ABSTRACT

OF THE THESIS ENTITLED
"TEXTUAL AND SEMANTIC STUDIES
IN CLASSICAL YOGA"

by G.A. Feuerstein

Notwithstanding that the Yoga-Sūtra of Patañjali has received more scholarly attention than any other yogic scripture, with the notable exception of the Bhagavad-Gītā, the existing translations and accounts of the Yoga-Sūtra are marred by serious misinterpretations. It is argued that these misapprehensions are due to (a) an almost naive reliance on the Sanskrit exegetists and (b) the want of a critical, in-depth analysis of both the textual structure of Patañjali's work and his conceptual and doctrinal edifice.

The present thesis represents an attempt to meet these desiderata by way of a strictly system-immanent interpretation of the teachings of Patañjali, founded on textual criticism. The data are arranged into two major parts. The first part (chapters 2-4) consists in a stringent examination of the textual structure of the Yoga-Sūtra on the basis of an explicit methodology postulating, in conscious contrast to the a priori assumptions of previous researchers, the intrinsic homogeneity of the text. This approach proved generative of significant new perspectives. Above all, it established that the Yoga-Sūtra is a composite of two sets of tradition, viz. Kriyāyoga and Aṣṭāṅgayoga, the latter being represented by a series of aphorisms which appear to be 'quoted' in the main text rather than arbitrarily interpolated.

This crucial finding furnished the starting-point for the critical
analysis, attempted in the second part of the thesis (chapters 5-7), of the conceptual framework of Classical Yoga as embodied in the Yoga-Sūtra itself. It was possible to cast new light on several key concepts – philosophical, psychological and practical – of Patañjali's system of thought. These analyses clearly evinced the full autonomy of Patañjalyoga as a distinct darsana, thus correcting the popular misconception that Classical Yoga is merely Classical Sāmkhya transmogrified along theistic lines.
TEXTUAL AND SEMANTIC STUDIES
IN CLASSICAL YOGA

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by
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CONTENTS

PART ONE : INTRODUCTION

Chapter 1 : A Preliminary Definition of 'Yoga' 2

PART TWO : TEXTUAL PROBLEMS

Chapter 2 : The Yoga-Sūtra in the Light of the Classical Exegetists 9
Chapter 3 : A Structural Analysis of the Yoga-Sūtra 24
Chapter 4 : Kriyā-Yoga and Aṣṭa-Āṅga-Yoga : A Comparison 80

PART THREE : SEMANTIC INVESTIGATIONS

Chapter 5 : Philosophical Abstracta

1.Īśvara 97
2. Puruṣa 116
3. Prakṛti 133
4. Kaivalya 174

Chapter 6 : Psychological Concepts

1. Citta 184
2. Vṛtti 189
3. Kleśa, Kliśṭa-Akliśṭa 191
4. Saṃskāra, Vāsamā, Āśaya 196
5. Nirodha 203
6. Pratyaya 207

Chapter 7: Practice Concepts
1. Abhyāsa, Vairāgya 211
2. Pratyāhāra, Dhāraṇā, Dhyāna 215
3. Saṃdhī 221

PART FOUR: CONCLUSION

Chapter 8: Pātañjala-Yoga and Classical Saṃkhya 246

List of Publications Cited 264
PART ONE

INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER ONE
A PRELIMINARY DEFINITION OF 'YOGA'

It seems apposite to offer, at the very outset of this study, a preliminary definition of the subject-matter, viz. Yoga. In the past several tentative definitions or, more accurately, descriptions have been proposed. These were either far too specific or else too imprecise. What does it mean to speak of Yoga as a 'way of life', 'philosophy', 'Indian psychotherapy', 'religious union' or 'mysticism'? These concepts are themselves extremely vague, if not loaded, and hence quite inadequate as definitional tools. The rationale of a formal definition is the formulation of a set of propositions which are unconditionally valid. This means that only those components of the concept which are constant are to be singled out and logically related to each other within the specific semantic domain of that concept. The definition is expected to be both consistent and as complete as possible without at the same time violating the law of parsimony. Keeping these factors in mind I would suggest the following definition.

Yoga is a specifically Indian tradition consisting of sets of varyingly codified and/or systematised ideas, methods and techniques primarily intended to induce a transformation of consciousness in the
practitioner (yogin) and transmitted from one teacher to one or more disciples in a more or less formal setting.

By 'specifically Indian' I mean that Yoga is a part of the socio-cultural field of so-called Hinduism and its margins. This includes some of the neighbouring countries, especially Tibet and Kashmir, but excludes all other regions which cannot be said to have had more than a negligible cultural contact with Hinduism and its two great socio-cultural cousin configurations Buddhism and Jainism. Thus it would be misleading to talk of an 'Akkadian Yoga' or 'Hebrew Yoga' as did W. J. FLAGG (1898), but the designations 'Buddhist Yoga', 'Jaina Yoga' or 'Tibetan Yoga' are fully justified.

In view of the fact that Yoga is by no means a uniform tradition it is necessary to qualify the definition by speaking of 'sets' which, again, may be more or less complex according to the degree of codification and systematisation. By 'ideas' I mean simple concepts, fundamental suppositions, doctrines and even full-fledged ideological superstructures. It is assumed that the goal of all forms and schools of Yoga is the breakthrough onto a different level of cognition. This automatically excludes magic with its central concern for the acquisition and manipulation of 'power'. Yoga proper can be said to be primarily orientated towards gnosis, although it cannot be denied that some of the variants of Yoga display a more or less pronounced interest
in 'magic power' (siddhi, vibhūti).

Since there is no unanimity about the actual nature of the ultimate target of Yoga, as is evident from the contrasting definitions of kaivalya, brahma-nirvāna, nirvāna etc., it seems advisable to speak merely in general terms of a 'transformation of consciousness'. This takes also into account the extraordinarily multiform experiences encountered in the course of the various yogic programmes, e.g. the multifarious types of meditative absorption and samādhi. The 'teacher' who may or may not be a fully qualified adept must also be regarded as an essential feature of a complete yogic setting. His role is obviously analogous to that of the therapist or analyst in contemporary therapeutic procedures.

The 'setting' in which the tradition of Yoga is transmitted from guru to sāya can be as formal as the customary pupilage of upaniṣadic times, where the student lived in the teacher's hermitage (āśrama), or as informal as the occasional congregations of like-minded devotees of, say, Kṛṣṇa in medieval India. Specifications about the mode of transmission of the traditional knowledge remain outside the orbit of the definition, since there are far too many variables. For instance initiation by which a person is accepted into the teaching structure can be enacted on various levels of elaboration and formality. It may simply take the form of the teacher's silent consent, or else it can find ritualistic expression as in certain schools of Tantrism. The standards of selection differ greatly and particularly in
the more popular Yoga movements, such as the medieval bhakti-
śrīva, the threshold of tolerance can be unexpectedly low.

One more important point calls for consideration in connection with the present definition of Yoga. It is often maintained that Yoga is primarily, perhaps even exclusively, practice of one kind or another, and to be strictly distinguished from the various theoretical accretions. But such a distinction is fallacious. Theory and practice are not separable categories; they mutually inform each other. Nowhere has this intrinsic reciprocity of theory and practice/experiment been brought out more vividly than in the recent studies in the philosophy of science.¹

It is misleading to dichotomise the Gestalt of Yoga by identifying it either with the 'pure' practice of certain techniques of consciousness transformation or with a specific body of theorems. Thus, for instance, E. CONZE's rough-and-ready definition of Yoga as "a series of technical practices"² which in the course of history received various ideological underpinnings, leaves much to be desired. Though useful as a convenient analytical device, the clear-cut distinction between 'technical substructure' and 'ideological superstructure' — again E. CONZE's wording — must not be confounded with the actual data: Yoga is more properly characterised as a theory-practice continuum.

¹ See e.g. T.S. KUHN (1970², 33)
² E. CONZE (1962, 18f.)
This point has been vaguely appreciated by G.J. Larson (1969, 124) who, in a footnote (117n), makes the following observation: "It should be noted, however, that Yoga is never just action or 'doing'. It has associated with it a number of doctrines which clearly distinguish it and give it an identity which goes beyond sheer 'doing'." These considerations are not of course meant to disclaim the fact that within the yogic tradition great emphasis is placed on its practical application in the form of personal commitment and daring experimentation.

It may be argued that the above definition is still not specific enough so as to permit a fully adequate demarcation of Yoga from cognate trends in India. But it must be remembered that Yoga is a highly polymorphous phenomenon which does not readily lend itself to formal analysis. As M. Eliade (1973, 50) aptly remarks: "If 'yoga' means many things, that is because Yoga is many things."

Finally, I wish to delimit the precise connotation of the concept 'Classical Yoga' as used in the title and throughout the main body of this study. By this term I mean to refer to that particular school and type of Yoga which is associated with the name of Patanjali and is codified in his famous Yoga-Sûtra. By way of extension I include in this concept also the subsequent commentarial tradition initiated as far as we know by Vyāsa's Yoga-Bhāṣya and continued through a long though not perfectly continuous chain of sub-commentaries and glosses. Thus 'Classical Yoga'. does not so much mark a specific chrono-
logical event than constitute a particular genre of Yoga. Implicit in this is the idea that far from embodying a uniform tradition, Classical Yoga comprises a series of traditions which have as their common denominator a formal dependence on the Yoga-Sutra.
PART TWO

TEXTUAL PROBLEMS
CHAPTER TWO

THE YOGA-ŚŪTRA IN THE LIGHT OF THE CLASSICAL EXEGETISTS

Patañjali's work, as is evident from its regular Sanskrit title,\(^3\) belongs to the so-called śūtra-literature which emerged as a distinct genre of Indian literary history in the centuries before the rise of Christianity. According to M. Müller (1916\(^4\), 4) these systematic works "must be considered as the last outcome of a long continued philosophical activity carried on by memory only". The word śūtra means literally 'thread', and in the present context refers to what S. Dasgupta (1965\(^5\), I, 62) calls "short and pregnant half-sentences" which "did not elaborate the subject in detail, but served only to hold before the reader the lost threads of memory of elaborate disquisitions with which he was already thoroughly acquainted". He continues: "It seems, therefore, that these pithy half-sentences were like lecture hints, intended for those who had had direct elaborate oral instructions on the subject."

It is exactly this extreme brevity and conciseness which renders the śūtras almost unintelligible to the uninitiated. On the other hand, this same condensation and obscurity guaranteed the great degree of flexibility witnessed in the diverse traditions, since doctrinal matter could easily be developed and

\(^3\) I say 'regular title' because according to the Yoga-Bhāṣya, Patañjali's work is also known as Śāmkhya-Pravacana.
even reinterpreted on the basis of the śūtras. I.K. TAIWANI (1965, x) writes: "The language in which the Śūtras are constructed is an ancient one which, though extraordinarily effective in the expression of philosophical ideas, can lend itself to an extraordinary variety of interpretations." This remarkable feature is best exemplified in the Vedānta literature which spawned around the Brahma-Śūtra ascribed to Pādarāya (7200 A.D.). The unequivocal sanction of this treatise was claimed with equal emphasis and conviction by non-dualists, dualists and the propagators of other intermediary religious and philosophical positions.

This enormous elasticity of the śūtra was recognised by Vācaspati Miśra in his celebrated Bhāmatī (I.1.1) where he points out that a śūtra is so called "because of the communication of wide meaning" (bahv-artha-sūcanāt).

The difficulties which the śūtra style entails for the translator are immediately apodictic. He is not only faced with a frequently highly enigmatic original text but also an extensive trail of commentaries upon commentaries which, in seeking to plumb the purport of the śūtras, offer a wealth of differing, often even hostile and mutually exclusive interpreta-

4 See S. RADHAKRISHNAN (1960) (The Brahma-Śūtra)
5 See Sańkara's Bhāṣya
6 See Madhva's theistic commentary
7 See e.g. Rāmānuja's Śrī-Bhāṣya
Of course, not each and every aphorism is obscure. Nor are the classical exegetists permanently vying for recognition or totally unhelpful in their explanations. Very often they supply useful cues and valuable background information which in a way compensate for their misleading, fanciful, dubious or simply irrelevant statements.

Fortunately, the Sūtra style of Patañjali's composition is not as recondite and impenetrable as for instance certain portions of the Brahma-Sūtra, and the general purport of most of its aphorisms can be grasped without the aid of the Sanskrit commentaries. Whereas the author of the Brahma-Sūtra shows a distinct predilection for extreme terseness of statement — many of his aphorisms consist of a single word or a compound of two or three members only — the Yoga-Sūtra has an average of ca. six words per Sūtra. The shortest aphorism is I.23 (with two words, provided that Yāvara-pranidhāna is counted as one) and the lengthiest is II.34 (with nineteen words).

The comparative tangibility of the Sūtras of Patañjali's vade-mecum does of course not signify that the meaning of each and every aphorism is crystal clear, or else there would be little justification for the present study. The truth is that there is still an abundance of concepts which await more detailed analysis than was afforded to them by past researchers. Above all, it is

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my contention that little progress has been made as regards the exposure of the dynamics of Yoga, in particular our understanding of the subtle interplay between the conceptual framework and the ritual (i.e. practical) aspect.

Even though the Yoga-Sutra has received more scholarly attention than any other scripture of Yoga — with the notable exception of the Bhagavad-Gita — it still represents a vast terra incognita. In a certain sense the position of the researcher on Classical Yoga is analogous to the position of those among the early Vedicsists who, upon the discovery of Sāyāna's commentary on the Rgveda, were perfectly convinced that this explanatory text would solve all their exegetical problems. For, in their interpretation of the Yoga-Sutra the previous researchers have gone little farther than Vyāsa, the author of the oldest extant scholium. As a matter of fact they cannot even be said to have fathomed out the full depth of Vyāsa's commentary. As J.H. Woods (1966, ix) observes: "Even after a dozen readings the import of some paragraphs is not quite clear, such for example as the first half of the Bhasya on iii.14. Still more intractable are the single technical terms, even if the general significance of the word, superficially analysed, is clear. This irreducible residuum is unavoidable so long as one cannot feel at home in that type of emotional thinking which culminates in a supersensuous object of aesthetic contemplation."

In a way Vyāsa, a brilliant scholiast, has kept previous scholars off a critical and sufficiently independent analysis.
of the Yoga-Sūtra, just as he has exerted a strong influence on all subsequent native commentators. Even Bhoja, supposedly the most self-reliant glossist, who criticises in his Rāja-Mārtanda all his predecessors proudly dubbing them "distorters of the real meaning" (vastu-viplava-kṛtyaḥ), relies heavily on Vyāsa's work and consequently also commits the very same exegetical blunders.

Hence the first step towards a competent study of the Yoga-Sūtra would appear to consist in a critical assessment of the exegetical literature. The first scholar to pay some attention at least to this important question was J.W. HAUER (1958). He recognised what any detailed examination will but confirm and amplify: There are marked discrepancies between the Yoga-Sūtra and the interpretations of the exegetists. In J.W. HAUER's (1958, 265) own words: "The commentaries subsequent to Vyāsa, even already Vyāsa himself, instead of presenting the genuine philosophy of Yoga often foist on Yoga the philosophy of Sāṃkhya. For this reason they are to be used with caution."

Some of these divergencies are quite obviously conceptual differences, others are of a terminological nature. They arise from the simple fact that between the composition of the original sūtras and the compilation of the commentaries there elapsed a considerable period of time during which many shifts of emphasis in both language and thought must have occurred. At any rate, none of the long line of exegetists can be said to be a proper representative of Patañjali's school of thought. This naturally
does not challenge the fact that they constitute authoritative traditions in their own right. Yet it does impair their value as research implements. Perhaps it is just tenable to say that their reliability as exegetical sources decreases in proportion to their chronological remoteness from the *Yoga-Sūtra*.

Thus clearly the most important commentary is the *Yoga-Bhāṣya* which is most proximate to the *Yoga-Sūtra*. The exact date of this scholium is still uncertain, but it cannot be later than ca. 650 A.D. Little is known about Vyāsa himself whom tradition identifies with the legendary Vedavyāsa who compiled the *Sāmhitās*, the *Mahābhārata* and the *Purāṇas*. Since the Śāṅkhya teacher Vārgagaṇa is quoted in the *Yoga-Bhāṣya* (III.53; IV.13), who was in all likelihood a contemporary of Vasubandhu (probably 270–350 A.D.), Vyāsa cannot have lived before 350 A.D.

Thus the *Yoga-Bhāṣya* must be assigned to the period between 350–650 A.D. If the *Yoga-Sūtra* was composed in its present form in the second or third century A.D., as is assumed here, the *Yoga-Bhāṣya* must be assigned to a date sufficiently removed from...
that of the Yoga-Sūtra in order to account for the many misunderstandings. For this reason J.W. HAUER (1958, 266) favours the end of the fifth or the beginning of the sixth century as a likely date for the Yoga-Bhāṣya. The aforementioned discrepancies also led J.W. HAUER to query whether Vyāsa really was a yogin who had access to the highest experiences, but this argument is invalid. J.W. HAUER also pointed out that Vyāsa's viewpoint is very much akin to the earlier theistic Yoga tradition as it is embodied, for instance, in the Śvetāsvatara-Upaniṣad, where the lord (Īśvara) is identified with Rudra-Siva. J.W. HAUER deduces this from the opening stanza of the Yoga-Bhāṣya which runs:

\[
yā-tyaktvā rūpam-ādyam prabhavati jagato‘nekadē-
anugrahēya prakṛte-kleśā-rādīr-vīṣana-vīṣa-dhāro‘-
nakau-vyaktrah subhōct, sarvā-jñāna-prasūṭir-bhujāga-
parikarah prītaye yasya nityam devo‘hi-Īśah sa vo‘
vyāt-sita-vimala-tanur-yogadu yogayuktah.\]

This may be rendered as follows:

[May He] who, having abandoned the primal form, [and who] arises to favour the world in many ways, [He], the bearer of deadly poison, with many mouths and beautifully hooded, [who] destroys the mass of

(fn. 11 otd.)

the Yoga-Sūtra in the period between 300-500 A.D., which is accepted by J.W. HAUER (1958, 266). However, in view of the fact that the terminus ad quem of Vyāsa's work is 650 A.D. and very likely much earlier, the Yoga-Sūtra may justifiably be placed
the causes-of-affliction, to whose delight the 
multitude of serpents eternally brings forth all 
knowledge — may He, the divine lord of serpents, 
protect you with His white, stainless body, [He] the 
giver of Yoga [who] is [Himself] yoked in Yoga.

Admittedly, J.W. HAUER's proposed equation of ahi-Īśa with Śiva 
is valid. Still, as S. DASGUPTA (1930, 55) observes: "The adoration 
hymn of Vyāsa (...) is considered to be an interpolation even by 
orthodox scholars." This seems to be confirmed by the fact that 
Vyāsa shows, to my knowledge, no sectarian bias in his commentary, 
even though there would have been ample opportunity for expressing 
personal convictions especially in connection with the sūtras 
I.23-28 which deal with the concept of Māyāra.

Vyāsa's precise intellectual home is difficult to determine. 
According to P. CHAKRAVARTI (1951, 72, fn.1, 138f.) the author of 
the Yoga-Bhasya represents the Śākhyā school of Vārṣaṇagaya.

Discrediting Vācasaṃti Miśra's testimony, P. CHAKRAVARTI suggests 
that most of the quotations in the Bhāṣya are not from Pāṇḍaśikha 
but from Vārṣaṇagaya, "a distinguished teacher of Śākhyā" (p105) who 
"re-wrote the original Saṃhitātra of Pāṇḍaśikha" (p136) and also 
was the teacher of Vindhyāvāsa (see p138). This valuable hypothesis 
is indirectly confirmed by K.S.R. RAO (1966, 375) who points out 
that both Vyāsa (see YBh II.19) and Vārṣaṇagaya¹² subscribe to the 

¹¹ This is according to the Yuktī-Dīpikā, commenting on Śākhyā-
Kārikā 25; the text reads: eka-ṛṣṭuṃ pāṃkṛti-ity-avā, 
eka-uttaraṃ vārṣaṇagayaḥ.

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Kārikā 25; the text reads: eka-ṛṣṭuṃ pāṃkṛti-ity-avā, 
eka-uttaraṃ vārṣaṇagayaḥ.
so-called eka-uttara-('increasing by one') theory. This is an ontogenetic model operating on the principle of progressive inclusion. Thus, in contrast with other schools of thought, every tanmātra or sensory potential has not merely one characteristic, but rather each subsequent tanmātra entails the characteristics of all previous tanmātras. This view can be tabulated as follows:

1. sabda-tanmātra = sabda
2. sparṣa-tanmātra = sparṣa + sabda
3. rūpa-tanmātra = rūpa + sparṣa + sabda
4. rasa-tanmātra = rasa + rūpa + sparṣa + sabda
5. gandha-tanmātra = gandha + rasa + rūpa + sparṣa + sabda

Both the single characteristic theory and, as P. DEUSSEN (1920, I,67f.) calls it, the 'accumulation theory' are expounded in the Mahābhārata. The former notion is probably the older one. In K.B.R. RĀO's opinion the eka-uttara doctrine is also accepted by Yāvara Kṛṣṇa, but P. DEUSSEN (1920, I,446) denies that it can be found in the Sāmkhyā-Karika.

Be this as it may, it is clear from what has been said so far that Vyāsa must be located somewhere in the ramifying tradition of Sāmkhya. This is strikingly evident from the colophons of his commentary according to which his work is an exposition of Sāmkhya.

13 For an explanation of the concept of tanmātra see below pp. 163f.
Notwithstanding that Vyāsa cannot be considered as belonging to pātrājala-yoga proper, his commentary nevertheless does also not display the marks of bold innovation as is the case, for instance, with Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya to the Brahma-Sūtra. Vyāsa writes as a scholar with much insight and possibly a good deal of first-hand knowledge of yogic practice.

On a still more sophisticated level than the Yoga-Bhāṣya is the famous Pitā by Vacaspati Miśra, entitled Tattva-Vaiśeṣik. Vacaspati, who can safely be placed in the ninth century A.D., was a scholar of great repute. As C. BULCKE (1947, 3) puts it: "He is a very remarkable figure in the history of Indian philosophy and fully deserves the title of sarvataṃśa-svataṃśa, 'master of all systems but reliant on no one of them in particular'..."

The author of seven major exegetical Sanskrit works on Nyāya, Śaṅkhya, Yoga, Mīmāṃśa and Vedānta, he was a master of the philosophical style, the beauty and lucidity of which greatly impressed many a western savant (see e.g. M.WINTGENS, 1922, III, 454).

His Tattva-Vaiśeṣik is invaluable for understanding the more elusive passages of the Yoga-Bhāṣya, and it is a mine of interesting philological data. However, its expository value is low. Vacaspati, ostensibly, was no authority on Yoga; he approached his subject-matter with great candour and sympathy but not from within the yogic tradition. This is corroborated by his whole style and his preoccupation with philological and epistemological matters as well as his anxious dependence on Vyāsa. It is furthermore illustrated by the following story current in pandita circles,
as related by S.S. SURYANARAYANA SASTRI & C.K. RAJA (1933, x):

In those days (as even today in part of Upper India), it would appear to have been customary to hold learned discussions on such occasions as marriages. Vacaspati, who listened to such a discussion on the occasion of his own marriage, was so struck by the vagaries of dialecticians that he resolved straightaway to devote himself to the task of setting forth authoritative expositions of all the darsanas. So great was his zeal, so mighty the task and such the patient and tireless devotion of his wife that the couple had grown old before Vacaspati could write finis to his labours. Then alone did Vacaspati realise the magnitude both of his neglect of his wife and of his wife's self-sacrifice; and as a tardy measure of reparation, he gave her name to the last and greatest of his works, so that she could live on perpetually in the Bhamati, though not in the bodies of children born of her. The story is so picturesque, so typical of the scholar's neglect and the true scholarly recompense, that it deserves to be true.

Commenting on the Bhamati, undoubtedly Vacaspati's magnum opus, S. DASGUPTA (1965, II, 108) remarks that this great scholar "always tries to explain the text as faithfully as he can, keeping himself in the background and directing his great knowledge of the
subject to the elucidation of the problems which directly arise from the texts and to explaining the allusions and contexts of thoughts, objections and ideas of other schools of thought referred to in the text. This, mutatis mutandis, is true of his Tattva-Vaisāradī as well. It is this uncommon impartiality which makes it so difficult to get a rounded picture of his personal philosophy, though his own viewpoint is most likely that expressed in the Bhāmatī.

In the eleventh century Bhoja, ruler of Dhāra, composed a much acclaimed commentary to the Yoga-Sūtra, known as the Rāja-Mārtanda or Bhoja-Vṛtti. Although the royal author contributes many original interpretations, his work is largely moulded on the Yoga-Bhāṣya and perhaps not quite as independent as he himself appears to have believed. J.W. HAUER (1958, 268) concedes to the possibility that Bhoja was a practising yogin, but this is pure conjecture. It is clear, though, from the introductory verse of his composition that he was a follower of Śaivism and a devout theist.

Easily the most self-reliant and fascinating of all the extant commentaries is the Yoga-Vārttika by Vijnāna Bhikṣu, who lived some time in the sixteenth/seventeenth century in Bengal. An abstract of this voluminous scholium is the Yoga-Sara-Samgraha by the same author.

14 It is possible that Vyāsa was in fact not the first to comment on the Yoga-Sūtra. Thus according to J.W. HAUER (1958, 268f.) the Persian traveller al-Bīrūnī (973-1048 A.D.) apparently based his translation of the Yoga-Sūtra into Arabic on a commentary which does not appear to be either the Bhāṣya or the Tattva-Vāsāradī.
Vijnana Bhiksu ranks among the great philosophical geniuses of India. Rejecting the non-dualist interpretation of reality which formed the dominant philosophical paradigm of the post-Sankara period, he developed in his Vijnana-Amrta-Bhasya (to the Brahma-Sutra) and in his other works a type of theistic Sankhya not dissimilar to the Sankhya-Yoga-Vedanta tradition of the Mahabharata. As M. Muller (1916, 450) remarks, Vijnana Bhiksu was "a philosopher of considerable grasp" who "while fully recognising the difference between the six systems of philosophy, tried to discover a common truth behind them all, and to point out how they can be studied together, or rather in succession, and how all of them are meant to lead honest students into the way of truth".

He was a prolific writer and, in addition to the abovementioned treatises, also authored the Sankhya-Pravacana-Bhasya, Sankhya-Sara, Upadesa-Natnamala and a commentary on the Gita (= Kurma-Purana II.1-11). He has the delightful habit of commenting on points which other exegetists conveniently ignore. For instance, he is the first to offer a comprehensive theory of the gunas. His statements are generally clear, and he makes no attempt to conceal the fact that his interpretations are simultaneously reinterpretations.

Roughly contemporary with Vijnana Bhiksu is Ramananda, the author of a commentary entitled Manipurabha which is a work of little originality but which can be commended as a useful abstract of the leading ideas of the Yoga-Sutra and Vyasa's Bhasya. In this respect Ramananda's work is typical of most of the later scholia which on the whole contain little that is new or particularly insightful.
A rare exception is Harihara's Bhāṣaṭṭi, a late nineteenth century composition. He also composed the so-called Yoga-Kārikā and a Sanskrit tract on Pañcāśikha and other sages which was edited and translated by J. Ghosh (1934).

To sum up: There is not only a considerable gap of several centuries between the oldest known commentary and Patañjali's Sūtra, but also an equally real and profound ideological interstice. As the chronological distance increased and the Yoga-Sūtra became more and more removed, the intervening commentaries filled in the blanks with new material and, as layer upon layer of secondary exposition was added, the original became successfully obscured. Although it is in most cases not possible to determine the exact outlook or bias of a commentator, there can be no question that any of the extant glosses and sub-glosses can claim unfeigned authenticity in their exposition of the Yoga-Sūtra. The 'distortions' of the Yoga-Bhāṣya have proved exceedingly resilient, and there is no certainty even that those commentators who offer more self-reliant interpretations are any more correct than their less original congeners. Even a cursory reading of the commentatorial literature evinces its basically impaired reliability. I do not think it necessary at this stage to introduce evidential details, since some of the data will be effectively dealt with in the analytical part and a complete documentation lies outside the scope of this study. I merely wish to observe that the evidence can be grouped under four headings:

(1) Contradictions within the same text;
(2) discrepancies between one text and another;
(3) the silence of the commentators on vital issues;
(4) the striking contrasts between the traditional expositions and a 'purged' interpretation of the Yoga-Sūtra on the basis of a text-immanent study of it.

From what has been said so far it is clear that the commentaries, however indispensable they may be, have to be taken *cum grano salis*, and that for an adequate comprehension of the Yoga-Sūtra it is imperative to concentrate on the information and cues contained in the Sūtra itself. This is precisely what P. DEUSSEN (1920),*510 recommended long ago and what finally J.W. HAUER (1958) carried out more rigorously than any other translator. Despite all these misgivings, the intrinsic value of the majority of the commentaries is beyond question. Whatever their interpretational credibility may be, they were instrumental in the historical development of the yoga-dāśāna. In order to be able to detect and assess their individual contribution it is essential to study the Yoga-Sūtra on its own and carefully distinguish between the actual data of Patañjali's work as brought out by a critical analysis of it and the material in the commentaries.
CHAPTER THREE
A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF THE YOGA-SŪTRA

The conspicuous chronological and conceptual gap which exists between the commentators and Patañjali (or whoever may have been responsible for the final editing of the Yoga-Sūtra), evidently cancels the very possibility of arriving at an authentic understanding of the Yoga-Sūtra purely on the basis of the exegetical Sanskrit literature. Hence the only way of decoding the conceptual edifice of Patañjali is by means of a critical immanent interpretation of his text. In P. DEUSSEN's (1920, 1510) words: "We adhere to the principle of gaining all information as far as possible from the sūtras themselves and seek the aid of the later expositions only where they fail us." However, like most translators before and after him, he did not really pursue his own strategy with sufficient consistency and consequently remained under the powerful influence of Vyāsa's scholium. P. DEUSSEN hoped to achieve his target with the help of textual criticism. Whilst most Indian scholars tended to emphasise the coherent architecture of Patañjali's manual, he questioned the inner unity of the Yoga-Sūtra, regarding it as a composite of several existent texts patched together rather randomly. This he deduced from the contents and its peculiar arrangement.

Thus P. DEUSSEN postulated a number of sūtra-texts
which, as he envisioned it, served contemporaneous schools as vade-
meecums and which were then drawn together by the compiler of the
vulgate as we know it. He tentatively suggested the following
stratigraphy:

text A: I.1 - I.16

text B: I.17 - I.51

text C: II.1 - II.27

text D: II.28 - III.55

text E: IV.1 - IV.33

P. DEUSSEN's conclusions were renewedly investigated and
restated by J.W. HAUER (1958) who undertook the most stringent
analysis of the textual corpus of the Yoga-Sutra hitherto. J.W.
HAUER in fact felt that already the native Sanskrit exegetists
had been very much aware of the problematic nature of the composi-
tion of Patanjali's treatise. In this connection he drew attention
to Vacaspati Miśra's opening words to aphorism II.1:

\[
\text{namu prathama-pādena-eva sa-upāyah sa-avāntara-}
\text{prabhedaḥ sa-phalo yoga utktas tat-kim-sparam-}
\text{avisigvate yad-arthaṃ dvitiya-pādaḥ prarabhyaeta-}
\text{ity-ata ma udrṣṭa-itī, abhyāsa-vairāgye hi yoga-}
\text{upāyaṃ prathume pāda uktau, na ca ταυ vyutthitasya}
\text{drāg-ity-eva sambhavata iti dvitiya-pāda-uddeśyaṃ-}
\text{ṣa-upāyaṃ-apekṣate sattva-suddhya-arthaṃ.}
\]

15 According to most editions, there are 34 sutras in chapter IV.
This may be translated as follows:

Objection: The first chapter [of the Yoga-Sūtra] having described Yoga with its means, subdivisions and results, what reason does there remain for a second chapter to be commenced? Reply: He [i.e. Vyāsa] answers: "It has been stated [in the first chapter what Yoga is for one whose mind is concentrated]." For in the first chapter practice and dispassion were stated to be the two means of Yoga. And since these two do not come into being at once for one who is of out-going mind, he requires the means taught in the second chapter in order to purify the sattva.

There are similar introductory remarks to the third and fourth pāda. If Vācaspati would have entertained any real doubts about the authenticity of the various chapters, as J.W. HAUER seems to imply, he would certainly have expressed them in his prologue to the fourth chapter which prima facie appears to initiate a natural break in the textual continuity. Yet Vācaspati accepts the traditional division without even the slightest hesitation.

Admittedly, even a cursory reading of the Yoga-Sūtra convinces one of the fact that it cannot possibly be an entirely homogeneous composition. As S. DASGUPTA (1930, 51) observes: "An analytic

16 This is in fact not confirmed by an in-depth study of the text.
study of the sūtras also brings conviction that they do not show any original attempt but are a masterly and systematic compilation, supplemented with certain original contributions."

He isolates four factors which in his opinion seem to prove the compilatory nature of the text, viz.

1. the Yoga-Sūtra is divided into chapters (pāda) rather than into books (adhyāya) and lessons (āṇjika);
2. the highly systematic character of the first three chapters with their precise definitions;
3. the absence of any missionary zeal or polemics;
4. the fact that at the end of the third chapter the author writes 'finis' (iti) which is repeated at the conclusion of the fourth chapter.

Valid as these points are in themselves, they do not amount to primary evidence. The most remarkable feature in favour of the hypothetical compilatory nature of the Yoga-Sūtra are the apparent discontinuities in the textual arrangement which strike the eye of even the most casual reader. But granted that Patanjali's work is a compilation of extant aphorisms, how must one proceed to be able to separate the various assumed sūtra-units from the accretions of the final editor? I do not think that this question has ever been faced properly, since none of the previous scholars bothered to justify his particular methodology of textual criticism.¹⁷

¹⁷ For the technical aspects of textual criticism see J. MACKIE (1947, 53-80) and also J. WHATMOUTH (1954, 441-446).
Past scholars, on the whole, proceeded from the assumption that the *Yoga-Sūtra* cannot possibly be a single homogeneous textual entity owing to its apparent disorganisation. In the following I shall commence from the opposite end as it were by presupposing the perfect homogeneity of the text. In other words, I shall look for points which seem to contradict, or at least seriously challenge, this basic working hypothesis. In this way I hope to avoid the fallacy common to all attempts of textual criticism so far, namely to cut more and more slices from the cake until it simply vanishes out of sight and nothing but disconnected fragments — quite meaningless in themselves — are left behind.

Instances of this kind of procedure are legend in Indology. It has been applied to the *Bhagavad-Gītā*, the *Mahābhārata* and with especial success to the *Katha-Upanīṣad* which F. Weller (1953) managed to dissect into up to fifteen layers. The contradictory results of this approach are indicative of its implicit fallacy. It has, therefore, justly been questioned by some scholars. For instance, E. Conze (1967, 168) sounds this warning: "... such analytical studies of ancient writings are tedious to compose and unattractive to read, and when carried too far they threaten to shatter and pulverize the very text which they set out to examine, as we have seen in the case of Homer and the New Testament."

Speaking specifically of the *Yoga-Sūtra*, E. Frauwaller (1953, I, 439) makes this perfectly valid point: "... one proceeded with the analysis as if the different parts were merely strung together and as if it would suffice for their separation..."
to simply ascertain the joints. But things are not as simple as that. In addition to the fact that in such cases the various component parts often had a long history of their own and also had undergone considerable alteration before they were finally put together, they moreover were subjected to adjustments and approximations in the very process of editing. For, the editors were surely not oblivious to the many differences and contradictions of the diverse texts, and they tried to remove these and thus create a real textual unity. It is this which must be taken into account in any genuine analysis. It is important to recognise these editorial interventions and to grasp the original form of the miscellaneous doctrines.

Still, past textual criticism has not been completely wasted, since it singled out all those points which could possibly be regarded as real breaks in the structure of the text. In the following I shall re-examine all these proposed 'fissure' points while at the same time keeping alert to other possible joints previously overlooked. Although it is fair to assume that there are few Sanskrit texts which have escaped interpolations and alterations altogether, especially if they belong to an early period, it nonetheless seems futile to consider every sentence as suspect. It must be remembered that the oral traditions of India and their subsequent embodiment in the shape of actual texts are astonishingly reliable. The Indians' healthy respect for tradition is well known.

Thus before one contrives distortions, interpolations etc.,
one must ask oneself seriously whether what seems to be 'corrupt', 'confused' or 'patched together' is not merely the result of an unwarranted demand for absolute logical consistency and rational clarity, symptomatic of our specific thought pattern. Our need for 'order' in the sense of logical neatness is not necessarily shared by non-western cultures. That this is in fact the case has been amply demonstrated, I think, by Social Anthropology, Cross-cultural Psychology and cognate disciplines.¹⁸ In other words, what to us is blatantly incongruous may still be quite consistent within the cognitive framework of the Indians. Especially archaic thought operates far less with dualisms and hence finds it much easier to reconcile contradictions and to uphold paradoxes. Past textual criticism has been remarkably blind to this all-important insight, or else it could not possibly have insisted on applying the rigid standards of Aristotelian logic so uncompromisingly as to whittle away whole texts.

I shall now attempt to identify and single out those parts of the Yoga-Sūtra which definitely defy the assumed homogeneity of this text. It seem pertinent to base this re-examination of the architecture of Patañjali's composition on a critique of previous endeavours of textual criticism, and for this purpose J.W. HAUER's detailed analysis is, I think, the optimum point of departure.

J.W. HAUER (1958, 221ff.) starts from the premise that the parallel and divergent treatment of certain topics in the different

¹⁸ See, for instance, G. MYRDAL (1973, 89-99).
chapters is denotative of the composite character of this work. He suggests that the vulgate is a compendium of several independent suṭra-texts belonging to various schools which flourished in diverse historical periods. He accordingly divides the vulgate into five distinct text traditions:

1. **nirodha-text**: I.1 – I.22
2. **Īśvara-pranidhāna-text**: I.23 – I.51
3. **kriyā-yoga-text**: II.1 – II.27
4. **yoga-āsāga-text**: II.28 – III.55
5. **nirmanā-citta-text**: IV.1 – IV.34

J.W. HAUSER regards the **yoga-āsāga** section as the oldest portion of the Yoga-Sūtra and attributes it to the grammarian Patañjali. He offers two reasons for assigning this section to such an early date. The first is that the **yoga-āsāga** text contains several important features in nuce as it were which were later on elaborated in the other sections (e.g. the item of Īśvara-pranidhāna and the klesa doctrine). The second reason is that unlike the other (allegedly later) sections, the **yoga-āsāga** portion does not show any buddhist influence. Here one may argue that it also contains hardly any theoretical material on which one could study the possible impact of Buddhism. J.W. HAUSER's ascription of this section to the grammarian Patañjali is possible but unlikely.¹⁹

Since, according to J.W. HAUER, the yoga-sūga text does not consider certain significant aspects of Yoga, further śūtras were added to supplement it, such as the Ṛṣava-pramidēna section belonging, in his view, to the Rudra-Śiva-Viṣṇu adherents, the kriyā-yoga section pertaining to those groups of yogins who were more inclined to the brahmanical tradition, and still later the nirmiṇa-citta text. These were then assembled and supplied with a preface, the so-called nirūdhha text. As J.W. HAUER sees it, this final editing occurred some time in the fourth century A.D. This historical reconstruction is almost too neat to be convincing, and in fact J.W. HAUER lacks the material evidence to back up his inferences.

It is true that the Yoga-Sūtra displays a certain lack of methodical treatment. But must this necessarily point to a many-layered composition of the nature J.W. HAUER advocates? A more candid and less reductionistic reading of the text evinces that the different sections are far too coordinated to allow the deduction that they are of completely independent origins. Rather it seems that the apparent incongruities are due to the fact that the Yoga-Sūtra leans on already existing yogic traditions and partly incorporates the ideas and terminology of these earlier creations. J.W. HAUER's solution is also imperfect insofar as it does not provide a satisfactory answer to the question, posed by J.W.HAUER himself, as to why a 'superior Yoga guru' should have arranged these independent texts in such an haphazard manner.

In J.W. HAUER's opinion, the first pāda is a composite of
two distinct units. The first twenty-two aphorisms are, according
to him, some kind of an introduction to the vulgate and originally
had the function of defining certain psychological and philosophical
termini, the central concept being nirodha. He takes this to be
the key concept of these prefatory sutras, and wrongly identifies
nirodha with the terminal type of samadhi. As will be shown in
the semantic analysis of this important concept, nirodha has several
levels of application, and the definition "Yoga is the restriction
of the consciousness fluctuations" (I.2: yogas-citta-vrtti-nirodha)
must be understood as a preliminary one.

J.W. HAUER thinks that the editor of the vulgate, whom he also
holds responsible for the composition of the nirodha section, used
the Svara-prapidhana material as his starting-point precisely because
he could not find any better text in which the central term of his
own contribution, viz. nirodha, had a more decisive position: sutra
I.51 equates sarva-nirodha or 'total restriction' with nirbija-
samadhi or 'seedless enstasy'. J.W. HAUER's reasoning holds good
only as long as (a) there is merely one type of nirodha, namely sarva-
nirodha, and (b) sutra I.23 really stands in no immediate relation to
the preceding aphorism. He is wrong on both counts. As I will set
forth in the semantic part nirodha has three strata, which leaves
the second point for consideration.

Even though J.W. HAUER quite correctly recognises the intrinsic
theistic nature of Yoga, he somehow fails to utilise this momentous

20 See J.W. HAUER (1958, 463, fn.1).
finding in his interpretation of the *Yoga-Sūtra*. The practice of *Īvara-pranidhāna* is mentioned four times in the text (I.23, II.1, II.32 and II.45). Thus, following J.W. HAUER's segmentation, it appears once in the *Īvara-pranidhāna* section, once in the *kriyā-yoga* part and twice in the *yoga-āṅga* text.

In the last-mentioned section it is counted as a constituent of *niyama* and is defined in II.45 as conducive to *samādhi-siddhi*. J.W. HAUER, misunderstanding this crucial compound, translates it with 'Vollkommenheit der Einfaltung' (perfection of enstasy).

J.H. WOODS (1966) and G. JHA (1907) have similar renderings, viz. 'perfection of concentration' and 'accomplishment of meditation' respectively. The term *siddhi* is thus given the meaning of 'perfection', but it can also be taken in the sense of 'attainment', as for example, R. PRASĀDA (1912) and SHREE PUROHIT SWAMI (1938) fully realised. As a matter of fact this appears to be the more credible rendering.

As is borne out by the history of Yoga, at least in its hindu form, *Īvara* always played a signal role in yogic contexts. The *yogins* experienced him as a powerful entity whose 'grace' (*anugraha*) was an absolute prerequisite for obtaining *samādhi*. Hence the organic interrelation of meditative absorption and prayer in pre-classical Yoga. Even in contemporary Yoga, which is highly influenced by the non-dualist branch of Vedānta, devotion to a personified supreme being is regarded as axial to the attainment of *samādhi*. Ramāya Mahārāgī's attitude on this issue is paradigmatic.21

21 See also the interesting footnote by A.K. MAJUMDAR (1968, 65, fn.5): "Commenting on Yoga-Sūtra I.24 the Emperor [king Bhūja] writes *prakṛti-purusa-samyoja-viyogayor-īvāra-icchā vyatirekṣa-anuparateb*" (ctd.)
With the realisation of the centrality of the belief in Isvara, much of the strength of J.W. HAUER's conclusions about the so-called Isvara-pranidhāna section is dispersed. Granted that 'devotion to the lord' was already at the time of the allegedly older yoga-ānga section regarded as categorical to the attainment of samādhi and that therefore it did not (as J.W. HAUER supposes) stand in this text in a subordinate place, it is not really convincing that the Isvara-pranidhāna text should constitute the 'manifesto' of an independent school of Yoga which emphasised proper 'devotion to the lord'.

J.W. HAUER's interpretation is opposed by yet another important fact. To justify the assumed independence of the Isvara-pranidhāna section, he has to link up śūtra I.23 with I.12 and to put 'devotion to the lord' on a par with abhyāsa and vairāgya by conjecturing that the word va of I.23 refers back to nirodha. But this link-up of I.23 with I.12 has been rejected already by D. LAUENSTEIN (1943), though J.W. HAUER (1958, 462, fn.11) rebuffs his objections without however supplying sound reasons for it. J.W. HAUER translates I.23 thus: "Or [nirodha] can be achieved by devotion to the lord." Yet to put this important gnostic practice on the same level with abhyāsa and vairāgya is totally misleading, for these two concepts refer to the dual axis of any type of Yoga, as will be made clear in the semantic part.

(fn. 21 ctd.)

