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VERNON T. BULLOCK

A CRITICAL EXAMINATION
OF
PAUL TILLICH'S DOCTRINE
OF
THE HOLY SPIRIT

submitted for the Degree of
M. Idtt.

University of Durham, 1971
This thesis expounds and analyses Paul Tillich's doctrine of the Spirit as set out in the third volume of his *Systematic Theology* and other relevant passages from his writings. After a brief introduction to his theological method, his understanding of God and the symbolic nature of our knowledge of the divine is examined, specific reference being made to the meaning of 'Spirit' and the Trinitarian symbols. A chapter on the nature of life and its ambiguities in the spheres of morality, culture and religion, with which the doctrine of the Spirit is correlated in Tillich's thought, prepares the way for a more detailed analysis of this doctrine. This analysis deals first with Tillich's understanding of the divine Spirit in relation to the spirit of man, the Spirit's manifestation in the world, and the marks of the Spiritual Presence in historical mankind, culminating in the Christ and the creation of the Spiritual Community. The importance of the Spirit's work in resolving life's ambiguities by means of an unambiguous life of transcendent unity is indicated. The succeeding chapters expand this discussion and deal with the Spirit's impact in the realm of religion, the life of the church and the individual within the church; in the realms of culture and morality, the wider life of society; and finally, in the total context of man's life in the work of healing. A concluding chapter points out the implications of the concept of the transcendent unity of unambiguous life, suggesting that Tillich's understanding of the Spirit significantly deviates from orthodox Christian pneumatology, but also emphasising that in the final analysis Tillich has made a significant contribution to contemporary theological study of the Spirit.
# CONTENTS

## Introduction: Basic Concerns

- Philosophy and Theology in Tillich's System 1
- Reason and Revelation 11
- Existence and the Christ 15

## Chapter One. The Doctrine of God

- I. Being and God 33
- II. The Concept of Symbol and the Doctrine of God 40
- III. God as the 'Living' God and the Meaning of the 'Spirit' 51
- IV. The Trinitarian Symbols 58

## Chapter Two. The Meaning of Life and its Ambiguities

- I. The Concept of Life 73
- II. The Self-Actualisation of Life and its Ambiguities 82
  - A. The Self-Integration of Life 83
  - B. The Self-Creativity of Life 93
  - C. The Self-Transcendence of Life 114

## Chapter Three. The Spiritual Presence

- I. The Character of the Manifestation of the Spirit 139
- II. The Media of the Manifestation of the Spirit 153
- III. The Content of the Manifestation of the Spirit 172
- IV. The Manifestation of the Spirit in the History of Man 190
- V. The Spiritual Community 209

## Chapter Four. The Spirit and the Ambiguities of Religion: the Doctrine of the Church

- I. The Marks of the Spiritual Community in the Life of the Church 244
- II. The Spiritual Community and the Function of the Church 267
- III. The Spiritual Community and the Individual Christian 310
- IV. The Spiritual Community and the Conquest of Religion 344

## Chapter Five. The Spirit and the Ambiguities of Culture

- I. The Relation between Religion and Culture 362
- II. Towards a Theonomous Culture 369

## Chapter Six. The Spirit and the Ambiguities of Morality

- 400

## Chapter Seven. The Healing Power of the Divine Spirit

- 414

## Conclusion

- 427

## Appendix: Philosophical Background to Tillich's Theology

- 444

## Bibliography

- 459
INTRODUCTION

PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY IN TILlich'S SYSTEM

Before beginning our examination of Paul Tillich's doctrine of the Spirit, we must first look at some of the presuppositions which lie behind his theological system, and at the main directions in which his thinking moves. At the very heart of his thinking there is a correlation of theology and philosophy that is crucial to his system as a whole. Tillich is well aware that many contemporary theologians consider that to attempt such a correlation is virtually 'high treason against theology', but he believes it must be made. This is not to deny the importance of kerygmatic theology, whose purpose is to 'reproduce the content of the Christian message in an ordered and systematic way', yet such a theology is incomplete in itself. If one of the functions of theology is to interpret the gospel, it must of necessity use philosophical terms and categories, and 'even kerygmatic theology must use the conceptual tools of its period. It cannot simply repeat biblical passages'. Kerygmatic and philosophical, or apologetic, theology must therefore go hand in hand; they are complementary to each other.

Tillich says that both philosophy and theology ask the question of being, though each in its own way. Though contemporary philosophy does not seem to occupy itself to any great extent with this question, all true philosophy must in the long run ask ontological questions, and even epistemology must have some ontological basis. So, maintains Tillich, philosophy is essentially ontology. It 'asks the question of reality as a whole; it asks the question of the structure of being'. This is not a return to old-fashioned metaphysics, for the word
'metaphysics' suggests something that is beyond our present experience, and therefore in the realm of speculation, whereas when we concern ourselves with the question of being, we are concerned with that which is nearer to us than anything else; 'it is we ourselves as far as we are and at the same time as human beings we are able to ask what it means that we are'.

Theology also asks the question of being, but not the question of being in itself, but rather of being for us, of being as our ultimate concern. It deals with 'what concerns us inescapably, ultimately, unconditionally', and in so doing it is asking not for one being among others, but for the very ground and power of being itself which determines our existence. It asks for the way in which this ground and power of being expresses itself in and through the realms of being, so that man can be encountered by it, and know and act towards it; and how its appearance in the world of nature, or the events of history, or the experience of self, can express for us in concrete, existential terms that which concerns us ultimately.

The fact that theology and philosophy are both concerned with the question of being, despite their divergence of emphasis, implies a convergence which makes their correlation possible and necessary. Such a convergence is already apparent both in the fact that the philosopher himself cannot help but be conditioned by his existential situation and will therefore tend to see his ideas as ultimately relevant for human existence, and in the fact that the theologian in asking the question of being for us inevitably implies the question of being in itself in its meaning and structure as well as its particular manifestations. Because of this inevitable overlap, 'both philosophy and theology become poor and distorted when they are separated from
Just as there is divergence and convergence in the question asked by philosophy and theology, the question of being, so there is divergence and convergence in the way each discipline seeks to answer that question. In order to discover the meaning of being, the philosopher uses the power of his own reason, assuming 'that there is an identity, or at least an analogy, between objective and subjective reason, between the *logos* of reality as a whole and the *logos* working within him'\(^{9}\). Because the *logos* is universal, the ontological pursuit is the permanently valid endeavour through which the *logos* in every man opens up the objective *logos* of all being. In other words, there is what we may call a universal revelation of the meaning of reality available to man through the capacity of reason within him, and it is with this that the philosopher is primarily concerned. The theologian, however, is concerned not with the universality of the *logos*, but with its particular manifestation 'at a special place in a special time',\(^{10}\) and the source of his knowledge therefore is the *Logos* 'who became flesh', a revelation which is testified to by the traditions and life of the church. Put in a nutshell, the divergence may be stated thus: the theologian is concerned with the concrete *logos*, received through believing commitment, whereas the philosopher is concerned with the universal *logos*, received through rational detachment.

But alongside this second divergence, there is also an important convergence. For philosophy, though it is concerned with and must emphasize the universality of the *logos*, cannot escape the fact that not everyone discovers the revealing word, but that it is, as it were, 'granted' only to a few earnest seekers after truth in various times and places. The philosopher, therefore, is also concerned with a
concrete revelation and how it is received. He must of course move quickly on from this more concrete aspect of his study to consider its universal implications and application, to ask for the truth which transcends all concrete bases, but the very fact that he is concerned with the place where revelation occurs, means that there is a most important convergence between philosophical and theological enquiry. The Christian philosopher would go on to say that the point at which such a convergence is at its most powerful is in that man in whom the logos has appeared fully, Jesus of Nazareth. It is on the realisation of this point of contact that philosophical theology is based. So also, whereas the theologian is first and foremost concerned with the appearance of the logos at a special place and in a special time, and his task is to demonstrate how that appearance concerns man ultimately, the philosophical theologian must go further: he must seek to demonstrate that this appearance of what concerns us ultimately is none other than the universal logos of being. In other words, he tries to show that Jesus as the Christ is the logos.  

In any truly philosophical theology, therefore, there must be a correlation between philosophy and theology, and this is a central feature in the structure of Tillich's system. Philosophy provides the concepts and the categories together with the problems implied in them, and theology provides the answers to these problems in terms of the Christian message. Thus the problems implied in the concept of reason are answered in the doctrine of revelation, those in the concept of being in the doctrine of God, those in the concept of existence in the doctrine of the Christ, those in the concept of life in the doctrine of the Spirit, and those in the concept of history in the doctrine of the Kingdom of God. But it is not enough merely to give these
answers in their theological terminology and concreteness. Their wider relevance must be demonstrated by translating them into those very philosophical concepts which have universal currency, and in doing this the method of correlation is completed. It will be seen from this that philosophical theology is at the heart apologetic, for it starts from an existential analysis of the human situation and the questions asked by it, and then goes on to demonstrate that the symbols of the Christian message are the universally relevant answers to those questions. And for Tillich, all this is possible because Jesus as the Christ is none other than the concrete occurrence of the universal logos. In him the answer to every human problem is resolved, and philosophy and theology find their ultimate warrant for correlation.

It can already be seen that the doctrine of the Spirit must be viewed in the context of Tillich's system as a whole. It has its proper place within the method of correlation as the theological answer given to the problems implied in the concept and categories of life, which is ontologically distinguishable from the concepts and categories of being and existence, the specific problems of which are resolved in the doctrines of God and the Christ respectively. However, even at this early stage in our analysis, it is relevant to point out that God, Christ and the Spirit cannot be separated from each other any more than being, existence and life. But as in every theological system, there is a methodological point of departure here which is inevitable for clarity of discussion and adequacy of treatment.

So far there are two main problems which arise in Tillich's attempt to correlate philosophy and theology. The first concerns Tillich's interpretation of philosophy itself. Philosophy, he says, asks the question of reality as a whole, it asks the question of the
structure of being. It should be pointed out that not every type of philosophy has concerned itself with this question. Tillich is aware of this in his comments on epistemology, but one wonders whether he takes contemporary emphases in philosophy seriously enough. That there is a well-established philosophical tradition, which has been represented at all stages in history, which is concerned primarily with reality as a whole, is undoubtedly true, but this does not mean that it is the only tradition that merits consideration. One would not claim superiority for twentieth century philosophical analysis, but it must certainly be reckoned with. It is true that Tillich does not entirely ignore contemporary thinking, as is evidenced by his evaluation and use of phenomenological method, but he subordinates any such influences to the much stronger influences of classical philosophy mediated to him through German idealism. Of course, it can rightly be asserted that no philosophy can have completed its task unless it asks ontological questions, but this does not mean that a blind eye can be turned on those schools of philosophy whose preliminary emphases lie in other directions.

This too uncritical an acceptance of the classical-idealist tradition in philosophy comes out in his assertion that there is an identity between subjective and objective reason, between the _logos_ working within and the _logos_ of reality as a whole. This assertion makes two assumptions. In the first place, the concept of a _logos_ of reality as a whole is one which would not be accepted by all philosophers. This does not mean that one cannot envisage it as a point of view or an article of faith, nor that it is an unreasonable concept to hold to, and it is certainly one which has been used widely in certain theological schools, though by no means always in the same
way, but in so far as it is a presupposition and not a demonstrable fact, its currency in philosophical circles must at least be seriously devalued. One can argue for a universal *logos*, but philosophically one has no grounds for accepting it as an a priori. In the second place, the identity between the universal *logos* and the particular *logos*, between objective and subjective reason, which is fundamental to Tillich's system, cannot be taken for granted, which Tillich seems to do. This is another assumption, an assumption necessary to Tillich's understanding of philosophy however, in so far as the concept of the *logos* common to both man and ultimate reality is the key which unlocks the door to an understanding of reality as a whole. But it is a presupposition nevertheless. As J. Heywood Thomas comments:

> If we were to ask how we know that there is essentially this union, that the law of reason is the law of nature within mind and reality, it does not seem that Tillich has any answer other than that this is what was held by philosophers in the "classical tradition." Tillich never discusses this central epistemological difficulty and seems to be content to justify his position by appealing to the classical tradition as an authority. 

As we shall see, this participation of the human *logos* in the universal *logos* is one which has important implications for Tillich's rewriting of theology, and therefore for his doctrine of the Spirit.

The second major problem arising from the attempt to correlate theology with philosophy concerns the personalistic categories used in theological language, which are essentially absent from philosophical thought, or to put it simply, the issue of biblical personalism. Tillich's awareness of this problem is shown in his book *Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality*, in which he seeks to resolve the tension between the two modes of thinking. The problem, he points out, centres on the phrase 'ultimate reality', the ultimate
concern of both philosophy and theology, and what we mean by it. In biblical theology, one becomes conscious of ultimate reality through a personal experience of 'the Holy', and therefore 'the Holy' becomes personified. The concept of a personal God becomes basic. Ontology, however, does not think of God in this way. It interprets ultimate reality as 'being-itself', the power of being above the subject-object structure of existential reality, at once an impersonal concept. God as being-itself cannot possibly be considered as 'a person among others, related to them as an I to a thou'. How then can there possibly be a correlation between the theological idea of God as personal, and the ontological view of God as 'being-itself', when it would seem that in the ontological question the idea of God himself is transcended? Such a problem becomes even more acute when one considers the divine-human relationship. For theology, this is in the nature of a person-to-person encounter, in which both God and man maintain their distinction, a separation which is emphasised in such theological doctrines as creation, incarnation, sin and grace. But in ontology, the basic concept is that of participation of the finite in the ultimate. How can these two concepts of encounter and participation possibly be brought together?

The traditional answer in theological circles has been to say that they cannot be reconciled, and the seeming failures at synthesis underline this. Tillich, however, is confident that it can be done, and his starting point lies in the concept of the logos, for it is in this concept as we have seen that he believes a confrontation of philosophy and theology is possible. The theology of the Word, he says, which is basic to all encounter theologies, is not a theology of 'talk', but rather a theology of 'self-manifestation': the concrete logos in
Christ manifests the universal logos, in which all men participate. But because the logos manifests itself at a particular time and place, the experience of that manifestation can meaningfully be called an encounter. It is the life of reality itself in which we all share which appears to us and encounters us as it makes itself known in concrete situations. There is thus in Tillich's mind no opposition between the concepts of encounter and participation if both are understood in their proper contexts. It is along these lines also that we must understand the biblical concept of a personal God. When one speaks of 'a personal God', one generally gives the impression of a personal being who exists apart from other beings. Yet if God and ultimate reality are identical, God cannot be a being separate from finite reality, but rather that in which every reality participates for its own being and existence. It is more accurate to speak of God, therefore, as 'being-itself', that ultimate power of being which gives being to everything that is. It is when this ultimate reality reveals itself in concrete manifestations which are the basis of man's encounter with the divine, that God appears to man as personal. But this does not mean that God is one person among many, but rather, as the ultimate reality, 'the Personal-itself, the ground and abyss of every person', in which every personal being participates and from which it receives its life.

It has not been our purpose to make a full analysis of Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality, but enough has been said to show that the way in which Tillich attempts to effect a reconciliation between biblical personalism and ontological philosophy is to reinterpret biblical religion in terms of ontological categories, or as he himself would put it, to see the concrete revelation in terms of
universal revelation. Nevertheless, if a theology of encounter sometimes tends to over-emphasise or even absolutise the separateness of God and man, it will become increasingly clear in the course of this essay that a theology based on ontological participation comes dangerously near to saying that the infinite and the finite, God and man, are ultimately one, as monism and certain types of mysticism do, and that in order to realise his true being man must transcend the distinction which creates the existential illusion of separation. As we shall see many times in our analysis of the doctrine of the Spirit, Tillich often comes very near to making this assertion. If this is so, then the word 'participation' has certain overtones which are difficult to reconcile with any genuine reinterpretation of Christian theology, for any method of interpretation that suggests that ultimately the distinction between man and God is so transcended that it ceases to be, cannot be considered as Christian at all. For this reason we would dare to suggest that Tillich's attempt at synthesis fails, not necessarily because we are satisfied with a crude form of biblical personalism which sees God as another being who can be encountered in any normal way, but because his specific concept of ontological participation carried to its logical conclusion ultimately violates the one thing that Christian theology must always affirm, the eternal distinction between man and God. Or to put it another way, we do not object to the use of philosophical tools of criticism or even philosophical categories to help us in our task of reinterpretation, but we cannot accept the implications that the subordination of biblical theology to an ontology of participation involves.
According to Tillich, it is the participation of the finite in the ultimate, of the human in the divine, of the concrete logos in the universal logos, that makes revelation possible, thus opening up the meaning of God for us. Here we meet the correlation of reason with revelation in Tillich’s system. The problem is how reason can open up the meaning of God for us when, despite its participation in the universal logos, it is thwarted by the limitations and distortions of man’s existential state. It is not easy to follow Tillich in the answer he gives, but it lies in his use of two terms, ‘the depth of reason’ and ‘ecstatic reason’. By ‘depth of reason’ Tillich is referring to something which precedes reason and which reason reveals. He never gives us a precise definition of what this is, but he seems to mean that in which all reason is grounded, the underlying unity between the human and the divine, of which man in his existential state is not generally conscious. How man actually becomes aware of this is not directly but through the element of mystery which presents itself to him through the experience of the numinous, which breaks through certain phenomena or events, events which may be termed miracles or perhaps signs, and which give birth to symbols and myths through which they are expressed and handed down. In these mysterious events or phenomena man becomes intuitively aware of the divine, and his unity with it, and thus revelation has occurred. His mind has been grasped by something beyond himself, his reason has been transcended. Yet it is still his reason that apprehends it, it is still his mind that experiences it – hence the term ‘ecstatic reason’, reason driven beyond itself to grasp something which under normal circumstances it could not grasp. Ecstatic reason, therefore, or
reason beyond the limitations of the subject-object world, becomes
the organ through which revelation is received, and without it there
can be no revelation, for revelation is incomplete unless it is
received. In every genuine revelation both the objective event which
evokes the numinous awe and the subjective reception of the significance
of that event must be present. Tillich asserts that every genuine
revelatory experience is due to the 'inspiring presence of the
Spirit' which makes it possible, and it is the Spirit who is active
in driving man's reason beyond itself into its ecstatic state at
that moment when revelation is received. This we shall return to
and discuss more fully when we analyse the meaning of ecstasy in the
context of his doctrine of the Spiritual Presence.

Tillich distinguishes between original and dependent revelation,
the former being a totally new constellation of events, in which
miracle and ecstasy are joined together for the first time, and in
which both are original, and the latter being where the original
miracle and ecstatic reception already joined now act together to
create a new response in the lives of individuals and groups. For
example, the New Testament revelation is original in that the
revelatory event of Jesus as the Christ and its corresponding ecstatic
reception in Peter's confession together create a totally new situa-
tion, but in every successive Christian revelation the event of Jesus
as the Christ and the acceptance of that event by the disciples combine
to produce an ecstatic reaction that is dependent on the original.
In this way it is possible to widen the use of the word 'revelation'
to include every moment in the life of the Christian in which 'the
divine Spirit grasps, shakes and moves the human spirit'.

The knowledge received through revelation, says Tillich, is not
the sort of knowledge that we can add to that which we already possess regarding the external world. Rather it is a knowledge that reveals to us something of the mystery of being-itself, that is, knowledge of God. It can be called 'analogous' or 'symbolic' knowledge, because it is mediated through the analogia entis or the religious symbol: God cannot be known as the finite world is known, by direct observation. Similarly, this knowledge cannot be tested as we would test empirical knowledge, by verification. The only criterion for judging its authenticity is implicit in the revelation itself, its ability to negate itself as a finite reality in order that it may effectively express the ultimate reality to which it points. This does not mean that it loses itself; on the contrary its real significance is now affirmed. This criterion Tillich sees above all in the final revelation of Jesus as the Christ, where the 'power to negate itself without losing itself' is most fully realised. Thus on the Cross, Jesus totally denied his own finitude, even to the point of self-annihilation, but in so doing affirmed his own significance as one who revealed within his own person the eternal unity between God and man. For Tillich, therefore, Jesus 'stands the double test of finality; uninterrupted unity with the ground of his being and the continuous sacrifice of himself as Jesus to himself as the Christ'.

Such a necessarily brief summary of the gist of Tillich's doctrine of revelation is hardly the basis for any evaluation, but one or two comments which concern our further study should be noted. We must, of course, bear in mind the fact that Tillich bases his doctrine of revelation on the coincidence of the human and divine logos which is made possible through the participation of the finite
in the ultimate, the implications of which we have already discussed. The 'depth of reason', despite the ambiguities of the phrase, serves to underline this continuity or correspondence between human reason and divine reason, rooted as both are in the ultimate reality. In fact, what Tillich says here helps us to see the prior importance he attaches to the concept of a universal ontological revelation, and in this way: Man is not aware of the depth in which his own reason is grounded until some awareness of the mystery of being presents itself to him through the revelatory event in which his own reason is ecstatically grasped. But having received this revelation, he is now able to interpret something of its ontological significance precisely because the universal power of reason is at work within him. In other words, the point of the concrete revelation would be lost unless there were an ontological key already present within the mind of man which when grasped by the Spirit could unlock its real meaning. So even if we allow temporal priority to the concrete revelation as opening up the meaning of being for us, we must give the ultimate primacy to the ontological structure of reason that makes it possible for us to understand what that revelation is all about. Therefore, though in actual sequence the concrete revelation, including the final revelation in Jesus as the Christ, comes first, it is the deeper ontological revelation afforded by the universal logos ecstatically present in the mind of man that is our primary concern. It is difficult, however, to reconcile this sort of thinking with orthodox Christian thought, which refuses to subordinate the eternal message of the Gospel to any doctrine of a universal revelation based on a coincidence of divine and human reason, but emphasizes quite categorically both the primacy and the ultimacy
of God's revelation in Christ.

The role of symbolism in revelation is also seen to be of considerable significance, for it is the symbol that enshrines the revelatory event. We shall defer our discussion on this until we come to discuss the meaning of symbol in our analysis of the doctrine of God. 28

EXISTENCE AND THE CHRIST

Tillich's assertion that all concrete revelation is to be judged in the light of the supreme revelation in Jesus as the Christ leads us to speak a little more fully about this central Christian event. His interpretation of the significance of the Christ is set out in the second volume of his Systematic Theology. 29 According to the method of correlation, it is developed in answer to the questions implied in human existence. These problems arise from the fact that man, in his existential state, is not at one with his essential being. He is unable fully to actualise the powers which are potentially his because of his finite limitations. It can be said, then, with Plato, that man in his existential state has 'fallen' away from his true nature, thus causing a split between what he is in actual fact and what he is essentially. In other words, he is estranged from his true being. This classical concept of the Fall has influenced Tillich strongly, and he interprets Genesis 1-3 along these lines. Firstly, there is the possibility of the Fall, for man has the element of freedom in himself to make the transition from essence to existence. Secondly, the Genesis myth points to the motives behind the Fall. If man is to overcome the threat of non-being which causes him anxiety, if he is to become more than mere potentiality, in a state of 'dreaming innocence', 30
then he must take the plunge to actualise at least some of his potentialities. The desire to do so arouses his sense of freedom, and in the end he "decides for/actualisation, thus producing the end of dreaming innocence". 31 Thirdly, it will be seen that the Fall is the 'original fact', because it is 'actual in every fact': it is the first event in every process of actuality. To see this is to acknowledge that the Fall is something of far wider significance than sin in the sense of moral failure: it is of cosmic dimensions, involving the whole of existential reality in its estrangement. This comes out very clearly in the myth of the Transcendent Fall, which universalises the truths to which the biblical myth is pointing. Sin has its roots therefore not only in the moral freedom of man, but in the tragic element of universal destiny. 32 Finally, in the light of these statements one must ask the question as to the relation of the Fall to the Creation. Does not the definition of the Fall as the transition from essence to existence make 'sin' in the life of man ontologically necessary? 33 Tillich answers that Creation and Fall do indeed coincide in so far as there was no point in the past at which created goodness was actualised - no primeval utopia. In this sense, actualised creation and estranged existence are identical. But the coincidence is not logical, for in its essential character creation is good. It is only when it becomes actualised that it falls into universal estrangement. Yet this transition 'has the character of a leap and not a structural necessity. In spite of its tragic universality, existence cannot be derived from essence'. 34 Creation and Fall are not one and the same thing.

Tillich's way of understanding sin therefore is to define it in terms of estrangement: man's existential estrangement from his essential
being, which shows itself in three different ways, in estrangement from the ground of being, from the beings of others, and from one's own being. Though the Bible never uses the word, such a concept, maintains Tillich, is central to its understanding of man. Yet it is still good to retain the word 'sin' because it expresses more sharply the personal character of estrangement in personal freedom and guilt.

Tillich fixes on three different expressions to elucidate further the nature of this estrangement: unbelief, or 'unfaith', in which man in the totality of his being turns away from God; hubris, in which man elevates himself in his desire to become the centre of all things, thus making himself equal with God, refusing to acknowledge his own finitude and absolutising everything he is and does into infinite significance; and concupiscence, again characterised by self-centredness, by which man seeks to draw the whole world into himself as a compensation for his poverty resulting from his estrangement from God.

As a sinner in the state of estrangement, man is engaged in the pursuit of his own destruction, for sin causes an inner contradiction in his essential being. The ontological elements in his nature, at one essentially, now war against each other in their existential estrangement. Freedom, distorted into arbitrariness and divorced from destiny, causes life to become empty and meaningless; whereas destiny, separated from freedom, becomes distorted into mechanical necessity. Dynamics, separated from form, become distorted into a formless urge for self-transcendence, driving man in all directions; whereas form, separated from dynamics, becomes an empty legalism without creativity which leads in turn to rebellious outbreaks of dynamic forces. Individualisation, divorced from participation, causes man to become shut up within himself; whereas participation without
individualisation results in submergence in the collective. All these tendencies are present in man in his existential state of estrangement—all are the symptoms of sin.  

Faced with the possibility of the disintegration of himself and his world, man asks the question as to how he can conquer his existential estrangement. True to his Reformed tradition, Tillich affirms that it is impossible for man to resolve the predicament himself. What is necessary is for man's unity with God to be re-established, or a Tillich puts it, for essential being to appear under the conditions of existence. This is what Tillich means by 'the New Being'. Man, in relation to God, cannot do anything without him. He must receive in order to act... Only a New Being can produce a new action. The New Being is new in two respects: firstly, in contrast to the merely potential character of essential being; and secondly, in contrast to the estranged character of existential being, thus overcoming the subject-object split of existential reality. Tillich says that the history of religion is the record of man's quest for this New Being, whether his search be above history or as the aim of history, and such a quest is indeed an important work of the Spirit in man. This does not mean that religion is identical with the New Being, for every religion is open to distortion, but in every genuine revelatory experience at the heart of religion, the New Being is to be found. It is supremely present in that event which lies at the heart of the Christian religion, Jesus as the Christ. The Christ is the bearer of the New Being, and Jesus as the Christ is he who brings the New Being to man in his own person: 'Jesus of Nazareth... is actually the Christ, who brings the new state of things, the New Being'. In fact, the history of the symbol 'the Christ', with its Hebrew origins and the influence of non-Hebrew religions upon it, demonstrates that it
is an adequate symbol for the fulfilment of both historical and non-historical expectations of the New Being. Christianity affirms that the different forms in which the quest for the New Being have been made are all fulfilled in Jesus as the Christ, and in this context, Tillich sees the Christ-mysticism of Paul and his parallel doctrine of the Spirit as 'an important bridge across which the non-historical type of expectation could enter Christianity'\(^4\). So the New Being as it has appeared in Jesus as the Christ becomes the complete answer to man's existential predicament.

For Tillich there is a most important distinction between 'Jesus of Nazareth' and 'the Christ'. 'Jesus of Nazareth' points to the historical existence of the man Jesus, whereas 'the Christ' points to the significance of this man, the fact that in him the New Being, 'essential God-Manhood', has appeared in our human existence and subjected itself to its conditions without being defeated by them. To maintain this distinction means that 'the Christ' as such is free to appear in other forms outside the sphere of human history, but that as far as man is concerned it is Jesus of Nazareth who appears as the Christ for us. It also means that Christology is not replaced by a false 'Jesuology', which has frequently been the case in the life of the church. 'One cannot attribute to the eternal Logos in himself the face of Jesus of Nazareth or the face of historical man or of any particular manifestation of the ground of being. But certainly the face of God manifest for historical man is the face of Jesus as the Christ'.\(^4\) Tillich also feels that this essential separation of 'Jesus' and 'the Christ' in our Christological understanding helps us to place the historical Jesus in correct perspective. He has little time for the liberal quest for the historical Jesus, and seems
to suggest that what really matters is the picture one is given of this man in the Gospels rather than the actual historical existence. This does not mean that he is denying that there was no man on whom the picture was based. In fact, to ignore this would be to ignore the basic Christian assertion that essential God-Manhood has appeared in history. But it is the picture that is of vital interest to us — the portrait of a man who, because the New Being was present in him as the Christ, conquers the ambiguities of existence and opens up the way for all men to do the same. The proof of the historical existence of this man lies not in any attempt to demonstrate that he was born and lived and died at a certain time in history, or even that he was Jesus of Nazareth, but in the fact that the living, personal reality which shines through the Gospel story transforms all those who accept this reality as the Christ. It is an experiential proof, a proof of faith. So faith guarantees a personal life in which the New Being has conquered the old being. But it does not guarantee his name to be Jesus of Nazareth.

Jesus as the Christ, therefore, is the supreme revelation because in him the estrangement of man from his true being and from God is overcome once and for all, and supremely in the event of the Cross, where he surrendered the finite part of himself, the Jesus-element, to the New Reality which he bears, the Christ-element. Yet in every part of his life the conquest of sin is to be seen, and the three characteristic marks of existential estrangement, unbelief, hubris, and concupiscence, do not appear at any place in the biblical portrait of Jesus as the Christ. He was certainly tempted in these respects, but he never failed to demonstrate his complete unity with God. Indeed, the fact that he was tempted serves to show that in the
New Being, finitude, anxiety, ambiguity and tragedy are still present, but are so taken into the divine life in Christ that they lose their destructive power. Tillich's picture of Jesus as the Christ, then, is "not the picture of a divine-human automaton without serious temptation, real struggle or tragic involvement in the ambiguities of life", but rather the picture of a life which although subjected to every consequence of estrangement, completely conquers it and retains his complete unity with God.

Tillich makes a thorough analysis of the Christological dogma, rejecting Harnack's allegation that the use of Greek concepts led to an unnecessary intellectualisation of the Gospel, by pointing out that if the church were to fulfil its apologetic task, its work of mission, in the first three centuries, it had no alternative but to use hellenistic concepts, the only concepts available to it for the expression of the Christian message. However, he is aware that these very concepts are ones which create major difficulties for us today, particularly in our contemporary apologetic task, and therefore need to be replaced by ways of thinking that are more acceptable. But he reminds us that one must beware lest in attempting to rephrase the Christological dogma, one loses the important truths that Nicaea and Chalcedon sought to preserve, even though they did it with 'inadequate tools'. What in fact we need to reject, and can reject without any loss of real significance, is the 'two-nature theory' which was based on an idea of substance or static essence which is no longer valid, in favour of a new dynamic relational interpretation which substitutes for the expression 'the divine nature', 'eternal God-man unity', or 'eternal God-Manhood'. The essential truth is that in Jesus as the Christ we see that essentially God and Man are one.
Finally, Tillich asserts that the person and work of Christ are really two aspects of one and the same thing. Christ is Saviour primarily because of what he is. But if Christ is the bearer of the New Being, then his work is, as we have seen, to conquer the existential ambiguities of life in the power of the New Being, and this leads to the question of the Atonement. In the New Testament, the two major symbols of the Atonement, the Cross and Resurrection, point to the same thing, the conquest by Christ of the estrangement between man and God, a conquest made possible by the willing surrender of himself as Jesus to himself as the Christ, and the resultant victory symbolised by the Resurrection. The formulation which we call the doctrine of the Atonement is, for Tillich, 'the description of the effect of the New Being in Jesus as the Christ on those who are grasped by it in their state of estrangement'; a definition which refers to both objective and subjective sides of the atoning process, the conquest of estrangement which is responsible for all human guilt, and the reconciliation effected in the life of him who accepts the divine offer in his own life. It is the second of these aspects that will more particularly concern us in our consideration of the doctrine of the Spirit. However, there is need for reinterpretation of the doctrine of the Atonement just as of the Christological dogma, and whilst Tillich does not develop this in detail, he does suggest several broad principles which should be held in mind in any attempt at reformulation. First, there must be total emphasis on the divine initiative: all atoning processes are created by God and God alone. Secondly, there is no conflict in God between his reconciling love and his retributive justice. Thirdly, God's forgiveness in no way implies that he overlooks the reality and depth of existential estrange-
ment. Fourthly, his atoning activity is to be seen as his participation in that estrangement and its consequences. This is the very heart of the Atonement. Fifthly, in the Cross of Christ the divine participation in existential estrangement becomes manifest. And finally, through participation in the New Being in Jesus as the Christ man is able also to participate in the manifestation of the atoning activity of God. Tillich maintains that in this sense the concept of participation is much nearer to a real understanding of the Atonement than the traditional language of substitution.

This participation by man in the New Being in Jesus as the Christ is what theology has called regeneration. Christ brings the New Reality and in entering into it man participates in it and is reborn. When this participation occurs man is accepted by God, he is 'justified' before him. In this sense, salvation is both regeneration and justification. Though the terminology points to two different facets, 'as a divine act, regeneration and justification are one'. But salvation can also be described as sanctification, or transformation, and in this sense, it is to be distinguished from both regeneration and justification 'as a process is distinct from the event in which it is initiated'. It is this process, in which the New Being transforms personality and community, both within and outside the church, that is the work of the divine Spirit, who is the actualisation of the New Being. Because of this, neither the doctrine of man nor the doctrine of the Christ can come to an end at this point. Their implications must be worked out in the midst of the ambiguities of life and history. If the revelation in Jesus as the Christ is to be supreme, then it needs to be received by men in the depth of their lives at every stage of history, in and through the life of the Church, and this means that the
doctrine of the Spirit, and that of the Kingdom of God, is an integral part of the Christological work.

It has been necessary to make this analysis of the main directions in Tillich's Christological thought, for without some understanding of his teaching regarding Jesus as the Christ it is impossible to understand many of the things he has to say about the work of the Spirit. If the Spirit is 'the Spirit of Christ' as the New Testament asserts, then what Tillich has to say about the Christ must inevitably influence his doctrine of the Spirit, and this comes out clearly in his affirmation that the Spirit is at work among man to actualise the New Being in his life and experience by bringing him face to face with the Christian revelation. The Spirit therefore is active in the creation of the New Being, wherever and whenever this takes place. Part of our task will be to demonstrate what this means for Tillich, and how he interprets it in the ontological categories which he has chosen to use. One or two comments need to be made here, however, with regard to his concepts of estrangement and the Christ.

Firstly, we may venture to suggest that in his reinterpretation of the biblical myth of the Fall, Tillich ends up with something rather different from what the Genesis story is really saying. What he is really doing is presupposing the truth behind the Platonic myth of the Transcendent Fall from essence to existence, and then translating the biblical myth accordingly. In doing this, he seems not only to be taking the biblical concept of sin less than seriously, but also in his close alignment of sin with finitude coming very near to identifying creation with the Fall. Despite his denial of this, and his assertion that it is in its essential character that creation is good, the problem remains. The concept of an essential creation over against an
actual creation is a difficult one to grasp, and one must ask the question in what way creation can truly be creation if it is not actualised? It is extremely hard to give any meaning at all to this sort of distinction.

What concerns us more specifically is Tillich's definition of sin in terms of estrangement. In many ways it is a useful term. Not least does it point to the fact that sin is something far deeper than mere transgression, serious though this may be. Perhaps the classical prophets, when they spoke of not knowing the Lord as the root of moral evil, were saying the same sort of thing. Similarly, in the realm of human relations, the concept of estrangement underlines that sin is not merely a matter of words and actions, but has its roots within an attitude of mind that is basically self-centred and hostile towards the other one. Again, depth psychology has so emphasised the internal conflicts found in every man, preventing him from realising his essential nature, that one can meaningfully speak of one's estrangement from oneself. However, the real problem in Tillich's concept of estrangement is his assertion that it is the inevitable consequence of existential separation. For such a statement there would seem to be no authority save that of Tillich's system itself. Outside the system such a link is certainly not established and the argument is unconvincing. Furthermore, Tillich's assertion implies that the healing of estrangement, and thus the defeat of sin, is contingent on the conquest of the subject-object split which characterises the existential world. It is difficult to see how this can be reconciled with biblical thought. The New Testament has nothing to say about the need to transcend any existential distinction whether between man and God, or man and man, in its teaching on reconciliation, which it is quite content to express in
relational terms which preserve the individuality of all concerned. In assessing Tillich's understanding of sin in terms of estrangement, these reservations must be borne in mind.

Secondly, though we would not necessarily quarrel with Tillich's assertion that the quest for the New Being is universal, it should be pointed out that it is in no way apparent that the precise aim of the quest is always as Tillich would define it, that is, a quest for an order of reality in which the subject-object order of existence is overcome. It is far too sweeping to say that all religions, let alone mankind in general, are engaged in this sort of quest. Certainly the search for a new life in which man may experience new birth and the conquest of sin is to be found everywhere, but it is by no means always thought of in the precise ontological terms in which Tillich defines it. Despite this, Tillich obviously feels that every concrete and historical form of expectation in which new life has been sought must be seen in the light of what is for him the only valid goal of such a quest, participation in a state of essential humanity, or perhaps 'eternal God-man-unity', where all ambiguities are resolved as every form of existential separation is overcome. So in the long run it is not the individual himself that really matters, but the state of New Reality into which he enters.53 This is borne out in Tillich's interpretation of Jesus as the bearer of the New Being. As an individual in his own right he is of secondary importance. His real significance is that he brings to man the New Reality into which man can enter; he opens up for man what essential God-man-unity is. This, not the life of the individual, is the all-important thing. But
there is no warrant in the New Testament for the subordination of individual men to a state of eternal God-man-unity as such. We shall see later, in Tillich's discussion on the Spirit, how this priority of the New Being as a reality in itself into which man enters rather than a new life which he, as an individual receives, influences Tillich's whole approach to the doctrine of regeneration. 54

In the third place, one wonders whether Tillich takes the historical question of Jesus as the Christ seriously enough. His affirmation that even if faith does not guarantee the historicity of the name of Jesus it nevertheless guarantees a personal life in whom the New Being has appeared, such as one sees in the Gospel picture of Jesus, is rather strange. For does this really say anything more than if there ever was an appearance of the New Being in history, then faith would guarantee that he would be like the character we see portrayed in Jesus of Nazareth? Certainly faith cannot adduce any evidence that such a character actually existed. For this reason one feels that Tillich does not really come to grips with the historical question. Faith cannot liberate us from a legitimate historical quest. In fact, to suggest otherwise would have serious implications not only for Christology but also for the doctrine of the Spirit, in that it would open the way for a primarily mystical understanding of the Spirit of Christ that does not depend on any essential historical foundation.

Finally, turning to more specifically Christological issues, there are several points one would wish to raise. Tillich's attempt to provide a Christology for contemporary man is laudable, yet one wonders whether the conceptual tools he uses are any more adequate than those of Nicaea and Chalcedon which he disclaims. One of the tests of their adequacy must surely be whether they are able to convey the essential
meaning and message of the Gospel, and one feels from this point of view they have serious defects. Instead of 'divine nature' Tillich suggests that we replace the phrase 'eternal God-man-unity' or 'eternal God-Manhood'. One wonders whether this is really a satisfactory substitute. It seems to obliterate the distinction always emphasised in the doctrine of the two natures between the human and the divine, and though one certainly feels the need for reinterpretation, it appears that here they are confused rather than explained. This may be no disadvantage within the system as a whole, which presupposes an essential continuity between the human and the divine, but it is a serious disadvantage outside the system, where its fundamental propositions are not accepted. Furthermore, Tillich maintains that his new definition replaces static essence by dynamic relation. However, the very feeling that one gets about phrases like 'God-man-unity' or 'God-Manhood' is that they are still tied to concepts which are not so very different from those used by the early Christian theologians. They still have an air of solid substantiality about them! One feels that had Tillich moved towards a description of the relationship between Christ and God as one of dynamic love, which the Spirit continues to manifest in the world of men, one may have been nearer to a more effective substitute of dynamic relations for static essences.

It is difficult to make any satisfactory evaluation of Tillich's understanding of the Atonement, because what he provides us with is really a list of criteria according to which the doctrine can be developed in the contemporary period rather than a reinterpretation itself. If one is to make any criticism it would be that any interpretation of the Atonement in the ontological categories which Tillich
suggests may well rob it of the sharpness of its impact. One also feels that the brevity of his treatment of the objective aspects of the Atonement under the respective headings of regeneration, justification and sanctification, such as one finds in Volume II of his *Systematic Theology*, compares unfavourably with his more detailed analysis of these themes from the subjective standpoint with which we shall be concerned in our study of the Spirit. This could suggest that either his pneumatology is not sufficiently Christologically based, or that the Spirit-orientated experience is of more significance than the once and for all action of God in Christ, or perhaps both.
Notes to Introduction

2. Ibid., p. 84.
5. The Protestant Era, p. 86.
6. Ibid., p. 87.
7. ST, I, p. 28.
8. The Protestant Era, p. 89.
9. ST, I, p. 27.
10. The Protestant Era, p. 92.
11. Ibid.
12. See Ibid., pp. 92f, and ST, I, pp. 67-76.
17. Ibid., p. 76.
18. Ibid., p. 83.
20. ST, I, pp. 79-177.
21. Ibid., p. 88.
22. Ibid., pp. 124ff.
23. Ibid., p. 51.
24. See below, pp. 140ff.
27. Ibid., p. 153.
28. See below; pp. 40ff.
29. London, Nisbet 1957. Afterwards referred to as **ST, II**.
31. Ibid., p. 41.
32. Ibid., pp. 41ff.
33. Ibid., p. 50.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid., p. 52.
36. Ibid., pp. 53-63.
37. Ibid., pp. 66ff.
38. Ibid., p. 136.
39. Ibid., p. 92.
40. Ibid., p. 112.
41. Ibid., p. 103.
43. **ST, II**, p. 112.
44. **ST, II**, pp. 130ff. op. also his comment in his 'Dialogues with Students', where he says, 'I want to say that if we were able to read the original police registers of Nazareth, and found that there was neither a couple called Mary and Joseph nor a man called Jesus, we should then go to some other city. The personal reality behind the gospel story is convincing. It shines through. And without this personal reality Christianity would not have existed for more than a year, or would not have come into existence at all, no matter what stories were told. But this was the great event that produced the transformation of reality. And if you yourself are transformed by it, you witness the reality of what happened. That is proof.' Ultimate Concern: Tillich in Dialogue, London, SCM Press, 1965, p. 147.
48. Ibid., p. 170.
49. Ibid., pp. 196-303.
50. Ibid., p. 196.
51. See below, pp. 314ff.
54. See below, pp. 314ff.
55. pp. 203-209.
CHAPTER ONE

BEING AND GOD

The doctrine of the Spirit is an important aspect of the doctrine of God. However, in so far as it is only one aspect, we shall make no attempt to discuss the doctrine of God as a whole, but confine ourselves to those things which are directly relevant to the theology of the Spirit.¹

In accordance with the method of correlation the idea of God in Tillich's theology is developed in answer to the question implied in man's finitude, the question of being. Man is prompted to ask this question because he experiences the shock of non-being which everywhere surrounds him in his finite existence.² This awareness of nothingness is a very real part of his finitude, and it gives rise to a deep-seated anxiety which underlies the whole of human life. This anxiety cannot be eliminated, however, it can only be accepted and borne as part of himself with a courage that enables him to assert his being in spite of the threat of non-being which hangs over him. In his little book The Courage to Be,³ Tillich says that such a courage may appear sometimes as the courage to be part of a larger whole, or sometimes as the courage to stand alone. But above all man's ontological anxiety is more completely resolved in the courage to accept the fact that he is carried by the creative power of being in which every being participates.⁴ The courage which takes . . . anxiety into itself must be rooted in a power of being that is greater than the power of oneself and the power of one's world.⁵ The question of being therefore must be considered supremely in the light of those experiences which have been known throughout history in which the power of being has been
manifest, experiences which have given men courage to assert themselves in the name of that power against the limitations of finitude and the threat of nothingness which are constantly there. Sometimes this experience may be in the nature of a mystical awareness in which the individual becomes intuitively aware of his participation in the power of being. At other times it may take the form of a divine-human encounter, in which there is the consciousness of a relation of personal communion with the source of courage, resulting, as it did at the Reformation, in a courage of confidence based on God alone. But always it will be 'the state of being grasped by the power of being which transcends everything that is and in which everything that is participates'. The person who is in this state, which is the essence of faith, 'is able to affirm himself because he knows that he is affirmed by the power of being—itself'. This is what Tillich calls 'the courage to accept acceptance', so that in knowing that we are accepted and affirmed by the ground of being, we have the courage to assert our being even in the face of radical despair.

The question posed by our human finitude, therefore, — the question of being — is answered and resolved courageously when we are grasped by the power of being itself. This then is that which concerns us ultimately, Being—itself is the object of man's ultimate concern, it is the answer to man's questioning. Religion and theology have traditionally given the name 'God' to this ultimate concern. But there is a problem here. For the name 'God' is associated with something 'concrete' which can be encountered, a highest being among beings, whereas our ultimate concern, if it is to be truly ultimate, must transcend every concrete encounter. If it is to answer the question implied in finitude, it must transcend the whole realm of the finite.
The true God, therefore, says Tillich, is the 'God above God', who is hidden in every mystical experience and who is behind every divine-human encounter, the power of being-itself, the ultimate reality, which transcends everything that is. So Tillich prefers to speak of God as 'being-itself' or 'the ground of being', and he is of the opinion that 'many confusions in the doctrine of God and many apologetic weaknesses could be avoided' if God were understood first of all in this way.

Alternatively, he suggests that we may legitimately refer to God in his ultimacy as the 'power of being', for traditionally the concept of being-itself in philosophy and theology has pointed to the power within everything which enables it to resist non-being. So we can say that God is the 'power of being in everything and above everything, the infinite power of being'. Those theologies which do not identify God and the power of being lapse into a sort of monarchic monotheism of the most literal type, which sets God above the world, but makes him yet another being and thereby subject to being-itself. But God cannot be subject to anything, 'he is "by himself"; he possesses aseity'. And this can only be said of him if he is the power of being, being-itself.

When we talk of God as 'being-itself' we are also affirming, says Tillich, that God is above any distinction between 'essential being' and 'existential being'. In the ontological analysis of the nature of being as we know it we are able to distinguish between the essence of being and the existence of being; between potential ground and actual form; between the nature of a thing and the expression of that nature. But this distinction between essence and existence cannot be applied to God, for as being-itself he must be beyond such a contrast.
Tillich puts this clearly in his 'Dialogues with Students',\textsuperscript{17} where he says, 'There is of course that being which is beyond essence and existence, which in the tradition of the classical theology of all centuries we call God - or if you prefer, "being-itself" or "the ground of being". And this "being" does not merely exist and is not merely essential, but transcends that differentiation, which otherwise belongs to everything finite'.\textsuperscript{18} Thus it is incorrect to say either that God exists or that God is the 'universal essence'.\textsuperscript{19} On the one hand, if we say that God is 'universal essence' then we identify him with the unity and totality of all finite potentialities, which is somewhat different from saying that he is the power of being within them all, and which would therefore suggest that he does not transcend them, which is what pantheism tends to assert. On the other hand, if we say that God exists, we are thereby contradicting the idea of a creative ground of both essence and existence. It is more accurate therefore to speak of the 'reality of God', which points to his true nature as being-itself.\textsuperscript{20}

This insight, says Tillich, helps us to take a first step towards solving the problem of the transcendence and the immanence of God, for as the power of being, God transcends both every being and also the totality of being. 'Being-itself infinitely transcends every finite being. There is no proportion or gradation between the finite and the infinite. There is an absolute break, an infinite "jump".'\textsuperscript{21} This is the basis of the doctrine of the transcendence of God. On the other hand, every finite being participates in being-itself, in the power of being, otherwise it would never have emerged out of non-being. It is this fact that enables us to speak of the immanence of God. So when we call God creative, or immanent, we are emphasising that
everything participates in the power of being; and in calling him abysmal, or transcendent, we are emphasising that all beings are infinitely transcended by their creative ground.

The expression 'ground of being' helps us to understand the relation of God, as being-itself, to man, as finite being. The word 'ground' can be interpreted in the sense of both cause and substance. Interpreted as substance, the relation of being-itself to finite being was classically expressed by Spinoza in his naturalistic pantheism, which merged being-itself and all finite beings into one. But this type of pantheism made the Christian assertion of man's finite freedom impossible. So Christian theology came to reject the interpretation of 'ground' as substance, because of this way of thinking, in favour of its interpretation as 'cause', as developed for example by Leibniz on the basis of Thomistic tradition. The advantage seemed to be obvious. The concept of causality seemed to make both the created order dependent on God and also effectively separated the finite from being-itself. However, with the scientific assertion that cause and effect could not be separated, the category of causality also fell down. So, maintains Tillich, it is impossible to interpret 'ground of being' in terms of causality or substance if we are to use these expressions literally. However, there is some truth in them if they are used as symbols, which point to a truth rather than express it. Symbolically, we can say that God is both the 'cause' of the entire series of causes and effects, and that he is the 'substance' which underlies the whole process of becoming. In other words, 'there is no difference between prima causa and ultima substantia. Both mean what can be called in a more directly symbolic term "the creative and abysmal ground of being".'
Because God is the ground of being, he is the ground of the structure of being also. Though he himself is not subject to this structure, the structure is grounded in him. Tillich affirms: 'He is this structure, and it is impossible to speak about him except in terms of this structure'. This assertion, he says, has two important implications. In saying that God is not subject to the structure of being, we avert the danger of positing a structure of being above God, which would make him less than being-itself. In the second place, to say this means that we can approach God cognitively through the structural elements of being-itself, elements which we can understand in some degree through the structure of our own being. These elements make God a living concern for us and enable us to use symbols which point to the ground of reality.

One or two comments may be made at this stage. Several criticisms have been levelled at Tillich's use of the expression 'being-itself' and its parallel expressions 'the power of being' and 'the ground of being'. Most of these are concerned with inherent ambiguities within these expressions: for example, MacQuarrie points out that the phrase 'power of being' could mean either 'power to be' or 'power exerted by being', though one could reply to this that the power supremely exerted by being is indeed the power to be, and thus no ambiguity is really present. We shall not concern ourselves with these criticisms, but rather with the precise relation between the finite and the ultimate as it is expressed in Tillich's doctrine of being-itself, for it is this question that is of particular relevance to the doctrine of the Spirit. Though there are times when he makes specific reference to the distance between the finite world and God (as for example, when he speaks of an absolute break, an infinite jump, between the ultimate
and the finite), there are also many times when he much more forcefully emphasises the factor of participation which enables the power of the finite, including man, to share in the power of ultimate reality which is the ground of its being. One feels that this dominant concept of participation must imply at least some sort of continuity between ultimate power and the finite power of being. The problem as it affects our assessment of Tillich's doctrine of the Spirit will appear in this way: If the power of being in God and man are continuous, then it would seem to follow that between the divine Spirit and the human spirit there is some point of identity, or perhaps even that the human spirit is the finite aspect of the divine Spirit in which it participates. This point will arise again, not only in our discussion on Tillich's concept of symbol and the way in which Tillich speaks of the spirit of man as a symbol of the Spirit of God, but also in our final assessment of the meaning of the transcendent unity of unambiguous life to which Tillich's doctrine of the Spirit is closely geared.

One other comment, which is not unconnected with the above remark, arises from Tillich's suggestion that because the structural elements of our finite life are grounded in being-itself we are thereby able to understand something about God through an examination of the structure of our own life and being. This is really to say that there is a universal, ontological revelation of God which stems from man's participation in the life of God through the structures of being. This confirms what we have already pointed out in our introductory chapter, that ultimately for Tillich it is this universal, ontological revelation that is all-important, since it is only because we have this revelation deeply embedded in our own being that we can understand the significance
of every concrete revelation we receive. The fact that we have this inner revelation also prepares us to see that as far as Tillich is concerned it is only through an examination of the meaning of spirit in human life that we can come to understand the meaning of the Divine Spirit. The key to understanding lies within us. 29

II. THE CONCEPT OF SYMBOL AND THE DOCTRINE OF GOD

According to Tillich, therefore, God is to be understood as 'being-itself'. The question which this inevitably poses is how we can go on to speak meaningfully of such a God. We cannot, Tillich argues, literally express the truth about God in human terms, associated as they are with finite experience and the subject-object structure of language. How then can we speak about God?

Tillich's answer is that our language about God, or our knowledge of him, is symbolic. Only when we speak of God as 'being-itself' are we speaking literally, for this is a statement which in no way points beyond itself. 30 But apart from this every other statement about God must be symbolic. 'If anything beyond this bare assertion is said about God, it is no longer a direct and proper statement, no longer a concept. It is indirect, and it points to something beyond itself. In a word, it is symbolic'. 31

This brings us to one of the most important features of Tillich's theology: the concept of symbol. He says, 'The centre of my theological doctrine of the knowledge of God is the concept of symbol'. 32 We need therefore to spend a little time in considering this important concept. Tillich distinguishes between a symbol and a sign. Both point beyond themselves to something else, 33 but whereas a mere sign in no sense participates in the reality or power for which it stands,
this is precisely what a symbol does: it not only points beyond itself, it also participates in the power and meaning of that to which it points. For example, a flag is a meaningful symbol because it participates in the power of the king or nation which it symbolises; and similarly, the words of liturgical and poetic language participate in those experiences or situations which they represent, and thus become linguistic symbols which cannot be replaced. Tillich calls this participatory character of a symbol its 'representative' or 'basic' function: it represents that in the power of which it participates. This representative function of a symbol leads directly to its second or 'main' function, which is to open up levels of reality which would otherwise be hidden and which cannot be grasped in any other way. Thus the function of art, for example, is to open up levels of reality which cannot be otherwise perceived, and for this reason every artistic creation has a symbolic character. The same is true of different types of language, whether it be poetic, philosophical or scientific. Having opened up those levels of reality, the genuine symbol must also be able to initiate a response in the human soul by opening up a corresponding level of interior reality. So, says Tillich, the 'opening-up function' of the symbol has two aspects, 'namely, reality in deeper levels and the human soul in special levels'.

If this is so, then it is clear that symbols cannot just be replaced ad lib by other symbols in the same way as signs, for every symbol has a special function which it alone can fulfil. 'Genuine symbols are not interchangeable at all'. For symbols, unlike signs, are not arbitrarily invented; they are born. They are born out of the collective unconscious of the group to which they belong, which
acknowledges in this or that particular symbol the ultimate concern of its own being. 'This implies that the symbol is socially rooted and socially supported. Hence it is not correct to say that a thing is first a symbol and then gains acceptance; the process of becoming a symbol and the acceptance of it as a symbol belong together.' And just as this or that particular symbol is born, so also it can die, if the situation arises when it no longer draws out a 'yes' from the group unconscious, when it no longer opens up for the group those levels of exterior reality which initiate a response in the human soul.

So much for symbols in general: we must now turn to a consideration of religious symbols. It follows that the first characteristic of a religious symbol is that it participates in the ultimate reality to which it points. Any segment of finite reality which has become a vehicle of a concrete assertion about God, as a result of an experience of the Holy in a concrete encounter, not only points to God but also participates in the power of God. The crucial question is how a segment of finite reality can be the basis for any assertion about that which is ultimate. Tillich answers that this is possible precisely because everything that has being must necessarily participate in the power of 'being-itself'. This makes possible an analogy of finite things, an *analogia entis*, by means of which we can speak about God in a symbolic way. So the religious symbol opens up for us 'the depth dimension of reality itself, the dimension of reality which is the ground of every other dimension and every other depth... the ultimate power of being'. Furthermore, in doing this, it also opens up the experience of the dimension of this depth in the human soul: it initiates an interior response. As we have seen, if a symbol fails to initiate this response, it declines and dies, and this
is equally true of the religious symbol as of any other. There is a particular tendency for this to happen in an age such as our own, when in an increasing secular climate, the 'sacramental' or 'theonomous' significance of the material content of the symbol is often denied, so that symbols begin to lose their power and are in danger of disappearing altogether.  

What Tillich says here ties in very neatly with what he says about revelation. In his analysis of the meaning of revelation he pointed out that the numinous experience in which man encounters the mystery of the Holy, the power of being-itself, through certain phenomena or events, gives birth to symbols and myths which seek to preserve the original revelation. At the same time, because every revelatory experience must be an experience that is received, it must initiate a response in the human soul. So also the symbol which seeks to express the original revelation, fails in its function as a symbol unless it initiates the inner response. It is this that causes its eventual decline and death.

When a segment of finite reality, whether it be an object, word or action, becomes a religious symbol, it raises that particular segment of reality to a new level of significance, so that the reality becomes 'holy', or as we have said, 'sacramental'. Nevertheless, this does not mean that it is to be identified with the Holy itself, the ultimate reality to which it points and in which it participates. A true symbol, therefore, is both affirmed and negated, affirmed in the sense of its participation, negated in the sense that it always points beyond itself. It is when symbols are absolutised and identified with the Holy that idolatry is born, so that that which participates in the holy is now in danger of becoming demonic.
symbol fulfils its proper use, it is creative, revealing the hidden God and calling forth an inner response in man, but when it is absolutised and thus demonised it becomes inherently destructive.

Tillich distinguishes between two 'levels' of religious symbols, 'a supporting level in which religious objectivity is established and which is based in itself; and a level supported by it and pointing to objects of the other level'. The first level he refers to as 'objective religious symbols', the second level as 'self-transcending religious symbols', such as aids to devotion and so on. It is the first group with which he is mainly concerned. In this group he detects several types. The first and basic type is that of the divine beings, or in monotheistic religion, the supreme Being, "God". It is important that we distinguish two elements in this idea of God: the non-symbolic element, God as the ultimate reality, 'being-itself', which we have already discussed, and the symbolic element, the image of a highest being with the characteristics of highest perfection. There is therefore an immediate tension in the use of this basic symbol, and unless this is realised, there is always the possibility that the ultimate, or the Unconditioned, will itself become objectified, that God will be made into a thing, which leads as we have seen to demonic idolatry. So 'God as an object is a representation of the reality ultimately referred to in the religious act, but in the word "God" this objectivity is negated and at the same time its representative character is asserted'. The second group of objective religious symbols consists of those concerned with the nature and actions of God, such as love, mercy, and so on. In a sense these symbols presuppose that God is an object, although they do indicate the figurative nature of that presupposition. Because there is a
fundamental awareness that all knowledge of God is in some way of a symbolic nature, this immediately qualifies the way in which these symbols are used. Nevertheless, this does not undermine the truth such symbols seek to express. The third group of objective symbols consists of natural and historical objects which become 'holy' or 'theonomous' when drawn into the religious sphere. The most important of these are historical personalities, such as Jesus Christ or Gautama Buddha, who have become the objects of religious acts. As symbolic representations of the ultimate they have no place in the objective world, even though they were originally historical personalities. They have become cultic symbols in so far as 'they represent the presence of the Unconditioned transcendent in the empirical order'. This does not, of course, deny that they have an historical, empirical aspect, and it is the task of historical criticism to delineate between the two aspects and so prevent them from being demonised into false objectifications, 'by recognising the problematic character of the empirical element and by emphasising the importance of the symbolic element'. Yet their validity as religious symbols depends not on historical criticism, but rather on the measure of their effectiveness to express the ultimate. In this group also Tillich would presumably place the great sacraments: natural objects which have become sacramental in so far as they have been drawn into the sphere of the church and linked with the great historical events of the Gospel and their ontological significance. And lastly, the fourth group of objective symbols consists of what Tillich calls 'pointing symbols', which include signs and actions which have special significance in that they refer to the great symbols of religious faith: ritual acts, perhaps, which point to the primary symbols
which in their turn point to the ultimate. Sometimes it is, of course, difficult to distinguish these from Tillich's second 'level' of symbols, and for this reason they need not concern us here.

Despite the immense variety of symbols, Tillich realises that in an increasingly secular society there may be those who would wish to move away from symbolic language altogether, and speak more directly about the ultimate reality. It is impossible to do this, however, for there can be no total penetration of the ultimate by the finite, no 'unmythical treatment of the unconditioned transcendent', as he has demonstrated. If it were possible, then reality and symbol would become identical. What is needed therefore is not a move away from symbolism in our attempt to speak about God, but rather to appreciate the real nature of our language when we attempt to express in human terms something of the meaning of the ultimate. And in this, the concept of symbol, even though it affirms the fact that finite reality is not fully united with the ground of its being, is basic to our fuller understanding.

Before making any critical comments on Tillich's concept of symbol, it is important to point out the central place this sort of concept holds in our talking about God. Though the significance, and indeed necessity, of using symbols in religious language and experience has always been recognised in Christian thought to a greater or lesser extent, the clarification of theological expression demanded by contemporary linguistic philosophy has led to a new exploration and understanding of the meaning of symbol. To this examination Tillich makes an important contribution. His analysis is detailed and painstaking, and though there are points which certainly need clarification, it is obvious that it merits our criticism precisely
because it is so penetrating. Tillich's assertion that it is impossible to get away from some sort of symbolism in our talking about God is one with which most contemporary theologians would agree. If one considers also the new evaluation of symbols in depth psychology, and its influence on theological expression, one could say that in the religious world we are on the verge of a new and dynamic appreciation of the use of symbols in man's search for the meaning and ultimate concern of life. If, to put it in the words of Antony Bridge, 'there are good grounds for believing that men are longing to be freed from the intellectual and spiritual limitations imposed upon them by the narrow dogmatic assumptions of humanist materialism, and that a return to symbolic and analogical ways of thought and communication is not as improbable a contingency as it may superficially appear to be', then the work of Tillich is significant not only for theological thought, but for the whole of man's cultural life.

The main difficulty in Tillich's doctrine of symbolism is that of the precise meaning of 'participation'. This is a word which he uses in a variety of contexts. We have already noted that in his attempted synthesis between biblical religion and ontology, the concept of participation of man in the divine life is of fundamental importance in any reinterpretation of the theology of encounter, and later we shall see how important the same concept is to what Tillich calls 'the transcendent unity of unambiguous life' in which, in the power of the Spirit, the subject-object structure of existential reality is overcome. In fact, Tillich himself admits that he uses the concept in a variety of ways: 'the symbol participates in the reality it symbolises; the knower participates in the known; the lover participates in the beloved; the existential participates in the essences which make it
what it is under the conditions of existence... Every relation includes a kind of participation. W.L. Rowe says that try as we may it is impossible for us to define with any degree of precision what Tillich means by participation for this very reason, and this makes it doubly difficult to say just what Tillich means when he says that symbols participate in the reality to which they point. On the other hand, Gustave Weigel wishes to be more precise, and he suggests that Tillich's use of the word means that the participant is a constituent element of that in which it participates, and J. Heywood Thomas has pointed out that Tillich nowhere denies this. Now although this suggestion may not apply in every case, in his analysis of symbol, Tillich's use of the concept of participation is certainly open to the interpretation Weigel puts upon it. In other words, it suggests the sort of ontological continuity that we have already mentioned in our discussion on the relation between ultimate reality and the finite power of being. So for Tillich the possibility of symbolism must rest on a concept of ontological participation which we must take with the utmost seriousness. One realises that, according to Tillich, this possibility does not become an actuality until there is a revelatory experience of and creative encounter with the Holy which gives birth to particular symbols, determining which segments of finite reality actually becomes symbolic in the experience of man. But this does not undermine the fact that for Tillich the essential validity of the religious symbol must rest on a view of reality in which there is an ontological continuity between the finite and its ultimate ground.

This is one reason why one feels rather uneasy about Tillich's equation of symbol with the traditional concept of analogy. Although
this concept itself is open to different shades of interpretation, it
is not tied to the idea of ontological participation, as is Tillich's
doctrine of symbol. Certainly it presupposes a relationship between
the infinite and finite, but the relationship has not been defined in
this way, at least not in its classical formulations. The grounds
for analogy are seen rather in the similarity or likeness which is
made possible by the creature's dependence on the creator for its life.
There is no suggestion here that the finite is an aspect of the
infinite, a constituent part of ultimate reality. For this reason one
prefers the concept of analogy in our attempt to understand our
language about God rather than Tillich's understanding of symbol.50

The comparison between symbol and analogy raises also the
possibility of 'analogous literalism'. Tillich, as we have seen,
refuses to admit that there is any sense in which religious language
may be interpreted literally. But Gustave Weigel maintains that there
is an ambiguity about the word 'literal' which Tillich fails to
recognise and which may mislead us here. 'Is it simply true', he
asks, 'that we cannot use any word literally of God?'.51 To use
a word analogically, rather than symbolically, he states, does not
necessarily divest it of any literal meaning. We can say that the leg
of a table is analogous to the leg of a man in the sense that both have
certain functions in common: they may not be identical, but in either
case we are using the word literally. So also we can predicate certain
things of God because there is an analogous relationship between God
and the created order. That which we predicate of God and the creation
may not be identical in each situation, but this does not mean to say
that as far as each separate situation is concerned it is not literally
ture. For example, we say that man is wise and we say that God is wise.
In saying this we are affirming that there is a certain similarity between the wisdom of man and the wisdom of God which enables us to draw the analogy, even though we would not pretend that the two are one and the same thing. Though we are not using the same word identically in each situation, this does not mean to say that it is not being used literally. We are meaning that literally God is wise, even though we are recognising that his wisdom is different from our wisdom. So, says Weigel, 'the concept analogy tells us that there is the a priori possibility of analogous literalism'.

Weigel has an important point here which must not be overlooked. Perhaps Tillich's reply would be that even though we may concede the point to some degree, we are still unable to say literally what the wisdom of God means and involves in all its aspects. It may be true that God is wise, or loving, or kind, but we cannot express what that may mean except in human terms, which immediately means inadequate terms, in that we are trying to say more than what our language will allow us to say. Nevertheless, if one understands literalism as 'analogous literalism' rather than verbal exactitude to the furthest degree, there is no reason why one should not speak of much of our language about God in this way. It would seem, for example, particularly appropriate to the second group of objective religious symbols in Tillich's analysis, the group which includes such predicates of God as love, mercy and truth, and more particularly for our present purpose when we speak of God as Spirit. John Baillie says that when the Westminster Shorter Catechism refers to God as Spirit who is 'eternal and unchangeable, in his being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth', it is using language that is directly applicable.

It is a point that must certainly not be overlooked.
III. GOD AS THE 'LIVING' GOD AND THE MEANING OF THE 'SPIRIT'

The most significant symbol for God in the biblical revelation is that of life. God is the 'living God' for both Hebrews and Christians. Yet, asks Tillich, in what sense can we say that God lives? His answer is that we can say that 'God lives in so far as he is the ground of life'. The symbol of 'life' is thus an adequate one and affirms that our life is rooted in him. Yet more can be said than this. We can make certain observations about the processes of life, certain ontological observations, which enable us to speak more fully about the nature of being-itself, albeit symbolically. God is the structure of being and all being participates in this structure, and thus from an examination of the ontological structures we can point to certain aspects within the nature of ultimate reality itself.

Tillich's definition of life follows in the classical and German idealist traditions. The classical emphasis is seen in his definition of life as 'the process in which potential being becomes actual being'. In this process three elements are present: potentiality, actuality and the process of actualisation. The relationship between these three elements is worked out according to the dialectic characteristic of German idealist philosophy. Without its actualisation, potential being would remain as complete identity, power without form, ground without expression. It thus needs to become actualised and in so doing separates itself from itself in form, expression and meaning. However, actual being cannot be completely separated from the power which it expresses. There must be a continuous movement between the potential and the actual, the actual and the potential, so that both separation and reunion are essential to every life process, and without this dialectical movement there would be no life at all.
When we apply the symbol of life to God, therefore, according to Tillich, we are asserting 'that he is the eternal process in which separation is posited and overcome by reunion', and it is in this sense that God lives. The dialectic of life as we know it is a symbol of the structures of the divine life, the process symbolically present within the life of God. We are thus able to speak of three 'moments' within the process of the divine life. The first two 'moments' reflect the two ontological elements of potential and actual being, of power and meaning, of dynamics and form, the 'subject' and 'object' sides of the ontological structure. The one speaks of the divine depth, 'the basis of Godhead, that which makes God God', the inexhaustible ground of being. The other speaks of the divine form, classically referred to as the *logos*. It is this form or meaning that opens up the divine ground, 'its infinity and its darkness', and 'makes its fulness distinguishable, definite, finite', and without this principle of separation, of self-objectification, the first principle would remain 'chaos, burning fire' rather than creative ground. One problem here is that this second moment, in its actuality, or expressiveness, does for Tillich necessitate finitude, and this raises the question as to whether finitude can have any part in the divine life, a problem which we have already mentioned. Tillich is aware of this difficulty, and is hesitant to posit finitude, with the accompanying principle of non-being, in the divine life literally. He therefore insists that we are only positing it symbolically, so that in the life of God the element of finitude is dialectically present. This he maintains must be so if there is nothing outside God, if God is truly to be ultimate. So God is 'infinite because he has the finite . . . within himself united with his infinity'.
However we are meant to understand this, the point is that the self-expression of God in actual form is the universal *logos*, and this universal *logos* is to be found in all rational beings, giving knowledge of God by means of symbols and thus opening up for man the depths of the divine reality.

This leads us to the third 'moment' in the process of the divine life: the unitive action which actualises, fulfils and reunites the other two principles. This corresponds to the third element in the dialectical triad. It is this principle that underlies the whole process of life as we know it, uniting the ontological elements, summarised as dynamics and form, with the very *telos* of life itself. It is this unitive action in life which brings together the whole structure of being and enables it to fulfil itself. This principle Tillich calls 'spirit', the unity of power and meaning. What this means for the doctrine of the Spirit Tillich states thus:

Spirit is the unity of the ontological elements and the *telos* of life. Actualised as life, being-itself is fulfilled as spirit. The word *telos* expresses the relation of life and spirit more precisely than the words "aim" or "goal". It expresses the inner directedness of life toward spirit, the urge of life to become spirit, to fulfil itself as spirit. *Telos* stands for the inner, essential, necessary aim, for that in which a being fulfils its own nature. God as living is God fulfilled in himself and therefore spirit. God is spirit. This is the most embracing, direct, and unrestricted symbol for the divine life. It does not need to be balanced with another symbol, because it includes all the ontological elements.

Several important points stand out here. In the first place, the symbol 'spirit' is the most profound symbol we can use for God. In one sense it refers to a special principle at work within the Godhead, yet in another sense it symbolises the whole life of God, in so far as it is the Spirit which makes it possible both for God to go out of himself and express himself in the *logos*, and reunite the *logos*...
with the divine fulness. In this way, Tillich says he is affirming the Johannine text, 'God is Spirit'. Secondly, in so far as the \textit{logos}, bringing together one group of ontological elements, is embraced by the Spirit, and the \textit{logos} itself is expressed through finite actuality, it is the Spirit who not only makes the finite possible, but who also reunites it with the ground of its being. The Spirit eternally unites the finite with the infinite. Within the ultimate reality, as we have seen, Tillich says that we can only assert this symbolically, or dialectically: 'through the Spirit the divine fulness is posited in the divine life as something definite, and at the same time it is united in the divine ground. The finite is posited within the process of the divine life, but is reunited with the infinite within the same process'. But this assertion is also important in our understanding of the work of the Spirit in relation to the infinite and finite in existential reality, for as we shall see it is the same unitive action of the Spirit that is still at work, relating all things to their divine ground, and overcoming the existential split between subject and object which characterises life as we know it, thereby creating unambiguous life through transcendent reunion. Thirdly, in expanding the affirmation that the Spirit includes all the ontological elements, Tillich says that the meaning of spirit is 'built up through the meaning of the ontological elements and their union'. The polarity between potential and actual being in every life process is seen in the ontological elements of individualisation and participation, dynamics and form, freedom and destiny, in each case the subjective side of the ontological structure standing over against the objective side. Yet if life is not to be disrupted these polarities must continually be held together so that there is no exclusive emphasis
on one side or the other. It is the spirit that transcends this duality and effects a reconciliation and unity between the various elements, the all-embracing function in which all elements of being participate. It is vital then that we resist all attempts to define spirit as part of life. Spirit is the symbol which refers to life in its entirety, and if we say that life as spirit can be found only in man, this is because in him alone among the finite creation is the structure of being completely realised.

However, when we go on to speak of God as Spirit, we are saying that in him there is the perfect unity of those ontological elements which we have already discerned in the life of man. The history of theological thought has shown the difficulty of balancing one side of the ontological polarity against the other when speaking of God. Thus, Tillich points out, there has always been the tendency to over-emphasise the individuality of God as a person, a tendency which must be balanced by a real appreciation of the meaning of participation. The scholastics spoke of the polarity of dynamics and form, of potentiality and actuality, and in so doing ran the risk of ignoring the creative process of life, which is actualisation rather than actuality, effectively uniting the actual with its potential ground. It has always been easy to apply the concept of freedom to God, but it must not be forgotten that God is also his own destiny, in the sense of the ultimacy of his own being, and in his eternal participation in becoming and in history. So a full application of the ontological elements to being-itself prevents any one-sided doctrine of God from developing. In this way it can be seen that the symbol of life, filled out in the all-embracing symbol of Spirit, when applied to God opens up for us the richness of the meaning of ultimate reality.
So Tillich concludes:

God is not nearer to one "part" of being or to a special function of being than he is to another. As Spirit he is as near to the creative darkness of the unconscious as he is to the critical light of cognitive reason. Spirit is the power through which meaning lives, and it is the meaning which gives direction to power. God as Spirit is the ultimate unity of power and meaning. In contrast to Nietzsche, who identified the two assertions that God is Spirit and that God is dead, we must say that God is the living God because he is Spirit. 69

It is true to say with William Nicholls 'that Tillich thinks of God more typically as Spirit than in any other way', 70 and that the Spirit is not only the unity between the elements of power and meaning in the Godhead, 71 but also the 'ultimate synthesis to which the dialectic of being and existence points'. 72 Tillich's analysis of the symbols of 'life' and 'Spirit' when applied to God is certainly very profound and merits our full consideration. However, there are several points of criticism we would make at this stage. The first is to question the assumption that the meaning of life and spirit can only be understood in dialectical terms. It is by no means proven that the elements of power and expression in life are two opposites that stand in need of reconciliation or synthesis. This is a transference from logic to ontology whose only authority is the classical tradition of philosophy in which Hegel and the German idealists stand. One is tempted to retort, 'Where in fact are these elements opposed saved in the dialectician's head?' 73 Tillich is thus filling out the concept of spirit with ideas which are purely speculative. Thus though we may allow that there is a degree of affinity between human life and the life of God, between the spirit of man and the divine Spirit which makes it possible to speak of God meaningfully, we cannot apply a dialectical understanding of spirit to God because such an understanding
itself is open to question.

The second point follows on from this. In his concept of symbol we saw how Tillich referred to the religious symbol as that which opens up 'the depth dimension of reality itself', which it is able to do because of its participation in that reality. By speaking of God as Spirit, therefore, he is affirming that the human spirit opens up the meaning of the divine life because it participates ontologically in the life of God. We have already suggested that the concept of participation must necessarily imply a continuity between the symbol and the reality to which it points. It would seem then, if we are going to take the doctrine of symbolism seriously, that Tillich is virtually affirming a continuity, a point of identity, between the human spirit and the divine Spirit that is immediately suspect in the light of Christian theology. This does not mean that there is no affinity between the two. But it does mean that in any parallels we may draw we must be careful to maintain the ontological distinction between man and God.

This leads us to question Tillich's contention that the finite must indeed be posited in the life of God, yet not literally, but dialectically. It is not easy to see just what this means. Are we to infer that because we apply the concept of finitude dialectically rather than literally it is any the less real? In other words, that finitude ceases to be what we really mean by finitude when we apply it to God, but rather some sort of abstract principle of finitude which it is difficult to define with any further precision? This certainly seems to be one way out of the incongruities in the assertion that God has the 'finite within himself united with his infinity', but it is unconvincing. We cannot say that it is actually true of God, so
we say that it is dialectically true! If this is so, then all our
talk about God seems to be little more than a set of dialectical
abstractions. It would surely be much better to say, in accordance
with traditional Christian theology, that God has the capacity within
himself to create finite beings. There is another possibility, however.
For if we say that God and the world are ultimately one, ultimately
continuous, as the concept of participation and the language of
symbol seem to suggest, it would certainly be possible to posit finitude
within the life of God, seeing that the world itself is not to be
considered as something outside the divine life. One feels that this
is what Tillich is really wanting to say. Yet there is obviously
here a moving away from traditional Christian emphases on the relation
between God and the world, which would certainly not consider the
world as outside the experience of God but which would equally empha­
sise that it is not a constituent element in the divine life. Perhaps
it is because Tillich senses this vital discrepancy that he tries to
express his conviction in 'non-literal' terms, and thus avoid parting
company too obviously with the Reformed tradition of Christian theology
in which he stands. 74, 75

IV. THE TRINITARIAN SYMBOLS

Tillich contends that the analysis of the symbols 'life' and
'Spirit', with the dialectical emphasis on the three 'moments' in
the life process, suggests that we have arrived at a 'pretrinitarian
formula which makes trinitarian thinking meaningful'. 76 It is a
pre-Christian framework which can be filled out more specifically in
Christian theology by the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, which can
only appear with the assertion that Jesus is the Christ. 77 Yet even
without this assertion, we can still speak of trinitarian principles, based on the concept of God as Spirit. This does not mean that the Trinity ceases to be a mystery. All being is mystery, and the concept of the Trinity is indeed the mystery of being. But, as we have seen, the mystery is dialectical rather than irrational or paradoxical. Once this is realised we shall not run the risk of reducing it to a numerical riddle. We shall see that it is a profound expression of the mystery in all being and therefore in the structure of being itself, a 'precise description of all life processes'.

