The foundations of the doctrine of the logos in the prologue to the fourth Gospel

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THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE LOGOS IN THE
PROLOGUE TO THE FOURTH GOSPEL,
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THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE LOGOS
IN THE PROLOGUE TO THE FOURTH GOSPEL.

Introduction.

μὴ εἰκῇ περὶ τῶν μεγάλων συμβαλλόμενων.
- Heraclitus.

"The time has come to say that no one is rightly qualified to deal successfully with the problems of Christian origins who has not his mind open to the world's need of God and to the possibility that that need has been met as it purports to have been in the Gospels."

- C. Anderson Scott, in the Journal of Theological Studies, reviewing Part 1 of Foakes Jackson's and K. Lake's "Beginnings of Christianity" and Lake's "Landmarks in the History of Early Christianity".

"Whatever the Fourth Gospel may be, it is not a text-book of metaphysics. Primarily it is the text-book of the parish priest and the inspiration of the straightforward layman".

- The late Sir Edwyn Hoskyns.

The writer had been collecting material and designing his reading with a view to the present thesis for some time before the appearance of the late Sir Edwyn Hoskyns' commentary on the Fourth Gospel. But the following words by
the editor of that commentary (Mr. F. N. Davey) encouraged the writer in the belief that the general pattern of his work was warranted by the generality of comment during the last half century alone:

"... the observable field behind the Fourth Gospel, is highly complicated... and the Fourth Gospel is therefore misconstrued, not so much when its apparent and suggestive allusions to all these various environments are over-emphasized, as rather when the Gospel is depressed into one particular environment and explained far too simply, as a piece of oriental mysticism, or of the Jewish-hellenistic theology of Alexandria".

The purpose now initiated is that of summarizing and examining these "depressions", and of attempting to show that there is one "environment" which has not yet been adequately emphasized, but which may well, for that very reason, explain the confusion which is left in the mind of the New Testament student when, in his study of the early verses of the Fourth Gospel, he turns from one commentary to another.

In setting on foot any attempt to assess the content of the term λόγος in the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel, the primary fact which has to be realized is that the effort may be prejudiced - if not vitiated - by the consideration that the word itself is, so far as can be judged, without precise equivalents in other languages. In his German
translation of the Gospel Goethe (in his "Faustus") experimented with the terms "Wort", "Sin" and "Kraft": finally he rejected all three in favour of "That". Martin Luther was content to use "Wort". In Latin, ἀρετή has been rendered by "verbum" and "sermo"; even "ratio" has been pressed into service. (See additional note 1). Both the Authorized and Revised English Versions are content to translate by "Word". Robert Bridges in the "Spirit of Man" ventured the rendering "Mind". This brought a stern protest from Canon Scott Holland. The late Archbishop Temple - to the surprise of many - retained the rendering "Word". The late Dr. James Moffatt decided to retain the Greek word itself.

There can be no doubt that the obscurity of meaning which surrounds the term in the context of the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel has received generous contributions from the want of precise, or even adequate equivalents.

Perhaps we may best begin our task, and, at the same time, illustrate its scope, by indicating the attempts to find the content of ἀρετή in just a few of the commentaries in general use, and which the student of the Johannine writings might be expected to have to hand. These following instances could be multiplied; but, since the present aim is neither to exhaust not to reiterate the work of others, a few will suffice.
Westcott says:— "If we now ask with which of these two conceptions of the Logos, current respectively in Palestine and Alexandria, the teaching of St. John is organically connected, the answer cannot be uncertain". Westcott declares for a Palestinian derivation. "The teaching of St. John is characteristically Hebraic and not Alexandrine. It is intelligible as the final co-ordination through facts of different modes of thought as to the divine Being and the divine action, which are contained in the Old Testament. And on the other hand it is not intelligible as an application or continuation of the teaching of Philo". (The Gospel of St. John", pp.17-18).

Archbishop Temple expressed his opinion thus:—
"Nothing can be more misleading than to enquire whether the Johannine Logos is the Word of the Lord familiar in the Old Testament, or the Philonic Logos, who is spoken of as a "Second God"; for Philo had himself effected the combination of the Old Testament "Word" with the Stoic "Logos".

"I have no doubt that in a general sense St. John is here following the thought of Philo; but this does not mean that he was a student of Philo's writings. The term "Logos" was in general use in the Hellenistic world". ("Readings in St. John's Gospel". First Series: p.4.)

Lock, in his article in the "New Commentary" (edited by Bishop Gore) wrote:— "It is almost certain that .........
there is a conscious attempt here to attract Greek readers
by embodying much of their thought and yet showing that it
was inadequate ....... yet the primary conception is Jewish.”

Brooke in the corresponding article to be found in
"Peake's Commentary", said:- "The first object of the
Prologue is to assure those who were interested in Jewish
and Greek philosophical speculation that Christ, the Son of
God, whom Christians worship, is all that philosophy had claimed
for the Logos....... While the terminology shows clearly
the influence of Greek, and especially Alexandrian thought,
with close parallels to the language of Philo, the writer's
own thought is dominated by the Old Testament. (p.745).

Bernard's claim is that the Prologue "offers a philoso-
phical explanation of the thesis" of the Gospel (I.C.C. "St.
John", vol.1:p.138), and "is the commendation of the Gospel
to those who have approached it through metaphysics rather
than through history". (Ibid.p.143). "The Prologue is a
Philosophical solution..... a solution latent in the Wisdom
literature of the Hebrews, although not perceived by the
philosophers of Greece". "It is a Logos hymn ........
directly Hebrew in origin, but reflecting the phrases which
had become familiar in Greek-speaking society". (Ibid: p.146).
He enumerates as the "influences which contributed to the
formulation for the first time in the Prologue of the Christian doctrine of the Word", Hebrew Scriptures (the Targums in particular), the Sapiental literature of Alexandria, the Philonic writings, and the Mandaen and Hermetic writings. (Ibid. pp. 139, 93-94).

Loisy comments: - "Le Logos fait plutôt suite aux personifications de la Sagesse dans l'Ancien Testament..., dans l'Ecclesiastique.... et dans la Sagesse..... où la personification est décidément autre chose qu'une métaphore poétique. Mais le livre de la Sagesse est un livre Alexandrin, tout pénétré de l'influence hellénique. Notre Logos est encore plus spécifiquement hellénique, au moins par son nom, qui l'apparente à la philosophie de Philon. Toutefois si les affinités sont multiples entre doctrines de notre évangile (johannique) et celles de Philon, les différences ne sont pas moins considérables, et même il n'est pas autrement probable que l'évangile johannique dépende littérairement des écrits philoniens. Le point de vue de l'évangile n'est pas celui de la philosophie; la personnalité du Logos Johannique est bien plus accentuée que celle du Logos de Philon; et l'incarnation du Logos..... ne s'accorderait pas naturellement avec l'idée que Philon se fait de la métier. La conception, religieuse et mystique, de notre Logos est bien plus étroitement et et plus directement apparentée à la théosophie égyptienne,
qui, utilisant d'une part l'assimilation du Logos à Hermès dans la prédication stoïcienne, et identifiant d'autre part Hermès au dieu Thot, voyait dans Thot-Hermès non seulement le Logos organe de la création, mais le médiateur de la révélation divine et de la régénération pour l'immortalité, et opérait comme notre évangile avec les termes mystique de "vérité", "lumière", "vie"..... C'est avec cette doctrine de mystère chrétien, est en affinité, sans qu'on puisse affirmer, d'ailleurs, qu'elle en dépende directement". ("Le quatrième Evangile" pp.88-89).

Nolloth declared: - "The assumption of a necessary indebtedness of St. John to Philo is not required". ("The Fourth Evangelist", p.178.)


Thus, we can see that a wide variety of opinions have been held as to the origins of, and influences affecting, the term \( \lambda \nu \gamma \delta \) in the Prologue. It seems that the time is ripe for an attempt to summarize the views which have been
held, and for an effort to appreciate that which is of permanent value therein. It is hoped to show that none is entirely satisfactory, and that the attempt to rest in a synthesis, of a formal type - such as we might look for in the work of "Die religions-geschichtliche schule" - is insufficient. A plea will then be made for a fresh approach to the problem of the foundations of the idea of the Logos as we find it in the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel, with some attempt to lay down the lines towards a method of approach which has been neglected in the study of the Fourth Gospel.
The Word in the Old Testament.

"Say not, I will study Torah that I may become a Sage or a Rabbi, to acquire fortune so to be rewarded for it in the world to come. But do it only for the love of God. The Glory will come in the end".

- Sifre 79 b.

The New Testament student who surveys the literature on the Fourth Gospel which has been published during the last half century, is left with a vivid impression of what can only be called the complete swing of a pendulum. He discovers that Professor James Adam was so convinced of the connection between the use of the term λόγος in the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel and in Greek philosophy, that, instead of rendering it in his translation as "reason", even in the case of Heraclitus he agrees with Diels in rendering λόγος by "the Word" (Religious Teachers of Greece", p.221). He will find that under the influence of the great name of Adolf Harnack - and, no doubt, of Otto Pfleiderer, too - many commentators hailed the writings of Philo Judaeus as supplying the key to much in the New Testament and all in the Johannine Prologue. If his reading has been chronological, amongst the latest books he will have read Dr. H.R. Strachan's new and revised edition of his commentary on the Fourth Gospel, and Dr. W. F. Howard's "Christianity accor-
ding to St. John". He will have noticed that both seek
the antecedents of the term ἀγών, as used in the Prologue,
not even in the MEMORA of the Targums, but in the various
senses and uses of such terms in the Old Testament as ἠγονέω.
This "swing" is so radical that, in the Journal of Theological
Studies for July-October 1943 (Vol.44: Nos.175-176),
we find Professor C.H. Dodd protesting that "the Hellenistic
aspect of Johannine thought is of greater importance than
some recent writers, in reaction to earlier views, are
ready to admit. It was a weakness of Hoskyn's great commen-
tary that it scarcely took note of it ........"(p.209).
In reality, this is far too sweeping a judgement of Hoskyn's
position. It takes little account of such statements as:
"The Texture of the prologue is taken from the Old Testament
Scriptures (e.g.Gen:7:8.); but it is ALTOGETHER CHRISTIAN.
That Jesus once spoke is more fundamental than the history
of Greek philosophy or the story of the westward progress
of oriental mysticism; more fundamental even than the first
chapter of Genesis or the eighth chapter of Proverbs". ("The
Fourth Gospel", p.135). But, even so, it is a fair assess-
ment of the recent tendency in treating of the Johannine
Prologue, and Dr. Dodd's protest was anticipated ten years
before when M. Loisy, in his "La Religion d'Israël", warned
us against a tendency to look to Judaism as little more than
the preface to Christianity.
"In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. The same was in the beginning with God". John 1.1-2.

"In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth . . . . . . and God said . . . . . . " Genesis 1.1-3.

It is, of course, impossible to approach the early verses of the Fourth Gospel with minds entirely disabused of all preconceived notions. But in so far as we can leave all our studies in the background, most of us would have to agree that there is an instant temptation to refer the opening words to the early verses of Genesis, and, therefore, to begin there in our search for the content which the Fourth Evangelist was giving to the term λόγος . This fact of similarity is manifest alike in English, Greek and Hebrew versions of the Scriptures. In everyday life the art of successful parodying lies largely in establishing contact
with the listener by retaining as many as possible of the words and expressions of the original, and employing similar terms. In both the Prologue and Genesis, we find in the opening sentences the expression εῶ νάρκη and the category ὁ θεός. In the former we encounter the term ὁ λόγος, and in the latter we read that ὁ θεός spoke. Hence, then, the immediate predisposition to associate the thought of ὁ λόγος with that of speaking of God.

Again, we have not read very far into either the Prologue or Genesis before we realize that both are speaking of the divine creative activity. "All things were made by the Logos who "was God" and "was in the beginning". But in the beginning God created".

But, although to place the early verses of St. John's Gospel alongside those of the "Book..... called Genesis" immediately suggests an attempt by the Evangelist to send back the reader's mind to the first words of the Sacred Scriptures, this same process at once reveals a great divergence, namely the absence of the category λόγος in the priestly code's creation narrative. In the Prologue we find the absolute use of the term ὁ λόγος; this is missing in the passage from Genesis. It is still true that we find there various terms with which the Logos is associated, but not THE Logos.
Before leaving this topic, there is another point of difference which is worth noting. According to Genesis the creation of "light" (3) preceded that of "life" (20). In the Prologue the normal inference is that, on the contrary, "life" is antecedent to "light". Thus, if the Logos-category had been used in the creation narrative, it would have been with the connotation of "Revealer", a much more restricted concept of the Logos than that of our Prologue.

But none of the advocates of an Old Testament source of the Johannine Logos wishes to restrict the Fourth Evangelist's debt to the opening narrative of Genesis. Rather, they would point to the use of the idea of "the word of the Lord" in the prophetic writings and in the Psalms. In his famous commentary on the Fourth Gospel, the late Sir Edwyn Hoskyns has an essay on "The Historical Tension of the Fourth Gospel". In this he includes the term "word" among the instances which he adduces of the debt of that Gospel to the prophets of Israel. (p.63). Unfortunately he did not specify whether he was alluding only to the Prologue or to the Gospel as a whole. This point will become important when we reach the final section of this thesis.

Before we turn to the examination of the use of such expressions as the "word of the Lord", the moment is opportune to state the real value and strength of the recent
attempts to find the foundations of the Logos doctrine of the Prologue in the sacred writings of the Hebrews. It does take account of the fact that the writer is using a term with which he evidently expects his readers to be familiar. Even those scholars who are still prepared to defend the position that the Fourth Gospel is addressed primarily to non-Jewish Christians, can scarcely hope to deny that it presupposes not only a knowledge of Jewish Scriptures, but some acquaintance with Jewish observances and customs. We have ample evidence of a wide diffusion of those Scriptures. For instance, in the last century Dupuis argued for Mithraism as a source of Christian cultus. ("L'Origine de tous les Cultes"). But there is no evidence of an adequate westward infiltration of Mithraism at such an early date. So, then, here is the strength of the position taken by such as Hoskyns and Howard: they make ample allowance for the fact that the writer of the Prologue introduces the term Ὁ without pre-amble or explanation, assuming his readers' familiarity therewith; they do point to a source of sufficient diffusion in the world for which the Gospel was written, whether Palestinian or of the Dispersion.
The daily recital of the Psalter has given many of us a familiarity with the "Psalms of David" which often comes dangerously close to breeding the proverbial contempt. But, even so, we cannot remain entirely oblivious of the frequent use therein of the expression the "word of the Lord", and its like, nor of its reminders of the early verses of Genesis. It is not necessary to call into court more than a few instances.

1. Psalm 33. "By the word of the Lord were the heavens made, and all the host of them by the breath of his mouth."

(32) ὁ λόγος τοῦ κυρίου ὁ οὐρανοῦ ἐστὶν ἐξεστήκει τῆς ὥρας.

Hebrew הַלָּוְת הַבּוֹלַה

2. Psalm 105. "... until the time that his word came to pass; the word of the Lord tried him (Joseph)."

Ibid 42. "He remembered his holy word and Abraham his servant".

(154) μνήμη ὁ θεοῖς τοῦ θεοῦ τῶν λόγων αὐτοῦ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ κυρίου ἑνδομοιούσαν αὐτόν. ... ἔμψυχη τῶν λόγων τοῦ θεοῦ αὐτοῦ.

Hebrew הַלָּוְת הַבּוֹלַה

3. Psalm 107. "He sendeth his word and healeth them..."

(106) ὁ θεοῖς τοῦ θεοῦ τῶν λόγων αὐτοῦ κρατεῖ ἐν οὐσίᾳ αὐτοῦ ...

Hebrew הַלָּוְת

4. Psalm 147. "He sendeth out his commandment upon earth; his word runneth very swiftly".
It will be seen, even from these few instances, that in the Psalter we have the idea of the word (יִצְחַק) of Yahweh as involved in his creative activity, or as his expressed promise and command. (According to the Brown-Driver-Briggs Hebrew Lexicon pp.182 "יִצְחַק" is used 394 times in the Old Testament to express the divine communication given in the form of command, prophecy, etc.) In such cases we have no difficulty in appreciating that the thoughts of the Psalmists lie within the influence of the creation narrative. But, to the regular user of the Psalter, talk of the word of Yahweh immediately suggests the one hundred and nineteenth psalm, at once the longest and most artificial in the collection. It is the opinion of some (for instance the late Dr. Cheyne) that whoever composed this psalm had before him the nineteenth psalm, and from it derived his notions about the "word of the Lord" (8-10, 13 130, 4, 27, 142, 150, 160, 172, 127.) (psalm 19 op. Psalter 119 103, 133.) But the study of the English versions of the psalm is apt to be misleading, and to give the student the impression that the concept of the "word" is more specific than is the case.
This can be illustrated by tabulating a comparison of the English Revised Version, the Hebrew and the Septuagint Texts. In Hebrew "word" is rendered either by וּכְע or יִכְע and in the Revised Version, the texts are translated by "thy word" in verses 9, 16, 17, 25, 28, 42, 65, 74, 81, 89, 105, 107, 114, 160, 169. But the text of the Septuagint (ed: H.B. Swete) is:

9. 9. οἱ λόγοι σου  ΜS.variants:-  
16. 16. οἱ λόγοι σου  
17. 17. οἱ λόγοι σου  
25. 25. τὸ λόγιον σου  δ ὁ λόγος σου  
26. 26. οἱ λόγοι σου  
42. 42. οἱ λόγοι σου  
65. 65. τὸ λόγιον σου  δ λόγος σου  
74. 74. οἱ λόγοι σου  
81. 81.  δ λόγος σου  οἱ λόγοι σου  η τὸ λόγιον σου  
89. 89.  δ λόγος σου  
105. 105.  δ λόγος σου  
107. 107.  τὸ λόγιον σου  δ λόγος σου  
114. 114.  δ λόγος σου  οἱ λόγοι σου  η σοφία σου.  
160. 160.  οἱ λόγοι σου  
169. 169.  τὸ λόγιον σου  

These  ὁ λόγοι texts are rendered by "thy words" in verses 57, 130, 139, 147, 161.
Again, turning to the Greek, we find:

MS. variants.

57. ὁ λόγος σου
130. ὁ λόγος σου
139. ὁ λόγος σου
147. ὁ λόγος σου
161. ὁ λόγος σου

In verse 49, we have "the word", where the Greek has ὁ λόγος σου (MS. variant of ὁ λόγος σου). The Hebrew is without the possessive suffix.

Of the passages it only remains to note the first part of verse 42, and verse 43. In the former, the Revised Version reads "answer", and the Greek λόγος, without the article. In the latter, the Revised Version reads "the word of truth" and the Greek has λόγος ἀληθείας, without any articles, for the Hebrew יִתְנָא יִתְנָא.

The texts are rendered by "thy word" in the following verses of the Revised Version: 11, 38, 41, 50, 58, 67, 76, 82, 116, 133, 140, 148, 162, 170, 172. The Septuagint Version has:

11. τὸ λόγιόν σου
38. τὸ λόγιόν σου
41. τὸ ἔθις τοῦ σου
50. τὸ λόγιόν σου
58. τὸ λόγιόν σου
In verse 103, we have "thy words", reproducing the Greek τα λόγια σου, without variant readings. In verse 123, we find "thy righteous word" for τα λόγια της δικαιοσύνης σου (Hebrew: יְדֵי יָדֶךָ אֶלֹהֵי קְרִים).

Three more verses remain to be noticed, 124, 149 and 142.

124. The Revised Version reads: "according unto thy mercy". Swete’s text of the Septuagint has: κατὰ τὰ τα λόγια σου, but notes that other manuscripts have: κατὰ τὰ τα εἴλεος σου.

The Hebrew text is יְדֵי יָדֶךָ אֶלֹהֵי קְרִים.

149. Here the Revised Version reads: "according unto thy loving-kindness". Here, again, Swete’s text has: κατὰ τὰ τα λόγια σου, noting this variant: κατὰ τὰ τα εἴλεος σου.

Once again, we note the Hebrew:

142. The Revised Version of this verse has: "and thy law is the truth" for Swete’s
It will be seen that there is little, if anything, to suggest either divine communication or creative utterance in verses 124 and 149.

Dr. Burney failed to win the general acceptance among New Testament scholars of his theory of an Aramaic origin for the Fourth Gospel. But he did make students realize the frequent poverty of the Evangelist's Greek. Canon Knox has underlined this lesson by emphasizing the "atrocities" of language in the Johannine, and Dr. W.F. Howard, continuing Moulton's Grammar of New Testament Greek, is emphatic that the Greek of the Fourth Gospel is that of one "to whom Greek was no mother tongue". In the Gospel, too, the writer, in quoting from the Old Testament, sometimes agrees with the Hebrew version as against the Septuagint, e.g. 6:45 (Is: 54:13), 13:8 (Ps:41:9), 19:37 (Zech:12:10). But in no instance does he agree with the Greek as against the Hebrew.

If we could be convinced of the quondam picture of an aged John, long exiled from Palestine, absorbed by the Greek market-place philosophy, we might persuade ourselves that his Scriptures were those of Alexandria. But this picture of the author has grown dim. Thus we may not appeal to the fluctuation and variations of the Septuagint of Psalm 119, concealed in our English Version. What we may say, however, is that
here we have a translation of the Psalm which scarcely suggests the confident and bold words about the Logos uttered in the Prologue; moreover, some of the verses, in many of the readings, show that many years before the time of the Fourth Gospel, this psalm had been accepted as a panegyric upon the Torah, Ὅ νόμος (see Garvie's note on the use of the article with Ὅ μος, "Romans" in the Century Bible, pp.106). But with it should be compared Dr. C.H.Dodd on the uses of Ὅ μος, especially in relation to rendering Ἁραριν in "The Bible and the Greeks"pp.25-38). For as such it was almost certainly written. Nor can it be reasonably doubted but that, for the worshipper of the first century, the "word of the Lord" in the Psalter would normally carry with it the associations of Psalms 19 and 119. Nor should the point escape us that (except in Psalm 119 where λόγος appears without the definite article) in all the instances which we have given, Ὅ λόγος is not employed absolutely, but is related to a second category by the use of the genitive case. In the Johannine Prologue, though not in the First Epistle of John nor in the Apocalypse, Ὅ λόγος is, in all four instances, used absolutely.

We have already noted that, for the Jew of the first century, "the word" of the Psalter suggested the Sacred Torah. It is, therefore, difficult to attribute much indebtedness to the Psalms in the case of one who could
We have already noted Hoskyn's remark that the term "word" is part of the Fourth Evangelist's debt to the prophets. To a brief examination of this thought, we must now direct our attentions.

The reading of the prophetic writings readily familiarizes us with the prophetic catch-phrase "the word of the Lord came unto me" (eg. Ezekiel 3:16, Hosea 1:1 etc.) There are slight variations of this, such as Isaiah 2:1 "The word that Isaiah the son of Amos saw". In the first type we have θέαν ηλιστο καριον; in the latter instance, however, both the Hebrew and Greek carry the definite article. This is by no means usual; so that immediately we notice that the English version is more precise than the original. In Luther's German translation, he normally renders the phrase "Und des Herrn Wort geschah zu mir und sprach", although in rendering Hosea 1:1 he gives:— Dies ist das Wort des Herrn. On the whole, he preserved the ambiguity of the original.

