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THE POLITICAL CAREER OF HENRY GOULBURN

(a) Introduction

The first task of the universities, it has been said, is to make the students forget what they have learned at school. As far as the study of history is concerned, it is undoubtedly true that the profundity of historical ideas and the amount of factual details, which a pupil of 16 can be reasonably expected to assimilate, are so limited that the resultant conception of historical truth must at best be such as would appear a gravely distorted one to the Professor of History. Thus - though in many ways most understandable and commendable - the development, by which the 19th century has become the period most commonly studied by pupils in their last years at grammar schools, has had the unexpected and undesired effect that much of the historical perspective of that popularly acclaimed, though somewhat mythical personality, the average intelligent citizen, is more obstinately distorted as regards the 19th century than in respect of any other.

An excellent example of this tendency is to be found in the ideas prevalent about the Peelite group. An apparently incorrigible impression persists, even among people whose historical education has been continued beyond the school-room,

that this was a group which suddenly formed itself when Peel proposed to repeal the Corn Laws, that it immediately acquired both direction and cohesion, that until his death it was dominated by him, and that (perhaps because Gladstone was among its members) it consisted of men who were Liberals in all but name. Yet, to anyone acquainted more intimately with the features of politics in the first half of the 19th century, it must be at once apparent that such an estimate is a mere caricature of the real situation; however, much even experts may differ on shades of opinion.

This thesis may, perhaps, help in making possible an even more accurate assessment of some of these features of politics in the 19th century, and especially of the real nature of the Peelites. The early part of Henry Coulburn's political career, his election to the House of Commons for a "close" borough, and his political apprenticeship as Under-Secretary, first to Mr. Ryder and then to Lord Bathurst, serve as a useful illustration of many of the principal trends of English politics at that time. Later, he was not only one of Sir Robert Peel's closest personal friends in the political field, but when he held offices of importance, they always necessitated close contact and co-operation with Peel, and when out of office he appears to have been one of the most active and insistent in seeking to keep in being a group of Peel's friends in Parliament. A study of the work of one of Peel's most faithful lieutenants

can, therefore, hardly fail to throw some light on the greater man under whom he served and on the party of which both of them were convinced members.

Born in 1784, Henry Goulburn had a career which may be regarded as typical for the politician of his time. (1) He was educated at Trinity College, Cambridge, and entered parliament as member for Horsham at the age of 23. He subsequently represented St. Germain's, West Loce and Armagh, and finally, after a previous unsuccessful attempt, he was returned for his university in 1831. He retained this seat until his death, and there is ample evidence, both in his private correspondence and in his public work in parliament, that he served his constituents with devotion. He was appointed to his first public office in 1810, when he became Under-Secretary at the Home Office. Two years later he exchanged this under-secretaryship with that to the War and Colonial Office, and it was in that capacity that he served as one of the negotiators of the Peace Treaty with the U.S.A. in 1814. In 1821 he was promoted to the post of Chief Secretary for Ireland and simultaneously was made a Privy Councillor. After a brief period in the political wilderness during the confusion of parties attendant on the short-lived ministries of Canning and Goderich, he became a member of the Wellington Cabinet in 1828, and served as Chancellor of the Exchequer until the government fell. During Peel's hundred

days he was Home Secretary, and in 1841 he returned to his previous post at the Exchequer, which he retained throughout the second Peel administration. He remained an organiser and adviser⁽²⁾ of Peel's friends and an active parliamentarian until the end of his life, but he accepted no further offices under the Crown, even though attempts were made to persuade him to join Stanley's administration in 1851.⁽³⁾

It is quite clear from this outline that Goulburn's career falls into easily definable phases, and it will, therefore, be convenient to examine each of these separately in order to be able to arrive at a final assessment of his work.

(b) Background, Childhood, Education (4)

Henry Goulburn was born in London on 19th March, 1784. His father's ancestors originated from "the County of Chester," emigrated to Jamaica and there acquired sufficient wealth to enable them to send Henry Goulburn's father to England to be educated at Eton and Oxford. All the same he encountered the "great prejudice" which at that period "existed against those who had made fortunes in the East or West Indies and their admission into the higher class of Society." It was only by means of acquaintances which he formed at Oxford and on account of "the reputation of a large fortune" that he "obtained a qualified admission into the outer court of this exclusive temple, and thus became acquainted with...the daughter of the Viscount Chetwynd who from the smallness of his income had resided for many years in the neighbourhood of Bruxelles." The resulting marriage, which took place in 1783, was "more one of convenience than affection." While the memoirs show some coolness on the part of Henry Goulburn to his father, he says of his mother: "Of her it is impossible for me to speak without the deepest reverence and affection, for to her care and instruction, and yet more to her example, am I humanly speaking indebted for the advantages which I have enjoyed through life." (5)

We are also told, with a self-deprecating humour, which often characterises his private correspondence, though it never appears to break through into his public pronouncements, what

are the only facts recorded of his earlier infancy. "The Clerk of the Parish got drunk at my christening, fell down and broke his thumb, a fact of which he reminded me twenty-one years afterwards when I went to the Church to obtain the certificate of my baptism. Another equally interesting fact is that the nurse sat down on me when lying in a chair and that I escaped without further injury than that inclination of my head to one side and that defective vision of my right eye which have adhered to me ever since." While it is tempting to deduce psychological consequence from these early accidents, the available evidence affords little material for the obvious kind of speculation in which we could indulge on the basis of these data. Instead we are told that he "did not submit to authority well," of the punishments he received and "of the ingenuity with which on various occasions (he) eluded them."

The first $2\frac{1}{2}$ years of his life were spent in France, whence he returned totally ignorant of his own language. He was educated at first by his father and writes of his experience when first sent to school at the age of 7: "I found myself....more than on a par with the boys of my own age in my knowledge of English and Latin and what was more remarkable in my ignorance of French; so completely had an interval of a few years obliterated all trace of my earlier proficiency." He had spent two years at Dr. Moore's school⁽⁶⁾ at Sunbury - a period during which he formed several life-long friendships - when his father died. His mother, who had previously become

an invalid, found that her husband had died intestate, that various creditors were pressing for instantaneous payment, and that her marriage settlement "was altogether a nullity." Thus, while a lengthy Chancery case was in process, property was sold, servants were discarded, and a much reduced establishment set up, first in Manchester Square and later in East Acton. Throughout the next few years financial anxiety was never absent, especially since his mother's expenditure was "moderate indeed, but beyond what the means ultimately allotted to her were found to justify." The more distant future, however, was secured by his own inheritance held in trust until he reached the age of 21. While it was impossible to touch this sum directly, several loans were taken on this basis of security. A further move, financially somewhat imprudent, to a larger house in Cumberland Place, was of great importance in that it made the Goulburns' the neighbours of Mr. M. Montague. (7) This acquaintance laid the basis, not only of Henry Goulburn's marriage (8), but also of his political career, for it was Mr. Montague who first introduced him to Mr. Perceval, the future Prime Minister.

Meanwhile a severe inflammation of his eyes compelled his withdrawal from school. Until he recovered his sight, his aunt continued his education by reading to him, and upon recovery he for some time undertook his own education by instructing his brothers. There followed a period of two years, during which a private tutor, "a worthy man, but with a limited capacity and knowledge and not versed in the art of communicating knowledge

to others," was employed. Another spell of self-tuition ensued, and when an application to join the expedition to Copenhagen failed, it was determined that Henry Goulburn should proceed to Cambridge. In preparation he was given some excellent daily tuition by Mr. Evans, a fellow of Trinity College. This had an interesting by-product, for we are told: "During the following summer of 1800 my mother took a small house on Ham Common. From thence I used to walk to town 3 days in each week to attend on Mr. Evans, returning in the evening by one of the coaches. These long walks occupied some time, but were not profitless as to instruction. I used to start early so as to reach London by 10 o'clock, armed with a pocket edition of Horace, and my complete knowledge of that author was the result, as I learnt by heart, while on my road, the whole of him."

In 1800 he entered Trinity College as a fellow commoner, which had the disadvantage that it was "a class which was in those days one of rank and dignity and supposed to be more becoming those who had larger means." On the other hand it was the passport to the highest society, and he thus made many acquaintances which proved important to him in later life. There is a significant passage relating to his attendance at Chapel: "I did not take advantage of the exemption from religious duties then considered the privilege of Noblemen and Fellow Commoners. It is a remarkable fact that during the first two years of my residence I was never on any one occasion

absent from morning chapel." His academic career was not without distinction. He was in the first class at each of the annual college examinations, and gained the second declamation prize. In his third year, however, he dropped his mathematical studies, and followed his interests and pleasures rather than any prescribed course of study. He "acquired a smattering of law, of Anatomy, of Chemistry and mechanics, but nothing more... was passionately fond of sports and spent the best part of term time in shooting and rowing." This form of activity precluded him from competition for a fellowship and we are given an enlightening account of his final examinations: "Thus.....I went in to the examination with no other anxiety than that of keeping myself warm at the then coldest period of the year; for there were no stoves and very limited means of excluding the outward air. The Senate House was the place where winter reigned supreme. After 4 days of examination I came out the first of the *οἱ πρῶτοι*, or as the kind hearted examiner Dr. Calvert, subsequently Dean of Manchester, was ever afterwards pleased to call me, his Senior Wrangler." This success shows that he must have been a man of very considerable ability.

His period at the University coincided with the worst financial crisis of his family, aggravated because his brother had run into considerable debts and was, moreover, involved in a libel case. These difficulties were resolved on his coming of age in 1805, but he was unpleasantly surprised to find that such had been the expense of the Chancery proceedings and the

administration of the estate by the Master that he found himself possessed "only of about £20,000," in addition to a considerable annual profit from the Jamaican estate.

(c) Election to Parliament ⁽⁹⁾

Goulburn now moved freely in the highest society, since he was freed from the restriction of comparative property and had already made the right type of contacts, largely as a result of his years at Cambridge. It was only natural, therefore, that he would soon be offered an opportunity of entering parliament. The first offer was made to him in 1806. It was, however, coupled with an understanding that he would support Lord Grenville's government. He consequently declined the offer as inconsistent with his views on public policy.

In 1807, however, Lord Portland formed his administration with Mr. Perceval ⁽¹⁰⁾ as Chancellor of the Exchequer. Parliament was dissolved, and Goulburn intimated to the Chancellor through Mr. Montagu his willingness to stand for any place where the chance of success was reasonable. The Treasury advised him to try Horsham. What followed is best described by his own account of the proceedings, which are interesting not merely as an election in a "rotten" Borough, but chiefly because they show how difficult it could be even in that type of constituency to be certain of the election of specific candidates, and also because they illustrate the importance of lawyers in determining the final result of an election.

Horsham was "a borough in which the interest was divided between the Duke of Norfolk and Lady Irving, ⁽¹¹⁾ and in which, being a Burgage Tenure borough, the question at issue was not

that which agitated the country at that time of Protestant or Roman Catholic ascendancy, but merely whether the right of voting was in those who under Lady Irving held original and entire Burgages or in those who held the several portions into which the Burgages belonging to the Duke of Norfolk had for election purposes been divided. In the preceding parliament the Duke of Norfolk's cause had triumphed and Lords Palmerston and Fitzharris had been unseated on Petition. But the soundness of that decision was questioned by good legal authority and this issue was again to be tried. I accordingly was associated with Mr. Marryat and dispatched to the borough under the tutelage of Lord J. Gordon who occupied Lady Irwin's residence near the borough and to whom the management of the Election was entrusted. We made a Canvass, that is we called upon four gentlemen who had independent votes, and made an appearance in the Town Hall on the following morning. Mr. Marryat was with difficulty restrained by Lord W. Gordon from making a long speech and violent attack upon the Duke of Norfolk's Roman Catholic opinions, and then the two Attornies of the real combatants appeared, each with a Blue bag full of deeds, which were handed over to various individuals who after polling returned them to their respective owners. Argument was had as to the admissibility of divided Burgages, which the returning Officers, acting on the last decision of the House of Commons, decided against us, and our opponents Sir G. Romilly and

Mr. Jones Barry were returned. Mr. Marryat and myself, in due course, became Petitioners and a Committee was appointed to try the merits of the case. It was then the practice for each party to name one Member of the House especially to protect his interest though sworn equally with the rest of the Committee. The person selected on our part was Mr. Geo. Holford - on that of the sitting member Mr. Henry Martin the steward of the Duke of Norfolk. It met for business on the (2) and I attended its proceedings. But so soon as they decided by a majority of that the right of voting was not limited to entire and original burgages, thereby confirming the views of our opponents, I withdrew under the impression that my hope of coming into Parliament was for that time at an end. Judge, therefore, of my surprise on the afternoon of the following day to hear that we had been reported to the House as entitled to the seat. This result was entirely attributable to Mr. Holford's ability and judgement. So soon as the Committee had in opposition to his view decided that the Burgages were divisible he stated the necessity of adding to their resolution some provisions which should either place a limit to the divisibility or attach some condition to it as conferring the right of voting. The proposition was reasonable in itself and was adopted by the Committee and the test which they ultimately decided on applying to burgages so divided was that they should have been for a certain time entered on the Rolls of the Manor. On applying this rule to the Poll as taken at Horsham it was discovered that

many of the voters for Sir G. Romilly and Mr. Jones Parry had not been so entered and we had consequently the majority of legal votes. An effort was made by Mr. Martin to induce the Committee to rescind the Resolution, but it failed, the Committee by a majority of one refusing so to stultify themselves....

"I was eager to take my seat and rode down to the House in the following day for that purpose. But I found myself stopped at the door by the intimation that being in boots and not a County member, I could not be sworn. Such was at that time the regard to form that the objection was insuperable. I was embarrassed and annoyed, but Mr. Thornton, the Member for Surrey being at the door of the House offered me his shoes, and having taken off my own boots and donned his shoes I was at once qualified, admitted and sworn, and returned to the door to resume my own and restore to Mr. Thornton his habiliments and my thanks."

There can be no doubt that Goulburn took his duties and responsibilities as a member of Parliament seriously from the outset. He first recorded his vote, in support of the Government, on a motion censuring the Government for the Danish expedition. He made a written note of the reasons why he voted with the "noes," a practice which he intended to follow on every occasion when he cast his vote. Finding, however, that the occasions for voting were too numerous and often complicated, he abandoned this practice, not without

qualms of conscience though, for he remarks; "I am aware that the great defect of my character through life has been an unwillingness otherwise than under the stimulus of public duty or public observation to make any continuous exertion, and I, therefore easily satisfied my conscience that my time might be much better employed than in recording the reasons which in each instance actuated my conduct." There is little doubt that this self-stricture is unduly severe.

Regular attendance at the House gave him a thorough insight into the conduct of parliamentary business. Moreover, he soon became a member of a circle of younger members of Parliament, some of them his college contemporaries, who dined together on Wednesdays, and "formed a Society intimately united in political sentiment and literary tastes." This group consisted of Lord Palmerston, Mr. Manners Sutton ⁽¹³⁾, Mr. F. Robinson, ⁽¹⁴⁾ Mr. Milnes, ⁽¹⁵⁾ Mr. Vesey Fitzgerald, ⁽¹⁶⁾ Mr. Wellesley, Mr. H. Drummond and Mr. Croker. ⁽¹⁷⁾ This group of people of future distinction was joined soon afterwards by Mr. Robert Peel. Independent of this circle who dined at the Alfred, Goulburn also secured the friendship of Sir Arthur Wellesley, who at that time was Secretary for Ireland, with whom he often dined in the Kitchen, ⁽¹⁸⁾ "then the usual place of refreshment." Thus he formed his intimate connection with the Duke of Wellington, of which he could say that he always considered it as the most fortunate circumstance of his life.

He made his maiden speech in defence of the Government after the disaster of Corunna, and his experiences on that harassing occasion are described as follows: "After Mr. Turney had spoken, I rose simultaneously with Mr. Canning who gave place to me as a new Member. The call upon me by the Speaker was alarming. I nearly for a moment lost my sight. My understanding seemed to fail but I got through my first sentence intelligibly and managed to get through a short speech very little to my own satisfaction as I found that I had in my confusion omitted what I considered the best part of my argument. It was, however, well received. Mr. Canning who spoke afterwards complimented me, and my friends (especially he whom I valued most, Mr. Montagu) were more than satisfied." The maiden speech is not recorded in Hansard, (19) but Goulburn's consistent support of the administration was soon to attract the benevolent attention of the Ministers and to reap its natural reward.

(d) Junior Minister, 1810-21. ⁽²⁰⁾

At the end of the session during which Goulburn had made his maiden speech, he determined to undertake an extensive tour ⁽²¹⁾ of Spain, where his brother was serving with the Army. This interesting and adventurous journey was terminated, when, at Gibraltar, he received a letter from Mr. Perceval "stating the unfortunate circumstances which had induced the secession of Lord Castlereagh and Mr. Canning from the Cabinet" soliciting his support, and expressing the wish to see him. These requests were immediately complied with, but it took about a month before Goulburn reached London. The Government reconstruction, which had taken place in the summer, had promoted several members of the Wednesday dinner circle, but whether on account of his absence in Spain or for other reasons, Goulburn had not been among those who had been invited to share the spoils of vacant offices. On his return to the House of Commons, however, the new Home Secretary, Mr. Ryder, ⁽²²⁾ who was not among his previous acquaintances, offered him the still vacant under-secretaryship. This offer was readily accepted.

The new Under-Secretary of State was warned that the political situation made it possible and even probable that he would hold this office for no more than a few weeks, and not even the most sanguine would have prophesied that in the following 20 years he would hold various positions in the

Government almost without interruption. For the Perceval administration was indeed facing grave difficulties. Almost immediately after the reassembly of Parliament a motion for immediate inquiry into the causes of the failure of the Walcheren expedition had been carried against the Government. It "had to deal with a House of Commons in which there were besides the Government five distinct and separate parties. That of the Whig opposition led by Mr. Whitbread and aided by a party numerous and strong in talent. That of Lord Sidmouth of which Mr. B. Bathurst was the organ. That of Lord Castlereagh and that of Mr. Canning, neither formidable from their numbers but comprising men of quick ability and official experience, and lastly that which acknowledged Mr. Wilberforce as its head. It was true that against any direct measure for the return of the Whigs to power he might calculate on the negative if not positive support of these minor parties. But the danger of Governments does not so much depend on direct attempts at their removal as upon successive defeats on minor points in which coalitions may take place without previous consent or regard to ultimate consequences."

Nevertheless the Government survived, and Goulburn makes it clear that he found his new work most congenial, though he "had to learn everything even as to the form of proceeding." He gives much credit to the considerate and unselfish conduct of his superior officer, whose moral qualities more than

compensated for his deficiencies "of ability or information." The Home Office was at the time divided into two parts, and each was placed under the charge of an Under Secretary. ⁽²³⁾ Goulburn's part was assigned the management of the Militia and Volunteers. Reference to Hansard ⁽²⁴⁾ shows that he took very little part in parliamentary work. This throws some interesting light on the practice of departments at the time, for the reason is given explicitly: "As my Chief was himself in the House of Commons, I was not called upon to take any part in Parliamentary debate, and I confined myself therefore to regular attendance in the House and on those Committees in which the Home Department was interested." None the less, on one or two occasions he had to speak for his department. The first of these speeches recorded in Hansard was made in 1812. ⁽²⁵⁾ The left wing Whig, Sir F. Burdett, moved that the local militia should always be exempt from flogging despite the law extending army discipline to the militia in case of invasion. Goulburn successfully resisted this move by contending that in such an emergency it was essential that both forces should be under exactly the same discipline. This, however, occurred towards the end of his period at the Home Office.

His first duty was to supervise the arrangements for securing volunteers from the local militias for the regular army in order to supply the depleted Peninsular forces with reinforcements of men of already disciplined soldiers. It

appears that the chief difficulty was not absence of volunteers, but the reluctance of Militia Officers, "naturally proud of the efficiency of their Regiments," to part with their best men. Once this difficulty had been overcome, the measure proved entirely successful. His next task was the consolidation and amendment of laws relating to the local militia, which were contained in numerous acts of parliament, which was both legally and administratively inconvenient. Here another interesting sidelight is thrown on the departmental practice of the time. "As at that period there was no legal officer whose duty it was to draw Acts of Parliament and assistance was only occasionally obtained from a Barrister himself engaged in extensive Private business and acting as Counsel to all the Offices Military and Civil, the duty of preparing Acts of Parliament devolved mainly if not entirely on the Department to which they related." Thus Goulburn himself drew up the bill, which passed through Parliament without opposition. Thirdly, Goulburn claims that it was on his suggestion that Mr. Ryder secured first the Cabinet's and then Parliament's approval for a bill to make the militias of the United Kingdom and of Ireland mutually interchangeable. This was not only a logical and theoretical outcome of the Act of Union, but it was at the time of immediate practical importance in that regular troops could be relieved by British militiamen from their duties in Ireland, and could instead be used to strengthen the counter-attack which the Duke of Wellington was preparing from the lines of Torres Vedras.

On the personal side this period was important, because the year 1811 saw his marriage with Mr. Montagu's third daughter who was nine years younger than he. There can be no doubt that, in contrast to his father's marriage, this union was one of affection rather than of convenience. He himself described his wife as everything he could wish, considered the years 1811 and 12 in consequence as some of the happiest of his life, and could write in 1852 that his marriage "during the whole intervening period of 41 years has been a source of endless comfort." The same sentiments are either implied or openly stated in his letters to various correspondents throughout his life. (26)

"The year 1812 was rendered memorable by the assassination of Mr. Perceval," who had been a personal friend of both the Goulburn and the Montagu families. The official duties of the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department compelled him to spend some time alone with Bellingham just after the assassination. He gives this account of the experience: "We neither of us spoke. I felt a thrill of horror at being with him, but as I looked (at) his haggard countenance, his glaring eye and quivering lip and considered how short a time was to elapse before he would be called upon to answer before God for the crimes which he had committed, my feelings of horror gave way to those of compassion, and I appreciated the firmness of those who when called on to punish great wrong could merge their pity in their paramount sense of what was due to justice."

Mr. Perceval's death necessitated a reconstruction of the Government. Attempts to induce Lord Wellesley and Mr. Canning to strengthen it by their accession proved abortive, as did two attempts to form new administrations. Finally Lord Liverpool by conciliating two of the smaller opposition groups, those of Lord Sidmouth and Lord Castlereagh, succeeded in forming a Government which had a wider and securer basis of support than its predecessor. In the reshuffle of official positions, Goulburn was given the under secretaryship at the Colonial Office, a post previously held by Peel. He thus served under the new Secretary for War and Colonies, Lord Bathurst. Of the two branches of the department, the Colonial side was allotted to Goulburn. ⁽²⁷⁾

This arrangement brought in its wake not only transference to a different field of similar duties, but also one group of entirely new duties, for Goulburn now became his department's representative and spokesman in the House of Commons. His speeches in that capacity are, of course, on record, ⁽²⁸⁾ and it becomes at once obvious that debating skill was not the greatest of his gifts. There is far too much introduction - usually dull introduction - before he reaches the main point of his argument, and even these main points are too much hedged about with qualifications and verbose definitions for his speeches to acquire the qualities of polished or impressive rhetoric. On the other hand, it is well to remember that at a time when

politics were still considered sufficiently interesting in themselves to require no sub-editing and distortion in a cheap press, and when, moreover, parliamentary speeches were solely or primarily intended for the expert politician inside the Chamber and not for the population at large, the more fiery oratory of men like Hume or Spring Rice was often at a discount because they allowed their passion to carry them away so far as to contradict themselves. The less interesting but more accurate style of speaking adopted by Goulburn would save the Government from bringing discredit on itself on this account. The combination of scrupulously accurate detailed information and brilliant rhetoric, achieved e.g. by Peel, was undoubtedly a more difficult, or at least a very different attainment than to be a "good House of Commons man" nowadays.

One difficulty which Goulburn encountered in his new office was that many of his actions were rendered suspect by the fact that he himself was the owner of a Jamaican estate, and he was, therefore, frequently accused of unduly promoting the West Indies interest. This was, indeed, a charge which clung to him tenaciously, especially since in his later office as Chancellor of the Exchequer he again had to deal with a matter of supreme importance to the West Indian planters, the sugar duties. Even so great an authority on the period as Mr. Kitson Clerk in his scanty references to Goulburn, connects him immediately with the West Indian interest. (29) In his memoirs he rebuts this charge indignantly: "As I had the

misfortune of possessing an Estate in Jamaica every act of mine was regarded with suspicion and I had frequently to complain that unfair means were used to prejudice me individually in the eyes of the Public - but they failed in their object." It is certainly true that he always placed the public interest before the sectional one of the sugar planters. That is particularly true of his dealings with the sugar duties, (30) but nowhere is there evidence that he used or abused his influence in the Colonial department to secure special favours for the group of property owners to which he belonged. The fluctuating income which he derived from his Jamaican estate was much diminished after a well intentioned change of manager following a visit by his brother to Jamaica in 1815. Since he felt that the negroes were treated too harshly, the change was made but merely with the result of a general decline in efficiency, as a result of which the negroes did not benefit. Later in the thirties and forties, when there was more general distress among the sugar planters, his West Indian property was completely ruined, and became a liability rather than an asset. Yet his sense of the paramount importance of the public interest was such that even when in opposition after 1846, and even though financial ruin compelled him to let his English estate at Betchworth, he took no steps to seek relief for the West Indies when Peel had given his opinion against such steps in the then prevailing circumstances of the country. (31) A more complete refutation of the charge of partiality would be hard to imagine.

One of the main subjects of controversy which attached to colonial administration at the time was the question of slavery. There were complaints that the law prohibiting the slave trade was being evaded, that slaves were maltreated, and there was agitation for the total abolition of slavery. Of these topics Coulburn claims: "It is not possible to review Lord Bathurst's administration without admitting that more was done during his administration for the amelioration of the Slave condition and for removing suspicion of Slave Trade than at any antecedent or subsequent period previous to the abolition of Slavery." This claim may strike the cynic as slightly reminiscent of the more recent jibe that A.V. Alexander was the greatest First Lord of the Admiralty since Brendan Bracken, especially if we recall that the "antecedent" period, during which the prohibition of the Slave Trade had been in force when Lord Bathurst assumed the seals of office, was just a little less than 5 years. ⁽³²⁾ Coulburn supports his claim by stating: "In those various measures from 1812 to 1822 I bore a willing part. I introduced and carried the Slave Registration Bill to which the abolitionists attached great value. Orders-in-Council for the Crown Colonies were passed and the legislatures of the other Colonies were induced to pass laws abridging the hours of labour and restrictive corporal punishment." He makes this claim anxious to gain absolution from the charge of partiality to the owners, and this is perhaps the reason why he claims more than is his due. The idea of a

Slave Register was first laid before Parliament by Wilberforce in 1818⁽³³⁾ as part of a wider measure to improve the status of slaves. Goulburn secured the defeat of this measure by arguing that it would be wiser to be content, for the time being, with a less perfect system, and thus to conciliate the planters, whose co-operation could then be enlisted for improving the system. When, nevertheless, he introduced a Slave Register Bill as a Government measure in the following year⁽³⁴⁾, he was again concerned to stress that transgressions of the slave trade laws were infrequent, but that the bill was designed to prevent even these rare breaches of the law. He was supported, of course, by Wilberforce, who, however, regretted that the other parts of his rejected bill of the previous year were not included. The only opposition came from a small group of whom Gordon was a typical spokesman. They attacked it with the objection, which has probably been lodged against every social reform, and which certainly has a familiar ring in our days: To establish a Slave Register in London would mean more government expenditure, would create yet another government office and more government patronage.