(...) According to the editor [R.S. Bhattacharya], the Emperor was wrong in his estimation of Isvara's power (Introduction, p.16), but late Mr. Kalipada Guha Roy, a famous Yogin, assured me that the Emperor was quite right."
Rather it appears that Tāvare-prāṇidhāna must be understood as one of the elements of abhyāsa or 'practice', the positive axis of the bi-polar path of Yoga. It may now be asked in what connection I.23 really stands to the preceding aphorisms. One of J.W. HAUER's reasons for connecting I.23 with I.12 is that the latter sūtra can explain the ablative employed in the former. But there is no compelling grammatical reason for this. Besides, there is also an ablative in I.17. As a careful examination of the aphorisms immediately preceding I.23 bears out, Tāvare-prāṇidhāna has to be related to I.17-I.20. In I.17 the four forms of samprajñata-samādhi are mentioned; I.18 is a reference to asamprajñata-samādhi.

J.W. HAUER completely misinterprets the latter sūtra: "The other kind of control [i.e. nirodha] has as its precondition the exercise of the idea of cessation and has only an activator residuum." As it stands this translation is unintelligible. The compound virāma-pratvaya-abhyāsa-pūrvah is preferably to be rendered as "the cessation of [all] presented-ideas in the former practice [i.e. in samprajñata-samādhi]." This aphorism has, incidentally, also not been quite understood by Vyāsa, whose usage of sarva-vṛtti implies that he equates pratvaya with vṛtti, which is incorrect. Vacaspati of course makes the same mistake, but Harihara interprets correctly:

virāmasya sarva-pratvaya-hīnatavah.

I.17-I.20 are references to various means of reaching the

22 J.W. HAUER's own words are: "Die andere Art der Bewältigung hat zur Voraussetzung das Üben in der Vorstellung vom Aufhören und hat nur noch einen Bewirker-Rest."
The condition of samādhi (in its several grades and types). I.23 makes out 'devotion to the lord' as one of these implements. Its superior position among these means is apparent from the definition of Isvāra by which it is followed. This whole complex is succeeded by the enunciation of a series of other similar methods for effecting the state of inner calm (citta-prasādana), such as the regulation of exhalation and the fixation of the mind, etc. When all psychomental oscillations have come to a perfect standstill, the ground is prepared for the experience of samāpatti or 'coincidence'. This process will be examined separately.

On the basis of the above considerations, J.W. Hauer's proposition of the compound nature of the first chapter must be abandoned. The evidence adduced so far points rather to the unimpaired organic unity of the series of śūtras I.1-I.55. If there are any interpolations at all, it must frankly be admitted that these can no longer be ascertained.

The main problems inherent in the first pāda were also studied in some detail by the Czech scholar A. Janáček (1954, 70ff.), whose principal arguments and hypotheses will be dealt with presently. After giving a brief account of previous efforts in deciphering the textual pattern of the Yoga-Śūtra, A. Janáček poses the following question: "The Isvāraprāṇidhāna text is supposed to be a self-contained writing of one Yoga movement. The questions that remain still unsolved are: Where does this text actually start at, what was the manner in which the Buddhist śraddhā etc., maitrī etc., became part of the text, what is the true function of the
Although A. JANÁČEK remonstrates against his predecessors' method of breaking the text up into so many 'original' texts on the strength of mere textual analysis and although he instead prefers to ascertain first the nature, type and character of the diverse Yoga schools which may be represented in the Yoga-Sūtra, he nonetheless practically commits the same error, as those who went before him when he states that "the text of I.23 till I.29 (and may be till I.31) discusses completely one whole Yoga school."

Furthermore, his endeavour to "keep in focus" the aphorisms I.20-I.22 (with their leading terms samvega and śraddhā-vīrya-

Leaving aside for the moment the arguments laid down above against such a division and also the fact of the extreme brevity of the thus isolated unit, A. JANÁČEK's proposed Ṛṣvara-prapāṇidhāna text lacks the most important ingredient of any treatise on Yoga, which could possibly claim to be self-contained, viz. a pronouncement regarding the goal of the particular yogic path which it represents.

For, surely, the aphorism I.28 can hardly be taken as a statement of the ultimate terminus of the path outlined in the preceding sūtras, particularly since I.29 states quite unequivocally...

23 A. JANÁČEK (1954, 78)

24 A. JANÁČEK (1954, 79). The author, for obvious reasons, wavers considerably in fixing the precise length of this section.
"Thence results the attainment of the in-turned consciousness and also the disappearance of the obstacles", which aphorism A. JANÁČEK himself still counts to the Śīvara-pranidhāna section. It is obvious from this sūtra that the attainment of which it speaks is but a transitional stage in the protracted process of yogic involution.

This may be an opportune point to glance at the term bhāvāna occurring in I.28. As A. JANÁČEK aptly observes this technical word appears in the Yoga-Sūtra invariably in the immediate vicinity of the compound Śīvara-pranidhāna, and hence it seems a fair assumption that it should have a consistent meaning in all four cases. It occurs in the shape of the following compounds:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{tad-artha-bhāvanam} & \quad (I.28) \\
\text{samādhi-bhāvana} & \quad (II.2) \\
\text{pratipakṣa-bhāvanam} & \quad (II.33, II.34)
\end{align*}
\]

It can be taken to signify the idea of 'realisation, cultivation, effecting' throughout. Vacaspati Miśra (on I.28) explains the term bhāvāna as the "entering [or settling-down] again and again into the mind" (bhāvanam punah punaḥ-citte nivesanam). A. JANÁČEK paraphrases this concept by "quantitative increase, in other words a 'gradation of intensity'" — a typical example of his dialectical approach and terminology which he is keen to apply wherever possible. Vacaspati's interpretation is corroborated by Vyāsa who makes it

25 See A. JANÁČEK (1954, 82)
plain that the *japa* and *bhāvāna* of *om* combined lead to the one-pointedness of the mind and not to *kaivalya* straight away. A. JANÁČEK's interpretation of *bhāvāna* as an instance of *abhyāsa*, which he defines as 'effort' (*yatna*) or 'a manifestation of volition' (*iyohā, vīrya, utsaha*), is quite sound. Yet his emphasis on the 'voluntaristic' feature of *tāvāra-pranidhāna* and *nirodha* is exaggerated.

Moreover, it makes little sense to split the text between I.28 and I.29 or even between I.31 and I.32 as he does, for the line of thought in this passage is absolutely continuous. One may possibly concede to the fact that the aphorisms I.23-I.32 constitute a unit of their own without, however, assuming that this must of necessity be of the nature of a separate text altogether. Clearly, if one insists on a rigidly tight concatenation of ideas in the presentation of the subject-matter, the *Yoga-Sūtra*, like any other piece of writing — with the possible exception of some rigorous works on logic or mathematics — could be divided into any number of sub-texts.

Although scholars like J.W. HAUER (1958) and A. JANÁČEK (1954) — triggered off by the word *va* of I.23 — are preoccupied with figuring out the nature of the relationship between section I.23-I.31 and the so-called *nirodha* text (I.1-I.22), they take no notice of the aphorisms succeeding I.31. Or else they would realise that section I.34-I.40 delineates various ways of stabilising the inner world, i.e. of achieving the restriction (*nirodha*) of the fluctuations of the mind. There are also connective particles (i.e. *va* 'or') in I.34, I.35, I.36, I.37, I.38 and I.39. Applying the yardstick of previous researchers, these *sūtras* should all have the status of independent texts! Also,
the argument that the section on Távara-pranidhāna (I.23-I.32) is more explicit does not warrant the conclusion that it must therefore be an interpolation. Rather it seems preferable and wholly consistent to regard it as conclusive evidence of the paramount importance of Távara in Classical Yoga.

Finally, A. JANÁČEK inadvertently reinforces the present argumentation when he advances his hypothesis of the common basis of the so-called nirodha text and the Távara-pranidhāna section. Both passages, he points out, have abhyāsa and nirodha as their central terms. He considers the type of Yoga outlined in the nirodha part as a reform of the Távara school of Yoga under the pressure of buddhist thought. This assumption is fallacious, for A. JANÁČEK thereby means to imply that there can be a Yoga without renunciation or vairāgya, namely his 'voluntaristic type' as represented in the Távara-pranidhāna section. I am not aware of any scripture within the fold of Hinduism which would not emphasise the fact that without dispassion or renunciation (internal or external) the goal of Yoga is unattainable.

In another paper, A. JANÁČEK (1958, 88-100), after a critical comparison of the vocabulary of the various 'texts' of the Yoga-Sutra, introduces the idea that the nirodha section is a pre-requisite for the third chapter and that therefore the nirodha-yoga and the eightfold path (aṣṭa-aṅga-yoga) are 'interdependent'. Yet despite envisaging certain basic connections between the nirodha

26 See A. JANÁČEK (1958, 98)
section, the Tāvāra-pranidhāna part and the āṣṭa-āṅga-yoga texts, he nonetheless aligns himself with J.W. Hauer (1958), F. Deussen (1920), and others in maintaining a priori the separateness of these portions. Consequently it is not surprising to find that much of what A. Janáček adduces as supporting his own views is actually only a travesty of the facts.

A good example of this kind of unconscious misreading of the Yoga-Sūtra is his notion of the various 'starting points' of these supposedly independent schools of Yoga represented by the three sections mentioned above. Thus according to him the concept of vitarka or 'unwholesome deliberation' provides the starting point of the yoga-āṅga section, whilst the doctrine of klesa fulfills the same function in the kriya-yoga text, and in the Tāvāra-pranidhāna part it is the concept of antaraya or 'hindrance' which serves as a suitable trigger. In the nirodha text, one must add, the notion of vṛtti appears to have an analogous position, provided of course that A. Janáček's reasoning were sound.

But this neat arrangement is only apparently consistent with the data. Looked at more closely, it becomes evident that he disregards certain important aspects. First of all, his classification does not take into account that the 'hindrances' mentioned in I.29-I.30 are actually intimately linked with the process of disciplining the mental fluctuations (vṛtti). Sickness, languor, doubt, heedlessness, sloth, dissipation, false vision, non-attainment of the stages of meditative absorption and instability on these stages — all forms of antaraya — are most closely associated with any yogic path.
and can only really be understood in their function with regard to the control of the mental oscillations. On what grounds should the list of 'obstacles' (I.29-I.30) be regarded as giving out a system of categories entirely unique to the Iśvara-pranidhāna school? It seems to me that the items cited in these aphorisms must be considered as recognised symptoms of failure within the framework of any yogic path. Conversely, it is unlikely that they should have been selected and turned into full-fledged doctrines by the protagonists of the Iśvara-pranidhāna school of Yoga.

It is also not patent why the concept of antarāya should parallel that of vitarka. Whereas the 'obstacles' are connected with the yogin's subjective endeavour to pacify his mind, the 'unwholesome deliberations' pertain to his moral behaviour. The aphorism II.34 leaves no doubt about this when it associates vitarka with the opposite of non-harming, truthfulness, non-stealing, chastity and greedlessness.

J.W. HAUER (1958) is on this issue at least one step ahead of A. JANACEK (1958), for his version of the Iśvara-pranidhāna text does not abruptly terminate with I.32, but extends to the end of the first chapter. Far from forming an insular entity the complex of aphorisms on Iśvara-pranidhāna is closely connected with the remainder of the first pāda. Thus the expression citta-prasādāna (I.23) can safely be taken as a synonym of nirodha, and the subsequent aphorisms expound various alternative means of steadying the mind. Finally, I.42-I.51 definitely refer back to,
and constitute a detailed exposition of, the sūtras I.17–I.18.

These findings point all in the same direction. They demand the recognition of the first chapter as a consistent and self-contained thematic unit. Its traditional title, samādhi-pāda, is perhaps not quite as arbitrary as one might be tempted to think. It can be said to give a reasonably complete and satisfactorily clear outline of the principal mechanisms of Yoga, specifically the nirodha state.

The second chapter opens with a definition of kriyā-yoga which previous scholars have taken to be the commencement of an entirely new and independent treatise and not merely as the beginning of a new chapter. Following the lead of P. DEUSSEME (1920) both J.W. HAUSER (1958) and A. JANÁČEK (1954) assign to this, allegedly autonomous text the series of sūtras from II.1–II.27. According to them, these aphorisms expound a different kind of conceptual tradition and consequently also employ a vocabulary which is distinct from that of the preceding sūtras. However, assuming the unmitigated homogeneity of the Yoga-Sūtra as demanded by the criteria specified in the present methodological programme, how much weight do these arguments bear? Is the vocabulary and the conceptual milieu of the kriyā-yoga text really independent from the first pāda? For the time being I am not concerned with the validity of the hypothetical terminal point of this 'text' (viz. II.27), but I propose to accept it pro tempore in order to develop my counter-arguments against such a division.

Probably the most striking point that can be, and indeed has
been, cited in favour of the autonomy of the kriya-yoga section is the fact that *sutra* II.1 constitutes what appears to be an independent definition of a particular type of Yoga which is in contrast with the definition given in *sutra* I.2. But this carries far less weight than appears *prima facie*. One would expect a new chapter to commence with a suitable introductory statement epitomising the material to be proffered to the reader. In the present case this consists in a concise typological definition of the Yoga under discussion. The question is whether this definitional statement is in dissonance with the definition of Yoga as submitted in I.2, or whether both definitions have to be regarded as interrelated declarations.

The latter explanation is the more viable one, for the following reasons. As I have pointed out already the definition of I.2 cannot be deemed more than a prefatory statement of the initial function of yogic practice, and I have also drawn attention to the multi-level application of the concept of nirodha. This in itself would seem to vindicate the view that (a) the nirodha 'text' (I.1-I.23) is incomplete and that (b) there is every justification for further definitions, which either may be more comprehensive than the first one or else concern a different aspect of the path. The first point has been dealt with already. Still, the argument can be modified if one accepts the homogeneity of the first chapter. In that case it could be argued that the quasi-definition of I.2 finds its completion in I.51 where the expression sarva-nirodha is found.

This objection can only be answered in connection with the
second point. For, even though the outline of Yoga provided in the first chapter is in itself sufficient, it treats merely of a specific aspect of the yogic path but cannot be said to represent a full picture of it. The samādhi-pāda makes every impression of being an introduction only. There is an important formal difference between the definition of I.2 and that of II.1. Whereas I.2 entails a functional statement concerning the (preliminary) purpose of Yoga, II.1 is a statement about the componential features of the yogic path by which the purpose stated in the immediately following aphorism (viz. II.2) can be realised. Thus from purely formal considerations, I.2 and II.2 belong to the same category, while — as will be shown in detail — II.1 is of the same type as II.28–II.29. In contrast with I.2 which defines the preliminary goal — i.e. the pacification of the quivering mind — II.2 concerns the subtle mechanisms underlying this operation, viz. the 'attenuation of the causes-of-affliction' (kleśa-tanukāraṇa) which has as its overt correlate the 'realisation of enstasy' (samādhi-bhūvana).

Thus, rather than deeming the definitions of I.2 and II.1–II.2 as mutually exclusive, one is led to the conclusion that they are in fact complementary enunciations. This demolishes one of the points advanced in support of the alleged independence of the kriyā-yoga section.

The second point, which asserts the autonomy of the vocabulary employed in this part, stands on equally shaky foundations. For, what appears to be terminological divergencies can readily be explained by the simple fact that the subject-matter is bound to
determine to a certain extent the vocabulary in which it is
embedded. And there can be little doubt that the topics discussed
in the second chapter are not only different from those of the
first chapter but are also more complex and hence demand a select
phraseology. This very obvious circumstance does not seem to
have occurred to past researchers, who were remarkably oblivious
to such evidence as contradicted their pet theory about the composite
nature of the *Yoga-Sūtra*. As might be expected, they fail to
qualify their summary statements about the peculiarity of the
terminology of this 'text' in relation to the vocabulary used in
the first pāda. No specific instances are given which one could
examine and pass judgement on. Their arguments can safely be
assigned to the realm of impressionistic speculation.

On the other hand, there are certain points of contact which
evince the intimate link between the first chapter and the so-called
*kriya-yoga* section of the second chapter. This link is not merely
an accidental one, resulting from a thoughtful juxtaposition and
matching of two independent texts possibly by eliminating blatant
contradictions at the hand of a clever editor. On the contrary, it
reveals a fundamental structural coherence which simply could not
have been thus 'manufactured'.

These significant points of contact are the following:

(1) The central concept of the *kriya-yoga* section, viz.
*kleśa*, is clearly implied in 1.5 which uses the
perfect passive participle of the verbal root √kliṣ 'to be afflicted', both in the affirmative and the negative sense, as klistā and aklīṣṭa.

Also, in I.24 the term klesa itself is found.

(2) Asmitā, one of the klesas according to II.3, is mentioned already in I.17 as one of the component features of samprajñāta-samādhi.

(3) Another key concept of the kriya-yoga section is duḥkha (see II.5, II.8, II.15-II.16) which makes its appearance also in I.31 and I.33. Especially II.5 and I.33 invite comparison.

(4) The concept of draṣṭṛ, first referred to in I.3, is also to be met with in II.17 and II.20.

(5) The concept of rāga appears both in II.3, II.7 and in I.37.

(6) The important aphorism II.11 in a way qualifies the definition of Yoga given in I.2.

(7) The affiliated concepts of karma, vipāka and āsaya which hold a prominent place in the kriya-yoga text are clearly present in I.24; their appearance in II.12 etc. can be interpreted as being due to the desire of the author to develop these important concepts.

(8) Likewise, the term samskarā is used already in I.18 and I.50.

(9) The term pratyaya occurs first in I.10, I.18-I.19 and then again in II.20.
The term *prajña* offers another link. It appears in I.20, I.48-I.49 and then in II.27. Especially I.48 and II.27 seem to be closely associated.

These findings permit the conclusion that the so-called *kriyā-yoga* text is in fact a continuation of the first chapter. It elaborates certain ideas and concepts which are implied in the first *pada* but for obvious reasons are not treated in depth. That in the course of this further exposition the author should have introduced several new terms and concepts is but natural. Among these newcomers are terms like *ākāti* (II.6), *pratiprasava* (II.10), *parināma* (II.15), *drṣya* (II.17, II.18, II.21), *samyoga* (II.17, II.23, II.25), the rare word *bhoga* (II.18), *viśesa*, *avīśesa* (II.19), *liṅga-mātra* (II.19), *aliṅga* (II.19), *drśi-mātra* (II.20), *sva*, *svāmi* (II.23), *viveka-khyāti* (II.26). However, none of these terminological novelties contradicts any of the previous conceptual elaborations. Most of them are synonyms of terms introduced already in the first chapter. The rest can be understood as a linear continuation of the material of the first *pada*.

This overwhelming evidence allows but one conclusion, namely that far from being an interpolated piece, the *kriyā-yoga* section is consistent with the thought and language of the first chapter and hence is an integral part of the *Yoga-Sūtra*.

It must now be asked in what manner the *kriyā-yoga* section, which for the sake of the argument was taken to end with II.27, is related
to the subsequent body of aphorisms. This brings us to the consideration of the so-called *yoga-āṅga* text.

Previous interpreters are in unanimous agreement in two respects, namely that (a) the continuity of the text matter comes to an abrupt end after II.27 and that (b) II.28 initiates an entirely self-contained text, the so-called *yoga-āṅga* section. One may easily concede to both points. For, II.28 does in fact disrupt the hitherto fairly homogeneous and consistent textual presentation. Nor can it be denied that the relevant complex of aphorisms drawn together under the heading of *yoga-āṅga* is not only from the viewpoint of the content but also from purely terminological considerations incongruent with the preceding material.

As I have intimated above, the *sūtras* II.28-II.29 offer a quasi-definition of Yoga which is formally akin to the definition found at the outset of the second chapter where the constituents of *kriyā-yoga* are named (see II.1-II.2). It appears highly unlikely that in a continuously written text one would find such an obvious break in the treatment of the subject-matter, and one could expect a far smoother transition from one topic to the other. II.28 entails three interrelated semantic units, *viz.* (a) *yoga-āṅga-ayūstrāna*, (b) *asuddhi-ksaya* and (c) *ānāma-dīpti*, to which must be added a fourth unit which, on closer analysis, is evidently a later addition: (d) *ā viveka-khyāti*. These four units stand in a causal relation to each other. From (a) the performance of the various members of Yoga results (b) the dwindling of the impurities which, in turn, occasions (c) a flash of gnosis which leads (d)
up to the level of the vision of discernment. From this emerge at least three conspicuous points:

(1) The use of the word **anuṣṭhāna** rather than **abhyaśa**;
(2) the use of the term **dīpti** nowhere else employed in the **Yoga-Sūtra**;
(3) the rare use of the connective particle **ā** meaning 'up to'.

It is indeed rather surprising that none of the past researchers has remarked on the strange position of the phrase **ā viveka-khyāti** which is certainly suspect in this aphorism.

The term **jñāna** occurs in I.8 (mithyā-°), I.9 (śabda-°), I.38 (svapna-nidrā-°), I.42 (śabda-artha-°) in the straight forward sense of 'knowledge' without any gnostic implications. On the other hand, the term **prajñā** definitely stands for 'gnosis', e.g. in I.20 (samādhi-°), I.48 (śrāvaṇa-bhara-°), II.27 (śrāvaṇa-bhūmi-°) and even in I.49 (śrūta-anumāna-°). Yet in the compound **jñāna-dīpti**, the word **jñāna** unquestionably has a gnostic significance. It may be objected that this is purely coincidental and that in one other case at least (**viveka-jñāna**: III.52, III.54) **jñāna** is given a gnostic slant, but this isolated usage can be explained from the fact that **jñāna** is used extensively in this particular stretch of the text (e.g. III.16-III.19, III.22, III.25-III.28, III.35) in the sense of 'knowledge'.

The reason for the editor's addition of the phrase **ā viveka-**
khyāti is not far too seek. For, he uses this core concept last in II.26. It is significant that in the yoga-āṅga section proper neither the term viveka nor the term khyāti occurs other than in II.28. This very simple addition ingeniously bridges the considerable gap between the yoga-āṅga section (whatever its exact length may be) and the preceding portion of the Yoga-Sūtra.

II.28 and II.29 belong together. Whilst the former is a functional definition similar to I.2 (prefatory) and II.2 (advanced), the latter is a componential definition similar to II.1. The self-containedness of the yoga-āṅga section is, moreover, borne out by the fact that the three components of kriyā-yoga — viz. tapas, svādhyāya and tāvara-pranidhāna — are all listed in the yoga-āṅga text (see II.32) as members of niyama. There they are mentioned together with śauca and santosa. This series is evidently in contrast with the enumeration of II.1. Furthermore, there is also the circumstance of the absence of any reference to klesa but the definite mention of lobha, krodha and moha in II.34.

Essentially the yoga-āṅga section consists of definitions of the eight components of aṣṭa-āṅga-yoga and their sub-divisions. In other words, it is a purely technical section with virtually no philosophical matter, unless one agrees with J.W. HAUER's (1958) and A. JANÁČEK's (1954) versions of this 'text' which, according to them, extends right to the end of the third chapter. No adequate

27 I add 'proper' because this interpolated section is, as I intend to show, much shorter than J.W. HAUER (1958) and A. JANÁČEK (1954) propose. In its main body it does not extend beyond III.3.
reasons are supplied by either scholar, and it is doubtful that
this text continues much beyond the first few aphorisms of the
third chapter.

This calls for a more detailed examination. That one can expect
certain inconsistencies in the third pada is foreboded by the fact
that the actual topics discussed in it do not fully coincide with
the traditional title of vibhūti-pāda. The 'supranatural' powers
(vibhūti) with which it is supposed to deal are not at all mentioned
before III.16. The artificiality of the division between the second
and the third chapter is quite blatant; II.55 and III.1 are
practically continuous.

Even a cursory glance at the exposition of the eightfold yogic
path (II.28ff.) bears out that the material is absolutely homogeneous
until III.3 and perhaps even up to III.8. From III.9 on, however,
the text swings from the simple definitions to a number of somewhat
enigmatic aphorisms in which the term parināma figures prominently.
This term occurs, significantly, only once before, namely in the
kriyā-yoga section at II.15. This on its own does of course not
warrant a connecting up of the passage III.9ff. with the kriyā-yoga
portion. But there is ample evidence which makes such a link-up not
only possible but inevitable.

(1) The passage III.9ff. contains one of the nuclear
terms of kriyā-yoga, viz. samskāra, nowhere to be found
in the yoga-āṅga section.

(2) In III.13 the compound bhūta-indriya is used, which
occurs only at one other place and that is in the kriyā-yoga section at II.18 as bhūta-indriya-ātmaka "in the form of elements and sense-organs". Thus is described drṣya, 'the seen', i.e. the empirical reality or prakṛti. In III.13 the compound is actually employed in the locative plural as bhūta-indriyesu which J.W. HAUER (1958) translates with "in the element-built organs" thus giving another reading of this dvandva.Vyāsa, however, confirms the former interpretation: the 'seen' is split into elements, of coarse and subtle form, and into sense-organs by which the elements can be perceived. The compound bhūta-indriya clearly refers back to the drṣya of the kriyā-yoga text.

(3) III.10 contains the compound praśānta-vahita or 'calm flow', the second member of which is reminiscent of the word vahin or 'flowing on' in sva-rasa-vahī of II.9. Although it could be argued that the context necessitated the same word in both cases, but in reply to this one may say that the author could just as well have chosen another synonym (such as e.g. śru). His not doing so could well be explained as a possible instance of his personal preference within the boundaries of his active vocabulary.

These findings beyond doubt demand that one should allot the
passage III.9-III.16 to the kriya-yoga text. The question now arises whether the subsequent aphorisms (III.17ff.) belong to this section, as well or whether they are a continuation of the yoga-anga section. One has to bear in mind that the yoga-anga part (II.28-III.3 or III.8) does not make mention of the final goal, and unless one assumes a priori that this portion is all that is left of the text which expounds the eightfold path, one must look for the concluding part of it elsewhere in the Yoga-Sutra.

From III.17 on, the aphorisms deal mainly with the outcome of samyama or 'constraint' in the shape of the supranatural powers and certain higher enstatic processes. If one regards the aphorisms III.4-III.8, defining samyama, as still belonging to the yoga-anga section, this litany of descriptions of yogic powers should also rightly be counted as part of it. But it is not yet settled whether III.4-III.8 pertain to the yoga-anga text or not. One fact may be thought of speaking in favour of this: The yoga-anga section, after defining the miscellaneous practices of the eightfold path also describes their results. Thus the sutras II.35-II.45 state the fruit of the application of the disciplines of yama and niyama, II.48 that of the practice of āsana, II.52-II.53 of prānāyāma and II.55 of pratyāhāra. Only in the case of dhāranā, dhyāna and samādhi are the results not specifically stated. The reason for this may be that they are drawn together in the practice of samyama whose multiple results are listed in the third chapter.

However, in view of the fact that this enumeration of the effects of samyama on a wide range of topics is quite out of proportion in
comparison with the yoga-āñga section one is forced to query the authenticity of this list. One must be prepared, therefore, to accept that the text from III.17 on to the end of the third chapter belongs only partially and perhaps only to a negligible extent to the yoga-āñga material. The nature of these aphorisms on sānyāsa is such that their number could be greatly increased without any difficulty — and this is probably what has happened: copyists and editors have added and presumably also altered to the best of their knowledge.

Returning to the question as to whether or not the complex of sūtras III.4–III.8 is an integral part of the yoga-āñga section, there is one piece of evidence which would seem to gainsay this. For, in III.5 the compound prajñā-āloka occurs which can be taken as a synonym of jñāna-dīpti as found in II.28. The term prajñā does not occur in the yoga-āñga section at all, but significantly enough it appears at II.27. Even more remarkable is the fact that III.6 seems to refer back to II.27. This indicates, I propose, that the kriya-yoga text which was left off at II.27 is resumed at III.5, if not at III.4. J.W. HAUER (1958) and others have thought that the kriya-yoga text, as outlined above, was complete and that II.26–II.27 represent a description of the final goal of this particular school. This is not confirmed by the present findings; the kriya-yoga section is fragmentary. For, whatever the Sanskrit commentators make II.27 out to mean, this aphorism would be a very meagre and unsatisfactory statement of the ultimate target of this type of Yoga.

Thus one is confronted with two equally loose-ended sections.
However, as I have demonstrated one need not be satisfied with either J.W. HAUER's (1958) or A. JANÁČEK's version of the kriya-yoga text. There is weighty evidence that the kriya-yoga section continues after III.3. In fact the transition from the yoga-ānga material back to the kriya-yoga material is considerably smoother than the transition from II.27 to II.28. The treatment of samyana (III.4-III.8) proves a very convenient means of effacing the edges of the interpolated or rather 'quoted' yoga-ānga text. It remains next to establish the exact extent of this section.

Here, I think, it can hardly be denied that on the whole the aphorisms III.17ff display a distinct uniformity which in terminology and style suggests their intimate belonging to the first half of the kriya-yoga section. There are a number of easily recognisable common denominators, such as the occurrence of samskāra (III.18; cf. I.18, I.50, II.15), pratyaya (III.19, III.35; cf. I.10, I.18, I.19, II.20), sakti (III.21; cf. II.6, II.23), asamayoga (III.21; cf. samyoga II.17, II.23, II.25), asamkīrpa (III.23; cf. I.33), āloka (III.25; cf. III.5), asamkīrpa (III.35; cf. samkīrpa I.42), grahyā (III.21; cf. I.41), bhoga (III.35; cf. II.13, II.18). In addition, at least one other concept emphasises the discontinuity between the yoga-ānga and the kriya-yoga material, namely the term kāya-sampat (III.45, III.46) which I understand as a synonym of kāya-indriya-siddhi (II.43).

This calls for an examination of the vocabulary of the yoga-ānga section in relation to those aphorisms which have been identified as pertaining to the kriya-yoga text. There are a number of conspicuous parallels which need to be explained. The following deserve special
These remarkable agreements between the yoga-āṅga section and the kriyā-yoga material can be interpreted in two ways. One may either take them as evidence in support of the claim that the author of the kriyā-yoga text and the author of the yoga-āṅga text are one and the same person, which would leave us with the question as to why the yoga-āṅga section should appear so highly self-contained. Alternatively, and this seems to be far more probable, these parallels can be explained as unconscious 'resoundings' of the phraseology of the older yoga-āṅga material which the author of the vulgate had before him.

Accepting this second possibility, the following questions remain to be answered: Why would the author of the vulgate want to insert the yoga-āṅga section after II.27 in particular? Did he have a complete text in front of him, or was it merely fragmentary material which was
available to him? Furthermore, how much of it did he actually incorporate in his own work?

With II.27 the train of thought that provides the aphorisms dealing with the klesas etc. with their overt coherence comes to an abrupt stop. Still, as I mentioned earlier, the 'sevenfold gnosis' (saptadhā-prajñā) of II.27 is by no means a description of the ultimate destination of kriyā-yoga. The editor of the vulgate had thus the opportunity of prefixing his next topic, viz. the treatment of the vibhūtis, with the useful series of definitions of the eight members of Yoga as given out in the yoga-sūtra text. Sūtra III.3 then enabled him to switch over to the topic of samyama as the technique for producing the various types of vibhūti.

Although it seems likely that the yoga-sūtra aphorisms belong to, or constitute a textual unit of their own, no conclusions can be drawn from the available data as to the extent to which the author of the vulgate incorporated them into his own compilation, or even as to whether or not he took them over verbatim. The fact that he retained II.23 without adjusting it to his own material distinctly favours the conclusion that he did not adulterate the interpolated part too severely. The several intrinsic contradictions in the material between the two textual units also makes it improbable that he was responsible for the authorship of the yoga-sūtra text as well. The extreme brevity of this text would furthermore seem to speak against the notion that it is complete in itself. Most important, it lacks a proper definition of the yogic goal as conceived by the propounder of the eightfold path, for surely samādhi (III.3) refers merely to a
technical category of asta-sāga-yoga.

The question which springs to mind is this: Could it be that the vulgate contains further fragments of this yoga-sāga text? This seems more than likely. As I mentioned previously, some of the aphorisms subsequent to III.17 strike a somewhat dissonant note, and it is quite possible that some of them at least originally belonged to the yoga-sāga material, or at any rate are an echo of it. Thus, for instance, the second half of III.43 (...tatah prakāsa-āvarana-kaśyayaḥ) is suspect not only because it constitutes a perfect semantic and syntactic unit of its own (to the extent that it could figure as an independent śūtra), but also because the phrase prakāsa-āvarana is to be met with in the yoga-sāga text at 11.52. Linguistically the only difference between II.52 and III.43 is that whilst the former aphorism employs the root kaśi in its verbal form as kaśyate, the latter uses it as a noun. The other 'odd' aphorism is the concluding śūtra of the third chapter (III.55).

This aphorism is essentially a definition of kaivalya: sattva-purusāyaḥ sādhi-sārve kaivalyam-iti. Ostensibly consistent with the preceding couple of śūtras, this aphorism is nevertheless remarkable in that it is the second reference to kaivalya towards the end of the third chapter. The first occasion is at III.50: tad-vairāgyād-api doṣa-brīja-kaśaye kaivalyam. Admittedly, these two references about the ultimate goal are in no way contradictory, but the second instance (III.55) does not appear to be essential to the treatment, especially when one considers that the author of the vulgate deals with the emancipation processes in the fourth pada (which as will be shown is also an
integral part of the kriyā-yoga text). The line of thought from III.49–III.54 strikes one as adequately homogeneous to argue the case for the superfluousness of III.55 in this context. Thus in III.49 anyatā-khyāti — a favourite concept of the author of the vulgate — is said to bring about omnipotence and omnipresence. But this is not the final stage of the yogic path of transformation as is evident from the qualifying statement of aphorism III.50 which declares that the yogin must detach himself even from this elevated condition; the precise word is vairāgya or 'dispassion' with ṣākṣa which we are already familiar from sutras 1.12 and 1.15.

This final act of detachment causes the seeds of the defects (which lead to the externalisation of consciousness) to dwindle and this, in turn, 'transports' the yogin to kaivalya. It must be noted that this is not a definition of emancipation, but a summary description of the process leading up to it. Hence the next aphorism (III.51) is not really discontinuous. It contains a warning: The yogin must not let himself be tempted by higher beings to abandon his quest at this point for some pseudo-heaven. After this negative statement follows a positive advice (III.52) which prescribes a way of actualising the gnosis born of discernment or viveka-ja-jñāna. III.53 is a further specification. And, finally, III.54 is a definition of viveka-ja-jñāna which conducts the yogin across the stream of phenomenal existence to the Unconditioned. Then follows III.55 which seems rather superfluous in this entire exposition. The conclusion suggests itself that this terminating sutra does not belong to the kriyā-yoga material but is part of the yoga-ānuga text.
This is evidenced by two important facts. First, the phrase *sattva-purusayoh sūdhi-sāmye* is strongly reminiscent of the *yoga-aṅga* phraseology which operates a great deal with the concept of 'purity' or 'purification' as can be seen from II.28 (*aśuddhi-ksaye*), II.40 (*śaucāt*), II.41 (*sattva-sūdhi*) and II.43 (*aśuddhi-ksayāt*). By way of contrast, the *kriyā-yoga* material is couched more in terms of 'discernment' (*viveka, apiṣṭā-khyāti* etc.). The second point is the occurrence of the word *iti* or 'finis' at the end of III.55. This has been taken by J.W. HAUER (1958) and S. DASGUPTA (1930) as indicative of the fact that originally the Yoga-Sūtra ended at this point and that consequently the fourth chapter must be a later addition. However, as this hypothesis will be shown to be unsound, another explanation must be found. Could it not be that III.55 belongs to the *yoga-aṅga* section and that the word *iti* originally demarcated the end of this text and not of the third chapter of the vulgate? An alternative explanation would be that the author of the vulgate employed the word *iti* to denote the end of his quotation from the *yoga-aṅga* material, but this would imply that the *yoga-aṅga* text extends from II.28 to III.55 which seems unlikely unless one presupposes massive interpolations.

One possible objection which could be raised against this reconstruction is that III.50 does not pertain to the *kriyā-yoga* text and that therefore there is no question of duplicate statements about the goal, because of the use of the term *dosa* and not its expected synonym *kleśa*. But this argument carries little weight, since the employment of the word *kleśa* in the *kriyā-yoga* text does not exclude the simultaneous use of the term *dosa*. There is no evidence that
both are in fact synonyms. I think J.W. HAUER (1958, 238), following H. JACOBI (1929, 594), is mistaken in his belief that whilst kleśa is a genuine Yoga term dosa belongs essentially to the Nyāya tradition. Both terms are found concurrently in the Nyāya-Sūtra, and they also occur together in other philosophical texts; in this case one term usually has a more precise meaning than the other. I suggest that this is the case in the Yoga-Sūtra as well. Whereas kleśa has a definite technical meaning, dosa is used in III.50 in the more general sense of 'defect' or 'blemish' without any philosophical overtones.

To summarise the above findings concerning the vibhūti-pāda: It has been shown that this chapter is in essence a continuation of the kriyā-yoga exposition of the first and second pāda, with a lengthy interpolation, or rather quotation, extending from II.28-III.3 (?) which demonstrably influenced the conceptual and linguistic medium of the third chapter.

Turning to the fourth and final pāda of the Yoga-Sūtra there is ample evidence to suggest that it is also an integral part of the kriyā-yoga material. This conclusion runs counter to J.W. HAUER's (1958) and S. DASGUPTA's (1930) assertion that the kaivalya-pāda is a subsequent appendage. Especially the former scholar has given the fourth chapter much ingenious thought (1931, 122-133). He regards it as an attempt to present a systematic outline of the metaphysics of this school of Yoga. According to him, the central concept of this pāda is nirmāna-citta or 'created mind', and the clarification of this important notion must be regarded as J.W. HAUER's single most outstanding contribution to the study of the Yoga-Sūtra.
However, his speculations about the independent origin of the kaivalya-pāda (= nirmāṇa-citta text) are untenable. There is no drastic change in style as claimed by S. Dasgupta (1930) and endorsed by J.W. Hauer (1958). Quite on the contrary, the technical vocabulary is in remarkable consonance with the preceding kriyā-yoga material, and also the general trend of ideas is adequately continuous. The link existing between the kaivalya-pāda and the kriyā-yoga text is borne out by the following terminological agreements: pārīnāma (IV. 2, 14, 32, 33; cf. II.15; III.9, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16), asmita (IV.4, 5, 15, 16, 18, 21, 23; cf. I.17; II.3, 6; III.47), an-āśaya (IV.6; cf. āśaya II.24; II.12), vyavahita (IV.9; cf. III.25), viveka (IV.26, 29; cf. II.26, 28; III.52, 54), pratyaya (IV.27; cf. I.10, 18, 19; II.20; III.42, 17, 19, 35), klesa (IV.28, 30; cf. I.24; II.2, 3, 12), khyāti (IV.29; cf. I.16; II.26; III.49), kṣāna (IV.33; cf. III.9, 52), śakti (IV.34; cf. II.6, 23; III.21), pratiprasava (IV.34; cf. II.10), draśtri-dṛśya (IV.23; cf. II.17).

These linguistic parallels do not constitute the only evidence for the present hypothesis. It is, furthermore, supported by the obvious conceptual continuity between the kaivalya-pāda and the kriyā-yoga section. For instance, the exposition of the higher processes of Yoga terminating in emancipation would be inconceivable without the preceding klesa theory. In fact this original doctrine is further developed and explained in the kaivalya-pāda. It is also significant that in the fourth chapter the main emphasis is not on purification but on discernment or viveka which is in keeping with the tenor of the kriyā-yoga section. In IV.12 there is a reference
to the dharma-dharmin speculation of III.13-III.16. In this connection the parināma concept reappears (IV.14) which was first mentioned in III.9ff. In addition, IV.28 is clearly a reference to the kriya-yoga text; it reads: हनम-सग्म कलसव-उक्तम ("Their removal is like [that of] the causes-of-affliction [as already] described.") The author obviously has in mind sūtra II.10. IV.8, finally, speaks of the Self's apperception of the mental fluctuations, which is an echo of II.20 where the 'seer' is defined as 'pure seeing' (द्रस्ति-मात्रा).

The fourth chapter contains yet one more definition of the yogic goal. However, IV.34 is not merely an unnecessary replication; it forms an indispensable corollary of the whole set of aphorisms defining the final phases of the path of involution. Nor is it in dissonance with III.50 which simply states that the omnipotence resulting from sattva-purusa-anya-kuśa must be renounced as well before the yogin can 'enter' kaivalya.

These findings unequivocally demonstrate, I think, that the fourth chapter is neither a reservoir of Patañjali's personal philosophy joined to the body of aphorisms extant before him, as proposed by S. DASGUPTA (1930, 52f.), nor a collection of fragments appended to the first three pādas, as asserted by P. DEUSSEN (1920, I, 535), nor the résumé of an independent Yoga school as maintained by J.W. HAUER (1958, 230). The distinct philosophical tone of this section is more economically explained as the result of the natural development of the subject-matter.

Nonetheless, J.W. HAUER's analysis is an invaluable piece of
research. By freeing himself from the stereotypes of the classical commentators and relying on a strictly immanent interpretation of the *Yoga-Sūtra*, he succeeded in correcting an unfortunate and long-standing misconception about the intended purpose of the initial aphorisms of the fourth *pāda*. He was thus able to cast fresh light on this entire section, and his conclusions indirectly confirm the present hypothesis of the textual continuity between the third and the fourth chapter.

His crucial rectification concerns the key concept of *nirmana-citta*. This compound was interpreted by the classical exegetists in the sense of 'created mind' or artificially produced mental vehicle used by the *yogin* as a dumping-ground for his karmic deeds in order to avoid the fruition of moral retribution. J.W. HAUER (1958) convincingly shows that this interpretation completely ignores the highly philosophical tenor of the subsequent aphorisms. He also raises philological objections against the usual translation of *aty-antara-parinama* (*IV.2*) with "creating other beings". This profound misunderstanding of the nature and purpose of the fourth chapter also led, according to J.W. HAUER, to the fatal interpolation of *IV.1* which, in turn, managed to dupe all later commentators. Indeed, *IV.1* is entirely out of tune with the remainder of the *kaivalya-pāda* which does not treat of any of the *siddhis* at all. Their proper place is in the third chapter.

In this connection I wish to draw attention to C. PENSA's (1973) thoughtful observations on the concept of *siddhi*. Though primarily concerned with showing that both in Yoga and in Buddhism this concept
did not receive a persistently negative evaluation but often also a positive one, he has some remarks about III.37 which are pertinent to the present study. Usually this śūtra is explained as a total condemnation of the siddhis, yet as C. Penza (1973,13) points out originally it may not have had this wide scope at all. He thinks it possible that the word te ('these') most likely refers only to the five supranormal sensory activities and to pratibha mentioned in the immediately preceding aphorism (III.36). However, he does not seem to be justified in his implicit assumption that the term siddhi is used in the Yoga-Sūtra in a technical sense. This word is also used as 'perfection' (II.43) and 'attainment' (II.45), and unless one regards the chapter headings of the vulgate as spurious (which is probably right) the proper technical term for the 'powers' is vibhūti. But this does not alter C. Penza's main argument.

If all the vibhūtis were intrinsic impediments to the state of transformed consciousness (sāmādhi), all those aphorisms which describe sāmyama and its magical results would have to be considered as outright falsifications.

In his attempt to determine the content of the concept nirvāṇa, J.W. Hauer (1958) observes that the root mā combined with the prefix nis-o has been employed since epic times to convey the notion of 'constructing' or 'creating'. He refers to a quotation in the Yoga- Bhāṣya (I.25) which, according to Vacaspati Mīra, stems from Pāṇćeśikha; it reads: adi-vidvān-nimma-cittam-adisthāya kārṇyād-bhagavān parama-rśir-āsuraye jihjāsamānāya tantram provāca, "The first knower
[i.e. Kapila], assuming an earthly mind out of compassion, the exalted, supreme seer unto Āsuri who desired to know declared the doctrine." J.W. HAEBER (1958) is certain that here nirmana is used in the sense of 'earthly' rather than 'artificially created'.

He gives the same interpretation to the compound nirmana-kāya employed by Vasaspati Miśra (III.18) to explain the phrase tanu-dhara or 'wearing a body' occurring in the Yoga-Bhasya. The buddhist usage of the term nirmana seems to confirm J.W. HAEBER's interpretation.

He himself mentions especially the Leñkavatāra-Sūtra which must be placed in chronological proximity to the Yoga-Sūtra.

Thus nirmana-citta denotes nothing else but the individualised consciousness complex as it appears in the terrestrial world. The one citta from which the many individualised cittas are said to derive (see IV.5) reminds one of the 'mind only' conception in the idealist schools of Mahāyāna Buddhism. J.W. HAEBER likens it in fact to the dharma-buddha. Of course, the 'one mind' of the Yoga-Sūtra cannot be equated with the 'mind only' of a Vasubandhu or Asaṅga. The eka-citta is none other than asmi-ta-mātra. This is clear from IV.16 which contains a refutation of the idealist position, according to which the objective world is non-existent. Patañjali affirms the ontological reality of the world and denies that it is merely a product of mentation.

There is, however, no evidence to bear out J.W. HAEBER's suggestion that IV.16 is a direct attack on Vasubandhu's and Asaṅga's school of thought. It could just as well refer to an earlier idealist school.

28 J.W. HAEBER (1958) wrongly prints viṁśasamāṇāya instead of ājñāsamāṇāya.
Having clarified the objective of the first few sūtras of the fourth chapter, the subsequent aphorisms present no further difficulties. They are strictly sequential and evince the thematic unity of the kaivalya-pāda. P. DEUSSEN's (1920, I) assumption about the composite character of this chapter is thus shown to be entirely unfounded.