An examination of the writings of the prophets soon shows that phrases of this type are literary devices, usually used to introduce what the prophet claims to be a divine message, transmitted by his agency. Normally, it
stands at the head of the particular message; this need not be what we should understand by a prophecy, but a statement of fact. For instance, Ezekiel 11:15 is a factual assertion, and the subsequent prophecy is introduced in 16 "Thus saith the Lord". Again in Jeremiah 1:5, although introduced by the phrase "the word of the Lord came unto me", is the "call" of the prophet himself to his work. In Jeremiah 2:2, it is the command to the prophet to execute a certain task. Moreover, "the word of the Lord" was such that, rightly or wrongly, it could be compared with the priestly teaching (Isaiah 28:10-13) sometimes, on the opinion of some commentators, the phrase is a later introduction from the hand of a redactor (Isaiah 2:1 in the judgment of Whitehouse). Nor need the device introduce the prophetic message; it may stand in the body of the "oracle", serving as a reminder of the prophetic claim to divulge the message of God. An instance of this is Isaiah 24:3. But interesting to note, here we have a case where the English Version preserves the full force of the original:

The Septuagint has only το ο ν ε ρ α τ ο l α ι ο κ η η σ ι ων although a marginal reading of Egyptian Codex Marchalianus in the Vatican Library has το qημα τοιο. It is clear that the prophets, or whoever preserved their messages, regarded the "word" as at least given by
a voice, or source, external to the prophets themselves.
Indeed the phrase normally embraces the three factors
"word", "Lord" and "me" i.e. the prophet. The first and
second are related in English by the genitive case (the
contract in Hebrew) and conspire to constitute the subject
of the intransitive verb. The dative represents well the

Indeed the phrase answers to "Thus saith the Lord" (לֹֽאְךָ
נָשָׁה יְהוָּה) "Then
and/said the Lord", (נָשָׁה יְהוָּה)

The first seven verses of Ezekiel 13 illustrate this
point:—

(1) And the word of the Lord came unto me, saying

(גְּדוּר יְהוָּה רָצוֹן) say thou..... Hear the
word of the Lord (נָשָׁה יְהוָּה) (3)Thus saith the Lord
God (נָשָׁה יְהוָּה), Woe to the foolish prophets ..... (6)
that say, The Lord saith (נָשָׁה יְהוָּה); and the Lord hath
not sent them: and they made men to hope that the Word (לֹֽאְךָ)
should be confirmed. (7) Have ye not a vain vision, and
have ye not spoken a lying divination, whereas ye say, The
Lord saith; albeit I have not spoken (נָשָׁה יְהוָּה)

Another variation of this category of expressions
should also be mentioned. In Ezekiel the divine com-
mand to the prophet is introduced";—"And the hand of the
Lord was upon me: and he said unto me..." (הָלַךְ וְאָמַרְתָּ אֵלַי) This, too, suggests the "externality" of the prophetic message, or the message received by the prophet, for there is no distinction between these, being one and the same. The same inference surely attached to the like of Hosea 6:

Therefore have I hewed them (i.e. Ephraim and Judah) by the prophets; I have slain them by the words of my mouth". (וַיֹּאמֶר לְאָדָם וַיְהַלְּךָ "This.

Some notice, too, should be paid to the use of the phrases of the type which we have been considering, as we meet them outside the strictly prophetical books. For example, in 1 Samuel 9 the prophet Samuel tells Saul, "Stand thou still at this time, that I may cause thee to hear the word of God". (וַיֹּאמֶר לְאָדָם וַיְהַלְּךָ "Soon the question goes up, "Is Saul also among the prophets?" And we seem to have the notion of the "word" as the distinctive prophetical endowment. In the same writings, too, we have the idea of the "word" as a divine message transmitted through the prophet to whom it "comes", (so, I Kings 12) sometimes, apparently, during normal sleep (so, IChron:17). Note, also, the use of the characteristic "Thus saith the Lord" in verse 7). In some passages we have the thought of appeal to a prophet represented as having recourse to the "word" of God (eg. II Kings 16).
We have given a brief, but, it is hoped, fair survey of the idea of the "word" of God in the prophetic contexts of the Old Testament, stressing its "externality" as much as possible. But, when this is done, Lebreton's judgment remains a fair summing up; such phrases are no more than "bold figures of speech" (The Dogma of the Trinity", p.99 E.T.) There are isolated instances in the later chapters of Isaiah which, at a first glance, seem in advance of the normal prophetic use. But if it were possible to approach even these with minds divested of all subsequent use of these passages, especially in patristic writers, it is doubtful if we should have seen much in the prophetic word which would carry us forward to meet ὁ λόγος, THE WORD of the Johannine Prologue. At the most, the "word"-phrases connote the prophetic endowment; the predicates express the idea of the "otherness" of the prophet's messages. At the least they constitute no more than a literary device of the compilers of the books in question.

A brief glance at the Septuagint is, again, not without interest. There is no need to labour the fact that the appeal to the Septuagint is not so much to ascertain the "modus" of rendering the Hebrew into Greek, but, rather, to observe how the ideas of the time of translating have
affected that task. For instance, there is a change of emphasis between the Hebrew and the Greek Versions of Leviticus 24:16. The Revised Version is a fair enough rendering of the former:— "And he that blasphemeth the name of the Lord, he shall surely be put to death".

But the Greek version has:

ονομάζων εἰς τὸ ονομα κυρίου ἐαναίω σκοτούσων.

Turning to the rendering of the type of phrase with which we have been dealing, and confining ourselves to the examples which have already been cited, we note that the majority are rendered λόγος κυρίου, but there are variations:

1. Isaiah 28:3 καὶ εἰς ἑαυτῷ ὥσπερ τὸ λόγιον κυρίου.
2. Isaiah 24:3 We have already commented on the LXX text of this verse, and only call it into court to help in illustrating that the "word" of God in the prophetic writings is not consistently rendered in the Greek version.
3. Isaiah 2:1 (cf. Jeremiah 25:1) ὁ λόγος ὁ γενομένος.....

The δ, however, is absent in the Codex Rescriptus Cryptoferratensis; but this, in turn, is probably an 8th or 9th century edition. As we have already noted, this is regarded by some as an insertion by a redactor. While we are dealing with the work of the redactor, these points may be noted. In Isaiah, the introductions to chapters 15, 17 etc. (usually ascribed to the Redactor) open with the expression
which renders the Hebrew $\chi'\pi\eta\nu$. But, in 16 $^{13}$, concluding the $\pi\eta\mu\nu$ introduced in 15, we find $\tau\omega\varsigma\rho\eta\mu\alpha$, translating $\gamma\varsigma\rho\eta\nu\pi\tau\nu$ of the Hebrew. $\chi'\pi\eta\nu$ is rendered by $\theta'\sigma\rho\alpha\varsigma\tau\iota\varsigma$ in Chapter 19.

4. Ezekiel 13 $^{6}$ $\lambda\gamma\zeta\omicron\omicron\nu$. Here $\lambda\gamma\zeta\omicron\omicron\nu$ is used without an article.

5. Hosea 6 $^{5}$ $\epsilon\omicron\rho\eta\mu\tau\tau\iota\kappa\omicron\omicron\nu\varsigma\mu\nu$.

6. I Samuel 9 $^{27}$ $\rho\hbar\mu\alpha\tau\omicron\omega\theta\sigma\ominus$.

7. II Kings 1 $^{16}$ Here we find no specific word to correspond with $\gamma\varsigma\rho\eta\nu\pi\tau\nu$ of the Hebrew. And we may note, also, in the following verse $\gamma\rho\iota\nu\kappa\tau\omicron\iota\zeta\iota\pi\tau\iota\varsigma$ rendered kata $\tau\rho\hbar\mu\alpha\tau\omicron\omega\theta\sigma$.

Enough has been said to illustrate that the Septuagint translators found nothing in the meaning of the original to require expression in such a precise term as $\Theta\lambda\gamma\zeta\omicron\omicron\nu$.

We noted, in treating of the use of $\lambda\gamma\zeta\omicron\omicron\nu$ in the Psalter, a certain amount of textual confusion between the uses of $\lambda\gamma\zeta\omicron\omicron\nu$ and $\nu\hbar\mu\alpha\nu$. This may have been due to the fact that, for the Septuagint authors $\Theta\lambda\gamma\zeta\omicron\omicron\nu$ was $\Theta\nu\hbar\mu\alpha\nu$ of the Torah. We need not be surprised, then, to encounter this verse (Is. 1 $^{10}$) $\delta\kappa\omicron\sigma\omicron\omicron\varsigma\tau\omicron\lambda\gamma\zeta\omicron\omicron\nu\varsigma\kappa\rho\iota\omicron\omicron\nu$ ($\kappa\pi\nu\tau\iota\varsigma\zeta\tau\omicron\omega\varsigma$), $\delta\kappa\omicron\sigma\omicron\omicron\varsigma$ $\sigma\delta\hbar\mu\alpha\nu\nu$. $\pi\omicron\sigma\delta\kappa\omicron\iota\varsigma\kappa\rho\iota\omicron\omicron\nu\varsigma\mu\nu\Theta\sigma\tau\omicron\nu$ ($\kappa\iota\nu\tau\iota\varsigma\mu\nu$).

Here one manuscript has $\lambda\gamma\zeta\omicron\omicron\nu$ for $\nu\hbar\mu\alpha\nu$. Of course, at the time when the chapter was written, Torah has not acquired its subsequent legal meaning; but, by the time of...
the Septuagint Torah was ὦ νόμος and, by the time of the
Fourth Gospel, included the entire Old Testament, and, not
infrequently, the oral traditions, handed down from genera-
tion to generation. Hoskyns well summarizes:— "... chiefly
the word of God denoted the divine law given to Israel by
Moses" (Fourth Gospel" p.155). It will be a matter for
subsequent discussion as to whether the road to the concept
of ὦ νόμος lay by way of Torah. [Also noteworthy is Isaiah 5
"...... they have rejected the law of the Lord (ἡ νόμος τῆς ἡλίου)
and despised the word of the Holy One of Israel (ὁ λόγος)"
The LXX has ὦ νόμος and ὁ νόμον. ]

Finally, we may point to Exodus 12. The children of
Israel did according to the word of Moses (λέγοντες Ἰσραήλ
It is certainly to be doubted whether any less significance
is to be attached to this Ἰσραήλ than to the Ἰσραήλ of the pro-
phets, and yet what is the Septuagint? καὶ ἤτοι ὅτε Ἰσραήλ
Μωσῆς ἔγραψεν. Comment is superfluous.

It seems that foundations of the concept of the Logos
can scarcely lie in the thought of the divine communica-
tions made to the prophets. It does not seem that that
"debt to the prophets" has been run to ground in the pro-
phetic writings.
"The equivocal status of the intermediary beings in Jewish Theology ...... might be due to the fact that in the Jewish mind a reverence for God's majesty led to their conception while a reverence for his unity forbade their birth".


The words set at the head of this chapter are a reminder that for the Jewish thinker there existed a problem which could not be raised by his Stoic contemporary. Possibly this quotation, from Rudolf Bultmann's "Jesus and the Word", is as fair a summary of Greek thought that we can hope to make:- "In reality, Greek thought always regards God in the last analysis as a part of the world or as identical with the world, even when, or rather especially when, he is held to be the origin or formative, cosmic principle which lies beyond the world of phenomena. For here, too, God and the world form a unity within the grasp of thought; the meaning of the world becomes clear in the idea of God. Greek thought tends, therefore, to pantheism, which finds its final and most impressive embodiment in the Stoic philosophy". (E.T.p.134).

There is, in the Old Testament, a development in the ideas about God and his revelation, his nature and his
relationship to men. In the early stories of Genesis we read of a God who walks, and who hides. Even when the ark rests in Solomon's temple, the carrying poles are still there. After its restoration from captivity among the Philistines, it was thought of as a throne.

But even in the book of the prophet Isaiah we have traces of a developing problem, or, at any rate, of centres of tension from which the problem must, sooner or later, arise. In 61-4 there is a groping after the idea of Yahweh's omnipresence and yet of his exaltation. Yahweh is "high and lifted up", but "his train" still "fills the temple" - not necessarily the heavenly, but the Temple of Solomon in Jerusalem, and familiar to Isaiah the courtier. But in Isaiah 31, the talk is of Yahweh, "whose fire is in Zion, and his furnace in Jerusalem". So we are not only advancing towards the concept of a transcendent deity, but also to the problem of his relationship to the world and man, a problem thrown into bolder relief when the "Glory" of Israel departed, and his people were apparently deserted by Yahweh. How were they to account for their political, economic and military downfall? Was their own God the author and perpetrator of their misfortunes? It was searchings of this type which the Alexandrian Platonist could answer
with his ideas about the evil work of inferior beings. But, while these linked God and his world, they also drove him farther and farther away from man. And the pious Jew of Palestine was left to nurse his peculiar problem of a transcendent God and of his relationship to the world.

It may be questioned whether the problem was ever solved. But it can hardly be doubted that its existence was bound to affect Jewish thought. In fact the problem still occupies the mind of Jewish thinkers, as readers of such writings as S. Schechter's "Some Aspects of Rabbinic Theology" will know. Modern Jewish writers tend to suggest that the faith of Israel in God has always maintained a balance between his "sublimity and grandeur" and the "emphasis" given to his "nearness". (R. Mattuck). This is, probably, an ever-simplification of Jewish religious history. Other writers have tried to make much of the impact of Greek thought upon the religion of the Hebrews; what ideas we find in the former must, willy-nilly, have repercussions on the latter. But, as Canon Hodgson has put it, "the statement sometimes made, that the personification of intermediary beings in later Jewish theology is due to the influence of Greek philosophy on Hebrew religious thinking can only proceed from those who have never understood what philosophy is". ("Doctrine of
the Trinity" p.120). Others have suggested that there
was, in Judaism, an incipient doctrine of intermediaries,
which was later repudiated by Jewish thinkers on the score
that it might be taken as giving support to the developing
theology of the early Christian Church. (eg. Kohler, "Jewish
Theology"). Some would not deny that this phase of Jewish
religious development has left its traces in the Targums.

We have by no means said all that is to be said on the
subject of the "word" in the Old Testament; we shall, in
fact, return to the topic presently. All we have done is
to show that, whatever there may be in common between the
Prologue of the Fourth Gospel and those aspects of the
"word" in the Old Testament which we have considered, there
is a gulf which - supposing the writer's mind was influenced
by them - must have been bridged in the Evangelist's
thinking by another element. In point of fact, most attempts
to account for the term Logos in that Prologue resolve
themselves into the search for that factor. St. Jerome may
be right in declaring that St. John wrote the Prologue,
being "saturated with revelation". But it is still open to
the most reverent enquirer to try to probe the content of
that mind which received the revelation. To what factors
did he relate it in his attempt to reduce it to human speech?

Some have thought to find that element, bridging the
"word" of the creation narrative, of the Psalter and the
prophets, in the Targums. We step back into the leisurely days of Canon Liddon's great Bampton Lectures, and read:

"In the Hebrew books the Word of Jehovah manifests the energy of God: he creates the heavens (ps.33:6); he governs the world (Ps.147:15; 18:55). Accordingly, among the Palestinian Jews, the Chaldee paraphrasts almost always always represent God as acting, not immediately, but through the mediation of the Memra or Word". (p.63.2nd.etn.)

It will be seen that Liddon accepted both the idea of Jewish belief in some type of mediatory agent, and an identification of the Old Testament "Word" with the Targumic Memra. So, too, in his "Theology of the New Testament", Dr. Stevens spoke of the personification in the Targums of the Memra of Yahweh, conceived of as "a kind of intermediary angel between the transcendent Deity and the world" (p.579). The late Bishop Gore, in his Bampton Lectures, "The Incarnation of the Son of God", made a splendid effort to break with the temper and fashion of those days by refusing to find in Greek philosophy and in Hellenism the key to unlock all the problems of the New Testament and of early Christian thought. In 1891 he declared that "the characteristic force" of the central term of the Johannine Prologue" appears to be derived from Hebrew, not Greek sources, and from the atmosphere of Palestine
rather than of Alexandria". But he, too, turns to the Targums: he says of the Memra (or Debura) that it is "constantly spoken of as the efficient instrument of divine action, in cases where the Old Testament speaks of Jehovah himself. The Word of God had come to be used personally, as almost equivalent to God manifesting himself". (p.69. op. "Reconstruction of Belief" p.411-419). As Gore pointed out in his preface, he was preaching to a wider audience than would be indicated by the description "theologians". So we should not seek any over-cautious statements. It will be noted that that which is "the efficient instrument" can scarcely be "God manifesting himself". But it seems that he accepts the identification of the "Word" of the Old Testament and the Memra of the Targums.

Briefly, the Targums are Aramaic "renderings" (a satisfactory term is not easy to find; both "paraphrases" and "versions" are not applicable in all instances) of various parts of the Hebrew Scriptures. There are, in all, fourteen, some complete and others fragmentary. Between them, they "cover" all the Canonical Scriptures, except those parts already written chiefly in Aramaic. As documents, they represent the preservation at a relatively late date of "renderings" which had hitherto been preserved by oral tradition. Of particular relevance to the present topic are:-
1. The Onkelos Targum. This became for pre-ninth century Jewry what we might call an "authorized version" of the Pentateuch. It represents what is virtually a literal translation, not of the scholarly, but of the "popular" type. As we now have it, it is a Babylonian revision of a Palestinian original.

2. The Jerusalem Targum. This also is of the Pentateuch, but is a much freer paraphrase.

3. The Jonathan Targum. This is a Targum of the Prophets. As we have it, the final form may be of the fifth century of our era (see, R.A. Sagtoun, "The Servant of the Lord in Targum", "J.T.S. XXIII(90), January 1922). But the first written version was probably made at the end of the first century.

As we have noted, there was a common tendency during the last century, among those who preferred not to seek the derivation of the Logos in the Johannine Prologue in Philo or the Stoics, to regard it "as a Jewish idea, which is supposed to be traceable to the use of the term Memra. *(F.C.Burkitt). In the "Harvard Theological Review" for January 1922, Professor G.F.Moore provided an article on "Intermediaries in Jewish Theology". Professor Burkitt wrote a note in the Journal of Theological Studies, drawing the attention of English students to Professor Moore's article, and stressing the importance of it. In Volume XXIV
(No. 94) for January 1923, Professor Burkitt wrote a summary of the article from the American journal. The same conclusions were received in 1924 by Billerbeck, in the "Kommentar zum N.T. aus Talmud und Midrasch" (II. pp. 302-333). In his original article, Professor Moore attacked the idea that the Memra of the Targums corresponds to the הָלָּחָה of the Hebrew Scriptures, and that it has anything to do with the Logos of the Johannine Prologue, or any other Greek composition.

As I had made my summary of the article in the Harvard Theological Review before reading Burkitt's in the Journal of Theological Studies, I give this now.

He points out that the phrase "the Word of the Lord" in Hebrew Scriptures is not properly the equivalent of the "Memra" of Yahweh in the Aramaic Targums. In fact, it is misleading to render "memra" in English with a capital letter - Word. In the Targums "Dabhar Jahweh," or, sometimes, especially in the Palestinian Targums, by "milla". Both answer to λόγος and בְּרֵאשִׁית in the Septuagint. Thus, the Hebrew text of Hosea 1 is:

\[ \text{הַנּוֹלַת אֲבֵרָיוֹת בֵּיתֵיָהוּ שֶׁבֶרֶץ יְהוּדָה} \]

(Rv. "When the Lord spake at the first to Hosea, the Lord said....").

But the Targum speaks of "the word of prophecy from before Yahweh which was with Hosea".

... שֵׁלַי הָלָּחָה זֶרֶץ יְהוּדָה
Even in those passages where we might think that the "word" is almost personified, we still find the use of the word "pitgama". Thus in Isaiah 40, we have:

(תֹּבְךָ הַיַּרְדֵּנֶל ֶ֔יְשָׁרֵב אֶלֶּיהוֹ חוֹם פַּעְולָּם)
(RV: "The grass withereth, the flower fadeth: but the word of our God shall stand for ever"). Here the Targum reads:

כָּרְתָּךְ רַעְשֵׁךְ אֵבֹרָּה עַצִּים תָּבוּןָא, וּכָוָנָא לְאוֹלָם
- "The wicked man dies, and his plans perish, but the word of our God abideth for ever". So also, Isaiah 55

(כָּל֜וּלָּת שְׁעָרִים, Jeremiah 23

Thus where the Hebrew Scriptures speak of the creative activity of Yahweh, the Targums do not represent this activity as mediated by his "memra". There is one exception to this. In Isaiah 45 we have: - "I have made the earth and created man upon it: I, even my hands, have stretched out the heavens, and all their host have I commanded". Here the Targum reads:

אַלֶּּם בְּדַיֵּרָּק עַבְרֵי חַּרְבָּה יָרוּחֵי וּרְאוּפִּים עִלַּי הָרִי פַּּעֲלִים

Otherwise, it may be stated that "memra" does not connote the divine creative agency of any supposed Genesis cosmology.

MEMAR (definite memra) is the Aramaic counterpart of the late Hebrew מָעָר (from וַיְמַעַר). Used substantively,
in general it signifies something said - a dictum. It is used to express the giving and receipt of commands. Thus, in Genesis 45:21 "Joseph gave (the sons of Israel) wagons, according to the commandment of Pharaoh". Here the Targum has "memra de - Par'oh" for the Hebrew נָשָׂא the mouth. So, also, of Moses (Exodus 38:21); of Aaron (Numbers 4:21.), "To disobey his "memra"; to listen and to obey, is to receive the memra of Yahweh. (Gen.3:8 op. Deut.5:21.)

Many instances could be given in which "memra" is introduced to express Yahweh's speaking to someone. Thus, in Genesis 20:3 we read that "God came to Abimelech in a dream of the night, and said to him .........."
The Onkelos Targum reads: - "A memra from before Yahweh came to Abimelech in a dream of the night and said to him ......". Thus, in the Onkelos Targum of Exodus 30:44 we read: - "I will cause my memra (מִרְ י) to meet with the Israelites, and (the tabernacle) shall be sanctified by my glory". Yahweh assures Moses, "my memra (מִרְ י) shall be in they mouth". (Exod.4:12). Here, "word" signifies an oracle revealing God's will. Similarly, the acceptance of God's will is paraphrased as the reception of his "word". Thus, in Genesis 15.6, (Abram) believed the memra of Yahweh."
But the use of "memra" is not confined to expressing the idea of the revelation of Yahweh's will; it is also employed to signify his operative activity in mundane processes. Thus, the Onkelos Targum of Deuteronomy 3:22 has:— "For Yahweh your God his memra fights for you". Moreover, the anthropomorphic idea of protection at "the hand of God" is normally rendered by the same device. Thus, for Exodus 33:22(c) we have:— "I will extend protection by my memra over thee". Similarly the Scriptural statements of Yahweh's dealings with men are described in the Targums as between Yahweh's "memra" and men. In Genesis 9:12 we read:— "God said, This is the token of the covenant which I make between me and you...." But the Targum has "between my memra and you".

Before proceeding further there are two points which are worth mentioning. In the first place, while Professor Moore derived his examples, in the main, from the Pentateuch, similar instances can readily be found in the Prophets. Secondly, it will be noted, in the examples given above, "memra" is never used absolutely. In point of fact, the Targums appear to provide no case of the use of "memra" apart from a qualifying genitive.

We may now summarize Professor Moore's conclusions. "Memra" signifies Yahweh's dictum (as command or oracle),
denotes the expression of his will, or activity in carrying out that will (sometimes connoting his power.) In numerous instances, it appears as a device to maintain the remoteness of Yahweh. "In many instances it is clearly introduced as a verbal buffer - one of many such in the Targums - to keep God from seeming to come to too close quarters with men and things; but it is always a buffer-WORD, not a buffer-idea; still less a buffer-person". (F.C.Burkitt). Nowhere in the Targums is the term "memra" used to signify a being. It is neither the angel conveying the will, or commandments of Yahweh to men; nor is it, in the philosophical sense, a creative agent. It is, moreover, peculiar to the Targums, and is not found in Aramaic Midrash nor in Talmudic literature. Kohler accounts for this by pointing to the developing mistrust of the Rabbis for a word which they regarded as comprised by Christian associations. It is to be accounted for only as a device of Targumic literary style, and not as the expression of any theological speculation. Lebreton has well expressed the truth of the matter when he said: - "The difficulty preoccupying the Rabbis belongs above all to the order and practice of ritual (Here used in its exact sense.K.H.): a religious scruple did not allow them to name God as often as he was named in the Bible, not above all did they dare to attribute to him, directly
or immediately, as many actions as did the sacred books; to calm their scruples it was enough to veil the divine majesty under an abstract periphrasis". As a matter of interest, too, we may note that Lebreton found the only point of contact between the "memra" of the Targums and the "logos" of the Johannine Prologue to be the actual characters of the word itself. This, too, was Harnack's verdict. Billerbeck (op.cit.) accounted for the "Memra-Jahves" of the Targums, like Lebreton, as a circumlocution arising for the later Jewish distaste for pronouncing the sacred name.