Other problems which fell to Goulburn's care were those connected with new conquests and the defence of existing British Colonies. Among the former was the completion of the conquest of Ceylon, and the conquest of Mauritius. The latter resulted in considerable difficulties, because it had been carried out from the East Indies and the Government

established previous to communication with England was on the profuse scale of Indian Government." "The difficulty of counteracting local interests and plausible arguments in support of extravagant expenditure" included the enjoining of great reductions "on most unwilling Officers" who were apparently unable to understand that the resources of a small island were not equal to those of a sub-continent. As far as defence was concerned the most important and pressing problem was how to guard Canada against attack after the declaration of war by the U.S.A. in 1812. For the entry of the U.S.A. into the war, as Goulburn admits, was unexpected, and in common with other Colonies which did not seem directly threatened, the Canadas had been largely denuded of troops, which had instead been sent to Spain. Thus the defeat and surrender of the first American Army, engaged in the invasion of Canada was equally unexpected and a great relief to the Colonial Office, which was in this way given a breathing space for collecting reinforcements and "for organizing the Militia and Volunteer force of the Provinces to which may mainly be ascribed....the ultimate preservation of this part of H.M. Dominions."

It was natural that, when immediately after the cessation of hostilities with France the U.S.A. communicated through Mr. A. Baring their readiness to enter into peace negotiations, a representative of the Colonial Office should have been among the British plenipotentiaries. The choice fell on Goulburn who forthwith proceeded to Ghent. His duties in this capacity

were onerous, for in addition all papers from the Colonial Office were forwarded to him, unless a matter required immediate attention ("and very little did," comments Goulburn). Further, though he received no additional salary apart from expenses, his raised status as one of the three official representatives of the British Government involved him in considerable expenditure in his quasi-private social life, which significantly he did not charge to the expense account. Despite their title, the plenipotentiaries had very limited, almost non-existent, executive powers. They were in constant communication with London and Vienna, and never presented a note unless it had first been sanctioned by the Foreign Office. Under these circumstances the negotiations dragged on.

"But after a time the discussions at Vienna assumed a character which made it possible that there might be a renewal of hostilities in Europe, and parties there speculated upon the embarrassment which an American war would cause to England as regarded her free action in European affairs. We were, therefore, instructed to accelerate the treaty with the U.S. by withdrawing resistance to certain of their proposals, and the treaty was accordingly signed on 14th December."

One of the worst dangers facing the Colonial Office in the post-war period was that of its imminent extinction. The outcry for economy in administration was loud in those years of distress. Perhaps there was some understandable confusion in the public mind as to the difference between the

duties of the Secretary at War and of the Secretary of State for War and Colonies, or perhaps it was merely, as Goulburn suggests, a lack of understanding of the importance of colonial administration. Be that as it may, several attacks were launched in the House of Commons with the object of abolishing the third secretaryship, ⁽³⁵⁾ and that by "no less a man than Mr. Tierney" Goulburn found it difficult to persuade the numerous supporters of economy that the saving effected would not compensate for the loss occasioned to the colonies. ⁽³⁶⁾ In any case, probably in order to placate the critics, it was decided to retain only one Under-Secretary. This threw a considerable amount of extra work on Goulburn ⁽³⁷⁾ so that each week he spent at least 3 days a week in his office from 9 a.m. to 6 p.m. and spent the other days at his recently purchased country residence at Betchworth in the reading or preparation of dispatches. He commends the Civil Servants at his office for having shown an equal devotion to duty during this period of economy, and states that from 1815-21 he "was never absent from the Office for more than 7 consecutive days and only, for that time, on two or three occasions."

Finally, a word must be said about the Ionian Islands, which had been ceded to Britain by the Treaty of Vienna, and which proved a continual parliamentary trouble-spot. This, Goulburn claims, was a main cause of the death of the Governor, General Campbell. The new Governor, Sir Thomas Maitland,

was entrusted with the task of drawing up a constitution. This was attacked in Parliament as insufficiently liberal. (38)

Goulburn retorted that it was a fallacy to suppose that the British Constitution must be the best possible applicable in each and every place, and that the people of the Ionian Islands had not reached the requisite maturity. These views are explained in greater detail in his memoirs: "Where a people have been accustomed to institutions having even a shadow of freedom it may be practicable and easy to extend to them to a great extent the power of governing themselves; but where their whole idea of liberty is to confer upon one class the power over their inferiors which had been previously exercised by a despotic God over all, great caution is necessary to guard against a democratic Tyranny under the name of liberty." Failing to gain satisfaction through Parliament, the discontented among the Ionians secured the intervention of the Russian Emperor who was prevailed upon to present a note in London. This note was transmitted by the Foreign Office to Goulburn who was commissioned to draw up a reply. "Documents without number were referred to and no time or labour was spared in making it complete." He concludes that this "reply was not unsatisfactory, as we were not troubled with any further Russian interference." It is at any rate true that the Ionian Islands' stormiest days were over.

(e) Chief Secretary for Ireland.

The Office of Chief Secretary for Ireland was vacated by Peel in 1818, and on that occasion Lord Liverpool offered it to Goulburn, (39) who however refused. This refusal was partly prompted by domestic difficulties - the illness of his mother - and partly by financial considerations, for Mr. Peel "having a large independent income...had been most profuse in his expenditure," but Goulburn calculated that, even if he added his private income to his official salary, he would not be able to maintain a suitably reduced household even, but would have to make reductions on such a scale that the contrast with his predecessor would render him so unpopular as to endanger his usefulness to the government. It is perhaps well to remember these fears before accepting the strictures made on the man who was appointed instead.

The inside story of the motives which ultimately led to the appointment of Goulburn to the office which he had declined in 1818 is recorded by Lord Sidmouth's (and later Peel's) private secretary as follows: (40) "The disturbances in Ireland having proved the inefficiency of Lord Talbot and Mr. Charles Grant, especially the latter, a Cabinet was held at which it was determined to recall them. Lord Sidmouth proposed that the Duke of Wellington should go thither, and Lord Melville was inclined to that opinion. Lord Liverpool and Lord Londonderry thought that the Duke was too big a gun

to fire on such an occasion; the Duke himself concurred in this opinion, but professed himself ready to go if it was thought necessary for any period from 3 months to 3 years... The only two other persons thought of were Lord Hopetown and Lord Wellesley....; Lord Wellesley recommended by his ability, his reputation and his family. The Duke of Wellington stated with respect to his brother that great energy cannot now be expected of him, that he never was very diligent and that his indolence has increased with his years; and therefore he advised that before the appointment was proposed to him, it should be determined who was to go as Secretary. Lord Liverpool sounded Huskisson as to the latter office, but he disdained it. It was then proposed to Goulburn, Lord Bathurst's Under-Secretary, who after one day's consideration accepted the offer. The higher office was then proffered to the Marquis of Wellesley, who received it with the greatest cordiality."

By a further entry in his diary⁽⁴¹⁾ Hobhouse makes it quite clear that this change of ministers was necessary in itself, but that "it was thought desirable that the change in Ireland should appear to be only part of the general arrangement" of reshuffling the ministry and admitting some of the Grenville group to office. This impression of a general rearrangement was apparently conveyed even to Goulburn himself,⁽⁴²⁾ when the Chief Secretaryship was offered to him for the second time. He records two special inducements for accepting the office: "Lord Sidmouth was about to retire from the Home

Department and was to be succeeded by Mr. Peel.....I should therefore have all the assistance both official and private which could be afforded by an intimate friend who had been for many years Chief Secretary and was intimately acquainted with every circumstance connected with the Country and with the characters of all with whom I should have to deal." It might be worth noting, in parentheses, here that, although a separate Irish Office existed in London at the time, the work of that department and of the Irish Government at Phoenix Park was subordinated in the first instance to the Home Secretary, who was the connecting link between Dublin and the British Cabinet. It was to the Home Office that the Lord Lieutenant directed his official dispatches, while it was customary for the Chief Secretary to be in frequent "Private"⁽⁴³⁾ communication with the Home Secretary.⁽⁴⁴⁾ Secondly Lord Liverpool explained to Goulburn that his service as Under Secretary had been sufficiently prolonged for him to be recommended for a pension of £1,000 a year, which might be appropriately increased according to the period of his prospective service in Ireland. Thus, already assured that "Mr. Grant had brought the previously expensive establishment within reasonable limits," Goulburn could face the future with equanimity, for even if he did incur debts in Ireland he would be able to redeem them with the aid of his pension. Finally the death of his mother meant that domestic ties no longer forced him to remain in England, and thus he accepted the promotion offered to him.

The position accepted by Goulburn could not in any way be described as an easy one. His predecessor had in fact been dismissed as a failure, and though events in Ireland between 1815 and 1822 are not usually accorded much space in standard histories of Great Britain, there can be no doubt at all that discontent and its manifestations were, in those years, at least as strong in Ireland as in England, where the violence of the period, perhaps because it was more unusual, has been more successful in attracting the historians' attention. The position was further complicated by the fact that Ireland could well be described as the frontline of the most impassioned and most deeply dividing political issue of the early 19th century, the Catholic question. Of the three most important members of the new Irish Cabinet two - Lord Wellesley and Mr. Plunkett, the Attorney-General - were pro-Catholic and Goulburn had to seek to impose his own anti-Catholic policy not only on a hostile majority of the population, but also on two rather unwilling co-operators in ministerial office. It seems certain that this was the task intended for him by the British Government, for Hobhouse writes; ⁽⁴⁵⁾ "Goulburn....is very inimical to the further concessions to the Romanists. He certainly was selected with this view, Grant having done much mischief by the offence he has given to the Protestants of Ireland, and it being necessary that either the Lord-Lieutenant or the Secretary should prefer the cause of that body. Lord Wellesley, though he supported the question in parliament,

now professes to be convinced that until the Catholics conduct themselves with more temper than they have yet done, it would be highly dangerous to concede to them further power."

Despite such protestations on the part of the Marquis of Wellesley, it was, however, quite obvious that even with the best of intentions it would be impossible for men, who were on different sides of the Catholic watershed, to work together without some tension. Goulburn recognised this difficulty, though rather one-sidedly, for he felt that "Mr. Plunkett.... had been so intimately connected with the Roman Catholic body... that it was scarcely possible to contemplate on his part that impartiality of judgement between the Protestant and Roman Catholic parties which were essential to the satisfactory conduct of the Irish Government, still less to prevent the suspicion which would justly or unjustly be attached to every act of his by the Protestant Party in that Country."⁽⁴⁶⁾

There is no sign, however, that he realised that this stricture, in reverse, might be applied to him as one who held that Roman Catholic emancipation was inconsistent with the principles of the British constitution, because it was intimately tied up with the Church Establishment.⁽⁴⁷⁾ Nonetheless he was soon decried as an Orangeman among Catholic partisans - a gibe, though as the following pages will show unjust, perpetuated by the only historian to make more than a fleeting reference to Goulburn.⁽⁴⁸⁾

The difficulties of the new Irish Government were enhanced

by the character and the past achievements of the Lord-Lieutenant. To the Duke of Wellington's estimate of his brother's abilities ⁽⁴⁹⁾ we can add a corroborating account by Goulburn himself. ⁽⁵⁰⁾

In his characteristic fashion he puts down all he can on the favourable side of the ledger. Unfortunately, however, we are no longer disposed to accept "unequalled Latin composition" in extenuation and compensation for failure to attend to public business, unlike Goulburn who "was often repaid for a long waiting in his (Lord Wellesley's) anteroom by the recital of Latin poems, either originals or translations, not inferior in elegance or style to any of those of the ancient writers."

Similarly, the modern cynic would easily misconstrue the intention though not the sense of Goulburn's estimate of the Lord-Lieutenant as possessed of "the valuable talent of availing himself to the fullest extent of the ability of others."

At the root of Wellesley's troubles there seems to have been the vanity based on his early reputation gained in India and at the Foreign Office, coupled with the fear that future action might destroy this reputation, a fear made more real by his downright laziness. As a result he was "easily accessible to flattery," and perhaps in order to hide his own shortcomings he was "apt.....to indulge in occasional fits of passion which for a time overcame his natural kindliness." So as to preserve his reputation as a writer, the "despatches which he addressed to the Secretary of State (Peel), and which were sometimes anxiously expected as the basis of measures in Parliament,

were deferred from day to day and from week to week for the purpose of being corrected and retouched," a statement which will be fully appreciated by anyone who has read the dispatches referred to. (51) Worst of all, perhaps, "he accepted the Lord Lieutenancy under the impression that he had the power which no other man possessed of conciliating Roman Catholic feeling, and of bringing into harmony the conflicting passions of the contending parties in Ireland...His disappointment at the failure of his endeavours was great in proportion to his previous expectation."

Such were the colleagues who were to govern Ireland for the next 5½ years. Goulburn proceeded to Brighton to call on His Majesty, was sworn in as a Member of the Privy Council, and after a few days spent at Lutworth with Peel so as to gain some first hand information of what to expect at Dublin, crossed the Irish Channel and awaited the arrival of Lord Wellesley which was to have taken place on the following day. Characteristically, the Marquis failed to keep to the previously arranged time-table, which led to a number of vexatious days for Goulburn, who could not commence his duties until officially appointed by the new Lord-Lieutenant, and for the dismissed Ministers who did not take kindly to being in the Company of one of their successors. (52.)

The Irish Cabinet was presided over by the Lord-Lieutenant. He was assisted by the Chief Secretary, and by three legal ministers, the Lord Chancellor, the Attorney-General, and the

Solicitor-General, though the first of these three concentrated chiefly on judicial duties. The Chief Secretary, and any other Minister who was a Member of the House of Commons, divided his time between London and Dublin. While Parliament was in session, his attendance was required at Westminster, especially while the Irish estimates were under discussion. Ireland was, however, so frequent a topic of parliamentary debate that it was essential to have at least one Irish Minister in London throughout the session. Since it was usual, in the 1820s, for Parliament to be prorogued at the end of July and not to reassemble until the end of January, Goulburn normally spent most of the autumn and winter as well as the Easter recess at Dublin Castle. From there he was in constant official and "private" communication with Peel, whilst from the Irish Office in London he similarly kept in touch with Lord Wellesley - though, significantly, he elicited rather fewer replies. This correspondence is the main source on which an appraisal of Goulburn's work in Ireland must be based. (53)

It is interesting to note that the first major difficulty which the new Irish Government encountered was connected with appointments. The patronage, civil, military and ecclesiastical, exercised by Ministers and by Departments was, of course, considerable and applications from individual claimants on behalf of their friends or themselves, usually with a covering letter, favourable or unfavourable, by the Minister, form a considerable part of the political correspondence between Goulburn and Peel.

It appears quite clear from the general tone of their correspondence on the subject that both men, but especially Peel, were strongly averse from making any appointment except on the basis of the necessity of the office combined with the best possible qualification of the man to be appointed - and many were the disappointed place-seekers. Nonetheless, even so firm-principled a man as Peel had to allow slight deviations from this rule in Ireland, for not only was it essential to preserve a nice balance of pro- and anti-Catholics at all levels and in all spheres of administration, but so sour were the grapes of office, or at least of some offices, in Ireland that those singled out for promotion or transfer would not infrequently refuse to accept their new assignments. (54)

An instructive example - which also sheds some more light on the personal characteristics of the Marquis of Wellesley - of this refusal to accept promotion is provided by the arrangements and appointments that were necessary in order to make Mr. Plunkett Attorney-General. (55) Unlike Lord Talbot and Mr. Grant, Mr. Saurin who had been Attorney-General was considered an efficient minister, and had consequently not been dismissed. It was, therefore, proposed that he should be promoted to the position of Lord Chief Justice. (The Government was prepared to create Mr. Downes, the holder of that office, an Irish Peer, and he had obligingly agreed to vacate his office in return!) Judicial office in Ireland was, however, a most unenviable position. The Irish judge was hard put to it, when

seeking to sail along the narrow course of strict justice, for on the one side he was imperilled by the Scylla of a violent and predominantly Catholic press seeking occasion against him, and on the other side there was the equally threatening Charybdis of the similarly violent Orange minority and the likely displeasure of the Government, implying probably the ruin of all chances of further promotion, especially to a more peaceful English appointment. Moreover, it was often completely impossible to rely on the jury, for as soon as a case had a political flavour, the sheriff was liable to pack the jury so as to make the true administration of justice quite impossible. For these and other reasons ^(55a) Saurin had previously declined judicial appointments, and was likely to do so again. The Lord-Lieutenant, however, was confident of his powers of persuasion, and fully expected to make Saurin alter his decision. A personal interview was held for the purpose, but proved abortive. In consequence, Goulburn found Wellesley "in a state of indignation, which vented itself in a storm of passion and ultimately in a flood of tears. He treated Mr. S's refusal as an insult to the Crown and as an indignity to himself. He denounced him in the strongest language as undeserving of any favor or confidence." Goulburn and Peel, on the other hand concurred in the opinion that Saurin was a considerable loss to the government, for he ceased to hold any official appointment on handing over his office to Plunkett.

The Solicitor-General became Lord Chief Justice, and Mr. Jay, neither a Member of Parliament, nor, it would appear, of very much influence in the counsels of the Irish Government, became Solicitor-General. Thus the first of a number of crises of appointments was settled. The Office or honour concerned might vary from the Lord Chief Justice to the Chief Baron or the candidate for the representative peerage whom the government intended to support. The character of the problem was, however, always a similar one. There might be too many candidates or too few, ⁽⁵⁶⁾ but one change always entailed others, and in order to minimise the chances of embittering the rejected or even the favoured, much tact and patience and competence of judgment were required. The lack of outstanding complaints is the best possible proof that, on the whole, Goulburn on whom after the initial incident the bulk of this work devolved, discharged this task very well.

The Irish Cabinet having thus been completed it met to consider the measures necessitated by the disturbed condition of the country, which "in some counties amounted to little short of insurrection." ⁽⁵⁷⁾ We have a record of the various opinions expressed at one of the first of these Cabinet meetings, held for the purpose of discussing the re-enactment of the Insurrection Act. ⁽⁵⁸⁾ On the one side Mr. Plunkett urged the withdrawal from it of some of the most severe and somewhat unequable clauses, e.g. that providing punishment for persons on account of absence from their houses. On the other side

Goulburn, supported by the Solicitor-General and the Lord Chancellor, urged that the worst possible eventuality would be an abortive attempt to suppress the disorders, that therefore the maximum rather than the minimum of powers should be sought, and that the very unpopularity of the severer clauses would act as a check on their over-frequent or unjust use. This division of views is typical of the dissension inside the Cabinet throughout the years of its existence, and it may be said at once that it was of a political rather than a humanitarian or legal nature. Where pressure to be exerted was in the main directed against Catholics, Plunkett urged caution; where it was to be directed against Protestants, Goulburn became rather reluctant. But it says much for the integrity of all concerned that, notwithstanding their initial bias, in the majority of cases the severer view was adopted. While the wisdom of such a repressive policy may be doubtful, no doubts can be entertained as to the strength of moral courage and sense of duty that was required to cut loose from one's dearest political prejudice.

In addition to the Insurrection Act Goulburn required the suspension of Habeas Corpus as an immediate measure to curb outrage. (59) Since he had had to vacate his seat in the Commons on the assumption of his new office, he briefed the Government at Westminster with some of the reasons that made these two measures essential so that the expected Parliamentary opposition to such an infringement of civil liberties could be silenced. (60) There was, for instance, a strong concentration of Whiteboys

north and west of Cork, against whom a major military operation was just about to begin. There and elsewhere some 300 Whiteboy prisoners had been taken, of whom a number was to be executed, while the remainder was to be sent to New South Wales. (61)

Partly, perhaps, as the result of the full briefing given by the Irish Cabinet, Lord Londonderry encountered but little opposition when he introduced the Insurrection Act in Parliament.

Having thus obtained the necessary powers to quell the riots in progress, the Irish Government proceeded to consider "the measures by which the disposition to insurrectionary outrage could in future be best prevented or controlled." (62)

To do this Goulburn planned a twofold line of attack: Relief from the severity of the tithe system insofar as it was "consistent with the maintenance of the fair rights of Property," and steps to insure the impartial administration of the law. As regarded the first of these it was a subject of the utmost complexity, and it was not thought prudent to take any major step without the fullest inquiry and discussion. "The pressure however on the Government was such that it was deemed expedient to prepare a bill for the commutation of tithe." When Goulburn sought leave to introduce this Bill, (63) two important Irish M.Ps., Sir H. Parnell and Sir John Newport, criticised it as quite inadequate and as a likely impediment to a more satisfactory Bill in the future. With the first part of this criticism Goulburn himself concurred, (64) while the second part was proved incorrect by his future action. This Commutation Act (65)

permitted tithe owners to lease tithes to the tithe-payers for periods not exceeding 21 years, during which a lease rent equal to the best annual value of tithe was to be paid. No machinery for facilitating the conclusion of such lease-agreements and the complicated allied questions was set up, however. On the contrary, the consent of the ordinary of the diocese was required, and some of them at least were thought to be inimical to tithe commutation in any form. Thus it is hardly surprising that the Act was unproductive of practical results.

On the other hand the discussions and debates connected with the passing and working of this commutation measure give a clear indication of the general principles on which Goulburn based his approach to the vexed question of tithes throughout his career, and are, therefore, worth some detailed attention. The notion that tithes were one form of property and in essence no different from any other form of property was basic to his whole conception. This becomes clear in his speech requesting leave to bring in the Irish Tithes Leasing Bill.⁽⁶⁶⁾ He stated at the outset that he had no wish to invade the property of the Church, which would, in due course, endanger all other property. The clergy had the "most absolute and incontestable right" to their tithes property. He therefore could not agree to any general compulsory commutation, while voluntary methods remained untried. Again, six days later,⁽⁶⁷⁾ Joseph Hume, probably Goulburn's most persistent opponent in debate, whatever the subject, brought the same subject to the fore by demanding a pledge that a fuller and wider Tithe Bill

should be laid before the House in the next session. Recognizing the strength of Goulburn's argument he sought to destroy it by maintaining that tithes were quite different from any other form of property, since clergy as public officers could be removed from their position by the government, as had been done, e.g., in the Reformation. He was supported by Mr. Ellice who claimed that property was no more sacred a right than that of Habeas Corpus which the Government had suspended. Goulburn, however, remained adamant in defending the sacred rights of property from such an invasion as compulsory tithes commutation would constitute.

The other legislative step taken in 1822 with the intention of effecting long-term improvements in the state of the country was much more successful. This concerned the administration and enforcement of the law. If we are to believe Goulburn's description in his autobiography - and he was not a man easily given to exaggeration - the Irish magistracy in 1822 was in a pitiful condition. In every county there were some magistrates "utterly unfit some from want of character, others from various other causes to undertake the administration of the Law. They were in the habit of acting individually, and the decisions were in consequence wanting in uniformity, and what was yet more objectionable cases frequently occurred where the decision of one magistrate was defeated by the decision of another in the immediate neighbourhood acting often on a mistaken view of the law;

both however in many cases acting on interested or party motives with little or no reference to the merits of the particular case." It is hardly necessary to point out that under these circumstances the administration of justice in Ireland became a mere farce. Nor should it be necessary to stress that the more disturbed the state of the country, the more essential it is that the impartiality of its judicial system should be beyond doubt. It was therefore decided to purge the Magistracy of its undesirable elements. This required the assistance of the Irish Chancellor, and though Goulburn does not seem impressed with either the speed or efficiency with which he executed this task, it was the Chancellor who devised a method which would result in the minimum of hurt feelings, always a consideration of some importance in Irish affairs. (68) It was determined that the king should signify an entirely new Commission of the Peace as a result of this accession, even though that event had taken place two years earlier. Thus the inefficient could be dismissed without the stigma of unfitness, and the efficient reappointed in the new Commission. Goulburn's complaint was that some of the inefficient were reappointed, but nonetheless he vigorously applied himself to the task of preventing the new Commission from deteriorating to the condition of the old.

This prevention was successfully secured by a legislative enactment, (69) defining and regularising the duties of Irish H.Ps. and providing them with an efficient police force to enforce the magistrates decisions. The magistrates had already

been directed ⁽⁷⁰⁾ to hold Petty Sessions regularly and to try all ordinary cases there. The new act gave the Lord Lieutenant power to appoint resident magistrates where none existed, laid down their salary, and stated both their judicial and administrative duties, which latter included the making of monthly reports on the state of the county. The more important clauses of the Act, however, dealt with the Police.

The state of the Constabulary was as unsatisfactory as that of the Magistracy. Goulburn himself described it as follows: ⁽⁷¹⁾ "Decrees...obtained from individual Magistrates were in the great majority of instances entrusted for execution to the parties in whose favor they were given or to a class of local Constables whose feelings were equally involved in the issue. Hence a general contempt and resistance to the execution of the law." The Constables' inefficiency was further enhanced by the fact that, since they were appointed by local grand juries, their pay was quite inadequate for full-time duties, ⁽⁷²⁾ The new system devised by the 1822 Act is particularly interesting, because Goulburn claims that he and his colleagues thereby established the system of "Peelers." ⁽⁷³⁾ "Sir Robert Peel when Secretary for Ireland had established what was called a Peace Preservation Police, being in fact a body of civil officers under the control of a paid Magistrate which in the event of the existence of special disturbance in any part of the country might be sent and charged upon the locality so long as the disturbance continued. It is true that the existence and proved good effect of this

measure where applied suggested the idea of making a somewhat similar measure applicable to the whole country without reference to tranquillity or disturbance and the name of 'Peelers' which the former had acquired was readily transferred to the new Constabulary. Thence many have erroneously stated that Sir R. Peel was the author of that which I believe to have been one of the greatest benefits to that country, 'the Constabulary Act.' "That he cordially approved it and gave it every possible support..... is undoubtedly the fact, but that the measure originated with him or owed its preparation to any other than the Irish Government is an error."

The law in its final shape provided that the Lord-Lieutenant should appoint a chief constable for each barony, and require the magistrates to appoint up to 16 constables per barony. All men were to hold office during the Lord-Lieutenant's pleasure, and could, at the chief constable's discretion, be armed. They were, however, to work under the magistrates' direction. No constable was to have any other employment, and his maximum salary was fixed at £35 plus accommodation. It must be remembered that pay conditions were a great improvement on the prevailing terms.

The criticisms levelled against this measure in Parliament have a distinctly modern ring. ⁽⁷⁴⁾ Mr. Spring Rice attacked the bill as unconstitutional, because it arrogated to the Crown powers which ought to be exercised by local authorities. Others while less extreme in the manner of their criticism were equally disturbed by the increased hold which the central government was

given over local affairs by controlling, though not directing, the police force. This led Mr. Grant, Goulburn's predecessor, to deplore the bill as yet another attempt to govern Ireland by brute force. So intense were the criticisms that the Act as compared with the original bill contained some concessions. These included "sacrifices to the desire for patronage,.... taking great part of the charge on the Consolidated Fund, and giving the nomination of the men in the first instance to the local authorities." (75)

Another of Ireland's perennial problems demanded Goulburn's attention in the first year of his new office. This was the problem of food shortage and the danger of starvation. Again we can find that Goulburn at this early stage had clearly formulated the broad principles on which he based his actions throughout his career. Stocks of potatoes were nearing exhaustion in some parts of Ireland at the beginning of April, 1822, and the government in various ways was pressed to undertake relief measures. (76) At the time Goulburn was in London, and on 2nd April he wrote to the Lord-Lieutenant as follows with respect to reports of distress in Co. Clare. (77)

"It is advisable to defer affording any relief from Government as long as possible, and...where ultimately afforded it would be more effectually and more economically administered in the shape of assistance to parochial or local contributions either of money or provisions than in any other manner." Liverpool, Londonderry and Peel entirely agreed with this view. Goulburn

further suggested that the reports of conditions were, at least partly, exaggerated, that people could eat the potatoes normally devoted to cattle-feeding; that the Government should certainly not act until the country gentry did so; that Government buying of corn would merely raise its price further, and summed up in these words: "It is better to hold our hands until the evidence of distress is too clear to be disputed, and until the government's assistance can no longer be withheld."

