The development of D.H. Lawrence’s philosophy of the unconscious: 1913-1922

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The Development of D. H. Lawrence's Philosophy of the Unconscious: 1913 - 1922

by

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Thesis submitted for the degree of Master of Letters in the University of Durham

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ABSTRACT

The term 'philosophy' is Lawrence's own, used, hesitatingly, to refer to his expository essays. Critics have preferred other terms, notably 'doctrine', on the grounds that Lawrence's vision cannot lay claim to the rigour of philosophy. 'Doctrine', however, gives a misleading impression of rigidity to a body of work essentially exploratory and if philosophy is, in Whitehead's words, 'the critic of abstractions', then Lawrence's purpose, if not his method, can pretend to the definition.

In a series of essays beginning in 1913 and ending properly with the Fantasia of the Unconscious of 1921, Lawrence sought to develop his philosophy. Art and philosophy he saw as parallel supreme expressions of 'man's conscious understanding' and he sought to express both and ultimately to unite the two. This thesis traces this development through the major essays of the years 1913 to 1921, adding a final discussion of the changes of the 1920s, as expressed now in both essays and fiction. It shows Lawrence, a 'passionately religious man' in a post-religious age, seeking to develop a philosophy in which life is the prime mover, the religious source, and the individual 'the beginning of life'. The religion which he sought to establish must also be a psychology; the psychology which he constructed had the significance of a faith. It shows him seeking to solve the problems inherent in such a standpoint. Finally, it shows him seeking to develop his views against the pressure of another major twentieth-century attempt to deal with man in a post-religious age; that of Freud. The themes were the same; the treatment opposite. Lawrence, at first attracted and stimulated by psychoanalysis, was finally moved to refutation, and the best of his philosophical essays were conceived as a direct answer to Freud.
ABBREVIATIONS

LAWRENCE


FREUD

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I. INTRODUCTION: Lawrence and Freud
It has long been acceptable to discuss Lawrence's 'philosophy'. As early as 1930, Stephen Potter's *D. H. Lawrence: A First Study* opened with a discussion of Lawrence's 'philosophy of two worlds', although it insisted that

> Interesting as it is to codify these dogmatic beliefs, it is far more important to disentangle a writer from the metaphysic which hides him.

Graham Hough's study of 1956, *The Dark Sun*, treated the philosophy for the first time as an important and separate part of Lawrence's writings, and opened the way for a view of Lawrence as a thinker who expresses an important way of viewing the predicament of twentieth-century man.² At the same time, however, Hough's study gave the argument against the procedure which I shall follow in discussing the philosophy, that of tracing it as it develops through each major essay. Hough writes that this 'would be an unprofitable way to work':

> It would involve much repetition, chasing the same idea through half a dozen formulations that are only superficially different; or chasing the ideas on half a dozen different subjects only to find that they are easily deducible consequences from a few central positions.

The argument seems to have been sufficiently weighty to deter later critics. All follow Hough's procedure of abstracting Lawrence's thought from the major essays written at different periods of his life. In support of my method, however, and in criticism of Hough's, I should like to put the following points.

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In the first place, Lawrence's philosophy, despite the permanence of its central, intuitively-based position, was essentially a developing one. It developed partly in response to external circumstances and pressures, partly in response to a recognition of the problems inherent in its central position. Moreover, that central position was itself based upon an emphasis upon growth and a corresponding rejection of stasis, so that inevitably Lawrence's procedure in his essays followed the conviction which was at their core.

Secondly, in the course of this development Lawrence, in Julian Moynahan's words, 'faced all the really difficult problems raised by his doctrinal position'. Seeking to develop this position, he encountered its difficulties and dangers, and he reacted to them in a very similar manner to, and with no less honesty than in the novels. The essays thus become a parallel stage on which Lawrence enacts the struggle to emerge from the dangers attending his position. If, therefore, one is to regard this position as important for twentieth-century man's understanding of himself, a viewpoint which is central to this thesis as it is to many later appreciations of Lawrence, then, as J. M. Murry writes in his late tribute to Lawrence, Love, Freedom and Society, his 'failures, his exaggerations, his perversities, are all vital'. Indeed, in the essays Lawrence seeks

5. See for example:
   Eugene Goodheart, The Utopian Vision of D. H. Lawrence (Chicago, 1963)
   Baruch Hochman, Another Ego (Columbia, 1970)
   George A. Panichas, Adventure in Consciousness (The Hague, 1964)
consciously to do what Murry would have him doing throughout the novels: he presents himself and his thoughts as representative, as the battleground on which modern man's spiritual struggles are being fought. In consequence any attempt to abstract an ethic from Lawrence's essays becomes a falsification. It ignores their characteristic exploratory nature, the juxtaposition of conflicting statements as contradictory intuitions struggle towards resolution.

This viewpoint raises two points which require clarification. The first concerns the problem of terminology. Lawrence himself always referred to his expository essays as 'philosophy' although always with some hesitation. Graham Hough, however, rejects this term on the grounds that the philosopher's vision, unlike that of Lawrence, has been 'checked for internal consistency and for consistency with the reports derived from other modes of experience than his own'. Lawrence can offer at most a *Weltanschauung*, but since 'we have no convenient word for this', Hough prefers the term 'doctrine'. I shall employ Lawrence's term, firstly because Hough's term, like his method of procedure, fails to do justice to the exploratory nature of Lawrence's work, particularly in the period which I shall discuss. Secondly, whilst Lawrence's method would scarcely meet the requirements of an academic philosopher such as A. N. Whitehead, still in its central purpose it amply fulfils Whitehead's definition of

7. See, for example, C.L., pp 330, 546.

philosophy as 'the critic of abstractions'.

The second point requiring clarification is: why, if Lawrence's essays cannot be regarded as doctrine and simply parallel the progress recorded in the novels, need they be treated at all? First of all, Lawrence himself saw art and philosophy as parallel expressions of 'man's conscious understanding', each being the highest expression of its sphere of the psyche. The two must be reconciled if the duality of man's psyche was to be resolved, and Lawrence's sense of urgency, of impending catastrophe, seemed to impel him to move towards this reconciliation in his own work. In keeping with this sense of parallelism, up until the early nineteen-twenties the major essays do provide a separate and self-contained record of Lawrence's development. Moreover, it is a record in which, not being embedded in the context of fiction, his central ideas and his reaction to pressures upon them are more transparent, and in which the success or failure of individual works is more entirely dependent upon the degree of success with which he overcomes the essential difficulties of his viewpoint.

With the writing of Aaron's Rod, however, the two aspects of Lawrence's work begin to become less separate, for reasons


10 S.M. p 137.

11 For this reason, the main body of this thesis contains only scattered references to the major fiction. However, a brief chronology of the years 1912 - 1921 is appended (Appendix I), which indicates the relative chronological positioning of fiction and essays.

12 First published in April 1922, and written for the most part 1920 - 1921.
which I shall indicate. The essays become assertive rather than exploratory, and the philosophical exposition is transposed, often virtually unclothed in fictional context, into the novels.

For this reason, although I shall discuss briefly this stage of Lawrence's development, I shall leave the detailed discussion of his essays at this point. The earlier essays which I shall discuss in detail are those considered to be major by Graham Hough, in his excellent introduction to Lawrence's philosophy.

I have mentioned above Lawrence's central position and its attendant problems. To complete this introduction, I wish to indicate now what I believe these to be, and in what context I consider them to be important.

Eliseo Vivas, in his study of Lawrence, *The Failure and the Triumph of Art*, writes of Lawrence's relation to existentialist philosophers. He and they, Vivas concludes, face the same problem. Like theirs, all Lawrence's ideas, solutions, insights and messages, significant as they are by themselves, achieve full significance only when we see them as attempts to discover a way of life that would center "seeing there is no God".

This I believe to be fundamentally true, if by 'God' is meant the God of Western Christian civilization. Lawrence himself, however, as he pointed out early in his career, was and remained

13. This is not to say that the earlier novels did not contain philosophy. It is always, however, worked into the fabric of the novel and explored separately in the essays.

14. See Hough p 222 for a substantiation of this view.


'a passionately religious man'. A religious man in a post-religious age, a 'major religious seeker' without a God, like other major twentieth-century thinkers he saw man's 'everlastingly accursed questions' in terms of man rather than of God. The religion which he sought to establish must also be a psychology; the psychology which he erected had the significance of a faith.

For Lawrence life itself is the prime mover, the religious source. It has 'no ascribable goal save the bringing-forth of an ever-changing, ever-unfolding creation: ...new creative being and impulse surges up all the time in the deep fountains of the soul'. At its simplest this means, as Julian Moynahan writes, that 'the only marvel is to be alive in the flesh'. In more complex terms: life is seen as being without source, eternally self-creative yet manifest only in individual living beings, and surging always to individual fulfilment and self-expression in them. Perfection is therefore the perfect expression of the fulfilled self. It is, however, essentially momentary, giving way, always before the renewed demands of life, and thus creating an ever-moving cyclic pattern within individual life-experience.

For the achievement of individual fulfilment - and here, as at other points, Lawrence's views have affinities with those

17. C.L., p 273.
18. The last two quotations are from Panichas, Adventure In Consciousness, p 16. Panichas refers to 'what in Russian literature are commonly referred to as those "everlastingly accursed questions": the meaning of life and the destiny of man, good and evil, matter and spirit, life and death, rebirth and corruption, beauty and decay....'
19. 'Education of the People', Phoenix, p 608.
of Henri Bergson relationship is necessary. In entering a relationship, man reaches simultaneously beyond and within himself, to enter also the life-force itself. The maintenance of this relationship — with other forms of life as well as with other human beings — becomes the source and definition of morality.

Man himself is Lawrence's prime concern, however, and in the transference of the above standpoint into terms of individual psychology there are problems to be encountered. In the first place, between life and expression, energy and form, in man as he exists now and has existed, there would seem to be an ineradicable division. Man finds expression through consciousness, and with consciousness comes knowledge and logic. Expression thus becomes abstraction and abstraction is the opposite and, inevitably, the enemy of the life-force itself. In it the all-important cyclic movement is interrupted and replaced by stasis. Secondly, if this view is to be extended to become an analysis of social as well as of individual man, a solution must be found for the problem of how to reconcile this emphasis on an initial self-sanctioning energy which must be expressed with the demands for control which civilization appears inevitably to impose. Civilization, in this view, has imposed the forms produced by consciousness, pressing its abstractions, in the shape of ethical standards, against the initial impulse. In other terms, the dilemma may be seen as that of reconciling natural

21. Bergson, Creative Evolution, transl. Arthur Mitchell (London 1911), p 183. Bergson writes that intuitive as opposed to intellectual knowledge may be obtained through 'sympathy' not understanding.
man with man as he has manifested himself in history. Thirdly, a view of life, and consequently of pre-conscious man, as primarily creative must, if it is to be acceptable, account for the destructive, even perverse impulses which seem to be equally primary in man.

Finally, it may be noted that Lawrence's standpoint places restrictions on the actual expression of his philosophy. His convictions are, as Moynahan writes, 'primarily a product of intuition'; and in practical terms an emphasis on primary creativity means an emphasis upon this initial intuition.

Conceptualisation of any sort, as its translation into abstract terms, becomes a falsification. All sets of terms are equally symbolic and equally arbitrary. At the same time, however, if the philosophy is to be persuasive, a set of terms must be found which adequately objectifies the original intuition and at the same time links it with what Lawrence felt to be its physiological basis. Similarly, logic as the tool of abstraction is the enemy of intuition, yet a logical structure is essential to essays with philosophical pretensions. This last problem Lawrence tried to overcome, as I have indicated, by creating his essays in the form of dramatic explorations of his ideas.

22. Moynahan, p 152.

The problem of terminology was one with which he struggled throughout the course of the essays.

As a reaction to a world in which God is dead, or at the least must be re-located, the viewpoint sketched above is, I feel, important. In many ways it resembles the views of the psychologist, C. G. Jung, but it has, it seems to me, two important advantages. The first, not discussed in this thesis but nevertheless always implicit in it, is its embodiment in a vision of life manifest throughout Lawrence's novels and stories as their organising impulse. The second, again demonstrated throughout the fiction, is that it is less mystic, less limited to the visions of the individual human being. It reaches out, connecting man with his fellow beings, human and non-human.

Lawrence's viewpoint resembles that of Jung in another very important respect, however. It is the precise reverse of another twentieth-century attempt to deal with man in a post-religious age: that of Freud.

Lawrence's name has often been coupled with that of Freud. Occasionally he has been seen as 'an orthodox Freudian'. More usually, as in Daniel A. Weiss's simplistic *Oedipus in Nottingham* or in Vivas' much more subtle and therefore more destructive study, Lawrence's work has been interpreted in Freudian terms.

Frederick J. Hoffman has dealt with Lawrence's 'quarrel with Freud', but only in terms of the specific points raised and answered by Lawrence, and still using Freud as his touchstone. Only Eugene Goodheart and Philip Rieff do justice to the radical and vitally important difference between the two. Rieff writing on the whole from a Freudian, Goodheart from a Lawrencean point of view, neither sees Freud as a scientific touchstone by which to judge Lawrence but as an important twentieth-century thinker who stands on opposed, irreconcilable, but essentially equal grounds. To Rieff, whilst Freud represents the 'chastened culmination' of the rationalist tradition, Lawrence is

The most talented believer in the irrational yet to come out of contemporary rationalist culture...

Goodheart sums up what I feel to be the essential relationship and significance of the two:

Unlike Freud's other antagonists, Lawrence offers an alternative mode of awareness as compelling as Freud's. If the two modes of awareness cannot be harmonized into a faith, as they obviously cannot, they have nevertheless become for the modern intellectual a double image of possibility.

Here, therefore, I wish to indicate very briefly the tendency of Freud's thought and the nature of his conclusions


29. Introduction to Psychoanalysis... pp x, xiv.

30. 'Freud and Lawrence', Psychoanalysis and the Psychoanalytic Review, 47 (4), 1960, p 63.
during the first period of his thought (1900 - 1917), the period during which Lawrence knew and reacted to his work. Later, Freud changed some of his psychological categories and responded much more fully to the challenges created by his thought, but the early period was decisive, and is usually seen as the more important.\(^{31}\) It must be emphasised, however, that this summary will inevitably be a distortion of Freud's thought, partly because I omit many of its features which Freud felt to be amongst the most important, partly for reasons which I shall indicate later. A list of those works by Freud from which this summary is abstracted is given in the bibliography to this thesis. In addition, useful summaries of Freud's thought may be found in the works by Hoffman and Stafford-Clark cited above. Philip Rieff provides an excellent though difficult study of Freud as philosopher and moralist in his *Freud: The Mind of the Moralist.*\(^{32}\)

The theory which Freud formulated from his psychopathological studies can be seen as organised around two important points: the Unconscious and the question of sexuality.\(^{33}\) The two are vitally interconnected; the place which the Unconscious holds in Freud's theory of the structure of the psyche, sexuality holds in his theory of its operation. Both arose out of Freud's treatment of neurotics whose symptoms were revealed as the outcome of psychological events, usually sexual in character and

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31. See, for example, David Stafford-Clark's summary of Freud's ideas in *What Freud Really Said* (Penguin, 1967).


33. Freud himself, in his *Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis* (1916 - 17), organized his theory around more practical points. Nevertheless, his two key early works were *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900) which contained his theories of the Unconscious, and the *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality* (1905). It was these two works which he most consistently revised.
usually dating from infancy. These events were found to be repressed from conscious memory but nevertheless still sufficiently active within the psyche to cause psychological and even physical symptoms. Freud first attempted to reach these repressed memories through hypnosis, during which the patient was made to relive the original traumatic events. This was later replaced by the method of free-association, in which the patient was asked to relate all the thoughts which occurred to him during the period of treatment, without regard for relevance or sense. In this way Freud hoped to by-pass the repression involved in disciplined thinking. Eventually the dreams of the patient were used as the starting point for this free-association.

It was through his study of dreams, those of his patients but chiefly his own, that Freud arrived at his theory of the Unconscious. Dreams, he discovered, provided the best means of reaching the buried memories and desires: 'The interpretation of dreams is the royal road to a knowledge of the unconscious activities of the mind'. This was because, heavily disguised and distorted to avoid the conscious recognition of their contents, they nevertheless provided a release for these memories and desires. The unwelcome thoughts were permitted temporary hallucinatory expression, divorced from both action and waking consciousness. In addition, dreams, with roughly similar contents,

34. See the Studies on Hysteria, (1895), S.E.II, pp 1 - 309. For Freud's own account of his development see On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement, (1914), S.E. XIV, pp 3 - 66.
35. According to Freud, this first occurred because in the course of treatment, 'patients, instead of bringing forward their symptoms, brought forward dreams. A suspicion thus arose that dreams too had a sense.' Introductory Lectures, S.E.XV, p 83.
36. The Interpretation of Dreams, S.E. V, p 608.
are found in the normal as well as the neurotic, so that through their study Freud was able to extend his conclusions beyond psychopathology and into psychology.

From his study of dreams, Freud posited a three-tiered psyche. The Unconscious, the largest part of the psyche, provides its dynamic, semi-instructual base. It consists not of forgotten events but of energy striving for release, in the form of wishes striving for fulfilment. These wishes are chiefly sexual, always 'infantile' and, what amounts to the same thing, primitive. They are 'of a reprehensible nature, repulsive from the ethical, aesthetic and social point of view', completely egoistic. The Unconscious operates entirely according to the Pleasure Principle. An increase of tension or, in psychological terms, of the pressure of desire brings 'unpleasure'; its release, or fulfilment, brings pleasure. Thus the Unconscious strives always for its own pleasure, obtained from the fulfilment, real or hallucinatory, of egoistic wishes. The Unconscious can therefore 'be compared with an aboriginal population in the mind'. To this population are later added the rejects of consciousness, wishes found inadmissible but still seeking fulfilment. Finally, this aspect of our psyche is normally inaccessible to us:

the core of our being, consisting of unconscious wishful impulses, remains inaccessible to the understanding and inhibition of the preconscious...

37. See Introductory Lectures, S.E. XV, pp 210 - 211.
38. Introductory Lectures, S.E. XV, p 142.
40. The Interpretation of Dreams, S.E. V, p 603.
Between the Unconscious and consciousness or activity stands the preconscious. Though still unconscious, its contents may enter consciousness 'without ... impediment provided that certain other conditions are fulfilled: for instance, that they reach a certain degree of intensity, that the function which can only be described as 'attention' is distributed in a certain way, and so on'. This aspect of the psyche has been created through evolution out of man's need to adapt to others and to reality. Thus, between it and the Unconscious stands a psychic censor. This may admit the unconscious impulses, reject them, or admit them in a modified, or sublimated form. The energy needed for this last is withdrawn from the impulses themselves and redirected towards their repression or modification. Its higher level of development means that the preconscious has substituted obedience to the Reality Principle for obedience to the Pleasure Principle. Hallucinatory wish-fulfilment is no longer sought; instead the psyche seeks its fulfilment through adaptation to reality. In this way, pleasure is usually postponed and diminished and 'the task of avoiding unpleasure turns out to be almost as important as that of obtaining pleasure.' A psyche 'thus educated has become "reasonable"'. All 'higher' developments belong to this aspect of the psyche: language, the recognition of time, as well as regard for cultural and moral demands. Consciousness is usually seen by Freud as merely the

41. The Interpretation of Dreams, S.E. V, p 541.
42. Introductory Lectures, S.E. XVI, p 357.
perceptual tip of the preconscious. According to the immediate needs of reality it spotlights those contents of the preconscious which may be useful. It is not usually seen as having separate psychic properties.

Turning to the psychic system as a whole and to the relation of its parts, we find that the Unconscious is the most powerful element in this system. Its desires are always primitive, or infantile, so that repression of them is both normal and inevitable. Repressed, these desires nevertheless remain, their energy always seeking discharge: 'Indeed, it is a prominent feature of unconscious processes that they are indestructible'\(^43\). Moreover, the psyche is dependent upon this energy for the development of its higher functions and for the process of repression itself. Thus each man must relive in his own development the evolutionary struggle of the species. Growth becomes a progress towards increased control, the erection of a more effective psychic censor, a greater diversion of energy from its original goals. Freud's own therapy sought to increase this control by making the neurotic patient more aware of his impulses: 'Our therapy works by transforming what is unconscious into what is conscious'\(^44\) with the intention of bringing 'the Ucs. under the domination of the Pcs.'\(^45\). As a therapist he was hopeful of achieving this end; through increased self-knowledge, he writes, the patient's mental life 'is raised

\(43\). The Interpretation of Dreams, S.E. V, p 577.
\(44\). Introductory Lectures, S.E. XVI, p 280.
\(45\). The Interpretation of Dreams, S.E. V, p 578.
to a high level of development and remains protected against fresh possibilities of falling ill. It is assumed that the Unconscious can be reached and modified by consciousness. As a philosopher, however, Freud was much less optimistic, and here a glance at the wider applications of his theory is necessary.

As indicated above, the individual's development mirrors that of the race. Civilization has evolved through the increasing capacity of man to divert and control his unconscious impulses. Conversely, the 'influences of civilization cause an ever-increasing transformation of egoistic trends into altruistic and social ones'. Thus we may take instinctual repression as a measure of the level of civilization that has been reached.

The progress of man's cultural development is through primitive religion, with its fairly undisguised illusory wish-fulfilments, to more complex religions with their more vicarious illusory wish-fulfilments coupled with restraint in the present. The final stage, yet to be completely achieved, is the replacement of illusory methods of cultural control by control through understanding. Primitive man, writes Freud, 'owing to the projection outwards of internal perceptions, ... arrived at a picture of the external world which we, with our intensified conscious perception, have now to translate back into psychology.'

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47. Thoughts for the Times on War and Death (1915), I, 'The Disillusionment of the War', S.E. XIV, p 282.
49. Totem and Taboo, S.E. XIII, p 64.
Nevertheless, since the preconscious and its cultural creations depend on the energy of the Unconscious, and since our Unconscious remains that of primitive man, the achievement of this stage seems doubtful. A higher level of civilization means greater repression and the consequent increase in pressure from unconscious wishes denied fulfilment. In addition, present-day moral controls are entirely based upon repression. It is doubtful, Freud concludes at one point, 'whether a certain degree of cultural hypocrisy is not indispensable for the maintenance of civilization'.

For Freud, sexuality and the Unconscious are very closely interlinked. Fundamentally, indeed, sex and the Pleasure Principle are identified; sexual activity is the highest form of pleasure, modelling the release of tension which characterizes the fulfilment of that principle. Thus Freud finds sexual desire and activity in the primitive infant. This conclusion was reached empirically: the dreams of his patients were found to have their origin chiefly in unfulfilled sexual wishes dating from childhood. Nevertheless, it was inferred rather than demonstrated, based on the analysis of adults rather than of

50. Thoughts for the Times on War and Death, I, S.E. XIV, p 284.
51. For Freud, sexual activity is almost always seen as exclusively male.
52. See The Interpretation of Dreams, S.E. V, pp 605 - 606, although Freud is rather coy in the expression of his conclusion here.
of children.  

Freud's argument is that we call the dubious and indefinable pleasurable activities of earliest childhood sexual because, in the course of analysis, we arrive at them from the symptoms after passing through indisputably sexual material.  

The child's first sexual object is therefore the mother; its first sexual activity is autoerotic, centring around the erotogenic zones, those parts of the skin 'in which stimuli of a certain sort evoke a feeling of pleasure possessing a particular quality'. The first of these activities is suckling, involving stimulation of the labial zone. Later activity is 'sadistic-anal' and then phallic. This last period brings with it the first phase of the Oedipus complex, in which the child organizes his desires around the first love-object, the mother, and feels a corresponding hatred and jealousy of the father. Freud emphasises that these emotions, love for the mother and hatred of the father, are entirely natural:

Psycho-analytic researches have shown unmistakably that the choice of an incestuous love-object is ... the first and invariable one, and that it is not until later that resistance to it sets in; it is no doubt impossible to trace back this resistance to individual psychology.

External reality, however, places restrictions upon the expression of these desires, and the result is the onset of the 'latency period', which lasts from the age of about five years until puberty. The impulses of childhood which the adult world would label perverse are now repressed, the inhibiting forces which have been external become internalised, to operate hence-

53. Freud did analyse one child, 'Little Hans'; see S.E. X, pp 1 - 149. The analysis was conducted at second hand, however, through the boy's father. Freud only met his patient once during the time of treatment.

54. Introductory Lectures, S.E. XVI, p 324.

55. Three Essays, S.E. VII, p 183.

56. Three Essays, S.E. VII, p 198.

forward as 'disgust, feelings of shame and the claims of aesthetic and moral ideals'. It is at this time, therefore, that the preconscious is reinforced: morality is born in the child, together with regard for reality and 'higher' functions, both aesthetic and intellectual.

Puberty brings the adult sexual organization. It brings also the return of the original sexual object, the mother, although fulfilment is sought now only in the form of phantasies. If normal adulthood is to be attained, sexual aim and sexual object must now converge, but must be diverted from their natural focus upon the mother. The major task of puberty, indeed of life, becomes that of freeing oneself from the Oedipus complex, and of reconciling oneself to the father. Nevertheless, the original love-object plays a decisive part in determining later object-choice. In addition, the original sexual activities of childhood must be subordinated to the mature aim through repression, to become the activities of 'fore-pleasure'. In women the developments of puberty are entirely repressive. The original love-object, the father, must be superceded and infantile sexual activity, which in girls also is 'male' (i.e. clitoral) must be completely repressed. The pubertal increase in sexual activity in males is paralleled by 'a fresh wave of repression' in females. The neurotic is the individual in whom, partly through an original failure of development, partly through adult frustrations, there occurs regression to an

58. Three Essays, S.E. VII, p 177.
59. Three Essays, S.E. VII, p 220.
earlier stage of development, usually Oedipal. These earlier stages, however, are repressed from conscious memory, and regression occurs always in a form distorted to evade the censors of consciousness.

To explain this development in psychological terms Freud evolved his theory of the libido. Libido was seen as sexual energy, being 'the force ... by which the sexual instinct manifests itself.'\(^{60}\) A certain amount of energy is expended at each developmental stage, with the object always of obtaining pleasure. This energy must then be withdrawn in order that transference to the next stage might occur. In his theory Freud sought to attribute an alternative form of energy to the ego-instincts of the preconscious. Nevertheless, since in practice the ego, or preconscious, is seen to act only in a passive way, borrowing its energy from the unconscious impulses themselves, the libido appears as the equivalent of a life-force. It is a life-force, however, whose most valuable contributions to life, or to civilized life at least, arise through its repression, modification and transformation. In its original state it is destructive of society, 'the most unruly of all the instincts'\(^{61}\) incapable 'of uniting men.'\(^{62}\)

Society, indeed, is seen to have been built upon the repression of the sexual instinct. Once again, in his development the individual simply recapitulates the history of the species. Primitive man fulfilled the Oedipal wishes, those of

60. *Introductory Lectures*, S.E. XVI, p 313.
killing the father and marrying the mother, which now belong to the infant. From the subsequent desire of the sons to live together in peace emerged the incest ban with its consequent widening of the social structure. Society was based on complicity in the common crime; religion was based on the sense of guilt and the remorse attaching to it; while morality was based partly on the exigencies of this society and partly on the penance demanded by the sense of guilt. 63

Man's intellectual development parallels in a similar manner 'an individual's libidinal development' 64. Maturity in the individual, with its replacement of the Pleasure Principle by the Reality Principle, is equivalent to the scientific age which is just beginning, with its replacement of the illusory fulfilments of religion by the search for fulfilment in the outer world. Thus culture is given a biological basis, but at the same time each individual must struggle to attain for himself the level of civilization into which he has been born. The repressive demands of culture which are responsible for neurosis in the individual are also the cause of social development. As a philosopher, therefore, Freud was once more unable to propose those cultural relaxations which his therapeutic experience seemed to demand. Since neurosis and civilization spring from the same source, the susceptibility of civilized human beings to neurosis is only 'the reverse side of their other endowments' and 'a risk with all education' 65.

63. Totem and Taboo, S.E. XIII, p 146.
64. Totem and Taboo, S.E. XIII, p 90.
From this brief outline of Freud's thought it can be seen how similar yet how radically opposed is his viewpoint to that of Lawrence. Both postulate an original creative energy whose conscious expression splits the psyche into two opposed parts. Both assume that the unconscious aspect of this dualism is the mainspring of intuitive life, whilst civilization is the outgrowth of its conscious aspect; intuition and civilization therefore seem inherently opposed. Both assume the increasing dominance of the conscious, civilized aspect and the corresponding repression of the unconscious aspect. Both appear as subversive of received cultural controls, in their assumption that morality may be otherwise based.

For Freud, however, the life-force is primitive and dangerous, its instinctive creations egoistic and disruptive. His policy towards it is one of containment, seeking to permit the Unconscious only so much freedom as will prevent its outbreak into violence on a massive scale. His therapy employs faith and passion, products of the Unconscious, in order to replace them by reason; this he sees as the process, repeated on a large scale, by which religion will be replaced by scientific understanding. The language of his work, and this is why any non-technical summary of his conclusions must distort them, seeks to conceptualise feelings and in doing so to order and control them.

66. I assume here that Freud's preconscious and conscious are for practical purposes identical.

Lawrence sees the life-force as wholly positive, its spontaneous creations as life-expressive and life-creating. He would seek to prevent the wholesale distortion and repression of initial creativity which is responsible for massive outbreaks of violence. Consciousness must be expressive not repressive of impulse, and Lawrence seeks the renewal not the replacement of religion. The language of both his fiction and his essays seeks to recreate feeling.

The similarities are tempting but the contrast is absolute. Freud, claiming the objectivity of science, and following nineteenth-century evolutionary thinking, took as his standard that civilization in which both he and Lawrence found themselves. The individual whom his psychology described was the individual he found there; from him Freud drew his theory of man. The fulfilled individual whom Lawrence wished to describe, on the other hand, did not and probably could not exist in such a repressive civilization. Lawrence's standpoint was wholly subjective; his standard of reality lay outside civilization and, as a felt potentiality, within the individual unconscious. The revolution in consciousness to which both pointed lay in opposite directions.

Such a relationship is one sensed not only by later commentators, however, but also by Lawrence himself. This thesis will trace the development of his views as they took form always under the pressure of Freudian thought and, in the later essays, as they were conceived as a direct answer to Freud. This
pressure and its effects will be discussed in relation to individual essays. For the final aspect of this introduction, however, I shall indicate very briefly its origins. These, as with most of Lawrence's contacts with ideas, were personal rather than literary. Frieda Lawrence gives the following account in Not I, but the Wind. At the time of her meeting with Lawrence:

"I had just met a remarkable disciple of Freud and was full of undigested theories. This friend did a lot for me. I was living like a somnambulist in a conventional set life and he awakened the consciousness of my own proper self."

A comparison of Frieda's Memoirs and Correspondence with Ernest Jones' account of the beginnings of psychoanalysis makes it clear that this 'disciple' must have been Otto Gross, described by Jones as 'a young genius'. The Memoirs and Correspondence also


Emile Delavenay, in his D. H. Lawrence: The Man and his Work (London, 1972), comes to the same conclusion, although from different sources. See Delavenay p 143 and note p 542. Delavenay's source is Reinald Hoops, who reports that Frieda's sister, Else, said to him on 21st August 1933:

dass ihre Schwester Frieda, schon bevor sie Lawrence kennenlernte, mit einem Psychoanalytiker und Schüler Freuds, Dr. Otto Gross, befreundet war, dass sie von ihm viel über Freud und die Psychoanalyse hörte, dass sie sehr davon beeindruckt wurde und mit allen leuten darüber sprach, und dass somit Lawrence spätestens als er Frieda kennenlernte mit der Psychoanalyse vertraut wurde.

that her sister Frieda was friendly with a psychoanalystist and pupil of Freud, Dr. Otto Gross, before she knew Lawrence, that she heard a great deal about Freud and psychoanalysis from him, that she was very impressed by it and spoke about it to everyone, and that consequently Lawrence would have become familiar with psychoanalysis at the latest when he got to know Frieda.

Hoops, Der Einfluss der Psychoanalyse auf die englische Literatur, Anglistische Forschungen, Heft 77 (Heidelberg 1934), p 73.
indicate that this relationship was far more serious than the above account suggests. Frieda fictionalizes her correspondence with Gross ('Octavio') but it accords well with Jones' account of him as 'the nearest approach to the romantic ideal of genius I have ever met.'

It is clear from these letters, firstly, that there was a possibility of Frieda's leaving her husband for Gross in similar circumstances to those in which she later did elope with Lawrence, and secondly, that Gross' use of Freud's theories brought his position much closer to that of Lawrence than to that of Freud himself. Clearly, therefore, whether or not Lawrence's knowledge of Freud's theories had any effect on his fiction, Freudian thought must have been felt by him initially to be an immediate and a personal rival to his own view of life.


72. As Frieda indicates obliquely in The Memoirs and Correspondence (p 91) Gross developed schizophrenia shortly after her affair with him and during the first World War committed murder and suicide. By this time, of course, Lawrence's knowledge of Freud's theories was more extensive and his awareness of the challenge offered by the theories themselves greater.
2. FIRST FORMULATIONS
In January 1913 Lawrence produced the first two significant formulations of his philosophy. One was the frequently quoted letter to Ernest Collings of 17 January, and the other the pretentious and obscure Foreword to *Sons and Lovers*. Of the latter Lawrence wrote that he would 'die of shame' if it were printed, but he was still sufficiently proud of it to send it triumphantly to Edward Garnett. Both are confident and assertive statements of Lawrence's position, but both reveal its uncertainties and confusions. By the close of the Foreword he has exhibited the self-contradictions which will come to form the core of his doctrinal difficulties. But he has also indicated the fundamental standpoints on which he will seek to build an answer, and he has begun to grapple with three of his major problems: the question of terminology; the relationship between aspects of the self; and the relationship between individuals.

The letter to Collings presents man in terms of a dualism in which body, flesh, blood and life are ranged against intellect, knowledge and morals, and it declares its stance:

> My great religion is a belief in the blood, the flesh, as being wiser than the intellect. We can go wrong in our minds. But what the blood feels and believes and says, is always true.

1. Lawrence does not use this term to describe his own work until early in 1915 (C.L. pp 323, 329) although he has used it, self-consciously to describe his views as early as 1908 (C.L. p 16).

2. A.H. p 104. Garnett thought that Lawrence wished the Foreword to be published with the novel.

3. A.H. p 94.
Yet the assertion is qualified by the sentence with which Lawrence closes the long passage in which he sets forth this position. The desires of the flesh, he writes, 'which are there whether-or-not, are utterly ignored, and we talk about some sort of ideas.' Then he adds a flash of ironic self-deprecation:

I'm like Carlyle, who, they say, wrote 50 volumes on the value of silence.  

The Foreword sets out to resolve the self-contradictions acutely glimpsed here.

The Foreword to Sons and Lovers, apart from its final section in which Lawrence seeks to establish a link with its ostensible subject, splits into two natural parts of which the second, seeking to extend the first, in fact contradicts it. Man is once more seen in terms of a dualism. The terms are now biblical; Lawrence reverses the opening of the Gospel according to St. John:

John, the beloved disciple, says, 'The Word was made Flesh.' But why should he turn things round? The women simply go on bearing talkative sons, as an answer. 'The Flesh was made Word.'  

This dualism of Flesh and Word, with the Flesh receiving the dominant role, seems at first merely a repetition of the letter to Collings. But Lawrence now goes much further. 'Flesh' may  

at times be given its literal meaning: Christ's flesh, for example, has left nothing unless 'perhaps some carpentry he shaped with his hands retains somewhere his flesh-print'. The term expands, however, to include also those instincts and emotions which are spontaneous and immediate, products of the body's desires. Much more important, Lawrence evokes the Christian associations of his chosen terminology in order to invert them. He writes:

We are the Word, we are not the Flesh. The Flesh is beyond us. And when we love our neighbour as ourself, we love that word, our neighbour, and not that flesh. For that Flesh is not our neighbour, it is the Father which is in Heaven, and forever beyond our knowledge.

The Father retains from the Christian context the attributes of infinity, incomprehensibility, and mystery, but He is divorced from those mental-spiritual qualities usually associated with the intangible godhead and is relocated in the physical. Infinity is to be found in potentiality rather than in transcendence. Thus the Flesh rather than the Word is infinite: infinity belongs to 'the law-giver but not the law'. This relocation may, as Emile Delavenay suggests, be due to the influence of Bergson, whom Lawrence read in 1912. But it is significant that whereas Bergson separates the life-force from the matter with which it operates, Lawrence deliberately stretches his terms in order to identify the two. The process

6. Lawrence uses his terms with or without a capital letter. No clear or consistent distinction appears to divide the two senses.
7. A.H. p 96
8. A.H. p 96
10 See Bergson, 'Life and Consciousness' in The Hibbert Journal Vol. X, No. 37 (Oct. 1911 - July 1912), pp 24 - 44.
results in inevitable confusion, as he dodges from one sense of a term to another in order to prove his points, yet it accurately reflects his determination, even at this relatively early date, to identify the infinite and the incomprehensible with the individual and the physical.

The Word can be similarly identified with the 'intellect' of the letter to Collings, and also with the 'spirit' of Christianity. It is associated with social law (rather than with the law-giver), with morals, with knowledge and with the conscious personality, and it is expressed in man's conscious and therefore limited purpose, work:

For a man may hire my Word, which is the utterance of my flesh, which is my work. But my Flesh is the Father, which is before the Son.11

Like the Flesh, the Word is also revalued by Lawrence. Stripping it of its traditional Christian associations, he identifies it not with God or the Holy Ghost, both to be found in the Flesh, but with man's conscious nature. Thought and spirit become merely finite products of the infinite Flesh. Of the tradition, Christian and Platonic, which would make the opposite claim, he writes:

So the Son arranged it, because he took for his God his own work when it should be accomplished: as if a carpenter called the chair he struggled with but had not yet made, God.12

Like Bergson again, Lawrence, looking back from his own intellectuality, insists that man's intellectual progress is the product of a life-force located not here but in the undifferentiated

11. A.H., p 98
12. A.H., p 99
body of life.

The Son is creature of the dualism of Flesh and Word; he is 'the Flesh as it utters the Word'. This first part of the Foreword makes it clear that Christ represents the human being: 'Adam was the first Christ: not the Word made Flesh, but the Flesh made Word'. Accepting the mystery of the Flesh which is 'forever beyond our knowledge' though manifest only in us, we, the Son, must use the products of consciousness only in order to express the impulses of the Flesh, not to seek to control them. For in essence 'the Word altereth nothing, but can only submit or deny'. Thought itself, despite Lawrence's own use of it here, is denied any degree of infinity or potentiality. We, however, have acted according to the dictates of the Word. Replacing impulses by duties, we have substituted charity for love, and suffered in the flesh for our conscious ideals.

Lawrence is attacking here any attempt to apply abstract principles to life, but his particular target is the Christian traditions of equity, charity and self-sacrifice.

In this, Lawrence's first attempt to forge a terminology for his thought, then, the Christian tradition is still felt to be sufficiently powerful for him to use its terms as a frame of reference for his own reversals and counterassertions. The terminology and meanings thus established will recur as reference points in later expositions, long after he has ceased to feel bound within the Christian framework. Yet the tradition is

13. A.H., p 96
manipulated in the interests of a personal search to find terms which will be capable of uniting the physical and the indefinite, the literal and the symbolic, in a description of the creative aspect of man. Lawrence clearly found no terms at hand for what he sought to describe, and thus attempted to achieve the desired synthesis by extending still further the overtones of mystery already attached by Christianity to a physical term, the Flesh. Too often in the Foreword, however, the result is a confusion of meanings, as logic grapples un成功fully with a shifting symbolism.

As in the letter to Collings, the primary concern in this formulation is with the present dominance of Flesh by Word. Seeking to reverse this emphasis, however, Lawrence is moved to a corresponding overvaluation of the instinctive, which at this stage seems to hold little promise as an alternative source of morality. He writes:

But if in my passion I slay my neighbour, it is no sin of mine, but it is his sin, for he should not have permitted me. But if my Word shall decide and decree that my neighbour die, then that is sin, for the Word destroyeth the Flesh, the Son blasphemeth the Father.

The terms of this conclusion, described by Keith Sagar as 'logical and appalling', would certainly justify a change that Lawrence

15. A.H. p 98.
is at this point advocating 'feeling divorced from responsibility'\textsuperscript{17}. Though its expression was to undergo much modification, however, the statement holds for him a kernal of truth which was to remain a central standpoint.

The second part of the Foreword extends the discussion. In face of the destructiveness of the traditional attitude, Lawrence now seeks to clarify what he believes should constitute morality and the ideal relationship between Flesh and Word. The analysis is extended to cover the relationship between the sexes, and the ideal of this relationship is in turn used as a paradigm of the relation between man's two halves. No more than the first part is this section essentially concerned with its ostensible subject, \textit{Sons and Lovers}. Its inspiration is to be found more in Lawrence's personal situation\textsuperscript{18} at the time. But more important, as H. M. Daleski points out\textsuperscript{19}, like all Lawrence's expository writing, and in contradiction of his own account of his practice, it looks forward rather than back, foreshadowing the problems to be explored in the novels and essays to follow rather than stating those resolved in the completed works.

\textsuperscript{17} The charge is made, not specifically about this work, by Philip Rieff in his Introduction to the Viking Compass edition of \textit{Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious: Fantasia of the Unconscious}, (New York, 1960), p x.

\textsuperscript{18} See Delavenay, pp 167 - 173, although he considerably over-stresses the point.

\textsuperscript{19} Daleski writes in 'The Duality of Lawrence', \textit{Modern Fiction Studies V} (Spring, 1959), p 3.: the ideas contained in the expository writing of any given period tend to be coeval with their imaginative formulation, and often to precede it.
This second part no longer locates the Word - Flesh division within the individual. Instead, it becomes equivalent to the division between man and woman. The woman embodies the Flesh/Father, whilst the Son, still born of the Flesh and uttering the Word, becomes man in the sexual not the generic sense. This is the division which Daleski feels to be the central one in Lawrence's work; Lawrence's dilemma, he believes, is to feel identification with the female qualities, whilst 'the male principle is very nearly equivalent to what Lawrence spent a substantial part of his life fighting against: abstraction, idealism, what he generically called the "mental consciousness"'. Daleski's argument centres upon the 'Study of Thomas Hardy', yet the inadequacy of such a view of the central division in Lawrence's thought is well illustrated by the breakdown of such an identification in the Foreword. Lawrence's position, as I hope to show, is far more complex, and the male - female division of qualities far more suspect than Daleski maintains.

Lawrence begins this section as if to confirm Daleski's view: as hymn of praise to the Flesh and woman. We are, he writes, wrong in assuming, first, that the Word preceded the Flesh, and second, that man preceded woman. The beginning belongs to the Flesh and to its embodiment, woman. Man is created by woman, and the Word is the sterile product of man's labours. The emphasis reflects that of Lawrence's letters of the period. To Sallie Hopkin he wrote on 23 December 1912: 'I shall do my work for women, better than the suffrage'.

Yet the actual descriptions of man's secondary nature, though they show the division of qualities between the sexes to be one genuinely felt, reveal a very different bias. Lawrence writes:

the Word is that of the Father which, through the Son, is tossed away. It is that part of the Flesh in the Son which is capable of spreading out thin and fine, losing its concentration and completeness, ceasing to be a begetter, and becoming only a vision, a flutter of petals, God rippling through the Son till he breaks in a laugh, called a blossom, that shines and is gone. The vision itself, the flutter of petals, the rose, the Father through the Son wasting himself in a moment of consciousness, consciousness of his own infinitude and gloriousness, a Rose, a Clapping of the Hands, a Spark of Joy thrown off from the Fire to die ruddy in mid darkness, a Snip of Flame, the Holy Ghost, the Revelation.22

The influence of Bergson may be present here once more, but it is apparent that the sheer joy in consciousness is Lawrence's own. Consciousness is once again expression only, but that expression seems now to be identified with art, and, despite his intentions, Lawrence cannot believe the male utterance achieved in art to be less than the Flesh which fostered and produced it. The Holy Ghost is thus no longer of the Flesh but is instead consciousness itself, and this consciousness is not the derivative light, as it was in the letter to Collings23, but living flame. The images surrounding it are of life and fulfilment; consciousness is waste from a functional viewpoint and possesses for this very reason intrinsic value. In Delavenay's words, the Forward 'sets out from the idea of the divinity of the flesh to culminate in that

22. A.H. p 100.
23. A.H. p 94.
of the spirit, and from believing in the superiority of woman it comes to assert that of man.

Clearly Lawrence's attitude is ambivalent here, but the ambivalence is born to some extent of a confusion in meanings. The consciousness which he celebrates here is not precisely equivalent to the Word which he earlier condemned, but his terminology is too blunt to register the distinction. Fulfilment in self-expression and the moment of consciousness in which this culminates are thus not distinguished, nor are the act of consciousness and its products. Yet it is essentially the achievement of the act which Lawrence celebrates here, and the application of its static products to life which he earlier condemned. He seeks to resolve these confusions by turning to describe the ideal relationship between man and woman. Since the two sexes embody the Flesh and the Word, such a description will present the ideal harmony between the two aspects and provide a basis for a new morality.

Like 'bees in and out of a hive, we come backwards and forwards to our woman', he writes:

And as [the bee] comes and goes, so shall man for ever come and go; go to his work, his Uttering, wherein he is masterful and proud; come home to his woman, through whom is God the Father, and who is herself, whether she will have it or not, God the Father, before whom the man in his hour is full of reverence, and in whom he is glorified and hath the root of his pride.25

The concept of a balance between Flesh and Word is now set forth


as an ideal, to be found in the balance between man and woman, the embodiments of the two qualities. Important though the concept is, however, as presented here it has certain disquieting aspects. One is the element of compulsion implicit in the role ascribed to woman. 'Whether she will have it or not', she is the embodiment of the Flesh, whilst to the man is given more than merely the Word. He exists both by day and by night, in work and in home, in social and in individual activity; the woman lives only by night. In reality the balance is found not between the two but within the man alone. Lawrence reverences woman whilst at the same time relegating her to a subsidiary, even subhuman role. But he is uneasy, hinting at her dissent, a dissent which will be manifest in his work whenever the danger of sexual imbalance threatens. If, to reach beyond the Foreword for a moment, it is the weakness of Lawrence's concept of the 'otherness' of individuals that in his difference the other may be undervalued, then it is its strength that his voice may nevertheless always be heard in dissent.

