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Faith and reason in Samuel Taylor Coleridge

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An account of the work carried out by
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under the direction of the Rev. R.P. McDermott, M.A.,
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and submitted in candidature for the degree of
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ABSTRACT

The essential features of the theology of S.T. Coleridge are discussed on the basis of both his published and unpublished work. The development of his thought after the publication of the *Aids to Reflection* is taken into account.

A comprehensive investigation of Coleridge's distinction between the Reason and the Understanding, upon which his theology was based, shows that this distinction, as well as his division of Reason into practical and theoretic Reason, was not Kantian, but was the Platonic distinction between that which pertains to the sense and that which pertains to the supersensible, between an intuitive and discursive manner of attaining knowledge. An attempt is made to explain why Coleridge had such a high regard for Kant that he borrowed much of his terminology, but yet deserted the whole spirit of his thought and never considered himself a follower of the critical philosophy. Throughout his life Coleridge remained an "evangelical" mystic.

The religious thought of Coleridge is discussed in the light of his growth from Unitarianism and pantheism to orthodox Christianity; he returned to the Church of England because of strictly religious considerations. Luther was Coleridge's greatest hero and authority, and Coleridge considered that he had taken up his mantle as reformer and theologian. He would complete Luther's thought. To the conceptual language of Luther's motif of justification by faith, Coleridge added the dynamic language of "being-in-Christ", thus forming a synthesis between imputed and imparted righteousness. Coleridge was certain that Luther never
meant the idea of justification to be merely notional or forensic, and never for a minute doubted that he walked in the spirit of his master.

Because of his insistence that all revelation was immediate, Coleridge had a difficult time finding the right niche in his theology for history. His relationship with Edward Irving, which led to a sort of crisis in his ideas on history and Biblical interpretation, is discussed together with these topics.
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INTRODUCTION

Regardless of the wide band of light or, for some types of thinking, shadow which Coleridge cast across his own century, it is not a very simple matter to obtain a clear outline of exactly what Coleridge himself taught. There are a number of reasons for this, but the primary difficulty is the seminal nature of his thought. He was content to lay down a foundation of certain fundamental principles, upon which not only those who came after him, such as Newman and Maurice, were able to build very differently styled superstructures, but upon which Coleridge himself often designed varying accommodations to suit either a pressing polemic need, or a growth in thought, or even a complete reversal of opinion. No sooner did Coleridge publish a design of the type building he proposed erecting upon his foundation than he discarded or modified it for another more advanced design, leaving behind him a trail of recantations and emendations. More often than not, the appended explanations purporting to clear up an error or omission in his thought only tended to leave it more confused.

Yet, through all the growth and change in his thought, Coleridge insisted that his fundamental principles remained the same. Some students and critics of Coleridge have insisted otherwise, and, I believe, have misinterpreted the very foundation of his thought. But the fault lies not so much with his readers as with Coleridge himself. In the instance of the basic principle
of his religious and philosophic thought, namely, the distinction in kind between the Reason and the Understanding, Coleridge managed to weave a rather heavy mist around what he actually conceived the distinction to be. I shall investigate the possibility of seeing through this mist, a possibility which must at least become a probability, if his theology is to have the consistency and meaning which Coleridge claims for it, and which, even from the most cursory reading of the Notes on English Divines or the Notes, Theological, Political, and Miscellaneous, it obviously has.

Another difficulty in approaching the theology of Coleridge is the fragmentary nature of his published work. Southey lamented, "All other men whom I have ever known are mere children to him, and yet all is palsied by a total want of moral strength. He will leave nothing behind him to justify the opinions of his friends to the world." **Much of Coleridge's influence on the religious world around him was accomplished through personal intercourse with a group of admirers. Hence, while this "oral tradition" was still very much alive for Maurice, Kingsley, and Rigg in the middle of the last century, a reader is today unfortunately committed to his published works. Although Coleridge's published works are ample enough today to invalidate the statement of Southey as prophecy, they reflect such an unsystematic author as to justify the fear which motivated the prophecy. His works are characterized by digressions, omissions, and promised disquisitions and explana-
ations to the extent that Moores verdict, "Inexcusably fragmentary", must remain; the Aids to Reflection is not much more than "a scrap-book of his musings." 2/

It has been pointed out by Coleridge's critics, as indeed it had been confessed by Coleridge himself, that when he felt himself confronted with a task he deemed important he instinctively shrank from performing it. Coleridge attached a Reformer's importance to his religious pronouncements and perhaps this helps to account for the fragmentary nature of his theological utterances. However, the important thing to recognize is the personality quirk which accompanied this horror of "ought". Stephen Potter has commented, "With this 'ought' phobia goes its reverse. Coleridge was at his best when nothing was expected of him. In no author is the difference between public and private writing more marked. His best lectures, all agree, were unprepared, or off the proposed subjects. His best prose is often to be found written down the margins of a borrowed book, with no care taken about its preservation; and of these notes themselves, it happens as often as not that the most valuable matter is to be found in a parenthesis." 2/

While the preceding quotation is the judgment of a contemporary literary scholar, F.J.A. Hort, had made a similar estimate directly concerning his theological thought in 1856, while the "oral tradition" was still very much alive. "Even in his continuous writings, the most trustworthy matter is usually
to be found in the notes; but the casual remarks, written in
the margins of his books, and published after his death, give
the deepest insight into his convictions, and in some measure
into the processes by which he arrived at them." 4/ Charles
Lamb learned even earlier the value of Coleridge's marginal
annotations and counselled his reader: "lend thy books; but
let it be to such a one as S.T.C. - he will return them (generally
anticipating the time appointed) with usury; enriched with
annotations, tripling their value." 5/

Coleridge was, of course, a voracious reader, and if a
work was obtainable during his lifetime it is almost safe to
assume that Coleridge had made its acquaintance. In many of
the books he read he made marginal notes. A philosophical or
theological work Coleridge always read sympathetically, and
never simply for information. His primary concern was not the
historical formation or transmission of thought, but whether or
not the ideas expounded by the writer were applicable to his own
experience. Usually, although by no means always, he wrote
spontaneously for his own benefit and satisfaction, not that of
his public. Herein lies the great value of both his marginalia
and notebooks, and is a factor very significant for Coleridge's
theology. He held certain theological opinions which he never
voiced, deeming that his "liberalism" would fall too heavily on
the heads of his contemporaries should he give public voice to
his opinions. 6/

Some of the marginalia relating to Coleridge's religious
thought were first published in the *Literary Remains* in 1838–9, edited by H.N. Coleridge. In 1853 Rev. Derwent Coleridge collected theological material from the *Literary Remains*, and, with a few additions, published it in two volumes called "Notes on English Divines". "Notes, Theological, Political, and Miscellaneous" followed in the same year, with the addition of more new material. Derwent Coleridge stated in the preface to his editions, "The present volume completes the publication of Coleridge's marginalia." But it was really only the beginning, the end of which is still not in view. Since that time, some of Coleridge's theological marginalia have been published in a scattered and often haphazard fashion in various places, but no more specifically theological collections of his unpublished marginalia have been published. Very much remains unpublished. A large collection of Coleridge marginalia from the library of Lord Coleridge at Ottery St. Mary, Devon, has been recently acquired by the British Museum. Together with the volumes previously held, this forms by far the largest collection of Coleridge marginalia. In 1952 the British Museum also acquired fifty-two notebooks in which Coleridge faithfully recorded his thoughts from year to year, now being edited for publication by Miss Kathleen Coburn. It is on these sources I have relied most heavily, finding the estimate of Hort to be very discerning.

H.N. Coleridge took considerable editorial liberties in the notes published in the *Literary Remains*, and Derwent Coleridge relied on his transcript in *Notes on English Divines*. 
Prof. Dunn complained that some notes on Dohne "have been 'edited' presumably to make them more orthodox." However, after checking the editing of a number of volumes, I have found them to be substantially reliable and I have used the printed text when quoting from marginalia published in Notes on English Divines. A few of H.N. Coleridge's corrections or omissions will, it is true, change the meaning of a sentence or paragraph, but most are justifiable. He removed some of the insulting polemical material frankly set out in notes which were obviously not intended for publication and which it would have been imprudent to have included only three years after S.T. Coleridge's death. Also, he removed some crudities of expression as well as revising or omitting a very few statements made by S.T.C. which the editor knew were not in accord with his later opinions.
CHAPTER I.