We have noted how immediate was the general acceptance of Professor Moore's conclusions in this country, following the lead of Professor Burkitt. Its early acceptance can be noticed in Dr. Kirk's article on the "Evolution of the Doctrine of the Trinity". (Essays on the Trinity and the Incarnation", A.E.J. Rawlinson, p.190), while both Dr. Strachan and Dr. Howard have also agreed with him in more recent publications.

Actually, Moore's position was anticipated in the last century by Dorner, in his "Person Christi" (pp.59-60). He declared that the Memra, Shekinah and Metatron entail only a parastatic appearance of God, being symbolic of his Presence, and impersonal. Balman, in his "Die Worte Jesu" (pp.187-188) appears to have held a similar position.
R.L. Ottley, too, seems to have entertained some such idea; for, although he speaks of the "Memra" being "used paraphrastically to express the personality of a being", he also suggests that it is "a paraphrase for God himself". (The Incarnation" p. 39.) It is even possible that this, too, was Bishop Gore's view. Be that as it may, it is customary to regard Professor Moore's article as enunciating and stabilizing the position, and the conclusion which he offered has found general acceptance.

It is not to be expected that one article in an American journal could immediately and finally undermine a position with which European scholars would associate the impressive name of Bousset (see his "die Relig. des Judentum", p. 398 and with which op. Haksell in Rev. Bibl. Internat. for 1902, p. 62). Thus we can still read in a book belonging to the present decade:—

"In the Tarqums it is not the localized Shekinah but the Memra, the almost hypostatized word, which is regarded as the active representative of God on earth". (W.J. Phythian-Adams, "The People and the Presence". p. 177).

Again, in the Jewish Quarterly Review for October 1932 (N.S. Volume XXII No. 2) Canon G.H. Box reconsidered the "Idea of Intermediation in Jewish Theology" (pp. 103 ff), with particular reference to the use of "memra". If I have under-
stood him aright, two factors in his criticism of Professor Moore are of particular interest and relevance in the present discussion. [Canon Knox also wrote:— "For some unexplained reason the writer (of the Fourth Gospel) identified Jesus with the rather shadowy Memra or Word of God which plays a somewhat unimportant role in the Targums as a periphrasis for the divine name". Thus, it seems, he wishes to retain the debt of the Johannine Prologue to the Targums, but to reduce the significance of the language of the Targums to that of periphrasis.]

1. Box noted the case of Isaiah 45.12. We have already seen that Moore allowed that this verse is the one exception to his thesis that the Old Testament is not translated by "memra" in the Targums. Canon Box suggested that "memra" was consistently used to render  ידיל in the lost Palestinian original; but that "pitgama" was substituted in the Babylonian revision, Isaiah 45.12 somehow escaping revision, and remaining to provide the clue to the usage of the original. Thus, he argued, there was a stage of Targumic development, whose literary memorials we no longer possess, but in which the Rabbis had gone someway in the direction of the personalization of the "memra".
2. Box's second argument was an appeal to Kohler's article in the Jewish Encyclopedia, in which he noted the use with "memra" of verbs implying personal action.

On these grounds, Canon Box, repudiated the thesis that "memra" is a "buffer-word", devoid of any "theological significance".

But Moore's argument, especially since it was reiterated in his "Judaism in the First Centuries of the Christian Era" (I, pp. 417 ff.) has won fairly widespread acceptance in Europe. The "memra" is "not an intermediary or hypostasis, but only a purely formal substitute for the sacred tetragrammaton, the ineffable name". My own criticism, while finding Moore's arguments conclusive, is to wonder if the question of intermediation is strictly relevant to a consideration of antecedents for the Logos-term of the Johannine Prologue. I can perceive no evidence that the author thereof had any idea of an intermediary when he introduced his Logos-category. This is a point which we shall have to mention again. But this consideration will not serve to reopen the door which scholars of other days thought that they perceived between the Prologue and the Targums.

But, in fairness, it should also be noticed that, even if the argument against a Targumic source of the
Logos-term has been established, the possible indebtedness of the Johannine author to the Targums for such associations as are suggested by Ἰησοῦς ζητεῖ has still to be as convincingly disproved.

The interesting consideration, too, arises from the discussion; if all this is true which has been argued by Moore and accepted by such as Dr. Howard, it would also appear that we go some way towards our being able to say that the natural development of Old Testament thought and language was not in the direction indicated by the Johannine Prologue.

To sum up: the Prologue culminates in a categorical statement of the Incarnation. No phrase of the Targums goes beyond the stage of quasi-personification. The language of Targums is in large measure the reflection of that Hebrew poetry which extends at least from the Psalmists to Heine; that is, it is in high degree symbolical - as all religious poetry must be. The things symbolized must be taken into consideration in the weighing of meanings. No doubt the language of the Prologue could be considered poetical; but we should never forget that the limits of its symbolism are again defined by the historical Gospel to which it is related.
What is the Debt to Greek Philosophy?

"If, then, it is alleged that the Greeks gave expression to some aspects of true philosophy by accident, that accident depended on divine economy; for no one will be induced by the present controversy to deify chance".

- Clement of Alexandria in "Stromateis".

Quid Athenis et Hierosolymis? Quid acadamiae et ecclesiae?"

- Tertullian,

in de Praescriptione Haereticorum.

To introduce, in the present year, the topic of the indebtedness of the writer of the Johannine Prologue to the teachings of the Greek Philosophers, seems almost like stepping into another century; or, at any rate, like paying a tribute to an age which is gone, although as recently as 1944, it appears that Dr. A.J. Macdonald was prepared to accept the indebtedness of the Johannine writer to "Greek thought" about "the idea of the creative Logos" ( Interpreter Spirit and Human Life" p.III.) Considerable thought could produce no straightforward title for this part of the discussion. Only a question seemed adequate. And yet, it was less than half a century ago that much of the concentration was upon the Hellenistic background of
the New Testament. We have already had occasion to notice Dr. C.H. Dodd's protest at the radical swing to the position of almost exalting the Hebrew antecedents of the Fourth Gospel to the denial of any non-Hebraic contribution. We may quote again, "Indeed the Hellenistic aspect of Johannine thought is of greater importance than some recent writers, in reaction to earlier views, are ready to admit". A little later, Professor Dodd expresses his own belief thus:-

"The fact is that the fusion of Hebraic and Hellenistic thought is extra-ordinarily complete in the Fourth Gospel. Not only in the Prologue, but almost everywhere its language opens up vistas into two worlds, in both of which the writer is at home....."

There are three main reasons why the present treatment of the Logos-term in the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel ought to include some account of the place and use of λόγος in Greek philosophical writings. Firstly, because it is unlikely that those who found there at least one of the roots of the Johannine Logos can have been wholly wrong. Secondly, because the warning has sounded that the days of an exclusive Hebraic derivation are numbered. Thirdly, as we shall see, some consideration must later be given to the possibility that Judaism and later Hellenism was not without its effects upon the former.
In the minds of most New Testament students, the derivation of the Johannine Logos-term from the philosophy of Greece is always associated with the massive learning of Aberdeen's great Cambridge son, the late Professor James Adam. In his famous "Religious Teachers of Greece" he wrote:—

"In St. John's Gospel and the Epistles of St. Paul, Ideal Righteousness, which Plato, we must remember, speaks of as divine, has become incarnate in Jesus Christ: "the Word became flesh and dwelt among us": hence we may fairly say that in these two writers the person of Christ occupies the same relative position as is occupied by the Idea of Righteousness in Plato (p.436).

Having thus quoted Adam, it is interesting to quote the one whom Dr. Dodd has blamed for a too radical and exclusive Hebraic derivation of the Logos-term - the late Sir Edwyn Hoskyns. "So convinced was Adam of the direct connection between the use of the word Logos in the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel and in Greek philosophy, that he selected THE WORD rather than REASON as the most adequate translation into English of the Stoic Logos" (p.157).

Many years ago, Harnack posited that there must be some reason why "the religion of Jesus" has failed to take root in any Jewish or Semitic soil. Some have suggested
that the reason may well be the Greek (or non-Judaic) thought therein. But even Harnack himself, while admitting "well marked traces of it in Paul, Luke and John", concluded that "we cannot say that the earliest Christian writings, let alone the Gospel, show, to any considerable extent the presence of a Greek element". *(What is Christianity?* E.T.203.)*

A treatment of the Prologue of the Fourth Gospel is scarcely the place for a dissertation upon the theology of the Pauline Epistles, or his speeches in the Acts of the Apostles. It must suffice to note that there is a fairly general agreement as to a considerable community of thought between these and the Johannine writings. What is of interest to us is to note that there has also been a change in the approach to the Pauline theology. In spite of Harnack's warning that the Holy Land lay well within the sphere of Hellenic influence, the idea was once popular of a Hellenized Jew of Tarsus, whose divinely appointed task was to express afresh the teaching of a Jew of Palestine. Principal W.R. Halliday once wrote:

"If the Founder of Christianity was born in Bethlehem of Judaea, his message in order to reach the larger world was necessarily dressed in Hellenistic garb. The form in which Christian metaphysics and theology are expressed,
consequently has its roots in Greek philosophy and literature". ("The Pagan Background of Early Christianity", p.144). In fairness, it may be pointed out that Principal Halliday admitted (p.160) that the speech in Acts 17 lies outside the main stream of St. Paul's thought. But as far back as 1890, Krenkel found St. Paul so bereft of any traces of Greek culture, that he questioned the veracity of the statement in the Acts of the Apostles, that he was "of Tarsus".

But there are three points which ought to be kept in mind before we begin a summary of Greek philosophical thought on the topic of the Logos.

1. We cannot ignore the question of St. Paul and current philosophy. Although modern writers pay more attention to the Paul who sat at the feet of Gamaliel, and who boasted that he was an "Hebrew of the Hebrews", than to the Paul who quoted a Stoic hymn in Athens (Acts 17), we must give due weight to the fact that not only could Justin Martyr, "wearing his philosopher's cloak", speak of Christians before Christ, but that as early as the fourth century "that very jejune forgery, the CORRESPONDENCE between the Pagan (Seneca) and the Christian thinkers came into circulation". (Halliday, op.cit.p.4.) The idea of contact between Christian and Pagan thinkers has, at least, the respectability of old age to commend it.
2. Some weight must be given to the evidence for the study of Greek philosophical authors in Palestine. In his Schweich Lectures on "Some Hellenistic Elements in Primitive Christianity", Canon Knox says:

"In a curiously neglected passage of the Talmud (Sotah 49b) R. Gameliel is reported as saying that his father R. Simeon b. Gameliel II had in his house 500 lads learning the wisdom of the Jews and another 500 learning the wisdom of the Greeks. The number of pupils at this academy are of course as ridiculous as all ancient Jewish statistics; but there is no reason to doubt that that the Rabbis of the first century A.D. were alive to the need of such a dual curriculum". (p.31). Canon Knox's statement requires to be balanced with other passages from the Talmud. For instance Menachoth (99b):- "A Rabbi asked, "Since I have learned the whole of Torah, may I study Greek philosophy?" In reply, the verse was quoted, "This book of the law shall not depart out of thy mouth, but thou shalt meditate therein day and night" (Joshua 1:8a.), and the remark was added, "Go and search at which hour it is neither day nor night, and devote it to the study of Greek philosophy". Of course, while discountenancing such study, the verse may be taken as testimony to the availability of the study of Greek philosophy. Or what of Baba Kamma (83a)? There were
a thousand pupils in my father's school, of whom five hundred studied Torah and five hundred studied Greek philosophy; AND OF THE LATTER NONE WERE LEFT BUT MYSELF AND MY NEPHEW. But, "A man may teach his DAUGHTER Greek, because it is an accomplishment for her" (p. Peah 15c), though "Cursed be the man who has taught his son Greek philosophy". (Baba Kamma 326). From the Talmud also we learn that some of the Rabbis were prepared to countenance the study of the Greek language but not the philosophy. It is, of course, difficult to see how the study of that language could have been made without some contact with the various philosophical systems. Again, although we may not be ready to accept Canon Knox's statement unreservedly, it is still possible to point to the efficient and effective methods of Jewish propaganda, and to suggest that this would not have been possible if those who "compassed sea and land to make one proselyte" did not give some care to the study of non-Judaic thought.

3. Sight should not be lost of Claude Montefiore's argument "Judaism and St. Paul" that the Judaism of the Diaspora was less liberal than that of Palestine, and that the reaction of non-Palestinian Jewry to the pagan world was one of exclusiveness.
It is impossible within the scope of the present thesis to trace in detail the uses in the classical Greek authors of the various shades of meaning which attach to λόγος.

It carries almost unnumbered shades of significance — collection, story, census, and reckoning: so Aristotle κατὰ λόγον τῶν ἱμάρων, and Thucydides ὁ ξυνηθὸς λόγος (the total number); account, or reason: so εὖ (οὕδειν) λόγῳ ποιεῖν τινὰ (τι) or εἰς τὸ πρὸς λόγου (to be worthy of notice); reason: ἐκ τῶν λόγων; (by what reason) ἐν τῷ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ ὕστερα (for the purpose of reflection.)

But, for practical purposes, it is usual to begin with Heraclitus of Ephesus, one of the possible places of origin for the Fourth Gospel; for even modern commentators agree that at any rate the earliest diffusion of Johannine Christianity may well have been in its traditional home of proconsular Asia. Otto Pfleiderer, in his "Primitive Christianity" (vol. IV. p. 7) maintained that the correspondences between the Prologue to St. John's Gospel and Heraclitus' tractate περὶ Φοβεῖσθαι are sufficient to justify those who suppose a direct dependence between the two. Norden ("Antike Kunstprosa II") says that, in the Prologue "In the beginning was the word" and "the word was God" are two Heraclitan phrases separated by an Hebraic-Hellenistic phrase - "the word was with God". And it is also true that
Heraclitus was one of those whom Justin Martyr specifically named as one of "the Christians before Christ", (Apol. 1). So to Heraclitus we now turn.

When Professor Willick was lecturing in Geneva, he used to impress upon us that the clue to the understanding of pre-Christian Greek thought is always to remember that the Greek lived under what he called "the embarrassment of change". Heraclitus, reacting to the Ionian materialism, claimed to observe, in phenomenal change, law; and it is in his observations that it is generally considered that we first encounter the concept of a "cosmical logos". This is the crucial passage (fran 2 in most editions):-

"This λόγος is always existing, though men fail to understand it both before and when they have heard it. For everything happens according to the Logos (γινομένων νεφελών κατά τὸν λόγον) but it seems as though men were never acquainted with it, when they come to know such works and words as I propound, dividing each severally according to its nature, and explaining how it actually is".

Attention naturally centres on the expression κατὰ τὸν λόγον. Some have thought that it signified the speaker himself; but, in fact, Heraclitus specifically claims to be its mouthpiece. Others have maintained that is Heraclitus' treatise or argument, and that, therefore, κατὰ τὸν λόγον means "according to the present piece of writing", or "according to my argument". To this Adam re-
turned that such an equation would destroy the parallels and antitheses of those arguments in which the term is used, pointing to the 92nd fragment, stating that, while the λόγος is universal (τὸ λόγον δέοντος ἐπιθύμητο), most people live as if they had a "purely private intelligence". Certainly, none of the earlier readers of Heraclitus appear to have thought that by λόγος, he meant "argument" (e.g. Sextus Empiricus Adv. Mathem, 7/133; Stobaeus appears to have equated Heraclitus' λόγος with εἴμαι προΐνη τάτο). Nor will Adam have it that Heraclitus' logos is a law or "supreme ordinance". Against this he argues by pointing out the use of active verbs in speaking of the "activity" of the logos (e.g. γιγνώσκω).

But Adam, while maintaining that Heraclitus does throw out suggestions of an incorporeal logos, does not ask us to believe that his logos is entirely divorced from the material. He is, Adam admits, "a hylozoist in the fullest sense" (p. 225). Moreover, the limitations of Heraclitus' idea of a logos determined by his own view of reality. It may be that all things are "living, vital and animated", but all things are God, which is the totality of the primary fiery substance. Change may be orderly; but it is not to the order of any supra-material directive; phenomena are cosmical and not chaotic, but Heraclitus goes no further than
his own declaration ὁ θεὸς ημέρη εὐφροῦη, ἱεραίων θεός, πόλεως εἰρήνη, κόσμος λίμος. It is this that we have to keep firmly in mind when we read that Heraclitus regarded "the logos as God". However much we qualify the terms "pantheism" or "materialism" the truth remains that for no pantheistic materialist is there a transcendent God whose logos it could be. It has also been expressed that while for the writer of the Prologue the Logos, the outward world and souls of men are three entities, such a thought would have appeared unintelligible to Heraclitus.

Before we take leave of Heraclitus, we pause to note that Canon Hodgson drew attention to an unpublished paper by Professor A. J. Smith, in which he had pointed out that, in Heraclitus, the saying τὸν λόγον ὁ ἐόντος ἀνεκτυγμένον "has nothing to do with the eternity of a supernatural being. It simply states that while the discussion of some unidentified question is endless, men find it difficult to understand what it is about". Logos came to denote "definition", i.e. description in words, and so to the sense "diagram", e.g. the drawing of a diagram to answer the question, "What is the logos of a triangle?" Thus logos "came to be connected with the idea of reason, for only that which is rational is definable". It appears, moreover, that Professor Smith
denied that "the word was ever used in the Greek tradition for the active reasoning faculty in man, or for a cognate principle in the universe", for which the word is λόγος.

He maintains that Philo used λόγος to render ἀρχή, but "theologians in their ignorance read back the latter meaning..... into earlier writings where it was out of place".

Certainly, if Professor Smith is right, many passages in the tractate whose meaning, on the traditional showing of the force of λόγος, seemed, to say the least, trivial, began to acquire a significance which can be appreciated. By way of example we could mention: - "οὐκ εὖ μοι ἡ λάθα τῶ λόγου ἀκούοντας ὁμολογεῖν σοφόν ἐστι οὐ πάντα εἶναι.

It certainly begins to appear that the Greek philosophical antecedents of the Prologue have been neglected not only in favour of the fashionable tendency to find all the New Testament in the Talmud, but also because of its own inherent weaknesses - that is unless we are prepared to lay at the door of the writer of the Prologue the charge that he shared the ignorance of "the theologians" to whom Prof. Smith alluded.

After Heraclitus, the concept of the Logos disappeared until the advent of the formal Stoics; that is, for about two centuries. After all, the doctrine of immanent deity belongs to pantheism, whereas the philosophers of the fifth
and fourth centuries B.C. were, in the main, dualists. Before we go any further, it is as well to note that Plato tells of no Logos. Any idea that he did so arose from the subsequent confusion between Plato and the Platonists, and from a failure to distinguish between the authentic writings of the philosopher and the pseudo-Platonic works which flooded the ancient world after his death. It could be argued - and it is a point to be borne in mind in considering the relationship between the Johannine Prologue and Greek philosophy - that not until Plato was the concept of the Stoic Logos finally embedded in the dualism of later Platonism.

Leaving Heraclitus, we pause to notice that, if his term ἀόρατος had any of the significance which has been claimed for it subsequently, in Anaxagoras the term νόησις is preferred. The argument remains unsettled as to whether this νόησις is immaterial or "the subtlest form of matter." But it appears to have been conceived of as distinguishable from other modes of the constant matter.

It is, of course, very difficult to be sure exactly what Socrates taught, and to disentangle his teaching from that of his great pupil and from the records of Xenophon. However, it may be assumed that he introduced the concept of teleology into philosophical thinking. If we are to
trust Xenophon, we may make the somewhat confused assertion that beyond Socrates' polytheism there lay a monotheism, the God of which has an intelligence which pervades all (τὸν ἐν πάντι δύναμιν Ὀμόφόρῳ). This is the nearest approach to the idea of a Logos. But, since his genuine interests were religious, we ought to mention it.

We have already remarked that, in the authentic Plato there is to be found no logos. But so marked is his affinity with the doctrine of later days - as we learn when we study the philosophy and theology of Alexandria - that a brief glance at his teaching is necessary. Such a glance precludes an indication of even the general scope of the great philosopher's thought; we can only mention that aspect which bears most closely on that subsequent development in which we are particularly interested.

Foremost in Plato's thought is his doctrine of the eternal "ideas". These belong not to the world of sensory experience, and are to be apprehended only by the reason. While his writings preserve no complete and systematic treatment of "the hierarchy of ideas" we glean that what we may call "the highest term" is ἡ ὅποτα ἀληθῶς ἦν - the idea of the good. No can there be much doubt that he regarded "the idea of the good" as God, of whom he speaks in language which leaves no doubt that he regarded God as personal.
Nor does Plato formulate precisely a doctrine of the relationship between the "ideas" and the "phenomenal world". But, as will be readily appreciated, it is in the consideration of this question that he comes anywhere near to the doctrine of the Logos. For his thoughts on this point, we turn to his "Timaeus" (29 o.d.), where he discusses the problem of the genesis of the cosmos. There can be no doubt that his doctrine of a "world soul" (30 a) and of secondary deities (41a) had much influence on the development of the idea of a mediating Logos, although there is no evidence that it influenced the writer of the Johannine Prologue. The gulf there is apparent when we remember that, for Plato, there are two deities, the Supreme God - the Creator - and the "world-soul" who (or which?) is his vicegerent - the mediator between the unknown Creator and his creation. Moreover, the "world-soul" is created. Plato does not say exactly how; one suggestion is that he thought of it as an emanation of the mind of his Supreme God.

Even from this brief summary, it is clear how far is the cry from Plato to St. John. But it is also fair to say the concepts of a transcendent Creator and of a "world-soul" have their logical fruition not in a statement of incarnation but in the ideas of Neo-platonism, holding apart the creation and the Supreme Deity.
Aristotle's interests were first and foremost with the problem of matter and form. For him, matter is an ωὐσία and the subject of change. Corresponding to Plato's ἐἶδος, is the "form", for which he has many names ἐἶδος, μορφή, ἡ κατὰ τὸ λόγον ωὐσία, τὸ ὑπὸ τὴν σινα. The "form" has no independent being, and is, as regards matter, immanent and not transcendent. The "embarrassment of change" he explains by a "Prime Mover", beyond that which changes, and which, among other titles, he calls Ἐρωταί.

