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HAMISH F. G. SWANSTON

THE THEOLOGY OF RENN DICKSON HAMPDEN

M.LITT. THESIS, 1965
Hampden is unknown to most and therefore the major part of this work is exposition of his thought; he is also unknowable apart from the work of his contemporaries at Oriel; therefore I have begun with a short outline of the general theological attitudes of the Oriel Nectics. Once known, Hampden demands appraisal, and this forms the third section of my study.

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BACKGROUND
THE ORIEL NOETICS

The new brilliance of Oriel society did not appear until Copleston became Provost, but there is much in the work of Provost Eveleigh (1781 - 1814) that foreshadows the intellectual temper of his more well-known successors. It is very much in what became the Oriel tradition to grant, as Eveleigh did, the place of reason in Christian theology to be an important one, and yet to distrust its exercise in actual practice. Thus at the beginning of his Bampton Lectures in 1792 he announced:

It is a distinguishing property of our Religion that it not only admits of a rational inquiry into its truth, but also incites its professors to this inquiry in the most forcible manner, making it a part of their religious duty.

But his opinion of individual theologians who attempted to fulfill this religious duty was not always favourable. Of the scholastic theologians he said:

Had they consulted the Scriptures instead of the expositions of philosophers and the perplexed reasonings of prejudiced men; it would have been impossible that the doctrines, which engaged the study of their lives, should have formed any part of their creed.

1. Eveleigh Bampton Lectures, Sermon I, p 1
2. Ibid. Sermon III, p 84
Much depends, indeed, on the colour of one's reasoning. Eveleigh gives as examples of men 'who were advocates for a rational profession of Christianity, and who knew the proper means by which it was to be promoted', Arnold of Brescia, *Bishop Grosseteste, Wickliff and Hus*. Reasoning, if it is properly pursued, leads to freedom not to dogmatics. Thus Luther is the 'learned advocate for religious liberty and truth', and from his time 'Christianity began to assume its genuine appearance'. In all this one can see the beginnings of the later Griel theology and its view of history.

The members of the Griel senior common-room during the first decades of the nineteenth century are justly famous for the unremitting intellectualism of their theologising. They were extremely serious conversationalists, and their conversation was of theology. The tone of the Common room was set by Eveleigh who introduced the policy of selecting the Fellows from among men who thought, rather than from men who managed to do well in the Schools. He opened the Fellowships to the whole University; Copleston followed this system with

1. Ibid. Sermon IV, p 129
2. Ibid. Sermon IV, p 133
3. Ibid. Sermon IV, p 134
4. He did not despise examination successes. Quite the contrary. He introduced the division of those who 'examinatoribus maxime se commendaverunt' from the mass of graduates.
enthusiasm:

Every selection to a fellowship which tends to discourage the narrow and almost technical routine of public examinations, I consider as an important triumph.

Newman was elected in 1822, having appeared below the line. This was a brave election since the college had not quite recovered from the uproar caused the previous year by the choice of two men from the second class in preference to D.K. Sandiford who had gained a First. Newman joined a society in which, its enemies whispered, 'all was pretended to be for the benefit of free discussion which was substituted for the claims of truth'. But the Fellows were men for whom Newman had 'a great reverence and loving pride'.

Indeed Copleston made the Fellowships into the most coveted of academic honours. His distinguished young men included Whately and Hawkins, and his rigorous intellectualism was not without its influence on the second generation of Griel Fellows, Hampden, Arnold, Kehle and Newman. The succession of Hawkins to the Provost's place in 1828 marks, perhaps, the beginning of the conservative decline. Hawkins had not the radical temper of his predecessor, nothing was to be changed and daring ideas were discouraged.

1. Memoirs of Edward Copleston, by his son, p 188
2. Grotory Archives, A.6.22. No. d.h.
None of the Oriel noetics can be understood in isolation from the other Fellows. Newman recognised this when he gave such elaborate descriptions of them in his Apologia. Thus he wrote of Hawkins:

He was the first who taught me to weigh my words and to be cautious in my statements. He led me to that mode of limiting and clearing my sense in discussion and controversy, and of distinguishing between cognate ideas, and of obviating mistakes by anticipation, which to my surprise has since been considered, even in quarters friendly to me, to savour of the polemics of Rome.

And James Fraser, Bishop of Manchester, returned to Dean Burdon the draft of his life of the 'Great Provost' with this remark:

There is one point which I have always thought remarkable – the influence he exerted in the most opposite directions: upon Arnold and Hampden in one, upon Newman (at least at one time) and S. Wilberforce in another.

This was one of the most important factors in the dispute. These men understood one another from conversation and argument in the common room. They had not so much need to examine whether or no a piece of work by any one of them was ambiguous. They understood each other's tempers and

1. Apologia, p 8
2. Quoted by Burdon in Lives of Twelve Good Men, p 430.
recollected other things said on the same or similar sub-
jects. For this reason I have at times adduced evidence of
men's views on the Hampden matter from publications which
came later. Not all of them used their fellows as anvils in
the Whately manner, but they all discussed things with one
another and must have voiced opinions, tried them out, in
conversation, before they put them into print. As Whately
wrote of his own work:

How far I am indebted to Dr. Copleston, those who
have perused his 'Enquiry,' will, in part, perceive;
I say 'in part' because having long enjoyed the
advantage of familiar intercourse with him, I have
derived from his conversation more instruction than
from his writings; and more indeed than it is
possible accurately to estimate. When any two
persons have been very long accustomed to discuss
subjects together, it is difficult, if not impossible,
for one of them to state precisely which are his own
original ideas1.

To this closed intellectual society a professorial election
was of great import.

Dr. Burton, Regius Professor of Divinity at Oxford, died on January 19th 1836. On the 23rd January Pusey wrote to Newman to the Archbishop of Canterbury's domestic chaplain feared that Renn Dickson Hampden would be named. Newman replied the next day to say that it was not likely that Hampden would be appointed but that if he were 'numbers would approximate to us and open themselves to our views, from fear of him, who are at present suspicious of us.' Later Newman wrote to Froude about the state of the parties:

Whately is pressing for Hinde. Copleston writes down to his nephew that we may rest secure, no inexpedient man will be given us, and in town advocates Hampden. I can only reconcile him with himself by supposing, as I do, that, by 'inexpedient man' he hints at Arnold and me. Dr. Goddard has been talked of in high quarters; also Bull, Denison, Jenkyns and Short. Moreover Tyler, whom I should not wonder, after all, if they fall upon as a moderate man whom no one speaks ill of.

2. H.J. Rose.
To Pusey he had also suggested Shuttleworth:

Were Shuttleworth appointed, which on the whole I should prefer he could do nothing against us - he has no popularity, no insight into antiquity, no clearness or grasp of mind, and (at his age) little energy or desire of contest. I cannot help thinking he would be nothing at all, and we might act as if sede vacant1.

Less than a week after Burton's death Rose told Newman that Archbishop Howley thought Keble had a chance2, and Newman wrote to Puse's3 and Pusey with this exciting news. Pusey wrote to Gladstone:

We are under great anxiety as to our new professor.

Rumour mentions Keble's name. But this would be too great a blessing for us to dare, in these days, to hope for, though we may pray for it4.

It was in fact far too great a blessing to hope for. Lord Melbourne had received from Archbishop Howley a list of eight


3. January 31, 1836

names¹. But the Prime Minister wanted other opinions. He consulted Archbishop Whately of Dublin who wrote on January 22nd:

The best fitted for a theological professorship that I have any knowledge of are Dr. Hampden and Dr. Hinde². On the day of Burton's funeral Melbourne replied to Whately including Newley's list; it was a document which would certainly have surprised some of the Oxford speculators:

Mr. Pusey, the Professor of Hebrew
Dr. Shuttleworth, Master of New College³
Mr. Ogilvie, late Fellow of Balliol College (one of the Archbishop's Chaplains)
Mr. Newman, of Oriel
Mr. Keble, of Oriel
Mr. Miller, of Worcester College
Dr. Short, Rector of St. George's, Bloomsbury
Dr. Goddard, Archdeacon of Lincoln⁴.

1. Melbourne's list to Whately has nine names, one 'from another quarter', his nephew William Cowper thought the Archbishop had suggested only six names.


3. He was Warden of the College.

Whately replied that none of these men would do at all. He again suggested Hampden and Hinds. Hinds, was well known as the favourite of Whately, and was afterwards for some time Bishop of Norwich. Melbourne was undecided. William Cooper wrote to the Duke of Bedford:

Lord Melbourne doubted for some time between Arnold and Hampden, but thinking the former too rash and unsettled in his opinions for so responsible a post, decided in favour of the latter.

Feeling by now almost sure of his choice, Melbourne asked Copleston what he thought. Copleston advised Hampden. Melbourne asked for the approval of the Archbishop of Canterbury who consented. Hampden's appointment was announced in Oxford on Monday February 8th. J.B. Mozley wrote to his sister:

The news first came out on Monday morning, and of course excited great astonishment. There was however no doubt about the fact; Shuttleworth had got it from the person himself.


2. Archbishop Mozley later regretted his action and emphasised the difference between approval and consent.

That Monday Pusey gave a dinner to see what could be done to prevent Hampden's appointment. By Wednesday enough enthusiasm had been roused for a meeting of resident masters in Corpus common room. That night Newman sat up writing his *Elucidations* of Hampden's Bampton lectures and by the weekend the pamphlet was being sent out. To Melbourne's surprise the opposition was mustering with alarming earnestness and rapidity. The principles on which they were acting were set forth in a public Declaration and Report on Hampden's theological publications. The penultimate paragraph of the Report crystallises the whole endeavour of the opposition:

...the present controversy is not so much concerned with an individual or a book, or even an ordinary system of false doctrine, as with a Principle, which, after corrupting all soundness of Christianity in other countries, has at length appeared among us, and for the first time been invested with authority in the University of Oxford. This principle is the philosophy of Rationalism, or the assumption that uncontrolled human reason in its present degraded form is the primary interpreter of God's word, without any regard to these rules and principles of interpretation which have guided the judgements of Christ's Holy Catholic Church in all ages of its history and under every variety of its warfare. It
is the Theory of Rationalism (as set forth systematically in the Hampton Lectures of 1832, and still more recently in lectures addressed to students) which is to be considered the root of all the errors of Dr. Hampden's system.1

It is interesting to note that though the opposition had its headquarters first at Corpus and then after the defeat of the condemnation by the proctors on March 22nd2, at Brasenose, the prime movers in the business, on both sides, were connected with Oriel.

Whatley and Copleston who had recommended Hampden, had been Fellows of the College before their elevation to Dublin and Llandaff, Hampden before becoming Head of S Mary's Hall. Newman, Keble and Pusey were still Fellows at the time of the controversy. Colightly was a junior member of the College and Hawkins was the Provost. The strongest blow from Hampden's side was delivered by Arnold, a former Fellow, in a fierce article in the Edinburgh Review on the Oxford Malignants and Dr. Hampden. The one man in the government who tried to prevent the Prime Minister appointing Hampden


2. For this Convocation Dr. South of Magdalen appeared in his place among the Doctors for the first time for many years, he voted against Hampden.
was Charles Wood; an Oriel man and brother of a man who tried for an Oriel Fellowship in 1833. Charles Wood warned Melbourne that Hampden would be a dangerous man to support. Melbourne asked Copleston if he were sure that Hampden's orthodoxy was beyond reproach. Copleston vouched for Hampden's orthodoxy and popularity. J. B. Mozley told his sister:

When the stir began at Oxford, and a petition against the appointment had made its appearance, Ministers were of course excessively angry with Copleston for having taken them in. Melbourne turned for help to Wood, but there was nothing to be done, and in astonishment Melbourne realised how very much an Oriel affair the thing was becoming:

Pray, Wood, how is it that in the bosom of your sluggish University, and out of a College by no means the largest in it, so many heresiarchs have lately sprung up: First there is Whately, Arnold and Hampden, then there is Mr. Keble and Mr. Newman, who, I hear, are quite as great theologians as the others, only in another way.


Melbourne decided that it was impossible to give way to the opposition. He confirmed the nomination of White's Professor of Moral Philosophy as Regius Professor of Divinity.
CONSEQUENCES.

In the notes to his Third Discourse on Necessity and Predestination Copleston considers the advisability of curiosity about matters religious. And he admits that it has indeed been the practice of the most eminent divines to dissuade us from entering far into such abstruse speculations, induced by a reasonable disgust of the manner in which topics of that sacred nature are too often handled. And further he admits that men may be forced to say more than they intend by too penetrating an enquiry into their statements; reason in religion is often objected to because of 'a disapprobation of many consequences which seemed plausibly enough to be connected with each opinion, when peremptorily maintained'. He finds evidence of this disapprobation in the works of Luther, Cranmer and Ridley. But such objections need not, Copleston suggests, be brought against every use of reason in theology. The very caution of Ridley about Bradford's tract on predestination was an attitude of reason, and Archbishop King had produced a way of reason which would 'check presumption and irreverence towards the Almighty when we converse and reason' about His nature and attributes. King became on Copleston's recom-

1. Enquiry into the doctrines of Necessity and Predestination, (1821) p 115.
2. Ibid, p.115.
condemnation the theologian of Whately and later of Hampden; all three were delighted with what Copleston described as King's freedom 'from attachment to any system or to any party', and all three took up King's exposition of the doctrine of analogy.

All three also took up Archbishop King's remarks about the danger of consequences. Copleston notes with approval that 'King's reasoning is directed with a view to silence that dogmatical theology which imposes upon Christians the duty of receiving words in their literal sense, and of deducing consequences from them precisely as we do when they are used among men'. It is certainly true that revelation is not of words; 'from the derivation of the term it is addressed to the sight'. Doctrine may be set forth in many ways, in variations of words, but the doctrine remains the same. The doctrine endures beyond the words. Some of the latitudinarian theologians seem to have supposed that the doctrine vanishes when the words are changed. There is an idea communicated, not indeed except through words, but not in dependence on any formulae: "Such is the nature of that

1. Ibid. p 119.
2. Ibid. p 140.
3. Leman; note written on a sheet of paper pasted inside the cover of a copy of the first edition of the Essay on Development used in 1877 for the preparation of the third edition. There is no direct mention of King here.
communication to the Apostles of truth, which is called Revelation'. On the other hand there may also be formulae which cannot be varied without loss of the doctrines, for example the formulae 'There is one God'. So that some words, some formulae, must be accepted 'in their literal sense', and being fixed canons consequences can safely be deduced from the actual wording - consequences like 'The Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Ghost is God'.

Copleston supposes that if consequences are not allowed to be deduced from theological statements not the least advantage gained will be the immediate cessation of 'much unprofitable wrangling that is destructive of all true religion'. So Copleston advocates a return to the principle of sola Scriptura. We must resist the temptation to build theories of our own upon subjects of which we have but an imperfect knowledge:

If we set up these notions of our own as the standard of faith, and require a peremptory assent to all the inferences which appear to flow from them, we quit the true, the revealed God, and be-take ourselves to the idols of our own brains.

1. Newman; same note.
2. Enquiry, p 141.
3. Ibid. p 141.
Here Hampden is, quite evidently, reiterating the appeal of the reformation writers. He is quick to point this out himself:

in Luther, in Cranmer, in Ridley, in all the great restorers of religious truth in our own country we recognise the same sentiment, that to attempt to know God otherwise than as revealed in Scripture, is a vain, a fruitless, a dangerous undertaking.

The notion that it was irreligious to disinter deep-buried consequences from a writer's works, to lead forth conclusions from his propositions, was adopted as a latitudinarian principle, and appears in several of the most important works of the Oriel theologians. In 1822, for example, Whately preached the Bampton Lectures on the subject of the Use and Abuse of Party Feeling in Matters of Religion. This is obviously a subject which might usefully be presented during a time of ecclesiastical crisis or of high theological tension between groups of divines. But when there is no blast of controversy raging, the idea, put forward as an abstract principle, is one which readily lends itself to latitudinarian interpretations. It can happen that any opposition to a theory is represented as an unchristian measure of faction and fanaticism.

The Oriel Fellows were men who enjoyed their Common Room talk so greatly that it was rumoured amongst the less gifted dons that they cramned during the day for a display of erudition in the evening. They were an intellectualist set whose religious attachment to their Church

1. Enquiry, p 141
was, almost without exception, something of habit, even of accident.

Dogma, as such, did not hold any high place in their esteem, and Whately's Bamton Lectures witness to this moderate contempt. He was rather like Dr Lloyd, Professor of Divinity and later Bishop of Oxford, who used to tell his pupils: 'D'ye see, I take it that the old Church of England mode of handling the Creed went out with Bull'. Neither Lloyd nor Whately, however, would have thought themselves anything but orthodox, and they had a vague notion that some sort of orthodoxy is necessary for salvation.

A moderate enthusiasm is of doubtful lasting value. It will either disintegrate towards indifferentism, or grow into a real assent. Whately may be reckoned to have given up his vague belief in the necessity of an orthodoxy for the continuance of a community sometime during his tenure of the Archbishopric of Dublin. When Newman first met him, however, Whately was still attached to the great body of Anglican tradition deriving from the Caroline divines. It was from Whately that Newman first learned 'the existence of the Church as a substantive body of corporation, and those anti-Erasitian views of Church polity which were one of the most prominent features of the Tractarian movement'. He Whately moved far from such a position in later life. When he delivered his sermons he was in no sense a member of the movement for a re-awakening of the Church. It was with a mind secure and even complacent in the theological clime that he gave his Bampton

1. Apologia, p 12 (1895 edition)
Lectures; looking from his Oriel eminence upon the disastrous chaos that resulted from religious dispute he decided that all such dispute must be bad. He complained that some divines 'have been but too ready to attribute to such as do not coincide with their peculiar views'¹ the rejection of the doctrines upon which they held these views. Whately rightly sees that many of the disputes conducted by theologians are fired by one set of theologians pointing to the inevitable and logical consequences of another set's principles. He suggested a simple way out of this dangerous area; Resist the temptation to advert to consequences. The peace that will ensue if we only take everything at its face value, will be well worth the mental discipline involved. Newman in his *Elucidations* of Hampden's Bampton Lectures suggested that while Hampden himself may escape the charge of personal heresy because he did not realise the consequences of his own doctrines, he might yet lead others into Socinianism. Whately had thought of this:

We may indeed point out to any one the danger of the doctrines he maintains, in case others should deduce from them such conclusions as appear to us to follow; but even this must be done with great caution.²

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1. Whately, Bampton Lectures p 119
2. Whately, Bampton Lectures, p 120.
Caution because of what may follow. Newman had a similar fear. He was often restrained from shewing a man the full consequences of his theories lest he proved too much and the man because of an all too human pride refused to give up his principles and so accepted their consequences. As Whately put it in his lectures:

It will often happen, that men may thus be led actually to adopt and support false doctrines, which originally they never thought of, when it can be made clear to them that these are inevitable consequences of their principles: they may be so bigoted to these, that rather than renounce the premises, they will admit the conclusion; and thus will have been driven into heresy by imprudent opposition.¹

Whately, with his love of new things and a healthy distrust of the established view, supposes that the Arian heresy certainly, and the Nestorian heresy perhaps, began not with their supposed originators, but with the charges of their opponents. The orthodox accusations were accepted by the accused as grounds for debate, but at first only the accusers believed in their existence. The orthodox made the heretics. In the scholastic disputes Hampden notices that

¹. Ibid. p 121.
Theologians 'looked more to the consequence than to the position itself'.¹ He likens the way in which an orthodox scholastic convicted his opponent of heresy to the way in which a serpent fastens its victim with its masonic eye; with unwearied vision the orthodox sought out the most remote deductions 'as if they were present on the surface';

The heretical disputant in vain fluttered and shifted his position. The serpent gaze of the subtle logician was still watching the tendency of all his efforts, and bound him by an irresistible fascination to the spot from which he was anxious to escape.²

The whole trouble, Hampden says, echoing Whately, is that 'consequences have been imputed as principles of belief'.³

2. Ibid. VIII, 365.
3. Ibid. VIII, 365.
Julius Hare, in his Letter to the Dean of Chichester, refers to Hampden's Essay on the Philosophical Evidence, and suggests that those who are at all acquainted with the writing of what was then called the Oriel School, would immediately apprehend that Hampden's writings 'in their whole tone of thought, both philosophical and theological, are a genuine birth of that School'. Certainly the grounds and origins of many of Hampden's ideas and expressions are of Oriel. This is certainly the case with his notions about the meaning and use of analogical predication.

In 1821, Copleston published his Inquiry into the Doctrine of Necessity and Predestination. This essay on the use of language in theology, is a source book for some of Hampden's thinking. The thesis of Copleston was that disputes are more often caused by a confusion of terminology than by a real disagreement of principle. In his memoir of his father, William James Copleston wrote that it 'had long been a favourite theory with the author, that mistaken and exaggerated forms of thought, in every department of knowledge, are often traceable to the equivocal use of words'. It is apparent to anyone who has read something of Hampden that he was acquainted with Copleston's view, whether from conversation or from the essay. Copleston even hints on page X that his principle might be used in theology:

1 Letter to the Dean of Chichester, 2nd edition, Postscript, p 91
2 Memoir of Bishop Copleston, 1851, p 88
Whatever is thus proved of natural religion, is applicable by analogy to revealed. The difficulties and apparent incongruities which belong to the one, we ought to expect to find also in the other, as they profess to come from the same author. We should regard them, therefore, in the case of revealed religion, not as objections to its credibility, but as evidences of its truth.

And on page XI Copleston himself propounds the most offending of Hampden's phrases:

God is not revealed to us in Scripture as he is absolutely, but as he is relatively to ourselves.

Copleston has immediate resort to the work of Archbishop King and the meaning of analogy - a meaning that the Archbishop propounded in another work on Predestination. Copleston links the difficulties of language with the misuse of analogical methods. He rightly insists that much of the error that has been bruited on the subject of predestination comes from too rigid an interpretation of language which attributes human qualities to God. He cites with approval the scholastic rule: Affectus in Deo denotant effectum, and he says our language and ideas of God must always be used with due caution:

They are the best means, indeed the only means we have of expressing our thoughts upon this subject at all, but they ought never to be used without a
reverential sense of their imperfection — and the rule of interpreting them always as relative to ourselves is an admirable preservative against many mistakes and perplexities, into which men are led by a critical analysis of scriptural terms.¹

Copleston thinks that the tendency to overemphasize the natural attributes of God and to equate language with reality is the besetting error of the Calvinist method of theologising. He is much more sympathetic to Luther and the sentiments of hesitation he so often expressed:

Nemo igitur de divinitate nuda cogitat, sed has cogitationes fugiat, tanquam infernum, et ipsissimas Satanae tentationes.²

The solution he proposes to such rough and unpleasant language, and the deliverance from the exaggerated ideas to which such language inevitably gives rise, is the use of analogy. Archbishop King's sermon was addressed, says Copleston, against the contemporary presumption and irreverence when men talked and reasoned about predestination and free-will, and it is in such a cause that he is taking it up in his Inquiry:

In fact, the outcry raised against this mode of explanation does not appear to arise from any fear

¹ Inquiry. p.96
² Inquiry. p.103.
lest our sense of the moral attributes should be
impaired, but because it is employed to solve the
difficulty which is raised about the foreknowledge
of God being consistent with the free-will and the
probation of his creatures, and thus overthrow the
favourite position of Calvinism.¹

While Copleston is fully alive to the wider implications of
the doctrine of analogy it was left to Hampden to make the
fullest use of the principle. He seems to have misread
Copleston on one vital point - the difference between
similarity and analogy.

As Copleston points out in the long note on King's sermon
attached to the third Discourse of the Inquiry, analogy does
not mean the same thing as the similarity of two things, but
the 'similarity or sameness of two relations'.² The mere
fact of similarity does not create analogy, and 'it is an
abuse of the word to speak so, and it leads to much confusion
of thought'.³ Copleston recognises that the confusion of
ideas brought about by linguistic juggling of analogy and
resemblance 'not only in popular discourse, but by philosoph-
ical and scientific writers of modern times',⁴ and even by

2. Ibid. p.122
3. Ibid. p.122
Archbishop King himself, is damaging to the proper use of analogy in theology. The danger of confusion between analogy and resemblance is greatest in theology, for here we have to deal with qualities that 'have no form or existence of their own - as the whole essence of them consists in their relation to something else'.¹ We slide from thinking the relations are alike to thinking that the things must be alike. So by making no distinction between analogy and resemblance, we lapse into anthropomorphisms, and forget that the qualities are identical 'only in proportion as the nature of the respective subjects to which they belong may be regarded as the same'.² There is, too, the difficulty in theology that we are committing error if we allow ourselves to think that the actual qualities are the same. Analogy must be preserved at all stages of our thinking.

Copleston makes the interesting and perceptive remark that we object to the substitution of analogy for resemblance in our thinking about God, not from a jealousy for God's honour, but for our own. We are prepared to discard as analogous all scriptural references to God as material and passionate, but we are not prepared to accept as analogous words 'expressive of intellectual and moral attributes' because 'we conceive a similarity in the nature of man and of

¹ Ibid. p.129.
² Ibid. p.133.
God in these respects, and are unwilling to relinquish so exalted a
pretension. Copleston prepares to advance a theology which denies
the possibility of reasoning about the nature of God, since there are
no words 'expressive of the same determinate notion' when we speak of
man and of God.

Archbishop King's theory was patient of an interpretation which
denied existence to God - for existence, too, could not be predicated
of God and man. Copleston works out a closer argument, and he always
adds a clause which stresses that he is only denying univocal predic-
atation. But he takes this denial of similarity in favour of analogy
that he can admit only 'a relative deity'. This phrase became almost a piece
of technical jargon in the work of the Oriel theologians, and meant
different things according to the user. In general it does not mean
simply a deity conceivable only in relationship to ourselves, but
rather something akin to Kant's phenomenal in the noumenal/phenomenal
distinction. Certainly this is how the phrase is used in Hampden, as I
shall shew later, but he is the most radical of the Oriel noetics and
Copleston does not go as far. He merely wishes to deny univocal con-
cepts when speaking of God:

The names indeed of all particular virtues essentially denote
relation, such as justice, kindness, generosity, prudence, and cannot
be predicated literally of a being who does not literally bear
the same relation to us, which we bear to one another. Copleston
does affirm relativity in theology to the surprising extent

1 Inqu

2. Ibid., p 135
that we are to regard God as if He were our Father, not as our Father. Copleston, and Hampden after him, in the process of throwing off the scholastic terminology and logic have discovered that they cannot advance in theology without the idea of analogy. This is seen in Copleston's use of the word 'literally' in the passage just cited. This word can mean 'in a univocal fashion' or 'with any real meaning connected to the way we normally use the word' or it could, perhaps, be used consciously to avoid a decision between these two concepts. But it is precisely this decision that must be made at this stage of the argument.

All the concepts which we use to signify the divine attributes, even the concept of Being itself, have been taken from our knowledge of the finite order, and in their proper meaning all these concepts represent finite objects. The problem that the method of analogy is adduced to elucidate, the problem that Copleston tried manfully to tackle, is whether these concepts can be referred to the Infinite in any meaningful manner. The Infinite Being is to some extent knowable, and to some extent expressible. The transcendental extension of the concept of being is a conceptual expression of what we see to be an adequate similarity which links all beings together. Thus far, at least, Copleston could go. This is the basis, too, of the 'analogy' of the kind drawn by Hampden and Butler, which is really a form of similarity. The resemblance of
finite things among themselves, Copleston thought, results from the more fundamental resemblance which obtains between each finite being and its infinite cause. The patent resemblance among created beings follows from the very nature of causality. Each created being resembles every other created being because each created being resembles the creator. The cause contains its effect. A total cause (and the doctrine of creation demands a total cause of beings) contains its effect entirely. Thus every similarity in finite reality is based upon the similarity of the finite and the infinite, and this similarity is a necessary consequence of creative causality.

The essential distinction demanded by Copleston's argument depends on a particular form of reasoning. The similarity (of being or of any perfection) between the Creator and the creature, which derives from the relation of the total causality of the creative act cannot be expressed by the use of a term predicated univocally of God and man. Being and perfection exist in God in a primary and wholly independent manner, and in the creature in a derived, secondary and wholly dependent manner. We must, therefore, as Copleston and Hampden insisted, stress the difference between God and creature.

On the other hand, the meaning of being or perfection is not entirely different when applied to God or man; it is not a completely equivocal predication. If our modes of speech allowed a totally equivocal predication of being or perfection in connection with God
and man, then we should find ourselves having to say that either man does not exist, has no being, or that God does not exist.

Neither Copleston nor Hampden was prepared to doubt his own existence, nor were they prepared to doubt the existence of God. They did not intend to allow the predication of being (and they did not stop to consider the problem as to whether existence is a predicate or not) in a univocal manner. But intentions do not always work out. They seem in practice to say just this: The idea of a 'relative deity' demands an explanation that neither Copleston nor Hampden could attempt because neither had a proper grasp of his tools; neither could give an adequate account of the concept of analogy.

Hampden's work led on quietly to the further question 'Does the predication of perfections, even analogously, give us any real knowledge of God?'. In the finite order we can compare beings among themselves; measure one thing against another. Between finite and infinite there is no comparison possible. We do not know the infinite in itself. It would seem that if we can say that creatures are like God, we should be able to say that God is like creatures. We have in the end to be content with the acknowledgement that the similarity we recognise between Creator and creature is not so great as to prevent our recognising also that there is a great dissimilarity. We are unlike in being. We are unlike in the manner of being. This may be enough to safeguard the honour of God. Hampden at least thought so. We are at any rate acknowledging the problem for which analogy was devised. If we make necessary distinctions between univocal and equivocal predication those who do not, like Hampden and the Oriel men
will appear to have destroyed the validity of theology as a science. Like the Pseudo-Denis, they will appear to have set out a proof that such predications as 'not-good' and 'not-wise' must be applied to God, or like the Cordovan Maimonides they will give the impression of reducing the affirmation 'God is Living' to a mere 'God is not not-living'.

If one knows that God exists, one knows something about him, and can begin to talk about him. One may not know much, but one has a starting-point for rational discourse which will not inevitably involve one in self-contradictions or tautologies. One can hunt the Smark once one knows that it exists, even though one is ignorant of so important an intelligence as that it is a Recjum.

It is the task of the responsible Christian theologian to defend the meaningfulness of theological statements; Newman puts the matter in an immediate manner. He suggests that the various terms used in Trinitarian theology may by their combination in theological structures give rise to ideas which are altogether novel and represent an advance in understanding, even though in themselves they continue to be of a finite temporal character.

When it is said that such figures convey no knowledge of the Divine Nature itself, beyond those figures, whatever they are, it should be considered whether our senses can be proved to suggest any real idea of matter. All we know, strictly speaking is the existence of the impressions that our senses make on us; and yet.
we scruple not to speak as if they conveyed to us the knowledge of material substances. Let then, the Catholic Dogmas, as such, be freely admitted to convey no true idea of Almighty God, but only an earthly one, gained from earthly figures, provided it be allowed, on the other hand, that the senses do not convey to us any true idea of matter, but only an idea commensurate with sensible impressions.¹

This is not an argument for total scepticism, or even for religious agnosticism. For Newman goes on to shew that there is a certain correspondence between the idea, though earthly, and its heavenly archetype² in such a way that the idea belongs to the archetype in a way not proper to any other earthly idea, in such a way that the idea is the nearest approach that is possible to home viator. This much even St. Paul admitted when he spoke of seeing now 'in a glass darkly, but then face to face'. 'Meanwhile we are allowed such approximation to the truth as earthly images and figures may supply us'.³ In one of his letters Newman shews what he understands by approximation when he likens our knowledge of divine things to that of a child who has been told that an ox is a calf's uncle. The

1. Oxford University Sermons. XV. 32
2. Ibid. 33.
3. Ibid. 33.
information that we have is true, is all that we require, all that we can understand, but it is not the whole truth.

In Whately's edition of King's Discourse on Predestination— an edition which, he says, was occasioned by the 'high commendation very justly bestowed on it by Dr Copleston,' and which was the edition Hampden read in preparation for his book on the Philosophical Evidence— Whately describes the main objection to King's view of the subject as the 'supposition' that if the moral and intellectual attributes ascribed to God in the Scriptures are not to be understood as the same in Him as they are in us, but merely analogical representations, the precepts which direct us to imitate the divine perfections will be nullified, since it is impossible to imitate the unknown. Whately concurs in Copleston's opinion that we know God only in relation to ourselves, that is, through His actions towards men, that God is, in this sense, a relative deity. Therefore our morality can consist only in imitating among men those relative actions of God towards men which we have grasped in a relative fashion. The nature of the case does not allow an absolute communication of absolute moral norms. Copleston supports King, and Whately supports Copleston in suggesting that moral qualities in God or men are perceived only in their effects, and have only a relative existence.

1 Published 1833
2 Discourse of Archbishop King, Introduction, p 453
4 Discourse, p 455
5 Copleston, note to Discourse III, p 128f of Inquiry.
6 Discourse (ed. Whately) p 470
7 Discourse (Whately's Introduction) p 455
For Whately, and for Copleston, analogy is an insubstantial thing; it is a way of saying that we had better think and act as if things were univocal while suspecting that they are equivocal. This is why Hampden's doctrine, taken as it is from inconclusive writers, is but a shadow of the real concept of analogy.

Thus in Whately's *Elements of Logic*, the theory of analogical predication is put forward in a version that only a latitudinarian could have entertained. Whately, while assuming the infinite difference between finite and infinite (though he never makes this plain) manages to suggest that we may see the real meaning of analogy in theological matters if we consider that two men are said to have the 'same' disease if they are precisely similar in respect of their ailments, but they do not in fact suffer each other's sickness. One can see where Hampden's emphasis on resemblances. While in one part of his essay Whately defines an analogous term as one 'whose single signification applies with unequal propriety to more than one object', in another he writes of 'two or more things connected by resemblance or analogy'. Whately sometimes slips, therefore, into traps that Copleston had attempted to warn against.

1. *Elements of Logic*, V. para. 2, pp266-7
2. Ibid. p 333
3. Ibid. p 168; cf King, Discourse, p 471: 'by way of resemblance and analogy'.
Mystery and Logic

On Whit Sunday, 1821, Whately, then a Fellow of Griel, preached a sermon to the University on the Use of Human Learning in Matters of Religion. He began with a description of the irreligious mind of the Corinthians to whom St. Paul preached. The Corinthians, Whately supposed were typical of the Greeks in general; they were disposed to set a high value on the devices of human ingenuity, on rhetoric and philosophy. Now rhetoric and philosophy may be all very well for pagans, but Whately was sure that 'such aids would have been a degradation of the Gospel, and would have tended to weaken the evidence of its truth.' He then discussed whether those who would preach in the nineteenth century might not do well to relinquish the human aids they so often employ:

Nothing undoubtedly can be more just than the renunciation of all reliance upon human means, as of themselves sufficient; the preference of moral to intellectual qualifications; add candour and sincere piety, to learning and acuteness; and the caution not to exalt human reason to a level with divine revelation, nor to submit the mysteries of God to be judged by philosophical rules devised by arrogant and shortsighted men.

1. Five Sermons on Several Occasions, Oxford, 1823, Sermon IV.
2. Sermon IV. p.107
There is, however, the complication, that if we follow the example of St. Paul in rejecting these human accomplishments and attempt to imitate him in the manner of propagating the revelation of God, we shall soon discover that we have not the aids St. Paul had; we are not inspired, we cannot work miracles. To claim inspiration is certainly a way of obscuring our incapacity, but it does not actually remove it. There are some indeed, Whately laments, who seem to rely on nothing but thin air, and promise—cram their hearers, but they are fools.

Whether the error we have been speaking of arises originally from indolence, and from distaste either for study in general, or for any particular branch of it, or whether it is to be traced to a hasty and careless interpretation of the Apostle's language, or is the offspring of enthusiasm and spiritual pride, or of these cases conjointly, there is no error that is more likely to damp or to misdirect the exertions, and to defeat the object, both of the hearer and teacher of religion.¹

Study and reasoning become a sacred duty. However worthless such study is when employed for other purposes, it becomes ‘ennobled and sanctified when directed by a pious mind towards a good object’.²

1. Sermon IV. p. 120.
The peroration, with its hints about the practice of religion, shows that while Whately is interested in the promotion of learned and usefully studied sermons, he is not an intellectualist in matters of religion. He gives a warning that our reason must be kept under control. We must be anxious to guard against the error of trying the mysteries of religion by the rules of philosophy — of boldly measuring the decrees of divine wisdom by the imperfect standards of human reason! This is eminently sane advice. Whately here anticipates a point of Froude — that we must not be too quick to measure revelation by assumptions from human experience, receiving or rejecting what revelation presents us, according as it is agreeable or repugnant to our preconceived notions, 'explaining away or modifying, the scriptural doctrines, into a conformity with our own presumptuous speculations.' But the reasoning behind this warning is not quite the same as that later presented by Froude. Froude was engaged in the defence of scriptural facts against the attacks of spurious reason; Whately assumes the surety of fact and is discussing the process of theologising. When he speaks of speculation, it is not atheistic doubt and objections that he is thinking of, but Christian enquiry. In the Essays on the Peculiarities of the Christian Religion, published two years after the Sermons, he takes his attack on Christian speculation a little further.