REASON AND UNDERSTANDING

1. Coleridge the Reformer.

In 1851 Carlyle wrote this famous, mildly sarcastic, appraisal of the "oracle of Highgate": "He was thought to hold, he alone in England, the key of German and other Transcendentalisms; knew the sublime secret of believing by 'the reason' what 'the understanding' had been obliged to fling out as incredible; and could still, after Hume and Voltaire had done their best and worst with him, profess himself an orthodox Christian, and say and print to the Church of England, with its singular old rubrics and surplices at Allhallowtide, Esto Perpetua. A sublime man; who, alone in those dark days, had saved his crown of spiritual manhood; escaping from the black materialism, and revolutionary deluges, with God, Freedom, Immortality still his; a king of men. The practical intellects of the world did not much heed him, or carelessly reckoned him a metaphysical dreamer; but to the rising spirits of the young generation he had this dusky sublime character; and sat there as a kind of Magus, girt in mystery and enigma; his Dodona oak-grove (Mr. Gilman's house at Highgate) whispering strange things, uncertain whether oracles or jargon." 1/

In 1857 Rigg stated that "one main point, perhaps the main point, of Coleridge's Intellectual Philosophy was the Kantian distinction between the Reason and the Understanding." 2/ In
the *Bibliotheca Sacra* for October, 1865, J.M. Hoppin published an article on the "new Coleridgean school" in which he said that its dominant characteristic was the special emphasis which it placed on the distinction between the Reason and the Understanding. But if there had been any doubt as to the importance of this distinction for Coleridge and his disciples from the way in which it affected their thought, Coleridge's critics had only to return to his own explicit statements concerning the centrality of the distinction in all his thinking. In philosophy Coleridge maintained that mastering the fundamental difference between the Reason and the Understanding was "pre-eminently the *Gradus ad Philosophiam.*" He expressed "no hesitation in undertaking to prove, that every heresy which has disquieted the Christian Church, from Tritheism to Socinianism, has originated in and supported itself by, arguments rendered plausible only by the confusion of these faculties, and thus demanding for the objects of one, a sort of evidence appropriated to those of another faculty." Without having mastered this distinction in one's own experience, without having lived out the distinction, it was impossible to have any real knowledge, because until one had experienced the diversity of the two faculties he could not know Reason; "and reason alone is knowledge." With the distinction between the Reason and Understanding Coleridge meant to overthrow the prevailing spiritual malady, a theology which had become "mechanical". Muirhead wrote rather scornfully of "the exaggerated sense of his own mission as a renovator of the Christian religion, blown into a flame by the
adulation of the more fanatical of his friends". It is undoubtedly true that Coleridge viewed his own role as reformer through eyes that had an exaggerated vision at times; but this zeal "as a renovator of the Christian religion" came from the failure of the Christianity around him to meet adequately his religious needs and not from fanatic friends. If anything, (as in the case of Edward Irving), Coleridge acted as a restraining influence on several of his more enthusiastic friends.

Early in his life, in 1798, while still of the Unitarian persuasion, Coleridge wrote to J.P. Estlin, a Unitarian minister, "To the cause of Religion I solemnly devote all my best faculties; and if I wish to acquire knowledge as a philosopher and fame as a poet, I pray for grace that I may continue to feel what I now feel, that my greatest reason for wishing the one and the other, is that I may be enabled by my knowledge to defend Religion ably, and by my reputation to draw attention to the defence of it." Coleridge, whose mind "ached to behold and know something great, something one and indivisible", and whose mind was "habituated to the Vast", whose consciousness had absorbed with a sacred horror the "intuition of absolute existence", whose conscience became so acutely aware of personal guilt that he filled his private notebooks with prayers for deliverance and made the sense of guilt the foundation of his "system", had an extreme seriousness toward renovating the Christian religion which was born of experiential dissatisfaction with the popular scheme of his day.

When Coleridge had in his own experience found a shallowness
in a certain phase of Christian teaching, this became an issue of vital concern not only for himself but for the nation and the future of the Christian Faith: "...in England, the demoralization of all ranks is frightful! ...the Dissenters ... & wealthier families in the mercantile world ... (have) a grasshopper noise, and agility about Religion - i.e. about Bibles! - Not concerning the Bible, but all about Bibles ..." - whether the addition of the Prayer Book should be made or not, or the worth of Bibles with or without the Apocrypha. Coleridge thought all this dreadful noise completely lacking in religious content; he accepted the mission as reformer. "A single word characterizes the Religion of this country. It is ideless, i.e. no Religion. The Ideas, that constitute Religion, neither exist for the clergy nor in the Laity. But as Leighton finely observes - the cold and darkness are often greatest just before the Break of Dawn. - There have been moments (Alas! how soon swallowed up in bodily languor!) when I have seemed to hear myself called to the perilous Heraldry - when the Spirit of Luther has pointed to a Trumpet. Truth! the Truth! the whole Truth! So only can a People be made free".

The passage above was written in 1827. That same year, regretting a previous breach with his family over religious beliefs and feeling the Reformer's loneliness, he wrote, "It was the Will of Providence that I should pursue my pilgrimage alone." In 1829 he lamented that the reformation he called for could not be readily understood and accepted. "Alas! I have to address men who have never distinctly or consciously referred their opinions to Principles,
much less traced the several steps of the ascent; and yet in order
to make any effect... I must urge only such arguments as the Reader
or Hearer will immediately see the full force of, and recognize as a
previous judgement of his own. In short, I dare not pretend to
inform, instruct, or guide...No! this Writer must be his Taylor
who is to take the cloths already in the Reader's possession, and
bring it back in the fashionable cut." Again in 1830 he com-
plained of his role: "I was born to... (an) ... invidious task -
viz. to propound and do my best to prove and elucidate certain truths,
at least certain positions, which leave no other choice to the Mind,
but that of receiving them as truths, or rejecting them as false-
hoods." He foresaw that he would be maligned for his
innovations in theology and wrote the same year, "I quite calculate
on my being one day or other holden in worse repute by many Christ-
ians than the Unitarian and open infidels. It must be undergone
by everyone who loves the truth for its own sake beyond all other
things." The desire to reform and re-align the truths of the
Christian Church could indeed assert itself in an exaggerated form,
as when he wrote, "...were I young, and had I the bodily strength
and animal spirits of early manhood with my present powers and con-
victions, I should not so far despair of a union between the Protes-
tant and the now papal but still Catholic Church, as to prevent
me from making it an object." All this was to be brought
about, moreover, by the realization of the distinction between
the Reason and Understanding in both sections of Christendom.

Coleridge's zeal as a Reformer of the Church was founded on
the positive desire to make the Church more compatible to those earnestly seeking after truth, as well as to bring about a vital religious attitude within the community of believers. Thus his call to the trumpet of Luther was accompanied by a call to evangelize those outside the Church. This active missionary programme in turn heightened his passion to renovate the Christian religion. In 1828 he complained, "...when I was deriving unspeakable comfort from the success with which God had blest my efforts in removing the scruples and aversions of many amicable and talented young men and of re-attaching them to our Church - I found a set of enemies from a quarter, that I could have least expected - the clergy themselves - and that precarious conventional orthodoxy, the offspring of Sect and Class... It was not sufficient that I believed the Gospel, as explained by our Church in the 39 Articles, Liturgy, her Homilies and by the great Founders and Fathers of the Church, I must likewise believe their arguments and modes of proving these truths - and am whispered down as an infidel for exposing their weakness..." 16

Coleridge's aim, as a Missionary to and Reformer of his age, is summed up very well in a note on Boehme, a passage similar to that with which he ended the Biographia Literaria: "This alone be my object, as this alone can be my Defence, the desire to kindle young minds, and to guard them against the temptation of the Scorners, by shewing that the Scheme of Christianity tho' not discoverable by reason, is yet accordant thereto - that Link follows Link by necessary consequences; that Religion passes out of the kin of Reason only where the eye of Reason has reached its own Horizon;
and that Faith is then but its continuation, even as the Day softens away into the sweet Twilight, and Twilight hushed and breathless steals into the Darkness; It is Night, sacred Night! the upraised Eye views only the starry Heaven, which manifests only itself - and the outward Look gazes on the stars twinkling in the awful Depth only to preserve the Soul steady and concentered in its trance of inward Adoration."

As Reformer and Missionary Coleridge never tired of diagnosing the spiritual diseases of his time which he would heal by his distinction between Reason and Understanding. The analysis of the ills of his own generation always ended or began in an indictment of the empiricists. "Mercy on the Age, and the People, for whom Locke is profound, and Hume subtle." In 1810 Henry Crabb Robinson reported, "Of Locke he spoke, as usual, with great contempt, that is, in reference to his metaphysical work. He considered him as having led to the destruction of metaphysical science by encouraging the unlearned public to think that with mere common sense they might dispense with disciplined study."

In 1830 Coleridge still sang the same tune: "...is it not mournful that such common-place stuff scummed from the mere surface of the Senses should have superseded the works of Luther, Melancthon, Bucer, yea, of Waterland, and Stillingfleet in the Libraries of the clergy, even of those who have and use Libraries?" And again in 1830 Coleridge pitied and defended himself against charges of injustice to Locke: "Give a dog a bad name; and you hang him. Worse, have him hunted with a black kitten at his tail - So has it been with me in relation to the black charge of Metaphysics - and then his jargon about Ideas!
Poor Ignoramus! - he should be informed, that long before he began to scribble or even breathe, there was a John Locke who had blown up all his ideal trash! Nevertheless, S.T.C. begs leave to observe that he had read Locke and read him all through more than once some 25 or 30 years ago - which is more, he ventures to believe, than 19 out of 20 of his compassionate critics can truly affirm of themselves!" 23/

Let us have at least a glimpse of that "common sense" theology which Coleridge felt had fallen prey to the tradition of Locke. This was the theology of the eighteenth century as a whole, excluding Wesley of course, whose contrasted thought stood mainly as a reaction against the tradition of Locke. At the time of Coleridge the most distinguished theological representative of the theology of evidence and demonstration was William Paley, who consequently became the prime target for the arrows of Coleridge. He founded religion upon intellectual evidences which confused mathematical and religious certainty. God was approached in the mathematical manner of demonstration, and known by evidences which could be compiled by analogy and argument. The mystical and poetical experience of religion was lost in the struggle for cold, dry proofs. When reading the works of Paley today it is difficult to realize how seriously his theology was taken. For the content of his theology it is significant to note that Paley was for a time a Fellow of Christ's College, Cambridge, where he lectured on Clarke's Attributes, Butler's Analogy, and Locke. His Moral and Political Philosophy was first published in 1785 and by 1809 had gone through seventeen editions. Natural Theology; or, Evidences of the Existence and
Attributes of the Deity collected from the Appearances of Nature was first published in 1802 and by 1820 had gone through twenty editions. As early as 1787 the Moral and Political Philosophy was adopted as a standard text at Cambridge for examinations. Natural Theology was used for many years as a classic text.  