After Aristotle, philosophical interest in such problems as cosmology and epistomology began to give place to an increasing concern for ethical studies. The reason for this is most likely to be sought in the oriental influences, which were now becoming considerable, and in the fact that a succession of teachers was springing up, who came, not from Greece, but from Babylon, Tyre, Sidon, Carthage, Cilécia, Phrygia and Rhodes. When we consider this point, we see that it is inadequate to say that there is an interest in "ethical studies". Rather we should say that there grew up a succession of teachers marked by "moral earnestness". This should be borne in mind. It is easy, on a cursory reading of Stoical, and kindred writers, to give thoughtless assent to St. Jerome's remark about "Stoici qui nostro dogmati in pleris que concordant". But Jerome's interests were practical and, especially, ascetical; he was ill-read
in philosophical authors. But when genuine philosophers, like Justin Martyr and Augustine, undertook to build up the metaphysical approach to the Faith, they turned not to those whom Lightfoot has described as being under the "influence of the One religion" (Commentary on the Epistle to the Philippians), but to the Platonists and Pythagoreans. Lightfoot was also of the opinion that the theological language - as distinct from the philosophical doctrine - was derived, in the main, from eastern and, indeed, Jewish sources. (Ibid. p. 317). Alongside this, we may place another judgment, that "if you strip Stoicism of its paradoxes and its wilful misuse of language, what is left is simply the moral philosophy of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, dashed with the physics of Heraclitus". After all, Platonism - if not Plato - had banished God from the material world, had left it a dark mass from which the soul must detach itself if it would find him, and yet this is the world which encloses us on every side, with which we have primarily to do. (E. Bevan, "Stoics and Sceptics", (p. 41). Nor, when turning from ethical questions to those of natural philosophy, were the Stoics in any better case if they appealed to Aristotle. His is, notoriously, "a ἀνελή deity". Anaxagoras, true, had mattered νῦν διεκόσμησε πάντα. Socrates found this not explanatory, but descriptive, and set it on one side. The Stoics, too,
could not be satisfied with it. The subject \( \text{νόσ} \) seemed too definite in content, and too personal in concept; while the predicate, with its transitive verb made the maxim capable of a deistic interpretation. In large measure, the first Stoics looked upon the past two hundred years as years which the locusts had eaten, and reverted to the nebulous term \( \text{λέι} \). It is typical of them that they were interested only in an argument ex consensu omnium.

Such, then, are the points which we should bear in mind when we turn to the works of the earlier Stoics.

Of these Stoics, the first figure whom we meet is Zeno of Citium; and that he was probably of Semitic extraction seems to be indicated by his customary nickname "the Phoenician". We may be sure of Semitic influence at Citium, with its colony of Hebrew traders and their families. But it is not so easy to decide that the title "the Phoenician" means that his teaching owed much to Phoenician thought. We know nothing about Phoenician wisdom. On the other hand, due weight should be given to the fact that when Zeno reached Athens, Plato had only been dead for some thirty years, and was very much alive influentially. But even if we grant that his message was Hellenic, and recognize his use of the formal syllogism, his manner and method are much more those of the eastern prophet. "Zeno with that touch of oriental symbolism which characterized him, used to illustrate to his
disciples the steps of knowledge by means of gestures". (Stock, "Stoicism" p.28).

Again, it is not easy to be sure exactly what Zeno taught. All that has survived of his writings are the titles and a few isolated phrases. For the rest, we have to rely on the testimony of later disciples and critics. Nor, again, do the Stoic teachings represent a consistent whole. Thus, while Zeno set the general tone of Stoicism by abandoning Plato's transcendental deity in favour of pantheism, Boethus distinguished God and the cosmos.

But although Boethus allowed that deity was an "aethereal substance" (Boëtos ὁν ἀιδέα τοῦ θεοῦ ἐπεξείατο, Stobaeus Eclog.I,60) he would not speak of the cosmos as a living thing, or being. (Boëtos ὁν φήσον εἰς εἰναί ὑπὸν τὸν κόσμον Diogenes Laërtius, 143)

For our present purpose, we are not called upon to follow the vagaries of individual Stoics; it is sufficient to indicate the general line and scope of Stoic teaching. But no attempt to epitomize the main tenets of Stoicism can rightly be made without reference to the greatest single
expression of primitive Stoicism, which we know as Cleanthe's
Hymn. Of Cleanthe M.P. Lagrange well said, "on dirait de lui
qu'il fut l'Epitome de l'ancien stoicisme". (Vers le logos
de Saint Jean" in Revue Biblique 1923 p.166). Here is Pro-
fessor James Adam's English version:-

"O God most glorious, called by many a name,
Nature's great king, through endless years the same;
Omnipotence, who by thy just decree
ControUest all, Hail, Zeus, for unto thee
Behoves thy creatures in all lands to call.
We are thy children, we alone, of all
On earth's broad ways that wander to and fro,
Bearing thine image wheresoe'er we go.
Wherefore with songs of praise thy power I will forth
show.
Lo! yonder heaven, that round the earth is wheeled,
Follows thy guidance, still to thee doth yield
Glad homage; thine unconquerable hand
Such flaming minister, the levin brand
Wieldeth, a sword two-edged, whose deathless might
Pulsates through all that nature brings to light:
Vehicle of the universal word, that flows
Through all, and in the light celestial glows
Of stars both great and small. 0 king of kings
Through ceaseless ages, God, whose purpose brings
To birth whate'er on land or in the sea
Is wrought, or in the high heaven's immensity;
Save what the sinner works infatuate.
Nay, but thou knowest to make the crooked straight:
Chaos to thee is order: in thine eyes
The unloved is lovely, who did'st harmonize
Things evil with good, that there should be
One Word through all things everlastingly.
One Word - whose voice alas! the wicked spurn;
Insatiate for the good their spirits yearn:
Yet seeing see not, neither hear
God's universal law, which those revere,
By reason guided, happiness who win.
The rest, unreasoning, diverse shapes of sin
Self-prompted follow; for an idle name
Vainly they wrestle in the lists of fame:
Others inordinately Riches woo,
Or dissolute, the joys of flesh pursue.
Now here, now there they wander fruitless still,
For ever seeking good and finding ill.
Zeus the all-bountiful, whom darkness shrouds,
Whose lightning lightens in the thunder clouds;
Thy children save from error's deadly sway:
Turn thou the darkness from their souls away:
Vouchsafe that unto knowledge they attain;
For thou by knowledge art made strong to reign
O'er all, and all things rulest righteously.
So by thee honoured, we will honour thee,
Praising thy works continually with songs,
As mortals should; nor higher meed belongs
E'en to the gods, than justly to adore
The universal law for ever more".

Cleanthes had been a professional pugilist, before
becoming the pupil of, and, nineteen years later, the
successor of Zeno. Granted the genuineness of his hymn,
few could deny that he has left behind him "the finest
devotional utterance of paganism." (Stock). From the point
of view of rhetoric, the early Stoics were unimpressive".
"If a lesson is wanted in the importance of sacrificing to
the graces, it might be found in the fact that the early Stoic
writers, despite their logical subtlety, have all perished".
It is a fine tribute to the Hymn of Cleanthes that it is the
most considerable utterance of the early Stoics to have been
preserved by a subsequent writer.

As a composition the Hymn is entirely typical of what
has survived of the teachings of the early Stoics. But we
have to remember that it is the work of a poet. If we
imagine that the poet distinguished between the Logos and
God, we have to remember that this is only a figment of his
poetry, and not a truth of his philosophy. For the Stoic's "logos" was one of the many names of God, who is all life, will, mind, breath, the motivating, divine and rational principle of the Cosmos. Nor is God "Spiritual" in anything nearly approaching what we now understand by the term.

Chrysippus "le second fondateur et désormais le vrai maître du Portique" speaks of God as πνεῦμα νοερόν καὶ πορώδες ("Intelligent and fiery vapour" - Stobaeus Eol.1,2). The testimony of Diogenes Laërtius, too, is that Zeno taught that "the soul is a hot, gaseous substance (Ζηνων δὲ Κινεσ..... πνεῦμα ἐν οὐραμον εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν. πετέρυγος ἡμᾶς εἶναι ἐμπύνοντες καὶ ὅπο τοῦτο κινεῖται (VII 157) with which op. Cicero (Tusc. Or.I.9) "Zenoni Stoico animus ignis videtur")

Stobaes said that the term πνεῦμα was adopted because it was said to be air in motion, and, further, to be analogous to πνεῦμα (πνεῦμα δὲ εἰληπτικός, διὰ τὸ λέγεσθαι αὕτη ἀέρα εἶναι κινοῦμενον ἐξάλογον δὲ γίγνεσθαι κατὰ αἰθέος

We could also note at this point that Chrysippus gives practically no place to the idea of a logos; for him ethics is the all-important study, to which logic and physics are purely subsidiary. It is this which fixes the significance of λόγος in his writings - such as we have them. Τέλος γίνεται τὸ αἰκολούθεσις τῇ φύσει γίν, ὡμως ἐστι κατὰ τὴν ἐνσώματι καὶ κατὰ τὴν τῶν ὀλοκληρωμάτων ἐν αὐτογενεύσεως εἰς θεῖο τὸν νόμος τὸ κοινός, ὃς ἐστιν ὁ ὀρθῶς λόγος διὰ πάντων ἐρχόμενος.
"The end is to live in accordance with nature, that is according to one's own nature and that of the universe, doing nothing that is forbidden by the common law, which is the right principle (λόγος) running through all things). And he goes on: ὁ θεὸς ἡμῶν τὸν Διὸν, καθὼς ἐκμόνι τῷ πνεύμα τῷ αὐτῶν δοικῆσθαι ἦν "... is the same as Zeus, the supreme head of the government of the universe". "Diogenes Laertius VII(1) 88). This wholehearted Pantheism of the early Stoics is summed up:- Ἕν ὁ εἶναι θεὸν καὶ νόμον καὶ εἰραμένον καὶ Δίον πολλαῖς τε ἄτεροις ἀνομασίαις προσωνομασθέσαι...... λέγει δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν θυμῶν ἐν τῷ περὶ τῶν θύμων ("God, Mind, Destiny, Zeus - it is all one thing which is called by these and by many other names... Zeus treats of all these things in his work "Concerning the whole of Things" (Diogenes Laertius VII 135-6). And to observe the persistence of this typically stoic outlook, we need only recall Seneca's words:-

Quid est Deus? Mens universi,
Quid est Deus? Quoq vides totum,
Et quod non vides totum. Sic demæam
Magnitudo sua illi redditur, qua
Nihil majus exoogitari potest, si solus
Est omnia, opüs suum et extract
Intro tenet.

(Nat. Quæst. 5 Prolog.13).
Philodemus has bequeathed to us this summary of Chrysippus' teaching: — "Now Chrysippus, in his work "Concerning the Gods" says Zeus is the λόγος pervading everything, the world-soul, and that all things have their life by partaking of him.... even the stones. This is why he is called Ζήνα or ὑιός (Note: — Ζήνα is the poetical accusative and ὑιός the prose accusative of Zeus. K.H.) because he is the cause and Lord of everything. The Cosmos is animated and is a god, both its principle and its entire soul. Zeus is also named..... and the common nature of all things, Destiny, Necessity, Good Order, Justice, Concord, Peace, and of kindred to them, in the same. The gods do not differ in sex, like cities and virtues; it is just that they are given masculine and feminine names which do not correspond to these distinctions in the beings thus given names, just as is Ζής and Μήν. And Ares stands for and the conflict between one army and the other side. Hephaistos is fire, Crates is the current of events, Rhea is the earth, Zeus is the aether; or may be Apollo and Demeter is the earth or the spirit in it. And he says that it is sheer puerility when gods are spoken of, or depicted or modelled as of human form — like cities, rivers, places, experiences. The air around the earth is Zeus, and the dark shadow Hades, and the air through the earth and sea is Poseidon. As in
the case of those cited, he identifies the other gods with
the inanimate things. He has the opinion that the sun and moon
and the other stars are gods and also the law, and he says
that men have changed into gods. (de Pietate c.11.)

We said, above, that we should not follow the history
and development of Stoicism through the peculiar contribu-
tions of the various Stoics. This is not altogether easy.
As Lightfoot observed, "Stoicism has no other history except
the history of its leaders. It consists of isolated individ-
uals, but it never attracted the masses or formed a com-
unity. It was a staff of professors without classes". (Com-
mentary on Philippians p.317). Actually, this statement
requires some qualification. There was undoubtedly a certain
"Stoicism of the market-place". But it is quite true that
it is virtually an impossibility to indicate even the general
teachings of Stoicism without appealing to some,
at least, of the teachers. Of these is, undoubtedly Posi-
donius. For when modern writers speak of the concentration,
at the beginning of the century, upon possible Hellenistic
antecedents of the Fourth Gospel, it is almost certainly
Posidonius whom they have in mind. For they judged that
such fragments of his works which remain only faintly hint
at the extent of his influence, which involved such figures
as Cicero, Philo, Seneca and Plutarch. In the margin of a
copy of Bevan's "Stoics and Sceptics", in the University of London Library, I once found this summary of opinion:

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    Panaetius
       /\        
  Poseidonius  (Athens)
       /\        
  Athenodorus  Seneca
       (Rome)
    Paul.
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It is thought that Poseidonius borrowed much from Panaetius who, in his old age, had presided over the Stoic school. Sir William Ramsay held the opinion that similarities of thought between Seneca and St. Paul are to be explained on the assumption of the mutual influence of Athenodorus.

But Poseidonius is to be singled out because he represents the tendency of Greek philosophy to coalesce "The great body of his writings expressed with unique completeness the general mind of the Greek world at the Christian era: he focused it and made it conscious of itself". (E. Bevan, "Stoics and Sceptics", p. 94). The eclecticism of Poseidonius is obvious when we consider that it is claimed of him that he brought together the teaching of the Stoics and of Plato (Bevan, op. cit. p. 100 op. 128), and that he adapted Stoicism "to harmonize with
ideas of Pythagorism, and by incorporating in it the religious views attaching to Babylonian cosmography" (W.R.Holliday, "Pagan Background of Early Christianity", p.175).

There is no call for us to dwell upon the particular teachings of Poseidonius. His real interest for us is that we see in him an aspect of Stoicism which is so easily overlooked in assessing the contribution of Greek philosophy to the New Testament. It is all very well for Lightfoot to say that "the true Stoic was too self-contained, too indifferent to the condition of others, to concern himself whether the tenets of his school made many proselytes or few. He wrapped himself up in his self-conceit, declared the world to be mad and gave himself no more trouble about the matter..... The temper of Stoicism was essentially aristocratic and exclusive in religion, as it was in politics. While possessing the largest comprehension, it was practically the narrowest of all philosophical castes." (op.cit.320). Against this we can do no better than set Gilbert Murray's judgments:- "Astrology fell upon the Hellenistic mind as a new disease falls upon some remote island people. The tomb of Ozymandias, as described by Diodorus, was covered with astrological figures.......... for monarchs. It was natural/to believe that the stars watched over them.
But everyone was ready to receive the germ. The Epicureans held out, and so did Panaetius, the coolest head among the Stoics. But the Stoics as a whole gave way...... Epicureans and sceptics of the Academy might well mock at the sight of a great man like Chrysippus or Poseidonius resting an important part of his religion on the undetected frauds of a shady Levantine 'medium'. Still the Stoics could not welcome the arrival of a system of prophecy and predestination ......"("Five Stages of Greek Religion" pp. 144-146). It is fairly obvious that the searching of Greek authors for parallels to the Fourth Gospel is largely as unproductive as the results are unconvincing. Canon Knox has practically curry-combed the literature; and the results are not impressive. But there was a "popular" Stoicism, a "Stoicism of the Agora", a Stoicism in which, later, Hermes was to be the personification of the Logos. Such a Stoicism was unlikely to leave behind many literary monuments. But its existence has tended to be forgotten in recent New Testament studies. When Professor Dodd claims that "not only in the Prologue but almost everywhere [the Fourth Gospel's] language opens up vistas into two worlds, in both of which the writer was at home", he cannot mean that the Evangelist had at his finger-tips all the minutiae and refinements of Greek philosophical thinking. It will be a long time before -
if ever - any dare claim that of any New Testament writer. But the possibility has once again to be given place in the study of the Johannine Gospel that the writer knew something of a type of Greek philosophical thinking, so pragmatic and "popular" that its existence alone can be claimed, and its details only inferred from such books and writings as are likely to have been affected by it - the New Testament and Philo's works. Some aid may be given in the study of the phenomena of propaganda today, and comparing technical or "expert" teaching with popular or "armchair" expositions. Paul's slender verbal quotations from extant philosophical authors is no proof that he had no contact with the "market-place" expositions of contemporary philosophy.

Poseidonius is important: "the Rhodian" - and it should be remembered that he sprang from Syria - was one to affect the people amongst whom he lived. His moral stature and almost "evangelical" earnestness point to him as just the type to affect "popular" thinking. Moreover, "we can see a certain common element running through much of Cicero and Seneca and Plutarch and Philo of Alexandria - a body of ideas whose GENERAL CURRENCY THEY PRESUPPOSE. " If we like to label this body of ideas "Poseidonius", in order to give it a distinctive name, it may be useful to do so". (Bevan op.cit.p.96). It would be surprising if the Johannine
writings, springing from a living church, were not in some measure affected by a teaching which was influencing so many other writings of that first century A.D.

Bearing this in mind, our task is not to close our eyes to the possibility of an Hellenistic - and, especially, a Stoic-influence upon the Logos doctrine of the Johannine Prologue, but to see if there is any evidence for such a Logos-notion as could contribute anything to the Prologue.

We do not pursue very far our reading of Stoic writers before we encounter the phrase ἡπερματικὸς λόγος. Typical is this passage: — καὶ ὄσπορος εἰς τὴν γονῆν τοῦ ἡπερματίκου περιέχεται, ὥσπερ καὶ πατέρα σπερματικὸν λόγον ὅπως τοῦ κόσμου τοῦ ἐκ τοῦ ὑπολείπεσθαι εἰς τὴν ὑφαντόν αὐτῷ ποιήσεις τὴν ὑλὴν πέρα τῶν εἰρής γένεσιν.

("And just as the seed is contained in the genital fluid, so God, as the Seminal Formula of the Cosmos, remains, such as he is, in the watery mass, modifying the stuff so that it yields to his working, for the production of the next things". (Diogenes Laertius VII 136 - the teaching of Zeno).

The phrase is difficult to render. The rendering "seminal" is Bevan's suggestion, and keeps closely to the Latin translation. Palmer, translating Zeller, varies between "creative", "generative", "productive", and "germinative". Possible instances are hundreds. But even in the brief quotation just supplied it can be seen that
while God can be regarded as the θεον ανθρωπομετατραπέζων and question of διός προς τον θεον is ruled out by the very nature of Stoic pantheism.

We cannot, here, digress to discuss the Stoic idea of the "two substances". But we may note one point in passing. The thought was concisely enunciated by Seneca:-

Dicunt, est seis, Stoici nostri duo esse in rerum natura, exquibus amnia fiant, causam et materiam, materia iacet iners, res ad omnia parata, cessatura, si nemo moveat, causa autem id est ratio, materiam format et quocumque vult versat, exilla varia opera producit. Esse ergo debet, unde fiat; quoc causa est, illud materia. (Ep.65.2). Or, as Cleanthes is reported to have taught:- δοκει η σοιος αρχαι ειναι την θεον δυο, τα ποιηματα υπαιναι ανεξ θεον. η μεν ουν ανεξ θεον ειναι την θεον οικειαν, την ομης, ει δε ποιηναι ανει εν αυτηι λογον, τον θεον.

("They - the Stoics - held that there are two first substances of the universe, one active and one passive. The passive is the unqualified substance, stuff; but the active is the Logos in it, that is God". (Diogenes Laelius, VII 134).

This quotation underlines clearly the fact that, for the Stoics, the thought of the Logos of God is precluded by the entire system of concepts.

Of the thought of a θεομετατραπέζων Drummond once remarked that "the phrase expresses in a concise form a
theory of natural evolution and by its two terms combines the teleological idea of the universe with that of a slow and orderly development. The productive power of seeds seems to have fascinated the Stoics. They saw that, tiny as it was, the seed contained more than all which was to appear in the fully developed plant or organism. Even Zeno is reported to have taught that the primary, fiery substance is a seed containing all that has, does and will happen. Now we have already seen that he taught that this primary fire was "reasonable". This concept meets that of a "seminal" fire to produce the thought a "seminal reason".

A recent publication has represented Shakespeare as returning to twentieth century England and being bewildered to find what he was supposed to have meant by the words which he had used in his plays. If we may judge from Canon Hodgson's report of Professor Smith's unpublished paper (noted above) it would seem that the Stoics would be equally amazed to find what has subsequently been "read into" their words by Christian writers from at least the Patristic authors until the end of the nineteenth century. Professor Smith declared that the λόγοι σπέρματικοί of the Stoics "described a biological theory according to which the fact that the offspring of horses are horses and of goats, goats is due to the fact that in each case
the male spermata are miniature copies of the full-sized animals". (op.cit.216). Whether this case is likely to commend itself to scholars or not, Professor Smith has, at any rate, issued a valuable warning that the Stoics should be studied as Stoics and not as Christian apologists - conscious or unconscious.

Since, as we have noted, the primary concerns of the Stoics were with ethics rather than natural philosophy, we should expect them to have some ideas about the relationship of their logos to men. Here is a passage which is to the point:-

"That the Cosmos is a living being, rational, with soul-life, and mind, Chrysippus states in his "Concerning Providence" Book I. . . . . That it has a soul-life is plain from our own soul which is a fragment of it". (Diogenes Laelius VII.142-3)

The context allows, and the equations of stoic thought demand that the individual soul is a fraction of the God-Logos. This is, in fact, the foundation of the Stoic faith in the unity of mankind. But it leaves no room whatever for a Logos going to his own, who "received him not". Nor
has language any meaning which speaks of "such as received him".

We have already mentioned the fact that failure to find parallels of thought and expression between the Prologue and Stoic writers (or, for that matter, other Hellenistic philosophers) does not entitle us to deny the influence of a "market-place" stoicism which has left no literary remains. The Neronian Stoic Lucius Annaeus Cornutus in his Theologiae Graeci Compendium, noted that popular identification of the Logos and Hermes which we have already mentioned. Cornutus seems to have concluded that this meant that the vulgar mind understood by λόγος "speech" rather than "reason" - Hermes, being, of course, derived from ἑρμῆς. "Hermes is the Logos, which the gods sent to us out of heaven, man alone of all things that they made on earth being endowed with reason - the things which they possessed in a transcendent degree. The name Hermes comes from the words ἑρμῆς μήνως ὡς, that is, "to contrive to speak"; or perhaps from the God being an Eryman to us, as much as to say a 'bastion'." (Τοῦχρενεὶ δὲ ὁ Ἑρμῆς ὁ λόγος ὡς, διὰ πιστεύειν ποιείν ἑρμῆς ἐξ οὐρανοῦ ἐκ οὐρανίου μόνον τῶν οὐρανίων ποιείν μὴν λορδόν ποιησαντεῖ, ὁ οὐρανός τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐξ οὐρανίων εἰς ἐπάνω μήνως ἀληθεοῦσαι ἐδει καὶ ἐκ ἑρμήν μήσαι, ὅπερ ἐστὶ λόγος, ἐκ οὐρανίων εἶναι καὶ ὁ ἑρμῆν ἑρμῆν.)

Bevan pointed out that to render the opening phrase as
"Hermes is the Logos" is misleading; for Cornutus represents the degeneracy of Stoicism, and in the entire chapter \( \lambda'\gamma\varsigma\) carries only the significance of human speech. If the term ever signified Cosmic Reason in any Stoic writer, it certainly does not do so here. Lebreton is well worth quoting. "In this popular exegesis the Stoic concept of the Logos was greatly compromised and partially distorted: Zeus, king and ruler of the world, could alone represent the universal reason which determines everything by its law and animates everything with its own life; Hermes was a very inferior God to personify this sovereign force. He was only the messenger of the high gods; he filled, in mythology, the secondary role of intermediary and messenger, which the Logos was to adopt in Alexandrine philosophy, and we may well think that the myth of Hermes showed its influence in this direction of philosophical thought". ("Dogma of the Trinity" pp.50-51). Thus we arrive at the position of having to admit the evidence for a "popularisation" of philosophical ideas, but in the direction of the notion of an intermediary. As we have already noticed, there is no suggestion of an intermediary Logos in the Johannine Prologue.

