21) We
can confirm this by quoting an admirable passage from
one such 'pure' sociologist, T.B.Bottomore, who is as
alive as any to the need for restraining claims of a
science which is still methodologically in its infancy
and thus dependent on u on the philosopher for concept-
ual guidance.

(20) Ibid., p. 56
(21) See, for example, Musgrave, P. W., The Socio-
logy of Education (London, 1965), for a persuasive
introductory text which adopts a suspect 'functional-
ist' approach.

He says: '...because the concept of function is
based upon an analogy between social life and organic
life, it may be argued that the analogy is not suff-
iciently close for functionalism, so far as it prov-
ides explanations at all, to provide valid explanat-
ions of social phenomena. The analogy presents sev-
eral difficulties: societies change their structure
while organisms do not; it is impossible to determine
the health or sickness of societies in the way that
can be done for organisms, and consequently it is im-
possible to speak precisely about the "normal" and
"pathological" functioning of the "organs", or about
"function" and "dysfunction" (in fact, all such ways
of speaking about societies involve value judgments);
it is difficult to determine the function of a social
activity or institution with the same precision as
the function of organs is determined in biology by
the examination of numerous instances (and in the
organic world there is, moreover, a one-to-one corres-
pondence between organ and function which does not seem
to hold in the social world' (22)

We can take a comcrete example to illustrate the
point of such critiques of the 'organic' metaphor.
In a totalitarian state, for instance, cultural 'con-
tinuity' could be defined (perhaps in the 1984 'New-
speak' dictionary !) in terms of a consistently docile

(22) Bottomore, T. B., <u>Sociology. A Guide To Prob-</u>
<u>lems And Literature</u> (London, 1962), p. 39

attitude on the part of the people; that is, as long
as there are no complaints in word and action about
the way things are it can be said that the culture
remains the 'same'. 'Normal' working of the culture
is that in which there is no opposition to the dictat-
orship: there are no strikes, demonstrations, demands
for a free press, subversive organisations etc. In
such a social situation the processes necessary to
maintain this state of affairs - that is the process
of 'education' on the 'transmission of culture' anal-
ogy - will include all those evils familiar enough to
any spectator of twentieth century history: the meth-
ods of terror and indoctrination associated with the
Nazi regime, the 're-education' of Spanish anarchists
and Russian deviationists and all the paraphernalia
of mind control described by Koestler, Orwell and
others.

Most certainly the function of education under
such totalitarian circumstances is to ensure contin-
uity, for the processes defined as 'education' and
the 'continuity' as specified are set up together,
making any argument about education and the trans-
mission of culture logically impregnable: if any
process which is indispensable for the achievement of
prescribed goals is to be called 'education', then
'education' by definition has the function of trans-
mitting culture. But all this misses the point urged
from the 'Peters-Scheffler' position, for it obscures

and blurs the all important distinctions between different processes of transmission which can only emerge, in their view, from an awareness of what 'education' means in its ordinary usage. As Scheffler says, with reference to this, his own, totalitarian example: 'It does not follow that such processes ought to be employed or approved. It does not follow, either, that dictatorships ought to work normally or satisfactorily in the specified sense, i.e., that they ought to be unopposed. The moral issues are not only not stressed in social "function" statements, but are often confused by the socially irrelevant connotation of value surrounding the term "function"' (23).

There are examples of a less extreme nature than this totalitarian one chosen by Scheffler to make his point in as stark a way as possible; and, particularly, there is the example from contemporary English education mentioned above (p. 131). This concerns the brief history and inglorious fate of the Secondary Modern school in a society geared to industry, competition and education-based social mobility. From the late nineteen fifties onwards these schools increasingly used methods of 'education' of a narrow, unthinking sort under the pressure from parents, industrialists and pupils themselves for examinations designed

(23) Scheffler. I., op. cit., p. 56

to provide the paper qualifications which a competitive society equates with educational success. Very many of the teachers in these schools showed either their 'fear of freedom' or their acceptance of the social values implied by the pressures in willingly allowing themselves to be involved in the kind of examination dominated system which rapidly evolved, taking often a leading part in the extension of it, within schools, from the level of higher-ability pupils down to the less able for whom examinations would appear, on any sane view, to be totally irrelevant.

This whole phenomenon has been described by the sociologists as the inevitable movement back on to a course dictated by social realities of schools set up in a post-war ethos of educational 'idealism' and experimentalism. The function of the school and the educational system as a social ladder to success will determine, they argue, the sort of education demanded ; and unrealistic objectives such as were originally set up for the Secondary Modern schools when there was much fine talk of giving a meaningful education to less able children are bound to be overwhelmed by the working out of the facts of social life. (24).

The phenomenon can, however, be described in an

(24) See Taylor, W., The Secondary Modern School (London, 1963)

alternative way, in keeping with the philosophical points made above about the teacher's job. If too many teachers fail to grasp that, in Scheffler's words, '...the teacher has obligations that are in- dependent of social continuity in various prevalent senses', (25), of which one is that which is presupp- osed in the pressure for certificates of success in a competitive school system, they will not be intell- ectually armed to resist such pressures, will come to believe what lies behind them and will, perhaps with- out really knowing it, abdicate the moral responsib- ility that - so it is argued on this philosophical view - is built in to the very notion of 'teaching'. If a Secondary Modern teacher <u>believes</u> that he can personally do nothing about the mode of education which his school is adopting under pressure from outside and with, initially, <u>some</u> sympathy within, then he will, in fact, do nothing and what was assum- ed to be inevitable fulfils itself and <u>becomes</u> inevit- able.

At the present time in England there is an attempt originating at a high level to recall teachers to the responsibilities they have to be <u>educators</u> and to bring their own critical, rational selves to the bus- iness of setting up objectives, framing syllabuses and devising teching methods. The creation of the Cert-

(25) Scheffler, I., op. cit., p. 57

ificate of Secondary Education, the theoretical work
backing it and the subsequent investigations and pub-
lications of the Schools Council can be taken as a
contemporary illustration of what Scheffler would
favour in denying that, '...teachers ought, by any
means and above all, to adjust students to the pre-
vailing culture (specified in any way you like) and
to ensure its continuity (no matter how specified)' (26).

For whether teachers ought or ought not to adjust,
say, Secondary Modern pupils to our prevailing culture
defined in terms of technological foundations, indus-
trial production, vocational training, competition in
and after examinations and all the other characterist-
ics suggested by the apt term 'rat-race', is a moral
question which requires the constant, serious attent-
ion of those most concerned, along the lines which,
as we saw at length in earlier chapters, it is poss-
ible to give it. Such a question receives no emphasis
in the 'organic' metaphor which is embedded in, at
least, much of the sociologically influenced think-
ing done in and around education during recent years;
and for that reason the metaphor is, as Scheffler
shows with the lucidity that goes only with philos-
ophical analysis, inappropriate in the practical
contexts in which it is too often found.

To have revealed the limitations of the 'organic'

(26) Ibid., p. 58

metaphor is to have demonstrated the bearing of mod-
ern analytical philosophy on educational theory in
an area that clearly has need of the philosopher's
special skills, an area that vibrates with the activ-
ities of another and less cautious kind of specialist.
As Scheffler makes plain at the outset, educational
discourse is different from, say, sociological dis-
course and the latter cannot be transplanted whole-
sale into the former without the 'sea change' that
only the philosopher can describe, for it is a pecul-
iarly complex discourse which '...embraces a number
of different contexts, cutting across the scientific,
the practical, and the ethical spheres, which lend a
variety of colors and emphases to ostensibly common
notions. A fundamental task of analysis would thus
seem to be the disentangling of different contexts
in which education is discussed and argued, and the
consideration of basic ideas and appropriate logical
criteria relevant to each' (27)

Once again, we find here the expression of ideas
arising out of one part of our enquiry - the use of
analogy, metaphor and models in educational theory -
which are, being more general, best left for discuss-
ion in another part; that is, in the later chapter
which, as mentioned (see p. 125, supra), investigates
the nature of educational theory from psitions altern-

(27) Ibid., p. 9

ative to that implied in the last quotation and lab-
elled, for convenience, the 'Peters-Scheffler' posit-
ion. But before pursuing that wider topic we can
make an immediate extension from what we have consid-
ered in this chapter into closely related themes which
enable us to redress the philosophical balance of this
account, in that there is post-Schefflerian work of
some importance being undertaken on the two language
features which he examines in conjunction with metaphor
- slogans and definitions - that presents a different
emphasis to that of the predominant 'Peters-Scheffler'
approach, an emphasis more in keeping with the 'pos-
itivistic' element in Hardie and O'Connor, but devel-
oped more rigorously.

The following chapter - mainly on definitions and
concepts in education, rather than on the associated
theme of slogans which have received sufficient inc-
idental mention - will, towards the end , give great-
er weight to the scientifically orientated 'positiv-
istic' approach, not because it occupies a major part
of the current literature but because of its possible
importance for the future development of the new dis-
cipline away from the 'official', 'linguistic'emphasis
which characterises it and the account we have been
giving of it at the present moment. We can continue
to follow the procedure which has enabled us to enter
the literature with some profit by returning once more
to Hardie for a brief cue into later developments: and
this will be found at the point at which we commenced
our investigation into the use of analogy.

TWO PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACHES TO DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS IN EDUCATION

The Predominant 'Linguistic' Approach

In Hardie there are many cues to be found for introducing later developments of this theme, cues which occur at points in his argument all the way from the last place at which we used him to the final chapter of his book. And it is to this, the positive end-product of all his earlier criticisms, that we can go to find, within his discussion of what elements any educational theory must contain, remarks on definitions in edueation which provide an effective springboard for a further comparative study, particularly of the work of Scheffler, taken as representative of the 'linguistic' approach, one of the two approaches with which this chapter will deal.

Hardie is conscious of the numerous definitions of education that have been given, three of which he has analysed before coming to the point of suggesting the 'second order', philosophical investigation which must precede any additional definition being offered as superior and more comprehensive than the rest; he says, '...we must find out how we decide whether a definition is right or wrong. It is, for example, sometimes held that we can define words as we please, so long as we do not depart from our defined meaning.

On the other hand, it is sometimes held that it is not words that we define but things or concepts, and definitions therefore cannot be arbitrary' (1).

He tries to mediate this controversy through an analysis of one type of what he distinguishes as 'bi-verbal definition' (2), arguing that such definitions - for example, 'man is a rational animal' - consist of <u>two</u> kinds of proposition in conjunction, a proposition of what he chooses to call 'social history' and a proposition which expresses the 'command' of the person giving the definition (3). To state how you think a word has been used in the past - that is, to define in terms of a word's 'social history' - is to risk being wrong, for there are no grounds for disputing the <u>facts</u> of past usage. But to express one's own intentions about the definition of a word is to do something entirely different: no one can object to a word being used in an odd fashion, without reference to its social history, provided that the use is consistent.

Hardie then relates these preliminary remarks, which it will be noted neatly dispose of the problem by interpreting 'real' definitions in terms of social conventions, to the problem of defining education. For a completely satisfactory definition, he says, '... we must give all the marks which have been thought

(1) Hardie, C. D., <u>Truth and Fallacy in Education-al Theory</u> (Cambridge, 1942), p. 67
(2) Ibid., p. 67
(3) Ibid., p. 68

characteristic of it, and then agree to use the word "education" only for a process having those character- istic marks' (4). In other words, we must survey the social history of the term 'education', identify the main features of that history, bring them together and make the decision to limit the use of the term to what we find as the 'essence' of past usage.

This analysis, simple though it is, constitutes a first step along the path that Scheffler that was to tread more surely much later: we can attempt to relate the two with reference to what Scheffler calls 'general definitions' (5), to be distinguished from scientific definitions for much the same reasons that metaphors in educational theory are to be distinguish- ed from models in scientific theory, as we have seen. He says: 'We are interested, broadly, in non-scientif- ic discourses in which definitions of educational notions are offered...It makes no difference whether the definitions offered in such contexts are put for- ward on scientific authority or not; the important fact is that they are presented not as technical statements interwoven with special scientific res- earch and for theoretical purposes, but rather as general communications in a practical context' (6).

Scheffler is quick to isolate a type of defin- ition - the 'stipulative' - which at first sight appears to be partly equivalent to the second kind of proposition that Hardie says is present in a def-

(4),(5),(6) See p. 145, infra

inition, that which expresses a command or volition.
If the two types were equivalent we could give Hardie
more credit for early originality than is possible as
things stand, but they are not, as we shall see in
shifting the examination to Scheffler, whose analysis
reveals strongly the influence of those developments
in 'pure' philosophy which have taken place, as was
mentioned earlier, since Hardie's early days.

A stipulative definition is, according to Scheff-
ler, '...a piece of terminological legislation that
does not purport to reflect the previously accepted
usage of the defined term' (7); that is, it has no
connection with what Hardie calls 'social history',
being often, in fact, an <u>invented</u> term and free of
entanglement, even when it is not invented, with
common usage - which Hardie's 'arbitrary' element
(see pp. 142-3, supra) is certainly not. The motive
for making such definitions is purely the convenience
of having abbreviatory terms for the sake of economy;
as, for example, with the shorthand terms of teachers
such as 'pass' or 'credit', which are handy equival-
ents of rather complicated descriptions that <u>could</u>
be given in full for the papers in question.

    (4) Ibid., p. 70
    (5) Scheffler, I., <u>The Language Of Education</u>
(Springfield, Illinois, 1960), p. 13
    (6) Ibid., p. 12
    (7) Ibid., p. 13

In what sense 'stipulative' definitions can be
said to be arbitrary Scheffler makes clear, for it is
a point of some importance to the exposition of other
kinds of definition later, which are of great import-
ance in education and which must be distinguished
from those that he identifies at first. He says:
'What is...fundamental with regard to all stipulative
definitions is that they do not purport to reflect the
predefinitional usage of the terms they define...
Once it is established that a stipulative definition
...is formally coherent and pragmatically well-chosen,
it is irrelevant to argue against it further on the
ground that it fails to reflect the normal meaning
of the defined term. In this special sense, stipul-
ative definitions may be said to be matters of arbi-
trary choice' (8).

That this 'arbitrary' choice is different from the
'arbitrary' element noted by Hardie can be seen in
considering the next type of definition that Scheff-
ler distinguishes, for this type - the 'descriptive'
definition - is connected with previous usage in a
way that Hardie attempts in his too crude a fashion
and with his too restricted analytical tools to un-
cover. Descriptive definitions, according to Scheff-
ler, purport to give an account of the prior usage of
the terms in question; they clarify meanings by look-

(8) Ibid., p. 15

ing at 'social history', genuinely _explaining_ and
not merely, as 'stipulative' definitions do, abbrev-
iating. Scheffler puts the difference in this way:
'If we visualize the definition as a formula, after
the fashion of modern logic, in which the defined
term...appears at the left and the defining...set of
terms appears at the right..., then we may also vis-
ualize the difference...as a difference in the _direct-
ion_ of interest in the formula as a whole. Whereas
the interest in stipulation moves from right to left,
that is towards more condensed utterance with increas-
ed vocabulary, the interest in descriptive definition
moves from left to right, i.e., towards expanded ex-
planatory utterance with a smaller vocabulary' (9).

Hardie's 'social history' is thus roughly equiv-
alent to Scheffler's 'descriptive' definition, and
his 'command or volition concerning the use of words'
is an element which he correctly identifies but which
he fails to account for satisfactorily: it draws att-
ention to the fact that a particular aspect of an
often complicated prior usage is to be understood -
something which is extensively elaborated by Scheffler,
as we shall see in examining further his 'ordinary
language' approach to the definition of 'teaching'.
So, as with metaphor, we find here an example of the
earlier writer providing a first attempt at analysis

(9) Ibid., p. 16

in an area deemed to be of great importance by the later writer; and doing so in a manner which appears as comparatively unsophisticated and yet as not lacking certain virtues of rough approximation to the analytical truth.

Scheffler's contemporary analysis is too thorough to be followed in full, so that, for our purposes, it will be best to select those aspects of it which can be most easily related to the work of other philosophers, particularly Peters. His (and Peters') continual emphasis upon the <u>context</u> in which the language under examination appears is immediately in evidence, designed to correct any false impression given (by talk of 'formulae') that the analysis of definitions is a mechanical affair. He warns, '...a given definitional equation may serve either as a stipulation or as a descriptive definition, depending on the context in which it is offered and the purposes which it is intended to serve; the difference is thus not a formal or purely linguistic one but relates rather to the pragmatic environment of the definition. If and only if the definitional equation purports to mirror predefinitional usage is it descriptive' (10).

Such mirroring of usage is precisely what he himself claims to be doing, at a later stage of the argument of this book, with the concept of 'teaching',

(10) Ibid., p. 17

aspects of which we have already noted when they arose in our discussion of metaphor. He is there showing in _use_ a philosophical technique, the logic of which he is here describing when he says: '(Descriptive definitions) may be formulated in cases where the term is already being applied proficiently to instances, the point being to distil the guiding principle of such application and to show its interconnection with others. This last sort of enterprise is characteristically philosophical, exemplified in the work of many thinkers since Socrates, whose attempt was precisely to formulate general characterizations covering known instances of important terms' (11).

Thus, a consideration of definition soon brings us to the same emphasis upon a general _philosophical_ position that we have been brought to on a number of occasions before – to the predominant 'linguistic', 'ordinary language', 'official', 'Peters-Scheffler' or call it what you will position which is ubiquitous in the literature. The very terms used are pointers to its presence; for Scheffler's 'distil' brings to mind Peters' 'essence' and the moment when he, too, stakes out the philosopher's claim with a similar emphasis on _contextual_ considerations. He asks, '... (I)s a philosopher who embarks on such a task (i.e., conceptual clarification) committed to the suspect conviction shared by Socrates that there is some "ess-

(11) Ibid., p. 17

ence" of education which conceptual analysis can ex-
plicate?...have I already put my foot on the primrose
path that leads to essentialism?...Frankly I do not
mind if I have. What would be objectionable would
be to suppose that certain characteristics could be
regarded as essential irrespective of context and of
the questions under discussion' (12).

Both Scheffler and Peters are thus concerned with
explicating ordinary, standard usage; and they both
make plain their awareness of the fact that such usage
is not completely consistent or exhaustive, so that
in appealing to it there can be allowed considerable
leeway or choice to the philosopher - the skill shown
in exercising this is, in fact, what makes him a phil-
osopher. Many descriptive definitions meet the demands
of accuracy in mirroring prior usage, making some meas-
ure of definitional legislation inevitable. As Scheff-
ler says: '...where prior usage clearly applies a term
to some object, the definition may not withhold it;
where prior usage clearly withholds the term from
some object, the definition may not apply it. But
with respect to undecided cases, the definition may
serve to legislate in any manner' (13).

That the manner of legislation is important - the
manner which results in, for example, Peters defining
'education' in the way he does and Scheffler defining

(12) Peters, R. S. 'Education As Initiation', in
Archambault, R. D. (Ed), Philsophical Analysis and Ed-
ucation (London, 1965), pp. 88-9
     (13) Scheffler, I., op. cit., p. 18

'teaching' in a similar way - will become clear as
we pass to the third type of definition that Scheffler
identifies - 'programmatic' definition - and then to
the most important questions concerned with the poss-
ible <u>overlapping</u> in actual contexts of the different
types of separately identified definitions.

A 'programmatic' definition is one which gives
expression to a practical programme, appearing as it
does on a particular occasion in a particular context
and used often to indicate a serious moral choice.
There is clearly no 'programmatic' formula but only
a 'programmatic' use: Scheffler derives his views on
this type of definition to a great extent from the
Stevenson we examined in the chapter on ethics, and
makes his debt clear in an important footnote where
he states what he conceives to be the difference be-
tween a 'persuasive' and a 'programmatic' definition
in terms which confirm our placing him amongst the
'cognitivists'. He says:'The emphasis on programm-
atic rather than persuasive definitions is not a den-
ial of the importance of the latter, but, at least in
part, an attempt to stress the "cognitive" import of
definitions for social practice, which has, it seems
to me, been unduly neglected recently despite its sig-
nificant role in general discourse' (14).

What he is saying is that a 'programmatic' defin-
ition expresses a moral choice for which <u>arguments</u>

(14) Ibid., p. 20, footnote 9

can be produced, of the sort that we investigated
earlier. However, the importance of 'programmatic'
definition becomes clearer from Scheffler's analysis
of the cases of overlap, the most interesting of which
is that between 'descriptive' and 'programmatic', part-
icularly the situation in which, as he says, '...undec-
ided instances are involved and in which two equally
accurate definitions may yet be programmatically opp-
osed' (15); that is, in which alternative definitions
of a term are possible, each legitimately claiming to
be accurately 'descriptive' since, as we have noted,
prior usage is not exhaustive - the language of the
past cannot possibly account for all the non-linguist-
ic changes that will have to be described in the then
future!

The alternative and equally accurate 'descriptive'
definitions may differ in legislating for hitherto un-
decided cases - as they may without losing their claim
to be 'descriptive' - and the manner of this legislat-
ion , the way in which undecided cases are brought
within the definitions or excluded from them make up
the differences in programme if alternatives of prac-
tice are involved: the different definitions are pro-
grammatically different. The most familiar context
for this phenomenon is, of course, in law, as Scheff-
ler says: 'Legal contexts provide clear instances of
definitions that legislate on practical matters while

(15) Ibid., p. 27

purporting to sum up prior (legal) usage' (16). But
it occurs in social thought generally, and particular-
ly in educational discourse at a time when rapid
change is creating the borderline instances of old
terms which require legislation in Scheffler's sense
and which, consequently, become defined programmatic-
ally: 'secondary education' is an obvious example of
such a term on the contemporary English scene.

If we apply this definitional scheme to the term
'education', we can see that to give it a definition
is to incidentally convey a programme while attempt-
ing to reflect previous usage: even with accurate def-
initions we are still left with the main problem, for,
as Scheffler says: '...such accuracy cannot be used
as a measure of the worth of the expressed education-
al program. Different programs are compatible with
accuracy and the justification of any program is thus
an independent matter' (17). In this way he 'unblurs'
the distinctions that he is continually mentioning.

It appears that Scheffler is providing just the
kind of analysis that can equip us for a critical re-
turn to Hardie, who, it will be remembered, seeks to
identify all the marks which have been thought char-
acteristic of education before defining the term for
agreed use (see pp. 143-4, supra). According to

(16) Ibid., p. 28
(17) Ibid., p. 31

Scheffler, it is not possible to give, in any useful sense, <u>all</u> the marks, i.e., to give the totality of predefinitional usage; so that whatever marks are finally chosen by Hardie must, if they are to represent the achievement of his intention according to his own beliefs, be described at such a high level of generality as to be practically useless as they stand, and in need of further definition, a process that will inevitably involve him in implying a programme.

Hardie does, in fact, pursue further the constituent, abstract terms that make up his eventual definition of 'education', apparently unaware of the practical programme he is suggesting with the interpretation he chooses. The characteristic marks which he uncovers are, '...four conceptions...(1) the original nature of man; (2) the production of changes in behaviour as, for example, the formation of habits; (3) the environment; (4) the idea of value' (18); and these are built into the definition: 'Education is a process involving the action of the environment on the original nature of man in such a way as to produce valuable changes in behaviour' (19).