Paley's moral system was a thoroughgoing statement of utilitarianism; morality was based on future retribution and reward: "...we can be obliged to nothing but what we ourselves are to gain or lose something by; for nothing else can be a violent motive to us. As we should not be obliged to obey the laws, or the magistrate, unless rewards or punishments, pleasure or pain, somehow or other depended upon our obedience; so neither should we, without the same reason, be obliged to do what is right, to practise virtue, or to obey the commands of God."  

As early as 1798 Coleridge remarked to Hazlitt that the adoption of Paley's Moral and Political Philosophy as a text for examinations at Cambridge was a national disgrace.  

When Coleridge first blew his trumpet of Reform so that it could be heard, in the publication of The Friend in 1809, he warned his readers that much of his thought would be in direct contradiction to that taught by the revered Dr. Paley, and announced in the Prospectus that "The object of The Friend, briefly and generally expressed, is - to uphold those truths and those merits, which are founded in the nobler and permanent parts of our nature, against the caprices of fashion..." Coleridge wished to refer men back to first principles, or, as is clear from The Friend, to the principle
of the difference between the Reason and the Understanding. Paley's sort of practical Christianity he considered "a total subversion, not only of Christianity, but of all morality; the very words virtue and vice being but lazy synonyms of prudence and miscalculation..." 29/

When later in life Coleridge transferred the emphasis in his campaign of reform from ethics to Redemption he was even more at odds with Paley. The watch which Paley used in his Natural Theology to lead people to the discovery of the existence and attributes of God is justly notorious. But Paley was by no means limited to the mainspring and mechanism of a watch. The wonderful fitness and contrivance of the spleen, liver, kidneys, and muscles were all specimens and proof of mechanical design. "In a city feast, for example, what deglutition, what anhelation; yet does this little cartilage, the epiglottis, so effectually interpose its office, so securely guard the entrance of the wind-pipe, that whilst morsel after morsel, draught after draught, are coursing one another over it, an accident of a crumb or a drop slipping into this passage (which nevertheless must be opened for the breath every second of time), excites in the whole company, not only alarm by its danger, but surprise by its novelty. Not two guests are choked in a century." 30/ He concluded that God was a very intelligent designer; intelligence implies consciousness and thought, and therefore the personality of God. The design of the contrivance is beneficial; pleasure is added to sensation, and therefore the divine goodness is proved. In A View of the
Evidences of Christianity, published in 1794, Paley went about proving the truth of the Biblical Revelation. He used the proofs of miracles as satisfactorily attested only in the Gospel, the certainty of the belief of the Apostles in Christ, the superior morality of the Gospel, and the originality of Christ's character.

Also standing in the tradition of Locke, but, unlike Paley, outside the Liturgy and Articles of the Established Church, was Joseph Priestley, who with Paley suffered the biting theological scorn of Coleridge. At the time of Coleridge the Unitarians held very closely to the views of Priestley, and Coleridge considered Priestley the author of English Unitarianism. For the tenets of Unitarianism Coleridge had his own titles of abuse. It was "Psilanthropism, or the assertion of the mere humanity of Christ." Usually he called it Socinianism, a term which he used extensively "as the general term for all Heresies that deny or metaphorize the mystery of Redemption and Incarnation." Coleridge had said in 1807 that he believed that anyone beginning with Paley and not held down by the Liturgy and Articles, plus the pay and establishment of the Church of England, would end up with Socinianism or beyond. Like Paley, Priestley had the sincere conviction that his doctrines could be logically proved by rationalistic argument. Christ was a very good man whom God raised from the dead as an example of what would happen to all who followed the exemplary morality of Christ. Priestley used the miracles as proofs of the truth of Christianity: "... the Universal Parent of Mankind commissioned Jesus Christ to invite
men to the practice of virtue, by the assurance of his mercy to the penitent, and of his purpose to raise to immortal life and happiness all the virtuous and good, but to inflict an adequate punishment on the wicked. In proof of this he wrought many miracles, and after a public execution he rose again from the dead."

This quotation contains not only the sum of Priestley's theology, but adequately reflects the Unitarian teaching which Coleridge embraced and later turned against in scorn. All this worry about evidence, whereby Christianity was thought to be capable of rational proof, was more than Coleridge could bear. In the *Aids to Reflection* he wrote: 

"... I more than fear, the prevailing taste for books of Natural Theology, Physico-Theology, Demonstrations of God from Nature, Evidences of Christianity, and the like. Evidences of Christianity! I am weary of the word. Make a man feel the want of it; rouse him, if you can, to the self-knowledge of his need of it; and you may safely trust it to its own Evidence, — remembering only the express declaration of Christ himself: *No man cometh to me, unless the Father leadeth him.*"

2. The Conflict of Head and Heart.

To do battle with the superficial, rationalistic theology of evidence and demonstration Coleridge forged his weapon of a distinction between the Reason and the Understanding. Underlying all of Coleridge's early thought which led up to the formulation...
of the distinction was the problem of knowledge. The problem first asserted itself in what could be called, even now, a philosophic manner, namely, the contribution made by the mind itself in the act of knowing; but it was never separate from the religious question of knowledge of God. It has been well noted: "All the time he is haunted by the desire to find everywhere the working of the mind of God; and in his linguistic as in his literary criticisms, religious conviction is always lurking in the background." 27/

Coleridge was born when the empirical theological tradition was at its strongest, yet Coleridge was by nature unable to fit himself into this tradition. For Coleridge the emotions were of as great authority as the process of reasoning on objects presented to the senses. Through a total experience Coleridge knew himself to be in immediate contact with a supernatural reality and to have a knowledge of this reality which could not be explained in logic. Dissatisfaction with the empirical school of Locke was latent from the beginning. He wrote in an autobiographical letter, "My mind had been habituated to the Vast, and I never regarded my senses in any way as the criteria of my belief," and he "ached to behold and know something great, something one and indivisible." 28/ Yet the empirical tradition was ingrained in Coleridge to the extent that he was not, at first at least, willing to capitulate to the mystical Neoplatonic camp. He demanded an explanation of how it was possible to have knowledge of supernatural reality in one's
experience; he wanted an account of why it was that knowledge of spiritual reality given in experience could properly be called knowledge. Coleridge himself was never in doubt that this mystical experience truly apprehended reality. The contrasting traditions of the empiricists and the Platonists reflect the conflict which Coleridge felt and wished to harmonize. The empirical tradition contributed logic which was understandable and satisfying to the intellect; the Platonist mystical tradition contributed images and ideas in which the emotions were sympathetically nurtured. The inherent mystical nature of Coleridge found satisfaction in the Platonist tradition, yet his intellect longed for the logic of the empiricists. Coleridge himself was well aware of this conflict between head and heart very early in life.

While at Christ's Hospital, Coleridge announced that he was an infidel and was promptly thrashed for the announcement by the Schoolmaster, Boywer. 29/ Coleridge later credited Voltaire's Philosophical Dictionary for infidelity which he described as only assumed. "...I sported infidel: but my infidel vanity never touched my heart." 40/ While still at Christ's Hospital he made an intimate acquaintance with the mystical tradition of Platonism which he never deserted. Lamb related how at Christ's Hospital he had stood entranced with admiration while Coleridge unfolded the mysteries of Plotinus. 41/ While there was an increasing influence of Neoplatonism in England at this time through the translations of Thomas Taylor, Coleridge insisted in a notebook in 1810, "I was not originally led to the study of this Philosophy
by Taylor's translations; but in consequence of early, half-
accidental, pre-possession in favor of it sent in early manhood
for Taylor's Translations and Commentaries..." 42/ Yet in
1794 after what he termed an "intense study", he complimented
"Locke, Hartley, and others who have written most wisely on the
nature of man," 43/ and two years later named his son David
Hartley in the hope that "ere he be a man ... his head will be
convinced of, and his heart saturated with, the truths so ably
supported by that great master of Christian Philosophy." 44/
However, he was not uncritical of Hartley, 45/ and in 1796 he
publicly questioned the "mechanical philosophy". 46/ But
although he was not satisfied with the empirical tradition he
found that he could at least understand it. The Platonist he
could not, and while Plato said life was harmonious, "he might
as well have said a fiddlestick's end; but I love Plato, his
dear, gorgeous nonsense." 47/

The conflicting claims of head and heart became even more
pronounced when carried from speculation on the nature of man
and life to the question of religious belief. While Coleridge
was at Cambridge there was a strong Unitarian influence, mainly
in the person of William Frend, to whom Coleridge gave credit
for his conversion to Unitarianism. 48/ In 1794, while still
at Cambridge, he wrote his brother, the Rev. George Coleridge,
that while he had at all times and places defended the "Holy One
of Nazareth," he was nevertheless an infidel because he could
not "thrust his head into a mud gutter, and say, 'How deep I am!'"49/
Again the same year he wrote his brother, "... my religious creed bore, and, perhaps, bears a correspondence with my mind and heart. I had too much vanity to be altogether a Christian, too much tenderness of nature to be utterly an infidel. Fond of the dazzle of wit, fond of sublety of argument, I could not read without some degree of pleasure the levities of Voltaire or the reasonings of Helvetius; but, tremulously alive to the feelings of humanity, and susceptible to the charms of truth, my heart forced me to admire the 'beauty of holiness' in the Gospel, forced me to love the Jesus, whom my reason (or perhaps my reasonings) would not permit me to worship, - my faith, therefore, was made up of the Evangelists and deistic philosophy ... a kind of religious twilight." It is striking that he used "religious twilight" to describe his faith when he was interested in Unitarianism, for his favorite description of this manner of thinking about religion in his later life after he had rejected it was by the phrase "Socinian Moonlight." In 1834, the year in which he died, Coleridge said that the sole ground of his Unitarianism had been "a strong sense of the repugnancy of the doctrine of vicarious atonement to the moral being." He had strictly an intellectual allegiance to Unitarianism, however, for it was the failure of Unitarianism to meet the demands of the religious experience of sin in a supernatural redemption which brought about his ultimate condemnation of the sect, just as it was the failure of Hume and Locke to meet the emotional, creative aspect of knowledge which led to their rejection. A questioning entry in an early notebook bears out
the fact that Coleridge was never uncritical in his intellectual allegiance to the Unitarians: "Unitarians travelling from Orthodoxy to Atheism. Why?" In 1796 he inquired in a letter written to a Unitarian minister why it was that Dr. Priestley was not an atheist. "He asserts in three different places that God not only does, but is everything ... But if God be everything, everything is God: which is all the Atheists assert ... Has not Dr. Priestley forgotten that Incomprehensibility is as necessary an attribute of the First Cause as Love, or Intelligence?"