Woman's secondary role is, however, a curiously ambivalent one. Lawrence's description shows the man to be peculiarly dependent upon her. Since she is God the Father, the Father should more properly 'be called Mother'. The Queen to whom the male bee returns each day is mother as well as lover. One is reminded that it was from his mother that Paul Morel 'drew the life-warmth, the strength to produce'. Lawrence's attraction

26. This first formulation of the concept of a separate, masculine purpose, it is interesting to note, sees it as belonging quite definitely to consciousness.

to the relationship which he is already in the Foreword beginning to analyze psychologically reappears briefly here, to indicate a recurrent point of weakness in his thought. Balance becomes an alternating process of devaluation: if woman is degraded in being allotted only half the attributes of the Son, then man is no less devalued if 'God the Father' is to be found in the woman rather than through relationship with her.

The attempt at resolution is therefore a failure. Lawrence's division of the two halves of his dualism between the sexes is vitiated by his uncertain attitude to woman and by his unacknowledged love of consciousness. The result is an inevitable imbalance. But the failure lies also in the nature of the attempt. If truly effected, such a division would involve a sad reduction of Lawrence's complex view of the human being as Christ the Son, Flesh and Word, drawing infinite potential from the one and expending it in the other. Clearly Lawrence wishes to indicate the interconnection between balance within the individual and sexual balance between individuals. To assume, however, that the former may be simply equated with the latter, so that sexual balance is alone necessary is to evade the problems both of individual balance and of the relation between it and sexual balance.

The final paragraphs of the Foreword see Lawrence turn back to the situation of Sons and Lovers, and they also see his first reference to Freud. If the ideal marital situation is not achieved, he writes, and the partners are not free to re-marry, 'then shall they both destroyed'. The man will 'consume his own flesh ... whether with wine or other kindling'; the woman may
fall ill, she may herself turn to consciousness, she may fight her husband, 'to make him take her' or she may 'turn to her son, and say 'Be you my Go-between'. The son then assumes the husband's role as utterer, but, not being his mother's lover, he is torn, becoming neither physical husband to his mother nor spiritual husband to his wife. Lawrence comments: 'The old son-lover was Oedipus. The name of the new one is legion'. The reference seems almost certainly to be to Freud's work, but it is both uncertain and uninformed. Lawrence's account of the Oedipal situation shows it to be, firstly, the responsibility of the parents and here of the father in particular, secondly, unnatural and therefore connected with the faults of the society in which it occurs and, thirdly, not sexual in nature. All of these points contradict the Freudian view; all will later be used against the Freudian position. Here, however, the reference seems rather to be an uncertain attempt to link Lawrence's own conclusions with those of psychoanalysis. Whatever knowledge of Freud he had gained from Frieda at this time would appear to have been vague and confused.

At the end of the Foreword, then, Lawrence seems more confused than when, in the confident letter to Collings, he began. Consciousness is condemned in its application to life but celebrated in action; its domination of modern society is attacked, but Lawrence's own suggestions as to its correct operation see it either as still within the traditional social structure, in work, or as a-social, in artistic expression. That there are

problems in his viewpoint, however, is now implicitly recognized; the simple assertions of the letter to Collings are no longer felt to be adequate. And Lawrence has established what is to be his central position throughout later expositions; that of a belief in life's essential creativity, manifest in the physical but as indefinite potentiality. He has sought, however unsatisfactorily, an adequate terminology for this concept, one which will fuse the physical and the spiritual. Finally, in however confused a manner, the connection between individual man's creativity and dualism and the relationship between individuals has been affirmed.
In September 1914 Lawrence began again, this time upon the work which he later regarded as the first version of his philosophy. The 'Study' is confused; even whilst typing it, having apparently rewritten it at least once, Lawrence recognised that he 'must write (it) again, still another time'. Yet, if less systematic than the Foreword to Sons and Lovers, it is at the same time more self-confident, more urgent and more seminal than the earlier essay. It abounds with the insights which were to form the material of all the later, more systematic expositions of his thought. Four major causes may be adduced to explain this upsurge in confidence and direction. One is the influence of Hardy himself; when first projected in mid July 1914, the 'Study' was intended to be 'a little book on Hardy's people' but, as Lawrence comments, 'if one wrote everything they give rise to, it would fill the Judgement Book'. A second is Lawrence's need to restructure his thought in preparation for the final draft of The Rainbow. Finally, there are the influence of Lawrence's first direct exposure to psychoanalysis; and the impact of the outbreak of World War I.

1. See Q.R. p 122. Lawrence writes to Kott: 'I have written into its final form that philosophy which you once painfully and laboriously typed out, when we were in Bucks., and you were in the Bureau.'

2. C.L. p 298. The 'Study' was not published during Lawrence's lifetime. It was first published complete in Phoenix: The Posthumous Papers of D. H. Lawrence (London, 1936).


4. 'Study', p 410.


(ii) 'Study of Thomas Hardy' (Phoenix pp 398 - 516)
It was during Lawrence's residence in London, from late June until early September 1914, upon his return to England from Italy, that he first came into direct contact with psychoanalysis. Murry's description is well-known:

At this particular moment his novel Sons and Lovers had been discovered by some of the Freudian psychoanalysts, who were enthusiastic about it because it exemplified some of Freud's main theses; and Dr. Eder then called more than once on Lawrence to discuss the doctrine... 6

Eder, writes Frederick J. Hoffman, 'began to attend the "Lawrence evenings" and to undertake a serious discussion of the Freudian theory' 7. According to Hoffman, 'Lawrence studied psychoanalysis with his usual intense interest', but the study must have been conducted entirely through discussion, for it appears that Lawrence's reading of Freud did not begin until at least 1916 8. Lawrence's partner in these discussions, Dr. M. D. Eder 9, will be discussed in more detail later. Here it is worth noting, however, that his own grasp of psychoanalysis in 1914 combined a sure knowledge of the practical and therapeutic aspects of Freud's thought with a failure to appreciate the wider and more inclusive theory which Freud had built upon them. His tendency was to merge Freud's therapeutic guidelines with the far more optimistic general position of Jung, who had broken with Freud in September 1913 10. In October 1914, Freud could write to

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10 See Freud's 'History of the Psychoanalytic Movement', S.E. Vol. XIV, p 45. The work by Jung which heralded this break, Psychology of the Unconscious, appeared in German in 1912 (as Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido) but was not translated into English until 1916.
Ernest Jones 'that the loss of Eder (who had at that time gone
over to Jung) was not at all a pity'.\[^{11}\] Lawrence's mild reaction
to this first exposure is therefore not surprising. On the one
hand, he could feel that 'Freudianism is only a branch of medical
science - interesting',\[^{12}\] failing to see that Freud had rather
produced a psychological justification of the scientific position,
which Lawrence was to reject. Lawrence could feel his own
theories to be far more important. On the other hand, psycho-
analysis was felt to be sufficiently near to his own position
for him to use it, much as he had used the conclusions of
Bergson, whom he nevertheless pronounced 'a bit thin'.\[^{13}\] The
greater confidence in his own division of man, its greater
psychological bias, and the increased psychological subtlety of
his analyses of man's failure, all probably owe much to the
feeling of reinforcement which Eder's account would give to
his own theory.

If the 'Study' was first projected during the London
period, as an analysis of Hardy's characters, however, it was
actually begun 'out of sheer rage'\[^{14}\] at the outbreak of war.
The result is not, as in 'The Crown', an attempt to account for
destruction, but rather what Kinkead-Weekes calls 'a study of
creativity embarked on under the first impact of war'.\[^{15}\] The

\[^{12}\] Letter of 21 September 1914 to Gordon Campbell. C.L. p 291.
\[^{13}\] Letter of 26 April 1913 to A. W. McLeod. C.L. p 203.
\[^{15}\] Kinkead-Weekes, p 374.
war produced from Lawrence an urgency of optimism, the statement of the centrality of creativity from which all his later expositions begin.

Lawrence opens with the image of fulfilment, the poppy, which has achieved so far its complete poppy-self, unquestionable. It has uncovered its red. Its light, its self, has risen and shone out, has run on the winds for a moment. It is splendid. 17

This fulfilment, it is emphasised, is waste, excess. Yet:

The excess is the thing itself at its maximum of being. If it had stopped short of this excess, it would not have been at all. If this excess were missing, darkness would cover the face of the earth. In this excess, the plant is transfigured into flower, it achieves at last itself. 18

The combination is that of the Foreword. Here, however, Lawrence is not describing consciousness, but an unconscious self-expression, self-fulfilment in being. This does not constitute a reversal so much as a clarification, the recognition of distinctions which before were blurred by the rigidity of Lawrence's dualism. To the concept of the Flesh as infinite potential and eternal continuance is now added that of Being as ever-renewed transcendence. It is now accepted that it is the blossom which defines the plant. 19 The conception of fulfilment as waste brings with it also an insistence upon the importance of the present. It is the moment of transcendence which is all-important; neither

16. In contrast to many of his own letters of the period.
17. Phoenix pp 403-4.
18. p 402.
19. Contrast the above quotation (18) with A.H. pp 99-100.
the past nor the future is relevant. In this moment is found what Leone Vivante calls 'a self-contained eternity', which rescues us from the eternity of 'the tick-tack of birth and death, monotonous as time'. It brings also the recognition of eternal newness, the underived originality of all manifestations of life:

What was Dido was new, absolutely new. It had never been before, and in Dido it was. In its own degree, the prickly sow-thistle I have just pulled up is, for the first time in all time. It is itself, a new thing.

This insistence upon being as waste is paradoxically also an insistence upon value; and here Lawrence's intuition comes very close to the philosophy of A. N. Whitehead. Whitehead writes that

Value is the word I use for the intrinsic reality of an event ...

and

Realisation ... is in itself the attainment of value.

Lawrence writes. 'That is the whole point: something is which was not'. The idea of the Foreword, that fulfilment is found in work, is consequently rejected:

Seed and Fruit and produce, these are only a minor aim; children and good works are a minor aim.
Instead of in work, creativity should be expressed in 'sheer play of being free'. Art should be 'about becoming complete or about the failure to become complete'. The world itself 'is a world because of the poppy's red'. The emphasis on creativity, which often appears to owe something to Bergson, becomes therefore what Bergson's is not, an ethical philosophy. For Lawrence opposes this concept of intrinsic value in being to the nineteenth-century evolutionary idea that 'life is the great struggle for self-preservation; that this struggle for the means of life is the essence and whole of life'. By extension, this becomes a rejection of all theories of man which view him in social terms, and all conscious and imposed systems of morality, which would deny an intrinsic, rather than an extrinsic, value in life. The view of man in purely functional terms which was half-rejected in the Foreword, is now associated with consciousness and thoroughly repudiated. Social reform is irrelevant, for laws cannot 'put into being something which did not before exist'. They 'can only modify the conditions for the better or worse of that which already exists'. Those who do seek reform according to an abstract ideal of man are analysed, in a manner borrowed surely from psychoanalysis but thoroughly adapted to Lawrence's own ends. Failing to achieve self-fulfilment, they

27. p 422.
28. p 410.
29. p 404.
30. p 404.
31. p 405.
transform their sense of this failure into a feeling of pity for their neighbour, who is 'an image of' themselves:

I do not care about him and his poverty; I care about my own unsatisfied soul. But I sidetrack to him my poor neighbour, to vent on him my self-pity. 32

Social passion is driven always by a sense of personal failure.

Through his analysis of Hardy's characters, particularly of Clym Yeobright, Lawrence translates this vision of the potentialities of life into a more explicit account of man himself. Consciousness as well as being is now discussed. It is clear that whilst Lawrence has separated his concept of fulfilment from the operation of consciousness, the two remain closely linked. The 'source' presses always for 'utterance', 33 man's instincts 'move out' to 'utterance' as well as to 'action'. 34 Thus man's aim must be to 'learn what it is to be at one, in his mind and will, with the primal impulses that rise in him', 35 consciousness must be first and foremost self-consciousness, the expression of being....

Yet man's consciousness (his 'mind and will') has produced a 'system of ideas' which forms 'the little walled city', 36 of human civilization or community and which stands posed against 'the vast, uncomprehended and incomprehensible morality of nature or of life itself, surpassing human consciousness'. 37

32. p 408.
33. p 422.
34. p 417.
35. p 418.
36. pp 417, 419.
37. p 419.
As symbol of this force Hardy's Egdon Heath now replaces the poppy as Lawrence's dominant explanatory image. Like the Flesh of the Foreword, or the creative 'carbon' which in June 1914 Lawrence saw would form the theme of *The Rainbow*, it is both physical and indefinite, actual and potential:

the dark, powerful source whence all things rise into being, whence they will always continue to rise, to struggle forward to further being.

The origin of all life, it manifests itself in man through his 'primal impulses', which are thus identified with the natural world. Clym Yeobright did not know that the greater part of every life is underground, like roots in the dark in contact with the beyond.

It provides, now explicitly, a 'primal morality' in contradiction to the imposed moral systems by which man seeks to protect himself from what he sees as 'the waste enormity of nature'.

It is the conflict between these two concepts of morality which is seen to form the tragedy of Hardy's novels. Lawrence himself uses it to point to two conclusions. One is that man's immediate problems spring from the split within himself, from the fact that he has a purpose which he has divorced from the passionate purpose that issued him out of the earth into being.

39. p 418.
40. p 418.
41. p 419.
42. p 415.
Consciousness having ceased to be purely expression, man's feelings are now 'suppressed and contained', his energies diverted to the service of an abstract system imposed from without. To the rejection of abstraction of the Foreword, Lawrence here adds a psychological explanation of its growth and operation within the individual, which is an adaptation of the psychoanalytical concept of repression and sublimation. Secondly, Lawrence insists that whatever the external and historical demands for this repression, man remains free. Despite Clym's early subjection to the yoke of civilization, he must learn self-fulfilment: 'Till then, let him perish or preach'. Hardy's concept of tragedy is therefore rejected. Harmony between man and nature, or more properly between man's mind and his self, not only can but must be achieved. His failure is not tragedy but cowardice, failure to put being before self-preservation. Lawrence typically adds to his explanation of man's failure in psychological terms an insistence upon religious absolutes.

Lawrence provides in the 'Study' two explicit descriptions of the psyche itself: one of the nature of its division; the other of the functions and tendencies of its two aspects. The former is expressed in an image which might well have served Freud. Indeed, Lawrence seeks to draw from it his own psycho-pathology. Man, he writes,

is a well-head built over a strong, perennial spring and enclosing it in, a well-head whence the water may be drawn at will, and under which the water may be held back

43. p 418 - 9.
indefinitely. Sometimes, and in certain ways, according to certain rules, the source may bubble and spring out, but only at certain times, always under control. And the fountain cannot always bide for the permission, the suppressed waters strain at the well-head, and hence so much sadness without cause. Weltschmerz and other unlocalised pains, where the source presses for utterance. 44

There is a suggestion here that man's dualism may after all be ineradicable, a suggestion which appears to be confirmed in Lawrence's account of the functions of its two aspects. He writes:

So, facing both ways, like Janus, face forward, in the quivering, glimmering fringe of the unresolved, facing the unknown, and looking backward over the vast rolling tract of life which follows and represents the initial movement, man is given up to his dual business, of being, in blindness, and wonder and pure godliness, the living stuff of life itself, unrevealed; and of knowing, with unwearying labour and unceasing success, the manner of that which has been, which is revealed. 45

This division, echoing that of Bergson between life and intellect, implicitly poses problems for Lawrence. He suggests no means of ensuring the balance between the two directions, and his account of Hardy has suggested that the two are in conflict, the backward direction stifling the forward. Nevertheless, there is no indication here that this restricting power of consciousness might be inherent in its operation. Instead, the division is swept into affirmation. Consciousness is not only harmonised with

44. p 422.
45. p 430.
46. See Bergson, Creative Evolution (London, 1914), p 250. Bergson writes that consciousness, 'though it does indeed move in the same direction as its principle, ... is continually drawn the opposite way, obliged, though it goes forward, to look behind. This retrospective vision is ... the natural function of the intellect, and consequently of distinct consciousness.'
being; it is seen as a vital aspect of this being. The movement is a cyclic one. Life's aim is to 'bring all life into the human consciousness', but only in order that life itself may once more 'heav[e] into uncreated space'. Lawrence goes further: knowledge 'is a force active in the immediate rear of life, and the greater its activity, the greater the forward, unknown movement ahead of it'. Consciousness is, moreover, man's 'greater manifestation of individuality', providing the realisation of otherness; 'the finer, more distinct the individual, the more finely and distinctly is he aware of all other individuality'. These are large claims, claims born out of the confidence that psychic harmony is possible. In the societal sphere they become the affirmation that the products of consciousness, science and technology, may be accepted and absorbed into the service of being. Neither self-preservation nor work are to be rejected; they are merely to be given their correct, subsidiary place in the cycle of being. The misuse and overvaluation of both consciousness and its products are inevitably the result of a failure to achieve this being and a compensatory turning to a form of knowledge which is not founded on self-knowledge.

But what, in human as opposed to the vegetable terms of his images, constitutes for Lawrence this all-important being? The exploratory process by which he arrives at an answer to this

47. p 431.

48. p 433.
question typifies Lawrence's essays as well as his fiction. The question is raised three times in the early sections, momentarily struggled with and abandoned. The whole of the complex middle portion can be seen as a confused attempt to answer it. Finally, when in the closing sections he returns to the analysis of Hardy's characters, the hint of the early sections, that the 'via media to being, for man or woman, is love, and love alone' is brought to fruition. It is in Jude Fawley's sexual relationships that he achieves being. This relationship must be physical: the discovery of the unknown in the other and the identification with nature through the plunge into this unknown. It must also be spiritual: the transmutation of the sensual knowledge thus gained into expression. Out of this relationship springs a flowering which includes consciousness, and a new idea is produced. Jude 'singed himself out from the old matrix of the accepted idea, he produced an individual flower of his own.' The fulfilment of this idea constitutes man's conscious purpose. This vision of potential become transcendence and expression through the sexual relationship is central for Lawrence and was to provide the central theme of The Rainbow. In its expression here he perhaps comes closest to overcoming that sense of man's dualism which, it has been seen, is as much characteristic of his thought as is his desire for its transcendence. All aspects of

49. pp 410, 423, 428.
50. p 410.
51. p 499.
man are creative, and each flows naturally into the next.

Against this vision of fulfilment are set the failures: Sue, who lacks the necessary physical vitality to supply her mind, for 'the mind, in a common person, is created out of the surplus vitality, or out of the remainder after all the sensuous life has been fulfilled'\textsuperscript{52}; Arabella, whose vitality is merely physical; and Phillotson, who exemplifies the difference between thought in the process of becoming, and thought as already formed. Living entirely in the latter, performing thought's backwards movement, he becomes the antithesis of creation, the machine.

So far, this analysis has concerned only the first and last portions of the 'Study', ignoring the middle portion on which attention is usually focussed. Before turning to this section, however, a comment must be made on Lawrence's use of language in the portions already discussed. Here the impression is once more that of a flow of creativity. The terminology is fluid and in place of schematization Lawrence prefers the use of suggestive images, either of his own creation or borrowed from Hardy. It is through the images of the poppy and the heath, and through other reinforcing images, that his view of life and of man is focussed. The conclusions seem often to be forced by the images themselves, rather than to control them. But this profusion of terms is grouped around a central division, that between being and consciousness, and it is to describe the first of these two aspects

\textsuperscript{52} p 507.
that Lawrence's images are called into play. Here again, the
influence of his recent exposure to psychoanalysis may perhaps
be detected. 'Consciousness' and its conceptual synonyms are
felt to be adequate terms for that aspect of man to which they
refer, but in place of 'the unconscious', that 'somethingness
called nothingness', Lawrence prefers to create his own vision
of man's 'underground' life.

In place of this profusion of images, the middle portion
of the 'Study' seeks to impose a rigid schematization. The
attempt is as much characteristic of Lawrence's expository
writing as it is the exploratory groping for solutions already
described, reflecting as it does his search for an adequate and
authoritative form for his speculations. Here his starting
point is once more the notion that the 'via media to being,
for man or woman, is love, and love alone'. The moment of trans­
cendence for the poppy is consequently redefined:

where does my poppy spill over in red, but there where
the two streams have flowed and clasped together, where the
pollen stream clashes into the pistil stream, where the
male clashes into the female, and the two heave out in
utterance. 55

Lawrence proceeds to formulate an explanation of history, and
in particular of the history of what he sees as the two most
important manifestations of civilization, art and religion, in
terms of the division of male and female. The division echoes

53. p 402. The reference would appear to be almost certainly
to the 'unconscious' of psychoanalysis.
54. p 418. See Appendix II for a tabulation of Lawrence's terms
here.
55. p 442.
that of the Foreword: once more the female is the Father, the male the Son. But it extends outwards from the psyche to the whole of nature in one direction ("everything of life is male or female"), and to the history of civilization in another. The female principle has been manifested in the (roughly pre-Christian) epoch of the Law, and the male principle in the (Christian) epoch of Love. In addition, the sexual division corresponds also to the division between the Will-to-Motion (male) and the Will-to-Inertia: (female). It is this division which H. M. Daleski takes to be the all-important one of the 'Study', and, indeed, within Lawrence himself. Daleski tabulates the qualities belonging to each aspect of the division, yet the relationship between the different forms of this division is not as simple as he assumes. These forms clash, momentarily absorb each other, then separate. The analysis abounds in confusions; Love is equivalent to the spirit, yet it is also applied to a relationship which is both physical and spiritual; the male is spirit and the female body, yet body and spirit must not seek union with each other; spirit and motion are both male, yet the conflict of Love and Law is "pure motion struggling against yet reconciled with the spirit." The division is unwieldy and clearly difficult to apply to individual cases, so, rather than discuss it as a whole, I shall deal in turn with its different aspects and their functions in Lawrence's thought.

56. Lawrence's 'starting-point' in the 'Study', he writes, is 'the assertion that the duality of all life is manifested in two opposing wills which must be brought into true relation...,' Daleski, The Forked Flame (London, 1965), p 24.
57. The Forked Flame, pp 30 - 31, cf 54 above.
58. pp 465, 474, 477.
The creation of a scheme which will elucidate religious and artistic history corresponds to Lawrence's need to provide a framework for his own utterances on religion and art, both in the 'Study' itself and in the novel to follow, The Rainbow. The scheme he produces is both psychological and apocalyptic; it can be both, as Baruch Hochman points out, partly because Lawrence uses the same terms for his historical epochs as he uses to divide the self, and, indeed, the natural world. A contemporary letter to Gordon Campbell, written after Lawrence's reading of Mrs. Henry Jenner's book, Christian Symbolism, is even prepared to view religious history as merely symbolic of aspects of the self. Lawrence writes:

The Crucifix, and Christ, are only symbols. They do not mean a man who suffered his life out as I suffer mine. They mean a moment in the history of my soul ... 61

The 'Study' itself projects psychology on to history. The early period of the Law restricted life to the body, and consciousness of the body; the succeeding epoch of Love, seeking to right the balance, has in turn restricted life within the spiritual or male mode. Thus man's religious history records his struggle and failure to attune his conscious purpose with the purpose of nature. There is a suggestion that every moral system must represent an imbalance, since thought itself is born from 'unsatisfaction' and creates as its God that which 'man lacked and yearned for in his living'. 62. All morality, and here Lawrence


62. p 446.
anticipates the conclusions of *Education of the People*, is therefore 'of temporary value, useful for its times'. Art, however, has a more important function and 'must give a deeper satisfaction. It must give fair play all round', containing 'the essential criticism on the morality to which it adheres'.

But Lawrence's history of the past exists at least in part in order to suggest fulfilment for the individual of the future: 'Man must be born to the knowledge, that in the whole being he is nothing, as he was born to know that in the whole being he was all'. His scheme is apocalyptic, borrowed from Joachitism. This doctrine, writes Frank Kermode, 'postulates three historical epochs; one for each person of the Trinity, with a transitional age between each'. For Lawrence, the Holy Ghost, to whom the final period will belong, exists within the self as the creative principle itself, as reconciler of the two aspects and as their consummation. Thus the past is viewed as partial in order that the future may be seen as whole. But the scheme also serves to distance Lawrence both from civilization as it exists and from its immediate manifestation, the war, which may now be viewed as merely the mark of the transition from the second to the third epoch.

63. p 476.
64. p 453.

In 1254 a book was published called 'Introduction to the Everlasting Gospel', supposed to contain the teaching of a famous seer or prophet, the Abbot Joachim, who died at Naples in 1202. In this book it was said that Judaism was the revelation of the Father; Christianity was the revelation of the Son; now man must prepare for the revelation of the Holy Ghost.

66. See p 513.
The problem of the place of civilization within Lawrence's view of life has been implicit throughout the 'Study'. He has suggested on the one hand that it, or its products, may be somehow fitted into the cycle of growth which should characterize man's life, and on the other, that in its developed form it is opposed to fulfilment in being. At one point he offers a solution in which it operates as a guardian of balance: the Christian lesson, the recognition in consciousness of the demands of others, serves as a counterbalance to the non-conscious fulfilment of self. More often, he exhorts us simply to abandon it:

If it is not convenient for me, I must depart from it. There is no need to break laws. The only need is to be a law unto oneself.

The apocalyptic scheme offers, as well as a historical explanation of the war, a historical excuse for this attitude and an explanation for the constricting nature of civilization as it now exists. It offers also a vision of the absorption of civilization within the cycle of life as about to occur. But it may be noted that the assumption contained in this scheme, that history, as the record of man's unsuccessful attempt to attune himself to nature, will be abolished in the third age, stands in implicit contradiction to Lawrence's earlier concept of an unceasing cyclic movement, in which consciousness and civilization is always the climax and is always superceded. Its rigid patterning contradicts also his insistence that each individual is always free, whatever his circumstances.

67. p 512.
Lawrence's scheme is persistently dualistic as well as apocalyptic. In the epoch of the Law, the 'greatest of all Utterance of the Law has given expression to the Law as it is in relation to Love, both ruled by the Holy Spirit'; similarly in the epoch of Love, the 'greatest utterance of Love has given expression to Love as it is in relation to the Law'\(^69\). The movement is always one of 'a double cycle, of men and women, facing opposite ways, travelling opposite ways, revolving upon each other', drawing 'nearer and nearer, each travelling in his separate cycle, till the two are abreast, and side by side, until even they pass on again, away from each other, travelling their opposite ways to the same infinite goal'\(^70\).

This concept serves once more to identify history with individual psychology. The partial past and the whole future may be seen as grounded in the same psychic qualities, representing failure or success in balancing and fusing them. It offers also an explanation of the individual moment of transcendence which was so stressed in the early parts of the 'Study'. This is seen as the point of meeting of the two opposites which themselves are separate and eternal, but which in their meeting create a third thing, the moment of consummation or transcendence. This concept and its related idea, that the psychic opposites may be held in a relationship of mutual, complementary balance, will recur in 'the Crown', to be more fully developed. So too will the use of psychic opposites to provide a historical and natural explanation of the opposite of creation, destruction.

69. p 513.
70. p 449.
Here Lawrence writes:

The dual Will we call the Will-to-Motion and the Will-to-Inertia: ... cause the whole of life, from the ebb and flow of a wave, to the stable equilibrium of the whole universe, from birth and being and knowledge to death and decay and forgetfulness. 71

In the coming together of the opposites is growth; in their separation is decay.

Despite the immediacy of the war, the question of destruction has been scarcely tackled in the 'Study'. It is suggested in the early parts that it is the result of failure of being and the resultant self-enclosure within the restrictive form of the accepted system and idea. But Lawrence's concept of fulfilment as waste implies death as its climax, and at one point at least this climax of life is viewed in terms of death. 72. His speculations on Hardy's character, Phillotson, carry this idea further:

Why does a snake horrify us, or even a newt? ... What is it, in our life or in our feeling, to which a newt corresponds? Is it that life has the two sides, of growth and of decay, symbolized most acutely in our bodies by the semen and the excreta? 73

In Lawrence's apocalyptic scheme, this individual explanation becomes historical, and pessimism is once again evaded. Decay and destruction is natural, but temporary; the prelude to renewed growth.

The choice of the male-female division as his central dualism once more places the individual at the centre of both

71. p 448.

72. p 409: 'What is the aim of self-preservation, but to carry us right out to the firing-line; there, what is is in contact with what is not'.

73. p 502.
'all life' and history. The form assumed by this dualism varies, but Lawrence's central view appears to be that

every man comprises male and female in his being, the male always struggling for predominance. A woman likewise consists in male and female, with female predominant. 74

Until puberty, there is no predominance at all. It is through love, specifically the sexual act, that we become pure male or female:

In love, in the act of love, that which is mixed in me becomes pure, that which is female in me is given to the female, that which is male in her draws into me, I am complete, I am pure male, she is pure female; we rejoice in contact perfect and naked and clear, singled out unto ourselves, and given the surpassing freedom. 76

The search for a complement other than the human partner results in the creation of spiritual goals and a God who represents man's aspiration.

This internal division enables Lawrence to draw further distinctions within man's psyche. In him is found both the 'Will-to-Inertia', the feeling that the self is all-important, the centre to which all things are drawn, and the 'Will-to-Motion' the movement outwards towards action in the world. Consciousness is to be distinguished from both, belonging predominantly to either, depending on whether the epoch is of Law or of Love. There is a suggestion, picked up from the letter to Collings and later to be much more fully developed, that the body or blood has its own form of knowledge, which may be brought to consciousness. The male-female division also serves to stress the

74. p 481. Elsewhere in the 'Study', contrary to Daleski's view (The Forked Flame, p 33), Lawrence can assert the opposite, that 'our view is partial. Man is man and woman is woman, whether no children be born any more for ever'. (p443)

75. p 459.
76. p 468.
77. p 450.
78. A.H. p 94.
centrality of the sex-relationship for human fulfilment. It is in the sexual act that the opposites are brought together and a transcendent individuality is achieved. The sexual relationship is physically and spiritually necessary, incorporated, in the form of desire, within the self itself.

The sexual division, moreover, corresponds to a recurring aspect of Lawrence's thought, not only in its emphasis upon the absolute 'otherness' of the sexes, in which each represents the unknown to the other, but also in the qualities attributed to each. As in the Foreword, the man, active, spiritual and conscious, must fulfill through the accomplishment of his purpose, the static, inclusive being of the woman:

The male lives in the satisfaction of some purpose achieved, the female in the satisfaction of some purpose contained. 80

Although this sexual distribution of qualities can be rationally defended, it is this aspect of Lawrence's thought which is most difficult to reconcile with the individual psychology developed in the early part of the 'Study'. A suggestion given at one point by Lawrence is, I feel, illuminating. Man, he writes, creates the God of his aspiration out of his own imbalance:

So that the attributes of God will reveal that which man lacked and yearned for in his living. And these attributes are always, in their essence, Eternality, Infinity, Immutability.

79. pp 490 - 492. It is when we forget this that our 'knowledge tends to become our abstraction, because it is limited by no unknown'. p 456.

80. p 481.

81. For such a defense, see Hochman, pp 83 - 5.
And these are the qualities man feels in woman, as a principle. Let a man walk alone on the face of the earth, and he feels himself to be a loose speck blown at random. Let him have a woman to whom he belongs, and he will feel as though he had a wall to back up against; even though the woman be mentally a fool. No man can endure the sense of space, of chaos, on four sides of himself. It drives him mad. He must be able to put his back to the wall. And this wall is his woman. 82

The suggestion is that man's view of woman as well as of God is born less from the qualities which she possesses than from those which he lacks, and despite the generalization, it suggests a biographical explanation for this division which will recur throughout Lawrence's thought.

In justification of this view, the application of the male-female division brings imbalance. It absorbs rather than supplements the earlier distinction between being and consciousness 83. Being is given to the female, consciousness to the male, but the scope of the former is drastically reduced. As 'full life in the body' 84 being is separated from its fulfilment which, as either action 85 or utterance, is given to the male. The following description, ostensibly stressing equality, indicates the subtlety of the earlier distinction between being and consciousness.

82. p 446. This suggestion implicitly contradicts Dalecki's assumption of Lawrence's 'identification with the female principle'. (The Forked Flame, p 36)

83. p 509: 'the Male, the Love, the Spirit, the Mind, the Consciousness' against 'the Female, the Law, the Soul, the Senses, the Feelings'.

Lawrence may have been influenced here by his conversation on 18 November 1914 with Murry, when he must have been in the middle of writing the 'Study'. Murry reports that he suggested to Lawrence that 'the Law' and 'Love' 'were better called the condition of being and the condition of moving', and that Lawrence 'accepted this'. J. M. Murry, Reminiscences of D. H. Lawrence (London, 1933), p 45.

84. p 481.

85. Movement, or growth, was earlier an attribute of being.
with which this imbalance may operate:

The female at the same time exhausts and invigorates the male, the male at the same time exhausts and invigorates the female. The exhaustion and invigoration are both temporary and relative. The male, making the effort to penetrate into the female, exhausts himself and invigorates her. But that which, at the end, he discovers and carries off from her, some seed of being, enriches him and exhausts her. 86

The confusions to which Lawrence is liable in his attempts to apply this division are most evident in his return, at the close of the 'Study', to his ostensible subject, Hardy's characters. The complexities of the characters constantly evade his divisions. Thus, of Tess he writes that the 'female in her [had] become inert' 87, later that the 'female in her was indomitable, unchangeable' 88; of Jude he writes that, possessing only the (male) attribute of learning, 'there was danger ... that he should never become a man' 89. It is the physical connection with Arabella which 'makes a man of him' 90. Hardy himself is said to insist both that 'the spirit of Love must always succumb before the blind, stupid, but overwhelming power of the Law' and that 'At its worst, the Law is a weak craven sensuality; at its best it is a passive inertia' 91. In his most successful analyses, Lawrence abandons his scheme and returns to the more flexible terminology of the earlier part of the 'Study'. If the tragedy of Jude the Obscure is said to be 'the result of over-development of one principle of human life [the male] at the expense of the other' 92, the characters themselves evade both sexual and historical

86. p 500.
87. p 482.
88. p 486.
89. p 494.
90. p 493.
91. p 480.
92. p 509.
stereotyping. Jude's failure is in achieving a full relationship with one woman; the one-sidedly spiritual (male) Sue is balanced by the one-sidedly physical Arabella.

Hardy provides Lawrence not only with material for his analysis of the individual and historical psyche, but also with the occasion to develop a theory of art. Since, as always with Lawrence, this theory is intimately dependent upon his view of life and echoes its complexities and problems, a brief account of his development of this theory within the 'Study' may serve to close this discussion. In essence, three accounts are offered. The first echoes the early confidence in the creative power of consciousness when absorbed into the cycle of creation. The 'artistic effort' is 'the effort of utterance, the supreme effort of expressing knowledge, that which has been for once, ... the portraying of a moment of union between the two wills, according to knowledge';\(^93\). Later, Lawrence is less sure of man's power to achieve this wholeness. Art becomes the expression and criticism of an inherently divided man:

> every work of art adheres to some system of morality. But if it be really a work of art, it must contain the essential criticism of the morality to which it adheres. \(^94\)

In the final pages of the 'Study' Lawrence sweeps the two together into affirmation, through his apocalyptic scheme. Out of man's final knowledge shall come his supreme art. There shall be the art which recognized and utters [man's] own law; there shall be the

\(^93\) p 447.

\(^94\) p 476.
art which recognizes his own and also the law of the woman, his neighbour, utters the glad embraces and the struggle between them, and the submission of one; there shall be the art which knows the struggle between the two conflicting laws, and knows the final reconciliation, where both are equal, two in one, complete. This is the supreme art which yet remains to be done. 95

The final note is optimistic, characteristic of the 'Study' as a whole. It is a work rich in insights, many of which seem to lead direct to the mature Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious. But the problems and conflicts which separate it from that work are also implicit in it. Finally its optimism can only be sustained by an apocalyptic scheme which takes the vision of a creatively conscious man out of the present and into the future. Lawrence was to retain the scheme until 1915, 96 but its easy assumptions about contemporary civilization, in the 'Study' itself the expression of hope as much as of faith, could not be retained in the face of the actual destruction manifest in the war.

95. pp 515 - 6. Mark Kinkead-Weekes point out (p 385) that Lawrence is looking here to his own novel, The Rainbow, to be this 'supreme fiction'.

96. With some modifications, it appears in Twilight in Italy, which was rewritten in September 1915 (see L.L. p 364).
3. THE ORIGINS OF DESTRUCTION
To the Freudian view of man the degeneration and destruction unleashed by the 1914–18 war caused no difficulties of explanation. Although ultimately the war was responsible for revisions in his theory¹, 1915 saw Freud nevertheless able to offer a psychological explanation of its results in terms of the theory already established². If we are to be judged by our unconscious wishful impulses, we ourselves are ... a gang of murderers³, desiring the death of our enemies and having ambivalent feelings even towards those we love; and this unconscious is 'imperishable'⁴ as an active force in each of us. The prohibitions by which these desires are controlled are both external and innate, the latter having developed during the history of civilization from the former. 'Generally speaking, we are apt to attach too much importance to the innate part', regarding 'men as 'better' than they actually are'⁵. In fact, most men are 'living, psychologically speaking, beyond [their] means', estranged by the restrictions of civilization from their 'instinctual inclinations'⁶. The outbreak of war provides an opportunity for the fulfilment of these desires; the moral restrictions of civilization lifted, man is able to grant 'a temporary satisfaction to the instincts which [he] had been holding

2. In 'Thoughts for the Times on War and Death', S.E. XIV pp 273 - 302. First published early in 1915 in Imago (Vienna) Bo V.
3. S.E. XIV, p 297.
4. S.E. XIV, p 286.
5. S.E. XIV, p 283.
6. S.E. XIV, p 284.
in check'. Degeneration is therefore regression, regression to man's original nature. The explanation is coherent and convinc­ing but without hope for the future. The unconscious can be neither modified nor outgrown, and intelligence can function reliably only when it is removed from the influences of strong emotional impulses; otherwise it behaves merely as an instrument of the will and delivers any inference which the will requires.

Freud can plead only for a greater degree of self-knowledge in order that the actual situation may be better tolerated. For To tolerate life remains, after all, the first duty of all living beings.

To Lawrence's antithetical vision the war presented a profound challenge. Against his view of a primal creativity (rather than Freud's 'toleration' or self-preservation) as life's motive force, it offered destruction and degeneration as the present norm, thereby challenging his view of man and of history. Against his conception of the individual as free to step out of society to fulfilment, it revealed him as inextricably implicated in society's actions, attitudes and guilt. With regard to his vacillating attitude towards consciousness and his uncertain vision of man's wholeness it forced the issue: where in the individual psyche did the responsibility for this destruction lie? In Mary Freeman's words: 'Need to absorb decay in an acceptable view of life became the dominant motivation

7. S.E. XIV, p 285.
8. S.E. XIV, p 287.
9. S.E. XIV, p 299.
in his writing at this time.\textsuperscript{10}

The perspective of the 'Study of Thomas Hardy' is therefore now reversed. From a statement of man's intrinsic reality and potential offset by an account of his historical past and present, Lawrence now turns to a statement of man's historical present offset by a vision of his intrinsic reality and a very qualified account of his potential. From a statement of life's good he now turns to an explanation of man's evil. Inevitably, the shift in perspective brings also a modification of his position.

In the first place, evil must be not only explained but also come to terms with. The 'Study' equated life and good through the concept of life's 'primal morality'. If, as the war would also seem to suggest, evil is therefore to be identified with death, or a form of death, it must also be to some extent tolerated and accepted. For death is an aspect and a confirmation of life; the grave and the womb 'are the same thing, at opposite extremes'.\textsuperscript{11} Lawrence's concept of man's intrinsic reality must therefore be modified.

Secondly, man's two realities, intrinsic and historical, already becoming separate in the 'Study', are now forced further apart. Lawrence must realize that he is actually discussing two different types of man: the man of the present, the product of

\textsuperscript{10} Freeman, D. H. Lawrence: A Basic Study of His Ideas (Gainesville, 1955), p 73. I would quarrel, however, with the term 'decay', which does not adequately describe the complex forces of destruction for which Lawrence sought to account.

society and his historical past, and an alternative vision of a fulfilled individual man who now exists within mankind only as an unfulfilled potential.

Both the works to be discussed in this chapter explore these problems. Juxtaposing the two visions of man, they seek to ground both in the same psychological and natural qualities, and consequently to explain how potential man becomes historical man, and how historical man may in turn become fulfilled man. Both therefore demand, in the immediate situation of degradation and destruction, 'Are we really doomed ...?', and seek to reply with: 'There must be a certain faith', attempting to discover how and in what faith may be affirmed in such a situation.

Both, in consequence, were conceived as action against the immediate circumstances.

(1) THE CROWN (Phoenix II, pp 364 - 415; The Signature No. 1, pp 3 - 14; No. 2, pp 1 - 8; No. 3, pp 1 - 10)\(^{13}\)

The writing of 'The Crown' was immediately preceded by Lawrence's friendship with Bertrand Russell, with its concern for the practicalities of revolution and an alternative form of society. In March 1915 Lawrence had begun rewriting the 'Study of Thomas Hardy', apparently called at that time 'Le Gai Savaire'.\(^{14}\)


\(^{13}\) References are usually to Phoenix II. Where, however, it differs from The Signature, the 1915 version is quoted. Only the first three parts of 'The Crown' were printed in 1915. For the last three, Lawrence's word, (Phoenix II p 364) that he alters them in 1925 'only a very little', must be accepted.

\(^{14}\) C.L. p 324. Also called 'Le Gai Saver' or 'The Signal'.

His 'revolutionary utterances', it was to be published 'in pamphlets, weekly or fortnightly'. Under the influence of the developing friendship with Russell, this rewriting became material for the projected joint series of lectures to be undertaken in the autumn of 1915. Although the autumn saw the friendship broken and the philosophy once more rewritten, this time with a new terminology and as material for The Signature, the influence of this relationship on 'The Crown' was considerable. Despite Lawrence's disclaimer in the 1925 'Note' to 'The Crown', it is clear from his letters of the period, as well as from Murry's account, that he was the principal architect of this short-lived paper. 'The Crown' was also to be 'revolutionary'. Throughout his correspondence with Russell, Lawrence had insisted that the 'spirit' must precede the 'form'; the starting point for a new state must be 'the Infinite, the Boundless, the Eternal'. The first task was to alter man's consciousness. Thus 'The Crown', the most purely symbolic of his philosophical formulations, is also that most politically motivated. Its beliefs are those 'by which one can reconstruct the world'; it is to be 'the seed, and hope, of a great change

15. C.L. p 327.
16. C.L. p 324. Intended to run for six, fortnightly issues, it lasted for only three, appearing on 4 October, 18 October, and 1 November. The original versions of only the first three of 'The Crown' essays are therefore extant.
18. p 364.
22. C.L. p 364.
in life: the beginning of a new religious era. It also contains an analysis of the present era which is to a great extent the fruit of Lawrence's friendship with Russell.

The starting point for 'The Crown' is a variation of the apocalyptic scheme of the 'Study'. As before, man's past systems of morality have been both repressive of one half of his nature and, paradoxically, an attempt to express that nature.

'We have heard both declarations, we have seen each great ideal fulfilled, as far as it is possible, at this time, on earth.' Now, however, there is to be no easy transition from the past to the future; between the two stands an impenetrable barrier. For the past has occurred within the womb of time, the future depends on birth, and

The walls of the old body are inflexible and insensible, the unborn does not know that there can be any travelling forth. It conceives itself as the whole universe, surrounded by a dark nullity. It does not know that it is in prison.

Man is now seen as a creature imprisoned. His prison is the womb which is 'our era' but also, as a continuation of the 'walled city' image of the 'Study', civilization, and thirdly, as an extension of the image of the internally rotting cabbage of the 'Study', man's conscious self.

'The Crown', therefore, presents historical man, conscious and civilized, as unborn and repressed. The womb has contained the whole of the past, and it now contains us all: 'A myriad,

24. p 410.
25. p 390.
myriad people, we roam within the belly of our era, seeking, seeking, wanting. Lawrence's own reborn or twice-born man becomes a vision, a prophetic indication of a condition not yet achieved. It is also, however, reality, as against the unreality of the present. Life is 'a travelling to the edge of knowledge, then a leap taken'; the 'visible world is not true. The invisible world is true and real'. Lawrence is not infrequently drawn to an image of fulfilment which stresses merely its promise, on the one hand, and to an alternative account which insists on its reality, on the other:

There are myriads of framed gaps, people, and a few timeless fountains, men and women.

I shall deal first with Lawrence's concept of intrinsic man. This is less discussed than its opposite, and it is also difficult to disentangle. All the implications of the situation suggested above are not explored, and the vision frequently appears to make concessions to that of historical man. Nevertheless, it forms Lawrence's (subjective) touchstone, by which historical man may be judged.

This vision begins with the concept of a pair of opposites: the lion, or dark, and the unicorn, or light. These are cosmic, universal, infinite. But, being only partial, they are also relative:

If there is universal, infinite darkness, then there is universal, infinite light, for there cannot exist a

27. p 374.
29. p 385.
specific infinite save by virtue of the opposite and equivalent specific infinite ... And these are two relative halves. 30

They are manifest throughout nature, in all life: the 'little yellow disk' of the sow-thistle 'gleams absolute between heaven and earth, radiant of both eternities, framed in the two infinities'. They are manifest also in man's psyche. Here the opposites are equivalent to the divisions established in the Forward and the 'Study', with spirit and consciousness identified. Meaning is established by an accumulation of subsidiary, and earlier, opposites, under the new headings: creator and creation, the Father and the Son, flesh and spirit or mind, source or beginning and goal or end. Within the individual psyche, however, each aspect is born of both infinites: there is
cry after cry as the darkness develops itself over the sea of Light and flesh is born, and limbs; cry after cry as the light develops within the darkness, and mind is born, and the consciousness of that which is outside my own flesh and limbs ... 32

Time is born with this birth, and a relationship of mutual attraction and repulsion.

In the movement of creation the two come together to a meeting which is being, or form, and is 'absolute, timeless, beyond time or eternity, beyond space or infinity'. In the movement of decay, they flow apart, and being and form are dissolved. The crown is the consummation of meeting, absolute not eternal and timeless by virtue of being lifted outside, or

30. p 368.
31. p 375.
32. p 369.
33. p 372.
between, time into consummation. We are both the ground of this meeting and the meeting itself, 'the foam and the foreshore' ('between the oceans'\textsuperscript{34}. The meeting once more implies the sexual relationship\textsuperscript{35}, but it also extends beyond this exclusive significance. Moments of consummation occur throughout life; 'And each year the blossoming is different; from the delicate blue speedwells of childhood to the equally delicate, frail farewell flowers of old age: through all the poppies and sunflowers'\textsuperscript{36}. Thus the Crown, or rainbow or Holy Ghost, is also the relationship between the opposites, in the intervals between consummations, and it may also embrace alternative fulfilments, the enjoyment of sensual fulfilment in the sexual act, and the suffering or selflessness of spiritual fulfilment\textsuperscript{37}. God is therefore both relationship and revelation in consummation.