In the third of these Essays, Whately begins with the relation between natural and revealed religion:

Human ethics and natural religion may be sufficient to satisfy the understanding as to the nature and the claims of virtue; but to engage the feelings on the same side, belongs in an especial manner to the Gospel.\(^1\)

Whately admits that it is necessary to convince men's reason, but the affections must also be involved. So St. Paul, Whately says, presents us with the promise of a fuller knowledge of Christ so that we may move towards a person. The idea of Christianity as essentially a personal religion, in the sense that it was founded by, and directed to, a Person, was not of course an idea peculiar to the Oriel theologians, but it was one which Whately made much of, and which was vigorously prosecuted by both Newman and Keble. Newman in describing the influence of Keble's conversations, notices especially Keble's insistence that 'the firmness of assent which we give to religious doctrine' derives not from the probabilities which introduced it\(^2\) (here Keble escaped from Butler's all-pervading probability) but from 'the living power of faith and love which accepted it.'\(^3\). This is worked out to a fully

2. Apologia. p.19
3. Ibid. p.19.
religion conclusion:

Faith and Love are directed towards an object; in the vision of that object they live; it is that object, received in faith and love which renders it reasonable to take probability as sufficient for internal conviction. Thus the argument from probability, in the matter of religion, became an argument from Personality, which in fact is one form of the argument from Authority.¹

Whately was not likely to employ his insight to support an argument from Authority, but Keble is using the same argument. Keble proceeds from the hard necessity of following an argument; his way of putting it seems near to Fideism, and this is perhaps why Newman, though he saw its wonder, yet was not completely happy about it.

I did not at all dispute this view of the matter, for I made use of it myself;² but I was dissatisfied because it did not go to the root of the difficulty. It was beautiful and religious, but it did not even profess to be logical.³

It was this presence of beauty and this absence of logic which led Newman to formulate the first expressions of the Illative Sense. Whately, too, went further than the argument

1. Ibid. p.20
2. In Tract VIII.
3. Apologia, p. 20.
Keble offered. The necessity of personal affection being involved distinguishes Christianity from all systems of religion, or of philosophy, which unaided reason can devise. Because he regards this personal involvement as the peculiarity of Christianity, Whately will have nothing to do with natural theology. With the robustness for which he was famous in Oxford — a robustness that crashed as heavily on other men's ideas as it did on the spindly fragility of a drawing room chair — Whately propounds the essentially practical character of the Christian Religion. Revelation is not so much of doctrine but of duty and morality. Here there is an anticipation of Hampden.

Men, Whately remarks, are curious about many things; they are always seeking after fresh information on subjects which have little claim to utility. He agrees with Cicero that men are especially interested in 'things hidden and things admirable'. They are therefore naturally curious about the Supreme Being, His nature and attributes:

Is it not then natural, that men should eagerly seek some superhuman means of information on subjects so interesting to their curiosity, and so much beyond their unaided powers?

1. Essay III, p.179
2. De Officiis Bk.I.
Speculation is to be shunned because it ignores the main purpose of God's revelation. The dogmatic theories of those Christians who seek after more knowledge of God than is at once apparent in Scripture exhibit a 'general want of reference to human conduct - their being principally calculated to attract and amuse an inquisitive mind', 1 Whately passes in review the pagan religions, and then comes a little nearer home:

What a multitude of idle legends do we meet in the Romish Church, that have no more reference to practice than the heathen mythology! 2

This disposes of all foreign wanderings from the truth, and Whately moves forward to the discussion of the proper attitude towards revelation. Here Newman, (whose copy of the Essays I have been using), has marked two passages which are at the centre of Whately's argument:

Both reason and experience show that it is the obvious policy of an impostor, and the most natural delusion of a visionary, to treat much of curious and hidden matters, relative to the divine operations, beyond what is conducive to practical instruction. 3

It follows from this that a real revelation is unlikely to be much occupied in ministering to speculative curiosity.

It is axiomatic that God will reveal something not to gratify our intellect but to guide us in right conduct:

It may be said indeed, that the trial of our faith, humility and candour in assenting, on sufficient authority, to mysterious doctrines, is a worthy and fit purpose, for which such doctrines may be revealed; this is undoubtedly true; and the purpose may even be fairly reckoned a practical one, since so good a moral effect results from such belief.¹

It will be seen that a great deal depends on what is meant by a reasonable enquiry and reference to practice. It is possible to make a defence for almost every theological enquiry with the argument that the more we learn and know of God the more we shall love Him. Speculation is therefore aligned to a supremely practical result. And if this seems too sly an argument, this is because of the different interpretations that are put on reasonable theological enquiry. What is reasonable? In these Essays, Whately avoids any real discussion of this crucial point. That Newman scored the two passages I have just quoted would suggest that he interpreted them to mean that in the end man must humble himself before God's revelation, acknowledge the mystery. This was always a major element in Newman's theology. He was always contending against the usurpations of too curious a reason, what he called

¹. Sermon IV. p.195
the world’s reason. Newman agrees with Whately that revelation must always remain mysterious. Man would not be man but God, if the nature of God did not puzzle and elude his understanding:

I consider that this mysteriousness is, as far as it proves anything, a recommendation of the doctrine. I do not say that it is true because it is mysterious; but that if it be true, it cannot help being mysterious.¹

But while Whately sees in the mystery the command to cease enquiry, Newman sees in it an indication that we must look elsewhere as well as in the scriptural revelation:

It is not stranger that the testimony of others should be our guide as to the next world, than it is our guide in this.²

The argument from mystery becomes an argument for Tradition. This is not what Whately meant at all.

In the Errors of Romaniœm that Whately published in 1830, a book based on some of his earlier University sermons, he shows what he meant by mystery. He defines mysteries as ‘truths not discoverable by human reason, but made known by revelation.’ And in this definition the emphasis is placed

on the making known of a mystery 'not the concealment but the disclosure'. Mysteries are revealed explanations; they are, once revealed, perfectly intelligible. To suggest that what God has revealed is not as fully revealed as possible to our minds, that there is, in fact, any mystery left after revelation, is mere foolery;

The unprofitable, absurd, presumptuous, and profane speculations of scholastic theologians (not all of them members of the Roman Church) which are extant, afford a melancholy specimen of the fruits of this mistake as to the Christian Mysteries - this 'corruption from the simplicity that is in Christ'.

The assumption that a mystery, once revealed, is plain to all, leads Whately to deny the possibility of 'the testimony of others' being 'our guide to the next world':

Learning cannot advance one man beyond another in the comprehension of things which are confessedly beyond the reach of the human faculties altogether.

Whately and Newman, though they appear to differ completely here, may be said to agree in part - both agree that men cannot investigate the mysteries of God further than He has revealed them. But while Whately assumes that revelation is

1. Errors of Romanism, p.77.
2. Errors of Romanism, p.81.
3. Errors of Romanism, p.87.
immediately intelligible in all its parts, Newman thinks that
the human mind must be set to understand the full implications
of the fact revealed. This is not a defence of rationalism;
the Christian speculation on the revelation of God is something
quite different;

... though the Christian mind reasons out a series of
dogmatic statements one from another, this it has ever
done, and always must do, not from those statements
taken in themselves, as logical propositions, but as
being itself enlightened, and (as if) inhabited by
that sacred impression which is prior to them, which
acts as a regulating principle, ever present, upon
the reasoning, and without which no one has any
warrant to reason at all ... ¹

The difference between Newman's attitude to the revelation
in Scripture and that of Whately can be succinctly seen in one
sentence of Newman's 1843 sermon on Development:

The Scripture statements are sanctions as well as in-
formants in the inquiry; they begin and they do
not exhaust. ²

While Whately is concerned with the moral character of
revelation, the precept it gives us, while for him 'the most

¹ University Sermons, XV, p.334.
² Ibid, XV, p.335.
practical interpretation of each doctrine is ever likely to be the truest', for Newman Christianity is 'a rule of faith as well as of conduct' and we must discover the meaning of revelation as well as the fact.

How then are the Scriptures to be studied?, Whately gives his answer in a collection of University sermons published in 1828. It is not to be supposed, he writes:

.... that great part of them consist of a series of perplexing difficulties, serving only to exercise the ingenuity of theologians, in endless controversies, and barren of all edifying application.  

Rather the Scriptures are to be approached to discover the facts of revelation and we ought to expect these facts to be (Whately never ceases to say) 'not matters of speculative curiosity but of practical importance'. Whately is able to dismiss the question of truth or falsity of the Calvinistic doctrine of Election because if rightly viewed, he considers it is shown to be but a speculative thing, and therefore not to be part of God's message to us. Similarly he regards the 'system of imputed sin and righteousness' as 'altogether fanciful and groundless'. Plausible enough, the doctrine is yet suspiciously systematic, and this puts Whately on his

4. Ibid. p.189.
for there is no more common error in many departments of study, and especially in theology, then the prevalence of a love of system over the love of truth. ¹

The main danger of theological systematisation, whately supposes, is in the multiplication of technical terms, and the reference of technicalities to words used in Scripture:

... it would have been better if, from the first, no scriptural terms had been introduced into systems of theology.²

And he rejoices that the term 'Trinity' is not to be found in Scripture, for this prevents our making texts mean something in conformity with our systems:

As it is, one of the best safeguards against this danger would be to vary from time to time the language of our expositions of Scripture-doctrine.³

For technical terms give the impression of absolutes in theology. And these cannot exist. We can never have anything more than a relative knowledge of what God is, because all his revelation is relative — it deals with the relations between God and man, and of the practical truths thence resulting. Now the dogmatic systemisers demand absolute and fully certain knowledge of 'the real state of things'.⁴

1. Ibid. p. 189.
3. Ibid. p. 190
4. Ibid. p. 208.
must rejoice in our lack of certainty, because this uncertainty itself is a proof that we are not in error:

...for if we obtain a full and clear notion of things beyond the reach of human faculties, it cannot fail to be an erroneous notion.\(^1\)

This leads on to a discussion of the relative deity which Hampden eagerly took up. Hampden later was to emphasise that the scriptural revelation is rather a record of God's dealing with men than a description of His own nature.

It will become apparent in a later section that Whately's naturalistic and reasonable approach to the content of revelation and the mode of being of a mystery was entertained by Hampden and others of the Oriel theologians.

\(^1\) Difficulties in S Paul, p221
PROVOST. HAWKINS

I. Private Reason and Faith

In a sermon preached in the University Church on 11 November, 1838, Provost Hawkins outlined a view of the relation between reason and faith, and the relation between the individual and the community of the Church. This was not a new subject with him. Nor was this the last time he was to embark on its description. He developed his ideas still further in the Bampton Lectures that he gave in 1840. It is instructive to notice how far Hawkins has reacted against the view of Whately that has just been mentioned.

Hawkins has no intention of being ranked with those who throw away reason in the enthusiasm of faith. He is no fideist. He is not making an attempt to dispossess reason. He will not admit that the Reformation leaders were correct in their estimate of reason's present condition among fallen humanity. He will not admit a total distortion or wreck of this faculty:

the very gift of the faculty of Reason affords a strong presumption that we ought not to prevent its being exercised. Weak and corrupt as we are, there is not probably any one of our natural faculties or affections of passions which we should endeavour to eradicate. Regulation, control, correction, they all require; extirpation and extinction not one of them.

1 Duty of Private Judgement, Oxford, 1838. 2 Ibid. p 11
Hawkins has no love of the irrationalist: 'let no one tell you that Religion is not within the province of your Reason.' He knows that there are two kinds of men who will assert that reason and religion are entirely separate, even that they are living negations of one another. One is the rationalist who wishes to destroy religion by breaking it against the rock of reason. The other is the fideist who wishes to preserve religion from the frightening powers of science and logic:

The unbeliever is fond of saying with a sneer of the truths of revelation that they are the objects of Faith and not of Reason, and mistaken piety adopts the error.

This idea is repeated in the Bampton Lectures:

Faith is invidiously contrasted with Reason and the cultivation of our moral affections with that of the intellect; as if the principle of Faith excluded argumentation, and the heart's being right, the judgement must of necessity be sound.

He is here addressing those timid Christians who so fearfully refuse to investigate the power of reason to help them in the comprehending of Revelation.

1 Duty of Private Judgement, p12
2 Ibid. p 12
3 Hutchinson The Principle means of attaining Christian Truth, VII, p222
Hawkins' case is that Rationalism is itself unreasonable. It does not take account of all the elements of the situation in which it is attempting to work. Reason would have told the Rationalist, if he had been humble before its dictates, that a divine revelation would naturally be expected to contain ideas and concepts far surpassing the experience and mental capacity of unaccommodated man:

It is plainly a perversion of Reason to make our first instrument of knowledge the measure of every other, to make Reason the judge of revelation, one gracious gift to shut out another. And it is plainly an abuse which is boundless in its principle and in its effects may be fatal; neither revealed doctrine nor inspired writing is excluded from its operation; and even Heresy is not so much its natural result, as Apostasy and utter Unbelief.

Faith includes the exercise of our reason and judgement:

By Reason we examine the evidence of Revelation; by Reason we scrutinize and interpret the language in which its truths are conveyed; by Reason we apprehend the meaning of the propositions in which revealed truths, as well as all others, are expressed. Reason is to examine the evidences, preliminary to belief, in natural theologising; it is to examine texts and other means of communication in which revelation is said to be conveyed; it is even to systematise and work towards a harmony of doctrines.

1 Bampton Lectures, VII, p228
2 1838 Sermon, p 13
But Hawkins does not relinquish his reason even at this moment; he recognises the divine principle of activity, grace building on nature:

... by Reason, lastly, comprehended in Faith, and blessed and consecrated by the Spirit of truth, we embrace and believe them.¹

It is at this point that Hawkins' theology takes note of the prevalent exploitation of the 'Evidence of Christianity' and with this type of theologising he has little sympathy.

God has not made all His revelations so mysterious that we cannot understand anything of their nature; He has left glimpses of His infinite wisdom in the world and in His special revelation to Christians. Now men are, if they take the revelation of God at its proper serious value, likely to attempt a connection between the signs of God in nature and the signs of God in the special revelation. This connection is generally found in the Internal Evidences of Revelation, 'a beautiful subject of devout contemplation, on which pious and ingenious minds have delighted to expatiate, and which is, perhaps unconsciously, pursued by very many more to their continual profit and edification'.² But there is always the danger, as Hawkins was at pains to emphasise, that men will be led away by their enthusiasm for the evidence of Christianity 'as to make their existence, and our perception of them essential to our very belief.³

1. Ibid. p.13.
2. Bampton Lectures, Sermon VII. p.230. 3. Ibid. p 230
revelations. He admits that there may indeed by no ill-effects upon the minds of those who indulge in this kind of theologising, but upon those who read them there may fall a heavy shock and scandal. In this connection he refers to the activities of some of the Fathers and 'most of the Schoolmen' who, he supposes, compensated themselves for their submission to the infallible authority of the Church 'by their unlicensed speculations on Sacred subjects, where the Church had not prescribed the line which Reason was not to overstep'. 1 The Evidentials are therefore in some sense the heirs of all that was wrong with the Patristic and Scholastic traditions, and this kind of error is not confined to the older writers;

... all the peculiarities of Calvinism are recent instances of similar errors; the peremptory decisions of human reason upon subjects which Revelation left undecided. 2

However, Hawkins returns to the assurance that such mishaps should not deter us from seeking to use our reason rightly in the work of theology; they should serve, rather, as warnings, so that we walk more carefully. We must learn that there are limits to the uses of reason, but within those limits reason must be given its full extent: 'it is one of the very offices of Reason to discover these limits, and to conserve them is our best wisdom'. 3

1. Ibid. p. 233
2. Bampton Lectures, Sermon VII. p. 234
3. Ibid., p. 237
II Private Judgment and Tradition

The relation of reason to theology led the Provost of Oriel to consider the relation of the private individual to the consensus of the Society established to govern religious matters. In the general confusion of theories about the meaning of the Church in the divine economy of salvation, Hawkins produced a straight middle-of-the-road view.

He began by suggesting that a true idea of the individual's responsibility and his position within the ecclesiastical frame could be reached by a consideration of the meaning attached to the right of private judgment. He offers a distinction which is basic to his thought about the individual:

... let us observe the vast practical difference there is between asserting the Right, and acknowledging the Duty of Private Judgment.\(^1\)

He thought that Right had a fellowship with 'a spirit of pride and independence' and that Duty, on the other hand, was concerned not with self but with 'the importance of religious truth' and its interest directed 'to the best modes of seeking the truth, and the best aids we can obtain in our pursuit of it'.\(^2\)

Hawkins suggests that there is an analogy between the way we behave in normal affairs of life and the way we are meant to participate in the Christian religion. In the

1. 1838 Sermon on The Duty of Private Judgment, p.17.
2. Ibid, p.17.
ordinary business of our lives we have, he observes, to submit ourselves and our judgment to doctors and lawyers. We exercise our private judgment once in determining to consult a specialist and then submit ourselves to the course directed by that judgment:

Hence it is no paradox to say that the duty of private judgment calls upon us in some cases to suspend or to abrogate our private judgment; that is, calls for every degree of deference to the judgment of others which is suited to the actual inferiority of our own judgment, as the case may be, according to our age, education, capacities and acquirements, throughout our whole course from the cradle to the grave. 1

In the copy that Newman possessed of this pamphlet, he has written in pencil against this passage:

This is granting everything. Considering the great moment of the fundamentals of faith, our own weakness, and the strength of Catholic Testimony, the question is, whether such fundamentals, or the Creed, be not a case in which it is a 'duty to abrogate private judgment'.

Hawkins did not think that he had admitted so much. He thought that his reservation about 'age, education, capacities and acquirements' allowed him to exalt the powers and position

of the Church while maintaining as low an estimate as one
might wish of any particular representative of the Church.
However, such a point was not his immediate object in this
sermon. He was concerned with the unity of the Church, with
constructing a means to end theological divisions. He was
always concerned at the pretensions of the clergy; he had
preached two sermons against this. On the other hand, he had
no intention of allowing the error of the Dissenters to take
the place vacated by that of the Romanists. So he was against
the right of private judgment:

Let the right of private judgment be our watchword,
and we shall have a strong temptation to prove how
well we can assert it by differing from the judgment
of other men.¹

So we are diverted from the quest of truth into a seeking for
originality, and heresy is set at a premium under the guise of
sincere conviction. On the other hand, he is asserting the
duty of private judgment as completely opposed to the division-
making tendencies of the right:

The duty of private judgment diverts the mind from all
thoughts of jealousy, rivalry, opposition to others,
and directs it simply to truth. The truth becomes our
single aim.²

1. 1838 Sermon. p. 20
2. ibid. p. 20
Here is his ground from which he can attack the latitudinarian theology — the theology of sincerity and well-held differences, the theology of disappearing orthodoxy:

The recognition, we may add, of the duty of private judgment, overthrows that fearful reliance upon their own sincerity which some consider to be all in all, a full justification of every defect and every error. Not only must truth be our aim, but we are responsible for its attainment.¹

This kind of statement, suggesting that the asking of questions may well not be enough in the Christian life, is very much against the trend of latitudinarian thinking. Archbishop Tillotson had once been amazed at the way in which the English seized upon the principles of rationalism and agnosticism:

for I do not think that there are any people in the world that are more generally indisposed to it and can worse brock it; seriousness and zeal in religion being almost the natural temper of the English.²

But when Hawkins was writing, when Keble was declaring that the whole nation was turning Apostate, and Newman seriously considering the possibility of the Anglican bishops dying martyrs' deaths, it did not seem so strange that the English

1. 1838 Sermon. p.21.
should be accused of shying at dogma and loving their own judgments more than the coming to the truth. Hawkins at least was convinced that something must be done to preserve the Christian religion, and preserve it as it was contained in the Anglican Church, not as it is in Rome, or in the Dissenting convention:

We might, perhaps, at our pleasure or discretion, refrain from exercising a right; we are not permitted to decline a duty. ¹

So we have a duty to search the Scriptures and to listen to the voice of the Church:

Sincerity is no longer an excuse for error, if we have slighted any means of ascertaining the truth which He has provided us, whether through the Scriptures or through the Church. ²

And here he meets the objection that he has no right to insist on his particular form of Christianity being maintained. There is no reason why one should not be prejudiced in favour of the truth, and no reason why anyone should object to such a prejudice:

Hence, lastly, the doctrine which we would inculcate tends to dislodge that prejudice against Prejudice, which is gratuitously introduced into the subject of religion, and often presents a formidable opposition

². Ibid. p.21.
to the attainment of religious truth. No one dreams of his infringing the independent rights of other intellects, when he teaches whatever he knows and believes, and thinks useful in History, Politics, Philosophy, Morals, or any other subject, except Religion, to any one of any age who will receive instruction from him. In religion alone we hear of the improper prejudice which such a procedure tends to generate.  

A good example of what Hawkins means when he talks of the pejorative use of Prejudice in religion can be seen at the beginning of Hampden's Observations of Religious Dissent; he is proposing to discover whether or no the Establishment is justified in refusing to admit Dissenters to the University degrees:  

In pursuing such an enquiry we are naturally led to consider the principle on which Christian doctrine takes its rise; that is, whether there is foundation for the common prejudice which identifies systems of doctrines - or theological propositions methodically deduced and stated - with Christianity itself - with the simple religion of Jesus Christ, as received into the heart and influencing the conduct.  

Now this passage, besides revealing the latitudinarian ancestry of Hampden's theology of the heart and conduct as opposed to  

doctrines and theological propositions, is a fine example of Hampden's debating technique, as T. W. Lancaster pointed out:

We have occasion to admire the candour of our judge, who stigmatises with the name of prejudice a principle, respecting which he proposes to enquire, but has not yet enquired, whether it is a prejudice or rational conviction: he first condemns his prisoner and then goes into the case: castigatque auditque doles.¹

Lancaster is complaining against his beliefs being termed prejudices, Hawkins protests against 'prejudice' being thought a bad word in theology any more than in any other study. It is difficult now to imagine that 'prejudice' could ever be a good word, but one can see what Hawkins means. If one has a firm conviction, there should be nothing shameful about expressing it. However, he is not supporting the latitudinarian emphasis on sincerity at this late stage in his argument. By a firm conviction he means one which has stood the test of close study, and has nothing in it of rash opposition to traditional values; his advice to the undergraduates at the end of this sermon is fully in line with his whole approach to theology:

When you proceed to the actual investigation of the more difficult subjects of religious controversy, be assured that it is a work of time and care to examine

¹ Lancaster: Strictures on a Late Publication of Doctor Hampden. 1836. p. 3.
them with perfect candour, to weigh the relative importance of doctrines, to distinguish between vital truths and their accessories, to clear the doctrines of Revelation from the necessary imperfections of human statements — to keep our judgments undisturbed, on this side and on that, by the spirit of party. And what, if every party within the Church owes in fact its very existence either to some exaggerated statement of a Christian truth, or to its giving to some truth or class of truths an undue prominence? 1

This is a firm-minded counsel, and one with which most men would agree — it could be argued, I think, that both Newman and Hampden would have found themselves able to subscribe to it. It was Newman’s argument in the struggle about the Articles and Tract XC that he was merely presenting the literal and undistorted meaning of the words themselves, clearing the Articles from the ‘necessary imperfections of human statements’. And, of course, Hampden’s whole theology was based on the imperfections of symbols and the necessity to avoid all human interpolations and definitions.

Hawkins at the end, then, takes sides against the Reformation principle, just as he takes sides against the Roman practice, and he asks the tutors to encourage another spirit in the undergraduates, a spirit of humility:

1. 1838 Sermon. p.26
... prevent their baneful reliance upon their mere Sincerity, correct the unnatural desire of Independ-
ence, restrain the gratuitous and hurtful jealousy so often entertained against Prejudice.¹

But he is not sanguine about the future of English religion; the error which Hampden was presenting as toleration and Christian charity, seems bound to triumph. As society becomes more and more cultivated and subtle, the prevailing form of religious error will not be 'superstition or fanaticism; as in former days, but Rationalism'. The new era will be one in which partial, defective schemes of Christianity will be welcomed because they offer 'least offence to the pride of reason'.²

From the opposition he offered to rationalism in religion Hawkins moved to the subordination of the individual reason to that of Society. He has now to place that Society in the divine plan, and to put forward a frame within which Scripture and Tradition may be properly employed for the salvation of men.

The Apologia records the great influence that Hawkins, then Vicar of St. Mary's, had on Newman's theological opinions when he was an under-graduate. It was Hawkins who shewed Newman that he ought to give up his 'remaining Calvinism, and

1. 1838 Sermon. p.27
2. Ibid. p.29.
to receive the doctrine of Baptismal Regeneration. And it was Hawkins who first introduced him to the doctrine of Tradition in a sermon which seemed to Newman too long in the hearing, but which he afterwards read with enthusiasm. Hawkins, Newman writes,

lays down a proposition, self-evident as soon as stated, to those who have at all examined the structure of Scripture, viz., that the sacred text was never intended to teach doctrine, but only to prove it, and that, if we would learn doctrine, we must have recourse to the formularies of the Church; for instance to the Catechism, and to the Creeds. He considers that, after learning from the doctrines of Christianity, the inquirer must verify them by Scripture. This view, most true in its outline, most fruitful in its consequences, opened upon me a large field of thought. Dr. Whately held it too.

The sermon was important enough in Newman's life for him to record in his Autobiographical Memoir the account he received from Dr. Whately of the origin of the sermon:

"Hawkins came to me and said 'What shall I preach about?' putting into my hands at the same time some notes which he thought might supply a subject. After reading them, I said to him, 'Capital! Make a Sermon

2. Ibid. p.9.
of them by all means; I did not know till now that you had so much originality in you'. Whatley felt the doctrine as true as he considered it original.\(^1\)

Hawkins published the Sermon under the title of 'A Dissertation upon the use and importance of Unauthoritative Tradition'. He gave a copy to Newman, as Newman records in the Apologia,\(^2\) and it is this copy in the Oratory archives that I use to provide my quotations.

Hawkins begins by asking, 'Why are so many of the Christian doctrines so indirectly taught in the Scriptures?\(^3\) This is a question, he says, which is often asked, for the Apostles might just as easily have set down the doctrines explicitly and made things so much easier for the faithful. He is certain that this is a real difficulty, and if some have not considered it before, it is probably because they have avoided the doubt merely by inattention to the real existence and extent of the difficulty in the sacred Volume.\(^4\) Men may by-pass the question because they have received the doctrines from other men and therefore do not see at first sight the amount of hurrying from one place to another in the Bible to find a conclusive proof, they do not understand 'that one text occasionally of the greatest importance towards their

1. Autobiographical Memoir, III (written for Ambrose St. John, used by Miss Mozley and printed in Autobiographical Writings, edited by H. Tristram & C. S. Desaun, pp 78-9)
conviction had no force at all in that respect until compared with another, and that perhaps with a third, each separately incapable of bearing upon the point in question, but all together composing an indissoluble argument, of so much the more force indeed, as it precludes the possibility of forgery and interpolation. He insists how very unconnected such texts are in the actual Bible. Similarly, theologians often use as direct proofs of doctrine passages which are not at all means for the purpose, and this 'with perfect propriety so far as the truth and soundness of their argument is concerned, but incorrectly with respect to the form of the original words'.

He gives as an example of this use of Scripture the way in which the passages in St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans which assume the doctrine of Original Sin are brought forth to prove the fact of Original Sin.

This is, as Hawkins notes, all very odd. For we should expect that if God wishes to teach something He would tell us plainly what His doctrine is. Indeed, some theologians have been so convinced that this is what is to be expected that they have not noticed that this is precisely what is not to be found. We do not approve of obscurities in the writings of men, so why is the Bible so full of obscurities? Surely God would not fall into confusion just when He intends to reveal and enlighten men? We would have no patience with 'the philosopher who obliges us to pursue such a painful method of collecting those opinions which he professes to teach'.

And certainly it would not seem consonant with the divine intention to save all men if God were to make the means of saving them open only to the most intelligent and scholarly of his people. Hawkins concludes that

the method of the Christian writings affords indeed the very strongest proofs of doctrines interwoven by allusion, implication, and every indirect mode, with the texture of the sacred books; but it is often the least adapted to the purpose of teaching those doctrines, which was the end we should have expected them to have in view.¹

It is such considerations as these which prompt men to ask why, in His infinite Wisdom, the Holy Ghost should think it best to give the world these all-important truths in such a way. But there is, Hawkins thinks, little propriety in proposing a difficulty for consideration which is not likely to be answered completely, and which seems to present the faltering with even greater occasion of doubt, and the unbeliever with another cavil against the truth. The unbeliever may, however, be turned aside with the observation that it would be no less unreasonable to object to the truth of Christianity itself on account of the difficulty here acknowledged, than it would be to deny the reality, or even the high importance of that knowledge of agriculture which civilised nations possess, because there are various savage

¹. Ibid. p.11.
tribes to whom the art itself is unknown.¹ Hawkins is inclined also to the opinion that we should not always expect that everything contained in God’s revelation to Man should be readily understood by each man:

it seems to have been the very intention of Providence that doubts and perplexities on the subject of Religion (different also to different minds) should remain as parts of our probation.²

Hawkins does not decide that no solution at all can be offered. God must reveal Himself in the way that He knows is best for us, the way that we can most easily take advantage of. We may at least say it is a salutary trial of our faith and humility. The very discussion of this problem itself shows that revelation has by its peculiar manner evoked added interest to its content.

Hawkins begins his explanation of the obscurity of revelation by comparing this to the obscurity of God’s manner of giving us the moral precepts; another view of this comparison is given in Hampden’s lectures as White’s Professor. Hawkins notices that the moral precepts are also taught in Scripture with far less system than in the least exact works upon moral subjects; they are rather to be gleaned than readily gathered from history.³ Now as we have the guide of

3. Dissertation. p. 16
conscience and reason in our carrying out of the moral principles so we have a guide to help us in the working out of our salvation by the doctrines revealed in Scripture. And having this guide we cannot complain that Revelation is obscure. 'Exactly such an aid and guide may surely be found in tradition'.

Since everyone admits that we need such a guide, and since there do exist 'the traditions conveyed from age to age by the Church' it would seem evident that there is at least a probability that it is these traditions which are meant by God to be our guide. That revelation in practice means the Scriptures interpreted by means of tradition. It must have been

the general design of Heaven that by early oral, or traditional instruction the way should be prepared for the reception of the mysteries of faith: that the Church should carry down the system but the Scriptures should furnish all the proofs of the Christian doctrines; that tradition should supply the Christian with the arrangement, but the Bible with all the substance of divine truth.

Having said so much, Hawkins is obviously afraid that he will be thought one of those who hanker after the authoritarian

1. Ibid. p.17
2. Dissertation. P.18
traditionalism of Rome. He is quick to disavow this connection. Rome, according to Hawkins, is quite capable of thinking traditions superior to Scriptural revelation, and certainly maintains in the face of all-convincing proof from history that her traditions are infallible and incorruptible. Hawkins will allow tradition no independence at all. They must always be referred to the Scriptures:

We perceive that traditions may be contradictory to the Scriptures and then we absolutely reject them; or they may be supported by the Scriptures, and then we allow them no further, than as they coincide with the dictates of reason; or they may be supported by the sacred writings, and then we respect them as the original sentiments of the first believers — as derived indeed from the true and only authority.¹

It is, then a genuinely Protestant tradition that Hawkins claims to be presenting, and though the Roman view may not be so far from his own as he would like men to believe, it is a view which is presented in a way that will commend it to Protestants. It is a view, too, which entails a high place for the Church in divine Providence: 'the Church teaches and the Scriptures prove the doctrines of Christianity'²

1. Ibid. p.20
And Hawkins is anxious lest the remembrance of the errors of Romanism should prevent Protestants realising how true his explanation of tradition is. The history of Protestant apologetic is all against him. Hooker was obliged to apologise even for the use of the word 'tradition' and the XXXIV Article is not encouraging. He appeals then to our common experience that we believe the doctrines of Christianity when they are shown to us from the Scriptures, but he insists that we admit that we might never have found them in the text for ourselves. He brings in Hooker to support him. Hooker had said that the Articles were drawn up to make essentials clear:

As the decalogue of Moses declareth summarily those things which we ought to do; the prayer of the Lord, whatsoever we should request or desire; so either by the apostles or at leastwise out of their writings, we have the substance of Christian belief compendiously drawn into few and short articles, to the end that the weakness of no man's wit might either hinder altogether the knowledge, or excuse the utter ignorance, of needful things. ¹

This appears to Hawkins a statement that since the Scriptures are not given to us as a systematic revelation we are forced by the will of God the revealer to systematise for ourselves.

Traditional instruction is 'the obvious supply of the want'.¹

He claims that by bringing again to the fore the tradition of the Church 'we do but resume the too-much neglected principle of our Reformers'.² The men who rescued the English Church as a brand from the burning did not abandon all that they had heard of the doctrines of God and 'set themselves the task of culling for themselves the important points of faith out of the wilderness of Scripture'.³ They took the traditions they had received and examined them 'by the standard of Scripture', and, while discarding some that would not bear the trial, gratefully retained 'the doctrines of sterling weight and value'.⁴

The Bible was intended much less to teach, than 'to enforce and establish what had been taught before'.⁵ It is this generally accepted interpretation which persuades some to omit reading the Bible, or giving money for distribution of Bibles to 'the bulk of the community'.⁶ And it was the intention of Christ in establishing the succession of his ministers that they should be the custodians of this traditional instruction:

We have thus the Scriptures implying traditional

1. Ibid. p.26
2. Ibid. p.27
3. Ibid. p.28
4. Ibid. p.28
 instruction: we have the necessity for such aid continually felt, and the assistance itself continually afforded in the Church; we find also an order of men appointed from the very beginning of Christianity whose duties cannot but comprehend the care and distribution of this aid to all who need it. Surely, then, it is difficult to conceive that this use of tradition was not also from the beginning contemplated and intended by the founders of Christianity.

Whately's theology is much like that of Hampden. He is evidently an influential predecessor. Hawkins said little that was in accord with Hampden's line, but he did treat professedly of subjects of interest to Hampden. Something of a reaction against Hawkins may be discerned in Hampden's writing. The relevance of this lengthy note on Hawkins' view of previous theologians' work in the midst of a consideration of Hampden's theologising will, I hope, become more apparent when an outline of Hampden's view of systematising theological conclusions and the enforcement of credal statements is presented later.
Oriel Influences:

It would be not too difficult a matter to present further evidences of the Oriel inbreeding in speculative matters. The men influenced one another time and again. Even the phrasing of certain problems took on a coterie and clubbable character once the Oriel men had talked about it. And they talked about important things. They provide, if taken as a group and considered sympathetically, a coherent treatment of those questions which exercise the minds of any Christian who considers the intellectual assumptions and content of his belief. They deal with the philosophical preambles concerning the structure of language and its relation to concepts in general, and to the discipline of theology in particular. They deal with the peculiarly Christian questions about revelation, its interpretation and tradition. There is no direct or elaborate discussion of the person of Christ, the nature of the Church, or of eschatological matters, and this is itself indicative. These were not subjects which arose in dispute at this period, and in so far as they did not realise their importance, so far the Oriel notics forfeit a claim to be considered masters in theology. Of this, in connection with Hampden in particular, I shall say more later.

1 of Newman's question to Froude, with its dependence on Hawkins' terminology: 'What is meant by the right of private judgement? The duty I understand'; Letters, edited Mozley, volume I, p 221.
In all this there is much that will be seen to have a large effect on the work of Hampden, not only in the way he tackled problems but in the very selection of certain problems as being the proper study of a nineteenth century Anglican theologian confronted with a rationalism of many faces and concerned with the fulfilment of his duty to preach the revealed gospel of Christ.

In the second of his *Hampton Lectures* Hampden gave this description of his work:

> We are now tracing to its origins that speculative logical Christianity, which survives among us at this day; and which has been in all ages, the principal obstacle, as I conceive, to the union and peace of the Church of Christ.\(^1\)

Hampden related his theologising to the debates conducted by S Justin and Tatian; but, perhaps because he was afraid that his material was near unmanageable, he was content to consider in detail the mediaeval theologians only, writing always with an eye to the theology which 'survives at this day'. He was alarmed at the renewal of speculative dog-

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Among the chief causes of our unhappy divisions, we are accustomed to reckon the uncontrolled exercise of the Right to Private Judgment.
matics, and he tried to show how this kind of thing had been the main cause of the chaotic state of mediaeval theology. He worked for the establishment of a new handling of revelation free of the trammels of human curiosity.

The latitudinarian position was consolidated by the affair of Tract XC, but it was the appointment of Hampden as Regius Professor of Divinity in 1836 that marks the establishment of a new orthodoxy in Oxford. As Dean Church remarked much later

what the defeat of the Tractarians really had done was, to leave the University at the mercy of Liberals to whom what had been called Liberalism in the days of Whately was mere blind and stagnant Conservatism.¹

Hampden and his friends introduced a new liberalism. Like Dean Church, Newman in later years, saw how very little Whately had carried his liberalism into practical affairs; Whately was more interested in the free play of intellect than in active reform. Newman wrote of him in 1864:

I doubt whether he carried any one reform whatever, or even suggested any considerable one.²


2. Newman to Fitzpatrick, 7th March, 1864. (Cratery Archives)
Whately combined a liberal intellect with conservative practice. Hampden had none of his grasp of what was possible and what would provoke too excited an opposition. Radical though Hampden's revolution of theological discussion was, it yet owed much to the liberalism of the time of Whately - a liberalism that seemed in 1831 to be the worst possible:

They are Liberals, and in saying this I conceive I am saying almost as bad of them as can be said of anyone.¹

But we can never say that we are at the worst. With the publication in 1833 of Hampden's Bampton's a beginning was made with a new liberalism.