But in his typically Neoplatonic rejection of the vicarious atonement he had adopted the main tenets of Priestley and Unitarianism in which he had the freedom for speculation he desired. In 1795 he gave a series of theological lectures at Bristol in order to acquire funds for his Pantisocratic venture in America and followed completely the Unitarian teaching and, it should be remarked, Paley as well. He showed that the belief in Deity was almost an axiom because of the very evident contrivance and fitness of things which are met in all parts of the universe. He appealed to miracles as proofs and evidences of the divine nature of the Christian religion. He pointed to the resurrection as a proof that all men will live hereafter. By reducing the mysteries of Christianity to the Unitarian minimum Coleridge felt better able to exercise his missionary zeal on the heathen. He wrote to John Thelwall, attempting to convert him to Unitarian beliefs, in 1796, "...you say the Christian is a
mean religion. Now the religion which Christ taught is simply, first, that there is an omnipresent Father of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness, in whom we all of us move and have our being; and, secondly, that when we appear to men to die we do not utterly perish, but after this life shall continue to enjoy or suffer the consequences and natural effects of the habits we have formed here, whether good or evil. This is the Christian religion, and all of the Christian religion." From time to time Coleridge preached in the Unitarian chapels, and Cottle related how in 1796 he preached in the chapel at Bath dressed in a blue coat and white waistcoat, refusing to wear the hide-all sable gown. He preached in the morning on the Corn Laws and, while dining in a tavern, decided to preach another sermon that afternoon. He then preached on the Hair Powder Tax. Although he was never very enthusiastic about the idea and did not think it proper to "preach for hire", he contemplated for several years the prospect of entering the Unitarian ministry "as a less evil than starvation." Before finally accepting an annuity of £150 a year from Josiah Wedgwood on condition that he give up any ideas about the ministerial profession and devote his time to poetry and philosophy in 1798, Coleridge had refused a previous offer with a list of reasons why he preferred the Unitarian ministry, one of which was that "the necessary creed in our sect is but short ... it will be necessary for me, in order to my continuance as an Unitarian Minister to believe that Jesus Christ was the Messiah ... in all other points I may play
off my Intellect ad libitum." In other words, there was to be no mystery at all; to believe that Jesus was the Messiah meant only to believe that he was a Jewish Napoleon. The intellectual faculty had the upper hand in this period of Coleridge's life. Guilt was out of the question; he denied its possibility. Prayer could have no efficacy. He could not reconcile his intellect to the Sacraments and thus dismissed them. His interest was primarily that of morality but he was emphatic that true morality was dependent upon the reconciliation of head and heart. The best way to achieve this was to preach the Gospel.

But even while Coleridge affirmed by voice the rational doctrines of Priestley, he fed his Platonic "predisposition" elsewhere. He borrowed Cudworth's *True Intellectual System of the Universe* from the Bristol Library. From Cudworth, who proposed to refute the radical empiricism of Hobbes, could possibly have come the seeds from which grew the concept of imagination as a creative force of the mind. He was interested enough in Jacob Boehme in 1796 to state in a notebook the intention of writing his life and to make a memorandum to reduce to a regular form the Swedenborgian reveries. He also greatly admired the disciple and interpreter of Boehme, William Law. He appreciated the writings of George Fox, the exponent of the inward light. Coleridge had written in 1794, "I have little faith, yet am wonderfully fond of speculating on mystical schemes. Wisdom may be gathered from the maddest flights of
imagination, as medicines were stumbled upon in the wild processes of alchemy." In the *Biographia Literaria* Coleridge thanked Boehme, Fox, and Law, who had "contributed to keep alive the heart in the head," and who had given him "an indistinct, yet stirring and working presentiment, that all the products of the mere reflective faculty partook of Death, and were as the rattling twigs and sprays in winter, into which a sap was yet to be propelled from some root to which I had not penetrated, if they were to afford my soul either food or shelter." 

The best insight into the conflicting claims of Coleridge's religious views at about the time of his leaving Cambridge is found in the poem *Religious Musings*. There he could refer to Priestley as "patriot, and saint, and sage," and to Hartley as "he of mortal kind wisest." But he completely deserted the spirit of their thought while lauding them with encomiums. Coleridge knew himself to be brought into communion with the "one omnipresent mind" whose "most holy name is Love" by a direct intuitional act, not by any process of reasoning or association of ideas.

> God only to behold, and know, and feel,  
> Till by exclusive consciousness of God  
> All self-annihilated it shall make  
> God its identity: God all in all!  
> We and our Father one! 

'Tis the sublime of man,  
Our noontide majesty, to know ourselves  
Parts and proportions of one wondrous whole!  

67/
While yet adopting Unitarianism as his favored sect, Coleridge went through a period of avowed pantheism about the turn of the century, noting in 1802, "Strong feeling and an active intellect conjoined, lead almost necessarily, in the first stage of philosophising, to Spinozism." McKenzie recognized the conflict in Coleridge between heart and head and wrote, "The entire range of Coleridge's thought presents a mind which is trying to find a rational philosophic justification for an intuitive emotional belief." This is a true representation of the thought of Coleridge up until the time he had formulated the distinction between the Reason and Understanding, which he had done at least as early as 1806, but after this it was rather the problem of communicating the justification for the "intuitive emotional belief" which Coleridge had to his own philosophic satisfaction accounted for in the distinction.

3. Fancy and Imagination.

The first attempt of Coleridge to account for the experienced reconciliation of head and heart in the act of knowing was expressed in a philosophic manner. It took the form of an attempt to answer a literary question of why some poetry appealed to him so much more than other poetry. In 1796 Coleridge had written in a letter to Thelwall, "I feel strongly and I think strongly, but I seldom feel without thinking or think without feeling ... My philosophical opinions are blended
with or deduced from my feelings."  

In Chapter IV of the *Biographia Literaria* Coleridge related how in his twenty-fourth year (1796) he had heard Wordsworth read one of his poems and had been so impressed that it had led him to attempt to explain the superiority of the poem. "I no sooner felt, than I sought to understand."  And what was the main attraction for Coleridge in Wordsworth's poetry? "It was the union of deep feeling with profound thought."  While Coleridge "sought to understand" why this was a fact in the poetry of Wordsworth while it was not present in other poetry, "Repeated meditations led me first to suspect, (and a more intimate analysis of the human faculties, their appropriate marks, functions, and effects matured my conjecture into full conviction,) that fancy and imagination were two distinct and widely different faculties, instead of being, according to the general belief, either two names with one meaning, or, at furthest, the lower and higher degree of one and the same power."  

So Coleridge formulated his distinction between Fancy and Imagination. It is not needful to go into any detail concerning this distinction; it has been given lengthy treatment by Shawcross, Richards, and Willey. What interests us is the similarity with which Coleridge solved the problem of creativity in poetry by his distinction between Fancy and Imagination with the manner in which he "saved the crown of his spiritual manhood" by his distinction between Reason and Understanding. Fancy was a faculty of adaptation and selection:
"Fancy must receive all its materials ready made from the law of association." 78/ The Imagination, on the other hand, was "the living Power and prime Agent of all human Perception, and as a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM." 79/ By using Imagination, and only by using Imagination, could the poet himself construct creatively the world of thought and emotion which surrounded him, a world that was truly his own and with which he was one. If Fancy was the dominant faculty the poet merely reproduced the world around him in his poetry. The Imagination was an act of the total personality of the poet. When using Imagination the mind of the poet, working in conjunction with the emotions, did not then merely reproduce external images, but, as Willey stated, "it knows its objects not by passive reception, but by its own energy and under its own necessary forms; indeed, it knows not mere objects as such, but itself in the objects." 80/ Coleridge vouched that "Milton had a highly imaginative, Cowley a very fanciful mind." 81/

There was never any doubt in Coleridge's mind that the origination of the distinction between Fancy and Imagination was his, and not Wordsworth's. 82/ Shawcross has shown that the distinction was formulated before Coleridge went to Germany in 1798. 83/ Coleridge and Wordsworth had frequent conversations on the subject of Fancy and Imagination in poetry, but Coleridge explained that while Wordsworth had only wished to deduce the distinction from its manifestation in poetry, it had been his
own object to investigate the seminal principle. In other words, Coleridge's interest in asserting that Fancy and Imagination were actually two different faculties was not simply to enable him to explain why the poetry of Wordsworth transcended that of the eighteenth century, although by it he achieved this function, but to investigate the problem of knowledge. When one reflects that he could have explained the superiority of Wordsworth's poetry rather simply and easily by noting that the distinction between Fancy and Imagination was a matter of degree, and that Wordsworth only used more Imagination when writing poetry than did other poets, Coleridge's assertion that he was even then interested in the "seminal principle" must be taken at face value. For Coleridge affirmed that Fancy and Imagination differed not in degree, but in kind.

