The role of gush Emunim and the Yishuv Kehillati in the west bank 1974 - 1980

Newman, David

How to cite:

Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:

- a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
- a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
- the full-text is not changed in any way

The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.

Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
THE ROLE OF GUSH EMUNIM AND THE YISHUV KEHILLATI
IN THE WEST BANK 1974 - 1980

David Newman

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author.
No quotation from it should be published without
his prior written consent and information derived
from it should be acknowledged.

Thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy,
Department of Geography, University of Durham.

17 June 1981

July, 1981.
ABSTRACT.

This thesis constitutes the first comprehensive analysis of the Gush Emunim movement and their settlements in the West Bank. It is concerned with the specific evolution of this new politico/religious settlement movement and discusses their settlement patterns, which are seen to be greatly influenced by ideological factors. The particular settlement type, within which the majority of the Gush Emunim settlers live, is shown to be of major significance in that it represents a totally new form of rural settlement in Israel. It is the type of settlement, as opposed to the political location of these settlements, which may have more meaning for future settlement policies.

The study firstly analyses the evolution of the Gush Emunim movement, their beliefs, their settlement ideology and policy implementation. There follows a study of the development of a new settlement type – the Yishuv Kehillati (Community Village). These two developments are drawn together in an examination of two specific case studies. Finally, conclusions are drawn as to the value of this settlement activity, as it relates to Israeli society and the future of the West Bank, bearing in mind the Israeli general elections to be held in July 1981.
DECLARATION

I declare that the contents of this thesis have not previously been submitted at this or any other university.

David Newman

Department of Geography,
University of Durham.
July 1981.

COPYRIGHT

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author.
No quotation from it should be published without his prior written consent and information derived from it should be acknowledged.
PREFACE

The Arab-Israel conflict, notwithstanding the Camp David Peace Accords between Egypt and Israel in 1979, continues to be one of the major causes of international instability. Central to this conflict is the issue of the West Bank and a Palestinian Homeland. The past decade has witnessed an increased polarisation of stances relating to this controversial issue, apparently leading ever further away from compromise and ever closer to renewed conflict.

The activities of the Gush Emunim movement, studied in this thesis, is one example of the adoption of an extreme stance. I have felt that the argument, as represented by the participating governments and in the media, has become one of continual attack and defence. Arguments tend to represent the subjective views of the authors and offer little real analysis of new situations. Furthermore, much of the analysis reflects new developments only as they affect the wider international and political conflict, often leaving aside the domestic issues. It is with this in mind that I have attempted to provide an objective analysis of a highly emotional subject. This ambitious aim was only possible because of my ability to gain entry into the settlements, and remain in the confidence of the personalities involved. While recognising that I have my own own particular perspectives and
Introduction of the study and context

Personal knowledge of the political and religious background to this study has been essential to disentangle the complex processes at work. It is to be hoped that a complementary study representing the picture as observed from the far more numerous Arab settlements in the West Bank, may be attempted by someone with the same credentials with the Arab villagers.

The literature on the Arab-Israel conflict is vast, much of it being repetitive. The study of the Gush Emunim movement represents an analysis of a little known phenomenon — but one which is proving to be a major factor in the West Bank situation. The issue of Jewish settlement in the West Bank is one of the central problems to be resolved in the Arab-Israel conflict. Insofar as the West Bank, with its existing physical and human landscapes, is not suitable for the insertion of a totally new settlement network, the reasons for the development of settlement activity here is seen as being dependent on specific ideological stances. It is the ideological factor which is shown to be the common factor linking settlement location and settlement type.

This study has involved research over a three year period, although its roots are based in a far longer connection with the Jewish religion and Israel. Using this as background, three field visits were made to the study area between 1979 and 1981, resulting in extensive visits to the settlements themselves and interviews with political and planning personalities responsible for Gush Emunim settlement. A fluent knowledge of Hebrew has
been essential in using much of the primary source material, including planning documents, political statements, and the local press, and this is reflected in detail in the bibliography.

A note must be made concerning the use of currency figures in this study. Over the six year period under review, the Israeli economy has undergone massive inflation, thus substantially reducing the value of the Israeli pound as against the major foreign currencies. Wherever currency figures are used in this thesis, the equivalent value in dollars, at that specific point in time, is appended. A full conversion table of the currencies covering the timespan referred to in this thesis appears in the final appendix.

David Newman.

July 1981.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It is a pleasure to be able to acknowledge the constant aid and advice given to me by my supervisor, Dr. Gerald Blake. He has always been ready to give of his time to discuss the progress of this study and I am greatly indebted to him for the interest he has shown in this work. I would also like to thank Professor W.B. Fisher for accepting me into the Department to carry out this study.

I would like to express my appreciation to the many people in Israel for their advice and help in obtaining information. Mr. Avshalom Rokach and Mr. Meir Eldar of the Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem were influential in obtaining planning documents for me and in offering advice concerning the nature of settlement planning in Israel. Dr. David Grossman of the Department of Geography at Bar Ilan University was always on hand to help establish contacts and to offer critical advice, while Professor Shalom Reichmann of the Hebrew University helped me understand the specific role of the settlement type under study.

Within the Gush Emunim movement, Mr. Zvi Slonim - the ex-spokesman for the Gush and a resident of the settlement of Kedumim - helped establish contacts for me and sent continual information to me in Durham. Mr. Avram Shtub of Bar Ilan
University, Mr. Yosef Manor of the Ophrah settlement, and Mr. Yoram Adler of the Kefar Adumim settlement - and a planner by profession - all helped me collect relevant data and information.

Mr. Jim Fine of the Quaker movement was influential in presenting the information that could not be obtained through Israeli authorities. He provided much relevant documentation and personally conducted me on tours of the West Bank, pointing out the relevant areas of land under dispute. The staff at the Oriental Library and Middle Eastern Documentation Centre in Durham, the Zionist Archives and the Truman Research Institute (both in Jerusalem), and the Settlement Study Centre (in Rehovot) were all helpful in obtaining material.

My thanks go to the Social Science Research Council for funding me for three years research. In the production of this thesis I am indebted to all the staff at the Numac computer centres in both Durham and Newcastle, and most particularly to Judith and Alan Hunter in Newcastle for their continual help and advice concerning the application of the word processing programme Textform.

Professor M. Sussman of the Department of Microbiology at Newcastle University read large sections of this manuscript and his constructive comments were much appreciated. I acknowledge the help and example of my father whose thirst for scholarship and recognition of rights and wrongs in all conflicts was always uppermost in my thoughts. Finally, but by no means least, my deep gratitude to Elaine who has stood by me for the last two
years and has given me a home base from which to work.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract ........................................... ii
Preface ............................................. iv
Acknowledgements .................................. vii
Table Of Contents .................................. x
List Of Appendices ................................. xiv
List Of Figures ..................................... xv
List Of Tables ..................................... xviii
Glossary ........................................... xix

## 1 INTRODUCTION ........................................... 1
1.1 The Role Of Ideology ............................ 3
1.2 Objectives ....................................... 12
1.3 The Study Area .................................... 14
REFERENCES .......................................... 25

## 2 SETTLEMENT STRATEGY AND THE WEST BANK: THE EMERGENCE OF
GUSH EMUNIM ........................................... 29
2.1 The West Bank: Settlement History .......... 29
2.2 Settlement And Security: The Case Of Israel .... 32
2.3 Attitudes Towards The West Bank In The Arab-Israel
Conflict ................................................ 42
2.3.1 Jordanian Rule .................................. 42
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.3.2 The Six Day War</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.3 The Allon Plan</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.4 The Land Of Israel Movement</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.5 Cracks In The Government Concensus</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.6 The Yom Kippur War</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4 The Emergence Of Gush Emunim</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4.1 The Ideological Argument</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4.2 Tactics Under The Mapai Government</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5 Other Settlement Activity</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5.1 The Case of Jerusalem</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5.2 Other Settlement Proposals</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6 Conclusions</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REFERENCES</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3 POST-1977: THE GROWTH OF GUSH EMUNIM | 102 |
| 3.1 The Likud Government: Ideological Background | 102 |
| 3.2 Gush Emunim As A Political Force | 109 |
| 3.2.1 Initial Expectations | 109 |
| 3.2.2 The Lands Issue | 113 |
| 3.3 Multiplicity Of Plans | 125 |
| 3.3.1 Government Proposals | 125 |
| 3.3.2 Non-Government Plans | 134 |
| The Existing Settlement Network 1980 | 140 |
| 3.4.1 Regional Framework | 153 |
| REFERENCES | 164 |
4 RURAL SETTLEMENT EXPANSION IN ISRAEL: INDUSTRIAL PROCESSES

AND FORMS ...................................................... 172
4.1 Ideological Considerations And The Rural Urban Bias 172
4.2 Rural Industrialisation ................................. 182
  4.2.1 General Trends .................................. 182
  4.2.2 Change In The Individual Settlement Unit ... 189
4.3 The Industrial Village (Kefat) ....................... 201
  4.3.1 The Concept .................................. 201
  4.3.2 The Regional Framework ...................... 209
  4.3.3 The Segev Example ............................ 212
REFERENCES .................................................. 221

5 THE YISHUV KEHILLATI .................................... 229

  5.1 The Demand For New Forms Of Rural Settlement ... 229
    5.1.1 The Rural Village Centre ................. 230
    5.1.2 The 'Movement For New Urban Settlement' . 237

  5.2 The Yishuv Kehillati ................................ 240
    5.2.1 The Concept ................................ 240
    5.2.2 The Struggle For Recognition ............ 247
    5.3.3 Similarities In The Past .................. 258
    5.3.4 Rural Or Urban Concept? .................. 263

  5.4 Wider Applicability Of The Concept ............... 266
    5.4.1 Garin Raphael ............................. 267
    5.4.2 New Ma'alot .............................. 271

  5.5 Future Development ............................... 273

REFERENCES .................................................. 277
BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................. 399
Newspapers. ..................................................... 399
Books and Theses - General. ............................... 400
Books and Theses - Specific ............................... 404
Articles. ......................................................... 414
Documents and Primary Sources ......................... 430

APPENDICES .................................................... 435
1. Gush Emunim - Movement For The Renewed Fulfillment
   Of The Zionist Ideal ..................................... 435
2. Gush Emunim Masterplan For Settlement In Judea And
   Samaria 1978 .............................................. 441
3. Master Plan For The Development Of Settlement
   In Judea And Samaria 1978 (the Drobles Plan) .... 445
4. Community Settlement - Organisational Structure ... 449
5. List Of Gush Emunim Settlements 1980/81 ............. 454
6. Planning And Construction Process In New Settlements . 455
LIST OF FIGURES.

FIG 1.1. Ideology, Politics and Settlement Activity in Israel. ......................... 5
FIG 1.2. Israel And The Occupied Territories 1967 ....... 11
FIG 1.3. The West Bank: Physical Regions. .............. 15
FIG 1.4. Arab Population Distribution in the West Bank. .. 19
FIG 2.1. Ancient Jewish Kingdoms in Palestine .......... 30
FIG 2.2. Jewish Settlement in Palestine 1880 - 1914 .... 36
FIG 2.3. Jewish Settlement in Palestine 1937 - 1939 .... 37
FIG 2.4. The Rokhell-Lev Settlement Plan 1943 .......... 39
FIG 2.5. Population Change in the West Bank 1948 - 1967 .. 44
FIG 2.6. Table of Settlement History. ................. 47
FIG 2.9. Gush Emunim 'Yesh' Settlement Plan 1976. .... 74
FIG 2.10. Settlement in the 'Wider Jerusalem' Area: Housing Ministry Proposal 1976 .......... 81
FIG 2.11. Settlement in the 'Wider Jerusalem' Area: Israel Lands Authority Proposal 1976. ............... 82
FIG 2.13. The 'Double Column' Settlement Plan 1976 (after Wachman). ............... 86
FIG 3.2. The Sharon Settlement Proposals 1977 & 1979 .... 128
FIG 3.3. The Weizmann (Defence Ministry) Settlement Proposals for Urban Settlement 1978 & 1979 .... 131
FIG 3.4. Gush Emunim Master Settlement Plan 1978 ...... 136
FIG 3.5. The Drobless Settlement Plan 1978 .............. 137
FIG 3.6. Jewish Settlement in the West Bank by Political Regions 1980/81 ........ 141
FIG 3.7. Settlement in Gush Etzion 1981 .................. 145
FIG 3.8. Housing Development in Jerusalem post-1967 ...... 146
FIG 3.10. West Bank Settlement in Care of the Housing Ministry 1981 ........ 151
FIG 3.11. Jewish Regional Councils in the West Bank 1980 .. 161
FIG 4.1. Settlement by Urban Regions (after Zohar) 1977 .... 183
FIG 4.2. The Industrial Village: Stages of Regional Development ..................... 208
FIG 4.3. Segev Regional Development Plan 1979 ............ 215
FIG 5.1. Rural Centres in Israeli Regional Planning ....... 231
FIG 5.2. The Yishuv Kehillati Concept .................. 241
FIG 5.3. Theory and Reality in Israeli Rural Settlement Types ...................... 260
FIG 5.4. The New Ma'alot Settlement Plan 1977 ........... 272
FIG 5.5. The New Ma'alot Neighbourhood Concept .......... 274
FIG 6.1. Location of Case Studies .......................... 283
FIG 6.2. Ophrah and Region .................................. 288
FIG 6.3. Kedumim and Region ................................. 288
FIG 6.4. The Settlers at Camp Kaddum 1976 ............... 301
FIG 7.1. The Rural/Urban Continuum & Settlement in Israel 371
LIST OF TABLES.

TABLE 1.1. The Area of the Palestinian Mountains
Calculated by Weitz 1943 ............................. 17

TABLE 1.2. Population Increase in the West Bank 1968-1980  ................ 20

TABLE 3.1. Comparison of Settlement Plans ...................... 126

TABLE 4.1. Israel's Rural Population as a Percentage
of the Total 1948-1980 ............................... 177

TABLE 4.2. Employment Structure in Israeli Settlement-Types 186

TABLE 4.3. Major Sectors of Kibbutz Industrial Growth  ...... 193

TABLE 4.4. Required Employment Structure for the Segev
Region 1976 ........................................... 216

TABLE 4.5. Present and Future Population - Segev Project .. 219

TABLE 6.1. Comparison of Three Yishuv Kehillati Plans ........ 286

TABLE 6.2. Employment Structure of Kedumim 1977 & 1980 .. 313

TABLE 6.3. Employment Structure of Ophrah 1977 & 1980 ... 319

TABLE 6.4. Proposed Industrial Investment in Yishuv
Kehillati in the Jerusalem Region 1980/81  ...... 327

TABLE 7.1. Population Estimates for Israel (after Bachi) 345

TABLE 7.2. Population Estimates for Israel
(after Friedlander & Goldscheider) .................. 345

TABLE 7.3. Building Requirements in New Settlements 1979  .. 357

TABLE 7.4. The State of Israeli Rural Settlement 1979 .......... 361

TABLE 7.5. Establishment of New Israeli Rural Settlement. 363
Administered Territories. - Official term used by Israeli authorities to define the Occupied Territories.

Amanah. - The Settlement Division of Gush Emunim.

Eretz Israel. - lit: The Land of Israel. Derived from Biblical sources and denoting an area much larger than present day Israel. Its use often denotes the 'holy' Land of Israel.

Green Line. - Neutral term used to define the borders between the Occupied Territories and pre-1967 Israel.

Gush Emunim. - lit: Block of the faithful. Right wing politico-religious settlement group, founded in 1974, with the objective of settling throughout Eretz Israel, particularly in the West Bank.


Hitnachalut. - Term used to describe the squatting means by which Gush Emunim settlers seek to establish permanent resident rights.

Hityashvut. - lit: Settlement. Describes the normal process of settlement in Israel.

Judea and Samaria. - Ancient name of the West Bank (excluding the Jordan Valley) derived from the two ancient Jewish Kingdoms. Used by many Israelis to describe the West Bank.

Kefat. - Abbreviated term for Kefar Ta'asiyati (lit: Industrial Village). Rural settlement whose economic base is industrial.

Kibbutz. - A collective or communal settlement based primarily on agriculture, in recent years diversifying into industry as well.
Knesset. - The Israeli Parliament.

Likud. - The right wing coalition, forming the Israeli government since 1977.

Mapai. - Term by which the Israel Labour Party is known. It was the largest party in Israel from 1948 to 1977.

Mapam. - United Workers Party. Their philosophy is based on a combination of Marxism and Zionism. They believe in returning all of the Occupied Territories.

Mizrachi Party. - Main component of the National Religious Party, and original orthodox group in the Zionist movement.

Moshav. - Cooperative settlement of smallholders.

Moshav Shitufi. - Settlement with collective control over labour and means of production, but with more emphasis on private family living than in a Kibbutz.

Nahal. - Military/agricultural pioneering unit of the army. Used to maintain new border settlements before civilians take over.

National Religious Party. - NRP. Political party representing the bulk of religious Jews in Israel. Coalition partner in most Israeli governments since 1948.

Occupied Territories. - Territories captured by Israel in the Six Day War of 1967. Consists of the Golan Heights, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and part of the Sinai Peninsula.

West Bank. - Territorial unit on the west side of the River Jordan, now under Israeli control. Borders were defined following the 1948 War of Israeli Independence. Governed by Jordan until 1967.

Yishuv. - lit: Community. Refers to Palestine Jewry before the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948.

Yishuv Kehillati. - lit; Community Village. Rural settlement whose economy is based on a mixture of free enterprise industry, agriculture and commuting. It is a new settlement type within the Israeli rural planning framework. Most Gush Emunim settlements are of this type.
"Human groups everywhere tend to regard their homeland as the centre of the world. A people who believe they are at the centre claim, implicitly, the ineluctable worth of their location"

Tuan 1977.
Chapter One.

1 INTRODUCTION.

The establishment of new settlements throughout the world has been examined largely on the basis of their socio-economic justifications (1). Settlement policies vary according to the nature of the specific problem they are designed to meet. These include the alleviation of rural poverty and overcrowding, the extraction and exploitation of valuable raw resources in unsettled areas, the opening up of new land tracts in marginal areas, and the inhabiting of strategic areas based on political motivations. The degree to which any new settlement project is successful depends largely on the ability of the planner to plan in as comprehensive and rational a way as possible and on the degree of integration between any new structures and existing ones. It is also essential that there is a willingness on the part of the settlers to undertake such a project and to make it succeed. Furthermore, the ruling authority must deem the project sufficiently worthwhile to be prepared to inject large capital investment and subsidies into the costs of the early years.

General colonisation schemes based on particular political orientations, associated with security and the national idea abound, and they are referred to in Chapter Two. There are also many cases of specific groups establishing networks of colonies in an attempt to preserve their cultures, often against the threat of persecution and/or assimilation. The Amish communities in Pennsylvania have survived as a distinct sect by means of
forming compact settlements and the development of a regionally integrated folk culture (2). Similarly, the Hutterian Brethren live mostly in colonies scattered over the prairie provinces of Canada (3). The Maronite communities in the interior highlands of Lebanon came about as a result of fleeing from persecution in the fifth and succeeding centuries (4). From the eleventh century on, Druze settlement also began to play a major part in this same region (5). Elsewhere in the Middle East, the Ikhwan tribe formed desert townships in Saudi Arabia in the early twentieth century, amounting to colonies of proselytising warriors to whom politics and religion were indivisible (6).

The settlement activity to be examined in this study is unique in that it consists of the establishment of settlements in an area already heavily populated, with few natural economic resources, and whose strategic value in twentieth century terms is doubtful. Furthermore, the society which sponsors these settlements is deeply divided as to their importance. Reasons other than socio/economic ones have to be sought in attempting to explain the motivating force leading to the establishment of these settlements. It is argued that this motivating force is an ideological one, based on a particular understanding of religion and history as they relate to a specific territory.
1.1 The Role Of Ideology.

Houston (1978) notes that

"the fierceness with which Jews and Arabs have fought for territory in the Near East suggests that much more is at stake than the merely horizontal pressures of political ambitions" (7).

The crucial factors affecting settlement location and settlement type, as analysed in this thesis, are those of ideology and the way in which specific ideological groups within Israeli society influence the implementation of national planning objectives. It is assumed that national and local planning constitutes an activity that relates to the basic values and ideologies of the society in question. Seliger (1970) defines ideologies as being

"sets of ideas by which men posit, explain and justify ends and means of organised social action with the aim to preserve, amend, uproot or rebuild a given reality" (8).

The principle hypothesis of this thesis is that, in the case of Gush Emunim, ideologies and values exert a powerful influence on the planning process and that clashes of interest within the planning process are affected by ideologies.

The common element affecting all the groups in this study, is that they are all members of the Jewish people and all view the State of Israel as a central focus of their existence. This is a basic tenet of Zionism. However, within this all-embracing Zionist framework, there remain alternative interpretations of what constitutes real Zionism. The major components of the Zionist ideology are those of nationalism, socialism, and religion. Secular nationalism gave rise to the political Zionist
movement of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This general
framework was then interpreted in a variety of ways by groups of
people with specific socialist and/or religious beliefs.

This author distinguishes two major ideological groups within
the Israeli populace in relation to settlement activity in the
West Bank (Fig 1.1), namely the socialist, secular Mapai (Labour
Party) governments, and the private enterprise, religious-historical Likud government and Gush Emunim movement. These
two general groupings maintain different approaches to the
issue of settlement in the West Bank. Gush Emunim will be seen
to hold an ideological stance on the question of territories and
settlement location based on a religious viewpoint. This is a
more extreme viewpoint than that of the Likud coalition who view
the issue from a historical, rather than religious, stance. The
implementation of settlement policies based on this line of
thinking has been specifically associated with the right-wing
Herut party of Mr. Menachem Begin, which has constituted the
major coalition partner in the Israeli government since May 1977.
Gush Emunim represent a radical extension of this viewpoint. By
contrast, both the Gush and the Likud hold a non-ideological
(somewhat anti-ideological) viewpoint concerning the type of
settlement within which they live. The Mapai group hold a more
pragmatic view concerning territories and settlement location
based on the notion of 'defensible' boundaries. This argument
was advanced most notably by Deputy Premier and sometime Foreign
Minister, Mr. Yigal Allon (9). Harris (1978) (10) has analysed

Chapter One
FIG 1.1  IDEOLOGY POLITICS AND SETTLEMENT IN ISRAEL

Territorial Objectives

EXTREME
- Total annexation and integration into the State of Israel
- Residence of Jewish settlers in strategic areas
- Occupation of territory suitable for settlements
- Return of all territories as a condition for peace

MID-RIGHT
- Peace-oriented non-ideological
- Jewish settlements/Moshavim/Smaller

MID-LEFT
- Non-settlers/nongovernment and collective enterprises

Settlement Type

IDEOLOGICAL INFLUENCE
- Farmers
- Moshav
- Settlements

Source: D. Rosenfeld
the period of settlement activity, from 1967-1977, along the Jordan Valley and the Golan Heights, and has described the resulting spatial patterns. However, the Labour Party adhere to a strong ideological viewpoint concerning the importance of settlement type, emphasising the values of co-operative and communal modes of living and ownership.

According to Altmann and Rosenbaum (1973) "Ideology is a definition of reality which is rooted in a historic past and which draws a clear picture for man in the present of what society should become. An ideology has a set of political and/or social principles (ideals) which not only order thought, but also direct social or political action. An ideology is characterized by its substantive content, its ethical role in a contemporary social setting, and its method of operation" (11).

The "definition of reality" which is rooted in the historic past, in this particular context, spans a spectrum from one which places the emphasis primarily on territory and only secondarily on mode of living, to one which reverses these priorities. The principles which help define the resulting social and political action reflect the varying importance attached by different groups to the Biblical modes of social conduct and morals in a modern secular society. It is therefore argued that the substantive content of different ideological stances are based on the degree to which Jewish traditional values are upheld, and these, in turn, help to define the ethical conduct and method of operation of any particular group.

The power of any ideological viewpoint lies in the inherent belief in the superiority of that viewpoint over any other. This is particularly so when that viewpoint is based on what is deemed
to be a religious teaching. Since religious practice is Divinely inspired and thus constitutes the only 'right', its message has to be pursued at all costs. In practical terms, this leads to dogmatic and rigid adherence to any political strategies which arise out of the religious teaching. The strength of the ideological belief means that democratic processes are only pursued until they are no longer of any use. The subsequent stage is to go beyond the democratic process, since the belief in the inherent right to do something supersedes this stage. It will be observed that whereas both the present day activities of Gush Emunim, and much of the Jewish settlement activity of the past hundred years in Palestine, are indicative of the application of rigid adherence to ideological viewpoints, the additional religious element which the Gush have inserted within their Zionist framework, has been a major factor influencing their actions.

The central element in the Zionist ideology, and more specifically the religious Zionist ideology, has been the actual territory in question. Minogue (12) and Deutsch (13) note that the attainment of nationalist objectives generally occurs at the expense of the nationalist aspirations of other peoples. This is particularly so when more than one group compete for the same territory, as is the case in Palestine, where both Jews and Arabs lay claim to the same area. In this context, Houston states that

".. place implies belonging. It establishes identity,It defines vocation. It envisions destiny. Place is filled with memories of life that provides roots and gives direction" (14).

Chapter One
The Arabs, having lived in Palestine for hundreds of years, and having established strong roots in their homeland, have suffered as a result of a sense of belonging felt by another people for the same land. Only small pockets of Jews were to be found permanently in Palestine, mostly in the cities of Jerusalem, Hebron, Shechem (Nablus), Safed and Tiberias, and even in these places there were periods without Jewish residence at all. However, the 'Land of Israel' has always constituted a central theme in the Jewish religion and occupies an elevated role in the fulfilment of Divine Commandments (15). Although Tuan argues that no place is more sacred than another in the universal religions of the world "since all is created by and all is known to an omnipotent and omniscient God" (16), this is not the case in Judaism. The Judaeo-Christian tradition places a strong emphasis on the significance of the 'promised land' (17). The initial link between the specific race and the specific land is to be found in the Biblical accounts of the Divine promises to the Hebrew patriarchs (18). The borders of this territorial unit are defined in a number of places in the Scriptures (19), the greatest extent being interpreted as stretching from the River Nile to the Euphrates (20). Although the specific delineation of these territorial limits were never central to Jewish existence, the place of the 'holy land' as such, centred on the city of Jerusalem, has always played a dominant role in Jewish prayer and ritual. Gottman (1952) has proposed the concept of an 'iconography' of a people (21). This
iconography embraces the values of the past and is resistant to change while

"the territory is the very basis on which national existence rests" (22).

The land of Israel became a major part of the Jewish iconography. Emerson (23) notes that the Jewish people always maintained their identification with the country from which they had been exiled and the Land of Israel was the factor that reflected a sense of belonging and destiny for the people. In nearly all of the major prayers, there are references to the future 'return to the land' and 'rebuilding of Jerusalem', symbolising the Messianic future and the redemption of mankind. Thus, although the earliest political Zionists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were largely secular, they nevertheless rejected all proposals for a Jewish Homeland in other parts of the world. The central emotional force of the 'promised land' provided a major unifying factor, taking in the majority of the Jewish people.

In the earliest period of Zionist colonization and settlement, from the 1880's to 1920's, the areas settled depended largely on the permission of the Ottoman and British sovereign powers and the ability to acquire land suitable for farming. The location of these settlements eventually proved to be of political significance in that they were influential in defining the borders of the State of Israel in 1948. The area which became known as the West Bank was not included in the State of Israel, since Jewish settlements had not been established in this region. The Jordan Valley was considered too arid by the Arabs, while the
mountain ridge was densely populated, and, with the exception of the Etzion area to the south of Bethlehem, was not suitable for farming. Whereas, therefore, this region had been the centre of the ancient Jewish kingdoms, it was not deemed to be as important to the Zionist enterprise as were the coastal plains and valleys.

Nevertheless, Kimmerling notes that the West Bank and Galilee highland regions maintained their historical significance and were regarded by some groups as constituting an integral part of Palestine long after the beginning of Jewish colonisation (24). Furthermore, Houston notes that

"The creation of the State of Israel in 1948 and the repossession of the temple site in Jerusalem in 1967 have reawakened acutely the intense symbolism of place and land in the Jewish consciousness" (25).

Since the West Bank occupation in 1967, there has been intense settlement activity in this region by the Israeli authorities. Such activity is not only viewed as a means by which a permanent Jewish presence can be established along the eastern boundary of the Jordan Valley and the Golan Heights (Fig 1.2). It is also seen by some groups as the way by which Jews can settle in this emotionally historic Jewish highland region, known to the Israelis by its ancient name of Judea and Samaria. Spearheading this approach is the Gush Emunim group, as outlined above.
FIG 12.
ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 1967

The Occupied Territories

International boundaries

Source: D.Newman 1981
1.2 Objectives.

In complementing and extending the work of Harris, this thesis makes a first analysis of the Gush Emunim movement and its settlement activities. Whereas Harris is concerned mostly with the Labour Party pragmatism and their concern with the establishment of 'defensible' boundaries along the eastern border, this study is more specifically concerned with the settlements in the West Bank highlands to the west of the Jordan Valley, and the largely non-pragmatic factors which have resulted in the evolution of a new political settlement movement, known as Gush Emunim, and their relationship to the domestic framework of Israeli politics. Central to an understanding of the development of this movement are the ideological self-justifications of Gush Emunim, within the context of Jewish religious belief and Jewish historical experience - including the growth of twentieth century political Zionism. It will be argued that emotive and largely irrational factors, based on intrinsic religious belief, have constituted the crucial driving force behind the development of the Gush Emunim movement and this, in turn, has influenced their settlement activities.

As well as an analysis of the political evolution of the Gush Emunim movement, an examination is made of the means by which their settlement strategies have been implemented on the ground. At the macro level, the settlement networks and the regional linkages to other Jewish settlements, both within the West Bank
and within Israel proper, is of major importance. It is noted that no such linkages exist, or are planned, with the dominant Arab settlement network. At the micro level, the individual settlement type, known as the Yishuv Kehillati (lit: Community Settlement) within which the majority of the Gush Emunim settlers reside, is highly significant. The Yishuv Kehillati represents a totally new settlement form, quite distinct from the traditional kibbutz and moshav. The Yishuv Kehillati is evaluated within the context of traditional Israeli planning, which has been strongly influenced by the Zionist ideological process, and which continues to attach great importance to utopian forms of rural settlement.

Overall therefore, this thesis analyses the processes which have resulted in a new settlement movement (Gush Emunim) and in a new settlement type (the Yishuv Kehillati). Both of these are shown to have come into being as a result of a departure from the accepted processes of Israeli development, which have tended to be based on a strongly centralised and beura cratic government and institutional decision-making elite. It is argued that this departure from the previously accepted trends is due to the adoption of an alternative understanding of the Zionist/Jewish endeavour of the twentieth century.

The processes which have led to these new developments consist of an intricate mixture of religious and political factors and planning principles, each in turn being based on strong ideological beliefs (Fig 1.1), resulting from the different
interpretations of Jewish history and destiny. The end result of this process is shown to be the practical implementation of settlement policies arising out of the inherent belief in a particular ideological viewpoint. This practical implementation is brought about as a result of pressure being exerted on those in power, concerning both the political level (location in specific areas) and the planning level (specific types of settlement).

1.3 The Study Area.

The West Bank is a political, rather than a physical unit, brought about by the ceasefire lines following the 1948 War of Independence and the Armistice Agreement between Israel and Jordan in 1949 (26). Excluding East Jerusalem, the area encompasses some 5505 square kilometres. The area contains three distinct physical north to south sub-regions (Fig 1.3), consisting of the semi-arid Jordan Valley in the east; the eastern slopes, stretching from the valley to the mountain ridge to its west; and the mountain ridge itself. This mountain ridge is only part of the mountain belt which stretches from the River Litani in the Lebanon to the north, south to the Beer Sheba Approaches. The mountains are bordered by the Coastal Plain to the west, the Negev Plain in the south, and the Jordan Valley in the east. Weitz (1943) has described the mountain belt from the
FIG 1.3
THE WEST BANK: PHYSICAL REGIONS
Lebanese border through to its southern extremity (27). He calculated the total area of this belt in Palestine as some 91,050,000 dunams (Table 1.1).

The central uplands has an average altitude of 700-900 metres, with the peak being 1208 metres in the Galilee. Such level land as is available is to be found in the upper parts of these highlands, above the steep slopes of the narrow valleys. Broad valley grounds are rather restricted in Galilee and Samaria, and completely absent in Judea. Water is scarce with no perennial rivers and little subsurface water at reasonable depths. By contrast, the coastal plain - which attracted the earliest Jewish settlement - has very favourable conditions for cultivation with plenty level land, deep soil, and a reasonable supply of water.

Judea and Samaria form part of Palestine's central massif, with Judea comprising the Hebron and Jerusalem mountains, and Samaria covering the area from Jerusalem north to Jenin. These two areas together cover some 3700 square kilometres with a length of 130 kilometres and an average width of 40 kilometres. It is bounded in the south by the Beer Sheba and Arad basins and in the north by the Beit Shean and Jezreel Valleys. The Judean mountains extend some 70 kilometres in length. Of this, the Hebron mountains occupy half of this range and form the highest continuous area of Palestine, never falling below 750 metres, and in places rising to 1000 metres. The southern part of the Hebron mountains is transitional and eventually merges into the desert.

Samaria is the smaller of the two regions, bordered in the

Chapter One
TABLE 1.1.

LAND AREA OF THE PALESTINIAN MOUNTAINS ACCORDING TO WEITZ 1943.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOUTHERN MOUNTAINS</th>
<th>AREA IN DUNAMS</th>
<th>NORTHERN MOUNTAINS</th>
<th>AREA IN DUNAMS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Be'er Sheba</td>
<td>39,000</td>
<td>Haifa</td>
<td>122,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebron</td>
<td>1,989,000</td>
<td>Nazareth</td>
<td>304,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bethlehem</td>
<td>658,300</td>
<td>Acco</td>
<td>589,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>491,300</td>
<td>Tzefat</td>
<td>440,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramallah</td>
<td>685,000</td>
<td>Tiberias</td>
<td>385,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jericho</td>
<td>57,700</td>
<td>Bet Shean</td>
<td>166,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shechem/Nablus</td>
<td>1,433,100</td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>2,008,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ein Ganim</td>
<td>579,600</td>
<td>OVERALL TOTAL</td>
<td>7,048,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramleh</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>+ 2,008,000</td>
<td>= 9,048,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tulkarm</td>
<td>279,000</td>
<td>+ natural extension</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haifa</td>
<td>428,100</td>
<td>to River Litani</td>
<td>9,808,300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

south by the Beit El Foothills, in the north by Jenin, and in the east by the Jordan Valley. Its western flank is the Tulkarm to Kalkiliya road. The region is some 60 kilometres in length and some 40 kilometres wide at its mid-point. Samaria lends itself to farming much better than does Judea. Its annual rainfall of 700–800 millimetres is almost twice that of Judea and its soil cover is much more continuous. Its hills, generally 400–500 metres above sea level, are considerably lower than the Judean ones.

The whole of the West Bank came under Israeli military administration following the Six Day War of June 1967. The region contained some eight administrative districts (Fig 1.4). The subsequent Israeli administration redrew these boundaries and reduced the number of districts to seven. The Arab population in 1967 totalled 598,637. In 1952, a Jordanian population census showed some 667,000 inhabitants. Allowing for natural increase, the reduction in population numbers from 1952–1967 was considerable, due to the exodus of Palestinian refugees in 1967 (some 250,000) and a sizeable outmigrating male labour force. Decline continued until 1969, since when this trend has been reversed. By 1980, the Arab population had risen to some 720,000 (835,000 including East Jerusalem) (Table 1.2). This population is distributed throughout a variety of towns and villages, mainly confined to the mountain ridge and the larger valleys. The major urban centres of Nablus, Ramallah, East Jerusalem, and Hebron are spread out along the north-south line of the mountain ridge.

Chapter One
FIG 1.4
POPULATION DISTRIBUTION IN THE WEST BANK

Pre-1967 administrative boundaries
Urban centres

1. Nablus
2. Hebron
3. Ramallah
4. Jenin
5. Beithlehem
6. Jericho
7. Tulkarm
8. Jerusalem

Population Density

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Area (Km²)</th>
<th>Population Density</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nablus</td>
<td>1,587</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebron</td>
<td>1,056</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramallah</td>
<td>770</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jenin</td>
<td>572</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beithlehem</td>
<td>566</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jericho</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tulkarm</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Estat 1977; Harris 1990
### TABLE 1.2

**NATURAL INCREASE OF WEST BANK POPULATION 1967-1980**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>NATURAL INCREASE (%)</th>
<th>LIVE BIRTHS (1,000's)</th>
<th>TOTAL ARAB POPULATION (1,000's)</th>
<th>+ EAST JERUSALEM POPULATION (1,000's)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>581.7</td>
<td>74.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>595.2</td>
<td>76.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>603.9</td>
<td>78.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>617.3</td>
<td>81.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>629.0</td>
<td>86.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>657.4</td>
<td>88.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>661.6</td>
<td>96.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>665.1</td>
<td>99.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>570.9</td>
<td>103.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>681.2</td>
<td>106.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>690.4</td>
<td>110.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>699.6</td>
<td>114.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>713.0</td>
<td>117.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Smaller towns are Jenin, Tulkarm, Bethlehem, Kalkiliya and Jericho (Fig 1.4). The towns account for some 30% of the Arab population. The rest are dispersed amongst some 380 villages, most of which rely on farming as their major economic source.

Population density was 109 inhabitants per square kilometre in 1967, rising to 125 in 1977. Some 47.1% of the population are in the 0-14 age group. This is due to both the high birth rate and the large male emigration in the 25-44 age group. It helps explain why the labour force under Jordanian rule was small in relation to the total population (some 22%). Employment has since increased, but this is due to the gradual economic integration of the West Bank as a source of cheap labour in Israel. By 1970, some 14,500 workers (12.8% of the labour force) were employed in Israel, this figure rising to 37,000 (28.6%) by 1976. In fact, the West Bank's marketing system has been largely reorientated to complement the Israeli economy as a result of Israeli policies since 1967.

The major source of income in the West Bank is derived from agriculture. Some 40% of the land area is cultivated, although only some 2% is irrigated. Cultivated acreage expands and contracts from year to year, depending on the variable rainfall. A census carried out by the Israeli authorities in 1967 revealed that 51,000 (42%) of the West Bank households had farms (28). Most of the farmers lived in the villages rather than on the land itself, owing to the high degree of fragmentation of holdings distant to each other. The major problem for agriculture in this
region is the lack of precipitation and the high rate of evaporation, particularly in the Jordan Valley. The northern part of the West Bank and the mountain ridge receive most rainfall and have always been the most productive regions. There are some high value crops, mostly fruits and vegetables, but the total crop acreage is dominated by large areas of cereals. Until 1967, subsistence farming was the rule with only part of the output reaching the market. Exports to the East Bank and neighbouring Arab states consisted of vegetables and fruits. Following the 1967 War, the 'open-bridges' policy of Defence Minister Moshe Dayan, enabled the import-export market of the West Bank with the rest of Jordan to continue. However, the long-and medium-range objectives were to integrate the West Bank agricultural production into the Israeli economy (29). In addition to maintaining its own local market and that of Jordan, West Bank produce is now also sold in Israel itself and exported to Europe through Agrexco - the Israeli agricultural exporting company. The introduction of crop specialization has led to the import of crops, once grown in the West Bank, from Israel. Furthermore, the increased use of capital intensive methods has led to a decrease in the work-force engaged in agricultural production, resulting in larger daily labour movements to Israel. Finally, the drilling of some seventeen wells by Mekorot, the Israeli Water Company, and the confiscation of old wells to provide water for Israel, has resulted in a reduction in the amount of water available to the West Bank Arabs (30). Overall,
West Bank agriculture is now faced with a decline in labour, land and water, despite the increased yields which have resulted from the introduction of new techniques and equipment.

The industrial sector of the West Bank has always been weak. It has suffered from its failure to attract capital investment, while its location - both physically and politically, has entailed high transport costs. This precludes expansion based on the import of raw materials or on markets abroad. Industrial development between 1948-1967 was based on private initiative. In 1967, the West Bank contained a half of the Jordanian population, but only 22% of the industry and 16% of the transport (31). Under Israeli control, there has been much subcontracting of work from Israeli firms, owing to the cheap labour market to be found in the West Bank. Although industry has grown slightly since 1967, it remains less than 10% of the total domestic product of the West Bank, much of it being highly dependent on the Israeli economy (32).

An analysis of the human and physical resources of the West Bank show that there is little scope for new settlement structures, particularly if these structures are to exist in isolation from the predominant existing networks. Arguments that stress the strategic significance of Jewish settlement in this area, do not mean that such settlements will be any less artificial in socio/economic terms. Nevertheless, the strategic argument has been used mainly with regard to the agricultural based kibbutzim and moshavim in the Jordan Valley where the
resources for agricultural development do exist, if harnessed properly. But even this does not apply in the West Bank highlands, where the indigenous Arab population is at its densest, where no large tracts of agricultural land are available, and whose strategic significance is relevant only in terms of how to defend these new settlements in a naturally hostile environment. This increases, rather than decreases, the minimum security requirements.

It will be noted in the ensuing chapter that the reasons for the initial Arab settlement along the mountain ridge no longer apply today. Similarly, the importance attached to Jewish settlement as providing a permanent civilian foothold in a region and its associated defence orientated thinking, recede in significance with the development of modern technological warfare. It will therefore become obvious that other reasons must be sought and understood to account for the settlement activities of Gush Emunim, in what appears to be an unsuitable physical and human environment.
REFERENCES

1. For a review of some of the major literature on settlements, see


5. Ibid.


See also


9. Allon's policies are described in Chapter Two.


15. The Jewish religion contains 613 specific commandments. Many of these relate to activities which can only be carried out in the Land of Israel, mostly concerning laws governing Temple rite and agricultural produce.


Chapter One
b) Ibid. Chapter 14, Verse 8.
c) Ibid. Chapter 26, Verse 3-4.
d) Ibid. Chapter 28, Verse 15.
e) Ibid. Chapter 35, Verse 12.

b) Numbers. Chapter 34, Verse 1-15.
c) Joshua. Chapter 1, Verse 1-6.


26. For descriptions of the human and physical geography of the West Bank, see


32. For an analysis of the integration of the West Bank economy into the Israeli system, see:

a) Hilal, J. (1975) *op cit*.


Chapter One
Chapter Two.

2 SETTLEMENT STRATEGY AND THE WEST BANK: THE EMERGENCE OF GUSH EMUNIM.

2.1 The West Bank: Settlement History

The early Bronze Age is thought to have been the first period of large scale settlement in Palestine. The earliest settlers were attracted to the plains because of the better soils there (1). Egyptian domination of the late Bronze Age led to their authority being imposed but their influence was less in the more sparsely populated hills and desert fringes (2). Gottman asserts that the promise to Moses of a separate territory "as a necessary condition of freedom and independence" (3) when he led the Hebrew people out of Egypt, was the factor that led to the development in history of an association between

"the notion of political organization and the geographically defined concept of a territorial base" (4).

The Israelite conquest took place in about 1250 B.C. and was concentrated in the previously unoccupied hill country along the mountain ridge from Judea to Upper Galilee. This area remained the centre of all the sovereign Jewish kingdoms until they were finally brought to an end by the Romans in the first century B.C. (Fig 2.1). Although the mountains were much less promising for the agriculturalist and settlement development was slower, it was
FIG 2.1

TERRITORIAL EXTENT OF ANCIENT JEWISH KINGDOMS IN PALESTINE

A. The Conquest by Joshua
12th century B.C.

- Area of Israelite control

B. The Kingdom of David
CA. 990-968 B.C.

- Judah and Israel
- Conquered kingdom
- Sphere of influence

C. The Division of the Kingdom
928 B.C.

- Northern kingdom (later Samaria)
- Southern kingdom (later Judah)
- Territorial boundaries

D. The Hasmonean Kingdom
76 B.C.

- Area under Jewish sovereignty
- Internal province boundaries

Source: Atlas: Carta vol.1 maps 115
Source: Atlas Carta vol.1 map 126
Source: Atlas Carta vol. 1 map 115
Source: Atlas Carta vol. 2 map 68
more steady and continuous. Amirian (1953) defines the three permanently settled regions of Ancient Palestine as comprising Galilee, Samaria and Judea (5) and he shows that all the urban settlements in the upland areas remained stable over time, while those of the coastal plain experienced far greater fluctuation. This was shown to be related to times of fluctuating security. In times of invasions and congests, coastal towns were often destroyed while the uplands were rarely penetrated. The degree of mountain continuity of settlement is marked in the case of the rural villages. Research has shown that a large number of present day village sites in the uplands of Palestine are the successors of settlements known from Biblical times (6). Dlin notes that Samaria, in particular, was a favourable region for human settlement for thousands of years and that only along the eastern and western margins of this region did a number of settlements cease to exist in insecure times (7). Most of these places were resettled with the beginning of Turkish rule. Gichon asserts that only the people that had control over the mountains was able to call itself fully independent in history. He shows that in each period, the foreign conquerors attempted to avoid having to engage in battles with the mountain inhabitants (8). This aspect of fluctuating security is best seen in the Shephelah which has more than three times the number of abandoned sites than the average area in Palestine. The Shephelah is the transition zone between the Judean mountains and the Coastal Plain and therefore suffered more destruction in times of war.
than did the actual combatting neighbouring regions. Periods of
insecurity forced the population to live and concentrate in
easily defendable settlements. The British Mandate from 1922 to
1948 led to better security conditions and brought about an
extension of settlement in the frontier zone. This greater
security resulted in a number of villages in hill-top locations
slowly moving or spreading to new, more economically favourable,
sites further down the valleys. The conditions governing the
establishment of settlement types in earlier periods was no
longer valid.

2.2 Settlement And Security: The Case Of Israel

Jennings (1963) argues that sovereignty and territory are
bound together by the rule of international law. A sovereign
country requires territory on which to exercise its sovereignty
while territory cannot function unless it is under some sort of
sovereignty (9). The relationship between these two concepts is
built upon the connecting link of the activities of the people
within that territory, either as permanent settlers or transitory
agents maintaining control (10). The actual method of control
over the land can be by means of sovereignty, ownership or
presence. Ownership can be acquired through legal purchase of
the territory, while presence is
"a situation of fait accompli achieved by the system's presence in a territorial space, and, inter alia, aimed at demonstrating or achieving ownership and/or sovereignty. Presence may be expressed by cultivating fields, setting up military bases, or populating a whole region, depending on the needs as perceived by the system" (11).

The boundaries of territorial units act as partitions and are often artificial, being as strong as the system can make them. This acts as a line of defence and controls movement in and out of the territory (12).

Planned land settlement is by no means unique to Israel. In countries without security problems, such policies are usually parts of government strategies aimed at alleviating rural unemployment and overcrowding. However, the security factor produces its own policies and forms of settlement, the latter changing over time as military weapons and techniques undergo modification (13). Kimmerling notes that

"locating settlements according to defensive needs is a well known phenomenon" (14).

and examples are abundant. Harris (15) cites the Crusaders' use of Muslims as settlers in fifteenth century Spain. He also notes the English policies in Ireland and the Hapsburg policies against the Ottoman Empire. Johnson (16) draws attention to the British military establishments in urban cantonments in India. These temporary encampments gradually became permanent residential areas. He also motions the use of the American military outposts in controlling the Indians. Lattimore (17) discusses Chinese colonization in Manchuria in which the aim was to maintain control over lands strategically dominating Northern China. This

Chapter Two
was carried out by providing a combination of permanent landowning farmers and a defensive system of outposts. In Latin America, colonization schemes have taken place throughout the continent (18).

With regard to the specific case of Israel, Kimmerling remarks that

"'Zion' was only a vague, unspecified and flexible territorial concept" (19).

leaving its interpreters with a great degree of freedom within wider theoretical boundaries. Control over territories occurred only where and when the possibilities (i.e., political constraints, social conditions and financial resources) permitted it. A major role has always been accorded the 'strategic' factor in both pre-State and post-State settlement planning in Israel. Thus, whereas Arab settlement was established over a much longer period of time depending on climatic conditions, security, access and natural resources, the Jewish settlement had to be located where space permitted, particularly in the period between the first colonizations in the 1880's and the third major wave of immigration, starting in 1919. Blake (1977) shows how the scattered distribution of villages in 1919 reflected the availability of land for purchase, thus leading to the colonization of the coastal plain much of which was dune and swamp and thus largely uninhabited (20). From 1920 until 1931, settlement became more continuous, and larger areas were colonized. However, these continued to be located in the valleys and plains of Central and Northern Palestine. This accounts for
the fact that 53% of Jewish settlements today are at elevations below 100 metres (21) (Fig 2.2).

The political and strategic role of settlement in key areas in order to establish a permanent Jewish presence was a second stage in the early settlement process. It led to dispersal of settlement over a wider area and at higher elevations because of the need to physically control areas of land. In the intensive period of settlement activity that took place between 1936-39, 55 new settlements were established, mostly in areas uninhabited by Jews (Fig 2.3). The Beit Shean Valley, the Hula Basin, Western Galilee and the Menashe Hills were all areas of concentrated settlement activity which, it was hoped, would create a Jewish presence, thus facilitating the inclusion of these areas in an eventual Jewish State. Following publication of the British White Paper of 1939 (22) which severely limited the area available for Jewish settlement to a small part of Western Palestine, land was sought everywhere—particularly in those parts closed to purchase. Areas of land under Jewish ownership but not yet settled (such as parts of the Northern Negev) were now hurriedly colonized by means of 'tower and stockade' settlements established overnight. By the 1940's, networks of settlements were being established, to ensure Jewish regional defense and co-operation.

During this latter period, the Hagannah (23) produced a plan for widespread settlement known as the Rochell-Lev Plan (24) after its joint authors. It proposed the establishment of
FIG 2.2
JEWISH SETTLEMENT IN PALESTINE 1880-1914

- Jewish settlement established 1880-1914
- Towns - Arab and Jewish residents
- Towns - Arab residents only
- Occupied territories post-1967

Approximate Populations
1880 - 470,000 Arabs
24,000 Jews
1914 - 500,000 Arabs
90,000 Jews

Source: After Gilbert, 1975, map 5
FIG 2.3
JEWSIISH SETTLEMENT IN PALESTINE 1937-1939

- Jewish settlement established 1937-1939
- Towns - Arab and Jewish residents
- Towns - Arab residents only
- Occupied territories past 1967

Approximate Populations
- 1914: 500,000 Arabs, 90,000 Jews
- 1948: 1,050,000 Arabs, 460,000 Jews

Source: Hassan & Gesenfeld 1980, Blake 1976
hundreds of new settlements in key areas in both the centre and periphery of the country. The aim of the plan was to double the number of existing Jewish settlements to 480 while the specific locational objectives were to

"ensure that we have total control and possibility to expand the borders in all directions" (25).

The settlement objectives were approached on two fronts:
1. Existing areas of Jewish settlement had to be consolidated.
2. Areas of strategic importance, as yet unsettled, had to be penetrated. This applied to three regions.
   - Central Lower and Upper Galilee.
   - A region comprising a square whose boundaries took in Jenin to Ramallah and Tulkarm to the River Jordan.
   - The Judean mountains from Bethlehem to Beer Sheba.

All three of these regions were densely populated by Arabs. The latter two comprise, what is, the greater part of today's West Bank (Fig 2.4), while the Galilee is another area of current Arab-Israeli political tension and considered to be of utmost priority on the settlement front by successive Israeli governments. Taken together, these three 'priority' regions comprise the natural north-south mountain belt that extends into Lebanon. The Rochell-Lev Plan was divided into first, second and third settlement priority. Some 106 locations were deemed as being of first priority (Fig 2.4). Of these, 78 had been established by 1948.
FIG 24
THE ROKHELL-LEV SETTLEMENT PLAN 1943

○ First priority settlement
○ Regions without Jewish settlement
□ Border of plan
—— Border of occupied territories post-1967

Source: Orren 1978
The establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 did not mean that the strategic factor became obsolete. The national settlement strategy was described by Granott (1949).

"....It (Israel) must therefore plan first of all for security and its first line of security are its border settlements......Our frontiers, must be secured, and as swiftly as possible, by the erection of deep belts of border settlements to guard the approaches to Israel. Strategic villages must be established along all great routes of communication...." (26).

Such a policy applied to all the peripheral areas of the country. Golany asserts that the economic and long term agricultural development of the Negev played only a secondary role in the early settlement of the region, while primary importance was accorded the strategic objective of securing the land. This task was carried out by pioneers imbued

"by a sense of national mission......setting out to establish political facts, defense lines which would guarantee territorial rights to the region in the future" (27).

Similarly, in the Galilee, the most immediate concern of the new State was to secure the Lebanese border by establishing new settlements along its length. The Jewish National Fund had originally refused to settle the Galilee because of its unfavourable mountain conditions. However, this policy underwent a major change after the Partition proposals for Palestine recommended the exclusion of the Galilee from the Jewish state. Current plans for settling the Galilee make the point that were it not for the political situation, this region would be developed as a nature reserve and tourist resort because of its attractive mountainous scenery (28). The same strategic
settlement policy was applied to the settling of the hilly Jerusalem Corridor region so that access to and from the capital could be ensured (29). Thus, due to the overriding importance of the strategic factor, location in these areas was not influenced by such factors as soil quality, water availability and immediate security. Only after settlement had taken place and a physical presence established, could the manner of land utilization and long term settlement development be considered. This is clearly demonstrated by the Rochell-Lev Plan. The objective of this plan was the establishment of as many settlements as possible in as short a time as possible. Such policies were a major factor in the rapid development of the kibbutzim since this settlement type operated as a mutual support group, best prepared for hard conditions. Indeed, there were industrial concerns who were prepared to establish plants in strategic areas, but they were not taken into consideration (30). This was due to the need for group defense, which a small plant could not offer and because of the deeper ideological reasons inherent in the rural bias (see Chapter Four). Settlement location was a political decision concerned with the establishment of as many strongholds as possible.
2.3 Attitudes Towards The West Bank In The Arab-Israel Conflict

2.3.1 Jordanian Rule

Modern Jewish colonization found no substantial foothold in the West Bank in the pre-State period. In the first place, the Jordan Rift Valley was not conducive to human settlement in great numbers because of its harsh climatic conditions. The inner mountain belt was more amenable to human settlement but was already densely populated, owing to the long term relative stability of this region. With the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, only seven Jewish villages had been established in what became the West Bank. These were the four settlements of the Gush Etzion area, south of Jerusalem; the villages of Nveh Ya'akov and Atarot, both just north of Jerusalem; and Kibbutz Beit Ha'arava at the northern end of the Dead Sea. All of these sites were abandoned and destroyed in the ensuing struggles following the establishment of the State.

During the 1948-67 period, the borders of the newly created West Bank served as artificial barriers affecting the Arab settlement growth in this region. The Jordanian government established settlements on the same principle as used by Israel. A large number of new villages were founded along the border with Israel while existing settlements and those villages located...
along new security roads underwent major expansion (31). A major effort was made to settle the Judea region and many nomads, peasants from other villages, and refugees were brought to this region. Since much of the Arab land in the plains was no longer accessible, the hilly areas of the West Bank were now extensively cultivated. By contrast, the Jordan Valley and semi-arid areas underwent only relatively small scale expansion. Overall, the number of Arab villages in Judea increased from 54 to 210 between 1947 to 1967 and those of Samaria from 132 to 264 (Fig 2.5). Nevertheless, Brauer argues that whereas only a sixth of the Arab villagers in the West Bank are in strategically important locations, a quarter of them are in very poor strategic locations (32).