I depend much on Hampden's being able to advance his own meaning without too great a commentary. I follow the opinion of Hobbes:

It is not bare words, but the scope of a writer, that giveth the true light by which any writing is to be interpreted, and they that insist upon single texts without considering the main design, can derive nothing from them clearly.²

The general scope of Hampden's writing will become apparent by quotations taken from all parts of his work, and I hope


that the estimate I have formed of his work will not then seem too arbitrary. I find it difficult to agree with J.C. Hare's judgment on Hampden's work:

.... one of the impressions which has been produced on me by Dr. Hampden's Hampton Lectures, is thankfulness for having become acquainted with a work so learned and thoughtful, and so favourably distinguished both in these respects, and by its philosophical candour and sobriety, from the bulk of our recent theological literature;¹

but Hare was right to stress the historical interest of the Lectures, and in taking 'a particular interest, as men of philosophical habits of thought are wont to do, in tracing the coinage of obsolete systems in the language of after generations'.²

1. A Letter to the Very Reverend the Dean of Chichester on the agitation excited by the appointment of Dr. Hampden to the See of Hereford, by J.C. Hare, M.A., Archdeacon of Lewes. London, Parker, 1848. p 10.

2. Hare, Ibid. p 11. Hare's opinion is not to be lightly dismissed. He has been praised by Dean Inge as a man 'unjustly forgotten', and 'a worthy successor of the Cambridge Platonists', and, more recently, Professor Owen Chadwick has cited Hare as proving that 'it was not impossible for a liberal Anglican cleric of the nineteenth century to understand Luther'. Certainly Hare, in his consideration of Hampden, has remarked the most important feature of his work. cf. Inge, The Platonic Tradition in English Religious Thought, p 95, and Owen Chadwick, Creighton on Luther, C.U.P. 1959, p 14.
EXPOSITION
REVELATION

I Natural Revelation in Hampden's Theology

Hampden was convinced that natural theology had a real value. He took it to be self-evident that 'the natural world may no less strictly be regarded as a revelation from God than the written word'.

Hampden's natural theology is elliptical. It is shaped round two considerations: the character of human intellect, and the character of scientific methods: of observation and generalisation which are commonly employed by men in intellectual concerns. I have tried to say something about both in this expository section, reserving a judgement upon Hampden's work until later.

The character of a Protestant natural theology is in Hampden's view best set out by means of a description of the workings of our intellectual cognition. He suggests that our knowledge is conditioned by our nature rather more intrinsically and effectually than is thought by cosmologists: generally and by natural theologians in particular:

All our knowledge indeed is the result of the adjustment of the principles of our minds to our condition, since it is the perception of facts as they appear to minds constituted as the mind is.

He means, quite simply, that we are dependent for the material of our thinking about the physical world, the world which is other than our minds, upon the impressions which this alien existant makes upon our senses - non in intellectu nisi prius in sensu, as Aquinas has it.

1 Essay on Philosophical Evidence of Christianity, 1828, p 1
2 Ibid., pp 5-6
He means also that the character of the human sensory-receptive mechanisms determines the manner in which we are brought into awareness of the physical and alien world. Further than this, Hampden suggests that the nature of the human intellect determines both the selection of material for thought, and the manner in which we respond to the intelligence offered for our consideration - quidquid recipitur secundum modum recipientis recipitur. This is not meant to introduce a disintegrating subjectivism into epistemology, however likely such a result may appear. Hampden is simply making a statement about the nature of human activity. The general Man is capable of working only within certain conditions - as a fish or bird have a natural capacity and do not fret at the limitations of water or air, so we are not to fret within the human condition, without the conditions there would be no possibility of human activity. At the same time Hampden emphasises that individual men may well be circumscribed by their condition in ways which differ from those of other men. So that within certain circumstances we are subjectivist. This he regards as simply another way of saying that we are individuals. We are, then, all framed in the human condition, and we are each circumscribed by our capacities.

For Hampden all this is not a mere exposition of the obvious, for it leads into his analysis of man's capacity for understanding, and the nature of communication with man - this he describes in terms applicable to communication from man to man and from God to man. Man is designed to
receive, to respond to, but one kind of communication, he can understand but one kind of information:

and this we find to be of a relative nature; therefore such must also be the truth scripturally revealed.

It is evident that such a starting principle will affect every consideration of theological activity. Hampden was interested mainly in two theological problems in this connection. Firstly, the position of scripture and what sort of thing it communicated to us from God. Secondly, the way in which theologians were prepared to construct analogical predications within the context of faith. Hampden's work is more satisfactory and more original on the first of these two matters; he has some very interesting things to say concerning the relation of scriptural revelation to dogmatic theology. He is, however, more at home, more enthusiastic about his subject, when he is dealing with the rash intrusions, as he often thinks them, of the analogies men build between the things of men and the things of God.

The consequence drawn by Hampden from the limitations which are imposed on us simply by the fact that we are human beings is one which is particularly concerned with the nature of human understanding. It is not a necessary conclusion from his starting point — the scholastic theologians of the middle ages began with something akin to his description of human powers, but went on to something quite different.

1 Philosophical Evidence, p 6
when they spoke of scriptural revelation or theological analogies - but it is certainly an important one for the comprehension of Hampden's work in both natural and dogmatic theology.

Hampden says that our knowledge of the external world is confined within a pattern of our making. He makes suggestions about the nature of the universe, though obscurely enough, which correspond in general features to some cosmological theorists of the present age. Thus he thinks of our comprehension of the world around us as being rather as if we had only a two dimensional geometry, and never came to the realisation that the world we described within the two-dimensional theory was itself three-dimensional.

Hampden hopes to guard against the rash accusation of thorough-going subjectivism by a good common-sense appeal to general human experience. Since he is talking always of what is true for everyman no man can step outside the restrictions and accuse another of subjectivism we all use the two-dimensional geometry; it is all we have and we could not do geometry at all if we did not use it. Hampden rescues us from collective unhappiness by a determined concentration on the social check. For all practical matters - and these are the only one he is concerned with - we may with confidence rely upon and conform to the general impression of mankind. Hampden engages in metaphysical analyses merely to show how worthless and insubstantial such things are when confronted with reality. He undermines the dogmatic attitudes of some theologians not to
replace them with his own new dogmatism, but to encourage ordinary men to proceed without dogmatism.

All we have, all we need, is the general consensus of men that things whether they be thus and thus may be used as if they were thus and thus. The social check is a way into tolerance. Though we should always try to work within the ordinary categories ourselves, for of such compliance is human society constructed, we should beware of erecting any view into a dogma, even the general view, because of the all-pervading relativity of our capacities and notions. In religion this leads to Hampden's standpoint of conventionalism for oneself and tolerance for others. Of this I will say more in the last section of my work when I mean to criticise and appraise in further detail Hampden's general thesis.

In the Essay on the Philosophical Evidence of Christianity published in 1828, Hampden rehearses the foundations of theodicy. He begins with a consideration of the province and capacity of natural science. He is particularly interested in the competence of our sensory perception to comprehend and communicate truth, the reality of things, to our minds. The distrust Hampden has of the assumption that we know things precisely, or even generally, as they are, comes not from Humean considerations, but from the simple experience of men that often things are not what they seem. An open face or a mirage in the desert may be equally deceiving, and most men learn to distrust appearances. Hampden is impressed by the occurrence of mistakes in our affairs and of the history of mistakes which occurred in theological discussions of the past. He regards mistakes as part of the normal process of science. Mistakes are not to be frowned upon.
Any line of thought which tends to lessen the possibility and the intellectual respectability of secret censorship, or public prosecution, especially any such thing pursued in the name of an unmistak- ing orthodoxy, is to be welcomed. This is one aspect of Hampden's continual support of the liberal toleration principle in matters of theology. Once mistakes have a status as part of the inevitable machinery of theologising they cannot be prosecuted.

Hampden suggests that no man can operate a world-view with any degree of confidence unless he knows himself to be supported by the consensus of human opinion in the main aspects of his epistemology, cosmology and sociology. That is, while Hampden sees no way of checking a man's individual apprehension of reality other than by comparing it with that comprehension of the many, he is prepared to accept the only check available. He does not seek another. He disapproves of those who erect a false absolutism and refuse to accept their condition. The medieval scholastic view is an example of men turning away from reality:

It was by its artful combination of these two ingredients of human judgement — the positiveness of dogmatism, and the waywardness of private reason — that its empire was decided. It is pleasing to see the charge of 'private judgement' being turned back on such men.

1 Bampton Lectures, I, p 14
Hampden is quite well aware that such a mode of argument as he is presenting, which erects mistakes into part of the system, and thus devalues the procedures, cannot be controlled by the device of the social check. The objection that if one man may err then a great many may, is a real objection. There is no safety in numbers when it is the very worth of our powers of knowing that is in question. Hampden has no quarrel with this point. He is complacent about his general devaluation of theological argument, because this is one of his aims. If things are uncertain he hopes that passions will be the less aroused in their defence. Thus toleration will the more abound.

Hampden's status for mistakes has a further advantage for his kind of theologising. It places theology amongst those subjects which in their intricacies and subtleties are thought unrewarding and trivial by the greater part of men. For in most things men act according to common sense. They take things roughly, they do without precise formulations. Hampden is the theologian of common sense. His theory of mistake and uncertain knowing doesnot lead him to make affirmations of systematic doubt. He knows that nothing will come of nothing. Doubt as a ground can support only further doubt. Therefore intellectualism is to be distrusted and theology got on with the tools of common sense. His theological work is thus plainly meant, it is conventional in its formulations and undogmatic in its attitude. Hampden accepts as his working way the conventions of the general account of the world.
One of the commonest features of the ordinary Christian's belief, at least in the early nineteenth century, was the conviction that the God who made the heaven and the earth had left his trace and mark upon his work and that man could by looking at the world about him come to realise that it was a creature, and that there must therefore be a creator.

The romantic view of nature as somehow autonomous had not yet been translated into scientific terms, and nature still held something of the numinous by association with God. Hampden accepts this situation. He accepts the possibility of natural theology. He only challenges certain views of its capacity.

The literal interpretation of Scripture, the fundamentalist view of the job of exegetes, that obtained in most nineteenth century minds in England, is also largely accepted by Hampden. Since it was part of this view that the evidence of Scripture and the evidence of nature were equally ready to be handled in a straightforward empirical fashion, the ages of trees being measured by examining their rings, the ages of patriarchs by counting up the durations of recorded events, Hampden was led to accept the similarity of natural and scriptural revelation. He did not put the same value upon them as most men did, but he did accept the uniformity of value.
Hampden believes in the possibility of natural theology and in a natural theology of the scholastic and indeed Calvinist pattern. He does not subscribe to Kant's dismissive remark about 'fruitless' labour. Hampden is prepared to talk about 'natural revelation' in a way acceptable to most traditionalist theologians. It is characteristic of Hampden, as I shall point out at greater length later, to talk in a way appropriate to conventional and conservative theology, and yet to mean something quite different when everything is added up. When discussing, in the Philosophical Evidences, the witness of nature to its Creator, he has none of the contemporary distrust of modern theologians for the description of the signs of God as 'revelation'. Revelation, in Hampden's usage, is not restricted in reference to the shewing of God in the Word of Scripture and the Incarnate Word. Rather the result of his theologising is to suggest that what is sometimes called 'supernatural revelation' is revelation only because it shares with natural signs the capacity to speak of God to any who will attend it. The priority of natural revelation in the logical order is transferred to the experiential order. The results of this procedure will be apparent later in this section.

Though Hampden accepts nothing of Kant's pejorative description of natural theology capacity, he does fully concur
in the Kantian analysis of the processes of sensory perception, and the reliability, in matters of any moment, of these processes to convey a proper reality. Hampden is thus led to accept, at least in general outline, the Kantian epistemology which follows immediately from his analysis of our experience. From things not as they are but simply as they are known, Hampden constructs a description of the task of natural theology and a view of what part of this task we can confidently expect it to accomplish. He suggests that the older theologians had the right view of things when they assumed that the material universe arranges itself before us in an ordered and harmonious pattern, and that this pattern is presented to our perception as a witness to the activity of our Creator. Hampden is perfectly prepared to allow that our senses are adequate for the reception, and our mental processes are adequate for the correlation and evaluation, of this harmonious pattern. Nature does present God to men.

In a Reith Lecture Professor Medawar once made delightful fun of the theory that El Greco's elongated figures were the result of his having a peculiar defect of vision which made him see people in such a tenuous shape. He pointed out that the way El Greco saw people would perform be the way in which he saw his own paintings of people. His defect would be a constant and not affect the result. Only he would see the pictures as he saw the people. We would see the pictures as we see the people.

1 P.B. Medawar: The Future of Man, 1960, p 72
Hampden applied such reasoning to natural theology and our 'seeing' of God in his world. Everything we see is governed by the way we see. We may not see the object as it is in itself but we see uniformly and therefore can relate our visions to one another in a coherent pattern. We must always bear in mind, however, the subjective character of the bases of our system. We can produce a natural theology which is relevant to our proper concerns, but which we must commit ourselves to only as to a relative description of God.

Although he is quite prepared to admit, indeed to affirm, that natural theology is but the working of a defective, since it is human, ratiocination, Hampden maintains also that natural theology is capable of producing a picture of the world which is proper to our human capacity for understanding. Since the limitations of our capacity come from God as much as the capacity itself, such a natural theology must be what God intends for Christians. It is at any rate no more vitiated by the inherent weakness of human powers than is the criticism made against it by those who will not allow theodicy. In Kantian terms, the noumenal is, for our peculiar purposes, adequately expressed by the phenomenal. At the same time we must remember that adequacy for our purposes is not the same as identity with a total expression of the real.
This is not a factor peculiar to the workings of natural theology. It is a commonplace in the philosophy of science that scientific theories do not deal with things as they are experienced but with things as they are idealisable in definitions. Yet, of course, the descriptions of theoretical physics are related enough to the world of experience to 'work' in that world. We gain in explicability and lose in applicability, as Heisenberg pointed out, but we do not lose all applicability.

Natural theology is governed by the same kind of condition as other natural sciences. It depends on evidence, the witness of the senses and such instruments as are available to extend the range of the senses. It formulates hypotheses and theories and can as well as any other science be led astray by giving these an inexact value. There is no use in claiming proof where mere possibility, or at most probability, can be established. Hampden's natural theology abides within the conventional forms of such work but he has altered the value of the expressions. The great thing was to speak as one. That reality is more complicated than such an harmonious chorus might suggest he admitted but thought this relatively unimportant.

Hampden holds that our natural theology is a work of mind which yet corresponds in the most important moments with what we may term 'objective truth'. I shall henceforth proceed with Hampden's view of revelation without constant reference to his initial devaluation of our claim to certitude, but it ought to be kept in mind until my critique of this part of his work. His awareness of the observer enables him to...
to avoid the subjective logic of potuit ergo fecit, at least to a greater degree than many another antural theologian.

Hampden's natural theology, therefore, does not take the shape of an argument from within science. He does go about things in the Paley manner — whose argument from design was derived from the geometrical order suggested by Newtonian mechanics. Hampden's approach is more like that of S Augustine, it is an argument from the nature of reality — the Christian, in contemplating the world, experiences an illumination of mind from the God who makes all things new.

The opening of Hampden's discussion of the natural order in the world in relation to our human ratiocination is concerned with the character of our impression of regularity in natural phenomena. At this point he makes one of his few concessions to Romantic ways of thinking and discusses the outlook and response of a child to the stars and mountains. He asks, first of all, whether the principle of regularity and continuance, which is part of our concept of the universe, is present in the mind as the result of an immediate impact from one original impression, or whether we come to realise the observable order only gradually through the cumulative effect of repeated experience. Wordsworth had by-passed the problem with a neo-Platonic theory of recollection:

Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting,
but Hampden is more systematic and more rigorous with himself. His analysis of our first childhood intimations of cosmic order and governance leads him to suppose that though by definition the first formation of the impression is totally independent of our experience, it is not capable of exciting in us an
adequate conception of order and certainly not of an orderer.

The repetition of the impression of the world received at the primal vision is effective not merely through repetition. Firstly, the information which is received through the impressions individually forms a pattern realisable only when the centre of the picture is so grasped that details, occult evidences and outlying facts may be the object of comprehensive attention. Secondly, the repetition is not merely quantitative in its results but qualitative, even though it be repetition of identical impressions. And this not solely because of the increase in receptive power of the maturing intellect but by reason of a simple quantitative increase. That quantity can radically alter quality may seem an odd consideration but it is one familiar to those who give accounts of the structure of the atom and the characteristics which vary with the addition of an electron, and more generally, to those who have seen a conversation suddenly die or come alive when one other person was added to the company.

Hampden supports his version of natural theology with references to Bacon:

\[ \text{Intellectus humanus ex proprietate sua facile supponit majorem ordinem et aequalitatem in rebus quae inventi;}^1 \]

and to Hey's lectures on theology.

1. Nor. Organum I. 45
In the matter of our reception of natural impressions, Hey has anticipated Hampden's notion:

When I was young, I felt no surprise at the return of summer and winter; and I imagine the unthinking peasant takes all the usual changes in natural phenomena as things of course: but now, the days never grow in spring without exciting in my mind pretty strong sentiments of wonder or admiration. Hey suggested that the progress of experience is educative to a point at which a man is ready to accept contradictions because he realises he cannot demand explanations. Hey, engaged in anti-supernaturalist rationalism, to him faith was something very odd and totally illogical, therefore to some it would necessarily appear useless and to others wonderful. Hampden argued in a different way. Given that there is a real and properly so-called revelation of God in the world of ordered nature, it ought, on a normal supposition, to be readily available to all men. It ought at the very least to be available to those whose intellects are such that they can conveniently cope with the demands of situations more complicated than the ordinary. In other words, an explanation is, on the face of it, demanded to explain why the natural order does not so impress itself upon each man's consciousness. Why are not all men theists?

1 Hey: Lectures in Divinity, I, p 164 (1796 edition)
Wordsworth answered the question in terms which assumed that there was something more artificial than good about modern methods of education, that experience was interpreted in such a way as to blunt sensibility. Hampden's natural theology is a looking-over-the-shoulder affair, an argument after the conclusion has been arrived at by other means. He has none of Wordsworth's regard for childhood as the sensitive time. He is concerned with the adult response to things as they are.² Hampden begins his natural-theology explanation by acknowledging the one existing God. God is responsible for the natural world, and all in it. He is responsible, therefore, for the mechanisms of the human intellect. He is responsible, therefore, for the kind of reflection that our minds provide of the material universe. Hampden is certain that God, like any maker, has put his mark upon his handiwork:

Your print is on the wide white sand,
   Within the air I touch your hand,
And on the silver fish I see:
   Hallmarks of immortality

Your love within the sunlight flames.
   And love the shadowed moon proclaims,
Till images and shadows pass
   And we discard the darkened glass.

² That is, Hampden is concerned with the moral problem, which is a matter of acting, according to things as they are.
The world, for Hampden, is seen as the presentation of one design. This is an argument capable of conversion. Through the harmony impressed by God's action as creator we can come to realise his presence in his creation - at least we can come to know what kind of attributes are properly predicated of God, and perhaps, (thought I do not think that this is ever made clear by Hampden) know that he exists.

Natural theology is thought of by Hampden as of divine design. It is a science by divine appointment. Since he suggests that nature is presented as an harmonious pattern to our minds in order that we shall become aware of the creaturality of the world as the result of a planner's activity.

All this is, evidently, from a privileged position. Hampden knew by means other than those of natural theology that there is a creating God. He knew this before ever he began his theology. This may make his work appear too slipshod. But it is as well to acknowledge the difficulty of setting out a demonstration of God's existence from an agnostic starting point. None but the most assured neo-scholastic would in these days suggest that there has ever been a self-contained proof of God's existence. In Hampden's time things were vastly different. Many a theologian was prepared to deploy the Evidences in the Paley manner. It is a sign of Hampden's strength that he did not escape down such an easy bolt-hole.

Hampden is not trying to produce a severely intellectualist argument. He wishes only to remove the intellectualist obstacles before he grapples with the moral question. This interests him. How is God to be found
in his work? How is it possible that men who fail to discover the traces of his presence in his work are morally blameworthy, as B. Paul asserts? The relevance of the moral question is obvious to Hampden and he makes much of it. I will later give some account of his view, and some critique of its value for us today.

Hampden's natural-theology methodology raises two large questions for any student of his work. One of these is common to any attempt at making a theodicy, whether medieval or modern. The other is an epistemological difficulty which I have mentioned earlier and which he shares with those who pursue natural science, though Hampden is aware that the epistemological question is introduced in a more acute form in his work than in any other. Hampden is ambivalent in his conception of the basis of natural theology as a scientific subject. And, if this status is allowed the study, and a real value given to natural theology, he is not clear as to the method of expounding its theories and conclusions.

His first difficulty arises when he speaks of natural theology as setting out in logical form the ways in which we 'recognise God in nature'. Hampden is unsure about what is to be found 'in nature'; he is further unsure as to who can be included in 'we'. Do 'we' recognise the God we already know - we as Christians - or are 'we' simply men without revelation looking at the world? If the second what could we see? Most natural theologians have pretended to be agnostics but have relied on revelation to announce the aim of their work.
not allow our Christian insights to direct the progress of our
search. This would be proper advice only if we could adopt such
a position. We cannot. We are Christians, and there is no good purpose
served by pretending to be anything other than Christians seeking a
reasonable demonstration of one aspect of our faith. Once understood,
this description of our endeavour undercuts the very essence of natural-
theology claims. A vague sense of this insecurity of natural theology
disturbs Hampden. He does not want to erect an empty agnosticism, but he
cannot quite be brought to define the "we" in terms of 'Christian'.

Though he avoids the explicit reference to Christian assumptions,
he does it in a way explicable only within the Christian context. His view
of the Quinque Viciae is totally defined by scriptural categories. The
classical, post-Aquinas, 'proofs for the existence of God' have been
thought of at various times as guides that any man might follow and, given
good will and a sense of human dependence, accept. Hampden, rather more like
Aquinas himself, thinks of natural theology in the main not as proving God
but as describing some of the characteristics of God once his existence is
received. He therefore intends by his natural theology to produce suasions
towards the acceptance of the God revealed in Christ Jesus, rather than
prove the existence of God. He talks not of theists and non-theists, but
of Christians and non-Christians in this connection because he is concerned
to show all men that the God to whom nature witnesses is the God revealed
in Scripture. Natural theology has a value for Hampden, but it is not a
value which can be credited apart from Christianity. Hampden is concerned
immediately with the problem of the relationship between revelation written and natural revelation. He spends a great deal of effort in producing a workable accommodation of the two. He is not able on his own principles to be content with a simple priority as means to end of natural revelation to Scripture, his concept of the virtual impos­sibility of non-Christian natural theology complicates the relationship. Of this more later.

Given that natural theology has a value, what method of enquiry is proper to it? Hampden gives an answer to this question which appears at first certainly to contain a con­tradiction. He says both that man must adapt his mental workings and attitudes to the world of material beings in order to encounter the evidence, the traces, of God, and that there is already in existence a real harmony between the world and the structure of the human mind, and that this present harmony demands the recognition of God by all within the world. It would appear then that Hampden is saying that there is and there is not a harmony already existing between non-human and human creation.

I think we may say that in his description of the relationship between world and mind Hampden has included an unstated moral imperative - a man must be humble before nature, must acknowledge God in nature. This would make natural theology a moral as well as an intellectual dis­cipline since it describes the moral content of both the
enquiry into the nature of God, and the proper recognition of God which the enquiry is directed towards educating in the reader.

It is important to notice that Hampden's moral preoccupations, which are readily discernible in his theodicy discussions, save him from the worst of intellectualist errors in natural theological proceedings. It is characteristic of much 'orthodox' natural theology, that God is considered to be approachable in much the same way as the final line of a Euclidean theorem or of an Aristotelian logic puzzle. By emphasising the moral content of the natural theologian's work, and the demand of God to be recognised and adored, Hampden is refusing to accept the simple, slick, and unsatisfactory modes of demonstration to be found in too many text-books of theology. Hampden aligns himself not with the neo-scholastic versions of Aristotle and Aquinas which proliferate even in modern discussions. He aligns himself more with the work of Anselm which, though he thought it unpleasantly metaphysical, does at least begin with an immediate recognition of the wonder of God. Hampden is more at home still with the psalmist's cry:

If I climb the heavens, you are there,
If I lie in the grave, you are there.

Hampden thus reduces the audience for his theologising from the honest pagan masses some envisage to those who already acknowledge the Lord. At least this does not arouse the uncomfortable thought that something so coldly trivial as a logical proof has encompassed the being of God. Hampden's way demands a thorough and humble re-thinking of the present

And which Newman found when he met Beronio in Rome and the neo-Thomist Sanserverino in Naples.
method and the final aim of natural theology. It demands too the withdrawal of the simple idea of 'if there is a harmony men must see it; as there is a harmony men do see it'. This is replaced by the Christian doctrine of the effects of Original Sin. Though the world is 'charged with the grandeur of God' and there is a real harmony in the universe which proclaims the presence of God; it demands great moral as well as intellectual effort for man to recognise the presence of God. Here again the attempt to frame an intellectualist theodicy breaks down, and though Hampden does not expressly acknowledge this, it seems to lie behind his distrust of non-Christian natural theology.

This much at least is clear to Hampden, that the whole course of nature 'so long as the mind of man is what it is, cannot but be considered in the light of a revelation from God'.

1 Philosophical Evidence, p 7
II Revelation in Scripture

Hampden's view of the limitations of man's receptive capacity lead him to say of any revelation from God:

it cannot impart to them (human beings) a knowledge of a different nature from that which they are adapted to receive.\(^1\)

There are no supernaturalist bolt-holes. The revelation given in Scripture must be describable in human terms. At the same time he thinks it evident that

something more than the truth as taught by nature... appears to be

necessarily involved in the notion of a miraculous revelation.\(^2\)

Hampden's concern is to determine the line whence the 'more than' begins. Since he has already come to the conclusion that nature has the potential to reveal God to men, and that this revelation is not actually effective, he reasons that Scriptural revelation must be given to supplement by another means the one revelation we have already received in nature. Hampden thinks we may make a distinction between the two forms of the one revelation by saying that when God employs nature to reveal his purpose

He speaks in that universal language which preceded all utterance of human tongue.\(^3\)

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1 Philosophical Evidence, p 20
2 Ibid., p 35
3 Ibid., p 36
while when God delivers his word in Scripture he employs "conventional 
signs of ideas already acquired by the mind." Calvin suggested a 
theology of wonder derived from nature, complementary to a theology of 
knowledge derived from scriptural revelation. Hampden does not make so 
radical a distinction. He talks of modes and ways of revealing, and of 
different aspects being revealed. It is thus that he accounts for the 
differences of truth conveyed by the natural and scriptural modes of 
revelation.

The difference between natural and scriptural revelation depends 
for Hampden, as for many theologians, on the notion of Original Sin: 
If man were perfect in his moral and intellectual powers, as 
when he first came forth from the hand of his Creator, it might 
be conceived that the language of nature would have 
clearly and indubitably conveyed to his understanding and heart 
that knowledge of God which was requisite for his duty and his 
happiness; so far, at least, as the creation was appointed by God in the stead of more express revelation. He would have seen the 
traces of the Almighty agent, not as now, through the obscurations 
of a perverse and blind understanding, but with a quick and 
lively perception.

For Hampden, the Fall has destroyed the keenness of his moral eye.

1 Philosophical Evidence, p 35
2 Ibid., p 43
3 Ibid., p 44
and, in a phrase reminiscent of Calvin's similes, Hampden says that after the Fall man "has no longer an ear for the melody of creation." 1 Man is now reduced to the laborious use of his reason; he is made the nudge of doubts; he is even distrustful of the conclusions of his reasoning. Reason, for Hampden, takes the place of the primitive intuition of God that men might once have possessed. Reason is all we have, and however unsure may be its guidance, it must be used:

We must now collect by slow prowess of reasoning amidst doubting and suspicion of error, the truths which would otherwise have immediately told their tale in all their native charm. 2

Seeing our perplexities and uncertainties, God has given us the revelation in the words of Scripture. In Scripture we have a direct and clear communication of the will of God; following its order, we shall arrive at happiness.

My enquiry...presupposes a Divine origin to the Christian revelation, and a superintending Providence over its whole course. This is my point of departure. 3

To the revelation of God he proposes a response of man in terms

1 Philosophical Evidence, p 44
2 Ibid.
3 Bampton Lectures, p vi.
characterised by his own peculiar epistemology, arriving at a restatement of theological values which is in some significant ways original.

Hampden's emphasis on the representatory aspect of ideas in the human intellect, rather than on things in reality, leads him to discover a paradox in the nature of revelation. He suggests that the Scriptural revelation is limited fundamentally because it is conveyed by words, and thus it must be so far restricted to the use of such signs as have been adopted into the use of mankind for the communication of their ideas to each other whereas the signs which the universe presents are in themselves without limit.

Things actually existing are fully themselves, and therefore, Hampden argues, if we could understand their revelation of God, we should have a full revelation. But the effectiveness of revelation is limited primarily by our restricting God cannot reveal to us more than He has made us capable of receiving. And secondly, the human receptivity has been lessened by Original Sin, so that the effectiveness of revelation is doubly restricted.

We use words and God uses words in speaking to us. Our words are but signs of things, and so are limited by their nature. Hampden at other times will make much of this limitation and show how it deprives dogmatic statements of finality, but in this context he

1 Philosophical Evidence, p 44
rejoices in the limitation as helpful in communication. He suggests that words are properly adapted to Fallen men because they have the stamp of authority; they are closed and final; they do not admit of misunderstanding. This seems difficult to maintain in the face of our history. Hampden means that words have a definite sense once they are accepted by society, and that it is only in juxtaposition with other words in a sentence that the conventional sense may become blurred. Words which singly were simple take on complex characters together.

This is a highly suspect notion and would make but slender appeal to anyone concerned with the logic of communication—and indeed we would most of us object both to a notion that words in themselves, ranged in the columns of the Oxford English Dictionary, were simple things, and to the notion that words are ever to be considered as individual counters, independently existent apart from the actuality of communication. However Hampden's linguistics have a peculiar character and it would be wrong to delay on the matter at this point. Later I shall have something to say about these questions.

The difference between words and things accounts for the difference between natural and scriptural revelation and the effectiveness of revelation by these two modes. The knowledge of God we may reach through created things is so potentially effective that it renders men inexcusable if they do not serve God and love Him when they are confronted with it. On the other hand the revelation of God
in Scripture, through the limited words, which are by definition incapable of an absolute construction, is designed and adapted to our minds and is so explicit that 'man cannot but hear and understand and be converted by it.' That some men hear and are not converted is simply the result of a bad disposition. The moral argument is therefore once more put at the centre of the theological discussion.

The moral argument has for Hampden a particular and a general version. The fact that some men do not listen to the word of God in Scripture and so are not converted, seems to Hampden a particular example of the general fact that no man listens enough to the revelation of God. The poverty of our natural-revelation theory shows how little the voice of created nature is heard by our generation. It is a 'perverseness of human nature' which ever prevents our appreciating the gifts of God in the world and which prevents our appreciating the gift of scriptural revelation.

It would be wrong to credit Hampden with nothing more sophisticated than the simple proof-ridden intelligence of the Evidential schools. He does not look for a magic way of demonstrating the Christian view of God in a quick, slick and incontrovertible fashion. He understands the difficulties. He understands them not from an analysis of the difficulties in themselves but from an investigation of theological history. Proof and evidence have rarely worked. Hampden is acquainted with human perversity and its workings. Just as
our 'perverse and blind understanding'\(^1\) refuses to see a meaning in the work of creation, so we may refuse to see a meaning in Scripture:

yet notwithstanding the dullness of the ignorant, the apathy of the indifferent, the contradictions of the proud and rebellious understanding, the sacred truth consigned to faithful records remains in all its integrity and prominence to such as will impartially and diligently address themselves to the inquiry after it.\(^2\)

The truth of God is, then, to be found easily in the words of the Bible if we submit ourselves to it. It is to be found 'as the pure ore collected and refined for our immediate use.'\(^3\)

These are the lively oracles of God, as Calvin was so fond of pointing out, not dead letters, not undecipherable like the runic opera Dei. The words of revelation give life to him who reads and accepts. They are 'readily available to all.'

In shewing forth the accessibility of the scriptural revelation and its ease of understanding, Hampden by no means wishes to suggest that the Bible contains a new revelation of new things. The revelation that God placed in his work of Creation could have told us as much about Him if only we had not blinded ourselves by Original Sin. The pre-

1. Philosophical Evidence, p.43.
2. Ibid. pp.45-6.
3. Ibid. p.46.
Imperial Adam, he considers, could have worked towards these truths which we now receive from the Bible. It is only now, in our state of deprivation, our lack of primitive innocence, that we cannot recognise the primitive revelation. It is only now that truths which reason would never have discovered, if left to make its own inference from the facts of experience, will appear disclosed to our view as we follow the written guidance of the Spirit, with a vividness of colouring which belongs to objects placed in the foreground of a landscape.

Hampden's doctrine of the Fall is thus severely Protestant in at least one aspect: our capacity to fit into the scheme of things is ruined. But we have the physical world still, we can see through the mist of obstructions that the physical universe is a revelation. Hampden has taken Calvin's hesitant allowance of something in nature and admitted a mode of natural revelation. Hampden's design includes a developed form of Calvin's idea of Scripture as a pair of spectacles through which we may see nature. In one respect he is more radical than Calvin. Hampden refuses to allow that we can understand a revelation in Scripture which is different in kind from that in nature. He is not prepared to admit a revelation of mystery.

1: Philosophical Evidence, pp 46-7
2: In another context he is not so ready to accept this view.
3: p 179 of this thesis.
Hampden wishes to introduce some scientific structure for theology to
the extent of establishing the relationship between natural and
scriptural revelation, so that he has a systematic answer to the
arguments of those who refuse possibility to the existence of natural
theology. In this matter he is in the tradition of the Oriel Moetica.
The connection he employs reveals something of his view of the structure
of theology. It is quite evident that Hampden holds a naturalistic version
of revelation.

Hey, who, as I have mentioned earlier, was much read by the Oriel
theologians, remarked concerning the mysteries of revelation, that they
are much like mysteries in any science, obscure concerns; hidden and
almost defying discovery. Hawkins, who was the most traditionalist of the
Oriel writers, was happy enough to use the example of mystery which
derived from Hey's considerations but which is hardly adequate for the
purpose. He admits that the powers of reason are limited when they deal
with religious matters, but suggests that this is true of any study:

Every truth in Physics as well as in Religion runs up into a
mystery which we cannot penetrate; but reason extends alike in
either case up to the point where the mystery commences. Hawkins
example of a mystery in Physics is an odd one - the fact that we
consist of body and soul. This fact our reason acknowledges, although we
cannot understand either the nature of the inter-activity of body

1 1838 Sermon, p 12
and soul, nor the way mind acts on matter. These are mysteries beyond reason. Evidently Hawkins is not concerned with what passes under the title of Physics today; he has a more antique fashion in mind, he is thinking more, perhaps, of what we now call 'philosophical psychology.' He seems likely to regard insoluble problems or difficulties as mysteries - as if a mystery were something we could never know rather than something we could never fully understand. He appears to have a view of mystery much like that of Hampden, and he expresses this later in his sermon:

Religion indeed, Natural not less than Revealed (and both of them agreeing in this respect with every branch of merely human knowledge) runs up into many difficulties and mysteries and subjects inscrutable, above and beyond the reach of our imperfect faculties.

As soon as revealed religion is linked in its mysterious character with 'every other branch of merely human knowledge' the damage done to the concept of mystery is irreparable. The equation between the methods of Revelation and Physics is a false equation:

The argumentative method of Theology is that of a strict science, such as Geometry, or deductive; the method of Physics, at least on starting, is that of an empirical pursuit, or inductive. This peculiarity on either side arises from the nature of the case. In Physics a vast and omnigenous mass of

1 1838 Sermon, p 14
information lies before the inquirer, all in a confused litter, and needing arrangement and analysis. In Theology, such varied phenomena are wanting, and Revelation presents itself instead. What is known in Christianity is just what is revealed and nothing more; certain truths, communicated directly from above, are committed to the keeping of the faithful, and to the very last nothing can really be added to these truths.

This passage from Newman shows well enough the divergent views of the Oriel men about the nature of theological activity. Hampden could never have admitted so great a distinction between natural science methodology and the appropriate pursuit of theological science. For Hampden it would not be odd to speak of revelation as a conclusion from experience. He does actually use such a form of words, and this brings theology well into line with natural sciences and the method of observation and generalisation by which they prosper:

If the difference between a scriptural truth and its counterpart in the system of nature, were greater or less than such as might be attributed to the difference of circumstances, the scriptural truth could not in such a case be regarded as a conclusion from experience.

1 Idea of a University, p 441

2 Philosophical Evidence, p 63
Neumann is, of course, considering the position of theologians when they come to look at revelation once it has been given to men. They can add nothing to the original gift, though they may develop their understanding:

From the time of the Apostles to the end of the world no strictly new truth can be added to the theological information which the Apostles were inspired to deliver.

Hampden is more concerned with the very inspiration of the Apostles. How does something come to be revealed? This, he says, is a matter of response to experience, a matter of understanding of environment. He produces a description of revelatory processes, the how of the matter, which is close to the how of natural science process. The way he develops his theory of revelation is peculiarly modern at this point, and he deserves great credit for its presentation at his period.