I will next turn to the important contributions by E. FRAUWALLNER (1953, I, 427ff.) and G. OBERHAMMER (1965, 98ff.) who approach the Yoga-Sūtra from the angle of Gestalt analysis. Both scholars contend that there are two different types of Yoga present in Patañjali's work and that the main defect of the existing presentations of Classical Yoga is the lack of differentiation between these two Gestalten. This gives rise to an artificial unity which, they argue, is absent in the original. According to E. FRAUWALLNER (1953, I) the well-known eightfold path forms the nucleus of the work which, as we have seen, is also J.W. HAUER's (1958) contention. "In it widely held views are brought into a final shape, and therefore it is little surprising that this form of the yogic path should not be confined exclusively to the classical system of Yoga."29 The exposition of the eightfold Yoga was then prefixed with some preliminary techniques drawn together under the name of kriyā-yoga.

E. FRAUWALLNER correctly recognises the homogeneity of the aṣṭa-āṅga-yoga type, but is mistaken in imputing to it a far greater significance within the Yoga-Sūtra than to the kriyā-yoga material.

29 E. FRAUWALLNER (1953, I, 427).
He contrasts the asta-āṅga type with the nirodha type expounded in the first chapter, arguing that the conception of both path and goal of this nirodha-yoga is in stark contrast with that of the asta-āṅga type. While in the former emphasis is laid upon the cessation of all mental activity in order for the Self to abide in transcendental purity, the latter form of Yoga focuses on the distinction between Self and non-Self, as a higher kind of cognition by which emancipation is obtained. In E. FRAUWALLNER's opinion what is attempted here is an intensification of cognition rather than the reverse. From a textual angle he appears to isolate three distinct units:

(1) pāda I : nirodha-yoga  
(2) pāda II-III : asta-āṅga-yoga prefixed by kriyā-yoga  
(3) pāda IV : later appendage30

He considers the Yoga-Sūtra as an attempt to assimilate and integrate both types of Yoga. These conjectures about the architecture of the Yoga-Sūtra need no special refutation at this stage of the present analysis; the intimate relation that exists between the nirodha section and the subsequent aphorisms has been demonstrated already as also the precise length of the asta-āṅga-yoga part. Of additional interest is here A. JANÁČEK's (1958, 98f.) paper in which he considers the linguistic interdependence between the nirodha-yoga and the asta-āṅga-yoga on the basis of a statistical analysis of the vocabulary of these

30 E. FRAUWALLNER (1953), strangely enough, says nothing definite about the kaivalya-pāda and its relation to the remainder of the Yoga-Sūtra.
sections. However, E. FRAUWALLNER's (1953) typology is not only not supported by the text, it is also unconvincing in other respects. For, practically speaking, nirodha is a pre-condition of all higher yogic states. Samādhi cannot occur until the externalising tendency of the mind has been brought under control in meditative-absorption whose function it is to achieve nirodha. For precisely this reason the term nirodha is not confined to the first chapter but also appears in an important aphorism in the third pada (vs. III.9) which E. FRAUWALLNER counts to the āstā-āṅga material! He quite evidently neglects to correlate his ideal typology with the actual textual reality.

Nevertheless, his distinction between what one might call a 'cognition-restrictive' and a 'cognition-affirmative' type of Yoga may possibly pay off in other areas of Yoga research. As regards the Yoga-Sūtra the most that can be said is that the kriyā-yoga school of Patanjali operates with the concept of nirodha without belonging to the conjectural 'cognition-restrictive' type. A further puzzling point is that although E. FRAUWALLNER equates the āstā-āṅga tradition with the above 'cognition-affirmative' form of Yoga, he nonetheless regards the goal of this Yoga (see the concluding aphorisms of the third chapter) as perfectly consistent with his interpretation. This is unintelligible unless he reads these sūtras (III.49-50) differently, for they clearly imply that there occurs a discontinuation of cognition prior to the actualisation of kaivalya, which in this event must be understood as a meta-cognitive attainment. Unfortunately, E. FRAUWALLNER does not document his
inferences which would allow one to retrace his argumentation.

None of the above counter-arguments are raised by G. OBERHAMMER (1965) who accepts E. FRAUWALLNER's (1953) hypothetical typology *ex cathedra* and seeks to vindicate it in a detailed examination of the structure of meditation in Classical Yoga. He isolates three groups of statements dealing with meditation, namely I.2-I.18, I.41-I.50 and II.54-III.7. The first and second set correspond with the two types of Yoga as determined by E. FRAUWALLNER. The third group is considered by G. OBERHAMMER as being identical with the second group, for which assumption he advances the following reasons:

(1) The equation of *samāpatti* with *samprajñāta-samādhi*, as favoured by the classical exegetists, must be rejected as improbable. The four stages of *samprajñāta-samādhi* (*viz.* savitarka, savicāra, ānanda, asmitā) of I.17 must be placed against the four stages of *samāpatti* (*viz.* savitarka, nirvitarka, savicāra, nirvicāra) of I.42-I.44. As an example of the difference between these two meditation schemata, G. OBERHAMMER states that in the case of *samāpatti* the highest meditational content is alīfaga (see I.44), whereas in the case of *samprajñāta-samādhi* it is 'the unity-consciousness of I-ness (asmitā), 31.

31 G. OBERHAMMER (1965, 103, fn.11)
(2) According to G. OBERHAMMER (1965) the 'dynamics' of samāpatti is essentially different from that of samprajñāta-samādhi of the second group (I.41-I.50) but is cognate with that of the third group (II.54-III.7). He draws attention to the Yoga-Bhāgva which looks upon samāpatti and the samādhi of the third group as formally identical (i.e. interprets both as sva-rūpa-śunya-iva-artha-mātra). He then argues that the fourth stage of samprajñāta-samādhi (second group) cannot be defined in these terms, since its content is only 'the unity-consciousness of I-ness'. Quite consistently he also contends that the dynamics of samāpatti and of the samādhi of the third group is in no way geared towards asamprajñāta-samādhi.

How valid are these rather bewildering arguments? The answer to this must be that interesting as they are they simply lack the factual evidence to back them up. A different solution of the problem at issue is not only possible, but as will be seen also far more probable and economic. Thus, the reading of I.17 is perfectly plain: \textit{vitarka-vicāra-ānanda-asmitā-rūpa-anugamati-samprajñātaḥ}, which literally translated means "[The enstasy resulting from nirodha is] 'cognitive' on account of [the occurrence of such] phenomena [as] cogitation, reflexion, joy [and] I-am-ness."
There is no positive indication in this aphorism that the four 'phenomena' (rupa) listed are necessarily sequential and specific to certain levels of attainment in the enstatic involution process, though this assumption is implicit in G. OBERHAMMER's (1965) thesis. This is of course also the view of the Sanskrit exegetists. However, considering the available data on the phenomenology of enstatic experiences within and outside the purview of Yoga and also paying due respect to the parināma doctrine, it seems commendable not to insist on too watertight a compartmentalisation of these four rūpas.

I.42, then, turns out to be a qualification of the term vitarka and I.44 of the term vicāra, which is commonly accepted. The fact that the second group of statements mentioned by G. OBERHAMMER employs the feminine forms vitarkā and vicārā (as required because of samāpatti in I.41), prefixing these with the positive particle ā- and the negative particle nis- respectively, can quite simply be explained as a contextual requirement. That ānanda and asmita are not mentioned separately would seem to confirm the above-made suggestion that they do not constitute segregated high-level experiences in samādhi. Perhaps they are symptomatic of all object-dependent forms of enstasy, that is, they constitute constant values in every type of samprajñāta-samādhi. This interpretation immediately confutes G. OBERHAMMER's contention that samāpatti has as its highest content the uncreate matrix of all physico-mental existence, viz.

32 See e.g. M. LASKI (1965). Further references are supplied in connection with the semantic analysis of the various degrees of samādhi.
aliṇga, whereas in the case of samprajñata-samādhi it is asmitā. The arbitrariness of such a distinction is self-evident. G. OBER-HAMMER (1965) manifestly confounds the objective stimulus of the enstatic act—commonly known as alambana or 'support'—with the subjective response (i.e. vīrāga, vicāra etc.).

Nor is his second point, concerning the inner dynamics of samāpatti and samprajñata-samādhi, particularly cogent. Since his insistence that asmitā (of I.17) represents the 'content' of a specific stage of samādhi has been exposed as entirely unfounded, his argumentation that one cannot possibly describe this particular enstatic stage in terms of artha-mūtra and sva-rūpa-sūnyya is also completely erroneous. In consequence of these fundamental misinterpretations G. OBERHAMMER's remaining pronouncements about the two types of Yoga allegedly traceable in the Yoga-Sūtra must similarly be regarded as invalid.

On the foregoing pages an attempt was made to examine the pros and cons of proposed interpretations from as many sides as possible (semantically, structurally, formally) and to weigh the various and often contrasting views against each other and also to grope for new explanations—all the while scrutinising the findings in the light of the initial hypothesis that the structure of the Yoga-Sūtra is intrinsically homogeneous. The complementary hypothesis of the above methodological standard demanded that by reason of the manifest chronological and also ideological gap between the Yoga-Sūtra and the exegetical literature, all material evidence should be based on a text-immanent interpretation of Patañjali's
treatise. By applying these two criteria with the appropriate consistency, it was possible to disclose that the text of the *Yoga-Sūtra* is by far more self-contained and integrated than previous scholars were prepared to concede.

In conclusion of this re-examination the following précis of the key findings can be given: In contradistinction to those of my predecessors who have disassembled the *Yoga-Sūtra* into so many variant traditions or textual layers, the present study has established that the vulgate is a composite of merely two sets of sūtras apparently representing two independent though overlapping traditions. Linguistic, conceptual and textual considerations demand that the material should be regarded as adequately continuous from I.1-II.27. At this point the author of the vulgate seems to have introduced a series of aphorisms into the main body of his work which contain useful and succinct definitions of some important components of Yoga. This 'quotation' led conveniently over to the extensive discussion of *samyama* and its magical results. The exact length of this insert could not be fixed conclusively, though there is some evidence that it does not extend beyond the first three aphorisms of the third chapter, if III.3 (in view of its definitional similarity with I.43) does not already lie outside the boundary of this interpolated piece. The following aphorisms (III.3/4ff.) have been shown to belong in style and content to the sūtras I.1-II.27. However, it has been granted that this second half of the vulgate may contain some sporadic quotes from the interpolated section, but only in one instance could a sufficiently convincing identification
be made (viz. III.55). There are several other occasions where the author of the vulgate appears to have, if not quoted, so perhaps paraphrased some of the (no longer extant?) aphorisms before him. Except for these two fissure points (viz. II.28 and III.2/3 respectively), caused by the insertion of the yoga-āṅga material, all other stops in the text must be understood as thematic pauses. Although the possibility of further later interpolations cannot be excluded, only one instance (viz. IV.1) could be ascertained as a subsequent addition which was based on a serious misunderstanding of the fourth chapter and also caused considerable confusion among the exegetists.

Diagrammatically, the stratigraphy of the vulgate looks as follows:

**KRIYĀ-YOGA TEXT (PART 1)**

1. Introduction: nirodha section (I.1-I.51)
2. Outline of the important features of kriyā-yoga (II.1-II.27)

**ĀSTĀ-ĀNGA-YOGA TEXT (= quotation, II.28-III.2 or III.3)**

**KRIYĀ-YOGA TEXT (PART 2)**

1. Discussion of samyama and vibhūti (III.3 or III.4-III.54)

**ĀSTĀ-ĀNGA-YOGA FRAGMENT (III.55)**

**LATER INTERPOLATION (IV.1)**

**KRIYĀ-YOGA TEXT (PART 2) ctd.**

2. Philosophical postscript (IV.2-IV.34)
How does this reconstruction relate to the traditional division of the Yoga-Sūtra into four chapters? Surprisingly, the pattern disclosed by the present exercise in textual criticism more or less confirms the arrangement of the vulgate into the well-known four pādās. Only the transition from II.27 to the quoted yoga-āṅga text and then back to the kriyā-yoga material at the beginning of the third chapter is somewhat clumsy. But this problematic point can be resolved if one moves the beginning of the vibhūti-pāda forward to II.28. This slight re-arrangement would give rise to the following picture:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pāda</th>
<th>Chapter Range</th>
<th>Number of Aphorisms</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pāda I</td>
<td>I.1-I.51</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pāda II</td>
<td>II.1-II.27</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pāda III</td>
<td>II.28-III.55</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pāda IV</td>
<td>IV.1-IV.34</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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The awkwardness of the existing pāda division is probably due to the fact that at one stage an attempt was made to create chapters of fairly equal length. The correction proposed above best explains the otherwise inexplicable fact as to why the third chapter should disrupt the systematic treatment of the 'eight members' of asta-āṅga-yoga.

Thus the Yoga-Sūtra displays a marked tectonic coherence which cancels any suggestion that it is merely a hotchpotch of extant aphorisms badly patched together and furnished with a few personal remarks of the editor.

One last point, of a methodological nature, remains to be
sorted out. This is the possible objection that the above conclusions are really contingent on the presuppositional framework put to the test during the course of the present investigation. In other words, it could be argued that the results confirm merely what has been postulated at the outset. The correlation between the original premise that the text is homogeneous and the research findings cannot be denied. But this must not be construed to mean a selective bias in the examination of the data. This danger was far more prominent in the previous studies which failed to employ a strictly defined methodology.

In addition, I have naturally also tried to minimise any possibility of an unconscious carrying-over of the initial hypothesis by rigorously applying the procedural criteria irrespective of whether or not the findings were positive or negative in terms of the assumed homogeneity of the material. It is of course one of the drawbacks of analytical models of the kind utilised in the present study that they do establish a predeterminate selective pattern which on the one hand greatly facilitates the scanning of the data but on the other hand is functional only within its defined limits. Still, it is preferable to operate with a clearly specified model which is then consistently applied than with some a priori assumption which is neither appropriate nor competently tested. It is on these grounds that one must reject any textual criticism which assumes a text to be 'patched together', 'contaminated' or 'defective' etc. without any legitimate reason.
In the previous chapter I have shown that the Yoga-Sūtra is a composite of two blocks of traditions; one is the so-called kriyā-yoga and the other the well-known asta-āṅga-yoga. I now propose to determine both traditions typologically and also to try to skeletonise their locus within the larger ethico-religious context of Indian thought. This will prepare the ground for the subsequent semantic studies.

I shall begin with the asta-āṅga tradition whose eight-phase model exercised a far greater impact on the other gnostic schools of India than did the kriyā-yoga, although the latter is theoretically of superlative significance. According to P. DEUSSEN (1920, I, 523) the asta-āṅga section of the Yoga-Sūtra extends from II.28-III.55, and in his opinion is not the most valuable of the several tracts present in the vulgate. He rates the kriyā-yoga exposition (II.1-II.27) as the most important. For J.W. HAUSER (1958, 234), on the other hand, the yoga-āṅga part (II.28-III.55) represents the most complete systematic sūtra compilation in Patañjali's work. He maintains that this section treats the entire Yoga with exhaustive completeness. He also considers this portion as the oldest since it does not mention either the klesas or any other terms reminiscent of buddhist thought as active in the first centuries A.D.

E. FRAUWALLNER (1953, I, 427), similarly, seems to regard the
delineation of the eightfold path (II.28-III.55) as the nucleus of the vulgate. He looks upon this tradition as a variant of a basic conception of Yoga which is also represented by Buddhism, and contrasts this with the nirodha tradition as expounded in the first chapter of the Yoga-Sūtra:

With its doctrine of the eightfold Yoga the system of Yoga has not created anything essentially new, but has recast old elements in an extraordinarily happy form, whose clear classification and systematic numerical arrangement best suited the Indian mentality. No wonder that this form of Yoga quickly gained popularity and diffusion. 33

Of typological relevance is the fact that the yoga-aṅga material is conspicuous by virtue of its non-philosophical but strictly practice-oriented tone. Granted that the yoga-aṅga aphorisms quoted in the vulgate constitute a more or less complete 'text', it is necessary to explain this eight-phase model historically. First of all, the present thesis that there existed once a Yoga text which came to be incorporated into the vulgate has a logical consequence. This is that the yoga-aṅga tract as a separate whole is anterior to the vulgate. It would, however, be erroneous to assume that therefore the total conceptual content of this text must also precede that of the kriyā-yoga text into which it was inserted. For, as I have pointed out before, Patañjali (as the hypothetical author of the vulgate) did not erect

33 E. FRAUWALLNER (1953, I, 444-45)
his philosophical structure in an absolute vacuum. Rather his elaborate treatment was based on subjacent layers of philosophical formulation and systematisation, though it proves near impossible to disentangle the many strands of thought which led up to the creation of Classical Yoga.

J.W. HAUER (1958) suggests that asta-āṅga-yoga must be placed in the proximity of the Nyāya school of thought. This is certainly an imaginative attempt to resolve the difficulties but one which is not substantiated by the tenuous evidence supplied by him. On the other hand, a comparison between the asta-āṅga tradition and the sad-āṅga-yoga seems more promising. The latter made its first appearance in the Maitrāyanīya-Upaniṣad and thus incontrovertibly precedes the classical eightfold model. The relevant reference is VI.18: tathā tat-pravṛgya-kalpaḥ prāṇaśāryaḥ pratyahāro dhyānam dhāranaḥ tarkaḥ samādhiḥ sad-āṅga-ity-ucyate yogah.

In translation: "The standard for effecting this [unity of the One] is this: control of the life-force, sense-withdrawal, meditative-absorption, concentration, tarka, enstasy — this is [what is] called the Yoga of six members."

A juxtaposition of this schema with the well-known eightfold model of the yoga-āṅga text shows up the differences and similarities between both systematisations:
The most striking distinction between these two schemata is (a) the absence of yama, niyama and āsana in the śad-āṅga-yoga, (b) the reversal of the categories of dhāraṇā and dhyāna and (c) the appearance of a new element called tarka. Although the first three members of the classical eightfold path are missing in the six-phase model, they nonetheless are present in the Maitreya-Upasād in a pre-systematic form. The transposition of dhyāna and dhāraṇā can easily be explained by the intimate relation which exists between these two yogic processes. This leaves the category of tarka to be explained.  

J.W. HAUSER (1958) fully recognises the importance of tarka in this series, and he relates it to the buddhist vitarka-dhyāna which he holds to be a development of the upaniṣadic tarka. S. DASGUPTA

34 The popular notion that these āṅgas are 'stages' or 'rungs' on a ladder is evidently wrong.
also seems to subscribe to the view that *tarka* is of Hindu origin. He seeks to circumscribe this term in the following way:

Now, from the account of the sixty-two heresies given in the *Brahmajālasutta*, we know that there were people who either from meditation of three degrees or, fourthly, through logic and reasoning had come to believe that both the external world as a whole and individual souls were eternal. From the association of this last mentioned logical school with the concentration (*samādhi*) or meditation (*dhyāna*) school as belonging to one class of thinkers professing eternalism (*sātvatavāda*) and from the inclusion of *tarka* as an accessory (*āṅga*) in concentration (*samādhi*), we can fairly assume that the list of the accessories (*āṅga*) given in the *Maitrāyana Upanishad* represents the oldest list of the Yoga doctrine when the Śāṇkhya and the Yoga were in a process of being grafted upon each other and when the Śāṇkhya method of discussion had not stood as a method independent of the Yoga. The substitution of postures (*āsana*) for thinking (*tarka*) in the list of *Patañjali* shows that the Yoga method had now grown into a method separate from the Śāṇkhya.  

Aside objections of a historical nature which one may raise against S. DASGUPTA's pronouncements, it is also highly improbable that

35 S. DASGUPTA (1930, 65-66)
in the above-cited verse from the Maitrāyaniya-Upanisad, the term tarka has the meaning of 'thinking'. I can also not agree with M. ELIADE's (1973, 125) rendering of this word with 'reflection' and 'strength of judgment'. However, he is correct in stating that this is a rare term in yogic texts. He quotes, interestingly enough, a stanza from the Amrtabindu-Upanisad (16) where tarka is defined as 'meditation that is not contrary to the śāstra'.

I think this traditional explanation is far more in keeping with the original core meaning of this concept as employed in yogic contexts. This appears to have been on R. DAVIDS' (1936, 136) mind when explaining tarka as 'intellectual activity' with the added proviso: "...that tarka counted for much in yoga was not true. The mental activity which we are tending today to call intuition, an attitude the reverse of intellectual, i.e. analytical activity, is more akin to yoga."

This whole question has been opened up again by A. ZIGMUND-CERBU (1963, 126-34) and more recently by C. PENSA (1973^, 9-24). In C. PENSA's (1973) opinion, the sad-āṅga-yoga is prior to the aṣṭa-āṅga path, although it was by no means only the latter which came to be widely accepted. Various versions of the sad-āṅga model were preserved and kept alive in later traditions, particularly in the krama system of Kāśmīrī Śaivism. According to C. PENSA (1973, 11) this type of Yoga "must have had a place of the greatest

36 Upon checking I discovered that the quotation is not from the Amṛtabindu- but from the Amṛtanādabindu-Upanisad and reads: agamasya-avirodhena uha'n[tarka ucyate. See A.N. MAHADEVA SASTRI's edition of the text (1968, 17).
importance in later periods, within the Tantric, Hindu and Buddhist speculation and practice. He draws special attention to the central role which tarka plays in these northern schools emphasising that it does not mean, as commonly held, 'logic' or 'reasoning', but that it is defined as the equivalent of bhāvanā or buddha-vidya, that is, the supreme realisation or enlightenment. It also has a second meaning, viz. 'reflection' technically known as cintāmaya (see e.g. Malinlāvijaya IV.28), being a propedeutic exercise conducive to bhāvanā. Thus in the Kāśmirī schools at any rate, tarka denotes both the supreme illumination and the means thereto. It is suggested that in the Maitrāyanīya-Upanisad, tarka is used in the instrumental sense, otherwise VI.20 would be unintelligible.

There appears to be a certain continuity between the sad-āṅga tradition of the Maitrāyanīya-Upanisad and later hindu and buddhist schools. However, this six-phase model never achieved the same fixity as did the eightfold schema of asta-āṅga-yoga which is obviously an elaboration of the former type. Yet while the classical eightfold path was being formulated, other schools notably in Buddhism continued to favour sixfold models. It is not clear why tarka was dropped in the formulation of the eightfold path. But the most likely explanation is that it never has been a typical feature of hindu Yoga but rather should be seen as belonging to the doctrinal sphere of Buddhism. J.W. HAUER's (1958, 102) conjecture that the buddhist term vītarka-dhyāna is modelled on the tarka of the Maitrāyanīya-Upanisad puts the cart before the horse.
The Buddhist influence on this scripture is beyond dispute.

As concerns the *yoga-āṅga* section, nothing can be said about any Buddhist bias in it. Its semblance with the Buddha's doctrine does not go beyond the hardly significant fact that formally both *asta-āṅga-yoga* and Hinayāna Buddhism subscribe to an eightfold classification system. The appalling lack of data makes it impossible to ascertain the exact place of the *asta-āṅga* tradition within the context of ancient Indian soteriological speculation.

Somewhat less enigmatic, albeit by no means perfectly manifest, are the connections between the *kriyā-yoga* and the ramifying network of contemporaneous ethico-religious traditions. P. DEUSSEN (1920, I, 561), like so many other scholars, fails to appreciate the significance of the *kriyā-yoga* tradition in the *Yoga-Sūtra*. He wrongly deems it to be a preparatory stage, out of which evolved the later *hatha-yoga*. He also seems to entertain the strange notion that this tradition is dealt with only in the first two aphorisms of the second chapter. The fanciful equation of *kriyā-yoga* with *hatha-yoga* is also accepted by M. MÜLLER (1916*, 344f.) who likewise does not appear to be aware of the philosophical import of the *sūtras* commencing with II.1.

G. JHA (1907, x-xi), again, translates the compound *kriyā-yoga* with 'disciplin ary Yoga', arguing that it is suited for the *yujñāna*, i.e. the second of the three stages of yogic accomplishment, whereas the *asta-āṅga-yoga* is allegedly for the beginner or *ārurukṣu*. This

37 See P. DEUSSEN (1920, I, 509)
far-fetched explanation seems to be according to Vījñāna Bhikṣu’s *Yoga-Sāra-Samgraha* (p.3), edited by G. JHA (1933). Also E. FRAUWALLNER (1953, I, 427) subscribes to the view that kriyā-yoga leads up to aṣṭa-aṅga-yoga. M. ELIADE’s (1973, 39) standpoint is not evident. Only J.W. HAUSER (1958, 236) and A. JANÁČEK (1954) recognise the independence of the kriyā-yoga tradition, though both again are mistaken about the extent of the kriyā-yoga ‘section’ in the *Yoga-Sūtra*.

With the exception of those aphorisms which deal with the eight ‘members’, the whole of Patañjali’s work can be said to be an exposition of kriyā-yoga. Not only is kriyā-yoga not a preparatory stage to aṣṭa-aṅga-yoga, but it is a type of Yoga in its own right, and one which is theoretically far more advanced than the aṣṭa-aṅga tradition. The wide-spread misconception about this kriyā-yoga and the consequent over-evaluation of the aṣṭa-aṅga model is tentatively criticised in a paper by S. TAKAGI (1966, 451ff.). He examines the three components of kriyā-yoga, viz. tapas, śvādhyāya and ṭāvara-pranidhāna, in their historical context. Although his paper is basically a review of previous research and not too critical, the author rightly concludes that the kriyā-yoga "was not a mere arrangement on the part of the author, but that such had existed as an independent form of religious practice." He furthermore makes the valuable observation that there are some striking parallels between the kriyā-yoga tradition in the *Yoga-Sūtra* and

38 S. TAKAGI (1966, 442)
the Mahābhārata. However, in the end he adopts E. FRAUWALLNER's (1953) nonsensical distinction between nirodha-yoga and asta-
ānga-yoga.

The term kriyā-yoga is an interesting one. According to G.A. JACOB (1891) the word kriyā is not to be met with in the earlier upanisadic literature. Possibly its first occurrence is in Pāṇini's Astādhyayā (III.3.100), and the compound kriyā-yoga is used in Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya (I.1.14). Presumably originally kriyā, like its synonym karman, simply denoted 'action' or 'activity'. Maybe as the word karman came to be increasingly more invested with an eschatological meaning, viz. 'action-determinant', the term kriyā gradually acquired the sense of 'rite' or 'ritualistic activity'.

In the Mahābhārata, one of the great landmarks in the history of Yoga, the compound kriyā-yoga is mentioned only twice. Both references were first pointed out by E.W. HOPKINS (1901, 366 & 371). He interprets the one instance (XIII.14.22: śāna-siddhi-kriyā-yogaih) in terms of "the kind of Yoga-science characterized by necessary external actions as compared with that characterized by discarding this in favour of psychical perfection", in other words as hatha-yoga, but the text fails to bear him out on this. Of greater interest in relation to the Yoga-Sūtra is the second reference, viz. III.2.22: tad-āsu-

pratikāraṇa-ca satatam ca-avicintanat, ādhi-ṛyādi-prasāmanam kriyā-
yoga-dvayena tu. or: "These [physical ailments are to be dealt with] by swift countermeasures and always by [proper] reflection, but the healing of [psychological] ailments (ādhi-ṛyādi) is by means of

This is not according to the critical edition by V.S. SUKTHANKAR but probably to the Calcutta edition.
kriyā-yoga.

Even though E.W. HOPKINS (1901, 371) contends that the phrase kriyā-yoga-dvayena need not necessarily imply Yoga, this stanza reminds one immediately of the aphorism I.30 in the Yoga-Sūtra which lists the so-called citta-vikṣepas. In fact the first item to be mentioned is vyādhi. That this is not coincidental is evidenced by the entire tenor of the epic passage in question, which is all about suffering and its removal. Thus verse III.2.23 reads: manasena hi duḥkhena śatām-āpyatvam, ayah pindena taptena kumbha-gaṇatham-iva-udakam, or: "From mental pain the body is agonised, as when a hot iron bar is put in a pot of water." To alleviate this pain, gnosis or jñāna is recommended. Furthermore, it is emphasised that sneha ('attachment') is at the root of all pain (see III.2.26). Sneha, again, gives birth to trṣṇa or the 'thirst' for life which is said to lead a person to ruin. In subsequent stanzas the value of saṁtosa or 'contentment' is praised.

One cannot avoid the conclusion that this epic kriyā-yoga foreshadows the kriyā-yoga of Patañjali. The obvious link between them is the doctrine of suffering or duḥkha as fully developed in the Yoga-Sūtra in the shape of the klesa theory. Both versions of kriyā-yoga share the same 'clinical' approach to the alleviation of sorrow by means of gnostic illumination.

I now proceed with a brief description of the three components of kriyā-yoga 'proper', viz. tapas, svādhyāya and ṭīvra-pranidhāna. In the Yoga-Sūtra the term tapas seems to be used in a generic, multivalent way. No actual definition is provided, presumably
because the word was not intended in any technical sense. Hence it is best translated with 'austerity' or 'ascesis' or perhaps even 'spiritual exercise'. The difference between tapas and abhyāsa or 'practice' must be carefully registered. The latter is employed as a formal parameter of the yogic path in association with vairāgya or 'dispassion' which is its negative correlate as it were. Tapas, on the other hand, suggests a definite, concrete content. Strictly speaking, it pertains to the abhyāsa category.

In the yoga-āṅga section (see II.43) it is stated that 'on account of tapas, as a result of the dwindling of the impurity, there comes about the perfection of the bodily organs' (kāya-indriya-siddhir-asuddhi-ksavat-tapasah), but, again, this is no definition. In view of the secondary position of tapas in the yoga-āṅga tract, it is possible to speculate that it may have a more narrow connotation here than in the kriyā-yoga part.

A similar proviso must be made in regard to the interpretation of the objective of svādhyāya as given out in II.44, viz. "contact with the chosen deity" (ista-devatā-samprayogah). In the kriyā-yoga tradition svādhyāya has probably a less sectarian meaning. However, that it simply stands for 'recitation', as maintained by S. TAKAGI (1966, 445) and others, is unlikely. Considering the philosophical, 'learned' character of Patañjali's tradition, one would rather expect svādhyāya to signify 'self-study', in the sense of adhyayana or 'reading of scriptures'. In the Tattvārtha-Sūtra (IX.25) of Umāsvāti (or Umāsvāmin), svādhyāya is described as having five forms, namely vācanā or 'teaching', praccchanā or 'con-
sultation', anuprekṣa or 'contemplation', āmnāya or 'revising' and dharma-upadāda or 'preaching the law'.

The third constituent of the triad of practices characteristic of kriyā-yoga is Īśvara-pranidhāna. Quite possibly it is this feature which has misled so many interpreters into believing that kriyā-yoga is mere ritual activity and preparatory to the āśta-āṅga path. This misconception was reinforced by the equally fallacious notion that Īśvara was introduced into Classical Yoga from the outside. The paramount significance of Īśvara-pranidhāna is borne out by the fact that it figures as an important element in both yogic traditions present in the Yoga-Sūtra.

As is apparent from I.23ff., Īśvara-pranidhāna is an intrinsic part of the practice structure of kriyā-yoga, though again, it is nowhere defined unless one turns I.28 into a definition. This aphorism runs as follows: ta[i-jāpa]-tad-artha-bhavānām, or: "Recitation of that pranava, i.e. om [leads to] the realisation of its content i.e. the Lord". Vyāsa furnishes us with two, maybe complementary, explanations of what the practice of Īśvara-pranidhāna entails, and both are far removed from the notion of 'recitation' (japa) as referred to in I.28.

pranidhāna-d-bhakti-viśeṣa-d-āvarjita Īśvara-tam- anuprathāy-abhidhyāna-mātreṇa tad-abhidhyāna-mātrād-api yoginā āsanna-tarāh samādhi-lābhaḥ samādhi-phalam ca bhavati-iti. (I.23)

"On account of pranidhāna, [that is] through a particular
love-attachment (bhakti) towards him, the Lord inclines towards the yogin, and favours him alone by reason of his meditative-devotional disposition (abhidhyāna). By this disposition only, the yogin draws near to the attainment of enstasy and the fruit of enstasy [i.e. emancipation]."

Īśvara-pranidhānam sarva-kriyānām parama-gurav-aparnam tat-phala-samnyaso va. (II.1; also II.32) "Pranidhāna to the Lord is the offering-up of all deeds to the supreme teacher, or the renunciation of their fruits."

Whereas the former interpretation echoes the bhakti-yoga of the Bhagavad-Gītā, the latter presents in a nutshell the essence of karma-yoga. Nonetheless, Vyāsa tells us nothing about possible technical devices employed externally or internally to execute this pranidhāna.

The history of the word pranidhāna, which I have left untranslated so far, is rather obscure. It is composed of the prefixes pra + ni and the root ādha (‘to put, place’) and has the literal meaning of ‘putting together, application’. In the Bhagavad-Gītā (XI.44) the gerund pranidhāya in the sense of ‘prostrating [the body]’ is used, but this seems to be the only instance throughout the earlier Upaniṣads (see G.A. JACOB, 1891). It appears that pranidhāna belonged originally to the buddhist phraseology.
Iśvara-pranidhāna is usually translated with 'devotion to the Lord', but 'devotion' is a somewhat ambiguous word, and I think that pranidhāna has none of the emotive overtones generally attached to this term in religious contexts. Perhaps the buddhist usage of pranidhāna provides the essential clue for understanding this important concept within the hindu realm of teaching. In the mahāyānic scriptures, such as the Śatasahasrikā (X,1458) and the Abhisamayālaṅkāra (I,68), pranidhāna is employed in the sense of 'resolve'. It is a kind of positive affirmation of, or respect for, the Lord. Again no ritualistic practice need be involved here. Perhaps pranidhāna entails the idea of 'emulation', which could be explained by the other buddhist usage in the sense of 'plans for the future', as in the Abhisamayālaṅkāra (IV,16) and the Pañcagīvīṃśatī-śasikā (299).

Iśvara, unquestioningly, is the archetypal yogin. In order to attain to his lofty estate, that is to recover one's Self-identity as the transcendental puruṣa, it is natural to think of him as a guide or Vorbild. The grace which the Lord bestows on the yogin by virtue of his efforts in emulating the divine being, is not actually mentioned in the Yoga-Sūtra but it can safely be assumed in view of the antecedent developments leading up to the peculiar theism of Classical Yoga.

It has, I trust, become evident that the kriyā-yoga of Patañjali is not a mere preliminary ritual to the asaṅga-yoga tradition, but an independent type of Yoga with its specific practical and theoretical framework. Despite the fact that the triad of tapas, svādhyāya and

40 See E. CONZE (1967)
Śāvāra-prāṇidhāna were understood in a ritualistic sense in the pre-classical traditions, in the Yoga-Sūtra this is no longer the case except perhaps in a metaphorical way if one concedes that all Yoga is internalised ritual.

It is interesting to observe that the ritualistic character of kriyā-yoga has been retained or revived, in the doctrinal sphere of the Purāṇas where the old association of kriyā with 'ritual action' has not been forgotten by reason of the active cultic worship among the Vaiṣṇavas and Śaivas. This leads one to conclude that only in the strictly philosophical yoga-dārśana did tapas, svādhyāya and Śāvāra-prāṇidhāna acquire a non-ritualistic meaning.
PART THREE

SEMANTIC INVESTIGATIONS
CHAPTER FIVE

PHILOSOPHICAL ABSTRACTS

1. Isvara

The ontology of Classical Yoga, or kriyā-yoga, has three foci, viz. Isvara, purusa and prakṛti. These are deemed irreducible ontic ultimates. The most distinctive feature of the ontology of Patañjali's school of thought and, I wish to contend, of any form of hindu Yoga, is the concept of 'the Lord' or Isvara.

The word Isvara is a derivative of the verbal root र्ध ('to rule'), current already at the time of the ancient vedic samhitās. Synonyms are क्षिति, ईś and ईśā; Isvara being the more prevalent form in later periods. It conveys the notion of a highest personal god, at times endowed with certain anthropomorphic characteristics but never totally divorced from the concept of the impersonal absolute, the brahman, of philosophical enquiry. The term Isvara is intimately bound up with the history of theism in India.

Repeated attempts have been made in the past to trace the evolution of this crucial religio-philosophical concept. One of the first scholars to apply himself to the study of the history of theism was F.M. MÜLLER. He distinguishes three major stages all of which can be evidenced in the vedic age; they are (1) Polytheism, (2) Henotheism (or Kathenotheism), (3ª) Monotheism and (3ª) Pantheism.

Thus on the most primitive level N. MÜLLER (1916ª) envisages
a kind of theological pluralism in which the thirty-three known
gods of the ṛgvedic pantheon were regarded as embodiments or
abstractions of natural phenomena. On the basis of this diffuse
conceptual stage the need arose for a unification of the multiple
devas populating the heavens. According to M. MÜLLER the notion
of the viśva-devas ('all-gods') was a first step in this direction.
Certain gods were identified with each other or coupled together as
in the case of Mitra-Varuna and Agni-Soma etc. On the next stage,
as M. MÜLLER sees it, a single god was invoked under the temporary
forgetfulness of all other gods. M. MÜLLER devises for this
phenomenon the term Henotheism (also: Kathenotheism). From then on
the development proceeded in a bifurcate line. On the one hand
it gave rise to monotheistic conceptions and on the other hand to
Pantheism with its impersonal absolute.

The entire problem was renewedly investigated by H. JACOBI (1923).
In principle accepting M. MÜLLER's (1916) classificatory system,
he modifies somewhat his formulation of the nature of Henotheism in
that he prefers to regard it not so much as a direct pre-stage to
Monotheism, but as a rejection of the gods as totally independent
entities and thus as a preparatory stage for the development of the
concept of the impersonal quintessence (or brahman) of the manifest
world.

The concept of brahman (neutr.) was of first-rate importance
in the religious and philosophical speculations of the post-vedic
period and, as S. DASGUPTA (1965, I, 20) remarks, it "has been
the highest glory for the Vedānta philosophy of later days". In one
sense it is antipodal to the idea of Is\v{a}vara, yet in another sense it can be said to complement it, or perhaps even partially define it. For in the formulation of the notion of a personal god the idea of the omnipresent and omnitemporal ground of being is never lost sight of.

The idea of the personal deity is anticipated in the vedic conception of the 'unknown god' (M. MÜLLER's phrase) eulogised in X.121, as also in the conception of Prajāpati, Dhātṛ, Viśvakarman, Tvāstrī and Purusa (see X.90). Whether or not one interprets these according to some preconceived evolutionist scheme as the culmination of a primitive polytheist medley, by the time the bulk of the Mahābhārata had been composed the concept of Is\v{a}vara was firmly established in the religious sector of Indian culture. The theism of the epic is largely analogous to that of the metric Upaniṣads, such as the Śvetāśvatāra- and the Kaṭha-Upaniṣad and not least the Bhagavad-Gītā. This highlights an interesting point, namely it brings out the close relation which exists between the concept of Is\v{a}vara, Śāṅkhya ontological ideas and yogic practice. Their joint occurrence in the post-buddhist period is certainly remarkable and calls for an explanation.

B. KUMARAPPA (1934, 3), in a slightly different context, suggests that theological speculation was originally triggered off by the primary question "Whence this universe?". He thus links up theism with cosmological and etiological considerations, which would seem to have the supportive evidence of the many creation theories in the Upaniṣads. But perhaps this is merely one half of the full answer.
A different solution to this problem is possible if one places proper emphasis on the fact it is not only the speculative Sāṃkhya which is bound up with the Īśvara concept but also the age-old experimental tradition of Yoga. Basing myself on R. OTTO's (1959) acknowledgement of an innate capacity in man for numinous experiencing, I wish to propose that Īśvara is essentially and primarily an experiential construct arrived at through yogic self-absorption rather than theological ratiocination. In this respect it can be aligned with the other ontological categories of Sāṃkhya and Yoga which, as I will show, are most appropriately understood as being phenomenological distillations of meditative-enstatic experiences. However, I must emphasise that this line of argumentation does in no way imply either an affirmation or a denial of the objective reality of any of these categories of experience.

It has not always been appreciated that theism is woven into the very fabric of hindu Yoga. Thus in R. GARBE's (1896) opinion, Yoga is a theistic re-interpretation of the nirĪśvara tradition of ancient Sāṃkhya. He speculates (p. 50) that this acceptance of Īśvara into Yoga was the likely result of an effort to make Yoga more acceptable to the popular strata of society. R. OLDENBERG (1915, 281) asks: "Did this belief originally pertain to Yoga as an essential element? Have Sāṃkhya and Yoga always been differentiated in the way the epic has it and as they are differentiated in their classical forms: as an atheistic and a theistic system respectively? This seems doubtful. The practice
of Yoga obviously does not necessarily presuppose the notion of god (\ldots). Visible proof that a system greatly suffused with yogic elements could nonetheless reject the belief in god is supplied by the doctrine (\ldots) of the Buddha.

This stance has been challenged early on in the controversy by H. JACOBI (1923, 39) who writes: "This assertion of Iśvara has been interpreted as a concession of Yoga to Brahmanism, which is surely wrong; rather one should admire the audacity and the courage of a school of philosophy which, in the face of the prevalent atheism in philosophical and orthodox circles, dared to put forward the existence of Iśvara (\ldots) as one of its doctrinal axioms." H. JACOBI thus reaffirms L. VON SCHROEDER's (1887, 687) contention that "Yoga has a distinct theistic character". This has been definitively confirmed by more recent research into the pre-classical configurations of the Sāmkhya school of thought. In an outstanding contribution, K.B.R. RAO (1966) has conclusively demonstrated the intrinsic theistic nature of the pre-classical Sāmkhya schools. His comprehensive study fully corroborates and consolidates F. EDGERTON's (1924, 8) findings: "Where, then, do we find that 'original' atheistic view expressed? I believe: nowhere. A study of the epic and other early materials (\ldots) has convinced me that there is not a single passage in which disbelief in Brahman or God is attributed to Sāmkhya."

H. JACOBI (1923) sees a connection between the employment of tapas and the belief in Iśvara. He points out that not
infrequently the declared purpose of the fearful ascetic practices
was to get the attention of a particular deity who, impressed
and gratified with the tapasvin's self-inflicted hardship and
unflinching endurance, would bestow a boon on him. He mentions
in passing that in such a context the deity was generally known
as varāda or 'bestower of the boon'. He then states (p. 29): "For
the popular conception at least, the grace of the deity
was a necessary precondition for the recompense of ascetic
exertion. It seems but natural that Yoga should adopt the
recognition of Īśvara into its system."

This view is reiterated in many modern studies, especially
on the history of religions. Thus N. SMART (1968, 30), a typical
proponent of this misconception, writes: "... Yoga has borrowed
a concept from popular religion and put it to a special use."
As he asserts elsewhere (1971, 163), Yoga is essentially
an atheistic system. No reasons are supplied. H. JACOBI (1923)
at least offers some kind of explanation even though it is
unacceptable. For, what his interpretation amounts to is the re-
duction of the conception of a personal god to one of two actors
in a process of bargaining: the ascetic excels himself and is
rewarded or 'paid off' by the deity. I do not contest that this
may be exactly the essence of many of the ascetic 'deals'
recorded in the epic. But I find it unsound reasoning to take this
as a historical prelude to the act of grace (prāśāda) spoken of
in later Yoga. I prefer to understand such legends as
folkloristic interpretations of a phenomenon which could well
be a parameter of mystical experiencing: the ultimate crossing of the threshold of phenomenal existence as a transcendental act which appears to be initiated as it were from 'outside' or 'above'.

The idea implicit in H. JACOB's (1923) suggestion that Patañjali in a way made a compromise to placate the orthodoxy is preposterous. Imputing to the famous Yoga teacher such hypocrisy, it is hardly surprising that his precise philosophical position has never been appraised in any detail.

Less objectionable but similarly unconvincing is M. MÜLLER's (1916, 326) psychological explanation. Rejecting the historical argument according to which Patañjali merely sought to appease the orthodox brahmans, M. MÜLLER instead suggests that it was the natural human craving for a first cause which led Patañjali to the postulation of Isvara. If this were correct one would expect Isvara to have at least one definite cosmological function; yet 'the lord' is neither the creator, sustainer or destroyer of the universe. The 'first cause' of which M. MÜLLER speaks is, in Patañjali's system, the world-ground or prakṛti, the eternally creative matrix of the manifest world.

As against the above historical and psychological explanations of the concept of Isvara, I wish to propose that its origins lie in the realm of yogic experiencing itself. This is also M. EHLADE's (1973, 75) conclusion: "Patañjali nevertheless had to introduce Isvara into Yoga, for Isvara was, so to speak, an experiential datum..." This of course does not imply that Patañjali's formulation
of the concept is a creation *ex nihilo*. It is obvious from a
perusal of the *Mahābhārata*, especially certain portions of
the twelfth *parvan*, that the conceptualisation of *Īśvara* in
Classical Yoga has its epic antecedents.