Thus the relationship of eternal strife between the opposites with which 'The Crown' begins and which is usually seen as Lawrence's ideal\textsuperscript{38}, is not to be desired. Strife is their relationship within the womb, the search for self-oblivion in conflict, in order to forget unfulfilment\textsuperscript{39}. The ideal relationship is one of harmony and consummation. Nevertheless, Lawrence does not follow to its logical conclusions the idea implicit in the concept of the womb, that re-born man will achieve a being in which the two are fused and both time and dualism therefore abolished. Close though he may come to this, both man and nature

\textsuperscript{34} p 376.
\textsuperscript{35} See p 376.
\textsuperscript{36} p 396.
\textsuperscript{37} See pp 377 - 8 and pp 410 - 411.
\textsuperscript{38} See for example Graham Hough in \textit{The Dark Sun} (London, 1956) pp 225 - 6.
\textsuperscript{39} p 366.
are still seen as inherently dual, moving always in the effort towards transcendence.  

Both the ideas and the terms of this view owe much to the early Greek philosophers, whom, in John Burnet's collection, Lawrence read in July, 1915. 'These early Greeks', he wrote to Russell, who had lent him Burnet's book, 'have clarified my soul'; it was under their influence that he decided to alter his terminology. The idea of life as a continuous flux, and the concept of opposites and their fusion are found in Heraclitus, but Lawrence rejects his explanation of unity as strife and war in favour of Empedocles' account of life in terms of love and strife. The idea of approach and separation as creation and dissolution, love and strife, is that of Empedocles. As always with Lawrence, however, the borrowed categories are assimilated to his own thought, and it is their function here that is all-important.

Here for the first time, then, Lawrence presents a natural cycle which includes death and decay but is nevertheless basically creative. Death is 'neither here nor there', serving to emphasise life. It is a cycle which operates also in the psyche of man, 'flesh and spirit', in which the eternities are truly relative: encompassed and transcended. Within man it represents the desired relationship as one of balance. The consummation, when achieved, includes consciousness and its attributes as well as

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40. p 370.
42. C.L. p 352.
43. p 374.
44. p 376.
the unconscious flesh. In man, the natural cycle becomes also religious. Fulfilment is absolute, outside time, and it is also difficult. The mature man must commit himself to the leap into the unknown; only then is 'the divine grace' given, the soul born and the 'part of nature' transformed into the fulfilled individual. This last concept brings Lawrence very close to the Christianity which he has rejected.

The new conception brings losses as well as gains, however. With the replacement of the idea of a force pressing to continuous creation by that of a flux which includes also decay, the concept of this creative force as God is lost. There is no longer a sense of a vital potentiality, and Lawrence's efforts to reincorporate this sense result only in an identification of the opposites with the Bergsonian matter and spirit, so that matter and life becomes, as they were never in the 'Study', divorced. God can now be found only in the relationship of the opposites or in the moment of revelation ('This revelation of God is God'), which is outside time and a matter of grace. The object of that faith which Lawrence believes to be so important becomes uncertain; it can no longer be a felt potentiality. The revelation itself becomes both increasingly mystical and increasingly tenuous. Removed from time it appears also to be removed from life: 'Only in the other dimension, which is not the time-space dimension, is there Heaven.' Within this time or life

45. See pp 374; 410 - 411.
46. p 384.
47. Compare for example the theology of Kierkegaard.
48. p 412.
49. p 413.
not only dualism but also the strife of the dual opposites is increasingly accepted. Man's intrinsic reality approaches closer to his historic reality. Lawrence is in danger of asserting against the latter only a mystic and momentary revelation.

Historical man is manifest in the destructive war which in 1915 was omnipresent. To account for this war, Lawrence explores, in terms of the vision of intrinsic man established above, several alternative explanations of a destruction which would be evil, and not merely that of natural decay. All begin from the concept of the womb which has become a sepulchre and which prevents man from issuing from 'the husk of the past' into the fulfilment of the future.

The first and simplest sees the opposites, failing to fuse in fulfilment, turning to destroy themselves and each other. Consciousness becomes 'supreme self-consciousness' and the flesh becomes mindlessness, 'clinging faster upon the utter night whence it should have dropped away long ago'. In separation each achieves a false victory,

And without rhyme or reason they tear themselves and each other, and the fight is no fight, it is a frenzy of blind things dashing themselves and each other to pieces. 51

A greater degree of complexity is introduced in the second explanation. Here life is seen to have overbalanced so that only one of the dual fulfilments, the sensual one, is achieved. The partially unfulfilled soul then seeks 'to make itself whole by bringing the whole world under its own order, ... seeks[s] to make

50. p 371.
51. p 371.
itself absolute and timeless by devouring its opposite.\textsuperscript{52}.

This sensual overbalancing is hate (the spiritual overbalancing is love\textsuperscript{53}); it seeks to establish a static situation which devours that which shall be, other than what is, devour it all up into that which IS, which IS, and is eternal, absolute. \textsuperscript{54}

This explanation appears only in the 1915 version of 'The Crown'; by 1925 Lawrence was much more reluctant to place any blame on this aspect of man and reversed his account to accord with that given later in 'The Crown'. His readiness in 1915 to accept purely sensual perversions, however, shades into an ambivalent attitude towards these perversions. The unconscious aspect of man tends itself to become equivalent to hatred: in the contemporary \textit{Twilight in Italy} essays Lawrence could write that 'passion is fundamental hatred'.\textsuperscript{55} The lion has always 'a ravening mouth'.\textsuperscript{56}

The third, far more complex, explanation is that which is finally preferred. From an initial failure of consummation the womb both creates and is the self-conscious ego of man. Created by the recoil into self-consciousness of the two opposites which cannot move forward into fusion, the ego is cut off from the potential of both. With the aid of the will, it asserts as absolute and eternal the 'temporal form ... so far attained',\textsuperscript{57}, thus becoming equivalent also to the 'old form' of 'civilization' and established morality. It fails firstly to die, and therefore

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{52} p 379.
\item \textsuperscript{53} \textit{The Signature} No. I, p 10.
\item \textsuperscript{54} \textit{The Signature} No. 2, p 9.
\item \textsuperscript{55} \textit{Twilight in Italy} (Penguin, 1960), p 65.
\item \textsuperscript{56} p 368.
\item \textsuperscript{57} p 388.
\item \textsuperscript{58} pp 401, 389.
\end{itemize}
really to live. Secondly, it fails to commit the self to the
unknown and the consequent achievement of timelessness and
recognition of mystery. In place of the missing 'being' it
asserts 'having':

All that great force which would carry [it] naked over
the edge of time, into timelessness, [it converts] into
fatness, into having. 59

Thus the material system, in Baruch Hochman's words, 'stems not
so much from a fear of death as from a fear of life'. 60 It may
take the form either of selfishness and capitalism, exemplified
by the vulture, or of its reverse, altruism and democracy,
exemplified by the hyæna. The first type seeks to fill the
'bottomless pit' of the self by 'pouring vast quantities of
matter down his void'; the second turns outward, seeking to give
all his 'having so that it can be put on the heaps that surround
all the other bottomless pits'. 61 The womb becomes the 'rind' of
the individual cabbage, the 'pit-head' which frames the 'bottom-
less pit' of the unfulfilled self (the historical equivalent of
the creative 'well-head' of the 'Study'), and the tomb which is
civilization and its ideal. 62

Within these repressing walls the movement is one of recoil,
motion towards the reduction of the form already achieved. It
is this which constitutes 'real death'. 63 The description of
this movement is Lawrence's most significant departure from his
earlier expositions. Whereas before he has described success
or failure to achieve fulfilment, he now deals with a movement

59. p 385.
60. Hochman, Another Ego (Columbia, 1970), p 158.
61. p 385.
63. p 393.
which is purely destructive, travelling in the reverse direction to that of life. In his account of the details of this movement, Lawrence seems frequently to draw on the manuscript of Russell's 'Philosophy of Social Reconstruction', which Russell sent him early in July 1915, and whose general direction he criticised heavily.

The reversal takes two forms. One is 'sensational gratification in the flesh', the way of the vulture. This is the self-conscious exploitation of unconscious men, within the 'closed shell' of accepted civilization and morality. The reductive activity is progressive. It begins with destructive sexual activity which reverses the true creative function of the sexual union, seeking 'not a consummation in union, but a frictional reduction', the obtaining of a sensation. When the sensations thus obtained become inadequate, there 'remains only the reduction of the contact with death'. The result is the destructive violence, turned both outwards and inwards, manifested in 'those ... fatal wars and revolutions which really create nothing at all, but destroy, and leave emptiness'. Here is Lawrence's absolute reversal of the Freudian explanation of war and its psychological degradations. Far from being a breaking through of unconscious desires, it is the result of their failure to break through and the resulting self-conscious


65. p 393.
66. p 388.
67. p 394.
68. p 398.
exploitation and perversion of man's unconscious resources.

Accompanying this is the self-conscious exploitation of the second of Lawrence's opposites, 'sensational gratification within the mind', the way of the hyaena. Here is the reductive activity of 'the scientist in his laboratory', of 'analysis', even of that art (to be portrayed so devastatingly in Women in Love) which, rather than expressing a growing self, seeks only to 'state this self [which we are]', and the reactions upon this self, perfectly'. This, modern tragic art, is not true art but 'aestheticism'. Within the sexual relationship, the individual caught in this activity seeks to obtain 'the knowledge of the factors that made up the complexity of the consciousness, the ego, in the woman and in himself, reduce further and further back, till himself is a babbling idiot, a vessel full of disintegrated parts, and the woman is reduced to a nullity'. There is some confusion in this account, as Lawrence wavers between viewing this activity of reduction as reduction of the consciousness and identifying all consciousness with the self-conscious ego and regarding reduction as occurring within the consciousness. It is, after all, the activity of science which seeks to create those absolutes which imprison us:

These "laws" which science has invented, like conservation of energy, indestructibility of matter, gravitation, the will to live, survival of the fittest: and even these absolute facts, like - the earth goes round the sun, or

69. p 393.
70. pp 392, 391.
71. p 393.
the doubtful atoms, electrons, or ether - they are all prison-walls, unless we realize that we don't know what they mean. 72

These are activities of life, and life moves always beyond our categories.

Both of these types of reduction result in absolute solitude, not the relationship which is an aspect of the fulfilled individual. Both are masked by sentimentalism, 'the smell of [man's] own rottenness'. From them, Lawrence is able to reach out to a definition of good and evil: 'The goodness of anything depends on the direction in which it is moving'.

Death and decay as part of the creative cycle of life have a positive force. It is stasis and the resulting movement of recoil, which constitute evil.

Whatever the details of this account may have owed to Russell, Lawrence's description of the failure of historical
man and his vision of intrinsic man have drawn on the same psychic and universal opposites. Unlike (as he claimed) Russell, he has founded his own account upon 'the Infinite, the Boundless, the Eternal'\textsuperscript{76}. The question of how the first becomes the second, of how, in Baruch Hochman's words, 'granting the conception of history as the outgrowth of nature, ... history turn[\textsuperscript{77}] against nature', centres around the problem of the restricting womb. Why can the womb not give birth? Lawrence wavers between two suggestions: that the failure is somehow natural and inevitable, and that it is caused by perversion, the conversion of womb into unrelenting sepulchre. Both assume the identification of the womb with 'the public form, the civilization, the established consciousness of mankind'\textsuperscript{78}. The implications of the first, of an ineradicable dualism in man whose aspects assume a relationship resembling that of Freud's conscious and unconscious, is clearly intolerable for Lawrence. The second is preferred; but here the problems are no less. What is the difference between this self-conscious perverted form and consciousness itself, and what creates this difference? Lawrence fails to resolve this problem. His arguments tend to be circular: the repressive 'dry walls of the womb'\textsuperscript{79} create the ego, and the ego prevents fulfilment. In practice it has been seen that the two forms of

\textsuperscript{76} C.L. p 353. Letter to Lady Ottoline Morrell written, according to Harry T. Moore, on the day Lawrence returned Russell's manuscript with his own comments.

\textsuperscript{77} Hochman, p 72.

\textsuperscript{78} p 389.

\textsuperscript{79} p 390.
consciousness become identified. Indeed, there is no apparent
difference between the backwards movement of consciousness which
is rejected here and that which was accepted in the 'Study'.
The suggestion that it is the will which preserves the existing
form and therefore causes the motion of reversal merely defers the
problem of how a natural quality may become the agent of per-
version. This problem is indeed the central difficulty in
Lawrence's view of man. Rejecting the manifestations of con-
sciousness, of the historical present, (abstraction and self-
consciousness) he nevertheless seeks to incorporate consciousness
in his vision of fulfilled man. If his vision is not to become
tragic, some distinction between a fulfilling and a perverting
consciousness must be found. 'The Crown' asserts, but fails to
define, such a distinction.

In fact, Lawrence in 'The Crown' shows a far greater
interest in the related problem of how historical man may become
fulfilled man. 'The Crown' was conceived as action, and his
use of symbols enables him to draw together the psychological
and the political. The vulture and the hyena, as well as
representing themselves, symbolize both aspects of the perverted
self and the political institutions which Lawrence sees as their
manifestation; the womb is both the ego and civilization.
Lawrence's answer is that the womb in both its aspects must be
broken through; it is 'this alone which was evil'. In his
desire for action, this becomes itself a form of destruction,

80. p 389.
and as the demands for it become increasingly urgent in the
course of 'The Crown', there is a breakdown of the distinctions
and values so far established. It is this aspect of 'The Crown'
upon which Colin Clarke draws in his statement that Lawrence
not only emphasizes 'the renovatory virtue of ... decadence'
but also draws no consistent distinction between the cor-
ruption which is preparatory to rebirth and the reductive pro-
cess which it is usually assumed he saw 'as the only evil'81.

For Lawrence, the only consideration becomes that the womb
too should be destroyed. He therefore tends to identify the
reductive process which occurs within the womb with the pro-
cess of natural decay which was included as an aspect of intrinsic
man. He writes that

Destruction and Creation are the two relative absolutes
between the opposing infinities. Life is in both. Life
may even, for a While be almost entirely in one, or almost
entirely in the other. 82

We are now caught in the process of destruction, and the des-
cription of this process identifies the natural separation of the
opposites with their reduction:

We cannot subject a divine process to a static will, not
without blasphemy and loathsomeness. The static will must
be subject to the process of reduction also. For the
pure absolute, the Holy Ghost, lies also in the relation-
ship which is made manifest by the departure, the departure
ad infinitum, of the opposing elements. 83

81. Clarke: River of Dissolution: D. H. Lawrence and English
Romanticism (London, 1969), pp xiii, xii. Clarke ignores the
search for values which, it seems to me, characterizes 'the
Crown'.

82. p 404.

83. p 403.
Thus the war itself may be a preparation for rebirth, 'one bout in the terrific, horrible labour, our civilization labouring in child-birth, and unable to bring forth'.\(^{84}\) Lawrence himself participates in the destructive process, desiring the death not only of the civilized form but also of all unfulfilled men, those whose 'death is of no more matter than the cutting of a cabbage in the garden'.\(^{85}\) Implicitly, this is a desire for total destruction. One is reminded both of Murry's description of Lawrence's 'deep sense of kinship with the War' and 'desire for destruction'\(^ {86}\) at this period, and of Lawrence's own account in his Introduction to Magnus' Memoirs of the Foreign Legion, in which he writes that 'we were all drowned in shame'.\(^ {87}\)

At this point, then, Lawrence loses sight of both his distinctions and his goal, of creative rebirth. The natural embodiments of separation or decay, the snake and newt, come to symbolize also reduction, which therefore itself becomes natural.\(^ {88}\) The alternatives become either 'death, ... the blood-devouring Moloch', or the 'static form of the achieved ego'.\(^ {89}\) The womb itself is replaced by individual examples of petrification, so that the apocalyptic urge is lost. Lawrence's final return to a vision of unrepressed man and exhortation to creation is consequently less than convincing. He has indicated neither how creation will necessarily follow destruction nor how, supposing it does, 'a repetition of the present failure of

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84. p 400.
85. p 384.
88. See pp 388, 402, 407.
89. p 407.
rebirth may be avoided. The final note, indeed, appearing to recognize this, implies a rejection of 'action' and its accompanying destruction:

No, if we are to break through, it must be in the strength of life bubbling inside us. The chicken does not break the shell out of animosity against the shell. It bursts out in its blind desire to move under a greater heavens. 90

Yet the desire for destruction, all-pervasive though it may seem at times, is born ultimately of the hope for creation. Lawrence never abandons his insistence that salvation and hope is possible: 'The near touch of death may be a release into life; if only it will break the egoistic will, and release that other flow'. 91 Nor does he abandon his insistence upon the ultimate responsibility of the individual for both destruction and creation. The very terminology of 'The Crown', obscure and idiosyncratic though it appears, underlines this responsibility. The 'correspondence' which he found in the early Greeks between 'the material cosmos and the human soul' 92, expressed in the terms which refer to both, he extends to include also human civilization. The responsibility for the deviation of the latter from the cosmos is placed in the 'human soul' which bridges the two.

Finally, the formulation suggested by this terminology is inadequate. No more than that of the 'Study' is it really explored and developed. The pressure of destruction which

90. p 415.
91. p 399.
92. S.M. p 176, See Chapter IV.
inspired Lawrence to restructure his thought ultimately prevents him from fully developing a psychological and religious system which will account for this destruction whilst emphasising creation. His view, unlike Freud's, is neither consistent nor coherent. He has combined an uncertain picture of unconscious man which proves no certain object for faith and an abstract picture of consciousness with an absolute rejection of the manifestation of consciousness in human terms: a stable civilization. Permanence of any kind appears to be rejected:

there is nothing for a man to do but to behold God, and to become God. It is no good living on memory. When the flower opens, see him, don't remember him. When the sun shines, be him, and then cease again. 93

But his exploration of destruction leaves both his vision and his hope intact. Whatever its explanation, the present remains 'a ridiculous travesty'. Life is essentially something 'tingling with magnificence'. 94.

93. p 414.
94. p 415.
(ii) THE REALITY OF PEACE (Phoenix, pp 669 - 694)

Written in February - March 1917, this fresh attempt to absorb the destruction manifested in war into a framework of creativity is more nakedly personal, more tentative, and much less ambitious than 'The Crown'. Lawrence is less concerned with nature and the cosmos; his orientation is more completely psychological. 'The Reality of Peace' was not the first rewriting of his philosophy after 'the Crown'. In January - February 1916 he had written 'the first ... half' of 'a little book of philosophy or religion' which he called 'Goats and Compasses'.

This was apparently to consist of two halves, the first 'destructive', presumably an analysis of and attack on the historical present, and the second, the 'new half', Lawrence's vision of future man. Only the first half was written, and this was subsequently destroyed; Lawrence's vision was instead embodied in Women in Love, begun in May and completed in November 1916.

From the experience represented by Women in Love the concepts of 'The Crown' could not emerge undisturbed. The participation in the destructive process which was enacted in the earlier essay is now fully realized, so that Lawrence must seek to come to terms with it. At the same time, however, there is

1. See C.L. pp 427, 408.
2. See C.B.I, p 349. Cecil Gray's description of this work and its fate is quoted in C.B.I p 582. The 'suspiciously lively interest' in homosexuality which Gray found in it, was clearly meant by Lawrence to describe a corrupt world. Compare the Prologue to Women in Love (Phoenix II, pp 92 - 108).
a far greater sense of Lawrence's own isolation, of being 'torn off from the body of mankind' which in 'The Crown' he had sought to save. Hope is more tentative, closer to despair; in a contemporary letter Lawrence writes of 'the tension of trying to keep a spirit of life and hope against such masses of foulness.' And with this increased isolation comes a greater temptation merely to abandon humanity to the flood of destruction which promises 'to sweep away the festering excess of ugly-spirited people.' The pattern of 'the Crown' is repeated. Lawrence again presents his vision of intrinsic man and his analysis of historical man, seeks to explain why the latter has become unnatural and to offer a means by which he may become both natural and fulfilled. Now, however, historical man appears as less universal, his predicament more a matter of individual choice, and Lawrence's search for a way through becomes more personal and exploratory. His recognition of his own participation in destruction makes him less aggressive than in 'The Crown'; his sense of isolation leads him to a more individual solution. Ultimately, this pressure of the destructive process upon his own sense of self forces him to a reconsideration of the nature of intrinsic man.

5. C.L. p 504.
6. C.L. p 495.
7. This statement is based on the four essays of 'The Reality of Peace' which remain extant. It must be qualified by the fact that the remaining three essays of Lawrence's original seven have been lost. See C.L. pp 505, 521 and Warren Roberts, A Bibliography of D. H. Lawrence (London, 1963), p 121.
Despite this personal emphasis and sense of isolation, however, the essays, like those of 'The Crown' were seen as action rather than diagnosis. Lawrence's presentation of an alternative vision of man and his suggestion as to the means of realizing this vision were intended once more to change man's consciousness and, as a result, his political institutions too. The title of the essays is taken from a letter to Lady Cynthia Asquith:

When are we going to have a shot at preparing this nation for peace? Peace and war lie in the heart, in the desire, of the people - say what you will ... The reality of peace, the reality of war, lies in the hearts of the people ... 8

But Lawrence could also write:

There must be a new spirit - and then a new world. This old Parliament, which is so disgusting, must be turned out. We must have a real, living, representative government. 9

Thus 'The Reality of Peace' embodies in a striking form the two contrasted impulses in Lawrence's work described by Julian Moynahan as 'an impulse to build life anew and a counter-impulse to stand aside and let the world go smash'.

Lawrence opens with his vision of intrinsic man. In a version of a favourite water image, man's impulsive 'spring' ('Study of Thomas Hardy') or 'fountain' ('The Crown') becomes now a river. The river is 'pure impulse'; it is creative, active and perpetually new. This 'incalculable' impulse of

8. C.L. p 487.
11 p 670.
creation' pushes always ahead of our knowledge which is 'only record from the past'. The impulse is both purely individual and beyond the individual, 'the exquisitest suggestion from the unknown that comes upon me ... It is not me, it is upon me.' Thus the opposites of 'The Crown' are replaced by the more central view of the 'Study'. The faith which Lawrence felt to be so important in 'The Crown' is once more given an object, in the self and beyond it. This object is a perpetual becoming, undirected and without 'aim or purpose' in the sense that it has no extrinsic purpose. Its purposiveness is instead organic and intrinsic. If we can look beyond the mechanism of conscious aim,

we shall see the banks of the old slipping noiselessly by; we shall see a new world unfolding round us. It is pure adventure, most beautiful.

Within the self, Lawrence no longer, as in the 'Study', locates this creative impulse in the 'flesh'. It is instead identified with the 'quick' or the 'soul', which is seen as different and anterior to both flesh and spirit. Death, in this initial vision, is present but somehow external. We may, upon the creative impulse, 'run the gauntlet of destruction', we may be 'fulfilled with the activity of death', but the presence of only 'one spark of happiness' in us means the conversion to creativity, life.

12. p 671.
14. p 669.
15. p 671.
16. p 672.
17. pp 670, 674, 675.
Upon this creative river rest the other two aspects of the psyche: the will and understanding. If the initial impulse belongs to 'all created life'¹⁸, then these two elements are specifically human. They represent the executive and the decision-making aspects of the psyche respectively:

We steer by the delicacy of adjusted understanding, and our will is the strength that serves us in this. ¹⁹

The will, far more prominent than in earlier expositions, is thus defined not as desire, which belongs to the unconscious impulse, but as the Christian free will, and associated with consciousness. Against deterministic accounts of man, Lawrence insists upon man's possession of free will, yet its highest function is to relinquish itself to the service of impulse, where it acts as 'the strength that throws itself upon the tiller when we are caught by a wrong current.'²⁰ Its assertion can mean only the refusal of life:

So much choice we have. There is so much free will that we are perfectly free to forestall our date of death, and perfectly free to postpone our date of life, as long as we like. ²¹

Man must choose, and submit to, life. His efforts at self-direction, or even at self-preservation, leave him 'excluded, exempt from living.'²²

The choice is made by understanding. The impulse is properly beyond us; it is understanding which ensures our identity

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18. p 670.
20. p 670.
21. p 673.
22. p 674.
with it and makes the initial choice to sacrifice the false self and the old knowledge in the 'act of courage', to yield the 'will to the unknown, ... deliver our course to the current of the invisible'\(^\text{23}\). The choice is deliberate, the resulting conversion to life both mysterious and natural. Thus the proper attitude of the understanding, or consciousness, is not comprehension but faith\(^\text{24}\). It is to be subordinate, not all-enclosing, religious, not analytical. It is faith which constitutes the life-value, the source of morality, not the old value-systems which rely on comprehension. This submission in faith, properly conceived as an active one, although Lawrence's images at times belie this, constitutes peace. The concept follows that of the 'Study', but like 'The Crown' it makes consciousness a part, not just a result of consummation. Unlike 'the Crown', its consummation, peace, is a permanent psychological condition rather than a transcendence achieved in the fourth dimension.

The concept also has social consequences. Peace, Lawrence writes, is not equivalent to the 'old securities'\(^\text{25}\) of a stable civilization, but results from a purely individual submission, not to an external will whether of a society or another individual, but to the life impulse itself\(^\text{26}\). This, Lawrence assumes, will be sufficient to create a new world. All political solutions are rejected as belonging equally to the assertive will and consequently to death. The assumption is that the form of

\begin{enumerate}
\item \(23\). p 671.
\item \(24\). p 673.
\item \(25\). p 670.
\item \(26\). p 670.
\end{enumerate}
the new world will be given in the impulse itself, that identity of impulse is sufficient to create community of purpose. Despite its apparent naivete, this is a belief to which Lawrence will return.

The greater psychological emphasis of this formulation, with its impulse, will and understanding replacing the lion, unicorn and crown of the earlier essay, is matched in Lawrence's account of historical man. For this, he drew upon his reading in December 1916 of Wilfred Trotter's excursion into psychology and sociology, *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War*. Before discussing this account, however, it is worth noting that it is probably from this part of 'The Reality of Peace' that the further three essays are missing. Both 'the Crown' and the lost 'Goats and Compasses' gave heavy emphasis to this aspect, and it is likely that these parts would be those that Austin Harrison, editor of the *English Review*, would be most reluctant to print.

The most important point to be noted about this account is that the symbol of the womb, which in 'The Crown' served to fix all historical humanity within the repressing walls of time, has now been lost. Its attributes are retained. Man is enclosed within a 'horny, glassy, insentient covering', fixed and static, representing both the current civilization and his own ego. As such he is 'cut off from life and death', unable to accept his own participation in the corruptive death process and consequently to be reborn into creation and life. Instead, he seeks

27. The terms are not equivalent.
30. p 684.
31. p 688.
to manipulate death as he has manipulated life, thus producing the horrors of war\textsuperscript{32}. Now, however, instead of this description applying to the whole of a trapped mankind, it applies only to the herd of 'the living dead'\textsuperscript{33}. It is the herd which now represents 'this foul prison where we suffocate'\textsuperscript{34} and the walled city of the 'Study'.

It is Wilfred Trotter's book which provides the terminology of this shift. Trotter claimed the herd instinct as a primal instinct (the others being those of self-preservation, nutrition and sex), responsible for social unity and reinforcing social morality. Its function is to make the evolutionary process of natural selection act on a larger unit than that of the individual, thus permitting a greater variety within the herd. It is manifest in three forms: the aggressive (the wolf-pack), the defensive (the sheep), and the socialized (the bee or ant). The last is that properly belonging to humanity, though not yet fully developed.

Lawrence takes Trotter's herd to be equivalent to historical man. All Trotter's examples of its operation are seen as representative of death. They have moved beyond creation into stasis and 'living death'; their aim is not to encourage variety but to perpetuate a false oneness. They have 'one temperature, one aim, one will, enveloping them into an obscene oneness'\textsuperscript{35}. Trotter's socialized herd is that most cut off from life:

That we are a vast colony of wood-llice, fabricating elaborate social communities like the bees or the wasps or the ants, does not make us any the less wood-llice

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{32} p 686.
\item \textsuperscript{33} p 683.
\item \textsuperscript{34} p 686
\item \textsuperscript{35} p 685 - 6.
\end{itemize}
curled up upon nothingness, immune in a vast and multiple negation. It only shows us that the most perfect social systems are probably the most complete nullities, that all relentless organization is in the end pure negation. 36

The herd, exemplified in the hyena, is now a far greater threat than the vulture, 'the overweening individual', for it is able to perpetuate itself and its values indefinitely. 37

Lawrence's vision has lost hope of rebirth. Humanity is in the situation of 'The Crown', but Lawrence now stands outside it. There is no sympathy with trapped humanity; it has caused its own predicament through its resistance to creation 38. Lawrence no longer believes any communication to be possible; indeed he cannot see 'these ghastly myrmidons' as people. They are Trotter's herds, amongst which we must 'go forth with whips'. 39 The individual self, and particularly Lawrence himself, is seen entirely as victim. From the herd, Lawrence cries, 'I must be saved'. 40 His plea is for the destruction of the herd and the isolation of the individual with the impulse from the unknown. It is no longer, as it was in the 'Study', easy to step out from the walled city of civilization. Nevertheless it is this which is once more necessary:

Let me derive no more from the body of mankind. Let me derive direct from life or direct from death, according to the impulse that is in me. 41

Lawrence's analysis of the cause of this situation draws on a suggestion of 'The Crown', that it is the will which seeks to preserve the existing situation and thus cuts man off from life and death. The free-will which should submit to the

37. p 686.
38. p 669.
40. p 685.
41. p 687.
creative impulse, 'out of its fear of the unknown substitutes 'self-insistence', insistence on the known, that which lies static and external.\textsuperscript{42} Its self-insistence is insistence upon the external because it is the creative impulse, that which is beyond us, which nevertheless constitutes the intrinsic self. The insistent will can only cut itself off from this true self and create a false self, the ego. In this choice, each individual is free:

He may choose to absolve himself from his fate either of life or death. He may oppose his self-will, his free will, between life and his own small entity, or between true death and himself.\textsuperscript{43}

The account is one which frees Lawrence from the necessity of making distinctions between natural and unnatural types of consciousness, and it is one which once again roots man's failure in those psychological faculties which should ensure his fulfilment. Nevertheless it is unsatisfactory. Lawrence cannot explain why the will should become thus self-insistent. He suggests an initial failure of fulfilment, but is uncertain whether the failure was to admit death or to achieve life, whether it is a matter of individual responsibility or of historical inevitability\textsuperscript{44}. As with the account of 'The Crown', there seems ultimately to be no explanation in terms of a perversion possible. The fact of will implies self-insistence, and it is Lawrence's concept of the eternal demand for the submission of

\textsuperscript{42} p 673.
\textsuperscript{43} p 687.
\textsuperscript{44} See pp 682 - 3.
the will, rather than the concept of a self-insistent will, which appears unnatural and sophisticated. His vision hovers once more on the edge of the inevitable and the tragic.

Again, however, it is less the cause than the solution of the situation with which he is concerned. What is required is the end of the 'old static entity', the 'old self', the 'old-established world' the old 'righteousness', and the end of 'humanity'. It is Lawrence's search for a means of achieving this in the self which constitutes the most interesting, the most exploratory, and the most radical aspect of 'The Reality of Peace'. In the extremity of his contact with destruction, he comes closest here to agreement with his total opposite, Freud.

If Lawrence no longer now accepts his place within the womb which encloses humanity, he does, as he did not in 'the Crown' fully accept his own complicity in the corruption which characterizes it. The tone is frequently that of a man who can hold out against this realization no longer, and who must therefore search for a personal solution. Balancing the river of creation, corruption is seen as a stream, 'the living stream of seething corruption'. It is this stream which the herd refuses to recognize in itself, and which therefore rises to a destructive flood. Picking up the description of Phillotson in the 'Study', it is identified with the 'issue of corruption' of 'our bowels'. It is also, like the river of creation,

45. p 673.
46. p 676.
47. p 683.
48. pp 676, 677.
equivalent to impulse, or desire; the 'desire of dissolution' balances, but is also born of the 'desire of creation'. As such it is seen as entirely natural, the 'natural marsh in my belly', equivalent to autumn as creation is equivalent to spring. The creative river of the vision of intrinsic man becomes now a double movement and man becomes 'the watershed from which flow the dark rivers of hell on the one hand, and the shimmering rivers of heaven on the other'. Thus the two processes of 'the Crown' are identified in one natural movement; man's failure lies in his choice: to prolong the natural winter whilst at the same time refusing to acknowledge it, and thus to choose death not life.

With the death-process now entirely accepted as an internal one, clearly the simple destructive solution of 'The Crown' becomes inadequate. Instead, Lawrence adapts his vision of intrinsic man. Understanding must submit also to the stream of dissolution. This impulse, too, is beyond us; we must acquiesce and 'be at peace with' it. The description of this process shows the clear influence of psychoanalysis. The probable source of this influence is Barbara Low, sister-in-law to M. D. Eder, who stayed with the Lawrences in Cornwall in August 1916, and remained on very close terms with Lawrence throughout this year. Not yet herself a full-time psychoanalyst, she would

49. p 678.
50. p 679.
51. p 677.
52. p 677.
nevertheless appear to have been practising on a part-time basis. Lawrence would also have found a summary of Freud's theories, although curtailed and heavily edited to agree with his own views, in Trotter's book.

Lawrence writes, in an anticipation of Freud's post-war views, that

we are all desire and understanding, only these two.
And desire is twofold, desire of life and desire of death.

Death, in this description, is manifest in both the desire for self destruction and the desire for destruction of others. Our failure to accept this leads us to banish the desire from consciousness, so that it lies 'beyond, in the marsh of the so-called subconsciousness'. This failure is rooted in our shame and horror, our ethical rejection of the 'devils' in us. Lawrence here proposes the concepts of repression, of the unconscious or 'so-called subconsciousness' as holder of these repressed desires, and of the repressed desires themselves as ethically abhorrent and antisocial. He also, in this new formulation, gives a surprisingly large place to understanding. It is still given a passive role. It expresses and gives form to desire or impulse; it is a product of our whole psyche, 'the senses and the spirit' as well as the mind. Nevertheless

55. p 681.
57. p 677.
58. p 677.
59. Compare the discussion of Freud's theories in Chapter I.
60. p 682.
it now replaces being as man's consummation, creating and not,
as in the 'Study', following, the quality of being:

The timeless quality of \textit{being} is understanding; when I
understand fully, flesh and blood and bone, and mind and
soul and spirit one rose of unison, then I \textit{am}. Then I \textit{am}
unrelated and perfect. In true understanding I \textit{am} always
perfect and timeless. 61

Understanding is also given a more active role; it is
this quality which is to be the means of our release from 'the
old static entity'. 'Thrusting through these things with the
understanding, we come forth in first flowers of our spring'62.
Instead of banishing the unwelcome desire from consciousness,
'let me bring it to the fire to see what it \textit{is}'63. Once seen,
'I must make my peace with it, and cease, in my delicate under­
standing; to be offended'64. Peace is to be made 'by incorporation
and unison'65. Both the desire and its ethical overtones are to
be understood and accepted into the self, and into our idea of
the self. Like Freud's, Lawrence's therapy is to operate, 'by
transforming what is unconscious into what is conscious'66,
thus providing a new self-understanding and a greater 'freedom'.

From this self-understanding, both life and death may follow:

\begin{quote}
Henceforward actual death is a fulfilling of our own
knowledge. 67.
\end{quote}

That Lawrence felt able to incorporate the Freudian
concepts into his own vision in this way indicates that he was
still far from recognizing the threat to his own views which

61. p 680.
63. p 677.
64. p 678.
65. p 677.
67. p 682.
the Freudian theory represented. For, as with his use of Bergson's theories, aspects of Freud's views are assimilated whilst Lawrence still remains far from the Freudian position. Indeed, in his use of them, he anticipates his later criticism. Thus, for Lawrence, unlike for Freud, the moral overtones of the unwelcome desires are not created by the repressing forces and are not dissipated when the repression is lifted. Lawrence employs Freud's concepts but his own terminology. The desires are 'devils', 'serpents', born of 'the hell of corruption and putrescence' 68. The 'horror' of these, too, must be accepted. Lawrence claims a source of morality anterior to both repressing forces and repressed 'limbo'. The 'devils' cannot be 'cast out' (or sublimated) by their exposure to consciousness; they can merely be accepted as devils. Their exposure, moreover, is a simple, voluntary matter, a matter, once more, of choice by the individual. The primal self and its demands can always be heard. No analytic technique is necessary; in Lawrence's letters to Barbara Low of the period it is against analysis that he protests 69. Analysis precludes, and in Freud's theory replaces, faith, and Lawrence's concept of understanding meets his concept of faith through the intermediary of acquiescence:

I must make my peace with the serpent of abhorrence that is within me ... Did I create myself? According to the maximum of my desire is my flower and my blossoming. This

68. p 677.
69. See C.B. I p 406. Letter of 28 November 1916: For heavens' sake don't be analysing Spiers or anybody else ... I think analysis is evil.
is beyond my will for ever. I can only learn to acquiesce. 70

Above all, it is in Lawrence's concept of the purpose of this therapeutic process that he moves away from Freud. Ultimately, our unacceptable desires are to be brought to the fire of consciousness not in order to reinforce consciousness but in order to destroy it and thus move beyond it. Admission of these desires kills 'our established belief in ourselves ... our current self-esteem' 71. It undermines those beliefs which have formed not only our conscious selves but also our stable civilization, leaving us once more the freedom of impulse. Lawrence employs the Freudian process to destroy, not to shore up civilization. The solution, unlike that of 'The Crown', and unlike the belief in faith, is one not accessible to all. Only those

who live in the mind must also perish in the mind. The mindless are spared this. 72

The emphasis upon understanding therefore creates hierarchy based on intelligence and consciousness. But those at the pinnacle of the hierarchy act for the rest:

For the rest, they have only to know peach when it is given them. But for the few there is the bitter necessity to understand the death that has been, so that we may pass quite clear of it. 72

70. p 678. One is reminded here of Ursula's reflection, towards the close of Women in Love that
She was bestial ... There would be no shameful thing she had not experienced. Yet she was unabashed, she was herself. Why not? She was free, when she knew everything, and no shameful things were denied her.

71. p 676.

72. p 676.
Here, despite his pleas for isolation, Lawrence states his involvement with the herd. It is one which suggests his later leadership theories, but it is based upon a deep sense of responsibility, and a failure to find a closer and more equal degree of involvement.

Lawrence is here after all concerned with historical man. Man has always been repressed, has 'always fought shy' of the corrupt half of himself. But through understanding it, there is hope for his conversion into a fully creative being, of the fulfilment of intrinsic man. The hope, however, has become extremely tentative; the new world seems very remote:

Maybe the serpent of my abhorrence nests in my very heart ... Then I shall know that my heart is a marsh. But maybe my understanding will drain the swampy place, and the serpent will evaporate as his condition evaporates. That is as it is. While there is a marsh, the serpent has his holy ground. 74

'We can never conquer death'; its corruption is 'the inevitable half' of life. This conclusion seems partly forced by Lawrence's failure to distinguish here between the different senses in which he uses 'death': as physical dying, as active destruction, as corruption and perversion. Nevertheless, it is the conclusion reached, and the fourth essay in 'The Reality of Peace' seeks to present a new concept of man in which death is included. Some of Lawrence's earlier vision of intrinsic man is sacrificed (it will be permanently) in order that his

73. p 676.
74. p 678.
75. p 681.
two visions of man may be brought closer together. 'Peace' is now to be found not in pure creativity, but in a state which includes but transcends death.

Perhaps not unexpectedly, this fourth essay is extremely confused. 'All is somehow adjusted in a strange, unstable equilibrium', writes Lawrence, as he struggles to re-establish the concept of balance of 'The Crown' after this radical exploration of the death process. He now returns to the symbols of the earlier work, but their meaning becomes unstable. For the most part now, light and dark, lamb and lion, are equivalent to life and death, death including both the decay of the self and the destruction of others. But Lawrence's insistence that both be experienced continually tends towards an emphasis upon destruction. This becomes equivalent to power, and to the senses; its opposite becomes a concept of spiritual submission whose function is to bow to 'the mottled leopard' of sensual destruction. Finally, however, Lawrence's insistence that 'we are the two halves together' produces the concept of a duality of desire in man in which the psychological equivalents of life and death are love and hatred. Love is manifested in the sexual relationship, but it is also the source of true 'fellowship' with men, as opposed to the false oneness of the herd. Counterbalancing it, hatred appears as the desire for resistance.

76. p 690.
77. p 692.
78. p 693.
and isolation. Lawrence's own plea for isolation and his desire for the destruction of the herd are placed as a product of the same impulse, an impulse which is a part of a dualism whose essence is relationship. From the balance in opposition of these two desires springs a transcendent wholeness, the fulfilment which is the 'rose of lovely peace'. Thus the rose includes the desire for death, but it belongs itself to life. Actual death appears as a reinforcement of this blossoming life; the 'rose of being blossom[es] upon the bush of ... mortality'.

This ending remains unsatisfactory. Lawrence's acceptance of his own corruption remains too close to an acquiescence in his own desire to destroy humanity, and his final vision of man is confused. Death, even now, is neither properly defined nor fully placed in Lawrence's intrinsic man, although both its reinforcement of life in the form of mortality and its absorption into life in the form of hatred will be retained in later formulations. Certainly Lawrence is still far from producing a consistent and coherent view of man which will both absorb and explain death and corruption. Finally, however, two important points emerge from this exploration of death.

The first is that in this self-immersion in destruction Lawrence never loses faith in life. Michael Fraenkel in Death is Not Enough, accuses Lawrence of attempting 'to forestall the

79. pp 693 - 694.
80. p 694.
81. p 693.
82. The assumption that this was the final essay of Lawrence's original seven must, of course, remain tentative. Nevertheless its air of finality suggests this.
death process' by seeking an awareness of life rather than of death. But Lawrence seeks both. Unlike Fraenkel, he sees humanity as never wholly dead; its living death is a thwarting of life and may always, upon its acceptance of the 'one spark of happiness' be reconverted into life. At his most isolated, he will still take the responsibility for the rebirth of the herd which he condemns.

The second point to emerge is that in this extremity of destruction, Lawrence turns to consciousness and makes his furthest concessions to it in his vision of man. The mind now appears as 'living', having a life which parallels that of the body. It, too, must be reborn, so that 'the idea of life' may create a new epoch of the mind. If in the past, therefore, Lawrence has condemned the old mind and the civilization which is its product, it is now clear that he is both very dependent upon his own mentality and aware of man's need for a mental life to contain the abstractions necessary for a new epoch. If Lawrence has already recognized, in A. N. Whitehead's words, that a 'civilization which cannot burst through its current abstractions is doomed to sterility after a very limited period of progress', he is now close to accepting that nevertheless, 'You cannot think without abstractions'. The relationship between faith and comprehension, as indeed the very writing of these essays indicates, is not as simple as he had assumed.

84. p 682.
4. REFORMULATION: Psychology and Civilization
'The Reality of Peace', like 'The Crown', was immediately followed by yet another effort, subsequently lost, to 'put salt on the tail' of Lawrence's philosophy. This, 'At the Gates', was regarded as the philosophy in 'its final form', based 'upon the more superficial Reality of Peace. But this is pure metaphysics, especially later on: and perfectly sound metaphysics, that will stand the attacks of technical philosophers. It would appear to have continued both the vocabulary and the impulse to 'pure understanding' of the shorter work. Lawrence wrote of it: 'One is happy in the thoughts only that transcend humanity'. 'At the Gates' was begun in April and completed in August 1917, and upon its completion Lawrence began the Studies I. These essays, aimed at what Lawrence saw as his future market, America, were to be 'snuff to make Uncle Sam sneeze', 'rather a thrilling blood-and-thunder, your-money-or-your-life kind of thing', written 'in the hopes of relieving my ominous financial prospects'. During the period of a year

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1. For the history of the three versions of this work see Arnold's introduction, pp 1 - 4. Only eight of the original twelve essays remain extant. Arnold's comments on the essays must be read with some care, however, since they are not infrequently inaccurate.

2. Q.R. p 68. Lawrence refers here to the lost 'Goats and Compasses'.


7. See C.L. p 508; A.H. p 414.


which it took Lawrence to complete them, however, their character changed completely. By 23 September 1917 they had 'passed beyond all price'; they became 'philosophic essays' and upon their completion in August 1918 the 'hopes of the world' which Lawrence placed upon them were no longer financial.

During this time, in which the essays appear to have been completely rewritten at least once, Lawrence developed what was to be the major reformulation of his ideas. Emerging through the course of the Studies I and restated in 'Education of the People', this reformulation was to be fully stated in Lawrence's two works upon the unconscious. Even more than earlier terminologies chosen by him, it is difficult, obscure and often apparently absurd, but it is vitally important for both the expression and the development of his thought. Through it and in it is formulated in its most complete and balanced form that Weltanschauung which was conceived as the refutation of determinism and as the necessary basis for the new mental epoch which must occur if man is not to strangle himself in the monstrous growths of his present civilization. Both these

10. Q.R. p 123.
13. Lawrence would appear to have written the essays in Cornwall before his expulsion in October 1917. On 2 February he announces that he is 'finally going through' the essays but this clearly develops into a complete rewriting which lasts until June when the essay on Whitman is written. On 3 August 1918 when 'The Spirit of Place' was sent to Pinker, there were 'six or seven more' ready typed, apparently by Koteliansky. These were printed in the English Review, from November 1918 to June 1919. The remaining essays were typed in September 1918 and copied by Koteliansky in September 1919, but have been lost. See C.L. pp 538, 556; A.H. p 455; Q.R. p 191 - 4; Roberts, A Bibliography of D. H. Lawrence (London, 1963), p 256; Arnold, Introduction to S.M. pp 1 - 4.
monstrous growths and the glimmerings of a rebirth into a new and truer mode of being Lawrence found embodied in the literature of America. As Americans, its artists reveal that development into disintegration in which America leads Western civilization, but as artists they transcend their vision as men and suggest the reality of, and the way towards, the rebirth which Lawrence believes must take place.