Alongside this ontological motive for trinitarian thinking, Tillich places another motive, which from the point of view of human experience precedes it: that of the tension between the absolute and concrete elements in our ultimate concern. 'The concreteness of man's ultimate concern drives him towards polytheistic structures; the reaction of the absolute element against these drives him towards monotheistic structures; and the need for the balance between the concrete and the absolute drives him towards trinitarian structures'. Consequently, in the great monotheistic systems, in order that God shall be known, there appear divine figures which mediate the ultimate in concrete form. For example, in certain types of monarchical monotheism, the highest god sends 'lower divinities' or 'half-gods'. Then in mystical monotheism, we could cite the example of Brahma, Vishnu and Shiva, united together in a divine triad as symbols of the Brahman principle. In Judaism, there are mediating powers such as Wisdom, Word and Glory, or the heavenly angel messengers, culminating in the expectation of a Messiah. All these, claims Tillich, are preparations for a full trinitarian doctrine. The idea of a trinitarian principle is already there. 'The trinitarian problem is the
problem of the unity between ultimacy and concreteness in the living God.

The third motive for trinitarian thinking, says Tillich, is the specifically Christian motive, 'the threefold manifestation of God as creative power, as saving love, and as ecstatic transformation', the culmination of the Christian revelation, summarised in the symbolic formula Father, Son and Holy Spirit. 61 There are two things that need to be said in connection with this. Firstly, it should not be thought of as purely subjective, three different ways of looking at the same thing. The symbols of Father, Son and Holy Spirit in the Christian revelation 'have a fundamentum in re, a foundation in reality'. Each symbol refers to a different aspect of God, the Father as the aspect expressed in the symbol of creation, the Son as the aspect expressed in the symbol of salvation, and the Spirit as the aspect of God 'ecstatically present in the human spirit and implicitly in everything which constitutes the dimension of spirit'. However, there is a subjective element necessarily present, for the trinitarian symbols are also a religious discovery that had to be 'made, formulated, and defended'. The story of that discovery is the substance of the New Testament, and its formulation and defence part of the history of the early church. Secondly, because the emphasis in this third motive for trinitarian thinking is so tied up with the subject of revelation, we should not be blinded to the fact that the previous two motives are also revelatory. The motive of the tension between the absolute and concrete elements in our ultimate concern also stems from revelatory experiences of man's encounter with the Holy at various stages of his life and history, and the dialectical motive is based on what we have called ontological revelation, enabling us to arrive at trinitarian
thinking through an analysis of life as we know it. In fact, says Tillich, 'there is no such thing as trinitarian "speculation" (where "speculation" means conceptual phantasies). The substance of all trinitarian thought is given in revelatory experiences, and the form has the same rationality that all theology, as a work of the Logos, must have'.

We have already mentioned Tillich's attempt at a reinterpretation of the Christological dogma in terms of 'dynamic-relational' concepts. Its relevance to the doctrine of the Trinity, and our understanding of the trinitarian dogma is obvious. The problem which Nicaea and Chalcedon sought to resolve in relation to the divinity of Christ, namely how ultimate concern can be expressed in two divine figures, is now extended to pneumatological considerations. We are faced with the problem of the divinity of the Spirit, and how a further figure can also be an expression of ultimate reality. 'How can ultimate concern be expressed in more than one hypostasis?' Or, in terms of religious devotion, which is particularly concerned with the life of the Spirit, when one prays to one persona in whom the divine substance exists, is one addressing someone different from another of the three to whom the same prayer may also be directed? If not, why not just pray to God? If so, are we not in danger of falling into tritheism and thus opening up to the way of prayer to others in addition to God?

Tillich is certain that there is no answer to these questions along traditional lines. The solution to the question of the Spirit must lie along the same lines of reinterpretation as that of the question of the Christ, in terms of dynamic relation rather than static substance, though unfortunately he does not spell out for us what this may involve. He sees a precedence for this relational interpretation of trinitarian
doctrine in Augustine, who emphasises that the three hypostases of the Trinity do not refer to three individuals, but rather to three different modes of being within the one personality. Had this Western reinterpretation been allowed to develop, maintains Tillich, our understanding of the Trinity may have been somewhat clearer, but the Eastern formula remained, and with it the persistent temptation to tritheism.

Tillich feels that several consequences followed from this refusal to consider new ways of trinitarian thinking. In the first place, the framework of trinitarian symbolism was so influenced by the Greek interpretation of reality in terms of 'grades' or 'levels' that it became eventually possible to speak of the subordination of the Son to the Father, and the Spirit to both. Secondly, any later attempt to deviate from the formula became heretical, as well as politically dangerous. Thirdly, the real purpose of the doctrine was forgotten, and the formula 'became an impenetrable mystery, put on the altar to be adored', a numerical riddle, a weapon for ecclesiastical authoritarianism and suppression of thought. Fourthly, in Protestantism, a more severe consequence began to emerge. This was the tendency to unitarian ways of thinking. As a denomination, Unitarianism as such never extended far and wide, yet its influence on Protestantism was profound. For no new understanding of the Trinity was produced for many centuries, and the dogma remained stultified, though never exactly rejected. Falling into disuse, it tended to be replaced in practice by a type of 'Christocentric unitarianism', which emphasised the teachings of Jesus at the expense of any attempt to understand the mystery of God, and also prevented a real appreciation of the Spirit of God at work in the church and the world. Despite this, the trinitarian creeds remained the hallmark of orthodoxy in Protestantism, and trinitarian formulae are
still used in Protestant worship. Finally, a more indirect consequence of the similarity between traditional trinitarian formulae and tritheism is the way in which this tendency opened up in Catholicism moves towards a quaternity, by elevating the Virgin Mary to such an extent that there is always the possibility of her becoming a matter of ultimate concern. This danger is seen when one studies the history of the symbol, and it is in this context particularly that one must consider as dangerous the doctrine of the co-redemptrix. Part of this elevation of the Virgin Mary is obviously a reaction against the interpretation of the Godhead in terms of male symbols from which even the Spirit does not escape. Such an emphasis on masculine symbols does not satisfy the psychological need for devotion to the feminine principle, evident in all religions, even in Protestantism, where often an effeminate Jesus is to be found. Tillich suggests that two things must be emphasised in order to rectify this. Firstly, it should be pointed out that the correspondence of the number 'three' to the intrinsic dialectics of life is itself a safeguard against using any additional symbols in our description of ultimate concern. And secondly, it should be underlined that God is above any distinction between male and female. In fact, the symbol 'ground of being' could point equally to the 'mother quality of giving birth, carrying, and embracing' as to the more masculine role of 'calling back, resisting independence of the created, and swallowing it'. Similarly, in the concept of the Logos, revealed as man in Jesus Christ, the self-sacrifice there to be observed transcends any male-female alternative. The very act of self-sacrifice is the denial of sexual differentiation. The concept of the Spirit as ecstatic transformation likewise transcends both rational and emotional elements in life, which are usually attributed to male and female types respectively.
Thus the personalism of traditional religion, as expressed in the masculine image of God, must be overcome, and in Tillich's opinion, the trinitarian symbols, when understood as he would interpret them, have the power to do this.

Finally, mention should be made of the way in which the trinitarian symbols need to be correlated to the existential questions man asks. 'Like every theological symbol, the trinitarian symbolism must be understood as an answer to the questions implied in man's predicament.' It is in fact the most inclusive answer to the existential question. As we have seen, the human predicament is characterised by three concepts: finitude with respect to his essential being as a creature, estrangement with respect to his existential being in time and space, and ambiguity with respect to his participation in life universal. Each of these questions is answered by a specific trinitarian symbol: finitude by the doctrine of God and its symbols, estrangement by the doctrine of the Christ and its symbols, ambiguity by the doctrine of the Spirit and its symbols. These answers express 'that which is a matter of ultimate concern' in symbols received from revelatory experiences, and the truth of these symbols 'lies in their power to express the ultimacy of the ultimate in all directions'. Every problem confronting man, therefore, according to Tillich, is answered in a nutshell in the doctrine of the Trinity. In conclusion, therefore, the Trinity is not an irrelevant speculation; it is a matter of deep existential concern.

We have already questioned the validity of Tillich's claim that there is a dialectical structure within reality which provides an ontological foundation for the doctrine of the Trinity. To this we may now add one or two other criticisms. In the first place, it is difficult to see why the tension between the absolute and concrete elements in our
ultimate concern should lead to trinitarian thinking as such. Now it may be true that things often seem to come in threes and also that we find the number three useful for the purposes of analytical thinking, in which case it may be helpful to think about God in this sort of way. But this is not an argument for saying that the reality of God is essentially trinitarian. There is no essential reason why the number three should be chosen to resolve the tension between the concrete and the absolute. Why not, for example, choose four (the number held to signify completion in certain magical forms), or two (as in Zoroastrianism and the dualistic religions), or even one (as in Judaism and Islam)? One concludes that Tillich's preference for three lies rather in other directions - namely his dialectical view of reality - and that this is his ultimate justification for selecting this number rather than any other.

One must also question Tillich's implication that there are vestigia trinitatis in other religions which act as a preparation for the doctrine of the Trinity. Though the Hindu triad of Brahma, Vishnu and Shiva is frequently referred to as the 'Hindu trinity' in the West, on closer examination it has very little in common with the Christian understanding of the trinitarian God. If one is to draw a parallel, then presumably one must place the Spirit alongside the god Shiva, and this is clearly unacceptable. Similarly, one sees very little resemblance between the early Jewish emphasis on 'Wisdom, Word and Glory' and the Christian 'Father, Son and Holy Spirit', particularly in view of the fact that in Christian circles both Wisdom and Word became synonymous with the Son. It may well be that these are genuine attempts to solve the problem of the unity of differing facets of the divine reality in other religions, but this is not the same as saying that they are preparations for a full trinitarian concept of God. If so, one would have expected Judaism to
move towards a doctrine of the Trinity long ago. So Tillich takes it for granted far too easily that the tension between the concrete and absolute elements in our ultimate concern is a proven motive for trinitarian thinking. His assertion is purely speculative, and has no justification in Christian theology whatever, whose only motive for trinitarian thinking about God is the Christian revelation of God in Christ, mediated to us through the Holy Spirit.

Tillich's analysis of the trinitarian dogma states the problem clearly enough, but his attempt at working towards a solution is in need of further elucidation. One certainly does not object in principle to his interpreting the Trinity in terms of dynamic relations, but it is clear that when he does this he is really doing something other than describing the inner relations of the Godhead. He is describing more significantly the essential relation between God and the world culminating in the life of man, so that the divine nature of Christ becomes eternal God-man-unity and the Spirit that which effects this transcendent unity between God and man. Such an interpretation is rather different from how orthodox theology has normally understood the Trinity. As Nicholls says, 'Tillich's doctrine of God is evidently not trinitarian in the traditional sense . . . The three aspects of the doctrine of God do not correspond to the three persons of a traditional Trinity'. They correspond rather to the three 'moments' in the dynamic relation between God and the world, pointing to the essential unity between the infinite and the finite, between God and man. In this, the influence of nineteenth-century German monistic and dialectical philosophy stands out clearly, and it is in this context that one must perhaps view Tillich's lack of interest in other and more orthodox contemporary treatments of trinitarian doctrine and his failure to consider their contribution to a new understanding of the Trinity in
One must, of course, point out that Tillich does not set out to give a completely new statement of trinitarian doctrine. In his conclusion to his brief section on the doctrine in his Systematic Theology, he states: 'The doctrine of the Trinity is not closed. It can be neither discarded nor accepted in its traditional form. It must be kept open in order to fulfil its original function - to express in embracing symbols the self-manifestation of the Divine Life to man'. Certainly it would be dangerous to consider the doctrine as closed. Yet, whilst one certainly appreciates many of the points Tillich has raised, one cannot help but feel that if we proceed in the direction along which he is moving, we shall finish up with a doctrine of the Trinity which is something rather other than what it originally set out to be.
Notes to Chapter One

1. The doctrine of God is discussed fully in ST, I, pp. 181-321.

2. ST, I, p. 207.


4. The Courage to Be, pp. 152f. See also ST, I, pp. 299f.

5. Ibid., p. 152.


8. Ibid., p. 168.

9. Ibid.

10. See ibid., chapter 6.

11. ST, I, p. 234.


14. Ibid.,

15. Ibid., p. 262.


18. Ibid., p. 45.


20. Ibid.

21. Ibid., p. 263.


23. G.W. Leibnitz, Monodology, 1720. See also the draft of a letter to Arnauld (1686), where Leibnitz analyses his concept of cause (trans. in R. Latta, Leibnitz' Monodology etc. Oxford U.P. 1925, pp. 204 ff.) For Tillich's assessment of Leibnitz, see Perspectives, pp. 40 ff.; see also Ninian Smart, Historical Selections in the Philosophy of
24. ST, I, p. 264.
25. Ibid.
27. See above, pp. 18ff., and below, pp. 48f., 52f., 150f., 432ff.
28. See above, p.13f.
29. See below, p.139f.
30. Tillich seems to modify this statement in his introduction to ST, II, where he says that the only statement that we can make about God that is not symbolic is 'the statement that everything we say about God is symbolic' (p.9). If this is so, then his earlier statement that God as being-itself is to be taken literally must be ruled out. The later statement does not, of course, tell us anything about God but only about statements made about God. However, whether we are still at liberty to interpret the concept of God as 'being-itself' as literal or whether we should see it as symbolic, does not alter the fact that 'being-itself' is a description that must have much more content if it is to have any meaning for us, and this content can only be added according to Tillich by using symbolic language.
31. ST, I, p. 265.
34. Theology of Culture, p. 57.
36. Ibid., p. 16.
37. ST, I, p. 265.
38. Theology of Culture, p. 59.
40. See above, p.11f.
41. Myth and Symbol, p. 27.
42. Ibid., p. 28.
43. Ibid., p. 30.
44. Ibid., p. 33.
45. In 'The Life and Death of Symbols', in Ibid., p. 75.
46. ST, I, p. 196.
47. W.L. Rowe analyses the concept of participation in his book Religious Symbols and God, pp. 112ff. He dismisses the suggestion that by participation Tillich means either structural similarity or similarity in the sense that the symbol evokes from a person the same response as the thing symbolised, though the latter interpretation may legitimately be considered as a genuine consequence of participation. "The basic reason (for this) is that similarity of emotional response belongs to the level of the phenomenological description of religious experience, whereas participation is for Tillich, an ontological category and therefore belongs to the level of ontological explanation".
50. For a discussion on analogy in Aquinas, see F.C. Copleston, Aquinas, London, Penguin Books, 1955, pp. 134-141. Herbert McCabe is of the opinion that too much has been read into Aquinas' alleged teaching on analogy. St. Thomas' real concern, he maintains, is that we can use words to mean more than they mean to us - that we can use words to "try to mean" what God is like, that we can reach out to God with our words even though they do not circumscribe what he is" (Appendix 4 on 'Analogy', in St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Vol. 3 (la-12-13), ed. & trans. by H. McCabe, London, Blackfriars, 1963, p. 106.) If McCabe is right, it would certainly be mistaken to build a doctrine such as Tillich's concept of symbol on Aquinas' teaching about analogy.
52. Ibid., p. 194.
54. A similar point is made by certain process philosophers. 'The crucial insight of the neoclassical theology Hartshorne has pioneered in developing,' writes Schubert Ogden, 'is that God is to be conceived in strict analogy to the human self or person' (The Reality of God, London, SCM Press, 1967, p. 175). This is possible because the divine Self is related to all other selves through his eternal omnipresence. This means that there is not only an analogical sense, but also a literal sense, in which certain fundamental concepts are applied to God (see note in Ibid., p. 175, and reference to Hartshorne's article, 'The Idea of God - Literal or Analogical?', in the Christian Scholar, June 1956, p. 136.)
55. *ST*, I, p. 268.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
58. The concept of 'moment' is Hegelian. God, as Absolute Spirit (cf. Tillich's contention that 'Spirit' is the most all-embracing symbol for God) posits itself in three forms, which correspond to the three stages in the dialectical process. As Welch summarises it, 'Spirit is the eternal process of self-differentiation and resumption, of "diremption" and reconciliation' (C. Welch, *The Trinity in Contemporary Theology*, London, SCM Press, 1953, p. 11).
60. See above, p. 38.
62. Ibid., p. 276.
63. Ibid.
67. For a full treatment of this theme, see *ST*, I, pp. 220ff.
69. Ibid.
71. Ibid., p. 264.
72. Ibid., p. 240.
74. J. Heywood Thomas comments: 'From this perfectly valid assertion (a metaphorical one) that the creature is eternally hid in the creator's life (Tillich) wrongly deduced that the forms of finitude are, in a literal sense, also present in the life of God.' He points out that such a deduction can never be compatible with biblical theology. 'The eternity of God is indeed related to time but not as a genus to a species. When the Bible talks of God sharing in time it does not suggest that he is "temporal"' (op. cit., p. 74.)
According to H.D. Lewis, the general trend of Christian theology has asserted that the supposition that God as ultimate or absolute being must include all reality in itself comes about from trying to bring within our own comprehension the elusive relation of God to the world which is essentially beyond the categories of our own thought (H.D. Lewis and R.L. Slater, *The Study of Religions*, London, Penguin, 1969, p. 150).

83. See above, p. 21f.
84. *ST*, III, p. 308.
86. *ST*, III, p. 309.
I. THE CONCEPT OF LIFE

The doctrine of the Spirit in Tillich's system is developed in correlation with the ambiguities and questions implied in the concept and categories of life. In this chapter therefore we shall examine Tillich's understanding of life and his analysis of the specific problems associated with it.¹

As we have already noted, Tillich's definition of life proceeds along classical lines. Life is the 'actuality of being', or better still, the 'actualisation of being', the process in which that which is potential is actualised,² and this interpretation of life unites the two main qualifications of being employed by Tillich, the essential and the existential, a crucial distinction in his system. On the one hand, potentiality is 'that kind of being which has the power, the dynamic, to become actual';³ it is essential being. On the other hand, when being is actualised, it subjects itself to the conditions of existence: it is existential being, even though it still retains its essential character. If we thus define life as a 'mixture' of essential and existential elements, then it will be seen that we are speaking of something that is universally present, for the process of actualisation is everywhere to be observed, in the inorganic sphere as much as in the realms of organic life and human experience, and this is important for Tillich's analysis.

Basic to Tillich's analysis of life is his concept of multi-dimensional unity.⁴ Traditionally, the problem of how to create a unity in life in spite of its diversity has been solved by postulating a hierarchical order, in which every 'level' of reality has its proper
place, moving from the lower levels upwards until God himself is reached. Tillich feels that such a solution is both artificial and too rigidly defined; it allows no participation of one type of reality in another, which is contrary to all physical, biological and psychological principles; and it is particularly dangerous in its implications for theology, not only because it insists upon a fundamental difference of kind between religion and culture, the one being God-given and the other man-made, but also more insidiously because it leads to a 'theological supranaturalism' which maintains an eternal distinction between man and God. Instead of unity we are, in fact, left with some sort of ontological pluralism.

According to Tillich, a much more accurate way of describing the unity of life is to think of it in terms of a series of dimensions, each of which intersects and interpenetrates the other without any conflict such as one inevitably finds in a hierarchical interpretation of reality. This is not to deny that there is conflict in life, but to affirm that the conflict arises not from the essential structure of reality itself but rather from the ambiguities which inevitably follow when the dimensions of life become actualised in an existential state. This interpretation of life's dimensions means two things. It means that every 'lower' dimension is actually present in every 'higher' dimension, and in this sense the presence of the 'lower' dimensions is necessary for the actualisation of the 'higher' dimensions (for example, the inorganic dimension is necessary for the actualisation of the organic, the organic for the animal, and so on). Similarly, it means that every 'higher' dimension is potentially present in every 'lower' dimension (for example, the human dimension is potentially present in the animal dimension) in the sense that it remains hidden, as it were,
perhaps for millions of years, awaiting those particular conditions that will allow it to become actualised.

According to this procedure, Tillich classifies four main dimensions: the inorganic, the organic (more specifically referring to the plant world), the dimension of self-awareness (more specifically the animal world) to which he also gives the name 'psychological', and the dimension of spirit, the specifically human dimension, actualised in the personal-communal realm in which man lives. The use of the word 'spirit' to refer to the specifically human dimension of life is significant, and must be understood in the light of Tillich's earlier definition of spirit as 'the unity of the ontological elements', which he summarises under the two poles of power and meaning, with 'the telos of life'. In other words, spirit is that which makes possible the complete fulfilment of the inner directedness of life which seeks to give total meaning and expression to the power of being. The fulfilment of this process is seen only in the life of man, in whom power and meaning are held together in unity, so that in him it can truly be said that life comes to understand itself. Thus man is appropriately 'the dimension of spirit', the sphere in which spirit fulfils its desired end.

But having said this, it is important to see that no lopsided definition of 'spirit' can do real justice to the meaning of the word, and the frequent confusion of 'spirit' with 'mind' robs it of its dynamic element, leading to an exclusive emphasis on intellect. Both of these elements must be held together, for that which is genuinely spirit contains within itself both power and intellect in unity. When this is realized, the identification of the dimension of spirit with the life of man can unhesitatingly be made.

The actualisation of the dimension of spirit, then, takes place
when such conditions appear within the animal realm, or the dimension of self-awareness, as make this possible; not indeed at one moment in time, but over a long period in which the new struggles to be born until that leap is made which brings about the dominance of the dimension of spirit. In one sense the same sort of struggle still goes on in every man, as he strives to become a creative human being, more than just aware of himself in a psychological sense. So, out of a constellation of psychological factors, there is created something that is new, a personal centre, a ‘totally centred self, that is to say, one that is free’. It is this personal centre which is able to take, for example, the raw materials of knowledge, things like sense expressions, experiences, volitional and emotional elements, and coordinate them, analyse them, and work on them according to logical or methodological criteria, and in this way not only to unite the elements which make up what may be called the psychological self through its own free deliberation and decision, but also to transcend them and transform them in a creative act of knowledge. It is the personal centre which, again, takes the raw materials of morality, drives, desires, inclinations and so on, selecting them or rejecting them as it wishes, and by working on them and synthesising them, transcending them and transforming them, thus making possible the moral act. But in neither case could there be any creative act without the personal centre, which freely transcends the raw materials of psychological experience with which it is provided.

So, says Tillich, a leap forward has been made from mere self-awareness, which is possible only for the totally centred self to make, and this act of self-transcendence demonstrates the presence of the dimension of spirit. However, it is clear that the personal centre which makes this act of self-transcendence possible is not something ‘added to’
what is already there, like an immortal soul. It is already potentially present, waiting to be actualised when the appropriate concatenation of elements and circumstances appear, so that it may unite them and centre them in itself. Thus the dimension of spirit is neither to be set over against nor dissolved into the psychological dimension. There is rather an essential unity between them, and through the process of becoming which is potentially present in all dimensions, the one is carried forward into and transcended by the other. In this way, says Tillich, the unity of all dimensions is preserved.

Tillich points out that the freedom with which the personal centre acts upon the raw material with which it is presented is possible only because there are 'norms' to which the spirit subjects itself in order that it may be genuinely free, so that it can be said that in the life of man 'freedom and subjection to valid norms are one and the same thing'. The source of such norms, he maintains, lies beyond any criteria based on their pragmatic or inherent value; it is, in fact, nothing less than the essential nature of man and his world. Yet to assert this only throws us back onto the problem of how we can know about the essential nature of man and his world. To this problem, says Tillich, there is no certain answer, for the essential is always partly visible and partly hidden. We can know about it only through 'its ambiguous manifestations which is life', manifestations which conceal as well as reveal. And this means that every concrete act of freedom which seeks to subject itself to the essential norms of life so that it may indeed be free is both 'a venture and a risk'. It means that life will contain an element of daring, an element which will be present in every creative act, whether in the sphere of morality, or of culture, or of religion. Nevertheless, this does raise the problem
of the quest for unambiguous life, in which man realises his essential being, even under the conditions of existence, and as we shall see this is the central issue in Tillich's doctrine of the Spirit in relation to life's ambiguities.

**Evaluation**

Without entering into a detailed analysis of the concepts of potentiality and actuality, much of which would not be strictly relevant to our present study, it is important for us to see that we are dealing here with an interpretation of life that is set squarely within the idealist tradition. However Tillich envisages the nature of potentiality, or essential being, it is clear that this order of being is of primary significance. In it all actual being is grounded, and apart from it nothing could exist. Furthermore, from his assertion that potential being is 'that kind of being which has the power, the dynamic, to become actual', one must surely infer that for Tillich it has a reality of its own which is in no sense dependent on its actual existence. It is the essence of every actual being, but the essence is real whether it has been actualised or not.¹¹

But can we really accept this idealist interpretation of potentiality? Would it not, in fact, be more meaningful to define the reality of potentiality or essential being in terms of capacity or property of being, rather than a kind of being in itself, as Tillich asserts? To do this would not mean rejecting the idea of actualisation itself, but to interpret such a process rather differently, so that it becomes that which enables certain properties or capacities of being to actualise themselves in the external world under the appropriate conditions. In other words, it is the purposive, directing activity, present within being as a whole, enabling it to make real certain latent possibilities
in life itself.

We should also note the way in which Tillich's interpretation of essential being influences his use of the concept of dimension, and particularly the way in which this concept is put forward as a means of solving the problem of the unity of all forms of life. Such conflict and disunity as there is in life, he maintains, arises not from the essential nature of the dimensions, which intersect and interpenetrate quite freely, but from the actualisation of those dimensions in time and space. But here we meet the same problem as before. What does it mean to talk of the dimensions as they are in their essential state? If it means that they have some sort of reality prior to their actual appearance, then we are faced with an idealist interpretation of reality which is clearly unacceptable.12 Surely, if we are to discover any unity in life, we must look not in some essential order of reality beyond our present existential order of things (and therefore beyond verification), but in life as we know it, as it appears to us experientially and empirically. It may well be that this unity is not immediately apparent, that the first thing that strikes us about life is its disunity and conflict. Yet no scientist, for example, would deny the basic unity of the natural world. Such a unity is apparent not only in the interdependence of the various scientific disciplines, it is apparent also in the whole story of the evolution of life, from the smallest electron to the first cell of organic life, from the tiny protoplasm to the sophisticated brain of man. We can speak of a fundamental, multidimensional unity of life without having to resort to an idealist interpretation of reality to warrant it, a unity which is apparent in the fact that every organic process, whether animal or vegetative, can be broken down into biochemical formulae, and that every
cell can be seen in terms of atoms or bundles of energy.

So Tillich's affirmation that the higher dimensions are already potentially real in the preceding dimensions before their actualisation must be viewed with suspicion, because of its idealist overtones. Nevertheless, we can certainly say that given certain conditions and concatenations of events within a lower dimension there is a strong possibility that a new and higher dimension will be born, that there may be certain qualities or capacities within a lower dimension that will find their opportunity for development when the appropriate circumstances arise. But this is rather different from saying that the higher dimension is already essentially present. Even if the birth of a new dimension is, to use the words of L.A. Birch, the 'concrete realisation of what is potentially possible', \(^{13}\) we are not to think that the 'potentially possible' already has a reality of its own waiting to be actualised. Surely a possibility is a possibility, not a reality. So empirical understanding would suggest that no new dimension has any reality until those circumstances appear which will allow it to emerge. The unity of the dimensions of life is a developing unity, which proceeds as each new dimension is born, and it is in this developing unity that the Spirit is at work.\(^ {14}\)

Referring to Tillich's definition of the specifically human dimension as the dimension of spirit, one must point out that we can accept this identification without seeking to prove it in accordance with the principles and presuppositions of the dialectical ontology of Tillich's system. The biblical literature frequently uses the concept of spirit to describe the life of man without subscribing to any such predilections. But it is important to see that Tillich's analysis of spirit is more philosophical than theological, and that in allowing the equation of the
dimension of the spirit with the total life of man we are not thereby saying that the spirit of man can only be understood or defined in this sort of way.

Tillich's discussion of the advent of the dimension of spirit raises several important points which need underlining. Firstly, his rejection of the traditional idea of God adding an immortal soul to the human body at a specific moment of time on the grounds that this would destroy the unity of the psychological and spiritual facets of man's nature by 'importing' into man something from the outside is significant, in view of the fact that there are still Christian scholars who seek to resolve the tension between evolution and traditional Christian thinking on the origin of man in this way.15 Tillich's point of view that the spirit of man, his 'personal centre', that which makes him man and not merely an animal, is something which evolves quite naturally from that which is already present, takes much more seriously the purposes of the Spirit of God which are present within the whole evolutionary process, leading it upwards towards its desired end. Secondly, despite the fact that the advent of the human spirit is a natural stage in the process of evolution, his reference to this as a 'leap' does point to its momentous significance in that for the first time life, in the form of man, is able to stand outside of itself, as it were, in an act of self-transcendence.16 And finally, Tillich's understanding of the freedom with which man as a personal centre acts upon the psychological material with which he is provided to fulfil the dimension of spirit, as subjection to valid norms, is a useful correction to any interpretation of freedom in terms of total permissiveness. One certainly accepts his assertion that the only ultimately valid norms are those which are in accordance with man's essential being, but the statement does need
stripping of the idealistic overtones we have already come to associate with Tillich's use of the phrase 'essential being'. When stripped of these, it is a forceful reassertion of the Christian view that only when man seeks to become what God intends him to be, an intention that is indeed written in the framework of his personality, both in relation to himself and to his world, can he avoid misusing that freedom. Anything that would cause him to violate his true nature and stunt his own growth towards the fulfilment of the divine purpose for him within the world would violate that freedom and result in a further estrangement from himself, his world and God. And the fact that his attempt to discover his real purpose and significance in life will involve the taking of risks and the possibility of selecting the wrong course of action, rightly opens up for him the question of how life can be free from these ambiguities and thus prepares the way for an understanding of the work of the Spirit of God in the life of man.

II. THE SELF-ACTUALISATION OF LIFE AND ITS AMBIGUITIES

Tillich discerns three basic functions of life which occur during the process of actualisation. Firstly, there is the function of self-integration, a sort of circular movement constituted by the three elements in the process of actualisation, self-identity, self-alteration and the return to one's self; a movement 'from centredness through alteration back to centredness' in which the identity of the centre is retained. Secondly, there is the function of self-creation, for the process of actualisation involves not only a circular movement but also a horizontal movement forward in producing new centres separate from the original self, but created by it. Thirdly, there is the function of self-transcendence, a vertical movement in which the original
self transcends itself by being driven beyond its own finite limitations out towards the infinite. It is because "life, by its very nature as life, is both in itself and above itself," that this driving towards the 'sublime' is possible. Each of these functions, Tillich points out, is dependent on certain ontological polarities: self-integration on that of individualisation and participation, self-creation on that of dynamics and form, self-transcendence on that of freedom and destiny. At the same time, all three functions unite elements of self-identity with elements of self-alteration, but such a unity is constantly threatened by existential estrangement, and whenever this disruption becomes a reality, self-integration is countered by disintegration, self-creation by destruction, and self-transcendence by profanisation. So every life process has an ambiguity resulting from the mixture of these positive and negative elements, which are virtually impossible to separate in actual life. Thus 'life at every moment' becomes ambiguous. We must therefore go on to discuss the basic functions of life, not only in their essential nature, 'separate from existential distortion', but as they appear within the ambiguities of existence. In this discussion, we shall direct ourselves specifically to the dimension of spirit as that with which the divine Spirit is more particularly concerned.

A. The Self-Integration of Life

The first function of life in Tillich's analysis is self-integration. In order to become a fully-integrated self, every individual thing in life, whatever its dimension, must create a perfect balance between participating in its environment and maintaining its own individuality. Failure to create this balance leads to a disintegration of
the centred self, and it is this dilemma that gives rise to the ambiguity of self-integration. As far as man is concerned, rather than have an environment to which he is slavishly tied like other forms of life, he has what may more aptly be called a world, in which he not only participates as a totally centred self, but which he is also able to transcend and therefore understand. This means that as a fully centred person, he develops his personality in relation to the world, or more precisely in relation to the community to which he belongs, in an act of free decision. It is this which, for Tillich, lies at the very heart of morality, so that morality becomes not obedience to some external law, but that through which every centred person constitutes itself in an act of self-integration. Thus, man can respond in knowledge and action to the world to which he belongs; but also because he confronts his world, and in this sense is free from it, he can respond "responsibly", namely, after deliberation and decision rather than through a determined compulsion. So by confronting the world he becomes aware of the essential norms of life to which he must respond if he is to be a truly integrated person.

These norms appear to man in the nature of an imperative. Man, when he faces the world, has the whole universe as the potential content of his centred self. His participation in his world will mean that he will need to take certain elements from the world back into his own self and make them his own. However, he is limited in his attempt to do this by the other self whom he confronts, for there is no way in which the other self can be assimilated as content of his own centredness. It is Tillich's contention that in the very experience of this limitation man becomes aware of 'the ought-to-be, the moral imperative'. The moral constitution of the self in the dimension of spirit begins
with this experience, and true personal life is only able to emerge in the context of this person-to-person encounter. This is why the self-integration of person as person can only occur in community, where mutual encounter of self with self can and does take place.

The ambiguities in this process can best be illustrated, says Tillich, when one looks at the concepts of sacrifice and the moral law. In the first place, since self-integration necessitates taking certain things which it encounters into the self for the purpose of its own development, the problem inevitably arises which it shall take and which it shall not. Faced with this dilemma, the self may choose to remain as it is, but in so doing it runs the risk of preventing its own integration. This means that a choice must be made; either certain possibilities must be rejected for the sake of preserving the self as it now is, or else something already actual must be given up for the sake of something possible 'which may enlarge and strengthen' it. So life moves backwards and forwards between the possible and the real, and requires the surrender of either one or the other. This gives rise to the sacrificial nature of life, for no man is able to realise all his potentialities and is therefore faced with the problem of having to choose some and reject others. But in having to make such a choice, man is also having to assess the value of different possibilities, and in so doing is in constant danger of making the wrong decision. Every sacrifice thus entails moral risk, and for this reason it should never be said that sacrifice in itself is good. 'The moral risk in sacrificing an important possibility can be equally as great as the risk in sacrificing an important reality'. In the same way, self-sacrifice is also ambiguous, for on the one hand the self to be sacrificed may not be worthy, and on the other hand that for which
it is sacrificed may not be worthy to receive it. 'Thus the ambiguity of sacrifice is a decisive and all-permeating expression of the ambiguity of life in the function of self-integration. It shows the human situation in the mixture of essential and existential elements and the impossibility of separating them as good and evil in an unambiguous way'.

The ambiguities in the moral law face us in three different ways.

The first problem concerns the unconditional character of the moral imperative. As Tillich has already implied, the validity of the moral imperative lies in the fact that it represents man's essential being against his existential estrangement. This means that it is, in the words of Kant, categorical, or unambiguous. We have also seen that man becomes aware of the moral imperative in his relationships with the other person, in the 'unconditional command to acknowledge him as a person'. But all this, says Tillich, is no more than a 'preliminary, formal answer'; it still needs to be filled out with meaning. For what does it mean to acknowledge the other as a person? It means that when one encounters and participates in the life of the other person, one accepts his own particularities, those things which in fact characterise and constitute his personality. In other words, it is the 'acceptance of the other self by participating in his personal centre'.

Now this, claims Tillich, is what the New Testament means by agape. So, 'the preliminary formal answer, that the unconditional character of the moral imperative is experienced in the encounter of person with person, has now been embodied in the material answer, that it is agape which gives concreteness to the categorical imperative, centredness to the person and the foundation of the life of the spirit'.

It is precisely in this filling out of the moral imperative with...
the material content of love that the possibility of ambiguity arises. For though *agape* as its ultimate norm is above the distinction between the formal and the material, yet nevertheless there is ambiguity precisely because *agape* does contain a material element. For example, says Tillich, the material expression of the moral imperative, demands that we participate in the other self, but how does this demand in itself guide the actual measure of our participation in or rejection of the other self's particular characteristics? Or to what extent should other forms or qualities of love, such as *eros* or *philia*, influence our measure of participation, and how does the mixture of these influences with *agape* affect the validity of *agape* as an ultimate norm? Such questions serve to show the ambiguity of the moral law, even when considered from the point of view of its validity. The moral imperative as a formal expression remains unambiguously valid, but as soon as it is filled out with a material element, ambiguity arises and its validity is thereby questioned.28

This leads us to the second question, the ambiguity of moral norms as expressed in commandments. If the material expression of the moral imperative in terms of *agape* gives rise to ambiguity, even more does its more specific expression in terms of laws and commands. Again, such norms are valid in that they point to man's essential nature as set over against his existential condition. But the question arises as to how it is possible to fulfil these norms within the 'ambiguous mixture of essential and existential elements which characterises life'?29 It is only possible, says Tillich, through *agape* itself, which includes both the formal principle of justice and the freedom to apply this principle in different ways in differing concrete situations. This answer does, of course, bring us back to where we were before, and
raises again the problems in how one expresses love in the world of human relationships. Indeed, there is no final answer to this question, in the context of man's ambiguous life, and every attempt to provide an answer is fraught with moral risk. If there are times when the answer breaks through in revelatory experiences, 'experiences which underlie the ethical wisdom of all nations', it never breaks through altogether, and in man's existential state there is much that remains hidden both of his essential nature and of the ultimate norm of agape. Even conscience cannot guide us, for it has no moral certainty of its own. It is obvious, concludes Tillich, that we have before us a problem that man of himself cannot hope to resolve. It can be resolved, as we shall see, only in the context of the work of the divine Spirit.

The third problem in the \textit{agape} principle is that of moral motivation. As the 'law of Love', \textit{agape}, says Tillich, commands reunion with one's essential being, the integration of the centred self. But this is a two-edged command, for as a motivating power law not only prompts to goodness, it also encourages man to rebel, in so far as the commandment to love serves to underline man's estrangement from himself. Thus in his existential state, obedience and disobedience to the law are mixed within him. So the law motivates partial fulfilment but also leads to resistance, resulting in hostility against God, man and oneself. This makes possible three different attitudes towards the law: (a) that of self-deception, by those who feel that because the law has motivating power, it can eventually lead to self-integration; (b) that of compromise, a resigned acceptance of the fact that the motivating power of law is indeed limited and therefore cannot really achieve self-integration; (c) and that of rejection, which recognises the validity of the law but completely despairs about its motivating power, and so opposes it,
rationalises it, or substitutes for it man-made ideologies. Or as Tillich puts it in his essay on 'Moralisms and Morality', 'Legalism drives either to self-complacency (I have kept all commandments) or to despair (I cannot keep any commandment). Moralism of law makes pharisees or cynics, or it produces in the majority of people an indifference which lowers the moral imperative to conventional behaviour'. These considerations show the futility of trying to impose agape on man as law, and 'the experience of this situation leads to the quest for a morality which fulfils the law by transcending it, that is, agape given to man as reuniting and integrating reality, as new being and not as law'. 'Moralism necessarily ends in the quest for grace', the workings of the divine Spirit in the life of man.

Evaluation

Although the integration and development of the individual has always been one of the proper concerns of ethics, it must be pointed out that to define morality primarily in terms of self-integration, as Tillich does so here, is by no means without its problems. It immediately implies that moral behaviour is something in which one engages solely for the help it gives to the development and enlargement of one's own personality. If this is so, then the world which the self encounters, including countless other selves, becomes a tool to be used in much the same way as a cat scratches the bark of a tree to sharpen its claws or a dog chews a bone to aid its digestion. But just as in these cases there is no real concern for either bark or bone, so it would seem that when one defines morality in this way there is little room for that genuine concern for the encountered world which truly characterises Christian morality. The same point comes out in Tillich's discussion on the role of 'norms'. We have
already seen how he emphasises that the development of one's own personal centre necessarily involves subjecting oneself to such norms as are essential to the development of a true humanity, and with this we have agreed. Nevertheless we must note how easily such a statement can be misinterpreted. For we may conclude, as Tillich seems to do so here, that the individual's overriding concern should be the integration and fulfilment of his own humanity, to which everything else must be subordinated and in which context everything else must be understood. Hence the primary purpose of agape, as the essential moral norm, becomes that by which man achieves something for himself rather than the means by which he serves his fellows. We would certainly agree with Tillich's assertion that agape involves 'the acceptance of the other self', but we cannot agree that the primary significance of such an acceptance is the contribution it makes towards the realisation of one's own humanity rather than what it can do for the other person concerned. This does not mean that love has no part to play in personal development. On the contrary, Christian theology would affirm that no man is truly integrated unless he has the spirit of love. But this is rather different from saying that the primary purpose of love is to achieve this end. So it would seem that Tillich's reading of morality in terms of self-integration is fundamentally at variance with the New Testament understanding of agape which begins with concern for others, not with concern for oneself. It may well be that this other-centred concern will lead to a deeper integration of one's own personality, and in this sense morality must be considered as one of the means by which God brings a person to true maturity and real fulfilment;
but self-integration is not its main objective.

The same issue arises in Tillich's remarks about the ambiguities of sacrifice. The desirability of sacrifice, and the precise nature of whatever sacrifice is involved, is considered entirely from the standpoint of what is best for the purposes of self-integration. When some actual sacrifice is made the choice must be determined by whichever procedure may 'enlarge and strengthen' the centred self. Even self-sacrifice should be measured by the scale of worth! So there is an ambiguity about sacrifice which arises not from the question, 'What is best for the other self?', but, 'What is best for the centred self (myself)!' It is difficult to see how this understanding of sacrifice has anything in common with the Christian concept, according to which he who seeks to save his own life shall lose it and he who loses his life for the sake of Christ and the Gospel, and therefore for the sake of others, shall find it. The Christian concept of sacrifice is entirely other-centred, and to measure its advisability or even its efficacy by its value for the purposes of self-integration is to begin with the wrong premise altogether.

Similarly, Tillich's interpretation of morality in terms of self-integration influences his concept of the moral imperative. The sense of 'ought' that is experienced through encounter with the other person opens up for man the norms of his own essential being. Thus the moral imperative of which man now becomes aware is in actual fact his own essential manhood calling him to realise his true self, to work towards self-integration. In interpreting the unconditional demand in this way, as the intuitive realisation of the nature of essential being, Tillich sees the moral imperative not so much as the obligation or duty one has towards one's fellow men, but as the correct steps one
needs to take in relation to one's fellows in order to realise one's own essential being. The purpose of the moral imperative is not to benefit the other person, but rather the fulfilment of one's own essential nature. So the moral imperative is made to serve the interests of self. It seems to me therefore that there is a grave defect at the centre of Tillich's understanding of the moral imperative. This does not mean, of course, that we have to deny the concept itself. We can still affirm the sense of 'ought' in every man in a formal sense. 'But the sense of unconditional obligation that one is normally aware of is what one must do with one's neighbour rather than what one must do in order to realise one's own essential humanity. In fact, the attempt to use the moral imperative to serve one's own ends is deliberately to twist and distort it, which is in itself surely one of the most potent sources of ambiguity. For if the primary purpose of morality is to satisfy the desire for self-fulfilment, then its very self-centredness will lead only further into ambiguity and confusion. The Christian assertion is surely that an unambiguous morality can only truly be realised when it is based on an outgoing love and concern for the other person, such as we see in Christ, a love which genuinely seeks the best for the other self, which is the very foundation of agape.

None of these criticisms, valid as they are from the standpoint of Christian morality, need distract us from Tillich's statement that of himself it is impossible for man to live an unambiguous moral life. He will always be confronted with the problem of how love can fully reveal itself and what actions it demands in given situations, and his decisions to act will always be fraught with the anxiety lest he should do the wrong thing. In the face of these things he may well despair in his quest for a life free from moral ambiguity, yet it is surely partly
in answer to this despair that the work of the Holy Spirit must be seen.

B. The Self-Creativity of Life

The second function of life according to Tillich's analysis is self-creation, or as he also terms it, self-creativity. In the pre-human dimensions of life, this function is concerned with the principle of growth, in the sense of both individual growth and reproduction, in which the self seeks to give form to its own power of being. In this process, many ambiguities, such as struggle, pain and even destruction, are present, and Tillich discusses each of these at length. As far as man is concerned, all these things apply, in so far as he contains within himself all previous dimensions, and particularly the preceding dimension of self-awareness which he shares with animal creation. But in man in his capacity as the bearer of the dimension of spirit, the function of self-creativity is extended to his relation to the world of which he is part, and particularly to the way in which he 'cultivates' and creates something new from what he encounters within it. In a word, self-creativity under the dimension of spirit gives rise to the phenomenon of culture. So Tillich defines culture as 'that which takes care of something, keeps it alive, and makes it grow'. It 'creates something new beyond the encountered reality'.

Tillich observes that in relation to the encountered world, man can use his self-creative function in three ways. He can create something new in a material sense, something technical which he can use; or else in a receptive sense, something theoretical which reflects the way in which he looks at his world; or else in a reactive sense, practical means by which men can act upon each other.

In the material, or technical, sense, the function of self-creativity appears in the 'double creation of language and technology'. 
For Tillich, the significance of language is not only that it is the supreme means of communication, but also that it creates a 'universe of meanings', so that communication means participation in that universe of meanings. This is possible, says Tillich, because man is not in bondage to concrete situations; he can transcend them, and in transcending them is able to observe in every particular a universal to which he gives a common name. As he puts it, 'Every language, including that of the Bible, is the result of innumerable acts of cultural creativity. All functions of man's spiritual life are based on man's power to speak vocally or silently. Language is the expression of man's freedom from the given situation and its concrete demands. It gives him universals in whose power he can create worlds above the given world of technical civilisation and spiritual content'.

Language then must be the basis for any discussion on self-creativity in the dimension of spirit, because it is fundamental for all cultural functions and present in all of them. The study of language therefore becomes 'a door to life in the dimension of spirit'. The fact that there are different types of language, different ways in which language is used, means that there are different types and varieties of self-creative activity, depending on the way in which man encounters reality: technical, religious, poetic, scientific and so on. And if we are to understand fully these different spheres of cultural activity and the essential difference between them, it is important that we both recognise that in each of them language is used in a rather different way and also seek to understand the significance of those different usages. Just as language liberates man from the 'here and now' by means of universals, so also the technical handling of encountered reality liberates man from the natural limitations of his
existence by the production of tools, to which we give the name 'technology'. But for man to produce tools as tools, Tillich states, he must have the concept of universals, and in this sense 'the power of tools is dependent on the power of language. Logos precedes everything'. So man becomes free, bound no longer by his environment, able to choose from a whole host of technical possibilities. But because these technical possibilities are unlimited, he finds himself in an ambiguous situation. For in this case, production may well become an end in itself, a distortion which can affect a whole culture. Herein lies the ambiguity of technology.

The duality of these two basic functions of culture, language and technology, is reflected in the two other types of cultural activity, to which Tillich refers as theoria and praxis. Theoria refers to self-creativity in a receptive or 'theoretical' sense; praxis refers to it in a reactive or 'practical' sense. Theoria, says Tillich, 'is the act of looking at the encountered world in order to take something of it into the centred self as a meaningful, structured whole', such as one finds in every aesthetic image and every cognitive concept. However, though the mind naturally strives to produce an all-embracing image or concept, in reality the universe can never appear in such a direct way, but can only partially reveal itself through particular images and concepts. Thus each specific creation of theoria is but a 'mirror of encountered reality, a fragment of a universe of meaning'. This can be illustrated by language itself. Language moves in universals, but its meaning can only be grasped in specific examples. 'World breaks through environment in every universal. He who says, 'This is a tree', for example, 'has grasped treehood in an individual tree and with it a fragment of the universe
of meaning." The same would be true for any other expression of theoria - a painting of a tree, for instance, becomes an image both of universal treehood and of that universe reflected in a particular tree.

As we have seen, the two ways in which theoria receives reality are through the cognitive and aesthetic functions, 'concepts' and 'images'. There is, says Tillich, in the nature of the cognitive process a basic tension. 'In the act of the cognitive creativity of life... there is a fundamental conflict between that which is intended and the situation that both causes the intention and at the same time prevents its fulfilment'. Such a conflict is based on the estrangement between subject and object, though it should be emphasised that without this split there could be no cultural creativity at all, for 'the cognitive act is born out of the desire to bridge the gap between subject and object'. The expression Tillich uses for such a union, equivocal as it may be, is the word 'truth', and the ambiguity of the cognitive function lies in the fact that because this union can never be fully achieved, truth can never be completely known.

The aesthetic function, however, not only seeks to find truth, it also, and perhaps more significantly, seeks to 'express qualities of being which can be grasped only by artistic creativity', such as beauty and goodness. So the word 'authenticity' is a better word than 'truth' as far as the aesthetic function is concerned. A work of art, for example, is authentic 'if it expresses the encounter of mind and world in which an otherwise hidden quality of a piece of the universe... is united with an otherwise hidden receptive power of the mind'. In one sense, there is a union of self and world achieved in the aesthetic encounter that is not possible in the cognitive function, though there
will be different degrees of the depth of such unions. This is why some philosophers have seen art as the highest expression of life and why some cultures have tried to replace the religious by the aesthetic function. But this overlooks its limitations, for the aesthetic function can reach only certain aspects of the otherwise hidden reality; it cannot reach ultimate reality itself, just as the self itself can only grasp this reality in specific images and not with the whole of its being. So there is an incompleteness about the aesthetic function which gives it an element of unreality, of 'not-yet'. 'The ambiguity of the aesthetic function is its oscillation between reality and unreality'.

Praxis, says Tillich, as the corresponding function to theoria, 'is the whole of cultural acts of centred personalities who as members of social groups act upon each other and themselves'. In this sense, it is the self-creativity of life as expressed in the 'personal-communal realm'. In some ways, the cultural acts of praxis, such as social relations, law, politics, and so on, resemble what we would call ethics, but Tillich feels that it is better to confine the term 'ethics' to the science of the moral act rather than its cultural expression. The cultural functions of praxis moreover are much wider than ethics, and the special content of morality is only one creation of the cultural self-creativity of life. Just as theoria may be considered as a continuation of the linguistic act, so praxis, Tillich points out, may be thought of as a continuation of the technical act, in that it uses 'means for ends', or tools. Its tools are things like economy, medicine, administration, education, and so on, each of which, of course, are in themselves complex functions of the spirit.

The aim of all cultural creativity in the sphere of praxis is
the achievement of the 'good', which for Tillich means 'the essential nature of a thing and the fulfilment of the potentialities implied in it'. Various concepts refer to the achievement of the 'good' in different spheres of life. In the social sphere, for example, we are concerned with the concept of justice, which is the legitimate 'aim of all cultural actions which are directed towards the transformation of society'. As far as the individual is concerned, Tillich suggests that we use the concept of 'humanity', a word which conveys the original meaning of the word 'virtue', which has tended to become rather debased in contemporary usage, which points to the actualisation of essential human potentialities in the life of individual man, by which he achieves the 'good' for himself. Admittedly, says Tillich, there are snags in using the word 'humanity', but it is a good word to convey the sense of 'the fulfilment of man's inner aim with respect to himself and his personal relations'. So the inner aim of praxis as far as the group is concerned is justice, as far as individual man is concerned humanity.

Ambiguity in praxis stems from the gap which lies on the one hand between the existing human subject and the object for which he strives (that is, essential humanity), and on the other hand between the existing social order and the object towards which it strives (that is, essential justice). This reflects the parallel gap in theoria, which exists between the knowing subject and the object to be known. The subject-object scheme therefore, becomes not only an epistemological problem but also an ethical one, and thus one which must be resolved in a new, unambiguous life such as is created by the divine Spirit.

Tillich discusses the ambiguities of the cultural act more completely under three separate heads: those present in the linguistic, cognitive and aesthetic self-creations of life, those of technical and
personal transformation, and those of communal transformation. In the first place, as we have seen, language, the first act of self-creativity, permeates every other cultural act and therefore every function of the spirit. Nevertheless it has a special relation to the functions of theoria in the same way as the technical act has a special relation to the functions of praxis. So Tillich prefers to discuss more fully the ambiguities of language along with those of truth and expressiveness, and the ambiguities of the technical act along with those of humanity and justice.

We have already seen how language creates 'a universe of meanings' in so far as every word is itself 'the bearer of meaning'. The ambiguity of language lies in the fact that although language has this 'meaning-creating power', it also inevitably separates the meaning from the reality to which it refers, so that an unavoidable gap is opened up between mind on the one hand and reality on the other. Because of this ambiguity language is open to confusion, distortion and contradiction, and it is only in the ultimate unity of word and power in the life of God, its historical manifestation in the Christ, and its ecstatic transformation in the Spirit, that this ambiguity is overcome, for here the word does not encounter reality, but is itself grasped by 'reality beyond the split between subject and object'.

The same sort of ambiguity can be observed in the cognitive act, and examples of it abound. There is the 'ambiguity of observation', in that the reality we observe and encounter can never be anything more than encountered reality, which is always to some extent distorted. There is the 'ambiguity of abstraction', in that the cognitive act tries to reach the essence of the object by abstracting its essence from the particulars associated with its manifestation, such as one
finds in the phenomenological method, an obviously impossible task. There is the 'ambiguity of truth as a whole', in the creation of large conceptual patterns, the question as to whether these patterns have any foundation in reality, and the fact that in such a creation the cognitive act can change the encountered reality so that it becomes virtually unrecognisable. There is the 'ambiguity of argumentation', where a chain of arguments is used in an attempt to conceptualise reality but where unnoticed assumptions nevertheless always play a determining role. It is obvious then that there is no way of bridging this subject-object gap, no method of resolving the ambiguity, and this is why there are those who seek to discover truth in some sort of mystical unity, which claims to transcend the split in the power of immediacy. Others, however, believe that such a reunion of theoria with reality is possible in artistic intuition and its images. Their optimism is ill-founded, for each artistic style interprets the reality it encounters in a different way, and ambiguity stems from the variety of approach. In naturalism, for example, the subject matter will tend to overpower expression; in idealism, there is always the attempt to get beyond the encounter to essential reality itself. In neither case can ambiguity be avoided, and the subject-object gap is still unbridged. The only solution is that achieved under the impact of the Spirit, as we shall see.

Secondly, whereas in the self-creation of life in the functions of theoria it is the subject-element which causes the ambiguity in that the subject is not able to achieve unity with the object, in the functions of praxis, including the technical sphere, it is the reverse. Here it is the object that causes the ambiguity, for it is with the transformation of the object that we are now concerned. As far as
technology is concerned, for example, 'the tool which liberates man', remarks Tillich, 'also subjects him to the rules of its making'. In order to produce tools, one must understand the inner structure of the materials used and their behaviour under certain conditions, and then comply with these. In technical production Tillich perceives that this leads to three ambiguities: that of 'freedom and limitation', in which man is free to make tools, but is limited by their destructive character; that of 'means and ends', in that the superior purpose of production is often hidden or ill-defined, so that the production of means becomes an end in itself; and that of 'self and thing', in that a technical product is not a 'self' but a 'thing', and in this technological context there is always the tendency for man himself to become 'a thing among things', a mere cog in a machine. So the liberation afforded man by technology can result in his own bondage, and this is seen nowhere more clearly than in modern society. None of these ambiguities can be resolved, of course, by getting rid of technology. Rather do they lead to 'the quest for unambiguous relations of means and ends, that is, for the Kingdom of God', the New Being which the divine Spirit brings.

Ambiguity is no less present in the practical means by which men seek to act upon and transform either themselves or each other in the field of human relations. Whether it be the case of man striving for his own humanity, or whether it be the case of one helping the other to reach the same goal, in each case there is an ambiguity, an ambiguity which consists of 'the relation of the one who determines and the one who is determined'. In the case of self-determination, it is the ambiguity between the self as determining and the self as being determined. The determining self can only determine 'in the power of
what it essentially is', yet under the conditions of existence, it is separated from what it essentially is. This means that self-determin-ation into fulfilled humanity is impossible, — impossible, but neverthe-less necessary, 'because a self determined completely from outside would cease to be a self'. Herein lies the ambiguity of self-determination, which in every responsible person results in despair. In the case of other-determination, there is ambiguity in the sense that working towards the growth of a person does at the same time run the risk of working towards his de-personalisation. 'Trying to enhance a subject as subject makes it into an object'. We see this, Tillich reminds us, in the field of education, where all sorts of extremes, from indoctrination to laissez-faire, are potentially present. The same thing can be seen where any guiding activity is present, from psychotherapy to family life, where the factor of transference can be so easily at work. In fact, contemporary psychotherapeutic practice is constantly seeking ways of overcoming this sort of problem. The same truth underlies it all: 'unambiguous life is impossible wherever the subject-object scheme is unbroken'.

In the field of human relations ambiguity is similarly found in the realm of participation. Tillich reminds us that every act of participation oscillates between a total holding back of oneself in self-seclusion, and a total giving of oneself in self-surrender. Sometimes this may be for psychological reasons. On the one hand, there may be times when one draws back from the other person because the knowledge one has of him is really no more than a knowledge of an image one has projected on to him. On the other hand, there are times when the other person deliberately creates the wrong sort of image of himself such as will appeal to others and make them give themselves
wholeheartedly and unreservedly. In either case, the ambiguity of personal participation in the other self is underlined, and the consequences that may often follow. This is true whether one is thinking of cognitive or emotional participation, and it is this sort of situation that is responsible for 'the inexhaustible creative-destructive situations in the relation of person to person'.

There are also ambiguities in the realm of communal transformation. As we have seen, the aim to which all cultural actions are directed in the transformation of society is enshrined in the concept of justice. We must therefore consider the ambiguities of the principle of justice. Or as Tillich puts it, 'What are social groups intended to be by their essential nature, and what ambiguities appear in the actual processes of their self-creation?' Tillich rightly distinguishes between social organisms and the organisational forms which special human activities create in order to help them achieve social justice. Social organisms, such as the family or the local community, have grown up naturally within the self-creative process of life, whereas organisational forms are created with special intention. Nevertheless, as he makes plain, the social organism is inherent within any organisational form and makes its own contribution to it, particularly in the way it practices justice in its own community. For this reason, the form of the social group, the 'organisational form', is determined by an understanding of justice that is already effective in the group. Wherever justice is so demanded and actualised, however, its ambiguities appear; and these ambiguities can result in totally different attitudes, either despairing resignation that justice is ever possible, or else utopian expectation which inevitably leads to frustration and disillusionment.
Tillich lists four important ambiguities in the sphere of justice. In the first place, there is that of "inclusiveness and exclusion". All social groups include certain kinds of people and exclude others. "Social cohesion", Tillich points out, "is impossible without social exclusion", and if cohesion is to be strengthened this will necessitate expelling or rejecting certain groups or individuals who stand on the boundary line, who may weaken the group as a whole if they are retained. Thus there is ambiguity in the fact that "justice does not demand unambiguous acceptance of those who would possibly disturb or destroy group cohesion, though at the same time it 'certainly does not permit their unambiguous rejection". In the second place, there is the ambiguity of 'competition and equality'. Inequality in the power of being is not a matter of static difference, but of continuous dynamic decisions, in which in the encounter of being with being there is either pushing ahead or withdrawal, a "continuous alteration between victory and defeat". This happens in all dimensions, but under the dimension of spirit this competitiveness stands under the principle of justice. The question we have to ask is, 'In what respect does justice include equality?' In so far as every person is a person there is, of course, an unambiguous equality. 'There is ultimate equality between all men in the view of God and his justice is equally offered' to them all. But in the concrete application of this principle to specific situations, ambiguity arises. The necessity of competition works continuously for inequality, manifesting itself in such things as the class system and political hierarchies, and the consequences of this can sometimes result in the almost total destruction of justice in the life of society, the corruption of power and the eclipse of freedom, things which we have seen in depth
in the contemporary period. To aspire to a state of unambiguous justice in this sense therefore is to cry for the moon!

A third ambiguity in the field of justice is that of leadership. 'Leadership', says Tillich, 'is the social analogy to centredness', for without the centredness provided by the leader, neither self-integration nor self-creativity in the group would be possible. Yet leadership is open to severe ambiguities, such as the ulterior motives of the leader himself or the attempts to transform leadership into 'mass-management' backed up by subtle enforcement or overt coercion. Yet to remove the structure of leadership as is sometimes attempted would result in anarchy, which in turn breeds dictatorship, so that nothing is resolved by so doing. A further ambiguity lies in the confusion of leadership with authority. There are authorities in all realms of culture, which stem from the 'division of experience', and which are necessary because of every individual's limited range of knowledge and ability. It is when this authority becomes bound up with particular social positioning, as for example in the case of kings and priests, that the real meaning of authority is distorted and ambiguity occurs. Yet again, this is no ground for rejecting established authority, and to do so would be to undermine the whole social structure of life. At the same time, we cannot fully surrender to authority, for this would in turn belie its very purpose, which is to serve 'the personal self and its claim for justice'.

The fourth ambiguity of justice according to Tillich is that of 'legal form'. We have already seen the ambiguity that is present in the moral law. The ambiguities of legal forms are similar to this in that though their purpose is to establish justice, in actual fact they give rise to both justice and injustice. Tillich cites two reasons
for this. The one is external, arising from the relation between the legal form and the powers that execute and interpret it. Power can manipulate and create legal forms to serve its own interests, so that the legal form itself reflects the ambiguities of leadership. Yet power without any valid legal form would destroy itself, so the concept of legal form cannot be rejected. The other reason for ambiguity is internal, for like the moral law, legal form is abstract, and therefore inadequate to every concrete situation. And whilst it is true that most legal systems try to safeguard against this, the difficulty can never be completely removed.

In his analysis of culture, Tillich turns finally to one important question which he feels has fundamental significance: 'What is the meaning of the creation of a universe of meaning?', which is the ultimate aim of all cultural creativity. He perceives that there are two sides to the answer to this question. The first, which he calls 'macrocosmic', is to say that the universe of meaning is 'the fulfilment of the potentialities of the universe of being'. This means that all the unfulfilled potentialities of every dimension become actualised under the dimension of spirit, not precisely in the way in which they would have been fulfilled in their own dimensions, but in the way in which those dimensions are appropriately actualised under the dimension of the spirit which we observe in man. But such a fulfilment of the universe as a whole must clearly await the coming of a situation where unambiguous life is possible, where the limitations of finitude are removed, such as one finds referred to in the symbol 'eternal life', and to which the concept of self-transcendence points. The second answer to the question is more relevant to our present discussion. Tillich calls it 'microcosmic': man is seen as
the point at which and the instrument through which a universe of meaning is created. In him the universe 'reaches up to an anticipatory and fragmentary fulfilment'. In him, and his capacity for self-creativity, one can see something of what the universe means, something of the fulfilment towards which it strives. Tillich observes that this idea was already present in certain Renaissance scholars who contended that in everything finite the infinite was present: 'Every human being, they felt, is a microcosm, a small universe in whom the large universe is mirrored. As a mirror of the universe and its divine ground, the individual is unique, incomparable, infinitely significant, able to develop in freedom his given endowment'. This, he says, forms the basis of what genuine 'humanism' really means, for the dignity of the humanistic idea lies in the belief that the aim of all human self-creativity, all culture, is to lead upwards to this fulfilment. In man, the universe discovers itself, and in his cultural acts, it discovers its own meaning and significance. Thus if man is to realise his true significance as man, the whole of his life must be geared towards this aim.

In this quest, however, man is necessarily confronted with the ambiguities of all cultural self-creation, and he must therefore reach the stage when, because of his own finite limitations, he asks the question of unambiguous life. The chief ambiguity arises from the humanistic tendency to absolutise the self-creative function and disregard the self-transcending function, that function by which man seeks to go beyond himself in the direction of the infinite. In this sort of situation, religion itself, which points to the need for and the possibility of self-transcendence, becomes nothing more than a cultural act. A further field in which the ambiguities of humanism
are predominant is that of education. The humanist ideal would claim that the aim of all education is to actualise all the potentialities available to man. However, because of human finitude, it has to modify this claim realistically by saying that the purpose of education is to actualise those human potentialities which are possible within the framework of the historical destiny of the individual. But in so doing, it has already hedged around its claim that the self-creative function is itself absolute with fatal qualifications. In any case the vast majority of men are always excluded from the 'higher grades of cultural form and educational depth', so that the 'intrinsic exclusiveness of the humanist ideal prevents it from being the final aim of human culture'.

All this leads Tillich to the conclusion that only a humanism which is self-transcending, which points beyond itself, can answer the question of the real significance of culture and how it can be fulfilled. Unless humanism is able to transcend itself in this way, then 'the demand of humanist fulfilment becomes a law and falls under the ambiguities of the law. Humanism itself leads to the question of culture transcending itself'. As we shall see, this it can only do under the impact of the divine Spirit.

Evaluation

In his painstaking analysis of self-creativity and culture, Tillich has provided us with many valuable insights and penetrating comments. Particularly helpful is his demonstration of the inevitability of ambiguity which arises in every sphere of cultural activity, though one could perhaps say that in his desire to systematise he has tended to fit things together a little too neatly. The various aspects and types of cultural act overlap and intermingle much more than such a precise analysis would suggest. However, one realises that if analysis
is to be made, there must be some order of procedure and scheme of work. There are undoubtedly many criticisms that one could make regarding the details of this analysis, which are not all entirely relevant or essential to the doctrine of the Spirit which he sees as providing the answer to the ambiguities of culture. However, there are several important points which he discusses which afford some insight into his philosophical method, and it is important to understand these if one is to place his teaching on the Spirit in perspective.

It seems to me that when Tillich describes culture as the self-creative function under the dimension of spirit, he is using the expression 'self-creative' in two rather different ways, which though they are indeed connected, do nevertheless need to be distinguished. Firstly, he is using it to point to the fact that whenever any cultural act occurs, the essential initiative in that act lies with the self rather than in the environment which the self encounters, so that whatever is created may legitimately be called a creation of that self. But there seems to be a more profound sense in which he is using the expression, and one which ties in very neatly with his concept of the multidimensional unity of all life. In so far as every dimension of life is present in the dimension of spirit, this means that every dimension is actually participating in the creative act through the medium of man. All dimensions present in him come to act upon themselves wherever through him they encounter themselves within the world. In other words, in acting upon the encountered reality in a creative way life, which includes every dimension, acts upon itself. It is being self-creative in a reflexive sense. Out of the substance of its own being it produces something new, a 'universe of meaning', which in itself mirrors and through which it comes to understand the universe
of being, which is its own life. The same point is made when Tillich says that man is a microcosm of the universe of being through whom a universe of meaning is created and in whom it is fragmentarily fulfilled. This is why it is particularly appropriate for Tillich to refer to the function by which the self actualises its own creative thought and power in its interaction with its environment 'self-creativity'. It is not just that man initiates the process, it is also that in him the whole of life acts upon itself to create something that is new.

It is obvious that Tillich's definition of culture as self-creativity differs from the usual definitions of culture to which one has become accustomed through sociological and anthropological study. The sociologist begins his analysis of culture with an investigation of specific cultures and then proceeds to deduce his remarks about culture in general from the results of his investigations. As a rule, he defines it in terms of behaviour: culture, he says, is concerned in the main with the way men behave in community, and the patterns which emerge from this, whether these patterns are technological, social, educational or moral. Such patterns of behaviour determine the nature of the culture, so that culture becomes the product of behaviour patterns, and therefore in some sense dependent on and secondary to them. Tillich, however, starts as it were from the other end. For him, culture is an a priori rather than an a posteriori reality. It is no end product shaped by patterns of behaviour, but rather the very principle at work within man in society that produces ways of behaviour. It is the function of self-creativity which works on everything man encounters, so that in his response to that which he encounters, whether it be in the world of things or the
world of human relationships, something new is born, some new pattern of life emerges, some way of behaving in community is evolved. The resultant pattern may be termed 'a culture', but 'culture' in itself is much more than the amorphous term used by the sociologist, an all-embracing term for behaviour patterns, but rather the very principle of and urge towards creativity inherent in man which causes him to behave in certain ways in relation to his world. The sociologist's definition of culture is empirical, deductive and scientific: Tillich's definition is a priori, purposive and ontological. So Tillich's definition of culture is a challenge to the scientific definition, for not being content with a purely empirical analysis, he is concerned with the deeper question, 'Why should there be culture at all?' And his answer is that the roots of culture are to be found in the roots of being itself, in the very capacity for self-creativity that is found in all life, and which comes to a head in man. In this he has given to the whole concept of culture a new dimension of depth and dignity which prepares the ground for a theology of culture in which the Spirit has a central place.

The phrase 'a universe of meaning' needs a word of explanation. Though Tillich does not always use this phrase clearly, it is obvious that he is strongly influenced by both idealist and phenomenological schools of thought. His exposition of the cognitive function of theoria confirms this indebtedness. By exercising such a function, we are able to develop, for example, from our observation of particular trees the concept of treehood itself. But for Tillich such a concept is far more than a mental image - it is the expression of the essence of treehood which underlies every particular tree. The concept discloses the reality. That which belongs to the sphere
of meaning reflects and reveals a universal essence. Thus man
creates a whole world of meanings which open up the essential reali-
ties in which they participate. And in so far as the capacity for
language and knowledge, the power to think in universals, lies behind
every cultural activity, culture as a whole shares in the creation
of a universe of meaning. What we must question here is Tillich's
assumption that the concept of a universal corresponds to a universal
essence which underlies every similar concrete occurrence, that the
'universe of meaning' created by the power of language is paralleled
by a 'universe of being' which gives it its validity. There are
surely no grounds for making this sort of assertion. To move from
a mental concept to an extra-mental reality is completely unwarran-
table. Surely it is not that the tree opens up the meaning of some
hidden reality called treehood, but rather that the linguistic concept
of treehood is a convenient abstraction used to summarise those
qualities and properties which all trees have in common. And the same
must be true of all cultural creativity. In a variety of ways man
acts upon his world to develop forms of differing characteristics,
giving meaning and expression to his world, but we cannot assume that
behind those forms there are essential realities waiting to be actu-
ised. We can certainly accept Tillich's contention that culture is
a mirror of the divine activity in that the creativity of man reflects
the creativity of God. But this statement does not need to be justi-
fied by an idealist interpretation of reality or understood in this
way at all. So also we can speak of a 'universe of meaning', but
such a phrase can be meaningful without filling it out with the sort
of ontological speculation which Tillich affirms.79

For Tillich, one of the advantages of thinking in terms of
essences is that every essence overcomes the existential distinction between subject and object, a distinction which for him is the occasion of all cultural, as indeed every other form of, ambiguity. If then man could overcome the subject-object order of his existence and escape into some essential realm in which there was no such distinction, his problems would be solved. But one may ask whether to say this really solves anything at all? Some words of Kierkegaard which we have already quoted may well be adapted here: that in an abstract realm which is unknown to us in any way save through our own theorising, an idealistic world which bears the stamp of unreality, how can there be any ambiguity seeing that abstraction has removed it all? Now one would not wish to deny that all ambiguities are resolved in the presence of God, but whatever that means, it does not mean that the presence of God is to be characterised by some state of being in which no distinction between subject and object remains. Furthermore, it is by no means the case that every ambiguity of life arises from the 'subject-object' differentiation. Many do, but others equally do not, as a theological understanding of the nature of sin would affirm. Nevertheless, it is important to see that for Tillich only in the framework of this type of understanding of reality can any ambiguities be resolved at all. And it is in this sort of context which, as we shall see, the doctrine of the Spirit, as he who transcends the subject-object order of reality and enables us to participate in essential reality unambiguously, will be developed.

We have pointed out the meticulous nature of Tillich's analysis of the ambiguities of culture. We are certainly confronted with such a sea of ambiguities that one wonders how existential man can possibly avoid drowning! Nevertheless, these ambiguities are with us for what
they are and there is no way of avoiding them. Each ambiguity is a vast problem in itself. Several will stand out as of more pressing concern than others. Modern man will perhaps be not so concerned with the ambiguities in the cognitive and aesthetic acts as those of technology which constantly press in upon him. Similarly, the ambiguities of personal identity and development, of justice and leadership, are all sources of deep-seated problems and anxieties in the complex world of the twentieth century. Perhaps never before has man felt so much in the need of a solution. One feels that in this discussion despite the questionable nature of Tillich's philosophical presuppositions, which may sometimes seem to throw us back into the classical world, here at any rate is a genuine attempt to make his theology strikingly relevant, and whether the answers he proposes in his development of the doctrine of the Spirit are altogether viable or not, at least the issues he raises are very much to the point.

C. The Self-transcendence of Life

The third function of life in Tillich's analysis is self-transcendence, made possible by the ontological polarity of freedom and destiny. In varying degrees, as life becomes free from a complete bondage to its own finitude, it strives vertically towards ultimate and infinite being, which is its destiny, thereby transcending 'both the circular line of centredness and the horizontal line of growth'. Such a move towards transcendence is expressed in both biblical and classical thought: Paul, for example, in his letter to the Romans, says that the whole creation longs to be set free from subjection to futility, and Aristotle speaks of all things being moved by their eros towards the unmoved Mover. We must ask therefore how this self-transcendence manifests itself. This cannot be answered in empirical
terms, because self-transcendence is something that man becomes conscious of inwardly rather than empirically. Nevertheless, in this inward awareness of transcendence, he acts as a sort of 'mirror in which the relation of everything finite to the infinite becomes conscious'.

Indeed, whenever this relationship between the finite and the infinite is denied, the real meaning of life is profaned, and this struggle between the elements of self-transcendence and profanisation is one which has been found throughout history, particularly at those times when there has been 'conflict between the affirmation and the denial of the holiness of life'. This distinction between the transcendent and the profane is reflected in the contemporary tension between the sacred and the secular, though Tillich feels that the word 'profanity' expresses more sharply the contrast between these two elements than does the word 'secular'. In any case, as we have it today, the word 'secular' does not have the same demonic overtones as the word 'profane' has. Thus in every act of self-transcendence, the profane is potentially present, and it is this that results in the ambiguity of life in its self-transcendent functions.

In the mirror of man's consciousness, then, life appears as having both greatness and dignity. Its greatness lies in the fact that it shows a power of being and meaning that makes it representative of ultimate being and meaning, and its dignity lies in its nature as such and its power of representation. Yet greatness also implies the risk of tragedy, for in realising its greatness there may always be the temptation for life to overreach its finitude and seek identity with the infinite only to feel tragically rejected, often with bitter consequences. Indeed, although the greatness and the tragedy of life is to be found in all of life's dimensions, nowhere is it seen more fully
than in the life of man, where greatness and tragedy are not only present but also for the first time consciously and reflectively experienced, since only man is aware of his capacity for self-transcendence. This experience of greatness tempered by tragedy is universal, a fact which confirms the universality of man's estrangement, so that greatness is never found without some kind of hubris, the desire to reach up to the divine. Man will always tend to distort his nature in this way, and this can have disastrous consequences. Even so, man cannot escape this dilemma by seeking to avoid his greatness, for that in itself would be tragic. He must accept it, together with the risk that goes with it. Even those who stand for the holy itself in the presence of men must accept such a risk: they also will become fully involved in the tragic element of life, and nowhere does this stand out more clearly than in the life of Christ, who experienced to the full the consequences of man's estrangement from the divine.

The purpose of religion in the life of man, says Tillich, is to point specifically to the function of self-transcendence, but before turning to a consideration of religion itself, we need first to summarise what he says about the relation of religion to morality and culture. According to their essential nature, morality, culture and religion interpenetrate, together constituting the unity of the spirit. In this unity, though these elements cannot be separated as such, nevertheless they can be distinguished. Morality, 'the constitution of the person as person in the encounter with other persons', is essentially related to culture, in the sense that culture provides it with content in the form of specific ideals of personality and community in legal and ethical codes; and it is related to religion, in the sense that religion provides it with the unconditional character
of the moral imperative, the possibility of reunion of the separated in *agape*, and the motivating power of *grace*. Culture, 'the creation of a universe of meaning', is essentially related to morality in the sense that the validity of every cultural act is based on personal encounter, which checks the tendency to arbitrariness, and without which no demand for any cultural creation could be felt. It is related to religion in the sense that the religious element in culture is the ultimate depth of every true creation, the 'substance' or 'ground' from which it lives, the element of ultimacy to which all culture points, even though it lacks it in itself. Religion, 'the self-transcendence of life under the dimension of spirit', is essentially related to morality in so far as there could be no self-transcendence without the constitution of the moral self by the unconditional imperative, and to culture inasmuch as self-transcendence could take no form except within the framework of a universe of meaning such as is created in the cultural act. The operative word in this discussion is of course 'essential': we have here a picture of the essential relation of the three functions of spirit, a picture to which Tillich gives two titles: 'transhistorical remembrance', by which he means the "looking back to" a condition of 'dreaming innocence' prior to existence, and 'utopian anticipation', a looking forward to the ultimate triumph of the essential over the existential. This is a picture which stands in judgment over against their actual relations under existential conditions, though perhaps it is more than that, for the picture is itself to some extent actual in that life itself is a mixture of both essential and existential elements, and therefore in life as we know it the unity of the three functions must be as effective as their separation. This is why it is valid to apply the picture as a criterion. But the fact
that both essential and existential elements are present in the 'here and now' means that there are ambiguities in the relations between the various functions of life under the dimension of spirit.