It may be thought that this section is disproportionately long. But two points have had to be kept in mind;
the reproach of those who condemn the scant attention given
to possible Greek philosophical antecedents for the Johan-
nine Logos; and, secondly, the desirability of presenting
the difficulties which lie in the way of the summons to return
to the Stoικ. After all, no one has explained the ease and
readiness with which the apologists turned to contemporary
philosophical thought for argument and terminology. Nor will
it do to point out that some, like Justin Martyr, did not
stop to remove their philosopher's cloaks. For the right
inference is surely one of a continuity of thought. Merely
to read a textual comparison between Epictetus and the New
Testament, such as that in Douglas S. Sharp's "Epictetus
and the New Testament", is enough to convince one that
"τὸν Ἐπίκτητον, ὁ πιοίς ἁγιότατος ἰσόπητος, ὁ Λόγος
ν'α αὐξίνεται καίτις οἰκετείας ἱεροτοιευς προτειναν". (Lagrange
in Revue Biblique XXXII). No doubt a similar comparison
between the New Testament and any Stoic writer would yield
the same judgment. Indeed, to one whose life lies wholly
within the present century, it seems incredible that
scholars can have made, in all seriousness, assertions of
a dependence between the Stoicism of the literary remains
and the Prologue of the Fourth Gospel. But the mind has
to accept the fact that, if we, nowadays, find it difficult
to perceive much evidence of dependence, it is equally
difficult to suppose that a movement which has left such remains, and a movement with both prophets and messages, can have had no effect and have left no marks upon the New Testament.

An honest attempt has been made to resist the prejudice against any contact between the Fourth Evangelist and Hellenistic (especially Stoic) thought. The general conclusion is that no fair case can be made for a dependence upon philosophical authors; but the possibility is entertained of a more general influence. To this we shall have recourse in a later chapter. But, for the present, a balance must be restored by considering, in brief, certain general difficulties which have to be met if a return is to be made to the idea of any considerable debt to Greek philosophy.

If we look in the direction of the Stoics, we shall have to remember that, for them, not only is the being of God summed up by the Cosmos, not only is the "ordo naturae" the sphere of his activity, but the Cosmos becomes the expression of the passions and emotions of God. This is far removed from the thought of "a world which knew him not", but is in line with the pantheism of so many of the poets - Emily Bronte, Byron, Shelley and the Wordsworth of the earlier poems. The thought of Stoicism logically tapers off in an immanentism which, at the hands of the poets,
assumes the appearance of a "general incarnation", or an incarnation in humanity at large", such as Hegel and Strauss would have accepted; it does not point to the incarnation at a moment in history of a Logos who could be called йд О ν η η η.

The studies of recent years have only emphasized the inseparability of the Prologue and the Gospel to which it is attached. The theory which accounts for him as the Logos should also be able to account for the other titles which the Christ bears in the Fourth Gospel. Both Zahn and Hoskyns, though separated by half a century, are agreed on the point that the title Logos is on a par with the other titles in the Gospel - Bread, Vine, Truth, Life, Good Shepherd, Way, Door. ("Das Evangel des Johan" and "The Fourth Gospel".)

Nor should we forget something of which Liddon reminded us in his criticism of Dollinger's tendency to "rhapsodize" the Stoics; that from the ranks of Stoicism came some of the most thoughtful and penetrating opposition to Christianity. And thus we are brought to the fundamental objection to the ransacking of Hellenism for the antecedents of the Logos in the Johannine Gospel; the author's interests are not philosophic but evangelistic, not with the Logos, but with the Logos "made flesh", of whom there is not a breath in all the philosophy of Greece. "The evangelist avails himself of certain abstract ideas, prevalent in the religion of his time, but he does not set out from those ideas. He takes
his departure from an historical fact, which he aims at unfolding and elucidating in its deeper import. To Hellenistic piety the speculative interest is everything... For the Evangelist the history is of primary importance". (E.F. Scott "The Hellenistic Mysticism of the Fourth Gospel", in the American Journal of Theology, XX. July 1916). And the solid fact remains that the avowed purpose of the Evangelist is not to convince us that Jesus is the Logos, but that he is "the Christ, the Son of God". (20 31).
"The Theism of the Old Testament compared with the Theism of the Greek and Roman worlds differs, not in degree, but in kind".

W.E. Gladstone to Cardinal Manning in a letter 7/1/1886.

"It would be unreasonable to expect in this wisdom-literature the precise and carefully guarded definitions and distinctions of the later Church theology. Certain things are said of Wisdom which it might be difficult to incorporate into the scientifically formulated doctrine of Christ and the Trinity. Instead of wondering at this we ought rather to be surprised at the extent to which on the whole the wisdom-conception fits into the subsequent revelation concerning the person of our Lord and his place in the Godhead".

Gerhardus Vos, in an article in the Princeton Theological Review XI (1913).

We have already indicated that some scholars have looked to the Wisdom Literature of the Hebrew people in their quest of the antecedents of the Logos doctrine in the Fourth Gospel. Thus there is an editorial comment in Gore's "Commentary":-
"We should prefer to say, whose (i.e. Philo's) influence some scholars find in the New Testament conception of Christ, though to us it seems more probable that the Logos doctrine of St. John is directly derived from the Old Testament doctrine of Wisdom". The pursuit in this direction, however, has tended to that of concepts rather than terminology. Influenced by a hint thrown out in the commentary on the Prologue in Dean Alford's Greek Testament, some have even looked for a "mediated Stoicism", finding the mediator in the Hebrew Sapiential Literature.

In this chapter, then, we shall be concerned to examine this Wisdom Literature, consider its place in Judaism and discuss the question of its relationship to Greek philosophy. We shall also have to try and assess the possible influence on the Johannine Prologue.

It is not intended to give an exhaustive account of the Wisdom Literature. We may, however, take it as beginning in the urge to preserve "pithy" and apt dictums indicative of the contemporary reaction to circumstances - what some might even call an unsystematized philosophy of life. Although it is generally held that the bulk of the surviving Wisdom Literature belongs to the Greek period, and later, traces have survived of an earlier "Wisdom" tradition, e.g. Judges 9 op. Judges 14 I Sam: 24
("As saith the proverb of the Ancients, out of the wicked cometh forth wickedness: but mine hand shall not be upon thee") may legitimately be called in as further evidence. In point of fact, of course, the Jews themselves looked back to the time of King Solomon as the golden age of Wisdom teaching. (I Kings 4:29).

In Jeremiah 18 we have these words:—

"Torah shall not perish from the priest, nor counsel from the wise (נביאים), nor the word (נביאים) from the prophet". From this it appears that "the wise" stands alongside the priest and the prophet as a teacher. (cp.Is:29). As priest and prophet each produced his literature, so, too, the wise man has bequeathed us his Wisdom Literature. In the Palestinian Canon this includes Proverbs, Job, Ecclesiastes, together with some of the Psalms and parts of Psalms. Extra-canonical are Ecclesiasticus and the Wisdom of Solomon, together with passages in other books. Another bequest of "the wise" is the treatise Pirke Aboth. "But", Oesterley reminds us, "it must be emphasized that these teachers were the spiritual descendents of an important ancestry, the history of which goes back for centuries before this period". ("Judaism in the Greek Period", p.234.).

On the whole, with the exception of the Book of Job, modern scholars assign this Wisdom Literature to an intellectual movement which is related to a specific era in Jewish
history, and which, while lasting possibly five hundred years, lies, broadly, between the decline of prophecy and the rise of nationalism under the Maccabees. At such a time the Jews were most likely to submit passively - indeed unconsciously - to extraneous influences. In the main, the Hebrew Wisdom Literature probably represents the reaction of Judaism to Hellenistic penetration. For the present, this general introduction, in which many points are ignored, is sufficient. But it will be necessary to give some subsequent consideration to the last point - the topic of Jewish reaction to Hellenism.

Briefly, the approaches of those who turn to the Wisdom Literature for the antecedents of the Logos term of the Johannine Prologue, fall into two classes. There is first the group which maintains that the ideas - or predicates - expressed in the Prologue, and even some of the terminology, are derived from the Jewish Sapiential Literature. Secondly, there are a few who maintain that behind the Logos-prologue there is to be discerned a more primitive Sapiential-hymn.

To open an account of the first category, it is best to indicate the principle sources in the Wisdom books from which they have drawn their conclusions.

Whatever may be the date which we finally select for the Book of Proverbs, it will by no means necessarily be
the date of any particular quotation. "With the exception of the Psalms there are no books of the Old Testament which lend themselves more easily to additions by later scribes than those belonging to the Sapiential Literature. And of these the Book of Proverbs, with its numbers of short couplets of most varying content, quite independent of their context in most cases, is the one more likely than any of the others to receive additions; indeed one might say that its aphoristic character invites them". (W.O.E. Oesterley, "Book of Proverbs", intro: XX.) While in its final form the book is undoubtedly one of the last works in the Canon - to which it was not admitted without dispute - in all probability it preserves some of the most primitive of matter. Moreover, it is clear that the first chapters contain some of the most recent of the book's material, while 10-16 - 22 the Proverbs of Solomon - may represent the most primitive stratum of the collection. If we treat of Proverbs first, it is only because Gressmann has argued that, in the past, the tendency has been to regard the date of the book as too late. (He places chapter 10-30 about 700 B.C., with 1-9, 31 somewhat later). But this is not the place to discuss the respective merits of a pre- or post-Exilic compilation date. It is sufficient to notice that there is every likelihood that the first section (1-9) belongs to the Greek period.
It is impossible to tabulate all the references to Wisdom in the literature under review. Only the more important passages are to be quoted.

"Wisdom crieth aloud in the street;
She uttereth her voice in the broad places;
She crieth in the chief places of concourse;
At the entering in of the Gates,
In the city, she uttereth her words:
How long, ye simple ones, will ye love simplicity?
And scorner delight them in scorning,
And fools hate knowledge?
Turn you at my reproof:
Behold, I will pour out my spirit unto you.
I will make known my words unto you". (1

"For Wisdom shall enter into thine heart,
And knowledge shall be pleasant unto thy soul". (2

"Because I have called, and ye refused;
I have stretched out my hand, and no man regarded;
... Therefore shall they eat of the fruit of their own way,
And be filled with their own devices.
For the backsliding of the simple shall slay them,
And the prosperity of fools shall destroy them".

(124,31-32)
"... the upright shall dwell in the land,
And the perfect shall remain in it.
But the wicked shall be cut off from the land,
And they that deal treacherously shall be rooted out of it". (21-22)

"For the Lord giveth wisdom...
... That he may guard the paths of judgment,
And preserve the way of his saints.
Then shalt thou understand righteousness and judgment,
And equity, yea, every good path". (26,8-9)

"If thou seek her as sister,
And search for her as for hid treasures;
Then shalt thou understand the fear of the Lord,
And find the knowledge of God".
For the Lord giveth Wisdom.
... Wisdom shall enter into thine heart". (2 4-6,9)

Thus Wisdom calls to a change of heart, with the promise of help through the outpouring of her spirit and by dwelling in the heart; she judges, and gives power to recognize her judgment. To those who seek she is God's gift, and, in return, gives knowledge of God and spiritual insight.(op.4 5) To find her is to find happiness; "happy is the man that findeth wisdom, and the man that getteth understanding"(3 13).
It may be noted, in passing, that "wisdom" is expressed by the plural (יִרְאוֹת) in 1:20, 1:14 and 2:7. Probably the plural is designed to convey the perfection and excellence of Wisdom. This idea may also be carried in 9:1:

"Wisdom hath builded her house,
She hath hewn out her seven pillars;"

Where the "seven pillars" would convey the completeness of the building, seven, as neither a factor nor multiple of any number below ten, signifying perfection. (Philo: de Great.33).

In Proverbs, Wisdom and Creation are closely associated in several passages.

"The Lord by wisdom founded the earth;
By understanding he established the heavens.
By his knowledge the depths were broken up,
And skies drop down the dew". (3:19-20)

"The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his way,
Before his works of old.
I was set up from everlasting, from the beginning,
Or ever the earth was.
When there were no depths, I was brought forth;
When there were no fountains abounding with water.
Before the mountains were settled,
Before the hills was I brought forth:
While as yet he had not made the earth, nor the fields,
Nor the beginning of the dust of the world."
When he established the heavens I was there:
When he set a circle upon the face of the deep:
When he made firm the skies above:
When the foundations of the deep became strong:
When he gave the sea its bound,
That the waters should not transgress his commandment:
When he marked out the foundations of the earth:
Then was I by him, as a master workman:
And I was daily his delight,
Rejoicing always before him;
Rejoicing in his habitable earth;
And my delight was with the sons of men". (8:22-31).

In order to express the full significance of this passage, it is necessary to add a few comments. In verse 22 the Authorised and Revised Versions show a bias of translation indicated by the Vulgate alone of the Ancient-Versions—Dominus possedt me in initio .... Addition is made to the difficulty of deciding upon the sense of מְשֶׁרֶת because we have no Onkelos Targum of Proverbs, a point made by Professor Danby in his review of Guignebert's "The Jewish World in the Time of Jesus". (J.T.S. Apr.1940 XII No.162).

In the Journal of Theological Studies for January 1926 (XXVII No.106) Burney had an article which has won widespread approval, while calling for a revision of conclusions
received by Liddon (Bampton Lectures) Newman (Select Treatises on St. Athanasius) and R.L. Ottley ("The Incarnation"). In the contribution he gives detailed consideration of Proverbs especially in relation to Colossians I, which he regards as a piece of rabbinic exposition of in Genesis I. He demonstrates that the verb means "get, acquire", and cannot mean "possess, own". (Fr. Lagrange, Revue Biblique V.493 note 4 renders "donner l'être"). He says, "In the face of this evidence (some eighty-eight uses of the verb and of substantives derived from the root) we must surely conclude that the ground meaning of is that of acquiring something not previously possessed, which is done by buying or making it, in the case of a child by begetting it, in the case of wisdom by accumulating it through mental application...... The Hebrew , in fact, in so far as it contains the idea of POSSESSING, is exactly like the Greek (in the perfect), and the substantives derived from it like (162) ....... Now the idea of buying or acquiring from an outside source may clearly be excluded without argument, since wisdom is certainly not pictured as something originally external to God. We thus have to choose between the two meanings 'created' or 'begat'. (165).

By examining the force of the verbs used in describing the production of wisdom ( and ) he is able to
say that "יְהֹוָה יָלָב" means "Yahveh begat".

Burney also pointed out that our English Versions render "In the beginning of his way") , while the marginal rendering of the Revised Version has a direct accusative in opposition to the object of "As the beginning of his way""). In the first case, such a use of "the inseparable preposition 2 would be unique, and this rendering by the adverbial accusative may have been influenced by Jerome, who, in quoting this passage, inserted the preposition 2 . In more recent times this mode of rendering seems to have been accepted by the late Fr. Lagrange. In a footnote to an article in the Revue Biblique V he has:- "Jahve m'a donner l'être 'au' commencement de 'ses' voirs 'avant' ses oeuvres d'antan;

J'ai été fondée des l'éternité,
Avant l'origine, avant le début de la terre".

Burney also notes that יָלָב is not used in Hebrew as a preposition, but denotes THAT WHICH IS IN FRONT OF, FOREMOST. Thus he renders the verse:-

"The Lord begat me as the beginning of his way.
The antecedent of his works, of old".

While there can be no reasonable doubt that verse 22 lies behind Colossians 1:15-18 and Revelations 3:17, and while there is evidence that the passage was used in Christological
contexts at an early date, this does not necessarily mean that there is any dependence between it and the Johannine Prologue.

It is not appropriate, at this point, to discuss fully the significance of Hokmah; but it will clear the ground considerably if we note that of the many passages which treat of Wisdom, only a few in the entire Sapiential Literature are even conceivably transcendental in character. Normally Hokmah connotes a certain human endowment, distinct from factual knowledge. "It was applied to the faculty of acute observation, shrewdness in discovery or device, cleverness of invention". (Driver: "Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament", p.368). Its precise nature need not detain us now. The earlier quotations given above are instances of the normal use of the word, and give a fair indication of its content; but, it may be remarked that, while the earliest usages do not carry a specifically religious connotation, the significance is never exclusively secular. Indeed, at the hands of the Wisdom writers, Hokmah "has as its dominating principle, the fear of God". (H.G. Box: "Judaism in the Greek Period", p.119).

Turning now to the Book of Job our special interest is in chapter 28. There is a consensus of opinion among scholars that this chapter represents an interpolated poem; this is
the conclusion alike of exegetical and linguistic studies. Canon Knox describes it, for instance, as the fragment of "a writer who thought (even if he did not write) in Greek" ("The Divine Wisdom", in J.T.S. July 1937 XXXVIII No.151, pp.230-7).

The poem consists of three strophes. According to Duhm, the first (1-11) was originally introduced with the question, "Whence cometh Wisdom?" (op. verses 12 and 20). It represents an account of human achievement in discovering the wealth of the earth. The second strophe (12-19) is again introduced with the question, "Whence cometh Wisdom?". In it the contrast is drawn between these accomplishments and man's failure to discover and to gain Wisdom, the price of which transcends human valuing. The third strophe (20-28, again introduced with the question, "Whence cometh Wisdom?" contains the answer, that none living knows.(21) "Destruction and Death" admit that they have only heard "a rumour thereof". (22) God alone knows the truth about Wisdom. He "understandeth the way thereof, and knoweth the place thereof". (23).

(Commentators differ as to the status of verse 28. Some claim that it is an original part of the poem. Others maintain that it is an inserted gloss, since it treats of human wisdom and Hokmah has its more usual sense, ability in modelling one's life. This point, however, could be conceded
by those who argue that the verse is an original part of the poem. They would say that, while the rest of the poem speaks of the Divine Wisdom, the poet does not ignore the place of a man's wisdom in his life. The contemplation of the former should urge him to use his own capacities.

Driver went so far as to say that, while the fulness of Wisdom belongs only to God, he "has appointed for man, as its SUBSTITUTE, the practice of a righteous and holy life". ("Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament", p.397). In this verse wisdom has something of the force which it has in the interpolated speech of Elihu (32-37), in which the point is put forward that wisdom does not necessarily come to a man with advancing years, but is a diving gift, irrespective of age (326-22 op. Prov.26).

Although the Book of Ecclesiastes is certainly to be classed as Wisdom Literature, it is not very important for our immediate purpose, as none of the statements about Wisdom adds to that which has been said already. On first noting Kuhn's proposition that Koheleth, although the name of a man, is feminine in form since Solomon is regarded as the representative of Hekmah, we seem to be on a hopeful track for an assertion of personification. But against this must be set the possibility that Koheleth is a title of office, and, as such, would be feminine under the normal conventions of Hebrew grammar.
Certain of the Psalms, and a few isolated passages of others, are to be classified as Wisdom Literature. But, again, there is little of moment added to what has been mentioned before. As we should expect, like Ecclesiastes, their place in the Wisdom Literature is due not to their containing any exposition of Divine Wisdom, but, rather, to the fact that they preserve the practical advice and the meditations (op.49\textsuperscript{3}) of the sages. But, interesting enough, in 49\textsuperscript{3} (verse 4 in the Hebrew Version), the Hebrew for Wisdom is again plural (םִּשׁוֹנָה); but so, for that matter, is the word for Understanding (יָדָע). Briggs regarded the first four verses of the Psalm as an introductory strophe of later date. (ICC.Vol.I.p.406) and classified these plurals as "abstract intensives".

Moving now to the Wisdom writings outside the Palestinian Canon, we turn next to Ecclesiasticus, "the Wisdom of Jesus the son of Sirach". The book is of relatively late date (c.180 B.C.), and thus shows how the writings and influence of the Wisdom school persisted. The author himself acknowledges that he is a belated contributor to the literature of his tradition (33\textsuperscript{16-18}). But while a remarkable piece of writing on any reckoning, the author does not show any great originality, being dependent on the Old Testament scriptures, and particularly indebted to
Proverbs. "Ecclesiasticus is a compendium embodying the teaching of the Wise regarding the problems of life" (G.H.Box "Judaism in the Greek Period", p.163). It would be unjust, none the less, to dismiss the son of Sirach as a mere compiler; he had his point of view. Although primarily interested in practical ethics, there is a reverent and vigorous religious element in his book. But, for our interest, it is just in connection with this last that he is most obviously dependent on the work of another. This will be seen by comparing chapter 24 with Proverbs 8. It may even be that less than 50 years separate the two passages.

Of particular importance to our consideration are the first and the twenty-fourth chapters. Chapter one falls naturally into three divisions, 1-10, treating of the origin of Wisdom, 11-20, of Godly fear, and 22-30 of the wise and his desire for Wisdom.

1. All Wisdom comes from God (1) and, although created, was in existence "before all things" (6). "The root of Wisdom" (6) is revealed and given "freely to them that love" the Lord (10).

2. "To fear the Lord is the beginning of Wisdom" (14) "the fulness of Wisdom" (16) "the crown" (18) and "the root of Wisdom". (20) op. 15, 21, 34.
3. "Wisdom is the reward of those who keep the commandments". (26).

Here, again, Wisdom does not correspond to pure knowledge. Although employed of human wisdom, the source is with God. Thus, every manifestation of Wisdom is religious in character.

In chapter 24 we have what we may call an autobiographical rhapsody of Wisdom. She "came forth from the mouth of the Most High, and covered the earth with a mist". (op.Gen.26). She had "sought rest" (7) "in every people and nation" (6). "The creator of all things" commanded, "Let they tabernacle be in Jacob, and thine inheritance in Israel" (8). There was she "established in Sion" (10). Moreover, she identifies herself with the Law ("The creator of all things gave me commandment"). Established in Jerusalem, she "took root in a people that was glorified, even the portion of Jehovah's own inheritance" (12). Those roots flourish in a vine which "puts forth grace" (17). Men are to eat and drink of her (21), that is, to partake of her life, by those obediences and deeds (22) which are "the book of the covenant of the Most High God, even the law which Moses commanded" (23).

In the Book of Wisdom we meet the finest and most attractive of all the extra-canonical writings. Dr. Thackeray
declared that, so far as we can judge, it was the only uncanonical book used by St. Paul. ("The Relation of St. Paul to Contemporary Jewish Thought". p. 223). The book is in three sections:— 1-6 is addressed to the "judges of the earth" (1\(^1\)), and includes what seems to be an attack upon the Scepticism (or, perhaps Epicureanism) of Koheleth (2) and upon the doctrine of a causal relationship between sin and calamity (e.g. 4\(^1\), etc). The second section introduces Wisdom as the speaker (6\(^9\)-11\(^1\)), while the last part recalls the deliverance of Israel out of Egypt and the wanderings "through a desert without inhabitant, and in a trackless region (11\(^2\)), and contrasts the fortunes of Israel and Egypt".

"Whereas thou didst provide for thy people
a burning pillar of fire
To be a guide for their unknown journey,
And withal a kindly sun for their proud exile.
For well did the Egyptians deserve to be deprived of light and imprisoned by darkness.... (18\(^3-4\))

As we should expect, the unity of the book has been called in question. But the topic is immaterial for our present consideration. It is sufficient to note that there is a consensus of opinion that the second section—the most relevant to our purpose, is pre-Philonic."
It is said of Wisdom that she permeates all things (7 24), being "a vapour (Δυν.ος) of the power of God", making men "friends of God" (27 cp. 14). Wisdom is "A reflection (αναλογισμὸς op. Hebr. 1) from everlasting light, an unspotted mirror of the working of God, and an image of his goodness" (24).

She is "compared with light", and found to be before it (29). Against her "evil doth not prevail" (30), and she orders "all things graciously" (8 1). Therefore "Solomon" prays, "O God of the father (9 1) ....

.... with thee is wisdom, which knoweth thy works.
And was present when thou wast making the world (9)
.... Send her forth out of the holy heavens,
And from the throne of thy glory bid her come.
That being present with me, she may toil with me,
That I may learn what is well-pleasing before thee" (10).

God's creating activity is expressed in language reminiscent of Psalm 33, but is also attributed to his Wisdom.

God made "all things by his word" (6 ο λόγως αὐτοῦ) and "by his wisdom" formed man (6 ο φιλακος αὐτοῦ) (9 1).