Philosophically the most important treatment of the theistic
component in epic Yoga is to be found in section XII.296\(^{41}\) of
the critical edition of the *Mahābhārata*. Here *hiranyagarbha-yoga*
is dealt with which K.B.R. RAO (1966, 278) wrongly identifies
as the philosophy of the epic Yoga system *par excellence*.
However, this slip does not detract from the general merit of
his acute analysis of this particular school of Yoga. On the
basis of P.M. MODI's (1932) earlier work, he succeeded in
undertaking a complete reinterpretation of the above passage
which has been lamentably misconstrued by F. EDGERTON (1965)
and others. He managed to reconstruct a good deal of the
philosophy sketched in these extremely difficult and obscure
verses.

Accepting in principle the general epic theories about
the twenty-three evolutes of the unitary world-ground, the
*hiranyagarbha* school of Yoga introduces the distinction between
the Self which has recovered its innate enlightenment, *vis. the*
so-called *buddhyamāna*, and the ever-enlightened *buddha* or *prabuddha*.
In comparison with the latter, *i.e.* god, the enlightened Self is

\(^{41}\) K.B.R. RAO (1966) follows one of the earlier editions of the
*Mahābhārata* where this passage is XII.308.
said to be abuddhamāna (see vs. 17). Thus there is no straight identification of the twenty-fifth tattva, viz. buddhyamāna, with the twenty-sixth which is the supreme godhead. The latter principle is also referred to as távara, maha-ātman and avyakta-brahman. The buddhyamāna is also called purusa and buddha (which confusingly enough is also applied to the twenty-sixth tattva).

The twenty-fourth principle, which is the insentient world-ground, is known by the name of prakṛti, abuddha, avyakta and apratibuddha.

It is said of the buddhyamāna (see vs. 2) that it creates, upholds and withdraws the gunas of the world-ground and that it 'knows' or apperceives the world-ground (see vs. 3) whilst itself being nirguna (see vs. 4) and hence 'unknown' by the avyakta.

On the other hand, the buddhyamāna does not apperceive the lord (see vs. 6) who is pure, incomprehensible, eternal and always apperceiving (see vs. 7). This maha-ātman or great being permeates both the visible and the invisible (see vs. 8). When the buddhyamāna or Self identifies itself with something that is external to its being it is known as avyakta-locana (see vs. 10). Taking his cue from XII.296.18 (= XII.284.18 crit. ed.), K.B.R.RAO (1966, 282) interprets this term as "wearing the spectacles of prakṛti" or "seeing through the avyakta" by means of the organ of cognition (which is buddhi) rather than understanding this interesting compound in the plain sense of "seeing the avyakta".

The goal of this Yoga is naturally also quite different from that enunciated in the contemporaneous Samkhya and Pāncarātra schools which implies a merger of the phenomenal self with the universal Self.
This difference is evident from such phrases as buddhatva (XII.296.11), kevala-dharma (vs. 12) or kevalena samagamya (vs. 13). These imply that the buddhyamana attains to the 'estate' of the twenty-sixth principle without becoming identical with it. In other words, Íśvara always remains transcendent (para). It never becomes involved with any of the lower tattvas. Thus emancipation can be said to be a condition of the buddhyamana qua the buddhyamana in the 'company' (samiti) of the lord (see XII.296.27ff.).

The metaphysics of this dominant school of Yoga in epic times undoubtedly provided the basis for the peculiar ontology of Classical Yoga. This was first pointed out by P.M. MODI (1932, 81): "The idea of God in the Yoga System was not arrived at by superimposing it on an atheistic Sākhyya System with twentyfive principles, but by distinguishing the Jīva from God on practical grounds." This is fully confirmed by K.B.R. RA0 (1966, 290): "Probably the Epic Yoga lays the inchoate foundation for the classical Yoga conception of a detached Íśvara." However, he remarks (p. 291) that the conception of Íśvara in the ancient hiranyagarbha-yoga is "utterly naive and simple" since it depicts god as "a motionless and frigid witness" who is not even interested in the yogin's struggle for emancipation. He deems the more activist conception of god as expressed in the Yoga-Bhasya (I.25) a positive advance on this view. But K.B.R. RA0's criticism is biased. Although no mention is made in the epic passage in question of the lord's soteriological function, one must nevertheless ask oneself why a need should have been felt to philosophically recognise the superlative status of Íśvara if this
concept would not somehow have had an experiential content. This would seem to be corroborated by the strictly pragmatic approach of Yoga with its emphasis on experiment and personal verification. Nor is the absence of any reference in the above passage to the idea of grace or purasāda, which looms large in other contexts, a positive proof of its irrelevance in the yogic process as envisaged in hiranyagarbha-yoga.

After this brief excursion into the epic antecedents of Classical Yoga, I will next scrutinise Patañjali's theological formulations. He defines 'the lord' (Īvara) in this way:

\[ \text{klesa-karma-vipaka-sāvyair-sparamratah purusa-vigēsa Īvaraḥ} \]

"The lord is a special Self untouched by the causes-of-affliction, \( \text{by} \) action \( \text{and its} \) fruit \( \text{and by} \) the deposit \( \text{of subliminal-activators} \)" (I.24). In the Yoga and Sākhya ontology the entire spectrum of existence is analysed into the two primary modalities of Self (purusa) and non-self (prakṛti). The former embodies the principle of pure awareness corresponding with the Kantian 'trans-intelligible subject', whereas the latter is the womb of all creation. P. BOWES (1971, 168) circumscribes these as the 'principle of consciousness' and the 'principle of materiality' respectively.

Understandably Īvara could not but be included in the former category, as has been pointed out long ago by Vatsyāyana in his commentary to Nyāya-Sūtra IV.1.21.

Thus god is defined as a Self sui generis, and his separateness from the 'ordinary' transcendental Self or purusa is explained
in negative terms: The lord is unaffected by any of the modifications which the ordinary purusa is subjected to by reason of his involvement with the world-ground and its products. To put it differently, Távare at no time forsook or will forsake his perfect condition of transcendence as pure Being-Awareness. Because of his 'inactivity', by which is not meant mere abstention from action but the kind of condition which the Bhagavad-Gītā calls 'actionlessness' or naiśkarmya, no vipāka ever accrues to him, and for the same reason he is also never subjected to the causes-of-affliction which are the natural concomitants of any implication in phenomenal existence.

M. MÜLLER (1916, 321) remarks on this concept that the lord "may be primus inter pares, but as one of the Purushas, he is but one among his peers. He is a little more than a god, but he is certainly not what we mean by God". Yet Patanjali's definition of Távare has also a positive aspect. This is clear from I.25—I.28: tatra niratīśayam sarva-dhiṣṭā; pūrveśam-api sūrya kālana anavacchedat; tasya vācakā pranavaḥ; tai-japas-tad-arthā-bhāvanam, which can be rendered as follows: "In this [Távare] the seed of omniscience is unsurpassed. He was also the teacher of the former [yogins], since there is no temporal limitation [for him]. His signature is the pranava [i.e. om]. The recitation of that [pranava] leads to the realisation of its meaning." To these statements must be added the concept of Távare-prāpāda which has already been discussed.

Aphorism I.25 is of special interest as it has always been understood as a 'proof' for the existence of god. Thus the Yoga-Bhāṣya (I.25) has: vatre kāṣṭha-prāptir-bhānasya sa sarva-ūpah sa ca
purusa-vidyasa iti, or "In whom the limit of knowledge is reached, he is all-knowing, and he is a special Self". By 'seed' Vacaspati Miśra understands 'cause' (kārana), whereas Vijnana Bhiksu, in his Yoga-Vārttika, explains it as 'mark' (liṅga). Our 'supra-sensuous grasping' (ati-indriya-graṇha), as Vacaspati Miśra observes, depends on the degree to which tamas obscures sattva. The moderate ability for knowledge displayed by the worldling contains the seed for higher knowledge and, even, omniscience. There comes an upper limit which cannot be surpassed, and this is the omniscience of the lord. As G.M. KOELMAN (1970, 61) correctly notes: "The absolute extension of the lord's knowledge is unambiguously asserted. But there is no word, no insinuation even that the lord's knowledge is different in essence, is a more perfect way of knowing."

Vyāsa explains the unexcelable knowledge of Śāvara as the result of the utter purity of the sattva reflecting his transcendental Awareness. His knowledge extends to all objects and all periods, and it is this which distinguishes him from such seers as Kapila or the Buddha.

It is difficult to decide whether or not these observations by the classical exegetists were in fact intended as a kind of 'proof' for the existence of god. Patañjali himself, again, is far too concise to win such an interpretation from śūtra I.25. Probably it simply refers to the fact that in contrast with the awareness of the ordinary purusa, the Śāvara's awareness is perfectly continuous, that is to say, uninterrupted by prakṛti, since Śāvara at no time and not even for an instant falls victim to nescience or
avidyā. Thus maybe I.25 does not entail so much a grading of omniscience which would make little sense than a statement about the fact that what constitutes a potential for the ordinary being is a permanent actuality for Īśvara. I cannot agree with S. RADHAKRISHNAN's (1951, II, 369) assertion that "Pātanjali proves the omniscience of God by means of the law of continuity, which must have an upper limit". I prefer to see in I.25 a parallel to the mahāyāna buddhist notion of the tathāgata-garbha as the seed of consummate enlightenment, temporarily covered with defilements of a cognitive and conative nature, viz. vikalpa and abhinivesa, whilst in reality it is transcendent and nirvikalpa. As long as this seed has not sprouted, cognition is distorted and things are not seen as they are (vātha-bhūta).

That the lord is not conceptualised as a being who is of complete irrelevance to mankind clearly emerges from I.26 where Īśvara is called "the teacher of the former [yogins]". This is in keeping with the traditional pre-classical interpretation of the concept of god as expressed, for instance, in the following stanza from the Bhagavad-Gītā (IV.1): imam vivasvate yogam proktavan-aham-avyayam, vivasvān-manave prāha manur-ikṣvākave'bravīt, or: "To Vivasvat I expounded this imperishable Yoga; Vivasvat related it to Manu; Manu told it to Ikṣvāku". Unless one presumes this doctrine to be no more than a forced concession to śruti, which would be incongruous with Pātanjali's generally self-reliant approach, there is one difficult question which calls for an answer. This is: How can a perfectly transcendent being assume a teaching
role? Vyāsa, in his Yoga-Bhāṣya (I.25), attempts to solve this problem by introducing anthropomorphic features: \( \text{tasya-ātma-} \)
\( \text{anugraha-} \quad \text{abhāve'pi bhūta-anugrahaḥ prayojanaṃ,} \)
\( \text{ātma-dharma-} \quad \text{upadeśena kalpa-} \quad \text{pralaya-mahā-pralayesu samsārinah purusa-} \)
\( \text{anuddharisyami-iti, tatha ca-uktam-adi-vidvān-nirmana-cittam-} \)
\( \text{adhisthaya karunyad-bhagavan parama-rsir-} \quad \text{āsuraye i} \text{jñāsamānaye/} \)
\( \text{tantram provāca-iti, or: } \text{"Although he has no [feeling of] self-} \)
\( \text{gratification, [the lord's] motive is the gratification of beings:} \)
\( \text{"By instruction in knowledge and virtue, at the dissolution [of the world] [at the end of] a world-age [or] at the great dissolution [of the entire universe], I will uplift the Selves [immersed] in conditioned-existence." And likewise it has been said: 'The first knower, assuming a created mind out of compassion, the exalted, supreme seer declared this teaching to Āsuri who desired to know."} \)

This passage epitomises the popular and orthodox belief that Īśvara is the author of the Vedas by whose teachings the staunch believer transcends all ill. Within the framework of Patanjali's philosophy such an interpretation makes little sense. A more sophisticated solution is called for which does not in any way interfere with the definition of Īśvara as transcendence per se. The classical exegetists are of no help here. Their interpretations of the nature of Īśvara are exclusive attempts to somehow relate his existence to the mechanisms of the world-ground and to the destinies of the sentient beings ensnared by prakṛti.

If one excludes the possibility of Īśvara actively entering into a teaching situation by somehow phenomenalising himself, there
remains only one logical alternative, and this is that his role as a teacher is entirely passive: His very existence is a sufficient challenge to the yogin who either has come through śraddha to believe in him or whose spiritual discipline has brought him to the margins of conditioned existence where experiential proof of his existence is found. In other words, Isvara is the archetypal yogin who 'instructs' by his sheer being. Pressing this metaphor still farther, one could say that 'communication' between him and the aspiring yogin is possible by reason of the ontic co-essentiality of god and the inmost nucleus of man, viz. the Self (purusa). M. ELIADE (1973, 74) circumscribes this with the phrase 'metaphysical sympathy'.

On the transcendental level the relation between Isvara and purusa is one of 'enclosure' by coalescence; the Self is eclipsed by the being of Isvara. Empirically, however, the relation is a one-way affair in which the believing yogin emulates Isvara's condition which is co-essential with the condition of his inmost Self. This is the idea implicit in the concept of Isvara-prapidhana which is a channeling of one's emotive and cognitive life to god by endeavouring to 'simulate' his unconditioned nature. For the purpose of this imitatio dei the yogin symbolises god in the form of the pranava which is the sacred phoneme om. As Vyasa, in his Yoga-Bhasya (I.27), aptly points out this symbolisation is not due to convention

42 Cf. G. OBERHAMMER (1964, 197-207)
(saṅketa), but the relation between Tāvāra and om is a natural and permanent one. In other words, om is an experience rather than an arbitrary verbal construction. It is thus a true symbol charged with numinous power. Experiencible in deep meditation it is a sign of the omnipresence of Tāvāra as manifest on the level of sound. Access to this experience is gained, paradoxically, through the recitation of om. Thus om is both expedient and goal. The human voice is employed to reproduce a 'sound' which is continually 'recited' by the universe itself — an idea which in the Pythagorean school came to be known as the 'harmony of the spheres'. On the Indian side it led to the development of nada-yoga.

By now it should have become evident that notwithstanding the precarious philosophical interpretation of Tāvāra in Classical Yoga, god is of no mean importance in its practical sphere. I cannot therefore endorse G.M. KOELMAN's (1970, 57) contention that it "is striking how the mention of the Tāvāra in the Yoga Sūtras is quite casual" and that, as he continues (p. 58) we "could very well cut out the sūtras relating to the Lord, without in any way impairing the systematic coherence of the Patañjala Yoga, without even leaving a trace of the excision". This is of course a recapitulation of R. GARBE's (1917, 149) view which, incidentally, is also accepted by S. RADHAKRISHNAN (1956, II, 371, fn.3). G.M. KOELMAN (1970, 63f.) elucidates his position further: "If we said that the Tāvāra does not answer any logical need in the Patañjala Yoga, we do not maintain that either Patañjali himself or
the Yogis in general cannot be true devotees of the Īśvara. The only thing we mean to say is that the whole Yoga philosophy and the psychological technique of liberation it stands for are atheistic in nature. If some one yogi, even if all yogis, did admit Īśvara as somehow God, this would be due not to Yoga doctrine, but to the yogis' individual religious dispositions. We might say that Patañjala Yoga technique prescinds from whether someone admits a God or denies him." Yet, strangely enough, in the very next sentence the author states: "We believe that Patañjala Yoga is essentially theistic." But as G.R.F. Oberhammer has proved (sic!), the Patañjala doctrine of the Supreme Lord had to express itself in terms of a philosophical school, the Sāṃkhya School, which has no room for God." Despite his unusual objectivity on other points, the author — a Jesuit — obviously found it difficult to suspend his own conception of what god ought or ought not to be. How else can one explain the formidable ambiguity of his statements?

The fact is that the doctrine of Īśvara is an integral component of the philosophy of Classical Yoga and that, moreover, Īśvara figures prominently in the practice structure of Yoga, and any attempt to exorcise this concept would amount to a crippling of both the theoretical superstructure and the practical substructure of Yoga. It is correct, as M. ELIADE (1973, 73) observes, that Īśvara is a god only for the yogins, the spiritually awakened who are prepared to take him as their Vorbild. But since it is implied in the philosophy of Classical Yoga, as in all other dāsānas,
that the *summum bonum* of human life is to transcend contingent existence, god can, and in terms of this ethical model should, be meaningful also to the laity. Shocking as this attenuated theism must be to the committed deist, it is a curious fact that rather cognate views can be found in the writings of some of the intellectual mystics such as Meister Eckehart or Plotinus. This may be instructive in that it entails the warning not to look at this question from a purely theoretical or logical point of view rather than from the angle of spiritual practice and experiential verification.
2. Purusa

Like the notion of Isvara the concept of the Self or purusa is not a purely theoretical construct. It is best understood as circumscribing a particular yogic experience of the numinous. This 'experience' is not of the nature of what is ordinarily meant by this term. Owing to the radical dualism between the Self and the non-self (or prakrti), as conceived in Classical Yoga, there can strictly speaking be no experience of the Self at all. This holds true of Isvara as well, being defined as he is as a purusa sui generis. However, Patanjali does make certain provisions which allow one to speak of a 'vision of the Self' (purusa-khyati) or 'Self gnosis' (purusa-jñana). I will go into this later.

In view of the experiential derivation of the concept of purusa all explanations which seek to establish the logical necessity of the Self within the conceptual lattice of Classical Yoga, or which try to make a case for the theoretical inadequacy of this doctrine, must be relegated to a subsidiary position. This pre-eminently practical orientation of Yoga has not always been duly appreciated by western scholars. Thus when R. Garbe (1917, 356) insists that the purusa is primarily a philosophical postulate inferred from empirical data, he blatantly ignores the fact that whatever role ratiocination may play in Classical
Sāmkhya, its foundations are, like those of Classical Yoga, to be found among the diverse traditions of consciousness technology current at the time of the Mahābhārata. The classical proofs adduced for the existence of the Self must therefore be looked upon as afterthoughts to consolidate what constituted originally an experiential (but not empirically observable) datum. Nonetheless, the 'rationalisation' and 'moralisation' — these are R. Otto's (1959) terms — of the encounter with the numinous in Yoga are potent in themselves, because they are the building blocks of the soteriological formulations in the doctrinal structure of both Classical Yoga and the Sāmkhya of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa. Treating the interrelation between Self and non-self, A. Bharati (1970, 204) offers another suggestion which lies midway between the experiential and the rationalistic answer. He regards the puruṣa as a "postulate of intuition rather than of discursive reasoning". Elsewhere (p. 16) he explains his use of the term 'intuition' which he sets off from gnosis or jñāna, and consequently one must appraise this interpretation as inadequate as the rationalist conjecture.

The history of the word puruṣa and its association with the experience of the numinous in Yoga is a long and interesting one. It is remarkable that the Yoga and Sāmkhya traditions should have adopted this designation rather than the synonym ātman which enjoys such a great popularity in the Vedānta schools of thought. The etymological derivation of the word has given rise to a considerable amount of speculation. Native Indian tradition proffers
several, more or less fanciful, etymologies. The oldest reference is to be found in the Atharvaveda (X.2.28) which has a pun on the word pur or 'citadel' to the effect of stating that pur-usa is a derivative of it. This etymology is also mentioned in the Mahabharata (XII.294.37) where purusa is analysed into "he who lies (āte) in the 'citadel' (pura)" of the unmanifest world-ground. In the Nirukta (??) a derivation from pur + sad (= purisāda) and / also from pur ("to fill") is suggested. A further etymology is given in the Brhadāranyaka-Upanisad (I.4.1) where the word is broken down into purva + us ('to burn'). According to R. Garbe (1917, 356) the correct etymology of the word purusa and its synonyms pums and pumāma is the one suggested by E. Leumann (??, 10-12), namely the compound pu-vṛsa both components of which signify 'man'.

In its earliest recorded conception, purusa stands both for the mortal 'person', and, more significantly, for the cosmic creator who, like the giant Ymir in teutonic mythology, is the causa materialis and the causa efficiens of the manifest universe: He is the demiurge and the primordial substance from which the world is fashioned. This double role is possible because the act of creation is understood as the self-dismemberment of the macrocosmic Person. Symbolically this is interpreted as the first sacrifice (yajña), of archetypal importance to the pan-Indian sacrificial cult. In most instances, this gigantic purusa is 43 See e.g. Rāṣeśa 97.4-5
thought of as transcending the world which he emitted from his own body. It is this cosmogonic model which was destined to exert a decisive influence on subsequent thought in India, as can readily be appreciated from a study of the Bhagavad-Gītā and other works of the Pāncarātra school.

In the Chandogya-Upanisad (VIII.10.1) a record of a popular psychological theory has been preserved according to which the puruṣa, conceived as a 'mankin', departs from the body of the sleeping person. This notion of an indwelling 'ghost' is part of many folk philosophies and figures, among other ancient non-Indian literary documents, in Homer's Odyssey (e.g. X.493). E.H. Johnston (1937, 41ff.) speculates that the later 'soul theory' as he calls the doctrine of puruṣa was arrived at through the gradual fusion of the primitive notion of an immaterial principle or principles animating the human body and of the equally archaic notion of a separate psyche which acts as the carrier of a person's post-mortem identity. He thinks (p. 43) that the Rgveda "contains traces of both conceptions and of the beginning of their amalgamation". This historical approach, which seeks to establish a causal relation between conceptualisations of a different type and degree of complexity, is entirely inapt and inconclusive.

44 See e.g. Rgveda X.90.3-4 and I.164.45, as also Atharvaveda II.1.2.

45 See also the highly symbolic rites performed on the occasion of the installation of a temple which is regarded as a manifestation of the vāstu-puruṣa or supreme architect of the world. This is ably discussed in H. Zimmer (1926).
Following up the development of the concept of purusa

E.H. JOHNSTON (1937) observes that in the early metric Upanisadas and in the Bhagavad-Gītā (except for the chapters XIII-XVIII) purusa denotes the individual psyche. He thinks (p. 53) that this term replaced the theory of the ātman-kaetrajña in the older texts. He also maintains that those epic passages which equate the purusa with ātman belong to a more recent period. J.W. HAUER (1958, 64) points out that the frequency of the word purusa is higher in the Atharvaveda than in the Rgveda which far more often employs the term ātman. He even goes so far as to suggest that the word purusa is specific to the vrātya tradition as recorded in the Atharvaveda (see especially book XV) and that it came to be introduced into the doctrinal sphere of orthodox Brāhmaṇism as a result of the large-scale conversion of the vrātyas. The heterodox origin of purusa is strongly indicated by the fact that the ancient litany on Rudra, the god of the vrātyas, viz. the so-called Ātari-drīva found in the Kathaka-Samhitā (XVII.11-17; cf. XXI.6) represents, according to J.W. HAUER, the oldest version of the famous gāyatri-mantra. It links up Rudra with purusa: tad-puruṣāya vidmahi mahā-devaṁ dhīmahi tan-no rudrāḥ pracodayāt, or: "This [litany] we have invented for the Purusa; let us meditate the great god; may Rudra promote this [meditation]."

H. Oldenberg (1915, 224) makes a pertinent observation: "It is significant that linguistic usage tends to connect ātman with the genitive case in order to express whose ātman is referred to, whereas puruṣa occurs more often in conjunction with a locative in order to indicate wherein this Puruṣa dwells. In view of this I would suspect that the preference of the designation Puruṣa for the spiritual principle in Sāṃkhya is related to the strict separation and confrontation, peculiar to this system, between the spirit and nature." I am not sure to what extent this proposition is valid, but certainly puruṣa tends to be associated if not with spatial metaphors, so with the idea of rulership and proprietorship. This is quite evident in the phraseology of the Yoga-Sūtra which on this point reflects the general trend of the upanisadic period.

Patañjali employs the term puruṣa altogether eight times (viz. I.16, 24; III.35 twice; III.49, 55; IV.18, 34). He also avails himself of a number of synonyms such as drṣṭi (I.3; II.17, 20; IV.23), svāmin (II.23), grahītṛ (I.41), ṅgṛ-śakti (II.6), ṅṛṣi (II.25), ṅṛṣi-mātra (II.20), prabhu (IV.18), cīti (IV.22), cīti-śakti (IV.34) and para (IV.24). With the exception of the word para ('the other') these are all 'loaded' terms insofar as they are modelled on the empirical relations of perceiving, cognising and owning and for the sake of communication ascribe a content to something which is by definition without all differentiae (nir-guna) and hence strictly speaking incommunicable. The full latitude of the meaning of puruṣa is brought out when one maps the
above synonyms in the following manner:

\[
\begin{align*}
&\text{metaphor of otherness} \\
&\quad \text{para} \\
&\quad \{ \text{drṣṭr}, \text{dṛg-śakti}, \text{dṛṣṭi-mātra} \} \\
&\text{metaphor of seeing} \\
&\quad \text{PURUṢA, svāmin, prabhu} \\
&\text{metaphor of owning} \\
&\quad \{
&\text{graḥītr}, \text{citi} \} \\
&\text{citi-śakti} \\
&\quad \text{metaphor of cognising}
\end{align*}
\]

If one were to place the concept of इवारा into this semantic grid, it would have to be accommodated to the far right by virtue of the strong connotation of 'lordship' attached to this term. Most of these synonyms of the word पुरुṣा belong to the old stock of yogic terminology and occur already in the metric Upaniṣads and the Mahābhārata, but dṛṣṭi-mātra and dṛg-śakti are more recent coinages which may possibly have originated in the doctrinal sphere of Mahāyāna Buddhism.

Nowhere in the Yoga-Sūtra is there a full-fledged definition of the concept of पुरुषा, and the most probable reason for this is that by the time of the composition of Patañjali's वादेमेचुम its precise meaning was perfectly evident. The opposite case must have been true of the concept of इवारा which Patañjali carefully demarcates from its popular usage in the sense of 'creator'.
From the few references in the *Yoga-Sūtra* it is clear beyond doubt that the concept of *purusa* is remarkably akin to that delineated in the epic and other pre-classical Sanskrit literature. It expresses the notion of man's 'transcendental identity', here rendered with 'Self' or 'transintelligible subject', as distinct from the world-ground (*prakṛti*) both in its noumenal form as *pradhāna* and in its manifest form as the objective universe (*drṣyā*). The Self is an aspatial and atemporal reality which stands in no conceivable relation to the composite world of phenomena nor to their transcendental source. It is sheer awareness as opposed to consciousness-of and in this respect is the exact antithesis to the world-ground which is by definition insentient. This Self is considered the authentic being of man.

Since the mental apparatus, with its consciousness-of, is regarded as an evolute of the world-ground, the Self is necessarily also quite distinct from the mind (*citta*). Viewed psychologically the Self is the 'seer' (*drṣṭr*) of the on-going psychomental processes or *vṛtti* (*viz. I.3*). As long as the empirical consciousness is operative and man's transcendental identity is obscured, this watchman is said to be 'of the same form' (*sārupya*) as the psychomental whirls. This is to say, the loss of authenticity is due to the shifting identifications with the discontinuous states of experience: "I am this sensation; I am that thought" etc. This perpetual process of constructing false identities is known as *asmitā* or 'I-am-ness'. It is this power, generated by 'nescience' or *avidyā*, which is responsible for the erection of man's inner world, i.e. his motivations, cognitive schemata and emotive response patterns.
and so forth. The Self is set apart from all these mechanisms which are founded on the energetic character of the primary constituents of the world-ground, the so-called guṇas. Properly speaking, the puruṣa is neither an actor nor a passive enjoyer of the experiences which occur in the mind, even though some Śaṅkhya works speak of it metaphorically as the 'enjoyer' (bhoktr) of all experiences. The Self does not intend, feel or think. The involvement with the discontinuous contents of consciousness, as implied by the phrase sarūpya, is merely an apparent one. It is 'affected' (paramāṣṭa) by the kleśa-karma-vipaśā-ādaya sequence only insofar as these factors are instrumental in cluttering the empirical consciousness and thus in relinquishing its capacity for emptying itself which is the only way in which the presentation of the transcendental Self to the mind can take place. The 'correlation' (saṃyoga) between the 'seer' and the 'seen' (viz. II.17) is a peculiar one and ranks among the most problematic issues of the dualistic metaphysics of Yoga and Śaṅkhya. For it is difficult to comprehend how the Self, which is defined as drśi-matrā and sūddha ('pure'), can apperceive the presented-ideas (pratyaya) as stated in II.20. The mental on-goings (vṛtti) are always apperceived because the puruṣa does not suffer any alteration but is a perfect continuum (viz. IV.18).

M. Bowes (1971, 169) sums up the situation in this way: "Indian philosophers, when faced with the objection that there is no such thing as consciousness as such, meaning that there is no empirical
experience of such a thing, stress that even if all consciousness is consciousness of something there must be a function called 'consciousness' to be conscious of this something. Many would object no doubt that this is hypostatising consciousness which arises only in a particular context of contact with objects and which is not to be thought of as an entity by itself, but the Indians claim that consciousness performs a distinct function, that of manifestation (equivalent to Sartre's revelation and Husserl's constitution function) of the object it is conscious of as well as of itself — a function which cannot be performed by anything which is non-conscious and so it must be thought of as there, as a reality of a distinct sort."

For Patanjali this puzzle is no puzzle at all, but an eminently practical issue. As long as samyoga prevails there is suffering (duhkha). Since the root of the correlation, rather phantom correlation, between Self and non-self is nescience (avidya), it is this which must be terminated for samyoga to be abolished. The prescribed expedient for this is viveka-khyati, the 'vision of discernment' as a high-level enstasy which eliminates all one's false identities not by way of mere intellectual acrobatics but in a process of clarification and purification of consciousness. First the mind is withdrawn from the external stimuli, then all presented-ideas are obliterated and ultimately the subliminal traces or vasanās themselves are rooted out which amounts to the total dispersion of the consciousness-of or citta.
Ordinary experience is possible only on account of the massive identity confusion arising from the overpowering influence of the subliminal traces which habitually throw the consciousness outside itself thus forcing it to gather in continually new impressions thereby replenishing the stock of vāsanās in the depths of the mind. In other words, the fundamental confusion about man's true identity is built into the psychomental organism whose growth and decay the individualised consciousness is witnessing. In fact, without this cognitive mix-up no experience would be possible. Experiencing, called bhoga in III.35, is an intrapsychic process which does not actively involve the Self; the puruṣa simply apperceives the presented-ideas in the experiencing mind. Patañjali promotes an extreme dualism when he insists that the Self and the most translucent aspect of the consciousness complex, the sattva, are eternally 'unmixed' (asamkīrṇa) (viz. III.35), and that precisely because of this perfect distinction the recovery of Self-authenticity is at all possible.47

Parenthetically it may be observed that by reason of the transphenomenal nature of the Self any qualitative ascription is in the last analysis tantamount to a falsification. This is as true of the description of puruṣa in terms of awareness (see citi, citi-śakti) as it is of the more obvious tropological predications.

47 Cf. IV.22 where citi is said to be apratisamkrama which J.H.WOODS (1966) translates with "which unites not (with objects)."
Unlike the anonymous author of the *Samkhya-Sūtra*, Patañjali does not seem to favour negative descriptions of the nature of the Self but prefers, as we have seen above, metaphors of seeing, cognising and owning which are in keeping with his psychological rather than metaphysical approach.

One last important point remains to be discussed. This is the controversial question of the singularity or plurality of the Self as conceived in Classical Yoga. M. Eliade (1973, 32-33) gives vent to the popular view on this matter when he says about *Samkhya* and Yoga that they "affirm that there are as many *purusas* as there are human beings. And each of these *purusas* is a monad, is completely isolated; for the Self can have no contact either with the world around it (derived from *prakṛti*) or with other spirits. The cosmos, then, is peopled with these eternal, free, unmoving *purusas* — monads between which no communication is possible."

Apart from the objection which one may wish to raise against M. Eliade's nonsensical use of concepts such as 'monad' and 'communication' as also against his blatantly wrong metaphor of the Selves populating the cosmos, another more serious criticism must be brought against his unquestioning acceptance of the testimony of rival schools which ascribe to Yoga the doctrine of the plurality of the transcedentional Selves. He obviously relies in his judgement on the work of his teacher S. Dasgupta (1930, 167) and others.

48 For a similarly loose and misleading use of language cf. G.J. Larson (1969, 183) who says about the Self that "it is simply present in the world".
But is this doctrine really a part of Patañjali's system of thought?

There can be no question that this strange doctrine is part and parcel of the philosophy expounded in the commentarial literature on the Yoga-Sūtra and also inĪśvara Kṛṣṇa's Śaṅkha-yātrī. The latter text has a stanza (18) which reads as follows: janam-maratn-karṇāṇāṃ pratiniyāmādyugapratvṛttiś-cā, puruṣa-bahutvāṃ siddham tṛai-guṇa-viparyayac-ca-eva, "The multiplicity of the Self is established by reason of the idiosyncracy of a person's birth, death [and] deed and because of non-simultaneous activity and also on account of the alteration in the guna-triad". That the word bahutva in this stanza does not merely signify 'duplicity' but 'multiplicity' is borne out by the phrase prati-puruṣa-vimokṣa-arthaḥ or "for the sake of the release of every Self" in verse 46 of the same work. The word prati, a favourite expression withĪśvara Kṛṣṇa (viz. verses 5, 31, 37) has consistently the sense of 'every, each' in his Śaṅkha-yātrī.

The word bahutva is derived from bahu meaning 'abundant, much', and it signifies 'multiplicity, multitude'. In the Mahābhārata the cognate nāṇātva is generally employed to express the idea of 'manifoldness'. There is, however, at least one instance in which bahuda is used (viz. XII.296.2, according to the edition employed by K.B.R. RAO XII.308.1). According to K.B.R. RAO's (1966, 278) analysis of this verse the idea of the plurality of Selves is definitely implied in this passage, but F. EDGERTON (1924) thinks

49 G.J. LARSON (1969) translates pratiniyāma in a more conservative fashion with 'diversity'.
50 The commentators take the term karana as referring to buddhi etc.
that such a view is entirely untenable. As C.A.F. RHYS DAVIDS (1936, 146) notes: "A heresy so startling would have needed to be rubbed in, as it is not." F. EDGERTON (1924) severely criticises E.W. HOPKINS (1901) for grossly misinterpreting the epic passage XII.303.11 (= XII.315.11 acc. to K.B.R. RAO):

avyakta-ekatvam-ity-ahur-nanatvam purusas-tathā
sarva-bhūta-dayā-vantah kevalam jñanam-asthitah.

E.W. HOPKINS (1901, 123):
"Those who have the religion of compassion ... say that there is unity in the Unmanifest but a plurality of spirits."

F. EDGERTON (1924, 26):
"It is a unity in the Unmanifest; so they explain the plurality (of the manifest, empiric universe),—men who, having compassion for all beings, resort to pure knowledge."

"Men who are compassionate with all beings, and who have resorted to kevala jñāna, i.e. the knowledge of the Absolute, say that the Avyakta is eka and also nāna."

F. EDGERTON makes the undoubtedly valid point that the phrase "plurality of spirits" would require either purusa-nanatvam or nanatvam purusānām. It is his conviction that the epic view
coincides with that of the metric Upaniṣads, which is one "of a plurality in the empiric, finite world, but an underlying unity, realised by the enlightened, in which there is no longer any plurality, nor any consciousness, the attribute of plurality" (p. 25).

S. DASGUPTA (1930, 167) argues on the basis of II.22 that Patañjali recognises a plurality of Selves. In this he follows the cues provided in the Yoga-Bhāṣya and especially in the Tattva-Vaiśāradī. But what does this aphorism really convey? The Sanskrit text runs as follows: \( \text{krta-artha}\text{ prati-naṣṭam-ani naṣṭam tad-anya-śādharanatvat} \), or: "Though [the objective world] has ceased for [the one whose] purpose is accomplished, it has not ceased [altogether] since it is common to [all] the other [empirical selves]." It cannot be conclusively shown on the strength of this aphorism alone that Patañjali subscribed to the doctrine of plurality. Nor are there any other statements in his work which would vindicate such a view. I therefore wish to propose that it seems far more congruent to read this śūtra in the spirit of the epic tradition where krta-artha denotes the person who has become the Self, i.e. who has recovered Self-authenticity, beyond all plurality.

Availing himself of the stock arguments of the Sāṃkhya thinkers, S. DASGUPTA (1930, 167f.) sees an epistemological problem here. He asks how in view of the postulated reality of prakṛti one single purusa of equal reality could possibly be responsible for all the cognitive processes occurring in the multiple real organisms. He draws attention to the viewpoint of Advaita-Vedānta according to which the Self is at least not identified with the real experiencing subject, but which asserts that the notions of experiencing etc. are all false, produced
by the illusive action of maya (which is itself inscrutable or
anirvacanaya). He contends that if indeed only one purusa were
'associated' with the many psychosomatic entities, the release
of a single being would imply the simultaneous release of all
others. However, these arguments are lame, since the process of
emancipation is a prakrtic event which effects only a particular
entity, whereas the Self is ex hypothesi neither ever in bondage
nor in need of liberation.

Assuming that Patañjali does not maintain that there
are innumerable Self monads which inhabit some acosmic dimension,
it must next be asked how this interpretation affects the conception
of Isvara in his system. For, Isvara is defined as a 'special Self'
which is untouched by the kleása, by the propelling force of karman
and so on. It may be thought that 1.24 tabernacles the idea that
the ordinary purusa is somehow 'touched' by the kleása etc.
which would be an indirect confirmation of the doctrine of plurality.
But there can be no question of the purusa - be it Isvara or not -
ever being affected by the kleása or any other prakrtic phenomenon.
The phrase kleása-karma-vipáka-śayāair-aparāmpātah must therefore be
applicable as much to the ordinary purusa as to Isvara. Unless one
wants to stretch this aphorism beyond its capacity, it does not appear
to entail either any real inconsistency or a hidden reference to the
notion that there are multiple Selves, and that Isvara is primus inter
pares as M. Müller (1916, 325) argues.

Thus Patañjali seems to promulgate a variant of the pre-classical
epic Yoga tradition which affirms the singularity of the transcendental Self. Furthermore, he also appears to accept the theistic conception of his predecessors who understood Távára as eclipsing the purusa. Where he differs from them is in his insistence on the absolute separateness of purusa and prakṛti — thus developing the dualistic trends in the Mahābhārata and the metric Upaniṣads into a full-fledged dualism with the transintelligible subject on the one side and the objective universe on the other side. Philosophically unattractive, this Cartesian dichotomy is of considerable practical relevance.\(^{51}\)

\(^{51}\) See G.A. FEUERSTEIN (1971, 38f.)
3. *Prakrti*

The third of the transcendental principles which together constitute the tripod of the conceptual edifice of Classical Yoga is *prakrti*. The word is composed of the preposition *pra* 'forth', the verbal root *kṛ* 'to do' and the feminine suffix *ti*, and it conveys the idea of 'bringing forth'. In the *Brahma-Vaivarta-Purāṇa* (II.1.5) these three morphemes are explained symbolically as representing *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamass* respectively.

Although the word itself does not occur prior to the metric *Upaniṣads*, the concept of *prakrti* appears to be known in principle already in the *Ṛgveda* and *Atharvaveda*. K.B.R. RAO (1966, 99), for instance, conjectures that whilst the notion of *ātman* led to the formulation of the concept of *purusa*, the earlier concept of *brahman* as the substratum of the manifest world gave rise to the idea of *aksara*, *avyakta* and, then, *prakrti*. He cites F.O SCHRADEL (1956) in confirmation of this hypothesis. However, D. CHATTOPADHYAYA (1959) proffers an entirely divergent view. He links up the evolution of this key concept with the fertility cult of what he regards as the original non-vedic *Sāmkhya-Tantrism* . "Evidently the term *prakrti*

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52 See *Bhagavad-gītā* III.27, 29, 33; IV.6; VII.5, 4, 20; IX.7, 8, 10, 12, 13; XI.51; XIII.19, 20, 23, 29; XVIII.59. *Śvetāsvatara-Upaniṣad* IV.10. *Nairāryāṇya-Upaniṣad* VI.10, 30; II.6. *Māhānārāyanā-Upaniṣad* X.8.
was not the invention of the early Sankhya philosophers because it was the basic concept of Tantrism, the history of which is traced back to a very remote antiquity. And it is impossible to deny that the prakriti originally stood for the female principle without questioning the Indian cultural tradition fundamentally.  

Despite the persuasiveness of D. CHATTOPADHYAYA's tight-knit argumentation, I fail to be convinced by his sweeping reconstruction of the history of Indian thought and hence entertain certain reservations about his unilinear derivation of the philosophical concept of prakrti from popular religious contexts. I have, however, similar misgivings about K.B.R. RAO's attempt to recognise in Rigveda I.164 and X.129 the earliest references to the proto-conception of purusa and prakrti. I am not sure that he is justified in his conjecture that these two hymns must have "in no small measure contributed to the breaking of the original absolutism of Brahman as the Personal or Impersonal into the dual Principles, the Personal and the Impersonal". It seems to me that the actual situation at the time must have been far more complex than is suggested by either view.  

Besides, there are interesting references in the Atharvaveda which will have to be taken into account if one wants to arrive at a more comprehensive interpretation. Regrettably this whole hymnody has been rather neglected and underrated, but possibly the fullest survey of the Atharvaveda from the viewpoint of proto-Yoga and Samkhya

53 D. CHATTOPADHYAYA (1959, 404)
54 K.B.R. RAO (1966, 114)
materials is that by J.W. HAUER (1922; 1927; 1958). For instance, he (1958, 59) sees in Atharvaveda X.8 a definite link with the much later Śvetāsvatara-Upaniṣad which is one of the outstanding early Yoga texts, and he perceives in X.8.29-31 a clear indication of the germ of the later notion of prakṛti. Of particular interest is here the use of the verbal root /«/ac/año which J.W. HAUER regards as the origin of the later concept of vyakta and avyakta. What seems to be the essence of these early expressions is the idea of a primal, transcendental source or 'womb' (yoni) from which issues forth the multiform universe. This is precisely the meaning of the concept of prakṛti as the creative matrix, the ůpX'{, which holds in posse all things, itself being unbounded (απελπον).

E.H. JOHNSTON (1937), in his admirable and still useful study, shows that the older term for prakṛti is avyakta, the 'unmanifest', still current at the time of the Katha-Upaniṣad. In the Bhagavad-Gītā which is slightly older than the Śvetāsvatara-Upaniṣad, both terms are employed interchangeably. Avyakta is mentioned, for instance, in VIII.18 and contrasted with vyakta (plural use), and in VIII.20 the word is employed to denote something which is higher than the ordinary avyakta, whilst in VIII.21 this higher avyakta is identified with aksara. At that time prakṛti had not yet acquired a strictly technical sense (as 'nature') whereas aksara signifying the purusa is decidedly a technical expression in the Bhagavad-Gītā.

55 This strange relation between Śvetāsvatara-Upaniṣad and Atharvaveda is highlighted by the fact that IV.3 in the former scripture is a verbatim quotation from the latter, viz. X.8.27.


57 See e.g. Bhagavad-Gītā III.33, IV.6 et al.

58 See P.M. MODI (1932, 5)
In the Śvetāsvatara-Upanisad (IV.10) the term prakṛti is found in the phrase māyām tu prakṛtim vidyān māvinam tu mahā-Tāvaram, or: "prakṛti is to be known as māya [and] the great lord as the māvin". Here prakṛti = māya (not in the sense of 'illusion') stands for avyakta which elsewhere in this text is denoted by the word pradhāna. E.H. JOHNSTON (1937, 27) points out that since this particular stanza is in the anustubh metre it must have been inserted into this series of tristubh verses at a later stage. The regular use of prakṛti for this period is in the plural, which refers to the set of eight primary evolutes, viz. buddhi, ahamkāra, manas and the five dhā elements. This enumeration is according to the Bhagavad-Gītī (VII.4-5), but other variants are known. For example, in the Buddha-carita (XII.18) these eight constituents are said to be avyakta, buddhi, ahamkāra and the five elements. This text also mentions the complementary set of sixteen vikāras or secondary evolutes, viz. the five senses, the five sense-objects, the five organs of action and the manas (see XII.19). This double usage of the term prakṛti is also retained in the Sāṅkhya-Karikā which speaks of prakṛti (in the later sense of avyakta) and of the various prakṛtis and vikṛtis, that is the primary and secondary evolutes of the world-ground.

Remarkably, this is also the way in which Patañjali applies the term prakṛti. It is mentioned a mere three times in the Yoga-Sūtra, namely in I.19 as prakṛti-laya and in IV.2-3. In IV.3, significantly enough, the word is used in the plural genitive (as prakṛtīnām). The two sūtras in question run as follows: jāty-antara-paripāmah prakṛty-apurūt; nimittam-aprayojakam prakṛtīnām varana-bhedas-tu tatah kṣetrikavat. In consonance with J.W. HAUER's (1958) revised interpretation
of the initial aphorisms of the fourth pada, I propose this translation: "The transformation into another category-of-existence (jāti) [derives] from the pouring-over of the world-ground. — The incidental-cause (nimitta) [viz. the store of sanskāras] does not initiate the prakṛtis, but [merely] singles out possibilities (varana) [in accordance with the karmic conditions], like a farmer [who irrigates a field by selecting appropriate pathways for the water]."