There are two things, suggests Tillich, which arise from the definition of religion as 'the self-transcendence of life under the dimension of spirit'. First, such a definition makes possible the image of the essential unity of religion with morality and culture, in the sense that both morality and culture point beyond themselves, the one to the unconditional imperative, the other to the ultimate ground of meaning in the creative act. They are united in their self-transcendence. In addition to this, it also underlines the three functions in their separation, for insofar as they are separate, neither morality nor culture are able to reach self-transcendence, and in fact resist it and become secularised. However, in the second place, this definition of religion as self-transcendence also implies that self-transcendence is not so much an independent function in itself as a quality of both morality and culture, of self-integration and self-creativity. And in a sense this is true, for if self-transcendence were just another function alongside the other two, then it would itself need to be transcended also. As he puts it, 'Life cannot genuinely transcend itself in one of its own functions'. Nevertheless, it is a fact that in life religion does exist as an independent reality beside morality and culture, as well as a quality within them. And the obvious reason for this is that left to their own devices, morality and culture would in fact forget all about self-transcendence and allow themselves to become completely secularised, profaning their real significance. Morality would become merely a form of activity between finite possibilities and culture an increasingly empty form. This is why religion
must arise as a special function of the spirit. Religious activities and concepts are born because 'the self-transcendence of life under the dimension of spirit cannot become alive without finite realities which are transcended'. This gives rise, however, to what Tillich calls a dialectical problem, 'in that something is transcended and at the same time not transcended'. There must be a concrete existence to transcend, yet at the same time that existence must be negated in the act of being transcended. This, says Tillich, is the dilemma facing all religions. 'Religion as the self-transcendence of life needs the religions and needs to deny them.'

Tillich points out that the self-transcendence of life in religion shows a double ambiguity. We have already referred to the first of these, that of greatness and profanity, and the fact that in order to resist the tendency to profanisation self-transcendence needs to be asserted in a special religious function. But the very character of religion leads to a further ambiguity. For in its very claim to solve the ambiguities of life, religion itself can 'fall into even profounder tensions, conflicts and ambiguities'. In its very representation of the greatness of the holy, it can come to the stage where it so identifies itself with the holy, that it begins to despise the secular realm, and in its attempt to set itself up as the holy, it drags the holy itself down in an act of profanisation. Every honest assessment of religion must take this fact into account and reckon with it. So, on the one hand, genuine self-transcendence must fight against the profane secularisation of life, and on the other hand, it must fight against the tendency of religion itself to make absolute the very forms it uses. If the one process can be called profanisation, the other, says Tillich, may effectively be labelled demonisation. Let us see,
therefore, what he has to say about them both in their specifically religious context.

(i) In religion, he says, the 'great' is called 'the holy', and all religion is based on 'the manifestation of the holy itself, the divine ground of being'. The greatness and dignity of religion lies in its character as the receptive response to this manifestation in its various revelatory phenomena. So when the adjective 'holy' is applied to a particular thing or person, it means that it points beyond itself to that response in a specific experience or event. It is 'self-transcendent', or looking at it from the side of the holy, 'translucent'. In other words, the holiness of a thing lies not in any particular quality that it has, but rather in its power to point beyond itself. 'It is not the personal quality that decides the degree of participation, but the power of self-transcendence'.

The profanisation of the holy, says Tillich, can take place in two different ways. Firstly, it can take place in an 'institutional' way. There can of course be no expression of the self-transcendent without some sort of form, but the danger is that every institutional form of religion, instead of transcending the finite in the direction of the infinite, will become just another finite reality itself. The institutional structures, whether they are ecclesiastical, liturgical or dogmatic, thus become subject to the sociological laws which govern all groups, and this tends to blot out their self-transcendent character. Even in the personal religious life this cannot be entirely overcome, for the individual depends on the religious life of the group for the content of his own religion, so that the ambiguities of institutional religion inevitably brush off onto him. So there is no point in trying to remove organised religion in an attempt to achieve pure self-transcen-
dence, for some sort of institutionalism is inevitable, just as the ambiguity that arises from it is inevitable. This means that in all forms of communal and personal religion, profanising elements will be present and effective. Yet despite this, the element of holiness cannot be totally obliterated, and the trivialities of everyday religion cannot invalidate the greatness of religion itself, which lies in its capacity to point beyond itself to the holy.

The second way in which the profanisation of the holy can take place is in a 'reductive' sense. Religion can be 'reduced' to morality or culture. Religious symbols, for example, can become in the eyes of men nothing more than cognitive concepts or aesthetic images. Myth becomes a combination of primitive science and poetry, and religious institutions or personalities are set alongside other forms and persons for sociological analysis. So far, says Tillich, 'religion is given a place in the whole of man's cultural creativity, and its usefulness for moral self-actualisation is not denied'. But there is no reference to its nature as self-transcendent. In fact, eventually it is considered as nothing more than a psychological or sociological phenomenon, and not infrequently as an illusion or an ideology. Or else it becomes just another department of secular life, an agency to speak and work for the fulfilment of man's secular needs. Tillich feels, in fact, that this sort of profanisation is much more dangerous than that which stems from institutionalism. Yet again there is no final answer to the problem, for religion must live in cultural forms, even though this may mean that it becomes considered as just another department of cultural life. Its dissolution into secular forms is a risk that it must always take.

Yet even so, Tillich emphasises, reductive profanisation cannot
entirely extinguish the religious quality that is present, however hidden, in every function of life. For there are occasions when it will break through to the surface as an unexpected and forceful experience in the midst of life, perhaps in the form of the moral imperative, perhaps in the depth of culture. There is no way of annihilating it altogether.

(ii) The second major ambiguity of religion is that of the divine and the demonic. Whereas in the profanisation of religion, self-transcendence is resisted, the essence of what Tillich calls demonisation is, as we have seen, that it seeks to identify itself with the holy which it represents: 'The claim of something finite to infinity or to divine greatness is the characteristic of the demonic'. In the history of religion one can see this particularly in polytheism, where finite realities are raised to the level of the infinite, but Tillich points out that demonisation is not confined to polytheism, for it occurs in every religion at some time or another, Christianity included. But there is a difference between the demonic and the tragic. In the concept of tragedy, the subject does not actually claim divinity for himself, but rather seeks to touch the sphere of the divine, finding himself rejected in the attempt. In the concept of the demonic, however, the subject does claim divinity, and in so doing raises certain finite elements into the realm of the infinite at the expense of other elements which he rejects. In the individual, this can lead to a split in the centred consciousness, a sort of religious schizophrenia, with disastrous results; in the group, it can lead to a vast assortment of gods, all claiming ultimacy for themselves, in so far as some are chosen by certain people, and others chosen by others, and this inevitably leads to the disruption of society by demonic forces. Again, claims Tillich, this tendency can be observed in Christianity as elsewhere.
Because demonisation is the elevation of the finite into the realm of the infinite, wherever it occurs, even in the moral and cultural spheres, it will show religious traits, and this is seen in the fact that wherever man demands the unconditional allegiance of his fellows to that which he has elevated, there is a pseudo-religious type of fanaticism present. But in the more narrowly religious sphere, claims Tillich, the ambiguity is even deeper, for there is a strange irony present when that which claims to represent the divine should set up its own moral and cultural expressions as possessing divinity themselves. This is why some theologians have rejected religion as a genuine expression of the divine, for they have felt that religion is inevitably man's attempt to claim ultimacy for something that is really of his own creation. In fact, some have gone so far as to say that here is the fundamental difference between Christianity and other religions, in that the religions are nothing more than man's own attempt to glorify himself whereas Christianity is based purely on God's own self-revelation. Tillich feels that this rejection is based on a basic confusion in the minds of such people between religion and demonised religion. It also 'ignores the fact that every religion is based on revelation and that every revelation expresses itself in a religion. In so far as religion is based on revelation it is unambiguous; in so far as it receives revelation it is ambiguous'.

It is therefore an oversimplification to say that religion is revealed. But it would be equally wrong to embrace the opposite point of view. The truth of the matter is that religion is both the creation and the distortion of revelation.

In fact, Tillich continues, theology cannot avoid the idea of religion, even though it will always seek to examine it critically. In the study of the history of religion, the continual tension between
religion as the expression of unambiguous life and the demonic distortion of religion will always be very much to the fore: a never-ending inner struggle against religion 'for the sake of the holy' itself. The Christian claim is that there is one event only in which this tension has been victoriously resolved: in the Cross of the Christ. Yet even this claim is threatened by distortion in the life and structures of the churches, particularly when they claim that such a victory is complete within their own life. In fact, the church itself is very much subjected to the ambiguities of religion which we have been describing, as can be clearly observed by anyone who examines its history throughout the years.

One of the main problems in the history of religion is that it frequently claims superiority for its own particular cultural forms over against all other cultural forms. Though religion does in fact exist to point to the need for the transcendence of all cultural patterns, when it claims superiority for its own particular forms of expression and life, it is in fact once more lapsing into a form of demonism. Quite often, for example, the religious social group will try to "rule the roost" so to speak over all other types of social group. In extreme cases, in the life of a nation justice itself can be overridden by religious structures in the name of the holy, and the history of religion shows just how devastating this type of divine-demonic ambiguity can be. Or in the personal realm, in the aspiration to sainthood, religion can often suppress the individual's development of his own humanity in the interests of holiness, and it is not infrequently the negative, ascetic aspects of sainthood which receive religious blessing over against the more positive aspects of human development. Or again, in the cognitive sphere, there is often an attempt by religion
to force doctrines and dogmas onto people, violating their own intellects and consciences in the name of obedience to the truth. The same pattern is also at work in the attitude religion frequently adopts towards the arts, where it consecrates certain styles and expects the artist to conform to them in his religious works. Tillich points out that whereas self-transcendence does indeed reveal both cognitive truth and aesthetic authenticity, so that behind both religious doctrines and artistic expressions lies the power of the holy, this is no ground for allowing traditional dogmas and forms of art to suppress any new expressions in the name of the divine, for this is tantamount to demonic destruction. In all of these examples, two things stand out: firstly, that because of the element of distortion that is always present, religion itself cannot be the answer to man's quest for unambiguous life; and secondly, that despite this, because religion is that which testifies to self-transcendence, the answer to man's quest can be received only through religion, and through no other medium. We are therefore led to the quest for an unambiguous self-transcendence in the function of religion, and the ground is thus prepared for our consideration of the doctrine of the Spirit in relation to life's ambiguities.

Evaluation

Tillich's concept of self-transcendence is a most important preparation for his doctrine of the Spirit, for not only is it the Spirit who makes the act of self-transcendence possible, but the nature of self-transcendence as Tillich defines it helps us to see the precise lines along which his doctrine of the Spirit is to be interpreted. This will become more apparent as we turn to examine his analysis of the work of the Spirit in detail, particularly in relation to the ambiguities of religion which are mentioned here. Nevertheless there are one or two
things which call for comment at this point.

It is very true, for example, that the tragic element in human life, resulting from man's attempts to transcend himself and seek after a higher and deeper fulfilment which seem continually to be thrown back into his face, is something with which the theologian must be concerned, especially when one realises the part this theme plays not only in classical literature, but also in more recent writing, whether Christian (as in Dostoievski) or atheist (as in Camus). The constant thwarting of man's desire in this way, by which he comes to feel that his feet are so firmly tied to the ground that every time he seeks to rise to the demands and invitations of his greatness, even for unselfish ends, he is pulled back with a disastrous crash, inevitably results in the depths of despair so characteristic of contemporary literature. Here is a vast problem which seeks to be resolved, and if the doctrine of the Spirit has anything to say to us it must certainly deal with such a theme. The way is prepared therefore for a concept of the Spiritual Presence that will lift man out of this predicament and allow him to find his true greatness in conformity with God's purpose for the world. So Tillich's assertion that the holy itself is beyond tragedy must show its relevance particularly on a human level, and those who assert it must show the truth of its application in their own experience.

Tillich's comments on the essential unity of morality, culture and religion underline the difficulties already pointed out in our evaluation of the concepts both of potentiality and essences. In the state of mere potentiality or 'dreaming innocence', made known to us through some sort of trans-historical remembrance, Tillich says, there is no independent morality, culture and religion. Their disunity and apparent independence appear only when they are actualised in their
existential state. Now apart from the fact that it is extremely difficult to give any real meaning to what he calls 'dreaming innocence' and how one can have a 'transhistorical remembrance' of this, it is even more difficult to understand what an essential unity of morality, culture and religion is within this so-called transhistorical state. Yet the implication is that there is a prior order of reality in which essential morality, essential culture and essential religion, whatever these things may be apart from their actual occurrence in human experience, are one. We cannot accept this way of thinking, however. Surely one can affirm the underlying unity of the various functions of life without having to bring in idealistic notions to warrant it. To do so serves only to confuse.

Tillich's definition of holiness in terms of self-transcendence and his understanding of holy things according to their capacity to transcend themselves in the direction of the divine, raises the problem by what criteria we decide which things have this capacity and which things do not. It is clear that no objective criteria can be applied to answer this question, for we have no empirical knowledge of the divine by which to test the validity of holy things. But we have already seen that for Tillich every genuine revelatory experience is due to the 'inspiring presence of the Spirit'. The answer to the question therefore of how we can know which things are holy is that the Spirit makes us aware that this is so by grasping us and creating in us through these things a sense of ecstasy which triggers off a response in our own experience. This is a theme which Tillich will proceed to develop fully at a later stage, when he comes to talk about the meaning of ecstasy and inspiration. We raise it here because what he says at this point does tend to presuppose what he says later.
One point in Tillich's analysis that is of particular interest in that it has an indirect bearing on his understanding of the relation between the divine Spirit and the human spirit, is his defence of the word 'religion' against those who devalue such a concept as man-made in favour of a Christianity based on God's revelation in Jesus as the Christ. There can be little doubt from his comments in Perspectives that it is the Barthian school of theology that he has chiefly in mind. Apparently when Tillich returned to Germany in 1948, he was regaled for using the word 'religion', because the current German view of religion had been strongly influenced by Barth's definition of religion as human arrogance. Every attempt of man to reach up to the divine is, according to Barth, man-made and consequently unbelief. In this sense, Barth refused to apply the word 'religion' to Christianity, grounded as it is in God's revelation of God in Jesus Christ. He was willing to describe Christianity as 'true religion', but the implication of this is that the religions as such, as distinct from Christianity, are false. Tillich felt that Barth adopted this point of view because he 'negated every point of identity between God and man, even in the doctrine of the Spirit who might be dwelling in man,' and therefore failed to answer the question how God can appear to man at all. It is precisely here where Tillich feels himself to be totally at odds with Barth, emphasising that without some point of contact revelation is impossible. If God is 'Wholly Other', as Barth maintains, and not also immanently present as the divine Spirit in the life of man in the sense that there is a common point of identity between the two, then according to Tillich there can be no meeting point whatever. For Tillich's claim that the divine power of being, and therefore the divine Spirit, is present in the whole life of man, is the very basis of his assertion that every
religion is based on revelation, a response to the divine Presence in human life, and that this is as true of other religions as it is of Christianity.

Now while Tillich may well be justified in his attack on Barth's position here, it is not at all clear what his own position is. On the one hand, he is certainly correct in his assertion that without some point of contact between God and man there can be no revelation. But on the other hand, there is no reason why this point of contact has to be a 'point of identity'. It does not follow that if there is no point of identity there can be no revelation. Revelation does not presuppose a point of identity. Nevertheless the concept of a point of identity between God and man is one of the central doctrines in Tillich's theology. Yet at the same time it is a concept which needs considerable clarification. It raises the problem which we have already noted of the precise relation between the finite and the infinite, the human and the divine, and more particularly from our point of view the human spirit and the divine Spirit. If there is a 'point of identity' does this mean that man and God are ultimately one, with no difference of genus? Are we to suppose that because there is an immanence of the divine Spirit in the human spirit, that essentially the two are one and the same? Is Tillich saying therefore that revelation is possible precisely because in the final analysis the spirit of man and the Spirit of God are to be identified, an identity which at the moment is hidden from us because of our existential situation? An attempt to give some sort of answer to this question must await further discussion. At the moment we note yet again the difficulty that such a concept raises, and the way in which there may well be a deviation here in Tillich's thinking from orthodox Christian thought. The solution to the problem must inevitably influence
our final judgment on his doctrine of the Spirit.
Notes to Chapter Two

1. ST, III, pp. 11-113.
2. Ibid., p. 12.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., p. 13ff.
5. ST, I, p. 276.

6. Tillich also rejects other ways in which 'spirit' has been interpreted. The most significant of these, he says, is its use in the sense of a 'spiritual world', either akin to Plato's world of essences and ideas, in which sense the 'spiritual world' is the 'universe of potentialities', which would tend to overemphasise only one type of being, whereas life as spirit includes both essential and existential being; or else in the sense of a 'spirit realm' apart from life as we know it, a usage which can be subjected to the same sort of criticism. The only English word which he feels still retains something of the original meaning of the word 'spirit' is 'spirited', which contains the idea of power, and is very closely related to the Platonic virtue of courage. He completes his semantic analysis by relating the term 'spirit' to other terms traditionally associated with the doctrine of man. (i) The word 'soul' (psyche), he says, has suffered a similar fate to that of 'spirit', for the rejection of the soul as an immortal substance has led to the rejection of the world itself. Where the word has been preserved, as in poetic language, it designates the seat of the passions and emotions. 'Spirit', he feels, as the unity of power and meaning, can to some extent become a substitute for 'soul', though its range is wider. But by and large Tillich feels that the word 'soul' itself has lost any usefulness in a theological understanding of man and his relation to the divine Spirit. (ii) It is necessary to see that although 'mind' cannot be used as an effective substitute for 'spirit' it is an important word in its own right. It expresses the consciousness of a living being in relation to its surroundings and to itself, including perception, awareness and intention. In the animal dimension it appears as soon as self-awareness appears, and whether in an elementary or developed form, includes intelligence, will and directed action, and in man it becomes related to the universals in both perception and intention. (iii) Finally, 'mind' is structurally determined by 'reason' (logos), 'the principle of form by which reality in all its dimensions, and mind in all its directions, is structures'. (ST, III, p. 25) But 'spirit' as dimension includes far more than reason, though without the structure of reason it could not express anything. Furthermore, reason, in the sense of reasoning or technical reason, is one of the potentialities of man's spirit in the sphere of knowledge, and is thus the tool of scientific analysis and the technical control of reality.

7. ST, III, p. 27.
One may note the rather different interpretation of essential being given by Thomas Aquinas. F.C. Copleston comments, 'These ways of speaking are not meant to imply either that existence is something apart from an essence or that an essence has an objective reality apart from existence. The distinction between them is a distinction within a concrete finite being... Before the union of essence and existence to form a concrete and actual thing there was no objective essence and no existence.' (F.C. Copleston, *Aquinas*, London, Penguin Books, 1955, pp. 101f.).

Tillich's attempt to resolve the contradictions between the various dimensions by claiming that they are united in their essential state falls under the same criticism that Kierkegaard made of Hegel. The philosopher, he says, 'is absolutely right in saying that sub specie aeterni, in the language of abstraction, in pure thought and pure being, there is no aut... aut. Confound it! how could there be, seeing that language itself has removed all contradiction?' (S. Kierkegaard, *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, Princeton University Press, 1941, p. 270.).

It is useful here to compare Tillich with Teilhard de Chardin, who similarly emphasises the fundamental unity of life in all its dimensions, and to whose thought Tillich pays tribute in the introduction to Volume III of his *Systematic Theology* (p. 5). Teilhard's phraseology, however, is significantly different, for whereas Tillich speaks of potentiality and actuality, essence and existence, Teilhard speaks of the 'within' and the 'without' of things. And it would be wrong to conclude that they mean precisely the same thing. For whereas in Tillich the essential and the existential are two distinct orders of reality, even though the existential is grounded in the essential, in Teilhard the 'within' and the 'without' are fundamentally and originally one, two 'faces' of the same thing. Both the 'within' and the 'without' can be 'resolved backwards into a dust of particles', both have a common property of atomicity, so that there is a basic identity of the within and the without. The psychic and the physical are basically one. 'In these depths,' says Teilhard, 'the world's two aspects, external and internal, correspond point by point. So much so that one may pass from the one to the other' (*The Phenomenon of Man*, London, Fontana, 1965, p. 64). The unity of life, then, according to Teilhard, is not found in some abstract realm beyond existence, but in the very stuff of life itself, in the ultimate identity of the within and the without. The history of the 'within' is the history of the interior face of reality which is found at every stage of the evolutionary process, from the primeval dust particles of the cosmos to man himself, in whom it reaches its highest development in human consciousness. And it is here where Teilhard locates the unity of all
life, in the 'within' which is like a golden thread running through every level of reality, until it comes to understand itself in the workings of the human mind, so that the whole of life is the story of genesis or becoming. And because life is one at this deeper interior level, so also it is one in its exterior aspect, despite its diversity, for ultimately the 'without' and the 'within' are one.

Thus, although there is a strong similarity between Tillich and Teilhard in their teleological approach to reality, there is at the heart of what they are saying a fundamental difference. For whereas in Tillich the potential is prior to the actual, the existential a fallen and ambiguous reflection of the essential, the true reality behind the phenomenal world, in Teilhard the 'within' and the 'without' are two faces of the same reality, with no question of the one being prior to the other; and it would seem that at this point Teilhard is far nearer to Aquinas than Tillich. Thus the unity of life's dimensions must, for Teilhard, be found within life as we know it, and not beyond it in some essential order which has the flavour of abstraction. May we possibly detect here the difference between realist and idealist metaphysics?


16. Teilhard also refers to a 'leap' within the process of evolution: 'Hominisation can be accepted in the first place as the individual and instant leap from instinct to thought, but it is also, in a wider sense, the progressive phyletic spiritualisation in human civilisation of all the forces contained within the animal world.' (op. cit., p. 200).

17. ST, III, p. 32.
18. Ibid., p. 33.
19. Ibid., p. 34.
21. ST, III, p. 43.
22. Ibid., p. 45.
23. Ibid., p. 46.
24. Ibid., pp. 46ff.
25. Ibid., p. 47.
26. Ibid., p. 48.
27. Ibid.
28. See also 'The Religious Source of Moral Demands', Ch. 2 of Morality and Beyond, pp. 25-41.
Paul Ramsey pinpoints the difference between the ontological type of ethic such as one finds in Tillich and the New Testament meaning of love in his book *Basic Christian Ethics* (London, S.C.M. Press, 1953). There are two main questions that are asked in ethics, he says: What is the good? and, whose good shall it be when the choice is made? The first question, he points out, is by and large the concern of philosophical or ontological ethics, which arranges its answer along a vertically ascending scale of values, but always with reference to the self's own fulfilment, so that even our relationships with others still remain 'overtly or covertly within the circle of self'. Thus love in philosophical ethics becomes virtually a 'self-regarding concern for others' (pp. 114ff). The other question, 'Whose good?' he continues, is the main, perhaps the only concern of Christian ethics, which consequently finds itself in opposition to philosophical ethics when the latter pretends to answer this question in terms of selfish enlightenment or by general, value-centred appeals to the acquisitive aspirations of some poor love. Christian ethics answers the question, Whose good? by requirements which would move the agent on the horizontal plane where he happens to stand more over to the side of his neighbour'. In Ramsey's view, the difference between these two approaches is fundamental. It is the difference 'between poor and plenteous love, between craving and giving, between desire and desire inverted, between acquisition and self-sacrifice, between upward-reaching and giving over, between agape-love which seeks not its own and erotic love which seeks its own on earth and in heaven'. He asks, 'Would it not be foolish to try to demonstrate the value of such "neighbour-regarding concern for others" in satisfactions to the self, even in terms of the great satisfaction of escaping from oneself?' So for Ramsey, the Christian ethic is primarily 'de-ontological: certainly it is no part of the meaning or intention of neighbour love to be good for me but for me to prove good for my neighbour, though good may follow for me as a quite unintended by-product.' Now perhaps we cannot go all the way with Ramsey here. It is difficult to see, for example, just how the Christian ethic can set about determining Whose good? until it has first decided what the good shall be? It is a fallacy to say that Christian ethics is not concerned with the nature of the good, even though it be defined in terms of love. The Christian ethic, therefore, is not entirely 'de-ontological'. Yet Ramsey's point is important and is a useful
corrective to Tillich's primary understanding of love in terms of self-integration. The real nature of Christian agape, and therefore the Christian understanding of morality, is not that of self-fulfilment, but a selfless, outgoing, caring concern for others.

37. See ST, III, pp. 53ff.
38. Ibid., p. 61.
39. Ibid. Tillich's point is that in both the Genesis myth (Genesis 2) and Greek philosophy (see Plato, The Republic, trans. by Cornford, Oxford University Press, p. 109; see also p. viii), language and technology are held together; the former where God commands man to name the animals and to till the soil, the latter where words are discussed in their technical context.

40. Theology of Culture, p. 47.
41. ST, III, p. 62.
42. Theology of Culture, pp. 47ff.
43. ST, III, pp. 65ff.
44. Ibid., p. 66.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid., p. 67.
47. Ibid., p. 68.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid., p. 69.
50. Ibid., p. 70.
51. Ibid., p. 71.
52. Ibid., p. 72.
53. Ibid., p. 73.
54. Ibid., p. 74.
55. Ibid., p. 75.
56. Ibid., p. 77.
57. Ibid., p. 78.
58. Ibid., p. 79.
59. Ibid., p. 80.
The term culture,' says Linton, 'refers to the total way of life of any society . . . A culture is the configuration of learned behaviour and results of behaviour whose component elements are shared and transmitted by members of a particular society'. The sociologist, he remarks, uses the term to represent a 'generalisation based upon the observation and comparison of a series of cultures. It bears much the same relation to these individual cultures that the "spider monkey" of a naturalist's description bears to the innumerable individual spider monkeys who together constitute the species.' (R. Linton, The Cultural Background of Personality, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964, pp. 20ff.) Similarly, Ogburn and Nimkoff speak of culture as originating with 'the transmission of ways of behaviour by learning from the group', and significantly see it as something which originates before the actual arrival of man, in the superorganic realm. (W.F. Ogburn and M.P. Nimkoff, A Handbook of Sociology, London RKP, 1950, p. 22.)

This is affirmed in a passage in Perspectives, where he points out that the basic assumption of this type of philosophy 'is that the
human mind has power to intuit essences. In looking, for example, 'at a red object at this moment, a red shirt or dress, the mind can experience the essence of redness. The essence of redness appears in a particular object and can be grasped by the mind. This I call intuitive reason'. (p. 32).

79. If one drives the phrase, as Tillich interprets it, to its logical conclusion, with all its overtones and implications of universal essences, one ends up with all sorts of ridiculous ideas. In the realm of technology, for example, if every object created has a universe of meaning which points to a corresponding universe of being, what is to prevent us from postulating essential 'car-hood' or essential 'food-mixer-hood' and so ad infinitum? It seems that whilst one may usefully abstract essential qualities of being in some cases for the purposes of analysis and discussion, to do this with every aspect of man's creative function would be exceedingly odd.

80. See above, p. 79 n. 12 (p. 132).

81. ST, III, pp. 92ff.

82. Romans 8:19ff.

83. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book A, 1072f; also Book A, 984; and Physics 265.

84. ST, III, p. 92. Note the similarity here with Schelling. See below, p. 452.

85. Ibid., p. 93.

86. Ibid. The greatness and dignity of life in all dimensions is discussed in pp. 93-101.

87. Ibid., p. 101.

88. Ibid., p. 102.

89. Ibid., p. 103.

90. Ibid., p. 104.

91. Ibid.

92. Theology of Culture, p. 9.

93. ST, III, p. 105.

94. Ibid., p. 106.

95. Note Tillich's comments on Kierkegaard's criticism of organised religion: 'One can almost say that when Kierkegaard deals with the church or theology, the image which he presents is more a caricature than a fair description. In particular the ecclesiastical office was an object of criticism. He attacked the fact
that the minister becomes an employee like all other employees, with special duties and economic insecurities. This position of the minister, especially its bourgeois elements . . . while at the same time proclaiming the impossible possibility of the Christ is for Kierkegaard involved in a self-contradiction. But Kierkegaard does not indicate how this conflict might be solved. Certainly it is a reality, and for Kierkegaard a reality which contradicts the absoluteness of the essence of Christianity. One cannot take this as an objectively valid criticism, because if one did, then one would have to abolish every church office. If the office is not abolished, it is inevitable that the laws of sociology will make themselves felt and influence the form of the office and those who hold it'. (Perspectives, p. 176). See S. Kierkegaard, Training in Christianity (1850).

96. ST, III, p. 107.
97. Ibid., p. 109.
98. Ibid., p. 111.
99. Ibid., p. 113.

100. See our comment on the nature of potentiality and essential being, above, p. 78f.
101. See above, p. 12.
102. See below, p. 141ff.
103. p. 241.

105. For a discussion on this theme, see H. Hartwell, The Theology of Karl Barth, London, Duckworth, 1964, pp. 87ff.
I. THE CHARACTER OF THE MANIFESTATION OF THE SPIRIT

It is important for us to see that for Tillich no doctrine of the divine Spirit is possible without first understanding the nature of spirit as a dimension of life itself. The nature of 'spirit' with a small 's' opens up for us something of the nature of 'Spirit' with a capital 'S', and in this way the human spirit and the divine Spirit are correlated, and the human spirit becomes an effective symbol of the divine Spirit. Man experiences in his own life the unity of power and meaning that is characteristic of 'spirit', and because he thus knows what 'spirit' is, he is able to speak effectively of God as 'Spirit', the unity of power and meaning that transcends and underlies all life.

In our analysis of Tillich's theology so far it has become obvious that the life of God and the life of the world, particularly as it reaches its climax in human life, are intimately connected. God is present within his world in a relationship of mutual participation. The symbol of the Spirit above all points to this intimate presence of God within his world. The Spirit of God, he says, 'is the presence of the Divine Life within creaturely life. The Divine Spirit is "God present"'. To give the symbol its full significance therefore he prefers to speak more fully of 'the Spiritual Presence'. Or, as he puts it elsewhere, 'This is what the Divine Spirit means: God present to our spirit. Spirit is not a mysterious substance; it is not a part of God. It is God himself; but not God as the creative ground of all things and not God directing history and manifesting himself in its central event, but God as present in communities and personalities, grasping them, inspiring them, and transforming them'.

We may ask, of course, how it is that the Spiritual Presence, the Presence of the Divine Life, is to be found in the human spirit, in the midst of creaturely life. Tillich answers this by using the concept of dimensions, which has formed the basis of his understanding of the unity of life so far. We should not, of course, imagine that the Spiritual Presence is a further dimension of life existing alongside every other dimension as a constituent part of the unity of all dimensions. When we apply the concept of dimension to the divine Spirit we are using the term in a somewhat different sense. For the Spirit is rather the ultimate dimension of life, the 'dimension of depth', the ground of every other dimension and the 'aim toward which they are self-transcendent'. To refer to the Spiritual Presence as the dimension of depth means that in this dimension 'all dimensions are rooted and negated and affirmed'. So while in the existential situation, we need to correlate the human spirit, including all other dimensions, with the divine Spirit, it would be wrong to see this as setting them over against each other in a dualistic fashion, for essentially there is a mutual immanence based on the fact that the Spiritual Presence is the depth-dimension of Being-itself. The finite and the infinite are essentially one, and it is only in the world of separate existences that there appears a preliminary and transitory duality. The Spirit of God transcends this duality because it penetrates the whole, the finite and the infinite, in ultimate depth. And 'he who knows about depth,' says Tillich, 'knows about God'.

The question that follows on from this is where the Spiritual Presence manifests itself in the spirit of man, and what character this manifestation has. Traditionally, Tillich points out, this question has been answered by saying that 'the divine Spirit dwells and works in
the human spirit", 6 penetrating the 'innermost parts of our own spirits', so that 'our entire inner life, our thoughts and desires, our feelings and imaginations, are known to God'. 7 The crucial word here is the little word 'in', for there is a sense in which the 'in' of the divine Spirit involves an 'out' for the human spirit: when the divine Spirit breaks into the human spirit it drives the human spirit 'out of itself'. By this Tillich does not wish to imply that the human spirit becomes something other than what it is, or loses its identity, but rather that it is able successfully to transcend itself because it is grasped by something ultimate and unconditioned. To this situation, man in a state of self-transcendence under the impact of the divine Spirit, Tillich refers the classical term 'ecstasy'. 8 He realises that certain associations with this word make it a difficult one to use, but he feels that it is a word which needs to be rescued from its contemporary distortions and 'restored to a sober theological function'. 9 Every revelatory and saving experience within the life of man is made possible by this state of ecstasy, when the human spirit is driven beyond itself by the Divine Spirit without in any sense destroying its essential, rational structure. This dual capacity of ecstasy both to transcend the human spirit and yet at the same time not to violate its rational structure has already made it possible for Tillich to speak of ecstatic reason, 10 the vehicle by which man is able to receive revelation. Ecstatic reason, he points out, remains reason, 'it does not receive anything irrational or anti-rational . . . but it transcends the basic condition of finite rationality, the subject-object of structure', as all mystical experience will testify. 11 Thus, though this experience of ecstasy does not destroy the essentially rational structure of the human spirit, it does do something which the human spirit itself is incapable of doing: it creates unam-
ambiguous life, a life in which the subject-object structure is transcended. Man may reach for unambiguous life, but he cannot grasp it; he can only be grasped by it, and the answers to the ambiguities of life can only come through this creative act of the Spiritual Presence. This means that it is impossible for man to compel the divine Spirit to enter his own spirit, and whenever he attempts to do so, the result will be not the divine Spirit that 'descends', but rather a human counterfeit 'in religious disguise'. The finite cannot force the infinite; man cannot compel God'. Or, as he puts it in Perspectives, 'In listening and waiting we may experience the Spirit, but more than this cannot be said. There is no valid method at all of forcing God upon us'.

All this leads Tillich to reject any idea that ecstasy is some sort of miracle in which the Spiritual Presence invades and destroys the essential structure of the spirit of man. Such an idea, he maintains, is based on a complete misinterpretation of the relationship between the divine Spirit and the human spirit. Yet within the history of religion there are many incidents which suggest that something like this does happen, when certain strange physical or psychological effects occur, and not all of them can be ascribed to man's attempt to force the divine Spirit down upon him. One need only think of speaking with tongues, or certain types of extra-sensory perception, or healings at a distance. But while this suggests that when man is grasped by the Spiritual Presence extraordinary things may happen and 'astonishing events' may be experienced, this may well be explained by the fact that the Spiritual Presence, in grasping the spirit of man, grasps at the same time every other dimension of life present within human life in ways which we do not fully understand, with the result that 'spatial and temporal separation and bodily and psychological disorders and
limitations are overcome'. It is this to which the word 'miracle'
really points. In fact, it is in these moments of astonishment, when
man is forced, as it were, to stand aside and become aware of the
mysterious presence of the holy which has grasped him, that revelation
becomes possible. But none of this, claims Tillich, really undermines
our assertion that when the divine Spirit grasps man in a state of
ecstasy there is no violation of the essential structure of human person­
ality.

Two terms have been traditionally used to express the way in which
the human spirit receives the impact of the Spiritual Presence, and
Tillich subjects both of these to careful analysis. The first is
'inspiration', which denotes a 'breathing' into the spirit of man.
Tillich comments that this does not mean that man 'receives an 'informa­
tive lesson about God and divine matters', as certain schools of
biblical interpretation would suggest, for in his point of view the
role of the Spirit is 'not that of a teacher but of a meaning-bearing
power which grasps the human spirit in an ecstatic experience'. It is
after this experience has occurred, he says, that the teacher is able to
analyse and formulate its meaning, but by that time the experience itself
has already passed, and it is to the experience itself that the ecstasy
of inspiration refers. The other term is 'infusion', which signifies
a 'pouring' into the spirit of man, a concept which was central both in
the early church and later on in Catholicism, which spoke of an
infusio fidel and an infusio amoris by which faith and love respectively
were derived from the infusio Spiritus Sancti. The inevitable tendency
to distort this doctrine along magico-materialistic lines in later
Catholic thought wherein the Spirit became some sort of "matter" which
was transmitted by the priest in the performance of the sacraments,
caused Protestantism to become extremely suspicious of this concept. Instead the Protestant churches sought to emphasise the personality of the Spirit. Faith and love, for example, in Protestant thought, were considered not as infusions injected by the Spirit into the spirit of man, but impacts of the Spirit upon man, effected by the Word, whether within or without a specifically sacramental context. For this reason, the Reformed churches have continued to be reluctant to use the concept of infusion. However, this reluctance, feels Tillich, cannot be entirely justified, and in fact there are times when even the Protestant is prepared to speak of the 'outpouring of the Spirit', as he does in his reading and interpretation of the Scriptures. And even if he prefers the term 'inspiration', he is still using a metaphor of substance, for 'breath' is also a substance, which 'enters' him who receives the Spirit. Tillich adds that in our contemporary situation, the psychological rediscovery of the significance of the unconscious and the consequent re-evaluation of symbols must inevitably lead to a re-assessment of the Protestant emphasis on the Word as the sole medium of the Spirit, and this must certainly bring the word 'infusion' back into play.

Tillich sees Paul's doctrine of the Spirit as the classical expression of the spiritual unity of ecstasy and structure. For him, Paul is primarily a theologian of the Spirit, his Christology and eschatology both depending on this 'central point in his thinking', and he feels that Paul's doctrine of justification by grace through faith is an expression of the fact that with the appearance of the Christ a new state of things has come into being, which is the creation of the Spirit. He is certainly not happy with the prevalent Protestant assertion that Paul was predominantly a theologian of justification. "That certainly is not wrong," he says. "But this was a defensive doctrine
for Paul . . . it was not the centre of his theology. At the centre was his experience and doctrine of the Spirit. Thus he is on the side of those in Protestant theology who stress inwardness. In every experience of the Spirit, he continues, Paul emphasises the ecstatic element. Take, for instance, the example of prayer. Every prayer which achieves the real purpose of prayer, that is, union with God, has for Paul the character of ecstasy. Such prayer is impossible for man under his own steam because of himself he does not know how to pray. But it is possible for the divine Spirit to pray through a man, even in words that cannot be uttered. Another example is Paul's frequent use of the term 'in Christ', a formula which is not to be interpreted merely in a psychological sense, but which points rather to an ecstatic participation in the Christ who "is the Spirit", by virtue of which a man is able to live 'in the sphere of this Spiritual power'. Yet all this, Tillich points out, does not mean that man's essential structure is destroyed. In fact, Paul strongly resists any such suggestion. For example, in I Corinthians, when he speaks of spiritual gifts, he rejects both the ecstatic speaking with tongues wherever this leads to chaos and disruption, and also the emphasis on personal experiences of an ecstatic nature wherever they lead to hubris, in addition to any other Spiritual gift that is not subjected to love, the 'greatest creation of the Spiritual Presence'. In fact, in the famous hymn to love, there is a complete unity between the structure of the moral imperative and the ecstasy of the Spirit. Similarly, as the first three chapters of the same letter demonstrate, although the knowledge man receives through ecstasy is not received through his normal capacity to acquire and formulate knowledge, this knowledge received through revelation in no way destroys the cognitive structures of man's mind. Thus both agape and
and gnosis refer to 'forms of morality and knowledge in which ecstasy and structure are united'.

The dilemma that the church has always faced, Tillich points out, is that while it must preserve structure by preventing the confusion of ecstasy with chaos, it must also avoid both the institutional profanation of the Spirit such as one found in early Catholicism with its tendency to replace the gifts of the Spirit with office, and the 'secular profanation' of contemporary Protestantism which can so easily take place when ecstasy is replaced with doctrinal or moral structures. Here he feels that Paul's criterion of the unity of structure and ecstasy must stand over against both types of profanation. It is a duty for the church constantly to apply this criterion, for whenever it lives in institutions and disregards the ecstatic side of the Spiritual Presence there follows an inevitable swing of the pendulum to chaotic and disrupting forms of ecstasy and then in turn to the growth of secularised reactions, even though one realises the inevitable risk that whenever the church takes ecstatic movements seriously there is a tendency to confuse the impact of the Spiritual Presence with psychological determined over-excitement.

This leads us to the inevitable question of how we can distinguish between ecstasy and emotional intoxication. How can we differentiate between the genuine impact of the Spiritual Presence and psychologically determined over-excitement? In answering this question, says Tillich, we must realise that whenever the Spirit grasps a man he grasps the whole of him, and this means his psychological dimension as well as his spiritual dimension. When a man is held in the power of the Spirit, his dimension of self-awareness is not excluded, for as the doctrine of the multidimensional unity of life teaches us, 'the dimension of spirit
actualises itself within the dynamics of self-awareness and under its biological conditions. It is common, however, in certain circles, both psychiatric and ecclesiastical, to try to reduce every spiritual experience to a psychological state. This profanisation of the genuine ecstatic experience, asserts Tillich, must be resisted at all costs. For ecstasy does not originate from within a man's psychological self, or else it would not be able to set him free from the limitations of that self. For one of the marks of genuine ecstasy is that it gives man a new awareness by which he is able to overcome the subject-object structure of his normal life, and become conscious of something higher and deeper than his day to day experiences. In other words, it raises man to a state of self-transcendence.

One of the problems that arises in this context is that there are also certain psychological states which seem on the surface to liberate man from this bondage to the subject-object structure of reality, but there is, Tillich claims, an essential difference between the liberation afforded by genuine ecstasy and the so-called liberation effected by the psychological manipulation of the mind. For true ecstasy leads to something which is more than the subject-object structure, whereas mere psychological over-excitement in actual fact leads to something less. In the one, there is no attempt to ignore the realities of normal life as if they were not there; in the other, there is a deliberate attempt to obliterate those realities. The way of ecstasy is the way of self-transcendence in which the ambiguities of life are retained but overcome; the way of intoxication is the way of escapism by a retreat into mere subjectivity in which the destruction of life's ambiguities is sought after through temporary release. Yet this temporary release, he points out, only serves to heighten the tensions it seeks to avoid – it can
never resolve them, for it has no creative power. It lacks completely both 'spiritual productivity and Spiritual creativity'. And this is precisely what a genuine ecstatic experience has. By a complete involvement of both subject and object in so far as they are both transcended in the power of the Spirit, something new is produced, something that is richer in content and in power than was there before. So, for example, the preacher who is genuinely grasped by the Spirit will not only remain fully aware of the social situation of his time, but also see that situation in the light of eternity. The man who contemplates will not only be aware of the structure of the universe as he sees it, but also understand that structure in the light of the ground and aim of all being; and he who prays will not only be fully alive to his own or his neighbour's situation, but also see it under the Spirit's influence and in the context of the divine direction present in the whole of life. These experiences which Tillich cites are all ecstatic, and in each of them there is nothing objective that is reduced to mere subjectivity - rather is it preserved and even increased. It is preserved not merely by an increase in psychological awareness, but by a transcendent awareness in which the independent existence of each is overcome in unity: 'a union of subject and object has taken place in which the independent existence of each is overcome; new unity is created'. He uses prayer as a specific illustration of this. In every serious prayer, he says, though in one sense it may seem that God is an object for the one who prays, yet he is also subject, in so far as 'we can only pray to the God who[himself]prays to himself through us'. Thus genuine prayer is possible only in so far as the subject-object structure is overcome, but whenever this fails to take place the true greatness of prayer is profaned. It is this transcendence of the subject-object scheme of
life which makes possible in every sphere a genuine creativity within
the life and experience of him who is grasped by the Spirit of God.
And it is this element of creativity, concludes Tillich, that is the
necessary criterion 'which must be used to decide whether an extra­
ordinary state of mind is ecstatic, created by the Spiritual Presence,
or subjective intoxication'. In the latter state there is no element
of creativity present, only the forces of destruction which aim to
reduce the self to nothing more than a vacuum. So, he concludes, 'the
use of this criterion the church can employ in "judging" the Spirit'.

Evaluation

Our first point of discussion is to do with Tillich's use of the
term 'dimension' in describing the relation between the human spirit and
the Divine Spirit. The expression which he uses to define this more
precisely, 'the dimension of depth', is a useful one, and one which has
some valuable insights, particularly in its emphasis on the presence of
the Spirit in the whole of life, interpenetrating it at every level.
However, there are three points which must be raised by way of criticism.

Firstly, it is important to realise that the word 'depth' can have
connotations other than what Tillich intends, particularly in contemporary
psychological usage. Tillich asserts that 'he who knows about depth
knows about God'. But he may well know not about God, but about other
things in the depth of his own being which are far less inviting. The
examination of the unconscious through psychological analysis may reveal
many dark things about life which are both haunting and anxiety perpe­
tuating, and one feels that there is profound psychological insight in
such symbols as hell, Sheol, the underworld, and so on, all of which are
symbols of depth. Though Paul speaks of the Spirit searching out the
deep things of God, he also knows that in the depths of his own being
there are things which give grave cause for concern, and any analysis of
Romans 7 will show how deeply troubled he was about these things. 34 There
is therefore an ambiguity in this symbol which stems from its psycholog­
cal usage which should make us use it with caution. It may well be,
of course, that the struggle in the depths of man's being reflects a
deeper ontological struggle in the life of being-itself, and that the
outcome of this struggle is determined by the fact that the depth of
God is deeper than the destructive depths of non-being which threaten
it, but the psychological usage of the term is a reminder that it is an
expression that has its limitations and disadvantages. Careful clarifi­
cation is essential.

Secondly, there is something impersonal about the word 'dimension'
which should make us particularly careful when we use it as a symbol of
the divine Spirit. One would not wish to infer from this usage that
the divine Spirit is impersonal, for this would be to court a heresy
which has constantly been rejected by the Christian church. As we shall
see later, 35 it is not entirely beyond possibility that Tillich himself
has fallen into this trap. What needs to be emphasised therefore is
that this is a symbol which has meaning provided it is kept within the
limits of helping us to understand something of the relation between the
divine Spirit and the human spirit, and not used to point to the precise
nature of the Spirit himself.

Thirdly, having said this, one must ask what the implications for
Tillich's thought are when he says that ultimately there is no duality
between the dimension of depth and the dimensions of finite reality,
between the Spiritual Presence and the finite world culminating in the
spirit of man. The duality we experience, he says, is merely prelimi­
inary and transitory. Once again we are faced with this question: Does
this mean that ultimately there is no distinction between the finite and the infinite, between spirit and Spirit? If there is no ultimate distinction, then surely we have reached a totally monistic conception of the universe, in which the two are ultimately identified. But if a distinction does remain, it would seem that at least we are left with some sort of duality, even though we may not think of this in terms of a strict metaphysical dualism. Spirit is not opposed to spirit, but neither are the two one and the same thing. As we have seen, this difficulty of interpretation is one which underlies the whole of Tillich's theology, and one which makes it not at all easy to decide whether his ontological mode of thinking can really be reconciled with Christian thought or not.

Turning next to the way in which the Spiritual Presence grasps the human spirit, several points need to be made. It should be borne in mind, for example, that Tillich's use of the term ecstasy is rather different from the way in which it is often used by scholars. Commentators on prophetic religion tend to describe the unusual behaviour or incomprehensible utterances attributed to certain groups of people as ecstatic, and this is clearly not what Tillich means, for he is very careful to make a distinction between ecstasy and intoxication which in other writers frequently tend to become blurred into one and the same thing. In fact, the point that Tillich is making is tremendously important: that when the Spirit enters a man he does not violate his personality in any way. The man is not disrupted or destroyed by some potent force beyond his own control. He remains his true self, but his vision and his creative power are strengthened and enlarged. This is a most important point in any understanding of the work of the Spirit.

So Tillich has provided us with a penetrating analysis of the
difference between ecstasy, as he defines it, and intoxication, and his comments are extremely valuable in an age when there is a great desire on the part of many to seek to escape from the problems of modern living in experiences which purport to enlarge and widen the horizons of the mind. The criteria which he lists—spiritual creativity rather than destructivity, a heightened sense of self-awareness in the presence of the Spirit rather than its obliteration, a genuine response to the world around rather than a numbing of its challenge and its consequent depersonalisation—are most useful for the church in helping it in its discernment. However, there are one or two points which would have benefitted from further clarification. Firstly, though the criterion of spiritual creativity as a mark of genuine ecstasy is vitally important, it should be remembered that many artists claim that much of their creative work is done while under the influence of some sort of artificial stimulant. That intoxication of this type can act as a force which liberates certain types of creativity cannot be denied, and though the full implications of this sort of activity are not easy to resolve, nevertheless it is sufficient to put us on our guard. Bearing this in mind, one feels that Tillich could have said something about the motive behind the creative act, the purpose to which it is put, and the various ways in which this creativity manifests itself in the life of the community and human relationships, as some of the criteria by which genuine ecstasy is to be judged.

Secondly, the emphasis on the individual's awareness of transcending the subject-object order of reality in the state of ecstasy leads one to ask whether this type of experience always accompanies the impact of the Spirit. It may well be that every genuine mystical experience of this nature is due to the Spirit's impact, but it does not follow that
every experience of being grasped by the Spirit must follow this pattern. For example, in the life of prayer, it is by no means true to say that all valid prayer has a mystical quality, for if this were so it would suggest that many prayers, offered in all sincerity and in an attitude of faith yet without any element of mysticism, are not really prayers at all. There are many cases where a much more simple awareness of the divine Spirit is the case. It is simply not true that mysticism is the only form religious experience takes, and this is something which Tillich should have made more explicit in the context of his discussion on ecstasy.

There is one other point which arises out of his comments on prayer. His emphasis on the subjective role of God in the life of prayer, in the sense that it is the Spirit who is the source of every genuine prayer man prays, is indeed important. But surely this does not mean that it is mistaken to think of God as the object of our prayers. That God is the object of our experience does not mean that we treat him as an object in the sense of something to be used. That indeed would be culpable. But surely it is inevitable that we experience God as object in our praying. In every true 'I - Thou' relationship the objectivity of the 'Thou' is truly retained, and this is particularly true in the relationship between man and God in the life of prayer. That God has a subjective role in prayer is not to be denied - but this does not mean that his objectivity is any the less real.

II. THE MEDIA OF THE MANIFESTATION OF THE SPIRIT

Tillich now turns to the way in which the Spirit manifests itself in the world of human experience: What media does God use to reveal himself to men? The traditional answer to this question is that God comes to man through Word and sacrament, but this needs to be seen in a
wider context than the life of the church. In the first place, it should be pointed out that the traditional Protestant dichotomy between Word and sacrament is false, for the concept of the sacramental includes every type of communication, including that which is verbal. The silent presence of an object precedes any verbal significance given to it, even though the Word itself is implicit within it, waiting, as it were, to be given expression by man in the dimension of spirit. The sacramental object 'cannot be without the Word, even if it remains voiceless'.

Though in its widest sense the concept of the sacramental denotes everything in which the Spiritual Presence has been experienced, it has been narrowed down to refer more specifically to those particular objects and acts which are the media of Spiritual experience in a particular community, and narrowed down most of all in referring to the 'great' sacraments of the church. It is when the wider meaning of the word 'sacramental' is forgotten, that there is a tendency for the narrower sacramental activities to lose their significance and even the great sacraments to become robbed of their real meaning. There are two reasons for this: a current over-emphasis on the intellectual and volitional aspects of man's nature, which results in the belief that only words can communicate the Spirit; and the much older association of the sacraments with magic, which was found in pre-Reformation Catholicism, and which resulted in the Protestant rejection of sacramental thought in favour of its emphasis on faith. This is why Tillich feels that it is important to distinguish carefully between 'the impact of a sacrament on the conscious through the unconscious self' and 'magical techniques which influence the unconscious without the consent of the will'.

In the first case, one consciously shares in the sacramental experience; in the second, the unconscious is influenced directly without one's willing...
participation. Although today there may be very little 'magic' used in personal relations, there are nevertheless other ways in which unconscious influences are deliberately brought to bear, and when this sort of thing is found in the life of the church, it means that the sacramental principle is in danger of becoming demonically distorted. However, it is not thereby invalidated, and contemporary psychological emphasis on the important role of the unconscious provides us with a welcome opportunity for a positive revaluation of sacramental life. It suggests to us particularly that to maintain that the Spirit can only be experienced through conscious elements alone is far from the truth. For if the Spirit is mediated to us no less through the unconscious part of our being than the intellect or will, then it must be that the sacramental medium has an essential place. It points to the fact that when the Spirit of God grasps a man, it grasps him in the totality of his being.

Our earlier exposition of Tillich's concept of symbolism helps us to understand the precise relation between the sacramental and God, for a sacrament is essentially a symbol of God's presence in the world. Like every symbol, it points to God and it participates in God, though it is certainly not to be elevated into the rank of the divine. A sacrament, therefore, in accordance with the concept of the multidimensional unity of all life, does not point to something foreign to itself; it is rather 'intrinsically related' to what it expresses, having qualities which make it completely adequate to its symbolic function.\(^{39}\) These qualities are not the material properties which it possesses, but its capacity to express the life of the Spirit in which it participates, a capacity which becomes apparent when 'brought into sacramental union'.\(^{40}\) Tillich points out that this understanding of the sacramental invalidates
both Catholic and Protestant extremism. On the one hand, for example, it exposes the fallacy in the doctrine of transubstantiation, which by claiming that the particular symbol that is used (bread and wine) is transformed into a thing in itself (the body and blood of Christ) which can be directly handled, thereby misses the whole point of what a sacramental symbol really is. And on the other hand, it invalidates the attempt of certain types of Protestantism to reduce the sacramental symbol into a mere sign, for this would be to deny that it participates in the power of that to which it points. So, says Tillich, 'a sacramental symbol is neither a thing nor a sign. It participates in the power of what it symbolises, and therefore, it can be a medium of the Spirit'.

So much for sacraments in general. Turning to specific sacraments, Tillich reminds us that they grow up over long periods of time. Though any part of encountered reality can become sacramental material, the actual selection will depend on the specific need. Occasionally, a certain magical tradition will be transformed into a religious one, as in the case of the concept of 'sacramental food'. Or a historical moment may be commemorated in the form of a sacred legend, as in the case of the Lord's Supper. Quite often sacraments become associated with important moments in the life cycle of the individual, or with climactic religious events (such as initiation into the religious group), and not infrequently these are brought together into a single ritual activity.

But more than this needs to be said. For unless we are to return to a primitive magical sacramentalism, we must also assert 'that there can be no sacramental object apart from the faith that grasps it'. It can only become a bearer of sacramental power when it is correlated with faith, when it points to an ultimate concern. For the Christian,
of course, this means that no object can become sacramental unless it is related to the events of the history of salvation, for it is through its relation to these events that nature is liberated from its demonic elements and 'made eligible for a sacrament'. This is why Christianity cannot recognise so-called 'sacraments of nature', not because nature has no intrinsic power of being, but because it is ambiguous and open to distortion unless it participates in the history of salvation. This does not mean that every single natural object will become a sacrament, for every single object does not directly participate in the history of salvation, and is therefore not adequate to become a sacrament. Nevertheless, claims Tillich, the very capacity of certain objects to point beyond themselves, and become sacramental media, is itself 'a representation of what essentially is possible in everything and in every place'.

In a word, when nature itself is delivered from its demonic bondage and in Christ brought into the unity of the history of salvation, it becomes the bearer of sacramental power.

One question that has always troubled the church is whether the Spirit is bound to specific sacraments. The answer to this question, says Tillich, is partly 'yes' and partly 'no'. If we affirm that the Spiritual Community actualises the New Being in Jesus as the Christ, then it is clear that 'no sacramental act can take place in it which is not subject to the criterion of that reality on which the community is based', so that in this sense the Spiritual Presence is bound to certain specific media; the answer is 'yes', and this answer would have the advantage of excluding all demonised and distorted sacramental acts. But the answer is also partly 'no', in the sense that the Spiritual Community must always be free 'to appropriate all symbols which are adequate' to this criterion 'and which possess symbolic power'. Thus
the question behind the argument as to the number of great sacraments, for example, is not whether Jesus himself prescribed them, but whether in fact 'they possess and are able to preserve their power of mediating the Spiritual Presence'. And if certain sacramental acts lose their meaning and ability to grasp large numbers of the Spiritual Community, however valued they are in the tradition of that community, we must face the possibility that such acts have lost their sacramental power. Our answer then to the question as to whether the Spirit is bound to definite media is affirmative in so far as all valid media participate in the New Reality to which they point, and negative in so far as the Spiritual Community is always free to appropriate any symbol which is adequate and reject any other which has become inadequate. The 'yes' and 'no' are two sides of the same coin.

Tillich has quite a lot to say in his writings about symbols and sacraments in general, but oddly enough there is little specific mention of the two sacraments of Baptism and the Lord's Supper. What he does say is confined to two small sections in the essay on 'Nature and Sacrament', which appears in The Protestant Era. The basic sacrament, that of baptism, contends Tillich, is the easier of the two to analyse. It has one element only, the 'simple element' of water; it is through water that baptism becomes a sacrament, and without it there would be no baptism. But Luther's statement that 'without the Word of God, the water is simply water and no baptism', raises in Tillich's mind profound theological problems. 'What is meant', he asks, 'by the phrase "simply to be water"? And if water as such is described as "simply water", why use water at all? Why is not the "Word of God" sufficient without water, why need there be a sacrament? Tillich says there are three possible answers to this question, which have appeared at various times in history.
(i) The first is to interpret the act of baptism as a visible representation of the idea of baptism. This Tillich refers to as the 'symbolic-metaphoric' approach. According to this understanding, water is a symbol 'for purification or for drowning or for both together', and refers to 'the dying of the old, the unclean, and the resurrection of the new, the pure'. The act of baptism, therefore, whether by sprinkling or by immersion, is to set forth in picture form that which is expressed by the accompanying word. This is perhaps the most commonly accepted understanding of the sacrament. However, Tillich maintains that it is quite obvious that water is not the only pictorial action that could be used to convey these ideas. Passing through the fire, or going down into the cave, symbols which are familiar in the mystery religions, could do the job equally as well. We are left with the conclusion that water is preferred either because of tradition or of convenience. But it is quite clear, he concludes, that this interpretation does not allow any 'necessary, intrinsic relationship between water and baptism'.

(ii) The second answer is to assert that water is used in baptism solely because of the divine command. This is what Tillich calls the 'ritualistic' interpretation. Water acquires its sacramental significance, according to this point of view, when it is correctly used in the sacramental rite. This approach to the sacrament, he notes, is particularly common in Protestantism, where much is made of its dependence on the biblical account of Christ's own institution. But again, there is no intrinsic relationship implied between the water and the act of baptism.

(iii) The third answer, which Tillich feels is the only one that really does justice to the real concept of what a sacrament is, is to maintain that there is in fact a necessary relationship between water and baptism, an interpretation which Tillich describes as 'realistic'. This viewpoint,
whilst repudiating the magical conception of the sacraments along with Luther, nevertheless questions his view that water is "simply water". In some way, affirms Tillich, water has a 'power of its own', which makes it completely adequate to 'become the bearer of a sacral power and thus also to become a sacramental element'. There is therefore a necessary relationship between water and baptism. This realistic understanding rejects any merely arbitrary connection between the two, and is in fact according to Tillich the only conception adequate to the true nature of the sacrament.

The interpretation of the Lord's Supper is much more difficult, and Tillich gives four reasons for this. Firstly, there are two perceptible elements rather than one: bread and wine. Secondly, both of these elements are artificial, manufactured, rather than natural. Thirdly, the two together represent the Body of Christ, the basic element of the Lord's Supper. And fourthly, though Christ's physical body as a body belongs to the natural order, yet his transcendent body is 'beyond nature'.

The Lord's Supper, according to Tillich, is the 'sacramental appropriation of the exalted body of Christ'. The eating of a real body is, of course, out of the question, and in any case the physical body of Jesus is inaccessible to us. The exalted, transcendent body, the 'spiritual' body of Christ, on the other hand is accessible to us, but it is not physically perceptible, and therefore lacks the natural element without which there can be no sacramental celebration. What happens therefore is that tangible, organic substances that nourish the body are substituted for the transcendent body of Christ, so that instead of the physical body itself, we have the elements that nourish the body. The 'body of Christ' under the form of bread and wine symbolises therefore the transcendent
body. Yet it is singularly appropriate that this should be so, seeing that the transcendent body of Christ has elevated with itself every preceding natural dimension which was present within it as a physical body. And because within the transcendent body every natural dimension is thus present, this means that natural reality itself has been invested with a transcendent, divine meaning. Tillich concludes from this that in the Eucharist 'participation in the divine power is a participation also in the divine power in nature', and he feels that this is what Luther was hinting at when he propounded his strange theory of the ubiquity of the body of Christ.

A more difficult question confronts us, says Tillich, when we seek to determine the precise significance of the secondary elements of bread and wine. The doctrine of transubstantiation, in which the bread and wine are annulled and replaced by the actual body and blood of Christ, is in one way the simplest answer to this question, but it fails to recognise that these elements have an independent significance of their own. What then is the reason for the choice of these particular elements? The ritualistic interpretation would see their adequacy stemming from the command of Jesus, which linked together the body of Christ and the bread and wine almost as a historical accident. However, Tillich feels that the action of breaking bread and pouring wine has no symbolic relation to the transcendent Christ, even though it is a fitting symbol for Calvary. The ritualistic interpretation therefore can go no further than the Cross. The realistic interpretation, however, is able to go much further than this. It is able to recognise the bread and the wine 'as representing the natural powers that nourish the body and support in the human body the highest possibility of nature'. So he concludes that the real significance of the bread and the wine is that 'they point
to the presence of the divine saving power in the natural basis of all spiritual life as well as in the spiritual life itself.\textsuperscript{53} Thus in both cases Tillich argues that participation in the Lord's Supper is a participation in the power of God which is present both in nature and in the life of the Spirit.

In Protestant thought, the Word of God has frequently been considered as the supreme sacrament, and in turning his attention to this, Tillich affirms his Protestant heritage when he reminds us that in addition to sacramental objects and activities, "the word is the Spirit's other and ultimately more important medium".\textsuperscript{54} Whenever human words, no matter what the language may be, become bearers of the Spiritual Presence, and have the power to grasp the human spirit on behalf of the Divine, then they can be called the 'Word of God'. Thus it may be said that the Word of God, as the word of revelation, is language that has become transparent to the Spiritual Presence. 'Something shines (more precisely, sounds) through ordinary language which is the self-manifestation of the depth of being and meaning'.\textsuperscript{55} This helps us to see, says Tillich, what we mean when we call the Bible the Word of God. We do not mean that the Bible consists of actual oracles or words which God has spoken, as Calvin put it,\textsuperscript{56} but rather that it is able in a unique way to become the Word of God to us, the bearer of the Spirit to us, simply because it is the 'document of the central revelation, with respect to both its giving and its receiving sides'. Tillich feels that the impact of the Bible on people both within and outside the church demonstrates that it is the Spirit's most effective medium within Western culture. But it must also be emphasised that everything within the Bible is not always a medium for the Spirit. It is a potential medium, but 'it only becomes an actual medium to the degree in which it grasps the spirit of men'.\textsuperscript{57} No word,
not even the biblical word, is the Word of God unless it is the Word of
God for someone, and unless it is a medium whereby the Spirit enters
the spirit of someone. This means that there is no point in proclaiming
the Word just like that, without any attempt to correlate it to the
situation of those who are listening. As he puts it elsewhere, 'No
biblical word is the Word of God for us, so long as we have to give up
our historical reality in order to understand it. Not even the biblical
word can reach us religiously if it does not become contemporaneous'.

He continues:

It is the greatest emergency of the Protestant churches of
today that they have not yet found a way of preaching in
which contemporaneity and self-transcending power are united.
The ecclesiastical, and to a great extent the biblical,
terminology is removed from the reality of our historical
situation. If it is used, nevertheless, with that attitude
of priestly arrogance which repeats the biblical word and
leaves it to the listeners to be grasped by it or not, it
certainly ceases to be the "Word of God" and is rightly
ignored by Protestant people.

Then again, it must be recognised that the Bible is not the only
medium of the Spirit: other words also can become the Word of God.
Wherever words hit the human mind in such a way that an ultimate concern
is created, there is the Word of God, mediating the Spirit, and this can
take place anywhere in religious and cultural literature and even in any
part of ordinary conversation where circumstances work together towards
this end. However, Tillich affirms that the Word of God as revealed
in the Bible must necessarily remain the criterion of judgment as to
what is the Divine Word and what is not, because it is in the Bible
alone that we see manifest the New Being as it appears in Jesus as the
Christ.

So far Tillich has related the working of the Spirit to media which
have not only an internal impact on man, but also have an objective,
external side. But the question has often arisen in the history of the
church, particularly at the time of the Reformation, as to whether such media are really necessary at all. Is it not possible for the Spirit to work internally without the need for external media? If God is present in the whole of life, then surely he is not bound to any manifestation or sacrament. Why then does the Spirit need such mediations at all? The conclusion of all such Spirit-movements is that God "dwells in the depth of the person and when he speaks through the "inner word" he who listens to it receives new and personal revelations, independent of the churches' revelatory traditions." 

Tillich feels a deep sympathy with this point of view, and agrees with much of the criticism levelled at established forms of religion in Western society by the Spirit-movements, and their assertion that the Spirit is free from these forms. Yet he also feels that there are several criticisms that must be made of this point of view. In the first place, he points out that the terminology "the inner word" is not particularly good. The reason for this is that the word "word" refers to a means of communication between two centred selves, and the implication of this must be that the other self is either the Logos or the Divine Spirit. Now this is fair enough, he says, if we interpret it symbolically to mean the "voice of God", such as one finds in the Old Testament prophets. But in saying this we are also saying that the "inner word" is not completely "inner", for what we have done is simply to replace the other finite self of ordinary communication with the divine "self." However, even though we have done it symbolically, Tillich questions whether we can in fact really apply the word "self" to God at all. Certainly, there are aspects of the centred self which we can apply to God symbolically, but "self" is a structural concept and therefore not really adequate to symbolic material. It would, in fact, be better to
avoid the expression "the inner word" altogether and say that the Spiritual Presence grasps us from the "outside". And this is acceptable provided we remember that "this "outside" is above outside and inside; it transcends them" for in fact, the 'categories "inner" and "outer" lose their meaning in the relation of God and man'.

In the second place, Tillich affirms that we must deny the suggestion that God speaks to man without a medium, because man's life under the dimension of spirit is determined by word, whether that word is vocal or not. The medium of the word is always present, and even when man thinks he thinks in words. Even then he is not communicating something new to himself. Rather is he remembering 'what has been spoken to him since his life's beginning', and 'organising it into a meaningful whole'. When God spoke to the prophets, he did not give them new words, but put facts already known to them in the light of their ultimate significance and commanded them to speak out of that situation in their own language. Similarly, when the Spiritists of the later Reformation era spoke of the "inner word" it was really the Word of the Bible, or tradition, or the Reformers, as illuminated by their own experience of the Spirit. And in this way God's Word broke through afresh in each age. Thus there can be no "cutting-off" of the Spirit's work from the revelatory tradition, not even in those types of religion where religious experience is considered to be the decisive principle. The concept of the "inner word" is therefore misleading. For what really happens is a 'refocusing into contemporary relevance of the words from traditions and former experiences', a refocusing which occurs under the impact of the Spirit. But 'the medium of the word is not excluded'.

Thirdly, there is danger that undue emphasis on the "inner word" may cause the ultimate criterion of all revelatory experiences, the New
Being in Jesus as the Christ, to be lost in favour of the immediacy of the Spirit. The Reformers recognised this danger, and so tied the Spirit firmly to the biblical message of the Christ. But in so doing, another danger appeared, for when the biblical revelation became interpreted solely in light of the doctrine of the justification by faith, this resulted in the impact of the Spirit being replaced by an intellectual acceptance of the doctrine, with the sole work of the Spirit being to testify to its truth. It is certainly part of the Spirit's work to affirm the Biblical message, but not to guarantee the literal truth of forms of biblical expression. In fact, this would have the effect of replacing genuine life in the Spirit by seeking security in the Bible as an external authority. There must, says Tillich, be a balance between the two. On the one hand, the criterion of Jesus as the Christ as it appears in the biblical message must remain to prevent the Word of God from being identified with any pious words that one may speak to oneself. On the other hand, the impact of the Spirit on the life of man must not be subordinated to a legalistic biblicism, which would have the effect of placing severe limitations on the Spirit's work.

Evaluation

Tillich has made a valuable contribution to a theology of the sacraments in the contemporary period, a contribution which is influenced both by his doctrine of symbolism and by his indebtedness to the insights of modern depth psychology, such as one finds in the Jungian school of psychological interpretation. It is obvious that no doctrine of the sacraments will be adequate for contemporary man which fails to understand the important role of the symbol in human life. In this connection one also values Tillich's warning lest the sacraments, as symbolic media of the Spiritual Presence, should become debased into the means of trying
to force the Spirit upon people through techniques and methods of persuasion whereby the unconscious part of a man is helplessly brain-washed into accepting something which under normal circumstances he would not accept, a warning which is particularly relevant in an age when there is increasing interest in magical cults and emotional expressions of worship. Nevertheless, this is all the more reason why a sober reassessment of the symbolic and the sacramental is called for, and Tillich's evaluation of the sacramental is profoundly significant in this direction. In addition to this, it is good that Tillich has emphasised that for the Christian the historical dimension in the significance of the sacramental is vitally necessary, for it is this dimension above all that prevents a return to a merely superstitious or magical understanding of the sacraments, as well as providing the necessary link with the specifically human dimension of spirit. For it is man who interprets the sacramental significance of natural things, and this is where faith, as a response of the human spirit to the action of the Divine Spirit in the history of salvation, comes in. In this way, the gap between the two extremes of a 'magical sacrament' and a strictly dominical interpretation is narrowed.

There are certain themes, however, which one feels Tillich could have expanded a little more fully, particularly the point about the adequacy of certain objects or activities to become more specifically sacramental than others. This need for expansion comes out especially in his analysis of the two sacraments of baptism and the Lord's Supper. In fact, his analysis of baptism is not so much an analysis as an introduction, which needs filling out considerably if it is to be more than this. Yet even if we concede that what he provides is an outline of his understanding of the sacrament, it is an outline which is far from clear,
particularly in the conclusion to which he comes. Thus we are told that water has a special power of its own which suits it to become the bearer of sacral power, but we are not told what this special power is and why it is not found, for example, in the alternatives Tillich mentions. We are left then wondering what the necessary relation between water and baptism precisely is. If we are to reject any arbitrary connection between the two, at least we must be given a legitimate reason for doing so; or else we run the very risk of attributing 'magical' properties to water that Tillich himself wishes to avoid. In short, the discussion is far from clear.

His analysis of the Lord's Supper likewise needs elucidation at several points. In the first place, his comment on substances that nourish the body being effective symbols for the body itself is possibly an extension of Calvin's thought on sacramental food, and thus provides a link with the Reformers. Secondly, his interpretation of the partaking of the bread and wine as a symbol of participation in the spiritual body of Christ is valid enough, but there is no reason why this should rule out a so-called 'ritualistic' interpretation of the Lord's Supper. Tillich's assertion that such an interpretation goes no further than the Cross fails to reckon with the fact that the bread that is broken is broken that all may share, and the wine that is poured out is poured out so that all may drink of it. Here there is no one-sided emphasis on the Cross, for the life of Christ cannot be shared until he is risen. In the sacramental rite, the Cross and Resurrection are truly held together. And thirdly, he moves far too quickly over the point of the transcendent body of Christ taking up into itself the whole of the natural dimensions that have culminated into his physical form. Now this seems to suggest that the natural dimensions themselves (to which bread and wine belong) in
some way participate in the transcendent body of Christ, that they do in fact have a part in his spiritual body, which they can therefore appropriately represent in the Eucharist. If this is so, then we seem to have reached some sort of mystical interpretation of the Eucharistic Presence which goes far beyond New Testament teaching on the Lord's Supper, and which is based on a point of view regarding the relationship between God and the world which is rather alien to biblical theology. Neither would it be fair to say that this is what Luther means in his doctrine of ubiquity, as Tillich suggests. It is much more likely that Luther is grounding his affirmation of the presence of Christ in the Eucharist on a doctrine of the risen Christ's omnipresence rather than on some concept of ontological participation between the Spirit of Christ and the natural order. However, having made these comments, one must frankly admit the difficulties of expounding or assessing Tillich's doctrine of the Lord's Supper with any degree of satisfaction, if only because the inadequacy of Tillich's own analysis does not permit us to do so.

Finally, although the analysis of the two sacraments which we have included here is taken from The Protestant Era, a collection of essays not specifically concerned with the Spirit as such, it is nevertheless unfortunate that he does not relate the nature of the sacraments more explicitly to the work of the Spirit in the life of the individual and the church. Whilst he is justly concerned with the validity of the symbols, there is a notable absence of any meaningful reference to the Spirit's work of regeneration and the corporate fellowship of the Body of Christ with which the two sacraments respectively are intimately connected. For this reason his analysis is incomplete and needs to be linked with what he says later about these concepts in his discussion on the church.
Like his discussion on the sacraments of baptism and the Lord's Supper, Tillich's analysis of the relation of the Spirit to the Word of God, particularly as it appears in the Bible, is far too brief. There are suggestive insights which would certainly have benefitted from being followed through, such as his attack on propositional revelation and his suggestion that the biblical word cannot be the Word of God in objective isolation, though his implication that Calvin propounded an idea of propositional revelation is hardly consistent with his own exposition in Perspectives, where he says, 'For Calvin the Bible does not say anything to anyone, either to theologians or to pious readers, without the Divine Spirit. The Divine Spirit is the creative power in which our own personal spirit is involved and transcended. The Spirit is not a mechanism for dictating material as in some forms of the theory of inspiration.' This exposition, which is much more faithful to Calvin's own position, shows that in his Systematic Theology Tillich is being rather unfair to Calvin by suggesting that he held the view that the Bible consisted of the oracles of God without some qualification. Two further points may also be raised. Firstly, in his assertion that the Bible is the most effective medium of the Spirit in Western culture, Tillich seems to be implying that in other cultures it may not be so. Are we to infer from this that the most effective medium of the Spirit in India is the Bhagavad Gita, or in Arab lands the Koran? Now without in the least denying that the Bhagavad Gita or the Koran or any other sacramental form of a written or spoken nature may be spiritually effective, Christian theology could never place them above or even on a par with the Bible, even in the context of their own particular cultures. In fact, the primary question is not which is the most effective medium of the Spirit at all, but where the revelation of God in history supremely occurs. So
the Bible derives its unique efficacy from the fact that it is the record of the historical revelation of God in Christ, which the Spirit takes and makes real in the experience of men. Because of this, it is entirely misleading to suggest that the Bible is the most effective medium of the Spirit in Western culture alone. Its effectiveness applies to all cultures, in so far as God's revelation in Christ is the supreme revelation for all men. The other point that stems from Tillich's analysis of the Bible as the Word of God in relation to the Spirit is the importance of his assertion that the message of the Bible must be relevantly correlated to the needs of men rather than just spoken to them and left at that. This is an issue which has come very much to the fore in the church's re-appraisal of its mission and message in the contemporary world, and one which cannot be ignored in the theology either of communication or of the Spirit.

Tillich's discussion on the problems surrounding the concept of the "inner word" is well balanced, bringing out the force of the arguments on both sides, and showing the dangers of both the doctrines of the immediacy of the Spirit and the work of the Spirit as primarily establishing the infallibility of the Scriptures. The attempt to cut off the Spirit's work from the revelatory tradition is as unjustified as the attempt to impose on the Spirit's work a strictly biblical pattern of reference. However, his criticism of the use of the expression the "inner word" is open to several objections. More generally, does it have to imply that there are two separate selves communicating? For example, could not the expression in certain cases refer to the self talking to the self, which is what happens in much of our thinking, and even meditation? 'Talking to oneself' is a common occurrence, not reserved solely for the insane, and there is no reason at all why the expression the "inner word" should not be used
in this way. So the implication that the other self is the Logos or the Spirit does not follow at all. But even were we to identify the other self as the Spirit, are we falling as foul of the rules as Tillich would suggest? His assertion that because self is a structural concept we cannot apply it symbolically to God is not entirely convincing. In fact, to refuse to do so would immediately imply that God is somehow less than truly personal. Yet even in Tillich's own theological milieu, mystical understanding has never shrunk back from referring to the divine Self, so he has good precedence for its usage in his own system. Again, it seems to me that if one rejects the expression the "inner word" because it is a symbolic application of the concept of the self to God, then surely one must also reject the expression the "Word of God" for precisely the same reason, in that this expression also conveys the image of a divine Self trying to communicate. The truth is that if one is to use any genuine symbol of communication, this sort of image is inevitable. Ultimately therefore, provided one bears in mind Tillich's valid contention that there can be no private revelation outside the revelatory tradition of the Spirit culminating in Jesus as the Word of God, one sees no reason why the expression the 'inner word' should not refer to the silent communication of the Spirit within the spirit of man, testifying to the Word of God as it is recorded in the Scriptures and applying its message to the life and experience of him who is grasped by the Spirit of God.

III. THE CONTENT OF THE MANIFESTATION OF THE SPIRIT

We turn now to the specific content of the manifestation of the Spirit in the life of man. As we have already seen, the purpose of the Spirit's revelation in human life is to make possible the creation of a life that is free from all those ambiguities which have been occasioned by
the split between the essential and existential elements of being in the subject-object world. Such a life is characterised therefore by a reunion of essence and existence, subject and object, the divine Spirit and the human spirit, which is made possible not through any act of transcendence that man is able to achieve for himself, but only through the impact of the Spiritual Presence. An unambiguous life of transcendent unity is created by the Spirit which Tillich calls 'the transcendent unity of unambiguous life'.