The vision of man found in the Studies I continues Lawrence's earlier ideas. 'Our simplest spontaneous movement precedes all knowing and willing', he writes. 'Secondly and afterwards, we are conscious, we have voluntary control.' This initial 'creative gesture' is seen as a manifestation of the 'central creative mystery' in which 'we have our being' but which is also beyond us. This creative mystery is now explicitly identified with God. Because God 'precedes us', we can only realize this mystery. We cannot ourselves create; our attempts to do so result only in production, the mechanical substitute for creation. The 'only form of worship is to be'; this self-fulfilment constitutes the primal morality. Linking God and the process of realization is the concept of 'Presence'. The spontaneous expression of the creative mystery is always immediate, 'always Now'. As in 'The Crown', the perfect

15. p 37.
17. p 36.
18. p 43.
19. p 137.
realization lies in the moment of mature consummation, 'the whole of wholeness', but here the 'quick of wholeness' is also manifest throughout life, in the 'gleaming Now'. All time is central within this ever-present creative Now; eternity, by contrast, 'is but the sum of the whole past and the whole future, the complete outside or negation of being'. God, therefore, is Presence, or realization, never an abstraction and never to be doubted, because it is always evident to our living soul, the Presence from which issues the first fine-shaken impulse and prompting of new being, eternal creation which is always Now.

Even the dead live in the present, through their 'presence in the living'. Here, powerfully expressed, is Lawrence's claim for the reality of the alternative vision of man which he presents. Although it stands opposed to man as he has appeared in history, the fact that this reality is implicit, immediate and spontaneous means that it can always be verified subjectively.

Thus, 'the quick of the creative mystery lies ... in the human soul, the human psyche, the human anima'. But the 'impulse' of 'The Reality of Peace' is now divided. Instead of a threefold, there is a fourfold process:

We are moved, we are, and then, thirdly, we know. Afterwards, fourthly, after we know, then we can will.
It is the process by which the creative mystery is realized in being that constitutes the important development of Studies I. Lawrence, then, finds that 'We are creatures of duality, in the first place', \(^\text{26}\). Impulsive being is manifest in two chief modes, the spiritual and the sensual of 'The Crown', the male and female of the 'Study'. The two are now termed the spiritual and the sensual consciousness or being:

By spiritual being we mean that state of being where the self excels into the universe, and knows all things by passing into all things ... It is that movement towards a state of infinitude wherein I experience my living oneness with all things.

Conversely:

By sensual being ... we mean that state in which the self is the magnificent centre wherein all life pivots, and lapses, as all space passes into the core of the sun ... The self is incontestable and unsurpassable. \(^\text{27}\)

For the first time, however, Lawrence introduces physical locations for the two modes within the human nervous system. The spiritual impulse issues from within the breast, from the cardiac plexus, 'the great sympathetic centre within the thorax'. The sensual impulse originates in the belly or bowels, in the solar plexus, 'the plexus of the abdomen'. \(^\text{28}\) The symbolic origins of this concept are apparent: in the first of the Studies I life is still seen to stir 'to motion in the breasts and bowels of the living'. \(^\text{29}\). Nevertheless the course of the essays sees the development of an increasingly complex physiological system.

\(^{26}\) p 56. \\
\(^{27}\) p 186. \\
\(^{28}\) pp 55 - 6; 74. \\
\(^{29}\) p 25.
Within the initial dualism is found further division of impulse. Balancing the impulses described above, which are born of the 'great sympathetic activity of the human system' are the corresponding impulses of 'the voluntary system':

The front part of the body is open and receptive, the great valve to the universe. But the back is sealed, closed. And it is from the ganglia of the spinal system that the will acts in direct compulsion, outwards. 30

Thus, spiritual onewing is balanced by the compulsion, issuing from 'the thoracic ganglion and the cervical ganglia', and 'from the lumbar ganglion and from the sacral ganglion acts the great sensual will to dominion'. This latter is the primitive urge for power and destruction; it encompasses also the recoil into isolation of the self. The outgoing sensual impulse is seen to include tenderness, curiosity, and 'the slow trust of wild, sensual love' which is the basis of 'worship and empire':

There is the impulse of the lesser sensual psyche to yield itself, where it trusts and believes, to the greater psyche, yielding in the great culminating process which unifies all life in one gesture of magnificence. 34

Lawrence therefore incorporates into his new system in a far more complex form the impulses of love and hate which were so important in 'The Reality of Peace'.

Beyond these primary centres of impulse Lawrence goes on to suggest others: 'the wonderful plexuses of the face, where our being runs forth into space and finds its vastest realisation; and ... the deep living plexus of the loins, there where deep calls to deep'. He also divides between the central pair of

30. p 188.
32. See pp 189; 61; 64.
33. p 67.
34. p 60.
35. p 187.
impulses the five senses. Taste, smell, hearing and the sensual aspect of touch found in the embrace of the mouth are 'connected with the lower or sensual system'; sight and the touch of the hands belong to 'the spiritual system of the upper body'.

Anterior to the whole nervous system he also suggests the existence of an independent blood-consciousness centred upon the heart.

The relationship between the central impulses and between their physiological locations should be one of polarity. This is the scientific 'law of dual attraction and repulsion' which in 'The Reality of Peace' was seen as 'the primary law of all the universe', though it was not specifically applied to the psyche there. As in 'The Crown', this relationship encompasses the separate fulfilment of each of the impulses, with each at times becoming dominant. These partial fulfilments, however, are only stages in the progress towards wholeness and freedom, when

I need not compel myself in either of the two directions, I need not strive after either consummation, but can accept the profound impulse, as it issues from the incalculable soul, act upon it spontaneously; and can, moreover, speak and know and be, uttering myself as a tree in full flower utters itself.

Thus each impulse, in itself a mode of relationship with the natural world, is merely an aspect of the realization of the life-mystery in total being or individual self-fulfilment. As in 'The Reality of Peace', this complete fulfilment is inseparable from understanding or full consciousness. Now, however, each of the

37. p 187. This centre, however, is in function indistinguishable from the solar plexus, so that its introduction merely adds confusion to the system.
38. Phoenix, p 692.
39. p 57.
two chief impulses, or modes of relationship, is seen also as a form of awareness, or consciousness:

Each great nerve-centre has its own peculiar consciousness, its own peculiar mind, its own primary percepts and concepts, its own spontaneous desires and ideas. 40

In this way the primary 'being' which in the 'Study' was opposed to consciousness, is now seen as itself an alternative form of consciousness. This, 'primal consciousness', is the mode of awareness experienced and expressed by all life. In man it includes the consciousness of the spiritual impulse, but is to be firmly distinguished from mental consciousness which is the vehicle of thought and situated in the brain. 41 Mental consciousness is but 'a sublimation of the great primary, sensual knowledge':

It is like the flowering of those water-weeds which live entirely below the surface, and only push their blossoms at one particular moment into the light and the air above water. 42

As such, like the 'spirit' of the early Foreword to Sons and Lovers, it is both perfect and finite, the apex and the limit of consciousness. 43 Lawrence, then, identifies the impulsive and the immediate with a mode of subjective awareness and subjective knowledge. Appropriately, his verification of the physiological system which he has developed takes the form of an appeal to subjective affirmation;

*We know, if we but think for a moment of our own immediate experience, that the breast is the dynamic centre of the great passionate [sic] selfless spiritual love...* 44

40. p 135.
41. p 135.
42. pp 135 - 6.
43. p 188.
44. p 56.
The full consciousness which should characterize the fulfilled man unites this complete primal consciousness with its mental expression, but in a relationship which is, however, typically uncertain. Lawrence is torn between presenting mental consciousness as itself the consummation of the bodily forms of awareness and viewing this fusion as effected in a whole primal consciousness which is then merely expressed in mental terms. Perverted or corruptive destructiveness is found to occur through an imbalance in favour of one of the primal impulses, when it alone receives mental expression and a subsequent reinforcement by the will. In this way the self-conscious reductive process of 'The Crown' is now thoroughly separated from a natural destructive impulse which is an aspect of the sensual psyche held always in check by the necessity for psychic balance or polarity.

As a reinforcement to this psycho-physiological system, Lawrence presents in the Studies a cosmological scheme. His intention is the discovery 'the true correspondence between the material cosmos and the human soul', and so once more to link man and nature, this time through explanation and not, as in 'The Crown', through the use of a single symbol to denote aspects of both. Lawrence therefore proceeds to interpret Genesis as being the psyche's intuitive knowledge of its own genesis which is 'at the same time ... the genesis of everything'. Man not only must live in relationship with the cosmos; his divisions reflect those of the macrocosm. Thus God, or 'the creative reality', or life, precedes both matter and created form.

46. p 176.
47. p 137.
48. p 176.
The subsequent account is somewhat confused by Lawrence's insistence that the material universe, with which both he and Genesis begin, is actually a secondary development. Its essence, however, is that the 'creative reality' is immediately manifest in a dual life-form-dual in order that spontaneous generation may always occur. In one aspect, this duality is manifest in the sexual division, in another it corresponds to the divisions within the individual described above. In both cases the two halves must fuse in order for birth to take place: in the latter case the birth of the mature individual soul or being, and in the former case the birth of a new potential soul. Upon the death of the individual being, the completed soul returns to life, but from the body is created the material universe:

In the transmutation of the plasm, in the interval of death, the inanimate elements are liberated into separate existence. The inanimate material universe is born through death from the living universe, to co-exist with it for ever. 49

Thus the material world too is dual, its elements being fire and water. From these, following the generative process of life, is born the whole of the universe of matter. Sun and space, day and night, represent respectively their flowing together and their separation. Each new life-form is balanced by a new material product:

The gems of being were created simultaneously with the gems of matter, the latter inherent in the former. 50.

49. p 180.
50. p 179.
Through this cosmology Lawrence is making several important, if confusedly expressed, claims. The first is that life is the initial creative element: life always embodied, ever new and with no extrinsic purpose. Matter follows it: its essence is death and its laws are the equivalent in death of the habits of life. Thus polarity is found first in life, as 'dual otherness', and consequently in matter. The reverse assumption made by science, that matter precedes life, falsely deprives life of the value which is implicit in it, and in consequence causes man to believe that he may manipulate it. The second claim is that the world of science is, quite literally, the world of death; its function is to analyse and explore the laws of matter. Since life is always embodied and must always seek form, these laws are manifest also within the living being. Lawrence suggests their identification with the physiological aspects of his proposed impulsive - conscious system. In life, however, they always express the creative mystery, as Lawrence's system seeks to demonstrate, so that when dealing with life, science must act always in the service of impulsive awareness:

the soul can never be analysed any more than living protoplasm can be analysed. The moment we start we have dead protoplasm. We may, with our own soul, behold and know the soul of the other ... And this communion can be conveyed again in speech. 52

51. p 183.
52. pp 120 - 121.
Lawrence's third claim is that the system he develops here, both cosmological and psycho-physiological, is just such an expression:

So the ancient cosmology, always so perfect theoretically, becomes, by the help of our scientific knowledge, physically, actually perfect. 53

The symbols of 'The Crown', the expressions of Lawrence's own intuitive awareness, are now presented as literally, scientifically true. As a model for this relationship (and influencing its expression), Lawrence takes the early Greek cosmologists. Both scientific speculation and religious symbolism, their theories demonstrated 'science and religion ... in accord'.

Lawrence's desire to effect a re-evaluation of the relationship of science to life appears to us now to be far more valuable than his attempt to create that re-evaluation himself through the advancement of scientific claims for his own intuitive insights. Nevertheless, this attempt represents a considerable part of his effort, and to further it he incorporated into his system, in Mary Freeman's words, 'a chunk of theosophical mythology'. 55

Lawrence's use of theosophy has been noted elsewhere, but since it is very largely responsible for the obscurity of expression in this and subsequent works and since its significance has not

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53. p 178.
54. p 176.
55. Freeman, D. H. Lawrence: A Basic Study of his Ideas (Gainesville, 1955), p 134. Freeman wrongly ascribes the introduction of this 'mythology' to the writing of 'Education of the People'.
56. See particularly William York Tindall, D. H. Lawrence and Susan His Cow (New York, 1939), particularly chap. 5, 'Susan Unveiled'. 
been fully evaluated, it is worth some consideration here.

Lawrence's interest in theosophy appears to have begun in the summer of 1917, stimulated probably by his neighbours in Cornwall, the 'herb-eating occultists', Meredith Starr and his wife. His reading included Isis Unveiled and The Secret Doctrine by the founder of theosophy, Madame Blavatsky, and continued into 1918 when he read 'another book on Occultism' and recommended Blavatsky's books to Mrs. Nancy Henry. Theosophy presented centres of being which were not mental, pronouncing mental acts to be unimportant and locating the centres of vital force firmly within the body. Perhaps most important, it presented these centres as scientifically accurate. Blavatsky's The Secret Doctrine was subtitled 'The Synthesis of Science, Religion, and Philosophy'. In it she challenged current scientific thought, both presenting theosophy as itself scientific and seeking to incorporate the conclusions of science as a materialistic groping towards the ancient esoteric truths which she claimed to be revealing. In The Apocalypse Unsealed by Blavatsky's

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57. Although Freeman's comments are often very intelligent. See particularly pp 134 - 5.

58. Emile Delavenay, in D. H. Lawrence; The Man and his Work (London, 1972), and D. H. Lawrence and Edward Carpenter (London, 1971), asserts a much earlier knowledge by Lawrence. He provides no evidence, however. Tindall places the date of this first reading as 1912-1915, but again the evidence is shaky.

59. C.L. p 523. See also C.L. p 519.

60. Blavatsky, Isis Unveiled (1877), and The Secret Doctrine: The Synthesis of Science, Religion, and Philosophy (1888).


disciple, J. M. Pryse\(^63\), which Lawrence also read in 1917\(^64\), the description of the life centres becomes a specifically physiological one. Pryse identifies the mystical seven chakras or 'life-centres' with the 'seven principal' ganglia\(^65\), sanskrit and medical terms are assimilated, and the plan of the route of the kundalini or 'spiritual will'\(^66\) is in fact an anatomical diagram indicating the position of the sacral, prostatic, gastric and pharyngealplexuses, the cavernus sinus and the pineal body\(^68\). Lawrence borrows some of these terms and his suggestion that there may be four chief nerve-centres, the facial and the sexual in addition to the spiritual and the sensual, would appear to owe such to Pryse's account of the 'four principal life-centres':

1. The head, or brain \([\text{which}]\) is the organ of the Nous, or higher mind.
2. The region of the heart, \([\text{which}]\) is the seat of the lower mind, including the psychic nature.
3. The region of the navel \([\text{which}]\) is the centre of the passional nature ...
4. The procreative centre \([\text{which}]\) is the seat of the vivifying forces on the lowest plane of existence. \(^67\)

\(^63\) London, 1910.
\(^65\) Pryse, p 15.
\(^66\) Pryse, p 22.
\(^67\) Pryse, p 14.
\(^68\) Pryse, however, calls the gastric the 'epigastric Plexus'; his 'cardiac plexus' is actually the deep cardiac plexus; his 'cavernus ganglion' is in fact the cavernus sinus, not a nerve junction; and he calls the pineal body 'the conarium'.

Essentially, however, it was the idea of the identification of intuition and physiology which Lawrence borrowed from Pryse. In a letter to Edith Eder he requested the loan of 'a book which describes the human nervous system', and he corrects Pryse on a number of details of physiology. Pryse appeared to offer Lawrence the opportunity of rendering his earlier symbolic expressions of non-conscious being objectively true and scientifically accurate. It now seemed possible to relate the life force and its living manifestations: discursively rather than through their fusion in symbolism, with a resulting increase in clarity and subtlety of thought. Lawrence's presentation of intuition might become objectively accurate, whilst at the same time science itself, the expression of conscious thought, might become also the expression rather than merely the analyst of impulse. Certainly the central position of theosophy held no attraction for Lawrence. In Pryse's account the chakras are roused by the spiritual will only in order that they might be conquered. True spirituality is the aim, to be achieved by asceticism, and Blavatsky sees the highest of the seven human principles as being the Universal Spirit and the lowest as the Body.


70. Pryse, p 22.

71. Pryse, p 62.
The Soul attains third place whilst the Life-Essence achieves only sixth place, below the Animal Soul. Lawrence is quite aware of this emphasis. He presents theosophy as using, in order to destroy, an earlier, sensually-based system. Its knowledge 'still was based upon the sensual activities' but it was itself a part of the movement towards spiritual domination which culminated in Christianity.

The system developed by theosophy and its sensually-based predecessor was nevertheless 'much more profound, nearer the quick, than anything we have since known in psychology. It understood and expressed in symbols which captured the movement if not the nature of impulse

that which we might call our unconsciousness or sub-consciousness, but which is more than these, and which, though in very fact the bulk of our being and knowing, is regarded from our mental standpoint as nothing, or nothingness.

Here, then, is a more specific reason for Lawrence's adaptation of theosophy for his own use. It offered the possibility of an alternative kind of psychology to that which defined the impulse as negative: psychoanalysis. For the first time, in Studies I, Lawrence begins to focus his philosophy as a refutation of psychoanalysis.

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73. S.M. pp 75 - 77. The references here would seem to be definitely chiefly to Pryse.
74. p 76.
75. p 75.
Lawrence's friendship with Barbara Low had continued during the period in which he was writing *Studies* I. More important, during his stay in London from October to December 1917, between the two periods in which he would appear to have written the essays, his friendship with David Eder was resumed. Eder was to be of the Rananim party. Ernest Jones records in his autobiography that Lawrence was during this brief period a member of Eder's circle. It was, moreover, to Eder that Lawrence wrote in August, 1917:

> Do you know the physical - physiological - interpretations of the esoteric doctrine? - the chakras and dualism in experience? 79

After this time the references to psychoanalysis in Lawrence's letters increase and he proposed himself to Cynthia Asquith as 'in some sort, a psychic physician'. When he finally gathered together the essays of *Studies* I to send to Huebsch for publication in America, it was in relation to psychoanalysis that he viewed them:

> These essays are the result of five years of persistent work. They contain a whole Weltanschauung - new, if old - even a new science of psychology - pure science ... I know the psychoanalysts here - one of them - has gone to Vienna,

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76. She visited the Lawrences for Easter, 1918. See *A.H.* p 437.
77. See *C.L.* p 531.
79. Hobman, p 119.
80. See *C.L.* pp 536, 553, 554 and *A.H.* p 430; *C.L.* p 537.
partly to graft some of the ideas on to Freud and the Freudian theory of the unconscious — is at the moment busy doing it. I know they are trying to get the theory of primal consciousness out of these essays, to solidify their windy theory of the unconscious. Then they'll pop out with it, as a discovery of their own. — You see, I've told Ernest Jones and the Eders the ideas. — But they don't know how to use them. 81

The psychoanalyst concerned was Ernest Jones and with regard to his purposes in Europe Lawrence could not have been more wrong. Jones' visit, for which he had only with great difficulty obtained a permit, served two purposes: during it he renewed his friendship with Freud, and he also met and married his second wife. 82 It is highly unlikely that Lawrence's theories received any consideration. Yet Lawrence's view of their importance is clear and compelling. Before discussing his treatment of psychoanalysis in the essays, a brief account of the chief source of his knowledge of the subject, David Eder, may help to clarify this view.

Eder's early life exhibited three driving forces: Zionism, International Socialism and Psychoanalysis. 83 The combination is a strange and an apparently contradictory one, but the fact that it occurred sheds light on the nature of Eder's attraction to psychoanalysis. For all three sprang from the same desire for social and moral change: in an early pamphlet Eder wrote that although he did not aim to put "nature" right throughout ... I think we can correct some of her grosser blunders or at least we can attempt to do so. 84 To such a man, the pessimistic lines

83. See Hobman, David Eder: Memoirs of a Modern Pioneer.
of Freud’s thought, which must have become increasingly apparent, could not have been attractive, and the early period of Eder’s practice, from 1912 to March 1918 when he left for Palestine with the Zionist Commission, shows a constant tendency to bend Freud’s practical conclusions towards the more optimistic position of Jung. Eder, writes Ernest Jones, himself an orthodox Freudian, "obstinately refused to admit that there was any noticeable difference between Freud and Jung." Eder’s review of Jung’s *Psychology of the Unconscious* of July 20, 1916 shows clearly his attraction towards Jung’s position. Jung’s definition of the libido as ‘the psychical energy of the human spirit as a driving force that urges towards ever new psychologic adaptations’, rather than as the purely sexual force of Freud’s theory, is stressed with approval. The resulting positive definition of the unconscious as ‘the dynamic sources of the individual expressions of life which are always surging into consciousness’, a point mentioned only briefly by Jung, is also emphasised. Also stressed are the results of this view, that repression is to be avoided, and that the incest-desire, far from being a sexual urge, is a secondary result of the individual’s fear of the forward movement to which his libido urges him and a consequent desire to return to the security of infancy. In all, Eder’s conclusion, very far from the Freudian position,

87. 'Psychological Perspectives', p 284.
88. 'Psychological Perspectives', p 284.
We must hearken to the voices, chaotic though they may seem, blurred and indistinct as they are, which emerge from the whirl of the unconscious. 89

It is a conclusion held to in all his papers of the period 90, yet its deviation from Freud's view is not acknowledged, and it would appear that whilst Eder's grasp of Freud's practical views was sound, he did not (or, as Jones suggests, would not) fully understand the extent and implications of Freud's thought. It was not until his return from Palestine in 1922, disillusioned by the failure to establish the National Home, that Eder fully accepted what he saw as the Freudian 'belief in original sin, without a belief in man's definite and final redemption' 91.

In view of Eder's compromises with an optimistic 'theory of primal consciousness'; Lawrence's claims are perhaps not as absurd as they first appear. But his own new 'science of psychology', outlined above, goes much further than Eder's compromise. It seeks to construct an all-inclusive psychology upon a religious basis; its science is to be symbolically not analytically based. Practically 'the whole of psychometry and psychoanalysis depends on the understanding of symbols' 92,

89. 'Psychological Perspectives', p 285.

The Psycho-Pathology of the War Neuroses, The Lancet of 12 August 1916, pp 264 - 268;
It was Eder's work on the war-shock neuroses which constituted his most significant contribution to psychoanalysis. The non-sexual neuroses which he discovered were instrumental in causing Freud to revise his theories in the post-war years.


92. S.M. p 18.
Lawrence writes, but, viewing them from the standpoint of mentality, psychoanalysis seeks to analyse rather than, like the ancient priests, to express them. Lawrence's claim is that science, and in particular psychology, pressed against life produces mechanism and death. Further, from his own intuitive or subjective standpoint, he argues that the world and the man which the objectively-based psychoanalysis accepts as normal are in truth sick. Unlike Freud's norm, the fulfilled man of Lawrence's psychology has never existed, but the aspects which should contribute to this fulfilment may be felt intuitively (We know, if we but think for a moment of our own immediate experience ... etc.). The historical man who is the norm of psychoanalysis can, he feels, be truly explained only in terms of a failure to achieve this fulfilment. From this standpoint he reinterprets several of the central concepts of psychoanalysis.

The most important of these is repression. Each mode of impulsive awareness, if it alone attains consciousness and is reinforced by the will, may become repressive. When its original energy is forced by the will, it becomes a 'dark lust for power over the immediate life itself', the 'dangerous negative religious passion of repression'\(^93\). Its force may, and indeed has dominated a whole civilization, creating a split world, 'all ... fair-spoken' above, but with a now distorted destructive unconscious passion operating below\(^94\). The incest-desire, for Freud

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\(^93\). p 25.

\(^94\). p 128.
the chief, and a biological, influence on the individual's
development, is seen as a direct result of this repression,
arising inevitably when man, through insistence of his
will in one passion or aspiration, breaks the polarity of
himself. 95

Lawrence's account of the psychoanalytic view of this desire
not surprisingly, in view of its probable source, confuses the
accounts of Freud and of Jung, but he is correct in his assump-
tion as to its importance in psychoanalytic theory. His own
reinterpretation splits the Oedipus Complex into two aspects.
The first is the desire itself, caused through the emphasis of
our civilization upon the spiritual impulse:

The incest-desire is only one of the manifestations of
the self-less desire for merging. It is obvious that this
desire for merging ... finds its gratification most readily
in the merging of those things which are already near -
mother with son, brother with sister, father with daughter. 96

The second aspect, the continuing influence of parent upon child,
long after the child has reached maturity, is explained by Lawrence
through his theory of the return of the souls of the dead. These
lodge within the souls of the living who have loved (or hated)
them. The concept both reinforces Lawrence's insistence upon the
'Now' and suggests a continuing and increasing pressure towards
fulfilment, as each repressed generation seeks its fulfilment in
the next:

We have now the hosts of weary, clamorous, unsatisfied
dead to appease by our living. 97.

95. p 128.
96. p 125.
97. p 79.
The reinterpretation is not entirely successful and, like other tentative reversals of psychoanalytic findings\textsuperscript{98}, will be taken up once more in later works.

It is America, the America revealed in its literature, that in \textit{Studies I} furnishes the examples of the historical man who is the norm of an objectively-based psychology. For Lawrence, America telescoped the whole of Western history into its few centuries of existence. It was moreover actually further advanced in the process of disintegration with which he had dealt in 'The Crown' and 'The Reality of Peace'; it was in a state of 'senile decay and second childishness'\textsuperscript{99}. Thus the impulse which had driven him to seek to explain and oppose the destructiveness of the war was in essence the same impulse which led him now to analyze American literature. Western civilization was, he believed, at a historical crossroads, and America was its leading shoot.

The view which in the 'Study' of Thomas Hardy' identified history and the psyche therefore now increases in subtlety and scope. Each of the chief modes of relationship which should be both fulfilled and transcended in the mature individual has at

\textsuperscript{98} Lawrence begins for example by accepting the psychoanalytic view of dreams as the expression of the unconscious, for him the primal consciousness (p 23), but his view of this mode as essentially \textit{responsible} causes him later to reject it (see p 156). He also attempts to include in his psychology a theory of child-development. See pp 56 - 57.

\textsuperscript{99} C.L. p 481.
some time dominated a civilization, and each in domination has become repressive. Thus history has sought both to express and to repress the self. Man, and especially American man, is now in the repressive phase of the spiritual impulse. Essentially, this phase seeks to impose a static oneness, yet in this imposition, is repressive, even destructive of life, since all life in its individuality contravenes the ideal of oneness. Paradoxically, the attempt to impose oneness also cuts through the bonds which should spontaneously unite a society:

The New Englanders, wielding the sword of the spirit backwards, struck down the primal impulsive being in every man, leaving only a mechanical, automatic unit. In doing so, they cut and destroyed the living bond between men, the rich passional contact. And for this passional contact gradually was substituted the mechanical bond of purposive utility. 100

Thus the inevitable expression of spiritually repressed man is a machine-dominated society, and this in turn increases repression, Benjamin Franklin 101 is presented as the first embodiment of American man created in this way. He is man's attempt to perfect, or to create himself: a virtuous monster, a creature of ideals cut off from life through the repression of his own spontaneous impulses and hence cut off also, since it is the impulses which constitute the self, from individuality. Through him Lawrence attacks the concept of a rationally-based, and therefore repressive morality, for Franklin was in Lawrence's view concerned essentially with morals. A morality, indeed a concept of man thus based, writes Lawrence, can operate only on a

100. p 27.
101. SM. pp 33 - 49.
profit-principle, since reason, unable to react intuitively, may only calculate. Its God is a Providence 'who makes each man responsible for the working of the established system; and who reserves for himself the right of granting a kind of immortal pension, in the after-life'. Its natural complement is materialism or capitalism. The comment is perceptive. That civilization operates by offering benefits less immediate but more extensive than those of immediate gratification is a fact accepted also by Freud. For him, however, this process in some form is inevitable to any type of society; for Lawrence its repression is destructive. In Franklin, he points out, it leads to rather than prevents barbarism. Franklin's attitude of self-abnegation towards his own society is quite compatible with the desire to destroy an alien culture.

Following Franklin, Crevecœur, the next writer in Lawrence's historical survey, exemplifies cultural repression in a more self-consciously emotional form. After him, Fenimore Cooper demonstrates its creation (as in 'The Grown) of a false self, the ego. This self necessarily represents the 'social conscious[ness]', the 'social unit', mechanical and repressive of the individual impulsive self. It is this false unit of oneness upon which the equality of democracy is based. Thus democracy appears as the political expression of the repressive

102. p 38.
103. pp 51 - 70.
104. 'Fenimore Cooper's Anglo-American Novels', pp 71 - 87.
105. p 83.
spiritual ideal. Lawrence's alternative, briefly sketched here, would be a hierarchical society based upon the natural impulses to sensual submission and leadership. Coming to Poe, Lawrence finds himself completely within the destructive world of 'The Crown'. Poe represents and expresses 'the great white race in America keenly disintegrating, seething back in electric decomposition'. The tales themselves, with their mechanical facility of expression, their attempt to extract 'a sensation from every phrase or object', and their analytical emphasis, are properly to be classed 'as science rather than art'. Not only do the tales deal with the material world but Poe himself, identified by Lawrence with the narrator of the tales, is found to be without a soul. He presses science against life, in himself and his lover, thus destroying the life he would seek to possess through knowledge. His passion is solely of the will and through him Lawrence comes closest to suggesting that creative life may be totally absent in man, leaving only the physiological and mental functions which should express it, together with the energy of the will. In Poe the passion of love which should represent 'the triumph of life and creation', becomes purely repressive, willed and destructive.

After Poe, Hawthorne writes in The Scarlet Letter the myth of the collapse of the human psyche in the white race.
In this novel, Dimmesdale represents the spiritual impulse of Western man in an isolated but a pure form, 'wherein the lower or primary self flows in gradual sublimation upwards towards a spiritual transmutation and expression'. With the awakening of his sensual self through contact with Hester the sensual woman, however, this flow is broken. Dimmesdale realizes his own sensuality only in order to seek to destroy it. Hester herself represents (although Lawrence shows some confusion here) the repression and consequent distortion of the sensual self, as does her husband Chillingworth, the 'aboriginal spirit of the primary, sensual psyche' now become subjected and twisted. In order for Dimmesdale to be saved, it would have been necessary for him fully to realize and accept his sensual self and so 'in some way to conquer society with a new spirit and a new idea'. Instead he becomes divided, repressively destructive within, but maintaining his 'will to preservation of appearances'. Thus the branding of Hester exhibits a duplicity of attitude in society which 'exalts in shame that which it worships in lust'. The first versions of the critical essays which follow that on Hawthorne are lost, but from the later versions it is clear that Dana, Melville and Whitman complete the process of repression and control begun with the arrival of the Pilgrim Fathers.

114. p 151.
115. p 150.
116. p 145.
117. p 151.
118. p 140.
119. The Versions of these essays printed in *The Symbolic Meaning* are III, II and II. See pp 191 - 124, 215 - 250, and 251 - 264.
Historical man is therefore repressed man. Concerning the cause of this repression Lawrence once more shows considerable uncertainty. Yet now the process is seen as quite definitely natural. Poe, Lawrence writes:

had to lead on to that winter-crisis where the soul is, as it were, denuded of itself, reduced back to the elemental state of a naked, arrested tree in midwinter. 120

The process against which Lawrence fought in 'The Crown' is now accepted as inevitable, and the result in the essay on Poe is a blurring of earlier moral distinctions. Once more the combination of (mental) consciousness and will is guilty of the repression, but Lawrence again fails to explain why such a perversion should occur. The impulse towards such repression seems actually contained within the passion itself. Lawrence is compelled towards the assumption of, if not an original sin, then an original temptation:

there lies latent in the soul of man, at all times, the desire to ... control and compel the issue of creation, by force of the self-conscious will. 121

It is this towards which Satan tempted Christ when he 'offered him the world'. There is at one point the suggestion that it was the accession into consciousness itself which caused this desire. In this case, Lawrence's proposed solution from 'The Reality of Peace', the 'pure lesson of knowing not-to-know' receives its proper significance as a sophisticated, learned solution. Lawrence, indeed, goes so far towards the acceptance of a

120. p 117.
121. p 26.
122. p 121.
123. S.M. p 49.
natural cause that in his description of the function of the voluntary centres, he assigns to them the repressive mode of an originally creative impulse\textsuperscript{124}.

Perhaps Lawrence is prepared thus to accept the process of man's self-repression and distortion as a natural one because in these essays he comes nearer than elsewhere to actually demonstrating a way out of the resulting disintegration. Fundamentally, the solution is once more simply a statement of faith:

This thing, this mechanical democracy, new and monstrous on the face of the earth, cannot be an end in itself. It is only a vast intervention, a marking time, a mechanical life-pause ... There will come an America which we cannot foretell... 125

Nevertheless, through his presentation of American literature, the American Literature which itself reveals the process of disintegration, Lawrence manages also to suggest that this new growth is actually in progress.

America, having seen both sensual repression, in the Spaniards, and spiritual repression, in the New Englanders, has telescoped the whole expressive - repressive growth to maturity of historical civilization. But both processes were performed by alien, immigrant cultures. America has yet to produce her own civilization and thus in her is latent the energy necessary for rebirth into mature wholeness. Lawrence preserves the apocalyptic vision of the 'Study of Thomas Hardy' by shifting its location. Coincident with the advancement of Western decay in America has been the growth of a totally new 'life-experience,
emotion and passion and desire. Non-conscious or impulsive man, Lawrence suggests, attunes himself to physical location and, like other forms of life, seeks to express the 'spirit of place'. Europe and America are no longer one, ... there is this inconceivable difference in being between us, the difference of an epoch. It is here that Lawrence rests his hope. As history, his account is unconvincing. His attempt to explain historically the sudden importance of America to Western man leaves his solution of man's predicament as inexplicable as his cause: the land itself mysteriously asserted itself.

Equally mystical is the concept with which he seeks to reinforce that of the 'spirit of place': the idea of the return of dead souls to press for fulfilment in the living. Having destroyed the Red Indian, the American 'becomes responsible, in his own living body, for the destroyed'. His fulfilment must then express the being of the original inhabitants of the continent.

In his treatment of American literature, however, the concepts acquire conviction. If this literature states the old ideal and demonstrates a progressive disintegration, it also suggests the new being and itself acts out a solution. Lawrence criticises art as life and his artists reveal themselves to be divided men, divided in 'social reality' and passion. But he insists also that art transcends life; because his Americans are artists they can transcend their limitations as

126. p 17.
128. p 17.
129. p 80.
130. p 95. The reference is to Cooper.
men and attain the role of prophets of a rebirth not yet achieved in life.

In Crevecoeur, then, despite his fixation in the old ideal, is found the first sensual recognition of the 'otherness' of life, a recognition which receives its culmination in Cooper. If Cooper's 'social reality' is the false ego of democracy, in 'passional reality' he is Natty Bumppo or Leatherstocking, the white hunter who attains a final meeting with and recognition of the Red Indian whom he destroys. In the Leatherstocking novels, Cooper records Lawrence's own myth, a 'biography in futurity, record of the race-individual as he moves from the present old age of the race into re-birth and the new youth which lies ahead.' Like Dimmesdale, Natty is the pure representative of the White or spiritual impulse. As such he is 'the mystic destroyer of the Red Man out of life'; yet he also achieves with Chingachgook the 'pure unknowable embrace' between races. Out of this perfect communion in mature separation is conceived the 'new psyche, ... new race-soul' which is to be reborn man. The races themselves, both spiritual White and sensual Red, then progress into distortion; rebirth cannot occur until the process, both reductive and heroic, is complete:

But even this is a process of futurity. It is the flower which burns down to mould, to liberate the new seed.

It is this process of reduction which is recorded in Poe and the writers who follow him. Yet even here, man is never wholly dead;

131. p 70.
132. 'Fenimore Cooper's Leatherstocking Novels', pp 89 - 111.
133. p 101.
134. p 102.
135. p 103.
136. p 111.
glimpses of creation emerge. Moreover, through their creation of myth and of art proper, these same writers actually discover the possibility of the new out of the 'monstrous growths'\textsuperscript{137} of the old.

Lawrence's theory sees myth as the interpretation of 'the unconscious experience'\textsuperscript{138}, the type of expression of primary awareness which occurs at 'the beginning ... of a civilization'\textsuperscript{139}. Thus Cooper's 'myth of the atonement'\textsuperscript{140} appears as the first expression of that reborn man who has yet to appear. To art and its symbolism Lawrence gives even greater significance. 'Art-speech' is 'the greatest universal language of mankind'. Like psychoanalysis and theosophy it operates through symbols, but its symbols are not merely intellectual ciphers but 'pulsations on the blood and seizures upon the nerves, and at the same time pure percepts of the mind and pure terms of spiritual aspiration'\textsuperscript{141}. The 'art-symbol', then, is a creative synthesis which expresses and communicates whole being in the process of becoming. The distinction resembles the revaluation of the Freudian notion that a symbol is 'a disguised indication of something which is generally known' which Jung was currently making\textsuperscript{142}. It resembles also that between the 'pseudo-symbol'
and the 'constitutive symbol' which Eliseo Vivas makes in The Failure and the Triumph of Art. Like both Jung and Vivas, Lawrence identifies his true or 'art-symbol' with the activity of the unconscious or primal consciousness. Through it the unconscious of the artist circumvents the repression which is expressed in his 'plain-speech'. In the case of America, the artist expresses the new being in the language of the old idea. This concept, that written art is subversive of the established form, because it uses its instrument, language, in such a way as to transcend it and point it in the direction of rebirth, is one which would be employed also by a later advocate of sensual rebirth, Norman O. Brown.

Art, then, is for Lawrence the highest human expression. At its greatest, whatever the deliberate intentions of the artist,
it expresses 'the primary mind' in harmony with 'the outer or cerebral consciousness'. It thus expresses full consciousness, or understanding, that quality which, in 'The Reality of Peace', Lawrence saw as vital if the old world was to permit the new to be born. In America, the seed of rebirth has been sown by Cooper; in order for it to grow, repression and disintegration must be encompassed in the understanding until the point is reached where a conscious choice can be made:

then, and only then, having utterly bound and fettered himself in his own will and his own self-conscious knowledge, will man learn to make the great choice, the choice between automatic self-determining, and mystic, spontaneous freedom. 149

This is the process performed by Hawthorne, Dana, and Melville. In Whitman the choice is made and the birth begins. This is the essay which Lawrence's letter to Huebsch rates as the most important. It is therefore extremely unfortunate that its first version should have been lost. In both later versions, Whitman is given this climactic responsibility, but its nature differs in each. In the second version the 'new great era of mankind' 150 is to be established upon the basis of Whitman's love of comrades and in the third upon the 'single individual soul'. 151. In both Whitman is seen as recovering a lost

148. p 136.
149. p 48.
150. p 262.
spontaneity. It is possible only to guess at the emphasis of the first version, but the progress of the essays would suggest a beginning of the fulfilment of Lawrence's whole, psycho-physiological man.152

Thus art, and particularly here American art, is seen as prophetic. In consequence, philosophy and art criticism are inextricably interwoven in the Studies I. As David Gordon writes, 'Lawrence proceeds by bringing his vision of the nature and destiny of man into meaningful relation with works of literary art.'153 Sometimes the juxtaposition is crude and the essay fragmentary. Often, however, it is extremely effective, perceptive as criticism and at the same time, because of the pressure of the actual material with which Lawrence is working, more than usually effective as philosophy. Perhaps, indeed, this kind of procedure, in which Lawrence reinforces his own intuitive awareness by an elucidation of that of others, is the only means by which such an emphatically subjectively-based system might receive the objective (intellectual) assent which he desires. Within the critical essays, Lawrence's psychology of the whole man is tested, developed, and freed from its theosophical and psychoanalytic origins, whilst at the same time the artists themselves become woven into Lawrence's own mythical structure.154

152. This would appear to be indicated also by the emphasis in the letter to Huebsch on the 'theory of primal consciousness'.
154. Gordon points out this tendency in Lawrence's criticism. See Gordon, pp 7 - 8.
Lawrence's vision of history as an expressive-repressive spiral is paralleled in the Studies I by another view of man's development whose suggestion of continuous progress appears at first sight to contradict the first. If art, Lawrence writes, is the expression of primary consciousness, then science is the expression of mental consciousness. The progress of the former is from myth to art proper, through legend and romance; the progress of the latter is from general theory, through particularisation, to the final discovery of 'the connection between scientific reality and creative, personal reality':

The progress is towards a pure unison between religion and science ... the progress of religion is to remove all that is repugnant to reason, and the progress of science is towards a reconciliation with the personal, passional soul.

In reality this account serves to clarify Lawrence's view. It suggests that there have been earlier perfections, like the early Greek, in which 'science and religion were in accord', but that in these both aspects were at a less developed level. In our civilization, science has developed to the point where it is subtle enough to express the soul, but has been used wrongly, to aid the repression which art, as expression of the religious unconscious, has sought to evade. Instead of expressing life, science has imposed death. Thus we are now at the point of possible reconciliation, where 'man can really begin to be free.'

156. p 138.
157. p 176.
158. Lawrence's description of this most subtle stage of science suggests he has psychology, and probably psychoanalysis, in mind.
159. p 138.
At the same time, however, science is now so far developed that repression can be broken only by the kind of deliberate choice which Lawrence believes to have been made by Whitman.

Even more important than its general significance in his theory, however, is the importance of this concept for Lawrence's own work. He writes:

"The nearest approach of the passional psyche to scientific or rational reality is in art. In art we have perfect dynamic utterance. The nearest approach of the rational psyche towards passional truth is in philosophy. Philosophy is the perfect static utterance. When the unison between art and philosophy is complete, then knowledge will be in full, not always in part, as it is now." 160

The two prongs of Lawrence's own effort have been art and philosophy, and his own philosophy has attempted to make the vital leap from analysis to expression. His effort in his expository essays is now seen, not as the necessary struggling with an ever-new form, but as the movement towards perfect objective form. In his psycho-physiological system he believes he has found this form. Since he himself has sought to bring together art and philosophy, Lawrence also appears as the true heir of Whitman, the artist-philosopher able to express the whole man. His future is as an American.

The essays of Studies I are thus consistent, coherent and prophetic. Lawrence presses with a new confidence, urgency, and

160. p 138.
balance his psychology of the whole man. It is a psychology in which both destruction and mentality find a place but in which they are firmly separated from their perversions, and it is a psychology of a future man who is to begin now. As such it is set against that of Freud. Moreover it is demonstrated, pushing towards its fulfilment, in the literature of an America which is the focal point for the whole of Western civilization.

Yet once again it has serious flaws.

The first and most important of these is that its psycho-physiological system is, as later reviews of Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious were to indicate, unacceptable, even incomprehensible, to the analytic mind. Lawrence is guilty, moreover, of relying upon science at the very points at which he proposes to re-evaluate it. His polarized psyche thus surely follows rather than, as he claims, precedes the scientific law of polarity. His philosophy is not, as he would like to believe, the culmination of science but the product of intuition decked out with scientific and pseudo-scientific borrowings. It does not step out to meet his art but proceeds from the same source in a parallel progression. His anxiousness to demonstrate his sense of what philosophy should be thus prevents the acceptance of his intuitions for what they are. In his lack of knowledge he is even too conservative with regard to science, failing to distinguish between its facts and its assumptions. He fails to make, for example, the criticisms of science made by A. N. Whitehead161, a philosopher of the scientific descent

which Lawrence would like to claim for himself whose view in some ways resembles his own. Lawrence cannot fully envisage a science freed from repression.

Secondly, in his effort to achieve objectivity, Lawrence is often guilty of the rigidity and reductiveness of which he accuses science. His system possesses both the idealism and the rigidity of those it would seek to replace, and his application of the system to criticism is frequently as reductive as he claims the analytic process of Freud to be. The essay upon Hawthorne is especially liable to reduce the novels to the pattern of symbols which Lawrence believes them to be creating.

Finally, in its application to criticism Lawrence's psychological system tends to be simplified into a single dualism in which the true (sensual) self is posed against the false self in which spirit and mind are indistinguishable. 'Christianity', he can write, 'is the era in which the rational or upper or spiritual mind has risen superior to the primary or sensual being'. The effort to distinguish spiritual impulse from spiritual ideal thus breaks down in practice. Both spirit and consciousness, after all, are aspects of the civilized part of man; mental expression is natural to the spiritual mode but antipathic to sensual desire. The tendency in Lawrence's thought against which he has fought so hard, that of proposing a tragic and inevitable dualism in man, appears again at such times. Man appears as split in the Freudian fashion but with

162. p 139.
the positive weight reversed: consciousness and not unconscious desire is to be overcome. Lawrence's psycho-physiological system, with its separation of spiritual impulse and mental ideal and its location of the former in a balanced 'primary mind', then appears not as the statement of an imminent wholeness but as a means of preserving the hope of that wholeness. Lawrence himself emerges not as the true heir to Whitman but as, in David Gordon's words, 'a divided man in a divided age, heroically determined to make himself and it whole',

163. Gordon, p 95.
Upon the completion of Studies I, Lawrence began his school book for the Oxford University Press, Movements in European History\(^1\). This enterprise, together with his expressed desire to obtain a post in the Ministry of Education, since it appeared that it would be necessary after all for him to take some part in the war effort\(^2\), probably provided the stimulus for the essays, 'Education of the People'. In connection with his school book, he wrote to Mrs. Nancy Henry on 26 July 1918, 'We should introduce the deep philosophic note into education: deep philosophic reverence.'\(^3\).

The essays were actually written, however, after the war had ended, and this fact altered their nature and their significance for Lawrence. The first four essays were written in November-December 1918 for publication in the Times Educational Supplement\(^4\), but were rejected with the comment that they were 'rather matter for a book than a supplement'.\(^5\) The remaining essays were probably written early in 1919 in accordance with an offer by Sir Stanley Unwin to publish them in book form if Lawrence would

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1. (London, O.U.P., 1921), published under pseudonym 'Lawrence H. Davison'; O.U.P., 1925, under his own name. Lawrence first mentioned the possibility of writing this book on 3 July 1918 (C.L. p 561), and sent the 'first three chapters' to Mrs. Nancy Henry on 26 July (A.H. p 450).
2. In a letter to Lady Cynthia Asquith of 26 September 1918 (C.L. p 563).
4. Lawrence had written three essays by 21 November 1918 (C.L. p 566) and had written four by 22 December 1918 (C.L. p 570).
5. See C.L. p 576.
'write as much again'. The version published in Phoenix, however, is almost certainly Lawrence's revision of June 1920, and as with the later parts of 'The Crown', it is impossible to determine how much the essays were rewritten, if indeed they were ever completed in 1919. Evidence of the influence of Lawrence's reading of late 1918 in the essays suggests the earlier date, however, and I shall assume that 1920 saw only their revision.