The plural prakṛtis has been subjected to various renderings and paraphrases, such as 'evolving-causes' (J.H. WOODS), 'Werdevorgänge' (J.W. HAUER), 'natural tendencies' (I.K. TAIMNI), 'die (schöpferisch sich betätigenden) Naturen' (P. DEUSSEN), 'material causes' (G. JHA), 'creative-causes' (R. PRASĀDA) and 'constituents' (M.N. DVIVEDI). Because of the classical commentators' complete misunderstanding of the true intent of these sutras which have nothing to do with magical feats, the obvious meaning of this plural use has never been spotted: Here we have not just a reference to some vaguely conceived process of creation, but very probably the plural prakṛtis refers to the well-known set of the primary evolutes emerging from the primal matrix. Of course, one cannot be sure that Patanjali had in mind the set of eight principles as enunciated, for example, in the Bhagavad-Gītā or in other passages of the Mahābhārata. As a matter of fact his ontology — as will be seen — follows its own idiosyncratic pattern which is distinct from those promulgated in the epic, the Caraka-Samhitā, the Buddhacarita or other coeval sources.

Patañjali's vocabulary includes several synonyms of the term prakṛti. Thus he employs drśya (viz. II. 17, 18, 21; IV. 23), gṛhva...
(I.41), alīṅga (I.45; II.19), and svā (II.23). E.H. Johnston (1937, 26) states that pradhāna is the regular term used in the Yoga-Sūtra, but this word in fact occurs only once in III.48. The term avyakta, on the other hand, does not appear at all. However, Patañjali employs vyakta (IV.13), contrasting it with suksma ('the subtle'). These are said to be the two aspects of the dharma which compose the universe; their essence are the gunas. In this case vyakta and suksma refer to the time dimension of things, vyakta being the generic term for those properties which are evident, i.e. present, and suksma for those which are potential either because they existed in the past or will exist in the future.

The most common denotation for prakṛti is unquestioningly the term drṣya, which covers both the unmanifest and the manifest component of prakṛti. This concept has an epistemological ring about it which is yet another indication of the psychological experiential orientation of Yoga. Thus drṣya (from ṛṣayā 'to see') signifies anything that is capable of becoming the object of the transcendental witness-Self, that is to say, anything that pertains to prakṛti in any of its modes, including the causal core (pradhāna) itself. In this respect three major aspects of prakṛti can be differentiated: (i) the transcendental dimension, (ii) the objective (physical) part and (iii) the subjective (psychic) aspect. G.N. Kṣemān (1970, 158) calls the last-mentioned, more appropriately perhaps, 'subjectivo-objective' by way of contrast with the 'objectivo-objective' energisations of prakṛti. The commentators appear to have taken drṣya in a far more restricted sense. Thus the Mahāprabhā (II.17) has drṣyaṃ buddhi-sattvam, "the seen is the translucent-aspect of the mind". Vyāsa, again, says in his Yoga-Bhasya (II.17): drṣyaḥ buddhi-sattva-upārdhān̄ sarve dharmaḥ, "The
objects-of-sight (drṣya) are all qualities [of prakṛti] which have affected the sattva of the mind". Vacaspati Miśra explains this further in his Tattva-Vaisaradī (II.17):

\[
tad-\text{etad}-\text{buddhi}-\text{sattva} \\
\text{sabda-ādy-ākāravat-drṣya-ayas-kānta-mani-kalpa-purusasya svam bhavati} \\
drṣi-rūpasya svāminah,
\]

"Thus this same sattva of the mind, containing [the objects of] sound etc., [becomes] the 'seen' [acting] like a loadstone, it becomes the property (sva) of the Self, the proprietor of the form of Awareness". That Patañjali employs drṣya in the widest possible sense is evident from II.18 where he delineates its main characteristics. He speaks of a 'disposition' (śīla) to (a) luminosity (prakāśa), (b) activity (kriya) and (c) inertia (sthiti).

This tripartition is the outcome of the presence of the three types of guṇas, which is clear from II.19 which gives out the various levels of manifestation of these primary building-blocks of the world-ground. I will come back to this issue shortly.

I wish to conclude these pre-eminently linguistic observations with the following semantic matrix constructed on the basis of the above synonyms of the term prakṛti.

\[
\begin{array}{c|c|c|c}
\text{comprehensive concepts} & \text{restricted concepts} \\
sva & prakṛti (singular) \\
drṣya & pradhāna \\
\text{GRAHYA} & \text{aliṅga} \\
PRAKṛTI : & \text{prakṛti (plural)} \\
\text{vyakta - sūksma}
\end{array}
\]
It must next be asked what exactly prakṛti stands for. First of all, it is important to realise that it comprises two cardinal dimensions. On the one hand there is the noumenal matrix of creation, also called aliṅga (= avyakta = pradhāna), and on the other hand there is the realm of the multitudinous phenomena of contingent existence. The latter category is not exhausted by the visible universe of ordinary space and time. In its phenomenalised nature, prakṛti also embraces the vast hidden dimension impervious to the senses but experiencible in yogic introspection and logically deducible from the spatio-temporal sense-derived data. This inner or 'subtle' (sūkṣma) aspect of prakṛti I propose to call deep structure in contradistinction to the surface structure, i.e. the visible, audible, tactual world.

The deep structure of prakṛti is stratified hierarchically, albeit in an aspatial sense. This stratification, which varies in its conception from one tradition to another, has also been referred to as 'ontological map', as it serves the yogin as a guidebeam in his programme of conscious involution. Viewed dynamically rather than structurally, one can also speak of an evolution of ontic categories or tattva-antara-parināma. The term tattva denotes such categories as buddhi, ahamkāra, etc.

This conception implies a view of the universe as an essentially autonomous system of necessarily interrelated events. This particular aspect of prakṛti was precipitated in the vedic concept of rta or 'order', and later on came to be expressed for instance in the idea of adṛśta 'the invisible law' in the philosophy of Nyāya and

59 See G.A. FEUERSTEIN (1974', 87f.)
Vaiśeṣika. Prakṛti can thus be looked upon as a system or 'field' composed of interdependent sub-systems arranged hierarchically according to the principle that each higher sub-system is progressively more inclusive. This is best illustrated on the example of the well-known schema utilised in Classical Śāmkhya which permits the following diagrammatic condensation:

The co-ordination and interdependence between the several sub-systems are defined in terms of causal relations of a specific type.

60 See Śāmkhya-Kārikā 22 and 24.
It is traditionally known as the 'doctrine of (pre-)existent effect' or sat-kārya-vāda or, more specifically, as the 'doctrine of (real) transformation' or parināma-vāda. R.A. SINARI (1970, 38) calls this the "earliest and epistemologically the most valuable attempt made in Indian philosophy to set up a theory of causal order". This view is partly foreshadowed in the Bhagavad-Gītā (II.16) which contains these lines: na-asato vidyate bhavo, na-abhavo vidyate sataḥ, or: "Of the non-existent there is no becoming, of the existent there is no dis-becoming". The full-fledged doctrine, being a re-statement of the above notion, is to be found in the Saṁkhya-Kārikā (9): asad-akaranad-upadana-grahanat-sarva-sambhava-abhāvāt, saktasya sākya-karanāt-kārana-bhāvān-ca sat-kāryam, or: "[There is] pre-existent effect because of the non-productiveness of non-being, because of the need for a material-cause, because of the impossibility of derivation from everything, because of [a thing's] ability-to-produce [only what it is] capable [of producing] and because of the nature of the cause".

This somewhat obscure passage stands in need of elucidation: the pre-existence of the effect in the cause is based on five logical reasons. The first is that something which is not cannot be brought into existence nor can it bring anything else into existence. This is the famous axiom ex nihilo nihil fit. The second reason adduced by Ṛṣṭya Kṛṣṇa is that any effect requires a cause which in his opinion must be of the same material. Next, it is argued that the effect must have a specific cause and cannot be derived simply from the sum total of other effects; there must be a special relation between effect and
cause, and this is interpreted in the sense that the cause potentially contains the effect. Fourthly, not everything is capable of producing a specific effect which is yet another affirmation of the essential inherence of the effect in the cause. Finally, the pre-existence of the effect in the cause is demanded by the fact that the cause is of the same nature as the effect. These statements can hardly be said to amount to proofs unless it is admitted that a circular logic is put forward. Notwithstanding this criticism, it is interesting that Śaṅkhya and Yoga carefully distinguish between the material (upādāna) and the instrumental (nimitta) cause of a thing, subsuming both under the heading of kārana which is set against kārya or 'effect'. Occasionally the effect is defined either as upādānika or naimittika.

All phenomena, whether they belong to the surface structure or to the deep structure of prakṛti, are considered as 'transformations' (parināma), of one and the same substratum, viz. the world-ground. Here applies, if ever, the phrase plus ca change, plus c'est la même chose. The technical designation of this particular theorem is prakṛti-parināma-vāda. It is one of four major theoretical positions on the issue of causality as developed in Indian philosophy. There is first of all the view of the Nyāya and Vaīśeṣika schools of thought — known as arambha-vāda — according to which eternal atoms create by continual re-combination the multiform universe. Also the Ājīvikas, Jainas and materialists of ancient India must be reckoned as subscribing to this view. The best known representative of the second type of interpretation is Hīnayāna Buddhism with its dharma theory. This saṅghītā-vāda asserts that separate existential factors create the
individual and his external and internal environment by a process of co-operative collocation (saṅghata). The third position is the vivarta-vāda which is characteristic of the non-dualism of Śaṅkara, according to which the one real brahman remains ever unchanged; all transformations are attributed to the contingent universe which is regarded as vivarta or an appearance quite different in nature from its cause. The Mahāyāna thinkers maintain a similar view. Finally, the parināma-vāda asserts that the Many is created out of the One by way of a series of real transformations, and it is this position which is typical of Yoga, Śāmkhya and the older Vedānta schools.

The parināma-vāda claimed a considerable following, and its prominent place in Indian philosophical speculation can readily be appreciated when one considers the frequent refutations of it by other traditions, especially Buddhism. In later times Śāmkhya and Yoga thinkers availed themselves also of such concepts as had been developed in opponent schools in order to buttress their position in the increasingly more competitive spirit of analytical philosophising. For example, Patañjali adopts the concepts of quality (dharma) and substance (dharman) which played a decisive role in the heyday of Indian philosophy.

Intimately related to the concept of prakṛti is the doctrine of the gunas which I will proceed to discuss next. The world-ground as conceptualised in the Śāmkhya and Yoga tradition has been

61 See W. LIEBENTHAL (1934)
62 See E. FRAUWALLNER (1953, 390)
described by some scholars as a kind of 'ultimate energy' transmuting itself into various conditions by means of a re-arrangement of its basic constituents, the so-called gunas, which invite comparison with the 'quantum packets' of modern nucleur physics.\(^6\)

The notion of the gunas is one of the central doctrines of Yoga-Samkhya ontology and can safely be regarded as the single most original contribution of this proliferating tradition.

The word guna means literally 'strand, rope' and is also used to denote 'quality'. In the present context it is best rendered as 'primary-constituent' of the world-ground. Other frequent translations are 'aspect' (J.H. Woods), 'quality' (S. Dasgupta), 'attribute' (G. Jha). N. Smart (1964) prefers to translate it with 'strand-substances' and J.W. Hauer (1958) with 'Weltstoff-Energien', whilst others retain the Sanskrit term (see I.K. Taimni, G.M. Koelman).

The doctrine of the gunas has a protracted and rather recondite history. The idea was conceived long before the codification of either Yoga or Samkhya, but its exact origins are shrouded in mystery. Various attempts have been made to trace the development of this important philosophical concept, with varying degrees of success.\(^6\)

The available historical data permit the conclusion that the guna theory was gradually developed out of much older speculations recorded in the vedic samhitās, the brahmana texts and also the Upanisads.

\(^6\) See for instance F. Capra (1972, 15ff.)

\(^6\) See the extensive bibliography by M. Eliade (1973\(^2\)). Not mentioned but of paramount importance is the study by J.A.B. Van Buitenen (1956\(^1\)) in the Journal of the American Oriental Society, vols. 76 (pp. 155ff.) and 77 (pp. 88ff.). Also not listed are T. Stcherbatsky (1934, 737-60) and A. Wayman (1962, 14-22).
There is no compelling reason to assume that it evolved within non-āryan traditions, though it may not have been the creation solely of the brāhmaṇic orthodoxy either. According to E.H. JOHNSTON (1937), the gunas were originally simply psychological qualities, and he refers to the use of the synonym bhāva or 'force of becoming, sentiment'. But as J.A.B. VAN BUITENEN (1956) shows beyond all doubt, there are two types of evolutionary schemata advocated by Śāmkhya, namely a vertical and a horizontal theory of evolution which later on came to be integrated in some schools. He denies that the term guna (= bhāva) originally meant 'moral or psychological quality of the buddhi'. The original vertical version did not involve the gunas at all. J.A.B. VAN BUITENEN understands bhāva as a "form of being, cosmic phase evolved under the influence of a guna". Thus guna in its most archaic conception stood for a triad of factors one of which was rajas. Their combined action on buddhi resulted in the evolution of the three bhāvas or states of being which, according to J.A.B. VAN BUITENEN's reconstruction of the epic evidence, may consist in manas, the indriyas and the bhūtas. The well-known triad of sattva-ajas-tamas is definitely a subsequent creation, though the principle implied in these concepts must have been present already in the earlier triadic conception.

What then are the gunas in their classical sense? Surprisingly enough this question has never been satisfactorily answered by any of

65 J.A.B. VAN BUITENEN (1956).
the earlier thinkers, and it was in fact Vīñāna Bhikṣu who, as late as the 16th century, afforded this topic a first critical examination and discussion. The gunas can be described as being the ultimate building blocks of the material and mental phenomena in their entirety. They are not merely qualities or properties, but actual entities or 'reals' (S. DASGUPTA) and as such non-distinct from the world-ground itself. They are the indivisible atoms of everything there is with the exception of the Self (purusa) which is by definition nir-guna. The gunas underly every appearance, and are the world-ground in its noumenal character. This is expressed by Īśwara Kṛṣṇa in this way: tri-guṇam-

aviveki visayā sāmānyam-acetanam prasava-dharmi, vyaktam tathā pradhānam tad-viparītas-tathā ca pumān, or: "The manifest [world] and the primary-substratum [are both of the nature of] the triple gunas, without discernment, objective, generic, without Awareness and productive. Yet the Self is the reverse of this".67

Thus they are the very material of prakṛti. In fact in Classical Śāṅkhyā prakṛti is defined as tri-guṇa-sāmya-avyasthā or "the state of homoeostasis of the three gunas".68 In his study on the Bhagavad-Gītā S. DASGUPTA (1965, II, 465) suggests that in this scripture the gunas are not thought to constitute the world-ground, but this is obviously wrong, for he clearly overlooks VII.14 where Kṛṣṇa's māyā (= prakṛti)

66 See Vīñāna Bhikṣu's remarks to Śāṅkhyā-Sūtra I.61: sattva-ādīni dravyāni na vaiśeṣikā gunāḥ, that is, "sattva etc. are substances not qualities [as taught in the school of] Vaiśeṣika".

67 Śāṅkhyā-Kārikā (11) Vaiśeṣika Miśra on Śāṅkhyā-Kārikā (3) ; cf. Śāṅkhyā-Sūtra (I.61): sattva-rajās-tamasām sāmya-avyasthā prakṛtih.
is called guna-mayi or 'composed of the gunas'. Nor do we need to perceive any real conflict between this statement and such expressions as gunah prakrti-sambhavah (XIV.5) or 'the gunas born of the world-ground'. Any argument to the contrary would be meaningless in view of the sat-kārya doctrine which demands that the gunas in their noumenal state are mere potentialities which become actualised with the process of evolution. As K.B.R. RAO (1966, 52) states: "Gunas are themselves prakṛti. Gunas are not 'ingredients', or 'parts'!. C.T. KENGHE (1958, 4) has a remark to the same effect: "The three forces Sattva, Rajas and Tamas cannot be said to be the parts of Prakṛti, for in themselves they are equally impartite and impartite things can never be parts of anything else". The author also calls prakṛti a 'suprapychical substance' rejecting the widely prevalent translation of the term with 'matter'; but this is equally obscure.

Patañjali is perfectly cogent on this issue. In II.19 aliṅga which corresponds with the Sāmkhya prakṛti-pradhāna, is said to be one of the levels (parvan) of the gunas. There are four levels in all which will be dealt with in detail below. It is clear from this that for all practical purposes the gunas can be equated with prakṛti (in the comprehensive sense).

The important question of the substantiality of the gunas has been left untackled by both Vyāsa and Vacaspati Miśra, just as they ignored the problem of their multiplicity. The texts mention triple gunas but do not explicitly state whether there are only three types of gunas or a multitude of gunas which may be classified into three categories in respect of their several functions. However, the postulation of a large number of gunas seems a logical necessity if it is maintained that the plethora of phenomena are the direct outcome of infinite
guna permutations which is at least Īśvara Kṛṣṇa's proposition. In his opinion the entire phenomenal world and its deep structure are created by a process of continual re-combination of the primary-constitutents of prakṛti. Indeed, if there were only three distinct entities the inordinate multiplicity of existing things could not be explained. On the other hand, it is convincing that a near infinite number of gunas of three different types should by way of collocation and perpetual re-combination produce the multifaceted dynamic network of existence.

Maybe today this question can be resolved on a non-substantialist basis in the light of contemporary field theory which has successfully supplanted the classical conception of matter as a chunk of substance floating in empty space. Perhaps it is not too far-fetched to compare the gunas with the atoms of modern nuclear physics which are described as localisations of fields. As F.L. KUNZ (1963, 5) puts it: "An atom ... may be correctly thought of as a standing wave system in an open wave force field potential." It is surely not by accident that it is always the energetic nature of the gunas which is pushed into foreground by the later expounders of the Śāmkhya and Yoga traditions. Although Vijnāna Bhikṣu characterises them as dravyas or 'substances' he does so only in order to refute the Vaishējika position according to which the gunas are qualities, and had he known the expression 'energy parcel' he would probably not have hesitated to use it instead.

As G.H. KOELMAN (1970, 77) notes: "The gunas' nature is throughout expressed in terms of functional qualities, kinetic dispositions and causal urges." This is well illustrated by the Yoga-Bhāṣya (II.18) From this passage emerges that
(1) although the gunas are quite distinct entities having different characteristics,
(2) they nonetheless influence each other and by their interdependent functioning create the phenomenal universe, and thus
(3) everything must be looked upon as a 'synergisation'
(G.M. KOELMAN, 1970, 78) of the three gunas.

The energetic nature of the gunas is furthermore indicated by the fact that Patanjali associates them with the concept of paripūrṇa or 'transformation' and that of pratiprasava or 'involution', the flowing back of the manifest gunas into the potentiality of the world-ground. Yoga ontology thus conceives Nature to be a quivering force field undergoing continuous transformations. The dynamism is sustained by the incessant interaction of the three types of gunas whose activity can be inferred from their phenotypes as experienced externally or internally.

The classic guna triad is headed by sattva. The word means literally 'being-ness' and is derived from sat 'being' and the abstract suffix -tvā. A great variety of renderings have been proposed, such as 'intelligence-stuff' (S. DASGUPTA), 'essentiality' (R. PRASĀDA), 'goodness' (G. JHA) all of which hardly touch the core meaning of this term. J.H. WOODS (1966) wisely leaves the word untranslated, but G.M. KOELMAN (1970, 10) contends that it is best rendered by its Latin equivalent entia (as in presentia, absentia), whilst the adjectival form sāttvika would correspondingly assume the appearance of 'entic'. I must admit that I fail to see the advantage of such a procedure. If one has to have recourse to a foreign language anyhow in order to convey the meaning of
sattva, might one not simply retain the Sanskrit term and maybe anglicise its adjective to sattvic?

The single most important study of the concept of sattva is that by J.A.B. VAN BUITENEN (1957c), in which he criticises past scholarship for reading the classic expression of this concept into the older material. He remarks (p. 88): "One result of this classicism was the acceptance of sattva and the other gunas as factors only conditioning the individual soul's buddhi, their cosmological function being looked upon either as secondary or as superseded". Thus J.A.B. VAN BUITENEN completes the partial rectification of this aprioristic view by É. SENART (1915 and 1925).

In the pre-classical Sāṃkhya and Yoga traditions the term sattva was used in many different senses; it denoted the body-complex but also the psyche and the concretely existing entity or sentient being. J.A.B. VAN BUITENEN (1957c, p. 105) says: "It would seem that sattva, undoubtedly a notion that was elaborated in circles where the idea of a personality — with increasingly microcosmic features — persisted, reflects in its functions the aspect of sat as the reified and created. As such it could easily become linked up with tripartite creation..."

On page 106 he remarks: "It is not clear how sattva came to be associated just with rajas and tamas. Probably it succeeded to a principle like tapas or jyotis, which acquired the connotation of 'light of knowledge' and had its opposite in 'darkness' and 'obscuration'."

The second member of the guna triad is rajas which according to J.A.B. VAN BUITENEN (1957c, p. 106) probably "brought the triadic pattern along", Like sattva it has suffered various more or less adequate
renderings into English, such as 'energy-stuff' (S. DASGUPTA, F.V. CATALINA), 'energy' (R. PRASĀDA), 'foulness' (G. JHA). E. SENART (1915), the first to give a thorough examination to this term, shows that originally rajas signified the 'atmosphere'. This was recently challenged by T. BURROW (1945, 645) who relates it to 'dirt' \rightarrow 'moral defilement' \rightarrow 'cosmic principle'. However, this hypothetical reconstruction of the evolution of the concept of rajas is firmly rejected by J.A.B. VAN BUITENEN (1957, p. 92) who is most insistent that rajas had to begin with a purely cosmological significance and that only subsequently it acquired a psychological meaning. To cover both the cosmic and the psychic aspect of this term, G.N. KOELMAN (1970, 12) uses the Greek word ἐργασία paraphrasing rajas with 'ergetic constituent'. It is the active principle which stimulates, initiates action and supplies the dynamic impulses without which the field of prakṛti would collapse.

Finally, there is tamas which has been translated with 'mass-stuff' (S. DASGUPTA, F.V. CATALINA), 'inertia' (R. PRASĀDA) and 'darkness' (G. JHA). Whilst rajas is derived from ṛaj/ṛan 'to glow, be brilliant', tamas is a derivative of ṭam 'to be exhausted, become rigid'. G.M. KOELMAN (1970, 12) connects it with the allied Latin term temea of which the ablative temere 'blindly, rashly' has survived. He calls this third member of the guna triad accordingly the 'temeric constituent'.

S. DASGUPTA (1965, I, 242-3) makes an attempt to explain these gunas as 'feeling-substances'. According to him, feelings "mark the
earliest track of consciousness, whether we look at it from the point of view of evolution or of the genesis of consciousness in ordinary life (…). The feelings are therefore the things-in-themselves, the ultimate substances of which consciousness and gross matter are made up (…). The three principal characteristics of thought and matter (…) are but the manifestations of three types of feeling substances". This seems to be accepted *prima facie* by F.V. CATALINA (1968, 35), but interesting as S. DASGUPTA's perspective is it nevertheless implies an unwarranted psychologisation of the nature of the *guna*s. Such a one-sidedness must be avoided if one wants to do full justice to this complex concept. The *guna*s are both cosmogonic and psychogonic forces. This ambivalent nature of the primary-constituents is indeed confusing accustomed as we are to distinguish most carefully between material phenomena on the one hand and psychomental events on the other hand. But, again, we must take heed not to project our own cognitive patterns onto the Indian schemata.

One can sympathise with R. GARBE (1917, 272) when he styles the doctrine of the *guna*s a "strange theory", but he is decidedly mistaken in his further statement that it is "a pure hypothesis (…) which shares the fate with many other philosophical hypotheses not to be able to hold good in the light of the modern natural science" (p. 284). On the contrary, as I have intimated above, this striking teaching is far from being a weird product of early man's vivid imagination but that it can be explained most adequately with the help of such avant-garde sciences as field theory. 69 Moreover, the *guna* 69 See also J.W. HAUER (1958, 334)
model appears to be a perfectly cogent framework of explanation of reality as encountered by the trained yogin. Like the concept of prakṛti that of the guṇas, too, cannot be regarded as based on mere fiction. Rather more compelling is the unpopular view that these are experientially derived concepts. To gānsāy this a priori is to deny the raison d'être of Yoga and of the older Sāṃkhya which are geared to experience rather than conceptualisation.

Little wonder that S. RADHAKRISHNAN (1951, II, 274) who seems to be oblivious to this explanation is constrained to make the following admission: "It is difficult to understand the precise significance of the Sāṃkhya account of evolution, and we have not seen any satisfactory explanation as to why the different steps of evolution are what they are. The different principles of the Sāṃkhya system cannot be logically deduced from prakṛti, and they seem to be set down as its products, thanks to historical accidents. There is no deductive development of the products from the one prakṛti. Vijnānabhikṣu is aware of this defect, and so asks us to accept the Sāṃkhya account of evolution on the authority of the scriptures. But this is to surrender the possibility of philosophical explanation."

In rejecting Vijnānabhikṣu's answer, S. RADHAKRISHNAN simultaneously forfeits the only reasonable explanation of these concepts which are of an experiential nature, for what is the foundation of the authority of the scriptures if not 'revelation' in the sense of the experience of reality in non-ordinary states of consciousness (such as meditation or samādhi)? Admittedly, such an interpretation is seemingly contradicted by the fact that all these concepts have a history, that is, underwent a process of development and did not just spring into existence ready-made.
However, gradual conceptual refinement is an integral part of the life of any theory and this fact by no means undermines the raw data themselves which, in this particular case, are the subjective observations during meditative and enstatic states of consciousness. The question is rather to what degree the later doctrinal sophistications, especially those of Classical Samkhya, can be said to reflect the original experiences.

But to come back to the word guna, we find that it is used altogether six times in the Yoga-Sutra (viz. I.16; II.15, 19; IV.13, 32, 34). To these instances must be added sutra II.18 which mentions the phenotypes (ātla) of the three gunas, namely prakāśa or 'luminosity' (pertaining to sattva), kriyā or 'activity' (belonging to rajas) and sthiti or 'inertia' (connected with tamas). K.B.R. Rao (1966, 54), who is bold enough to speak of "the scientific character of the theory of gunas" (p. 51), epitomises their respective nature as follows: Sattva is that "which makes for existence or beingness"; rajas is that "which makes for change in itself" and tamas is that "which denies annihilation through change". In other words, sattva represents the principle of existence, rajas that of discontinuity and tamas that of continuity.

These are said (II.18) to be 'bodied forth' in the elements and the senses. The exact Sanskrit phrase is bhūta-indriya-ātmakam which J.H. Woods (1966) renders as "with the elements and organs as its essence". R. Prasāda (1912) has "it consists of the elements and the powers of sensation", whilst J.W. Hauer (1956) agrees with the above interpretation ("körpert sich dar in Elementen und Organen").
Of course these bhūtas and indriyas as the external aspects of the gunas merely constitute what I have previously called the 'surface structure' of prakṛti. To express the same idea, Patañjali employs the technical term viśesa or 'the particularised' (see II.19). The 'deep structure' of the gargantuan body of prakṛti, on the other hand, is stratified into three primary levels of increasing complexity and organisation; these are the so-called guna-parvans or 'levels of the gunas', namely avisesa 'the unparticularised', linga-mātra 'the differentiated' and aliṅga 'the undifferentiate' which is the most generic stratum.

According to M.N. DVIVEDI (1934) these parvans are identical with the 'four stages' allegedly described in I.45; but this particular aphorism does not mention any stages at all, and he himself quite correctly translates sūksma-viṣayatvam ca-aliṅga-paryāvasānam with "The province of the subtle ends with the indissoluble". I.K. TAIMNI (1965, 180), again, attempts to correlate the levels of the gunas with the stages of samādhi mentioned in I.17 and also with the vedāntic notion of the kośas or 'sheath'. He proposes the following equations:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{vitarka-samādhi} & \quad \text{viśesa} & \quad \text{manomaya-kośa} \\
\text{vicāra-} & \quad \text{aviśesa} & \quad \text{vijñānamaya-} \\
\text{ānanda-} & \quad \text{liṅga} & \quad \text{ānandamaya-} \\
\text{āsmitā-} & \quad \text{aliṅga} & \quad \text{ātman}
\end{align*}
\]

The apparent neatness of this tabulation is matched only by its total fictitiousness. First of all, it is misleading to equate the enstatic experience of aliṅga with the realisation of ātman in Vedānta. The latter is synonymous with the yogic purusa as the principle.
of Awareness, whereas *alinga* is without question conceived of as an insentient category. If a comparison can be made at all, one would rather expect that it is the *anandamaya-kosa* which corresponds with *alinga* as both are regarded as the root of spiritual nescience.

The *vijnanamaya-kosa*, again, would seem to be more properly related to *buddhi* as the higher mental faculty, and the *manomaya-kosa* could then be put on a par with the *manas* and the sensory complex. The realm of the particularised (*viṣeṣa*) entails also the five *sthūla-bhootas* which, if one wanted to be consistent, would call for the inclusion of the fifth and lowest (or outermost) 'sheath' as well, namely the *annamaya-kosa*. Thus one would have to squeeze a pentadic classificatory system (i.e. the *pañca-kosa* doctrine) into a quaternary schema (i.e. the *parvan* doctrine) which is unsatisfactory and in this particular case misleading as well.

I.K. Taimni's second contention according to which there is a correlation between the four types of *samādhi* and the *guna-parvans* is on first sight more promising, but on closer examination it reveals itself to be equally fallacious. For, the *vitarka-samādhi* concerns only the *sthūla* aspect of *prakṛti*, that is, the manifold composites of the five categories of *bhūtas*, 'elements', existing in the space-time universe.

On the other hand, the *vicāra-samādhi* comprises all subtle entities up to *alinga* (see I.45), that is, the entire deep structure of *prakṛti*. The *ānanda-samādhi*, again, is directed towards the instruments of knowledge (i.e. the senses) if we can rely on the testimony of the commentators, whilst the *asmitā-samādhi* is orientated towards the principle of individuality.
Nor must one confuse the four 'levels' on which the gunas manifest themselves with the ontogenetic series. It appears that Patañjali's four-level model is a structural view of the universe constituted by the primary-constituents or gunas and is not meant to explain the actual evolutionary process in which the individual tattvas emerge from the world-ground. In fact Patañjali does not refer to the tattva evolution at all and merely mentions some of the emergent categories of existence, such as the bhūtas, the indriyas, the mind or manas. The term buddhi appears to be used in the sense of 'cognition' only. Ṣvabhāva is probably replaced by asmitā, and the tanmatras are nowhere mentioned and may have been unknown to the author of the Yoga-Sūtra. The crucial problem now is one of assigning the tattvas to Patañjali's four-level model. Vyāsa (Ii.19) advances this correlated schema:

tatra-ākāśa-vāyū-agmy-udaka-bhūmaya bhūtāni śabda-sparśa-
rūpa-rama-gandha-tanmatraṇam-avīśeṣaṇām viṣeṣaḥ, tatha-a-
śrotva-cakṣu-jihvā-ghrāṇāṇi buddhi-indriyaṇi, vāk-
pāṇi-pāda-pāyu-upasthaṇi karma-indriyaṇi, ekādasaṃ manah-
sarva-arthaḥ, ity-etāny-asmitā-lakṣaṇasya-aviśeṣasya viṣeṣaḥ,
guṇānām-etaṃ sūḍaśako viṣeṣa-parināmaḥ, sad-aviśeṣaḥ, tad-vathā-
śabda-tanmatram sparśa-tanmatram rūpa-tanmatram rasa-tanmatram-
gandha-tanmatram-ca, ity-eka-dvi-tri-catus-paṇca-lakṣaṇaḥ-
śabda-ādayaḥ paṇca-aviśeṣaḥ, gaśṭad-ca-aviśeṣo'asmitāmāṇa iti,
I propose the following translation:

"Of this [four-level structure] the elements 'ether',
'air', 'fire' and 'earth' are the particularised [modifications] of the unparticularised potentials (tanmatra),
[viz] sound, touch, form-percept (rupa), taste and smell.
Similarly, ear, skin, eye, tongue and nose are the cognitive organs, [whilst] voice, hands, feet, anus and genitals are the conative organs. The eleventh [particularised modification] is the multi-objective (sarva-artha) mind. These are the particularised (viśeṣa) [modifications] of the unparticularised, [which is] characterised as asmita. This is the sixteenfold particularised [modification] of the gunas. The unparticularised [modifications] are six; they are the sound-potential, the touch-potential, the sight-potential (rupa-tanmatra), the taste-potential and the smell-potential. Thus sound etc. [having respectively] one, two, three, four or five characteristics, are [known as] the five unparticularised [modifications]. And the sixth unparticularised [modification] is the 'substratum-of-I-am-ness' (asmita-matra). These are the six unparticularised modifications (aviśeṣa-parināma) of..."
the great entity, the 'substratum-of-beingness' (sattā-mātra). That which is prior to the unparticularised modifications is the 'substratum-of-(all that which bears)-characteristics' (liṅga-mātra), the great principle."

Whether or not this account is trustworthy cannot definitely be ascertained. However, it seems quite significant that Vyāsa here makes ample use of Patañjali's own specific terminology, while elsewhere often completely ignoring it and superimposing his personal nomenclature on that of the Yoga-Sūtra. The above excerpt from the Yoga-Bhāṣya can be reduced to the following diagram which shows up Vyāsa's correlation of the four parvans with the better known series of tattvas:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{aliṅga} & \\
\downarrow & \\
\text{liṅga-mātra} & \\
\downarrow & \\
\text{avidesa} & = \text{asmitā-mātra} + \text{the five tanmātras (absent in Patañjali's work)} \\
\downarrow & \\
\text{viśesa} & = \text{manas} + \text{the ten indriyas} + \text{the five bhūtas}
\end{align*}
\]

I will next analyse each of the four parvans separately. To begin with the concept of aliṅga, the word itself is composed of the negative prefix a- and liṅga (from aliṅga 'to attach, adhere, clinging to')
and has the meaning of 'that which is without mark or sign', here rendered as 'the undifferentiate'. Alīṇga is first used in the metric Upaniṣads where it designates the Self. However, in the Yoga-Sūtra it is clearly a synonym of prakṛti in its noumenal state as the matrix of the evolved cosmos. As such alīṇga is identical with the Śaṅkhyā concept of avyakta or 'the unmanifest'. G.M. KOELMAN (1970, 88) describes it as the 'non-resoluble genetic entity', seemingly having in mind the traditional interpretation of the term liṅga as 'the mergent', that is, that which resolves into the world-ground upon the accomplishment of emancipation. However, this interpretation of alīṇga is of a secondary nature only. Its primary connotation is 'the signless'.

From the ultimate substrative cause - alīṇga - derives the first of the series of ontic evolutes (natura naturata), namely liṅga-mātra or 'the differentiated'. The second half of this interesting compound, mātra, is customarily employed in the sense of 'only, mere', but in the present philosophical context it must be credited with a more substantial meaning. In its oldest usage mātra signified as much as 'substance' or 'material', and the later form mātra as met with in such compounds as liṅga-mātra, asmita-mātra or tan-mātra unquestionably has retained a shade of the original meaning. Hence in the above-quoted passage from the Yoga-Bhāṣya (II.19) I have risked to translate it tentatively with 'substratum-of-'.

70 See e.g. Vacaspati Miśra's Śaṅkhyā-Tattva-Kaumudi on Śaṅkhyā-Kārikā 40 and Aniruddha's Vṛtti on Śaṅkhyā-Sūtra VI.69. This native view is refuted by R. GARBE (1917, 328).

71 See e.g. Brhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad IV.3.10 and Chāndogya-Upaniṣad II.24.16 and III.19.1.
But what does the concept of liṅga-mātra stand for? Even though there is no definition of this term in the Yoga-Sūtra and in fact the word occurs but once (in II.19), its meaning can be fairly reliably inferred from the context and with the additional evidence of comparable ontological models. Vyāsa quite rightly identifies it as 'the great principle' (mahat-tattva) or 'mere beingness' (sattā-mātra). As the direct source of all further differentiations of the undifferentiate noumenal world-ground, liṅga-mātra itself has but a single characteristic which is 'existence'. No more can be said of it except that it exists; it is non-differentiated existence. In G.M. KOELMAN's (1970, 92) words: "This state of 'being-only' is not a state of functional activity, whereby it could be characterized (...) It is the level of pure non-functional existence. The only operation it may be said to possess is its self-differentiation into the following evolutes. But this is a cosmical energization, not a functional activity." In other traditions this threshold from the noumenal to the phenomenal is known as 'the golden germ' (hiranya-garbha) or as 'the lord of creatures' (prajāpati), and it can be compared with the νοῦς in the philosophy of Neoplatonism.

According to S. DASGUPTA (1920, 51) the term liṅga-mātra is a synonym of asmitā-mātra (as used in IV.4), but this is an unfounded assumption which is not corroborated by the evidence in the Yoga-Sūtra itself or in any of the scholia. J.W. HAUER (1958, 286), who usually displays a more critical acumen than his predecessors, unexpectedly commits the same blunder only to contradict and thus unknowingly correct
himself on p. 288. Nor must liṅga-mātra be equated with buddhi which, in Patañjali's philosophical jargon, stands for 'cognition' only and not for any ontic principle.

The third level (parvan) of the guṇas is known as avīśeṣa or 'the unparticularised' (from Viṣ 'to leave'). The word is used only twice in the Yoga-Sūtra, once in the general sense of 'not distinguished' (III.35) and then in the technical sense (II.19). Again, Patañjali offers no definition of this important concept. According to Vyāsa it is an umbrella term covering asmita-mātra and the set of five tanmātras. This is a plausible enough explanation, but there is no degree of certainty about whether or not Patañjali included the concept of tanmātra in his ontogenetic theory. In view of the fact that virtually all ancient and modern commentators insist on the inclusion of the tanmātras, I will briefly delineate their essential nature.

The word tanmātra (lit. 'that only') is like most of these concepts difficult to translate. Various suggestions have been made, such as 'fine element' (J.H. Woods), 'rudimentary element' (G. Jha), 'sensation' (I.K. Taimni), 'subtle element' (G.J. Larson), 'Grundstoff' (R. Garbe) and 'Subtilenergie' (J.W. Hauer). Possibly S. Dasgupta's rendering of the term with 'potential' best captures its meaning: "The tanmātras possess something more than quantum of mass and energy; they possess physical characters, some of them penetrability, others powers of impact or pressure, others radiant heat, others again capability of viscous and cohesive attraction."72 This interpretation is based on B.N. Seal (1915) who defines the tanmātras as energy.

72 S. Dasgupta (1963, I, 251)
potentials being the essences of the sensory faculties. However, this does not resolve any of the obscurity which surrounds this conception, and with G.J. Larson (1969, 205) one is forced to admit that "[exactly what is meant by 'subtle element' is difficult if not impossible to determine]."

G.J. Larson also draws attention to the Sāmkhya-Kārika (38) which describes the tanmātras as aviṣeṣa, thus opposing them to the bhūtas which are said to be viṣeṣa. This appears to be the application of both these terms in the Yoga-Sūtra as well. Vyāsa proffers this explanation: There are six 'unparticularised' modifications of the primary substratum, the sixth being asmitā-mātra (which is excluded in Īśvara Kṛṣṇa's version). He arranges them in the following manner:

1. śabda-tanmātra — potential of sound
2. sparśa— — potential of touch
3. rūpa— — potential of sight (lit. 'form')
4. rasa— — potential of taste
5. gandha— — potential of smell
6. asmitā-mātra — substratum of I-am-ness

No definitions are supplied by the author of the Yoga-Bhāṣya, but he makes mention of the fact that they are to be distinguished by their respective number of characteristics, which may be one, two, three, four or five. Vacaspati Miśra provides the proper attributions:
(1) śabda-tanmātra — one characteristic only
(2) sparsa-° — two characteristics
(3) rūpa-° — three characteristics
(4) rasa-° — four characteristics
(5) gandha-° — five characteristics.

The number of characteristics inherent in each tanmātra is explained by the number of ways in which the corresponding bhūta can be experienced. Each subsequent bhūta incorporates the properties of all the previous bhūtas. Thus while the ether (akāśa) pertaining to śabda-tanmātra can only be heard, the air (vāyu) pertaining to sparsa-tanmātra can be heard and felt; fire (āgni) can be heard, felt and seen and hence its corresponding tanmātra which is rūpa-° is stated to have three characteristics; water (udaka) can be heard, felt, seen and tasted and consequently its matrix which is rasa-tanmātra is said to display four characteristics; finally, earth (bhūmi) can be heard, felt, seen, tasted and smelled wherefore gandha-tanmātra must have five characteristics.73

These tanmātras are, as G.M. KOELMAN (1970, 114) puts it, 'objective universals' which do not stand for any particular sound, taste or visual percept but are sound as such, taste as such. He, moreover, makes the valuable observation that they are not purely logical categories, but unlike the objectum formale of Scholasticism are experienceable ontic reals; however, as they are prior to sensation they can only be experienced by way of immediate apperception as

73 According to another theory each tanmātra has but one characteristic. See Yuktidipikā on Śāmkhya-Kārikā (25) eka-uttaram-iti vārgaganyah.
cultivated by the yogin. We merely recognise their effects in the properties of their material counterparts, the bhūtas.

Whether or not Patañjali was aware of the tanmatras, the concept of asmita-mātra must definitely be assigned to the aviśeṣa category. Whereas liṅga-mātra is a tattva of which nothing can be predicated save that it exists, asmita-mātra "differentiates and pluralizes the indetermined and universal principle of being (sattamātra) into so many different centres of reference, so many sources of initiative."\(^\text{74}\)

And: "These centres of reference constitute, so to say, distinct nucleations within the one Prakṛti, in such a way that there arise different suppositions or subjectivations, or numerically distinct units of centralization, adapted to the needs of each particularized Self. This supposition is sufficiently stable to be called a substantial entity, a tattva or a dravya.\(^\text{75}\) Asmita-mātra is, in other words, that agency which splits the primary substratum into subjects vis à vis objects in the form of a bifurcate line of evolution.

This concept corresponds with the Śāmkhya notion of ahamkāra. The author of the Yuktidīpikā (on Śāmkhya-Karika 4) is therefore mistaken when he maintains that Patañjali does not know ahamkāra as a separate entity but includes it in mahat.\(^\text{76}\) Similarly erroneous is S. RADHAKRISHNAN's statement that Yoga "does not recognise ahamkāra and manas as separate

\(^{74}\) G.M. KOELMAN (1970, 107)

\(^{75}\) ibid.

\(^{76}\) The Sanskrit text reads: evam tarhi na-eva-ahamkāro vidyata iti patañjaliḥ, mahato 'mi-pratyaya-rūpatva-abhyupgamati. "Thus, then, there is no I-maker [says] Patañjali, on account of the admission of the appearance of the notion of I-am in the great [entity]."
This confusion could have been avoided by acknowledging the fact that Patañjali's vocabulary is not just a replica of Śāṅkha's terminology. Asmita-maṭra, with him, is the 'universal' principle of individualisation (corresponding with mahat of the Yuktidīpikā), but asmita connotes the particularised 'I-am-ness'. Thus a distinction is made between the ontological (structural) and the psychological (functional) use of the word asmitā. Asmita-maṭra occurs only in IV.4 where it is unequivocally given out as the source of the multiple individualised minds or nirmanā-cittas. On the other hand, asmita as a function of the phenomenal mind is mentioned in II.3, 6 and III.47, and as a particular experience in samādhi in I.17.

Of special interest is the use of asmita-maṭra, the pre-individualised ontic principle of subjectivity. The introduction of this special designation does away with much of the ambivalence connected with the equivalent term ahamkāra which is used both in the sense of 'individualised ego-consciousness' and as 'pre-individualised generic principle of egohood'. Most commentators ignore the second meaning of ahamkāra, and hence J.A.B. VAN BUITENEN (1957) dedicates considerable space to this concept in order to correct the past lop-sided interpretations by bringing out the 'I-maker's' 'cosmic function of creator of the empirical universe'. His penetrating analysis is of relevance also to the study of the concept of asmita-maṭra in Classical Yoga.

J.A.B. VAN BUITENEN (p. 21) points out the mythological elements

77 S. RADHAKRISHNAN (1951, II, 434)
78 J.A.B. VAN BUITENEN (1957, 15)
present in the notion of ahāṃkāra and makes it clear that "the origin of the creative ahāṃkāra must be sought in the ancient upanisadic speculations on a self-formulating, self-creating primordial personality" (p. 21). He criticises the current exclusive interpretation of the term as that organ which forms the conception of the ego, putting forward that "if this had been the intended meaning when the term was coined, one wonders why the responsible thinker, capable of such conceptual thought, did not express himself more accurately in ahāṃtā-kāra. Besides, kāra has as a rule the much more concrete sense of 'fashioning, building, making and doing with one's hands'" (p. 16). He continues (p. 17): "Side by side with ahāṃkāra we find in later texts mamākāra. Explications of ahāṃkāra take always the form of a quoted sentence with iti: 'I am .. I do..' etc.; of mamākāra: 'This is mine' etc. This points to another meaning of kāra, not as in kumbhakāra etc., but as in omkāra, vāsatkāra, svāhākāra, etc.: 'the cry, uttering or ejaculation: Aham!'"

