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THE CONCEPTION OF HUMAN PERSONALITY IN  
THE ADVAITA VEDĀNTA AND CLASSICAL SĀMKHYA  
- A CRITICAL STUDY -

BY

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Submitted as a Thesis for the Degree of M.Litt.

UNIVERSITY OF DURHAM  
School Of Oriental Studies

1978

(i)

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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

Indian philosophers from the earliest times have strived to realize the true nature of man, in the perspective of his physical existence. A person is a persistent self-conscious being as is evident in his reflections 'I am', 'I exist' and so on, and is opposed to the objective world which is experienced by him. A person is a subject of reference. The classic definition of a 'person' is given by Boethius: 'person is an individual substance of rational nature. As individual, it is material, since matter supplies the principle of individuation. The soul is not person, only the composite is. Man alone is among the material beings 'person', he alone having a rational nature. He is the highest of the material beings endowed with particular dignity and rights'. (The Dictionary of Philosophy ed. by Dagobert D. Runes. Ph.D. London, Peter Owen - Vision Press. p. 229).

The present endeavour is a critical study of the conception of human personality as has been formulated mainly in the Classical Sāṃkhya and Advaita-Vedānta systems of Indian Philosophy. Both these systems owe their origin to the Vedic and Upaniṣadic literature. In the classical stage Advaita-Vedānta and Sāṃkhya developed into two parallel systems confronting each other. It is my aim to discuss how far these two systems agree or disagree regarding the conception of human personality and how far the respective system has succeeded in giving a plausible explanation of the empirical existence.

In the Introductory Chapter (Chapter I), I have proposed the comparative and critical study of the general conception of human personality in Indian philosophy.

Second Chapter deals with the conception of human personality in the Advaita-Vedānta system. As a pre-history to the emergence of the Advaita concept, the vedic and post-vedic conception of human personality has been discussed. This chapter subsequently deals with the development of Advaita conception of human personality through the successive stages of Gauḍapāda's Māṇḍukya-Kārikā and Badarayana's Vedānta-Sūtras - finally into the Advaita-Vedānta of Śaṅkaraachārya.

Third chapter deals with the dualistic preachings that can be traced in the Vedic literature. It also deals with the Sāṅkhya views in the Caraka-Saṁhitā and in the Epics. Finally, I have discussed the Classical Sāṅkhya conception of human personality (as in Īśvarakṛṣṇa's Sāṅkhya-Kārikā; Yuktidīpikā and in the Sāṅkhya-sūtras).

Last chapter is devoted to a comparative study of the classical Sāṅkhya and the Advaita-Vedānta views -where I have tried mainly to bring out the points of agreement and disagreement regarding their ideas of the different aspects of human personality.

I have arrived at the conclusion that the conception of human personality in these two systems has evolved from the same source though they followed two different lines of systematization. Thus, there is a great deal of affinity between them, yet they differ regarding the conception of the essential reality in man. It is regarded as the highest reality in both the systems. Both Sāṅkhya and Advaita Vedānta posit a transcendental self, the essence of which is pure consciousness unadulterated by qualities and empirical relations - over and

above the empirical self. While Advaita-Vedānta believes in the reality of the transcendental self only, Sāṃkhya believes in the reality of the transcendental self and the objective world. There are certain weak points in both the systems. The analysis shows that both Sāṃkhya and Advaita Vedānta, in their attempt to rescue the empirical self from the bondage of personality - have succeeded only in blighting the prospects of liberation and almost depersonalising the person.



LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

A.A.	- Aitareya Āraṇyaka
Ait. Up.	- Aitareya Upaniṣad
Av.	- Atharva Veda
A.V.	- Advaita-Vedānta
BG	- Bhagavad Gītā
Brh.	- Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad
Chan.	- Chāndogya Upaniṣad
CS	- Caraka Samhitā
GB	- Gauḍapāda Bhāṣya
Isa	- Īśa Upaniṣad
Katha	- Kathopaniṣad
Kau	- Kauśitakā Upaniṣad
Maitri	- Maitrī or Maitrāyaṇī Upaniṣad
Mbh.	- Mahābhārata
Mk	- Māṇḍukya Kārikā
Mund	- Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad
N.D.	- Nyāya darsana
N.V.	- Nyayavaisesika
Prasna or Pr	- Praśna Upaniṣad
RV	- Ṛg Veda
Sat. Br.	- Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa
SEG	- Śaṅkara-bhāṣya on Bhagavad Gītā
SBS	- Śaṅkarabhāṣya on Brahma-sūtra
SK	- Sāṅkhya Kārikā
SPB	- Sāṅkhya Pravacana Bhāṣya
STK	- Sāṅkhya-tattva-kaumudī
SPS	- Sāṅkhya Pravacana-sūtra
SSV	- Sāṅkhya sūtra vṛtti
Sve	- Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad
Taitt	- Taittirīya Upaniṣad

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VS	- Vedānta sūtra
YB	- Yoga bhāṣya
YD	- Yukti Dīpikā
YV	- Yajurveda
Y.V.	- Yoga Vārttika
SSVS	- Sāṃkhya-sūtra-vṛtti-sāra
Mand	- Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad
VSP	- Vedānta-sūtra-paribhāṣā

CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION

The concept of 'Human Personality' invariably involves the human 'person' to whom it belongs. A person himself appears to be a speck in the cosmic dust. Yet he seems to have infinite creative power, somehow working through a finite physical body. A person is an experiencing subject. "St. Thomas gave the definition of 'person' as 'a distinct subsistent in an intellectual nature.' The person is first of all an intellectual individual, but what characterizes him is his distinct subsistence, conscious of himself and opposed to others. There have been different views regarding the nature of his personality. Some conceived it as a kind of special mode, qualifying either the essence or the existence, others confused it with individuality, while yet others identified it with existence, either as opposed to or as inclusive of the proper essence. However, all agreed that person is the highest ontological value, 'perfectissimum quid in natura', the most perfect aspect of the self manifestation of being."<sup>(1)</sup>

A person is a persistent self-conscious being as is evident in his reflections -- 'I am' 'I exist' etc. Moreover, a person is opposed to the objective world, experienced by him. Standing in the midst of beings, yet transcending them all, the (human) 'person' presents a peculiar aspect of reality. It is not a thing among other things. It is a subject of reference. He is not a thing, but he by whom and for whom a thing is and he is for himself. In this sense a 'person' is opposed to mere being. If man is merely the mechanical or the organic body, he appears to be, how can he be the creator of

this vast civilization? A creative being must be a free being. If he is only the physical body, -- from where does he derive the freedom? It suggests that his being is rooted in something great and infinite. The philosophers, from the earliest days have strived to determine the true nature of a human individual (or person) who seems to be determined by the physical body yet who asserts his freedom and individuality at the same time.

The individual person stands self-proved and is always immediately felt and known. One is absolutely certain about the existence of one's own being and there can be neither doubt nor denial about it. Vācaspatimīśra remarks in the Bhāmatitīkā-  
na kaścīc sandigdhe ahamasmi na vā, (no one ever doubts I am or not). This person I am conscious of as 'me' is the empirical person manifested in the physical body as a persistent experiencing subject, as well as thinking, feeling, willing, endeavouring to attain the desirable and has aversion from the undesirable. Moreover, the person who asserts himself as a subject, is opposed to the objective external world and always tries to determine his true reality. We are concerned here with this empirical personality only.

The conception of human personality in Indian philosophy is inextricably entwined with the conception of an important distinction between the empirical person and the transcendental self. This distinction is most rigidly maintained in the A.V. and the Sāṃkhya systems. These two systems though differing in many vital and fundamental aspects, have however met at this one important point that the empirical person is not the transcendental self, and that a transcendental self must be

posited in order to justify the very possibility of the empirical self. According to these two systems the 'person', properly speaking, is the empirical self.

The Nyāya-vaishēṣika system is the most consistent advocate of a personal self and the personal God. In its view, which is vigorously pursued by its supporters, God is as much a person as an individual self, and that both are real persons. Here ātman is one of the nine fundamental realities falling under the category of 'substance'. Hence, in the enumeration of fundamental substances, God or Paramatman has found no special mention but is included in the class of ātman.

In Nyāyadarśana, ātman is defined thus -- icchādveṣa-prajātna-sukha-duḥkha-jñā-nāni ātmano liṅgam. (ND. I.1.10) -- "will, aversion, endeavour, pleasure, pain and knowledge are the essential characteristics of a person". Thus NV., unlike AV., and Sāṃkhya, believes in a personal self who is a real empirical subject experiencing both the subjective and the objective worlds. He has the will to do, to attain the desirable and to avoid the undesirable. He exerts himself for this purpose. He feels both pleasure and pain. The agreeable is sought to be attained and the disagreeable is sought to be shunned. And above all he is the knower. These are the specific qualities of ātman, which characterizes him as a person and hence constitute his personality. There are three other specific qualities -- namely merit, demerit and memory -- impressions (dharma, adharma and bhāvanā). But these are imperceptible properties which can only be inferred. God or Paramātman has however only three special properties, namely will, exertion and knowledge.

The personal character of ātman in the NV. System is further emphasized by its well-known epistemic tenet, that ātman is not directly self-conscious in itself but can be known only through mental perception in relation to one of its appropriate specific qualities. In other words the self can be known only as the possessor of one of these qualities. The pure substratum bereft of qualities is beyond the ken of perception. So the self-cognitive perceptual judgement necessarily takes such forms as 'I know', 'I do', 'I am happy' and so on. Thus Viśvanātha observes in Siddhāntamuktāvalī - the ātman can be perceived only in relation to the appropriate special qualities like knowledge, pleasure, etc, and not otherwise, as it appears, 'I know', 'I do', and so on. (2) Among the three special qualities, presence of merit and demerit are necessary for the moral evaluation of a person. The continuity of past impressions (bhāvanā) suggest the continuity of being. Thus we get a realistic definition of an empirical person, who is essentially an experiencing intellectual subject. He experiences both the external and internal objects. Without the reality of the objective world, the reality of the experiencer becomes logically illegitimate. Thus, the external world of experience must be real. Nyāya is the only system where we get a full consistent definition of the empirical person, as Nyāya believes in the reality of subjective person responding to the reality of the objective world.

In the pragmatic world, we have seen that the existence of a thinking feeling and willing person is undeniable. Thus, every system has to explain the fact of experience of an empirical being, and to do that they had to resort to various

hypothesis in accordance with the respective fundamental postures of their respective philosophical systems. Unlike the NV. system, both the Sāṃkhya and the AV. posit a transcendental self, the essence of which is pure consciousness, unadulterated by qualities and empirical relations, — over and above the empirical self.

According to AV., 'jīva' or the individual personality comprises of a subject-object complex. Its subject element is pure consciousness and is called 'Sākṣin'. Its object element is the internal organ called the 'antahkarana' (i.e. mind or intelligence), which as a mode of material existence, undergoes constant configurations (vṛtti) through its contact with the external objects. According to AV. the entire universe except 'pure consciousness' (Brahman) is illusory. Hence, antahkarana together with its contact with the external world is also a projection of avidyā, the positive principle of cosmic illusion and as such it is unreal. Hence, it follows that jīva or the personal empirical self is not a basic reality. According to AV it is only the empirical self or 'jīvātman', which enters into a subject-object relation involved in every fact of experience. Buddhi or antahkarana (i.e. intelligence) is a material object which is too inert and obtuse to be a conscious cogniser in itself. But any form of experience indubitably involves some sort of consciousness. To know, feel or will is to be conscious of an object of knowing, feeling and willing. To be an object of experience is to be manifested in and through consciousness. Thus, it is consciousness which is the final illuminator of

an otherwise unilluminated object. The Buddhi undergoes constant transformation in the shape of objects with which it comes into contact. These transformations are also material and so cannot manifest an unmanifested material object. But the fact of conscious experience cannot be denied. Then how to explain this phenomenon? It is then assumed that material intelligence must be somehow charged with some sort of borrowed consciousness through which the intelligence itself become illuminated, so that it can illuminate in its turn the material objects appearing in cognition. Herein lies the necessity of assuming the transcendental self of pure consciousness from which the material intelligence receives its illumination that illumines the object of experience. As the fundamental illuminator of inert matter the transcendental self is called 'Sākṣin' or 'witness-consciousness', which lends cognising character to intelligence. This conception of Sākṣin-consciousness is a novel but basic principle in Advaita epistemology. The very possibility of subject-object relation depends on this Sākṣin without which the world would have been steeped in blinding darkness.

The empirical personality is thus dependent on the absolute transcendental self for its relative reality which is captured in the subject-object relational complex. As an illustration of its dependence. We may take the case of perception, wherein the sense organ comes in contact with an object and the internal organ (Buddhi) assumes the form of that object. It is the vṛtti or nature of the internal



organ (buddhi or antaḥkāraṇa). This vṛtti enlightened by the sākṣin, takes the form of empirical knowledge.

The Sāṃkhya accepts the fundamental reality of both spirit and matter. In this respect, it is definitely opposed to the Advaita view which dismisses the material universe as only a tentative reality, being a false projection of the Brahman, which is the transcendental self or Ātman per excellence. But despite this basic difference the Sāṃkhya also assumes a transcendental self to be beyond the range of any empirical relation. It is unqualified, uncharacterized, unrelated pure-consciousness. As such it cannot be called a 'person' in its proper sense. Yet 'person' cannot be denied, since the fact of experience and hence the subject-object relation is too eloquent to be suppressed. It is a fundamental tenet of Sāṃkhya philosophy that Buddhi or intelligence is the first evolute of Prakṛti, the primordial matter. As a form of matter, it is subject to continuous change. In the context of empirical knowledge, it assumes constant configurations in the shape of objects which are experienced. As a form of matter in the process of evolution, intelligence (buddhi) can neither be self-expressive nor can express its objects, the shape of which it is bound to take in conformity with the material aspect of the epistemic law. Hence Buddhi alone cannot explain the phenomenon of consciousness without which experience is impossible. It is here that Sāṃkhya propounds its famous theory of 'pratibimbavāda' (theory of reflection) according to which the material buddhi catches the reflection of the transcendental

self and thus shines in the borrowed glory of a derivative consciousness. Buddhi or intellect acts as an intermediary between the Puruṣa (*self*) and the aḥamkāra (empirical ego). The material intelligence (buddhi) enlightened by the reflection of the transcendental consciousness is the empirical self or person, reinforced by the sense of ego or aḥamkāra. It is important to mention here that Sāṃkhya does not feel the need of assuming the Advaita hypothesis of Sākṣin-consciousness in order to explain the empirical relation of the personal self. In conferring its reflection on Buddhi, the Puruṣa need not act as the agent of any action. Its very existence is enough by virtue of which the reflection of consciousness is spontaneously passed on to intelligence.

It is further important to note that the empirical person of the Sāṃkhya is not as much unreal as that of the Advaita. According to the Sāṃkhya view, the fundamental reality is basically classified into two categories -- cit and acit (spirit and matter). The spirit or pure-consciousness (Puruṣa or Ātman) is eternal without any change. It is a sort of static eternity. Matter is equally eternal and indestructible but its eternity is attended with constant change without any loss of essential identity and continuity. It may be called dynamic eternity. The material objects including Buddhi and ego are all real substantial things of the world. The person of Sāṃkhya is thus endowed with double character. It is material insofar as its basic constituents -- Buddhi and aḥamkāra are the real shapes of real matter. It is also spiritual in the sense that it downs the mantle of

of spirituality through the reflection of transcendental consciousness. Hence the personal self of the Sāṃkhya can be called 'unreal' only in this limited sense of a reflectional consciousness, being mistakenly assumed to be real consciousness as a result of which the difference between spirit and matter is obliterated in the practical world. Consequently, false assumption and suppression of distinction between matter and spirit leads to a false entanglement of the Puruṣa in such basically false judgements as 'I know the pitcher', 'I am happy', etc. In other words, the falsity here lies in the erroneous identification of pure spirit with the buddhi qualified by ego, -- that which is not a person is conceived as a person. In the Sāṃkhya view, it is an eternal and universal error by which a person is projected into the supreme impersonal (Puruṣa)/

Apparently this coexistence and interdependence of the transcendental self and the empirical personality verges on mysticism of some sort, as it stands totally on inference and hypothetical imagination. Whether we call it mysticism or not, there is a logic behind it, which we have partially explained above and shall deal in some details later on.

Fleeting sense-impressions emphasise the reality of a continuent self, which runs as an inserverable thread, through the entire range of experience and thus save them from drifting away as so many 'wandering adjectives'. The rational experience projects empirical personality as a continuous entity. We have seen, so far, that persistence, continuity and identity are indispensable factors determining the concept of a person. The Buddhist philosophers, especially

of the Mahājāna school and more particularly of the Mādhyamika school and the Dinnāga-Dharmakīrti school of Vijñānavādins are uncompromising opponents of these notions of identity, continuity and persistence. Just as a stream of water particles or a flame of lamp is conceived as a persistent identity, so also a stream of impressions or conscious moments (vijñānasantāna) is assumed to be a continuent personal identity. According to them, what appears as self is but the bundle of ideas, emotions and active tendencies manifesting at any particular moment. The next moment these dissolve and new bundles determined by the preceding ones appear. The present thought is thus the only thinker. Apart from the emotions, ideas and active tendencies, we cannot discover any separate self. As these ideas emotions etc., change every moment, there is no such thing as a permanent self.

The question here is, how do we explain the past and future experiences, if we do not accept a continuous permanent self? Buddhist says -- that we have the feeling of continuity and permanence -- is due to 'anādivāsanā' or the eternal false disposition by which a constructed (kalpita) sense of identity and permanence is superimposed on the fleeting moments of experience which are really discrete and discontinuous.

The philosophers of the Nyāya, the Sāṃkhya-yoga, and the Mīmāṃsā schools including the Vedānta school have relentlessly attacked this Buddhist view of universal flux and impermanence. We are, however, not concerned here with this protracted debate between the Buddhist and the Brāhmanical

Philosophers within the limited compass of this dissertation.

Moreover, there is one reality in the empirical life, which is universally accepted in human experience as something which apparently seems inescapable, but from which we continually strive to escape. This is the reality of suffering. This can be regarded as one of the important characteristics of human existence, that he has to undergo suffering from the moment of his empirical existence. The Samkhya philosophers have considered that the empirical life is full of three kinds of sufferings. The first kind, called 'ādhyātmika', is due to intra-organic psychophysical causes and includes all mental and bodily sufferings. The second, 'ādhibhautika' is due to extra organic natural causes, inflicted by men, beasts etc. The third 'ādhidaiivika' is due to supernatural causes like the planets, elements, etc. Even the so-called worldly pleasures lead to pain. The end of man is to get rid of these three kinds of pain and sufferings. Liberation means complete cessation of all sufferings -- which is the summum bonum, the highest end of life (apavarga/parama-purusārtha).

The N.V. school also conceives emancipation as the complete and final cessation of sufferings. This conception of liberation has evoked sharp criticism from their opponents especially the Advaita Vedāntists. If the highest ideal of man is limited to mere cessation of sorrows, we cannot reasonably explain man's pursuit of happiness as a positive aspect of life. This positive aspect is too insistent to be denied or dismissed as only negation of pain. The state of emancipation should be imagined not as a complete break with what man

positively desires, rather it should be accepted as the final sublimation of the aspirations of man. The concept of emancipation as entertained by the Sāṃkhya-Yoga and the NV. schools, is entirely negative in approach. In this context, the N.V. school may be called the most uncompromising negativists, because in their view even consciousness is finally and completely obliterated in the stage of emancipation. So the critics have compared the state of liberation advocated by this school to a condition of permanent stupor. It is revolting to accept the position that the summum bonum of human existence is a ceaseless comatic condition. Hence, the emancipated stage of man must be an expression of the highest and unalloyed fulfillment of his positive aspiration for happiness. That is why the Advaitins look upon the essence of the Transcendental Being as eternal bliss and consciousness. The final liberation is nothing but this ultimate realization in which the jīvātman sheds off its empirical character for good and becomes completely identified with the transcendental Brahman, shining in its eternal glory of blissful consciousness. It is interesting to note that even Vasubandhu, the great teacher of Buddhist Vijñānavāda, has accepted emancipation as a state of eternal bliss. Thus, in the 30th verse of Triṅśik-āvijñaptimātratāsiddhi, it is explained that the cosmic consciousness (dharmakāya) of Buddha is also absolute happiness. (3) According to Sāṃkhya-Yoga, liberation is a state of complete isolation of Puruṣa from the empirical state and the world of matter. This is a state of ultimate and complete cessation of sufferings which are erroneously superimposed on Puruṣa, which is essentially pure consciousness, i.e. never really charged with pleasure or pain. In the state of liberation Puruṣa is

established in its essence of pure consciousness which is bereft of all qualities and relations. Hence, neither pain nor happiness can exist as a property of the pure spirit. Pleasure presupposes pain and is relative to it. Pleasure or happiness is the result of Sāttvaguna and liberation transcends all guṇas.

Here the Advaitin's criticism against Sāṃkhya proceeds along the following line. Sāṃkhya forgets that the bliss in liberation is not empirical pleasure produced by Sāttvaguna. The bliss is also transcendental in nature. It is beyond both pain and pleasure. The Advaitin's criticism of the Sāṃkhya theory of emancipation is primarily directed against its sole emphasis on negation. This theory fails to do any justice to man's aspiration for happiness. Man does not simply want to negate something, he also wants to achieve something. This sense of achievement is clearly expressed in his positive aspiration. It is agreed, however, that the terms 'mukti', 'freedom', 'liberation' or 'emancipation' -- undoubtedly suggests some undesirable or unpalatable condition from which we want to be 'mukta', 'to be freed', 'liberated' or 'emancipated'. This has given rise to the negative conception of emancipation as an escape from something which we do not like. But, the meaning of a term is not always entirely exhausted by its grammatical suggestion or derivative sense (vyutpattinimitta). The sense of a term established in convention, very often transcends the meaning which is directly obtained by grammatical analysis. The meaning-concept is 'pravṛttinimitta' (through connotation) which is other than 'vyutpattinimitta'. So the saying goes --

'sometimes the connotation of a term is something else than the meaning given through grammatical analysis',<sup>(4)</sup> If we accept this theory of meaning concept, it is easy to see why the meaning of <sup>'mukti' or</sup> 'emancipation' can not be limited to a mere escape from the unwanted aspect of existence and also why the meaning should be stressed to something positive that one wants to attain. Thus, emancipation is more an attainment than a negation. This emphasis on the positive aspect does justice to human aspiration for happiness. The transcendental nature of man must have some continuity with his empirical nature. It is not unfortunate that man hankers after happiness. What is however unfortunate is that man, limited by the empirical world, falls in a fundamental error of judgement by misconstruing something as happiness which is really sorrow<sup>or</sup> suffering in disguise. According to the Advaitins, the jīvātman or the personal self in its fundamental aspect is also the transcendental self or pure universal consciousness, that in jīva-stage, however, is circumscribed by the ego and antahkarana, which is a projection of avidyā. Thus, the aspiration of jīva for happiness is grounded in its basic transcendental nature, which is identical with Brahman. This presupposes that bliss or happiness should be the very essence of this universal ground of the universe. From this the Advaitins argue that the state of emancipation is the state of Brahmahood in which bliss and consciousness are identified in 'One Being'

The Sāṃkhya, however, has one relieving feature. Though its conception of emancipation is charged with a sense of negation and escapism, it makes a thorough departure from the



Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory in its emphasis on the full glory of consciousness in the final emancipated stage of the self. It is not a state of stupor, completely bereft of consciousness on the contrary, it is the full affirmation of consciousness untarnished by the touch of the empirical ego. At this point the AV. and the Sāṃkhya find a partial meeting ground.

Despite all these differences among the Sāṃkhya-Yoga, AV. and the NV. schools, relating to the concept of liberation -- they seem to agree on one basic aspect, namely-- 'emancipation means a total loss of personality.' This loss is accounted for from different angles in the three different schools.

According to the NV., the self or person in the emancipated stage, is not only released from the bondage of suffering but is also released from all the specific qualities including consciousness even, which constitute his personality. Thus the person of the empirical world is fully depersonalised in the realm of liberation. The emancipated selves are not persons but only so many individuals, among which it is difficult to notice any mark of differentiation.

The Sāṃkhya theory also fares no better in this respect, despite its retention of consciousness in emancipation. All relations with the empirical ego and the empirical world are abolished. Consciousness is not a property of Puruṣa, but is Puruṣa or Spirit itself. It is completely detached (asanga) and unqualified (nirguna) in its uncompromising purity. So the emancipated soul is nothing but an isolated and scattered unit of consciousness to which the term 'person' or 'personality'

cannot be applied in any way. Here, too, then emancipation is a supreme act of depersonalization.

The AV. clearly pronounces its faith in depersonalization, since it announces the person to be an illusion, -- which must be deleted in the state of final liberation. The self of the Sāṃkhya and the NV. loses its personality but not its individuality in liberation. But the self of the AV. loses both by being integrated without any distinction into the One Supreme Being. But, all these three schools have this common point that, the 'person-liberated' is the 'person-lost'.

So far I have tried to give a brief outline of the concept of personality crystalized in the Sāṃkhya, Advaita-Vedānta and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika systems. In this dissertation, I shall limit myself to the concept of personality in the Samkhya and the AV. systems only. The relevance of the NV. system has, in this context, come in only as a way of interesting contrast and comparison, which is expected to highlight the Vedānta and Sāṃkhya concepts.

The Sāṃkhya and the Vedānta have a long history of evolution through the Vedic and the post Vedic periods, before they were organised into regular systems. Both the systems are very old and their germs can be unmistakably located in the Vedas and the Upaniṣads. This is more so in the case of AV., though it is not difficult to trace the Samkhya thoughts also in this ancient period of Indian literature and philosophy. From this consideration, I think a historical resume of the evolution of the concept of human personality in these two systems is called for before we go for the detailed examination of the subject.

In pursuance of this plan, the second chapter deals with the conception of human personality in the Advaita-Vedānta System and is divided into four main sections. Section A deals with the Pre-Upaniṣadic and Upaniṣadic literature. Section B deals with the Gaudapādas Maṇḍukyakārikā. Section C deals with the Vedānta Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa. Section D deals with the Advaita Vedānta conception of human personality in Śaṅkarāchārya's Śārīrakabhāṣya

Chapter III is divided into four main sections. Section A deals with the Pre-Upaniṣadic and Upaniṣadic literature. Section B deals with the the Caraka Samhitā. Section C deals with the Pañcaśikha and the Mahābhārata. Section D deals with the Classical Sāṃkhya, mainly in Īśvarakṛṣṇa's Samkhyakārikā, Sāṃkhyasūtras and Yuktidīpikā.

Chapter IV comprises of two sections. Section A deals with a review of the conception of human personality in the Advaita Vedānta and Classical Sāṃkhya and in Section B, a critical appreciation of the conception of human personality in these two respective systems is attempted.

## CHAPTER II

### THE CONCEPTION OF HUMAN PERSONALITY IN THE ADVAITA VEDANTA SYSTEM

Etymologically the term 'Vedānta' means 'the end of the Veda' or the doctrine set forth in the Upaniṣads, i.e., the closing section of the Vedas. In the Mahābhārata XII.55. the term 'Vedānta' is taken to denote the Upaniṣads,<sup>(1)</sup> and this may be regarded as its primary reference, which through the Āraṇyakas and the Brāhmaṇas reaches back to the Vedas. According to Urquhart, the Upaniṣads are later summarized in the Vedānta-Sūtras, a collection of aphorisms in which the salient points of the Upaniṣads are emphasized.... the culmination of the Vedānta is to be found in the commentaries such as those of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja.<sup>(2)</sup> The name 'Vedānta' is given to the whole development as a rule. Yet the philosophy of Śaṅkara has been assigned to the central place in the field of Vedāntic consciousness. We meet with the concepts conforming to the Vedāntic tradition at every step in the Vedic and Upaniṣadic literature. Thus, the conception of human personality in the earlier and later Vedic literature, wherein the concept conforming to the Vedānta system is obviously present, -- is necessary to be discussed.

#### Section A - PRE-UPANIṢADIC AND UPANIṢADIC LITERATURE

##### I. - THE VEDAS:

The Vedas have contributed uniquely and abundantly to the understanding of man. These earliest literary signposts of the Indo-European people represent the groping of man for a satisfactory answer to the mysteries of nature and the enigma of his own existence. The primary concern of the

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Vedic Aryans was nature and not man. Thus prayers and oblations were offered to the sun, the moon and other natural forces, and they were worshipped as individual gods. Awed by the vastness and magnificence of Nature, he sought the numinous in the personification of natural phenomena. Thus sūrya the luminous sun, agni the all-consuming fire, dyaus, the infinity of the sky, maruts the defiant storm and many others are continuously praised. Subsequently, the Vedic seers, by way of serious reflections turned from the conception of a plurality of deified natural phenomena to a more comprehensive monotheism, not to find one god above all other gods but the common power that works behind all of them. In fact, the awareness of the regularity and orderliness in the universe (in the samhitās this principle is Rta), which would be impossible without an underlying unitary principle controlling the forces of Cosmos, led to the worship of a single god ultimately. (3)

These religious as well as metaphysical considerations gave rise to the doubt as when the seer wonders 'Who is the God to whom we are to offer sacrifices?' and then reflects 'He is not' (RV.II.12.5). Besides, when the Vedic seers were reflecting on the ultimate reality behind the visible diversity, their attention was simultaneously attracted to another direction -- to the inward Man. This is borne out by such pressing questions, 'What thing I truly am, I know not' (RV.I.164.37)

In a verse of the 16th hymn of the 10th mandala of the RV, which is devoted to the description of a funeral ceremony, the eye of the deceased has been asked by the seer to go to the sun which is its cosmic-counterpart, the ātman is

directed to go to heaven or to the earth according to its qualities (dharmā), or else to move even to waters or the plants if it so suited it. This Rg-vedic verse seems to be an older evidence of the conception of the correlation between microcosm and macrocosm. 'This correlativity is best illustrated in the semi-mythological narrative of the Aitareya Upaniṣad : the Ātman once existed alone and desired to create the worlds. It then created the upper and lower worlds. Then it wished to create the lords of the worlds. It created a form (the world person) and meditated on it. The mouth of the form opened; from mouth speech, and from speech the god of fire came forth. It's nostrils opened; out of the nostrils came life (prāṇa) and out of life air came forth. It's eyes opened; out of eyes sight, and out of sight the sun came forth. Similarly other gods came out of other senses and the mind. The gods wanted a habitat and sustenance. The ātman gave them first a cow and a horse. When they said that the animals were not enough, they were given man and thereafter they were satisfied. Thus, the senses and the mind of man and their corresponding objects became the realms (āyatanas) of the gods of the world and all the gods were subordinate to ātman. This narrative is highly significant as it states how the external gods became internal in man. 'Man was thus made the meeting point of the gods of the universe and its controlling forces'.<sup>(4)</sup> Ātman was the highest reality within all men and the universe, whereupon Prajāpati, Varuṇa and others were relegated to a lower place. The insight of the Vedic seers about the fundamental universal reality was not directly projected on to the inner essence of

man. One can only say that the Vedas showed the way to the gradual discovery of a universal inner principle as the basic fundamental reality, which culminates in the Upaniṣadic doctrine of the 'Absolute Ātman'.

The Ṛg-Veda and other vedic literatures have developed three different approaches to unveil the mystery of the universe and its reality, namely, theological, metaphysical and psychological. (5) The theological approach which is markedly present in the earlier Vedic literature has led to the conception of a particular god, worshipped and adored as the 'transcendental impersonal principle' that underlines the whole universe and yet appears to be related to it as the creator and preserver. He is comprehended as Supreme Being (paramapurusaḥ) and has the whole universe as his body. The Puruṣa-sūkta explains - 'The Puruṣa is of a thousand heads, a thousand eyes, a thousand feet. He exists pervading the whole terrestrial regions and is above it by ten fingers' (RV.X.1.3). Thus whatever was or whatever will be - all that is Puruṣa. This immanent Puruṣa contains the physical universe in his body but is essentially transcendental. Hiraṇyagarbha (in RV.X.121) and Viśvadeva (in RV.I.89) are also conceived as the uncaused progenitors of the whole universe.

This theistic speculation is essentially different from the metaphysical postulations in the 'creation hymn' (Nasadiya-sūkta : RV.X.129). This hymn speaks of the transcendental reality beyond the range of physical limitations. It gives a pantheistic view of creation. The hymn declares the state before the emergence of the universe thus : 'Then

there was neither existence nor non-existence'. Here non-existence (asat) does not mean absolute non-existence; the existence (sat) denotes that which is differentiated by name and form. The term 'non-existence' thus would mean the same previous to its differentiation. This neutral state was immensely potential in bringing forth the universe. The absolute reality, which is at the background of the whole world, cannot be characterized either as being or non-being, existent or non-existent.

The psychological approach is also quite evident in the Ṛg-Veda. In RV.I.164 we notice the first doubt about the reality of the physical body together with the quest for the nature of man. Thus, the Ṛṣi exclaims - "Who saw the first being born, when the boneless covered the bony (the unmanifested Māyā covered all manifestations)? From Earth arose the breath and blood, but whence is the Ātman (soul)? Who enquired about this of the sages?" Again he exclaims - "Am I really this (the physical body) that I know not? For I am not of clear mind and wander about being in doubt and bondage". Another verse says - "The immortal residing with the mortal in the same place and having obtained the physical body, sometimes goes to upper regions and sometimes to lower. Both of them always remain together and move about together. People can recognize one of them, the other is not recognized" (RV.I.164). These passages clearly indicate that the individual soul is immortal and migrates to different planes of existence.



The identity of the individual soul with the cosmic spirit has been revealed in the following well-known verse of the R̥g-Veda in which R̥ṣi Vāmadeva having realized the ultimate spirit, exclaims - "I am Manu, I am the son, I am the intelligent sage Kakṣivat ..... I am the poet Uśanas, behold me! I have offered the terrestrial region to the Āryas, I have given rain to men, I am the giver of waters with thunderous sounds. All gods obey my orders:" Vāc also speaks in the same mantra in the same strain - "I am the queen of the whole universe, the bestower of all wealth. I am the knower of truth, the first among the worshipful. The gods have placed me in various regions, as diverse are my abodes and I exist in various living beings" (RV.IV.261,2). Here we see that a correlation is established between man and the physical world outside. The seer realizes in himself a miniature universe.

In the Vedic age itself, the seers of the enlightened souls also realized that man's nature is not accounted for by dissecting his physical body -- and accordingly, that there must be something more in the universe than the sum-total of its physical elements. As to the question of the essence in man, there are various revelations. 'Prāṇa', the 'life-breath' which sustains the body and is the essential process of living, is considered as the principle of man's life (which leaves the body at death). Its cosmic correspondent is 'Vāyu' or 'wind'. Prāṇa refers to the active process of the rhythmic outgoing and ingoing breath, analogous to the great breath of the "One that breathed breathlessly by Itself" (RV.X.129.2). Prāṇa is that which underlies breath and

therefore life and thus pervades all living beings. Without it there is no life. The vital principle underlying the physical life may be regarded as one, but only up to a certain level. Beyond that level there is the supreme universal reality, apprehended by the Vedic seers. This is the conception of Puruṣa or Ātman.

The word Ātman occurs several times in the Ṛg-Veda, where it generally denotes an immaterial principle ascribed to various phenomena of Nature and living beings. Although it cannot be seriously doubted that in most philosophical contexts it denotes some aspects of what is popularly understood by the word 'soul'. Whatever the original meaning of the term might have been, it is clear that in the RV, Ātman also is primarily used in the sense of 'breath' (RV.X.16.3), held to be the life-principle in man and beast, along with the appreciation of the fact that 'wind' (vāta or vāyu) is its macrocosmic parallel. Thus it is interesting to note that even in the earliest parts of the Ṛg-Veda, the word Ātman acquired a special meaning signifying 'breath' or the vital spirit as the 'life principle' in living creatures or denoting in a metaphysical sense, the intrinsic nature (svarūpa) or the essence (sāra) of persons and things.