But this is not a great help to educationists, particularly as we already know how he goes on to further define the most promising element - concerning what is 'valuable'- in the definition. It will

(18) Hardie, C. D., o . cit., p. 73
(19) Ibid., p. 73

be remembered that he defines 'valuable' in emotive
terms and bases his conclusions about the practicalit-
ies of moral education upon the definition; he supplies
a programme, but , in any event, the definition he off-
ers is 'programmatic' and the programme in either case
receives no independent justification in the sense that
Scheffler uses.

Similarly, in examining what Hardie does with the
second element in his definition, the 'original nature
of man', we note the lack of that awareness that a Sch-
effler-type analysis would have cured, had there been
one developed at the time. He is drawn into a lengthy
account of what is known about the modifiability of
behaviour which is a good example of the sort of educ-
ational discussions which Scheffler charges with, '...
failing to take account of the several points noted
abve regarding definitions that are both descriptive
and programmatic. There are an indefinite number of
alternative definitions of "man", indefinitely many
ways of dimensionalizing his structure and capacities,
all equally accurate. To choose one such dimensional-
ization on the basis of its accuracy and to proceed
to read off curricular counterparts to each dimension,
as is often done, is to beg the whole question. One
basis of choice of a definition for educational pur-
poses must be a consideration of the very consequences
for educational practice to be expected as a result
of adoption of such a definition' (20).

(20) Scheffler, I., op. cit., pp. 33-4

And if it is argued, as it well might be, that Hardie's 'positivistic' intention is to introduce relevant <u>scientific</u> information into the discussion - an impression given by both his early and later writings - this still leaves him open to another of Scheffler's strictures, aimed not, of course, directly at him but as an object for which he can certainly stand. Scheffler says: 'An analogous point holds for the transfer of definitions from science to education...They cannot be fitted into our stipulative, descriptive, and programmatic categories without serious distortion...to take a scientific definition for programmatic use is not to avoid the need for evaluation of the program such use conveys. The scientific adequacy of a definition is no more a sign of the practical worthwhileness of such a program than accuracy with respect to prior usage' (21).

In sum, Hardie's achievement, inspected from the viewpoint of a much later philosopher, able to draw upon rigorous enquiry within the philosophy of language, is diminished at the level of philosophical appraisal if not at the level of historical interest - assuming, that is, the acceptability of the more contemporary work. The confrontation of the two philosophers affords us, too, a further stroke for the picture we are painting of the 'bearing' as this has developed over the years; and it has allowed us to detail,

(21) Ibid., p. 34

by substantial quotation, one contemporary part of
that picture which is as significant as any. Just
how significant it is we can now try to show by bring-
ing the Scheffler analysis to bear, not upon a dated
Hardie, but upon a currently influential Peters, and,
in the manner which produces the paradoxes - mention-
ed above (see p.115) - upon Scheffler's own attempt
to define 'teaching'.

This procedure, of making 'the predominant "ling-
uistic" approach' of our section heading into the work
of two of its leading practitioners, will enable us
to develop criticisms of our own to an extent and of
a type not hitherto attempted, in preparation for the
more positive and less literature-bound parts of the
thesis to come later; and it will allow us to bridge
the two philosophical approaches mentioned in the
title of this chapter, carrying us into an account of
a minority, 'scientifically orientated' view of defin-
itions and concepts in education which combines a
closeness in spirit to the Hardie we have just seen
dismissed with a more impressive, contemporary anal-
ytical vigour.

The Ordinary Language Definition Of 'Education' And 'Teaching'

Peters defines 'education' in his latest work (see
p.28, supra) with a specific purpose in mind, and def-
ines it in his inaugural address as a separate and

self-contained piece of philosophy: it is to the lat-
ter that we turn. What sort of definition is it that
he offers? How does it fit into Scheffler's scheme?
Is it stipulative?; or programmatic?; or descriptive?;
or does it illustrate one of the possible overlappings
of these types? Our previous references to Peters'
work tells us that the definition, no matter what
kind it is, results from Peters' concern to get clear
about education in such a way as to make sense_of the
teacher's task and to make sense to the teacher as he
sees his task, engaged in the enterprise.

If we look at another part of his contribution,
delivered in a transatlantic symposium on the possib-
ility of a discipline of education, we find a clear
admission of his desire both to keep teachers in mind
while philosophising in education ('...most philosoph-
ers regard this field as a philosophical slum. But
it need not be so. There are genuine and exciting
philosophical problems in this field. Indeed there
is enough work to keep a company of trained philosoph-
ers busy for half a century. And such work could
contribute much to the clear-headedness of teachers
on the job' (22)) and to gain benefit in philosophy
from the concrete, real problems that teachers have to
face ('I find that taking the concrete situation of
the teacher in a school system is often an admirable

(22) Peters, R. S., 'Comments' on Walton, J., 'A
Discipline of Education' in Walton, J. and Kuethe,
J. L. (Eds), The Discipline Of Education (Wisconsin,
1963), p. 20

way of trying out conceptual analyses and theories of
justification and bringing them down to earth! (23)).

This belief, that the teacher's position is clar-
ified by philosophy and his concrete situation is a
testing ground for philosophical theories which other-
wise would float too freely, is shown in Peters' manner
of defining 'education'. He takes, it will be recal-
led, various one-sided views which are to be found
condensed into metaphors, and after examining their
limitations makes '...three conceptual points about
"education" which are necessary for the explication
of its essence' (24). The 'essence' must, of course,
account for what the dedicated teacher believes him-
self to be doing.

The first of these points is '...that "education"
implies the intentional bringing about of a desirable
state of mind' (25); the second is '...that to be "ed-
ucated" implies (a)caring about what is worthwhile and
(b)being brought to care about it and to possess the
relevant knowledge or skill in a way that involves at
least a minimum of understanding and voluntariness' (26);
and the third, concerned with the cognitive aspect of
education that Peters is always at pains to stress,
is added to that which emphasises the value of what
is passed on and that which underlines the manner of

(23) Ibid., p. 20
(24) Peters, R. S., 'Education As Initiation' (see
p. 150, supra), p. 90
(25) Ibid., p. 91
(26) Ibid., p. 97

its assimilation, is expressed negatively with refer-
ence to the kind of person who is highly trained but
not 'educated' - '...he has a very limited concept-
ion of what he is doing. He does not see its connect-
ion with anything else, its place in a coherent patt-
ern of life. It is, for him, an activity cognitively
adrift ' (27).

, These three criteria, together with the insights
gained from an examination of the popular but limited
models of his preliminary critique, equip Peters to,
as he puts it, 'construct' a more positive account
of education. The question for us is to what extent
such talk of 'construction' can be fitted into the
definitional scheme suggested by Scheffler. For this
'construction' is undoubtedly understood by Peters
himself as revealing what '..."Education" involves
essentially' (28) and '...what is meant by "education"'
(29); and is thus, apparently, both an attempt to ex-
plicate the ordinary usage of the term 'education'
and an effort towards reconstructing, dialectically,
a more satisfactory account of what education is.

According to Scheffler, there are many possible
descriptions of the ordinary usage of any term, each
one with a legitimate claim to be mirroring predefin-
itional usage accurately; so that, on this account,
if Peters' main preoccupation, in what appears to be
a double exercise, is with the first aspect, with what

(27) Ibid., p. 98
(28) Ibid., p. 102
(29) Ibid., p. 108

'education' does in practice <u>mean</u>, then his second
aspect, in which he talks of 'essential' meaning,
hardly fits into what Scheffler asserts about the in-
exhaustive nature of 'descriptive' definition and the
possibility of equally valid definitions of this type.
He must be defining 'programmatically': in which case,
the programme he is expressing stands in need of the
'independent justification' that Scheffler refers to.
In fact such independent justification of a programme
of <u>moral</u> education is what we have seen Peters sketch-
ing in another context; and this he continues in the
latest of his contributions, which we have not, unfor-
tunately, been able to assimilate more than marginally
into this account.

But, as far as the inaugural lecture is concerned
- and this is the object of our present examination -
the above questions and perplexities about the nature
of Peters' definition of 'education' remain. Scheff-
ler and Peters, hitherto very much in harmony, appear
to clash. We can perhaps best proceed by re-eastab-
lishing the harmony and dealing with the 'felt' diff-
iculties by examining them in <u>Scheffler's</u> work, taken
as representative of the whole 'Peters-Scheffler' app-
toach. And the re-establishment of harmony is easily
effested by interpreting Peters' 'education' as equiv-
alent for our purposes, to Scheffler's 'teaching'.
For this economical procedure there is some warrant
in the emphasis, already noted, which Peters places,
when discussing the nature of education, on the teach-

er'on the job'. Also, we can note, in his account
of 'education as initiation', the hesitation about
discarding the term 'teaching' as a suitable label
for what he has in mind. (30).

So, we can put it this way: Peters describes as
the ordinary meaning of 'education' - i.e., what its
standard use implies - just one of the equally valid
meanings that can be analysed out of ordinary language:
and this meaning is very close to the meaning of 'teach-
ing' as this is analysed out of ordinary usage by
Scheffler. In short, the essential meaning of 'ed-
ucation', the core of its use, is 'teaching' in
Scheffler's sense of the term. Our questions about
Peters (see p. 158, supra) then become questions ab-
out Scheffler. To what extent is his 'teaching' def-
ined 'descriptively' according to his own account of
'descriptive' definitions? How does the definition
in the later part of his book withstand the force of
his own earlier analysis in which it is shown that
there are always several, equally valid 'descriptive'
definitions for any term?

Clearly, there is at the heart of this problem,
which is simplified to make it manageable within the
confines of this enquiry but which is nevertheless
difficult enough to see into, the very large philos-
ophical question which has been implied at several

(30) Ibid., p. 102

points hitherto, in discussing the 'linguistic' app-
roach. It is to what extent 'ordinary language'anal-
ysis is self-sufficient, granted that it is a sound
starting-point for conceptual enquiries. As we shall
see better in the final section of this chapter, there
are those who object to what they consider to be the
stultifying effect on conceptual creativity of a tot-
al commitment to 'ordinary language' analysis - an
effect briefly touched upon in our comments below.

Turning to the details of Scheffler, we read that
his purpose is, '...through an application of philosoph-
ical methods to clarify certain pervasive features of
educational thought and argument' (31): it is clear
that his 'philosophical methods' are those of 'ordin-
ary language' analysis and that it is clarification
of what <u>exists</u> that concerns him and not <u>invention</u>
of something new. But it can be argued that descrip-
tion of usage can and should be followed by prescrip-
tion, that the disentanglement of the common language
confusions should be a preliminary task to that of
creating more precise definitions and concepts, with
clear practical implications, for use in education.
In fact, if Scheffler's own definitional scheme is
accepted, this cannot but happen, for situations in
which his 'descriptive-programmatic' overlapping ob-
tains are almost inevitable in a complex discourse

(31) Scheffler, I., <u>The Language Of Education</u>
(Springfield, Illinois, 1960), p. vii

like that of education.

However, he insists that his own clarification of 'teaching' is of '...its everyday ᴍᴇᴍ, standard use', of '...ways in which it is typically applied, and that to which it typically refers' (32); and by this insistence he leaves no doubt that he believes himself to be offering a descriptive definition. Presumably , he would deny that his method here could be described in the words he uses on another occasion; and yet they seem to fit admirably what he does with 'teaching' when we consider the constant use by so very many people of that term. Scheffler says:

'...mention must be made of "explicative" methods, whose object is not primarily to describe standard uses of current concepts, but rather to refine and explain these concepts systematically so as to render them unambiguous, precise, and theoretically adequate. The refined products of explicative methods must be similar in certain basic respects to their natural originals; they must be, recognizably, precision-made idealizations of these originals. Yet for the sake of superiority in expressive or theoretical power, "explication" feels free to deviate considerably from the actual uses of concepts in ordinary language' (33).

But this is what Scheffler appears to be doing with 'teaching'. If he is not - and it is foolish

(32) Ibid., p. 60
(33) Scheffler, I., Philosophy and Education (Boston, 1958), pp. 8-9

to be dogmatic in an area where puzzlement is respectable - then it is difficult to know why his analysis is so thought-provoking; for to state that to 'teach' is to submit to the requirement of the pupils' understanding, to his demand for reasons and adequate explanations, does not appear, on the face of it, to be the mere giving of a description of the term's ordinary usage. It seems more appropriately classed as an 'explication', made, as is quoted above, ♦...for the sake of superiority in expressive...power', and implying a programme in its defining as 'teaching' only those aspects of pedagogical relationships that are found in a <u>small</u> proportion of teaching (in another sense) situations.

For if we think of teaching in Scheffler's way, we must favour great changes in the schools that we have at present; and, of course, there is the same implication in any acceptance we give to Peters' notion of 'education as initiation' with which we entered this phase of the discussion. And that this programme of change is not to the liking of everyone, we have seen in reporting Eason's doubts (see p. 103, supra) expressed on behalf of an older generation of educationists, who would no doubt define 'teaching' in a manner different from that of Scheffler and, in their view, preferable to his because of the very consequences for practice implied. It would appear then that his definition cannot be other than ♦programmatic'.

Yet Scheffler insists that he is <u>describing</u> without legislating; and this, in view of his philosophical standing, makes our critical remarks open to doubt, for whatever force they have derives in fact from Scheffler's own earlier insights into definitions. It will be as well to speculate on the kind of move he would make against the contention that he constructs rather than reports in his analysis of 'teaching'. We can summarize the objection to his views by stating that 'descriptive' definitions must be (a)<u>selective</u> with respect to the totality of past usage, and (b) <u>legislative</u> or constructive, because <u>each</u> use of a word contributes to new usage or meaning - that is, the meaning of, say, 'teaching' is changed for us on reading Scheffler's account, and if it is changed for us it is changed for everyone with whom we have conversational contact in which 'teaching' occurs; and similarly with them.

To this we can reply, taking Scheffler's part, that his framework of definition is a relatively sophisticated and subtle tool with which to investigate language and that it is in the hands of a skilled philosopher. It is not a case of <u>anyone's</u> opinion on language usage being equal to anyone' else's. A Scheffler only defines after extensive preliminary sorting and judging of usage, calculated to develop a 'feel' for the concept - for its important, central uses in ordinary language. The resulting definition

mirrors this usage and so falls within the 'descript-
ive' class. Without such reflection of the ordinary
applications of the terms in question by a language-
conscious, skilled philosophical investigator, defin-
ition would be completely arbitrary, for it is only
the control by initially accepted cases of applicat-
ion that distinguishes a 'descriptive' definition
from a 'stipulative' definition, as these are presented
ed by Scheffler.

In plain terms (which no doubt modesty prevents
philosophers from using), any fool can give a defin-
ition but only a philosopher can give one that cap-
tures what can only be called its 'essence'. And the
reason for this is the sheer complexity of the task,
for which few are fitted - a fact that a recent pic-
ture of the philosopher at work, sketched by Ryle,
makes one hesitate to deny. He says, '...the phil-
osophical examination of a concept...can never be the
examination of that concept by itself, but only the
examination of it vis-a-vis its numerous neighbour-
concepts, and then vis-a-vis their innumerable neigh-
bours too. It follows...that the procedure of the
philosophical examination of a concept is necessar-
ily an argumentative or, if you prefer, a dialectic-
al procedure. The philosopger has done nothing at all
until he has shown the directions and the limits of
the implication-threads that a concept contributes to
the statements in which it occurs; and to show this

he has, so to speak, to tug these threads through their neighbouring threads , which, in their turn, he must simultaneously be tugging' (34).

It is this skill that Scheffler claims to be exercising, showing what Ryle distinguishes, in the mentioned article, as the philosopher's 'afternoon' concern with the language that we all use unconcernedly in the 'morning'. Scheffler's purpose is, above all, to make clear what a 'programmatic' definition is; and, particularly, to warn us that such a definition appears, as it were, in disguise and needs, in every case, to be unmasked and shown for what it is - a departure from initial usage made for practical and moral purposes and hence to be evaluated by appropriate moral and practical criteria. His own concept of teaching is not intended to be programmatic in this carefully distinguished sense, for teaching is, Scheffler maintains, normally distinguished by the giving of honest reasons such as he has stated in his analysis.

In answer to the objection that 'teaching' as we know it is most plainly not so distinguished, Scheffler clarifies his position by isolating the 'activity' sense of the term from all other senses. He does this so well - in reply to a critic voicing similar doubts to those we expressed above - that it is worth leaving it as his last say in this section of the discussion.

(34) Ryle, Gilbert, 'Ordinary Language and Philosophy', in Hammer, L. Z. (Ed), Value and Man (New York, 1966), p. 382. (From 'Abstactions', Dialogue, Vol.I, No.I, pp. 5-16, June 1962).

He says: 'It is true that we often employ a role-
notion of teaching, as referring to whatever teachers
(an institutional class) do in fact. Insofar as this
may be true, the ordinary word is ambiguous, and I
have chosen to explain the activity-sense of the word,
using other means to talk about schools as institut-
ions and the role of functionaries in them. This
choice brings out the option of considering how far
teaching (in the distinctive activity sense) is to be
used in society as a model of cultural renewal. To
blur the distinction would, in effect, (I think) tend
to conceal this option. But I hope I did not beg the
moral issue; there may be good reasons for using other
than rational methods in given circumstances, for in-
stance. My point is that the option, as a moral, not
linguistic, issue, needs to be clearly exposed' (35).

We can leave Scheffler on this note of restraint,
perhaps not wholly convinced that 'whatever teachers
do in fact' can be excluded from the discussion by
talk of ambiguity. Teachers - those '...quiet men
working at the job at which they have always worked'
(36), as Peters puts it, disarmingly, for their ears
- do many things: hundreds of thousands of them eng-
age in a variety of activities, all of which they
would unhesitatingly call 'teaching'. And most of
these activities, measured against the standards
implied in Scheffler's 'teaching' and Peters' 'educ-

(35) Scheffler, I., Studies in Philosophy and Ed-
ucation, Vol.IV No.I, pp. 135-6, Spring 1965
    (36) Peters, R. S., op. cit., p. 87

ation', fall short; so that it is still hard to see
how these philosophers' emphases can be claimed as
descriptions of what is the case. There remains the
suspicion that the work of Scheffler and Peters is
best interpreted as the sophisticated plea, of phil-
osophers with a particular analytical commitment, to
view education and teaching in a special way. Howev-
er, to show any less restraint in voicing this suspic-
ion than Scheffler shows in developing the object of
it would be inappropriate. We can, instead, turn to
report on a philosopher with a different analytical
commitment who does not hesitate to be blunt.

The Alternative 'Positivistic' Approach

This approach is as well represented by G.R.East-
wood as by any philosopher currently working in educ-
ation. And in turning to him we can give an instance
of the 'bearing' under scrutiny which originates, un-
like those we have been considering, in a more peri-
pheral part of the English-speaking world. Eastwood
is a Canadian working in an area hitherto dominated,
so far as our account goes, by a small group of phil-
osophers with a particular commitment; so that he is,
geographically and philsophically speaking, an outsid-
er who argues in the manner we have called 'positiv-
istic' and who is thus closer in spirit to Hardie and
O'Connor than to the philosophers who have tended to
take up our time.

His views, as expressed in the <u>bulk</u> of his work, are radically opposed to those who would rest content with an 'ordinary language' approach; but, as we shall see, the degree of his opposition is difficult to determine finally, and the grounds of it even more difficult to state, because in <u>parts</u> of his writings he appears to reveal a contradictory sympathy for the procedures he attacks. However, we can start by reporting the 'new' element to be found in his contribution. In a number of articles published during the nineteen-sixties he pursues the theme that educationists must attempt to develop a precise, technical language – what he calls a 'P-language', for professionals. A quotation from onex of these articles, notable for the specific reference to the views of Scheffler discussed above, will serve to show both his blunt demand for thoroughness and system and his philosophical sympathies and antipathies.

He says: 'The language analysis of philosophical activity is largely, but not entirely, therapeutic. Understanding current usage and current meanings is an initial stage but unless it is followed or accompanied by the substitution of the precise for the imprecise and the clear for the vague, little is achieved. Language does not function according to rules. Rules summarize usage. To follow a rule means to understand the rule. Most of the work so far done in analysis of the language of education displays a

tendency to accept it as it is and therefore does not proceed beyond the elementary therapeutic level...Definition is essential for precise usage in any language though it remains largely unexplored with specific reference to education and the only published work /¯reference to Scheffler_7 on the topic is limited in scope and makes little attempt to explore the possibilities of many types of definition that have been developed in other contexts. This alone constitutes a field in which there is hope for a great deal of philosophical activity and it may well be that new ways of defining are necessary. The act of defining may be largely the responsibility of the worker in a specialist field (e.g., curriculum) but clarification of use and interpretation, the establishment of satisfactory criteria for use and the appropriateness or relevancy of the concept associated with the term are philosophical problems. The degree to which they are performed determines the degree to which an adequate P-language is established' (37).

This is a clear demand that we go beyond clarification or therapy to the creation of precise concepts for effective _professional_ intercommunication. It also appears to be a simple demand, unflattering in its implication that philosophers such as Scheffler have been remiss in not seeing to it. The tone is such as

(37) Eastwood, G. R., '"Contemporary Philosophy" In Education', _Australian Journal Of Higher Education_, Vol.I, pp. 32-3, 1961-63

to make us wonder either how we could ever have been impressed by the 'Peters-Scheffler' approach or how Eastwood can be blind to their delicately argued subtleties. There is no doubt that he is scientifically orientated, like Hardie: he talks of educational philosophy 'moving towards greater utilitarian value and practical applicability' (38), away from its scandalously limited past.

The careful separation of slogan, metaphor and definition to which Scheffler devotes many pages, and which we have reported as a substantial portion of the 'bearing' of philosophy, is practically ignored by Eastwood, who disparages the whole of traditional views as though it were just a gigantic, self-perpetuating slogan, a philosophical free-for-all. He says: 'The concept of educational philosophy as one grand slogan interpreted by a system of subsidiary slogans leaves those responsible for interpretation and application free to do anything or nothing and yet claim to "follow the rule". The result is that whatever X chooses to <u>think</u> is life adjustment <u>is</u> life adjustment. A slogan means whatever it is <u>taken</u> to mean' (39).

This passage, the content of which is plainly derived from the less iconoclastic work done by the Americans Komisar and McClellan (40), illustrates Eastwood's

(38) Ibid., p. 29
(39) Ibid., p. 30
(40) Komisar, B. P. and McClellan, J. E., 'The Logic Of Slogans', in Smith, B. O. and Ennis, R. H. (Eds), <u>Language and Concepts in Education</u> (Chicago 1961)

main weakness, particularly evident at this point in
our account, following a consideration of more moder-
ate opinion; for there is an element of tongue-in-
cheek about his source which he has obviously missed.
In contrast to them, East wood will have none of the
inadequately defined terms and vaguely expressed id-
eas that pack educational discourse. He is disturbed .
at the acceptance of slogans as legitimate features
of such language, for a situation in which a term
means whatever a user of it <u>thinks</u> it means outrages
the scientist in him. We are reminded of Hardie's
jibe at a similar acceptance of an undesirable feat-
ure of educational theory - 'It has been customary
to consider that disagreement in such a subject is
quite respectable' (41).- and his determination to dis-
pose of it with a new solution for old problems.