While the activity and creativity of the mind in the act of perception were the main emphases in Coleridge's conception of the Imagination, he never attempted to express in Kantian logic, or any other sort of logic, how this was so. He simply stated that it was a fact. In stating that it was a fact he had recourse to analogy with the creative act of God. In 1804 Coleridge mentioned in a letter that the Imagination was "a dim analogue of creation, not all that we can believe, but all that we can conceive of creation." However, the Imagination was not just an "analogue of creation" but was itself dependent upon generative sparks from the Creator. This was the very heart of the "seminal principle", and it is here that Coleridge's ideas
on the Imagination accepted a religious outlook, the real substance of which Richards and Willey seem to have disregarded in their discussion of Coleridge on the Imagination, for the "generative sparks" from the "infinite I AM" were not, as Willey says, "influxes proceeding from Nature." The "I AM" was Coleridge's title for the personal God. In 1815 the Imagination was defined as the "living Power and prime Agent of all human Perception, and as a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM." But the whole principle of knowledge was set forth as the identification of subject and object in the infinite I AM. As the "prime Agent of all human Perception" the Imagination was not only a repetition in the finite mind of the creative act, but was dependent in its creative act of unification upon a prior intuitive identification with the infinite I AM in which seminal stimulants were received. It was, Coleridge could have said, dependent upon the λόγος συνεφακτικός, not the immanent "rational principle" of the Stoics, but of the living, personal God.

4. Reason and Understanding - Attempts at Definition and Distinction

In a very similar manner to the way in which Coleridge reconciled heart and head in his concept of Imagination, he reconciled emotional and intellectual claims to knowledge for specifically religious purposes in the distinction between Reason and Understanding. In 1801 or 1802 Coleridge exclaimed, "Gocinianism moonlight - Methodism a stove! 0 for some sun to
unite heat and light." Consequently, in 1803, Coleridge gave as the object of his study, "What is it, that I employ metaphysics in?... to make the Reason spread Light over our Feelings, to make our Feelings diffuse vital warmth thro' our Reason, - these are my objects..." In a letter written in 1806 we get our first glimpse into Coleridge's decision about the diversity of the Reason and Understanding. The distinction was avowedly devised in order to offer to Reason the capacity for spiritual apprehension. It is noticeable that the problem for Coleridge was not how to convince his own mind of the validity of intuitional knowledge of God, but how to communicate this knowledge without charges of enthusiasm and mysticism from those he referred to as "honest infidels." "What the Spirit of God is, and what the Soul is, I dare not suppose myself capable of conceiving; according to my religious and philosophical creed they are known by those, to whom they are revealed, ... Datur, non intelligitur. They can only be explained by images, that themselves require the same explanation,... The only reasonable form of question appears to me to be, under what connection of ideas we may conceive and express ourselves concerning them, as that there shall be no inconsistency to be detected in our definitions, and no falsehood felt during their enunciation, which might war with our internal sense of their actuality." After attempting to communicate his thoughts about the soul and conscience, he comes to the account of what he believes the distinction between Reason and Understanding to be. The
"Faculty of the Soul which apprehends and retains the mere notices of Experience, as for instance that such an object has a triangular figure, that it is of such or such a magnitude, and of such and such a color, and consistency, with the anticipation of meeting the same under the same circumstances, in other words, all the mere \( a \) of our nature, we may call the Understanding. But all such notices, as are characterized by **Universality** and **Necessity**, as that every Triangle must in all places and at all times have its two sides greater than its third -- and which are evidently not the effect of any Experience, but the condition of all Experience -- that indeed without which Experience itself would be inconceivable, we may call Reason -- and this class of knowledge was called by the Ancients \( \text{Nov}^\text{c} \) in distinction from the former, or \( \text{A}^\text{r} \). Reason is therefore most eminently the Revelation of an immortal soul, and its best Synonyme..." 90/

The first time Coleridge made public the distinction between the Reason and Understanding was in **The Friend**. While Coleridge later said that the main purpose of **The Friend** was to make clear the distinction between the Reason and the Understanding, 91/ it seems evident from remarks inserted in the revised edition of 1818 that the distinction had not yet assumed in 1809-10 the **raison d'\^etre** it later came to have.

The point of departure for Coleridge in showing the diversity of Reason and Understanding in **The Friend** was the evident difference between animal and human life. It was not
the first time, nor the last, that Coleridge complained that the prevailing systems of thought did little to account for this difference. But Coleridge decided that what constitutes man as man is Reason; animals have an Understanding differing from that in man only by degrees of development. In defining Reason Coleridge asserted that he did not object to following Jacobi. It is "an organ bearing the same relation to spiritual objects, the universal, the eternal, and the necessary, as the eye bears to material and contingent phaenomena." But he insisted on going where Jacobi would not, and qualified the definition with an "if"; if, he went on, the organ is admitted to be identical with its appropriate objects. "Thus God, the soul, eternal truth, etc., are the objects of reason; but they are themselves reason." He believed that whatever is conscious self-knowledge is Reason, and "in this sense it may be safely defined the organ of the supersensuous." On the other hand, the Understanding "may be defined the conception of the sensuous" whenever it does not use the "inward eye" of Reason. It is that faculty "by which we generalize and arrange the phaenomena of perception." The great difference between animals and mankind was this: "The understanding of the higher brutes has only organs of outward sense, and consequently material objects only; but man's understanding has likewise an organ of inward sense, and therefore the power of acquainting itself with invisible realities or spiritual objects." The organ of inward sense was Reason. Thus the Understanding possessed two
distinct organs; the outward sense, and the inward sense which was Reason.

Coleridge also admitted at this time of another valid use of the word Reason, but thought it "less definite, and more exposed to misconception." This he called the "rationalised understanding." Here we see Kant creeping in. It consisted of the Understanding considered "as using the reason, so far as by the organ of reason only we possess the ideas of the necessary and the universal. Reason therefore, in this secondary sense, and used, not as a spiritual organ but as a faculty (namely, the understanding of soul enlightened by that organ) -- reason, I say, or the scientific faculty, is the intellection of the possibility or essential properties of things by means of the laws that constitute them. Thus the rational idea of a circle is that of a figure constituted by the circumvolution of a straight line with its one end fixed."

Every man had Reason in the same degree in the secondary sense when spoken of as a faculty, because every man had the power to know whether two ideas in his head were or were not contradictory. But although every man had Reason, the "means of exercising it, and the materials (i.e. facts and ideas) on which it is exercised," were possessed by different men in different degrees, and therefore the end result of reasoning was, or could be, entirely different in different individuals.
Farther on in *The Friend* Coleridge summed up his definition of Reason and Understanding in a curious mixture of Kant and Plato: "By the understanding, I mean the faculty of thinking and forming judgements on the notices furnished by the sense... By the pure reason, I mean the power by which we become possessed of principles (the eternal verities of Plato and Descartes), and of ideas (N.B. not images), as the ideas of a point, a line, a circle, in mathematics; and of justice, holiness, free-will, etc., in morals." ²⁴/

Toward the end of Essay 4, Section I, of the *The Friend* Coleridge summed up his view of Reason in a passionate encomium: "Reason! best and holiest gift of Heaven and bond of union with the Giver! The high title by which the majesty of man claims precedence above all other living creatures! Calm and incorruptible legislator of the soul, without whom all its other powers would 'meet in mere oppugnancy!' Sole principle of permanence amid endless change! in a world of discordant appetites and imagined self-interests the only common measure! ...Thrice-blessed faculty of reason! all other gifts, though goodly and of celestial origin, health, strength, talents, all the powers and all the means of enjoyment, seem dispensed by chance or sullen caprice -- thou alone, more than even the sunshine, more, than the common air, art given to all men and to every man alike! To thee, who being one art the same in all, we owe the privilege, that of all we can become one, a living whole!" ²⁵/
In Essay II of Section II Coleridge described the groundwork of all true Philosophy as "the full apprehension of the difference between the contemplation of reason, namely, that intuition of things which arises when we possess ourselves, as one with the whole, which is substantial knowledge, and that which presents itself when transferring reality to the negations of reality, to the ever-varying framework of the uniform life, we think of ourselves as separated beings, and place nature in antithesis to the mind, as object to subject, thing to thought, death to life. This is abstract knowledge, or the science of the mere understanding."

The next stage of Coleridge's development of the concept of the Reason and Understanding is found in the Statesman's Manual published in 1816. He described Reason. "The reason, (not the abstract reason, not the reason as the mere organ of science, or as the faculty of scientific principles and schemes a priori; but reason) as the integral spirit of the regenerated man, reason substantiated and vital, one only, yet manifold, overseeing all, and going through all understanding; the breath of the power of God, and a pure influence from the glory of the Almighty, which remaining in itself regenerateth all other powers, and in all ages entering into holy souls maketh them friends of God and prophets; (Wisdom of Solomon, C.VII.) this reason without being either the sense, the understanding or the imagination, contains all three within itself, even as the mind contains its thoughts, and is present in and through them all;... Each
individual must bear witness of it to his own mind, even as he
describes life and light; and with the silence of light it
describes itself, and dwells in us only as far as we dwell in it.
It cannot in strict language be called a faculty, much less a
personal property, of any human mind. He, with whom it is
present, can as little appreciate it, whether totally or by
partition, as he can claim ownership in the breathing air or make
an inclosure in the cope of heaven." 27/

The Understanding was the logical faculty for use in
abstraction. Its proper use was dependent upon the enlighten­
ment of Reason. Of the enlightened Understanding Coleridge wrote,
"Our Shakespeare in agreement both with truth and the philosophy
of his age names it 'discourse of reason,' as an instrumental
faculty belonging to reason." 28/

In a MS. note on the first edition of the Statesman's
Manual both Reason and Understanding were described in a two­
fold character. 29/ Coleridge called them the "critical" or
"intellective," and "moral" or "practical."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason (Intellective)</th>
<th>Understanding (Intellective)</th>
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| The contemplation of immediate truths - or the immediate recog­
nition of the necessary and the universal in negative and positive positions. | The Power of generalizing the notions of the Sense.... the faculty of mediate Truths or knowledge obtained discursively. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason (Practical)</th>
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<tr>
<td>The power of determining the Will by Ideas, as ultimate ends.</td>
<td>The faculty of selecting and adapting means to proximate ends - i.e. such ends as will then become means.</td>
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N.B. Reason in the highest sense of the term as the focal point of the Theoretic and Practical, or as both in one, as the Source of Ideas and conversely, an Idea is a self-affirming Truth at once theoretic and practical which the reason presents to itself as a form of itself. For the understanding, an Idea can be only described negatively - as that it is supersensuous.