Deussen has given different etymologies of the term Ātman. Thus, the word is said to have been derived from the root 'a' of 'aham' and 'ta' = 'this', so that it denotes 'This I', 'the self', "which in due course is felt to be the final expression possible for the ultimate fact of existence, arrived at by stripping away the various coverings, which

envelope the ultimate reality in man, - the covering of the body, the covering of the mind, the covering of the intellect!"<sup>(6)</sup> As Deussen has suggested, the meaning of the word developed into four directions - (i) the own person, own body as opposed to the outside world; (ii) the trunk of the body as opposed to the limbs; (iii) the soul as opposed to the body, and (iv) the essence as opposed to what is not the essential self.

Furthermore, the tendency to correlate microcosm and macrocosm influenced the development of the notion of Ātman (RV.I.115.1) : "Sun is the 'soul' of all that moves and stands." But, it is probably in the Atharva-Veda that the macrocosmic sense proper of Ātman is clearly recognized. In AV,X.843-44, the word Ātman is clearly used to denote the macrocosmic Yakṣa (Hiraṇyagarbha) which is no other than the primeval soul or empirical Brahma in its incipient stage. The latter idea is fore-shadowed, however dimly, in RV.X.168.4 where reference is made to 'ātmā devānām bhuvanasya goptā : the soul of the gods and the embryo of the universe. In view of the embryonic analogy, which is implied here, it is not unreasonable to interpret the concept of "the primeval man, as occurring in the Puruṣa-sūkta, as the macrocosmic anthropomorphic representation of the same Ātman".<sup>(7)</sup> In the Vedic speculation, the ultimate reality was thus kept uncharacterized both in regard to its essence and its relation to man.

Thus we may sum up the Vedic conception of Ātman. First, it is the Sun which is the root essence of what moves and

moves not (RV.I.115.1); the all-seeing, all-illuminating life-giver (RV.IV.53.3,4); the bestower of insight (RV.VII.66.10); illumination and immortality (RV.IV.54.2.); that solar splendour which for the races of men, extends with his rays 'immortal light' (AV.XII.1.15); then it is the light immortal not outside, but inside all beings (YV.XXXLV.1.6), and finally it is the immanent Ātman synonymous with the transcendent self of the Upaniṣads. In the AV.X.8.44, Ātman is mentioned as serene, ageless and youthful, - qualities point to the transcendence of the essential nature of man. Thus, Ātman, Puruṣa, Sūrya and Brahman, though apparently conceived independently, imply a similar meaning - the immortal unchanging principle hidden in the form of man.

In the RV.I.164.4 the word Ātman is interpreted by Sāyana as Pañca bhūtātmaka-śarīra-sambaddha-cetanah: the thinking and intelligent principle abiding in the perishable body which is essentially different, yet attached to the gross body. There are several other terms signifying the soul or essence in man, such as manas, ajobhāga, asuḥ, and tman. The reflexive pronoun or adverb 'tman' is once interpreted by Sāyana as 'life' or 'existence' (RV.I.63.8), where Indra is asked to bestow on his worshippers the 'tman'.

The word 'Jīva' occurs several times in the Rg-Veda in the connotation of (i) individual soul (RV.I.1316); (ii) life (RV.VIII.44.5, 78.9, 113.8, X.57.5); (iii) living being in general (RV.I.192.9, IV.51.5 etc.); and (iv) children (RV.X.18.4,8). In RV.I.113.16 the seer speaks of the return of life (asu) at the approach of dawn, meaning thereby the revival of

consciousness after sleep, and shows that he is aware that there is a spirit which is distinct from the body and without which the body is insentient. Here Jīva is taken as the 'active and animating principle' in the individual. Asu is taken by Sayana to mean (i) life or life-breath (prāṇa); (ii) controller of the body (śarīrasya prerayitā), and (iii) sūkṣma śarīra (subtle body). In a prayer (RV.X.59.7) the earth is requested to restore the departed soul (asu), while Soma is asked to return the body, which thus makes a clear distinction between the body and soul.

We may surmise the conception of a subtle body (sūkṣma śarīra) in RV.X.10.6. It was developed and categorized in the later philosophical systems. The subtle body, according to the later philosophical systems, comprises 17 or 18 finer qualities; but in the earliest Vedic conception ajobhāga implies the vague idea of a subtle entity outliving the physical death. In another hymn, the soul (called manas) of one who is lying apparently dead is beseeched to return to the body wherever it may be wandering. Thus, there is the essence, which is different from the body with which it moves and grows and without it the body is inert.

Death was regarded as the beginning of a new life in another world. The path was prepared by the ancestors who went long before. It was sufficient for them to know that higher elevated persons went to heaven which over-flow with honey (RV.I.154.5). In RV.X.16.3 the dead person is asked by the seer to move back to the sun, which is analogous to infinity, the Ātman or breath-spirit to the vāta (wind) or

to the heaven or the earth, according to the qualities or else to move even to the waters or the plants. This mantra suggests the return of the elements to their causes. It presupposes that the human personality is built up by different elements of nature to which it is asked to return at death.

It is an eternal urge in man to preserve his ego, his identity, the personality or the body with which he tends to identify, from the clutches of death and decay. The Indian philosophers from the earliest Vedic times realized the perishability of this 'persona' or mask, covering the essence or self in man, which is immortal. Thus, they defied the fear of death.

## II THE BRĀHMANAS:

In the Brāhmaṇas the Ṛgvedic ideas are presented in a more organized way. The creative principle is here concentrated in Prajāpati (the Lord of Creatures), sometimes mentioned anonymously as 'Ka' which is assimilated in the later Brahmanas and mainly in the Upaniṣads as Brahman.

Prajāpati creates the beings from his vital organs. Out of his mind emerged man, out of his eye the horse, out of his breath the cow, and so on. Because man is created out of Prajāpati's mind and mind is the first of the vital organs, therefore, man is the first and strongest of all creatures (Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa VII.5.2.6.). It is important to note that man is regarded as the highest form of life on earth. Yet the real order of the development of the conception of human personality is difficult to trace. The following

confusing passage in the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa VI/1.1 is characteristic of the fact - "In the beginning there was only asat (non-existence)". It is added, thereafter, that "this non-existent was really the Ṛsis, and these by means of self-mortification, brought forth everything. These Ṛsis, however, were the Prāṇas or life-spirit, and these created first seven Puruṣas (or persons) and then united them to a single Puruṣa, to Prajāpati". Furthermore, this Puruṣa (person) Prajāpati desired to multiply himself to propagate his species (St.Br 6.1.1). The text goes on to relate how Prajāpati 'standing firm upon the foundation' mortified himself and then first created the waters. With the aid of the Veda he brought forth an egg; out of the egg arose Agni, and the egg-shell became the earth. The whole account taken together, is rather confusing. But it is quite significant that the personal and rather confusing. But it is quite significant that the personal and impersonal evolutions are proclaimed to be based on the ultimate reality called 'Brahman'. But, in comparison with that, the Ātman doctrine, as the essential reality in man, is not yet fully defined.

### III -THE ĀRANYAKAS:

Some of the Āraṇyaks preserve the references of pre-Upaniṣadic thought more clearly and systematically than the Brāhmaṇas. According to the expositions of the Aitareya Āraṇyaka (II.3.11) from the five-fold hymn, the living soul springs. There is no difference in kind, either between the physical universe and the organic world, or between the world

and man. The fundamental difference if any, is only the difference in intensity or degree of growth. Historically, it is for the first time that, in Aitereya-Āraṇyaka, we find a determined effort to reflect systematically on the different stages of the development of citta (consciousness) in the living world (prānabhṛtsu). It is put forward in this way: "Know the gradual development of the individual things" ātmanam avistaram veda, i.e., avistaram = atīśayena prakatatvam: - Śāyana. First of all, a beginning is made here in the successive gradation of reality on the basis of degrees of consciousness in plants, animals and human beings. Thus, the text expounds: "There are herbs and trees and all that is animal, and he knows the ātman gradually developing in them. For in herbs and trees, sap only is seen, but citta is seen in animated beings. Among animated beings again, the ātman develops gradually; and in man again, the ātman develops gradually, for he is most endowed with prajñā. "He says what he has known, he sees what he has known, he knows what is to happen tomorrow, he knows the visible and the invisible world; by means of the mortal he desires the immortal. Thus, is he endowed. With regard to other animals, hunger and thirst are a kind of understanding, but they do not say what is to happen tomorrow... They go so far and no further" (A.A.II.3.2). (Note: The word ātman is used here in the sense of vital force, and not in the Upaniṣadic sense proper.)

Here not only the psychical development, but also the physical development is pointed out. 'Yet it is not said that sense itself develops into reason or a plant becomes a man by gradual evolution'.<sup>(8)</sup> It postulates that sense perceptions



and reasoning, as mental functions, are not different in kind but only in intensity. According to this view, all the mental functions, bear the name of reason.<sup>(9)</sup> Secondly, we can assume that there is no difference in kind either between the physical universe and the organic world, or between organic world and man. As we have already mentioned, the difference is only of intensity or degree of growth. Thus, we can conclude that man is more manifested than other worldly things and the organic things are less manifested than man.

According to the exposition of the Aitareya-Āraṇyaka man is to be conceived as the miniature universe (A.A.II.1.8.1). It says - 'whatever there is belonging to the father, belongs to the son; whatever there is belonging to the son, belongs to the father'. This concept is translated in terms of macrocosm and microcosm (A.A.III.1.2.6-7), and is also considered true in the case of every living substance, down to root, seed and germ. As already mentioned, the difference between man and the apparently inorganic things, is only one of intensity or the degree of growth or manifestation. The distinction is characterized thus - "All these shining gods - the sun, lightning, the moon, the planets and the stars, and all these five great elements (mahābhūtāni) - the earth, air, sky, water and fire - belong to the physical world; the reptiles, birds, horses, cows, etc., to the animal kingdom; and man naturally belongs to the animal kingdom (A.A.II.6.15). The difference is explained as to the gradual development of self, i.e. of life in the world as a whole, particularly of a thinking soul in man. More precisely, according to the

Aitareya-Āraṇyaka all the material things are built up of five elements - water, fire, earth, air and space. These five elements along with prāṇa constitute man (A.A.II.3.1.2.).

#### IV - THE UPANIṢADAS:

The ideas of the Upaniṣads are more important than those of the earlier parts of the Vedas, because the ideas of the Upaniṣads obtained the form in which the Vedānta philosophers took them up for developing their systems of thought. The sum-total of the Upaniṣadic teaching rests on the two pillars, namely the concepts of Brahman and Ātman, which ultimately developed into the equation "Ātman equals Brahman." The fundamental idea that runs through the early Upaniṣads is that, underlying the external world of continual change, there is an unchangeable reality which is identical with that which constitutes the essence in man. (Brh.IV.4.5.22). This unchangeable ultimate reality of the universe is named Brahman. But the quest goes on to determine the nature of this ultimate reality and the question is put forth - "What is the beginning, what is Brahma?" (Brh.2.1.1; Ghān V.11.1).

We have noticed that in the later Samhitā period, the conception of a single creator and controller of the universe, variously called Hiraṇyagarbha, Prajāpati, Puruṣa, Brahmanaspati and Brahman - gradually gains ground. But this divine 'creator' was still a deity. The search for the nature of this deity began in the Upaniṣads properly. Many visible objects, like the sun, the moon and so on, and various psychic phenomena, like the mind, the vital breaths, etc. were put forward, but could not satisfy the great ideal that had been awakened. The ideal started with the idea of a supreme

controller (essence) of the universe and man. Here the primal entity is posited as Brahman. The Upaniṣads record the history of the proceedings of the quest up to the final mystic realization. When we merely look to this quest, we find that we have not yet gone out of the Brāhmanic and Āraṇyaka conceptions, where Prāṇa (vital breath) was regarded as the most essential function for the life of man for its superiority over all the senses and indispensibility for the life. This leads to the mediation of Prāṇa as Brahman (Brh.2.2.1). So also, we find ākāśa (ether). (Brh.5.1), Āditya (sun), moon, lightning, ether, fire, water, etc. (Brh.2.1), life and void (Chan 4.10.5), food, breath and mind (Taitt.3) and so on meditated upon as Brahman. But none could satisfy the ideal. It is also true that the effects of the sacrificial duties and magical element in it, lingered in the minds of the sages, while Brahman was regarded as a personal deity. The inadequacy of the explanation to bring out the nature of Brahman, can be found in Brh.2.3.1. Gārgya Bālāki volunteering to expound Brahman before King Ajāt<sup>a</sup>śatru starts: "The person who is yonder in the sun - him indeed I worship as Brahman"; Ajātaśatru said, 'Talk not to me about him; I worship him as the pre-eminent, the head and king of all beings'. Thus, protested, Gārgya tried again and again for eleven times more, describing the Person in the moon, in the lightning and so on, ending with the Person in the body (Ātman) as Brahman. He was refuted by the king each time. Being asked, Ajātaśatru ultimately consented to bring out the conception of Brahman thus - "He verily O Bālāki, who is the

maker of all these persons (whom you have mentioned in succession), of whom verily this is the work - he verily should be known." The direct definition of the supreme entity could not be brought out, because Brahman is beyond the field of our cognition - (aśabdam-asparśa-rūpam-avyayam). With the illustration at hand, of a man awaking from sleep, Ajātaśatru shows that finally Brahman is to be conceived of as that into which one goes to sleep and from which one wakes again. The conclusion is - "As a spider might come out with his thread, as small sparks come forth from the fire, even so, from this soul come forth all vital energies, all worlds, all gods, all beings. The mystic meaning thereof is 'the real of the real'" (Brh.2.1.20). This discourse is very important, as it is here, that the world-ground is established to be Brahman.

Ultimately it was realized that it was impossible to bring out a positive and definite content of the ultimate reality, i.e. Brahman. The approach changed into a negative method. Yājñavalkya, is the pioneer of expounding - 'He, the Ātman, is not this nor this (neti neti). He is inconceivable, for he cannot be conceived, unchangeable for he is not changed, untouched, for nothing touches him; he cannot suffer by a stroke of the sword, he cannot suffer any injury' (Brh.4.5.15). Katha 3.15 declares - "That which is inaudible, intangible, invisible, indestructible, which cannot be tasted nor smelt, eternal, without beginning or end, greater than the great (mahat) and fixed - He who knows it is released from death".

The conception of Brahman developed into the conception of the transcendent reality as the essence. He is infinite and vast, yet the smallest of the small (mahato mahiyān anoranīyān), at once here and there, 'no characterization of him is possible, otherwise than with the denial to him of all empirical attributes, relations and definitions'.<sup>(10)</sup>

The doctrine of Atman is perhaps the most significant topic in the Upanisadic philosophy. We have already discussed the implication of the word Ātman, in the Ṛgveda, where it denotes on the one hand the ultimate essence of the universe, and on the other hand, the 'vital breath' in man.<sup>(11)</sup> Later on, in the Upaniṣadic period we see an evident difference, where the word Brahman is used in the former sense (i.e. the ultimate essence of the universe), and the word Ātman is used to denote the inmost essence in man. Furthermore, it is emphasized that the two are one and the same.<sup>(12)</sup> The doctrine of unity is the greatest contribution of the Upaniṣads. To quote Deussen - "It was here that for the first time the original thinkers of the Upanisads, to their immortal honour, found it when they recognized 'Our ātman, our inmost individual being, as the Brahman, the inmost being of the universal nature and of all her phenomena".<sup>(13)</sup>

On many occasions, the two terms Brahman and Ātman are used as synonyms. The Ch. Upaniṣad frames the central question thus - 'Ko nu ātmā kim Brahma?' (Chānd.5.11.1), i.e., 'What is Ātman, what Brahman?' In certain contexts, the word Ātman is used to denote the source of the universe and the word Brahman is on the other hand used to denote the essential

reality in man. Through an inquiry into the true nature of one's own self, the realization of a non-dual reality had been felt of the diversified universe and the plurality of selves.

As we have already discussed the Brahman theory, the approach to the highest reality in both the occasions has started with a gross expression and has gradually developed into subtle conceptions. We can mention here about the great philosophical contest, held at the court of Kīng Janaka, where Gārgī started questioning Yājñavalkya - 'since all this world is woven warp and woof on water, on what, pray, is the water woven warp and woof?' (Brh.III.6). Yājñavalkya answers - 'On wind o Gārgī'. And thus through a series of questions and answers, Yājñavalkya leads the inquiries to higher and higher worlds and lastly reaches to the point of Brahman as the highest reality. The questions beyond this becomes futile.

Questioned by another questioner, Uddālaka, Yājñavalkya explained that the principle that lies behind all things, cosmic as well as individual, the principle which these things do not know but which controls them from within, is the inner ruler; and this ruler, said Yājñavalkya, was our own immortal self. "He who dwelling in all things yet is other than all things do not know, whose body all things are, who controls all things from within - He is your Self, the inner ruler, immortal". (Brh.III.715)

Now the question as to 'ko nu ātmā?' i.e. what is Ātman (Chān.5.11.1) remains to be discussed. A positive answer to the question is quite impossible. The Self of man involves an ambiguity.

The Indra-Virocana episode in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad explores the reality in man, starting with the 'body'. Here Virocana - a representative of the asuras, is said to believe in the doctrine that the self or ātman was identical with the body. But Indra was not satisfied with this idea and through repeated attempts realized the Ātman beyond the dreamself and the Self in deep sleep. Ultimately Prajapati explains the highest truth - "This body is the support of the deathless and bodiless self. The self as embodied is affected by pleasure and pain; the self when associated with the body cannot get rid of pleasure and pain, but pleasure and pain do not touch the bodiless Self" (Chan VIII.7-12). This anecdote shows that the Upaniṣadic seers sought an eternal, changeless essence in man. Kaṭha Upaniṣad describes:

'As the one fire has entered the world  
And becomes corresponding in form to every form/  
being (bhūta)  
So the One Inner Self (antarātman) of all things  
Is corresponding in form to every form and yet  
is outside' (Kaṭha V.9)

The ṛṣis sometimes tried to understand the true meaning of the ātman by analysing the changes in the conditions of man in wakeful, dreaming and sleeping states. The conclusions they arrived at was that there can be four states of existence for human beings, namely, (i) the active wakeful state, (ii) the dreaming state, (iii) the deep sleep state, and (iv) the transcendental blissful state (tūriya) (Māndlī2.7). 'The three stages of waking, dream and deep sleep are respectively called Vaiśvānara, Taijasa, and Prājña. The fourth state is the real self, beyond the changing modes of existence. It is beyond empirical usage and it shines by its own light'. (14)

In the state of tūriya, all the functions of body and mind are stopped - only the essence of life-force exists. This is called the natural state of ātman.

In the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, Uddālaka tells his son Śvetaketu - 'That which is the subtle essence, this whole world has for its self that is the true, that is the self. That art thou', Śvetaketu'. Whoever, therefore, knew his own Ātman, knew the ātman of the universe, Brahman too. Thus, the ātman was supposed to be the essence of all internal reality, while Brahman was described as the transcendent unity of the world. In this sense one is not different from the other.

The ultimate reality, according to the Upaniṣads, is neither subject nor object, but it underlies both subject and object. This truth can be realized only when the apparent distinction between the cosmic and the individual forms may be broken. In the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, the 'Person' seen in the eye is identified with the one observed in the sun, (I.7.5.) and the mind and space are identified as Brahman (III.18.1). In the dialogue between Bālāki and Ajātaśatru in Brh. II. 1, which is repeated in Kauṣītāki IV, there is first an objective approach to the problem of reality. Bālāki refers to the Person in the sun and the moon as Brahman. Ajātaśatru shows in each case that there is a deeper principle behind the cosmic phenomena. These are the adhidaiva forms of the reality. Then the discussion turns in the direction of Adhyātma forms like one's shadow, echo, body and eye. Finally, Ajātaśatru gives a description of the cosmic soul from which



comes forth all worlds, all gods and all beings: He is the seer of all seeing, the hearer of all hearing and the knower of all knowledge. He is the light of all lights. He is like a lump of salt, with no inner or outer, which consists through and through entirely of savour, as in truth this ātman has no inner or outer, but consists through and through entirely of knowledge (Vijñānamaya). Bliss is not an attribute to it, but it is itself Bliss. The state of Brahman is thus like the tūriya stage, i.e. beyond dreamless sleep. It is dearer to one than anything. It is for it and by it that things appear dear to us. This is our inmost Ātman. (Kau IV)

The 'Absolute' of the Upaniṣads manifests itself as the 'Subject' as well as the 'Object', and transcends them both. The self and the not-self are equally manifestations of the Absolute and are at the bottom one. The individual self is in fact no longer individual but universal. The microcosm and the macrocosm are essentially identical.

A Brahman scholar asked Yājñavalkya in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka, "Explain to me the Brahman that is immediately present and directly perceived, who is the self in all things?"<sup>(15)</sup> Yājñavalkya replied, "This is your self. That is within all things". In the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, Uddālaka teaches his son Śvetaketu - "That which is the subtle essence, this whole world has for its self. That is the true, that is the self. That art thou Śvetaketu". (Chan.VI.10) Whoever knew his own self, knew Brahman. Ātman as the inner reality and Brahman as the transcendent unity of the world were regarded as the same. The Taittirīya Upaniṣad asserts - He who considers Brahman as non-existent questions his own existence".

Some passages of the Upaniṣads assert that Brahman is man himself and that nothing is superior to man. In the Brhadāraṇyaka, for example, we find the following regarding Brahman's relation to the self: "Whoever knows this, 'I am Brahman' becomes this all. Even the gods cannot prevent his becoming thus, for he becomes their self. So whoever worships another divinity (than himself) thinking that he is one and Brahman another, he knows not.

The non-dual Brahman-Ātman is conceived of in two forms in the Upaniṣads - (i) as the all-inclusive ground of the universe - perishable, unmoving and actual (sa-prapañca); (ii) as the reality of which the universe is but an appearance - imperishable, moving and true (niṣprapañca), (Brh.II.3.1-3). On these two different currents is based the divergence later on between the theistic and the absolutistic school of Vedānta.

The Upaniṣadic view of the unitary principle behind the diversity of nature, seem to have two different aspects; one materialistic view that the universe is the outcome of a single material stuff underlying the whole universe; secondly, the idealistic view is that the unity behind the diversity of the universe is pure consciousness. (16)

The Upaniṣadic seers have pondered on the questions of the reality and components of human personality, most critically. The simple questions like "Whence are we born? By what do we live? ...." in the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, have become more critical when we see the following quests: "Why does not mind keep still? Why is the human mind restless? ...." Or, 'When

a person fell asleep where was his intelligence and whence did it come back'? (Brh.II.1.16) Different seers have answered the questions in different ways. Yet all the Upaniṣads have preached the existence of Ātman (the inner self) which is the basis of human existence and which is one with Brahman - the ultimate reality of the universe.

The term 'Jīva' (derived from the root jiv; which means 'to live') applies to the human personality (individual soul). There are a few passages in the Upaniṣads which apparently speak of two selves. The analogy of two birds best declares the apparent difference between Paramātman and Jīvātman. "Two birds, ever united companions, cling to the self-same tree. Of these two, one eats sweet berries. The other looks on without eating. On the self-same tree a person immersed (in the sorrows of the world) is deluded and grieves on account of his want of strength. But he becomes free from sorrow when he sees the other who is worshipped (by man) and who is the lord, and also his greatness'. (Śve.IV.6.7.; Mund III.1.1-2) The Kaṭha compares the supreme self and the individual self to light (ātapa) and shade (chāyā). (Kaṭha III.1.) The Praśna Upaniṣad says, "From the Ātman this life (prāṇa) is born. Just as there is this shadow in the case of person, so is this (life i.e. the individual soul) connected therewith (i.e. the Ātman)". (Brh III.3) 'Thus it will be seen that what makes for the state of jīva is the apparent conditioning of the self by a complex of body and mind. (17)

The older texts of the Upaniṣads do not recognize any duality in the soul. The Bṛhadāraṇyaka says, : "It is thy

soul, which is within all (Brh.III.4.1;III.5.1). The immortal immanent soul dwells in the earth, the water, the fire, in space, wind, etc., yet is distinct from them and he rules them all from within (Brh.III.7.3+23). This Ātman who alone exists is the knowing subject in us, and as such sustains the whole universe, in which is everything and beyond which is nothing, and with the knowledge of this Ātman therefore all is known (Brh. 2.4.5). This is the pure idealistic view, which denies the existence of everything else besides the knowing subject. The other theory equates the conception of Ātman with the old cosmogony and teaches that the Ātman created the universe and then entered into it as the soul (Chān.6.3.2.). In fact it is for the first time here that we meet with the word jīvātman. Yet there is no proper criterion of the individual soul. The ātman himself who creates the universe, enters into it as jīvātman. Eventually the universal ātman omnipresent, omniscient and omnipotent is regarded as Brahman and the jīvātman (the self in living beings) not in any way distinct but individualized is called ātman.

All the Upaniṣads, even the oldest ones, have made a distinction between the soul imprisoned in samsāra and the divine emancipated soul (Chān.III.14.4). Yet all the poetic differentiations are dominated by the consciousness of the unity of Ātman. The Kaṭha 3.4 gives also a description of the individual soul as the Bhoktr (enjoyer). This enjoyer, the individual soul results from the union of the Ātman (the supreme self) with the organs, manas (mind) and indriyas

(sense organs) (Katha III.4.) The Śvetāśvatara also mentions the individual soul as the Bhoktr, (Śve 1.8.9.12) where the contrast with the supreme self is brought out. The entire fifth chapter serves as a further exposition of this contrast. Furthermore, the individual self is here contrasted with the supreme self as being endowed with saṅkalpa (volition), aḥmkāra (ego) and buddhi (intellect). Yet the individual self is identical with the supreme self.

The question as to how and why this supreme self assumes the apparitional form and as an individual self becomes fettered to the Samsāra, first arises in the latest Upaniṣads and the answers to them are unsatisfactory and indefinite. In Praśna III.1 the question is proposed - "Whence does the prāṇa (life-force) originate? And how does it enter into this body?" The answer says - "From the ātman this prāṇa originates; as the shadow of a man so he projects himself on it; and he enters into the Body out of his own will (manokṛtena)". This answer is not wholesome.

Maitrī Upaniṣad III.2 explains after pointing out the difference between the supreme and the individual Self: 'assuredly his immortal ātman continues to exist like the drop of water on the lotus flower; yet this ātman becomes overcome by the qualities of Prakṛti. Being thus overcome then it falls into an illusion and it fails to recognize the holy creator subsisting in itself; but torn asunder and drifted by the stream of guṇas it becomes without support, weak, broken down, sensual, disordered and a prey to delusion, fancies 'This is I', 'This is mine' and fetters itself by its own action, as a bird by its nest'.

In the beginning the Ātman alone in the form of a man was the universe. He gazed around; he saw nothing there but himself. Thereupon, he cried out at the beginning - 'It is I'. Thence originated the name 'I'. Therefore, today, when anyone is summoned, he answers first, 'It is I'. Here the I-consciousness, termed ahamkāra, is the starting point. When this original idealism had been obscured by the advancing realism and a distinction had been set up between the supreme and the individual soul - then only ahamkāra appeared among the functions or organs of the individual soul.

According to the Upaniṣads, Ātman is at the root of all our senses and experiences. Chāndogya VIII.12.4 says, "When the eye directs itself into space, it is the spirit in the eye, the eye (itself) serves (only) for seeing, and if a man desires to smell, that is the ātman, the nose serves only for odour ...". This essential identity of the organs with the ātman lies in the basis of the expression in the Mundaka II.1.3 - "From it originates breath, the mind, and all senses."

In Chāndogya 6.5, manas, prāṇa and speech are said to be the most subtle products of the elements, food, water, and heat, created by the ātman. To the organs of the individual ātman, there correspond in the universe, the forces of nature (nature gods) as organs of the cosmical ātman. Similar to the idea, which we learn from the hymn of the Purusa (RV.X90.13-14), Aitareya I.1-2 presents the gods, Agni, Vāyu, Āditya, Diś, etc. as originating from the mouth, nose, eyes, ears, etc. of the

primeval man, and these then enter into the individual man as speech, smell, sight, hearing and so on.

The name indriya for the organs of senses is first found in the Kauśitakī Upaniṣad 2.15. Still in the end, they are again described by the old name Prāṇas. The oldest passage which cites the ten later indriyas complete, with the addition of manas and hrdayam in Brhadaranyaka 2.4.4 and 4.5.12. With manas and without hrdayam in the later total of eleven, they appear first in Praśna 4.2, in evident contrast with the five Prāṇas; while in the continuation of the passage (Praśna 4.8) there are enumerated five elements, five tanmātras, ten indriyas, with their objects, together with manas, buddhi, ahamkāra, cittam, tejas and prāṇa. This passage is the precursor of the Vedānta's sixteen-fold enumeration of the psychical organs, and at the same time, of the Sāṅkhya's twenty-five tattvas (principles).

Manas (mind) is regarded as the central organ of the eleven organs, and the other ten are subordinated to the mind.

In the Taittirīya doctrine of Kośas (Taitt.II) five sheaths of the soul are mentioned - (i) annarasamaya, which is the outermost sheath made of food, viz, the physical body; prāṇamaya, the sheath of vital airs; monomaya, the sheath of mind; vijñānamaya, the sheath of knowledge, and ānandamaya, the sheath of bliss. The Kaṭha compares the self to the Lord of the chariot, the body to the chariot, the intellect to the charioteer, the mind to the reins, the senses to the horses and the sense objects to the roads (Kaṭha III.3.4).

The body (annamaya) and breath (prāṇamaya) are the physical basis of soul's enjoyment. The viññānamaya and the ānandamaya, which are higher than the manomaya represent the moral and supra-moral levels of experience. The Bṛhadāraṇyaka 2.2.1 describes the body of 'a new-born-infant' (man) as Prāṇa's abode, of which the head forms the roof, in which it is bound to the breath as posts, by food as ropes.

The most interesting problem of the Upaniṣadic psychology still remains to be the sheath of the soul which is enumerated in Taittirīya. It says, "Within this physical body which is made up of food, is another body which is made up of breath; the former is filled with the latter which is also like the shape of man. More internal than the body which is made up of breath is another body which consists of mind; the former is filled with the latter, which is again like unto the shape of man. More internal still than the mental body is another body which is full of intelligence; the former is filled up with the latter, which is again like unto the shape of man. Finally still more internal than this body of intelligence, is another body, consisting of bliss; the former is filled with the latter, which still is like the shape of man"(Taitt.II.1).

Ranade is not very happy with the problem of the sheaths. He comments - "It was possibly such a passage as this which has been responsible for spreading such a notion as that of the Pañcakośas or the five bodies of man." He further comments - "What are by difference called the 'bodies' of man in the Upaniṣads, are nothing more than mere allegorical representations



of certain psychological conceptions. Man is made up of a physical body, of vital air, of mind and intellect, and of the faculty which enables him to enjoy an exstatic ṁewp'ca (enjoyment). (18)

The soul, in the view of the Upaniṣads, is not born with the body, nor does it perish with it. "The wise one (i.e. the soul) is not born; nor does it die. This one has not come from anywhere; nor has it become anyone. Unborn, constant, eternal, primeval, this one is not slain when the body is slain" (Kau II.18). What happens in death is only the decease of the physical body. The soul migrates from life to life, being conditioned by the cause of such migration - ignorance, and by the instrument which enables it to migrate i.e., the 'subtle body'. The first vivid reference of the transmigration doctrine is found in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, there Yājñavalkya enumerates the basis of rebirth as karman (Kau XXX.5)

In Chāndogya this is said of a dying man - "In the case of this man, my dear Sir, when he dies, his speech enters into the manas, manas into the prāṇa; prāṇa into the heat, heat into the supreme god-head" (Chān 6.8.6; 6.15.2). Here, according to Śaṅkara (Com. on sutra 4.28) as by speech the indriyas as a whole are to be understood, so by heat (tejas) the elements as a whole are to be understood, as they constitute the subtle body on the departure of the soul. According to the words of the text however, nothing further is implied here than the thought that the organs, manas, prāṇa and speech have been derived by means of food, water and heat (Chān. 6.5); from the 'one being without a second'; at death they are again resolved into it as the supreme godhead.

Another important passage in the Brhadāranyaka (Brh.4.4.5) runs thus - "In truth, this self is Brahman, consisting of knowledge, manas, like, eye and ear, consisting of earth, water, wind and other, consisting of fire (and not of fire) of desire and not of desire, of anger and not of anger, of justice and not of justice, consisting of this or that, exactly as he acts, exactly as he moves, so will he be born; he who does good will be born good, he who does evil will be born evil, he becomes holy by holy deeds, evil by evil". This passage enumerates as the permanent companions of the soul the organs and the five elements, as changing factors, the moral qualities. This is an evident instance of the development of the idea of the subtle body. We may also cite another verse to explain (Brh.IV,4.6.):

'To this he clings, after this he aspires by his actions. Whereby this inner self (lingam) and his desire (manas) abide'.

Here we find the mention of the technical term 'lingam', which is used mainly by Sāṃkhya to mean the 'subtle body'. The lingaśarīra is described in Sarvopaniṣat 16 as the vehicle of the organs, the prāṇas, the guṇas and the ethical qualifications and accordingly is identified with the bands of the heart. That the actions or karma determine the formation of the next life, is often emphasized in the Upaniṣads (Brhadāranyaka 3.2.13; 4.5-6, Chānd.3.14.1, Kaṭha 5.7., Īśa 17 and so on). The gross body which abandons the soul at death, as the mango fruit its stalk, must be distinguished from the subtle body which as a vehicle to the psychical organs, accompanies the soul on its wanderings till the time of release.

So far I have discussed the fragments from the Vedas and the Upaniṣads, which enumerate the conception of human personality in the Vedic literature. The Vedānta system has evolved directly from the Upaniṣadic philosophy. So this will give a background to the further systematization and development of the concept of human personality in the Advaita Vedānta system, which follows next.

### Section B - VEDĀNTA CONCEPTIONS IN GAUDAPĀDAS'S MĀNDUKYA KĀRIKĀ

According to the Vedāntic tradition, the first available treatise on Advaita Vedānta, is the Kārikas on the Māndukya Upaniṣad, written by Gauḍapāda. His work - the Māndukya Kārikā, is one of the earliest embodiments of the doctrine of strict monism. Śaṅkara cordially welcomes him as his paramaguru (predecessor) and declares that to him is due the credit of recovering and restating the absolutist creed which he holds to be the true teaching of the Veda. Gauḍapāda sets forth at times in a rather extreme form, what later becomes some of the main principles of Classical Advaita. It is acknowledged on all hands that Gauḍapāda was greatly influenced by the Buddhistic philosophy of Vijñānavāda and Śūnyavāda.<sup>(19)</sup> The main doctrine that Gauḍapāda puts forth is called ajātivāda - the theory of no origination. According to ajātivāda the entire world of duality is merely an appearance: nothing ever really comes into being, for nothing other than Brahman really exists - the whole world is an illusion like a dream.

Gauḍapāda's work is divided into four chapters. In the first chapter, he begins with the four apparent manifestations of the self. When the self knows the external objects in the

waking condition, it is called Viśva. It is Taijasa in the dream state; it knows dream-cognitions. It is Prājña in the dreamless sleep. The Viśya stage enjoys gross objects; the Taijasa enjoys subtle objects, and the Prājña enjoys bliss. But the Ātman is beyond them all; it is subject-objectless transcendental consciousness. Gauḍapāda describes the fourth state of the self as unseen (adr̥ṣṭa), unrelationable (avyavahāryam), ungraspable (agrāhyam), unspeakable (avyapadeśyam), the essence as oneness with the self, as the extinction of the appearance, and quiescent (śāntam), — — — the good (śivam) and one (advaita). The world appearance would have ceased if it had existed, but all this duality is mere māyā (illusion). The one is the ultimate real.

In the second chapter, Gauḍapāda explains what unreality of the world means. That, which neither exists in the beginning nor in the end, cannot be said to exist in the present. The appearance has a beginning and an end, and is therefore false. There is first the imagination of a perceiver, a soul, and then along with it the imaginary creations of diverse inner states and the external world. Just as in darkness the rope is imagined to be a snake, so the self is also imagined by its own illusions in diverse forms.