Altogether, there are 330 Arab villages in the West Bank, of which 45 have populations exceeding 2000. Thus, the average village is larger than most Jewish rural settlement but smaller than the Arab villages inside Israel. The inhabitants of villages constitute 71% of the overall population of the West Bank (33). The rest of the population live in the towns and tends to occupy the mountain crest in Judea, while in Samaria they have developed on the edge of the mountains facing the Coastal Plain and the Jezreel Valley or as communication centres. Thus, the pattern of West Bank settlement in 1967 was one which was concentrated in major north and south nodes and along the border with Israel.
FIG 2.5
POPPULATION CHANGE IN
THE WEST BANK 1948-67

Rural
- < 300
- 300 - 500
- 500 - 1000
- 1000 - 2000
- decrease

Urban
- < 2000
- 2000 - 4000
- 4000 - 7000
- 7000 - 10,000

Source: Efrat 1977
2.3.2 **The Six Day War**

The Six Day War of June 1967 had an immense effect on Israeli political thinking and policies. The question of control over specific areas of territory was not confined to the realms of military thinking alone. Deep ideological beliefs and their relationship to the interpretation of modern Zionism and the permanent future borders of the State of Israel were brought to the fore. This led to much internal debate and conflict within Israeli society. Kimmerling asserts that after the Six Day War "pressures were felt within the collectivity to reintroduce this space into the cognitive map and relate toward it in expressive terms" (34).

Similarly, according to Hirst, "......the modern Israelis rediscovered overnight something of the zeal and vision which had moved the early pioneers. It all gushed forth, this Zionist renewal, in a torrent of Biblico-strategic, clerico-military antics and imagery" (35).

According to Liebman, Israelis were now being asked to make sacrifices for newly acquired territory on the basis of 'historical right' as well as on security grounds. Nevertheless, the Israeli military administration in these areas confronted an indigenous population who disputed not only that claim but also the very basic foundations of the State of Israel. Israeli legitimacy needed reinforcement and since, in Judaism, historical rights are linked closely to religious associations, it was the religion that provided the necessary reinforcement (36). This can be said to hold for sectors of the population, most
particularly those who later became the leaders of Gush Emunim, but certainly not for all groups. Waterman sees the development of activity on the West Bank in a different light. He argues that during the first twenty years of statehood, it was the Negev that acted as a peripheral pioneering area in the process of national growth and development. In the post-1967 era, this was taken over by other regions such as the Golan Heights and the West Bank (Fig 2.6). These areas are less forbidding than the desert and offer greater emotional attraction and satisfaction (37).

From 1967 to 1980 there were three main phases of settlement activity in the West Bank, reflecting the different government attitudes under changing circumstances. The first of these, 1967 to 1973 (the period between the Six Day War and the Yom Kippur War), was one in which the traditionalist stance of the ruling Labour party was dominant. This policy was based on pragmatic, rather than ideological or emotional, grounds. Kimmerling holds that during this period

"the system tended to return to the means of conflict management characteristic of the pre-sovereign period: manipulation of presence rather than ownership" (38).

Such a policy tended to postpone any 'ultimate goals'. Any pressures brought to bear, both externally by international opinion and internally by respective right wing 'hawk' or left wing 'dove' positions, could be rebuffed. Stances were taken according to the ideological foundations of the different factions. The ruling Labour party was the group which identified

Chapter Two
FIG 2.6  CHART OF JEWISH SETTLEMENT HISTORY 1880-1980.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SETTLEMENT TYPE</th>
<th>INFLUENCES</th>
<th>TOTAL NO OF SETTLEMENTS</th>
<th>INFLUENCES</th>
<th>SETTLEMENT LOCATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1880-</td>
<td>Moshav</td>
<td>Earliest Zionist settlers - private enterprise farming</td>
<td>Availability of land in the plains and valleys for private purchase</td>
<td>Sharon Plain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Eastern Galilee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900-</td>
<td></td>
<td>Second wave of immigrants - socialist ideology - search for new forms of collective lifestyles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910-</td>
<td>Kibbutz</td>
<td>Third and fourth waves of immigration - consolidation of kibbutzim - development of moshavim by those groups seeking private family life within a cooperative framework</td>
<td>Beginning of large scale purchase of land by the Jewish National Fund</td>
<td>Jezreel &amp; Harod Valleys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920-</td>
<td>Moshav</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Increasing Arab-Jewish tension - settlements established over wider areas to denote permanency of residence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930-</td>
<td>Moshav</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>Rapid settlement activity following - Peel proposals 1937 - Woodhead Commission 1938 - MacDonald White Paper 1938</td>
<td>Bet Shean Valley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940-</td>
<td>Moshav</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>Tower and stockade settlement - 55 established 1936-39</td>
<td>Negev</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-</td>
<td>Rural Centre</td>
<td>Regional planning based on the composite rural structure</td>
<td>Consolodation &amp; expansion in all areas, particularly Galilee Negev &amp; Jerusalem Corridor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-</td>
<td>Industrial Village</td>
<td>Consolidation of existing structure - start of rural industry</td>
<td>Six-Day War - Alien Plan settlement aimed at securing the new boundaries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

itself with the stance of pragmatism and compromise based on territorial concessions for peace. The right wing Herut party had as its motto, 'Israel on both sides of the Jordan', basing its right to these boundaries on those of ancient Israel at its greatest extent.

2.3.3 The Allon Plan

The actual strategy adopted with regard to settlement in the territories was known as the Allon Plan (Fig 2.7) after its author, Yigal Allon (39). As the commander of the Palmach forces (40) in 1948, Allon had even then wanted to march into the West Bank. However, Ben Gurion had instead ordered him to advance into the Negev since it offered wider expanses for potential national development. The situation in 1967 was one in which if Israel were officially to annex the West Bank and the Gaza strip, it would add half a million Arabs to a population of under three million Jews. Even allowing for Jewish immigration to make a net gain of 25,000 per annum (this figure would now be highly theoretical in light of the increased emigration rates in recent years) the Arab growth rate of 4% per annum would mean that they would constitute 46% of the population by 1993 (41). From the demographic point of view, therefore, it would not be in Israel's interests to retain control over the whole of the West Bank. However, Allon argued that it was necessary to have a Jewish
FIG 2.7
THE ALLON SETTLEMENT PLAN 1967-1980

Strategic settlement zones
Jordanian-Palestinian unit
- Allon Plan settlement 1980

presence in what he defined as being the strategic defensive points in the West Bank. He therefore proposed a plan aimed at securing the border along the Jordan Valley by the establishment of settlements in the traditional Israeli manner. This would create a situation whereby Israel would have 'defensible borders' and the area to be controlled would be the least populated part of the West Bank. The densely populated West Bank uplands would be an autonomous region of its own with a corridor linking it from Ramallah through to Jordan. The Arab population would not have to become citizens of Israel and would not, therefore, threaten the Jewish majority (i.e; the raison d'etre) of the State. Allon argued that

"a security border that is not a state border is not a security border - a state border that is not settled along its length by Jews is not a state border" (42).

Israel argued that this policy would be in accordance with Article 49 of the Geneva Convention for the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of war. This prohibits the transfer of an occupier's population to occupied territories but it does permit the building of security outposts (43). Gerson notes that under international law, military necessity may justify seizure or destruction of enemy public real property. However, definition of 'military necessity' with any measure of precision has yet to be formulated and were it to be so, then it would have to be judged by a neutral observer rather than by any active participant. Private property could undergo requisition only - never confiscation - even for reasons of military necessity (44).
The implementation of the Allon Plan started out as a security belt of Nahal settlements (45) along the Jordan Valley. By the end of 1970 there were six such sites. The Jordan Valley Settlement Plan (46), which covered an area of 60 kilometres from Beit Shean in the north to Jericho in the south, and about 14 kilometres westward to the border of the dense Arab concentrations, was based on the Allon Plan. The Allon road, marking a second north-to-south security belt, was built to link Mehola in the north (the first settlement to be established in the Jordan Valley) to Ma'aleh Adumim on the Jerusalem to Jericho road. Experience to date has shown that settlements on this inner road have faced the most acute problems of development and growth. Whereas the Jordan Valley settlements have large tracts of agricultural land and the Gush Emunim settlements are sufficiently near to Tel Aviv and Jerusalem to permit commuting (Chapter Five), the settlements on Allon's inner road have neither advantage. They are relatively isolated and have found it hard to attract sufficient numbers of settlers.

Overall, it is the government that determines the general areas to be given priority in settlement planning. Once this has been agreed, the specific site within these general areas is identified by a joint team of the Jewish Agency Rural Settlement Department and the Government. This latter decision is more concerned with the technical and professional considerations than the national political considerations and examines such factors as topography, soil and existing infrastructure. In those cases
where the government approved the establishment of a settlement across the 'green line', the Minister of Industry, Mr. Bar Lev, proposed a loan amounting to 20% of any investment in that project. This is equivalent to the amount given to projects in development areas inside Israel. The first investment under this plan was IL3 million ($750,000) for the industrial zone in the urban development at Kiryat Arba, next to Hebron. Abbu Ayyash states that in some cases this loan could be increased to as much as 50% of the working capital in any industrial project in the territories (47). In 1970, the Inter-Ministerial Settlement Committee was established as the final decision maker in matters pertaining to settlement location in priority areas. From its inception and until the election of the right-wing Likud government in 1977, this committee was chaired by Allon himself or by his closest political ally, Israel Galili. In this way, the Allon Plan became the foundation stone of Israeli settlement policy in the West Bank.

2.3.4 The Land of Israel Movement

The Allon Plan was based largely on military assumptions. The ruling Labour party was not the party of strong historical or religious attachment to the 'Land of Israel'. Nevertheless, there was much ideological debate about the future of the territories. At the left of the political spectrum, the 'doves'
opposed the Allon Plan on the grounds that it was wrong to keep any land occupied in war if it resulted in controlling sectors of a population who had no wish to be under the new administration. Opposing this was the right-wing 'hawk' view which held that Israel had a historic right to the whole of Eretz Israel and should therefore annex these areas completely so that they become part of Israel proper (48).

As part of this ideological debate, pressure groups were established to reflect these respective attitudes (49). Pressing for a complete retention of all the territories occupied in 1967 was the 'Land of Israel Movement' (LOIM), established in August 1967. To this group, the issue was not simply one of control over a piece of land but was related to Jewish national destiny. The Movement became the first major group to break down the traditional Israeli political divisions to achieve a wide cross-section of public support for their maximalist doctrine. It drew together individuals from labour, religious and nationalist movements into a single framework, but one that remained initially a non-party framework. The LOIM were not prepared to compromise on any territory, not even Sinai, whereas the right-wing Herut party of Menachem Begin were prepared to do so under certain conditions (50). Isaac argues that the LOIM represented the revival of a traditional ideology (namely, Revisionist Zionism) which had never been renounced by some groups in Israel but had not had any practical relevance between 1948 and 1967 (51). This position was one of 'normative
Zionism', which

"never denied the claim of the Jews to title over an undivided Land of Israel; it merely put the claim aside as of less importance under a particular set of historical circumstances than achievement of sovereignty over some of the Land in order to create a Jewish State under what were, in hard fact, conditions of severe external constraint" (52).

The LOIM argued that an Israeli government had no right to surrender any land which 'belonged' to the Jewish people throughout history.

The short-term goals of the Movement were for extensive agricultural and urban settlement, economic integration of the territories, and the introduction of Israeli law within these areas. In the long term, they wanted full legal and formal incorporation of the territories in Israel. In 1969, LOIM members were elected for their respective parties and this gave them a limited power of internal government lobby by organizing themselves informally within the Knesset (53).

At the other end of the political spectrum, the Peace Movement was established. This group called for the return of all territories together with a full dialogue between Israel and all the neighbouring Arab States in exchange for peaceful relations. Thus, Abba Eban noted that

"Zionism, apart from its emphasis on territories and landscapes of the homeland, gives a central place in its consciousness to the aspiration for peace, and to repulsion from all superfluous domination of other people against their will" (54).

Over time, the initial government concensus of 'territories for peace' began to crack, and members tended to adopt one of the

Chapter Two
two above mentioned positions. Although both movements became increasingly marginal, especially when they attempted to become part of the political establishment, rather than operating as an extra-political pressure group (55), they nevertheless continued to provide alternative sets of justifications and courses of action for the decision makers. They emphasized the importance of ideology to a government which prided itself on its pragmatic approach to the problem. The LOIM argued, as did Gush Emunim later, that unless the government presented policies based on ideology, there would be no principles on which to base any action - even the Allon Plan. The LOIM avoided any illegal actions (although they helped the Hebron settlers of 1968 who eventually established the urban quarter of Kiryat Arba). In 1973, they joined the right-wing Likud alignment and by 1977 had been totally absorbed into this political grouping.

2.3.5 Cracks in the Government Concensus

To understand the position of settlements with the approach of the 1973 Arab-Israel war, and the subsequent emergence of the Gush Emunim Movement, it is important to describe the position taken by one of the country's leading political figures of the time, Defence Minister Moshe Dayan. He had been the key figure in Israel's victories of 1967 and had become a national hero (a role he was to lose following the 1973 War). Although a member
of the ruling Labour government, he argued for more extensive settlement in the West Bank and pressed for the adoption of a policy of total economic linkage between the west Bank and Israel. He proposed the establishment of four urban settlements adjoining the West Bank towns of Ramallah, Jenin, Nablus and Hebron (56). Dayan further argued that it was intolerable that

"the government of sovereign Israel should restrict Jewish land purchases in Judea and Samaria" (57).

Although the Jewish National Fund and the Israel Lands Administration were delegated by the government to purchase land anywhere across the 'green line', the purchase of land by individuals or companies in the territories was prohibited by law. However, Gerson points out that many unlawful sales were in fact carried out especially around Jerusalem in 1972/73 (58). This was done by granting an irrevocable power of attorney and by postponing the registration of the transfer until such time as the government would permit private land transactions in the hope that they would then receive retrospective authorization. Dayan avoided the issue of the demographic problems that his policy would create for Israel by urging the adoption of a system of functional compromise. This meant that there would be a single economic entity comprising both Israel and the West Bank in which both Arab and Jew would work. However, each could belong to a different political entity which would be decided on the basis of cultural and demographic identity, rather than on geographical borders. Sovereignty over the West Bank would remain undetermined, but Israel would retain military control. The 

Chapter Two
majority of the Mapai leaders at the time favoured Allon's more moderate plan to that of Dayan. His stance in 1973 over the purchase of land in the territories, together with the proposal to establish the town of Yamit in Northern Sinai, caused much internal conflict in the government ranks during the period leading up to the 1973 elections. At that time, Dayan was far too important a figure for the Labour party to lose just before the election campaign.

Thus, in the summer of 1973, a compromise agreement was worked out and presented in the Galili Document. This leaned towards Dayan with its emphasis on an increased rate of settlement activity and the extension of the settlement concept to include locations other than those necessary only for strategic and military purposes. The Galili document, therefore, moved towards a gradual implementation of the programs of the LOIM. Harris (1978) argues that the chief significance of this compromise formula was, in fact, the written confirmation that it gave to six years of gradual 'minimalist retreat' within the Mapai ranks (59). Nevertheless, the mobilization of opposition from the Peace Movement and its supporters prevented the government from going even farther.
2.3.6 The Yom Kippur War

Before the Galili document could be presented to the electorate as part of the Mapai manifesto and subsequently implemented, the 1973 Yom Kippur War broke out. This created a totally new situation in which the decision makers substantially changed their outlooks and attitudes. Immediately following the War, there was a 'crisis of authority' (60) in which the political leadership was dealt a severe blow due to this unforeseen historical event. A great deal of prestige had been lost by the leaders and to retain their support, they felt it necessary to institute a change in policy regarding the status of the territories. At the Labour Party Executive meeting in November 1973, the plans for long term industrial development projects and increased Jewish settlement in the West Bank were not included as part of the new election platform. Although not officially scrapped, the Galili Document, only a few months old, was not mentioned. The accent changed from one of settlement to one of negotiated withdrawal.

A major factor influencing this policy reversal was that, viewed in the pragmatic security terms of the Labour party, the settlements had not served their military function during the war. The army had had to spend valuable time evacuating the border settlements on the Golan Heights before it could turn its attention to the advancing Syrian Army. Gottman argues that in the modern era, several fundamental functions of territorial
sovereignty are in question, not least that of protection. With modern weapons

"little remains of the sheltering role of territory controlled by national government within well-demarcated boundaries" (61).

But the outcome of the war confirmed the views of the LOIM as well. They were convinced that had it not been for the buffer space provided by the territories, the enemy advance would have been even more rapid, resulting in catastrophic losses. Many argued, like Zohar (62), that the reason the settlements had been a hindrance during the war was because the development of the full regional settlement network (including a city of 50,000 inhabitants) had not yet been implemented by the government. There was thus a need for more rapid settlement development rather than a slowing down in establishing new villages. Within the government ranks as well, Allon argued that the settlements established to date had simply not been sufficiently fortified and that this was now being attended to. Thus, Galili assured a delegation of settlers from the Golan Heights that no existing settlement would be imperilled by any disengagement agreement with Syria.
2.4 The Emergence Of Gush Emunim

Following the post Yom Kippur War elections, held on 30th December 1973, the more nationalist 'young guard' of the National Religious Party became a pressure group within the party aimed at forcing the NRP only to join a new government which declared the right to annex all the territories. When the party leadership refused to accept this as policy, some of the 'young guard' (led by Zevulun Hammer, Education Minister in the Likud government since 1977, and his colleague, Yehudah Ben-Meir) decided to lend their support to start an extra-party movement consisting of those people campaigning for the right to settle in any part of 'Eretz Israel'. The subsequent formal founding of Gush Emunim dates from 7th February 1974 when a group of several hundred activists attended a founding convention at Gush Etzion. Although, as will be seen later, the first settler nucleus for a site in the West Bank Highlands already existed, nevertheless, this convention represented the first official meeting of a national pressure group. At first, the NRP did not join the new government coalition when it was formed on 19th March 1974 by Premier Rabin, because of these pressures from its 'young guard'. However, this decision was reversed in the following October.
2.4.1 The Ideological Argument

According to O'Dea, Gush Emunim grew out of a situation of anomie which followed the 1973 War. She defines anomie here as being

"the breakdown of the consensus which provided the individual with meaning, orientation and norms" (63).

A loss of morale had occurred within Israeli society and this prepared the way for the birth of a more radical movement. O'Dea argues that Gush Emunim were representative of the post Yom Kippur War feeling of increased isolation and they therefore responded with a determination to go it alone and triumph over all opposition. They emerged in support of a hard-line government position to withdrawal and against the Kissinger initiative which resulted in a partial withdrawal from strategic points in Sinai. By contrast, Hareven views the emergence of the Gush as a political group which was the outgrowth of the LOIM, rather than as a reaction to the government policies of the post-war era (64). According to her, they simply gave an organizational framework to an ideology in existence since 1967. Although this is true, the Gush founders represented one particular sector within the maximalist camp, while the government policies of the immediate post-war era were the major causative factor in their emergence as an independent active entity.

The Gush Emunim ideology is based on a deep religious commitment to the concept of 'Eretz Yisrael' (lit: the Land of

Chapter Two
Israel) (65). Following 1967, the major policy decisions concerning the West Bank (with the exception of Jerusalem) were all security orientated. The Allon Plan left the 'heart' of Judea and Samaria out of settlement activity. In Gush Emunim's view, such a policy put into doubt the claim to any part of Israel whatsoever. The Zionist claim was, according to their traditional religious outlook, one of the Divine promise of, and the historical connection with, the Land itself. In Jewish history, no part of the ancient Jewish kingdoms had been as important as the Judean and Samarian uplands. This area had contained all the holy Jewish sites such as Jerusalem, Hebron, Shechem, Beit-El and Shilo. It was this area that now contained the dense Arab population concentrations and in which Gush Emunim held as imperative to establish a Jewish presence.

Marmorstein (1949) has stated that

"the abandonment of a part of the historical legacy of the nation has been compared to vivisection, and suggestions for compromises for the sake of peace are considered as repulsive as the action of an individual who would assent to have a limb amputated for reward" (66).

Gush Emunim viewed the Land of Israel in the same way and their manifesto stated that the government's failure to annex all the territories was a negation of

"the obligation of the Jewish nation to establish full sovereignty in the land" (67).

Although the Gush do emphasize the security aspect as well, it is only supplementary to the religio-historic argument. The underlying basis for their ideology is the principle that both
the Jewish nation and the Jewish land are holy since they were both chosen by God. The future Messianic days of redemption can only come about through the union of these two parts of Jewish destiny. Thus, the Land of Israel does not simply represent a Jewish homeland in which all Jews can be safe from persecution. It is, rather, a place which every Jew is commanded by God to come and live in and to repossess. The Land of Israel is the promised land and has its own sacred history and sanctity. The establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 is seen as a proof that the days of the ultimate Messianic redemption have started and every possible means to further this process has to be attempted. Thus, the National Religious Party (Mafdal) Convention of 1956 made mention of the processes of the 'complete salvation of the Jewish people' and spoke of ensuring the historic and religious rights over the promised land. The 1967 War reinforced this belief of

"a Divinely inspired and ordained redemptive process" (68)

and not simply one of

"the triumph of a particular movement of national liberation" (69).

In the Mafdal Convention of 1969, the 'young guard' pushed through a motion calling for

"extensive agricultural and urban settlement in the liberated territories" (70)

and reaffirmed this at all subsequent meetings. Before this, the Mafdal had not adopted any formal policy on such matters since they were viewed as being outside the religious interests for
which the NRP fought.

Gush Emunim differ from the Mafdal religious Zionist mainstream in that they are a radical offshoot of the latter and take their religious outlook to its extreme. Whereas the mainstream religious Zionists could also relate to Judea and Samaria in practical terms, Gush Emunim were not prepared to make this severance of religious and political facts. O'Dea argues that the real dilemma concerns the degree to which religious interests may be reconciled with secular interests (i.e., political affairs) without losing the unique religious character of life. She argues that the latter aim is threatened by

"Gush Emunim's single-minded identification of a particular political position with God's absolute Will" (71).

Thus, the need to make peace with the Arabs was recognized, but only as secondary to the higher need of fulfilling the Divine Will. According to the Gush, Arabs can have rights as residents of the land but not the rights of the land. This means that Arabs can own individual plots of land but there cannot be any joint Arab sovereignty over whole regions within Israel. As is always the case, ideological perceptions of reality are highly selective and practical involvement by any group or individual is only geared towards the socio-political reality as they see it. The Gush see themselves as a spiritual elite forced into politics by the urgency of the hour in which the Israeli government strayed from Zionism. The government have to be stopped in their 'folly' by those who are rooted in Jewish tradition and ritual

Chapter Two
and who are ready to act. They view their settlement activities as a renewal of the pioneering trends of the early kibbutzim. This is important since they feel that the ideological values which brought the State of Israel into existence are being forgotten and pushed aside. Thus, Arian (1968) asserted that it is much harder to renew ideological formulations in line with day to day crises than to keep to older ideological formulations already in existence (72). Similarly, Etzioni-Halevy states that

"it is sometimes argued that Zionism is no longer relevant in Israel today. At one time....Zionism exacted intense commitments....But this ideology is no longer relevant for present day Israelis; for them, the former ideals have become routine facts" (73)

She goes on to say that compared to the period of the Yishuv, there has been a dilution of the collective commitment and this has been emphasized by the slackening of pioneering fervour and the inability of the collective settlements to grow in proportion to the country's population. Gush Emunim set about not only to fulfil their religious obligations concerning settling the land as they saw them, but to carry them out in a way which they believed would reinstill the pioneering ideological values into society.

The method they adopted to carry out their policy of settlement throughout Judea and Samaria was known as 'hitnachalut'. Schnall (74) argues that this is a major part of the Gush Emunim policy. It represents the practical ways in which the philosophy can be carried out. Hitnachalut involves physically establishing a presence in the necessary area by

Chapter Two
squatting, even if it is against government regulations. If they are forced to leave, peacefully or otherwise, they must then return until they are allowed to remain as permanent settlers. This requires leaving their city appartments (although they rarely sell them at first) and initially settling in tents and huts. Their belief was that once a settlement had been established it would never be surrendered. This basic belief was based on Israeli government policies concerning existing settlements and stems from the establishment of Jewish outposts and villages in the pre-State British Mandate period. Just as settlements had had spatial significance in the fixing of boundaries in the past, so too would the hitnachalut type settlements of the Gush have significance in the future. This had been the belief underlying the Allon settlements as well. However, opponents of the Gush argue that there can be no comparison between their policies of 'hitnachalut' and the traditional policies of 'hityashvut' (lit: settlement) since the latter also represented the social and cooperative aims of building the Jewish society and not only the security aspect (75). To the Gush, the social form of the settlement is only a secondary factor. They do not see the same need to synthesize traditional religious values with those of modern Jewish nationalism in the way that the Religious Kibbutz Movement have done with their collective frameworks (76).

Overall, N. Zion argues that the Gush philosophy is a totally new concept of Zionism. Up to the emergence of the Gush, there...
had been two types of Zionism. There was Herzlian political Zionism from which all territorial claims to the ancient Jewish land emerged, and socialist-utopian Zionism from which the ideals for new forms of Jewish society come (77). He sees Gush Emunim as having abandoned all attempts at solving the Jewish problem by means of 'political universalism' and instead turning to a supernatural force, not dependent on the political world. The Gush Emunim heroes are those personalities, motivated by a religious ideology, who represent the fight for Jewish national independence. These include the Maccabees during the Second Temple period and Rabbi Akiva (78) who lent his religious sanction to the revolt of Bar Kochba against the Romans after the Temple had been destroyed.

In October 1975, the Oz VeShalom group was created as a religious opposition to Gush Emunim. Hareven (79) describes this group as representing true religion and she views the Gush as disregarding the real theological lessons of the 1973 War. The Oz VeShalom group accepted that there was a religious obligation to settle in Judea and Samaria but only at the appropriate time in Jewish history. The pursuit of peace was an even greater religious value than the obligation to settle the land and thus overruled this latter injunction (80). To dwell in 'Eretz Israel' meant an acceptance of higher moral and ethical standards. The domination of the West Bank Arabs was seen as an incompatible objective. Oz VeShalom were more concerned with the building of society inside the existing borders than where the
actual borders should be. Arieli asserts that for both the LOIM and Gush Emunim

"the commandment of redeeming the land has taken the place of the commandment of redeeming the people" (81).

Although there are large sectors of the religious population in Israel who do not support Gush Emunim (on tactical rather than ideological grounds), the Oz VeShalom group has remained small.

The ideological opposition on the secular, or non-religious, front is indicated by Elam (1976). He describes the Gush Emunim ideology as being one of a 'false Messianism' and argues that Zionism did not arise from the attachment to the Land of Israel or from religious obligations. Rather, it was the urgent need for a solution to the problem of Jewish existence in the modern period. He cites, as support, one of the early Zionist ideological giants, Leon Pinsker, and quotes him as stating that

"not the 'holy land' should be the aim of our endeavour, but a land of our own" (82).

Elam also cites Theodore Herzl, the founder of political Zionism within an organized framework, who was prepared to set up a Jewish homeland in other parts of the world, rather than wait for the possibility of settling only in the Land of Israel (83).

According to Elam, the 'Land of Israel' is not true Zionism. The head of the Jewish Agency in the mid-1970's, Pinchas Sapir, argued that Zionism had never had anything to do with mysticism and that in the second half of the twentieth century, territorial claims had to be decided on national, rather than religious grounds (84). Such opposition to Gush Emunim and their policies

Chapter Two
was highlighted in March 1978 with the formation of the Peace Now Movement. They subsequently lobbied the government to prevent new settlements being established and held mass rallies and demonstrations in opposition to Gush Emunim settlement activity.

Thus, there is much dispute concerning the place of the Gush Emunim philosophy within the Zionist ideological process. Although it can be generalised that the religious sector of the Israeli population tend to identify more with the Gush, and those of the secular camp more with the Peace Movement, this is only relative. While there are traditionalists (in the religious sense) who view the Gush as a fulfilment of Jewish theological views of settling the land, there are others, who while accepting this as a Divine injunction, view it as only secondary to the greater value of attaining peace and avoiding bloodshed. Similarly, while there are secularists who view the Gush activities as negating the whole basis and existence of a State living at peace with its Arab neighbours, there are others who compare the Gush to the pre-State Zionist pioneers.

2.4.2 Tactics Under the Mapai Government

The principle of hitnachalut adopted by Gush Emunim aimed at eliminating the areas of non-Jewish settlement in the West Bank. The idea of squatting was initially used in the case of Keshet in the Golan Heights in May 1974, by a group of like-minded people.
trying to prevent the return of Kuneitra to Syria (85). The Gush felt that the LOIM lobby had not been as effective as it should have been and it was now necessary to back up such demands with active participation. Isaac notes that there had been illegal settlement attempts before the emergence of Gush Emunim but these had been more of a demonstration against government policy as opposed to a serious attempt to establish permanent settlements (86). A group of Israelis had attempted to settle on Mount Gerizim near Nablus in June 1969 but had been forcibly removed by the military government.

The first attempt by Gush Emunim to settle was in Horon, near Nablus, in June 1974. They were forcibly evicted. The Rabin government was unsure as to the lesson to be learnt from this attempt and seven motions to debate the issue in the Knesset were postponed (87). Press reports of the time indicate that students of the Mercaz Harav Talmudical Academy in Jerusalem, whose spiritual head was Rabbi Kook and from whom much of the Gush leadership drew their inspiration and support, had been planning such settlement attempts in Judea and Samaria for two years. A subsequent announcement from Mercaz Harav spoke of a pending attempt to establish an academy (Heb: Yeshiva) 'somewhere near Jericho', to be followed by a permanent settlement (88). In the following month, a group of settlers squatted in the old Sebastia railway station in Samaria and were permitted to remain there for the night. The settlers turned down a government suggestion of an alternative location on the eastern border of Samaria.
overlooking the Jordan Valley. This location was in the inner security road of the Allon Plan. They insisted on being allowed to settle permanently at a location on the mountain ridge itself. Hundreds of supporters arrived to demonstrate their solidarity with the Gush. The government were unwilling to use force again, and after four days the settlers left of their own accord. This incident led to the first major debate in the Knesset on the issue. Prime Minister Rabin stated that

"it is not by accident that settlement in that area (i.e; Nablus) has been prevented for the past seven years by different governments" (89).

Sebastia, nevertheless, became the scene of repeated settlement attempts and the rallying point for Gush Emunim. Other groups were organized for the Shilo, Ma'aleh Adumim and Jericho areas. In October 1974, a mass attempt at a number of sites throughout the West Bank marked the biggest challenge to government authority and the country witnessed scenes of unprecedented violence by Israeli civilians against the military authorities. This was a frightening awakening for a country that prides itself on its internal unity in the face of its external threats. As the Gush Emunim movement grew in size and organization, it made repeated settlement attempts at all of the four above mentioned sites (Fig 2.8). The government then permitted the Gush to stage a two day march through Samaria and this attracted about 20,000 people. This has since become an annual event to demonstrate solidarity with the Gush Emunim cause.

The status quo did not undergo any significant change until

Chapter Two
FIG 2.8
GUSH EMUNIM SQUATTING ATTEMPTS 1974-1980

Source: D. Newman 1981
December 1975 with the issue of Camp Kaddum (Chapter Six). A settlement attempt in the Sebastia region was this time allowed to remain temporarily in a nearby army camp by Defence Minister Shimon Peres. The settlers would remain there until the government had decided on a suitable alternative location. To the Gush, this was their first foothold in the West Bank. This compromise arrangement caused a split in the Cabinet and there was much heated argument. Allon tabled a motion in the Knesset on 30th April 1976 which stated that the government would continue to encourage settlement in areas it was deemed necessary to settle, but that Kaddum was not in one of those areas. The settlers should be offered alternative sites within the government approved areas or be evicted. In the absence of alternatives acceptable to the Gush, the settlers gradually began to develop their existing 'temporary' home. At the same time, a group of settlers moved into Ma'aleh Adumim on the Jerusalem-Jericho road and a third group remained at Ophrah, north of Ramallah, having originally received permission to go there as a temporary 'work camp' (90).

On 11th February 1976, Gush Emunim produced a settlement plan calling for the settlement of one million Jews at 100 sites throughout the West Bank over a period of ten years (91) (Fig 2.9). They described their plan as a blueprint for Israel's fourth decade. Whereas the first three decades had been respectively

Chapter Two
FIG 2.9
GUSH EMUNIM
'YESH' SETTLEMENT PLAN 1976

△ First priority
● Second priority
★ Existing settlements
□ Urban

Source: Gush Emunim 1976
immigration and settlement,
agricultural consolidation, and
industrial development,
the fourth decade would witness a settling of the mountains. The introduction to the plan states that "It is the right and obligation of the Jewish people to settle throughout the width of the land and therefore it is forbidden that there should be any political obstruction in the fixing of settlements in Judea and Samaria" (92).
The proposed locations were based on
1. The need for strategic control;
2. The settlement of Jewish and State land so as to avoid the expropriation of Arab land;
3. An attempt to fit, as far as possible, into the existing infrastructural network;
4. Proximity to places of Jewish historical significance.
An analysis of the proposed sites (listed in the appendix to the plan) show that the strategic, political and historical considerations were dominant while the economic considerations were only secondary. Whereas only a brief note is appended regarding the suitability of each location to agriculture and/or industry in general, greater importance is accorded the significance of the location in terms of domination over communication networks and the relationship to borders. The proposed locations are spread out along the main north-south Hebron to Jerusalem to Nablus route, and along the east-west routes connecting this route with the coastal plain to the west.
and the Jordan Valley to the east. The types of settlement to be established would comprise a three tier hierarchy. There would be the small, closed settlement type of the kibbutz, moshav and industrial village (Chapter Four), a larger rural type settlement for a few thousand people (see Chapter Five on the Yishuv Kehillati), and cities for tens of thousands of settlers. The framework would be a hierarchical one in which the proposed cities would be surrounded by the smaller settlements. The plan called for implementation to take place by means of redirecting government resources from the coast to Judea and Samaria; the establishment of a company to invest in the development of Judea and Samaria; the extension of government ownership to all land over which ownership is doubtful; the establishment of the settlements in the traditional pioneering fashion; and the rapid development of the economic branches of all the settlements. The plan did not cover any specific point in professional detail. In fact, it is only eleven pages long, and half of it is the appendix listing the actual sites. It received scant attention from the government, particularly as Gush Emunim were not a recognised settlement movement. However, it served to show the total settlement concept that the Gush were fighting for.

In the period between the publication of this plan and the right-wing Likud election victory in May 1977, the situation between the Gush and the government remained the same. The three unrecognised and 'temporary' settlements of Kaddum, Ophrah and Ma'aleh Adumim underwent gradual, but unofficial, development
(Fig 6.1). In January 1977, the Inter-Ministerial Settlement Committee added Mes'ha to a list of settlements that they recommended be established over the next few years. This location was only a few kilometres over the 1967 border and there existed a group of 300 families who were prepared to settle there. One week before the 1977 elections, the Mapai government (now under the leadership of Peres) authorised Gush Emunim to move the first fifteen families into this settlement. This, therefore, became the first 'official' settlement in Samaria (93).

The major controversy that arose out of the Gush Emunim activities concerned their relationship with the political establishment and the rule of democracy. The Gush, as a movement, had always insisted on remaining outside the formal party framework, and this continues until today despite the new Hatchiyah party (94). The first Rabbi Kook had conceived of his Zionism as divorced from the arena of party politics and had remained aloof from all parties, including the Religious Zionists. Gush Emunim adopted a similar policy. It can be argued, therefore, that not only do they adopt settlement policies against government wishes but also do not want to become part of the framework that could change the policies to which they object. Their confrontations with both Israeli army and government have led to charges that they are opposed to democratic procedures. Thus, in the case of Kaddum, Galili argued in the ensuing Knesset debate that it was not merely an
issue of settlement but one of how Israel was to govern itself.

"Any group which undermines the foundations of our democratic process, thereby weakens our campaigns for permanent defensible borders" (95)

and Yigal Allon had accused the Gush of being

"a political movement of false Messiahs and nationalistic demagogues" (96).

Nevertheless, Sprinzak argues that the methods used by the Gush are in keeping with their objectives of recreating the pioneering spirit. The Gush argue that the pre-State Zionist activity was one of illegal acts in areas of defence, immigration and settlement (97). Furthermore, it is the descendants of these leaders of the pre-State Yishuv that now (pre-1977) run the country and they should therefore be more understanding of such policies. The Gush also see their undemocratic procedures as legitimate since they follow the teachings of the present Rabbi Kook who claims that no human power can relinquish a sacred and holy possession even if the human element is one that, by majority consent, represents the modern Jewish nation (98). Similarly, one of the founders and foremost leaders of the Gush, Rabbi Moshe Levinger, claims that Zionism and settlement cannot be voted away by majority votes (99). Overall, Schnall sums up the Gush position as being one in which they

"must opt either to abandon the territories, which is unacceptable to it, or to abandon democracy, which is unacceptable to its opponents" (100).

Chapter Two
2.5 Other Settlement Activity

2.5.1 The Case of Jerusalem

One area in which the conflict between government and Gush Emunim was less intense was with regard to Jerusalem. There was a national consensus intent on reinforcing the Jewish claim to the city because of its special significance. In 1976, three proposals were put forward, each suggesting a different method of surrounding Jerusalem with Jewish settlements (101). The various proposals were all aimed at securing the hinterland of Jerusalem by means of increasing settlement within a ten to fifteen kilometre radius of the city and by developing a complete infrastructural system linking Jerusalem to its surrounds.

One of the proposals put forward was that of the Housing Ministry (102) (Fig 2.10). This plan contained two alternative strategies. The first of these involved building three medium sized towns and a number of small suburban or industrial settlements. The alternative strategy proposed creating a wider framework of small settlements, of which five would be suburban quarters with 5000 inhabitants each. Three of the five suburban quarters would be located at the sites of the proposed towns of the first strategy. The larger settlements (depending on the strategy adopted) would be located at key interchanges on a...
proposed new road system around the city.

A second plan was proposed by the Lands of Israel Authority (103) (Fig 2.11). This called for continuous urban settlement to the north of the city with smaller rural settlement to the north and north-west around Beit Choron. They also suggested establishing two cities commanding the western and southern approaches to Jerusalem. Apart from the cities, the Lands Authority urged that the circle of inner suburbs be completed quickly and that the Jerusalem Corridor be widened by the establishment of new rural settlements.

The most thorough settlement strategy for this region was that put forward by the Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency. They proposed the establishment of three blocks of rural settlement containing Industrial Villages (which are described in Chapter Four) (Fig 2.12). This reflected their traditional approach to settlement planning in that a number of small settlements was deemed as being most suitable to gain wide control of an area. Furthermore, they require less initial investment than do new cities or urban quarters. These small villages would also cause less harm to the development of Jerusalem itself in that they would not act as competing urban centres.

The three proposed blocs of settlement were:

1. Gush Givon (104) which would consist of four Industrial Villages with a total population of 600-800 families and would control the Latrun-Atarot road to the north and north-west of
FIG 2.12
SETTLEMENT IN THE 'WIDER JERUSALEM' AREA:
JEWISH AGENCY PROPOSAL 1976

Source World Zionist Organisation 1976; Jerusalem Municipality 1977
Jerusalem.

2. Gush Cochav Hashchar (105), dominating the Jericho - Ramallah road, had already been planned as part of the Jordan Valley Settlement Plan serving as part of the inner security road of the Allon Plan. It would be located halfway along this road between Ma'aleh Efrayim in the north and Ma'aleh Adumim in the south and would consist of three Industrial Villages.

3. Gush Etzion (106) to the south of Jerusalem and already consisting of three settlements was earmarked for an additional four villages to the east of the existing ones. The plan proposed settlement of 2010 families by 1993. In 1975, Gush Etzion contained 210 families.

With the victory of the Likud in the 1977 elections and the increased pressure from Gush Emunim, a fourth block was later recognized for the Ma'aleh Adumim area on the Jerusalem-Jericho road. It is interesting to note that the Settlement Department Plan proposes nothing for the area immediately to the north of Jerusalem since this is the area of dense Arab population concentrations and, therefore, not in line with Mapai policy. The settling of Ophrah in this area was vehemently opposed by Yigal Allon. Not only did it fall outside his planning area for settlement but it was located right in his proposed Arab corridor, thereby destroying his whole concept.

The common element to all three plans were the proposals for corridors of settlements along the lines of Beit Choron to Ma'aleh Adumim and from Emek Halah to Gush Etzion. As will be

Chapter Two
seen, the realities of actual settlement establishment have been largely dictated by Gush Emunim and include settlement types common to all the above mentioned plans.

2.5.2 Other Settlement Proposals

The right-wing lobby for extended settlement was not limited to the realms of Gush Emunim. Wachman (1977) argued that it was necessary to develop a 'double column' of settlement in Israel (107). This necessitated the populating of the eastern column, namely the rift valley from the Golan Heights in the north, to Sharm e-Sheikh in the south, with two million inhabitants by the end of the century (Fig 2.13). Such a region would serve as a parallel axis to the populated coastal strip of Israel. Wachman describes a hierarchical settlement framework for this region. The basis for the plan would be the foundation of new urban centres. For the implementation of the plan, a decisive policy would be required by the government to divert population, industry and resources to the planning region. On the lines of the Allon Plan, the densely populated Arab areas would constitute autonomous enclaves linked to the neighbouring Arab states by territorial corridors.

Another settlement strategy was proposed by the La'am faction of the Likud Alignment as part of their election manifesto in 1977 (108). This proposal called for widespread settlement
FIG 2.13
THE 'DOUBLE COLUMN' SETTLEMENT
PLAN 1976 (after Wachman).

Coastal column
Eastern column
Autonomous Arab region
Proposed Jewish towns
Existing urban centres
Arab towns in planning region
Border of occupied territories
Israel/Egypt ceasefire line 1973

throughout Eretz Yisrael (Fig 2.14). In the urban sector, they proposed a moratorium on building in the coastal plain and a transfer of resources for the establishment of high quality dormitory towns at distances of fifteen to thirty kilometres from the coastal cities. The plan proposed the establishment of 150,000 living units of this type over the next four years. In the rural sector, it was proposed to establish 46 new villages. These would be allocated to any group that was seriously prepared to settle (thus hinting at the recognition of Gush Emunim), while the settlers would be allowed to decide on the form of the settlement themselves (allowing for the Yishuv Kehillati - see Chapter Five). Although, the La'am proposal discusses the strategy required for the whole country, the major input would be in Judea and Samaria. This area would receive 50,000 dwelling-units during the four year period of the plan, with the settlers mostly commuting to the Tel Aviv and Jerusalem regions.

2.6 Conclusions

Regardless of the varied activities and unofficial settlement plans of this period, the Allon Plan remained the basic guideline for settlement in the West Bank. Prime Minister Rabin informed Jordan Valley settlers in April 1976 that the Jordan River would remain Israel's security boundary. On 30th September 1976, Galili reiterated this policy when he announced the government
FIG 2.14
LA'AM PROPOSAL FOR RURAL
AND URBAN SETTLEMENT 1977

- Existing urban - Jewish
- Existing urban - Arab
- Proposed urban - Jewish
- Proposed rural village
- Proposed rural centre
- Proposed Yishuv Kehillati
- Local village regions
- National planning regions
- Border of occupied territories

Planning regions: 1-Galilee, 2-Golan, 3-Jordan Valley, 4-Judea/Samaria, 5-South

Source: L'Am planning proposals 1977
intention to establish a continuous band of settlement from Gush Etzion eastward to Tekoah and from Ma'aleh Adumim southward to Beer Sheba. Allon himself also suggested, on 29th December 1976, turning the two ends of the Allon Road (i.e., Ma'aleh Efrayim and Ma'aleh Adumim) into urban centres.

Overall, between 1973 and the election of the Likud government in May 1977, 35 new settlements were established in all the territories. Most of these were small rural settlements and Monroe shows that in the Jordan Valley there were only 900 Jewish settlers in 1976, as compared to about 20,000 Arabs (18,000 in Jericho). Nevertheless, she asserts that these settlers used 70-80% of the Valley floor (109). Lesch argues that the fact that the government had plans to expand the Gush Etzion area and also to build new highways through Samaria by the 1980's (along which settlements would be established) is indicative of the fact that the Allon Plan was only part of the overall strategy and that the subsequent Likud policy was not as radically different as is suggested (110). The dissection of Samaria into controllable sectors is the basic idea behind Arik Sharon's Plan (see Chapter Three) under the Likud administration. It would appear that the similar idea of the Labour Government may have reflected the short period in which Sharon acted as a private adviser to Prime Minister Rabin. However, it was not a policy favoured by the majority of the leadership of the party at the time.

Thus, by the time the Labour government were defeated in the 1977 elections, there existed a framework of settlements

Chapter Two
throughout the West Bank. The emergence of Gush Emunim had acted as a strong challenge to existing government locational policies. At first, their squatting attempts had been treated with forceful eviction, in the belief that this would cause them to refrain from any further such attempts. But their continued perserverance and growing support eventually led to their achieving a more permanent foothold in the West Bank. This was due, in no small way, to the unofficial aid given by Defence Minister Shimon Peres. Comprehensive and objective planning surveys were not yet part of the Gush scheme. However, their subsequent recognition by the new Likud government and the resulting loans and grants they received, led them to consider these other important aspects. This process is analysed in the following chapter.
REFERENCES


4. Ibid.


6. The geography and settlement patterns of ancient Jewish kingdoms are described in


Chapter Two


Chapter Two


23. The Haganah was the armed force of the Jewish Yishuv in Palestine. It later served as the foundation upon which the Israeli army was built.


See also


34. Kinnerling, B. (1979) op cit. p.16.


39. a) Ha'aretz. 5/9/67, p.1. 'Allon to press conference - The borders of Israel will be fixed according to its security requirements'.
   e) Harris, W.W. (1978) op cit.. Harris discusses the significance of the Allon Plan. The purpose of it being reiterated here is twofold. Firstly, mention of the plan is necessary to make the narrative chronological. Secondly, to identify the place of the Allon
Plan within the ideological and traditional framework which concern the author. The various stances, for and against the plan, are examined on this basis, including the reaction of Gush Emunim and likeminded people.

40. The Palmach were the striking force of the Hagannah. It contained the crack units, many of them drawn from the kibbutz framework and thus highly ideologically motivated.


43. The status of the land under both the Hague and the Geneva conventions became one of the major issues in the 'Land Trials' of 1978 onwards, when Arab villages and landowners appealed against land requisitions and confiscations for settlement purposes.


45. The Nahal are the units of the army who opt, as part of their army service, to spend periods on newly established settlements, developing the basic infrastructures and economic branches. Once the settlement has reached a specific stage of development, it is turned over to the civilian settlers. This usually applies only to settlements in strategic or topographically hard locations.


48. Harris (1978) describes these two stances as representing respectively the minimalists and the maximalists. In Israel, they are known more commonly as the 'doves' and the 'hawks'.


Chapter Two
Thus, the fact that the Herut leader, Mr. Menachem Begin, was later able to compromise on Sinai under the Camp David accords is not against the policy of that party.

Isaac, R.J. (1976) *op cit.*

Ibid, p.18.

A last minute idea to sponsor one of the IOM's leading ideologues, Israel Eldad, on a 'Land of Israel' party ticket resulted in no Knesset seats being won.

Quoted in Ibid, p.126.

Sprinzak argues that until Gush Emunim came on the scene, every pressure group or extreme political group in Israel's history had always eventually become part of the accepted Israeli political establishment without greatly affecting the basic foundations of society. See Sprinzak, E. (1977) 'Extreme politics in Israel', *Jerusalem Quarterly*. No.5, 33-47.

This bears a striking resemblance to the Defence Ministry concept of four years later when the Defence Minister was Ezer Weizmann. At that time, Weizmann and Dayan were allies in opposing the extreme elements in the right wing camp. For a description of Weizman's plan, see Chapter Three.

30/3/73. *Jerusalem Post.*

For Dayan's policies in the post-1967 period, see

a) Ha'aretz. (Hebrew) 27/6/69, p.1. 'Dayan calls for settlement in the territories'.


c) Yediot Ahronot. (Hebrew) 25/4/73. 'Moshe Dayan's Map'.


See also,

Herzog, C. (4/7/79) *Jerusalem Post.* 'Security and settlement'.

Chapter Two


Chapter Two


Raz argues that gush Emunim have "no social or generally humanistic objectives".


78. Rabbi Akiva was the leading religious personality at the time of the Roman invasion of Palestine in the first century B.C.E. He sanctioned the revolt against the Romans by Bar Kochba. This struggle has come to symbolise the Jewish nationalistic fight.


Similar views are expressed in
83. There were many attempts to establish a Jewish homeland or autonomous Jewish settlements at various locations throughout the world. The most notable of these was the Uganda proposal which was nearly accepted by the Zionist Congress of 1903. Other ideas included El Arish in Northern Sinai and the Sudan. In fact, there was a movement known as the territorialist movement which was set up by Jews not specifically interested in the Land of Israel itself. Its aim was to establish Jewish settlement anywhere. Similarly, there was the Am Olam Society formed by Russian Jews with the aim of establishing agricultural colonies in the USA.


85. The story of Keshet is transalated as an appendix in Harris, W.W. (1978) op cit.


87. Jerusalem Post, 5/6/74; 11/6/74.

88. Jerusalem Post, 7/6/74.

Ha'aretz, (Hebrew) 24/6/74.

89. See all Israeli press between 25/7/74 to 29/7/74.

90. These three settlements of Kedumim, Ophrah and Ma'aleh Adumim are examined in more detail in Chapter Six.


93. The name of Mes'ha was changed firstly to Pe'erim and later to Elkanah. Today, it is one of the major Jewish settlements in Samaria. It is an urban settlement and is located on the Sharon bisect road.

94. The Hatchiyah party was formed in 1979 after the signing of the Camp David Accords, by two members of the Knesset, Mr. Moshe Shamir and Mrs. Geula Cohen. They believed that Mr. Begin had sold Israel out. Many of the country's foremost 'hawks' immediately identified with the party. Two of the leading gush Emunim activists, Mr. Chanan Porat and Mr. Gershon Shafat, joined the new party list and were forced to resign their full time administrative jobs in Gush Emunim. However, they remained on the Gush Emunim executive and the Gush maintain strong links with the new party. Nevertheless, the Gush Emunim executive decided to remain as
an extra-party movement rather than officially join the new framework. As of the present time (summer 1981), the Hatchiyah Party is preparing to undergo the test of the electorate for the first time.

95. Jerusalem Post. 10/5/76.
96. Jerusalem Post. 13/6/76.
98. a) Hatzofeh. (Hebrew) 22/12/75.
   b) Ma'ariv. 6/5/74.
99. Jerusalem Post. 9/8/76.
100. Schnall, D.J. (1977) op cit, p.158.

101. The three plans are discussed and compared in
    Jerusalem Municipality, Planning Department. (1977) The
    Wider Development of Jerusalem. (Hebrew) Jerusalem.

    See also:
    a) Jerusalem Post. 17/12/75, p 6. 'To thicken - or not to
        thicken: Jerusalem planners draw up a suburban belt'.
    b) Ma'ariv. 6/2/76, p 19. 'Industrial villages and the
        plans for a wider Jerusalem'.
    c) Ma'ariv. 6/8/76. 'Three plans for widening Jerusalem'.

102. Housing Ministry, Department for Rural Building. (1975)
    First Examination of the Implication of Establishing
    Settlements in the Jerusalem region. (Hebrew) Jerusalem.

103. a) Lands of Israel Authority, Planning Department. (1976)
    Jerusalem and its Approaches. Jerusalem.
    b) Jerusalem Post. 9/3/76. 'Lands Administration plan for a
       wider Jerusalem'.

104. World Zionist Organisation, Rural Settlement Department.


Chapter Two


Chapter Three.

3 POST-1977: THE GROWTH OF GUSH EMUNIM.

3.1 The Likud Government: Ideological Background

In May 1977, the right-wing Likud coalition was returned with the largest number of seats in the Knesset. This was the first time since the earliest Jewish colonization of over 100 years previously that power was no longer concentrated in the hands of the socialist labour groupings. Duverger (1964) (1) asserts that every period in history tends to have a dominant doctrine which is based on the major ideology of that society. As time passes, the dominant doctrine may shift as public attitudes and orientations change. However, the ruling establishment holds on to the old doctrine, thus causing political tension and the weakening of the establishment position. Arian (1968) notes that in Israel, it was the dominant Mapai party that had a special affinity, for many years, to the dominant doctrine of socialist Zionism, but that this was beginning to change by the late 1960's (2). The 1969 elections had shown an increased support for the centre and right while the Yom Kippur War had served to harden the extreme positions on foreign affairs. Thus, when the dominant party were defeated in the 1977 elections, it was not as much a major turn around in voting behaviour as a continuation of these changing attitudes.
Nevertheless, although the result was seen as a resounding victory for the right-wing, the actual figures show that it was more a defeat for the Mapai party than a victory for the Likud. Most of the votes lost by the Mapai Party went to the newly formed Party for Democratic Change headed by Professor Yigal Yadin. The number of seats lost by Mapai was 19 (from 51 to 32), while those gained by Likud were only 4 (from 39 to 43). The Party for Democratic Change won 15 seats, all of them new. This new party had been formed as a response to what it saw as a neglect of internal social and economic development at the expense of the perpetual priority given to foreign affairs and the Arab-Israel conflict. It was symptomatic of the 1977 election campaign that only an unusually minor part was given by any party to the foreign affairs issues while the problems of welfare and the economy were accorded a major role. Peretz (1977) notes that the issue of peace and foreign affairs only came sixth on the list of priorities of the Likud coalition in their election platform. They considered the issues of inflation, corruption, lack of leadership, the tax burden, and declining living standards as more important (3). This emphasised the importance in the right-wing coalition of the Liberal party who provided the basic social and economic balance to the Herut preoccupation with foreign affairs. The Herut party (the largest party in the Likud coalition), under the leadership of Mr. Menachem Begin, had always placed its priorities on matters concerning Israel’s security and the fate of the Jewish

Chapter Three
people. However, the basic policy guidelines of the Likud election manifesto of 1977 stated that 

"the government, will plan, establish and encourage urban and rural settlement on the soil of the homeland" (4),

and the La'am faction presented a settlement plan for the country which was included as part of the manifesto (5). This plan proposed the establishment of five towns (to total 150,000 people) and 43 agricultural and industrial settlements throughout the occupied territories, together with the construction of east to west roads through the West Bank. This would be implemented by means of transferring all the planned government housing projects for the coastal strip to these areas, with new settlers commuting to work in central Israel. However, although part of the official manifesto, it did not receive much prominence during the election campaign. This attitude towards the elections was particularly emphasized by the scandals surrounding the Mapai Government in its last year, the most notable of these being the suicide of Housing Minister, Avram Ofer, on 3rd January 1977, after allegations by a journalist that he had committed offences during the period that he had served as director general of the Histadrut's housing company, Shikun Ovdim (6). This was followed, three months later, by the resignation of Prime Minister Rabin following the disclosure that his wife held an illegal foreign bank account (7).