Hampden begins by recognising the progressive nature of revelation, the recognition that it was not all given at once in one manner and degree, but 'in sundry times and in divers manners'. He describes the Bible as 'a record of the divine dealings with the successive generations of mankind'. He speaks harshly of those who hid this temporal character of scripture and let it be thought that the Bible was all of a piece:

1 Idea of a University, p 441
2 Bampton Lectures, p 88
The whole of Revelation was treated as one contemporaneous production; of which the several parts might be expounded, without reference to the circumstances in which each was delivered.

Hampden sees that if we are to understand Scripture we must be aware of its various historical settings and not simply string together a complacent catena of passages which are in agreement with each other. He is rightly contemptuous of such unscientific procedures:

what was termed in the Schools, the Analogy of Faith, was not, as might be supposed, an interpretation of passages relatively to particular periods and particular occasions, but merely the shewing that 'the truth of one Scripture was not repugnant to the truth of another.'

We read Scripture wrongly if we read it as a description of the immutable God. It is really, says Hampden, a record of man and his response to God:

If we now read the Scriptures in the way of the Schoolmen, as having God for their proper subject, instead of reading them as a divine history of man, we naturally neglect the analogies of time and circumstance.

1 Bampton Lecture II, p 88
2 Ibid. The reference is to Aquinas:Summa Theol. I.1 art 10
3 Ibid., p 89
If we read Scripture as about man rather than as about God we shall be the more ready to abandon the false dogmatism that arises from transmuting scriptural images into metaphysical concepts, and the more ready to understand that scriptural teaching is almost always concerned with how men should act. We then seek to learn what man has been at the infancy, and at the maturity, of his condition in the world; how he has been treated by his Creator at different periods, and how he has responded to that treatment. Hence results an historical theology, a register as it were of the religious conduct of man under the government of God; and consequently principles of the Divine Character and Government applicable to the future direction of our lives. It would impossible to withhold admiration from such a piece of writing. By realising that revelation has a history, that it comes to particular men in particular circumstances, Hampden has not taken away its universal relevance, on the contrary he has given the Bible a present existential character which allows us to learn from it how to act as Christian men. Further, the introduction of historical criticism allows Hampden to recognise the existence of literary genres in the scriptural revelation and to avoid an unthinking transport of every

1 Hampton Lectures, II, pp 89-90
phrase of the biblical authors to a scholastic category and rigid uniformity:

The theology of the Schools involved further a total disregard of the Rhetorical nature of the Scriptures. In the ascendency of the spirit of dogmatism, every sentiment of holy exhortation, the terrors of rebuke, the winnings of persuasion, the piety of fatherly love, the commands of authority, all disappear, except in the inert tangible material of the words themselves, on which an unfeeling reason may act. 1

Hampden is arguing for a recognition of the temporal character of the Scriptures. He is arguing too for a recognition of a view of inspiration which was not acceptable to many of his contemporaries. He is suggesting that, for example, the prophets came to understand the meaning of God's actions towards Israel by taking thought about the history of the People of God, and the history of their own private lives. The work of Hosea would have been a good example of the kind of prophetical work that Hampden took as typical. Though not all the prophets can be placed in the Hosea pattern, there is enough in Hampden's view to make it attractive as an explanation of the how of inspiration and the origin of revelation in words. The theory is a gain in intelligibility over many theses advanced to account for the mechanism of inspiration and revelation.

1 Hampton Lectures, II, p 90
Given such a view it is obvious that a great many of the usual nineteenth century ways of conducting theology will lose their force. It will instead erect the methodology of the physical sciences into the methodology of theology. The theologian as much as the physicist will find himself comparing and judging and correcting his findings; the theologian will entertain a new value for his predecessors.

In general it is not unfair to suggest that arts subjects proceed by looking over their shoulders. The new in art is judged by standards from giant canons of the past. In general also the natural sciences proceed by looking straight ahead. It is not often that a piece of scientific work is judged by past achievements, the normal practice is to applaud that which fits now, that which in the present enlarges our picture of reality. Hampden in a sense has designs to move theology from the artsman's province to that of the scientist. In these days, Hampden remarks, the scientist is led to weigh contentions and notions against the balance of his own 'internal stock of principles' 1 so that he may 'compare them with each other, discern contrarieties and reject what perplexes and confounds him.' 2 and in these days the theologian must regret the past refusal to revalue premises. The evil consequences of this static theology are

1 Hampden Lectures II, p 56

2 Ibid.
the more readily understood if we make a comparison with the same forces at work in the physical sciences.

These evil consequences have long been fully acknowledged in the parallel case of Physical Science. It has been admitted that conclusions from abstract terms are no valid indications of facts in nature. May we hope that the time will come when the like will be as fully, and as practically, admitted in Theology?

Hampden, therefore, makes out a very strong case for regarding natural revelation and scriptural revelation as two facets of the same act, and for regarding both as patient of scientific investigation in a thoroughly human fashion. He thus erects a thesis about revelation which is both coherent in itself and readily understandable. These characteristics while not sufficient of themselves to proclaim the thesis true, are certainly enough to make it respectable and attractive.

1 Hampden: Lectures II, p 56
I Analogy in Theology

The method that Hampden adopted in considering scriptural revelation was essentially an historical one. He spent some energy in arguing for an appreciation of the historical background of the various scriptural writings. In this he was ahead of most of his contemporaries in Oxford. The furthest back that many of them had read was the theology of Gudworth and the Cambridge men of his period.

The historical method seemed to Hampden to hold the clue to a rediscovery of the meaning of Christian words. He wanted to find the times and places where certain formulae and attitudes arose and then discuss whether the conditions which gave rise to them still obtained or whether it would be necessary to revise the formulae in the context of our present conditions. He was nothing of the antiquarian, simply a man who wanted to know the bases of the contemporary situation. He believed, like Newman, that the present is a text and the past its interpretation.

This historical attitude led him to conduct most of his theologising by means of an examination of other men's work. It is not fortuitous that his most famous work was a review of the mediaeval scholastics. Even when he is discussing a perennial problem like that of analogical predication Hampden proceeds by historical exposition before making his own contribution to the discussion. Since analogy is so important in theological considerations I will outline Hampden's treatment of the question.
Hampden begins by objecting to a criticism of the analogical method by Hey in his *Divinity Lectures*. Hey had suggested that the function of the analogical method was really to calculate probability:

> When we conclude from anything having happened, that the same will happen again, in like circumstances, we are said to reason by Analogy.¹

Without quoting this passage, Hampden does refer to Hey's conclusion from this description:

> ... conclusions by analogy are not, properly, reasoning.²

Hey, according to Hampden, has confused the observations on which analogy is founded, with the act of stating an analogy—the concluding analogy is a logical deduction from premisses.³

When Hampden himself goes about to explain what he means by the analogical method he refers at once to Copleston, and, after a long paraphrase of Discourse III of the *Enquiry into Necessity and Predestination*, he concludes:

1. *Lectures in Divinity, 1796, Vol.I. p.162* (Hampden used the second edition, Cambridge 1822 in four volumes. References are to this second edition.)

2. Ibid.

3. *Philosophical Evidence*, p.63. There is a reference to Whately: *Logic*, p.207, but this is merely on the meaning of Induction as distinct from Syllogism.
Whence it follows, that, whilst by induction we obtain absolute conclusions, by analogy we can only arrive at relative conclusions, or such as depend for their absolute and entire validity on the coincidence of all the circumstances of the particular inferred with those of the particular from which the inference is drawn.¹

Hampden admits that analogy depends on circumstances, and does not have absolute conclusions such as reasoning properly should attain to. He cannot therefore with consistence object to Hey's remark that 'when circumstances are changed, our analogy, however strong soever, instantly vanishes.'² But this, he thinks, is erroneous.

Hampden elaborates three kinds of analogy. He presents analogical situation in which the circumstances from, and to, which we reason, are known to be similar; situations where the circumstances are known to be different; and situations where it is impossible to be certain about similarity and difference. Analogy then depends entirely on circumstances. It is possible to confuse the metaphor with the analogy, but this is a problem that Hampden considers solved 'by the Provost of Oriel in his admirable Dissertation on Analogy.'³

Hampden takes it as evident that it is the third

species of modification with which we have to deal when talking of divine revelation since he supposes that our conclusions on such subjects 'must be held with a reserve for our natural ignorance of the circumstances to which we reason.' It would seem that Hampden is proposing to build on a very subtle foundation. If we are really to suppose that we place an analogy on uncertain circumstances, then we must also suppose the result uncertain, since, as he says, the circumstances determine the analogy. Hampden appears to be launching forward into an epistemology of doubt. This, however, is not entirely true. Hampden does indeed sometimes seem to be working on the supposition of uncertainty, and this does contribute to his latitudinarian attitude, but at other times he admits the possibility of certainty. This certainty is based on the divine concurrence, the actual facts of revelation. By examining the relation between an observable fact of nature and the revealed fact of scripture, he is enabled to make what he considers a possible analogy. But his manipulation of his sources of analogy renders analogical theology impossible. Hampden in fact destroys both analogy and the necessity for analogy.

Hampden destroys analogy itself by his admission that his analogy is to be founded on two facts, the fact of nature and the fact of revelation. And in doing this he falls at once into the error which he had so tried to avoid. His doctrine of relative information, from which he partially
escaped by the allegation of a certain revelation, vitiates another part of his argument. He admits that Copleston is right in describing analogy as 'not the similarity of two things, but the similarity or sameness of two relations,' but by establishing nature and revelation as two facts, he cannot institute an analogy between them. An analogy could only be drawn from the relation of a natural fact to the natural principles, and the relation of a revealed doctrine to the principles of the supernatural. By declaring our inability to achieve a certain terminus ad quem in our speculations about the being and nature of God, and the consequent impossibility of establishing a criterion of similarity or difference, Hampden has actually denied the possibility of analogical situations in theology.

Hampden was able to extol the virtues of analogy while at the same time making analogy impossible because he had actually, perhaps unconsciously, changed the meaning of the term. In this he was certainly encouraged by his reading of Hey, and indeed of Butler. Both these authors he cites with regularity and approval. When Hampden is concentrating on the facts of nature and the facts of revelation, he is in fact preparing the way not for analogical conclusions but for comparisons. This is exactly what Hey had supposed analogy to be, a form of comparison, an analogous situation

being present when there are 'two events and two situations to be compared.' This is elaborated on the very page that Hampden has cited:

... a single event may give some faint expectation of its being repeated, when the same circumstances recur (at least when we have been accustomed to other analogies); a repetition makes the expectation stronger; and the more constant the repetition, the stronger is the expectation generated; till at length we lose all our doubts, and expect the event fully and entirely: - this, however, is only a single analogy.¹

Hey suggests by the calculation that 'this has happened in this situation and so it will happen in an identical situation', is 'really likely to happen', we establish an analogy. What we really establish, of course, is a comparison of situations and a deduction of events. Hey does not think this is an illegitimate use of the word since he is sure that he is following Hume and Butler. Hampden, too, thinks he is working in a true analogical tradition.

We can see just what Hampden means by analogy from the examples that he presents. He supposes that there is an analogical reference between the fact that nature leads us

to suppose the immortality of the soul, and scripture, as he reads it, tells us that we are immortal. He argues that natural theology leads us no further than to the feet of immortality, and that reasoning from nature, from experience, will reach about those points nothing which scripture is meant to teach us. There is a complementary relation between the two sources of information. He says that from this complement we may adduce a more perfect view of the fact of immortality. All this may be very true, but the establishment of a complement is nothing to do with analogy. It is not a piece of 'analogical reference' as Hampden would have us think, to add information from one source to information from another.

Similarly with Hampden's other examples. He reduces analogy to the postulation of 'what is likely' from a comparison of situations. The doctrine of eternal punishment and reward is shewn to be reasonable because in natural order we undergo punishment for wrong; Scripture merely shews us how God works his purpose out. We knew already that the purpose was working in our midst. Similarly the doctrine of the redemption:

... is analogous to those facts which shew in general that men are appointed to depend in some measure on the instrumentality and co-operation of each other, in obtaining not only the advantages but the common blessings of the present
life; or to such as shew that bad consequences, which must inevitably have followed as far as our ability to avert them is concerned, have been often averted through painful exertions voluntarily undergone by others.¹

The very nature of scriptural revelation seems to Hampden to evidence its truth by an analogy with nature. Scripture provides us with a coherent scheme of truths. He does not mean that there is a logical connection between the truths of revelation or even an intermingle of implications and dependencies, this he despises

... for this suffices merely for the purpose of forming schemes of theology, or systematic arrangements of scriptural doctrines.²

Hampden is only concerned with a 'simple union'³ of revelation, with 'mysterious ties of brotherhood.'⁴ He finds the same kind of constitution prevailing among the truths we obtain from nature. This is, as he says, a form of the argument presented in Butler, that natural events are not absolute and independent, but by their 'reciprocal correspondence and mutual relations, everything which we see in

2. Ibid. p. 99.
3. Ibid. p. 99.
nature is actually brought about.\textsuperscript{1} The comparison which one expects Hampden to institute now is between the simple union of natural truths (leading towards one end in a perceptable and ascertainable and therefore describable pattern) and the supernatural revelation. But if Hampden did make this comparison, what he would call an 'analogy', he would have to admit the describable character of the pattern of God's truth and so would arrive at an argument for systematic theology.

Hampden escapes from the dilemma by reference to Butler and the principle of incomprehensibility. Butler completed his comparison between the natural scheme of things and Christianity by stressing the unknown qualities of nature and asserting:

Christianity is a Scheme, quite beyond our comprehension.\textsuperscript{2} For Butler, the very character of this 'mysterious economy'\textsuperscript{3} is an answer to objections, as we do not know all natural phenomena in themselves or in their causes, so there are things in Christianity which we but half-know. Indeed, the part of Butler's work which is concerned with natural religion leads up to an affirmation that:

Upon supposition that God exercises a moral

\begin{enumerate}
  \item Butler: Analogy. (Hampden simply cites 'p.173', in one of Newman's copies, ed. by Halifax, published 1813, Edinburgh, the quotation appears in Part I, ch.7, p.155.)
  \item Butler: Analogy, Part II, ch.4.I, (Halifax ed. vol.I, p.233)
  \item Ibid.
\end{enumerate}
government over the world, the analogy of his natural government suggests, and makes it credible, that his moral government must be a scheme quite beyond our comprehension.

Hampden takes this a stage further. Using Butler to establish that a divine scheme of truth may well exist without our being able to see the fulness of connection between part and part, since nature also is hidden in its connections, he proceeds to use the principle of incomprehensibility with great effect. In this early work, as much as in his later Bampton Lectures, he is arguing against the validity of forming human schemes of theology. So he extends the influence of the principle of incomprehensibility to the very nature of connection. When we deal with revealed truths

... the laws or their connexion may be entirely beyond our powers of perception.

And he includes with this desperate principle the fundamental denial of logic in theology by a denial of the distinction between temporal and causal priority:

... Where the notion of time vanishes, the succession of antecedents and consequences also vanishes.

so that Hampden is able to conclude on what, in any other

1. Butler: Analogy. Part I ch.7. stated at the beginning (Halifax, vol. I. p.153) and then repeated as the principle of several sections of the chapter.
3. Ibid. pp. 102-3. 4. Ibid. p.103.
presentation of theology, might appear a somewhat
blasphemous or at least contradictory note:

The connexion of them (doctrines) may be simply
revealed to us without our being able to discern
it (since we might well be) left in ignorance as
to the mode of connexion or relationship.¹

In practice, however, Hampden does not demand so
radical an application of his principle; he is generally
prepared to admit that where we can see a connection we may
take it that such a connection exists in the mind of God, or
at least in the will of God for us. And from these connect-
ions observed by men a proof of truth may be derived.
Hampden, having asserted the possibility of incoherence
being merely the appearance that disguises a real coherence,
is able to employ the theory of coherent truth upon those
facts which he admits are describable:

All the doctrines of scripture being associated,
either by their reference to a common end, or by
their implication of each other; it follows that an
evidence to the truth of any one is in some degree
an evidence to the rest.²

He is not supposing that we can see the association of truth
in its mode but merely in its factual aspect. We know that
the truths of God must be connected in some way which we do

¹. Philosophical Evidence p.103
². Ibid., pp.129-130.
not know. Therefore if there is evidence for one truth, it is a support for all the other truths associated with it whether or no we can discern the association-method. Hampden is thus able to deny the value of traditional theology while maintaining the value of the evidential. He has, in fact, reduced theology to apologetics since the Christian does not need the evidences to convince him of the facts (associated or not) which he believes come from God, he merely uses the evidences to convince unbelievers. I suspect that Hampden considers a Christian may well be more sure of the truth of his religion if he can persuade another to accept it. There is something here of a principle of vicarious reasoning. If another man will accept the reasons provided by the evidences the Christian is assured that his belief in the facts is justified.

The doctrine of analogy becomes in Hampden's hands merely the means of examining the truth of that scheme of knowledge which (Scripture) unfolds, by the test of its accordance with our nature and condition.¹ This is exactly the point made by Tillotson in three sermons to which Hampden refers.² Tillotson, too, encourages the comparison of natural and supernatural as a means of ascertaining whether it be the supernatural or no. And he thinks, like Hampden,

   I have used Newman's copy of Tillotson edited by Birch, Vol. V, pp. 19f, 34f, and 51 f.
...as for revealed religion, the only design of that is, to revive and improve the natural notions which we have of God, and all our reasonings about Divine revelation are necessarily gathered by our natural notions of religion.

so that the man who has a proper knowledge of nature when he arrives at the presentation of revelation 'measures it by those steady and sure notions' which he derives from natural investigations into the Divine nature and purpose.

Now all this is to some extent a truism. It is obvious that when a doctrine which is generally accounted revealed appears to many to be in opposition to natural revelation, it will at least be suspect, and we may well consider that either we have misunderstood the doctrine, or else that it is not a doctrine revealed by God, or else that we have been too quick in our estimate of the natural revelation. But this is not Hampden's thought. For Hampden there is no possibility of doctrine in this sense. He is concerned only with what Tillotson calls the reviving and improving of natural notions about God in the sphere of morals. Hampden is concerned with action rather than with speculation:

the student of Christian theology is no enquirer into the nature of the Deity.

To seek information in the Scriptures is shown to be a bad thing by the errors in which their sinister inquiry terminates; the Scriptures are

1 Tillotson, Sermons, Volume V, p 24
2 Ibid.
3 Philosophical Evidence, p 154
a code of necessary information concerning the duty of man.¹

That they are not meant primarily to inform us of God is seen by the difficulty men have in proving the Trinity in Unity. The Christian doctrines certainly baffle our comprehension; they are therefore not meant for us as conceivable but as directives:

... they have all a subserviency to that moral instruction with regard to human life, which, we infer, must be a characteristic of the sacred writings.²

So although Hampden quarrels with Hey's description of doctrines as 'unintelligible' he allows that they are 'inconceivable' since we can have no terms comprehensive of divine truth.³ In this way, Hampden arrives at the position he adopted in the Sampson Lectures, that terminology was in itself an evil in theology.

2. Ibid. p.161.
II The Bampton Lectures.

1) Scholasticism Reviewed

In 1832 Hampden delivered the Bampton Lectures on 'The Scholastic Philosophy considered in its relation to Christian Theology'. This was a subject for which his previous researches had eminently prepared him. In a letter to Archbishop Whately, the Bishop of Kildare wrote of these lectures, 12 March, 1836:

Every man of decent theological reading must have an impression of an author's design; and mine is that he has stated the system of the schoolmen with ability and impartiality, giving no formal opinions of his own, making only such remarks as were incidental to his subject, and committing to men learned and mature in judgement, the fairest invitation to canvass the deep metaphysical subjects which were thus opened to the notice of the Churches of Rome, England, Geneva, not omitting Lutheran Congregations; all of whom in some degree, more or less, seem still to be influenced by the language adopted by the schoolmen.

Mosley, in his Reminiscences chiefly of Oriel College suggested in no uncertain terms that another, and not Hampden, was the actual author, if not of the text precisely, at least of the substantial form and ideas.

1 Quoted in Memorials of Bishop Hampden, pp 26–27
of the Lectures, of all, that is, which made them interesting and original: at the time the Lectures were written, there was only one man in Oxford who knew anything about the scholastic philosophy, and that was Bianco White. Mosley has a story that a sudden intimacy developed between White and Hampden in the months just before the delivery of the Bampton Lectures. However, Mosley is a notorious romancer, and we may agree with Archdeacon Hare that Hampden's earlier work, especially the Essay on the Philosophical Evidence of Christianity, contains hints and drafts of the chief speculations of the Bampton Lectures. We can consider the Lectures themselves without making a judgement on what Mosley elevates into a plagiarism issue. Wherever Hampden found the material it was certainly congenial material. He reiterates many of his earlier opinions, and he deploys the material in a way that might well be expected of the author of the Essay on Philosophical Evidence.

1 Mosley: Reminiscences, Volume I, p 352
2 Letter to the Dean of Chichester, p 91
3 Similarly we need not attempt to decide between the loyal affirmations of Henrietta Hampden that 'the Bampton Lectures were preached to a very large congregation!' and 'they were listened to with universal interest' (Memorials, p 27) and Mosley's malicious remarks about the preacher and 'the empty benches which are often the only audience of a Bampton Lecturer' and his suggestion that 'if the lectures were not heard, neither were they read' (Reminiscences, I, p 351).
In the Preface to the published version of the Lectures, Hampden gives a general comment on what he is trying to perform. This sets the work in its proper relation to the Essay on Philosophical Evidence. The present lectures are, he writes:

not a work of evidences, but a particular view of the connection of human philosophy with the given truths of the Scriptures, the agency of man here forms the leading idea.¹

He intends to set before his reader 'the force of Theory in its relation to the divine truths of our Religion', and to give an account 'of the effect of Opinion as such on the doctrines of Christianity.'²

One can see at once the way in which Hampden intends to expound the 'agency of man'. It is going to be in direct contrast with the activity of the Divine Author and Guardian of the Faith.³

Hampden is prepared to look at the whole of the scholastic system as concerned with language. This is precisely why it interests him. In the mediaeval abuse of language he finds the origins of deviations from the Christian mode of looking at reality. He is not being dismissive when he speaks of the scholastic concern with terminology, he is acknowledging that the mediaevals influenced the very centre of theological enterprises by their powerful theoretic modifications of our theological language.⁴

1 Hampton: Lectures, Preface, p vii
2 Ibid., Lecture I, p 6
3 Ibid.
4 Preface, p vi
It seemed necessary to Hampden that the mediaeval metaphysicians should be doubly censured. Firstly, as they were metaphysicians they must perforce have abused the nature of words; they must have played the well-known metaphysical game of erecting adjectives to the status of nouns, so that men lost a hold on existing things, of good men, beautiful objects, and true events, and became involved with mere talk about Goodness, Beauty and Truth. Secondly, the metaphysicians of the Schools had employed this rarifying technique on subjects which of their nature most demanded to remain the common possession of all practical men. Hampden would have accepted the Wittgensteinian commonplace that 'to imagine a language is to imagine a form of life', and his turn of mind is such that he is very susceptible to the suggestion that through the thinness of scholastic terminology we may discern the thinness of the religion which they expressed in such terms.

Such a religion would also require a strange theological structure, for, if it were to be fully coherent and logical, the question which would arise at the onset, and which would appear likely to militate against any further pursuit of the subject, would be 'On what ground of truth, self-evident and positive, is the theological structure to be founded?'. Hampden supposes that the great difficulty for the mediaeval theologians was the establishment of first principles. According to scholastic modes of thought, these principles were, he says, only to be
drawn from the nature of the Divine Being. But the scholastics were confronted with the task of demonstrating the evidence or criterion of the truth of the principles they proposed. The conclusions were, Hampden thinks, only secure when the first principles had been fully demonstrated. Now the scholastics had admitted that God, as He is in Himself, is incomprehensible by the human faculties. The difficulty, says Hampden, would have been recognised as insuperable by any other group of theologians. Not so the schoolmen 'versed in an eclectic philosophy, in which the mysticism of Plato was blended with the analytical method of Aristotle.' Authority intervenes and produces the first principles secure by Faith:

If we believe the Scripture accordingly, we may proceed to the exercise of understanding; - the authority of Revelation being conceded, Reason has its ground, on which it may build its airy edifice of speculation.  

Although this is a somewhat distempered version of the scholastic method, it is near enough to the truth to be accepted as a sincere attempt to describe the scholastic theology. Hampden thinks that because Scripture was used as a basis, it was used as a basis only, and not a directive in the progress of theologising. The philosophical attempt to

1. Ibid. p.80.
2. Bampton Lectures. II. p.80-81.
reduce the signs and symbols by which Scripture conveys God's revelation to men resulted merely in a falsification and departure from revelation. The conclusions of scholasticism Hampden classes as 'vain mystification of science.'¹ This is the natural result of using logic as a means of investigation, when really it should be used only for the framing of exact definitions. He considers that the schoolmen's 'whole Theology is a conglomeration of doubts,'² and hence leads only to an uncomfortable scepticism. Hampden is content to suggest that such a theology is the deserved result of a fundamental misuse of Scripture.

In Hampden's view the scholastics had considered that the revelation of Scripture was the revelation of God, and so had deduced from Scripture information about the nature of God. This in combination with a ruthless and inapplicable logic had produced the system Hampden is considering. Hampden asserts that the revelation of Scripture is a revelation of man, 'the nature and condition of man' is the 'great subject of our Sacred Books.'³ We learn from the Bible 'how he (man) has been treated by his Creator at different periods, and how he has responded to that treatment.'⁴ The schoolmen, he says, regarded Scripture as propositional, when they should have realised that it is rhetorical. They missed the

1. Ibid. p. 82.
2. Ibid. p. 86.
3. Baughton Lectures. II. p.89.
4. Ibid. p.89.
whole meaning of Scripture.

The prime example of the scholastic misunderstanding of the intention of Scriptural revelation, and one to which Hampden devotes the whole of his third lecture, is the doctrine of the Trinity. He finds it difficult to believe the ardour and bitterness with which 'minute points of difference' between Arian, Sabellian and orthodox were debated; 'we are apt to feel surprise at the extraordinary excitement' but that is because we forget the political element of the importance both of imperial beliefs and of the local patriotism of Alexandria and Milan, whose people supported their Prelates with 'passionate obstinacy.' And we must remember that the Athanasian Creed 'is an evidence of the triumph of a party in the Church' which took the name of the famous patriarch to declare their judgment authoritative. So a doctrine that was the work of a politico-religious faction was inherited by the logical theologians. 'The Schoolmen set themselves in the first instance to rationalise the doctrine of the Trinity.' By so doing, they determined the content of the doctrine, and set up rigorous standards of orthodoxy. This is, in its turn, the

1. Ibid. III. p.101.
3. Bampton Lectures. III. p.103
4. Ibid. p.105.
5. Ibid. III. p.111.
cause of heresy - since without orthodoxy there could be no divergence from a standard. In Hampden's eyes the scholastics invented a mystery which was not present in the original Scriptural revelation; while he is convinced that 'no scheme of Unitarianism can solve the whole of the phenomena which Scripture records'¹ it does not require a conservative Trinitarian scheme to do so either.

Hampden supposes that the Scriptural revelation of the Oneness of God 'was not meant to convey to Israel any speculative notion of the oneness of the Deity'² but simply to attain the practical end: Thou shalt have no other God but me:

Now, were this view of the Revelation of the Divine Unity strictly maintained, would it not greatly abate the repugnance often felt at the admission of a Trinity in Unity?³

We are only to profess that we know God as the only God we can worship and it will be quite irrelevant to our scheme of religion to demonstrate or refute any conclusion from the notion of Unity. He thinks that if this were the case with our religion then we should see that to deny the Trinity was the same as to deny that any 'new manifestation'⁴ of God can be true. We should then bother little about differences of

1. Ibid. p.146.
2. Ibid. p.147.
3. Hampton Lectures III. p.147.
4. Ibid. p.148.
opinion on how there is a Trinity and a Unity; we shall not worry whether we accept or not the opinions of Praxeas, and Artemon, and Theodotus, of Paul of Samosata, Noetus, Sabellius, and others\(^1\) since they are all Trinitarian in principle:

All differences of this kind belong to the history of the human mind, as much as to theology, and affect not the broad basement of fact on which the manifold forms of speculation have taken their rise. The only ancient, only catholic truth is the Scriptural fact.\(^2\)

Here is all we know and all we need to know.

When he came to examine how the scholastics had worked from nature towards a synthesis of information, Hampden discovered just how little he believed in analogy as a theological instrument. Analogical reference led only to definitions and a structure of consequences. All our divisions he truly traces to the position that metaphysics occupied in the mediaeval theology. If we accept metaphysics we are likely to arrive at conclusions which we hold with tenacity against the spirit of Christian moderation.

We have built on mere abstractions\(^3\) as of priority, necessity, power, will\(^4\) and these abstractions are coherent in

1. Ibid. p.148.
2. Ibid. p.149.
themselves: but are 'very fallacious tests' of 'facts out of the region of the mind itself'1. We have confused metaphysical reality with physical reality; we have betrayed beings in the search for Being. Hampden will have none of this subtlety. Our difficulties are due to our false philosophy more than to our Religion2. It was one of the glories of the Reformation that it 'opposed a practical check to these refinements of Christian truth'3. What we needed then, and Hampden suggests that what was needed in his time, was 'an energetic practical amendment', a return to the naked gospel.

Hampden was himself at one time compared to one of the most unremitting logicians of the middle ages. Henry Wilberforce wrote, in 1835, a little pamphlet4 commenting on Hampden's proposals for the admission of dissenters to Oxford degrees and the discontinuance of the requirement of the oath to sustain the XXXIX Articles5. Wilberforce was very pleased with his Abelardian comparison, and he realised the curiosity of the situation:

Is it not remarkable to find men, in our own times, boasting, like Dr Hampden, of the progress of our mental illumination and of our freedom from the false philosophy of former days, and comparing the discoveries of modern theology with those

1 Bampton Lectures, p 202
2 Ibid., p 203
3 Ibid., p 251
4 Foundations of the Faith assailed in Oxford, 1835
5 Observations on Religious Dissent
which have given a new existence to the science of medicine, while
all the time they are only reproducing errors which were brought
forward, refuted and consigned to oblivion in the contemned
middle ages. ¹

But if Hampden were like Abelard then the defenders of the truth must
be like the mediaeval churchmen; they must follow the example of their
predecessors in doctrine:

Let us be warned by the example of former times: the errors of the
works before us are not new; they come to us, indeed, with the stamp
of elder times — but it is the stamp of censure and condemnation:
not the impress of approval ²

and in discipline:

Does not the success which attended the efforts of the Church to
purge off her dross in the 12th century encourage us on this day
to follow the example of St. Bernard? ³

So the opponents of the Regius Professor took their stand on this
comparison and made a great deal of it. Tom Mealey, unreliable ever,
many years later recalled this comparison, and denied one of its
implications:

It has been stated by writers who no doubt believed what they
said, that these lectures were attended by large and deeply inter-
ested congregations, as if Hampden had really been the Abelard his:

¹ Foundations of the Faith Assailed, p38
² Ibid., p 35.
³ Ibid., p 39.
antagonists would make him.\textsuperscript{1}

What justification was there in Hampden's writings for the Abelardian comparison? In some ways, not much. Abelard could never have written:

It is necessary that we should retrace our steps to the point of departure from Scripture and freely examine whether the first step has been legitimately taken. It will appear, I think, that all who acknowledge the divine authority of Scripture are much more unanimous in reality than they profess to be, in what they fundamentally believe; and they differ, in fact, more in what is matter of human opinion and speculation than in their acceptance of divine truth\textsuperscript{2}

Indeed, Hampden is often opposed to the very things Abelard fought so fiercely to maintain. St Bernard lost patience with so able a logician, and William of Champeaux hated Abelard for no other reason than that he had been worsted by his pupil in a logical demonstration of a point in the theory of universals. Abelard was a dialectician who turned to theology, and he believed all his life in the necessity of logic to good theologising, the necessity of logic to the achievement of a properly based religious truth. Hampden spent much of his professional effort in opposition to precisely this type of theologian:

\ldots the principle for which I contend (is) that no

\textsuperscript{1} Mosley, Reminiscences, Volume I, p 351

\textsuperscript{2} Observations on Religious Dissent, 1st edition, 1834, p 5
conclusions of human reasoning, however correctly deduced, however logically sound, are properly religious truths.

In the end it may well seem that Hampden is more the S. Bernard redivivus than a second Abelard; thus he told his parishioners:

When God gave an express revelation to man he signified to human reason — 'hitherto shalt thou come, but no further; and here shall thy proud waves be stayed.' He appointed that revelation to be accepted by reason, not to be measured by it. — And none, therefore, who apply their reason, as the measure of divine truth, can reach its height. The great Cornerstone of the Gospel cannot be quarried out with tools of mere earthly manufacture. It must be dug and fashioned with those which the Holy Ghost has placed in our hands in giving us the Scriptures.

There is much that is attractive in the theory advanced in the Hampton Lectures that the scholastic writers merely manipulated signs within a closed and rational system, seeking nothing in the way of contact with the language and thought of ordinary life. It will seem odd in Hampden, however, to distrust the scholastics because they erected a conventional system within which to discuss theological problems, indeed he does not

1 Observations on Religious Dissent, p 8
2 Parochial Sermons, volume V, pp 101-2
condemn them precisely because they had a conventional system but because they took their conventions so seriously as to confuse them with reality. They made an epistemological mistake because of the intellectual clarity and rigour of their logic.

The idea of the pure message of the naked Gospel, the idea of bringing men simply and immediately to Christ, the idea of what is fashionably called kerygmatic theology, is, of course, deeply attractive. But to say this is not to say that we can avoid the use of human explanations. The Scriptural revelation of God demands a missionary community to present the truth to the world of men. And missionaries, as those in India and China in the seventeenth century, or those in Kenya and the Congo in our own time, found, will fail utterly of their purpose unless they find words of men in which to convey the word of God. If the Scriptural revelation were itself enough we might post a Bible to every home in the world and wait for a day when the world would wake up Christian. It is not irrelevant to point to the first day of Pentecost and to St Peter preaching to the people by making a selection from the Scriptures and adding his own comments so that the Scriptural revelation became immediate to their situation. The study of St Paul's epistles today shows equally the determined effort of the first Christian preachers to become theologians, that is, to become men who spoke of God's action in a way understandable of the people. It may be, as Hampden claims, that some
of the disputes among the schoolmen were unreal, that they fell into
the materialism that converts signs into things; and it may be that
the mediaeval period was one in which a logical theology gave a new
pretext for passion and argument, but it is important to realise that
the dangers of such things are not absent from any theological
discussion, and that abuse does not remove the possibility of use.
To say that they did not achieve a perfect balance is not to
condemn the attempt unless one can shew that the attempt was bound to
fail, that it bore with it seeds of self-destruction. That Hampden
did suppose he could shew. He was convinced that theological investiga-
tion of a systematic kind would never assist in the purification of
the world of 'telegrams and danger'.

Hampden judged that during the period of Dominican influence
Christian theology had tried to win a way through by the desperate
expedient of logistics, when only a purposeful and moralist study of
God's revelation could have presented them with an answer to the prob-
lems they recognised in the attempt to describe the world. Such an
unreal structure must inevitably fracture upon contact with the swash-
buckling enthusiasm of the renascence and the mercantile prosperity of
the nineteenth century.

Hampden viewed the mediaeval church as far too thin a thing for
men of breath and blood, it seemed to him to give no lively sense of

1 Bampton Lecture, II, p 55
the present incarnational activity of Christ, he thought it a mere
theory without force of application. To him it seemed also that the
mediaevals elaborated a religion of absolutist tendency since it had
a vocabulary of definite and unchanging meanings. Words give shape to
life and the precise structure of mediaeval terminology in theology
edged and limited the religious experience possible to those who used
the vocabulary. A set of verbalist definitions will inevitably lead
to a set of dogmatic definitions, to torture and burning as the
implements of absolutist fanatics.

The important thing, therefore, to be accomplished in modern
theological work is the introduction of a new relativist vocabulary
which will give men's minds the opportunity for mistakes, corrections
and free conversation, above all the opportunity for questions when we
have for so long been dominated by the search for answers. Hampden
illustrates his programme for the future work of theologians by a
description of two aspects of mediaeval failure in this enterprise;
the continual fight amongst the mediaevals to set up an authority in
theological matters, and the unsatisfactory character of the work of
Aquinas. With the struggle for freedom in Aristotelian Christendom I
will deal in the next section, and then I will turn to Hampden's
estimate of Aquinas.
ii) Authority and Freedom

Hampden's view of the middle ages is difficult to contain and describe. He disliked both mystery and logic. He attacked both as they were manifest in mediaeval dogmatism and scholasticism. But his attacks were sometimes ambiguous. He defended the religious sense of the Christian from logical strictures, while at the same time defending the use of reason against the pretensions of the authoritarian hierarchy who indulged in mystery.

Of one thing Hampden is certain. The menace of scholasticism is not a thing of mere historical value; a bogey from a creaking chest. The menace is present, alive, with them in nineteenth century Oxford:

It is in the very air of our social life. Its legend, though worm, is not effaced from the current coin of our philosophy and theology.

Hampden is concerned to make an historical survey in his Bampton Lectures only because of the relevance he finds of mediaeval enquiries to the modern situation. Hampden is never to be found engaged in purely speculative pursuits. His whole theological activity has a moral spur. He is attempting to produce a description of right action in the contemporary scene, and he uses history as a means of presenting certain truths about the present.