This transcendent unity of unambiguous life, the creation of the Spirit, appears in man both as faith and as love, which are thus two aspects of the same thing. 'Faith', says Tillich, 'is the state of being grasped by the transcendent unity of unambiguous life - it embodies love as the state of being taken into that transcendent unity.' Though faith logically precedes love, neither can be present without the other, or else they become distorted, faith into little else than 'an ambiguous act of religious self-transcendence', love into 'an ambiguous reunion of the separated without the criterion and power of transcendent union', and therefore no real reunion at all. Existing apart, they are merely distortions of the original Spiritual creation.

Tillich deals firstly with the Spiritual Presence manifest as faith. The word 'faith', he points out, is difficult, because of centuries of misinterpretation and confusion. Today it is commonly confused with belief in something for which there is little or no evidence, often quite absurd and ridiculous, and such confusion opens up Christianity to attack by critics who have fallen into the error of believing that this is what faith is meant to be. So faith is a concept that needs to be defined carefully and correctly. Tillich differentiates between faith as defined formally and faith as defined materially. The formal definition of faith,
he says, is valid for faith in any type of religion and culture. It is, in fact, 'the state of being grasped by that toward which self-transcendence aspires, the ultimate in being and meaning', or to put it more succinctly, 'the state of being grasped by an ultimate concern', or quite simply the 'state of being ultimately concerned'. This state of ultimate concern has two aspects, one subjective, the other objective: 'somebody is concerned about something he considers of concern'. In traditional theology, Tillich points out that the subjective aspect of ultimate concern corresponds to the faith through which one believes (fides qua creditur), the objective aspect to the faith which is believed (fides quae creditur). So faith is both the concern of a person towards that which is ultimate and infinite, and also the expression of the ultimate which is the object of that concern. Tillich maintains that in this formal sense of faith as ultimate concern, everyone has faith. 'Nobody can escape the essential relation of the conditional spirit to something unconditional'. Even though the objective, concrete expression of that faith may be unworthy, the concern is still there and cannot be completely extinguished.

In his 'Dialogues with Students' he affirms:

If people tell you, "I have no ultimate concern," . . . then ask them, "Is there really nothing at all that you take with unconditional seriousness? What, for instance, would you be ready to suffer or even to die for?" Then you will discover that even the cynic takes his cynicism with ultimate seriousness, not to speak of others, who may be naturalists, materialists, Communists, or whatever. They certainly take something with ultimate seriousness.

So everyone is concerned about something, even though that which they may consider their ultimate concern is in fact 'preliminary, finite and conditioned', invested in their own minds with the dignity of the ultimate, infinite and unconditional. But at least, some sort of faith is there, and to recognise this is to refute the idea that the world of man is
somehow the battlefield between faith and 'un-faith', as Christian assessments of history have sometimes maintained.

In *Dynamics of Faith*, Tillich says that this formal expression of faith as ultimate concern, is an act which involves the whole personality. 'It happens in the centre of the personal life and includes all its elements'. Because it shares in the dynamics of life, including its polarities, it is thus capable of uniting the various elements of the personality by its power to transcend them and the existential split between them. So genuine faith is self-transcendent, ecstatic. The test of faith, therefore, as ultimate concern is whether it makes this self-transcendent, ecstatic union possible. Any faith which makes a preliminary concern ultimate fails to do this. It is not self-transcendent, and therefore leads to the disruption of the centredness of life, as well as distorting the ultimate. Such faith, says Tillich, though it contains the formal element of what faith should be, is nevertheless idolatrous. And the struggle between genuine and idolatrous faith is one which has gone on throughout history, a struggle 'waged between a faith directed to ultimate reality and a faith directed toward preliminary realities claiming ultimacy' for themselves.

This leads us to consider faith in its material aspect, for it is that which gives content to the formal framework of faith that determines whether its concern is ultimate or not. So the definition of faith as being grasped by an ultimate concern, is now filled out with the statement that faith 'is the state of being grasped by the Spiritual Presence and opened to the transcendent unity of unambiguous life', which for Christian theology means more precisely that faith 'is the state of being grasped by the New Being as it is manifest in Jesus as the Christ'. In such a definition, the formal and universal definition of faith becomes material.
and particular. This does not mean, says Tillich, that the Christian faith excludes all other faiths, but rather fulfils them. The Christian assertion fills out with meaning the formal structure of faith as ultimate concern, and in this sense, it becomes the criterion for distinguishing between those forms of faith which are genuine and those which are idolatrous.

Tillich admits that his understanding of faith in terms of ultimate concern is far from traditional definitions in terms of intellect, will or feeling, which are distortions of what faith really is. The intellectual distortion stems from the idea that faith is an act of knowledge with a low degree of evidence. This lies open to several criticisms. In the first place, it reduces faith to belief, and in this way raises the problem of the authority on which something is to be believed. And secondly, it confuses faith with knowledge. And this in itself raises difficulties, for the certitude that stems from knowledge, however it is received, is always in danger of being undercut by new discoveries or methods. But the certitude that stems from faith, Tillich points out, is different. It is the "existential" type of certitude, involving the whole life of man in response to the question "to be or not to be". As such, the certitude of faith cannot be subjected to any empirical means of verification and therefore 'nothing is more undignified than to make faith do duty for evidence which is lacking'.

The voluntaristic distortion of faith stems from the attempt to establish a more intimate relationship between faith and moral decision, a need which arises from over-emphasis on an intellectual interpretation. Tillich points out that in the scholastic tradition, faith becomes 'the will to believe', in that that which cannot be ascertained by evidence is made up by an act of will. But this leads us to ask what it is we are
'willed to believe', which in its turn presupposes some authority for belief, and this re-establishes the intellectual understanding of faith. Similarly in the Protestant tradition, faith is often defined as 'obedience', in the sense of 'the obedience of faith'. Now this term can legitimately refer to the act of commitment that is implicit in the state of ultimate concern, but more generally it has meant subjection to the command to believe through the medium of preaching. We are left with the same question, 'Obedience to whom?' Where does this command to believe come from, and wherein lies its authority? So the intellectual understanding of faith is again re-established. And if the answer is given that the authority lies in the Word of God, then one is left with a circular situation where such an authority can only be accepted 'by one already in the state of faith who acknowledges the word heard to (be) the Word of God'. So 'no command to believe and no will to believe can create faith'. Faith must precede them both.

The third type of distortion to which Tillich refers is emotionalistic. He points out that the identification of faith with feeling is not only the most common misrepresentation, but it is also the one most readily accepted by those who would reject any religious claim to truth and yet cannot deny its great psychological and sociological power. It means that they can put religion neatly and safely away 'into a corner of subjective feelings', so that it becomes emasculated and unable to influence man's cultural activities. In this case, religion is left unscathed until it breaks out of these limits imposed upon it and trespasses on 'the solid land of knowledge and action'. But once it does this it is vehemently attacked. There are those who feel that this misinterpretation of faith originated with Schleiermacher, but Tillich points out that this is really a travesty of what Schleiermacher said. For
Schleiermacher faith in fact was much more than a mere subjective feeling, it was rather the feeling of 'unconditional dependence', a phrase which Tillich feels is not far removed from his own 'ultimate concern'. The common conception of religion as 'feeling' that one finds today, however, is rather different from this. When people normally identify faith with feeling, they are saying that faith is a matter of merely subjective emotion, which has no particular content or demand. In rejecting this one is not saying that feeling has no part in faith, as Schleiermacher saw so clearly, for 'emotion always expresses the involvement of the whole personality in an act of life of spirit', but one is affirming, and rightly so, that emotion is not its source.

In fact, faith draws every element of life into itself. It grasps the total personality and every part of life becomes ecstatically opened towards the Spiritual Presence. This means that the intellectual, volitional and emotional elements of life are all included. There is assent to faith, a cognitive acceptance of the truth which concerns our relation to the ultimate and the symbols which point to it; there is obedience in faith, an obedience not of submission but of participation, of keeping oneself open to the Spirit; there is an emotional element in the state of him who is grasped by the Spirit, which is not an indefinite feeling but an ecstatic courage which overcomes the anxieties of finitude by taking into itself the power of the transcendent unity, thereby creating unambiguous life. But none of these things create faith. It is rather that the ultimate 'grasps all of these functions and raises them beyond themselves by the creation of faith', a creation achieved by God alone. This does not mean, of course, that faith is not in man. It is in man, though not from him. Within himself man is aware of his being grasped by the Spirit; it is not just a case of blindly believing what he believes.
And though there is no self-assurance about being in the state of faith, man is nevertheless conscious of the Spirit of God working in him, even though that work stems from a radical transcendence of divine activity.

Finally, Tillich delineates three elements within the material concept of faith: firstly, that of being opened up by the Spirit, faith in its 'receptive character, its mere passivity in relation to the divine Spirit'; secondly, that of accepting this in spite of the infinite gap between the divine Spirit and the human spirit, faith in its 'paradoxical character, its courageous standing in the Spiritual Presence'; and thirdly, that of expecting final participation in the transcendent unity of unambiguous life, faith in its 'anticipatory character, its quality as hope for the fulfilling creativity of the divine Spirit'. These three elements, he points out, do not follow on one after the other. They are all mutually present within each other wherever faith occurs. In Christian thought, they correspond to the characterisation of the New Being in terms of regeneration, justification and sanctification, great theological themes which will be analysed more fully when we come to discuss with Tillich the Spirit's conquest of life's ambiguities.

Whereas faith, according to Tillich, is the state of being grasped by the transcendent unity of unambiguous life, love is the state of being taken into that transcendent unity by the Spiritual Presence. Tillich points out that in this way love is rightly spoken of as a logical consequence of faith, for one cannot be taken into the unity of unambiguous life until one is first grasped by it. However, love is much more than a mere consequence of faith: 'it is one side of the ecstatic state of being of which faith is the other', and any attempt to set them over against each other leads to distortion. Both together are the work of the Spirit.

Tillich points out that love, like faith, has suffered from a variety
of misinterpretations. This can be seen particularly in the common
definition of love in emotional terms. But while love does have a genuine
emotional element, it is far more than mere emotion. In fact, it is
actual in every function of the human personality and its roots are to
be found in the very core of life itself, so much so that it may be called
the 'moving power of life', a truly ontological reality. In the state
of existential estrangement, this power is directed specifically towards
overcoming this estrangement. But it can only do this because those things
which are separated in existence are essentially one: 'estrangement
always implies a fundamental belongingness, and therefore an inner drive
towards reunion'. So love is effective in each of life's processes:
'it unites in a centre, it creates the new, it drives beyond everything
given to its ground and its aim'. It is because it is thus at work
within the whole of life that it takes on many different expressions,
yet each expression is the context in which an attempt is made to bring the
estranged elements of life together. Each attempt to create unity, however,
is subject to ambiguity, which can be seen in every person-to-person
encounter. Such an impasse poses the question of how an unambiguous
reunion can be achieved. It cannot, says Tillich, be achieved by man
himself, it can only be achieved by participating in the transcendent
unity of unambiguous life, by which it is possible to overcome every
barrier and participate fully in the life of the other self. This
creation of unambiguous love is the work of the Spirit. It is this love
to which the New Testament refers as agape.

Two questions arise here. The first, says Tillich, is concerned
with the relation between love itself, as ontologically defined in terms
of agape, and the various functions of the mind in which it appears. We
have already noted the common confusion of love with emotion, and have
pointed out that though this confusion must be exposed, we should not go
to the other extreme and allow no part in love for the emotions at all.
How then are we to define love in relation to the emotions? Tillich's
answer begins with the assertion that 'the emotional element in love
is... the participation of the centred whole of a being in the process
of reunion, whether it is in anticipation or fulfilment'. Whenever
a person anticipates reunion or experiences it the emotions are involved,
but this is rather different from saying that the emotions are the driving
power in love. The drive towards reunion belongs rather to the 'essential
structure of life and, consequently, is experienced as pleasure, joy, or
blessedness, according to the different dimensions'. The emotional
element then does not come first, it is rather that the anticipation and
experience of reunion as far as man is concerned expresses itself in
emotional ways.

Love also includes a strong volitional element, which is necessitated
by the fact that in life as we know it there is always a fundamental
resistance to complete unity. The Great Commandment to love refers above
all to this volitional element, for without it, it would be impossible for
love ever to 'penetrate to the other person' at all. Similarly there is
an important relationship between love and the intellect. Tillich
points out that this intellectual appreciation of love, which stems from
the classical tradition, is found in the early Christian vocabulary where
the word gnosis stood equally for knowledge, sexual union or mystical
participation. So love must include knowledge of that which is loved:
not a scientific type of knowledge, but a 'participating knowledge which
changes both the knower and the known in the very act of loving knowledge'.
Thus we see that love, like faith, includes the whole person: emotion,
will, intellect; 'all functions of the human mind are alive in every
act of love'. 96

The second question that arises is the relation between *agape* and the other kinds of love: *philia*, the love of friendship, *eros*, 'the striving towards a union with that which is the bearer of values because of the values it embodies', and *epithymia* or *libido*, the desire for vital self-fulfilment. Unlike certain contemporary theologians, 97 Tillich maintains that there is no essential disunity between *agape* and these other kinds of love: 'agape, as the self-transcending element of love, is not separated from the other elements', 98 since they each 'drive toward the reunion of the separated'. 99 This is why it is better to speak of different 'qualities of love' rather than different 'types': 'there are not types, but qualifications of love, since the different qualities are present, by efficiency or deficiency, in every act of love'. 100 The attempt to make a fundamental distinction between them has in fact, maintains Tillich, led to two unfortunate results. It has led to *agape* being reduced to a moral concept, both in relation to man and in relation to God, and it has virtually given *eros* a solely sexual orientation which has resulted in its profanisation, thereby denying it any part in unambiguous life. 101 What actually distinguishes *agape* from the other qualities of love is its character as an ecstatic manifestation of the Spiritual Presence, which is possible only in unity with faith. In this sense it is independent of the other qualities of love, but it is also able to unite with them, judging them and transforming them, and in this way conquering their ambiguities. 102

As a creation of the Spirit, love, like faith, has the basic structure of the New Being, in its receptive, paradoxical and anticipatory characteristics. Its receptive character is seen in its totally unrestricted acceptance of the object of its love, its paradoxical character in its
holding onto this acceptance despite the estranged condition of its object, its anticipatory character in its looking forward to the re-establishment of the 'holiness, greatness and dignity' of its object because of its acceptance of him. In these ways it 'takes its object into the transcendent unity of unambiguous life'. Initially, of course, agape is God's own love 'toward the creature and through the creature toward himself'. This is why this threefold character of agape must always speak firstly about God's relationship to us, and only then of our relationship to each other. This does not mean that we cannot speak of agape when we speak of man's love towards God, especially if we define it as the drive towards the reunion of the separated. But such a love is only possible in the act of faith, in which the Spirit grasps man's being. Yet in that same act man is drawn into the transcendent unity of unambiguous life whereby his love for God is fulfilled. In this way the distinction between faith and love disappears.

Evaluation

Our approach to what Tillich has to say about the work of the Spirit in creating faith and love must bear in mind the specific connotations of the difficult phrase 'the transcendent unity or unambiguous life'. We must wait until the end of our study before attempting a detailed analysis and evaluation of this expression, but three points have arisen in our discussion so far which are relevant to our assessment of Tillich's concept of faith and love. Firstly, the state of transcendent unity which characterises unambiguous life is a state in which the estranged essential and existential elements of life are reunited, so that each existential form is reunited with its essential reality. Secondly, it is a state in which the division between subject and object in existential life is overcome, so that mutual participation of the one in the other is possible.
Thirdly, it is a unity which is characterised above all by the participation of man in his divine Ground, made possible by the impact of the divine Spirit on the human spirit. It is because this fundamental unity has been effected that the two previous expressions of unity are possible. What must be emphasised particularly is that for Tillich this transcendent unity is a unity of being, an ontological unity, so that the participation of which he speaks is more than an 'empathetic' or 'psychological' participation: it is a total participation of being in being, which involves a mutual immanence between essence and existence, subject and object, finite reality and ultimate Ground. As we shall see in our final evaluation, all these things must be borne in mind when we come to ask just what Tillich does mean when he speaks of the transcendent unity of unambiguous life. However, although at this stage it would be premature to make such an evaluation, enough has been said to show that it is very much open to question as to whether the New Testament envisages the work of the Spirit in this way at all. Certainly the Spirit is the bearer of new life to men, but whether the biblical message thinks of this life in terms of a transcendent, ontological unity, in which there is total immanence between subject and object, is doubtful.

These considerations are bound to influence our judgment on Tillich's definition of faith in terms of 'ultimate concern', since it is clear that for Tillich being grasped by an ultimate concern, and being grasped by the transcendent unity of unambiguous life, are one and the same thing. The expression 'ultimate concern' therefore is tied to and filled out with a more precise ontological meaning, so that he who becomes concerned for the ultimate is also concerned for transcendent unity, in which the subject-object scheme which makes his own individual existence possible is transcended. The implication here is that anyone
who does not express his ultimate concern in this particular way has a concern that is less than ultimate, and therefore defective. Now this is surely to presuppose that the ontologist alone is able accurately to define what an ultimate concern really is. Kenneth Hamilton's comment here is very pertinent. 'Not for one moment', he says, 'does Tillich consider the possibility that the believer may not agree with the ontologist concerning what makes an ultimate concern ultimate, but instead he proceeds to define true ultimacy in ontological terms'. This alone should make us suspicious of Tillich's definition of faith as 'being grasped by an ultimate concern'. But the expression 'ultimate concern' not only gives rise to problems regarding the precise connotation of the word 'ultimacy'; it also raises the question as to whether the concept of 'concern' is a valid interpretation of faith at all. There are certainly no grounds in the New Testament for saying that faith and concern, or being grasped by concern, are one and the same thing. If one considers the more formal aspect of faith in the Scriptures, one is more in the realm of a relationship based on trust, commitment, obedience, response, or even belief, than concern. This is not to say that these concepts exhaust the meaning of faith, nor is it to say that concern has no part in it. But it is to say that concern for the ultimate is not the essence of biblical faith. In fact, this 'concern' of which Tillich speaks in some ways seems much more akin to 'seeking after God' or 'man's quest for the divine'. Now such a quest in itself is important, and something which indeed is a work of the Spirit. But seeking is not finding, and there is a vast difference between searching for God and responding to his invitation in trusting commitment.

Nevertheless, even though we cannot agree with Tillich's definition of faith, his distinction between the formal and material aspects of faith
is tremendously important, for the attitude of faith is common not only to the Christian churches, but also to virtually all religions, philosophies and ideologies, despite their differences in content. This distinction is a useful corrective to those Christians who would maintain that they alone have faith and that all other faith is counterfeit. Yet for Christian theology it is ultimately the material content of faith that is all important, and for this reason one must view the work of the Spirit not only as bringing all faiths to their fulfilment in Christ, but as directly challenging men to abandon all preliminary expressions of faith which may well prevent the specifically Christian content of faith from being acknowledged. On this point Tillich could have been much more emphatic.

Several points arise from Tillich's analysis of the distortions of faith. In the first place, although he is completely justified in rejecting the equation of faith with belief, he does tend to underestimate the part belief plays. At some stage every act of faith must become a leap of commitment, and in every act of commitment there must be some element of belief present, some ground on which the commitment is made. It cannot be wholly irrational, not a complete shot in the dark. Secondly, although he clearly brings out the ambiguity in the expression 'the obedience of faith', because he gives insufficient consideration to faith as an act of commitment, he tends to over-emphasise the disciplinary implications of this expression. The fact that faith logically precedes obedience should not blind us to the fact that in the Scriptures obedience is the necessary complement to faith, the sign of true commitment. A third point is that although he rightly draws a distinction between the certitude that stems from epistemological knowledge and that which stems from faith, it would have helped if he had introduced another word here which would have em-
phaised that distinction, and one ventures to suggest the word 'assurance' in this context, a word which has been frequently used in the theology of experience to refer to the certainty that faith creates in the life of him who has been grasped by the Spirit. Nevertheless, Tillich's analysis is a helpful one, and one welcomes particularly his re-assessment of Schleiermacher in his discussion on the relation between faith and feeling.

The ontological implications of the concept of the transcendent unity of unambiguous life are also particularly significant for an understanding of Tillich's interpretation of love as being taken by the Spirit into the sphere of transcendent union. For it is clear that Tillich is going beyond what the psychologist or pastoral theologian means when he talks about entering into unity with the other person and the need for identification in the act of love. If it were empathy in its deepest sense to which Tillich is referring, much of what he says would be very relevant to this breaking down of the barriers of separation which prevent true understanding and concern between man and man. However, Tillich's meaning of the reunion which characterises love is rather different from empathetic identification: it is an ontological participation in which one shares fully in the life of the other person by way of the transcendent unity. In fact, one cannot help feeling on reading Tillich's exposition of love, that its real concern is not so much for the other person as such as the desire for ontological unity as an end in itself. It is in fulfilment of this desire that the Spirit takes one into the transcendent unity, in the context of which a truly ontological unity with the other self is made possible. It may be said, therefore, that in a sense Tillich's definition of love as being taken into transcendent unity is too self-centred, in that it is above all the fulfilment of one's own desire. 108

Tillich has, of course, fallen into the trap into which all Christian
philosophers of the classical-idealist tradition have fallen, of accepting the traditional ontological definition of love, in terms of union, and then interpreting *agape* in this light. This will not do. The classical interpretation of love is basically that of *eros*, and the primary purpose of using *agape* as the word to describe Christian love was to distinguish it from this classical understanding. *Eros* is always the love which seeks and drives towards a complete unity. But *agape* has a different stance altogether. Its purpose as far as the self is concerned is disinterested; its total concern is with the other person as a person, and it is developed 'in relation to' rather than 'in union with'. In fact, there may well be cases where *agape* will result in something rather different from unity altogether. To quote Macquarrie:

> Love is letting-be even where this may demand the loosening of the bonds that bind the beloved person to oneself; this might well be the most costly of demands, and it is in the light of this kind of love that a drive toward union may seem egocentric .... It is not impossible to visualise a case where really to love a person might mean that one has to renounce the treasured contact and association with that person, if only so can that person realise what there is in him to be.

To define Christian love in terms which derive from *eros*, therefore, would seem to fail to take into account the very thing that sets Christian love apart: its selfless, outgoing concern for the other person, which is the very heart of *agape*, whether this leads to unity or not.

One must come to the conclusion, therefore, that Tillich fails to bring out the distinction between *agape* and *eros* clearly enough for this very reason. This difficulty meets us particularly when we are trying to evaluate his assertion that *eros*, along with every other quality of love, has a rightful part in *agape*. If one accepts Tillich's definition of *agape* in terms of transcendent unity, it is obvious that it does. However, if one adheres more firmly to a New Testament conception of *agape* as a
selfless concern for the other person, can one still affirm that *eros* is compatible with it? The answer to this question is both affirmative and negative. It is negative as long as the aim of *eros* is to unite itself with the other person either at the other person's expense or out of sheer gratification of desire. But it is affirmative in so far as the natural affections of man for his fellows are not to be rooted out as if they were evil in themselves. This means that *eros*, when brought into unity with *agape*, will be purged of its purely self-centred demands. In the school of *agape* it will learn the art of self-denial, and in this way it will be ennobled and confirmed. So we can say in the words of Berdyaev, that 'the love which ascends, rapturous love, may be side by side with the love which descends, with compassionate love'. It is for this reason that one cannot agree wholeheartedly with Nygren when he sets *agape* and *eros* totally apart. Yet having said this, two riders must be added. The first is to say that here we are stripping *eros* of the precise ontological implications that it has in Tillich's theology, so that we are thinking not of a total union of being, but rather a unity of togetherness which maintains the individuality of both him who desires and him who is desired. And the second is to point out that in saying that *eros* needs to be brought to *agape* so that it may be purged of any wilfully selfish element, and in thus affirming that *agape* and not *eros* is the true frame of reference for Christian love, we are underlining the fact that it is tremendously important that the distinction between them should be maintained, and not blurred, as Tillich seems to do.

In conclusion, we would agree with Tillich in his assertion that faith and love characterise the content of the Spirit's presence in the life of man, and that whenever man is grasped by the Spirit faith and love are created. But because of the way in which these two concepts are
interpreted within the context of the ontological doctrine of the transcendent unity of unambiguous life, we cannot accept the more precise definitions of these expressions, and do not feel that his interpretation of either faith or love are in accordance with biblical teaching.

IV. THE MANIFESTATION OF THE SPIRIT IN THE HISTORY OF MAN

If the Spirit is to manifest itself to man, then it must do so within the context of human history, and this raises the question as to where and in what ways this revelation has taken place. Tillich says that there are two marks which demonstrate the presence of the Spirit in historical groups: specific symbols which point to the openness of the group to the impact of the Spirit, and the rise of movements or persons which protest against the distortion of these symbols, recalling the group to a true understanding of the Spirit's work within its midst. These two marks, he points out, are found within every religious group, and they belong together. However, although both marks are facets of the work of the same Spirit, there is frequently tension between them, and sometimes this can go so far as a total rejection of the reforming agency by the original group, with the result that new groups are formed, such as one found at the Reformation. Occasionally, however, the work of reformation achieves its desired end, and the original religious group, together with its symbols, becomes transformed into a more effective vehicle of the Spirit. In one way or the other, therefore, the Spirit is constantly breaking through into the lives of men, sometimes in the great moments of religious history (the 'historical kairot'), more often perhaps in man's everyday experience, but always to make him conscious of the presence of an unambiguous life which is the nature of the New Being. So wherever this new creation is found, whether in the original religious group or the work of Reformation, there the Spirit is actively present.
Nevertheless, Tillich points out, the presence of the New Being in history can never be total; it can only be fragmentary, for the 'ful-filled transcendent union is an eschatological concept', and therefore something that can only be complete when the finite limitations of human history are finally overcome. In other words, the fragmentary presence of the New Being, created by the Spirit in the lives of men, is an anticipation of what is to come. This does not mean that it is ambiguous, for fragmentation is not the same thing as ambiguity, and a true anticipation of the New Being, like the New Being itself, must be unambiguous. So 'Paul speaks of the fragmentary and anticipatory possession of the divine Spirit, of the truth, of the vision of God, and so on'. Thus, wherever a group is grasped by and accepts the Spirit, even though that acceptance and participation is only fragmentary and anticipatory, yet nevertheless in the moment of its acceptance it is created into a holy community, because of the unambiguity of the New Being in which it shares. Although it is surrounded by and indeed dependent on the ambiguous forms of life for its concrete existence, at its heart there is a genuine experience of unambiguous life which guarantees its character as a community of the Spirit. To be aware of this distinction, affirms Tillich, is 'the decisive criterion for religious maturity'. This means that the actualisation of the New Being in history is subject to the same criteria by which it judges every ambiguity of life, yet at the same time at that point where the New Being itself appears, even though fragmentarily, the ambiguities of life are conquered.

The most obvious place to look for the manifestations of the Spirit in history is in the history of the religions, and it is to this that Tillich now turns. Rather than examine the various religions in detail, he discusses some of their most characteristic expressions of the Spiritual
Presence. But first of all he warns us that 'the only authentic way' of understanding anything about other religions is 'through actual participation'. In a total sense this is impossible, but because there are certain common elements in all religions which arise from the identity of spirit in every spiritual being, some degree of participation is not altogether out of the question. There is a mystical element, for example, that is found in both Asian religion and Christianity, so that it becomes possible for us to understand something of Eastern religion by participating in Christian mysticism. Even so, one must proceed with caution, for the fact that mysticism is dominant in Asian religion but only secondary in Christianity means that the way in which these religions are structured will be different, for the shape of any religious faith is largely determined by its dominant element. This means that though some degree of understanding is possible through common elements, even this limited way of participation can be deceptive. \[115\]

Tillich looks at several types of religion. The first is animism. Here the emphasis on the invisible and mysterious power in all things, which characterised the original \textit{mana} religion, is a recognition of the Spiritual Presence 'in the "depth" of everything that is', and this early insight into the universal presence of the divine Spirit forms the basis of most forms of sacramental thinking, even in the higher religions like Christianity. Secondly, in the great mythological religions, although they presuppose a dualistic interpretation of reality, the presence of the Spirit in the world is underlined by the concrete manifestations of the divine powers in human experience. Any true understanding of these religions depends on the ability to uncover the real significance of the symbols which they use without destroying the symbols themselves, a task which is particularly important because of the way in which these mytholo-
gical ways of thinking and expression have influenced later religious forms. The continual danger, Tillich reminds us, in the history of these religions was that their symbols could so easily become profaned, and it was against this sort of distortion in the form of a vast number of divine forms and figures that religions like the mystery cults arose, which sought to re-emphasise the element of mystery, embodying it in the specific figure of the mystery-god. This latter type of religious expression, with its emphasis on ecstatic participation in the divine life, in Tillich's opinion provided the pattern for Christianity, where through Christ man participates in the life of God through an ecstatic experience of the Spiritual Presence. Another such protest was against the demonic distortion of the divine presence that was common in polytheistic religions, and this led to dualistic forms such as Zoroastrianism, which sought to prevent the demonisation of the Spirit by concentrating all evil potentiality in one particular figure. Tillich notes that this type of thinking also has influenced Christianity, not only in its heretical forms, but also in the persistent personification of evil in the form of Satan.

But the two most important experiences of the Spiritual Presence, asserts Tillich, are those found in mysticism and monotheism. Mysticism, he declares, is an advance on mythological religion in that it 'experiences the Spiritual Presence as above its concrete vehicles'. For the mystic all divine figures are 'grades on a Spiritual stairway to the ultimate', but they are grades which must be left behind if the presence of the divine Spirit is to be fully experienced. So mysticism seeks to transcend every divine figure as it also seeks to transcend the subject-object scheme of man's finitude, even though in doing this, it runs the risk of annihilating the very self which receives the ecstatic experience of the Spirit. It is at this very point, confesses Tillich, that understanding between Eastern
and Western religious thought is so difficult, for whereas the aim of Eastern mysticism is to achieve a 'formless self', the aim of Western monotheism is to preserve the self in the ecstatic experience both in terms of personality and community. In Hebrew monotheism, even in the heights of prophetic ecstasy, the centred self was never eliminated, and this meant that in prophetic religion, concepts like sin and forgiveness, which expressed the relationship between man and God in distinctly personal terms, had to be taken seriously. So for Old Testament religion the Spiritual Presence implied humanity and justice, which took personal problems and relationships with the utmost concern, asserting that any neglect of these issues was a travesty of the life of the Spirit. Elijah was ecstatically grasped by the Spirit, but his experience in no way destroyed his centred self, but only served to heighten his sense of justice and humanity, and it is this same characteristic of Spiritual experience that was continued and so forcefully emphasised both in the monotheistic religion of the New Testament and in the genuine reformation movements in the history of the church.

The climax to all these forms of religious experience in the life of man is the revelation of the Spirit in Jesus as the Christ. So Tillich turns his attention more specifically to the nature of the Spiritual Presence in the life of Jesus. He defines the relation between the Spirit and the Christ in this way: the Spiritual Presence is that which creates the New Being, whereas Jesus as the Christ is he who bears the New Being. The New Being, we recall, is for Tillich 'essential being under the conditions of existence', so that Jesus as the Christ is the one who for man reveals the nature of essential being under existential conditions, freely and unambiguously. Nevertheless, though he is the bearer of the New Being, he does not create it; only the Spirit can do that. So Jesus
as the Christ is the one who is completely taken over by the Spiritual Presence, whose own human spirit, even though subjected to individual and social conditions, is ecstatically 'possessed' by the Spirit of God. And it is this alone that makes him the Christ, 'the decisive embodiment of the New Being for historical mankind'. And because the divine Spirit is present in him without distortion, then he becomes the criterion of all other Spiritual experiences, whether in the past or in the future.

All this, says Tillich, is underlined in the New Testament. In fact, as the earliest Synoptic traditions show, the very first type of Christology to appear was a Spirit-Christology which emphasised the presence of the divine Spirit in the life of Jesus. The first significant event was the moment of baptism, when Jesus was grasped by the Spirit, confirming his election as the Son of God. Tillich expresses the primary importance of the event in this way:

I believe that a truer interpretation of its significance is given by the voice that comes down to John or Jesus ... in the scene of the baptism: "Thou art my beloved Son. Today I have chosen thee." These words have nothing to do with a metaphysical or mythological form of son. If we strip away the mythology, and read simply what the gospel stories have to say, we have a picture of a man who is driven by the divine Spirit to his function, to his message, to his work as Messiah, and who anticipates the coming of the Kingdom of God in his message.

From the moment of baptism onwards, the divine Spirit was the dominant force in Jesus' life, and the Spirit's work can be traced right through the Gospel story. The early church's conviction of this led them to ask how it was possible for a person to be so completely the vehicle of the Spirit, and it was in answer to this question that the story of the Virgin Birth appeared, in which Jesus is procreated by the Spirit of God. Though this story runs the obvious danger of undermining the full humanity of Jesus, Tillich feels that it has two important points in its favour.
In the first place, it emphasises that it was the whole of Jesus - body as well as mind - that was grasped by the Spirit, and in the second place, it points to the fact that there 'must have been a teleological predisposition in Jesus to become the bearer of the Spirit without limit'.

Today we may reject the story itself, but we cannot reject these two important assertions about the relationship between Jesus and the Spirit of God.

We have already seen that wherever the divine Spirit is manifest, faith and love are to be found. Now as far as love is concerned, there is no problem with regard to the life of Jesus. The love of Christ, a love which led to his own self-sacrifice, is central both in the Gospels and in the apostolic preaching; one sees in him the principle of agape embodied, 'radiating from him into a world in which agape was and is known only in ambiguous expressions'.

In Christ we see the perfect expression of love in human form. But it is not so easy, Tillich feels, to apply the concept of faith to the life of the Christ, for it is not a word that is generally used in relation to Jesus either in the New Testament or in theology. Possibly the reason for this is that in view of the fact of human estrangement, faith, as it has normally been understood, always includes an element of 'inspite of', an implication which could certainly not be applied to one who was in unbroken fellowship with God, 'the Word made flesh'. Even more recent definitions of faith, as 'a leap, as an act of courage, as a risk, as embracing itself and the doubt about itself', hardly make the problem any easier, for none of these can be applied to one who claims unity with the Father. But perhaps the main reason why Protestant theology has been reluctant to speak of the faith of Christ is that in Protestantism such a concept has almost universally been allied to the doctrine of justification by faith in which faith
is the means through which the unjust are paradoxically accepted by God and their sin forgiven. Clearly this cannot be applied to Jesus as the Christ. Nevertheless, Tillich points out, we cannot refuse to apply the concept of faith in some way to the life of Jesus, for if we do refuse we run the risk of denying him a real humanity. But we can speak meaningfully of the faith of Christ, if we define it as 'the state of being grasped by the Spiritual Presence and through it by the transcendent union of unambiguous life'.\(^\text{126}\) It is when we understand faith in this sense, as a Spiritual reality over and above its actualisation in those who possess it, that it becomes directly applicable to Christ, for he is the one who is totally grasped by the divine Spirit. It is true that in the life of Jesus we see struggle, exhaustion, and despair, the testing of his faith on every side, and in this sense we do not see a complete fulfilment of the New Being in him, but we do see in him a true fragment, a genuine anticipation, of what it means to be fully grasped by the divine Spirit, for throughout all these experiences the Spirit never deserts him. So in this sense, when we look at Christ we can see in fact what faith really is.

There are two further important implications of the Spirit-Christology of the Synoptics which Tillich mentions. The first is that 'it is not the spirit of the man Jesus of Nazareth that makes him the Christ', but 'the Spiritual Presence, God in him, that possesses and drives his individual spirit'.\(^\text{127}\) This guards against the sort of theology which makes Jesus as a man the object of Christian faith, which for Tillich distorts the basic Christian message that 'it is Jesus as the Christ in whom the New Being has appeared', and disregards Paul's statement that 'the Lord is the Spirit',\(^\text{128}\) which means that we know the Lord not \(^\text{(flesh)}\) according to his historical existence/but only as the Spirit who is alive
and present'. 129 In fact, once this truth has been grasped, the Christian will realise that he is not tied to the specific words of one man, Jesus of Nazareth, but that the Christ, who is the Spirit, will provide him with a freedom that transcends every concrete expression of the New Being in time and space. 'Christ is the Spirit, not Law', and 'where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom'. 130

The second implication of Spirit-Christology is that Jesus as the Christ 'is the keystone in the arch of Spiritual manifestations in history'. 131 Tillich points out that he is no isolated event, but is to be seen in the context of 'a whole history of revelation and salvation before and after his appearance'.

The event "Jesus as the Christ" is unique but not isolated; it is dependent on past and future, as they are dependent on it. It is the qualitative centre in a process which proceeds from an indefinite past to an indefinite future, which we call, symbolically, the beginning and the end of history. 132

This recognition of the 'Spiritual Presence in the Christ' as the centre of history helps us to understand the manifestation of the Spirit throughout the whole of history, for as the New Testament affirms it is the same Spirit who is present in both. 133 All manifestations of the Spirit therefore must be consonant with him, whether they are 'before' him or 'after' him. However, Tillich is not using these prepositions in a purely temporal sense, but rather in relation to an existential encounter with Jesus as the Christ, 'before' and 'after' a personal confrontation with the New Being as it appears to him. So it was possible for men who lived before Jesus to have an existential encounter with the Christ even though a historical encounter was as yet impossible, because the Spirit who grasped them was the same Spirit who became his Spirit. This for Tillich is the real truth behind the paradigm of prophecy and fulfilment, that 'the Spirit who created the Christ within
Jesus is the same Spirit who prepared and continues to prepare mankind for the encounter with the New Being in him.\(^{134}\)

Tillich notes that since biblical times there has been serious discussion regarding the relation of the Spirit of Jesus as the Christ and the Spirit at work among his followers. He feels that such a question was inevitable once the early Spirit-Christology had been replaced by the Logos-Christology of John’s Gospel. The answer the early church gave was to say that after the incarnate Word’s return to the Father, the Spirit was given to take his place. So it is true to say that in ‘the divine economy’, in the history of salvation, ‘the Spirit follows the Son’. Yet it is also true that ‘in the essence, the Son is the Spirit’.\(^{135}\) This means that the Spirit testifies to the Son, he ‘does not himself originate what he reveals’, and for this reason ‘every new manifestation of the Spiritual Presence stands under the criterion of his manifestation in Jesus as the Christ’. In continuing to affirm this, the church has stood firm against those ‘Spirit-theologies’ that have arisen during the course of its history, ‘which teach that the revelatory work of the Spirit qualitatively transcends that of the Christ’.\(^{136}\) Yet this cannot be so, for to claim that there is more than one ultimate manifestation of the Spirit would destroy the ultimacy of the Christ-event. The early church therefore was right in making the manifestation of the Spirit in Jesus as the Christ the essential criterion for any theology of the Spirit or assessment of Spiritual experience.

One of the most notorious controversies in the church’s history, the argument over the procession of the Spirit, also arose over this issue of the Spirit’s relation to the Son. The Orthodox church claimed that the Spirit proceeds from the Father alone, whereas the Latin church asserted that he proceeds from both Father and Son, giving rise to the famous
filioque clause. Tillich points out that though the classical expression of this argument was rather pointless, there was nevertheless a real issue at stake. For in claiming that the Spirit proceeds from the Father alone, the Orthodox church opened the way for a 'direct, theocentric mysticism', even though it was baptised into Christ, whereas the Western church more firmly adhered to the application of the Christocentric criterion to all Spiritual experience. Unfortunately in the West, the Pope became more and more the sole authority for applying this criterion, with the result that it became distorted into a rigid legalism which sought to limit the Spirit's freedom. Though placing himself in the Western line of tradition, Tillich feels that in this Papal tendency was a flagrant distortion of the Johannine doctrine that the Spirit would be given to all Christ's followers.\(^{136a}\)

**Evaluation**

Tillich's remarks on fragment and anticipation would have been strengthened by some reference to Paul's concept of the Spirit as the *arrabon*, the earnest which is given to the man of faith as a foretaste of that which is to come. Says Paul, 'I am prepared for this change by God, who has given me the Spirit as its pledge and its instalment'.\(^{137}\) The divine Spirit is here regarded as a gift in anticipation of final salvation, a pledge that those who have the Spirit shall in the end receive the fulness of new life which God offers. In this sense, Paul breaks down any concept of eschatology that is completely futuristic. The new life which the Spirit brings is something which can be experienced here and now, and not something which is postponed until some future date. As Hendrikus Berkhof puts it, 'The whole work of the Spirit . . . is an anticipation of the consummation'.\(^{138}\) Tillich's concept of fragmentary anticipation is saying much the same sort of thing.
In his discussion on the religions, Tillich has rightly recognised the importance of distinguishing the genuine core of every Spiritual experience from the ambiguous nature of all attempts to convey and express it in human forms. What we are not so happy about is his persistent tendency to read a genuine experience of the Spirit in terms of an awareness of the transcendent unity, with all that this implies. It is one thing to say that at the heart of all religious forms lies a real awareness of the Spiritual Presence which is a true anticipation of the life of the New Being. It is another thing altogether to assume that this experience is to be understood in terms of an ontological union which transcends every split occasioned by the existential world. We must re-iterate what we have already said, that a mystical experience of transcendent union is not the only form religious experience takes. There are other forms of religious experience which can also be a genuine anticipation of life in the Spirit, as Hebrew and Christian monotheism testify. In fact, one senses in Tillich's analysis a certain tension in his own thinking between mysticism and monotheism. We have, of course, already observed this tension in our comments on biblical personalism and ontology, where it was pointed out that Tillich emphasises that the idea of a personal God is symbolic of the ultimate reality, but no more than symbolic. But the tension is now confirmed here in two additional ways.

In the first place, Tillich points out that as far as mysticism is concerned, all divine figures have value in that they represent grades on a Spiritual stairway to the ultimate, but that they are grades which must be left behind if the Spiritual Presence is to be experienced fully. In view of what Tillich has already said about Jesus as the Christ as the Bearer of the New Being, in which the person of Jesus is clearly subordinated to the New Being which he brings to men, one might be justified
in asking whether the Christ himself is nothing more than a grade on the
Spiritual stairway leading to the ultimate, the highest grade perhaps, but
still a grade; and in this sense one who can be dispensed with once the
New Being is realised, the final rung of a ladder that can be kicked away
once the ultimate is reached and the Spiritual Presence experienced.
Despite all his protestations about applying the criterion of Jesus as the
Christ to all forms of religious experience, one feels that in the end
what he does in fact is to reinterpret the Christian faith in terms of
mystical presuppositions, placing less than ultimate value on Jesus as
the Christ in the process. This seems to be confirmed by Tillich by what
he wrote in an article soon after his visit to Japan. Christianity,
he says, needs to rid itself of 'all elements of a Jesu-logical' theology,
for in so doing it will commend itself more fully to the Eastern world.
For Tillich, then, it is obvious that despite the centrality of the
historical event of Jesus Christ in Christian faith and experience,
the essential basis for all religion, Christianity included, is an under­
lying mysticism which transcends all forms of concrete expression, and to
which all forms of religion therefore must aspire.

Secondly, the tension between mysticism and monotheism in Tillich's
thought is underlined here in his observation that whereas Eastern
mysticism leads to the 'formless self', in which the individual is absorbed
into unity with the divine, Western monotheism safeguards the centred
self in the ecstatic experience. Now obviously we have here two in­
compatible types of religion, one which sacrifices the centred self, the
other which preserves it. But this raises the inevitable question as to
which of these two types of religion is nearer to Tillich's conception
of man's participation in the transcendent unity of unambiguous life,
which is the life of the Spirit. Despite what he says about the importance
of retaining the centred self, it is difficult to see how the self can have any place in a totally transcendent unity any more than a personal God, for to retain either would be to perpetuate the subject-object scheme of reality which he wishes to avoid. Yet even though his ontological presuppositions push him towards mysticism as the highest expression of religious experience, he is unwilling to throw a monotheistic form of religion away completely. The tension so far is unresolved.

There is an interesting passage in his 'Dialogues with Students', however, where he returns to this theme, and where the tension again reveals itself. Here he is differentiating between the 'mysticism of dissolution' such as one finds in the Eastern religions, and the 'mysticism of love' such as one finds in Christian monotheism:

One can say, in sum, that there is a mysticism of dissolution of the individual and a mysticism of love. It is interesting that when Bernard of Clairvaux speaks of the last stage in mystical development (not to be reached on earth), he describes it as like a drop of wine poured into a cup of wine. The drop is still there, but no longer independent; it is now identical with the whole. The fact that it is not lost is decisive, of course. But it is no longer self-centred. It has as its centre, so to speak, the cup of wine as a whole, which is not its own. And I believe we must face this fact. Our religious language is unable to resolve the difference between Buddhist – or, let us say, Hindu – and high Christian mysticism. But I know from two seminars which I led for a whole year on Christian mysticism that one can definitely say that Christian mysticism is always a mysticism of love.

Now love presupposes a differentiation between the subject and object of love. Even in imagining eternal life or eternal fulfilment, this differentiation remains. What that actually means cannot be further pursued. We can only state it. When we use a word like "communion" instead of "love", all the elements of separation which are presupposed in the concept of communion come into the picture. And in the classical phrase of Plotinus "the meeting of the one with the one", is still valid, you can hardly escape it. But in the concept of the Eternal One, the Divine One, which is all embracing – including the individual which reunites with the Divine One – the concept of unity is adequate. For this reason I would perhaps accept the two mysticisms: that of dissolution and that of love. And if someone asks, "What is the difference?" we cannot say more than this.
Yet the answer Tillich gives here is really unsatisfactory, for one fails to see how ultimately the two mysticisms are compatible. One is driven to the conclusion that he is unable to resolve this basic inconsistency in his thought. We shall return more fully to this problem when we come to assess the precise meaning of the transcendent unity of unambiguous life. For the moment we must be content with stating once again this dilemma: is the unambiguous life which the Spirit creates a life in which no ultimate differentiation between subject and object, individual self and divine Spirit, remains; or is it a life of communion with God, in which man and God are eternally distinct (though not opposed), as Christian monotheism has always affirmed?

There are two minor points in Tillich's discussion on the religions that should perhaps be mentioned. The first is that he accepts too uncritically the assumption that animism is the original form of religion. This is a theory that has long been viewed with suspicion, and it is strange that Tillich should still cling to an outmoded idea of evolutionary development in religious belief that begins with animism and works its way "upward" to more sophisticated forms. The other point is to question Tillich's bland assumption that the mystery religions provided a pattern which was carried over into Christianity. He accepts far too readily the view that the mystery religions were largely influential in the formation of early Christian theology, an opinion which has by no means gone unchallenged in contemporary biblical studies, despite the connection that older New Testament scholars like Bultmann see between Christianity and the mysteries. A much more balanced judgment is put forward by R. McWilson, when he says:

It must be admitted that the church in later ages absorbed into its belief and practice those elements which it could take over without doing violence to its own essential
faith, but this is a vastly different matter from the view that these cults exercised a formative influence upon Christianity in its earlier stages.\textsuperscript{145}

This may seem a fine distinction, but it is an important one, and one which Tillich ought to have brought out. For while the early church quite rightly sought to express its message in forms with which its own generation was familiar, this is very different from saying that the Spirit was at work within the strange rituals and doctrines of the secret mysteries with the express purpose of providing a pattern according to which the Christian revelation could best be understood.

But having said these things by way of criticism, we must also point out that the positive value of Tillich's analysis of the role of the Spirit in the religions must not be minimised. His affirmation that God is at work in those religions outside the Hebrew–Christian revelation is important, not only because of its pragmatic significance in making a genuine dialogue between religions possible, but also because of its theological insight. One does not need to accept Tillich's ontological assertions to recognise that the Spirit is at work in the total religious dimension of human experience. To affirm this is to underline the fact that God is always seeking to make himself known to man, and is everywhere preparing the way for his supreme revelation in Jesus Christ.

There are several points which arise from Tillich's analysis of the relation between Jesus as the Christ and the divine Spirit. The first is to ask whether Jesus actually thought of his life and ministry in the way in which Tillich understands it, that is, as the bearer of a New Reality, created by the Spirit, in which the transcendent unity of unambiguous life fragmentarily appears under the conditions of existence. He was, of course, vividly conscious of a deep and profound relationship with God, a relationship to which the story of his baptism in the Spirit points,
but there is nothing in the Scriptures to suggest that this relationship was understood in terms of a transcendent unity, with all that this phrase implies. The Synoptic Gospels certainly do not give the impression that Jesus was primarily some sort of mystic who constantly sought to realise his ontological unity with God. Even in John's Gospel, where the picture is rather different, and where Jesus speaks of his unity with the Father, we cannot legitimately read into his words the implications which Tillich seems to place upon them, for we have no grounds for doing so. The same is true of his message. When the Johannine Christ speaks to Nicodemus, or the woman at the well, or the disciples in the upper room, about the gift of the Spirit and the new life the Spirit creates, there is nothing to suggest that this is a life in which ultimately every existential differentiation is transcended. Even though in his last discourse he speaks of a mutual indwelling between the Father and the Son, and between the Son and the disciples, it is an indwelling in which the differentiation remains. It is not totally transcended. And this must certainly be set alongside the message of the Synoptic Jesus, where the concepts of forgiveness, love and reconciliation all take man's ultimate individuality quite seriously. There is little evidence in the Gospels therefore to lead us to interpret Jesus' understanding either of his own life in the Spirit or of his message of a new life created by the Spirit in the way in which Tillich would have us do.

Secondly, there is a certain tension between adoptionism and incarnationism in Tillich's Spirit-Christology that is not easy to resolve. It is certainly true that he does not intend his emphasis on what he considers to be a perfectly valid adoptionist theology to undermine the doctrine of the Incarnation. The fact that 'Jesus was grasped by the Spirit at the moment of his baptism' must be seen alongside the equally
true assertion that 'there must have been a teleological predisposition in Jesus to become the bearer of the Spirit without limit'. So for Tillich adoptionism at least implies incarnationism. What Tillich has not done, however, has been to show the relationship between these two concepts clearly enough, and especially in the context of the doctrine of the Spirit. One must point out particularly the inadequacy of his statement that the story of the Virgin Birth arose as an answer to the early church's question as to how it was possible for Jesus to be so completely grasped by the Spirit. C.K. Barrett, in a penetrating study of the relevant passages, sees the origin of the birth stories rather differently in the belief that just as the Spirit was present at the beginning of the old creation, so he must be present at the beginning of the New. 'Just as the Spirit of God was active at the foundation of the world, so that Spirit was to be expected also at its renewal ... The fundamental thought involved in the conception stories in their bearing upon the work of the Holy Spirit is legitimately derived from Old-Testament thought: the Spirit is Creator Spiritus in both creations'.\(^{148}\) In the light of this statement, as Tillich's treatment stands it tends to misrepresent the function of the Spirit in this context, whose role is rather more profound than Tillich would suggest. It is significant that Barrett sees the same motive behind the baptism story: 'The work of the Spirit is to call into being part of the New Creation of the Messianic days, namely, to inaugurate the ministry of the Messiah, ... Here, as in the birth narratives, the Spirit is the creative activity of God which calls into being the conditions of the Messianic era'.\(^{149}\) In other words, the link between the two stories is the creative activity of the divine Spirit, to which both the concepts of adoption and incarnation point in their own particular way. Tillich's discussion would have been considerably strengthened by emphasising this point.
A third point arises out of the discussion on the relation between the Spirit of Jesus as the Christ and the Spirit at work among his followers. One accepts the main point of Tillich's argument, that the early church, in emphasising that the Spirit was given in order to take the place of and testify to the Word, thereby guaranteed that every spiritual experience in the lives of Christians should be subjected to the criterion of the Spirit's revelation in Jesus as the Christ. However, his statement in this context that 'in the essence, the Son is the Spirit', is rather misleading. As a statement in itself, one would naturally assume that what Tillich means is that in essence there is no difference between the Son and the Spirit, that the two are ultimately one and the same, a statement which is obviously irreconcilable with traditional trinitarian theology. But in this context, this cannot possibly be what Tillich means. What he does seem to mean is that as far as human experience is concerned, the life of the Son in Jesus as the Christ and the unambiguous manifestation of the Spirit in the life of man completely coincide, so that whenever the Spirit manifests himself in the experience of the followers of Christ, he does so according to that criterion, and not according to some other criterion which is separate from him. This is a perfectly valid assertion: it is a pity that Tillich confused the issue by making a statement which is open to misunderstanding, and which taken out of context would mean something rather different altogether. So what Tillich is really saying here does not differ much in actual meaning from his comment on Paul's statement, 'the Lord is the Spirit', that we know the Lord not 'according to his historical existence but only as the Spirit who is alive and present'. Or as Barclay puts it,

When Paul wrote that, he was not thinking in terms of the doctrine of the Trinity and the persons in the Godhead; he
was not thinking theologically at all; he was speaking from experience, and his experience was that to possess the Spirit was nothing less than to possess Jesus Christ. 150

Finally, Tillich has rightly drawn attention to the difficulties in speaking of the faith of Jesus, but his own solution is not without its problems. For to say that faith is a reality over and above its actualisation in those who possess it, a reality that is created as such by the Spirit is to give the impression that faith is a pre-existent, essential, reality, waiting to take form as it were in concrete human expression, and in Jesus the Christ finding its most perfect opportunity to do so. This sort of language is rather foreign to the New Testament. It would be much more meaningful to say that the faith that the Spirit creates is a new relationship established between man and God. In this sense, one can indeed speak of the faith of Jesus, for in the life of Jesus as the Christ, as indeed in the life of any person who is grasped by the Spirit, there is a relationship with God established, a relationship which is characterised in the New Testament by obedience, commitment and trust. In the life of estranged man, the element of justification is present as the factor that makes such a relationship possible. But in the case of Jesus as the Christ, there is no need for this justifying element. His acceptance by God is there from the beginning, for with him there is no estrangement, and the full and uninhibited work of the Spirit within him gives testimony to this fact.

V. THE SPIRITUAL COMMUNITY

We saw, in our introductory chapter, that for Tillich revelation only truly becomes revelation when there are those who can receive it; in other words that revelation and reception must go together. 151 Similarly, for Tillich the Christ is not truly the Christ unless there are those who receive him as the Christ: "he could not have brought the new reality
without those who have accepted the new reality in him and from him'.

Those who accept this new reality in Christ are created by the Spirit into a Spiritual Community, and Tillich lists this as a third creative work of the Spirit in the life of man: firstly, faith; then, love; and now, the Spiritual Community. Tillich prefers the expression 'Spiritual Community' to the word 'church' because of the ambiguous religious associations which the latter has. Whereas terms such as the 'Spiritual Community', or the 'body of Christ', or the 'assembly of God' can express the unambiguous life of the Spirit unambiguously, the word 'church' is so tied up with the ambiguous life of organised religion that it is difficult to use it unambiguously in this way.

We need to examine a little more closely what Tillich means by this phrase 'the Spiritual Community'. It is, he says, a community that is Spiritual in two ways. Firstly, it is Spiritual in the sense that it is created by the Spiritual Presence. This means that it is unambiguous. But because it appears under finite conditions, it is also fragmentary, like every creation of the Spirit and manifestation of the New Being in the life of man, including the Christ himself. Despite this, it is able to conquer both estrangement and ambiguity. Secondly, the Spiritual Community is Spiritual in Luther's sense of 'invisible', 'hidden', 'open to faith alone', terms which are not intended to undermine its reality, but which point to the face that its true nature as the creation of the Spirit is not recognisable except to those who themselves have been grasped by the Spirit. This does not mean, as it has sometimes been taken to mean, that it is an invisible church existing alongside the visible church, but that it is the inward, divine essence that determines the nature of the visible church. 'The Spiritual Community,' he says, 'does not exist as an entity beside the churches, but it is their
Spiritual essence, effective in them through its power, its structure, and its fight against their ambiguities. Furthermore, the Spiritual Community is active in other communities as well as the churches. It is the power and structure inherent and effective in all religious groups, whether Christian or not. It is when these groups 'are consciously based on the appearance of the New Being in Jesus as the Christ', that they are called churches. But whenever the nature of a group is determined by an ultimate concern, the Spiritual Community is present and effective within it.

Logically and ontologically, says Tillich, the Spiritual Community may be defined as 'essentiality determining existence and being resisted by existence'. But there are two possible errors here which must be avoided. The first is to envisage the Spiritual Community as an ideal which exists over and above the reality of the churches, an ideal that is 'constructed from the positive elements in the ambiguities of religion and projected onto the screen of transcendence'. In this sense the Spiritual Community is seen as a state to which the churches must continually aspire, a picture which they must persistently attempt to emulate, an expectation which they must always seek to fulfil. But Tillich asks, 'What justifies such an expectation? Or more concretely, Where do the churches get the power of establishing and actualizing such an ideal?'

The usual answer is to say that the power is given by the Spirit who is already at work within the church, helping it to fulfil its expectations. However, it is important to see that the Spirit is present in the church, not as something separate from the power it imparts, but as none other than the essential power itself - the power within the Word and sacraments that makes them effective media of its work, the power of faith that creates faith, the power of love which gives rise to love, and the power of the
Spiritual Community which precedes any actualisation of the Spiritual Community in the life of the churches. So the Spiritual Community, as the creation of the Spiritual Presence, is 'the New Creation' which is the very essence of the church's life, 'into which the individual Christian and the particular church is taken', and not some ideal that is set over against it. Tillich confesses that this sort of interpretation may be rather strange to contemporary man, but it is both soundly biblical and theologically necessary for any church that confesses Jesus as the Christ, the bearer of the New Reality.

The second error Tillich feels we need to avoid in our affirmation regarding the nature of the Spiritual Community is the tendency to see it as an 'assembly of so-called Spiritual beings', constituted of both the heavenly congregation and the elect gathered in from all mankind. In this sense the Spiritual Community is interpreted as the 'supranaturalistic' counterpart, in the Platonic sense, of the church militant. But whatever the symbolic value of this may be, it is a piece of 'mythological literalism', and can in no sense provide the criterion which makes the church the church. The church can only truly be constituted by its invisible, essential Spirituality, not by any heavenly ideal of which it is but an earthly reflection.

What we need in fact, claims Tillich, is a new category in interpreting reality which is neither realistic, idealistic nor supranaturalistic, but rather 'essentialistic - a category pointing to the power of the essential behind and within the existential'. And it is in this way that we must interpret the Spiritual Community - as the essential behind and within the church, its inner driving force or telos which is the source of all that constitutes the church. This analysis, of course, not only applies to the relationship between the Spiritual Community and
the church; it applies, as we have seen, to all of life's processes: 'everywhere, the essential is one of the determining powers'. In a sense it is teleological, inasmuch as it directs the shape of existence and drives towards fulfilment, but Tillich feels that it is better to avoid the word 'teleological' because of its traditional associations with causality, and in its stead use the word 'essential'. We are inevitably reminded here of his definition of 'spirit' as the 'unity of the ontological elements and the telos of life', that inner, essential aim which enables a being to fulfill its own nature. So the Spiritual Community is the inner telos of the church whereby the Spirit is able to lift it into the transcendent unity of unambiguous life in which it finds its true fulfilment.

We must now ask what relationship Tillich envisages between the New Being present in the Spiritual Community and the New Being as it appears in the Christ. To explain this relationship, he looks at two New Testament passages. The first is the story of Peter's confession at Caesarea Philippi, in which he declares that Jesus is the Christ, and Jesus in return replies that his insight is not the result of any ordinary deduction, but the work of the Spirit within him. This story for Tillich is of tremendous importance: it constitutes 'the central scene in the whole synoptic tradition'. 'It is the Spirit grasping Peter that enables his spirit to recognise the Spirit in Jesus which makes him the Christ', he says, and this recognition forms the basis of the Spiritual Community which Peter and the disciples represent. So Tillich concludes from this story: 'As the Christ is not the Christ without those who receive him as the Christ, so the Spiritual Community is not Spiritual unless it is founded on the New Being as it has appeared in the Christ'. The authenticity of the Spiritual Community lies in its being founded on
The confession that Jesus is the Christ, the bearer of the New Being.

The second significant passage from the New Testament is the Pentecost story, which, says Tillich, powerfully emphasises the character of the Spiritual Community. Though the story itself presents certain difficulties, in that it is a combination of historical, legendary and mythological elements, its overall symbolic meaning is vitally important. Tillich brings out five elements in the story. The first is the ecstatic character of the creation of the Spiritual Community. The nature of the Spirit always manifests the unity of ecstasy and structure and this is particularly so in the story of Pentecost. The second element is that of faith, 'a faith which was threatened and almost destroyed by the crucifixion of him who was supposed to be the bearer of the New Being'. That which happened at Pentecost released the disciples from their uncertainty and re-established their faith. They were grasped ecstatically by the Spirit and their newly found certainty overcame their doubt. Without the certainty of faith, says Tillich, there can be no Spiritual Community.

The third element of the character of the Spiritual Community is that of love, a self-surrendering love which expresses itself in service, particularly towards those who are in need. The fourth element is that of unity, symbolised by the ecstatic glossolalia and the bringing together of all sorts of men around the sacramental table, and there can be no Spiritual Community apart from the ultimate reunion of all who are estranged. Finally, there is the element of universality, which is seen in the early move towards mission which is so vivid in the Pentecost account. The New Being would not be the New Being, says Tillich, unless mankind as a whole and even the universe itself were included in it. Without this openness the Spiritual Community cannot exist.

Tillich declares that these same five elements must be present
wherever the Spiritual Community is found, and though the predominant characteristic will always be ecstasy, it will be 'an ecstasy united with faith, love, unity and universality'. As a community of faith, it must overcome the tension between the individual's personal faith and that of the community as a whole, and by uniting the man who is grasped by the Spirit in the act of faith with the God who works through every expression of faith without restriction, the Spirit transcends every distinction between different types and conditions of faith in the life of the Spiritual Community. For the true character of faith, Tillich reminds us, lies not in forms or expressions of belief, but in its ability to overcome 'the infinite gap between the infinite and the finite', and it is only when this becomes the criterion for the faith of the churches that they are able to conquer their ambiguous expressions. This character of the Spiritual Community as a community of faith leads also to its unity, which holds together the various expressions of faith in a common bond, enabling the community to withstand all vicissitudes that arise from its structure, or its historical development, or the variety of preferences regarding symbols, rituals and doctrines. Similarly, as a community of love the Spiritual Community contains within itself the tension between the variety of love relations that are possible and agape, the love 'which unites being with being', since it is within the power of agape to overcome this variety of love relations by uniting the separated centres from which these various forms of love spring. This power of love in the Spiritual Community is affirmed by its universality, by which it includes within itself not only the variety of love relations, but also all sorts and conditions of men, irrespective of sex and age, race and nation, tradition and character, making it possible for all to participate in its life. This is not merely a question of reconciliation with God as
'children of the same father', but also of reconciliation with each other, in spite of existential estrangement by participating in the transcendent unity of unambiguous life.

Although because of the limits of finitude, these qualities of faith and love, unity and universality, can in each case only be fragmentarily realised, yet because they each anticipate the ultimate fulfillment of the Kingdom of God, they do form the essential criteria of all moves towards unambiguous life in the ambiguous life of the churches. It is this unambiguous nature of the Spiritual Community that enables us to call it 'holy', for it shares in the holiness of the life of God. So Tillich refers to holiness, or participation in the divine life, as the 'invisible Spiritual essence', both of the Spiritual Community itself and of the churches which express it. To conclude on the one hand, the marks of faith and love, of unity and universality, in the life of the churches, point to their ecstatic participation in the life of God. Whereas on the other hand this unambiguous participation in the divine life, which is what holiness implies, becomes the ultimate criterion for the meaning of these qualities in the life of any religious group.

Because the Spiritual Community, as the essence of the churches, is not identical with them, and because the Spiritual Presence also manifests itself elsewhere as well as in Jesus as the Christ, we must ask what the Spiritual Community's relation is 'to the manifold religious communities in the history of religion'? It is clear that for Tillich wherever the Spirit makes its impact on mankind, there the Spiritual Community is created. This means that the Spiritual Community does indeed appear in the preparatory period before Christ, but because Christ himself has not yet appeared, its appearance will differ from its later manifestations in those periods when Christ is both known and received. In order to differ-
entiate between these two types of Spiritual Community, Tillich proposes to use the terms 'latent' and 'manifest', the 'latent' Spiritual Community referring to the Spiritual Community 'before' an encounter with the Spirit's central revelation in Jesus as the Christ, the 'manifest' Spiritual Community referring to the Spiritual Community 'after' such an encounter. But in this context he is using the terms 'before' and 'after' not just in relation to the historical event of the coming of Christ into the world at a particular time and place, the basic kairos, but also more significantly in relation to every derivative kairos, every existential encounter which a religious or cultural group may have. It is in this sense of 'before' and 'after' an encounter with Christ that one is able to distinguish between the latent and manifest Spiritual Community.

Tillich defines latency as 'the state of being partly actual, partly potential', and it is this state that characterises the latent Spiritual Community. The impact of the Spirit in faith and love is present, but the ultimate criterion of that faith and love as manifest in the Christ is lacking. It is this negative aspect that makes the latent Spiritual Community such easy prey to the processes of profanisation and demonisation, for it has no ultimate principle of resistance, and here the Spiritual Community in its manifestation as the church is at an advantage, in that it has the principle of resistance to these processes in its own life, a resistance which comes out clearly in the prophetic and Reformation movements, where the church judges itself according to the criterion of Christ.

The latent Spiritual Community is to be found firstly in every religious and cultural movement of history; in the Hebrew community of the Old Testament as well as in modern Judaism, in the great religious movements of Islam, in the mythological cults of the ancient world, in
the great mystic religions of the East. But secondly, it is to be found also in those non-religious groups outside the church which represent the Spiritual Community in its secular latency. Often these groups may be different from or even hostile to specifically religious expressions: generally they have some other object as their central concern - education, art or political issues, to name but a few. Frequently the impact of the Spiritual Presence is also to be found in the lives of individuals who are connected with neither the church nor any other group. But the fact that these groups or individuals do not belong to a church does not exclude them from the Spiritual Community. If the church itself claims to be part of the Spiritual Community in the face of those instances of profanisation and demonisation which occur in its own life, still less can it exclude those so-called 'secular opponents' who show the impact of the Spirit on themselves in an undeniable way.

Yet in both types of group, whether religious or secular, the emphasis must still lie on the word 'latent', for the ultimate criterion of the Spiritual Community 'has not yet appeared'. It is, says Tillich, owing to the lack of this criterion that such groups are not able to actualise either the 'radical self-negation' or the 'self-transformation' that one sees in the Cross of Christ, a fact that causes them at times to reject the preaching and activity of the churches. However, because they are 'unconsciously driven toward the Christ', they quickly notice those occasions of ambiguity that arise in the church, and this in itself can cause them to reject it, becoming 'critics of the churches in the name of the Spiritual Community'. Tillich points out that there are times when even openly anti-Christian movements can act in this role. 'Not even communism could live if it were devoid of all elements of the Spiritual Community': even this is related 'teleolo-
Tillich believes that all these considerations have bearing on the ministry and mission of the Christian church, in regard to those both within and outside Christian culture. For it means that we need no longer treat non-Christians as complete strangers, to be 'invited' into the Spiritual Community from the outside, but rather that we approach them as those who are already members of the Spiritual Community in its latent stage. If this were realised more fully, Tillich is certain that much of the ecclesiastical arrogance which so frequently dogs the steps of the Christian mission would be overcome.

Finally Tillich turns to the relationship of the Spiritual Community to the work of the Spirit in the unity of the three functions of life, morality, culture and religion. The transcendent union of unambiguous life in which the Spiritual Community participates, he says, includes the unity of the three functions of life under the dimension of spirit, for the unity of life in its essential nature, disrupted under the conditions of existence, is recreated by the Spirit at work within the Spiritual Community 'as it struggles with the ambiguities of life in religious and secular groups'.

We must begin, says Tillich, by pointing out that religion itself is not to be thought of as a special function of the Spiritual Community, as the more narrow connotations of the word 'religion' imply. Rather is religion concerned with the whole of life, not just a part, and this means that when the Spiritual Presence grasps a man, it grasps him in every dimension of his experience. So 'the universe is God's sanctuary. Every work day is a day of the Lord, every supper a Lord's supper, every work a fulfilment of a divine task, every joy a joy in God'. So in creating the Spiritual Community the Spirit does not need to create a
specific organisms to receive and express it; instead it 'grasps all reality, every function, every situation'. It exists in the 'depth' of every cultural creation, for every act of cultural creativity participates in the divine life as its ultimate ground and aim. This is why in the Spiritual Community, as distinct from the church, there are no specifically religious symbols and acts, for encountered reality itself becomes completely symbolic of the Spiritual Presence and every cultural act becomes one of self-transcendence. Essentially, then, in the Spiritual Community, the relation between religion and culture, that 'culture is the form of religion and religion the substance of culture', is realised. However, because of man's finite limitations, this situation can never be realised more than fragmentarily in actual life. At different times one or the other will predominate, though they need not always be separated. It is when they do exclude each other entirely that an occasion for both religious and cultural ambiguity occurs most pointedly, a situation that the Spiritual Presence will resist, applying as a criterion the unambiguous union of religion and culture which is found in the Spiritual Community hidden in their midst.

In essence, Tillich continues, religion is also one with morality, and in the Spiritual Community this unambiguous union is manifest. Those conflicts which do occur between religion and morality arise from the narrower concept of religion, from which morality claims its independence, and against which claim religion in the narrower sense reacts. But because in the Spiritual Community the Spirit grasps the whole of man, including his personal and communal relations, there can be no conflict between morality and religion as defined in its broader sense. The New Being cannot appear in a narrow religious form set apart from society and then impose moral forms on it from without; it must manifest itself
within the essential framework of man. For this reason the morality of
the Spiritual Community can be called 'theonomous',\textsuperscript{172} which means that
to be obedient to the moral imperative is in fact to affirm what essentially
one is. It also means that when a person is grasped by the Spirit he be­
comes aware of his infinite value as a participant in the divine life,
and so seeks to affirm his essential being rather than destroy it. To
be grasped by the Spiritual Presence, to realise one's transcendent unity
with the divine life, and to accept the unconditional nature of the
moral imperative are one and the same thing. So the motivating power of
morality is not law, but participation in the divine life which makes
transcendent union with oneself, one's world and one's ground of being
possible. Tillich calls this Spiritually created transcendent union
'grace', and in this way affirms that grace alone can establish both the
moral personality and the moral community. 'The self-establishment
of a person as person without grace leaves the person to the ambigu­
ities of the law. Morality in the Spiritual Community is determined by
grace'.\textsuperscript{173} Or as he puts it elsewhere, what grace accomplishes 'is to
create a state of reunion in which the cleavage between our true and
actual being is fragmentarily overcome, and the rule of the commanding
law is broken'.\textsuperscript{174}

The ultimate unity of religion and morality, like that of religion
and culture, says Tillich, can only be established fragmentarily because
of the limitations of finitude. It cannot therefore embrace the whole
field of human relations at once. It can only be an anticipation of ful­
filled personality and community. Yet wherever this unity is observed,
the Spiritual Community is to be found, and the criterion thus perceived,
which may be called 'the ethics of the Kingdom of God', is the measure
of ethics in both church and society.\textsuperscript{175}
Finally, there is in the Spiritual Community a unity of morality and culture. This, says Tillich, can be demonstrated in two ways. In the first place, morality receives its content from culture. The unconditional moral imperative must be filled out with specific content, and this is provided by the culture in the context of which the moral imperative is received. This immediately introduces an element of relativity into morality, which is inevitable. But the element of relativity does no damage so long as it is conditioned by the love which affirms the other in the act of reunion, for in this love the moral imperative and the ethical content meet to constitute what Tillich calls the 'theonomous morals of the Spiritual Community'.

This love will, of course, show itself in many different ways, but it will still remain love, and this is why in the Spiritual Community there are no laws apart from the Spiritual Presence, since the Spirit creates a love appropriate to every situation. 'The "Spiritual Presence" opens man's eyes and ears to the moral demand implicit in the concrete situation'. This may well give rise to 'documents of the wisdom of love', but it is a mistake to think of these as law books. Love must always remain free to "listen" to the particular situation. So while morality depends on culture for its content, it is independent in its imperative of love, which is the creation of the Spiritual Presence alone. Nevertheless, in the Spiritual Community there is an essential unity of morality and culture, fragmentary because of the limitations of existence, which means that some moral decisions will always have to exclude others, but still a true, unambiguous unity which is the criterion of every moral-cultural situation and the hidden power which constantly seeks to unite them in their existential separation.

In the second place, the essential unity of culture and morality
is demonstrated by the fact that morality gives seriousness to culture. Tillich points out that when a cultural creation is divested of seriousness it becomes merely a thing to be enjoyed rather than the object of a genuine eros, a situation which Kierkegaard called 'aestheticism'. By 'seriousness' Tillich means the force of the unconditional nature of the moral imperative which prevents cultural creativity becoming 'shallow and destructive'. In the Spiritual Community, claims Tillich, there is no such 'aesthetic' detachment, but only 'the seriousness of those who seek to experience the ultimate in being and meaning through every form and task'. There is therefore no conflict arising from an irresponsible enjoyment of cultural forms and activities or from an attitude of moral superiority over culture. There will be tension, because the unity is only fragmentary; yet the essential unity of moral seriousness and cultural 'openness' to the depth of being and meaning will determine all true relationships between morality and culture in every human group and will constantly struggle against the ambiguities of separation.

Tillich concludes his analysis of the Spiritual Community by saying that it is clear that in every instance of the Spiritual Community in the life of man, as in every instance of the Spiritual Presence, its presence is both hidden and manifest. 'It is as manifest and as hidden as the central manifestation of the New Being in Jesus as the Christ; it is as manifest and as hidden as the Spiritual Presence which creates the New Being in the history of mankind, and indirectly, in the universe as a whole.' In all three instances, everything Spiritual is manifest within its hiddenness, open only to the eyes of faith, a faith that is none other than being grasped by the Spiritual Presence. 'As we have said before,' he declares, 'only Spirit discerns Spirit.'
Evaluation

Tillich has provided us with a most valuable and penetrating analysis of his concept of 'the Spiritual Community', an analysis which one cannot ignore in working towards a contemporary doctrine either of the work of the Spirit or of the church. There are several points, however, which call for critical attention. The first concerns his definition of the Spiritual Community in essentialistic terms. From what he says it is clear that the Spiritual Community is, like all essential being, a reality in its own right, prior to any actualisation in existential forms. This comes out clearly in his assertion that it is the 'New Creation into which the individual Christian and the particular church is taken'. Yet at the same time, in his definition of the Spiritual Community he goes further than his previous definitions of essentiality, for he is also claiming that it is a teleological force which not only directs the shape of existence, but also drives towards its fulfilment. In other words, he is not only including the essential ontological reality, but the dynamic process of actualisation as well.

It is important for us to realise this in our attempt to evaluate Tillich's doctrine of the Spiritual Community, for whilst we must immediately reject the idea that the Spiritual Community is some sort of prior reality independent of its manifestation in the life of man, his further assertion that the Spiritual Community is the inner telos of the church carries much more meaning. What we can certainly say is that the Spiritual Community is the hidden, purposive principle by which the Spirit works within the community of men to create a genuine expression of partnership to which the New Testament gives the name koinonia, 'that rare quality which makes the church fully the body of Christ'. Perhaps this would be seen more clearly, then, if the definite article were
removed, and we spoke quite simply of 'Spiritual Community', and in this case it becomes a good and valuable term to use.

The second point is to question Tillich's assertion that the terms 'the Body of Christ' and 'the Assembly of God', which he proposes as alternatives to 'the Spiritual Community', are themselves free from ambiguity. This is just not true. In contemporary theology regarding the church, particularly in more Catholic circles, the 'Body of Christ' has become so frequently allied with the organised church with all its ambiguities, that the two have become virtually interchangeable. The other phrase, the 'Assembly of God', also carries an ambiguity, because of its almost exclusive use by Pentecostalist and other evangelical groupings to refer to the local congregation. One feels therefore that the expression 'Spiritual Community', without the definite article, is preferable to either of these proposed alternatives.

Several points may be made regarding the analysis of the Pentecost story. One would certainly wish to affirm with Tillich the presence of the ecstatic element in the events of the first Whitsunday, but it should be pointed out that there is no evidence that the disciples understood their experience of ecstasy as a transcending of the subject-object order of reality. To be grasped by the Spirit is certainly indicative of Spiritual Community, but as we have pointed out before, this does not necessitate a mystical experience in which one becomes aware of transcendent unity. Having said this, it is interesting to see that in his description of faith and love in this particular context Tillich is much more Scriptural than in his previous analysis of faith and love in terms of ultimate concern and the drive towards reunion. Here faith is seen much more in terms of certainty and commitment, and love much more in terms of a self-denying agape, though it is a great pity that when he
goes on to talk of these marks in the life of the Spiritual Community in a more universal context, he again reverts to his former ontological understanding of the nature of love as the desire for the reunion of the separated. Finally, would it not be more Scriptural to say that these elements in the Pentecostal experience derive from the risen Presence of Christ in the midst through the Spirit, rather than 'from the image of Jesus as the Christ and the New Being as it appears in him'? It may be true that they are seen most clearly in the image of Jesus as the Christ, but to say that they are derived from this image is significantly weaker theologically than to affirm that it is the risen Lord in the midst through the power of his Spirit who produces within the life of the Christian community the same marks of the Spiritual Presence as were seen in him. Tillich's phrase here suggests more of an 'imitation of Christ' than 'Christ in me'.