The resulting change in government meant that fundamental changes in the conception of Israeli society could be put into
effect in the fields of economic and social policy as well as foreign affairs. The Herut party of Prime Minister Menachem Begin had always advocated a hard-line policy with regard to the Arab-Israel conflict and the status of the territories. The ideology of the Herut party dates back to the breakaway Zionist Revisionist movement founded by Vladimir Jabotinsky (8). He founded the Revisionist Party on the Zionist Executive in the 1920's as an opposition to the Zionist leadership of the time. He argued that their policy towards the British Mandatory Government in Palestine should be one of an active and energetic attempt to force the issue of a mass transfer of the Jews of Europe to Palestine, rather than one of appeasement. Whereas the majority of the Zionist leadership, under Chaim Weitzmann, emphasised the creation of an ideal society based on agriculture and socialism, Jabotinsky emphasised political action. The dispute affected the issue of boundaries as well and this grew to be a major point of contention (9). Jabotinsky had declared that

"Palestine is a territory whose chief geographic feature is this: that the Jordan River does not delineate its frontiers but flows through its centre" (10).

He eventually resigned altogether from the Zionist Executive and in 1935 broke away completely from the Zionist Organisation to found the New Zionist Organisation. This group emphasised the historic right of the Jews to 'both sides of the Jordan' and this continued as a part of the Herut platform until 1965. It represented the first, and only, major challenge to the policies of the powerfully dominant trend in the Zionist Movement, namely

Chapter Three
the socially based Labour Zionists.

The underground anti-British movements of the Irgun Zva Leumi and the Stern Group (11), were an outgrowth of the Revisionist ideology. Menachem Begin became the Irgun leader, the larger of the two groups, after his arrival in Palestine from Poland, where he had been an ardent follower of the now deceased Jabotinsky.

With the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, and under Begin's leadership, the Irgun developed into the Herut Party. It adopted hard line policies on all matters relating to Israel and the Jewish people. Thus, much of its support came from survivors from Nazi Europe and from refugees from countries now hostile to the new State. In the 1950's, the party vehemently opposed the reparations agreements between West Germany and Israel in the first display of hostile anti-Government demonstrations in the State's short history. Herut also came to represent the private capital interests along with the Liberal Party. This was an attitude that developed out of the existing situation in that they were the major opposition to the ruling Labour alignment governments. The Herut party and the Labour alignments developed opposing policies in all spheres. Furthermore, whereas Herut took much of their support from the refugees, the Labour Government took much of theirs from the idealist pioneers of earlier years. Both the Labour movement and the right-wing adhere to the national ideology of Zionism, but the latter emphasise nationalism as an end in itself and support the private sector, advocating liberalization of the economy as

Chapter Three
opposed to public sector and State planning. As will be shown later (Chapter Five) this has much practical significance in settlement planning.

The Herut party continued to press for a hard-line policy with the neighbouring Arab states. After the 1967 war, much of their ideology acquired practical relevance for the first time and Herut influence was felt in that they were represented in the National Unity Government of 1967 and 1968. Within days of the Likud election victory, the settlement issue was brought to the forefront of the international scene. The first official appearance of the new Prime Minister took place at the, (as yet unrecognised), settlement of Camp Kaddum where he publicly declared that there would be many more Eilon Morehs (12) under his new administration (13).

Paradoxically however, the right-wing did not have the tradition of establishing settlements inherent in their ideology, as did the Labour Zionist movement. Revisionist Zionism had always emphasised the general political process rather than the practical policy of gradually building settlements. Thus, although the new government had hard line views about the location of new settlements, nevertheless,

"for the first time in Zionist policy, presence did not imply irreversibility, and settlements were in no case perceived as determinants of a fait accompli" (14).

It was therefore, not an ideological problem for the Herut Party to agree to abandon Jewish settlements in Sinai under the Camp David accords of 1979. However, it must be noted, that in the

Chapter Three
latter case, the government were strongly supported by the opposition Mapai Party, who did have the close association with settlement activity, whereas the 'hawks' in Mr. Begin's camp opposed the peace agreement with Egypt.

To make possible the implementation of the new government's policies, a joint chairman was appointed for the Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency. This had always been the domain of the Mapai controlled beauraucracy and never more so than under its long serving head and settlement expert, Mr. Ra'anan Weitz. He was opposed to settlement throughout the West Bank and it was, therefore, decided to have a counterweight, Mr. Matityahu Drobless, to direct settlement activity in accordance with the government's views. Similarly, Agriculture Minister Ariel Sharon, became the new head of the Inter-Ministerial Settlement Committee, which had, up to then, always been chaired by Allon or Galili, to reflect the new government directives. As soon as the Inter-Ministerial Committee, under Sharon, had approved the location of a new settlement in the West Bank, the Settlement Department, under Drobless, could respond by helping actively to plan the settlement and attend to its establishment. Both Weitz and Drobless subsequently produced their own settlement plans for Judea and Samaria (see below). These plans, together with the activities of Gush Emunim, were responsible for the shift in settlement priority to the West Bank during the rule of the Likud Government.

Chapter Three
3.2 Gush Emunim As A Political Force

3.2.1 Initial Expectations

Gush Emunim viewed the Likud victory as a vindication of their squatting policies and believed that the new administration would legalise their activities. The new head of the Inter-Ministerial Settlement Committee, Ariel Sharon, known for his hard line policies, declared that the government's policy was to bring about widespread settlement in Judea and Samaria (15). The immediate response by Gush Emunim was to present the government with an 'Emergency Plan' for settlement (16). This proposed the immediate establishment of twelve new settlements along the mountain ridge of Judea and Samaria (Fig 3.1) and the legalization of the existing 'temporary' unofficial settlements of Camp Kaddum, Ophrah and Ma'aleh Adumim. The Gush ultimately wanted the government to adopt new legislation concerning the status and the ownership of land in the West Bank. Since this would take time to implement, they proposed that the new settlements be established, wherever possible, in existing army camps. These would later be transferred to civilian control or the civilian population would be able to develop beyond the army camp limits into their own settlement. Alternatively, 'state lands' would have to be found and used. The twelve locations are
FIG 3.1
GUSH EMUNIM
'EMERGENCY' SETTLEMENT PLAN 1977

- Proposed immediate settlement
- Existing Gush locations
- Etzion Bloc settlements

Source: Gush Emunim 1977
all mentioned in the Gush Plan of 1976 (Chapter Two) and were seen as constituting locations of utmost priority. Appended to the short 'Emergency Plan' was a short memorandum on the Yishuv Kehillati (Chapter Five) as being the most appropriate form of settlement type through which the plan could be implemented. These twelve settlements would serve as a basis through which their more extensive, long-term plans for widespread urban and rural settlement could take place. Groups of prospective settlers were ready to move into each of these twelve locations and the Gush argued that it was necessary for the authorities to relate to these groups as it did to settlement nuclei in other parts of Israel. Additional nuclei would be created in order to make possible the establishment of further settlements in the long term.

The new government responded by legally recognising the three existing, as yet unofficial, settlements of Camp Kaddum, Ophrah and Ma'aleh Adumim on 27th July 1977 (17). These newly recognised settlements were now entitled to the same aid from public funds as were settlements throughout Israel. Assistance included help in building semi-permanent homes, government grants and low-interest loans, and development aid in the field of educational, medical and cultural services. However, the government did not decide on any formal adoption of a timetable to meet the Gush demands. On 18th August 1977, three new settlements were approved by the government at Mevo Horon in the Ayalon Valley, Yattir to the south of Hebron on the way to Be'er
Sheba and Zur Natan Bet near Tulkarm. These settlements were in line with the policy adopted by the outgoing Labour government and were all close to the old border rather than in the heart of the West Bank. Only one, Yattir, was to be settled by Gush Emunim (18). By September, the government had still not commented on the Gush plan and the Gush therefore decided to revert to their tactics of hitnachalut. They announced that they intended to settle in these twelve sites with or without government permission, and accused the new government of having failed to live up to its promises. They claimed to have 2500 people waiting to settle at these sites (19). A compromise was reached between the government and the Gush by which the Gush settlers were allowed to move immediately into six military sites (20). The settlers would be employed at these army camps initially as civilian employees of the Defence Ministry with the possibility that eventually the army would withdraw altogether, thus leaving the camps as fully fledged civilian settlements. The six sites, all located along the mountain ridge, were occupied by the end of 1977. They were; Shomron, near Sebastia; Dotan, near Jenin; Beit El, near Ramallah; Nveh Tzuf (Nebi Tsalah), north west of Ramallah; Givon, north west of Jerusalem; and Beit Choron, in the Latrun Salient. Another three sites were later added to this list, namely; Mitzpeh Yericho, on the Jerusalem to Jericho road; Tirzah, on the Nablus to Damiyah road; and Sanur, on the Nablus to Jenin road (Fig 3.1). This activity represented the first practical government departure from the
Allon doctrine.

Although the Gush wished to continue their policy of establishing settlements, they also recognised the need to consolidate those already in existence. Thus, with the exception of Shilo, north of Ophrah and settled under the guise of an archaeological dig, no new settlement activity was attempted in the first half of 1978. Indeed, during the visit of Premier Begin to Washington in March 1978, all settlement activity was frozen, including the expansion of existing sites.

3.2.2 The Lands Issue

Towards the end of 1978, Gush activity was renewed in force and was centred on the struggle to establish a settlement by the name of Eilon Moreh near Nablus. The Gush threatened to renew their policy of squatting unless the government continued to establish new settlements. The government were eager to avoid confrontation with the Gush, particularly as many members of the government were sympathetic to their cause. Most of the Gush demands were, in fact, acceded to and in June 1979, the government approved the establishment of Eilon Moreh. The latter decision was to lead to a major conflict with the settlers when, in November 1979, they were ordered to move to a new site after the High Court had upheld an appeal by the local Arab landowners against the expropriation of their land. The land issue now
played a major role in the Gush campaign. This related not only to the establishment of more settlements but also to the expansion of existing ones. Many of the settlements had been established as extensions of army camps and as they consolidated and grew, the settlers required more land for expansion. The land near the settlements was mostly private Arab land and the government was not prepared to expropriate it for Gush Emunim.*

Until the British Mandatory rule in Palestine, Ottoman law dating from 1856 had applied to landownership (21), and land law had its origins in the Ottoman Mejallah and Civil Code. Under Ottoman Law a number of categories of landed property belonged to the State. These consisted of:

a) "Miri" land, whose cultivation had been neglected and therefore reverted to state ownership.

b) "Jiftlik" land that had originally been the property of the Sultan.

c) Land covered with sand dunes.

d) Forest land, excepting private or institution owned tracts.

e) Mines and quarries.

f) Antiquities.

g) State Domain and land used directly by the State.

Nearly all of the Jordan Valley together with large stretches in the south of Palestine and in the hill zones were regarded as State Domain. Although much of this land was cultivated by fellaheen who had been settled on their land for a long time, there was no official registration of these plots in the Land

Chapter Three
Registers, since Turkish Law only obliged private owners to register their land. Under the British, and later, Jordanian rule, a cadastral survey was carried out for the registration of properties. This was followed, in 1928, by the Land Settlement Ordinance which laid down rules concerning the determination of rights of ownership and possession. Special machinery was set up to investigate and adjudicate on land ownership claims in all villages. These decisions were recorded in the new Land Registers. However, not all areas underwent the process and in such areas, the old Ottoman Law still applied. Whereas most of the Jordan Valley had undergone the process of registration, this was not the case in most of the hill areas of the West Bank. Much of the dispute over land for Gush Emunim settlements centred on this region. According to the Ottoman Law, land which is not used for agriculture is known as 'mawat' (dead land) and is government land since there is no private owner. This usually involves rocky and marginally cultivable land. However, the government are not the outright owners. Rather, it is land which "the government seeks ownership over" until the process of sorting out and establishing precise ownership has been undertaken. For the government of Israel to change the status of any of this land, they would have to introduce civilian law to the West Bank. Since the West Bank is, under International Law, occupied territory, the government cannot do so. Thus, their authority is exercised by means of the military government and acquisition of land is carried out by 'requisition' as distinct

Chapter Three
from outright 'confiscation'. This is an international concept and does not constitute a change in ownership rights. Theoretically, land taken for army purposes can only be used in cases of military necessity. The owner should receive a payment for each year that it is used and should receive the land back as soon as the army no longer requires it. Agricultural areas do not fall into this category. In this way, most of the settlements were established on 'government' land for use by the military.

Land can be confiscated inside Israel for public needs such as schools, hospitals and roads. Once confiscated, it becomes government land and the former owners no longer have any claim to it. Such land is usually acquired by the Israel Lands Administration who first offer payment for the land. If the owners are unwilling to sell, the land can be expropriated under the 1943 legislation of 'Acquiring Land for Public Purposes' and this is carried out by, and in the name of, the Finance Minister. This confiscation of land can only take place when the government has full legal rights over the land. However, these rights did not extend to any territories beyond the 'green line'.

The Defence Minister from 1967 to 1974, Moshe Dayan, made it known that military settlements would only be established in the West Bank if they were on State or Absentee property. Alternately, the land may have been purchased by the Israel Lands Administration or the Jewish National Fund providing there was consent of the owner. However, the laws pertaining to the
appointment of a custodian to register 'absentee property' within Israel, and the right of development authorities to purchase such land from the custodian, was not to be applied to the West Bank. Also, no private purchase by Jews was allowed. This was laid down by the Military Administration of the West Bank in an ordinance dated 15th September 1967 entitled 'Command concerning land transactions - The West Bank region'. Punishment for committing this offence was to be five years imprisonment or a fine of 1500 dinars. By April 1973, the Israel Lands Administration had openly purchased over 30,000 dunams in the West Bank and about 18,000 dunams in Jerusalem. Gerson (1978) notes that the actual area purchased was much larger, but that it had been registered in the name of Arab agents against 'irrevocable' bills of sale (23). Although Dayan continued to press the government to change the law so that private purchase would be allowed, this did not take place until 1979, under the Likud Government. But this did not extend to confiscation of private land in the West Bank since the government would have been required to change the whole legal status of the area to do so. However, Quiring (1978) maintains that, in fact, the Israeli government has taken much private land even though the villagers had 'tapo' (land registry) documents dating from the Ottoman period which established their ownership in areas as yet untouched by the land registration process of the British administration. He asserts that the use of 'security' purposes as the rationale behind land acquisition eliminated the need for

Chapter Three
the government to file formal expropriation orders (24), thus avoiding any legal problems.

With the official government sanction for civilian settlements throughout Judea and Samaria under the Likud Government, Arab landowners began to file appeals against the use of their land for these purposes (25). The first 'order nisi' halting construction temporarily and giving the army a set time period in which they had to show cause why they should not cease construction was at Nveh Tsuf (Nebi Salah) in May 1978. The first major test case in the courts was that of Beit El, to the north of Ramallah. In the same case, an appeal was also lodged against the use of land at Toubas in the Jordan Valley for the establishment of the Israeli settlement of Beka'ot. The case started in September 1978 and judgement was delivered in March 1979. The central question to which the Court had to address itself was the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and also to the Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907. In both the cases of Beit El and Beka'ot the petitioners were protesting against the seizure of their land and the denial of the right to enter their land as well as the establishment of Jewish civilian settlements on it (26). Whereas the land in the Beit El Case had originally been requisitioned by the army in 1970, the case was only brought in 1978, after a civilian settlement had been authorised adjacent to the large Army camp.
It was argued that such a settlement could not be established on land taken in such a way since requisition meant that the land would be returned to the owners when no longer needed, while a civilian settlement implied permanency beyond the military time-span. The petitioners argued that the land was being used for civilian rather than military purposes and that, in any case, the seizure was not legal under International Law. In mid-September 1978, the High Court ordered the Defence Minister, the Commander of Judea and Samaria, and the Military Governor of the Ramallah area to show cause why they should not prevent construction for Israeli settlers at Beit El. A temporary injunction forbidding construction in the area during the legal proceedings was issued. This was the first time such an injunction had been issued against construction of a Jewish settlement beyond the 'green line'. The response of the army was that all Israeli settlements beyond the 'green line' constituted a part of the Israeli Defence Forces regional defense system and that they received priority in resource and manpower allocations. The settlements acted as a controlling factor and in the case of Beit El, the settlement was located on a major road junction (the north to south Jerusalem-Nablus road; the east to west Jericho-Coastal Plain road), controlling the water, electricity and communications infrastructure of the region. In the opinion of the Military Commander, the land seized was for urgent and necessary military needs.

The bench consisted of three High Court Judges. The final
judgement, rejecting the appeal, held that
"there is no reason to doubt that the presence of settlements, even civilian ones, composed of citizens of the occupying power, in the occupied territory, is a significant contribution to the security of that territory. Jewish settlement in occupied territory—as long as the state of belligerency continues—serves genuine security needs" (27).

Since the army acquired the land through requisition and not outright confiscation, the High Court decided that there was no contravention of the Hague Convention. One Judge drew the distinction between something being necessary in military terms and at the same time being acceptable under International Law. He ruled that the two concepts did not necessarily go together. Security did not have to be defined only in terms of army logistics. However, another Justice did concede that the land would have to be returned following any international agreements, owing to the temporary nature of its acquisition.

Following this case, other cases were brought in the High Court. The court rejected a similar application by 41 Arab landowners from Anata, a village to the north of Jerusalem, to stop the military government seizing 1700 dunams of land for a military camp (28). Preliminary work was halted by a Court Order at Efrat, near Gush Etzion (29), at Matityahu, just across the 'green line' border (30) and at Ma'aleh Adumim B on the Jerusalem-Jericho road. However, these temporary injunctions were all eventually withdrawn once the Courts had decided, in each case, that they served as part of the overall regional defense system for the area. The one case where this did not

Chapter Three
happen was with Eilon Moreh. An interim injunction was granted against further work at the site, and the government was ordered to show cause why it should not cease construction of the settlement (31). Adequate defense reasons were not considered sufficient by the Court, and, in November 1979, the Settlement was ordered to be dismantled within 30 days.

In addition to their anger at the Eilon Moreh judgement, Gush Emunim were opposed to the fundamental system which allowed these appeals to take place at all. They wanted the government formally to change the status of the land. In their Master Plan for Settlement (discussed below) they argued that

"since Judea and Samaria is part of Eretz Israel, the birthplace of the Jewish people, it is necessary to establish ownership of land similar to the rest of Israel" (32).

They called for the government immediately to lay claim to all unregistered land, to map this land and to forbid all use of it by unauthorised persons. Furthermore, they wanted to extend the law of outright confiscation for public purposes to areas beyond the 'green line'. They recommended a planned programme of land purchase in the Gaza Strip, the Galilee, and the West Bank by means of government funds, the establishment of purchasing agencies and the extension of the right of purchase to the private sector. Finally, they demanded that plans be drawn up and that the government refuse to allow building by Arabs that did not comply with these plans. Any such building should be destroyed. The Gush decided to continue with a programme of action to signify their disapproval at the Arab court cases and

Chapter Three
to focus attention on their demands for new land laws. In August and October of 1979, the Gush settlers at Kedumim, Ophrah, Tekoa and the urban quarter of Kiryat Arba removed part of their boundaries and began to fence in extra areas of land in a demonstration against the prevailing trends. The Gush argued that only 30,000 dunams out of a total of five million dunams in the West Bank was in Jewish hands. Land bought by Jews before 1948 and which had been administered by the 'controller of enemy property' under the Jordanian government, had not been returned since 1967. Only in the case of Karnei Shomron, with 7,000 dunams, did the Gush feel that expansion could take place. Although the settlers returned to their previous boundaries in each case, the point made was significant enough for the Likud faction to call on the government to solve the problems of land shortages for new and existing settlements (33). This resulted in the lifting of the government ban on private land acquisition by Jews anywhere beyond the 'green line'. However, the government were still not prepared to sanction the seizure of large tracts of Arab owned land for widespread settlement as this would necessitate formal change of the legal status of these territories.

Of the eight settlements that wished to expand but were unable to do so, seven were allocated additional amounts of land totalling a further 4,000 dunams. This was still insufficient for the Gush Emunim development plans, and they organised a series of "sit-ins" at thirty locations in the West Bank on 13th
October 1979. A review of the various options open to the government was prepared by the Attorney General, Yitzchak Zamir, in February 1980 (34). The basic options appeared to be as follows:

a) Maintenance of the existing legal position, whereby state-owned or private lands seized for 'military' purposes were used for settlements;

b) The application of Jordanian law providing for expropriation of land for 'public purposes';

c) The application of the equivalent Israeli law providing for expropriation for the same reasons;

d) Declaration of the territories as not being 'occupied' and thus not subject to international law;

e) Official government annexation of the territories.

In May 1980, Ariel Sharon was appointed head of a new ministerial committee of which the objective was to find land for these and other settlements. Within a fortnight, the committee had 'discovered' sufficient state-owned land and 'unregistered' land for the expansion of the settlements of Elkana, Ariel, Kedumim, Efrat and Givon, while Beit Horon was allocated an alternative site nearby. The committee also undertook to find more land for Ophrah and Kiryat Arba. One of the means they used to find this land was to allocate areas of land in the lower regions of the hills to settlements located at the top of these hills. This would leave the Arab villages on the slopes as enclaves between the Gush settlement and its land. In the cases...
of the planned towns of Givon and Efrat, the Arab land would become reservations within the new boundaries. The owners would be permitted to continue cultivation of these lands but not to build on them. The Justice Ministry argued that there had been no change in the criteria used to find the extra land, meaning that no tracts cultivated in the previous ten years, or land registered as privately owned had been taken. Sharon, therefore, argued that this solution could only be temporary and that what was needed was a change in the legal status of land to allow full expropriation.

Thus, by exerting pressure whenever they had fresh demands to make, plus the fact that the Likud government were more favourably disposed towards them than the previous Mapai administration, the Gush built up a network of seventeen settlements by the spring of 1980. This figure does not include the urban quarters of Kiryat Arba, Elkana and Ariel which, although in the heart of the West Bank and with settlers of similar political and/or religious orientations, are not officially sponsored by Gush Emunim. This is due to the division between 'urban' and 'rural' in Israel, as explained in the next two chapters.
3.3 Multiplicity Of Plans

Although most of the actual settlement activity tended to take place at times of renewed political fervour, the Gush and their supporters had a plan for overall settlement strategy on the West Bank. However, this was not the only plan. Other relevant authorities produced complementary settlement strategies and it is possible to distinguish four major settlement plans (Table 3.1). In the government there were the conflicting ideas of the chairman of the Inter-Ministerial Settlement Committee, Ariel Sharon, and the Defence Minister, Ezer Weizmann. At the non-governmental level, similar plans were produced by Gush Emunim and the new joint chairman of the Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency, Matityahu Drobless.

3.3.1 Government Proposals

In September 1977, Ariel Sharon, the new Minister of Agriculture and chairman of the Inter-Ministerial Settlement Committee, produced a twenty year plan aimed at procuring and settling two million Jewish settlers (35). Known as the Sharon Plan, it disputed the political notion underlying the Allon Plan because it failed to create strategic depth for the coastal strip and because it did not create a physical link between the coastal

Chapter Three
### TABLE 3.1.

**COMPARISON OF SETTLEMENT PLANS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sharon Plan</th>
<th>Weizmann Plan</th>
<th>Gush Emunim Plan</th>
<th>Drobless Plan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Date of Plan</strong></td>
<td>September 1977</td>
<td>Spring 1978</td>
<td>July 1978</td>
<td>October 1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Time Schedule</strong></td>
<td>20 to 30 years</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>By year 2000</td>
<td>Five years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Planned increase in population</strong></td>
<td>2 million in eastern region of 'Greater Israel'</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>100,000 by 1982; 750,000 by end of century</td>
<td>8,000 families by first year; 27,000 families in five years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>No. &amp; Type of Settlements</strong></td>
<td>Imprecise; Mostly small villages with a few urban centres</td>
<td>Six cities</td>
<td>32 new settlements; 2 cities, 4 towns, 20 sub-urban quarters &amp; 25 clusters of Yishuv Kehillatis</td>
<td>46 new settlements and expansion of three existing locations. All except Yishuv Kehillatis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
strip and the Jordan Valley. In his plan, Sharon proposed the establishment of a major line of settlement along a 650 kilometre long strip from the Golan Heights in the north, through the entire Jordan Rift Valley, and continuing to Sharm elSheikh in the south (similar to the Wachman plan outlined in Chapter Two). Settlement would also proceed in the Jerusalem corridor, along the slopes of Western Samaria and in the foothill areas south of Hebron. Around Jerusalem the system would be based on three satellite towns, while in the other three regions there would be mostly small farming or industrialised villages. A major part of his plan was the construction of east-west roads through the West Bank connecting the heavily populated coastal strip to the newly populated strip along the Jordan Rift Valley (Fig 3.2). These roads would also enable the dissection of the West Bank into easily controllable sectors by splitting up the two major north-south concentrations of Arab residents. This would be achieved by the east-west roads and the north-south Jewish settlement lines. Five zones would thus be created from east to west (Fig 3.2), namely

1) the dense Jewish population of the coastal strip;
2) the Arab population of the western slopes;
3) the main north-south road of Gush Emunim settlements, together with the densely Arab populated Judean and Samarian hills, including the major West Bank towns;
4) Jewish control of the eastern slopes; and
5) Jewish settlement along the Jordan Rift Valley sealing off the
FIG 3.2
THE SHARON SETTLEMENT PROPOSALS 1977 & 1979

- Large town (>50,000 inhabitants)
- Small town (5-6,000 inhabitants)
- Plus many small settlements
- The 'Sharon Highway'
- The 'Axon Road'

Strategic Regions:
1. Coastal Plain; 2. Western Slopes;
3. Mountain Ridge; 4. Eastern Slopes;
5. Jordan Valley.

Source: Jerusalem Post 9/8/77 & 14/10/79.
eastern border.
Abbu-Ayyash draws specific attention to this policy of creating a transport network enabling sectoral division of the West Bank. He notes that the transportation system was already being restructured to make better Israeli control of the West Bank hinterland possible (36). Before 1967, the major axis was the north-south line from Jenin to Jerusalem and on to Hebron. He argues that the new north-south axis in the Jordan Valley and the beginning of east-west routes through the West Bank have served to break up the region into sectors. In fact, Efrat had already emphasised the suitability of such a framework in his physical structure plan of 1970 (37) and Sharon's plan only served to reinforce the pressure for new transportation networks and an increase in the expenditure allocated for their construction. His plan was therefore in total accordance with Gush Emunim aims and it was through Sharon that Gush Emunim were eventually recognised as an official settlement movement with the same legal rights and treasury budgetary allocations as every other kibbutz or moshav movement (38). Sharon continued to emphasise the importance of the Jordan Valley as Israel's eastern defence line and continued to press for settlement there as well (39). However, it was only of second priority in comparison to the West Bank highlands.

In contrast, Defence Minister Weizmann, who also supported the notion of settling the West Bank, aimed at the establishment of six urban centres to increase the West Bank Jewish population from
4,500 to 10,000 over a three year period and to 160,000 in the longer term (40). Known as the 'Widening of Jewish Settlement in Judea and Samaria', it was opposed to the notion of widespread distribution of many small settlements. The six sites he proposed for urban development were at Givon, north-west of Jerusalem; Ma'aleh Adumim, on the Jerusalem-Jericho road; Merkaz Efrat, north-east of Gush Etzion to the south of Jerusalem; Haris, halfway between Ramallah and Nablus; Nebi Salah, north-west of Ramallah; Karnei Shomron on the Kalkiliya-Nablus road (Fig 3.3). The first three of these centres were aimed at providing strategic depth for Jerusalem, while the latter settlements on the western flank of the Samarian hills were all within fifteen kilometres of the Green Line and were aimed at providing a buffer for the densely populated Jewish coastal plain. All six sites had already been approved by the government for the establishment of small settlements and thus, Weizmann described his plan as one of deepening existing sites rather than indiscriminately adding new ones. Indeed, it can be argued that this is the reason that the plan is known as a plan for 'widening' rather than 'establishing' settlement in this region. He saw these centres as being cheaper to establish in the long term since their proximity to the main urban centres of Israel would make it unnecessary to create large new economic infrastructures. He argued that Gush Emunim settlements were far too expensive to establish because they were mostly in remote locations and were set up on bases that neglected the true
FIG 3.3
THE WEIZMANN (DEFENCE MINISTRY) PROPOSALS FOR URBAN SETTLEMENT 1978 & 1979

- Proposed May 1978 & October 1979
- Proposed May 1978 only
- Proposed October 1979 only

The 'Sharon Highway'
The 'Ailon Road'

Source: Horvat 1978; Jerusalem Post 15/10/79

N.B. The bracketed figures are the proposed population figures for the first stage of the 1975 plan.
economic and security costs of the enterprise. The basic infrastructural costs of providing roads, water, telephones and electricity to each new small settlement could not be met. To implement his policy he was prepared to remove some of the smaller Gush Emunim settlements which, he felt, were obstructions. Weizmann's plan came under heavy criticism from the Jerusalem planners who argued that the implementation of such a policy would inhibit the growth of the population of Jerusalem itself, particularly in the newly built urban quarters of Ramot in the north and Gilo in the south. Jerusalem planners wanted a compact city and were opposed to any ribbon development. Whereas small settlements, as proposed by Sharon and Gush Emunim, would enhance the status of Jerusalem as the regional urban centre, larger settlements could inhibit that growth. Sharon argued that Weizmann's plan was impractical since it would take far too long to develop new towns. Speed was of the essence in creating facts and this could be achieved best by means of small settlements.

This conflict between the two views went in favour of Sharon. The Defence Ministry plan was never officially discussed by the government. Furthermore, the two non-government plans of Gush Emunim and Drobleless representing the approach of the settlers themselves were similar to that of Sharon in favouring widespread small settlements. The conflict was brought to a head towards the end of 1979 when the government responded to a call by the Likud faction on 13th September 1979 to adopt a nationally approved and recognised settlement policy to which all planning
bodies would adhere (41). Both Sharon and Weizmann presented an updated version of their plans for consideration (42). Sharon now submitted a relatively more realistic proposal calling for 16 new settlements in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank to incorporate a population of 100,000. This idea was to be based on the establishment of twin or neighbouring settlements for existing Yishuv Kehillati settlements, again bearing strong resemblance to the ideas of Gush Emunim and Droblless. His plan called for the investment of IL2.5 billion ($80 million) and argued that it was now necessary to establish a foothold in as many locations as possible by the time autonomy became a reality. It is not surprising, therefore, that Sharon found land for the expansion of Gush Emunim settlements (see previous section) in a very short time. The plan presented by Weizmann for consideration was now scaled down to four major areas of settlement. Haris and Nebi Salah were no longer included, but there was the addition of Reihan in the north of Samaria. The Ministerial Committee for Settlement eventually presented a programme to the government, on 15th November 1979, based on a compromise between these two positions. They included nineteen previously approved sites, twelve existing military sites plus Weizmann's four urban sites. However, this was again only a guideline rather than the definitive blueprint sought for and was far too grandiose to be implemented over any specific time span.

Chapter Three
3.3.2 Non-Government Plans

In July 1978, Gush Emunim produced their most far-reaching and extensive plan for settlement, the 'Master Plan for Settlement in Judea and Samaria', which called for the long term settlement of 750,000 Jews in the West Bank by the end of the century (43). In the short term it proposed increasing the number of Jewish settlers to 100,000 by 1981. The Gush plan was based on a number of influences. Firstly, they had their own previous two plans as a foundation from which to develop their ideas. However, they were now far more aware of the need to plan for practical settlement types and to define, in professional terms, the suitability or otherwise of specific locations for the establishment of settlements. In other words, having attained their political objectives, they now had to plan the means by which those objectives could be put into permanent effect. It is apparent from their 'Master Plan' that more research went into these problems than in their previous plans, which were more of a political statement than a plan of action for settlement. The Gush now had its own Settlement Division, known as Amanah, which consisted of people concerned solely with the settlement frameworks. Furthermore, they now had experience from the settlements which had been in existence for a few years. The Gush plan was related to the needs of both the 'rural' and 'urban' sectors as defined in the Israeli context. Finally, the plan was drawn up as part of a more comprehensive framework.

Chapter Three
concerning settlement throughout Israel and not solely in the West Bank, although it argued that the latter area was in the most dire need of immediate action and that it should receive top priority in the allocation of government resources and investment. The overall plan (for an English summary see Appendix Two) proposed the establishment of two cities of 60,000 people each at Kiryat Arba and in the Haris/Tapuah area in central Samaria; four smaller towns of 20,000 inhabitants each at Dotan, Shomron, Shilo and Dahahiriya; twenty suburban quarters of 10,000 inhabitants each and 25 'clusters' of Yishuv Kehillati settlements, each with 250-500 families (Fig 3.4). The plan included two appendices. The first of these discussed ways in which the necessary land for the implementation of their strategy could be acquired. The second appendix describes the Yishuv Kehillati as being the most appropriate form of settlement for these regional groupings. The overall diversity of settlement types would offer attractions to all sectors of society and would, therefore, make possible the transfer of people from the urban centres in the coastal strip to the West Bank.

The Settlement Department of the World Zionist Organisation produced their plan, prepared by Matityahu Drobless, in October 1978 (44). The plan reflected the hard line political views of Drobless and, again, argued for widespread rural settlement throughout the West Bank (Appendix Three). It was based largely on the concept of regional clusters of Yishuv Kehillati settlements (Fig 3.5). It proposed the establishment of 46 new
FIG 3.4
GUSH EMUNIM
MASTER SETTLEMENT PLAN 1978

- Group of Yishuv Kehillot
- Garden City
- Small town
- City
- Agricultural village
- Road to be improved
- Proposed new road

Source: Gush Emunim 1978
FIG 3.5
THE DROBLES SETTLEMENT PLAN 1978

- Rural village - proposed
- Urban - proposed
- Rural village - under construction
- Urban - under construction
- Rural village - existing
- Urban - existing
- Regional blocs of settlement

Source Drobless 1978.
settlements for 16,000 families over a period of five years, together with an additional 11,000 families in the existing settlements. Drobless wanted to surround Nablus with sixteen Jewish settlements within a ten kilometre radius and a similar ring of six settlements around Jericho, thus blocking the Allon corridor (45). However, considering that this plan represented the views of a section of the highly professional and skilled Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency, there are no topographic data, and although investment figures and infrastructural costs are given for all the proposed settlements, they are not broken down beyond general amounts. Similarly, the accompanying map gives no indication of the existing Arab villages and towns (a factor common to most of the plans mentioned). In short, the Drobless plan is another political document which adds weight to the cause of widespread settlement, particularly as much of the practical advice and aid will eventually come from the Settlement Department itself.

In attempting to arrive at a plan of action, taking into account all of these government and non-government proposals, the Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency approved a programme aimed at doubling the West Bank Jewish population of 16,000 over a period of one and a half years. This programme, approved on 26th December 1979, would cost IL10 billion ($320 million).

A note must also be made of a proposal by Ra'an'an Weitz, the long serving head of the Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency and architect of much of Israel's unique settlement
policies in the previous thirty years. He was opposed to widespread settlement throughout the West Bank. In August 1978, he produced a settlement plan which argued that there would be a Palestinian Arab State on the West Bank and that settlement should be planned accordingly (46). Israel would retain the Jordan Valley and would have to strengthen it on the lines of the Allon Plan. He proposed the creation of 102 rural settlements in a five year period, from 1979 to 1984, of which nearly a half would be beyond the 'green line'. Priority would be given to the Jordan Rift Valley, the Rafah area in Northern Sinai, the Galilee and the area of the 'green line' itself. In an ensuing debate, the World Zionist Organisation, who for so long had been strong supporters of Weitz under a Mapai government, rejected the plan outright since it went against a statement of the last Zionist Congress noting the right to settle in all parts of Eretz Israel (47). Weitz continued to argue against settlement strategies in Judea/Samaria and produced detailed statistics to show that such policies caused a misdirection of scarce national settlement resources (see Chapter Six).
3.4 The Existing Settlement Network 1980

Owing to the varying priorities in settlement policy from 1967 to 1980, an analysis of the existing Jewish settlement pattern in the West Bank produces a picture of widespread activity overall, with localised concentrations of settlement. Jewish settlements in the West Bank in 1980 can be divided into five main groups (Fig 3.6) (49).

1. The settlements along the Jordan Rift Valley and the inner security road of the Allon Plan.

2. The urban housing estates which have been built to surround Jerusalem.

3. The block of settlements in Gush Etzion, to the south of Jerusalem.

4. The small ruralised settlements of Gush Emunim constituting an expanding network.

5. Those settlements designated as being independent urban units and under the control of the Housing Ministry, as opposed to the Settlement Department.

It will be shown that all these groups are slowly merging into a wider regional network covering the whole of the West Bank. This is clearly seen by the establishment of three new regional councils in 1979/1980 -Shomron, Binyamin and Midbar Yehudah - to add to the already existing regional councils of Gush Etzion and

Chapter Three
FIG 3.6
JEWISH SETTLEMENT IN THE WEST BANK BY POLITICAL REGIONS 1980/81

- Gush Emunim settlement area
- Allon Plan settlement area
- Gush Emunim settlement in Allon Plan area
- Jerusalem housing estates
- Gush Etzion settlement area
- Areas without Jewish settlement
- Jewish settlement designated as "urban"
- The 'Sharon Highway'
- The 'Allon Road'

Source: Fieldwork 1973 & 1980/81
the Jordan Valley. These councils coordinate activity between settlements in the region particularly in the spheres of politics, economics and cultural facilities. They receive budgets from the Ministry of Interior at normal municipal rates and are also the recipients of local taxes in the settlements themselves. The establishment of such regional councils brings the regional administration of the Jewish settlements in these areas in line with the framework which operates throughout Israel.

The first of the three groups mentioned above will only be outlined briefly below, and then only as they relate to the wider regional picture. This study is concerned particularly with the fourth and fifth groups, since they relate more directly to Gush Emunim.

1. The Jordan Valley.
Since 1978 there has been little development to add to the existing settlements in the Jordan Rift Valley. The main period of activity within the framework of the Allon plan took place between 1967 and 1977, particularly in the last two years of that period, following the publication of the Jordan Valley Regional Development Plan in 1975. This plan called for 8,000 settlers by 1995 along the two north-south lines of settlement, namely, along the Jordan Valley floor and in the mountain fringe to the immediate west of the valley along the Allon road. Whereas the settlements on the valley floor are mostly agricultural kibbutzim
and moshavim along the lines of traditional Israeli rural settlement planning, those in the inner line were planned as a combination of agricultural and industrial villages. The rural centre of Ma'aleh Efrayim, on the Allon road, provided services for the small settlements in the northern part of the Jordan Rift area. The main post-1977 activity in this region consisted of the consolidation of existing settlements, and, more recently, the addition of new settlements in locations previously closed to Jewish settlement, because they constituted part of the Arab corridor in Allon's plan (Fig 2.7). As will become apparent, the regional network originally proposed by Allon and Galili, underwent basic changes in the post-1977 period, particularly as regards the relationship of these settlements, in terms of linkages, with other Jewish settlements within the wider Jewish settlement network in the West Bank as a whole.

2. Gush Etzion.
The Etzion bloc of settlements to the south of Bethlehem, constitutes the first Israeli development in the West Bank following the 1967 War. Gush Etzion is the site of four pre-1948 Jewish settlements which were captured by the Jordanian Arab Legion in 1948 and subsequently abandoned. Immediately following the 1967 War, a group of the original settlers' children were given permission to resettle here. They established the Kibbutz of Kefar Etzion, and this was followed by another Kibbutz, Rosh Tzurim, and a rural centre, Allon Shvut (see Chapter Five). In Chapter Three
1975, an Industrial Village, Elazar, was added, and work has now started on a middle class urban development by the name of Efrat (Fig 3.7). Gush Etzion constitutes one of the Jewish Agency Settlement Department's block of settlements in the 'Wider Jerusalem' area (Fig 2.12). It also constitutes one of the five Jewish regional councils that have been set up to coordinate regional activity in areas beyond the 'green line'.

3. The Jerusalem Housing Estates.
A major emphasis has been given to the extension of Jewish Jerusalem, leading to the establishment of four major housing estates around the city (49). This is in addition to large residential quarters built in the city itself. The four housing estates are those of Nveh Ya'akov in the north-east, Ramot in the north-west, Giloh in the south-west, and Mizrach Talplot (Armon HaNatziv) in the south-east (Fig 3.8). Both Giloh and Ramot have projected populations of 25-30,000 in their final stages. Each of the housing estates commands a number of surrounding Arab villages to the north and the south of the city, and they extend to within a few kilometres of the Arab towns of Ramallah in the north, and Bethlehem in the south. They also constitute bases from which new transportation routes will be built, widening the Jerusalem corridor in the north, and leading to Kiryat Gat via Gush Etzion in the south-west. A fifth housing estate is now under construction to the east of the city at Ma'aleh Adumim. This is located on the Jerusalem-Jericho highway, about halfway...
Fig 3.8
Housing Development in Jerusalem Post-1967.

- Jewish settlement pre-1967
- Arab settlement
- Jewish housing development post-1967
- The Old City
- Proposed extent of Jewish settlement
- Municipal boundary post-1967

Source: Cohen S.B. 1977, Fig 7.
between the city and the Dead Sea. Although the latter estate is located outside Jerusalem's corporate limits, it will serve a function similar to that of the other housing estates, namely increasing the permanent Jewish population of Jerusalem and controlling the major routes to and from the city. Ma'aleh Adumim will also be closely associated with the development of the nearby industrial area of Mishor Adumim.

The network of Gush Emunim settlements has taken shape since the accession of the Likud Government in 1977. In July 1980, there were 18 settlements affiliated to Amanah, the settlement movement of Gush Emunim, (Fig 3.9) as well as a number of organised settler groups waiting to settle in new locations. The existing settlements are mostly of the Yishuv Kehillati type and are located throughout the highland areas of the West Bank, particularly in locations near, or overlooking, the main north-south route from Jerusalem in the south, via Ramallah and Nablus to Jenin in the north. Jewish settlement also stretches farther south along this route, by way of the Gush Etzion block of settlements and the urban quarter of Kiryat Arba. Those Gush settlements not located along this major route, are situated along the intersecting east-west routes running from the 'green line' across to the main north-south route, some of them continuing down into the Jordan Valley. The major east-west route is that of the recently constructed 'Sharon transect

Chapter Three
The Sharon Highway

The A10 Road

FIG 3.9
GUSH EMUNIM SETTLEMENT NETWORK 1980/81

△ Existing settlement
△ Planned settlement

(Individual place names correspond with numbers in Appendix Five)

Source: D. Newman 1981
Although the two major lines of settlement to the east of the main north-south route were established as part of the Allon plan, it is apparent that the inner line of this settlement along the Allon road itself, is becoming linked with the main Gush settlements. The distances between the two are small and furthermore, one settlement has recently been settled by a Gush Emunim sponsored group. Similarly, all the existing Jewish settlements in the area constituting the western part of the Allon Plan, namely a strip running along much of the old 'green line' border, were established by Gush Emunim (Beit Choron, Givon), or with their help (Elkanah - formerly Mes'ha).

The size of the existing Gush settlements vary from 130 families at Kedumim to only 14 families at Tappuah. From Appendix Five it can be seen that the total number of families in the Gush Emunim settlements in July 1980 totalled around 815. To this must be added the six settler groups, consisting at present (January 1981) of about another 100 families. It must be noted that since the majority of Gush settlements are composed of inhabitants from the religious sector of the population, the average birth rate is higher than amongst the secular population. Thus, the average settlement in this area is planned to cater for a family of six to eight people each. Finally, in August 1980, the government decided to go ahead with a final ten new settlements in the West Bank in the following year. Of these, one was designated for the Jordan Valley, one for the inner Allon Road, while another four were all designated for the main Gush
Emunim areas in the highlands, taking into consideration the existing Gush settler groups.

5. Urban Settlement.
There are at present eight locations where settlement is designated as urban and is, therefore, in the charge of the Housing Ministry rather than the Settlement Department (Fig 3.10). The oldest of these is the urban quarter of Kiryat Arba, situated above the Arab town of Hebron. This was first settled in 1968, before the emergence of Gush Emunim, by many of the people who were later to be founder members of the Gush. It is the largest Jewish settlement in the West Bank today, and constitutes the southern end of the inner belt of settlements, as proposed by Allon. The other major developments are the settlements at Beit El B, Givon, Ariel, Efrat, Ma'aleh Adumim, and Elkanah. These were all initiated with the help of the Gush, although they are not part of the settlements affiliated to Amanah. Beit El B is to be a small urban quarter situated next to the Gush settlement of Beit El. At present, its existence is based entirely on the religious seminary there and contains only a few families. The settlement of Givon, to the west of Jerusalem, contains 120 families. Although the early stages of this settlement were with Gush Emunim settlers, the site was noted as strategically important in all of the plans for settlement of the 'Wider Jerusalem' area mentioned in the last chapter. Elkanah is the outgrowth of the settlement of Mes'ha,
FIG 3.10
WEST BANK SETTLEMENT IN
CARE OF THE HOUSING MINISTRY 1981

- Existing urban settlement
- Small settlement to be expanded
- Settlement undergoing construction
- The 'Sharon Highway'
- The 'Alon Road'

Source: D. Newman 1981
which was approved by the outgoing Labour government in 1977, and subsequently legalised by the new Likud administration. The original settlers, the Ma'arav Shomron group, had been formed in response to the Housing Ministry plans for settlement of the 'Wider Jerusalem' area, and their fight to attain recognition constitutes an important part of the Yishuv Kehillati discussion in Chapter Five. The settlement of Ariel is planned to be the central city in 'Jewish Samaria' and is located at the centre of the north-south and west-east routes which dissect the northern part of the West Bank. In July 1980 it numbered 210 families, after only one year in existence. Efrat is to be an urban centre located in the Gush Etzion region. As of March 1981, the first housing units and infrastructure were undergoing construction. However, registration for houses in the first two stages was already closed due to the attractive nature of its location within the Etzion region and its close proximity to Jerusalem. The urban quarter of Ma'aleh Adumim, under construction to the east of Jerusalem on the main highway to the Jordan Valley, is seen as constituting an additional suburban housing estate to those mentioned above. However, its location some seventeen kilometres from the city and its later development than the other housing estates, means that it will undergo a process of more individualistic development than the other suburbs.
3.4.1 **Regional Framework.**

With the eventual recognition of the Gush by the Likud government in 1977, and the changing emphases in settlement location policy, settlement now became the focus of the wider regional plans mentioned above. Planning implementation had to take into account settlements already in existence and which were now legalised. Thus, the two existing major concentrations of Gush Emunim settlements have developed around the two oldest Gush settlements of Ophrah and Kedunim (See Chapter Six).

A memorandum on Ophrah, dated 1977, discusses two alternatives for the integration of the existing settlement with other Jewish settlements in the region. One proposal was for regional co-operation with Gush Ochav Hashachar, the block of settlements being constructed on the Allon road and as part of the Jewish Agency Settlement Department plan for the development of the 'Wider Jerusalem' area (See Chapter Two). The alternative proposal was for regional co-operation with new settlements of a communal character similar to Ophrah. Since that time, other Gush Emunim settlements have been established in the surrounding area, at Shiloh and Beit El, thus putting the second alternative into effect. This falls in line with the ideas propagated in the 1978 plans of Sharon, Drobless and Gush Emunim (see Chapter Three). Drobless defines his Beit El bloc of settlement as including those of Beit El, Ophrah, Cochav Hashachar and Rimonim, the latter two having their roots in the Allon Plan. All of

Chapter Three
these proposed settlements exist today and are all part of the new Jewish regional council of Binyamin, whose offices are located in Beit El. Such a regional grouping puts both options into effect at the same time. Regional co-operation with the Cochav Hashachar group of settlements has, in any case, taken place, because the settlement at Cochav Hashachar did not attract settlers to its bleak and hard location, owing to the fact that the line of settlement along the Allon road had neither the advantage of the Gush settlements near the main Jewish centres of the coastal plain, nor the possibility of using large tracts of land for agriculture as in the Jordan Valley settlements. Thus, the army Nahal unit had to remain in Cochav Hashachar longer than originally planned (for a total of five years). This only changed when a group sponsored by Gush Emunim and interested in a more individualistic type of settlement structure (as described in Chapter Five) offered to settle there. The first 12 families of settlers finally moved in during August 1980 and they maintain a close contact with Ophrah, which helps with the supply of provisions and with technical aid. Following the civilian settlement of this location, the Allon Road was paved, from Ma'aleh Efrayim in the north, down to these two settlements, and was finally formally opened on 23rd February 1981. The road covers a distance of 48 kilometres from Ma'aleh Adunim in the south to Ma'aleh Efrayim in the north. It is also planned to extend the road further north to the settlement of Beka'ot, and from there down to the Jordan Valley and Beit Shean. In the Chapter Three
south there exist long term plans to extend the road to Arad.

The axis of inter-relationship between the Allon road and the Jordan Valley settlements as proposed in the Allon plan is, therefore, being reversed. The settlements of Cochav Hashachar and Rimonim, on the Allon Road, are establishing strong links with the Gush Emunim settlements to the west, and not only with the Jordan Valley settlements to the east. This regional relationship thus partially negates the Allon concept of organised lines of 'security' settlement in only the sparsely populated areas of the West Bank. The relationship between the various settlements in the network are now taking on an important east-west linkage as distinct from simple north-south lines of settlement with a cut off point at the edge of the densely populated Arab areas. The importance of the religious-secular divide within Israeli society can be gauged from the fact that the settlement of Rimonim, three kilometres to the south of Cochav Hashachar and settled by a civilian settler group associated with the 'Ichud Haklai' (Farmers Union) in September 1980, will maintain the proposed strong links with the Jordan Valley settlements. Since the group is not religious, they will send their children to the secular school in the Jordan Valley. However, the settlers at Cochav Hashachar will be sending their children to the religious school at Ophrah. Nevertheless, the settlers were only finally attracted to both these settlements because they are to be Yishuv Kehillati settlement types like the Gush Emunim settlements, and not co-operative/collective types of
settlement, as in the Jordan Valley. Finally, in August 1980, it was farther announced that an extra settlement, Michmash, would be established four kilometres to the south of Rimonim, and thus complete this regional bloc of settlements.

Allon's plan of an Arab corridor from Ramallah to Jericho has been further negated by the decision to close the southern end of this corridor near Jericho. Following the establishment of the Gush Emunim settlements of Mitzpeh Yericho and Vered Yericho, it was announced, on 28th September 1980, that a third settlement, Beit Ha'arava, would also be established in this area.

Strong regional links are also developing in the area of Jewish settlement in Northern Samaria, and this area, from Tappuah up to the northern extremity of the West Bank, now comprises the Jewish regional council of Shomron. The initial Gush Emunim settlement at Camp Kaddum, now known as Kedumim, is located seven kilometres from the Jewish settlement of Karnei Shomron, which is planned as an urban centre to serve a number of surrounding Jewish villages, including Kedumim. Located seven kilometres to the north-east of Kedumim, on the main Nablus to Jenin road, is the Gush Emunim settlement of Shavei Shomron. The Samarian transect highway to be constructed to the south of Kedumim would lead directly to the proposed city of Ariel, some twelve kilometres away. Ariel is envisaged as being the central city for 'Jewish Samaria'.

In the Drobless proposals, Kedumim is to be only one of four settlements in the Kedumim bloc. This, theoretically at least,
is to be bordered by another bloc of seven settlements centred on Karnei Shomron in the south-west. Finally, to the east would be Eilon Moreh. The establishment of the latter in June 1979, plus the fact that three of the ten new settlements to be announced in August 1980 are all in this North Samaria region, show a strong trend towards implementation of the Drobless proposals.

The various blocks of regional settlement also take into account the plans for settlement of the 'Wider Jerusalem' area. The Adumim block of settlement in the Drobless Plan, consists of six rural villages, which would constitute a block of settlements additional to those of Gush Givon, Gush Cochav Hashachar and Gush Etzion in the 'Wider Jerusalem' settlement plans, as originally proposed by the Jewish Agency Settlement Department in 1976. Each of these regional groups of settlement is well established today. The existing settlements in the Adumim region are those of the urban suburb of Ma'aleh Adumim, the Gush Emunim settlements of Kefar Adumim and Mitzpeh Yericho to the east, and a new, as yet undefined, settlement of Vered Yericho. In the Drobless plan, a further three settlements are proposed for the Adumim block, and these would be located to the north of Kefar Adumim, thus forming a territorial continuity with the Beit El block of settlements to the north, which, as has been noted, are adjacent to the Cochav Hashachar block and the Jordan Valley settlements to the east.

Plans also exist for the settling of the extreme south of the West Bank, between Hebron and Beer Sheba. Although there are
some settlements in this region it has not received the same
degree of activity by Gush Emunim as have the areas further
north. The first settlement to be established here was the Gush
Emunim settlement of Yattir, which is an agricultural-based
moshav shitufi. Its initial temporary location was 500 metres
inside the 'green line' border, but its permanent site is to be
adjacent to the Luzifer police station inside the West Bank.
Since Yattir is a moshav shitufi, they did consider joining the
religious moshav movement at first so as to benefit from the
social and economic aid. As of March 1981, this move had not yet
taken place. Another settlement is to be established by the Zif
group of Gush Emunim.

At the end of 1979, the Settlement Department had 94
settlements over the 'green line', of which 33 were still in
their temporary stages and another five were still inhabited by
the army nahal corps. Another 19 sites had received the
necessary permission for establishment, thus giving a total of
113 small settlements. The total Jewish (non-urban) population
of these settlements was 13,700 (2,400 more than the previous
year) (50). Including the urban settlements, there were 18,000
residents in the West Bank (excluding East Jerusalem), of which
12,000 lived in the Judea/Samaria hill regions (including Gush
Etzion and Kiryat Arba). The rest were in the Jordan Valley
(51). This population was concentrated in twenty yishuv
kehillati settlements, five moshavim, three kibbutzim, two
industrial villages, one regional centre, and one industrial

Chapter Three
centre. Over 60% of the settlers in Judea/Samaria are religious and the average age of the settler population is 32.

Overall, then, new and distinctive settlement patterns had taken shape by 1980 even though no long-term government approved plan for the West Bank existed. There are definite patterns, constituting a network of villages and small urban developments throughout the West Bank highland area, particularly in the Jerusalem region and in Northern Samaria. Although both the Gush Emunim and the Drohless proposals make note of hundreds of thousands of settlers, the reality of the situation is that the existing network contains some 18,000 inhabitants, constituting only 3% of the Arab population of 720,000 (excluding East Jerusalem). The largest settlement is the urban quarter of Kiryat Arba with some 600 families. The total Jewish population of the West Bank is equal to only a third of the annual natural increase of the indigenous Arab population. Nevertheless, the settlements constitute a strategically strong network controlling the major routeways and infrastructure of the West Bank. Apart from the Allon Road, major work is continuing (1981) on other routeways. These include a 30 kilometre stretch of the Sharon trans-Samarian 'Highway', extension of the Gush Etzion to Tekoa road through to Mitzpeh Shalem on the Dead Sea, and the completion of a trans-Judea road linking Beit Guvrin (east of Kiryat Gat in Israel) to Hebron. Most settlements are now linked to the Israel national electricity grid, some of them receiving their supplies from the East Jerusalem Electric Corporation.
Water is piped from across the 'green line' or is obtained from the new wells that have been sunk by Mekorot, the Israeli Water Company. Furthermore, the different settlement sub areas are now organised into municipal regional councils covering the whole of the West Bank (Fig 3.11). These councils receive government funds and are responsible for coordinating all cultural and social activities within regions. Many of the Gush leaders now occupy the administrative jobs in these councils, particularly in the Shomron and Binyamin regions. It was also announced in December 1980, that the Israeli military government was to establish municipal courts which would enable the application of Israeli law to the Jewish settlers in the West Bank. Until then, any civilian matters had to be adjudicated (in theory) by Arab courts using Jordanian law. Since military courts can only deal with security matters, the Jewish regional councils were unable to impose their own by-laws concerning such matters as taxation, sanitation and construction. The first court to be established would be in Kiryat Arba with an Appeal Court in Jerusalem (52).