The 'P-language' is Eastwood's solution. This
will embody accurate description and explanation and
will demand of its professional users the precise state-
ments and consistent interpretation of terms that
characterises any technical language. For the first
time professional educators will be able to communic-
ate with each other in terms that accurately convey
<u>beliefs</u>, leaving the expression of <u>attitudes</u> as the
task of the 'L-language', intended for communication
with and amongst laymen, for whom attitudes are more

(41) Hardie, C. D., <u>Truth And Fallacy In Educat-
ional Theory</u> (Cambridge, 1942), p. ix

necessary. The old terms will thus have a double role, one of which, the P-role, is amde possible by the deliberate creation of a completely <u>new</u> scientifically precise usage for the terms.

Eastwood puts it in this way: 'The difference exists in the precision of the concepts associated with them. The use of the term "activity" in the P-language implies, or should imply, a concept clearly defined for the particular context or use and based upon an adequately developed set of criteria so that it is capable of universally consistent interpretation. Its use in the L-language permits emotive-persuasive connotations designed to facilitate acceptance of a kind or quality of programme the criteria for which are a professional concern. Currently terms such as "activity", "curriculum","growth", "individual differences", "progress", "achievement" and others are no more clearly defined and understood and no more consistently used or interpreted among professionals than in lay discussion. The eduoator cannot speak or write precisely or assume that he is being interpreted as he means to be because the language does not allow' (42).

To this diagnosis of the communication disease amongst educationists anyone in the business, experiencing its effects daily, will be tempted to give

(42) Eastwood, G. R., op. cit., p. 32

immediate assent. So much discussion of educational
topics at all levels in the system seems to be semant-
ically anarchic: conversation in staff room and in
committee often resembles the dialogue of a Pinter
play. But a diagnosis is not a cure. What Eastwood
offers as a remedy, his constructive proposal for the
creation of a new, vigorous use of educational concepts,
seems a little too clear-cut and straightforward.
We are reminded again of Hardie with his mechanical
substitutional analysis that seemed inadequate to the
propsed task. And one of Eastwood's own favourite
phrases comes to mind as an appropriate label for
what we suspect: he talks of 'naive specialisation',
and we sense that such is the weakness of his own
proposal, for surely only a naive person could fail
to see that such a <u>simple</u> solution rests upon an ass-
umption of <u>simplicity</u> in educational discourse.

If we recall that Scheffler and the 'ordinary
language' analysts assume a <u>complexity</u> in such dis-
course, we realize that once more we are touching on
the <u>general</u> problem of the nature of educational the-
ory that we have twice before approached in dealing
with subsidiary matters. Eastwood's solution - as
opposed to his identification of the problem, which
is uncontroversial - assumes that 'education' in one
of its senses is or could be a 'discipline' possessed
of an autonomous discourse in which key concepts
could be refined by professional agreement and effort.
Such, at any rate, is the impression that his over-

condensed pronouncements give.

Now this is an assumption very much open to chal-
lenge, as we shall see in detail during the next
chapter. For the moment it can be said that the nat-
ure of educational theory is a debatable issue in
which one of the crucial questions is whether East-
wood-type assertions such as the one given below are
acceptable in the face of the arguments of a Scheff-
ler or, even more, a Hirst (see p. 2, supra). East-
wood says, for example, linking his views on 'theory'
with the attack on slogans that we have noted: 'An
educational theory does not differ in principle from
a theory in any other field and the use of the word
"theory" in the weak sense to mean a speculative gen-
eralisation based on what someone believes to be the
case and the appropriate way of dealing with it stems
from inadequate development of the concept. In this
weak sense a theory is no more than a generalized
set of beliefs designed to create an attitude and
deriving effectiveness from the degree to which emot-
ive language and sloganistic expressions can advance
the opinion of the advocate' (43)

To return to the more restricted topic: we have
still to enquire a little more closely into Eastwood's
proposals for clean and tidy definitions. How exact-
ly does he suggest that concepts can be developed

(43) Ibid., pp. 39-40

and a 'P-language' created? What are the <u>details</u> of
any procedures he may have for giving concrete form
to what might be called his Carnapian aspirations
for educational language? How effective a defence
of his procedures can he erect against the inevitable
criticisms that will come from the 'ordinary language'
school, whom he acknowledges by name in the following
passage, where his own (predominant) approach is also
briefly described? - '...<u>contemporary philosophy</u> is,
in part, at least, empirically based and concerned in
some way and degree with language. The language com-
ponent may be <u>ordinary language</u> which is the dist-
inguishing characteristic of one type or strand; or
it may be one of the forms of <u>ideal language</u> typical
of another which attempts to achieve a greater degree
of expressional clarity by use of symbolic systems of
logico-mathematical form' (44)

The answers to these questions can be found, if
at all, in the three stages that Eastwood suggests
for progressing from the analysis of language as it
is currently used to the more constructive activities
that he favours. In describing them as stages necess-
ary for the creation of <u>satisfactory</u> educational con-
cepts, he charges <u>both</u> groups of contemporary theor-
ists - the 'progressive' educationists and their cog-
nitive critics - with an equal failure in precision;

(44) Ibid., p. 28

for terms like 'structure', essential to the argum-
ents of one group, are as unsatisfactorily defined
as the terms like 'activity' which crowd the writings
of the other group, the 'child-centred' theorists, ag-
ainst whom the structuralists are reacting. Clearly
Eastwood thinks that a Bruner (45) represents no phil-
osophical advance on a Dewey!

The first stage, his 'explication' (46), calls for
a survey and classification of the meanings of terms
as they are used in various normal contexts, with
the objective of establishing a precise and consist-
ent meaning for each context. This seems a reasonable
starting point; but as Eastwood, unlike the philoso-
phers whom he tends to indict, expresses himself
tersely, without the illuminating examples encounter-
ed in, say, Scheffler, his own meaning for the key
term 'context' is not at all clear. If he means by
it what Scheffler means, for example, then his first
stage is no more than an 'ordinary language' clarif-
ication. If, on the other hand, he means something
different, then his compacted exposition of the stage
stands in obvious need of the 'ordinary language'
technique it purports to repace.

Fortunately, the obscurity of his position is
slightly diminished by Eastwood's account of stage
two. Criteria are to be specified for each context

(45) See Bruner, J. S., The Process Of Education
(harvard, 1961), Ch.2, for 'The Importance Of Struc-
ture'
(46) Eastwood, G. R., op. cit., p. 35

in which a term may be used; so there will be available
what he calls a 'criteriaset' (47)for each situation
in which terms like 'activity' and 'structure' can
legitimately occur. Presumably the specifications
and instances of situations, agreed between the now
'professional' educationists (at a convention?) will
provide the content of the professional course ⊕ the
'literature' (to use the Peters' vocabulary in an al-
ien place) into which young aspirants are 'initiated'
The pity is that Eastwood provides us with an attract-
ive college brochure but little in the way of schemes
of work; for while we might agree with him in what he
says in, for example, the following quotation, we can
not _really_ say what it is we are agreeing with until
his terms become more expanded. The situation is
similar to that in which Hardie's definition of 'educ-
ation' was found acceptable because of its generality
and the impossibility of unforced dispute (see p. 154,
supra). We long for a detailed _example_ of a 'criter-
iaset' when he says: '...the essential point is that
each criteriaset designates a separate concept so
that for any term there is not an associated concept
but a "family" of concepts. It does not make sense
to ask "What does..._a_...mean?"! The question must
be phrased in some such way as "In this context for
this purpose what does _X_ mean by the use of..._a_...?"'
(48).

(47) Ibid,, p. 35
(48) Ibid., p. 35

The allusion to the 'family' notion of the later
Wittgenstein puzzles us further, coming as it does
from one whose main object of attack is the kind of
'laissez faire' philosophy that stems from the 'Phil-
osophical Investigations'. If what Eastwood describes
in this way as stage two is not another aspect of the
kind of enquiry to which Peters and Scheffler devote
themselves, it is, as with stage one, difficult to
say what it is. And if it is the same, we wonder
why there is all the initial fuss about the 'elem-
entary therapeutic level' and 'limited scope' of, for
example, Scheffler (see pp. 171-2, supra); for already
two of the three stages have been described without
anything recognizably new being offered.

Several years later than the 'P and L language'
article Eastwood still displays this disconcerting
ambivalence towards the 'linguistic' branch of anal-
ytical philosophy when he says: 'Since the publicat-
ion of Wittgenstein's "Philosophical Investigations"
the concept of "families of meanings" instead of
"meaning" has been debated but not questioned. Aware-
ness of this situation in language usage is an essent-
ial preliminary step, but it does not constitute an
effective solution to the problem' (49). He again im-
plies the iconoclastic intention of his own work,
written against the orthodoxy which is 'debated but

(49) Eastwood, G. R., 'Categories, Concepts And
Ostensive Learning', Canadian Education And Research
Digest, Vol.5 No.3, p. 175, September 1965

not questioned', again acknowledges 'ordinary language' analysis as 'an essential preliminary step' but fails, once more, to give a post-preliminary step which reads as convincingly as the detailed writings of those whom he criticizes.

Lack of detail is his strength and his weakness: his contribution cannot be dismissed, for its large claims may, we feel, turn out to be justified; and yet the justification is presently lacking. At times he comes close to admitting that his role is the negative one of diagnosing a philosophical ailment without the power, at the moment, to write out the full prescription for a remedy: as, for instance, when he says, 'The clarification of the language of a discipline is not a task to be undertaken with hopes of reaching finality. Even if precision could be achieved now it would, without further development, be short lived. The results that accrue stem not so much from the definitions provided, the usages established and validated and the criteria developed, as from creation of awareness that there is a continuing problem. The solution comes not by creating a precise language but by creating a precise attitude towards its use. Changing the form and/or elements of a language is not a sufficient condition for effective establishment of precise and consistent use' (50).

(50) Eastwood, G. R., '"Contemporary Philosophy" In Education', Australian Journal Of Higher Education, Vol. I, p. 34, 1961-63

The more we read such passages in Eastwood - characterised by _vague_ talk of the need for precision - the more we suspect that the 'alternative "positivistic" approach' of our section heading is a little optimistic for the nineteen sixties. In this area, at least, the thorough investigations of Scheffler, Peters and others occupy pride of place not only in terms of bulk, which we have reflected in our account, but also in terms of quality; for this turning from the main path to follow the Eastwood track does not seem to have provided us with a satisfactory alternative route. Perhaps this is a judgment conditioned by the state of the discipline at the time of writing and the sheer influence of the central emphasis in the literature. Perhaps these views on concept development should be appraised more for their potential than for their achievement: there are signs in the above passage that Eastwood himself would be content with such a reception.

We can, then, inspect the third stage with its potentiality rather than its accomplishment in mind, asking ourselves how it might be developed, given time and intellectual labour, and remembering how short has been the period of philosophical activity that we are surveying. This final stage is one of 'intersubjective explication' (51), in which the families of concepts from stage two are corporately ex-

(51) Ibid., p. 36

amined with reference to the range of contexts in which they occur and the range of persons who use them in those contexts; presumably with the purpose of exposing individual interpretation by users and deciding upon consistent interpretation by _professional_ users.

The whole enterprise has the sound of an empirical investigation for which the scientist in Eastwood is more responsible than the philosopher. (It was suggested above - see pp. 166-8 - that one of the defining characteristics of a philosopher is that 'feel' for the central uses of a concept which cannot be trivialized into scientific enquiry.) His own words will confirm this impression of scientific eagerness, for they are littered with the impressive-looking symbolism that has bulldozed genuine philosophical discussion out of many an argument. He seeks '...to determine if, even though the concept in each appropriate context is founded upon adequate criteria, it is in fact used by all informed individuals both appropriately and consistently. Adequate understanding is dependent upon universally consistent interpretation which can be achieved only if concept C_i (where "i" goes from 1 to n and designates the family of concepts), is interpreted by subjects S_j so that if particular subject S_1 uses a term and associates with it a particular concept C_1 it will be interpreted with an acceptable degree of probability as C_1 by S_2, S_3... ..S_n . The level of probability of appropriate inter-

pretation that is acceptable is, in principle at
least, empirically determinable' (52).

Such a manner of expression provokes questions.
If this type of 'meta' language is required for the
clarification of eduaational discourse, where do we
turn for confirmation that the concepts in _it_ are,
as Eastwood himself puts it, 'used by all informed
individuals both appropriately and consistently'?
The imprecision which he sees as a problem in his
'object' language (the language of education), and
which he attempts to solve by using such a language
as that exemplified above, is surely a problem, too,
in _that_ language(our 'object' language - the language
of Eastwood), for the solution of which a third, 'high-
er order' language is required. Are we not caught
in an infinite regress which we can break out of _only_
by using, at some point, ordinary langmage in as con-
scious and critical a manner as we are able? But are
we not then attempting to do what philosophers like
Scheffler and Peters were doing in the first place?
(And doing it well; which is what makes them philos-
ophers).

Again, we cannot be dogmatic in evaluating the
part that Eastwood is playing in an ongoing and as
yet short lived enterprise. The fact that he follows
the quoted 'symbolic' passage by an attempt to relate

(52) Ibid., p. 36

his own views to Wittgenstein's second thoughts on
language is cause enough for hesitation in identify-
ing his position. Exactly where he stands, to what
degree he really favours 'ideal language' over 'ord-
inary language' (his own terms for our 'positivist-
ic' and 'linguistic' approaches), to what extent his
remarks on Scheffler imply a bias towards the former
language and his direct references (here and else-
where) to Wittgenstein imply a contradiction of this
bias - these are questions not really answerable on
the evidence provided by the article we have concen-
trated upon and his other always-brief expositions.

What can be said is best left to Eastwood himself,
to a pronouncement so remark-ably neutral, so univers-
ally accommodating in its conclusion that we are left
with the sort of continuing doubt that only a full
scale statement of his position, equivalent in detail
to those of a Scheffler or a Peters, could resolve.
He says: 'Two approaches to the task seem to be poss-
ible. On one hand there is the more formal way which
begins with the definition of terms and the delineat-
ion of appropriate modes of expression and attempts
to build a P-language of an ideal form. On the other
hand there is available the less formal approach that
has been widely applied in (particularly) ethics which
operates upon existing language and endeavours to ach-
ieve clarification by explicating appropriate mean-
ings and uses, designating definitional criteria and

establishing syntactical forms. Each has its place
and one of two situations might prevail - either some
will use one and others the other, or preferably, all
will use both and allow the particular context to det-
ermine on which form the greater stress should be' (53).

Eastwood does, in fact, himself attempt to 'use
both' in the later article mentioned above (54); but
it supplies little to alter the general point we have
been making about his position in relation to the more
influential philosophers working in this field, it is
being a further expression of viewpoint, cocentrated
to the extent of defying clear interpretation. The
final word on this aspect of his work must be that
its fuller development (not only by Eastwood but also
by others who accept his strategy for concept develop-
ment) will possibly be of as much importance to some
future investigation of the bearing of analytical
philosophy on educational theory as its present adum-
bration has been intriguing for our own. But how long
we will have to await this development and to what
extent it will prove to be the creation of a precise
language of _education_ rather than part of the normal
improvement of the social science languages that un-
derpin education is a question which transports us to
the more comprehensive problem that has been inevitably
mentioned several times during the exploration of this
and other more restricted topics - to the problem of

(53) Ibid., p. 33
(54) Eastwood, G. R., 'Categories, Concepts And
Ostensive Learning', _Canadian Education And Research
Digest_, Vol. 5 No. 3, pp. 175-89, September 1965

the nature of educational theory.

We can suggest, as a preliminary to the examination
of that problem and as a final word on this phase of
our report, that Eastwood, in attempting to force the
development of the new discipline beyond what is curr-
ently feasible, in seeking to transcend an 'ordinary
language' approach, displays the practical naivety
implied in the quotation which follows. Ernest Nagel,
a powerful philosopher of science whose writings have
influenced the more 'scientific' aspect of Scheffler's
work and a proponent of views that are of importance
in a later chapter, comments on the hazards of any
premature attempt at 'reducing' one science to anoth-
er: this comment, mentally translated so as to embrace
the 'reduction' of ordinary educational concepts thr-
ough three stages to scientific-educational concepts,
identifies the flaw we have sensed in Eastwood's work.

Nagel says: '...the possibility should not be ig-
nored that little if any new knowledge or increased
power for significant research may actually be gained
from reducing one science to another at certain per-
iods of their development, however great may be the
potential advantages of such reduction at some later
time. Thus, a discipline may be at a stage of active
growth in which the imperative task is to survey and
classify the extensive and diversified materials of
its domain. Attempts to reduce the discipline to an-
other (perhaps theoretically more advanced) science,

even if successful, may then divert needed energies
from what are the crucial problems at this period of
the discipline's expansion, without being compensated
by effective guidance from the primary science in the
conduct of further research' (55).

Our contention is that, during the present 'active
growth' of a new philosophy of education, Eastwood's
approach may 'divert needed energies from what are
the crucial problems at this period of the discipline's
expansion', and that the first 'philosophical approach'
of our chapter title, that of Scheffler and Peters,
is the more appropriate (and hence the more convinc-
ing) <u>now</u>, no matter how much it may require complem-
enting at some future time when the social sciences
have outgrown their infancy and the relationship be-
tween formal and informal languages has been philos-
ophically illumined. To what extent this contention
is a strong one or whether it needs modification and
a change in emphasis we shall see in exploring the
central area of 'educational theory'.

(55) Nagel, E., <u>The Structure Of Science: Problems
In The Logic Of Scientific Explanation</u> (London, 1961),
p. 362

RIVAL THEORIES OF 'EDUCATIONAL THEORY'

Hirst's 'Field'Thesis

In examining this very recent contribution, the
most explicit expression of the London school's 'offic-
ial' view, we keep the promise, made early in our In-
troduction (see p. 2, supra), to view Hirst's influent-
ial thesis against a previously drawn background of
varied 'bearings': such a background is provided by
our first five chapters. We also cease to use Hardie's
text as the starting point for the separate avenues
of exploration, having done this sufficiently to est-
ablish his relationship with current, accepted philos-
ophising - as was also promised(see p. 9, supra) - as
that of precursor, and to expose the limitations that
he inherited from the philosophical masters of his
day while establishing his firm right to an important
place in the history of this mid-twentieth century
enterprise.

Hirst's article on philosophy and educational the-
ory is of major importance, whether viewed as the most
lucid of statements for those inclined to accept the
'linguistic' position or as the most incisive of crit-
icisms for those who are 'positivistic' about theories
and their role. In a sense, he attempts both to do
more and to do less than is attempted in this account.

The scope of his contribution is greater than ours
in that only one of its parts is specifically concern-
ed with the relation to educational thought of anal-
ytical philosophy, of, as he puts it, 'The more anal-
ytical view that philosophy has a purely critical and
clarificatory function for educational discussion' (1).
Other sections take him beyond the bearing of philos-
ophical analysis to an examination of the traditional
claim that speculative systems of thought, the various
conflicting 'isms', have educational implications, a
claim that we have ignored in order to concentrate
on what seems more important in the new approach.

But Hirst's views on the topic that is of specif-
ic concern to us are more restricted than our own en-
quiry, in that we are attempting to show the 'bearing'
by contrasting examples of work that has been and is
being undertaken in fact; and his contribution is mere-
ly one such example, albeit one that, in the firmness
of its pronouncements, could, if it were to be widely
accepted, cause the variety we have encountered in
the literature to be replaced by a more unitary app-
roach - the possibility and the unwelcome consequences
of this we have implied in using the term 'official'
for the views of Hirst and those with whom he is ass-
ociated.

In comparing his delineation of 'educational theory'

(1) Hirst, P. H., 'Philosophy And Educational
Theory', British Journal Of Educational Studies, Vol.
12, p. 51, November 1963

with those of others who have given thought to the
problem of describing it, we necessarily overlap with
the content of our other chapters, particularly the
last one which, it will be remembered, flowed from
Hardie's identification of the four characteristic
marks of education as a process. A systematic account
of these marks is, to the earlier writer, what makes
an 'educational theory', one element in such a theory
being the 'idea of value' that we discussed at some
length in the first chapter. Alternative theories
consist, to him, of the integration of alternative
accounts of these elements; that is, '...when educat-
ional theories differ, they must do so in the accounts
they give of one or more of these basic conceptions' (2).

Somewhat similarly in Hirst, we find that 'educat-
ional theory' is viewed as the complex rationale for
the practical process of education and has within it
an important ethical component necessitated by the
involvement of the theory with such practice: this
links him surprisingly with Hardie, replenishing to
some extent the by now diminished philosophical stand-
ing of the latter. We find, too, that Hirst establish-
es the logical status of 'educational theory' by dis-
cussing the possibility of there being a discipline
of education: this connects his work with that report-
ed in the last chapter and thus emphasises the inter-
related nature of all that we are exploring in this

(2) Hardie, C. D., Truth And Fallacy In Education-
al Theory (Cambridge, 1942), p. 73

account and the possibility of other than our own division of the subject matter being made on the basis of alternative modes of entry into the literature listed in the bibliography.

Hirst employs a Peters' technique: he positively declares his own position only after an analysis of the positions of others in which limitations are exposed after the fashion familiar to us from Peters' construction of 'education as initiation' on a basis of metaphor-scrutiny. The traditional view, that there exists a direct relationship between philosophy and education, is the first to be rejected. Philosophical beliefs cannot, in Hirst's view, form premises from which educational principles are logically deduced. Logically, the relationship is 'looser' than that.

What such beliefs _can_ provide are some of the _reasons_ for the educational judgments made within a complex area lying midway between the high level abstractions and the concrete practice, the area in fact of 'educational theory' conceived as what Hirst calls a 'field' of knowledge. This notion of a 'field', characterized by complexity because of the many different disciplines (including philosophy as _belief_ rather than analysis) that enter into its creation, is part of Hirst's epistemological position, which he progressively discloses throughout this article until it is made explicit in giving his _own_ view of the nature

of educational theory and which he develops more fully
elsewhere, as we shall see.

He makes this point early, clearly conscious of
the need to introduce some consistency into the term-
inology and taking the opportunity of making it a
logically based consistency. He says: '...between
philosophical beliefs themselves and educational prac-
tice we must envisage a domain of theoretical discuss-
ion and investigation concerned with forming these
principles. To this domain, which I shall refer to
as educational theory, philosophical beliefs make
their own distinctive contribution alongside social
theory, psychological theory and so on' (3).