Thus any suspicion that the man, who at almost the same moment suggested to the Lord Lieutenant that police appointments should be in the hands of the Central Government and that there should be salaried Police Magistrates "under the sole control of the Government to command such constables whenever and wherever it might appear expedient to the Lord Lieutenant," (78) was a believer in any 20th century political theory of the state as the controller and director of all human activity must be speedily abandoned. He certainly did not believe in the Welfare State!

In parliament Irish distress was always a delicate subject, for in addition to Irish and pro-Catholic members, others who were normally loyal supporters of the Government were stirred to action by humanitarian feelings. Thus it was hardly possible for a Minister to state 19th century political and economic theory quite so bluntly in the House of Commons in such a context. Moreover, slightly careless phrasing might easily lay him open to the charge of inconsistency, should later events compel

him to take action, and inconsistency, it must be remembered, was at the time considered one of the gravest parliamentary sins. Thus at first Goulburn used delaying tactics, suggesting that there were some extenuating features in the situation, e.g. that oatmeal was cheaper than normally, and that the Government was considering how far it could administer relief, since the sums involved were enormous, running to 2400,000 in County Clare alone. (79) This latter statement was no empty phrase, for his correspondence with Peel reveals that he was discussing with him relief arrangements modelled on those of 1816-17, when Peel was Chief Secretary for Ireland. (80)

These discussions bore fruit in the introduction of an Irish Poor Employment Bill on 16th May, which was welcomed on all sides, (81) and became law within eight days. (82) This authorised the Lord Lieutenant to sponsor public works, notably road building and repairing, and legalised 250,000 already being spent on such projects. Ultimately, Goulburn estimated, (83) these works would cost 2250,000, and in addition he asked for a 200,000 vote of credit for gratuitous relief. The administration of this gratuitous relief necessitated a good deal of correspondence with Peel, and it may be worth recording one exchange of letters, because of the light it throws on the principles of Peel's conduct of public affairs. (84) Goulburn wanted to send some oatmeal to the distressed areas. This was cheaper in Ireland than in England, but, he enquired, would it not create a better

effect to send some from England. Peel sent this laconic, but characteristic reply: "I do not think it necessary to do anything for effect. If the food can be effectually supplied from parts of Ireland, on every account it ought to be."

No complete picture of Goulburn's first year in Ireland could be gained, if the activities of the extremist Protestants were disregarded. The Orange Association, while it had no legitimate or recognised existence, had a very real existence, which was a continuous embarrassment to the Government. In September, 1822, for instance, (85) it proposed to present an address to the Lord-Lieutenant. Before this plan was abandoned, they had already caused some dissension, for Lord Wellesley's dignity had been hurt a little, when Goulburn suggested to him that he could not possibly receive an address from a body that was not considered legitimately existent. Goulburn expressed his own opinion of the address in no uncertain terms to Peel; "I think it is proof of the absurdity of the gentlemen who compose this association who could consider an address of this kind as conciliatory or as meeting the wishes of the Lord-Lieutenant." Less than two months later more serious trouble was in sight. An Orange demonstration was planned in Dublin, which was to culminate in the decoration of the statue of King William. Such a demonstration could not have failed to produce serious rioting and an adroit handling of the situation was called for. The Lord Mayor of Dublin prohibited the decoration of the statue, but the Orangemen threatened to go

Lord-Lieutenant's calm and collected conduct in the face of immediate danger was not matched by equal wisdom in the succeeding days. He maintained that the bottle-throwing was part of a distinct plan by Orangemen to murder him, and let this conviction be generally known, although he had no concrete evidence whatsoever. Thus, when some vague evidence of talks overheard in a coffee house, had been supplied, the Attorney General, to Goulburn's dismay, was prevailed upon to commit the men not for misdemeanour, but for conspiracy to murder the Lord-Lieutenant. Since the evidence was quite inadequate for proving such a charge, it was unlikely that the men would be sentenced. To make matters worse, the Sheriff on duty was a convinced Orangeman, and was alleged to have promised to pick an Orange jury who would ensure acquittal. (89) Before the trial opened, two circumstances were improved. The panel of jurors was actually drawn up by both Sheriffs in conjunction, and the second one was held to be a reliable man. Further, the Lord Lieutenant was persuaded to agree to an indictment for misdemeanour only. Nevertheless on January 2nd the Grand Jury decided to ignore the bills of committal for riot, as they found it against two people only, and rioting is no offence unless committed by more than two people. It was, therefore, necessary for the Attorney-General to file ex-officio informations, and for the trial to be postponed until the opening of term. (90)

In this particular instance the delay caused by the corrupt state of the Irish administration of justice worked, paradoxically, in

favour of the government, for in the course of further investigations the Attorney-General discovered evidence what Goulburn described as a "remarkable measure of preparation" for the theatre riot by various Orange Lodges, as well as evidence that Sheriff Therpe had after all been able to pack the Grand Jury which had ignored the bills of committal. (91) In this way the case for the prosecution was, of course, strengthened immensely.

The episodes of the decoration of the statue and of the theatre riot constitute an effective reply to the charge that Goulburn was an Orangeman. While it is true that he was a convinced Protestant partisan, and that naturally his sympathies would, therefore, tend to lie with the Orange Lodges rather than similar Catholic bodies such as the Ribbon Societies, it is quite clear that, however strongly he approved of the aim of any organisation, he would not tolerate the adoption of methods which might disturb the peace or impede the King's Government. This determination to execute justice regardless of party sympathies was shared by the pro-Catholic members of the Cabinet. The narrowness of the extent of disagreement to which their partisan differences might lead these officers of the Irish Administration, is equally well illustrated by the preparations for the trial. When the Attorney-General had unearthed the complicity of some Orange Lodges in the theatre riot, he suggested to Goulburn that the Government should utilise the occasion for a public condemnation and forcible suppression of these lodges. Goulburn retorted that it would be better to try the rioters,

and if the evidence proved adequate, to proceed against the Sheriff and perhaps the Jury, and thus to punish delinquencies rather than membership of Orange lodges, and to give the Government's view of their activities by implication in the evidence called by the prosecution. (92) While the case remained sub judice, it must be admitted, the procedure proposed by Goulburn was far more correct than that suggested by his colleague.

These incidents, however, did not distract the Irish Government's attention from its main object, for the coming year, a satisfactory tithe measure. The 1822 Act had been passed almost entirely for the purpose of silencing parliamentary critics, and the government had never had real hopes of its success. (93) Thus it is hardly surprising to find that within less than three months of the passing of this act, discussions began in Dublin and London with a view to providing a truly effective measure for the next parliamentary session, without, however, impairing the general principles of the protection of property and the maintenance of the powers of the Church Establishment. At first sight this problem might well appear to be an attempt to reconcile what is incompatible. It was no wonder, therefore, that the preliminary discussions left Goulburn rather depressed. He could see no prospect of a satisfactory settlement, for the majority merely wished to defraud the Church of tithe, yet to keep it as an available resource for the landlord. Hence, to guard the Church against plunder, commutation rather

than any measure getting rid of the tithe altogether, was to be sought. On the other hand, he feared that if the terms of commutation were to be at all equable, the scheme would remain largely inoperative. Thus he thought of a scheme, parts of which did not commend themselves to Mr. Plunkett, however, by which individual parties would be given power to exchange tithes for land or corn rents, the details to be settled by a specially constituted tribunal. (94)

The complex details of this problem occupy much of the correspondence between Goulburn, Peel and Wellesley in the ensuing months, and in order to understand the extraordinary difficulties besetting this problem it is necessary to examine at least some of them more closely.

First and foremost is the delicate relationship of events in Ireland and England. Throughout the correspondence on the Tithes Bill we can discern the fear that anything done in Ireland might be taken as a precedent for dealing with the affairs of the Church of England. Thus, for instance, the Irish Government was considered to be incompetent to decide the question of whether compulsory commutation should be resorted to. This, Peel and Goulburn agreed, was undoubtedly a matter for the English Cabinet, since it would affect similar property in England. (95) In this way the difficulties of the ministers, who could not treat Ireland as an isolated problem were considerably enhanced.

Then there was the danger to which any compromise measure

is exposed, that the extremists on both sides will be dissatisfied and may combine to defeat it. This danger was the greater in days of no party discipline and ^{of} group politics. The opposition on the one side came from the clergy and the "Ultra-Tories". Of these the clergy were the more important, and at one time ⁽⁹⁶⁾ Goulburn commended his proposed scheme, because, while to gain the support of all the Irish clergy would be an impossibility, it would secure the assent of some of them at least. Later, when the Bill was already before Parliament, this division became more clearly defined. It was the higher clergy that was alarmed by the Bill, and, Goulburn added in an aside, the Lord Chancellor's opinion of it varied "according as he has last conversed with myself or the Archbishop." ⁽⁹⁷⁾ A few weeks later the Bill was attacked in the House of Commons as unfair to the clergy and gentry of Ireland. Goulburn retorted that it was a false comparison to attempt to draw a parallel between English and Irish tithe conditions, for whereas English tithes were chiefly a burden on the upper classes, their incidence in Ireland was chiefly upon the lower classes. Thus there was much vexatious litigation about the value of goods, which would be avoided, to the mutual benefit of tithe,-owner and payer, if, as under the Bill, an agreed money payment had been substituted. ⁽⁹⁸⁾ The opposite pole of criticism was represented by Goulburn's most consistent antagonist, Joseph Hume, who in his motion on the Irish Church Establishment proposed so radical a scheme of reform that the Chief Secretary for Ireland stigmatised it as an

attempt to "overthrow the foundation of all property and to malign the established Church," and further felt it necessary to remind the House that the Civil War, which had ended in the shedding of the King's blood, had begun in an attack on the Church by their 17th century predecessors. On balance, however, the Tithe Bill as a whole was hardly opposed at all, though details of it were contested severely, and sometimes effectually, in Committee. (99) On March 8th, Goulburn informed Wellesley, with the implication of pleasant surprise, that both Irish and English members of parliament had received the principles of the Tithe Bill favourably. In fact no dissentient voice had been raised. Even Spring Rice, who was second only to Hume in constant opposition to Goulburn's Irish policy, had given it his blessing. (100)

Before examining the Bill in detail it is worth while to note at least one instance of the technical problems it involved. Voluntary tithe commutation required agreement between the incumbent and the tithe-payers. There was, however, no existing local government or other authority which represented the tithe-payers and could therefore act for them. True, there was the vestry, but this consisted of Protestants only, while the bulk of the tithe-payers was Roman-Catholic. To exclude them from the proceedings would have meant to court disaster for the entire scheme from the outset. The obvious alternative was to call a special meeting of the tithe-payers of the parish. This, however, would have run contrary to the policy of the Irish Government, which was to prevent whenever possible large gatherings

of any sort, for in the state of the country at the time a meeting of many people almost invariably ended in a riot. Moreover, since the tithe-payers were very numerous - more than half of them paid tithe of a value less than £1 - such meetings would have been too large for the efficient conduct of business. Finally a solution was found by calling a special vestry of both Protestants and Roman-Catholics, but imposing a high property qualification.⁽¹⁰¹⁾ Similarly intricate problems abounded in almost every clause of the measure. If resort was to be had to arbitration in valuing the tithe, how were the arbitration tribunals to be composed? Would local tribunals be too heavily biased to be reliable? Were parishes composing a union to act as one unit or as several for the purposes of tithe commutation? Was the composition to last indefinitely or was it to be of limited duration? If the latter was determined on, what number of years would be the most convenient?⁽¹⁰²⁾ All these and other questions had to be considered in detail, before a draft suitable for presentation to Parliament could be passed by both Cabinets.

This draft was further amended by Parliament before it became "An Act to provide for the establishing of Compositions for Tithes in Ireland for a limited time."⁽¹⁰³⁾ A detailed survey of its provisions is of interest, because the preceding correspondence between Whitehall and Dublin Castle shows that it was mainly Goulburn's hand which was responsible for shaping them. It is thus one of the few major parliamentary measures

which can be chiefly attributed to him.

The Act empowered the Lord-Lieutenant, on the application either of the incumbent or of five tithe-payers who were "220 occupiers," to call a special vestry in the parish, notifying both the Bishop and the incumbent and giving at least three weeks' notice. The vestry was to consist of the twenty five ⁽¹⁰⁴⁾ highest tithable rate-payers, paying more than 20s. p.a. A quorum of 7 was fixed. If such a vestry reached no agreement, it was to be adjourned sine die, but might be resummoned at any time. If, however, agreement to proceed was reached, both incumbent and tithe-payers were to appoint a commissioner to act for them, and the two commissioners were to fix the amount to be paid for composition on the basis of the average payment for the last seven years. For this purpose the commissioners were empowered to examine on oath. If the two commissioners could not reach agreement they were to appoint an umpire, or failing agreement on the appointment, it was to be made by the Lord-Lieutenant, who was to work on the same principle. An appeal by either side against the award was allowed, and this was to be referred by the Lord Lieutenant either to the Privy Council or to "the next going Judge of Assize." The composition was to be valid for 21 years after the conclusion of the agreement, and in united benefices a separate composition would be required for each constituent parish. Finally, the pay of Commissioners and Umpires was fixed at £1.10.-- a day in addition to their expenses.

Goulburn's influence may be especially noted in the smallness of the vestry, and the property qualification, on both of which he insisted. (105) Further he was largely responsible for the time-limit, as he apparently regarded the eventual reversion to the status quo ante as a public recognition of the clergy's right to the tithe, which he was most anxious to defend. (106) The painstaking provision for all possible contingencies, made in 59 clauses, is also typical of Goulburn's application to every detail of his work. On the other hand, he never appears to have been very happy about the compulsory clause, and his letter to Wellesley announcing that it had to be dropped almost seems to be indicative of a feeling of relief: "I believe that the Bill without the compulsory clause will be sufficiently operative and in that case I shall not regret its abandonment." (107)

The extent to which we can say that this belief was corroborated by future events depends on the definition of the somewhat vague word "sufficiently." The facts are that within 8 months of the Royal Assent to the Bill 1026 applications for special vestries had been made and that 240 vestries had decided to act under its provisions, while 339 had adjourned sine die. Commenting on these figures, Goulburn stated that the Act had proved particularly popular with the lower classes, while the low rates of composition already adopted were a tribute to, and proof of, the moderation of the clergy. (108) Almost two years later, when it must be supposed that the impetus of the Act had been largely exhausted, he maintained that its results had

far exceeded his hopes, for composition had been effected in 676 parishes, or about $\frac{1}{2}$ of the total number of Irish parishes. (109) In other words even without compulsion more than a third, probably as many as half, the Irish parishes had tried and a quarter had succeeded in availing themselves of the provisions of the Act. That in itself is proof that it was a workmanlike measure, a conviction which is strengthened when it is remembered that no protest against its operation is on record. (110) That is certainly an unheard of thing in the Ireland of the 1820s. Undoubtedly the Act served to mitigate some of the hardships of the Irish people.

No impression of the work of the Irish Government would be correct, if it failed to convey the invariable background of an either openly or latently mutinous population. Eternal vigilance was required, therefore, to curb and prevent outrages or more general rebellions. A few random examples chosen from Goulburn's correspondence with Peel will serve as illustrations: In September 1822 Peel referred to the skilful planning of the attack on a Mr. Norcott's house as a particularly gloomy omen for the winter. (111) Disturbance always increased in the winter months, not only because the diminishing food stocks generally exacerbated the distress of the poor, but also because the longer nights afforded the miscreants a better chance to evade detection. (112) In the following month several men, belonging to "Dublin Committees," a group of secret societies, were being tried for high treason. Though the original charge failed, some of the men were convicted

of administering unlawful oaths and thus sentenced to transportation.⁽¹¹³⁾
A few days later, Goulburn protested against the withdrawal of a
battalion from Ireland, because such action would inspire the
rebellious, especially in Munster, with new hope.⁽¹¹⁴⁾ While
in London for the session of parliament, Goulburn received a
letter from the Solicitor-General apprising him that Dublin
was in a state of alarm, because the Ribbon-men seemed to be
preparing for a crisis, that pikes were being manufactured, and
that the Orangemen might soon be expected to fight in defence
of the Constitution and the Irish Government.⁽¹¹⁵⁾ The following
exchange of letters, marked "Secret," was more unusual, but brings
to light another aspect of the same problem. On October 27th,
1823, Peel wrote: "Keep an eye on Monsieur Romain who is, I believe,
French Consul in Dublin. He corresponds with Chateaubriand on
all matters of Irish Domestic Policy." Peel added that the
reports were not, as yet, treasonable and that they passed
through the Post Office. Goulburn replied five days later:
"We will keep a watchful eye on Monsieur Raymond, though I think
it will be better to leave his letters to Chateaubriand to your
inspection; as they must pass through London Post Office on their
road to Paris, and we are such bunglers at the Post Office here
that we should never get at the contents of his letters without
rendering them unfit for delivery. Moreover our opening them
would be immediately promulgated."
So far, however, this "resistance movement" had lacked any
form of central organization and thus was also devoid of direction.

While this presented problems of its own for the Government, such as the greater incalculability of where and when outbreaks would occur and hence the need for the dispersal of forces, the lack of cohesion among the rebels was certainly one cause of their ineffectiveness. Among other causes the determination of the Government to quell all disorder, as evidenced in the Magistracy and Police reform and the Insurrection Act, which had again been renewed in June, 1823, was unquestionably the most prominent. Thus Goulburn could report three months later that the state of the country was the quietest since he had been appointed.⁽¹¹⁶⁾ Yet certain Irish patriots had then already begun to prepare the instrument which was to resharpen the blunted edge of Irish resistance. That instrument was the Catholic Association.

The first reference to that body shows how alert Goulburn was to any possible danger to the peace of Ireland. While in London he noticed a press report that an aggregate meeting for the purpose of reviving the Catholic Board was to be held. He immediately wrote to inform the Lord-Lieutenant and to state his views on the subject. He would much prefer that no such body would exist in Ireland, considering the temper of the country, but he also recognized that the Catholics would frame their organization carefully so as to avoid the risk of illegality. For instance, they would have no delegates, since representative assemblies were forbidden. Thus, all the Government could do was to watch for any grounds that would warrant their forcible dissolution without violation of the law. He promised to

peruse the Home Office documents relating to the dissolution of the Catholic Board by the Duke of Richmond, and requested the Lord-Lieutenant's views on the subject, since it might be raised in the House. (117) Characteristically no reply to this letter was received.

It was some time before the newly formed Catholic Association achieved sufficient prominence to receive serious ministerial attention again. That was at a time when Goulburn, commenting on the state of the country, held that while manifestations of violence were rare, its spirit remained unabated, and that he therefore felt Ireland would, for some time to come, need between twenty and twenty-one thousand men to safeguard public order. (118) The issue, which was being canvassed by the Association, had been raised by an incident in September. A Roman Catholic burial had taken place in a Protestant churchyard in Dublin, and the sexton had prevented, though not forcibly, the saying of the Roman Catholic burial service. The legality of the saying of Roman Catholic burial prayers was questionable. The Irish law-officers held opposing views on the subject. O'Connell skilfully seized on this issue, on which the Government was doubtful, and which, moreover, was obviously charged with indignant emotion. He made a statement declaring that funeral prayers were perfectly legal and should be continued. The difficulty was enhanced by the fact that there were only few burial grounds in Dublin exclusively reserved for Roman Catholics, the majority of whom were customarily buried in Protestant churchyards. (119) The Catholic Association was thus provided

with a popular and topical cause.

Somewhat alarmed by press reports of its proceedings, Peel requested further information about that body: How many and what sort of people attended its meetings? What was known about public feeling towards this "mischievous body," and had it any connection with the priesthood? Why, finally, did "government" papers report its debates, when surely it could be killed by the refusal to publicise its activities?⁽¹²⁰⁾ Goulburn's reply showed that he underestimated the potentialities of the Association very considerably. He maintained that the last debate had been most unspirited, forecast that the Association would die of inanition, and further reported that the Roman Catholic authorities were said to disapprove of it. Public interest, however, must have been great, for he explained, rather in corroboration of the more modern adage that the public will get the type of press it wants, that it would have been inadvisable to prevent government papers from publishing the debates, as such a course of action would affect sales, since all other papers published the proceedings.⁽¹²¹⁾

Peel's and Goulburn's attitude to the Irish press deserves a brief digression, since it is the only occasion on which we can reproach Goulburn with political dishonesty. Peel, on a later occasion,⁽¹²²⁾ made an almost identical accusation against the "Patriot," and Goulburn took steps to ensure that its editorial views would in future be more favourable to the Government. He himself had at one time secured the immediate examination of

the editor of the "Courier," which had printed "a most violent and indecent paragraph," and had taken the view that the editor was "unfit even in name to continue the government paper unless able to give a satisfactory excuse." (123) Yet, when in parliament he was confronted with the accusation that advertisements of government proclamations were used to bribe sections of the Irish Press, he replied that he did not know which Irish papers were friendly to the government and which were not. (124)

In any case it may be doubted, whether failure to report the Association's activities would have had any appreciable effect on its vitality. Its remarkable feature was that it appealed to and was supported by all classes, and the Irish poor, who formed the majority of the population, were not able to afford the luxury of a daily paper, especially as it was burdened by the paper tax. Be that as it may, the Association quickly grew in strength and influence, so much and so quickly that throughout the year 1824 the Government sent its own shorthand-writer to report the debates. (125) The principal object of this action was apparently to ascertain whether anything said in the course of debate put the speakers within the reach of the law. The reports were always personally perused by both Lord-Lieutenant and Chief-Secretary, and dubious passages were then referred to the Law-Officers to decide if they warranted the institution of proceedings. Finally the reports were transmitted to London. While attempts were thus made to remove individual leaders, no similar attempts to suppress the Association as a whole were at first contemplated.

The turning-point in the Government's attitude occurred, it appears, when the collection of the Catholic rent was decided on. Goulburn wrote from London that the Bishop's support for the Catholic Association's notion to collect a Catholic tax rendered that body far more formidable than he had previously regarded it. This change might necessitate a reorientation of Government policy in the direction of forcible intervention. (126) On his return to Ireland he immediately reached the decision that suppression was indeed essential. In reply to Peel, who had expressed anxiety that a regularly constituted body ^{should} ~~shall~~ ape the forms of Parliament and collect a tax from the Roman Catholic population for an unspecified purpose, he stated regretfully that the Attorney-General thought the Convention Act, prohibiting representative assemblies, had not yet been infringed by the Association. Goulburn added, however, that its effects on the country were "most evil," and that it therefore ought most certainly to be suppressed. (127)

Nevertheless, the Government did not pursue the question of suppression with great rapidity or even with great urgency. One reason for that was undoubtedly the cleverness with which O'Connell contrived to balance on the edge of legality. Thus he is reported as having spoken of "That great and mighty body consisting of seven millions of people whom they (the Association) did not represent, for the law forbade such a representation, but for whom they acted." (128) Moreover, during the summer months "parliamentary" meetings were largely abandoned, while O'Connell

and other leaders toured the country, holding meetings explaining the objects of the Association and organising it on a nation-wide scale. This dispersal of activities may have contributed to the somewhat complacent attitude of the Government, which was lulled into a false sense of comparative security by the unusually peaceable state of Ireland, (129) and had to fear no criticism from opposition groups due to the early prorogation of Parliament at the end of June.

By the end of October, however, Goulburn was thoroughly alarmed at the extent of the Association's activities, and his report to Peel was transmitted to several members of the English Cabinet. Whereas originally it had consisted chiefly of "demagogues of doubtful reputation," the Association's new members included representatives of the nobility, some of them Protestants, and of the higher Roman Catholic clergy, Members of Parliament and others of the higher classes who would be strongly exposed to Catholic influence. Its finances were secured by the priests' encouragement to the collection of "rent," which secured a weekly income of £200-300. Each parish had its "rent-collector" who could easily be transformed into an agent if disorders broke out. Wherever a Protestant was involved in a law-case with a Catholic, the Association sent a barrister and sought to intimidate the magistrates into giving judgment for the Catholic. Yet, how could these evils be combated, especially since new legislation would be easy to evade under the cloak of charity organisations? (130) Within a fortnight of this report, rumours of imminent widespread

rebellion abounded in the country. With 20,000 troops and a reliable police force, however, Goulburn, though apprehensive, was prepared to face any eventuality without further reinforcements from England. (131) These rumours were largely without foundation of any sort, and are rather to be taken as an indication of the intensity of unrest, which the Association had succeeded in stirring up, than of actual preparations for an armed rising. There is even some suspicion that O'Connell fostered or created them intentionally in an effort at what would nowadays be called a "war of nerves." (132) It succeeded in so far as the atmosphere of unrelieved tension deepened the Irish Cabinet's suspicions of each other's integrity. In particular, Goulburn felt that Plunkett was trying to avoid a collision with the Catholic Association at almost any cost. (133)

Finally the English Cabinet decided on action. On 15th December Peel wrote to Goulburn: "I believe a new law necessary. I believe that law must be a very strong one, but if we, the King's Servants, shrink from the responsibility of directly proposing it and fighting stoutly every step of it, until it is either rejected or passed into a law, we are unfit for our stations." Some time earlier another avenue for governmental attack had opened itself. O'Connell was reported as having asked his audience: "Who was there that did not revere the memory of a Washington or a Bolivar? who had made their countries independent and great, and any man that admired a Bolivar or a Washington ought to stamp on the grave of the

miscreant Castlereagh. He would instruct his children that Castlereagh was the man who had sold his country." (134)

Lord Wellesley underlined this passage in pencil and made a note "that it should be referred to the Law-Officers. It seems difficult to understand why they should have taken more than a month to give their opinion, but in any case on 20th December, Goulburn joyfully reported to Peel that they held there was an excellent case for proceeding against him for seditious words. He had been held to bail to take his trial, which would be heard within a few days, though a miscarriage of justice might be possible in Ireland despite the clearest evidence. (135)

The next few days' correspondence reveals that feverish activity took place on both sides of the Irish Channel to ensure that insofar as it lay with the prosecution, O'Connell would be convicted. Matters were complicated by the fact that, as soon as he had been arrested, Sir Harcourt Lees called the Ulster Protestants to arms against the Catholics on the grounds that the Government was too weak to protect them. Goulburn bitterly complained that he should have chosen such an "inopportune moment for his ravings." They could, however, obviously not be ignored, though procedural manipulations ensured that his trial would take place a few days later than O'Connell's. Thus at least the issue would not be confused in either case. (136)

It is yet another comment on the quality of Irish law-courts of the time that the bills against the accused in both cases were ignored. In this instance the Grand Jury was perfectly

respectable, but Judge Moore directed that they must be satisfied that the person using the words intended them in the sense of meaning charged, or else they could not find the bills. With this ridiculous direction before them the Jury had no choice, and unless repudiated it made nonsense of all future trials of the same type. (137)

Efforts were therefore redoubled to produce as nearly ^{perfect} waterproof a measure for the suppression of the Catholic Association at the earliest moment. On 5th January, Goulburn could, for once, report that the Irish Cabinet agreed unanimously. What was more, their ideas on the bill for the suppression of the Catholic Association were almost identical with those of the English Cabinet. Goulburn rightly insisted, however, that it was probably even more important to look beyond the bill to the future of Roman Catholic organisation in Ireland. He forecast that this would take the form of series of aggregate meetings for avowedly legal purposes, always attended by the same people. Thus the Lord-Lieutenant should be empowered to discontinue by proclamation any society formed in evasion of the new law and to disperse meetings. Charitable and educational societies should not be specifically exempted from these provisions. Quite unaccountably, however, he withdrew these very sound, and almost obvious, suggestions several days later, giving as the only reason for his recantation that all the Irish Ministers thought such powers would be both inconvenient and unpopular. (138)

It is not easy to fathom why the thus weakened measure

should have aroused such fierce parliamentary opposition. Brougham opened the attack on it after the King's speech had requested Parliament to take steps to deal with unlawful associations. (139) When on 10th February Goulburn sought leave to introduce his Unlawful Societies Bill, he had to face a four day debate, and the voting figures of 278-123 are evidence of the good attendance of which this measure was considered worthy. He made the case for the Government in one of his better speeches. He contended that the objects of the Catholic Association were quite immaterial in this context. What mattered were their methods of seeking to attain their objects, and these were incompatible with sound government. The Association, he alleged, had allied with the remnants of the 1798 rebellion committee. The methods by which the Catholic rent was collected resembled forcible extortion, since refusals to contribute were recorded in a special book. The funds collected in this way were chiefly used to interfere with the administration of justice. The Bill should forbid two of the most obnoxious features of the Association, namely permanent sittings and the levying of money for the redress of private or public grievances. At a later stage of the Bill's progress he rebutted the charge that it was a piece of partial legislation. (140) It had indeed from the outset been intended that it should be applied equally against Orange and any other illegal associations. (141)

In its final shape the "Act to amend certain Acts relating

unlawful Societies in Ireland,"⁽¹⁴²⁾ which was limited to a duration of two years, was rather formidable in appearance. It made illegal any society or committee acting for the redress of grievances, for an alteration of the constitution or for assisting people legally, or meeting for more than 14 days, or levying money, or employing officers of other societies doing so, or having various branches, or corresponding with other societies, or excluding members of any legally permitted religious faith. Any two J.Ps were empowered to command unlawful meetings to disperse, and to effect forcible entries. Membership of an unlawful society became a misdemeanour punishable by fine or imprisonment. Exemptions were, however, granted to societies for religious worship, or to further charity, science, agriculture, manufacture or commerce, and to meetings called solely to petition King or Parliament.