1 Bampton Lectures, II, p 76
Hampden admits that his subject may often seem to have little present relevance, and he advances as a basis for discussion the notion that scholasticism:

educated the human intellect in the West, for the larger views, and more elevated thoughts, and more masculine vigour of Modern Science and Modern Theology.¹

He then moves further in the prosecution of his design and shows how scholasticism makes its greatest contribution to modern thought by way of its more unorthodox figures. He considers men like Berengarius, Roscelinus and Abelard to have presented 'varied forms of rationalism' and 'the pure exertions of the mind.'² Hampden makes the final persuasion in their favour by a dexterous use of the word 'free.'³

We may appreciate the efforts of the Rationalists of the Middle Ages. Their mind exulted in the simple perception that it was still free.³

The freedom that he extols in the proto-rationalism of the heterodox school becomes the dominant motif in Hampden's analysis of the mediaeval theological endeavour. He finds different facets of the one struggle between the men of liberal freedom and those of doctrinaire authoritarianism in the whole complex of theological activity during the long ages of scholasticism, but especially in the disposs-

¹ Hampden Lectures, I, p 8.
² Ibid, p 37
³ Ibid, p 38
ession of Plato by Aristotle in the Schoolbooks. This he thought resulted in a theology of a rarified character concerned only with distinctions in logic, and which allowed the cramped monastic mind-room to play and juggle in an ingenious but paltry freedom.

The question of Aristotle and the proper place of Aristotelian studies in theological schools, was not a dead one for either Hampden or his original bearers. The matter had been debated several times in the recent past.

A general apology for Aristotelian studies in contemporary Oxford had been made by Copleston against the attacks of the Edinburgh Review in 1810. The Review had made a disparaging remark about the Oxford undergraduate's knowledge of Aristotle in the middle of a notice of La Place's Traité de Mécanique Céleste; it had suggested that at Oxford

the dictates of Aristotle are still listened to as infallible decrees and the infancy of science is mistaken for its maturity.

Copleston in his pamphlet proceeded to examine the sciences for which the study of Aristotle is considered useful when taught at Oxford. He admitted that there were abuses but this did not, he thought, argue against the Aristotelian system as a whole.

1 A Reply to the Calumnies of the Edinburgh Review against Oxford, 1810
2 Edinburgh Review, No. 22, p 283
Even the candid and sagacious Locke is not proof against the blind propensity mankind feel to mark their disgust of the abuse of a thing by denying its use. How else can we account for his continual reflections on the folly and uselessness of Logic when in his Thoughts on Education he recommends that his friends son should be made to read Chillingworth? Read Chillingworth! Not a page of Chillingworth is intelligible without Logic.

Copleston argued for Aristotelianism as necessary to enable an undergraduate to give a coherent account of the evidences of Christianity, and then examined the usefulness of Aristotle's Logic in matters of Ethics. Copleston to some extent anticipates some of Hampden's thoughts on this matter: religion, he says, adds a sanction to Ethics, which the sublimest philosophy could never give: it corrects some errors, into which the purest philosophy, without that guide, had fallen. But it displays no entire and systematic code.

And he concludes with a splendidly snide remark:

"If therefore the whole of what we learnt in Morals were to be derived from one work, no Christian could hesitate between the system of Aristotle and the system of Paley."
Copleston had made an earlier attack on Paley in *Logic Vindicated*, 1809 and the whole tone of his writing was to defend the classical Aristotelian logic from the moderns.

Copleston's article was but part of a long-maintained discussion in early nineteenth century Oxford. In January 1830, Newman wrote to Hurrell Froude about various measures for reform of the examination system, and he discussed the latest attempt at modernisation – by another Oriel Provost, Hawkins had suggested a moderate revision of the statutes, and Newman wrote of his proposals:

> If I possibly can I shall vote for the new Examination Statutes. I cannot but fear, if it be rejected, men will be appointed who are likely to make great innovations, losing sight completely of those old principles which, in drawing up this, the Provost has kept in view. Cardwell, Mills, Burton, Short, Hampden, &c. – would they not exclude Aristotle, and bring in modern subjects?  

In the same letter Newman suggested that modern history or Hebrew ought to be brought in to the list of required subjects for the M.A. degree. He was not opposed to change but to substitution. Hampden did not argue in favour of ridding the schools of Aristotle. The nature of the examination dispute, Hampden noted with interest, was much like the thirteenth century dispute about the introduction of Aristotelian studies.

1. *Logic Vindicated*, 1809, p 50
2 January 9, 1830. Anna Mosley, Volume I, p 220
In his study of the medieval period Hampden remarked that much of the discussion of the relation between revelation and reason was conducted under the question as to what place Aristotelian philosophy was to hold in the Schools. This seemed to Hampden, and rightly so, a most important question, relevant to any discussion of the possibility of theology. This was a question answered in one way by the Tempier condemnations of 1270 and 1277, in other ways by S Thomas Aquinas, Ockham and Bradwardine, and in other ways again by Luther, Melanchthon and Jewel. These variations were possible, perhaps, because of the characteristic of Aristotle's methodology that Newman noted. Aristotle, he suggested, had presented a logical system whose aim confessedly is to baffle an adversary, or at most detect error, rather than to establish truth.

In an article which appears in the 1853 edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, but which was written twenty years before, Hampden writes of Aristotle's Philosophy and suggests the kind of influence that Aristotle has had in Christian theology. He thinks that the spirit of

1. Professor David Knowles has described this condemnation as 'in itself a stupid mistake', and he says of Aquinas' regard for Aristotle: 'To him Aristotle seemed, as he had seemed to Averroes, and as he still seems to many of us, to be in the main the human reason working right with no nonsense'. Knowles: The Historical Context of the Philosophical Works of S Thomas Aquinas, pp 12 and 8. The Aquinas Society of London, Aquinas Paper 30, Blackfriars, 1958.
disputatious subtlety which is displayed in the quarrels between Nominalists and Realists was inherited by the renascence scientists rather than the reformation theologians. The employment of logical principles to speculations in physics was, of course, a mediaeval practice too but the Middle Ages are more important in Hampden's thought for their decadent theology than their developing science. In theology the application of Aristotelian principles produced a combustible situation immediately preceding the Reformation:

Theology became more and more corrupted by the refinements of systematic exposition until at length the accumulated mass of error became too evident to be borne, and, among other cause, produced a re-action in the Reformation of the Church.

Hampden suggests that if Luther had been alone in the work of reform Aristotle would have been completely excised from the schools, but Melanchthon restrained him. Melanchthon is the man of mean for Hampden who 'assisted in supporting the established dominion of Aristotle', but who could see that the scholastics had set about employing Aristotle in theology in a perverted manner. Melanchthon, then, had enough appreciation to use Aristotle properly. Hampden does not think that Melanchthon's wisdom belonged to his successors:

Afterwards the disputes among Protestants
themselves served to perpetuate that dominion and for the same cause as before, the subtilties of the Logical and Metaphysical treatises were studied rather than the more practical parts of philosophy.¹

The demand for practicality was always a strong one in the work of the Oriel theologians. Whately never ceased to demand the use of doctrines, and to reject as unnecessary those which seemed to him to have no practical and immediate application. Similarly Hampden is not prepared in this article, as he was in the later Bampton Lectures, to condemn the use of Aristotle in any connection with theology. He explicitly allows the possibility of an Aristotelian theology:

The philosopher is not to be censured for that deprivation of philosophy to which he was made subservient; but rather had his teaching been rightly applied, and pursued in the spirit of its author the Schoolmen could hardly have been led into those airy and unreal speculations.²

Hampden sees that the Church took to herself the 'most elaborate specimens of that exercise of Reason'³ when SS. Albert and Thomas Aquinas were accepted as the guiding theologians. Hampden notices that one of the results of

1. Ibid. p 537.
2. Ibid. p 538.
such a delicate alliance was the tension that resulted in
the minds of the commentators when they came to the discus-
sion of a 'point on which the Church had pronounced.¹ The
idea of limit was evidently so disturbing to them that they
had recourse to a desperate invention:

... the expedient of Distinctions; the artifice,
by which an acute Reason could maintain its own
hypothesis consistently with the devotion due to
the prescriptions of Authority²

It is by such means that the older tradition of anti-
rationalism was reduced to accept the new logical theology
and the 'more theological Philosophy of Plato' put aside.

Hampden admits that his pejorative use of 'logical'
may startle some of his listeners. To dispel the prejudice
that logic may be used to advantage in theology is his main
concern in the rest of his lectures. He objects to the
deduction of consequences, not simply because he objects to
all mingling of human activity with divine, but because it
is an irrelevant activity:

It will appear, that, whilst theologians of the
schools have thought they were establishing
religious truth by elaborate argumentation, they
have been only multiplying and arranging a
theological language.³

1. Ibid., Lecture I. p.47.
2. Ibid., Lecture I. p.47
Hampden laments the manners of the nominalists, despite their happy reaction against the earlier 'realists', and their epistemological novelties; they found themselves trapped yet more deeply in the nets of logic and language:

We find there, no longer an enlarged philosophy of language, but mere terminology; a collection of technical terms, explained in immediate application to their theological use, and by way of Introduction to Theology.

This terminological exactitude became, heu, 'the interpreter at once of Revelation and of Nature'.

It is one of Hampden's main and recurring theses: that men trust too often in an equation of words and things. The mediaeval schoolmen are used in the Bampton Lectures as so many warnings against the dangers of linguistic theologising. By the careful deployment of words they concealed the gap in their affairs, and directed attention to a specious edifice of logic and coherence. To Hampden this was the greatest menace. To him, believing as he did that all sciences, and particularly theology, are constructed from inadequate linguistic tools which poorly presented truth, he regarded those who advanced the claim of words to adequacy in the transmission of realities as the most deceiving of men.

1 Bampton Lectures, II, p 65
2 Ibid., p 69
Hampden's study of the mediaeval period may not have been thorough by contemporary standards amongst modern scholars, but they were the first of such studies in Oxford since the renaissance period. They revealed to Hampden a set of men supremely adept in the arrangement of words in coherent patterns and in argumentative array of a most impressive kind. But he did not admire the strength displayed. It was precisely because the mediaeval schoolmen were so adept and technically skilled in the erection of verbal and logical niceties that they seemed to Hampden to be so dangerous. They provided a theological language - that is, in Hampden's view, a set of theological conventions, makeshifts and ingenuities - and then so manipulated these conventional signs that they themselves forgot the makeshift and inadequate character of their own linguistic system.

The signs have been converted into things. The combination and analysis of words which the Logical Theology has produced, have given occasion to the passions of men, to arm themselves in defence of the phantoms thus called into being. Not only have professed theologians, but private Christians, been imposed on, by the specious terms of Theology; and have betrayed often a fond zeal in the service of their idol-abstractions, not unlike that of the people of old, who are said to have beaten the air with spears, to expel the foreign gods by whom their
country was supposed to be occupied

And from this disarming allusion to Herodotus' account of the Caunians, Hampden pursues his argument further and finds in the mediaeval heritage a present cause of modern infidelity:

I believe it to be one of the chief causes of the infidelity which prevails among speculative men. Notions are proposed to them, which they feel themselves competent to examine with freedom; because they have an instinctive perception of the source from which they are derived. Everyone who reflects at all, has some knowledge of metaphysical truth; for it is the truth that is most intimate with him. And when a reflecting person, accordingly, has notions proposed to him, which he finds to be part of the internal stock of principles belonging to his nature, he is led to compare them with each other, to discern contrarieties, and to reject what perplexes and confounds him.

If our knowledge of God is presented in a thoroughly impersonal and knock-you-down manner then any man will think himself invited to consider an argument — whereas in fact Christianity invites men to speak with a person. So far all men of sense must agree with Hampden's analysis of the dangers of a logical theology — such a theology may well

1 Bampton Lectures, II, pp 55-6

2 Ibid., p 56
decline into a decadent and slick apologetics. We are all too well aware of the dangers of such a business to disallow Hampden's caution. Newman himself was, at the same period, saying much the same sort of thing: "Life is larger and than Logic," and Newman's presentation of God's presence depended on His being known as fully personal, and as revealing Himself to persons. One does not have to subscribe to all Hampden's arguments and theological stations to give a concurrent opinion on this matter. He quotes with good effect the words of Gregory Nazianzen during the Arian dispute in the Church:

Time was when things with us were flourishing and well-ordered; when this exquisiteness and precision and technicality of Theology, had not so much as access to the divine courts; when the saying or hearing of anything of subtlety, was accounted the same as playing tricks with pebbles that deceive the sight by sleight-of-hand¹

Hampden suggests that such logical cleverness is useful in theological argument as a means of defence, but of defence only:

To logical science, in fact, simply considered as an art of defence, as a discipline of disputation applicable to the service of orthodoxy, there was never any indisposition on the part of the Church authorities²

but the scholastics would not leave logic there. They attempted to

² Bampton Lectures, II, p 58.
employ logical tactics in the establishment of a coherent positive theology, to use logic for attack as well as defence.

Although Hampden admits that logic has uses as a defence mechanism, he does not admit that every use of logic by the Church can be allowed as having a defensive character. The Mediaeval Church seems to him to have widened in a most unwarrantable manner the number of cases in which logic was appropriate:

the authorities of the Church objected only to the employment of logic in discussing questions of religion, when it was found a vexatious instrument in the hands of the heretic. Where the disputant professed agreement with the prescriptive views of the Church, there was no objection in this case to the use of subtleties, which otherwise incurred the severity of reprobation and invective. Even sophisms, it was conceded might be rightly employed, where the design was, to establish the orthodox truth, and subvert the false and delusive conclusions of heresy.

Such a theory must have inevitably two results, says Hampden. The first is that the theologians trained in this manner will be well equipped for war. They will be taught how to conduct campaigns of offensive theology against the heretic. They will, therefore, be the willing instruments of a policy of intolerance. The second result is that when there is no war to be waged against the heretic these warriors will turn to domestic squabbles or find some means of displaying their one:

1 Bampton Lectures, II, p 60
skill. They will seek occasions for the exercise of their one talent. They will be frustrated in their laudable desire to serve the cause of Christ until they find a place to logic in. Inevitably, therefore, the business of technical logicality will take over the centre of Christian discussion. Men will cease to think carefully about how they are to act up to their vocation as Christians, they will come to regard the proper manipulation of orthodox formulae as paramount in life, as the one secure way of shewing that one is really a Christian:

Thus was a kind of Lacedaemonian policy pursued in regard to the cultivation and exercise of logical science in the Church. The member of the spiritual commonwealth was trained to acts of hostility against the stranger and the enemy, but was most inconsistently expected to live in quietness and inaction at home. The whole institution was for war abroad; whilst he was strictly prohibited from displaying the skill which he had acquired in any occasion of domestic grievance. The natural consequence was, that, as the Spartan was restless within his own territory, so the Christian logician was ever impatient to exert his disciplined acuteness within the pale of the Church itself.

One of the direct results of such a policy was the establishment of Aristotle as arbiter in the Christian Schools.

1 Bampton Lectures, II, pp 60-61.
As Hampden notes, Aristotle did not find an immediate welcome in Christian Schools. This was because of his use by certain early heretics:

the speculations on the Trinity, introduced by Artemon and Theodotus in the IInd century, were imputed to their study of Aristotle...a prejudice against Aristotle appears to have been created from that circumstance among the professors of Christianity.

In the beginning of Christian speculative theology it was Plato who seemed the philosopher most attuned to Christian ways of understanding the universe:

the piety of Platonism, its abstractedness from the visible world, its elevation of the moral sentiments, recommended it forcibly to the imagination and the feelings of the contemplative theologian.

However Latin Churchmanship could not long be governed by so mystical a view of life as Platon appeared to present. Even if there had been no Aristotle the mediaevals would have invented him:

whatever were the objections to Aristotle, and to the art with which his name was associated, it was impossible that logical science could remain dormant in such a state of things, as

1 'Bampton Lectures', II, p.61
2 Ibid., pp.61-62
that which the Christian Church presented in the middle age.  

And this was because of the complexity of the mediaeval struggle of minds, the struggle of those who clamoured for an individual liberty and those who sort to impose 'the restraint of spiritual authority.' That both the clamour and the repression came often from one man, that many a mediaeval wanted at once a scope for intellectual juggling and an authoritarian Church necessarily, Hampden supposes, gave rise to 'an artificial method of philosophising':

An art of logic answered these internal cravings of the mind. It enabled the mind, to wander within the limits of prescribed hypotheses, and to indulge in excursions which gave at least the semblance of freedom to its efforts. Here was the fundamental grievance, which led the intellectual Christian of the middle age to cultivate a subtile logic; and raised the name of Aristotle to that dreary eminence, from which he looks down on the subject realms of Scholasticism.

It is tempting to pause for a moment here and speculate whether the present phenomenon of a daring logistic being combined with a timid religious fundamentalism in certain Catholic Oxford philosophers is an example of the kind of thing Hampden was discussing. However that may be Hampden saw in the mediaeval controversies the manifestation of a deeper antagonism between the individual mind and the oppressive powers

2. Ibid.  
3. Ibid.  
4. Ibid., p 63
of authority,

between the efforts of human reason, on the one hand, to assert its own freedom and independence; and on the other hand, the coercion exercised over it by the civil or ecclesiastical powers. 1

It is only in the light of such a struggle that Hampden can see a reconciliation of what he calls 'the most startling curiosities of minute enquiry' 2 and 'a servile addiction to the previous determinations and sanctions of the venerated doctors of the Church'. 3 The whole scholastic system is thought to be a severely held tension between 'the positiveness of dogmatism and the waywardness of human reason'. 4 He finds many examples of this struggle in mediaeval theological discussions:

The contest between Ratramn and Paschase on the doctrine of the Eucharist; of Lanfranc with Berenger on the same subject; of Anselm with Roscelin on the nature of Universals; the complaint of Bernard against the dialectical theology of Abelard; are all illustrations of the collision between Reason and Authority. 5

1. Bampton Lectures I, p. 13
2. Ibid. p. 13.
3. Ibid. pp. 13-14
4. Ibid. p. 14
5. Ibid. p. 37.
The whole of mediaeval theology is interpreted in terms of a political movement for independence. It may be proper to codify the various philosophers and theologians of the long period in such a way. It may well be that within the mediaeval world there was no room for speculation in the autocratic feudal state and the authoritarian Church. But Hampden does not fully realise the difficulties of proving his case. He makes too many assertions. Many, indeed, may feel disquiet at Hampden's prime example of this struggle of minds - the nominalist reaction of the later mediaeval period.

Hampden conceives that Realism is to be equated with the established orthodoxy, and Nominalism with a brave new challenge, whose upholders were to be praised for being 'bold enough to risk the imputation of heresy in their adventurous pursuit of the truth'¹

Once this assumption is made S Anselm is, of course, the villain of the piece. By his vigilance the offending nominalist was silenced.² The weapon he used was his episcopal authority. Roscelinus found that Realism was a 'philosophy held in suordination to Church-Authority'³

Hampden thinks of Nominalism as the return to actuality, the championing of objective facts against the dictatorship of 'general notions of the mind'⁴. Nominalism, he suggests, is the progenitor of modern realistic science. Of course even the Nominalists were men of

¹ Hampden Lectures, II, p 69
² Ibid., p 70
³ Ibid.
⁴ Ibid., p 71
their own age and clime. Hampden has to admit that they were not strong enough to deny the orthodox theology as much as he would have wished them to do; they were not quite emancipated into modern liberalism:

The validity of an appeal to experience would, of course, be but tremulously entertained at such a period, amidst the complete general subjugation of the intellect to the force of Religious Authority. The classic example of the denial of experience by all the mediaevals he is considering, was the idea of substance and accident, taken over in a debased form from the ubiquitous Aristotle, which reached a culminating oddity in the doctrine of the Eucharist. There was no clamour, even from the Nominalists, against this doctrine; no protest that a Real Presence was asserted, which implied the deceptiveness of the senses.

The Nominalists, even their leader Ockham, were not so modern as Hampden suggested. But in his consideration of historical material Hampden does seem at this point in his argumentative review of the mediaevals to be totally taken up with the elaboration and proving of his thesis of continual tension in the Schools of theology between

1 Baptist Lectures, II, p 71
2 Ibid., p 72
the demands of reasonable freedom and the exigencies of authority. The opposition of Ockham and the neo-Thomists was a situation which could be written in terms of the thesis. Ockham is represented as the one who obtained a merited celebrity by the title of the second founder of the school of Nominalism; and from that, on that account, incurred the condemnation of the ruling party in the Church. Hampden considers the Templar condemnations as a reaction of the conservative ruling party, and the condemnation of nominalism deriving from equally conservative ecclesiastics. Just as the condemned of 1277 became the establishment of 1326, so the Ockhamists have reached a respectable status amongst us since their work contained the germ of a future revolution in science.

Hampden comes at the last to admit that his simplified version of mediaeval theological circles will not quite fit the facts. He has to abandon the defence of those whom he has earlier called the champions of freedom, and lament that Nominalism was maintained by Ockham rather as a question of Philosophy than of Theology. The gaps in his evidence are never properly accounted for in the Bampton Lectures, and the assured manner covers a multitude of generalisations. Despite some intelligent criticism of the mediaevals Hampden never came to quite close enough grips with his ostensibly subject.

1 Bampton Lectures, II, p 74  
2 Ibid., p 75  
3 Ibid., p 74
Hampden might well have accepted such a criticism with equanimity. He was not primarily concerned with the historical material of the lectures. He was primarily concerned with the situation of theological studies in Oxford amongst his contemporaries. Hence his concentration on matters of freedom. Hampden was always occupied with moral questions, with the nature of action, with the character of right action; and he was concerned with dogmatic questions - what other men might have regarded as the springs and principles of action - only incidentally. To him it was much more important that there should be freedom than that there should be orthodoxy.

At a glance this is an attractive attitude. It has the ring of charity. But Hampden's freedom is in some ways unreal - a freedom that is not exercised within the truth is an odd kind of freedom. Hampden's refusal to dogmatise which seems so modest has much of the aspect of indifference when put into position with events. In this Hampden was unlike Kant who had demanded freedom as a necessary condition for a man's operating his life according to the categorical imperative. The Critique of Pure Reason does not envisage a indifferent attitude to truth; it demands that men should 'do the truth'. I shall come later to remark the difference and likeness of Hampden's epistemology and the theology of the 'relative deity' and the Kantian distinction of phenomenal and noumenal being. Here it is enough to mention that, despite all the difficulties for his own theory of being, Kant
recognised that the idea of freedom involves our being members of
an intelligible world. In this matter, at least, we have an intui-
tion of the noumenal. For HAMPDEN the matter was more simple. For him
action was real and theories just theories. Obviously, therefore, action
has a real priority. In a more radical philosophy this view would have
led inevitably to a situation ethic; in HAMPDEN it was but another:
ground for a proper conventionalism.
A Note on Hampden's description of Aquinas.

Hegel, when he came to speak of the mediaeval scholastics in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, sighed for 'seven-league boots' to cover the tedious thousand years, and when he arrived at Descartes 'after a long and tedious journey' he felt 'like the mariner after a long voyage in a tempestuous sea' hailing the sight of land. Of all the mediaevals only one did Hegel think worth reading in his barabrous Latin - Aquinas. Of Aquinas' Summa Hegel wrote:

In this book there are found, indeed, logical formalities - not, however dialectical subtleties, but fundamental metaphysical thought regarding the whole range of theology and philosophy.

It is amusing to notice how Hampden has almost reversed Hegel's judgements. To Hampden Thomas Aquinas appeared the villain of the mediaeval piece, others of the scholastics sometimes evidenced a concern with important matters and a sane response to them, but Aquinas did not interest of instruct. For the mediaeval men in general Hampden had a kindly curiosity, he dealt with them as with untutored children, but for Aquinas he had a nervous distaste. He regarded Aquinas as the man responsible for the worst excesses of the logical revolution in Christianity. It is precisely because of the metaphysical character of Aquinas' work, so enjoyed by Hegel, that Hampden distrusted him.

1 Trans. Haldane and Simson, III, p 1. 2 Ibid., p 217 3 Ibid., p 71
Hampden's description of Aquinas in the Bampton Lectures is not entirely balanced. He refrains from quoting sentiments like these which can be found in profusion in Aquinas' works:

Si autem vel in modico auctoritate Sacrae Scripturae derogatur, iam nihil fixum in fide nostra esse poterit, quae Sacris Scripturis inmititur

and

Non enim est dicendum circa divina mysteria nisi quod ex sacra Scriptura habetur.

If Hampden supposed these to be incidental or not bearing the weight of Thomistic thought, he should have said, not passed such things in silence. Even the comparison with reformation insights that he makes several times in the Lectures should have taken account of this principle enunciated by Aquinas:

Sola canonica scriptura est regula fidei

and this about the province of philosophy in theological studies:

Haece scientia accepta potest aliquid a philosophicis disciplinis, non quod ex necessitate eis indiget, sed ad maiorem manifestationem eorum quae in hac scientia traduntur. Non enim accipit sua principia ab aliis scientiis, sed immediate ab Deo per revelationem. Et ideo non accipit ab aliis scientiis a superioribus, sed

1 Contra Gentes, IV, c 29
2 Summa Theol. III, xxxv, 4,1.
3 Lectio vi in Ioann. xxi
eis tamquam inferioribus et ancillis, sicut architectonicae utuntur subministrantibus, et civilis militari. Et hoc ipsum quod sic utitur eis, non est propter defectum vel insufficientiam eius, sed propter defectum intellectus nostri, qui ex his quae naturalem rationem, ex qua procedunt aliae scientiae, cognoscuntur, facilius manducitur in ea quae sunt supra rationem, quae in hac scientia traduntur.¹

Reason then is used as a tool, philosophy is totally subordinated to the demands of theology. It would appear that S Thomas' theology is not so mechanical as some of his critics would imply. The unique character of the divine revelation is obviously affirmed in a most explicit manner:

Inititur enim fides nostra revelationi Apostolis et Prophetis factae, qui canonicos libres scripsentur: non autem revelationi, si qua fuit, aliis doctoribus facta.²

There seems little in this to justify Hampden's comment that by the work of S Thomas 'Reason was in effect made supreme over the revealed truth'.³

In fact Hampden's criticism of the thomistic position results from a reading of the Summa Theologica which was

1. Summa Theol. I, 5 ad 2
2. Ibid. I, 8, ad 2.
directed by a prejudice, a prejudice to find in S Thomas evidence for the scholastic misuse, or simply non-use, of scriptural revelation. It is all the more disturbing to find this prejudice in Hampden when one considers the state of mediaeval studies in the Oxford of his time. Hurrell Froude, Newman's intimate friend, read S Thomas, and this was the cause of some friendly chaffing, it was looked upon as an oddity. ¹ Few other men read any of the mediaevals with serious purpose. Hampden therefore was to be congratulated on his attempt to open up the mediaeval theological disputes for his contemporaries and shew how they were related to the present. But it is a little odd to find one who was professedly investigating the unknown approach it with such firm convictions as to what it will produce. If Lord Melbourne really believed that Hampden was opposed because he was introducing novelties,² the Americas of theology, to adapt a phrase of Sir Thomas Browne, then he believed on the testimony of men who knew something of the contemporary state of theology. Thomistic studies were, then, new things, and it behoves the exponent of new things to present a true and unbiased account of the subject. Hampden failed in this. He presented a picture of the mediaeval schools as wholly devoted to curious logistics

² Melbourne to Hampden (cf. Memorials, p 49 for part of the letter offering the Professorship to Hampden).
and of Aquinas as totally uncaring about the realities of Christianity as revealed in Scripture. His quotations from Aquinas were chosen in order to highlight a certain feature at the expense of the full Thomistic pattern of things.

III  Adding the Sanction to Ethics

At the beginning of October 1835 Hampden published the lectures he had given as White’s Professor of Moral Philosophy. They are an accomplished piece of work, more readable than his previous writings, but presenting little difference of tone, and little variation of subject matter, from the Essay and the Bampton. Again he finds a place for an attack upon systematic theology and for the emphasis on the practical nature of revelation:

The Scriptures addressing themselves to men at large and not to the instructed scientific intellect; avoid all statement of scientific principles, and give such directions of conduct as are of immediate practical force and useful application.1 Hampden objects to moral science, not to what he calls ‘scripture-morals’ which are concerned with practical things are are necessary for the ordering of life, though they are not ‘theoretically necessary for the establishment of moral truth’.2 Hampden sometimes seems to be arguing for the establishment of a theory of Moral Law in Nature. This device enables him to suggest an authority behind the Scriptures ‘for the evidence of Revelation refers itself ultimately to our moral ideas’.3

1 The Study of Moral Philosophy, p 8
2 Ibid., p 12
3 Ibid.
Copleston had argued that Aristotelian ethics and the Christian religion were to be thought of as complementary.

Without the sanction of religion the purest system of ethics could be comparatively lifeless and unfruitful; and without ethical instruction religion itself is vapid and even dangerous.\(^1\) and he had maintained that ethics is 'much more included within the province of religion than that of philosophy'.\(^2\)

Hampden often seems to agree with Copleston's views. He makes a fierce attack on the contemporary 'timidity of speculation in ethics'.\(^3\) which is disturbed at the idea of a moral obligation being founded on anything other than the direct revelation of God in Scripture, and refuses to believe that a system of sanctions can work unless used in connection with a belief in reward and punishment in 'a future state of existence'.\(^4\)

In modern times the general advance in science and knowledge has enabled philosophy to escape the authoritarian clutch of theology, and yet paradoxically, men have been backward in the use of that liberty of reason they possess. This Hampden suggests, in an unexpectedly vicious attack on Paley, is why that divine's work on Moral Philosophy has been so successful. Paley had made expediency the criterion

1 Copleston, Reply to the Calumnies, p 178
2 Ibid.
3 Study of Moral Philosophy, pp 14-15
4 Ibid., p 14
of the will of God, and found this criterion declared in Scripture. He had been able to complement Ethics with Religion in a comfortable Christian way which obscured the real problems. Hampden thinks that there is something to be deprecated in the clerical morality of Butler who introduced moral philosophy into his sermons in the Rolls Chapel. Similarly he sees too specifically and limiting a Christian spirit at work in moral philosophy as performed by Cudworth in his debate with Hobbes. Hampden allows Cudworth in his Treatise of Immutable Morality so far as he bases his linkage of morality and Christianity on the fact that idolatrous religions often result in unseemly perversions, and Christianity is generally associated with a pure morality.

However we deceive ourselves if we think that there is an essential connection between faith and morality. We are but entertaining unaware another of those inheritances of Christian attitude which we have received from the scholastic writers. Hampden puts his thoughts on the medieval moralists characteristically and clearly when he writes:

Moral Science shared the same fate as Logic, and all other sciences in that dark period. It was absorbed in the vortex of Theology.

1 Ibid., p 17
2 Ibid., pp 16 and 17.
3 Ibid., p 23
That this is so is evident from the very name of Moral Theology which was given to the science and which is still a subject in the seminaries. Such a name 'sufficiently marks the nature of the speculation as prosecuted by the philosophers of the Schools':

The mediaevals supposed that by referring all things to the divine mind they might obtain a fixed standard of morality; by this means 'a stable basis was given to the distinctions of right and wrong'. Revelation was employed to provide the lacks of a natural law theory. Here, Hampden says, is the beginning of that confusion so evident in the moral treatises of Gudworth and Clarke. These eighteenth seventeenth and eighteenth century divines were simply latter-day mediaevals in moral philosophy.

Hampden himself admits that a moral philosophy which takes no cognisance of natural theology is an incomplete science since 'our moral nature is not contented with itself', but reaches forward to a goodness beyond itself. There is some sense then in which a moral philosophy must be a moral theology. Certainly Hampden thinks it true that ignorance of true morality is a source of unbelief. He gives as an example of this the doctrine of total corruption of men that had been put forward by some of the reformers. Hampden thinks this to be against the known conclusions of our moral science. Any notion of morality depends from the idea of responsibility. The Reformers, dominated by their scholastic training in the Schools,

1 Study of Moral Philosophy, p 23.  
3 Ibid. p 37

2. Ibid.  
4. Ibid. , p 62 of. p 109
were compelled by the theological circumstances within which they worked to consider only the reasonableness of a whole argument, rather than to consider how it fitted with the Christian life. The neglect of moral philosophy resulted in systematic erections of theology when men should have "humbly felt the truth and bowed obedience to it."¹ As with dogmatic theology in the Middle Ages, so with moral philosophy there was nothing to soften down the hard outline of logical deductions."²

Moral philosophy may be thought of as a controlling device so that our obedience to dogmatic theology does not get out of hand. Hampden thinks that when we discover that someone has taken religious principles to their extreme meaning, the fault is not of perverting religious principles but of leaning on religious principles alone. Such people 'leave no room for their own nature to develop itself'³ they convert a comforting gift of God 'into a sublime luxury and a holy pastime.'⁴ He assumes that 'the religious instincts of the heart' were never meant 'to absorb the whole man'.⁵ He thinks of religion and morality as two forces 'sustaining the equilibrium of our nature'⁶ so that we are not carried away into foolishness by 'the conviction of a Supreme, All-

1. Ibid. p.64.
2. Ibid. p.65.
3. Ibid. p.98.
4. Ibid. p.98.
5. Ibid. p.98.
6. Ibid. p.98.
pervading Being' which 'steeps in self-forgetfulness all the faculties of the soul'. Again, he takes an example from the reformation when he castigates 'a belief of our justification by faith separated from natural convictions of duty', and as a converse 'the amiable enthusiasm of Quietism'. Hampden is not contending for a moral theology but for a moral philosophy and a morality religion. As he says later in the lectures, it is necessary to 'abandon the rigour of logical speculation in questions relating to human life'. Moral philosophy admits evidence in a special way and is concerned not with the deduction of 'truth from abstract principles' but the examination of 'whether fact really is'. It is at this point that Hampden introduces the idea of analogy into his demonstration of the nature of moral philosophy.

Hampden builds his moral philosophy on two bases: Experience and Analogy. In Hampden's terminology 'Experience' is the methodical reduction of observed facts to their principles. It is the transformation of raw facts, by means of the senses, into knowledge. 'Analogy' presupposes 'Experience', which it synthesises. By analogy we understand the way in which an experiential principle derived from one set of facts can be applied to another set of facts. Statements are either of observables or analogical relations of observables. The way to a moral view can be:

1. Study of Moral Philosophy, p 99
2. Ibid., pp 101-2
3. Ibid., p 102
4. Ibid., p 174
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., p 176
dangerous. We must beware of a too hasty assumption that an analogy exists. We must not speak in analogical terms before the observed facts warrant it. It must be kept in mind that at every point the argument depends upon Hampden's view of analogical predication and not on the more disciplined concept of the classical theologians. At this point there is in Hampden's system a connection between moral philosophy and natural theology.

The medieval theologians had rejoiced in a connection between metaphysics and natural theology. By their concentration on the meaning of the Good, the Christian writers had endeavoured to seize "the ultimate object of the moral sentiments"\(^1\). They confounded practical human morality with attempts to define the nature of Goodness itself, in order to deduce from it, as the one universal principle, the particular rules of good conduct.\(^2\) The older moral philosophers had confused speculative with practical matters. Hampden thinks that if this confounding had been avoided lots of questions would have been seen to concern not theologians but moralists.

A better method is to begin with the moral strivings of men to Good, rather than with deductions we make on from Good. This method is

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1 Study of Philosophy, p 212
2 Ibid.
seen in the analogy of Butler. Butler takes the moral principles that the world offers and conceives them expanded to their perfection and glory in the more immediate presence of the great Moral Governor of the world.\footnote{Ibid. p.221.} This is where the two principles of Experience and Analogy combine; observation and illumination towards God is the work of moral philosophy, and so it is moral philosophy which provides the true foundation for a natural theology.

At this point Hampden makes one of the important observations of his whole method of theological enquiry. Since natural theology has been shewn to depend not on metaphysics but on moral philosophy, and since we cannot suppose that supernatural revelation is different in kind from natural knowledge of God, there is evidently a close connection between the practice of revealed religion and morality. It is not at all evident that there is a connection between supernatural religion and dogmatic or metaphysical principles. Just as Butler had argued that when we consider the evidence for religion we should not demand evidence strong enough to convince the understanding but merely strong enough to encourage and discipline that temper of mind which the very investigation of the evidences supposes, so Hampden argues that all theology must be attuned to moral persuasions and not to logical conclusions:

As a moral subject, it demands to be appreciated
by a moral power

Since we are to assume no principles, but to rely on the evidence of physical observations to provide the moral persuasion, (as Butler himself noted) the new theology will be much more open to criticism than the scholastic method which is tight shut upon itself. The method of Experience and Analogy is open to cavil from either side. The experience of men is not uniform. Men are not likely to agree always on the method of applying their experience. This makes theology a very difficult subject. But, and this is perhaps its greatest virtue as a theory, Hampden's method makes historical criticism of previous theologians much simpler. Nothing remains to claim an uninvestigated orthodoxy. It becomes possible to introduce a relativity of historical circumstance into the discussion of previously accepted dogmatic pronouncements.