Next, having contended that there is a place for
educational theory against those who plunge straight
from philosophy to practice, Hirst argues that this
domain is not autonomous, that 'education' is not a
discipline. Clearly, his willingness to assert what
is a 'discipline' and what is some other kind of the-
oretical enterprise must be justified as more than a
mere preference for a particular use of the term, and
he does, in fact, further develop his basic epistemol-
ogical position from which such judgments proceed, ar-
guing that, 'It is in fact in terms of distinctive
types of judgment that disciplines are usually said
to be autonomous' (4), giving us with the 'usually said'
the clue to his philosophical commitment.

(3) Hirst, P. H., op. cit., p. 52
(4) Ibid., p. 56

Historical judgments and, as we would expect in the light of our own early chapters, moral judgments are 'distinctive' in Hirst's sense; and there are no analogous <u>educational</u> judgments, for they are, logically speaking, examples of the wider class of practical judgments which are 'not unique to educational theory for in everyday affairs and in political and social theory, for example, the same process is to be found' (5). Educational theory is thus one of several related theories, all of which answer questions about intentional practical activities by making <u>similar</u> forms of judgment: it does not develop criteria of its own for assessing the wide range of knowledge and beliefs, from a variety of intellectual sources, out of which it is created. We must look to the varied <u>sources</u> of educational and similar theories to find the disciplines.

They are found outside, develop outside and are only justifiable outside. Hirst says, using his alternative name for 'discipline', 'These forms of understanding are valid in their own right and must therefore be accepted into the theory as they are. As their function is to provide a wider knowledge of what is involved in educational practice and so promote more responsible judgments, it is difficult to see how the knowledge itself can be assessed by criteria within the theory. The theorist has to recognise or

(5) Ibid., p. 57

discover the relevance of other specialist studies
for education, taking these into account when he forms
his principles' (6).

It can be noted that Hirst's refusal to allow that
education can be a discipline is a more thorough ver-
sion of his colleague Peters' slightly earlier reject-
ion of an American claim published in a volume entitled,
nevertheless, 'The Discipline Of Education'. Peters
says: 'I just cannot grasp the thesis that education
could ever be a discipline in any ordinary sense; it
is rather a focus or meeting place of disciplines...
A discipline develops when there are some reasonably
well-worked-out and structured answers to...questions
which come to form a body of knowledge, together with
techniques and procedures for developing better answers
or for dealing with new problems which these answers
give rise to...These various disciplines are concerned
with quite different sorts of questions, and if the
case of education is considered it is absurd to think
that the various disciplines that have bearing on ed-
ucation could ever be co-ordinated into one discipline'
(7).

However, the existence of and the arguments in
the book that contains this confident pronouncement
are testimony to the strength of an intellectually
respectable 'open' discussion in which the Peters-Hirst

(6) Ibid., p. 57
(7) Peters, R. S., 'Comments' on 'A Discipline Of
Education' by Walton, J., in Walton, J. and Kuethe, J.L.,
The Discipline Of Education (Madison, Wisconsin, 1963)
pp. 17-8

position is just one element. Scheffler, for example,
supplying in the same volume the most sustained phil-
osophical analysis of the problem, places his emphasis
in such a way as to reveal the more scientific of his
varied intellectual traits, and thus introduces a dis-
cordant note into the harmony that we have perceived
between him and Peters in another context. He equates
'discipline' with 'scientific discipline' and thus
draws away from the epistemology of a Hirst towards
that of an O'Connor, an alignment that we shall pres-
ently describe with reference to his more substantial
writing and one that is clearly shown in this confer-
ence report when he says:

'A crucial issue, it thus seems to me, is whether
we can establish reliable principles to explain how
and why children learn, schools develop, curricula
change, ideals conflict, perceptions alter, societies
differ, standards of taste and culture are formed.
That any discipline is likely to be developed capable
of answering these questions systematically and reliably
is still a matter of some controversy...The problem,
it seems to me, is thus tom advance the state of soc-
ial inquiry - in particular, of all those studies that
which seem likely to yield explanatory principles rel-
evant to the concerns of education' (8). Scheffler
clearly has 'social inquiry' of a recognized scientific
kind in mind rather than some hybrid 'domain of theor-

(8) Scheffler, I., 'Is Education A Discipline?' in
op. cit. (see p. 196, supra), pp. 60-1

etical discussion and investigation' as the answer
to educational problems.

But to return to Hirst: so far he has built up a
partial picture of what he conceives 'educational the-
ory' to be out of the positive aspects of his critic-
ism of two well known positions. But it is the third
position, the analytical, which allows him to develop
his own views to the full, and his criticisms here are
of the greatest importance for a number of reasons:
the philosopher under attack is O'Connor, the position
under attack is 'analytical' in one of the two broad
senses that we have defined, and the manner of attack
is 'analytical' in the other sense. In Hirst v O'Conn-
or we have, then, the intra-analytical dispute at its
most elemental.

Elsewhere the analytical alignments, a major theme
of our account, are becoming less clear cut as we acc-
umulate examples. We have already seen that the Scheff-
ler of 'educational theory' is not quite the Scheffler
who analysed 'teaching' in the 'ordinary language'
manner. We have seen, too, that the Hardie of 'educ-
ational theory' is closer to what we so far have seen
of Hirst's views than would have been imagined on the
evidence of the ethical Hardie (see p. 192, supra).
Before reporting the simple confrontation of Hirst and
O'Connor, it will be perhaps best to briefly confirm
this blurring of the clear lines of our main theme as
a warning against oversimplification of issues that

this key article of Hirst invites in the context of this account with its personal sampling.

We can easily do this by quoting from a recent lecture by (the so far 'positivistic') Hardie on the 'educational theory' topic of research and progress and bearing it in mind while following how Hirst comments on O'Connor. Hardie says: 'Closer attention to the different uses of language in communication would make possible a different sense for "theory" in the phrase "theory of education". In this sense a theory of education would not be a deductive pattern correlating different empirical laws, but a collection of sentences that had a variety of functions. Some of them would be analytic, functioning as definitions; others would be empirical generalizations from observations and experiments; still others would be prescriptions leading to evaluative sentences; and so on. In the formation of these sentences logical words such as "if...then", "true", "not", "all" would be used as well as extra-logical or empirical words. The latter would be either terms from commonsense or technical terms, linked to observation by means of definitions. An educational theory would then be considered satisfactory if it was successful in correlating a wide range of experience. The construction of an educational theory in this sense would make coherent the kind of talk in which we indulge when we write articles or talk about our work either with

our colleagues or on more solemn occasions such as
lectures and conferences' (9).

Hardie's thinking has certainly moved in a Hirst-
ian direction. The phrase 'would make coherent' made
with reference to 'a collection of sentences that
(have) a variety of functions', and his rejection of
the idea that an educational theory displays a 'ded-
uctive pattern' show this. When he talks of the suc-
cess of a theory in terms of 'connecting a wide range
of experience' we cannot but be reminded of Hirst's
view, as so far described, that an educational theory
attempts 'to build together whatever knowledge, values
and beliefs are relevant to practical issues'. The
similarities are close enough to make the point ment-
ioned above and make an interesting preliminary to
the Hirstian view of O'Connor that we can now take.

This view is dominated by the objection that O'Conn-
or is obsessed with scientific theory as the paradigm
for all theories, and that he has not been able, in
consequence, to discover the job that educational
theory actually <u>does</u>. O'Connor has excluded for sep-
arate treatment the metaphysical statements and value
judgments - the non-scientific elements in educational
discourse that he certainly identifies as of importance
- and thus artificially reduced the <u>complexity</u> of the
discourse to a much simpler scientific level. In short,

(9) Hardie, C. D., Research And Progress In Educ-
ation', <u>Australian Journal Of Education</u>, Vol. 9 No. 3,
p. 238, October 1965

educational theory is concerned solely with the <u>means</u> by which <u>separately</u> justified ends are achieved; and such theory is or could be or should be scientific: so comments Hirst.

His own position obliterates the 'ends-means' division by creating the middle domain. He says: 'If we accept O'Connor's classification of the two main senses of the word "theory" that are important for education, it is surely the first of these that gives the primary meaning here, not the second as he suggests. Educational theory is in the first place to be understood as the essential background to rational educational practice, not as a limited would-be scientific pursuit. Even when O'Connor momentarily recognizes this, he nevertheless fails to realize the complex kind of theory that is necessary to determine a whole range of practical activities. He therefore falls back on his scientific paradigm maintaining that the theory must be simply a collection of pieces of psychology' (10).

Hirst's criticism is that O'Connor has overlooked the important difference between scientific theories and theories of practical activity: the first aim at explaining what <u>is</u> while the second aim at guiding and controlling what is <u>done</u>: the first are the result of investigation while the second determine activities. Confusion of the two is a philosophical sin, of which

(10) Hirst, P. H., op. cit., p. 59

O'Connor is guilty - 'To try to understand the nature
and pattern of some practical discourse in terms of
the nature and pattern of some purely theoretical
discourse can only result in its being radically mis-
conceived' (11). Radical misconceptions on the part
of philosophers of O'Connor's standing are, it must
be noted, less common than plain differences of commit-
ment! We can recall Atkinson's comment: '...the class-
ical statement of the view that all practical problems
have this form /that is, are means/ends problems7...
is followed in all essential respects by so recent
and philosophically sophisticated a writer as O'Conn-
or. Such scepticism as O'Connor expresses...about the
adequacy of the education/applied science analogy
does not derive from any doubts about the appropriate-
ness of applying the means/ends category here, but
rather from his doubt whether the social sciences have
developed to a point at which they are clearly of
more use to the educator than is commonsense, "psych-
ological" lore' (12).

But to Hirst empirical investigation and practic-
al activity are radically different so far as their
theories are concerned; and education is just one sec-
tor of the latter. The 'education/applied science'
analogy is alien to his _way_ of thinking rather than
merely to him, a fact that clearly emerges from his

(11) Ibid., p. 60
(12) Atkinson, R. F., 'Instruction And Indoctrin-
ation' in Archambault, R. D. (Ed), <u>Philosophical Anal-
ysisAnd Education</u> (London, 1965), p. 180

reference to the work of a philosophical friend whose
very individual and thorough expression of an anti-
O'Connor point of view is well known. We can turn
to Arnaud Reid for a moment to sample the background
to the Hirst thesis. He devotes a chapter in the book
that sums up his long years of experience in educat-
ional philosophy to the notion of 'application' of
theory to practice; and this is founded on a central
prescription the very phrasing of which reveals the
distance at which he operates from the more scientif-
ically-orientated analytical philosophers: 'We have,
I believe, to work from the idea of applying theories
and concepts, as such, to practice, towards the idea...
of a person, charged with ideas, deciding and acting
in an enlightened way in the individual situation' (13).

His scale of 'application' examples ranges from
engineering (favoured in analogies by both O'Connor
and Scheffler) to educational philosophy, and is des-
igned to persuade us that, at the latter end, '...
"application" tells us hardly anything and becomes
the wrong word' (14); for there is an increasing com-
plexity of situation in which imponderables multiply.
In a complex situation, he argues, it is not meaning-
ful to talk of, for example, 'applying' principles
of scientific psychology to particular instances: rath-
er, we must conceive the situation as '...the use of

(13) Reid, L. A., Philosophy And Education (Lon-
don, 1962), p. 87
(14) Ibid., p. 88

science by a teacher who has assimilated it, in help-
ing him to come to terms with his practical problems'
(15).

Moreover, there is implied in every application
of theory to practice, according to Reid, a judgment
of value - very often this is a simple looking judg-
ment (for example, '...we want in education to teach
better, to help children' (16)), but its presence
is precisely what makes talk about education the com-
plex phenomenon that it is. Reid's position is thus
consonant with that of Hirst, for he holds that the
theory of the <u>activity</u> that is education must draw
upon many different kinds of knowledge, that it inv-
olves the making of value judgments and the utilisat-
ion of beliefs of the metaphysical and religious kind
which O'Connor dismisses as an irrelevance in educat-
ional <u>theory</u>. To Reid, this complex theory can only
be effective in the thought and action of a <u>person</u>
who is indivisible into the philosophic 'ends' chooser
and scientific 'means' investigator and applier that
O'Connor's position suggests.

Hirst's 'field' thesis, seen against this back-
ground, is thus the careful elaboration of the logic-
al status of 'educational theory' as this appears to
philosophers of a certain persuasion. But O'Connor's
scientific model for educational theory is not lacking

(15) Ibid., p. 91
(16) Ibid., p. 92

various allies in the philosophical background, and
to these we can turn before resuming the report on
Hirst in a context within which he gives his fully
developed position, the context of a direct examin-
ation of O'Connor's contribution. We thus follow
the Hirst technique itself in reporting in stages with
incidental cross-reference to related and alternative
views; and continue in this way the established pro-
cedure of our own account.

Eastwood's Scientific Model

Eastwood bewails '...the failure of educational
philosophy to be influenced by contemporary scientific
philosophy' (17), by which he means the failure to
distinguish, within the complex discourse that attends
education, those elements that are capable of scient-
ific improvement from those that are non-scientific
in character: he is a 'means/ends' thinker, eager to
isolate, concentrate upon and fefine the theory of the
'means' and is thus in complete opposition to the kind
of view developed by Hirst.

He talks in terms of theor<u>ies</u> rather than theor<u>y</u>;
that is, of explanation within limited areas of phen-
omena rather than of rationally illuminating practice
through general discussion which integrates the find-
ings of a variety of disciplines with respect to educ-

(17) Eastwood, G. R., '"Contemporary Philosophy"
In Education', <u>Australian Journal of Higher Education</u>,
Vol. I, p. 38, 1961-63

ation. To Eastwood 'theories' are scientific, derived from experimental research and refined in practice to describe, explain and predict phenomena in the familiar manner of other areas of enquiry: to him, 'educational theory' implies a piecemeal, cumulative understanding of what goes on, it '...implies the formulation of a systematically related set of theories to explain the educative process and facilitate the development of coherent practices' (18).

As we would expect, from what we know of Eastwood's work on concepts, he is concerned with what is in <u>principle</u> possible and not with what exists to be seen in the achievements to date of even the most scientific parts of educational theory. His vision is of a scientific discipline of education, the eventual construction of a set of related laws and established hypotheses which are specific to education - 'Undefined terms and terms defined in the system and the axioms established by means of them are as capable of development in education as in any other field' (19). Though this view, the antithesis of Hirst's, is expressed with the reminder that a very long way has to be trod before the vision becomes the reality - '...it must not be expected that a set of satisfactory theories can be easily and quickly evolved' (20).

An example of a theory such as Eastwood's 'system-

(18) Ibid., p. 39
(19) Ibid., p. 40
(20) Ibid., p. 40

atically related set' would consist of is that of in-
dividual differences, one for which he claims scient-
ific maturity. The development and inter-relating
of such theories is possible, he argues, if the task
is approached positively, if resources and scientif-
ic 'know how' are made available so that it is acc-
epted by those involved that it is possible to struc-
ture adequate scientific theories in the context of
education, just as it is in the context of the more
familiar factual sciences. Eastwood's point (always
slightly obscure, as was shown in our last chapter)
seems to be that hindrances of resource and will hold
back education more than hindrances of principle; and
that as much can be expected of education as of the
other social sciences, once these hindrances are over-
come: his assumptions, that social sciences in gener-
al have impressive records and that education can be
made into another social science and so partake in
this record, are so controversial as to make us hope
once again for an extended exposition of his views.

When he says, 'Such development has not occurred
in the case of educational theories and one of the in-
itial tasks of the contemporary scientific philosopher
is the modification of this structure to suit educ-
ation or the development of an entirely new structure'
(21), he would seem to be substituting his own wishes
for a realistic assessment of what is possible at the

(21) Ibid., p. 40

moment in the social sciences and what is in princ-
iple possible for 'educational theory' viewed under
its scientific aspect. Certainly there are well-fin-
anced attempts being made, particularly in America,
to realize what we can identify as Eastwood's vision,
but these, for example the series of papers by Eliz-
abeth Maccia listed in our bibliography, are open to
the charge of methodological naivety and the pseudo-
use of symbolism such as we noted in our last chapter
with reference to Eastwood himself. A typical comment
from a leading philosopher of science on such attempts
to anticipate the genuine, slow progress of social
research is the following: 'To the logician it is
clear that in educational research...there is still
a pathetic tendency to identify the use of jargon
with the possession of a science...It could almost
be said that, outside of statistics, terms which have
been introduced specifically for educational research
have done more to confuse than to clarify' (22).

Confusion rather than clarity seems to result,
for example, from Eastwood's introduction of the terms
'first order theories' and 'second order theories'
to develop his present views, for, as we shall see,
similar terms are used in a much more straightforward
sense by Hirst: the two senses and the contexts of their
use symbolize, in fact, what much of our account is

(22) Scriven, M., 'The Philosophy Of Science In
Educational Research', <u>Review Of Educational Research</u>,
Vol. XXX No. 5, pp. 427-8, December 1960

about. First order theories describe and explain selected aspects of the educational process and thus have their origin in observation, practice and experiment within the school situation: they are developed by researchers who are, presumably, close enough to the classroom to be thought of as educational researchers. The English Schools Council is currently initiating work that probably meets some of Eastwood's demands at this level, particularly in its emphasis upon putting the curriculum on a more rational basis.

Second order theories are closer to the 'human sciences' of Hirst's analysis of the forms of knowledge in that their construction depends upon a linking of first order theories with those derived from such sciences. As Eastwood puts it: 'Their development necessitates the establishment of cross-connection laws and is primarily a logico-philosophical task. The difference between first-order and second-order theories is one of degree or scope rather than structure. The former function predominantly in the process of education while the latter are directed toward the discipline' (23). It cannot go unnoticed that Eastwood is as bound to ordinary terms such as 'link' and 'relate' for the exposition of central parts of his thesis as is Hirst to terms like 'build together' and 'composite' for his.

(23) Eastwood, G. R., op. cit., p. 40

Both levels of theory require philosophical attention: but, in stating this, Eastwood means the attention of what he himself calls 'scientific philosophy' and what we can take to be the philosophy of science. The comment already given from that quarter indicates to what extent this bold demand for structuring research and developing theory within 'the context of education' stands much chance of being implemented in the near future. The whole analysis derives from a hopeful interpretation of what the logic of science could make possible predated into an assertion of what it does make possible provided the exhortations of those like Eastwood who make the claim are widely acted upon.

It is a view completely antithetical to that of Hirst, a view that can be rated as a 'tough minded', less restrained version of the O'Connor position on metaphysically-unencumbered scientific theory in education which draws Hirst's fire. And its answer to the question of 'application' of theory to practice, to the problem of 'building together' what is with what ought to be is expectedly unsubtle. The issues raised by Hirst and Reid concerning the complexity of the theory-practice relationship are not even recognized by Eastwood: they are ruled out by his defining 'theory' in the way that he does. He says, boldly: '... the contention that theories in education function as descriptive and explanatory devices precludes the poss-

ibility of the question of derivation of practice from
theory from arising' (24).

The whole of this question of what we educate
for is banished from the area in which 'theory' is to
be clarified into a separate realm of 'ends' which is
no concern of the scientific philosopher. Eastwood
quotes Scheffler in passing on the problem, obviously
having little interest in the traditional type of
discussion which is so open to the kind of non-rigor-
ous sloganizing that he has elsewhere condemned. He
says: 'For those who wish to cling to the concept of
the educational philosopher as a determiner of values
and a designator of goals this view has little to off-
er and little to say other than as a reminder that
value-determination cannot "plausibly be considered
the exclusive responsibility of any specialist" ' (25).
The alternative which he offers to the Reidian notion
of a 'person charged with ideas', one in whom the
Hirst 'field' can be said to operate, is the charac-
teristically impersonal one of '...an interpretational
agency which must function at the level of the prac-
tising educator and be capable of translating research
findings into practical activities' (26).

However, there must be more than a suspicion that
Eastwood is overstating a case here, and that it is
the overstatement rather than the case that is at fault.

(24) Ibid., p. 41
(25) Ibid., p. 29
(26) Ibid., p. 41

Decisions about ends have to be taken, whether they
are taken in such a way as to establish the truth of
the Hirst 'field' thesis or in a manner that needs
an O'Connor 'means-ends' view for its description.
If the latter, there is need for the decisions to be
made in the light of what philosophy can offer: it is
not the case, as Eastwood contends, that 'this view
has little to offer', as we shall see when we examine
O'Connor's position directly. But for the moment we
can take up the reference to Scheffler in order to
indicate that a philosopher who values what philosophy
can contribute to general discussions of education
(We have seen him in his non-scientific role in earl-
ier chapters) can also appreciate the need for scien-
tific theories somewhat similar to those for which
Eastwood so singlemindedly calls.

Scheffler insists time and again on the need to
recognize that both teacher and researcher, both ped-
agogue and scientist have legitimate interests in ed-
ucation and that each should accept the claim of the
other. As he says: 'If inquiry is to be effectively
related to the practice of teaching, the divergence
of goal between teacher and educational researcher
needs to be recognized as legitimate and as calling
for different working distances from the world of
practice. There needs, of course, also to be a rel-
ation of mutual and sympathetic interest between teach-
ers and educational researchers. Teachers must not
only understand the researcher's divergence of aim

and his difference in practical orientation; they
must also be able to comprehend the implications of
his results for their own work. For their part, the
researchers must not only appreciate the goals ins-
piring teaching; they must also understand its pecul-
iar problems in diverse situations and be willing to
take these as starting points for research and as end-
points to which research results may be applied' (27).

This is, as is to be expected, a much more rest-
rained emphasis upon scientific theory in education
than that typically encountered in Eastwood: never-
theless, the emphasis is there. Scheffler clearly
conceives educational theory as providing better and
better means for achieving the practical teacher's
goals as scientific knowledge replaces the less than
scientific. The goals themselves are another matter,
of more concern to the other Scheffler whom we have
watched disentangling the pervasive features of gener-
al educational discourse, the discourse which is closer
to Hirst's middle domain than that of the scientist.
As has been mentioned on a number of occasions, Scheff-
ler appears to combine in one philosopher the two app-
roaches ('scientific' and 'humanistic'?) to be found
respectively, in the present context, in Eastwood and
Hirst. This is a fact that is coming to be noticed
in the literature and one which holds out some hope
for the eventual realization of that complementarity

(27) Scheffler, I., The Language Of Education
(Springfield, Illinois, 1960), p. 75

which we suggested earlier. G.F.Kneller says very recently, for example, '...if we choose to analyze pedagogical discourse seriously, we are not likely to find the formalist approach helpful. Israel Scheffler, for example, who writes as a logical empiricist on the philosophy of science, adopts the method of informal analysis when he considers some major concepts in pedagogy' (28)

The term 'pedagogy', contrasted by Kneller with 'research', is that branch of the study of education '...which is largely prescriptive...It consists basically of recommendations for educational practice... and it includes much ethical and general philosophical writing...Although it also involves descriptions of practice, its language is for the most part normative...Pedagogy tends to be expressed in , :: ordinary language, or the language of educated speech... So-called pedagogical theories...are not explanations in any scientific sense;' (29). 'Pedagogy' is thus what Hirst wants to improve by making us conscious of its logical role, what Scheffler examines in his 'ordinary language' moments, what Eastwood closes his eyes to in concentrating on the 'science' of education and what has been created and re-created by thinkers from Plato to Dewey.