The Act's bite, however, was in no way commensurate with its bark. In the first place the numerous exemptions, as could have and indeed had been foreseen, could cover a multitude of sins. The result was certainly not what had been intended or expected by its protagonists: "O'Connell evaded the letter of the law, founded new associations as quickly as they were broken up, and still collected the rent."⁽¹⁴³⁾ In contrast to these Roman Catholic attempts to thwart Parliament, Goulburn pointed out that the Orange gentry had tried to stop processions and other demonstrations.⁽¹⁴⁴⁾ In fact by January, 1826 it had become clear that the Act had succeeded fairly well in suppressing the

Orange organisations, but had failed completely in its primary object of putting down the Catholic Association. The idea of attempting prosecutions was canvassed then and again 12 months later in both governments. But fearing that a prosecution would fail, hoping on rather slender evidence that the popularity of the Association was on the decline, and realising that its suppression would no longer achieve the desired object since the priesthood had taken up the political cudgels, (145) the Ministers finally abandoned such plans. O'Connell had clearly beaten Goulburn in the battle of wits, partly because of the Government's failure to make the Unlawful Societies Act sufficiently strong, and partly because O'Connell having had "practical experience in dealing with the technicalities of the law" (146) had an infinite ability for skirting the edge of illegality without committing himself sufficiently to warrant a prosecution under the unreliable circumstances attending the Irish administration of justice. Goulburn's defeat enabled O'Connell to carry out his campaign for Catholic emancipation.

After this account of the major developments in Irish affairs during Goulburn's tenure of the office of Chief Secretary of Ireland, we must turn our attention to some points of less intrinsic importance and far reaching effects, perhaps, but nonetheless valuable for an insight into the day-to-day administration of Ireland or into the principles of Goulburn's political thought.

Reference has already been made to Irish food shortages, and to the general direction of Government policy regarding this problem. It must, moreover, be remembered that this was very nearly an annually recurring event. The line of policy to be adopted was thus almost automatically copied from the preceding year. Nor was there any difference in the devotion with which Peel and Goulburn accepted the dictates of the "dismal science." Thus Peel in discussing the subject stated he would rather risk attacks on the Government in the Commons than the dangers of Government purchase of food before the commencement of famine. Such action, if open, would encourage improvident consumption, and, if concealed, would raise prices, which might lead to the opening of the ports and thus damage the agricultural interest. (147) Writing some weeks before the potato harvest of 1824, Goulburn put a similar view even more crudely. The Government's chief problem was the constant clamour for relief. Because a large number of parishes were reported without food, it was, he stated rather indignantly, "expected to send money or provisions into all the districts."

This was not done, however, since potatoes were procurable "at prices not generally speaking exorbitant when the season of the year is considered." He concluded by saying that such an experiment was possible in that year because parliament had already adjourned, and that the period of suffering would not be of many days' duration. (148)

Another question which reared its head periodically was

that of the size of Ireland's population and the possibility of relieving distress by sponsoring or assisting emigration. Apparently Peel was the main proponent of such schemes. Unfortunately, however, Wellesley took offence at the way in which one of the earliest attempts was handled, and little could be done to renew these, while he remained in office. While in London, Goulburn discussed the possibility of encouraging emigration from the disturbed districts with Lord Liverpool and the Chancellor of the Exchequer. They agreed to provide immediate transport to Canada for 1000, to be selected from those willing to proceed, and facilities for a larger number in the following year, believing that "the hope of being conveyed to Canada as a reward for good conduct (might) induce the lower orders to adopt a more peaceable line of conduct." The Lord-Lieutenant, however, apparently stung by the fact that he had not been consulted, considered that bad consequences would arise from the encouragement of emigration, and Goulburn had to offer the cancellation of the proposal as a result. (149)

Further difficulties ensued from Lord Wellesley's private affairs. His son, Mr. Johnstone, held a post at the Stamp Office in London for which he drew a salary of £1,000. Notwithstanding this "occupation," he spent much of his time in Dublin where he exerted a most unsteady influence on the Lord-Lieutenant's policies. This situation was complicated by the second marriage of Lord Wellesley, which took place in November, 1825. His wife was a Roman Catholic, and that in itself was a matter of

comment and some annoyance in the state of Ireland. By the end of the year a contest for power in the household, rather on the lines of that between Mrs. Proudie and Mr. Slope in Barchester, had reached its climax and was decided in favour of Mr. Johnston and against the Lady-Lieutenant. She, therefore, threatened to separate from her husband, which would have put him in a completely impossible situation, since he had already incurred a good deal of ridicule preparatory to and attendant on his marriage a few months earlier. In desperation, Goulburn suggested that Mr. Johnston should be threatened with loss of his sinecure unless he resided in London, but Peel mentioned the matter confidentially to the Duke of Wellington, who apparently succeeded in smoothing the outward ripples of the family conflict at least. (150)

Among the most frequent targets of parliamentary critics were various topics connected with the Church of Ireland. In at least two instances Goulburn introduced new legislation largely in response to such criticism. In 1823, while repudiating almost everything else that Hume had said in a debate on the Irish Church Establishment, he agreed with him on the need for enforcing the residence of clergy, as long as it left Church privileges unimpaired. (151) In the following year he secured the passage of a measure, which forbade beneficed clergy to engage in trading, and arranged that they should lose graduated parts of their income, if they were non-resident for more than three months. Exemptions included those granted for teachers,

masters of hospitals, Bishops' chaplains and canons. (152)

In the second instance a private member's bill, introduced by Sir J. Newport, (153) provided the stimulus for a law to regulate Irish vestries. The government measure divided vestry business into two parts, ecclesiastical and secular. The two types of business had to be discussed at separate vestry meetings. At vestries discussing Church matters, Roman Catholics were not allowed to vote; at all other vestry meetings all parishioners were entitled to vote. Roman Catholics were permitted to refuse service as churchwardens, and the incumbent's right to be the ordinary vestry chairman was reaffirmed. (154)

Finally, a few illustrations of minor administrative matters may be of interest. Dr. Jocelyn, Bishop of Clogher, accused on charges of immorality, had been deprived of his see. Before his trial he had left the country. On 3rd December, 1823, Goulburn received secret information that he had returned to Ireland, and immediately consulted Peel on the steps to be taken. The reply marked "Secret," reads: (I agree that the) "apprehension and trial of Dr. Jocelyn would be a great public calamity..... to the church..... To avert it, we ought to disregard the Principles on which we should act in ordinary cases." He added the suggestion that an influential member of the family should be apprised of the Government's knowledge, and warned that a trial would be instituted unless Dr. Jocelyn immediately left the country. This advice was carried out and after a few anxious days it succeeded. (155) The case is particularly

interesting, though, because Peel here enunciated in miniature the doctrine on which the later "betrayals" of his party were based: To avert calamity we must disregard ordinary principles of action.

In November, 1824, Peel requested an account of the agricultural and industrial state of the country. Goulburn contended that it was "not easy to reduce this to any distinct form," but a month later supplied this unusual economic report: The best indication of the improved state of agriculture was the promptness with which rents were paid. Nor was there any longer difficulty in letting farms. There was a notable decrease in unemployment (but no statistics are given). The cotton manufacture was expanding surprisingly, and cotton exports had almost been doubled within a year. (156)

The unification of English and Irish currency in 1826 led to some financial and commercial difficulties. Goulburn reported that the Dublin manufacturers had no employment except what was provided by charity. Many workers had demanded as much payment in the new British as in the old Irish currency, and as the employers had "very properly" resisted this demand, a general "turn out" (157) of labourers had ensued. Thus the streets were filled with idle men, and typhus was spreading. The Government was doing its utmost to check disease, and since it considered that the unemployed were to be pitied, but not those who refused employment offered to them, it was trying to encourage charity for the former, and to repress the latter.

It is striking to note that again no direct relief measures were undertaken by the Government, although Goulburn noted that the primary difficulty was lack of money, since all resources had been drained. (158)

The end of Goulburn's association with Ireland was brought about by the end of the Liverpool administration. On 17th February, 1827, Lord Liverpool was seized by an apoplectic fit at breakfast as a result of which he died some days later. By the middle of April the reshuffling of groups had made it clear that Canning would head the new administration, and on 14th April, Goulburn intimated to Lord Wellesley his intention to resign. He explained that he "thought it inconsistent with (his) character to take any share in the administration," because the newly formed Government would vitally affect the Roman Catholic question, since Canning was at its head. Thus he would resign as soon as a successor had been found for him, though he would of course support the new Government, which contained many of his friends. Peel, however, had also resigned. (159)

(f) Chancellor of the Exchequer
1828-30.

In the succeeding months the death of Canning, following ^{Canning actually predeceased Liverpool by 4 weeks (Aug 27)} so quickly on that of Liverpool, played havoc with the stability of the British Government. Goulburn, like Peel, remained outside both of the pro-Catholic administrations, and very little is known of his activities during that period, especially as most of it coincided with the parliamentary recess. When, however, the Duke of Wellington was called upon to replace Goderich as head of the administration, the way to the resumption of ministerial office was no longer barred to him by conscientious scruples. That Goulburn did not merely resume a post under the Crown, but was promoted, was due in part at least to the influence wielded by Peel, who expressed his view in a memorandum to the Duke: "Mr. Goulburn has in my opinion a full claim for efficient Cabinet Office." (160)

Thus he obtained the post of Chancellor of the Exchequer in accordance with the custom of the time, by which a Commoner was given this office when the First Lord of the Treasury sat in the House of Lords, while the two offices were held by the same person if the First Lord was a member of the Lower House himself.

Before we proceed to an examination of Goulburn's work as chief financial minister, it will be convenient to deal with the religious question which reached its climax, while he was a member of the Cabinet. It must be remembered that he joined

the Cabinet, because it had set its face against recognition of the Catholic claims. On the other hand, his failure to suppress the Catholic Association, while in charge of Irish affairs, forced him to become instrumental in granting these claims.

Catholic relief had been left an open question in the Liverpool administration. Cabinet colleagues spoke and voted on opposite sides when the topic was under discussion in parliament. Sir F. Burdett's Catholic Relief Bill of 1825, was a measure which had been very efficiently prepared and canvassed by O'Connell himself (who claimed that he would submit to the suppression of the Catholic Association, if the bill passed)⁽¹⁶¹⁾ and gave Goulburn the opportunity to state his opinion in detail. The Bill, he contended, was incompatible with the British Constitution, which was tied up with the Church Establishment. That the Bill was dangerous was self-evident, for else there would have been no need to include safeguarding clauses. To pay the Roman Catholic Clergy would be tantamount to making the Irish Catholic Church the Church of Ireland. The Bill might even endanger the Protestant succession, if the Royal Family became extinct. The imposition of an oath that they would not work for the subversion of the Established Protestant Church would be inadequate unless taken by all Catholic clergy. The oath required of those, who partook in the government of the realm in parliament, stated that they recognised no ecclesiastical or spiritual power exercised by

the Pope as valid in Britain. Surely that ought to exclude Roman Catholics from parliamentary places automatically. (162) These and other arguments notwithstanding, the third reading passed the Commons by 248 votes to 227, and only the Duke of York's impassioned speech in the House of Lords defeated the Catholics' almost certain hopes.

There is no reason to suppose that Goulburn would have recanted any of these opinions in 1829, when he cast his vote in the other lobby. In May, 1828 he still voted against emancipation, (163) and his first public defence of his conversion was outstanding only by his lack of enthusiasm for his new faith. While petitions against the Roman Catholic claims were being presented he indicated his agreement with the petitioners' fears that many dangers might result from concessions, but added that he had reached the conviction that even greater dangers would result from resistance to the claims. (164) During the second reading debate he found a little more warmth for his Government's measure, but characteristically began by saying that he appreciated the honesty of the convictions of the Bill's opponents, though he believed them to be mistaken. He reiterated that a choice had to be made between two evils, and that in his opinion the greater evil lay in a continued division of both Government and Parliament by Roman-Catholic agitation. He hoped that the removal of the grievances which had formed the basis of that agitation would open the way for

the re-establishment of Roman Catholic-Protestant co-operation, especially in Ireland. (165) It is important to realise, how much this public recantation must have cost Goulburn. In common with many other Tories he had regarded the question of the Protestants' ascendancy as the major political issue since the beginning of his public life. (165A) It must have appeared to him as though he had decided to pull down with his own hands the structure which he had staunchly defended for so long. (166)

Once the Catholic question had been settled, parliamentary reform moved into its place as the main political watershed, but, although Goulburn remained convinced until the end of his life that the Reform Bill had been a calamity, his duties as Chancellor of the Exchequer did not place him, except by accident, in the forefront of this political struggle. It must also be noted that, since Peel had returned to the Home Office, the official connection between the two men was less strong than at any other time at which both of them held Cabinet rank. Apart from the occasional parliamentary assistance afforded by Peel as leader of the House, there was very little need for consultation between them, and the Peel-Goulburn correspondence shows that in fact hardly any such consultation did take place on matters of major financial policy. Nor, on the other hand, is there any indication that the First Lord of the Treasury exercised a dominating or very considerable influence in that field. While the Duke of Wellington's correspondence with Goulburn suffices to show how

unjust is the popular judgment which attributes his attainment of high political office merely to his success as a soldier, it is quite evident that despite his clear grasp of intricate financial problems, he was not the prime mover of the Government's budgetary or other financial policy. (167) Thus Goulburn's work at the Exchequer during the three years from 1828-30 was probably more independent and freer of outside influences than at any other point of his career. Finally, it is well to bear in mind that financial disagreements between Huskisson and Herries had led to the breakup of the Coderich administration, but that they did not recur in the new Government, although it included both of these as ministers. (168)

One of the first actions of the new Chancellor of the Exchequer was the setting up of a House of Commons committee, under the Chairmanship of Sir H. Barnett, to inquire into national finance. This action had been foreshadowed in the King's Speech, and Goulburn appeased the ever critical Hume, who had demanded twelve separate committees for a subject of so many ramifications, by assuring him that if on any topic a separate committee appeared necessary, it would be appointed after the investigations of the main committee had begun. (169) It was apparently the deliberations of that committee which delayed the budget statement to the unusually late date of 11th July.

The budget, however, was of more than ordinary interest, for it sounded the death knell of the vicious policy, by which

such religious deference was paid to the Sinking Fund, that in order to keep this instrument for the reduction of the National Debt intact, new debts were incurred by raising loans.

Introducing the Budget Debate, Goulburn explained that for the financial year 1827 an expenditure of nearly £53 million had been incurred, of which, it is interesting to note, £31 million were accounted for by interest payments and pensions. (170)

Subtracting this sum from the total net revenue a surplus of a little more than £1½ million was left. For the coming year he anticipated a rise by at least £800,000 in the revenue, for although it could not be expected that corn imports, and thus corn duties, would be as high in the previous year, an improved sugar crop would raise the receipts from the sugar, rum and brandy duties. Similarly the revenue derived from the Excise would be improved by higher yields on malt, hops and beer on account of the good harvest. The supply estimates for the public services had been considerably reduced so that an expenditure of £51. million, a revenue of £54 million, and a surplus of £3 million could be expected for the following year. That, however, would be £2 million short of the sum which existing laws required to be applied to the reduction of the National Debt. That left him with these alternatives. He could seek to raise new taxation, which, however, he did not consider warrantable. Or he could raise new loans to meet the Sinking Fund deficiency, a course of action, which he dismissed as illusory. He had, therefore, determined on

amending legislation, under the terms of which only the real surplus would be applied to the reduction of the National Debt. (171)

He effected this determination by an immediate, but temporary Act, which after a year's experience was replaced by a permanent and slightly more complicated measure. The first of these merely stated that the National Debt was to be reduced by 3 instead of five million pounds in the next year. The second measure instructed the Treasury to transmit a fourth of the annual surplus to the Commissioners for the Reduction of the National Debt each quarter. The Commissioners were empowered to purchase Exchequer Bills, and all stock thus purchased was to be deemed cancelled and interest on it was to cease. (172)

The change in the Sinking Fund Policy was generally welcomed, by both Government supporters and Opposition. This welcome is made particularly clear by two facts: even Hume joined in it - though with some qualifications - and Herries found it necessary to point out to the House that this proposal had originally been made by a Government and not an Opposition member of the Finance Committee. Unfortunately, he did not mention his name. Finally, the committee's chairman, Sir H. Parnell, summed up, somewhat in contradiction to Goulburn's assurance that the Government would continue its strenuous efforts to reduce the National Debt. He suggested that the reason for the Committee's advice had been that reduced taxation, especially insofar as it was hampering

industry, would be of greater advantage to the Country's finances than a Sinking Fund, for it would contribute to raising the level of prosperity. (173)

If such had indeed been the line of thought of all the Committee members - which may well be doubted - they must have been disappointed, for in neither the 1828 nor the 1829 budget did Goulburn propose any reductions of taxation. Instead he was able to announce with some pride, when opening the budget debate on 8th May, 1829, a surplus of £5,850,000, which was the biggest since 1822. On the other hand, he could not repeat the assertion of the preceding year that there was general and increasing prosperity, for a bad harvest and a partial economic depression were casting some shadows on the prospects for 1829. While he was anxious that these should not be falsely magnified, he admitted that the "inevitable" depression following on a period of great prosperity would diminish the revenue of the Customs and the Excise noticeably. Assuming, therefore, an expenditure of £51½ million, he budgeted for a reduced surplus of £3 million in 1830. This was immediately attacked by Hume. The depression, he contended, was neither temporary nor inevitable. If the Chancellor inquired into its causes, he would find that it was occasioned by too heavy taxation which the Government was doing nothing to reduce. He was supported by Waitham who described the taxes as "wrung from the pockets of the

people," and instead demanded more protective duties for industries, (174) a proposal which is paradoxical only in appearance, since most revenue was derived from Customs and Excise duties on foodstuffs or raw materials. Hume was always fiery in speech, and often wrongheaded, but in this instance it is difficult not to feel sympathy with much of what he and his colleague said. He was certainly right in saying that the depression was not going to be shortlived. It deepened throughout the year into the conditions provoking the labourers' revolt of 1830. By February 1830 distress was the subject of an amendment to the Address. (175) In the long term interest it was undoubtedly important to proceed energetically with the reduction of the National Debt, but it seems probable that a diversion of at least part of the surplus of almost £6 million from this purpose could have done much to mitigate the hardship, experienced by those worst hit by the depression, if applied to the removal of some indirect taxes. Though a policy of government investment was, of course, outside the notions of early 19th century economics, it is interesting to speculate to what extent the use of the available surplus for such a purpose would have ridded the country of depression altogether.

It is certain that many individual Members of Parliament were not satisfied. Mr. Slaney pressed for an inquiry into the restrictions on the manufacture of malt and beer, especially those occasioned by high taxation, and their effects on the middle and lower classes. Coulburn evaded the attack by

suggesting that the decreasing consumption of malt per head was not the result of the duties levied on it, but of growing preference for other drinks such as coffee and tea (the latter having become the customary drink in some factories even!) (176)

Similar attacks were launched against the sugar and tobacco duties, but also proved abortive. In the new year Hume changed his tactics slightly. He moved for the reduction of the public establishment, so as to make possible the reduction of taxation. Though Goulburn stigmatised the attempt to tamper with the Civil List as dishonourable, explained that the highest Government expenditure was the payment of interest, and maintained that ~~highest~~^{strictest} economy was already being exercised by departments, he rose four days later to announce reductions in the civil and military estimates amounting to more than £1 million. (177) How far this was due to public pressure is difficult to gauge in the absence of private correspondence on the subject. It is quite clear that such extensive cuts in the estimates could not possibly have been made within four days. On the other hand, notice of Hume's motion must have been given some time previously, and this fairly obvious line of attack would, under the duress of the worsening economic conditions, have been undoubtedly anticipated by the Government. That it was responsive, even if slowly, to parliamentary pressure is made clear by the fact that a few days' later Goulburn, in reply to a petition for the repeal of the malt tax, stated that he was inquiring into the possibility of altering the licensing system

so as to allow the free sale of beer without endangering the morals of the people. (178) In fact he was somewhat belatedly acceding to Slaney's motion of the previous year.

Special historical interest attaches to the 1830 budget, because as a "crisis" budget it is bound to bring Goulburn's economic doctrines into relief more clearly than its two precursors, which were presented while conditions were more normal. In opening his statement he admitted that his hopes of the preceding year that the depression would prove temporary had been disappointed. The level of the anticipated revenue had not been reached, since the bad harvest had affected, e.g., the malt and beer duties, though unexpected increases in Customs receipts and the sale of the City Canal for £120,000 had reduced the defalcation in the expected surplus so that it had been possible to make a real reduction of the National Debt by nearly £2½ million. Moreover, he had secured the conversion of a similar sum of permanent annuities into life annuities, which would benefit the country within the next 30 years. An accurate forecast for the coming year was very difficult to make in the unsettled state of the country. Those in distress had clamoured for tax-reliefs for themselves and for a property-tax, but, he declared amid cheers, the lower orders would not be helped by the imposition of heavier taxes on their opulent employers. Thus after careful consideration the Government had decided against such taxation and intended, instead, to reduce those taxes which pressed most heavily on the

poor, but the reduction of which would least affect the revenue. Thus, since beer had become almost a luxury for the poor, the beer duty was to be abolished, and since the monopolistic retail system had further raised its price, the sale of beer was to become free. The malt tax, however, was to remain. These changes, together with the remission of the cider tax, were to take effect from 10th October, while the leather tax and restrictions on its modes of manufacture were to disappear as from 5th July. This would bring a total tax relief of $\text{£}3\frac{1}{2}$ million, with additional benefits to be derived from the ending of restrictions. Such, however, were the utmost limits to which it was possible to go. Even so, in order to budget for a reduced surplus of $\text{£}2$ million in 1831, it would be necessary to raise a moderate, additional duty on spirits - low enough to prevent smuggling, yet high enough to prevent corruption of morals - while the projected consolidation of the stamp laws would also raise the Irish Stamp duties. As regarded the rest of the revenue, had internal production would mean a fall in Excise receipts, but, due to higher imports, increased Customs receipts. In order to effect economies in expenditure he would, in future, require all Civil Servants to pay money into a superannuation fund, and he intended to reduce the interest on part of the National Debt from 4% to $3\frac{1}{2}\%$. (179)

It is quite clear that insofar as this budget was intended to give real relief to the distressed, it must have been largely inoperative. Indeed the cynic might observe that the only

way out of misery which it provided for them was the time-honoured one of getting "dead-drunk for twopence." Goulburn must have been unaware of, or unwilling to operate, the ways, by which national financial policy can be used to promote greater industrial activity. It might be suggested that this budget was intended to be the beginning of a cheap money policy, which, would decrease the risks of industrial entrepreneurs and thus create more employment. Any such suggestion must fall to the ground, when we consider Goulburn's more detailed statement on the conversion of 4% annuities to 3½% stock. Far from regarding himself as giving a lead, he justified the measure, because in the general money market mortgages had already displayed the tendency of dropping from four to 3½%. The new rate of interest was to be guaranteed for 10 years, the old guarantee having expired in 1829. Thus any idea of a progressive "cheapening of money" cannot have been under consideration. Indeed he declared, the only object of the transfer to be the easing of the burden on the National Debt. (180) This emphasises the main charge that can be levelled against this budget. It was fatally preoccupied with long-term interests, so as well-nigh to exclude the immediate and more pressing needs.