It is this creative aspect of ahāṃkāra, as anticipated in the words ahāṃ bahu syām, "May I be many", of the Chandogya-Upanisad (VI.2.3), which is crystallised in the concept of asmitā-mātra. Although Patañjali merely asserts that the nirmana-cittas originate from asmitā-mātra, it is safe to assume that asmitā-mātra also acts as the source of the tanmātras (granted that Patañjali incorporated them in his ontology) and the bhūtas and indriyas. This successive evolution can be depicted graphically in the following way:
Vācaspati Miśra, for no apparent reasons, places asmitā-mātra and the tanmātras on the same ontogenetic level inasmuch as he regards both as evolutes of buddhi (= liṅga-mātra)\(^{79}\). However, both on logical and on historical grounds the vertical arrangement suggested above makes more sense. As G.M. KOELMAN (1970, 115) observes:

"Since the functions of cognition are evolved from the Ego-function, it seems plausible that the objective universals are evolved from the same Ego-function; this seems even more probable when we consider that the pure Ego-function on the existential level (asmitā-mātra) is also the prakritic subject of the activity of cognizing."

This brings us to the last guna-parvan, the level of the particularised phenomena or viśeṣa, that is, the 'surface structure' of prakṛti. Contrary to Iśvara Kṛṣṇa, the author of the Yoga-Sūtra does not equate aviseṣa with the tanmātras and viśeṣa with the bhūtas\(^{80}\) but includes in the category of viśeṣa also the indriyas. This is hinted at by the phrase bhūta-indriya-ātmaka (II.18) and possibly also by the


80 See Sāṃkhya-Kārikā (38)
compound *kāya-indriya* (II.43). Besides, it is in perfect alignment with the epic traditions.

The word *indriya* occurs seven times in the *Yoga-Sūtra*: II.18 (bhūta-indriya), II.41 (indriya-jaya), II.43 (kāya-indriya), II.54 (indriyānām pratyāhāra), II.55 (vaśyata indriyānām), III.13 (bhūta-indriya), and III.47 (indriya-jaya). *Indriya* is an old term, well known already to the composers of the early *Upanisads*. As a distinct ontogenetic set the *indriyas* are first mentioned in the *Katha-Upanisad* (III.3-4) in the famous allegory of the chariot (= body) which is spun to horses (= senses) by means of reins (= mind) held by the chariot-driver (= buddhi).

The *Brhadārāṇyaka-Upanisad* contains an archaic passage — III.2.1-9 — in which we find one of the earliest analyses of the sensory tools. An interesting distinction is made between the eight 'graspers' (*graha*) and their corresponding 'super-graspers' (*ati-graha*).

1. the vital force (*prāna*) is 'supergrasped' by the in-breath (*apāna*)
2. speech (*vāc*) is 'supergrasped' by name (*nāma*)
3. the tongue (*jihvā*) is 'supergrasped' by taste (*rasa*)
4. the eye (*cakṣus*) is 'supergrasped' by form (*rūpa*)
5. the ear (*śrōtra*) is 'supergrasped' by sound (*śabda*)
6. the mind (*manas*) is 'supergrasped' by desire (*kāma*)
7. the hands (*hasta*) are 'supergrasped' by action (*karman*)
8. the skin (*tvac*) is 'supergrasped' by touch (*sparśa*)
In later times this somewhat random enumeration came to be replaced by the classical double set of five conative and five cognitive senses, known as the \textit{karma-indriyas} and the \textit{manas} or \textit{buddhi-indriyas} respectively. To these must be added the mind or \textit{manas} as the relay station for all other sensory capacities. Its inclusion among the \textit{indriyas} brings to the fore one all-important point, namely that correctly speaking these \textit{indriyas} must not be confused with the sense organs themselves, but they represent their intrinsic capacities. This was recognised long ago by R. GARBE (1917, 320) who remarks: "These ten senses must not be mixed up with the visible organs (\textit{goloka}) in which they have their seat (\textit{adhishāna}); they are in fact supra-sensory (\textit{atįndriya}) and can only be deduced from their functions." However, his words have been heeded by very few translators.

\textit{Manas} is used thrice in the \textit{Yoga-Sūtra} (III.48; I.35; II.53) and very probably has the usual denotation as that mental capacity which organises the sensory input, or as K.B.R. RAO (1966, 68) puts it "the synthesising factor of the experience got by the \textit{indriyas}" which "converts the indeterminate percepts into a determinate idea". It is a mute point whether \textit{manas} should be assigned to the \textit{avīśeṣa} category or whether Patanjali conceived of it as just another \textit{indriya} pertaining to the \textit{vīśeṣa} category. I tend to favour the former solution in view of the special nature of the \textit{manas}.

Turning next to the set of five elements which together with the senses compose the \textit{vīśeṣa-parvan}, we find that Patanjali employs the term \textit{bhūta} five times, viz. once in the sense of 'creature' (III.17).
once as a participle (II.20: \textit{avīṣeṣabhūtātva}) and thrice in the sense of 'element' (II.18; III.13, 44). Although the elements — ether, air, fire, water and earth — are not specifically listed, Patañjali was undoubtedly acquainted with the bhūtas as ontogenetic factors. Parenthetically, it may be remarked that the Yoga-Sūtra contains no reference to the 'atoms' as the ultimate subdivisions of the elements, and the statements of the commentators must be taken cum grano salis. The word \textit{ānimān} 'fineness', denoting the yogic paranormal ability to reduce the size of the body (see III.45), does not implicate in the least that Patañjali subscribed to the atomic theory as developed in the Vaiśeṣika school. The word appears already in the Chāndogya-Upanisad (VI.6; 8) at a time when the notion of atoms was certainly quite unknown.

It should now be possible to attempt an overall reconstruction of Patañjali's implicit ontogenetic model as it can be ascertained on the basis of the Yoga-Sūtra and comparable sources. The findings presented on the preceding pages can be epitomised in the following diagram:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{āliṅga} & \quad \downarrow \\
\text{liṅga-matra} & \quad \downarrow \\
\text{asmita-matra} & \quad \downarrow \\
5 \text{ tanmatras} & \quad \rightarrow \quad \text{manas} & + \\
5 \text{ bhūtas} & \quad \downarrow \\
\text{physico-genesis} & \quad \text{psycho-genesis} & \rightarrow \\
\text{visēṣa} & \quad \text{avīṣeṣa}
\end{align*}
\]
Granted that this conjectural model is correct, Patanjali apparently favoured a version of ontogenesis which has been grossly distorted by the classical commentators. Furthermore, the present reconstruction discredits all those misinformed efforts to reduce the ontology of Classical Yoga to that of Classical Śāmkhya. On the other hand, it is equally incorrect to assert, as did J.W. HAUER (1958, 262), that Patanjali made no use of ontogenetic categories at all but rather subsumed everything under the generic heading of citta, as derived from asmitā-mātra. I will substantiate this criticism in some of the later chapters.
In view of the preceding reappraisal of the ontology of Classical Yoga which led to multiple corrections of long-standing misconceptions about it, it seems desirable to re-examine also the concept of emancipation (kaivalya), "the greatest original contribution of Indian philosophy". For, if Śvētāsvata and purusa must, as I have tried to demonstrate, be understood differently from what has commonly been assumed ever since Vyāsa superimposed the views of his particular school on the philosophy of Patañjali, this can be expected to have its logical reverberations necessarily also in the conception of liberation.

The technical designation for this concept is kaivalya which can be said to be a yogic term par excellence. Its earliest known occurrence is in the Yoga-Sūtra, where it is employed in II.25, III.50, III.55 and IV.26. Kaivalya is the gunated form of kevala meaning 'alone'. The latter word is frequently used in the epic, and in the philosophical sense occurs for instance in XII.294.43; 296.13, 29; 304.16, 26; 306.5, 74, 77, 79. The Śvetāsvatara-Upaniṣad (I.11; IV.18) also knows this usage. In the Maitreyanīya-Upaniṣad (VI.21) the synonym kevalatva 'aloneness' is introduced, though it is doubtful whether this particular section belongs to the oldest material of the text. Finally, as H. ZIMMER (1953, 305f.) points out the words kevala and kaivalya

82 A.K. LAD (1967, preface)
played a significant role also in the philosophy of older Jainism. The word kevala is used for instance in the Tattvārthādīhigama-Sūtra (I.9, 30; X.1), and in VIII.8 of the same text the compound kevala-darśana occurs. Moreover, the great pathfinders of Jainism, the tīrthaṅkaras were also known by the name of kevalins. But these are not the only points of contact between Yoga and Jainism; there are also striking parallels in the ethical sphere which it would be worthwhile to pursue in a separate study.

What kind of yogic experience does kaivalya denote? J. GONDA (1960, I, 312) offers this explanation: "The various members of Yoga which are as it were arranged in stages have but one purpose, the isolation of the spirit (Kaivalya), that is, the union with God. Kaivalya is the experience of the perfect simplicity and uniformity of the nucleus of the personality. This experience (...) is one of transcendental bliss infinitely superior to the ordinary state of consciousness, and in it the true being of the yogin expands immensely. The condition of enlightenment is indescribable: one has transcended nature and no longer stands in need of anything and experiences the unity of all existence." This description of the goal of Yoga is not only fragmentary but positively defective and misleading. Aside the fact that the 'members' of the yogic path cannot be regarded as rungs on a ladder, in what sense can one possibly speak of a union with god? Does kaivalya really contain an element of bliss? What does it mean: "the true being of the yogin expands immensely"?

To what degree these strictures are valid is borne out by the actual meaning of kaivalya as it emerges from an unprejudiced study of its context in the Yoga-Sūtra. Here we find that in II.25 kaivalya is
used to qualify the word *drśi* or 'seeing' which is identical with the 'sheer seeing' (*drśi-mātra*) of II.20. If any predication can be made at all of the Self it is this that the *purusa* is of the nature of pure unmitigated Awareness, or as Patañjali (IV.34) has it, *citi-sakti*. Visual experience supplies the most illuminating metaphors to describe this transcendental Awareness, though in earlier days the other sensory and mental experiences also served the same purpose. In a famous passage in the *Brhadāranyaka-Upanisad* (III.7.22), for instance, Yājñāvalkya instructs his disciple thus: 

"[The Self] is the unseen Seer, the unheard Hearer, the unthought Thinker, the unknown Knower — other than He there is no seer, other than He there is no hearer, other than He there is no thinker, other than He there is no knower. He is the Self, the Inner Controller, the Immortal."

The expression 'aloneness of seeing' (*drśēh kaivalyam*, II.25) is not repeated elsewhere in the *Yoga-Sūtra*, but it can be taken to be implied in all other instances where the term *kaivalya* is mentioned. *Kaivalya* is primarily the 'aloneness of seeing (of the Self)' and only secondarily and by implication the 'aloneness of purusa'. This strange usage can be explained by those aphorisms which speak of the seeming involvement of the Self with the processes of *prakṛti* or, more precisely, with the states of the psycho-somatic organism. *Kaivalya* is the exact antithesis of *samyoga* or 'correlation', which refers to the Self's function as the 'seer' of the contents of consciousness.

83 adṛṣṭo draṣṭā agṛtah śrūtah amato manta avijñāto viññāta na-anyo' to'sti 
   draṣṭā na-anyo' to'sti śrūtā na-anyo' to'sti manta na-anyo' to'sti viññātā 
   esa ta ātma-antaryāmy-amṛtaḥ.
This is the condition described in I.4 as vṛtti-sārūpya or 'conformity with the fluctuations (of the mind)'. In contrast to this, kaivalya denotes the 'own-form' (sva-rūpa) of the 'seer' (dṛṣṭi). It supervenes when sāmyoga, the correlation between the Self and the contents of consciousness, is disrupted.

**Sāmyoga** is defined in II.23 as the "cause of the apprehension of the own-form of the power of the 'owner' [and that of] the 'owned'" (sva-svāmī-sāktyoh sva-rūpa-upalabdhi-hetuh). In II.24 avidyā or 'nescience' is stated as the cause of sāmyoga. The correlation between purusa and citta is of a purely noetic nature. No real substantial intermixing takes place, since an unbridgable hiatus is postulated between the Self and prakṛti. However, because of the uniformity of the Self as the principle of Awareness, it is possible for the purusa to apperceive continuously the ongoing transformations of prakṛti as mirrored in a particular consciousness (see II.20) of a specific organism.

As is emphasised in III.35 purusa and sattva (= citta) are always 'unmixed' (asamkīrṇa), and yet somehow the ordinary unenlightened mind fails to perceive this fundamental distinction and confuses both principles. Purusa is always and irrevocably pure Awareness, whether the mind is operative or idle. Consciousness-of (citta) is in perpetual motion and can diminish to the point where one speaks of the inception of unconsciousness, but citta-sakti is in no way altered or reduced when a person is hypnotised, asleep or plain unconscious. The Self is quite unaffected by the behaviour of the mind.

This axiom, undoubtedly derived from yogic noumenous experiencing and therefore also only experientially verifiable, has caused some western critics considerable embarrassment, accustomed as they are to
regard consciousness as an attribute of the mental life. In a recent study on the nature of consciousness as seen from various philosophical angles, P. BOWES (1971, 170-71) makes the following pertinent observation: "One of the reasons why people are inclined to feel that consciousness is a function of the brain is that they identify the conscious with the mental, and the mental, as recent researches in neurophysiology and computer functioning show, can be identified with the physical with some gain in clarity and understanding. If the mental is the physical the conscious must be physical too, for consciousness is an attribute that sometimes qualifies the mental. But the conclusion that the conscious is the physical does not follow if the conscious is something distinct from the mental. This is where Samkhya philosophy comes in, which may have a contribution to make, not in the details of its explanation, much of which is pretty archaic, but in its contention that the conscious is not the mental when the mental is characterised by intelligence, and that the mental has to be explained in terms of the material."

The notion of the Self as pure undervived Awareness is only one side of the doctrine of emancipation; the other is the postulate that man's true identity lies outside the personality complex in the Self. It is this second point which provides the ethical imperative of Yoga which challenges man to dissociate himself from the impermanent states of the body-mind configuration in order to regain true Self-identity. Man's essence is thus the pure Awareness itself. Hence the empirical self must be a mirage. Criticising this interpretation
of reality as advocated in Yoga and Śāmkhya, P. Bowes (1971, 184) contends that Śāmkhya may be misled by the term 'pure' frequently prefixed to 'transcendental awareness' in order to demarcate it from the empirical consciousness—of or citta which always is a knowing of this or that. She says: "But the term 'pure' has also a moral connotation which suggests that whatever is pure is far more desirable than what is not pure. So consciousness as such, pure consciousness, becomes something with which men ought to identify themselves rather than with empirical consciousness which is relative to its content and hence not pure."

The concept of freedom as conceived in Yoga is manifestly quite distinct from the western interpretations of it. In a sense man is, essentially, always free because the Self is never entering the mechanisms of prakṛti. Ergo emancipation is not something which could, strictly speaking, be attained or effected. But in another, empirical, sense there is a movement towards the Self via purification and noetic catharsis. Emancipation is total transcendence which amounts to the same as saying that when the essence of man is 'somehow' recovered, man ceases to be man as we know him.

The self-same transcendental Awareness 'shines forth' unalloyed and unabated. Its 'light' is 'mirrored' in those organisms of prakṛti which have evolved a sufficient degree of complexity, such as the human organism. It is at this point in time that there arises the vexed problem of identity: the self-reflective stage of the mind. Thus consciousness—of is in a way a function of pure Awareness and prakṛti.

84 Cf. G. Kaviraj (1966, 128): "The term 'kaivalya'.(...) conveys the sense of being 'kevala' or alone. It implies the idea of purity and freedom from defilement".
combined. By manipulating the organismic situation in the form of voluntaristic alterations of consciousness, the mind can be approximated to the pure Awareness. This process is couched in terms of purification (śuddhi): the yogin must endeavour to remove the 'veils' (āvarana) which prevent the transcendental Awareness from manifesting itself in the organism; he must burn up the 'defilements' (dosa) which stain the mirror of his mind.

This is in principle a purely cognitive cleansing process as is brought home by such key terms as viveka-khyāti or anyatā-khyāti. This inner re-arrangement or mental purification consists in the main in a gradual but persistent effort of dispelling the various empirical mal-identifications. In other words, the yogin assumes a priori that the Self is the locus of his true identity and then proceeds to disentangle his multiple misconceptions about his own nature by retracting from everything that exposes itself to him as non-self. And 'non-self' is absolutely everything that proves to be unstable, finite and sorrowful. Thus severing all contacts with prakrtic identities, the empirical consciousness ultimately collapses for lack of an objective prop. What remains is the pure Awareness itself.

Kaivalya ensues upon the disappearance of even the last trace of defilement (dosa) at which point the sattva is, figuratively speaking, as pure as the Self (see III.55). This at least is the definition of kaivalya according to the āṣṭa-āyga-yoga text. Here sattva does not signify one of the three gunas, but it stands for a condition of the mind which is connected with the "upward progress of return to
to the original state. It corresponds with linga-mātra in the structural schema of ontogenesis.

It is clear from what has been said hitherto that kaivalya, or rather the 'aloneness of seeing', transcends every known state of mind. Strictly speaking, it represents an unknowable. Hence to describe it as an 'experience', as did inter alia J. GONDA (1960, I), or worse still as an 'experience of joy', must be recognised as a serious distortion of the true position of Classical Yoga. Likewise, spatial metaphors are out of place, since the Self is an aspatial/atemporal reality. No 'expansion' of anything or into anything can occur.

Equally unsound is the popular idea, ostensibly subscribed to by J. GONDA, that kaivalya implies a union with the divine. Whatever the reality may be that kaivalya stands for — and I do not wish to discard the idea of a transcendent unity of numinous experiencing — the system of explanation proposed by Patañjali certainly does not leave a niche for such an assumption. Union presupposes a situation of separation, and Ṣāvara and puruṣa are absolutely and irreversibly co-essential, wherefore the question of a re-linking does not even arise. In this respect Classical Yoga differs markedly from the teaching of the Bhagavad-Gītā where emancipation is conceived of as a kind of living in the eternal presence of God in a medium of mutual transcendental love-participation (bhakti). This is the concept of brahma-nirvāṇa as subsisting in the being of God.

Lastly, having demolished the repeated allegation that Patañjali

85 J.A.B. VAN BUITENEN (1957, 403).
affirmed the plurality of Selves, \textit{kaivalya} can also not be said to represent a state in which each Self-monad is reinstated in utmost isolation from the world and from all other Self-monads, as is asserted by M. ELIADE (1973, 32). \textit{Kaivalya} is not anything separate from the Self. Nor is it properly speaking a condition or quality of the Self. Nor is it a goal for the Self. It is simply an empirical construct invented to mark off the Self as postulated in the mash of psycho-somatic existence from the Self as 'verified' after the pseudo-event of liberation. I am not sure that H. ZIMMER (1953) is right in emphasizing that \textit{kaivalya} denotes both 'isolation' and 'perfection'. Primarily \textit{kaivalya} appears to be used in a more narrow sense, as describing the Self's uncontaminated purity. This seems to be confirmed by the use of \textit{apavarga} or 'liberation' in II.18 which is regarded as the antithesis of \textit{bhoga} or 'world-enjoyment'. \textit{Apavarga} describes the ethical goal of the \textit{yogin}, the movement towards the Self, and it is to this notion to which applies H. ZIMMER's transcription of the yogic target as 'integration'.
In response to its soteriological purposes Yoga has developed a peculiar psychology whose primary objective is the facilitation of the yogin's pursuit to reconstitute his consciousness so as to allow the transcendental Self-Awareness to become manifest in the mental complex. It is thus an eminently practical endeavour which cannot be separated from the over-all philosophical concerns of Yoga and its ethical goals. As a matter of fact there does not even exist a synonym for what is here called 'psychology'. This important circumstance is fully appreciated by M. ELIADE (1973, 38) who places the word in quotation marks. It must be remembered that any compartmentalisation of the homogeneous structure of Yoga theory into such divisions as 'psychology', 'philosophy' or 'ethics' is no more than an artificial device in order to promote the analysis and understanding of a rather differently organised body of knowledge. Because of the prominent practical orientation of the 'psychological' aspect of Yoga, it has occasionally been compared to western psychoanalytical theories and procedures, but this comparison is only conditionally valid. 86

The fact is that the psychological dimension of Yoga is still a fairly unexplored territory awaiting a far-sighted explorer. There

86 See e.g. A.W. WATTS (1961)
exist a few tentative studies of various aspects of Yoga psychology, mostly by Indian authors, but these do not amount to a great deal and conceptually often leave much to be desired.87 One of the principal reasons which invalidate, or at least render questionable, many of these well-meaning contributions, is a certain lack of semantic differentiation. More often than not these interpretations take little notice of the particular context in which concepts occur. Yet only a scrupulous analysis of the contextual meaning of a concept creates an adequate base for a comparative study and assessment. On the following pages, then, an attempt is made to determine the semantic content of a select number of concepts as they occur in the *Yoga-Sūtra*.

1. Citta

The single most important psychological concept employed in Classical Yoga is *citta*. A variety of translations have been suggested for this word, such as 'mind' (R. PRASĀDA, S. DASGUPTA), 'mind-stuff' (J.H. WOODS, H. ZIMMER), 'internal organ' (G. JHA, C.K. RĀJA), 'innere Welt' (J.W. HAUSER), 'mind-complex' (G.M. KOELMAN) and 'consciousness' (M. ELIADE).

87 See e.g. R. RÖSEL (1928), S. LINDQUIST (1935), P.V. PATHAK (1931), S.K. SAKSENA (1944), E. ABEGG (1955) and SWAMI AKHILĀNANDA (1946).
The word citta is a derivative of the verbal root *cit meaning 'to recognise, observe, perceive' and 'to be bright, to shine'. It is applied wherever psycho-mental phenomena connected with conscious activity are to be expressed. Citta is used already in the Rgveda and the Atharvaveda besides the more frequently employed terms asu 'life' or 'vital force' and manas 'mind'. It is also a scarce term in the Upaniṣads. However, it was in constant use by the time of the composition of the Mahābhārata, and from then on belonged to the standard psychological vocabulary. Unlike manas which is used by most other orthodox hindu schools of thought to denote the concept 'mind', the term citta appears to be more specifically at home in Yoga. In Sāṃkhya the synonym 'inner organ' (antahkarana) is found which is taken to be constituted of buddhi, abhuma and manas. The Yoga commentators, on the other hand, employ the terms buddhi, antahkarana and citta rather indiscriminately. Notwithstanding the fact that Patanjali does not provide a definition of this concept, it is transparent from its twenty-two applications in the Yoga-Sūtra itself and from the commentaries that citta generally denotes the entire mental complex. It is an umbrella term comprising all the various functionings of the mind. As G.M. KOELMAN (1970, 100) trenchantly puts it, citta "is surely not a separate prakṛtic evolute" inasmuch as it is not distinct from its component factors, i.e. buddhi etc., whose emergence from the ground of prakṛti is the theme of the ontogenetic schema outlined above. This evinces yet again the holistic approach of Classical Yoga which
lays great stress on the organicity of the processes of consciousness and is only secondarily interested in an analytical categorisation of the inner states. Often citta conveys simply 'consciousness'. It is impossible to find a single label for it in English. 'Mind-complex' and 'consciousness' should both be borne in mind.

In any event, I believe S. RADHAKRISHNAN (1951, II, 345) to be entirely wrong when he conjectures that citta is a synonym of the Sāmkhya mahat. Nor do I understand his statement that it "is the first product of prakṛti, though it is taken in a comprehensive sense, so as to include intellect, self-consciousness and mind". Nowhere in the Yoga-Sūtra is citta regarded as the first evolute of the world-ground, and if it were thus considered how could it possibly be said to entail the other categories listed by S. RADHAKRISHNAN?

P. TUXEN (1911, 99) and E. FRAUWALLNER (1953, I, 411) are likewise mistaken in regarding manas as equivalent to citta. In one sense citta is a comprehensive operational concept which embraces the function of the sensorium commune or manas, and on the other hand it is 'consciousness' as a non-structural concept.

Precisely what citta entails can be pieced together from the relevant statements in the fourth pada which deals more with the philosophical issues of Patañjali's teaching. The following points emerge from an analysis of these references:

1. Citta is in a way the product of both the transcendental Self-Awareness (purusa) and the insentient world-mechanism.

88 Cf. also T.R. KULKARNI (1972, 69): "Patañjali clearly seems to have used the Sanskrit terms citta and manas interchangeably."
(prakṛti), for it is said to be 'coloured' (uparakta) by the perceived objects as well as by the Self (see IV.23). However, it is not an actual derivative of either. It can thus be characterised as a function of the relation between purusa and prakṛti. For this reason the translation with 'mind-stuff' must be rejected.

(2) In IV.4 citta is said to arise from asmitā-mātra. It is important to know that no causal dependence is implied here. Citta is not a separate tattva which could be traced back to asmitā-mātra along a direct evolutionary line. Citta denotes the whole set of psycho-mental factors as the true evolutes of asmitā-mātra. Only inasmuch as citta is constituted by these individual tattvas of the psychic branch of ontogenesis can it be said to have derived from asmitā-mātra which is the point where the bifurcation into physical-objective and psychic-subjective tattvas takes place. In this sense alone can citta be regarded as a particularisation or nucleation of asmitā-mātra.

(3) Although citta is held to be born of the 'single mind' (eka-citta) which is none other than asmitā-mātra, there are nevertheless many distinct cittas which are all real (see IV.16) and not merely attributes of external
objects (see IV.15). Nor are they simply products of the imagination of the single mind.

(4) Citta is suffused with, and in a certain way structured by, countless subliminal-impressions or 'activators' (samskāra) which form into 'traits' (vāsanā) (see IV.24); and it is they which feed the fluctuations (vyātti) thus causing the centrifugality of the mind which actively prevents Self-actualisation.

(5) However, despite the innumerable subliminal traits which are without beginning (see IV.10), the samskāras being stored in the depth-memory (śmṛti) (see IV.9), the mind nonetheless serves the purpose of emancipation (see IV.24). This teleology of citta is explained by the 'proximity' of the Self.

(6) When the Self shines forth in perfect purity, the guṇas involute, and with the dissolution of the organism, the mental complex likewise is annihilated (see IV.34). This dissipation of the mental complex upon emancipation is inferred from the fact that the guṇas are said to stream back into the transcendental core of prakṛti.

As is clear from the above, Patañjali operates with a remarkably sophisticated concept of mind which bears close semblance to certain modern psychological theories. According to him, mind represents a system of dynamic relations which have as their mainstay the complex neurophysiological (= objective-prakṛtic) organism. There are various
sub-systems — the evolutionary tattvas proper — such as manas which translates the sensory data into concepts, or asmitā which is the focal point of most of the occurring internal processes. There is also a deep structure, formed by the depth-memory as the storage centre of past mental activity which is not confined to this particular existence but extends backwards ad infinitum. Consciousness is energised by this network of vāsanās which set up a certain tension thereby causing the mind to incline towards sensory experience. Externalisation, in turn, leads to the formation of subliminal-activators (samskāra) which reproduce themselves by means of the vṛttis. The first and foremost task of the yogic process is to intercept this cycle (samskāra - vṛtti - samskāra ...) by way of the gradual introversion of consciousness or pratyak-cetana.

In passing it may be pointed out that the question of the spatial extension of the mind which seems to pre-occupy especially the later exegetists, is really a pseudo-problem. The mind can be said to have a depth dimension but no location or extension. This is borne out by the ontogenetic model itself. The space-time universe is but the outermost rim of the vast body of prakṛti which is essentially aspatial and atemporal but holds the possibility of spatial/temporal existence.

2. Vṛtti

According to Patañjali, the centrifugal consciousness functions in five major ways. These are known as the vṛttis. The word stems
from the root /vṛt/ 'to revolve, whirl about' and can mean 'mode of action, conduct, manner of being' etc. G.M. Koelmans (1970, 86) wrongly equates the term vṛtti with parināma, for the former always implies a local activity whereas the latter connotes serial change.

According to aphorism 1.6 there are five modes of functioning in which the ordinary mind complex can engage, viz. valid cognition (pramāṇa), misconception (viparyaya), conceptualisation (vikalpa), sleep (nirṛti) and memory (smṛti). The word vṛtti is applied to any mental content which falls into any of these categories. Used altogether ten times in the Yoga-Sūtra (viz. I.2, 4, 5, 10, 41; II.11, 15, 50; III.43; IV.18), vṛtti is employed both in a more general sense as 'function, mode of being' (e.g. II.15: guna-vṛtti, II.50 and III.43) and as a terminus technicus which refers specifically to such mental activity as falls into the above five behavioral categories of the mind. In this sense it is often used in the plural (viz. I.5; II.11; IV.18). In the light of this evidence it is completely incomprehensible why H. Jacobi (1929, 588) writes that "vṛtti is not a philosophical term and hence is not defined by the commentators". He is doubly wrong here because not only is vṛtti definitely a technical designation but it is also defined by Bhāja on at least two occasions. In his Rāja-Martanda (I.2) he states: "The vṛttis are forms of modification [of the mind] with a reciprocal relationship between them" (vṛttayah aṅga-aṅgi-bhāva-parināma-rūpas-tāsām), and elsewhere (I.5) he says "the vṛttis are particular modifications of the mind" (vṛttayah cittasya parināma-vidyāsām).
The fact that the term vṛtti in its technical sense refers to specific mental events and not, as is often assumed, to any odd mental content, is clearly borne out by the statement (II.11) that the vṛttis are eliminated in meditative absorption (dhyāna). This important śūtra has always been glossed over. What it says in effect is that no vṛttis whatsoever are carried over into samādhi but that their complete cessation is a precondition for enstasy to arise. The factors present in samādhi are not vṛttis but pratyavas (e.g. vitarka, vicāra etc.). From this it is also evident that aphorism I.2 does not represent a comprehensive definition of Yoga, and as opposed to M. SAHAY (1964) I consider it to be merely a preliminary announcement. M. SAHAY's contention that Patañjali meant to prefix sarva to the word vṛtti is of course nonsensical. In this particular context, nirodha is used in a restricted sense. As will be set forth shortly, the process of 'restriction' comprises several levels of application, and the statement of I.2 implies only the lowest degree of restriction (nirodha) and not sarva-nirodha.

3. Kleśa, kliṣṭa-akliṣṭa

The five kinds of vṛtti can be either kliṣṭa or akliṣṭa (viz. I.5). These terms were respectively translated with 'painful/non-painful' (R. PRASĀDA, H.N. DVIVEDI, G. JHA), 'impure/pure' (M. ELIADE), 'afflicted/non-afflicted' (S. DASGUPTA) 'hindered/unhindered' (J.H. WOODS) and 'Dränger-behaftet/-nichtbehaftet' (J.W. HAUER). G.M. KOELMAN (1970),
surprisingly enough, does not seem to be aware of these twin terms at all, though he refers to the concept of klesā. Yet this conceptual triad — klesā, kliṣṭa and akliṣṭa — constitutes a central aspect of Yoga psychology. All three words are derivatives of the root kliṣ 'to torment, be troubled'. As H. ZIMMER (1953\textsuperscript{2}, 294) aptly remarks, kliṣṭa is used "as an adjective meaning 'distressed; suffering pain or misery; faded, wearied, injured, hurt; worn out, in bad condition, marred, impaired, disordered, dimmed, or made faint'". He continues: "A garland, when the flowers are withering, is kliṣṭa (sic!); the splendour of the moon is kliṣṭa (sic!), when obscured by a veil of clouds; a garment worn out, or spoiled by stains, is kliṣṭa (sic!); and a human being, when the inborn splendor of his nature has been subdued by fatiguing business affairs and cumbersome obligations, is kliṣṭa (sic!)."

In contrast with this general usage of the word kliṣṭa, in the Yoga-Sūtra kliṣṭa and its antonym akliṣṭa are distinctly technical terms which must be juxtaposed to the concept of klesā or 'cause-of-affliction' denoting, as H. ZIMMER (1953\textsuperscript{2}, 294) puts it, "anything which, adhering to man's nature, restricts or impairs its manifestation of its true essence". G.M. KOELMAN (1970, 127) offers a more precise explanation: "Man is born with certain psychological habits, congenital psychical passions that bind him to cosmic conditions. They blind him, prevent him from discovering what his genuine Self is, make him attached to cosmic life and its allurements, afflict his existence with an endless chain of woes, enmesh him more and more in the net of conditioned existence, and hinder his liberation."
Patanjali (II.3) distinguishes five types of kleśa: nescience (avidyā), 'I-am-ness' (aamīta), attachment (rāga), aversion (dvega) and will-to-live (abhiniveśa). Each category is carefully defined, and nescience is explained as the nurturing ground of all other types of kleśa. This doctrine entails many implications which cannot all be made explicit in this study. For the present purposes it will suffice to make the following observations. The kleśa theorem can be said to circumscribe the fact that every organism on attaining self-consciousness, finds itself in an existential situation where it has become aware of its own awareness but is confused as to the true nature of this awareness, and the organism is as it were compelled to act out of a false identity. This is what is meant by nescience or avidyā. It refers to the peculiar cognitive condition of man who fails to recognise that consciousness-of (citta) is an epiphenomenon of the transcendental Self-Awareness.

Nonetheless, it would be misleading to ascribe, as does G.J. Larson (1969), to nescience a cosmogonic function which would be more appropriate in the context of Advaita-Vedānta. He says (p. 191): "In the Yogasūtra the reason given for the emergence or evolution of the manifest world is avidyā ('ignorance'). In this respect there is a fundamental difference between Sāmkhya and Yoga, for the appearance of the manifest world in classical Sāmkhya is much more than the result of ignorance. It is the result, rather, of the very nature of puruṣa which must become what it is not in order ultimately to become what it is."

Apart from G.J. Larson's misapprehension of the precise viewpoint of Patanjali, one may also question his bold speculation that in Sāmkhya prakṛti-parināma is due to the impact of puruṣa. This appears to be
a later theory which is as yet absent in Isvāra Kṛṣṇa's formulation of Śamkhya thought. The recognition of an innate teleology in prakṛti does not contradict the simultaneous admission of the autonomous evolution of the tattvas.

At any rate, according to Patañjali avidyā is merely a cognitive distortion potent from the very moment self-consciousness occurs. In his own words: "Nescience is the [false] perception of the permanent in the impermanent, of the pure in the impure, of joyfulness in the sorrowful, of the Self in the non-self" (anītya-aśuci-duḥkha-anatmasu nitya-aśuci-sukha-ātma-ātmaneṣu-avidyā, II.5). Coterminal with this fundamental error is the establishment of a false identity: "'I-am-ness' is the seeming 'one-self-ness' [or identity] of the power of seeing [i.e. the Self] and that of vision [i.e. the mind]" (ātya-darśana-saktyor-eka-ātmatā-iva-asmitā, II.6). This mal-identification gives rise to emotive reactions of which Patañjali distinguishes two basic types, viz. attachment and aversion. "Attachment is that which dwells on pleasure" (sukha-anuṣayī rāgaḥ, II.7) and "Aversion is that which dwells on sorrow" (duḥkha-anuṣayī dvēṣaḥ, II.8). The remaining constituent of this psychological web is the powerful thirst for life, eros, the survival instinct about which the Yoga-Sūtra states: "The will-to-live, flowing on by its own nature, is rooted even in the sage" (sva-rasa-vāhī viduṣo'pi tatha rūḥo'bhiniveṣaḥ, II.9).

The klesas provide the dynamic framework of the phenomenal mind-complex. They urge the organism to burst into activity, to feel, to think. As the basic emotional and motivational forces they lie at the root of all misery, for Yoga favours the simple equation anatman = duḥkha, that is to say, as long as man lives out of a false identity
in ignorance of his essential nature (which is the Self, purusa) he remains subject to sorrow and suffering. Thus the normal human situation can be characterised as the product of a cognitive error, a positive misconception of reality, for which there is but one remedy: the recovery of the Self as the true identity of man.

These klesas are thought to have four modes of appearance (see II.4). They may be latent (prasupta, lit. 'asleep'), attenuated (tanu, lit. 'thin'), temporarily suppressed (vichinna, lit. 'cut off') or fully active (udāra, lit. 'coming up'). It is the objective of kriyā-yoga to effect their attenuation (tanukarana) which amounts to the cultivation of enstasy (samādhi-bhāvana) (see II.2). No direct attack on the klesas is possible, for every mental activity without exception merely increases the concatenations in the depth-mind. 'Attenuation' is achieved by refusing these forces an outlet in the form of consciousness processes. Their power is partly checked by sensory withdrawal and the accompanying stilling of the mind. In other words, the yogin plays the subliminal structures off against each other. By disallowing them to take effect in the conscious mind, he indirectly achieves that they annihilate each other. The underlying process is comparable to that of a mill-stone which grinds itself away for lack of grain. When even the last samskāra is exterminated the klesas can be said to be fully destroyed as well.

This intriguing doctrine, "which is really the foundation of the system of Yoga outlined by Patanjali" 89, is contained in nuce in the two terms kliṣṭa and akiṣṭa. Quite correctly, Vyāsa (I.5) explains

89 I.K. TAIMNI (1965, 130)
kliṣṭa as 'caused by the kleśas' (kleśa-hetuka), but this makes little sense in view of the fact that aklīṣṭa would consequently have to be understood as 'not caused by the kleśas' which is absurd since all mental activity is ex hypothesi engendered by the kleśas. Hence Vijnāna Bhikṣu, in his monumental Yoga-Vārttika (I.5), proposes a different interpretation of aklīṣṭa paraphrasing it with 'resulting in akleśa' (akleśa-phalika). But what is the nature of this akleśa? The answer to this question is supplied in the Maniprabha (I.5) by Rāmānanda where we find the equations kliṣṭa = bandha-phala (i.e. having bondage as its result) and aklīṣṭa = mukti-phala (i.e. having liberation as its result). In other words, aklīṣṭa are those mental events which facilitate the yogic process of the self-destruction of the kleśas, whereas kliṣṭa describes all other mental activity which merely helps to maintain the potency of the kleśas. Thus akleśa designates that condition in which the power of the kleśas on the mind is partially or completely checked.

4. Samskāra, vāsanā, āsaya

Hidden behind the obverse mental processes lies a vast inexhaustible pool of stimuli, the so-called subliminal activators or samskāras, which power the machinery of consciousness. These are organised into configurations, known as vāsanās or subliminal traits, which partly manifest in the idiosyncracies of the individual. This large storehouse of dispositional factors is the dynamic aspect of the deep structure of human personality. The samskāras are formed continuously as a result
of the individual's world experience. In other words, every thought, feeling and impulse to action must be regarded as an actualisation of the tremendous tension inherent in the subliminal pool. On the other hand, overt mental activity in turn replenishes the subliminal deposit — in this manner perpetuating the vicious circle of phenomenal existence (*samsāra*).

The pool of subliminal activators is conceived as pre-individual. This means that although world experience (*bhoga*) somehow reinforces the *samskāra* grids, it does not originate them. The newly born individual is by no means a *tabula rasa*. Rather his very birth is the product of the irresistible pull of the subliminal traces. This conception in a way foreshadows the modern notion of the unconscious. However, it is far more simplistic and, furthermore, has been evolved in response to different kinds of questions, namely to explain certain occurrences during the process of radical introversion and especially during the terminal states of *samādhi*. Unfortunately, Patanjali does not develop this theory in detail but, as with so many other topics, presumes that the reader is acquainted with it. Nonetheless, it is clear from the scanty references in his work that this conception belongs to the core of his system of thought, though of course he cannot be hailed as the genius behind its invention or formulation.

Having sketched the general idea behind this intriguing theory, I will next look more closely at its constituent working parts. To begin with the term *samskāra*, this much used Sanskrit word has a wide spectrum of meanings. Composed of the prefix *sam-* and the root *kṛ*.
'to do', its most general sense is 'preparation', but in addition also conveys the idea of 'embellishment, training, ritual action' etc. In yogic contexts, it is habitually translated with 'impression' (J.H. WOODS, G. JHA, S. DASGUPTA). R. PRASADA (1912) opts for 'habituation' which perhaps would be more appropriate in describing the concept of vāsana. I prefer to render samskāra as 'subliminal-activator' thus stressing its dynamic nature. It is far from being a mere imprint as is suggested by the common translation with 'impression'. This active aspect of the samskāras is apparent especially from III.9 where two varieties of samskāra are distinguished, viz. those which lead to the externalisation (vyutthāna) of consciousness and those which induce 'restriction' (nirodha). Similarly, in I.50 the type of inverted samskāra is mentioned, which appears in the highest form of samādhi and which swallows up or rather obstructs all other samskāras.

Then, again, the fact that the samskāras are vestiges of previous mental activity can be inferred from III.18 which states that by means of the immediate apperception (saksattkāra) of the samskāras the yogin can acquire knowledge of his former embodiments. Samskāra is thus an active residuum of experience. This concept is beautifully captured in the notion of bija or 'seed' as used in I.51 and III.50.

Patañjali's concept of samskāra is ostensibly a mirror-image of the ancient buddhist notion of saṅkhāra signifying the conative factors in the paticca-samupatta or, more precisely, its second nidāna. In a way the five klesas of Classical Yoga are comparable to the twelve-fold nidāna nexus or at any rate are equivalent to part of this schema. However, no direct borrowing from Buddhism need be involved
here. Speculations about avidyā, duhkha and punar-janman are pan-Indian property.

The next term to be considered is vasana. Although often used by the exegetists and the modern interpreters as a synonym of samskāra, vasana really stands for a different concept. Vasana, which is a derivative of the root vas 'to dwell, abide, remain', is mentioned only twice in the Yoga-Sūtra (viz. IV.8, 24) and in both instances in the plural. It has variously been translated with 'subconscious impression' (J.H. Woods), 'impression' (G. Jha) or 'residual potency' (R. Prasāda). J.W. Hauser (1958) renders it as 'Einschöpfung' and correctly delineates it in his translation from the concept of samskāra; however, in a footnote (p. 469, fn. 7) contradicts himself by making the unwise remark that vasana, samskāra and karma-ādāya can be regarded as synonyms. He fails to realise that Patañjali would hardly have introduced three different terms to express one and the same idea.

According to aphorism IV.8 the origination of the vasana is to be linked up with the fruition (vipāka) of man's activity. Whilst the activity of the adept yogin is thought to be (see IV.7) neither 'white' nor 'black', that of the ordinary mortal is threefold. This somewhat recondite aphorism is explained by the doctrine of moral retribution as it has been current in India ever since the early Upaniṣads in which it was announced first. What Patañjali appears to be saying is this: Ordinarily every action's fruition can be classified as either 'black' (kṛṣṇa), i.e. 'non-meritorious' (apunya, see I.33; II.14), or 'white' (sukla), i.e. 'meritorious' (pūrva), or, I presume, as mixed. In contradistinction the yogin, his mental complex being fully inclined towards total dissolution (pratiprasava), does not
generate any action which could be thus typified. By vipāka or fructification is not meant the 'outcome' of an act on the empirical plane, but its 'moral consequence' which is expressed in terms of the production of corresponding vāsanā configurations. These vāsanās, in their turn, act as the propelling force for the creation of a new individual organism after the death of the present subject. They must be considered as aspatial/atemporal constellations 'located' in the deep structure of the cosmos. The question as to how these subliminal configurations can bridge the gap between two existences is explained in a rather difficult sutra (IV.9) which reads:

\[ \text{iṣṭi-deśa-kāla-vyavahitarām-apy-anantaryam smṛti-samskārayor eka-rūpatvat.} \]

J.H. WOODS (1966) translates this as follows:

"There is an uninterrupted [causal] relation [of sub-conscious-impressions], although remote in species and point-of-space and moment-of-time, by reason of the correspondence between memory and subliminal-impressions."

In accordance with Vyāsa's scholium, J.H. WOODS links up anantārya or 'uninterrupted (causal) relation' with the word samskāra, yet this lacks in clarity. Anantārya, it seems, refers to the causal dependence between the original input into the vāsanā pool and the resultant re-translation of the vāsanā code into a specific spatio-temporal existence. This homogeneity between cause and effect is guaranteed by the 'uniformity' (eka-rūpatva) between the subliminal-activators (samskāra) and the depth-memory (smṛti). Hence I would rephrase the above translation as follows: "Although [the resultant spatio-temporal existence] is remote [in terms of] category, place and
time, [there is nonetheless] a causal-relation [between the original subliminal input and the resultant existence] because of the uniformity between the subliminal-activators and the depth-memory." I have rendered the word smṛti as 'depth-memory' to indicate that what is meant here is not really the ordinary 'memory' but the vāsanā concatenations peculiar to a particular individual. Furthermore, I propose that this is identical with asmitā-mātra which is said to be (see IV.5) the root of the individual mind-complexes or cittas. I suggest that smṛti in I.43 has the very same meaning, since it cannot stand for the ordinary memory — considered to be one of the five categories of vṛtti — which is eliminated in the process of meditative absorption. The above contention is not as fanciful as it may seem prima facie, if one recalls that Yoga postulates a 'subtle' (suksma) counterpart to the overt reality as we know it.