The process of development between Studies I and 'Education of The People' is most apparent in a glance at the essay 'Democracy', which provides an intermediate stage between the two. There, Whitman's vision of Democracy is identified with Lawrence's vision of the reborn man as 'a struggle to liberate human beings from the fixed, arbitrary control of ideals, into free spontaneity'. Yet as a positive religious expression of man in society it is in many ways false. 'Education of the People', combining the realization of Lawrence's early essays that self-expression in the present society is impossible with the sense of the reality of the societal bond of the later essays, presents Lawrence's alternative to Whitman. Its practical proposals are for the new world which Lawrence, despite

6. C.L. pp 576 - 77. Also Q.R. p 158.
8. Particularly that of Jung's Psychology of the Unconscious, which Lawrence read in November, 1918. Catherine Carswell, however, (quoted in C.B.I p 488) suggests that the essays were not completed at this time.
10. Phoenix, p 713.
the pessimism he felt, was tempted to identify with the end of the war. They seem also made in an attempt to rebut the suggestion implicit in all Lawrence's essays so far, that his philosophy is subversive of all forms of civilization. Civilization has been identified with the fixation of a consciousness which should, in the mature individual, be constantly modifying its conclusions in adaptation to an ever-growing primal consciousness.

In this connection it may be significant that Barbara Low, through whose influence Stanley Unwin, the publisher of her own forthcoming book, was moved to offer to publish Lawrence's essays\textsuperscript{11}, was at that time seeking to base similar practical proposals upon the Freudian psychology. Before becoming a full-time psychoanalyst, she had been a Training College lecturer, and at the time of Lawrence's writing of his essays upon education, she must have been at work upon the manuscript of her own Psycho-Analysis; A Brief Account of the Freudian Theory\textsuperscript{12}. In this short book the most original chapter is the final one upon the 'Probable Social and Educational Results' of the Freudian theory\textsuperscript{13}. In it she pursues the same ground in relation to psychoanalytic psychology as Lawrence pursues in 'Education of the People' in relation to his own psychology-philosophy.

Whether or not Lawrence's work is a direct response to her attempt to give to the Freudian theory a constructive role in a future civilization, a comparison between the two is instructive. It

\textsuperscript{11} See C.I., p 576 - 77.

\textsuperscript{12} (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1920). The book must have been completed by August 1919, when Ernest Jones' Preface was written.

\textsuperscript{13} Chapter VI, pp 156 - 187.
is a major aspect of Lawrence's attack upon Freud in *Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious* that his theory fails to support such a constructive role. Equally, 'Education of the People' is born of Lawrence's conviction that his own philosophy may be creative as well as destructive of civilization.

Barbara Low sees the new knowledge revealed by psychoanalysis as necessitating, 'in Nietzsche's phrase, "a transvaluation of values"', with important consequences for 'the Educational and Social System, Individual destiny, Family relations'. These she sums up:

The primitive impulses, admitted and understood as the dynamic basis of our psychic life, bearing their own validity and splendour, essential to any harmonized consciousness, will obtain much larger consideration. The "rational" conscious life will be realized as part only of the whole psyche, not necessarily, nor always, as sole leader and guide. A social system must, perforce, be evolved which allows some satisfactory measure of freedom to the primitive instincts, alongside with Sublimation, and the undue exaltation of the ultra-civilized ideals will cease. This new ideal brings in its train revolution in our methods of Child-training and Education, which hitherto have dealt almost exclusively with Consciousness. From such an altered educational system we may expect individuals more capable of understanding and more able to recognize intuitively human motives...

More specifically, the new social system will sum up the deepest impulses of its individual members. Oppressive laws will be removed through an understanding of their cause, so preventing the present 'deadening ... crystallization of ideas', the influence of the herd-instinct will be diminished, repressive

14. See Chapter V.
17. Ibid, pp 158 - 159.
18. Ibid, p 162.
energy will be rediverted to communal ends, and there will be a removal of social hypocrisy and unnecessary fears and taboos. The new child training will be directed to the prevention of the growth of the Oedipus complex and the avoidance of 'illegitimate Repression and the creation of unresolvable Complexes'\textsuperscript{19}. Above all, 'Over-haste and undue Uniformity'\textsuperscript{20} in the process of upbringing must be avoided. In the third element affected, Education proper, psychoanalysis will help and guide the sublimating capacity of the individual into channels most desirable for himself and Society\textsuperscript{21}. Education must aid the pupil to self-recognition and the liberation of mental energy, it must avoid standardisation and 'the impregnation of the pupils with any set of ideas from outside'\textsuperscript{22}. Above all, it must educate the unconscious as well as consciousness.

Through a process of understanding, expressing and above all of sublimating the unconscious impulses, then, psychoanalysis would seek to create whole men where before there have been only split men with 'a perpetual gulf between conscious and Unconscious'\textsuperscript{23}. The considerable similarity of these aims (with the exception of the emphasis upon sublimation) to those of Lawrence will become apparent. Here, however, there are two important points to be noted about them.

In the first place, these are conclusions which could only be made by someone who either did not understand, or chose to

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{19} Ibid, p 170.
\item \textsuperscript{20} Ibid, p 172.
\item \textsuperscript{21} Ibid, p 179. Barbara Low's italics.
\item \textsuperscript{22} Ibid, p 181.
\item \textsuperscript{23} Ibid, p 183.
\end{itemize}
reinterpret, the direction of Freud's thought. Like Eder, Barbara Low seeks to point psychoanalysis in an optimistic direction which is undercut by Freud's own conclusions. Her assumptions that repression and cultural hypocrisy may be overcome, that unconscious impulses may be freely expressed and on occasion submitted to, because 'impulse works in the direction of Sublimation as well as towards primitive wishes', all ignore Freud's historical view of man. This view would see repression and cultural hypocrisy as necessary at each stage of civilization except perhaps the very last, and would see sublimation as a small capacity in man and one historically acquired. Her 'valid' and 'splendid' unconscious wishes are far from Freud's 'gang of murderers'.

Secondly, whether as an expression of the Freudian view of man or of a view which, like that of Jung or Lawrence, substitutes a vision of a creative unconscious, Barbara Low's suggestions for reform are sadly inadequate. Freud himself wrote in 1907 of the

undisdom of sewing a single silk patch upon a tattered coat - the impossibility of carrying out an isolated reform without altering the foundations of the whole system. Such an alteration for him would mean the abandonment of all faith, fantasy and art and the substitution of the analytic attitude of resignation. A belief in a creative unconscious, on the other hand, requires, as Lawrence constantly insists, an equally great

25. Freud, 'Thoughts for the Times on War and Death', S.E. XIV, p 297.
26. 'The Sexual Enlightenment of Children' (1907), S.E. IX p 139.
27. See 'Totem and Taboo' (1912 - 1913), S.E. XIII, pp 88, 90.
alteration in the foundations of society. Barbara Low faces the consequences of neither view. She offers particular suggestions for reform, within a view which constantly makes conventional moral assumptions about their desirability.

In 'Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious', Lawrence writes that probably the 'followers' of psychoanalysis are 'ignorant, and therefore pseudo-innocent' of what their leaders 'have in hand'. The comment would certainly seem applicable to Barbara Low. In the aim of producing whole individuals, in the emphasis upon a correct psychology as a necessary basis of education, an education which will have self-fulfilment as its goal, in the insistence upon the necessity to avoid idealization and standardization, in the placing of the responsibility for neurosis upon the parent-child relationship and that of its prevention upon the parent, Lawrence agrees with Barbara Low. But his discussion ranges wider, sewing no silk patches but rather seeking a new coat to fit the new wearer, his future man.

'But, seriously, before we can dream of pretending to educate a child, we must get a different notion of the nature of children,' he writes. The psychology which he presents follows that of Studies I in its assumption of psycho-physiological centres of impulse, consciousness, and here also knowledge. There is once again a division between the plexuses, solar and cardiac, and the ganglia, lumbar and thoracic. Repeating the association which Lawrence made in 'The Two Principles' between the two types of centre and affect and will, the plexuses and ganglia are now

28. See, for example, her assumptions about the desirability of infant sexuality, Psycho-Analysis, pp 174 - 175.
30. Phoenix, p 617.
termed emotional and volitional, rather than sympathetic and voluntary, centres. To the earlier association of the two with love and hate is now added a responsibility for productive and contestive activities. There is no further distinction in function made between the upper and the lower centres. This simplification may reflect the influence of Jung, whose Psychology of the Unconscious Lawrence read in November 1918. Lawrence now defines the emotional activity as the desire to seek again the 'old connexion with the mother which forms the basis of the impulse towards relationship', whilst volitional activity propels the individual towards isolation. The simplification also reflects Lawrence's desire to make the main line of division that between 'mental consciousness' and the primal consciousness. This division is one of the chief points of emphasis in this restatement of Lawrence's psychology. Mental consciousness is strictly limited, being 'a sort of written, final script, in the brain', finite and mechanical. Describing its relationship to primal consciousness (or the unconscious) Lawrence echoes curiously the definition of Freud which will be quoted by Barbara Low. Freud writes:

The unconscious is the larger circle which includes within itself the smaller circle of the conscious; everything conscious has its preliminary step in the unconscious; whereas the unconscious may stop with this step and still claim full value as a psychic activity.


32. p 623. The theme of the dual urge of man, onward, towards adaptation, and retrogressive, towards the mother, runs right through Psychology of the Unconscious.

33. p 628.

34. From The Interpretation of Dreams. Quoted by Barbara Low in Psycho-Analysis, p 69.
For Lawrence,

The whole mental consciousness and the whole sum of the mental content of mankind is never, and can never be more than a mere tithe of all the vast surging primal consciousness, the affective consciousness of mankind. 35

Whereas Freud goes on merely to insist upon the consequent impossibility of our knowing this 'the real psychic'; however, Lawrence insists upon its suppression and control by a mental consciousness 'grown unwieldy'. He has, however, no wish to limit consciousness:

Why does this happen? Because we have become too conscious? Not at all. Merely because we have become too fixedly conscious. 37

Consciousness, or mental consciousness, should remain flexible, using its attribute, intelligence, to adapt its ideas to the springs of impulse emerging from the deeper psyche.

The other main point of emphasis is upon relationship. The psycho-physiological centre is now less important than the relationship it establishes with the equivalent centre in another individual. In the terms of Lawrence's magnetic analogy, the pole is less important than the completed circuit. It is the circuit not the impulse which establishes primal knowledge, and it is this which is responsible also for physical as well as psychological growth.

Both points are stressed as Lawrence for the first time here adapts his psychology to deal with child-development and child-training. The aim of the latter is to reach that point where at last there will be a perfect correspondence between the spontaneous, yearning, impulsive desirous soul and the automatic mind which runs on little wheels of ideas. 38

35. p 629.
36. Psycho-Analysis, p 70.
37. p 629.
38. p 605.
Thus, like Barbara Low's, Lawrence's aim is to unite the previously split halves of man. In his psychology, however, the brain is responsible only for 'little wheels of ideas'; to the physiological centres are attributed motor as well as psychological power. Consequently, the aim is not to direct and sublimate the unconscious whilst allowing a certain amount of impulsive gratification. It is to stress motion, spontaneity and relationship. The greatest danger to the child is its mental consciousness:

When mental cognition starts, it only puts a spoke in the wheel of the great affective centres. 39

There is, therefore, a natural tendency in man towards imbalance and distortion in favour of mentality, but it is a tendency which, in the fulfilled individual, should be corrected with maturity:

education and growing up is supposed to be a process of learning to escape the automatism of ideas, to live direct from the spontaneous, vital centre of oneself. 40

The process is the reverse of the Freudian view of development as an increasing repression and sublimation. The responsibility for the child's development lies with the parent, not, however, in his conscious direction, but in the spontaneous relationship with the child which should develop body and psyche in both parent and child. Love and wrath should develop emotional and volitional centres, and parental responsibility, a commitment deeper than either single emotion, should be employed to ensure that the 'emotions ... flow unfalsified'. 41 In this way repression and the Oedipal relationship will be replaced by a

39. p 618.
40. p 604.
41. p 647.
continual spontaneous adjustment of relationship. 'One should go the extremity of any experience' Laurence writes, 'But that one should stay there, and make a habit of the extreme, is another matter.'

These emphases are repeated when Lawrence turns to education proper. Here he proposes his own alternative system of education. It is a tapering system, based upon the principle of selection. Education would begin later and be more evenly divided between physical and mental education, the latter dealing in abstract knowledge and the former comprising physical education and craft. From a common base, each child would be educated intellectually only according to his abilities and desires, although all would be trained physically and each should 'have a craft at which finally he is expert.' At various stages children would be drafted, at first on a part-time basis, into different trades and professions. The practical proposals are based firmly on Lawrence's psychology. The system, then, despite Lawrence's insistence upon its economical virtues, is all designed for the future fulfilled man, in preparation 'for [the] fall of Rome.' For the present Lawrence can only suggest 'a bit of solid, hard, tidy work. And for the rest, leave the children alone.' As an expression of intrinsic man, it develops both creation, in craft, and contest, in physical exercise. The encouragement of fight within the individual relationship, Laurence believes, would prevent wholesale destruction under the

42. p 653.
43. p 598.
44. p 651.
45. p 627.
banner of idealism as well as, the other side of the same coin, that perverse form of contest which is the competition of capitalism. Sublimation is thus again seen as harmful. Mentality is to be developed to the full, but upon the basis of a fulfilled primal consciousness in total relationship with its fellows, and in complete separation from physical education. This last change seeks to check man's natural tendency to mental automatism; it insists also, perhaps surprisingly, upon the purity of abstraction. Abstract concepts should not be demonstrated inductively; inherently removed from life, their introduction into life's practicalities is a falsification. In this system the highest responsibility will go to the educators, themselves men of the highest education. In them, mentality will be at its most developed but, being based upon a fulfilled primal being, it will become 'living understanding' and life expression.

It is obvious that a system of education such as the one we so briefly sketched out ... will inevitably produce distinct classes of society.

Lawrence sees the two aims of education as being self-expression and citizenship, and he redefines both. The educational system based upon his psychology of the fulfilled man in turn supports a vision of a new social system. It will be a system based upon the classes created by his educational system, a social pyramid, whose 'vigorous, passionate proletariat of indomitable individuals' will taper to perfect expression in the new 'life-priests', the

47. pp 607 - 608.
48. p 607.
educators. It is to be democracy redefined, and its basic principle is best expressed in Lawrence's essay of that name. The present democracy, he writes, is based upon the average, the false assumption of equality based upon the equivalence of material needs. The aim of the new democracy will be that each man shall be spontaneously himself - each man himself, each woman herself, without any question of equality or inequality entering in at all; and that no man shall try to determine the being of any other man, or of any other woman. 50

The true freedom, to be truly onself, is posed against the false freedom represented by the concept of equality, and it is this true freedom which Lawrence's social system would encourage. Its most startling aspect is noted by Graham Hough:

In [Lawrence's] educational and social pyramid, the highest government responsibilities go to those with the highest education - to those, that is to say, most capable of the conscious intellectual activity that he has apparently been at most pains to dethrone. 51

But this is a system for Lawrence's fulfilled man, whose conscious leaders would express the dumb potency of the mass. The system is conceived as organic and, typically, at the same time religious. Its leaders, more aware, are to be 'men deeply initiated into the mysteries of life' 52. Their role is described thus:

Some men are aware of the deep troublings of the creative sources of their own souls, they are aware, they find speech or utterance in act, they come forth in consciousness. In other men the troublings are dumb, they will never come forth in expression, unless they find a mediator, a minister, an interpreter. 53

49. pp 606 - 607.
50. Phoenix, p 716.
52. p 607.
53. p 608.
Within the context of this system the virtues of civilization, duty and morality, may be redefined. They are now to ensure fidelity to the spontaneous impulse; that is, they are to be harnessed to the primal self which they have previously repressed. Society and its cultural and ethical attributes are to serve Lawrence's great aim: the fulfilment of the individual being.

Against this vision of the future is once again set an account of a destructive present, destructive in its self-consciousness and adherence to an outgrown idealism. Its psychology is false, assuming the mind to be the centre of individuality and the premental to be instrumental and non-individual. The ideal it has erected in consequence, of spirituality and personality, is equally false, although historically it may have been useful. The result of this falsity in the sphere of child-development is the creation of the Oedipus Complex. The self-conscious mother, seeking to impose this ideal on the child 'traduces the child into the personal mode of consciousness'\(^\text{54}\). Forcing personality and spirituality where there should be spontaneous relationship, she robs the child of its proper psychic nourishment. The child then experiences, as in the Freudian view, ambivalent feelings towards the parent. This ambivalence, however, consists not in conscious indifference and unconscious desire, but in conscious love and unconscious hatred. This thwarting of relationship and spontaneity and creation of a divided self produces neurosis. Lawrence borrows from both Freud and Jung (it was the 'mother-incest idea' which interested him most in Jung's book) but, accepting the Oedipus Complex as

\(^{54}\text{p 625.}\)

\(^{55}\text{See C.J. pp 565 - 566.}\)
the chief cause of neurosis, he nevertheless insists that both it and the neurosis it produces are products of a perverted society.

Within the sphere of education proper, the result of our false idealism is again self-division. We urge self-expression, but 'proceed to force all natures into ideal and aesthetic expression'. The self to be expressed is one artificially created; thus the primal emotions are in fact repressed and emotional responses dictated 'from the mind'. The educators themselves are a prey to the falsity which also dominates the present social system. This is the falsely based democracy, with its ideal of 'equality and the perfectibility of man'. The ideal of spiritual and mental equality is in itself destructive but its application as scientific materialism and mechanism is yet more so. The process by which idealism and materialism are identified is not explained here, as it was in

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56. It is interesting that although he absorbs into his own psychology Jung's dual impulse, writing that from the solar plexus 'the child yearns avidly for the mother, for contact, for unison, for absorption even' (p 639), he nevertheless resists the conclusion that the incest desire is therefore natural. Instead this movement, if not exaggerated by consciousness and will, receives its spontaneous corrective from the voluntary centres.

57. p 596.

58. p 626.

59. p 600.
Studies I. Lawrence insists instead upon the self-division of a society which preaches spiritual equality and practises the equality of the wage and the machine-part, with the latter becoming ever more important. Since the 'system is in us, it is not something external to us', this self-division, Lawrence suggests, corresponds to the neurotic split diagnosed in the individual by Freud. Within this split the merging of productive and contestive activities which characterizes democratic capitalism takes place.

Unlike in earlier formulations, there is little attempt to suggest a historical explanation for this situation. But as so often before, Lawrence's attempts to assign a cause in psychological terms hover between the suggestion that the cause is natural and the assumption that perversion has occurred. Man is at fault because he has 'become too fixedly conscious', causing the primal centres to become 'subordinate, neuter, negative, waiting for the mind's provocation'.

60. In 'Democracy' Lawrence writes:
Your idealist alone is a perfect materialist. This is no paradox. What is the idea, or the ideal, after all? It is only a fixed, static entity, an abstraction, an extraction from the living body of life. Creative life is characterized by spontaneous mutability; it brings forth unknown issues, impossible to preconceive. But an ideal is just a machine which is in process of being built. Phoenix, p 711.

61. p 590.

62. A similar suggestion is made by Trigant Burrow in 'Psychoanalysis in Theory and in Life'; The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease Vol 64, No. 2 (September, 1926), pp 209 - 224. This is one of the papers probably sent to Lawrence in 1919 - 1920 by Burrow (see Chap. V), and so probably read by Lawrence before his revision of 'Education of the People'.

63. p 629.
not the fault of the mind. It dominates because man's original polarity has been broken by the will, not by the natural will of the volitional centres, however, but by 'that miserable mental obstinacy which goes in the name of will nowadays'\textsuperscript{64}. Clearly Lawrence's arguments are circular. He insists that he does not 'find fault with the mental consciousness' but merely 'with the One-and-Allness which is attributed to it.' Yet it is this very assumption of 'One-and-Allness' which he describes as characterizing mentality\textsuperscript{65}. The implication is once again that mentality is inherently repressive of the non-mental.

'Educate the People' began upon the assumption that the age to which its proposals would be relevant was immediately at hand. As the essays progress Lawrence's confidence wavers. There is the statement of faith:

Although in Rome one must do as Rome does; and although all the world is Rome today, yet even Rome falls. Rome fell, and Rome will fall again. That is the point. \textsuperscript{66}

Increasingly, however, there is the sense that the Roman walls constitute an unbreakable circle. Lawrence wrote to Catherine Carswell that his essays were 'most revolutionary'\textsuperscript{67}. In fact the revolution they demand is a total transvaluation of values, for no single change that he proposes would be possible alone. Without an alteration of the social structure his hierarchical system of education could easily become repressive rather than expressive of the less educated mass. And without a total change

\textsuperscript{64}. p 640.
\textsuperscript{65}. pp 634 - 636.
\textsuperscript{66}. p 651.
in values his simple proposal that 'all education should be State education' is not feasible. It is for this reason that Lawrence's urging of the economic merits of his system sounds naive; in order to operate, his proposals demand a reborn man to whom questions of cost would be irrelevant.

The present system constitutes a similar unbreakable whole. Lawrence constantly urges sanity against the world's madness, but he concludes that the world likes its madness; man 'would rather be the ideal god inside his own automaton than anything else on earth'. Moreover, the situation is created anew in each generation by the family situation:

The question is, don't our children get this self-conscious, self-nibbling habit, in the very womb of their travesty mothers, before they are even born? We are afraid it is so.

The repressive womb of 'The Crown' now becomes the literal womb, and doubly inescapable. Lawrence's faith fades. 'The sense of futility overwhelms us,' he writes. The target of his appeal becomes uncertain. Parents and educators are both discredited, although Lawrence continues to appeal alternately to each.

Increasingly, therefore, the object of Lawrence's proposed system of education becomes to create rather than to express the fulfilled man. He writes:

As a matter of fact, our private hope is that by a sane system of education we may release the coming generation from our own nasty disease of self-consciousness ...

68. p 598.
69. p 630.
70. pp 631 - 632.
71. p 633.
72. p 627.
In such a situation the problems inherent in the system as it is proposed by Lawrence become more obvious.

Clearly Lawrence's system, though it may claim to be interpretative rather than repressive of man's deepest impulses, cannot really be said to express the distorted mankind of the present. As an abstraction designed for the future rather than a spontaneous expression of growth it links Lawrence with the idealists he condemns. He accepts the association. Civilization depends upon 'fixed beliefs'; they are the means by which man may organize relationship on a social scale; they determine social behaviour and provide the stability within which progress may occur. The balance between relationship and isolation which man must seek to attain appears in social terms as the balance between belief and growth:

Life consists in the interaction between a man and his fellows, from the individual integral love in each.
And upon what does human relationship rest? It rests upon our accepted attitude to life, our belief in the life-aims, and in our conception of right and wrong. 73

Thus the true choice is not between system and no system. It is between system and system, mechanical and organic. 74

Lawrence's solution to the obvious self-contradiction which this appears to present, is to propose an ideal of spontaneity:

We must have an ideal. So let our ideal be living, spontaneous individuality in every man and woman. 75

His ideal seeks to undercut the importance of idealism, and his new morality, as has already been pointed out, attempts to reinforce rather than repress the power of impulse. The ideal

73. p 614.
74. p 611.
75. p 606.
itself is to be held only provisionally, belief being tempered by understanding:

It is useless to think that we can get along without a conception of what man is, and without a belief in ourselves, and without the morality to support this belief. The only point is that our conception, our belief, and our morality, though valid for the time being, is valid only for the time being. 76

The solution is remarkably similar to that suggested by Jung in *Psychology of the Unconscious* to the problem of religious symbolism. 'I think belief should be replaced by understanding', he writes, 'then we would keep the beauty of the symbol but still remain free of the depressing results of submission to belief.' 77

Lawrence's philosophy can support proposals for an alternative system of civilization, therefore, only by a very sophisticated manipulation of his views. His realization that most men are incapable of answering his appeal, that, in the words of a contemporary letter, it is 'proper ruling they need' 78 so that his system must actually be enforced against the pressure of the mass, causes him to go yet further in the transgression of his own first principles. The imposition of his proposals, however much he may claim that they are for an organic, expressive society, would fulfil his own definition of repressive idealism as a pressing of the abstract against the actual. In this connection, the peculiar compromise nature of the system

76. p 615.
77. *Psychology of the Unconscious*, p 145. Jung's italics. For Jung, however, the 'depressing results' are of an unconscious, for Lawrence they are of a conscious, belief.
itself may be noted. Designed to express a reborn man, and indeed unworkable without one, it nevertheless contains safeguards against man's natural 'susceptibility to falsification'. Envisaging a society freed from the mechanical production of man's needs and the stimulation of artificial needs, it is nevertheless designed for an industrial society. Urging that 'the business of man is to become so spontaneous that he shall utter at last direct the act and the state which arises in him from his deep being', it can nevertheless not envisage a mankind freed of idealism.

Lawrence's dissatisfaction with the equivocal position in to which his attempt to base a social system upon his philosophy leads him is evident from the self-contradictory dogmatism of much of the later part of 'Education of the People'. 'Let there be a fierce new Athenian creed, to damn and blast all idealists', sums up one aspect of his attitude. Spirit and consciousness are identified as the 'upper consciousness', responsible for idealism; both should be abandoned. Despite the earlier criticism of those who 'demand the abolition of all systems' and thus 'desire the disintegration of mankind into amorphousness and oblivion', Lawrence's later exhortation is to

Snap the old connexions ... Fall apart into your own isolation; set apart single and potent in singularity for ever. One is one and all alone and ever more shall be so. Exult in it.

79. p 604.
80. p 608.
81. p 631.
82. p 633.
83. pp 610 - 611.
84. pp 633 - 634.
The other, and contradictory, aspect of Lawrence's attitude is expressed in his exhortation to the unintelligent everyman, 'Go now; be still, Briareus, and let a better man than yourself think for you'. He is contemptuous of the mass, respectful of consciousness and science. His extended psycho-physiological system echoes almost word for word the mechanical system of science earlier condemned. The height of Lawrence's confusion is reached in the closing passages of the essays where he urges the vision of male comradeship 'on the verge of death' which, although it was clearly an important preoccupation of his at this time, has no basis in his psychology. The male-female division is made again, with the female being given the domain of the immediate and the male that of abstraction and mechanism. It is the male who should be leader, his world of abstraction is now identified with 'the unknown', and his venture into an abstract future is urged as heroism. The celebration, however, is of an abstraction disguised as passion; a relationship of spontaneity and fidelity is to be found in this inhuman world of mechanism.

The fact is that Lawrence's philosophy cannot support the kind of systematic proposals for the future to which he seeks to extend it in 'Education of the People'. Unlike Freud's, his viewpoint enables him to envisage a form of civilization which will be non-repressive, to believe, in Mary Freeman's words, that 'individuality and social revolution pull in the same direction'. But his is in essence an individualistic

85. p 663.
86. p 665.
87. See, for example, Lawrence's letter to Katherine Mansfield of 21 November 1918, G.L. pp 565 - 566.
88. pp 664 - 665.
philosophy. His social system is conceived essentially as a means to the achievement of a fulfilled individuality. 'All communion, all love, and all communication, which is all consciousness', he writes, 'are but a means to the perfected singleness of the individual being'\(^\text{89}\). Moreover, relationship is envisaged always as relationship between two individuals, its epitome the sexual relationship, 'two beings who recognize each other across the chasm, who occasionally cross and meet in a fiery contact, but who find themselves invariably withdrawn afterwards, with dark, dusky-glowing faces glancing across the chasm which intervenes between two beings'\(^\text{90}\). When forced to extend this, he can present multiple relationship only symbolically, as 'the most delicately and inscrutably established order, delicate, intricate, complicate as the stars in heaven, when seen in their strange groups and goings'\(^\text{91}\). He continually implies that a truly fulfilled individual would transcend any system and render all irrelevant. Such a view can only legitimately urge its vision of a whole individual who would express himself in a way not now foreseeable and not dependent upon any abstraction. Thus, if Barbara Low did not understand that in the conflict which he saw as existing between nature and civilization

\(^{89}\) p 637.

\(^{90}\) p 634.

\(^{91}\) p 637. Eugene Goodheart in The Utopian Vision of D. H. Lawrence (Chicago, 1963), p 143, sums up this tendency well: Lawrence was unable to think politically because he could not regard human relationships as anything other than personal relationships or impersonal encounters between the gods that inhabit two persons.
Freud's allegiance lay invariably with the forces of civilization, Lawrence, despite his much more radical exploration of the implications of his own views, shows a similar failure, in refusing to accept that his quarrel was 'with civilization itself' 92.

It is a consequence of Lawrence's search for wholeness and his insistence that impulse always seeks form that he should resist this conclusion, however. He has shown an increasing conviction of man's need for relationship and community, and the attempt of 'Education of the People' to present a system which would be a religious expression of this need for community is a logical result of such a conviction. The fact that the attempt must nevertheless be judged a failure, and a failure in terms of Lawrence's own philosophy, suggests important consequences for his views. Unless he can find a convincing point at which abstraction can exist without being fixed, dead or repressive (a condition which his own definitions suggest would be self-contradictory) it would seem that he must relinquish either his belief that his philosophy can support a new form of civilization or his assumption that civilization expresses itself in consciousness and is held together by a fixed belief.


Lawrence's effort to break the crust over fresh intuition formed by the fixing tendency of ideologies ... leads him to quarrel with civilization itself.
5. REFUTATION OF FREUD
In January 1920 Lawrence wrote the 'six little essays on Freudian Unconscious' which were the culmination of his efforts to give philosophical form to his intuitions. Tightly organized, clear and concise, the sureness of *Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious* in both substance and expression stands in contrast to the exploratory writing of earlier essays. The psycho-physiology of *Studies I* and 'Education of the People' is clarified and finalized, and it is now focussed wholly and explicitly as a refutation of the psychoanalytic falsehood. The essential connection between these two facts is summed up by Eugene Goodheart:

When Lawrence read Freud, he sensed the presence of an enemy, but like all great enemies, Freud proved a remarkable opportunity for Lawrence to define himself. *Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious* and *Fantasia of the Unconscious* are more than critical essays of Freud; they constitute what are perhaps the most definitive statements of Lawrence's ideas. The reason for this is not difficult to see. Freud's speculations on the unconscious, consciousness, the body, the passions, and sex are unrivaled by any other thinker in the modern period in interest and profundity. It is a rare opportunity for a thinker to confront a definitive treatment of his major themes by an adversary. In the work of Freud, Lawrence found this opportunity.

Much the same point was made by Murry when in 1923 he wrote in his review of *Fantasia of the Unconscious* that Lawrence was the first man in England, and probably in Europe, 'truly to realise the scope, the enervature, of the problems of which psycho-analysis

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1. C.L. p 618. Letter of 29 January 1920 to R.W. Huebsch. The essays were first projected at the beginning of December 1919. See C.L. p 599.

has touched the fringe', not because he was a student of Freud or Jung, but because of 'his own intuitive apprehension of life'.

The pressure of the Freudian viewpoint upon Lawrence's completely opposite Weltanschauung was not however, as Goodheart implies, a sudden one. Its creation of such a self-definition in 1920 therefore requires some explanation. It was in September 1919 that Lawrence described to Huebsch the 'new science of psychology' contained in Studies I from which the Freidians were trying to steal 'the theory of primal consciousness'. The fact that neither Studies I nor 'Education of the People' had obtained publication in book form, coupled with the forthcoming appearance of Barbara Low's book on Psycho-Analysis, may have prompted him to re-state this 'new science'. The influence of psychoanalysis was nearing its height; the comparative ease with which Lawrence's own book on the subject found publication is one indication of this. In Studies I he had written that the 'last steps remain to be taken' in the union of art with science, 'and then man can really begin to be free, really to live his whole self, his whole life, in fulness'. Clearly Lawrence must take these steps himself. The destructive course of psychology must be checked, its knowledge made to serve its true function, the fulfilment of individual life.

4. Letter of 30 September, C.L. p 596.
5. It is not clear why 'Education of the People' was not published. Lawrence was still hoping that Huebsch would publish Studies I.
6. See also Reinald Hoops Der Einfluss der Psychoanalyse auf die Englische Literatur, Anglistische Forschungen, Heft 77, (Heidelberg, 1934). Hoops (p 24) gives 1920 - 1923 as the highpoint of the influence of psychoanalysis.
The most immediate stimulus to this effort was Lawrence's receipt, in either late 1919 or early 1920, of a selection of psychoanalytic papers by Dr. Trigant Burrow. These papers provided him with both material and confidence in his attack upon Freud. Certainly the brief reference to Burrow in *Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious* fails to do justice to the extent to which Lawrence relied on him, particularly for his specific descriptions and criticisms of the Freudian theory.

Trigant Burrow was a psychoanalyst who had studied under Jung but who preferred to follow Freud after the rift between the two men in 1913. Despite his belief in himself as an orthodox Freudian, however, the papers which he wrote between

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8. For Burrow's account of his relationship with Lawrence, and additional information, see C.B. III, pp 147 - 148 and 678 - 685. Burrow writes (C.B. III, p 147), 'I think it was about the year 1920 that reprints of mine first went to Lawrence.' Since the material furnished by Burrow's papers is an essential part of Lawrence's work, however, he must have read them before the end of January 1920, possibly even before his departure from England in November 1919. In this connection it may be noted that during the summer of 1919 Lawrence was in contact with yet another psychoanalyst, Godwin Baynes, a follower of Jung. For a brief account of Baynes, see C.B. I, p 512.

1914 and 1920 show a radical, though unadmitted, divergence from Freud's views. Briefly, this divergence takes the following form: Burrow accepts Freud's findings as regards the human psyche, but as facts only; he feels at liberty to disagree with Freud's interpretation. He therefore judges the Freudian unconscious from an ethical standpoint. The unconscious as Freud describes it undoubtedly exists, but it is morally unsound. Burrow consequently rejects Freud's assumption that it represents man's fundamental nature. Instead, he postulates a psychic mode which antedates both conscious and unconscious: the subjective, organic; non-sexual 'preconscious'. This mode should persist and develop alongside consciousness throughout life. With the accession into consciousness, however, there follows self-consciousness, repression and a split in the psyche. The Freudian unconscious is created through the repression by consciousness of elements of the preconscious. Both repression and the Freudian unconscious are consequently seen as unnecessary and evil. Implicit in the original, preconscious mode is an 'organic morality' opposed to the conscious 'fear morality' which is dominant within society. Education should therefore aim at the fulfilment of the self rather than at conformity with

10. Burrow's papers did not go directly from him to Lawrence, so that Burrow can not identify precisely the papers which Lawrence received. He does, however, (C.R. III, pp 678 - 679) indicate those most likely to have been sent, and it is from these that the following account of Burrow's views at this time is drawn.
civilization; both the Oedipus complex and contemporary civiliza-
tion are results of maladaptation.

In advancing these views, Burrow saw himself as merely
adding to Freud's thought. He carefully distinguished himself
from Jung who, he thought, attempted actually to alter the
Freudian theory. Yet his additions perform the same function
as Jung's alterations: they completely reverse Freud's view of
the psyche, of neurosis, of civilization and man's relation to
it. Man appears as intrinsically moral, in natural harmony with
the cosmos. His problems are caused by self-consciousness,
which causes sexuality (as opposed to sex) and the Oedipus com-
plex. Consciousness itself, however, is not to blame, but
rather man's failure to harmonise the two aspects of his psyche.
This failure is visibly demonstrated in civilization, with its
hypocrisies and compromises. In such a situation it is civiliza-
tion which is neurotic and the neurotic, with his failure to
conform to it, is healthier than the normal. Such a view alters
not only Freud's conclusions but also the standpoint from which
he makes them, for Burrow's norm is the wholly subjective one of
the healthy preconscious of his own theory. Such a position led
to the charge of mysticism from a fellow founder-member of the
American Psycho-Analytical Association, John T. MacCurdy.
MacCurdy's comments are interesting, because they show how near
Burrow had come to Lawrence's position. He writes that

the psychopathologist can use nothing less concrete and
objective than the mental behavior of the average man as
his standard of normality. If one were to accept Burrow's
subjective standard each psychiatrist would stand on a pedestal and judge the rest of the world to be insane. 11 Yet it is important to note that, whatever the implications of his views, Burrow had not taken the 'last steps' which Lawrence desired. His views in these early papers are advanced sometimes through criticism of Freud but more usually by a subtle, apparently unconscious and usually unacknowledged modification of Freud's conclusions to serve the purposes of his own theory.

It is upon Burrow's work, then, that Lawrence draws in his specific comments upon Freud which open Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious. There is, indeed, nothing in the work itself which would indicate that Lawrence had actually read Freud. It is a reliance which results in considerable inaccuracy. Lawrence's assumption that Freud's psychology has no 'preconscious' would appear to stem from Burrow's 'addition' of a preconscious mode to the Freudian theory.12 His definition of repression follows Burrow, as does his criticism of Freud's sexual findings. His account of Freud's unconscious shows the same influence, although this time it is acknowledged. Burrow's separation of the Freudian unconscious, the result of repression, from the source of psychic life, the preconscious, means that Lawrence's all-important reversal of Freud's view of the nature of the unconscious bases


13. See Burrow 'Conceptions and Misconceptions in Psychoanalysis [sic]', Journal of the American Medical Association, LXVIII (1917), p 357. Eder and Barbara Low also assume that repression is undesirable.
itself upon an erroneous account of that view. Similarly, his assumption of the remissive intention of Freud's theory, although it probably also owes much to the influence of Eder and Barbara Low, follows Burrow's confusion of his own purposes with those of Freud. The most glaring inadequacies in Lawrence's knowledge of Freud's thought are to be found in his account of the Freudian view of the 'incest-craving'. He writes:

The analyst set out to cure new humanity by removing the cause of the neurosis. He finds that the cause of neurosis lies in some unadmitted sex desire. After all he has said about inhibition of normal sex, he is brought at last to realize that at the root of almost every neurosis lies some incest-craving, and that this incest-craving is not the result of inhibition of normal sex-craving. Now see the dilemma—it is a fearful one. If the incest-craving is not the outcome of any inhibition of normal desire, if it actually exists and refuses to give way before any criticism, what then? What remains but to accept it as part of the normal sex-manifestation?

Following Burrow's account of the psychoanalytic aim and method, this account misunderstands the tendency of Freud's thought. It ignores his economic and historical conception of the psyche, according to which the original energy provided by primitive desires may be rechannelled into more socially acceptable pursuits. It also ignores the therapeutic mechanism of transference, by which the original impulse is not simply released but re-experienced and eliminated by catharsis. Lawrence fails to realize that Freud seeks to reinforce rather than remove restraint.

14. See Frederick J. Hoffman, 'Lawrence's Quarrel with Freud' in *Freudianism and the Literary Mind* ( Baton Rouge, 1957), pp 151–176, for a criticism of this and other erroneous assumptions by Lawrence. His criticism of this particular aspect appears on p 163.

15. p 7.

Lawrence's inaccuracies of detail, however, are more than compensated by the sure grasp which he shows of the essentials of the Freudian position. Having anticipated Burrow's views, to the extent of having used the same symbols in his illustration, he feels at liberty to borrow detail from him. But he does not see Burrow as the orthodox Freudian of Burrow's own presentation. Burrow's implicit reversal of the Freudian position becomes in his hands complete and explicit, and Burrow is presented as being critical of Freud. The two perspectives from which his fundamental criticisms of Freud are made, the moral and the historical, may find their starting point in Burrow, but they go far beyond him in their criticism of the Freudian position.

In 'The Meaning of Psychoanalysis' Burrow writes that psychoanalytic therapy appears, by removing moral inhibitions, to 'threaten the very foundations of society,' but that this is in fact not the case. The new 'primal morality' will replace the old 'fear morality.' Lawrence, probably also having in mind Barbara Low's description of the 'transvaluation of values' to be effected by psychoanalysis, implicitly contradicts him:

'It is not here a matter of reform, new moral values. It is the life or death of all morality. The leaders among the psychoanalysts know what they have in hand. Probably most of their followers are ignorant, and therefore pseudo-innocent ... Psychoanalysis is out, under a therapeutic disguise, to do away entirely with the moral faculty in man.'


Freud, having destroyed the old, cannot create a new Weltanschauung because 'he can't get down to the rock on which he must build his church'. Lawrence's perception is acute. Defining morality as a control imposed by the reality-orientated preconscious upon the unconscious, operating to the benefit of society and reinforced in the past by religious symbols, Freud both denies it an impulsive basis and seeks to remove, by rationalizing them, the religious props which have hitherto supported it. His purpose,, to borrow Philip Rieff's description, is to provide 'more powerfully rational controls, distributed like oil derricks, over the self-conscious surface of life'. Freud's concern with morals is one which leaves him 'without ... a moralizing message'. Analysis should replace morality, reason belief.

Freud's age of reason, however, is by his own admission far from being attained. Indeed his presentation of an unchanging primitive unconscious suggests that it may be an impossible goal. In such a situation, Lawrence's description of the 'moral dilemma' with which the 'incest-craving' presents psychoanalysis may also, despite its inaccuracies of detail, be fundamentally correct.

Because Freud has undermined the old basis of morality through an analysis of its religious origins without providing any replacement with which to reinforce his own solutions, man's possibilities according to his theory may actually be, as Lawrence's supposes, degenerate licence or repression and neurosis.

20. Introduction, the Viking Compass edition of Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious: Fantasia of the Unconscious, p ix.
For the mankind which Freud describes, rational control may be impossible. As Norman O. Brown writes, 'no psychoanalytical reason is given or can be given for believing that ... secular motives for civilized behavior will succeed where religious motives have failed'\textsuperscript{22}.

To Burrow, again, Freud's findings with regard to man's unconscious are accurate, but their nature reflects the fact that man is at present in a period of maladaptation and neurosis. Freud is writing at a particular point in the history of civilization; his findings do not indicate the constant psychic nature of man. Once more Lawrence goes further. As the spokesman for 'the last stages of idealism', the light which Freud carried into the cavern of the unconscious was 'his ideal candle'. In consequence, the unconscious which he discovered with its aid is 'the inverted reflection of our ideal consciousness', 'the cellar in which the mind keeps its own bastard spawn'\textsuperscript{23}. Beginning his investigations from a point firmly within nineteenth century culture, his theories have the scientific-materialist ideal as their starting point not as their conclusion. Thus, to borrow Philip Rieff's paraphrase of Lawrence, as 'itself a secular support of the inherited culture, psychoanalytic rationalism found what it was trained to suspect in the dark corners ... of which it is afraid'\textsuperscript{24}. Again the criticism is

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{22} Brown, \textit{Life against Death: the Psychoanalytical Meaning of History} (London, 1959), p 142.
\item \textsuperscript{23} pp 12, 5, 13, 9.
\item \textsuperscript{24} Rieff, \textit{The Triumph of the Therapeutic} (London, 1966), p 198.
\end{itemize}
central. Freud's wholly hypothetical psychic structure is based on the analogy with anatomical structure, and his psychological principles base themselves upon the principles of physics. That Freud consequently sees as biological and determined what is in fact cultural and subject to change is a criticism which later writers have also levelled, although Lawrence's specific claim that the Oedipus Complex is a result of the repressive culture of which psychoanalysis is an agent does not seem supported by later evidence.

Perceptive though these criticisms are, however, they are much less important than Lawrence's reorganization of his own philosophy into a counter-revolution which should replace whilst using the conclusions of psychoanalysis. The systems developed in Studies I and 'Education of the People' are now put forward as the 'true ... unconscious', anterior to (as with Burrow's 'preconscious') both consciousness and its repressed products which form the Freudian unconscious. Lawrence begins once more upon a statement of faith. The 'incest motive is in its origin not a pristine impulse':

The first bubbling life in us, which is innocent of any mental alteration, this is the unconscious. It is pristine, not in any way ideal. It is the spontaneous origin from which it behooves us to live.

27. See for example the conclusions of the British Medical Journal, 13 May 1972, p 364.
He elaborates:

Where the individual begins, life begins. The two are inseparable, life and individuality. And also, where the individual begins, the unconscious, which is the specific life-motive, also begins. 30

As equivalent to life, the unconscious appears as the 'being' of the 'Study' and the 'impulse' of 'The Reality of Peace'. It is comparable to Bergson's 'elan vital'. But as equivalent to individuality it distinguishes itself from Bergson's continuous force, in which the 'tendency to individuate' is always opposed by the 'tendency towards reproduction' so that individuality is never complete31, and also from Burrow's subjective preconscious in which self is not distinguished from cosmos32. As 'the specific life-motive' the unconscious, or life, is always new, always underived. Appearing 'in defiance of all scientific law, in defiance even of reason', it is therefore equivalent to the divine soul, or God33. The same concept is expressed by A. N. Whitehead when he writes that, as the process of realization, 'God is the ultimate limitation, and His existence is the ultimate irrationality'34. Reason cannot be applied to Him because 'reason flows from' Him. For Lawrence 'Religion was right and science is wrong'; individuality is antecedent to cause-and-effect. Like Freud's, therefore, Lawrence's unconscious is indestructible, but as 'the active self-evolving soul' it is ever creative. Its

32. But Lawrence later, in his review of Burrow's The Social Basis of Consciousness, ignores this fact, assimilating Burrow's 'living continuum' to his own view of unconscious individuality. See ! [The Individual Consciousness v The Social Consciousness], Phoenix, pp 761 - 764.
33. p 15.
purposiveness is intrinsic, having no other goal than 'incarnation and self-manifestation'. Evolution thus characterizes the unconscious but it is a process which is entirely individual, involving the pain of a continuous death and rebirth.

Identical with the life-mystery itself, the unconscious is not only pre-mental but also pre-nervous. Its self-manifestation creates 'psyche and corpus', 'spinning the nerves and brain as a web for its own motion, like some subtle spider'. Thus it is both 'life-motive' and manifestation, its impulses traceable through their psycho-physiological expression. It is as the latter that the system of Studies I and 'Education of the People' is presented. Again there are four principal pre-mental centres: the solar plexus (lower sympathetic) and the lumbar ganglion, (lower voluntary), the cardiac plexus (upper sympathetic) and the thoracic ganglion (upper voluntary). A firm distinction is now made both vertically, between plexuses and ganglia, and horizontally between upper and lower, or in Lawrence's new terms, objective and subjective. The functions of the lower centres are those given in Studies I: the psyche is 'darkly self-centred' here, whether in attraction (from the solar plexus) or repulsion, hate and power (from the lumbar ganglion).