On the other hand it must be conceded that if Goulburn was not ahead of his time, the spontaneous criticism which his budget speech provoked shows that few members of the Commons were more enlightened. Baring set the tone in a speech, which

in view of his later conduct when associated with the Exchequer makes rather ironical reading. The Chancellor's surplus rested on flimsy hopes, not concrete facts, and he was thus light-heartedly frittering away the Sinking Fund. Thereafter, the discussion largely centred on the surplus and other technical aspects of the budget, while the plight of the poor was forgotten. During the next few days specific taxes were attacked, but usually by interested members. Lord Chandos pleaded for the remission of duties on West-Indies produce. It is to the credit of Goulburn's political integrity that, although his own fortunes shared in the general ruin of West-Indian property, he regretfully refused to accede to this plea. Sir J. Newport inquired about the chances of Irish grown tobacco to escape taxes. Only Paulett Thompson in a motion on "injudicious taxation" prepared a comprehensive indictment of financial policy. The length of his introductory speech, which covers 39 columns in the closely printed Hansard of the 1820s, was, however, one reason why he failed to attract support. (181)

The only other major measure for which Goulburn was responsible during his first tenure of the Chancellorship was the implementation of the 1826 Act forbidding the issue of banknotes of a value of less than £5 in England. This had been passed as an attempt to deal with the dangers arising from the imperfect knowledge of the banking system which resulted in frequent bankruptcies in the 1820s. The pros and

cons of this Act, which was due to become operative on 5th April, 1829, need not concern us here. It is important, however, to note that the law did not apply to Scotland or Ireland. If, then, the circulation of small bank-notes was an evil, it would be necessary to prevent the circulation of Irish and Scottish notes for the evil to be remedied. To that end Goulburn introduced a bill on 3rd June, 1828. He explained that the change-over contemplated by the 1826 Act would run very smoothly. The only date for which exact information on small bank notes was available was January, 1826. The notes then in circulation had amounted to £6,200,000. Of these, it was reasonable to suppose that ordinary wear and tear, bankruptcies and the new law would have induced the withdrawal of a sufficient number to require replacement by no larger sum than £2,400,000. Such a sum in gold was available, and since existing English notes would remain valid until withdrawn, there was no need whatever for Irish or Scottish notes to tide over the transitional period. In fact, Gresham's law made it clear that paper money would drive out gold, if the two were circulated concurrently. Opposition to this measure was mainly nationalistic in character. It was led by Sir J. Graham, who contended forcefully that the 1826 committee had found that Scottish notes did not displace English metallic money, that the new law would cause considerable hardship in border districts, where most business was transacted in Scottish notes, and that the trouble with English notes was not that they were notes, but that they

were based on the unsound English banking system, which stood in great contrast to the very sound Scottish system. (182) Nevertheless, leave to introduce the bill was granted by 154 votes to 45. It is significant, however, of the confusion of thought, which existed on currency questions at the time, that some M.Ps. attributed the 1836 depression to the withdrawal of small banknotes from circulation. (183)

One or two sidelights of varying nature, 'but of considerable interest, are uncovered while studying Goulburn's administration of the Exchequer. For instance, Peel wrote to him that he had been informed by a Dr. Munro of Edinburgh and by the Lord Advocate of Scotland that 12 murders had taken place within 9 months so as to procure bodies for dissection. Peel added that he had already requested Custom House Officers to permit the import of dead bodies from France for purposes of dissection without minute inquiry. He asked Goulburn to address the Custom Houses of Scotland and Ireland in similar terms. For, he argued, though this was conniving in a statutory offence, that was preferable to giving rise to murder. Needless to add the letter was marked "Most private." (184)

During one of his unsuccessful attempts to make the Civil Service pensions scheme contributory again, Goulburn gave some alarming figures about the cost of the non-effective charge on the public services. (While salaries amounted to £21 million, pensions cost £5½ million p.a. (185) It is interesting to compare these figures with those condemned as

excessive by a Royal Commission on the Civil Service 60 years later. The annual money value of the non-effective charge was then a little less than £2 million. (186) It is some indication of the extent, to which sinecures etc. were still part of British national expenditure at the earlier date. The only reason why this very useful bill did not become law was that it had been introduced too late during the session to make possible its passage through parliament. (187)

The distress of 1830 stimulated all manner of ingenious ideas designed to help the poor. One of the most interesting of these was propounded by Stoney in the House of Commons. He suggested a state sponsored insurance scheme by which workers could make provision against unfavourable fluctuations in trade. Goulburn did not think such a scheme possible, and by his refusal deprived himself of the lasting fame of having been the precursor of Lloyd George and Beveridge. (188)

Distress was only one cause of increased political tension. The French revolution which displaced Charles X, and the illness and death of George IV, necessitating a general election, were equally important contributory factors. It was quite clear that these events would vitally affect the cause of Parliamentary Reform. (189) This put new heart into the parliamentary opposition. Goulburn on 11th May wrote to Peel, who had had to leave London on family business, that the House had sat till three in the morning and only got through seven unimportant votes, because the Whigs wished to delay all business to show

their strength and to gain popularity. Some days later he complained that Peel's absence and the King's illness were almost fatal to the conduct of business. If more withdrawals were forced on the Government he would prefer its resignation. (190) It was in this way that finance suddenly came into the forefront of politics, not because of its intrinsic importance, but because it was a convenient testing ground for political strength.

It was well-known that the General Election had strengthened the Reformers' camp, but the exact position could not be known until full division on party-lines had taken place. The opportunity for this was provided by the necessity of granting the new King the Civil List. The King's Speech had forecast minor changes in this field: "I place without reserve at your disposal my interest in the Hereditary Revenues, and in those funds which may be derived from any Droits of the Crown or Admiralty, from the West-India Duties, or from any casual revenues..... In surrendering to you my interest in revenues which have in former settlements of the Civil List been reserved to the Crown, I rejoice in the opportunity of evincing my entire reliance on your dutiful attachment, and my confidence that you will cheerfully provide all that may be necessary for the support of the Civil Government, and the honour and dignity of my Crown." (191) If such indeed had been the King's expectations, they were soon to be disappointed.

Goulburn, in introducing the Civil List, explained that

for the first time in history during the whole of the last reign no debt had been incurred on this account. The new King's willingness to surrender the casual revenues of the Crown in addition to the hereditary ones would save a further £85,000. The critics, however, were not to be appeased by such minor palliatives. Led by Lord Althorp they demanded the separation of the charges incurred by the Monarch in his private and public capacities. This concession was refused by Goulburn on the ground that the division lines were too blurred for such separation. (192) When the House divided on this issue the Opposition mustered 233 votes against the Government's 204. Wellington decided to resign without waiting for further confirmation of the election results.

No blame attaches to Goulburn's management of the Civil List question. It appears that he had to fight hard to wring from Wellington these minor concessions even. When the Cabinet had settled on its lines of action, Wellington had an interview with the King as a result of which the Duke expressed himself as "really anxious that the Cabinet should for the sake of the Monarchy reconsider their proposal respecting the Droits of Admiralty and the Escheated Property." Apparently the King felt that under the new arrangements there was no provision for unforeseen expenditure, such as journeys to Scotland, which, he feared, would in future require separate estimates. He also raised the question of whether it was right to restrict the King's power of conferring favours, which he was able to do

because Escheated Property was "peculiarly the Property of the Sovereign." (193) Goulburn won the battle inside the Cabinet, but he lost the battle outside, not because feeling ran high on the question of the Civil List, but because feeling ran high on the question of Parliamentary Reform.

(g) In Opposition 1830 - 34.

"The Reform Bill.....had been mainly carried by the efforts of the various classes of Dissenters operating in the general pressure of distress at the particular period and inflamed by the unparalleled exertions of the Whig Government. Having been long excluded from all participation in power they were reckless as to the consequences of the measure, farther than as it might tend to give them, if not a perpetual, at least a very prolonged tenure of office. Indeed those among them the most active in promoting the extreme measure which they submitted to Parliament did not hesitate to avow that the perpetual exclusion of the Tories from Office was one of its main objects and advantages. Lord J. Russell was, if not absolutely the author, at least the approver and propounder of the measure in Parliament, and as the leader of the Whig Aristocracy carried with him the large portion of that party. Whatever popularity he had in the country rested on his co-operation with the Dissenters and he was, as many men in political life have been, ultimately the tool of those whom he professed to lead, and obliged for the sake of preserving the connection to sacrifice much of principle at their bidding. He had not indeed much to surrender. (194) It must be quite clear that a man who could, many years after it had been enacted, write in such terms of any parliamentary measure, must have sought to do whatever was in his power to secure its defeat while it was yet under consideration.

Such in fact was his course of action from 1830 to 1832. Thus, for instance, on the seventh day of the debate on the Ministerial Plan for parliamentary reform he succeeded in catching the Speaker's eye, and attacked the bill in terms which were characteristic of his political principles and his parliamentary tactics. He explained that he would not vote against the introduction of the bill so that full discussion would make the measure's pernicious principles more completely apparent. Speaking as member for Cambridge University - one of the most insecure seats - he pointed out that opposition to the bill did not only come from members representing rotten boroughs, though they had the obvious duty of defending their constituents' interests. The existing system was good, and the prosperity of the country was patent proof of that. (This must have sounded a little strange after the 1830 depression!) The only guarantees that the projected system would be better were illusory Government promises. An illustration of the defective system, which the bill would set up, was that the Crown, though possessing the right to appoint what ministers it chose, would lose a convenient method of placing these ministers in parliament. (195) Again, on the 17th day of the Committee Stage of the first bill he complained that the bill was being rushed through! During the final Commons' debate on the Reform Bill he warned that it would afford the multitude a greater influence on affairs than to any other "interest," and that it would thus endanger the

safety of the state. (196)

Apart from these open and unavailing attacks Goulburn attempted to kill the ministerial measure by a more subtle method. He sent Peel a measure drawn up by a Mr. Hildyard. This, he believed, might secure the support of many reformers, but at the same time he fairly harmless. While he had at once informed Mr. Hildyard that he could not be a party to any sort of reform bill, he had promised him, if Peel concurred, an introduction to Lord Harrowby who might be more amenable. (197) A second letter on the same subject concludes with the sentence: "I am daily more convinced that this reform is not desired except by those who are to gain by it." (198) Apparently, he did not try to estimate the many who were, or expected to gain by it in comparison with the few who knew they would lose by it. More probably, however, he would have dismissed any such numerical consideration as irrelevant.

Finally, he seems to have tried to embarrass the Government on as many other subjects as possible, in the hope, perhaps, that it might be forced to resign and that the cause of parliamentary reform would thus lose the advantage of its ministerial champions. This was a role for which he was not particularly well suited on account of his limited oratorical powers. Thus, when allowance is made for these limitations, it must be admitted that he used these tactics very skilfully and with considerable success. He achieved this by concentrating on those subjects with which he was best acquainted and could,

therefore, speak with some authority in the House. It was obvious, e.g. that he would attack the new Civil List settlement and especially the departure from the old principle that the Civil List and the Civil Government should be provided for from the same grant. He criticised several provisions, (199) either explicitly or implicitly, as attempts to reduce the prerogative of the Crown unduly. The Whigs, who before long were to need the King's assistance, obviously wanted to avoid the stigma of anything approaching republicanism, and when in committee Goulburn moved that the proposed £10,000 grant to the Crown for sudden emergencies be doubled, the Government gave way. (200) He scored a similar success when criticising the budget. True, his warning that the projected surplus of £450,000 was inadequate to allow for all emergencies went unheeded. His castigation of the Government's proposal to tax the transfer of funds as a breach of faith, on the other hand, secured its withdrawal within three days. (201) During the next financial debate he contrasted the small surplus of £493,000 with his own administration of the Exchequer, where in three years he had reduced the National Debt by £20 million, and thus the interest chargeable by almost £1½ million. (202) When it became clear that a deficit had to be expected, because revenue was £1,200,000 less than anticipated, he was provided with more ammunition. As an opposition member he also felt freer to press the case of the West-Indies for special consideration, e.g. when the Government proposed a committee to inquire into West-India distress, he demanded -

unsuccessfully - that immediate action should be taken, dismissing a committee as useless and undesirable because it would create delay. (203)

Goulburn's disappointment at the passing of the Reform Bill was commensurate with the tenacious efforts he had made to defeat it. This is made clear in a letter to Peel who had asked him if he would be prepared to accept nomination as Speaker. He replied that if the old constitution of the country had remained that position would have been most desirable to him, but that the change of the constitution had ended all his political ambitions. He only remained in public life, because God had cast his lot there, and to avert the progress of evil, which could only be done by keeping together a party opposed to "the frantic progress of the Government." Thus, if his candidature for the Speakership would advance the interest of that party, he was willing to stand. If not, he would support whoever advanced that interest best. (204) This letter incidentally defined very well the task to which Goulburn devoted so much energy, whenever he was in opposition. To keep together a party. And how much this task was needed!

It was not in Goulburn's nature to be permanently despondent. Within a month he sent a much more hopeful report from Cambridge as the result of his canvass preceding the general election. The manifestations of support he had received, showed "that conservative principle had gained great strength in the educated classes of the community." (205)

In the following months he attended the House conscientiously, except when ill, although his activities were not so prolific as in the two years before the passing of the Reform Bill. He concentrated his attack on the measures to reform the Irish Church. He objected to them as designed to diminish the influence of the Church of Ireland, for he believed that the salvation of Ireland depended on that Church, that her pacification could only be effected by the Protestant faith. He singled out as "monstrous" the provision to abolish all livings where no services had been held for three years, since he contended that many of them ^{clergy} were exiled by violence. Instead, he suggested, that special provision should be made for the restoration of activities in such parishes. (206) He also criticised the measure for the abolition of slavery, not because he objected to the emancipation of the negroes, but because the minister's failure to protect the colonial agricultural interest would ruin colonial trade. (207) During the recess he visited Ireland, where he considered the new Chief Secretary, Littleton, to be little more than a tool of the Roman Catholic party, while he reported of his former chief who had just resumed the Lord-Lieutenancy that he found "Lord Wellesley's conversation almost purely conservative." (208) 1834 gave Goulburn yet another budget to attack. He pointed out that the last three years had seen an increase of 2600,000 in the National Debt, while common prudence dictated that it should be reduced. Althorp had admitted that trade was prosperous, but

had then proceeded to reduce trading duties, instead of alleviating the burden on agriculture which was in a more languishing condition. (209)

Then the unexpected happened. Difficulties in Ireland, which had already caused the defection of some of the ablest Whig Ministers, led to the variously styled resignation or dismissal of the Melbourne administration. Once again, after the short interlude of the Duke of Wellington's "personal reign," Goulburn was called to hold office under the Crown.

(h) Home Secretary, 1834-5.

Peel's first government was in a constitutional position, which appears to us now, and appeared to some people at the time, to be rather irregular. His predecessor had not been defeated in the House of Commons, nor had he appealed to the electorate before resigning. It was well-known that Peel could not have commanded a parliamentary majority, and it was exceedingly doubtful that new elections would result in a more favourable composition of the Commons. Goulburn, however, was troubled by no scruples as to the unconstitutionality of his office. In his speech against the Reform Bill, which has been referred to in the last chapter, he had made it clear that he held that the King had the right to appoint what ministers he chose. ^{as Goulburn?} He had, therefore, merely exercised this right in replacing Melbourne by Peel.

The possibility of forming a Cabinet not including Goulburn was never considered. On the contrary he appears to have advised Peel on the composition of the Cabinet. He sent on letters he had received, confirming his view "that the property of the country desires a conservative and not an ultra Tory Government - meaning by that a Government deaf to all improvement which comprises change, however much on other grounds to be desired." He discussed the advantages and drawbacks of including Stanley, and stated that "general opinion" favoured a union with him both as an insurance against ultra

Toryism and in his own right. (210) This is interesting not only as a forecast of the type of policy the Government would seek to pursue, but also as indicative of the confidence which Peel placed in Goulburn. ?

This impression of confidence and trust is corroborated by the Secretaryship which was allotted to him. Since Peel was a member of the House of Commons he automatically assumed both the offices of Prime Minister and Chancellor of the Exchequer. The Home Secretary was the most important Cabinet minister at the time. Any doubt about that is dispelled, when we remember that Wellington, Grey and Melbourne had chosen Peel, Melbourne and Russell respectively to be their Home Secretaries. (211)

In this particular instance, however, there is further proof to be found in the King's Speech. Apart from its routine contents and from the steps made necessary by the destruction of the Palace of Westminster by fire, it referred to a number of changes to which Parliament would be asked to give legal effect. With one exception, these changes would in one way or another have come under the supervision of the Home Department. They were, moreover, concerned in almost every instance with highly controversial and intricate matters, such as "means of effecting an equitable and final adjustment of" the Irish Tithe question," measures.....to promote the commutation of tithe in England and Wales - to improve our civil jurisprudence, and the administration of justice in ecclesiastical causes - to make provision for the more effectual maintenance of ecclesiastical

discipline, and to relieve those who dissent from the doctrines or discipline of the Church from the necessity of celebrating the ceremony of marriage according to its rites." Further a commission had been appointed "for considering the state of the several dioceses in England and Wales, with reference to the amount of their revenues, and to the more equal distribution of episcopal duties." Finally, the report of the commission on Municipal Corporations was awaited so that action could be taken on it. (212)

Nor were these merely empty phrases of a Government that knew itself to be doomed and which was seeking to impress public opinion. That is proved by correspondence which took place prior to the end of the elections. While Goulburn was busy with his constituents at Cambridge, Peel wrote to him as follows: "I am afraid Gregson will decline. He seems to think such an appointment as his (I mean of a lawyer capable of preparing and examining Bills for Parliament) indispensable for your comfort and satisfactory discharge of your duties.... It is the real fear of encountering such questions as Corporation Reform, Church Reform, Tithes etc. - I mean the consideration of details - which will lead Gregson to decline your offer." On the following day he wrote: "Pray speak to everyone you safely and confidentially can as to Dissenters' marriages and Church Reform; I mean as to the general principle of the latter, not of course mentioning our interview at Lambeth." Goulburn replied that the only two fields of difficulty would be Church Rates and Tithe

Committation. "Anything on other matters which we can get the Archbishop of Canterbury to agree to will be gladly adopted." (213) This is not the language and activity of an effete Government. They were fully in earnest with each of their projected measures, and if further proof of this were needed it is to be found in the fact that the conversations with the Archbishop of Canterbury continued. By 13th January, apart from the difficulty of fixing a fee, the Marriages Bill was ready for submission to the Cabinet in all details.

It was not from unwillingness on the Government's part that none of its main measures passed into law. (213A) It never had the chance to prove itself in action. In Ireland the Chief Secretary was replaced by Sir H. Hardinge, and Wellesley was spared the humiliating experience of having to correspond with his erstwhile subordinate by being requested to vacate his office to make possible the appointment of Lord Haddington as Lord Lieutenant. These changes were very necessary, for in the debate on the Address, both Russell and Goulburn pointed to the Irish Church question as the watershed between Government and Opposition supporters. Goulburn taunted his predecessors in office with their lack of unity on how to use the surplus revenue of the Church of Ireland. He gave the pledge that if there was in fact a surplus he would not agree to its use for any purpose other than ecclesiastical. He expected, however, that if the Irish Church were to be placed on a proper footing there would rather be a deficiency of funds. (214) He was, however, unable

to promote such a reorganisation of the Irish Church, or to superintend any of the changes that had been forecast in the King's Speech, for though the Peel administration struggled bravely against a stronger opposition, it had to surrender in April, when it had been defeated for the sixth time in six weeks. (215)

(1) In Opposition, 1835 - 41.

It was during this second period as a leading member of the opposition, that Goulburn began to concentrate on his work as a party organiser. Except in periods of high political tension, he no longer devoted the greatest part of his energies to public criticism of the Government in the House of Commons, but found a more suitable sphere of usefulness in organisation. His emphasis on this theme was not new. He had deplored the lack of cohesion among Government supporters during the last year of the Wellington administration. The occasion for the complaint had been the success of a motion for Jewish emancipation by a narrow majority. At the time a number of ministers even left just before the division, and a large number of members, who were usually hostile, voted with the Government. Goulburn pleaded, therefore, for greater exertions to secure attendance. (216)

This demand was frequently echoed in his later correspondence, but became particularly insistent after the Whigs had resumed office in 1835. One reason for this was undoubtedly the fact that Peel held himself rather aloof from the main stream of politics after the end of his "hundred days."

While Peel was absent from London, Goulburn was active in keeping his friends together, and in many ways he appears to have been the main communicating link between them and their nominal leader. He was, however, aware that nothing he could do would have so stimulating an effect as the presence of Peel

himself. Accordingly he often pressed his colleagues to travel to London. There was, e.g. some excitement as to the way in which the Government would deal with the Lords' amendments to the Corporation Bill. Goulburn informed Peel that about 100 of their friends were in town, and that they all wished for his presence at so critical a time. (217)

The task of organising the opposition was indeed a formidable one, not least because of the strain imposed upon unity by the new Conservative as distinct from the ultra Tory conception of politics. It would have been easy enough to lead a party to oppose the administration root and branch, but how exactly was the difference between a judicious and an injudicious reform to be discovered? A rough classification would place in the latter category all reforms tainted by radicalism, i.e. a tendency to enhance the powers of the Central Government, or dealing with the Established Church, unless the ecclesiastical authorities had expressly notified their approval, or threatening to change the constitutional rights of the Monarchy or the House of Lords. At first sight such a classification seems clear enough, but in practice the border-line cases outnumbered those which fell unquestionably into either one category or another.

These difficulties were increased by two factors. First, for some unspecified reason, Peel was often anxious not to commit himself even to his friends and supporters. One example of this is supplied by the following instance: Lyndhurst and

Wellington informed Goulburn of the amendments they intended to propose to the Corporation Bill. They were identical with those proposed by the Conservatives in the Commons, except for an additional one seeking to ensure that $1/3$ rd or $1/2$ of the existing governing body should form part of the new councils for whatever period of time they were entitled to office under the old arrangements. This proposal appeared of doubtful wisdom to Goulburn, and he wrote for Peel's advice, assuring him that he would ensure the Lords' consideration of this advice without committing Peel by submitting it as his own opinion. (216)

Another letter, a fortnight later, again assures Peel expressly that his opinions will not be assigned to their originator. The second factor was that there was some divergence between the views of the Opposition in the Upper and Lower Chamber, chiefly because the ultra Tory element was stronger among the Lords, especially since Lyndhurst was nearly as influential as Wellington. This rift was admitted - and deplored - by Goulburn. Shortly before the opening of the parliamentary session of 1836 he suggested the advisability of moving an amendment to the Address. In that way their friends, who were eager to fight after the success of the Northants election, would be given their chance, and also they would be able, as indeed they wished, to condemn the attacks made on the House of Lords at the end of the previous session, which might incidentally restore the cordiality of relations between the opposition parties in the Lords and the Commons. (219)

These obstacles notwithstanding Goulburn continued his organisational work. After the 1837 General Election he sent an interesting analysis of the results to Peel, assuring him that he had included all doubtful cases with Government supporters. (220) The aggregate result showed that the Government had a majority of 34, but the analysis made clear that it depended on the precarious Irish vote:-

	<u>Government</u>	<u>Opposition</u>
English boroughs	193 (1 loss)	148 (1 gain)
English counties	48 (19 losses)	111 (19 gains)
Scottish boroughs	22 (No change)	1 (No change)
Scottish counties	10 (1 loss)	20 (1 gain)
Total	<u>273 (21 losses)</u>	<u>280 (21 gains)</u>
Ireland	73	32
	<u>346</u>	<u>312</u>

At other times he hardly ever hesitated to add his "ceterum censeo" on party organisation whatever had formed the main subject of his letter. These subjects might be as diverse as the historical parallels to be drawn with the years preceding the French Revolution, or the loss occasioned to the Exchequer by the introduction of the penny postage. (221) The eminence which Goulburn attained in determining party strategy is perhaps best appreciated, when we find that by the end of 1839 Peel asked him whether or not an immediate attack on the Government should be launched on the reassembly of Parliament. (222)

In the House of Commons these 6 years are important in Goulburn's career, because they included his unsuccessful candidature for the Chair of the House. There can be no doubt

that he would have become a jealous guardian of the traditions of the Commons. The Speakership was, however, a position much more political in character than nowadays, and the candidature in itself must have been largely intended as a partisan trial of strength. Abercromby's resignation took place only a few days after the "Bedchamber question," and the election of the opposition's nominee to the Speakership might have led to the renewal of the Government crisis. The division, therefore, was strictly on party lines and Shaw-Lefevre was elected by 317 votes to Goulburn's 299. (223)

A survey of his parliamentary record during these years shows that he took part in most of the outstandingly controversial debates. He was there regularly to oppose the measures with regard to the Church of Ireland and to Church Rates etc. in England. His arguments of the importance of the Protestant Church to the welfare of Ireland, and the danger to all other property, once Church property was touched, are by now familiar and need not be repeated in detail. He had quite obviously to attack a radical measure like the Registration of Births Bill, especially because he saw a danger that it might dissociate naming from baptism, and might thus incline the ignorant to omit baptism altogether. (224) To a large extent this warning has proved correct. He joined in the indictment of the Government, when the suspension of the Jamaican constitution was proposed. How far was the offence, if any, of Jamaica due to the Government's policy with regard to the West-Indies? (225) The administration

escaped with a margin of five votes. Before its even narrower escape on the famous Education Estimates of 1839, Goulburn had voiced his suspicions that the failure of the Government to state the purposes for which it intended to appropriate the supply asked for, had sinister reasons. Might it not seek to divorce education from religion, and, by doing this through the estimates, hope to evade the criticism which the clergy in the House of Lords would offer? (226) When Parliament debated the provision to be made for Prince Albert, he supported an amendment for reducing it by £20,000. This was carried against the Government. (227) Then, of course, the budget debates always gave him the opportunity of criticising the Government effectively, while no surplus was shown. In 1839 he moved unsuccessfully that the introduction of the penny postage should be postponed until there was a surplus of revenue. (228) In 1841 while welcoming the Government's intention to balance revenue and expenditure, he pointed out that the postal experiment had meant a loss of £1½ million, and that, though revenue in 1841 was 1½ million higher than in 1836, in the course of those five years an aggregate deficiency of £5 million had been incurred. (229)

Of the minor debates in which he participated we need only note a few, which throw some light on his attitude to issues of his time with which he did not ordinarily come prominently into contact. For instance, in the course of a debate about railway construction he gave a very sound warning that it was undesirable to have too many companies, rivalling each other. This would

lead to the investors' loss of their money, and hence it would be far preferable to concentrate on a smaller number of lines. (230) He supported one of Ashley's motions on children in factories. While adults were able to look after their own interests, children needed protective laws to prevent their being overworked. The main question was one of enforcing the existing laws, e.g. the provision of education in factories, and the Government was blameworthy for the delay in taking action. (231) He opposed the Sunday opening of the public exhibitions as a desecration of the Sabbath. He countered the argument that the provision of serious amusements would lower the incidence of drunkenness on Sunday, by contending that statistics showed that there was no correlation between drunkenness and serious pleasures. (232) Finally, we may note that on 23rd March, 1841, he opposed a private motion for a property tax on the grounds that direct taxation would dislocate capital and thus cause much unemployment and other economic ills. How he must have wished a year later that he had never intervened in this debate!

(j) Chancellor of the Exchequer,
1841 - 6.

On 4th June, 1841, Peel had carried a vote of no confidence in the Melbourne Government by a majority of one. A general election ensued. The accounts of the election proceedings in "The Times" make fascinating reading, if only because of the strong resemblance which the contests in several constituences bore to the Eatonsville election recorded in the "Pickwick Papers," and because the journalistic standards and methods of "The Times" were, in the 1840s, not so very far removed from those employed by the two newspapers in that notable borough. In any case, they make it clear that by 5th July a Conservative majority was ensured. Melbourne, however, retained office, in accordance with the customs of the time, until he had faced the New Parliament. Meanwhile "The Times" indulged in all sorts of speculations as to the composition of the new Government. For instance it reprinted a report from the "Standard," which in turn quoted a "respected correspondent," that "so soon as Mr. Goulburn had decided to accept the Home Department, it was arranged that Sir E. Wilmot should be elected to the Speakership" (233). Such speculations were rudely shattered when in the following month the unanimous re-election of Lefevre to that position had to be reported. If any further proof of the partisan and unreliable character of "The Times" must be sought, it is provided by the fact that it described a very lame speech of

Goulburn's, in criticism of the Queen's speech, as "powerful," in a leading article. (234) On the other hand its editorial comment on the list of ministers, which showed that Goulburn had returned to his old post at the Exchequer, deserves not only quotation, but a large measure of approval: "The separation of the office of Chancellor of the Exchequer from the Premiership is most judicious, and will form a salutary constitutional precedent for the future. Everyone who considers what an important department of the public service the Chancellor of the Exchequer has to preside over must perceive the fitness of this arrangement. No-one would like to see Sir Robert Peel transformed into a mere Finance Minister; and that there should be a Finance Minister, devoting his whole time and attention to the management of the public revenue is indispensable under the present circumstances of the country." (235)

Why did Peel make Goulburn Chancellor of the Exchequer? One suggestion might be that he had not proved a success at the Home Office in 1835. That suggestion can be immediately dismissed. The duration of Peel's first administration was far too brief to permit any man to prove his worth in a new office. The truth appears to lie in the diametrically opposite direction. It has already been noted that Goulburn became Home Secretary at a time when Peel intended the main work of the administration to fall under that department. It is well known that his second Government has become famous chiefly for the changes it effected in financial policy. Indeed it is clear (236) that from the outset he intended considerable innovations in

fiscal policy for the first year of his administration. The person chosen for carrying out the new policy had to be a particularly reliable man. Thus Goulburn became Chancellor of the Exchequer.