When the older theologians were talking about the matter and method of theology they were discussing theology as if it were a science related to metaphysics. They misunderstood not only the nature of theology but also the nature of their own minds as they worked on the theological postulates. They vainly argued towards unattainable absolute expressions of the truth. This is demonstrable from the history of dogmatic formulae in various Confessions. He takes the

1 Study of Moral Philosophy, p236
acknowledged fact of an impetus to definition from a heretical proposition to mean not only that the orthodox statements of the faith are denials of unorthodox statements but are also simply different conclusions by way of experience and analogy:

The opinions of Arius and Athanasius, for instance, are to be understood with reference to the speculations then afloat;¹

neither have, for us now, with our different experience, any absolute value. Nor, in their own time, was it right to think that they had such an absolute value. Even if the experience was similar the analogy drawn by Arius was different to that drawn by Athanasius, so both were mere 'opinions.' All differences being subjective, (since they depend on these two principles of true theology) there can be no possibility of anathema. Intolerance, an evil to be avoided at all costs, is thus the product of the mistake of thinking metaphysics connected with theology when really the connection is between morality and theology:

When Our Lord prescribed a method for knowing the Divine truth of his doctrine, he did not send the disciple to the scribes and doctors of the law; he appealed to the practical teachings of each man's heart.²

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1. Ibid. 245.
2. Ibid. p.274.
Thus Hampden comes to the same conclusion from his study of the nature of moral philosophy, as he did from his study of the philosophical evidence for Christianity, and as he did from his study of the history of theological debate; the conclusion that a latitudinarian theology is the only possible one for a true Christian.
IV. Christian Formularies and Dissent

Hampden's work is directed to seek all the main subjects of theological discussion. He attempts to place in a coherence, though obviously not in a system, the witness to God that is present in nature and in scripture, and to show the fundamental agreement of that witness. Further than this, he makes large efforts to destroy the presumptions of human artificers, and to render the proud boast of definition and limitation of the things of God patently absurd. He thinks it possible to perform this useful operation by means of a critical examination of the capacities of our languages to express reality in an adequate manner. All this is directed towards the final goal of a tolerant attitude in the midst of theological controversy. His theologising is moralistic in that it is concerned with action rather than with belief, and in that it is itself an action of tolerance. These traits are to be discovered in Hampden's whole work, but I will say something now of their presence in his notion of tradition in the Christian community.

In March 1839, Hampden delivered a lecture in the Divinity School which he directed against the excessive theory of Tradition found in the writings of other Oxford men. He was determined to walk in the way 'marked out by the Reformation' which had been trodden for 'nearly three centuries' with so much truth and so much freedom. These are his virtues, he will have nothing to do with the muddling of opponents by

1 A lecture on Tradition, 1839, p 1
professorial censure, — indeed, the power of censure had been taken from him a year after his appointment.

Hampden began by noticing the strangeness of the contemporary state of the discussion. The position of tradition in religion, its value and its weakness, seemed to him to have been settled long ago. He suspects any tampering with the Reformation settlement, and now men are "debating a fundamental principle of the Reformation itself."\(^1\)

It is odd that after nearly three centuries of happy experience of a Church-system established on the basis of Scripture-authority, we should be enquiring into the Authority due to Tradition in the Church of God, and wrangling about boundary lines which it was one great business of the Reformation to ascertain and fix.\(^2\)

It seems a little strange, too, that Hampden, having declared his love of freedom and truth, should seek to enforce a three-century old decision, strange too, that while declining to think much of Tradition he should be so pained at the questioning of the traditional reformation view.

He recognises, however, the importance of the matter in question. It is one on which a great division of opinion once was made between Protestants and Catholics. And now it

\(^1\) Ibid. p.5. 
\(^2\) Ibid. p.5.
seems to him that this division is to be denied. The party that is most busily working among us: ¹ is attempting to shew that the Roman theory of Tradition is one that the Protestant Anglican Church holds. He is disturbed that we find the subject of Tradition now so studiously brought into notice, and elaborate arguments drawn from the stores of ancient controversy, adduced to prove the traditional derivation of the doctrines of the Church, or the insufficiency of Scripture for salvation, until its treasures have been unlocked by the key of a supposed Divine Tradition of Doctrines and Interpretations and Rites.²

Hampden is not anxious to throw away tradition as of no value at all; he is, on the contrary, most conscious of its value in the practical living of the Church, but he cannot allow that, independently of Scripture, it makes a divine demand of our obedience.

He makes the necessary statement of his position almost at the beginning of his lectures:

Whilst therefore I fully receive all the information which ecclesiastical antiquity can impart, as most valuable evidence of the truths of the Gospel, I deny to it the prerogative which belongs

1. Ibid. p. 7.
2. Ibid. p. 7-8.
to Scripture alone of revealing to me what I am
religiously bound to believe.\(^1\)

He receives Tradition as 'confirmation — and most im-
portant confirmation — of what I am bound to believe as
taught by Scripture.'\(^2\) He will not abandon himself to
Tradition as if it were the 'primary authentic revelation'\(^3\)
of God.

Hampden realises that this is opposed to the doctrine
of tradition and scripture that Hawkins had proposed in his
famous sermon in 1819. He is aware that that theory was
gaining adherents all the time, that 'Tradition is the
primary source of Doctrine, and Scripture its confirmation.'
This is the theme of a passage in Newman's first book, The
Arians of the Fourth Century:

Surely the Sacred Volume was never intended, and
is not adapted to teach us our creed; However
certain it is that we can prove our creed from it,
when once it has been taught us, and in spite of
individual producible exceptions to the rule.\(^4\)

Here again the idea of tradition teaching and Scripture
proving, is set forth as the true economy of revelation, the
true purpose of God. This is the scheme it is suggested that

1. Ibid. p.9.
2. Ibid. p.9.
3. Ibid. p.9.
has been proved in history; in the records of the Church and of heresy alike it is borne out:

From the very first, the rule has been, as a matter of fact, that the Church should teach the truth, and then should appeal to the Scriptures in vindication of its own teaching. And from the first it has been the error of heretics to neglect the information thus provided for them, and to attempt of themselves a work to which they are unequal, the eliciting a systematic doctrine from the scattered notices of truth which Scripture contains.¹

Hampden presents the argument that the Bible is its own witness, that the revelation in Scripture demands of itself the obedience that men give it; that any further witness—such as Tradition might be allowed to be—is unnecessary. The Bible can 'speak its own divine instructions to the heart and understanding of its devout reader.'² And the reader will not need the human traditions, the human Church to help him: 'though it would be folly and arrogance in any of us to whom helps are afforded, to despise those helps, who can deny to the pious searcher into Scripture, that blessing which God's word itself has attached to the work?'³ To say that

1. Ibid. p.50.
2. Lecture on Tradition. p.21.
3. Ibid. p.20.
tradition is necessary for the understanding of Scripture would appear to Hampden to suggest that scriptural revelation was like natural revelation, hidden in obscurations - and this he would never allow:

'After all, it must be acknowledged that the Bible speaks plainly enough as to all the fundamentals of salvation.'

Tradition deals only in those things not necessary for salvation, those added beauties of Christianity. Hampden makes a comparison between the natural and scriptural sources of our knowledge of God which brings out his meaning fairly:

As Natural Religion probably was derived from an original Revelation, so probably the tradition of Gospel-truths owes itself, so far as it is pure and sound, to the Scripture revelation as its original. The tradition of the Gospel would probably have been lost or obscured, or perverted, just as that of Natural Religion has been, had not the Bible existed, as the great original and standing corrective of the aberration and obscurities of the tradition of the Gospel. History, indeed, as strongly evidences the latter fact, as it does the former.

Tradition must be curbed and bridled by Scripture. The difference between them is that while Tradition is controlled

1. Ibid. p.20.
2. Ibid. pp.21-22.
by the 'succession of time itself' and is bound by finite categories, Scripture has that 'everlasting present which, as it belongs to Eternity itself, belongs analogously to the one standing record of the Divine counsels'. The shifting forms of tradition must be fixed by the hard realities of Scripture:

The voice of Scripture will fix for you what is the true tradition whether it be a doctrine or a comment about which you are in doubt.

This is a notion of great attractiveness, but one which which Hampden does not develop so that there is little justification in considering its present possibilities.

Hampden has to deal with the difficulty that there are a great many men who profess to accept the revelation of the Scriptures and yet who do not agree one with another or with him. If the words of the Bible are 'refined for our immediate use' it would appear impossible for those who read them humbly to disagree. Hampden having said that the Bible is 'readily available to all' cannot be dogmatic. He must accommodate himself to dissensions, must accept them and find a way of justifying their existence.

1 Lecture on Tradition p 22
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid., p 24
V Practical Toleration

The whole theory of language and its capabilities which Hampden elaborated tends towards a practical toleration of diverse formularies in the Christian Church since it reduces any formulary to a relative status from its confessional absolutist position. I do not wish at this point to enter upon a critique of Hampden's theory of language, I want merely to stress that it is precisely adapted to a free toleration amongst Christians. Hampden, holding such a view of language, must certainly be a man in favour of any motion which presented a way of decreasing the influence of those elements in our religious life which were in favour of dogmatic rigidity. He must, on his account of our language, be a man committed to a broad church toleration within a Protestant ethos.

I do not intend to give a large attention to the practical aspects of Hampden's proposals for the admission of dissenters to Oxford but rather to make use of his pamphlet as a reminder of his general theological manner. Hampden said in his sub-title that his little work had 'particular reference to the use of religious tests in the University'. In her collection of Newman's letters Anne Mosley described Hampden's occasional pamphlet, and Newman's response to it, as the

1 Observations on Religious Dissent, 1834
"beginning of hostilities in the University." 1 Certainly the letter she prints from Newman to Hampden about this pamphlet shews what an effect it had on Newman on the instant of publication:

The kindness which has led to your presenting me with your pamphlet encourages me to hope that you will forgive me, if I take the opportunity it affords to express to you my very sincere and deep regret that it has been published. 2 Newman thought it tended to 'formal Socinianism' and hinted that if Hampden wanted a war he would not lack opponents.

Hampden wrote back:

I do not intend to enter into any personal controversy on the subject. But I shall be quite ready to hear any arguments that may be alleged against my positions. 3

So the struggle began.

Hampden's pamphlet is just the sort of thing one would expect from the author of the Bampton Lectures of 1832. T. Mozley says that Newman 'had looked into' 4 the Bampton lectures; if that is so, Newman must have realised how the theories of the Bamptons were being applied in the pamphlet. Hampden himself says at the beginning of the Observations

2. Ibid. p.77.
3. Copied into Newman's copy of the pamphlet.
that he is going to review 'the bearing which conclusions or inferences of doctrine from the text of Scripture have on the development of religious truth'\textsuperscript{1} This is evidently the Bampton Lectures in: Little. So, also, when his broad patronage of the doctrines of the Arians and Sabellians is remembered, is this ecumenical remark:

For what is dissent in Religion, but difference of opinions arising out of the different conclusions drawn by different minds out of the same elements of Scripture\textsuperscript{2}

Hampden says that there is nothing unusual in men suggesting that our dissensions come from the unruly passions of men, 'the wayward inclinations of human nature'; this is not unusual and it has something of truth in it; but it is, Hampden thinks, rather a superficial view. The real foundations of our theological and confessional differences are the confusions of theological and moral opinions with religious truth. Men erect opinions about religious truth into dogmatic articles of faith. This judgement on his Oxford contemporaries and their attitudes is very like his judgement on the mediaeval theologians who, he argued, elevated mere abstractions to the place of reality. In his Bampton Lectures he maintained the continued prevalence of such follies. In the Observations he writes:

We introduce theories of the Divine being and attributes - theories of human nature and of

1 Observations on Religious Dissent, p 3. 2 Ibid., p 4 3 Ibid., p 7
the universe - principles drawn from the various branches of human philosophy.¹

So we create a 'dogmatical and sententious wisdom' which has nothing to do with 'the wisdom that is from above.' Nor is it simply the use of human terminology that Hampden distrusts. He objects also to the policy advocated, with a similar object to that of Hampden in view, by Hey in his Divinity Lectures - the conduct of theologising by means of scriptural expressions alone.² Hampden realises that a dexterous use of texts might result in as human a system as the one he is trying to abrogate. His whole endeavour is directed against theological conclusions, for when made, these tend to assume an importance equal to that of the scriptural facts. He will allow moral conclusions about right conduct, for these are not straitened into fixed terminology, but intellectual conclusions are always working against 'the simple faith'.³


2. It is interesting to see Pope Gregory IX advocating something similar to the proposal of Hey; at least the Pope was perturbed by the growth of scholastic jargon. In a letter to the University of Paris in 1228 he wrote:

   quidam apud vos spiritu vanitatis ut uter distenti pesitos a patribus terminos prophana transgredi non solum est temerarium, sed prophanum, ad doctrinam philosophicam naturalium inclinando, ad ostentationem scientie, non profectum aliquem auditorum; ut sic videantur non thedocti, sed theologi, sed potius theophanti.


That the Scriptures are not meant for such a purpose as the systematisers and dogmatists aver he thinks evident from the historical nature of the scriptural narrative which is linked so closely with events that it is only capable of giving us now a general moral guidance. Scripture speaks through history but the history is too thick for us to bear very much. Events teach, but only how to behave in that eventful world; the revelation of God is 'exclusively of a practical nature.' How dissensions are obviously impractical, they prevent the prosperity of Christian teaching, they cannot, therefore, be according to the will of God. Hampden is content with the utilitarian argument for Christian Unity — that the 'others' will be the more readily impressed by the fact of Christians working together. He does not use the theological argument — that dissension is a denial of the work of our redemption, and a refusal to help in the building up of the Body of Christ. Practical reasons are enough for him to be convinced that we must sacrifice our doctrinal opinions and join together. His famous apostrophe to the Unitarians occurs at this point. He refuses to deny the name of Christian to those who deny the divinity of Christ. Opinions cannot separate.

All that Newman considered to be middle-headed is displayed in Hampden's Observations, and he was profoundly shocked by this:

When I look at the reception by the Unitarians

1 Observations on Dissent, p 13
2 Ibid., pp 20-21
both of the Old and the New Testament. I cannot for my part, strongly as I dislike their theology, deny to those who acknowledge this basis of divine facts the name of Christian.\footnote{Observations on Religious Dissent, with particular reference to the use of Religious tests in the University. p.19}

Hampden was always in danger of lapsing into indifferentism, since he believed that the dogmas of religion are merely 'theological' and have no support from any but 'human authorities'.\footnote{Bampton Lectures, p 375.} He severely limited the relevance of theology.

The task of the theologian is to attempt the setting of all parts of God's revelation together in harmony. Newman, as much as Hampden, would say that any departure from the facts of revelation must inevitably lead to a barren science. The difference that exists between their concepts of theology is the refusal of Hampden and the acceptance by Newman of a distinction between indulging a curious spirit in the things of God, and working to find the unity of revelation within a measured discipline. For Newman theology is a progressive science, it must progress since we can never exhaust the content of the revelation we have received:

... a very many-sided fact, multiform, fertile, productive fact. Such extraordinary facts make a deep impression on the minds of those who come across them, which impression may be called the subjective idea of them - but from the vastness,
richness, etc., no individual mind more than partially embraces it; thus it makes a different impression or idea on different minds - the same indeed, but incomplete and therein different - also arranging differently and making different parts the most important.¹

Theologians differ, but the revelation that they expound remains the same, and if they are good theologians, their differences will be of emphasis and not of fact. Hampden saw the differences but could not see how unity was to be brought about except by throwing away the differences. His theory of knowledge did not help him here. On the contrary, it made him suspect even his own ideas. He considered we know only our adaptations of things, and he is honest enough to see that another man's adaptation may be as good as his own. He is scarcely able to dispute with a man who is sincere in his belief because Hampden himself relies rather on his sincerity than on any doctrine:

Other communions are not necessarily in error or heresy, because we hold them to be so; but viewing their opinions as erroneous, we must guard against them as feeling that we ourselves should be heretical or profane, if we should change and adopt such opinions.²

As Newman rather caustically remarked on this passage, Hampden seems to make heretical opinions dangerous to no one except those who do not hold them.\(^1\) It might well have been of Hampden that Newman was thinking when he wrote in the Grammar of Assent:

> Great numbers of men must be considered to pass through life with neither doubt, nor, on the other hand, certitude (as I have used the words) on the most important propositions which can occupy their minds, but with only a simple assent, that is, an assent which they barely recognise, or bring home to their consciousness or reflect upon, as being assent. Such an assent is all that religious Protestants commonly have to show, who believe nevertheless with their whole hearts the contents of Scripture.\(^2\)

It was not evident to Newman that 'all religious truth is to be found in a number of works, however sacred, which were written at different times, and did not always form one book.'\(^3\) This he thought 'a doctrine very hard to prove'; to Hampden it did not seem to require proof. Hampden was utterly opposed to the intrusion of theology into religion; he considered it an abuse of Scripture to deduce doctrines at all:

The collection of scriptural expressions into one body of statement amounts to a human exposition of the doctrine.\(^1\)

Once the human element has entered into religion Hampden is shy and feels unsafe; the selection of texts to prove a doctrine seems to him a dangerous exercise. Others might do it to support their opinions, he would rather not; 'an artificial construction is given to them, which they have not in the Scripture itself.'\(^2\)

At the end of his Bampton Lectures Hampden attempted to shew how his conclusions affected the contemporary conduct of theology. A technical statement of the revealed truth necessarily involves a great deal of human workings, involves the reduction of truth to a form laid down by human theory. The propensity to lay down human formulations of the revealed facts was not confined to the mediaeval theologians. He now asks 'how far are all human formularies of faith to be admitted' and in this question is involved another: 'on what ground should we admit a formulary?'\(^3\)

To Hampden the question is not so subtle as that for which he had elaborated the doctrine of analogy. He thought it merely a matter of discovering 'where the certainty of Divine fact ceases, and the probability of Opinion takes its rise, in matters of Religious belief and conduct.'\(^4\)

2. Ibid.
sure that some generally agreed line could be drawn, frontier-like, between the revelation of God and its immediate consequences on one side, and the more removed theological deductions on the other; thus Christian peace would be achieved. Hampden argues that if there is to be unity, as there is to be unity, men must abandon their intransigence. To argue against this is to argue oneself unChristian.

In a pamphlet dealing with practical matters one might expect that such practical difficulties would be taken into account as are bound to arise when the abolition of religious tests is suggested. But Hampden cannot conceive of a sane Christian man not accepting his suggestions.

The design is an ambitious one. How, above all, are the meanings of 'immediate' and 'remote' to be defined in actual cases? To learn his answer at this point, Hampden refers his reader to the Bampton Lectures where in the last of the series he presents a general theory of theological activity and its proper conduct. He asks and attempts to answer the question 'how far are all human formulae of faith to be admitted; and what is the ground on which they rest their pretension to be received by the Scriptural Christian?'

We are, Hampden argues, still unhappily dominated by the false authoritarianism and the temptation to self assertion that he had from

1 Bampton Lectures, VIII, pp 349-50
the first maintained to be the spur to scholasticism. The more tenacious we are of particular doctrines, the more we demonstrate 'the compromise of principles'\(^1\) which the mature scholastic theology displays:

It is ratiocination that triumphs; and Logic domineers over Theology.\(^2\)

'In the Scripture itself there are no doctrines'\(^3\) and 'Dogmas of Theology as such are human authorities.'\(^4\) They have their uses, certainly, but they are not so important as to justify a man taking his stand and refusing to enter into communion with another man who did not hold the same doctrines. And the best use of dogmatic theology is in the denial of heretical corruptions of the scriptural revelation, not in an affirmation of consequences. So too, the present formulations of doctrine in creeds and articles must be recognised as a series of negatives attempting 'to exclude others more obviously injurious to the simplicity of the Faith.'\(^5\) To insist on positive formulation 'whether as employed by our Reformers, or the primitive believers'\(^6\) is a perversion of the dogmatic nature. We may well admit that the Creeds 'as records of opinion'\(^7\) are really valuable. But they can readily be

1. Bampton Lectures, VIII. p.373.
2. Ibid. p.373.
3. Ibid. p.374.
4. Ibid. p.375.
5. Ibid. p.378.
6. Ibid. p.379.
7. Ibid. p.381.
improved upon; we can set out a 'more perfect adaptation to the
existing circumstances of the Church at different periods'¹
We must beware of cleaving tenaciously not to God but to out-
mode systems, to doctrines which the contemporary state of
knowledge: entirely supersedes². If we do not throw over the
past, we are like a feudal baron in his castle 'imagining himself
safe amidst his walls, against assaults from modern inventions in
the art of war'³

And yet, for all his bravura writing, and his tilting
at dogmatic pretensions among the ecclesiastics, Hampden is forced
by his own reiterated emphasis on the primal authority of the
Scripture-fact to make a statement of theological purpose which he
appears to set out for us entirely unconscious of its irony:

The problem before the Dogmatic Theologian is to
preserve that agreement (on Scripture-fact) entire;
to guard it from a latitudinarianism which would
virtually annul it; and to prevent its dissolution
by innovators, either within or without the religious
society.⁴

It is patently obvious that Hampden is expressing his fear that
the following of his policy might make away with all doctrine, he is

¹ Hammond Lectures, VIII, p 361.
² Ibid., p 382
³ Ibid., p 383
⁴ Ibid.
anxious to defend himself from the charge of rashly putting away doctrines which follow immediately from the scriptural revelation. His defence is almost a moral one. He does not dispute the theological question, which is concerned with whether or no a doctrine does actually arise from the evidence of scripture. This he passes. What interests him is the question as to whether a doctrine is 'such as ought to have been deduced'. But when he approaches the revelation in this manner he seems to be perilously near to becoming as selective a theologian as those he so regrets.

Refusing to select he becomes extraordinarily vulnerable. His attitude is parodied with great skill in Chapter IX of Loss and Gain in the character of Dr Brownside, 'Dean of Nottingham, and sometime Huntingdonian Professor of Divinity' who preaches on reason in religion, and argued that

though the Athanasian Creed was good for us, it did not follow that it was good for our neighbours; rather that what seemed the very reverse might suit others better, might be their mode of expressing the same truths

Condemnation is impossible and Brownside concluded with:

one word in favour of Nestorius, two for Abelard, three for Luther, 'that great mind' as he worded

1. Ibid. p 353.
it, 'who saw that Churches, creeds, rites, persons, were nought in religion, and that the inward spirit, faith' as he himself expressed it, 'was all in all'; and with a hint that nothing would go well in the University till this great principle was so far admitted, that they should—not, indeed, give up their own distinctive formularies, no, but consider their direct contraries equally pleasing to the divine Author of Christianity. ¹

¹ Loss and Gain, p. 61.
VI The Character and Function of Theology

In this section I want to say something about two major aspects of Hampden's consideration of theology and its practice. Firstly, I mean to consider the effect of Hampden's evaluation of natural theology on the whole structure of theology, the inter-relation of the various ways of speaking about God, particularly the relation of natural theology with speculative and dogmatic theology.

Secondly, I hope by the introduction of some material from the writings of Newman, to show the differences between Hampden and other contemporary theologians. I have chosen to work from Newman material for two reasons. He is the most distinguished opponent that Hampden ever confronted, and therefore the one who presents most effectively the opposite view from that of Hampden, and Newman is a theologian who makes so many distinctive and important contributions to the discussion of the topics in which Hampden was himself interested that he is worth in our context at least a cursory presentation for his own sake.

It must be evident by now that one of the main concerns in Hampden's theological writings, and this whatever the ostensible subject before him, was to extend as far as possible the dominion of the categories employed in natural science to the field of
dogmatic theology as well as that of natural theology. That is, he assumes that the logical order of theological inquiry is derived from the foundation of the structure in the establishment of God's existence by natural reason. The movement of theology should be from the evidence of created being as to God's being, to the available adjectival description of God in Scripture. Revelation becomes for Hampden a matter of a more complete shewing forth of the characteristics of the God whose being is shewn forth in nature. One cannot know what Scripture is talking about unless one has established the being of the subject of that talk. This, it must be stressed, is the logical structure of theology according to Hampden. He nowhere suggests that this logic is followed in experience of the living God. But if we are to have theology as a distinct science then we must be prepared to admit that the logical structure is set up thus. All theology, therefore, derives from natural theology. This has something of the scholastic methodology about it, though it would be inaccurate to suggest that any of the more distinguished mediaeval theologians and logicians held quite such a view. The natural theology of the thirteenth century schools was concerned with ordering the known and derivable characteristics of the God who is revealed as creator of
heaven and earth. They were not so much concerned with the logical as the real order. No mediaeval, perhaps no man ever, set out to prove the existence of God unless he first believed in God.

There is a further difference which is more important than the positioning of the logical structure of theology, though it derives from Hampden's peculiar methodology. The natural theology on whose competence the rational discussion of the data of revelation is made to depend by Hampden, provides only such information as could be provided by any natural inquiry. That is, the God arrived at by natural theology is essentially a God whose status is as secure as any result of natural science, as the conclusions of physics or biology. Natural theology conclusions are on a level with heliocentricity or evolution. We shall go on using such hypotheses without a constant reference to their hypothetical character - we use them because they save the appearances but we use them as expedients. We are prepared to tinker with them if evidence arrives which conflicts somehow with the general theory. We even must be prepared for the unlikely demand to sacrifice the whole theory. It is not impossible that a natural science hypothesis should be found to conflict radically with things as they are later seen.
Hampden conveys this hypothetical expedient and relative value into natural theology conclusions first of all. The methodology decides the status of the result. The existence of God can be demonstrated but only within the relative order of human science. Hampden goes further than this. He makes his most original and most devastating contribution to nineteenth century theology at this point in the argument.

Hampden accepts the general notion that when revelation occurs it is revelation of a God whose reality is already accepted. God speaks to his people, to those who already know that he is. But Hampden attributes the acceptance of God's being, by a society if not by any one individual in that society, to the already accomplished successful prosecution of natural theology procedures. The major point here is that it is acceptance of a relative deity - natural theology cannot present a relative deity concept for acceptance. We cannot get further than our evidence.

From this it follows that all the adjectival operations of revelation are predicated of a relative deity, and therefore share the fundamental relativity of the natural theology structure. For Hampden, therefore, all theology is relative and has no right to claim an absolute quality.
The difference, therefore, between Hampden and many another theologian who accepts the inadequacy of theological terminology for the expression of the truth of God is a complex and fundamental one. Hampden diverges from other theologians on the most important aspects of scriptural and systematic theology. He advances a new position concerned with the value of revelation and the status of absolutist dogmatic statements raised upon revelation. Most theologians are ready enough to admit a value for theology which is nothing more than that of a temporary expedient, of a device which we must employ until we know even as we are known. Most theologians would agree with Hampden that God is not solely to be approached through the medium of natural-theology processes. The God who makes himself known in Scripture and in the Incarnate Word, does not, most would agree, wait upon our theodicy of demonstration and proof before he makes himself known. God speaks to men, and they become aware of his personal effective presence amongst them. Natural theology is an attempt to produce a rational demonstration of the credibility of such a personal revelation, but it decidedly is not the ground or motive of such a belief.

Most would say this, but Hampden has taken the inadequacy of human words about God to justify the dogmatic assumption that all we know of God is vitiated by phenomenological conventionalism. Hampden
has assumed, and it must be clear that there is nothing inherently juvenile about such an assumption, that our knowledge and our capacity for expression have a one to one correspondence. That which we know we can speak of.
That which we can speak of we know. We can say as much as, but only as much as, we know of the being of God. The poverty of our expression of the divine reality is a true indication of the poverty of our knowledge.

It thus becomes clearer how it is that Hampden differs from most speculative theologians. He regards the workings of theology as elaborations of natural enquiry, there is nothing importantly different from natural theology results in the words of revelation. He supposes that the acknowledged inadequacy of our language when confronted with the transcendent reality of God imposes its own and identical limitations on our knowledge of that reality. This is vastly different from the view of Newman, say. Newman, writing of the doctrine of the Trinity and the efforts of our theological formulae to encompass the truth they express, says of our language:

Three, One, He, God, Father, Son, Spirit - are none of them words peculiar to theology, have all a popular
and are used according to that obvious and popular meaning when introduced into the Catholic dogma. No human words indeed are worthy of the Supreme Being, none are adequate; but we have no other words to use but human, and those in question are among the simplest and most intelligible that are to be found in the language.¹

There is an open recognition here of the distinction between the expressed and the expression, and Newman goes on to say some pages later in the Grammar of Assent:

a general principle.... holds good in all such real apprehension as is possible to us, of God and His Attributes. Not only do we see him at best in shadows, but we cannot bring even those shadows together for they flit to and fro, and are never present to us at once... exercises of reasoning indeed do but increase and harmonize our notional apprehension of the dogma, but they add little to the luminousness and vital force with which its separate propositions come home to our imagination, and if they are necessary, as they certainly are, they are necessary not so much for faith, as against unbelief.²

¹ Grammar of Assent, p 127. ² Ibid. pp 131-2
This is written with something of Hampden's air. It asserts a real difference between words and things, between God and theology. But it is not the Hampden difference that Newman is admitting. For Hampden the difference is between what we can say and what is the case, for Newman the difference is between what we can say and what we realise to be the case. For Hampden the limits are set by language, for Newman only the limits of expression not of understanding, knowing or believing, are set by language. He wrote in 1877:

Revelation is not of words......I may have a new truth, e.g. the doctrine of induction, or the wealth of nations, etc., conveyed to my intelligence by one set of words, then by another, then by a third - and I may get the idea simply into my mind, independent of any one sentence of all that has been said to me. And, then, when called upon I may enunciate the doctrine, the very same same doctrine, but again and afresh in my own words, and not in those which were used to teach it to me, and again on another occasion in a second set of words, or a third on another. Here there is an idea communicated, not indeed except through words, but not in dependence on any formulas. Such is the nature of that communication
to the Apostles of truth, which is called Revelation. It may be given also in formulas, as 'the Father is God', 'the Son is God', 'the Holy Ghost is God' — 'There is one God!', — but this is not necessary for the Revelation.

For Hampden the words are primary, they are all we have got and we can know nothing that we cannot say. For Newman the words are secondary or tertiary, they lag behind both the thing and our apprehension of the thing. Revelation is not a communication of words but a communion of reality, a personal experience of God within the community of his friends. Newman certainly suggests that our notional concept of God differs from our real assent to Him, but the difference derives from a difference of function not from an inherent inadequacy of one, the theological expression, to do the work of the other, the real experience of God's love. Newman does not expect theology to have a one to one correspondence with our living faith. Hampden thinks that there must be some such correspondence and since our theology is such a poor thing our experience must be a poor thing too.

1 A note pasted inside the cover of Newman's copy of the first edition of the Essay on Development used in 1877 in the preparation of the third edition.
Newman's view is that our experience is a vital thing and we only recognise the poorness of language (a poorness to be acknowledged but not despised) because of the richness of the experience we know ourselves to have. Revelation makes a real difference. God opens out that which we could not know without him, and which we know despite the little power of words.

The concepts and notions of rational theology are designed, in Newman's view, to explain the commitment of belief, so far as it is explicable. They 'work' because they translate action and belief into argument. They suffer something but no more than is usual in ventures of this kind - say a love-sonnet or a sports commentary - in the translation from inadequacy of expression. They are to be relied upon not as approximations which 'will do' but as proper expressions of what is expressible. Words fit the work we expect them to perform. We do not expect them to be substitutes for the total experience. Hampden seems to make unreasonable demands of words, supposing that they ought to do duty for experience, he is not convinced that they do not so stand duty and therefore thinks that the whole experience is contained in the words. This leads him to conclude that the experience itself is a shadowy thing.
And, of course, our present experience is a shadowy thing. We would all agree that the difference between our hopes and our possessions is enormous. We do not know as we are known. We do not possess heaven here and now except under signs and images. Some of these signs are effective in making present to us the activity of Christ. Even so they do not appear more than signs. Hampden's way with words prepares the reader for short shrift for signs. Signs are only signs. The signified is not present. Hampden's turn of mind allows no place for a developed sacramental theology, and similarly he has nothing to say about eschatology and its relation to history and present events. Just as words showed how little we know, so signs shew Hampden how little we have. While many theologians might make such a point, few would leave the question there; most would go on to shew how much we have in expectation and hope. Newman, for example, acknowledges the shadowy nature of our present state but looks forward to the event when he will move

ex umbris et imaginibus in veritatem

as he put it in his self-chosen memorial inscription. But

1 Decided upon February 13, 1881
even this proposition of hope he thought might savour too much of scepticism. He was sensitive to the exaggerated use of arguments about in adequate signs, he knew the kind of thing that Hampden would have meant by such a sentiment. He wrote in his notebook about this tablet inscription:

it must not be if persons to whom I should defer thought it sceptic al.

Newman would never have lent his support to a suggestion that we do not have truth now. This would have been to sacrifice the dogmatic aspect of Christianity. He wrote in the Apologia:

I have changed in many things, in this I have not.
From the age of fifteen, dogma has been the fundamental principle of my religion; I know no other religion;
I cannot enter into the idea of any other sort of religion; religion, as a mere sentiment, is to me a dream and a mockery.

1 Newman need not have worried about this. Aquinas commenting on Hebrews 10, Summa Theol.II,CI,Art.II,4, has just such a sentiment, and no one would suppose that Aquinas, for all his realisation of his work being 'as straw' before the wonder of God, would have indulged in dogmatic scepticism.

Similarly S Austin, Lect.IV Septuagesima, calls Eden the umbra vitae.

2 Apologia, p 49
Newman considered it one of the basic principles of the Christian religion that it should be absolutely dogmatic, and that the particular dogmas should be conveyed through the use of words. He set out in the Development of Doctrine nine principles of Christian life, and the first he set down was

The principle of dogma, that is, supernatural truths irrevocably committed to human language, imperfect because it is human, but definitive and necessary because given from above.¹

From this it follows that Newman has a high idea of the place of theology in the Christian scheme of things. As the third principle, after the principle of Faith, he put:

Faith being an act of the intellect, opens a way for inquiry, comparison and inference, that is, for science in religion, in subservience to itself; this is the principle of theology.²

There is obviously here a belief in Christian-ity as a given, as describable, as incarnational. Words may be of little use in conveying our understanding of the whole truth of God, but they are of great use in conveying particular aspects of that

¹ Development of Dogma, c.VII, section 1,1,4,1 (p325)
² Ibid. 3(p325)
understanding:

theological science, being thus the exercise of the intellect upon the premiss of revelation, is though not directly devotional, at once natural, excellent and necessary. It is natural, because the intellect is one of our highest faculties; excellent, because it is our duty to use our faculty to the full; necessary, because unless we apply our intellect to revealed truth rightly, others will exercise their minds upon it wrongly.

Theological propositions are correlatives to the general notion of orthodoxy. Orthodoxy is an impossible notion, it has no real application, unless the propositions delineate the truth to which our assent is demanded. Truth does demand our assent and words are our means of submitting to the demands of truth. Propositions, though not quite obviously part of the kerygma, are in a real sense the fulfilment of the command to 'teach all nations'. Unless someone preach, uses words, delineates, theologises, the men who are to hear and understand and commit themselves to the truth of Christ will never come to know him. Newman believed that words could convey truth, and that credal and conciliar pronouncements did so convey this truth. In this he was unlike Hampden.

1 Grammar of Assent, p 147.
CRITIQUE
Hampden's theology is eclectic. It is successfully eclectic, assimilating the material involved. There is, therefore little purpose in the tracing of sources and influences. However a consideration of one facet of Kant's work does help in the understanding of Hampden's theologising. Something of the meaning and significance of Hampden's notion of the relative deity is brought out by a comparison with the kind of thing Kant was saying about the distinction between the 'noumenal' and the 'phenomenal' in connection with the natural sciences, the distinction between things in themselves and things as they are perceived.

I have no intention of mounting a developed criticism of the Kantian position. I want to suggest merely some parallels with Hampden's thesis concerning our knowledge of things. I will say nothing directly evaluative about Kant's epistemology. Kant is sometimes supposed to have been sceptical simply, and to have destroyed the foundations of natural science by taking away the basis of the claim to know things as they are. It is certainly true that Kant acknowledges a debt to Hume:

> I freely confess that it was the thought of David Hume which many years ago first interrupted my dogmatic slumber and gave an entirely new direction to my inquiries in the field of speculative philosophy, but Kant proposed entirely other conclusions than those of

1 Prolegomena, I 83, forward.
Hume. Kant is not a total sceptic, he is sceptical simply about one method of relating our knowledge to objects. He agreed with Hume that it was fundamentally impossible to derive absolute necessity from empirical data, but Kant did believe that we could still make valid statements about necessity in the physical world. For example, we could with assurance say that every event is caused. This, evidently, is not a principle which could be derived from experience of every event; it is something known in advance of events, known, that is, a priori. Kant could not, therefore, admit that our knowledge is simply our intelligent recognition of things as they are in the present nor that it is a matrix of deductions from our recognition of things as they have been. In this situation Kant refused to sink into a sceptical slumber, he proposed a view of the relation between things in themselves and our knowledge of things which he thought would satisfy the criticism of Hume while maintaining the possibility of necessity-statements in connection with physical objects:

Hitherto it has been assumed that all our knowledge must conform to objects. But all attempts to ascertain anything about them a priori by concepts, and thus to extend our knowledge, came to nothing on this assumption. Let us try, then, whether we may not make better progress in the tasks of metaphysics if we assume that objects must conform to our knowledge. This at all events accords better with the possibility which we are seeking, namely of a knowledge of
objects a priori, which would determine something about
them before they are given to us. ¹

Kent hoped that he might at once revolutionise our way of
thinking about metaphysics (and about natural theology,
consequently), and preserve the content of metaphysics. He
aptly likened his revolution to that of Copernicus in astronomy
and cosmology. Kent, like Copernicus, produced a thesis which
accounts as well for the observables as any other previous
thesis, and, further, gives a position and explication for new
observations previously uncoordinated. As Copernicus was able
to set in order both our impression of the sun's movement (an
impression which remains in the heliocentric as well as the
gocentric system) and for the phenomena he had observed to
demand a heliocentric system, so Kant accounted for empirical
reality (which is still observable whether the mind conforms to
it, or it to the mind) and for our a priori knowledge.