The Gush and their supporters appeared, therefore, to be in a strong position, particularly with their close ally, Ariel Sharon, occupying the post of chairman of the Inter-Ministerial Settlement Committee. Just as Allon and Galili had used this post to push forward an acceptance of the Allon Plan as the main settlement doctrine before 1977, so too, Sharon placed priority on his plan for widespread settlement and the similar Gush Emunim plan. By February 1981, the Likud government had been
FIG 3.11
JEWISH REGIONAL COUNCILS IN
THE WEST BANK 1980

Approximate regional boundaries

Source: Fieldwork 1980/81.
responsible for the establishment of 165 settlements (including the Galilee outposts of a few families each) in the space of four years, as compared to 72 by the Labour government in the space of the previous ten years. Whereas, in 1977, there had been 37 settlements in the West Bank, there were now 75 - excluding the final ten promised by the Begin government in October 1980 (53). Since 1977, over 6,700 square metres of industrial plant and commercial buildings had been erected in this region. Some 11,300 dunams of land is devoted to settlement out of the 150,000 dunams under Israeli military and civilian control (54).

By the summer of 1980, the Gush also had another five civilian groups (Garin Zif, Garin Haramatit, Garin Michmash, Garin Ophrah B, and Garin Karnei Shomron H) waiting to settle in new locations, and as a legally recognised settlement movement, they were also preparing for their first two Nahal units to enter the army the following summer. The first of these is Garin Tirzah. This group will undergo their preparatory training in the settlement of Shavei Shomron. These groups moved into the settlements announced as being the final ten of the Likud government, in the first quarter of 1981.

In order to implement their plans, the Gush are not only active on the political front, but also at the level of individual settlement planning. To enable their settlers to live in the type of community which would cause them to remain in the West Bank, they adopted the Yishuv Kehillati as the most appropriate settlement type. To understand the development of

Chapter Three
new types of settlement in the Israeli context, we must now turn to an analysis of the settlement trends of the previous thirty years.
REFERENCES


2. For a description of these trends, see


5. The actual election manifesto of the Likud coalition for 1977, included the following statements:
   a) The right of the Jewish people to the Land of Israel is eternal, and is an integral part of its right to security and peace. Judea and Samaria shall therefore not be relinquished to foreign rule; between the sea and the Jordan, there will be Jewish sovereignty alone.
   b) Any plan that involves surrendering parts of Western Eretz Israel militates against our right to the Land, will inevitably lead to the establishment of a "Palestinian State," threatens the security of the civilian population, endangers the existence of the State of Israel, and defeats all prospects of peace.
   c) The Likud government will call on the younger generation in Israel and the Diaspora to settle in all parts of Erets Israel and will assist any group and individual in the task of settling the Land, while having due care that no one shall be deprived of his land.

For details of the actual settlement plan adopted, see:
   b) 3/7/77. Jerusalem Post. 'Cabinet defers debate on new settlement plan'.
6. 4/1/77. Ha'aretz, Jerusalem Post, Ma'ariv, Yediot Achronot.

7. 8/4/77. Ha'aretz, Jerusalem Post, Ma'ariv, Yediot Achronot.
See also


9. The political and ideological outgrowth of Revisionist Zionism as understood today is described in


10. Quoted in

11. The Irgun Zva Leumi and the 'Stern Group' were the violently anti-British groups in Palestine in the 1940's. Amongst other incidents, they were responsible for the killing of two British sergeants in retaliation for the hanging of some of their members and for the bomb explosion at the King David Hotel which killed many British officers in 1947. The Irgun, the larger of the two organisations and the less less extreme of the two groups, later formed the nucleus of the right wing Herut political party under their leader, Menachem Begin. Herut constitute the major party in the ruling Likud coalition Government (1977- ).

12. The original settlers of Camp Kaddum had intended that this site would become the settlement of Elon Moreh. However, it eventually became known as Kedumim and the original nucleus pressed for the establishment of Elon Moreh nearer Nablus. This was granted in June 1979.

Chapter Three
13. 20/5/77. Jerusalem Post, Ma'ariv, Ha'aretz, Yediot Achronot.


15. Jerusalem Post. 20/5/77.


See also

17. 27/7/77. Jerusalem Post, Ma'ariv, Ha'aretz, Yediot Achronot.

18. Jerusalem Post. 18/8/77 'Three more settlements for Judea/Samaria'.

19. Jerusalem Post. 5/9/77 'Gush Emunim to go ahead with settlement plans'.

20. 29/9/77; 11/10/77. Jerusalem Post, Ma'ariv, Ha'aretz, Yediot Achronot.

21. Much of the background for this section was gleaned from an interview with the Controller of Government Property, Mr. M. Menuhin, at his office in Jerusalem on 20/6/79.

See also
a) Lankin, D. 14/6/79 'Private land for public good'. Jerusalem Post.

b) Griffel, A. 23/7/76 Jerusalem Post. 'Land grab'.


Chapter Three

25. An individual claiming ownership to 'State Land' which has been allocated to a Jewish settlement is entitled to appeal within 21 days of the publication of the statutory notice declaring the area to be 'State Land'. Within this period, no work is allowed to be carried out on the land in question.

26. Transcripts of the Court Proceedings as follows:
   (1) Petitioners brief.
   (2) Supplement to petitioners brief on the Applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention with Particular Reference to Article 49.
   (3) Petitioners affidavit Toubas Case (September 11th. 1978)
   (4) Petitioners affidavit Beit El (el Bire) case (September 8th. 1978)
   (5) Written summation of petitioners arguments.
   (6) Respondents' (government) affidavit Toubas Case (November 1978)
   (7) Respondents' (government) affidavit Beit El Case (November 6th. 1978)
   (9) Summary of High Court ruling.

See also Dinstein, Y. 2/4/79 'Law and the West Bank Settlements', Jerusalem Post.

27. Ibid (9) p 4.

28. 18/12/78. Jerusalem Post. 'Anata landowners lose case against seizure'.

29. 25/7/79. Jerusalem Post. 'High Court halts work at Efrat'.
30. 26/7/79. Jerusalem Post. 'High Court drops injunction against Matityahu'.


b) 16/9/79/ Jerusalem Post. 'Begin's role explained in Eilon Moreh decision'.

c) 31/12/79. Jerusalem Post. 'Arabs may challenge Eilon Moreh delay'.


See also Haetzni, E. 6/5/79 'Judea and Samaria in the land siege', Ma'ariv.


34. 29/2/80. Jerusalem Post. 'State leaders study Zamir's opinion on territories' status'.

35. a) 4/9/77. Jerusalem Post, Ma'ariv, Ha'aretz, Yedioth Achronot.

b) Silver, E. (11/9/77) The Guardian. 'Cool reception for general with a dream'.

c) Goell, Y. (9/9/77) Jerusalem Post. 'A vision of Israel at century's end'.

d) Rabinovich, A. (12/9/77) Jerusalem Post New Year Supplement, pp 8-9. 'Settlement at the crossroads'.

e) 10/9/77. The Economist.


Chapter Three

38. 7/10/77. Ma'ariv. 'Regional planning of Ophrah and Elon Moreh will be done by the World Zionist Organisation'.

39. See, 21/6/79. Jerusalem Post. 'Sharon: Jordan Rift vital to defence of Jerusalem'. Sharon called for the establishment of 26 new settlements along the Jordan Rift.

40. a) Litani, Y. (13/3/78) Ma'ariv. 'Hitnachalut, the Weizmann way'.

b) 30/4/78. Jerusalem Post. 'Jerusalem planners attack proposal for three new satellite cities'.

c) Brilliant, J. (19/5/78) Jerusalem Post, p 2. 'Weizman calls for six Jewish West Bank towns'.

d) Rabinovich, A. (4/8/78) Jerusalem Post Weekly Supplement, 6-7. 'Planning across the line'.


41. For the press reports on the Likud factions call for the adoption of an overall plan, see 14/9/79. Jerusalem Post, Ma'ariv, Ha'aretz, Yediot Achronot.

42. a) For Sharon's version, see Ha'aretz. 15/10/79.

b) For Weizmann's version, see Ha'aretz. 26/10/79,


45. a) 26/7/79. Jerusalem Post. 'Drobless wants Nablus ringed'.

b) Morgenstern, J. (6/12/78) Jerusalem Post Special Supplement, p 12. 'Getting a settlement going'.

Chapter Three

b) 27/8/78 *Jerusalem Post*. 'Labour to discuss replacing Weitz following his Palestinian State plan'.

c) 1/9/78. *Ha'aretz Weekly Review*. pp 8-9. 'The Palestinian vision of Ra'anan Weitz.'

d) Morgenstern, J. (6/12/78) *Jerusalem Post Special Supplement*, p 9. 'Plan for rural and urban settlement'.

47. 29/8/78. *Jerusalem Post*. 'Weitz Palestine State idea rejected by Zionist Executive'.

48. This differs from the four types of settlement defined by Efrat, E. in his 1978 article, entitled 'Four approaches to settlement in Judea and Samaria', *Kardom* (Hebrew) Vol.1, No.2, 3-14.

He discusses all settlement throughout the West Bank. His first group is the Arab settlement in its entirety. Secondly, there is the Israeli reginal network in the Jordan Valley (similar to this author's Allon Plan group of settlements). Third are the 'individual Yishuv Kehillati strongholds in Judea and Samaria' (similar to the Gush Emunim network), and finally are the urban suburbs around Jerusalem.


50. Maoz, S. 28/2/80. *Jerusalem Post*. 'Settlements in territories get at least IS750m for '80'.

51. a) See all Israeli press of 25/7/79 concerning the press tour by head of the Settlement Department, Mr. Matityahu Drobless, on the West Bank.


53. The final ten settlements were to be Yakir A and B, Karnei Shomron D, Reihan D and E, Nili, Tekoah B, Mitzpeh Govrin, and Shavei Shomron B.

Chapter Three
54. This total amount of land is made up as follows:
   a) 80,000 dunams of 'Jordanian public domain.'
   b) 32,000 dunams of 'abandoned land.'
   c) 16,000 dunams expropriated.
   d) The remainder purchased by the Israel Lands Authority,
       the Jewish National Fund or by individual buyers.
Chapter Four

4 RURAL SETTLEMENT EXPANSION IN ISRAEL; INDUSTRIAL PROCESSES AND FORMS

4.1 Ideological Considerations And The Rural Urban Bias

The colonization of Palestine by Jewish immigrants from Europe dates back to the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Continued waves of persecution and pogrom led people to seek a practical solution to the problem of finding an independent haven for the Jewish people, and the historic and religious links of the people to the 'Land of Israel' provided the necessary destination. These objectives were brought together under the banner of the new political movement of Zionism, which aimed at a renewal of Jewish national life in its ancient homeland. The society to be formed in this homeland would not be a replica of the patterns of Jewish life in the Diaspora but would, ideally, aim at a utopian social existence together with a return to an agricultural way of life. Thus, the 'return to the land' was not simply an issue of attachment to the Land of Israel itself but also involved overturning the occupational pyramid of the Jewish people in Europe. Whereas they had been mostly engaged in urban pursuits in Europe, it was felt that in order to create a healthy society, the people should be engaged in agricultural pursuits. It was the second and third waves of immigration (1900-1925) with
their pioneering socialist orientations that served as decisive stages in the formation of future socio-political patterns and the eventual dominance of the Labour left-of-centre. The ideology of the pioneering socialist Zionism was one that asserted the primacy of the collective over the individual with publicly owned means of production and collective forms of social organization; it emphasized a classless society. This pioneering ideology proved to be the most appropriate outlook in the initial harsh conditions at the beginning of the century and was able to motivate immigrants to carry out their burdens while living in an austere fashion (1). The specific agrarian ideology consisted of three basic tenets. First, the farmer was to be an equal of men in all other sectors of society and capable of being self-sufficient. Secondly, progress and prosperity of the whole society was to depend on successful agriculture. Thirdly, agricultural life was to be preferred to the 'evils' of materialism and leisure, dominant in urban life (2).

This gave rise to a situation in which those who devoted themselves to manual labour and an agrarian life-style were accorded preferential status and advantages, while there was a simultaneous de-emphasis and even denigration of those following urban pursuits. Cohen has stated that

"Pioneering Zionism showed an indifference and even outright hostility towards the city....(it) has been characterised by a strong pastoral or agricultural bias, stemming mainly from the belief that the country would be won through the conquest of the soil, and society rejuvenated by creating a healthy farming population" (3).

Chapter Four
Most of the attention and aid in the first half of the twentieth century was given to the rural sector and agriculture, while

"no comparable effort was made to develop the urban sector. In fact, the tendency .... was to disregard the city completely" (4).

The first land purchases by the Jewish National Fund were specifically for the promotion of agricultural settlement. Most of the urban land was bought with private Jewish capital. This resulted in a rural sector which was predominantly publically owned, and a privately owned urban sector. Cohen notes that such a negative attitude was typical of most utopian and socialist movements of recent times. Even a proposal by Ben Gefen (5) to establish towns for 50,000 inhabitants based on a pioneering framework and internal selection procedures for new members, to safeguard the social character of the town, was not examined by the authorities. Thus, in a discussion of the potential for settlement in the mountainous regions of Palestine, Weitz (1948) describes the problems of the terrain, devoid of agricultural resources. Nevertheless, he makes no attempt to consider the establishment of industrialized or urban settlements in these regions but only discusses the alternative types of agricultural settlement possible under these conditions (6). In another area of apparently poor agricultural resources, the Negev, the region was initially left vacant and rural outposts were only eventually established, when the political need arose, in the 1930's and 1940's. Golany asserts that this was consistent with

Chapter Four
"the anti-urban Zionist ideology" (7), and he farther notes that the settlement authorities did not create any new urban centre in the entire country until after the establishment of the State. In the period between the two World Wars, no Zionist leader made any statement regarding the urban future of society. Although, as Waterman (1971) notes, this period did witness the development of guidelines for local town planning, it was only as part of the British Mandate of providing regulations for society and did not concern the leaders of the Jewish community and their establishment of new settlements (8). The only sphere in which the ideological foundations of society were brought into contact with the urban sector was in the attempt to amalgamate the two systems into a utopian framework, so that urban dwellers would 'benefit' from the rural life. This was the reasoning behind the proposals, in the 1930's, for the 'urban kibbutz' aimed at introducing communal ways of life into the already existing cities (9). However, none of these experiments was successful. Other examples were the Shechunot Ovodim (Worker's Quarters), described in Chapter Five. Regardless of this, the majority of the Jews lived in towns.

From the 1930's on, there was a period of middle-class immigration, much of it coming from Germany and Poland. These people saw the cities as a permanent way of life and provided much of the initiative for industrial and urban development. From 1930-37, the number of factories and workshops doubled and investment increased fivefold (10). The peak rural population
was 29% in 1941 (Table 4.1), since when, there has been a continued decline in the proportion of the rural population engaged in agricultural pursuits and a rise in the proportion of those engaged in secondary and tertiary occupations (11). This led to a paradoxical situation in which the urban majority were considered as marginal to the mainstream of the Zionist effort with only a fraction of the amount of financial resources devoted to agriculture being channeled towards them. This imbalance between town and countryside is further seen in the plans for urban development in the post-State era. The New Towns Policy was one of the means used to solve the situation in the country in the years immediately following the establishment of the State. After 1948, there ensued a period of mass immigration of Jews to their new haven. In the first instance, it was simply not feasible to establish new rural settlements for all the newcomers. Speed was of major concern and there were not sufficient financial resources. Furthermore, the majority of the new immigrants were not pioneers come to build up a rural homeland. They were refugees from devastated Europe and increasingly hostile Arab countries. There were no inherent agricultural or socialist ideals driving them on. They were mostly urban dwellers, engaged in the professions and business, who wished to follow similar lifestyles in Israel. One of the foremost ideologues of that period, Tabenkin, is quoted as saying that
### TABLE 4.1

**URBAN AND RURAL POPULATION IN ISRAEL 1948-1980.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>873.0</td>
<td>2,058.6</td>
<td>12,179.5</td>
<td>2,841.1</td>
<td>3,147.7</td>
<td>3,575.3</td>
<td>3,653.2</td>
<td>3,757.6</td>
<td>3,836.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>641.7</td>
<td>1,596.0</td>
<td>1,697.9</td>
<td>2,332.5</td>
<td>2,684.6</td>
<td>3,075.2</td>
<td>3,150.7</td>
<td>3,223.2</td>
<td>3,326.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>231.3</td>
<td>492.6</td>
<td>481.6</td>
<td>508.5</td>
<td>461.0</td>
<td>493.1</td>
<td>491.6</td>
<td>498.7</td>
<td>489.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural as % of total</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
"the vast majority of the immigrants are not prepared to settle in pioneering agricultural communities......We must remember this simple truth; the vast majority of Jews are not attracted by agriculture; the city and its suburbs attract them" (12).

The subsequent national settlement policy incorporated the development of New Towns throughout the country (13) to serve as regional centres. Rural centres (see Chapter Five) would serve a similar purpose but on a smaller scale. The first outline of the comprehensive settlement plan for the whole country appeared as early as 1950. The primary factor was the development of these new settlements as part of a policy of population distribution throughout the country. Theoretically, these towns and rural centres would fill the 'gap' which existed between the two extremes of Israeli settlement types, namely the individual rural villages and the large towns. In 1948, 20.4% of the entire Jewish population and 82% of the non-agricultural Jewish population was concentrated in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Haifa and their suburbs. Some 79.3% of the Jewish population lived in the central coastal area (14). This polar settlement structure was typical of new immigration countries.

However, the existing imbalance in favour of agricultural development was to cause problems in the development of urban centres. Cohen argues that it was precisely this earlier neglect of urban values that led eventually to the restriction of economic growth in the New Towns by denying them the positive self-image necessary for development (15). There were, in fact, the creation of a number of rural-urban subcentres but these

Chapter Four
became the weakest link in the whole settlement structure because of the emphasis placed on agriculture by the planners, thus preventing the natural growth of urban functions (16). A strong school of thought still existed amongst Israeli planners who argued for the development of small rural centres linked directly to the major metropolitan areas (17) rather than the creation of urban settlement. Although this was not accepted as official policy, the existing strong national ties of the kibbutzim and the moshavim meant that the proposed regional frameworks were in any case weakened. These existing settlements had already developed systems of co-operation with the national networks and did not require the services offered by new urban regional centres. On the other hand, the regional towns were functionally dependent on the surrounding settlements. In fact, the rural settlements often employed seasonal labour from the new regional towns, reversing the logical relationship between town and hinterland. Thus, the new towns lost much of the hinterland necessary for their successful development and growth. In later years, the town was provided with a role more suited to closing the gap between the urban and the agricultural but the emphasis still remained on the latter. This can be seen from the case of Kiryat Gat in the Lachish Scheme (18) which, although it is the regional town, was planned by the Rural Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency. Cohen asserts that in the late 1950's and throughout the 1960's, the town did finally overcome the rural bias and planning was directed at providing true urban

Chapter Four
life-styles without attempting to insert agricultural or co-operative values (19). Nevertheless, the ideological factors underlying settlement planning were still dominant. Thus, Weinryb (1957) notes that although the rural bias was disappearing because of the natural growth of the capitalist market economy, it nevertheless remained part of the official creed. Efforts were therefore made by the government to increase agricultural settlement and production (20). As will be seen in the following chapter, this trend still plays a dominant role in settlement planning in Israel.

Another result of the rural bias was that in the twenty years in which new urban centres have been established, there has not been any ultimate authority to deal with national urban policy and development. The nearest any authority approaches this role is the Housing Ministry. They are responsible for the physical development of urban sites, but only after the government has approved its establishment. Thus, development plans are often proposed by competing authorities and are often superimposed on each other resulting in a series of half-constructed towns. This is highlighted in the case of Ma'alot in the Galilee. In conjunction with the national aim of developing the Galilee, a private plan was put forward in 1975 by an industrialist, Stef Wertheimer, for a 'Rose Garden City' just outside Ma'alot to cater for a highly qualified, middle class population living at low rural density. The municipal authorities of Ma'alot saw this as a negative development in that it was a plan for segregation.
and would draw resources away from the town rather than contributing to its development. The Jewish Agency Settlement Department proposed an alternative scheme to develop suburbs attached to the town catering for the same population who would work in local highly technological and scientific industries (21). The latter plan was approved by the Mapai Government. Subsequently, under the Likud Government (of which Wertheimer was a member for the Democratic Change Party), the 'Rose Garden City' concept was also approved and work was scheduled to start on this by 1980, despite the local opposition (22). The development of both plans, only a few kilometres from each other, demonstrates this lack of overall authority in urban planning in Israel.

The demand for urban development has not been restricted to those operating from within the accepted system of rural priority. Drabkin (1977) has proposed the creation of an urban industrial concentration in the unsettled areas of the Negev to cope with population dispersal. He argues that for such a policy to be successful, the same resources given to agricultural development must be provided (23). In a similar vein, Zohar argues that, for both ecological and perceived political reasons, the population has to be dispersed away from the coastal plain towards the east (namely, into the West Bank). His planning concept is one of urban regions in which there is a central city surrounded by smaller satellite towns at equal distance from each other. He proposes seven urban regions centred on the four existing towns of Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Haifa and Beer Sheba and

Chapter Four
three new centres to take in the regions of
1. Eastern Galilee and the Golan Heights;
2. The Jordan Valley and Eastern Samaria; and
3. The north of the West Bank through to Afula (24) (Fig 4.1).

Similarly, within the planning establishment itself, Efrat (1978) has argued that with regard to the West Bank,

"urban development is preferable over any other form of development due to its capability of absorbing the largest number of people in the smallest relative area" (25).

Thus, ideas for integrated urban development exist in Israel, based mainly on the political needs of population dispersal and settling the West Bank. However, these schemes represent too radical a departure from the rural-urban status quo in that they disregard the rural altogether. The actual shift in development that has taken place has mainly been within the rural sector and on a far smaller scale than total urban development necessitates.

4.2 Rural Industrialization

4.2.1 General Trends

Less developed countries tend to favour rural industrialization as a means of providing additional employment and to raise rural per capita income. Developed countries use
FIG 4.1
SETTLEMENT BY URBAN REGIONS
(after Zohar)

- Urban centre - existing
- Urban centre - to be expanded
- Urban centre - proposed
- Occupied territories
- Proposed urban regions

such policies to promote development in poorer regions and as a means of balancing population dispersal.

It has already been noted that in Israel, the development of agriculture constituted a prime national objective and was accorded a favoured status in investment and planning policies. Nevertheless, industrialization of rural areas has taken place on a considerable scale. Immediately after the establishment of the State, large tracts of land were made available for mass settlement-projects, involving the populating of whole regions. The model used was that of the 'composite rural structure' (26). This involved comprehensive rural planning aimed at the integration of agriculture, industry and services within a region, based on a three tier settlement hierarchy. The lowest level was the village of up to 100 families and with the minimum necessary services. At the next level were the rural service-centres for localized groups of villages (27), while the New Towns would provide regional services at the highest level and contain employment opportunities for any rural population surplus. The basic concept was taken from the hierarchical theories of Christaller (28) and Losch (29). In the mountainous areas of sparser settlement, small industries were established in the rural centres to provide extra income for farmers. The small scale industrial infrastructure was established under the guidance of a new company known as 'Ta'asiyot Kefar' ('Village Industries'). This was administered jointly by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and the Settlement Department of the Jewish

Chapter Four
Agency. Theoretically, the prime objective of the 'composite rural structure' was to bring about regional economic integration. This was never totally achieved because of conflicting national objectives such as the social integration of immigrants, military and security requirements, and the political aim of population dispersal (30). Furthermore, the effect of the existing rural framework operated against the establishment of a new regional pattern.

Pohoryles (1979) analysed the ratio of rural population to cultivated land (31) and showed that population density increased rapidly during the first decade of statehood. Since then this trend has been arrested and the share of agriculture in total employment has dropped (Table 4.2). Nevertheless, the rural standard of living has continually risen during this period. In concluding, he states that

"the importance of land and water as the crucial element determining the development rate of Israeli villages was greatly reduced. The main reason for this was the development of non-agricultural employment opportunities both in the rural areas themselves and outside them" (32).

The employment figures for the various sectors demonstrate this decline of agriculture. Whereas 57% of the rural population were engaged in agriculture in 1948, the figure fell to 34.6% by 1976. During the same period, public services rose from 8.2% to 18.1%, while industry and crafts rose from 11.8% to 16.5% (33). Although Pohoryles argues that agriculture still remains the backbone of Israel's rural economy - particularly since much of the small scale industry is serving the agricultural sector - he
TABLE 4.2.

EMPLOYMENT STRUCTURE IN ISRAELI SETTLEMENT TYPES 1948 - 1976.

(\% of total employment in settlement type)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AE</td>
<td>K</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>NC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, forestry, fishing</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>40.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity, water, etc</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction and public works</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport, storage, hauling</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce, banking, insurance</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public services</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>26.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal services and entertainment</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Code:

Source: Pohoryles, S. (1978). Table 10, p.33., Table 14, p.36., Table 16, p.40.
Israel, Statistical Year Book.
forecasts a rise in the industrial share of rural employment to 20% by 1985 and 24% by the end of the century (34). The agricultural development that has taken place during this period, particularly after 1960, has been concentrated in those branches demanding the minimum of the basic creative resources, namely land and water. Such developments include turkey breeding, dairy farming, hothouses for flower growing, and glasshouses for intensive fruit and vegetable crop cultivation.

Basing future rural planning on these trends, Pohoryles argues for a dual-purpose framework in which agriculture will be developed within existing restrictions for both the home and foreign markets while the individual village will be transformed into a 'multi-sectoral' production unit necessitating a rural integrative income stemming partly from agricultural and partly from non-agricultural employment at both the individual settlement and regional levels. Such an integrated regional plan would develop an optimization approach to land use alternatives. A transition from agricultural planning to overall rural planning would take place and income from all sectors would be aggregated as in the urban sector. This would be known as the 'rural aggregate'. Pohoryles sees this as an inevitable process and he argues that planned change is preferable to unplanned change. Planned change means that less State resources will need to be used in the long term since there should be central organization and less chance for unforeseen disasters (35). In order to meet these regional planning requirements, new geographical regions of
economic significance would have to be delineated.

One way in which rural planning has adapted to change since the 1960's has been the establishment of the Rural Industrialization Company Ltd. This was set up by the Jewish Agency Assembly of 1973. Its main purpose was to assist industrial initiatives in rural areas by means of professional advice, technological know-how and capital investment. The Company is an adviser and a consultant but not an owner. Examinations are made of proposals by individuals, settlements or groups of settlements to determine their feasibility (36). The Company has the power to allocate government assistance to the extent of 70% of total investment. This is made up by a 30% equipment grant from the government and a 40% development loan from a commercial bank. In an instance where the settlement itself cannot provide the remaining 30%, the Jewish Agency will itself provide the loan. In a study by the Settlement Department of 52 new factories established since 1975, it was noted that the Galilee-Golan region and the Jerusalem-Jordan Valley region accounted for 32 of these new concerns (37). 25% of these factories were involved with plastics, 19% with metalworking, and 15% with electronics. About 1050 people were employed in these 52 factories, of which 75% lived in the settlements themselves, the rest coming from nearby urban and rural settlements. Some 70% of the factories had between eleven to twenty workers each, while only 18% had more than thirty. The Settlement Department were directly responsible for investment to the value of IL46.5

Chapter Four
million ($3 million) - 28.4% - of the overall investment of IL63.7 million ($11 million) in the period 1975-78. Furthermore, it was noted that whereas only 3.7% - IL29 million ($2 million) - of the Settlement Department budget for 1977/78 had been earmarked for direct investment in industrial enterprises, the budget for 1978/79 allocated some 8% - IL39 million ($2.8 million). More specifically, the sophistication of the type of concern established by these means can be seen from the following examples in mountainous settlements:

1. Computer services and electronics in Moshav Ya'ad in the Segev Bloc;
2. Microwave electronics and computer services in Moshav Nveh Ilan in the Jerusalem Corridor;
3. Precision metal casting in Kibbutz Moran in Upper Galilee (38).

Compared to a list of industrial and semi-industrial enterprises in the Jewish rural areas in 1965, this constitutes a significant change. In the earlier period, the major 'industrial' branches had been slaughterhouses, fruit processing, refrigeration plants, cotton mills, and agricultural equipment (39).

4.2.2 Change in the Individual Settlement Unit.

The individual rural settlement is the prime planning unit in Israel. Development and change are best understood through these

Chapter Four
units. The following section provides a brief analysis of the effect of industrialization on the three main settlement types in Israel (40), namely, the collective kibbutz, the co-operative moshav and the free enterprise moshava.

Initially, the co-operative settlements were ideologically opposed to industrialization. Agricultural labour was seen as of supreme value, while industrialization represented speculative profit-making. Industrialization in a communal settlement gives rise to the fear that a privileged elite will develop and thus endanger the principle of absolute equality. The need for specialists in industry could lead to a break up of the democratic procedures of the co-operative. In fact, Mayer (1953) asserts that even within farming, a considerable shift towards specialization took place over time. Nevertheless, in theory all jobs remained interchangeable (41).

1. The Kibbutz.

The present day kibbutz framework is an outgrowth of the kvutzah, the first of which was founded in 1914 and was aimed at providing a totally communal and collective way of life for a small group of people. In 1921, Shlomo Lefkowitz - a member of the Ein Harod Communal Settlement produced a proposal for the 'Large Kvutzah' with the aim of establishing a settlement for 3,000 people based on a combination of agriculture and industry.
He stated that

"we must create a source of livelihood in every collective for the largest possible number of immigrants; this can only be achieved by combining industry and crafts with agriculture. In this way the Kvutzah can become a self-supporting, self-sufficient economic unit, supplying almost all the needs of its inhabitants" (42).

The basis of the kibbutz economy is described as a combination of agriculture, industry and crafts. Such a combination would enable the optimum use of resources, thus strengthening the economic base of the settlement as well as providing the urban functions necessary for the village to become a totally independent unit. However, the initial attempts at kibbutz industry, in the 1940's, were small and scattered. They included such concerns as wood and furniture-making plants at Afikim in the Bet Shean Valley and Gan Shmuel. However, Arian (1968) points out that after the establishment of the State, the kibbutz became more economically specialized particularly as their military and political role declined. Social stratification began to be based on leadership roles together with resistance to change from prestige jobs and the growth of industrial enterprises (43). Similarly, Mayer asserts that the collective movement adapted to change in this period but that it was not always a conscious process,

"nor has it always been openly admitted" (44).
He says that change often took place as a result of circumstances and

"subsequently received the blessing of the movement's theoreticians, or at least were not censured" (45).

Nevertheless, agriculture remained the dominant force and the main source of income until the 1960's. At first, many kibbutzim only established industrial enterprises jointly owned with outside investors. Only activities maintaining full collective principles and employing kibbutz labour were kept inside the settlement while much of the early hired labour was restricted to the industrial enterprises. With the passing of time, the kibbutzim became less ideologically rigid on this matter.

The 1960's heralded the major boom in kibbutz industry as land and water resources grew more scarce. Between 1960-72, the number of Kibbutz industrial enterprises rose from 180 to 297 and the number of employed from 4,860 to 9,944. Product (per capita) increased from IL248 ($68) in 1966 to IL475 ($130) in 1971 (Table 4.3). During the same period, the kibbutz population increased by only 37.2% (46). Between 1968-1973, the Settlement Department provided investment in 29 kibbutzim to help establish industries, amounting to IL9.8 million ($3 million). Of these enterprises, 16 were located in the Northern and Galilee planning regions (47). Arian lists what he considers are the ten major components of Kibbutz ideology and asserts that the only one to have undergone significant change is the clause requiring a totally agricultural framework (48). Crown (1965) argues that this change is fundamental and states that since 1955, kibbutzim have
TABLE 4.3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Branch</th>
<th>1946</th>
<th>1952</th>
<th>1963</th>
<th>1973</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Metal and Printing</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>30.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronics</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timber and Furniture</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plastics and Rubber</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textiles and Leather</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building Materials</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemicals</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Don, Y. (1976), Table 2.
undertaken little, if any, pioneering or missionary work. This was due to a change in emphasis from building for the future good of society, to desiring the collective comforts of the present (49). Cohen (1966) describes this phenomenon as a dilemma between the values of 'progress and communality'. In endeavouring to progress financially and to develop its economy and institutions, the kibbutz endangers its social collective foundations. To retain its total communality, the kibbutz would have to forgo much of its dynamism and change, without which, in turn, it could not survive economically (50). Since the early 1970's, the kibbutzim have derived a higher income from their manufacturing plants than from farming and by 1977, industry accounted for close to 30% of the overall net product in the Kibbutz economy. The turnover of kibbutz industry in that year was IL5 billion ($300 million) with exports of $102 million (51). In the following year, the respective figures were IL6.5 billion ($345 million) and $125 million. This represented 5% of total Israeli industrial output (52). Emphasis is especially put on export-oriented industries as a condition for obtaining investment capital.

All kibbutz industry is represented by the Kibbutz Industries Association (KIA). This was founded in 1961 with the aim of assisting kibbutz industries in marketing, exports and capital investment. It now represents more than 300 enterprises in 170 Kibbutzim, employing 11,500 workers, of whom only 60% are actual kibbutz members. More recently it was reported that the KIA
mobilised $10 million abroad to help finance expansion plans and to grant ten year loans to kibbutzim which were finding it hard to raise money (53).
2. The Moshav

The moshav is a co-operative smallholders village in which each family unit has its own privately farmed plot of land. Communal endeavour takes place in the spheres of centralized purchasing of expensive equipment and in the selling of produce. The moshav emerged as a reaction to the kibbutz in 1919. The founders of the first moshavim were settlers who wished to be part of the colonization endeavour but were opposed to the rigid social and communal frameworks of the kvutzah and the kibbutz. Many moshavim started out with a relatively high percentage of non-agricultural employment. Zarchi (54) notes that in the pre-1948 era, moshav farmers lacked economic consolidation and therefore sought non-agricultural employment elsewhere. It was only as agriculture was consolidated on a national scale in the first decade of statehood that the proportion of the moshav workforce in that sector increased. In 1966, 71.4% of the moshav population were in farming compared with 50% of the overall rural population (55). But this was short-lived, and from the second decade on, that proportion has continually decreased. This emergence of a rural non-farm economic base with a suburban way of life has not affected the formal and legal structure of the moshav, and urban growth has been checked by the community acting through their public ownership of the land (56).

The moshav is faced with different problems from those of the kibbutz in adapting to industry. The kibbutz has a co-operative workforce and communal capital, both of which can be directed
wherever the community decides. By contrast, the moshav is based on individual farm units and its structures cannot be extended to directing the workforce to new places of work or in investing in communally built factories. However, because inheritance rights in a moshav are limited to a single heir, many of the second generation have no automatic work opportunities. Thus, they have to leave the moshav or, in some cases, become commuters to neighbouring towns. To combat these trends, the Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency decided in the early 1970's to help establish industrial concerns in moshavim (57). Particular stress has been laid on this policy in the mountainous areas which have few agricultural resources. Although industry had been introduced to some moshavim in the hill areas in the 1960's, it had been on a small scale. Since 1973, new industrial centres have been built in hill regions. These contain factories belonging to, and employing inhabitants of, moshav villages in the local area. One example is that of Merkaz Goren in Northwestern Galilee. The development of such centres has allowed for diversification in rural employment. A great deal in development costs is saved in that such centres do not require the infrastructure that would be necessitated by building a whole new settlement for the second generation inhabitants. Furthermore, such centres are able to achieve economies of scale on a regional level unlike the individual moshav.

Non-farmer residents have been allowed to join some moshavim, particularly near the cities, and are able to continue to work in
their city professions but these newcomers do not have full membership and the numbers permitted to reside in any one settlement are limited to a maximum of about a third of those engaged in agriculture (58).

Thus, overall, because of its organisational structure, the kibbutz has been able to adapt to industry without losing its character. The moshav is faced with the problem of retaining the family farm structure and this is an obstacle to creating large economies of scale in that each individual is limited by the amount he has available for expansion or investment. This problem has been partly overcome by the creation of regional industrial centres in moshav areas.


The non-cooperative settlements have more highly developed services, industry and commerce and are also far more sensitive to urban trends. The co-operative villages have counter-balanced the urban pressures by resisting attempts to convert agricultural land to major urban uses. The private enterprise moshava (plural: moshavot) was, from its inception, a farming village in which each farmer owned and worked his own land. In the earliest period (1880-1920), land structures were often based on large private holdings of up to 25-30 hectares per family (59). This land/man ratio diminished after 1920 with the development of the co-operative settlements.

Industries and crafts developed at an early stage in the Chapter Four
moshavot of the coastal plain and in some of the larger settlements they began to take on semi-urban characteristics. In the period 1908-13, the Jewish National Fund allotted areas of land around some moshavot for agricultural workers' housing projects. These, in time, led to the development of urban quarters (60). Etzioni asserts that in the pre-State period "the Moshavot were conceived as being reactionary.....as obstructing the Zionist cause. Their economic motivation was considered irreconcilable with the pioneering considerations which were mainly evaluative and sometimes political in character" (61).

Gonen (62) examines the process of urbanization in the moshavot and he argues that whereas urbanization of rural villages in most of the world was associated with the migration from settlements to the towns, in Israel it was associated with the immigration of Jews in the world to existing moshavot, thus causing them to grow into towns. In the moshava, there are no limitations on size or direction of growth. Much of the growth that took place was associated with the permanent settlement in and around the moshava of the hired labourers, both permanent and seasonal. Land was owned privately and could be bought (enlarged) or sold freely without restrictions of entry for new members. Factories and industry could be set up on agricultural plots with few objections, even though such activity negated the ideal of agricultural labour. Many of the moshavot underwent further development in the post-1948 era. Special areas were allocated to industrial undertakings and immigrant housing projects. The number of non co-operative villages dropped from 70 in 1961 to

Chapter Four
only 43 in 1976, that is by some 30%, owing to the processes of urbanization. In 1976, only 25% of the residents of these settlements worked in agriculture. These characteristics are emphasized in the coastal region, from Ashkelon in the south through to Haifa in the north, where there are immense urbanization pressures. The moshavot most highly susceptible to urbanization became middle-class residential neighbourhoods or suburban settlements. Nearly all the moshavot are now either totally urban or semi-urban. In fact, nine out of the eleven middle-sized older cities in Israel were originally moshavot (63). The small towns of Petach Tikva and Rishon Letzion represent the most extreme instances of total industrialization and urbanization of what were non co-operative rural settlements. In the Galilee, those moshavot far away from the coastal plain and population centres have remained rural in character.

For centuries, there was almost total identity throughout the world, between the rural framework as an individual settlement form and agriculture as the economic substance of this framework. Pohoryles suggests that in Israel

"this identification of the concept of agriculture with that of the village belongs to the past...." (64).

However, owing to the deep-rooted ideological considerations which have always governed Israeli settlement planning, official change in individual settlement type has been limited to that which meets the needs of the time, without having to compromise too much with the traditional ideological factors. It was such a weighing up process that led, in the early 1970's, to the concept

Chapter Four
and formation of the 'Industrial Village' (Kefar Ta'asiyati - or Kefat for short).

4.3 The Industrial Village (Kefat)

4.3.1 The Concept.

The Industrial Village is a new type of co-operative rural settlement (65) which, from the outset, bases its employment on industry and services. This is a unique form of rural settlement in that it aims at the introduction of highly sophisticated industrial enterprises into small communities rather than into large urban centres. Reichman describes the Industrial Village as being

"a combination of a rural residential framework with urban occupations by means of a strict co-operative ideal" (66).

The major difference from that of the existing individual settlement frameworks is that the Industrial Village is based, in the first instance, on industry and services, as opposed to agriculture.

The proposal for a new type of rural settlement was defined in the early 1970's by Ra'anan Weitz, head of the Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency, to cater for the demand from
groups of people who wanted to live outside the city and were prepared to accept communal decision making processes and to work within the co-operative system. However, they wished to work in industry and services rather than in agriculture and they also wanted to exercise personal control over their family decision making. These new villages were also aimed at absorbing groups such as second generation farmers without inheritance rights and groups of culturally homogeneous immigrants seeking to build up new meaningful co-operative life-styles together in the Jewish State (67). Most important of all, settlement could be established in the strategically important areas lacking agricultural resources. The latter political factor was a very important one. After 1967, Israeli administration covered the areas of the Golan Heights, Sinai and the West Bank. In all of these areas, as well as the mountainous Galilee, it was deemed politically necessary to establish settlements to ensure security and "defensible borders". However, much of this land contained no resources for large-scale agricultural development and other resources had to be found on which new settlements could be economically based. Although other forms of agriculture, not dependent on land and water (e.g., chicken rearing) had been used in some of these areas, while other settlements had been allocated land in distant locations, such as Gush Etzion - where much of their agricultural land is in the Lachish Region, (some thirty kilometres away), Jewish settlements were still relatively sparse in these areas.

Chapter Four
For all these groups and in all of these locations, the Industrial Village offered a life-style based on the development of industry in accordance with the traditional concepts of co-operation and equality in rural settlements. To achieve this, there had to be a method by which the industry could be owned and controlled centrally. The major problem was to ensure an equal distribution of investment to all inhabitants regardless of skill or level of industrial management. Industry requires a hierarchical framework of managers and workers which enables a factory to function efficiently. Adoption of a moshav framework would mean that the income from all jobs would go to a central pool and each family would receive a wage according to their needs. Furthermore, there exists the need for enough industrial diversification to enable workers to change jobs without being obliged to leave the settlement and live elsewhere. The alternative would be for these workers to commute to jobs in larger towns. Such an idea ran contrary to one of the basic traditional concepts of Israeli settlement planning, namely that all production should be home based. This was one of the major areas of conflict in the emergence in the late 1970's of the Yishuv Kehillati (see next chapter).

On a wider scale, agriculture is associated with the national agriculture industry. This framework enables the nationwide dissemination of information and the establishment of marketing boards serving the kibbutzim, the moshavim and the private farmers in the moshavot. By contrast, industry is based on
competition. This necessitates private information which, in turn, can lead to the danger of a settlement collapsing due to its total reliance on industry should other firms start to produce a similar product at cheaper prices (68). Agriculture is so highly developed in Israel that it is unlikely that any settlement would be allowed to reach a point at which it would collapse because of total failure of all of its agricultural branches.

These many problems were taken into account in formulating the concept of the Industrial Village. The outcome was a rural settlement type based on a mixture of private and communal ownership. Homes and property are owned by individual members (although they can never become the property of non-members) while public facilities are owned by the community. The principles of the Industrial Village are:

1. Application of co-operative principles in daily internal administration;
2. A closed community to which newcomers must be elected;
3. A size large enough for the provision of basic services but small enough not to involve the risk of growth into urban settlements;
4. Members are required to work in home-based production;
5. Joint ownership of land, factories, services, and public facilities;

Chapter Four
Many of these organizational foundations are similar to the moshav-type of settlement and it was originally proposed that all Industrial Villages would be of the moshav shitufi type. Later, this was modified, and any group planning to establish a new Industrial Village was allowed to define its own form of organization, provided that it adhered to the basic principles of self-labour, mutual co-operation and assistance, and control by the group over who may join. The importance of attaining a high degree of internal social cohesion meant that a candidate for membership of an Industrial Village would be accepted only if he could integrate socially. Job suitability would be only a second priority. A strict selection process would be undertaken in order to provide a solid human base capable of developing both the social and economic form of the settlement.

The major innovation was the place of the factory in the village organizational framework. To cope with this, a change was made in the structure of the village co-operative system. In most moshav-type settlements in Israel, there is one co-operative which runs both production and the village services. The problem in an Industrial Village is that the number of individuals working in any specific factory is not necessarily the same as the number of individuals belonging to a village. A factory may be jointly owned by members of a few villages, each of whom has the particular skill required in that concern. Nevertheless, these workers live in their own villages and expect that their home village will provide their needs, to which they feel
entitled. The problem was resolved by the creation of two co-operatives in the Industrial Villages to which each resident would belong. Each village would have a 'services co-operative' dealing with the municipal services. Every member of that settlement would be a member of this co-operative. It would be a normal co-operative like that in any moshav and each member would pay his taxes to the co-operative for the maintenance of services and infrastructure.

There would also be a 'production co-operative' to be established by each factory. Only the workers in that particular factory would be members. In this way, they would become joint owners of the means of production and would have an equal say in the management of the factory. Ownership would be by way of shares rather than by simple membership as in a kibbutz and moshav shitufi, or physical ownership of land as in the moshav. In the same way, the service workers in each Industrial Village and in the regional service area would be members of their own 'production co-operative'.

Thus, the member of one settlement could be the member of a 'production co-operative' in another village or at the regional centre, depending on where that factory is located. There would also be an umbrella co-operative which would supervise all the individual production co-operatives and would help them in the field of economic planning, engineering, legal and purchasing problems. The umbrella co-operative would have equal representation from each Industrial Village in the region and

Chapter Four
would have a say in the activities of each village. In order to function, the umbrella co-operative would receive a share of the profits from each production co-operative.

This system also provided the solution to the problem of industrial diversification in that it enabled groups of Industrial Villages to be established in one region (Fig 4.2). Culturally homogeneous social groups would live together in the individual villages and work in their skilled professions at other villages or at a regional industrial centre. This represented the most developed stage of the concept and it was accepted that in the first stages of development there would be complete identification between the two co-operatives in each settlement until regional factories could be established. Traditionalists argued that the establishment of a 'two co-operative system' would lead, in time, to a decreasing emphasis on self-help and that, instead, each village should be completely self-sufficient in all sectors (69). This argument was not, however, accepted by the Settlement Department planners, mainly because it was essential to have economic and industrial diversification and economies of scale.

Nevertheless, along with the insistence on maintaining the social principles of Israeli rural settlement, emphasis was still laid on the other traditional factor inherent in rural planning, namely agriculture. Although the whole concept was formulated as a means by which settlement in non-agricultural land could be established, it was nevertheless maintained that all Industrial
FIG 4.2
THE INDUSTRIAL VILLAGE:
STAGES OF REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT

- Industrial Village
- Industry attached to village
- Central industrial area
- Central service area

Stage 1

Stage 2

Stage 3

Source: Jewish Agency Settlement Department 1974a.
Villages should, wherever possible, contain a minimum of agriculture. This would help to sustain the importance of agriculture as a prime element in Israeli society. The Industrial Village represented a minimal departure from the traditional settlement and this only because of political necessities.

4.3.2 The Regional Framework.

McLaughlin (1976) has stated with regard to the future planning of the English village system that

"rural planners might consider designating groups of villages or hamlets as areas for investment based on a principle of 'functional interdependence'. On this principle, the planning unit would not be an individual village but a system of perhaps five or six villages over which public services, residential development, educational and employment opportunities would be spread" (78).

The idea of establishing a group of similar village types in one region has already been mentioned with regard to industrial diversification. This is by no means a new idea in Israel. The Religious Kibbutz Movement had always emphasised the need to establish their settlements in 'gushim' (lit: blocks) in one region, so as to benefit from joint provision of religious and educational services for those with similar religious beliefs and backgrounds. This stretched back to the earliest period of Jewish settlement when new villages were almost exclusively established at the individual level. The Religious Kibbutz
Movement turned down proposals for colonization at this time since the Settlement authorities had not yet accepted the plan for geographical concentration in one particular region. Thus, they were not prepared to offer the Religious Kibbutz Movement land for more than one village (71).

In the case of the Industrial Villages, it was proposed that a 'gush' of such settlements should consist of between five to eight village units of 150 to 200 family units in each, giving a total population of 1,000 to 1,600 family units with an estimated four people in each unit. This would make possible the provision of a higher level of public services at a regional level and the establishment of factories employing 50 to 100 people each. An individual village would be limited to three or four factories in its final stage but this would be augmented by regional factories in the central industrial area. This latter area would be a separate physical entity drawing employment from all the Industrial Villages in the region. Similarly with services, the individual village would provide the smaller scale establishments such as a kindergarten, a general store, a first aid centre and the village secretariat, while the regional service centre would provide elementary and intermediate education, a supermarket, higher level medical and sports facilities, the offices of the co-operatives and the regional secretariat.

The development of a complete regional framework is proposed by the Jewish Agency Settlement Department in three stages: (Fig 4.2)
Stage One involves the establishment of one or two individual settlements with their own industrial areas:

Stage Two sees the addition of another two or three settlements with the development of a central service and central industrial area:

Stage Three envisages the completion of the regional framework with the full development of all settlements and the centres.

With regard to actual construction, housing is built at two units per dunam to Jewish Agency standards. Another 50 dunams is allocated for services and sports facilities while the first stages of industrial development receive up to a further 25 dunams. This totals 150 dunams, increasing up to 250 dunams by the final stages of development. An inter-village distance of between one to three kilometres was deemed as a minimum with the centre of the region being not more than ten minutes by road (i.e., a maximum of ten kilometres) from any village. This would require a total area of about 2,000 dunams for the development of the whole regional framework. This land has to be found in mountainous areas and such land requires huge investment in blasting and clearing the rock surfaces and steep slopes for building. Such large investments can often be justified only on political grounds especially in the initial years when industry is small-scale and returns and profits have not yet been built up.

The practical implementation of the Industrial Village concept only started in 1976 in the Segev region in Central Galilee (see Chapter Four
next section). Similar projects were planned for the Tefen region in the Galilee and for an area in the Central Golan Heights. Together with the introduction of more sophisticated industry in existing kibbutzim and moshavim, this emphasises the changes taking place in the traditionally agricultural based sector of Israeli society. The high level of skills necessary for such industry implies that the Industrial Village concept is a middle-class one, aimed at attracting professionally qualified groups of settlers, both from within Israel and from abroad, but who are interested in a more centrally organized social life-style than they have been accustomed to in the towns. Since most of the available resources for investment in new settlements in Israel have been diverted to the West Bank in recent years, and since to implement fully a regional network of Industrial Villages, the prior commitment of a sufficient number of groups to populate at least five to six settlements is required, it is not surprising that only a few such villages have been established to date.

4.3.3 The Segev Example.

The most highly developed example of a complete regional framework of Industrial Villages is the Segev Block in Central Galilee about eight miles south of Carmiel and twenty miles east of Haifa. The mountainous region of the Galilee has always
constituted a region of high settlement priority to successive Israeli governments because of the perceived dangers from the large resident and increasingly growing Arab population. A major development plan was approved by the Government in 1966 but in the aftermath of the June 1967 War the Golan Heights and the Jordan Valley became the priority settlement areas. Thus, resources earmarked for the Galilee were diverted to other regions.

With the growth of Arab-Israeli political tension in the 1970's, there was renewed interest in the development of this region. The Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency produced development plans in 1974 and 1975 (72) aimed at attaining a Jewish majority in the whole Galilee by 1980 and in the mountainous region by the year 2000. Considering the Arab:Jewish population ratios in this region, plus the fact that the natural Arab growth rate here is 4% compared with the national Jewish rate of 1.9%, this was an unrealistic objective. It proposed planning for growth in four regions, two of which (the Segev and Tefen areas) would have networks of Industrial Villages. The plan stated that

"the agricultural means of production in the mountainous Galilee are small and under (intensive) use.....there is no possibility of enlarging the percentage of the population that benefit from Agriculture. However, in order to ensure a chain of settlements in the Galilee.....it is proposed to establish rural settlement which is non-agricultural" (73).

Specific development plans were drawn up for each region. The Segev Planning Region comprises an area of 40 square kilometres
for the development of the plan. The topography of the area consists of hills ranging from 250-450 metres above sea level. This region is surrounded by Arab villages with a total population exceeding 30,000 (1976). Within the boundaries of the planning area there are two existing Jewish settlements; the agricultural moshav of Yodfat and the remaining 30 houses of the old moshav at Segev. Yodfat was to be included in the plan but the remaining inhabitants of Segev would be offered incentives to sell their land and move elsewhere. The Segev Plan (74) is for the development of a region of planned Industrial Villages to include a framework of production and service systems that, in conjunction with the developing township of Carmiel (pop 8,500), will stimulate regional growth. The specific objective was to establish and develop six industrial co-operative villages, a community service centre and a central industrial area to achieve a total population of 1,200 families (7,000 people) (Fig 4.3). This was later increased to nine new villages with an eventual population (including Yodfat) of 21,80 families (75). Each settlement is to have its own light industry while the majority of the enterprises will be in a geographically central industrial area which will be no more than eight kilometres from the furthest settlement. The industrial plants are to be smaller than the theoretical size originally planned by the Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency. Factories will have workforces of between 20 to 50 people each. The main emphasis is to be placed on electronics and metal industries (Table 4.4). Each
FIG 4.3
SEGEV REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT

PLAN 1979

- Existing settlement
- Central industrial area
- Central service area
- Proposed new settlement
- Main Arab settlement
- Proposed new roads

Source Committee of Segev settlements, 1979.
### TABLE 4.4.

**REQUIRED EMPLOYMENT STRUCTURE FOR THE SEGEV REGION 1976.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BRANCH</th>
<th>Academics</th>
<th>Techn.</th>
<th>Profes.</th>
<th>Clerks</th>
<th>Opera-</th>
<th>Semi-</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronics</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Components</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apparati</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scientific</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrumentation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(general)</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanical</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metal Products</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workshops</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

settlement would also have some intensive agriculture initially with a small area of hothouses each. This would be expanded in the future when more land could be bought and prepared. The master plan was drawn up in July 1976 and a regional co-ordinator, Erik Raz, was appointed at the beginning of 1977. The plan spoke of investment for production (1976 prices) of IL171.1 million ($21 million) in 1980; IL383.8 million ($46 million) in 1984; and IL526.4 million ($65 million) in 1988 (76). Of this investment, over 90% was scheduled for industry, the rest going to services and agriculture. The first group to settle in the Segev Region was Garin Ya'ad. They consisted of young Israeli technicians and engineers who organized themselves at the Technion in Haifa in 1972. This was before Segev had been planned. The group was searching for a new life-style with a challenge, one in which they could put their professional qualifications to good use. The Settlement Department suggested that they become the first model of a planned Industrial Village. They moved into temporary dwellings in 1974 but because of financial problems have only recently moved into their permanent homes. They have a computer software concern and an electronics workshop in operation.