In the Aids to Reflection we find the next significant attempt to disentangle Reason and Understanding, with Coleridge's plea that he has been contending for the diversity of the two for twenty years. The point of departure was again, as it had been in The Friend in 1809, the relation of the human Understanding to instinct in animals. He equated the Understanding in humans with instinct in animals, and referred to Huber's observations on ants to prove it. However, in 1825 he was more explicit and emphatic in asserting that Reason differs in kind, not merely in degree, from the Understanding. This was the main point he wished to make. For this purpose he constructed another chart of the functions of Reason and Understanding in which each was contradistinguished from the other. The Understanding was discursive; but Reason was fixed. The Understanding appealed to some other faculty as its authority, but Reason appealed only to itself. The Understanding was the faculty of reflection, but Reason of contemplation, "for Reason (says our great Hooker) is a direct aspect of Truth, an inward Beholding, having a similar relation to the Intelligible or Spiritual, as SENSE has to the Material or Phenomenal."  

N.B. The Practical understanding is substantially the same faculty as the intelligial Instinct in the Dogs, Elephant, Ant, etc., and becomes Understanding by its co-existence in one and the same subject with the Reason and the Free Will, - Hence Shakespeare calls the Understanding "Discourse of Reason."
in definition, therefore in kind.

Again Coleridge divided Reason into the Practical and Intellective, now calling the latter Speculative, however. If Reason is "contemplated distinctively in reference to formal (or abstract) truth, it is the speculative reason; but in reference to actual (or moral) truth, as the fountain of ideas, and the light of the conscience, we name it the practical reason." To the speculative or theoretic Reason Coleridge assigned the office of deciding negatively as to the truth of doctrine. That is, Reason, while not able to discover speculatively the truth of Christian doctrine, should be able to point out by use of logic why every other system is false.

5. The Basis for Distinction - Kant or Plato?

We have now before us the various definitions, and attempts at definition, of the distinction between Reason and Understanding which, we noted above, Coleridge himself considered all-important for his theology, and, in fact, all theology. In all of them Coleridge considered the Understanding as the faculty which judged according to sense. In the Aids to Reflection he had said that he was using the authority of Leighton and Kant in assigning the Understanding this definition. It was, throughout his attempts at definition, much more than a faculty of judgement as the faculty of reflection and generalization and thinking, but Coleridge was nevertheless always clear that the
Understanding is the faculty which has to do with the world of phenomena only. It is not the faculty of the supersensuous. Of noumena the Understanding can have no knowledge. As must be evident to the reader, even from the few short passages of definition quoted, the confusion begins when we attempt to ascertain what Coleridge meant by Reason. Having admitted to be following Kant in his definition of the Understanding as the faculty which judged according to sense, did he also follow Kant's definition of Reason, and did he make the same distinction between Reason and Understanding, as well as the same division of Reason into practical and speculative? Or did Reason have anything to do with "reasoning", or logic, or concepts at all? Because of Coleridge's close study of Kant and his high esteem and avowed love of the "Sage of Königsberg," as well as a rather close following of Kant in several of his works, it could well appear without a too close reading of, for instance, the Aids to Reflection that Coleridge was at least a disciple of Kant if not always faithful to his master. It has been shown how closely Coleridge adhered to the pattern of Kant's thought in expounding the dogma of original sin in the Aids to Reflection, how the unpublished Treatise on Logic is almost a paraphrase and summary of the aesthetic and transcendental analytics of the Critique of Pure Reason, how the Essay on Faith is filled with Kantian ideas, and how the idea of faith set forth in the essay coincides almost exactly with Kant's laws of pure reason.
In regard to the definitions of Reason it has been said that Coleridge followed Kant in his division of Reason into practical and theoretic, and that the various definitions of theoretic reason are always Kantian, although he differed greatly in his concept of practical reason. Further, there was the supersensuous faculty given to practical Reason and its primacy over theoretic Reason which are Kantian ideas. From the similarities between Coleridge and Kant it has been determined in the latest book published on the thought of Coleridge that by 1818, while rewriting *The Friend*, Coleridge returned to Kant after a short romance with Schelling during the period of the *Biographia Literaria* after which there was no more change.

While there has been no dearth of critical judgments on the thought of Coleridge which have allied him with Platonism (and, in fact, the Platonism in his thought has never been denied), it is nevertheless vitally necessary for a correct understanding of Coleridge's theology that all Kantian epithets be removed, and, most important, that he not be understood as a follower of the "critical way". One of the difficulties in approaching the theology of Coleridge for the general reader is that he will most unfortunately find in many of the short reference works, as for instance *The Oxford Companion to English Literature*, that Coleridge advocated a "more spiritual and religious interpretation of life, based on what he had learnt from Kant and Schelling." The truth seems to be that
Coleridge would have advocated the same principles and reached the same conclusions had he never encountered either Kant or Schelling. The fault for the label of "Kantian" which has been attached to Coleridge lies most of all with himself and the very curious way in which he adapted much of Kant's terminology to use for his own purposes. He has seemingly borrowed so heavily from Kant because he agreed with his logic, which Coleridge decided left untouched the realms of psychology and ideas in which he himself was interested, and he could use this sort of logic to "communicate" and "reform" as well as save himself from the "black charges" of mysticism. Critics in this century such as Muirhead and Coburn have helped foster the illusion of Coleridge's allegiance to the "critical way" in their efforts to comply with Coleridge's own wish that his theosophy (Coleridge himself called it theosophy) should not be saddled with that term of abuse, - mysticism. But perhaps the most apt epithet which could be given to Coleridge, if not used as a term of abuse, would be that of an "Evangelical Mystic".

The critics of Coleridge in the last century were in little doubt as to where the foundation of his thought was set, although a few of the less discerning critics could even then refer to him as Kantian. It is significant that Hort, in the middle of the last century, should have emphasized that the most trustworthy material in Coleridge's writing was found in the footnotes and marginalia. Hort still had touch with the Coleridge who had taught his contemporaries by word of mouth, and he realized that portions
of the *Aids to Reflection* were no more than an oblique reflection of the real Coleridge. Let us look at some of the estimates of Coleridge's thought made during the middle of the nineteenth century when the theological controversy which had direct reference to his teaching reached its crisis, centered around the avowed disciples of Coleridge such as Hare, Maurice, and Kingsley, who had gained a prominent position, along with a certain amount of notoriety, in the field of religious thought.

In 1856 Hort demanded that "... justice to Coleridge requires that he should not be subject to needless reproach under the ambiguous title of an 'idealist', when his methods, no less than his results, differ so widely from theirs." He defended him against the charges, "on the one hand, of having originated the more thoughtful forms of theological unbelief, and, on the other, of having retarded the desired downfall of Christianity by choking his own (supposed) destructive inclinations." Hort noted that Coleridge parted company with Kant in the problem of knowledge, admitted that he was a Platonist, but thought it absurd that he should be taken for a Neoplatonist. In the same year, 1856, James Martineau gave an accurate account of the theology of Coleridge, and, although he leaned a bit too heavily on the *Aids to Reflection*, he was not blind to a major obstacle confronting the Coleridgean school of theology: "The first questionable step is, perhaps, at the point where it enters
history, and hands itself over from Plato to St. John."

(It is amusing, however, to read in the next line why this is questionable. "The identification of the eternal Logos with the historical Christ...rests with a single evangelist". And Martineau, in keeping with his age, could not trust to a very great degree the Gospel of St. John).