It must be immediately made clear that there was never the
intention in Kent's mind to produce a theory which would permit
of reduction to any form of idealism. Our knowledge of empirical
reality is a real knowledge of real things and events; we do
not devise things from the ideas rising in our imaginations.
God has created real things and means men to know them really.

But at the same time Kant is raising the question of how we
know reality, and admitting the necessary condition of our
receptivity, our capacity to know only in certain ways; things

¹Critique of Pure Reason, Second edition, XVI
are known, and only thus known, according to the a priori conditions natural to the subject's powers of cognition. The knower with his natural sensibility (Sinnlichkeit) and understanding (Verstand), conditions and conforms things, making them knowable.

The object of our knowing is the object itself. Kant never questions this, but he affirms that it is the object precisely under the condition of a known object. The nature of the a priori conditions depends on the nature of the knowing subject. In this sense they are subjective, but they cannot be termed subjective in any other sense since they are the only way for us to have knowledge of things. We cannot get behind them and so they are immune to our categorisation. We are not passive in knowing. We subject objects to conditions of being known. For example, we subject objects and events to the interpretation we refer to as cause and effect, and, further, to causal necessity. That which is subjected is the noumenal, the thing in itself; the noumenal as subjected, as knowable, is the phenomenal. They are distinct but not unconnected.

It was to be expected that Kant's hypothesis about noumenal and phenomenal being should have maximum importance in the philosophy of science. After all it was the evidence of mathematics and physics which first suggested the theory to him, and the pattern of astronomical history helped him to work out his theory. The scepticism of Hume was directed against the Newtonian confidence of natural science. Kant was convinced
that Newtonian physics was perfectly correct, that is, that things are constructed upon basically Newtonian lines. Hume had explained science as a psychological phenomenon. He suggested that we have a natural tendency to believe in and invent a uniformity of nature, a capacity in nature to be subdivided and ordered, and an equal belief in our human powers of categorisation. This was the comfortable doctrine behind modern science, and it was maintained because it worked (as long as one did not question the basic humanist, anthropocentric principles). Kant wanted to save the appearances, but to do so by establishing necessity in nature and its formulation in necessary laws.

Since Hume seemed to Kant to be in the right of things when he rejected empirical induction, Kant supposed that nature—that is, the whole range of beings, individual and inter-related, and capable of being experienced both as separate beings and as a whole complex of being—is conformable to the general a priori conditions of our experiencing an object. We can know certain truths, without fear of their contradiction being possible.

It is on these truths that Newtonian explanation of the universe is founded. Kant has to admit, therefore, that the world may not be Newtonian, but he affirms that while this is a logically possible and speculatively curious suggestion, it can in fact be ruled out as far as our knowledge of the world is concerned. Kant gave up any attempt to reach behind our
knowledge. He adopted *a priori* categories because he understood that science could not work with *a posteriori* concepts only.

Despite the famous remark about the star-strewn heavens above us, Kant did not accept the traditional arguments of theology, which he summarised as inferring the attributes and existence of an author of the world from the constitution of the world and the order and unity observable in it,¹ and which he described as a 'completely fruitless'² attempt. It is remarkable, however, that Kant did accept a natural theology derived from moral imperatives. This is very near the kind of thing that Newman was saying about the primacy of conscience and the evidence it gives of an author of man's moral being. Kant thought that our catalogueing of nature by various physical laws, however valid such a system might be within physical science, did not warrant our arguing further to God as the author of the laws, but the laws of morality do not merely presuppose the existence of a supreme being, but postulate it with right (though only, of course, from the practical point of view) as these laws are themselves absolutely necessary in another relation.³

Kant admitted that once we had come to a moral recognition of God we might very well construct a legitimate and rational

¹ *Critique of Pure Reason*, Second edition, 660
² Ibid, 664
³ Ibid, 662
This is, of course, like all descriptions of what Kant was doing, a 'rationally reconstructed' Kant, but it will do for the purpose of making a comparison with Hampden's view of natural science. Hampden certainly seems to have understood what Kant was saying in his theodicy discussion. I do not suggest that Hampden had read Kant, and there is no evidence that he was acquainted with Kant's theories. It is, however, useful, I think, to present Kantian speculations for they show how the rather vague remarks of Hampden would look if they were developed into something like a system. Hampden's mind was engaged on much the same problem as was Kant's and Hampden seems to have an obscure realisation of the Kantian solution.
II

Confronted by embattled dogmatics Hampden introduced the notion of the 'relative deity'. Natural theology is so evidently tied to and conditioned by our perception of the empirical universe, its relative character and tentative condition are so immediately obvious, it is well nigh impossible for a sensitive man to mistake the nature of its arguments and conclusions for a dogmatic absolutist procedure. Hampden is well enough aware, however, that theologians often are not content with the modest claim of conventionalist, phenomenal value, for their theologising on dogmatic subjects. Beyond the scope of theodicy, they attempt the transcendental and make absolutist claims. Like Kant, Hampden refuses to make any assay beyond the phenomenal evidence. But there the likeness ends. Hampden is content with approximations in description of reality as long as reality itself is preserved inviolate. He has a proper sense of the honour of God.

Kant had guaranteed certainty at the expense of reality in natural science, and had properly transferred these limiting conditions to natural theology discussions. Hampden admitted the value, in such spheres, of this moderation of value, but at the same time he realised that the phenomenal limitations will not do duty when we claim to speak of God as he is. Traditional theologising in a sense depends on our possessing a capacity for the noumenal. This capacity is precisely what Hampden
queried. The interest of Hampden's thinking about this point is that it reveals a man struggling to erect a theology of the traditional kind without the traditional foundation. Hampden was confronted with the question as to whether or no we could ever have a theology in the dogmatic absolutist sense. He contemplated the situation of contemporary theology without being sure as to his answer. He wanted but could not honestly admit a knowledge of God as he is. He was disturbed by the claim to know even as we are known while we are yet in via. Obviously if it were possible to know God, as it were, noumenally, than it would be possible to make absolute statements about God and to adopt perfectly logical, coherent, consistent procedures leading to a systematised theology graduated from our realisation of revelation in created being towards our knowledge of God in heaven. If such a system were to be erected it would of necessity be adapted to maintenance of orthodoxy. That is, it would be possible to use the system as a norm, to judge the rightness of ideas against its standard, and to proclaim as heretical those ideas which shewed warped against the normal line.

Once he has made the claim to know, the dogmatic theologian will automatically begin heresy proceedings; he will inevitably indulge a righteous intolerance. He will, in Hampden's opinion, forsake the manifest intention of Christ that we should live in a kingdom of peace, and worrit out deviations from the orthodox statement. A high value will be put upon credal formulations, and a higher value on a particular understanding of the credal
formulations. All this will doubtless be done from motives difficult to impugn, but the defence of truth must be done with charity, and Hampden would not be prepared to allow that the insistence on such an orthodoxy - an orthodoxy referable to human statements - is a Christian activity. Hampden is much more concerned with Christianity as a morality than as a doctrine. At the same time he is dogmatic theologian enough to assert that if there is to be any theologising at all we must begin with the affirmation of the uniqueness of God. The uniqueness of God is the cause of his refusal to accept Kant's dichotomy as a simple answer to every problem. When we speak of God Hampden would have us realise that we speak of the only being, the only person, whose reality is greater than our certainty.

Those who want to be assured that God is the supreme reality for other men ought to be satisfied, says Hampden, by the knowledge that other men make a faithful committal to him. The error of the orthodox, what makes it a dangerous phenomenon in the Christian community, is that a demand is made for certainty in description. This is true of the orthodox assessment of their own religion, in that confessional formulae are continually being drawn up, and in their assessment of other men's religion, in that continually men are asked to sign, swear and recant.

Hampden has thus upturned the Kantian remarks about phenomenal beings; he had admitted that the dogmatic absolutist theologians have an absolute subject for their theologising, but at the same
time he has asserted their total inadequacy (because of their total humanity) to dogmatise about this absolute subject. God has taken precedence over theology. This is no small achievement, and however Hampden's theology may appear strange and inadequate in all kinds of matters, it does at least make the one essential theological affirmation of God.

At the same time Hampden makes the second necessary affirmation of man. He refuses to credit the claims of knowing God as he is. Man can only know God through human terms. This is the basic affirmation behind Hampden's misunderstanding of analogy and its use in theology. Analogy is whittled down in his system to a rough hewn comparison; the element of correspondence is removed. Most sensible men will have had moments, at least, in which this does seem to be the proper view of analogical thinking. The purist use of analogy seems to most of us at some time, far too ambitious a proposal, and we rate theology according to its power of vivifying images of God. I think that this is a direct consequence of the affirmation of God's uniqueness.

If we take half a dozen marbles and range them in a row, and then write out a description of the marbles in order, it is not a difficult task to describe them accurately enough that another person can take the marbles and reconstruct the row in order. If on the other hand we take only one marble and describe it as carefully as we can and then throw it back into a barrel with thousands of other marbles, all different, the task of finding
it among the rest is probably impossible. If, thirdly, we try to describe one marble in isolation from all the rest, and to do so adequately, we may well go on for ever and yet not exhaust its characteristics. This is a model, I would suggest, of the statements Hampden set out when considering our words about God.

It is easy enough to think about God when we compare him with a comparatively small number of other things; when we call him Father, or Friend, or describe him as loving or powerful. At this point we are implicitly comparing him with men who are thus, or have these qualities in their human measure. But if we set about a description of God so as to rule out other beings, or to describe him in himself, we find ourselves employing words which by their very function and definition cannot be comparatives, and which convey very little to us; words like 'unique', 'infinite', or even 'ground of being'. These words are doubtless correct, but their meaning comes perilously near to nothing. Hampden maintains that God is unique, infinite, and so on, and therefore these comparisons do not set up a one to one correspondence when used of him and creatures. He is also saying that analogies of the kind 'a pumpkin's existence is to a pumpkin, as God's existence is to God', have no real content. What we have got by the revelation given to us in Scripture of God as Father, Friend, Light and Life, is a capacity to commit ourselves to God through images. The images, especially those given us in Scripture, present us with a real understanding of God but not a cognitive understanding of God as he is.

Images, however, are valuable in theology only as long as they are
seen as images. Thus the credal image of light, like that of a relay race being passed from man to man, lumen de lumine, is useful as an image but is useless as a dogmatic statement. Hampden would never give a real status to the image. It is this perhaps which accounts for his inability to form a coherent account of the sacraments and their place in the divine economy of redemption. The idea of the image and the reality being one, of the sign being effective, of the action being at once of the Christian and of Christ appeared to him to be a confusion of distinct orders. Images are simply images. Things are things.

Hampden, therefore, approves the image-theology and its scriptural emphasis, but refuses to allow that scriptural patterns can be formulated within dogmatic limitations. Some images are certainly better than others, and those hallowed by tradition are to be revered more than others, and to be used more than others, but no image can demand committal from the Christian. No theologian can require that any other theologian accept his system of images in order to deserve the name of Christian. He is a traditionalist in everything except the traditional evaluation of theology and of the orthodoxy that theology represents.

We have, under Hampden's aegis, to acknowledge all our statements to be emotive, and inevitably moralistic, since the emotive response is to operate in the sphere of action rather than in the sphere of intellect. All our statements are to
be seen as relative, phenomenal, and therefore though inevitable (not quite in the Kantian sense, but in the sense that we must have some theology in order to give a context to the image) not ineluctable. We may well change them. We cannot anathemise any word about God because we can never know, in this life at any rate, that his reality is thus and thus in itself. Since we do not have reality it is simply a moral panic to assert dogmatically that such and such is the case. This is a moral failure to acknowledge the reality of God which confronts us whenever we try to circumscribe it. We can never substitute certainty for reality.

This much is attractive and it may well be that the malice of heresy hunting is often greater than that of heresy. The large moral concern of Hampden's theology is sympathetic. But it is also a mite too drastic.

When Hampden says that none of our words will quite do for God, he cannot of course rouse opposition in any but the most scholastic breast. And when he says that all our words will not do, he is at one with the great theologians of the 'via negativa' - the kind of thing one discovers in such as writer as the pseudo-Dionysius. And though this often seems to me rather too intellectualist a manner for Christian theology, it is at least understandable. But Hampden goes further, at all events in theory. A contemporary summary of his views, as they appeared to an unsympathetic certainly, but not unqualified theologian - is contained in this paragraph of Newman:
(Hampden) considers that the only belief necessary for a Christian, as such, is belief that the Scripture is the word of God; that no statement whatever, even though correctly deduced from the text of Scripture, is part of the revelation; that no right conclusions about theological truth can be drawn from Scripture; that Scripture itself is a mere record of historical facts; that it contains no dogmatic statements, such as those about the Trinity, Incarnation, Atonement, Justification, &c; that theological statements though natural and unavoidable, are in all cases but human opinions; that even the juxtaposition of the actual sentences of Scripture is a human deduction...... that the Articles of the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds are merely human opinions, scholastic, allowing of change, unwarranteble when imposed, and in fact, the produce of a mistaken philosophy; and that the Apostles' Creed is defensible only when considered as a record of historical facts.

In many ways this is a fair conclusion from some of the things Hampden is saying:

No conclusions of human reasoning, however correctly deduced, however logically sound, are properly religious truths, or such as strictly and necessarily belong to human salvation through Christ.\(^1\)

I shall only briefly touch here on a fundamental characteristic of the Christian Scriptures, which totally precludes

\(^1\) Observations, p 8.
all deductions of speculative conclusions concerning religious truth

Strictly to speak, in Scripture itself there are no doctrines. Dogmas of Theology then as such, are human authorities

'The wisdom that is from above' is at once 'pure' and 'gentle'. Surely it has no resemblance to that dogmatical and sententious wisdom which theological controversy has created.

There is enough here to hang him, I suppose. But it is worth remarking that Hampden can be shown to be writing in all the passages quoted, for a particular audience. He is not writing for the people of the parish pew. His parochial sermons have a very different tone. He is writing for those who have dedicated themselves to the prosecution of theology and who are in danger, he thinks, of finding in the technicalities and formulations of that science a substitute for the truth of Christ. Thus in commenting on such theologians' exegesis of S. Paul's epistles he writes:

1 Observations, p 13

2 Hampton Lectures, p 374

3 Ibid. p 375

4 Observations, p 8
I appeal, from the logical criticism of the Apostle's words to their apostolical spirit, from Paul philosophising to Paul preaching and entreating, and persuading. And I ask whether it is likely that an Apostle would have adapted the form of an epistolary communication for imparting mysterious propositions to disciples with whom he enjoyed the opportunity of personal intercourse; and to whom he had already declared the whole counsel of God; whether in preaching Christ he would have used a method of communicating truth, which implies some scientific application of language, an analysis at least of propositions into their terms, in order to its being rightly understood? 1

He was concerned with Christ and careful not to confuse the experience of Christ and committal to him with the delights of clever talk about him. When he spoke from the pulpit he was concerned to give them the traditional faith and to encourage their awakening to the truths expressed in the credal statements. This was not a contradiction it was simply an attention to his hearers; he presented the necessary and balancing view of the Christian truth to scholastic and academic persons on the one hand and to busy trading persons on the other.

However that may be, there yet remains the uncomfortable tone of the remarks about speculative theology even in its scriptural form. While Hampden asserts the uniqueness of God he equally asserts the common quality of our words about God.

1 Hampton Lectures, p 374
He allows as a basis for theologising only a 'relative deity'. This is a conventionalist concept. It opens the way for experiment, analysis and exploration but nor for final and certain conclusions. No question can have the closure applied to it within this frame of argument; no formula or creed can be accepted as definitive. This is not the same as declaring that any formula of religion, any credal statement may be patient of development, as our understanding of truth grows. It is quite simply saying that no formula can get any nearer to reality than the relative concepts. That we are bound by the relativity of our perception.

Hampden gives a metaphysical status to the insufficiency of language that we are so often forced to admit in our everyday communication. The distinction between absolute and relative receives added point when God is the subject of our attempts to communicate. Hampden does not seem quite to decide whether the difference between our talk of material objects and our talk of God is one of degree or kind. After all even the realist who knows nothing of the distinction between noumena and phenomena will assert a difference between what we can say univocally of things and of God. So one would expect Hampden to suggest a difference peculiar to his situation. This he does not do. He seems to say that while we cannot speak noumenally of things this does not much matter in practice since things will go on in their relatively unimportant way however we speak of them.
We have only to speak consistently of things for our speaking to be adequate. When we are speaking of God we must recognise our relativity explicitly because we speak of more important matters and must be more precise. So that while we can have only a relative knowledge of both saucepans and God, we can speak without too much care of saucepans but must qualify our talk of God as being of a 'relative deity'. There is evidently here a favourable ground for a misunderstanding of the mechanics of analogical predication - such a misunderstanding is certainly present in Hampden's work, as I have suggested earlier. Certainly to some contemporary critics Hampden appeared to speak only as if our knowledge of God and therefore our manner of talking to him, differed from our knowledge of natural objects and our manner of talking of them in degree not in kind. Thus Pusey thought that the very idea of a 'relative deity' was a naturalistic concept admitting only of a degree difference. He quoted Hampden's early work on the Philosophical Evidence for Christianity as an example of the way in which perfectly orthodox vocabulary suffered a sea change and led into heresy. To Pusey the idea of a 'relative deity' conveyed the notion of our knowing God only as he reveals himself related to us, acting towards us. Pusey takes it for granted, without need of proof, that we can know God as he is. He quotes Hampden thus:

It is still a relative Deity, whom it (Christianity) reveals to us, when we learn that there are three persons in the Unity of the Godhead; for it is only from being enabled to behold God in the new distinct relations of a
Redeemer and Sanctifier superadded to that in which we naturally regard him as our Father in heaven, that we are led to the confession of the co-equal Godhead of the Son and of the Holy Ghost.

and he comments on this:

The mystery of the Holy Trinity is here explicitly resolved into the mere modes of relation of God to man; whence he consistently infers, that our knowledge from Revelation is 'different in degree, but the same in kind' with that which we have by nature.

Leaving to one side the obvious travesty of Hampden’s remarks about our talk of the Trinity into a statement about the being of the mystery and its resolution, it is sad not to be able to check on Pusey’s quotation about degree. He gives no references and I have not been able to find it. But then several of Pusey’s quotations have varied from the text when I have checked them.

However Hampden seems to work mainly as if our knowledge of God and of talking about him were of a kind with our talk of everything else, but of a degree different. Having established the noumenal/phenomenal dichotomy he regards it as of no practical interest in connection with things like saucepans and uses it only in theology. This allows him to ignore the dichotomy’s relevance to things and so to ignore the question of kind or degree differentiation.

What is the task of theology in such circumstance? It is

1 Philosophical Evidence, p22-3

2 Dr. Hampden’s Statements and the Thirty-Nine Articles compared. Oxford, 1835, p xx.
something like Locke's view of his philosophical task - clearing away the dead wood of previous muddled thinking. If the limiting condition of our knowledge is accepted we can set in order the concepts we have of the relationship between man and God. That is, we can construct a coherent pattern of what God has done 'relative' to ourselves.

It is at once apparent that this is a master-stroke. It opens out the possibility of a really scriptural theology which will be concerned not with the arid certainties of metaphysics but with the enlivening challenge of the acts of God. The impulse which gave us the scriptural account of God derives from just such a realisation of the God who acts. God shews himself in the Exodus and the Resurrection. In the written Word of God we are told of the Word made flesh. Men are to respond to these acts and words, to act as men of God and to write of him for other men. All this is the Christian pattern. This is what Hampden would at first appear to be demanding in the nineteenth century Christian theologian. There is much in his writing which places a proper emphasis on the word of God as of a different kind from the words of men:

There can be no rational doubt that man is in a degraded disadvantageous condition, that Jesus Christ came into the world in the mercy of God to produce a restoration of man, that he brought life and immortality to light by His coming, that he died on the cross for our sins, and rose again for our justification, that the Holy Ghost came by
his promise to abide with His Church, miraculously assisting the Apostles in the first institution of it, and ever since that period interceding with the hearts of believers. These and other truths connected with them are not collected merely from the texts or sentences of Scripture, they are parts of its records. Infinite theories may be raised upon them; but these theories, whether true or false, leave the facts where they were.¹

Dogmas of Theology then, as such, are human authorities. But do I mean to say by this, that they are unimportant to religion, or that they are essentially wrong, foreign to true religion, and inconsistent with it? I wish rather to establish their importance and proper truth, as distinct from the honour and verity of the simple Divine Word.²

We then proceed to contend for these unrevealed representations of the wisdom of God, as if it were that very wisdom as it stands forth confessed in His own living oracle.³

All this shows a proper understanding of the place of Scripture in the economy of salvation, and such an understanding comes out

¹Bampton Lectures, p390.
²Ibid. p 375.
³Observations, p 8.
plainly in his parochial sermons, but in his academic work the scriptural affirmation has disappointing results.

When Hampden speaks of our knowledge of a 'relative deity' he does not generally appear to be launching into a theology of scriptural revelation at all. He is simply acknowledging the partial usefulness of such terms as 'infinite', 'unique' or 'trinity', or 'transcendental'. This is not very exciting and has in fact already been achieved more scientifically, though no more excitingly, by the theologians of analogy. Hampden therefore to a large extent misses the fulness of his own intuition. He remains content to clear the undergrowth rather than enter new territory.
The earlier parallel from the history of natural science may help again in the explication of Hampden's limited enterprise. When the sixteenth and seventeenth century churchmen began to realise what the revolution in science was that was going on around them, and to sense that there would be a clash between their own exegetical understanding of revelation, and the scientists' understanding of God's created world, they attempted to persuade the astronomers to be content with a conventionalist vocabulary. They suggested that the scientists should continue their hypotheses merely as hypotheses, as ways of making calculations with greater ease than before. As Dr. Lakatos once remarked to me 'Giordano Bruno refused the offer, Galileo accepted it; that is why Bruno was burnt and Galileo wasn't'. It is possible in natural science, and indeed in theology also, to have a way of speaking which we do not so revere and cherish as not to be able to change it. There is no need in astronomy or theology to commit ourselves irrevocably to any particular formulation of the truth we have received. Evidently Hampden would grant this immediately, but an absolutist theologian, given certain safeguards that revelation was not regarded as changeable, would also be able to accept the notion.

Certainly the ordinary worshipper in the parochial setting would quite simply accept the reformability of formulae. It is evident that much of our public worship, and
this in whatever communion of Christians we act, expresses our attitude of praise and petition, without in the rite saying anything to which each worshipper would give unhesitating and unqualified assent. The rite, the forms, are secondary to the attitude which they are meant to convey and encourage. That many Christians go on repeating 'dead phrases' does not mean that these same Christians do not have a 'lively faith'. It means simply that the rite is not fully expressive of the faith.

Berkeley had hoped to take the met from under physical science and to leave from the three ways of knowledge open to man, revelation, experience and ratiocination, only the first impregnable. Hampden has no such itch to attack. He wants to remind theologians that they are in the same case as the scientists; theologians are human and share the human situation. To Hampden the theological speculations which have survived the process of examination through a long history, have not certainty but probability. Not the probability of the calculus, but the probability of approximation to fit expression. A good example of his position can be found in his attitude towards the Athanasian Creed:

If it be admitted that the notions on which their (the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds) several expressions are founded, are both unphilosophical and unscriptural; it must be remembered, that they do not impress those notions on the faith of the Christian, as matters of
affirmative belief. They use only the terms of ancient theories of philosophy, theories current in the schools at the time when they were written, to exclude others more obviously injurious to the simplicity of the Faith.

One fact is clear through all this labyrinth of variations which theological creeds have exhibited; that there is some extraordinary communication concerning the Divine Being, in those Scriptural notices of God which have called forth the curiosity of thinking men of all ages. To me it matters little what opinion on the subject has been prior, has been advocated by the shrewdest wit or deepest learning, has been most popular, most extensive in its reception. All differences of this kind belong to the history of the human mind, as much as to theology, and affect not the broad basement of fact on which the manifold forms of speculation have taken their rise. The only ancient only catholic truth is the scriptural fact.

On such passages Newman commented:

It will be seen... that Dr. H. considers the doctrine of the Trinity as held by himself, to be but one out of the infinite theories which might be formed from the facts of the Scripture revelation.

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and on these passages Pusey wrote:

All knowledge, then, of God, out of the narrow bounds of this our earth, is excluded; we know nothing of Him, save as acting in some way to ourselves. God is to us, as to the Athenians, 'an unknown God'.

There is something of a right judgment here, but it is obviously impossible for such theologians to be without exaggeration and bias when writing of a thinker like Hampden. Hampden accepts the Athanasian Creed, but not quite as Newman and Pusey accept it. For Hampden it is an approximation to the knowable truth, but no more than an approximation. We cannot properly on such a basis anathematise those who are unable to accept this approximation. Hampden believes that the whole value of theological statements, such as those in Christology, or those on the nature of the Church, toleration and ecumenical activity, depends on the primal fact of the relativity of our knowledge of reality. In other words, Hampden saves reality at the expense of certainty. He thus reverses the Kantian dichotomy.

Such a reversal has its parallel in natural science. Newton, after all, is not totally accepted now as providing certainty in physical theory; the theory of relativity (significantly enough named) has supplanted some of his ideas. On the other hand Newton is not totally discredited. So too with the work of past theologians and the formulators of credal

\[\text{Dr. Hampden's Theological Statements.}\]
statements. They made proper attempts to say things of God at their time. It is not that they were totally wrong but that they were not called upon to deal with modern conditions and therefore are naturally inadequate to our present purposes. This is not an attack but simply a statement of fact.

The full conventionalist framework is not accepted by Hampden. His rejection is made on the basis of a recognition that total conventionalism, that is, a full acceptance of one way of talking, would defeat the contention since it would erect such a partial way of talking in an absolute. To erect the Athanasian Creed into a position like that of Euclidean axioms would be to imprison Christianity as effectively as geometry was imprisoned for centuries. So Hampden would like to have conventions but to have them only when they are recognised as conventions, and therefore to have them on the understanding, that they can be reviewed and changed when occasion warrants, and that no one is to be forced into the acceptance of a convention – such as the XXXIX Articles – as if it were an absolute truth:

Pious opinions, indeed, we may form; it is hardly possible practically to avoid exercising the mind in reasoning and speculating on the given truths of Scripture. Such indeed are the doctrinal statements of our Articles. I wish there were less dogmatism in them.¹

¹Observations, p 14.
One thing which follows from the adaptation of conventionalist techniques is that the results will not be radical. This can be seen in the natural sciences as well as in theology. The most prominent characteristic of those like Bellarmine or Poincare, Duhem or Bohr, who practice conventionalism is a committal to the principles of continuity. They are never the ones to propose radical change in the structure of discussion. Small adaptations here and there, tinkering and manipulating, are common enough in such theories but not a wholesale renewal of terms and methods. Conventionalist devices are usually employed to accommodate partial refutations of a theory, or to simplify some aspect of its organisation. A recent example of this might be the redefinition of 'revolution' in Marxist thought when the Hungarian revolution of 1956 shewed that the principle 'revolutions do not take place in socialised countries' needed the addition of 'but counter-revolutions can occur'. Perhaps the conventionalist principle of continuity is at work in the definition of 'bishop' in a number of Christian communities today. Programmes of aggiornamento are often set up in the same spirit. The urgency with which many Roman Catholics view the necessity for a declaration of infallibility of the whole people of God and of the General Council of the Church is of a similar order since it will not deny papal infallibility but certainly revalue the papal position. So Hampden's theologising does not
radically alter the common structure; it simply places a
different value on most parts of the structure. This is one
main reason why it was so upsetting to the champions of
absolutist, dogmatist orthodoxy.

The deep-rooted conservatism which reigns in any of
Hampden's anti-dogmatist impulses is well exemplified in his
discussion of the XXXIX Articles, to which he was required to
give his assent, both as an ordained minister and as professor
of theology. Hampden had no difficulty in understanding the
Articles in his own sense, but he did sometimes feel that their
wording should be regarded as unalterable as the laws of Medes
and Persians; however he was moderate enough even in his holding
of this view:

I do not presume to say that alteration is actually
required. I am merely addressing myself to the general
question, as to the capacity of improvement in Church
Creeds and Articles, with the view of suggesting a right
theory of the subject. To deny the essential variableness
of such documents, is to admit an human authority to a
parity with the authority of Inspiration.¹

Probably the significant word here is 'theory'. Hampden was
above all a man interested in what we have come to call
'practical Christianity'. He was a moralist, and he saw in
dogmatic theology an opposition to things as they are and a
preoccupation with things as they should be. This he regarded
as mere 'theorising' and so to be opposed on theoretical grounds

¹ Bampton Lectures, p 381.
simply to silence opposition on its own terms. But really this was not the important thing. The important things of Christianity were to be found in the sphere of action. This attitude was extremely galling to his opponents who conceived that they were battling for the most important things in life. Not only were they told that they were wrong but also that they were wrong on unimportant matters. It was equally disturbing that Hampden was so unconcerned with the responsibilities of dogmatic theology that he was willing to say almost any orthodox phrase if it would help keep the peace. There was no way for his opponents to charge him with heresy because he never made heretical remarks clearly enough. His work is shot through with perfectly orthodox theology - even from the most absolute theologians' point of view. The effect that this had on the debate and Hampden's opponents' estimate of his position will become clearer later.

Hampden was prepared to accept the Articles as the best that could be offered in a difficult situation:

To exclude theological opinion from religious profession, to endeavour to sweep away the accumulation of ages, would be but the vain attempt suddenly to change the face of the world. Our next best alternative is to modify it, to correct its improper application, and so to obviate its mischievous effects. In truth, I say, it ought not to exist...¹

¹ Observations, p 21.
What Hampden wanted was to remove any irritating exclusive clause which prevented 'practical Christians' from accepting the formula. If this were achieved the Articles would be more in accord with the Church of England whose faith they were meant to express:

I love and admire the Church of England, because I conceive it to be constituted on the right basis of religious communion; neither dogmatic in spirit, though the wording of its formularies may often carry the sound of dogmatism.

The Anglican Church, Hampden supposes, has always known how to interpret her own formularies so that they do not bear that harshness of tone and intolerance of spirit which formularies elsewhere possess. Thus in treating of the sacraments and what the Articles and Catechism say of them, Hampden shews how in fact the Church of England has not felt itself confined by its definitions:

The definition, indeed, given in the Catechism of the Church of England, is exactly what the Scholastic theory suggests; so far, at least, as the language of it characterises the nature of a sacrament. It is the subsequent application of this definition, that the Church of England has modified and improved on the fundamental idea of the Scholastic doctrine, whilst the idea itself is preserved, as being part of the very

\[1\text{Observations, p 22.}\]
Thus Article XXV:

Sacraments ordained of Christ be not only badges or tokens of Christian men's profession, but rather they be certain sure witnesses and effectual signs of grace and God's good will towards us, by which he doth work invisibly in us, and doth not only quicken but also strengthen and confirm our faith in him.

is admitted by Hampden to have been founded, in its formulation, on a kind of scholasticism which he characterises, not entirely accurately I think, as:

the application of the Passion of Christ to the healing of the soul, a collection of remedial measures by which its languor and infirmities may be relieved and strengthened. The Incarnation of Christ is regarded as the primary efficient cause of health to the soul: dispensed by the several sacraments as the instrumental and secondary causes.

but the Article, he suggests can be perfectly properly understood as resting:

on the simple fact of the Divine Ordinance, appointing certain external rites as essential parts of Divine Service on the part of man, available to the blessing of the receiver.

1*Hampden Lectures*, p 313.
2Ibid. p 311. 3Ibid.
The Article wording about 'effectual' influence and activity is seen by Hampden to derive from 'the general belief in magic in the early ages of the Church'. It is not surprising, therefore that, whether or no such interpretation and its method is permissible, Hampden found no difficulty in accepting the Articles as a declaration of confessional faith. If their wording simply disguised a proper reading of scriptural revelation then it was possible to accept the revelation and work towards the changing of the wording. Indeed Hampden at one point suggests that the wording itself may be accepted as relatively well putting across the scriptural meaning:

I think everyone who has watched the progress of his mind in theological studies, will confess to this fact in his own case; his difficulties in admitting the Articles have gradually diminished; he has seen, more and more, the reasons of them. For my part, I declare such to have been the result on my own mind, and far from experiencing any objection to the Articles from an increased acquaintance with them by the prosecution of theological study, I have found my disposition to receive them increase from this very circumstance, that I see more fully the reasons of the statements contained in them.1

It is difficult to accept the generalisation that 'everyone' will confess to a growing case of acceptance of the Articles. Newman, for example, found it more and more difficult to understand the Articles in what he thought an orthodox sense, 1Postscript to Observations, p 9.
and was at last shut out of the Anglican communion because he had so struggled to understand the Articles in his sense that they were not recognisable to other men. However at least this makes somewhat clearer how it was that Hampden could protest his orthodox innocence while maintaining a theology so unlike that of his contemporary Anglicans. While it is conceivable that Hampden would sound a sympathetic note in many theologians' ears today, when many writers have a less rigid notion of what orthodoxy entails, it is staggering to consider the effect of such theologising on the general body of clerical and Anglican opinion in the early nineteenth century. It was only Hampden's conventionalism and its resultant continuity principle that allowed him to speak such things in a way not horrific to most members of his communion. Hampden spoke in terms common to all theologians, it took more than a cursory glance to detect a difference of meaning behind the comfortable phrases.

Those who did detect the difference were fierce against him early in the century, but as the nineteenth century moved on the difference became more acceptable, so that now we find it hard to understand why out and out opposition was so forthcoming in the Anglican communion to a man of Hampden's opinions. There is a fine example of this change coming about in Gladstone's letter to Hampden, twenty-four years after the great controversy: Gladstone writes suddenly to Hampden, now bishop of Hereford,
just after the proceedings in the Council of King's College, London, against F.D. Maurice. The Council, of which Gladstone was a member, passed against Gladstone's advice a declaration which he described as 'couched in general terms which did not really declare the point of imputed guilt, and against which perfect innocence could have no defence' and he then goes on to explain how it is that the Maurice affair has shown him himself of years before:

It was only after mature reflection that I came to perceive the bearing of the case on that of 1836, and to find that by my resistance I had condemned myself. I then lamented very sincerely that I had not on that occasion, now so remote, felt and acted in a different manner.

I beg your lordship to accept this expression of my cordial regret...¹

It is evident that despite the Maurice condemnation the opinion of Anglicans was turning towards the position that Hampden had adopted many years before. It is evident that that position is a majority one today.

¹Gladstone to Hampden, 9 November, 1856, printed in Morley, Life of Gladstone, vol.1, p 168.
The conservative adherence to the continuity principle is most apparent in Hampden's parochial sermons. It is possible with little enough search to produce from his preaching a general and not at all inadequate account of the dogmatic truths which have been held to constitute the intellectual content and basis of Christianity. Hampden does not set his hearers in a flurry or put them into confusion by preaching a doctrine they have not heard before. He preaches to them the self-same doctrine as any other Anglican parson of his day. This is much to be remembered when considering the accusations against him concerning the effect of his being made a professor of theology. Sermons can, at the least, do little harm, which are so little speculative and original as these.

It seems an appropriate method of continuing to select from the sermons some notice of the matters which were under dispute at Oxford and to see how Hampden thought they should be positively expressed.

In the second of his parochial sermons Hampden outlines the connection he thinks obtains between scripture and dogmatics, using as his example the doctrine of the Trinity:

You are now fully prepared, I should hope, to go along with me in the assertion, that the doctrine of the Trinity in Unity is one which no person who has the Bible before him, and who is able to search and see whether these things are so, can hold it a matter of indifference whether he
receives or rejects. What I have been endeavouring to
impress on you is, that if the Scriptures exist, this
document exists; that it is the very substance of our
whole faith; and not a mere article of it; or rather,
that either this doctrine is, or Christianity is not;
and that in the act of renouncing it, we depart into
another system of faith, and quit that which results from
the records of Scripture. If you are thus persuaded, you
place the doctrine on a right footing, and hold it in due
honour. But, being thus persuaded, you cannot do otherwise
than think, that your salvation is intimately connected
with this your right belief.  

Here the doctrine of the Trinity is spoken of not in terms
appropriate to scholastic logicalities, but in those proper to
religious truth. It is said to be not only derived from
Scripture but the essential characteristic of the scriptural
religion. More than this the importance of the doctrine is such
that holding to it is for the Christian the way of salvation.
What is not said, and what I think many of Hampden's opponents
would even here want him to say is whether or no this doctrine
must be held by everybody if they are to be saved. Hampden is
talking to Christians in his parish church; he is not disputing
about such questions as baptism by desire, or the saving of the
infidel. He is not even concerned with Socinian or Unitarian.

1 Parochial Sermon II, pp 38-9
He is concerned with Christians being more perfect Christians.

It is certainly possible to interpret 'if you are thus persuaded' and 'being thus persuaded' as clauses which turn the doctrine in a relative statement, fit for some but not for others. But even if this is the case, it is equally the case that while the Christian who has come to the knowledge of the truth must not make shipwreck of the faith and lose his sense of committal to Christ, the pagan cannot be expected to produce an explicit confession of the Trinity if he is not persuaded. Nor can a Christian too easily suggest that the pagan's salvation is 'intimately connected' with his professing such a belief.