Each of the groups settling in the Segev region has its own culturally homogeneous characteristics. Garin Massada, numbers only ten families in 1979, is composed of highly qualified young Americans; Garin Manof, numbering 45 families, of whom half are similarly qualified South Africans; while the Thuat Lehafatzat
Hatorah is a group of religious Hasidic Jews who wish to contribute towards the development of this region. They number 160 families with 1,000 children. Yishuv Kehillati Gilon numbers 350 families, while Moshav Agron has 75 (Table 4.5). A Joint Committee of Segev settlements was set up with representation from each existing settlement and from groups preparing to settle. They planned to work together for regional development and co-operation. Owing to the political importance attached to settling the Galilee, the Segev region is defined as a top priority development region under the Law for the Encouragement of Capital Investment. Nevertheless, development of the basic infrastructure has not taken place as speedily as expected by the settlers. By the end of 1978, only 100 of the 300 dunams for the central industrial area had been prepared and the first factories had not yet moved in. Similarly, no start had been made on the building of the central service area, not least because the Ministry of Housing opposed its establishment on the grounds that it was unnecessary. They wanted the Segev inhabitants to frequent Carmiel more often. Erik Raz, the regional co-ordinator of the Segev project, argues that a major reason for the slow pace of development is that the Settlement Department only has experience of planning in agricultural settlements. This involves a process whereby the prospective inhabitants are first settled in a village with only the basic facilities. They then have to provide the development impetus which allows the village to develop and expand. He argues that, with Industrial Villages,
Table 4.5.

Present and Future Population - Segev Project.
(Families)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Settlement</th>
<th>Present Population</th>
<th>Waiting Settlers</th>
<th>Target Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ya'ad</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shecheniah</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manof</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koranit</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atzmon</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moreshet</td>
<td></td>
<td>150</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sof Ma'arav</td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gilon</td>
<td></td>
<td>350</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rakefet</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yodfat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>2180</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Community Services in the Rural Centre of Segev (1979). Table 1.
the factories should be built first and that communications and other industrial infrastructure should be given the same priority as fields and tractors are given in an agricultural settlement. The up-to-date report of 1979 showed that, to begin with, only four telephones would be installed in each settlement and these were not sufficient for an Industrial Village. It was hoped to expand the number of telephones once the network was linked to the Carmiel telephone exchange (77). The other major factor is the reallocation of resources to settlement in other regions, particularly under the Likud Government in the post-1977 period (see Chapter Seven).

Segev represents the first prototype of the Industrial Village concept. More Industrial Villages have been established in other parts of the Galilee, the Golan Heights and the Gush Etzion area near Jerusalem. The Industrial Village is a departure from the agricultural ideological tenet of Israeli rural settlement planning, but does not function as a discontinuity in the overall planning process. The other ideological foundations of rural settlement are still adhered to and development remains the concern of the centre (the Government and the Settlement Department). To understand the development of an even more recent type (late 1970's) of rural settlement - the Yishuv Kehillati (Community Village) - which shows a discontinuity with the traditional processes, we must first understand the political environment within which new settlements are now being established in Israel.

Chapter Four
REFERENCES


A shorter version of this paper is given in Cohen, E. (1977) 'The City in Zionist Ideology'. Jerusalem Quarterly. No. 4, 126-144.


11. The next section on Israeli rural industrialization gives a detailed analysis of these trends.

12. Tabenkin, Y. (1951) 'At this time', (Hebrew) Mibifnim. No.15, 4-8.

13. For literature on Israeli New Towns, see


21. This suburban proposal is explained in detail in Chapter Five on the 'Yishuv Kehillati'.

22. 24/7/79 *Jerusalem Post*.


26. For an analysis of the composite rural structure, see Weitz, R, & Rokach, A. (1968) *op cit.*

27. The rural centre concept was a major factor influencing the development of the Yishuv Kehillati. It is explained fully in Chapter Five.


31. Pohoryles, S. (1979) *Rural-Urban Landuse Equilibrium*. Tel Aviv: Joint study by the Ministry of Agriculture - Rural Planning and Development Authority; Land Use Research Institute; the Department of Geography - University of Tel Aviv.


The original paper can be found as Lavi, S. (1958) 'The large Kvutzah', pp 351-356 in Gadon, S. (Ed) Paths of the Kvutzah and the Kibbutz. (Hebrew) Tel Aviv.


44. Mayer, E.J. (1953) op cit.

45. Ibid.

Chapter Four


The achievements of kibbutz industry often feature in the national press. See, for example, Jerusalem Post International Edition.
a) 8-14/6/80, 'Kibbutz that made plastics pay' describes Kibbutz Ma'agan Michael which expects $12million exports in 1980 from its plastics factory.
b) 15-21/6/80, 'Israel's Kibbutz fire engine firm' describes Kibbutz Beit Alpha which tripled its exports of modern fire engines from $651,000 in 1978 to $1.8 million in 1979.
c) 6-12/7/80, 'Kibbutz made plastic is steel tough' describes the production of Qualex sheet plastic at Kibbutz Ramat Hashofet.

53. 12/5/80 Jerusalem Post.


55. Ibid, p.131.


64. Pohoryles, S. (1973) op cit.

65. The documents outlining the Industrial Village concept and the reasons for its development are:


67. Earliest Israeli rural settlement was based on the idea of dispersing immigrants throughout Israel. This led eventually to a clash of cultures. The Industrial Village concept accepts that if social absorption is to be successful, then there has to be the growth of homogeneous communities. Weitz argued that many immigrants were searching for the social and development challenges of establishing new settlements and that the new concept would serve as an attraction for them.

Chapter Four
68. To overcome this problem, the government have awarded their contracts to the Industrial Villages, particularly in work for the Defence Ministry.


73. Ibid (a)

74. Documents relating to Segev are:
a) Jewish Agency, Settlement Department. (Northern Region) (1976) Comprehensive Regional Development Plan; Segev Bloc. Haifa.

b) Committee of Segev Settlements. (March 1979) Community Services in the Rural Centre of Segev. (Hebrew).


f) Much of the material on Segev was gleaned in an extensive interview with the Segev regional coordinator, Mr. Erik Raz, at his office on 10/8/79.
75. Ibid (b) & (c)


77. Committee of Segev Settlements. (May 1979) op cit., p.3.
5.1 The Demand For New Forms Of Rural Settlement

We have seen that the existing forms of Jewish settlement in Israel are the result of two interacting processes. These are:

1. The social foundations of establishing a free and self-sufficient Jewish nation, and;

2. The geo-political factor concerning the acquisition of land for the Jewish homeland, and its settlement for security.

The first of these is concerned with the principles of collective endeavour, self-labour, and agricultural production. However, as has been noted in Chapter Four, industrial as well as agricultural activities have now come to be included within this definition. Nevertheless, this has only occurred where settlement is perceived as a necessity and agricultural land is not available. Thus, it has been largely because of external political factors rather than the continuation of the process of planning for an 'ideal' rural society, that has brought about much of this change. Whereas much of this industrialization has been concerned with the input of small factories into the rural framework, the most recent period has witnessed an even wider definition of rural planning than that encompassed by the Industrial Village concept, to include forms of planned rural
urbanization as distinct from simple industrialization. This has largely been due to the pressure exerted on the settlement authorities by groups concerned primarily with the second of the two principles, namely the geo-political environment.

This form of planned rural urbanization, the Yishuv Kehillati, underwent its formative stages during the 1974-77 period, as members of Gush Enunim attempted to find a means of settlement through which their political objectives, the settlement of the whole of the West Bank, could be attained. This chapter examines the stages through which the Yishuv Kehillati came to be accepted as part of the Israeli settlement planning framework. It attempts to explain the process by which this took place in terms of a continual interaction between the two sets of factors mentioned above, namely the ideological planning framework, and the political locational policies.

5.1.1 The Rural Village Centre.

During the period from 1948 to the 1970's the only significant totally new rural settlement concept to emerge was that of the rural village centre (Fig 5.1). These were established as part of composite regional planning in which groups of between five to eight settlements in a local area would be served by these centres (1). Their main purpose was to provide services for the agricultural settlements in regional groupings. In this way,
FIG 5.1
RURAL CENTRES AND ISRAELI REGIONAL PLANNING

 Hierarchical Framework
1. City
2. Provincial town
3. Rural town
4. Rural centre
5. Village

Source: Rehovot Papers No1 1966
they would also serve to increase the population in remote areas for purposes of national strategy. In addition, second generation moshav dwellers without land of their own would be able to find employment at these new service sites. The rural centres were also seen as a means of integration between the communities, each in their own culturally homogeneous village. As a general principle, the centres were originally planned to be only two kilometres from each village, so that they could be within walking distance. The lifestyle in these centres would be "between the type in a closed rural community based on clear co-operative ways of life and that of the regional town which is based on a free, open society with no special co-operative rules. It is more like the latter than the former" (2).

The official definition of these centres contained the clause limiting the right of residence to service workers and their families as long as they were engaged in that service activity. On ceasing that work, the individual would have to leave the settlement. Thus housing in the rural centre is provided for teachers, doctors, nurses, accountants and technicians on a temporary basis. There is no permanent right of residence by which a person can buy his own house and live there, regardless of the work he does.

The underlying reason for such a policy is again rooted in the traditional settlement planning factors. The development of the rural centre represented an insertion into the rural landscape of values other than those associated with a co-operative way of life and agricultural pursuits. By imposing such conditions of
residence the planners were able to allow for development

"without affecting the basic ideological values of rural society" (3).

Thus, one of the major conflicts to surround the rural centre was whether they should be allowed to develop their own industry. Weitz noted that

"opinions are divided on the basic question of whether the industrial development of the rural centre is to be encouraged or not" (4).

Opposing industrial development were those who saw the introduction of industry as foreshadowing the growth of these settlements to a point where their rural character would be lost. Despite this, since the second half of the 1960's, many of the rural centres have developed agricultural or industrial enterprises of their own in addition to their service tasks. This has led to greater stability within these settlements. There is now a less rapid population turnover (5) and this, in turn, has meant the provision of more efficient services.

However, it also led to a demand for a more permanent residence status, coupled with a greater delegation of decision-making to be given to each inhabitant about the future development of the settlement itself. In some of the rural centres such as Even Shmuel in the Lachish Region and Mercaz Shapira in the Southern coastal plain, communities were formed because families remained permanently. Furthermore, one of the suggested solutions for the problem of second generation moshav settlers without land of their own was that many of them could be absorbed into the rural centres to enable them to remain in the

Chapter Five
countryside (6). Nevertheless, despite this development, these communities were forced to remain as units totally dependent on the Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency. Since the inhabitants were only regarded as transient settlers, the Jewish Agency would not allocate them permanent independent status. Thus, they were unable to make their own decisions about their future development. This problem gained prominence with the cases of the rural centres of Allon Shvut in the Gush Etzion block of settlements in the West Bank, founded in 1971, and Bnei Yehudah, founded in 1973, in the group of settlements in the South of the Golan Heights.

These settlements had been established in the years following the 1967 War. Because of the geo-political connotations of settlement strategy beyond the 'green line', the Government wanted all such settlement to reflect their proposed status of permanent villages. Thus, in Allon Shvut, a large Talmudical Academy was built as a focal point for the region. In addition, fifty lots were sold to residents to build their own homes (7). A large plant of the Israel Aircraft Industry was moved to Bnei Yehudah to provide additional skilled employment. Nevertheless, no resident in these two rural centres was allowed to establish private industry because of the 'dependent' status of the settlement. Bnei Yehudah, therefore, fell into the trap of being a 'one-industry' village. When a person left work in the aircraft industry he no longer had the right of residence. The settlers in these two villages wanted to achieve a permanent
independent status in which they could plan for their own development.

Note must also be taken of another group seeking a form of urbanized settlement in rural surroundings. These were people who had joined together in 1976-77 to implement Alternative B of the Housing Ministry Plan for the settlement of the 'Wider Jerusalem' area. This had proposed the establishment of five suburban quarters of 5,000 inhabitants each, all within a radius of 15-20 kilometres from Jerusalem (see discussion in Chapter Two and Fig 2.10). The largest of these groups, Garin Ma'arav Shomron, had formed as early as 1974 and consisted of 250 families (1,320 people), all highly qualified. They decided to settle within existing government plans at the proposed site of Givon, to the north-west of the city. They were prepared to pay towards the construction of their own houses. Furthermore, since they all intended to remain working in their present jobs, either by commuting or by transferring their factories to the new site, the authorities would not have to invest large sums in the construction of new industrial units. The group drew up their own economic development programme, based on the existing ownership of factories by the members. Nevertheless, the proposal had been rejected by the traditionalists headed by Galili, Chairman of the Inter-Ministerial Settlement Committee, and Ra'anani Weitz, Head of the Jewish Agency Settlement Department. They had favoured the establishment of Industrial Villages as set out in the Settlement Department Plan.

Chapter Five
The case of the Ma'arav Shomron group is indicative of the increasing numbers of people in Israel who would like to live in a rural environment but without the social obligations of the co-operative frameworks in the traditional rural settlement types (8). The group included 19 engineers & architects; 30 physicists; 5 chemists; 2 agronomists; 15 computer programmers; 4 doctors; 6 psychologists; 25 teachers & lecturers; 29 economists; 18 administrators; 15 accountants; 6 army captains; 7 lawyers; and 4 journalists. Johnson (1975) asserts that

"...the Israeli planners and architects had originally intended to follow the British 'garden city' design for new towns, emphasizing open spaces, single-storeyed houses or semi-detached bungalows. Considering the scarcity of arable land, this policy has recently been drastically changed, and small houses are being replaced by apartment houses with three or four storeys or even ten or more" (9).

Although unquantifiable, there is undoubtedly great demand for this type of development by people with a middle-to-high standard of living, a large proportion of whom are immigrants from Western Europe and North America. Gonen asserts that this increased interest in a suburban style of living started in the 1960's. However, the necessary land was not available at that time (10).

These groups sought ways in which to further their aspirations. They settled on the 'Movement for New Urban Settlement' to achieve this.
5.1.2 The 'Movement For New Urban Settlement'.

In the summer of 1975, a meeting took place at the home of Professor Yuval Ne'eman, between representatives of the Committee for Golan Settlements and Gush Emunim. It was decided to establish a new movement which would work on behalf of all new settlements who had no guidance or aid from the official settlement authorities. The new organization would work with the leaders of the urban settlements across the 'green line' and would act as an umbrella movement in demanding their share of the development resources of the nation (11). The new movement initially represented six existing settlements. These consisted of the urban settlements of Kiryat Arba in the West Bank; Yamit, on the Mediterranean coast south of Gaza; Ophrah, in the West Bank to the north of Ramallah; Ma'aleh Adumim, on the Jerusalem-Jericho road; Allon Shvut and Bnei Yehudah. All rural settlements, on both sides of the 'green line', were cared for by the appropriate kibbutz or moshav movement. Urban settlement within the pre-1967 boundaries were looked after by the Mercaz Shilton Mekomi (Centre for Municipal Authorities).

Those involved in the establishment of the 'Movement for New Urban Settlement' consisted of Professor Ne'eman, a leading physicist; Professor Ezra Zohar, of the Tel Hashomer Hospital; Yehudah Harel, a settler at Kibbutz Merom Golan; Chanan Porat, a settler at Kefar Etzion and a leading Gush Emunim personality; and Uzi Gdor, a leading Israeli planner. The first official
meeting of the new movement took place on 17th August 1975 in Tel Aviv. The aims of the movement were defined as:

1. The development of an organizational and professional framework to deal with the developmental problems of the various settlements under its auspices.

2. The establishment of new settlements.

3. The formation of an autonomous governing administration to include all such settlements.

The 'Movement for New Urban Settlement' stated that it would only lobby on behalf of places approved by the government, thus excluding any illegal settlements. However, the official settlement authorities were at first not prepared to recognize this new movement. It thus received no budget of its own. The Housing Ministry was prepared to support them by helping to establish and develop government approved urban settlements. But the Inter-Ministerial Settlement Committee had first to approve any new settlement. This body was headed by Yisrael Galili who had initially rejected recognition of the new movement. The new settlement organization was eventually recognized as an offshoot of the Mercaz Shilton Mekomi and subsequently received a budget and offices.

Initially, the concern of the movement was to press for the continued development of the largest urban centres beyond the 'green line'. But it was also seen as being a lobby for those groups pressing for the right to establish smaller, but equally permanent, independent rural settlements based on urban
functions. The movement wanted the authorities to accept the status of any such settlement. Furthermore, they wished to include the many rural centres of hitherto 'temporary' and undefined status, now seeking independence from the centralised Settlement Department. Because of this, representatives of Allon Shvut and Bnei Yehudah applied for membership. But the Settlement Department opposed their membership on the grounds that they were not independent settlements and thus were unable to take such a decision of their own accord (12).

Regardless, the movement was prepared to represent these settlements. Furthermore, the 'Movement for New Urban Settlement' also represented eight settlement groups, as well as the six existing settlements. Of these eight, four had been formed as part of the Housing Ministry Plan for settling the 'Wider Jerusalem' area. These four were Garin 'Jebel Mauzil', consisting of 40 families; Garin Harei Yerushalayim, consisting of 200 families - all highly qualified; Garin Bnei Moshavim, consisting of 50 families - all second generation moshav dwellers from the Jerusalem Corridor area; and Garin Ma'arav Shomron (mentioned above). The other four groups consisted of those preparing to settle the proposed urban developments at Katzrin in the Golan Heights; Ophira, at the southern tip of the Sinai Peninsula; Har Giloh, to the south of Jerusalem; and the Segev region in the Galilee. The number of existing and proposed settlers, under the umbrella of the Movement for New Urban Settlement, was 6,000 people. The head of the movement, Uzi Gdor
(13), defined a type of settlement which would take account of this growing demand for a rural life-style within a freer socio-economic environment. The result was a written outline of this new settlement concept, known as the 'Yishuv Kehillati' (lit: the Community Village) (14).

5.2 The Yishuv Kehillati

5.2.1 The Concept.

The underlying principles of Gdor's original model and its subsequent development are those of
- a 'half-open' settlement; and
- a small settlement (Fig 5.2).

A. A 'half-open' settlement meant that it would be without the kibbutz type socio-economic restraints of collective decision making (i.e: fully-closed) but would not allow the individual settler freedom of decision in all affairs (i.e: fully-open). What it did allow was for any individual to make his own decisions regarding place of employment, providing there was no objection from the other settlers as a whole. This could include commuting or establishing a private factory.
FIG 5.2 THE YISHUV KEHILLATI CONCEPT

COMMUNITY

- Community services (physical infrastructure, education, etc.)
- Culture: activities
- Settlement units
- Local government
- Central government

FUNCTIONING OF SETTLEMENT UNIT

- Economy: internal production, external market
- Employment: general categories
- Community services: general categories

Siphon community resources, dependent upon cultural autonomy and ability to have a regular source of income.

Source: Newman, 1981
However, there had to be certain communal obligations so that the settlement would be able to function smoothly. The services in a small settlement are estimated to cost ten times per head the cost in a city (15). As in any settlement, taxation rules were necessary, since without some sort of obligatory framework, people would not be prepared to pay for these partly invisible costs. Such an obligatory framework can be seen in an expanded version of the original Yishuv Kehillati concept, which appeared as an appendix in the 1978 Gush Emunim Master Plan. It stated:

"As has been emphasised, the aim is to prevent, as far as possible, any limitations as regarding the inhabitants jobs. Limitations will only be fixed in cases which might damage the settlement .... The family unit will have a private and independent life in everything concerning employment and economics. It will be the owner of its housing and will be obligated to - live permanently in its own house (so as to prevent the appearance of temporary summer houses) - to take part in the local co-operative union" (16).

The co-operative union is a more flexible unit than its counterpart in the more traditional types of rural settlement. The union is responsible for
- services - it hires and pays the necessary service workers. This provides for the daily administration of the settlement and the supply of a first-aid centre and a local mini-supermarket.
- economic matters - it acts as an adviser, not as a decision maker. The union owns the physical structures of the factories and workshops and hires them out to the private entrepreneurs. It is financed by a combination of members taxes, factory taxes, factory shares, factory profits, membership levies and Government and municipal grants. At a more advanced stage, sectoral
organizations would be developed to encourage efficiency and scale economies. These would represent the varying industrial, agricultural and service interests in the settlement, and would compile useful and relevant business information. They would operate within the overall co-operative union framework.

B. The small settlement was seen by the settlement authorities as
1. being able to have a high level of social services (albeit at a price),
2. acting as a magnet for other Jewish settlers, in areas of perceived settlement necessity, owing to its high standard of services and quiet rural atmosphere,
3. being capable of being dispersed politically over a wider area than a large town.

Doxiadis (1968) has constructed a set of Ekistic laws pertaining to all human settlement types. Law no. 28 of Ekistics states that

"the population size of a settlement depends on its role in servicing certain needs for its inhabitants and for its Ekistic system" (19).

Doxiadis expands on this by stating that if the evolution of a settlement leads to a necessity for a larger population, then
"there is no reason to believe that any human force can put a limit to the size. No political or social system of the present era has proved to be stronger than the force of economic activities and the Ekistic system, which in the final analysis defines the population size of every settlement" (20).

But the reality of planned settlements in most parts of the world, and particularly in Israel, is one in which the

"foundations are not necessarily economic but social and organizational by whose means a high quality of life can be achieved..... The size of the Yishuv Kehillati is limited by the numbers who will still know everyone else and who can be made to feel obligated by a majority decision" (21).

This is indicative of the view held by settlement planners in Israel that for the small settlement to be successful, internal social cohesion must take precedence over the economic framework. Without common cultural and ideological motivations holding the community together, it would not be able to function efficiently. Thus, in the formative stages of moshav planning, it was realised that a minimum of sixty families was needed for there to be economies, while if there were more than 150 families, the internal social contacts would be weakened (22).

The original Yishuv Kehillati concept, as defined by Gdor, spoke of settlements of between 250-500 families (i.e; 1,000-2,000 inhabitants). This is enough for the establishment of basic services. But by the time the Settlement Department brought out their first memorandum on the subject of the Yishuv Kehillati in 1977 (23), the upper limit had been brought down to 300 families.

Gdor's original model was of a rural commuting village in
which the cities would not be more than half an hour away by transport. Each inhabitant would find his own employment. The only government investment would be for basic infrastructure such as that given to development towns. Thus, his concept was one of a commuting village rather than an independent rural settlement, with its own production base. He made this distinction clear when he opposed the use by the settlement of Ophrah of 50 dunams of their original 300 dunams for an orchard (see Chapter Six). Gdor believed that any Yishuv Kehillati type settlement should be totally dependent on urban employment, and it was this point, in particular, to which the settlement authorities were opposed. Such an innovation appeared revolutionary. The idea that a Jewish 'rural settlement' could in the first instance be established based on commuting, rather than on home-based industry or agriculture, caused immediate opposition from the traditionalist camp. It has already been noted that the concept of the Industrial Village, as defined by the Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency, is founded on home-based production, thus maintaining an attachment to the local area.

The idea of rural commuters is itself not new to Israel. There are many moshavim and non-co-operative rural villages which have substantial numbers of commuters (24). In these settlements, the income derived from one agricultural plot is often not sufficient and farmers seek jobs outside their villages while they lease their land. Alternatively, they use hired farm labourers to work their plots. But these settlements are places
where commuting has developed as an additional function over a considerable period of time. In no case has commuting been part of the original planning principle. The opposition of Galili and the Settlement Department to the idea of the Yishuv Kehillati would suggest that were it not for the artificial restraints of traditional rural planning, this phenomenon would be even more widespread in Israel today.

The final stage of the Yishuv Kehillati concept is that of the regional planning level. In both the Gush Emunim Master Plan (25) and the Drobless Settlement Plan (26) it was proposed to establish a group of Yishuv Kehillati settlements in a concentrated area forming an 'eshcol' (lit: cluster) of settlements (27). This would facilitate a higher level of services, wider regional employment and better security. The outgrowth of this would be the development of local regional centres. Commuters to the towns would theoretically eventually switch to working in these centres.

"The eshcol of settlements, with the regional centre in it, can also serve as the basis for the establishment of a town. In certain locations, where the conditions for development are appropriate, the regional centre can grow and a residential quarter of urban character can be established adjacent to it. Slowly, the spaces between the single settlements will be filled. The Yishuv Kehillati will change to become independent quarters in a city" (28).

Thus all resemblance to a rural settlement, in terms of both size and function, would be lost. This stage represented a move towards total urbanization with the major difference between this and a planned town being that of the density of residential units
and living space.

5.2.2 The Struggle For Recognition.

The 'Movement for New Urban Settlement' exerted much pressure on the Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency to recognise this new concept as one worthy of receiving official backing. They argued that such a concept would lead to the settlement of thousands of people in strategic areas. One of the main arguments was that, whereas in the case of the Industrial Villages, the government had to invest between IL500,000-IL700,000 ($70-100,000 dollars) per family unit, this would not be the case in the Yishuv Kehillati. Since the settlers would find their own employment and were also prepared to pay towards the cost of constructing their own houses, the actual infrastructural investment required from the government would be only IL200,000 ($30,000) per family unit. It was argued that this would be equivalent to the amounts allocated to family units in development towns. This resulted in the setting up of a joint committee of representatives of the Settlement Department and of the Housing Ministry to discuss the issue. Their conclusions were that they could not recognise any independent settlement which did not have major productive sources of its own. Nor would they agree to a form of 'small rural' settlement that did not have some form of acceptable co-operative, which

Chapter Five
could enforce communal obligations. Thus, the settlement authorities were not prepared to recognise this new concept as valid. Without such recognition, no planning which would allow for the use of the technical expertise of these bodies could take place. The Settlement Department were opposed to the Yishuv Kehillati on both conceptual and political grounds.

At the conceptual level, the Yishuv Kehillati went beyond what the traditional planning establishment was committed to in terms of settlements being based on agriculture, home-based production and a co-operative unit. To the settlement authorities, the Yishuv Kehillati negated all of these values and, therefore, had no place in the Israeli rural landscape. In addition, Gush Emunim had not yet been recognised as a settlement movement in its own right and thus had no representation within the Settlement Department. This is of significance in that the Settlement Department

"is not free to plan in new directions which would enable new types of settlement, different from the norm" (29).

According to Zohar, the Settlement Department only plans according to the accepted socio-economic norms of the different settlement movements. The Yishuv Kehillati is not the only case to be affected. Zohar cites the case of a proposal to establish cattle ranges in the Negev on the lines of those in Texas. The Settlement Department did not even examine the idea (30).

It is also reasonable to assume that for any settlement type based on outside work, a government would not be prepared to provide as much capital investment and infrastructure as in a

Chapter Five
settlement where the central authority has a degree of control in the running of the industrial or agricultural activities. Such investment would only be allocated to this type of new settlement if there were other reasons for its establishment. This is reserved for cases where it is deemed necessary for the 'public good'. In Israel, this is usually the perceived strategic necessity.

Thus the settlement authorities were not prepared to go beyond the concept of the Industrial Village. This stance was emphasised by the fact that the Settlement Department's plan for the 'Wider Jerusalem' area (see Chapter Two) called for the establishment of Industrial Villages, while that of the Housing Ministry was based on a suburban type village of the Yishuv Kehillati type. It would appear that by not recognising the validity of the Yishuv Kehillati concept, the Settlement Department could push more strongly for the adoption of its own plan.

At the political level, the Mapai government was officially opposed to the establishment of settlements in the densely populated upland areas of the West Bank. Gush Emunim, on the other hand, were concerned primarily with settling that area. In refusing to recognise the settlement concept, which was now strongly backed by Gush Emunim, the government hoped to prevent them from striking roots in the West Bank.

But the political conflict was not only on the external front. It had deeper internal roots. In Israel, the body that decides
on the allocation of new settlements to settlement movements is the 'Agricultural Centre of the Histadrut Ha'ovdim'. This included the Hartsfield (Givati) Committee on which all the major settlement movements are represented. The Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency is partly financed by these settlement movements and, therefore, partly controlled by them. The separate movements, in turn, are affiliated to political parties. Any independent group of settlers must, by law, belong to an officially recognised settlement movement. In 1976, Gush Emunim did not have settlement movement status. It was, therefore, highly unlikely that any small movement or group of settlers not associated with the parties represented in the government would get sufficient resources for their development plans (32).

This opposition to the Yishuv Kehillati concept on two fronts was not totally new. In a major discussion carried out by the Settlement Study Centre in 1974 on issues relating to the then new Industrial Village concept, the question of creating a new settlement movement to cater for rural industrial activity, as distinct from the existing kibbutz and moshav movements, was raised. So, too, was the apparent danger seen by the traditionalist camp of the Industrial Villages developing into dormitory suburbs. Both issues were dismissed as being of no major concern (33). The Settlement Department felt that it could direct the development of these new settlements by use of their strong central authority. This would however not be the case with the Yishuv Kehillati.
This situation of non-recognition continued until the election of the Likud Government in 1977. The only exception was the Garin Ma'arav Shomron group (mentioned above). The outgoing Labour government proposed that this group be allowed to settle at Mes'ha in the West Bank. This was later confirmed by the Likud government. The settlement today is known as Elkanah and is designated to be an urban development, as opposed to a small Yishuv Kehillati. The new right-wing administration favoured settlement in all territories beyond the 'green line'. They were also inclined to a freer enterprise economy than existed under the socialist Mapai governments.

A joint committee of the Jewish Agency and the Housing Ministry was set up to review the issue and they eventually agreed to recognise the Yishuv Kehillati as a valid alternative settlement. This recognition was the result of a variety of factors. The legalization of the existing Gush Emunim settlements in July 1977, meant that they were now in a position to receive government grants and Settlement Department expertise to the same extent that any newly established settlement in Israel does. The role of the Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency is to help plan the long-term development of any new 'rural' settlement. It aids the settlement with both financial aid (loans and grants) and with its substantial professional expertise. This continues until the settlement reaches a level of self sufficiency, whereby it is able to continue with an ordered process of development together with the paying back of

Chapter Five
the various loans received. The usual procedure is for the Settlement Department to work through the adopting settlement movement, such as the various kibbutz movements or the moshav movement. This is particularly important in the forming of settler groups that undertake the initial establishment of the settlement. The majority of these groups are ideologically and/or politically motivated groups of young adults, often consisting of more singles than married couples. The Settlement Department also draws up a detailed long-term plan within the first few years. This deals with the projected population estimates, long-term employment opportunities, permanent housing, and the relationship of the settlement to existing and future regional and infrastructural networks.

The application of these principles of centralized planning control had to undergo changes with respect to the existing Gush Emunim settlements. The 'Emergency Plan' presented by the Gush to the new government (34) made it clear that they viewed the individualistic Yishuv Kehillati type of settlement as being the most appropriate form through which they could put their political locational policies into effect. Although the Yishuv Kehillati was not recognized as a valid settlement alternative, development had taken place along these individualistic lines owing to the peculiar political circumstances in which these settlements existed. Apart from the strong political motivation of these settlers, development that had taken place had been helped by the fact that, unlike most new settler groups, they

Chapter Five
were mostly older, professional people with families and with work experience behind them. Thus, the lack of official aid was countered by the fact that they were able to cope with the establishment of a settlement themselves, particularly one based on private enterprise, thus reflecting their own 'urban' background.

Coupled with the fact that the government were now prepared to authorise more Gush Emunim settlements, this extra experience proved to be a major cause in the subsequent recognition of the concept by the settlement authorities. The Settlement Department had to be able to assume control of the existing settlements within the recognised and accepted planning frameworks. This was of particular concern with regard to the long-term development, since it necessitated the provision of larger amounts of investment capital at both the level of the individual settlement and, more importantly, at the regional level. The consolidation that had so far taken place at the settler initiative, had been on a smaller scale. The allocation of government approved aid could be carried out by two opposing methods. Theoretically, the possibility existed of simply allocating each settlement its appropriate grant and leaving it free to continue to direct its own future development. But this was totally unacceptable to the centralized settlement authorities. On the other hand, the alternative would have been to pressurise the settlers into changing their form of settlement so that it would fit neatly into the existing settlement frameworks. This, in turn, would
have been unacceptable to the settlers themselves. They had already developed the foundations of their own settlement type and were not prepared to revert to what they considered as being restrictive socialist-communal modes of life. Thus, it was a matter of political expediency to find a compromise by which the Yishuv Kehillati could be recognised as a valid settlement alternative.

The eventual recognition of the concept was with the proviso that in the long term, commuters would revert to home-based industry. However, since there was now a perceived political need to settle all areas, the new settlements would be allowed to base their economy, in the short term, on anything that would enable them to be established quickly and with the minimum of limited government resources. Furthermore, by means of this compromise, the Settlement Department was able to reverse its previous policy in line with the new administration without losing face. In effect, the compromise was simply a way to satisfy all sides. The first paper published by the Settlement Department on the Yishuv Kehillati in 1977 contained the clause that

"the productive activities in the settlement must be supervised by the members or by groups of members" (35). It states nothing more concerning employment. Thus, if a person wants to work in a Yishuv Kehillati, he has to be a member, but not every member is obliged to work in the settlement.

The reversal in policy was reflected by the fact that delegates to the World Zionist Organization (WZO) Assembly in
1978 were briefed about the concept of the Yishuv Kehillati and informed that they (the WZO) would take part in financing investment and infrastructure in these settlements (36). In October of the same year, the right-wing joint head of the Settlement Department, Mr. Matityahu Droblless produced his settlement plan which was based almost entirely on the Yishuv Kehillati idea (37).

In the short period since this change in policy, the concept has undergone development by the settlement planners especially as actual settlements have been established. A short, succinct memorandum was produced in 1978 (38) showing the currently held views of the Settlement Department. This is important in that it is the Settlement Department that now has total responsibility in the planning of these settlements. The concept had not been changed significantly except for the fact that nothing is mentioned about regional clusters of Yishuv Kehillati settlements which would develop into urban areas. The Drobless plan is based on regional groupings of such settlements but in the more conventional way of small separate settlements remaining separate entities within a regional framework. Thus, for the Yishuv Kehillati to be cared for by the Settlement Department, it would have to remain a 'small' village. At a meeting in March 1980 between representatives of the Settlement Department and the Authority for Rural Building (39), the following standards were agreed upon;
size of a Yishuv Kehillati to be 200-250 families,
size of average family to be five people,
expected yearly growth rate to be 3.1%,
no. of children per year to be 30-40,
average area for each family unit to be 500 square metres, to include the house and garden of the settler, while the rest is part of the communal space.

A system of loans and grants has also been worked out between the various government ministries, the Settlement Department, Gush Emunim and the individual settlements. They conform to the general standards applicable throughout the country with some specific changes according to the political situation. The Settlement Department now give a grant to any productive enterprise in a Yishuv Kehillati but with preference for those that also have government grants, such as from the Ministry of Tourism or Agriculture for specific projects. Nevertheless, these are not total grants, and the individual settler is also expected to invest a share of his own capital. Industrial enterprises are accorded the status of those in development areas and receive 30% of their initial investment from the government and another 40%, which has to be repaid at 30% interest over a period of eight years, from a commercial bank after government authorization. The remaining 30% has to be found by the private entrepreneur. The Settlement Department build the factories and pass them over to the co-operative of the settlement who have to buy the property within five years with the help of government.
loans. The co-operative, in turn, lets the building to the individual entrepreneur. In this way, the interests of the settlement are safeguarded against enterprises to which the majority of the inhabitants might object. Two extra grants are available for the initial period of any new concern. These enable a new enterprise to get underway before the first returns come in. The first of these is a loan of IIL10,000 ($300), to each family unit, to be paid back in twelve monthly payments at 20% interest. This is provided by a fund held by the joint settlement organization of Gush Emunim settlements. This fund is administered jointly by Gush Emunim, Ananah (the settlement movement of Gush Emunim) and the individual settlements. Secondly, there is an industrial fund from which up to IIL50,000 ($1500), may be obtained for each family unit, again to be paid back in one year, at a rate of 21% interest. This is only given after the Rural Industrialization Company Ltd., of the Jewish Agency (see previous chapter) has agreed to the request. With regard to agriculture, an individual may receive a grant from the Ministry of Agriculture directed through the Gush Emunim settlement fund. The amount of this grant changes according to the agricultural branch involved, so that intensive hothouse flowers for export can be awarded between 20-50% of initial investment while chicken breeding for domestic consumption receives nothing. The Ministry of Agriculture also provides loans to be paid back when the first returns are made. Any urban places across the 'green line' approved by the government, such
as Ariel and Elkana both in the West Bank, would be cared for by the Housing Ministry and are not included in this system of loans and grants, which only applies to 'rural' settlements.

5.2.3 Similarities In The Past

Orni has stated that the basic ideas of the kibbutz and the moshav in its time were "derived exclusively from the initiative of the settlers themselves" (40). The initial ideas were first tried out in practice. The kibbutz developed as a reaction to the ideological failure of the private farms of the previous wave of immigration. They sought new socio-organizational patterns to promote land settlement. This, in turn, was criticised by those who saw this total communal way of life as destroying the family base and preventing the full use of personal freedom. Thus, the moshav developed as an adaptation to the kibbutz by those who saw it as a more natural form of human living by which they could fulfil their national and social ideals. Klayman points out that, "the founders and pioneers of the moshav movement were no less Zionist or socialist than those of the kibbutz" (41).

Only after 1948 was nationally planned settlement totally organised by central government and the Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency. The development of both the rural centres and the Industrial Villages were an outcome of this total planning.

Chapter Five
The Yishuv Kehillati has seen a return to development through the settler initiative taking precedence over central planning. The wider struggle for recognition of the Yishuv Kehillati has been essentially one of a demand by people to be able to live in rural areas but with far more flexibility in their own individual freedom of decision making than in the traditional forms of settlement.

A comparison of the obligations incumbent upon respective members of a Yishuv Kehillati and a moshav show that the Yishuv Kehillati demands nearly as much from the individual as does the moshav (Fig 5.3). The Yishuv Kehillati is not therefore as revolutionary as was initially feared by the traditionalists. Under the authority of the Settlement Department it has been brought into line with the other rural settlement types.

Reichmann sees the Yishuv Kehillati as being similar to the Shchunat Ovdim (lit: workers' quarters) that were set up in the 1920's at a radius of about 20-25 kilometres from large industrial concerns (42). The Shchunat Ovdim was defined as being for city workers who wanted to get out of the city limits and establish their own communities. They could develop their own farms and agriculture but were not obliged to do so. They could also establish a settlement whose economic basis would be one in which the majority of the inhabitants would work in the city. Thus, Reichmann sees the Yishuv Kehillati as bearing a strong resemblance to this idea of communally based suburbs with urban functions. The ideological precepts of the labour movement

Chapter Five
## FIG 5.3
 THEORY AND REALITY IN ISRAELI RURAL SETTLEMENT TYPES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>KIBBUTZ</th>
<th>MOSHAV</th>
<th>MOSHAV SHITUF</th>
<th>INDUSTRIAL VILLAGE</th>
<th>YISHUV KEHILLATI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Families</td>
<td>100-150</td>
<td>80-120</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>200-300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Theoretical Principles
- A: Obligation
- B: Optional
- C: Rejection

### Reality
- A: Total adherence
- B: Partial adherence
- C: Non adherence

Source: D. Newman 1981
were satisfied by the fact that each urban worker was given a small plot of land for part-time agriculture. However, the workers were forbidden to hire labour or open up their own shops or enterprises. The Shchunat Ovdim represented a rural-urban compromise in an age of scarce agricultural land and increasing urban workers. The location of these quarters was to be near enough to the city to be able to commute but far enough away to avoid causing inflationary land prices.

The development of these quarters went through two stages. In the first stage, the land area of each such settlement was between 2,500-3,000 dunams, thus making possible the insertion of agricultural elements. In the second stage they came under a new central organization established by the Histadrut (43) for the benefit of their workers. It then became more of an urban quarter and lost any individual characteristics it had developed. The outcome was that urban-type elements were established in previously unsettled land. But in comparing the reality with the original idea, it is obvious that there was a lack of success in combining the communal framework with urban functions. Although the founders had emphasized that these settlements must contain agriculture, the final result showed how difficult it was to attempt to introduce ideological values within the urban context. In the agricultural kibbutzim and moshavim there was no such problem.

Nevertheless, it would appear that there remains a major difference between the two settlement types. The Yishuv

Chapter Five
Kehillati represents a struggle aimed at the establishment of a settlement based first and foremost on urban functions. This may exclude agricultural activity altogether. The Shchunat Ovdim represented an attempt to infuse people with urban orientations, with a more ideologically based life-style, whereas the Yishuv Kehillati is an attempt to fragment these same ideological values.

The restrictions that have been placed on the individual within the Yishuv Kehillati by the members are seen as being necessary to prevent their subsequent total urbanization as happened with the Shchunat Ovdim and with many of the moshavot. Moshavot were the earliest forms of agricultural settlement set up by the Zionist effort but by private enterprise and capital. They do not impose strict standards on numbers, while land ownership is private. Hence settlers are solely responsible for their own holdings. Many of these moshavot became totally urbanized over time (see Chapter Four) and, indeed, such urban places as Petah Tikva and Rishon Letzion developed in this way. Gonen (1975) notes that suburbanization of the middle class in the 1920's and 1930's took place through the establishment of new independent communities near the urban centres. Although perceived as agricultural settlements, the strong urban ties resulted in commuting taking place from the beginning. In time, this spread to the whole community and agriculture disappeared altogether, leaving these suburban towns (44).
5.2.4 Rural or Urban Concept?

The question remains as to whether the Yishuv Kehillati is a rural or an urban concept. Within the Israeli planning system this is a highly significant question in that the Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency only deals with 'rural' settlement. All 'urban' development is dealt with by the Housing Ministry. In normal economic analysis, function, as opposed to size, serves to identify the nature of a place. However, in the Israeli case, size is usually the determining factor for planning purposes. Weitz (1979) defines a rural settlement as being a 'closed' unit in which the economic life is organised by the community, not by the individual (45). In his criticism of the Gush Emunim settlements, he argues that the new Yishuv Kehillati settlements have not been defined. Its development is too slow for it to constitute a proper urban quarter (requiring 30,000 people) while its emphasis on private enterprise and individualism destroys the uniqueness of Israeli 'rural' settlement. The establishment of the agudah (the co-operative) in which all residents are members is a very important factor, according to Weitz, since this can control and define the way of living of the rural community.

This problem was highlighted by the case of Eilon Moreh in June 1979. After a long battle on the political front, the government finally gave the green light for the development of a Gush Emunim settlement, Eilon Moreh, close to Nablus, in the
heart of the West Bank. The Settlement Department refused to supervise the development until a decision had been reached as to the status of the proposed settlement. They would only take charge if it was to be a 'rural' village (46). A similar problem existed in Ofrah over the issue of residential development (see Chapter Six).

This problem extends further than simply the initial stages of development. If the settlement is of a rural size but containing urban functions, then the question arises as to which body takes charge once that settlement has reached a stage of self-sufficiency. To date, rural settlements have all been given over to the care of the Ministry of Agriculture. However, such a system of transfer cannot take place in the case of the Yishuv Kehillati, owing to its predominantly urban functions. An interesting development that has taken place in relation to this is the case of Allon Shvut. Having eventually won their battle to become an independent settlement, and being sufficiently developed to be independent of the normal 'caring' process, they have become the first village in the care of the Settlement Department to be handed over to the Housing Ministry for aid and loans when necessary, rather than to the Ministry of Agriculture.
Weitz has stated that

"the non-agricultural co-operative movement is - from its creation - an urban movement. Until now, the division between agricultural co-operatives and non-agricultural co-operatives is the accepted division between village and town" (47).

But in the case of the Industrial Village

"It can be said that these places are more like urban places than rural settlement and, therefore, should be cared for by the institutions dealing with urban development. But it is not so, since the idea is to add to the rural structure but with a view to the needs of our days. Non-agricultural co-operative villages are established to show how it is possible to build "meaningful social units in a scientific/technological age" (48).

It can be argued that the Yishuv Kehillati is just one type of Industrial Village. Whereas the latter is concerned with the type of economic base (i.e; industrial infrastructure in areas of no agricultural resources), the Yishuv Kehillati is simply a form of Industrial Village with a different social organizational structure. Thus, the kibbutzim of Moran and Tefen in the Galilee are based almost entirely on industry, as is the moshav shitufi of Nveh Ilan in the Jerusalem Corridor. The Industrial Village concept can be defined as including all of these varied settlement specific types and the Yishuv Kehillati is that type which has a a' totally free enterprise and individualistic organizational system.
5.3 Wider Applicability Of The Concept

Eaton and Solomonica (1980) examined 'rurban' villages in Israel. They defined these as being

"bedroom communities for persons employed in nearby towns and cities" (49)

with a rural economic, social and political base. There are closely knit community ties and agriculture is combined with other sources of employment. Together, with the trend towards part-time farming, there has been an increase in jobs outside farming and outside the village altogether. However, their study relates to the way three moshavim have developed over time and show how the ideological commitment of the settlers to the concept of co-operation was never strong. Due to this, many of the original co-operative enterprises were abandoned over time. The settlers are described as having been more pragmatic and less ideological about their moshav structure than the planning officials who drew up the original plans. Thus, their study is only concerned with an existing situation, rather than one of specific planning for a rurban type village such as the Yishuv Kehillati.

Soon after the first mention of the Yishuv Kehillati concept, an article appeared on the subject in the Israeli national newspaper, Ma'ariv, entitled "What is a Yishuv Kehillati?" It stated that
"...although the Yishuv Kehillati is a necessity thrown up out of the special factors relating to the aftermath of the Six Day War, it should be able to be a successful settlement tool also in the older areas, such as the Galilee and the Negev" (50).

The style of living as emphasized by the Yishuv Kehillati is by no means restricted to the West Bank or to Gush Emunim. At the World Zionist Organisation Congress in 1978, two distinct future directions of settlement planning emerged. These were the application of sophisticated agricultural techniques (particularly for the production of vegetables and flowers for export) in the Negev and the Jordan Valley, and the establishment of industrial, service and commuting settlements in the Galilee, Golan Heights, and Judea and Samaria. The demand for this type of settlement can be seen in the cases of Garin Rafael and the New Ma'alot Plan.

5.3.1 Garin Rafael.

The case of Garin Rafael emphasized the conflict that existed with the settlement authorities at both the conceptual and political level (51). Garin Rafael consisted of a group of 70 families (including 140 children), all highly qualified and skilled professionals who were interested in establishing a Yishuv Kehillati as part of the Segev Project in the Galilee (See Chapter Four). Founded in July 1975, they all worked for an Israeli defence industry on the outskirts of Haifa, from which
their name, Rafael, was taken. Their plan was to settle in Segev, but continue to work in the same industry. The distance of 20 kilometres between settlement and workplace was no problem.

The Settlement Department refused to allow the group to settle in this form. They wanted the Rafael group to cease working in the defence industry and establish totally new industry at the site of the new settlement. On 17th November 1975, the group appealed to Prime Minister Rabin to help their cause, but they did not receive any definitive reply. The Movement for New Urban Settlement supported the group as a test-case in their fight for recognition of the Yishuv Kehillai concept. The group had grown to 300 families, all highly committed to settling a national priority area. They were seen as a valuable group, not to be lost to the settlement cause. Thus, the settlement authorities attempted to persuade them to settle as part of the proposed Industrial Village network in Segev. The groups involved in establishing the other settlements in Segev had sympathy with the Settlement Department in that they were not eager to have a settlement based on free enterprise competing against a group of new settlements whose basis was that of regional co-operation.

The head of the Inter-Ministerial Settlement Committee, Galili, gave the Garin Rafael group the option of settling as a moshav-type Industrial Village or giving up their plans for settlement altogether. Faced with this ultimatum, they reluctantly accepted the choice of becoming a moshav. But when
the new political climate was created in 1977, there was a renewed demand by a section of the group to become a Yishuv Kehillati. This was despite the fact that the first Settlement Department paper recognising the Yishuv Kehillati referred to the World Zionist Organisation, as opposed to the Jewish Agency, as being the planning body for the Yishuv Kehillati. The only difference between the Jewish Agency and the World Zionist Organisation, with respect to their respective settlement departments, concerns the actual spatial area within which they operate. Whereas the former only facilitates settlement activity inside Israel, the latter are only concerned with the establishment of settlements beyond the 'green line'. The actual personnel and officials involved are exactly the same. Thus, this paper served as a strong hint that Yishuv Kehillati settlements would only be established over the 'green line' due to political necessity. Within the pre-1967 boundaries, there would be stricter control over settlement type. Even though the Yishuv Kehillati is now an officially accepted alternative settlement form and, therefore, should be established in all areas (53), it is nevertheless regarded as of lesser importance in areas where the government are promoting other forms of settlement. This is especially the case in the Galilee, where the government has attempted to promote settlement in the development towns of Ma'alot, Hatzor and Shlomi. If established in these areas, the Yishuv Kehillati, with its middle-class environment and style of living, would attract the exact strata
of society which are so badly needed in the development towns (54).

The Garin Rafael group split into two factions - one of which became Moshav Agron, the other Yishuv Kehillati Gilon. The latter were finally accepted as a Yishuv Kehillati in the Segev region in 1978 due to the political climate. The remaining settlements in Segev accepted the reality of the situation and agreed to work with the Yishuv Kehillati towards regional co-operation and development in the settling of the Galilee.

Apart from Garin Rafael, all Yishuv Kehillati settlements that have been established up to and including June 1980 have been associated with Gush Emunim. Nevertheless, the moshav movement is, at present, sponsoring the development of Reihan Bet in Northern Samaria. These two examples are significant in that other movements, without the specific political interests of Gush Emunim, are prepared to establish Yishuv Kehillati settlements. In fact, there is nothing to stop other 'freer' settlement movements with a similarly small amount of central control over individual settlements, establishing a Yishuv Kehillati. Such movements as the Liberals, Herut (the right-wing political party) and Haoved Hatzioni (lit: The Zionist Workers) fall into this category. The fact that all these groups have some agricultural settlements goes back to the period when collective-pioneering values were the dominant force in the pre-State Yishuv. Although the large bulk of the support of these groups was, and remains, urban based, these rural settlements were a necessary part of

Chapter Five
their political activity, since it was the establishment of pioneering settlements that was identified by the Jewish populace as constituting the most important contribution towards the establishment of an independent Jewish state (55).

5.3.2 New Ma'alot

The New Ma'alot Plan of the Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency (1977) (56) is a proposal for low density urban development in the Galilee (Fig 5.4). The basic concept is similar to that of the 'cluster' of Yishuv Kehillati settlements. The idea is to build a middle class suburb next to the development town of Ma'alot. Employment will be in scientific and technological industries with the main employment opportunities being at the seventy dunam industrial park under development at Tefen, four kilometres to the south. This park is destined to become a regional industrial centre when the Ma'alot-Carmiel road is completed. It will be possible to establish small-scale non-polluting industries adjacent to the residential areas of New Ma'alot itself. The residential units are based on the development of homogeneous community groups of forty to fifty families each, all with similar cultural backgrounds and/or professional interests. These community groups will, in turn, be part of a wider neighbourhood hierarchy (Fig 5.5).
FIG 5.4
THE NEW MAALOT SETTLEMENT PLAN 1977

Map showing the new Maalot settlement plan with various symbols and labels indicating the city boundary, proposed extension of city boundary, regional industrial park, existing Jewish village, proposed Jewish village, existing Arab settlement, and highways. The map includes scale indicators for kilometers and miles.

Source: Jewish Agency Settlement Department 1977, Fig 1; Saffer & Shmueli 1977
Thus,

Community group  Residential area  Neighbourhood.

150-250 families  800-1,000 families  5,000 families.

The first stages of development involve settling 1,000 families in the first four years of the plan. Although planned at the outset as an urban concept, much is to be gleaned from its striking similarities to the Yishuv Kehillati idea and from the fact that the plan was proposed by the Settlement Department and not the Housing Ministry. Like Segev, the New Ma'alot project represents an attempt to adopt the principle of group and community absorption from agricultural rural villages to small urban based settlement.

5.4 Future Development

This chapter, based on primary sources and fieldwork, has analysed the struggle for official recognition of a new settlement concept. The strong centralization of the settlement planning authorities in Israel, coupled with their adherence to the traditional/ideological principles of Zionist pioneering settlement types, acted as an obstacle to the Yishuv Kehillati attaining this recognition. The major factor causing the eventual recognition of the new concept was the change in political administration following the elections of May 1977. The government wanted to put new locational policies into effect,
FIG 5.5
THE NEW MA'ALOT NEIGHBOURHOOD CONCEPT

Neighbourhood centre-to serve 5000 families

Community groups 150-250 families each

Residential areas 800-1000 families each

Source: Jewish Agency Settlement Department 1977, Fig 2
concentrating on an area (the West Bank Highlands) which necessitated a different type of settlement, because of the physical characteristics of the region and the human characteristics of the potential settlers. In May 1977, the West Bank contained three existing prototype Yishuv Kehillati settlements (see next chapter), and it was in the knowledge that such a framework could prove attractive to other potential settlers that the settlement authorities were forced to reconsider the issue. The compromise agreement that was reached with the settlement authorities gave the proponents of the Yishuv Kehillati their chance to prove the validity of this settlement type as a viable alternative to the more traditional small rural villages.

The case studies examined in the following chapter relate to the three 'veteran' Yishuv Kehillati settlements of Ophrah, Kedumim and Kefar Adumim. They show that today, in both the cases of Ophrah and Kedumim, an increasing emphasis is being placed on settlers working in home-based industries. Alternatively, other settlements such as Beit-El and Kefar Adumim show no signs of undergoing a significant reversal in commuting trends. It would appear that the Yishuv Kehillati may, in time, form two distinct types of its own depending upon the wishes of the settlers and their relative locations (57). The question remains open as to whether the Settlement Department could, if the situation were to ever arise, forcefully influence these settlements to change their employment structure. Nevertheless,
it was reported in September 1980, that about 20% of the settlers in the 'hill country' of the West Bank were employed locally. M. Droblless, the joint head of the Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency, announced that he would request the government to allocate funds for the development of industry in this area in 1981/82 so that the percentage could be increased to 40 (59).

Both the Yishuv Kehillati and the Industrial Village, whose inhabitants are middle class and upwards, are classic examples of suburbanization. Neither of the two types has undergone development on a large enough scale, both spatially and temporally, to arrive at definitive conclusions as to their long-term applicability to rural areas. Like the kibbutz and the moshav before them, they have to be viewed within the unique Jewish colonization policies of the last hundred years. Nevertheless, it is necessary to examine such settlement types as exist, with a view to the possible application of such concepts in other areas throughout the world, which it is felt necessary to settle, but which are devoid of local natural agricultural or mineral resources. Furthermore, should governments wish to promote policies of rural development that would attract middle-class sectors of the population, it would be necessary to attempt experiments of this nature, based on access to skilled and technological industry, by means of establishing totally new plants or by commuting (59).
REFERENCES


7. The normal arrangement in the rural service centres was that the resident service workers paid rent to the Settlement Department for the right to live in their homes.


Chapter Five
12. The two settlements also attempted to become independent under the auspices of the Development Towns Corporation and the Ministry of Industry. Neither authority accepted them.

13. Uzi Gdor was a leading Israeli settlement planner. He was responsible for the Master Settlement Plan of the Golan Heights and also for the more recent Defence Ministry plan for urban settlement in the West Bank. Much of the material in this chapter is based on an extensive interview with him at his home at Moshav Bet Halevy on 22/7/79. For an analysis of his work within the Israeli planning establishment, see
   a) Erez, Y. 26/5/78 'The planner can go', Ma'ariv.
   b) Rabinovich, A. 4/8/78 'Planning across the line', Jerusalem Post Weekly Supplement. 6-7. 'Planning across the line'.

14. This was produced in conjunction with Professor S.Reichman, now of the Department of Geography in the Hebrew University. The original draft was reproduced in the Gush Emunim 'Emergency' Plan of 1977 and updated in more detail in an appendix of the Gush Emunim Master Plan of 1978.