Tillich's discussion on the Spiritual Community in its latent and manifest stages is a valuable contribution to contemporary thinking about the church, particularly concerning its relationship with the world. It is obvious when one examines the course of history that the work of the Spirit in creating Spiritual Community is neither confined to the Christian church nor identical with its activity. The forceful recognition of this fact in modern times, together with the increasing contact between Christians and non-Christians, necessitates a re-appraisal of the precise theological relationship between the institutional church and these other groups, and here the words 'manifest' and 'latent' provide a useful distinction. One feels that Tillich could have differentiated more forcefully between non-Christian religious groups and secular groups, by pointing out that in the case of the former the Spiritual dynamic is overt and acknowledged, even though the Christ is
not named, whereas in the case of the latter the Spiritual dynamic is hidden, to a great extent unacknowledged and even sometimes explicitly denied. But be that as it may, his recognition that the Spirit's work is in no way confined to the manifest church is important.

Nevertheless, there have been mixed reactions to the concept of latency, for in addition to those who see it as a recognition of the world-wide activity of the Spirit in working towards true community, there are those who see its disadvantages, pointing out that it may well be used as a means of justification for those who wish to cut themselves off from the church because of its ambiguities and failures. It is interesting here to contrast two writers on this theme. The first is a Continental lay theologian, who says:

When I was a child, I was taught: A Christian is a person who goes to church. But as I grew up I noticed that Christ is not only to be found in the church, because he lives and acts in the world, as it were, incognito, under other names; because he is there where men live more genuinely and more freely than heretofore, and because he will there be crucified where men are being killed - in this form he is present always. We can no longer turn our eyes away from the presence of the "Greater Christ" in the world if we really desire to believe that Christ has died for all men. God has made us free in Christ and thereby broken down the barriers so that the established church is no longer the only place where one can ask for Christ and believe in him. As a result of secularisation, is there not a "Church outside the Church", a hidden, latent Church in which Christ is present unknown as he was once at Emmaus?184

On the other hand, from the other point of view, a British theologian has this to say:

If taken too seriously (the notion of a latent church) can lead not only to romanticism, which sees particular historical movements ... as heralds of the kingdom of God, but also to the most invidious and deadly form of self-righteousness, that of the man who considers himself too righteous to belong to a corrupt church. This is a form of self-deception greater than that which any ecclesiastic is likely to suffer in these days, for it allows a man to enjoy the glow of self-satisfaction of the Pharisee, without either accepting his responsibilities or enduring the odium of being branded with
his name... Once those who are outside begin to flatter themselves that they belong to the 'latent' and, therefore, superior Church, they place themselves under a clearer judgement than even those who are unworthily joined to the visible Church deserve. 185

The concept of a latent church or Spiritual Community, therefore, is one which itself suffers from ambiguity, and for this reason must be used with care, despite the fact that it is a valid and a necessary concept if one is to affirm that the Spirit is at work within the world as well as in the church itself. Nevertheless it is a doctrine that must inevitably call the church to a re-appraisal of its own nature and function within the life of man, a theme which Tillich takes up later when he discusses more specifically the relationship between the church, as the manifest community of the Spirit, and the world outside. 186

One can agree with Tillich that in any group where Spiritual Community is latently present, the marks of the Spirit's activity will be found, even though they may appear in slightly different ways. One question which does arise, however, is in what sense faith appears in the secular group in which the Spirit is at work. There is no particular problem here if one accepts Tillich's definition of faith as ultimate concern, but this is a definition which we have rejected. How is it that faith in the New Testament sense can appear in the secular group? The problem is particularly acute if the group describes itself as secular humanist, for in this case, though there may well be a certain measure of agapeistic concern present, there will be little that we could call faith in the Scriptural sense at all. Nevertheless, it could well be argued that the formal marks of faith are not entirely absent. For example, one could say that the humanist who is filled with motives of concern for his fellow men does believe something after all—he believes that in a transient world man matters, and were he not to...
believe this he could not act in a humanitarian way. We can detect in this belief the pattern of faith, even though it does not derive from any specifically religious convictions about the nature of man and his dignity as a child of God. Similarly, one could point out that the elements of response and commitment, both of which are important facets of faith in the New Testament, are both present in the way of life of the secular humanist, even though they are not developed in relation to God. Despite this, however, it seems to me that if one is to be really honest one must say that if any mark of the Spiritual Community is notably deficient in secular latent groups, it is the element of faith. The seeds of faith may well be present, but it is not always possible to uncover them.

The chief difficulty with Tillich's discussion on the relation between the various functions of life in the Spiritual Community is that he is speaking of these functions in their essential state and not as they actually are. It is this that gives rise to a certain artificiality in what he says. We have already rejected his concept of essentiality as a prior reality preceding actual existence, and this applies here. There is no reason at all why one should not affirm the unity of life without having to bring in an abstract realm of essences to warrant it. We can certainly say that the unity of morality, culture and religion, will become more and more apparent in human experience as the Spirit grasps man's life and works within it towards the creation of community in which there is no basic contradiction between these various functions. But we can say this without Tillich's ontological predilections.

Similarly, one doubts whether Tillich's statement that in the Spiritual Community, where religion and culture are essentially one, there is no place for religious symbols can be substantiated. One could
legitimately say that in any community fully constituted by the Spirit, every act of human creativity, whether narrowly religious or not, would fulfil the religious function of pointing to the presence of the divine in the midst of life. Yet even were it possible for such a community to exist, one would still question whether the need for specifically religious symbols would drop out altogether. If Tillich is right then the necessity for symbolism would appear to be merely a cultural phenomenon rather than something implied by the transcendence of God. Yet it is surely significant that in those communities where the Spiritual Community has been most fully realised, the need for religious symbols has by no means been abandoned, but has rather been more deeply affirmed, in accordance with the fact that the nearer one gets to God the more conscious one becomes of the distance which separates one from him. This is true even of those communities which on the surface do not seem to rely on any form of symbolism at all, such as the Quakers where silence itself is nevertheless a religious symbol with a profound depth of meaning. We cannot agree then with Tillich that in the Spiritual Community there is no need for religious symbols as such, because wherever Spiritual Community has been most fully realised in the life of man, the religious symbol seems to have become more significant than ever.

We shall defer our comments on the concept of theonomous morality until later, when Tillich discusses the relation of the Spirit to morality more specifically. But it should be pointed out here that Tillich's definition of morality in terms of self-integration which has already given us cause for concern should not lead us to rule out a concept of theonomous morality in itself. We can affirm such a concept even if we disagree with how Tillich interprets morality, and even if we cannot hold to the ontological presuppositions behind Tillich's idea
of theonomy which will become apparent in our later discussions. What we can affirm at this stage is that any morality that is truly genuine is one which is born as a result of the impact of the Spirit of God in human life. This is totally in accord with New Testament teaching. One would also affirm the close relationship Tillich detects between morality and culture. Yet at the same time, however, one must question the assumption that it is morality alone that gives seriousness to culture, for religion as interpreted in its wider sense of pointing man beyond himself to the God who gives to life its ultimate significance, is surely that which makes us view every cultural activity with the utmost seriousness. Both morality and religion have a part to play here, and this underlines the interdependence of the various functions of life, and the realisation of their unity in the power of the Spirit.

A further comment concerns the use of the word 'grace'. Like other theological expressions in Tillich's system, this word is interpreted along specific ontological lines, so that it now becomes above all the gift of transcendent ontological union with the divine Life, in the context of which man becomes both one with himself and one with his fellows, thus establishing a genuine moral 'integration'. Now we can affirm with Tillich that grace is a gift, we can also affirm that the life of grace is a life free from law, created by the Spirit, but we cannot affirm that the biblical concept of grace is best understood as the gift of the transcendent unity of unambiguous life. The biblical emphasis is rather on the free and forgiving mercy of God which seeks man in his need, reconciling him with himself, a reconciliation which is something rather different from the ontological union which Tillich has in mind. Here we have a further example of how Tillich takes important biblical words and gives them a subtle yet significant twist to
make them fit in with his scheme of ontological participation.

Despite these various criticisms, it is important to emphasise Tillich's positive contribution towards an understanding of the unity of human life and experience. The unity of its various functions — morality, culture, and religion — which is characteristic of Spiritual Community, is something towards which man should constantly be working, for it is when life becomes divided into isolated departments that disintegration and loss of community occur. Here Tillich's discussion is valuable in that it points beyond things as they are to things as they should be, and which through God's grace they can become. Finally, one must underline his concluding comment that only the Spirit discerns Spirit as neatly summarising the New Testament attitude. His doctrine of the Spiritual Presence has emphasised that everywhere God is at work within the life of man, but it is also true that such a work is not always recognised, 'hidden' save to the man whose eyes have been opened through faith, who himself has been grasped by the Spirit in the depths of his being. As Paul puts it, 'No one comprehends the thoughts of God except the Spirit of God. Now we have received not the spirit of the world, but the Spirit which is from God, that we might understand the gifts bestowed on us by God. And we impart this in words not taught by human wisdom but taught by the Spirit, interpreting spiritual truths to those who possess the Spirit'. Like Paul, Tillich recognises that apart from the Spirit's impact on man, there can be no discernment of God's presence in the midst of life, and no true anticipation of the life that is to come. Though we may not agree with the ontological presuppositions behind much of what he has to say, his analysis of the Spiritual Presence so far has underlined this truth at every point.
Notes to Chapter Three

1. ST, III, p. 118. See above, pp. 75ff.

2. Ibid., p. 114.


4. ST, III, p. 120.


6. ST, III, p. 119.

7. The Shaking of the Foundations, p. 43.

8. ST, III, p. 119.


10. See above, p. 11f.

11. ST, I, p. 124.


13. ST, III, p. 120.

14. Perspectives, p. 29.


17. Ibid.

18. Ibid., p. 123.

19. Ibid., p. 124.

20. Perspectives, pp. 20f. Tillich goes on to say that though he would not classify himself as a mystical theologian, he also is more on the side of inwardness and experience, and therefore sees himself in the Pauline tradition.


22. Romans 8:1 et al.

23. ST, III, p. 124.

25. ST, III, p. 125.

26. Ibid. Tillich makes a similar point in Love, Power and Justice, where he speaks of the way in which love, as the 'creative element' in justice, fulfils justice without denying its ontological structure. 'Love,' he says, 'has the same relation to justice which revelation has to reason. And this is not an accidental analogy. It is rooted in the nature of both revelation and love. Both of them transcend the rational norm without destroying it. Both of them have an "ecstatic element". Love in some of its expressions, e.g. in those which Paul gives in I Cor. XIII can be called justice in ecstasy, as revelation can be called reason in ecstasy'. So Paul derives both revelatory experiences and the dynamics of love from the divine Spirit. 'And [just] as revelation does not give additional information in the realm where cognitive reason decides, so love does not drive to additional acts in the realm where practical reason decides. Both give another dimension to reason, revelation to cognitive reason, love to practical reason' (p. 83). There is no contradiction of the structures of either. Rather does it point to the fact that the whole realm of moral action and knowledge is dependent on Spiritual power.

27. ST, III, p. 126.

28. Ibid.


30. ST, III, p. 126.

31. Ibid., p. 127.

32. Ibid.

33. I Corinthians 2:10.

34. See particularly vv. 13-20.

35. See below, p. 435f.


37. ST, III, p. 128.

38. Ibid., p. 129.


40. ST, III, p. 131.
41. ibid., p. 131, see also The Shaking of the Foundations, p. 86.

42. The Protestant Era, p. 110. The whole essay 'Nature and Sacrament', is relevant to this theme.

43. Ibid., p. 111.

44. See below, p. 194ff.

45. ST, III, p. 131.

46. Ibid., p. 132.

47. The Protestant Era, pp. 94ff.

48. Luther says in his sermon on John 3:1-4, 'Of course, we are well aware that Baptism is natural water. But after the Holy Spirit is added to it, we have more than mere water. It becomes a veritable bath of rejuvenation, a living bath which washes and purges man of sin and death, which cleanses him of all sin' (Luther's Works, Vol. 22, ed. by J. Pelikan, St. Louis, Concordia, 1957, p. 283).

49. The Protestant Era, p. 95.

50. In this context the term 'realistic' is meant to convey the ideas encompassed in Tillich's doctrine of symbolism, i.e. that the symbol or sacramental element is adequate within itself to point to the reality in which it participates.

51. The Protestant Era, p. 96.

52. Ibid., p. 97.

53. Ibid., p. 98.

54. ST, III, p. 132.

55. ST, I, p. 138.

56. See below, p. 170, n. 67 (p. 236).

57. ST, III, p. 133.

58. The Protestant Era, p. 81.

59. Ibid.

60. There is a detailed analysis of the expression 'the Word of God', but not in the context of the divine Spirit, in ST, I, pp. 174-177.

61. ST, III, p. 134.

62. Ibid., p. 135.
63. Ibid., p. 136.
64. Calvin says, 'That Christ is the bread of life by which believers are nourished unto eternal life, no man is so utterly devoid of religion as not to acknowledge. But all are not agreed as to the mode of partaking of him. For there are some who define the eating of the flesh of Christ, and the drinking of his blood, to be, in one word, nothing more than believing in Christ himself. But Christ seems to me to have intended to teach something more express and more sublime in that noble discourse, in which he recommends the eating of his flesh — viz, that we are quickened by our true partaking of him, which he designated by the terms eating and drinking, lest anyone should suppose that the life which we obtain from him is obtained from simple knowledge' (Institutes, Book IV, Ch. XVII, para. 5). See also ibid., para. 10.
65. One would not wish to pretend, however, that Luther's concept of the ubiquity of the risen body of Christ in relation to the sacrament is easy to understand. See the discussion on this in James Atkinson, Martin Luther and the Birth of Protestantism, London, Penguin Books, 1968, pp. 269ff.
67. Certainly Calvin emphasised the importance of the actual words and oracles as the vehicle of revelation ('God revealed himself to the fathers by oracles and visions', Institutes, Bk. I, Ch. VI, para. 2; and, 'Every word which may have issued from God is to be received with implicit authority', Commen. on Psalm 62:11) though whether this amounts to a strict fundamentalism is open to question. But there are other passages which suggest that the biblical word can only become effectively so when the Spirit is at work within the heart of the one to whom it is spoken. 'For as God alone can properly bear witness to his own words, so these words will not obtain full credit in the hearts of men, until they are sealed by the inward testimony of the Spirit. The same Spirit, therefore, who spoke by the mouth of the prophets, must penetrate our hearts, in order to convince us that they faithfully delivered the message with which they are divinely instructed', Insta., Bk. I, Ch. VII, para. 4. And again, 'We have no great certainty of the Word itself, until it is confirmed by the testimony of the Spirit. For the Lord has so knit together the certainty of his Word and his Spirit, that our minds are duly imbued with reverence for his Word when the Spirit shining upon it enables us to behold there the face of God; and, on the other hand, we embrace the Spirit with no danger of delusion when we recognise him in his image, that is, in his Word', Insta., Bk. I, Ch. IX, para. 3. For Calvin, then, the work of the Spirit is not only to administer the Word, but also to confirm it in the heart of the believer.
68. ST, III, p. 137.
69. Ibid., p. 138.
70. Dynamics of Faith, p. 1.
80. e.g. Aquinas writes: "... it is determined through the agency of the will, which chooses to assent ..., definitely and positively, through some influence which is sufficient to move the will but not the intellect, namely the fact that it seems good or fitting to assent ...; this is the state of belief, as when a man believes in the words of someone because to believe seems becoming or advantageous; and thus we are moved to believe in certain sayings inasmuch as eternal life is promised to us as a reward for belief, and by this reward our will is moved to assent to what is said, although our understanding is not so moved by any evidence presented to it' (De veritate, Q. xiv. art. 1.).

81. Dynamics of Faith, p. 37.
82. ST, III, p. 140.
83. Dynamics of Faith, p. 38.
84. Ibid., p. 39.
85. See below, p. 447.
86. Dynamics of Faith, p. 39.
87. Ibid., p. 40.
88. ST, III, p. 141.
89. Ibid., p. 142.
90. Ibid., p. 143.
91. Love, Power and Justice, p. 25.
92. Ultimate Concern, p. 47. See also Love, Power and Justice, p. 25; 'It is impossible to unite that which is essentially separated. Without an ultimate belongingness no union of one thing with another can be conceived.'
93. ST, III, p. 143.

94. Ibid., p. 144.

95. Tillich discerns this present in the Greek tradition, particularly in Plato, where part of the function of love is to make the knower aware of his own emptiness over against the fulness of the known, and in Aristotle, where a slightly different emphasis is made in the assertion that the function of eros is to move the universe towards pure form.

96. ST, III, p. 145.


98. Morality and Beyond, p. 35.


100. Ibid., p. 5.

101. Even such a notable scholar as William Barclay is of the opinion that eros is always connected with sex. Eros, he says, 'is characteristically the word for love between the sexes, for the love of a man for a maid; it always has a predominantly physical side, and it always involves sexual love' (Flesh and Spirit, London, SCM Press, 1962, p. 63.)

102. In Love, Power and Justice, Tillich considers how the ambiguities of love in its various qualities are resolved by agape in the Spiritual (holy) community as it unites them to itself. The quality of libido is transformed because it no longer seeks to bypass the centre of the other person in the fulfilment of its own desires, for agape 'seeks the other one in his centre' and 'sees him as God sees him'. Eros, the driving force in all cultural creativity and in all mysticism, is liberated from its detachment and irresponsibility by agape, which, whilst not denying its longing towards the good and true and its divine source, 'prevents it from becoming a (mere) aesthetic enjoyment without ultimate seriousness', making the cultural eros responsible and the mystical eros personal. The ambiguities of philia, which lead to preferential love and the exclusion of others, are conquered by the Spiritual love which purifies it from a subpersonal bondage and elevates its preferential characteristic into universal love, so that although 'not everybody is a friend, ... everybody is a person'. It 'cuts through separation of equals and unequals, of sympathy and antipathy, of friendship and indifference, of desire and disgust.' It loves 'in everybody and through everybody love itself'. In agape love is brought to its transcendent unity and every quality reaches its unambiguous fulfilment. (pp. 117ff).

103. ST, III, p. 146.

104. Ibid.
105. See below, p.


107. A similar point is made by Alan Richardson: "Christian faith is not formally different from the faith principles which operate in other systems of thought and philosophies of life". (*Christian Apologetics*, London SCM Press 1947, p. 236). And again, "Every philosopher who attempts to build a metaphysic is ultimately dependent on some "faith-principle", whether he is a Christian or non-Christian, religious or anti-religious. No metaphysic or world-view can be constructed without a "faith-principle" in this sense ... Even those philosophies which claim to be based on reason alone without any admixture of faith, always turn out upon examination to be elaborate rationalisations which conceal the initial act of faith upon which they are based" (*ibid., pp. 230f.*).

108. John Macquarrie has some words that are relevant here. "Love," he says, "usually gets defined in terms of union, or the drive towards union, but such a definition is too egocentric. Love does indeed lead to community, but to aim primarily at uniting the other person to oneself, or oneself to him, is not the secret of love and may even be destructive of genuine community" (*Principles of Christian Theology*, London, SCM Press, 1966, p. 310). We may also compare Tillich's definition of love here with his understanding of morality in terms of self-integration - again basically egocentric (see above, p. 83ff.).


111. Nygren refuses to see any ground of meeting between *eros* and *agape* at all. He states the problem of their relationship thus: "Here we have a pair of ideas which in their origins and early development had nothing at all to do with one another, and by nature are completely antithetical, and yet in the course of subsequent history have become so thoroughly interwoven that it is now difficult for us to think of the one without thinking of the other" (*op. cit.*, p. 23).

112. SP, III, p. 148.


118. Ibid., p. 153.
119. Ibid., p. 154.
120. ST, II, p. 136.
121. ST, III, p. 148.
122. Ibid., p. 154.
123. Ultimate Concern, pp. 137ff.
125. Ibid., p. 155.
126. Ibid.
127. Ibid., p. 156.
128. II Corinthians 3:17.
129. See II Corinthians 5:16.
130. II Corinthians 3:17.
131. ST, III, p. 156.
132. Ibid.
133. e.g. Hebrews 1:1ff.
135. Ibid., p. 158.
136. Tillich cites as examples the Montanists, radical Franciscans and the Anabaptists, claiming that the same trend is also to be found in certain contemporary theologies of experience, including the syncretistic notion of progressive spiritual experience.

136a. It is interesting to see how a contemporary Roman Catholic theologian himself takes issue with this tendency. In his book Infallible? (Rome, Queriniana Publishing House, 1970), Hans Künig has this to say: "No one has the right to believe himself to be the unique and original possessor of the Holy Spirit. No one has the right to attenuate the possession of the Holy Spirit which others hold. It is a fact, rather, that the New Testament does not acknowledge systems based on a single man. The Church can not be identified at all with those who govern it. The truths of Christian faith are not 'deposited' in Roman offices or in bishops' chancellories! Unfortunately, owing to ecclesiastical pressure, the book was withdrawn from circulation soon after publication (Report in The Guardian, 12th December 1970).
137. II Corinthians 5:5 (Moffatt).


139. See above, pp. 9f.

140. See above, p. 18.


142. Ultimate Concern, p. 140. Although Tillich is using Bernard of Clairvaux's words here to support his contention that there can be no difference between Eastern mysticism and a 'higher Christian mysticism', in that both use the language of dissolution, he is really misinterpreting what Bernard says. In fact, the correct quotation should read, 'As a drop of water poured into wine loses itself, and takes the colour and savour of wine ... so in the saints all human affectations melt away by some un­ speakable transmutation into the will of God' (On Loving God, London, SCM Press, 1959, p. 58). Two comments follow from this. Firstly, the water is not to be identified with the wine. So man is not to be considered as the same genus as God, as Tillich may seem to imply. It is therefore not possible for man to be completely dissolved into God. Secondly, Bernard is speaking here not of a union of being, but rather a union of will, whereby the surrendered will is somehow transmuted into the will of God. Whatever this means, a unity of will does not imply a merging of being.


149. Ibid., p. 45.

151. See above, p. 12.
152. *ST*, III, p. 159.
153. Ibid.
155. Ibid., p. 173.
156. Ibid., p. 175.
157. Ibid., p. 176.
161. Ibid., p. 161.
162. Ibid., p. 161.
163. Ibid., p. 165.
164. Ibid., p. 167.
165. Ibid., p. 162.
166. Ibid., p. 163.
167. Ibid., p. 164.
168. Ibid., p. 165.
169. Ibid., p. 167.
172. For an analysis of 'theonomy', see below pp. 370ff., 401f.
176. Ibid.
177. *Morality and Beyond*, p. 38.
178. Ibid., p. 37.
179. Kierkegaard (Stages on the Road of Life, 1845) said that man lived on three levels, the aesthetic, the ethical and the religious. Tillich points out that 'the characteristic of the aesthetic stage is the lack of involvement, detachment from existence'. As long as one remains in this stage, he says, it is impossible to understand reality (Perspectives, p. 169).

180. ST, III, p. 171.

181. Ibid., p. 172.


183. See above, p. 173.

184. Dorothee Sölle, 'The Church is also outside the Church', Mimeographed manuscript of an address delivered at the German Kirchentag in Cologne 1965, tr. H.C. West, p. 3. Dr. Sölle goes on to describe the marks of the latent church in detail, giving examples of its presence in the world and appealing to the manifest church to recognise its presence and work along with it.


186. See below, pp. 294ff.

I. THE MARKS OF THE SPIRITUAL COMMUNITY IN THE LIFE OF THE CHURCH

There is no real division in Tillich's thought between pneumatology and ecclesiology. Because the church is the manifest expression of the Spiritual Community in the life of man, the doctrine of the church follows on quite naturally from the doctrine of the Spirit, and therefore comes within the same area of theological concern. Built on the experience of the New Being as it has appeared in Jesus as the Christ, and created by the Spiritual Presence through an existential encounter with the Christ, at its heart it shows the marks of genuine Spiritual Community. Essentially, therefore, the church is the community of the Spirit. But it is only the man of faith who has been grasped by the Spirit who recognises this. To the man who has not been grasped by the Spirit the church will appear as just another organisation. These two points of view underline the paradox which lies at the centre of the church's life in the world. For while the church inwardly participates in the unambiguous life of the Spiritual Community, which is fragmentarily realised in its midst, outwardly it shares in the ambiguities of all life because of the inevitability of having an external form. Tillich has already underlined this paradox by referring to the 'invisible' and 'visible' aspects of the church's nature, and by differentiating between the essential Spiritual Community and the ambiguous life of the churches. Another way of approaching the paradox is to look at the church from theological and sociological standpoints, the latter emphasising the church as a visible, sociological phenomenon, the former its inner significance as the fragmentary actualisation of the Spiritual Community.¹
The value of a sociological study of the church is that it points out and analyses the ambiguities that appear in the church's life. But Tillich points out that it is not easy for such a study to be undertaken with complete objectivity. Not infrequently those who look at the church in this way are motivated by subjective attitudes. For example, there are those who in their analysis will draw particular attention to the discrepancy between what the churches are and what they claim to be. They will compare the 'miserable reality of the concrete churches' with 'their claim to embody the Spiritual Community'.

Perhaps this attitude arises because the enquirer expects far too much of the church in the first place and becomes cynical because of his disappointment at the church's so-called failure. But whatever the explanation, for such a person 'the church at the streetcorner hides the church Spiritual from view', and becomes an obstacle rather than a means of revelation.

On the other hand, there are those who value the churches for their social significance, their usefulness as an agency for good, or the way in which they provide psychological security for those who need it, affirming that in this way the church is playing an important role in the life of society. Neither of these judgments is truly objective, for in the former case the enquirer is in danger of engaging in mere polemic, and in the latter the attempt to provide an apologetic for the church along the lines of its social value fails to reckon with the fact that the church's raison d'être claims to lie in other directions. Because of this element of subjectivity, there are few sociological conclusions regarding the nature of the church which would pass unchallenged.

This means that one must recognise the inevitable limitations of a sociological approach to an understanding of the nature of the church. But this does not mean that such an approach is invalid, nor does it follow
that the social characteristics of the church have no significance. The church is not 'a sacred reality above the sociological ambiguities of past and present', as Rome has frequently implied, neither does it have a 'sacred, unambiguous history' of its own, separate from the ordinary vicissitudes which affect all other historical groups. Because Rome has believed this it has not been able to tolerate any criticism of its essential doctrines, ethics or hierarchical structure, for such an attack in this case would be tantamount to an attack on the Spiritual Community itself, and Tillich feels that this is one of the sources of the hierarchical arrogance which has so often characterised the Roman Catholic church. For by absorbing the sociological character of the church into its theological nature the Roman church has sought to turn a blind eye on the ambiguities of its life. To do this is to ignore that the relation between the two aspects is paradoxical, a fact which cannot be overcome either by the elimination of one or by the subjection of one to the other. Both aspects must be held together.

The sociological-theological paradox at the heart of the church's life comes out clearly when one examines it in the light of the various marks of the Spiritual Community. The first mark is that of holiness. 'The churches', says Tillich, 'are holy because of the holiness of their foundation, the New Being, which is present in them'. Their holiness is derived from no other source, neither institutions, doctrines, rites and ceremonies, nor moral codes. One could say, of course, that the church is holy because it is made up of individuals who have been justified through faith by grace and who are therefore accepted by God as 'holy in spite of their actual unholiness', but this is just as true of the church as a whole as it is of its individual members. For despite the ambiguities of religion which are part of its life, and for which reason it stands under the judgement of the
cross, the church is holy, accepted by God, precisely because the New Being, created by the Spirit, is at work within it. It is at this point, says Tillich, that the gap between the Protestant and Roman Catholic doctrines of the church seems impossible to bridge. The Roman church will accept critical judgment of its members, even of the Pope himself, but it refuses to accept judgment of itself as an ecclesiastical institution, and claims to be institutionally perfect, a claim which cannot be questioned, despite the present movements towards reform within it. The Protestant churches, on the other hand, cannot accept this understanding of holiness in terms of institutional perfection. It recognises that the church in every time and place is both holy and distorted, and in this way affirms the paradox at the heart of the church's life. But what Roman Catholic and Protestant alike affirm, despite their difference in interpretation, is that the mark of holiness which points to the presence of the New Being, means that the church has within itself the very power to fight against all attempts to betray its essential nature.

The second mark of the churches which underlines their paradoxical character is that of unity, which is again derived not from any organisational form, but from the unity of their foundation, the New Being, present within their life. Tillich maintains that for this reason the denominational structure of the churches is no denial of their essential unity, which is 'independent of these empirical realities and possibilities'. All local churches, despite their existential separation, participate in this essential unity created by the Spirit, and in this way are united with each other. But here again we are faced with a division of opinion between Roman Catholics and Protestants. The Roman claim to be the only true church virtually means that unity is fully actualised within its own structures. There is no problem of disunity if other Christian bodies are
outside the pale! This is why Rome has in the past refused to cooperate on religious matters with any other church, and Tillich feels that if any real progress is to be made towards reunion, despite the present thaw in ecumenical relations, Rome must give up this claim to be the one true church. Protestantism, on the other hand, has never made such a claim; it has always realised that because of the ambiguities of the religious situation, the rise of different denominations is inevitable. At the same time it has insisted that the apparent division between the churches does not contradict their essential unity, recognising that such a unity is something far deeper than external form. Yet despite the inevitability of visible division, Tillich maintains that the church must always fight against it 'in the power of the Spiritual Community', for the Spirit's impact on the life of the churches will always press towards that unambiguous unity to which the Spiritual Community belongs.

This is the important truth within the ecumenical movement, and this is why such a movement can be legitimately described as a work of the Spirit. On the other hand, there will be times when prophetic criticism will be necessary in the life of the church, especially when the church stagnates in an effort to preserve its own holiness, and this in itself may cause further division, as history so clearly shows. Yet whenever this happens, such a division is itself the result of the Spirit's work, made necessary because of the ambiguities of life. The move towards unity and the prophetic protest which may occasion further disunity must be held in tension, and this underlines the paradoxical nature of the church's unity, so that it can significantly be said that 'it is the divided church which is the united church'.

The third mark of the churches, universality, also stems from their foundation, for the New Being is universal in its concern. The universal
nature of the church appears in two ways. Firstly, it appears in an intensive, or qualitative, way; in the power and desire of the church to share in life as a whole. This inevitably creates a conflict between the Spiritual Community and the ambiguities of life which are encountered in that participation, yet despite this danger the church must remain open to every part of life. The Roman church has always sought to do this, even though this has resulted in ambiguous elements being incorporated into its life, and the danger of demonic features developing. Because of this Protestantism has at times swung to the opposite extreme, not denying the principle of universality as such, but developing a 'poverty of sacred emptiness' in which participation in the life of the world is resisted at every point. There can be, says Tillich, a 'universality of emptiness' just as much as a 'universality of abundance'. The principle of universality is only really denied when the church emphasises particular elements of life at the expense of others, an attitude which encourages the growth of secularism and the inevitable emergence of a secular catholicity, the church remaining a mere segment of life rather than participating in life as a whole. Nevertheless, such a situation is quite unacceptable theologically, and despite the existential impossibility of the church participating in all segments of life simultaneously, it must be affirmed that because life is one then by sharing in certain parts of life the church is expressing its desire to participate in life as a whole. In this way it is affirming that 'the universality of the churches is paradoxically present in their particularity'.

The other facet of the universality of the church is quantitative, or 'intensive'; it is concerned with 'the validity of the church's foundation for all nations, social groups, races, tribes, and cultures'. Today, this aspect so forcefully emphasised in the New Testament, needs parti-
cular emphasis, in view of the many divisions which separate man. But because of the inevitable particularity of time and space in which the churches live, this universality must again be paradoxical, in so far as the churches become tied to specific nations and cultures. So historical particularity tends to prevent the full actualisation of true catholicity, and this can be seen in every branch of Christendom. This tendency to identify the church with a particular cultural or racial expression must be resisted at all costs. As in the case of qualitative universality, the church must show that its concern is for every man and every expression of his life, despite the fact of its own existential limitations, and the way in which it shows this concern, or fails to show it, will be the measure of its own universality. In this way, Tillich points out, "the concept of universality becomes paradoxically present in the life of the particular." 10

Holiness, unity, universality; or, as the Apostles' Creed puts it, 'one, holy Catholic church': these, as marks of the Spiritual Community, are also marks of the churches, even though ambiguously so. The individual Christian who confesses this creed is often much more aware of this ambiguity than the theologian may care to think. Even though he may have no real understanding of what the Spiritual Community is, he is at least aware that the life of the church is one of paradox, for the paradox is part of his own experience. The layman is not deceived into thinking that in this present world the church will become perfected. Even so, says Tillich, he who expresses his belief in the one, holy and catholic church can only do so because he is grasped by the power of the Spiritual Community, the unambiguous heart of the church's life.

The fact that there is paradox in the life of the church means
that the ambiguities of religion are conquered by the Spirit 'in principle' rather than entirely eliminated. Tillich defines 'in principle' as 'the power of beginning, which remains the controlling power in a whole process', and the principles which conquer the ambiguities of religion, he says, are the Spiritual Presence, the New Being and the Spiritual Community – they are the beginning and the continuation of any conquest of life's ambiguities that takes place in the life of the churches. And although it is true that these ambiguities will never be completely removed in the framework of our present existence, yet they are recognised for what they are and explicitly rejected. In this way their 'self-destructive force is broken', and the ultimate power of their ability to subvert is overcome. All this, says Tillich, can be clearly seen in the act of faith, for nowhere in the life of the church can the ambiguities of religion be observed more clearly than in this sphere, for when faith becomes distorted it opens up the way for destructive and demonic forces to get to work within the life of the church. Yet at the same time there is in the life of every church a power of resistance at work against the distortion of faith, a power which is in fact no less than the divine Spirit embodied within the Spiritual Community. So we come to consider the mark of faith in the life of the churches.

The thing that one immediately notices in the faith of the church is the tension, even sometimes a cleavage, between the faith of the individual and the faith of the community as a whole. This leads Tillich to ask the question, 'What do we mean when we speak of the faith of the churches?'. He points out that in the days of the early church it was far easier to answer this question than it is today. For the early Christians faith was a living response to Christ, an 'existential
decision', and those who joined the church frequently did so at their own risk. So the church was, in a very real sense, the community of faith. But later on, people entered the church for other reasons: perhaps to obtain some form of security, or because the whole community to which they belonged had become Christian in a wider sense. What did faith mean to these people? It is obvious that an active faith, 'fides qua creditur', could not be taken for granted. What in fact did remain was the credal foundation of the church, 'fides quae creditur', and the problem arose as to how to determine the relation between these two interpretations of faith. Here the tension between the faith of the individual and the faith of the church became most pronounced, as ambiguities arose regarding its meaning. In fact, says Tillich, these ambiguities became and remain so pointed that one may wonder whether the concept of faith is a good one to use at all any longer. In the second place, a further problem arose over the use of creeds. Many people felt that the creeds were a burden which they could not honestly accept, and this meant that when the church subordinated faith to these doctrinal formularies, it let loose within the life of the church a potentially destructive force, which threatened to tear the church apart. A further difficulty stems from the presence of the church in the secular world, and the way in which its members imbibe the critical attitude of secular society to the concept of faith. All these considerations, says Tillich, mean that we must ask ourselves again, 'What does "community of faith" mean, if the community, as well as the personalities of the individual members, is disrupted by criticism and doubt?' The very fact that such a question has to be posed, he suggests, shows the power that the ambiguities of religion have in the life of the churches, and how difficult it is for faith to resist them.
Tillich begins his answer to the question 'What does faith mean in the life of the churches?' by saying that whatever else it may mean it means first and foremost the acceptance by the church that Jesus is the Christ, the Bearer of the New Being. The church cannot avoid this confession, for it is based upon it, and if it rejects it, it ceases to be the church. So one can define the church as 'a community of those who affirm that Jesus is the Christ'. In Tillich's understanding this means for the individual a decision 'not as to whether he, personally, can accept that Jesus is the Christ, but ... as to whether he wishes to belong or not to belong to a community which asserts that Jesus is the Christ'. In fact, there are many who opt out of the life of the church on these grounds alone. But there are also those in the church who have personal doubts about Jesus as the Christ, yet who at the same time would not wish to break away from it, people who 'belong to the church, but doubt whether they belong'. Tillich maintains that such people do in fact belong to the church because of their desire to participate in the life of a community which accepts Jesus as the Christ. This means that there are many who though they are unhappy with the external forms and expressions of the church can still legitimately and unhesitatingly belong to it. Such people need to 'be assured that they fully belong to the church, and through it to the Spiritual Community, and confidently live in it and work for it'. The only reservation Tillich has about this conclusion is with regard to the church's ministers and leaders, for no one who leads the church can honestly do so if he denies the basis and aim of its particular function, namely to confess that Jesus is the Christ.

Another question that arises is more complex. How is the community of faith to be related to its expressions of belief? The answer to this,
Tillich insists, must be given 'in concrete decisions of the concrete church — ideally by the church universal, actually by the manifold centres between it and the local church'. It is these decisions, he points out, that have resulted in the creeds. But creeds should never be regarded as they are in the Roman church, as unconditionally valid statements of belief, for if they are, every deviation from them, no matter how small, will be regarded as heretical and schismatic. If it is realised that all religion is ambiguous, and that no religious group can possibly be identified with the Spiritual Community, such a mistake would be avoided. Here, says Tillich, the Protestant churches are on firmer ground. Yet it is still necessary for them to formulate and defend their own credal basis, even though in doing so they run the inevitable risk of encouraging potentially destructive elements to arise: 'the church cannot avoid fighting for the community of faith, ... but in doing so [it] may fall into disintegrating, destructive, or even demonic errors'.

But any church that wishes to remain true to its foundation in the Cross of Christ, or stand within the tradition of prophetic criticism, must be willing to accept this risk as part of its life.

All this raises the question of heresy, a term which originally stood for any deviation from officially accepted doctrine, but which later on, as doctrinal or canon law of the church became part and parcel of state law, became a far more serious offence, often leading to the persecution and liquidation of heretics. It is because of these later associations that Tillich feels that the concept of heresy must be abandoned. He therefore prefers the more straightforward expression 'deviation'. However, it is important, he points out, to distinguish carefully between a total rejection of the foundation of the church, the
New Being in Jesus as the Christ, and deviations occurring within the church's life which arise from the attempt to formulate this basic assertion in conceptual terms. The former is nothing less than a total separation from the church; it is the latter which constitutes the problem of so-called 'heresy'. The Protestant, in the light of the Protestant principle of 'the infinite distance between the divine and the human', would answer the question of deviation by asserting that no doctrinal expression can ever be absolute. In fact, 'it belongs to the essence of the community of faith in Protestantism that a Protestant church can receive into its thinking and acting every expression of thought and life created by the Spiritual Presence anywhere in the history of mankind'.

Unfortunately this has not been the case with the Roman church, and this is one reason why it has lost the prophetic freedom for essential self-criticism. But if the true spirit of Protestantism is to remain at the heart of the church's life, it must continue to allow that the capacity for deviation is both inevitable and permissible. And in this way it will testify to the two realities in which it participates - 'the Spiritual Community, which is its dynamic essence, and its existence within the ambiguities of religion'.

The remaining mark of the Spiritual Community in the life of the churches is that of love. 'As the community of love', Tillich points out, 'the church actualises the Spiritual Community, which is its dynamic essence'. In this operation Tillich observes three principles at work. Firstly, there is the principle of acceptance, in which people are united in their affirmation of each other in the deepest levels of their being. There is an acceptance in the church which transcends all arbitrary divisions of race, class or temperament, though this does not mean that such distinctions can be ignored as if they did not
exist, in favour of some communistic ideal, which the early church tried
unsuccesfully to put into effect. It is true that these sociological
ambiguities hide the church's theological significance as a community
of love, and this is why the churches cannot be put forward as communi-
ties where perfect equality and justice are to be found. Despite this,
the church will constantly be prepared to resist all forms of inequality
and injustice wherever they are to be found, and this means beginning
with its own life particularly. It will also continually seek to
minister to those who suffer because of social injustices, although
it must beware of substituting acts of charity for the deeper obligation
of genuine personal encounter with those who are in need. Neither will
it subscribe to the sort of thinking which perpetuates injustice so
that love may abound, for true agape will be more concerned with creating
those conditions where men may know the creative experience of loving
for themselves, and in working for these conditions the church will
be engaged in much more positive works of healing.

The second principle operative in the actualising of love in the
church's life is that of judgment. The church must consistently judge
those things which deny love, whether in itself or in the world, even
though this means that it becomes involved in the ambiguities of judging.
Sometimes its judgment may become severe and harsh, precisely because
it seeks to judge in the name of the Spiritual Community, and in order
to prevent this the presence of the Spirit within the church will
constantly stand in judgment over the judgments of the church itself.
The tools of judgment that it will use as far as its own life is con-
cerned are chiefly the Word and the sacraments, together with other
functions which the church may care to use, such as particular means
of discipline. Protestantism, however, has never been really happy
with formal expressions of discipline, and this is especially true of excommunication, which is automatically ruled out by the Protestant principle that 'no religious group has the right to put itself between God and man, either to unite man with God or to cut him off from God'. In fact, Protestant discipline is in the main a much more informal business, much more concerned with seeking to restore the person concerned to the fellowship of the church through counselling, than effecting his separation from the life of the church. Here the principle of judgment becomes one with the principle of reunion, the third element in the actualisation of love, and Tillich insists that the two must always be held together in the Christian community. 'Even a temporary cutting off makes a wound which can probably never be healed'. Tillich points out that when this has occurred in Protestantism it has frequently led to the social ostracisation of the backslider by the church, particularly by its more influential groups, and it is often because of these groups that the real prophetic ministry of the church, which would condemn such action, is stifled. When the church becomes sociologically determined in this sort of way the real purpose of judgment is suppressed, the element of reunion is denied, and the consequent situation is far more damaging to the church than any so-called heresy in its ranks. So, while the principles of acceptance and judgment are both important for the pastoral life of the churches, the presence of the Spirit is perhaps nowhere more clearly observed than in the act of reunion which implies the message and act of forgiveness. And it is only when genuine forgiveness is present that reunion in love becomes possible.

Perhaps the ambiguities of religion in the sphere of love are most pronounced in the relations between particular churches on the one hand and between the church and non-ecclesiastical communities on the
other. It is here where the element of acceptance is put fully to the test. For example, it would be easy, says Tillich, for the individual who comes into the church from the outside to be met with an insistence on conversion. But such an insistence must be qualified. In the first place, one must ask precisely what it is the particular church desires the individual to be converted to; and in the second place, it is quite possible that the individual concerned is already a member of the 'latent Spiritual Community', and therefore in a sense a potential member of the church. Tillich suggests that bearing these things in mind, several answers should be acceptable to the church. Either the person concerned may become a full member of the church in question, by assenting to its specific beliefs and practices. Or if he is already a member of another church (by which Tillich presumably means a lapsed member) he may choose to retain that membership and yet become a 'fully accepted guest' in the other. Or else he may choose to stay first and foremost in his own particular secular group which shows signs of the latent Spiritual Community, and yet at the same time participate in the life of the church as a visitor or friend. But the decisive criterion in each case should be 'the desire to participate in a group whose foundation is the acceptance of Jesus as the Christ', rather than the acceptance of a particular creed, and this will open the door 'into the community of love without reservation on the side of the church'.

The relation between particular churches is one which is very much to the fore in the present ecumenical climate. There is unfortunately a traditional antagonism between the various churches, sometimes resulting from sociological causes, sometimes as a result of Spiritual resistance to the forces of profanisation and demonisation which one church fears may happen if it participates in the life of another. Fre-
quentiy this anxiety, bolstered up as it is by the need for security, can lead to fanaticism and suspicion, and in certain cases persecution and hate. It is pointless ignoring such a fear merely by minimising differences and preaching tolerance. It can only be conquered by the Spirit itself, which is at work in every church, even in those where profanising and demonising forces are at their most conspicuous. Only by realising that the particularities of each church are affirmed and judged by the Spiritual Community which is the 'dynamic essence' of every church, can 'one church . . . recognise the community of love with another'. 24 Such a conclusion reinforces the paradoxical nature of the unity of the church.

The Spiritual Community, therefore, as the dynamic essence of the church created by the Spirit, marks out the church in holiness, unity and universality, in faith and love, even though because of the ambiguities of religion each of these marks will only appear paradoxically. It is because these marks are present that the church is the bearer of the New Being. As Tillich sums it up:

The Church is the Community of the New Being. Again and again, people say, "I do not like organised religion". The Church is not organised religion. It is not hierarchical authority. It is not a social organisation. It is all this, of course, but it is primarily a group of people who express a new reality by which they have been grasped. Only this is what the Church really means. It is the place where the power of the New Reality which is Christ, and which was prepared in all history and especially Old Testament history, moves into us and is continued by us . . . The Church is the place where the New Being is real, and the place where we can go to introduce the New Being into reality. 25

Evaluation

A preliminary comment of a more general nature regarding Tillich's doctrine of the church in relation to the Spirit is that there is a certain tension between ontological and dynamic emphases which consider-
ably weakens what he has to say. Thus he speaks of the theological understanding of the church realising its inner significance as the fragmentary actualisation of the Spiritual Community, or the holiness of the church being derived from the holiness of its foundation, the New Being present within it, or the unity of the church stemming from the unambiguous unity to which the Spiritual Community belongs, and in using this sort of language immediately creates the impression of something rather lifeless and impersonal. Having opted, quite rightly, to set his doctrine of the church firmly within the context of the doctrine of the Spirit, Tillich should have demonstrated the vitality of this relationship in a much more dynamic way. The over-all impression one gets of the Spirit's work here is not of the God who is personally living and active in the life of the church, but of an essential, ontological reality - whatever one calls it, whether the New Being or the Spiritual Community - created by the Spirit 'behind the scenes', moving slowly towards its goal in the midst of a vast host of existential ambiguities. For this reason, the direct, personal, living relationship between the Spirit and the church, which is the foundation of the Spirit's activity, does not stand out clearly enough. Though we shall not reiterate this criticism, it is one that applies throughout Tillich's analysis of the church, and to his study of the work of the Spirit in the realms of culture and morality.

What Tillich says about the holiness of the church is rather inadequate. His statement that the church is holy because its foundation, the New Being, is holy, may be acceptable as far as it goes, but it hardly tells us what holiness means in the life of the churches. Here Tillich could have made more of his previous definition of holiness in terms of transparency towards the divine, and this could have profitably
been expanded in relation to the church and the implications for its life. There is another element, however, in the New Testament concept of holiness which Tillich does not mention. When Paul, for example, writes to the young church at Corinth, he refers to its members as κλεοτοι ήγίοις,26 those who are called to be consecrated, set apart. So the concept of holiness also involves separation from the world, and this raises important questions as to what it means for the church to be set apart from the world and for what purpose. Certainly the church is separated from the world so that it may become transparent to the divine nature, but it is also set apart that it may become the appointed agency through which the Spirit works within the world to fulfil the divine mission. Thus both its openness to God and its preparedness to proclaim the Gospel are marks of the church's holiness. Tillich's analysis would have been strengthened by pointing this out.

Many tomes have been written on the unity of the church, and in a sense one can hardly expect Tillich to do justice to such a complex theme in a few paragraphs. For Tillich, of course, the word 'unity' is a loaded term, as we have seen already, and this inevitably colours what he has to say about the unity of the church. Our problem is that it is difficult to conceive of the essential unity of the Spiritual Community as some sort of prior reality, which the church is to actualise fragmentarily in the life of the world. It would surely be more meaningful to say that the unity of the church is found in its common allegiance to and fellowship in Christ, made possible through the work of the Spirit. Such a statement bases the reality of the church's unity on its relationship with Christ through the Spirit who indwells the church rather than on any prior ontological state as Tillich suggests.

Never-
theless, despite this criticism, Tillich's comments on the implications of unity and the ambiguities which thwart it and create division provide a sound note of realism, particularly when seen against the glossy picture sometimes painted in ecumenical circles. His emphasis on the role of the Spirit in the movements of prophetic protest are especially relevant here, for there has sometimes been a tendency in the contemporary church to think that the work of the Spirit in relation to the unity of the church is in one direction only. The unity of the Spirit to which Paul refers, and which he encourages the church to preserve, must be set against John's statement that the Spirit is the Spirit of truth, and when truth is betrayed in the life of the church the Spirit's first task will be to recall it to the Christ who is the truth. There can be no real unity outside the Christ to whom the Spirit testifies and into fellowship with whom he purposes to bring all men.

Tillich's emphasis on the qualitative aspect of the church's universality is important, in so far as this particular understanding of catholicity has been frequently overlooked. The church's neglect of certain aspects of life is indeed one which has frequently led to its alienation from the world. The church, in the words of O.S. Tomkins, must indeed work towards that unity of all human living, a balanced wholeness of work, craftsmanship, family life and community life, scholarship, games, art, bound together in a living and joyful sacrifice before God in worship, by union with the Word made flesh and in the power of the Holy Spirit.

And as Robert Nelson comments, All this is encompassed by the saving work of Christ, and can become actualised in the common life of the church.

It is true that historically this sort of catholicity has been much more common within the Roman communion. On the other hand, it is questionable
whether certain Protestant churches have ever really achieved the 'universality of emptiness' to which Tillich refers. Admittedly, there have been certain types of Protestantism, notably the Puritans and Pietists, and more particularly the Quakers, where the desire to strip away the vestige of 'worldly things', particularly things of aesthetic beauty, has been prevalent. However, if one is to accept the more 'religious' aspects of the life of these communities, such as preaching and prayer, as a valid part of human experience, it is difficult to see how they can be said to have achieved a total universality of emptiness, despite their aspirations. To give but one example: if they had done so their attitude towards the world would presumably be devoid of any moral content, that is, it would be amoral, whereas in actual fact many extreme Protestants have sought a genuine expression of morality in their relationships in the world as well as within the church. Though Protestantism has certainly been guilty of neglecting certain aspects of the life of man, it has never achieved the universality of emptiness to which Tillich refers.

Tillich gives us a useful summary of the ambiguities of faith in the life of the churches. The fact that these ambiguities are said to be conquered 'in principle' rather than in fact should not, however, blind us to the truth that the more the churches realise the koinonia in their midst the more these ambiguities will be overcome in reality. It is surely this deepening of fellowship, with its greater measure of understanding, that provides the environment in which the tensions between the 'dogmatic' faith of the church and the personal faith of the individual Christian can be resolved, as the Spirit of love tempers the ruthlessness often associated with dogmatism. A more controversial topic is the relationship between faith and doubt in the life of the individual as a member of the church. That Christians do doubt, even while remaining
loyal members of a confessing church, is undeniable, and it is indeed important to affirm that this does not and should not exclude them from the church. Expulsion from the church, as Tillich points out, would only result in total loss of opportunity for the individual to share in a fellowship in which his doubts may be resolved. But it seems to me that there is a difference between unresolved doubt and outright rejection of the church's basic faith in Jesus as the Christ which Tillich does not bring out forcefully enough. This comes out particularly in his assertion that the decision for the individual is not whether he has a personal faith in Jesus Christ, but whether he wishes to belong to a community which confesses this faith. It is here where a distinction needs to be drawn between doubt and unbelief. The doubter is one who has not made up his mind about Jesus Christ, or maybe finds that he cannot express his personal faith in him in the precise way in which the church formulates it. At least he is concerned with the question regarding Christ and for him he means something, though he may not know what. His faith is incomplete, but the seeds of it are there. This person must and should have a place within the church, for it will normally be his desire to belong to that community where faith resides. And the church which recognises this can have no set requirement for church membership. But it is different with the unbeliever. In his case, his doubt has been confirmed in unbelief. He cannot accept that Jesus is the Christ not just because he has doubt about the credal expressions of the church, but because he explicitly rejects Jesus as the Christ in his own experience. For him, there can be no question of joining the church because he wishes to belong to a community of faith, for to belong to such a community would be to contradict his own lack of faith confirmed in unbelief. It is also difficult to see how the church could accept him into
membership on these terms. This is not to say that it would alienate itself from him, and it would certainly seek to enter into dialogue with him. But the distinction does need to be made between him who doubts and him who disbelieves entirely. There is place for the one in the membership of the church: there seems to be little point in making out any case for the other. In view of this, it is interesting that in his ensuing discussion on heresy, Tillich places much more emphasis on the difference between him who totally rejects the foundation of the church's faith and him who deviates from its traditional formulations in his understanding of that foundation, pointing out that whilst there is place for the latter in the church (sometimes with an important role to fulfil), the former has separated himself entirely.

In the discussion on love in the life of the church, Tillich raises many points of vital pastoral concern, and in this context his comments are remarkably free from the more abstract definitions he has used so often. One values particularly his analysis of the meaning of judgment and discipline in the fellowship of the church. There are just two points that need comment. Firstly, one feels that Tillich has not taken the implications of the element of acceptance in love seriously enough, and is perhaps too prone to accept uncritically the social barriers that exist within the church. Although the communistic ideal is something which may be both impractical and undesirable, there is a sense in which love must work towards a greater actualisation of mutual acceptance in the lives of the members of the church in the removal of these barriers. It is easy to talk about the transcending power of love, and still maintain segregation, whether social or racial, within the church, and when this happens the implications of the impact of the Spirit are considerably weakened by surrender to the ambiguities of life.
It is interesting that Tillich's interest in this sort of problem seems to have abated since his earlier days and his activity in the field of religious socialism.\textsuperscript{31}

Secondly, the question raised by Tillich regarding the grounds on which members of other groups are accepted as members of the local church raises a similar point to that which we have already discussed under the heading of faith, and in this context we must ask whether the desire to become part of the community of love is a sufficient criterion. There is every case for the church encouraging others to share with it in its redemptive work of love, but for full participation in the membership of the church faith and love must go together. If the tendency of the church in the past has been to over-emphasise the credal aspect of membership at the expense of love, it must not now swing to the other extreme of accepting as the criterion for church membership a humanitarian concern or the desire for friendship at the expense of leading others to share in the faith of Christ in the power of the Spirit.

Finally, there are two minor points which may be made. In the first place, since Tillich wrote his \textit{Systematic Theology} there have been significant changes in the Roman church which have led to a reappraisal of the nature of the church and the meaning of its unity. There is far less readiness to accept either an interpretation of its holiness in terms of institutional perfection or the assertion that the Roman church is the only true church to the exclusion of all others.\textsuperscript{32} Here the thaw which Tillich feels is so important for ecumenical relations has already set in, though it remains to be seen how far it will go. Secondly, though one appreciates the valuable distinction Tillich has made between the theological and sociological understanding of the church, one wonders whether he is entirely fair to sociological enquiry.
Admittedly there may be sociologists who approach the study of the church with some inbuilt bias, possibly polemic, possibly apologetic. But when sociological analysis becomes influenced in this sort of way it is in danger of becoming unscientific, and for this reason the majority of sociologists would take great care to be strictly impartial in their enquiry. Significantly, it is this sort of enquiry that is ultimately the most helpful to the church in its reappraisal of its life and its relation to society, and which will therefore assist it in becoming a more effective agency of the divine Spirit in the sphere of human life.

II. THE SPIRITUAL COMMUNITY AND THE FUNCTIONS OF THE CHURCH

We turn now to the various functions of the church, functions which must be present wherever the church appears, even though the forms they take may vary. Tillich distinguishes three such functions: (i) the functions of constitution, which are related to the grounding of the churches in the Spiritual Community; (ii) the functions of expansion, which stem from the claim of the Spiritual Community to universality; and, (iii) the functions of construction, which arise from the actualising of the Spiritual potentialities of the churches. The principles which govern these various functions in the life of the church, he says, all share in the paradox of religion, and this means that they are performed not only 'in the name of the Spiritual Community', but also by the churches as 'sociological groups' and their members as 'their representatives'. So they share in the ambiguities of life even though they seek to overcome them in the power of the Spirit. Furthermore, because the functions of the church are part of its very nature, they will always be present wherever the church is found, even though it may not be in an organisational form. A particular function of the church does not necessarily need an institution through which to express itself.
The institutional form arises, claims Tillich, when 'the nature of the church requires that a particular function make itself felt in Spiritual experiences and consequent actions'. Most institutions therefore arise quite spontaneously, which means that none should be considered as permanent. The freedom of the Spirit should guarantee that when an institution fails to fulfil its purpose then other ways of exercising the same function may arise and replace it. In this way the church is set free from 'any kind of ritual legalism, in the power of the Spiritual Community'. To maintain that an institution derives necessarily from the nature of the church is to confuse the terms 'institution' and 'function', and this is true even of those institutions which are deemed essential to the church's life, such as the priesthood or the sacraments.

Corresponding to these three functions, there are three polarities of principles. Says Tillich,

The functions of constitution stand under the polarity of tradition and reformation, the functions of expansion under the polarity of verity and adaption, the functions of construction under the polarity of form-transcendence and form-affirmation.

The ambiguities inherent in these polarities are clear:

The danger of tradition is demonic hubris; the danger of reformation is emptying criticism. The danger of verity is demonic absolutism; the danger of adaption is emptying relativization. The danger of form-transcendence is demonic repression; the danger of form-affirmation is formalistic emptiness.

We shall consider each of these polarities together with their ambiguities in connection with the appropriate function of the church to which they are related.

a. The Constitutional Functions of the Church

The constitutional functions of the church move between the polarities of tradition and reformation. When we speak of tradition,
we are, in Tillich's view, not merely recognising that the cultural forms of each new age grow out of those of a preceding age, we are also affirming that there is a vital link between the foundation of the church in Jesus as the Christ and each successive generation. The idea of tradition, he contends, states that all generations are 'ideally present' in every function of the church because the same Spiritual Community is present within them all, and for this reason the concept of tradition itself transcends any particular tradition. So the principle of tradition is an expression of the unity of historical mankind, at the centre of which is the Christ. Tillich is aware that the idea of tradition has persistently been misrepresented throughout the history of the church, and this is why he feels it is difficult to use the word today without giving wrong impressions. Protestants particularly are suspicious of it because of the way in which it is used in the Orthodox and Roman churches, the one holding that the church itself constitutes the living tradition, the other maintaining that tradition can be legally defined and papally determined. Nevertheless, Tillich points out, tradition is an element in the life of all churches, and even the Protestant protest itself was only possible because it accepted certain parts of the Roman tradition, such as the Bible, which it used as its tools for reformation. 'It is a general characteristic of prophetic criticism of a religious tradition that it does not come from outside but from the centre of the tradition itself, fighting its distortions in the name of its true meaning', and in this sense it is true to say that tradition is an essential prerequisite for reformation.

The principle of reformation is the means by which the Spirit fights against the ambiguities of religion in the life of the church. At the time of the Reformation in the sixteenth century, for example,
the church had so suppressed this principle that the Spirit needed to break through at every level of the church's life. Though it has generally been assumed that in this principle of reformation, the Bible is the objective criterion, Tillich insists that this is not really so. The only true criterion is the awareness of Spiritual freedom, which admittedly means a risk, yet it is nevertheless a risk encouraged by the prophetic presence of the Spiritual Community within the church. Generally speaking, Protestantism, unlike Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism, has been willing to admit such a risk, even though this has endangered from time to time the life of particular churches. "It takes the risk in the certainty that the Spiritual Community, the dynamic essence of a church, cannot be destroyed." 39

The inevitable tension between tradition and reformation, says Tillich, creates a struggle between the divine Spirit and the ambiguities of religion. Every church is tempted to invest its own traditions with absolute validity and to suppress any undermining of them. So any move towards reformation is resisted in the tradition-dominated church because there is the fear that things which have been held sacred should now become profaned, and possibly the whole structure disintegrate. Nevertheless, it is because tradition is so frequently raised to this absolute level, suppressing the freedom of the Spirit, that the principle of reformation is necessary as a corrective. So on the one hand the danger of tradition is that it may lead to demonic suppression, and on the other hand the danger of reformation is that it may lead to disintegration. Yet both principles are essentially united in the Spiritual Community. "They are in tension but not in conflict", 40 and the degree in which the churches participate in the power of the Spiritual Community determines to what extent the possibility of conflict is
'transformed into a living tension' that has dynamic effect.

The constitutional, or constitutive, function of the church is seen first, says Tillich, in the element of receiving. The church must receive because it depends on the New Being as it is manifest in Jesus as the Christ and present in the Spiritual Community for its life. But this receptive function of the church applies not merely to individuals who belong to it, but also to the church as a whole, and if the church ever ceases to receive it becomes fossilised in its own structures. But the function of receiving does not stop there, for the church receives that it may also mediate: the function of reception includes the 'simultaneous function of mediation', both of which can be seen, for example, in the Word and sacraments. So 'he who receives mediates, and, on the other hand, he has received only because the process of mediation is going on continuously'. When reception and mediation are seen to be part of each other in this way, the sort of hierarchical structure that would separate the laity as those who receive from the priesthood as those who mediate is seen to be invalid. Both share in each function as recipient and mediator. So the church is 'priest and prophet to itself'; 'he who preaches preaches to himself and listener, and he who listens is a potential preacher'.

Mediation, according to Tillich, takes place sometimes within the context of corporate worship, at other times in the meeting of priest and layman. In the latter case, it is primarily 'the priest who mediates and the laity who respond'. But what we have just said applies here, and the minister, who has the cure of souls, should see himself also as standing in need of the Spirit's healing, and if he realises this, it will help him not to treat the person who seeks his help merely as an object to be counselled. It is vital therefore for the work of mediation
to be initiated and guided throughout by the Spirit, the counsellor himself submitting to the Spirit's impact on his own life in the same way as he would encourage him whom he counsels to submit. Only he who is healed by the Spirit can offer healing to others; only he who is grasped by the Spirit can lead another to that point where the Spirit can grasp him also.  

The response of the church and its members to that which is received and mediated takes place in affirmation and worship. Affirmation refers primarily to a 'confession of faith', but Tillich points out that such a confession need not take the form of a credal statement. It can equally be made through the medium of literary art, or symbols, or hymns. What the credal statement does it to concentrate this affirmation within itself and thus it becomes the essential basis for later theological developments. And even a church which rejects any credal formulation at all will still need to make its affirmation in other ways, in its type of worship or its specific practices. Tillich defines worship as the means whereby the church 'turns to the ultimate ground of its being', to God who is Spirit, 'the source of the Spiritual Presence and the creator of the Spiritual Community'. This turning to God is possible only because God has first grasped those who experience him, so that the initiative in worship lies with God, and worship is thus correctly interpreted as a response to the Spirit's impact on man: 'the responding elevation of the church to the ultimate ground of its being'. Tillich detects three main features in worship: adoration, prayer and contemplation. Adoration he defines as the 'ecstatic acknowledgment of the divine holiness and the infinite distance of Him who at the same time is present in the Spiritual Presence'. In every act of praise and thanksgiving this means that two elements are brought together: 'the com-
plete contrast between the creaturely smallness of man and the infinite greatness of the creator', and 'the elevation into the sphere of the divine glory'. To praise God therefore is also to share fragmentarily in God's glory. In every act of adoration these two elements of participation in the life of God and our infinite distance from God must be held together in paradoxical unity. If the element of distance is over-emphasised, then it becomes distorted, leading to a perverted doctrine of man as a miserable creature with no real dignity and a demonic God who stands over against him, a distortion which the Spirit always resists by grasping the one who adores and enabling him to share in the divine environment. On the other hand, if the element of participation is over-emphasised, the act of adoration can easily become man's own self-magnification, which is in the end self-defeating, in that it never reaches God at all.

In his discussion on prayer, and its role in worship, Tillich distinguishes between the superficial and the deeper levels of prayer. The real force of prayer, he contends, lies not in any specific content which it may happen to have, but rather in its 'hidden content', the essence of which is the 'surrender of a fragment of existence to God', and it is this hidden surrender that makes God's work in answer to prayer possible. Thus genuine prayer does not seek to interfere with the existential situation, but rather to transform it. 'God is asked to direct the given situation toward fulfilment,' in terms of the divine creativity. So it can be said that 'every serious prayer produces something new', this something being 'the Spiritual act of elevating the content of one's wishes and hopes into the Spiritual Presence', even though on occasions the specific content of one's hopes and wishes in itself may be denied. So the prayer of intercession not only initiates
a new relationship to those for whom it is made, it also introduces
'a change in the relation to the ultimate of the subjects and objects
of intercession'. Because of this more profound understanding of
petition and intercession, Tillich finds it impossible to accept Ritschl's
contention that the only legitimate type of prayer is thanksgiving. He can understand Ritschl's desire to rescue prayer from its popular
distortions in superstitious and magical terms, but he claims that his
rejection of certain types of prayer is completely unjustified from a
theological point of view. To forbid supplicatory prayers would be
not only to create 'a completely unrealistic relation to God', but
would also deny prayer its biblical paradox as the 'wrestling of the
human spirit with the divine Spirit'. Such a paradox asserts that
whereas it is impossible for man himself to pray aright, the Spirit
of God represents him before God without any 'objectifying language',
getting behind our inadequate words and taking and transforming our
prayerful desires. This means that there is a deep and profound mystery
at the heart of all true prayer. 'It is the Spirit which speaks to the
Spirit, as it is the Spirit which discerns and experiences the Spirit',
and in this very process the subject-object structure of our normal
conversationary communication is transcended.

Truly Spiritual prayer, says Tillich, leads inevitably to contemplation, an aspect of worship traditionally, though unfortunately,
neglected by Protestants, despite the renewed emphasis on silence in
church services. Tillich describes contemplation as 'participation in
that which transcends the subject-object scheme, with its objectifying
(and subjectifying) words, and therefore the ambiguity of language as
well (including the voiceless language of speaking to oneself)'. He
feels that Protestant neglect of this element in prayer is due to its
personalistic interpretation of the Spirit, which fails to appreciate that the Spiritual Presence transcends personality in an ecstatic manner. So any response to the Spirit's impact must itself be Spiritual, which means that it must itself transcend ecstatically the subject-object scheme of ordinary experience, and in the contemplative act more than any other this paradoxical nature of prayer is made clear in 'the identity and non-identity of him who prays and Him who is prayed to: God as Spirit'. But this is not mysticism in disguise, for whereas the usual mystic idea is that contemplation is a state which can only be reached by degrees, little by little, approaching God as if he were a 'besieged fortress' until he yields himself to him who prays, in Protestant thinking true prayer always begins with God's surrender, in the sense that it is God himself who has overcome the estrangement between himself and man in the act of grace. So contemplation should not be thought of as a higher degree in the life of prayer, but rather as a quality of prayer, the essence of which is the awareness that 'prayer is directed to Him who creates the right prayer in us', and in this quality of prayer above all others does the spiritual unity of man and God shine through.

b. The Expansive Functions of the Church

The expanding functions of the churches, says Tillich, arise from the universality of the Spiritual Community and its message concerning Jesus as the Christ. As we have seen, these functions occasion a further polarity of principles, of verity (or truth) and adaption. Tillich notes that the tension between these two principles can be observed again and again in the mission of the church from the first century until the present moment, so that the history of mission becomes the record of the church's successive attempts to adapt its message to
particular ages and cultures without sacrificing its essential truth for the sake of mere accommodation. There is, of course, a difficult problem here. If on the one hand the principle of verity is affirmed without recognising the need for adaption, this can lead to a 'demonic absolutism', which 'throws the truth like stones at the heads of the people, not caring whether they accept it or not', in which case the divine offence of the Christian mission becomes transmuted into the demonic offence of a totalitarian church. The church must recognise that its members are conditioned by their cultural environment and can only understand the truth of the Gospel in the categories of that environment. Yet at the same time, the church must beware lest in seeking to make its message understood it loses the essential truth of that message, thus paving the way for secularism and a reactionary totalitarianism. A 'missionary accommodation which surrenders the principle of verity does not conquer the demonic powers, whether they are religious or profane'. Verity and adaption must go together.

Tillich differentiates between three specific functions of expansion: missions, education and evangelism, though he recognises the inevitable overlap between them. The first function of expansion, that of mission, which began with Jesus sending out his disciples, has been both 'successful' and 'unsuccessful' throughout the course of its history. Though there are those who would point to the fact that after two thousand years of missionary work the majority of men and women are still not Christians, there are few places which have not been influenced in some way or other by the effect of Christian culture. But the real purpose of mission, according to Tillich, is not to impose its own forms of culture onto cultures which are not Christian, still less to achieve some sort of syncretism; nor is its purpose to save individual
souls from damnation. It is rather to actualise the Spiritual Community within concrete churches throughout the world. In spite of this, the danger of identifying the Christian mission with the culture it has itself created is always present, and it is notoriously difficult to separate the two: 'in a sense, it is impossible, because there is no abstract Christian message'. So the church has no alternative but to speak through these traditional cultural categories. But it must do so in such a way that its underlying message is unmistakeably clear, and it can only do this when the power of the Spirit, present within its life, enables it to transcend these categories. On the other hand, every attempt should be made at a genuine participation in the culture with which the missionary is involved, whether it be the great Oriental cultures or even the working class cultures of Western Europe. 'Communication,' he points out, 'is a matter of participation. Where there is no participation, there is no communication,' and where communication is impossible, the function of mission is impotent. It is through the Spirit alone that both participation and communication are made possible. 

The function of education, says Tillich, 'is based on the desire of the churches to continue their life from generation to generation', and goes back to the days when the first family received into a church was faced with the task of communicating the faith to its children. The present turmoil about Christian education does not escape Tillich's attention. He sees its origin firstly in the difficulties in the educational process itself, and secondly in the doubts that parents themselves have about Jesus as the Christ. The first of these problems, he points out, can only be solved through new understandings in educational psychology and new educational methods. The second can only be resolved in the context of the Spiritual Community itself, as the Spirit gives
its members the courage "to affirm the Christian assertion and to communicate it to the new generation". Tillich sees the main task of Christian education to introduce each new generation into the reality of the Spiritual Community, into its faith and love, and this is done through participation in the church's life according to differing degrees of maturity, and through interpretation according to growth in understanding. So the true emphasis of Christian education is not to be found in passing on information about church history or doctrine to the potential church member, nor awakening a subjective piety at the moment of conversion, but rather in this twofold process of participation in and understanding of the church's life. Both are essential: "there is no understanding of a church's life without participation; but without understanding the participation becomes mechanical and compulsory".

Tillich distinguishes between mission, as the expansion of the churches throughout the world, and evangelism, which he defines as 'missions toward the non-Christians within a Christian culture'. The two evangelistic activities he specifically mentions are practical apologetics and evangelistic preaching. Practical apologetics he defines as 'the practical application of the apologetic element in every theology'. There is a sense in which the church must always be engaged in such a task, for it is constantly being asked questions about its own nature. The most effective answer it can give to these questions is, of course: its own example as a living testimony to the reality of the New Being and the power of the Spiritual Community within its life, a silent witness of faith and love which is far more effective than any argumentation. But arguments are needed, both to break down the walls of intellectual scepticism and to destroy the barriers of dogmatism.
erected by the church itself. And these are walls and barriers which
certainly need to be destroyed, for it is largely the result of atti-
tudes such as these that the church becomes more and more isolated from
the world, reduced to 'a small, ineffective section within a dynamic
civilisation'. In this task of breaking down the barriers, practical
apologetics plays a vitally important part, and it is one of the first
jobs of systematic theology to lay those foundations on which practical
apologetics is built, as Tillich's own system sets out to do. At the
same time, having accepted its responsibility, it must realise that
there are inevitable psychological and sociological limitations to its
task, a realisation which in itself forms 'an element in the apologetic
function'.

Tillich's understanding of evangelistic preaching is directed
more specifically towards people who have belonged or still belong to
a Christian culture but whose relationship to the church has become
strained, maybe just indifferent, maybe downright hostile. Because
of its charismatic nature, it will differ from the usual type of preach-
ing, and will have more impact on those who listen. Such an impact
is not merely psychological or emotional, although it is true that
the Spirit can use any psychological condition to grasp the personal
self. But there is a very real danger of reducing evangelistic preaching
to a merely subjective impact. The truly Spiritual impact of evangelism
lies in its power to transcend any contrast between subjectivity and
objectivity by transforming the subjectivity of the listener and actuali-
sing the New Being within his own experience, in the life of the Spiritual
Community. This can never be achieved by mere emotionalism, even if it
results in conversions according to set patterns, for in this case
'repentance, faith, sanctity, and so on, are not what these words are
taken to mean', their effect becomes momentary and transitory, and excitement becomes confused with ecstasy. Such ambiguities are inevitable, and it would be wrong to reject evangelism because of them. But the real corrective and genuine criterion for all true evangelistic success is the impact of the Spirit in the creation of a New Being.

c. The Constructive Functions of the Church

Tillich defines those functions as constructive in which the church "builds its life by using and transcending the functions of man's life under the dimension of \( \text{spirit} \)". This applies particularly to cultural creations. The church, as we have seen already, depends on forms which are essentially cultural to express itself: forms in the realms of \( \text{theoria} \), with its aesthetic and cognitive functions, and \( \text{praxis} \), with its personal and communal functions. The big question is the exact relationship between these aspects of man's cultural life as autonomous forms, and their function as material in the construction of the churches. "Does their functioning in the service of the ecclesiastical edifice distort the purity of their autonomous form?" Must expressiveness, truth, humanity and justice be bent in order to be built into the life of the churches? To ask and to answer such a question, of course, both reveals the possibility of ambiguity and raises the problem of how it is to be avoided. It raises in other words, the issues of form-affirmation and form-transcendence, the polarities which stand in tension in all constructive functions. For the churches must use these forms in such a way that they both affirm and transcend them. On the one hand, unless the churches transcend the forms they use, they cannot be true manifestations of the Spiritual Community, they would not point beyond themselves, and the work of the Spirit would not be seen within them. "The churches do not act as churches when they act as a
The church shows its presence as church only if the Spirit breaks into the finite forms and drives them beyond themselves. Without form-transcendence there would be little more than a meaningless formalism. But on the other hand, this does not mean that the principle of form-affirmation can be neglected, and in no church function can it be permitted for the basic structure of a cultural creation to be violated. When form-transcendence is emphasised over against form-affirmation, the churches become, in Tillich's phrase, 'demonic-repressive': they violate cultural integrity and repress structural necessity; they undermine scientific honesty and ultimately destroy personal humanity 'in the name of a demonically distorted fanatical faith'. The dangers of these two extremes can only be avoided when the power of the Spiritual Presence is such in the life of churches that the principles of form-transcendence and form-affirmation are one.

Turning to the constructing functions in greater detail, Tillich first examines the aesthetic function, which appears in the life of the churches in the religious arts, whether visual, literary or musical. In these elements the church expresses the meaning of its life by giving its religious symbols artistic form, the style of which will differ from period to period. Tillich calls this process 'double symbolisation'. He cites Grünewald's painting of the Crucifixion as an example of this. This painting is not only a great masterpiece of artistic expression in its own right, it is also an expression of the Protestant spirit with its emphasis on the Cross. In other words it is a visual expression not only of the Cross itself, but also of the spirit of the Reformation which placed the Cross at its centre. So it
can be said that it transforms what it expresses, by giving it a particular significance. In the case of Grunewald's painting, it conveys a different image of the Christ from that presented in the Eastern and Roman churches, with their respective emphases on the Resurrection and the Incarnation. In fact, every church to a greater or lesser extent seeks to guarantee that those religious works of art it sponsors reflect its own teachings and emphases, and will because of this do its utmost to influence the artist concerned - whether he is a painter, a poet or a composer. So, says Tillich, the significance of religious art is not just its straightforward expressiveness, but that as a form of expression it brings to life that which it expresses in a particular and distinctive way. It is a double symbolisation.

But all this gives rise to a conflict between the churches' justified request that religious art must express what they confess (the principle of consecration) and the artists' equally justified demand that they should use the style which they feel personally impelled to use (the principle of honesty). Tillich sees the principle of consecration as an application of the wider principle of form-transcendence to the realm of religious art and that of honesty as the application of the wider principle of form-affirmation. On the one hand, the principle of consecration 'is the power of expressing the holy in the concreteness of a special religious tradition', and this means that it uses those religious symbols which characterise that particular tradition as well as those stylistic qualities which distinguish religious from other forms of art. In this way the Spirit can be present in the music and word of the liturgy, in architecture, in the painting and sculpture of differing traditions. On the other hand, the principle of honesty is the limit set by the artist to the demands made on
him in the name of the principle of consecration. This principle is particularly important in any transitory period when old styles are on the wane and new ones are beginning to appear, and when there is an inevitable split in cultural consciousness between the two. In such periods, there tends to be a retreat to those older expressions which have links with traditional religious experiences, with the temptation to absolutise them in the name of consecration, and so try to prevent the creation of new forms of expression. This undermines the artist's desire to be honest in his work, but Tillich feels that in this sort of situation, if the artist is to be true to a genuine Spiritual expression, he must adamantly refuse to use any traditional forms which have ceased to have meaning. The churches also must be ready to confess the inadequacy of these forms, even though they may not yet be able to envisage what the new forms will be. The principle of honesty demands that styles which once had 'great consecrative possibilities' should not be used in a different situation where they can no longer express the religious experience. Tillich feels that it was this mistake that lay behind the failure of the neo-Gothic revival.

Tillich suggests that those styles in religious art which can best express the ecstatic character of the Spiritual Presence are those in which some expressionistic element is present, for it is this element above all others that points to the capacity of life to transcend itself. The more predominant the expressionism, the more readily will a style lend itself, but even in styles where the expressionistic element is secondary, such as in idealism, works of religious art are still possible, though they will not have the same impact. Tillich feels that

the rediscovery of the expressive element in art since 1900 is a decisive event for the relation of religion and the visual arts. It has made religious art again possible...
The predominance of the expressive style in contemporary art is a chance for the rebirth of religious art.67

In the Protestant churches, Tillich points out that there has been a great neglect of visual expressions of art in favour of aural expressions in music and hymns, reflecting the general cultural re-orientation of later medieval times. Some Protestant movements even went so far as to reject the use of visual art altogether. The fear of idolatry which was responsible for this was to some degree understandable, for the visual arts are indeed much more prone to idolatrous demonisation than any form of aural expression. However, he maintains, the fact that the Spirit drives towards the unity of all life must validate visual expression as much as any other form.68 The nature of spirit, then, demands that aesthetic expression should use every realm of human experience, and the lack of visual art in Protestantism is; 'though historically understandable, systematically untenable and practically regrettable'.