Additionally the solar plexus is defined as the first of the centres. In the process of individual evolution the division of its nucleus produced the other centres. The function of the

35. p 42.
37. pp 42, 18.
38. p 27.
upper sympathetic centre is also that described in Studies I. It produces 'that effluence which we call selfless love',39, love which devotes itself entirely to the external object. The upper voluntary centre, however, is now no longer identified with the repressive will. Instead it appears as that 'mode of dynamic objective apprehension, which in our day we have gradually come to call imagination'. This impulse 'by which a man may in his time add on to himself the whole of the universe' is the force which drives 'the modern, truly male mysticism'; but it should also result in 'knowledge of the limits of the self'.40 The identification is a curious one, since imagination would seem more properly to belong to the process of identification with the other which characterizes the sympathetic mode. Only by dividing affect and consciousness between his two modes can Lawrence achieve it. But apart from its function in emphasizing the spontaneous balance of the pre-mental psyche, in which the impulse towards spiritual merging receives its corrective in a complementary realization of separation, this definition also shows Lawrence's persistent identification of the historical and the psychological. The mystical ideal (incidentally the ideal of theosophy) is, like its Christian counterpart, an exaggeration of one aspect of the psyche, valid as impulse but with no absolute value as an ideal.

40. pp 40, 38.

41. Lawrence may also be intending a clarification of his assertion of the relationship between Christianity and capitalism, according to which the Christian ideal is the mentalization of the upper sympathetic centre and capitalism that of its acquisitive complement.
Each of these centres is both a mode of relationship and, upon the completion of the circuit between the self and another, a 'kind of consciousness'. The total relationship is one of love, its goal the perfect singleness of each individual, 'polarized ... by the counter-posing singleness of the other'. The total consciousness is the full primal consciousness of Studies I. A polarized relationship also exists between the individual centres within the self. On each plane (upper and lower) the centres are both complementary and opposite, and between the two planes the same relationship exists. The creative opposition between aspects of the self first suggested in 'the Crown' is now fully incorporated within the intrinsic self. Upon the achievement of this relationship, maturity is attained; the 'individual consciousness has now its own integral independent existence and activity, apart from external connection'. Lawrence is not here proposing self-absorption as the goal of maturity. He is suggesting that maturity means that the individual becomes responsible for, rather than dependent upon relationship. He is insisting, too, that in the mature individual the psyche is not, as in the Freudian view, self-divided. Its separate modes function in contact with each other.

42. p 27. Lawrence persistently uses the term 'consciousness' in two senses, 'the one having to do with the mental sophistication of individual awareness, the other with consciousness regarded as an inclusive... principle'. The quotation is from Trigant Burrow's description of his own use of the term in The Social Basis of Consciousness (London, 1927), p 119. In the latter sense the unconscious may also contain modes of consciousness.

43. p 22.

44. p 33.
Although 'the unconscious is the creative element' and as such is 'beyond all law of cause and effect in its totality, yet in its processes of self-realization it follows the laws of cause and effect'. As in the cosmology of Studies I the creative mystery, here the individual unconscious, creates matter as well as life, physiology as well as psychology. Thus matter, or death, is contained and used in the service of life. Ultimately the physical laws are no more than the fixed habits of the living unconscious. Lawrence suggests a further 'polarized duality' between psyche and body. The unconscious centres which produce emotion are responsible also for behaviour and physical function. The breast which provides the mother's milk also bestows her love upon the infant.

Beyond the unconscious the psyche contains also will and mental consciousness. Returning to the definition of the will of 'The Reality of Peace', Lawrence both separates it from the voluntary system and insists upon its positive function in the natural man. Equivalent to free-will or conscience, it is a unit of extra power in the psyche to be used, in the intrinsic man, to correct any inherent tendency to imbalance. It is the force by which the maintenance of spontaneity may become a duty, by which civilization may be united with nature. It is its dislocation from this function which produces madness, neurosis and idealism.

45. p 16.
46. p 16.
47. p 43.
Mental consciousness is once again the terminal result of the psyche, transmuting 'what is creative flux into a certain fixed cipher'. Its product is the idea, useful, but 'unliving, insentient', for ever outgrown. In its relationship to the unconscious it must remain an instrument, used to its full but always harnessed to the moral faculty of the unconscious soul.

Pure analysis, the Freudian ideal, as the application of death to life, must invariably aid rather than remove repression.

The description given above is clearly that of the psyche of intrinsic or natural man. At the same time, however, it is true that, as Baruch Hochman writes, it is a psychology which seeks 'to render the fallen world intelligible'. Lawrence's method is to combine a full description of the unconscious as it is manifest in the developing child, with much briefer descriptions of the state of fulfilled maturity. The description of each stage in the growth of the child's psyche is accompanied by a description of the results of the failure or perversion of such a development. These results, the over-dependence upon the mother, the premature stimulation of personality and 'personal sex', and the creation of complexes, add up to the modern world described by psychoanalysis. Lawrence's psychology in this its most developed form seeks, therefore, to bridge the distance between intrinsic and historical man. In addition, as the true heir to the false doctrine of psychoanalysis, it provides its own psychopathology, a reversal of the Freudian position which

48. p 46.
links madness and idealism. Maturity, that 'amazingly difficult and vital business of human relationship' 50 has not been achieved. The will has become dislocated, identifying itself either with a psycho-physiological circuit, to produce 'primary madness' 51, or with the mind, to produce idealism and its result, mechanism. The first is an individual, the second a social result, making mind controller rather than instrument. The natural tendency of the infant towards mentality is thus stimulated rather than checked, to produce 'real complexes' 52.

In thus re-stating his philosophy as the true heir of psychoanalysis, Lawrence, as Goodheart suggests, achieves a new sureness of focus. *Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious* is organized to make the most central claims to attention of Lawrence's thought, against the pressure of a totally opposite view. In the first place, then, his counter-revolution is essentially a religious one. In re-identifying the unconscious with the divine soul, Lawrence reinstates religion, faith, morality, all that Freud's reduction of the incomprehensible soul to the ego-centric unconscious had sought to eliminate through analysis. The reversal is one which Jung 53, more subtly, and Burrow, less consciously, also sought to perform. Lawrence performs it aggressively. 'Unconscious' means 'inconceivable', 'unanalyzable'; 54 hence the unconscious is equivalent to the creative mystery, accessible not to consciousness but to experience, a positive not a negative term. This is a religion, however,

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50. p 45.
51. p 48.
52. p 31.
53. For Jung's effort to create a post-Freudian religion see Rieff, 'The Therapeutic as Theologian: Jung's Psychology as a Language of Faith', *The Triumph of the Therapeutic*, pp 108 - 140.
54. p 15.
whose basis is relocated. It is founded upon life, which is anterior to both matter and psyche, and centred upon the individual.

Lawrence's religious goal, the 'goal of life', is therefore 'the coming to perfection of each single individual'. It is a goal which requires effort, and the 'strength and pride to accept the whole ... nature of the psyche's own creative activity'.\(^5^5\). The result of its failure is described thus:

The individual psyche divided against itself divides the world against itself, and an unthinkable progress of calamity ensues unless there be a reconciliation. \(^5^6\)

Lawrence here abandons his specific concern with civilization for a statement of his central identification of history with psychology. Like Freud he sees the problems of history as a result of self-division within the psychology of the individual\(^5^7\), but unlike Freud he can offer for the future a vision of a whole, fulfilled self. The overcoming of self-alienation must inevitably mean man's overcoming of his alienation from God and from a true community.

For the future, then, Lawrence offers true freedom, the freedom of man in contact with himself, rather than the Freudian alternatives of repression or the false freedom of self-consciousness, of man in control of himself. He offers the possibility of a full and reciprocal relationship in which man is not trapped within his own repressions but is able always

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\(^5^5\) p 41.

\(^5^6\) pp 40 - 41.

to mach out beyond himself. For Freud the individual is isolated, in contact with external reality initially as recipient only. To the child the parent is agent of fulfilment and agent of repression, moulding its responses to conform with cultural demands. For Lawrence relationship must be balanced and reciprocal. The replacement of spontaneity by conscious conditioning is equivalent to perversion. To Lawrence indeed the spontaneous relationship of the unconscious, which, being reciprocal, is never 'in any sense selfish', is identical with morality:

The essence of morality is the basic desire to preserve the perfect correspondence between the self and the object, to have no trespass and no breach of integrity, nor yet any refaulture in the vitalistic interchange. 58

58. p 28. Elsewhere, as David Gordon (D. H. Lawrence as a Literary Critic, (New Haven and London, 1966), p %) points out, Lawrence's definitions of both life, and art are almost identical to the definition of morality quoted here (see 'Morality and the Novel', Phoenix, pp 527, 528). Thus for Lawrence art, as well as life, is both essentially moral and essentially concerned with the unconscious. Its morality, however, should not be explicit, but implicit in its presentation of what Vivas (D. H. Lawrence: The Failure and the Triumph of Art, (London, 1961), p 217) calls 'the felt quality of experience'. It was essentially for this reason that Lawrence was compelled to abandon the traditional novel form whose plot-structure and characterization imply a morality which is explicit and ultimate rather than implicit and immediate. His use of an organic form, employing the symbol 'whose referend cannot be fully exhausted by explication, because that to which it refers is symbolized not only through it but in it' (Vivas, p 208), is one with his reversal here of nineteenth-century determinism, in the person of Freud. Lawrence was compelled, in Murry's words, to burst the tradition 'not merely of the novel, but of the experiences, the values, the religion on which the traditional novel is based into fragments' - J. M. Murry, Love, Freedom and Society (London, 1957), p 58.
Freud's divorce of the unconscious from both relationship and morality is repaired. The ethical systems which for him constitute morality become for Lawrence once more the expressive-repressive conscious results of man's innate moral sense. The replacement of relationship by ideas permits action, for the idea forms 'at once an insulator and an instrument for the subduing of the universe'\(^{59}\), but this action must inevitably be destructive, since the true source of morality is suppressed.

Philip Rieff writes that Lawrence's 'moral doctrine' is 'neither an ethics of responsibility nor an ethics of conscience, but an ethics of action'; Lawrence advocates 'feeling divorced from responsibility'.\(^{60}\) Lawrence's developed psychology, however, identifies responsibility and conscience with action or feeling. The balance within the individual psyche is one which is continually being overturned and is continually righting itself. Responsibility allies itself to spontaneity through the medium of conscience, or will, whose function is to ensure that the psyche's self-righting process continues to be performed. Thus in the individual Lawrence indicates, as he has not been successfully able to do on a larger scale, how the civilized virtues may be used in the service of spontaneous life. Lawrence's essential claim, then, is that unlike psychoanalysis, his psychology can tell us how we can 'escape neuroses'.\(^{61}\) Living 'from the spontaneous initial prompting, instead of from the

\(^{59}\) p 47.

\(^{60}\) Rieff, Introduction to the Viking Compass edition of Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious, pp xix, x.

\(^{61}\) p 45.
dead machine - principles of ideas and ideals', we may avoid the split between unconscious and (mental) consciousness. Lawrence's would be a truly effective therapy, offering the possibility of a fulfilled future.

Like Burrow's, Lawrence's psychology reverses the standpoint from which Freud's conclusions are reached, but unlike Burrow's Lawrence's reversal is performed with full awareness. For Burrow and Lawrence, as indeed for Freud, the unconscious is characterized by subjectivity. It is thus from a subjective standard that Lawrence judges man. In subjective experience is expressed that delicate relationship which is the manifestation of the life-principle in man. Through it man enters into direct, religious relationship with the universe, without the interference of self-consciousness which marks objectivity. Thus the essential difference between the Freudian and the Lawrencean definitions of the unconscious is that Freud defines it objectively and therefore negatively, from the point of view of consciousness, whilst for Lawrence the unconscious is

62. p 16.

63. For a definition of subjective and objective experience see Vivas, D. H. Lawrence: The Failure and the Triumph of Art, p 111:
The former [subjective experience] may be dominated by the felt quality of belief, irrespective of its possessing or lacking an external object in relation to which it can be called adequate or true. The latter [objective experience] has such an object ...
This definition is to be distinguished from Lawrence's own use of the terms in Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious to describe sensual and spiritual experience respectively.

64. We will describe the system that lies behind the pre-conscious as 'the unconscious', because it has no access to consciousness except via the preconscious, in passing through which its excitatory process is obliged to submit to modifications.
subjectively defined in its own terms, as

that essential unique nature of every individual creature, which is, by its very nature, unanalysable, undefinable, inconceivable. It cannot be conceived, it can only be experienced, in every single instance. 65

Knowledge, Laurence insists, is always primarily subjective,
or unconscious; it is

always a matter of whole experience, what St. Paul calls knowing in full, and never a matter of mental conception merely. This is indeed the point of all full knowledge: that it is contained mainly within the unconscious, its mental or conscious reference being only a sort of extract or shadow. 66

Where knowledge derived from subjective and from objective experience diverge, it is the former which is to be trusted; the mental conception is to be adjusted accordingly. As far as the knowledge of inner experience is concerned, Leone Vivante puts Lawrence's essential case. Vivante writes that the 'objective and analytical knowledge of inner reality',

strictly speaking, is ruled out not only in art but also in science and philosophy. For inner being cannot be known as an object, but only in its subjectivity, i.e. as an active subject, through a kind of identification. 67

Lawrence, with his belief that 'the genesis of the psyche of the human species is at the same time ... the genesis of every­thing', 68 would extend the scope of this claim. In the Studies I he wrote that the 'last steps remain to be taken' in the union of religion and science. 69 These steps are now defined.

65. p 15.
66. p 15.
68. S.M. p 137.
69. S.M. p 138.
Science, and particularly psychology, must submit to the guidance of the subjective, abandoning 'its intellectualist position and embracing [the old religious faculty]'\(^\text{70}\). Having accepted the guidance of the unconscious, the function of science becomes that of recording its psychological manifestations, recognizing its habits and from these deducing its 'laws and processes in ourselves'\(^\text{71}\), laws which, because they belong to life, may always be subject to change:

Here is a real job for the scientist, a job which eternity will never see finished though even tomorrow may see it well begun ... It is a great task of the liberators, those who work forever for the liberation of the free spontaneous psyche, the effective soul. \(^\text{72}\)

As the first of these liberators this is also Lawrence's task. Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious is itself designed to play a vital role in the revolution which Lawrence desires.

Much more systematically, then, Lawrence employs the procedure begun in earlier works, of appealing for verification of his abstract system to subjective experience. We know that the solar plexus is the first centre of consciousness because

We feel it, as we feel hunger or love or hate. Once we know what we are, science can proceed to analyse our knowledge, demonstrate its truth or untruth. \(^\text{73}\)

\(^{70}\) p 17. Compare Bergson, who envisaged a science based on intuition, though supplemented by intellect, which would 'enable us to grasp what it is that intelligence fails to give us, and indicate the means of supplementing it'. Creative Evolution, p 187.

Also Jung whose 'analytical psychology' in Philip Rieff's words, also 'aspired to become revelation merged with science'. Rieff, The Triumph of the Therapeutic, p 199.

\(^{71}\) p 16.

\(^{72}\) p 35.

\(^{73}\) p 20.
That the 'nuclei are centres of spontaneous consciousness' is 'obvious, demonstrable scientific fact, to be verified under the microscope and within the human psyche, subjectively and objectively both', 74. Lawrence's focus upon the development of the infant psyche is particularly important here, for it enables him constantly to appeal to experienced behaviour for verification of his theory. The result is a system which seeks both to interpret psychologically the earlier symbols of myth and at the same time to retain them. The cross is interpreted as representing the fourfold division of the unconscious, but it itself is not mysticism - no more than the ancient symbols used in botany or biology'. The unusual nature of the appeal is something which the first reviewers felt vaguely but without understanding the full extent of Lawrence's intention. George Soule closes his review for The Nation:

Beneath its terrifying exterior it seems to correspond, in a vague way, with much of what we are feeling nowadays. If he had only used, to express it, the imagery of fiction or poetry instead of the intellectual terms which he distrusts, he might have written a great novel. 76

Criticism of Lawrence's 'intellectual terms' is made in another way by Mary Freeman. She writes:

In [his] effort to locate the generation of attitudes in the body, Lawrence fell into the very mechanism which he deplored in science. His scattering of consciousness merely pushed the error of rigid localization from one place to another. 77

74. p 43.
75. p 44.
There is certainly truth in the comment. Yet, as an agent in the 'liberation of the free spontaneous psyche' Lawrence's psycho-physiological system is qualified by his description of the process which it is to serve. Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious seeks to perform the process of understanding which since 'The Reality of Peace' Lawrence has regarded as necessary if further spontaneous growth is to be possible. Its 'understanding of the true unconscious' expresses man's subjective experience of a more extensive consciousness than that hitherto admitted in psychology. It is employed in order to break the old, repressive limits, but not in order to create new ones. Lawrence describes the process:

What we must needs do is to try to trace still further the habits of the true unconscious, and by mental recognition of these habits break the limits which we have imposed on the movement of the unconscious. For the whole point about the true unconscious is that it is all the time moving forward, beyond the range of its own fixed laws or habits. It is no good trying to superimpose an ideal nature upon the unconscious. We have to try to recognize the true nature and then leave the unconscious itself to prompt new movement and new being - the creative progress.

The system, in destroying the old, seeks to be a new beginning. It suggests the correct balance between the aspects of man's psyche and at the same time demonstrates the relationship between religion and science, the unconscious and (mental) consciousness which will express that balance. 'We profess no scientific exactitude,' Lawrence writes, 'particularly in terminology. We merely wish intelligibly to open a way'. The apparent humility indicates in fact the extent of Lawrence's ambition.

78. p 45.
79. p 16.
80. p 36.
Science, and particularly psychoanalysis, is invited to reverse its course and develop the revolutionary route which Lawrence has indicated for its future and for the future of man.

In discussing Lawrence's earlier formulations of his philosophy I have emphasised their points of failure. *Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious* seems to me to be his most successful formulation, because, in response to the challenge posed by Freud, it is organized so surely around the points of his greatest strength. Yet it did not effect the desired revolution; its aims were not even understood. And within the terms of Lawrence's philosophy, it has distinct points of weakness.

The barrier to acceptance which Lawrence's choice of terminology represents has been discussed in connection with *Studies I*. Here again, however, Lawrence fails to be scientific in the manner he wishes, and again he borrows from science at the points where he claims to be re-establishing it. Burrow's terms and conclusions are frequently used to give the air of scientific solidity. Lawrence's abstract system, despite his insistence upon its provisional nature, is elaborated to the point where it is acceptable neither subjectively nor objectively. His hint of esoteric knowledge beyond the capacity of

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81. 'Unconscious' replaces 'soul'; 'subjective' and 'objective' consciousness replace 'sensual' and 'spiritual' consciousness; sympathetic and voluntary forms of consciousness have a positive and negative flow respectively; to the 'poles' of consciousness are added 'planes' and 'fields'.
the public\textsuperscript{82} seems a defensive reaction to the recognition of this fact. The result is that he cannot effect the counter-revolution which is his aim. Perhaps, indeed, it is impossible, at least in the terms in which he envisions it. Certainly his attempt to reinstate the mythical symbol alongside its psychological explanation is unconvincing alongside the Freudian insistence that myth and analysis are mutually destructive.

The remaining points of weakness emerge chiefly through implication, the counterpart of Lawrence's strengths. His description of man in relationship sees him in contact with another individual and with the cosmos. Individual relationship is described thus:

\begin{quote}
Within the individual the polarity is fourfold. In a relation between two individuals the polarity is already eightfold. \textsuperscript{83}
\end{quote}

Morality becomes the maintenance of this polarity. Clearly this is a concept of morality applicable only to individual relationship; the polarity required for the complex relationships of man in society would be inconceivable. For man in society Lawrence, despite an assumption of collective aims, offers no guidelines. His vision of man's correct use of consciousness criticises all fixed moral dictates. Consciousness and intelligence should be employed in 'the brave adherence to a profound soul impulse'\textsuperscript{84}. Idealism is derangement, although once more Lawrence offers no

\textsuperscript{82} See p 49.
\textsuperscript{83} p 35.
\textsuperscript{84} pp 48 - 49.
ultimate cause for this derangement. Consciousness or mind is treated only briefly in Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious. F. R. Leavis picks out this aspect of the work to emphasize Lawrence's respect for and use of intelligence. Yet Lawrence here insists upon the instrumentality of mind in the service of life without granting it the positive functions it assumed in earlier expositions. It is usually seen negatively, without the essential function of expression of earlier works. Its positive functions are transferred to the upper voluntary centre of the unconscious. In Studies I Lawrence sought to distinguish spirit from mind, by locating the spiritual impulse in the unconscious. Here he goes much further, attributing 'objective knowledge' to the upper voluntary centre. Its knowledge is 'of the gulf that lies between the two beings nearest to each other', it gives a sense of 'objective finality', it 'searches and explores the beloved, bringing back pure objective apprehension'. This apprehension, Lawrence writes, 'is not critical in the mental sense', yet its distinction from that form of love in which the beloved 'is endlessly appreciated, criticized, scrutinized, exhausted' is extremely fine. When Lawrence goes on to write of the world's desire for 'voluntary, objective, separatist control', it is difficult to avoid the assumption that he is able to be so critical of mind and of its relationship to society because he has relocated its positive

86. pp 38; 40; 37.
87. p 30.
88. p 40.
functions within civilization in an aspect of the unconscious. Even then, Lawrence's description of the instrumental function of mind attributes to it a surprising degree of control. It gives us plain indications of how to avoid falling into automatism, hints for the applying of the will, the loosening of false automatic fixations, the brave adherence to a profound soul impulse.

If, then, for Freud civilization and neurosis are inseparable, it would seem that Lawrence's ability to suggest the possibility of a man who, unrepressed, may 'escape neuroses' has as its counterpart a failure to envisage man within civilized society. It is perhaps for this reason, above all, that Lawrence could not reverse the emphasis of psychoanalysis as he wished.

Yet Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious is, I feel, the legitimate place of rest for Lawrence. If he fails fully to refute psychoanalysis, being weak at the points where Freud is strong, yet his vision is sufficiently powerful at the points where Freud is weak for the two to offer, in Eugene Goodheart's words, 'a double image of possibility'. In advocation of his case against that of Freud, I should like to make two final points.

89. That the distinction is not entirely clear may be judged from the fact that at least one critic, Eugene Goodheart, assumes that the upper unconscious mode and 'ideal or mental consciousness' are one, attributing the functions of the former to the latter. See Goodheart, The Utopian Vision of D. H. Lawrence, p 108.

90. p 48.

The first is that the conclusion which Lawrence resists in attempting to assign a cause to the perversity of civilization, that mentality itself causes man's self-division, through its automatic development towards increasing dominance, need not be as pessimistic as he appears to feel that it is. Certainly, his resulting vision of a mankind become so conscious that it becomes able to subdue consciousness to its indestructible creative unconscious seems an increasingly valuable one, if only as a last hope. It would simply involve a larger role for mentality than Lawrence would care to envisage; mentality would employ its energy in self-criticism, itself restrictive of its own tendency to dominance.

The second point is that the Freudian view, which seems to deal much more adequately with the relationship of the self to society,\(^\text{92}\), attributes the original cause of society to an act, the killing of the primal father,\(^\text{93}\), as implausible as Lawrence's attempts to explain historically the cause of civilized perversion. The division between self and society which, in his analysis of contemporary man, Freud diagnoses very acutely, is due, he believes, to the fact that society springs from the guilt and remorse resulting from this initial act. That man's abiding sense of guilt is due to this first crime seems

\(^\text{92}\) See Baruch Hochman's comments in Another Ego, pp 261, 262.
\(^\text{93}\) See Freud, Totem and Taboo, S.E. XIII, especially p 141.
especially improbable in view of Freud's own statement that this parricide 'may easily be observed in herds of wild oxen and horses' without, one assumes, leading to social and religious development in them. Yet without this initial act Freud is left with a causeless original guilt at least as inexplicable as Lawrence's assumption of an original temptation in man towards mental self-dominance.

94. Totem and Taboo, S.E. XIII, p 142 n 1.
(ii) CONTINUATION AND COLLAPSE (Fantasia of the Unconscious, Viking Compass Edition; New York, 1960)

Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious was published on 10 May 1921, and reviewed between June and August of that year. 'After Lawrence found out how completely his presentation had been misunderstood', writes Philip Rieff, 'he immediately tried again - belligerently, even somewhat peevishly ... Fantasia is a restatement and elaboration of his doctrine as it was stated in Psychoanalysis'. Certainly, the impetus toward the writing of Fantasia appears to have come from the publication of Psychoanalysis, and its title and in part also its 'fantastic' style were determined by the reviews of the earlier work. This would seem to apply particularly to the later parts of the book, for it appears to have been completed in two bursts: written for the most part during Lawrence's stay at Ebersteinburg between May and July 1921, and completed and corrected upon his return to Taormina in September of that year. On 2 November 1921 Lawrence wrote to Earl Brewster from Taormina:

I finished the Unconscious book and sent it to America with a foreword answering some of my darling critics. Called it provisionally Fantasia of the Unconscious. - Call it Fantasia to prevent anybody tying themselves in knots trying to 'understand' it.

3. Internal evidence clearly indicates that most of the work was written at Ebersteinburg, but first references to it in Lawrence's letters occur upon his return to Taormina.
Lawrence's bitterness here is a measure of the importance which he attached to Psychoanalysis as both statement and action, for although its reviews were few they were not hostile. Towards his views the reviewers were sympathetic; E. L. Buermeyer, for example, saw the work as 'raising questions both psychologically and ethically fundamental for the psycho-analytic movement.' Yet all were bewildered by its terminology, and none saw him as offering a serious alternative to psychoanalysis. George Soule's assumption, in his review for The Nation, that Lawrence had missed his way in venturing amongst 'the intellectual terms which he distrusts' sums up this reaction.

The revolution which Psychoanalysis was to bring about had not occurred and Lawrence, as Rieff suggests, reacted with a restatement which was bitter and more extravagant. He writes:

In that little book, Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious, I tried rather wistfully to convince you, dear reader, that you had a solar plexus and a lumbar ganglion and a few other things. I don't know why I took the trouble. If a fellow doesn't believe he's got a nose, the best way to convince him is gently to waft a little pepper into his nostrils. And there was I painting my own nose purple and wistfully inviting you to look and believe. No more though.

5. Psychoanalysis was reviewed in The Nation of 27 July 1921; Survey of June 1921; the New York Evening Post Literary Review of 16 July 1921; and the New Republic of 17 August 1921. It was not published in England until July 1923.

Lawrence may also have had in mind here the reactions to Women in Love, whose first Trade Edition appeared in June 1921. The condemnation of Women in Love by John Bull appeared on 17 September 1921. See C.B. II, pp 89 - 91.


7. 'A Novelist as Psychoanalyst', The Nation, 27 July 1921, p 103.

8. p 68.
The concise form of the earlier work, with its attempt to merge the subjective and the scientific gives way here to a more vehement emphasis upon the subjective. Lawrence must press home his points and to do so he also expands the scope of the earlier book. Both the starting point of Psychoanalysis, the perversion of the modern world, and its implications, the reborn world which must occur if humanity is to be saved, are now treated explicitly. In the course of this expansion Lawrence meets head on the central problems of his position which the tight focus of the earlier work avoided. Thus this, 'the second book to Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious' is a very different work. Lawrence's anger, his far from systematic expansion of his views, and the very varying success with which he tackles the problems inherent in his standpoint combine to produce, in Graham Hough's words 'an almost indescribable work'.

As in the earlier work, however, the pressure against which he must define his position is provided by Freud. Lawrence begins Fantasia by proposing to refute the Freudian view of sex in the same manner in which, in Psychoanalysis, he refuted the psychoanalytic view of the unconscious. In his review of Psychoanalysis, L. L. Buermyer suggested that in Lawrence's discussion of the unconscious, 'he is really investigating the essential character of the sexual impulse'. This view mistakes the included for the

inclusive element. Lawrence's unconscious is manifested in relationship; it is not equivalent to sex. It does however indicate the extent to which the two overlap, for Lawrence as well as for Freud.

As we saw, Freud's early work led to two major achievements: the formulation of a theory of consciousness and the unconscious, and the investigation of the sexual instinct and its development. The two, however, were closely interwoven. It is the sexual instincts which, in Freud's view, chiefly attract to themselves the forces of repression, partly because they are much less adaptable to reality than the ego-ininstincts, and partly because of the cultural demands of contemporary civilization. It is also sexual energy, in the form of the libido, which provides the motive force not only for the struggle to fulfil primitive wishes but also, in its sublimated or negated form, for cultural aspirations and prohibitions. Freud's speculative account of man's intellectual and cultural development, Totem and Taboo, is also an account of his sexual development.

Lawrence proposes, then, to deal with this, the major content of the Freudian unconscious, as he dealt with its nature. Once again there are surface inadequacies of knowledge and an apparent reliance upon secondary sources, here less the work of Burrow than Barbara Low's Psycho-Analysis: A Brief Account of the Freudian Theory. Once again, following Burrow and Barbara Low, Lawrence accepts Freud's discoveries but reinterprets them. Again there

12. (London, 1920).,
are also perceptions which reach to the heart of the Freudian position and, most important, an alternative explanation which responds throughout to the pressure of the Freudian standpoint. In addition, Lawrence is here far more decided than in the earlier work in his placing of Freud as a representative of the perverted age which he claims to describe dispassionately.

In the *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality* (1905), Freud's major early work on the sexual instinct, he was concerned to redefine sexuality, to explain sexual perversions by means of this redefinition, to trace the development of the sexual instinct in terms of its aims and its object, and to provide a 'conceptual scaffolding' to account in psychological terms for the results of his enquiry. Whether or not Lawrence had read this work, and there is no evidence that he had, his discussion in *Fantasia* rejects Freud's explanations at all these points.

Barbara Low describes Freud's redefinition of the term, 'sexual':

He uses it, as well as in its recognized sense, to cover a far wider sphere than is usual, including under it functions and processes not generally considered as of a sexual nature, owing to the fact that such processes and functions have not hitherto been traced to their basic origin. 15

Lawrence responds:

Sex surely has a specific meaning. Sex means the being divided into male and female; and the magnetic desire or impulse which puts male apart from female ... but which also draws male and female together in a long and infinitely varied approach towards the critical act of coition. 16

Freud's view of sex is historical and relative. The act of coition is for him the supreme fulfilment of the Pleasure Principle, being essentially a release of tension, but it represents also a narrowing down of the original infantile sexual aims, and it is frequently thwarted by the claims of reality. Thus Freud's concern is above all with the unfulfilled sexual instinct and its aims. Lawrence's view of the unconscious as concerned essentially with maturity, relationship and morality leads him instead to identify sex with mature coition. The act of coition is an absolute, not a relative, experience. It is a mutual act of relationship and has therefore a moral function. What is important is not the individual release of tension but the mutual renewal of being which should be its result.

This insistence upon the mature sexual relationship as the definition of sex leads Lawrence also to reject the Freudian concept of an original bisexuality, one half of which is suppressed in the development of the mature sexual role, and to insist instead upon the absolute differentiation of the sexes. Although it is true that 'the rudimentary formation of both sexes is found in every individual' this doesn't mean 'that every individual is a bit of both, or either, ad lib'. Instead:

A child is born sexed ... Every single cell is either male or female, and will remain male or female as long as life lasts. 17

17. p 131
Individuality is a wholeness which transcends possible divisions rather than a narrowing down of original potentialities. Thus:

Sex—that is to say, maleness and femaleness—is present from the moment of birth, and in every act or deed of every child. But sex in the real sense of dynamic sexual relationship, this does not exist in a child, and cannot exist until puberty and after. 18

This view is not, as Rieff and Hoffman suggest, naive. Freud sees adult sexuality as a composite instinct and seeks to trace its origins. Much of Freudian 'infantile sexuality', therefore, is sexual only in a historical sense. Viewed as sexual, infantile sensual activity is what Freud terms 'polymorphously perverse', but, as Jung was quick to see, there is no reason, from an empirical rather than a theoretic standpoint, why this activity should be seen as sexual. Lawrence, regarding the sexual impulse as non-composite and the sexual experience as absolute, sees infantile sensual activity as non-sexual. Specifically sexual activity in a child is 'curious, shadowy, indecent', but unimportant because not absorbed into a mature relationship. The account of child psychology of Psychoanalysis, repeated here, presents the child's relationship to the parents as a preparation for adult relationship but, though sensual, as non-sexual in character.

18. p 137.
22. p 130.
23. Contrast Barbara Low's precis of the Freudian position: The special characteristics of the parent-child relationship have developed from mutual sexual impulses. Psycho-Analysis, p 97.
Like Freud, therefore, Lawrence associates the sexual perversions with infantile sexuality, but in a very different manner. In Freud's view sexual perversions represent a regression to the aims of infantile sexuality in cases where the normal development of adult sexuality is prevented by excessive repression. To Lawrence, infantile sexuality is itself a perversion, and both it and adult perversions result from the excessive mentality of contemporary civilization. Thus the infantile development presented by Barbara Low as the type of normality becomes in the hands of Lawrence the type of a perverted age. Infantile sexual curiosity, for example, the 'desire to look, to touch, to know, so far as it has reference to bodily spheres' \(^{24}\), which to Barbara Low provides the basis of adult intellectual curiosity, is to Lawrence 'the greatest tragedy of our day. The child does not so much want to act as to know.' \(^{25}\). Lawrence's is therefore once again a psychology of natural or intrinsic man; its norm is a subjective one. Freud's conclusions are wrong essentially because they view contemporary man as normal.

Freud, justifying the present situation by pronouncing it biologically determined, and encouraging present aspirations by seeking to intensify our self-consciousness, is seen, then, as both spokesman and prophet of the contemporary world. Lawrence's

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25. p 155.
answer is to combine psychopathology and social criticism in a powerfully energetic condemnation of this world. The psychopathology is that of Psychoanalysis. Modern man's idealism has caused him to become 'hopelessly self-conscious. That is, the great affective centres no longer act spontaneously, but always wait for control from the head.\textsuperscript{26} Having suppressed his lower centres man depends more and more upon 'the old ideas of sympathy and benevolence'. The application of these ideas, however, 'is all will, the fatal love-will and insatiable morbid curiosity. The pure sympathetic mode of love long ago broke down'.\textsuperscript{27} This dominance of mentality and will over the spontaneous psychic balance which constitutes morality causes neurosis, madness and '[i]mmorality, vice, crime'.\textsuperscript{28} It also causes physical illness. Lawrence's view of the unconscious as creative of psyche and body thus reverses the Freudian view according to which the unconscious counterfeits physical illness in neurosis. As so often he returns to a much older, religious-mythical view, but presents it with the claims of science.\textsuperscript{29} In general, however, the psychopathology is careless, often relying on a sort of shorthand condemnation, incomprehensible without the fuller explanations of earlier works. Thus the condemnation of the 'love-will' (the ideal of love imposed by the will) cited above is made in a work which, unlike Psychoanalysis, gives no independent role to

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{26} pp 131 - 132.
  \item \textsuperscript{27} p 116.
  \item \textsuperscript{28} p 116.
  \item \textsuperscript{29} See pp 90 - 91.
\end{itemize}
the will. Instead it identifies it entirely with the upper voluntary centre which in the mature individual should receive its share of fulfilment.

It is within the sphere of the family that the neurosis of modern man is perpetuated and reinforced. Like Burrow, then, Lawrence identifies both sexual perversions and 'so-called normal [sexual] life' with a perverse civilization. Like Burrow, he accepts Freud's description of the contemporary situation but contrasts 'the actual state of affairs today' with 'the ordinary course of development'. Fantasia of the Unconscious sees, therefore, his most extensive attempt to refute the psychoanalytic view of the Oedipus Complex. Mary Freeman describes in terms of individual psychology the challenge which the psychoanalytic concept represented to Lawrence:

Freud's assumption that the residuals of childhood persist essentially unchanged in the adult ran counter to Lawrence's plea for a mature individuality always transcending itself.

The challenge, however, is more profound than this. Barbara Low's account of Freud's view of infantile sexual development, which it is probable that Lawrence read, makes it clear that it is upon his premiss of the biologically based Oedipal situation that Freud's account not only of sexual development and normality but

31. Fantasia, p 172.
33. Lawrence and Barbara Low remained in contact after the Lawrence's departure from England in November 1919. Miss Low appears to have been in possession of a number of Lawrence's manuscripts until his appointment of Curtis Brown as his agent in April 1921. Lawrence's presentation to her of a copy of Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious in June 1921 may have been a return gift.
also, through the concept of man's initial crime, of the nature and development of civilization rests. Lawrence denies this biological basis. The Oedipal situation is the product of the excessive self-consciousness and idealism of the present age; it is culturally, not biologically determined. This refutation clears the way for the possibility of, firstly, a whole, unrepressed man and, secondly, a civilization which would express rather than repress instinct.

Lawrence's account of the development of the modern child and of its deviation from a natural childhood growth follows the account given in 'Education of the People', except for its introduction of four further unconscious centres which should come into being only at puberty. These consist of two 'deeper centres of consciousness and function', the hypogastric plexus and the sacral ganglion, and 'their corresponding poles in the upper body', the cervical plexuses and the cervical ganglia. The parent, unfulfilled in an age which prevents true fulfilment, turns to the child for the fulfilment he has failed to find in the adult marital relationship. The normal impersonal sensual reactions of childhood are suppressed, and in their place the upper centres, which should commence operation only at puberty, are stimulated. The child is thus forced into an adult relationship with the parent, who usurps the position which should be

34. pp 138 - 139.
reserved for the stranger, the adult sexual partner:

And thus, the great love-experience which should lie in the future is forestalled. Within the family, the love-bond forms quickly, without the shocks and raptures inevitable between strangers. And so, it is easiest, intensely - and seems the best. 35

Here is a convincing clarification of the assertion of Studies I that the desire of the upper sympathetic centre 'for merging ... finds its gratification most readily' within the family36. This relationship is spiritual, not sexual, but the polarized response of the unconscious centres forces the adult sexual centres into a corresponding premature operation. The result is sexual curiosity, masturbation and introversion, for the child, failing to find a partner for his premature sexual desires, becomes his own partner.

'On revient toujours à son premier amour.'37. We remain tied to the person who first draws the attraction of the four adult centres of consciousness. The premature excitation by the parent of only two of these centres, the upper two, may be sufficient to produce the permanent connection. Lawrence thus adapts the quotation from Étienne borrowed by Barbara Low from Freud's use of it in the Three Essays38. In Barbara Low's hands it illustrates the natural dependence of later loves upon the initial love for the parent. Lawrence's use stresses the unnatural nature of such a dependence.

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35. p 160.
36. S.M. p 125.
37. p 157.
38. Charles-Guillaume Étienne (1778 - 1845):

On pense, on pense encore
A celle qu'on adore,
Et l'on revient toujours
A ses premiers amours.

Freud, in the Three Essays, (S.E. VII, p 154) quotes correctly. Barbara Low (Psycho-Analysis, p 99) misquotes, substituting: 'nous revenons ... '.
To Lawrence, then, Freud's attempt biologically to justify the Oedipal situation simultaneously produces a view of man humanly unacceptable and justifies the status quo. Its vision of man's nature justifies the idealism which has led us to abstract and control the body, and at the same time echoes it, mirroring the self-repulsion which is the inevitable result of such an abstraction:

We could have produced the same barrenness and frenzy of nothingness in people, perhaps, by dinning it into them that every man is just a charnel-house skeleton of unclean bones. Our "understanding", our science and idealism have produced in people the same strange frenzy of self-repulsion as if they saw their own skulls each time they looked in the mirror. 39

The Freudian treatment for the neurosis which is inseparable from such a civilization merely accentuates its cause. The analytic aim of 'the Patient's own discovery of self' 40 seeks to increase that self-consciousness which is the cause of the Oedipal situation. After psychoanalysis 'we shall be just where we were before: unless we are worse, with more sex in the head, and more introversion, only more brazen' 41.

As prophet of the modern world Freud would therefore lead us to a New Jerusalem which would be an intensification of the perversions of the present. Anticipating Huxley's Brave New World 42, Lawrence presents a powerful attack upon this future 'city of light' 43. A technologically created Paradise, it illustrates that identity of contemporary idealism and materialism upon

39. p 149.
40. Barbara Low, Psycho-Analysis, p 152.
41. p 161.
43. p 167.
which Lawrence is concerned to insist. Both are abstractions from life, seeking its conscious manipulation; the Paradise to which they aspire is therefore both painless and lifeless. The effect of the self-consciousness expressed in such aspirations is that 'man is ... as savage as a cannibal, and more dangerous. The living dynamic self is denaturalized instead of being educated'. Against the Freudian view of the increased capacity for the sublimation of his primitive self which civilization brings to man, Lawrence asserts the destructive effects of such sublimation.

Upon this basis Lawrence reverses also the Freudian vision of history as given in Totem and Taboo. For the first time he fully accepts the conclusion implicit in many of his essays, that the growth of mentality itself responsible for the perversions of society. Thus 'the danger of idealism', not Freud's Oedipal desires, is 'the besetting sin of the human race'. It was man's failure to resist this temptation to self-consciousness and the mental dictation of impulses which led to his expulsion from Paradise. Following Burrow, Lawrence insists that it was not man's sexual impulses but his mentality which caused 'this gnawing disease of unappeasable dissatisfaction'. The savage taboos

44. p 127.
45. S.E. XIII, pp ix - 164.
46. Although Lawrence occasionally uses 'idealism' to refer to the specific philosophical antithesis to materialism, usually as here, he is referring instead to the whole body of abstractions which constitutes the Weltanschauung of an age and forms its 'ideals' in the more usual sense. An ideal is an abstraction pressed against life.
47. p 162.
against incest are the result not of man's natural inclination towards incest but of his mental tendency always to disobey the promptings of impulse. Self-consciousness has caused the destruction of earlier races, in a process which, in accord with Lawrence's view of consciousness as finality, has been a cyclic rather than a continuous one: 'Every race which has become self-conscious and idea-bound in the past has perished. And then it has all started afresh, in a different way, with another race.' When Lawrence rejects evolution, it must be remembered that in Totem and Taboo Freud drew upon the Darwinian concept of a 'primal horde'. It is the rejection of a view which sees man's development as a continuous growth into increasing conscious control, and this development as good. Lawrence seeks to reverse this overvaluation of contemporary civilization and undervaluation of intrinsic man.

Above all, Freud is wrong in giving to sex the primary place in the unconscious, wrong in 'attributing a sexual motive to all human activity.' As scientist, Freud seeks to make sex into a causal principle. He is therefore at once nearer the truth and more dangerous than Jung and Bergson, whose causal principles, the non-sexual libido and the Elan Vital, remaining abstractions from the body of life, offer no convincing threat to the Lawrencean view. Lawrence may be guilty here of once more

49. p 171.
50. p 122.
51. S.E. XIII, esp. pp 125 - 6; 141 - 6; 149; 160.
52. p 145.
generalizing from inadequate information. His source is probably Barbara Low, who states on the one hand that Freud's 'working hypothesis of mind structure implies a creative force, a prime mover, which constantly impels all animate life, and gives the mental processes their dynamic nature', and on the other that 'all the primitive trends of the Psyche are sexual in origin'.

Freud himself denied that he had 'derive[d] "everything from sexuality"'; his psychology was always dualistic, the early theory dividing instinctual impulses into two groups, the libido (sexual) instincts and the ego (self-preservative) instincts. Yet in practice Freud saw the ego-instincts as acting in a purely repressive role, whilst the libido was seen as the energy which drives the psyche in its characteristic search for wish-fulfilment. Lawrence's generalization thus strikes very near the truth.

In contradiction of the Freudian view Lawrence presents once more his own 'conceptual scaffolding'. In seeking to establish the nature of what he opposes to sex as a first cause and to explain how his alternative operates, he also faces the central problems of his position. In the first place, then, Lawrence refuses 'any cause'. Individuality is absolute; life is perpetually created anew. Man's initial impulse is 'the essentially religious or creative motive', expressing itself partly in sex but transcending sex and often directly antagonistic. Life exists always now, and the subjective, rather than any objective speculative

55. pp 60–61.
first cause, is all-important. Lawrence's emphasis upon the individual and the subjective, indeed, is aggressive: 'If you don't believe me, then don't.'

Beyond his concept of initial individuality, Lawrence repeats and develops the psychology of Psychoanalysis. The description of the nature and development of the four unconscious centres follows that of the earlier work, except that the function of the upper voluntary centre, about which Lawrence always seems uncertain, alters slightly once more. More negative in function now, its capacity for negative withdrawal is focussed as a form of power, and it is identified with the spiritual will which in Psychoanalysis was seen as a far more complex force. Once more these centres are seen as forms of relationship and this balanced relationship constitutes morality. Lawrence seeks now to give this concept of morality a wider base, however, including father and siblings as well as mother within the initial sphere of relationship of the child. As well as emphasising their nature as relationship, Lawrence is also far more insistent here upon the different kinds of subjective knowledge to be found at the four unconscious centres.

In addition to this restatement Lawrence also extends the system of the earlier work along lines drawn by its original intention. One of these, taking up the hint at the close of Psychoanalysis, is the addition to the four unconscious centres of a further four, coming into operation at puberty. Continuing

56. p 64.
Lawrence's account of individual development past the stage of puberty, this addition finds its chief cause in his attempt once more to refute Freud. Compared to the original account the addition is unconvincing. Lawrence's arguments are circular: the new centres whose function is to account for the changes of puberty, provide also the evidence for these psychological changes. In addition, the original compact system, which specifically served adult as well as child, is weakened: functions are redivided and self-contradictions result. Nevertheless, the general argument which this addition serves does provide a persuasive alternative to the Freudian view. Lawrence insists upon the accession into responsibility which puberty brings, upon the radical difference between adult and infantile relationship, and his account identifies the developments of puberty with natural growth.  

'Childhood is a chrysalis from which each must extricate himself', writes Lawrence, thus rendering the psychological changes of puberty as part of that growth which is implicit in life itself. The changes which Freud describes, on the other hand, run counter to this growth. Repression of infantile sexuality characterizes puberty and is wholly dominant in females. Adult sexuality is itself partly repressive and the higher forms of love are the result of sexual repression. Lawrence's additional centres mean that all forms of love are an expansion not a reduction of possibility and that sexual fulfilment, like all other forms of individual fulfilment, should be the goal of maturity.

57. p 150.
Other developments are towards a much greater translation into developmental terms than occurred in Psychoanalysis of the psychological system of the earlier work, and, as a parallel, a closer connection between the psychic and the physical. One result is that the blood, the symbol used so often in the fiction to signify the unconscious in its most elemental sense, becomes, as it did briefly in Studies I, the 'blood-consciousness'. Blood-consciousness is the psychic at its nearest to the physical, 'the consciousness of the night when the soul is almost asleep'\(^{58}\). It governs physical sexual activity and, though almost 'one and homogeneous' with 'the blood stream of mankind', is nevertheless still 'integral and individual'\(^{59}\). Another connection between the two is provided by the five senses. '[H]alf-psychic, half-functional', the senses are the medium of unconscious relationship but their perceptions also inform consciousness. As the former, all involve the active participation of the individual in a reciprocal, not merely a passive relationship with the external world. All are expressive as well as creative of our vision of the world. Once more Lawrence makes the physical dependent upon rather than creative of unconscious reactions and insists upon the unalterable subjectivity of man's vision of the world.