In the third chapter, Gauḍapāda says that truth is like the void (ākāśa) which is falsely conceived as taking part in birth and death, coming and going and as existing in all bodies. Duality is a distinction imposed upon the Advaita by Māyā. In the fourth chapter called Alāṭasānti, Gauḍapāda

further describes the final state. The existence of all things is like a magical illusory elephant (māyāhasti) and exists only as far as it merely appears or is related to experience. All things are regarded as being produced from a relative point of view only (samvṛti); there is therefore nothing permanent. At times Gauḍapāda blurs the distinction between waking and dream consciousness, a distinction which Śaṅkara later insists upon, and suggests that the whole of our waking experience is exactly the same as an illusory and insubstantial dream.

The empirical world is said to have for its substratum, the Ātman, which in reality is a non-cognition of all duality (MK 1.13.17). "The world of duality is mere māyā, the real being the non-individual" (MK II.17). Śaṅkara says - "The variety of experience subsists in the Ātman, as the snake does in the rope" (SB on MK II.12,19). We should not say that the Ātman converts itself into the world. It gives birth to things, as a rope does to a snake, and not in reality (SB on MK III.27;2.17). It appears to become many only through māyā.

According to Gauḍapāda, if the world is the objectivisation of the mind (cittadrśyam) imposed on the absolute Ātman, so is the jīva. The individuation of the Ātman into the many jīvas is only apparent. Ātman is compared to universal space, and the jīva, the same enclosed in a jar; and when the enclosure is destroyed, the limited space (ghaṭākāśa) merges into the universal space itself. Even as we cannot say that the limited space is either a part (avayava) or an effect (vikāra) of universal space, we cannot say that the jīva is either a part or an effect of the Ātman. The two are one,

and the differences are apparent, though for practical purposes we have to treat the two as distinct (MK III.3-14). Thus, in Gauḍapāda's view, jīva is not an ontological reality but an empirical reality. Under the veiling influence of beginningless māyā or cosmic nescience, jīva believes itself to be real; but when it revives from the influence of māyā, it realizes its eternal non-dual nature. The jīva is an unreal appearance. The world-appearance is infected with duality. All duality is a mere appearance; non-duality is the ontological reality. If the world-appearance were existent, it could be destroyed; but it is an unreal appearance (MK.I.17-18). Brahman or Ātman is the ontological reality. Neither the jīva nor the world is real.

Thus Gauḍapāda lays the foundation of Advaita Vedānta which was elaborated by Śaṅkara and his followers later. Nāgārjuna called the ontological reality śūnya (void), which is the predicateless absolute. Gauḍapāda calls the same conception Brahman or Ātman, which is one, eternal, non-dual, pure consciousness. Gauḍapāda, like Nāgārjuna, distinguishes between the two degrees of the truth, viz., ontological truth and empirical truth (i.e. samvṛti satya - veil of appearance) (MK I.17; 2.1; 4.32).

Gauḍapāda, like Vijñānavādins, argues that empirical objects are the subjective creations of the mind (citta). These illusory objects have no existence apart from the mind. It cannot apprehend an object either in the past, or in the present or in the future. So its cognitions are objectless, uncaused and illusory. All empirical objects are unreal like dreams because they are due to samvṛti. The mind is simply nirviṣaya

or objectless- it is always unattached (asaṅga). The empirical mind (grāhaka) and the empirical objects are due to agitation of the mind (MK . IV.72). All are appearances of one eternal pure consciousness - Brahman or Ātman (MK IV.67). It is the argument of the Vijñānavādin, that the Ātman is neither a substance nor a non-substance, so it can be neither a cause nor an effect. Empirical minds are not produced by the mind (citta). Causality is an appearance. So long as the intellect views the empirical world through category of causality, empirical life persists. Nāgārjuna also holds the same view. Only he substitutes the śūnya for Brahman; empirical objects are not really produced; their production is illusory like magic or māyā, and māyā is not real. Gauḍapāda converts the śūnya of Nāgārjuna into Brahman, though he uses the same language and the same arguments.

Gauḍapāda has mentioned different theories of creation. He maintains that it is the inherent nature (svabhāva) of God that He should create the world. He is eternally fulfilled and so cannot have any desire. Brahman associated with māyā produces all jīvas or individual souls (MK I.7-9). Brahman is unconditioned and conditioned (para and apara). Unconditioned Brahman is the one eternal consciousness beyond space, time, and causality. Conditioned Brahman is God, who is transcendent to and immanent in all creatures. God is Brahman associated with māyā. By His own magical power (svamāyaya) He imagines the multiple worlds as souls. He imagines the variety of cognitions and the variety of objects. He creates objects through His power of māyā and is deluded as it were, by His

own creation. The world is neither different nor non-different from Brahman. One Brahman is equally present everywhere. All things are uncaused (ajāti) eternal Brahman. Creation is thus not real.

The jīva or individual soul is said to be born as it were from the universal soul or Brahman in conjunction with body (samghāta) which is its adjunct, even as the ether limited in a jar is said to be born from the ubiquitous ether (mahākāśa) though in reality, they are identical with each other. When the jar is destroyed, the ether in it is merged into the ubiquitous ether. So when the body is destroyed, the individual soul becomes the universal soul. The adjunct of body individualizes the jīva. When the limiting adjunct is destroyed, it realizes its identity with Brahman. Though the universal soul is one, the individual souls are many owing to their limiting adjuncts. When one individual soul feels pleasure or pain, other jīvas do not feel pleasure or pain, even as the ether limited by one jar soiled by dust, smoke and the like, does not soil the ether limited by any other jar. Ether is one, but its differences are due to its limiting adjuncts. Likewise, Brahman is one; its empirical plurality, as jīvas, is due to its limiting adjuncts. Just as the ether limited in a jar is neither a part nor a modification of the ubiquitous ether, so the jīva is neither a part nor a modification of the Brahman. Just as the ubiquitous ether appears to be soiled with smoke to ignorant persons, so the universal soul appears to be subject to birth and death to ignorant persons. All adjuncts of body



and the like are the products of avidyā of the individual soul (ātma-māyā). They are not ontological realities. They are imaginary creations of the jīva deluded by avidyā. The universal soul (para jīva) is the self of the five sheaths - the bodily sheath, the vital sheath, the mental sheath, the intellectual sheath and the blissful sheath. Identity of the individual soul with the universal soul is real. Difference between them is accidental. Their difference is due to the limiting adjuncts of the bodies and the like. When the jīvas are said to spring out of Brahman like the sparks of a fire, their non-difference from It is emphasized. There is absolutely no difference between them (MK III. 3-14). When the jīva breaks the delusion of avidyā, it realizes its identity with the Brahman (MK I.16). The jīva is never born. Dr. Dasgupta comments - "It is so obvious that these doctrines are borrowed from the Mādhyamika doctrines, as found in Nāgārjuna's kārikās and the Vijñānavāda doctrines, as found in Lankāvatāra, that it is needless to attempt to prove it. Gauḍapāda assimilated all the Buddhist sūnyavāda and Vijñānavāda teachings and thought that these held good of the ultimate truth preached by the Upaniṣads". (20)

However, Gauḍapāda's doctrines of Brahman and Māyā and the identity of the world appearance and the jīvas with Brahman are derived from the Upaniṣads. He says - "This was not spoken by Buddha". Śaṅkara says - "The non-dual ontological reality devoid of cognitions, cognized objects and cognizer was not taught by Buddha. It is the teaching of the Vedānta." (21)

Section C - THE VEDĀNTA SŪTRAS OF BĀDARĀYANA

The Vedas have been investigated systematically in two different directions, viz., the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā of Jaiminī, dealing with the ethical side of the Vedic literature, and the Uttaramīmāṃsā of Bādarāyaṇa, investigating the theological and philosophical side of it in the Upaniṣads. Bādarāyaṇa's work is known as Vedānta-Sūtras. He tried to systematize the various strands of the Upaniṣads which form the background of the orthodox systems of thought. The Vedānta-sūtras is also called BRAHMA-SŪTRA because it is an exposition of the doctrine of the Brahman. It is officially called - Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā-sū-tra, meaning the 'threads of the Enquiry into that which is embodied' (taking the members of the compound backwards). It deals with the embodiment of the unconditioned self.

The Vedānta-sūtras are based on the Vedic texts and are thus self-validating. The commentators of the Brahma-sūtras agree that it was intended to be a summary of the Upaniṣads. The sūtras were intended to be a collection of short sayings in which the essence of the Vedānta was to be preserved; as Śaṅkara puts it - 'they string together the flowers of the Vedānta passages'.<sup>(22)</sup> Bādarāyaṇa's systemization removes apparent contradictions in the doctrines, binds them systematically together and is specially concerned to defend them against the attacks of the opponents. The mantras from the Upaniṣads were <sup>u</sup>molded into signifying the different trends of thought in one system, called Vedānta.

The Vedānta-sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa were written probably in the early 1st century B.C. There are numerous commentaries on

the sūtras from the very early days. There is reason to believe as mentioned by Dasgupta, that the Brahmasūtras were interpreted first of all by some Vaiṣṇava writers who held some 'modified dualism'. Everyone claimed that his interpretation of the sūtras was the only one which was faithful to the sūtras. However, there are two different interpretations of the Brahmasūtra - one dualistic and the other monistic. Dasgupta believes that the dualistic interpretation of the sūtras were probably more faithful to the sūtras than the interpretations of Śamkara.<sup>(23)</sup> The pure monism of the Upaniṣads, scattered here and there, were not supposed to formulate a definite monistic system. There were the dualistic tendencies all along in the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad and the like. The epic Sāṃkhya developed from the dualistic literature. The Brahmasūtras by themselves do not follow the monistic trend wholly.

We shall here discuss the contents of the Vedānta-sūtras in order to understand Śamkara-Vedānta properly. The Vedānta-sūtra has four chapters. The first deals with the theory of Brahman as the eternal reality. Here, there is an account of the nature of Brahman, its relation to the world and the individual soul. The second meets objections brought against this view and criticizes rival theories. It also gives an account of the nature of the dependence of the world on God and the gradual evolution from, and reabsorption into him; in the latter part (VS III.15) there are interesting psychological discussions about the nature of the soul, its attributes, its relation to God, body and its own deeds. The third

discusses the ways and means (sādhana) of attaining Brahma-vidyā. We have in it an account of rebirth and minor psychological and theological discussions, together with many exegetical comments. The fourth deals with the fruits of Brahma-vidyā.

According to the Vedānta-sūtra, the Puruṣa and Prakṛti of the Sāṃkhya are not independent substances, but modifications of a single reality. A plurality of true infinites is not possible. The one infinite substance, Brahman, is identified with the highest reality set forth in the Upaniṣads. In the first chapter we have a discussion of the several descriptions of Brahman given in the Upaniṣads (VS I.2.3). He is the origin, support and end of the world (VS I.1.2), the efficient and the material cause of the universe. He creates without implements (VS II.1.23-27). A psychological proof of the reality of Brahman is offered on the evidence of dreamless sleep (VS I.1.9). Brahman is not to be confused with the unintelligent pradhāna, or the individual soul. He is possessed of all dharmas. His cosmic aspects are also brought out. He is the cosmic light, the golden person in the sun, the cosmic space or ākāśa and the cosmic breath or air or prāṇa. He is also the light in the soul. He is to be contemplated as residing in the heart of man (VS I.2.7), and we are allowed to look upon the omnipresent God as occupying a limited space. The ultimate ground of things is a single supreme spirit, which is the source of everything and an adequate object of unqualified adoration and worship (VS I. 1.7).

How unintelligent things and intelligent souls can be related to the one supreme? The sūtra does not give a clear lead. The vagueness of the Upaniṣad's view of creation remains in it. Brahman itself uncreated and eternal, is the whole universe (VS I.1.5; 2.1). Every material element is created by Brahman (VS II.3.7.). If it is assumed that through the activity of the primary elements the evolution of the world takes place, even then it is Brahman that confers the power, through the exercise of which the evolution takes place. As it is said, Brahman after creating the elements, enters them, and it is Brahman dwelling in the elements that effects the production of other things (VS II.3.13).

Bādarāyaṇa believes that the power of creation belongs to the pure, stainless Brahman, even as heat belongs to fire (VS I.3.1). Brahman for its own sport develops itself into the world without undergoing the change and without ceasing to be itself. Bādarāyaṇa says that the soul is jñā, which Śaṅkara interprets as intelligence. The individual soul is an agent (kartā) (VS II.3.33-39). Birth and death refer to the body and not to the soul, which has no beginning. It is eternal (VS II.3.18). The jīvātman is said to be anu (atomic). Śaṅkara is of the opinion that the soul is all-pervading or vibhu, though it is considered to be atomic in the worldly condition. Bādarāyaṇa holds that Brahman is in the individual soul, though the nature of Brahman is not touched by the character of the soul. As the jīva and Brahman are different as the light of the sun and the sun, and as when the light is covered by clouds the sun is not affected, even so when the

jīva is subjected to pain, Brahman is not. The statements, 'That art thou' and 'This Ātman is Brahman', attempt to show that the two Brahman and Ātman, God and man, are in reality one. If Brahman be the cause of everything, it must be the cause of the individual soul as well. Every individual shares in the spirit of God. It is not clear, from Bādarāyaṇa's account, in what exact manner the individual is related to Brahman as a part (aṃśa) or reflection (ābhāṣa) of the universal self (SV II.2.48 & 50). Bādarāyana looks upon the difference between Brahman and the individual soul as ultimate, i.e. something which persists even when the soul is released. The jīva, though minute in size, pervades the whole body even as a little sandal ointment refreshes the whole body (VS II.3.23). When the jīva passes out of the body, it does so, enveloped by the subtle senses, mind (manas) and the chief prāṇa (VS III.I. 1-7; IV.2.3-21). It takes rebirth along with them.

Thus Bādarāyaṇa conforms to the Upaniṣadic teachings to a great extent. The human personality, according to him, is nothing but the Brahman in reality. The example of the relation between Brahman and the individual self as that between the sun and its rays establishes it. Yet there is something which stops the individual self to be Brahman. That is its conjunction with the physical entity. These early literatures on Vedānta helped quite a lot to give rise to the later systematic Advaita-Vedānta.

Section D - ADVAITA VEDĀNTA OF ŚAMKARĀCHĀRYA

According to the Vedāntic tradition, Śaṅkara is the real founder of the Advaita-Vedānta system. Śaṅkara (788A.D. to 820A.D.) wrote a commentary on the Vedānta sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa and a number of commentaries on different Upaniṣads.

In the words of Van Buitenen - 'Advaita Vedānta' is that school of Vedānta, which affirms that Reality or Brahman is non-dual (a-dvaita), that the world is false (mithyā) - the product of a creative illusion (māyā), and that the human being is essentially non-different from Brahman. Advaita-Vedānta has occupied the dominant position in Indian philosophy from the time of Śaṅkara (ninth century) to the present day. Its prestige in fact, has been such that the very term Vedānta is often made synonymous with it. (24)

Śaṅkara emphasized on the monistic trend of the Upaniṣads and developed it into a systematic Advaita-Vāda. He tried to show that the Upaniṣad passages could be coherently interpreted only on the basis of non-dualism and that any other interpretation of the ideas of the Upaniṣads was open to objections. Śaṅkara is described as a 'rigorous monist' by Kirtikar, (25) and perhaps such a phrase gives us most concisely the key-note of his teaching. He asserts one reality, and only one, for there is no such thing as plurality or difference anywhere.

From Śaṅkara's commentaries on the Brahma-sūtras and the Upaniṣads, it becomes obvious that he is controverting dualistic interpretations of the teaching of the Upaniṣads.

Śaṅkara himself says that he is attempting the commentary to demonstrate the unity of the Self (Ātmaikatva).<sup>(26)</sup> It is called the 'idealistic monism' by K. Werner.<sup>(27)</sup> He emphasizes the reality of the unconditioned and unqualified (nirguṇa) Brahman, and regards Īśvara (God), jīva (the individual soul) and jagat (world) as appearances due to an undefinable principle called Māyā, which is neither real nor unreal, nor both, nor neither (and thus anirvacaniyā). God is said to be Brahman associated with māyā in its excellent aspect. Jīva is Brahman associated with avidyā in its inferior aspect. Jīva is in essence, identical with Brahman or Ātman. Brahman is the only reality. It is one, eternal, pure, transcendental consciousness. It transcends the duality of subject and object. It transcends the empirical categories of space, time, substance, causality, change and the like. It is one homogenous consciousness. He advocates the ontological reality of the unconditioned and unqualified Brahman only. The world is only an appearance of Brahman. Śaṅkara recognized the empirical reality (vyavahārikasattā) of the individual souls (jīva) and the world-appearance, for practical purposes. He advocates 'vivartavāda' in his theory of causation. The effect is an appearance of the cause. Thus, Brahman as the cause is real. The world as the effect is its appearance. The main contention of Śaṅkara's conception of the human personality is that it is ontologically unreal and thus is a mere appearance of the ultimate reality.

I - BRAHMAN:

Brahman is the only ontological reality in the Śaṅkara-Vedānta (eka-meva hi paramārthasatyam-Brahma: SB Taitt.Up II/6).



It is the supreme, perfect and absolute reality. According to Śaṅkara, Brahman is the cause of the origination, subsistence and dissolution of the world, which is extended in names and forms and which consists of many agents and enjoyers (SB I.1.2) such as, - (1) this world must have been produced as the modification of something which is itself unproduced. Brahman is the source and if it is produced from something else, we will have anavasthā or regress-us ad infinitum; (2) the world is so orderly that it could not have come forth from a non-intelligent source. Brahman is the intelligent source; (3) this Brahman is the immediate consciousness (sākṣin) which shines as the self and also through the objects of cognition which the self knows. Even when we deny it, we affirm it. Moreover, the existence of Brahman is proved as the self of all beings. Everyone knows the existence of his own self. No one knows that he does not exist. The existence of the self (ātman) which is self-existent and self-proved, proves the existence of Brahman (SBS I.1.1). Śaṅkarāchārya has shown in his commenatary on the Vedānta-sūtra (SB III.2.22) how the contemplation of finite things leads to a direct discernment of the supreme as their absolute source. Śaṅkara says - "whenever we deny something unreal we do so with reference to something real. The unreal snake, for example, is negatived with reference to the real rope. But this is possible only if some entity is left. If everything is denied, then no entity is left, and if no entity is left, the denial of some other entity which we may wish to undertake becomes real and cannot be negatived." (SB.III 2.22). (28)

The question now arises - what is the nature of Brahman?  
Brahman is Truth or Existence, Knowledge and Infinite:  
satyam jñānam anantam Brahma (Taitt. II.1.1). Brahman is  
Knowledge and Bliss: vijñānam ānandam Brahma (Brh. III.9.28).  
It is eternal, infinite and supreme Bliss. Brahman is  
immortal (amṛta) and imperishable (akṣara); it is not limited  
by time, space or objects. It is certainly fulfilled  
(nityatrpta), and so it is of the nature of Bliss. Thus,  
Existence, Knowledge and Bliss constitute essential characters  
(svarūpalaksana) of Brahman. They distinguish Brahman from  
the world-appearance which is unreal (anṛta), non-intelligent  
(jada) and of the nature of pain (dukha) (SBS I.3.9,10).  
Brahman transcends the past, present and future, and also  
transcends causes and effects which are empirical phenomena.  
It further transcends all empirical existence (SB Kāṭha.Up.  
I.2.14); it is attributeless (nirguṇa) and indeterminate  
(nirviśeṣa) real being (sat) (SB Ch.Up.VIII.1.1). Yet Brahman  
appears to be qualified by attributes (saguṇa) to the intellect  
perverted by ignorance (avidyā).

The nature of Brahman is difficult to comprehend. It is  
the negation of all attributes which we attribute to the  
world of experience. The Upaniṣads, as well as Śaṅkara  
(SB.Praśna Up.IV.1) deny Brahman both being and non-being of  
the type with which we are familiar in the world of experience.  
We can at best say what Brahman is not, and not what it is.  
It transcends the opposition of permanence and change - whole  
and part, relative and absolute, finite and infinite, which  
are all based on the oppositions of experience. Brahman is

infinite and it is 'not a person, since personality cannot be realized except under the limiting condition of a non-ego'. (29) When the 'absolute' is said to be nirguṇa, this only means that it is trans-empirical, since guṇas are products of prakṛti and the 'absolute' is superior to it. The 'absolute' persists as the permanent among all the changes. So it transcends the guṇas or the phenomenal being. The Upaniṣads say nirguṇo guṇī, to establish that. On that account it is not to be regarded as a mere blank. Brahman is of the nature of ultimate consciousness and yet knows nothing, since empirical cognition is a modification of the internal organ. Knowledge in fact is its essence and not its property.

Brahman is thus the supreme reality - it is noumenal and immutable. It appears as mere names and forms in the universe; this entire universe is Brahman itself (SB Muṇḍ.Up II.2.12). Brahman is one; it has no genus (sāmānya) or species (viśeṣa); it has no activity or quality; it is indefinable; it is devoid of the homogeneous (sajātīya), heterogeneous (vi-jātīya) or internal difference (svagatabheda). It is distinctionless; it is not an enjoyer of joy and sorrow, since it is devoid of merits and demerits.

The Upaniṣads speak of the higher Brahman (parabrahma) and the lower Brahman (aparabrahma). The former is unconditioned, indeterminate and attributeless; the latter is conditioned, determinate and qualified by attributes; the former is trans-empirical and non-phenomenal; the latter is empirical and phenomenal; the former is transcendent; the latter is both transcendent and immanent. Existence, consciousness and bliss constitute the essence of the indeterminate Brahman. Omnipotence

and omniscience are the characteristics of the determinate Brahman, conditioned by avidyā or māyā: he is the empirical lord of the world of phenomena; he is the intermediate principle between Brahman and the empirical world. This principle (viz. apara Brahman) is called Īśvara (God).

## II - ĪŚVARA:

In Śaṅkara-Vedānta, Īśvara occupies a vital position as the intermediary between the transcendent Brahman and the empirical world. Śaṅkara gives the cosmological, teleological and moral arguments for the existence of God. Īśvara is the cause from which proceeds the origin, subsistence and dissolution of the world of appearances (SBS I.1.4,5) which are differentiations of names and forms, with many agents and enjoyers, which is the abode of the fruits of their actions, and so on. Omniscient and omnipotent God is the cause of the world (SBS I.1.2). He is both the material cause and the efficient cause of the world (SBS I.1.5; X.2.2).

Īśvara is the determinate Brahman. He is Brahman conditioned by māyā or the cosmic neiscience. Īśvara is a phenomenal appearance; He is eternal, pure, conscious, free and omniscient. But He is conditioned by the pure sattva of māyā (which is composed of the triple qualities of sattva, rajas and tamas). He is not an enjoyer; he is only an onlooker. He is of the nature of pure consciousness, but he produces multiform objects with the aid of the different impure adjuncts of names and forms (SB.Kaṭha.II.2.12). He is inactive in his essential nature, but active in association with māyā (SBS II.2.7). He is independent of the body and sense organs (SBS I.1.5).

Śaṅkara sometimes uses the term Brahman to denote Īśvara, but the differences between them are too great to be confused with each other. While Brahman is the 'trans-personal ground and abyss of everything personal', Īśvara is the 'Personal God'. While Brahman is object of nirvikalpa samādhi, Īśvara is the object of sa-vikalpa samādhi. 'In the concept of Īśvara the Absolute is brought into closer relationship with the world'.<sup>(30)</sup> Brahman and Īśvara are not distinct entities but different aspects of the same reality. Brahman is Īśvara 'when viewed as creative power' (Abadhūta Gītā 1.3). Brahman is the pure, transempirical, unconditioned, indeterminate, eternal, subject-objectless consciousness. Īśvara is the supreme person. He is the intermediate principle between Brahman and the empirical world. His creation of the world depends on the differentiation of the seeds of empirical names and forms, which are of the nature of avidyā (SBS II.1.14). He controls and guides the empirical selves - which depend on the adjuncts of the body, the sense organs, manas, buddhi and the like, in their empirical life which are the products of avidyā. Brahman is called the causal-Brahman (kāraṇa Brahma) and Īśvara is called the effect-Brahman (kārya Brahma) in the SB.Brh.Up.V.1.1. Brahman is inactive but Īśvara is active. As Brahman answers to the content of the tūriya or the transcendental consciousness, Īśvara answers to the susupti or the consciousness of deep sleep.

### III - ĀTMAN:

The main concept of Śaṅkara's Advaitic philosophy is that the ultimate and absolute truth is the self or Ātman, which is one, though appearing as many in different individuals.

The outside world also has no reality and has no other truth to show than this self. The famous Vedānta text says, 'That are thou, O, Śvetaketu!' This comprehension of one's self as the 'Self', as the ultimate truth, is the highest knowledge. For when this knowledge is once produced, our cognition of world-appearances will automatically cease. 'The self is an independent entity underlying the conscious personality and the physical frame. The natural man is alienated from the self in him. All that we know and express about the self belongs to the world of change, of time and space, but the self is for ever changeless, beyond the world of space, time and cause.' (31)

Śaṅkara opens his commentary on the Brahma-sūtra with a distinction between subject and object, ātman and anātman, with the formulation of the absolute disparity between 'I' and 'Thou', asmāt and yusmat. The pure subject is distinguished from the ego, i.e. the psychological or sociological self which is a part of the objective world. In the very core of his existence the self continues to be himself. Of this self, Śaṅkara says, "The unconditioned, markless, free from characters of existent and non-existent, is real meta-physically" (SB on Kaṭha.VI.13). Consciousness is the very essence of self. While the content of experience changes, the consciousness does not. Even when there are no objects to be known as in deep sleep, consciousness is present (SB II.20.3). The Ātman is one eternal homogeneous consciousness in its essential nature. It is the witness of all cognitions; it is their knower; it reveals all cognitions; it reveals all objects which cannot reveal themselves; it is neither subject nor object.

The Ātman is not an enjoying and active agent (kartr); it is devoid of merits and demerits; it is inactive since it is immutable; it is not subject to birth and death. Ātman in itself, unconditioned by an adjunct is not an enjoyer. Being limited by the adjuncts of buddhi and the like, it becomes an enjoyer as it were. Pleasure, pain, desire, activity - all appear and disappear but do not belong to the eternal Ātman.

The Ātman, according to Śaṅkara, is one with the universal self. Ātman is in reality Brahman, the 'absolute'. Jīva is the individual empirical self, limited by the body, sense-organs, manas, buddhi, and the like, which are its limiting adjuncts (upādhi). Ātman is the transcendental, non-empirical, metaphysical self, while jīva is the empirical, phenomenal and psychological self. Ātman and Brahman have the same characteristics of being, consciousness, all-pervadingness and bliss. Ātman is Brahman. The purely subjective is also the purely objective. Brahman seems to be mere abstract being, even as Ātman seems to be mere abstract subjectivity in the eyes of the intellect.

#### IV - ĀTMAN AND JĪVA

The term Jīva is used to indicate the empirical personality. The ātman is the supreme, universal self; it is non-dual or one; it is partless (niravayava) and omnipresent (bibhu). Jīva is the ātman limited or individuated by adjuncts of the body, the sense organs, manas, buddhi and ahaṁkāra. It is the psycho-physical organism; it is the empirical self or ego. Though the ātman is one, it appears to be many individual selves owing to the different limiting adjuncts (SBS I.2.6; SBS I.1.2.20; SB Māṇḍ I. III.3).

Ātman is the kernal of the human personality. The internal organ (antaḥkaraṇa) is the adjunct of the Ātman. It takes the forms of manas, buddhi, vijñāna and citta. Vijñāna refers to ahaṁkāra. Thus, the internal organ in its fourfold form is the individuating principle of the ātman. The individuated entity is called jīva. It is the individual empirical self, compared to Ātman, which is the transcendental universal self. It is neither a part nor a modification of the ātman (SB.Māṇḍ.K III.7). It is only an appearance. The adjuncts of the body and the antaḥkaraṇa are creations of avidyā (SB.Māṇḍ.K III.15). They are not real. The jīva is a construction of māyā or avidyā. As soon as avidyā is destroyed, the jīva remains in its essential nature as the ātman, which is its reality.

Jīva is the knower (pramātr), enjoyer (bhoktr), and active agent (kartr). It acquires merit and demerit, and experiences their fruits. The difference between ātman and jīva is not real (pāramārthika) but phenomenal (laukika). The origin of the jīva from ātman is not real; on the destruction of the psychophysical organism the jīva merges in the ātman or the supreme self (SB.Māṇḍ.K III.3.4). The relation between ātman and the adjunct or buddhi is due to false knowledge. It does not cease until the knowledge of identity of the jīva with the ultimate Brahman is realized.

The embodied self has three parts, viz., the gross body, a subtle body and the causal body. The gross body is made of five gross elements, sense organs and the vital forces. The subtle body is made of the seventeen elements, the five



organs of perception, the five organs of action, the five vital forces, manas and buddhi. Jīva transmigrates with the subtle body, which is the basis of its moral equipment. The causal body is made of avidyā or false knowledge, of the not-self as the self. There can be three states of the self, waking, dreaming and dreamless sleep. The waking self knows external objects through the sense-organs; the dreaming self knows the dream cognitions through the manas; the sleeping self is one homogeneous mass of consciousness and bliss. The intuitive self is the ātman, which is unconditioned (nirupādhi), non-dual, homogeneous, distinctionless. It is present in the waking, dreaming and sleeping self. It is the ultimate reality. It is the universal self. It is the eternal consciousness which comprehends all.

The jīva is an object of self-consciousness (ahampratyaya-  
viṣaya). The ātman is the witness (sākṣi), which reveals the jīva; it is the pure self; it is self-luminous; it is apprehended by intuition. The jīva is its limited form (upahitarūpa), though there is ontological identity between them. The empirical self is an object of self consciousness (asmatpratyaya-  
viṣaya). Ātman, the eternal, universal self in jīva, is considered as sākṣin or witness of all cognitions (sarva-pratyayasākṣin) or witness of the mental modes. The ātman reveals the self-consciousness. Vācaspati also regards ātman conditioned by the mind-body-aggregate as the jīva and the pure ātman as its witness (SBS I.1.4). Therefore, the pure transcendental unconditioned ātman is the witness self, which is the ontological reality in the empirical self.

V - ĪŚVARA AND JĪVA

Both Īśvara and Jīva are empirical realities. Īśvara is limited by the excellent adjunct of the pure sattva of māyā. But jīvas are limited by the impure adjuncts of avidyā, the mind-body aggregate. So Īśvara rules the jīvas (SBS II.3.35). Jīvas are not parts of God, but they share the pure consciousness with God. Brahman is the essential reality in both, Īśvara and jīva. God and the individual souls are the phenomenal appearances. When Brahman is limited by the pure sattva of māyā, it appears to be Īśvara; when it is limited by impure adjuncts of avidyā and the psychological organisms, it appears as jīvas. Īśvara as well as jīvas are Brahman in their essential nature (SBS II.3.43). But Īśvara is not deluded by the influence of māyā, and therefore, not subject to empirical life and consequent misery (SBS II.1.9). Jīvas feel misery of empirical life owing to non-discrimination between the self and the not-self, or its adjuncts (SBS II.3.46). Jīvas are neither the supreme self nor different entities, but are its reflections (SBS II.3.50). Though Īśvara and jīvas are appearances of the same Brahman, they are not identical in nature with each other. Īśvara is omniscient, omnipotent and perfect; jīvas have finite knowledge, limited powers and imperfections; Īśvara is eternally enlightened and liberated; jīvas are bound and liberated by right knowledge only; Īśvara is the directive cause (kārayini) of human actions and enjoyments and sufferings; jīvas are active agents and enjoyers (SBS I.2.11). Īśvara is not affected by the enjoyments of the jīvas, since he has eternal right knowledge

and so he is not subject to the empirical life. But due to the false knowledge, jīvas undergo miseries of empirical life. The divine nature of the jīvas is manifested when the right knowledge of their identity with Brahman dawns upon them. Thus the difference between Īśvara and jīvas is not real, but apparent, due to false knowledge (SBS I.3.19).

Radhakrishnan has summed up the stages of emanation of the human entity from the supreme reality of Brahman thus -

"The individual soul, as identified with the material body is the jīva or the dehin or the embodied. The unity of all these jīvas the collective or cosmic self in the waking state is virāj or vaiśvānara. As identified with the subtle body as in the dream state, the individual is the lingin or taijasa. The unity of all the taijasas or subtle selves is Hiranyagarbha or sūtrātman (SB II.3.15). Lastly, as identified with the kāraṇaśarīra, the individual is called Prājña, and the unity of all Prājñas is Īśvara". (32)

#### VI - BRAHMAN AND JĪVA: THE EMPIRICAL PERSONALITY

After discussing the reality of Īśvara and Jīva, we may now turn to the more important subject of the relation between Brahman and Jīva; such relations are mainly explained by similes. There are mainly three theories in this regard in the Advaita-Vedānta, as follows; (i) According to Āsmarathya, the jīva is partly different and partly non-different from Brahman, as the sparks are partly different and partly non-different from fire. The sparks are not absolutely different from the fire, as they are of the same nature of fire. They are absolutely non-different neither, as in that case they

could be distinguished neither from the fire nor from one another. In the same way, the jīvas are not essentially different from the Brahman, being of the same nature of consciousness; nor absolutely non-different, because in that case, they would have been identical with Brahman and with one another. Hence, the jīvas are different and non-different from Brahman (Bhārati SBS I.4.20); (ii) Audulomi regards the jīva as different from Brahman when it becomes impure in contact with the adjuncts of body, sense organs, manas, and buddhi. But he regards it as non-different when it is divested of the limiting adjuncts by right knowledge and mediation. Thus, the bound jīva is different from Brahman; but the liberated jīva is non-different from it (SBS I.4.21). (iii) Kāśakṛtsna regards the jīva as identical with Brahman. The jīva is not different from the immutable Īśvara or Brahman (SBS I.4.22). Kāśakṛtsna's view is in keeping with the Sruti which says - 'Thou art that' - the jīva is identical with Brahman. It is not a modification, since if it were so, it would be merged in prakṛti or māyā in dissolution and would not be immortal (amṛta). So the names and forms which subsist in the adjuncts are attributed to the jīva. It's origin from Brahman like that of the sparks issuing from fire is really the origin of its limiting adjuncts.

Śamkara has adopted mainly Kāśakṛtsna's view. He further pronounces it to be the only authoritative interpretation acceptable to all Vedāntins, that the difference between the finite individual and the 'absolute' is not a metaphysical, constitutive or real one, but is due to the limiting adjuncts

of body, senses, manas and forms imagined by avidyā. That jīvatva or individuality is an adjunct is further emphasized in the commentary of VS II.III.17 - "This one Supreme Being has no intrinsic differentiations as evidenced by the Śruti text: 'One Supreme Lord, all-pervasive, and all-abiding as the soul of all souls lies hidden in all beings'. The appearance of its division in many is conditioned by (its association with) adjuncts like the apperceptive function (of the psychical mechanism), just as the limitation of space due to association with jars etc.". Thus according to Samkara, the differentiated Brahman appears as jīva or the finite individual.

The jīva is not a part of Brahman, since Brahman is devoid of parts. It is not a modification of Brahman, since Brahman is unchangeable (SBS IV.3.14; SB Mand.K.III.7). Brahman, the eternal, transcendental consciousness is the substratum of the empirical selves and the entire empirical universe, which cannot exist apart from it (SB.Mund, II.2.1). The jīva limited by the adjuncts of body, vital forces, senses and the like, subsists in Brahman. It is the reality of the jīva. The Śruti praises non-difference of the jīva from Brahman and condemns their difference. The difference between them is not real. Just as the space limited by a jar is non-different from the infinite space, so the empirical self is non-different from Brahman. "So far as the finite or empirical self is concerned, Śaṅkara is emphatic on the point that it is the 'psychological Me' the object of self-consciousness (ahampratyaḥviṣayah), the active and enjoying self and not

the witnessing consciousness (sākṣī), which is the presupposition of all finite experience (VS. I.1.4). Thus, all agency belongs to self or ātman so far as it is limited and individuated by the adjunct of buddhi and others, and not intrinsically. (Com.on VS III.2.8-10)". (33)

The Advaita Vedānta concept of the empirical self is based either on the theory of reflection or on the theory of limitation. The theory of reflection is again divided into two sub-theories -- namely ābhāsavāda and pratibimbavāda. Both Suresvara, the author of Brhadā-ṛaṇyaka-bhāṣya-vārtika and Prakāśātman, the author of Pañcapadika-vivarāṇa accept the position that jīva or the empirical self is the reflection of the Brahman or the transcendental consciousness in neiscence (ajñāna) limited by antaḥkaraṇa. Suresvara thinks that a reflection is unreal and as such jīva or the empirical self is not a reality. This is called ābhāsavāda

Prakāśātman on the other hand thinks that a reflection is also a reality, being identical with the original, that is reflected, and as such jīva is not totally unreal. Pratyagātman, the author of Samkṣepasārīraka, takes the position that jīva is the reflection of pure consciousness or Brahman in buddhi (intellect).