Tillich insists that religion itself cannot force any style upon the autonomous development of the arts, for this would violate the principle of honesty. When a new style arises, it is not because of any impact of religion, but in the natural course of the self-creativity of human life and experience: it is created by 'the autonomous act of the individual artist and, at the same time, by historical destiny'. Nevertheless, there are situations, where through the impact of the Spirit religion can have an indirect influence both on historical destiny and autonomous creativity, and this leads to the concept of 'cultural theonomy', to which Tillich will turn more fully later.69

The cognitive function of cultural creativity appears in the life of the churches as theology, in which the religious symbols are given
conceptual form, concepts which form the basis of all doctrine and dogma. To some extent we have already examined the relation between theology and philosophy in Tillich's thought. In the present context, Tillich affirms that theology also, like each of the other constructive functions of the church, stands under the polarity of form-transcendence and form-affirmation, and this gives rise to two important elements in theological study, the 'meditative' and the 'discursive', the former seeking to penetrate the substance of the symbols of religion, the latter analysing and describing the form in which they can be grasped.

In the former aspect, which is rather similar in some ways to contemplation and is the direct concern of the divine Spirit, the knowing subject and its object, 'the mystery of the holy', are united, and Tillich says that without this unity theology would be but an analysis of structures without substance. At the same time, the meditative act itself cannot produce a theology without the analysis of its contents and their constructive synthesis which the discursive act provides.

No theology which plays down either of these two aspects of theological study can really be taken seriously. Yet frequently in the history of the church there have been those who have rejected the second aspect, either because they have felt that it would undermine the specific message of the church or else because they have been convinced that the substance of theology is far too restrictive for conceptual expression. Yet Tillich insists that theology must find ways and means of overcoming this dichotomy between meditation and discourse. So the question arises 'whether there are forms of the conceptual encounter with reality in which the meditative element is predominant and effective without suppressing the discursive strictness of thought'. Such forms are possible, he answers, as long as the theological ingredient is kept
in place and does not seek to control the other elements in discursive thought. But what about the contrary position: can theology use those types of discursive thought where the theological element is absent? Tillich doubts whether in fact any type of discursive thought can really exclude the theological element, for there is a sense in which a meditative element is automatically provided by the subject matter of every system, whatever the substance happens to be. In this sense even a materialist, he claims, can be a theologian. Hence theology is possible on the basis of any philosophical tradition. Nevertheless, some philosophical traditions will lend themselves more easily than others, particularly those where there is already a strong meditative element present, such as one finds in every type of existentialism that has appeared throughout history. Where this element is not so prominent, as in philosophies which deal with the structure of reality rather than the predicament of existing, the discursive element comes more into play, and the philosophy can be significantly labelled 'essentialist'. Yet even though the church will prefer an existentialist mode for its theology, it must not attempt to enforce any particular way of thinking on its philosophers. 'It is,' says Tillich, 'a matter of autonomous creativity and historical destiny whether or not the existentialist element which is present in all philosophies breaks out into the open'. But this should not mean that the function of theology cannot proceed unless the existentialist element does break out. It can begin, contends Tillich, quite legitimately with essentialist descriptions of reality, for it will need these as well in the course of its study, and then proceed to discover the existentialist presuppositions behind them, accepting or rejecting them as the case may be. On the other hand, 'even the most radical existentialist, if he wants to say something, necessarily falls
back to some essentialist statements because without them he cannot even speak. 76

Having dealt with the functions of theoria in the life of the church, Tillich now turns his attention to those of praxis, the sphere in which there is interdependent growth of personality and community. He reminds us that the question which again faces us is whether their functioning in the life of the churches distorts their autonomous forms. Just as in the realm of theoria this involves a tension in polarity between consecration and honesty in art, and between meditation and discursive strictness in theology, so in the realm of personal-communal relations, 'it raises the question whether community can maintain justice and whether personality can maintain humanity if they are used for the self-construction of the churches'. 77 Can justice and humanity be preserved when employed in the realisation of communal and personal holiness? If the power of the Spirit is able to conquer the ambiguities of religion the answer must be 'yes'.

Because communal holiness within the churches is an expression of the Spiritual Community, Tillich points out that the Spiritual Presence will continually fight against its distortion. This distortion can take place whenever a church permits injustice to occur in the name of holiness, in which case the necessary basis for communal relations, the principle of justice itself, is flaunted. In fact, as far as the leadership and hierarchical institutions of the church are concerned, this has not infrequently been the case. Justice is suspended in the name of sacramental authority! Again, it has not been uncommon for the church to turn a blind eye on the injustices perpetrated by the civil powers that be, particularly when it depends on those powers for its own standing in society. Even in modern times, on a more local level, there
is always the danger that a parish minister will be so dependent on those who are socially or economically influential that he ignores the real needs of those who are exploited by others. This sort of thing, whenever it happens, is a flagrant distortion of the holiness of the church, and when it does occur the churches are justifiably repudiated, both by those on whom the church has turned its back and by those who are disgusted at the church's attitude.

The four ambiguities of communal life which Tillich has already discussed in general he now examines in the light of the question, 'In what sense are they overcome in the community which claims participation in the Holy Community and derived holiness for itself?' The first ambiguity, that of inclusiveness, is overcome, he says, whenever the church claims to be all-inclusive beyond any social, racial or national limitations. Unfortunately this claim is conditioned by man's existential estrangement from his true being, consequently one observes tremendous social and racial problems present in the life of the churches. A more specific example of the ambiguity of this claim is the very way in which the churches exclude those of other creeds, which may to some extent be understandable, in that no church, if it is to retain its identity, can admit symbols which compete with its own symbolic expressions of the faith. Nevertheless, the church is often in danger of idolising its own symbols. 'Therefore, whenever the Spiritual Presence makes itself felt, the self-criticism of the churches in the name of their own symbols starts', and the willingness of the church to do this, says Tillich, is evidence of its dependence on the Spiritual Community and of its own fragmentary character as well as its awareness that it is continually threatened by a lapse into the very religious ambiguities it is intended to fight.
The second ambiguity of communal life is equality, which the church interprets primarily as 'the equality of everyone before God'. Though this transcendent form of equality does not necessarily demand social and political equality, it should nevertheless create a desire for equality in the fellowship of the church. But somehow the church has always been rather uneasy about Jesus' statement that all men are equally sinners and therefore equally forgiven, making a distinction between those whose sin is socially condemned and those whose sin is socially acceptable. To make such a distinction strikes at the very roots of the principle of equality, both in the life of the churches and in the life of society. Tillich warns that when the church falls into this way of thinking, the Spirit may well have to use other means to actualise equality in the life of man.

Closely connected with the ambiguities of inclusiveness and equality is that of leadership, for it is the leading groups primarily who choose either to condemn or condone the denial of these things. Leadership can lead to tyranny, which is much more than a 'bad historical accident', but rather 'one of the great and inescapable ambiguities of life', to which religious leadership is prone as much as any other.

The task of the Spirit is to raise up men who will expose any suggestion of tyrannical leadership in the life of the church. This sort of spiritual judgment is commonplace in Protestantism: in fact, some may consider it as one of the weaknesses of the Protestant system; but at least it is preferable to the capacities for demonic leadership that one finds in the papal system, for example, and what therefore may be termed weakness in the Protestant churches is in actual fact their greatness and the evidence of the Spirit at work within them.

The fourth ambiguity is that of legal form, which the church needs
no less than any other institution. This does not mean that God pro-
vides it with constitutional forms that cannot be changed, even though
the church and its functions stand under the direction of the Spirit.
As Tillich points out, 'The Spirit does not give constitutional rules,
but it guides the churches toward a Spiritual use of sociologically
adequate offices and institutions'. Nevertheless, the constitutional
form a church adopts does reflect how it interprets the relationship
between God and man. A monarchical church, for example, has a very
different understanding of that relationship than the democratic
churches. So it is true to say that constitutional problems are in-
directly theological, and this explains why many of the divisions in
the church are seemingly based on constitutional issues. The Protestant
principle of fallibility and its protest against infallibility, or the
principle of the priesthood of all believers in its protest against the
divine-human hierarchical structure are illustrations of this. And
the theological principles behind the constitutional forms are indeed
'matters of ultimate concern', even though the organisations set up
for their manifestation are secondary. Tillich concludes, therefore,
that those constitutional forms are preferable which are the most
expedient under the criteria of ultimate theological principles.

Tillich observes in the ambiguities of the legal organisation of
the church an initial reason for the widespread resentment against so-
called 'organised religion'. Yet in spite of this, some form of organ-
isation is sociologically inevitable, as the repeated failure of small
sects to live without any organisation easily shows, and quite frequently
the small sect can develop an organisation more demanding than that of
the orthodox churches themselves! But he recognises that there is a
second and far more subtle reason for the resentment against organised
religion: the idea that religion is a personal thing. This is a misconception, because man depends on community for the development of his personality, and this is as true in the religious sphere as any other. A man's religious experience would soon fade were it not nourished by the faith and love of the church. There is, of course, a personal response to the religious community, a response which may have creative, revolutionary or even destructive impacts upon it, and which in turn can sometimes give birth to a new type of community; but this is rather different. In fact, underlying the criticism against organised religion Tillich detects a far more radical criticism which denies any attempt to channel the relationship between God and man into specific channels. This criticism instinctively recognises that no religion as such can achieve perfect unity with God. In this sense, it may legitimately be called a 'religious criticism of every form of religion, whether it is public or private'. But though this is very important, it is something far more embracing and significant than the criticism of organised religion itself, for this is a complaint levelled against religion in all of its aspects, not just that of its constitutional forms.

If one feels, says Tillich, that the ambiguities of religion can be resolved by withdrawing from the communal life of the church, one is still faced with the ambiguities of personal religion, which are equally as great. These may be described as 'ambiguities in the actualisation of humanity as the inner aim of the person', and they appear both in a person's relation to himself and in his relation to others. Just as the holiness of a community must in no way destroy its justice, so also the saintliness of the individual within this community must not destroy the person's humanity, his own development towards maturity. The first question we must ask, therefore, says Tillich, is in what way saintliness
and humanity are related under the impact of the Spirit.

Tillich defines a saint as a person who is transparent to the divine ground of being, which corresponds to his definition of holiness. The snag is that historically the achievement of this state has generally been held to depend on the denial of so many human possibilities that it stands in inevitable tension with the ideal of humanity, and on occasions has led to outright conflict. Tillich distinguishes between three types of self-denial or asceticism. In the first place, there is what he calls 'ontological asceticism', the type on which Roman monasticism based itself, which aims at spiritual achievement through a total renunciation of material things. This type of asceticism not only makes it impossible for a person to fulfil his true humanity; it is also based on a false dichotomy between spirit and matter. God is creator of both, and because of this Protestantism has been wise in rejecting this type of ascetic practice. The second type is 'moral asceticism', which emphasises self-discipline. The danger that Tillich perceives here is that one threatens the telos of humanity by overstrict moral repression, such as one sees in certain puritanical attitudes to sex. This type of asceticism can therefore become equally as suffocating as its ontological counterpart. Tillich perceives that one of the great advantages of modern psychology is that it has helped the church to get rid of this particular image of personal holiness. The third type of asceticism is the genuine work of the Spirit in the life of a person, in which he is so united with the telos, the goal, of his own humanity, that he denies himself those things that would prevent this fulfilment. It is the same type of discipline without which no creative work would be possible, the discipline which participation in the created object demands, in this case the creative work being the development of one's
own humanity, and the created object the goal itself. This type of asceticism, then, is 'the conquest of a subjective self-affirmation which prevents participation in the object', the object of a full humanity. In this sainthood and humanity are one, for sainthood is being so opened to the Spiritual Presence that the union of oneself with the objective of the full development of one's humanity is now possible.

The subject of discipline raises an important issue which must be resolved: the question of determination, for here there is a real ambiguity present. As far as self-determination is concerned, the problem, says Tillich, can be stated thus: 'How is personal self-determination possible if the determining self needs determination as much as the determined self?' In other words, how is self-determination possible if the self as subject needs to be determined no less than the self as object? The answer lies in the doctrine of the Spiritual Presence, which transcends any distinction between subject and object by helping the self to realise its essential humanity, and which thus gives the self as subject the determination necessary to determine the self as object. This, claims Tillich, is part of what the Christian means by grace, the preceding activity of the Spirit, the 'given', which makes it possible to overcome the ambiguities of self-determination. With this gift of the Spiritual Presence, the self is able not only to understand what saintliness and humanity mean for his own life, or in other words to understand what one's essential being is, but also to fulfil those ideals in its own experience. This is the only way, he says, of 'escaping the despair of the conflict between the command of self-determination and the impossibility of determining oneself in the direction of what one essentially is'.

In the case of other-determination, in the spheres of education
and guidance, Tillich points out that the ambiguities which these functions entail, arising from the separation of him who determines and him who is determined, are as much present in the religious context as elsewhere. In the power of the Spirit which transcends every subject-object split, the church is able to fight against these ambiguities, for as subject and object both participate in the Spirit, so they participate in each other through the Spirit, so that the subject also becomes object, and the object subject. This is borne out by the fact that the nearer one gets to the telos of humanity, the more one realises just how far one still has to go in one's own life, and this means that any attitude of superiority towards or desire to control the other person is overcome by the realisation that he who seeks to teach or guide is himself in need of teaching and guidance. Nevertheless, a fragmentary participation in the telos of humanity, both one's own and that of the other person, is possible, because the Spirit grasps one, as it were, 'out of the vertical dimension', and this means that teaching and guidance can be genuinely offered under the impact of the Spirit which is something other than one's own ideas and desires. It is true to say, concludes Tillich, that 'the Spirit does not let the subject in any human relation remain mere subject and the object mere object; the Spirit is present wherever the conquest of the subject-object split in man's existence occurs'.

d. The Relating Functions of the Church

Tillich has dealt extensively with the internal functions of the church. But these are not the only functions. For the church exists in the world, and because of this it constantly encounters other social groups, 'acting upon them and receiving from them'. These relationships pose many problems which are of a practical nature, and which do not lie
within the proper realm of systematic theology. Nevertheless Tillich feels that every theological system must seek to formulate ways in which the churches relate themselves to other social groups. He calls these the 'relating functions of the churches'.

There are three ways, says Tillich, in which the church relates itself to other groups. The first is the way of silent interpenetration, 'the continuous radiation of the Spiritual essence of the churches into all groups of the society in which they live'. In this way the church can influence and change society by pouring its 'priestly substance' into the social structure to which it belongs. Because of the accelerating secularisation of contemporary society, the force of this silent presence of the church within the world is frequently unacknowledged, yet were the church to be removed an empty space would soon appear as the power of its influence gradually faded away. So the church imperceptibly penetrates the world. But the movement is reciprocated, for the world also penetrates the church with its developing and changing forms of culture and society, as new ways of understanding and expressions of experience are opened up by man. So there takes place a mutual exchange of substance and form between the church and the world, an interpenetration 'silently exercised at every moment': 'the churches silently give Spiritual substance to the society in which they live, and the churches silently receive Spiritual forms from the same society'.

The second way in which the church relates to the world is in critical judgment, again exercised reciprocally between religious and other social groups. In this way the church has often been able to change the society in which it was placed, at times quite radically. This open attack by the church on society in the name of the Spiritual Presence, says Tillich, can be called 'prophetic', just as its silent
penetration could be called 'priestly'. Sometimes the church may not seem to be very successful in its prophetic judgment, yet even in these cases it has at least put society into the position of having to react one way or the other in the face of its message, so that no society can remain exactly the same, even if its reaction is negative and it becomes hardened in its demonic traits. The church therefore will encourage prophetic criticism, even if this entails a measure of self-sacrifice on its own part, and even though it realises that it can never fully actualise true Spiritual Community within the life of society. So he writes in one of his sermons:

We must pray for the prophetic spirit which has been dead for so long in the churches. And he who feels that he has been given the prophetic task must fulfil it as Isaiah did. He must preach the message of a new justice and of a new social order in the name of God and his honour. But he must expect to be opposed and persecuted not only by his enemies, but also by his friends, party, class and nation. He must expect to be persecuted to the degree to which his word is the word of that God who alone is holy, that God who alone is able to create a holy people out of the remnant of every nation.92

He who is grasped by the Spirit must be prepared for these things. Reciprocally, there are times when the world will need to stand over in judgment against the church, particularly in its exposure of any "holy injustice" and "saintly inhumanity" within the churches and in their relation to the society in which they live.93 Tillich notes that this sort of criticism has been particularly prominent in the contemporary era, and has provoked two rather different results. Negatively, it has unfortunately led to an ever-widening gap between the church and those sections of the society where injustice is most likely to have its effect, such as in the world of industry and labour relations. But positively, it has led to an important reassessment by the churches of the meaning of justice and humanity. Tillich calls this criticism of the
church by the world a 'reverse prophetism', and interprets this prophetic voice outside the church itself as one of the evidences of the latent Spiritual Community, to which we have already referred. So the Spirit uses voices in the world to call the church back to its true function and mission. It is the duty of the church to listen to these voices. As he puts it in one of his essays:

In its prophetic role the Church is the guardian who reveals dynamic structures in society and undercuts their demonic power by revealing them, even within the Church itself. In so doing the Church listens to voices outside itself, judging both the culture and the Church in so far as it is part of the culture ... Most of (these voices) are not active members of the manifest Church. But perhaps one could call them participants of a "latent Church", a Church in which the ultimate concern which drives the manifest Church is hidden under cultural forms and deformations. Sometimes this latent church comes into the open. Then the manifest Church should recognise in these voices what its own spirit should be and accept them even if they appear hostile to the Church.

Finally, says Tillich, the church is related to the world through political establishment. Because Christ is king as well as priest and prophet, 'every church has a political function, from the local up to the international level'. Indeed, part of this function is to influence the powers that be to acknowledge the church's priestly and prophetic roles and enable it to fulfil them. However, whenever the church acts politically it must never use methods of persuasion or coercion, although it may frequently be tempted to do so. For the real power of the church does not lie in methods such as these, but arises from the presence of the Spirit within its life. Tillich feels that the traditional Protestant reserve towards political involvement may have arisen as a reaction against the Roman use of persuasive and coercive techniques and the consequent misuse of its Spiritual power, but he also states quite firmly that the Protestant cannot really escape political respon-
sibility: in fact, to attempt to do so would be to betray the kingly office of Christ and the church's participation in it. But once again, there is a reciprocity between the church and the world, and this means that as long as the churches are in the world they 'must be ready not only to direct but also to be directed'. This applies particularly in the relation between church and state. But it does not mean that the church should compromise its own nature: indeed, it must resist any form of political establishment that would destroy its character as an expression of the Spiritual Community. It must never kowtow to the state or a government department like an obedient slave, so that its humility becomes weakness, any more than attempt to control the whole of life in totalitarian fashion. Both would be a denial of its participation in the Spirit of Christ.

In each of these three ways in which the church is related to the world, there is a sense of mutual belonging. Both church and world have to face life's ambiguities, and the fact that the church does belong to the world in this way prevents it from making its paradoxical, finite holiness absolute. However, because the church is the means by which the holiness of the divine Spirit is manifest in community, there are times when it will need to stand in opposition to other groups, and this is particularly true in the contemporary period when so often the state has sought to usurp its priestly and prophetic functions by introducing nationalistic sacraments and rites and encouraging an outspoken national fanaticism, as well as rendering its royal function impotent by subjecting it to or separating it from the state. So alongside the principle of belonging there must also operate the principle of opposition: 'the church in the world' must be counterbalanced by 'the church against the world'. Yet in order to keep this truth in a proper perspective, Tillich
reminds us that 'it is part and parcel of (the ambiguity of religious life) that the world which is opposed by the church is not simply not-church but has in itself elements of the Spiritual Community in its latency which work towards a theonomous culture', a subject to which we shall turn later on.

**Evaluation**

Tillich has provided us with an extremely useful and careful analysis of the various functions in the life of the church, and there is a sense in which any points of criticism will be offset by points of commendation. This should be borne in mind with reference to the critical comments which follow.

In his remarks on the polarities of tradition and reformation in the constitutive functions of the churches, Tillich's distinction between the concept of tradition itself and the various traditions of local churches is a very important one, and one to which Protestantism has given far too little attention. What needs to be emphasised is that tradition is an important vehicle of the Spirit, establishing and maintaining the continuity of his work throughout the ages. By standing in the tradition of the Spirit and understanding how it has developed throughout the centuries in response to specific needs, the contemporary church will not only see the relevance of the Christ to whom the Spirit testifies for every generation, but will also be able to determine more carefully what that relevance may mean and where the Spirit is leading the church in our own day. To ignore tradition and seek to begin all over again, as some would try to do, would be to deny the Spirit's work in the past and therefore to take it less than seriously in the present. As Daniel Jenkins emphasises:

Unless churches understand what tradition teaches them and how they themselves inevitably help to form tradition,
they are likely to succumb to one of two dangers. Either they will be guilty of archaism in reaching their judgements because they are inhibited from recognising novelty, or else they cut themselves off from the rich treasury of wisdom about man's life on this earth which is available to them from the Christian past.99

Thus,

Protestantism needs to see with new clarity that the church lives always in the dimension of the Spirit, 100 a dimension to which the body of Christian tradition points and affirms.

So the contemporary church must take with all seriousness Tillich's insight that genuine prophetic criticism of any tradition will come not from outside but from inside the body of tradition itself, and that this is one of the principles and tests of true reformation. It is something that is of especial importance in an age when the church may well be facing the beginnings of a new reformation, triggered off in the main by its increased contact with the secular world, and the seriousness with which the church takes the world's criticism of itself. In the face of this, what Tillich is saying is that though the secular world has every right to criticise, and indeed may be the agent of the Spirit in its criticism, yet there can be no attempt to impose a real reformation on the church from the outside. This can only come from within, as the Spirit works from within the body, creating new life, and casting out the dead wood. Any such attempt to impose reformation from the outside would not be reformation at all, but something entirely different in content, determined by the world rather than by the Spirit of Christ.

On the other hand, it is difficult to see what Tillich's rejection of the Bible in favour of an awareness of Spiritual freedom as the criterion for any genuine reformation really achieves. This statement is clearly unacceptable if he is implying that an awareness of Spiritual
freedom is separate from the revelation of God in Christ that is recorded in the Scriptures. One does not deny the element of Spiritual freedom in any true movement towards reform — indeed it must be present — but there can be no freedom of the Spirit outside Christ, for the Spirit is the Spirit of Christ. And we cannot know Christ apart from the Scriptures which speak of him. There is then no Spiritual freedom that is not in accordance with the Word of God recorded in the New Testament. In fact, John himself offers the genuine criterion for reformation when he says, 'The Holy Spirit whom the Father will send in my name, will teach you everything and recall to you everything I have said'. Such a text emphasises the centrality of the New Testament record in the work of the Spirit. It is a pity Tillich has not made this point, for in its present crisis the church needs to take it more seriously than it has done so far. There is much talk of reformation, even defined as a response to the divine Spirit, but how can the church determine what the Spirit is saying and where he is leading except in the light of the Word? It is in this sort of situation that the Bible, not only as the record of God's revelation, but also as the safeguard of the church's own tradition, is the vital yardstick against which any concept of reformation must be measured. It is this alone that will prevent any movement of reform in the life of the church from being misguided into a flurry of unchannelled zeal which would dissipate its life in preliminary concerns. As Nelson puts it, 'The Body of Christ has not been left in the world without the proper direction for its maintenance and growth ... The task of the church therefore is ... in all matters faithfully to serve the Word'. It seems to me that if Tillich is to show himself a faithful doctor of the Word, he should have been far more explicit on this point. There is no way in which it would
contradict his doctrine of the Spirit: it would only serve to clarify and strengthen it.

Tillich's analysis of prayer presents us with several problems, most of which stem from the ontological framework of his theology. For example, the statement that the Spirit helps us in our praying means that God is praying to himself through us is confusing in two ways. Not only does Tillich fail to preserve the trinitarian structure of prayer (that prayer is to the Father through the Son in the power of the Spirit) but he does not delineate clearly enough between the place of the human spirit and that of the divine Spirit in the act of prayer. In fact, his assertion that prayer is not to be thought of in terms of conversation between man and God in that every genuine prayer transcends the subject-object distinction (and therefore the distinction between the human spirit and the divine Spirit), leads us to reply that one of the reasons why it is sound to think of prayer in terms of conversation is precisely because it underlies the personal relationship between God and man in which the distinctiveness of each is preserved. It is partly because Tillich cannot admit of any such personal relationship that he is led to underestimate the importance of concrete intercession in Christian prayer. Now it is certainly true that one of the purposes of intercession is to bring one's desires - whether for oneself or for others - into subjection to the divine will, and in that will find their true fulfilment, and in this sense Tillich is agreeing with Kierkegaard's saying, that 'prayer does not change God, but changes him who offers it'. But this is surely not the sole purpose of intercession. Behind the prayer of intercession lies two important assumptions: firstly, that our human interests, problems and desires are of the utmost concern to God - no matter how small or seemingly insignificant they may be; and
secondly, that God is able to order all things, not only for the accomplishment of his purposes, but also for the blessing of those who turn to him in prayer. Tillich does not really make these points at all. For him, the specific prayers of the individual are of secondary importance; what really matters is that the Spirit should override these prayers and reorientate them away from their concrete concern to the more general concern of the ultimate fulfilment of God's purposes as a whole. But to say this must be to devalue the place of specific intercession, let alone to deny the efficacy of particular intercession in the lives of countless numbers of people throughout Christian history. And we are left with the image, not of the personal God who is intimately concerned with his people, seeking to fulfil the personal needs of those who place their trust in him, one to whom the individual can turn and know he will be heard; but of an impersonal divine purpose into which the specific content of our prayers is absorbed without any real significance having been accorded to it. Such an interpretation of prayer would hardly have prompted the writer of Hebrews to say, 'Let us then with confidence draw near the throne of grace, that we may receive mercy and find grace to help in time of need', still less the assurance with which Paul promised his Philippian brothers, 'My God will supply every need of yours'.

It is little wonder, then, that Tillich has nothing to say about the role of faith in the act of prayer. The New Testament, on the other hand, strongly emphasises the place of faith in the prayer of intercession, a faith that is always directly concerned with the specific content of the prayer being offered, a faith related to a conscious need. For Tillich, however, the real nature of prayer is nothing consciously expressed, but rather something hidden from us, incomprehensible, known only to the Spirit. What we must assert is that any genuine understanding of prayer
must contain both of these elements. For the doctrine of the Spirit, this means that the same Spirit who prays within us with unutterable words also gives us boldness to approach God with our conscious intercessions in the knowledge that they will be heard. 110

Tillich is completely justified in recalling Protestants to a reappraisal of contemplation, and there is much truth in his suggestion that this neglect has been to their spiritual disadvantage. But one fails to see why contemplation necessitates an ecstatic transcendence of the subject-object order. This is only so if one accepts as the only valid understanding of contemplation the interpretation put forward by mystical schools of devotion which would emphasize the essential unity of the human spirit with the divine Spirit at the expense of a truly personal relationship. Hence Tillich contends that the Protestant neglect of contemplation stems from its personalistic interpretation of the divine Spirit. It is not true, however, that contemplation in itself is incompatible with a definition of the Spirit in personal terms. One can contemplate on the intensely personal nature of the love of God, or meditate on the reality of the divine Presence, without subscribing to a belief in transcendent union. The one does not depend on nor arise from the other. 111

There is little comment of a critical nature that one can make about Tillich's remarks on the expansive functions of the church. Much of what he says is of a practical nature, and in this context is useful. There are one or two assumptions in his analysis of evangelism, however, which one would question. His interpretation of 'evangelistic preaching', for example, seems too narrow, and there is a sense in which this type of evangelism has become discredited precisely because of the sort of emotional abuse to which Tillich refers. One feels, therefore, that he could have
given some attention to other, more contemporary forms, of kerygmatic
proclamation, such as communication through the mass media, or the role
of personal evangelism. Secondly, one must question his assumption that
all true evangelism creates a transcendence of subject and object. This
is one of those statements which seems to mean very little, and is
certainly not borne out by any evangelistic results. The ideas behind
such a mode of expression would be completely foreign to the work of most
evangelists. It is certainly true that the Spirit is active in genuine
evangelistic work, and that the purpose of evangelism is to reconcile
men with God, but this does not have to be interpreted in the sense of
creating ontological union. In this context, Tillich's criticism that
certain evangelists use the words like 'repentance', 'faith' and so on, to
mean other than what they are intended to mean, could equally justifiably
be levelled against himself.

In his discussion on the constructive functions of the churches, the
general point that Tillich makes about the relation between form-affirmation
and form-transcendence is an important one, and underlines the truth that
the Spirit uses the materials of ordinary life and experience as the means
by which he works within the world. This emphasises the point that must
be made again and again in the development of the doctrine of the Spirit,
that the divine Spirit neither violates nor bypasses human activity, but
by using it for his own purposes gives it a new and profound significance.
This is certainly something Tillich does not intend us to forget, and
rightly so. His discussion on the aesthetic function and its place in
the life of the church is interesting, but it would have greatly benefitted
from more specific illustrations. The tension between the principles of
'consecration' and 'honesty' is, for example, one of the primary concerns
of contemporary liturgical renewal, which seeks to 'consecrate' the modern
emphasis on functionalism, despite the resistance of traditional forces within the church. This can be seen particularly in the revolution in church architecture, closely connected as it is with the liturgical movement.\textsuperscript{112} This is something which has certainly affected Protestantism, and in some ways may have illustrated the point Tillich is making more effectively than his analysis of religious paintings. However, it is easy to be subjective in one's preferences here: different forms of aesthetic expression make their appeal to different people. Hence the need for a variety of illustrations if the point is to be made effectively. Nevertheless, one can certainly affirm with Tillich that the Spirit is not tied to particular artistic styles and forms of expression, even though certain types will lend themselves more to his revelatory activity than others. The 'openness' to the Spirit which is so essential to any genuine Spiritual activity calls for an honesty of expression which is incompatible with any demand for traditional conformity.

With regard to his analysis of the cognitive function in the life of the churches, one cannot agree with Tillich that theology is possible on the basis of any philosophical tradition. Certainly there are important philosophical traditions which can be used as an effective framework for a theological system, but it is difficult to see how a theology can be constructed on the foundation of a philosophy that denies the spiritual dimension, as materialism and naturalism do. The most the materialist or the naturalist can do is to offer a critique of theology, or perhaps seek to offer a reinterpretation of theology along non-theological lines. But this is not theology. It may be true that such philosophies contain a 'meditative element', but one would take issue with Tillich that the meditative element alone is the criterion for theological understanding. It is surely the way in which one views the meditative element, and whether
one recognises within it the spiritual dimension or not, that determines whether one's approach can be called theological. The very refusal to recognise a spiritual dimension to life, let alone the presence of the divine Spirit in the midst of life, would surely rule out materialistic forms of philosophy as the framework for theological construction and understanding.

In dealing with the ambiguities of inclusiveness in the life of the churches, Tillich pays particular attention to the way in which the need to protect the symbols of a particular denomination may cause it to resist unity with other denominations. Now whilst this may certainly be true, it is surely necessary to draw a distinction between symbols which are of basic, fundamental importance and symbols which are of a secondary nature. For while the church is frequently and perhaps much more generally divided over the latter, there are important primary symbols, such as the Word of God, the Christ and even the divine Spirit, which are much more the basis for unity than the cause for division. One feels that through the present ecumenical contact between the churches, the various denominations will become more aware of their vital unity through these primary symbols of the faith, as indeed they are doing. And having realised this, it may well be that each denomination will become more aware of the significance of those secondary symbols which belong to another denomination, and also be led to a reappraisal of its own. In this case, the church may come to realise its inclusiveness amidst the variety of symbols used within its life rather than in spite of it.

Two comments may be made with reference to the functions of leadership and constitution in the life of the church. In the first place, whilst Tillich is quite right in pointing out the demonic dangers in the papal system, it should be emphasised that democratic forms of leadership
are not exempt from such dangers on account of their democratic nature. There are times when under the guise of democratic leadership in the Protestant churches, tyranny may well occur, as history shows, and this is something Tillich should have shown much more clearly. The General Assembly or the Methodist Conference can violate the principles of leadership just as much as the Pope of Rome, despite the fact that they work under the name of democracy. It is only as democracy is grasped by the Spirit that unambiguous leadership becomes possible. In the second place, the statement that the Spirit guides the church into certain constitutional forms which are adequate to its functions suggests a pragmatism that is not altogether consistent with the view that constitutional problems are indirectly theological. Once one has admitted that such issues are of a theological nature — whether directly or indirectly — one must surely relegate pragmatic considerations to a secondary place. One sees this in the debate as to whether episcopacy is of the esse or the bene esse of the church. If one is convinced that the theological principles behind episcopal church government are sound, then presumably pragmatic considerations are not strictly relevant to the question of whether one accepts or rejects episcopacy at all. One accepts it because it is a necessary, valid symbol of the relation between God and man, not because it is expedient in a particular time and place. There is need for clarification in Tillich's argument here.

Turning to the discussion of the personal functions in the life of the church, Tillich's concept of genuine asceticism as that in which those things are denied which hinder development towards the fulfilment of one's own humanity is in danger of subordinating sainthood to humanity without sufficient qualification. One does not deny any connection between the two — indeed in its use of the word teleios, the New Testament itself
suggests that all who aspire to sainthood must press on towards maturity in the power of the Spirit. But what Tillich does not really point out is that this is not a maturity that is pursued regardless of agape towards one's fellows. In fact, the New Testament is quite explicit that there are times when one must specifically deny oneself for the sake of those who stand in need. In fact, it is surely in the very act of self-denying love, such as one sees supremely in the Christ, that one shows a real transparency to the divine, which is, on Tillich's own definition, the essence of sainthood. One must beware therefore of interpreting sainthood in terms of the fulfilment of one's personal humanity, for there are times when it can only be achieved at the expense of one's own fulfilment. For this reason, one must conclude that Tillich's interpretation of sainthood is somewhat defective. A further place where Tillich is not particularly clear is in his comments on other-determination. It is not immediately apparent what he means when he talks about the Spirit in the function of other-determination transcending the subject-object split, so that he who is subject becomes object and he who is object becomes subject. If he means that in any genuine act of sharing neither the one who teaches nor the one who learns is to be viewed exclusively in those roles, in that both receive and both give, then we can heartily agree. But if in addition to this he also means that in some way or other in the Spiritual Presence the essential distinction between subject and object is somehow obliterated in a transcendent, ontological union, this is something rather foreign to Christian thought. We are faced again with the problem of the precise meaning of the transcendent unity, to which we shall return in our final evaluation.

Finally, the section on the relating functions of the church forms a useful introduction to any discussion on the involvement of the church
in society, and it is because of the relevance of what Tillich has to say on this theme throughout the broad spectrum of his writings that he has been hailed by the theologians of involvement. His understanding of the church's mission as becoming active in the life of the world at every level, seeking to prepare the way for the impact of the Spirit in every place, is an important corrective to narrower, traditional interpretations which restrict the church to a purely religious role, though it needs to be added that the church's main function is still to preach the Gospel of Christ. This emphasis on involvement is timely, though Tillich cannot be unaware of the fact that the state does not always encourage such involvement, and in certain situations as in the Communist East may forbid it. The need to participate politically will mean, therefore, that at times the church will walk on a tightrope, and it is here where it must remain very close to the Spirit who leads it. Nevertheless, altogether one feels that Tillich's comments here — as indeed in the whole of this section — are well worth careful study by the church and its members.

III. THE SPIRITUAL COMMUNITY AND THE INDIVIDUAL CHRISTIAN

The relationship of the individual both to the church and to the Spiritual Presence occupies a central position in Tillich's discussion on the work of the Spirit. Although this is a subject of fundamental importance in all theological thinking, his way of dealing with it is far from traditional, and his main concern is to reinterpret those concepts traditionally associated with it in the light of his basic assertion that the function of the divine Spirit is to create a New Reality into which the individual Christian, as well as the individual church, is taken.

Tillich turns firstly to the problems of Christian initiation and conversion. He sees the individual church member as a 'Spiritual personality', who is constituted thus by his participation in the Spiritual
Community which is the essence of the church's life. As a Spiritual personality, the church member is a creation of the Spirit, 'a saint in spite of his lack of saintliness'. So just as the Spiritual Community is the dynamic essence of the church, the Spiritual personality which derives from it is the essence of every individual church member. So the thorny historical question as to which comes first ontologically, the individual Christian or the church, is resolved by going beyond the question itself and asserting that in fact both are preceded by the Spiritual Community, and both depend on the Spiritual Community for their life.

Historically, however, various attempts to answer this question led to two different types of church, the one emphasising the priority of the church, the other that of the individual. Tillich describes the first type of church as 'objective', the second type 'subjective'. The advantage of the first way of thinking was that it did at least point to the church as the community of the New Being into which the individual enters. It realised that the essential faith of the Spiritual Community which lies at the heart of the church's life, is a reality 'which precedes the ever becoming, ever changing, ever disappearing, and ever reappearing acts of personal faith'. This is why such a church accepted infant baptism as its acknowledged form of Christian initiation. For in practising the baptism of infants, it placed the real emphasis on the faith of the community itself, into which the individual is taken and in the context of which he becomes a Spiritual personality and so actualises faith in his own life. By acknowledging that individual faith is something which grows and develops as one participates in the Spiritual Community, the 'objective' church is set free from having to determine at what stage a person has actual faith or becomes spiritually mature. For this reason,
Tillich feels, Christian initiation rightly takes place at the outset of life, at the beginning of a person's participation in the Spiritual Community, and does not need to be postponed to a later date when some 'quasi-sacramental' rite of confirmation occurs, based as it so often is on an enforced affirmation of commitment which is both psychologically undesirable and theologically unjustifiable.

But the second type of church, the 'subjective', also leads one to assert the priority of the Spiritual Community. Existentially, such a church arises from the decision of certain individuals who have been grasped by the Spirit to covenant together and with God, believing that they have been led to do so by the Spirit at work in their lives. Now such a decision may give the impression that the individual Christian is prior to the church. But Tillich points out that because such people could not make such a decision without the guidance of the Spirit, they are in a very real sense already members of the Spiritual Community, which must therefore precede them. So the distinction between these two types of church begins to fade away when one acknowledges that the Spiritual Community is prior to both, and the question as to which comes first, the individual or the church, is transcended.

The problem of conversion arises from the fact that the impossibility of singling out a specific moment in the life of an individual as the beginning of his participation in the Spiritual Community applies just as much to those who have come into the church from the outside as to those who have been brought up in a church environment. Although this may seem to contradict the biblical doctrine of conversion, which emphasises the experience of conversion as the precise moment in which a person enters the Spiritual Community, Tillich reminds us that conversion is not necessarily an instantaneous event: 'it is in most cases a long
process which has been going on unconsciously long before it breaks into consciousness, giving the impression of a sudden, unexpected and over-whelming crisis. But it would be a mistake to think that the climax itself is the essence of conversion, despite the fact that this is the particular part of the conversion process that receives most attention. It is indeed true that in the process of conversion there comes a particular point at which, as the word itself suggests, one 'turns around on one's way', a point at which one affirms the New Being in the power of the Spirit, but this time of decision has been prepared for through a whole series of past experiences and should not be isolated from them. Thus conversion, the act of entering into the Spiritual Community, is to be viewed as a process 'that becomes manifest in an ecstatic moment', a process without which the climactic decision itself would be nothing more than an emotional outburst with no lasting effects.

Tillich points out that there are many times when conversion 'can have the character of a transition from the latent stage of the Spiritual Community to its manifest stage'. In such a situation, neither repentance nor faith are completely new, for the Spirit is already at work within the latent Spiritual Community to which the person concerned has belonged. There is 'no absolute conversion, but . . . a relative conversion before and after the central event of somebody's "repenting" and "believing", of somebody's being grasped by the Spiritual Presence in a fertile moment, a kairos'. This consideration is bound to affect the church's approach to evangelism. It will no longer seek to convert people in an absolute sense, but rather in the relative sense of 'transferring them from a latent to a manifest participation in the Spiritual Community'; it will not address men as 'lost souls', without God, but rather speak to them as those who are already in some
degree of latency, seeking to actualise that latency in a manifest experience. In the same way, the ancient Greek philosophers would describe experiences analogous to conversion as 'experiences in which their eyes were opened', but this did not imply that they were completely blind before. And Tillich feels that this analogy between philosophical and religious conversion is entirely valid in so far as 'the Spiritual Community is related to culture and morality as much as to religion' and that wherever the Spirit is at work 'a moment of radical change in the attitude to the ultimate' becomes inevitable.

By participating in the life of the Spiritual Community as a member of the church, the individual experiences for himself the New Reality. In line with traditional theology, Tillich distinguishes three elements in this experience: 'the experience of New Being as creating (regeneration), . . . as paradox (justification), . . . and as process (sanctification)' . He completely rejects a purely empiricist theology which would go no further than describe these elements from an objective standpoint of faith, in favour of a theology based on participation, in which the subjective experience becomes the ground for the certainty with which the statements of faith are expressed. Thus, the basis for faith is not just the activity of God in Christ, but also the continuing work of the Spirit in the experience of the individual in the context of the Spiritual Community.

Traditionally, Protestant theology has placed regeneration after justification in the scheme of salvation. This underlined the Reformed position that no man is justified on account of anything he is in himself, even on account of his new birth. He is justified by God as he is, in spite of his 'unacceptability', purely on God's own initiative of grace. Therefore in the Protestant scheme of theology, the new birth follows
justification, as the consequence of it, rather than the reason for it.

It is significant that Tillich reverses this order in his own scheme, making regeneration prior to justification. His reason for doing this is that he defines it rather differently from the Reformers. For whereas the Reformers interpreted regeneration in the straightforward biblical sense of the individual experience of new birth, Tillich understands this experience not in the sense of a man becoming a new being in himself but rather in the sense of entering a new reality in the context of which he may become a new being. In fact, to enter this new reality does not imply that one is necessarily to become a new person at all: 'participation in the New Being does not automatically guarantee that one is new'.

Yet by entering into it, the experience of justification now becomes possible, for justification is part of that new order of things brought by Christ. Furthermore, no man can accept justification without faith, and there can be no faith unless one is first grasped by the Spirit who creates the New Reality and draws one into it. In this sense, regeneration must precede justification. So Tillich says that 'participation in the New Being, the creation of the Spirit, is the first element in the state of the individual in the church in so far as it is the actualisation of the Spiritual Community'. In a theology based on participation, regeneration comes first.

The priority Tillich accords to regeneration as being grasped by the New Reality also resolves the concern of those who feel that because of their lack of faith they cannot be justified.

If the Spiritual Presence must grasp me and create faith in me, what can I do in order to reach such faith? I cannot force the Spirit upon myself; so what can I do but wait without acting?

The point is that those who ask a question such as this in all seriousness
can only do so because they are already under the impact of the Spirit who is the source of faith. He who is ultimately concerned about the state of his estrangement and about the possibility of reunion with the ground and aim of his being is already 'in the grip' of the Spiritual Presence. His faith may not yet have found expression, but the important thing is that he is already grasped by the Spirit and therefore placed firmly within the context of Spiritual regeneration, the New Reality the Spirit creates. And this is the beginning of his justification and the ground of his hope.

This brings us to consider justification, the second facet of the experience of the New Being in the life of the individual. As the central doctrine of the Reformation, the concept of justification is the 'first and basic expression of the Protestant principle itself', and emphasises the fact that in the scheme of salvation God alone takes the initiative. There are one or two semantic problems, however, that this doctrine raises, and Tillich looks at these first of all. The first is concerned with the famous expression sola fide. Despite the traditional Protestant defence of this phrase in its controversy with Rome, Tillich feels that it is not a good one. For if one says 'justification is by faith alone', then one gives the impression that faith itself is the cause of God's justifying act, so that it virtually becomes a 'work' in itself. To avoid this confusion it is better to reject the traditional expression 'justification by faith' in favour of the fuller, though more accurate, expression 'justification by grace through faith', a formula which emphasises that the initiative in justification lies with God alone. Secondly, the term 'justification' is one which, because of its legal associations, creates difficulties for contemporary man. Today, we are not so much concerned with the problem of how a man can be legally justi-
fied by God as in Paul's day, and for this reason Tillich feels that the apologetic value of the expression has greatly diminished. We need a term that will speak more forcefully to man in his present situation, and Tillich proposes the word 'acceptance', which points to the fact that we are accepted by God in spite of our unacceptability, despite our estrangement from our essential being and from God himself. Such an expression would be doubly acceptable because of its existential significance in an environment in which biblical language is rapidly losing all meaning. A third problem arises from the expression 'the forgiveness of sins' which is often used instead of 'justification'. Tillich feels that this phrase has severe limitations. Its use in the field of human relations, for example, implies that the person who forgives also stands in need of forgiveness himself, and this obviously cannot be said of God. Similarly, the plural 'sins', while quite valid in the realm of human relations, does not point out clearly enough that what stands between man and God is not so much particular sins as a state of separation and resistance to reunion with him. It has therefore concentrated man's mind on specific sins and their moral quality rather than estrangement from God and its religious quality, even though it is true that particular sins can be powerful symptoms of the condition of sin itself.

The objective aspect of the doctrine of justification properly belongs to the doctrine of the Atonement, 'God's participation in man's existential estrangement and victory over it' in Christ, who thereby becomes the basis for forgiveness and equally the basis for the certainty that one is forgiven. But in the present context of the doctrine of the Spirit, Tillich is concerned with justification as a subjective experience. As he puts it,
How can man accept that he is accepted; how can he reconcile his feeling of guilt and his desire for punishment with the prayer for forgiveness; and what gives him the certainty that he is forgiven?

The only valid basis for this certainty is that God declares him who is unjust to be just, *simul justus, simul peccator*. This does not mean that God accepts a half-sinful, half-just man on account of his good half, for God rejects any human claim to goodness. In fact, there is an important difference between human goodness, with its ambiguous demands for moral justice and the punishment of sin, and the goodness of God, which overcomes any demands for a strict justice in an attitude of free acceptance, 'a justice which makes him who is unjust just'.

This does not mean that God negates human justice, but rather that he fulfils it in the sense that he destroys the very estrangement which makes reunion with himself impossible, a situation which man would never be able to achieve under his own steam. The only way forward for man therefore is to surrender himself completely to God, including his own goodness, and the courage to make this surrender is the 'central element in the courage of faith'. Yet in this very act of surrender he experiences for himself the paradox of the New Reality, that he is accepted by God in spite of his unacceptability, as he is grasped by the unambiguous life of God through the impact of the Spirit.

In this context Tillich is also concerned with the person who is in the situation of radical doubt, 'existential doubt concerning the meaning of life itself', and its relationship to justifying faith. A person who finds himself in this situation is in danger not only of rejecting religion in its narrower sense, but also in its wider sense of ultimate concern, and thus he cannot accept the message that God accepts the unacceptable because God has no meaning for him. Questions regarding acceptance or rejection by God are for him replaced by
questions regarding the discovery of meaning in an apparently meaningless world. How can such a man as this experience justification? First of all, says Tillich, one must realise that God cannot be reached by any intellectual exercise any more than by moral works, and this means that a man in this situation cannot of himself overcome his doubt any more than another person can overcome his sin. But having said that, Tillich feels that the very search for meaning in a 'meaningless world' which this person is engaged in, in itself means that he does presuppose a meaning, and that his ultimate concern lies in this quest of truth. Augustine affirms this when he says that in the situation of doubt the truth from which one feels separated is already present inasmuch as in every doubt the formal affirmation of truth as truth is presupposed. And this means that God is present incognito in the ultimate honesty of doubt and the absolute seriousness of despair about meaning. In these things, the impact of the Spirit is at work within the life of the so-called 'unbeliever'. This enables Tillich to affirm that contemporary, questioning man, is accepted by God because of his concern regarding the ultimate meaning of his life, despite the fact that he is unacceptable in view of the doubt and meaninglessness which has taken hold of him. To those in this situation Tillich would say that 'in the seriousness of their existential despair, God is present to them. To accept this paradoxical acceptance is the courage of their faith'.

It is significant that in his analysis of the order of salvation, Tillich gives more space to the theme of sanctification than to any other theme. This is hardly surprising, seeing that his is a theology of participation, for sanctification above all others is the theological expression which points to the experience and fruit of life in the Spirit. 'The impact of the Spiritual Presence on the individual,' he

says, 'results in a life process based on the experience of regeneration, qualified by the experience of justification, and developing as the experience of sanctification'.\textsuperscript{132} Sanctification, then, is fundamentally a process in which the New Being is experienced, an actual transformation of life under the impact of the Spirit. In this sense it is something completely different from justification, though the two have often been confused in the history of theology. This process of sanctification has been described differently in various traditions. The variation largely depended on the precise emphasis each tradition placed on the role of law, though every form of Protestantism rejected the Catholic idea that law is the necessary basis for the Christian life. Instead, the Reformers saw the function of law in a rather different light. For both Luther and Calvin, it had two main purposes: firstly, to direct the life of the political group, and secondly, to act as a schoolmaster in the sense of 'showing man what he essentially is and therefore ought to be and the extent to which his actual state contradicts the image of his true being'. It is in this second function, as Tillich interprets it, that law drives man to his quest for transcendent union, or more simply, leads him to Christ. But Calvin added a third function to the law, that of guiding the Christian in his daily living, for although the Christian is indeed grasped by the Spirit, he is nevertheless not entirely free from the power of negative thought and action. So in Calvinism the law became a disciplinary tool in the process of sanctification.\textsuperscript{133} But this was unacceptable to Luther, who believed that such guidance came more directly and immediately from the Spirit himself, who helped man to reach his decisions in the light of agape alone, thus being freed from the letter of the law.\textsuperscript{134} Tillich argues that whereas Calvin's solution may have seemed more realistic in that
it could support both an ethical theory and a disciplined life of sanctification, and was therefore possibly more acceptable to many, Luther's solution was more 'ecstatic', more open to the impact of the Spirit, which although unable to form any ethical system was nevertheless full of creative possibilities for the personal life. The third tradition of Protestantism, the 'Evangelical-Radical', or Pietist, tended to follow Calvinism, but in addition emphasised much more the concept of holiness. The Pietists maintained that perfection is possible in this life, even if only in the case of certain individuals or groups in whom the Spirit is particularly present. But Tillich feels that this sort of thinking denies the significant 'in spite of' in the process of sanctification. One of the obvious dangers of perfectionism was the tendency to confuse salvation with moral perfection, an obvious distortion of the truly paradoxical nature of holiness, and here Pietism crossed swords with Calvinism, which saw perfection as a goal to be aimed at rather than a state attainable in this life.

Tillich maintains that these three differing attitudes have far-reaching consequences regarding the Christian life. We may describe the Calvinist understanding of progressive sanctification, assisted by the law as a guide and a means of discipline, as a 'slowly-upward turning line' in which faith and love become actualised more and more. On the other hand, the Lutheran pattern is more a series of oscillations between ecstasy and anxiety, 'of being grasped by agape and (then) thrown back into estrangement and ambiguity', a pattern which itself may have been partly responsible for later devaluation of morality and practical religion in Lutheran circles, and as a reaction against which Pietism may well have arisen. On balance, Tillich is inclined to favour Luther's understanding of ethics (as distinct from later Lutheran
distortions) as being more true to actual experience, more in keeping with contemporary psychological thought regarding man, and more in line with his own reading of the doctrine of the Spirit and his ecstatic impact on human life and action.

What is needed at the present moment of time is a reinterpretation of the doctrine of sanctification bearing in mind contemporary theological and psychological thought. Tillich suggests four principles to act as the necessary criteria for such a reinterpretation: increasing awareness, increasing freedom, increasing relatedness, and increasing transcendence. These principles, he says, unite both religious and secular traditions, to create an "indefinite but distinguishable image of "the Christian life"."\(^{136}\) The increasing awareness which Tillich names as the first principle of sanctification is an awareness of the ambiguous nature of the Christian life and the continuous struggle between the divine and the demonic. The Christian is not like the Stoic who believes that once he has conquered his passions and desires no further ambiguity remains. Instead, as he proceeds in Christian experience, he is increasingly aware of the element of struggle to which the ambiguities of life give rise. But he is also aware of a power of affirmation present in his life by which the Spirit makes him sensitive towards every challenge that confronts him, whether it be in relation to his own spiritual growth or that of others. Such an awareness, says Tillich, does not depend on cultural education or sophistication: it is nothing less than the gift of the Spirit. It may well be that increased education will help in this and in this sense there is an overlap between psychological and spiritual sensitivity, but in any true development of awareness the presence of the Spirit is the directing factor.
By increasing freedom, Tillich means an increasing liberation from those things which hinder man's spiritual growth. In the first place, it is a 'growth in freedom from the law'.\textsuperscript{137} For the law, as 'man's essential being confronting him in the state of estrangement', is a hindrance to the spiritual growth of man in the sense that it is continually hounding him with laws of prohibition and commandment which inevitably produce feelings of guilt and inadequacy. But as man experiences the impact of the Spirit on his life more and more with a consequent growth in the Christian life, such a bondage is eased and the more free he becomes. Increasing Spiritual reunion fights against estrangement. Secondly, this growth in freedom is an increasing liberation from the specific contents of the law. Particular laws are not only helpful but also oppressive, in that they 'cannot meet the ever concrete, ever new, ever unique situation', and to be free from them means that the process of sanctification will give rise to a mature freedom which is able to create new 'laws' or modify older ones to meet changing situations. Although there is an obvious risk here that man may use this newly found liberty to sanction his own desires, the fact that the Spirit is effectively present will mean that such a tendency will be resisted. The freedom of the Spirit holds within itself the power to combat every force that would seek to destroy it, and this applies equally both to internal and external pressures. This resistance on occasions may lead to self-denial - sometimes even to martyrdom - and though these things do not in themselves achieve sanctification, yet they do constitute a response to a demand to help preserve freedom in a given situation. And thirdly, this growth in freedom from the law under the impact of the divine Spirit is also a growth in freedom from the fear and despair which stems from the failure to fulfil the
law. As he puts it in one of his sermons,

Where it happens that man has gained freedom, "the spirit of bondage to fear" is overcome by "the spirit of adoption". When a child has a moment that we could call a moment of grace, he suddenly does the good freely, without command, and more than had been commanded; happiness glows in his face. He is balanced within himself, without enmity, and is full of love. Bondage and fear have disappeared; obedience has ceased to be obedience and has become free inclination; ego and super-ego are united. This is the liberty of the children of God, liberty from the law, and because from the law, also from the condemnation to despair.138

The principle of increasing freedom in the process of sanctification is balanced by that of increasing relatedness, by which the Christian conquers any tendency to self-isolation in the reuniting power of love. This relatedness implies (both) the awareness of the other one and the freedom to relate to him by overcoming self-seclusion within oneself and the other one.139 Tillich confesses that such a process is not easy, that there are many barriers to the creation of true relationships with others, as psychology has shown. But the Spirit's ecstatic impact on the individual breaks down these barriers by helping him to rise above himself and 'find' the other person in a very real sense, by creating a power of relationship within him that pervades every concrete relation he experiences, so that he knows intuitively when to withdraw and when to communicate, holding both of these aspects together in perfect balance. In this way the process of sanctification enables a person successfully to overcome any tendency to introspection, not by encouraging him to become an extrovert, but by turning his personal centre towards the dimension of its depth and height. As he puts it, 'Relatedness needs the vertical dimension in order to actualise itself in the horizontal dimension'.140 Or in other words, true relationships are possible only in the context of the divine Spirit.
What is true of one's relationships with others is also true of one's relationships with oneself. In this sense, sanctification creates 'a mature self-relatedness in which self-acceptance conquers both self-evaluation and self-contempt in a process of reunion with one's self'. But such a reunion is possible only when the dichotomy between the self as subject and the self as object is transcended. For as subject, the self tries to impose itself on the self as object through self-control and self-discipline, whereas as object, it resists this imposition in self-pity. Mature self-relatedness is to reconcile the self as subject with itself as object by spontaneously affirming one's essential being beyond this split. As one becomes more mature in the Spirit this spontaneity increases and the individual is more able to affirm his true self without falling into the opposing pitfalls of self-elevation and self-humiliation. This quest for self-relatedness, Tillich points out, is virtually the same as the psychologist's 'search for identity', whose aim is not to preserve the 'accidental state of the existential self', but to drive towards a self which transcends every stage of its development, yet which is still essentially the same self through every change it undergoes.

The fourth principle which Tillich enumerates as determining the meaning of sanctification for contemporary man is that of self-transcendence, a principle which is not so much on a par with the other three as that which makes the other three existentially possible, and without which any growth in maturity would be out of the question. The act of self-transcendence is, of course, in the direction of the ultimate, a 'participation in the holy'. As such, it is the essence of the life of prayer, although it is by no means confined to prayer. In fact, the more mature a person becomes in the life of the Spirit, the more will
he realise the implications of self-transcendence in every part of his life. Yet despite this, prayer will nevertheless remain the model for all genuine self-transcendence and all acts which express it. These acts will be all those in which the impact of the Spirit is experienced: 'in prayer or meditation in total privacy, in the exchange of Spiritual experiences with others, in communications on a secular basis, in the experience of creative works of man's spirit, in the midst of labour or rest'. 142 To be in such a state of self-transcendence 'is like the breathing-in of another air, an elevation above average existence', and as one becomes increasingly mature one becomes aware of this experience more and more. Tillich feels that the renewed emphasis on self-transcendence in theology in post-war years, coupled with the fact that there seems to be widespread desire for some such experience in the contemporary world, has greatly diminished prejudices against religion, particularly in its claim to be the mediator of such an experience. He feels that in the light of this favourable situation it is imperative that new symbols of transcendence should be found which will assist people in their quest and so help them in their growth towards maturity.

So Tillich summarises his interpretation of sanctification in this way:

The Christian life never reaches the state of perfection - it always remains an up-and-down course - but in spite of its mutable character it contains a movement toward maturity, however fragmentary the mature state may be. It is manifest in the religious as well as the secular life, and it transcends both of them in the power of the Spiritual Presence. 143

Just as there have been different ways of defining and working towards sanctification in the various Christian traditions, so also there have been differences in opinion as to what constitutes a saint, or as Tillich puts it, what constitutes a valid image of perfection. 144
One may legitimately define a saint as one who is transparent to the divine, but in pre-Reformation times this led to a transmoral superiority of the canonised saint over other people, so that he stood ahead not only from a moral point of view but also from other standpoints, such as the ability to work miracles, demonstrating in his own life the divine power over nature. Tillich points out that Protestantism felt that this was a distortion of the true biblical concept of saintliness, which emphasises that every Christian is a saint. Furthermore, the Reformed tradition could never be happy with any distinction which threatened the Protestant principle of the infinite distance between man and God, a threat which the idea of transmoral perfection seemed to contain. But though Protestantism does not recognise 'saints', it does recognise sanctification, and because of this it accepts personal representations of the impact of the Spirit on man, which manifest to others the meaning of that impact and its implications for the individual. Such representations are to be called 'saints' no more than any other members of the Spiritual Community; rather are they 'examples of the embodiment of the Spirit in bearers of the personal self and as such are of tremendous importance for the life of the churches'.

In Tillich's view, such people may be found in both the religious and the secular spheres of life. They may be termed 'images of perfection', images which are 'patterned after the creations of the Spirit, faith and love, and after the four principles determining the process of sanctification'.

Two problems arise in this connection, however; both of them connected with the idea of faith and love as the foundation of perfection: the problem of doubt in relation to the increase in faith, and the problem of the relation between the eros quality of love to growth in its agape quality. In the first place, it has generally been assumed
that perfection entails the elimination of doubt. The acceptance of the church's authority in matters of faith and order as divine in the Roman Catholic church necessitates the saint's unconditional acceptance of that authority, and a similar situation is often found in certain forms of Protestantism, particularly where faith has been distorted into a literal acceptance of the Bible and the Creeds. Thus one sometimes gets in Protestantism the strange situation where sin is admitted as being inevitable in the life of the Christian (according to the principle of simul justus et peccator) whereas doubt is not allowed. Tillich points out that to maintain this Protestantism is being inconsistent. If there is, as Protestantism affirms, an infinite gap between man and God, then it must admit a certain agnosticism in man's understanding of the divine. This means that some element of doubt will remain, so that far from eliminating doubt, the process of sanctification will take all honest doubt into itself. So 'creative courage is an element of faith even in the state of perfection, and where there is courage there is risk and the doubt implied in risk'. It is this element of doubt that really differentiates between faith and mystical union, and this is why Tillich feels that certain forms of Pietism, which emphasise the certainty that accompanies an immediate awareness of the presence of God, are really trying to anticipate mystical union rather than affirm the role of faith. However, because a full mystical union is impossible within the existential sphere, such certainty is out of the question: 'doubt is unavoidable as long as there is separation of subject and object, and even the most immediate and intimate feeling of union with the divine... cannot bridge the infinite distance between the finite and the infinite by which it is grasped'. In fact, the more spiritually sensitive a man is, the more advanced his
his sanctification, the deeper the impact of the Spirit upon his life, 
the greater his awareness of the gap between himself and God, and conse­
quently the more profound his doubt. Thus doubt is not only psycholo­
gically probable, it is also more significantly theologically necessary. 149

This raises the whole issue of the place of mysticism in relation 
to sanctification. Tillich points out that there have always been those 
in Protestantism who, in addition to the Pietists, have affirmed that 
the zenith of sanctification is mystical union. On the other hand, 
more personalistic types of Protestant theology have tended to assert 
that the ultimate aim of sanctification is to be seen in terms of a 
perfect relationship rather than mystical union, that in fact faith 
should reject anything that savoured of mystical experience. But 
Tillich cannot accept this; for him faith and mystical experience are 
not alternative ways to God, they each complement the other. Indeed, 
because faith is no less than the divine Spirit grasping a man, then in 
every state of faith there is 'an experience of the presence of the 
infinite in the finite', which can be called none other than mystical. 
'Every experience of the divine is mystical because it transcends the 
cleavage between subject and object, and wherever this happens, the 
mystical category is given'. 150 The mystical, then, is an element in 
faith. But so also is faith a genuine element in every mystical exper­
ience, inasmuch as every such experience is a result of being grasped 
by the divine Spirit. Faith and mystical experience, therefore, inter­
penetrate each other, but they are not identical, for whereas in faith 
there are elements of courage and risk present, elements which presuppose 
the cleavage between subject and object, in mystical experience these 
elements are left behind, even though only fragmentarily. Tillich 
concludes that faith and mystical union belong to each other in the
process of sanctification. Such a realisation must inevitably recall Protestantism to a reappraisal of the place of mysticism in its own life.151

The second problem arising from using faith and love as patterns for perfection concerns the relation between the eros-quality of love and the increase of its agape-quality in the life of the Christian.152 This problem arises from the fact that it has often been thought that agape excludes all other forms of love, an assumption which in Tillich's point of view is mistaken. Contemporary psychology has demonstrated that even the highest functions of spirit are rooted in the most vital trends of human nature, and Tillich's own concept of the multidimensional unity of life would also reject any separation of human vitality and spiritual functions. This is why, as we have seen already, an ascetic discipline which pursues sanctification by ruthlessly repressing the vital elements of human personality can do untold damage. What is needed is a form of discipline supported by creative eros and wisdom which will see to it that each of these elements fulfils its proper role in the process of sanctification. This does not mean that the Christian is at liberty, for example, to pursue every pleasure he may love in a self-centred hedonism though we should not infer from this that so-called 'innocent pleasures' are permissible, whereas others are not. What it does mean is that under the impact of the Spirit, the Christian will be led to discern the divine and the demonic possibilities in every pleasure, in every form of love, and the true image of perfection is therefore the one who in the battle between the two prevails against the latter, even though fragmentarily. In fact, this participation in ultimate victory is for Tillich the distinguishing criterion between the Christian and the humanist images of perfection. But the Christian can only share
in this victory over the forces of evil by affirming in the first place that every part of human vitality, every form of human love, has its legitimate place in the process of sanctification. So agape does not deny the other elements of love as place in the life of him who is grasped by the Spirit. Rather through Spiritual discernment does it recognize what their role shall be. It is only when such a role is affirmed that the Spirit can demonstrate his conquest of every ambiguity of love.

Evaluation

Tillich has provided us with a valuable and penetrating study of the life of the individual Christian in the church in relation to the work of the Spirit. This particular aspect of the Spirit's activity has always been emphasised by Protestants, even though the accent has not always fallen in the same place. Often it has been emphasised at the expense of any systematic doctrine of the church itself, and for this reason Tillich's attempt to bring together the work of the Spirit in the Spiritual Community and in the life of the individual is important. The precise relation between the individual and the church from the points of view of 'Who is a Christian?' or 'What is a church member?' has always been a difficult one, and Tillich is aware of the sensitivity surrounding these questions. Nevertheless, his solutions to these problems would not be accepted by all. In his discussion on conversion and church membership, for example, he places far too little emphasis on the conscious and individual response of faith to the work of the Spirit. The argument that a church member is essentially a creation of the Spirit because he is a member of the church which is itself essentially a creation of the Spirit only serves to throw us back onto what one means by a church member and what is the criterion of his membership. Does every church
member, simply because his name is on the membership roll of the church, genuinely participate in the essence of the church's life? In what way can it possibly be considered that a purely nominal church member is a creation of the Spirit, a Spiritual personality? Even were one to accept Tillich's later interpretation of regeneration as entering into the New Reality rather than being made new in oneself, it is obvious that there are many formal members of the church who have never experienced that New Reality which is at the heart of the church's life. In fact, it is difficult to see how any church which is consciously seeking to actualise true Spiritual Community can be content with a purely formal or automatic approach to church membership which fails to emphasise the need for inward change, and though one would not wish to say that inward change is the criterion for church membership, yet any concept of church membership which does not include 'turning round in one's way' is surely defective from the New Testament point of view. Tillich is certainly right in his rejection of any insistence on the church's part that he who wishes to become a church member must go through a set pattern of conversion. But what is surely important is that the Spirit operates within the individual, creating within him not only the desire to participate in the life of the church (which Tillich has already emphasised) but also the response to the message of the Gospel which the church proclaims. This may well seem to conflict with Tillich's assertion that what matters fundamentally is not the personal faith of the individual as such but the ongoing faith of the church into which context the individual is taken and may find commitment, but it is difficult to see how one can decide on a criterion of church membership without some reference to the work of the Spirit in the life of the individual with particular regard to the creation of a personal response to the message of the
Gospel and the faith of the church, and this is true whether one accepts the validity of infant baptism or not. The fact that it is not always possible to say when such a response is made, does not mean that it has no part to play in seeking to define such a criterion. Certainly Tillich does not provide us with any compelling reason why one should reject the rite of confirmation or its equivalent, despite its ambiguities. In fact, one would have thought that he would be the first to affirm that nothing is invalidated because of the ambiguities to which it may be subjected. At least such a rite underlines the importance of personal response and commitment whether it actually coincides with it or not. And in seeking to work towards a valid criterion for church membership this particular work of the Spirit cannot be ignored.

The analogy Tillich draws between religious and philosophical conversion is, although valid, limited. It is true that both forms of conversion may be described as 'having one's eyes opened', and in this sense both can lead to a fundamental change in the life of the individual. But this is the extent of the analogy: it does not tell us anything about the nature and implications of religious conversion, what the impact of the Spirit involves, neither does it point to the fact that religious conversion in the New Testament is much more radical than conversion to a particular philosophical ideology. When the New Testament speaks of conversion it has in mind a renewal of the individual in the very depths of his being as through the work of the Spirit he is turned and reconciled to God. In this sense it goes beyond what the Greek philosophers meant by 'having one's eyes opened'.

Turning to the experience of the New Being in the life of the individual, the first problem that confronts us is Tillich's definition of the subjective experience of regeneration as entering into a new
reality in the context of which it is possible to become a new being, rather than the actual experience of becoming a new being oneself. It is important that we understand in what way Tillich is using the term 'subjective experience' here, particularly as the phrase is capable of several meanings. Clearly he is not using it to refer to a purely subjective feeling which does not relate to anything objective at all and which cannot be verified empirically. But the phrase suffers from a further ambiguity. Either it could mean the personal witnessing of an objective reality without that reality becoming a part of oneself - the subjective experience of the onlooker who observes. Or else it could mean the subjective appropriation of something, the impact that an objective reality makes on one's life in such a way that it becomes part of oneself. Now it seems that when Tillich defines the subjective experience of regeneration as entering into a new reality in which context it is possible - though not necessary - to become new, he is going no further than speaking of a subjective experience in the former sense. The individual witnesses or observes the new reality by 'entering into it' without necessarily making it a part of his own life. On the other hand, New Testament usage seems to connote the actual experience of becoming a new being oneself, of being so opened up to the Spirit's impact that the new reality brought by Christ effects a fundamental change in one's innermost nature. This is certainly the most straightforward interpretation of those passages which refer to the new birth in the New Testament.154 'If we have, as it were, ' says Paul, 'shared the death of Christ, let us rise and live our new lives with him, even as we are raised to newness of life in him'.155 'For if a man is in Christ he becomes a new person altogether - the past is finished and gone, everything has become fresh and new'.156 Paul says to the
Ephesians, 'To you, who were spiritually dead ... to you Christ has given us life'. And James says, 'By his own wish he made us his own sons through the Word of truth, that we might be, so to speak, the first specimens of his new creation'. All these passages show that regeneration is something which is no less than a radical change in the life of those concerned, nothing less in fact than the gift of a new life, the birth of a new being. In addition to this, if one accepts Tillich's definition of regeneration as 'entering into the new reality', it makes the words of Jesus to Nicodemus in John's Gospel meaningless. Jesus says to Nicodemus that unless he is born anew he cannot even see, let alone enter into, the Kingdom of God. Now for Tillich, the Kingdom of God, like the Spiritual Community, points to the new reality wrought in Christ. One cannot enter this new reality, therefore, according to John's Gospel, unless one is born anew. But if we accept Tillich's definition of regeneration, or new birth, as entering into the new reality, this would mean that John 3 would be paraphrased thus: 'Unless you enter the new reality, you cannot enter the new reality'. The phrase therefore becomes tautological. On these grounds also one feels justified in rejecting Tillich's interpretation of regeneration, for it makes the Johannine text say virtually nothing at all.

In his analysis of justification, despite his insistence on the distinction between the objective act of justification, 'the eternal act of God by which he accepts as not estranged those who are indeed estranged from him by guilt', and justification as a subjective experience, 'the accepting that one is accepted', one feels that Tillich does not maintain this distinction clearly enough. In one sense, his discussion on justification by faith, the meaning of the term for today, and the doctrine of the forgiveness of sins, belongs much more
to the objective side of justification rather than the subjective side, despite the fact that these problems have reference to the individual in his relationship with God. On the other hand, his definition of the subjective experience of justification as the acceptance of acceptance, discussed as it is in relation to such questions as 'How can I accept that I am accepted?' and 'How can I be certain that I am forgiven?', suggests that what he is thinking of here is very similar, if not the same as, the doctrine of assurance. If the two are indeed the same, this would help us to understand why Tillich places justification after regeneration in the scheme of salvation, for no man can accept that he is accepted by God unless he is first grasped by the Spirit in the experience of regeneration. So in his sermon on 'The Witness of the Spirit to the Spirit', he emphasises that the only source of our subjective acceptance that we have become children of God is the divine Spirit himself 'who testifies with the human spirit that we are born of God' by grasping the human spirit ecstatically. One is reminded of Wesley's sermon on the same text where he says, 'The testimony of the Spirit is an inward impression of the soul, whereby the Spirit of God directly witnesses to my spirit, that I am a child of God'. In other words, it seems that what Tillich has provided us with here is a contemporary interpretation of the traditional doctrine of assurance, rightly seeing it as the subjective appropriation of justification, which is made possible only by the work of the Spirit. But by using the word justification to refer to both the objective reality and the subjective experience, his discussion is not as clear as it might be.

In his preliminary remarks on justification, Tillich raises some important issues, but there are some points which need to be challenged. Although there is a sense in which the term 'acceptance' may stand for
'justification' in our contemporary understanding, it should be pointed out that the two are not synonymous. There is in the concept of justification (New Testament: dikaiosune) a strong element of forgiveness which is not necessarily present in the idea of acceptance at all.  

In fact, throughout his discussion on justification Tillich plays down the element of forgiveness altogether. This comes out clearly in his criticism of the phrase 'the forgiveness of sins'. His rejection of the concept of forgiveness when applied to God's dealings with man on the grounds that such a concept presupposes that he who forgives must also be forgiven is just not acceptable. The fact that this is so in human relations stems from the universality of man's sin, not from the nature of forgiveness, and Tillich should have seen this. His argument is entirely unconvincing. In fact, one suspects that the real reason why Tillich is not happy with the concept of forgiveness is that it emphasises the eternal distinction between God and man which alone makes meaningful relationships, including that of forgiveness, possible. Whereas in Tillich's theology of participation, the divine-human relationship is swallowed up in a transcendent union in which the infinite accepts the finite as part of itself, and in which context therefore the word 'acceptance' is more applicable.

Tillich's remarks on the relation between justifying faith and radical doubt are stimulating, but it would be a mistake to caricature them as a doctrine of 'justification by doubt', as William Nicholls has done. To say that Tillich would allow justification by any other means than the grace of God would be a complete misrepresentation of his teaching. It would be equally wrong to say that Tillich is suggesting that one is justified through doubt, that doubt is the vehicle of the justification of the doubter in the same way that faith is the vehicle
of the justification of the believer. It is rather the utmost seriousness or concern about the meaning of life that radical doubt reveals that becomes the vehicle for his justification. He is justified 'in spite of' his doubt because of his ultimate concern. In saying this, Tillich reflects the influence of Martin Kahler. This is how he summarises Kahler's teaching:

Not only he who is in sin but also he who is in doubt is justified through faith. The situation of doubt, even of doubt about God, need not separate us from God. There is faith in every serious doubt, namely, the faith in the truth as such, even if the only truth we can express is our lack of truth. But if this is experienced in its depth and as an ultimate concern, the divine is present; and he who doubts in such an attitude is "justified" in his thinking. So the paradox got hold of me that he who seriously denies God, affirms him.\textsuperscript{167}

The link here with Tillich's own understanding of faith as ultimate concern stands out clearly, and if faith is to be understood in this way then it is legitimate to say that it is secretly present in the ultimate concern of him who doubts radically. But we have already questioned whether the biblical concept of faith can adequately be expressed in this way,\textsuperscript{168} suggesting that the ultimate concern of which Tillich speaks is more akin with man's quest for the divine rather than the response of faith, seeking rather than finding. That this element is present in the situation of radical doubt no one would deny, and in this sense, the one who doubts is in the same position as the one who seeks; both look for the ultimate in life and meaning, whether the search is expressed in religious terminology or not. But to say that such a man is justified through the seriousness within his doubt is like saying that he who seeks has already found. It is more true to say that he who in his concern for truth has come to that point where he realises that he will never find the answer of himself is now poised at
the gateway to the kingdom of God. He is now in that situation where the Spirit can break through and reveal to him the things of Christ in a meaningful and dynamic way. This is indeed a paradox - though not the paradox to which Tillich is referring. Only he who has become aware of his moral or intellectual inadequacy is ready to receive the Christ, and when the man who doubts radically reaches this point he is paradoxically nearer to his acceptance by God than if he were in some superficial state either of doubt or religious allegiance. Certainly one detects here a working of the Spirit, a work of prevenient grace, bringing man to a moment of crisis, the moment of truth when the Spirit is able to grasp him and draw him into the experience of the New Reality. This one would affirm most strongly. But so far it is a preparation for justification, not the experience itself, and it is difficult to see how Tillich can pretend that it is.

Tillich provides us with a useful summary of the difference between the three main Protestant traditions in their attitude towards sanctification. One would certainly wish to affirm that the central element in the process of sanctification, as Luther so clearly saw, is the direct work of the Spirit in the life of the individual helping him to reach his decisions in the light of love intuitively and instinctively, thus freeing him from the letter of the law. But no one can live in such a continued state of ecstasy, and in this context Tillich's characterisation of Luther's description of the Christian life as a continuous oscillation between ecstasy and despair is a valid one. Nevertheless, it is surely in these periods of doubt and despair, when the Spirit of love is not intuitively recognised, that the Christian will need some direction from 'the law' as to what he should do, even though this need may stem from the anxiety lest God should be offended. In fact, Luther himself makes
this point. But is this not also to say that the majority of Christians need guidelines and principles to help them in their spiritual growth, in addition to the ecstatic impact of the Spirit? So there is a sense in which the Calvinist emphasis on the law as an aid to spiritual discipline must exist side by side with Luther's emphasis on direct Spiritual experience. Clearly there are dangers in an exclusively Calvinist approach, and a too rigid adherence to the syllogismus ethos can well lead to bondage rather than liberty. Any doctrine of sanctification must contain both elements if it is to be a satisfactory interpretation of growth in the Spirit.