Also included among the Wisdom passages is Baruch 3 9-4 4, constituting a homily on Wisdom, being prefaced with the Shema, the usual mode of introducing such a composition in a synagogue on a solemn occasion. The speaker sets out to
treat of the problem of Israel's exile. "How happeneth it
O Israel, that thou art in thine enemies' land? (310).....
Thou hast forsaken the fountain of Wisdom (12).... Learn
where is wisdom" (14); the rich, the wise and the ancients
failed to do so. "There is none that knoweth her way, nor
any that comprehendeth her path (31). But he that knoweth
all things knoweth her, and he found her out with his under­
standing (32).... This is our God (35).... Afterward did she
appear upon earth, and was conversant with men" (37).
Wisdom, in fact, "is the book of the commandments of God,
and the law that endureth for ever". (41).

Verse 37 is quoted in Patristic writings as a witness
to the Incarnation. Accordingly some have suspected that
it is a Christian interpolation. But:—

1. It follows naturally from the sense of verses 32-36.
2. The passage is clearly a commentary on Ecclesiastical
   248. This verse is in keeping with the ideas there
put forward.
3. Rabbinic teaching contained the concept of Torah
   as existing with God prior to its appearance.
   "Torah preceded creation by two thousand years".
   (Gen.R.82) "Nine hundred and seventy four genera­
tions before the creation Torah was written, and
lay in the bosom of the Blessed One (ARN313)."
4. Verse 3 of chapter 4 is probably an hostile allusion to Christians. If the homily had been subjected to a Christian re-adjustment, we should expect this verse to have been modified or excised. Thus, we have strong grounds for regarding 3:7 as genuine and original.

In mentioning Wisdom 9:1, we have already had the hint that in the sapiential literature there is not only the concept of Wisdom, but also the idea of a Logos, which "although on lines parallel to those of Wisdom", yet "is much less developed". (Lebreton, "Dogma of the Trinity" p.99.E.T.). It will have been noticed already that the Greek of Wisdom 9:1 - ε' λόγος σου - lacks the precision suggested by the Revised Version. The Revised Version of 18:14ff has:

"For while peaceful silence enwrapped all things .... Thine all-powerful word leaped from heaven out of the royal throne...."

Here, however, we find the article ὁ παντελής σου λόγος; with this we may compare 16:12 λόγος ὁ πάντα ἐκ μικρὸς In Ecclesiasticus we read ὁ λόγος Χριστὸς τὰ ἐφόνωσεν αὐτὸν (42:15); ἐν λόγῳ άληθείᾳ διηγεῖσθαι κατὰ κρίμα (43:10, where, again, the Revised Version is more definite than the Greek cp.43:5); καὶ ἐν λόγῳ αὐτοῦ συνεκτικόν πάντα (43:26(28)).
We have already noted that, while there are references to the Logos in the books under review, there is not the extensive use of the term which we find in the case of Sophia. Lagrange's judgment, moreover, may be quoted:— "On sait que l'idée de la Sagesse se développa ensuite en celle du Logos...." (La Paternité de Dieu", Rev.Bibl.V,4 Oct.1908.pp.481-499).

The next task must be that of deciding the nature of this Wisdom-category. Have we here a personification, or personalization, or hypostatization such as would have enabled the author of the Johannine Prologue to derive "directly" his Logos-doctrine "from the Old Testament doctrine of Wisdom", as the editorial comment in Gore's Commentary has suggested? Or have we no more than a figure of speech?

R.L.Ottley put forward the view that in the Sapiential Literature we can discern a development in the concept of Wisdom. "In the Book of Proverbs (e.g. 8:22) Wisdom is introduced as a quasi-personal being distinct from God. She is personified, but never perhaps actually hypostatized. She is no mere attribute of Deity.... In the Wisdom-doctrine of the Old Testament we can discern progressive stages. Thus in Proverbs 8 and Job 28 Wisdom is personified as being distinct from God. In later books she is represented as at
once emanating from God (Wis. 7:23-25) and immanent in nature. (ib. 8:17f). The ascription of personality is more clearly marked". ("The Incarnation", p.44).

It may be stated, quite bluntly, that everything which Ottley said can be supported and contradicted by reference to other writers. For example, in the case of Job 28, Oehler affirmed, while Hackspill disputed a distinction between Sophia and Yahweh. There is no room in the present treatment to tabulate and survey all opinions. Any judgment can only be another opinion. On the whole, it may be said, R.D. Middleton's judgment ("Logos and Shekinah in the Fourth Gospel", J.Q.R. Oct.1938) represents a fair estimate of opinion; in Proverbs 1-9 - being the later part of the book - Wisdom is personified, and is not an abstraction, as it is in 10ff. But the language is always that of the poet, and not of the metaphysician; there is no sign that the writer intended to expound the idea of an hypostatization. Indeed, the religious imagination of the Hebrew poet never moved in the sphere of speculation for its own sake. But, even with these reservations, it is not easy to assess the extent of the personification. Treating the same evidence, different conclusions have been reached. It has been noted that if Wisdom is personified, then so, too, is understanding. (Prov. 2:8, 7:4, 8:14). Lebreton noted that the language
used of Folly is similar, and that if we want to find a hypostatization of Wisdom, we shall have to accept, too, an hypostatized Folly. (Op. cit. p. 92). He would use this consideration to limit the extent of the personification of Wisdom. It is thought, therefore, interesting and instructive to recall Liddon’s words of ninety years ago. “Are we listening to the language of a real Person or only of a poetic personification? A group of critics defends each hypothesis: And those who maintain the latter point, to the picture of Folly in the succeeding chapter (9:13-18)” Liddon suggested that the consideration of Folly led to the opposite conclusion. “Folly is there no mere abstraction, she is sinful woman of impure life, whose guests are in the depths of hell! The work of Folly is the very work of the Evil One, the real antagonist of the Divine Jehovah. Folly is the principle of absolute Unwisdom, of consummate moral Evil. Folly, by the force of the antithesis, enhances our impression that ‘the Wisdom’ is personal”. (Our Lord’s Divinity” p. 60). It will be seen that Liddon set the extent of personification very near to that of hypostatization. In this connection we note that in Prov. 3:15, 18 and Job 26:18 Wisdom is said to be better than rubies (or coral). The only other occurrences of the word (דַּיִן) are Proverbs 20:15, 31:10 and I Samuel 1, where it is said of
Hannah that she was "better than rubies". There is a possibility that here we have an Hebrew idom for "a good woman".

Canon Knox (J.T.S.XXXVII,151, July 1937) argues that the personification of Wisdom may represent the reaction of Judaism to Ptolemaic cultus and belief, since there is a fair probability that the opening chapters of Proverbs were written while Judea was part of the Ptolemaic Empire. However this may be, the attitude which we take towards the degree of personification (or possibility of hypostatization) will depend on the date which we accept for the relevant passages in Proverbs and Job. If we can "date" them late enough to have been influenced by Persian and Greek religion and philosophy, then we shall incline to Liddon's position.

It has been argued (e.g. by J. Drummond, "Philo Judaeus" I.p.145) that the writer of Ecclesiasticus had contemplated the separate existence of Wisdom as more than a divine attribute. This, it is suggested, may be inferred from 14:- "Wisdom hath been created before all things". But the second half of the same verse reads "and the understanding of prudence from everlasting". The degree of importance which we attach to the first part will depend upon our attitude to Liddon's idea that the
personification of Understanding, Folly, and the like argues towards the personification of Wisdom. But it scarcely seems likely that the author of Ecclesiasticus contemplated the distinct existence of "Understanding". We shall, then, be restricted as to what may be inferred from the first part of this verse. Moreover, 24:23ff show that the writer's interests are ethical rather than metaphysical. It should also be borne in mind that the approach to the question of the personification of Sophia in Ecclesiasticus has been coloured by the Vulgate gloss in chapter 24, Ego feci in coelis ut oriretur lumen indificientes.

Many writers have warned us that we must remember that, in reading these Wisdom passages, we are at grips with the poet and not the metaphysician. But, whatever our final conclusion, there is no doubt that "in the Book of Wisdom the Sophia is more distinctly personal". (Liddon, op. cit. p.62). Some would go further and say that here the poet has been seduced by the philosopher, and that the language used of Sophia is not to be minimized as that of poetic fancy - particularly in the kernel of the book (7:28). "That in Sapientia Solomonis Wisdom appears as a developed hypostatical being is generally recognized". (G. Vos, Princeton Theological Review XI. p.399).
Some of us, however, will still want to allow for the poet. In treating of the origin of Wisdom (7.25, 26) the language is still that of symbol and metaphor (e.g. αρτύσις). Weight, too, must be given to those passages in which that creative activity which has been ascribed to Wisdom is attributed to God Himself (13.1 etc). Drummond went so far as to say that "Wisdom exercises not a primary nor even a delegated, but simply an instrumental agency..... all her activity is in reality the activity of God". (Op. cit. 221).

The truth of the matter seems to be that if we emphasize the poetic character of the book we shall want to minimize the idea of Wisdom as an entity, and regard it as an attribute of God. But if we can believe that the book is intended to be taken seriously as a philosophic work, we shall take the opposite view.

Even if, however, we can be persuaded that the poet is consciously and deliberately handling philosophical concepts, we should remember that he shows no signs of knowing anything of the "exact writers like Aristotle". His philosophy is"that of the market place or at least of the lecture room". (Goodrick, "Book of Wisdom", p.410). This is not, of course, to deny entirely all Hellenistic influence; for such is obvious in the treatment of the doctrines of the soul (8.20-9.15 7-15 op.4 ) and immortality (37.8). So, too, the traditional Hebrew doctrine of
creation ex nihilo has gone, apparently in favour of creation out of an already existing matter (ἐξ ἐξωτερικῶς ὑποθέτου ἔκθεσις, II 17). But, however marked the influence, the faith is that of Judaism, and it is going beyond the evidence to speak of "the submergence of Jewish apocalyptic in Greek philosophy".

Before leaving the Wisdom of Solomon, we may notice, briefly, the question of the personification of the Logos. Naturally, our attitude to the supposed hypostasis of Sophia will govern our estimate of the personification of Logos. This is most apparent in 91.2 where ἐκ λόγου ὑποθέτου is parallel to ἐκ φιλοσοφίας. In 2.3 Logos seems to connote the "life principle", but 16.12 goes no further than the Psalms (e.g. 106:20). In the case of 18-14-16 some have claimed to find a bold personification, on the ground that resemblance to the destroying angel of I Chron. 21.16 points to more than poetic licence. But, against this, there is no evidence that the writer had Chronicles in mind. It is, again, doubtful if he would have turned there for more than imagery.

Before abandoning the topic of an hypostatization of the Sophia and the Logos, we should not ignore the fragmentary Wisdom source embedded in the Similitudes of Enoch, and representing the development of ideas about Sophia.
"Wisdom found no place where she might dwell. Then a dwelling place was assigned her in the heavens. Wisdom went forth to make her dwelling among the children of men, And found no dwelling place: Wisdom returned to her place And took her seat among the Angels (421, 2).

Thus we infer that Wisdom is regarded as angelic—a belief peculiar to the Wisdom-source and not reiterated in the rest of the Similitudes. In the source it is also said, "The Wisdom of the Lord of spirits hath revealed him to the holy and righteous" (467), and "Wisdom is poured out like water" (491). (Translations from Charles', Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha). These last quotations are set in a messianic context. For the compiler of the Similitudes, the Messiah is a person and no abstraction. It used to be thought that we have here a connection between Sophia and a personal Messiah; this would suggest an hypostatization of Wisdom. But subsequent investigation has traced this identification to a mistake made by the Ethiopic translator.

But, this apart, R.H. Charles declared that "the influence of Enoch on the New Testament has been greater than that of all the other apocryphal and pseudepigraphal books taken together" (op.cit.p.41).
Having given some account of the Wisdom Literature, we must now give attention to the other tasks mentioned in the early part of this chapter. The examination which we have just finished has been protracted to a certain degree so that these other questions may be the more briefly treated.

As it confronts the present day reader of the Complete Holy Bible, the Wisdom Literature is very impressive; but what is really important, however, is the question as to its status at the time when the Johannine Gospel and Prologue were written. If we could divest our Christological heritage of the dexterities and ingenuities of patristic and subsequent theologians, we should probably find that Marboroough is very near the mark when he observes that "it is indeed doubtful how seriously the personifications of Wisdom were taken seriously by the Jewish mind". ("The Christ" in Essays on the Trinity and the Incarnation, edit. Rawlinson p.51).

It will, again, be noticed that much of the "advanced" Wisdom literature lies outside the Palestinian Canon. While in the present undertaking we cannot enter upon a discussion of the locus of the Fourth Gospel's origin, it may be pointed out that while none has established the fact, the door has not been finally or securely closed against Palestine. And it is also true that the Wisdom books were
only admitted finally to the Canons after no small struggle. (Vide, e.g. Barton, Ecclesiastes, I. 6. 6.). Probably only their ascription to Solomon made possible their final acceptance, for, as Dr. Dix expressed it, "in the post-prophetic development of Jewish thought concerning 'Wisdom'..... is the most strikingly un-Jewish of all the nation's religious ideas". ("The Heavenly Wisdom the Divine Logos in Jewish Apocalyptic", J.T.S. XXXVI, 101 Oct. 1924 pp. 1-12). How alien these Wisdom passages are to the literature in which they stand is the better relished if we remind ourselves that character of Wisdom had to be introduced in order that she might dissertate upon herself. As we should expect, the radical position has been assumed by at least one competent scholar; Canon Knox points out that all those passages praising Wisdom may be excised. He is, in fact, prepared to assign them to an "interpolator", who may have been the one who cast these books into their present form. (J.T.S. XXXVIII, 151, July 1937, p. 230 f.).

The truth of the matter seems to be that while it would be foolhardy to dismiss any serious debt to the Jewish Wisdom literature, we must also guard against a tendency to "read back" into that literature significance which has accumulated in subsequent Christological thought. Bulgakov's reminder merited; Sophia "is used without any relation to
Christology. Matt. 11:19 and Luke 7:35. ("The Wisdom of God", p. 50 - but reserve is necessary in appealing to Bulgakov, for often his teaching is more reminiscent of Valentinianism than of orthodox Christianity). Nor should we forget how soon in the development of Christological thought the stress upon Christ as the Logos of God gives place to a stress upon his Sonship. This began with Tertullian. (Dorner: Person of Christ, Div. I. Vol. II. p. 65, E.T.).

Some scholars, as we have already mentioned, while regarding the Sophia of the Jewish Wisdom Literature as the direct precursor of the Logos of the Johannine Prologue, had argued that this Sophia-idea, in turn, involves a debt to Stoic Philosophy. Professor J. Rendel Harris argued this thesis on several occasions. (The Expositor, 8th. series Nos. 63-72, Aug.-Dec. 1916 - "The Origins of the Prologue to St. John's Gospel"). He summarized his position: - "In the sources of the Prologue of John; the Logos is Sophia, and Sophia is Zeus, and Zeus is Fate. The Stoics say definitely, that Zeus and Fate are the same thing". (Bulletin of J. Ryland's Library (1922) p. 449).

Harris' articles and pamphlets cover a good deal of matter, and not always very systematically. The following is an attempt to summarize his expositions as contained in his various publications.
Logos in the New Testament normally means the Evangelic Message, except in the Apocalypse, where it is a Messianic title, and in the Epistle to the Hebrews, where it is "explicable by Philonean parallels in a metaphysical sense". (Expositor, p.150). He suggests, therefore, that Logos replaced an earlier metaphysical title, namely by Wisdom. He points to 1.Cor.1, maintaining that the use of the conjunction is to throw the emphasis on Wisdom, which should have a capital letter.

He draws up the following comparison between the Prologue and Proverbs (LXX).

\[\begin{align*}
\text{ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος.} & \quad \text{κύριος ἐκτίσεν με ἁρχὴν ὅσων} \hfill \\
\text{ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν.} & \quad \text{ἡμᾶς περὶ αὐτῷ.} \hfill \\
\text{ὁταὸς ἦν ἐν ἀρχῇ πρὸς} & \quad \text{κίναι ἡ πολιμαζῇ τῶν οὐρανῶν,} \hfill \\
\text{τὸν θεόν.} & \quad \text{συμπαρήμην αὐτῷ.} \hfill \\
\text{ἐν αὐτῷ ἦν.} & \quad \text{αἰ γερὰ ἐγοδοῖ μοι ἐσοδοὶ ἰωῆς.} \hfill \\
\text{} & \text{ἐπὶ λον ἰωῆς ἐστὶ πολι τοῖς} \hfill \\
\text{} & \text{αντεχομένοις ἀδῆς.} \hfill
\end{align*}\]
Moreover, if we substitute the term Sophia for Logos in the opening sentences of the Prologue, we shall see remarkable affinities with Proverbs 8:27-30.

Harris puts forward four questions:-

1. Is there any literature praising Sophia? In answer he points to the entire range of the Sapiential Books. The bridge between Proverbs and the Johannine Prologue is found in Wisdom 9:1, which provides also a transition from Logos to Sophia.

2. Is there any literature in which our Lord is equated both with Sophia and Logos? Harris points to Luke 11:49 ("Therefore also said the Wisdom of God, I will send unto them.....") and the corresponding passage in Matthew ("Therefore, behold, I send...." 23:34). He notes that Tatian's Harmony (Diatessaron) has "Behold! I, the Wisdom of God send....."

3. As in the case of the Prologue, are such praises derived from Proverbs? As we should expect, he readily establishes the nexus between Wisdom 9 and Proverbs. He is able, here, to point to the Testimonia Adversus Judaeos, which are bound up with Cyprian's writings. In the "headings" with which these open Christ is called both Sapientia Dei and Sermo Dei, and in the text itself Proverbs 8 is invoked.
In the later form of Testimonia (generally attributed to Gregory of Nyssa) I. Corinthians 1:24 is actually quoted.

In his pamphlet, "The Origin of the Doctrine of the Trinity", Harris also argues that in the later editions of the Testimonia "where Logos and Sophia come together, it is the Logos which is the after thought and intruder". (p.30).

4. Are Logos and Sophia genuinely interchangeable?

Harris' answer is rather technical; but, in effect, it is that Wisdom and the Prologue are both of Stoic origin. If this is so, then we can legitimately erase "In him was life" and say "In her was life". For the Stoics equated Sophia and Zeus, and the Stoic philologists had derived $\tilde{\eta} \nu$ (acc.) from $\tilde{\eta} \nu$.

"The Logos in the Prologue to John is a substitute for Sophia in a previously existing composition". (Bull. of J. Ryland's Lib.). Moreover he declares that not only the Prologue, but also the famous Christological passage in Colossians are constructed out of material available in ben Sirach's eulogies of Wisdom.

In support of his theme, Harris produces Patristic evidence that, $\alpha$) Christ was there equated with Sophia, and that, $\beta$) the statement "the Lord created me the beginning of his way, before his works of old", was used by these writers in a Christological context. (Justin, Theophilus of Antioch, whom he claims as representing a time when the
Logos-doctrine was replacing the Sophia-doctrine (op. on this point, Prestige, "God in Patristic Thought", p. 89), Irenaeus, Tertullian, who substituted Logos for Sophia in the Proverbs passage, Origen and Eusebius).

"Reviewing the course of the inquiry, we see that the commentators on the great Christological passages in the New Testament..... have failed to set these passages in the true light of their historical evolution. We have tried to restate the texts..... first, by correcting a grammatical error in John 1..... second, by showing that the theology of the Church is best seen in the first days of its making by a careful consideration of the primitive books of Testimonies; it follows from these corrections and identifications that the key to the language of the Johannine Prologue and to St. Paul's language in the Epistle to the Colossians lies in the Sapiential tradition and not in the reaction from Plato or Philo or Heraclitus". (Expositor p. 393).

Harris' argument is impressive and ingenious. But it has certain difficulties, chiefly that it fails completely to account for the writer of the Prologue's preference of Logos to the term Sophia. Besides, in postulating a proto-Prologue with Sophia, instead of Logos as the key-term, Harris would seem to infer that Christ's impact upon his followers was that of one manifesting the Wisdom of God.
In his pamphlet on the Trinity he does, in fact, suggest that the impression which he made was one of "abnormal, supernatural Wisdom". For this there is no evidence. Jesus of Nazareth was recognized as Messiah; "the Christ", as the result of theological thinking, is spoken of as "the Wisdom of God". If it were true that Jesus of Nazareth gave this impression of "supernatural Wisdom", we should have to suppose that he thought of himself as the Wisdom of God. For this we have, again, no real evidence. "The parallels between the consciousness of Christ and the conception of Wisdom personified do not seem frequent enough or close enough to suggest that he entertained any form of Wisdom Christology". (Narborough, op.cit.p.42).

Harris, rightly, noted that many of the terms used of Christ in the two great Christological passages were originally Sapiential; but he has to admit that in no Sapiential source, as we now have it, can Pleroma be found. He is, therefore, driven to postulate an intermediate document in which Sophia and Pleroma are related. (Expositor p.417). This is, of course, no more than speculation; there is no evidence for the existence of such a document. He constructed facts to suit his hypothesis.

In trying to persuade us of the place of Stoic terms in the early Church, Harris suggested that St. Paul used
Stoic language in the Areopagus. But it is generally recognized that this incident lies outside the general trend of Christian policy and preaching.

By way of conclusion we may note that, while the idea of a previously existing Prologue is still held (W.F. Howard, "Christianity According to St. John", p. 46), it is now admitted that any such composition must have been an essentially and characteristically Hebraic work. "If", said one writer, "Hellenism could not be imposed upon the Jews by force, neither could they resist it by force alone, for this new world temper, this complex of ideas and of aspirations seeped through all walls of division whether political, religious, social, racial, or economic. Hellenism was in the very air breathed by the men of the (first) century (B.C.)" (Purdy (and Macgregor) "Jew and Greek: Tutors unto Christ"). But today it is more and more recognized how easy it has been in the past to over-emphasize the effects of the Greek world upon Jewry, and to underestimate the virility of the reaction of Judaism to the challenge of Hellenism. A more balanced judgment is needed, in which due weight is given to the fact, that though some of the Wisdom Literature is anti-Hellenic, this does not preclude the possibility that the writers were themselves affected by that which they tried to belittle. (Oesterley: "Ecclesiasticus" XXIVf). But
the judgment must also give weight to the fact that the very existence of the Septuagint shows that it was the Jewish Scriptures which the Hebrew of the Dispersion wanted to read. Or, to put it differently, we have to allow for the influence of the Greek communities in Palestine, while admitting the possibility that the Jews of the Dispersion reacted to the Gentile world with exclusiveness. (G.K. Gilbert, "The Hellenization of the Jews between 334 B.C. and A.D. 70", J.T.S. XIII. No. 4 pp. 520-540). The late Dr. C. Montefiore, in his "Judaism and St. Paul", also insisted that the Judaism of the Dispersion was less liberal than that of Palestine.
PHILO OF ALEXANDRIA.

"The worst extravagances of mystical interpretation among the Fathers, combined with the most tedious platitudes of a modern sermon, will convey an idea of the manner in which Philo 'improves' Scripture"


"To thread the maze of Philo's inconsequent and self-contradictory language is the work of a life-time, and students admittedly of the first rank come to diametrically opposite conclusions about him".


"I have no doubt that in a general sense St. John is here following the thought of Philo; but this does not mean that he was a student of Philo's writings".

- The Late Archbishop William Temple, in his "Readings in St. John's Gospel".