15. This figure was given by Mr.S.Ravid, the administrative head of the Settlement Department in an interview in August 1979.


Chapter Five


27. Israeli regional planning is based on the 'composite rural structure' in which there is a block (gush) of settlements in any one region enabling a regional level of services and better security. It is explained with regard to the section on the Industrial Village in Chapter 4.3.


30. Ibid, pp.36-37.


35. World Zionist organisation, Rural Settlement Department. (1977) op cit. See Appendix Four.


39. Minutes of meeting 10/3/80 - The Inter-Organizational Committee on Settlement in Judea and Samaria.


42. Reichmann, S. (1977) 'New forms of urban settlement in Israel'. *City and Region* (Hebrew) Vol.3, No.4, 3-17.

43. The Histadrut is the central organising body of the Israeli Trades Unions. It is a powerful body, particularly in the Labour party.


46. 12/6/79 *Jerusalem Post.* 'World Zionist Organisation delays commitment to build Eilon Moreh'.


51. The groups' struggle is discussed in *Ma'ariv* 30/1/76.

52. This viewpoint was expressed in an interview with the regional coordinator of the Segev Project, Mr. E.Raz, on 10/8/79.

53. Personal communications:
   a) Professor S. Reichmann (Hebrew University), 13/5/80;
   b) Mr. A.Rokach (Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency), 20/5/80.

54. Personal communication:
   Professor S. Reichmann *op cit.*


57. This possibility was put forward by Mr. Yoel Bin-Nun in an interview with him at his home on Ophrah - 11/7/79. Mr. Bin-Nun is a leading figure in Gush Emunim and was a resident of Allon Shvut at the time they were fighting for their own independent settlement status. At that time he represented both the Gush and his settlement on the executive of the Movement for New Urban Settlements and was a leading proponent of the Yishuv Kehillati concept.


59. It must be noted, however, that there are still some people in the traditionalist camp in Israel who argue that agricultural development is the key to integrated rural development, and that secondary and tertiary activities should revert to a subsidiary role. This viewpoint is expressed in Weitz, R. (Ed.) (1979) Integrated Rural Development: The Rehovot Approach. Publications on the problems of regional development, No.28. Settlement Study Centre, Rehovot.

Similar sentiments are expressed in a 1980 paper from the Settlement Study Centre by Sherman, N. entitled From Government to Opposition. In this paper, the author argues that the co-operative rural sector, as represented by the kibbutzim and moshavim, has undergone a period of neglect by the authorities since 1977, and that this sector will only be able to reassert itself should a Labour government be elected in 1981.
Chapter Six

6 THE YISHUV KEHILLATI: CASE STUDIES OF KEDUMIM AND OPHRAH.

6.1 Introduction

An analysis has thus far been made of the political and planning processes responsible for the establishment of Jewish settlements in the West Bank. This chapter discusses two village case studies in order to highlight the operation of these interacting elements. The settlements examined are those of Kedumim, to the west of Nablus, and Ophrah, to the north of Ramallah (Fig 6.1). The choice of these villages lies in the fact that they are the two longest standing Gush Emunim settlements, having been established illegally during the tenure of the Mapai government of Yitzchak Rabin (1974-1977). These two settlements were the first to be legalized under the Likud government, together with those of Ma'aleh Adumim and Elkanah, in July 1977 (1). Kedumim and Ophrah represent the nucleus of Gush Emunim settlement activity, and the inhabitants of these settlements include much of the Gush Emunim leadership. Thus, they best demonstrate the earliest Gush struggle for recognition, from the inception of the movement in 1974, and through to the election of the Likud government in 1977 - the latter resulting in the legalization, consolidation and growth of the movement.

At the individual settlement level, both Kedumim and Ophrah
The "Sharon Highway"

The "Alton Road"

FIG 6.1
LOCATION OF CASE STUDIES

Kedumim
Ophrah
Jerusalem Kefar Adumim
are undergoing a process of development as the first prototypes of the Yishuv Kehillati, and this chapter analyses the major locational, political and socio-economic features of settlements of this nature. It will become apparent that this state of ongoing development and experimentation is because there remains a need to define the Yishuv Kehillati as a result of practical experience and not simply as a vague theoretical framework. This practical application is emphasised in the case studies by the fact that both Kedumim and Ophrah underwent an initial stage in which they were not recognized as official settlements. Thus, their only form of progress and development during this period had to be under the settlers' own initiative in all spheres, without the aid of the government ministries and the Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency. As a result, the current process of settlement development is one of adaptation to the Settlement Department standards, by which the Yishuv Kehillati was recognised in 1977, but at the same time, taking into account the strong individualistic features that each settlement already exhibited by this date. This is unlike the traditional planning process in Israel, whereby each new settlement developed according to a comprehensive planning programme covering all stages of the evolution of the settlement, from establishment through to self-sufficiency (see Appendix Six). The development of Kedumim and Ophrah is also significant in that the Yishuv Kehillati settlements established since 1978, and which do have comprehensive planning frameworks, tend to use these two

Chapter Six
prototype settlements as providing guidelines for their own development.

The political nature of the Gush Emunim enterprises coupled with the continuing uncertainty as to the future of the West Bank, means that any long-term forecast of continued independence or otherwise, is at least tentative. The most important consideration is to examine the Yishuv Kehillati type of settlement as a whole, and to make reference to its possible validity as a rural based urban village, not only in the West Bank.

A description of the general development history of each settlement will be made, reflecting the various processes and conflicts outlined in the previous chapters. The focus of the political struggle for initial recognition of the right to settle in the West Bank Highlands is discussed, particularly in the case of Kedumim, where the inhabitants represent much of the original settler nucleus of Gush Emunim. The socio/economic base of both settlements will be outlined, and this will be measured against the goals as set out in the respective planning programmes (Table 6.1).

Other important factors to be taken into consideration are the emotional/Biblical significance of these particular locations, and the wider regional implications of these already developed settlements for the further establishment of settlements, in line with the political frameworks outlined in Chapter Three.
### Table 6.1
Comparison of these planning programmes for Yishuv Kehillatis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Ma’aleh Adumim Bet</th>
<th>Ophrah</th>
<th>Kedumim</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date of plan</td>
<td>June 1979</td>
<td>October 1977</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Schooling up to road; 12kms east of Jerusalem</td>
<td>Ramallah-Jericho road; ex Jordanian army camp</td>
<td>Kfar Saba-Kalkillyah-Nablus road; 12kms from Nablus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date of recognition</td>
<td>October 1974 (1)</td>
<td>May 1975 (2)</td>
<td>December 1975 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planned population</td>
<td>250 families</td>
<td>250 families</td>
<td>250 families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population-May 1979</td>
<td>35 families (5)</td>
<td>52 families (5)</td>
<td>38 families (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existing land 1979</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>270 dunams</td>
<td>218 dunams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planned land area</td>
<td>139 dunams</td>
<td>818 dunams (4)</td>
<td>770 dunams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land ownership</td>
<td>Requisitioned private land-present and future</td>
<td>Army camp</td>
<td>Additional land to be confiscated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>Proposed (5)</td>
<td>Proposal</td>
<td>Proposed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standing of orchards</td>
<td>30 dunams of orchards</td>
<td>30 dunams of orchards</td>
<td>30 units of intensive agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 dunam of orchard per unit</td>
<td>3% of workforce</td>
<td>3% of workforce</td>
<td>1 dunam per unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existing industry</td>
<td>Mishmar Adumim Industrial Area</td>
<td>Computer services</td>
<td>Metalwork shop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved from temporary camp</td>
<td>Two matchets</td>
<td>Electronics workshop</td>
<td>Children's clothes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning to Jerusalem</td>
<td>Honey production</td>
<td>Dyeing factory</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planned industry</td>
<td>Electronics</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>50 units of small factories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Computers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22% of workforce</td>
<td>3% of workforce</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other interests</td>
<td>Talmudic Academy</td>
<td>Field school</td>
<td>Talmudic Academy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Immigrant Absorption</td>
<td>Hebrew education seminar</td>
<td>Local history seminar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Building contractors</td>
<td>Holiday area</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7% of workforce</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>Schooling up to age 14</td>
<td>Schooling up to age 14</td>
<td>Schooling up to age 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Settlement offices</td>
<td>Settlement offices</td>
<td>Settlement offices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Small shop</td>
<td>Small shop</td>
<td>Small shop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>First aid centre</td>
<td>First aid centre</td>
<td>First aid centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Now almost total — want to reduce to 25%</td>
<td>Now 43% — want to reduce to 30%</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1) This was first settled within the framework of workers for the nearby industrial area of Mishor Adumim.
2) First settled as a temporary work camp.
3) Survey by authors, May 1979.
4) Gluege from immigrants seen on Ofra, July 1979.
5) This had not yet been accepted by a majority vote of the settlers.
6.2 Locational Characteristics

6.2.1 Physical Features.

The settlement of Ophrah (Fig 6.2) is located seven kilometres to the north-east of Ramallah, one kilometre east of the Arab village of Ein Yabrud. To the north, the settlement is bordered by the east-west Ramallah to Jericho road. This road intersects with the main north-south Jerusalem to Nablus route, two kilometres north of Ramallah. There are nine Arab villages within a five kilometre radius of Ophrah, while the only Jewish settlement within this area is Beit El. The immediate surrounding area comprises that of the Bethel foothills, which is the northern extension of the Judean mountains. The average height of the area is 900 metres above sea level with the local peak being Mt. Ba'al Hatzer at 1016 metres. This mountain has always been recognised as the border between Judea and Samaria. The foothills are distinguished by fairly extensive plateaus and mountain ranges intersected by narrow river beds, which widen gradually towards the coastal plain. The average rainfall in the Bethel mountains rises to 700 millimetres, this being higher than the average for the Judean Hills (600 millimetres) (2). The soil, as in much of the central and western part of the West Bank, comprises two types. These are the reddish-brown terra
FIG 6.2 OPHRAH AND REGION

Ophrah, 840 o', 5 Miles
Arab settlement
Jewish settlement
Roads
Streams

FIG 6.3 KEDUMIM AND REGION

Tulkarm, 491
Arab settlement
Jewish settlement
Roads
Streams

Source: Nature Protection Society 1:100,000 map, 1976
D. Newman 1981
rossa overlying various rocky limestone strata, and dark rendzina on soft limestone.

Kedumim (Fig 6.3) is located on the Kalkiliya to Nablus road, ten kilometres west of Nablus, which is the major Arab population concentration in the north of the West Bank. The natural extension of this road westward over the 'green line' is the Israeli town of Kefar Saba, 25 kilometres from Kedumim. To the north of the settlement is the road leading from Netanyah on the coast, via Tulkarm on the West Bank border, to Nablus. This road is reached via the local Arab village of Kuzein. There are eight Arab villages within a five kilometre radius of Kedumim, the largest being Kafr Kaddum, one-and-a-half kilometres to the north-west. The two nearest Jewish settlements (Karnei Shomron and Shavei Shomron) both lie outside this five kilometre radius.

The settlement is sited at a height of 400 metres above sea level in the highly intersected mountainous region of Southern Samaria, running from Nablus in the north to the Bethel foothills in the south. Heights rise from 730 metres in the north to as much as 915 metres in the south-east, but falling off to the west in the vicinity of Kedumim. The region is criss-crossed by numerous narrow valleys except in the north-eastern part. The soils are similar to those around Ophrah, but with a far greater area being covered by rendzina soils. There are also different colluvial alluvial soils in the valleys.

Both Ophrah and Kedumim are located on the north-south mountain ridge, extending from Jenin at the extreme north of the

Chapter Six
West Bank, via Ramallah and Jerusalem, continuing through to Hebron in the south. Nearly all available agricultural land throughout this region is under cultivation.

6.2.2 Biblical Significance.

A major ideological factor motivating the Gush in their settlement philosophy has been the significance of Biblical and Jewish historical sites in Judea and Samaria. The settlements of Ophrah and Kedumim were settled by groups of Gush Emunim activists whose objective was to settle sites on the strategic mountain ridge, the precise locations to be in the vicinity of important ancient Jewish sites.

1. Kedumim.

The original settlers of Kedumim, and later Eilon Moreh, sought to establish a settlement in the vicinity of another centre of important Jewish historic sites. This area, in the north of the West Bank, consisted of the two major cities of Shechem (now Nablus) and Shomron (now Sebastiya). The ancient Biblical city of Shechem was a Canaanite and Israelite city situated between Mt. Gerizim and Mt. Ebal in a fertile and well watered valley in the heart of the central hill country. It has been identified with the ancient mound of Tell al-Balata, one mile east of modern Nablus (3). The site has undergone three excavations, all this century.

Chapter Six
The name of Shechem is first mentioned in the Bible in connection with the arrival of Abraham in Canaan. He built an altar there at "Eilon of Moreh" (4). Later on, two sons of the Patriarch Jacob, Simon and Levy, destroyed the city in revenge for the rape of their sister Dinah (5). The bones of Joseph are said to have been brought out of Egypt by the Children of Israel for burial in Shechem (6). The arrival of the Israelites, in the 13th century B.C.E., witnessed the assembly of all the tribes in Shechem by Joshua for the making of a covenant (7). Shechem later became the centre of the short-lived kingdom of Abimelech (8), while King Jeroboam established his first capital here (9) after the division of the monarchy (10). The Assyrians destroyed Shechem when they invaded the northern kingdom, in the 8th-7th centuries B.C.E., and by the 5th century B.C.E., the city had disappeared altogether. It was revived again as a powerful city during the Hellenistic period (2nd-3rd centuries B.C.E.), but was again destroyed in 107 B.C.E. by John Hyrcanus, who completely levelled the site (11).

Although many authors equate the exact site of Shechem with that of Nablus, the Madaba Map distinguishes between the two sites (12). The town of Nablus was founded by the Emperor Vespasian in 72 C.E. on the site of the Samaritan village of Mahartha. Because of its favourable geographic position and abundance of water, the city prospered. Known as Neapolis, it became a centre for the Samaritans. A Jewish community is mentioned in 1522 and the city was not completely abandoned by

Chapter Six
Jews until after 1900 (13). Attempts to resettle there following World War One only finally ended following the unrest in Palestine in 1929.

The city of Samaria (Sebastiya) was founded during the period of the Jewish monarchy in 880 B.C.E. by King Omri. He moved his capital here, away from the devastated Tirzah. The city was located in an excellent strategic position on a high and isolated hill in Mt. Ephraim. It thus became the capital of his kingdom in the 9th-8th centuries B.C.E. and remained the Jewish capital for close to 300 years. Its name, Shomron (Samaria), was derived from the name of the previous owner of the hill on which it was built, namely Shemer (14). This name of the new capital, which became the chief rival to Jerusalem, gradually replaced the name of Ephraim as the general designation for the whole area.

The fortunes of Samaria varied with those of the Israelite Kingdom. Its earliest period was one of economic growth and stability. Excavations show Samaria to be one of a few large flourishing cities of the time. A collection of unique manuscripts, found in the excavations of Samaria and known as the Samaria Ostraca (15), add much information about this region. They show that during the period of the Israelite Monarchy, there was a dense agricultural population in the Samaria region.

The Assyrian campaigns of about 735-730 B.C.E. captured much of the surrounding area. It left Samaria free to function, but only after its leaders had promised complete submission to the Assyrians. However, in the following campaigns of 724 B.C.E.,
the city was conquered after a three year siege (16). Its inhabitants were deported and replaced with others. The Kingdom of Israel (Samaria) was converted into an Assyrian province called Samerina. The town itself was later transformed into a Greek town with the settlement there of 6,000 Macedonians. It was re-established by Pompey and rebuilt by King Herod in 25 B.C.E. Herod renamed the city Sebast, in honour of the Emperor Augustus. However, the city never became an important Jewish centre again. Today, there is an Arab village on the same site, and there remain remnants of the ancient city. The significance of this site in the ancient Jewish kingdoms is emphasised by the fact that two other existing Gush Emunim settlements (Karnei Shomron and Shavei Shomron) and a settlement of the Herut/Betar movement (Ma'aleh Shomron), contain the name of Shomron.

2. Ophrah.
The settlement of Ophrah is named after the Biblical site of the same name. Yet, the real historic significance of this local area is in the sites of two later Gush Emunim settlements nearby, Beit El and Shiloh. The former is located three kilometres to the south-west of Ophrah, the latter ten kilometres to the north. Both of these are major Biblical Jewish sites, and in fact, the original settlers of Ophrah had as their objective, a settlement in the vicinity of Shiloh. The existing settlement of Shiloh was eventually established by another group of settlers in 1978 under the guise of an archaeological dig.

Excavations show settlement as early as about the 19th-18th
centuries B.C.E. (Middle Bronze Age) at Shiloh (17). The site was abandoned at first but resettled at the beginning of the Israelite period. Under the leadership of Joshua, the tabernacle was erected at Shiloh, in the territory of the Ephraimite tribe, and it became the centre for assembly for all the tribes to settle their disputes with the tribes beyond the River Jordan (18). It became the capital of ancient Israel during the period of the Judges (13th-11th centuries B.C.E.). The site was totally destroyed by the Philistines when they took the holy ark from the city (19), and it thus became a symbol of Divine judgement against a backsliding Israel (20). After its revival, it reached a high point of development under the Romans. Shiloh is also known from later sources and it appears on the Madaba Map (21). Its tombs continued to be visited by Jews until the 14th century (22). The identification of Biblical Shiloh with Seilun was established by E. Robinson in the 19th century (23).

Beit-El was a Canaanite and Israelite town, some 17 kilometres north of Jerusalem, located at the intersection of the north-south mountain road along the watershed, and the east-west road leading to the plains of Jericho in the east and the coastal plain in the west. The actual site is today occupied by the Arab village of Baytin, 866 metres above sea level.

Settlement at Beit-El apparently began at the turn of the third millennium B.C.E. when it inherited the position of neighbouring Ai (al-Tell), which already lay in ruins (24). Originally called Luz (25), it was enlarged in the 16th century
B.C.E. It was during this latter period that Abraham is recorded as having built an altar on this site (26). Similarly, the Bible locates the dream of Jacob as taking place at Beit-El (27). This latter episode is one of importance in the Gush Emunim philosophy since it was in the same dream that God confirmed his promise to Jacob that the surrounding area would be given to his descendants. Canaanite Beit-El continued to flourish in the late Bronze Age (15th-14th centuries B.C.E.). It was captured and burnt down around the first half of the 13th century B.C.E., and resettled by an Israelite population (28). It would appear that Beit-El was one of the first Canaanite cities in the mountains of Ephraim to be conquered by the Israelites. It is unclear as to whether Beit-El was at the southern edge of the Ephraimite territory or at the northern edge of the Benjaimite territory. For a short period, Beit-El became the home of the holy tabernacle and ark (29). With the division of the monarchy following the death of King Solomon, Beit-El passed into the possession of King Jeroboam, who incorporated it into the southern extremity of his Kingdom of Israel. It was this kingdom that later came to be known as Samaria, while the southern kingdom retained its name of Judah (hence 'Jewish', 'Judea'). In attempting to wean his subjects away from continuing their pilgrimages to the holy city of Jerusalem, now in the southern kingdom, King Jeroboam erected one of the two principal shrines of his kingdom at Beit-El, incorporating its own priesthood (30). This continued until it was captured by King Josiah of Judah, who
incorporated Beit-El into the northern extremity of his kingdom. He also destroyed everything connected to its shrine (31). The city was eventually destroyed during the Babylonian invasion (6th century B.C.E.) and remained in ruins until the Persian era (5th & 4th centuries B.C.E.). It was captured by the Roman Emperor Vespasian in 69 C.E. Later references include the Madaba Map (see above) but few remains of the post-Roman era have been discovered at the site.

Ophrah itself is the name of two Biblical locations. The relevant one to this study is that of a locality in the northern part of the territory of Benjamin (32), near Beit-El. It was the capital of a district ceded by the Kingdom of Samaria to Judea in 145 B.C.E. when it was known as Aphaerema (33). It does not have the same religious and historical significance as that of the previous two sites discussed. The name is first noted in the Israelite Conquest period (13th century B.C.E.) and is known to have been an important political centre much later on during the Maccabbean era (2nd & 3rd centuries B.C.E.).
6.3 Political Evolution Of The Gush Settlements

6.3.1 Kedumim.

The settlement of Kedumim was established as a result of numerous squatting attempts carried out, by the Eilon Moreh group of Gush Emunim, at sites in the vicinity of Sebastia and Nablus in Northern Samaria, between July 1974 and December 1975. The establishment of the Eilon Moreh group took place in Kiryat Arba in February 1973 (prior to the establishment of Gush Emunim, which took place in 1974) with the objective of settling in the vicinity of Nablus. They requested that the government allow them to settle as an independent and private entity in this area, without any government allocation of funds and assistance. Following the 1973 War, the objectives of the group were highlighted by their decision to help the settlers at the illegal settlement of Keshet on the Golan Heights (34). Following the Government refusal in March 1974 to allow them to settle in Samaria, the group decided to emulate the Keshet example and take the initiative themselves.

Between July 1974 and December 1975, the group attempted to squat eight times in this region. The first attempt took place
at Camp Choron to the south of Nablus (35). The group spent IL15,000 ($2,500) on equipment for this attempt. After remaining at the site for a day, the army removed the settlers with force, and this resulted in widespread coverage throughout Israel. Two months later, a second attempt was made at the old Turkish railway station of Sebastia, 15 kilometres to the north-west of Nablus (36). Apart from the members of the group itself, hundreds of sympathizers came to offer support and this was instrumental in bringing the whole issue of settlement in the West Bank Highlands to the fore of national public debate. The government allowed the squatters to remain for a few days while the issue was discussed in the Knesset, but eventually the settlers were ordered to leave. They complied with this request after the army was again sent in, although no force was used.

The third attempt took place at the old police fort of Nebi Tsalah, 20 kilometres north-west of Ramallah. This was part of a mass demonstration organised by Gush Emunim and its settlement groups on the night of 8th October 1974 (37). Apart from the Eilon Moreh group, other settlement groups had objectives of settling at Jericho (38), Shiloh (now the Ophrah settlers) (39), and Mes'ha (40). In the following year, the group made two more attempts in the spring (41), both at the old railway station of Sebastia. Each time, the settlers were forcibly ejected. In July of that year, following the example of the settlers at Ophrah three months previously, eight members of the Eilon Moreh group received permission to become employed as civilian workers.

Chapter Six
for the military government of the West Bank and were allowed to sleep in the old railway station during the period of their work. This only continued for two weeks, when the government ordered them to leave. Finally, in December 1975, a mass group of over 2,000 supporters went to the old railway station and remained there for eight days without hindrance (42). Prefabricated buildings were erected and the settler group established a school and a nursery. This attempt took place to coincide with a Worldwide Jewish Solidarity Conference being held in Jerusalem, resulting from the United Nations resolution equating Zionism with racism. The conference affirmed

"the historical right of the Jewish people to the Land of Israel"

and a group of delegates at the conference visited the Eilon Moreh squatters. The government were unable to order the removal of the settlers with this atmosphere pervading. Subsequently, following pressure from Welfare Minister Zevulun Hammer (43) and Knesset member Ariel Sharon (in charge of settlement policy in the Begin government from 1977-1981), the Defence Minister, Mr. Shimon Peres (head of the Labour Party since 1977), announced that the Eilon Moreh group would be allowed to remain in the 'heart of Samaria' as an independent unit, but they would have to move into one of the army camps (44). The Defence Ministry would allocate temporary accommodation for the 30 families of the group and the government would agree to hold a full debate on the issue of settlement in this region within the next two to three months. They would then be offered a more permanent location. Faced with

Chapter Six
the choice of moving into Camp Choron or Camp Kaddum, the settlers chose the latter, this resulting in the present name of Kedumim.

Eventually, the government offered the settlers a choice of three alternative locations where they would be permitted to establish a permanent settlement. These were Cochav Hashachar, Tekoah and Mes'ha (45), but they were unacceptable to the Gush at the time because, although located in the West Bank, they were not in the central highland area (Fig 6.4). These three locations all occupy sites within the framework of the Allon Plan, the first two being located along his inner line of 'defensible' settlements, while the latter was just over the 'green line' border in Western Samaria. Considering that the Inter-Ministerial Settlement Committee was headed by Yisrael Galili, the closest political ally of Allon, this offer was not surprising (46).

Initially, 15 families moved into the army camp, and a hillside just outside the camp was immediately prepared for their living quarters. The settlers themselves added extra tents and huts to the prefabricated structures allocated by the Defence Ministry. By June 1976, the group had expanded to thirty families (including 53 children) plus fifteen single adults. Within a year, they had built a communal dining hall, a synagogue, schoolrooms, and had extended the sewage system to their area as well as having an independent electricity system. Two buses came each day to the settlement from Tel Aviv. A group

Chapter Six
FIG 6.4
THE SETTLERS AT CAMP KADDUM 1976

Location of settlers as from January 1976
Alternative sites offered by government June 1976
The "Sharon Highway"
"The Alton Road"

of the settlers travelled daily to their jobs in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, while others were employed by the Defence Ministry (from March 1976) in the installation of the electric and sewage infrastructure. The Defence Minister also authorised the construction of a separate road to the living quarters, thus bypassing the army camp centre altogether (47). Nevertheless, the Labour Government did not officially recognize the settlement as being legally constituted, meaning that all the development work came either by means of under-the-table handouts by Defence Minister Peres, or from the private resources of the settlers and the Gush Emunim supporters.

6.3.2 Ophrah.

The settlement of Ophrah was established in April 1975, before that of Kedumim, although the initial settlement group was formed later. The original objectives of the group had been to establish a settlement in the vicinity of ancient Shiloh (see previous section). Ophrah lies eight kilometres south-west of that site.

The group was involved in the mass squatting attempts of October 1974. In the following year, members of the settlement group succeeded in procuring contract work from the Ministry of Defence, involved in erecting fences in the area of Mt. Ba'al Hatzor nearby. This 'work group' started operations in April
1975. Whereas the Eilon Moreh group were using their squatting attempts to arouse mass support for their cause, the Ophrah settlers hoped to lay their foundations quietly and without fuss. The method of establishing a 'work group' was taken from the examples of settlers from the third wave of immigration into Palestine between 1919-1923. In fact, the Eilon Moreh group also tried to use these tactics three months later. The work group at Ophrah commuted to their work daily from their homes in Jerusalem for eight months, after which they quietly moved into a local deserted Jordanian army camp and began to develop it as a permanent settlement. Although questions were raised in the Knesset and by the press as to the legality of this operation, the settlers were not ordered to move away.

6.3.3 Kefar Adumim.

Although this chapter is concerned specifically with the cases of Kedumim and Ophrah, the establishment of Kefar Adumim is also described since it was the third of the pre-1977 settlements, established by manipulation of an existing government framework, rather than in opposition to government settlement policy (48). As in the previous two cases, the settlement of Kefar Adumim (until 1979 known as Ma'aleh Adumim) evolved from one of the earliest settlement nuclei associated with Gush Emunim. Nevertheless, there are some major differences from the cases of
Kedumim and Ophrah. The location of Kefar Adumim is at the southern end of the Allon road, where it joins the main Jerusalem to Jericho highway (Fig 6.1). There had always been Labour government approval to establish some sort of Jewish presence in this area. In fact, the various proposals for settlement of the 'Wider Jerusalem' area outlined in Chapter Two, all show this point to be the key location for an industrial area to serve Jerusalem. A second difference between Kefar Adumim and the other two settlements is that the present day settlement of Kefar Adumim is an outgrowth of the settler nucleus from the temporary settlement of Ma'aleh Adumim B but on a new site, whereas in the cases of Kedumim and Ophrah, the present permanent locations developed as physical extensions of the original temporary sites. Ma'aleh Adumim B had been the location of the settlement since the original squatting in 1975, and consisted of two groups. The first of these was a Gush Emunim orientated group who are now the settlers at Kefar Adumim. The second group were those interested in becoming the first settlers at the Ma'aleh Adumim urban quarter, at present under construction a few kilometres to the west. Ma'aleh Adumim constitutes part of the encirclement of Jerusalem with Jewish urban quarters.

Defence Minister Moshe Dayan had originally proposed the establishment of a town at this location within the Allon Plan framework. In October 1974, the Mayor of Jerusalem, Mr. Teddy Kollek, announced the establishment of an industrial area at Ma'aleh Adumim for the location of heavy industry for the city.
(49). In November 1974, the Israeli cabinet approved a three tier industrial plan for Jerusalem which included the establishment of an industrial estate at Ma'aleh Adumim on an area of 5-6,000 dunams. However, the only reference to any residential development concerned the construction of an estate to house the workers at the industrial area. This was because the Rabin cabinet was initially divided as to the wisdom of establishing a civilian settlement on the main road from Jerusalem to Jordan. Although dovish ministers, such as Housing Minister Avraham Ofer, and Commerce and Industry Minister Haim Bar-Lev, opposed major development at this site, the Cabinet nevertheless decided to allocate IL10 million ($1.4 million) towards the development of the project to cover the basic infrastructural work of building access roads, and laying drainage, water and electricity systems (50). This was coupled with the levelling of a 700 dunam area for the development of the industrial zone and the construction of the necessary infrastructure, including roads and utility lines. The Jerusalem Economic Corporation, a government municipality corporation, carried out the work on behalf of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. At first, two generators supplied electricity, but these were replaced in June 1977 by the extension of power lines from Jerusalem. Four buildings, each 1,000 square metres, were built to house the first enterprises.

Gush Emunim were not satisfied with this action. They considered the site to be a key strategic location. The fact that the residential estate was to be only for single workers,
signified to them that the government did not wish to create a permanent political fact that may be hard to remove should any agreement with the Arab world render it necessary. Furthermore, the Minister for Commerce and Industry stipulated that all industries must be large enough to offer employment to at least fifty persons each and that this must be Jewish labour. This was seen as a measure aimed at inhibiting short-term development at this site. Thus, a settler group with the objective of settling at Ma'aleh Adumim undertook a squatting attempt on 2nd March 1975. This group was not officially affiliated to Gush Emunim, but many of its members were associated in a private capacity. The Cabinet acquiesced and subsequently decided that families, as well as single workers, could apply for housing here, but only if their livelihood was to be derived from the industrial area. Immediate temporary accommodation would be established on a nearby hill, 800 metres from the edge of the industrial zone. Thus in reality, there was little effective opposition to the squatting at this location.

In December 1975, the first settlers moved in and this was followed by two further groups in the following eighteen months – including a group associated to the Histadrut (Israel Trades Union) and interested in eventually settling in the proposed urban quarter. Fourteen enterprises were approved in the first instance, one of them being a military based industry aimed at employing 200 people in its first stage, others including a metal works and a cheese shop. The first workshops and small plants

Chapter Six
began to move into the industrial area at the beginning of 1977 (51) (Table 6.1). These included a branch of Olihab, a compressor manufacturing firm from Herzliyah, and an auto repair shop established by some of the settlers. The first four enterprises employed some thirty people among them, those in the auto repair shop being Arabs from East Jerusalem. Nevertheless, until the official recognition of the settlement by the Likud Government, the status of Ma'aleh Adumim B remained that of a 'work camp' - this itself being a compromise between those favouring a fully recognized residential area, and those now opposed completely to any residential framework due to the associations with the Gush Emunim settlers. By the time the right-wing Likud came to power in May 1977, the outgoing Labour government recommended, at their last Cabinet meeting (52), the establishment of an urban residential satellite for Jerusalem containing 5,000 dwelling units, at a fresh site in this area. Due to the subsequent planning of the more permanent settlements (i.e; the urban quarter of Ma'aleh Adumim and the Yishuv Kehillati of Kefar Adumim), the existing settlement of Ma'aleh Adumim B underwent no further official expansion. Therefore, any development was at the initiative, and with the resources of, the settlers themselves. However, they had a good infrastructure on which to build owing to the fact that the Housing Ministry had provided a substantial framework for the initial workers' residential estate. This included electricity and water infrastructure, prefabricated housing, and centrally located
communal buildings. Eventually, in October 1979, the settlers at Ma'aleh Adumim B moved to their new, permanent site, located on the opposite side of the Jerusalem-Jericho highway. This has become the Yishuv Kehillati known as Kefar Adumim.

Common strands can be detected from the evolution of these three case studies. The most obvious is the fact that it was the squatting tactics of the respective groups that forced the governments' hand in all three cases. The settlement policy of the Labour Government from 1967-1977 was based on the Allon Plan framework, with the consequent rejection of any plans proposing different policies. Nevertheless, the hard line opinion within the Labour government, sympathetic to the Gush Emunim settlement policies and led by Defence Minister Shimon Peres, constituted a major factor in allowing the settlers to remain at Ophrah and Kedumim. Furthermore, these government sympathizers helped in finding employment for many of the settlers in the army camps or in the installation of their own infrastructure. Allon himself vigorously opposed the Gush Emunim movement and particularly the establishment of Ophrah. This location lay astride his proposed Arab corridor from Ramallah to the Jordan Valley. Both Ophrah and Kedumim are located along the main north-south mountain ridge, wherein reside the major Arab population concentrations of the West Bank. Although other Jewish settlements have since been established nearby (see Chapter Three), the inhabitants are

Chapter Six
nevertheless totally outnumbered by the indigenous Arab population, yet they have little or no contact with them at all. Kedumim is exceptional in that it does not have a perimeter fence surrounding the settlement. Virtually all the other Jewish settlements in the West Bank are protected in this way (53). Each of the three settlements remained 'unofficial' under the Labour government and much of the development that took place was due to private initiative of a kind unknown to Israeli rural settlement. This latter fact is highly important when considering the subsequent development of the Yishuv Kehillati idea, based on private enterprise and industry.

6.4 Socio-Economic Development

6.4.1 Kedumim.

1. Population.
When the squatters at Sebastia were eventually allowed to move into the army camp of Kaddum, the group consisted of 18 families. By June 1976 (6 months later) there were 30 families (including 53 children) plus 15 single adults. The settlement was allocated
an area above the military camp comprising some 210 dunams. The Likud government promised the settlers an extra 200 dunams with the eventual dismantling of the army camp. Electricity was initially supplied by means of two generators, while the water supply was shared with the army until a new well was dug to a depth of 350 metres. It was planned to dispense with the electricity generators, and the settlement would be linked up with the Israel National Grid, by continuing the grid a further eight kilometres south to Shavei Shomron, and from there a further eight kilometres to Kedumim. A small reservoir was planned for the north of the settlement which would supply both the needs of Kedumim and Karnei Shomron, by means of a pipe installed by the Housing Ministry.

The development programme (54) (Table 6.1) proposed an eventual population of 400 families, for which 200 units would be established in the first stage. The total land area planned would constitute some 770 dunams, even though the settlers only possessed some 210 dunams. By December 1980, Kedumim consisted of 140 families, including 380 children, plus 17 single adults. There are also 70 single adult males who are full-time students at the Talmudical academy located in Kedumim. The average age of the settler families is 35, and there is an average of 3-4 children per family. The oldest member of the settlement is aged 59. Kedumim grew in population as and when new buildings could be established to provide additional accommodation. 50 families were absorbed in the summer of 1977, and a similar number the
following year. No new families are being accepted today, due to the inability to acquire more land for extra buildings. Fifteen percent of the families are Anglo-Saxon and American immigrants. Another 25% are of Sephardic origin, while the remainder are Israeli citizens of Western/Ashkenazic extraction. In terms of economic status, all the settlers are middle class. Not one settler has left Kedumim of their own accord since the establishment of the settlement.

During the initial stages of development at Kedumim, the wage earners of 11 of the 18 families commuted to their jobs in the major Israeli towns. The remainder began to prepare the camp and its infrastructure to make it habitable. These latter settlers were employed by the Ministry of Defence to install water pipes, electricity lines, and a sewage system. With the help of volunteers who came to identify with the Gush Emunim cause for short periods of time, the infrastructure was laid out, an approach road to the settlement built, and some central communal buildings erected. The first factories to be established were a metalshop engaged in a Defence Ministry contract, and a small electronics factory. To begin, all these enterprises were owned communally, but they were eventually bought by private individuals amongst the settlers. At the eastern edge of the settlement, two hothouses for growing flowers were built, and a further two dunams used for other agricultural purposes. By

Chapter Six
1979, there were six temporary buildings designed for factories, while an area of 5 dunams to the south of the settlement was being prepared to contain the eventual industrial area.

The development programme proposed the establishment of an eventual economic structure consisting of 80 privately owned intensive agricultural units, 120 industrial units (including partnerships, employees etc) and 200 people employed in service jobs or as commuters. The plan spoke of 60 new industrial units in the first stage of development at a cost of IL600,000 ($18,000) per unit. Forty agricultural units would be laid out on an area of one dunam each, at a cost of IL800,000 ($24,000) per unit. The total projected investment for the first planning stage (including infrastructure and housing) would be IL27.5 million ($800,000).

By December 1980, the industrial framework of the settlement had expanded substantially (Table 6.2). Whereas the two original factories (the metalshop and electronics production) were in the process of being transferred to the newest Gush Emunim settlement in the area, Eylon Moreh, there now existed a variety of other small industrial and service enterprises. These employed 70 people altogether, while another 18 worked in the private agricultural enterprises, and a similar number in the two educational institutions in operation for outside groups. A large number of the women taught in the local school which catered for the children up to age 14. The school serves all the Jewish settlements in the region, and school children come from

Chapter Six
### Table 6.2

**Employment Situation in Kedma, July 1978 & July 1988.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry and Services</th>
<th>1978</th>
<th>1988</th>
<th>Extra Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Metalworks</td>
<td>1 owner + 5 workers</td>
<td>Defence contracts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronics</td>
<td>1 owner + 3 workers</td>
<td>Move to Elon Moreh, Production of fine parts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Childrens clothes</td>
<td>1 owner + 1 worker</td>
<td>National market, Sold plated ornaments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ornamental factory</td>
<td>1 owner + 2 workers</td>
<td>Ornamental factory, Tourist market, Sold plated ornaments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical products</td>
<td>2 owners</td>
<td>New patents, 1 owner + 2 workers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpentry shop</td>
<td>1 owner + 2 workers</td>
<td>Engaged in work on settlement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer paper factory</td>
<td>3 owners + 6 workers</td>
<td>Subsidiary of larger Japanese company</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer services</td>
<td>4 owners + 4 workers</td>
<td>Contracts in coastal region, Office based in Kedma</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountancy service</td>
<td>1 owner + 4 workers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Photography</td>
<td>1 owner + 1 worker</td>
<td>Laboratory in Kedma</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agriculture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greenhouses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicken runs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Talmudic Academy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midrash Institute</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public Services</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Educational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlement admin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mini-market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building Materials shop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Book shop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toy shop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houseware shop</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Computing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All employment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total** | 184 workers | 137 workers |
the settlements of Dotan, Tappuah, Karnei Shomron and Shavei Shomron. Kedumim also houses the offices of the evolving regional council of the Jewish settlements in the Shomron area. The council co-ordinates political, cultural and sporting activities between the settlements, and disseminates any necessary information. (By contrast, Ophrah is located within the regional council of Binyamin, whose offices are located in the settlement of Beit El.)

The agricultural land in Kedumim was privately owned from the beginning. The flower hothouses were built by the Settlement Department at a cost of IL2 million ($30,000), and these were then bought by private owners. The grant given by the Settlement Department to help private owners set up their agricultural concerns is the same as applies to industrial enterprises. Thus, as each individual could receive up to a maximum of IL650,000 ($9,000) from the Settlement Department, each hothouse had to be purchased by a partnership consisting of three owners.

One of the more recent additions to Kedumim is probably the most unusual. A paper factory involving the investment of $500,000 has been established by a Japanese businessman (by the name of O'Hara) who came to settle in Kedumim. The factory expects to produce $500,000 worth of computer paper per annum for export to Japan and Europe, as well as selling in Israel itself. O'Hara continues to own a larger, 18 man, computer operated paper works in Japan.

The remainder of the labour force on Kedumim (about a third)
continued to commute to their jobs in the Tel Aviv region, a journey of some forty minutes by car. The settlement prefers new members who are prepared to work in the settlement itself, but they are not inflexible on this point (in Ophrah, this rule is more rigid). However, as of January 1981, this rule was being applied more stringently in Kedumim, since the industrial area was fully utilized, and there was no short term prospect of additional land becoming available.

3. Housing.

In Kedumim, the settlers opted to have the houses built under the 'Build Your Own Home' scheme from the outset. This decision was based partly on the outcome of the discussions at Ophrah (see below). An area of land is undergoing preparation for the establishment of the first 75 units of permanent housing. Everyone pays IL100,000 ($1,500) towards the cost of maintaining and expanding the settlement infrastructure.

At first, the Kedumim settlers had wanted to expand into an urban settlement. However, with the establishment of other Jewish settlements in the region, it was realized that others were better placed to develop in this way, at least in theory. Furthermore, it was understood that by accepting the new Yishuv Kehillati type of rural settlement, they would be able to undertake their initial development faster than in an urban settlement due to the possibility of immediate aid from the Settlement Department.

Chapter Six
6.4.2 Ophrah.

The outline for long term development at Ophrah was drawn up as early as October 1977 (55). This reflects the unofficial recognition of the Yishuv Kehillati concept by the Settlement Department immediately following the government legalization of the settlement in July 1977.

By means of private initiative since 1975, the settlement had expanded its framework. The settlers drew their water by means of attaching a feeder to the 12" pipe which led from Ein Samua to Ramallah. Their electricity came from the East Jerusalem network by means of a transformer.

1. Population.

In October 1977, the settlement consisted of 39 families, including 109 children. There were also 22 single adults. The proposals for development planned for a final population of 250 families (Table 6.1). This would eventually mean 1,500 people, since the religious settlements throughout Israel assume an average of six children per family. It was proposed to absorb twenty new families per year, thus reaching the final target within ten years (including absorption of its own second generation). However, this ideal absorption rate would be limited by the availability of employment opportunities and sufficient housing.

By December 1980, the settlement had grown to 75 families,
including 230 children, plus 35 single adults (56). The average age of the settlers is 32, with the oldest being 60. Of the 230 children, 120 are below age 6, 85 are between the ages of 6 and 14, while the remainder are between 14 and 18 (high school age). There are also 20 part-time students at the local ulpan (college for immigrants to learn Hebrew). These people study for half of the day and work on the settlement for the other half. Apart from this small group, all the residents are full Israeli citizens, of which ten families were originally immigrants. Only four families have left the settlement of their own accord since its establishment in 1975, and two of these left to help establish other Gush Emunim settlements in Samaria. No family, once accepted by the absorption committee, has subsequently been expelled. The growth rate fell short of the proposed one, not due to the shortage of applicants but due to the lack of sufficient land for physical expansion, allowing three-quarters of a dunam for each family unit in addition to the land for agriculture, industry, communal offices and shops, and the existing temporary accommodation. The settlement was located on an area of 270 dunams, mostly confiscated Jordanian land. The original intention was to increase this area to only 400 dunams and it was this that led the settlers at Ophrah to be in the forefront of the 1979 demonstrations aimed at securing more land for the Gush Emunim settlements (see Chapter Three). Indeed, in 1979, Ophrah had closed its waiting lists to potential new settlers due to this lack of space. Instead, they had helped
form a new settler group known as Garin Ophrah B, which settled the nearby location of Cochav Hashachar in September 1980. With the expected completion of the first 50 permanent houses by March 1981, on part of the original area reserved for that purpose, it was hoped to be able to immediately absorb new families in the temporary accommodation that would be vacated.

2. Employment.

In 1977 the Ophrah labour force numbered 67, 24 of whom derived their income from their original jobs in Jerusalem to which they continued to commute daily. Another 20 people were involved in the services of the community (including schoolteachers), 12 worked in the educational institutions catering for outside groups (ulpan, field school) while the remaining fifteen were engaged in establishing some small-scale industry - the major ones being an aluminium ladder manufacturing factory, textile printing, and a computer service (Table 6.3). The 1977 development proposals (57) spoke of the continued consolidation of these industries until they became viable concerns. New developments would consist of the expansion of the textile printing works to employ 12 workers, a second carpentry shop, and the expansion of the computer service to employ 12 to 15 workers. The remaining enterprises consisted of a 40 dunam agricultural area, comprising cherry and peach orchards, a field school run in co-operation with the Nature Protection Society, and another
TABLE 6.3.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA OF EMPLOYMENT</th>
<th>NO. OF WORKERS 1977</th>
<th>NO. OF WORKERS 1980</th>
<th>EXTRA INFORMATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>INDUSTRY &amp; SERVICES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reception Aluminum</td>
<td>1 owner + 4 workers</td>
<td>1 owner + 7 workers</td>
<td>Export to S. Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(4 from Jerusalem)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reception Ophra (metalshop)</td>
<td>1 owner + 1 worker</td>
<td>1 owner + 1 worker</td>
<td>Local demand.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpentry shop</td>
<td>1 owner</td>
<td>2 owners</td>
<td>Orders from Jerusalem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silk screening &amp;</td>
<td>1 owner + 2 workers</td>
<td>2 owners + 9 workers</td>
<td>Production for national market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>textile printing,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(5 from Jerusalem)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer services</td>
<td>14 owners</td>
<td>14 owners + 8 workers</td>
<td>Largest private computer works in Israel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISRAEL metal</td>
<td>12 owners + 6 workers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>framworks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(all from Jerusalem)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second carpentry shop</td>
<td>1 owner + 1 worker</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronic parts</td>
<td>1 owner</td>
<td></td>
<td>Produces automatic motors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surveyors office</td>
<td>1 owner + 3 workers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Translators service</td>
<td>1 owner</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beehives</td>
<td>1 owner + 1 worker</td>
<td></td>
<td>Owner is from Jerusalem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AGRICULTURE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orchards</td>
<td>1 worker (part time)</td>
<td>3 workers</td>
<td>143 dunams of cherry &amp; peach orchards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicken runs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Under construction - Jan 1981.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INSTITUTIONS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field School</td>
<td>17 teachers</td>
<td>18 teachers</td>
<td>School groups and tourists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 helpers</td>
<td>4 helpers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational seminary</td>
<td>2 administration</td>
<td>12 administration</td>
<td>Aided by Ministry of Education.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ulpan for immigrants</td>
<td>14 teachers &amp;</td>
<td>12 administration</td>
<td>Students work half-day on settlement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12 administration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PUBLIC SERVICES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational</td>
<td>11 teachers &amp;</td>
<td>18 teachers &amp;</td>
<td>Schooling up to age 14.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 administration</td>
<td>12 administration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlement admin</td>
<td>5 workers</td>
<td>6 workers</td>
<td>Daily administration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General services</td>
<td>2 workers</td>
<td>2 workers</td>
<td>Shop, post office.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gush Emunim admin</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Work in other settlements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15 workers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>COMMUTING</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All employment</td>
<td>124 workers</td>
<td>147 workers</td>
<td>Mostly to Jerusalem.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>157 workers</td>
<td>158 workers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
educational institute, concerned with informal education for children of high school age, run in conjunction with the Ministry of Education. These latter three were owned by the settlement as a whole.

The 1977 development proposals also aimed at an eventual balance in the labour force of 30% working in private industry located at the settlement, 30% in communally-owned agricultural plots, and 30% in the educational projects. This latter sector plays an important part in both Kedumim and Ophrah and reflects the aims of Gush Emunim as laid out in their manifesto (Appendix One). In this document, they emphasize that settlements are only part of their overall objectives of reintroducing a sense of mission and pioneering into Zionism which, they argue, no longer exists. The high proportion of teachers within the Gush settlements allows them to set up informal education projects to further this aim. Ophrah wants to expand its educational sector, although there are some members who argue that less emphasis should be placed on this and more on industrial expansion.

Overall, the implementation of these proposals would bring the level of commuting to work in Jerusalem down from 40% to 10%. Nevertheless, the proposals made mention of the fact that commuting would probably remain higher, while agriculture would not expand to 30% due to the limited availability of agricultural land.

The industrial enterprises underwent much expansion, so that by December 1980 (Table 6.3) 65% of the workforce were employed...
in the settlement itself, the rest continuing to commute to Jerusalem. Some 111 people now worked in the settlement, including all the single adults. Of these, four of the partners/owners of firms and another sixteen workers commuted daily from Jerusalem to Ophrah. In addition, there were the workers in the community services (secretariat, shop etc.) No Arab labour was employed. Preference was given to settlers arriving between 1977-1980 who undertook to set up industry at Ophrah itself, or to get a job in the existing framework within three years. To implement this, factories were established on a two-and-a-half dunam area in 1980, and four chicken runs were built, which would be taken over by the settlers. The computer service agency was owned by four partners, of whom one lived outside Ophrah but owned 50% of the company. It employed another 8 people and is the largest private computer service agency in Israel. The other major factory is the silk screening and textile printing works. This is run by an Ophrah resident, who was an official in the Education Department of the Jerusalem City Council and a youth and community leader before he came to the West Bank. He retrained so as to be able to open up industry in Ophrah itself. Other enterprises to have opened since 1977 include a second carpentry shop, a metalwork factory, an accountancy service and a translation service. All these factories and service agencies are privately owned. The private entrepreneurs in any of the Gush Emunim settlements can receive loans of up to IL650,000 ($9,000) per partner from the Settlement

Chapter Six
Department of the World Zionist Organisation, to help them establish new enterprises. These loans have been granted to all present owners of approved enterprises in Gush Emunim settlements. This is applicable to all areas designated as Development Status A in Israel. In Ophrah, the settlement itself is prepared to grant additional loans in return for securities, but this is not the case on most Yishuv Kehillati settlements.

3. Housing.
A major development, of significance for all Yishuv Kehillati type settlements, has been the question of permanent housing. The initial stages of any new settlement are always carried out in small, temporary accommodation, supplied by the Settlement Department and rented by the settlers. The eventual permanent housing is built by the Housing Ministry and/or (in urban settlements) by private contractors. In the urban areas, the Housing Ministry then sells the completed houses to the private buyers. In the rural settlements, where they are the only builders, they build to an accepted rural standard of 68 square metres. These are not sold privately to the settlers, but are handed over by the Settlement Department for as long as the settler remains there. In moshavim, the settler has to pay back, but only at a very nominal rate of interest and only after 25 years. The settlers at Ophrah wanted the Housing Ministry to build their homes at the larger urban standards. Alternatively, they wished to be able to hire private contractors to build under
the 'Build Your Own Home' scheme (58). However, since the settlement was now under the auspices of the Settlement Department of the World Zionist Organisation, the Housing Ministry decided to begin building to the usual rural standards, with the object of allocating houses to the settlers, without any private buyers rights, as is done in the kibbutzim and moshavim.

The settlers opposed this move, and at a meeting with the Housing Minister in May 1978, an agreement was reached whereby the infrastructure of the settlement would be developed to urban standards, with the settlement receiving a loan to cover the difference in costs between the standard of urban and rural infrastructure. Furthermore, the type of housing could be chosen by the Ophrah residents within the design frameworks of the 'Build Your Own Home' scheme. However, since it was realized that not every one could afford to pay for the higher standard, and that building only to the rural standard would be retrogressive in pursuing the objectives of the Yishuv Kehillati, it was eventually agreed that the Housing Ministry would build to rural specifications, but each settler would have the option of paying for specifically designed extensions to the initial framework. Each settler would buy the original house from the Housing Ministry, as in urban places.

Out of this, there developed the standards of housing for all Yishuv Kehillati settlements. A memorandum from the settlement movement of Gush Enunim (Amanah) indicated that there would be two ways by which Yishuv Kehillati housing would be built (59).

Chapter Six
Either settlers could opt to have private contractors build their houses under the 'Build Your Own Home' scheme, or they would buy a house built by the Housing Ministry. There would be no allocation of houses as in kibbutzim and moshavim. Every settler would have to buy his own house, thus emphasizing the private and individualist nature of the Yishuv Kehillati concept.

In Ophrah, each family also has to pay a sum of IL10,000 ($140) every three months (linked to the cost of living index) into a central fund, to cover the maintenance of the community infrastructure. The settlers also have to pay taxes, at normal municipal rates, for the maintenance of the administrative and cultural services. The settlement collects these taxes in addition to a municipal grant which is received from the Ministry of Interior. Costs are high per capita in these settlements due to their geographical isolation from the Jewish population centres, and because of the price of providing advanced services to a small population. Also, each private firm pays the settlement rent for the use of the factory premises, which are owned by the community. However, this is virtually the only community intervention in economic affairs; even the agricultural plots of land, which were started by the settlement as a whole, are to be sold off in fifteen dunam plots to private settlers during 1981. Similarly, the four chicken breeding houses, established in January 1981, will also be privately owned.
6.5 The Yishuv Kehillati As A Viable Settlement Medium

These two case studies are indicative of the way that the Yishuv Kehillati type of settlement is evolving. Although general principles now exist for all Yishuv Kehillati settlements, the emphasis on individualism and private initiative within this framework lead to distinctive variations between settlements. Thus, in Ophrah, the Agudah (settlement union) is more prepared to enforce the rule requiring inhabitants to work within the village. Therefore, they help individuals set up their own factories with additional loans over and above those given by the Settlement Department. However, in Kedumim, the settlement is not prepared to offer this extra help, and the private entrepreneurs have to be able to find the necessary funds elsewhere. Thus, although the Yishuv Kehillati is required, by law, to have a union which runs the affairs of the settlement and to which all residents must belong, it only really operates in the social sphere, with regard to the acceptance of new members, rules concerning religious behaviour, pollution and other matters of community concern. Nevertheless, the union is legally able to make decisions concerning any issue whatsoever, even economic, providing the majority of members agree (60). It is this power, plus the limitation on the growth of the size of the Yishuv Kehillati, which most strongly links it to the traditional rural
settlement types of the Jewish Agency Settlement Department.

By the end of 1980, industrial infrastructure was being laid out in all the existing settlements. In Eilon Moreh, an industrial area of 1.2 dunams, including factory buildings was being prepared. Even in Beit El, where there is a strong commuting tendency with little indication of change, there is a toy factory and a cosmetics factory in production, while an industrial area of .6 of a dunam is being prepared to accommodate three to six factories. Some of the settlers in the Adumim region, including those at Kefar Adumim, Mitzpeh Yericho, and Vered Yericho, will have jobs at the large Mishor Adumim industrial area. Similarly, a few settlers from Ophrah and Beit El, in the Ramallah district, work in the Atarot industrial area to the north of Jerusalem, next to the local airport. An industrial area to serve the northern Samaria settlements is also under construction opposite the settlement of Karnei Shomron.

An inventory of the proposed immediate investment by the World Zionist Organisation Settlement Department in industrial, agricultural and service employment for the Yishuv Kehillati settlements in the Jerusalem region for 1980/81 show a figure of nearly IL150,000,000 ($2 million) (Table 6.4) (61).

The minor details concerning the establishment of new factories differ from one Yishuv Kehillati to another. In most cases, outside partnerships (i.e., by non-settlers) can not exceed 50% of the ownership. Any factory employing over ten workers has to register as a limited company. In most settlements, the
### TABLE 6.4

PROPOSED INDUSTRIAL INVESTMENT IN YISHUV KEHILLATIS IN THE JERUSALEM REGION 1981/82.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SETTLEMENT</th>
<th>INVESTMENT</th>
<th>NO. OF ENTERPRISES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tekoa</td>
<td>IL25,650,000</td>
<td>Six</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mitzpeh Yericho</td>
<td>IL21,000,000</td>
<td>Seven</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kefar Adumim</td>
<td>IL27,800,000</td>
<td>Nine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chadashah</td>
<td>IL14,300,000</td>
<td>Six</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beit El</td>
<td>IL 2,000,000</td>
<td>Three</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ophrah</td>
<td>IL16,750,000</td>
<td>Eleven *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rimonim</td>
<td>IL14,000,000</td>
<td>Three</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cochav Hashachar</td>
<td>IL14,000,000</td>
<td>Three</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shiloh</td>
<td>IL 8,000,000</td>
<td>Two</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tappuah</td>
<td>IL 2,200,000</td>
<td>Four</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>IL45,700,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>Fifty four</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Most of the enterprises at Ophrah were already underway. Thus, there was less investment proposed per unit.