There is a sense in which the Pietist approach to sanctification, despite its emphasis on perfection, does at least try to hold these two elements together, and one feels that Tillich could have been more sympathetic towards the Pietist point of view if only for this reason. In fact, if Tillich had been more aware of recent theological expositions of the doctrine of perfection stemming from the Wesleyan tradition, itself strongly influenced by Pietism, which emphasise the importance of distinguishing between what may be called 'relative' and 'absolute' perfection, he would have realised that there is much in this tradition that resembles his own interpretation of sanctification as a continual process. The idea of a 'relative' perfection, which understands perfection not as an absolute achievement, but as a dynamic process in which growth in the spiritual life of the individual proceeds in such a way that there is a perfection constantly maintained in proportion to the rate of growth and relative to the measure in which the individual becomes open to the impact of the Spirit, is not an impossible concept, and certainly merits further theological enquiry. Because the emphasis has here moved from perfection as a state of being to perfection as a
continual process, one feels that Tillich's analysis would have benefitted from some reference to these trends in the so-called Pietist tradition. Certainly any contemporary doctrine of the Spirit cannot ignore them.

In fact, Tillich himself seems to have some such idea of relative perfection in mind when he speaks of 'images of perfection'. It is obvious that he is not using the term 'perfection' here in any absolute sense. Absolute perfection is possible only when all existential barriers between man and God are overcome, a state reached only beyond this life in the presence of the Divine. His emphasis on the infinite distance between man and God in the present context shows that he is not using the word in this way, but much more in the sense we have outlined above. Man when grasped by the Spirit can only be fragmentarily or relatively perfect in this life, although this may be a genuine anticipation of the absolute perfection of eternal life. This is why we can affirm with Tillich that in such a state of relative perfection, in the life of the saint, even in the life of him who lives most closely to God, doubt will inevitably remain. What Tillich fails to go on to say is that in the state of eternal life, beyond the present order of things, according to the New Testament doubt itself will be swallowed up in knowledge. Or as Paul summarises it, 'Now we see only puzzling reflections in a mirror, but then we shall see face to face. My knowledge now is partial; then it will be whole, like God's knowledge of me'.

One must also ask whether Tillich is being really fair to the Pietist when he says that his emphasis on the certainty that accompanies an immediate awareness of the presence of God is really trying to anticipate a full mystical union to the extent that the need for faith is undermined. Apart from the fact that it is extremely unlikely that the Pietist, with his strong evangelical tradition, would diminish the role
of faith in this way, there is no reason why the emphasis on certitude should in any way seek to anticipate full mystical union, especially the sort of union in which the separation between man as subject and God as object, or vice-versa, is overcome. So far as one can tell, the Pietist has never led us to believe that the 'most immediate and intimate feeling of union with the divine' is the same thing as a transcendent union in the sense in which Tillich defines it, and there is certainly no evidence for this sort of thinking in the theology of men like Spener and Zinzendorf. It is also extremely unlikely that he who stands within the Pietist tradition today would support a theology which would allow the entire elimination of doubt in this way. He may affirm a certitude of the presence of God because of the intimate presence of the Spirit in the heart of the believer, but this is not the same as saying that in this life our knowledge of God is complete.

In fact, one wonders why Tillich should spend time in castigating the Pietist for his alleged emphasis on mystical union in the Christian experience when he himself goes on to affirm a place for it in every genuine expression of faith. Because faith is essentially the divine Spirit grasping a man, he says, then in every state of faith there is an experience of the presence of the infinite within the finite, transcending the subject-object split between them, so that within the essence of faith the mystical category is given. Thus, he concludes, faith and the experience of mystical union belong to each other in the process of sanctification. What we would question here is Tillich's precise interpretation of such a mystical union in terms of the transcending of the cleavage between subject and object in which one realises one's unity with the divine. One cannot see how he can really reconcile this concept with his own affirmation in this same context of the
Protestant principle of the 'infinite distance between man and God', for it would seem that mystical union, when fully achieved, must remove this distance altogether. Admittedly, Tillich does not allow the possibility of a total mystical union in this life, but the implication behind his concept of transcendent union is that the distance between man and God is not ultimately infinite, but rather preliminary, for this world only. Nevertheless, in so far as the process of sanctification is a sharing in the life of the Spirit, such a mystical union can be fragmentarily realised in the here and now. In face of this, surely if one is to be true to the Protestant principle which Tillich affirms but also seems to undermine, the only mysticism one can possibly allow as an element in sanctification is one in which union with God is seen not in terms of a total unity of being, but in terms of a perfect unity of relationship in which faith eternally remains. To say this is to affirm a role for mystical experience in the Christian life, but it is also to say that in its reappraisal of mysticism, Protestantism can accept no other form than that which is Christocentric. This does not mean that every valid form of mysticism has to have a specific Christ-label attached to it, but rather that the Spirit who initiates it is none other than the Spirit of Christ. And as there are no grounds for believing that the message of Christ is one which invites man into ontological union with God, so any form of mysticism which attempts to achieve this type of union, in which the eternal distinction between God and man is transcended, is unacceptable to Protestantism and unrequired in the process of sanctification.

It is also with this reservation in mind as to the precise meaning of self-transcendence that one must assess the four principles which Tillich lists as criteria in any understanding of sanctification for
today. It is certainly true that an increased sense of communion with God which enables man to see his daily experiences of life in a new dimension is a valid criterion of growth in the Christian life, but mystical awareness in the sense in which Tillich understands it is by no means the same thing. The Christian should also be ready to discern between what is a genuine desire for self-transcendence in the sense in which we have defined it and the desire to escape from the limitations of existential life which is behind so much of contemporary pseudo-mystical thinking and practice. With these reservations, one can accept Tillich's four principles as a valuable aid to providing a twentieth century interpretation of sanctification. The criteria of increased awareness, freedom and relatedness all have the advantage of taking the doctrine out of the specifically religious cage in which it has been locked for so long. Life cannot be lived apart from the world and its ambiguities, and personality cannot be developed in religious isolation. So there is need to see more clearly what it means for the man who is grasped by the Spirit to live within the world, and what this means for his growth in the Christian life. These are certainly points which merit further expansion in a contemporary understanding of the work of the Spirit.

IV. THE SPIRITUAL COMMUNITY AND THE CONQUEST OF RELIGION

We have followed through with Tillich how the divine Spirit is effective both in the life of the Spiritual Community as represented in the church, and in the life of the 'Spiritual personality' as represented by the individual in the context of the church. We have seen how the Spirit conquers the various ambiguities of life in respect of each of these considerations, communal and personal, in a fragmentary manner, pointing above the ambiguities of existence to the life of the New Reality. Basically then the church is not a narrowly religious community,
but 'the anticipatory representation of a new reality, the New Being as community'; and the individual member of the church is not a narrowly religious personality, but 'the anticipatory representation of a new reality, the New Being as personality'. The real purpose of the religious function therefore, whether in community or personality, is not an end in itself, but to point beyond itself to the true actualisation of the New Being in community and in personality, or in other words, in every part of life. This is what Tillich means when he says that religion in the narrower sense is conquered, for the coming of Christ was not to found a new 'religion' which would supersede the old, but to transform the already existing state of things in life as a whole. Thus the gap between the religious and the secular is removed: faith becomes, not a mere set of beliefs, but a state of being grasped by an ultimate concern in every part of one's life, and love no longer negates the dimensions of life for the sake of a non-dimensional 'religious' transcendence, but seeks to reunite that which is separated in all dimensions, including the dimension of spirit.

Because religion itself is conquered by the Spirit, Tillich continues, this means that the profanising and demonising of religion is also conquered. The fact that the members of the church, through their church membership, participate also in the Spiritual Community, means that the tendency to profanise religion into a sacred mechanism of structure, dogma and ritual form, will continually be resisted within the church itself, insofar as the Spirit is able to break through as it did for example at the time of the Reformation. When this happens, morality and culture are affirmed as direct concerns of the ultimate just as much as religion, so that there is no further justification for any division between the sacred and the secular, and in this way
the grounds for secular protest against religion are undermined. Similarly, the demonisation of religion is conquered when religion itself is overcome by the Spirit. Any self-affirmed greatness by the church is demonic, whether it be a church's claim to represent the Spiritual Community unambiguously in its own structure, or the individual church member's self-assurance which arises from his association with such a church, for in so doing the open aspect of the demonic which seeks to identify the finite with the infinite becomes obvious. The conquest of religion by the Spiritual Presence, says Tillich, will prevent such a claim to absoluteness, it will show that no church represents God to the exclusion of any other, it will undercut the individual member's claim to an exclusive possession of the truth by its witness to the fragmentary and ambiguous nature of all participation in the truth. No man can boast about his grasp of God when he himself is the one who is grasped by the Spirit: 'no one can grasp that by which he is grasped - the Spiritual Presence'.

Tillich feels that all this is summarised in his concept of the Protestant principle, which emphasises the infinite distance between man and God.

The Protestant principle is an expression of the conquest of religion by the Spiritual Presence and consequently an expression of the victory over the ambiguities of religion, its profanisation, and its demonisation. It is Protestant because it protests against the tragic-demonic self-elevation of religion and liberates religion from itself for the other functions of the human spirit, at the same time liberating these functions from their self-exclusion against the manifestations of the ultimate.

Such a principle, therefore, underlines the fact that no religion is to be identified with the divine itself, or considered as the sole sphere of the Spirit's activity. It is not merely to be applied to the Protestant churches, but to every church as a concrete expression of the Spiritual
Community. And though it is a principle which has been betrayed by every church at some time or another, it is still effective in every denomination as the force which prevents profanisation and demonisation from destroying it. But having said this, the Protestant principle cannot exist by itself, and alongside the assertion that man can never comprehend God in all his fulness must be placed the symbols of those experiences in which God has opened up something of himself for man to understand in his own limited way through the impact of the Spirit. This is what Tillich means by 'Catholic substance'. So in a world where God is transcendent, he is also intimately present, even though his presence may be veiled, open only to the eyes of faith. Tillich frequently summarises all this in his formula 'Protestant principle and Catholic substance'. The Catholic substance affirms that in every manifestation of the Spirit, God is truly present, grasping the life of man; the Protestant principle prevents such manifestations from becoming identified with God himself. And in so far as this principle itself is the most profound result of the Spirit's impact upon man, who realises thereby that nothing he can say or do can adequately express God in all his fulness, then such a principle, says Tillich, 'is the expression of the victory of the Spirit over religion'.

**Evaluation**

The formula 'Protestant principle and Catholic substance' which lies behind what Tillich has to say here provides us with an important criterion in our assessment of the nature and function of the church and the place of the individual within it. In this discussion he has most carefully drawn the distinction between the inner nature of the church as the community of the Spirit (and correspondingly between the inward nature of the
Christian as one who is renewed by the Spirit) and the outward forms, symbols and structures that the church must use in the world (and correspondingly the life of the individual Christian as a man among men). In this distinction his formula 'Protestant principle and Catholic substance' helps us to see that whereas it is necessary for the Spirit to use structures and symbols to make his presence known in the world, forms which are inevitably taken from the world itself and filled out with 'Catholic substance', there are no grounds either for asserting that such forms are thereby sacred in themselves, and therefore unalterable, valid for all time, or for confusing them with the divine to which they point, with the result that they become demonic, since there is an infinite distance between the divine life and the life of man. Such an understanding may well be of great help to the church both in its life in the world and its relation to the world, and in its own ecumenical discussions. But it is also important for us to see that Tillich's formula is of considerable theological significance as well, holding together the polar emphases on transcendence and immanence in the doctrine of God, the 'Catholic substance' underlining the immanence of the Spiritual Presence within the world, using the forms of the life of the world to reveal himself to man, the 'Protestant principle' pointing to the fact that the same Spirit is far above and beyond the inevitable limitations of any such forms. Certainly one may wonder whether Tillich does not, in fact, in his doctrine of the ultimate transcendent unity, place himself in the position where he must eventually abandon the truth for which his own formula stands, with the result that the distinction between the transcendence and immanence of God remains valid only in a preliminary, existential context; and this in itself is a serious criticism. But this apart, one would nevertheless affirm that here we
have a formula which has vital significance for our understanding of the relation between the Holy Spirit and the world. The truth it expresses holds together important complementary aspects of the nature of God and points out the way in which revelation can become possible.

In this context it is also significant to note how the same formula stands behind what Tillich has to say about the future of religion. In his last lecture delivered in the University of Chicago, he saw theology as standing at a crossroads. One way pointed along the secular road, 'a religion of non-religion', 'a theology-without-God language'; the other way was to develop a theology of the history of religion. Tillich feels that it is along this latter road that religion must travel if it is to maintain its integrity. Yet along that road religion is challenged to break through everything that would prevent 'a free approach to the history of religions', whether it be the exclusivenss of orthodoxy or the rejectivity of secular interpretation. Only a theology which recognises the universality of the divine revelation in all religions and at the same time which subjects every religion to the concrete revelation in the Christ-event is able to break through these barriers and provide a valid religion for the future. Such a religion, in which the truth inherent in both universal and concrete aspects is recognised, is termed by Tillich 'the religion of the concrete Spirit'. This way forward, which Tillich was beginning to explore in the latter years of his life, brings the idea of the Protestant principle and Catholic substance onto a much wider stage: Every religion, as a concrete expression of the Spiritual Presence, must be seen to be transcended in the name of the ultimate to which it points; yet at the same time the concrete substance of every religion is affirmed and purified as it is brought face to face with the Christ, who as the supreme symbol of the
Presence of the divine in human life brings to a head within himself everything to which every other valid symbol points. Now although Tillich's assertion that Christ is the supreme symbol of the divine Presence needs much further elucidation from a Christological standpoint, a factor which itself must influence our understanding of the relation between the Christian revelation and other religions, it nevertheless remains true that his formula as it is here expressed will provide a useful criterion in any assessment of the work of the Spirit in the total religious dimension of human life and experience.
Notes to Chapter Four

1. ST, III, p. 176.
2. Ibid., p. 177.
3. Ibid., p. 177.
4. Ibid., p. 178.
5. Ibid.
7. Ibid., p. 181.
8. Ibid., p. 182.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., p. 183.
11. Ibid., p. 184.
12. Ibid., p. 185.
13. Ibid., p. 186.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid., p. 187.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., p. 188.
18. Ibid., p. 189.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid., p. 191.
22. Ibid., p. 192.
23. Ibid., p. 193.
24. Ibid., p. 194.
25. Theology of Culture, pp. 212f.

27. Ephesians 4:3ff.


33. ST, III, p. 195.

34. Ibid., p. 201.

35. Ibid., p. 195.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid., p. 196.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid., p. 197.

40. Ibid.


42. The function of reception-mediation does, of course, open up the whole question of the relation between priesthood and laity. In an essay in The Protestant Era on 'The Protestant Principle and the Proletarian Situation', Tillich points out that the Protestant principle overcomes the gap between the sacred and the secular spheres in the life of the church, particularly where this gap is reflected in the dichotomy between the ordained minister and the layman. Protestantism, he says, demands 'a more radical laicism' than Catholicism' (p. 174). In Protestantism, 'the minister is a layman with a special function within the congregation ... qualified for the fulfilment of this function by a carefully regulated professional training'. Every layman is potentially a priest, just as every secular realm is potentially religious. The quasi-priesthood that arose in the Lutheran churches after the Reformation was a betrayal of Luther's own pronouncement of the universal priesthood of all believers. To defend such a priesthood, as many Protestant laymen are concerned to do, either out of deference to obsolete tradition or else because of 'pseudo-priestly' fanaticism, is to re-assert past elements which have already been rejected by prophetic and theological criticism. The task of the layman in this respect is always 'to challenge any conscious or unconscious attempt of ministers or theologians to set up a religious sphere as separate
from his "secular" life and his "secular" work. Only by doing this can he share fully in the receiving and mediating work of the church.

43. ST, III, p. 203.

44. Ibid.

45. ST, I, p. 297.

46. ST, III, p. 204.

47. Ritschl writes, 'Since, then, there exists a danger that we should pray for blessings which it is not God's will that we should receive, the ultimate resting of the soul in the contrary will of God is a manifestation of that thanksgiving by which every petition ought to be ruled and, according to circumstances, limited'. (A. Ritschl, The Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation, Eng. Translation by H.R. Mackintosh and A.B. Macaulay, Edinburgh, T. and T. Clark 1902, p. 646).

48. ST, III, p. 204. See Rom. 8:26. 'We do not even know how we ought to pray, but through our inarticulate groans the Spirit himself is pleading for us, and God who searches our inmost being knows what the Spirit means, because he pleads for God's own people in God's own way'. (N.E.B.).

49. Tillich expands these thoughts in a sermon on this text from Romans ('The Paradox of Prayer', The New Being, pp. 135ff). After reminding the liturgical churches that they should ask themselves whether their classical formulas prevent people of today from praying effectively, and the non-liturgical churches that they should ask themselves whether their spontaneity may at times profane prayer and deprive it of its mystery, he asks whether prayer is really possible at all. It is, he says, according to Paul, humanly impossible, impossible because we are praying to someone nearer to us than we are to ourselves, because we are addressing someone who can never be addressed as object because he is always subject, because we are telling something to him who knows not only what we should tell him but also the unconscious ground from which our conscious words grow. The only way, therefore, in which prayer is possible is that God himself prays through us, when we pray to him. 'God Himself in us; that is what Spirit means ... "God present", with shaking, inspiring, transforming power. Something in us, which is not we ourselves, intercedes before God for us' (p. 137). The gap is bridged by God, and this profound symbol of God praying to himself for us is meant to point to that astonishing fact. And because God knows everything that there is to know about us, even the depths of our unconscious being, he is indeed the one alone who can effectively bring us into his own presence. That is why words themselves are inadequate; that is why they must be replaced with 'sighs too deep for words'. So 'the essence of prayer is the act of God who is working in us and raises our whole being to Himself ... Only in terms of wordless sighs can we approach God, and even these sighs are His work in us' (p. 138).
57. Tillich points out that the importance of the symbolic nature of religious language and rituals has great bearing on this participation of the young individual in the life of the church. In his essay 'A Theology of Education' (Theology of Culture, pp. 146-157), he says that the great task of the religious teacher is 'to transform the primitive literalism with respect to religious symbols into a conceptual interpretation without destroying the power of the symbols' (p. 155). Though the full significance of religious symbolism must be brought out at a later stage by the method of correlation, yet 'one should not allow a religiously empty space in children up to the moment in which they can fully understand the meaning of the symbols. Nobody can say exactly how much or how little a young child takes from a ritual act into his unconsciousness, even if he understands almost nothing of it. Here the church school and its inducting type of religious education have a decisive function. It opens up the subconscious levels of the children for the ultimate mystery of being' (p. 156).

58. ST, III, p. 208.
59. Ibid., p. 209.
60. Ibid.
62. Ibid., p. 200.
64. Ibid., p. 211.
65. In one of his essays, Tillich has this to say about the temptation to mock the styles of previous generations:

An artistic style is honest only if it expresses the real situation of the artist and the cultural period to which he belongs. We can participate in the artistic styles of the past in so far as they were honestly expressing the encounter which they had with God, man and the world. But we cannot honestly imitate them and produce for the cult of the church works which are not the result of a
creating ecstasy, but which are learned reproductions of creative ecstasies of the past. It was a religiously significant achievement of modern architecture that it liberated itself from traditional forms which, in the context of our period, were nothing but trimmings without meaning and, therefore, neither aesthetically valuable nor religiously expressive. (Theology of Culture, p. 48).

66. ST, III, p. 213.

67. Theology of Culture, p. 74.

68. Tillich says: 'According to the multidimensional unity of life, the dimension of spirit includes all other dimensions - everything visible in the whole of the universe. (It) reaches into the physical and biological realm by the very fact that its basis is the dimension of self-awareness. Therefore, it cannot be expressed in words only. It has a visible side, as is manifest in the face of man, which expresses bodily structure and personal spirit. This experience of our daily life is the premonition of the sacramental unity of matter and Spirit'. (ST, III, p. 214).

69. See below, pp. 369ff.

70. See above, pp. 1ff.

71. ST, III, p. 215.

72. Ibid., p. 216.

73. Tillich cites as examples Plato and the Stoics, Boehme and Schelling, and modern existentialists like Heidegger.

74. He cites as representatives of this school of thought Aristotle and the Epicureans, Descartes, Leibnitz, Kant and Hegel.

75. ST, III, p. 217.

76. Theology of Culture, p. 121.

77. ST, III, p. 218.

78. Ibid., p. 219.

79. Ibid.

80. These words are not actually used by Jesus, but he implies this teaching, cf. Mt. 6: 14f, and Mt. 18: 23ff.

81. ST, III, p. 220.

82. Ibid., p. 221.

83. Ibid.

84. Ibid., p. 222.
85. Ibid., pp. 224f.
86. Ibid., p. 225.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid., p. 226.
89. Ibid.
90. Ibid.
91. Ibid., p. 227.
92. The Shaking of the Foundations, p. 92. In his essay "The End of the Protestant Era?" (The Protestant Era, p. 230), Tillich has this to say: "The most important contribution of Protestantism to the world in the past, present and future is the principle of prophetic protest against every power which claims divine character for itself - whether it be church or state, party or leader ... The prophetic protest is necessary for every church and for every secular movement if it is to avoid disintegration. It has to be expressed in every situation as a contradiction to man's permanent attempts to give absolute validity to his own thinking and acting. And this prophetic, Protestant protest is more necessary today than at any other time since the period of the Reformation, as the protest against the demonic abuse of those centralised authorities and powers which are developing under the urge of the new collectivism ... Without this prophetic criticism the new authorities and powers will necessarily lead toward a new and more far-reaching disintegration. This criticism requires witnesses and martyrs. Without these, the prophetic and Protestant protest never has been and never will be actual'.
93. ST, III, p. 228.
94. See above, p. 217.
95. Theology of Culture, p. 50f. The whole essay, 'Aspects on a Religious Analysis of Culture', is relevant.
96. ST, III, p. 228.
97. Ibid., p. 229.
98. Ibid., p. 230.
100. Ibid., p. 10.
102. e.g. J.A.T. Robinson says, 'The prerequisite ... of reformation, as of all else, is sensitivity - sensitivity to what the Spirit is saying to the churches, and to the world' (The New Reformation? London, S.C.M. Press, 1965, p. 17).
103. So also Michael Harper: 'Everything must be brought to the touchstone of the Scriptures, which must obviously be more thoroughly and carefully read than ever before' (As at the Beginning, London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1965, p. 120).

104. John Wesley said, 'You are in danger of enthusiasm if you depart ever so little from Scripture'. (quoted by Harper, op. cit., p. 120).


108. Phil. 4:19, cp. 4:6.


110. See Eph. 6:18. It is interesting to note that shortly before his death, when asked by a journalist if he ever prayed, Tillich replied, 'No, but I meditate' (quoted by P. Schaeffer, The God Who is There, London, Hodder Paperback, 1970, p. 78).


112. This stands out clearly in the contrast between the two Liverpool cathedrals, the Roman Catholic building bearing a stamp of authenticity which the Anglican one can never have.

113. See Phil. 3:12-14.


115. ST, III, p. 231.


117. Ibid.

118. Ibid., p. 233.

119. Ibid., p. 234.

120. Ibid., p. 235.

121. Ibid.

122. Ibid., p. 236.

123. Ibid., p. 237.

124. Ibid.
129. Objectively, says Tillich, this is what the Cross of Christ points to: God accepting the unacceptable, participating in man's estrangement and thereby conquering the ambiguities of good and evil in a unique, definite and transforming way. This paradox of justification, revealed in Christ, was central to the experience of all three great formative theologians, Paul, Augustine and Luther, though they may have expressed it with slightly different emphases. Tillich feels that although Luther, for example, concentrates more on the individual aspects of the paradox, and indeed to a great extent tends to emphasise this at the expense of its wider significance in an ecclesiastical or even cosmic setting, yet his affirmation that justification does mean acceptance for the individual is deeply profound and full of meaning for contemporary man, as the best insights of modern psychology would confirm. (ibid.)

130. ST, III, p. 241

131. Augustine says, 'Everyone who knows that he has doubts knows with certainty that something is true, namely, that he doubts. He is certain, therefore, about a truth. Therefore everyone who doubts whether there be such a thing as the truth has at least a truth to set a limit to his doubt; and nothing can be true except truth be in it. Accordingly; no one ought to have doubts about the existence of the truth, even if doubts arise for him from every possible quotation' (Of True Religion, xxix. trans. by J.H.S. Burleigh, Library of Christian Classics, Vol. VI, Augustine: Earlier Writings, London, SCM Press, 1963, p. 262.).


133. 'It is the best instrument for enabling (believers) daily to learn with greater truth and certainty what that will of the Lord is which they aspire to follow, and to confirm them in this knowledge ... The Law acts like a whip to the flesh, urging it on as men do a lazy sluggish ass. Even in the case of a spiritual man, inasmuch as he is still burdened with the weight of the flesh, the Law is a constant stimulus, pricking him forward when he would indulge in sloth' (Calvin, Institutes, Bk. II, Ch. VII, para. 12.). The same emphasis is to be found in other Calvinist writings. 'The law was given as a direction of life, a rule of walking to believers' (the 17th Cent. Samuel Bolton, in The True Bounds of Christian Freedom, rep. London, Banner of Truth Press, 1964, p. 83); 'The law was also given as a reprover and corrector for sin, even to the saints; I say, to discipline them and reprove them for sin ... The law was given to be a spur to quicken us to duties. The flesh is sluggish, and the law is "instar stimuli" (of the nature of a spur or goad) to quicken us in the ways of obedience' (ibid., p. 83).
In his sermon on 'The Witness of the Spirit to the Spirit' (The Shaking of the Foundations, pp. 139ff.) Tillich speaks of the doubt that stems from the gap between the Christian and God as the very work of the Spirit itself, as the way in which the Spirit throws us back in dependence on him. Commenting on the text, 'Likewise the Spirit helpeth our infirmities . . .' (Romans 8) he says, 'Paul recognises the fact that usually we are possessed by weakness which makes the experience of the Spirit and the right prayer impossible. But he tells us that in these periods we must not believe that the Spirit is far from us. It is within us, although not experienced by us . . . To the man who longs for God and cannot find him; to the man who wants to be acknowledged by God and cannot believe that He is; to the man who is striving for a new and imperishable meaning of his life and cannot discover it - to this man Paul speaks. We are each such a man. Just in this situation, where the Spirit is far from our consciousness, where we are unable to pray or to experience any meaning in life, the Spirit is working quietly in the depth of our souls. In the moment when we feel separated from God, meaningless in our lives, and condemned to despair, we are not left alone . . . In feeling this against feeling, in believing this against belief, in knowing this against knowledge, we, like Paul, possess all. Those outside that experience possess nothing'. The experience of doubt itself becomes the very stepping-stone to a higher awareness of the presence of God in our lives.
Tillich is quite sure that it is unfortunate that Protestantism has come to reject mysticism as it has done, for this makes it doubly difficult to make any real communication between Protestant Christianity and the great religions of the East. He feels that this has caused a certain reaction in Protestant countries against Protestantism itself in favour of more mystical expressions of religion, and cites the present influence of Zen Buddhism in the West as an example of this. But he also notes that there is a new assessment of mysticism in Protestant circles taking place. Greater emphasis is being placed on contemplation in the life of prayer, greater emphasis on silence in Protestant worship, a renewed emphasis on liturgy over against preaching and teaching. All this Protestantism must welcome and encourage: the sort of mysticism it must reject is that which attempts union with the divine through ascetic or other means at the expense of the profound truths for which the doctrines of human guilt and divine acceptance stand. This means that for the Protestant churches, there can be no mysticism without faith, and no sanctification without justification.

For an analysis of the New Testament concept of regeneration, see the article by C.E.B. Cranfield in A Theological Word Book of the Bible (ed. A. Richardson, London, SCM Press, 1950, p. 30). 'The New Testament,' he says, 'indicates the absolute contrast between two kinds of life and the momentousness of the passing from one to the other by metaphors of creation . . . resurrection . . . and birth. The need for radical renewal . . . is most clearly expressed in John 3: 3,5. The new life is spiritual, and can be originated only by God . . . The change can be effected only by God, and is sheer miracle', (italics mine).

Roman 6: 4ff.

II Cor. 5: 17.

Eph. 2: 1f.

Jas. 1: 18.

Jn. 3: 3,6.

ST, II, p. 205.

Ibid., p. 206.

The Shaking of the Foundations, pp. 130ff.

Rom. 8: 16.

For an analysis of the meaning of *dikaiosyne*, see C.K. Barrett, *The Epistle to the Romans*, London, Black, 1957, pp. 74ff. Barrett comments, 'Justification then means no legal fiction but an act of forgiveness on God's part ... Far from being a legal fiction, this is a creative act in the field of divine-human relations'.


*The Protestant Era*, pp. xf.

See above, p. 185.

Luther, *Treatise on Good Works*, see above, note 134.


Such a perfection has been popularly defined as 'giving as much as one knows of oneself to as much as one knows of God'. (I have been unable to trace the source of this phrase, but I owe it to the Rev. J.E. Bolam of Eastbourne).

I Cor. 13:12.

See above, p. 202, for a discussion on Tillich's concept of mystical union.

*$ST$, III, p. 258.


See also *ibid.*, pp. 7, 130.

I. THE RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND CULTURE

Before dealing specifically with the ambiguities of culture and the way in which they are resolved under the impact of the Spirit, we must first look at what Tillich says about the essential relation of religion and culture in the light of the Spiritual Presence. As we have seen already, in Tillich’s view, morality, culture and religion are essentially one, even though under the conditions of existence they are estranged and appear as separate functions. It is part of the purpose of the divine Spirit to bring them together again in an essential unity. As far as culture is concerned, this brings to the fore the problem of the relation between the churches, as representatives of the Spiritual Community, and the culture in which they are placed. Tillich sees a two-fold relationship. Because the Spiritual Community is the dynamic essence of the churches, the churches become the media through which the Spirit can work in the community as a whole towards the self-transcendence of culture; but in so far as the churches inevitably distort the Spiritual Community in their own ambiguous existence, then their influence on culture itself can be distorting and ambiguous, and for this reason it is equally as wrong to subject culture to a church in the name of the Spiritual Community as it is to keep the churches withdrawn from general cultural life. Nevertheless, there can be no full impact of the Spirit on any cultural function unless there is firstly what Tillich calls an ‘inner-historical representation of the Spiritual Community in the church’. And this remains true despite the fact that the Spirit is already latently at work in a preliminary or preparatory sense in other
groups and individuals, whether in the sense of preparing for a full manifestation of the Spiritual Community in a church, or even in a residual sense in those situations where the church has lost its essential power but the results of its original impact on a culture still remain, keeping alive to some extent the self-transcendence of its cultural creativity. However, this means that the Spirit cannot be bound to the churches, with their Word and sacraments. It is free to make its impact on any culture, preparing a religious community in its midst, and in the context of that community, men and women who are ready to receive it.

With this in mind, Tillich establishes three principles concerning the relation between religion and culture. The first is what he calls 'the principle of the consecration of the secular', which stems directly from the freedom of the Spirit to work in the whole of life, not merely in the religious sphere, so that every part of life is open to the Spirit, not just the life of the church. Tillich sees this 'emancipation of the secular' as a feature of the ministry of Christ himself, something that was rediscovered at the time of the Reformation. Its effect is far-reaching. It immediately crosses swords with those who say that the only way of saving culture from its potentially destructive ambiguities is to call for a revival of religion in its narrower sense. For apart from giving the impression that religion is merely a safeguard to be used to bolster up a decaying culture or nation, rather than having a special function of its own, thereby 'using the ultimate as a tool for something non-ultimate', such people make the fundamental error of thinking that the Spirit is tied to the use of religion alone in order to exert any impact on cultural activity. Such a mistake can only be made, says Tillich, by those who limit the freedom of the Spirit to the
churches as sole representations of the Spiritual Community. Against this attitude the principle of the consecration of the secular must stand. In fact, even secular forms which are actually hostile to religion can be consecrated in this way: the Spirit can work in and through them, awakening social conscience, or giving man a deeper understanding of himself, or breaking the power of those superstitions that are encouraged by the churches. The Spirit is not averse even to using 'anti-religious' means if this will result in a transformation of secular culture — in fact, quite often by these means the Spirit effects important changes in the life of the churches themselves. And the Protestant churches, if they are in any way true to the principle which gave them birth, will surely be the first to realise this.

Nevertheless, to say that the Spirit does not only use religion to make his presence felt within secular society is not the same as saying that religion can be dispensed with, and it is important to emphasise this in the present situation. Here Tillich differs from many of the so-called 'secular theologians' of today. In fact, he would maintain that in the long run, a lack of concrete historical religion would lead to a total secularisation or profanisation of life, which would in turn result in the self-destruction of society. Without the concreteness of religious symbols, devotion and fellowship, the real substance of religion would eventually disappear, and with it the sense of the divine Presence in life as a whole. The very purpose of religious activity is to remind man that God is indeed present in the whole of life; without it there would be no reminder and the power of the presence of the divine would be lost. In other words, though religious symbols and activities ultimately may be discarded, yet they are still necessary in the existential sphere because of man’s estrangement from the ground of his being.
We are all poor people because we all have the fundamental tendency toward the secular, toward going out from the presence of God, fleeing from God. And religions are the restraining, the balancing power. It may well be that there are times when religious activities can blind us to the presence of the divine in secular life, and when this happens the churches have failed in their purpose, but even so there are times when the church, like a treasure chest, opens up its divine treasures to men, and it is important that in those times there should be those who are ready and able to participate in its symbolic power.

The second principle which determines the relation between religion and culture is the 'convergence of the holy and the secular'. In one sense, the secular is the result of resistance to any actualisation of self-transcendence, but this resistance, Tillich points out, is ambiguous, for though it laudibly prevents the finite from being merely swallowed up in the infinite, and though it rightly opposes the claim of the churches to represent the transcendent directly and exclusively, it cannot ultimately resist the universal function of self-transcendence, for to do so would be to leave the finite itself empty and meaningless, cut off from the infinite source of its being. The finite must inevitably ask the question of life above itself, and in doing so it necessarily moves in the direction of self-transcendence. So 'the secular is driven toward union with the holy, a union which actually is a reunion because the holy and the secular belong to each other'. But if this is true, just as the secular cannot exist without the holy, so also the holy cannot exist without the secular. It cannot isolate itself, for if it does so it not only loses its claim to represent that which concerns man ultimately, it also falls into self-contradiction. For even an isolated form of the holy must use language, patterns and ideas, which
themselves are forms of secular culture: 'the simplest proposition in which the holy tries to isolate itself from the secular is secular in form'. So the holy has need of the secular to give content and expression to itself. Nevertheless, the secular frequently resists this attempt by seeking adamantly to stand alone. So, says Tillich, there is 'claim and counterclaim'. Nevertheless, in spite of this, 'there is a convergent movement of the one toward the other; the principle of the convergence of the holy and the secular is always effective'.

These two principles, says Tillich, are rooted in a third, 'the essential belongingness of religion and culture to each other'. It is this principle to which the statement that 'religion is the substance of culture and culture the form of religion' refers. So in this context, it is necessary to reassert that 'religion cannot express itself even in a meaningful silence without culture, from which it takes all forms of meaningful expression', and that 'culture loses its depth and inexhaustibility without the ultimacy of the ultimate'. In fact, Tillich observes that this latter point is exactly what has happened in our contemporary situation. The concentration of man's activities on the methodical investigation and transformation of his world, including himself, and the consequent loss of the dimension of depth in his encounter with reality, is painfully obvious in modern industrial society. 'Reality has lost its inner transcendence or, in another metaphor, its transparency for the eternal ... The result is that God has become superfluous and the universe left to man as its master'. Creativity has become a human quality, the state of man's estrangement is ignored, and man becomes demonically enslaved in the ambiguities of his own attempts at self-sufficiency. As he puts it,

When the religious substance of humanism disappeared, the mere form was left, abundant, but empty ... Cultural goods
have become trimmings, means for having a good time, but nothing ultimately serious, nothing through which the mystery of being grasps us. Humanism has become empty. 13

The reaction of the church against this in retreating into its own traditional past and creating a supranatural above the natural realm, has only served to emphasise the current divorce between culture and religion, a divorce which liberal theology clearly failed to overcome in that it tended to soft-pedal the message of the New Reality. But the current protest against the spirit of industrial society such as one finds in existentialism opens the way, says Tillich, for a new assessment of man's encounter with reality, and makes it possible in this context for the theologian to assert the essential belongingness of culture and religion together.

Evaluation

There is little to offer at this juncture in the way of critical comment. One would agree basically with what Tillich has to say here about the relation between religion and culture, and particularly the way in which they must be held together if the life of man is to be seen in something more than merely humanistic categories. The three principles he enunciates to explain this relationship are sound enough, and underline important issues, though in a very real sense the three principles are basically one and the same, and clearly overlap. Sometimes one feels that Tillich's desire for orderly systematisation leads him to make rather artificial divisions, and this is a case in point. A more important point concerns the mutual need of the holy and the secular for each other. The secular cannot exist without the holy, says Tillich, and equally the holy cannot exist without the secular. What perhaps he does not bring out clearly enough is that the holy does not need the
secular in precisely the same way as the secular needs the holy. In the first place, the holy's need of the secular is that it must use its forms of expression to manifest itself in the existential world. Without this no revelation is possible, and in this sense, one could say that the holy cannot 'exist' without the secular. But this is by no means the same as saying that without the secular the holy cannot be, and though Tillich does not actually say this, it does need underlining. It certainly cannot be said that the secular is in any way necessary to the reality of the holy itself, for to say this would have the effect of making God as equally dependent on the world as the world is on God. One feels that this point must be made in so far as any dialectical interpretation of the relation between God and the world, such as Tillich seems to favour, could well lead to this sort of statement, which is quite unacceptable from the standpoint of orthodox theology. But secondly, when one turns to the secular's need of the holy, the situation is such that although the secular may not acknowledge its need of the holy, even perhaps repudiating the holy itself, this does not alter the fact that its need for the holy is in the nature of an absolute necessity, not only to give it ultimate significance, as Tillich points out, but also for its very life. The world is dependent on God, and without God it could not be. So whilst man may not feel the need of the holy in the preliminary concerns of his everyday life, he must constantly be reminded that without the creative and sustaining power of the divine Spirit the whole of life would cease to be. So the holy's need of the secular is relative, whereas the secular's need of the holy is absolute. As Tillich's treatment stands it needs strengthening to bring out this difference more forcefully.
Nevertheless, one welcomes Tillich's comments concerning contemporary secular theology and his warning that such a theology may well result in a total denial of transcendence. His fears seem justified in light of the current 'Death of God' school, and the way in which this type of theology is prepared to deny the presence of the divine in the midst of life. Despite Gilkey's claim that the 'Death of God' theology has accepted from Tillich the campaign against theism, it is clear from what Tillich says here that the proponents of this school of thought are moving in a rather different direction altogether. Though Tillich may reject the idea of a personal divine being, he by no means rejects the concept of God itself, which seems to be the inevitable conclusion of much of the thinking of men like Hamilton and Altizer. By asserting that the presence of the holy in the midst of life, manifested through the Spirit, is that alone which gives life significance and meaning, Tillich is not only disclaiming any connection with such a theology, but also forcefully underlining the spiritual bankruptcy of theological atheism. Any tendency that modern secular theology may have to move in the direction of denying the transcendent certainly does not have Tillich's blessing.

II. TOWARDS A THEONOMOUS CULTURE

We have already seen how, in his analysis of culture, Tillich emphasised the numerous ambiguities with which the area of cultural creativity is beset, and how these ambiguities reach their climax in the realisation that it is impossible to fulfil every potential of the creative function in a process of actualisation which is what the humanistic ideal would suggest. If the fulfilment of the self-creative function of man cannot be realised in this way, in a 'horizontal direction', then it must break out of this into another direction altogether, and this
leads to the possibility of culture 'transcending itself'. This it can only do, Tillich maintains, when it is grasped by the power of the divine Spirit, which alone enables it to fulfil itself. This leads us to ask the question, 'What happens to culture as a whole under the impact of the Spiritual Presence?', a question which Tillich seeks to answer by developing more fully the concept of theonomy. 16

The concept of theonomy is one which Tillich frequently uses. It is based on the belief that the divine Spirit is present in the whole of life as its essential ground. Whatever is open to and directed towards this divine depth can be called 'theonomous'. 17 But theonomy is not to be confused with heteronomy, which presupposes that God is alien to man and can only come to him from the outside, imposing himself upon him. On the other hand, neither is it to be confused with autonomy, which suggests that man is the source and measure of his own life and behaviour, the master of his own destiny, which can result in anarchy. Rather does theonomy perceive that in the depth of every human life the divine is at work, not as something strange or foreign to man, but as that in which the life of man is rooted and participates. So theonomy transcends autonomy in that it recognises the true source and power from which all autonomy springs. In this sense it resists all secular forms of autonomy in the same way as it resists all religious structures of a heteronomous nature. In so doing, it stands over against the refusal to affirm the presence of the divine Spirit in human life as well as the attempt to express the impact of that presence in terms of a rigid superimposition.

A theonomous culture, then, is one which is open towards the divine Spirit who is recognised as the source and ground of all cultural acts. Because of its participation in the Spirit it is 'a culture in which the
ultimate meaning of existence shines through all finite forms of thought and action; the culture is transparent, and its creations are vessels of a spiritual content. It is a culture which thereby communicates the experience of holiness in every part of its life - from a painted flower to a hymn, or even a political document. In a theonomous environment, nothing will be unconsecrated; 'in all its forms' it will be 'open to and directed toward the divine'. But this does not mean that it will violate cultural autonomy, for though theonomy and autonomy are not the same they are not necessarily contradictory. On the contrary, just as 'Spirit fulfils spirit instead of breaking it', theonomy will affirm the autonomous forms of every creative process, but in such a way as to show that every autonomous form is not merely the finite expression it seems to be on the surface, but receives its real power and significance from the theonomous depths in which its life is rooted. In the historical situation, Tillich recognises, however, that there is a real danger here, for the very concern to preserve the theonomous significance of culture may well give rise to heteronomous principles which clamp down on all autonomous forms in the name of the Spirit, seeking to impose only those forms which are felt to express the experience of the ultimate. So theonomy is distorted into heteronomy, a distortion which has unfortunately characterised much of the church's approach to culture down through the ages. And by seeking to impose certain patterns of cultural activity upon man 'from the outside' so to speak, it has frequently threatened to destroy the genuine autonomous impulse by forcing man to conform to certain forms and structures.

This enslavement of every form of autonomous expression inevitably leads to a rebellion on the part of autonomy, in which vigorously independent autonomous forms will seek to break through and destroy the heter-
Onomous forms which hold them down. The danger is that in so doing, autonomous forms of culture will also threaten any element of theonomous concern that may remain. Such a situation, Tillich points out, is characterised by a 'self-complacent humanism' which 'cuts the ties of a civilisation with its ultimate ground and aim, whereby, in the measure in which it succeeds, a civilisation becomes exhausted and spiritually empty'. The cultural forms it produces will appear only in their finite relationships as the totally secular autonomy now seeks to work towards the fulfilment of as many human potentialities as are possible, rushing aimlessly ahead in a horizontal direction, as we saw in our analysis of the ambiguities of culture. The impossibility of securing such a fulfilment, with the frustration and sense of purposelessness that it causes, gives rise to the question of how the cultural function can be fulfilled. The only answer to this question is to lift it out of its horizontal context and see that its fulfilment lies in a 'vertical' direction, in the realisation that once again every cultural act can be an expression of the divine Spirit in man, open to the ultimate meaning and significance of life as a whole. Such a direction transcends every individual aim and answers the humanistic indefiniteness about 'where-to?' which springs from a purely finite term of reference beyond which secular humanism cannot go. It is, of course, the genuinely theonomous answer, which sees all cultural forms 'in their relation to the unconditional', in relation to the divine Spirit. So the struggle between heteronomy and autonomy leads inevitably to the search for a 'new theonomy', a search which is resolved only under the impact of the Spirit, whereby culture again comes to realise its significance and depth. And 'wherever this impact is effective, theonomy is created, and wherever there is theonomy, traces of the impact of the Spiritual Presence are visible'.
Tillich refers to those times in history when a new theonomy appears as *kairos*, the moment of impact of the divine Spirit in the realm of culture, in which the depth and significance of human life and history are revealed. Such moments are preceded by an attitude of 'creative waiting', sparked off by the secularised and emptied autonomous type of culture to which we have referred. For the Christian, of course, the unique and universal *kairos* is the appearance of Jesus as the Christ, but the history of religion and philosophy provide other examples. Tillich feels that it is possible for such a theonomy to 'characterise a whole culture', maintaining that one of its most complete expressions was in the early and high Middle Ages 'before its nominalistic disintegration', when it effected a balance between heteronomous and autonomous trends. But even at those times when it does not appear as the dominant force in a particular culture, its presence can be observed to some extent, and on occasions it will come into direct conflict with whatever element is predominant, whether heteronomous (as in the later Middle Ages) or autonomous (as in the Enlightenment). It will be seen, then, that though the victory of the Spirit in establishing a theonomous culture is never existentially complete, neither can it be totally destroyed. 'Its victory is always fragmentary because of the existential estrangement underlying human history, and its defeat is always limited by the fact that human nature is essentially theonomous'.

Turning to more specific cultural acts, Tillich feels that the impact of the Spirit in creating theonomy helps to resolve one of the most fundamental ambiguities of all cultural activity, that of the split between subject and object. Man has never successfully resolved this cleavage, though he has constantly attempted to do so in a variety of ways, such as mystical experiences and the erotic aspect of human love.
All that he has been able to do has been to anticipate in some way the ultimate resolution of the problem. Such an anticipation, however, is only a genuine fragment of the unity of subject and object when it is the result of the impact of the divine Spirit. Consequently it is in the theonomous situation, where the Spirit breaks through and grasps the cultural realm, that the ambiguity of subject and object in the creative act, fragmentarily disappears. So 'the Spiritual Presence drives the ambiguities of toward the conquest of culture by creating theonomous forms in the different realms of the cultural self-creation of life'.

Tillich deals in turn with the three basic types of function which he has already outlined in the sphere of culture: truth and expressiveness, purpose and humanity, and power and justice. Turning firstly to the functions of truth and expressiveness, he looks initially at language, where the subject-object cleavage is immediately apparent. 'No language is possible without the subject-object cleavage and that language is continuously brought to self-defeat by this very cleavage.' But in a theonomous situation, Tillich maintains, language is fragmentarily liberated from bondage to the subject-object schema: 'it reaches moments in which it becomes a bearer of the Spirit expressing the union of him who speaks in an act of linguistic self-transcendence'. So we should not think of the word which bears the Spirit as grasping some object opposite the speaker, but as expressing and 'giving voice' to something which transcends both subject and object. The most important way in which this occurs is through the Spirit's creation of a verbal symbol, which we may call 'the Word of God'. This Word of God, or the 'Spirit-determined human word', is not bound to any particular revelatory event, nor is it confined to any religion or even to religion at all, for it appears wherever the Spirit takes hold of man, whether as an individual
or as a group. Such language is beyond the power of every type of
linguistic ambiguity. It conquers the polarity of poverty and abundance,
since under the Spirit's impact 'a few words become great words', as
all holy books demonstrate. Yet the impact of the Spirit is by no means
confined to holy books - every use of language, every type of literature,
can become the Word of God if the Spirit grasps him who speaks or writes
and elevates his words so that they become the bearer of the Spirit to
man. It conquers also the ambiguity of particularity and universality,
in so far as every expression of a particular encounter with reality
under the impact of the Spirit transcends that encounter by pointing to
and sharing in the universal Logos, which is the criterion of every
particular logos. It conquers the ambiguity of indefiniteness, which is
inevitable in everyday language because of the infinite distance between
the 'language-forming subject' and the 'inexhaustible object', not by
trying to grasp an object which will always escape it, but by expressing
a union between subject and object in a linguistic symbol which is both
indefinite and definite at the same time, indefinite because it leaves
the potentialities of both subject and object open, definite because it
alone is able to express the character of that particular encounter
adequately. And finally, it conquers the ambiguity which stems from the
fact that language not only communicates but also on occasions prevents
genuine communication. For because language cannot really penetrate to
the centre of the other self, it not only reveals, it also conceals, it
not only opens up, it also distorts. The Spirit-determined word however
reaches the centre of the other person, not in a merely descriptive
activity, but by 'uniting the centres of the speaker and the listener in
the transcendent unity'. So wherever the Spirit is present, estrange-
ment in terms of language is overcome, as at Pentecost, and the possi-
bility of distorting the language from its natural meaning is removed.
'In all these respects,' says Tillich, 'one could say that the ambiguities
of the human word are conquered by that human word which becomes the
divine Word'.

Theonomy also conquers the subject-object cleavage in the cognitive
sphere, the realm of knowledge. Tillich lists three examples where this
cleavage is most pronounced: in the fact that every cognitive act must
use abstract concepts, which inevitably ignore the concreteness of the
situation; in the fact that it can never know anything other than partially,
despite the fact that 'the truth is the whole'; and in the fact that
whatever concepts and arguments it uses, they are patterns which are
applicable only to the world of objects and their interrelations. All
this is unavoidable on the finite level. What is needed is a type of
knowledge which can transcend these limitations and help us to see things
as they truly are, and especially in relation to the eternal. Such
knowledge is the creation of the divine Spirit, and it is mediated to us
through the language of universals, which are 'vehicles for the elevation
of the partial and concrete to the eternal, in which totality as well
as uniqueness are rooted'. This is what religious knowledge really is -
'knowledge of something particular in the light of the eternal and of
the eternal in the light of something particular'. In this sort of knowl-
edge, he maintains, the ambiguities of both subjectivity and objectivity
are overcome.

The impact of the Spirit resolves not only the ambiguities of
knowledge itself, but also the ambiguities in the method of knowledge.
Tied to a subject-object scheme, the subject tries to grasp its object
through making observations and reaching conclusions. But when the subject-
object scheme is overcome by theonomous cognition, conclusion by observa-
tion is transformed into insight by participation, a way of knowing which is not so much a method as a state of being elevated into transcendent unity. It is this sort of knowledge which in fact forms the essence of revelation, for revelation is none other than cognition determined by the Spirit. As we have already seen, this revelation in Tillich's opinion is not to be confined to those revelatory experiences on which the actual religions are based, for the divine Wisdom or Logos is equally present in the wisdom of many wise men, and where such wisdom is, there also the divine Spirit is to be found. Such wisdom is to be 'distinguished from objectifying knowledge by its ability to manifest itself beyond the cleavage of subject and object', and in this sense it would be appropriate to call theonomous knowledge 'Spirit-determined wisdom'. This does not mean that it negates or discards autonomous knowledge or the ordinary means of receiving that knowledge, for the Spirit is concerned to discern and maintain the integrity of both types of knowing. Nevertheless, it is important to recognise that there is a knowledge that is over and above the accumulation of facts based on empirical observation, a knowledge which is directly given under the impact of the Spirit of God.

The search for expressiveness, the aesthetic function of culture, presents similar problems. The first problem is whether the arts express the subject or the object. A second concerns the precise relation of man to the whole realm of aesthetic expression. The former problem can only be resolved in the light of the answer given to the latter, and this constitutes what Tillich calls the problem of aestheticism. It arises because in the subject-object scheme, the aesthetic function can create images only for the purpose of aesthetic enjoyment, and whilst this may be well in keeping with the creativity of the human spirit, it hardly
leads to genuine participation. This situation can only be overcome by
the impact of the divine Spirit, who makes subject and object one in
mutual participation. So the answer we give to the second question is that
man can only participate in that which he seeks to express through the
work of the Spirit within him. In the light of this, the answer we give
to the first question as to whether the arts express the subject or the
object is that in a theonomous situation they express neither, rather
do they express the union of the two in the Spiritual Presence. This
leads us to ask the inevitable question as to whether one particular
artistic style is more theonomous than another. Tillich admits that
this is not an easy question to answer, for whereas in theonomous cog-
nition, the theologian who seeks to answer this type of question does
so by using a particular philosophy which he feels is best suited to
his purpose or to the human situation in which he finds himself, in the
realm of art the situation is not exactly the same, for particular
artistic styles do not fall into such clearly marked categories as differ-
ent types of philosophy. For our purpose, it would be much more accurate
to speak of certain stylistic elements, which are present in all artistic
traditions to a greater or lesser degree, even though one will usually
predominate. Of the three stylistic elements commonly accepted, the
realistic, the idealistic and the expressionistic, Tillich feels that
the latter is most able to express the self-transcendence of life in that
'it breaks away from the horizontal movement and shows the Spiritual
Presence in symbols of broken finitude'.' In every period it has there-
fore been the genuine expressionistic element which has given rise to
great works of religious art. Hence when realist elements predominate the
finite is accepted in its finitude, and when idealist elements predominate
the finite is represented in its essential potentiality, ignoring its
existential disruption or salvation. Only expressionism can really
give a transcendent appreciation by breaking through into the vertical
dimension, and for this reason it is the genuinely theonomous element in
aesthetic creativity.

Turning to the functions of purpose and humanity, Tillich notes
that in the realm of technical activity the basic ambiguity of the
subject-object scheme is seen in several ways: in the conflicts which
result from the unlimited possibilities of technical progress, in man's
finite limitations which hamper his adjustment to the things he has
produced, in the production of means for ends which become just means
with no ultimate end, and in the technical change of parts of nature
into mere technical objects. He feels that all these ambiguities can
be overcome only 'by producing objects which can be imbued with subjective
qualities; by determining all means toward an ultimate end, and, by so
doing, limiting man's unlimited freedom to go beyond the given'.36 All
this is possible under the impact of the Spirit. In the first place,
as far as the Spirit is concerned, no thing is merely a thing, it is
rather the bearer of form and meaning, and thus a possible object of
eros, and this applies even to tools, whether primitive or complex.
'This eros toward the technical Gestalt,' he says, 'is a way in which a
theonomous relation to technology can be achieved', and as long as it is
not corrupted by sinister motives, it has a genuinely theonomous character.
So, although the technical object is a potent factor in causing cultural
ambiguity, needing itself to be transcended, it does not necessarily
conflict with the idea of theonomy, and for this reason it can be meaning-
fully imbued with subjective quality.

In the second place, under the impact of the Spirit it is possible
to determine all technical production towards an ultimate end. There is
in contemporary technology a trend towards what Tillich calls 'emptiness',
seen, for example, in the current obsession with gadgets. Gadgets, he
says, are not evil in themselves, but to gear a whole economy towards
their production, repressing the question of an ultimate end of technical
production, or what is the purpose behind it all, is no less than
demonic. Purposefulness is reduced to emptiness. Only when the attitude
towards technical possibilities and production is radically changed under
the impact of the Spirit will such a problem be resolved. As he himself
puts it, 'The divine Spirit, cutting out of the vertical direction to
resist an unlimited running-ahead in the horizontal line, drives toward
a technical production that is subjected to the ultimate end of all life
processes - Eternal Life'.

Thirdly, the impact of the Spirit overcomes the destructive
capacities of technical production. Tillich reminds us that the road to
destruction is even more terrifying than the trend to purposelessness,
particularly in the present period with the production of atomic warheads.
In no other situation is the potentiality for good and evil in the same
means of production so clearly pronounced, and the demonic possibilities
give rise quite rightly to an ever-increasing concern. But under the
impact of the Spirit, the destructive side of all such production would
be banned, not by authoritarian restriction which is really a heterono-
mous solution, but by a change in the desire to produce things which have
destructive aims as their main intention. Such a solution is unimaginable
without the Spiritual Presence, because 'the ambiguity of production and
destruction cannot be conquered on the horizontal level, even fragmentarily. 39

In the personal-communal function of culture, the Spirit conquers the ambiguities in all forms of determination, whether it be self-determination, other-determination or personal participation. The ambiguity of self-determination, rooted in the split between the self as subject and the self as object in which the one tries to determine the other in the direction of 'the good' from which it is estranged, implies that in the existential situation no centred self is fully identical with itself. Hence there arises the 'search for identity', which can only be resolved when the Spirit takes hold of a person and unambiguously, albeit fragmentarily, re-establishes his true identity. 'The self which has found its identity is the self of him who is "accepted" as a unity in spite of his disunity'. 40 Similarly, the ambiguities of other-determination are also clearly rooted in the subject-object split, and for this reason the necessity of overcoming the dilemma of self-restriction or self-imposition by the one who educates or guides is impossible. On the one hand, if he who guides restricts himself completely he will be totally ineffective, a passive observer who has done nothing to free the other from his ambiguities. On the other hand, if he imposes himself upon the other, he violates the other's personality by depersonalising him and making it impossible for him to reach a genuine fulfilment of his own life in which he freely responds to the aim of his own existence. This latter attitude is particularly prevalent in any form of brainwashing, in which the object becomes the 'perfect example of the principle of conditioned reflexes'. 41 But the impact of the Spirit, argues Tillich, sets man free both from mere subjectivity and from mere objectivity, so that truly theonomous education and counselling leads him towards the
ultimate in life which gives him freedom without internal disruption.

'If the educational or guiding communion between person and person is raised beyond itself by the Spiritual Presence, the split between subject and object in both relations is fragmentarily conquered and humanity is fragmentarily achieved'.

The need for personal participation in the other person arises from the fact that one's own humanity can be realised only in reunion with the other. This leads to the two ambiguities present in every person-to-person encounter, that of subjection, in which the subject tries to take over the other person, or that of surrender, in which the subject gives himself up to the other one. Either way, says Tillich, there is no real participation, for these solutions lead inevitably to the destruction of those they seek to unite. It is the vertical dimension of self-transcendence which again comes to the rescue, affirming that the other person 'can be reached only through that which elevates him above his self-relatedness'; the other person's life is entered by means of the transcendent unity in which both persons participate. So the impact of the Spiritual Presence pierces the shell of self-seclusion so that 'the stranger who is an estranged part of one's self has ceased to be a stranger when he is experienced as coming from the same ground as one's self'. In this way, concludes Tillich, theonomy preserves humanity in every human encounter.

Finally, Tillich turns to the ambiguities of power and justice present in the communal function. The first of these is exclusiveness, the direct result of the limitations placed on a community by its necessary inclusiveness. Under the impact of the Spirit, says Tillich, two things happen. The first is that the churches themselves, as representatives of the Spiritual Community, are changed from religious communities which
possess a certain amount of demonic exclusiveness, into holy communities with universal inclusiveness, even though at the same time they retain their identity as churches. In this way, through the churches, the Spirit is able indirectly to influence the secular community. In the second place, the Spirit influences more directly the concept of justice in secular society by being imperceptibly instrumental in the creation of more embracing unities through which those who are rejected by smaller groups become part of a larger group, a process which continues until all see that they are part of the largest group, mankind itself: 'family-exclusiveness is fragmentarily overcome by friendship-inclusiveness, friendship-rejection by acceptance in local communities, class-exclusiveness by national-inclusiveness, and so on'.

Tillich does point out, however, that there is a difference between this Spirit-created inclusiveness and the collective inclusiveness of totalitarian societies, which in fact destroys any true community, and therefore against which the Spirit is firmly set.

The second ambiguity, that of equality, arises from the fact that 'equality of what is essentially unequal is as unjust as inequality of what is essentially equal'. To resolve this difficult problem, says Tillich, the Spirit must unite the 'ultimate equality' of everyone called into the Spiritual Community with the 'preliminary inequality' that stems from a person's self-actualisation as an individual. It can only do this if it both conquers any existential inequality of men (such as one finds in situations like slavery) which obscures their ultimate equality and makes it ineffective, and in addition preserves that preliminary essential inequality which can be seen in the different gifts which men possess by resisting forms of communal equality, like totalitarian society, in which the preliminary inequality of men is obliterated.
In this way the ultimate equality of all men is made one with their preliminary inequality: 'with the affirmation of the ultimate equality of all men, the Spiritual Presence affirms the polarity of relative equality and relative inequality in the actual communal life', thereby producing a genuine theonomy.

Perhaps the most obvious ambiguity in the communal realm, says Tillich, is that of leadership and power. Having no physiological centredness, the community must create centredness by some form of ruling group, itself represented by an individual, in which the communal centredness is embodied. The problems that stem from this are obvious, for the ruler and his group, in actualising the power of being of the whole community which they represent, will inevitably actualise their own power of being also, and this makes tyranny a very real possibility. But the anarchical reaction against this impasse is equally as demonic, in addition to the fact that such a reaction in itself provokes further tyrannical measures. The situation thus gets out of hand, and there is danger of total disintegration. To put it succinctly,

The centre of power is only the centre of the whole as long as it does not degrade its own centrality by using it for particular purposes. In the moment in which the representatives of the centre use the power of the whole for their particular self-realisation they cease to be the actual centre, and the whole being, without a centre, disintegrates.

Such ambiguity, claims Tillich, is conquered under the Spirit's impact, by which the members of the ruling group, including the ruler, 'are able in part to sacrifice their subjectivity by becoming objects of their own rule along with all other objects and by transferring the sacrificed part of their subjectivity to the ruled'. This principle is essential to the concept of democracy, even though one must be extremely careful not to identify democracy itself with any particular democratic constitution.
which seeks to actualise the democratic principle. But wherever the principle itself is at work, the Spiritual Presence is to be found.

The two remaining ambiguities in the realm of communal justice relate to the justice of the law, in the sense in which the law becomes a 'power-supported legal system'. These are the ambiguities of the law's establishment and its execution. The first, says Tillich, is similar to that of leadership. 'The justice of a system of laws is inseparably tied to justice as conceived by the ruling group, and this means that the spirit of every act of legislation will inextricably unite the spirit of justice and the spirit of the controlling powers. So justice implies injustice'. When the Spirit is in control this ambiguity is removed, and the law becomes theonomously 'the justice of the Kingdom of God', not in the sense that it is a rational system of justice superimposed on the life of any communal group, but in the sense that the Spiritual Presence working from within the life of the group removes the injustices of the law by combatting those ideologies which seek to justify them. Sometimes this fight has been waged through the church, sometimes through prophetic movements within secular society, but wherever it influences those who have charge of the law to change it accordingly, the result may be appropriately called 'theonomous legislation'. The second ambiguity, that of the execution of the law, has two aspects. In the first place, Tillich points out, it depends on the power of those who judge, who in their turn are dependent on their own total being, so that their judgements express not only the meaning of the law but also their own attitudes. The prophetic spirit must always be ready to expose any bias in favour of class or vested interests or the dangers of temperamental influences in making judicial decisions that may accrue from such a situation. The second aspect of the ambiguity of the law's execution arises from the
abstract nature of the law and the consequent difficulties in applying it to specific cases. The usual way of trying to overcome this is to make more and more laws to fit more and more situations. But this never works, and ultimately there must lie between the abstraction of the law and the concreteness of each situation the wisdom of the judge, which he can apply only in so far as he comes under the impact of the Spirit, 'theonomously inspired'. So we can affirm that the 'abstract majesty' of the law does not mean that it is at liberty to override individual differences, in the same way as its admission of those differences in no sense deprives it of its general validity.

At this point we have reached the stage where we venture into the proper realm of morality, for it is morality that directly underlies all forms of justice and all expressions of humanity as well as indirectly underlying all functions of cultural creativity.

Evaluation

It should be borne in mind that what Tillich has to say about the impact of the Spirit upon culture ties in with what he has already said about the way in which the ambiguities of culture are resolved in the life of the churches. Consequently there is some reiteration here, though he is obviously concerned in this present context with a much wider sphere than that of the church. His concept of a theonomous culture is clear enough, but one must immediately challenge his assertion that our grounds for affirming such a concept lie in a doctrine of ontological participation of all finite forms of expression in the divine Spirit. One does not have to accept Tillich's interpretation of the relation between God and the finite world in order to affirm that through the impact of the Spirit a culture may be transparent to its ultimate meaning and its creations filled out with spiritual content. Any doctrine of
creation which takes the relationship between God and man seriously will recognise that no culture can truly fulfil its purpose unless it is open to the creative power of the Spirit of God. But this is not a case of forcing upon man's creative activity some direction from the outside, alien to himself. It is rather to affirm that man cannot truly be himself and fulfil his capacity for cultural creativity in the right direction unless God is at work within him, helping him to see and make known his own significance within the total purpose of God for the created order. Such a situation is certainly theonomous. In no way does it violate man's own integrity, yet at the same time it maintains the affirmations of Christian monotheism.

In the same way one would question Tillich's concept of theonomous union as the means by which the Spirit overcomes the gap between subject and object in man's cultural experience. One would agree, of course, with his assertion that there are many ambiguities which inevitably arise from this existential situation, particularly in the areas of communication, knowledge and art, but the solution he proposes is difficult to accept. His conviction that such ambiguities can only be resolved by the creation of a theonomous union is based on the belief that both subject and object have a common ground in the divine Spirit which makes it possible to affirm their essential ontological unity and to experience this fragmentarily in the present order under the Spirit's impact. This again presupposes a continuity between the divine Spirit and the finite world which we cannot affirm. In fact, it is very difficult to put any sensible interpretation on the idea of a theonomous union of an ontological nature at all. It would seem that if we are going to use the concept of union between subject and object it must be interpreted in a rather different way. What we can confidently assert is that he who is truly grasped by
the Spirit is given a deeper insight and powers of understanding than he
may normally possess, gifts which enable him to enter into an experience
of the object concerned which transcends the superficial contact made in
everyday life and which creates a sense of oneness with one's object
which one never knew before. But when we say this we are using 'oneness'
in a metaphorical sense: we are not suggesting that there is an onto-
logical union hidden somewhere in the depths.

It is with this in mind that we must assess Tillich's concepts of
theonomous language, knowledge and art. Nevertheless, having made this
basic criticism, we should not be blinded to the fact that there are
also many things of value in what he has to say. For example, the
concept of a theonomous language need not be seen as a simple destruction
of the subject-object differentiation if we view it as that which breaks
down the barriers between men and makes real communication possible, so
that a new understanding is created through the very words that are used.
This has very real importance for the doctrine of the Spirit. It emphasises
that the Spirit can take hold of human language and use it in such a way
that a new relationship is formed between him who speaks and him who
listens. Indeed, this affirms Tillich's contention that theonomous language
is not some language 'given from above' which can be substituted for
ordinary everyday speech. It is ordinary everyday speech as it is taken
and used by God for his purposes of healing and reconciliation.53 Such
a concept of theonomous language is summarised for us by Paul, who says,

This is what we discuss, using language taught by no human
wisdom but by the Spirit. We interpret what is spiritual
in spiritual language.54

We must note, however, Tillich's failure to differentiate between
the Biblical word and any other human language that is used by the Spirit.
By asserting that any human word that is grasped by the Spirit can become
the Word of God, and by lumping together all holy books as examples of Spirit-filled literature, he is failing to recognise any intrinsic difference between the Bible as the Word of God and any other word that the Spirit may use. In fact, it is true to say that he never really tackles this problem of the way in which the Bible may differ or may not differ from other 'holy books' or language in its capacity as the Word of God, either here, or previously, where he discussed in more detail the Bible as the medium of the Spirit. Certainly if one takes his earlier statement seriously, that the Bible is not the Word of God unless it becomes the bearer of the Spirit to someone (which ties in rather neatly with what he says here), then this must mean that the Bible is presumably no more and no less theonomous than any other human word: both have the capacity to become theonomous, to bear the Spirit, but are not actually so until the Spirit takes them and uses them. However, if there is no essential difference between the Bible and any other literature or language, then Tillich is surely running right against the grain of Christian theology, which even though it may not accept a literal inerrancy of the Biblical word, does in no uncertain terms emphasise the uniqueness of the Bible over against any other book, precisely because of the supreme revelation it records, and in virtue of which it is able to bear the Spirit to man in a unique way. If Tillich intends to differentiate between the Bible and other examples of theonomous language, then he has blurred the distinction so much that one is unable to say just where the difference lies. What perhaps could have been pointed out is that in the Bible as the Word of God one finds a much more controlled use of language which makes it potentially more significant, in so far as it enshrines the symbols and experiences of God's revelation in history which makes it possible in a very special way for it to become
the bearer of the Spirit to men.

Again, one finds in Tillich's comments on theonomous knowledge points of obvious value and others which one would question. One is certainly not happy with the essential link he makes between Spiritual knowledge and the concept of universals. There is certainly no biblical warrant for this, and to make theonomous cognition dependent on such a controversial concept is something which we clearly cannot accept. To know a thing 'in itself', which is certainly an important part of theonomous knowledge, is just not the same as understanding some abstract essence of which it is allegedly a particular concrete manifestation. This sort of statement falls into the very trap of ignoring the distinctiveness of the particular which Tillich has already condemned. For this reason we must reject Tillich's definition. Nevertheless, we can certainly affirm that there is a knowledge which comes through intimate experience which brings together the knower and the known in a far deeper way than ordinary perception permits - rather similar, in fact, to what the Hebrews meant by da'ath. It is along these lines perhaps that we can understand something of what theonomous knowledge is: the intimate experience of another person, thing or situation, in the context of which the Spirit opens up a new depth of understanding. It is this sort of knowledge of which presumably Paul is speaking in his first letter to the Corinthians, the divine knowledge that enables a man to speak with wisdom, the spiritual experience which enables him to give spiritual judgments and make spiritual insights. Only such a knowledge as this will enable man to overcome the estrangement between himself and his world, as the Spirit gives him deeper understanding and insight through the experiences of life in which he grasps his whole being. The theological significance of this is well expressed by Paul, when he says,
God has revealed it to us by the Spirit, for the Spirit fathoms everything, even the depths of God. No one can understand the thoughts of God, except the Spirit of God.\[56\]

The experience of being grasped by the Spirit enables us to know theonomously as we come to understand something of the thoughts of God himself.

Tillich's comments on the role of the Spirit in artistic expression are interesting, though there is need for some clarification in his discussion on expressionism. Even allowing that this type of art has greater possibilities of being open to the impact of the Spirit than any other, we cannot conclude that any expressionistic work of art is therefore theonomous. How the artist may view or feel about a certain thing is not necessarily how the Spirit sees it. Tillich has not in fact provided us with any criterion which helps us to determine whether a particular expressionistic work is theonomous or not. In any case, to provide such a criterion would be extremely difficult, partly because the interpretation of art necessarily involves a subjective element and partly because the theologian is obliged to correlate his theology with philosophical thought and not simply interpret expressions of aesthetic experience. These are points which in themselves he could have made with advantage.

Again, in the realm of technical activity, Tillich's claim that the way to theonomy is through the achievement of a unity of purpose is acceptable, but his language is particularly difficult in this context, especially the way in which he speaks of the need for eros towards the technical object. One feels that this could lead to some ludicrous situations, even though a man may sometimes develop an almost erotic relationship with his car! Here particularly, with regard to man's relationship with the tools he uses, the idea of an ontological unity must
give way to a purposive unity, whereby man participates in the purpose for which the tool was created, though this of itself in no way guarantees that the purpose will be a good one rather than a demonic one. In fact, it is important that both the motive behind the creation of tools and the use to which they are put should be subjected to the guidance of the Spirit, which means that anything that creates reconciliation and harmony between men is permissible, whereas anything that alienates men from each other or seeks to destroy merely for the sake of destruction will not be allowed.

It is a pity that Tillich's otherwise excellent discussion on the ambiguities of human relations, whether personal or in community, should again be marred by the difficult concept of a theonomous union of an ontological nature. This comes out clearly in his discussion on the role of the Spirit in the area of other-determination, where he says that 'the stranger who is an estranged part of one's self has ceased to be a stranger when he is experienced as coming from the same ground as one's self'. In this statement Tillich is quite clearly affirming an essential point of identity between subject and object which needs to be experienced, albeit fragmentarily, if truly theonomous relationships are to be established. But it is extremely difficult to place any orthodox interpretation on this doctrine. In any case, as far as biblical theology is concerned, there are no grounds whatever for saying that the healing of estrangement in human relationships necessitates the overcoming of ontological separation between man and man. The Christian doctrine of reconciliation has no such trappings. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the element of unity is absent from a Spirit-filled society. But it is a unity which is the result of the healing of estrangement, not its precondition. It is a unity, furthermore, which seeks to preserve the eternal distinctive-
ness of both subject and object, rather than transcend it in ontological union. Such a unity would emphasise a sharing together of the deeper things of life, or participating in a common experience, or having a togetherness of purpose, or experiencing a genuine, empathetic concern for the other person which enables one to see things from his point of view and enter into the depths of his sufferings. All these things, of course, are the marks of a society or culture which is dominated by the spirit of agape. It is perhaps significant that in his discussion on the meaning of theonomy in the realm of personal and communal relations, Tillich's use of such a word is noticeably sparse. Notwithstanding this, we would affirm that the cultural forms and patterns of behaviour of any society that is rightly called 'theonormous', must show the mark of agape more than any other. The divine Spirit is above all the Spirit of love, and hence a theonomous culture must be supremely one where love abounds.

In the light of this, there are one or two minor points which may finally be raised. The first is to question Tillich's strange assertion that the way in which the Spirit resolves the tension between inclusion and rejection in society is by creating larger and larger groups, so that he who is rejected by the smaller group is accepted within the context of the larger. One wonders whether such a theory works out in practice. It is just not true that a person who is rejected by a small group will always discover a deeper sense of belonging by his acceptance into a larger community. The larger community will frequently have the tendency to depersonalise the individual, losing him in a sea of humanity, and this can have a disastrous effect on the person concerned. It is only at the more personal or intimate level, in the smaller group in fact, that the sense of rejection can really be overcome in any meaningful way, and it is surely here that one should look for the work of the Spirit. One
has grave reservations therefore in accepting this sort of theological assertion when there is so much evidence of a sociological nature which suggests otherwise. Secondly, there is danger that the concept of a preliminary inequality of gifts may militate against the conviction that the work of the Spirit produces an equality of opportunity. Although it is certainly true that men do not have equality of gifts, it is equally true that God is no respecter of persons, and this surely means that in a theonomous society the Spirit will work towards that situation in which there will be an equal degree of opportunity for all.

The third point of criticism arises from Tillich's assertion that 'theonomy can characterise a whole culture'. This phrase is ambiguous in so far as it could be taken to mean that there are cultures which have arisen in the course of history which are completely characterised by theonomy. Now on Tillich's own understanding this is unlikely, even impossible, owing to the existential limitations of life and its ambiguities. It is nothing more than a theoretical possibility, and this point should have been made more clearly. On the other hand, one can certainly affirm that certain cultures have a greater theonomous element than others. The difficulty arises, of course, when one comes to decide which these cultures are. One feels that to some extent there will always be some difference of opinion here, in so far as different people will see the working of the Spirit in different ways. Hence, Tillich sees high mediaeval culture as that which is most transparent to the divine Spirit, and one feels that part of his reason for saying this is that in mediaeval thought there was a degree of philosophical understanding, stemming from the Classical tradition, which to a great extent permeated the whole culture of the Middle Ages, creating in its cultural patterns a love of knowledge and a quest for truth. Others, however, who seek to
list the marks of a theonomous culture, will be more concerned with the way in which agape finds expression in the realm of human relationships and social justice. They would point out that no society can begin to call itself theonomous where love is not found in every sphere of life. True to the teaching of the New Testament, they would affirm that the divine Spirit is above all the Spirit of love. And to find examples of such cultures, they would perhaps turn away from mediaeval times and look elsewhere. Nevertheless, one feels that in any genuinely theonomous culture, because the Spirit is concerned with the whole of life, the quest for truth and the practice of love must go together. And one also feels that, despite the obscurity of much of his language, in the final analysis this is what Tillich himself would want to say.
Notes to Chapter Five

1. See ST, III, pp. 262ff.
2. See above, pp. 219 ff.
3. ST, III, p. 262.
4. Ibid.
5. See above, pp. 118 ff., and also his answer to the question 'Can a secular society survive?' in Ultimate Concern, pp. 175ff.
6. Ultimate Concern, p. 177.
7. ST, III, p. 263.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid., p. 264.
10. See above, p. 219.
11. ST, III, p. 264.
12. Theology of Culture, pp. 43f.
13. Ibid., pp. 151ff.
15. See above, p.108.
18. The Protestant Era, p. xii.
19. 'A theonomous culture expresses in its creations an ultimate concern and a transcending meaning not as something strange but as its own spiritual ground'. (The Protestant Era, p. 57).
20. The Protestant Era, p. xii.
21. Ibid., p. 45.
22. Tillich holds that this 'new theonomy' is a restoration of the original theonomous union which preceded both heteronomous and autonomous elements. Such an original theonomy, however, is to be conceived of as mythologically, rather than historically, founded. The new theonomy, on the other hand, though awaiting its total fulfillment in the context of the transcendent unity of unambiguous life, is fragmentarily realized in the historical context of the life of man. (ST, III, p. 267).
This creative impact of the Spirit which is the ground of all theonomic culture is further emphasised in the sermon on "The Witness of the Spirit to the Spirit" as one of the grounds of our certainty that God is with us. 'Spirit is life,' he says, 'creative life, as the ancient hymn, Veni, Creator Spiritus, declares ... Neither power alone, nor reason alone, creates the works of art and poetry, of philosophy and politics; the Spirit creates them individually and universally, powerful and full of reason at the same time. In every great human work we admire the inexhaustible depth of its individual and incomparable character, the power of something which happens once and cannot be repeated and that, nevertheless, is visible to century after century, universal and accessible in every period. (The Shaking of the Foundations, p. 137). Yet the autonomous element in every cultural creation is not denied when the Spiritual Presence takes over. Rather it is transcended and made into the particular vehicle through which the Spiritual Presence engages in his work of the creation of life, and in its own particularity manifests the impact of the universal and living Presence. That is the hallmark of a true theonomy.