In devoting any consideration to Philo Judaeus during a discussion of the Johannine Prologue half way through the twentieth century, any writer must be aware of a certain element of unreality. Yet the present writer can turn to the notes which he took as a theological student in the early nineteen thirties, and find this statement:
"The writer of the Fourth Gospel bases his conception (of the Logos) upon that of Philo. He found it as a popular category which almost exactly expressed his notion of the function of Jesus". (op. Sanday: "The preponderance of opinion at the present time (1904) doubtless leans to the view that there is some connection between the Logos of Philo and the doctrine of the Logos in the Fourth Gospel". - "Criticism of the Fourth Gospel" p.185). There are, of course, reservations and qualifications, but, as we have already indicated in the Introduction, it is doubtful whether any lecturer today would venture such a statement. While we should always reckon with the possibility of a change of fashion, it seems unlikely that Philo will receive much consideration, for some time, as a possible source of the Logos in the Johannine Prologue. James Drummond, in his great work on Philo, might well have been speaking of the modern situation, when he concluded, so many years ago, that Philo's writing "was too early to be influenced by Christian ideas; and although it is possible that his works may have been known to some of the writers of the New Testament, and there are occasional startling coincidences of thought and expression, yet there is nothing to prove conscious borrowing, and it is probable that the resemblances are due to the general condition of religious culture among
the Jews" (I p. 12). Ehrmaack's rejection of a borrowing from Philo is now generally accepted (History of Dogma, I E.T. p.114), and few would today go far with Siegfried in his arguments for the dependence of the Johannine Prologue on the work of Philo of Alexandria. ("Philo von Alexandrien")

As a philosophical writer, Philo was indebted to Platonic sources. But some have seen in the allusion to "the all-cutting Logos (Oυτος o Θεος ακον πολλονων των τομου των ουχαλλων αυτου λογον ....... Quis Rev. Divin. Heres, XXVII,130-140), a borrowing by Philo from the philosophy of Heraclitus. It is also likely that he was indebted to the Stoics (and especially Chrysippus) for his teaching that the Logos gives cohesion to the universe. His identification of the Logos with the moral law is characteristically Stoic.

(αυτη) (ποιητεια) δε εστιν o τω ψευτω υπερος λογος .... (αo Οψι, Λνδι,143 )

It would be, it is alleged, with these associations of the term Logos in his mind that Philo would be confronted with the Greek Version of the Jewish Scriptures. Here, too, he would meet the category Logos used to render ΑΥΓ, and thus signifying the divine "revelation", rather than the "unifying principle" of the Greek philosophical authors. (see chapter III). The situation, then, is that Philo read the Greek translation of his nation's sacred writings, and encountered the term Logos, which, on account of his
philosophical studies, had clearly a peculiar significance - and that not in the minds of those who had written the Jewish Scriptures. Thus, in Philo of Alexandria the two meanings meet: the uttered word of the Scriptures, and the Reason of Philosophy, the divine Utterance and the metaphysical Logos.

Indebted to many sources - Hebrew Wisdom and Word, Platonic Idea, and the Stoic concept of the Divine Reason, at least - it will be appreciated that Philo's Logos will scarcely admit of systematic presentation. Since the number of passages in his writings in which he treats of the Logos is about thirteen hundred, and since many of these are irreconcilably contradictory, there is no use seeking for twentieth century standards of consistency in Philo, and any attempt to present his teaching about the Logos (unless all the passages are to be quoted) must be arbitrary to some extent.

It is proposed now to give a selection of passages from Philo's works, such as will at once indicate his thoughts about his Logos, and allow him to be heard speaking for himself. So many have written to tell us what they have found in the works of Philo, but it was Dr. Hart who set the example in letting him speak for himself, although the articles reached from October 1904 until January 1908, in the Jewish Quarterly Review. As has been mentioned already
any selection of passages must be to some extent arbitrary. The following series is given with the frank opinion that "in the past abnormal attention has been directed to Philo's fluid and confused conceptions of the Divine Logos and the Divine Powers". (H.A.A. Kennedy, "Philo's Contribution to Religion" p.5.).

1. The Logos is "the Beginning", God's "Eldest Son", his "First-born", the "Older of created things".

Μᾶν μηδέποτε μένοι οὐκ ἔχειτε τις ἄνδρας λέγοντας ὅτι θεόν οὗτός ἐστιν + προσαγόρευ εἰς Θεόν, ὅτι οὕτως κοσμεῖτο κατὰ τὸν πρῶτον λόγον ἀυτῶν λόγον ..., πολυνυκίων ὑπάρχοντα ... καὶ γαρ ἀρχή...

(de confusione Linguarum,146).

"If there is as yet anyone unfit to be called a son of God, let him endeavour to take his place under God's First-born, the Logos..... he has many names ...... the Beginning....."

Τοῦτον μὲν γὰρ πρεσβύτατον οἰδὼν οὐ τῶν οὔλων ἐκεῖνος πατὴρ, δι' έστέρως πρωτόγονον οὐνόμασθε).

"That man is the Eldest Son (i.e. the Incorporeal One, differing in no way from the Divine Image), whom the Father of all raised up, and elsewhere calls his "First-born".

ὁ λόγος ὃς πρεσβύτερος τῶν γενεσιῶν εἰληγοτέτοιν (de Migratone Abrahami,6).

"The Logos, who is the Antecedent (or Older) of those things which were created".
Philo also expressed the relationship between God and the Logos thus:

το δὲ γενεικύτατον ἐστιν ὁ θεός, καὶ δεύτερον ὁ θεοῦ λόγος.

(Legum Allegoria II.86).

"The primal existence is God, and next to him is the Logos of God".

2. The Logos interprets and guides men in doing the will of God, being a prophet.

ἀρματήσον, εἶπεν κατὰ τοῦ ἀνόματος αὐτοῦ δυνηθῶμεν, ὁπερ ἡν τὸ ἐφημένος λόγος.

(Legum Allegoria III.207).

"We must be content to swear by his name, which, as we have seen, means the interpreting Logos". The reference may be to "Quod Deus Immutabilis Sit", XIX.138, which reads:

"The soul... should follow the guidance of that Logos which is the Interpreter and Prophet of God " (ὅ ἐφημένως τοῦ θεοῦ... ἔρχεται ἐπιτύπωσι).

.... (de Mutatione Nominum,18)

"His (i.e. the αὐτοῦ, sovereign's) interpreting Logos will show me ...."

The same ideas are expressed differently, e.g.,

"This hallowed flock (the Universe under God) he leads according to right and law, setting over it his true Logos and First-born Son (ὁ ύιόν πρωτότοκος οὐκ ὁ θεός ) who shall assume its government like the viceroy of some great king" (de Agricultura, 51).
3. **The Logos is the source of Light.**

τὸ μὲν γὰρ παρὰ δείγμα ὁ πληρώστατος ἐν αὐτῷ λόγος, φῶς.

(de Somnús, I. 75).

"The pattern was the Logos, which contained all its fulness - light".

(Retaining φῶς, which Mangey excised).

4. **The Logos is the creative instrument.**

**Σύνθεσις** καὶ κίττον (of the Cosmos) μὲν αὐτῶν τῶν θεῶν ὁ λόγος ὁ πρεσβύτερος τῶν γένεσιν εἰληφότας, ὁ δὲ θεότητος ὁ θεότητος ἐνειλημένος οὐκ ἑαυτοῦ ἐναρχήν περαλιοῦκε τῇ σύμπαντα καὶ ἐκεῖ ὁ καθότατος ἄρτος εἰς τὴν ὑπόστασιν τῶν ὑποτελομένων σύστασιν;

(de Cherubim, 127).

"The cause of the Universe is God, by whom it came into being, the instrument being the Logos of God".

[ὁ τῶν θεῶν οἶκος] τὸς ἐν οἷς εἶπα πάντα ὁ λόγος ὁ πρεσβύτερος τῶν γένεσιν εἰληφότας, ὁ δὲ θεότητος ὁ θεότητος ἐνειλημένος οὐκ ἑαυτοῦ ἐναρχήν περαλιοῦκε τῇ σύμπαντα καὶ ἐκεῖ ὁ καθότατος ἄρτος εἰς τὴν ὑπόστασιν τῶν ὑποτελομένων σύστασιν;

(de Migratione Abrahami, 6).

"What then can the house be except the Logos, who is the antecedent (older) of all that came into existence - the Logos who is the Steersman of the Universe, grasping a rudder to guide all things on their course; even as when he was fashioning the world, he used it as his instrument, that the fabric of his handiwork should be irreproachable?"

τῷ δὲ ἀρχαγγέλῳ καὶ πρεσβύτερῳ λόγῳ ὁμορράιν ἐνυγκε 

εἰσίνεται ὁ τῷ ἄλλῳ γεννήσας πάντα, ὅπερ μεθορίον στὰς τῷ 

γενομένων διακρίνη τῇ περαιτερώσῃ... οὕτω γενέστησον ὁ 

θεός ἐν ὑμῖν γένος ὡς ἡμέτερος σὺν ἡμῖν, ὡς ἡμέτερος σὺν ἡμῖν...
(Quis Rerum Divinarum Heres Sit, 205-206).

"The Father who has begotten all things, granted as his supreme gift to his chief messenger and most honourable Logos, that he should stand in the midst between the Creator and the created, being neither uncreated like God, nor created like you, but placed between the extremes as a pledge to both".

It is, of course, impossible to mention all the striking statements about the Logos; but the association of ὁ λόγος and ἐκὼν is particularly arresting. It will be remembered that St. Paul uses εἰκὼν of Christ in II. Cor. 4. In "to the Hebrews", in affinity with εἰκὼν we have χαρακτήρ (13). Interesting, then, is this passage from de Plantatione (5)

"Our great Moses likened the fashion of the reasonable soul to no created thing, but said that it is a genuine image of that aseful spirit, divine and invisible, signed and impressed by the seal of God, the imprint of which is his eternal Logos".

So, also, λόγος ἐστιν εἰκὼν θεοῦ (Spec. Leg. I. 81) and when God had perfected it, he sealed the Universe with an image and idea, even his own Logos (ἐκὼν τῆς ιδέας).
Although the modern student may not find the alleged affinities of thought and expression between Philo's works and the Johannine Prologue very impressive, the fact remains that in the quite recent past competent scholars found such likenesses. But, in coming to a decision, it is not difficult to tabulate these. The essential point is that the writer of the Prologue introduced the term Logos without explanation, from which we infer that it must have been intelligible to his readers. Proof is still wanting as to the place of origin of the Fourth Gospel and of the precise locus of the Christians for whom it was designed. Recently, J.N. Sanders has argued in favour of Alexandria as the place of origin, on the grounds of a papyrus evidence, the contacts between Johannine and Alexandrian thought, the use of this Gospel by the Gnostics, and the slow acceptance of the Fourth Gospel by the Church at large, since Alexandrian Christianity was suspect (as being tainted with Gnosticism) until the middle of the second century. But Mr. Sanders did not accept his own argument as final, and does not insist upon a non-Ephesian place of origin. More serious consideration, too, is being given to the possibility of a Palestinian "locus". But, for our purposes, it is sufficient to note that there is no sufficient evidence of the influence of Philo at an
appropriate date in any of these centres - Palestine, Alexandria or Ephesus. The ingenious suggestion has sometimes been advanced that since Apollos had worked and taught at Ephesus, and that since he was "an Alexandrian by race" (i.e. "by birth" - Τῷ Γεν.), he may have familiarized the Ephesian Christians with some of Philo's thoughts by including them in the subject-matter of his teaching. Against this, the Acts of the Apostles (18:24-28) indicates John the Baptist as in the influence upon his thought; he knows "only the baptism of John". It is a very far cry from the Baptist to Philo Judaeus. Moreover, the evidence suggests that Stephen was also an Hellenic Jew, probably of Alexandria; but there is no hint of Philonic influence in his apology. (Acts 7). Further, Apollos is reported to have been "mighty in the scriptures" (δυνατὸς ἐν τοῖς γεν. (18:24) an expression reminiscent of the description of Moses in Stephen's defence - "he was mighty in his words and works". (ἡ δὲ δυνατὸς ἐν λόγοις καὶ ἐν γεν. (7:22)). It is said, too, of Apollos that "he taught the things concerning Jesus". (18:25). This may mean that either he expounded the Old Testament prophecies, demonstrating their fulfilment in Christ Jesus, or that he told the facts about the life, death and resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth. On the whole, his subsequent treatment (26) favours the former explanation.
And after receiving instruction from Priscilla and Aquila, it was the Jews whom he combatted. It will be remembered that the point under discussion is the lack of evidence for Philomic influences. There is little to suggest a knowledge of Philo's doctrines in a tent-maker from Pontus, settled in Rome, or in his higher-born, and possibly Roman wife. "Acts" epitomizes his work: - \( \varepsilon\varphi \tau\omicron\omega\varsigma \gamma\alpha\rho\tau\eta\varsigma \iota\omicron\nu\delta\omega\omicron\iota\omicron \varsigma \delta\iota\omicron\kappa\alpha\pi\nu\lambda\epsilon\gamma\kappa\eta\omicron\tau\omicron \) (28). The language is much more forceful than the English Versions reveal. In effect, it means that Apollos brought the objections of the Jews into court, and confounded them by laying against them the evidence of their own scriptures. But, at the same time, it should be remembered that Apollos' manner of scriptural interpretation differed from that of Paul, and was evidently better relished by some at Corinth. An adequate explanation could be given if we suppose that Apollos' teaching about the sacred writings was more allegorical. But this allegorical approach was made by many who took no account of Philo and his teachings.

It should not be forgotten, either, that Philo was by no means the only exponent of the faith of Judaism in Alexandria. We shall have more to say in an additional note about the usual description of Philo as a "lone figure". Meanwhile, we quote Fairweather, that Philo puts "the crown upon already existing traditions" in Alexandria ("Jesus and the Greeks", p. 174), an opinion also expressed by E. Kerbs in
"Der Logos im Ersten Jahrhundert". The possibility is that what has been taken for the influence of Philo is no more than the influence of Alexandrian traditions in general. And, if we are to look to Palestine as the place of origin of the Fourth Gospel, we shall have to face the initial improbability that the works of the writer who, if not a "lone figure", is outside the main stream of Hebrew orthodoxy, should have enjoyed such a diffusion.

Thus we have to face the lack of conclusive evidence for that orientation of Philomic thought which would ensure that the readers of the Prologue would interpret the term Logos in accordance with it.

For Philo, the Logos is pre-eminently the creative activity of God (vide de Migr.Abr.l. etc). Yet in only one verse of the Prologue does this aspect of the Logos receive any mention - "all things were made by him". The late Dr. E.F. Scott, in his book on the Fourth Gospel, pointed out "that the omission of this verse in no way interrupts the line of thought which is developed in the Prologue". The possibility is at any rate open that the phrase was not found in the original version of the Prologue. For, "literary structure and the interrupted sequence of thought both argue for the theory that editorial revision has taken place at some stage in the history of the Prologue".
While there is, of course, no textual evidence to support it, it is possible that there was an original composition about the Logos (perhaps verse 1,2,(3),4,5,10,11,14,18). It may be that the phrase in verse three ("All things were made by him") was inserted when the Prologue was cast in its present and final form. It is, after all, remarkable that if the Prologue is dependent upon Philo for the content of its central term, Logos, only one phrase should be used to mention what is, for Philo, the outstanding feature and function of the Logos. (W.R. Inge "The Theology of the Fourth Gospel" in Cambridge Biblical Essays, p.277 wrote: "It is true to say that the Johannine God is not an absolutely transcendent Being who can only manifest himself through an intermediary. In consequence of this, the CREATIVE function of the Logos loses its interest for St. John and is not referred to again after the Prologue").

The polemic aims of the Gospel, such as they are, may be taken into consideration. Even if the Gospel is not deliberately polemical, some of the references and teachings seemed to be stressed as if in opposition to errors prevalent at the time of writing - perhaps those of the Ebionites and the Docetists. So close is the affinity between the Prologue and the rest of the Gospel that it would be
surprising if the polemic designs obvious in the one did not find an echo in the other. For example, if it is true that the writer intended to correct the exaggerations of John the Baptist's devotees, this purpose is fostered both in the Prologue and the Gospel. The aim of the Gospel is to assert that the Lord Jesus is the Son of God, the Christ (2031); that of the Prologue is the same - to maintain that the Logos is personal and fully divine. This the Fourth Evangelist asserts against the Gnostics - although, since Dr. R.P. Casey's cautions (J.T.S. XXXVI, 141, Jan. 1935) we must beware of attaching too much to the term Gnosticism. The Gnostics, so far as we know, held that the Logos, the Christ, was an inferior and intermediate being; for them, that he could be the One God's agent in creation was possible because the Logos did not partake of "the Godhead fully". Thus, as regards the instrumentality of the Logos, Philo is nearer the Gnostics than the Fourth Evangelist. While the Prologue, as it stands, asserts that "all things" were made by the Logos, this is done only after the writer has declared the complete deity of the Logos. Drummond argued that the Logos of Philo is not personal" (Philo Judeaus"II, 223ff); Heinze took the opposite view ("Lehre vom Logos" 291ff.) "Is Philo's Logos a personal being or is he after all a pure abstraction?" asked Liddon; and answered, "Philo is silent;
for on such a point as this the Greek and the Jew in him are hopelessly at issue. ("Our Lord's Divinity", p.66). Zeller believed that Philo gave answer neither for or against the personality of his Logos. (Die Phil. der Griechen" III. 378). This confusion of conclusions points to the fact that, in Philo, there is no clear doctrine of a personal Logos, only of a ὄργανος θεοῦ (de Cherub.35 op.Χρηστόν ὄργανος τούτῳ de Migr.Abr.1). Nor, again, does Philo speak of a pre-existent Logos in any terms comparable with those of the Johannine Prologue. In the Prologue, the Logos is μονογενής, whereas, as Lightfoot pointed out, the Logos of Philo is not even πρωτοτόκος, but πρωτόγονος.

It is, again, true that Philo speaks of the Logos as embracing light in all its fulness; but there is no attempt, as in the Prologue, to connect the two mighty categories of Light and Life, both of which are also characteristic of the rest of the Fourth Gospel.

The reader of Philo's works is conscious that he was pulled in two directions, and that much of his inconsistency is due to the tension between Hebrew orthodoxy and Greek philosophy. Although the tendency has been, of recent years, to see Philo more and more as carrying out normal Rabbinic exegesis, comparable with that of the Midrash, (H.St.J. Thackeray, "The Relation of St. Paul to contemporary Jewish Thought", p.232), the case is still going strong that he was
by inclination a metaphysicist. Although Moses is his hero, he is for him, as Aristotle was for Aquinas, ὁ φιλόσοφος. Thus, while it is doubtful if his Logos is hypostatic, there are numerous passages in which it is contemplated as abstract, metaphysical intelligence. But, as we have seen, the Hebrew religious concept of the Word of God is so tangible that it is late on in the development of Judaism that anthropomorphic descriptions are even criticized. It is compared with the crash of thunder (Job 40:9, Pss. 77:18, 104:7 etc.), or the blare of the trumpet (Exod. 19:16). Whatever the final conclusion as to the origin of the Logos in the Johannine Prologue, it is no wonder that recent scholars, seeking to find the way open for an Incarnation, have returned to the path of Hebrew Scriptures rather than the track of the metaphysician.

While Philo closely relates the idea of creation and the idea of the Logos, his Logos - as can be seen in the extracts already given - is an instrument, and "occupies a ministerial and mediating position". (R.L. Ottley, "The Incarnation" p.45). Although he did not wish to say that the Logos is γενήτος, yet he cannot have it that the Logos is γενήτος. (Quis Rev. Did. Heres 206). In fact the Logos is part and parcel of his teaching about the intermediary powers. Only in de Somnus I.72-76 does Philo expound the traditional Jewish doctrine that matter was created by God. Otherwise
Philo appears to have accepted the Platonic doctrine of matter as existing before creation. The Logos has the task of vitalizing matter but ὁ λόγος .... ἐνεσετος καὶ γενεκτως των ὄσων γέγονε. (Leg. All. III. 175). It is here, then, that we see that Philo and the Fourth Evangelist are poles apart. The Johannine Logos creates because he is God; the Philomic Logos creates because he is other than God, who is precluded from that mundane contact necessary to creative activity. But Philo would have recoiled from any suggestion that the Logos could "become flesh". "To Philo, as to any of his pagan contemporaries, it would have appeared an inversion of all values, whether religious or metaphysical, that the Evangelist should have dared the tremendous assertion 'the Logos became flesh and dwelt among us'." (H. A. A. Kennedy, op. cit. 177). The theology of Philo might have led to a doctrine of "eternal incarnation", such as that advanced by Schelling in the nineteenth century, but not to the incarnation of the God-man at a specific point in history.

"There are three types of life: one of which is πεσὶς θεὸν; another of which is πεσὶς γενεσίν; and the third of which is a conglomeration of the two. But the ἡ πρὸς θεὸν has not come down to be face to face with us (μετέβη πεσὶς ὑμᾶς) nor has it approached the necessities of the body". For Philo, there is no Incarnation; his Logos does not "become flesh".
In the case of Philo we are particularly aware that any attempt to find precedents or backgrounds for the use of Logos in the Johannine Prologue is beset with the notorious difficulty of the obscurity of the term's meaning. In Philo it is probably best summarized by the word "reason." In the Prologue the picture is that of a word proceeding forth, or being uttered by an act of divine will. For all significant words, as distinct from unintelligible sounds, are produced by acts of deliberate willing. We noted, in the introduction, that Robert Bridges, in his "Testament of Beauty" rendered the term Λόγος as "mind." Scott Holland protested against this; and he was right. For such a translation is given an arbitrary Philonic bias.

It will be recalled that we pictured Philo as being confronted, in the Greek version of the Scriptures, with a term which had already acquired distinctive significance in the Greek philosophical authors. When this happened, three issues were possible; a synthesis of meanings; the elimination of one in favour of the other; the use of the term without any deliberate resolution of the contradictions entailed. The last course was adopted by Philo. Hence, there is no "system of thought" about the Logos, and no consistency of use or meaning. Moreover, Philo was, above all else, an allegorist, which the Fourth Evangelist is not.
While later Christian writers were bound to appreciate Philo's eclecticism, it was his allegorical methods which they welcomed, and not his originality as a thinker.

As long ago as 1904, Sanday threw out a hint of what may well be the truth of the matter. He noted, in his book on "Criticism of the Fourth Gospel", that "many catchwords of the Philonian doctrine are entirely absent from the Fourth Gospel". However, "among these expressions are several that at an early date entered into Christian literature, but they are not found in the Fourth Gospel". (pp. 191-192). From this we seem driven to conclude that the appeal to, and the use of Philo by Christian writers are post-Johannine.
The quest for an adequate Latin rendering may well have received a spur from Tertullian's discussion of the term λόγος (in ADVERSUS PRAXEAN, chap. 5). He notes the custom, among Latin-using Christians, of translating λόγος by "sermo", and of speaking of the Sermo as having been "in the beginning with God". He pleads that it would be more apposite to speak of "Ratio", since God is not "sermonalis" from the beginning, whereas "before the beginning" God is "rationalis".

In his APOLOGIA, he speaks of "the wise men of the heathens" being agreed that the Logos, "that is Sermo and Ratio" was the "Artificer of the universe".
ADDITIONAL NOTE.

The fact of the matter seems to be that the approach to the entire Fourth Gospel has altered radically, and the treatment of the Prologue has been deeply affected by this change. We used to be taught that the Johannine Gospel was a pious meditation upon the words and deeds of the Lord Jesus Christ; now we are being persuaded that it is a piece of "sound history". A quarter of a century ago Foskes-Jackson and Kirsop Lake spoke airily of St. Paul's "capitulation to Hellenism". In those days we believed that the Fourth Gospel was written to commend the evangelic message to the Greek philosophical world. Thus attention was drawn by commentators to the Evangelist's explanations of Jewish terms and customs. But nowadays our attention is drawn to the fact that "we are hardly through the Prologue when we meet with priests, Levites and Pharisees, a reference to Elijah, and a quotation from Isaiah, all without explanation". (Dodd) Rabbinic doctrines and exegesis of the Scriptures are introduced without comment. In fact, the material is ready and the time is ripe for the presentation of the Fourth Gospel as a Judaean-Christian "apologia" directed at the Jewish Diaspora.

The general attitude had it that the Johannine Gospel was written to supplement the work of the Synoptic Evangelists. Then Professor Windisch, in his "Johannes und die
Synoptiker", advanced the proposition that the Fourth Gospel is intended to replace the other three Gospels, and not to correct or supplement their Accounts. In 1935, Dr. I Sigge, in his "Das Johannes Evangelium und die Synoptiker", put forward the thesis that the Johannine Gospel was written to meet the requirements of a Church which was actively dissatisfied with the Synoptic Gospels.