Vācaspatimīśra is the advocate of avaccedavāda. According to this theory, the substratum of ajñāna is not the Brahman but jīva. Jīva is consciousness limited or circumscribed by antaḥkaraṇa, which is an evolute of ajñāna. Both ajñāna and antaḥkaraṇa differ from one jīva to another. As the substratum of a particular ajñāna, each jīva creates his own

material cause. The seeming oneness of a material object appearing before different individuals is due to sense of similarity imposed by the fundamental avidyā. These different AV. concepts of the empirical self based on different theories of reflection and limitation have been precisely and succinctly summarized by Madhusūdanasaraswati in his Siddhāntavindu.<sup>(34)</sup>

There are two more views regarding the nature of jīva: the 'One-Soul' theory or ekajīvavāda and the 'Many-Souls' theory or anekajīva-vāda. According to the first theory, there is but one jīva, and one body, and that all the world as well as all the jīvas in it are merely his imaginings. This is the view of those who maintain that jīva is only one. These dream-jīvas and the dream-world will continue so long as the super-jīva continues to undergo his experiences. The cosmic jīva is alone, the awakened one, and all the rest are but his imaginings. The opposite of this doctrine is the theory held by some Vedāntists that there are many individuals, and the world appearance has no permanent illusion for all people, but each person creates for himself his own illusion, and there is no objective datum, which forms the common ground for the illusory perception of all beings; just as when ten persons see in the darkness a rope and having the illusion of a snake there, run away and agree in their individual perceptions that they have all seen the same snake, though each really had/<sup>seen</sup> his own illusion and that there was no snake at all. According to this view, the illusory perception of each happens for him subjectively and has no corresponding objective phenomena as its ground.

According to another view, phenomena are not objectively existent, but are only subjectively imagined; so that the jug I see had no existence before I happened to have the perception that there was the jug; as soon as the jug-illusion occurred to me, I said that there was the jug, but it did not exist before. As soon as I had the perception there was the illusion, and there was no other reality apart from the illusion. It is, therefore, called the theory of dr̥ṣṭi-sr̥ṣṭi-vāda i.e. the theory that the subjective perception is the creating principle of the objects and that there are no other objective phenomena apart from subjective perceptions.

According to the normal Vedāntic view, the objects of the world are existent as phenomena. Subjective perception is created by the sense-contact with the objects. The objective phenomena are nothing but the modifications of ajñāna, which exist as the common ground for the experiences of all. This view, therefore, has an objective epistemology, where as the Dr̥ṣṭi-Sr̥ṣṭi-Vāda has no proper epistemology, for the experience of each person is determined by his own subjective avidyā, and the previous impressions as the modifications of avidyā.

#### VII - MĀYĀ AND AVIDYĀ:

Śaṅkara uses the two terms Avidyā and Māyā indiscriminately, but the later Advaitins draw a distinction between the two, in as much as Brahman and Ātman are one, and so are Māyā and Avidyā. The tendency of the human mind to see what is really one as if it were many, is called Avidyā. This being common to all individuals, Avidyā is thus connected to the individual



phenomena. Māyā, on the other hand, is the power (śakti) of Īśvara. Omniscience and creatorship of Īśvara depend on the manifestation of the seeds of the world as names and forms which are of the nature of avidyā (SBS II.1.14). Īśvara himself imagines different forms in himself through his own māyā (SB.Māṇḍ.K.II.12). Names and forms are germs of the empirical world. They are not real in themselves. Their reality is Brahman. The world appears to be born owing to māyā (SB.Māṇḍ.K.III.27). All empirical objects are generated by avidyā (samvṛti). They are created and destroyed from the empirical standpoint; but ontologically they are eternal Brahman (SB.Māṇḍ.K.IV.57). Here we see that most often Śaṅkara has used both the terms avidyā and māyā to signify the same conception. Māyā is avidyā (avidyā-lakṣaṇā anādimāyā : SB.Māṇḍ.K.III.36). Māyā is neither being nor non-being, but indefinable. The omnipotent Īśvara through his infinite magic powers (māyāśakti) can create the world out of the unmanifested seeds of names and forms (SBS.II.1.31). Īśvara is inactive in his essential nature, but he becomes active in relation to his māyā (SBS.II.2.7). Māyā is cosmic nescience; it is also called Mahāmāyā. Īśvara is called Mahāmāyīn (SBS.II.1.37). Māyā is not an independent principle like Prakṛti of the Sāṃkhya. It is dependent on Īśvara; it is his energy (śakti). Māyā is often called avyakta (unmanifested), since it cannot be defined as real or unreal (SBS.I.4.3). It is called avyakta also because it consists of the unmanifested subtle essences of the elements.

Avidyā is false knowledge or the absence of true knowledge. It is non-apprehension of the reality; it is beginningless;

it is the cause of samsāra; it exists in the form of seeds or karmas in the jīvas (SB.Mand.K. I.16). Avidyā veils the nature of Ātman or Brahman (SB.Īśa Up.3). The jīva subject to avidyā cannot know its inner self. Brahman, within it (SB.Mund.Up.III.1.7).

Radhakrishnan puts the difference between avidyā and māyā as the 'subjective and the objective sides of one fundamental fact of experience. It is called avidyā, since it is dissolvable by knowledge; but the objective series is called māyā since it is co-eternal with the supreme personality. Śaṅkara admits its existence even in the state of pralaya or destruction. Īśvara, the omniscient, who controls his māyā, has no avidyā, and if Śaṅkara here and there lends countenance to a different theory, it is in the figurative sense that Īśvara has the power which leads to avidyā in the individual'. (35)

In fact the connection between avidyā and māyā is so close that it is difficult to distinguish between them. Thibaut is inclined to identify them, and in Dasgupta's opinion, 'to Śaṅkara, māyā means both a principle of creation and the result of this creation'. (36) Deussen prefers to regard avidyā as the causal principle and māyā as the effect. Avidyā works by the ascription of upādhis or 'limiting adjuncts', and māyā is the resulting totalization of these upādhis, inclusive of the ideas of a personal God, the world and the individual souls. We find also occasionally a disposition to distinguish between avidyā and māyā on grounds of valuation, the product of the latter being regarded as having a more elevated character than the former. In a later passage, Dasgupta points out that according to some Vedāntists māyā is more distinctively the

projective creative force (viksepa) and thrusts into embodiment the higher attributes, whereas avidyā is rather of the nature of a concealing power (āvaraṇa) and is responsible for the less worthy attributes. Further, it is sometimes indicated that the pure intelligence of the 'Absolute' in relation with māyā produces first of all Īśvara, or the personal God, whilst in relation with avidyā, it produces the individual soul. Too much stress however should not be laid on these minute distinctions, seeing that the Vedāntist writers themselves do not always observe them, and for all practical purposes avidyā and māyā may be taken as imply slightly different ways of describing that mysterious power which produces the more or less unreal world of ordinary experience. (37)

#### VIII - EVOLUTION:

According to the Advaita-Vedānta, the empirical world (samsāra) is the unfoldment of undifferentiated names and forms, which are the objects of avidyā or false knowledge. The world consists of formed and formless objects, imagined by avidyā. It is superimposed on Brahman or Ātman. Brahman is different from the empirical world. Śaṅkara has offered a cosmology of the Vedānta from the orthodox standpoint. At the beginning of a particular cycle of existence, the entire world is supposed to have been lying dormant in Brahman as the result of the periodic re-absorption or dissolution of the world therein. The creative power of Brahman reveals itself in making manifest the seeds of things and the individual souls as so many kārmic potentialities or

forces constituting the body of Brahman who is the material as well as the efficient cause of the world. Different Vedantists have given diverse theories of cosmology. I shall, however, concentrate mainly on Śaṅkara's stand-point. In the beginning of a particular cycle, the entire world is supposed to have been covered up by death as the result of the periodical reabsorption of the world in Brahman. Creation is indicative of the disturbance in the temporary equilibrium from within by an inner necessity of a self-determination on the part of the Creator, who is then called, not Brahman, but Parameśvara.

Māyā is the energy of Īśvara. Īśvara is the creator, preserver, and destroyer of the world. The world exists in the effect state (kāryāvasthā) after creation. It exists in the causal state (kāraṇāvasthā) after dissolution. Īśvara creates the empirical objects for the enjoyment and sufferings of the individual selves. Śaṅkara has attempted to show how each appearance endeavours to reveal the character of reality which is its ground. Since the inexhaustible Brahman stands at the root of all, continuously higher and higher expressions reveal themselves in the world (SB.I.1.11). Again, as in the series of beings which descends from man to blades of grass, a successive diminution of knowledge, power and so on is observed - although they have all the common attributes of being animated - so in the ascending series, extending from man up to Hiraṇyagarva, gradually increasing manifestation of knowledge, power, etc. takes place (SB.I.1.1). We can distinguish in the world of phenomena the following - (i) The Īśvara or God who is the origin of the world; (ii) the

extension of nature or the nāma-rūpa-prapañca, i.e. the name-and-form world; and (iii) the plurality of the individual souls, subject to the limitation of individuality. The material world is called ksetra, since it is the environment where the individual souls can act, realizing their desires and fruits of their past karma (SB.Mund. III.1.1).

The world or samsāra consists of various orders of beings with different modes of existence. (SB.I.3.10). The evolution of the universe obeys an order (SB.II.24-25). The entire world springs from Īśvara or paramēśvara. All the elements spring from Īśvara (SB.II.3.7). Paramēśvara is the direct creator of the five subtle body (lingaśarīra), and of the Hiraṇyagarbha, the first born or the first created being (prathamo jīva or śarīrī prathamah), and is indirectly through Hiraṇyagarbha, the author of the manifold or concrete things (Vedāntaparibhāṣā chap. VII). The inorganic nature consists of the five elements which are called sūkṣma-bhūtas or subtle matter, and they originate in continuous succession. Ākāśa is the first evolute to come into being from the self-alienation of Brahman. From ākāśa originates vāyu; from vāyu - tejas; from tejas - ap, and from ap - earth or pr̥thivī (SBS.II.3.8-13). Śaṅkara rejects the Buddhistic view that ākāśa is a negative entity, the mere absence of obstruction. It is, on the other hand, a positive entity which is inferred from the quality of sound (SBS.II.2.22,24). It is not eternal as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika maintains.

Śaṅkara recognizes the distinction between the subtle elements (sūkṣma-bhūtas) and the gross elements (mahābhūtas),

like the Sāṃkhya. The Upaniṣads mention the five subtle elements (tanmātras) (Pr. Up. IV.8-SB). All these subtle elements enter into the composition of the gross matter which is made up of the varying combination, in different proportions of the subtle matter - the process of this materialization being known as pañcīkaraṇa. From the māyā of Īśvara, the matrix of unmanifest (avyākṛta) names and forms, is generated the subtle essence of sound (śabdatanmātra). It is the subtle element of ether. It has the quality of sound only. The subtle element of air is generated from it. Its essence is touch. The subtle element of fire is generated from them; its essence is colour. The subtle element of water is generated from them; its essence is taste. The subtle element of earth is generated from them; its essence is smell. Ether has sound; air has sound and touch; fire has sound, touch and colour; water has taste in addition to all these qualities.

Gross elements are generated from the subtle elements by quintuplication (pañcīkaraṇa). The doctrine of quintuplication has its earliest indication in the Chāndogya in the doctrine of triplication, where the elements of tejas, ap and prthivī are compounded to produce the gross elements. In the later Advaita Vedānta works, like Pañcadaśī and Vedāntaparibhāṣā, the theory of quintuplication is authoritatively accepted. The Vedānta-paribhāṣā Chap. VII clearly affirms that 'the texts bearing on triplication imply quintuplication'.

According to the pañcīkaraṇa theory, the five subtle elements, soon after their origin are disintegrated into parts

and seek to recombine in the form of mahābhūtas. Having bifurcated into two equal parts, of which again, one part is divided into four equal parts, and re-combined. each of these four equal parts with the other four halves of the sūkṣma-bhūtas, we have the five sthūlabhūtas. The Pañcīkaraṇa theory could as well be schematised thus: -

Gross ether =  $\frac{1}{2}$  ether essence +  $\frac{1}{8}$  air essence +  $\frac{1}{8}$  fire essence  
+  $\frac{1}{8}$  water essence +  $\frac{1}{8}$  earth essence

Gross air =  $\frac{1}{2}$  air " +  $\frac{1}{8}$  ether " +  $\frac{1}{8}$  fire " +  $\frac{1}{8}$  water "  
+  $\frac{1}{8}$  earth "

Gross fire =  $\frac{1}{2}$  fire " +  $\frac{1}{8}$  ether " +  $\frac{1}{8}$  air " +  $\frac{1}{8}$  water "  
+  $\frac{1}{8}$  earth "

Gross water =  $\frac{1}{2}$  water " =  $\frac{1}{8}$  ether " +  $\frac{1}{8}$  air " =  $\frac{1}{8}$  fire "  
+  $\frac{1}{8}$  earth "

Gross earth =  $\frac{1}{2}$  earth "  $\frac{1}{8}$  ether " +  $\frac{1}{8}$  air " +  $\frac{1}{8}$  fire "  
+  $\frac{1}{8}$  water ". (Pañcadaśī I.27)

Thus the gross elements (mahābhūtas) are compounds of the subtle elements. B.N. Seal has explained the contest thus: - "The Sūkṣmabhūtas are forms of homogenous and continuous matter, without any atomicity of structure; the mahābhūtas are composite; but even these are regarded as continuous and without any atomic structure. The Vedānta speaks of anu not as an ultimate indivisible discrete constituent matter, but as the smallest conceivable quantum of matter". (38)

Different kinds of substances are produced from the gross elements by transformation. Matter is constantly undergoing change of state. Changes may also be induced from without. Śaṅkara speaks of a cosmic vibratory motion (sarvalokapari-pandanam). Īśvara himself creates the subtle and gross elements out of his māyā by volition, as these elements are non-intelligent and cannot, therefore, bring about their own

development (SBS.II.3.13). In dissolution, the earth becomes water, water - fire, fire - air, air - ether, and ether is reabsorbed in Īśvara (SBS.II.3.14).

IX - CONSTITUENTS OF HUMAN PERSONALITY:

The individual soul is constituted - or disguised, according to Śaṅkara, by the upādhis or adjuncts or empirical conditions. Of these, the first is the condition of the gross body, which is completely left behind in the migration of the soul. Thus, the soul changes different bodies through numerous lives. The unchanging part is the 'subtle body' (sūksmaśarīra) which is made up of the extremely subtle counterparts of the gross elements. It has a persistence which enables these subtle elements to continue after the death of the gross body.

The physical organism is made of all the five gross elements. The different parts of the physical body or sthūlaśarīra, are constituted of different elements. The psychic organ like manas is assumed by Śaṅkara to be of like nature with the physical elements. The human organism is composed of the three elements of earth, water, and fire respectively (SB.II.4.20). Śaṅkara admits that they are sometimes regarded as different in kind from the physical elements and are produced before or after them. In any case, they as well as the elements, are in themselves lifeless and are produced as means to ends. Inorganic nature is parārtha, i.e. it serves a purpose which lies beyond it (SB XIII.22). There is uniformity of nature in the inorganic world (SB.Taitt.Up.II.8).



The chief prāṇa, the cosmic life, which is the energy inherent in all natural forces is a creation of Īśvara. Prāṇa is the energy inherent in the physical organism. It is neither air nor activity of the sense organs. The organs of knowledge and the organs of action cannot produce the vital force of the organism as the Sāṃkhya holds. Life is a subtle physical force (adhyātma) pervading the organism. It is prior to the senses and regulates the development of the organism (SBS.II.4.9). It is subtle and pervades the body (SBS.II.4.13). The word 'Prāṇa' has been used in different senses: -<sup>(39)</sup> (i) Prāṇa is Brahman. All the devas and all the sense carry oblations to Brahman which is prāṇa. Prāṇa is the inmost being. It exists behind the senses and the manas (kausitaki,Chap.2); (ii) Prāṇa is the cosmic energy. It is the support of creation (Prašna, Ch.II). This Prāṇa originates from ātman. The devas, the natural forces and the indriyas derive their capacities and powers from Prāṇa; (iii) Samkara holds Prāṇa to have originated from ātman, and it should not be confounded with mūlā prakṛti (BS.II.4.2). This Prāṇa manifests itself chiefly in two ways: (a) as the energy inherent in all natural forces, and (b) as the energy inherent in the inner organism, the vital forces, the energies of the indriyas, and of the active organs (Śaṅkara Bhāṣya Brh. Chap.I. 5,6,7,8; Chap. II.III). The former may be called adhi-bhūta prāṇa, the latter adhyātma prāṇa.

There are five vital forces in the physical organism, namely prāṇa, apāna, vyāna, udāna and samāna. Prāṇa is said to reside at the nasal cavity; it regulates inspiration and

expiration. Apāna resides at the anus; it helps evacuation. Vyāna pervades the body; it sustains the whole organism. Udāna resides at the throat; it has upward movement. Samāna resides at the navel; it digests and assimilates food and drink. The five vital forces arise from the five subtle elements collectively with the excess of rajas (SB.II.4.12).

The physical body, with its appetites originate out of the mahābhūtas. The gross earth transforms into bone, flesh, nerves, skin and hairs; the ap into bile, blood, secretions and sweat; the tejas into hunger, thirst, sleep, beauty and indolence; the vāyu into contraction, expansion and motion; the ākāśa in spaces of the stomach, heart, neck and head.

There are five organs of knowledge (jñānendriya) and five organs of action (karmendriya). The organs of knowledge - ears, skin, eyes, tongue, and nose arise from the five subtle elements of ether, air, fire, water and earth, individually with the excess of sattva, which manifests objects. The five organs of action - vocal organ, hands, feet, excretive organ and generative organ arise from the subtle elements individually, with the excess of rajas, whose function is activity. The external sense-organs are called bhautika or physical.

X - MANAS:

The Vedantic psychology conceives the existence of manas as the central organ of the soul. It is supplied with knowledge of objects through the sense-organs. The sense-organs are the outlets through which the mental consciousness can go out and perceive external objects. These sense-organs are five in number, as we have already described, viz. the ears, skin, the eyes, the tongue and the nose. Corresponding to

these five senses there are five kinds of perceptions according as their object is, sound, touch, form, taste or smell. These are the organs of sensibility supplying the material content of knowledge.

The distinction between adhyātma adhibhūta and adhidaiva are clearly borne out. The sense-organ is adhyātma, its object is adhibhūta, the corresponding cosmic force is adhidaiva. This distinction has also been extended to the organs of action - speech, hand, feet, the organs of generation and evacuation - are adhyātma corresponding to the respective adhibhūtas - speech, etc.; Agni; Indra, Viṣṇu, Prajāpati and Death preside over them. These senses are not mere outlets through which the inner senses of Antahkarana goes out. Every sense is endowed with power, such as, the skin as an indriya, is not a mere outer surface of the body. The capacities of the indriyas are something different from the surface-existence of the senses, though they are inherent in them. These senses are inert. These indriyas cannot give us any knowledge unless they have in the background the light of consciousness.

The prāṇas and indriya-śaktis are subtle and escape direct perception. But they are not all-pervasive. Vedāntism does not accept the conclusion of the Sāṃkhya that they are all-penetrating, being all pervasive. Had they been so, they would have given us the knowledge of distant but small things. The author of the Vivaraṇaprameya-saṃgraha has denied the possibility of indriyas going out everywhere in the company of body, for the body is inert, and it can move only in

association with prāna. The name indriya appears first in the Kaṭha and the Kena. Other texts call them prāna. The enumeration of the ten indriyas occurs in the Brhadāraṇyaka (Chap. II,IV,V.12). It adds manas and heart. We have also reference to manas as the central organ of cognition and action (Brh.I.V.3., IV.1.6)

The mind-stuff or antaḥkaraṇa is the inner organ. It is called the eleventh sense. It is to be distinguished from the organs of senses and the organs of action. Its special function is to give us the knowledge of manifold things, one by one in succession. The antaḥkaraṇa is the name given to the totality of vṛttis or semi-spiritual functions. Manas is the faculty of reflection. When the antaḥkaraṇa is in state of doubt due to its inability to make out the true character of anything and to arrive at a clear judgement, it is called manas. This manas is on the one hand regarded as the organ of volition, and on the other hand regarded as the central organ of perception. The sense-organs cannot give us knowledge if the manas is not active. The functions of the mind have been localized in different parts of the body. Manas has a limited or measurable magnitude. If it were infinite in magnitude, then ātman would experience all things at once. In the earlier texts, manas, vāk and prāna are affirmed to possess infinite magnitude. Vāk is the RK, manas is the Yajur, prāna is Sāman; vāk is the devas, manas the fathers, prāna the men. Prajapati is represented to be vāk, manas and prāna. Here we are to take manas in the sense of collective mental consciousness which is all-pervasive and is the upādhi of Hir<sup>a</sup>nyagarbha or prāna.

The later Vedāntism holds that apart from the cosmic manas. there are manas-units appropriated to individuals. The Vedāntists agree in holding that manas or antaḥkaraṇa has the capacity of expansion and contraction. No doubt it is of limited magnitude, but it has no limit in this direction. It can take the form of anything large or small.

The upādhis, which condition the individualisation of the soul, may be classified in the following way: - (I) The coarse body, the fleshy covering which the soul casts off at death. (II) The body that accompanies the soul beyond and which includes the subtle body or the finer body consisting of (i) the life organs - prāṇa and so on - the vital currents supporting and preserving the organic existence; (ii) the five organs of action including the tongue, the hands, the feet, the organs of generation and evacuation; (iii) the five sense-organs including the organs of hearing, seeing, touching, smelling and tasting; (iv) the central organ of conscious life, directing the organs of perception and the organs of action - called antaḥkaraṇam, which again is chiefly taken as manas and buddhi.

The coarse body is purely flesh. It is the dense cover - annamaya koṣa. The subtle body is divided into three-fold sheath of prāṇa, manas and vijñāna. The organs of vitality and the organs of action combine to form the prāṇamaya koṣa, i.e. the vital cover. Buddhi with the senses forms the still deeper covering, the vijñānamaya koṣa, i.e. the intelligence cover.

#### XI - THE SUBTLE BODY:

It is composed of the five organs of knowledge, five organs of action, the five vital forces, manas and buddhi.

The subtle body is made of the five subtle elements; it clings to the jīva till it attains liberation; it helps its transmigration from one body to another (VSP.17). The causal body (kāraṇasārīra) is the cause of the subtle body and the gross body. It is the individual nescience (ajñāna) which is an appearance of the eternal consciousness. It is not ontologically existent, since it is destroyed by the knowledge of the ātman. It is not absolutely non-existent, since it is known by perception and capable of fulfilling our practical purposes. It is not both existent and non-existent, since it is self-contradictory. It is not different from the ātman, which is the only reality. It is not non-different from it, since it deludes the jīva, and veils its real nature. It is not both different and non-different from the ātman since it is self-contradictory. It is not divisible in parts, since it is not an effect. Nor is it indivisible and partless, since it is modified into the body, the senses, manas and buddhi. Nor is it both divisible and indivisible since that is self-contradictory. It is thus indefinable (anirvacanīya). It is destroyed by the knowledge of the identity of the ātman with Brahman. The entire aggregate of effects and organs is of the nature of names and forms. They are assembled to serve the ends of individual selves. This subtle body, while material, is also transparent, and so is not seen when jīva migrates. While the subtle body and the vital forms persist as permanent factors of the soul until liberation, there is the varying factor of moral determination (karmāśraya), which accompanies the soul in each life

as a new form not previously existing (SB.II.4.8-12). The basis of individuality is to be found not in the Ātman or the adjuncts, but in moral determination, which is a complex of knowledge (vidyā) works (karma) and experience (prajñā) (Brh.IV.4.2). The vital forces continue to exist like the subtle body, which carries them, as long as samsāra endures, and accompany the soul inseparably even if it should enter a plant, in which case, the internal organ and the senses cannot naturally unfold themselves. As samsāra is beginningless, the soul must have been equipped with this apparatus of vital forms from eternity. A third, kāraṇa śarīra, is sometimes mentioned and identified with the beginningless indefinable avidyā. The causal self (kāraṇa-ātmā) is the relatively permanent human self, which persists through successive rebirth, determined by the law of karma.

### XII - CONCLUSION:

The AV. conception of human personality, as we have seen, comprises of a subject-object complex. The subject element is pure-consciousness (sākṣin). The object element is the internal organ (antahkarāṇa) which undergoes constant configuration through its contact with the external objects. As according to AV. the entire objective world except the pure consciousness, envisaged in Brahman, is illusory, -- thus, the antahkarāṇa together with the vṛttis is considered illusory and as such unreal. Hence, the empirical personality does not remain a basic reality according to AV. conception. It is only the jīvātman or empirical self, which enters into a subject-object relation, without which empirical cognition

is impossible. The jīvātman is Brahman itself. It is through the borrowed consciousness from the transcendental self (Brahman) that the material buddhi receives its illumination and thus illumines the object of experience. The empirical personality entirely depends on the transcendental consciousness of Brahman for its relative reality, which is captured in the subject-object relational complex. Thus, according to AV, the jīvātman or the personal self, which in its fundamental aspect is also the transcendental self or pure universal consciousness -- in the empirical stage i.e. while reflected in the internal organ is circumscribed by the ego.

In the state of emancipation, the pure light of Brahman as the identity of pure intelligence, being and complete bliss, shines forth in its unique glory, and all the rest vanishes as illusory nothing. The Being of Brahman is not an abstraction from all the existent beings (as the sattā of the NV), but the concrete, the real, which in its aspect as pure consciousness and pure bliss is always identical with itself.

AV. believes that the state of emancipation is not a state of release from pain and suffering *but* is a positive state of happiness. The Advaitins argue that the state of emancipation is the state of Brahmahood, in which bliss and consciousness are identified as 'One Being'. Knowledge of Brahman, which leads to eternal bliss, does not depend on the performance of any act, for Brahman is already an accomplished fact. Knowledge of Brahman depends on Brahman itself. This knowledge is not mental activity, because it depends not on



mind but on the existent fact.<sup>(40)</sup> There is also no succession of knowledge. Once it dawns, it dawns forever and at once removes all ignorance and consequently all bondage. Liberation, therefore, means removal of ignorance by knowledge. Vedānta believes that even when the true knowledge has once been attained, the body may last for a while, if the individuals previously ripened karmas demand it. This is jīvanmukti. The Śruti says - 'The only delay for him is the death of the body.' Just as a potter's wheel goes on revolving for sometime even after the push is withdrawn, similarly the body may continue to exist after knowledge has dawned, though all attachment with the body is cut off.<sup>(41)</sup>

The question of emancipation is discussed in the concluding chapter again.

### CHAPTER III

#### CONCEPTION OF HUMAN PERSONALITY IN THE SĀMĀKHYA LITERATURE

##### INTRODUCTION:

Sāṃkhya is undoubtedly one of the oldest systems of Indian philosophy. We find references of the Sāṃkhya doctrines in some of the Upaniṣads, e.g. the Chāndogya (VI.4,1), the Praśna (VI.2), the Kaṭha (I.3.10-13) and particularly the Śvetāśvatara (IV.5.10,12,16). The Vedānta system of thought, which proved to be a powerful rival to the Sāṃkhya doctrines, over-shadowed it at a later stage. Śaṃkarāchārya regards it as the main opponent of Vedānta. Both Sāṃkhya and Vedānta claim that most of the Upaniṣadic literature conform to their respective system of thought. After a thorough search into the problem, scholars have found out an innate affinity between the Upaniṣadic Sāṃkhya and Vedānta. A bifurcation or parting of the ways appeared only from the age of the epics, preceding the emergence of the Brahma-sūtras. During the early stages, there was presumably a kind of peaceful co-existence which we find in the literature of the Mahābhārata. (1)

The point, that the early Vedānta and Sāṃkhya were not antagonistic to each other in the early Upaniṣadic period, can be supported by the evidence that Sāṃkhya and Vedānta stood for the some adjectives quite often as 'ātma-vidyā', 'adhyātma-jñāna', 'jñānayoga', 'vidyā' and so on. In fact the name 'Sāṃkhya' appeared for the first time in the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad (Śve.VI.22) and the name Vedānta in the Muṇḍaka (Muṇḍ.III.26) - both of which are known to be comparatively later Upaniṣads. We ought not therefore presume that the

Sāṃkhya and Vedānta ways of thought did not exist prior to the appearance of these terms. On the contrary, it seems rather proper to consider that the early speculations had everything in the making of both the later Sāṃkhya and Vedānta. There are certain technical terms like puruṣa, buddhi, guṇa, etc. which are considered as the particular property of Sāṃkhya; whereas others like ātman, brahman, avidyā, māyā, etc. belong only to Vedānta. Nevertheless, these terms are quite often used together in the earlier Upaniṣads as well.

The first clear elements of the dualistic preaching, which conforms to the Sāṃkhya Philosophy are found in the Katha Upaniṣad (III & IV). In the Upaniṣads with their main idealistic and monistic passages, the dualistic trends are often present inter se. Although the leading Upaniṣadic conceptions are not in favour of establishing dualism as primary and ultimate, without mentioning the specific terms - Sāṃkhya and Vedānta, these two branches of philosophy progressed together; this assumption reveals an absence of difference between them pointing towards a fundamental unity. Rao goes as far as to declare that it is not unreasonable to think that the rational analysis of reality was itself the Sāṃkhya and it formed the very back-bone of the early Upaniṣadic Vedānta. (2) According to him, Sāṃkhya may be regarded as an off-shoot of the Upaniṣadic literature, but not the off-shoot of the Upaniṣadic Vedānta, because as a 'method of enquiry', the Sāṃkhya may be the 'logical antecedent' to the Upaniṣadic Vedānta. Furthermore, the Upaniṣads are not prerogative of sectarian mono-philosophers. Finally, it may be said that

the Sāṃkhya analysis of experience, or its empiricism and rationalism and Vedāntic idealism were integrally connected forming undifferentiated parts of a unified thought in the Upaniṣadic times.<sup>(3)</sup>

The early Indian philosophical texts are often regarded as literary works rather than historical documents. If we say that the Upaniṣadic literature is the literature of the Vedāntic tradition, then it will make them sectarian irrespective of their historical value. The Upaniṣads, on the other hand, are repository of all the philosophical trends, like idealism and realism, monism and dualism, personalism and impersonalism. The obvious disagreement between the later Vedānta of the Brahma-sūtras and the classical Sāṃkhya as expounded in the Kārikās, developed after both the systems had undergone a very long process of systematization. Classical Sāṃkhya is regarded as "that formulation of Sāṃkhya, found in Īśvarakṛṣṇa's Sāṃkhya-kārikā".<sup>(4)</sup> The precise date of the text is not determined. The Sāṃkhya kārikā along with a commentary was translated into Chinese by Paramārtha sometime between AD 557-569.<sup>(5)</sup> Assuming then that the text was well known at that time, we can have an idea of its chronological place in the history of Indian thoughts.

Any analysis of a specific system must include a careful examination of the history of the tradition which plays an important role in the development of the respective concepts. Like all the orthodox systems, classical Sāṃkhya owes its origin to the Upaniṣadic literature, but it followed a different line of development than the Vedānta. I have already discussed

mainly the idealistic side of the Upaniṣadic philosophy which forms the background of the Vedānta system in the previous chapter. Now I have endeavoured to bring out how much the conception of human personality in classical Sāṃkhya owes to the Vedic and Upaniṣadic literature, to the epics and finally to the preclassical Sāṃkhya literature.

The history of the evolution of the Sāṃkhya school of thoughts begins with the dualistic preachings of the Upaniṣads. There are occasional mentions of the dualistic thoughts even in the Vedas. But the Upaniṣadic preachings are more explicit and can be called the origin of the Sāṃkhya system of thought.

The Upaniṣads contain the idea of prakṛti, puruṣa and jīva and held the view that the guṇas of nature are responsible for the bondage of the individual souls. Since the whole world is the creation of these guṇas, the individual soul, being bound by the guṇas enjoy the fruits of their various actions. In this stage of bondage, the individual self does not see the transcendental Puruṣa dwelling within himself. Both nature and jīva are modes of the supreme transcendental spirit, and are therefore dependent on Him (Brahman). Individual souls are only the sparks of the highest Lord and have, therefore, no existence apart from Him. It is important to mention here that the Sāṃkhya views, as we find in the Upaniṣads, in the Mahābhārata and in the Bhagavadgītā lean to theism. Puruṣa and Prakṛti are not independent realities here but only the modes of God. Edgerton remarks - "A study of the Epic and other early materials has convinced me that there is not a single passage in which disbelief in Brahman or God is attributed to the Sāṃkhya".<sup>(6)</sup>

In the Mahābhārata, reference of atheistic Sāṃkhya is also available. Pañcaśikha's teachings represent an important exposition of the atheistic school of Sāṃkhya, which recognizes only twenty four categories.

Kapila, the founder of the Sāṃkhya philosophy (whose detailed reference is found in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa) gives us a theistic exposition of the Sāṃkhya; but the Sāṃkhya of the Caraka Samhitā, which seems to be in line with the teachings of Pañcaśikha, represents a form completely different from the traditional theistic school. Puruṣa and Prakṛti, welded together in the avyakta category, are regarded as ultimate, and there is no place for God or Īśvara. Prakṛti part of avyaktam is the cause of the evolution of all the categories. The self, in association with the physical organs appear as the knower or the enjoyer.

The classical Sāṃkhya may be considered as a further development on the Caraka line, though these two differ in many areas. The classical Sāṃkhya explicitly recognizes the independent existence of the dual principles of Puruṣa and Prakṛti, and as such the elements of dualism are very prominent here. The important affinity between the Caraka Sāṃkhya and the classical Sāṃkhya is that in neither of them Īśvara has been admitted as the Highest regulative principle of the universe. On the basis of these facts, we may divide the whole course of evolution of Sāṃkhya in three stages: - (i) The theistic and monistic stage developed in the Upaniṣads, the Mahābhārata, the Purāṇas and the Bhāgavata (ii) Atheistic and semi-dualistic stage represented by Caraka and Pañcaśikha;

and (iii) Atheistic and dualistic stage represented by Arāda, Īśvarakr̥ṣṇa and the author of the Sāṃkhya-sūtras.<sup>(7)</sup>

In the forthcoming sections I have discussed the development of the Sāṃkhya conception of human personality in these three different stages.

### Section A - PRE-UPANIṢADIC AND UPANIṢADIC LITERATURE

From the previous discussions, we have come to a conclusion with a certain amount of certainty that the Sāṃkhya philosophy was rooted in the Upaniṣads. Before going into detailed discussions about the Upaniṣadic Sāṃkhya conceptions, I would like to put forth the trend of the dualistic outlook that is present in the R̥g-veda itself.

#### I - PRE-UPANIṢADIC LITERATURE:

The vivid pre-meditation of the Sāṃkhya is to be found in the Nāsadiya Sūkta (RV.X.129) of the R̥g-Veda. In the first five verses there are several important suggestions, which we may relate to the future Sāṃkhya system. In verse I, 'asat' is characterized as 'something as noumenal, undifferentiated, unmanifest potential state; in the beginning there was neither asat (non-existence/non-being) nor sat (existence/being)'. We speak of a thing as 'it is' only in relation to the things that are not elsewhere or in relation to another that is not there. On the other hand, we say of something as 'it is not' in relation to something which is there or so on. But in the absolute stage there is no chance of being in either ways. This indescribable state of the noumenal condition exactly fits with the Sāṃkhya description of Prakṛti (the primordial nature) as 'Sadasat' (Vyāsa-Bhāṣya II.19). 'Tamas

evolved in tamas ..... ' might be referred to the Sadrśa-parināma (homogeneous evolution) in the Sāmyāvasthā (equilibrium state) of Prakṛti. 'That which was to manifest had been concealed in nothingness', refers to the Satkāryavāda, with the possible manifestation of 'avyakta' as 'vyakta'.