The Protestant Era, pp. 44ff. Though Tillich's doctrine of the kairos is not immediately relevant to our present study, it should be pointed out that he uses the term in two ways. In a general sense it refers to any turning point in history 'in which the eternal judges and transforms the temporal', whereas in a special sense it refers to 'the coming of a new theonomy on the soil of a secularised and emptied autonomous culture'. Though the two uses are obviously connected, it is the second which Tillich has in mind here. In this sense, the kairos is the moment of impact of the divine Spirit in the realm of culture, and when this happens a new theonomy is born.

The Protestant Era, p. 70. Tillich sees as one of the supreme advantages of mediaeval culture its link with classical ways of thought, the 'mystical realism' which characterised Greek philosophy. See also ibid., p. 9.

For a discussion on the Word of God, see above, p.162.
34. Ibid., p. 272.
35. Ibid., p. 274.
36. ST, III, p. 274.
37. Ibid., p. 275.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid., p. 276.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid., p. 277.
42. Ibid., p. 278.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid., p. 279.
45. Ibid.

46. In *Love, Power and Justice*, Tillich makes a distinction between power as an ontological entity and compulsion as the distortion of power. The question this raises, he says, is whether there is a power which is neither physical or psychological, but spiritual. 'Compulsion', he comments, 'uses both physical and psychological means in order to exercise power, most conspicuously in the terror methods of dictatorships. No compulsion at all is presupposed in spiritual power. Nevertheless, one assumes that spiritual power is the greatest, that it is the ultimate power. One does so whenever one says that God is Spirit. The question then is, how does spiritual power work, how is it related to physical and psychological power, and how is it related to the compulsory element of power?' (see pp. 8f.).

48. ST, III, p. 280.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid., p. 281.
51. Ibid., p. 282.
52. See above, pp. 280ff.

53. One must ask how the phenomenon of speaking with tongues, which seems to characterise a renewal of the Spirit in all denominations at the present moment, fits in with what Tillich says here. Though he fails to mention it in this context, it is clear that any adequate discussion on Spiritual language must deal with this subject.
54. I Corinthians 2:13 (Moffatt). The whole chapter is relevant.
55. See above, pp. 162f.
56. I Corinthians 2:10f.
57. ST, III, p. 278.
In his discussion on the way in which the Spirit resolves the ambiguities of morality, Tillich makes an initial differentiation between 'theological' and 'theonomous' ethics. By 'theological ethics' he means an ethical system which is based on revealed information concerning ethical problems, an interpretation of ethics which he rejects in favour of what he calls 'theonomous ethics', which he defines as ethical principles or processes 'described in the light of the Spiritual Presence'. It is important, he says, to see that theonomous ethics are not foreign to man, superimposed from above, but are rather ethics 'from within', which are aware of their ultimate depth and concern. There is thus no fundamental conflict between theonomous and autonomous ethics: theonomous ethics are autonomous ethics in the light of their ultimate significance. This is why the theologian, when he discusses ethical problems, must be prepared to cast off his theologian's mantle which is characterised by its concern with revealed truth and the formulation of that truth in propositions, in order that it may be clearly seen that the moral imperative is not a series of such propositions imposed on man from the outside, but something that comes from within, welling up from the depths of his being. Tillich recognises, however, that there are those who would claim that the very element of ultimate concern and significance which distinguishes theonomous from autonomous ethics, and which has in fact given rise to certain traditions of morality, itself violates the autonomous principle. He cannot agree with this, and in reply asks whether in actual fact autonomous ethics itself can ever be completely independent of some tradition which expresses, however indirectly or unconsciously, some element of ultimate
concern. 'Even the most outspoken relativists cannot avoid something absolute'.² So, whilst autonomous ethics may be autonomous with respect to their method, in that they reject heteronomous formulations of morality superimposed from without, they can never be autonomous in respect of their 'religious substance', their experience of an ultimate concern. In all autonomous ethics the theonomous element is present, 'however hidden, however secularized, however distorted'.³ It is when this element is consciously expressed, under the impact of the divine Spirit, through free discussion and deliberation and not through any attempt to determine, that theonomous ethics is born. Thus theonomy is never intentional, never deliberately enforced from outside, or else it would become heteronomy and thus legitimately rejected. 'The moral imperative is not a strange law, imposed on us, but it is the law of our own being'.⁴ Real theonomy is born from within; it 'is autonomous ethics under the Spiritual Presence'.

Tillich is concerned in the main with two sets of moral ambiguities - those of personal self-integration and those of the moral law. To some extent he has already spoken of the way in which the Spirit resolves these ambiguities in the life of the Christian and in the life of the church.⁵ Here he is dealing with the same issues in a wider context. In his earlier discussion on the ambiguities of personal morality, or self-integration,⁶ he pointed out that in the movement between self-identity and self-alteration, certain choices have to be made which raise the difficult problem of whether the actual should be sacrificed for the potential or whether the potential should be sacrificed for the actual. This seemingly impossible dilemma, says Tillich, can only be fragmentarily resolved under the impact of the Spiritual Presence. By taking the personal centre into the transcendent unity of the universal
centre, a unity which embraces the content of all possible encounters, the Spirit raises it above its temporal encounters with reality, and so liberates the essential being of the person from the contingencies of freedom and destiny which characterise the existential situation. In accepting this liberation, the person makes the 'all-inclusive sacrifice', and in so doing finds the 'all-inclusive fulfilment'. This, says Tillich, is the only unambiguous sacrifice a man can make. Nevertheless, because it is made in the existential situation, it must remain both fragmentary and open to distortion by the ambiguities of life.

In the light of this, Tillich considers three sets of recurring questions which pinpoint more specifically the ambiguities of sacrifice. The first concerns the number of contents of the encountered world one is able to take into oneself whilst at the same time preserving the balance between self-identity and self-alteration:

How many contents of the encountered world can I take into the unity of my personal centre without disrupting it? And, how many contents of the encountered world must I take into the unity of my personal centre in order to avoid an empty self-identity?

Tillich's answer to this question is that when the personal centre is related to the universal centre, only those contents are allowed entry which help it to realise its essential being, its unity with the universal centre. This judgment is arrived at not by any arbitrary decisions, but only through the wisdom of the Spirit, which is concerned both to maintain the self's identity without impoverishing it, and simultaneously drive towards its alteration without disrupting it. In this way, says Tillich, the Spirit conquers the two-fold anxiety which logically preceded the transition from essence to existence, that of not actualising one's essential being and that of losing oneself in one's self-actualisation.

So in the power of the Spirit it is possible for man's essential being to
appear existentially as it conquers the element of distortion within the Reality of the New Being, such as one sees supremely in Jesus and man the Christ, in whom the eternal unity of God becomes actual under existential conditions without being conquered by them.

The second set of questions concerns the direction of life: Into how many directions can I push beyond a given state of my being without losing all directedness of the life process? And, into how many directions must I try to encounter reality in order to avoid a narrowing-down of my life-process to monolithic poverty? 

Tillich's reply is that where the Spirit is effective, 'life is turned ... toward the ultimate within all directions', the all-inclusive direction of depth which acts as the criterion of choice between all directions. The man who is thus orientated by the Spirit, the 'saint', knows both where to go and where not to go, and is able to tread successfully on the tightrope between 'impoverishing asceticism' and 'disrupting libertinism'. Because many people do not know which direction to take in life, their lives become restricted or frustrated, but this can be overcome by the Spirit who preserves the unity in divergent directions - both the unity of the self and the unity of the directions, which reconverge in the direction of the ultimate.

The third set of questions is basic: How many potentialities, given to me by virtue of my being man and further, by being this particular man, can I actualise without losing the power to actualise anything seriously? And, how many of my potentialities must I actualise in order to avoid the state of mutilated humanity?

Man is obviously limited in the number of potentialities he can fulfil, by his own finitude. Even mankind as a whole, because of its historical limitations, will never fulfil all its possibilities, let alone the individual. Such a situation cannot be changed, of course, by the Spiritual Presence, for the finite cannot become infinite just like that,
but the Spirit can nevertheless help man to accept his finitude and in this way give new meaning to the sacrifice of his potentialities by removing its tragic and ambiguous character. In such a sacrifice, man realises that every power of being which he possesses is not his in an absolute sense, it is his only because it is given to him. By accepting this, he comes to see that the humanistic ideal of the all-round personality, a 'God-man idea', in which every potentiality is actualised is clearly impossible. Even Jesus himself, the 'God-man image', was not an all-round personality in this sense. Nevertheless in him we do see what it means to sacrifice all one's potentialities for the sake of the one potentiality which man himself cannot actualise, 'uninterrupted unity with God'.

So whereas the humanistic idea of autonomous personal fulfilment suggests that man can actualise what he can be, directly and without sacrifice, the concept of theonomous personal fulfilment, determined by the Spirit, takes the inevitability of sacrificing certain possibilities much more seriously, and gathers them up in the one all-inclusive sacrifice, in which man, under the Spirit's impact, sacrifices all his potentialities in so far as they lie on the horizontal plane, to the vertical direction, the direction of the ultimate, for the sake of his unity with God. In so doing he views his potentialities in a new light, and in this way receives them back, fulfilled or unfulfilled, as a gift from the divine.

Having dealt with the ambiguities of personal morality, Tillich turns to those concerned with the moral law, particularly in its heteronomous and autonomous expressions. In a previous chapter we saw how he considered the nature of these ambiguities under three heads: the validity of the moral imperative, the relativity of the moral content, and the power of moral motivation; suggesting that the ambiguities of
each can only be resolved in the light of agape, the reality of love which is the ground of man's essential being. This answer means that the moral law is both affirmed, in the sense that it is an expression of what man essentially is, but also transcended in its legal expression as a commandment and threat which stands against man in his existential estrangement. 'Love contains and transcends the law'. This may be taken by some to mean that love itself becomes the all-embracing law summarised in the commandment 'Thou shalt love'. But if this were so, it would still fall prey to the ambiguities to which all law is subjected. One can never demonstrate the validity of agape if one thinks of it in this sort of way. In fact, ultimately love cannot be a commandment at all, for no man can fulfil any command to love in his state of existential estrangement. And if he cannot love, 'he denies the unconditional validity of the moral imperative, he has no criterion by which to choose within the flux of ethical contents, and he has no motivation for the fulfilment of the moral law'. For this reason Tillich prefers to speak of love as a reality rather than a law: 'it is not a matter of ought-to-be - even if expressed in imperative form - but a matter of being'. And such a reality, claims Tillich, can only be realised when one is grasped by the Spirit who creates love in the life of man and enables him to fulfil it. As he puts it in one of his sermons:

It is a matter of being, determined by the presence of the divine Spirit. Love is the fruit of the Spirit, and there is no love without the Spirit. Love is not a matter of law. As long as it is commanded, it does not exist. Neither is it a matter of sentimental emotion. It is impossible for the natural man, and it is ecstatic in its appearance, like every gift of the Spirit.

So theonomous morals, as distinct from heteronomous and autonomous morals, are not commandments, but 'morals of love as a creation of the Spirit'. Thus the basis of theonomous morality is 'the presence of
the Spirit of God in our spirit', and if this is disregarded Christianity becomes reduced to a system of moral commandments, which Tillich feels has so often unfortunately characterised Protestantism.

All this becomes an actualised reality when a person is elevated into the transcendent unity of the divine life. The Spiritual Presence reunites his estranged existence with his essence, which is exactly what the moral law commands, and in this way demonstrates its universal validity. This unconditional validity of the moral law is in no sense contradicted by the historical relativity of specific ethical codes, because the validity of such codes themselves lies in the extent to which they are an expression of love and thus confirm the reunion of man's existential with his essential being. So the unconditional character of the formal moral imperative is united with the conditional character of its ethical content: 'love is unconditional in its essence, conditional in its existence'. It is therefore a fundamental mistake to elevate any ethical content of love to unconditional validity: the imperative alone is unconditionally valid.

This leads us to the problem of the content of the law. Tillich observes that there are two types of content in the moral law: the moral demands made in concrete situations, and the abstract norms which are derived from ethical experiences in relation to these concrete situations. The individual inevitably swings backwards and forwards between these two alternatives, and this raises the question of an unambiguous criterion for making ethical decisions. Such a criterion, says Tillich, must be agape, which fragmentarily overcomes the tension between the abstract and concrete elements in every moral situation. How then is love related to these two elements? In the first place, 'in relation to the abstract element, the formulated moral laws, love is effective
through wisdom, the moral laws of a religion or philosophy which express the wisdom and ethical experiences of the past. But this does not give the ethical formulation itself unconditional validity: all moral laws must continually come under judgment according to whether they are adequate to a given situation or not, and in those cases where they have ceased to be effective or threaten to become destructive, they may have to be rescinded altogether. Secondly, in relation to the specific situation, love becomes effective through courage. Because of the obvious limitations of abstract norms in concrete situations, there are occasions where love must transcend the wisdom of the past, and to do so it will need courage, 'the courage to judge the particular without subjecting it to an abstract norm - a courage which can do justice to the particular'. But courage implies risk, the risk even of misunderstanding a situation and the possibility of mistakenly acting against love itself. So again, Tillich affirms that 'true morality is a morality of risk', it 'lives in the unsafety of risk and courage'. And it is only to the degree that Spirit-created love prevails in a man that this concrete decision is unambiguous. So,

with respect to moral content, theonomous morality is determined by the Spirit-created love. It is supported by the Spirit-created wisdom of the ages. It is made concrete and adequate by the application of the courage to love to the unique situation.

Finally, says Tillich, love is the motivating power in theonomous morality, not indeed as law, but as grace, and grace is none other than the effective presence of love in man, made possible through the impact of the Spirit. 'Grace is the impact of the Spiritual Presence that makes the fulfilment of the law possible - though fragmentarily'. It is a free gift, given without merit. So we can say that love is the source of grace. Love accepts that which is
unacceptable and love renews the old being so that it becomes a new being. Medieval theology almost identified love and grace, and rightly so, for that which makes one graceful is love. But grace is, at the same time, the love which forgives and accepts.\(^23\)

Theonomous morality is the only morality which makes 'the fulfilment of the law' possible, and every other type of morality lacks this ultimate motivating power. Affirms Tillich, 'Only love or the Spiritual Presence can motivate by giving what it demands'.

So Tillich's judgment on all non-theonomous ethics is this: they are inevitably ethics of law, and law can only intensify and aggravate estrangement. It can show neither the power of motivation, nor the principle of choice in the concrete situation, nor the unconditional validity of the moral imperative. Only love can do this, love which is not man's creation, but the creation of the Spirit, the gift of grace. And theonomous morals are the morals of love.

Evaluation

Tillich's attempt to differentiate between theological and theonomous ethics fails to a great extent because of his rather narrow understanding of the nature of the former. This he seems to interpret as a heteronomous system of ethics based on a divine authority external, and therefore alien, to man. But there is no reason why theological ethics should be interpreted in this way. Admittedly in its history the church has frequently sought to impose the divine law upon men by means of ethical systems which have every characteristic of heteronomy, but this does not mean that theological ethics as such is thereby discredited. His own concept of theonomous ethics is surely no less theological because it is not formulated heteronomously, unless of course one denies that the concept of theonomy has any theological significance. In any case, his rejection of the word 'theological' in this context hardly complies
with his usage of it in the rest of his system. He does not hesitate
to call his system theological, despite the fact that he most strongly
rejects a heteronomous conception of God. To be consistent with what he
says here, he would therefore have to say that his own system was theon-
omous rather than theological, and this he does not do. We see no
reason, therefore, why he should reject theological ethics as such, for
his own understanding of ethics is just as theological as any heteronomous
system, though expressed of course in a significantly different way.

On the other hand, our criticism of Tillich's interpretation of
theonomy must also apply here. If the ground for any theonomous un­
derstanding of ethics is, as Tillich implies, that God and man are ultimately
one, sharing the same essential nature expressed in agape, this is clearly
unacceptable. But a theonomous understanding of morality need not be
built on this presupposition at all. If God has made man in his own
image, then we must assume that because God is love, man also is made to
love and to fulfil himself in love. This means that in his search for
morality, he cannot rest until his every action springs from love. Yet
this is not a morality imposed upon him from without: it is a morality
which stems from his own nature, the way in which he has been made, the
purpose for which he has been created. Such a morality of love is in no
sense alien to man, and can therefore rightly be called theonomous.

What we can affirm with Tillich is that the concept of theonomous
morality rightly emphasises that man can only become a truly moral being
when he is grasped by the divine Spirit within his own life, so that he
is able to love freely and completely as he enters into the experience of
the divine love. Or as John puts it, 'We love, because he first loved
us'. The statement that without the Spirit there is no true morality,
no depth of agape, will always remain true. Similarly, we can affirm
that this Spirit-created morality cannot be adequately or legitimately expressed in heteronomous terms. The Spirit of love working within a man cannot be tied down to specific regulations, even though this work may be traced in certain broad patterns of activity, and at times even tabulated and codified in documents of wisdom for man's benefit and guidance. It is when these documents and codes are invested with heteronomous authority that the freedom of the Spirit is restricted, and this the Christian must constantly resist, remembering that 'the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus made me free from the law of sin and death'.

Thus although this is not the place to enter into a discussion on Christian ethics, we can certainly say that the affirmation of the dependence of morality on the Spirit neither makes Christianity moralistic nor rules out a genuine secular morality.

Finally, we have already had occasion to cross swords with Tillich's reading of morality in terms of self-integration. This, as we have seen, is to suggest that the primary purpose of our relationships with the world, including other people, is that we may use it and them, and take from it and them those things that are necessary, for our own development towards maturity. So anything which hinders self-integration is to be avoided, and anything that helps it is permissible and to be encouraged. This comes out very forcefully in the three sets of questions Tillich asks about the ambiguities of sacrifice and the answers he gives. One decides whether sacrifice is permissible or not, not according to whether it is in the interests of the other person, but whether it helps one to achieve the development of one's own essential being. To this we must take exception. If the real function of the Spirit is to help man to see what is necessary in his relation with others for his personal well-being, or what is inadvisable, what he ought to sacrifice and what he
ought to preserve, then it seems that this is a most inadequate way of
describing the Spirit's relation to morality. Is this all that a theono-
cous morality is for? Surely a truly theonomous morality is one in
which agape is central, an agape which is primarily other-centred, not
self-centred, which loves the other person for his own sake, and not for
self-gratification. If any self-integration or satisfaction follow in
the wake, it is a by-product. Such things - even if one sees them as
indirectly the work of the Spirit in man - are hardly the completion of
morality itself.
Notes to Chapter Six

1. ST, III, p. 284.
2. Theology of Culture, p. 135.
4. Theology of Culture, p. 136. In The Protestant Era, Tillich distinguishes between autonomous, heteronomous and theonomous morality in this way: 'Autonomy asserts that man as the bearer of universal reason is the source and measure of culture and religion - that he is his own law. Heteronomy asserts that man, being unable to act according to universal reason, must be subjected to a law, strange and superior to him. Theonomy asserts that the superior law is, at the same time, the innermost law of man himself, rooted in the divine ground which is man's own ground: the law of life transcends man, although it is, at the same time, his own', (pp. 56f).
5. See above, pp. 319ff.
6. ST, III, pp. 44ff, see above, pp. 83ff.
8. Ibid., p. 286.
9. Ibid., p. 287.
10. Ibid., p. 286.
11. Ibid., p. 288.
12. See ibid., pp. 47ff, and above, pp. 84ff.
13. Ibid., p. 289.
17. Perspectives, p. 22.
18. ST, III, p. 291.
19. Ibid.
20. Theology of Culture, p. 141.
22. Ibid., p. 292.


25. Romans 8:2,5.

26. See above, pp. 89ff.
In our study of Tillich's doctrine of the Spirit so far, we have seen how the divine Spirit, through its impact on life, resolves the ambiguities in the functions of morality, culture and religion. In this final section, Tillich turns his attention to the nature of the Spirit's activity within the world and the way in which its impact on life can be appropriately described as a work of healing. His first concern is with the actual relation of the Spirit to those dimensions of life which precede the human dimension of spirit. Has the Spiritual Presence, he asks, a relation to life in general? There are two answers, he says, to this question. In the first place, there can be no direct impact of the Spirit on these dimensions. 'Divine Spirit appears in the ecstasy of human spirit but not in anything which conditions the appearance of spirit.' In fact, to assert otherwise, he maintains, would be to think of the Spiritual Presence rather in the form of an 'intoxicating substance, or a stimulus for psychological excitement, or a miraculous physical cause'. It is true that biblical literature abounds in all sorts of miraculous effects attributed to the work of the Spirit, from the virginal conception of Jesus to the pentecostal glossolalia, yet nevertheless one must beware of taking these stories literally. To do so would tend to make the divine Spirit into a 'finite, though extraordinary, cause beside other causes', some sort of physical matter in which both its Spirituality and its divinity are lost. In fact, to describe the Spirit even as a substance of higher power and dignity than others is to abuse the word 'Spirit', for even were there higher natural substances than we know, they would still be lower than the spirit of man and therefore not open to the divine Spirit's impact. To avoid this
way of thinking it is essential, says Tillich, to affirm that the divine Spirit has no impact on pre-spirit dimensions, whether inorganic or organic, biological or psychological.

Even so, he continues, if one maintains that life is one in its many dimensions, then this does imply an indirect influence of the Spirit on life in general. The impact of the Spiritual Presence on the human spirit must imply some sort of impact on every dimension which constitutes man's being and makes possible the appearance of spirit in him. In creating theonomous morality, for example, the Spirit will also affect the self-integration of the psychological self, which in turn affects biological self-integration, and so on, back to the basic physical and chemical processes. But it is important, says Tillich, not to think of these implications as a chain of causes and effects, reaching backwards from the Spirit through the human spirit to each other realm. For 'the multidimensional unity of life means that the impact of the Spiritual Presence on the human spirit is at the same time, an impact on the psyche, the cells, and the physical elements which constitute man's; it is present to all dimensions of life 'in one and the same Presence'. So the impact of the Spirit on the whole of life is existentially limited to those areas where the preceding dimensions are brought to their fulfillment in the dimension of spirit, in the context of which alone the influence of the divine Spirit is known.

The total impact of the Spirit on the whole of life, Tillich points out, must await the coming of the Kingdom of God, a universal concept which transcends the existential limitations of the Spirit's activity in time and space. The function that unites the universality of the Kingdom with the fragmentary nature of the Spirit's activity within the existential order is that of healing which is present in both, and
which is an essential element in the total work of salvation. Healing, of course, presupposes disease, which Tillich has defined as the disintegration which results in any being if either of the two poles of self-identity or self-alteration is so predominant that the balance of life is disturbed. The work of healing in the organic realm for instance necessitates breaking the predominance of one pole and reviving the influence of the other, thus working for the self-integration of a centred life. But in so far as disintegration occurs in the whole of life, and just as there are many types of disease arising from differing processes of disintegration, so also there must be many different ways of healing and many different sorts of healers. The question for us, says Tillich, is 'whether there is Spiritual healing, and if it exists, how it is related to the other ways of healing, and further how it is related to that kind of healing which in the language of religion is called "salvation".'

Tillich recognises that although our contemporary understanding of disease and healing is concerned with the whole person, yet there are many different ways of healing, each of which will be used appropriately. The relationship between Spiritual healing and these other forms of healing is not an easy one, and Tillich feels that it has been particularly confused by the ambiguous concept of 'faith healing'. The way in which this latter concept is normally used would lead him to associate it with 'magical healing' rather than healing under the genuine impact of the Spirit. In fact, the use of the word 'faith' in this connection is nothing less than a distortion of the real meaning of the word into ideas of concentration and auto-suggestion, naturally produced under psychological conditions; it has nothing to do with being grasped by the Spiritual Presence. This is not to say that there is no value in faith
healing, despite its magical element. "Faith healing can be and has been quite successful, and there is probably no healing of any kind which is completely free from elements of magic." But though one may recognise this as one way of healing, one must constantly bear three things in mind: firstly, such healing is not healing through faith, but through magical concentration; secondly, though the nature of its impact may be justified as an element in human encounter, it should be remembered that its potentialities can be destructive as well as creative; and thirdly, if it excludes the other ways of healing in principle it is always predominantly destructive. None of these things can be said about the healing of the Spirit.

The practice of faith healing through prayer and certain sacramental acts has, of course, found its way into the church as much as elsewhere, and Tillich admits that it is not always easy to distinguish between this sort of prayer and the genuine Spirit-determined prayer for health and healing. Nevertheless, the Spirit-directed prayer, which is characterised by a real surrender to God of one's concern for the person who is sick, is ready to 'accept the divine acceptance of the prayer whether its overt content is fulfilled or not', whereas the magical sort of prayer, which merely uses God as a tool for its realisation, will 'not accept an unfulfilled prayer as an accepted prayer, for the ultimate aim in the magic prayer is not God and the reunion with him but the object of the prayer, for example, health'. Thus a genuine prayer for health 'in faith' is not an attempt at faith healing, but an expression of the state of being grasped by the divine Spirit, 'by a power that is greater than we are, a power that shakes us and turns us, and transforms us and heals us. Surrender to this power is faith'. One sees this supremely at work, of course, in the life and ministry of Jesus, who in
his own person bears the New Being which is created by the Spirit. This
same healing ministry is continued by others who have been grasped by
the Spirit and who have experienced the healing of the Spirit in their
own lives. And 'we belong to these people, if we are grasped by the
new reality which has appeared in him. We have his healing power our­selves'.

The real answer concerning the relation between different ways of
healing under the impact of the Spirit begins with the assertion that
healing under the divine Spirit is no less than what theology calls
salvation: the total integration of the personal centre through its
elevation into what is symbolically called 'the divine centre', the
transcendent unity of all life. In this experience of healing and salva­tion the receiving function is faith and the actualising function love;
so 'health in the ultimate sense of the word, health as identical with
salvation, is life in faith and love', a life which is unambiguous
though fragmentary. But this does not mean that the healing impact of
the Spirit can replace other methods of healing, as 'faith healers' often
claim, for every disorder of man cannot be ascribed to spiritual estrange­ment. As Tillich has already pointed out, each form of sickness must
be treated with the appropriate form of healing. Conversely, other
methods of healing cannot replace the impact of the Spirit, as certain
schools of psychiatry in their approach to man's existential predicament
seek to do. The psychiatrist may well be able to cope with man's
neurotic anxiety, for example, but he cannot cope with his existential
anxiety, his anxiety about being itself. He cannot do so because he
does not recognise the vertical dimension in life, that such anxiety can
only be resolved by the Spiritual Presence itself who grasps man and takes
him into the transcendent unity, thereby overcoming his existential
estrenagement which lies at the root of all his anxiety and guilt. However, Tillich is pleased that a new appreciation of the complementary nature of the various ways of healing is now taking place, even though such an appreciation must take care not to confuse the distinctive role of each. All forms of healing are indeed complementary, but no form can act as a substitute for any other. 11

Finally, Tillich reminds us that healing is necessarily fragmentary in all its forms, a situation which not even the impact of the Spirit can change. 'Manifestations of disease struggle continuously with manifestations of health, and it often happens that disease in one realm enhances health in another realm', and vice-versa. He cites the example of a healthy athlete who has all the symptoms of neurosis and the healthy activist who hides his existential despair. This can be none other, because of human finitude; and in the end, no healing, not even healing under the Spiritual Presence, can liberate man from the final inevitability of death. The question of healing, therefore, and with it the question of salvation, goes beyond the healing of the individual to healing through history and beyond history, and leads to the question of Eternal Life and the Kingdom of God. In the end, 'only universal healing is total healing - salvation beyond ambiguities and fragments'. 12 It is at this stage that we cross the boundary from the Spiritual Presence to the Kingdom of God, the substance of the second half of the third volume of Tillich's Systematic Theology.

Evaluation

There are several points in this final section relating to the healing power of the Spirit which need to be discussed. In the first place, Tillich's assertion that there is no direct impact of the Spirit in the pre-human dimensions is not altogether clear. The immediate
reaction to this statement would be to point to the fact that in traditional Christian thinking, the Spirit has always been intimately associated with the natural world, particularly in terms of his creative activity and sustaining power. Even if one does not allow a pneumatological interpretation of Genesis 1:2, there are other biblical texts which point to this. Two passages in the Psalms speak of the activity of the Spirit of Yahweh in creation: 'By the word of the Lord the heavens were made, and all their host by the Spirit of his mouth', and, 'When thou sendest forth the Spirit they are created; and thou renewest the face of the ground'. But Tillich rarely mentions the Spirit in the context of creation. We should not conclude from this, of course, that he has no place for the Spirit in creation. Indeed, his definition of God as Spirit must be filled out with his affirmation that it is the Spirit who unites the first and second principle of the Godhead, power and meaning, thus making creativity possible. If the Spirit then actualises the potential within the Divine Ground and expresses it in the Logos, we are surely intended to infer from this that it is through the Spirit that both creation and sustentation occur. But unfortunately this is a theme which Tillich never explicitly develops and consequently one is left somewhat in the dark. Nevertheless, perhaps Schelling can give us a clue here as to the direction in which Tillich's thought is moving. Schelling develops the idea that in all the dimensions preceding the human dimension the Spirit is indeed active, but not consciously so. The creation and the continuance of the material world is the unconscious activity of the Spirit. In this sense nature can be referred to as the 'unconscious poetry of the Spirit', who cannot act consciously until man appears, when that which has previously been slumbering now becomes awakened. Tillich's silence on any conscious activity of the
Spirit before man may well suggest that he follows his acknowledged master along these lines. Hence, he is unable to speak of a direct impact of the Spirit upon nature in this sense. However, we are not bound to accept Schelling's interpretation of the Spirit's activity. It would certainly be much more in line with orthodox Christian thinking to affirm that the Spirit is directly and purposively at work in the whole evolutionary process, actively bringing it to its climax in man. Christian theology knows nothing of Schelling's unconscious Spirit; it knows only a personal Spirit who is consciously alive in every segment of the universe. If indeed Tillich does follow Schelling at this point, then his doctrine of the Spirit is very different from the biblical conception and from what the Christian faith has always taught.

We must allow for the fact, however, that in the present context Tillich is dealing specifically with the healing work of the Spirit, in which case it may be that he is asserting only that there can be no healing by the Spirit in nature until the work of redemption begins in man. There are two points here. In the first place, despite what Tillich says, there is surely a sense in which the Spirit's work of healing is always present in the world of nature; certainly this is what the doctrine of providence, sustenance, preservation, or whatever we call it, implies. This work of healing may indeed be described as the natural processes at work, healing over the scars created by natural disaster, restoring the equilibrium so essential to the natural forces, but for Christian theology this is nevertheless the Spirit at work within the natural world he has created, constantly bringing order out of chaos, light out of darkness, continually at work in opposition to the forces of destruction that exist within the natural world. In this sense, the Spirit is directly engaged in the work of healing in those dimensions
which precede the dimension of spirit. However, there is a sense in which the final work of redemption in the natural world must await the healing work of Christ in man, a work which has begun but which will not be completed till the end of the age. In this context the words of Paul are relevant, where he speaks of the whole creation waiting with eager expectation for God's sons to be revealed, when full liberation shall occur. So the full impact of the Spirit on the other dimensions of life must await the redemption of man, a redemption which is already indirectly applied to nature in so far as man himself contains within his own being all other previous dimensions. In this context we can perhaps agree with Tillich that as yet there is no direct impact in the sense of ultimate healing. But this is not to deny that the Spirit is directly at work in the universe within the natural processes, creating and sustaining and restoring, until the day of ultimate salvation arrives.

The role of the Spirit in the ministry of healing is of considerable importance and the church itself is becoming increasingly aware of this rediscovered sphere of the Spirit's activity. One therefore welcomes the attention Tillich gives to this topic. Nevertheless, his condemnation of faith healing is far too generalised and indiscriminate. It is just not true that all forms of faith healing are operative through magical concentration (a term which, incidentally, Tillich fails to define). Whether one calls it faith healing or not, there is certainly a form of healing in which faith in the power of the Spirit to heal, supported by the prayer of intercession, plays an important role. It may indeed be more accurate to call such healing 'Spiritual healing', in so far as he who is sick is healed by the Spirit through the vehicle of faith, but this is not to minimise the role of faith, as Tillich seems to do. Now it is true that Tillich does speak of faith in his concept of Spiritual
healing, but his definition of faith as 'surrender to the power of the Spirit' seems to be intended, in the context in which it is used, to rule out the idea that faith is in any way concerned with specific answers to specific prayers. One does not see why this should be so, and to maintain that it is so would in fact immediately invalidate the majority of instances of healing in the New Testament, as well as many such cases in the ministry of the church throughout its history and at the present time. This, however, does not seem to concern Tillich, who is prepared to reject any concept of Spiritual healing which does not fit in with his own categories of thought. In so doing he either ignores an important part of the Spirit's activity altogether or else debases it by characterising it as the mere exercising of magical powers. Clearly this will not do.

Nevertheless, it is right that healing should be seen within the total context of salvation, as Tillich underlines. The Spirit is concerned with the whole of man, not just a part. The story of the healing of the paralytic confirms this. In this sense, salvation itself is rightly understood in terms of healing: the healing of man as a person, the healing of relationships between man and man, the healing of his estrangement from God. Consequently the work of salvation is concerned with every part of man's life and is operative in all: in morality, culture and religion; in the life of the Spiritual Community within the church, in the life of the individual within the context of the Spiritual Community. The Divine Spirit is he who heals every ambiguity of life, and though the totality of healing cannot come within the present order of things, every act of healing, every act of salvation, points towards this end, and demonstrates the Spirit breaking through into our midst. Tillich expresses, as we must expect him to do, all this in his usual
ontological framework. Yet this should not prevent us from asserting with him, despite any difference of mechanics or interpretation, that the total healing of man and nature can come only through the impact of the Spiritual Presence. The final consummation can only come in an eschatological context, which is beyond the terms of reference of our present study. Life in the Spirit then becomes life in the Kingdom of God. Yet the Spirit takes the things of the Kingdom, the New Reality of which Tillich so often speaks, and makes them fragmentarily real in the life of the present world, as a foretaste of that which is to come. As Berkhof puts it, 'All these operations are the "powers of the age to come"; they are all summarised in the work of the Holy Spirit'.

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Notes to Chapter Seven

1. *ST, III*, p. 293.


8. *The New Being*, p. 38. (Sermon on 'Healing').


10. *ST, III*, p. 298. So also, 'Salvation is derived from salvus, "healthy" or "whole", and it can be applied to every act of healing: to the healing of sickness, of demonic possession, and of servitude to sin and to the ultimate power of death', (*ST, I*, p. 161.).

11. In his sermon on 'Healing', Tillich has this to say: 'The physician can help, he can keep us alive, but can he make us whole? ... The counsellor and the psychiatrist can help; he can liberate us, but can he make us whole? Can he give us salvation?' Neither of these, he points out, can give us healing. God alone can do this. He alone can bring about the reconciliation in our souls and not infrequently in our bodies which are broken down in the encounter with reality: he alone, through the impact of his Presence; because it is he alone who can heal reality, by bringing a new reality, thereby reconciling the conflicting forces of our whole existence. 'Only a new reality can make us whole, breaking into the old one, reconciling it with itself. It is the humanly incredible, ecstatic, often defeated, but never conquered faith of Christianity that this new reality which was always at work in history, has appeared in fulness and power in Jesus, the Christ, the Healer and Saviour'. And this new reality, which is the 'power of reconciliation whose work is wholeness' cannot be thrown out, whether we live or die, for it is the very creation of the Spirit of God. (*The New Being*, pp. 40ff).

See also *Theology of Culture*, pp. 122ff., and pp. 211ff.


15. See ST, I, p. 278.


17. Ibid., p. 150.

18. Ibid., p. 137.


CONCLUSION

I

At the very beginning of our study, mention was made of the significant emphasis Tillich places in his theology on the concept of participation. This concept, which we found difficult to define with precision, is closely allied to a further concept which has constantly arisen in our study of the Spirit, that of the transcendent unity of unambiguous life, into which he who is grasped by the Spirit is taken, and within which he is able to overcome the subject-object cleavage of the existential order. Seeing that these two concepts hang closely together, it is not surprising that the concept of the transcendent unity of unambiguous life is no less difficult to define than that of participation. But because it is so crucial to any full understanding of the doctrine of the Spiritual Presence in Tillich's theology, we must look at it a little more closely. To know what life in the Spirit means, we must know what the transcendent unity of unambiguous life entails.

It has appeared from our study that the concept of the transcendent unity of unambiguous life is fundamentally a description of the divine life, the life of ultimate reality, in which there is no subject-object split, but in which the subject and object polarities are completely and unambiguously united, with no estrangement between them. By being taken into the divine life under the impact of the Spirit man comes to realise that his basic unity with the world lies in the fact that both he as subject and the object he encounters, whether it be another person, or a thing, have one common ground of being in the life of God which transcends every existential differentiation. Now it may seem that on the surface it is fairly clear what Tillich is saying, that in the depth
dimension of being-itself both subject and object are one in their ultimate ground. But when we probe a little more deeply, what is not so easy to understand is whether he is implying that because in the transcendent unity of unambiguous life, in the divine life and ground of being, both subject and object find their deeper unity, then there is ultimately no differentiation between the two. Obviously in their existential state, though a fragmentary unity may be realised, differentiation remains. But does this mean that ultimately, when the shackles of earthly existence have been cast aside, there is no further differentiation? Does participation of subject in object, and object in subject, effected by the Spirit, mean eventually a complete merging of the one into the other, with a resultant loss of individuality? Is there any place, in fact, for individuality in the Spirit-determined transcendent unity of unambiguous life?

Let us consider the case, first of all, where both subject and object are men. In the existential world they are separate, which means for Tillich, 'estranged'. Nevertheless, they are both one in their essential humanity, the common ground of all individual members of the human race. Tillich's view is that by being taken by the Spirit into the transcendent unity of unambiguous life they are each, both subject and object, able to participate in each other by participating in their essential humanity, thus overcoming their subject-object split. But does this mean that in the transcendent unity of unambiguous life, in the context of the divine Life, there are no individual men, but only an essential humanity? Much depends, of course, on what it means to overcome the subject-object split. We met this difficulty in discussing the meaning of unity in relation to the concept of love, but here the problem is much more acute, because now we are thinking of what this
unity ultimately involves, outside the limitations of the existential order.

It is not easy to decide what Tillich's answer to this problem is. At times he asserts the need to retain a proper emphasis on individuality as the necessary pole to that of participation. Participation is not identity, he claims. Yet over against this one has to set his statement that 'the stranger who is an estranged part of one's self has ceased to be a stranger when he is experienced as coming from the same ground as one's self'. In such a statement as this, if participation does not imply identity, it at least implies something very similar. At any rate, such a sentence crosses over the boundaries of the individual self in such a way that differentiation between subject and object becomes almost impossible and individuality ultimately meaningless.

Perhaps some light is thrown on this problem in the latter part of Volume 3 of his *Systematic Theology*, where Tillich talks about the eschatological symbols. Here he introduces the interesting concept of 'essentialisation', which refers to the state of being through which the individual participates in eternal life. However, this essentialisation, he points out, is not just returning to what a thing essentially is — it is not a mere sinking back into the essence which preceded actualisation — it is rather that

the new which has been actualised in time and space adds something to essential being, uniting it with the positive which is created within existence, thus producing the ultimately new, the "New Being", not fragmentarily as in temporal life, but wholly as a contribution to the Kingdom of God in its fulfilment. . . . Participation in the eternal life depends on a creative synthesis of a being's essential nature with what it has made of it in its temporal existence.

The essentialisation of humanity, therefore, in the context of unambiguous life, means that man's existential particularity is in some way
united with his essential humanity to create something new. It is essential manhood with a new important factor added, the fulfilment of essential being through the experience of actualisation. It is, in other words, a 'new humanity'. For Tillich, then, it seems that the value of man's individuality is that it has provided the existential element which goes towards making this creative synthesis possible. What is not so clear is whether or not the individual, once he has made his contribution to essentialised humanity, has any continuing life as an individual. Whatever the answer to this question, it is clear that the dominant concept is that of essentialisation, in which the individual life is of a secondary concern, the means to the desired end of a far wider fulfilment and a far deeper ontological unity.

Our understanding of essentialisation is taken further in another passage where Tillich talks about the fate of the 'lost'.

He who is estranged from his own essential being and experiences the despair of total self-rejection must be told that his essence participates in the essences of all those who have reached a high degree of fulfilment and that through this participation his being is eternally affirmed. This idea of the essentialisation of the individual in unity with all beings makes the concept of vicarious fulfilment understandable. In this passage it seems that the boundaries of individual differentiation are so violated that they no longer matter. What ultimately matters is that the individual is essentialised, and in this essentialisation becomes one with other individuals in such a way that it is possible to 'cross over' from one to the other. Even if one individual has not fulfilled himself through his own personal humanity, he can nevertheless do so because his essence is one with the essence of those who have thus fulfilled themselves. It seems that here the lives of individuals have become so merged into a state of essentialisation that it has become
exceedingly difficult to fill any talk of continuing individuality with intelligible meaning.

So when Tillich says that in the Spirit-determined transcendent unity of unambiguous life the subject-object split is so overcome that it becomes possible to participate in the life of the other one through the common essence of humanity, one feels that to say the very least, individual differentiation is being treated less than seriously. It is quite clear that in the experience of unity which unambiguous life ultimately provides, the important element is that of essentialised humanity as such, rather than men as individuals with identities of their own. This being so, it seems that what Tillich is ultimately leading to is a contemporary restatement of the Averroist heresy, which interpreted man's immortality in collective terms rather than the standpoint of Christian theology, which has always affirmed a place for the individual in the life of eternity.

The second question regards the relation between subject and object in the context of the transcendent unity when subject and object belong to two different modes of existence, between man on the one hand and other species of life on the other. Here the problem is complicated by the fact that Christian theology has not normally envisaged any sort of continuing life for those individual forms of life other than man. So in a sense we are raising an issue which in Christian circles would not normally be raised. But in so far as Tillich speaks of a unity between man and the objects he encounters within his world, fragmentarily realised in the Spiritual experience of the transcendent unity of unambiguous life, we must treat such a question seriously. One must ask then what is the nature of this unity and to what extent the individual 'selves' are retained.
Such a problem must obviously be resolved in the light of Tillich's concept of the multidimensional unity of all life, according to which all other dimensions are present and fulfilled in man as the dimension of spirit. In his essentialisation, therefore, man is bringing every previous dimension to its fulfilment in unity with himself. The answer then would seem to be that the unity that is experienced beyond the limitations of the existential world in the context of the transcendent unity of unambiguous life is a total awareness of one's essential unity with the whole of life in all its dimensions, which includes the essence in which any object which has been encountered in the world is grounded. Man, in his eternal life, brings nature to its fulfilment, but is aware of nature not as being constituted of many individual entities, but rather as the essences and dimensions which are now fulfilled in his own essentialised humanity. Our only comment here is that, interesting as this point of view may be, we have really moved outside the realm of theological assertion to that of metaphysical speculation. Though the Christian faith has always affirmed that the redemption of nature is closely connected with the salvation of man, it has never specified what place, if any, non-human forms of life may have within the life of eternity.

But by far the most important problem that arises from the Spirit-initiated participation of man in the transcendent unity of unambiguous life is the nature of the relationship between man and God, between the human spirit and the Divine Spirit. Right at the beginning of this essay we were concerned about the precise relation between the finite and the infinite in Tillich's theology, and whether the doctrine of participation implied that the finite was continuous with the infinite, that the life of man was continuous with the life of God. There are two
references which would certainly imply that this is so. 'God is infinite', says Tillich, 'because he has the finite within himself united with his infinity'; and, 'The finite is potentially and essentially an element in the divine life'. Both of these statements express quite clearly the belief that the finite is an essential element in or part of the life of God. Though it is not to be identified with the fulness of God, it is nevertheless a part of the divine Life. From this we take it that the divine Spirit brings the human spirit into a transcendent unity with God by helping it to see that beyond the subject-object order of existential reality it is one with the divine Spirit as the finite aspect of the Spiritual Presence with whom it is essentially united. So there is a point of identity, a point of continuity, which makes both one. This conclusion is reinforced by Tillich's assertion that any differentiation between the human spirit and the divine Spirit can only be maintained as long as the subject-object structure remains, but once this has been overcome and left behind, as it will be when the human spirit is totally, rather than fragmentarily, grasped by the divine Spirit, any preliminary and transitory duality will fade away. In this case, the problem is whether in the ultimate transcendent unity, once the duality between the finite and the infinite has been overcome, the finite spirit of man retains any distinctive identity as an element within the divine life, or whether it is absorbed or assimilated into the life of ultimate reality, with the consequent loss of any meaningful individuality.

This is why our discussion on the two types of mysticism to which Tillich refers, the 'mysticism of dissolution', which is prepared to sacrifice any individuality for the sake of the ultimate, and the 'mysticism of love', which demands the ultimate differentiation of
subject and object, was so significant. For though it seemed that Tillich was trying to have both forms of mysticism, despite their incompatibility, one cannot really escape the conclusion that, in spite of his regard for the Christian mysticism of love, he is driven to believe that a personalistic mysticism must eventually be transcended in favour of a monistic mysticism, wherein the human spirit is taken into the life of the divine. It is difficult to see how in this situation the complete identity of man can possibly remain. Certainly Tillich's suggestion that in the transcendent unity the human self is centred in the divine centre rather than itself would imply that the preservation of a specifically human identity would be gravely compromised.

In the last few pages of his *Systematic Theology*, Tillich has this to say.

It is appropriate to ask about the relation of the Divine Life to the life of the creature in the state of essentialisation or in Eternal Life. Such a question is both unavoidable... and impossible to answer except in terms of the highest religious-poetic symbolism. So any talk of the individual self in relation to God, any attempt to describe the relation between the human spirit and the divine Spirit in the context of eternal life, is really nothing more than a piece of religious poetic symbolism. Beyond this Tillich is unwilling to go. Nevertheless, one feels justified in concluding that Tillich's analysis of the relation between the human spirit and the Spirit of God must lead inevitably to that point where ultimately the spirit of man, through a process of essentialisation, is virtually absorbed into the divine Life, the transcendent unity of unambiguous life, in which every preliminary and transitory duality between the finite and the infinite is finally overcome.

However, it is difficult to reconcile this conclusion with biblical
theology at all. There is nothing in the New Testament to suggest that the ultimate purpose of the impact of the Spirit on man is to bring him into a transcendent unity with God in which his own individuality is at risk. In fact, the biblical understanding of the relation between the divine Spirit and the human spirit, maintaining as it does a clear distinction between them, could hardly give rise to such an idea in any shape or form. Though there is certainly testimony to the in-dwelling of the divine Spirit in the life of the Christian in the New Testament, there is nothing which suggests any form of continuity or any point of identity between the spirit of man and the Spirit of God, nothing which implies that they are ultimately and essentially one. This means that at the very heart of Tillich's pneumatology there is a grave defect which stems from an interpretation of reality whose roots lie in classical ontology and German idealism rather than biblical theology. In the final analysis, we suggest that the Christian doctrine of the Holy Spirit and the concept of transcendent unity are completely incompatible.

II

Two other general points of criticism of Tillich's doctrine of the Spirit may be made. In our discussion on Tillich's analysis of the doctrine of the Trinity we noted how the Spirit was described as a 'moment' in the eternal dialectic of the divine life, the ontological principle which unites every finite expression with its infinite ground. Just as this interpretation of the Trinity stems from philosophical speculation based on an essentially monistic view of reality rather than biblical revelation, so also Tillich's understanding of the Spirit as 'moment' is rather different from the personal, active and living Spirit
of the New Testament. This inevitably raises the problem of the personality of the Spirit. Certainly it would not be easy meaningfully to apply the concept of personality to an ontological principle or a moment in the dialectic of life. For this reason it is highly significant that Tillich rarely speaks of the divine Spirit in a personal way at all - he is content to use the neuter pronoun in almost every case. This suggests that the Spirit for Tillich cannot be adequately described in personalistic categories, and this ties in very neatly with his rejection of biblical personalism. Certainly he uses personal symbols when talking about the Spirit, but it is far from clear what the personal nature of these attributes mean in the context of the divine life. And admittedly he refers to God as 'Personal-itself', in so far as he is the ground of all personal being, but whether this means any more than God having the capacity within himself to produce personality, or the divine Spirit having the potential to give rise to personality in the form of the human spirit, is difficult to say. In any case, what ultimate meaning or value can one place on the concept of personality when in the process of essentialisation personal individuality seems to be little more than a necessary, though ultimately dispensable, stage on the road to fulfilment? These questions help us to see that when Tillich thinks of the Holy Spirit, he is thinking of something rather different from the New Testament concept and what the church has normally taught, both of which take the personality of the divine Spirit with the utmost seriousness. This does not mean that the doctrine of the personality of the Spirit does not need to be interpreted afresh in the modern age. But it at least suggests that any contribution that Tillich has to make to such a reinterpretation has severe problems which must be taken seriously and by no means accepted uncritically.
The other point is to ask whether Tillich's doctrine of the Spirit is sufficiently christologically grounded. As we have seen, for Tillich Jesus as the Christ is he who bears the New Being to man, whereas the New Being itself is actually the creation of the divine Spirit. Now without wishing to minimise in any way the Spirit's regenerative work, we must ask whether this sort of thinking does not effectively subordinate Jesus as the Christ to the divine Spirit in such a way that his sole function becomes none other than to show man what the New Reality is, whilst at the same time affirming that the real work is done by the Spirit himself who grasps man and takes him into his new creation, the transcendent unity of unambiguous life. It seems to me, however, that to say this hardly does justice to the basic christological assertion that in Jesus Christ God has acted personally and decisively in man's redemption, thereby reconciling the whole world to himself. In the New Testament the Christ is far more than the essential criterion of a genuine Spiritual experience. He is 'the Word made flesh', to whom the Spirit in his turn bears witness and whose atoning work he makes real within the hearts of men. And the new life which the Spirit brings is a life which is made possible precisely because this is so.

Consequently, one feels that what may be called the 'historical necessities' of the Gospel are toned down considerably in Tillich's theology. It is this that has led some critics of Tillich to ask whether in fact we have here a historical Gospel, in which the historic events of the Cross and Resurrection are all-important and not just symbolically significant, or a mystical Gospel, in which the aim and purpose of all religious symbols, including the Cross and Resurrection, is to bring men
into the transcendent unity in the power of the Spirit. The same point arises in his discussion on the Word, where his emphasis that the biblical word, like any other word, cannot become theonomous until the Spirit takes hold of it does not sufficiently recognise the nature of the biblical word as the record of God's mighty acts in history, culminating in the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. If Protestant theology has sometimes tended to swing too much in one direction in respect of these issues, emphasising the historical element at the expense of the experiential, it may well be that to some extent in his attempt to redress the balance Tillich has swung too far in the opposite direction. Difficult as it may be, it is essential that a perfect balance be maintained between the objective work of God in Christ and the subjective appropriation of that work in and through the power and presence of the Holy Spirit. Consequently, there must be an emphasis on the awareness of the divine in the midst of life, yet it must be an awareness that has been baptised into the historical revelation of God in Christ. There must be experience, yet it will be an experience of the Spirit who is promised to men by the Christ who died and rose again. There must be the Spirit, yet the Spirit is always the Spirit of Christ, who takes and reveals the things of Christ. In other words, Tillich's doctrine of the Spirit would have greatly benefitted if he had taken the historicity of the Gospel more seriously, instead of giving the impression that this very historicity is a stone of stumbling and a rock of offence.

III

Nevertheless, having made these criticisms, it would be completely mistaken to suggest that there is little of value in Tillich's doctrine of the Spirit. Our study has shown that this is far from the case.
There are many implications of Tillich's thought which have positive significance. One such is his very emphasis on the experience of the Spirit, which one can certainly affirm, even though one would deny the ontological basis for that experience which Tillich asserts. The indwelling of the Spirit is an important aspect of both New Testament and Reformed theology, even though nineteenth and twentieth century theologians have tended to tread with caution when dealing with such a theme. This may itself have been partly responsible for the over-intellectualisation of the Christian message in contemporary orthodox Protestantism from Ritschl onwards, together with the rejection of anything that has the slightest suspicion of what has been glibly called 'emotional'.

Thus any emphasis on the devotional life and interior communion with God has often been downgraded in orthodox Protestant circles, and in so doing there has been a refusal to admit a genuine Christocentric mysticism, which has frequently been characterised as mere subjectivity or feeling. In doing this, Protestantism has come very close to denying the legitimate experiential aspect of the Spirit's activity, leaving it in the main to left-wing evangelical sects. In order to restore the balance, there must indeed be a new theological assessment of the nature and role of Spiritual experience, which must inevitably lead to a much more comprehensive understanding of pneumatology. It is significant that those theologies which have underplayed the experiential or subjective aspects of the Christian Gospel have said far too little about the Holy Spirit, and one feels that Tillich has done much to remedy this defect, and this not least within the context of his own Lutheranism. As we have just said, this does not mean that the objective, historical basis of the Gospel can be ignored, but that the two aspects must be held together as necessarily complementary.
In the second place, Tillich has reminded us that any division between the doctrine of the Spirit and the doctrine of the church is theologically unjustifiable. It is well-known that one of the most significant features of post-war theology has been an intensive theological exploration into the nature and function of the church, stemming no doubt from the dual concern for unity within the ranks of the church and a new conception of its place within the secular world. Lesslie Newbigin, in his contribution to the debate about the church in the 1950s, emphasised that in considering the nature of the church it was not sufficient merely to take into account the traditional 'Catholic' and 'Protestant' emphases, but also that the 'Pentecostalist' emphasis on the church as the 'community of the Spirit' must have its proper place. Certainly all three emphases are present in Tillich, but the significant feature is that he, unlike most other great systematic theologians, sets the doctrine of the church firmly within the context of the doctrine of the Spirit. In this, of course, he follows Calvin, though his emphasis on the inward nature of the Spiritual Community is far more significant than Calvin could ever allow. This does not mean that Tillich is subjective in his ecclesiology, but it does mean that by going further than Catholic or Protestant theologies have gone in this direction, he has given us a doctrine of the church which has a healthy balance between the objective and subjective lines of approach. By affirming that the essential nature of the church is that of a Spirit-filled community, even though he describes this in ontological categories which we find difficult to understand, he has moved theology away from a description and analysis of the church in purely formal, intellectual or even sociological terms to something much more theologically significant.

Furthermore, in an age when there is an increase in secularisation
which influences the very life of the church itself, Tillich has empha­sised its Spiritual function in a way which needs to be underlined. Now let us be quite clear here. Few have emphasised more than Tillich the need for secular involvement, and few have worked out so pains­takingly the theological implications of the presence of the Spirit in secular life. And certainly no one has sought to justify this position any more carefully than Tillich, despite the fact that we are not happy with the ontological framework in which he does this, and in this context, his introduction of the concept of the latent church is one which has found ready acceptance among those who wish to affirm the presence of the Holy Spirit in the whole of life. Yet, at the same time, no one is aware of the dangers of secularisation more than Tillich, and his insistence on the religious dimension as that which alone can point to the ultimate meaning and significance of life stands in clear and healthy contrast to those who would reduce the role of the church to nothing more than secular involvement and fulfilment in a horizontal direction. His placing of the church firmly within the context of the doctrine of the Spirit is a reminder to contemporary theology that with­out the Spirit the church would lose its true raison d'être.

And finally, Tillich's emphasis on the role of the Spirit in the areas of morality and culture is one which has great relevance at the present time. Such an emphasis is necessary if society is to prevent a genuine and legitimate secularisation from being distorted into an arid secularism. There are, of course, certain things we have had occasion to question in Tillich's analysis, such as his reading of morality in terms of self-integration, his eagerness to interpret agape in classical terms, the ontological basis for his concept of theonomy. Yet what really stands out in his discussion is his insistence that when the
Spirit grasps man, he grasps him in every area of life, not just the narrowly religious sphere. Together with this affirmation is the equally important assertion that the Spirit is already at work in life even before his Presence may be overtly acknowledged, in those places where morality, culture and religion already seek to point beyond themselves to a transcendent presence in the midst. So Tillich rightly affirms that there is no limit to the Spirit's activity. In an age when there is an increasing rejection of organised religion these affirmations are tremendously important. God cannot be pushed out beyond the extremities of life when he is already at the heart of it. For this reason one welcomes Tillich's theology of culture and morality as an essential contribution to the doctrine of the Spirit.

At one stage in his analysis, Tillich describes Paul as primarily a theologian of the Spirit. It is not perhaps in any Pauline sense that one would apply this title to Tillich himself. But our study has shown that he has made a contribution that is valuable to the developing doctrine of the Spirit in our time. For this reason one may dare to say that his very mistakes are an inspiration to further theological investigation.
Notes to Conclusion

1. See *ST*, II, pp. 175f.
2. *ST*, III, p. 278. See also, above, p. 392.
5. The Moalem scholar Ibn-Rushd (Averroes) was a famous 13th Century Spanish commentator on Aristotle; his influence on mediaeval Christian thought was mainly through Siger of Brabant, whose belief in the collective return of all individual centres of human intelligence to the one Intellect after death was, among other doctrines, condemned by the mediaeval church.
8. See above, p. 140.
10. See above, p. 203. There is obvious confusion in Tillich's thought on this whole subject. In the last chapters of *ST*, III, he is at pains to point out that union with the divine does not mean that the individual centre is lost, but that it 'rests in the all-uniting divine centre' (p. 249). Now metaphorically, in a devotional context, one could use this sort of language, particularly with reference to man's surrender of his will to God. But Tillich's statement obviously goes further than this; it is of ontological, rather than devotional, significance. The problem is not only in what sense can it be said that the individual centre remains, but also whether such a statement is compatible with the Scriptural affirmation of the eternal distinction between man and God. The implication is, to say the least, that such a distinction is considerably blurred. The impression one gets is that his attempt to salvage some sort of continuing individuality for man is not very convincing.
APPENDIX

PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND TO TILLICH’S THEOLOGY

It would be impossible to trace in a few pages the various philosophical and theological traditions that lie behind Tillich’s thinking. In confining ourselves to a few observations on more recent thought, it is nevertheless important to point out that the whole spectrum of philosophical and theological thinking from the early Greeks onwards has played its part in helping to formulate his theological outlook. His indebtedness particularly to the classical-idealist tradition is quite clear and it is impossible to understand Tillich without some knowledge of this tradition. Yet in so far as this tradition itself appears prominently in the idealism of 18th and 19th century German philosophy, we shall concern ourselves only with these later formulations. One introductory word may be said, however. Tillich follows in the tradition that is concerned in the main with the concept of synthesis, the synthesis of philosophy and theology, of the finite and the infinite, of reason and revelation, of God and man. In this he continues the line which runs from Parmenides through Plato, Augustine and the Franciscans to Boehme, Spinoza and Leibniz, and on into the 19th century idealist tradition, over against the line which runs from Aristotle to Thomas Aquinas, and which Tillich felt was responsible for the nominalist and positivist philosophies which followed, leading to 19th and 20th century empiricism. These two traditions form the substance of his essay, 'The Two Types of Philosophy of Religion', in which he seeks to demonstrate that only in an ontological philosophy which stresses the ultimate identity of the one and the many can the problem of the relationship between God and the world, between the divine and the human, be resolved.
This does not mean that there are not concepts which are common to both traditions, as indeed are potentiality and actuality, and essence and existence. But for Tillich the mention of terms in themselves are not important. What matters is the context in which they are used. And he believes that the only acceptable context is one in which the duality of the subject-object scheme is overcome in a basic unity that lies at the heart of all reality, all truth and all meaning. Furthermore, he is convinced that the ancient doctrine of the logos supports this point of view. This doctrine asserts that there is a basic logos structure in reality as a whole which can be met and understood by the rational structure of the human mind precisely because there is a point of identity between the two, made possible by the participation of the finite in the universal logos. Tillich believes that it is this sort of thinking that lies behind the Johannine Prologue when it affirms that the world was made through the Logos, the same Logos who is the life and the light of every man, shining in the darkness, making revelation possible. Whether this is what John means or not, the ultimate identity of the finite and infinite logos is basic to Tillich's system, and in this concept he sees the justification for a bringing together of philosophical and theological truth.

It is generally acknowledged that the modern period in philosophy begins with Kant (1724-1804). Although he stands in a different philosophical tradition, there are two areas of Kant's thought which were of significance for Tillich. The first is the important distinction Kant makes between phenomenal and noumenal knowledge. The phenomenal world is the world as we know it, or more accurately, the world as it is transformed through the process of knowing. In this knowledge, the categories of time and space, quality and quantity, causality and sub-
stance, are all important. On the other hand, the noumenal world is the world 'as it is', beyond the limitations and distortions of human knowledge. It is, in contradistinction from the phenomenal world, the true reality of things that we cannot know — or at least, we cannot know through pure or theoretical reason. It is to such a world, says Kant, that God belongs. In one sense it may be said that this sort of division approximates to that which Tillich makes between the existential and essential worlds. The existential (paralleled by the phenomenal) world is made up of things as they appear to us, it is part of our experience, and we belong to it as part and parcel of it. The essential (paralleled by the noumenal) world, on the other hand, is the world which is 'hidden' from us, which we cannot know at first hand, yet the world that is truly real. The significant difference, of course, between Tillich's theology and Kant's view of reality lies in the concept of symbolism, whereby Tillich is able to affirm that the existential is symbolic of the essential because of its participation in it. This sort of thinking is absent in Kant who has neither a concept of symbol nor one of participation. Yet in a sense, the question he raises of how we can know reality as such, does prepare the way for these concepts to arise in later philosophical thought.

The way in which Kant does affirm knowledge of the noumenal world is through practical rather than theoretical reason. There can be no intellectual understanding of reality as it is in itself, but there can be an understanding which comes through the moral awareness that is found in every man. In this way man is able to distinguish between the phenomenal self, as observed through the senses, and the transcendental self, known through moral experience. The transcendental self, which is the real self, reveals itself through the consciousness of moral obligation,
the sense of 'ought' which stands over against what a man appears to be, and which therefore opens up to him what is his true nature. This categorical, or moral, imperative is something which comes from within, from man's real self, calling him to become in the phenomenal world what he essentially is. From this concept of the moral imperative, by which man comes directly into contact with the noumenal world, Kant postulates the existence of God, who is ultimately responsible for the moral law, freedom, by which man is able to fulfil the moral law, and immortality, which makes it eternally possible for every man to achieve that fulfillment. Now whilst Tillich could clearly not accept any such postulation regarding the existence of God, there is a significant parallel here in that both Kant and Tillich underline an essential relation between reality and morality, a fact which possibly links Kant with the classical tradition in Tillich's mind. Kant's affirmation that the moral imperative is not something foreign to man, but is grounded in his true self and therefore opens up man's essential nature so that man may respond to it and thereby fulfill himself is very similar to Tillich's definition of morality in terms of self-integration. Similarly the very link which Kant makes between the autonomous law which expresses man's true being and God as the originator of that law, suggests some such concept as theonomous morality, by which Tillich affirms that there is no contradiction between the divine moral law and the expression of one's essential humanity, seeing that the divine is that which is found in the depths of every man. Thus, while it would be wrong to suggest that Tillich was in any way dependent on Kant, there are these important parallels between them.

The influence of the thinking of Schleiermacher stands out very clearly in Tillich's writings. Like Tillich, Schleiermacher also was concerned to build his theology into a system, and many of the presuppo-
sitions which he uses as a basis are similar to those used by Tillich. Fundamental to Schleiermacher's thought is the concept of absolute dependence, frequently though not always justifiably characterised as 'feeling'. Though Schleiermacher on occasions narrowed down this concept to a subjective emotionalism, his idea of absolute dependence was much more significant than that. It is an absolute dependence that results from an immediate and intuitive awareness of the presence of the divine in human experience; in self-consciousness, God-consciousness is to be found. This is not then a merely subjective feeling, it is an awareness of the infinite pressing in upon one and breaking through the forms of finite existence. It is an 'immediate consciousness of the universal existence of all finite things in and through the Infinite, and of all temporal things in and through the Eternal'. This realisation of one's unity with the divine is what Schleiermacher interprets as Eternal Life, a state of being in which the distinction between man and God is virtually removed. To share in Eternal Life means to experience God in one's own life in the present, and to surrender one's personality to the Eternal One in the future. This is how he puts it:

The personal immortality you speak of outside time and beyond it is in truth no immortality at all. None but he who surrenders his own personality, in its transience, to God in His eternity, none but he is really immortal. In the midst of finitude to be one with the Infinite and in every moment to be eternal is the immortality of religion. Therefore strive after it, strive even here to annihilate your personality and to live in the One and the All.

Schleiermacher has no time therefore for a God who stands over against man as an 'object' who can be approached. For him God pervades the whole, 'the absolute and undivided Unity beyond and beneath all things', and as such it is misleading to call him a person. In fact, as Tillich himself points out, Schleiermacher is very unwilling to ascribe person-
ality to God at all, preferring to use the term 'spirituality'. One sees here perhaps a parallel with Tillich's use of the expression 'Spiritual Presence'. Certainly such an approach to the doctrine of the relationship between God and the world is one which has influenced Tillich, even though it may not have come directly from Schleiermacher himself but rather from the common tradition in which they both stand.

Schleiermacher felt that the real nature of religious experience was everywhere the same. This does not mean that he had no time for religions as such, for it is the religions which both arise from and keep alive religious experience. This may seem to reduce Christianity to the same level as the other religions, but the uniqueness of Christianity lies in the fact that at its heart is the Christ: it is essentially distinguished from other such faiths by the fact that in it everything has relation to the redemption accomplished by Jesus of Nazareth. The significance of Jesus of Nazareth is that in him the awareness of God is unbroken, so that in his life there is perfect coincidence of the infinite and the finite. The same awareness can be realised in the church through the 'unifying Spirit', which makes possible a sort of mystical union with Christ. It is Christ, then, who, as the Archetype of humanity, makes it possible for man to overcome his estrangement from the Infinite, and be reconciled to God. Here again, one cannot help but notice important parallels with Tillich's thought.

The revival of the classical-idealist position in 19th century German philosophy is perhaps due to Hegel more than any other philosopher, and his type of thinking, particularly his dialectical interpretation of reality, has considerably influenced Tillich's systematic approach to theology. It is, of course, impossible to do justice to the Hegelian synthesis in a few brief paragraphs. Like Schleiermacher, his interpre-
tation of reality is basically monistic. His fundamental idea is that the Infinite Spirit, or the Absolute, actualises itself in time and space, finally reaching the point of consciousness in man himself, and particularly in man's awareness of the Absolute. In this process he detects three 'moments' - the essential Power of the Absolute, the externalising of itself in finite reality, and the returning to itself in a consciousness that has been made possible through the evolutionary process culminating in man. Or to put it in another way, when the Absolute goes out from itself, it necessarily becomes 'estranged' from itself, so that finite reality can be thought of in terms of estranged reality, and it is the third moment in the creative process that makes possible the reconciliation of the estranged nature with the Absolute from which it came. All this points to a dialectical triad in the Hegelian concept of reality, which he felt was a valid ontological reinterpretation of the doctrine of the Trinity. The same structure can also be observed in the working of the mind, and this leads Hegel to assert that the rational is the real, and the real is the rational, in so far as this is a truth which is rationally comprehended. From this perception, it is possible to speak of God as the dynamic, creative mind which pervades the whole. Where Hegel differs from Schleiermacher is that the affirmation of the identity of the finite with the Infinite is not possible merely through religious experience, but more significantly through philosophical reflection, or, to use an expression more in vogue today, philosophical speculation. Thus, Hegel's philosophy becomes known as 'speculative philosophy'. As Tillich himself summarises Hegel's thought:

There is a point of identity between God and man insofar as God comes to self-consciousness in man, and insofar as man in his essential nature is contained together with everything in the inner life of God as potentiality. The
process in which God creates the world and fulfils himself in the world is the means whereby the infinite abundance of the divine life grows in time and space. God is not a separate entity, something finished in himself, but he belongs to the world, not as a part of it, but as the ground from which and to which all things exist. This is the synthesis of the divine and human spirit.10

Tillich might almost have been writing these words about his own theological system!

Hegel, however, is much more insistent on leaving behind the world of religious symbols than Tillich, and feels that only in pure speculative thought, where these impediments to true understanding are cast aside, can the identity of God and man be truly perceived. We must, for example, get behind the symbol of the historical Christ to the truth to which it points, namely the ultimate identity of the divine and the human in essence, or as Mackintosh puts it, 'that the life of man is the life of God in temporal form, and that the two natures, the divine and the human, can only realise themselves through vital unity with each other'.11

Here there is an obvious similarity with Tillich's thought, but Tillich is much more realistic in his assessment of the necessity for the retention of the religious symbol.

But more so than Hegel, it is the ideas of Hegel's contemporary Schelling that influenced Tillich. There were two main phases in Schelling's philosophical career. In the earlier phase, he was very much influenced by Spinozist ways of thinking, and developed his own Identitatphilosophie,12 in which he affirmed the basic identity of all things in their Infinite substance. For Schelling, the Absolute transcended any distinction between subjectivity and objectivity. It is, in fact, the 'pure identity' of subjectivity and objectivity13 that led Schelling to emphasise the divine presence immanent within the world of
nature. The natural world as we see it, he explained, was, as the external objectification of the Absolute, a kind of 'symbol' of the divine, or ideal nature, and in this way he gave to nature a new dignity which was entirely different from the approach of his other contemporary Fichte, who set the self over against nature, and gave the impression that nature was there to be used for the glory of man. It was part of Schelling's philosophy of nature that through the upward movement in nature culminating in man, nature comes to know itself, the decisive point in this process being the development of the human spirit. Until this point the Spirit at work within the natural world was unconscious, slumbering, but in man it breaks out of its unconsciousness in a new awakening. This is rather similar to Hegel's point about the Absolute coming to understand itself in man. It also fits very neatly into the same sort of dialectical framework. But Schelling's philosophy of nature did not stop with the relationship between the spirit and the natural world. The creative world of man is also part of the same whole: man creates the means by which he comes to understand something of the meaning of reality. Schelling pays particular attention to artistic creations. Art he defines as the means by which the identity of the unconscious and the conscious elements within the natural and spiritual dimensions of life is intuitively perceived through a concrete form. 'The same power which acts without consciousness in producing nature, the unconscious poetry of the Spirit, acts with consciousness in producing the work of art'.

Thus, in true Romantic style, Schelling affirms that art demonstrates that the true nature of the Absolute cannot be understood by seeking to explain it, but only through intuition, so that beauty and truth are ultimately one. There is, in Schelling, therefore, the beginnings of a theology of culture. A further element of the philosophy of identity was
the interpretation of eternal life not as a continued existence after death, but as the essentialisation of man's being in the divine life. All these elements in Schelling's early philosophy, the identity of the finite and the infinite, the symbolic power of nature, the full flowering of life in the dimension of spirit, a new interpretation of culture, and the emphasis on eternal life as essentialisation into the life of the divine, in which the philosophy of essentialism is dominant, are to be found in Tillich's thought.

In the second phase of his philosophy, Schelling dealt with what may be called existential, positive concerns, as over against the more abstract, essential concerns of his earlier thought. He did not deny his essentialism, however; in fact, he built on it, starting with the presupposition that in the divine life there is held in permanent tension both wilful and rational elements, which because they are eternally united with the Absolute, never break away from each other and thus never become disruptive. (In this, Schelling himself was influenced by the Medieval philosopher-mystic Boehme). These three elements — will, reason and unity — correspond to the dialectical structure of reality which we have already noted in Hegel. In man, as finite being, Schelling notes that the same three elements are present, but because of man's freedom, the elements of will and reason become estranged, and this opens up the possibility of good and evil in man's nature. Just as freedom is, for Schelling, absolutely necessary for the 'creation' of man, so also the consequences of that freedom imply a risk which makes evil inevitable. Thus it can be seen that Schelling's interpretation of evil is in the Platonic tradition of a 'transcendent fall' rather than the biblical tradition of a moral fall in the sense of an act of disobedience. This poses for Schelling the existential questions of anxiety, guilt and
despair, and while he does not provide us with any answers, he does demonstrate that the existential problems of man are rooted not merely in his own life, but in the very depth of being itself. It is clear that here again, in his existential concern and the way in which he accounts for the human predicament, we have the seeds of Tillich's own brand of existentialism, the way in which he describes the ambiguities of life and their origin in man's freedom and need to actualise himself, and the way in which the duality of the divine and the demonic is accounted for in the very polarities inherent in the depth of being itself. If Schelling does not actually correlate his essentialism and his existentialism as Tillich does, at least the two strands in his philosophy both have influence on Tillich's thought.

In so far as Tillich describes himself as a 'fifty-fifty essentialist-existentialist', there are influences of Kierkegaard's existentialism in his thinking, though these cannot be considered as significant as those which we have so far considered. Kierkegaard rebelled against Hegel's system, and in this context it is interesting that Kenneth Hamilton uses Kierkegaard's arguments against Hegel in his own critique of Tillich's theology. Nevertheless, one cannot deny that Tillich is no less existentially concerned than Kierkegaard, but whereas Kierkegaard sees the answer to his concern directly in terms of an acceptance of what God has done in Christ, Tillich seeks to reinterpret this in its ontological significance along essentialist lines. Perhaps the most important area of common concern is the concept of anxiety (Kierkegaard: angst). For Kierkegaard anxiety is deep-rooted ontologically in man's desire to actualise himself lest he lose his identity, yet in actualising himself becomes estranged from his true nature, which results in ontological guilt. Man becomes chained to despair in the depths of his being. These
are problems which Tillich also deals with, as for example in his little book *The Courage to Be*. But Kierkegaard would probably have little time for the systematic way in which Tillich seeks to resolve these questions. For Kierkegaard, the answer is provided by God coming into history 'from the outside' to offer men salvation in Christ, a salvation which can only be received in the 'leap of faith', in which man acts towards God with infinite passion. Although Tillich sees here a parallel with his own 'ultimate concern', it is clear that he goes much further than Kierkegaard in his attempt to answer the existential problem, and one feels that by and large he owes comparatively little to the Danish philosopher.

Perhaps of more significance was the philosophy of Husserl known as phenomenology. In some ways, phenomenology was not a new philosophy at all, and in fact there are undeniable traces of idealism in it. As a philosophical method it is not particularly easy to describe, but briefly it is a method if investigating reality which begins with the concrete phenomena and leads from them to an intuitive knowledge of universal essences. This is done by 'bracketing' the individual existence of any object in question together with any temporarily associated phenomena until one reaches a point where, having bracketed all existential manifestations, one becomes aware of the thing in itself, what is its nature, what it means when set free from the distortions of finitude and individuality. In this way one both 'intuits' the essences of things and their universal meaning through their concrete manifestations. Tillich's idea of a 'universe of meaning', whilst obviously not directly borrowed from Husserl, is clearly influenced by this type of thinking, as is also his analysis of the essence of religion through religious phenomenology. In fact, he acknowledges his indebtedness to Husserl's method when he says that 'theology must apply the phenomenological
approach to all its basic concepts', though there is a sense in which he reads Husserl's phenomenology in terms of the classical tradition, and for this reason tends to go beyond what Husserl has to say.

Our final reference is of rather a different type - theological rather than philosophical. It is to the German theologian Martin Kahler. Kahler was Tillich's teacher as a student, and there are two particular emphases in his thought which are carried over into Tillich's theology, and Tillich acknowledges his indebtedness to Kahler for both of them. The first point concerns his attitude towards the attempted historical reconstructions of the life of Jesus that were current at that time, such as one finds in the writings of Schweitzer. Kahler not only felt this was an impossible task, he was also convinced it was an unnecessary one. What really mattered for Kahler was the Christ of faith rather than any quest for the Jesus of history. It is the picture of Jesus as the Christ that one receives in the New Testament that is important - a portrait that is 'guaranteed' and received by faith rather than by historical research. So he distinguished between Jesus of Nazareth and the Christ of faith, not in the sense that they are two different people, but in the sense that it was the significance of Jesus as the Christ that was all-important. This distinction comes out very forcefully in Tillich's Christology, as we saw in our introductory chapter. The second influence of Kahler on Tillich was his idea that a man could be justified through the ultimate seriousness to be found in the depths of his doubt. No man can reach total certainty in his quest for God - even in his faith there is an element of doubt springing from the gap between man and God. Kahler saw this doubt as a sort of intellectual sin which was analogous to sin of a more moral nature. If, he said, one is justified despite one's sin in a moral sense, one can also be justified despite
one's sin in an intellectual sense, in spite of one's doubts. Doubts need not stand between man and God. Tillich took hold of this thought of Kahler's and developed it in the light of his own concept of ultimate concern, affirming that if, in the depth of his radical doubt, man was still concerned for the ultimate, then he was justified.

One could, of course, trace the influence of other philosophers and theologians on Tillich's thought. Apart from the long classical tradition, coming into the more contemporary period there are names like Otto, Schopenhauer and Heidegger, all of whom may be said to add to the philosophical background of Tillich's thought. But in this brief summary, we have selected what we consider to be the major figures. The significant thing is that there is hardly any theological or philosophical thought throughout history from early Greece to the contemporary Western world that does not come under his scan. Part of his greatness has been in his ability to use the contributions of great thinkers from all time, perhaps the only exception to this being the more recent philosophers of the positivist school, building into his system those insights which he felt to be of permanent value to theology. Even though we may disagree with many of his conclusions, he was, in more senses than one, a great synthetist.
Notes to Appendix

1. Theology of Culture, pp. 10ff.

2. Critique of Pure Reason (1781).

3. Critique of Practical Reason (1787).

4. Speeches on Religion (1799) and The Christian Faith (1821).


7. H.R. Mackintosh, op. cit., p. 67. See also Perspectives, pp. 99ff.


9. The Phenomenology of Mind (1806) and various Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion.


15. Philosophy of Revelation and Mythology (1846).

16. Perspectives, p. 245.

17. K. Hamilton, op. cit.


20. ST, I, p. 118.

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