In 1857 the storm descended on the theology of Coleridge in all its fury in the person of J. H. Rigg, who wrote from the viewpoint of an evangelical Methodism interested in retaining the vicarious atonement of satisfaction and sacrifice which Coleridge had ostentatiously discarded as a metaphor in the *Aids to Reflection*. C. K. Sanders has noted that the attack was "one of the most able," but thought that Rigg argued with "inadequate comprehension" of the theology he was fighting. It may be true that Rigg had an inadequate comprehension of Coleridge's theological position, but he saw clearly the real issues of his position for one like himself to whom the Bible was *the* truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

The attack was delivered with unrestrained emotion in a book called *Modern Anglican Theology*, with chapters on Coleridge, Hare, Maurice, Kingsley and Jowett. He reduced the scope of the term "Broad Churchmen", under which Conybeare had included men of such different theological tendencies as Kingsley and Whatley, to apply merely to the "school of Coleridge", as represented by Hare, Maurice, Kingsley, and their supporters. He asserted that the Neoplatonism voiced so loudly in the works of Kingsley was straight
from Coleridge himself. The weakness of his criticism was found in the fact that he viewed any form of Platonism as *a priori*, the enemy of not only Arminian Methodism, but of all forms of Christian thinking. But he understood Coleridge so well that in order to gain the needed ammunition for his attack on the "Neoplatonic pantheism" of Coleridge he simply disregarded the Kantian paraphrases of Coleridge as unrepresentative of his thought and went straight to the marginalia and revealing passages in the *Biographia Literaria* and *The Friend*, as had Hort, albeit for a different purpose. Rigg saw clearly that the crucial issue between Coleridge and the Methodists was that of revelation.119/

On the other side of the fence, Maurice, a disciple of Coleridge, was critical of Coleridge because at times he seemed not to remain a true disciple of Plato, and in his use of closely defined terms and logical formula, together with his passionate desire to construct a complete system, thought him to be partly under the influence of Aristotle. 120/

After the publication of *Essays and Reviews* in 1860 the polemicists had new material on their hands not immediately related to Coleridge, and debate which had direct reference to the theology of Coleridge largely ceased. The historians of thought came forward, and Leslie Stephen decided that by the time Coleridge wrote *The Friend* in 1809-10 he had become a Kantian. 121/ However, the Platonism in Coleridge had its champions, and Howard wrote in 1924 that Coleridge "saw in Kant
only an instrument for the most effective expounding of his own essentially Platonic attitude". 122/ In 1930 Muirhead published *Coleridge as Philosopher*, which misrepresented many of the important positions of Coleridge. Muirhead took no account of the marginalia, and by weaving the thought of Coleridge into his own brand of idealism discovered him to be the founder and "to this day the most distinguished representative" of the voluntaristic form of idealism. 123/ Muirhead decided that Coleridge rejected Kant's logic, but accepted "what was the basis of his ethics, and his point of contact with noumenal reality, namely, the categorical imperative..." 124/ In 1931 Wellek published the best exposition of the relation of Coleridge to Kant yet made in *Kant in England, 1793-1838*. Wellek admitted, "Terminologically Coleridge cannot get away from Kant," but said that the "... *Aids to Reflection* seems more like an attempt at a reconstruction of Kant for the purposes of a philosophy of faith." 125/ Wellek wrote that even though Coleridge borrowed much from Kant in his work, he deserted the whole spirit of the critical philosophy, and that in the end we have "here a storey from Kant, there part of a room from Schelling, there a roof from Anglican theology." 126/ Winkelmann wrote in 1933 that Coleridge followed Jacobi much more closely than Kant, but Muirhead attempted to refute both Wellek and Winkelmann in 1934 in an article entitled *Metaphysician or Mystic*. Muirhead determined that the work of Coleridge was metaphysical rather than mystical; he followed Kant instead of Jacobi, and never for a moment wavered in his allegiance to the
"critical way". Coburn, in the introduction to the Philosophical Lectures edited by her in 1949, agreed with Muirhead concerning Coleridge's allegiance to the "critical way," although she made certain reservations about his writing after the mid-twenties.

Howard and Wellek came to the right conclusion concerning the relationship of Coleridge to Kant, as had Rigg and Hort before them, when they concluded that Coleridge used Kant to expound his essentially Platonic attitude while deserting the whole spirit of the Kantian philosophy. While it is almost impossible to pin-point influence over Coleridge in any particular facet of his thought because of his vast reading and prodigious memory, it is evident from Coleridge's many references and commendations, as well as the whole framework of his thought, that Coleridge had gone back to the same sources which had been so influential with his German contemporaries and had only later gone to their material. While the thought and influence of Coleridge has been described as being much indebted to the German idealism which grew up more or less contemporaneously with him, it appears much nearer the mark to think of Coleridge as but another shoot which grew from the Platonic tradition, a shoot which would have been very well nurtured without a Kant, Fichte, Schelling or Hegel.

However, what I am interested in establishing here is that Coleridge cannot properly be called a follower of the "critical way", as Muirhead, Coburn and Chinol would have it. Both
Howard and Chinol have shown the close agreement of much of Coleridge's formal exposition with that of Kant, but if it is assumed that Coleridge was a Kantian or followed the "critical way", then it is impossible to understand Coleridge's theology. The distinguishing feature of his theological thought is that religious faith was certain because it rested upon knowledge of God, a knowledge which was the only real and valid knowledge because only God was real and actual. Above and beyond Kant's world of abstract concepts and notions there existed real knowledge with which immediate contact could be established by direct intuition, which knowledge itself took possession of the soul in redemption and purification. Coleridge was ready to agree with Kant that the senses gave us no knowledge of the noumenal world, and that the knowledge of God could not be demonstrated by evidence, but he never agreed that it was impossible to have knowledge of the reality beyond logic and perception. Coleridge was essentially a "dogmatist", after the pattern of Platonic mysticism, not one committed to the critical path. Faith rested upon knowledge, even though it was true this knowledge could not be proved or demonstrated.

The cause of Coleridge's adherence to the mystical ways of thought was his own experience, the same predisposition which he spoke of as first sending him to the study of the Neoplatonists, a predisposition which remained with him all his life. At precisely the point of the poetic and mystical experience Coleridge turned on to a road which led to a destination very
distant from the logical road of Kant. A statement by Broad in *Five Types of Ethical Theory* describes very well the divergent paths of Kant and Coleridge: "If any reader who is interested in this subject (i.e. the grounds for faith) will study Butler's Analogy, Hume's Dialogues on Natural Religion and the theological parts of Kant's three Critiques, he will learn all that the human mind is ever likely to be able to know about the matter, with just one grave omission. The omission is that he will find nothing about the claims of specifically religious and mystical experience to give information about this aspect of reality." 130/


The organ which apprehended intuitively the mysteries lying outside the sensible world Coleridge called Reason, and with this one concept he completely deserted the critical philosophy. We have noted how Coleridge attempted to follow Kant by dividing this power into theoretic and practical in his different definitions. Kant, of course, had made this division in order to deal with his two worlds of phenomena and noumena, and much has been made of this division of Reason by Coleridge. The almost humorous thing is that Coleridge never seems to have believed in such a division; he always uses Reason as the power of intuition, the organ for apprehending immediate truth, and as such it stands above, and sometimes in opposition to, abstract notions, conception and logic. The marginalia and notebooks reveal that Reason for Coleridge never carried the connotations
of reasoning, although he appeared to give it such in the Aids to Reflection. In The Friend we noticed how he hedged before permitting the use of the word Reason as a "faculty" instead of an "organ". He called it the "rationalized understanding", or the "scientific faculty", and tagged it with a Kantian definition. Then he went on later in the work to speak of the "pure Reason" as the power by which we become possessed both by the eternal verities of Plato and the ideas of mathematics, as well as of justice, holiness, etc. The confusion in Coleridge's mind as to whether or not he could follow Kant in The Friend in the division of Reason is noticeable, but it was to the eternal verities of Plato alone, not the ideas of mathematics, that Coleridge came to ascribe the organ of Reason. Again, in The Friend he said that Reason was that intuition of things whereby we possess ourselves as one with the whole, which alone brings substantial knowledge.

It would appear that Coleridge had changed his position when he wrote the Aids to Reflection, and that Reason was then thought of as practical and speculative. But had he? The clues were given in the footnotes, later published in some editions of the Aids to Reflection. The one which I now quote was made in the first edition of the Aids to Reflection and later published as a note to Appendix A. "N.B. The Practical Reason alone is Reason in the full and substantive sense ... On the other hand, Theoretic Reason, as the ground of the Universal and Absolute in all logical conclusion is rather the Light of
Reason in the Understanding..." 131/ In another note, deciding to discuss Reason as simply an intellectual power, he was able to give to the Understanding alone the power of conception or logic. 132/ In The Friend he said that abstract truth was a product of the Understanding, but in Aids to Reflection he assigned the speculative Reason to abstract truth — in the text, but not in the footnotes. In 1817 or 1818, he had written in a note on Tennemann his rejection of the "Kantian supposed Antinomies of Reason, which are themselves founded, on a similar substitution and on Kant's ἀφανές ἀξία, the derivation of Ideas from the Speculative Reason entirely." 133/ This, Coleridge went on to say, was not the true Platonic theory of ideas. In another note on Tennemann Coleridge condemned the rigid distinction of practical and speculative Reason as "arbitrary, and a hypostasizing of mere logical entities." 134/ In a note on Boehme he complained that the Kantians had divided the Reason from the Reason in the will, or, as in a note on Tennemann, the theory from the practical man. 135/ Comparable to the note attached to the Aids to Reflection is one from his note book after that work had been published: "...Reason as the Source of Ideas, which Ideas in their conversion to the responsible Will become Ultimate Ends — Ends in the alone proper and adequate sense of the word. On the other hand, Theoretic Reason or Reason as the Source of Absolute Principles — the Universal and conclusive in Logic, is properly the Light of Reason in the Understanding...." 136/
In a notebook of 1824 (the year before the publication of the *Aids to Reflection*) Coleridge explicitly rejected the function assigned to speculative Reason in the *Aids to Reflection* as being a use of Reason foreign to his own. "If any one of my learned Readers should be discontented with this scheme as unduly limiting the sphere of religious Inquiry, and inimical to a reasonable Faith: I would entreat him first to ask himself, what he precisely intends by the word, reasonable, what by Faith, and what by the combination of the two - and in order to this, let him ascertain for himself, in what sense he employs the term, Reason. Does he mean by it aught distinct from the Understanding? And if so, does he assume it simply, as the source of those universal Principles, or Truths connected with a sense of their being universally, and necessarily true, which tho' not the proper growth of the Understanding, are yet the condition under which alone the conclusions of the Understanding obtain scientific evidence, i.e. not only, that so it is, but that so it must be? on which therefore, as Ground and Antecedent, all logical exercise of the Understanding (*Discursio intellectualis*) depends, and by which the discursive faculty (so the elder logicians designated the Understanding) becomes 'Discourse of Reason'? Or secondly, does he mean by the Reason a yet higher power, or the same power with other and yet higher attributes, namely, as the source of Ideas? Ideas, I mean in the Platonic sense, alike contra-distinguished from Notions, Conceptions, and Images. Or lastly, does he use Reason as a mere synonyme of the Under-
standing — as the faculty by which we reflect on the notices
given by the senses and sensations, and thus form conceptions
of the corresponding objects? The faculty, in short, by which
we understand what we see or have seen? —