For currency exchange rates, see Appendix VII.
Source: Memo of the WZO Settlement Department, July 1980 (55).
settlement union has a specified percentage of the voting power in factory affairs when they relate to major issues, such as a change of ownership, or the closing down of a factory. The union owns the premises used by any factory, and receives a rent for such use.

General guidelines are also in existence concerning the permanent housing (62). Amanah (the settlement movement of Gush Emunim) has instituted a rule obliging all settlers within their settlement network to purchase their own house, whether it is built under the "Build Your Own Home" scheme or by the Housing Ministry. In more recent settlements, ways have been found to speed up the transfer from the stage of temporary accommodation to that of the permanent housing, so that a foothold can be established more quickly in the West Bank. Thus, in both Eilon Moreh and Shavei Shomron, the temporary houses have been erected in such a way as to allow them to be eventually joined together in pairs, by means of building an extra room in the middle. It is hoped that this will cut down on the use of resources for only temporary housing, while in time it will enable the settlers themselves to acquire a house at a cost of only IL750,000 ($1,000) (63). The optimal construction density for urban zone housing, recognised by the Housing Ministry, is 4 families per dunam (gross). The present day figure in Israeli towns is considerably higher than this optimum. Assumptions for rural housing was for one apartment per dunam (64). Thus, the settlers with their urban occupations are able to acquire housing at rural densities.

Chapter Six
Housing density in Israel is becoming polarized. Whereas in the Yishuv Kehillati each family is allocated an area of three-quarters of a dunam, in the new urban suburbs, such as Ramot and Giloh, there are between six to eight families per dunam (65).

Apart from the two basic elements of housing and industry, there remain many uncertainties as to the way these settlements will continue to develop. A major problem concerns the question of whether an artificial limitation on growth can be imposed on a settlement based on a free enterprise economy (see Fig 5.2). Although the Yishuv Kehillati may develop strong internal social and community ties by being limited to a growth maximum of 250 families, the small private firms will be unable to expand to a size enabling large cost savings, due to a shortage of labour and the lack of facilities for similar concerns to be established nearby. This is particularly the case in those settlements furthest away from the main Israeli population concentrations, in that they will be unable to hire Jewish labour, a central part of the Gush Emunim philosophy. One answer to this is the development of regional industrial centres, drawing labour from a few settlements in the area and enabling the growth of larger enterprises, such as in the Mishor Adumim and Karnei Shomron industrial areas. Today however, all the industry is small scale, with no factory employing more than fifteen workers. This is emphasized in the case of Shavei Shomron, a settlement which places a large emphasis on the need for home production. This

Chapter Six
settlement had an employment structure, in July 1980, of a carpentry shop and computer works, both with two workers; agriculture, with four workers; a field school, with ten workers; fourteen teachers and a secretariat of six. All the other activities (cafe, small shop, diamond cutting, & sewing shop) were one worker concerns.

Thus, to attain a real economic base, these settlements will have to grow, in accordance with the Gush Emunim political settlement plans. However, growth necessitates land on which to expand, and the Gush argue that their settlements are unable to grow because the government are not prepared to confiscate private Arab land on their behalf. Following the demonstrations against this lack of land in October 1979, the government allocated another 4,500 dunams, claimed to be 'State land', to these settlements. Nevertheless, this was allocated to seven different settlements, and did not represent anything like the Gush demands. The Kedumim development plan contains a detailed list of necessary land requirements in all stages of development and arrives at a gross minimum figure of 748 dunams for a settlement of 250 families, without any extra open spaces or room for new expansion. Similarly, the plan for Kefar Adumim details a minimum of 680 dunams (66). Apart from the land being unavailable in political terms, it is also unavailable in topographical terms, in that the rocky hills can not always be built upon. Until recently, the traditional rural settlement buildings have never been built on a slope of more than
one-and-a-half metres in ten. However, the settlement activity under implementation in the Judea/Samaria region and in the Galilee mountains, requires a revision of these accepted planning levels, due to the steep slopes involved (67).

The Yishuv Kehillati has an "acceptance committee", like all other rural settlements, responsible for accepting new members into the community. This committee comprises members of the settlement itself, representatives from the settlement movement (usually Amanah), and a professional sociologist from the Settlement Department of the World Zionist Organisation. However, unlike other settlement types, a person cannot be accepted unless he has guaranteed employment. The community do not accept a person and then promise to allocate him work as is done in kibbutzim and moshavim. If the candidate is prepared to establish a new factory, or is willing to continue to commute to his job in town, the problem does not arise. This problem of providing employment will be a major one in the newer settlements. Whereas in the cases of Ophrah and Kedumim, the settlers were made up of established families with resources and factories of their own, some of the newer settlements are being established by younger settlement groups, straight out of the army and/or university. In such cases, the means of production have to be supplied by the Settlement Department, and this could lead to a return to more centralized control by the latter body. In such cases, it would be hard to differentiate between the organizational frameworks of an Industrial Village and a Yishuv

Chapter Six
Kehillati, in terms of use of private resources and ownership of the means of production. But this could change over time, as settlers in the Yishuv Kehillati would be able eventually to buy their ownership from the Settlement Department as they build up private resources of their own.

Some of the Yishuv Kehillati settlements originally attempted to form a mixed community, containing both religious and non-religious inhabitants. This has not happened in any moshav or kibbutz framework, where the standards of the community are laid down according to the religious or secular make-up of the inhabitants. It has hitherto been accepted by the Israeli settlement planners, that a small community would not be able to survive the social tensions of both religious and non-religious inhabitants living in the same closed environment. In some Yishuv Kehillati settlements, such as in Mitzpeh Yericho, this mixing experiment did not work, and the settlers eventually split into two groups, one of which settled at Vered Yericho in 1980. In other cases, such as in Beit Choron, Kefar Adunim and Ma'aleh Shomron, the experiment is continuing. In the case of Kefar Adunim, a specific protocol has been drawn up to define the expected standards of behaviour. This will necessitate the acceptance by the secular inhabitants of the prohibition of work on the Sabbath and religious festivals, and the education of their children in religious schools.

Finally, the co-operative nature of Israeli rural settlement has always meant that should a wage earner become ill or die, his
family is cared for by the community. In a free enterprise urban economy, this can not be the case. Ophrah has become the first settlement to attempt to solve this problem by establishing a 'mutual aid' fund, to which all members of the settlement have to contribute fixed sums, and from which, families in need could be helped should the circumstances arise.

Overall, it has been seen that both Ophrah and Kedumim have developed to a point where they can no longer physically expand as planned, and their small scale industrial and agricultural enterprises will remain small in the immediate future. The various settlements each display their own characteristics, but the newer they are, the more they rely on the subsidies and grants of the Settlement Department. Nevertheless, there are waiting lists for many of these settlements, particularly those near the Israeli population concentrations of the coastal plain, due to the demand by many of the middle class to escape the crowded, noisy towns, without having to accept too many social or individual restrictions that the kibbutzim and moshavim would impose upon them. Although these people are prepared to live in the West Bank and thus support Israeli retention of this region, they are not necessarily political diehards as are the inhabitants of the earliest Gush Emunim settlements, who physically defied government authority in their bid to settle.

Thus, the Yishuv Kehillati settlement type has developed by means of two contradictory factors. Although based on a free enterprise and individualistic system within the settlement
itself, the political interests have meant that the major growth of these settlements, since 1977, has taken place within a framework of high government subsidies. The real economic viability of such settlements in terms of being able to develop and sustain their own investment and growth, can only be tested by removing the artificial subsidies which result from the role of planning in Israel in general, and the West Bank situation in particular. Whether the settlements will reach this stage of viability within the next ten years, depends largely upon the ability of Gush Emunim to continue to attract new settlers on the one hand, and the agreement of the Israeli government to continue to help subsidise these settlements in both monetary and political terms in the immediate short to medium time-span. This latter factor includes the allocation of more land to these settlements, necessarily Arab land, to these settlements so that they will be able to expand. Such a policy, in turn, would lead to more political confrontation with the Palestinians. A policy of non-expansion would lead to political confrontation with Gush Emunim and other settlement activists.
REFERENCES

1. Ha'aretz, Jerusalem Post, Ma'ariv, Yediot Achronot. 27/7/77.
5. Genesis, Chap 34.
8. Judges, chap 8, Verse 31; Chap 9, Verse 1.
10. a) I Kings, Chap 12, Verse 6.
    b) II Chronicles, Chap 10, Verse 16.
16. II Kings, Chap 17.
    c) Joshua. Chap 19, Verse 51.

Chapter Six
19. I Samuel, Chap 4, Verse 1, 18.


21. The Madaba Map was a sixth century mosaic map representing the Holy Land and the neighbouring countries. It was discovered in 1884, during the erection of a new Greek Orthodox Church in Madaba (now in Jordan). The main area covered by the mosaic is from Neapolis (Nablus) in the north, to Egypt in the south. It notes many names unrecorded elsewhere and provides evidence for the existence of many old Jewish sites.


   b) Joshua, Chap 18, Verse 13.
   c) Judges, Chap 1, Verse 23.

26. Genesis, Chap 12, Verse 8; Chap 13, Verse 3.

27. Genesis, Chap 28, Verse 11.


29. Judges, Chap 20, Verse 18 & 26; Chap 21, Verse 2.

30. a) I Kings, Chap 12, Verse 29.
    b) II Kings, Chap 2, Verse 2.

31. II Kings, Chap 23, Verse 15.

32. Joshua, Chap 18, Verse 23.


34. Keshet was established by politically motivated squatters in the region of Kuneitra on the Golan Heights. For a full account of this settlement, see Harris, W.W. (1978), appendix on Keshet.

Chapter Six
35. 6/6/74. Ha'aretz, Jerusalem Post, Ma'ariv, Yediot Achronot.
36. 26/7/74-7/78/74. Ha'aretz, Jerusalem Post, Ma'ariv, Yediot Achronot.
37. 9/10/74-13/10/74. Ha'aretz, Jerusalem Post, Ma'ariv, Yediot Achronot.
38. 14/10/74. Ha'aretz, Jerusalem Post, Ma'ariv, Yediot Achronot.
39. 15/10/74. Ha'aretz, Jerusalem Post, Ma'ariv, Yediot Achronot.
40. 17/10/74. Ha'aretz, Jerusalem Post, Ma'ariv, Yediot Achronot.
41. 20/3/75. Ha'aretz, Jerusalem Post, Ma'ariv, Yediot Achronot.
42. 30/11/75; 1/12/75-8/12/75. Ha'aretz, Jerusalem Post, Ma'ariv, Yediot Achronot.
43. Zevulun Hammer was a leader of the so called 'young guard' of the National Religious Party. This was a faction within the party which was formed immediately before the Yom Kippur War of 1973, arguing for a tougher party line on the issue of settlement and territories. Its leaders, Hammer and Yehudah Ben-Meir, took part in the initial establishment of Gush Etzion.
44. 9/12/75. Ha'aretz, Jerusalem Post, Ma'ariv, Yediot Achronot.
45. 2/5/76-11/5/76; 21/6/76. Ha'aretz, Jerusalem Post, Ma'ariv, Yediot Achronot. (Cabinet discussion).
46. In fact, all these three locations are settlements today, and all eventually started off as Gush Etzion settlements. However, the later designation of Mes'ha (now known as Elkanah) as an urban centre, meant that it passed over to the hands of the Housing Ministry, rather than remaining part of the Gush Etzion 'small' settlement network.
47. 24/3/76. Ha'aretz, Jerusalem Post, Ma'ariv, Yediot Achronot.

Chapter Six
48. Rabinovich, A. 24/6/77 'Ma'aleh Adumim is beginning to take shape', Jerusalem Post.

49. 14/10/74 'Kollek: Government willing to send heavy industry to Ma'aleh Adumim', Jerusalem Post.

50. Segal, M. 12/1/75 'Cabinet to vote Ma'aleh Adumim funds over leftist objections', Jerusalem Post.

51. Rabinovich, A. 24/6/77 op cit.

52. 20/6/77 'Full fledged settlement for Ma'aleh Adumim', Jerusalem Post.

53. For an article depicting the non existing relationships between the Jewish settlers and the neighbouring Arab villagers, see Habakuk, Y. 29/6/79 'Neighbours without neighbourliness', Ha'aretz. pp 15-17.


56. This figure of single adults was higher than in most settlements in the West Bank.


Chapter Six

63. This exceptionally low price is due to the fact that 80% of the permanent house will be made up from the original temporary housing sections. These are given to any new settlement by the Settlement Department.


65. Interview with Mr. Yossi Naim, employee of the Branch for Physical Planning, Jewish Agency Settlement Department. 10/6/79.


67. Interview with Mr. Yossi Naim, op cit.
7.1 The State Of The Planning Process.

The development of settlement planning within Israel has been one of the most important features of the Jewish State. The reality of the regional frameworks, as expressed in the composite rural structure, and the settlement types of the kibbutzim and the moshavim have been used as examples by many developing countries. The changes brought about by the 1967 and 1973 wars, and the subsequent development of Gush Emunim and the Yishuv Kehillati type of settlement, as analysed here, have led to changes in the traditional power bases of the settlement planning establishment. This chapter analyses the wider effects of the recent settlement planning and its relationship to the political future of the West Bank settlements.

7.1.1 Planning and Reality.

Various generalised models of public planning have been described in attempts to explain the processes at work in regional planning. Lindblom (1959) has put forward the theory of disjointed incrementalism, having termed it the 'science of
muddling through' (1). He saw this as constituting an antithesis to the concept of rational comprehensive planning (2). This latter model involves an attempt to plan for an end product by means of rational and comprehensive stages, in which all possible alternative courses of action are rigorously evaluated against the defined goals, these representing the concensus goals of society. Lindblom's model of disjointed incrementalism disputes the assumptions upon which the rational comprehensive model is based, namely that man has infinite intellectual qualities, that problems can be precisely defined, and that there is always total public concensus. Lindblom argues that, in fact, choice is based on incremental change at the margin by means of 'pushing forward' from the present rather than 'working back' from the future. The methods used to implement plans adjust over time as circumstances change, their nature depending largely on the results of bargaining and compromise between the various pressure groups and power interests. Thus,

"the holding and manipulation of power is a critical factor of disjointed incrementalism, with all the connotations which that implies" (3).

This process is inherently dynamic, dealing with the problems as they occur.

Faludi (1973) argues that any particular planning situation will be located somewhere along a continuum between these two planning extremes (4). Thus, in the case of settlement in the West Bank Highlands, there exist a number of settlement plans which relate to the required end result, as in a rational

Chapter Seven
comprehensive plan. But these plans do not represent a total public consensus and their detailed figures are not always based on rational analysis. Their implementation is carried out by means of incremental establishment of new settlements, as and when pressure is exerted by Gush Emunim, to combat the problems as they perceive them (5).

The subjective, non-rational input in this process is related to the historical and religious arguments upon which the Gush lay claim to the Judea and Samaria region of the West Bank. According to Isaac (1960),

"the geography of religion is the study of the part played by the religious motive in man's transformation of the landscape. It presumes the existence of a religious impulse in man which leads him to act upon his environment in a manner which responds secondarily, if at all, to any other need" (6).

Isaac explains that this emphasis on the religious factor means that great importance is attached to emotional and subjective elements in moulding the landscape, while rational factors are related to only secondarily. Such subjective factors are, in themselves, dependent on the way that any one group perceives the reality of the particular situation which concerns that group. Muir (1976) has noted that

"studies in perception are based on the fundamental fact that human decisions..... rely upon perspectives of reality which are always incomplete and frequently grossly inadequate. As reality exerts its influence on decisions made, these decisions must often be adjusted to take account of unperceived factors" (7).

It has been argued in this thesis that the Gush Emunim plans for widespread settlement in the West Bank, together with those

Chapter Seven
of Drobless and Sharon, are part of this emotional process of decision making, with roots in the religious and historic background which relates to the connection between the Jewish people and the 'Land of Israel'. To this extent, the reality of the situation, in terms of detailed settlement planning and as it relates to the wider political level of the West Bank and Palestinian rights, have not always been taken into account. However, with the practical implementation of these settlement strategies, the real factors have come more into play, particularly at the planning level, leading to a slightly more rational planning as opposed to totally emotional and political statements.

At the macro level of the West Bank as a whole, Harris (1978) has noted that Israeli decision makers have persistently been over optimistic as regards the nations demographic resources available to carry out widespread settlement projects (8). This can be seen by an analysis of the major planning plans mentioned in this thesis. Both Gush Enunim and Sharon speak in terms of settlement of two million Jews over a twenty year period (9). Even on a smaller time scale, Drobless proposes the settlement of 150,000 Jews over a five year period (10), while the La'an plan (11) and the Defence Ministry concept (12) called for similar amounts (Table 3.1). The Housing Ministry plan for settlement of the 'Wider Jerusalem' area assumes an annual net immigration of 60,000 per annum (13). Professor Ra'anan Weitz, the joint head of the Jewish Agency Settlement Department, in attacking
this plan, has pointed out that in reality, net immigration is only likely to total 2,000 per annum, taking into consideration the present immigration realities and the growing emigration of Israelis to Western Europe and America.

Population estimates for the Jewish population in Israel by the end of the century vary. However, none of them project such a large scale net influx of Jews to the State by the year 2000, barring another catastrophe on the scale of the Nazi holocaust. The present immigration of Jews from the Soviet Union equals only 20% of those Jews receiving exit visas, the rest remaining in Western Europe or travelling to America. Bachi (1974) estimated the Jewish population of Israel in 1993 as between 3.5 to 4.6 million, depending upon the rate of immigration (14) (Table 7.1). Friedlander and Goldscheider (1979) have estimated similar figures for 1990 and have extended their projections to the year 2010, giving a range of from 3.8 to 6.4 million (15) (Table 7.2).

Thus, the actual prospects for fulfilling such grandiose settlement plans remains small. Furthermore, even the rapid establishment of settlements is not large when taken together with the natural growth rate of the Arab resident population of the West Bank. In January 1979, Sharon asserted that 3,000 people had settled in Samaria in the previous year and a further 300 in the Jordan Valley (16). A year later, it was noted that the 1979 total Jewish (non-urban) population in all the territories was 13,700 - only 2,400 more than the previous year. Including the urban settlements, the figure was 17,000 (17).
POPULATION ESTIMATES FOR ISRAEL.
(Bachi - 1974)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JEWISH POPULATION</th>
<th>NON-JEWISH POP</th>
<th>TOTAL POPULATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis of immigration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1973</th>
<th>1993</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2810.4</td>
<td>3558.1</td>
<td>4110.3</td>
<td>4645.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>497.1</td>
<td>1063.2</td>
<td>3307.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4621.3</td>
<td>5173.4</td>
<td>5708.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


TABLE 7.2

POPULATION ESTIMATES FOR ISRAEL.
(Friedlande & Goldscheider - 1979)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Predicted</th>
<th>Predicted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,561.6</td>
<td>3,307.7 - 4,327.3</td>
<td>3,809.4 - 5,443.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This is based on three immigration and three fertility assumptions, giving eight projections in these ranges.
The implementation of the overall settlement strategy also raises other problems. Abbu-Ayyash argues that early Israeli settlement planning used criteria related to the settlement itself only and not to the existing surrounding Arab settlement infrastructure (18). Thus, the maps of the settlement plans rarely show these existing Arab networks. Due to the political implications of the settlement strategy in the West Bank, which necessitates control over infrastructure, routes and land, totally new infrastructural links and settlement networks are being built. Thus, the new regional councils are concerned with the Jewish settlement only, and the logical extension of this is for the development of two separate settlement networks in the same area, maintaining little operational contact with each other.

At the micro level of the individual settlement, Hock (1979) has shown that new villages in Malaysia were initially conceived of as temporary measures for security strategy. However, as time has passed and these villages have remained as permanent structures, they have become begetters of other economic and administrative problems (19). Similarly, Kulkarni (1979) describes the cantonments in India, which were differentiated from the purely military camps in that they were planned to be more permanent and more stable, as being parasites in the strict economic sense (20). Thus, in addition to the opposition to the establishment of settlements in Judea/Samaria at the wider political level, there is also the argument that such a rapid
rate of establishment of many new settlements will beget long-term economic problems, particularly if, as mentioned in the previous chapter, they are unable to build up a large productive base of their own.

Brown & Albaun (1971) note that

"the type of settlement utilised at any particular time and, more important, the location of the settlement are very much related to the objectives of national policy" (21).

Although Israeli settlement locational policies have always been strongly guided by the political factor, the success of the kibbutzim and moshavim over the last forty years testify to the professional and rational planning factors which were in operation. Much of this has been due to the centralized control and allocation of available resources by the Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency. Nevertheless, the strong external political factors have led to the heavy subsidization of some settlements. Orni (1976) notes that as a rule, settlements designated as being in pioneering and outlying locations are altogether exempt from household fees over their initial settlement period (22). Such settlements take a relatively longer period of time to reach a state of self sufficiency based on their own ability to produce goods and create wealth. Nevertheless, it is official government policy that even settlements established in largely political locations and with heavy subsidies, have to reach a stage of self sufficiency. If this were not the case, the government could simply leave a unit of soldiers in each location, thus requiring much less capital.
investment but still providing the perceived military and security function (23). The mass settlement of the 1950 period, which witnessed the hurried establishment of many settlements with large government subsidies, ensured that it would take about 20 years for any settlement to reach a stage of self sufficiency. Those settlements established in the 1960's and early 1970's (of which there were only a few, but more comprehensively planned) mostly became self sufficient in ten years. The current situation, which is witnessing the establishment of many settlements in as short a time as possible, may again result in them taking a long period to reach a self sufficient stage. This, in turn, will necessitate continued expenditure of limited national resources to sustain these settlements through this period (24).

7.1.2 Resource Allocation.

Newton (1972) has noted that

"like the individual, local and central government must operate within resource constraints, although these constraints tend to depend upon what is politically acceptable as much as what is academically feasible" (25).

Newton identifies three levels of decision making in the public sector. At the highest level, the allocation of resources is guided by political ideals on such national issues as defence, social welfare and education. An analysis of this allocation can
only be made by studying political objectives and priorities, not by a quantification of economic costs and benefits. National policies can produce acceptable economic costs. To understand such allocation decisions, political ideology has to be examined — in this case being the various Zionist ideologies resulting from different understandings of Judaism, Jewish history and the overall Jewish experience.

At the lowest level of Newton's hierarchy of decision making, resource allocation is governed by an analysis of alternative technical choices in which the costs and benefits can be quantified in economic terms.

The middle level of the decision making process is concerned with the allocation of resources within the nationally accepted political objectives. Newton notes that cost-benefit analysis can play an important role at this level since it brings a "more rational approach to resource allocation based on consideration of all the relevant costs and benefits" (26).

The issue of settlement in Israel falls into the middle and higher levels of this decision making process. It has been seen that there is a long established consensus within Israel that civilian settlements play a major role in the national defence policy. The role played by settlement in the pre-State era was that of laying claim to areas of territory to be incorporated into a future Jewish State. This was done by means of establishing a physical, permanent, civilian presence in these areas. In the period from 1948 to 1967, the national settlement
policy consisted of establishing new villages along the border areas in the north, and in the unsettled Negev in the south. Following the Six Day War of June 1967, other areas came under consideration. These were the Golan Heights, the Jordan Valley and the Sinai Peninsula. Settlements were established in these areas on the basis of providing 'defensible' boundaries. This was coupled with the recognition, by the Labour government, that all such settlement activity should be located away from the areas of dense Arab population concentrations.

Such a policy induced criticism from both sides of the political spectrum. On the left were those who demanded the return of all territories as a basis for peace, while on the right were those who sought widespread settlement activity in these areas as a prelude to total annexation. Thus, with the election victory of 1977 by the right-wing Likud coalition, official policy moved towards the latter view. This has led to increased political conflict at the middle level of the decision making processes since it reflects differing attitudes to the meaning of secure boundaries and peace. The result of this conflict means that scarce resources will be allocated to one political viewpoint at the expense of the other.

Until May 1977, no official government funds were channelled to areas of the West Bank outside the confines of the Allon Plan. Following the Likud election victory of May 1977 and their subsequent recognition of existing and future Gush Emunim settlements, the treasury requested authorization for IL81
million ($5.3 million) to cover immediate consolidation and short-term expansion of the Gush settlements (27). Larger amounts were allocated over the next four years as the settlement network expanded. In December 1978, the Ministerial Committee on Budgeting the Strengthening of Settlements in the West Bank allocated IL300 million ($16 million) for immediate expenditure and another IL300 million for the current fiscal year to enable the building of an extra 430 housing units in Samaria and 200 in the Jordan Valley. The government also allocated IL60 million ($3 million) for the construction of a new east-west road through Samaria, known unofficially as the 'Sharon Highway' (28). During the following month, the Knesset finance committee approved budgets totalling IL741 million ($33.7 million) for the establishment of 390 new units 'across the green line' and for 'other work' in settling the West Bank (29). The consensus agreement reached at the end of 1979 between the various factions approving widespread settlement activity resulted in a joint government-World Zionist Organization committee approved plan, aimed at doubling the West Bank population in one-and-a-half years. This grandiose plan, necessitating the establishment of houses for 20,000 settlers in that period, would require an expenditure of IL10 billion ($250 million) (30). In the following February, it was reported that the government was to invest at least IL7.5 billion ($187.5 million) in the 'territories' during 1980 (31). It was stated that the establishment of each new settlement would cost IL100 million.
($2.5 million) (32). Although the Yishuv Kehillati type of settlement is less costly to establish than a totally new Industrial Village, all building in the West Bank remained costly due to the need for infrastructural investment, plus the fact that the standard of housing, although still in the temporary stages, was larger than in the normal new settlement catering for single adults or young marrieds.

These large budgetary allocations of limited national resources have been strongly criticised. Firstly, it is argued that such an emphasis on one particular area has led to the subsequent neglect of settlement and development in other national priority regions. These include the Galilee mountains, the Jordan Valley and the Golan Heights.

The importance of the Galilee is seen from the fact that there exists a special Knesset Committee on the Galilee as well as a special government Inter-Ministerial Committee which is chaired by the Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Tourism. Reports are presented to this latter committee by a Special Co-ordinator of Governmental Activities in the Galilee. An overall plan for the development of the Galilee was originally approved by Prime Minister Eshkol in 1966. However this was not implemented due to the intervention of the 1967 War and the subsequent redirection of national priorities. In the 1970's, there was renewed interest in the Galilee, as witnessed by a number of settlement plans and government pronouncements (33) concerning the future of this region. This was highlighted in 1976, following the Koenig
Memorandum (34) and the subsequent Arab unrest. The Segev and Tefen projects, outlined in Chapter Four, resulted from this period of activity. Nevertheless, although the Galilee has been continually affirmed by successive governments as constituting a priority area for new settlements and investment due to the Arab-Jewish population ratio in this region, those involved in implementing these plans argue that the resources which should have been allocated to the Galilee have been redirected to the West Bank. Katz and Menuhin (1978) further note that

"a view of the actual performance record in achieving five major national development goals reveals some serious lags in the Galilee" (35).

They relate this to the fact that there are too many national, regional and sub-regional plans, all concerned with the Galilee but often not systematically related to each other. This is compounded by the political allocation of resources away from the Galilee to other regions. In response to this criticism, Minister of Agriculture Sharon claimed that the demographic fears in the Galilee were misleading and that the Jewish ratio had improved (36). However, by the end of 1978, it was again accepted by the Likud government that the Galilee constituted an area of prime national concern, and a new programme of developing thirty outposts in strategic mountain locations was put into effect (37). Each of these outposts would consist of five to ten families in the initial stage. They would control the land in the immediate area in the short-term, in order to enable the establishment of permanent settlements in the same locations in

Chapter Seven
the long-term. It was due to the lack of resources that such permanent settlements could not be established immediately. The outposts represented only a fraction of the resources going to the West Bank, and this led the influential Association of American and Canadians in Israel (AACI) to pass a resolution at its 22nd national convention in March 1980, calling on the Israeli government

"to recognise that settling of the Galilee is as important as settlements elsewhere" (38).

The plans for settlement of the 'Wider Jerusalem' region (see Chapter Two) have also been brought into question, even though a national consensus exists concerning this area. The Mayor of Jerusalem, Mr. Teddy Kollek, together with municipal planners, claimed that the Housing Ministry Plan for suburban type settlements around Jerusalem would take resources away from the development of the city itself (39). He favoured the development of a compact capital city and argued that the Housing Ministry plan would lead to ribbon development. Similarly, Professor Ra'anana Weitz claimed that such a plan would divert resources away from the Galilee (40). In response to these criticisms, Housing Minister Ofer, claimed that it was necessary to have large population nuclei surrounding Jerusalem rather than the small Industrial Villages proposed by Weitz and the Settlement Department, and that, rather than detract from Jerusalem itself, such settlements would provide an extended commercial hinterland for the city (41).
Even before the publication of the Drobless and Gush Emunim settlement proposals in 1978, the heavy cost of new settlement was being felt. The Settlement Department plan for activities during the period 1978-82 (42) notes that in January 1978, 231 settlements were still in the care of the Jewish Agency and had not yet reached a stage of self sufficiency. Of these, 190 had been founded in the years of mass settlement in the 1950's, while the other 41 were all post-1967 settlements. It was expected that by 1982, 100 of these settlements would no longer need this care. Furthermore, the World Zionist Organisation had 100 new settlements under their care (28 still in the process of being established) and only fifteen of these were expected to have reached a stage of independence by 1982.

The overall strategy for settlement by the Settlement Departments of the Jewish Agency and the World Zionist Organisation for the period 1978-82 was for the establishment of 57 new settlements for 2,700 families; an addition of 5,470 families to existing or newly established settlements; and the attainment of self sufficiency by the 115 above mentioned settlements. Thus, by 1982, there would still be 273 settlements under 'care' of the Settlement Department. These would be composed of:

1. 90 from the mass settlement period of the 1950's;
2. 41 post-1967 Jewish Agency settlements within the 'green line';
3. 83 new WZO settlements over the 'green line'; and
4. 57 settlements to be established.

This strategy represented an attempt to implement national settlement policy within realistic constraints. However, the increased emphasis on Gush Emunim during 1978 and 1979 made the actual investment much higher. The national budget for Israel for 1980/81 included an amount of IL6,000 million ($85 million) for settlement. Of this, IL4,000 million ($56 million) was allocated to Judea & Samaria, IL1,000 million ($14 million) to other areas beyond the 'green line', and only IL1,000 million to all areas within the 'green line'. Including the separate amounts from the budgets of the individual ministries (Housing, Agriculture, Education, Interior etc;) that was also allocated to new settlements, a total of IL15,000 million ($210 million) is arrived at (43). The largest of the individual ministry budget allocations was that of the Housing Ministry, since they were obliged, by a government decision of 1979, to build 10,000 housing units per annum in Judea & Samaria at a cost of IL10,000 million ($140 million).

Weitz (1979) produced detailed statistics in an attempt to influence the government against continuing this policy (44). He shows that, according to all existing settlement plans, there is a need to build 6,032 new housing units in the immediate future (Table 7.3). This figure is based on the addition of 80-100 units in existing settlements; 50 units in each of the new settlements which were still classed as 'temporary'; and 100 units in each Yishuv Kehillati. Such building would require an
## TABLE 7.3

**BUILDING REQUIREMENTS IN NEW SETTLEMENTS.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Permanent Sites</th>
<th>Temporary Sites</th>
<th>Total to be built</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. of sites</td>
<td>Existing units</td>
<td>To be built</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golan Heights</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1144</td>
<td>628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galilee</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>557</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan Valley</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judea &amp; Samaria</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gush Etzion</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Line</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pitchat Shalom</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negev &amp; Aravah</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>72</strong></td>
<td><strong>1556</strong></td>
<td><strong>2632</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

overall budget of IL7,140 million ($204 million), with an average expenditure of IL750-850,000 ($20-23,000) on each standard housing unit. Furthermore, this figure is exclusive of any new infrastructural investment necessitated by these buildings. In addition, the establishment of the 57 new settlements would require a budget of $200 million per annum for building alone, while the actual promised budgetary allocation from the Housing Ministry for this purpose was only $65 million — a third of the required sum. Although the inhabitants in the Yishuv Kehillati settlements have to eventually buy their own homes, the houses have to be built with public expenditure first, and when they are sold it is with all the financial advantages that accrue in regions with the status of Development Area A. This entitles each private house purchaser to loans as follows:

— For a person who already owns a house:

*IL750,000* ($10,000) — of which IL400,000 ($6,000) does not have to be repaid if the settler stays for five years.

*+IL250,000* ($3,500) — which has to be paid back at 5% interest but is not linked to the cost of living index.

*+IL100,000* ($1,500) — which has to be paid back at 5% interest and is linked to the cost of living index.

— For a person without any flat of his own, the equivalent amounts are *IL1,125,000 + IL400,000 + IL450,000* (about $28,000 at January 1981 prices).

Thus, in Ophrah (see previous chapter), where all the settlers involved in the purchase of the first fifty permanent houses are
established families, having previously owned flats, the
government will have to subsidise them to an amount of IL55
million ($800,000), of which IL37.5 million ($500,000) will never
have to be repaid should the settlers stay for the prescribed
cfive year period. Were the settlement to expand to its full
complement of 250 families (allowing for 100 families to have
previously owned flats, and the other 100 families to be first
time buyers) the total initial subsidy would equal IL362.5
million ($5 million). If this were expanded to include all the
existing Jewish settlements in the West Bank, the sum would be of
vast proportions (45), and this is without taking into account
the 150% inflation rate and the other investment for
infrastructure and means of production. Nevertheless, the fact
that the settlements are not expanding to their maximum planned
intake, due to the lack of land in some places and the lack of
settlers in others, together with the fact that a Labour
government - if elected in June 1981 - will probably remove the
special area status and its subsidies from the West Bank highland
area, makes it difficult to predict accurate subsidy totals in
the long term.

At the beginning of 1980, it was reported that the plans for a
thousand more housing units in Judea and Samaria, the Gaza Strip
and the Golan Heights could only take place if the Ministerial
Economic Committee cancelled other national projects and used
those resources. As this would be an unlikely event, the
settlement plans seemed unlikely to be implemented in their

Chapter Seven
entirety (46).

The same problems are being encountered concerning investment for the means of production in these settlements. Weitz notes that the annual budget allocates IL1,250 million ($33 million) for this purpose. However, IL500 million ($14 million) of this sum is to be re-allocated to help make up the shortfall in the housing budget mentioned above. This would leave only IL750 million ($14 million). Of this sum, IL45.7 million ($3.5 million) was already allocated to just ten Yishuv Kehillati settlements in the Jerusalem region (see Chapter Six). Weitz estimates that the minimum necessary investment for providing adequate new means of production within the settlement proposals was IL1,700 million ($48 million). Thus, there is a total shortfall of IL950 million ($26 million). This shortfall would be reduced to IL800 million ($22.5 million) when taking into account the ten Yishuv Kehillati settlements in the Jerusalem region.

Finally, Weitz notes that of the 110 settlements established in the post-1967 period, 70 were in a bad financial state in 1979 (Table 7.4). In the following year Weitz produced a further paper (47) in which he stresses this point and argues that the gap between 'temporary' and 'permanent' settlements is growing, while there is no indication that the problem is being resolved. Whereas in 21 settlements in Judea and Samaria, mostly temporary, nearly IL10,000 million ($140 million) has been spent, there remain gaps in the implementation of the Jordan Valley plans and
### Table 7.4.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA</th>
<th>Kibbutzim</th>
<th>Moshavim</th>
<th>Kefatin</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golan Heights</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galil</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan Valley</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judea &amp; Samaria</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Line</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pitchat Shalom</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aravah &amp; Negev</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


A - Settlement with a strong economic base;
B - Settlement with weak economic base;
C - Settlement under preparation.
Stage Two of the plans for settlement on the Golan Heights has not been started (Table 7.5). Although there were a total of 43 groups waiting and prepared to settle in areas apart from the Judea and Samaria region, only two of these groups had places to go to - and these only in two years time - while sixteen of the groups who had already settled had been forced to live in the temporary accommodation for far longer than is usual. The remainder of these groups had no dates set and there is the fear that many of them will disband out of frustration at having to wait indefinitely. These groups would not be prepared to settle by means of illegal squatting.

Overall, Weitz argues that priorities must be redefined in national settlement planning strategy. Prime importance must be given to the eastern border (i.e., the Golan Heights and the Jordan Valley) and the Galilee. Settlement should be stopped in the Judea and Samaria region due to the scarcity of resources and because of the dense Arab population concentrations in the region.

Nevertheless, in a memorandum published simultaneously by Matityahu Drobless (48), it is argued that the current direction of settlement policy should be continued, as is laid out in his settlement plan of 1978 (Chapter Three). Drobless argues that twelve to fifteen settlements should be established annually in the next five years. He also claims that the Yishuv Kehillati settlements are developing successfully and that they may eventually coalesce into small towns.
TABLE 7.5.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Golan Heights</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galil</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan Valley</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gush Etzion</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bank</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Line</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza Strip</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rafiah</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pitchat</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shalom</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negev,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aravah</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yattir</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A second front on which the allocation of resources to the West Bank is criticised is that of the social welfare sector in Israel. With inflation currently at some 150% per annum, coupled with the many social problems of the development towns and particularly amongst the Oriental Jewish community, it is argued that more of the scarce national resources should be used to help alleviate these problems. Less should go towards the establishment of settlements for a sector of the population who have a good educational background and already possess both jobs and homes.

There have always been vast differences in the living standards of many of the European Jewish and Oriental Jewish communities in Israel. In the early years of the State, the need for internal unity in the face of external threat diminished the importance of these factors. Marmorstein (1949) has noted that unsatisfied claims of a nationalist nature often draw attention away from the social reforms necessary in the internal affairs of a society (49). The first protest at these socio-economic differentials occurred only in the late 1950's, while the Black Panther movement representing Israel's poor Oriental communities was a phenomenon of the late 1960's and early 1970's. The majority of the oriental immigrants were initially drawn towards urban life rather than to the utopian forms of rural settlement. Most of them were directed to the newly established development towns as industrial and local service workers. According to the Minority Rights Group Report of 1974, about 28-30% of all
Oriental immigrant families were housed with three or more persons per room, and 10% have four or more per room. The report estimates per capita income of this group to be, on average, as low as 54% of the average European wage. These disparities led to the formation of the Black Panther group in 1971 by a group of Moroccan youths aged 19-22 (50).

The resources required for new settlement projects, with all the necessary infrastructure, is seen as having a detrimental effect on the allocation of funds toward alleviating some of these poverty problems. In 1973, Pinchas Sapir, the head of the Jewish Agency and former Minister of Finance, opposed Moshe Dayan's plan to build a town at Yamit. He argued that the required investment for this project would undercut that for the development towns (51). In 1975, Sapir alleged that funds amounting to IL10 million ($1.4 million), earmarked for the establishment of the Ma'aleh Adumim industrial area, would be diverted from the northern development towns (52). Under the policies of the Likud Government, the IL81 million ($5.5 million) requested by the treasury in December 1977 for the Gush Emunim settlements was equivalent to a fifth of the sum proposed to be cut from social welfare in the next budget (53).

It can be further argued that not only is this a disproportionate allocation of scarce national resources, but that in some cases the new settlements contain empty accommodation, while there is much sub-standard accommodation in the poorer areas of the major Israeli towns. Thus (in July

Chapter Seven
1977), early in the Likud government's term of power, Labour Member of Knesset, Mr. Yosef Sarid, argued that the proposals for settlement put forward by the La'am faction to settle 150,000 people in West Bank towns (54) should not go ahead in consideration of the fact that the urban quarter of Kiryat Arba contained 500 empty flats (55). It must be noted that this situation of empty accommodation no longer applied by 1980.

The protest from these quarters was brought to public prominence with two incidents in 1979 & 1980. In November 1979, a group of 150 Black Panthers drove into the moshav of Elazar in the West Bank (in the Gush Etzion area) and demonstrated against the use of government funds to subsidise this Industrial Village during its four years of existence (56). They argued that IL420 million ($12 million) had been spent on the twenty families living in the settlement, and that a third of the houses remained unoccupied. Elazar is not a Gush Emunim settlement and has undergone unique social problems of its own, causing a low population intake. Nevertheless, it is representative of the large amounts that are invested in some settlements. The response of Gush Emunim to this demonstration was to issue a call to all those families with housing problems to come and settle in the West Bank (57).

In June 1980, a group of 38 young married couples who had found the government unresponsive to their requests for decent housing, established a tent settlement in a field in Southern Jerusalem (58). Nearly all the protestors were Oriental Jews.
They argued that only demonstrations of this squatting nature seemed to produce results, as was the case with Gush Emunim. They called their tent camp 'Ohel Moreh' (59), the name constituting a play on the name of the infamous Gush Emunim settlement of Eilon Moreh, and announced that a further 29 such tent settlements would be set up, although they would all be within the 'green line'. The tent city was erected by a Jerusalem social activist group by the name of 'Ohalim'. The protestors finally left when the Mayor of Jerusalem, Mr. Teddy Kollek, promised them that a permanent site would be found for the development of housing for all those in need (60).

7.1.3 Settlement Type and the Rural-Urban Continuum.

This study has emphasized the evolution of a new type of settlement structure, as a response to the ever present perceived security and strategic interests of Israel, by a distinct group within that society. Since the areas of priority settlement strategy lack basic agricultural resources, so the settlement planning authorities have had to forego strict adherence to the rigid traditional settlement principles of the previous eighty years. Nevertheless, it has been shown that the transformation from settlements with an agricultural and collective societal base to those with industrial-urban functions and a free enterprise economic base has involved a process of political
'trade off'. As each new stage has taken place, so the Settlement Department have insisted on maintaining as many of the traditionally unique characteristics of Israeli rural settlement as is possible. Thus, even in the case of the Yishuv Kehillati, development is not totally free. There is a limitation on numbers, a strict procedure governing the acceptance of new members, and a policy of planned home production capacity as constituting the mainstay of the settlement's economic base - at least in theory. Budgetary allocations come through the Settlement Department as has always been the case for Israel's rural settlement. Nevertheless, it is argued here that the Yishuv Kehillati, due to the nature by which it initially developed, represents a major break with the Israeli settlement traditions with their precise definitions of 'urban' and 'rural'.

Jones (1955) has defined three types of settlement in the American context. These are metropolitan, urban hinterland and rural hinterland. He defines the urban hinterland as constituting

"that sub-area within a raw materials producing area (i.e., the rural hinterland) whose population has other economic functions than those of raw materials production. The primary social interests of this group are expressed in associations and institutions other than those of the surrounding or adjacent rural hinterland population" (61).

Allowing for the smaller scale of the Israeli landscape, it can be argued that the Industrial Village and the Yishuv Kehillati are producing the same sort of three tiered landscape. Pohoryles (1978) has already noted that three settlement types can be
distinguished in Israel, namely

"strictly rural, semi-urban and strictly urban" (62).

His definition is related to the moshavim and moshavot that underwent processes of transformation from purely rural to semi-urban environments. But such processes, in time, lead to specific changes in planning policies as a response. Thus, Reichmann argues that the planned urban environments in rural surroundings of today have led to three distinct (rather than two) planning categories. He defines these as being

1. Settlement Department agricultural settlements,
2. Settlement Department urban settlements,
3. Housing Ministry urban settlements (63).

The Industrial Village and Yishuv Kehillati both fall into this new second category. The difference between the first and second categories is that whereas in the first, the land itself is seen as the source of the settlement by means of agricultural production, in the second category it is the agent of the settlement in that the location is within the rural environment.

Dewey (1960) notes that although many authors have used their own items of reference in defining some sort of rural-urban continuum, the most commonly used measures included by all have been those of size and density of population. He argues that the rural-urban continuum should be dependent on variations in the following five qualities:

1. Anonymity,
2. Division of labour,
3. Heterogeneity, induced and maintained by (1) & (2),
4. Impersonal and formally prescribed relationships,
5. Symbols of status which are independent of personal acquaintance.

The less there are of each of these factors denotes rurality, while a greater degree of each one denotes urbanism. This offers a cultural continuum which can be marked against the general size continuum, since the latter cannot be wholly conclusive by itself (Fig 7.1) (64). Thus, Pohoryles (1979) notes that at the FAO conference of 1975, it was agreed by experts that a simple distinction between rural and urban was not valid for classifying social or economic characteristics and relationships. He argues that, in fact, the settlement process as a whole has to be taken into account, this process involving a natural transition from the 'rural' to the 'urban' (65). This is supported by both Meissner (1979) and Eaton and Solomonica (1980) with regard to the Israeli context. Meissner notes that an increasing amount of Israeli production is coming from small communities that are urban rather than rural. These are not simply "bedroom communities" but have their own autonomous economic, social and political base. They provide an alternative to both city living and collective agricultural lifestyles (66). Eaton & Solomonica argue that urbanisation
**FIG 7.1**

THE RURAL-URBAN CONTINUUM AND SETTLEMENT IN ISRAEL

- Urban
- Development Town
- Yishuv
- Kehillati
- Moshav
- Kibbutz
- Moshevi
- Rural Centre
- Rural

Cultural Values
- Increasing: Heterogeneity, individual decision making, informally prescribed relationships, free enterprise economy, status symbols
- Decreasing

"should be an alternative to city-centred industrialisation and modernisation.... In a 'rurban' environment, they can enjoy benefits without the negative side effects of city life" (67).

Thus it is clear that both the natural development of urban activities in older agricultural communities (e.g. the moshavot in the coastal plain) and the planned urban-industrial settlements such as the Industrial Village and the Yishuv Kehillati reflect a major change in the processes which led to the rural bias, noted in Chapter Four.

7.2 Gush Emunim And Israeli Politics: An Overview.

Hartshorne (1950) has developed the idea of the raison d'être of states. This concept holds that at anytime, the state is seen as existing in dynamic equilibrium between the centripetal forces which bind it together and work for its survival, and the centrifugal forces which threaten to tear it apart. For the State to continue to exist, the centripetal forces must exceed the centrifugal ones. The basic centripetal force is the elusive raison d'être (68). Similarly, Muir (1975) argues that each State has a stage in a dynamic equilibrium between forces of integration and disintegration and realignment. The relationships between people, territory and government embody these relationships and
"the closer the attitudes towards territorial and political organisation of the various elements in the population are to one another and to those of the government, the more internally stable the State is likely to be" (69).

The raison d'etre of the State of Israel is a Jewish homeland where Jews can live free from persecution and where a society based on Jewish heritage and values can be developed. To religious Jews and others with a feeling for Jewish history, this raison d'etre is extended to require that home to be only in the ancient Biblical Jewish land. Although it may be argued that Gush Emunim are fighting for what they see as constituting the raison d'etre of the State, they are nevertheless part of the centrifugal forces in the sense that their actions cause much dissent and strife amongst the Jewish population.

Ekstein (1966) holds that political cohesion is, under certain conditions, compatible with any kind of division (70). Stable democracy requires a balancing of all major contradictory social and political viewpoints, and these are often brought together by a threat facing the nation as a whole. This often causes a feeling of solidarity which serves as a strength or a stabilising force for the political regime. In Israel, this has always been the case during the Wars of 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973. But each successive War has caused the internal differences of opinion to become magnified and this has been most apparent when armed conflict has come to a halt. Thus, the Yom Kippur War of 1973 led to a strengthening of the two extremes of opinion regarding the status of the territories and peace negotiations. This, in
turn, led to the subsequent emergence of Gush Emunim.

Schnall (1977) argues that before 1973, there had only ever been limited radical or militant dissent in Israel and on the occasions that it did occur, was only supported by a minority of the population (71). Sprinzak (1977) notes that between 1948–1967, there had been an 'operative consensus' within Israel in which the political centre was able to develop its own rules and function according to them, without any peripheral interference. Any peripheral groups that did develop during this period was forced to operate from within the political centre, as witnessed by their decision to participate in Knesset elections on political platforms (72). Etzioni Halevy (1977) shows how both the Black Panthers and the Young Couples Protest movements attempted to work from within the system rather than clamouring for radical revolutionary change. No group employed violence and none succeeded in mobilizing mass support. Thus, protest had not been allowed to sidetrack the basic national development policies of Zionism. The strong collective commitment of the Israelis served as an integrative mechanism in emphasising unity of the Jewish nation (73). Sprinzak argues that 1967 was the watershed in this trend. Following the War of 1967, the operative consensus began to be shattered by peripheral activities which eventually led to their general acceptance post-1973. He asserts that only in this post Yom Kippur War period did extreme politics become an important element in the political system. Protest movements of previous periods are described by him as being
"simply outbursts of rage against specific wrongs" (74) including such instances as the demonstrations against German reparations in 1952, and Moroccan demonstrations against alleged discrimination in 1959.

Sprinzak goes on to distinguish between the concept of extreme politics and that of the politics of illegitimacy. The former operates as an extra-parliamentary activity being more anti-establishment than anti-democratic. However, when this is connected with an ideological position which denies the legitimacy of the democratic regime, it becomes anti-democratic and is concerned with the politics of illegitimacy (75). Similarly, Etzioni Halevy, while arguing that the theory of democracy has stressed the importance of citizen participation, notes that there is a danger inherent in excessive involvement on the part of citizens which curtails a government's freedom of action (76).

It can be argued that the squatting activities of Gush Emunim has meant that they have crossed this boundary between acceptable anti-government protest and non-acceptable anti-democratic action, although their leadership reject this charge in justifying their actions by recourse to a higher order (see Chapter Two). In contrast to other groups, Gush Emunim have become entrenched in the political scene as an independent entity and have been effective in furthering their own aims. Whereas foreign affairs in Israel have always been controlled by a small elite (77), Gush Emunim have presented a challenge to this

Chapter Seven
domination. An indication of the Gush as a political factor is that the government today has to consider the possible reactions from the Gush to any initiative concerning Arab-Israel affairs. Their effect on Israeli society was clearly seen in the case of Elon Moreh. Having received government sanction for the establishment of a settlement near Nablus in June 1979, the settlers were ordered to move to an alternative location following a successful appeal by the Arab landowners in the Israeli High Court. The Gush did not wish to move since they interpreted such an action as providing a precedent for future action (78). Only after much public debate and acrimony did they eventually move, and only then after they had extracted from the government a promise to set up a Select Committee to examine the whole issue of settlement in the West Bank, with a view to the adoption of an approved government plan for settlement.

According to Trice (1978), one of the ways by which interest groups can put forward their views is by becoming a part of the 'cultural milieu' which helps shape the perceptions and behaviour of governmental policy makers (79). Through the acceptance of a great part of the Gush ideology within sections of the Likud coalition, this has taken place to the point where they are a recognized and legal settlement movement. Since interest groups stand between formal government decision making and mass public opinion, they have to
"rely on those people within the government who do have such authority to translate their policy preferences into decisional outputs" (80).

In the case of Gush Emunim, the personality who became their champion was Ariel Sharon, the head of the Inter-Ministerial Settlement Committee, while the joint head of the Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency, Matityahu Drobless, helped put their plans into effect. Were it not for Sharon, they may have remained an unofficial movement unable to receive the development budgets from the Ministries of Agriculture, Housing, Education, Defence and Religious Affairs.

Although the Gush started life as a political pressure group, they have now built up the necessary organizational framework capable of dealing with budgetary allocations at a wide level. The official settlement movement of Gush Emunim is known as Amanah and this body deals specifically with the technical issues, such as the number of houses in each settlement, the means by which new members can be accepted as residents, and the various budgetary allocations.

The Gush itself has an inner secretariat of some ten people who deal with the day to day administration of the movement. Each has a specific portfolio. They also have a larger secretariat of some 25 people who used to meet fortnightly to decide on policy. This group includes representatives from other sympathetic groups such as the Land of Israel Movement (LOIM) and Chug Ein Vered. The general council of Gush Emunim meets three or four times a year. Since February 1978, this body has

Chapter Seven
consisted of 150 members, comprised of settlers and would-be settlers. All are elected to the council. This acknowledges the power base and the importance of the settlements as providing the long-term permanency of the movement. This has been further emphasized since 1979 by the creation of the Jewish regional councils, representing the settlements in each region. Since the establishment of these separate regional councils which deal with cultural and social co-ordination, together with the umbrella council of all settlements in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip which deals with the political issues, the Gush as a distinct pressure group has not been so politically active since early 1980. This has been due to the departure of some of the leading political personalities of the Gush to join the new radical right-wing Hatchiyah party. The main activities of the Gush today are those which are carried out by its' settlement movement, Amanah, and through the regional councils, these being of a distinctly professional nature.

Compared to Israel's political leadership, the Gush leadership is young, mostly in their thirties and forties. The majority of the leadership and membership is part of the Religious Zionist framework, but there are many non-religious members. Indeed, many of the original Gush settlements included both religious and non-religious settlers who worked together. The Gush attracts its non-settler support from the hard line element within Israel. The LOIM (or what remains of it) and Chug Vered are sympathetic to the Gush cause. This latter group is comprised of Labour
settlement activists for Judea and Samaria. The group was formed in March 1976 at Moshav Ein Vered and is totally non-religious.

Overall, Gush Emunim have had a powerful effect on Israeli society. Isaac (1976) asserts that the process by which the territories have been pushed to the forefront of Israeli political life has meant that consensus politics has been replaced by ideological politics (81). This is dangerous for Israeli society in that such ideological issues with the fervour they attract, can spill over to other issues such as religious and economic ones. Proof of this development have been the demonstrations at Moshav Elazar in December 1979, and the tent encampment in Jerusalem in June 1980.

7.2.1 Gush Emunim and Future Development.

In January 1981, Prime Minister Begin announced that he would be calling early elections. The date has since been fixed for June 30th. This followed much dissension over both economic and foreign policy by members of his own government coalition and the resignations, in the preceding eighteen months, of Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan, Defence Minister Ezer Weizmann, and successive Ministers of Finance Simchah Ehrlich and Yigal Hurvitz. Elections were due, nevertheless, by November 1981 at the latest. By managing to stay in power until June, the government was able to go ahead with the implementation of Mr.
Begin's final ten settlements, as announced in the previous year. It also means that the sole right-wing government of Israel's short history will have stayed in power for a longer single period than any previous Labour administration.

Settlement policy following the elections will depend upon the nature of the ruling administration. Three scenarios are offered here as representing the most obvious possibilities.

1. A continuation of a Likud right-wing administration, under whom settlement policy will continue to evolve in the present pattern.

2. A victory by the opposition Labour party but only with enough seats to enforce a ruling government by means of a coalition with the National Religious Party, the new Telem party of Moshe Dayan, and/or other small factions. Settlement policy will be directed away from the West Bank Highlands but no dismantling of settlements will take place. The extent to which change will take place is dependent upon the nature of the coalition partners. Should that partner be the NRP, it can be expected that policy changes will not be major.

3. An overall majority victory by the Labour party. Policy change will then closely follow the political programme of the Labour party, without external interference.