Upon the full development of all the unconscious centres occurs mature or transcendent individuality. This, the 'central

\(^{58}\) p 202.

\(^{59}\) p 203.
fullness of self-possession, the soul held in 'stillness and solitude' is the goal of life, the point at which man's derivative elements are truly absorbed into a whole individuality. It is to be distinguished from the initial spark of individuality which all life possesses; it is the Holy Ghost which all may but few do achieve. It is this distinction between potential and achieved individuality which makes Lawrence's a religious and not merely a naturalistic philosophy. His is essentially a twice-born religion, and it is the second birth which distinguishes intrinsic from historical man. Yet at the same time creative individuality expresses itself naturally in civilization. Lawrence describes man's greatness:

nothing will ever quench humanity and the human potentiality to evolve something magnificent out of renewed chaos.

I do not believe in evolution, but in the strangeness and rainbow-change of ever-renewed creative civilizations.

Norman O. Brown in Life against Death writes that the unrepressed or fulfilled man would be 'a man strong enough to live and therefore strong enough to die, and therefore what no man has ever been, an individual'. Animals 'let death be a part of life, and use the death instinct to die'. Man represses life and, because he has not lived, 'aggressively builds immortal cultures and makes history in order to fight death'.

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60. p 156.
61. p 180.
62. p 56.
63. Life against Death (London, 1959), pp 291; 101; 103.
conclusion is drawn from his attempt to reinterpret Freud's views and in particular the final dualism by which Freud chose to structure his psychology, that between Eros (the life instinct) and Thanatos (the death instinct). Lawrence, from the opposite direction, comes very close to the position to which Brown would like to extend psychoanalysis. Modern man's neurosis can be seen as his cutting himself off from death and consequently from life. In Fantasia Lawrence fully addresses himself to the problem of the place of death and destruction in a philosophy concerned primarily with life.

Within the psyche, then, the destructive aspects of the unconscious receive more emphasis than in Psychoanalysis. This emphasis centres upon the voluntary centres, whose negative nature is now seen as more actively destructive. From the lower voluntary centre comes the desire actively to destroy, 'to smash'; from the upper voluntary centre comes the desire for 'the obliteration of the thing which is outside', a 'sort of nervous critical objectivity'. This desire too is destructive, although 'in its true harmony the thoracic ganglion is a centre of happier activity: of real, eager curiosity, of the delightful desire to pick things to pieces'. Both are forms of will. Both, if properly balanced, release destruction in the service of life. Lawrence's desire to admit this destructive activity is so great, indeed, that, as so often in earlier works, he admits forms of activity elsewhere condemned. The 'benevolent spiritual will' is admitted

64. p 80.
65. p 181.
as a proper unconscious activity, permissible if held within the
correct psychic balance.

Death itself is discussed chiefly in the chapters 'Cosmological'
and 'Sleep and Dreams'. The basis is the cosmological chapter,
'The Two Principles' in Studies I. Here, however, Lawrence
alters his two principles and he is less concerned with them than
with the relationship between life and matter, or death. Life,
always unconscious and individual, precedes matter:

There is only one clue to the universe. And that is
the individual soul within the individual being. That
outer universe of suns and moons and atoms is a secondary
affair. 66

Inanimate matter is the result of the death of individuals. Being
dead, it alone is infinite. Thus 'living' individuals have no
infinity save in relation to the total death-substance
and death-being. 67. The laws of matter, or death, are those dis­
dcovered by the physical sciences, yet even within the world of
death these laws are not absolute, for

since the living really sway the universe, even if unknow­
ingly; therefore there is no one universal law, even for
the physical forces. 68

The universe of death sways always to the impulses of life. The
conclusions of science, mistaking effect for incalculable cause,
look for ultimate solutions in death rather than in life:

The atom? Why, the moment you discover the atom it will
explode under your nose. 69

66. p 181.
67. p 186.
68. p 163.
69. pp 180 - 181.
Fifty years later, the assertion that this particular search of science could produce only death has an additional twist. The conclusions of Psychoanalysis with regard to psychology are thus extended here. Science explores only death, yet we have a whole living universe of knowledge before us. The universe of life and death, of which we, whose business it is to live and die, know nothing.

In the physical sciences also, the objective should bow before the subjective, science before life.

Yet despite his insistence that there 'is nothing in the world that is true except empiric discoveries which work in actual appliances', Lawrence's eagerness to reinterpret science leads him once more to rely upon it. Einstein's law of relativity is his chief prop, but the laws of magnetism, of electricity and of genetics are also invoked to support Lawrence's arguments. In addition, Lawrence invents his own abstractions, at least as far from the 'empiric discoveries' of life as are the laws of science.

Whatever its inadequacies, however, Lawrence's cosmology has important implications for his theory as a whole. For individual life is seen as not only creating the world of death but as also growing from it. The earth is 'the centre of our substantial death' and it is in the earth that we, like the tree, are rooted. From the earth we 'thrust away' into individual,

70. p 183.

71. In June 1921 Lawrence requested from Koteliansky 'a simple book on Einstein's Relativity'. He received it on 15 June and on 16 June pronounced Einstein 'not so metaphysically marvelous [sic] but I like him for taking out the pin which fixed down our fluttering little physical universe'. See O.R. pp 220; 223; 224.

72. p 191.
positive life, but towards it we fall in death and in it we are
united. Life is always absolute and individual but, rising always
from death its birth is always a rebirth.

This 'duality of life and death' is also within us.
As earlier, the automatic physical processes which operate beneath
life are the products of death; the senses which bridge function
and unconscious bridge also death and life. In particular Lawrence
has in mind those digestive and excretory processes always associ­
ated in his work with death. In addition, death is manifest in
the cerebral processes. This connection is made partly for the
reason which leads Bergson also to make it: the mind deals so
naturally with the material world that it appears to have affinities
with it. Thus science as the study of death contains that death
also within it. Lawrence's plea, like Bergson's, is for a
subjectively-based science which 'proceeds in terms of life and
is established on data of living experience and of sure intuition.'
Partly, also, the connection is made because of the finality which
characterizes mental processes. 'To know is to die,' and to
seek to inject knowledge is to prevent life ever occurring.
Knowledge should be a distillation of unconscious experience;
to seek to make it replace that experience is to substitute death
for life.

Linking the physical and the cerebral is the concept of
automatism. Both physical and mental process operate automatically;

73. p 181.
74. p 54. Compare Bergson, Creative Evolution (London, 1911),
esp. pp 186 - 88.
75. p 108.
both demonstrate their nature in that living state which most nearly approximates to death, sleep. Once again Lawrence seeks to refute the Freudian view, this time the psychoanalytic concept of dreams. Again Lawrence's information about the Freudian view appears to come from Barbara Low. In 'The Role of the Dream', she discusses the dream function, the dream mechanisms and dream symbols; all are given alternative explanations by Lawrence. Once more he is inaccurate, failing in his account to make the all-important distinction between the dream's manifest content (the dream as we remember it), and its latent content (the actual desires it represents). He oversimplifies the Freudian view and elaborates his alternative explanations to the point of self-contradiction. Yet in essence his account reinforces his own positive alternative to Freud. Freud's view that the unconscious operates in sleep reflects his view of it as solitary, deterministic, outside time and responsibility. For Lawrence the unconscious, or soul, is awake, responsible, operating in relationship and in the present. The dream cannot therefore be its vehicle. Instead the dream reflects the cerebral and physical automatism operative in sleep, when the 'automatic pseudo-soul ... has got the sensual nature repressed'. When it has psychological significance at all, it is antagonistic to the living unconscious, drawing the static conclusions transcended by the ever-creative soul. Thus incestuous dreams reflect the initial, destructive relationship with the parent, not the creative desire of the soul, which would outgrow such a relationship.

76. Psycho-Analysis, pp 104 - 129.
77. p 199.
The automatic dream-activity, as 'the death activity busy in the service of life'\textsuperscript{78}, provides a model for the correct relationship of death to life. Death, like destruction, is not to be denied. 'To know is to die' but 'knowledge and death are part of our natural development'\textsuperscript{79}. If knowledge and the unconscious, death and life, are mutually destructive, they are also mutually complementary. Each death makes possible rebirth. Even scientific activity as it now exists is permissible within the limits of death. Science is 'perfect as far as it goes. But to regard it as exhausting the whole scope of human possibility in knowledge seems to me just puerile'\textsuperscript{80}. Death must be active in us, and must be accepted as such. Its acceptance, both outside and within ourselves, means the possibility of creative life in the present: 'life is the life of living creatures, and death is always our affair'\textsuperscript{81}. The refusal to accept it means, paradoxically, a victory for death, but death in a more subtle and corrupt form. 'Poor, nerve-worn creatures, ... hating to die because we have never lived'\textsuperscript{82}, we aspire to the infinity which belongs to death alone. The result is the dominance of the deathly intellect; science creates 'life-substitute - just as we have butter-substitute, and meat-substitute...'\textsuperscript{83}.

Julian Moynahan writes that

it seems to me that Lawrence has discovered the perfect place to rest a case against an industrial civilization. For no one pretends that such a civilization offers

\textsuperscript{78} p 193.
\textsuperscript{79} p 108.
\textsuperscript{80} p 54.
\textsuperscript{81} p 64.
\textsuperscript{82} p 123.
\textsuperscript{83} p 174.
spiritual rewards to its supporters. It offers merely the promise of a richer material existence, and Lawrence suggests that the offer is a swindle. What is given by one hand is taken away by the other, since dead men cannot appreciate, except in a simulated way, the benefits of life. 84.

Lawrence's fullest treatment of death not only gives it its legitimate place within a philosophy of life but uses it to place a civilization which has transgressed the principles of life.

The relationship of death to life is in part equivalent to the relationship between consciousness and the unconscious, or soul. The problems of this relationship, largely evaded in Psychoanalysis, are also explored here. Lawrence's account of childhood development, then, now includes a description of the growth to and beyond consciousness. Mental consciousness and individuality are now seen as parallel, but separate, results of the fulfilment at the four primary centres. Knowledge means death, however, and the results of unconscious fulfilment inevitably diminish that fulfilment: 'That is, as its individuality and its mental concept of the mother develop in the child, there is a corresponding waning of the dynamic relation between the child and the mother.' 85. The greater the mental knowledge, the less vital is the living relationship. Thus no living relationship can be dictated by an idea and the completion of the idea of the self, the ego, means the death of the self.

'Knowledge is to consciousness what the signpost is to the traveller: just an indication of the way which has been travelled before.' 86. Nevertheless, Lawrence's emphasis upon unconscious

85. p 108.
86. p 112.
individuality is balanced by a respect for mentality. Mentality brings the capacity for choice, and therefore responsibility. Added to unconscious impulse it produces wisdom, the state wherein we know the great relations which exist between us and our near ones. And it is the state which accepts full responsibility, first for our own souls, and then for the living dynamic relations wherein we have our being. It is no use expecting the other person to know. Each must know for himself. 87

Inevitably leadership means mental as well as physical consciousness.

Lawrence indeed at one point regroups his psychological divisions into a tripartite division of soul, psyche and mind, in which mentality plays its full part in fulfilment. This attempt to find a formula which will finally clarify his view of fulfilled man in face of the vicious circle of self-consciousness perpetuated by the family and sanctioned by psychoanalysis defines the soul as the life-spark of individuality, creative of impulse. Its psychological, semi-automatic manifestation is the psyche. Mind is the product of the two, but active in its own sphere, creative and not merely passive:

The business of mind is first and foremost the pure joy of knowing and comprehending [sic] the pure joy of consciousness. 88

Achieved individuality, as distinct from its initial spark, means the possibility of a transcendent fusion of the three into full consciousness, the Holy Ghost or conscience: 'Conscience is the being's consciousness, when the individual is conscious in toto, when he knows in full'. 89 Lawrence here, in his concept of the

87. p 91.
88. p 165.
89. p 165.
psyche, permits the possibility of an automatism which is purely habitual. Consciousness then assumes a more positive role: its knowledge may be used to break the hold of automatism in order that impulse may be free to operate. A concept of mature individuality is offered which, unlike that of Psychoanalysis, is inclusive of mind.

Achieved individuality thus transcends the tendency of the three aspects to pull apart. But it is this division which has characterized history. One element has become dominant; in Western civilization it has been mentality. The 'mindful Romans', anticipating the mindful Freud's later judgements upon the unconscious, saw the trees (here, as so often in Lawrence's work, epitomizing unconscious life) of the Black Forest as dangerous. They 'shrank before the trees that had no faces, and no answer. A vast array of non-human life, darkly self-sufficient, and bristling with indomitable energy'. Viewed from above, the forest is menacing. From within, although they may be dangerous to mentality, its trees can be seen as calm and protecting. 'The idea, the actual idea, must rise ever fresh, ever displaced, like the leaves of a tree'. Our imposition of abstraction means the folly of scientific final causes and 'the nullification of all living activity, the substitution of mechanism, and all the resultant horrors of ennui, ecstasy, neurasthenia, and a collapsing psyche'.

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90. p 84.
91. p 119.
92. p 119.
93. See esp. p 62.
In individual terms, then, Lawrence would appear satisfactorily to have resolved the problems implicit in his philosophy. Fantasia, however, is directed beyond the individual. Lawrence begins by linking the New Jerusalem of 'Revelation' and the promised land of 'Exodus' in his criticism of Freud as prophet of the modern world. If Freud would lead man to the Promised Land of death, then Lawrence appears as the saviour who would lead us back to life. Man must prepare for 'a whole new way of life, a new society'. Despite his mockery of 'the world-regenerators', that is precisely Lawrence's aim.

Civilization is again seen as being in a wintry state. Like individuals, 'old forms must die', in preparation, since 'dead leaves make good mould', for rebirth. But Lawrence's belief in 'the strangeness and rainbow-change of ever-renewed creative civilizations' extends only to the past. Our civilization is seen once more as having extended its self-consciousness too far; no 'great reservoirs of energetic barbaric life' now exist to provide spontaneous rebirth. Rebirth must occur from within; we ourselves 'must carry through all the collapse the living clue to the next civilization'. As in 'the Reality of Peace', therefore, understanding is necessary, an understanding capable of choosing to relinquish its own control in favour

94. p 123.
95. p 67.
96. p 208.
97. p 56.
98. p 208.
99. p 208.
of spontaneity: 'we must know, if only in order to learn not to know'. We 'still have in us the power to discriminate between our own idealism, our own self-conscious will, and that other reality, our own true spontaneous self. Lawrence assigns to self-knowledge, including that which he is engaged in presenting, the role which Freud gave to its opposite, faith. It is to be employed in order to secure its own abolition, as a means of reaching that state of health where its support will no longer be necessary.

As in 'Education of the People' choice must be made of a new belief. In the 'Foreword' Lawrence states this view in terms which indicate also his personal aspirations:

Men live and see according to some gradually developing and gradually withering vision. This vision exists also as a dynamic idea or metaphysic - exists first as such. Then it is unfolded into life and art.

This view presents, however, two problems. The first is that Lawrence also insists that the 'Ideal is always evil, no matter what ideal it be'. His own 'pollyanalytics' are 'inferences made afterwards, from the experience'. Such a self-contradiction leads to the concept of ideals which exist only in terms of the self: 'I may have ideals if I like ... But I have no right to ask another to have these ideals'.

100. pp 112; 122.
102. p 57.
103. p 119.
104. p 57.
105. p 90.
The second problem, again anticipated in 'Education of the People', is that the present represents a vicious circle, self-perpetuating and incapable of change. Lawrence becomes uncertain of his proposals. Destruction seems inevitable, he can urge only individual withdrawal; both the object of his appeals and their level of seriousness become uncertain. The system of the earlier work, both social and educational, is urged once more, but now with greater vehemence and greater extravagance, and supported by Burrow's similar criticisms of present-day education. Lawrence writes:

For the mass of people, knowledge must be symbolical, mythical, dynamic. This means you must have a higher, responsible, conscious class: and then in varying degrees the lower classes, varying in their degree of consciousness.

In practice these classes resolve themselves into two, the ruling classes and the proletariat: 'The leaders must stand for life, and they must not ask the simple followers to point out the direction.' More specifically, Lawrence presents himself as a future leader:

I would like the working man to give me back the responsibility for general affairs, a responsibility which he can't acquit, and which saps his life. I would like him to give me back the responsibility for thought, for direction.

107. p 113.
108. p 123.
109. p 149.
Education is to be directed above all to the prevention of premature or unnatural mentality. Action is to be substituted 'for the mass of people, in place of mental activity'. It must be recognized that 'every extraneous idea effectually introduced into a man's mind is a direct obstruction of his dynamic activity'.

Sex education above all is to be avoided before puberty: 'Let nothing be exaggeratedly hidden ... Exaggerated secrecy is bad. But indecent exposure is also very bad. But worst of all is dragging in the mental consciousness of these shadowy dynamic realities'.

Once again this system has the air of a compromise, impossible to operate without a reborn man, yet half designed to bring about this rebirth. Lawrence's view that there 'are few, few people in whom the living impulse and reaction develops and sublimates into mental consciousness' becomes confused with his view of historical men as 'half-born slaves' to produce a system which imposes control whilst claiming to express.

Julian Moynahan provides the essential criticism of this system as Lawrence presents it, as a remedy for historical man.

Lawrence gives

the image of a society in which a ruling class controls the responses of the masses by controlling and dictating the symbols to which these ignorant masses give unconscious

110. pp 122-123.
111. p 120.
112. p 131.
113. pp 119; 71.
and inevitable obedience. Whether this "conscious" class were a priesthood, a military clique, or a dictator's ministers, it would be in a position to become absolutely corrupted in the enjoyment of absolute power. 114

Such a system, whilst reflecting Lawrence's loss of belief in the capacity for fulfilment of most men, is clearly far from expressive of his fundamental intentions.

These problems Lawrence seeks to resolve by introducing the concept of a fundamental purposive impulse, manifest in the human male, operative in societal activity, upon which society should be, but at present is not, founded. Such a concept would clearly avoid the problems inherent in Lawrence's identification of civilization with consciousness and the ideal. As presented, it has complex origins. The concept of a specifically male purposive activity appeared in the earliest essays, but always identified with consciousness. In 'Education of the People' a communal male activity appeared, but was intellectual activity disguised as passion. The idea that such an activity might have unconscious origins probably stems from the views of Trigant Burrow. The primary preconscious posited by Burrow was not, like Lawrence's redefined unconscious, radically individual. Rather it appears as a 'societal consciousness', seeking a 'social merging of personalities': 'it is this quality of harmoniousness and unity inherent in the social aims of man that is, it seems to me, the strongest principle of man's consciousness. 115.

That Lawrence was attracted to this view may be seen in his review of Burrow's *The Social Basis of Consciousness* of November 1927\(^{116}\), although his letters suggest that ultimately he could not accept it\(^{117}\).

Lawrence, then, suggests a primary purposive impulse which is both antagonistic and complementary to the sexual impulse:

> You have got to base your great purposive activity upon the intense sexual fulfilment of all your individuals... But you have got to keep your sexual fulfilment even then subordinate, just subordinate to the great passion of purpose... \(^{118}\)

Moreover, 'there can be no successful sex union unless the greater hope of purposive constructive activity fires the soul of the man all the time: or the hope of passionate, purposive destructive activity: the two amount religiously to the same thing, within the individual.'\(^{119}\) Such a concept surmounts the problem of the radical individuality of Lawrence's view of man. It suggests the possibility of a society regulated on impulse rather than on ideal. It suggests also the possibility of revolution, for despite the incapacity of most men to respond to a new belief, they may respond to the promptings of an impulse. Eugene Goodheart summarizes the claims which may be made for such a concept against the views of Freud. For Freud, to whom culture

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117. *C.L.* pp. 993 - 4 (Letter of 3 August 1927): "there will never be a millenium. There will never be a 'true societal flow'.."

118. p 145.

119. p 214.
arises from the sublimation of the sexual impulse, 'a tension ... exists within every individual and every culture between the direct expression of the sexual instinct and the need to convert it to the uses of civilized life'. There is, therefore, 'a generic tragic opposition between the self and culture'. Lawrence, however, 'conceives of culture in its ideal form as a fulfilment of the passional - visionary self'. 'The unconscious is the divine presence in man from which all genuine civilization draws its energy'. Thus Lawrence's view permits the possibility of a transcendence of the tension between impulse and repression which for Freud is implicit in civilization120. Civilization would then receive a religious basis. The dichotomy between individual passion and social reason once transcended, leaders would indeed, as Lawrence proposed in 'Education of the People', become priests.

Lawrence's means of resolving the dichotomy between impulse and civilization is far from satisfactory, however, both in general and in individual terms. Philip Rieff, analysing this aspect of Lawrence's thought, identifies his use of the purposive impulse with the plea in *Psychoanalysis* for a return to the religious mode and concludes that Lawrence's is a therapy for religious commitment only, and not commitment itself121. As regards the purposive impulse, such a criticism is substantially correct.

Lawrence's religious absolute is the self, a self expressed in relationship with the cosmos. Thus in Fantasia the purposive impulse receives its value 'within the individual'. Conceived in terms of the self, and specifically in terms of Lawrence's own needs for community, it is essentially a means of tying civilization to the individual. Not fixed to any ideal, because of its character as impulse, it has no direction. Philip Rieff comments:

if they are to be effective, passionate purposes must be steady; and if they are steady, they must develop into 'fixed ideals'. Just this steadiness of purpose, Lawrence considers, needs breaking. This ... satisfaction of the religious need through passionate purpose dissolves, under analysis, into mere passion for purpose.

At the same time, however, Lawrence is aware that commitment, if it is to be effective, must be absolute and must be to something outside the self. His solution is to combine the purposive impulse with the vision of the ideal society first proposed in 'Education of the People'. The immediate goal for man's purpose is the production of the society which will guide man towards, and then head, such a society. Such a solution is circular, postponing rather than resolving the problem of the distinction between impulse and its direction. It is also both dangerous and self-deluding. If the followers may express impulse in their commitment to a leader, the leader must still be committed to an ideal. Purpose is to be divided between impulse and its

122. See pp 157; 169.
123. Introduction to Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious: Fantasia of the Unconscious, p xvi.
realization, knowledge between symbol and its interpretation. Lawrence's idea of individual fulfilment for the mass becomes that of the surrender by each man of 'his individuality to the great urge which is upon him'. Mature responsibility is now to consist of the maintenance of this loss.

Thus Lawrence's attempt to envisage a society based on impulse and thus free of the crippling self-consciousness which would characterize the Freudian future brings the prospect of a loss of individual freedom for the majority. Individual fulfilment in the terms in which he has envisaged it can be combined with a societal impulse only by the imposition of a caste division which would deny to most men the possibility of such a fulfilment.

In terms of Lawrence's individual psychology, his solution is no more satisfactory. In the first place, Lawrence claims that the purposive impulse is identical with man's primary creativity, as 'the pure disinterested craving to make something wonderful, out of his own head and his own self, and his own soul's faith and delight'. Yet at the same time he cannot avoid the fact that its ultimate expression is through the upper centres and consciousness, 'in spirit, in understanding', as an 'ideal or social principle'. Thus, in contradiction to all earlier accounts, it is the conscious aspects of man which appear as best expressing his primary creativity.

124. p 144.
125. p 60.
126. pp 143; 145.
Lawrence seems in fact to be seeking to identify what are elsewhere recognized by him as two different, even opposed, types of creation. Borrowing terms from Leone Vivante, these may be called intrinsic and extrinsic purposiveness, the self-creative and the mentally created. In the first there is fulfilment and death, potentiality but never stasis. The second is creation from material by force, producing a static, non self-renewing result. Civilization, Lawrence supposes in 'Education of the People', is largely a product of the latter. His identification of the two here arises partly from the desperation of his desire to recreate a dying civilization and partly from generalization from his own masculine 'purpose': art. Art, in its capacity as created object, is a product of the latter type of creation; in so far as it has the power to embody the creative processes which have produced it and which it may describe, it is capable of entering into the realm of the former. Lawrence would make it possible for each man's extrinsic purpose to be expression and communication of his intrinsic purposiveness.

Secondly, this type of fulfilment appears as opposed to sexual fulfilment. Lawrence would seek to avoid the Freudian conclusion that civilization is the result of the sublimation of the sexual instinct. The result, however, is the presentation of a psyche irreparably split, its two fulfilments, sex and purpose, separated in time and opposed. With sex are identified the lower centres, particularly the hypogastric plexus and the semi-material blood. Operative at night, associated primarily

with the female, it is isolationist and anti-cultural. It is to this activity, mindless, almost soulless, that individual relationship is reduced. With the upper centres is identified the purposive impulse, expressed in unity and active during the day in cultural production. Manifest in conscious, social activity, it involves the abandonment of individuality. Thus the complex psychological balance of *Psychoanalysis* is lost; there is no form of activity or relationship which can unite the two modes, and no possibility of that interchange between them which in the earlier work constituted creative growth. As in 'The Crown', man possesses his source (sex) and his goal (purpose), but there is now no transcendent element which might fuse the two into individual wholeness.

Thirdly, purpose is exclusively male. Lawrence, encouraged also by his refutation of Freud's theory of bisexuality and his own condemnation of the self-conscious modern woman, develops an account of sexual roles which, like his earlier accounts, emerges as severely unbalanced. To the woman is given only sexual activity; her 'true polarity of consciousness ... is downwards', towards 'the loins and the belly'. Her goal is 'the deep, sensual individualism of secrecy and night-exclusive-ness, hostile, with guarded doors'.\(^{128}\) To the man, however, is given both activities. Women 'live forever by feeling, and men live forever from an inherent sense of purpose'\(^{129}\), but at night

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129. p 138.
the man returns to give his wife her gratification. Thus the woman assumes a totally supportive role; she must 'relinquish her own self-assertion, and believe in the man who believes in himself' and goes beyond her. It is ironic that at this point, the division of sexual roles, where Lawrence's attack on Freud's failure to distinguish culture from biology could bite home, he agrees with his antagonist. The woman's role is biologically determined and is essentially self-sacrificial, Lawrence fails to see that in demanding of her the total relinquishment of personal goals and in thus limiting her potentialities, he is denying to her that self-renewing creativity which for him characterizes life. Such a role would actually encourage that restless turning to the children for satisfaction which he sees as characteristic of the modern, unfulfilled woman.

It would appear, then, that Lawrence's vision of the fulfilled individual, though it implies always a supportive community, cannot be harmonized with a vision of a future structured society. The sexual relationship, and here Lawrence and Freud agree, is fundamentally anarchic, and it is with the sexual relationship that Lawrence, despite his denials in Fantasia, is principally concerned. His view of what is necessary if civilization is to be based upon impulse, is destructive of his view of the fulfilled individual. The resulting self-contradictions are ones which will characterize all Lawrence's attempts of the nineteen-twenties to root civilization in individual impulse. The attempt there to identify individual potency and political power will be no more successful than the

130. p 160.
effort here to identify intrinsic and extrinsic purpose.

The vision of the whole individual which Lawrence has up to this time held before him as a promise, intuited not experienced, becomes, in the very effort to press it against a resistant present, broken. The vision of man with which he closes Fantasia is of an individual incapable of wholeness, able only to act and to react. Lawrence, indeed, returns to the vision of a divided man with which he began in the Foreword to Sons and Lovers. He asks once more the same question:

Was man, the eternal protagonist, born of woman, from her womb of fathomless emotion? Or was woman, with her deep womb of emotion, born from the rib of active man, the first created? 131

There is now, however, no ambivalence in the answer. Lawrence takes the part of the man, despite all his insistence upon the primacy of the unconscious. Despite the excellence and clarity of many of the insights of Fantasia, the concept upon which it closes shows both self-division and self-delusion. Lawrence can extend his views into a vision of salvation for civilization only by disguising the activity of the 'spirit' as an alternative form of the 'flesh' with which he began.

A glance at the form of Fantasia intensifies this impression of confusion. The controlled form, the consistency of style and of terminology of Psychoanalysis are an indication of its importance for Lawrence as a climax of his philosophy. To move beyond its position, clearly that form must be broken, yet it is broken in the direction of disintegration rather than of growth. Although individual parts of Fantasia show the movement

131. p 133.
toward struggle and resolution, formulation and reformulation, familiar from earlier essays, the work as a whole shows unity become division.

Abandoning the coherence of Psychoanalysis, Fantasia has no clearly definable structure. Instead, it is characterized by a dominant movement: that of action and reaction, toward and away from Lawrence's involvement in his own plans, his own effort at leadership, his own struggle towards resolution. Operative throughout the work, as retreat from abstraction, from the impersonal to the personal or as abandonment to isolation and despair, this movement finds its most extreme example in the fourth chapter. In 'Trees and Babies and Papas and Mamas,' Lawrence's retreat is presented literally. He becomes an actor in his own work, retreating from abstraction to a consideration of his surroundings, abandoning thought and responsibility. At such times the emphasis is upon the subjective, the non-conscious, the individual. The appeal to the objectivity of science is abandoned. Both the desire consciously to persuade, and the corresponding revulsion from consciousness are stronger here than in Psychoanalysis.

The style shows a similar division. At times the effort of the earlier work to present subjective realization in an objective manner is continued. But techniques of fiction become more prominent. Images become scenes, with context and characters, language is emotive, imprecise, rhythmic. In contrast there emerges the mockingly satiric style characteristic of the work of the nineteen-twenties. The juxtaposition is probably a

132. pp 81 - 5.
result of Lawrence's bitterness at the failure of Psychoanalysis, but the subject of parody is not always the self-conscious and uncomprehending world. He writes:

I'm sure, dear reader, you'd rather have to listen to the baby howling in its crib than to me expounding its plexuses. As for "mixing those babies up", I'd mix him up like a shot if I'd anything to mix him with. Unfortunately he's my own anatomical specimen of a pickled rabbit, so there's nothing to be done with the bits. 133

The mockery here is of Lawrence's own effort to marry the subjective with the objective.

Most significant of all is the terminology. Earlier philosophical formulations have sought to transcend previous conclusions through the development of a new terminology or the clarification and extension of one which has grown into being in the course of the preceding work. Each has sought to clarify the relation between body and spirit, to move closer to a union of subjective and objective, to contain duality within a transcendent unity. Fantasia, however, shows a bewildering variety of terms. The early part of the work continues and expands the terminology of Psychoanalysis, but in the absence of the vital, unifying term of the earlier work, 'the unconscious'. Thus new terms are created and abandoned, not integrated into a total vision. Older categories become inexact; the two divisions, sympathetic-voluntary and upper-lower, struggle for priority, assimilating attributes earlier otherwise distributed.

Later in the work the terminology of Psychoanalysis is for the most part abandoned, replaced by a return to much earlier terms. The religious character of much of this terminology

133. p 81.
reflects Lawrence's reaction away from objectivity, but its confused return gives the impression of retreat. Thus, sense and spirit, soul and mind, being and knowing, the Source and the Goal, briefly return to replace Lawrence's psychological descriptions of man's duality. For a time the wholly symbolic categories of sun and moon are used to draw together Lawrence's divisions of man. Elsewhere the chief division is into male and female attributes: 'Action and utterance, which are male, are polarized against feeling, emotion, which are female.' The result is the characteristic weighting of the scales which this division inevitably provokes in Lawrence:

Man, acting in the passive or feminine polarity, is still man, and he doesn't have one single unmanly feeling. And women, when they speak and write, utter not one single word that men have not taught them.

Lawrence's final attempt to draw together earlier divisions into a single psychic duality which will serve also as an answer to psychoanalysis is his division between sex and purpose. Compared to the vision of creativity of the 'Study', of transcendence of 'The Crown' or of individual balance and wholeness of Psychoanalysis, such a division can offer only a reduced picture of human possibility. That Lawrence should end in polemic is therefore not surprising; his final withdrawal into uncertainty sounds a note of honest perplexity at his own loss of direction.

134. p 133.
136. There is of course an Epilogue in the (original) American edition of the work. See the Viking Compass Edition, pp 222 - 225.
Stephen Spender writes in *The Destructive Element*:

The importance of Lawrence as a revolutionary and a preacher is that he insisted on real and living values. This is revolutionary, because it is clear that if human beings insist on having lives with these values, they cannot accept society as it now is. 137

It is Lawrence's own acceptance of this status as a revolutionary which provides the stumbling block in Fantasia. His preoccupation with death is finally resolved into a powerful view of man's needs and potentialities in his relationship to death and a criticism of a society which, in cutting itself off from death, denies and perverts life. His ambivalent attitude to the consciousness which is 'the most double-edged blessing of all', 138 becomes a vision of man's history in which his initial sin has been to allow mentality the dominance which it craves. But the solution to the resulting situation lies also with the mind in its capacity, informed by the soul, for choice, and future man must hold mind in check only by a complete self which includes, whilst transcending, mind. In finally refuting the antagonist whose views have in turn attracted, stimulated and repulsed him, Lawrence's individual philosophy completes itself. But in offering himself as the Christ to Freud's Anti-Christ for a civilization all too ready to accept analysis as its salvation, he pushes it into collapse. The importance which Lawrence attached to its success is expressed in the

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138. 'Education of the People', *Phoenix*, p 605.
Foreword to Fantasia. 'The novels and poems come unwatched out of one's pen', he writes, born of 'pure passionate experience'. In a dying age, however, the novelist must re-create the metaphysical structure which will support his novels before he is able to return to 'the fulfilment in life and art'.¹³⁹ Women in Love was to be called The Latter Days or Dies Irae; it was Lawrence's final judgement of the old. The new world to which he is now committed must see art and philosophy, or metaphysic, at last pull in the same direction. The novels of the next few years will seek to realize this aim.

Fantasia's purposive impulse, however, has been no true solution to the problem of Lawrence's inherent opposition to civilization as formed. It has provided only an illusory means by which he could believe that he might drag an unready mankind into his reborn future. In reality it expresses his lack of faith in the ability of most men to achieve this rebirth and it fails truly to overcome the fact that civilization needs the ideals which Lawrence's philosophy of the individual unconscious condemns. This failure illuminates the failure which will attend his next three novels.¹⁴¹ For they will be born not of the climax represented by Psychoanalysis and aspects of Fantasia but of the contradictions and failures of Fantasia. Lawrence here prefigures the structure of Aaron's Rod and Kangaroo.

¹³⁹. p 57.
¹⁴⁰. See C.I. pp 477; 480.
¹⁴¹ Aaron's Rod (New York and London, 1922); Kangaroo (London and New York, 1923); The Plumed Serpent (London and New York, 1926). Aaron's Rod, begun in November 1917, was taken up again in 1921 and written concurrently with Fantasia, being completed in June 1921. See Q.R. p 219; C.I. p 656.
particularly that of *Kangaroo*, in his movement from action to reaction, male involvement in consciousness to marital isolation and the unconscious. Already he can be seen turning to the presentation of himself as both actor and interpreter, author and protagonist\(^1\), but here in an attempt to escape the problems brought by his involvement in the effort at leadership. This suggests that the novel form itself, with its presentation of action and consciousness and its capacity to contain contradictions, will be used now in an effort to attain that transcendence not finally achieved within this long struggle in philosophy.

\(^{142}\) Birkin of *Women in Love* is not a self-presentation in quite the manner of Lilly of *Aaron's Rod* or Somers of *Kangaroo*. 
6. **AFTERWARDS**
Graham Hough, in his excellent chapter on Lawrence's 'Doctrine', writes that after the Fantasia of the Unconscious the doctrine was pretty well complete, but it had not yet been shown in action. The creative effort of the next few years is to show it at work - in the political and religious spheres as well as in individual life ... And the struggle is conducted largely in fiction, the doctrine itself being unchanged. 1

Lawrence, that is, having formulated his 'metaphysic', must now 'go forward again, to the fulfilment in ... art'. Art and metaphysic, separated for so long in the novel, must begin now in Lawrence's work to pull together, in a fiction which will embody the vision of 'the next future'. The effort, as Hough indicates, is a failure. In this final chapter, therefore, I wish to examine briefly the nature of this failure, as it is manifest in the fiction chiefly, but also in the essays, before turning finally to Lawrence's last attempt to express his philosophy and to resolve its problems: Apocalypse.

The three novels in which Lawrence sought to embody the views of Fantasia are the 'leadership' novels: Aaron's Rod, begun in December 1917 but written for the most part contemporaneously with Fantasia; Kangaroo, written in Australia in June-July 1922 except for the last chapter, which was added in September of that year in Taos; and The Plumed Serpent, begun in May-June 1923 but taken up again in February 1925. Of these, the first two in their very different ways are preparatory attempts,

leading us no further than the problems of Fantasia. These, therefore, I shall discuss only briefly.

The theme of Aaron's Rod was signalled in Fantasia: 'Allons, there is no road yet, but we are all Aarons with rods of our own.' In a series of episodes we see Aaron Sisson reject the modern world, in the shape of the mining community in which he was thoroughly involved both politically and domestically, and of the larger world, intellectual and bohemian, and capitalist. He rejects also its proposed political solutions, socialist or fascist. Instead, he steps out completely, impelled by a feeling as natural and inevitable as birth or death, and grows, through effort and understanding, towards rebirth and fulfilment. This fulfilment he finds in the discovery of his male potency, to be expressed in a new, dominating relationship with woman and in submission to the greater potency in a male leader.

Paralleling rather than testing the conclusions of the Fantasia, Aaron's Rod, is merely a 'sketch' of them in action, and the sketch reveals division rather than unity. First and most obvious, there is the division of Lawrence's protagonist into two characters: Aaron, the experiencing and growing self, the follower; and Lilly, the more obvious self-portrait, fulfilled and conscious and the future leader. The device could be used for self-exploration, with Aaron's experience testing the words of Lilly. Too often, however, it is employed for self-gratification. The relationship between the two is in fact

3. p 65.
4. See Hough, p 103.
indicated by Lawrence towards the close of the novel, in the long dream given to Aaron. In the form of a boat-journey, the dream recapitulates, and seeks to give form to, the progress towards rebirth enacted in the novel as a whole:

And now he was most definitely two people. His invisible, conscious self, ... hovered as it were before the prow of the boat, seeing and knowing, but unseen. His other self, the palpable Aaron, sat as a passenger in the boat. 5

Equally conscious but more obtrusive, Lilly guides the rather obtuse, experiencing Aaron, preventing, with his warnings and interpretations, any real exploration of his experience by Aaron himself.

In theory, then, Aaron is prompted by a feeling which is essentially natural; in practice he is impelled by the ideas of Lawrence's 'conscious' self. And as novelist no less than as protagonist Lawrence exerts this pressure. The novel's organization is provided by a group of symbols, biblical and natural, of quest and fulfilment. Chief among these is that of Aaron's rod, his flute, symbol of his potency and journey to rebirth, agent of his freedom and his therapeutic power. When it is finally broken the Promised Land, fulfilment and submission, is in sight. Aaron and Lilly being 'like brothers' 6, Lilly appears as Moses, prophet of fulfilment and as such compared and opposed to the prophet of self-sacrifice, Christ. Punning on his name, the prophet is represented also by the 'much-mooted lily', 'life-rooted, life-central' 7, fulfilled and alone, having

5. Aaron's Rod (Penguin, 1950), p 333. Earlier in the novel (p 134), Lilly has suggested, though with sarcasm, that 'Aaron and I are two identical little men in one and the same little boat'.
6. p 129.
7. p 201.
achieved that self-possession towards Aaron must still strive. These, however, are symbols urged by the author rather than arising from the experience of the characters; they remain rather embarrassing impositions. Like Lilly's speeches and the additions and interpretations which Lawrence gives to Aaron's own reflections, they are used to draw together the political and the personal, civilization and the individual. In fact, in their distance from the actual fabric of the novel, they reveal only the gulf between the two.

The equation between the potency which is equivalent to a life-force and which is manifest in individual self-fulfilment and the power upon which Lilly would build his new era remains unconvincing. Like the intrinsic and extrinsic purposiveness of Fantasia they seem antagonistic, the one demanding the sacrifice of that individuality which is the principal achievement of the other. The relationship between the two men remains in practice, moreover, a personal relationship between two men essentially isolated not only from the sources of political power but also from their fellow-men. The world which surrounds them remains unborn and hostile, and Lilly's hierarchy of power, like Lawrence's own in 'Education of the People', is impossible in such a situation: 'so long as we're liars'.

Finally, neither man has achieved the new relationship with woman which should be the first fruit of rebirth and which, Lawrence has constantly insisted, must precede any new

8. p 327.
9. and admits also here. See pp112; 202.
relationship between men. As a result, the relationship between Aaron and Lilly seems an evasion, an escape from the problems of the relation which should, if Lawrence were honestly to explore his philosophy, stand at the centre of the novel.

*Aaron's Rod* shows art asked merely to fill in a metaphysic, but it shows it also rebelling. To the extent that the novel lives other than as a travel-sketch, it lives because Lawrence the artist is sufficiently active to suggest the problems which the prophet chooses to ignore. As experiencer, Aaron is reborn isolated, outside a hostile civilization, his central problem the relationship with woman. To the extent that he is a created character, he resists the attempts of Lilly - Lawrence to equate his male potency with a political power in which his role will be that of submissive follower.

*Kangaroo* makes no pretence of unity. Far more complex and genuinely exploratory than *Aaron's Rod*, it examines self-division, recording Richard Lovat Somers' flirtation with involvement in an Australian religious-political movement, the Diggers, led by Ben Cooley, or Kangaroo. Like Lilly, Somers is a self-portrait of Lawrence as fulfilled man, and the novel fulfils in imaginative form a need for immediate involvement which, as 'Education of the People' and *Fantasia* demonstrated, was Lawrence's own. It examines this involvement from two viewpoints: in terms of the validity of Kangaroo's movement itself, as an answer for civilisation, specifically Australian civilization; and in terms of the individual, Somers, and its effect on his marital relationship and on his effort to achieve fulfilment. In both respects the result is failure and it is this failure which the novel, often confusedly, examines.
The focus of Lawrence's concern with the validity of the Diggers movement as an answer for civilization lies in Kangaroo himself. He is given, and indeed acknowledges the influence of, many of Lawrence-Somers' own ideas: a concept of life which stresses obedience to its urges and to the leaders who embody them, a desire to free man through such obedience, an a-political movement with no fixed aim, a hatred of the stifling mass of static uncreate men who constitute the only evil. Against him is set the world of Europe, presented in the 'Nightmare' chapter and analyzed elsewhere, a world imprisoned in an old, false ideal whose power stems from the compulsion of the will. Itself partial, living in consciousness only, it opposes wholeness and causes psychical dislocation in which the repressed non-conscious self erupts in waves of directionless mob-violence. Kangaroo's is to be a counter-revolution, harnessing the unconscious forces thus spontaneously released to the cause of future fulfilment.

Yet the movement is judged to be a failure. Somers rejects, even, the novel suggests, kills Kangaroo. For Kangaroo illustrates Lawrence's ideas converted to action in an un-reborn world, and so subtly falsified. He stands at the close of Christian civilization; indeed, he embodies this civilization, subordinating Lawrence-Somers' ideas to the ideal of spiritual love. Somers' wife, echoing Lawrence's own view, accuses Somers:

You know quite well you say yourself life doesn't start with a form. It starts with a new feeling, and ends with a form. 10

Kangaroo's is the old feeling. Moreover, the men he would command are prisoners of the old world. Somers reflects:

Sometimes I feel I'd give anything, soul and body, for a smash-up in this social-industrial world we're in. And I would. And then when I realize people - just people - the same people after it as before - why ... then I don't care any more, and feel its time to turn to the gods. 11

Involvement is no less a failure when measured in terms of the self. Fantasia demanded that the sexual and the purposive impulses, both products of a primal creativity, be balanced. Kangaroo re-states this necessity, but it fails to show the balance achieved. F. R. Leavis 12 gives an excellent analysis of the complexities in Lawrence's attitude which lead him to oppose, rather than to balance, the marital and the purposive relationships. Lawrence himself gives another cause for this opposition. He writes:

A man must strive onward, but from the root of marriage ... Like a tree that is rooted, always growing and flowering away from its root, so is a vitally active man. But let him take some false direction, and there is torture through the whole organism, roots and all. 13

Kangaroo's is a false direction. Nevertheless, Leavis' analysis is the more telling. As in Aaron's Rod, the male purpose seems an escape from the problem of the demanding wife-mother.

11. p 180.
13. p 183.
Perhaps more important is the question of the relationship of Somers' involvement to his individual fulfilment. In the first place, it is clear that, whatever Lawrence's assessment of its intrinsic merits, Kangaroo's movement exists primarily as a form of therapy for the individual, specifically for Somers. He owes much, he feels, to his wife, but

I need something else. Some other answer. 14

Earlier in the novel he is more specific:

I want to do something with living people, somewhere, somehow, while I live on the earth. I write, but I write alone. And I live alone. Without any connexion whatever with the rest of men. 15

In this respect, Kangaroo fails him because his appeal is one-sided, repressive. Somers says:

I know your love, Kangaroo. Working everything from the spirit, from the head. You work the lower self as an instrument of the spirit. Now is the time for the spirit to leave us again; it is time for the Son of Man to depart, and leave us dark, in front of the unspoken God; who is just beyond the dark threshold of the lower self, my lower self. 16

Yet, from Lawrence-Somers' examples of the activities of this lower self, it seems evident that what Kangaroo omits is inherently incapable of being realized in any communal movement. It is a quality of individuality, manifest in relationship only as 'a stoop as a gannet stoops into the sea, or a hawk, or a kite, in a swift rapacious parabola downwards, to touch at the lowermost turn of the curve, then up again' 17. It would seem,

15. p 79.
16. p 151.
17. p 154.
moreover, as if any truly fulfilled individual must stand apart from and above any communal relationship. Even leadership of the unfulfilled mass is too demanding:

Damn the man in the street, said Richard to himself. Damn the collective soul, it's a dead rat in a hole. Let humanity scratch its own lice. 18

Somers' compelling sense of his absolute individuality stands not only against Kangaroo but against the whole question of involvement.

Whatever the issues of Kangaroo may be on the surface, then, - and Lawrence also suggests that the cause of the failure lies in Australia itself 19 - the novel appears finally as torn between two alternatives: involvement and leadership in a conscious-spiritual relationship, and unconscious fulfilment in an isolation broken only by an impersonal sexual relationship. In presenting these alternatives, the novel's structure approaches that of Fantasia. Reaction follows action, passages are balanced rather than integrated, and the more intense the movement towards involvement, the more violent is the reaction. In response to Kangaroo's equation of consciousness and love, Somers' unconscious becomes very nearly equivalent to destruction.