Thus far at least belief in the Trinity is a relative thing. It is always important to understand the context of Hampden's remarks. What can be said speculatively in tutorial or lecture, even to undergraduates is not necessarily thought by the speaker to be appropriate to the pulpit, and this not from a sense of cowardice at the elders' fury, but simply from a proper recognition of pastoral responsibility to encourage and not confuse, to lead and not to scatter. On the other hand if only pulpit words were uttered in scholarly surroundings then the very theology upon which pastoral preaching must rely would remain unexplored and undeveloped, and the professorial responsibility would be shirked. It is neither cunning nor cowardice that persuades Hampden that he must preach to his people.

The only ancient, only catholic, truth is the Scriptural fact. Let us hold that fast in its depth and breadth -
- in nothing extenuating, in nothing abridging it - in simplicity and sincerity; and we can neither be Sabellians, or Tritheists, or Socinians

and here his people is the Oxford audience of the Bampton lectures. Similarly though he does not in his Bampton Lectures whole-heartedly approve the terms in which the Athanasian Creed is formulated, when preaching to his people in the parish he can say of the Trinitarian expressions:

If that Creed were an expression of abstract opinions formed by human reason on an incomprehensible subject; then it would be both rash and profane in any Church to exact a general conformity of declaration on a matter so precarious in its foundation. But that Creed, on the contrary, presupposes that the doctrine of the Trinity in Unity is a certain fact of Scripture.

Now I suppose it may be objected to Hampden's proceedings that he is not consistent and that he is simply deceiving his people by such sermons into believing him an orthodox clergyman. But there is no need to produce such an explanation. Hampden is certainly orthodox enough in the parish and we might on this ground make it a presupposition that he is orthodox in intention in the schoolroom. I do not suggest that Hampden is being deliberately provocative in his lectures, just to bring out the ideas of the young and encourage debate. He meant what he said but he meant it in the context of scholarly debate -

1Bampton Lectures, p 149-50  2Sermon II, p 35.
hence his extreme dismay and surprise when his opponents took to abusing his person, and his total discomfort at the Oxford gossip about him. He complained bitterly to Lord Melbourne and received the hearty reply 'Be easy; I like an easy man'. Hampden was attacked in what he considered an unfair manner and supposed himself innocent of any charge. I think this can be accepted. I do not suppose that he was craftily denying a guilt he knew himself to have. This leads to the conclusion that Hampden was not a heretic in any formal sense since he was not deliberately setting himself against the canons of orthodoxy. This becomes plainer as one moves through the sermons that Hampden preached.

Thus he preached to his parochial congregation on the Presentation of Christ in the Temple, and said of the child in Simon's arms:

You will remember that Saint John has introduced him to our devout contemplation at the very opening of his gospel... as the Word that 'was in the beginning with God and was God'; - adding that by him 'all things were made, and without him was not anything made that was made': that he is described as 'the only begotten Son of God....in him were united two distinct natures - the divine and the human - through which mysterious union, he became the Christ - 'Christ the Lord' 1

Though this lack of elegance it does not lack devotion, it does not lack faith and a conviction that Christ is to be preached. The

1 Sermon IX p 198.
relativity of language does not prevent Hampden doing his best with it, once he has acknowledged that relativity. Truth does not lose its power simply because put in earthen vessels. As he wrote of the Articles:

it is no impeachment of their truth, to regard them as capable of improvement, - of more perfect adaptation to the existing circumstances of the Church.

Hampden was convinced that the inadequacy of theological language did not necessarily make it misleading. The inadequacy was only dangerous if unrecognised. One should not mistake coherence for adequacy. Similarly, one must not confuse oneself with too emotive a use of language, so that the plain course of the scriptural narrative becomes involved and charged with the 'frenzies of fanatical excitement'. The Gospel subdues and chastens the mysticism to which its invisible realities might carry the susceptible mind, both by express maxims of duty, full of sobriety and prudence, and by its domestic picture of the Redeemer, as one mixing in affable converse with men, and drawing us to him with cords of humanity, no less than by the life-blood flowing from his cross.

Though Hampden above all men was strong in the expression of the conviction that it was within the design of God to save those who had not been taught the Christian truth, and that ignorance could not be considered culpable in a pagan, he was also perfectly convinced that whether:

1 Hampden Lectures, p 381

2 Sermon IV, p 71
he knew of it or no the pagan was still saved by the work of Christ:

All men - whatsoever be their creed - whatsoever their religious knowledge, - whatsoever their attainments in righteousness, can only be saved through the satisfaction made once for all on the cross.¹

The work of Christ is properly set forth, in no new or exciting way certainly, but with a common orthodox sense. Hampden is not an original theologian in Christology and he has nothing to say which has not been said many times over - this is of course not a condemnation, or if it is then most Christian theologians are condemned by it, but it is in contradiction to the general view of Hampden that early nineteenth century Oxford had. It is line rather with with Hampden's main concern with the morality of Christian life, in the sense that he was interested very little in doctrine and a great deal in the effect that the great scriptural truths had in the lives of his hearers. Thus the belief demanded in the work of the Holy Spirit is tested by Hampden thus:

Are you sincere believers in the doctrine of Santification by the Spirit? - You are sanctified in every good word and work. You have contemplated God, as the Helper of your infirmities, the Giver of a new life. - But how can any one honestly declare the same truth as his own personal conviction, who knows quite the contrary of himself - that he is such a one in his actions with whom the Holy Spirit.

¹ Sermon IV, p 71
cannot dwell. He may indeed acknowledge the truth generally. He may be a professor of a system of doctrines in which this particular doctrine enters. But as to any personal acceptance of the truth - which is the point at issue when a man's real religion is looked into - he is as one who has never 'heard whether there be any Holy Ghost'. The grace on which we heartily rely, speaks from the actions which it sanctifies.¹

The whole endeavour here is to improve the acts of his parishioners, to awaken in each a lively faith, an attempt to make their lives more like those of Christian man. This is the kind of thing which one might listen to at any Sunday Churchgoing in the nineteenth century. Volumes of such sermons have in serried calf and tooled lined vicarage walls, some perhaps less dull, others perhaps less familiar with the technicalities of theologians, but all saying much the same sensible good thing, leading to this usual conclusion that misses so much of the wonder of the Resurrection and the Day of the Lord:

whilst the doctrine of a Resurrection to life eternal, to which the text refers, is pregnant with wise comfort to the afflicted spirit of man, - comfort is not its principal practical intention. As life eternal is the peculiar revelation of Christianity - the exclusive sanction and promise of the faith in Christ Crucified; - the leading application of it must consist in its importance, as an argument for maintaining the Faith with constancy and zeal;

¹ Sermon VII pp 160 - 161
so that we may be inheritors of the immortality bequeathed to us by our Redeemer.¹

This is lame stuff. The wonder of Christ's glory and our inheritance is reduced to a spur of politeness and apologetics. This is not what one would expect from a heresiarch. It is also not what one would expect from a master in theology. It becomes more evident as one reads through these sermons that Hampden has no sense of how to put across his new insights into the wonder and glory of God - for this is really at the centre of his talk of the relativity of our language. He should have tried harder to make his insight communicable to the people in the pew.

The strange difference between the adventuresome manner of the scholastic writings of Hampden and his homespun sermons struck his contemporaries forcibly. Pusey, for instance devoted some time to explaining how it could be that a man of Hampden's outrageous statement could enjoy so undisturbed an orthodox belief. He made this judgment at the height of the professorship controversy:

_We believe that the earlier faith planted in the soul yet survives, unharmed if possible, by the later philosophical system which has been admitted to the intellect._²

If this seems to be a bit too patronising it is typical of Pusey's happy way of awarding a kindly nod to those who are trying to do better. Thus he writes of the 'extreme case' ³

¹ Sermon V p 95. ² Dr Hampden's Theological Statements, ppiii-i
of the German rationalists, who have

at last seen, what had long ago been pointed out to them
by the believing writers that their position was of all
the most inconsistent that they must, if consistent,
return to a sounder faith, or plunge deeper into Pantheism.
The division is now being made.¹

Hampden, Pusey thought, was like Semler, who after a lifetime
of belief and of teaching unbelief, was 'angered at the work
which his own hands had wrought'. Hampden, thinks Pusey, may
well have in his writings the major and minor premises of
Socinianism, but he is unlikely to realise what his writings
Teach. He does not know his own mind because his heart is in
the right place. Thus the distinction between the Bampton
Lectures and the Sermons is a distinction exemplifying the
fundamental distinction between what he thinks and what he feels.
Pusey allows Hampden to be a Christian in intent, but a heretic
in doctrine.

Further than this, it is possible Pusey thinks, to explain
how it is that Hampden should so unwittingly have arrived at
this position. A heresy will only affect the conduct and
feeling of a man if it has either been invented by him or has
been taught to him when he was young and impressionable. To
Pusey it seems obvious that Hampden has simply escaped these
forceful circumstances:

¹ Ibid p iv.
The theory promulgated in his recent writings has neither been part of the development of his own mind, nor admitted into it at a period when it was likely most to affect that development.¹

Most negative theologians, Pusey suggests, argue against any doctrine which is not directly scriptural, and Hampden has only been reading 'a modern French philosophy.'² Hampden has simply picked this up in middle age as an intellectual stimulant:

It has been received as an ingenious theory; the authorities whereon it rested, partially followed out, subsequently to its reception; but its whole consequences neither perceived nor entertained.²

If this were all then Hampden could be left quietly to walk his unknown way, but he has been chosen to teach the young, the undergraduates all ready to hear a novelty and heresy. Hampden did not follow his views through, he did not have the inclination to discover where they lead:

Will this be so, however, when it is proposed to immature minds, minds which in the energy of youth follow out unhesitatingly every theory laid before them, and have as yet no fixed principles to stay them? This is fearful to think of.³

The young men of Pusey's day must have been energetic indeed, and enthusiastic, to pursue every theory they heard in a lecture

hall or tutorial room, but at any rate this is a coherent explanation of Hampden's activities in the pulpit. It seems to carry some conviction that Hampden was unable in the preparation of his sermons to understand the relevance of his academic work to his parochial responsibilities. Or, if he did understand something of the implications of this work he was not quite sure enough of his thoughts and how to put them across to risk upsetting his parishioners with an improperly constructed theology. A combination of these reasons would probably fit the case well enough. At any rate there are no indications in Hampden's work that he thought of himself as living any kind of 'double life'. 
Hampden's conventionalist attitude towards theological formulations comes out strongly in the account of the discussions that took place during the Anglican bishops' meeting about the affair of *Essays and Reviews*, February, 1861. Hampden was vehemently in favour of proceeding against the clergymen involved. He remonstrated with the bishops who hesitated:

This is a question between Infidelity and Christianity, and we ought to prosecute a question of Christianity or no Christianity.¹

Such trenchancy makes an enquiry into Hampden's own theology not inappropriate. What did Hampden's liberalism amount to?

I shall consider first the often-made suggestion that in the circumstances of Anglican nineteenth century writing, theological liberalism was necessarily linked with political liberalism. I shall outline next what theological liberalism meant to Newman, Hampden's most distinguished critic, and how Hampden exemplifies this. I hope then to make some remarks on the way in which Hampden's liberal theologising was converted by his conventionalist frame into the harsh rigidity expressed in the attack on the Essayists.

Melbourne's letter in 1836 offering Hampden the Regius Professorship reveals the Prime Minister's conviction that liberalism in theology is allied to liberalism in politics.²

² Memorials of Bishop Hampden, p 49.
consciousness of this affinity may also account for the Duke of Wellington's unintelligent snub to Hampden later in the year.\(^1\) But the matter needs more thorough investigation. It might easily be argued that in the nineteenth century the more truly liberal one was in politics the more anti-liberal in religion. For Newman the great prize to be won was freedom. In the political sphere he was not satisfied with Manning's paternalism and he shared few of the conservative prejudices of Hopkins about Irish 'rebels'.\(^2\)

R.W. Greaves, writing about the Hampden controversy and the accusation that political motives were to the fore says, after his examination of Charles Golightly's Letters to his uncle at the time:

> There is not the slightest suggestion in these letters any more than in the polemical writings of Newman and Pusey, of what Hampden and his friends maintained was one significant element in the outburst against his appointment, namely a certain rallying of Oxford Toryism against a Whig minister's nominee\(^3\)

Though he saw political Liberalism as the advocate of freedom — at least when compared with the Tory party — it was not at all clear to Newman that there was a corollary to the political situation in religion. It was, he thought, only within a dogmatic context that true freedom could be enjoyed.

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1. Ibid., p 262, Wellington to Hampden, March 11, 1836.
In 1879 Newman went to Rome to receive the Cardinal's Hat. On May 12th, in the palace of Cardinal Howard, the biglietto, which officially informed him of the Pope's intention, was presented to him. In his speech Newman said

I rejoice to say, to one great mischief I have from the first opposed myself: For 30, 40, 50 years I have resisted to the best of my powers the spirit of liberalism in religion.¹

For Newman liberalism is the doctrine 'that there is no positive truth in religion, but that one creed is as good as another.'² For the liberal:

Revealed religion is not a truth, but a sentiment and a taste; not an objective fact; not miraculous; and it is the right of each individual to make it say just what strikes his fancy²

It was this liberalism that Keble attacked in his Assize Sermon on the National Apostasy on Sunday, July 14th, 1833³:

One of the most alarming, as a symptom, is the growing indifference, in which men indulge themselves, to other men's religious sentiments. Under the guise of charity and toleration we are come almost to this pass; that no difference in matters of faith, is to disqualify for our approbation and confidence, whether in public or domestic life.⁴

³ Ibid, p 7.
⁴ Oxford Sermons, 1848, p 136.
Newman summarised the liberal view as the belief that every man's view of revealed religion is acceptable to God, if he acts up to it; that no one view is in itself better than another, or at least that we cannot tell which is the better. This small paragraph brings out three characteristics of Hampden's work. Firstly, it shews the importance that Hampden put on toleration of opinion within the Christian theological schools. Secondly, it brings out the epistemological basis on which this toleration was founded - the impossibility of telling 'which is the better'. And thirdly, the moral emphasis of Hampden's theology is shewn in the proviso that one must 'act up' to one's belief. All theologians worth their vocation are, of course, concerned with the moral consequences of their teaching. Theological intellectualism is never enough. Newman no more than Hampden advocates a withdrawal from action in order to consider belief. But Newman rather more than Hampden is convinced that right action though not inevitably the result of right belief, is generally dependent upon right belief. Hampden's dogmatic refusal to accept absolutist dogmatics led, Newman thought, to a disregardance of revealed truth, since it erected human reasoning as perfect arbiter. Certainly, the first thing Hampden wanted - and here the influence of Tillotson is noticeable - was a prescription on how to be rational. This was a good idea in itself but it went wrong in act. The weakness of liberal conciliatory theology was its assumption that reason should be exercised as a test of all things.

1 Discussions and Arguments, p 129
Hampden exhibits the later liberal anthropocentric disposition to take one's bearings from 'religion' and not from an objectively given Creed, and he shares with later liberals too, the consequent mistrust of the 'Christ of dogma' on the one hand, and of the Old Testament's authority for faith on the other. But it cannot be simply asserted that Hampden was a 'pre-liberal'. The quest for the historical Jesus was not developed with the same vitality in Hampden's theologising as it was to be later; and for Hampden there is still a secure initial ground for religion in the natural theology technique, whereas later liberals became much less sure of this. Hampden, in fact, exhibits no sign of the contemporary disquiet with the old natural theology way of putting things. Hampden took, it appears, no count of the theology represented by Bridgewater treatises and the natural theology that develops out of natural sciences, nor of the kind of thing exemplified in Coleridge's reaction against the onrush of scientific knowledge, though both were steps forward from the *Evidences* of Paley. It is, indeed, questionable whether Hampden was at all conscious of the crisis in philosophy precipitated by natural science, or whether he was aware of the Romantic protest. Hampden refused to accept any one vitalising agent by itself. His work was eclectic and open in an emphatic way.

Hampden's continual denial of absolute truth to the terms of theological reflection, including those of scripture, led, in Newman's view to a position that denied the basic truths of Christian experience. Such a system was described in the *Apologia*, and its first four characteristics were presented thus:
1 No religious tenet is important, unless reason shows it to be so. Therefore, e.g. the doctrine of the Athanasian Creed is not to be insisted upon.

2 No one can believe what he does not understand.

3 No theological doctrine is anything more than an opinion which happens to be held by bodies of men. Therefore, e.g. no creed, as such, is necessary for salvation.

4 It is dishonest in a man to make an act of faith in what he has not had brought home to him by actual proof.¹

It would not be at all difficult to find these four principles stated in almost the same words in the works of Hampden. The first result in Hampden's theology, as Newman noted, is an undogmatic tolerance of all belief:

All that we have to do then is to act consistently with what we hold, and to value others if they act consistently with what they hold; that to be consistent constitutes sincerity; that where there is this evident sincerity, it is no matter whether we profess to be Romanists or Protestants, Catholics or Heretics, Calvinists or Arminians, Anglicans or Dissenters, High Churchmen or Puritans, Episcopalians or Independents, Wesleyans or Socinians.²

Hampden would not, of course, have seen such a conclusion in quite such a terrible light as did Newman. The evidence is that he was much in favour of some toleration for dissenters and even Socinians within the Christian communion - though he was not so keen on Romanists.

₁ Apologia, p 294
₂ Discussions and Arguments, p 130
Having accepted all beliefs as worthy of respect, the immediate difficulty is to accept the claim of one particular orthodoxy to be that system upon which one will base one's manner of acting. This is not simply an intellectual question, it has, and more importantly for Hampden, moral consequences. Hampden sets about discovering a belief that will serve as a foundation for morality. He has to do this if he is to 'act up' to his vocation as a Christian Pastor. His concern is essentially pastoral. He himself does not need such an enquiry. He might well act within the categories he has learnt from his mother and his churchmen. But there are others who are in need of moral guidance, and who require instruction in belief from which healthy morality issues. Hampden, as I have shown earlier, attempted to resolve his problem about the status of beliefs by recourse to distinctions like those of Kantian noumenal and phenomenal, and by introducing the 'relative deity' in order to establish the relative character of our knowledge of reality. This was not enough. Many theologians make an appeal to the moral sense of scriptural directives when their naturalistic arguments fail to secure full consent. In one sense Hampden could make such an appeal, but he did not think it consistent with his general system of thought to erect a rigid morality from biblical witness. His view of scripture did not permit his presenting from it a moral imperative of any absolute force. His indecision seemed to Newman to be characteristic of latitudinarian procedures:

you must first prove your proofs and analyse your elements, sinking further and further, and finding it in the lowest.
depth of a lower deep', till you come to the broad bosom of scepticism

Hampden found that the concrete existential predicament demanded a concrete commentary and act. But scripture was not, in his system, capable of giving the spur to such an act. Scripture was for him a closed system. It was a 'given' from the past, and told us about the past. The word was exact and limited in describing God and his attributes; it was exact and limited in its presentation of moral sanctions.

If action depends on belief then the Christian belief, bound to a closed dogmatic revelation given in the past will not be adapted to providing answers to the open moral questions of the present. As Hampden wrote in this connection:

There must be in fact a repeated revelation to authorize us to assert, that this or that conclusion represents to us some truth concerning God.

Hampden is evidently secure in the impossibility of such a revelation - and all Christians would agree that we have to wait on the Last Day before enjoying the full eternal revelation of God. But Hampden is also demonstrating the poverty - I cannot consider it the primitive innocence - of his concept of the Christian community and the guidance of the living Spirit of God. A live understanding of the Word of God is possible within the community because the community is alive with the Spirit. We have here a further

1 Grammar of Assent, p 95
2 Bampton Lectures, II, p 85.
indication of Hampden's lack of a proper theology of the sacramental activity of Christ. The Church has become simply an organisation, social and political in its being, and the Word in Scripture has become a dead word, spoken in the past. In the 1839 Lecture on Tradition, Hampden goes out of way to condemn the notion that a Reformed or Anglican theologian can countenance the belief in a living witness in the present Church. This adds to the general ethos of indecision, of obscurity in Hampden's writings concerning where Revelation is to be met and how Revelation is to be understood.

Taking his customary stand, in the manner of Calvin and many of the mediaeval scholastics, on the assumption that revelation is an exact word; and rejecting, unlike Calvin and the mediaevals, anything like an illative sense in philosophy, or like typology in exegesis; Hampden moves towards the formulation of a very thin doctrine of Christ. He argues that since all words are absolutist instruments they are all limited to one sense. The limitation inherent in language is transferred univocally to knowledge. Our knowledge is as limited as is the defining capacity of words. He rejects the romantic emphasis on experience instead of language expressed in such a poem as Wordsworth's Expostulation and Reply:

The eye - it cannot choose but see;
We cannot bid the ear be still;
Our bodies feel, where'er they be,
against or with our will

1 Lecture on Tradition, passim, especially p 23
Nor less I deem that there are Powers
Which of themselves our minds impress;
That we can feed this mind of ours
In a wise passiveness.

Think you, 'mid all this mighty sum
Of things for ever speaking,
That nothing of itself will come,
But we must still be seeking?

Hampden is concerned with the inability of words to do more than express a meaning within strict limits. He emphasises that one limit of verbalising is the limit of the subject receiving the meaning, and which, therefore, must apply whoever speaks the word. As I shewed earlier this is not merely a version of the scholastic tag 'quidquid recipitur secundum modum recipientis recipitur'; it is a far more radical denial of scope to the human intelligence. In Hampden's order of things it strikes at the very possibility of there being a revelation from God in any sense previously accepted. It may be that Hampden was feeling towards a notion of revelation widely accepted today as man's inspired understanding of his environment as created, but he certainly did not arrive at any view of revelation so coherent as this. His conventionalism did not permit his breaking through the vocabulary of the older theology; his mind did not work in the older patterns. His work, therefore, at all important points, remains tantalisingly ambiguous. It is therefore as Hampden and Newman found, difficult either to defend or to attack. Such an ambiguity is found in Hampden's writing
about Christ. Christ, the Word of God, he says, expresses God only so far as we can understand. If it is true that he who has seen Christ has seen the Father, Hampden argues that it is also true that only as he has seen Christ can he see the Father — that is, Christ expresses God humanly. This might well be the prologue to a fruitful understanding of the Incarnation and the meaning of the community of Christians in the Church and of Christ's action in the sacraments. But Hampden radically opposes orthodoxy at this point. For him the truth that Christ expresses God in human fashion, means that Christ's acts are merely human. It properly follows from this, since no man is more than his acts, that Christ is merely human, he is not the Lord.

Christology is, therefore, not theology. All the efforts made by earlier members of the Christian community to understand Christ, from the evangelists, through the Nicene Fathers, and onwards, are useless. Christ is valuable, supremely but only, because of his exemplary character. Christ is not realised as making demands on us, demanding our choice. This 'anti-Christology' has debilitating repercussions which must be explored further. Though the conventionalist structure is everywhere preserved it appears on closer examination to be an empty scaffolding.

The importance of Christ for Hampden lies in the moral sphere. When he endeavours to act rightly Hampden is not endeavouring to act as Christ requires, i.e. not answering a vocation to love and obey; he is acting as Christ acted. For him, the New Testament witness is of a man who walked in the way
of God before men; the New Testament sets before us an example to be followed. Hampden's reasonable sense of right action prompts his approval of Christ, and urges his imitation of him. The moral endeavour is fundamentally self-engendered not responsive to the dogmatic fact of Christ. This may well work with Hampden - his conventionalism extends to situations in ethics, he is conditioned into knowing the 'right thing to do' - but it leaves our untutored conscience with a burden greater than that we must necessarily carry.

It is inevitable that Hampden's lack of a proper Christology should have a radical effect upon the whole of his theologising. The inadequacy of one aspect infects the whole since no doctrine is capable of being understood in isolation from the total matrix. The doctrines of God, of Man and of the Last Things, for example, are rendered unbalanced in Hampden's system.

The absence of a proper theology of the Incarnation, of who Christ is, and what Christ does, necessarily involves a very thin doctrine of God. Any understanding of God derives its character from an understanding of Christ. We come to the knowledge of God through our response to the gospel witness to Christ. Just as today the work of Barth looks as if it is a Christocentric theology but is really concerned with God as God, and the Christological structure is a ladder to the knowledge of God, so Hampden's lack of Christology means that he lacks a theology. Unless one has a measure of understanding who Christ is then the New Testament faith in the God who so loved the world
is impossible. It is by the work of Christ that we are shewn not only the redeeming but the creating God and the history of his power among us in the people of Israel is given a meaning for us. This absence of theology at the very centre vitiates the whole structure of Hampden's operations. It prevents his understanding of the present situation of man in the economy of salvation, since his relation with God remains undefined, and it prohibits his employment of a scriptural methodology since the whole notion of a meaningful historical revelation depends from the notion of a God who acts and who speaks to men.

This, therefore, restricts the relevance of the biblical witness to God. There is no immediacy about salvation history. The past remains the past. If it is argued that Hampden was unable to realise this view of Scripture because of his own historical and confessional context, the reply is at once to hand in the sermons Newman published in the eight volumes of Parochial and Plain, which were the product of his time as Vicar of St. Mary's, Oxford, and which are a convincing witness to the possibility of an early nineteenth century Anglican theologian grasping the real notion of scripture as a progressive record of God's self-revelation at particular times and places, a record of God acting in history. This Newman got from his reading of the Caroline Divines and the Fathers. To a lesser extent Keble also had this view. But Hampden was not aware of this tradition of theology, not aware of it, at any rate, as a living possibility for him. Newman explored a territory in one sense much more modern than Hampden's, and yet
much more dependent upon the historical sources of Christian teaching. Thus Newman writes in the sermon on the **Particular Providence of God as Revealed in the Gospel**:

> It was foretold of the Christian Church: All thy children shall be taught of the Lord; and great shall be the peace of thy children. When the Eternal Son came on earth in our flesh, men saw their invisible Maker and Judge. He showed himself no longer through the mere powers of nature, or the maze of human affairs, but in our own likeness to Him. 'God in our hearts, to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ'; that is, in a sensible form, as a really existing individual being. And at the same time, He forthwith began to speak to us as individuals. He, on the one hand, addressed each of us on the other. Thus it was in some sense a revelation face to face.

Newman is very much aware of the revelation of God in 'the maze of human affairs', that is presented to us in Scripture. He is aware too, of the great difference we have now through the work of God in Christ. This work emphasises our individual value as men, since we are one with Him who is 'in our flesh'. This, we shall see in a moment, is another indication of the difference between Newman and Hampden, as men seeking to understand the ways of God.

Hampden has none of Newman's awareness of the present stimulus of scripture, of its living relevance. The bible states
simply what happened. The past remains the past. Thus Hampden speaks of the Christian truth as a record which:

may be tracked continuously through more than 3,000 years in the successive periods of its delivery to mankind, thus occupying a large field in the history of God's Providence; and we have just the same ground for believing its truth as we have for believing any other matter of history equally authenticated by events.

By which we may suppose that belief in Christ is somehow of the same kind as belief that the battle of Waterloo took place in 1815. In the same charge he repudiates the opinion that the miracles recorded in the gospel are 'the objects of faith, not of reason'. The nature of signs is incomprehensible to him, and he certainly cannot read S. John's gospel aright — which is a further pointer to his inability to formulate a satisfactory doctrine of the sacraments within the Church.

The distortion that occurs in the doctrine of God is enlarged in the doctrine of Man. The creature is known through the Creator, the redeemed through the Redeemer:

The only reason why we take man so absolutely seriously, the only reason why we can, and the reason why (whether we like it or not) we must, is that God, in the Word who became man, has taken man so absolutely seriously.

1 Last paragraph of a Charge of 1862. Italics mine.
The community of the flesh of Adam that we share with Christ gives a
worth to each of us. Our history begins with the creation of the
material universe and ends with the resurrection of the body. It:
 pivots in the middle, B.C. and A.D., on the Word becoming flesh. It
is this material universe that is made gracious by the act of Christ,
we are not mere souls, we are people. The Christian sharing in the
humanity of Christ has a new value. The true man

Acts in God's eyes what in God's eye he is —
Christ — for Christ plays in ten thousand places;
lovely in limbs, and lovely in eyes not his,
To the Father: through the features of man's faces.

The doctrine of the union of Christ with the Christian gives: value to
all human enterprise; as Barth once remarked:

Nothing in true human nature can ever be alien or irrelevant
to the Christian; nothing in true nature can ever attack or
surpass or annul the objective reality of the Christian's:
union with Christ.1

The whole of human endeavour moves towards that moment when Christ hands
over all things to his Father — it is an endeavour perfected now by Christ.

Our understanding of the world here and now depends on our understanding
of the work of Christ among us.

What, then, are Hampden's conventions worth? The eviscerating of

1 Christ and Adam; S.J.T. Occasional Papers 5, p 43
eager sentiment is seen in his Primary Charges:

As to the observance of the rites and ceremonies of the Church, how can he who regards his office as that of a representative of his Lord, be indifferent and careless about anything belonging to the Divine service: He knows, indeed, that the Gospel is not a religion of ceremonial and type, like the law. Still he will not undervalue those venerable forms which the Church has received and retained, whilst it rejected the mass of vain and superstitious ceremonies with which the simple worship of the Christian temple had been overlaid and defaced. Nor will he take upon him to alter them at his discretion, whether by addition or omission; when he remembers that, though the first institution of a ceremony be arbitrary — though in theory it be changeable — yet in practice the ceremonial of religion becomes closely connected with its doctrines, and expressive of them.¹

Though Hampden is concerned to admonish those of his Hereford clergy who are engaged in Tractarian or High Church modifications of the Prayer Book Services, his emphasis of the sacred character of what he acknowledges to be arbitrary forms is not unlike the worst kind of ritualism found in every Christian Church but not expected of the innovating Bampton lecturer. It is evident that the appointment to the bishopric was not all that dangerous to the conservative churchmen.

¹ Charge, delivered in 1850, 2nd edition, p 20. Printed in Memorials, p 188.
Nothing could be more convention bound than the abusive Charge of 1862 which concerned itself with the errors of the Essayists and Reviewers. This Charge was not published at the time of its delivery because the Bishop thought it worthwhile keeping to be enlarged and embellished before publication. A version of it in the half-corrected form was printed, though only in extract, in Hampden's daughter's Memorials. The chief object of the Charge was to re-establish the traditional methods of scriptural exegesis after the demythologising attempted by the Seven. In earlier years Hampden had made it a large part of his complaint against those who attacked his Bampton lectures that they did not specify passages, but tended to remark upon his 'tone' and 'general manner'. Hampden's complaint was not justified, and he himself was equally furious that pamphlets were published made up of precisely those quotations and particular citations that he had lamented the absence of. But when he was attacking Essays and Reviews he was happy enough about the generalisation method:

I do not mean to say, then, that the several writers in that now well-known publication have expressly adopted that method as their own, or designedly carried it out in their disquisitions, or that they would not disclaim a great deal of what is taught in the great text-book of the Mythic School of Scripture interpretation - the 'Life of Jesus' by Strauss. But I refer to the school as exemplifying in my opinion, the tendency of speculations such as those which are put forth in the work in question as a whole (italics.
Hampden’s), without imputing to any one of the authors in particular the evil tendencies to scepticism and indefinite belief, or positive rejection of Christianity, which we cannot but attribute to the work itself in which their disquisitions are contained.¹

Here is the first evidence in the Charge of that embracing conventionalism characteristic of Hampden’s mind. I have earlier argued that Hampden could not understand the dangers of his theologising or appropriate the difference between his work and orthodox writing, because he was bred within so strong an orthodox morality and conventional temper that he would have gone on behaving in the same way whatever he may have accepted as proper for believing. In this passage he is allowing the Essayists and Reviewers to have the same conventionalist attitude. He cannot believe that dogmatics affect morals. He accepts a division of action and belief. Conventions provide a frame within which the comparatively unimportant content can change,

The Charge goes on to describe the exegetical methods of the seven offending heretics: Hampden objects to the view that the Bible is the way God instructs men

by relations, whether of real or imaginary incidents, adapted to their existing circumstances and the state of knowledge and belief on successive occasions; and thus imparting to them new ideas, or general principles, abstractedly from the

¹ Memorials, p 212.
means - the legend, or mythical story or narrative, by which they are conveyed.¹

There is no need to make a decision oneself on the merits of Hampden's views to understand that he is adopting a conservative standpoint, and one of extreme rigidity. The fact that he has been proved wrong and that almost all present scripture scholars are concerned with discovering not whether literary genres exist but to what genre a particular book belongs, is not so much the point, as the intransigence and heretic-hunting attitude adopted in this Charge.

The intransigence is the result of conventionalism. It is apparent that by the time he had settled into his Bishopric whatever evidence there was in his earlier writing of a mind capable of original and enlivening thought has been nullified. Hampden's Bampton lectures did not lead to a re-thinking of Christian belief, they seem to have been little more in the end than a discardance of some technical terms in theology. The promise of new life of a new way of putting Christ across to the fast disbelieving nineteenth century intelligence was never fulfilled. Hampden succeeded in performing no more useful, nor more complex, an activity than affirming a placid convention of behaviour.

It would be possible to interpret his early career as one of following a principle, that of establishing the most comprehensive religious body possible in England at the expense of dogmatic differences. The Bampton lectures could be seen as the first major attempt to oust the orthodox from their intellectual

¹ Ibid. p 213.
positions of rigidity and to open the way for the admission of Dissent not into the University merely but into the Church. But if this is seriously entertained as an interpretation of Hampden's conduct, it still remains a puzzle as to why he should have become so rigid himself once established. The answer might be given in terms of the poacher turned gamekeeper, or in terms of hardened arteries. This would leave us with no great reason for regarding Hampden as worth much investigation now.

I think it at least as much in accord with the evidence to argue a different and much more sympathetic interpretation. Hampden, it seems to me, was a man 'passable like unto us' who was caught in a situation very much like our own. He wanted very much to adapt the Christian presentation so that it would make its eternal appeal to the men of his time. So he was in support of anything which seemed likely to brighten the Christian image and to show the Church as attractive. The Church must be like Christ, and the crowds followed him when he taught, so attractiveness must be a characteristic of the Church. But where does adaptation end and alteration begin? How far can one allow re-thinking to proceed? This was Hampden's problem. It is our own.

We can see now that the conflict between traditional orthodoxy and modern catechetics is not to be resolved by any recourse to 'thus far and no further'. Once we have begun a line of policy we must accept its consequences. We cannot hope to control a weapon once we have employed it to some purpose. Men will continue our work with or without our help and encouragement.
Hampden could not understand this; his hope was that once he had renovated Christian language men would accept the old patterns of belief. He did not recognise the necessity for an explanation of the present in terms of history which would account for both developments and deviations.

Hampden had no means of judging what was consistent with Christianity because he had no clear idea as to what Christianity is. He could rely only on the conventionalist frame of what had always been done (and 'always' in this context meant 'the last two or three generations') and use this essentially non-historical criterion to allow or disallow certain modern activities. If a view did not upset his congregation, or undermine the moral structure of society, no matter how intellectually inconsistent it might be with Christian belief, it could be tolerated within the scheme of things. For Hampden the only heretical proposition was one which tended to disrupt the peace of the community. He had no standard of orthodoxy. He did not know enough history. This is the main burden of any comparison instituted between Hampden and Newman.

If Hampden had had some consistent notion of the Church he would have acted more consistently in life. He is an example of a man who saw the necessity of preaching the truth to men of his time, but lacked the knowledge and understanding and wisdom to keep his nerve in so perilous a business. Hampden is no master in theology; he is a warning of how far from adequate in the Christian ministry are cleverness, conventionalism,
and good intention.

The liberal tradition in English theology was established with Hampden's consecration as Bishop of Hereford. Newman was ousted and could not find a place within the Anglican communion. He had held to be true those things that Hampden held to be false; their opposition was complete. They were divided on issues that must always divide men. Their dispute was not simply a small controversy, esoteric to theologians, endemic to universities; it was a dispute about essentials.
A Note on Unpublished Sources

All the time that I have been working on this study of Hampden's theology I have been able to consult the Newman Archives of the Birmingham Oratory. We possess not only many thousands of letters and memoranda of Newman. There are many complete sets of correspondence, including the one with Hampden which set in motion the Oxford controversy I have described. I have also used Newman's marginal comments in various books of the Oriel writers as a guide to what the Cardinal thought important.

I have also been allowed to obtain a microfilm of the letters of Hampden preserved at Oriel, and though it has not been within my scope to present an account of Hampden's private opinions I have sometimes used the letters as interpreters of his meaning in the published volumes.

Subsidiary to these sources, but not without interest on one or two matters, were the archives of Hereford and Norwich Cathedrals. The librarians and archivists of these Chapter Libraries have been helpful in allowing me to examine the material on Hampden that was in their keeping. It was especially tempting to write up the narrative of the quarrels of Hampden and his Dean at Hereford, but this was beyond the scope of my present study.
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This booklist includes works of three kinds. In section A I have listed the writings of the major figures of this study, the members of the Oriel Common Room, and writings consulted for information about these men. The primary texts are listed in order of publication, the secondary works by author alphabetically. In section B of the list I have set out a number of pamphlets which appeared during the Hampden controversy and these are described in rather more detail than the other works because they are less accessible. I have acknowledged indebtedness to other works on general and passing problems in the footnotes to the text.

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