The Ṛg-Vedic hymn declares, "from asat issued forth the sat" (RV.X.72.2-3), and again 'from Aditi was born Dakṣah' where Aditi stands for infinity and Dakṣah for understanding, which are suggestive of the Sāṃkhya idea of Avyaktā and the manifestations of Buddhi. In Ṛg-Veda X.190-3, it says, 'Dhātr' or creator fashioned the cosmic objects as previously (Yathāpūrvam) and AV.X.7-26 mentions that the Lord, while creating, 'rolled out what was old'. This evidently suggests the process of evolution and involution, as mentioned in Sāṃkhya. In Ṛv.I.164, the symbol of two birds can easily be interpreted from both the Sāṃkhya and Vedāntic points of view.

RV.X.16.4 envisages an analysis of the empirical personality (the work of future Sāṃkhya and Vedānta), when it says, 'Agni consumes only the body and the departed soul (Ajobhāga - the unborn part) emerges out. Here lies the suggestion of the mortal and immortal aspects of the individual which is the initial conception of the Upaniṣadic Sāṃkhya and the Upaniṣadic Vedāntic philosophies. Again, in the hymn X.5.6 it says, 'the unborn part when departing from the body is furnished with a 'lustrous body'. Here we find the inchoate idea of the 'subtle body' of Sāṃkhya and Vedānta, accompanying the soul in the cycle of transmigration. This idea is again suggested



in the hymn ṚV.X.16.3, where the departed soul is asked to go among other places to planets and stay there with bodies. The Purusa Sūkta of the ṚV.(X.90) is specially significant and can be regarded as the basis of the conception of Purusa in Sāṃkhya. This sūkta starts with a description of the absolute as a 'great person' immense in size. From this absolute there arose a diversification, a Virāt (what shines in a manifold way). This Virāt became material for the creation is compared to a grand ritual. This conception of Purusa also tallies with the Vedāntic doctrine of para-brahman. This trend started towards a greater synthesis in conceiving the identification of Ātman (individual soul) and Brahman (absolute reality). These attempts of unification are found in the early Rg-Vedic passages ṚV.I.89.10; I.164.46; III.55.1; X.90; and X.129.2. But those who were not after such a synthesis regarded these two principles independently and arrived at two-fold conclusions (utimates). It is highly probable that this analytic or dualistic attitude arose as a reaction to the efforts to identify. Thus Keith conjectures, "... the Sāṃkhya is a conception based entirely on the view of the difference between the subject and the object and that this conception was formed independently of the existing Ātman-Brahman philosophy, or at least in conscious reaction to it".<sup>(8)</sup>

The dualistic tendency is clearly evident in ṚV.I.164.4 - 'the boneless soul inhabiting the bony cage' or in St.BR.X.6.II 'ko nu ātmā kim brahmeti' (who verily is the soul) and also 'Now indeed, there is this two-fold thing, the Eater and that which is eaten' (RV.X.6.2.); 'Now this body is the food, and

that man in the right eye is the Eater, being concealed in the food, he shines' (RV.X.5.2,19) and so on. The Sāṃkhya is regarded as being developed from this second trend of thought.

When the attempts to discover the basic principles of the individual and the cosmos were in progress, both the groups of men perhaps concurred with regard to the analysis of experience or reality into the mortal and immortal aspects of man, or into the transitory states in nature. On the subjective side of man they pitched upon by excessive steps, the five senses, the five breaths, the mukhya prāṇa or the prāṇa and later discarded them as not constituting the most basic factor, and arrived at Ātman or Puruṣa as the sat (Chāndogya VI.2.1-2; Rv.X 129.1; Rv.7.2.2-3). Ātma-puruṣa (Brh.I.2.1; .I4.17), i.e. as the ultimate principle of one's life and personality, the ground on which any experience rests. As Śaṅkarāchārya rightly describes - 'the Ātman is the basis (āśraya) for the validity of proof. And because it is thus formed it is impossible to call it in question. For we may call a thing in question which comes up from without (āgantuka) but not our essential being' (Commentary Ved.Su.II 3.7). Likewise, on the objective side, the recognition and elimination of fire, earth, water, air, and space, as constituting only the name and form aspect of the cosmos, precede the discovery and recognition of the nameless and formless principle in avyākṛta or asat or Brahman as the most basic or ultimate. ('Asat' - Chān.6.2.1; Taitt.II.7; Brh I.2.1; RV.X.72.2-3; avyākṛta - Brh I.4.7; Brahman - Brh. I.4.10.11).<sup>(9)</sup> It is important to remember that these two principles

represent the two spheres of experience - subjective and objective. If Sat is existence, the Asat is only 'Not-sat' (non-positive/non-existence). Thus it is clear that in the early philosophical speculations, the analysis went on without any specific distinguishing features. The dualistic and monistic tendencies developed into two specific systematic theories quite lately in the later part of the Upaniṣadic period.

## II - THE UPANISADIC LITERATURE

The two major concepts of the Sāṃkhya philosophy are that of Puruṣa (the transcendental self) and Prakṛti (the primordial nature), on which stands the dualistic speculation of the Sāṃkhya philosophers. The word Puruṣa is mentioned in the Ṛg-Veda itself (RV.X.90) and throughout the Brāhmanic and Upaniṣadic literatures quite frequently. Compared to it, the appearance of the term Prakṛti is quite late. It is first mentioned in the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad (Śve.IV.10) along with the term 'Sāṃkhya'. But the conception of Prakṛti is illustrated earlier under the heading avyakta. In fact, avyakta or prakṛti may be considered as an objective principle while Puruṣa is in the Subjective side.

In the Upaniṣadic philosophy, the monistic tone is predominant and the central interest lies upon the discovery of Ātman (the inner self of man) and Brahman (the essence of the universe). A study of the early literature conveys the impression that Brahman was confined in the sphere of Object, the manifold universe. And likewise Ātman was confined purely to the sphere of the subject, i.e. the physical and personality

side of man. The early synonyms for these two principles seem to be (a) for Brahman - asat, akṣara, and for (b) Ātman - sat or puruṣa. Those who considered the two realities as separate, became dualists - Sāṃkhya; the others who believed in the merging of these two principles into one complete identity became monists - Advaita Vedānta. According to some scholars, the conception of Ātman led to the conception of Puruṣa and Brahman - the ultimate source of the objective sphere to the development of Prakṛti - passing through the successive stages of akṣara and avyakta.<sup>(10)</sup>

The dualistic tendencies can be traced even in the monistic speculations of the early prose Upaniṣads.<sup>(11)</sup> In the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad I.II.5 we find the 'food' and 'the eater of the food' and further, it is the puruṣa who is mentioned there as the 'eater of the food.' Sāṃkhya also treats prakṛti as 'bhogya' (to be enjoyed) and the puruṣa as 'bhoktr' (the enjoyer). The Kaṭha Upaniṣad explicitly mentions ātman to be the enjoyer (Kaṭha I.3.4) and both these terms 'bhogya' and 'bhoktr' are met with in the Śve.Upaniṣad. (Śve.I.12).

Rao has brought out three stages in the development of this line of thought. The first stage comprises of the older prose Upaniṣads, namely Bṛhadāraṇyaka, Chāndogya, Īśa, Kena. Muṇḍaka, Aitareya, Taittirīya and Kauśītakī - which developed mainly in the monistic trend of identity. In the second stage, comprising of Muṇḍaka and Kaṭha we see a tendency towards dualism along with monism and also the revival of theism. In the third stage belong Praśna and Śvetāśvatara, which are mainly dualistic.<sup>(12)</sup>

During the first stage, Ātman (or Puruṣa) and Brahman (or akṣara) are conceived as representing the two sides (subjective

and objective) of the same reality. Thus, the two aspects are often found being described in similar language viz., Puruṣa or Ātman, as - "This verily was Ātman in the form of Puruṣa" (Brh.I.4.1); "This verily was the Ātman in the beginning" (Brh.I.4.17); "...So much is His greatness, yet Puruṣa is greater than all this,

All things are one fourth of Him

The immortal is in Heaven" (Chānd.II.6)

Brahman is described as - "This verily is Brahman (in the beginning) (Chān.III.14)

"The knowers of Brahman describe it also as akṣara. It is neither gross, nor fine, nor short, nor long .... nor is it consumed by any" (Brh.III.8.8);

Ātman as "The (ātman) was verily brahman at first, It knew itself as 'I am brahman' " (Brh.I.4.10)

"This ātman is verily brahman (Brh. IV.4.5; also Chān.VI. 8.7; Taitt.II.5).

In these passages the two sides of realities Ātman and Brahman are treated as identical.

In the second state, we notice an evident development in the conception of the ultimate reality. Though, basically, the outlook seems to stand on the philosophy of the earlier stage, there appeared an apparent distinction between Ātman and Brahman. Rao puts it in this way - "There is a tendency in these Upaniṣads to treat the objective ultimate as a 'lower' principle than the subjective one, the Ātman." (13)

For example, "The resplendent Puruṣa is ... higher than akṣara" (Munḍ.II.1.2); "The highest principle is Puruṣa" (munḍ.III.2.8); "Higher than avyakta (i.e. akṣara or brahman) is Puruṣa; higher

than Puruṣa, there is nothing else" (Kaṭha.III.2); "Puruṣa; higher than avyakta" (Kaṭha.IV.8). Here, we definitely see a different gradation of the two principles which really occupied the same status in the early Upaniṣadic period. Rao suggests that this conscious distinction is aimed at between the two ultimates from two points of view, cosmological and theological.<sup>(14)</sup> Thus, Muṇḍaka gives the cosmological reason in saying - "Puruṣa is the seed-giver, akṣara is the yoni" (Mund.II.1.2.). The Muṇḍaka and Kaṭha definitions of Puruṣa are theistic. Thus, we can say that the abstract idealistic monism of the early Upaniṣadic period is changed into a form of realistic theism in the second stage.

The third stage of Śvetāśvatara is comparatively later, and is presumably even later than the Bhagvad-Gīta. Puruṣa is mentioned here as Īśa, Hara, Rudra and Maheśvara. The term prakṛti also appears here. There are four passages in Śvetāśvatara (viz. I.9;IV.5;IV.6;V.10) which maintained the duality of the subjective and objective principles. Here the supreme unitary principle is Brahman, who is the transcendent seer. The individual Ātman is ajñā (ignorant) and anīśa (supreme). Puruṣa or the subjective principle has got a very high position. Prakṛti is referred to as 'the power of God (devātma-śakti)'. Puruṣa is all powerful. He is the jālavāna (the schemer), the 'māyin (the magician), whereas, prakṛti is only māyā (the magical power). Puruṣa causes the union. He is the samyoga-hetu (instrument for conjunction) between the individual self and prakṛti. It is to be noted that the objective principle has attained a feminine status

in Śvetāśvatara, being called as 'devātma-sakti', māyā, and ajā, opposite to Puruṣa being called as the retodāh (the seed giver), and akṣara as yoni (womb). This seems to be the background of the feminine conception of Prakṛti. Thus, what was Brahman or akṣara (neuter in the early philosophy) up to Muṇḍaka, remained avyakta (neuter) in the Kaṭha and became Prakṛti (feminine) in the Śve. That is how we can conceive Prakṛti from Brahman or akṣara, the objective principle of the early Vedic literature. Rao maintains that the Śvetāśvatara is the basis of the atheistic Sāṃkhya. Because, for the first time, in this Upaniṣad, the power of creation was transferred over to Prakṛti. Puruṣa attains the position of a passive onlooker (mere spectator).<sup>(15)</sup>

Achieving the conception of an independent objective principle, the sages proceeded in considering the further analysis of the objective principle into sub-groups: (i) First emerged two groups - the higher objective aspect and the lower objective aspect, which were named differently in different Upaniṣads, such as:

in Muṇḍ - akṣara and brahma respectively  
in Kaṭha - avyakta and mahān-ātmā  
in Gīta - parā prakṛti and aparā prakṛti

(ii) Then came further eight groups - asta prakṛtayah as mentioned in the Gīta, Mahābhārata, Śve., Buddha Charita (XII), Caraka Samhitā and Tattva Samāsa. These are Prakṛti as avyakta, buddhi, ahamkāra, the five tanmātras.

(iii) Then came further sixteen vikāras along with eight prakṛtis;

(iv) Lastly, sub-grouped into Prakṛti, prakṛti-vikṛti and

vikāras - made the total of twenty-four in classical Sāṃkhya (the Sāṃkhya Kārikā).

In the Mundaka, the two aspects of akṣara principle are clearly distinguishable from each other, the Higher eternal and the lower non-eternal. The former is called akṣara and the latter, Brāhman. The inorganic matter comes out of akṣara.

"As the spider creates and withdraws the web as herbs sprung from the earth; as hairs come out of the body of a living person, so from this akṣara (even) the viśvam (i.e. the inorganic matter) has come out" (Mund.I.1.7). In these verses, two different categories are being mentioned as being emerged out of the akṣara: the bhūtas (the organic creation) and the viśvam (evidently the inorganic creation). These two categories of beings constitute the entire universe and thus the term Brahma is used in the next verse to comprehend both - "By heat (tapasā) (this) Brahma expands (ciyate), (from the root of birth 'ci' - to grow). Thus, what is born from akṣara is the Brahma, which expands and grows giving rise in turn to other things". "... From that are born anna, from that prāṇa, manas, satyam, lokāḥ (the worlds) and the endless karma" (Mund.I.1.8,9,10). Studying these verses, we see that akṣara is the source of 'brahma', which expands and in turn becomes the source of nāma (name) and rūpa (form). This means that apart from Puruṣa as the subjective principle, we have akṣara and brahma as objective principles. The Puruṣa is the efficient cause in regard to the creation, for he 'puts seed into the yoni', the akṣara (Mund.II.1.5).



The aksara is the material cause with respect to brahma (Mund. I.1.6-8). Of these three principles the first two (puruṣa and aksara) are eternal for Puruṣa is called ajā (Mund.II.1.2) and aksara is called agotram (unborn) and nityam (eternal) (Mund.I.1.6). Brahma is non-eternal for it is said, "From the aksara the varied creations (vivḍhāḥ bhāvāḥ) are born and verily into it, they merge again (Mund.II.1.1). But again the Puruṣa is regarded as the higher between the two eternal, "the Puruṣa who is self-respondent, formless, unoriginated and pure .... is higher than the aksara". (Mund.II.1.2)

The synonyms for avyakta as brahma, param dhruvam and aksaram establish the fact that aksara and avyakta are identical (Refer Pūrvapakṣa of Śaṅkara Br.Sū.I.1.21). The third principle, brahma of the Mund. Upaniṣad is identical with the mahān-ātmā of the Kāṭha Upaniṣad, for mahān-ātmā is a name for Hiraṇyagarbha, the first born, who is otherwise known as brahma. Thus we see that the Mund. Upaniṣad contemplates a division in the objective principle of which the eternal Puruṣa is regarded higher than the non-eternal aksara. Kāṭha Upaniṣad makes a slight difference in bringing out the term avyakta in place of aksara and mahat or mahān-ātmā in place of brahma. Between these two Upaniṣads, Kāṭha appears to possess more trends of the Sāṅkhya philosophy than the Mund. Upaniṣad. The Kāṭha mentions buddhi, manas, indri-yārtha and indriya in an order which was followed by the later Sāṅkhya system in a more or less same manner. Avyakta and mahān-ātmā are the two objective principles here, but there is no mention of aḥamkāra, which is a classical Sāṅkhyan principle.

An important change is found in Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, where the two parts of the objective principle (viz. aksara and brahma) are conceived under one unitary principle - Prakṛti. Besides the speculations on Puruṣa and aksara (Prakṛti in later Sāṃkhya), the upaniṣadic literatures contain references to the other Sāṃkhya principles. Though the technical sense of the terms are often different and sometimes not mentioned, yet the refernces to the ideas behind can be very easily regared as being those which developed into Sāṃkhya.

The early Ātman-Brahman philosophy started mainly by analysing one's own being, the corporeal and non-corporeal elements and by determining the mortal and immortal in one's own self. Such an analysis was done mainly (a) to know the ultimate in man and cosmos and a strive to realizes it, and (b) to know the immortal in man which would survive into the next life and possibly through the chain of births and deaths in the cycle of tranmigration. The early literatures from the Ṛg-Veda downwards contain references to those concepts which have formed the frame-work of all later systems of philosophy, based upon the Vedas.

We shall now discuss the different evalutes which emerge from Prakṛti and their nature. The Chāndogya Upaniṣad is the earliest to contain the idea of the Guna theory of the Sāṃkhya, though the terms sattva, rajas and tamas are not mentioned. It declares - "The redness (rohita) of the fire is colour of brilliance, its whiteness (śukla) is the colour of water and its blackness (kṛṣṇa) is the colour of the food.

Hence fire ceases to be fire. It is nothing but a word. It is a modification (vikāra) and only nominal. The three colours only are real" (Chān.VI.4.1). In the same manner the sun, the moon, the lightning are analysed in the succeeding passages into their constituents (or colours): redness, the whiteness and the darkness (Chān.VI.2-4).

The advocates of the Sāṃkhya also describe the universe as Prakṛti, which is said to have three guṇas as its constituents and all the objects other than the self are only particular formations of the guṇas and hence are in reality not different from them. It is interesting to note that in Śvetāśvatara we find the mention of Prakṛti 'as the one unborn of lohita, śukla and kṛṣṇa and characterises it by producing many offerings of its own form' (Śve.VI.4). In this Upaniṣad we also find the mention of the term guṇa and it also speaks of triguṇa (Śve.V.7).

Though the Chāndogya and Brh. Upaniṣads know nothing about the Prakṛti of later times, the mention of rohita, śukla and kṛṣṇa is highly suggestive of having formed the future guṇa theory. Buddhi is the first evolute of Prakṛti and may be treated partially as vijñāna which is referred in places in the Upaniṣads. Buddhi is first mentioned in Kaṭha (III.10.1); Brh speaks of vijñāna in the same sense of buddhi (Brh.IV.4.2 and Taitt.II.4;III.4). It is difficult to say whether the term buddhi is used in the sense of 'adhyavasāya' as in the Kaṭha. Kaṭha has also equated buddhi with sattva (Kaṭha VI.7.8). Again it is difficult to presume whether the equation rests upon a similar idea of the classical Sāṃkhya by mentioning buddhi as sāttvic because of the presence of sattva predominantly

in it. The Chānd. Upaniṣad says, - 'Verily I extend from below, I extend from behind, I extend from before, I extend from south, I extend from the north' (Chānd.VII.25.1). It tallies with the Sāṃkhya conception of ahaṃkāra to a considerable extent. The Praśna Upaniṣad, however, mentions ahaṃkāra quite clearly. Manas and Sankalpa are described side by side in the ancient upaniṣads and are regarded as two separate principles, but Sāṃkhya holds saṃkalpa to be the function of the mind. Of the indriyas, the Chandogya knows the ear, the nose, the tongue, the mind (Chānd.I.2; V.1.6-12), and skin is mentioned in V.23.1-2. The Brh. possesses an advanced knowledge regarding the sense organs, five jñānendriyas and five karmendriyas and one manas. (Chānd.III.9.4).

The Upaniṣads, anterior to the Praśna, do not mention the tanmātras. It is only in the Maitrāyaṇī that they are explicitly mentioned. The Praśna Upaniṣad however, bears the idea of tanmātras very clearly. In Praśna we find the prthivī and prthivīmātra, ap and apomātra, teja and tejomātra, vāyu and vāyumātra, ākāśa and ākāśamātra (Praśna IV.8).

Thus, we see that almost all the principles of the Sāṃkhya system of thought have their origin in the Upaniṣadic literature.

### Section B - CARAKA-SAMHITĀ

The second stage is comprised of more practical views of Caraka which will be the subject of this section. Caraka's enumeration of the Sāṃkhya is often regarded as a transitional stage between the Upaniṣadic observations and the orthodox Sāṃkhya doctrines of Īśvarakriṣṇa.

In the beginning of the first chapter of the eighth book of Caraka-Samhitā, Ātreya explains the nature of Ātman to Agniveṣa. He speaks about three different types of Ātman as conceived from three different angles of vision. Of these, the first one is the conglomeration of the five material substances and the conscious element, the second forms the pure consciousness alone and the third is again the conglomeration of twenty-four principles which comprise of mind, the ten organs, the five objects of the senses and the eight-fold Prakṛti, viz. avyakta, buddhi, aḥṁkāra and the five elements (Caraka-Samhitā VIII.1.15-16). According to the first view, the Puruṣa in the ordinary individual, consists of the six elements akṣara, vāyu, pr-thivi, ap, tej and the cetanā (which is also called Puruṣa) (C.S.VIII.5.5). The second view is in accordance with the classical Sāṃkhya view. According to the third view, the twenty four constituents of the Puruṣa are nothing but the evolutionary series of the Sāṃkhya. (Śārīra I.34). Puruṣa is said to be 'rāśi', that is, the conglomeration of the twenty-four principles. According to the classical Sāṃkhya however, Puruṣa is pure consciousness and is simply different from the group of Prakṛti,

Thus, by saying that the Puruṣa is a conglomeration of twenty-four principles, Caraka only refers to the psycho-physical entity of the ordinary individual, i.e. man. The Supreme Puruṣa is not subjected to birth, for it is without any beginning. Moreover, the Puruṣa, which is called rāśi, is the outcome of delusion, desire and hatred (CS VIII.1.52) and it is endowed with happiness, misery life and death (CS VIII.1.36) and it can be subjected to medical treatment

(CS VIII.1.37). The ultimate principles of Puruṣa and Prakṛti are only inferable in the Sāṃkhyan metaphysics. It is natural then, that, purely from the practical point of view, a physician like Caraka should have considered them avyakta (unmanifested/unseen) and therefore beyond diagnosis. What is strictly amenable to him is the psycho-physical combination, i.e. rāśi (CS.17.34) - called 'man' (Puruṣa) in ordinary parlance. (Compare: Mahābhārata XII.351.16 where rāśi speaks of subtle body). The conglomeration of sense objects (indriyārtha) or gross matter, the ten senses, manas, the five subtle bhūtas and Prakṛti, the mahat and ahamkāra taking place through rajas, make up the citadel of man. Thus, from one point of view, the term Puruṣa has not been adopted as the Sāṃkhyan technical term, but has been considered only as the 'human organism' to serve the purpose of Caraka's enumerations. Pleasure, pain, disease and death can happen to the psycho-somatic complex of man, while the transcendental Puruṣa remains untouched.

In the Caraka Saṃhitā, Puruṣa and Avyakta Prakṛti are not separately mentioned by different terminology but are referred together as avyaktam.<sup>(16)</sup> The unthinkable pure self becomes the knower of the field, and is eternal, and all-pervading. That which is different from this, is thinkable. Again, from another point of view, the whole of this psycho-physical world is vyaktam, but its basis, the ultimate avyaktam is beyond sense-perception and can be known only through inference. Here avyaktam in avyaktamātmā is used definitely as an epithet of the Self whereas in the sūtra 61, the same word seems to be

used in the sense of avyakta-prakṛti. The term avyaktam is used to refer to both Puruṣa and Prakṛti though the two principles are distinctly separated in the classical Sāṃkhya. Prakṛti and Ātman (Puruṣa) being taken under the same category of avyaktam, constitute one single principle, and this is why Caraka enumerates 24 principles (instead of 25 in the classical view).<sup>(17)</sup> K.B.R.Rao, on the other hand, believes that the psycho-physical combination of the 24 principles will have no significance if the 25th principle, Puruṣa, is not implied therein, for it is the animating force (cetanā-dhātu) in man. According to him, the misinterpretation of the term avyakta as unmanifested has arisen the confusion. The term avyakta should mean 'unseen' and not 'unmanifested'. That which is beyond the senses and can only be known by inference is the avyakta. From this point of view both the ultimates of a patient, i.e. the psycho-physical living entity are only avyakta or unseen. Had they been 'unmanifested', there would never be the psycho-physical entity. By not mentioning Puruṣa as a separate principle Caraka did not disregard the 25th principle, i.e. Puruṣa, but only pointed to a transcendental state without characteristics. Here the term avyakta loses its technicality from the Sāṃkhya point of view and is dealt with in its ordinary meaning.<sup>(18)</sup>

It is important now that we clarify the meaning of a few terms used in Caraka Samhitā. The term avyakta is verily a technical term. In the orthodox Sāṃkhya, avyakta is a synonym for Prakṛti. Caraka states this to be one of the constituents of the eight-fold Prakṛti and buddhi is its first evolute. But

Caraka identifies avyakta with ksetrajña, which ordinarily passes for Ātman (CS IV.7). He emphatically declares avyakta, pradhāna, prakṛti and jīva as the synonyms of Ātman (CS IV.7). The combined category of Puruṣa and Prakṛti under one name avyakta is somewhat a mixed category, which stands as the ultimate and unthinkable basis of this manifest universe,

Prakṛti has two aspects - aṣṭa-prakṛti (the eight-fold prakṛti) and soḍaśa-vikāras (16 vikāras) (CS.I.63); the former consists of avyakta, buddhi, aḥamkāra and the five elements, and the latter consists of five buddhīndriyas (organs of knowledge), five karmendriyas (organs of action), manas (mind) and the five indriyārthas (sense objects). From avyakta (unmanifested prakṛti or cetanā) arises buddhi. From it the aḥamkāra (ego), from aḥamkāra the ether and the other elements in succession. These five are the gross elements and not the tanmātras (subtle elements) of the later Sāṃkhya. Of them, ether has only one quality, while each succeeding element has got a corresponding increase of qualities (CS.I.27-29). When this process is complete, creation takes place. At the time of pralaya (periodical cosmic dissolution) all the evolutes return back to Prakṛti or to the unmanifested causal state. At the time of new creation, they emerge from the unmanifested state of avyakta or Puruṣa. This cycle of manifestation and the reverse goes on through the influence of rajas and tamas (CS.I.68). The conglomeration of all the twenty-four principles, which is technically called rāsi-puruṣa (CS.I.35) goes on indefinitely because of the influence of rajas and tamas.



When there is the preponderance of sattava, the conglomeration ceases (CS.I.36). Thus, it is maintained that the three gunas are the cosmic factors in the evolution and dissolution.

The sense organs are five, their constituent elements are also five, five are their seats in the body, five are their external objects and five also the perceptions arising therefrom - so have the ancients said. But over and above the sense-organs, we have, which is called by different names such as sattva and cetas, whose activity is directed towards its own unique field of feeling as also towards cognition and conation and which is at the back of all activity of the external sense-organs. The mind in an individual is one only, though it appears as many on account of differences in subjective moods, etc. It is in fact not many since it cannot proceed in different directions simultaneously. The sense perceptions are due to the contact of the sense-organs with the objects, of the mind with the sense-organs and of the soul with the mind. Mind (citta or manas) is the instrument of knowledge (CS.I.19), without which there can never be knowledge in the Puruṣa. Its functions are thinking and reasoning. It directs the senses (CS.I.21). It is the apparatus of sensations without which there can be no contact between the Puruṣa and the objects and so no pleasure or pain (CS.I.135).

The existence of a technical Puruṣa except as a rāśi-puruṣa is established in the Craka Samhitā 37-52 (also in the Bhagavad Gītā XVIII.14-16 and Mbh.XII.218.20-42). Two aspects of the Puruṣa are recognised here: transcendental and the empirical.

The transcendental Puruṣa is beginningless, unborn and is called Paramātmān. He is different from the rāśi-puruṣa as it is the product of the fruits of actions performed through delusion, desire and aversion. Being caused, it is not eternal like the uncaused eternal self (CS.I.53-59). It is also unthinkable. Such a transcendental Puruṣa is only one (CS.I.14,84,155 and also in Mbh.XII.219,48-49).

Towards the existence of this transcendental self, the proof is that a pot cannot be produced without a potter. One, who says so, utters falsehood and suffers ignorance. This self is not merely a series of changing states either; for in that case, for the work of one, others will be responsible (CS.I.46). Thus, the paramātmān is eternal, unmanifested and unthinkable. Though consciousness belongs to the self - the conscious states arise when the self is one with the 23-principles (ātmā jñāḥ kāranaiḥ yogāt jñānam tasya pravartate - CS.I.53). The self is called kṣetr̥jñā, and the objective principles are called kṣetra. This self, the kṣetrajñā, being cetana (sentient), kartā (doer) and sākṣhī (onlooker) is the empirical self. When it is associated with the individual body, it is called bhūtātmā (CS.I.57, 84, 155). Though omnipresent, this self is localized in the bodies and therefore, though omniscient (sarvavit - CS.I.14), cannot apprehend all sensations occurring in all bodies (CS.I.79). 'Yoked to the mind that cleaves to it by virtue of the acts performed through the instrumentality of the body, the soul, though present in all bodies is to be regarded for practical purposes as localized in one particular body'(CS.I.81). The

transcendental condition of the empirical self, as described in the Caraka-Samhitā, indicates that there is no dualism between them ultimately.

Section C - PAÑCAŚIKHA: MAHĀBHĀRATA

I - PAÑCAŚIKHA

In the Mbh XII.219 Pañcaśikha (believed to be the pupil of Āsuri, who is the direct disciple of Kapila, the founder of the Sāṃkhya system) gives an account of the Sāṃkhya which is much in accordance with Caraka's views. Pañcaśikha describes the ultimate truth as "Avyakta (unmanifest - Prakṛti) in the state of Puruṣa (puruṣāvastham-avyaktam)" (Mbh.XII.218.12). Pañcaśikha postulates same proofs as Caraka to establish the existence of the self that bears all our duties and moral responsibility. Pañcaśikha, like Caraka, says that 'all consciousness is due to the conglomeration of our physical body, mind and the elements of cetas'. The self is other than this conglomeration. The misjudgement of this conception that, 'conglomeration is the self', is the cause of suffering. Guṇas are only the good and bad qualities of the mind. Since the conglomeration is not the self, any attachment to this ego is false. The elements of the material bodies remain together in a collective whole by their nature and they are separated also in the same manner. The self is characterless. It acquires the characteristics (as it were) when it is associated with the body. In the state of release the self becomes aliṅga and unmanifest. Pañcaśikha's atheistic views together with Caraka's enumeration may have given rise to the atheistic Sāṃkhya of Īśvarakṛṣṇa.

According to S.N. Dasgupta's opinion, views of Caraka and Pañcaśikha formulate the transitional link between the Upaniṣadic doctrines and the classical Sāṃkhya.<sup>(19)</sup> A.B. Keith, on the other hand, does not believe in any connection between Pañcaśikha and the Sāṃkhya system.<sup>(20)</sup> But, I agree with Dasgupta's views in maintaining the theory that views of Caraka and Pañcaśikha together with the accounts in the Mahābhārata brought out the classical Sāṃkhya view.

## II - MAHĀBHĀRĀTĀ

Apart from Pañcaśikha's short enumerations, some details are found in the Śāntiparva of the Mahābhārata which conform with the theistic Sāṃkhya views. The Mahābhārata describes Puruṣottama (the highest spiritual being) as the ultimate reality and the Puruṣa (empirical self) and Prakṛti (nature) as two different essential phases of the highest Lord. Prakṛti is endowed with the dynamic power of evolving and dissolving the universe. But to carry out the creation, Prakṛti is under control of the supreme principle (who is her lord and master - Triguṇādhipa). This spiritual principle is the transcendental reality (Mbh. Śāntiparva 50.26.27), and includes both Prakṛti (Mbh.303.31-34) and the individual Puruṣa (Mbh.350.26-27). This is the principle of consciousness which illuminates and supports everything. He is the twenty-sixth principle and the final support of all.

The supreme principle (referred as puruṣottama in the Mbh.) is unique by itself. The duality is referred in the second stage between sattva and ksetrajña (perceiving self). The twenty-four categories, including avyakta, constitute the

physio-mental conglomeration known as ksetra (field) and the individual soul, that resides inside this whole, is known as the adhīsthātā or knower of the field. This is the twenty-fifth principle or ksetrajña who is the empirical self - i.e. the perceiving and living self inside the mind-body complex. The ksetrajña is not the supreme principle, as it is distinctly stated in the Mahābhārata, that it becomes united with the twenty-sixth principle at the time of kaivalya or release (Mbh.307.16 & 308.11-12). It is only in the state of bondage that the empirical self fails to discriminate between the highest self and its ownself. Though different in nature, these two principles are related together like fish and water or fly and fig leaf (mbh.194.39-40). In this way, the untouched and characterless self (in man) identifies itself with the nature and that leads to bondage. Though the Puruṣa is inactive and conscious yet due to ignorance, it assumes the pleasures and pains, which essentially belong to the Prakṛti or sattva.

The three guṇas - sattva, rajas and tamas, are mentioned in the Mahābhārata only as three different mental states - good, bad and indifferent. They did not achieve the standard of cosmic factors till later. Buddhi is regarded as a cosmic principle in the Mahābhārata. The universe is said to be 'shot' through and through with the buddhi. All matters merge into it and emerge from it (Mbh.194.17,18). We come across the terms bhūtātṁā and bhūtakṛt in the epic and all the bhautika elements are said to have evolved from it.

According to the epics, the various parts of the empirical world are derived from Prakṛti. But there are a number of

views on this point differing from each other. According to one view, there are five senses - mind, intellect and spirit as ksetrajña (Mbh.246.17). In another view, the spirit is admitted as the ninth element, as citta, a new element is added to the group (Mbh.274.16,18). In Chapter 306 of Śāntiparva, sixteen vikāras are mentioned as - the five organs of sensation, five organs of action, mind and the five objects. These categories are almost the same as in the classical Sāṃkhya system.

The Mahābhārata postulates that the individual souls are many and that they can be relieved of the burden of sufferings by their abandonment of Prakṛti and its evolutes. The supreme spirit is transcendental and is the merging ground of all multiplicity and difference (Mbh.Śānti.350.26). When the individual soul realizes his own nature and thus he sees his difference from the psycho-physical structure and thus from Prakṛti, the sufferings cannot affect him anymore. Thus, as regards systematization, the Epic shows marked step forward than the Upaniṣads. The theistic expositions in the Mahābhārata probably created the transitional period when the dualistic idea became consolidated.

#### Section D - CLASSICAL SĀMKHYA

In the previous sections, I have tried to bring out the complex and intricate problem of getting a more or less consistent picture of the nature of human personality in the pre-classical literature bearing fragmentary references to the Sāṃkhya system of thought. In this section, I shall discuss mainly the classical Sāṃkhya conception of Man.

By the term 'Classical Sāṃkhya', I mean the formulation of conceptions as in Īśvara-kṛṣṇa's Sāṃkhya-kārikā with its commentary, and in the Sāṃkhya-sūtra with Pravacanabhāṣya. The precise dates of these texts are difficult to determine accurately. It can be assumed that the Sāṃkhya-kārikā was known in the sixth century A.D. (refer page 92). The Sāṃkhya-pravacanasūtra is a later work - perhaps as late as the 14th or 15th century A.D. (21) For centuries, the Sāṃkhya-kārikā was the only definitive text of the Sāṃkhya tradition. I have, therefore, taken the Sāṃkhya-kārikā as the representative text for the classical period.