However, our immediate concern in this section is

(28) Kneller, G. F., <u>Logic And Language Of Education</u> (New York, 1966), p. 154
(29) Ibid., pp. 153-4

with the scientific model for theory which is common-
ly contrasted with 'pedagogy', and, at the moment,
with Scheffler's emphasis in this direction. He points,
for example, to the resemblance between teaching and
other practical arts such as engineering and medicine
(and cooking!) in a way that sets him off from the
thinking of a Reid, who, as we saw, notes significant
differences between the enterprises ˉ - 'The relation
of educational research to teaching may thus be com-
pared with the relation of physical research to engin-
eering, or, better, with the relation of medical res-
earch to the clinical practice of medicine' (30). He
reminds us that this relationship is complex, as it
is between any practical art and underpinning science;
it is such that educational research must be a common
focus of <u>many</u> sciences - sociology, anthropology, ec-
onomics as well as psychology - but he does not, as
Reid does in his talk of 'application', cease to look
<u>from</u> the underlying sciences <u>towards</u> the practical
activity as he moves along the 'continuum': to Scheff-
ler, the relationship is logically the same no matter
how complex the situations are in which it obtains.

His purpose is clear when he says: 'Though no
<u>unique</u> science underlies each of the major practical
arts, the degree to which <u>some</u> body of theoretical
science underlies an art is an important factor det-

(30) Scheffler, I., op. cit., p. 72

ermining its degree of professionalization' (31).
This is not the impossible demand for immediate rig-
our of an Eastwood, though it carries a similar mess-
age of faith in what the social sciences could, in
time, empower teachers to do and a similar scepticism
about the possibility of achievement in education
without proper scientific knowledge of the most eff-
ective means. It is the voice of one who, having
demonstrated his sympathy for a proper philosophical
analysis in the more general 'Hirstian' domain, still
wishes to urge the strong claims of scientific inquiry
for a large place in the educational enterprise. His
conclusion from another discussion gives, in fact, in
two sentences an answer each to the assertions of
Hirst and Eastwood and an admirable summary of his
moderate position - 'The problem, it seems to me, is
thus to advance the state of social inquiry - in part-
icular, of all those studies which seem likely to
yield explanatory principles relevant to the concerns
of education. Whether, however, it turns out that
one or several theoretical disciplines develop, and
whether any of these is a discipline of education
specifically, seem to me quite unimportant issues' (32).

We return now to Hirst for the final development
of his position as it is given in criticism of the
analytical views of O'Connor. And in doing so we can

(31) Ibid., p. 73
(32) Scheffler, I., 'Is Education A Discipline?'
in Walton, J. and Kuethe, J. L. (Eds), The Discipline
Of Education (Madison, Wisconsin, 1963), p. 61

note that this section has dealt with the 'means'
aspect of the 'ends/means' position and that the next
section, when it reaches the direct examination of
O'Connor, must deal, in addition, with the 'ends' as-
pect if the alternative to the complex 'field' view
is not to appear unacceptably remote from education
as a purposeful activity. It is in O'Connor's book
that the 'Ends/means' thesis is most plainly stated
and it is that statement, so influential in the dis-
agreement it has provoked, which must occupy a not
insignificant place in our report of the main lines
of discussion.

O'Connor's 'Means/Ends' Thesis

That this thesis de-emphasises the importance of
philosophy in its demand for scientific theory in
education is a main contention of Hirst - 'If we rej-
ect the scientific model as thoroughly false and art-
ificial, with it there can go too the idea that phil-
osophy is of only peripheral significance, even if
by philosophy we still mean an analytical activity'
(33). His object is to show that educational think-
ing has at its centre a philosophical component, even
on a limited analytical view of what philosophy is;
and that, on a less restricted view of philosophy,
philosophy enters into educational theory in more than
one way.

(33) Hirst, P. H., op. cit. (see p. 191, supra),
p. 60

He distinguishes 'first order' subjects from
'second order' (see Eastwood, p. 208, supra); that
is he emphasises the difference between those subjects,
the sciences and the humanities, which explain the
world and ourselves and which give us knowledge about
them directly, and, particularly, philosophy which
has a different kind of object for investigation -
which, in fact, '...can be said to be a second order
subject because it seeks to describe and explain the
way in which first order subjects do their job' (34).
His point is that, if scientific theory is taken as
the model for education, philosophy will be 'second
order' in the sense of being of second importance (or,
as we could add, remembering Eastwood's singleminded-
nes, of no importance at all). He says, 'If educat-
ional theory is thought of as scientific in charac-
ter, then this kind of understanding may well seem
of only fringe significance. If however the theory
is as complex as has been suggested above, it may
well be of quite central importance after all' (35).

In fact, Hirst makes a case for the twofold imp-
ortance of philosophy. First there is its 'second
order' contribution, such as O'Connor, for example,
favours - and valued even more highly by Hirst himself
because of the very complexity of the first 'level'
situation which is the object of the philosophical

(34) Ibid., p. 60
(35) Ibid., pp. 60-1

analysis. This is the 'formal' contribution, in which the philosopher brings his skills in a sense from the <u>outside</u> to bear upon educational discourse. Presumably, such discourse will have a cumulative benefit from conscious philosophical scrutiny, becoming less open to the more obvious philosophical criticisms as time goes on and the 'second order' activity becomes more widely practised <u>and</u> known to be practised.

Then, the other contribution of philsophy, its 'substantial' contribution as philosophical <u>belief</u>, will - again, presumably - become more consciously built in to educational discourse as an essential element of what is inevitably composite. In short, the effect on 'educational theory', in the complexity of which philosophical belief is always to be found, of the analytical activities of interested modern philosophers, will be the improvement which knowing more clearly what one is doing always brings. Such, at any rate, appears to be the implication of Hirst's going beyond O'Connor's confined analytical position.

Even on the assumption that philosophy is purely analytical, argues Hirst, its importance cannot be restricted to what O'Connor has in mind: his scientific paradigm for educational theory would make negligible philsophy's role, whereas a correct assessment of the complexity of this domain reveals the central importance of philosophy - '...the significance of philosophical work in these two fields is.

very different. Generally speaking the sciences dep-
end little on this kind of clarification for it is
part of the scientific pursuit itself to construct
and refine the concepts used so that they clearly ex-
press what is understood about the world. This they
do directly against the empirical evidence. As has
been repeatedly stated, educational theory is not
developed in this monolithic manner, but depends upon
bringing together of many diverse elements of under-
standing to form a composite theory in which practic-
al judgments are made. In such a complex activity,
serious problems of meaning frequently occur and in
particular a failure to understand the relations be-
tween different fields of discourse befogs many educ-
ational issues' (36).

Hirst's estimate of the dependence of the scient-
ist on the philosopher of science must be judged as
grossly inaccurate, unless the 'scientific pursuit'
is intended to cover the conceptual clarification ach-
ieved for science by any person whatsoever, no matter
what disciplinary allegiance he owes; but, in this case,
the estimate is true by defintion. However, the main
point is to underline the significance of philosophy,
even in its restricted analytical aspect, for educat-
ional theory if such a domain is the composite phen-
omenon that Hirst declares it to be: its importance
in this respect is hardly increased by asserting that

(36) Ibid., p. 61

it would be less were there no such domain and 'educational theory' was simply scientific.

Hirst's thesis places, then, great store by the formal, second order, analytical function of philosophy - its clarificatory value in a domain where many typical phrases are of uncertain meaning. Educational discourse is littered with such expressions as 'equality of opportunity', 'freedom of the individual', 'the education of character' which stand in need of skilled analysis. There are so many of them, from such a variety of sources, that even when philosophy is conceived only in this way, as an accessory to existing educational talk, it must be of major importance for the succes of the enterprise: in Hirst's words, '...it would seem to be rather like some crucial tool without which it is hard to see how the various bits of the machine can be put together' (37).

But, in addition, there is philosophy's second contribution, identified by Hirst in going beyond the mere analytical position of O'Connor ('...in general his view of the nature of philosophy seems to me acceptable as far as it goes' (38)). He argues that an important ingredient in the characteristically composite educational theory is that provided by philosophy itself in making available philosophical analyses leading to philosophical beliefs. The judgments of

(37) Ibid., p. 62
(38) Ibid., p. 58

educational principle made within the domain of the-
ory are warranted by, amongst other things derived
from other disciplines, what philosophers working in
areas <u>other</u> than education have found out in their
own unique way. We have seen at some length the ex-
ample of 'pure' ethics providing the analysis of the
nature and justification of value judgments which has
such a strong bearing on questions of moral education.

Other parts of 'pure' philosophical investigation
provide the substance to be mixed into the theory of
education: and, as we have observed, philosophers
themselves will probably enter education more direct-
ly as the place of this kind of contribution is made
clear; and do some of their philosophical work within
a pedagogical context rather than in seclusion as has
been the case. Further, non-'philosophers' within ed-
ucation will possibly be moved by the force of Hirst's
and others theory of educational theory to equip them-
selves with the necessary skills to improve the job
of theorising that they would be doing in any case,
so that there will be a great increase in the amount
and variety of philosophical analyses which, as Hirst
contends, '...constitute one of the diverse elements
that are brought together as the material out of which
educational theory is built' (39).

Hirst's thesis thus lays great stress on the need
for philosophy in educational theory, on the understand-

(39) Ibid., p. 62

ing peculiar to it and on the <u>direct</u> contribution
that it can make. He does this finally by building
his theory while showing the inadequacies - as he sees
them - of O'Connor's position. But the latter has so
far been described only on the basis of second hand
information derived from accounts which are hostile,
as with Hirst's, or in friendly relation, as with
Eastwood's. In view of its influence in arousing in-
terest in, as O'Connor himself puts it, '...important
contemporary ideas...still unfamiliar to educational
theorists' (40), it will be as well to go to the orig-
inal, leaving further consideration of Hirst until
the next chapter.

O'Connor's philosophical stance in relation to the
fact of education is easier to perceive than that of
Hirst. Educational problems are simply 'ends-means'
problems, each aspect of which requires separate phil-
osophical treatment. The 'ends' are the '...set of
values or ideals embodied and expressed in the purpos-
es for which knowledge, skills and attitudes are imp-
arted and so directing the amounts and types of train-
ing given' (41). A satisfactory attempt at stating
such ideals must involve the direct use of several
branches of philosophy, argues O'C6nnor, for it must
discuss questions of value and the nature of human
experience.

(40) O'Connor, D. J., <u>An Introduction To The Phil-
osophy Of Education</u> (London, 1957), p. v
    (41) Ibid., p. 5

The 'means', the '...set of theories which purport
to explain and justify the use of...techniques for im-
parting knowledge, skills and attitudes' (42), involve
first, as we have seen asserted in a more extreme way,
the positive sciences, for they deal broadly with
questions of fact. But they also involve philosophy
indirectly, for '...questions about the nature of the-
ories and their explanatory function are philosophical
questions' (43). He in this way places his emphasis
where Hirst considers it to be inappropriate - on the
philosophy of science and away from the philosophy of
'practice'.

There is no doubt that the education/applied science
analogy already identified in Scheffler dominates
those portions of O'Connor's book which distinguish
it from any other primer in modern philosophy (i.e.,
without 'of education'). He, too, stresses that im-
proved educational practice will come only with the
substitution of adequate theory for pedagogical folk-
lore, and that this theory waits upon the further
development of the social sciences. His hope, like
Scheffler's, is that the future development of psych-
ology, sociology and the rest will narrow the gap be-
tween scientific educational theory and the confirming
evidence for it; and in saying that '...this hope gives
an incentive for developing these sciences' (44) he
makes us wonder whether a criticism of Hirst by O'

(43) Ibid., p. 5
(44) Ibid., p. 110

Connor, if there were one, might not be such as to bring out what this statement implies - that an under-valuing of what science can contribute to education is itself part of the 'folklore', no matter how sophisticated its modern dress.

There is much in O'Connor that makes Hirst's condemnation of the 'scientific paradigm' appear somewhat hasty. In particular, his careful description and distinguishing of four principal ways in which scientific explanation is made provides the essential background to his remarks on educational theory and cannot be dismissed in the casual manner of Hirst's critique. They are included for the good reason that, without them, O'Connor's firm belief that the social sciences hold the key to greater educational efficiency could not be moderated by his equally firm realization that development along these lines will be slow.

He distinguishes the first type of explanation - of facts as instances of general laws - as '...clearly a fairly primitive level of explanation...more easily exemplified from the less developed sciences' (45); and the second type - of laws as instances of more general laws - as that found frequently in advanced sciences, and sometimes prematurely attempted '...in those social sciences relevant to education where the rules of method are not always so closely

(45) Ibid., p. 86

looked to as they must be in the sciences of nature' (46). These two types show the fundamental logical pattern of scientific explanation, according to O'Connor: a conclusion is true only when it is arrived at by valid deductive procedures from true premises.

O'Connor's point is that two other kinds of 'explanation' are not so logically basic, being more in the nature of ancillaries to the deductive type, and that educational theory at the moment patterns itself on these. The first, the constructing of a model to elucidate puzzling facts, is a characteristic explanatory device of (these days) the social sciences, being simply the putting of the unfamiliar in terms of what is familiar. It is only an aid to the development of 'real' theories, acting as a source for hypotheses designed to replace theories which their confirmation shows to be unsatisfactory. Consequently, it is used '...at lower levels of scientific thinking' where '...explanatory models are a very useful method of developing old and less adequate theories into new and more adequate ones' (47).

The use of such models in science was touched upon, it will be remembered, by Scheffler during his discussion of the role of metaphor in educational discourse. He says: 'The line, even in science, between serious theory and metaphor, is a thin one if it can be drawn at all...the initial metaphor must

(46) Ibid., p. 87
(47) Ibid., p. 89

lead to refinements in the comparison, expressed literally, and to experimental confirmation of predictions or other inferences derived from them...metaphors have often been said to organize reflection and explanation in scientific...contexts' (48). The same view is expressed by O'Connor: models enlighten us by suggesting arguments, '...But by themselves they are no more than a useful stimulus to the process of explanation' (49).

They may feature as an ancillary element in the last type of explanation, that which '...fills the gap' (50) between two facts which are separated by space, time or both in such a way as to reduce the puzzlement which the facts engender. O'Connor's careful analysis of types of explanation has been a preliminary to this one, the most important for educational theory because of its use in social science. He says: '...there are some sciences in which explanation at this level is basic and of the first importance. The so-called genetic or developmental sciences which include large parts of ...psychology...and almost the whole of studies like history and anthropology depend for the explanations which they can give us on gap-filling stories of this kind' (51).

Consequently, educational theory itself, being in

(48) Scheffler, I., The Language Of Education (Springfield, Illinois, 1960), pp. 47-8
(49) O'Connor, D. J., op. cit., p. 90
(50) Ibid., p. 90
(51) Ibid., p. 91

O'Connor's view a focus for the social sciences, will
rely heavily on such gap-filling explanations until
such time as the parent sciences can provide a more
satisfactory pattern; that is, explanation of the gen-
uine deductive kind. This moderate appraisal of the
situation contains no exaggerated claim for what is
presently or even shortly possible in educational
theory conceived as _scientific_ theory. It is realist-
ic in its acceptance that there are good reasons why
the sciences in question have not achieved more than
they can presently show; and, as such, it contrasts
favourably with the extremism of Eastwood. Certainly,
this aspect of O'Connor's work, _fully_ argued and pres-
ented with restraint, stands up well to Hirst's _brief_
attempt at dismissal. Given the possibility of a
scientific theory or theories of education, it is very
necessary to know in some detail what the philosophy
of science has to say about theorising and explanation,
and O'Connor makes a good provision of this knowledge
for our benefit.

When he turns from this thoroughly explicated back-
ground to the primary enquiry into the place of _educat-_
ional theory, he uses that analogy to be found conf-
irmed in Scheffler and rejected by Reid. Just as the
'growing points' (52) for the practical activities of
medicine and engineering lie in science and its theor-
etical justification of practice, so too with education.

(52) Ibid., p. 93

History makes this plain: as O'Connor says, 'There were of course doctors, surgeons and engineers in the ancient and medieval worlds. They had to work without the scientific equipment of their present-day counterparts and, as a result, the scope of their work and its efficiency was immeasurably less than that of modern doctors and engineers' (53).

But O'Connor knows that he is using an analogy. He is not so foolish as to ignore obvious difficulties and his argument abounds with qualifications and caution. He expects no revolution from the systematic application to education of the modest advances made in the relevant human sciences, and chides the view that does - '...I think there are good reasons for supposing it is far too optimistic about the future and, moreover, far too pessimistic about the present' (54). An important point which he makes is that , of the natural regularities that the sciences seek to establish, some are much more easily known than others, are more quickly grasped by persistent and careful <u>observers</u> unaided by controlled experimentation: many of the regularities of the sciences of man on which education depends are of this type.

Consequently, intelligent and critical observation can teach us much: 'The rough regularities of behaviour and experience that we can all notice in our-

(53) Ibid., p. 93
(54) Ibid., p. 94

selves, our friends and animals are sufficient to give
us all a modest stock of psychological knowledge' (55).
On the basis of this rough-hewn knowledge we can op-
erate successfully enough for everyday practical pur-
poses in our contact with other people, particularly
in a relatively uncomplicated social context. So,
education has for thousands of years been a success-
ful enterprise while lacking any scientific underpin-
ning, for the teacher has known '...enough of the
workings of human nature from common experience to
enable him to teach effectively' (55). This suffic-
iency, it can be noted, is one of the causes of the
'average' teacher's scepticism in regard to demands
that he should acquire greater professional knowledge,
a scepticism currently centred upon the Schools Council
initiative.

O'Connor emphasises that social conditions change;
and in the case of education they have changed dramat-
ically in recent times. There is now the need to ed-
ucate the whole of the child population and to comm-
unicate the vast accumulation of modern knowledge. To
cope with this problem it is necessary for teachers
to recognize that practice depends upon theory in the
O'Connor sense and that the theory needs to be as well-
founded as the times can make it. Traditional methods
of teaching, based upon unconsciously absorbed theory
of a prescientific commonsensical kind, which is pick-

(55) Ibid., p. 96

ed up at _best_ by intelligent reflection on wide ex-
perience, are not appropriate for a mass society un-
dergoing a knowledge explosion, no matter how well
they may have worked in the past or how well they may
seem still to work when judged only by the same people
who use them.

O'Connor's point, that every practitioner is also
a theorist in his sense, appears a valid one and rec-
eives considerable support from investigations into
the philosophy of research, an area which, it will be
remembered, Hirst undervalues in his desire to construct
his own theory of 'theory' at O'Connor's expense. For
instance, one of the most respected contemporary model-
makers in education has this to say: 'Yet, of course,
all men...are theorists. They differ not in whether
they use theory, but in the degree to which they are
aware of the theory they use. The choice before the
man in the street and the research worker alike is not
whether to theorize but whether to articulate his the-
ory, to make it explicit, to get it out in the open
where he can examine it. Implicit theories - of pers-
onality, of learning, and indeed of teaching - are
used by all of us in our everyday affairs. Often
such theories take the form of folk sayings, proverbs,
slogans, the unquestioned wisdom of the race. The
scientist on the other hand explicates his theory' (56).

(56) Gage, N. L.,'Paradigms For Research On Teaching',
in Gage, N. L., (Ed), Handbook Of Research On Teaching
(Chicago, 1963), pp. 94-5

Nevertheless, O'Connor's desire to see the replacement of 'folk' theory by scientific theory is not expressed in ignorance of the differences between education and other analogous practical activities. The time we live in demands that what we know in the sciences of man – and he makes no exaggerated claims for the extent of this knowledge – be applied in place of the rules of thumb that are no longer effective in achieving objectives which he considers are decided outside 'theory' in this restricted sense. He concludes: 'Thus the analogy between education and applied skills like medicine or engineering is imperfect. Even to be efficient on a small scale, medicine and engineering must be based on natural science. But education demands this only when it has so increased in scale and complexity that the laws of human nature that are patent to intelligent observers prove an inadequate theoretical basis and need to be supplemented or replaced by the sciences of man' (57).

So, O'Connor on 'means' is a valuable contribution to the debate – certainly more valuable than could be guessed from only an indirect knowledge of him gained from between the lines of Hirst's critical article. But there is also the O'Connor of the separate 'ends' to be considered; briefly, for it is one of the characteristics of O'Connor's type of thesis that this aspect of it contains the possibility of a sort of

(57) O'Connor, J. D., op. cit., p. 97

'escalation': as he says in his peroration, '...the
problems of the philosophy of education, if pressed
far enough, become the traditional problems of phil-
osophy' (58). Thus, an examination of the 'bearing'
of analytical philosophy on education could entail an
almost limitless series of enquiries into the contemp-
orary state of 'pure' philosophy in all its varied
aspects, for, as the quotation implies, all these as-
pects have some bearing, clear or obscure, on educat-
ional problems.

Particularly, two specialist areas within philos-
ophy could easily be drawn within a thesis such as this
one, if the O'Connor approach were to be examined thor-
oughly on the assumption of its superiority to rival
approaches which attempt to make sense of this puzzling
'boundary' domain. These are the philosophy of relig-
ion, the scope of which is merely sketched by O'Connor
('...there is a set of basic questions in the philos-
ophy of religion that have been discussed at a very
elementary level' (59)), and which could be explored
with profit now that analytical philosophy has begun
to penetrate theological discussion: and the philos-
ophy of philosophy, similarly broached by O'Connor -
'...there is the very difficult and controversial
question of the nature of philosophical enquiry of
which a rather superficial and admittedly partial acc-
ount was given' (60).

(58) Ibid., p. 140
(59) Ibid., p. 138
(60) Ibid., p. 138

However, to assume the superiority of O'Connor's
manner of displaying the 'philosophy of education'
(the totality of his separate treatment of 'ends' and
'means') would be to sin against the stated objectives
of this account as much as would have been an initial
acceptance of Hirst's view - a course deliberately
avoided (see p. 2, supra). Therefore the philosophy
of religion can be passed over with just this mention
of its importance, not only in connection with the
elucidation of 'ends' which appear in the O'Connor
scheme but also as a contributing source of Hirst-
type beliefs to his composite domain. This avoidance
of an important area is just as well from the point
of view of setting some bounds to our account, for an
examination of religion, its philosophy at a time of
'analytical' rejuvenation and the relation of these
to the problems of education would demand the kind of
space that only a separate thesis could provide. (61)
The philosophical investigation of the nature of phil-
osophy itself is a somewhat different case and must
be here included, if only to the extent of unifying
the scattered remarks made about it hitherto.