He had made it abundantly clear, while he was yet a member of the opposition, that he regarded the frequent budget deficits as the most serious feature of the financial policy of his rival Chancellors. Nor had this criticism been mere political clap trap, for he had expressed his real concern in his private correspondence with Peel. How was it that people were easily reconciled to such a policy? Slowly but surely it would break the basis of Britain's prosperity. While Pitt's Sinking Fund might have been of questionable value, its purpose, namely to reduce the National Debt annually by a specific sum, had been undoubtedly right. Revenue would have to be brought up to expenditure. He added the interesting comment: "It will be difficult to do this. It can only be done by one who like yourself has weight and authority." (237)

He had, however, been far less explicit in his suggestions for the ways and means by which the budgetary gap should or could be closed. The stock solution offered by nearly all oppositions to the ministers facing them is, of course, that of economy, especially with regard to the establishments of the public departments. Goulburn had not used this argument extensively while out of office. No doubt his experience of holding responsible positions, combined with his customary

uprightness, made him shrink from what he knew to be not only a two edged but also a somewhat dishonest weapon. It is interesting to note, in parentheses, that nonetheless, the new administration began a drive for Civil Service economy very soon after assuming office. Peel wrote to Goulburn suggesting a new idea for the reduction of staffs in Government departments. Gladstone and the junior Lords of the Treasury were to form an unpaid commission to investigate the establishments on the spot. They were to be armed with full powers to effect decisions and were to be instructed to disregard all patronage. (238) Yet, however, efficiently executed, such economies would at best be a drop in the ocean. Far more radical steps had to be taken to secure a budget surplus.

Almost immediately after the Conservative election success had become indisputable, and more than a month before he was in fact entrusted with the formation of a Government, Peel began to plan the details of his financial policy, though these would not be required for another 6 months at least. Thus he requested Goulburn's opinion on the possibility of an Income Tax, and a long letter enumerating both the advantages and disadvantages of such a levy was sent in reply. This letter repays detailed study. (239)

In favour of the imposition of an Income Tax Goulburn argued that it would relieve the poor from taxation, and that although they might suffer indirectly through the taxation of the wealthy, they would consider their financial position to be

improved by being freed from taxation. The net income of the United Kingdom would be at least £180 million, the figure reached in 1815, (240) i.e. before the great trade expansion in the years after the end of hostilities. Thus a $2\frac{1}{2}\%$ tax would raise £4-5 million, which would be exceeding the actual contingency of the budget deficit by £2-3 $\frac{1}{2}$ million. (241) Such an excess struck him as very desirable, for he thought it "wise to have a margin and a surplus applicable either to the reduction of Debt or to supply deficiencies of revenue occasioned by experimental reductions of taxation with a view to relieving the suffering classes and to increase consumption." It is quite clear, then, that Goulburn recognised the Income Tax as a possible means of combating the aspect of national finance which he most abhorred. He then showed that he also recognised its value for dealing with one of the most intractable political problems of his time, the Corn and Sugar Duties. This was, moreover, a problem in which he was personally interested as a West-India planter. He suggested that the Property Tax should be paralleled by a reduction of the duties on ^{Bark}sugar from 24/- to 14/-, and on foreign ~~corn~~ from 62/- to 20/-. This would have meant a loss of £1,800,000 if consumption remained static. He was at pains to defend the selection of sugar and mentioned four reasons, the last of which showed that he was not extending undue sympathies to the West-Indian interest. Firstly, it was a cheap commodity in use by all classes, also, it would benefit Ireland, if the recently observed change from spirits to tea and coffee consumption would

continue there. In addition, it would bring relief to the West-Indies, while chiefly it would facilitate a new commercial agreement with Brazil, since it would make possible a reduction of the coffee duties. West-Indian protests which were likely against such an agreement could be over-ruled, since the planters would have been compensated by the increased sugar trade.

Next, Goulburn listed the principal objections to the scheme. A direct pecuniary payment, especially as it involved disclosure of income, could not but be unpopular. It had never before been attempted in peace-time. There would certainly be parliamentary difficulties. A virtuous House of Commons was needed to countenance such a measure, and could virtue be expected in a reformed House of Commons? Since, in justice, Ireland would have to be included, additional trouble would arise. A bill of at least 250 clauses would be required, and the Government would hardly be able to risk modification of a single clause. Thus "the task of getting it through Committee would be awful and perhaps impossible." Further, the tax might act as an inducement to defraud the Government, and doubtless there would be evasions, e.g. by investment in foreign funds.

Finally, Goulburn suggested that it would be both politic and just to limit the operation of the bill to a number of years. He was unable to state whether alternative methods of raising revenue to a similar extent existed, before a careful scrutiny of taxes already in force had been undertaken by the Revenue Officers. One of the last sentences is, perhaps, the most

significantly "These strike me as the principal topics of consideration, before you decide upon the adoption or rejection of income tax." This is a striking confirmation, before Peel's assumption of the Premiership, of the charge which Gladstone levelled against him after his resignation: "Your Government has not been carried on by a cabinet, but by heads of departments in each in communication with you."⁽²⁴²⁾ There can be no doubt at all that this major policy decision was taken by Peel on his own, long before his Cabinet had a chance to discuss it. In fact, he enforced it on a rather reluctant Chancellor of the Exchequer. Small wonder, then, that the 1842 budget was introduced by Peel, and that Goulburn rose only twice in the course of the main debate to elucidate points of detail.⁽²⁴³⁾

It must not be supposed, however, that the embarrassment which Goulburn experienced in sponsoring a measure, which he had opposed in public in the previous year, extended to other aspects of the budget. It is quite clear from their correspondence that he shared Peel's views as to the desirability of lowering tariff duties. There is no direct evidence to show that either one man or the other was more responsible for initiating the policy of bold reductions. The letter on Income Tax shows that Goulburn was quite prepared to advise alterations in even the highly controversial sugar and corn duties. There seems to have been spontaneous agreement between Premier and Chancellor that reductions were, generally speaking, desirable, but that they were necessarily limited by budgetary considerations.

For instance, Goulburn, referring to fears of overabundance resulting from low taxes, wrote: "The outcry to which low prices will give rise is preferable to that which results from a population in want of food." (244) On another occasion Peel asked his Chancellor to decide if the country could stand the abolition of cinnamon duties financially, since there was no doubt that it was right commercially. (245)

Nor was Goulburn too churlish to recognize that he had been wrong in opposing the Income Tax. By 1844, when he posed the question of whether or not it should be renewed, he answered: "To that I say decidedly yes, and I think it had better be continued by an Act to be introduced this year." His reasons for that answer were the danger of an only just balanced budget in 1845 and of a deficiency in 1847. He suggested that the renewal should be for at least three years so as to last beyond the general election due in 1846, since it might be difficult to carry a renewal in face of a dissolution. If, to make the renewal more palatable, many duties were to be repealed, (as distinct from reduced), he advised a renewal for more than three years, since the recovery of revenue resulting from a repeal took a longer period, because its causes were indirect. (246) In fact he showed the natural affection of a tax collector for a thoroughly efficient tax. Peel in his reply feared great difficulties for the renewal of Income Tax unless accompanied by "some reductions in Taxation benefitting greatly the mass of the population, and what is more, carrying

such benefit in the face of them." He threw out some suggestions: Reduction of sugar and coffee duties, abolition of wool and vinegar duties. On the other hand he cautioned against touching cotton duties, as such a relief for the manufacturer might be a further weapon for those who demanded limitation of working hours. He disliked the notion of renewing it for three years - the same length as the original period - because that would give an impression of permanence. (247)

At the end of that year Goulburn calculated that he would have £2½ million available for reductions, of which £1 million would go on sugar duties. Since that was a relief chiefly for the general consumer, the remaining reductions should be designed to benefit other interests. That would exclude tea and tobacco. Instead manufacturers should be given relief, since they encountered tariff barriers in other countries. That applied especially to glass and cotton, a tax on which was objectionable "in principle" as they were raw-materials. (248) It must be beyond doubt that, whatever differences there were on details, Peel and Goulburn were entirely agreed on the principle of large scale tax reductions.

The introduction of the Income Tax, which ultimately resulted, despite the different intentions of its originator, in the complete reversal of the British system of taxation by making direct taxes the mainstay of the revenue, and the movement towards freer trade, which determined British commercial policy for decades to come, cannot be divorced from Peel's other major

financial decisions, the repeal of the Corn Laws and the Bank Charter Act. The repeal of the Corn Laws, though of great political importance, was intrinsically only part of the Free Trade policy, while the Bank Charter Act by putting British currency and banking on a secure basis was a concomitant of the Free Trade policy and equally essential in fostering British commercial expansion.

In the years following 1830 the railway mania and the beginnings of American commercial enterprise offered multitudinous opportunities for investors, and acted as an inducement for an expansion of credit, leading to the multiplication of banks of issue. The first crashes following imprudent speculative investments, undertaken despite official warnings, were not long delayed. By 1838 they had become sufficiently serious to lead to the appointment of a special parliamentary committee to consider the question of note issues. This committee, which had included Peel, did not, however, lead to any direct action. On the other hand it brought the problems connected with paper issues to the attention of all who were concerned with the nation's finances. While discussing budget deficits in 1839 Goulburn had expressed his anxiety about the issue of deficiency bills resulting from them: "As long as the Bank (of England) is required every quarter day to issue in advance from 4 to 7 millions of paper - which it cannot refuse - the efforts of that body to reduce their circulation must be either ineffective or must be made so violently as to derange many commercial and other

transactions. But if you are to change this system, it can only be by increasing Revenue as compared with Expenditure, and thus suspending the necessity of advances to pay the Dividends." (249)

Once he had resumed the office of Chancellor of the Exchequer, the problem pressed on him even more urgently, and in a letter to Peel, ^{he} gave a very full exposition of his views on the subject: "With respect to Joint Stock Banks.....it was an unfortunate measure in 1826 to encourage their Establishment. Looking at the time to the immediate fact of the breaking of so many private Banks, and the distress occasioned to the holders of their notes by the utter loss of their property, sufficient regard was not paid to other evils which Joint Stock Banks have occasioned, far greater than what any loss to individual holders of notes could have occasioned. But a step once taken is not easily retraced. Joint Stock Banking is now not only a Branch of our Banking System, but has superseded in a great majority of instances the private Banks that previously supplied the wants of the Community. Remove them you cannot, and considering the habits of trade and commerce engendered by their general establishment, I cannot discover any satisfactory mode of subjecting them to check or to restraint. I have looked at the Reports of 1836-7-8, but although I find there a discussion of evils arising out of them, I see nothing at all satisfactory suggested in the way of a Remedy. A single Bank of Issue is indeed suggested in one of the subsequent Bank Committees.

But I cannot make out how it would or could act as such. If the Bank of England were to be the issuer the cry against the self-interested monopolist would overwhelm it. The Government could not exercise the function so as to check abuse without at times producing the greatest loss to traders and calling forth combinations against the Government to effect improper extensions of the Currency. I do not indeed know how it would be possible for a Government to work it at all. I fear, therefore, that we have little to trust to as a consolation for past sufferings or a remedy against future sufferings but the prudence which may result from the past experience of the misery which such proceedings occasion, and in this I have little confidence, when I see how soon even in private life and yet more in public affairs all profitable recollection of the past passes away." (250)

There is no direct evidence to show that it was Peel who was responsible for changing Goulburn's opinion on the subject of a single bank of issue. The circumstantial evidence, however, is very strong. Goulburn was remarkable for the tenacity with which he clung to his views, and there is no record of his altering his opinions on any major question except under the influence of Peel. Moreover, it appears that he did not discuss the question in detail with anyone except Peel. In 1854 he wrote to Gladstone: "The main object which Sir Robert Peel and myself had in the arrangements (of 1844),"⁽²⁵¹⁾ thus bracketing Peel with himself. Yet, there is no other instance, however great his

admiration for his leader was, of Goulburn assigning the authorship of any measure to Peel, unless the latter did in fact bear the chief responsibility for it. Rather the opposite tendency is to be observed in Goulburn's later writings. Finally, it must be observed that Peel introduced the Bank Charter Act in Parliament, while Goulburn remained silent throughout the initial debate. On the second reading he did reply to some criticisms. The convertibility of notes into gold demanded Government regulation of the note issue; otherwise bankruptcy would be a continuous possibility. A large number of country banks issuing notes without due caution or understanding of the problems involved would render such control impracticable. This was a sound contribution to the argument, but it can hardly be described as the most prominent speech of the debate. (252) The conclusion that Peel rather than Goulburn was the father of the Bank Charter Act is almost inescapable.

While the origin of the central idea of the Act may then be ascribed to Peel, it must be added that extensive discussions on the details of the measure took place between Chancellor and Prime Minister. These began at least as early as 13th October, 1843. (253) Most of them, however, were oral and it is therefore impossible to assign with certainty the responsibility for any clause either to Peel or Goulburn. The historian may indeed regret the proximity of Nos. 10 and 11 Downing Street, which has undoubtedly robbed us of much evidence which would have become available had oral discussion presented greater obstacles. The

"Act to regulate the Issue of Bank Notes and for giving to the Governor and Company of the Bank of England certain Privileges for a limited period,"⁽²⁵⁴⁾ required the Bank of England to set up a separate department for the issue of notes. All the gold coin and gold and silver bullion not required by the banking department were to be transferred to the issue department, which was to base the maximum issue of notes on this backing and an additional fiduciary issue of £14 million. The silver contents of the backing was not to exceed 25% of the gold. The public were entitled to demand notes for gold at the rate of £3.17.6d. per ounce. The fiduciary issue could be increased by Order-in-Council, whenever any other banker ceased to issue notes, but such an increase was not to exceed 2/3rds of the notes issued by that banker. The Bank of England was to pay the Government £180,000 p.a. for its privileges. The privileges were, however, to be held redeemed after 1855, if the Government paid back the public debt due to the Bank. No new banks of issue were to be authorised, and bankers ceasing to issue notes would have no power to resume that activity. Existing issuers were to continue with the average amount of notes in circulation during the twelve weeks preceding 27th April, 1844. Such issuing banks would have to render four weekly accounts.

With regard to the Repeal of the Corn Laws various writers have demonstrated that Peel was primarily responsible for it, and some of the documents relating to Goulburn's attitude to the Repeal have been published.⁽²⁵⁵⁾ In view of the effects of the

repeal on Goulburn's career, and in view of the importance of these documents in throwing light both on his own political and economic thought and on his relationship with Peel, it is nonetheless essential to refer to them in some detail here, whether they have been published or not.

The protection of agriculture as one of the main facets of conservative policy had never been questioned by Goulburn. When the Anti-Corn Law League became prominent, he found an additional reason for maintaining protection. This is made clear in a letter in which he lamented the loss of a by-election in the City, which he felt ought to spur on the Conservatives to "endeavour to repair the injury which this Victory of the Corn Law League or rather the Victory of the Democratic principle has caused."⁽²⁵⁶⁾ It is well to remember that nobody had previously attempted similar democratic organisation other than the Roman Catholic Association in Ireland, and this comparison was not likely to predispose Goulburn in favour of Bright's and Cobden's movement. There was no question of Goulburn's conversion prior to the Irish disaster.

On 8th October, 1845, he forwarded letters from the Irish Provincial Bank to Peel. These stated that the potato crop all over Ireland appeared to have been affected by a serious blight. Goulburn, however, in whose experience Ireland had hardly ever been free from the threat of famine, was not disposed to panic, and added the following covering note: "If they have a week or ten days dry weather, the Irish harvest may be taken as an

average one so far as regards grain. As regards potatoes it will not be easy to form a good judgement until next month, when the extent to which the Rot has prevailed will be ascertained." This appraisal of the situation was undoubtedly complacent, but Goulburn may perhaps be forgiven on account of his long association with Ireland, if he regarded alarms from that quarter with some degree of scepticism.

The extent of his misreading of the situation is revealed by the secret communication which he received from Peel ten days later: "The accounts of the Potato Crops from Ireland are very alarming - Lord Heytesbury writes with great anxiety and apprehension. I am fully impressed with the necessity for great caution, for not immediately taking for granted that Irish Reports must be well founded, even when there appears to be a concurrent mass of evidence. I see before me all the consequences of our interference by an Act of Authority with the ordinary operation of the Law, or indeed of our invoking the aid of Parliament; but still we must be preparing for the necessity of action. It is one thing to act and another maturely to consider what are the steps which we shall take in the event of our worst fears being confirmed.....I have earnestly begged Lord Heytesbury to take such measures as may be requisite for supplying me with the Elements for consideration and decision.....Let us assume that intervention either by Prerogative or Legislative will be requisite. You appeared to think that there was no immediate pressure, that the severity of the Evil would not be felt until the Spring and that

we were relieved from the necessity of immediate decision. I doubt whether this is so, whether at least immediate decision may not be forced upon us. The total failure of the crops in many large districts will produce an immediate demand for other means of subsistence to be provided for those who have no means or very scanty means of providing it. Let us consider the remedies. I see little advantage in the prohibition of export or the Stoppage of Distilleries. The one remedy will be the removal of impediments to the free import of those articles of which human food consists. Some say permit the import of Indian Corn. I foresee that the admission of any one description of human food out of the ordinary course by an Act of Authority or by Legislative, proposed to meet a temporary but most severe pressure, will infallibly lead to the admission of every other. It will be so invidious to remit from the fear of scarcity the duties on Maize and to retain them on Wheat that the attempt would be hopeless. The temporary remission of all duties on Corn is, in the present state of public feeling, tantamount to the permanent and total remission of those duties. Once remitted they will never be re-established. I do not conceal from myself, therefore, the vast consequences which will follow the necessity for intervention.....There are various things independently of the remission of duties on foreign produce which might be of service." Among these things he mentioned the chances of chemical action or conversion into potato flour to save the affected crop, the possibility of the Government securing a supply of sound seed

potatoes for the future, and the question of untapped supplies in South America. He concluded by stating that it would probably be necessary to recall Parliament for November, and asking whether the Crown was capable of assembling Parliament at a fortnight's notice.

Goulburn sent an immediate reply, which shows that he must have been rather staggered by Peel's communication. He expressed no opinion on its main proposal at all for the time being, and merely reiterated: "That there has been a partial failure is undoubted.....From the enclosed which I received to-day it would appear that the danger has been exaggerated in the County of Monaghan. All accounts concur in the abundance of the Oat Crop in Ireland, and as to Potatoes I confess that I feel unable and I do not think anyone can form a just conclusion until the Potatoes are dry. On looking over hastily the letters (you enclosed).....some are evidently from persons who have taken up a general report as proof."

After three days' consideration, on 21st October, Goulburn sent a full reply and his counter proposals. He admitted that the state of the Potato Crop in both England and Ireland would "occasion pressure on the lower classes." He clung to the belief that some of the reports from Ireland were exaggerated, for in England such exaggeration had already been proved. He continued: "I hope that the same may turn out to be the case in Ireland. The letter which I sent you on Saturday tends to confirm this idea - But assuming the worst the question is what

course shall the Government pursue? To supply potatoes for the population is out of the question. They are too bulky.... and besides in a voyage of even a moderate length they heat and become unfit for consumption.....You cannot get Potatoes from neighbouring countries, for in them the Rot has been more destructive than with us. The People must be provided with some other food....(Is there) in the United Kingdom any deficiency to a considerable extent of other means of subsistence?.....I believe that the barley and oat crop both in Scotland and Ireland has been most abundant.....If this be so we shall have but little risk of not having enough on which to feed our people, although the food may be of a different and more expansive kind. If the Corn Law is worth anything it must be sufficient to supply the additional quantity of Grain which when added to an abundant crop here will make up for a partial failure of potatoes - I should decidedly object to any suspension of the Corn Law. If we should suspend it on our present apprehension of scarcity we should effectually condemn the measure of 1842. We should incur all the evils of a fixed duty and should not have a word to say against it, if again proposed. The Law as it is admits a free importation of Oats when the Average of Oats is 27/-, that is long before they reach famine Price, and in expectation of their price being attained we may rely, I think, upon a supply from abroad in the natural course of Trade. An unlimited importation now would, I think, aggravate distress." For instance, home-growers would at once lower wages, thus worsening

the workers' plight. As for the other suggestions made by Peel, a stoppage of distilleries would only cause discontent in the areas not yet affected, would raise unemployment, derange trade, decrease revenue and thus the Government's power of assistance. Government importation and distribution of articles was usually unsuccessful. Rice was the most useful commodity for such a purpose, but in general he thought "the interest of individuals... a far surer ground of reliance for an adequate supply of any article." Regarding potato flour, Sir Benjamin Brodie held that Professor Hinslow's receipt for extraction would not afford much nourishment. While Parliament could always be called at two week's notice, no case for such action existed yet, though legislative interference, if resorted to, should preferably come from Parliament and not from the Government assuming authority. What ought to be done was to "direct the attention of the Government to giving means of employment to the destitute." When the potato crop was dry an accurate survey of stocks should be made, together with a survey of oats and barley stocks. Then, before the breaking of the storm, stocks from districts with good supplies should be transferred to those threatened with famine, and the land-owners should be induced to devise means of employment, e.g. railway building. "This was pretty much the course pursued in 1822 when the deficiency of the Potato crop from subsequent rotting, after they had been pitted, was very great indeed." Those suggestions, he thought, should suffice to remedy the evil, though he observed that "to prevent

altogether the power of such a visitation is not in the power of man."

Peel's Cabinet was in serious difficulties, for Goulburn was by no means the only one who could not at once see his way clear to throwing overboard the central interest which Tories and Conservatives had for decades represented. As a stop gap measure the purchase of a large quantity of maize was determined on, although even this minor experiment in state trading cut against the grain of the ministry. It was thought necessary, in order to prevent a rise in the price of maize, to keep the Government's part in the transaction secret, and thus to entrust it to a merchant. The quantity to be bought was sufficient to provide one million people with a pound for forty days. On the day after the decision had been taken, Goulburn suggested that it would be better to entrust the contract to Mr. Baring than to Sir R. Routh's brother, since the latter did not make such deals ordinarily and thus would rouse suspicion. Two days later he reported that Baring had accepted, although he was critical of the principle of Government interference. (257)

Meanwhile the reports from Ireland grew ever more alarming. The Governor of the Bank of Ireland stated that one third of the crop had been destroyed already, and that, although potatoes could be immunised if "dug, dried and sprinkled with lime," it was feared that many peasants would not take the steps necessary to prevent further spreading of the pest. (258) Thus Goulburn was gradually feeling his way towards agreeing to the opening of the ports, but

was repelled when he understood that Peel intended, indeed he had already hinted in his first letter on 18th October, the cessation of corn duties to be permanent and not temporary. That was still too violent for Goulburn. "I have," he wrote, "such an habitual deference to the superiority of your judgement and such an entire confidence in the purity of your motives that I always feel great doubt as to my being right when I differ from your opinion. But the more I reflect upon the observations you made to me a few days since as to your difficulty in again defending a Corn-Law in Parliament, the more I feel alarmed at the consequences of your taking a different course from that which you have previously adopted." He suggested that it would damage their character as public men. The repeal of the Corn-Law could not affect the Irish famine, since its effects would not be felt before 1847. Other countries might be misled into thinking Britain's position worse than it was, and thus forbid exportation so as to protect themselves. Despite or because of the Corn Laws the price of corn in England had risen less than in other countries, and was less in 1845 than in the period of 1838-42. The abandonment of the Corn Laws would rend in twain the Conservative party, "the only barrier which remains against the revolutionary effects of the Reform Bill." Then, indeed, the prospect would be bleak; "I see nothing before us but the exasperation of class animosities, a struggle for pre-eminence, and the ultimate triumph of unrestrained democracy." (259) That was written just before the temporary, 15 days' resignation of Peel's Cabinet.

The only other written document relevant to Goulburn's

evolution of thought on the Corn Laws is an undated memorandum, probably written in the first days of January, 1846, in which he considered the claims and reasons for the protection of agriculture "absolutely," i.e. without reference to personal and party considerations. It is important, because in it he admitted for the first time the possibility of withdrawing protection, if the withdrawal was made very gradually and accompanied by other reliefs, such as a decreased land or malt tax. (260) By 5th February he was defending the Government's purchase of maize in the House of Commons. Later in the month he rose on the tenth day of the twelve day debate on the Corn Laws and made a speech, which is remarkable for its frankness. It was difficult to add new arguments after so long a debate. It had, however, been publicly stated that he differed from the rest of the Cabinet on the Corn-Laws. He wished to deal with that accusation. He admitted that in November he had opposed the opening of ports by Order-in-Council or a special session of Parliament. The reason for that opposition had been his conviction that the Irish case was not urgent enough to warrant interference with the existing laws. That conviction was based at the time on incomplete and inaccurate information. It had been in fact an error of judgment, which had been corrected when complete information became available. Such a change of opinion did not, as had been suggested, necessitate his resignation of his seat, for consistency of opinion depended on consistency of circumstances, but was impossible to maintain when they changed. (261)

In surveying the Corn-Law controversy as fought out between Peel and Goulburn it is impossible not to be impressed with the strength of many of the arguments urged by the latter. For instance, it was perfectly true that the ultimate repeal of the Corn Duties, scheduled for 1849, was entirely irrelevant to the crisis of 1845. Again he was right in forecasting the political result of the splitting of the Conservative party, and though we may differ from him in our assessment of the desirability of "the triumph of unrestrained democracy," it is undoubtedly true that this was hastened both by the Whig administrations which included some Radicals and by the succession of Disraeli to the Conservative leadership. It must, moreover, be remembered that the victory of democracy would have been as obnoxious to Peel as to Goulburn. On the economic results of repeal both men, like almost all their contemporaries, seem to have been quite wrong. It brought no substantial reduction in the price of corn - as might have been expected in view of Goulburn's statement that English corn prices had risen less than those of other countries - nor did it lead to any of the dire consequences which had been predicted for both the land-owner and the agricultural labourer. At least they were delayed until the speeding up of transport by new inventions led to the cheapening of American corn in the 1870s and 80s, when the advocates of protection, who had by then abandoned protection, were often in power and watched the ruin of British agriculture without taking action. It is in fact hard to resist the conclusion that the importance of the Repeal of the

Corn-Laws was an issue which was greatly over-rated by contestants on both sides. It was endowed with an emotional, and hence political, significance which was quite unwarranted by the economic facts. The atmosphere in which the measure was discussed is perhaps characterised best by Lord George Bentinck's contribution, who was content to dismiss all financial considerations, stated, "What I cannot bear is being sold,"⁽²⁶²⁾ and thereupon proceeded to destroy the Conservative party without stopping to work out, whether he was in fact being sold.