We have seen that the Sāṃkhya system is not a 'monolithic' system; but the systematization was carried on for a long time and it has thus assimilated a variety of traditions over a long period of time. Influences can be traced to the ancient vedic hymns of creation and to the old upaniṣadic conception of Ātman and Brahman (discussed in previous sections). It is finally in the Kārikās of Īśvarakṛṣṇa that we come across a systematic analysis of the Sāṃkhya views. Sāṃkhya here stands as an unified system, which is quite distinctive from Yoga and other branches of philosophy. Larson comments that, "this classical system represents a synthesis of many ancient traditions in which previously diverse and frequently contradictory doctrines are given a systematic and coherent form. From this synthesis an extremely subtle and sophisticated system of thought emerged." (22)

Usually the Sāṃkhya has been interpreted as a philosophic naturalism (Garbe, Dasgupta and others), or as a decadent

form of Vedānta (Deussen, Radha-krishnan, C. Sharma and others).<sup>(23)</sup> Further, classical Sāṃkhya may better be interpreted as a 'quest for salvation from suffering'.<sup>(24)</sup> It begins its analysis from within the context of concrete human experience. In the first verse of the first chapter of Sāṃkhya-kārikā, the purpose of the exposition is related as suffering in human existence. The purpose of Sāṃkhya philosophy is to provide means to get released from this suffering. Kārikā says that this release must be final (atyanta) and not temporary. The only means to this ultimate goal is vyaktāvyakta-jñā-vijñāna, i.e. the intuitive discrimination of the 'knowing one' or 'knower' (jñā), the 'manifest world' (vyakta) and the 'unmanifest' (avyakta). This knowledge leads mankind to salvation from suffering. Suffering is said to be threefold: (i) ādhyātmika, that which is brought about by factors related to the bodily or mental make up of man himself; (ii) ādhibhautika, or external and (iii) adhidaivika, factors coming from the cosmic or supernatural forces. In other words, suffering pervades man's whole life. The purpose of Sāṃkhya philosophy is to provide a means of release from this suffering.

Classical Sāṃkhya begins its analysis from within the context of concrete human experience. According to Sāṃkhya, consciousness is suffering. 'The kārikā deals at length with the problem of man and the manifest world, and the way to release from sufferings. It rejects the Buddhist notion of no-self or the Vedānta interpretation of self'.<sup>(25)</sup> It maintains rather a fundamental dualism - between the individual



consciousness on the one hand and a real world on the other. The sides of this dualism are interacting with one another, and it is this dialectic or interaction which brings about both the manifest world and the ultimate salvation of Puruṣa.<sup>(26)</sup> The knowledge of the manifest (vyakta), unmanifest (avyakta) and the knower (jñā) brings about the ultimate salvation. These three are intermingled in the personality of man. The structure of individual human personality corresponds a macrocosmic counterpart in Sāṃkhya philosophy. I shall try to describe them separately.

I - PURUSA:

The term Puruṣa is most important in Sāṃkhya expositions. It appeared quite early in the religio-philosophic literature. We find the term in the RV.X.97.4-5, signifying the 'mortal man'. The same term is used in the RV.X.90. to mean the 'cosmic man'. In the AV.X.2 and X.10 there are a few interesting suggestions.

In the Upaniṣads, the term <sup>Puruṣa</sup> is often used as a synonym to Ātman. In the later texts (the pre-classical period), the term Puruṣa is used to signify the self along with a number of terms like Ātman, Jīva, Bhūtātman, Ksetrajñā, etc. In the Upaniṣadic stage, the term Ātman is more prevalent. In the post upaniṣadic and epic literature where we find the emergence of a systematic Sāṃkhya tradition, the term Ksetrajñā (knower of the field) is used more frequently. But in this stage, there is still an evident suggestion of a cosmic self. In the later epic age, a marked dualism came through.

The classical Sāṃkhya gives a much more sophisticated notion of the Puruṣa as self. Puruṣa has become a technical

term here. Kārikā I of the Sāṃkhya-kārika mentions Puruṣa as jñā (knower) apart from vyakta (manifest) and avyakta (unmanifest). Here we can assume that the remnants of the preclassical conception of kṣetra-jñā (knower of the field) is jñā (knower) whereas vyaktāvyakta might be the kṣetra (field).<sup>(27)</sup> Kārikā III mentions the term Puruṣa for the first time, and it says - 'na prakṛtir - na vikṛtiḥ puruṣah' (Puruṣa is neither creative nor created). Puruṣa, thus, is over and above the twenty-four principles. Again in Kārikā XI Puruṣa is described as opposite to Prakṛti, i.e. 'Puruṣa is not characterized as being made up of three guṇas; it is discriminating, subjective, specific, conscious and non-productive'. Puruṣa is in reality, completely different from the manifest and unmanifest.'

The characteristics of Puruṣa is described in Kārikā XIX. They are: i) Sākṣitvam - the character of being a witness; ii) kaivalyam - isolation or freedom from misery; iii) mādhyaṣṭham - neutrality; iv) draṣṭṛtvam - percipience, and v) akartṛbhāvaśca - non-agency. Here, the isolation of Puruṣa from the manifested world and even its cause, the Prakṛti is established firmly. Puruṣa is completely free, being different from the manifested and unmanifested. Puruṣa is not a part of the universe and may only be described from a negative approach (like the netivāda of the Vedāntins to describe Ātman).

Puruṣa is the logical presupposition of all knowledge.<sup>(28)</sup> There is the necessity of accepting the existence of this changeless transcendental soul, for there is 'consciousness'

in the world. An unconscious principle cannot bring out the varied and unique universe. Again, every distinction in the phenomenal world is for something, and that is Puruṣa. On the other hand, Puruṣa must be free and transcendental.

(i): Inferences for the existence of Puruṣa, as the transcendental being, has been precisely and carefully elaborated in the Sāṃkhya Kārikā. In the Sāṃkhya System, the assumption of a transcendental self is necessary to make it possible for the empirical self to act as a person. The material basis of the empirical self is buddhi or antaḥkarana which is an unconscious evolute of the primordial matter (Prakṛti). A person is no person without consciousness or self-affirmation. So buddhi has to be elevated to the status of a person who has to derive or borrow consciousness or something simulating consciousness from some external entity, whose essence is consciousness itself. That external entity is Puruṣa or transcendental self, which is reflected in buddhi. This assumption of the transcendental self is based on a series of inferences which are comprised in the Kārikā XVII:

"Samghāta parārthatvat - trigunādiviparyayāt adhiṣṭhānāt  
puruṣoṣṭi bhoktrbhāvāt kaivalyārtham pravṛttesca"

The wordings of the verse do not express the exact syllogistic structure of the inference. The syllogistic structure is obtained by extension and modification of the kārikā form.

The expression 'Samghāta parārthatvāt' contains both the middle term and the major terms (hetu and Sādhyā). Parārtha is the major term and Samghāta is the middle term. For the purity of the inferential syntax, parārtha should be understood

as Parārthatva and samghata as samghātatva. Parārthatva means the property of existing for others and samghatatva means the property of being a composite body. The minor term (pakṣa) is not expressly stated in the kārikā. It should be avyaktamahadādayaḥ (the non-manifest prakṛti, intelligence, ego etc). In short, any material object which is a composite body may stand as the minor term. Technically, we cannot accept Puruṣa as the minor term and it's existence as the major term. The pakṣa is that, in relation to which the major term is not yet established, but is only proposed to be established. (29) Now, if 'existence' is itself the major term, which is not yet established in relation to Puruṣa - it would mean that the pakṣa (puruṣa) itself is non-existent. Then, how are we going to establish something in relation to something, which is non-existent? A correct middle term (hetu) cannot be related to a non-existent minor term (pakṣa). That would mean that upanaya (minor premise) in such a case becomes absurd due to the non-established nature of the minor term. In Indian logic this is technically called the fallacy of āśrayāsiddha, because the middle term itself stands unestablished due to the impossibility of its being related to a non-established minor term.

In the context of his criticism of the Sāṃkhya theory Dharmakīrti in his pramāṇa-vārttika has advanced the objection that no inference is possible with the existence of the minor term itself conceived as the major term. He says:

“Nāsiddhe bhāvadharmoṣti vyabhichāryubhayāśrayaḥ  
dharmo virudhaḥ abhāvasya sā sattā sādhyate katham (30)”

This verse has been quoted with approval by Jayantabhāṭṭa in Nyāyamañjarī.<sup>(31)</sup> From purely formal standpoint, a minor term should be either a positive entity (bhāva-padārtha) or a negative entity (abhāva padārtha).

Now formally speaking, three alternatives are possible as regards the relation between the minor term and the middle term. Either the middle term is the property of a positive pakṣa or of a negative pakṣa or of both the negative and the positive pakṣas.

If the existence of the minor term itself is proposed to be the Sādhyā and if the minor term be conceived as a positive entity - the position becomes absurd. Since we are trapped in the fallacy of āśrayāsiddha, as has been shown above. Let us examine the second formal alternative, in which, the middle term is supposed to be related both to a positive pakṣa and to a negative pakṣa and the 'existence' is proposed major term. In this situation, apart from the fallacy of āśrayāsiddha, we also face the fallacy of vyabhicāra or anaikāntika i.e. the violation of the major premise. A property of a negative entity is also negative in character. But 'existence' is a positive property. As such it cannot be the property of a negative pakṣa. In such a case 'existence' is turned into non-existence. This would mean that the hetu or middle term exists even in the absence of the major term (sādhyā), which means the violation of the major premise. Let us then take the third alternative, in which the middle term is supposed to be related to a negative pakṣa and 'existence' is supposed to be the major term. In such a position, apart from āśrayāsiddha and vyabhicāra, we also face the fallacy

of Viruddha, in which the middle term goes to establish just the opposite or contradictory of the major term. Since 'existence' is supposedly going to be established as a property of a negative pakṣa - it is also going to be turned into its opposite i.e. 'non-existence'. Thus, the hetu employed for establishing 'existence' formally goes to establish 'non-existence'. This is technically called the fallacy of Viruddha in which the middle term actually goes against the major term - which it is expected to prove.

To avoid this technical difficulty, the proper structure of the inference, which goes to prove Puruṣa should be restated as follows: the expression samghāta parārthatvāt should be bifurcated into two elements, parārthatva which is the major term and samghāta<sup>t</sup>va which is the middle term. After supplying the minor term avyaktamahad-ahamkāradayaḥ, the proper inference should stand thus:

"avyakta-mahad - ahamkāradayaḥ parārthāḥ  
samghātatvāt, śayanāsanādyangavat."

(Prakṛti, mahat, ahamkāra etc. exist for serving some other's purpose, because these are composite entities, like the accessories such as bed, seat etc). This is the compressed form of the syllogism which may be expanded in the following way:

- (i) Prakṛti - mahat - ahamkāra etc. exist for serving some other's purpose = Pratijñā - the proposition to be established.
- (ii) Because these are composite entities = (the reason, the middle term - hetu - probans).
- (iii) Whatever is a composite entity exist for serving some other's purpose, like the accessories such as bed, seat etc. udāharana i.e. vyāpti with example - major premise.

(iv) Prakṛti, mahat, aḥaṅkāra etc. are composite entities = upanaya, the minor term.

(v) Prakṛti, mahat, aḥaṅkāra etc exist for serving some other's purpose = conclusion or nigamana.

The Sāṃkhya thinks that once this inference is established, it follows by a further implication that this para or 'some other' is 'asamhata Puruṣa', the non-composite transcendental self.

The Buddhist logicians Diṅṅāga and Dharmakīrti, by challenging this implication, have attempted to expose the fallacy involved in the main body of the inference. This fallacy is called dharma viśeṣa - viparīta-sādhana in Nyāya; praveṣa ascribed to Diṅṅāga, - and iṣṭavighātakṛt in Dharmakīrti's Nyāyavindu. In both these treatises, this fallacy has been shown as a type of Viruddha. These two giants of Buddhist logic show the fallacy in the following way:

It is not enough for the Sāṃkhya, simply to prove that the composite bodies exist for other's sake. It must be further proved that this 'other' is a non-composite entity which is the transcendental self. This, however, is not proved by the inference. What is proved, on the contrary, is just the opposite of what the Sāṃkhya intends to prove. We see that the composite accessories like bed, seat etc. exist for the purpose of another composite entity i.e. the human body. Thus, these composite objects exist for the comforts of another composite object (like the human body) and not for the sake of any non-composite entity (like Puruṣa - proposed

by the Sāṃkhya). Puruṣa is a monolythic unit of consciousness. The purpose of the Sāṃkhya can only be served by proving this monolythic nature of Puruṣa, which is the other (para) for which Prakṛti etc. are supposed to exist. But we see that one Samhata (composite) object exists for another composite (samhata) object but never that a samhata (composite) object exists for another asamhata (non-composite) object. Thus, the inference goes to prove just the opposite of what the Sāṃkhya intends to prove. (32)

In Dharmottarapradīpa, Dharmakīrti observes - nanu ca tr̥tiyopi iṣṭavighātakṛt viruddhaḥ. The purpose of nanu with which Dharmakīrti's text begins here, is not to imply that it is not a Viruddha fallacy. It goes to imply that this should not be considered as a special type of Viruddha (unlike Diṇṇāga) but should be included in the previous two types shown by Dharmakīrti.

Both Vācaṣpati and the anonymous author of Yuktidīpikā have taken into consideration this formidable objection advanced by Diṇṇāga and Dharmakīrti. The author of Yuktidīpikā deals at length with this objection. (33)

Vācaṣpati in his Tattvakaumudī is very precise in noting this objection and answering it in his own way. He remarks - You (the Buddhists), on the strength of hetu and udāharana want to entertain the harmful (for the Sāṃkhya) major premise i.e. - 'any composite body exists for the sake of another composite body.' But in that case, you cannot escape the trap of infinite regress (anavasthā). Since what is established here is a 'samhata para' (composite other) - this being a samhata, the object will lead to another Samhata para and in this way you cannot reach the end of the process. Hence to avoid



the infinite regress, you must reach out a point of asamhata-para (non-composite other). If this is so, the major term of the vyāpti should not be 'Samghāta-parārthatvāt,' but simply parārthatva. This 'para' then must be asamhata (non-composite), because otherwise, the infinite regress is inescapable. (34)

Moreover when we go to establish an inductive generalisation on the strength/basis of some instance, we do not transfer all the special characteristics of the instance to the constitution of the major term figuring as the predicate of the generalisation. Suppose mahānasa (kitchen) having coexistence of fire and smoke, serves as the instance of generalisation - 'wherever there is smoke, there is fire.' Let us also suppose that the 'fire' in our kitchen is produced by cow-dung cake. Here, 'being produced by cow-dung cake' is a special property of the kitchen fire. But, we are not entitled, on the strength of this, to entertain the generalisation that 'wherever there is smoke there is cow-dung produced - fire, and proceed to infer that this mountain has cow-dung produced fire, because it has 'smoke'. If we insist on such a generalisation on the basis of involving all these special characteristics of the instance, in the predicable major term - no correct inference is possible at all. Hence, for the sake of correct generalisation and inference the instance should be accepted in its most general characteristic of having fire and not in the specific characteristic of having 'cow-dung produced fire.' In a similar way, in the Sāṃkhya inference concerned the instances bed etc. should be taken

in their general characteristics of simple 'parārthatva' and not 'samhataparārthatva'.

(ii) There is another crucial factor in the nature of Puruṣa and that is its multiplicity. In the pre-classical Sāṃkhya, Puruṣa is regarded as a cosmic reality and it resembles the conception of Ātman in the Upaniṣads. But classical Sāṃkhya recognises multiple number of Puruṣas - as many as there are animate individuals. In Kārikā XVIII the reasons are brought out - and the plurality of Puruṣa is established, viz. (i) because of the diversity of births, and faculties; (ii) because of actions or functions (that take place) at different times; and, (iii) because of differences in the proportions of the three guṇas (in different entities). In the absence of such a plu<sup>r</sup>ality, birth and death will be one for the whole universe. Thus, at the birth of one individual, all individuals would be born, and at the death of one, all would die. But, in fact, people are born and they die at different times individually. The absurdity of universal uniformity of human action is avoided by the hypotheses of multiplicity of Puruṣas. Vācaṣpatimīśra concludes his commentary on Kārikā XVIII saying - 'This diversity or differentiation due to the distr<sup>i</sup>bution of the attributes in the various entities, could not be explained if the spirit were one and the same in all. On the hypothesis of plurality, however, there is no difficulty.'<sup>(35)</sup> Again, action is individually restricted, that is, all do not perform the same work at the same time. Lastly, guṇas are differently manifested in different individuals, i.e., whereas a sāttvic

person is happy, a rājasic person is unhappy, and a tāmasic one is deluded (Kārikā XVII). The classical Sāṃkhya deviates from the older doctrine of a cosmic self. (36)

On the one hand, the doctrine tends to under-score the dualism of the system. All manifestations of the world have their existence in the mūlāprakṛti apart from Puruṣa, though they depend on Puruṣa for their existence. On the other hand, the doctrine of the plurality of Puruṣa tends to under-score the concreteness of the problem - salvation. (37)

Kapila in Sāṃkhya-pravacana-sūtra 1.154 mentions 'nādvait-aśrutivirodhaḥ jātiparatvāt.' 'There is no opposition to the scriptures (declaratory) of the non-duality (of soul), because the reference (in such texts) is to the genus (or to soul in general).' According to Davies, the sūtra is probably a late interpolation, by someone who wished to reconcile the system of Kapila with that of Vedāntist school. (38) He further states that 'Kapila himself seems to have been too honest and too bold a thinker to make such an attempt.'

Vijñānabhikṣu enumerates that the oneness of the soul advocated by the Śruti, the Vedānta, etc. refer to 'the homogeneous nature of Puruṣa and not to their numerical unity' (SPB.I.154). We cannot say that there is one soul only. The one soul appears as many, due to the imposition of different adjuncts (upādhis). In the case of a space, limited by a chair, the limited space can be saved from limitation by removing the chair; but that same space may be limited again by the imposition of some other things on it (SPB.I.150). So, if one spirit is recognized, bondage and liberation, limitation

and freedom will become absurd and meaningless.

S.N. Dasgupta has shown the realistic approach of Sāṃkhya thus: ".if the different selves be the reflections upon different buddhis from one Puruṣa or Ātman, as in the Vedānta, then the notion of self or personality would be false. For, then the only true being would be the being of Puruṣa. So, the knower being false, the known also becomes false, the knower and the known having vanished, everything is reduced to that which we can in no way conceive, viz., the Brahman . . . . The Sāṃkhya-yoga view does not hold that the knower is false, but analyses the nature of the ego and says that it is the seeming unity of buddhi and the Puruṣa, both of which are real in the strictest sense of the term." (39)

Puruṣa in Sāṃkhya is individual but not personal. The personal ego or self-consciousness is included in the notion of buddhi, aḥamkāra and manas. Thus what is known as self-consciousness or ego in classical Sāṃkhya is to be other than the Puruṣa, although Puruṣa's presence is required in order for the various human experiences to appear. Thus, Puruṣa by itself has no knowledge, action and emotion. Self is only a spectator. Puruṣa by itself is just the fact of consciousness. 'Impersonal yet individual, it is the fact of man's experience which renders him able to become a man.' (40)

Everything in this world appears through the interaction of Puruṣa and Prakṛti. How these two principles come together for the purpose of creation, is not explained anywhere. Puruṣa is never bound to the world. Only through the proximity of Puruṣa, Prakṛti undergoes series of transformations from which the world is manifested. According to the Kārikā XXI,

the purpose of the creation is the freedom of Puruṣa. The Kārikā says, "The association of the two, which is like that of a lame man and a blind one, is for the purpose of Primal Nature being contemplated (as such) by the spirit (from three-fold misery); from this (association) creation proceeds." (SXXXI). Thus Puruṣa and Prakṛti serve mutual purposes.

Puruṣa is pure consciousness, and has got no movements. Prakṛti is dynamic but unconscious. When the Puruṣa through beginningless ignorance, identifies itself with Prakṛti, then only creation takes place. According to Sāṃkhya, buddhi is the intermediate link between Prakṛti and Puruṣa. The Sāṃkhya-kārikā explains the union of the two principles thus: "Hence, from their union, the non-intelligent liṅga becomes intelligent as it were, and so too, though agency is of the constituents, the indifferent one (the spirit) becomes agent as it were" (Kārikā XX). Puruṣa being inactive, experience depends solely on the intelligised buddhi.

## II - PRAKṚTI:

The twenty-five principles of the classical Sāṃkhya may be grouped into two categories - the 'Self' and the 'Not-Self', or Puruṣa and Prakṛti. Puruṣa is the only member of the first category, while the second category comprises of twenty-four principles. All the twenty-four principles constitute what is called viṣaya or object (SK.XI) in relation to the twenty-fifth principle, Puruṣa, which is the knowing subject (Jñā: SK II).

The dualism of Sāṃkhya lies in the recognition of Prakṛti (avyakta or pradhāna) as an independent principle, existing

along side Puruṣa, Prakṛti is the name for the noumenal condition of all that exist apart from the self, and of which that comes into our experience.<sup>(41)</sup> For that reason, Prakṛti is called by the significant terms like avyakta (unmanifest or unseen), mūlā prakṛti (the root nature), pradhāna (the primordial one).<sup>(42)</sup>

The reality of such a primordial unseen entity is established on the basis of inductive reasoning: from an examination of the phenomenal particulars to the universal noumenon.<sup>(43)</sup> The concept of causation is developed by the Sāṃkhya philosophers under the name of Satkāryavāda and Parināmavāda. The arguments are put forward in the Sāṃkhya-kārikā thus: "The non-perception of that (avyakta) is due to its subtlety, not to its non-existence (na abhāvāt), for it is cognised from its effects." (SK.VIII). Further, 'the effect is existent (in its cause) prior to its becoming the effect, since non-existent cannot be produced; since an (appropriate) material is selected as a cause for each thing, because anything cannot be produced (from anything); since a potent (cause) can produce only that which it is capable (of producing); and since the effect is of the same nature as the cause' (SK.IX). As Keith has suggested, these reasons can be reduced into three ways; first of all, non-being obviously produce or do nothing; second, the effect is made up of the same material as the cause, there being a difference only with respect to the appearance or modification of the material; and third, a specific cause is able to produce only a specific effect.<sup>(44)</sup>

These arguments establish that this phenomenal world of experience points to a source, for without which it would not

exist. The source is not non-existent, for the reality of the world of experience points to its existence. The existence of a primal cause, called mūlā-prakṛti or avyakta is established, as the ground of all objective manifestation. Thus, Prakṛti is regarded as an ultimate first principle and its synonyms are avyakta and pradhāna (unmanifested and the chief principle). Since this prakṛti is the uncaused first cause of this vast and multifarious universe, it is unlimited, all-pervasive and infinite.<sup>(45)</sup> In Kārikā XI, vyaktāvy-akta is described as follows: it is characterised by three guṇas (triguṇam), undiscriminated (avivekī), objective (viśaya), general (sāmānya), non-conscious (acetana) and productive (prasavadharmi). In Kārikā X, the vyakta, i.e. that which includes the 23 evolutes of avyakta is described as follows: it is caused (hetumat), finite (anityam), non-pervasive (avyāpi), active (sakriyam), plural (anekam), supported (āsṛitam), emergent (lingam), composite (sāvayavam) and dependent (paratantram).<sup>(46)</sup> Avyakta or mūlāprakṛti is said to be the opposite of these characteristics.

Of all the characteristics of mūlāprakṛti, the most vital are three guṇas, which pervade all the evolutes from buddhi down to the gross elements. According to the Sāṃkhya-kārikā, guṇa is a 'substance' as well as a 'quality', both being inseparable from each other, and guṇa is an ontological real.<sup>(47)</sup> Guṇas are not the 'adjectival qualities of Prakṛti but are the very 'constituents'. M. Hiriyanna explains that Prakṛti is the first cause of the universe, and thus one and complex, and its complexity is the result of its being constituted of three factors, each of which is described as a guṇa. By the word

guṇa here, we should not understand what it is commonly taken to mean, viz., a quality. It means here rather a 'component factor' or a constituent of Prakṛti. But it should not be regarded as built up out of them - for, while it depends on them, they depend just as much on it, both being equally beginningless. This intrinsic interdependence of the guṇas excludes the possibility of the breaking up of the Prakṛti by their separation. (48) Mahādeva, in his Sāṃkhya-sūtra-vṛttisāra, says - Prakṛti is not the receptacle of the guṇas, but is itself the guṇas. (49) Aniruddha in his Sāṃkhyasūtravṛtti says - Although Prakṛti is the state of equipoise of three guṇas, still the word Prakṛti is also conventionally used to denote everyone of these severally (SSVS.I.61). In Kārikā XII - XIV, the guṇas are described as sattva, characterised by pleasure (priti) and illumination (prakāśa); it is buoyant (laghu) and shining (prakāśaka). Rajas is characterised by pain (apriti) and actuation (pravṛtti). It is stimulating (upastambhaka) and moving (cala). Tamas is characterised by indifference (viṣāda) and restraint (niyama). It is heavy (guru) and enveloping (varaṇaka).

All the three guṇas mutually or reciprocally involve each other. They should not be taken individually or separately. As the Sāṃkhyakārikā explains - they mutually 'suppress, support, produce and exist.' (50) However, when these 'forces' (51) are in equilibrium, we have, what is called the 'noumenal condition of Prakṛti', technically known as the 'avyakta' state. The equipoise or sāmyāvasthā of Prakṛti is the state where these three forces are equally operative in keeping the identity



of Prakṛti from transforming into Vikṛti (i.e. in evolution).

When the equilibrium of Prakṛti is disturbed by the preponderance of one or the other guṇa, evolution takes place. A varying proportion of these 'forces', got to make up the variety of the manifested world, in the following manner: (i) When the condition of sattva predominates, the manifestation exhibits the physical characteristics of buoyancy and illumination and psychological characteristics of pleasure. (ii) If the condition of rajas predominates, the manifestation exhibits the physical characteristics of stimulation and movement and the psychological characteristics of pain and passion. (iii) If the condition of tamas predominates, the manifestation exhibits the physical characteristics of weight and resistance or inertia, and the psychological characteristics of despondency or rejection. The guṇas thus are characterised from both psychological and physical characteristics. The psychological characteristics are pleasure, pain and rejection, and the physical characteristics are lightness, illumination and so on (SK XIII, XIV). It is impossible to think of an evolution from only quality or only substance, and so guṇas are conceived to be both.

Thus, Prakṛti is one and is nothing but the unity of the three guṇas in a state of potentiality and incoherence. It supports all, being the cause of all, and is not supported by anything else. It is alinga, because it does not refer to any other category for its existence. Prakṛti is niravayavi (formless), because, in this state, the production of different evolutes does not commence. It is svatantra (independent),

unmanifested (avyakta) and unconscious, and also the objective ground of all cognitions, Prakṛti or the primordial nature moves in two ways - anuloma (forward) - generating or evolving, and pratiloma (backward) - thus retreating the stages in which she marched. Sāṃkhya-kārikā XV & XVI also justifies the validity of the avyakta prakṛti being the source of all manifestations (vyakta). It says - because of the finite nature of specific objects, because of homogeneity, because of evolution being due to the efficiency of the cause, because of separation between cause and its effect and because of the merging of the whole world of effects, there is the unmanifest as the cause. All effects are finite - being caused. But Prakṛti being the potential cause, cannot be finite.

The avyakta, being the cause of the manifest world, exercises its creative functioning by means of the interactions of the gunas. The diversity of the phenomenal world is due to the various manifestations of the gunas, which are continually undergoing changes and transformation. The gunas can be traced back to the avyakta, and thus are like the Prakṛti, uncaused and eternal. Prakṛti, by means of the three gunas represents everything from the unmanifested potential causal state to the gross matters. Thus Prakṛti in a way stands for 24 principles of Sāṃkhya except the Puruṣa. The presence of Puruṣa as we have seen before, is the only factor which brings purpose to the evolution of Prakṛti.

### III - THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN PURUṢA AND PRAKṚTI

According to the Sāṃkhya view, 'creation proceeds from the proximity (or association) of the two (viz. Puruṣa and Prakṛti)

which is like that of a blind man and a lame man (which is) for the purpose of seeing the pradhāna (i.e. Prakṛti), and for the purpose of isolation of Puruṣa (SK.XXI). In this verse, the purpose of creation is said to be for the benefit of Puruṣa and Prakṛti. But ultimately it is only the Puruṣa, who is benefited from the creation. This notion is clearly expressed in the Kārikā LVI. "This creation brought about by Prakṛti from mahat (or buddhi) down to the specific gross objects is for the purpose of the release of every Puruṣa; (this is done) for the sake of another, as if it were for her own (benefit)."(52)

Samyoga (or proximity) being the Puruṣārtha is teleological. But the question arises, how the insentient Prakṛti can have the understanding or consciousness of the purpose. The Kārikā answers - 'though Prakṛti is insentient, it can work for the sake of Puruṣa in the same way as the non-intelligent milk flows for the nourishment of the calf! (SK LVII). Different views are propounded regarding the nature of the relation between Puruṣa and Prakṛti. Dasgupta says - 'It seems that the union of the buddhi with the puruṣa is somewhat mystical.'(53) He also mentions that Yoga has a different view on this. It holds that it is the creative will of Īśvara which enhances the evolvment of Prakṛti. Radhakrishnan describes the relationship thus: The first cause, as well as the final cause, of all the cosmic process is Puruṣa. But the causation of Puruṣa is purely mechanical, being not to its mere proximity. Puruṣa moves the world by a kind of action which is not movement. It is compared to the attraction of a

magnet for iron. (54) Here we see a disagreement between the two views. What Dasgupta regards 'the transcendental influence of the Puruṣa' is considered 'purely mechanical' by Radhakrishnan.

Max Müller has cited a simile of the dualism of Puruṣa and Prakṛti thus: '... the Puruṣa, when he seems to see, to combine, to rejoice, to suffer, and to will, does so by misapprehension only, like a spectator who is carried away by his sympathies for Hecuba, but who, in the end, dries his tears and stops his sighs, leaves the theatre of the world and breathes the fresh air of a bright night'. (55)

Max Muller's point of view agrees with Kārikā LIX which says, "As a dancing girl, having exhibited herself to the spectators of the stage, ceases to dance, so does Nature cease to operate when she has made herself manifest to the spirit". Prakṛti evolves for the sake of Puruṣa (SK LVIII). The liberation of Puruṣa lies in the isolation from Prakṛti. It is effected by the discriminating knowledge of the buddhi (SK LXIII). Then the knowledge arises in Puruṣa - "'I' does not exist, nothing is 'mine', there is nothing like 'ego'". (SK LXIV). This gives rise to the extinction of all individuality. This is the most complete knowledge which does not leave anything more to be known.

#### IV - EVOLUTES:

To bring out the experience of knowledge, Prakṛti has to go through a series of evolution. The proximity of Puruṣa brings forth the first evolute from Prakṛti, namely 'buddhi'. From buddhi emerges aḥamkāra; from that comes the group of sixteen. Moreover, from five among the sixteen, come forth

the five gross elements. Up to the point of the emergence of ahaṅkāra (ego), the evolution is vertical, i.e. each emergent appearing successively from the prior one. From ahaṅkāra, the group of sixteen emerges - containing manas, five senses, the five organs of action, and the five organs of action, and the five tanmātras (subtle elements). The emergence of these sixteen, however, is not vertical. It is rather horizontal, i.e., ahaṅkāra becomes transformed into mind, senses and subtle elements. In fact these sixteen elements arise from different aspects of ahaṅkāra. Finally from the five subtle elements, the five mahābhūtas (gross elements) come forth.

In Kārikās 23-38, the author describes each evolute separately, and the analysis is directed to the individual. According to Larson - "Classical Sāṃkhya seems to have interpreted the old cosmic principles in the individual terms".<sup>(56)</sup> Thus, the 'Cosmological Self' is reduced to the individual Puruṣa. The existence of Puruṣa as a witness is absolutely necessary for the manifestation of Prakṛti. In Puruṣa's presence, Prakṛti immediately undergoes transformation into the manifest world, which is then witnessed by Puruṣa. This process takes place immediately, as from Kārikā XX, we know that the manifest world appears immediately as if it were conscious. Thus, from the point of view of experience, the world is understood in terms of the individual Puruṣa - (i.e., puruṣārthata). As the classical Sāṃkhya maintains the individual Puruṣa and not the cosmic one, it is most logical that the tattvas are described from the point of view of individual consciousness.

The first evolute of Prakṛti is 'Buddhi' or 'Mahat' (intellect or the great one), which is predominantly sāttvika in character. It is also called jagat-vīja (seed of the world), as the rest of the world emanate from buddhi. According to Keith, the notion of buddhi or mahat probably goes back to the old cosmological idea of 'the creative principle entering his creation and becoming the first born of the creation.'<sup>(57)</sup> In its psychological aspect it is called buddhi (intellect) and relates to the individual while in the cosmic aspect it is known as mahat (the great one). This first principle is not individual or particular, but it includes within itself, the buddhis of all individuals and thus is called buddhi-tattva (the principle of intellect). Because of the universal character of buddhi, the world becomes the common objective ground of experience for all persons. Had it not been so, each person would have his own world of experience. In the Bhāṣya, the synonyms for buddhi are given as mahat (the great one), āsuri (demonic), mati (understanding, thought of inclination), khyāti (perception), jñāna (knowledge) and pra-jñā (insight or wisdom). Some of the characters here, like mahat and āsuri refer to the cosmic aspect, while others point to the individual side. Buddhi is the first 'manifest' principle, and thus is caused, finite, non-pervasive, active, plural and so on, which are the common characteristics of all the manifest objects in the world (SK.X.) Buddhi is defined and illustrated in Kārikā XXIII as - "Buddhi is (characterised by) ascertainment or determination (adhyavasāya). Virtue (dharma), knowledge (jñāna), non-attachment (virāga) and possession of power (aiśvarya) are its sāttvika form. Its

tāmāsa form is the opposite (of these four):. In the Kārikās, buddhi is characterised as adhyavasāya - the root being 'sa' or 'si', meaning 'to bind' with the prefixes 'adhi' and 'ava'. It could mean 'attempt', 'effort', 'exertion', 'perseverance' and so on. Buddhi includes the eight bhāvas (SK XXXIII), the 'dispositions' or 'conditions' which determine the style of life of the human being (SK.XLIII). Four of them are related to the sāttvika form of buddhi and four to tāmāsika.<sup>(58)</sup> Of these bhāvas only knowledge (jñāna) helps to attain salvation. Other seven lead to suffering only.

Buddhi is in itself unconscious, but it becomes intellegised by the <sup>reflections of Puruṣa's consciousness in it, and this</sup> reflected cetanā (consciousness) being united with the 'conceptual determinations' of buddhi, creates the phenomenal self which actually undergoes the various experiences of pleasures and pains. Puruṣa, the true seer, remains all the time in the background. The experience of the phenomenal aspects is only a transcendental illusion for the Puruṣa due to avidyā or ignorance. Thus the act of experience occurs in the buddhi only.

Psychologically, buddhi also ascertains and decides. The decisions about things are made by men by virtue of this principle, which exists in him as his special inner organ. The senses and the mind act on behalf of buddhi (SK.XXXV;XXXVIII). From the sāttvika part of buddhi arises aḥamkāra. Being the first evolute, buddhi is perceived by Puruṣa. With the emergence of buddhi, Puruṣa appears as ~~what it is not that is~~ what it is not that is as if it were buddhi. Larson suggests that the best way to take buddhi is as 'will', but not as

'will' in the sense of conscious choice and decision. Rather, buddhi is 'will' in the sense of being that dimension of man, which is the source of his fundamental strivings or urges. Thus, according to Sāṃkhya, it is the structure or dimension of man which makes up his innermost core of being and which provides the foundation of his self-conscious life. (59)

Ahaṃkāra (self-awareness) emerges directly from buddhi. It is described in the Kārikā thus: "Ahaṃkāra is self conceit (abhimāna). From it a twofold creation emerges, the group of eleven and the five subtle elements, (SK.XXIV). The term ahaṃkāra has been translated in different ways, as 'ego', 'individuation', 'I - consciousness' and so on. It has got two parts - aham the personal pronoun meaning 'I' and 'kāra', which may mean 'making', 'doing' and so on. Buitenen pointed out to a new meaning, emphasizing the cosmic significance of the term, and understands it as the creative cry - 'I' or omkāra. (60) It seems, amongst all, the best expression should be 'self awareness' which is not present in buddhi except potentially. In itself, ahaṃkāra is simply the sense of 'I' or 'mine'.

The Kārikā enumerates <sup>that</sup> the two-fold creation emerges from ahaṃkāra. In its sāttvika aspect arise the eleven organs, which according to Kārikā XXV-XXVII, includes mind (manas), the five sense organs and five organs of action. (61) With the emergence of the eleven categories of the mind and senses from the sāttvika ahaṃkāra, man comes into contact with the external world. (62)

Manas (mind) according to Karika XXVII is saṃkalpa - i.e. it is 'constructive', 'reflective', 'analytic' and 'explicative.'