In this connection, IV.10 must be taken into account which describes the vāsanās as 'beginningless' (anāditva) in view of the perpetuity of the primal-will (ātīs). How could the ordinary memory be said to store the entire matrix of vāsanās shared by all beings? In passing I wish to draw attention to the word ātīs, usually translated with 'desire', Patañjali employs this rare term to express the primordial drive inherent in prakṛti which, by means of the vāsanā patterns, leads to ever new phenomenalisations. Possibly the concept of abhiniveśa (see II.9) is identical with this notion; it can be regarded as a manifestation of ātīs in the life of a particular entity.
In order to denote the total stock of *samakāras* which have been called into existence by the volitional activity in either the present incarnation or in past existences and which are the determinative factors of future embodiments, Patanjali introduces the concept of *āśāya*. The literal meaning of this word, mentioned only in I.24, is 'deposit' (from अ + शय 'to lie, rest').

G.M. KOELMAN (1970, 50, fn. 100) translates the compound *karma-āśāya* with 'moral-value-deposit' explaining it as "the sum-total of merits and demerits". The idea behind the theory of *karma* or, more accurately, *karma-vipāka* ('fructification of action') is this: No action, or volition, is value neutral. Every action has a value in terms of an objective framework of reference. In other words, the cosmic order is a moral one, and the physical law of causality is extended, mutatis mutandis, to the realm of ethical behaviour.

Driven by the *klesas* the 'deposit' bears fruit, viz. birth, life and world-experience. Depending on the nature of the *vāsanās* or *samakāra* chains, which may be due to meritorious or demeritorious volitional activity, the world experience (*bhoga*) is characterised by either delight (*ḥūḍā*) or distress (*paritāpa*) (see II.14). There is no doubt in Patanjali's mind that even though there may be moments of happiness and even euphoria in life, all joy is deceptive because it is intrinsically transient, and sorrow (*duḥkha*) is woven into the very fabric of phenomenal existence. In his own words (II.15):

*parināma-tāpa-samkāra-duḥkhair-guna-vṛtti-virodhāc-ca duḥkham-evān sarvam vivekinaḥ*, or: "Because of the sorrow in the continual transformation [of the world-ground], [in] the anguish [and in] the
subliminal-activators and on account of the conflict between the movements of the gunas — to the discerning [yogin] all is but sorrow". Hence it is sorrow which is to be overcome (see II.16). The means by which duhkha can be surmounted is the disconnection of the 'correlation' (samyoga) between the 'seer' and the 'seen', that is the realisation of the innate Self as being apart from all accidental or epiphenomenal events of the mind-complex. This brings us back to the yogic process itself.

5. Nirodha

Yoga utilises a great variety of implements to disrupt the continuum of phenomenal existence, to break the incessant revolution of prakrti which holds no promise of stability or security. At the bottom of all these means lies an identical process, known as nirodha or 'restriction'. There is a good deal of misunderstanding about this term which has led astray already the classical exegetists. It is crucial for a fair comprehension of the yogic path to clarify this important concept. The source of this confusion is the fact that nirodha designates both the process of restriction and the state of restrictedness — a distinction which Vyāsa et al. have blatantly ignored.

The word is derived from ni + ārūdh 'to restrain' and is mentioned in I.2, 12, 51 and III.9. In contrast to Vyāsa's conjectures, accepted tout court by his successors, the important āṭra I.2 (yoga-citta-vṛtti-nirodhah) does not use nirodha in the sense of 'restrictedness'. Vācaspati Miśra's contention that
"Yoga is that particular state of the mind-complex in which the fluctuations [such as] pramāṇa and so forth are restricted is definitely erroneous. Nor can this aphorism be interpreted as implying that "[the goal of] Yoga is the restrictedness of the fluctuations of the mind-complex", since the ultimate destination of the yogin is not the inhibition of the five modes of mental activity of the externalised consciousness but kaivalya. Rather it must be concluded that 1.2 gives out a preliminary definition of Yoga as the process of restriction, commencing with the inhibition of the vṛttis.

This need not necessarily conflict with 1.3 where the initial word tada (‘then’) does not have to imply "immediately upon the restriction of the vṛttis">. Also, the phrase draṣṭu sva-rupe'vasthanam may not refer to kaivalya at all but simply to the Self as it appears in relative purity in samādhi: The stillness of the mind-complex permits a centralised experiencing in which, although the level of the transcendental Self has not yet been reached, the puruṣa's presence is keenly felt as the stable centre within the enstatic process.

As is borne out by a candid examination of the relevant parts of the Yoga-Sūtra, the process of restriction is not confined to the pentad of fluctuations but it is a multi-level happening which coincides with the yogic process of unification per se. This, incidentally, sheds new light also on the concept of abhyāsa or 'practice'. In point of fact, restriction comprises three distinct levels of application:

90 nirudhyante yasmin-pramāṇa-ādi-vṛttayo'vastha-vidēṣe cittasya so' vasthā-vidēṣo yogah (Tattva-Vaisāradī, I.2)
(1) restriction of the fluctuations (vṛtti-nirodha)
(2) restriction of the presented-ideas (pratyaya-nirodha)
(3) restriction of the subliminal-activators (samskāra-nirodha).

Nirodha sets in as soon as the yogin withdraws his senses from the external world by means of the technique of pratyāhāra conducive to one-pointed concentration. In III.9 it is stated that with the disappearance of the vyutthāna-samskaras, the nirodha-samskaras emerge. This means that during the normal waking or centrifugal condition of consciousness those subliminal-activators are effective which lead to wakefulness (vyutthāna), whilst the withdrawal of the senses involves such subliminal-activators as will countercheck the externalising tendency of the mind. Vṛtti-nirodha means the partial as well as the complete (sarva) restriction of the five types of mental fluctuation, thus covering every phase of sense-withdrawal, concentration and meditative absorption. It is an on-going process with increasingly greater degrees of restrictedness.

Pramāṇa and viparvaya, both of which are dependent on an objective substratum, are the first to be eliminated in the internalisation procedure. There is no more contact with the external environment once meditative absorption (dhyāna) is established. Vikalpa or 'predicate-relation', as J.H. Woods (1966) translates this term, is also soon restricted. Far more difficult is the elimination of sleep (nīdṛā). It is a common experience that during the first attempts of meditative absorption, the mind instead of reaching the restricted (niruddha) state often lapses into sleep. The untrained
mind is unable to sustain the intense concentration required for more than brief spells only and quickly succumbs to exhaustion. However, the greatest hindrance of all is the powerful human memory which constantly populates the consciousness space with thoughts, images and moods. Its complete control can only be achieved after extensive practice of dhyāna. 'Memory' (smṛti) refers here to the actual process of remembering and not, as in I.43, to the depth-memory, though both are of course intimately related. In passing it may be pointed out that Patañjali's enumeration of the vṛttis is far from being arbitrary. His arrangement is according to the vṛttis' relation with the external environment, pramāṇa being as it were the outermost and smṛti the innermost of the diverse mental activities.

Since the stoppage of the fluctuations is clearly stated to be effected in dhyāna (see II.11), nirodha cannot possibly be identified with samādhi, and the classical commentators are definitely at fault on this important point. The essential happening in the enstatic states of consciousness can be described as the gradual restriction of the pratyayās. As will be shown, these must not be confused with the vṛttis. On a still deeper level of restriction, the very propensities to form pratyayās or vṛttis, as the case may be, are brought under control. This is samskāra-nirodha which, when completed successfully, is known as sārva-nirodha or total restrictedness and is commensurate with the final breakthrough to kaivalya. I will discuss this phase in conjunction with samādhi.
6. Pratyaya

The word pratyaya (from prati + 'to go') occurs no less than ten times in the Yoga-Sūtra (see I.10, 18, 19; II.20; III.2, 12, 17, 19, 35 and IV.27), and it is an important technical expression. This fact has not been recognised by the exegetists who employ pratyaya occasionally in the sense of 'cause' and then again as descriptive of some mental content. Neither the Yoga-Bhāṣya nor the Tattva-Vaiśarādī provides a definition of this term in its second meaning of 'idea, notion'. When we turn to Bhoja, slightly more information about the meaning of this concept can be obtained. He describes, in his Raja-Mārtanda, pratyaya as knowledge (jñāna) (see III.2) and elsewhere (II.20) as "knowledge tinctured by the object" (visaya-uparaktāni jñānāni). He thus understands it as knowledge or awareness of something. This appears to be the meaning of the term throughout the Yoga-Sūtra. Even I.19 can convincingly be interpreted in this way. It is very unlikely that Patañjali should have used the word in more than one sense, and I consider it as belonging to the technical vocabulary of Classical Yoga, together with such termini as vṛtti, citta or nirodha etc.

In the commentaries pratyaya and vṛtti are frequently used synonymously, but this usage is incorrect if it is intended to reflect Patañjali's viewpoint. For, the presence of a pratyaya does not necessarily imply the simultaneous occurrence of a vṛtti. This is evident from the fact that there appear in samādhi various types of awareness units, e.g. vitarka, vicāra etc., which cannot be designated as vṛtti but which pertain to the pratyaya category.
It appears that the term pratyaya is specifically applied to the phenomenon of awareness as it presents itself in a consciousness that rests on an object of some kind. The analogue of vṛtti in the enstatic consciousness is not pratyaya but prajña or gnostic knowing in which the object is apprehended directly and from within itself as it were. On the basis of these considerations I suggest the following taxonomy:

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pratyaya
  /\  
prajña  vṛtti
  |    |
vitarka vicāra  pramāṇa viparyaya vikalpa nidrā smṛti
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The term prajña for the cognitive elements present in samādhi is inferred from its usage in such aphorisms as II.27 which speaks of a sevenfold gnosis, and III.5 which has the phrase prajña-āloka and, above all, from the term samprajñāta describing all modalities of samādhi which have an objective 'prop' (ālambana). However, there is one single exception to this rule: In I.49 prajña has the meaning of 'knowledge' usually designated by the Sanskrit word jñāna. This deviation can be explained from the context from which it is apparent that the author, for the sake of convenience, retained the word prajña as used in the immediately preceding sutra; maybe even a pun is intended which a modern writer would have expressed by means of inverted commas.

A. JANÁČEK (1957) attempts to show that pratyaya corresponds with the Pavlovian concept of 'impulse', but already J.W. HAUER (1958, 464 fn. 6) cast serious doubt on this interpretation, though he concedes that in the fourth pada (which he regards as a later
(appendix) the term pratyaya may possibly have the meaning suggested by A. Janček. As concerns the first three pādas, J.W. Hauer's translation wavers between 'awareness' and 'cause' as fit renderings of pratyaya. However, it is quite unnecessary to assume this double connotation, as all the relevant sūtras can satisfactorily be understood when one gives pratyaya the single meaning of a specific noetic factor. Unlike prajñā and vṛtti which are classified by their functional characteristics, pratyaya is more a relational concept in which the content of consciousness is defined in its relation to the transcendental Self as the permanent apperceiver of all ideation. Hence the most congenial translation of this term is the one proposed by J.H. Woods (1966), namely 'presented-idea'.

This is accepted, for instance, by G.M. Koelman (1970) who is one of the few scholars to make an attempt at developing a critical vocabulary for expressing yogic concepts in English. Still, he fails to recognise the leading significance of this concept in the psychology of Classical Yoga and consequently also does not realise that 'presented-idea' is the constant meaning of the term pratyaya in Patañjali's work. The reason for this shortcoming is his extreme reliance on the commentaries.

To quote but one instance, what does it mean when G.M. Koelman (1970, 185) translates aphorism I.10 with "Sleep is a fluctuation supported by the coming to the fore of the absence of the waking and dreaming states"? It seems to me that the compound abhāva-pratyaya is far more intelligibly rendered as "the presented-idea of the non-occurrence of conscious contents". Since nidrā is a vṛtti it must
be based on a pratyaya of some kind; hence abhava-pratyaya cannot really mean "the absence of pratyayas". This is fully recognised by K. BHATTACHARYYA (1956, I, 256) who writes: "Presentation of a content that is known as real is pramana, of a content that is known as unreal is viparyaya and of a content that appears real even when it is known as unreal is vikalpa; while presentation of a content as presented — i.e. presentation of presentation is smṛti and presentation of the absence of presentation is nidrā." In this way nidrā is adequately demarcated from nirodha in which all vyttis are restricted. This is in conformity with Vyāsa's exposition of 'sleep'. He attempts to demonstrate that there is mental activity of some kind even in deep sleep by pointing out that when a person awakes he usually 'recollects' that he has slept well or badly.

Likewise, the phrase bhava-pratyaya in 1.19 need not be taken to signify "caused by worldly means" as is the contention of the exegetists (see also J.H. WOODS, 1966). Rather it must be explained in conjunction with 1.18. These two aphorisms read as follows: 

\[
\text{virama-pratyaya-abhyaśa-pūrvah samskāra-śeṣo'nyah} — \text{bhava-pratyayo}
\]

\[
\text{videha-prakṛti-layanam.} \]

1.18 undoubtedly defines asamprajñāta-samādhi, and virūma-pratyaśa must be translated with "presented-idea of cessation" and is not to be confounded with abhava-pratyaya.

The "previous practice" (abhyaśa-pūrvah) refers to samprajñāta-samādhi in which pratyaya-nirodha is gradually effected. On the other hand, the compound bhava-pratyaya obviously signifies "presented-idea of becoming" which describes the contents of consciousness of those who have failed to transcend the realm of prakṛti and have lost sight of the goal of kaivalya.
CHAPTER SEVEN

PRACTICE CONCEPTS

1. Abhyāsa, vairāgya

The yogic path as formulated by Patañjali appears as a bi-polar process of gradual internalisation. All techniques are formally subsumed under the two categories of abhyāsa and vairāgya respectively. The former may be circumscribed as the actualisation of the One and the latter as the elimination of the Many. In L.A. SINGH's (1970, I, 108) words: "In modern terminology, abhyāsa may be conceived as the process of canalisation and re-conditioning; while vairāgya may be seen as a process of de-conditioning. By breaking the associations between motives and goals, of lower levels of psychological development by a process of de-conditioning and then forming new associations between motives and higher goals through a process of re-conditioning one gradually rises from lower to higher levels of affecto-motivational development."

Abhyāsa and vairāgya are thus the two poles of any form of Yoga and, indeed, of any spiritual discipline whatsoever. This point is seldom understood. Vyāsa illustrates the functional interdependence of both poles in a striking simile: citta-nadi nāma-ubhayato vāhinī vahati kalyāṇāya vahati pāpāya ca, yā tu kaivalya-prāgabhārā viveka-visaya-nimmā sa kalyāṇa-vahā, samsāra-prāgabhārā'viveka-visaya-nimmā pāpa-vahā, tatra vairāgyena visaya-srotāḥ khilī-kriyate viveka-darśana-abhyāsena viveka-srotā udghāthyata ity-ubhayā-adhīnaḥ-citta-
vyātti-niruddhah (I.12), "The stream of consciousness flows in both [directions]. It flows to the good, and it flows to the bad. The one commencing with discernment (viveka) and terminating in kaivalya flows to the good. The one commencing with non-discernment (aviveka) and terminating in conditioned-existence (samsāra) flows to the bad. Through dispassion (vairāgya) the flowing out to the sense-objects is checked, and through the practice (abhyaśa) of the vision of discernment the stream of discernment is laid bare. Thus the restriction of the fluctuations of consciousness is dependent upon both abhyaśa and vairāgya."

This bi-polar model of the yogic path was first formulated in the Bhagavad-Gītā which, in fact, employs the very same terms used by Patañjali to designate the two poles, namely abhyaśa and vairāgya, and it is as good as certain that he was fully conversant with this old Yoga scripture. The stanza in question is VI.35 which reads: asāmsayam maha-baho mano durnigraham calam, abhyāsena tu kaunteya vairāgyeṣa ca arghyate, "The mind, o strong-armed [Arjuna], is undoubtedly unsteady and difficult to control. Yet through practice and dispassion, o son-of-Kunti, it can be seized". This dyadic analysis of the yogic path has survived into the post-classical period of Yoga, as is evident from the encyclopedic Yoga-Vāsiṣṭha, and it can even be met with in the Sāmkhya-Sūtra (III.36) and certain Vedānta texts such as Śaṅkara's Viveka-Cudāmani (374).

Abhyaśa (from abhi + āśa 'to abide, engage in') does not occur in the earlier strata of Hindu literature where it is replaced by the term śrama or 'exertion'. Its first mention is in the Bhagavad-Gītā (see VI.35, 44; VIII.8; XII.9, 10, 12; XVIII.36) and the Śvetāsvatara-Upanisad (I.14), and it is also widely employed in the epic. In its
non-philosophical usage the word abhyāsa has the meaning of 'repetition, habit', and some of this connotation is carried over into Patañjali's concept of 'practice' as is clear from the aphorisms I.13 and I.14:

\[ \text{tatra sthitau yatno abhyāsaḥ - sa tu dṛṣṭa-kāla-nairantarya-satkāra-āsevito dṛṣṭa-bhumih,} \]

"Practice is the [repeated] effort to stabilise [the mind-complex]. However, this [practice] gains firm ground [only when it] is cultivated for a long time, uninterruptedly [and with full] attention". Nonetheless, S. DASGUPTA's (1930, 331) rendering of abhyāsa as 'habit' is incorrect, and he in fact elsewhere (p. 61) translates it quite appropriately with 'practice'. To sum up: "'Practice' stands for the concentrated inner application to the realisation of the transcendental Being which constitutes the essence of all yogic operations. It consists in the careful discrimination between the real and wholesome on the one hand and the transient and all that is unworthy of human motivation on the other. It is the inwardness and unification resulting from this enlightened discernment."\(^{91}\)

It may be noted here that in I.32 (eka-tattva-abhyāsa) and in I.18 (vairāga-pratyaya-abhyāsa), the word abhyāsa does not appear to be intended in the above formal sense but probably corresponds with the notion of 'exercise' as a specific instance of 'practice' per se.

Like its positive correlative the negative pole, vairāgya, pertains to the post-vedic vocabulary. It does not seem to have been in use prior to the Bhagavad-Gītā. Patañjali defines this second constituent of the path as follows: dṛṣṭa-anuśravika-vidyā-ṣaptasya vaśākāra-samjñā

\(^{91}\) G.A. FEUERSTEIN (1974, 35)
vairāgyam, "Dispassion is the consciousness of mastery of [the yogin who is] without thirst for seen and revealed objects". Drṣṭa denotes the things visible, that is, the ordinary objects of our pleasure seeking mind, whereas anuśravika (from anu + śru 'to hear') refers to objects revealed by the sacred tradition, such as the promised joys of heaven which are empirically non-verifiable. Dispassion, as understood by Patañjali, is not so much a specific act of non-attachment as a state of mind; it is the "consciousness of mastery" accruing from the persistent struggle to disengage the mind from everything that is inimical to its internalisation.

Patañjali knows of two orders of completeness of dispassion. tat-param purusa-khyāter-guna-vairāgyam, "The superior form of this dispassion is the non-thirsting for the guṇas [which results] from the vision of the Self". The orbit of the lower degree of vairāgya embraces every prakṛtic entity or function except the triple primary forces or guṇas into which all manifest and immaterial objects ultimately resolve. But even from these the yogin must dissociate himself by realising the higher degree of dispassion which discloses the Self to his enstatic view. This implies the resolution of the entire cognitive apparatus and in the last analysis the complete delation of the individual cosmos.

It may be conjectured that the differentiation into two degrees of consummation as regards dispassion may have its parallel in abhyāsa. Tentative evidence for this assumption is found in I.18 where the practice of saṃprajñata-samādhi is styled as "the other" (pūrva) abhyāsa, in contrast to asamprajñata-samādhi whose essential feature is pratyaya-niruddha. Granted that this is tenable, the following
correlation is possible:

- **Ordinary vairagya** in combination bring about **vyrtti-nirodha**
- **Ordinary abhyasa** in combination bring about **pratyaya-nirodha**
- **Higher vairagya** in combination bring about **samskara-nirodha**
- **Higher abhyasa** in combination bring about **sarva-nirodha**

### 2. Pratyahara, dharana, dhyana

The restriction of the five modes of **vyrtti** or mental activity, as the first stage of a protracted process ending in the total abolition of consciousness, is effected by means of the combined practice of sense-withdrawal (**pratyahara**), concentration (**dharana**) and meditative-absorption (**dhyana**). As these form three phases of a continuum as it were, I propose to treat them together. Patanjali himself prefers a different arrangement insofar as he combines **dharana**, **dhyana** and **samadhi** denoting their collective practice by the concept of **samyama**. The reason for his exclusion of **pratyahara** would appear to be simply that this is not a purely mental exercise.

**Pratyahara** (from **prati** + **a** + **ahy** 'to hold') is defined in II.54 as "the imitation as it were of the own-form of the mind-complex by the senses disuniting [themselves from] their [respective] objects" (**sva-visaya-asamprayoge cittasya sva-rupa-anukara-iva-indriyaam pratyaharah**). This fundamental process has been described in many
Yoga texts, and the favourite metaphor is that of a tortoise withdrawing its limbs. There is little ambiguity about this technique, and it can be perfectly understood on the basis of the psychology of attention. There is a certain degree of sensory inhibition in every kind of mental concentration. As the focus of attention narrows to a strictly confined locus, awareness of the surroundings is gradually lost. In Yoga, of course, complete cessation of all sensory activity is aimed at. This non-deployment of the senses is to be understood as a positive effort not to engage in sensory perceptions, as a deliberate attempt to disregard sensory stimuli. Initially arousal is still possible provided that the stimulus is sufficiently strong (e.g. a loud noise, a push etc.), but as the exercise proceeds control of the afferent functions becomes increasingly more perfect, until total sensory anaesthesia is achieved. This is what is meant by the expression paramā-vasyatā or 'supreme obedience' of the senses (see II.55).

Incidentally, this 'generalised inhibition' is prepared and facilitated by the muscular control effected through the practice of posture or āsana and of respiratory stoppage or prāṇāyāma. Here modern neurophysiology confirms the experiential wisdom of Patañjali and his predecessors (see T.R. KULKARNI, 1972, 99ff.).

G.M. KOELMAN (1970, 175-76), who singles out four levels of yogic interiorisation, remarks on the practice of pratyāhāra that "it is difficult to situate" in the arrangement proposed by him. Though it is in a sense somatic, inasmuch as physiologically the senses no longer react to external stimuli, and is also ethical in character to the extent that it is aimed at and brought about by
the heroic practice of universal detachment, yet we think it is already the threshold of the psychological level. 'Withdrawal of the senses' forms the bridge and is the cumulative result of the previous practices, and opens the door to one-pointed concentration." The four levels distinguished by G.M. KOELMAN are

1. the somatic level which has as its goal the pacification of the body;
2. the ethical level intended for the purification and stabilisation of the mind;
3. the psychological level entailing a frontal attack on the empirical mind which is to be transcended;
4. the metaphysical level which is identical with kaivalya or emancipation, that is, the transcendental realisation of the Self.

This is a useful model which in a way complements Patanjali's distinction between the 'external members' (bahir-āṅga) and 'internal members' (antar-āṅga) of the eightfold path (see III.7).

Perseverant practice of sense-withdrawal induces concentration or dhārana, characterised by Patanjali as follows: deśa-bandhaś-cittasya dhāranaḥ (III.1) or "Concentration is the binding of the mind-complex to [a single] locus". This technique consists in a focusing of attention, a mental zeroing-in on one topic to the exclusion of all others. It is also referred to in I.32 as "the practice of a single principle" (eka-tattva-abhyāsa). T.R. KULKĀRNI (1972, 118) aptly
describes the underlying process as "a general 'shrinking' of the
mind leaving only a smaller portion of concentrated mental activity". He also suggests that the concept of the 'neuronal model' of sensory stimulus, as developed by E.N. Sokolov (1963), may possibly be an explanation of this phenomenon in neuro-physiological terms. However, it must be stressed here that however instructive these parallels are one must not succumb to the reductionist fallacy of taking them to be sufficient explanations of what is essentially a psychological happening.

In 1.35 the expression "holding the mind in steadiness" (manasah sthiti-nibandhanā) is found which invites comparison with the statement of III.1. Whereas the latter is intended as a formal description of an actual technique, the former aphorism evidently speaks of a result of this concentration, namely nibandhana, the 'steady' condition of the mind being in this case the concomitant phenomenon of a yogic experience known as pravṛtti or extra-ordinary sensory activity.

The centre of attention, or locus of concentration, can be any object whatsoever, as long as it is properly 'interiorised'. Preferred loci are the bodily centres such as the nābhi-cakra (III.29), kāṇṭha-kūpa (III.30), kūrma-nādi (III.31), hṛdaya (III.34) and mūrdha-jyotis (III.32). Patañjali, moreover, lists such non-somatic 'topics' as śūrya (III.26), candra (III.27), dhruva (III.28) etc., and purely conceptual items like maitri (III.23), bala (III.24) etc. In addition there is the recitation (japa) of the syllable om signifying śavara (see I.27-28) which is an exercise of no mean significance in Classical
Yoga. Anything at all can serve as a 'prop' for concentration provided it is found fit (see I.39) to narrow consciousness to a spot sustaining it in this reduced state over a sufficient period of time. An object of some kind seems to be called for in order to avert the ever-present danger of a plain relapse into unconsciousness. The reduction of consciousness to a specific pre-selected point forestalls its premature collapse. In the light of these considerations one may hypothesise that where there is no definite objective support in meditation, the 'interiorised' body as a whole assumes this essential role.

Concentration is the persistent effort to arrest the natural inclination of the mind to engage in desultory activity thereby exteriorising itself. Patañjali mentions a series of 'obstacles' (antarāya) which impede the cultivation of 'inward-mindedness' or pratyak-cetanā. These impediments are sickness, languor, doubt, heedlessness, sloth, dissipation, false vision, the non-attainment of the stages of Yoga and instability in these stages. They are also known as the 'dispersions' (vikṣeṇa) and are said to be accompanied by certain physiological conditions, viz. pain, dejection, tremor of the limbs, faulty inhalation and exhalation (see I.33-34). Only by resolute application to single-mindedness can these obstacles and their negative side-effects be overcome (see I.32).

Patañjali mentions two synonyms of dhārana, viz. ekāgrata (III.11-12) and ekāṛtya, both meaning 'one-pointedness' (eka 'one' + āgrā 'point'). M. Eliade (1973, 70) speculates that ekāṛtya and dhārana differ from each other insofar as the latter is a mental fixation for the purpose of comprehension which is absent in ekāgrata.
I see no evidence for this hypothesis in the Yoga-Sūtra itself, though M. ELIADE’s suggestion is not without interest. As a formal constituent of the eightfold path, dārāna is essentially a technique which can be said to have as its characteristic feature the one-pointedness of the mind.

We now come to meditative-absorption or dhyāna which, by way of contrast, is defined in III, 2 as "the oneflowness of the presented-ideas": this is a literal rendering of the Sanskrit compound pratyaya-ekatānata. Implicit in this technical expression is the fact that dhyāna is so to speak a linear continuation of ekāgrata as achieved by the technique of dhārana. Yet although meditative-absorption devolves from dhārana, it is nevertheless a mental state with its own distinct properties. As T.R. KULKARNI (1972, 119) puts it: "While in dhārana the mind remains bound up, as it were, in a restricted space, its continuation in that bound up state in such a way that the experiential state corresponding to it remains uniformly and homogeneously the same despite variations in the internal or external perceptual situation, constitutes dhyāna (...) In the state of dhyāna, the indeterminateness of perception disappears with the mind remaining unaffected by distracting stimuli."

J.W. HAUER (1958, 322), who is known to have personally experimented with Yoga, offers this insightful description of the nature of meditative-absorption: "[Dhyāna] is a deepened and creative dhārana, in which the inner object is illumined mentally. The strict concentration on one object of consciousness is now supplemented with a searching-pensive contemplation of its actual nature. The object is,
so to speak, placed before the contemplative consciousness in all its aspects and is apperceived as a whole. Its various characteristics are examined till its very essence is understood and becomes transparent. This is accompanied by a certain emotive disposition. Although the reasoning faculty functions acutely and clearly, it would be wrong to understand dhyāna merely as a logical-rational process: the contemplator must penetrate his object with all his heart, since he is after all primarily interested in a spiritual experience which is to lead him to ontic participation and the emancipation from all constricting and binding hindrances."

Dhyāna, in other words, adds depth to dharana. Hence G.M. KOELMANN's (1970) rendering of the term with 'attention' is positively inadequate. Dhyāna is not just a prolonged dharana. It must be carefully demarcated from concentration by reason of its utmost and continuous clarity of consciousness, the relative voidness of the inner space, the looming large of the single object, the adjustment of all emergent noetic acts to the one object of consciousness, the slow-down of all cognitive and emotive processes and not least because of the underpinning of overwhelming peacefulness.92

3. Samādhi

In dhyāna a restructuring of consciousness takes place the most

92 See C. ALRECHT (1951)
conspicuous criterion of which is the increasing proximity between the meditating subject and the object filling the consciousness space. This monoidism brings the yogin to a natural threshold where suddenly and unpredictably consciousness undergoes a further radical reconstitution. This is samādhi, the symphysis of subject and object. The word samādhi, composed of sam + ā + dhā 'to put, place', literally means 'putting together'. This does not always come across in the many renderings suggested for this term, such as 'trance' (M.N. DVIVEDI, R. PRASĀDA), 'meditation' (M. MÜLLER, G. JHA), 'concentration' (S. DASGUPTA, S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.H. WOODS), 'absorption' (H. ZIMMER, G.M. KOELMAN) or 'Versenkung' (E. FRAUWALLNER) and 'Einfaltung' (J.W. HAUER). With the possible exception of the last-mentioned term these transcription are either too narrow or too vague to be acceptable. Hence M. ELIADE (1973) borrows from the Greek language the word 'enstasis' or 'enstasy' which has the advantage of not being loaded with the same kind of unwanted associations that force one to reject the above-mentioned alternatives. For some inexplicable reason this useful coinage has not so far been assimilated into the general technical vocabulary of indologists, and the terminological confusion continues unabatedly. J. GONDA (1960, I, 204) suggests 'identification' as a possible alternative to M. ELIADE's unfashionable coinage. But the word 'enstasy' has the additional advantage of clearly demarcating the phenomenon of samādhi from that of 'ecstasy' with which it is not infrequently confused. Enstasy, as R.C. ZAHNBER (1969, 143) observes, "is the exact reverse of ecstasy which means to get outside oneself and which is often characterized by a breaking
down of the barriers between the individual subject and the universe around him". 

_Dhyāna_ is a necessary though not a sufficient condition for _samādhi_ to ensue. This all-important point is apodictic from the fact that no genuine volitional acts are possible in meditative-absorption without instantly disrupting the meticulously built up mental continuum. What M. ELLIAD (1973, 80) says of the higher form of enstasy, _i.e._ _asamprajñāta-samādhi_, is in principle also true of any of the lower forms of _samādhi_: "... it comes without being summoned, without being provoked, without special preparation for it. That is why it can be called a 'raptus'." _Samādhi_ occurs, or rather _may_ occur, when the mind has reached a state of relative equilibrium, that is, when the five types of _vṛtti_ are perfectly restricted (see II.11). The _Yoga-Sūtra_ is quite unequivocal on this, and yet the exegetists have in many ways profoundly upset the conceptual and terminological neatness which makes _Patañjali_’s work such a valuable and appealing document. These distortions are so obtrusive and so symptomatic of the general unreliability of the exegetical literature that I shall for the present purpose abandon my original strategy of ignoring the commentaries altogether. It seems more rewarding to proceed on the basis of a critique of the interpretations or, more precisely, misinterpretations of the classical commentators.

Aphorism III.3 seems an opportune starting-point. Here _samādhi_ is characterised in the following way: _tad-eva-artha-mātra-nirbhāsām sva-rūpa-śūnyam-iva samādhiḥ_, or: "[When] nothing but the object is shining forth [in] that [meditative-absorption], [and when the mind is] as it were void of [its] own-form, [this is known as] enstasy".
Vyāsa, to be sure, understands this sutra quite differently:
dhyānam-eva dhyeya-ākāra-nirbhāsaṁ praṇava-ātmakena sva-rūpaṁ
śūnyam-iva yada bhavati dhyeya-sva-bhāva-āvesat-tadā samādhīṁ-ity-
ucyate, or: "When meditative-absorption shines forth in the form
of the meditated-object (dhyeya), as if void of [its] own-form
and being bodied-forth in presented-ideas, then, on account of
[its] fusing with the own-being of the meditated-object, it is
called enstasy" (Yoga-Bhasya III.3). Vyāsa ostensibly relates
the words nirbhāsa and sva-rūpa-śūnya to meditative-absorption and
not as would seem more logical to the intended object and the
mind respectively. But in what sense can dhyāna be said to shine
forth as the object? And how is one to envisage the loss of its
own-form (sva-rūpa)?

Although Vyāsa's interpretation requires the minimum of
fill-ins inasmuch as he follows tenaciously the overt grammatical
structure of the aphorism in question, this is nevertheless achieved
at the cost of intelligibility. Hence rather than translating
"that [meditative-absorption] shining forth as the object only",
I suggest a reversal, namely "the object only shining forth [in]
that [meditative-absorption]". Similarly, it would seem to be
more cogent to speak of the mind instead of dhyāna as being void
of its own-form, in view of the fact that in the enstatic condition
consciousness, which normally is founded on the dichotomy between
subject and object, is deprived of this characteristic dualism.
Only in a very loose way could the same be said of dhyāna.
G. OBERHAMMER (1965, 104, fn. 11) makes the curious comment that the fourth stage of samprajñāta-samādhi, by which he means asmitā-samādhi, cannot be determined as artha-mātra and sva-rūpa-sūnya since its content is the unity-consciousness of I-am-ness. First of all, as I have shown there is no such stage of enstasy, and consequently his criticism is unfounded. But even if there were an enstatic state in which all contents of consciousness except the feeling of 'I am' are fully abrogated, still the very fact of the presence of asmitā would justify one to describe this samādhi as artha-mātra, for to the apperceiving Self (as draṣṭa) asmitā certainly represents an intended object or artha.

Furthermore, G. OBERHAMMER's conjecture that samāpatti and samyema pertain to a classification system which is different from that which operates with the concepts of nirodha and samprajñāta/asamprajñāta-samādhi is equally untenable. Samāpatti is defined in I.41 as follows: ksīna-vṛtt-ahijātasya-iva maner-grahītya-grasāya-grāhyasya tat-atha-tad-ajñanatā samāpattih, or: "[In the case of the mind whose] fluctuations have dwindled [and which has become] like a precious [transparent] jewel, [there results], [in regard to] the 'grasper', the 'grasping' and the 'grasped', [a state of] coincidence with that on which [the mind] abides and by which [the mind] is 'anointed'". This śūtra describes the basic mechanism of any form of enstasy other than asamprajñāta-samādhi. Again, I would contend that samāpatti is descriptive of the underlying process of enstasy whereas samādhi is a formal category denoting a technique. In other words, the relation between these two terms is analogous to the relation between ekāgrata and dhārana and between
ekatānata and dhyāna.

There are four types of samāpatti or 'coincidence': tatra sabda-artha-jñāna-vikalpaiḥ samkīrpa savitarkā samāpattiḥ, smṛti-pariṣuddhau eva-rūpa-śūnya-iva-artha-mātra-nirbhāsa nir vitarkā, etayā-eva savicāra nirvicāra ca suksma-viso vāy vāyātyā (I.42-44), '[As long as there is] conceptual knowledge [based on] the intent of words in this samāpatti, [it is called] coincidence interspersed with 'deliberation'. - With the purification of the memory [i.e., the tranquillisation of thinking], [when the mind is] as it were void of [its] own-form [and when] the object only shines forth, [this is known as the coincidence] 'without 'deliberation'. - By these two types of samāpatti [the other two kinds of coincidence], with 'reflection' and without 'reflection' [which have] subtle objects [as their meditative support] are explained'.

The cognitive factors present in vitarkā- and vicāra-samāpatti represent a category of mental activity sui generis and must not be confused with the vṛttis. As is incontestably stated in I.41 samāpatti ensues after the vṛttis have dwindled. Vitarka and vicāra are specific to the transmuted consciousness of enstasy. They belong to the category of prajñā or supra-cognition, i.e. gnostic knowledge. As G.M. KOELMAN (1970, 199) aptly remarks in regard to vitarka-samādhi: "We should not think, however, that a discursive reasoning is going on while one is in the state of 'cogitative coarse intentional identity' (...) Were it so, there would be no state of absorption, no yogic inhibition of mental activity. Such
mental fluctuations are absent, but the immobile intentional identity is in terms of and expressed in rationalizing and conceptualizing signs". This applies mutatis mutandis also to the vicāra type of enstatic realisation.

Whilst vitarka signifies a supra-cognition in relation to a 'coarse' (sthūla) object, that is, anything pertaining to the surface structure of prakṛti (such as one of the somatic centres mentioned by Patañjali or any other micro- or macro-structure of the tangible universe), vicāra denotes a supra-cognition in relation to a 'subtle' (suksma) object which can be any phenomenon ranging from the tanmātras (provided Patañjali recognised these 'potentials') up to the transcendental core of the knowable world, i.e. the undifferentiate (aliṅga). In nirvitarka-and nirvicāra-samāpatti the respective supra-cognitions are fully dispersed and what remains is a consciousness which, like a highly polished mirror, reflects the intended object with a modicum of refraction. In 1.47 it is implied that nirvicāra-samāpatti is in fact the highest stage of this series which suggests the following hierarchic organisation:

\[
\begin{align*}
&\text{nirvicāra-samāpatti} \\
&\quad \text{vicāra-samāpatti} \\
&\quad \text{nirvitarka-samāpatti} \\
&\quad \text{vitarka-samāpatti}
\end{align*}
\]

There is no mention of any ānanda-samādhi or asmitā-samādhi in the Yoga-Sūtra which would validate the hypothetical models put

Of these [four types] the first, having [all] four associated together is the enstasy with 'deliberation'. The second lacking 'deliberation' is [the enstasy] with 'reflection'. The third lacking 'reflection' is [the enstasy] with 'joy'. The fourth lacking that ['joy'] is [the enstasy] with the feeling of 'I-am-ness'. All these are with supports [i.e. intended objects]". Arranged in a systematic fashion this looks as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{asmitā-samādhi} &= \text{asmitā} \\
\text{ānanda-samādhi} &= \text{ānanda + asmitā} \\
\text{vicāra-samādhi} &= \text{vicāra + ānanda + asmitā} \\
\text{vitarka-samādhi} &= \text{vitarka + vicāra + ānanda + asmitā}
\end{align*}
\]

This is a beautiful illustration of the sat-kārya axiom according to which the effect is pre-existent in its cause. In this particular case the lowest degree of enstatic realisation contains in posse the supra-cognitive elements typical of the higher forms of enstasy.
Thus Vyāsa assumes ananda and asmitā to constitute the contents of separate stages of samādhi. It is unclear how he envisages the correlation between these postulated four types and the four varieties of samāpatti as cited in I.42-44. Does he take ananda- and asmitā-samādhi to be instances of nirvicāra-samāpatti? And what sort of experiences do they stand for? Vācaspati Miśra tries to disentangle these knotty problems.

In his Tattva-Vaiṣāraṇī (I.17) we find this explanation:

ananda iti indriye sthūla-ālambane cittasva-ābhoga āhlādāḥ, prakāsa-
āteśāya khalu sattva-pradhānād-ahākārād-indriyāṇy-utpādāṇīṁ,
sattvaṁ sukhām-iti tāṇy-āpi sukhāṁ-iti tasminn-ābhoga āhlāda-iti
(...) asmitā-prabhavāni-indriyāni, tena-esāṁ-asmitā suksmaṁ rūpaṁ,
sā ca ātmanā grahītraṁ saha buddhir-eka-ātmikā samvid-iti, or: "Joy
is the mind's gladdening experience [when directed towards] a
sense-organ [which is to be understood as a] coarse support. The
sense-organs of course arise from the T-maker' [insofar as they
have] a disposition to enlighten because of the pre-eminence of
sattva [in them]. [As] sattva [manifests] pleasure, these [sense-organs]
too are pleasurable. Experience is thus gladdening [when directed
towards] those [sense-organs] ... The sense-organs are produced
from 'I-am-ness', [consequently] this 'I-am-ness' is their subtle
form, and this ['I-am-ness'] together with the grasper is [known
as] buddhi, [i.e.] the feeling [pertaining] to oneself".

These remarks, not particularly enlightening in themselves,
make more sense when viewed in conjunction with Vācaspati Miśra's
proposed model of eight types of samāpatti. He states (I.46):
Tena gr̥̄haye catasrah samapattayo grahīty-grahanayoḥ-ca catasra ity-astau te bhavanti-iti, "Thus [with regard] to the 'grasped' there are four coincidences, [and there are a further] four [in respect to] the 'grasper' and 'grasping'. Thus there are eight of these [coincidences]." Diagrammatically this looks as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective Prop:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>nir-asmita-samapatti</td>
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<tr>
<td>asmita-samapatti</td>
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<tr>
<td>nir-ananda-samapatti</td>
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<tr>
<td>ananda-samapatti</td>
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<td>nir-vicara-samapatti</td>
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<tr>
<td>vicara-samapatti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nir-vitarka-samapatti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vitarka-samapatti</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These conjectural stages of enstatic experience have been admirably analysed by G.M. KOELMAN (1970, 198ff.). However, whatever explanatory value they may be credited with they cannot be reckoned to be representative of Patañjali's viewpoint as it can be reconstructed from the evidence in the Yoga-Sūtra itself. At any rate the profound disagreements between the various exegetists on this crucial issue suffice for us not to accept any of their explanations precipitately. While Vācaspati Miśra boldly doubles Vyāsa's perhaps more convincing quartet of enstatic types, Vijnāna Bhikṣu in his Yoga-Vārttika (I.46) comes up with a six stage model. He explicitly rejects Vācaspati Miśra's view according to which the object of
vitarka- and vicāra-samādhi is grāhya, of ānanda-samādhi grahapa and of asmītā-samādhi the category of grahītṛ. Instead he regards ānanda as a product of extreme vicāra-samāpatti; which then is made the objective prop of the next higher form of enstasy.

Asmītā-samāpatti, again, is explained by him as kevala-purusa-ākāra-samvit, that is, the feeling which takes the shape of the transcendental Self. Vijnāna Bhikṣu adamantly denies that there is a nir-ānanda- or a nir-asmītā-samādhi.

G.M. KOELMAN (1970) opts for Vācaspati Miśra's interpretation which he seeks to vindicate in what must be considered the most penetrating analysis of this whole problem complex hitherto. However, he is sadly mistaken when he pleads that these eight types of samāpatti as delineated in the Tattva-Vaiśāradya "are the core of Patañjala mental discipline" (p. 223). They are indeed "a magnificent piece of psychology" (ibid), but it remains an open question to what degree this theoretical model is founded on experiential information. As I have pointed out at the outset of this study, Vācaspati Miśra was no doubt a conscientious and extremely erudite scholar, but hardly an initiated yogin who could speak authoritatively about such recondite phenomena as these enstatic states. In point of fact, as a close inspection of the Yoga-Sūtra itself bears out neither Vācaspati Miśra nor Vijnāna Bhikṣu are reliable guides in this complicated matter.

Patañjali's own view seems to be that he takes nirvicāra-samāpatti as the highest form of samprajñāta-samādhi. He states: nirvicāra-vaiśāradye'dhyātma-prasādah, rtam-bhūrā tatra prajña (I.47-48), or:
"When there is autumnal-lucidity in nirvicāra[-samāpatti], [then] this is called the clarity of the inner-being. - In this state of autumnal-lucidity knowledge is truth-bearing".

Vyāsa (I.47) paraphrases this enstatic condition with bhūta-artha-visavah krama-ananurodhī sphuta-prajñā-ālokāh or "the flashing-forth of full-blown (sphūta) gnosis, not conforming to [the law of] sequence [and having as its] objects the things themselves". At this culmination of the enstatic process of involution no specific pratyayas or 'presented-ideas' remain. There is merely a generic awareness of the essence of the intended object. All noetic acts of the supra-cognitive type (e.g. vitarka etc.) are suspended. Patañjali does not even mention the presence of ānanda (meta-bliss) or asmitā (meta-subjectivity) in this state, though this does not count as a proof of their actual absence. The gnostic illumination which occurs at this culminant stage is said to be without development. It is, as Vacaspati Miśra (I.47) observes, 'simultaneous' (yugapad), an atemporal knowing which has as its essential characteristic that it is 'truth-bearing' (ṛtam-bhara), that is, if one recalls the archaic overtones of the concept of rta, reflective of the universal order and harmony. This elevated enstatic state is likened to the clarity of the autumnal sky so typical of northern India.

In this connection Vyāsa (I.47) cites a stanza of unknown origin but identified by Vacaspati Miśra as a paramā-ṛṣi gāthā. It reads: prajñā-prasādam-ānuhyā asociyah socato jānān, bhūmi-śhūn-iva śaila-stahā sarvān prajñā'nupāsyati, or: "Having ascended to the
tranquillity of gnosis, griefless, he beholds, like [a person]
standing on the mountain [top] and looking down upon] the
valley-dwellers, all grief-stricken creatures'. This is a popular
metaphor which can be met with in the Mahābhārata (Calc. ed.
XII.17.20; 151.11) and the Dhammapada (28).