It is in considering the question of the extent
to which 'educational theory' mirrors the scientific
model so carefully described in his preliminary excur-

(61) See <u>Religious Education</u>, Vol. LX No. 1, Jan/
Feb. 1965 for a whole issue devoted to 'Linguistic
Philosophy And Christian Education' - an example of
the bearing of modern analytical philosophy on educat-
ional theory in an indirect manner via theology

sion into the logic of explanation that O'Connor sorts
out the distinctive areas to be found mixed into trad-
itional 'philosophy of education'; and thus touches
upon the nature of philosophy, particularly on the
status of metaphysical statements which enter so prof-
usely into the writings he has in mind. His intention
is of course to isolate the empirical component, to
make its importance clear and the possibility of its
improvement as a separate element beyond doubt. In
unscrambling the Hirst-approved mixture in this way,
he distinguishes three kinds of statement - metaphys-
ical, empirical and value statements - which, as he
says, '...are different in the sense that they belong
to distinct logical families and for that reason need
to be supported in quite different ways' (62).

It is with reference to metaphysical statements
that he makes clear his basic philosophical commit-
ment, a hint of which we have already reported in
presenting his contribution to the ethical debate (see
pp. 66-72, supra). We can best classify it briefly
in a negative way by giving a comment on it made by
one whose commitment is that alternative to the 'tough-
minded' neo-positivism which we have broadly classed
as 'linguistic'. Though it is to be noted that this
critic, Reid, is linguistic only in his own idiosyn-
cratic way - a fact that can serve as one more warning
that any unities of position which we impress upon the

(62) O'Connor, J. D., op. cit., pp. 104-5

varied nature of analytical 'bearing' are tentative
oversimplifications that future accounts will need to
remedy.

Reid, in the first part of his book, draws upon
those parts of 'pure' analytical philosophy which are
least sympathetic to the science-bound anti-speculat-
ive viewpoint of an O'Connor. He draws attention,
for example, to the notion of 'vision' in philosophy
propounded by the ex-Vienna Circle Waismann in saying:
'This liberal view of philosophy as fresh vision, or
as a case built up in rational, though not scientific
ways, as accepting a flexible view of the nature and
use of language, is an answer to the over-violent rep-
udiation of "metaphysics" (or speculative philosophy)
so evident some years ago...Professor O'Connor, for
example' (63).

This emphasis upon 'rational' procedures being
much wider than science dreams of, upon the limitat-
ions of the merely analytical approach, particularly
in its early revolutionary manifestations such as
live on in the 'dated' pronouncements of an O'Connor,
is to be found throughout Reid's persistent contrib-
ution to the discussion and, in more orthodox and less
'personal' form, within other instances that we have
already examined. As Reid says elsewhere: 'Metaphys-
ics in particular was loudly pronounced to be dead,

(63) Reid, L. A., _Philosophy And Education_ (London,
1962, p. 13

though it wouldn't lie down' (64). But to what extent it can be said that 'linguistic' sophistication has replaced 'positivistic' vigour in the arena of contemporary philosophy (to say nothing of the very special fusion of the 'linguistic' with the religious to be found in Reid himself) is something to be left for the next chapter.

What can be stated in this context, that of an examination of 'theory', is that O'Connor deals minimally with the non-scientific elements in educational discourse in order to highlight the importance, in his view, of the scientific element. He says: 'Statements of this kind /metaphysical7 are not believed, in the first place, just because they form part of educational theory. They are accepted rather because they feature in a philosophy or a theology which is already believed on other grounds' (65); and thus expels any discussion from 'educational theory' to the acknowledged philosophical and theological domains where the 'other grounds' can be properly debated.

To him, the proper procedure is to identify the metaphysical statements, sift them from the complex muddle of educational writings (66) and then subject them to appropriate philosophical criticism on, as it were, their home ground. As he says: 'It is important

(64) Reid, L. A., Philosophy And The Theory And Practice Of Education (London, 1965), p. 17 - Lecture delivered in 1962
(65) O'Connor, J. D., op. cit., p. 105
(66) See O'Connor, J. D., and others, 'Discussion: Philosophy Of Education', Harvard Educational Review, Vol. 33, pp. 219-36, Spring 1963 for a more recent

that, whether or not we suppose that such statements
are meaningful or provable, we should at least be able
to recognize them' (67). And it is clear from the
context and the emphasis to be found there that O'Connor
has what he would regard as healthy positivistic doubts
about metaphysics, especially when it is contained in
the 'urbane and cultural sermonizing' which is the
object of his most recent sceptical comment (see ar-
ticle cited at (66)).

Nevertheless, he admits that metaphysical state-
ments would be of great relevance to a discussion of
the aims of education if they were true: and his reas-
on for admitting this is of present interest because
it echoes (or, rather, anticipates) an argument in
the rival Hirst thesis. Like Hirst, he denies the
possibility of logically <u>deducing</u> statements about
aims from statements that are metaphysical, but grants
that such statements, if true, provide <u>'reasons'</u> for
creating an educational system of a particular sort.
He says: 'There is a sense in which a practical policy
for education can "follow from" a psychological theory
...if we know or think that we know something about
the motives governing human conduct, it would be fool-
ish not to take advantage of this knowledge in plann-
ing the educational system...In a similar way, philos-

(66) cont., but essentially unchanged position
than that found wanting by Reid and Hirst.
(67) O'Connor, J. D., op. cit. (see p. 223, supra),
p. 106

ophical statements <u>which</u> <u>are</u> <u>metaphysical</u> can have
practical consequences for education <u>just</u> <u>because</u> <u>such</u>
statements purport to be factual as well as philosoph-
ical. The difficulty, as we have seen, is that these
"facts" are of a peculiarly inaccessible kind' (68).

With talk of metaphysical "facts" we reach the
point at which commitments clash. Hirst, in his the-
ory of educational 'theory', assumes the existence of
philosophical <u>beliefs</u> which, because they are a kind
of knowledge, form part of the grist brought to the
mill of general educational discussion. O'Connor, in
his less 'tender minded' approach to 'theory', banish-
es all donors of purportedly <u>direct</u> philosophical
contributions to that place where the gifts can be
most properly examined; where, in fact, the possib-
ility of there being such gifts to offer is itself
an issue - to the self-questioning heart of 'pure'
philosophy. What goes on there, the next chapter
must briefly disclose, for an account such as this is
drawn towards it, as we have seen, at every point
where there is a pair of opposing viewpoints express-
ed in the context of <u>educational</u> discussion.

But before we leave the concept of an 'education-
al theory' or plain 'educational theory', we can make
the sort of general comment which indicates that the
discussion as reported here is a mere fragment of the

(68) Ibid., p. 106

available discussion and that the report itself is just one possible version. Reid, for example, ends his long professional association with the practical working out of some of the problems of educational theory in relation to philosophy by saying farewell with the theme of that very relationship; and presents a conceptual framework within which the Hirst thesis and the O'Connor thesis could perhaps merge without clashing. This is a possibility which must remain unexamined and merely suggested on the _tone_ rather than the details of the Reid valedictory lecture as evidence – as when he expresses his final hope, '... not one voice only, but many, in concourse' (69). Perhaps the normative and the explanatory aspects of the term 'theory', aspects which have received different emphases in the examples which this chapter has taken from the literature, can both be given due weight by some terminological agreement of the near future, forced on conflicting philosophers of education by the increasing volume of work in this area.

In any event, no matter what the ultimate resolution of the difficulties of which this chapter has made us aware, it will not come solely at the level of discussion connoted by the term which features largely in its title. From 'theory' we must move to 'philosophy' and so take up the fundamental questions of – to

(69) Reid, L. A., _Philosophy And The Theory And Practice Of Education_ (London, 1965), p. 40

quote our own introduction - 'The nature of philosophy, of language and, particularly, of knowledge' (see p. 7, supra). Perhaps at the end of this more thorough than hitherto scrutiny of the most fundamental sector of our field of enquiry we shall have become more capable than at present of suggesting avenues along which 'analytical' harmony may be found. For the moment, however, 'conflict' is the most appropriate term for the main characteristic of the scene that we have witnessed; and this term appears in the chapter title to follow as a reminder that, whatever cooperation the near future may bring, rooted disharmony is the mark of the present.

CHAPTER ·VII

THE CONFLICT IN ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY ABOUT
LANGUAGE AND KNOWLEDGE

The Basic Issue In 'Pure' Philosophy

Lack of unanimity amongst the analytically dispos-
ed has become familiar to us by repetition in several
contexts with an 'educational' aspect. The reason,
located outside such contexts, is not far to seek: it
has been implied on a number of occasions, but not
yet stated in the words of those most closely involved.
It is, however, recognized by them. At one .end of
the spectrum of analytical shades of opinion O'Connor
admits that he is '...putting forward a philosophical
theory which, like all such theories, finds no gener-
al acceptance' (1). At the other end, Reid recognizes
that 'The nature and function of philosophy is itself
a kind of philosophical problem – over which there has
always been controversy' (2).

Both thus look back to the ground in 'pure' phil-
osophy of the issues with which they are involved
when that philosophy is 'applied' to education. Small
wonder that the very scope of analytical 'bearing',
the manner in which it is said to operate and the res-
ults anticipated from it have been seen by us to pres-
ent a rich variety to the investigator; for the authors

(1) O'Connor, J. D., <u>An Introduction To The Philos-</u>
<u>ophy Of Education</u> (London, 1957), p. 4
(2) Reid, L. A., <u>Philosophy And Education</u> (London
1962), p. 3

of our examples look back, like O'Connor and Reid,
and see different views and so produce the varied mat-
erial in terms of which we have chosen to define the
'bearing'. Nevertheless, we have been forced to not-
ice a basic dichotomy within the literature - even
within the sample of it that we have taken from that
produced during a relatively short period of philosoph-
ical activity. This we can spell out in terms of the
'pure' philosophical background which the 'education-
al' writings perforce mirror.

This procedure is now demanded if we are to avoid
imbalance in an account that is drawing to a close;
for, so far, in paying close attention to 'education-
al' manifestations of analytical philosophy, we have
neglected (though not completely ignored) the reference
in detail to the fundamental debate which stands behind
what is being voiced in educational discourse. In our
last chapter, for example, we have seen how the con-
flict between two broad points of view implies an un-
derlying conflict that is being waged in less restrict-
ed territory than that provided by educational writ-
ings. The concepts of 'knowledge', 'discipline',
'theory' and so on to be found there are the markers
of epistemological territory which is extensive enough
to permit endless journeying.

We shall have to confine ourselves to a short ex-
cursion, just sufficiently informative to corroborate
and give 'body' to the main presupposition of our sur-

vey - that two branches of analytical philosophy, the broadly 'positivistic' and the broadly 'linguistic', exist in <u>fact</u>, and that their existence and the characteristics of each can be inferred quite accurately from the body of literature which is a 'secondary' manifestation of 'pure' philosophising. In dealing with ethics we were closest to the original sources, a fact which illustrates that the more important a sector of 'pure' philosophy is for educational thinking the more non-educational work must be called upon. Similarly now, epistemology must be viewed, for it too is of great significance for education. Scheffler's latest book is evidence of this; though the mention of it (3) must, unfortunately, be all we give of it for the same reason as that offered to excuse our mere mention of Peters' latest contribution - lack of time to assimilate important and relevant writings that are only just beginning to appear in substantial form and that will, undoubtedly, occupy key points in the accounts still to be written.

So, we move to analytical philosophy and its views of language, knowledge and the relationship between them. We have already stated (see p. 15, supra) that the two-phase philosophical career of Wittgenstein is the main source of, and the symbol for, both the continuity and the divergences within contemporary

(3) Scheffler, I., <u>Conditions Of Knowledge: Introduction To Epistemology And Education</u> (Chicago 1965)

analytical philosophy. The formal and the informal branches, the 'positivistic' and 'linguistic' emphases as we have called them, stem both largely from his insights. And these insights co^{n}cern language, as is well known. Common to both branches of the 'family' is the location of problems of <u>knowledge</u>, the core of philosophical problems, in problems of language, meaning and the analysis of these. This is the over-all picture, undistorted enough for our purposes if not for the chronicler of fine distinctions.

As W.H.F.Barnes says of the first, vigorous analytical phase (in a short impartial account written for educationists less than ten years ago to fill an obvious gap - a fact which illustrates the shortness of the period with which this survey deals): 'Positivism gave philosophy a tilt :by which words, sentences, talking, language, etc., became the object of attention, rather than ideas, thoughts, thinking, theory, and so on' (4). Of the later phase, Stuart Hampshire comments: 'There are certain permanent or recurring puzzles about the forms of our knowledge...What is largely new in the philosophy of the last thirty years ...is that many philosophers are now satisfied to trace these perplexities to their source in misunderstandings of the common forms of language' (5).

(4) Barnes, W. H. F., 'Logical Positivism' in Judges, A. V., (Ed), <u>Education And The Philosophic Mind</u> (London 1957), p. 125
(5) Hampshire, S., <u>Spinoza</u> (Harmondsworth 1951), p. 219

Language occupies the centre of the philosophical scene, it is clear. But how and why? The 'positivist' can speak first. Put roughly, it can be said that language has two main uses: to communicate 'facts' and to establish agreements about the use of terms with which such facts are communicated. The philosopher would put it technically by stating that there exist two distinct types of statements - 'synthetic' and 'analytic' - and the positivist would insist that the synthetic aspect of language activity, the assertion of how things <u>are</u>, is of primary importance, the analytic aspect being necessary only to ensure that fact-communication is accomplished by means of a reliable vehicle.

Only if agreement is reached about word-use can language operate effectively as an instrument of communication: there must be a consistent inter-relationship established between the elements of a language, a set of rules for the game. Clearly, in such 'analytical' use, experience of the world of fact is irrelevant to the question of <u>proper</u> use: an analytical proposition says nothing about the experienceable, non-verbal world, but speaks only of men's 'agreement' as to how the elements of language shall be used. Though this is not to deny the importance of analytic statements, for the positivist values studies in logic and mathematics - the two most clearly demarcated areas in which such statements form the bulk of what is said. It is only to emphasise the primary function

of language, which is to convey information about
something other than _itself_, to direct attention away
from the language level towards the non-linguistic uni-
verse.

It is synthetic statements which give us knowledge
of the world: the truth of such statements depends
upon what is the case and they are to be tested, acc-
ording to the positivistic view, against actual or poss-
ible sense experiences. This test distinguishes be-
tween analytic and synthetic statements, which between
them account for all statements that can be said to
be meaningful. If sense experience is appropriate
to the question of truth the statement is synthetic,
but if truth is determined only by an examination of
the terms and agreements implied in their use the
statement is analytic. If neither, the statement is,
to the positivist, 'meaningless' in a literal sense.

The notorious principle of verifiability is the
answer of this position to the question of the mean-
ing of a proposition. That is, the meaning of a prop-
osition consists in the logically equivalent propos-
itions into which the original can be translated;
and consists, ultimately, in derived statements about
direct experiences - the so called 'protocol' state-
ments which are, in a sense, their own justification.
The philosopher of this persuasion penetrates (in the-
ory) deep beneath the surface of language to this pro-
tocol-reflected bedrock, and if, in mining down from

a proposition or a kind of discourse, he fails to
find the basic level, the immediately known 'reality'
which affords a self-certifying sense experience, he
typically uses phrases like 'literal nonsense', 'mean-
ingless language', 'emotive meaning', or even 'meta-
physical moonshine'.

The verification principle and its more guarded
offspring, the principle of falsifiability, lies thus
at the heart of the positivistic theory of language
and knowledge, attempting to anchor all language in
the raw, common sensations which all human creatures
possess and which the simplest terms of our language
unmistakably 'reflect'. Its iconoclastic nature is
clear, as is the sympathy of those who held it in its
original form and those who have inherited its devel-
opments in contemporary philosophy of science for
the positive achievements of science. These charac-
teristics we have seen surviving, in various ways,
in the work of 'educational' philosophers such as
Hardie, O'Connor and Eastwood, all, to some extent,
willing inheritors of this vigorous, 'no nonsense'
tradition.

In contrast, the other, 'linguistic', branch of
analytical philosophy eschews blatant idol-smashing
and anti-metaphysical pronouncements. It is much
more liberal in attitude, as we have seen where it
appears in educational contexts: it de-emphasises the
importance of formal logic and positive science, as is

clear from the writings of philosophers like Hirst.
Barnes gives an admirable image of the contrast when
he says: 'To have made this transition is to have es-
caped from a strait-jacket into an easy-fitting lounge
suit' (6) - though, it must be said, he does not dwell
on the unsuitability of lounge suits for the perform-
ance of many essential practical tasks: boiler suits
are often made of straitjacket-like material.

With this approach, 'verification' as a slogan is
replaced by 'the meaning is the use' mentioned earlier.
The extraordinary variety to be found in the uses of
language, a variety which is unclassifiable within the
simple analytic/synthetic dichotomy, is appealed to;
particularly in the seminal passage from the later
Wittgenstein which concludes: 'It is interesting to
compare the multiplicity of the tools in language and
of the ways they are used, the multiplicity of kinds
of words and sentence, with what logicians have said
about the structure of language. (Including the author
of the "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus") ' (7).

If interest shifts, as it does with the 'linguist-
ic' philosopher, to language as a natural phenomenon,
of an almost organic complexity, there are not the
grounds for excluding as 'meaningless' any uses - as
there are when language is viewed 'positivistically'

(6) Barnes, W. H. F., op. cit., p. 138
(7) Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Philosophical Investig-
ations (Oxford, 1953), pp. 11e-12e

as functioning properly only in the communication of 'fact'. All uses have their 'natural' place, and are to be studied with patience rather than excluded because they do not measure up to a tidy but restricted scientific ideal. Language is a complex social product and should, in the 'linguistic' philosopher's opinion, be allowed to carry out its many functions and not be subjected to Procrustean assault: it should be carefully observed and not violently interfered with. This position lies behind Hirst's accusation that O' Connor '...has singularly failed to do what he set out to do - to discover the job educational theory performs' (8).; and represents, perhaps, the 'gentler' side to this continuing domestic quarrel within the analytical family.

'Look and see' is the exhortation from this quarter: look for the meaning in the use, for it is not buried deep at the level of incorrigible protocols, themselves the product of an aberration in analytical philosophy caused by what is often known as 'scientism'. What can be seen is the actual use, the ordinary standard use such as we have seen Peters and Scheffler attempting to elucidate in an educational context. Their work illustrates several techniques which have emerged from linguistic philosophy as valuable probes for language exploration. For example, they show in action the so-called 'paradigm case' technique which,

(8) Hirst, P. H., 'Philosophy And Educational Theory', British Journal Of Educational Studies, Vol. 12, p. 59, November 1963

in its simplicity, directness and wide applicability, is fruitful in many an 'applied' philosophical domain.

It can be put thus: whereever there is a piece of language whose use is not clear and is causing dispute, it can be clarified by finding another example which is quite clear in the sense that the disputants will accept either that or they are beyond any kind of convincing. The discovered example, the standard, unobjectionable, paradigm use, can be scrutinized and the characteristics established in this process (in a Peters sense, the 'essential' characteristics: see p. 123 supra) used to unravel the original use. The 'linguistic' presupposition is that a paradigm for each word, phrase and sentence in the language does, in fact, exist: the piece of language cannot appear at all without creating, by <u>use</u>, a genuine and legitimate (though not 'scientific') meaning - the meaning is the use!

Such a presupposition explains the frequent occurrence in the writings of, for example, Peters of statements like this, taken from an educationally relevant source which we have not time to explore: 'The paradigm case of a human action is when something is done in order to bring about an end' (9). It shows through, too, in a passage which will serve to bring this 'pure' philosophical stage of the dis-

(9) Peters, R. S., <u>The Concept Of Motivation</u> (London, 1958), p. 4

cussion to an end by echoing Wittgenstein and so con-
trasting the two analytical approaches with which
this section has been concerned.

He says: 'Ordinary language can convey...subtle
suggestions; for one way in which it differs from
scientific language is that its use is not simply to
describe and explain. It may command, condemn, guide,
express states of mind, announce, provoke, exhort, and
perform countless other such social functions. Often
a different word is used precisely because such a
specific social function is to be performed. Scient-
ific language, almost by definition, has no such sub-
tleties' (10). We must now re-enter the 'applied' area
to reconsider the basic issue as it appears there,
bearing Peters' words in mind.

The Issue Reflected In An 'Educational' Context

What is reflected is the issue between the two an-
alytical positions described admirably by P.F.Strawson,
probably the most powerfully 'pure' philosopher alive,
as having '...been of dominant importance in post-war
philosophizing. One involves turning away from the
forms of common speech, while preserving much of the
apparatus of the original programme of analysis. The
other involves continued close attention to the forms
of common speech, together with a vastly altered and
extended conception of the nature and techniques of

(10) Ibid., p. 29

analysis' (11).

Hirst can provide us with perhaps the best example
of the latter approach, in the important article which
complements his work on educational theory examined
in our last chapter. Its level is best gauged from
the comment of Archambault, who edits the volume in
which it appears. He talks of '...an approach which
is frankly epistemological and consequently relatively
abstract; yet a major portion of his paper is concerned
with the applications of the principles thus derived
to the practical educational context' (12). Hirst
makes explicit, in short, his views on the nature of
knowledge which are presupposed by him in the earlier
article. In the process, he leaves no doubt about the
close relationship of the epistemological position
he adopts to 'linguistic' insights within the philos-
ophy of mind – a fact which will allow us to confine
our investigation and excuse us from delving deeply
into the latter sector of 'pure' philosophy (an app-
ropriate sector for a separate and differently slanted
account).

A key Hirstian phrase is 'forms of knowledge' (see
pp. 193-4 , supra) which he defines as '...the complex
ways of understanding experience which man has achieved
which are publicly specifiable and which are gained
through learning' (13). He maintains that these forms

(11) Strawson, P. F., 'Construction And Analysis'
in Ryle, G. (et al), The Revolution In Philosophy (Lon-
don, 1956), p. 101
    (12) see p. 254, infra.
    (13) see p. 254, infra.

of knowledge are distinguished by their particular
concepts and expressions and by the criteria they have
established for handling questions of truth within
their 'jurisdiction'. It can be noted how close this
way of thinking is to that behind the Wittgensteinian
notion of language games or universes of discourse, in
which and of which 'mindful' men partake. Hirst talks
of the development of mind being determined by the
forms of knowledge and, having defined the forms as
'publicly specifiable', thus implies that what is char-
acteristic of man is that he is the creature in which
many distinct languages achieve, in a sense, signific-
ant 'embodiment'.

His exact words are as descriptively vague as those
in the last paragraph: he says that there is a '...
logical relationship between the concept of "mind"
and the concept of "knowledge", from which it follows
that the achievement of knowledge is necessarily the
development of mind - that is, the self-conscious
rational mind of man - in its most fundamental aspect'
(14). Mind is defined in terms of the conceptual
schemes, and the languages in which these are express-
ed, by means of which experience is structured and
articulated - '...it is by means of symbols, partic-
ularly in language, that conceptual articulation be-

(12) Archambault, R. D., 'Introduction. The Context
Of Educational Discussion' in Archambault, R. D. (Ed),
Philsophical Analysis And Education (London, 1965), p. 58
     (13) Hirst, P. H., 'Liberal Education And The Nature
Of Knowledge' in op. cit. ((12) above), p. 122
     (14) Ibid., p. 123

comes objectified, for the symbols give public embod-
iment to the concepts' (15).