The Repeal of the Corn-Laws did not affect the revenue to any serious extent. The budgetary policy of the years 1841-6 had been one of gradual, but very pronounced movement towards freer trade. Insofar as it related to the famous tariff-cutting budgets of 1842 and 1845 it has already been discussed. The budgets of 1843, 1844 and 1846 were introduced in the House by Goulburn, and while they have been given less emphasis by the general historian, they are nonetheless important since they stress the difference between the Whig policy of Free Trade pursued by Baring in 1841 and the Conservative policy of Free Trade pursued by Peel and Goulburn. This difference was that Baring budgeted for a deficiency, but that Goulburn always budgeted for a surplus.

The first signs of the new regime became apparent very soon after the change of Government in 1841. On September 27th, Goulburn announced in the Ways and Means Committee that he intended to transfer £2½ million of the unfunded debt to funded debt.

Since the rate of interest on the funded debt was lower than on the Exchequer Bills this would help to reduce expenditure and thus the expected deficiency. Peel's budget of 1842 contained an estimate of a surplus of £600,000. (263) This surplus was not realised, and instead a deficiency of almost £2½ million was incurred. The reasons for that defalcation were explained by Goulburn, when he introduced the budget of 1843. (264) In the previous year there had been an annually recurring deficit, accompanied, however, by a general desire for the reduction of duties. Peel had dealt with both aspects, but while the income from the property tax had started to flow in only after 6 months, the effects of the remission of duties had become noticeable immediately. Moreover the total Customs revenue had fallen short by about £1 million, and the Excise had failed to reach the estimate by a slightly larger sum. On the other hand, there had been an unexpected income of £½ million from the ransom of Canton. Moreover, the poor revenue could be confidently expected to be a temporary phenomenon only. In the next year the effect of the Income Tax would be fully felt, and the Customs duties had shown distinct signs of a rally. The excise defalcation was due to an exceptionally bad barley harvest, which had cut Malt Tax receipts. Thus, without any changes in taxation he could expect a surplus of about £2 million in 1843. As regarded the 1842 deficit he did not propose to meet it by raising new loans, but, having always disapproved of adding to the National Debt, he proposed to meet that additional charge in the coming year, thus

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Peel's Cabinet was in serious difficulties, for Goulburn was by no means the only one who could not at once see his way clear to throwing overboard the central interest which Tories and Conservatives had for decades represented. As a stop gap measure the purchase of a large quantity of maize was determined on, although even this minor experiment in state trading cut against the grain of the ministry. It was thought necessary, in order to prevent a rise in the price of maize, to keep the Government's part in the transaction secret, and thus to entrust it to a merchant. The quantity to be bought was sufficient to provide one million people with a pound for forty days. On the day after the decision had been taken, Goulburn suggested that it would be better to entrust the contract to Mr. Baring than to Sir R. Routh's brother, since the latter did not make such deals ordinarily and thus would rouse suspicion. Two days later he reported that Baring had accepted, although he was critical of the principle of Government interference. (257)

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passed the Commons without division, and the number of dissentient holders was so small, that the necessary compensation was only one tenth of $1\frac{1}{2}$ of the total involved. Such a sum could be found easily from the budget surplus.

Thus Hume's usual protest that there was a high budget surplus, accompanied by high taxation, was more justified than at some other times. In any case, the surplus which was in fact realised amounted to more than $\pounds 6\frac{1}{2}$ million, an excess of about $\pounds 3\frac{1}{2}$ million over the estimate. It was this surplus which enabled Peel to make the second of his famous duty reducing budgets in 1845. He forecast that as a result of these reductions the surplus would shrink to $\pounds 672,000$ in 1846. In actual fact it exceeded $\pounds 2\frac{1}{4}$ million. The 1864 budget was, of course, overshadowed by the Corn Law question. As soon as it became clear, however, that the surplus would in fact reach such proportions, Peel seems to have determined to attempt at least to submerge the Corn-Laws in another general reduction of the tariff. Sounding a rather fatalistic note, he wrote as follows:- "My wish would be not to give undue prominence to corn, but to cover corn by continued operation on the Customs tariff, expunging all articles which are not worth retaining either for Revenue or protection - diminishing duties which have been, though not so intended, prohibitory or nearly so - reducing, as far as it may be safe, all protections where there is no special case to be made out for retaining them - and thus applying to Corn a principle of universal application. I see no reason for retaining protective duties for cotton, woollen

or linen manufacture.....Surely our reduction of the duty on gloves is an encouragement to consider silk - I believe there is more smuggling in silk than in any other article of clothing.... I should much wish this year to purify the remaining Tariff by striking out all such articles as Asses, Horses, etc. Let us leave the Tariff as nearly perfect as we can. Dean may perhaps shake his head as he has done before, but I attach great importance to our doing, and doing now, what yet remains to be done. Let us put the finishing stroke to this good work." (267) Action was taken very much along those lines, though these reductions were kept in a separate bill from the Corn Duties, which thus retained even legislatively their special character.

Thus there was not much that was new left for Goulburn to announce in his budget statement. (268) Including the changes in the Corn-Law a loss of about £1 million was anticipated as a result of the new reductions. Even so a surplus of £776,000 could be expected. He then devoted himself to a review of the Government's financial policy since his assumption of office five years earlier. Duties had been reduced on 727 articles and repealed on 503. In the same period the balance in the Exchequer had been increased by £4,800,000, and the National Debt reduced by £7 million so that it stood at £785,115,000. The annual charge on the debt had as a result of this, in conjunction with the interest reduction, been lowered by £1½ million. He appended to what he appears quite clearly to have recognised as his swansong some remarks on the general prosperity and welfare of the country

as the result of the work of Peel's Ministry, and finished with a peroration by which he definitely ranged himself with the Free Traders: "For my own part, I confess that I shall ever review with humble satisfaction and thankfulness the share which it has been my lot to take in the several measures of which it has been my privilege to bring the results before the House. I shall derive a yet higher gratification, if the effect of the observation of the past shall be to impress upon Parliament for the future this important lesson - that if we, with cautious attention to existing interests, steadily and judiciously, but yet progressively, reduce those burdens which more immediately press upon the industry and comforts of the population, we shall adopt the course the most conducive to individual welfare; and shall, at the same time, place on a sure and solid foundation, not merely the financial interests, but the general prosperity and happiness of all classes within this mighty Empire."

Of the purely administrative problems which Goulburn encountered during his second period as Chancellor of the Exchequer, the most important were connected with frauds. Early in 1842 he acquainted the House of Commons that public securities had been forged in considerable quantities. This had been due to the breach of confidence by a public officer, who had since been arrested. The forgery of Exchequer Bills, and clever handling to prevent their presentation at the Exchequer Office had continued for five years. Thus to re-establish public credit Goulburn resorted to a somewhat cumbrous, but

probably essential method: All Exchequer Bills were called in, and, if found genuine, they were to be reissued. He also explained that the Government did not intend to compensate holders of forged Bills, since that would encourage fraud. As the whole transaction would have been impossible without a certain degree of complicity of some people in the City, he moved for the establishment of a committee of enquiry into the forgeries. (269) The report of the Committee had the somewhat unexpected result of softening the Government's heart on the question of compensation. This was granted not only to the holders of £187,000 worth of stock who were entirely exculpated by the Committee, but to two groups of holders to whom some degree of suspicion attached. Only the fourth group of holders, who were stigmatised as guilty of at least a gross lack of caution if not more, were to be deprived of compensation. Thus, in fact, the Government decided to honour £262,000 out of the total of £337,000 of forged Exchequer Bills! The House accepted the new plan after a debate without division. (270)

Further, there had been grave frauds in the Customs Departments. This was a very difficult problem, for prevention of their recurrence was far less easy to secure than in the case of the Exchequer Bills. It appears that the irregularities had occurred chiefly as the result of inadequate checks on the Outdoor Department. This, Peel suggested, showed gross negligence on the part of the superior officers of the Board of Customs. An inquiry was instituted, presided over by Lord Granville Somerset.

Its difficulties were enhanced, because the original information had been supplied by a man of notorious character and it was not easy to procure confirmatory evidence. The first objects of separating the innocent from the guilty were achieved, though the inquiry was impeded by the dilatory Mr. Dean, the head of the Customs Department. (271) The final report on how to ensure future prevention was not submitted until 2 years later. Nor was its content very revolutionary. It was proposed to leave the constitution of the Board of Customs unchanged. There was to be a Chairman, his deputy, and seven juniors. The juniors, however, were in future to be responsible for a separate department each. That was an attempt to alter the pernicious system, uniformly condemned by the Commissioners of Inquiry, whereby there was practically no contact between the Board and the Outdoor Department, and thus practically no supervision of the activities of the latter nor check on the honesty of individuals. (272) Such was the utmost limit of ingenuity for devices to prevent future Customs frauds!

Among the commercial activities of the time, which had a bearing on Government financial policy, the most important was the continued public indulgence in railway speculation. The unreasonable proportion which it had assumed may be gauged by Goulburn's estimate that the capital required to complete the lines, either begun or projected, would have sufficed to pay off the National Debt. Such a state of affairs naturally alarmed the Governor of the Bank of England. He approached Peel, who

asked Goulburn to draw up a memorandum, warning the public of the facts known about domestic and foreign railway investment. The Government could not interfere directly, but Lord Ganning would be able to secure the insertion of such a memorandum in "The Times." Goulburn prepared the statement to Peel's entire satisfaction, for it would not create panic, but reasonable caution. (273) Unfortunately, it failed in effect to produce sufficient of such caution.

It is not to be expected that foreign policy intruded very frequently into the correspondence of a 19th century Chancellor of the Exchequer. One of these instances is, however, worth recording. The Oregon boundary negotiations in the U.S.A. were tied up with commercial negotiations. General Greene called on Goulburn and assigned two main reasons for the difficulties encountered. One was the state of parties in the U.S.A., over which, of course, the British Government had no control. The other, however, was remediable. He alleged that Fox, the British representative was incompetent for the efficient conduct of the negotiations since he spent the greater part of the day in bed; (274)

Another matter related to foreign affairs, with which Goulburn was called upon to deal, was a hardy annual of parliamentary debates. Ever since Napoleonic Wars some members had urged the claims of the Danes in respect of shipping seized from them in the war of 1807. It is perhaps to the credit of the pertinacity of these members that they still pressed their

case in the 1840s. Several times Goulburn had to defend the Government's refusal to grant further compensation. He maintained that such compensation was not warranted by the accepted ideas of naval warfare. (275)

Among minor financial questions the following are of some interest. Encouraged, perhaps, by the Income Tax proposal, Mr. Elphinstone suggested in the House of Commons that a committee should inquire into the desirability of death duties on landed property. This suggestion Goulburn, with the support of the House, turned down out of hand. (276) — Since Savings Banks offered a high rate of interest they had been used, or rather abused, by wealthy people, who were not the real object of such establishments. He proposed, therefore, to reduce the maximum annual investment from £30 to £20, and the maximum total holding from £150 to £120. It may be worth mentioning that this was one of the two occasions when Hume gave his unqualified support to Goulburn. (277) The other occasion was Goulburn's last budget speech, in which he had confessed himself so vigorously to be a disciple of Free Trade.

In surveying the work of Goulburn at the Exchequer, the contrast between the responsibility of a Chancellor in the 1940s and this Chancellor of the 1840s becomes very striking. On the most prominent issues - Income Tax, Free Trade, the Bank Charter, the Corn Laws - the responsibility for initiating and for ultimately adopting policy appears to have been out of his hands altogether. Rather Goulburn seems to have filled the post of the modern Civil Servant, drawing up memoranda and giving effect to a line of

policy determined upon by the Prime Minister. Even on less important issues, e.g. the Customs frauds and the conversion of $3\frac{1}{2}\%$, the correspondence seems to suggest that, though initially a suggestion may have come from the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the responsibility for the decision rested with the Premier. It is, of course, well to remember that through the 19th century "First Lord of the Treasury" was not an outdated title but an exact description of some of the work the Prime Minister had to undertake. Even allowing for this difference between 19th and 20th century practice, the conclusion that Peel dominated the work of his financial minister quite exceptionally appears hard to avoid, especially if Goulburn's "habitual deference" to the superiority of Peel's judgment and his comparatively independent line of procedure as Chancellor of the Exchequer under Wellington are borne in mind. Yet his work as the administrator executing the policy decisions of another was far more difficult than that of the modern Civil Servant, for he had to defend that policy publicly in Parliament as though it was his own. It is, however, fair to add that usually he had by that time become convinced of the wisdom of the policy himself, and equally it is true that Peel, the originator of the policy, was almost always there to take part of that parliamentary burden, at least, off his shoulders. It may, nonetheless, not be altogether fanciful to suggest that this exceptional relationship between Prime Minister and Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1841-6 had some bearing on the development of the modern conception of collective cabinet responsibility.

(k) Retirement, 1846-56

The resignation of Peel, consequent on his defeat over the Irish Coercion Bill, meant, for the older members of his administration at least, the abandonment of any hopes of regaining office. Both Peel and Goulburn realised that they had joined the ranks of retired statesmen, though at first at any rate, they must have attached a different definition to the word "retired." Goulburn rather naturally resumed his work as party organiser, though it was a smaller party he had to manage now, while Peel retired from the political scene even more effectively than he had done in 1835. Goulburn attended Parliament "occasionally," even in August. For instance he thought "it right to support the vote for Buckingham Palace," and he reported that the Government, in difficulties on account of the holiday season, had only been saved by Peelite support on Irish business. He was at times consulted by members of the new Government, to whom he adopted a somewhat magisterial attitude in his advice, e.g. adding a warning that the Irish poor ought not to be kept permanently by the public purse, after having agreed with Russell that a public works programme was essential. ⁽²⁷⁸⁾ In December, 1846 he warned Peel that unless they took immediate steps to consider their future policy there was some danger that their followers would accept the lead of the popular Stanley. In fact, despite the unpopularity of Bentinck and Disraeli, that would almost certainly take place if Stanley dropped protection.

Goulburn felt that instead of a party of opposition Peel's followers should be a party of observation, united for the good of the country, supporting the ideas of the Government or the Opposition, whichever were the better. Peel replied rather despondently that it was most difficult to hold together a party which had no prospect of power, but Goulburn felt that such was the only course open to them, since they agreed with neither side. (279)

The situation of the Peelites was certainly most difficult. Goulburn's fears of a union with Stanley must have been rather exaggerated, for the protracted debate on the Corn Law question had cut too deeply to allow for so speedy a rebridging of the gap. On the other hand, the possibility of an ultimate reconciliation could not be excluded. As regarded the Government there was some degree of co-operation and consultation, but it could never be a cordial one so far as Goulburn was concerned. His opinion of Russell has already been described in connection with the Reform Bill. Nor did he esteem his former colleague Palmerston more highly, for his foreign policy seemed to consist of the "creation of new Constitutions for all the World" and of being "uniformly impertinent to Austria" on that account. (280) In 1848 he clearly outlined his dilemma: "There was never a fairer opportunity for attack - Lord Grey's Colonial Policy, as evinced in the case of Vancouver Island and in the relief of the West Indies; the management of the Expenditure and the means of meeting it - the failure of all the promises made at the commencement of the session would all furnish excellent topics for animadversion -

But our present anomalous position of fearing to turn out a Government of which we cannot approve deprives us of all means of useful control, and we must look to the strong expression of feeling in the Country as the only remedy for what is undoubtedly a great evil, viz a weak Government kept in power not by their own merit but by the division of their opponents." (281) He was confronted in fact by all the difficulties of a middle party - no prospect of power, the danger of defection to the right or the left, lack of a clear-cut policy. Then, to crown these misfortunes, the person who could have welded together the party by his influence had retired from the stage and only put in very occasional appearances. Peel's absence was a subject on which Goulburn often showed some irritation in his correspondence with Ripon.

Under these circumstances, Goulburn, while he continued to attend the House fairly regularly, often preferred not to voice his views on matters of moment. Such, for instance, was the case in the 1847 budget debate. Thus, though he did not speak rarely, there are only two outstanding speeches on political and economic matters standing to his credit after his resignation. One was a heated attack on the Government - in support of a motion proposed by Bentinck! - for its failure to give the West-Indies the special consideration to which their distressed condition entitled them. (282) The other was an act of poetic justice, an attack on Disraeli's first budget. He opposed that budget, he maintained, not factiously, but because it failed to

observe the principle which he had upheld both in and out of office, the principle of surplus revenue. Disraeli was fostering Free Trade without the conditions making freer trade possible, for the calculated surplus was so small that it could be upset by the least miscalculation and be transformed into a deficiency. (283)
The Stanley Government fell on the adjourned budget debate three days later.

In 1850 the death of Sir Robert Peel (284) made the task of keeping his friends together in one party even more difficult, and more and more they drifted, according to inclination, either back into the Conservative ranks, or into ever closer union with the Whigs. Goulburn might have been thought more likely to belong to the former group. When, however, Lord Ellenborough tried to persuade him to take office under Stanley, the unexpected result was that he persuaded Ellenborough, who had already accepted, to rescind his decision. (285) Instead, when Gladstone became Chancellor of the Exchequer under Aberdeen in 1852, Goulburn gave him confidential advice on many of the problems which he encountered. Even more interesting, and to some extent explanatory of his support of Whig administrations is the letter, sent to Gladstone on 5th February, 1855: "I have just learned on sufficient authority that you and your Peelite colleagues in the late Cabinet are disposed to decline forming a part of Lord Palmerston's administration. I hope that such a decision has not been come to.....What is to be said for the rest of his (Aberdeen's) party if they decline I cannot understand.....They.... decline in a moment of great difficulty to combine with any other

party.....to obviate the danger of a weak Government.....What will be the effect on our Foreign Relations if Palmerston at the head of a Cabinet which before entered into his views have uncontrolled dominion? What become of the Alliance with Austria especially?" The warning remained unheeded, but nothing could show the disintegration of the Peelite group as a separate party more clearly than that Goulburn should urge them to identify themselves with the Whigs, however machiavellian his motives for such advice may have been.

In addition to his worries about public business, Goulburn had many private troubles during his years of retirement, which perforce occupied much of his attention. The growing commercial depression in the West-Indies so diminished his income that in 1848 he was forced to let his estate at Betchworth - much to his regret. Moreover, the health of his wife and of his eldest son often proved great sources of anxiety, and on several occasions necessitated prolonged residence at Brighton. (286) Finally, his own health must have been failing. He was not a man to complain easily or frequently, but from about 1849 the references to his having to stay in bed, or to his unsatisfactory state of health in general, increase gradually. (287) Proof of this deterioration can be found by anyone who reads his letters. His handwriting, while it remained as always clear and legible, was beginning to show the unmistakable signs of old age. The nature of his illness is not referred to in his correspondence, or in his obituary notice in "The Times," but we know that he died on 12th January, 1856.

(1) Conclusion

It will now be possible to attempt an answer to the questions of what were the principles guiding Goulburn's actions. There can be no doubt at all that the principles which Goulburn himself would have placed first were religious ones. His devotion to the Church of England as the Established Church is evident throughout his political career. He lived at a time when the tradition of that Church was attacked both from without and within, and he sought to defend it against all these attacks to the best of his ability. There was the attack from the champions of Roman-Catholic emancipation. The whole of his work in Ireland can be seen as part of his struggle to defend the privileged position of Anglicanism from this attack. Then, there was the attack from within - the Oxford movement, or as Goulburn preferred to call it Puseyism. His references to that subject in his correspondence with Peel show almost a trace of pharasaical superiority. Of course, that sort of thing could not have happened in Cambridge! Yet his advice on ecclesiastical patronage was comparatively free from bias. Early in Peel's second administration an appointment had to be made to a vacant canonry at Christchurch. Goulburn realised that the heated state of parties in Oxford meant that every possible Professor of Divinity was in some way involved in the Pusey controversy. He suggested, therefore, that in order to find a sincere Christian of neither extreme, more importance should be attached to Pastoral Divinity than to Biblical criticism, especially since the latter

had given rise to the "present errors," (288) Later he wrote again to suggest Wilberforce, the Archdeacon of Surrey, of whom his clerical son had given him an "excellent account."

The third attack, against which he tried to guard the Church, was more directly connected with his political career. For his anxiety to keep the training-grounds of the Anglican Church, the Universities, free from the stain of pollution by Non-Conformity undoubtedly helped him in his attempts to be allowed to represent Cambridge University in the House of Commons. He was, in fact, no more kindly inclined to Dissenters than to Roman-Catholics. He attributed the beginning of the attack on the exclusive character of the University to Lord John Russell, whose "education and subsequent associations were not such as to encourage friendly feelings either to the Church or the Universities. Sent at a most critical period of his life to Edinburgh, he became early impregnated with what was then the prevalent dogma of those to whom education was entrusted. The general tone of the leading men of that day was to deprecate the English Universities, to denounce them as depositories of Bigotry and intolerance, and as undeserving of countenance or support either as places of learning or Morals." "Thus the Whig Government of the 1830s supported a measure to admit Dissenters to the honours and emoluments of the Universities." "It was happily rejected by the House of Lords but other measures of a similar nature were threatened. "...Such being the state of affairs, I (Goulburn) addressed myself to the Duke of Wellington, the Chancellor of

Oxford, and I suggested to him whether it might not be advisable to press upon the University the propriety of themselves correcting those anomalies which were made the pretext for hostile attack. He concurred entirely in my suggestion," and the reforms from within were carried out, though "progress was more slow than could have been wished." The happy result of their completion was that thenceforth "the attacks were limited to annual motions by persons of little weight or authority, and though supported by leading members of the Whig party and by Dissenters, who desired to obtain the possession and endowments appropriated by the original donors specially to the use of the Established Church, produced little effect on public opinion or on the decision of Parliament." (289) It was apparently as a result of these activities that Goulburn was awarded the degree of D.C.L. by Oxford University in 1834. We may add that Goulburn very regularly opposed the "annual motions" for the abolition of oaths in the Universities. (290)

It may be objected that the evidence so far points to a religion, merely formal and cold, and hardly to be described as the main guiding principle of a man's life. That, however, would be to judge the 19th century by the standards of the 20th, for it is certainly true that few truly religious Protestants of to-day would be so obstinate in upholding the privileges of their own Church, or indeed a particular group within that Church. Fortunately, however, a document is preserved which shows beyond doubt that his religious faith was far from formalistic.

Gladstone had asked him to canvass Cambridge for subscriptions to the National Society schools. To a list of people willing to subscribe Goulburn added some comments on the work of the society, in the course of which the following significant remarks occur: "My own fear with regard to the National School system has always been lest it should think its work done when the children are instructed in the forms and externals of religion while it has no influence upon their heart and life." (291) One other point may be mentioned. When his son, who had been destined for a career in the Church, died, a subscription was organised to provide the hamlet of Brockham Green in Goulburn's parish of Betchworth with its own church. This Church still stands to-day, a memorial to Goulburn's son and to his own devotion to the Church.

Once the paramountcy, which Goulburn attached to his religious beliefs, is established it becomes possible to explain an otherwise rather baffling problem. Why did Goulburn become a Tory? He certainly did not belong to the landed interest which formed the backbone of that party. Nor did he belong to an old established political family, which would have made him a Whig or a Tory almost against his will. On the contrary, he belonged to a family of "nouveaux riches," which had made its fortunes by commercial enterprise, and had just failed to make itself completely respectable by marriage with an impoverished branch of the aristocracy. All these were factors which ought to have led him to the Whigs. But here is an instance which

illustrates that the simple classification of Tories as agriculturalists, and Whigs as commercial and industrial entrepreneurs is far too facile. Quite apart from the fact that many of the aristocratic Whig leaders belonged to old established landed families, there was many another factor which determined a politician's allegiance at the beginning of the 19th century. In Goulburn's case it was most probably religion which was the decisive influence. The Whigs were already tainted by their more friendly inclination to Non-Conformist and Roman-Catholic claims. Grey had already been responsible for sponsoring schemes of parliamentary reforms which, while less extreme, tended in the same direction as the democratic aspirations of Dissenters like Priestley and Price. Burke seemed to have shown the close interconnection between changes in State and Church. For anyone who was an uncompromising Anglican the political atmosphere of the first decade of the 19th century left but little choice. He had to be a Tory in politics.

The events, which occurred during his formative years, remained a dominant influence on his political thinking throughout life. Commenting on the political situation in Europe, and especially the threatening upheavals in Italy in 1847 he wrote: "Having all my life had a fearful recollection of what I saw in my youth of the French Revolution I have a perfect horror of revolutionary propagandism and if I had to choose between encouraging and resisting such a system my voice would be for resistance." (292) Again some years later he could write:

"As my only cause of alarm for this Country is the undue growth of the Democratic powers, I am certainly not without anxiety, for the future." (293) Nor was this dislike of democratic principles confined to foreign countries. His aversion to the democratic Anti-Corn-Law-League has been referred to already. In fact the notion that the will of the people ought to be carried out by the Government, or that indeed the people had a will, never influenced his political thought or action at all.

Instead throughout his life he stood for an older interpretation of the British Constitution. The King's Government was truly the King's. Hence he would always support votes for royal palaces, and set his face against all but minor alterations in the Civil List. Thus, too, he felt that no necessity for the Ministers' resignation existed merely because they had been defeated, but only when successive defeats made it impossible for the King's Government to be carried on. In fact he suggested resignation when despite the absence of hostile votes, the parliamentary opposition made it almost impossible for business to be executed effectively. (294) This, too, was the reason why he advised Gladstone to join Palmerston's projected Government in 1852. At a moment of danger personal opinion must take second place to public duty to the Sovereign.

This loyalty to the Crown was perhaps one of the reasons for a parallel loyalty to his political leaders. His allegiance to Peel and the Duke of Wellington remained unswerving. This laid him open to the accusation of inconsistency. He was, for instance, described by Mr. Osborne, M.P. for Middlesex, as "one

who has been tied like a tin-kettle to the tail of the right honourable Member for Tamworth; so that in the several changes of the right honourable Baronet, as he runs from one side of the House to the other, we always hear the tin-kettle rattling behind him." (295) It must, however, have been very difficult for anyone, who was as closely associated with Peel as Goulburn, and who shared naturally many, if not most of his views, not to succumb to the spell of that outstandingly brilliant and upright man on the few occasions when there was initial disagreement. How close that association was is indicated by the fact that when Peel died, with the exception of the Prime Minister, Goulburn was the first person to pay his tribute to the dead statesman in the House of Commons. He claimed that he had been Peel's intimate friend for forty years, and it was he who revealed that Peel in his will had asked for a private interment at Drayton Parish Church, and thus declined the state funeral Russell had offered. (296)

Throughout his career, Goulburn almost always held offices which Peel had held before him, or worked under his direction. Thus a tacit understanding between the two had soon grown up and was acknowledged by Goulburn when he wrote to Peel from Ireland about the re-arrangements necessitated by Castlereagh's death: "It has given me particular satisfaction inasmuch as it has confirmed my predictions as to what would be your line of conduct on the occasion and has given me an additional reason for thinking that you always do right." (297) Under those circumstances it was only natural that Goulburn should develop a "habitual deference"

to Peel's judgments and follow him even where his first inclination would have been to move in a different direction.