18. p 310.
19. But see p 33r

Poor Richard Lovat wearied himself to death struggling with the problem of himself, and calling it Australia.
Rewording his division of the novel into art and metaphysics, Lawrence defines it here as 'emotion-adventure' and 'thought-adventure'. With absolute honesty, *Kangaroo* shows the two as pulling constantly apart. To have fused the two in a vision of achieved involvement would have required a different sort of courage to that manifested in the integrity with which *Kangaroo* reveals its self-contradictions.

This courage is found in *The Plumed Serpent*. It is Lawrence's most ambitious novel, and the size of its ambition should not be underestimated. It seeks to achieve the ideal of the Foreword to *Fantasia*, an ideal restated, forcefully, in the contemporary essay, 'The Novel'. Again here the novel is seen to comprise art and philosophy, usually pulling apart but in the highest art fused. Significantly, Lawrence's examples of this fusion, the books of the Old Testament, are prophecy. But he is aware of the pitfalls of seeking this fusion. 'You can't fool the novel'; it 'won't let you tell didactic lies, and put them over'. Significantly, Lawrence's examples of this fusion, the books of the Old Testament, are prophecy. But he is aware of the pitfalls of seeking this fusion. 'You can't fool the novel'; it 'won't let you tell didactic lies, and put them over'. Its vision must be inclusive of the world of everyday life; transgressing this world, or the spirit of life itself, the transgression is immediately obvious. Lawrence's

20. p 308.
21. 'The Novel', written in the summer of 1925, at a time when Lawrence was making the final revisions to *The Plumed Serpent*; see *Reflections on the Death of a Porcupine* (1925) included in *Phoenix II* (London, 1968), pp 416 - 426, here p 417.
vision of rebirth must, then, become actual; he must achieve in art the wholeness which the Fantasia failed to achieve in philosophy.

In addition, The Plumed Serpent is Lawrence's novel of America. In its Mexico red and white, Indian and European, meet in reality as they did in imagination in Fenimore Cooper's prophetic novels. As the Studies I made clear, a vision of rebirth for America is a vision of rebirth for the world.

The novel treats the attempt of Don Ramon Carrasco to recreate Mexican/American civilization through the revival of its ancient religious awareness and the symbols which express it. Unlike Kangaroo, then, Ramon 'turn[s] to the gods', seeking to base communal as well as individual fulfilment upon them. The attempt is seen for the most part through the eyes of Kate Leslie, a European (Irish) widow of forty who finally becomes a goddess in Ramon's new Mexican pantheon, marrying Ramon's friend and follower, Don Cipriano Viedma.

Ramon himself appears as the whole, reborn man. Mexican, he mixes red and white blood, Indian and European. To each he reflects his own world; to Kate he belongs 'to the old, old Europe' and to Cipriano he embodies 'the old, old Mexico'. The mixture which in most Mexicans is that of the half-breed, incomplete and self-divided, has been fused by Ramon into a new wholeness. Towards the end of the novel, Lawrence puts it plainly:

> When the spirit and the blood in man begin to go asunder, bringing the great death, most stars die out.

> Only the man of a great star, a great divinity, can bring the opposites together in a new unison.

And this was Ramon, and this was his great effort; to bring the great opposites into contact and into unison again. 23

The religion by which Ramon seeks to achieve this is that natural to the Mexicans, the ancient product of the spirit of place. Thus, as with Aaron but not the Australians, the spark, the nucleus for rebirth, already exists:

It is in the blood of the people; they cannot quite forget it. It comes back to them, with a sense of fear, and joy, and relief.

Of themselves, they dared not revive the old motion, nor stir the blood in the old way. The spell of the past is too terrible. But in the Songs and Hymns of Quetzalcoatl there spoke a new voice, the voice of a master and authority. 24

To this pre-Aztec, pre-conscious awareness Ramon seeks to add the consciousness but not the habits of the European:

The roots and the life are there. What else it needs is the word, for the forest to begin to rise again. 25

As we have seen, however, Lawrence no longer believes that most men are capable of this fusion. As in 'Education of the People' and Fantasia, therefore, he seeks to erect a compromise structure, now, however, religious rather than psychological. Expression for the mass is to be achieved through directed, ritual action, channelled through the leader who both leads and is the object of such ritual. Their consciousness is achieved through him who, in return, infuses them with the greater potency belonging to his wholeness. To his soldiers Cipriano was the greatest part of themselves to them. It was in him they were supreme. They got their splendour from his power and their greatest consciousness was his consciousness diffusing them. 26

23. p 435.
25. p 88.
26. p 381.
Through this concept of a communal consciousness in which the individual, by himself incomplete, is consummated Lawrence seeks to link his few fulfilled individuals with the masses of men unable to achieve individual fulfilment. The concept itself may owe something to the societal pre-conscious of Burrow and more perhaps to the collective unconscious of Jung, with whose ideas Lawrence, through Mabel Luhan, became more familiar during his American years.

Opposed to Ramon's Quetzalcoatl religion stands the Christianity which is the present faith of the people. Brought by their white conquerors, the religion of Jesus 'is no saviour to the Mexicans'\(^\text{27}\). It is rather a religion of death, encouraging the hatred of life which is characteristic of a people unable to achieve wholeness. Stressing the spirit, it allies itself to the mental automatism of white America and Europe, for which it is historically responsible. At best it is alien to the people; at its worst, it is symbolized in Carlota's relationship to Ramon. A 'thief', she tried to rob him of his 'fire' by taking 'the wine of his body' and returning only the 'water of ... charity'\(^\text{28}\). Ramon proves the stronger, and Carlota, like her faith, must die.

To this account of the growth of Ramon's religion Lawrence adds that of the relationship of Kate to Cipriano and thus to the movement as a whole. This performs two functions. The first, achieved without the complexities and hesitations which the

\(^{27}\) p 145.

\(^{28}\) pp 362 - 363.
self-portrait gave to the previous novels, is to demonstrate the relation of sex to Ramon's religion of power. Cipriano's power over his soldiers appears as 'the old gift of demon-power', the phallic power of Pan. Sexual and religious-political potency have the same source, the one belonging to the lesser, the other to the greater, manhood. For woman marriage is fulfilment in submission; her greater womanhood involves submission to the religious purpose. The sexual relationship thus remains at the centre of Lawrence's vision but is absorbed, through the concept of a larger communal self, into the wider purpose.

The second, symbolic, function of the relationship is to indicate the nature of the meeting between red and white which must take place if rebirth is to occur. Cipriano, the pure Indian, embodies not only the sensuousness of his race but also its capacity for destruction. As Huitzilopochtli he exemplifies the power of death at the service of Ramon's religion of life. But he is incomplete; Kate's spirit and consciousness are needed to complement his passion and to add the touch of mercy to his capacity for destruction. Thus the marriage of the two represents the necessary 'sinking of both beings into a new being' and Kate's total submission is equivalent to the temporary overpowering of the white consciousness which must precede fusion. The step is, however, dangerous and its dangers are perceived by Kate who reflects that 'if what was happening happened too rapidly, or violently, ... she would die'.

29. p 325.
30. p 431.
31. p 430.
Lawrence weaves the pattern of rebirth which is *The Plumed Serpent* by means, once more, of a series of dominant symbols. In *Fantasia* he wrote that for 'the mass of people, knowledge must be symbolical, mythical, dynamic'. Thus Ramon's religion operates through symbols of which he, being 'higher, responsible', is interpreter, and these symbols are reinforced by Lawrence's text. Ramon, like the god Quetzalcoatl which he embodies, is seen as the morning star. Of this star Lawrence was to write in *Apocalypse* that 'when the cult of dying and reborn gods started all over the world, about 600 B.C., he became symbolic of the new god, because he rules in the twilight, between day and night'. Lord of both ways, day and night, light and dark, conscious and unconscious, life and death, his two aspects are symbolized by the eagle and the serpent. Within the individual, the two correspond to Lawrence's earlier division between the upper and lower selves, with mentality added to the upper self; the two are once more to meet in balance. In addition, Cipriano, the Indian, is seen throughout the novel as serpent:

> Something smooth, undeveloped, yet vital in this man suggested the heavy-ebbing blood of reptiles in his veins. That was what it was, the heavy-ebbing blood of powerful reptiles, the dragon of Mexico.

It will be remembered that Chingachgook, the Indian in Fenimore Cooper's prophetic myth of atonement between the races, was also a serpent, the Great Serpent. The eagle, complement of the serpent, is elsewhere seen by Lawrence as the eagle 'of the spirit'. Not surprisingly, then, it is bird imagery which

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35. p 74.
describes Kate who feels 'like a bird round whose body a snake has coiled. Mexico was the snake'. Her final acceptance of Cipriano and Mexico is preceded by an encounter with a snake which results in her feeling 'a certain reconciliation between herself and it' Lastly, more consistently than Aaron's, Kate's progress towards rebirth is charted by a series of boat journeys, the first of which demonstrates their symbolic nature. Kate is ferried over the 'sperm-white' water by a crippled boatman who himself seems to embody the strange and mysterious gentleness between a scylla and a charybdis of violence ... The magnificence of the watchful morning-star, that watches between the night and day, the gleaming clue to the two opposites.

Nevertheless, Lawrence's most ambitious novel is a failure. Its ambition is evident chiefly as a sense of strain, manifest above all in the scenes in which he seeks to render the rituals of Ramon's Quetzalcoatl religion. Too often they tip over into the repulsive or the bathetically comic. The vision which should fuse art and philosophy into prophecy fails, leaving only assertion.

Ramon himself, the heart of the novel, remains unconvincing as an embodiment of rebirth. His power, which should be the intrinsic potency of wholeness, seems in practice merely the feudal power of the hacendado. His difference from the peons is absolute, and the difference is one of consciousness. Kate

37. p 79.
38. p 442.
objects with justification that 'Don Ramon isn't really Mexican ... He feels European'. His efforts, as Lawrence admits, are 'abstract'. Thus the curious symbolic, semi-articulate nature of his ritualistic utterances seems false, condescending; we may note that his objection to Christianity, made to the Bishop of the West, is that, as a spiritual religion, it must be understood and the 'Indians cannot understand it'. Ramon's own religious revival is the product of his mind and is maintained by his will. Again Kate's objection rings true:

For heaven's sake let me get out of this, and back to simple human people ... Ramon and Cipriano ... want to put it over me, with their high-flown bunk ... 43

The Mexicans are far from convincing as to their capacity for rebirth. Lawrence's desire in this respect is countered constantly by his observation, which reveals a Mexico still inert, a people uncreated and malevolent. Only in terms of natural description can he approach conviction:

It was as if, from Ramon and Cipriano, from Jamiltepec and the lake region, a new world was unfolding, unrolling, as softly and subtly as twilight falling and removing the clutter of day. It was a soft, twilit newness slowly spreading and penetrating the world, even into the cities. 44

Elsewhere, it is significant that the only individual examples of the Mexican peon we have seen, Juana and her family, fade from the novel, to be replaced by more malleable generalizations.

40. p 250.
41. p 444.
42. p 276.
43. p 387.
44. p 74.
In practice, therefore, Lawrence's attempt to merge civil-ization and the individual once more, despite his greater stress on communalism, falls apart. On the one side stands the mass, unborn, fragmentary, and despised not only by Kate but also by their would-be saviour, Ramon. On the other side are the few individuals, essentially alone with the gods who are manifestations of their own inner, unconscious selves. It becomes evident that, like Kangaroo's, Ramon's religion exists fundamentally as therapy for these individuals. 'Quetzalcoatl', says Ramon, 'is to me only the symbol of the best a man may be, in the next days.' The theology is not believed; the religion has no function other than the fulfilment of the individual self of which its god is a symbol. Given this function, the self-contradiction inherent in Lawrence's solution of a communalism based on degrees of potency becomes clear. Cipriano rules his men because he has found 'the second strength', the strength 'that comes from back of the sun', the strength of Huitzilopochtli which puts him in touch with the cosmos. Yet to his men he urges that when Huitzilopochtli comes, 'all you who strive shall find the second strength.' If this is so, and rebirth is possible for all, then the power structure must collapse unless it is to be based on degrees of consciousness; if it is not so, then the

45. Ramon reflects (p 266): There is only one thing that a man really wants to do, all his life; and that is, to find his way to his own God, his Morning Star, and be alone there.

46. p 285.

47. The term is that of Baruch Hochman. See 'The Communalist Phase' (pp 170 - 229) in Another Ego (Columbia, 1970).

religion is meaningless other than as a means of ensuring the submission of the masses.

The sense of strain characterizes also the account of the relationship between Kate and Cipriano. In Aaron's Rod Lawrence divided his experiencing self between two characters. To the extent that Kate and Cipriano represent aspects of the self, something similar occurs here. The resulting uncertainty of allegiance, which occurred also in the earlier novel, is intensified here by the sexual division between the two characters. Cipriano, the unconscious, sensual, passionate self is male; his potency and his maleness are, indeed, identified. To this potency Kate must submit completely:

In the shadowy world where men were visionless, and winds of fury rose up from the earth, Cipriano was still a power....

It was the ancient phallic mystery, the ancient god-devil of the male Pan....

Ah! and what a mystery of prone submission, on her part, this huge erection would imply! Submission absolute, like the earth under the sky. Beneath an over-arching absolute. 49

She must submit, indeed, to such an extent that her character is violated. In her reflections the insistent incantatory voice of Lawrence replaces what we recognize as the authentic tone of Kate: sceptical and down-to-earth. The result is a sense of violence, of death, as if the protesting voice of consciousness is submerged beneath an unconscious in which destruction reigns. Like 'The Woman who Rode Away', 50 Kate seems at times to be

49. pp 324 - 325.
riding to her death; towards the close of the novel she mounts
the donkey of Christ\textsuperscript{51}. Later she reflects about Cipriano:

So, when she thought of him and his soldiers, tales of
swift cruelty she had heard of him; when she remembered
his stabbing of the three helpless peons; she thought:
why should I judge him? He is of the gods. \textsuperscript{52}

The wrench caused by Lawrence's over-insistence is so violent
here that, rather than convincing, he raises doubts about the
whole basis of his philosophy. Given such lapses in Lawrence
himself, even imaginatively, one begins to wonder whether a
principle of fidelity to one's unconscious impulses can be
trusted to hold these impulses within the bounds of a natural
morality.

Yet, as representative of consciousness, Kate is never quite
abandoned to her fate by Lawrence. Her voice re-emerges again and
again, its comments sceptical and deflating. At times she seems
destined to play the part of a Somers. The centre of the novel
becomes uncertain: Ramon's Mexican revival is challenged by the
account of Kate's development whose end seems properly to lie in
her return to Europe carrying the seeds of rebirth, revived but
not absorbed by Mexico. Only by a distortion of her character
can Lawrence draw the two strands together. The grounds of her
final decision to stay, that she does not want to become a middle-
aged, egoistic 'grimalkin',\textsuperscript{53} in the drawing-rooms of Europe, seem
both inadequate and irrelevant to the serious issues of the novel\textsuperscript{54}.

\textsuperscript{51} See p 333.
\textsuperscript{52} p 409.
\textsuperscript{53} p 456.
\textsuperscript{54} See F. R. Leavis' discussion in \textit{D. H. Lawrence: Novelist},
pp 71 - 72.
Art and metaphysic, then, pull together in *The Plumed Serpent* only so long as the metaphysic remains firmly in control. The symbols which structure the novel, whilst better integrated with its fabric than those of *Aaron's Rod*, are no less impositions: impositions on the people by Ramon and on the texture of his novel by Lawrence himself. We learn, for example, that Villiers, Kate's American companion, in guiding the boatman strikes 'the American note ... of mechanical dominance' whilst the boatman himself resembles the 'mystery of the evening-star brilliant in silence and distance between the downward-surgeing plunge of the sun and the vast, hollow seething of inpouring night'; a later boatman lies 'coiled up like a serpent'; Kate seems to see 'the dark eyes of a deeper sun' behind the fierce sun of Mexico; the voices of Ramon's followers fan out 'like a dark eagle in the bright air'. Again and again Lawrence reinforces his metaphysic by these strained descriptions, putting, in his own words, 'his thumb in the scale, to pull down the balance to his own predilection'. Late in the novel, when Lawrence's preoccupation with Cipriano has led him to upset the balance of his original intention, we find a series of reflections, ostensibly Kate's but in the incantatory rhythms of Ramon's rituals, which reassert the balance and explain the symbols.

55. pp 101 - 102.
56. p. 114.
57. p 118.
58. p 360.
59. 'Morality and the Novel' (first published December 1925), *Phoenix* (London, 1936) p 528. This, writes Lawrence, constitutes 'immorality'.
By far the most ambitious and coherent of the three 'leadership' novels, *The Plumed Serpent* is also, by Lawrence's own criteria, the least honest. Whilst its surface symbols cohere in their message of rebirth, the novelist, one feels, is, again in the words by which Lawrence intended to measure not his own failure but his achievement, 'a dribbling liar'. That the failure is essentially one of conviction is apparent from the essays which form a parallel record of Lawrence's American experience.

The most interesting of these from this point of view are the third (published) versions of the *Studies in Classic American Literature*. Written in the winter of 1922-23, these essays are especially significant because they follow the plan of the original version. America is again seen to have two aspects: the mechanical dominance which is her European legacy and the new, as yet unborn self, which will result from the merging of the two races, red and white, and will be expressive of the spirit of place. Again the progress charted in American literature is one towards this rebirth with Whitman, 'the first white aboriginal', the herald of the new age. The vision of history is once more Joachite, with America the location of the third and final age, the age of the Holy Ghost. There are certain significant differences. The psychology which charted rebirth in *Studies I* is abandoned and America's reaction to Europe is

60. 'The Novel', *Phoenix II*, p 426.
seen instead in terms of Lawrence's principle of mastery. The democracy which represents America's ostensible reaction is regarded as a negation of the principle of '[mastery, kingship, fatherhood]' which dominated pre-renaissance Europe. The spirit which will be a new kind of submission: a submission to the deepest impulses of the self and to the men who most perfectly embody them. Nevertheless, the plan remains. Rebirth is to occur through fusion of sense and spirit, red and white, and it will be a rebirth, as before, manifest in relationship and occurring in the individual.

In structure, then, Studies III parallels both the first version and The Plumed Serpent. The heart of the work, however, lies in the first essay on Melville, 'Herman Melville's Typee and Omoo', which treats Melville's reaction to the South Sea Islanders. The earlier extant version, probably the second version, criticises Melville because his commitment to mentality prevents his experiencing the spontaneity of his 'savage hosts'. In the completely rewritten third version, however, Melville's experience is clearly seen as paralleling Lawrence's own American experience, and the result is a much greater complexity of attitude on his part.

Projected on to Melville, therefore, we find Lawrence's intense love for the savages to whom America introduced him. We are reminded that Lawrence was to write that 'New Mexico was
the greatest experience from the outside world that I have ever had'. It gave him the experience of a sensuous religion which he had failed to find elsewhere. Like Ramon, then, Lawrence believes that in order to recreate our civilization we must 'take a great curve in [the] direction' of the savages. Yet the dominant note of the essay is that of Lawrence's absolute commitment, despite his hatred of the civilized white world, to his own whiteness, his own consciousness and civilization. 'I know now' he writes, 'that I could never go back. Back towards the past, savage life. One cannot go back. It is one's destiny inside one'. Again he stresses that 'we cannot turn the current of our lives backwards, back towards their warm twilight and uncreate mud. Not for a moment'. Further, there is a feeling, evident here but running throughout the book, against the current of its original structure, that the desired fusion may not be possible, that the two aspects, white and red, may be intrinsically opposed. Of Crèvecoeur's dual desire, for both civilization and sensuality, Lawrence wrote in Studies I: 'he is divided against himself, which makes for madness'.

Here he comments:

He wanted both.
Can't be done, Hector. The one is the death of the other. 69

65. In 'New Mexico' Phoenix, p 142.
66. p 145.
67. pp 144; 145.
68. S.M., p 68.
69. p 36.
Later the message is reinforced:

Blood-consciousness overwhelms, obliterates and annuls mind-consciousness.

Mind-consciousness extinguishes blood-consciousness, and consumes the blood.

We are all of us conscious in both ways. And the two ways are antagonistic in us.

They will always remain so. 70

It is significant here that the complex psychology developed earlier, the product of Lawrence's search for a means to wholeness in the self, is abandoned in favour of an earlier, more divisive terminology.

Given such a situation, the rebirth originally envisaged as inevitable, to occur within the white man, seems remote. An almost purposeless destruction is instead desired:

Let us smash something. Ourselves included. But the machine above all. 71

There is no longer the desire to incorporate science in a complete vision. The experience of America would seem, in fact, to have intensified Lawrence's sense of division, leaving the original vision of fusion still desired but no longer really believed in. It is a division, too, which is self-division as well as a racial split, found by Lawrence to be within himself. The close of the first essay on Melville states his dilemma,

70. p 91.
71. p 138.
completing his identification with Melville's self-division:

Melville was, at the core, a mystic and an idealist. Perhaps, so am I. And he stuck to his ideal guns. I abandon mine. 72

72. p 152. Mornings in Mexico (1924 - 5) is also characterized by the sense that

The Indian way of consciousness is different from and fatal to our way of consciousness. Our way of consciousness is different from and fatal to the Indian. The two ways, the two streams are never to be united. They are not even to be reconciled ...

... That is, the life of the Indian, his stream of conscious being, is just death to the white man. And we can understand the consciousness of the Indian only in terms of the death of our own consciousness. Mornings in Mexico/Etruscan Places, (Penguin, 1950), p 55.

Here also the split is seen to be in Lawrence himself as much as in civilization, for the final chapter, completed in November 1925 after his return to Europe, gives Lawrence a dual self: American and European, sensual and spiritual. The chapter, 'A Little Moonshine with Lemon' (pp 90 - 93), sees him oscillate between the two before settling, reluctantly, for the European. Paradoxically, however, this work, which so stresses separation, comes nearest of these American works, and certainly much nearer than The Plumed Serpent, to bridging the gap between the two races. For Lawrence, the European, succeeds, one feels, in truly penetrating the Indian, to render his perceptions through the medium of consciousness.
The American experience which produced Lawrence's supreme effort to unite art and philosophy in a vision of wholeness and rebirth, brought finally, therefore, only a greater sense of the distance between aspects of the self, between man as he should be and historical man, between the fulfilled individual and society, and between creation and destruction. Lawrence's final attempt to resolve these problems in an exposition of his philosophy lay in Apocalypse. Before turning to this work, however, I should like to look briefly at a set of essays written or revised in America, the Reflections on the Death of a Porcupine, for these form a stepping-stone on the way to the final vision of Apocalypse.

In these essays individual fulfilment is found to have three aspects: the initial creative spark, its manifestation which develops through relationship, and the achieved, fulfilled self. This is as in Psychoanalysis, and as there, the first and the last of these are seen as wholly individual and as equivalent to creativity, or potency. The second aspect, the manifestation of this potency is now to be found in love, in desire, but most of all in the activity of power:

Power is pouvoir: to be able to. 74

Again:

If you are something, you'll do something, ipso facto. 75

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74. p 439. ('Blessed are the Powerful').

75. p 477. ('Aristocracy').
In these essays, however, the first and the third of these aspects are seen to exist 'within the fourth dimension'. This dimension, 'not to be reckoned in terms of space and time', is the timelessness which exists not beyond but within, or parallel to, time. It is here that absolute individuality is achieved, that each manifestation of creation becomes absolutely itself and therefore beyond comparison. It is here, therefore, that a relationship which is pure equilibrium is attained. It is in the fourth dimension that the goal of life consists in intrinsic purposiveness.

'Being' is achieved, then, in the fourth dimension, but existence is a matter of space and time, and it is in this concept of existence that Lawrence moves away from the ideas of Psychoanalysis. Existence is communal, not individual; in it potency is manifest as power, as mastery, as judgement, as a Darwinian destruction of the lower by the higher. In existence there is no refusal to compare. A creature's existence impinges on other existences, and is itself impinged upon. And in the struggle for existence, if an effort on the part of any type of species or order of life can finally destroy the other species, then the destroyer is of a more vital cycle of existence than the one destroyed. 78

In this way Lawrence seeks to marry his concept of an intrinsic self, creative, fulfilled and individual, with his view of historical man as fragmentary and destructive, as man in the

76. p 430 ("Him with his Tail in his Mouth").
77. p 469 ("Reflections ...'").
78. p 469.
mass whose primary need is to be ruled. As in 'The Crown', fulfillment is conceived as transcendent, mystical. Now, however, Lawrence goes further in seeing it as intrinsically separate from life as it is manifest in existence. The third age, the age of the Holy Ghost, is still to be the age of fulfillment, here the age of the fourth dimension. Its rule, however, will be manifest in existence and through mastery; the aim will be 'perfected relation with all things but the means will be conquest'. Lawrence can maintain his original vision of individual wholeness alongside a view of man in history only by separating the two. That the one is to be achieved by means of the other is an argument which Lawrence presses, but its central point, that creative potency may be equivalent to destructive conquest, remains as unconvincing as in The Plumed Serpent.

Apocalypse, written in October - December 1929, is Lawrence's last work. It represents a return to philosophy for him, in the form of an exposition of the work which has provided a stimulus to so much of his thought. It is a return, too, to a far more tentative, exploratory style than that of the American years, a return which may reflect Apocalypse's probably unfinished nature, but which must be due also to the fact that here Lawrence attempts a last resolution of his philosophy and its difficulties.

79. The difference can be seen also in a comparison of the 1915 version with the 1925 version of 'The Crown'. In 1915 Lawrence wrote that 'Death is no part of the story' and 'We know we are never purely relative. Timelessness is our fate, and time is subordinate to our fate'. In 1925 this becomes: 'Death is part of the story' and 'We know that in the process of life we are purely relative. But timelessness is ...' See The Signature No. 2 (18 October 1915), p 2 and Phoenix II, p 375.

80. p 472 ('Reflections ...).

As in Studies I, *Apocalypse* is seen as a Jewish-Christian transcription of a much older, pagan account of death and rebirth. Through his exposition, therefore, Lawrence seeks, firstly, to diagnose what went wrong in the Christian era to cause it to become so cut off from its pagan past and, secondly, by effecting the 'swing ... backwards'\(^{82}\) to this past age which is so necessary for rebirth, to lead us into a new era.

Lawrence makes three main statements about Christianity which together suggest, at this late stage, something of the cause of its persistent fascination for him. The first is negative:

> by the time of Christ all religion and all thought seemed to turn from the old worship and study of vitality, potency, power, to the study of death and death-rewards, death-penalties, and morals. All religion, instead of being religion of life, here and now, became religion of postponed destiny, death ... \(^{83}\)

Christianity, as the religion of spirit, is the religion of death. It will lead to 'the annihilation of the human race ... unless there is a change', an annihilation to be effected by the products of its abstraction, science and machinery\(^{84}\). The logic of this condemnation is often obscure. Lawrence proceeds by a sort of shorthand reference to associations established more firmly in much earlier essays. The message, however, is clear. Christianity

substituted the non-vital universe of forces and mechanistic order \([\text{for the cosmos}]\), everything else became abstraction, and the long, slow death of the human being set in. \(^{85}\)

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83. p 32.
84. p 27.
85. p 27.
Such a view offers little in the way of explanation of man's present predicament; it merely states it. Lawrence therefore supplies a corrective vision, one more in accord with his earlier view of history. Christianity was originally necessary as a stage in man's progress toward fulfilment. Civilization is revealed ... in sensitive life ... Culture and civilisation are tested by vital consciousness. Originally Christianity liberated this life and this consciousness; the science which it has produced was a natural outgrowth from 'the oldest religious conception of the cosmos'. Like all movements whose form becomes fixed, however, it became repressive. It was in addition one-sided. Jesus stressed love but refused to consider power; thus he sought to turn potency into self-abnegation instead of fulfilment through a hierarchy of power. He emphasized the spirit, the individual, and love and denied the body and its impulses, the mass, and power. The results were, first, his betrayal by Judas, 'because of the denial and subterfuge inherent in Jesus's teaching' and, second, the writing of the Apocalypse, product of the thwarted power-urge of the weak mass which

wants to murder the powerful, to seize the power itself, the weakling. 88

But, and here is Lawrence's third statement about Christianity, Jesus' message was a failure because the 'religions of renunciation, like Buddhism or Christianity or Plato's

86. p 39.
87. p 85.
88. p 16.
philosophy, are for aristocrats, aristocrats of the spirit'. The 'vast mass', however, have no aristocratic individuality, such as is demanded by Christ or Buddha or Plato. So they 'skulk in a mass and secretly are bent on their own ultimate glorification'. Jesus aimed for what in Reflections would have been the fourth dimension and it was too high; most men need a collective structure in which Jesus should have taken the role of 'their physical power-lord'.

This curious ambivalence of attitude is repeated in Lawrence's attempt to 'swing ... backwards' to the vision which is buried beneath the transcription of John of Patmos. Pagan man, Lawrence believes, lived 'breast to breast ... with the cosmos' and consequently in relationship, too, with his fellows. Potent, he recognized and worshipped the force which 'modern philosophers ... call ... libido or Elan Vital', this 'fluid, rapid, invincible, even clairvoyant potency that can surge through the body and spirit of a man'. The access into mentality, symbolized once more by the Eve myth, brought alienation from this unconscious potency, an alienation which was marked by the introduction of 'the god idea':

It was not until the individual began to feel separated off, not till he fell into awareness of himself and hence into apartness ... that the conception of a God arose, to intervene between man and the cosmos.

89. p 14.
90. p 16.
91. p 84.
92. p 76.
93. p 84.
Lawrence would seek, therefore, to 'destroy our false, inorganic connections' and return to 'the living organic connections, with the cosmos, the sun and earth' and hence also with 'mankind and nation and family'. In this way, civilization could once again be based on 'thou shalt' instead of 'thou shalt not'.

All this is central to Lawrence's philosophy, but now there is also the recognition that most men are, and will remain, fragmentary and unfulfilled as individuals. Lawrence therefore abandons his earlier hope of individual rebirth. The account has a personal note, and the implicit identification of Lawrence himself with the ideals of Christ sheds considerable light on his last completed piece of fiction, *The Man who Died*. He suggests that

as a matter of fact, when you start to teach individual self-realisation to the great masses of people, who when all is said and done are only fragmentary beings, incapable of whole individuality, you end by making them all envious, grudging, spiteful creatures.

Moreover, the individual, he writes, 'cannot love' because when 'the individual loves, he ceases to be purely individual. And so he must recover himself and cease to love'. By persisting in 'the path of individual self-realisation' through love, we are unnaturally resisting our connection with the cosmos; with the world, with mankind, with the nation, with the family... We cannot bear connection. That is our malady. We must break away, and be isolate. We call that being free, being individual. Beyond a certain point, which we have reached, it is suicide. Perhaps we have chosen suicide.
It reads like a self-condemnation. We may remember Lawrence's earlier identification of consumption with an excess of the sympathetic, spiritual aspect of the self\textsuperscript{98}. The opposition between love and the sense of individuality, which was earlier to be held in polarized relationship within the individual, is now seen as self-cancelling. The attempt to maintain it and its goal, Lawrence's earlier goal of 'individual self-realisation', is seen to be a spiritual ideal. Lawrence, it would seem, had stepped out of modern civilization and found no-one with him. He now accepts a lesser goal, in order to find the communion he has lacked:

Let us find some conception of ourselves that will allow us to be peaceful and happy, instead of tormented and unhappy. \textsuperscript{99}

The concept of a collective self, in the manner of Burrow or of Jung, is the one which he chooses. The debt to Jung may, indeed, be quite considerable, for Lawrence echoes also his distinction between the two types of thinking - Jung calls them directed and phantasy thinking\textsuperscript{100} - which distinguish contemporary from primitive man. Lawrence's distinction repeats his earlier one between the mental consciousness in which we 'torture ourselves getting somewhere, and when we get there it is nowhere, for there is nowhere to go', and full consciousness, in which a thought is 'a completed state of feeling - awareness'\textsuperscript{101}. Again the highest expression of the latter type of thinking is symbolic. Now, however, it is a product of the communal self and as such is 'based on the power-instinct'\textsuperscript{102}.

\textsuperscript{98} See \textit{Fantasia}, Viking Compass Edition, p 97.
\textsuperscript{99} p 103.
\textsuperscript{100} See \textit{Psychology of the Unconscious} (London, 1916), p 11.
\textsuperscript{101} p 43.
\textsuperscript{102} p 41.
It is upon the fulfilment of this communal self that Lawrence now concentrates, for it is this self rather than, as of old, consciousness, which is identified with civilization:

The State, or what we call Society as a collective whole cannot have the psychology of an individual. Also it is a mistake to say that the State is made up of individuals. It is not. It is made up of a collection of fragmentary beings. And no collective act ... is made from the individual self. It is made from the collective self, and has another psychological background, non-individual. 103.

Its fulfilment, the consummation of its potency, is to be found in a hierarchy of power, here and now:

The human heart needs, needs, needs, splendour, gorgeousness, pride, assumption, glory, and lordship... And every great king makes every man a little lord in his own tiny sphere, fills the imagination with lordship and splendour, satisfies the soul. 104

This fulfilment includes once more the destructive aspect of conquest. As so often before, Lawrence hesitates on the question of the necessity for destruction. At times he suggests that the destructive aspect of the dragon, symbol of power, is manifest only when man, as in the Christian era, turns away from its potency. In such epochs, with 'his serpent ... against him, he is stung and envenomed and defeated from within'. Elsewhere, however, it appears that, in the cyclical process which is history, it is the dragon in its red, destroying phase which must succeed 'the dirty-white dragon, or grey dragon of the Steel Age'. 106.

103. pp 100 - 101.
104. p 18.
105. p 76.
106. p 81.
Lawrence repeats, then, the vision of Reflections. There is, however, an important difference: here there is no fourth dimension. 'No man', writes Lawrence, 'is or can be a pure individual'. This is the dominant note; the connection with the cosmos and with mankind which was earlier seen as a means to the end of fulfilled, incomparable individuality now stands as an end in itself. The mystical thread by which Lawrence sought to tie communal salvation for the mass to his original vision of individual wholeness is abandoned. In the ensuing division, it is the community and its fulfilment which takes precedence. Individual rebirth is regarded as an illusion.

Yet the solution is unsatisfying. Lawrence has not accounted for the fall into abstraction which caused man's alienation from himself and from the cosmos. There is merely the old uncertainty: it is seen now as a transgression of life, denounced but not explained, now as a natural development which must be outgrown. There is the old ambivalence of attitude towards destruction; no distinction is made between the destruction which results from man's transgression of life's potency and that which is inherent in that potency. Most important, there is the sense that Lawrence's final work evades some of his deepest beliefs and their difficulties.

The hierarchical structure which Lawrence proposes for the community still, as in Fantasia, demands leaders who are conscious, capable of interpreting the symbols through which the mass will find expression. Occasionally Lawrence acknowledges this, and at such times, as the example of Jesus demonstrates, it would seem that the highest expression of potency

107. p 100.
is found in spirit and consciousness. For 'the commonalty, the horn of power was the ithyphallos', but in the leaders it is found 'between the brows'. The worship of power, moreover, belongs to 'the lowest substratum of the people', and although 'the consciousness of man always tends to revert to the original levels', still

there are two modes of reversion: by degeneration and decadence; and by deliberate return in order to get back to the roots again, for a new start.

Man, that is, has acquired mentality and must go forwards from this position. Yet Lawrence offers no directions for this movement. On the problem of civilization as it is equivalent to consciousness and ideals he is silent.

Finally, Lawrence's rejection of individuality and its isolation is that of an isolated man who still, as we have seen, regards individual fulfilment as man's highest goal. The Man who Died, the short novel which parallels the search for resolution of Apocalypse, clarifies this position.

Death, for the man who had died, was the result of the spiritual abstraction which was his message to the world. He reflects:

I wanted to be greater than the limits of my hands and feet, so I brought betrayal on myself ... For my reach ends in my finger-tips, and my stride is no longer than the ends of my toes. Yet I would embrace multitudes, I who have never truly embraced even one. But Judas and the high priests saved me from my own salvation...

108. p 92.
109. p 33.
110. p 90.
112. pp 1107 - 1108.
Reborn, he finds communion first with the sun and the potency manifest everywhere in life itself:

They came forth, these things and creatures of spring, glowing with desire and with assertion. They came like crests of foam, out of the blue flood of the invisible desire, out of the invisible sea of strength, and they came coloured and tangible, evanescent, yet deathless in their coming. 113

Through this communion he moves into relationship with the cock, individual manifestation of life, and thence to the relation with woman, through whose life-potency he passes at last from death into life. We leave the story of his progress at the point of his departure for the world of men, for he realizes:

Unless we encompass the life of the little day in the greater day, and set the little life in the circle of the greater life, all is disaster. 114

This is now his mission.

Yet the man who had died has been reborn out of the world of the past alone, and it is a separate individual that he meets the woman:

She would never know or understand what he was. Especially she would never know the death that was gone before in him. But what did it matter? She was different. She was woman: her life and her death were different from him. 115

From the world of men out of which he has stepped, his 'separation was absolute'; reborn into fulfilment, he must accept 'the irrevocable noli me tangere which separates the re-born from the vulgar'. 116. This world, moreover, is and remains hostile: in the mother of the woman of Isis, 'the little life of jealousy and property' would 'seek to be revenged in him for the bread he had

113. p 1105.
114. p 1129.
115. p 1132.
116. p 1124.
eaten, and the living touch he had established with the woman he had delighted in. Lawrence, in fact, in leaving his hero at the point where he must begin to integrate individual fulfilment with salvation for the community, leaves him at the point where his own problems have begun. The conviction remains that this integration must be achieved, but we must be doubtful of the ability of the reborn man to achieve it. We leave him escaping from a hostile world with which he has established no connection - for the woman of Isis, like himself is an individual apart - and from which it requires all his strength to escape. The suggestion lingers that crucifixion will await this second mission of Christ, as it did the first.

Lawrence's final vision fails, therefore, to achieve the reconciliation between individual fulfilment and the needs of civilization which has been his chief problem: since the Fantasia. Apocalypse was written between October and December 1929, and in November of that year Freud completed his own late study of the problems of civilization, Civilization and its Discontents. To close this study I should like to examine briefly the success with which Lawrence's old antagonist confronts the problems inherent in his own view of the relationship between man and the civilization which he has created.

In the first place, Freud's preoccupations in this late work are often strikingly similar to Lawrence's own. Like Lawrence, he places responsibility for man's discontents in society upon his 'ideals' - 'his ideas of a possible perfection

117. p 1137.
118. S.E. XXI, pp 59 - 145.
of individuals, or of peoples or of the whole of humanity, and
the demands he sets up on the basis of such ideas. Particularly unattainable is the Christian ideal, of a love 'that
does not discriminate' which has dominated our civilization.
To the commandment to 'love thy neighbour as thyself' Freud puts
two objections; firstly, such a love

> seems to me to forfeit a part of its own value, by doing an injustice to its object; and secondly, not all men are worthy of love. 120

Of love itself as a sole source of fulfilment, he writes:

> Sometimes one seems to perceive that it is not only the pressure of civilization but something in the nature of the function itself which denies us full satisfaction and urges us along other paths. 121

Like Lawrence, then, Freud turns away from a consideration of sex: both sex and women, as in Lawrence's 'leadership' novels, are seen as hostile to a civilization which is regarded as 'the business of man'. 122 Like Lawrence again, Freud turns instead to the problem of power. One of the chief dangers of our society is the lack of focus for this instinct, a danger which

> is most threatening where the bonds of a society are chiefly constituted by the identification of its members with one another, while individuals of the leader type do not acquire the importance that should fall to them in the formation of a group. The present cultural state of America would give us a good opportunity for studying the damage to civilization which is thus to be feared. 123

The diagnoses, as with their views of the individual, are alike; once again, however, the fundamental standpoints are totally opposed. For Freud, the opposition between love and power can be defined ultimately as the opposition between Eros, the instinct of life, and an opposing 'instinct of death'. 124

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119. p 94.
120. p 102.
121. p 105.
122. p 103.
123. p 116.
124. p 119.
This death instinct, or a large part of it, is diverted outwards, to become 'an instinct of aggressiveness and destructiveness'\textsuperscript{125} or alternatively re-diverted inwards to become conscience and repression. In the history of the individual, Freud finds that an initial aggression is developed against the parental authority which frustrates the child's erotic impulses, an aggression whose satisfaction is also denied by authority. As a result, the child 'takes the unattackable authority into himself'\textsuperscript{126} by identifying with it; the conscience or super-ego is born, and each fresh frustration reinforces its power. For his account of the history of civilization, Freud turns once more to the hypothesis of \textit{Totem and Taboo} of an original parricide, 'the killing of the primal father'\textsuperscript{127}. Because of the original ambivalence of the sons' feeling towards the father, the act was followed by remorse. Like the child, therefore, they identified a part of themselves with his authority, and created the conscience, or super-ego. In both cases it is the feeling of \textit{guilt} which is the foundation of civilization:

\begin{quote}
the sense of guilt is the most important problem in the development of civilization and ... the price we pay for our advance in civilization is a loss of happiness through the heightening of the sense of guilt. \textsuperscript{128}
\end{quote}

Civilization, that is, depends on the splitting off of a part of the self for the purpose of repression and with the result of

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{125} p 119. \\
\textsuperscript{126} p 129. \\
\textsuperscript{127} p 132. \\
\textsuperscript{128} p 134.
\end{flushleft}
guilt. And civilization is the destined life-form of man:

the evolution of civilization may ... be simply described
as the struggle for life of the human species. 129

Given such a situation, man's dilemma is acute. Christian
civilization has sought the total repression of the death
instinct in its aggressive manifestation, and the result,
Freud suggests, is that the progress of civilization has been
not, as he proposed in Totem and Taboo, towards maturity but
rather towards neurosis. Yet the nature of the death instinct
permits no alternative. Allowed fulfilment as aggression, it
must destroy the means to the instinctual renunciation upon
which civilization is built; restricted further in this direc­
tion by man's progressive renunciation of instinct, it will
intensify 'the self-destruction, which is in any case pro­
ceeding.'130 Freud's only suggestion of hope is that in such
a situation, 'the other of the two 'Heavenly Powers' ..., 
eternal Eros, will make an effort to assert himself in the
struggle with his equally immortal adversary.'131 He has
already indicated, however, the economic position of man's
libido:

Since a man does not have unlimited quantities of psychical
energy at his disposal, he has to accomplish his tasks
by making an expedient distribution of his libido. What
he employs for cultural aims he to a great extent withdraws
from women and sexual life. 132

In such a delicate position, the massive expenditure upon cul­
tural aims that would be necessary if Eros were to overcome the
aggressive instinct would surely destroy the already precarious

129. p 112.
130. p 119.
131. p 145.
132. pp 103 - 104.
balance by which sufficient libido is retained for instinctual fulfilment.

Freud, therefore, can only conclude:

I have not the courage to rise up before my fellow-men as a prophet, and I bow to their reproach that I can offer them no consolation; for at bottom that is what they are all demanding – the wildest revolutionaries no less passionately than the most virtuous believers. 133

The assumption is that no attitude other than a stoical acceptance in self-knowledge is possible. The psychology which sprang from a psychotherapy for neurosis has led finally to a philosophy which regards civilization as neurotic but which can see no future for man outside this civilization. In comparison, it is the strength of Lawrence's position that he can, to the last, 'rise up as a prophet'. For him civilization and instinctual fulfilment have the same root, in life; where civilization becomes equivalent to repression and death it has broken from this root. However unsuccessful he may be in tying a means of rebirth for civilization to his concept of individual fulfilment, still the fundamental vision of life from which he has begun remains, central and persuasive, urging again that we attempt such a reconciliation:

For man, as for flower and beast and bird, the supreme triumph is to be most vividly, most perfectly alive. Whatever the unborn and the dead may know, they cannot know the beauty, the marvel of being alive in the flesh. The dead may look after the afterwards. But the magnificent here and now of life in the flesh is ours, and ours alone, and ours only for a time. We ought to dance with rapture that we should be alive and in the flesh, and part of the living, incarnate cosmos. 134

133. p 145.

134. Apocalypse, p 103.
APPENDIX I

This chronology is a very modified version of that given by R. E. Pritchard in D. H. Lawrence: Body of Darkness (London, 1971), pp 211 - 216.

1912
Aug.-Nov. Completed Sons and Lovers.

1913
Jan. Foreword to Sons and Lovers.
Jan.-March Began and discontinued The Lost Girl (as The Insurrection of Miss Houghton).
Jan.-April Middle section of Twilight in Italy (first version).
March-June First version of The Rainbow and Women in Love (as The Sisters).
April-Dec. The Prussian Officer.
Sept.-Oct. Last two essays of Twilight in Italy.

1914
Feb.-May Third version of The Rainbow.
June Returned to England.
Sept.-Nov. Study of Thomas Hardy.
Dec.-March 1915 Final version of The Rainbow.

1915
Revised Twilight in Italy.

1916
April-Nov. Women in Love
Nov. The Horse Dealer's Daughter (as The Miracle), Samson and Delilah.
1917

Feb.-March The Reality of Peace.
Aug.-Aug. 1918 Essays on American literature, as The Transcendental Element in American Literature.

Love.

Dec. Began Aaron's Rod.

1918

July-Jan. 1919 Movements in European History.
Nov. The Blind Man. First version of The Fox.

Winter Fannie and Annie, You Touched Me, Wintry Peacock, Monkey Nuts, Tickets Please.

1919

March Adolf.
Summer Rewrote The Fox.
Sept. Foreword to Women in Love. Discontinued Aaron's Rod.

1920

Feb.-May Final version of The Lost Girl.

May Rex.

July Recomenced Aaron's Rod.

1921

Feb.-March Wrote Sea and Sardinia.
May Completed Aaron's Rod.

May-Oct. Fantasia of the Unconscious.
APPENDIX II

Unconsciousness  Consciousness
Being  Knowing
Becoming oneself  Knowledge
Body  Mind
Source  Utterance
Origin  Expression
Blood  Idea
Heart  Mental faculties
Nature  Convention, Law
Individuality  System
Soul  Will
Flesh  Word
Feelings  Thought
Passion  Theory
Life  Work, Good Works
Living  Self-preservation
Flower, root  Trunk
Motion  Machine
Natural Movement  Instrument
Primal  Mechanical
Forward moving  Fixed, static
Darkness  Light

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