The bhāṣya explains manas as determining and arranging the impulses or sensations coming from the senses. Sāṃkhya-tattva-kaumudī regards manas in the sense of determining and arranging the impulses or sensations which are vaguely perceived by the senses. (63) Manas, therefore, acts as a co-ordinator between buddhi, aḥamkāra and the senses. In Kārikā XXXIII-XXXV, manas, buddhi and aḥamkāra are mentioned together as antaḥkarana (SPB.II.40). In Kārikā XXVII, it is also mentioned as a 'indriya'. The co-operation of manas is at least necessary for both perception and action (SPS.II.26). Manas is not all-pervading since it has action and movement, (SPS.V.69-70).

The ten sense organs are divided into two groups - five sense organs and five organs of action. The five sense organs function as sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch (the senses are said to arise out of our needs. The Mahābhārata explains - ruparāgāt abhūt cakṣuḥ, i.e. the eyes came forth from the attachment of beauty....Mbh.Śāntiparva 213.16). The senses are not formed of the elements since both the categories arise from aḥamkāra. The senses are not external since their rise and fall are seen. The organs of action comprise of the tongue, feet, hands and the organs of evacuation and reproduction. Manas, with the organs, is said to produce the five vital airs, namely, prāna, apāna, samāna, udāna, vyāna (SPS.II.31). According to the Sāṃkhya-sūtra V.113, prāna (life force) is a modification of the senses and thus does not exist in their absence. Parallel to the emergence of the 'group of eleven' from sāttvika aḥamkāra, there is another group of five,

arising from the tāmasa ahaṅkāra, called the tanmātras, which correspond the five senses. (64)

The Tanmātras are the essences of sound, touch, hearing, etc. and are conceived 'as physical principles, imperceptible to ordinary beings'. (65) The tanmātras are regarded as 'aviśeṣas' (SK.XXX VII) i.e., they do not possess definite characteristics like gentleness, etc. They are 'infra-sensible' and thus are beyond the reach of human sense organs. But these tanmātras do not belong to an indifferentiated or indeterminate state like the bhūtādi. There is some kind of characterisation as they are mentioned as 'śabda tanmātra!', rūpatanmātra, etc. These invisible (atoms) or essences are inferred from the visible objects. Only the yogins through their transcendental perception can see them. Regarding the genesis of the tanmātras, Yogavārttika gives the following account: Bhūtādi produces the sound potential with the help of the element of rajas. The sound potential then, with a further addition from bhūtādi gives rise to the touch potential, which with a further addition of bhūtādi creates the rūpatamātra. The others also are derived in similar way. In the tanmātra stage, the subtle elements cannot be differentiated, yet they are named separately.

From tanmātras, by further process of evolution, the five gross elements are generated viz., air, fire, water, earth and ether. These categories are called viśeṣas, as they possess specific characters, including spatial dimensions and thus can be recognised as large or small (these are unlike the vaiśeṣika atoms). According to Vācaspati, ākāśabhūta (the element of ether) is derived from the ākāśa-tanmātra only, the

air-atom from śabda and sparsā (sound and touch). The fire-atom is derived from sparsā (touch) and rūpa (form); the water-atom from śabda, sparsā, rūpa and rasa; and earth-atom from śabda, sparsā, rūpa, rasa and gandha. Vijñānabhikṣu gives a slightly different account of the genesis of atoms in the sense that, in his opinion ether-atom has originated from ākāśatanmātra with an addition from bhūtādi.

The evolution of the specific (viśeṣa) from the unspecific (aviśeṣa) is called tattvāntara-pariṇāma. When the gross atoms (sthūlabhūtas) combine, their properties are transmitted in their products and thus they do not give rise to a new kind of existence (tattvāntara). The subtle elements are incapable of producing pleasure or pain, but they are discernable in the state of gross elements. Thus the gross elements are distinguished as soothing (śānta), terrific (ghora), and dull (mūḍha). The tanmātras in Sāṃkhya are visible, unlike the vaiśeṣika atoms. From the tanmātras emerge the organic and inorganic things. Evolution goes on due to the preponderance of one or the other quality and the various arrangements of the atoms.

#### V - THE EMPIRICAL PERSONALITY:

In Indian philosophy, the term denoting human personality is 'jīva'. According to Sāṃkhya, jīva is the self distinguished by the conjunction of the senses and limited by the body (SPS.VI.63). Vijñānabhikṣu clarifies that Puruṣa with aḥmākāra (ego) is jīva and not Puruṣa in itself (SPB VI.63). In the Vṛtti, Ātman is divided into two categories - para (transcendental) and apara (empirical) -

'ātmānam dvi-vidham prāhur parāparabibhedataḥ,  
parastu nirguṇaḥ proktaḥ aḥmākārayutoḥ paraḥ'

Here the transcendental self is called Puruṣa and the empirical self called jīva. Puruṣa is eternal, ubiquitous, immaterial, inactive, immobile, eternally pure, conscious and free. It is devoid of the guṇas. It is the noumenal self, unchangeable and immutable. It is devoid of pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, merit, demerit, and disposition. Puruṣa is consciousness itself (citsvarūpa). It is conscious (cetana), subject (aviśaya), seer (draṣṭṛ) or witness (sāksi).

When through the proximity of Prakṛti and its reflection in the buddhi, it is invested with the body, mind and merits then it is called jīvātman. Aniruddha defines jīva as the self determined by the body, the external senses, manas, aḥamkāra and buddhi (SSV.I.97). The jīva differs from the Puruṣa or the paramātman in that, the former is limited by the adjuncts of the internal organs, while the latter is pure self, free from all determinations (SPB.VI.63). Though it is not active, it appears to be active in conjunction with buddhi. When this pure Puruṣa, through eternal ignorance, identifies itself with the Prakṛti, the manifold world comes into being. The union between Puruṣa and Prakṛti takes place through the reflection of Puruṣa in the buddhi. The Puruṣa in itself is not the agent or enjoyer, since it is immutable. Jīva is the agent and enjoyer. Jīva, being the Puruṣa, determined by the body and the senses, - can act and enjoy in the presence of the body and sense organs only. It cannot act and enjoy in their absence (SPB.VI.63; SSV.I.106).

All the empirical cognitions (vṛttijñāna) belong to the empirical self. It is limited in time and space in its

experience. When the limiting adjunct (upādhi) of the psycho-physical organism is completely destroyed, jīva becomes indential with Puruṣa. 'It appears that Puruṣa represents that which is permanent, immutable, and intransient in each individual. That which reaffirms constantly that the individual of today is the same individual it was yesterday, plus all the new and continuous experiences that have and are proceeding eternally.' (67)

Puruṣa is reflected in buddhi, and it wrongly identifies itself with its reflection in buddhi and thinks all the modes to be its own. Aniruddha says that jīva is the doer (kartā) the enjoyer (bhoktā) and the guide (adhiṣṭhātā), since the self is reflected in buddhi owing to its proximity (SPS.SSV.I.96). The pure self wrongly thinks itself to be an active agent, owing to the reflection (SPS.SSV.I.106;I.64). Aniruddha holds that only self is reflected in buddhi, but buddhi is not reflected in the self (SSV.I.43). Buddhi and the other sense-organs act for the realization of the purposes of Puruṣa which is reflected in buddhi and appropriates the merits and demerits.

Vacaṣpatimiśra holds that the conscious Puruṣa, devoid of mental modes, being reflected in the unconscious buddhi modified into cognition, pleasure and other modes, wrongly identifies itself with buddhi and thinks the mental modes to be its own, though in reality it is immutable (STK.IV). Puruṣa can never be modified into buddhi which is formed of the three guṇas - sattva, rajas and tamas. It is devoid of the guṇas. Thus it can know objects by being reflected in buddhi, and not by being modified into it (SPB IV;II.20). He

further observes that self is reflected in buddhi, but buddhi is not reflected in self again (SPB I.87). In the commentary of SPB 1.87, Vijñānabhikṣu states Vācaṣpatimīśra's view thus: 'the self manifests a function or mode of buddhi, only when it is reflected in the mode. The mental mode is known by the self, only when it receives the reflection of the self and becomes illuminated. There is no reflection of the mental mode in the self.'

Vijñānabhikṣu objects to this view of Vācaṣpati. He considers buddhi to be intellectualized by the reflection of the image of Puruṣa which is then super-imposed upon Puruṣa. Vijñānabhikṣu assumes that the mode of buddhi being modified into the form of its objects does not modify the self, but is reflected in the self. This leads to a false sense of identity (abhimāna) between Puruṣa and buddhi. The self cannot have knowledge without the double reflection.<sup>(68)</sup> Thus, in Sāṃkhya view, buddhi acts as an intermediary between the self and the external objects. Buddhi is modified into the forms of the objects and it also receives the reflection of the self. Buddhi appears to be an intelligent knower, though in reality it is unintelligent.

It is generally assumed that the theory of reciprocal reflection between buddhi and Puruṣa is a special contribution of Vijñānabhikṣu to the Sāṃkhya theory of knowledge and personality. It is a contribution only in the sense that Vijñānabhikṣu has tried to adduce logical reasons for the necessity of double reflection.

That he is not the originator of the theory is evident from his reference to old texts.<sup>(69)</sup> The idea of reciprocal

reflection is clearly stated in Kamalaśīla's commentary on Tattvasaṃgraha in the context of refuting the Sāṃkhya view, (70) where one gets a very precise formulation of an important aspect of Sāṃkhya theory coming from an uncompromising opponent. We think that Vijñānabhikṣu has not been able to improve upon his statement except trying to offer some clumsy reasons behind the assumption of double reflection.

The theory of double reflection is also hinted at by the anonymous author of Yuktidīpikā, who seems to accept this theory. In his attempt to show that the Sāṃkhya theory of knowledge does not settle down to the identity of pramā and pramāṇa, (which is a very distinctive feature of Buddhist epistemology) the author of Yuktidīpikā remarks - 'buddhyāśrayam' etc. (71) In short it means that pramāṇa in the form of adhyavasāya or vṛtti belongs to buddhi, while the resultant pramā belongs to Puruṣa obviously Puruṣa cannot be the real substratum of experience. So an experience can belong to Puruṣa only in the form of a reflection.

Vijñānabhikṣu's attempt to find the rationale behind the reciprocal reflection does not appear very convincing. His difference from Vācaṣpati in this context refers to the interpretation of the term 'pauruṣeya' in Vyāsa's remark 'phalam-aviśiṣṭa pauruṣeyaścittavṛttibodhaḥ' (72) This remark means that the result of pratyakṣa pramāṇa is the knowledge of cittavṛtti (i.e. modification of intelligence in the shape of the projected object). This knowledge belongs to Puruṣa. By virtue of this knowledge, the distinction between the pure spirit and the material intelligence is obliterated.

Vācaṣpati takes the word 'pauruṣeya' in the secondary sense. According to him, it does not mean that Puruṣa possesses the knowledge of cittavṛtti. Puruṣa or pure spirit is reflected in buddhi and as a result, being enlightened by the reflection, the material buddhi behaves like a spiritual entity (cetanāyamānā). The seemingly conscious behaviour of the unconscious intelligence throws Puruṣa into the background and enables buddhi to usurp the role of Puruṣa. Hence, the distinction between Puruṣa and buddhi is lost.

Vijñānabhikṣu however in deference to some old Purāṇa texts insists that the expression 'pauruṣeya' in Vyāsabhāṣya should be taken in the primary sense and not in the secondary one. That means that Puruṣa should be the real substratum of experience. But in that case, there is an obvious danger of Puruṣa undergoing constant transformation through constant change in the range of experience. Hence, Vijñānabhikṣu hastens to add that Puruṣa is not the substratum of experience or cittavṛtti itself, but of the reflection of cittavṛtti. The reflection being an unreal phenomenon, cannot cause any transformation of Puruṣa. The determinate knowledge (vyavasāya) such as 'this is a pitcher', is possessed by Puruṣa only as a form of reflection cast by modified intellect. Knowledge in this form of reflection in Puruṣa is the resultant Pramā while the original modification of buddhi in the shape of the object is Pramāṇa.

A very pertinent objection crops up against this theory. If Puruṣa gets the reflection of Buddhi, let this single reflection serve the epistemic purpose of the Sāṃkhya theory.



what is then, the further need of Puruṣa being reflected back on buddhi? Vijñānabhikṣu answers that the second reflection is necessary for explaining the phenomenon of 'anuvyavasāya' or introspective knowledge viz. 'I know the pitcher'. Otherwise there is the fallacy of karmakartrvirodhaḥ (nominative-accusative contradiction, i.e. the subject becoming its own object) which is a contradiction in terms. The idea is this that the same knowledge cannot <sup>grasp</sup> group itself in the process of introspection. So the introspective knowledge or anuvyavasāya must be a different knowledge which captures the previous knowledge (vyavasāya). Vyavasāya, belongs to Puruṣa in the form of buddhi's reflection in Puruṣa, while anuvyavasāya belongs to buddhi in the form of Puruṣa's reflection in buddhi. Let us see how far this assumption of Vijñānabhikṣu stands to reason. It is agreed that 'anuvyavasāya' comes after vyavasāya. It will follow hence that the reciprocal reflection is not simultaneous. First buddhi is reflected in Puruṣa and then at the next stage Puruṣa is reflected in buddhi. But, why this delay in the 2nd reflection? Puruṣa and buddhi stand in proximity to each other, each having the capacity to reflect the other. If that is so the two reflections must be simultaneous. Under which royal command should the reflection of Puruṣa in buddhi be delayed? It is absurd to suggest that this delay is necessary to make 'anuvyavasāya' possible. Puruṣa is under no obligation to delay its reflection in subservience to the need of 'anuvyavasāya' or the fond wish of Vijñānabhikṣu. Moreover, the theory of anuvyavasāya suggests that knowledge in the form of vyavasāya is not self-expressive, but is

expressed or manifested by a subsequent introspection. This is the NV. theory and there is no evidence that Sāṃkhya-yoga accept this. Puruṣa as pure consciousness is accepted as self effulgent . So its reflection in buddhi which is enlightened by it, may easily be accepted as self-expressive. The reflection of the Sun in a mirror is self-manifest and has the capacity to illumine an object in a dark corner. Hence, the modification of buddhi in the shape of 'a pitcher' can be well-illuminated by Puruṣa's reflection in buddhi which thereby acts as a secondary consciousness. So we think that Vācaṣpati's theory of a single reflection is a more rational hypothesis.

The Specific Functions of the Components of Personality:

Thirteen evolutes or emergents of Prakṛti together make up what is called Karaṇa or linga<sup>(73)</sup> They are buddhi (reason), aḥamkāra (ego), manas(mind), the five senses and the five organs of action (SK. XXXII, XXIII, XLI). Of these thirteen buddhi, aḥamkāra and manas make up the 'internal organ' (antahkaraṇa) which functions in the past, present and future (SK.XXXIII). In Kārikā XXXV, the 'external' is compared to a door while the internal organ is called the 'doorkeeper'. This thirteenfold instrument functions as a whole by 'seizing' (āharaṇa), holding (dhāraṇa) and manifesting (prakāśakara) (SK.XXXII). The function of the five senses is 'bare awareness' (alocana-mātra), and the functions of the five organs of action are, speech, grasping, motion, excretion and procreation.(SKXXVII)

The specific function of buddhi is determination (adhyavasāya) (SS.II.13). It is definitive knowledge of

objects (Gaurapāda-Bhāṣya 23), or it is resolution to perform an action (STK.23). When there is a preponderance of sattva, it has such modes as virtue (dharmā), knowledge (jñāna), detachment (vairāgya) and supernatural powers (aiśvarya). When there is a preponderance of tamas, the contrary modes prevail in buddhi. Empirical cognition (vṛttijñāna), pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition or action, disposition, merit and demerit are modes of buddhi. They are unconscious mental modes. The self appropriates these modes of buddhi to be its own, owing to its false sense of identity with buddhi in which it is reflected (STK.5). Buddhi is the highest sense-organ. The external sense-organs, manas and aḥamkāra, function for buddhi, while buddhi itself functions for the self. The external sense-organs give indeterminate perception of objects. Manas turns it into determinate perception. Aḥamkāra leads to the appropriation of determinate perception by the empirical self. Buddhi turns it into definite knowledge. Ascertainment and resolution (niścaya and adhyavasāya) are affected by buddhi. The self, being reflected in such a buddhi, assumes the characteristics of buddhi. Recollection (smṛti), thinking (cintā), meditation (dhyāna) and reflection (manana) are the functions of buddhi, meditation being its highest function (SPS;SPB.II.40-47; SPS,SSV I.71).

Aḥamkāra is an evolute of mahat or buddhi (SKXXII;SPS I.62,72). It is described as 'abhimāna', i.e. self-awareness (SK.XXIV; SPS.II.1). Every person has, at first, knowledge of an object, - and then he appropriates it to himself. This consciousness of 'I' or 'mine' is behind every action, when we refer as 'this is mine', 'I know this' and so on. This is called apperception

or self-appropriation (abhimāna). Buddhi is the material cause of ahamkāra. It has the specific function of determination (niscayavṛtti). So buddhi is inferred from ahamkāra as its cause (STK.24; SPB.I.64,72; II.16). Ahamkāra is not mere self-awareness (i.e. abhimāna). It is considered as an internal organ, which has the function of self-awareness. It is inferred as the cause from its effects, viz. the subtle elements (tanmātras) and the sense-organs (indriyas). Ahamkāra is their material cause. In dreamless sleep (susupti), self-awareness of ahamkāra is destroyed but it persists as the substratum of disposition (vāsanā) (SPB.I.63). Merit (dharma) and demerit (adharma) are the modes of ahamkāra and ahamkāra being the effect of buddhi, they are modes of buddhi too (SPS,SSV VI.62). The self is not an agent (kartr) since it is immutable (aparināmin). Ahamkāra is the agent.

Manas (mind) evolves from ahamkāra in its sattvika aspects (SK.XXV; SPS II.18). It is the central organ supervising both the organs of action and knowledge. Without the supervision of manas there would be no sense-perception or action (SK XXVII; SPB II.26). The ten different sense organs are different modifications of the manas. They are originated from the different modifications in the constituent gunas (sattva, rajas and tamas) and are aided by the merits and demerits (SPS,SSV.II.27). Manas becomes identical with each organ in its diverse functions.

Manas is not atomic. If it were atomic, it would be eternal. But it is not eternal. It is an evolute of ahamkāra. It may be connected to different sense-organs at the same time, so it is not devoid of parts (SPS, SPB V.71). It is

not all-pervading (bibhu), since it is an instrument (karana), a sense-organ, like an axe which is of limited dimension. It is the instrument of experiences connected with whole body. This shows that manas is of intermediate magnitude (madhyama parimāna) (SSV.V.71). Further, manas is capable of movement. The self goes to another sphere of existence after death with the aid of its adjunct (upādhi) i.e. manas. The self, which is all-pervading, is incapable of movement. Only its adjunct manas is capable of movement. So it is not all-pervading (SPB V.70). Thus manas is neither atomic, nor all-pervading, but of intermediate magnitude and is possessed of parts.

Manas has the function of assimilation and discrimination (saṅkalpa). It reflects upon an object intuitively, apprehended by an external organ, and determined to be either like this or not and thus has a determinate perception of it. It knows the object in a subject-object relation (viśeṣana-viśeṣya-bhāva). The external sense-organs acquire knowledge in an indeterminate perception. Manas yields determinate perception. This is the view of Vācaṣpati. But Vijñānabhikṣu holds that the external sense-organs yield determinate perception. According to him, indecision and decision are the functions of manas. Decision (saṅkalpa) is the desire to do (cikīrṣa) (SPB.II.30).

Buddhi, aḥamkāra and manas are the three internal organs (antaḥkarana). Materials are supplied by the external sense-organs, to be elaborated by the antaḥkarana, which has a greater capacity than the sense-organs. The antaḥkarana apprehends the past, present and future objects, while the sense-organs apprehend only the present objects (SK.XXXIII, XXXV). As mentioned above, the functions of buddhi, aḥamkāra and manas

are 'determination', 'self-awareness' and 'differentiation' respectively (SK.XXIX; SPS.SSV II.30). With respect to perception, the 'internal organs', together with any one or more of the senses, function either simultaneously or successively (yugapat or kramaśāh).

There are ten external sense-organs, five buddhīndriyas (organs of knowledge) and five karmendriyas (organs of action). The sense-organs are the instruments of the self. They are the effects of ahaṁkāra, together with the mind. The self is the knower (draṣṭṛ); the cognitive sense-organs are the instruments of knowledge (SPS.II.29). Though the self is immutable and therefore inactive, it moves the motor sense-organs to act, even as a magnet moves a piece of iron, without itself moving. The sense-organs are evolved to realize the ends of the self (SPS, SPB.II.36). They act also to fulfill the merits and demerits of the empirical self. The sense-organs act by themselves for the sake of the self, even as milk flows of itself from the udder of the cow for the nourishment of the calf (SPS, SPB.II.37). All the sense-organs are beyond perception. They are wrongly identified with eyes, ears, etc. which are their physiological seats. They are powers behind the seats. All the ten external sense-organs are the different powers of the one chief sense-organ, manas, which is both cognitive and motor organ. Manas, in conjunction with the eyes, ear, etc. become identical with them and thus has the functions of vision, hearing, etc. (SPB.II.26-27).

The five vital breaths (prāṇas) circulate throughout the thirteen-fold instrument and according to the commentators,

maintain 'the living functions or life-forces of the instrument'.<sup>(74)</sup> Gauḍapāda's commentary gives an idea about the nature and functions of the vital airs, namely prāṇa, apāna, samāna, udāna and vyāna. They co-exist with antahkaraṇa, and when it is dissolved, the prāṇas also cease to exist. Gauḍapāda explains - 'the air, called prāṇa, is that which is perceptible in the mouth and nostrils, and circulation is the common function of the thirteen kinds (of instruments): that is, where there is breath, the organs acquire (are connected with) soul (they become living). Breath, like a bird in a cage, gives motion (vitality) to the whole. It is called prāṇa, breath or life from breathing. From carrying downwards (apanayana) the air apāna is so named, the circulation of which is also the common function of the organs. Samāna is so named from conducting equally (samanayana) the food, etc. (through the frame). It is situated in the central part of the body, and its circulation is the common function of the instruments. The air udāna denominated from ascending or from drawing or guiding best (un-nayana). It is perceptible in the space between the navel and the head, and the circulation that it has, is the common function of the organs. Lastly, the air by which internal division and diffusion through the whole body is effected is called vyāna, from its pervading (vyāpti) the body like the etherial element. The circulation of that also is the common function of the assemblage of the organs.'<sup>(75)</sup>

I have already mentioned about the 'linga' which consists of ~~the~~ the thirteen components and I have already discussed the components separately. Finally, this linga or thirteen-fold

instrument transmigrate until the Puruṣa attains salvation (SK.XL,XLIV). This linga transmigrates or attains salvation because of the force or power of the bhāvas which reside in the buddhi (SK.XL, XLIV, XLV). Larson puts it this way - 'that the thirteen-fold instrument is an essential structure or nature of man, which enables him to grasp and know the world and himself. It includes within it the/entire mental and emotional make up of man and it is by means of one aspect of this instrument, i.e. buddhi, that man is able to discover or discriminate Puruṣa, which is both the reason why man is ultimately free or isolated. Hence this thirteen-fold structure is appropriately called the instrument (karana) or the characteristic mark (linga).'(76)

The thirteen-fold instrument or linga cannot exist without some kind of support (SK.X.LI). The five subtle elements (tanmātras) make up sort of a body or support. According to the commentators, this sheath or body (śarīra) accompanies the linga in its transmigration from life to life. Thus the linga with respect to its nature as a transmigrating entity is made up of eighteen parts: the thirteen- fold instruments with the five subtle elements. The Bhāṣya, Sāṃkhya-tattva-kaumudī, etc. all refer to this total transmigrating entity as the linga-śarīra or sūkṣma-śarīra. Sāṃkhya-kārikā refers to the linga-śarīra and linga both as linga only (SK.X. - XLII). But it is implied in SK.XLI, that the five tanmātras support the linga.

In the classical Sāṃkhya, the bhāvas are supposed to be some kind of power or force which enhance the transmigration of the linga-śarīra. It explains why the linga transmigrates



from life to life . Bhāvas are 'conditions' or 'dispositions' or 'fundamental strivings' in the inner-most core of man. The Sāṃkhya-kārikā believes that a different causation is brought about by the bhāvas, which reside in the buddhi (SK.XXIII,LXIII). These bhāvas are eight in number; (i) dharma (virtue); (ii) adharmā (vice); (iii) jñāna (knowledge); (iv) ajñāna (ignorance); (v) virāga (non-attachment); (vi) vāga; (attachment); (vii) aiśvarya (power), and (viii) anaiśvarya (lack of power). All the conditions except jñāna lead man-kind through various phases of transmigration and suffering (SK.LXIII). Only the condition of jñāna leads to salvation. It is important to note that continuation of life, suffering and ordinary existence is attributed in the classical Sāṃkhya, to these fundamental quest for the inner-most nature. What a man becomes is determined by what he has done. Thus the eight bhāvas are essential parts of man's nature. In fact, according to Kārikā LVII, the bhāvas add an essential dimension to the functioning of the linga; na vina bhāvair liṅgam no liṅgenaviṅā bhāvanivṛttir ....'. Thus there are two functioning systems or structures - one is the linga - structure (elemental) and the other is the bhāva - structure (intellectual). The bhava - structure is a part of the linga - structure, since it resides in the buddhi. It performs the essential function of determining the future of the linga.

Another account of the bhāva - structure is given in Kārikā XLVI - LI which is different from the previous account. In these verses, bhāvas are said to be fifty in number - comprising of five viparyayas, 28 aśaktis, 9 tuṣṭis and 8 siddhis.

The doctrine of fifty bhāvas represented in Sk.XLVI -LI is interpreted as a later interpolation by Keith. (77) E.

Frauwellner says that it must have been an older sacred tradition which Īśvarakṛṣṇa felt obliged to include. (78)

It is evident from the Kārikās that Īśvarakṛṣṇa supported the view of eight bhavas as he mentions it a few times in the text.

Thus we see that the conception of human personality is quite explicit in the Sāṃkhya texts. The essential reality in man is singled out and given a separate position than the empirical entity which has evolved out of the unconscious Prakṛti (Nature). The 'lingaśarīra' is that inner entity of man which outlives the physical decay, and carries on the empirical entity till the ultimate salvation.


The conception of human personality as brought out in the Sāṃkhya literature has been discussed. We will evaluate the respective ideas further in the next chapter.

## CHAPTER - IV

### CONCLUSION

#### Section A: A REVIEW OF THE CONCEPTION OF HUMAN PERSONALITY IN THE ADVAITA VEDĀNTA AND THE CLASSICAL SĀMĀKHYA

In the previous chapters, I have described the evolution of the conception of 'Human Personality' in the two main systems of the Indian philosophy, namely Advaita Vedānta and Classical Sāṃkhya. Since the Vedas are the main sources of the Indian philosophy and influenced either positively directly or positively indirectly, or negatively all the other schools, both Sāṃkhya and Vedānta owe to the Vedic literature to a great extent. The positions of Vedānta and Sāṃkhya in the background of the Indian philosophy can be classified thus<sup>(1)</sup>:



Vedānta and Sāṃkhya constitute two main branches of the orthodox system, and thus it would have been incongruous not to have referred to the Vedic literature appropriately as a background to the Vedānta and the Sāṃkhya systems. Very often the same mantra is interpreted by both Sāṃkhya and Vedānta in accordance with its own concept. They have many concepts in common, having the common source to support their views. Yet there are important differences regarding some fundamental metaphysical questions and also regarding human personality.

The main contention of difference between the two systems is that, whereas Advaita Vedānta believes in an unitary principle underlying the universe and empirical personality, i.e. the Ātman or Brahman, Sāṃkhya believes in dualism of Puruṣa (spirit) and Prakṛti (nature). The Upaniṣads conceived Brahman (the cosmic eternal reality behind the universe) and Ātman (the essential reality of the human personality) as one. Likewise, the Advaita conceives an unitary principle as the essential reality of the universe in Brahman and proclaims - 'all this (the empirical entities) is verily the Brahman (sarvaṃ khalvidam brahma)'. According to the Classical Sāṃkhya, there are two ultimate entities - one conscious and the other unconscious. Both are transcendental and inter-dependent. The one, i.e. the mūlāprakṛti includes in itself the potentiality of all things in the manifest world, both mental and physical. The Puruṣa, however, is something like the simple fact of consciousness. In the Sāṃkhya-kārikā X & XI, the different nature of Puruṣa, Prakṛti and the manifest universe is brought out. It says - "The manifest (vyakta - universe) is caused, finite, non-pervasive, active, plural, supported, emergent, composite, dependent: - the unmanifested (avyakta-Prakṛti) is the opposite". Again Puruṣa is different from both manifest and unmanifest. While both the manifest and unmanifest i.e. the universe and Prakṛti are "characterised by the three guṇas, the undiscriminating, objective, general, non-conscious and productive; - the Puruṣa is the opposite of them, although similar". Thus Puruṣa is uncharacterised by the three guṇas, discriminative, subject, conscious and unproductive. It is

pure consciousness. Prakṛti is sat or existent as the world which we perceive is very much existent and is evolved from Prakṛti. The effect being existent, the cause, i.e. Prakṛti must be true. I have suggested that the conception of Ātman in the Upaniṣads is the origin of the conception of Puruṣa in Sāṃkhya. "In preclassical Sāṃkhya (viz. Gīta and Mokṣadharmā) Puruṣa is regarded as a cosmic reality and it resembles the conception of Ātman in the Upaniṣads".<sup>(2)</sup>

Advaita Vedāntic conception of Ātman and the universe is different from the Sāṃkhya views. The cosmological world-ground is known as Brahman in Vedānta. Brahman, according to Śaṅkara is the cause of the origination, subsistence and dissolution of the world, which is extended in names and forms, which consists of many agents and enjoyers (SB.I.1.2). When we look at the created world, Brahman is viewed as Īśvara. Brahman, associated with the principle of māyā or creative power, is Īśvara, who is engaged in creating and maintaining the world. Brahman is at once the material cause as well as the efficient cause of the world. There is no difference between cause and effect. Clay is the cause and jugs and jars are the effects. These transformations are appearances of names and shape (nāmarūpa). The world of experience is not the ultimate reality, i.e. pāramārthika, but only empirically true (vyavahārika).

The supreme Brahman is sat (existent), cit (conscious) and ānanda-svarūpa (of the nature of bliss). For Śaṅkara, ultimate reality is pure intelligence (cin-mātra) devoid of all forms. Brahman is devoid of qualities. Whatever qualities are conceivable can only be denied of it: 'eko brahma-dvitiyo-nāsti'. Scriptures describe Brahman as reality, consciousness

and infinity (satyamjñānam-anantam brahma). These are not qualities, but are one with Brahman. They constitute the very nature of Brahman. Śaṅkara holds that the self is of the essence of consciousness and bliss (cidānandarūpa). But the Sāṅkhya considers pleasure and pain to be unconscious modes of buddhi which do not affect the conscious self. It is devoid of pleasure and pain (STK.XVII). The self is devoid of the guṇas and therefore unchangeable. So bliss cannot be a mode (dharma) of the self. If bliss were the essence (svarūpa) of the self, it would be experienced in empirical life which is full of suffering. Consciousness is cognition. Bliss is pleasure. If the self were of the nature of consciousness and bliss, it would be affected by duality (SSV.V.66).

That Brahman appears to be connected with the three conditions of the world, is as illusory as the appearance of a snake in a rope (SB.II.1.9). This is merely to indicate the one-sided dependence of the world on Brahman. We cannot say that an illusion is non-existent. The rope which is perceived as snake is contradicted when the perception of snake disappears. But the world does not disappear. Thus the appearance of the world is said to be anirvacanīya, to mean that it is 'unique'. We cannot describe it as existent or non-existent. According to Śaṅkara, the world has a relative empirical reality. Śaṅkara regards the world as māyā, which is wrongly translated as 'illusion'. Śaṅkara says that the world does not exist in reality and its manifestation disappears when the reality is known. Māyā is not a real entity. Māyā is neither existent nor non-existent - tatvāntarābhyām anirvacanīyā. Thus it

could be said that according to Śaṅkara - "Reality is one and the world of many is not real." (3)

According to Sāṅkhya, neither Puruṣa nor Prakṛti is false or fictitious. Only the seeming unity becomes false in the highest state of emancipation. Prakṛti of Sāṅkhya and Māyā of Vedānta function in the same way as both are the world-grounds and unconscious. Prakṛti is eternal and existent. Māyā is destroyed by the realization of Brahman and is neither existent nor non-existent. Prakṛti is independent Māyā is dependent on Brahman. Sāṅkhya believes in the reality of the world while Vedānta believes in its falsity. Some Sāṅkhya philosophers hold that the Puruṣa is reflected in buddhi. Some Advaita Vedāntists hold that the Ātman is reflected in the internal organ (antaḥkaraṇa). These are the main differences between Sāṅkhya and Vedānta on the metaphysical grounds.

Everybody experiences that 'I AM' (aham asmi). The term 'aham' is always uttered in relation to a particular body, accompanied by the sense-organs, mind and intellect. But over and above these, there is something which constitutes the essential reality in man. This is the soul or self which is called Puruṣa and Ātman respectively in Sāṅkhya and Vedānta. I have used the term 'human personality' to signify this total conception of man. It indicates to the soul and the physical and mental characteristics together. We are concerned here with the Sāṅkhya and Vedānta conceptions regarding this human personality. Both the systems regard man as a spiritual and psycho-physical individual. But the nature of spirit,

body-and mind is differently conceived in each school.

It is necessary to mention here that none of the orthodox schools openly contradicts the view of the Vedas, including the Upaniṣads. But each system has interpreted the Vedic utterances in its own way. The classical systems emerged through a long process of systematization for a long period of time. I have discussed the main predecessors to Classical Sāṃkhya and Vedānta in the previous chapters. I have regarded their views regarding the conception of human personality and tried to show the process of transformation of the Upaniṣadic revelations about personality in two main systems of philosophy, namely Sāṃkhya and Vedānta.

The Vedānta teaches us that the real self, i.e. Ātman is neither this body nor the mind, nor a combination of both; it is beyond both mind and matter. Sāṃkhya also conceives the conscious entity in the human frame as Puruṣa who is in reality untouched by physical, mental or psychical aspects. According to Vedānta, Ātman is sat (existent), cit (conscious) and anandasvarūpa (of the nature of bliss). According to Sāṃkhya, bliss is a characteristic of the inner instrument (antaḥkarana) particularly of reason (buddhi) when it becomes pure (sāttvika). But the Ātman (self), when it exists by itself, has no relation to reason (buddhi). Buddhi, after all, is a product of Prakṛti! but the Ātman or Puruṣa is independent of Prakṛti. According to Sāṃkhya, Puruṣa is completely free and not a part of the universe or empirical entity. The existence of Puruṣa is thus only inferred. Moreover, the classical Sāṃkhya recognizes as many Puruṣas as there are animate individuals. The diversity



of attributes in different entities is explained by the plurality. Vijñānabhikṣu has explained that the oneness of the soul, advocated by the Śruti, the Vedānta and others, refer to 'the homogeneous nature of Puruṣa (Ātman) and not to their numerical unit.' (4)

The Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkara accepts on the whole, the evolution of man as given in the Taittirīya Upaniṣad, but it treats the explanation as of secondary importance, because it is the explanation which is a product of māyā. The Advaita conception of the constitution of the individual is also the same as that given by the Upaniṣad in its doctrine of the levels of the Ātman and the body. These levels are interpreted by this school as sheaths (koṣas). The original pure Ātman is encased, first in the sheath of bliss; this is encased in the sheath of reason, this in the sheath of mind, this in the sheath of life and this finally in the sheath of matter. The original nature of the Ātman is 'saccidānanda', i.e. existence, consciousness and bliss.