The Labour party are fighting the election campaign mainly on the economic issues, while the Likud are presenting the Labour party as the group which will hand the West Bank over to the Palestine Liberation Organisation (82). A political platform has
been drawn up by the Labour party, concerning all issues. Article 29 of this political programme, based on a report submitted by Yisrael Galili, states that

"settlements are not to be established which are not expected to remain under Israeli sovereignty and contrary to the competent decisions of the government. Settlement shall not be undertaken in the populated areas of the West Bank and Gaza" (83).

The Labour policy is to negotiate for territorial compromise, based on making a peace treaty with Jordan (84). They oppose the establishment of an independent Palestinian State in the West Bank, and argue that continuation of

"settlement in the Jordan Valley (including the area to the north-west of the Dead Sea), in the Etzion block, in the surroundings of Jerusalem, in the south of the Gaza Strip, and also on the Golan Heights - according to consideration of strategic activity and in close coordination with the Israel Defence Forces - is vital to the security of the State" (85).

Thus, this constitutes a return to the priorities and policies laid down in the Allon Plan, which were implemented under Allon and Galili between 1967-1977. Such settlement activity would still involve 40% of all the occupied territories, containing most of the arable land and water resources, but not the dense Arab population concentrations.

Although some political commentators argue that settlements in the highland area will be dismantled under a Labour government, this remains unlikely. Such a course of action is perceived unfavourably in Israel, although a precedent has been set by the dismantling of settlements in Sinai under the Camp David accords. As far as the political and religious hawks are concerned, the
surrender of Sinai did not compromise the integrity of 'Eretz Yisrael' and there was therefore agreement from some of these right-wing elements as well. A similar agreement by an Israeli government, but concerning the West Bank, would lead to a united opposition from all those with right-wing stances, be it moderate or extreme, due to the threat to the 'historic homeland' (86). If decisions concerning the dismantling of settlements were to be made, it is then argued that the implementation of such policies could lead to direct physical conflict between Jewish army units, on the one hand, and Jewish settlers on the other (87). However, neither side is willing to enter into such conflict, as it runs directly contrary to the raison d'etre of building a unified Jewish State. Nevertheless, there could well be skirmishes, should the Gush go ahead with any new squatting attempts. The nation was reminded of this possibility in January 1981, when 300 residents of the temporary settlement of Givon, north-west of Jerusalem, set up a temporary encampment at nearby Givat Ze'ev (88). They argued that this location had been designated as their permanent urban site as long ago as 1978, but that no development had taken place due to the beauracracy of the Housing Ministry, who are responsible for 'urban' settlements. The settlers agreed to leave after three days, when the government promised to hasten the construction on this site. It is unlikely that a Labour government would meet such demands, although it must be noted that Givon is a site agreed upon by all parties due to its proximity to Jerusalem. Although it must be remembered that the

Chapter Seven
Labour party leader, Mr. Shimon Peres, was the hard-line defence minister in the Rabin government who helped the Gush to establish their original settlements at Kedumim and Ophrah, in that he provided temporary sites and employment to the settlers by means of defence ministry contracts, he has adopted a more moderate stance since becoming leader of the party.

The most obvious policy to be pursued under a new government would be a redirection of public resources away from this region to the other settlement priority areas mentioned in the Labour political programme. The Development Area A status would be removed, thus making it harder to attract investment and loans. The Gush would have to consolidate and expand their settlement network by means of private funding. This would be far harder than under the previous Labour government, due to the growth in the scale of operations. Overall implementation of settlement strategy would probably pass back into the control of Ra'anana Weitz, and there is a distinct possibility that Matityahu Drobless would be voted out of his job at the forthcoming World Zionist Congress in 1982.

The Gush and the other settlement activists are preparing to meet these possible policy changes. On December 24–25th 1980, the newly established Council of Jewish Settlements in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, held a congress at Allon Shvut (in the Etzion bloc) at which representatives of forty settlements throughout the West Bank Highlands and the Gaza Strip attended. An organizational framework was set up to push for even
more settlement as well as consolidating and strengthening existing ones. The Council announced that they would seek ways to double the Jewish population from 18,000-40,000 (91). A legal committee would press for the introduction of Israeli laws and courts throughout these areas, while a land committee would find ways to increase the amount of land under Jewish control.

Settlement activity gained momentum in the first five months of 1981. The government were now eager to push forward with their maximalist policies, in order to create as many settlements as possible by the elections. To speed matters, Agriculture Minister Ariel Sharon announced a plan to allot areas of choice land in Jerusalem and other urban centres to building contractors who would undertake immediate construction activity in the West Bank and the Galilee (92). Between October 1980 to February 1981, some 24,000 dunams of land were seized in the West Bank. It was claimed that 20,000 of this was 'State' land while the other 4,000 was registered as belonging to Jews in the Gush Etzion area (93), although if this is the case, it is hard to understand why this land was not used previously. The Knesset Finance Committee allocated IL5,500 million ($79 million) for the establishment of six new settlements and the construction of 400 extra homes in existing locations, to be completed by election day. In February 1981, the settlement of Yakir was officially established. Work also began on the settlements of Nili, Mitzpeh Govrin and Shavei Shomron, and it was agreed to start work on Tekoah B in the near future (94). An extra 15,000 dunams of land
in the Nablus area was earmarked for an industrial centre north of Ariel (95). According to figures released in April 1981 by the information centre in the Prime Ministers office, a total of 200,000 dunams had been allocated to Jewish settlement in the West Bank, 36,000 dunams since July 1980 (96). 30,000 dunams of this latter figure was classified as 'state land' but this was disputed by lawyers representing Arab petitioners against this land seizure.

Another development has been the founding of an international group of supporters of the West Bank cause. This group, non-party, known as the Committee Against the Establishment of Another State in Palestine has been set up, under the auspices of Ariel Sharon, in America, South Africa and Western Europe. It is hoped that this will provide an international lobby against any attempts by a new administration to undo any of the recent settlement activity or to change the status quo on the West Bank. This committee is also expected to be able to raise funds to help consolidate the settlement activity, should the new government withdraw their budgetary allocations, either partially or totally.
REFERENCES


For an analysis of the various planning processes, see


5. If a Labour government were to be returned to power in the forthcoming national elections, any change of settlement priorities would similarly fall into this context, since it would only mean a change within the wider consensus regarding the importance of settlements in some areas - albeit not the same ones.


9. a) 10/9/77. The Economist.


Chapter Seven
For more detailed references to these plans and the following references, see Chapter Three.


16. Maoz, S. 18/1/79 Jerusalem Post. 'Finance committee sets IL741 million for settlements in areas'.

17. 28/2/80 Jerusalem Post. 'Settlements in territories get at least IS750 million for 1980'.


23. Interview with Mr. Shimon Ravid, Administrative Organiser of the Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency, 27/8/79.

24. Ibid.


27. Maoz, S. 10/11/77 *Jerusalem Post*. 'Treasury would give Gush Emunim IL81 million'.

28. 1/11/78 *Jerusalem Post*. '500 more units for West Bank'.

29. Maoz, S. 18/1/79 *op. cit.*

30. 26/12/79 *Jerusalem Post*. 'IL10 billion needed to double settlement'.

31. 28/2/80 *Jerusalem Post*. 'Settlements in territories get at least IS750 million for 1980'.

32. Ibid.


d) 27/3/74 *Jerusalem Post*. 'Doubling Lower Galilee population'.

e) 26/6/74 *Jerusalem Post*. '50 new villages to go up in vital areas'.

34. The Koenig Memorandum consisted of a secret report by the civilian administrator of the Northern Region of Israel, Mr. Koenig, in 1976, calling for more stringent measures in controlling of the Arab residents of the Galilee. This report was leaked to the press, leading to unrest (see chapter two).

36. 30/6/77 Jerusalem Post. 'Sharon plays down demographic fears'.


   b) 20/12/78 Ma'ariv. '30 mitzpim (outposts) will ensure rule over the nation's lands'.

   c) Rabinovich, A. 20/6/80 Jerusalem Post International Edition. 'Watch over the Galilee'.

38. 18/3/80 Jerusalem Post. 'AACI: Settle the Galilee'.

39. Rabinovich, A. 17/12/75 Jerusalem Post. 'To thicken or not to thicken – Jerusalem planners draw up a suburban belt'. p.6.


41. Rabinovich, A. 17/12/75. op cit.


43. Shuldiner, Z. 25/7/80 Ha'aretz.


   b) 18/9/79 Jerusalem Post. 'New settlements fail because government pump money into West Bank - Weitz'.

   c) 20/5/80 Jerusalem Post. 'Weitz hits 'unviable' new West Bank settlements'.

45. The twenty or so Gush Emunim settlements would therefore necessitate some $100 million alone. Account must also be taken of those settlements designated as urban - and therefore much larger - as well as the rural settlements in the Jordan Valley and the Etzion Block.

Chapter Seven
46. 24/1/80 Jerusalem Post.


52. Segal, M. 12/1/75. Jerusalem Post. 'Cabinet to vote Ma'aleh Adumim funds over leftist objections'.


54. La'an (1977) op cit.

55. 6/7/77 Jerusalem Post. 'Settlement talks postponed until after Begin's trip'.

56. 12/11/79 Jerusalem Post. 'Black Panthers invade West Bank moshav to protest slum conditions'.

57. Ibid.

58. a) Rabinovich, A. 9/6/80 Jerusalem Post. 'Slum dwellers adopt Gush tactics'.

b) Morris, B. 10/6/80 Jerusalem Post. 'Slum dwellers avoid eviction from tent city'.

59. The word 'ohel' means a tent.


Chapter Seven


63. Interview with Professor S. Reichmann, Department of Geography, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, June 1979.


65. Pohoryles, S. (1979) Rural Urban Landuse Equilibrium. Tel Aviv: Joint study by the Ministry of Agriculture - Rural Planning and Development Authority; Land Use Research Institute; the Department of Geography - University of Tel Aviv. pp.191-192.


75. Ibid.


The general processes of Israeli foreign policy and its decision making processes are analysed in detail in


78. 12/11/79 & 16/1/80 Jerusalem Post.


80. Ibid.


82. The Labour party are able to fight on domestic issues due to the disastrous results of the liberalization of the economy under the Likud government. In 1977, it was the Likud party who fought, and won, primarily on domestic socio/economic issues.

83. 30/1/81 Middle East International. No.142, p.15.

84. For the most recent analyses of the 'Jordanian option', see


b) Beeley, H. 30/1/81 Middle East International. p 8, 'No chance for the Jordanian option'.


85. 30/1/81 Middle East International. No.142, p.5.
86. For an analysis of the relative positions of the groups in relation to each other within the Israeli context, see
   a) Isaac, R.J. (1976) *op cit.*

87. a) Jacobson, P. 25/1/81 *Sunday Times*. 'How the West Bank impasse could make Jews shoot Jews'.
   b) Walker, C. 17/2/81 - 21/2/81 *The West Bank*, *The Times*. (Set of five articles).

88. 26^-28/1/81. Ha'aretz, Jerusalem Post, Ma'ariv, Yediot Achronot.

89. This latter section is largely based on a visit to the Gush Emunim leadership and settlements in January 1981.

90. Brilliant, J. 25/12/80 *Jerusalem Post*. 'Settlers plan to expand Jewish presence in areas'.

91. a) For the present population figures on the West Bank, see Chapter Three.

   For a cursory analysis of the present feelings amongst Gush Emunim settlers, see Goell, Y. 'Gush country', *Jerusalem Post Weekly Magazine*. Two articles - 30/1/81, 4-5; 13/2/81, 8-9.


93. This 24,000 dunams was made up of 5,000 for Yakir B, 4,480 for Gush Etzion, 4,000 for Gittit, 4,000 for Ma'on and Carmel, 2,350 for Tekoah B, 2,000 for Mitzpeh Govrin, 600 for Nili, 450 for Nebi Samwil, 450 for Kedumin, 180 for Givat Hadashah, 150 for Givon, 100 for Migdal Oz, 100 for Mochmash, and 35 for Efrat.

Chapter Seven
94. The Democratic Movement for Change faction in the government opposed the establishment of the latter three settlements. However, their appeals were defeated in the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee meeting on 26/1/81. It is interesting to note that in the case of Tekoah B, whose location is in the Allon Plan region, the Labour members voted together with the government in favour of its establishment (15 to 3), whereas in the case of Shavei Shomron B, located in the heart of the most densely populated area of the West Bank in Northern Samaria, only the government voted for its establishment (12 to 8). Mitzpeh Govrin was passed by a 12 to 6 victory for the government, since it lies close to the 'green line' boundary.

95. Richardson, D. 9/2/81 'New State lands destined for settlements on West Bank', Jerusalem Post.


Chapter Eight

8 CONCLUSION.

This thesis has examined the development of the Gush Emunim settlement framework. It has been seen that their impact has been substantial - out of all proportion to their actual size. The similarity between the policies of the Gush and the sentiments of the right-wing government since 1977 has made it possible to implement the settlement strategies within the official framework. A strong sense of nationalism, fuelled by historical associations and religious fervour have provided the ideological justifications for this activity, over and above the argument stressing the need for security. Nevertheless, Hinsley (1973) has noted that

"it is just when the national political loyalty is most extreme that it is ceasing to be national." (1)

Thus, many Israeli groups oppose Gush Emunim on the grounds that the Gush are an obstacle to peace and that dialogue with the Arabs cannot be carried out while new settlements are being established. Furthermore, the fact that the Gush have resorted to non-democratic behaviour in pursuing their objectives is not viewed favourably within Israel.

The implementation of the Gush settlement policies through the medium of the Yishuv Kehillati has shown that the switch to the right has not been just a foreign affairs issue. Etzioni-Halevy (1977) notes that the appeal of egalitarianism has decreased steadily over the past two decades and that a new competing ideology has come to the forefront, being one of equity rather
than of equality (2). Thus, increasingly less of the population are prepared to accept constraints of life-style wrought about by the rigid adherence to traditional settlement planning principles. This is important in understanding the new private enterprise type of settlement.

Nevertheless, as long as the Arab-Israel conflict continues to maintain its role in the centre of world affairs, it is the settlement location policies which will be of more interest to the observer than the settlement type. The validity of new settlement types in a realistic economic environment can only come about if and when the artificial subsidies, based on political and strategic requirements, are removed. This, in turn, will only happen when there is some sort of meaningful conflict resolution. Conflict resolution of an acceptable nature to all sides depends upon the participation of both moderate and hard-line elements, representing all views. It can be argued that the beginnings of conflict resolution often start from the adoption of an extremist position, since the alternative option is one of renewed physical conflict on an even larger scale. Within Israel, the coming to power of the hard line Likud government in 1977 helped create the conditions by which President Sadat made his historic visit to Jerusalem. However, the stage following such a breakthrough may necessitate the transfer of power to that group adopting a more moderate line. The slow pace of development of the Camp David accords outside the immediate peace agreement with Egypt, is a pointer in this

Conclusion
direction. The Labour party argue that their more moderate position on the issue of the West Bank, due to the absence of the powerful emotional historical/religious factors, makes them a more suitable administration in attempting to renew the peace process. This author argues that their policy of 'moderation' is only relative to the domestic front, but with respect to the other parties in the conflict is simply slightly less extreme than the Likud position (3). Although the Labour party may justify the Allon Plan type of proposals as being valid due to the need to develop 'secure' and 'defensible' borders, the emphasis on settlement anywhere in the territories is unacceptable to the Arab (4). Any acceptable solution agreed upon by all moderate and extreme interests would have to take the whole West Bank into consideration, and be dependent upon the wishes of the indigenous majority population. Policies of settlement establishment, in whichever area, are unlikely to bring about a change in negotiating positions that will greatly alter the stalemate reached in the peace process by 1981. It is to be hoped that the results of the elections of June 30th will herald an era of renewed dialogue between the conflicting parties.
REFERENCES


3. The Labour political programme represents the hard line Labour element. This was seen in the previous October, when Galili beat moderate Herzog in the fight to be responsible for drawing the programme up.


Conclusion
BIBLIOGRAPHY

NEWSPAPERS

The Economist.
The Guardian.
Ha'aretz. (Hebrew).
Israel and Palestine - monthly chronicle of events in the Occupied Territories since 1967.
Jerusalem Post.
Ma'ariv. (Hebrew).
Sunday Times.
The Times.
Time Magazine.
Yediot Achronot. (Hebrew).


Jennings, R.Y. (1963) *The Acquisition of Territory in International Law.* Manchester.


Boston: Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
BOOKS AND THESSES - SPECIFIC


Bibliography


Galvetz, S. (1940) The Urban Kibbutz. (Hebrew) Tel Aviv.


Pohoryles, S. (1979) Rural-Urban Landuse Equilibrium. Tel Aviv: Joint study by the Ministry of Agriculture - Rural Planning and Development Authority; Land Use Research Institute; the Department of Geography - University of Tel Aviv.


Rekhes, E. (1977) The Arabs of Israel and the Confiscation of Land in the Galilee. (Hebrew). Tel Aviv: The Shiloah Institute for Middle Eastern and African Research, University of Tel Aviv.


Settlement Study Centre (1977) Accession List of Regional Plans, Programmes and Projects. Rehovot.

Shapiro, O. (1968) Inhabited Rural Centres in Israel. Publications on problems of regional development, No.5. Settlement Study Centre, Rehovot.


ARTICLES


Beery, H. 30/1/31 Middle East International. 'No chance for the Jordanian option'. p.8.


Bibliography ARTICLES


Jerusalem Post. (12/9/77) Israel and the Territories. (Special supplement).

Jerusalem Post. (1/10/78) Eretz Yisrael: Land and People. (Special supplement).


Johnson, P. (12/5/73) 'Israel's thirty years'. New Statesman, 632-634.


Kaplan, R.D. (1979) 'Kibbutz industry is moving ahead'. Israel Year Book. pp 227-228


Kohn, M. (25/10/74) 'The would be settlers', Jerusalem Post Magazine.

Kohn, M. (14/5/76) 'The people at Kaddum', Jerusalem Post Magazine.


Bibliography

**ARTICLES**


Morris, B. (2/8/74) 'A rarified spiritual atmosphere: Ideals and values in Kiryat Arba', Jerusalem Post.


Nedava, Y. (1/10/78) 'Zion and Sinai'. Jerusalem Post New Year Supplement. 1/10/78. p.9.


Orglar, Y. (1973) 'Establishment of industrial towns along the green belt', Town and Region. (Hebrew) Vol.1, No.4, 3-13.


Tabenkin, Y. (1951) 'At this time'. (Hebrew) Mibifnim. No.15, 4-8.


Walker, C. 17/2/81 - 21/2/81 'The West Bank', The Times. (Set of five articles).


Yishai, Y. (1979) 'Interest groups in Israel', Jerusalem Quarterly. No.11, 128-144.


DOCUMENTS AND PRIMARY SOURCES


Committee of Segev Settlements. (1979) Community Services in the Rural Centre of Segev. (Hebrew).


Bibliography DOCUMENTS AND PRIMARY SOURCES


Bibliography DOCUMENTS AND PRIMARY SOURCES


APPENDIX ONE:
GUSH EMUNIM: MOVEMENT FOR THE RENEWED FULFILLMENT OF THE ZIONIST IDEAL

Gush Emunim Manifesto.

PURPOSE

To create a great revival movement in the Jewish nation to fulfill the Zionist dream in its entire range, without forgetting that the source of this dream is to be found in Jewish tradition and the roots of Judaism, and its aim is the full redemption of the Jewish people and the whole world.

BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION

1. At present the Jewish people is engaged in a bitter struggle for its very existence in its own land and its right to full sovereignty over this land. We feel that our ability to stand up to the trials before us is rooted not only in our military and economic strength, but also in our spiritual wealth and a return to the values of fulfillment and pioneering and the goals of redemption from whose strength the State of Israel is built.

2. In contradiction to the pioneering wave that is demanded of us today, we are unfortunately witnesses to a series of developments which point to a withdrawal from the fulfillment of the Zionist ideal in both its theoretical and practical aspects:

- Aliya is not the principal desire of the Jews abroad.
- For ten years, Jewish settlement in Judea and Samaria has been neglected.
- Large portions of the younger generation are painfully ignorant of Jewish heritage and the uniqueness and destiny of the Jewish people.
- Israel has been copying the worst of modern Western culture, its materialisms, its violence, its decadence,
with all the implications involved in this imitation.

- There has been a certain tendency to pursue the "good life", including a high standard of living and permissiveness. This atmosphere has brought with it an unwillingness toward personal fulfillment, avoidance of manual labour, strikes and corruption — and if this continues it will undermine both the culture and the economic structure of the country.

- Searching and doubt among a growing share of the Jews in Israel and abroad regarding the very aim and moral direction of the Zionist ideal as well as the assurance that the Jewish people will be able to survive in their own land.

3. The attempt to ignore these serious developments or to underestimate their importance is a deliberate flight from coming to terms with the idea of fulfilling the Zionist ideal in our generation. We cannot continue our customary activities in the Jewish State in the accepted ways without a radical and penetrating re-examination of the ongoing crisis revealed in the complex of phenomena listed above.

4. We can indicate four interrelated points which seem to be the source of this crisis in Zionist fulfillment and this weakening of the pioneering spirit.

a. Spiritual exhaustion and a feeling of frustration with the continuing struggle:
The Jewish people naively assumed that after the struggle of creating and establishing a state, the countries of the world, including the Arab nations, would accept and recognise the state, and the latter would allow the Jews to live a normal, peaceful life in their own country, just like other nations. Now, after a generation has passed, it is clear that the struggle is continuing, becoming harsher and more complicated, even on the ideological level and in the field of policy making, as well as in the military sphere. It continues to demand sacrifices and lives full of tension and constant alertness with no end in sight. This situation has created a feeling of frustration and has undermined the basic over-simplified assumptions of classical Zionism, which saw the Land of Israel as a secure refuge and a solution to the problem of anti-Semitism and persecution of the Jews.

b. Lack of a challenge and a Zionist goal:
Together with a feeling of exhaustion with the struggle, the feeling of a lack of challenge and lack of a Zionist
goal has grown. This is a result of the belief that the work of Zionism has been completed. The early Zionists built and created something from nothing in Israel, established settlements, planted wastelands, gathered exiles and built a state. The present generation feels that there is nothing left to do except preserve what is and relax, with no clear idea of which way to continue.

c. Dissociation and detachment from the faith of Israel and Jewish heritage:
In Jewish heritage can be found the key to an understanding of the uniqueness and the goal of the Jewish people and the Land of Israel. The return of the Jewish people to its land is a central event in the system of concepts of redemption envisioned by the prophets of Israel and yearned for by the nation during its long Diaspora. The dissociation from Jewish roots calls into question the value of the existence of the Jewish people and the secret of its devotion to the Land of Israel and undermines the idea of a return to Zion involving so many difficulties and so much suffering.

5. Against this slackness, and from a deep faith, Gush Emunim was founded for the purpose of casting an old-new image with the tools and in the molds that already exist, in order to reawaken the sense of Zionist fulfillment in both word and spirit. When Gush Emunim was created, its efforts were concentrated mainly on political struggle and settlement, but behind this activity there is a complete plan and overall direction. We would like to present here the foundations, directions and principles of action of Gush Emunim.

In this article we will not give the principles of Gush Emunim, only a summary of some of them:

1. Sovereignty and policy.
2. Education and love of Israel.
4. Aliya.

SOVEREIGNTY AND POLICY

Recognising that the whole of the Land of Israel is the exclusive property of the Jewish people, and demanding fulfillment of the obligation of the Jewish nation to establish full sovereignty in the Land, both as a means of ensuring its existence and the ingathering of the Diaspora, as well as an
independent matter connected with the mitzva (religious injunction) of settling the land, Gush Emunim will work for the consolidation of a policy establishing the following principles of action:

1. Full Jewish sovereignty should begin immediately over all areas of the Land of Israel which are presently in our hands, including Judea and Samaria, the Golan Heights in their present border, the Gaza Strip and large areas of the Sinai.

2. By means of education and information, a clear national consciousness should be created which sees all areas of the Land of Israel as one land which must not be divided.

3. We should make clear, in an unambiguous manner, to ourselves and to the nations of the world, that the Jewish people will fight with dedication against any attempt to impose on us a withdrawal from any part of the Land of Israel, by military or political means, and we will not abandon this necessary struggle as long as we have the power to continue.

4. The Arabs of the Land of Israel, as well as the other non-Jewish minorities living here, must be granted all the private and legal rights to which every person is entitled, including the right to migrate, the right to own property, to a trial, and all other personal freedoms. These rights must not be denied, except for reasons related directly to security. We must examine the possibility of granting Israeli citizenship to every non-Jewish resident who is prepared to accept all the responsibilities involved (including military service or alternative service). On the other hand, we should, by means of information and economic assistance, encourage those who are not prepared to accept Israel citizenship for nationalistic reason, to emigrate.

5. The realisation of full Jewish sovereignty in the Land of Israel involves absolute independence, with no dependence on foreign countries. Therefore every effort should be made to achieve economic and political independence, and above all we must determine an independent national policy which is not subject to any foreign nation.

6. We must lay the foundation for relations between Israel and the nations of the world on a moral basis of mutual understanding and aid in every case where any nation shows that it wishes this. But we must stand firm in every meeting with a foreign country on the rights and the vital needs of the State of Israel so that it is not debased in the rest of the world.

Every international organisation or framework which reaches decisions that dishonour Israel has no right to exist, and we must leave it with the hope that the day will come when the
honour of Israel will grow and truth will be revealed among the nations of the world.

EDUCATION AND LOVE OF ISRAEL

Gush Emunim will labour by a variety of educational and informational means, both with written material and oral presentation, in all public ways, for the purpose of bringing to the attention of the public the following important subjects:

1. Knowledge and connection to the Torah of Israel and its tradition, and to the roots of Jewish morality.

2. Love of the people and the Land.

3. Deepening of Zionist consciousness and the vision of redemption.


Gush Emunim is searching for ways to create an atmosphere of openness regarding the love of Israel hidden in the heart of the nation by bringing people together from all walks of life with no regard to differences of opinion and background. For activity of this sort, dedicated work to bring groups together and reduce the gap between social groups in the nation as a basis for all activities, we must develop moral measures and a personal educational example.

SETTLEMENT

Gush Emunim sees settlement as a real and deep expression of our tie to the Land and a powerful factor in preventing the undermining of our right to the whole Land, both from inside the country and from outside.

Therefore, Gush Emunim will work diligently and with no rest to expand settlement of all types and to establish new points in every part of the Land, first of all in Judea and Samaria, in the Golan, in the Jordan Valley, and in the expanses of the Sinai.

Besides being one of the cornerstones of Zionism, settlement is vital to achieving national goals, to improve the socio-economic system, to help the weaker classes, and mainly to develop the overcrowded coastal plain, to diffuse the population and to bring tens of thousands from the coastal plain to the hills and open places of the country.
ALIYA

Gush Emunim will prepare itself for continuous activity to encourage massive immigration of the Jewish Diaspora from every corner of the world, while taking the necessary economic and social measures for absorption, while at the same time presenting the goals of pioneering Zionist fulfillment before the new immigrants.
APPENDIX TWO:
GUSH EMUNIM MASTERPLAN FOR SETTLEMENT IN JUDEA AND SAMARIA.


; (The translation of the whole document covers some fifty pages in English. What follows is an English summary of the plan's contents.)

In order to ensure lasting peace, we must settle the whole of the Land of Israel. The heart of the country, Judea and Samaria, must be settled for the resurrection of the people. Isolated military outposts are a constant pretext for war. Settlement in Judea and Samaria will fulfill biblical injunctions to settle in Eretz Yisrael. Settlements create facts of political significance and moral weight, paving the way for political sovereignty. Settlements are an inspiring national challenge and will facilitate immigration and absorption.

Settlement of Judea and Samaria is more urgent than other areas. It must be integrated into Israel as a whole. Though we expect great waves of immigration in the next 25 years bringing the total population to 8 or 10 million Jews, our plans have been based on present rates of birth and immigration. At present rates the Jewish population will grow by 1.5 to 1.75 million persons by 2000 CE, while Arab population will grow by only one million. By 2000 CE then, we estimate that there will be 5.5 million Jews and 2.5 million Arabs in Eretz Yisrael's present boundaries.

At present 75% of the Jewish population live in the coastal strip. Of the remaining 25%, few live outside the major urban centres. This is due to a lack of infrastructure and comprehensive planning. We need metropolitan and regional planning which will move all private and public building eastward, settling the land while retaining contact with the urban centres.

GENERAL OUTLINE OF SETTLEMENT THROUGHOUT ERETZ YISRAEL

The new population should be distributed to fill the needs of the areas. The Golan Heights should have a total population of 40,000 to 50,000 souls to serve as a first line of defence in case of war. The Galilee region should receive an additional 150,000 settlers in agricultural settlements and in residential zones for Haifa away from the coast. In the south, Jewish
Population is sparse. Settlement should be encouraged there to retain possession of the land. The best area for agriculture is the western half of Sinai. Upper Eilat, Ophira, Kadesh Barnea and Yamit should become cities of 50,000 each. Total population in the south should reach 350,000 urban and 150,000 rural by the end of the century. Settlement of Judea and Samaria as outlined below should receive between 750,000 and one million settlers. It is assumed that approximately 500,000 immigrants will settle in the coastal plain despite efforts to stop growth in this region.

GUIDING OBJECTIVES IN PLANNING.

An Arab enclave in Judea and Samaria is the pretext for a Palestinian State. We must abolish the demographic barrier without eviction or oppression of the Arab minority. We must not be hostile to the Arab minority, but foster a good neighbourly attitude.

There are today four components in Israel's security set up.
1) The depth of the country from the Jordan River to the Coastal Plain.
2) Control of the mountain ridge of Judea and Samaria.
3) Control of the Jordan Valley.
4) A network of east-west roads enabling swift military mobilisation.
To these four we must add a fifth, namely that of Jews living on the land, able to assist the military in times of peace and war.

Large sectors of the urban population moving into settlements will be a healthy economic influence. It will transfer workers from service to production occupations and reduce the consumption of services. Capital investment in building and means of production will increase.

Surrounding Jerusalem with Jewish population especially to the north, east and south, will ensure the status of Jerusalem as Israel's capital.

Dispersal of the population into rural areas will alleviate overcrowding in the cities and ease the present trend of ecological and social harm caused by these conditions.

WAYS OF IMPLEMENTATION.

The commandment of settlement in Eretz Yisrael demands large scale settlement. The two basic aims of curtailment of the gap between Jews in the mountains and in the plains and a change in the demographic balance to create a Jewish majority, can only be achieved through settlement on a large scale. Population must be
dispersed throughout the land to increase control and influence.

Forms of settlement must be diverse to fit the desires of different types of settlers. The four types outlined are general categories of settlements which are actually more varied.

1. **The Community Settlement** will total 250 to 500 families of a heterogeneous nature or of a more intentional character. Several community settlements together will comprise a cluster which will be able to support a higher level of services than an isolated settlement.

2. **The Garden City** will average 2500 families or 10,000 souls. They will provide a place for those not wishing either intensive community life or large city life. Garden cities will rely heavily on large cities for employment and services.

3. **Small Towns** of 20,000 each will be centres of employment and services.

4. **Large Cities** of 60,000 persons each.

Agriculture will support only a minority of settlers due to the lack of agricultural land. Others should support themselves through light industry, tourism and cultural enterprises.

The coastal region is well established in industry and agriculture. Government aid should cease there and move eastward to the Western Slopes to build garden cities and community settlements. On the central mountain ridge, a line of heavy Jewish population concentration including two large cities, one in Judea and one in Samaria, should be created to parallel Jewish population in the coastal region. The Jordan Valley should be exploited for its agricultural resources, and a Jewish quarter should be built in Jericho. Jerusalem should become more central both in population distribution and in people's minds. Additions, repairs and improvements are required on many roads in Judea and Samaria, and some new ones should be created.

**Civilian Settlement in Samaria.**

1. One large city south of Nablus at the crossroads of the mountain ridge road and a road bisecting Samaria.

2. Three townships: Dotan, at the Nablus to Jenin and Hadera to Dotan crossroads; Samaria, at the crossroads of the mountain ridge road and the Natanya to Samaria road; Shiloh, in the vicinity of Biblical Shiloh which will also serve as the urban centre for some of the Jordan Valley settlements.

**Appendices**
3. 13 garden cities: 8 garden cities will serve as suburbs for the coastal region in the vicinity of the following places - east of Baka-es-Sharkiya, east of Tulkarm, east of Samaria, Azon, east of Elkanah, Heres, east of Rantis, Hirbata. 5 garden cities will be located north and east of Jerusalem within a radius of 15 to 20 kilometres at the following locations - Ma'aleh Adumim, Beit El, Givon, Beit Horon, Radar Hill.

Civilized Settlement in Judea

1. One large city in Hebron.

2. One township at Dahariya.

3. 7 garden cities as follows - Tekoah, Efrat, Beit Giloh, Allon Shvut, Yattir, Bnei Na'im, Tarkumiya.

4. 4 or 5 clusters of community settlements as follows - 2 or 3 on the Kiryat Gat to Arad road, one on the Dahariya to Beer Sheba road, ad one on the Tekoah to Mitzpeh Shalem road.

(The Gush Emunim plan has two appendices. The first of these discusses the issues of land ownership in the West Bank and puts forward guidelines on changes in the legal status of these lands. The second appendix discusses the concept of the Yishuv Kehillati -Community Village- as a viable new settlement type.)
APPENDIX THREE:
MASTER PLAN FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF SETTLEMENT IN JUDEA AND SAMARIA.

by Matityahu Droblcess,

INTRODUCTION.

For some considerable time now the lack has been felt of a comprehensive, well-founded and professional plan of settlement for Judea and Samaria (J&S). Therefore, upon my assumption of the post of head of the Jewish Agency's land settlement department and head of the rural settlement department of the World Zionist Organization, I began, with the help of the first rate and highly experienced staff in the department, to seek out various possibilities for the consolidation of a general master plan in J&S whose implementation would extend, in the first stage, five years. At the centre of this examination stands a comprehensive and systematic land survey, which is still in its midst. When the survey is completed, it is probable that we will be able to plan the disposition of settlements additional to those proposed below.

The following are the principles that guided the plan:

1. Settlement throughout the entire Land of Israel is for security and by right. A strip of settlements at strategic sites enhances both internal and external security alike, as well as making concrete and realizing our right to Eretz-Israel.

2. The disposition of the proposed settlements will be implemented according to a settlement policy of blocs of settlements in homogeneous settlement areas which are mutually interrelated this enabling, in time, the development of common services and means of production. Moreover, in the wake of the expansion and development of the community settlements, some of them may even combine, in the course of time, into an urban settlement which would consist of all the settlements in that particular bloc. Only in four instances was there no choice but to propose the establishment of an isolated settlement in an area, due to territorial and land limitations at the site.

3. The disposition of the settlements must be carried out not only around the settlements of the minorities, but also in

Appendices
between them, this in accordance with the settlement policy adopted in the Galilee and in other parts of the country. Over the course of time, with or without peace, we will have to learn to live with the minorities and among them, while fostering goodneighbourly relations - and they with us. It would be best for both peoples - the Jewish and the Arab - to learn this as early as possible, since when all is said and done the development and flowering of the area will be to the benefit of all the residents of the land. Therefore, the proposed settlement blocs are situated as a strip surrounding the (Judea & Samaria) ridge - starting from its western slopes from north to south, and along its eastern slopes from south to north: both between the minorities population and around it.

4. New settlements will be established only on State-owned land, and not on private Arab-owned land which is duly registered. We should ensure that there is no need for the expropriation of private plots from the members of the minorities. This is the chief and outstanding innovation in this master plan: all the areas proposed below as sites for the establishment of new settlements have been meticulously examined, their location precisely determined, and all of them are without any doubt State-owned - this according to the preliminary findings of the fundamental and comprehensive land survey now being carried out.

5. The location of the settlements was determined following a thorough examination of the various sites with respect to their being suitable and amenable to settlement, taking into account topographical conditions, land-preparation possibilities etc;

6. In order to create as broad a disposition as possible and to establish settlements which will excel in a high quality of life, we suggest that the majority of the settlements in J&S be established from the outset as community settlements. In addition to these, a number of agricultural and combined settlements will be established at locations where there are suitable means for production. The settlers' employment will be mainly in industry, tourism and services, with a minority engaging in intensive agriculture.

As is known, it is the task of the land settlement department to initiate, plan and implement the settlement enterprise according to the decisions of the government and of the joint Government - World Zionist Organisation Committee for Settlement. I hope and believe that this plan - which is based on experience, professional know-how, surveys and planning, all of which are aimed at ensuring effective implementation, - will in fact be

Appendices
approved, and soon, by these bodies. It must be borne in mind that it may be too late tomorrow to do what is not done today. I believe that we should encourage and direct the tendency which exists to day of moving from city to country, because of the quality of life which characterizes rural settlement. This will enable us to bring about the dispersion of the population from the densely populated urban strip of the coastal plain eastward to the presently empty areas of J&S. There are today persons who are young or young in spirit who want to take up the challenge of national goals and who want to settle in J&S. We should enable them to do so, and sooner is better.

Upon the approval of the plan proposed herein, the land settlement department will devote itself to drawing up a detailed plan for the development of settlement in J&S - including a timetable for the establishment of the proposed settlements - and the same applies for the thickening and development of the existing settlements and those now under construction. We must also ensure, from the State and WZO budgets, the required investments for realizing and executing this task.

According to the plan here presented, 46 new settlements in J&S will be added within five years, which at the end of that period will be inhabited by 16,000 families, this at an investment of IL32 billion. In the first year of the plan's execution the number of families in the new settlements will total, according to the plan, 5,000, at an investment of IL10 billion, thus the annual investment in each of the plan's four remaining years will be IL5.5 billion.

With respect to the thickening of existing settlements and those under construction, an additional 11,000 families at the end of five years is proposed, at an investment of IL22 billion. For the first year of the thickening project, a total of 3,000 additional families is proposed, which will necessitate an investment of IL6 billion in that year. Therefore, the annual investment in each of this project's four remaining years will be IL4 billion.

Altogether, then, after five years there will be added in J&S - in the proposed settlements, the existing ones and those under construction - 27,000 families, this necessitating an overall investment of IL54 billion. In the first year of the project's implementation 8,000 families will be added at an investment of IL16 billion. Thus the annual overall investment in each of the remaining four years will be IL9.5 billion. This investment is absolutely essential and is a condition for the execution of a paramount national mission. (Section 2 of the plan contains a detailed listing and description of each settlement and the respective regional groupings of settlements.)
EMPLOYMENT AND ECONOMIC BRANCHES IN THE SETTLEMENTS.

Employment and the economic basis of the residents in J&S will be in accordance with the nature of the settlement and the surrounding area. 
- In the urban settlements some 60% of the families will be employed in industry, handicrafts, holidaying and tourism, and the rest in services and work outside the settlement. In the towns close to Jerusalem the proportion of those employed in outside work will be higher.
- In the community settlements the economic basis in the development stage will be as follows: about 50% of the families will earn their living from industry and handicrafts; about 12% from capital-based intensive agriculture; about 25% from outside work; and about 13% from local services.
- The agricultural and combined settlements will be based on agricultural branches (mainly intensive, depending on the means for production in the area), as well as industry, handicrafts and tourism. Some of the settlers will engage in local and regional services.

SERVICES AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION.

- The regional services in education, health, culture etc. will be planned and set up already in the first stage of the plan's execution, in each bloc, in one of the bloc's central settlements. Their preparation as early as possible will prove a boon to the settlers in the new settlements.
- Social integration: The detailed planning of the settlements will be carried out with the formation of settlement core groups and their organization in anticipation of settlement. The absorption unit in the land settlement department will draw up an action framework in the sphere of the social absorption of the settlers (new immigrants and veterans) through coordination with the land settlement movements and other social bodies.

INVESTMENT REQUIRED TO EXECUTE THE PLAN.

The overall investment for executing the five-year plan (proposed new settlements plus thickening of existing settlements and of those under construction) is IL54 billion, of which IL16 billion would be needed in the first year to activate the plan and IL9.5 billion in each of the four ensuing years. The calculation for investment is based on the additional families, which, by the plan, would take up residence in J&S - 27,000 in the five years.

(The plan ends with detailed tables showing the proposed investment for individual families on any settlement, the establishment of all proposed settlements, and the consolidation of existing settlements and those being built.)
APPENDIX FOUR:
COMMUNITY SETTLEMENT — ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE.

Jewish Agency for Israel, Rural Settlement Department.  
World Zionist Organisation, Rural Settlement Division.  

Community Settlement under the supervision of the Settlement Division of the World Zionist Organisation is a form of rural settlement with the following characteristics:

1. The establishment of a community with a population limited to between 200 - 300 families.

2. Communal organization based on the establishment of a cooperative society in which the settlers comprise these members.

3. An economic system based on independent family units, or groups of family units in association, in which employment and the means of production are provided within the settlement itself.

4. The regulations of the cooperative society are such as to insure preservation of the character of the community, and define the mutual relations between

THE COOPERATIVE.

A cooperative society will be founded and registered according to law with the Registrar of Cooperatives.

1. The Cooperative will constitute the organizational framework of the settlement; it will serve as the municipal authority and as the authorized body in economic, consumer and social matters, as well as in the provision of services.

2. Each settler is required to reside permanently in the settlement and to be a member of the Cooperative.

3. Candidates and new members to the Cooperative will be accepted according to criteria determined by the Society. Candidates will be considered by an Acceptance Committee composed of three members, chosen as follows: a representative of the settlement, a representative of the
World Zionist Organization, and a representative of the settlement movement with which the settlement is affiliated. In the absence of such affiliation, a community representative recommended by a representative of the Settlement Division of the World Zionist Organization will serve as the third member of the Committee.

4. A candidate will be accepted as a member of the Cooperative after a trial period of one and a half years or one year, and after approval by the General Assembly. Regulations regarding the process of acceptance will apply to all new members of the Cooperative without exception.

5. A member may be removed from the Cooperative only under circumstances stipulated in the regulations, and according to the processes set down therein.

6. The functioning bodies of the cooperative will be as follows: the General Assembly, the Management and various committees.

7. The Cooperative will employ those workers required by it to provide the services mentioned below.

8. A special member will be appointed to whom the right of decision will be given in basic community matters which are to be stipulated in the regulations of the Cooperative. The appointment of this special member will be made by the Settlement Division and the settlement movement.

FUNCTIONS OF THE COOPERATIVE.

1. The Cooperative will operate according to social-settlement goals in community and cultural matters, and in its concern for the quality of life; it will be dedicated to preserving the character and structure of the settlement.

2. The Cooperative will provide municipal services: landscaping, road maintenance, garbage collection, water, etc.

3. The Cooperative will be responsible for providing welfare services, education, health services, etc.

4. The Cooperative will construct industrial and administrative buildings that will be available for rental to its members for their enterprises.

5. The Cooperative will aid its members in the management of their enterprises, in the management of accounts, and in marketing and financing; it will provide general services according to need and circumstances, including electricity,

Appendices
fuel, purchasing services, etc.

ASSETS OF THE COOPERATIVE.

1. The Cooperative will be the principal leaser of real estate and will grant, if it sees fit, the right of sub-lease to settler-members.

2. The Cooperative will be the owner of all community buildings, community property and other consumer institutions, as well as of all buildings needed to carry out the functions mentioned in clause 2 above. The Cooperative will be the owner of industrial and administrative buildings established by the settlement.

3. Transfer of the right to lease a vacant building, including a residential dwelling, will be made only to a member or to a candidate approved by the Cooperative; this will be so in order to give the community supervision over the character of the settlement.

FINANCING OF ACQUISITIONS AND ENTERPRISES.

1. The World Zionist Organization will share in the financing of community investments and the establishment of the settlement, according to the standards and procedures for rural settlement.

2. Financing of the settlement will be granted in the form of a long-term loan, the conditions of which, including securities, will be determined by the World Zionist Organization.

3. Family dwellings will be constructed in the recognized manner by the Administration of New Settlements and Rural Construction, under the Office of Construction and Housing. Until the arrangement of a direct rental contract between the Administration and the Settler, the settler will be granted only the right of sub-lease — the principal lease being, as stated, in the hands of the Cooperative. At a time when a direct rental contract can be arranged between the Administration and the settler, the Cooperative will relinquish its right of lease, while its rights will be guaranteed in the rental contract and in the regulations of the Cooperative.

4. The World Zionist Organization will share in the independent financing of productive enterprises of the members, according

Appendices
to the Standard Settlement Allocation. This financing will be restricted to members of the Cooperative who are permanently residing on the premises and who are employed in the enterprise concerned, as long as they are so employed. Support of the productive enterprises of the Cooperative will be estimated according to the Standard Settlement Allocation (the basis – family).

5. The Standard Settlement Allocation will be valid for no more than 200 families on the settlement.

6. The Cooperative will base its budget on several sources:
- taxation of members;
- taxation of enterprises;
- profits of enterprises owned by the Cooperative;
- rental profits from property belonging to the Cooperative;
- support from the government and other institutions.

PRODUCTIVE ENTERPRISES.

1. Productive enterprises on the settlement will be conducted by the members or by corporations of members, under their own responsibility.

2. The Cooperative will construct buildings for industrial, business, and commercial use, of which it will retain ownership. The buildings will be made available by the Cooperative under rental terms to the members involved. The Cooperative will supervise the use of the property and will act to prevent any use not stipulated by the rental agreement, or detrimental to the character of the settlement or to the quality of its life. Rent will be assessed so as at least to cover the capital and interest required for the financing of the building and for its maintenance.

3. An industrial building will not be made available to any corporation, the majority of whose members do not belong to the Cooperative (i.e., who are not living permanently on the premises).

RELATIONS WITH THE SETTLEMENT DIVISION.

1. A contract of settlement will be signed in the recognized manner with the Cooperative and its members.

2. The settlement will be assigned for the purposes of joint supervision to one of the areas of the Settlement Division.

Appendices
3. The settlement's budget will be administered according to the accepted standards, procedures and documents, as mentioned above.

4. Securities will be arranged in the recognised manner.

5. The Cooperative will represent the settlement vis-a-vis the outside.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>POPULATION</th>
<th>ECONOMIC BASE</th>
<th>AFFILIATION</th>
<th>REGIONAL HIZMATI</th>
<th>TYPE OF SETTLEMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bet hatefrach 16/5/88</td>
<td>Beit Shemesh, south of Rashi road, east of Ramallah, 19 km north of Jerusalem</td>
<td>Kibb</td>
<td>25 families</td>
<td>Small workshops, children’s kindergarten</td>
<td>Independent Jordan</td>
<td>Hadati</td>
<td>Small community</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. dream 1979</td>
<td>Mishor Adumim</td>
<td>Industrial</td>
<td>218 families</td>
<td>Small workshops, commuting, factory for education and industry</td>
<td>Independent Jordan</td>
<td>Hatzevi</td>
<td>Industrial area</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Allon 1977</td>
<td>Allon road, 16 km east of Ramallah, 12 km north of NTeva</td>
<td>Kibb</td>
<td>43 families</td>
<td>Factory for furniture, flower houses, orchards, field school</td>
<td>Independent Jordan</td>
<td>Haoved</td>
<td>Kibbutz</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Dvir 1979</td>
<td>Northern Samaria, on the Ramallah–Jericho road, 12 km east of Jericho</td>
<td>Kibb</td>
<td>24 families</td>
<td>Factory for furniture, flower houses, tourism, orchards</td>
<td>Independent Jordan</td>
<td>sequel</td>
<td>Kibbutz</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Efrayim 1979</td>
<td>Kefar Saba to Nablus road, 15 km west of Jerusalem</td>
<td>Kibb</td>
<td>8 families</td>
<td>Field school, Hadati</td>
<td>Independent Jordan</td>
<td>Hadati</td>
<td>Field school</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Ela 1979</td>
<td>Jerusalem–Jericho road, 20 km west of Jerusalem</td>
<td>Kibb</td>
<td>11 families</td>
<td>Printing, computer service; regional meteorological station</td>
<td>Independent Jordan</td>
<td>Hatzevi</td>
<td>Small community</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Halamish 1979</td>
<td>Northern Samaria, on the Ramallah–Jericho road, 12 km east of Jericho</td>
<td>Kibb</td>
<td>15 families</td>
<td>Printing, computer service, small workshops</td>
<td>Independent Jordan</td>
<td>Haoved</td>
<td>Kibbutz</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Keduma 1979</td>
<td>Beit Shemesh, south of Rashi road, east of Ramallah, 19 km north of Jerusalem</td>
<td>Kibb</td>
<td>46 families</td>
<td>Small workshops, commuting, factory for education and industry</td>
<td>Independent Jordan</td>
<td>Hatzevi</td>
<td>Industrial area</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Kfar Nafalim 1979</td>
<td>Northern Samaria, on the Ramallah–Jericho road, 12 km east of Jericho</td>
<td>Kibb</td>
<td>15 families</td>
<td>Small workshops, commuting, factory for education and industry</td>
<td>Independent Jordan</td>
<td>Hatzevi</td>
<td>Industrial area</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Kfar Omer 1979</td>
<td>Northern Samaria, on the Ramallah–Jericho road, 12 km east of Jericho</td>
<td>Kibb</td>
<td>42 families</td>
<td>Small workshops, commuting</td>
<td>Independent Jordan</td>
<td>Haoved</td>
<td>Kibbutz</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Kfar Yekutiel 1979</td>
<td>Northern Samaria, on the Ramallah–Jericho road, 12 km east of Jericho</td>
<td>Kibb</td>
<td>15 families</td>
<td>Small workshops, commuting</td>
<td>Independent Jordan</td>
<td>Haoved</td>
<td>Kibbutz</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Kfar Qana 1979</td>
<td>Northern Samaria, on the Ramallah–Jericho road, 12 km east of Jericho</td>
<td>Kibb</td>
<td>46 families</td>
<td>Small workshops, commuting, factory for education and industry</td>
<td>Independent Jordan</td>
<td>Hatzevi</td>
<td>Industrial area</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Kfar HaYardeni 1979</td>
<td>Northern Samaria, on the Ramallah–Jericho road, 12 km east of Jericho</td>
<td>Kibb</td>
<td>46 families</td>
<td>Small workshops, commuting, factory for education and industry</td>
<td>Independent Jordan</td>
<td>Hatzevi</td>
<td>Industrial area</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Kfar Qana 1979</td>
<td>Northern Samaria, on the Ramallah–Jericho road, 12 km east of Jericho</td>
<td>Kibb</td>
<td>46 families</td>
<td>Small workshops, commuting, factory for education and industry</td>
<td>Independent Jordan</td>
<td>Hatzevi</td>
<td>Industrial area</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Kfar HaYardeni 1979</td>
<td>Northern Samaria, on the Ramallah–Jericho road, 12 km east of Jericho</td>
<td>Kibb</td>
<td>46 families</td>
<td>Small workshops, commuting, factory for education and industry</td>
<td>Independent Jordan</td>
<td>Hatzevi</td>
<td>Industrial area</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Kfar Hanas 1979</td>
<td>Northern Samaria, on the Ramallah–Jericho road, 12 km east of Jericho</td>
<td>Kibb</td>
<td>15 families</td>
<td>Small workshops</td>
<td>Independent Jordan</td>
<td>Haoved</td>
<td>Kibbutz</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Kfar Qana 1979</td>
<td>Northern Samaria, on the Ramallah–Jericho road, 12 km east of Jericho</td>
<td>Kibb</td>
<td>46 families</td>
<td>Small workshops, commuting, factory for education and industry</td>
<td>Independent Jordan</td>
<td>Hatzevi</td>
<td>Industrial area</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Kfar HaYardeni 1979</td>
<td>Northern Samaria, on the Ramallah–Jericho road, 12 km east of Jericho</td>
<td>Kibb</td>
<td>46 families</td>
<td>Small workshops, commuting, factory for education and industry</td>
<td>Independent Jordan</td>
<td>Hatzevi</td>
<td>Industrial area</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Kfar Qana 1979</td>
<td>Northern Samaria, on the Ramallah–Jericho road, 12 km east of Jericho</td>
<td>Kibb</td>
<td>46 families</td>
<td>Small workshops, commuting, factory for education and industry</td>
<td>Independent Jordan</td>
<td>Hatzevi</td>
<td>Industrial area</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### APPENDIX SIX

**THE PLANNING AND CONSTRUCTION PROCESS IN NEW SETTLEMENTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STAGE</th>
<th>ACTIVITY</th>
<th>SETTLEMENT DEPARTMENT</th>
<th>MINISTRY OF HOUSING PLANNING BOARD</th>
<th>INTERMINISTERIAL COMMITTEES</th>
<th>OTHER ACTIVITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>STAGE 1</td>
<td>Establishment of the new settlement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Definition of the settlement's social character</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Definition of the type of zones</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Location of the settlement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Ensuring safety prior to physical planning</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Mapping</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STAGE 2</td>
<td>Physical planning of the settlement and related plans for infrastructure (including planning of water, sewage, and electricity) and settlement area, identifying residential, business, public, and tourist uses, and drawing plans for various activities (water, sewage, drainage, electricity, etc.), including physical plans for residential and public areas, and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Physical planning of the settlement and related plans for infrastructure (including planning of water, sewage, and electricity) and settlement area, identifying residential, business, public, and tourist uses, and drawing plans for various activities (water, sewage, drainage, electricity, etc.), including physical plans for residential and public areas, and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Preparation of plans for approval by the Ministry of Housing and Construction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Preliminary Activities**

**Stage 1:**
- Establishment of the new settlement
- Definition of the settlement's social character
- Definition of the type of zones
- Location of the settlement
- Ensuring safety prior to physical planning
- Mapping

**Stage 2:**
- Physical planning of the settlement and related plans for infrastructure (including planning of water, sewage, and electricity) and settlement area, identifying residential, business, public, and tourist uses, and drawing plans for various activities (water, sewage, drainage, electricity, etc.), including physical plans for residential and public areas, and
- Preparation of plans for approval by the Ministry of Housing and Construction

**Stage 3:**
- Determination of programs and standards for residential and communal buildings
- Detailed plans for residential and communal buildings
- Program and standards for farm buildings
- Detailed plans for farm buildings

**Stage 4:**
- Preparation of detailed plans for construction and infrastructure:
  - Roads
  - Parks
  - Water
  - Electricity
  - Landscaping
  - Security systems
  - Other planning systems
- Evaluation of detailed plans
- Preparation of detailed implementation plans
- Implementation
- Coordination
- Construction
- Implementation
- Coordination

**Legend**
- Implementation
- Coordination
- Evaluation

*This process (with slight modifications only) is also valid for comprehensive planning (replanning) of existing settlements.

Source: Rokach 1978.
APPENDIX VII

ISRAELI POUND (IL) AND AMERICAN DOLLAR ($) EQUIVALENTS 1974-1980.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>$ Equivalents (End of year)</th>
<th>Rate of Inflation (Yearly average)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>$1 = IL4.20</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>$1 = IL6.00</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>$1 = IL8.75</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>$1 = IL15.39</td>
<td>42.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>$1 = IL19.00</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>$1 = IL35.30</td>
<td>111.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>$1 = IL71 *</td>
<td>133%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: In 1980, the Israeli currency was changed from that of the Israeli Pound (IL) to that of the Israeli Shekel (IS). Each IS is equal to 10 IL's. For the ease of the reader, only IL's are used in the thesis.