His argument is that all the various domains of
human knowledge have been acquired by using accepted
tests on publicly agreed assertions; on the symbolic
expressions which have empowered man in his probing
of experience to find (or construct?) relations and
distinctions of an increasingly fine nature. As Hirst
puts it: 'To acquire knowledge is to become aware of
experience as structured, organized and made meaning-
ful in some quite specific way, and the varieties of
human knowledge constitute the highly developed forms
in which man has found this possible' (16). He offers
a persuasive portrait of the development of man, ach-
ieving through countless and barely imaginable cent-
uries these priceless forms of knowledge, creating
for himself a mind , a many sided rationality which
is embedded in the unique modes of understanding, in
the distinctive languages which create sense out of a
primordial experience.

We can pause for a sobering look at the work of
a philosopher cast in a different mould, one whose
'positivistic' inclinations take him to the more 'tough
minded' areas of contemporary philosophy of science
and whose brief contribution to the educational debate
of ten tears ago cannot possibly be omitted from our

(15) Ibid., p. 123
(16) Ibid., pp. 124-5

sample if we are to do justice to the older branch of
analytical philosophy. Herbert Feigl makes explicit
the affinity for science which this branch continues
to display even in its more moderate 'maturity' which
philosophers such as he have brought about: as when
he says, '...there are important educational aspects
in the scientific humanism which, as a general and
fundamental attitude, underlies the thinking of the
logical empiricists' (17).

He talks boldly of the equation of knowledge and
science in words that must make Hirst wince. To him,
'...theological and metaphysical assertions...must be
considered as nonscientific (or, as the logical empir-
icists generally would claim) noncognitive' (18); and
are thus excluded from the realm of genuine knowledge
which the 'linguistic' philosophers do not wish to
see limited in this way. He discusses the semantics
of the word 'belief' as it is used to make a knowledge
claim only to isolate for acceptance that meaning '...
which may be characterized as <u>empirical</u> because it is
at least in principle capable of being examined as to
its truth or falsity in the light of observational
evidence' (19). Our discussion of 'protocols' comes
immediately to mind! (See pp. 247-8, supra).

(17) Feigl, H., 'Aims Of Education For Our Age Of
Science: Reflections Of A Logical Empiricist' in
<u>Modern Philosophies And Education</u> (Chicago, 1955),
N.S.S.E. 54th Yearbook Part 1, p. XXX 304
    (18) Ibid., p. 312
    (19) Ibid., p. 313

To Feigl, beliefs which are made safe against dis-proof of an observational kind are merely of emotional significance, lacking as they do any factual meaning. He sticks to this view, quite aware that '...the most essential but also the most resented and disputed prin-ciple of logical empiricism is its criterion of factual meaningfulness' (20), but convinced that the objections are invalid. If a sentence can not be confirmed by some possible observation, and if it has no purely formal significance and yet is not accepted as carry-ing just emotive appeal, it is a piece of plain self-deception entailing unnecessary intellectual perplex-ity.

Such perplexity does not occur, according to Feigl, when the meaning criterion which he describes is acc-epted as a proposal or stipulation or working maxim. He thus gives a pragmatic defence of the 'positivistic' position against the standard criticisms - 'The formula which states the meaning criterion thus does not fall under its own scrutiny. The justification for its adoption consist simply in the realization that language used and understood in conformity with the criterion will not lead us into certain sorts of con-fusion and will not permit the asking of in-principle-unanswerable questions' (21).

This insistence on the philosophical wisdom of ex-

(20) Ibid., p. 315
(21) Ibid., p. 316

posing pseudo-problems is in marked contrast with
the 'liberalism' of Hirst, to whom the very term 'pseudo-
problem' would no doubt smack of an unphilosophical
obsession with science. For even when Feigl makes
plain his awareness that things have changed in phil-
osophy since the swashbuckling heyday of logical pos-
itivism of the Vienna dazzlement, he still urges that
it is scientific knowledge that counts, as when he says:
'...it is wise to proceed cautiously and conservative-
ly. We certainly must not cavalierly repudiate as
meaningless questions for which we have at the moment
no technique of decision but where the discovery of
such a technique and of relevant data is not logically
excluded by the manner in which the question is prop-
osed. There are countless unanswered questions in
science and many of them may remain unanswered for
all we know; mankind may not exist long enough to
work out an answer. But a question which is so con-
strued that it prevents any responsible answer whatso-
ever should be regarded as a pseudoproblem' (22).

To which Hirst would probably reply that such an
implied continuing hostility towards the knowledge-
claims made by religious and metaphysical (not to
mention moral) 'believers' is the prejudice of a
science-conditioned mind which is blinded to the obvious
facts of man's total experience. Certainly Feigl
shows an impatience with subtleties; and Hirst's

(22) Ibid., p. 317

writings are nothing if not subtle. Feigl says, for
example: 'To make a very long story very short, it
may be said that there is an empirical, cognitively
meaningful concept of reality, used in common life
and merely refined in science' (23). On the face of
it, this is startlingly close to what Hirst says:'The
various forms of knowledge can be seen in low level
developments within the common area of our knowledge
of the everyday world. From this there branch out
the developed forms which, taking certain elements
in our common knowledge as a basis, have grown in
distinctive ways' (24).

But the similarity is nothing and the difference
is all. Feigl's 'refinement' is the antithesis of
Hirst's 'growth': to the younger philosopher it must
appear more of a confinement (like Barnes' strait-
jacket - see p. 249, supra), just as, to the older
philosopher, Hirst's plural forms of knowledge must
appear the sort of self-delusion that only the future
development of a scientific psychology to the point
where it can account for the strange beliefs of non-
scientific philosophers can explain.

For Feigl propounds an empirical realism which
combines the (to him justifiable) claims of the afore-
mentioned criteria of meaning and validity with the
sound elements of 'common sense' which <u>science</u> ident-

(23) Ibid., p. 318
(24) Hirst, P. H., op. cit., p. 128

ifies as the foundation upon which its own construct-
ion stands. Its opponents would call it a 'natural-
istic metaphysic' underlying the 'positivistic' theory
of knowledge; and this charge might very well be acc-
eptable (ironically, in view of one of its terms) by
the Feigl who is willing to write: 'Small parts of
physical space and late arrivals in evolutionary time,
this is the place of "homo sapiens" in the universe.
An adequate theory of knowledge must reconstruct the
relations of the knower to the known in such a manner
that obvious naturalistic conclusions are not distort-
ed' (25).

But we must return from this brief glimpse of the
sort of statement of position which is, at the moment,
not favoured by the majority of, at any rate, English
participants to the most confident statement of the
position which is - to Hirst, for a summary of the
epistemological underpinning of the current 'official'
pronouncements which spread far and fast from London.
Scientific knowledge is, to Hirst, one amongst many
kinds of knowledge, for science is only one of the
many ways in which man structures and articulates his
experience. Other kinds have equal or perhaps greater
importance.

To recall his main contention: the various 'forms
of knowledge' exist primitively in the interactions
of everyday life and are found in developed form in

(25) Feigl, H., op. cit., p. 319

the distinctive disciplines achieved by civilized
man. These disciplines are identifiable by their cen-
tral concepts, by the particular logical structure
each has developed to relate the concepts in certain
limited but meaningful ways and by their distinctive
procedures for testing their own expressions against
experience, using different techniques and skills.
We have, of course, examined such a form of knowledge
while considering Peters' views on ethics, he being
a Hirst-type epistemologist (for our purposes and
according to our terms).

Not only is scientific knowledge to be viewed in
this characterizing way - there is universal 'analyt-
ical' agreement on this - but also, according to Hirst,
'...moral knowledge, and...the arts...Each form, then,
has distinctive expressions that are testable against
experience in accordance with particular criteria
that are peculiar in the form' (26). There is the
clear implication that the 'scientific' mind is a
mind in blinkers; and Hirst leaves us in no doubt that
the origins of this (by now familiar) view lie in the
later Wittgensteinian quarter of recent 'pure' philos-
ophy - though, it must be noted, the uninhibited tone
of his exposition is such as to imply, too, that he
believes himself to be advancing the discussion as a
'pure' philosopher himself.

The 'distinct worlds of discourse' (27) are, then,
all we can know, being, in sum, all we can say. But

we can say a lot, in Hirst's view. There are more
things in 'knowledge' than the scientist dreams of;
and therefore the conclusion of the early Wittgen-
stein - the seventh proposition, 'Whereof one cannot
speak, thereof one must be silent', of the 'Tractatus'
- which the positivistically inclined have used to
throw so much _actual_ language into the abyss of 'mean-
inglessness' is true (because of the liberation effect-
ed by the later Wittgenstein) in a sense beyond the
positivist's ken.

So, science and mathematics are not the only dis-
ciplines in the 'knowledge' sense. And even they are
seen somewhat differently by Hirst, who claims that
there is '...a good case, because of the nature of
their empirical concepts, for regarding the human
sciences separately from the physical sciences' (28),
a contention that can be put alongside a typical
statement of Feigl to produce a familiar dissonance.
He says: 'The unity-of-science movement, which has
been an important expression of the logical empiric-
ist outlook ever since its inception, has stressed
the essential unity of both method and subject matter
of the sciences. The natural and social sciences diff-
er in their special techniques, but the methods of
validation are esentially the same. They delimit the
range and the level of their analyses differently, but

(26) Hirst, P. H., op. cit., p. 129 (see p. 261, supra)
(27) Ibid., p. 129 (see p. 261, supra)
(28) Ibid., p. 130

there are good reasons to assume that these (super-
ficially very striking) differences amount only to
fruitful divisions of one unitary subject matter in
its various aspects and levels of organization' (29).

In addition to 'knowledge' as understood by the
positivists, there are the forms developed from other
aspects of human experience: moral knowledge, histor-
ical knowledge, religious knowledge and knowledge from
the arts - broad areas of understanding which divide
into the various arts and sciences of civilized life.
Such are 'first order' forms; but there are, in add-
ition, the second order forms already mentioned (see
p. 218, supra), of which philosophy is particularly
important. As a famous ex-positivist (and present
'positivistic' sympathizer amongst Oxford philosophers)
puts it: '...however uncertain they may be about the
details, there is now a fair measure of agreement
among philosophers that theirs is what is technically
called a second-order subject...Philosophy, it has
been said, is talk about talk' (30).

Furthermore, there are many 'fields' of knowledge,
one of which we have explored in the last chapter
while reporting the article of Hirst which is complem-
entary, so far as the epistemology is concerned, to
this one. A 'field' is an organisation of knowledge
created by integrating findings of various root dis-

(29) Feigl, H., op. cit., p. 339
(30) Ayer, A. J., 'Philosophy And Language' in
Ayer, A. J., The Concept Of A Person And Other Essays
(London, 1963), p. 3

ciplines, with reference to specific objects or practical activities. Engineering and geography are examples; and so, of course, is educational theory - though in a significantly different way. Work within a 'field' does not entail the validation of any logically unique form of expression or with structuring experience in a particular way, as work within a 'form' does. In consequence, the number and nature of this kind of organization is not 'laid down' but will vary from time to time as practical activities and their more immediate theoretical justification demand.

The most philosophically interesting of the 'fields' are those in which the practical knowledge includes distinct moral elements: this is, in fact, how moral knowledge is subdivided, as opposed to the subdivision of the 'forms' into institutional disciplines. So we establish the place of educational theory, amongst similar theories with moral components - and, in so doing, help to explain the appearance in the history of educational theory of works ranging from Plato's 'Republic' to Peters' 'Social Principles', works which have an equally legitimate place in the history of political theory. For, as Hirst says: 'Political, legal and educational theory are perhaps the clearest examples of fields where moral knowledge of a developed kind is to be found' (31).

Hirst's summary of his rather neat epistemological

(31) Hirst, P. H., op. cit., p. 131

classification is so clear that it is worth record-
ing before we hear a last voice from the opposition.
He says: 'In summary, then, it is suggested that the
forms of knowledge as we have them can be classified
as follows: (I) Distinct disciplines or forms of know-
ledge (subdivisible): mathematics, physical sciences,
human sciences, history, religion, literature and the
fine arts, philosophy.

(II) Fields of knowledge: theoretical,
practical (these may or may not include elements of
moral knowledge).

It is the distinct disciplines that basic-
ally constitute the range of unique ways we have of
understanding experience if to these is added the cat-
egory of moral knowledge' (32). It is interesting to
note the appearance, at about the same time as this
unhesitant classification, another equally anti-posit-
ivistic, equally 'liberal', equally firm pronouncement
of '...a philosophical theory of the curriculum for
general education based on the idea of logical patterns
in disciplined understanding' (33) - and to note how
different it is!

With this summary in mind, we can pay a last visit
to Hardie, giving us the opportunity to sample the
'second phase' work of one whose original contribut-
ion gave us a valuable starting point. He can be found

(32) Ibid., p. 131
(33) Phenix, P. H., Realms Of Meaning (New York,
1964), p. x (Note the significance of Chapter 16 for
Eason's comment on Hirst - see p. 103, supra)

giving recent voice to 'positivistic' sentiments, as
when he states bluntly: 'Scientific knowledge has come
to dominate our way of life, not just because of its
practical and theoretical successes but because it is
in fact coextensive with the entire field of knowledge'
(34). This assertion, of as unHirstian a kind as it
is possible to make, must make us judge Hardie to be
either plain inconsistent or fascinatingly varied in
his views, for, on the last occasion we used his writ-
ings, he appeared to be moving in the direction of
Hirst: here, he is in step with Feigl.

We will take him as we find him in this context,
for it is a little late to do any other: and some of
his own words, while they make it hard to get the whole
of his long contribution into one focus, nevertheless
are relevant to the issue we are presently discussing.
He sounds like one of Feigl's 'logical empiricists'
in this, for example: 'If, as is the case in most of
the problems in traditional philosophy, we have no idea
what the relevant evidence would even be like, then
we must admit that such problems are not meaningful
ones. This criterion for the meaningfulness of any
question or problem, adopted by practising scientists,
must now be accepted for the whole of knowledge' (35).

Again, he emphasises '...the knowledge of common-
sense...of mathematics...of the sciences' (36) in prov-

(34) Hardie, C. D., 'The Philosophy Of Education In
A New Key' in Park, J., Selected Readings In The Philos-
ophy Of Education (New York, 1963), p. 580
    (35) Ibid., p. 583
    (36) Ibid., p. 583

iding the philosophical underpinning for a suggested
curriculum. His brief excursions into the philosoph-
ies of language, mathematics, science and history -
four subjects in which, as he says, '...there are
problems that can be profitably be clarified by mod-
ern philosophical methods' (37) - show plainly how
'positivistic' his views are, in spite of his use of
the Ryleian term 'category mistakes' (38) and his
contention that 'In each of these four spheres...rev-
olutionary changes have taken place in the last few
decades' (39). For he places History squarely amongst
the social sciences; and we have seen where the other
side in the debate (e.g., Hirst) puts it.

If it was only Hardie who was currently arguing
in this manner, we should naturally suspect that the
alternative position to that of the 'linguistic' phil-
osophers was a weak one, not really in tune with the
sixties; for we have already noted that his historic-
al importance probably exceeds his importance from
a philosophical point of view. But, as we have seen,
he is not alone in remaining 'positivistic' in spite
of analytical developments of more recent years. We
have drawn attention to Feigl here and to O'Connor
and others elsewhere, and it would have been possible
to establish the viability of the more scientifically
centred position by scores of other samplings of the

(37) Ibid., p. 585
(38) Ibid., p. 586
(39) Ibid., p. 589

literature.

For, as we have constantly asserted, the only fair
judgment that can be made on the evidence which accum-
ulates from an enquiry such as this one is that the
most recent philsophy is not <u>necessarily</u> the most acc-
eptable, that 'linguistic' analysis is not <u>obviously</u>
superior to 'positivistic' analysis, that Wittgenstein's
professorial second thoughts do not <u>have</u> to replace
the first thoughts of his earlier years, that Hirst's
'official' clarification is not uncontroversially
safe from damaging counter-attacks originating in the
analytical sector which he considers to be out of date.
And to such an attack we can now go, selecting an ass-
ertion of Hirst and seeing to what extent it is contra-
dicted by 'positivistic' views that still carry great
weight in the philosophical world. This will involve
reference to Nagel (as promised; see p. 188, supra),
the slight 'deepening' of the argument in this limited
sector, with less direct reference to specific works
than hitherto, and the provision of a particular ex-
ample of the 'issue' with which this section has been
concerned (as, indeed, was the last - at the 'purer'
level).

The Nature Of History: One Example Of The Conflict

On the one hand, Hirst proclaims the autonomy of
History and, on the other, Hardie (taken merely as a
spokesman for the 'positivistic' side) regards History

as a social science and, hence, part of Science. It must be said that neither philosopher goes much further than proclamation. In the case of Hirst, there is reference to the 'linguistic' work of Dray (40), so presumably this important work is to be taken as read and as providing the detailed case which Hirst has not space to give. As, however, we have tended to weight this account on the 'linguistic' side in terms of the detailed reference to arguments, we can choose to present here the 'positivistic' approach to the nature of History, leaving the view of the opposition to be inferred from that.

The 'positivistic' view of History cannot, in fact, be satisfactorily described without reference to the more general thesis of the unity of science which has been implied in many of the comments we have reported and which, it will be remembered, Feigl refers to (see p. 262, supra). Clearly, if this thesis can be substantiated, the 'forms of knowledge' view is mistaken. If, that is, it can be accepted that the whole range of institutional disciplines - from physics through biology, psychology, the social sciences to history - form one complex, interconnected tissue that cannot logically be bisected or cut in other ways, then the 'linguistic' case is in error.

In such an event, not only does the Hirst claim for the autonomy of the human sciences and, particul-

(40) Dray, W., Laws And Explanation In History (Oxford, 1957)

arly, for the uniqueness of History as a mode of under-
standing fall down, but, even more surely, his wider
claim for the distinct 'knowledge' provided by relig-
ion and the arts collapses; and this will affect any
judgment made on Hirst's work within 'educational
theory', making an acceptance of the more scientific-
ally-turned sympathies of such as O'Connor more likely.
In a sense, then, the nature of History is a test case,
the outcome of which is important for deciding between
the many tentative judgments that have to be made
during an exploration like this.

The 'unity of science', which, if established,
would decide the case in favour of the 'positivistic'
position, means something quite simple, particularly
in comparison with the complex classifications of a
Hirst (or a Phenix - see p. 265, supra). It denotes
those features that all branches of knowledge have in
common - so it is claimed - in spite of the recognized
wide differences of methodology to be found in the
separate disciplines. Particular emphasis is placed
in the philosophical contexts within which this thesis
is discussed on the logical unity which is claimed
to embrace the natural sciences and the humanities;
hence the importance of History for testing the claim.

A positivist would regard it as foolish to deny
undoubted differences between disciplines or to ass-
ert the 'sameness' of, say, physics and history with-
out carefully describing the logical similarity which

alone concerns him. Distinctions of subject matter
and of methods between, for example, the sciences of
meteorology, chemistry and botany are as acceptable
to him as they are to Hirst. What he would want to
ask, however, is why, if these sub-disciplines can be
classed together as 'natural science' (one of Hirst's
forms of understanding), the process of establishing
similarities should cease at the particular points
or boundaries indicated by a Hirst (or anyone, like
Phenix, who cares to enter the epistemological arena).

He would want to question the contrasts between,
say, physics and psychology which Hirst identifies in
order to place them in different logical groups: for
on what grounds are they judged to be more 'basic'
than the undoubted contrasts between sciences which
Hirst does classify together? Hirst's argument is
carried on in the most abstract terms - talk of diff-
erent modes of structuring experience, of different
languages to be learnt, etc. - which are as inconclus-
ive as they are undoubtedly persuasive. This will
become clear when we sample the contrasting rigour of
Nagel.

And in coming to him we can make the general point
that the 'unity of science' view is often opposed by
attempting to distinguish the natural sciences and the
humanities by their supposed characteristics as 'gen-
eralizing' and 'individualizing' disciplines, respect-
ively. Nagel describes this distinction with care:

he refers to '...a widely accepted distinction between
two allegedly different types of sciences: the nomo-
thetic, which seek to establish abstract general laws
for indefinitely repeatable events and processes; and
the ideographic, which aim to understand the unique
and the non-recurrent. It is often maintained that
the natural sciences and some of the social ones are
nomothetic, whereas history(in the sense of an acc-
ount of human events, as distinct from the events
themselves) is pre-eminently idepgraphic. In con-
sequence, it is frequently claimed that the logical
structure of the concepts and explanations required
in human history is fundamentally different from the
logical structure of concepts and explanations in the
natural (and other "generalizing") sciences' (41).

Nagel affords this distinction a painstaking and
penetrating analysis, reaching the conclusion that
historical explanations possess no absolutely unique
logical features and that the methodological problems
in this area have their counterparts in other branches
of enquiry. This analysis is detailed and difficult,
and so must be passed over (in its original form),
just as the Dray position is merely cited by Hirst.
We can, for our purposes, but state that it is a piece
of philosophising which takes Dray's 'linguistic' views
into account and yet reaches 'positivistic' conclus-

(41) Nagel, E., The Structure Of Science. Problems
In The Logic Of Scientific Explanation (London, 1961),
p. 548

ions that are very widely accepted amongst the international philosophical community, before substituting some simpler observations of our own.

In commenting on the alleged distinction, the positivist could proceed thus: first, he could ask for general agreement that the course of history, taken as a whole, is a _unique_ phenomenon; that is, time flows, as it were, in one direction and flows only once. Through time, the earth was formed and plant species evolved, creatures came into existence and 'culminated' in man whose total activities have taken place within the 'stream'. The whole of this happening we know as one _individual_ event, in that it has happened only once. So, to be consistent with the definition of History as the individualizing discipline, _every_ investigation carried out within the totality of this happening should be regarded as History.

Yet we do not, of course, so regard _most_ of the investigations that men make. The normal procedure is to single out certain aspects of this total complex phenomenon, aspects which are _approximately_ repeated so that we can ignore the differences between one occasion and another, and to emphasise these, creating thus what is meant by _generalizing_ 'science'. A brief look at meteorology makes this clear. The weather is a _unique_ individual occurrence: if we examine, say, temperature readings made over years at a particular place, we find that no month is exactly equal to the

'same' month of the previous year. Yet we have a
generalizing science which describes this phenomenon
by singling out approximately similar elements in it
in order to state general laws, such as that it is
hot in summer and cold in winter at the place in quest-
ion.

Certainly this example is a simple one, but the
logical point is valid (according to the positivist):
what we are doing in this case is acting scientifically,
creating science, that is, arriving at the formulation
of general laws by abstracting from the unique, indiv-
idual, immediately given phenomena under investigation.
We simplify by neglecting the individual characteris-
tics of the separate occasions, by arbitrarily cutting
through most of the profusion of individual detail
that a 'time-unfolded' 'reality' possesses to the
common elements that science can theoretically manip-
ulate.