The Taittirīya Upaniṣad indicates that, that which is in man and that which is in the sun are one and the same. According to this Upaniṣad, out of the Ātman was born ether, out of ether air, out of air fire, and out of fire water, out of water earth, out of earth plants, out of plants food, and out of food man, who speaks of himself as "I". This is the Ātman but what is 'I' - 'Aham'? (Taitt. III). This Taittirīya conception of Ātman is elucidated by P.T. Raju thus - 'If a child is named John, and we ask him - who is John? It points to its body. So the 'I' or 'aham' is first regarded as the body.

But is it really the body? When a man dies, the body is there, but it does not speak of itself as the 'I'. It does not breathe, and so we may say the life-principle has escaped, and identify the life-principle with the Ātman. But is the life-principle then Ātman? When a man is fast asleep, his body is alive but does not call itself 'I'; so we may say that his mind is not there. But the mind also is not the Ātman, because a mad man may say that he was dead long ago and refuse to eat and drink, because dead bodies do not eat and drink. What is lacking in him is reason. We may therefore say that reason is the Ātman. But we say, 'I have reason, it works rightly'. But again what is this 'I' that has reason? That is the Ātman and is the fullest bliss.'<sup>(5)</sup> The same kinds of arguments are put forward in the Bhāmati by Vācaṣpatimisra.

The Sāṃkhya conception of the nature of man is more in accordance with the Kaṭha categories than with the Taittirīya account. According to Kaṭha, Ātman is smaller than the smallest and yet greater than the greatest (Kaṭha.I.II.20). It is imperishable. In truth there is no death for the 'I'. Only the body is destroyed at death. But how can we find Ātman? The objects are higher (deeper) than the senses (Kaṭha.I.3.10-11), for with reference to the objects we measure our reality. Manas (mind) is deeper than the object, reason is deeper than mind, the mahān ātmā (cosmic reason) deeper than reason, the unmanifest (avyakta) deeper than the cosmic reason and the Ātman (Puruṣa) deeper than avyakta. There we find the Ātman, deeper than which there is nothing. It is not an object towards which the senses, mind and speech can be directed. Yet it is not

non-existence or 'non-being', but existence or 'Being' itself. According to this view, -"as the centre is to the circumference, so man is the correlate of the external world". But the centre of both man and the world is the ego, or rather, ego comprehends both, because both issue out of it. The ego itself comes out of reason, which comes out of the primeval matter, Prakṛti. Some Vedāntic systems make Prakṛti part and parcel of the Brahman. The important difference between the Sāṃkhya and the Katha is that, the former leaves the opposition between spirit and matter unreconciled, whereas the latter makes matter only a derivative of the spirit. It is along the line of the Katha that some of the Vedāntic schools have reconciled the opposition by making the material principle a form of the energy aspect (māyāśakti) of the Brahman. (6)

We have already mentioned that according to Sāṃkhya, the Ātmans are of an infinite number. The classical Sāṃkhya, as an atheistic philosophy, rejects the reality of God. Puruṣa is not personal but individual. 'Impersonal yet individual it is the fact of man's experience', which renders him able to become man. The Brahman in Advaita Vedānta is the absolute and is impersonal; but God is not the 'absolute'; He is personal. Although God is not the 'absolute', He is not a separate being from the 'absolute'. Thus Dr. Raju explains - "He is the Absolute facing the world and knowing it as his object. At the level of the 'absolute', there is no distinction between the subject and the object, but at the level of God the distinction obtains. The Brahman creates out of itself, the world of souls and matter and faces it; as facing it, the

Brahman distinguishes itself from the world and becomes God. He is not over-whelmed by the forces of the world; but as facing them, he is free and above them. Yet element of finitude enters His being, because He distinguishes Himself from something which He is not. The Brahman as God is called Īśvara (The Lord)."(7) Classical Sāṃkhya, however, does not regard it necessary to believe in an omnipotent god.

Regarding the essential reality behind the human personality, the Sāṃkhya and the Vedānta conceptions are almost similar, as both regard a transcendent, conscious reality which is neither the doer nor the enjoyer, yet is wrongly attributed with them. According to Śaṅkara, the Ātman is the same as the Brahman as involved in the mind, the senses and the physical body. The Ātman again is not the same as the jīva. The jīva is the ethical personality. It is subject to transmigration. The Ātman does not really experience pleasures and pains, it is the jīva that experiences them. The Ātman is only an onlooker. The Ātman, as such, is neither the knower nor the agent of actions. Yet, without Ātman there is neither consciousness nor even existence of the jīva. The jīva has three states and three bodies. First, the body of the waking consciousness; secondly, there is the body of dreams and finally, there is the body of the deep sleep called the causal body (kāraṇasārīra) which the jīva carries during transmigration. According to Śaṅkara, the Ātman is not the same as 'I-consciousness' (aḥamkāra). The 'I-consciousness' is only the ego. The ego is only a part of jīva, along with kāraṇasārīra (causal body), citta (apperception), buddhi

(reason), manas (mind), the five sense organs and five organs of action. The mind analyses and synthesises the internal and external perceptions; ego appropriates those experiences as its own; reason asserts them through affirmative and negative judgements, and apprehension unifies all experiences into an inter-connected whole.

According to Sāṃkhya, jīva is the Puruṣa determined by the ego (aḥamkāra) as Vijñānabhikṣu describes it. Puruṣa on account of its proximity to Prakṛti receives the reflection of buddhi, and thus the modifications of buddhi are falsely ascribed to Puruṣa. Aniruddha defines jīva as the self, determined by the body, the external sense, manas, aḥamkāra and buddhi. Vācaṣpatimīśra holds that the conscious Puruṣa, devoid of mental modes being reflected in the unconscious buddhi modified into cognition, pleasure and other modes, wrongly identifies itself with buddhi and thinks the mental modes to be its own, though in reality it is immutable. The diversity of human existence is explained by Sāṃkhya by the theory of plurality of selves.

The Sāṃkhya conception of antaḥkaraṇa is different from the Vedāntic conception in the sense that it comprises three aspects of the psychic phenomena - namely manas (mind) which determines and arranges the impulses or sensations coming from the senses, buddhi (i.e. reason), will and aḥamkāra or ego. Manas is the mediator between the senses, buddhi and aḥamkāra. The function of reason is asserting and determining. It has two aspects - the sāttvika or the pure or transparent, and the tāmasika or lethargic. To the former are due merit

(dharma), knowledge (jñāna), detachment (vairāgya) and lordship (aiśvarya) and to the latter are due the opposite qualities. The functions of mind and ego are the same as those of the Vedānta. By including reason in antaḥkaraṇa, the Sāṃkhya seems to maintain that in possessing the inner instrument, man transcends his private individuality.

' Another peculiarity of the Sāṃkhya doctrine of antaḥkaraṇa is that, it carries the potency of both merit and demerit. Reason (buddhi) which is included in it, is both theoretical and practical; it is both consciousness and conscience in the usual meanings of these terms.' (8)

The Sāṃkhya conception of the vital principle is different from that of the Upaniṣads, which speak of it as different from mind. For both Sāṃkhya and the Upaniṣads, vital principle is of five kinds; but the Sāṃkhya says that the vital principle is the common function of the three forms of the inner instrument (antaḥkaraṇa). Each of the three has its own function to perform, but together they perform the function of biological activity.

The human entity consists of three parts - the gross body, the subtle body and the spirit; both Sāṃkhya and Vedānta adhere to this division. The spiritual aspect is the essential reality in man which is beyond perception. The gross body is constituted of the five gross elements. According to Vedānta, gross elements like fire, air, earth, water and ether arise through the pañcīkaraṇa process (explained in the Vedānta section) from the subtle elements. The gross element of the earth is the main constituent of the gross body and fire, air,

water and ether consisting in the gross element of the earth, constitute the different parts of the body containing water, fire, etc. The sense organs evolve out of the subtle elements directly - from sound arises the organ of ear; from the element of touch, the skin and so on. According to Sāṃkhya, the five sense organs and five motor organs arise directly from ego along with manas. The five subtle elements on the other hand give rise to the five gross elements. According to Sāṃkhya, two-fold creation emerge from ahaṃkāra. 'The group of eleven' also called sāttvika ahaṃkāra or vaikṛta ahaṃkāra is made up of mind (manas), the five senses (buddhīndriyas) and the five organs of action (karmendriyas) (SK.XXV). It is on this level of emergence or evolution that man is first in contact with the external or the gross world. The ten senses or indriyas are in two groups - (1) the five sense organs (buddhīndriyas) including the eye, ear, nose, tongue and skin; and (2) the five organs of action, including the voice, hands, feet and the organs of generation and excretion. These senses are not to be confused with the gross organs, which of course, are made of the gross elements. The senses rather refer to the functioning of the various organs. Emerging from ahaṃkāra, at the same time as the sāttvika ahaṃkāra or 'the group of eleven', is the group known as the 'five subtle elements' (tanmātras) characterized by a predominance of tamas. The term tanmātra means 'only so much' or rudimentary. It is difficult to determine the nature of the tanmātras; they are said to be aviśeṣas, i.e. non-specific. The gross elements have been interpreted variously. The Kārikā does not say anything

precisely. The Bhāṣya simply correlates the five tanmātras with the five gross elements. In the older accounts of the tattvas, the five gross elements functioned in the place of the tanmātras and the remaining five tattvas were the objects of the senses, which are left out of the Classical Sāṃkhya listings. This change is probably another indication of the Classical Sāṃkhyan interest in the analysis of the individual as opposed to the older cosmological concerns. The subtle elements represent a kind of bridge between the internal and external or between the individual and the world.

There is another important difference between the Sāṃkhya and the Vedānta. According to Sāṃkhya, the five elements come simultaneously from the ego; but according to Vedānta, they are out of one another: earth out of water, water out of fire, fire out of air and air out of ether. It should be mentioned here that according to the Taittirīya account, ether comes out of the Ātman; but according to the Sāṃkhya, all the elements come out of the ego and not out of the Ātman.

Sāṃkhya and Vedānta both believe in the transmigration of the subtle body. According to Sāṃkhya, every jīva has a subtle body (lingasarīra) formed of the ten sense-organs, manas, buddhi, and ahamkara, together with the five subtle essences (SSV.III.9). It is the basis of re-birth (SPS.III.16). The gross body is the effect of the subtle body. The jīva enjoys its empirical life through it. Merit and demerit (karma) are the individuating principles. The bondage of the jīva is due to the subtle body, through which the merit and demerit, which are modes of buddhi or ahamkāra, are wrongly appreciated



by the self or Puruṣa. The bondage of the Puruṣa is only phenomenal. So long as the subtle body continues, merit and demerit are wrongly owned by the Puruṣa. When it achieves discrimination (viveka), merit and demerit are destroyed and and therefore no longer appropriated by it, and it attains liberation. Discrimination leads to the destruction of merit and demerit, which dissolves the subtle body, annihilates empirical life and leads to liberation. (SPS.SSV. VI.67-70).

Śamkara also maintains that the empirical self transmigrates with a subtle body (SBS.IV.2.21). It is subtle in its essence and dimension, and capable of movement. It is transparent, irresistible and invisible (SBS.IV.2.9). It contains the seed of a future body in the shape of merits and demerits (karma). The kind of body to be assumed on rebirth is determined by the karma acquired in the previous births (SBS.II.4.11). Those who have exterminated avidyā by perfect knowledge or integral experience, realize absolute freedom. They never return to embodied existence (SBS.IV.4.22). The knower of indeterminate Brahman destroys avidyā and other afflictions and attains absolute eternal life (SBS.IV.2.12). His life, senses and subtle elements constituting his subtle body are dissolved into indeterminate Brahman (SBS.IV.2,13,15). This is the highest state of impersonal, absolute immortality.

#### Section B: - CRITICAL APPRECIATION

The declared aim of all the principal philosophical systems of India is to achieve salvation, the final freedom from worldly bondage. The metaphysical assumptions of different systems have been affected by different concepts of liberation.

The concepts of human personality have been carefully made responsive to the fundamental metaphysical postulates, which have been coloured by the need of liberation. Thus the concept of liberation calls the tune of philosophy which is made to accommodate both metaphysics and empirical personality within the spirit of final emancipation. According to the Sāṃkhya and the AV. systems, a self cannot achieve freedom if it is not basically free. If bondage belongs to the very nature of the self, it can never shake it off, because the essential nature of a thing cannot be changed or destroyed. In this concept, freedom is more an affirmation than an attainment. It is not true that the self attains freedom which was not there. What is true, however, is that the self affirms its freedom, which it somehow forgot to affirm. It misses freedom only in the sense that it fails to notice what it really has and looks like possessing what it really has not. Freedom is the very essence of the self and bondage is only a false superimposition. Yet sufferings seem too real to be easily dismissed by the simple wave of hands. This paradox of being free and feeling bound, certainly calls for an explanation. The attempted explanation results in postulating two selves, the one transcendental and the other empirical. Bondage and suffering belong to the empirical self and not to the transcendental one. Yet, somehow, through false identification between the two, the transcendental self is made to seem to suffer. The seeming suffering is the play of an eternal illusion. The Sāṃkhya system, vigorously retains the reality of the material world. Indestructibility of matter is one of its

most fundamental tenets. The spirit of the transcendental self, which is nothing but pure consciousness is also equally indestructible. Matter, though eternal and indestructible, is everchanging. Its dynamism is irrepressible. Spirit or Puruṣa is not only eternal and indestructible, but also changeless. Its static essence is too rigid to be reversible. The realm of matter and the realm of spirit are thoroughly unrelated. Yet, an eternally false relation is superimposed, between the two, through an eternal 'avidyā', the basic principle of falsity. This superimposition creates an empirical self out of buddhi, the first evolute of primordial matter and the reflection of the transcendental consciousness in the same buddhi. By virtue of this reflection the material buddhi misleadingly appropriates unto itself the character of consciousness. As a result, the distinction between buddhi and puruṣa is missed and worldly sufferings belonging to buddhi are fancied as belonging to Puruṣa, which has nothing to do with what buddhi brings to it, through a false transference of property. This buddhi, usurping the role of consciousness by capturing the reflection of Puruṣa, is the empirical self. Both bondage, and freedom really belong to buddhi itself. Their ascription to Puruṣa, the transcendental self, is only a matter of transferred epithet. Thus the empirical self in its very nature is stamped with a note of falsity. Freedom is nothing but a realization of this falsity, which is again nothing but the realization of the distinction between the material Buddhi and the spiritual Puruṣa. Thus, bondage is the non-realization of this distinction (a-viveka) and freedom

is its realization (vivekakhyāti). This realization also belongs to buddhi, for Puruṣa as pure spirit is too dignified in its secluded glory to need any realization whatsoever. It has lost nothing that it should try to gain back. As the supremely unattached being, standing in total indifference to anything else, it is ever free and not in need of attaining freedom.

The most intriguing problem consists in the assumption that buddhi is saddled with the responsibility of realizing the unattached and secluded nature of the Puruṣa and hence of distinguishing between the material essence of itself and the spiritual essence of Puruṣa. Puruṣa itself has no responsibility whatsoever. Constant meditative concentration on this distinction makes its realization take a firm root in buddhi, which is then no longer subjected to false abolition of distinction. But, the point is, does not this realization of distinction between matter and spirit require the reflection of the transcendental consciousness in buddhi?

Realization of distinction is consciousness of distinction. But, buddhi cannot have any consciousness of its own. It must be borrowed from the Puruṣa in the form of reflection. But so long this very reflection has been responsible for obliterating the sense of distinction, making it possible for buddhi to act as a pretender to consciousness. Now, how should this very same reflection act in the opposite way, demolish this pretention and throw upon the surface of the false consciousness, the distinction, which it has been screening so long? How can a false consciousness be conscious of its own falsity?

Moreover, buddhi, coming in contact with the external world, must go on taking the shapes of external objects (vṛttirūpa-pariṇāma) and these shapes of objective transformation, attended with feelings of pleasure and pain, must continue to be illumined by the reflection of Puruṣa. Hence, the basic source of confusion between matter and spirit remains intact, making it impossible for the realization of distinction to dawn upon buddhi. If it dawns at all, it will be a queer companionship between continuous abolition of distinction and continuous emergence of distinction. The Sāṃkhya has no answer to this paradox. The Yoga, on the contrary, has appreciated this difficulty and so has assumed that at the *stage* of asamprajñāta samādhi even this viveka-khyāti as a form of buddhi-vṛtti, is stopped. It is to be, then, further assumed that asamprajñāta samādhi is such a stage, in which buddhi has no longer the capacity to capture the reflection of Puruṣa. Buddhi can catch the reflection only when it goes on transforming itself into shapes of objects. In asamprajñāta samādhi, all vṛttis including vivekakhyāti, are made to cease altogether. There is then no objective transformation of buddhi, though a subtle form of non-objective transformation is there which is not capable of catching the reflection of Puruṣa (sadrśa-pariṇāma-dhārā). This is a bold mystic assumption enforced by the indispensable need of emancipation. But, the Sāṃkhya system proper stops at viveka-khyāti and has not the relieving feature of a further assumption which Yoga feels it necessary to make.

Thus in final analysis, the empirical self along with the attending concept of personality is a false phenomenon in the

Sāṃkhya doctrine. In liberation, this personality (and so the empirical self) is assumed to be abolished, through the realization of falsity, leaving the Puruṣa to shine in its absolute glory, which is however never diminished by all the pretensions of buddhi. But, the Sāṃkhya cannot thereby escape the trap of paradox laid before it.

The AV view also fares no better in this respect. It has noted the discomfiture of the Sāṃkhya in asserting the basic reality of both matter and spirit. If the two are equally real, a relation between the two must be maintained somehow. If there is no relation, what is the need of this unnecessary duplication of the real? The Sāṃkhya cannot explain this relation or want of relation. If the material world is real how should its relation with spirit be called false? And if this relation is false how can Sāṃkhya maintain the reality of the material world? Hence, to dispense with this difficulty, the AV. has dispensed with the world altogether. But has the AV. really gained anything by this total dismissal?

The Sāṃkhya may say- the material world is too loud to be ignored. So we cannot dismiss it at our will. May be we cannot satisfactorily explain the nature of relation between matter and spirit, but what right have you<sup>Vedāntist,</sup> got to dismiss the everkicking material world as a false appearance and what do you ultimately gain by it? The difficulty you<sup>Vedāntist,</sup> seek to avoid crops up in another form. The AV. then has to assume a principle of cosmic illusion which cannot be defined either as existent or non-existent. Yet the false world is assumed to be a transformation (pariṇāma) of this indefinable and false

avidyā. Thus, the world is the parivāma, of avidyā and the vivarta of Brahman. A false world is superimposed on the universal consciousness - the transcendental Brahman. The world is thus a false projection of the Brahman as the illusory snake is the false projection of a piece of rope in darkness. But why is it that what is false should appear as true? Hence, a cosmic principle of eternal illusion is postulated. But, if this principle is taken to be a reality, the AV. theory goes to pieces, for the Brahman, the One Reality, is then faced with an opposite number. To avoid this, it is then again assumed that avidyā is not a reality. It is neither existent nor non-existent. It is indefinable and so false. It amounts to positing a principle which is neither positive nor negative (bhāvābhāva-vilakṣaṇa), which is not far from saying that it is neither real nor unreal. Thus, ~~Vedantist's~~ dismissal of the material world has been more than compensated by the affirmation of an indefinable principle leading to the affirmation of an indefinable world. In a nutshell, a definite material world is replaced by an indefinable material world, which is the transformed state of an indefinable principle of illusion and a false projection of the One Supreme Real i.e. the Brahman. If this be an improvement on the Sāṃkhya view, let us not grudge it, but what then about the empirical self? It is the same Sāṃkhya view emerging under the cover of AV. technique. The empirical self is jīva which is nothing but the reflection of <sup>the</sup> transcendental consciousness in the Antahkarana a transformed state of avidyā (antah-karāṇa-pratibimbita-Ātmanyam jīvaḥ). According to the Sāṃkhya, antahkarāṇa is a

real material object, while according to the AV. it is an indefinable object, being the pariṇāma of indefinable avidyā. Like the Sāṃkhya view, here also antaḥkāraṇa undergoes transformation in the shape of presented objects and this transformation is also called vr̥tti (*modes*). This antaḥkāraṇa-vr̥tti is illumined by the reflection of the transcendental consciousness, in order to make for the possibility of empirical knowledge.

Let us leave aside other technical details and concentrate on the aspect of personality. The personality belongs to the empirical self or the jīva, *but* not to Brahman. The Brahman is the Supreme impersonal Being. The personal is a false projection of the Impersonal; through the efficacy of the indefinable avidyā, which is neither different from nor identical with Brahman. Liberation consists in the final realization that this personal self is an illusion and that basically it is one with the transcendental Brahman. Thus, emancipation is nothing but the <sup>^</sup>depersonalization of the personal self (the empirical jīva). When its limitation by antaḥkāraṇa is surmounted, the person disappears into a complete merger with the universal consciousness.

But here also the most question is - how do you <sup>Vedāntist,</sup> make for the possibility of this depersonalisation? It is said that it is made possible by constant meditation on the meaning of such Upaniṣadic mantras as 'Tattvamasi' (Thou art that). The meaning of these mantras, if constantly cultured in meditative realization, will lead to the uplift of the veil of avidyā, which has been so long screening the Brahman from the view of the jīva. 'I am that Brahman' (Soḥam) - this is the



final realization. But, here also the question of questions is - whose realization is this? Obviously it should be the realization of the empirical jīva. If this is so, this realization also is a form of 'antahkarana vṛtti' which is a modification of antahkarana, which in its turn is a modification of avidyā. As such, the realization of 'tattvamasi' or soṣham being a modification (vṛtti) of the internal organ (antahkarana) which is basically false, must itself be ontologically false. Thus, it is a queer case of falsity removing falsity. On the one hand the jīva or empirical self continues to be affected by the object-shaped transformation of antahkarana, on the otherhand, the same jīva is sought to be liberated at the same time through the same antahkarana undergoing another transformation in the shape of the meaning of 'tattvamasi' etc. This realization of indentity is also a matter of the material world, being a modification of the material antahkarana.

Thus, the conclusion settles down to this queer paradox - a false state of a false material essence helps to falsely rescue a false empirical self from a false limitation and helps it to identify itself with the true Brahman. Is it a happier conclusion than the Sāṃkhya view?

Thus, both the Sāṃkhya and the AV. systems in their attempt to rescue the empirical self from the bondage of personality and thus to affirm an ever existent freedom remaining screened so long have only succeeded in blighting the prospects of both liberation and personal confirmation.

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p. 183
- (2) Kārikāvalī; Bālaṃanoramā Prēss : Madras 1923 p. 410  
Dinakari says - "jñānādisambandha - prakārenaiva  
ātmanah pratyakhyasya anubhavasiddhatvāt"
- (3) "Sa eva anasrava dhāturacintya Kuśalo dhruvah sukha vimuktikayo -  
asau dharmākhyo - ayam mahāmuneh"
- (4) "anyaddhi śabdasya pravṛttinimittam anyacca vyutpattinimittam" -  
Sāhityadarpaṇa - Chapter II, Vṛtti under Verse No. XIV

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- (2) Ibid. p.5
- (3) M. Hiriyanna: The Essentials of Indian Philosophy; London 1949;  
pp. 12-15. This view is also put forward by  
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- (4) P.T. Raju: The Concept of Man - A Study on Comparative  
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- (5) Swami Sarvananda: Cultural Heritage of Indian; Vol. III;  
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- (7) A.B. Keith: Religion and Philosophy of The Vedas and Upanisads;  
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- (9) Aitareya Āraṇyaka II.6.3. - 'prajñānasya nāmadheyāni'.
- (10) S.N. Dasgupta: A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol.I;  
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- (11) 'sūryaḥ ātmā jagataḥ tasthuśasca'; 'ātman' - derived from √ān  
(to blow) meaning 'the vital breath', (Refer also  
Chap.I, p.9). RV I.115.1.
- (12) 'ātmā brahmaiva nāparah' - The Ātman is essentially Brahman  
and none else; or 'sa vāyam ātmā brahma' - Verily  
this ātman is Brahman. Brh. IV.4.5.

- (13) Quoted in 'A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy'  
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- (15) Brhadaranyaka Upanisad IV.2.2
- (16) This view is from 'Indian Thought - A Critical Survey'  
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- (17) T.M.P. Mahadevan: Invitation to Indian Philosophy; New  
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- (18) R.D. Ranade: A Constructive Survey of Upanisadic Philosophy;  
Bombay 1968; p. 103.
- (19) S.N. Dasgupta: A History of Indian philosophy, Vol. I;  
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- (20) Ibid. p. 429
- (21) 'Naitad buddhena bhāṣitam' - Gauṣapāda Māṇḍukya-kārikā  
IV. 99 and Samkara's commentary on it - quoted in  
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Calcutta 1952; p. 455.
- (22) Śamkara's commentary on Brahma-sūtra.
- (23) S.N. Dasgupta: op. cit. p. 421.
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- (26) Samkara's commentary on The Introduction of Brahma-Sutra.
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- (28) S. Radhakrishnan: The Brahma-Sutra; London 1960; p. 120.
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- (30) S. Radhakrishnan: The Brahma-Sutra; London 1960; p. 126
- (31) Ibid. pp. 122 - 124.
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- (34) Siddhantavindu: Parges 45-49; Bhandarkar Oriental Series 1962.

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- (39) M.N. Sircar: The System of Vedantic Thought and Culture;  
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- (40) Śārirakabhāṣya III. 2, 27.
- (41) Śārirakabhāṣya IV.1.15.

CHAPTER III -

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- (3) Ibid. pp. 5-6.
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- (5) M. Winternitz: Geschichte der Indischen Literature; Leipzig  
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- (6) F. Edgerton: American Journal on Philology; Vol. XIV. I.,  
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- (7) K.B.R. Rao: Op. cit. p. 6.
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- (9) K.B.R. Rao; Op. cit. pp. 35-36.
- (10) In a striking article entitled "Samkhya Original and Classical",  
Otto Schrader holds the same opinion that the Samkhyan  
Prakṛti can ultimately be traced to the Impersonal Brahman  
of the Vedic or Upanisadic times. He conceives the epic  
age as the beginning of this line of thinking - commented  
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p. 99 (footnote)
- (11) P.B. Chakrararty: Origin and Development of Samkhya System  
of Thoughts; Calcutta 1952; p. 11.
- (12) P. Deussen: Philosophy of The Upanisads; 1906; pp. 22-25 and  
also quoted in K.B.R. Rao, op. cit. p. 100.

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- (14) Ibid. p. 106.
- (15) Ibid. pp. 112-114.
- (16) 'Khādini buddhiravyak-tamah-kārastatha-stamaḥ bhūtaprakṛti-ruddiṣṭa' (Caraka Samhitā - Sārirasthanam 59-60).  
quoted in A. Sengupta, The Evolution of Samkhya School of Thought; Lucknow 1959; p. 116 (footnote).
- (17) tasmāt jñāḥ prakṛtiścātmā drastā kāraṇa-meva ca (thus the knower, prakṛti and ātman, the seer and the cause too) (CS.I.340) again, cetanādhatu... mantā, bodhayitā.... puruṣaḥ...pradhānam avyaktam jive jñāḥ...cāntarātmā ceti (CS IV.7). Here pradhānam, prakṛti and puruṣaḥ are used as synonyms.
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- (22) G.J. Larson: Classical Samkhya; Delhi 1969; p. 166.
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- (24) Ibid. p. 168.
- (25) Ibid. p. 168.
- (26) Ibid. p. 169.
- (27) Ibid. p. 182.
- (28) A. Sengupta: The Evolution of Samkhya School of Thought; Lucknow 1959; p. 26.
- (29) "Siṣādhayīṣita - dharma - viśiṣṭa - dharmānumeyaḥ pakṣaḥ"
- (30) "nāsiddhe bhavadharmo-asti....sadyate katham" - Pramanavārttika by Dharmakīrti; Benaras Sanskrit University Edition 1968; p. 316.
- (31) Nyāyamañjarī by Jayantabhaṭṭa: Vol.I. Chowkhamba; Benaras Ed. p. 116.

- (32) "dharmaviśeṣa-viparītasādhano yathā....ubhayatra vyabhicārāt"  
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1968; p. 5. and also in Dharmottarapradīpa - Tibetan  
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"tamudāharati - yathā....iti" - 87  
"tad....viruddhaḥ" - 88
- (33) "āha samghā-tārthatvopalabdheh....asti puruṣaḥ" - Yuktidīpikā;  
p. 77. R.C. Pandeya (Ed). Delhi 1967
- (34) Syādetat śayanāsanādayaḥ samghātāḥ....pārārthyamātreṇa  
anvayāt. - Vācaṣpati in Tattvakaumudī. pg. 308-309
- (35) Ganganath Jha; "Tattva-kaumudī of Vachaspati Misra"  
(Translation); Bombay 1896; p. 66.
- (36) Cf. Bhasya; Samkhya-tattva-kaumudī: Paramārtha's Chinese  
version on Samkhya-karika XVIII.
- (37) G.J. Larson: Op. cit. p. 28.
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systems of Thought; 1930; p. 167.
- (40) G.J. Larson: Op. cit. p. 185.
- (41) K.B.R.Rao: Op. cit. p. 47.
- (42) Mūlā-Prakṛti - Samkhya-karika III  
Pradhānam - Samkhya-karika XI, LVII, LXVIII and Avyaktam.
- (43) K.B.R. Rao: Op. cit. p. 47.
- (44) A.B.Keith: Op. cit. pp. 89-90.
- (45) 'Svarūpadānam pradhānam noparicchinnam vyāpakam ityarthah'  
- Samkhya pravacāna bhāṣya I. 76.
- (46) 'Lingam' - Vacaspati Misra prefers to take lingam as characteristic  
(of Primal Nature). The existence of the evolved is  
the middle term, whereby we infer the existence of  
Primal Nature; it is the characteristic mark whereon the  
inference is based. Lingam as understood by Gaudapada  
would be really distinctive of the evolved. Commented  
by S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri in his book The Samkhya-  
karika of Isvarkṛṣṇa, University of Madras 1935.
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- (48) M. Hiriyanna: Essentials of Indian Philosophy; London 1949;  
p. 108.

- (49) Samkhya-sutra-vrttisara I.61: Mahadeva bases his interpretation in accordance with the sutra VI.39. - 'Sattvādinām ataddharmatvam tadrūpatvāt.'
- (50) 'Anyanyābhibhavāśraya janana mithuna vṛtt-ayaśca guṇāḥ' : Samkhya-karika XII.
- (51) Yuktidipika describes the gunas as infra-subtle forces (suksma-sakti): of. 'parama-vibhāgam upasamprāptāḥ sūksma śaktayah' - P.B. Chakravarty, Yuktidīpika, Calcutta 1938; p. 57 - line 12.
- (52) 'ityeṣa prakṛtikṛto mahadādiviśeṣa bhūta-paryanta prati puruṣābi-moksārtham svārtha iva-parārtha arambha': SK.LXI.
- (53) S.N. Dasgupta: A history of Indian Philosophy. Vol. I.; Cambridge 1963; p. 260.
- (54) S. Radhakrishnan: Indian Philosophy, Vol. II; London 1952; p. 289.
- (55) Max Muller: Indian Philosophy, Vol. III; Calcutta 1952; p 80.
- (56) G.J. Larson: Op. cit. p. 196.
- (57) A.B. Keith: Op. cit. p. 9. K.B.R. Rao remarks in this context that the buddhi, ahamkāra, manas are fundamentally cosmic principles and they perform psychological functions. In the Samkhya-karika, the cosmic aspect of the principles is completely ignored, and they are treated as psychological principles depending on their psychological functions. (K.B.R. Rao. Op. cit. p. 69 - footnote).
- (58) E.H. Johnston: Early Samkhya. Prize Publication Fund, Vol.XV. London 1937; pp. 31-32 and also J.A.B. van Buitenen: Studies in Samkhya, Vol. I; 1956; pp. 153-157.
- (59) G.J. Larson: Op. cit. p. 200.
- (60) J.A.B. van Buitenen: Studies in Samkhya, Vol. II; 1957; p. 17 and also quoted in G.J. Larson, Op. cit. p. 201
- (61) Sāmkhya-kārikā XXII: According to Vijñānabhikṣu, mind alone evolves from sāttvika ahamkāra. Other senses arise from the rājasa ahamkāra or taijasa ahamkāra. The five tanmātras are derived from tāmasa ahamkāra or bhūtādi.
- (62) Refer to Bhaṣya, Sāmkhya-tattva-kaumudī, Yuktidīpikā and so on, on SK. XXV.
- (63) S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri: Translation of 'The Samkhya karika of Iśvarkṛṣṇa'; III Ed. Madras 1948; pp. 52-53.

- (64) Prof. Dasgupta has accepted the view of the Yoga-sutra and believes that the tanmātras must have evolved from tāmasa mahat, containing within it the seeds of the objective series. The tāmasa ahamkāra cannot be one with the sattvika side of the ego which is essentially different from it. It should rather be regarded as the tāmasa mahat as the origin (Ref. S.N. Dasgupta: Yoga Philosophy in Realtion to Other Indian Systems of Thought; 1930; p. 186). Dr. A. Sengupta points out that according to the Samkhya philosophy, the subjective series is never entirely dissimilar to the objective series as both of them have emanated from the same source. So the distinction is regarding the specific character and not the essential nature. Evolution means differentiation in integration. So it can be said very well that all evolutes are integrated either in the body of the avyakta or in Mahat... (Ref. A. Sengupta: Op. cit. pp. 36-37).
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- (67) F.V. Catalina: A Study of Self Concept of Sāṃkhya-Yoga Philosophy; Delhi 1968; p. 67.
- (68) Vijnanabhikṣu elaborates this view in Yoga-vārttika. I.2.4.
- (69) tasmiṅ-sciddarpane....drumāḥ. Vārttika on Yoga bhāṣya on Yogasutra 14 and 17.
- (70) Kamalaśīla observes - buddhidarpaṇā - rudam....tadavasthatvāt. Tattvasaṃgrahapañcikā under verse 297.
- (71) buddhyāśrayam hi....bhavitum. Yuktidīpikā on kārikā 5. edited by R.C. Pande. Delhi 1967 p.35
- (72) Bhāṣya under Yogasutra 17
- (73) According to E.A. Welden, 'linga' means 'characteristic mark' or 'mergent'. In the former sense it signifies that which characterizes man. In the latter sense it is that which disappears or vanishes when enlightenment or isolation is achieved; when taken together with the five tanmātras, the linga is then characterized as the 'linga-sarira' or 'subtle body'. The linga-sarira is the transmigrating entity and includes both the thirteen fold instrument and the five tanmatras. This interpretation of linga-sarira and linga is also that of Paramartha's Chinese version on Karika XL, XLI, XLII (Ref: The Samkhya Term linga; A.J.P., Vol. XXXI; 1910; pp. 445-459). Larson takes the term linga as equivalent to karana or the thirteen fold instrument (Ref: Classical Sāṃkhya by G.J. Larson; p. 206).



- (74) Sāmkhya kārīkā XXIX: There is a difference between Gauḍapādas doctrine and that of the kārīkā, as interpreted by Vacaspati. The latter holds that the circulation of the vital airs is the function only of the internal organs, while the former would assign the same function to all the thirteen elements - internal and external - taken collectively. The Jayamangala agrees with Gauḍapāda's view, while Vijñānabhikṣu agrees with Vacaspati. SPB II/31 - Sūryanā-rāyana Śāstri pp. 66.67.
- (75) S.K.G. Wilson's translation of Gaudapada-bhasya ; p. 103
- (76) G.J. Larson: Op. cit. p. 208.
- (77) A.B. Keith: The Samkhya system, op. cit. p. 105.
- (78) A.B. Keith: Op. cit. p. 339.

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- (3) S. Radhakrishnan; Indian Philosophy. Vol. II; London 1951; p. 33.
- (4) Introduction to Samkhya pravacana bhasya.  
'eko 'dvitiya iti veda-vacāmsi pumsī sarvābhīmāna -  
vinivartanato' sya muktai, baidharmya laksanabhida  
viraham vadanti nakhandatām kha iva dharmasatā-  
virodhāt.'
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- (6) Ibid. pp. 301-302.
- (7) P.T. Raju: The Philosophical Traditions of India; London 1971; p. 178.
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