This non-sequential gnosis is further explained in I.49: śruta-
anumāna-praṇābhyām-anya-viśayā višeṣa-arthatvāt, or: "The scope
[of this gnosis] is distinct from the 'knowledge' [derived from]
tradition or inference because of [its] particular purposefulness".
J.H. WOODS (1966) translates this sūtra differently: "Has an object
other than the insight resulting from things heard or from inferences
inasmuch as its object is a particular." Although this rendering
is true to Vyāsa's diction, who argues that whilst śabda and anumāna
deal with generic objects only, samādhi discloses the particular,
nevertheless a far less sophisticated interpretation is possible
and also preferable. J.W. HAUER (1958, 337), for instance, understands
the phrase višeṣa-arthatvāt as "weil sein Zweck ein anderer ist"
explaining this purpose to be that of liberation. I find the
simplicity of this solution convincing and therefore propose to
translate the above phrase with "particular purposefulness".

The gnostic flash or praṇā-praṇāloka spoken of in the Yoga-Bhāṣya
(I.47) and in the Yoga-Sūtra (III.5) can tentatively be understood
as the climax of the sevenfold gnosis (sapta-dhā praṇā) mentioned in
aphorism II.27 (tasya sapta-dhā prāntā-bhūmiḥ praṇā) and described
as arising from viveka-khyāti (see II.26). A possible elucidation of

93 According to Vyāsa the word tasya refers to the yogin who has attained
to the 'vision of discernment', but with Vijnāna Bhikṣu I prefer to
relate it back to the compound hāna-upāya of II.26.
what might be entailed in this 'sevenfold gnosis' can be found in the Yoga-Bhāṣya (II.27): saptadhā-iti aśuddhy-āvaraṇa-malā-apagamaḥ-cittasya prataye-antara-anutpade sati sapta-prakāra-eva praśna vivekino bhavati, tad-yathā-parijñātaṁ heyaṁ na-asya punah pariḥ̣eṇaḥ-asti, kṛṣṇa heyaḥ-heṅavo na punar-śeteṣāṁ kṣetavyam-asti, sākṣat-kṛtaṁ nirodha-samādhina hānum, bhavito viveka-khyati-rūpo hāna-upāvaḥ ity-esaḥ catuṣṭaya kāryavā vimuktih praśnāvāḥ, citta-vimuktis-tu trayāḥ carita-adhikārā buddhiḥ gūna-giri-sīkhara-kūta-cyuta śvā grāvāno niravasthānāḥ, sva-kāraṇe pralaya-abhimukhāḥ saha tene-astam gacchanti, na ca-esam pravītaṁnaḥ punar-aṣṭaḥ-utpadaḥ práyojana-abhāvāldi, etasyaṁ-svasthāyaṁ gūna-sambandha-ātitaḥ sva-rūpa-mātra-jyotir-amalaḥ kevali puruṣaḥ, or: "Sevenfold' [means that] through the disappearance of the defilements from the cover-of-impurity, when no other presented-idea is produced by the mind, the gnosis of the discerner (vivekin) is of seven kinds, [viz.] (i) that-which-is-to-be-escaped (heya) [i.e. all future suffering] is full-comprehended; it need not be full-comprehended again; (ii) the causes of that-which-is-to-be-escaped have dwindled [namely the correlation between 'seer' and 'seen' etc.]; they need not dwindle again; (iii) through the enstasy of restriction the [total] cessation (hsa) is realised; (iv) the means of cessation in the form of the vision of discernment has become manifested; this is the fourfold release of the gnosis to be effected; however, the release of the mind [as such] is triple: (v) the sovereignty of buddhi is obtained; (vi) the gūnas, like rocks [which have] fallen from the edge of a mountain-peak, are without support [and] of their own accord incline towards
dissolution, [and] they go to rest with that buddhi; and once these [guna] are dissolved, there is no new origination [for them], because of the absence of the cause [viz. avidya or 'nescience']; (vii) in this state the Self has transcended the connection with the gunas [and is established as] the light of nought but [its] own-form, undefiled [and] alone".

Viveka-khyati is the expedient by which the cessation (hāna) of the ominous correlation between Self and non-self is brought about (see II.26). It is also known as viveka-ja-jhāna or 'gnosis born of discernment' (see III.52, 54)94. Aphorism III.52 is of special interest since it prescribes a method by which this non-sequential gnosis can be effected most directly: ksana-tat-kramayoh samyamad-viveka-jam jhānam, or: "By constraint on the moments-of-time and their sequence [the yogin gains] discernment-born gnosis". The topic of this particular exercise is the structure of time thought to consist of smallest intervals of duration (ksana). In other words, time is made the meditative support by which the atemporal reality is to be actualised.

In III.54 this gnostic revelation is described as the 'deliverer' (tāraka) owing to its power which transports the yogin across the ocean of phenomenal existence into the Unconditioned. This gnosis is 'omni-objective' (sarva-visaya) and 'omni-temporal' (sarvathā-visaya) and 'non-sequential' (akrama) (see III.54). The quintessence of this vision of discernment is the abolition of the empirical ego. As Patanjali (IV.25) declares: viṣesa-dars'îna atma-bhava-bhavana-vivrttih, or: "For the seer of the distinction [between Self and non-self] there

94 J.H. WOODS' (1966) index lists viveka-jam dhyānam at III.52 which must be a slip since his translation clearly presupposes °-jhānam.
ensues] the discontinuance of the projection of the self's state". The decisive phrase \textit{ātma-bhāva-bhāvana}, here converted into "the projection of the self's state", is a problematic one as is witnessed by the existing translations. R. PRASĀDA (1912), for instance, takes it to mean "the curiosity as to the nature-and-relations of the Self" and G. JHA (1907) has "thought of the nature of self", whilst J.H. WOODS (1966) prefers to translate it with "pondering upon his own states-of-being". However, I submit that these various renderings disregard the active component in \textit{bhāvana} which is closely allied to \textit{bhāvana} meaning 'effecting, realising, cultivating'. I therefore propose to translate it with 'projection' which best conveys the element of 'mental construction'. Supportive evidence for this interpretation is found in Buddhism where \textit{bhāvana} is usually given the meaning of 'meditation' or 'visualisation' though, as LL. SNELLGROVE (1959, I, 134) points out, "in the special sense of mental production or thought-creation". These considerations apply naturally also to aphorism 1.33 which is the only other instance in which the word \textit{bhāvana} (as \textit{bhāvanātaḥ}) occurs. This \textit{sūtra} is of considerable interest insofar as it speaks of "the projecting of friendship, compassion, gladness and impartiality" (\textit{maitrī-karupā-muditā-upekṣāpām ... bhāvanātaḥ}) which establishes an immediate link with Buddhism in which this set of four mental attitudes is well known.

The term \textit{ātma-bhāva}, again, denotes the empirical self complex which is abolished as soon as \textit{nirvicāra-vaiśāradya} sets in, thus giving way to a state which Vyāsa circumscribes as "sheer existing" or \textit{sattā-mātra}. The act of 'discernment' (\textit{viveka}) which characterises
this enstatic elevation (prasamkhyaṇa) is not an ordinary intellectual exercise of 'differentiation' or 'comparison'. Rather it is an immediate knowing (Innnehmen) of the distinction between Self and self. This explains why the expedient by which the yogin propels himself into the next higher stage of enstasy, viz. asampraṇāta-samādhi, is not so much a noetic act as a conative one in the form of a total and irrevocable turning away from prakṛti reality. I am referring of course to para-vairāgya or 'higher dispassion' (see III.50; I.16) as the only means of entering into asampraṇāta-samādhi.

G. N. KOELMAN (1970, 237) displays a considerable degree of empathic understanding when examining this recondite phenomenon. Trying to determine the nature of this final volition to disengage entirely from prakṛti as such, he writes: "The rejection, however, should not be a violent effort, since this would impair peace of mind. There should be a tranquil suave disinterestedness, a peaceful refraining from thinking, rather than a rejection of the thought of inadequacy or of the thought of otherness, a constant refusal of consciousness and a sinking away into Awareness. The highest state of concentration (sic!) is, therefore, an effort of the will rather than an activity of the mind."

What happens once the vision of discernment has ceded? The answer is simple: When all conscious contents have been cleared and even the awareness of pure existing is no longer present, consciousness undergoes a total collapse. There is a gradual emptying of consciousness in the course of the enstatic journey, and then comes the critical point at which 'implosion' occurs owing to the extreme evacuation of the mind. This is asampraṇāta-samādhi which

95 E. FRAUWALLNER (1953, I, 424) wrongly equates prasamkhyaṇa with dhyāna.
coincides with *pratyaya-nirodha*.

However, this absence of consciousness does not mean that *asamprajñāta-samādhi* is equivalent to a state of unconsciousness as ordinarily understood. Such an interpretation is not defensible on any count, since Yoga is careful to differentiate between consciousness and Awareness (*cit*).\(^{96}\) For this reason one must also reject G. JHA's (1907) translation of the term *asamprajñāta* with 'unconscious'. A somewhat more appropriate rendering would appear to be 'ultra-cognitive' as suggested by M.N. DVIVEDI (1934\(^3\)). As S. DASGUPTA (1924, 124) comments: "This state, like the other previous states of the *samprajñāta* type, is a positive state of the mind and not a mere state of vacuity of objects or negativity. In this state, all determinate character of the states disappears and their potencies only remain alive". G.M. KOELMAN (1970, 239), more punctiliously perhaps, puts it thus: "Concentration (sic!) without objective consciousness should not be conceived as total absence of knowledge; only knowledge by objectivation is absent".

This rather elusive condition is also called *nirodha-parināma* in III.9: *vyutthāna-nirodha-samskārayor-abhibhava-prādur-bhāvau nirodha-kaśaṇa-citta-anvayo nirodha-parināmaḥ*, or: "[When there is] subjugation of the subliminal-activators of emergence and the manifestation [of the subliminal-activators] of restriction [this is known as] the restriction-transmutation [or] the connection of the mind with the moment of restriction". The immediately succeeding aphorism (III.10) complements this statement: *tasya prāśānta-vāhitā samskārāt*, or: "Its calm flow [is

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96 For some useful observations on the interpretation of the nature of this type of enstatic experience, see J. MARÉCHAL (1964\(^2\), 186ff.).
effected] by a subliminal-activator". The specialness of nirodha-parināma is brought out by the aphorisms III.11-12 which define the other non-ordinary 'transmutations' (parināma) of the mind: sarva-arthata-ekāgratayoh kaśaya-udayau cittasya samādhi-parināmaḥ, tataḥ punah sānta-uditau tulya-pratyayau cittasya ekāgratā-parināmaḥ, or: "The dwindling of all-object-ness and the uprisal of one-pointedness is the enstasy-transmutation of the mind. - Then again, when the quiescent and the uprisen presented-ideas are similar, [this is] the one-pointedness-transmutation of the mind".

Whereas III.12 is seemingly a description of the underlying process of the techniques of dhāraṇa and dhyāna, III.11 refers to the central happening in enstasy. The term sarva-arthata, which occurs only in III.11, is decisive. Contrary to the contention of the classical exegetists who equate this expression with visāya or external object, arthata must be taken to denote 'intended object'. Nor can I accept S. DASGUPTA's (1924, 155) interpretation of III.9 that "even when the mind is in the samprajñāta state it is said to be in vyutthāna (phenomenal) in comparison with the nirodha state, just as the ordinary conscious states are called vyutthāna in comparison with the samprajñāta state". He evidently reads slightly more into this aphorism than is actually there. It seems to me that the term vyutthāna merely qualifies the term samskāra and is not applied to the enstatic condition as such.

From the viewpoint of the empirical consciousness, asamprajñāta-samādhi is but a mass of subliminal-activators (see I.18) which devour each other step by step because they are prevented from conscious thematisation and also because there is no further feedback from
consciousness. This state is also designated as 'seedless' (nir-bīja, III.8) in contrast to the sa-bīja forms of samāpatti. The word bīja or 'seed' in all probability refers to the 'support' (ālambana) or the intended object.

Initially, asamprajñātasaṃādhi is only a fleeting experience intercalating itself into the general enstatic continuum on the level of samprajñātasaṃādhi. For by dint of the subliminal tensions the yogin reverts again and again to the lower forms of enstatic experience (see IV.27). Nonetheless, once the utmost boundary of nirvicāra-samāpatti is reached, he is carried as if by a powerful current towards kaivalya (see IV.26). This is so because despite of the innumerable viśaṇās, prakṛti ultimately serves the end of the Self (see IV.24).

In conclusion I shall briefly glance at the terminal stage of the entire enstatic process of involution, namely the phenomenon of dharma-megha-samādhi. This concept makes its appearance in a single aphorism, namely IV.29, which reads as follows: prasamkhyāne'py-aṅkuaīdasya sarvathā viveka-khyāter-dharma-meghaḥ saṃādhiḥ, or: "For [the yogin who is] always non-usurious (a-kuśida) even in [the state of] elevated-insight (prasamkhyāna) [there follows] from the vision of discernment the enstasy [known as] the cloud of dharma". The word akusida describes the adept who applies himself to para-vairāgya by which asamprajñātasaṃādhi is realised. The term dharma-megha-samādhi is used here either as a straightforward synonym of asamprajñātasaṃādhi or else it refers to the consummate phase of this highest type of enstasy. I shall argue in favour of the second alternative.
This important concept is surrounded by a certain enigma which the classical commentators have failed to illuminate as is clearly evinced by their contradictory and occasionally even self-contradictory interpretations of the precise location of dharma-megha-samādhi within the whole series of enstatic experiences. In his Yoga-Bhāṣya (I.2) Vyāsa makes the following statement: \[\text{tad-eva reko-lesa-mala-apetam sva-rūpa-pratisthām sattva-purusa-anyata-khyati-mātram dharma-megha-dhyāna-unevam bhavati, tat-param prasamkhyanam-ity-ācakṣate dhyāvīnaḥ, or: "[When] the defilement of the vestiges of rajas is removed from that \[state] of sattva \[and when sīta] is grounded in \[its] own-form \[and is] nothing but the vision of the distinction between Self and sattva, \[then] it tends towards the absorption \[known as] the cloud of dharma; that \[sattva state] is designated as the supreme elevated-insight by the meditators".}\]

Vijnāna Bhikṣu, in his Yoga-Vārttika (I.2) explains this passage thus: \[\text{dharma-megha-dhyānaṃ kim-ity-ākāśa-ayam-āha tat/param-itī/tat-adharma-megha-ākāśa dhyānaṃ paramam prasamkhyaṇaṃ tattva-jañnavā viveka-khyātārthā, or: "What is the absorption \[known as] the cloud of dharma? Anticipating this query \[Vyāsa] says: 'that is the supreme elevated-insight'. That absorption called the 'cloud of dharma' is the supreme elevated-insight, true knowledge \[born of] the vision of discernment". Clearly, this is a gross misconstruction of Vyāsa's stance. As is evident from subsequent statements in the Yoga-Bhāṣya (see I.15; II.2; IV.29) the author does not identify prasamkhyaṇa...}
with dharma-megha-samādhi and consequently the word tat or 'that' in the last sentence of the above quotation does not refer to dharma-megha-dhyāna (= c-samādhi), as Vījñāna Bhikṣu maintains, but to the state of unpolluted sattva.

G.M. KOELMAN (1970, 234) regards dharma-megha-samādhi as the "passage from the state of Sublime Insight to the state of Restriction", that is, from maempkhāna to asamprajñāta-samādhi. He contends (p. 235) that the 'enstasy of the cloud of dharma' "is the stage where there is absolutely uninterrupted discriminate intuition, at once apprehended and generously sacrificed, an uninterrupted experience of the fact that in our present state we do not square with our true Self...". But this is neither the view of Patañjali nor that of Vyāsa. G.M. KOELMAN (1970) tries to vindicate his interpretation by citing Vacaspati Miśra (I.18): dharma-megha-samādhīr-eva hi nītānā-vigilītara-jas-tamo-malāṭ-sattvād-upajitas-tat-tad-vīṣaya-stikramena pravarttamāno' nanto vīṣaya-avadyadarśī samasta-vīṣaya-parityāgoc-ca sva-rūpa-pratisthāh san-nirālambanah saṃskāra-sātra-geśasya nirālambasasya saṃśadeḥ kārānunapadyate sārūpyād, or: "When sattva is entirely freed from the defilements of rajās and tamās, the dharma-megha enstasy is effected. Its activity is transcendent to any object. [It is] unbounded, beholding [all] objects and on account of [the mind's] shunning of all objects [it remains] grounded in [its] own-form, being without support. It acts as the cause of the enstasy [which has] only a vestige of subliminal-activators [and which is] without support owing to [its] homogeneity".

This exposition goes, probably unintentionally, against all the evidence in the Yoga-Sūtra and against the authority of Vyāsa. For instance, 97 This substitution of samādhi by dhyāna is most unwonted, but there can be no doubt that dharma-megha-dhyāna is in fact the same as dharma-megha-samādhi.
in IV.30 it is stated that "thence [ie. as a result of dharma-megha-
 samādhi] comes about] the cessation of [all] causes-of-affliction
and of karman" (tataḥ klesa-karma-nivṛttiḥ). This interpretation
is reinforced by the whole context of the concluding sūtras in which
the concept of dharma-megha-samādhi is first introduced. Accordingly,
one is forced to conclude that the dharma-megha ecstasy forms the
terminal stage of asamprajñāta-samādhi and that it coincides with
the yogin's exit from the prakṛtic realm in toto. For this reason
one must also discard the equation, proposed in the Pūtakajala-Rahasya
(IV.29), of dharma-megha-samādhi with para-vairāgya. As has been shown,
para-vairāgya serves as the means to asamprajñāta-samādhi.

Having clarified the position of this puzzling phenomenon
on the enstatic scala, it remains for us to ascertain the meaning
of the concept of dharma in dharma-megha. The older generation of
indologists have focused on the ethical connotation of this flexible
word and invariably translated it with 'virtue' (G. JHA, R. PRASĀDA,
/ N. MÜLLER) or 'merit' (M.N. DVĪVEDI). More recent researchers have
found these renderings unsatisfactory and tacitly or openly queried
that dharma in the present context has a moral sense. Thus S.
RADHAKRISHNAN (1951) renders it with 'truth', G.M. KOELMAN (1970)
with 'essence' and J.H. WOODS (1966) suggests '(knowable) thing',
whilst J.W. HAUER (1958) taking his cue from buddhist contexts
understands it as 'tragende Urmacht'. Explaining this unexpected
paraphrase, J.W. HAUER (1958, 470, fn. 22) writes: "The meditator
is in this state enveloped by the supporting prime power [tragende
Urmacht] of the world; he has become a dharmakaya like the 'great
Muni'. This is an expression for Buddha who has entered Nirvāṇa".
I find this interpretation persuasive. For, the concept of dharma-megha does not appear to be mentioned by any Hindu authority prior to Patañjali, though it is evidently an integral part of the technical nomenclature of early Mahāyāna Buddhism. There it figures as the tenth bhūmi or 'stage' of the bodhisattva's path to perfection, as can be seen, for example, from the Pañcavimśati-Sahasrikā (p. 230, ed. by N. Dutt, 1934). I consider this to be the original usage of the concept of dharma-megha, whatever other shades of meaning it may have acquired in subsequent periods. And it must be in precisely this sense that Patañjali knew and probably also used the term. This raises anew the vexed question, broached by previous scholars (e.g. L. de la Vallée Poussin, 1936/37), of the relation between Classical Yoga and Buddhism.
PART FOUR

CONCLUSION
CHAPTER EIGHT

PATAÑJALA-YOGA AND CLASSICAL SĀMKHYA

Of the plethora of misinterpretations of Patanjali's darsana, both by foreign and indigenous scholars, none proved more inveterate and damaging than the claim that Classical Yoga is but a Spielart of Sāmkhya. This infelicitous assumption was first proposed by H.T. COLEBROOKE in his now classical essay on Yoga. According to him there is but a single difference between Yoga and Sāmkhya, namely the presence of the doctrine of Jñāvara in the former and its denial in the latter school of thought. "In less momentous matters they differ, not upon points of doctrine, but in the degree in which the exterior exercises, or abstruse reasoning and study, are weighed upon, as requisite preparations of absorbed contemplation." This mistaken view was destined to be echoed and re-echoed throughout the next century. The following statements, culled almost at random from the indological literature, are symptomatic of this fundamental misapprehension, and even in quite recent publications can this antiquated idea be found to ghost about.

In the same vein as H.T. COLEBROOKE, R. MITRA (1883, xviii)

98 H.T. COLEBROOKE (1873, I)

99 op. cit., p. 265
writes: "The Yoga Sutra takes for granted the twenty-five categories of the Sánkhya as the basis of its doctrine, and copies some of its aphorisms almost verbatim". Similarly, M.N. Dvivedi (1890, 1934^, xviii): "The Yoga subscribes to the Sámkhya theory in toto". M. Monier-Williams (1894, 200), again, writes: "The Yoga, founded by Patanjali and regarded as a branch of the Sánkhya, is scarcely worthy of the name of a separate system of philosophy. Yet is has undoubted charms for the naturally contemplative and ascetical Hindu..."

Although correcting some of the mistaken notions about Yoga and displaying a far more liberal-minded attitude towards it than did his predecessors, M. Müller (1916^, 312) nonetheless follows suit when he states: "... it may be quite true that, after we have once understood the position of the Sánkhya-philosophy towards the great problem of the world, we shall not glean many new metaphysical or psychological ideas from a study of the Yoga". R. Garbe (1917^, 148), well known for his pioneer work on Sánkhya, makes no concessions to Yoga at all: "All Sánkhya teachings about cosmology, physiology and psychology were simply taken over into the Yoga system. Even the doctrine of salvation is the same ..." S. Radhakrishnan (1927, 1951^, II, 342) expresses a more moderate but still not affirmative enough view: "Patanjali systematised the conceptions of the Yoga and set them forth on the background of the metaphysics of the Sánkhya, which he assumes with slight variations".

The first scholar to come to the defence of Classical Yoga and vigorously affirm its doctrinal autonomy is S. Dasgupta (1930, 2) who, seeking to rectify past misinterpretations and sweeping generalisations, remarks: "It is true that Yoga owes much to the Sánkhya philosophy, but
it is doubtful whether the obligation is due to the Kapila Sāṅkhya as we have it now. My supposition is that we have lost the original Sāṅkhya texts, whereas the systems that pass now by the name of Sāṅkhya and Yoga represent two schools of philosophy which evolved through the modifications of the original Sāṅkhya school; Yoga did not borrow its material from Kapila Sāṅkhya (.), though the Yoga and the Kapila Sāṅkhya are fundamentally the same in their general metaphysical positions, yet they hold quite different views on many points of philosophical, ethical and practical interest". M. Eliade (1973, 7), a former student of S. Dasgupta, blurs this fine distinction again when he writes: "As to the theoretical framework and the metaphysical foundation that Patañjali provides for these practices, his personal contribution is of the smallest. He merely rehandles the Sāṅkhya philosophy in its broad outlines, adapting it to a rather superficial theism in which he exalts the practical value of meditation. The Yoga and Sāṅkhya systems are so much alike that most of the affirmations made by the one are valid for the other".

F. Catalina (1968, 19) is far more discerning: "In the main, the two systems are very much alike. However, there are some significant differences which warrant our calling Yoga a separate system of philosophy". This enlightened view has unfortunately not become as widely prevalent as one would wish. Too often Yoga is still being reduced to Sāṅkhya, with perhaps a few unimportant appendages of its own. For instance, Ch. Sharma (1960, 169) makes this wooly comment: "Yoga is intimately allied to Sāṅkhya. The Gītā
calls them one. Yoga means spiritual action and Sākhyā means knowledge. Sākhyā is theory; Yoga is practice. For all practical purposes, Sākhyā and Yoga may be treated as the theoretical and the practical sides of the same system.

However, as a perusal of the literature evinces not only Indian scholars are guilty of this kind of reductionism and overgeneralisation. N. SMART (1968, 26), for example, writes: "The Samkhya system can hardly by itself be treated as a method of liberation, though it lays claims to being such, which is a main reason why it is coupled, and has been coupled over a very long period, with the Yoga system. The latter borrows its main features, with certain adaptations, from the Samkhya, so that it is not too misleading to treat Samkhya as the theoretical exposition and Yoga the practical account of how to achieve that clarity of consciousness which brings liberation from the round of rebirth and the suffering of the world."

Such inept statements could be multiplied almost ad libitum. They all betray a total lack of historical perspective which, in turn, is responsible for an almost incredible conceptual haziness. It is futile to attempt a comparison between two items which have not been clearly defined to begin with. Thus, in the above quotations Sākhyā is obviously used in a variety of meanings. Properly speaking, a valid comparison is possible only between Classical Yoga and Classical Sākhyā insofar as both have the status of a philosophical darsana. And in this sense, there can be no justification whatsoever for deriving Classical Yoga from Classical Sākhyā.
Recent research into the complex history of the Yoga and Sāṃkhya tradition has brought to light ample material to vindicate S. Dasgupta's (1930) conclusion that Patañjali's Yoga is a specific type of Sāṃkhya-Yoga just as the system of Classical Sāṃkhya it so be regarded as a separate line of development of the same common ideological ground. As K.B.R. Rao (1966, 9) puts it succinctly: "We must guard against another obsession which has taken deep roots in our minds. It refers to the equation that is generally made of 'atheistic Sāṃkhya' expounded in the Sāṃkhya Kārikā, with the one expounded in the Yoga Sūtras of Patañjali, with the exception of Isvāra in the latter. It is an error of judgement to place the Sāṃkhya Kārikā and the Yoga Sūtras or Kapila and Patañjali, in juxtaposition and treat them as preaching Atheism and Theism respectively (...) The Yoga Sūtras have Sāṃkhyan elements as Vedānta itself has, but its difference with the classical Sāṃkhya is as great as the difference between Vedānta and the classical Samkhya. The Yoga-Sūtra-Sāṃkhya is not simply classical Sāṃkhya plus God, nor the classical Sāṃkhya of the Sāṃkhya Kārikā is Yoga-Sūtra-Sāṃkhya minus God. They are fundamentally different in so many main principles".

Now, the precise nature of these differences has never been ascertained in any appreciable detail. The reason for this is obvious: the absence of an unprejudiced study of the Yoga-Sūtra preceded by a critical appraisal of the exegetical literature. However, on the basis of the purged reading of the Yoga-Sūtra, rendered feasible by the present study, we are now in a position to re-examine these differences and undertake a comprehensive
comparison between the Yoga-Sūtra and the Sāmkhya-Kārika. Such a formidable task, though, lies outside the compass of this investigation, and I must defer a detailed treatment of this promising line of research. For the present, I merely wish to point out the major divergencies between these two schools of thought as they have become apparent in the course of this study. I must emphasise at this point that I have certain misgivings about current interpretations of the Sāmkhya-Kārika as well, and that before any exhaustive comparison could be undertaken this text would have to be examined both from a textual and a semantic point of view, so that we may arrive at a sterling understanding of this important scripture unobscured by all later interpretations and likely distortions. Until then one has to remain content with the rough identification of three areas of contrast between Classical Sāmkhya and Patañjala-Yoga, viz.

(1) methodology
(2) doctrinal framework
(3) terminology

It is my contention that the different methodological approach of Classical Yoga is responsible for many of its conceptual and doctrinal as well as terminological idiosyncrasies. I therefore commence this review with a brief examination of the methodological aspect. The importance of the distinct approach of Patañjali is pertinently emphasised by M. Eliade (1973, 7): "... whereas, according to Sāmkhya, the only path to salvation is that of
metaphysical knowledge, Yoga accords marked importance to techniques of meditation". Elsewhere (p. 36) he remarks: "Patañjali takes over the Sāmkhya dialectic almost in its entirety, but he does not believe that metaphysical knowledge can, by itself, lead man to final liberation. Gnosis, in his view, only prepares the ground for the acquisition (sic!) of freedom (mukti). Emancipation must, so to speak, be conquered by sheer force, specifically by means of an ascetic technique and a method of contemplation, which, taken together, constitute nothing less than the yoga-darsana".

In a nutshell, whereas Classical Śāmkhya relies heavily on the power of ratiocination and discernment, Classical Yoga like any other yogic tradition is founded on a philosophy which encourages personal experimentation and direct 'mystical' verification. This basic difference is anticipated in a well-known stanza in the Mahābhārata (XII.289.7): pratyakṣa-hetavo yogah sāmkhyāḥ śāstra-viniścayāḥ, ubhe ca-ete tatve tāta yudhiṣṭhira, or: "The Śāmkhya-followers depend on [their] scriptures, [whilst] the Yoga-followers rely on direct-experience (pratyakṣa) ..." Even though on other occasions the unity of Yoga and Śāmkhya is vigorously asserted, the above statement which is by no means unique clearly foreshadows the later bifurcation of both schools of thought into a 'rationalistic' and a 'mystical' system.

It is this experimental and experiential approach of Yoga, as opposed to the more traditionalist Śāmkhya, which can be said to have been the great underlying stimulus in the doctrinal innovations and the creation of new schools within Hinduism as much as within Buddhism. The classical example of the seeker after truth who
discards all theory in order to probe the depths of reality
by means of his own one-pointed mind, is the founder of Buddhism
himself. After having pursued his search with the help of existing
'models', of a Samkhya and Yoga type, which he found of no avail,
the Buddha abandoned himself completely to a course of personal
meditative exploration of his own device, which ultimately resulted
in his sambodhi and in the formulation of one of India's most
prodigious schools of thought.

The highly formalistic and rationalistic basis of Classical
Samkhya is borne out quite clearly by the opening stanzas of the
Samkhya-Karika which read: duhkha-traya-abhigataj-ijhasa tad-
abhigatake hetau, drste sa-sapthha cen-na-eka-anta-atyantato
bhava^jft; dr^tavad-anusravikah sa hy-avisuddhi-ko^ya-atishaya-yuktah,
tad-vipar~tah sreyan-avyakta-avyakta-ja^sa-vijhanat, or: "Owing to
the tribulation [stemming from the] threefold suffering [there
arises] the desire to know the means of its removal. If [it be
argued that] this [inquiry] is futile because visible [means of
removal are available], [we reply that this is] not [the case] since
[the visible remedies] are not final or abiding. — The revealed
[cure for this tribulation] is like the visible [cure] [in the last
analysis ineffective], [for it is also] connected with impurity,
destruction and excess; different and superior to that is the
discriminative-knowledge [by which is differentiated] the manifest,
the unmanifest and the knower [i.e. the 'Self'] .

Thus the central expedient by which the termination of suffering
(duhkhah) is effected is vijhana or the careful holding apart of
the three essential ontological categories postulated by Samkhya.
The technical terms vyakta, avyakta and jna are explained in stanza 3
as the evolutes of the world-ground, the world-ground itself and
**purusa** respectively, and they are further defined in stanzas 10-11.
In stanza 64, whose importance is generally overlooked, **viññāna**
occurs by the technical name of **tattva-abhyāsa** or the 'practice
affirming (the truth) as taught by **Śaṅkhya**'. We also hear what
this truth consists in. I cite the entire verse: **evam tattva-abhyāsa-na-asmi na me na-aham-ity-apariśesam, aviparyayād-viśuddham kevalam-utpadyate jñānam**, or: "Thus, on account of the practice of the
truth [that] 'I am not', 'nothing is mine', 'I am not' [there arises] [that] knowledge [which] is complete, pure and solitary
because [it is] free from error". **Tattva-abhyāsa**, which is applied
**viññāna**, represents the effort to disrupt the habit of the
empirical ego of identifying with the phenomenal contents of conscious-
ness, so as to re-locate man's true identity in the transcendental
Self. For, man is essentially **purusa**, and in order to reach authenticity
he must divest himself of all phenomenal accretions, such as mind,
body, external property or social relations.

That this intellectual distancing is not enough in itself is
evident from the fact that **Īśvara Kṛṣṇa** also acknowledges the merit
of moral purification. (see 44). Moreover, as emerges from stanza
45, **viññāna** must be accompanied by an act of renunciation of every-
thing that reason - in keeping with tradition - has revealed to be
'non-self'. The verse in question reads: **vairāgyat-prakṛti-layah
samsāro bhavati rajasād-ragat...**, or: "From dispasion [comes]
the dissolution [of the evolutes back into] the world-ground; from
attachment [which is] passionate [comes] phenomenal-existence..."
Here **prakṛti-laya** does not, as in the **Yoga-Sūtra**, denote a sinking
away into the world-ground by the human personality, but **laya**
must be taken to refer to the dissolution of the evolutes coinciding with the recovery of the Self's authenticity. Any other reading would make no sense in the face of the fact that the avowed goal of Classical Śāmkhya is the reinstallment of the Self in its untainted splendour of keivalya. G.J. Larson's (1969) rendering of the phrase vairāgyat-prakṛti-layaḥ as "from non-attachment comes dissolution in prakṛti" is not specific enough to avoid confusion with the peculiar usage of the term prakṛti-laya in Patañjali's work.

The sole interest of the follower of Classical Śāmkhya is the disentanglement of purusa and prakṛti. This objective is shared not only by the antecedent Śāmkhya-Yoga schools but also by Classical Yoga. Yet one cannot avoid the impression that the Śāmkhya method of holding apart the primary categories of Self and non-self (= prakṛti) is executed on a level entirely different from that recommended by the more meditation-oriented schools. For in the latter the confusion between Self and mind (as a product of inesentient nature), is held to be removable only by means of a controlled introversion and transformation of consciousness. This does not appear to be the way of Classical Śāmkhya. Viññāna is by no means synonymous with prajña or gnostic insight as acquired in samādhi; rather it is an intellectual act of continuously reminding oneself that one is not this body, this particular sensation, feeling, or thought. This is the famous neti-neti procedure of the upaniṣadic sages applied in the most rationalistic manner possible. In later Vedānta the same technique is known under the technical designation of apavāda or the 'annulment' of 'erroneous predication' (adhyāropa). This intellectualistic refashioning of an essentially introspective-meditative practice compelled J.N. Mukerji (1930, 8) to exclaim that

100 See e.g. Vedānta-Sara (33)
"the point of view of Sāmkhya is logical and not psychological", which is probably a far too one-sided interpretation.

Moreover, it is feasible that a perpetual distancing of oneself from the contents of consciousness might sooner or later induce altered states of awareness, nor is it entirely impossible that this was fully accepted and perhaps even intended by Īśvara Kṛṣṇa and his disciples. The question is whether the approach of Classical Sāmkhya is, in the last analysis, adequate for realising the postulated goal of Self authenticity. This is tacitly denied by the adherents of Yoga who feel that the re-conditioning of the cognitive apparatus as achieved by the method recommended in Classical Sāmkhya is not conducive to that complete rupture with the phenomenal which alone is capable of securing emancipation. As the Yoga authorities are quick to point out, there are powerful traces in the depth-mind which no amount of re-habituation will wipe out. These subliminal-activators (samskāra) must be rendered sterile by a restructuring of consciousness itself, which is achieved through disciplined introspection leading to samādhi. Hence in Yoga the Sāmkhya vijñāna becomes viveka-khyāti or the gnostic vision of discernment. Similarly, vairāgya acquires a second dimension. On the ordinary level it is simply a letting go of externals, but in samādhi a second degree of detachment is called for which represents an act of will, subsequently leading to the much coveted asampajñāta-samādhi in which all subliminal-activators become obliterated. One may well speculate with K.B.R. RAO (1966, 432) that it is the accentuated rationalism of Classical Sāmkhya which must be held responsible for the fact that this school of thought never
actually acquired the same recognition and prestige as the other
darśanas. Be this as it may, for the present purpose it is vital
to realise that the methodological differences between Classical
Śamkhya and Classical Yoga as outlined above initiated important
contceptual and doctrinal divergencies which further enhanced
the chasm between both schools of thought.

There are three major points in the doctrinal structure of
Classical Yoga which separate it from Classical Śamkhya, viz.
theology, ontology and psychology. A fourth point occasionally
suggested is the so-called sphota doctrine which Patañjali is
held to subscribe to, but as I will show wrongly so.

The single most striking conceptual difference between both
darśanas concerns their respective interpretation or attitude towards
theological reality. Whilst Classical Śamkhya is said to be
nir-Iśvara or 'atheistic', Classical Yoga (as apparently all forms
of hindu Yoga) is most emphatically sa-Iśvara or 'theistic'.
This assertion is somewhat misleading. Although it is perfectly
correct that Classical Yoga is intrinsically 'theistic', Classical
Śamkhya cannot simply be styled 'atheistic'. The fact is that Iśvara
Kṛṣṇa, rather like the Buddha, does not mention or make any statement
about God at all. This can mean either of two things. He may
outright deny the existence of such a supreme being, or else he
may merely not lend any significance to this question or postpone his
judgement about it. In view of the absence of any positive denial of
the existence of God and considering the evidence of the Śamkhya-
Sūtra, I would rather conjecture that Iśvara Kṛṣṇa assumed a
typical agnostic stance. Ostensibly, if there be a God he can have
little or nothing to do with the actual path of salvation as envisaged in Classical Śāmkhya.

This indifference to theological matters is clearly out of tune with Classical Yoga which is definitely theistic in nature. As I have suggested above and counter to B. HEIMANN (1930, 90), there may possibly be an experiential basis for the concept of Isvāra, though I do not thereby wish to say anything affirmative about either the reality of the experience or the authenticity of the interpretations attached to it. If this argument is valid, the methodological factor can justly be said to be the cause of this most conspicuous difference between both dārṣānas.

The pre-eminently practical orientation of Yoga and its full reliance on pratyakṣa rather than on traditional knowledge of a rationalistic slant is moreover responsible for subtle but nonetheless crucial divergencies in the ontological conceptions of the two systems. As I have tackled this question already there is no need here to repeat myself. Rather what I am interested in at this point is the question as to how to account for these differences. The ontogenetic models were originally and primarily maps for meditative introspection, intended to guide the yogin in his explorations of the terra incognita of the mind. Thus these models served a very practical psychological purpose. This hypothesis helps to explain why so many of these models, as given out in the Mahābhārata and other early texts, are without apparent logical coherence. These 'maps' are records of internal experiences rather than purely theoretical constructions. They are descriptive rather than explanatory.
The 'map' character of the ontogenetic model of Classical Yoga is beyond question. The prakṛtic multi-level edifice is an eminently practical ad hoc conception which helps the yogin to 'program' his enstatic journey, to sign-post his inward odyssey so to speak and to orientate himself properly so as not to depart from his original trajectory. Thus the levels of cosmogenetic evolution are simultaneously the levels of psychogenetic involution. Each subsequently 'deeper' layer within the prakṛtic organism becomes a target for the conscious involutionary programme of the yogin, until all levels of manifestation of the world-ground, and even the world-ground itself, are completely traversed. This, however, is not a mere intellectual act. The process of samādhi with its various degrees of completeness cannot be equated with the technique, utilised in Classical Śamkhya, of discriminating Self from non-self on the basis of prefabricated categories of differentiation. Yoga demands more than that. Overt conceptual discrimination or viññāna is not enough. The categories of what represents the 'non-self' must become the object of direct experience. The ultimate destination is of course the Self, as the experiencer behind all manifest contents of consciousness. In Classical Śamkhya, on the other hand, the ontogenetic model has lost this 'map' character in a way and appears as a highly formalised structure typical of the extreme rationalistic position of this school of thought.

The rigorous meditative introspective discipline of Yoga, or as J.W. HAUSER (1958) puts it, its "experienced metaphysics" is furthermore responsible for the distinct holistic approach displayed
by this tradition which finds congenial expression in Patañjali's conception of mind. Whereas Īśvara Kṛṣṇa is mainly concerned with showing the various constituents of the inner world separately and in their evolutionary dependence, Patañjali emphasises the homogeneity of the human personality complex. This is clearly evinced by his concept of citta. Īśvara Kṛṣṇa's parallel term liṅga (or karana),

101 used to denote the collectivity of the thirteen evolutes (viz. buddhi, āhamkāra, manas and the ten indriyas), is by no means synonymous with Patañjali's citta. It somehow lacks the unifying and integrating strength of the latter concept. Whereas citta is expressive of the dynamic interaction between the psychic structures — and thus is essentially a psychological concept —, liṅga fails to convey any sense of dynamism or functional unity; it is primarily a static, analytical concept.

The last point adduced as a specific feature of the conceptual framework of Classical Yoga is the so-called sphota doctrine. 102 This teaching, which originated among the early Sanskrit grammarians, contains the simple idea that a word is more than the sum total of its component letters. Sphota, derived from śphut 'to burst open!', is conceived as eternal and as manifesting itself in the spoken word. It represents the concept, brought to expression in a configuration of letters. Neither each separate sound nor the total sound of a word is considered as being capable of evoking a particular concept. Therefore, the sphota-vādins conclude, there must be something more that inheres

101 On the meaning of the term liṅga and its significance see R. GARBE (1894, 323ff.). See also E.A. WELDEN (1914, 32–51).

102 See e.g. S. DASGUPTA (1963, I, 238, fn.1): "The most important point in favour of this identification [between the grammarian Patañjali and the author of the Yoga-Sūtra] seems to be that both Patañjalis (ctd.)
in a word which, when the word is heard, 'bursts forth' as meaning. On hearing the first sound we have a dark notion which becomes clearer as the word is uttered. However, as E. ABEGG (1914, 188ff.) has shown, sphota has a strong metaphysical ingredient which is absent in our standard notion of 'concept', wherefore a straightforward equation of sphota with 'concept' cannot be made. For, sphota is ultimately the plenum, brahman, and it is this aspect of the doctrine which was of cardinal importance to the Indians. As brahman is bodied forth in all contingent beings, so the concept of brahman is thought to be the root of all other concepts.

Now, if a definite reference to this recondite doctrine could be found in the Yoga-Sutra, this would be a significant factor in support of the traditional claim that the author of the Yoga-Sutra is identical with his namesake the grammarian. However, this does not seem to be the case. Patanjali himself nowhere mentions the word sphota, and all later discussions about it are based on a single aphorism, namely III.17 which runs as follows: śabda-artha-pratyayaṁ-ītara-ītara-adhyāsat-sankaras-tat-pravibhāga-samyamat sarva-bhuta-ruta-jañanam, which may be rendered thus: "Word, meaning and presented-idea of the corresponding object are [usually] present in a state of mixture because of their being each identified with each other. Through constraint (samyama) [on the distinction between] them, insight into the utterances of all beings is gained".

As I understand it, this simply means that by nature śabda, artha

(fn. 102 ctd.) as against the other Indian systems admitted the doctrine of sphota which was denied even by Sāmkhya".

103 See also K.K. RAJA (1956, 84-116)
and **pratyaya** are experienced as one. A sound uttered by a living being is always the bearer of meaning. It is also accompanied by an image in the mind of the percipient. If the sound is unknown, it can be understood by directly perceiving the idea in the mind of the sender. To achieve this direct perception or **sāksātkāra** of the idea in the sender's consciousness, the **yogin** must make the distinction between word, meaning and image the subject of his meditative absorption and enstasy. This seems to be the message of the above **sūtra**. There is no need here to assume that it contains any reference to **sphota**. Considering the context in which it appears, it probably merely relates to the very practical matter of reading another person's mind which is a generally recognised yogic feat. The explanations of Vācaspati Miśra and others must be rejected as too far-fetched. Interestingly, Vyāsa makes no mention of the term **sphota** at all. According to him the matching of sounds with objects is purely conventional (**samketa**), and the act of recognising the meaning of words is a question of memory. Thus the blame for this whole confusion must be put on Vācaspati Miśra.

It is but natural that out of these methodological and conceptual divergencies there should also arise differences in the terminology adopted by Classical Yoga and Classical Śāmkhya respectively. The preceding pages contain numerous examples which document this fact, and hence there is no need for duplication here. I merely wish to remind the reader of such specific yogic terms as **ālinga**, **liṅga-mātra**, **asmitā-mātra**, **aviśega**, **viśega**, **citta**, **vṛtti** and **pratyaya** which either are absent in the Śāmkhya-Kārikā or, else, have an entirely different connotation. The autonomy of the technical vocabulary of Classical Yoga is, I think, indisputable.
To sum up: As is apparent from a critical examination of the Yoga-Sutra, far from being a mere imitation of Classical Samkhya, Patanjala-Yoga has all the characteristic marks of a thoroughly independent philosophical school of thought. Patanjali, or whoever may have been responsible for the composition of the Yoga-Sutra, emerges as a striking personality who must be counted among the most creative minds of India. It would be almost frivolous to deny that he was intimately connected with the Yoga tradition and that he himself must have been a yogin of considerable attainment. He shows an unparalleled insight into yogic processes and, contrary to H.T. Colebrooke's (1873, I, 265) biased opinion, was not "more mystic and fanatical" than Kapila who "makes a nearer approach to philosophical disquisition". He had little sectarian inclination, if any. He showed a healthy respect for tradition but not at the expense of the immediacy of personal verification. Far from burdening his epigones with unintelligible mumbo-jumbo, he produced a work of fine texture and remarkable insight which compares favourably with the philosophical creations of his contemporaries, and which has deservedly inspired countless generations of yogins of all denominations.
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