In view of this, the positivist's fundamental
question is: do the humanities, or can the humanities
adopt any other procedure? His answer is that they
do not and can not. There is the one basic procedure.
If there were not - if the anti-positivistic distinct-
ion between 'generalizing' and 'individualizing' dis-
ciplines were valid in the sense intended - then, to
be consistent, such sciences as palaeontology and the
theory of evolution would need to be classed as human-
ities (being descriptive of aspects of the unique course

of events)and economics and linguistics, for example,
would need to be put with the natural sciences.

The economist, for instance, states the law of
diminishing returns, a general scientific statement;
but he must begin with the observation of unique cases
(there are no others), the individual differences of
which he disregards in order to achieve his scientific
objectives. The linguist, too, states laws: he states
laws, for example, governing the shift of consonants
with reference to the development of Romance languages
from Latin. But this was a <u>unique</u> historical event
which took place once only and thus provides us with
a 'closed' episode; so that the linguists procedure
has to be that which is said to be characteristic of
the natural sciences - he examines separate events
within our records of the episode, and eliminates in-
dividual details in order to generalize on the basis
of the <u>approximately</u> repeated elements which he abstr-
acts.

The inexorable positivistic conclusion is that
this alleged criterion by means of which natural sci-
ences and humanities are distinguishable - that the
one generalizes by passing over individual variations
while the other attends to what is individual - is in-
valid, at least with reference to the disciplines
that can be thought of as 'intermediate' on the implied
scale. Perhaps, though, it works with the 'extreme'
cases; with theoretical physics as the model of a

generalizing discipline and History (say, pure chron-
icle) as the model of an individualizing discipline.
We can recall, with reference to this conjecture, that
while Hirst is in no doubt about the autonomy of hist-
orical understanding, he is more hesitant in classif-
ying the social sciences (see p. 262, supra).

In inspecting extremes, the positivist would no
doubt freely admit that there are sentences whose sub-
ject is a single individual and whose predicate is a
unique action; and that there are, too, sentences that
state something repeatable about a group of people or
a 'plural' subject. But sentences of both kinds are
to be found in <u>both</u> disciplines, invalidating the
suggested criterion for <u>logically</u> distinguishing the
two enterprises. A sentence is usually called 'gener-
al' because its content makes no reference to time
and location; is independent of them, being, as we
have seen, a description of what is abstracted from
the infinitely varied flow of events. But such 'gen-
erality' is relative and is to be found in the state-
ments of physics <u>and</u> History in varying <u>degrees</u>.

For instance, the physical statement that all bod-
ies fall equally fast is a general statement. It is
therefore, according to what we have said, a statement
the content of which is independent of time and locat-
ion. But is it? It depends on what is meant, in this
case, by 'location'. The statement clearly refers to
all bodies <u>near</u> to earth: it may not refer to bodies

elsewhere in a vast universe (just as even more general statements and established systems of statements within physics which seem of 'universal' application may be replaced when found to be limited - as with the work of Newton and Einstein). Its generality is relative, restricted by location.

There is thus no such thing as an unrestrictedly general statement. Physics certaihly tends towards producing statements that are as general as possible, ones that cover as many cases as possible, but any conclusion covering a number of cases, be it many, few or even one, is, in this context, still a statement of physics. So, 'individualized' sentences, which are supposed to characterize History, are to be found in other disciplines, even physics. In fact, the distinction between 'generalizing' and 'individualizing' statements seems to be less appropriate than the notion of the relatively general content of statements - a matter of degree rather than of kind.

This is confirmed (says the positivist) if we look at History in a new light. Most certainly 'individual' statements are to be found there in abundance; that is, statements of the least possible generality, ones that are most dependent upon time and place. But they by no means form the whole content of historical writing; for even in 'pure' chronicle the choice of what is to be stated (and there must be choice) must be made on the basis of the writer's general coceptions

of a host of things that are the proper object of study of other disciplines (psychology for one) and so must implicitly transmit certain general propsitions which are as much a part of the writing as the words that actually appear.

We can, at this point where the 'positivistic' position cries out for the kind of detailed advocacy that only a Nagel is capable of giving it, turn to him for at least a couple of typical paragraphs, before attempting to bring this stage of the discussion to a close, knowing that we have here another example of the way in which the 'bearing' we have been examining could at many points involve us in an 'escalation' into the far corners of philosophy. For it must be said that, had we substituted a simple account for Dray's position instead of for Nagel's, we should probably still feel the 'pull' towards the original sources which is itself some indirect evidence of the extent to which modern analytical philosophy has become involved in matters that are 'educational' in a wide sense.

Nagel says: 'Even a hasty inspection of treatises in theoretical science on the one hand...and of books on history on the other, suffices to reveal a striking difference between them. For by and large the statements occurring in the former are general in form and contain few if any references to specific objects, dates, or places, whereas the statements in the latter

are almost without exception singular in form and are
replete with proper names, designations for particular
times or periods, and geographic specifications. To
this extent, at any rate, the contrast between the
natural and some social sciences...appears to be well-
founded. It would be a gross error, however, to con-
clude that singular statements play no role in the
theoretical sciences or that historical inquiry makes
no use of universal ones. As previous chapters have
repeatedly noted, no conclusions concerning the actual
character of specific things and processes can be der-
ived from general statements alone; for theories and
laws must be supplemented by initial conditions(i.e.
by statements singular or instantial in form) if those
general assumptions are to serve for explaining or pre-
dicting any particular occurrence...But neither can
historical study dispense with at least a tacit acc-
eptance of general statements of the kind cited in
theoretical treatises. Thus, although the historian
may be concerned with the nonrecurrent and the unique,
he must obviously select and abstract from the concr-
ete occurrences he is engaged in studying, and his
discourse about what is unquestionably individual
requires the use of common names or general descript-
ive terms. Accordingly, the historian's characteriz-
ations of individual things assume that there are var-
ious _kinds_ of occurrences, and in consequence that
there are more or less determinate regularities which

are associated with each other and which differenti-
ate one kind from other kinds' (42).

Nagel's point about '...the use of common names
or general descriptive terms' is one which is fundam-
ental to the 'positivistic' view of the nature of
History, proceeding as it does from a particular pos-
ition on language. There is implied a basic property
of language in its relation to 'reality': the descrip-
tion of an individual event must abstract from the
uniqueness of that event by virtue of being a descrip-
tion. Or, as the father of the American general sem-
antics movement, Korzybski, was never tired of pro-
claiming: 'The word is not the thing' (43).

In the act of using language the historian must
reduce the unique to a combination of repeatable elem-
ents which are, as it were, 'stored' in the words at
his disposal. He thus proceeds in an analogous manner
to the physicist who, too, abstracts recurrent feat-
ures from the _equally_ unique stream of natural events.
To the positivist, the logic of the procedures is the
same, the physicist's abstraction and simplification
of 'reality' being merely more thorough, obvious and
easy to achieve, and his direction of interest differ-
ent from that of the historian. One makes _primarily_
general statements, leaving the inferences about in-
dividual cases to his readers; while the other uses

(42) Nagel, E., op. cit., pp. 548-9
(43) See Korzybski, Alfred, _Science And Sanity_,
3rd ed. (Lakeville, Conn., 1948)

general judgments in selecting and formulating the individual sentences that tend to dominate his actual writings.

Nagel refers to this difference in the direction of interest and resultant characteristics as '...an important assymetry' (44) between theoretical science and History. The historian's task, usually taken to be the assertion of individual statements, rests on the assumption and use of general laws, even though the establishment of such laws is no part of the historian's objectives. And this conclusion of Nagel is part of his 'positivistic' answer, reached after very detailed discussion, to the question with which we have been concerned in this very restricted section (Though Nagel, of course, is not directly answering our question): the question of the extent to which Hirst's alleged differences between his 'sub-divisions' of the 'forms of knowledge' are less radical, in a logical sense, than the differences between the 'forms' themselves.

Nagel's position is clear: there are no radical divisions! Or, as he puts it analogically: 'The distinction between history and theoretical science is thus fairly analogous to the difference between geology and physics...A geologist seeks to ascertain, for example, the sequential order of geologic formations,

(44) Nagel, E., op. cit., p. 550

and he is able to do so in part by applying various physical laws to his materials of study; but it is not the geologist's task, qua geologist, to establish the laws of mechanics or of radioactive disintegration which he employs in his investigations' (45). To which we can add that the historian, too, is a scientist, on the 'positivistic' list of disciplined enquirers: a very special kind of scientist, of course, but then, so are they all. It is the fact that there is only the one list for such philosophers which causes the conflict reported in this chapter and assumed throughout this whole account; for, as we well know, there are those like Hirst who have not one but many!

So we leave the conflict as it appears at the three levels described in these last three sections, noting that it started with epistemology and ended with the philosophy of science; that is, it has ranged over an area which is both fundamental and controversial amongst philosophical activities, no matter what labels are used to identify it. For, as Nagel says: '...the term "philosophy of science" designates investigations continuous with those that have been pursued for centuries under such headings for traditional divisions of philsophy as..."theory of knowledge" ' (46). We must pass from the conflict itself to the possibility of its resolution (if there is a possibility); and,

(45) Ibid., p. 550
(46) Ibid., p. vii

before that, as a last quick glance at the voluminous
literature in an account of it that has grown weighty
enough to make its essentially simple point, to a men-
tion of other sectors in which the same conflict between
the two analytical approaches can be detected.

The Resolution Of The Conflict?

The philosophy of mind has received no special att-
ention; and one reason for this has already been given
(see p. 253, supra) - that it is inextricably linked
with the theory of knowledge in the work of Hirst
which gave us our most recent entry into a sector of
the 'bearing'. To pursue it further would be to enter
a vast domain. It would, for example, commit us to
an examination of at least the Ryle whose writings
have featured here and there in the account as sources
for more direct 'educational' writings. We can only
note in passing that Scheffler, in selecting material
for what he calls his '...hypothesis about the kind
of investigation philosophy of education might bec-
ome' (47), overlooks neither this area nor this phil-
osopher, and draws out from such work implications
for educational thinking which we cannot pursue more
deeply without embarking upon a separate account.

He emphasises both 'mind' and 'ordinary language'
analysis in commenting on Ryle, bringing out the way

(47) Scheffler, I., Philosophy And Education (Bos-
ton, 1958), p. 10

in which revolutionary insights into the concept have
been achieved by the use of certain (to us now famil-
iar) philosophical techniques; and indicating how the
whole procedure is of great importance to educationists,
because, as he says: 'Education, it is thus normally
said, is a matter of the imparting of truths, the
transmission of knowledge, the enrichment of the mind'
(48). We do not have to search far in our own account
to see whom Ryle's 'pure' philosophising has influenc-
ed! We have seen in the writings of Hirst and Peters
much that is in harmony with, for instance, this comm-
ent:

'...intellectual powers are the products of advanced
schooling, of "didactic discourse", of higher educat-
ion which constitutes culture and which is a condit-
ion of "all but the most primitive occupations and
interests". In view of the predominant effort, by
philosophers and researchers alike, to cast light on
educational processes by applying to them theories of
the mind, Ryle's diametrically opposite attempt, to
construe the intellect in terms of schooling, has con-
siderable significance and may appear to many to have
the advantage of building upon a more concrete base'
(49).

We are here presented neatly with one basis in
'pure' philosophy for Hirst's talk of 'harmony' between

(48) Ibid., p. 89
(49) Ibid., p. 91

the concepts of 'mind' and 'knowledge', which features
prominently in his epistemological article. And we
have a basis, too, for his contention that the know-
ledge out of which mind is built ('...construe the
intellect in terms of schooling') '...must be learnt
from a master on the job' (50), a contention with
which the major emphasis in the work of Peters is in
full agreement - for 'education as initiation' can be
taken as a most appropriate slogan for developments
in educational thinking that have the mark of Ryle
all over them.

It would, then, be both interesting and instruct-
ive to journey through the neighbouring kingdom of
'mind', particularly those parts of it so well charted
by Ryle. But this is not possible now. Attention can
be drawn to the detailed and direct examination of a
specific aspect of his work - the penetrating distinct-
ion between "knowing that" and "knowing how" - given
in a recent book of American essays (51). This would
(and at one time did) make an entry for us into an
entirely different 'level' of the 'bearing' in quest-
ion, the level of analysis in _action_ with reference
to specific concepts and restricted problems. For
our own account has been pitched more at a 'second
order' level, concerned primarily with discussing
what analysis is _about_ as this reveals itself in the

(50) Hirst, P. H., op. cit. (see p. 254, supra), p.129
(51) Smith, B. O. and Ennis, R. H., _Language And
Concepts In Education_ (Chicago, 1961). All 13 of the
papers, and not just the 'Ryle' critique by Roland, are
important examples of analysis in _action_.

literature.

At what might be called the 'working' level, at which the conflicts and controversies that we have identified are not evident (analytical tools being taken for granted in order to get on with the job) there is a mass of activity which could be explored within the terms of our assignment. To mention mere obvious fragments: Peters, with a firm foot in each of the psychological and philosophical camps, has criticized in a number of places the concept of 'mental health' which is often set up as an educational aim. This has elicited analytical responses of the *type* that would provide us with material for a survey many times the length of this which we are bringing to a close; particularly such examples as are appearing in the specialist American journal to which we have made some reference during our survey and with which the developments we have been charting come of age. (52).

In another direction, we could point without hesitation to the importance, at this 'working' level of uninhibited analytical activity, of philosophising about specific concepts such as 'learning' and 'adjustment' (and a hundred others) to be found in mimeographed form wherever philosophers of the persuasions and new interests that we have been describing are to be found gathered together, eager to contribute to and

(52) See, for example, Peters, R. S., ' "Mental Health" As An Educational Aim', Studies In Philosophy And Education, Vol.III pp. 185-200, Spring 1964; and response by McClure, G., 'Growth As An Educational Aim: Reply To R.S.Peters', Studies Vol.III, pp.259-270, Fall, 1964

to learn from the corporate and enthusiastic enterprise. All this <u>could</u> be brought within our terms of reference, had we decided upon an alternative (out of the many available - a point that we have tried to stress) mode of exploring the literature which was closer to the educational problems within our broad area than to the philosophical problems on which we have concentrated. As it is, we must merely mention such penetrating and currently relevant analyses ofmthe form just described as those by Komisar and Macmillan (53) - an almost random dipping into an ever-broadening stream of 'concept' literature.

However, the termination of a survey should not consist solely of an apology for what it does <u>not</u> contain. It should, rather, attempt to draw some sort of conclusions about the material that <u>has</u> been examined. In particular, with reference to the major presupposition of our own account and especially in view of the title of this last chapter (and the question at the head of this section) we should make some comment on the possibility of a resolution of the 'conflict' that has occupied so much of our time. This was promised at the outset (see pp. 7-8, supra).

But, in view of this promise, we must be careful to distinguish the <u>ending</u> of a conflict with the actual finding of a solution from the suggestions that can be

(53) Komisar, B. P., 'More On The Concept Of Learning' and Macmillan, C. J. B., 'The Concept Of Adjustment: An Analysis' - mimeographed booklets used in Temple University Education courses (copies in the possession of the present writer).

made as to the direction in which a solution might
lie. The former eventuality would, clearly, be the
intellectual feat of the century (if not of all time),
for the conflict in question is that between philos-
ophers; and to arbitrate philosophical disputes such
as are found amongst the 'big names' whose writings
have occupied us is a job that awaits one of them -
when one has reached the stature to accomplish it.
All that can be suggested is that our own survey of
the field leaves a very strong impression that there
exist differences of emphasis that 'must' surely (?)
be complementary; that must represent aspects of the
truth as this will come to be seen at some future
time; that are, in their own ways, enthusiastic but
nonetheless tentative approaches to some philosophical
'Golden Mean'.

The conflict in analytical philosophy (and, hence,
in its 'bearing' on education) is - because it is
analytical philosophy - a conflict 'about' language.
Is, then, the work of the only philosopher to have
consciously attempted to describe and account for all
the dimensions of language not relevant to its resol-
ution? We must hesitate before asserting its relevance,
if only on the grounds that his work (the work of C.
W.Morris: see p. 8, supra) is rarely mentioned by either
'side' in the dispute we claimed to see and the citing
of it may well bring no more than a tolerant smile to
the face of any philosopher of the non-'scientific'

'ordinary language' kind.

Yet we can be encouraged to put out this suggestion - that Morris's three dimensions of language study contain the germ of a solution for analytical conflict - by the recent appearance of two philosophical comments in two entirely different contexts, both of which demonstrate that the framework which he provides is firm enough to bear the strains generated by <u>partial</u> analytical interests of a kind that we have repeatedly noted in 'educational' discourse and its immediate 'pure' philosophical sources. Mention of these two views is all that we can now allow ourselves; for an integration of them in order to apply them to <u>our</u> context would be (and perhaps will be) a mighty task indeed, for which the present survey work could act as prologue.

The first is in the context of theology, become, as we have ourselves noted, language conscious with the consequent appearance of conflicting viewpoints such as we have had to contend with in educational discourse. Ferré, drawing on the work of Morris, has attempted, as he puts it, to '...place the controversy over theological discourse within a wider understanding of linguistic signification' (54). His disentanglement of the 'manifold logic' to be found in the various philosophical contributions recently made by analytically orientated thinkers to theological dis-

(54) Ferré, F., <u>Language, Logic And God</u> (London, 1962), p. 146. The chapter with implications for our interests is Chapter 12.

course is lucid, convincing and of a simplicity that
betokens the presence of a valuable insight: come to
following the inconclusive wanderings of an account
such as our own it 'feels' right, as the <u>kind</u> of sol-
ution to the problems that have emerged in this enquiry.

The second potentially relevant use of the Morris
structure for language investigation is to be found
in a little-known American journal devoted broadly
to 'semantics', the kind of peripheral philosophical
publication in which 'large' ideas that would find
difficulty in taking root in more orthodox circles
(because, perhaps, of the too-firm allegiances that
we have been forced to notice in our subject matter)
can be propounded. This is not to imply that this
contribution is at all philosophically 'cranky', for,
as we have noted, it is one which is very similar to
that of Ferré, now become a standard work in the phil-
osophy of religion. And its author is, in fact, a
professor in educational philosophy (though this is
mentioned as a credential: education does not come into
the article at all).

Dettering enquires into the prospect for semiotic
unity, ranging wide over the disciplines that have a
current interest in language, moving rapidly from one
to another while remaining 'on course' with the Morris
'dimensions' as a stabilizing device. From our point
of view, his conclusion is a fascinating one; for he
reaches a final point at which his references to the

conclusions of the later Wittgenstein strike familiar chords yet in a sense set up a minor cacophony. He sounds so like a spokesman for what we have called the 'linguistic' view and yet does so with the confidence of one who has appreciated and absorbed into an architectonic position that which we have called the 'positivistic' view, that we can only wonder what a detailed examination of this article with reference to our own accumulated material might produce.

He is worth quoting - as a substitute for any major conclusions of our own and as a justification for our stating that there might yet come a resolution of our 'conflict' along the lines that we have barely suggested, and that it might well be that Dettering is the philosopher to achieve it: at least as far as educational theory is concerned. After all, it is , as we have said, an _educational_ philosopher who writes this: 'The hope of a new rational empire lies before us. If anyone questions this hope, let him then consider any fact of the external world or any known behavior of an organism . Could such a"fact" or "behavior", whether it be the discovery of America, or the sun having risen this morning,...possibly be notarized merely by observation of some light and sound, or by the hearsay of people or the dull script of text-books? Or is it not our strong conviction about the truth in such matters founded on the total conspiracy of our experience - including the collusion between our

"language game" and the empirical data which force ꜩ
themselves upon us? Would even most of our own acts
make much sense without those same language rules?...
These "language games", as Wittgenstein called them,
perhaps create our greatest human dilemma. Those who
think they have avoided them by finding some "pure
reality" ...have simply been caught more inextricably
in some more engulfing, subterranean language which
they mistake for pristine being. Naturally, further
inquiry is needed into these vast and circular rel-
ationships, but for the moment it would seem that any
such inquirer could only eschew the "game" by invent-
ing a new one of his own. The frontiers opened by
such new games may well be worth the effort of con-
ceiving and playing them, however. They might keep
the human intellect quick and alive for another cen-
tury or so' (55).

And following the cues in such a passage might
keep this account alive for another century or so!
We must leave it, and with it any pretensions to be
able to offer conclusions other than those tentative-
ly reached during the exploration - with one exception.
It is this: coming to know a literature is an exciting
intellectual adventure. It can be recommended to the
growing number of educationists whose work now involves
them in the act of philosophising. Perhaps it should

(55) Dettering, R. W., 'The Prospect For Semiotic
Unity', Etc.: A Review Of General Semantics, Vol. XXI
No. 1,(pp. 39-71), pp. 68 and 71

be prescribed, for much that is being written (though not, of course, that which we have examined) displays an alarming ignorance that such a study would rectify – an ignorance of the short but richly varied history that these lively philosophical activities have behind them, a history that we have entered in just one simple way. Maybe this thought is a halfconscious echo of that Peters theme: one comes to know the 'language' only through the 'literature'! Certainly one at least gets to know the literature, and having 'heard great Argument About it and about' within that store, one feels (or hopes) that there is a separate exit for those who are the wiser for it.

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During the nineteen-sixties there has been an en-
ormous increase in the number of articles (and a large
increase in the number of books) which deal with the
area surveyed in this thesis. Many of these are list-
ed in the annual 'Reviews and Rejoinders' issue of the
specialist American journal, Studies in Philosophy and
Education, under 'Current Literature in Philosophy and
Education Compiled' (e.g., 3rd annual review in Vol.
IV, No. 1, Spring 1965). This journal is taken by the
University of London Institute of Education Library
(from the first issue, 1960); and taken, too, by the
University of Durham Institute of Education Library
from Summer 1966 (and available back numbers being
sought by the Librarian, Mr F. Rutherford: this will
give easy access to a vital source within the region
in which this thesis was written).

Most of this literature is not, then, listed below,
in order to limit the size of the bibliography. All
the books and articles listed here have in some way
entered into the preparation of this thesis. They
have either been read or the contents known from other
sources sufficiently well to justify their inclusion
in a bibliography designed to be of use to others who
may wish to sample the field in a different way from
that revealed in this thesis (and in the 'List of Books
and Articles Cited in the Text' - such a selection being
determined by what is available in the North and by a

desire to scrutinize the antecedents of the current burst of activity, particularly as shown in the major contributions of the most important workers).

The bibliography is arranged chronologically, to fit the thesis; items within each year are listed alphabetically. No attempt is made to relate the literature to the various themes of the thesis; in consequence, it is heterogeneous and open to many different kinds of classification, e.g., the obvious distinction between writings _about_ 'analytical' philosophy in education and writings showing analysis _in action_ in an educational context. The works actually used in the body of the thesis show a similar heterogeneity and, though listed separately, are included in this bibliography, of which they represent a significant sample. As stated, the bibliography itself - particularly with reference to the fecundity of the sixties - is a sample, albeit as large as possible without making it a separate work in itself. An attempt has been made to cover important Ausralian as well as British and American contributions to this essentially English-speaking venture.

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