In English, Mr. Gardner-Smith has put forward his theory ("St. John and the Synoptic Gospels") that the Fourth Evangelist's work is quite independent of the Synoptic tradition, representing, in fact, a different tradition, which over-lapped that of the other Evangelists at certain points. With some reservations, both Strachan and Howard accept his position.

So, too, Harnack regarded the Logos-concept as extraneous to the remainder of the Gospel, being "inharmonious and incommensurable therewith". Modern scholars, however, take the opposite view, finding the Prologue, Gospel and first Epistle of St. John integral parts of an whole. A recent article has hailed the first Epistle as the "first commentary" on the Gospel, while none can fail to be impressed by Canon W.L. Knox's demonstration, in his 1942 Schweich Lectures "Some Hellenistic Elements
in Primitive Christianity"), that there are nine episode-discourses in the body of the Gospel preserved there in order to illustrate the thesis that Jesus of Nazareth is the Logos. (pp. 60-87).
In Psalm 68, verse 11 reads: "The Lord giveth the Word: the women that publish the tidings are a great host". But both the Hebrew and the Greek versions are devoid of the precision of the English versions. The Hebrew reads: יִתְנַשֵׁ֣הַ מִֽ֑צָּה הָ֖אָמָ֑ר (verse 12 in Hebrew), while the Septuagint has: Κύριος διωτεί σηματοι τοῖς εὐαγγελισμένοις δυνάμει τοῖς πολλοῖς.

In the English Version of Psalm 105, we find: "He hath remembered his covenant for ever, the word which he commanded to a thousand generations". The Greek is: μνήμης εἰς τῶν αἰώνων διαδοχικὰς αἰῶνας, λόγου εὑρείλατο αἰς χιλιάδας γενεάς, for the Hebrew:

Again, it is easy to see how the English Version conveys a preciseness which is wanting in the original.
Isaiah 40:8 is not an exception. Verses 1 to 11 constitute one poem, from which, on metrical grounds verses 6-8 should be excised, and transposed to introduce verses 12ff. It is, however, true that in the later chapters of Isaiah the "word" of God has a much more "heightened" significance than elsewhere in the prophetic writings, connoting not so much a specific message, but, rather, the proclaimed purpose of God, especially in relation to the Return to Palestine after the Captivity. Thus in Isaiah 50:10-11 we have:—

"For as the rain cometh down and the snow from heaven, and returneth not thither, but watereth the earth, and maketh it bring forth and bud, and giveth seed to the sower and bread to the eater; so shall my word (יִבְדָּה) be that goeth forth out of my mouth: it shall not return unto me void, but it shall accomplish that which I please, and it shall prosper in the thing whereto I sent it". Reading such passages we can readily appreciate any tendency on the part of the Hebrews to regard an "utterance...... as almost a personal power fulfilling itself", although we should not exaggerate this tendency. In fact, it is appropriate to remark that the LXX here renders יִבְדָּה πῶς ὑμῷ. So, also, Isaiah 45:22-24, although the Hebrew יִבְדָּה is rendered in the LXX by ὁ λόγο.
In both these contents we should be justified in saying that the "word" is well on the way to poetic personification.
ADDITIONAL NOTE.

In the Targums, a man's "memra" normally signifies himself. For instance, the Jonathan Targum on Ruth 3:8 has, "Between his word and Michael".

We may note, too, that, while God's activity is usually represented by speaking of his "memra", sometimes the term "debbura" is preferred. In the Jerusalem Targum on Numbers 7:39 we find, "the debbura (יִלְבּוֹ) was talking with him" - Moses.

It will be seen that "memra" (or "debbura") bears the sense of "word", and not "reason". This is only one of the many meanings of λόγος, a meaning, moreover, which we do not often find in the writings of Philo. So that we may safely say that there is nothing in common between the "memra" of the Targums and the "logos" of Philo.
In the same article, Moore also affirms that
"Shekinah" (יְחַיָּהוּ) is no more than a circumlocution
for God; and "odour" of personality which we seem to
discern in its use is only present because it is em-
ployed to signify God in activities which can be described
as personal. Thus in Exodus 34:6, we read that "the Lord
passed before" Moses. But the Targum tells us that "the
Lord caused his shekinah (presence) to pass before him".
(יְחִיָּהוּ).

It may also be noted that, unlike "Memra", "Shekinah"
is to be found in the Aramaic Midrash and the Talmudic
writings.

Moore, also, discussing the identity and meaning of
"Metatron", shows that the derivation is from the Latin
"metator", a military word, denoting a "pioneer", and
that this passed into the Palestinian dialect. He shows,
by illustrations from the Babylonian Talmud, post Babylo-
nian Talmudic literature (and medieval recensions) and
the Midrashim, how easy it was for subsequent Christian
writers to find in the statements about Metatron, not
only adumbrations of the Christ, but also grounds for an
equation of the two. But he is also able to demonstrate
how great is the gulf between the New Testament concept
of the Logos and Talmudic Metatron, to whom no prayers are offered, and who received punishment for error.

In subsequent Cabalistic speculation the title Metatron was used for a sort of divine emanation, but not for an"intermediary."
ADDITIONAL NOTE.

It is also interesting to remember that St. Jerome said that Paul came from Gischela in Galilee (de Viris Illustribus). But in his commentary on the Epistle to Philemon (23) he says no more than that the Apostle's parents came from there.
In the "Phaedo" Plato clearly indicates that he understood Anaxagoras to have intended an incorporeal \( \phi\delta\sigma\) 

The fact that both he and Aristotle (Metaph. A 3.984\(^b\)15), greeted Anaxagoras' doctrine as an innovation in philosophy, seems, to me, conclusive.

While there is no passage in which he identified \( \varphi\upsilon\omega\upsilon\) and God, Anaxagoras has been called "the founder of theism in the Western World". This is largely because his \( \varphi\upsilon\omega\upsilon\) has many of the formal attributes of deity. But against this should be weighed the fact that he did not teach the doctrine of creation "ex nihilo".
Hail to thee Jupiter, the ruler of nature, most glorious, worshipped under many names, for ever mighty, and governing all by thy command. For the law of all mortals is to address themselves to thee. We are a race sprung from thee; alone we, by fate, bear thine image, in our mortality living out our days and treading our slow way upon earth. I shall sing to thee and laud thy power unceasingly. Yon Cosmos entire, round the earth revolving, obeys thee, celebrates thee, and willingly is lorded by thee. Thou renderest sure service by thine unconquerable hands - a two-edged sword, flaming, undying thunderbolt. For by thy forming every work of nature taketh shape, by which thou guidest aright the universal Logos, which goeth to and fro through all things, and subtly mingling through great and small, doth shine. Thou art the supreme King for ever. Thy divine fiat brings into being whatever work there is on earth, in sea or sky, save such deeds as evil men contrive by their own mad follies. But thou canst mould the abnormal to conformity, shape in symmetry the chaotic, and for thee the unloved is lovely, who didst shape in one whole all things good with evil things, so that for ever there is one Logos pervading all things. From thee ill-fated, wicked mortals
flee, always yearning after the heritage of the good. But they will neither clap eyes on, nor give ear to the universal law of God, but which those obey whose noble life is guided by reason. But these senseless fellows hasten forward after evil in various forms. In an unholy strife they lust after a good name, and try to stand well in reputation. Others seek diligently after licentious pleasures of the flesh and try to enrich themselves by devious ways, striving to have things entirely opposite. O all bountiful Jupiter, whose cloud-wrapped darkness is shot through with lightning vivid! Redeem us mortals from dismal ineptitude. Do thou, O Father, dispel the soul's darkness, give sound judgment and power to apprehend truth. Trusting wholly in that, thou rulest all things righteously. So that when thou dost favour us, we, with honour, may in turn give reverence unto thee, in unbroken hymning of thy works, as befits our mortality. No greater privilege can there be for men or gods than ever rightly to laud the universal law.
Κλεάνθος

κύδιστ' ἀθανάτων, πολυάρωμες θαυματεῖς οἷς, Ζεῦ, φύσεως ἄρχηγός, νόμον μέτα πάντα κυβερνῶν, χάρις ὥσ τοῖς πάντεσι θείς θυγατέρι προσαυξάνει.

εἰς τὸν γένος εἰς', ἢ οὕτω μιμήθη λαχώντες 
μοῦνα, ὅσα ἔφει τε καὶ ἔφει θυγήτ' ἐπὶ γαῖαν. 

τῷ σε καθενῷ καὶ οὐν κράτος οἷς ζεῖ. 

οὐ δὲ πᾶς ὅσον κόσμος, ἐπισοβίους περὶ γαῖαν, 

πειθέται, ἢ νέον ἄγνοοι καὶ οὖν ἑπὶ σε ἀρατέται. 

Τῷ τῶν εἴχει ὑποβρύχων ἀνικήτως ὑπὸ ξερείν 

ἀσφάλη, πρὸς τὸν, ἀνθρώπου 

τῷ γὰρ ὑποτιμήσοις φύσεως πάντ' ἔργα (ΤΕΛΕΙΩΤΑΙ). 

οὐ σοι κατενθέντες κοίλον λόγον, ὥς εἰς πάντων 

φωτιᾷ, μηγνύκτες μεγάλοις μηχανοῖς τε φάσσει. 

οὐ ὡς τοῖς θείως ὑπότασος βουλεύεις διὰ παντὸς. 

οὐδὲ ὃ γύνεται ἔργον ἐπὶ Χθονὶ οὐν διὰ ἴχθυα, δήμον, 

οὔτε καὶ οἴδεριον ἔκειν πόλων οὐτ' ἐν πάντω, 

πλὴν ὁπόσα ἐπόει κακὸς σφετέρας ἀνοίξες. 

οὔτε οὐ καὶ τὰ περίσσει ἐπίσταται ώρτον Θείνην, 

καὶ κοσμῶν τάκτορα καὶ οὐ φίλων οὐτοί φίλων εὐτίν. 

οὗτε γὰρ εἰς ἐν πάντα συνήρρακας ἐθόλα κακόσιν, 

οὕτω ἐκείνως ἔργων λόγον οἷς ζεῖ, 

οὐ φεύγωντες ἐνειοῦν οἴοι θυγητῶν κακοὶ εἰς,
δυσμοροί, οἱ τ' ἄγεθῶν μὲν δὲι κατὴν ποιητοῖς
οὖτε ἐσοφοῦμε θεοὶ κοινὸν νόμον, οὔτε κλάον
ὡς κεν πενείπμενοι οὐν νῦν μὴν ἔοιν ἔχων
ἐκχύνεν. οὔτε δὲ αὐθ', ὅρμων καὶ καὶ ἄλλον ἄλλον ἄλλο
οὐς ἐποίησεν δύος εὐθείας δυσφρήσεων ἐχοντες,
οἱ δὲι κραδοσύνας πετραχόμενοι οὔτενί κάδμη,
Ἀλλοὶ δ' εἰς ἄνεντι καὶ σύμμενοι ἔστε ἐφ' ἐνα.
<οἴποι κακὸς ἐπεκυροῦν>, ἐπ' ἄλλον γὰρ ἄλλα φέρονται
ἀπόδοντες μάλα πάμπλα ἐναντία τοινὲρ γενέσθαι.
Ἀλλά Ζεὺς πάντωρε, πειδανιφεῖς ἄριστον, τιμητοὺς
<μὲν> ὑρίου ἀπειροσύνης ὑπὸ λυγρῆς
ὅν γὰρ, πότερ, σκέδασον ψυχῆς αὐτοῦ, ὡς ἐς καρφώ
γνώμης, ὃ περὶ γὰρ σὺ δίκης μέτα πάνθα κοβῆρναις,
ὅτε ἄν τιμηθέντες ἀρετάμομα θαί τε ρήτοι,
ομᾶς τοιά ταύτα ἐπὶ ἐνα προσώπον,
καὶ ἑλθοίς ὅντος ἐνα
οὔτε ἄροσις νέρας ἄλλοι μεῖροι, οὔτε ἔθεσιν, ἡ κοινὸν ὁ δὲι νόμον ἐν δίκῃ ἔμειν.
The Stoics drew a distinction between, to quote Liddel and Scott, ὁ διάθεσις λόγος: a conception, thought, opposed to ἐν προφορικὸς λόγος (an expression, word). This distinction appealed to Philo and was avidly seized upon by Patristic writers. But there is nothing in the Prologue to suggest that the writer was acquainted with it.

The clearest expression of the distinction which I know is that in the pseudo Heraclitan Homeric Allegories (c.72) διάθεσις ὁ λόγος τοῦ τῶν δ' οἱ φιλόσοφοι (i.e. the Stoics) τῇ μὲν ἐν διάθεσιν καλῇς, τῶν δὲ προφορικῶν. ὁ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἐνδο λογισμῶν ἐστὶν ἐπηγγελμος, ὥς ὑπὸ τῶν στερνοῖς καθείρκοι. φασὶ δὲ τοῦτω χρησθαι καὶ τῷ θείῳ.
Many have objected to the possibility of an Hellenistic derivation for the title Logos on the ground that the Gospel shows no particular interest in the Greeks. So Hoskyns. (op. cit. p. 158). But the great philosophers of contemporary Hellenism were not Greeks at all. This appears to reduce the force of the argument.
The Rabbis readily identified Wisdom and Torah (Oesterley, Book of Proverbs pp. 64-65). Rabbi Hosea the Great, in the Beresheth Rabba, interprets Genesis 1 by Proverbs 8:30, but for Wisdom he substitutes Torah. Of the relating of Sophia and Torah, however, there were already indications in the literature itself (e.g. Ecclesiasticus 15:1, 19:20, 21:11, Bar. 41). Canon Knox finds the first equation of the two in Ecclesiasticus 24:23, which he places after 132 B.C. (Bousset, as we might expect, regarded the verse as an Alexandrine gloss).

Readers of Rabbinic literature will recognize that the equation of Sophia and Torah could argue in favour of an hypostasis of Wisdom. But, as Dr. Dodd points out in his review of Strachan's and Howard's books on the Fourth Gospel (J.T.S. XLIV, 175-6, July-Oct. 1943), in John 1:17 the Logos is not only expressly related, but also contrasted with Wisdom Torah; and he also notes that while the Jewish theologians identify the mediatorial Word and Torah the writer of the Johannine Prologue identified it with the Christ.
The original intention of the writer was to include the post New Testament writings in the scope of this thesis, and a fairly large source book was compiled for this purpose. But it was found that this would entail a much longer time than seemed reasonable. But Dorner's conclusion was borne out by the work of collecting these sources. Although great use was made of the term Logos, this is only true of the pre-Tertullian writers.
ADDITIONAL NOTE. p.119.

For ἡς τῷ Θεῷ the writer of the Prologue uses ἡς τον Θεόν (cp. ἡς καλητον ἐχομεν προς αὐν ἡμῖν I John 21). This poor Greek and is comparable with the Marcan usage (63, 19, 1449). There is a marked Aramaic savour, and John, like Mark, is mishandling the Greek language. The preposition should be ἡς, as in Proverbs.
Christum primogeniturn esse et ipsum esse Sapientiam Dei, per quem omnia facta sunt. Quod Sapientia Dei Christus, et de sacramento conconarnationis eius et passionis et calicis et altaris et Apostolorum, qui missi praedicaverunt.

Quod Christus idem sit et Sermo Dei.
Harris' restoration of the Prologue to its intermediate form:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prov.6:22</td>
<td>The Beginning was Wisdom.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wisdom was with God.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sap.Sol.94</td>
<td>Wisdom was the assessor of God.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All things were made by her;</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Apart from her nothing was made that</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>came to be.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sap.Sol.6:26</td>
<td>In her was Light, and the Light was</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the Life of men.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>That Light shone in the Darkness,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sap.Sol.6:29</td>
<td>And the Darkness did not overmaster it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>For no evil out-masters Wisdom.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wisdom was in the World.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In the World which she had made;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prov.1:28</td>
<td>The World did not recognize her.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sirach 34:13</td>
<td>She came to the Jews and the Jews did</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enoch 41:ff</td>
<td>not receive her.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sap.Sol.7:27</td>
<td>Those who did receive her became the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>friends of God and prophets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir.34:6</td>
<td>She tabernacled with us, and we saw her</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sap.Sol.7:25</td>
<td>splendid of God's only child.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ode.Sol.33</td>
<td>(She declared the Grace of God among us).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Sir. 35\textsuperscript{15}. From her pleroma we have received Grace instead of Law.

For Law came by Moses.

Sap. Sol. 3\textsuperscript{19}. Grace and Mercy came by Sophia.

Sap. Sol. 9\textsuperscript{26}. She is the image of the invisible God.

Sap. Sol. 6\textsuperscript{22}. She is the only Child of God, in the bosom of the Father, and hath the primary.
In connection with Jewish reaction to Hellenism, it should not be forgotten that, while Justin still wore his philosopher's cloak, early Christian thinkers seem to have been at pains to point out that the use of Stoic terms did not necessarily mean the adoption of Stoic thought. Thus, Tatian ("Oratio adversus Graecos") explains that God is not a spirit in the Stoic sense of all-pervading power and presence in material things. (It should, of course, be kept in mind that Tatian went to great lengths to dismiss all Greek philosophy as pernicious).
Tatiani Assyri. Oratio Adversus Graecos.


Deus noster non esse coepit in tempore, quem solus sine principio sit et ipse universorum principium. Spiritus est deus, non pervadens materiam, sed materialium spirituum et figurarum, quae in materia sunt opifex: et visu et tactu indeprehensus, quippe quum ipse sensibilium et invisibilium extiterit parens.

Greek and Latin rescripts edited by John Ch. Th. Otto. 1851.
ADDITIONAL NOTE.

Since Fr. R.P. Casey's article on "The Study of Gnosticism" (J.T.S. XXXVI, No.141, Jan.1935), more care has had to be taken in speaking of Gnosticism, and some are now more ready to allow that Ratzenstein and Bousset were right in regarding Gnosticism as older than Christianity, being the result of the impact of Oriental and Greek thought. Thus, in any reference to Gnosticism, the question of pre- or post-Christian is involved. If we bear this mind, the following consideration may be mentioned:-- In several Gnostic systems, Sophia appears as one of the aeons. It might seem strange, in view of the polemical aims of the Gospel (and Prologue), that the writer of the Prologue should have adapted a Sophia-Prologue in addressing himself to Gentile Christianity.
It is very difficult to make statements about Philo which do not require modification or qualification. For instance, Dr. Howard has refused to deny all Philonic influence on the Fourth Gospel, though he would limit this as having been exerted in a general way. He notes, thus, that Philo brought together ὁ δύσι and Ἀληθία . "It is not impossible that in the circles in which this Gospel took rise Philo's association of the words ὁ δύσι and Ἀληθία was already known, and that the Evangelist intended his hearers to discern a connection between the words in the fourteenth chapter, and the summary of the Gospel under the title Logos in the Prologue". ("Christianity According to St. John", p.175.)
ADDITIONAL NOTE. p.158.

The late Sir Edwyn Hoskyns also pointed out that it is a mistake to infer literary dependence from "parallel imagery". "(The Fourth Gospel"p.158).
Although indebted to the Stoics, the reader of Philo is aware that his attitude to Stoicism is marked by a certain revulsion against its materialism, a recoil which causes him at times to revert to a type of Platonism. There are passages where he is within an ace of equating the Logos with "the idea of the good". (op. de opif. Mund 6).
Attempts have been made to include Egyptian influences among those which contributed to the development of Philo's thought. Thus E.F. Scott wrote:— "The Greek conceptions on which Philo relied for his interpretation of the Old Testament had undergone a second growth in the soil of Egypt, where they crossed with the native theology. His Logos was something more than the immanent Reason of Stoicism, or the creative Word of Scripture. It was in some sense a personal divinity, corresponding with Thoth, the utterance or self-manifestation of the supreme God". (American Journal of Theology, XX, 3, July 1916). W. Scott, in the second volume of his edition of the Hermetic writings, considered that while this is not impossible, it has not yet been proved." The chief sources of the Philonic Logos doctrine, if not the only sources, were Jewish and Stoic; and it can be sufficiently accounted for as an outcome of Judaes-Stoic speculation, without assuming any part of it to have been derived from the indigenous religion of Egypt". (24-25).
A good example of Philo's inconsistency is to be seen in the fact that in his *de Somnus* he says the Logos is derived from Sophia, whereas in his *de Fuga et Inventione* he declares that Sophia is the mother of the Logos, a statement which also contradicts in the same work. (cp. also *de Providentia*).
By way of illustrating the work of other writers, we could point to the quotation in Eusebius of Ezekiel the Tragic (end of second cent. B.C.?), dealing with Moses and the burning bush.

Even those who believe that the writer of the Johannine Prologue was acquainted with Philo's ideas, seem to have had to concede that the diffusion of those was restricted in its scope. "It is interesting to observe as showing the gradual diffusion of language in the Synagogue of the Dispersion that Paul is not acquainted with Philo's far more convenient word (Λόγος), while the author of the Fourth Gospel is. The latter has even less contact with Philo's contact than Paul himself, but Philo's term has become by this time a commonplace of the Synagogues". (W.L. Knox, "St. Paul and the Church of the Gentiles" p.144,n.).
Harnack said, "The Gnostics are those Christians who, in a swift advance, attempted to capture Christianity for Hellenic culture, and Hellenic culture for Christianity, and who gave up the Old Testament in order to facilitate the conclusion of a covenant between the two powers". (Hist. of Dogma, I.227). This view would be resisted by many today, who would allow for modification in consideration of Bousset's argument that Gnosticism is older than Christianity. Casey took a somewhat extreme view: "There is no trace in early Christianity of "Gnosticism" as a broad historical category, and the modern use of "Gnostic" and "Gnosticism" to describe a large but ill-defined religious movement, having a special scope and character, is wholly unknown in the early Christian period". (p.55). But however the case may be about the historicity of the recognition of Gnosticism as an entity, this does not affect the arguments for the existence, at the end of the first century, of what we should now call Gnostic Christianity.
J. Wellhausen pointed out ("Das Evan. Johannis", p. 123) that in the Johannine Gospel the dualism between light and darkness is synonymous with the distinction between good and evil, and has nothing in common with the opposition between God and matter in Philo. If the Fourth Evangelist had depended appreciably upon Philo, we should have expected him to develop the concept of the antithesis of God and matter. This he does not do.
ADDITIONAL NOTE.

It will have been noticed that no use has been made of the favourite argument that Philo is a "lone figure", lying outside the life of Judaism, and therefore out of the way of the early Christian writers and thinkers. "Philo stands alone, a pathetic figure in the history of thought, and adopted only by the foes of that religion which he loved". (J.H.A. Hart, Jewish Quarterly Review XVII, 65, Oct. 1904). We have noted in the text of the chapter, that the picture of Philo as a "lone figure" may require some adjustment. We may also note that, in speaking of comparisons "according to the rules of allegory" (κατὰ τὸν ὄραμα τῆς ἀληθινομορίας καὶ ὁμόνοιας, de Somnus I. 73) he seems to regard himself as participating in a tradition already established. Such considerations, too, strengthen the plea that, for all his metaphysical studies, Philo remained essentially an Hebrew.

But it is also fair to mention that Philo is ignored in pagan literature except for one citation in Heliodorus (IX, 9, echoing de Vita Moyses II, 195).
Harnack said:— "No philosophizing Jew had ever thought of identifying the Messiah with the Logos; no Philo, for instance, ever entertained the idea of such an equation!" ("What is Christianity", E.T., p.207). On the other hand, Fairweather declared that Philo "does indeed identify the Messiah with the Logos". ("Jesus and the Greeks", p.172). He gives no reference; nor can I recall a passage making such an identification. Perhaps, however, Fairweather had in mind Philo's use of Messianic titles (e.g."Branch") in connection with the Logos.