Another characteristic of Goulburn's conduct in office requires emphasis. This was the absence of the corrupt use of patronage. That probity of conduct was perhaps inspired by Peel, but it is significant of Goulburn's high moral standing that it was to him that Gladstone sent an inquiry on accepting the Vice-Presidency of the Board of Trade in 1841. Ought he therefore to resign the interest he held in a Staffordshire iron works?⁽²⁹⁸⁾ Not only was there no corrupt use of patronage under Peel's administration, but there was even no attraction of aspirants by half promises of future consideration. "This is the course I am resolved to pursue with respect to all Honours, if possible to all Offices, to say not a word either specific or general, until the period of appointment is actually arrived."⁽²⁹⁹⁾ These words of Peel were equally descriptive of Goulburn's attitude, and anyone, who has looked at the correspondence of a 19th century statesman and knows how large a proportion of it is taken up with requests for honours, offices or pensions, will appreciate how difficult it was to pursue the course outlined by Peel.

Thus we obtain a picture of this Peelite which is very different from the conventional assumption that Peelites were Liberals in all but name. That sort of generalisation is in fact most destructive of true historical understanding, and if nothing else be gained by a detailed study of Goulburn's political

career, it serves at least as a renewed proof that historical truth can never be reached by preconceived classification, but only by entering fully into the life and outlook of the actors on the stage of History.

SOURCESA. Manuscripts

1. Additional Manuscripts in the British Museum.
2. Manuscripts in the keeping of Col. E.H.Goulburn, D.S.O.
3. Home Office and Treasury Papers at the Public Record Office.

B. Published Documents, etc.

1. Hansard - Parliamentary Debates - relevant volumes.
2. The Statutes at Large - relevant volumes.
3. The Memoirs of Sir R. Peel, edited by Stanhope and Cardwell.
4. C.S.Parker - Sir Robert Peel from his private papers.
5. Queen Victoria's letters.
6. Croker Papers.
7. The Greville Diary.

C. Newspapers, etc.

1. "The Times," - relevant volumes.
2. The Annual Register - relevant volumes.
3. The Gentleman's Magazine - relevant volumes.

D. Published Historical Works

1. Spencer Walpole - History of England.
2. G.K.Clerk - Peel and the Conservative Party, 1830-41.
3. D. Gwynn - Daniel O'Connell, the Irish Liberator.
4. E. L. Hargreaves - The National Debt.
5. S. Buxton - Finance and Politics.
6. Sir S. Northcote - Twenty Years of Financial Policy.
7. Relevant volumes of "The Political History of England" and the "Oxford History of England."

E. Reference Books

1. Encyclopaedia Britannica.
2. Dictionary of National Biography.
3. Ward - Men of the Reign.

NOTES

(1) I am greatly indebted to Colonel E. H. Goulburn, D.S.O., of Betchworth House, Betchworth, Surrey, who has a large collection of letters and other documents relating to the Rt. Hon. Henry Goulburn in his possession, and who has placed all these at my disposal for the purpose of this thesis.

(2) All quotations are reproduced exactly from the original documents with regard to spelling etc. The only alterations I have made are that I have written out all abbreviations in full, and that I have added a minimum of punctuation, where that was necessary to avert the danger of distortion of meaning.

(3) All letters and handwritten memoranda referred to in the footnotes are to be found in the Additional Documents in the British Museum, unless otherwise stated. The only exception to this rule is Goulburn's autobiography - a fragment dealing chiefly with his life and career up to 1822 - which is part of the Goulburn Manuscripts at Betchworth. Other parts of these Goulburn Manuscripts are indicated by (G.M.).

(4) The most important of the Additional Manuscripts are the following:

- (a) Peel Papers, Add Mss. 40,328 - 40,333.
- (b) Gladstone Papers, Add Mss. 44,162.
- (c) Wellesley Papers, Add Mss. 37,298 - 37,305.

FOOTNOTES

(a) Introduction

- (1) Cf "Times" Obituary Notice. 14th January, 1856.
- (2) Cf Correspondence with Gladstone, Ripon and Bonham, passim.
- (3) Cf Queen Victoria's letters. 27th February, 1851.
Memorandum by Prince Albert.

(b) Background, Childhood, Education.

- (4) This section is exclusively based on the fragments of Goulburn's autobiographical sketch. All quotations are taken from these memoirs.
- (5) She was not only a very beautiful woman, but also very charming in her manners. As a result she received the attention of many members of fashionable society, including the Prince of Wales, but Goulburn is concerned to point out her absolutely virtuous conduct both before and after her marriage.
- (6) This school contained about 30-40 boys "some of aristocratic and all of respectable parentage."
- (7) The final "e" is sometimes omitted.
- (8) Cf section (a).

(c) Election to Parliament

- (9) Once again all quotations are taken from his memoirs.
- (10) Mr. Perceval was a personal friend of the Goulburns, and had helped them considerably in the Chancery proceedings.
- (11) Later her name is given as Irwin.
- (12) In a number of cases blanks are left in the memoirs for dates or exact figures to be filled in after verification. This is one of many proofs of Goulburn's scrupulous regard for accuracy.

(c) Election to Parliament (Contd.)

- (13) Later Speaker of the House of Commons.
- (14) Later Viscount Goderich and Marquis of Ripon.
- (15) Thought, at the time, to be a man "with a future."
His early promise was, however, not realised.
He was offered the Post of Chancellor of the Exchequer by Perceval in 1810, but declined the Office.
- (16) Later Lord Fitzgerald.
- (17) Had attained ministerial office by 1810, when he became Secretary to the Admiralty.
- (18) Of the House of Commons.
- (19) For first recorded speech see section (d).

(d) Junior Minister, 1810-21.

- (20) Unless otherwise stated, quotations are taken from the memoirs.
- (21) It was usual for parliament to be prorogued in July and not to reassemble until January or February. Thus a prolonged tour of this nature did not interfere with the conscientious performance of his duties as a Member of Parliament.
- (22) Lord Harrowby's brother.
- (23) Goulburn's companion in office was Mr. (afterwards Sir J.) Birkett.
- (24) Though the Hansard for these years is no absolute guide for all that was said in Parliament, ministerial contributions to debate were almost invariably printed in the "Parliamentary Debates."
- (25) 6th March, 1812.
- (26) Cf. Correspondence with Peel, Gladstone, and Ripon. Passim.
- (27) Col. Bunbury was in charge of the war branch. Goulburn writes, "I knew no more of what was going on in the war branch than any stranger, unless during the absence of my Colleagues."

(d) Junior Minister, 1810-21.

- (28) Cf. Hansard, relevant volumes.
- (29) Cf. "Peel and the Conservative Party."
- (30) Cf. Section (j).
- (31) Cf. Correspondence with Lord Ripon Add Mss.
- (32) It became law on 13th March, 1807.
- (33) Cf. Hansard, 22nd April, 1818.
- (34) Cf. Hansard, 8th June, 1819.
- (35) That for War and Colonies.
- (36) Cf. Hansard, 3rd April, 1816.
- (37) There is, however, no evidence that he also looked after the war branch of the office.
- (38) Cf. Hansard 26th February, 1821, 7th June, 1821, etc.etc.

(e) Chief Secretary for Ireland

- (39) Cf. Goulburn's autobiography.
- (40) Henry Hobhouse Diary, 28th November, 1821.
- (41) *ibid.* 15th December, 1821.
- (42) Cf. Goulburn's autobiography.
- (43) This correspondence, marked "private," was of course largely ~~officially~~ ^{officially} largely or semi-official correspondence, which was "private" only in the sense that it was not intended to be public, e.g. it would not be submitted to parliamentary scrutiny, should one of the frequent demands that certain official correspondence should be laid before the House succeed.
- (44) The dependence on the Home Office is illustrated by the fact that Irish papers are catalogued as part of the Home Office papers at the Public Record Office.
- (45) Henry Hobhouse Diary, 15th December, 1821.

(e) Chief Secretary for Ireland. (Contd.)

- (46) Goulburn's autobiography.
- (47) Hansard, 21st April, 1825. Speech on the second reading of Sir F. Burdett's Roman Catholic Relief Bill. This is Goulburn's most consistent argument against emancipation.
- (48) Spencer Walpole, History of England from the Conclusion of the Great War in 1815, Vol. II, p.220.
- (49) Related by Hobhouse - quoted above.
- (50) Four pages of foolscap in his autobiography, as well as stray references in his early letters to Peel.
- (51) Home Office Papers, Public Record Office.
- (52) Goulburn's autobiography.
- (53) British Museum, Additional Manuscripts 40,322 - 40,333 and 37,298 ff.157-384; 37,299-301; 37,302 ff.1-320; 37,303 ff.187-256; 37,304 ff.99-120 and ff.137-247; 37,305 ff.13,33-96.
- (54) Cf. Huskisson's refusal to accept the Irish Secretaryship (above).
- (55) Letters from Goulburn to Peel, 6th January, 1822 and 7th January, 1822 (Add Mss); Goulburn's Autobiography.
- (55a) A letter from Goulburn to Peel, 25th January, 1822, suggests that bankruptcy was another reason.
(1) Gwynn suggests that Salvia had aspired to the Lord-Lieutenancy.
- (56) Even in this case several people had informed Goulburn of their desire to fill the post of Solicitor-General.
- (57) Cf. Goulburn's autobiography.
- (58) Cf. Goulburn's autobiography.
- (59) Letter to Peel, 30th January, 1822.
- (60) Letters to Peel, 28th and 30th January, 1822.
- (61) Goulburn's brother was the governor of New South Wales, but it was, of course, at the time the normal destination of convicts sentenced to transportation.

(e) Chief Secretary for Ireland (Contd.)

- (62) Cf. Goulburn's autobiography.
- (63) Hansard 13th June, 1822.
- (64) In his autobiography he states that it failed
"to produce any sensible benefit and was in
fact altogether inoperative."
- (65) 3 Geo. IV c.125.
- (66) Hansard, 13th June, 1822.
- (67) Hume's motion on Tithes and Church Establishment in
Ireland. Hansard, 19th June, 1822.
- (68) Cf. Letter from Peel to Goulburn, 5th September, 1822,
and the reply 9th September, 1822.
- (69) "An Act for the Appointment of Constables, and to
secure the effectual performance of the duties
of their office and for the appointment of
Magistrates in Ireland in certain cases."
3 Geo. IV, c.103.
- (70) Cf. Goulburn's autobiography.
- (71) In his autobiography. Later he describes them as
"entirely inefficient and corrupt."
- (72) Cf. Hansard, 7th June, 1822. 2nd reading of Irish
Constables Bill, Goulburn's speech.
- (73) In his autobiography. It is well to remember that
Goulburn rarely, if ever, sought credit for himself
where it was not due.
- (74) Debate on the second reading. Cf. Hansard 7th June, 1822.
- (75) Cf. Goulburn's autobiography.
- (76) Cf. e.g. letter by Sir O'Brien to Peel, enclosed with
a letter from Peel to Goulburn, 28th March, 1822.
- (77) Letter to Lord Wellesley, 2nd April, 1822.
- (78) Letter from Goulburn to Wellesley, 13th April, 1822.
- (79) Statement in reply to Sir E. O'Brien, Hansard,
29th April, 1822.

(e) Chief Secretary for Ireland (Contd.)

- (80) Cf. Letters from Goulburn to Peel (a) undated (April, 1822), (b) 4th May, 1822.
- (81) Cf. Hansard 16th May, 1822.
- (82) 3 Geo. IV. c. 34.
- (83) Letter from Goulburn to Peel, undated (May 1822).
- (84) Letter from Goulburn to Peel, 11th July, 1822 and reply.
- (85) Letter from Goulburn to Peel, 16th September, 1822.
- (86) Letters from Goulburn to Peel, 2nd November, 1822.
- (87) Letter to Peel, 4th November, 1822.
- (88) Letter from Goulburn to Peel, 15th December, 1822.
- (89) Letter from Goulburn to Peel, 21st December, 1822.
- (90) Cf. Peel - Goulburn correspondence, 26th January, 1822 - 3rd January, 1823.
- (91) Letter to Peel, 22nd January, 1823.
- (92) Letter to Peel, 22nd January, 1823.
- (93) On 9th July, 1822 Goulburn wrote to Wellesley who had criticised the bill as ineffective: "I so perfectly concur with your Excellency as to the measure itself that I should have little difficulty in abandoning it for the present Session, did I not think that the character of the Government having once proposed it was involved in carrying it through."
- (94) Letter to Peel, 16th October, 1822.
- (95) Letter from Peel to Goulburn, 27th November, 1822.
- (96) Letter to Peel, 18th November, 1822.
- (97) Letter to Peel, 31st March, 1823.
- (98) Cf. Hansard, 16th May, 1823.
- (99) Cf. letter to Wellesley, 7th June, 1823, in which Goulburn states that the compulsory clause in the Bill had to be dropped due to opposition.

(e) Chief Secretary for Ireland (Contd.)

- (100) Cf. Hansard 6th March, 1823.
- (101) Cf. Correspondence of Goulburn and Peel, 7th and 11th December, 1822, 21st January, 1823.
- (102) Cf. Correspondence of Goulburn and Peel, 18th November, 1st and 7th December, 1822.
- (103) 4 Geo. IV c.99. 19th July, 1823.
- (104) Fewer if necessary.
- (105) Letter to Peel, 21st January, 1823.
- (106) Letter to Peel, 1st December, 1822.
- (107) 7th June, 1823.
- (108) Cf. Hansard, 9th March, 1824.
- (109) Cf. Hansard, 16th February, 1826.
- (110) The success of the Act was probably largely due to the conversion of the majority of the clergy. On 1st September, 1823, Goulburn informed Peel that, in general, the clergy favoured the measure. At the same time he stated that he only refused applications which were likely to end in failure in order not to check "the ardour" for composition.
- (111) 10th September, 1822.
- (112) Letter from Goulburn to Peel, undated, probably September, 1823.
- (113) Letter from Goulburn to Peel, 4th November, 1822.
- (114) Letter from Goulburn to Mr. G. Davison, November, 1822.
- (115) Enclosed with a letter from Goulburn to Peel, 17th June, 1823. The description of the Orangemen as a secret, and thus unlawful society, with the object of defending the Law and the Constitution was the usual line of defence adopted by their apologists. Cf. Hansard 5th March, 1823, Goulburn's speech in reply to Abercromby's motion.
- (116) Letter to Peel, 16th September, 1823.
- (117) Letter to Wellesley, 5th May, 1823.

(a) Chief Secretary for Ireland (Contd.)

- (118) Letter to Peel, 15th November, 1823.
- (119) Letters to Peel, 23rd September and 3rd October, 1823.
- (120) Letters to Goulburn, 13th and 14th November, 1823.
- (121) Letter to Peel, 16th November, 1823.
- (122) Letter to Goulburn, 6th December, 1824.
- (123) Letter to Wellesley, 20th February, 1823.
- (124) Cf. Hansard 21st April, 1826, debate on Irish Estimates.
- (125) These reports are to be found in the Home Office papers at the Public Record Office. (H.O.100/213)
- (126) Letter to Wellesley, 26th March, 1824.
- (127) Letter from Peel to Goulburn, and reply, 14th and 16th April, 1824.
- (128) Catholic Association Debates, 29th May, 1824.
- (129) Cf. e.g. Letters from Goulburn to Peel, 27th July and 31st August, 1824.
- (130) Letter to Peel, 27th October, 1824, and reply 6th November, 1824.
- (131) Letter to Peel, 26th November, 1824.
- (132) Letter from Goulburn to Peel, 10th November, and reply 18th November, 1824.
- (133) Letter to Peel, 17th December, 1824.
- (134) Catholic Association Debates, 10th November, 1824.
- (135) Letter to Peel, 20th December, 1824.
- (136) Letter to Peel, 22nd December, 1824.
- (137) Letters to Peel, 1st and 5th January, 1825.
- (138) Letters to Peel, 5th and 16th January, 1825.
- (139) Cf. Hansard, 3rd February, 1825.

(e) Chief Secretary for Ireland (Contd.)

- (140) Cf. Hansard, 10th, 15th and 25th February, 1825.
- (141) Cf. Peel-Goulburn correspondence preparatory to the Bill, *passim*.
- (142) 6 Geo. IV, c.4. 9th March, 1825.
- (143) Woodward, "The Age of Reform" p.328.
- (144) Letter to Peel, 22nd July, 1825.
- (145) Letter from Goulburn to Peel, 20th December, 1826.
- (146) Woodward, "The Age of Reform," p.326.
- (147) Letter to Goulburn, undated, probably November, 1823.
- (148) Letter to Peel, 5th July, 1824.
- (149) Letters to Wellesley, 13th and 21st May, 1824.
- (150) Letter from Goulburn to Peel, 2nd January, and reply, 6th January, 1826.
- (151) Cf. Hansard, 4th March, 1823.
- (152) 5 Geo. IV, c.91, 21st June, 1824.
- (153) Cf. Hansard, 22nd February, 1825.
- (154) 7 Geo. IV, c.72. 31st May, 1826.
- (155) Letters Peel to Goulburn, 7th December, 1823, and Goulburn to Peel, 2nd January, 1824.
- (156) Letters to Peel, 8th November and 15th December, 1824.
- (157) It is not clear whether this term denotes a strike or a lock-out.
- (158) Letter to Peel, 25th July, 1826.
- (159) Letter to Wellesley, 14th April, 1827.

(f) Chancellor of the Exchequer

- (160) Cf. Peel's Memoirs (edited by Stanhope and Gardwell) Part I, p.15.
- (161) Cf. D. Gwynn - Daniel O'Connell, pp.175 ff.
- (162) Cf. Hansard, 21st April, 1825, Sir F. Burdett's Catholic Relief Bill, Second Reading.
- (163) Cf. Hansard, 12th May, 1828.
- (164) Cf. Hansard, 12th February, 1829.
- (165) Cf. Hansard, 17th March, 1829.
- (185A) Cf. Goulburn's Autobiography.
- (166) It was a question on which he felt so strongly that in the 1826 election he had, unsuccessfully, contested Cambridge University on that issue in opposition to a fellow-member of the Government, Palmerston.
- (167) Cf. Wellington - Goulburn correspondence G.M.
- (168) Cf. Woodward - The Age of Reform, pp.73,74. Huskisson's resignation in 1829 was not connected with financial policy.
- (169) Cf. Hansard, 15th February, 1828.
- (170) Only approximate figures are given here.
- (171) Cf. Hansard, 11th July, 1828.
- (172) 9 Geo. IV, c.90, and 10 Geo. IV, c.27.
- (173) Cf. Hansard, 11th July, 1828.
- (174) Cf. Hansard, 8th May, 1829.
- (175) Cf. Hansard, 4th February, 1830.
- (176) Cf. Hansard, 12th May, 1829.
- (177) Cf. Hansard, 15th and 19th February, 1830.
- (178) Cf. Hansard, 23rd February, 1830.
- (179) Cf. Hansard, 15th March, 1830.

(f) Chancellor of the Exchequer (Contd.)

- (180) Cf. Hansard, 26th March, 1830.
- (181) Cf. Hansard, 19th, 22nd and 25th March, 1830.
- (182) Cf. Hansard, 3rd June, 1828.
- (183) Cf. Hansard, 4th February, 1830.
- (184) Letter from Peel to Goulburn, 6th December, 1830.
- (185) Cf. Hansard, 8th July, 1828.
- (186) Ridley Commission on the Civil Service, Second Report, Sir H. Maxwell's evidence.
- (187) It might be added that in 1888 such sinecures etc. as were still granted were no longer shown on the same account as Civil Service Superannuation, since the Civil List and the Civil Estimates had meanwhile been separated.
- (188) Cf. Hansard, 13th May, 1830.
- (189) Cf. Woodward - The Age of Reform, p.75.
- (190) Letter to Peel, probably June, 1830.
- (191) Cf. Hansard, 2nd November, 1830.
- (192) Cf. Hansard, 12th November, 1830.
- (193) Letter to Goulburn, 8th October, 1830 (G.M.)

(g) In Opposition, 1830-34.

- (194) Cf. Goulburn's autobiography. "Principle" here refers to attachment to the Established Church and the constitution of the Universities.
- (195) Cf. Hansard, 9th March, 1831.
- (196) Cf. Hansard, 26th March, 1832.
- (197) Letter to Peel, December, 1831.
- (198) Letter to Peel, 28th December, 1831.

(g) In Opposition, 1830-34.

- (199) e.g. the provision by which the amount of pensions the King could grant were halved. (£70,000).
- (200) Cf. Hansard, 4th February and 12th April, 1831.
- (201) Cf. Hansard, budget debates, 11th and 14th February, 1831.
- (202) Cf. Hansard, 3rd October, 1831.
- (203) Cf. Hansard, 7th October, 1831. The West Indies were suffering from the results of a hurricane. £100,000 relief was granted in February, 1832.
- (204) Letter to Peel, 5th November, 1832.
- (205) Letter to Peel, 12th December, 1832. The noun used in connection with the adjective "conservative" was not "conservatism" but "conservation" as is shown by a letter sent three weeks previously.
- (206) Cf. Hansard, 12th February, 14th March and 13th May, 1833.
- (207) Cf. Hansard, 30th May, 1833.
- (208) Letter to Peel, 27th November, 1833.
- (209) Cf. Hansard, 25th July, 1834.

(h) Home Secretary, 1834-5.

- (210) Letter to Peel, 8th December, 1834.
- (211) In Melbourne's short-lived first administration Viscount Duncannon was Home Secretary.
- (212) Cf. Hansard, 24th February, 1835.
- (213) Letters from Peel to Goulburn, 31st December, 1834 and 1st January, 1835, and reply 2nd January, 1835. Gregson accepted the appointment despite his original refusal.
- (213A) Only 5 bills received the Royal Assent before the fall of the Government.
- (214) Cf. Hansard, 25th February and 2nd April, 1835.
- (215) Woodward - The Age of Reform p.97.

(1) In Opposition, 1835-41

- (216) Letter to Peel, 6th April, 1830.
- (217) Letter to Peel, 28th August, 1835.
- (218) Letter to Peel, 11th August, 1835.
- (219) Letter to Peel, 31st December, 1835.
- (220) Letter to Peel, 2nd September, 1837.
- (221) Letters to Peel, 2nd September, 1836 and 20th November, 1839.
- (222) Cf. Letter from Goulburn to Peel, 20th December, 1839.
- (223) Cf. Hansard, 27th May, 1839.
- (224) Cf. Hansard, 6th June, 1836.
- (225) Cf. Hansard, 19th April, 1839.
- (226) Cf. Hansard, 29th June, 1839.
- (227) Cf. Hansard, 27th January, 1840.
- (228) Cf. Hansard, 12th July, 1839.
- (229) Cf. Hansard, 30th April, 1841.
- (230) Cf. Hansard, 12th February, 1836.
- (231) Cf. Hansard, 20th July, 1838. Ashley was to be the Tory nominee for taking over the Queen's household during the "Bedchamber Crisis."
- (232) Cf. Hansard, 14th July, 1840.

(j) Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1841-6.

- (233) "The Times," 22nd July, 1841.
- (234) Cf. Hansard, 26th August and "The Times," 28th August, 1841.
- (235) "The Times," 2nd September, 1841, leading article.
- (236) Cf. the correspondence referred to in the following paragraphs.

(j) Chancellor of the Exchequer 1841-6

- (237) Letter to Peel, 20th November, 1839.
- (238) Letter to Goulburn, 20th October, 1841.
- (239) Letter to Peel, 22nd July, 1841.
- (240) The last year of Income Tax collections, and hence the last year for which figures of the national income were available.
- (241) Anticipated deficit £1½-2 million.
- (242) Woodward- The Age of Reform, p.106.
- (243) Cf. Hansard, 11th March, 1842. Moreover, Goulburn was convalescing from illness.
- (244) Letter to Peel, 17th November, 1842. The fears had been expressed by the Governor of the Bank of England.
- (245) Letter to Goulburn, 23rd July, 1842.
- (246) Letter to Peel, 6th April, 1844.
- (247) Letter to Goulburn, 8th April, 1844.
- (248) Memorandum to Peel, undated, December, 1844.
- (249) Letter to Peel, 20th November, 1839.
- (250) Letter to Peel, 17th November, 1842.
- (251) Letter to Gladstone, 5th May, 1854.
- (252) Cf. Hansard, 20th May and 13th June, 1844.
- (253) Cf. Letter from Peel to Goulburn of that date.
- (254) 7 and 8 Vic., c.32. 19th July, 1844.
- (255) In Sir Robert Peel's Memoirs.
- (256) Letter to Peel, 23rd October, 1843.
- (257) Letters to Peel, 11th and 13th November, 1845.
- (258) Letter from Goulburn to Peel, 12th November, 1845.
- (259) Letter to Peel, dated "Sunday morning," probably 30th November, 1845.

(j) Chancellor of the Exchequer 1841-6 (Contd.)

- (260) It is interesting to note that Peel's measure actually contemplated such a gradual reduction which would not become fully effective until 1849. The operation of all Corn Duties was, however, in practice suspended until 1st March, 1848. Cf. 9 & 10 Vic. c22, 26th June, 1846.
- (261) Cf. Hansard, 24th February, 1846.
- (262) Woodward - The Age of Reform p.118.
- (263) Cf. Sir S. Northcote - 20 years of financial policy p.36.
- (264) Cf. Hansard, 8th May, 1843.
- (265) Cf. Hansard, 29th April, 1844.
- (266) Cf. Hansard, 8th March, 1844, and Northcote - 20 years of financial policy pp.53 ff.
- (267) Letter to Goulburn, 27th December, 1845.
- (268) Cf. Hansard, 29th May, 1846.
- (269) Cf. Hansard, 3rd March, 1842.
- (270) Cf. Hansard, 13th February, 1843.
- (271) Cf. Peel - Goulburn correspondence, October, 1842.
- (272) Enclosures to Goulburn's letter to Peel, 4th October, 1844.
- (273) Cf. Peel-Goulburn correspondence, 21st-27th August, 1845.
- (274) Letter from Goulburn to Peel, 29th August, 1843.
- (275) Cf. e.g. Hansard, 20th June, 1843.
- (276) Cf. Hansard, 26th April, 1842.
- (277) Cf. Hansard, 2nd May, 1844.

(k) Retirement

- (278) Letters to Peel, 13th August, 1846.

(k) Retirement (Contd.)

- (279) Letters to Peel, 19th and 24th December, 1846.
- (280) Letter to Ripon, 12th September, 1849.
- (281) Letter to Ripon, 24th August, 1848.
- (282) Cf. Hansard, 4th February, 1847.
- (283) Cf. Hansard, 13th December, 1852.
- (284) Goulburn was one of the few friends present at the funeral, and was one of the executors of Peel's will.
- (285) Queen Victoria's letters. Memorandum by Prince Albert, 27th February, 1851.
- (286) Cf. correspondence with Ripon. British Museum, Additional Manuscripts 40,877.
- (287) Cf. e.g., correspondence with Gladstone (G.M.).

(l) Conclusion

- (288) Cf. letter to Peel, 1st December, 1841.
- (289) Cf. Goulburn's autobiography.
- (290) Cf. e.g. Hansard, 25th May, 1843.
- (291) Letter to Gladstone, 7th April, 1838.
- (292) Letter to Peel, 3rd October, 1847.
- (293) Letter to Ripon, 18th January, 1850.
- (294) Cf. Letter to Peel, June, 1830.
- (295) Cf. Hansard, 29th April, 1850.
- (296) Cf. Hansard, 4th July, 1850.
- (297) Letter to Peel, 16th September, 1822.
- (298) Letter to Goulburn, 1st September, 1841 (G.M.).
- (299) Letter to Goulburn, 2nd January, 1835.