If he use the word, Reason, in the second of these three
senses; and if his Ideas are more than high words, or vague
fancies, the creatures of a drowsy Eye, half sight, half dream;
there can be no dispute between us. He expresses in Platonic
Language the same convictions which the Spiritual Christian
conveys in the language of John and Paul. He must know, that
Reason in this unusual sense is not, and cannot be, a merely
speculative or intellective faculty ... it will not be impertinent
to observe that what the eldest Philosophy called Reason (Nous)
and Ideas the philosophic Apostle names the Spirit and Truths
Spiritually discerned..." 137 /

It is significant that Coleridge incorporated into the Aids to Reflection the section beginning
"it will not be impertinent to observe," followed by a quotation
from Seneca to prove his point, 138/ but omitted the previous
explication of Reason used "in this unusual sense." In a note
of 1827 Coleridge very frankly stated his difficulties in
defining Reason; he had made it into a "new sense" which
apprehends its objects immediately. "The want of a clear notion
respecting the nature of Reason may be traced to the difficulty
docket combining the notion of an organ of sense, or a new sense,
with the notion of the appropriate and peculiar objects of that
sense, so that the idea evolved from this synthesis shall be
the identity of both." 132/

7. Communicating an Intuitive Experience.

If Coleridge actually made no division between practical and speculative Reason in his own mind, the question may then be asked why he attempted to make this division in his published works. The fact was that Reason had never had the meaning of reasoning, as we normally use the word, but yet it had an intellective content. In order to try to communicate with those around him Coleridge was reluctant to use the word in an unheard-of, mystical sense, and consequently accepted the Kantian point of departure for the use of the word. Kant had made Reason a very noble faculty for Coleridge by showing with logic that the knowing mind constructs what it knows, and thus, Coleridge felt, dealing a death blow to the empirical philosophy. Coleridge had himself realized the creativity of the mind in the act of perception before he came to Kant; he had, indeed, asserted this in his conception of Fancy and Imagination. But in Kant he had found it explained how this could be. To this faculty which Kant had expounded so well for Coleridge's satisfaction, Coleridge gave the title of organ and made it descriptive of the knowledge gained by immediate vision of, or contact with, supersensuous reality in a coalescence of subject and object. Reason had, however, an intellectual content, because the intuitive experience in which man apprehended the mysteries of being was an act of the whole man, intellectual
as well as moral. Coleridge attempted to blend Kant into his evangelical mysticism in his published works, because he very much doubted anyone would know what he was talking about if he simply followed the "intuitive way", but someone might understand him if he followed Kant. Kant used logic. The mystics were correct in their apprehension of supernatural reality, but they could not be understood. In a note on Boehme written in 1818 Coleridge noted, "In all knowledge there are two parts - the mode of acquiring, and the mode of communicating it: \textit{Discere, et docere}. The first, in the first instance at least, is Intuition, or immediate Beholding. Above all, is this necessary in the knowledge of spiritual and metaphysical Entities ... The second is logic, by \textit{abstraction} and consequent distinction of terms ... Now Behmen, from his want of technical education neglected the Art of reasoning, by Acts of abstraction, which separate from the first are indeed mere Shadows, but, like Shadows of incalculable service in determining the rememberable outlines of the Substance. He is wholly intuitive." \footnote{140/} In consequence of this Coleridge proclaimed Boehme's language the great stumbling block of his works. \footnote{141/}

Coleridge himself left a record of his regret in having to try to communicate in a logical terminology. In a MS. note in the first edition of the \textit{Aids to Reflection} he wrote, "In the larger Work announced and described at p.152, in which I proceed \textit{synthetically} from the Idea of the Absolute to the Idea of the Triune God, it was in my power to give in a more
satisfactory because more positive form the Idea and Genesis of Reason, as it exists for Man, than was possible in the present Volume, in which I was obliged to proceed analytically and a posteriori, or rather, a datis. But taking it as analytic, the unprejudiced and competent Inquirer will, I dare assure myself, find the reasoning legitimate, and the demonstration compleat." \[142/\] (The larger work referred to is his *Opus Magnum* on which he was working with J.H. Green.) All Coleridge meant by "analytically and a posteriori" is, as he said, "a datis". He had to proceed with recognizable concepts and logic of experience instead of with his own nomenclature of ideas. This is also seen in a note of 1833. "In the Aids to Reflection I was standing on the same ground with those, whose opinion I strove to rectify - and consequently, took the terms, sacrifice, vicarious sacrifice, Debt, Satisfaction, Atonement, etc. with... the conceptions, which those, I was addressing, had formed, from the facts and usages of the World. To apply these, therefore, to the Deity, to the relation of the Father to the co-eternal Son... without debasing the Idea of the Divine, I was constrained to interpret them per metaphoram. Far otherwise will it be if beginning from the ideas I move descensively, tracing the Light into the Darkness in its diminuations, refractions, and turbid stains. Then... I should be among the first and most strenuous assentors... of their being the proper expressions of the Ideas signified." \[143/\] In a notebook he wrote directly concerning his assumed Kantian pose relative to the distinction between the
Reason and Understanding: "A more positive insight into the true character of Reason, and a greater evidentness of its diversity from the Understanding, might be given - but then it must be synthetically, and genetically. And this I have done in my larger work in which I commence with the Absolute, and from there deduce the Tri-unity, and therein the substantial Reason (Logos) as the $e^\frac{\omega}{\nu} - e^\frac{\omega}{\nu}$. But in the Aids to Reflection I was obliged to proceed analytically and a posteriori...." 144/

Coleridge was obliged to proceed a datis, from concepts readily acknowledged as conforming to intelligible language, because he had to communicate in order to reform and revitalize the Christian faith. He became so exasperated at his efforts to convey some sort of meaning to those around him that he wrote in a notebook in 1833, "...sometimes I think, that a great Composer, a Mozart, a Beethoven must have been in a state of spirit much more akin, more analogous, to mine own when I am at once waiting for, watching, and organically constructing and inwardly constructed by, the Ideals - the living Truths, that may be re-excited but cannot be expressed by Words, the Transcendents that give the Objectivity to all objects, the Form to all Images, yet are themselves untranslatable into any Image, unrepresentable by any particular Object...." 145/ And again, "Would that I could transfer the Idea, inwardly present to my mind. But I can only convey a rude Image of it." 146/ But Coleridge had realized that the great fault of the mystics was
their inability to communicate, and even though he came to the conclusion that for those who were constituted by the living ideas, conveying these ideas in words was impossible, nevertheless it should be possible to lead someone to the position where it would be possible for these germs of truth to be awakened from their sleep. However, this could not be done by language meaningful only to the individual by whom ideas were possessed. He wrote in a marginal note, "In my own instance, I solemnly bear witness and declare that every Idea, Law, or Principle, in which I co-incide with the Cabbala, or the School of Plotinus, or the Christian Gnostics, or the Mystics of the Middle Ages or the Protestant Masters of the interior way, as Behmen, Zinzendorf, etc., I recognized in them, as truths already known by me in my own meditation. Indeed, the language of the greater number of the Mystics, from causes explained by me in my Biog. Literaria, is so inadequate and arbitrary, and the writers themselves are so imperfectly the Masters of the Ideas, (possessed by fragments of the Truth rather than possessing even these-) that it would have been impossible to have decoyphered the true import of their Strivings, without the hounding scent of Sympathy and without the key of a previous and superior Insight." 147/

However, Kant was a different matter. In the Biographia Literaria he praised Kant for the clearness and evidence of his work; "(paradox as it will appear to those who have taken their notion of Immanuol Kant from Reviewers and Frenchmen)" 148/
In 1820 he advised a friend in a letter, "...I by no means recommend to you an extension of your philosophic researches beyond Kant. In him is contained all that can be learnt..." And in a letter of 1825, "...Immanuel Kant I assuredly do value most highly; not, however, as a metaphysician, but as a logician... In Kant's *Critique of the Pure Reason* there is more than one fundamental error; but the main fault lies in the title-page, which to the manifold advantage of the work might be exchanged for *An Inquisition respecting the Constitution and Limits of the Human Understanding.*" In 1812 Coleridge had told Henry Crabb Robinson that his obligations to Kant were infinite, but "not so much from what Kant has taught him in the form of doctrine, as from the discipline gained in studying the great German philosopher." There seems little doubt that Coleridge found Kant very acceptable in order to try to make himself understood; because Kant used logic, he did not think it necessary to have first shared with the mystics the "indistinct, yet stirring and working presentiment, that all the products of the mere reflective faculty partook of DEATH." Kant was well suited for the purpose of Coleridge's "reformation". Thus, while Coleridge denied the categorical imperative as a basis for ethics, Kant had yet crushed the "shallow morality of Paley... with elephantine feet." While Coleridge could not accept God as a mere postulate who was not both the subject and object of all knowledge, yet Kant had destroyed Paley's theology of evidence and demonstration. While Coleridge could not accept
Reason as merely regulative, yet Kant had, he felt, dealt
the death-blow to empiricism. Moreover, and most important,
the "living ideas" in which Coleridge was really interested
Kant had consistently "left behind in a pure analysis, not of
human nature in toto, but of the speculative intellect alone." 154/

While Coleridge was critical of this aspect of Kant, it was, of
course, to his advantage when using him as a mouthpiece. In
the MS. Logic Coleridge wrote, "Considered as Logic it (i.e. the
transcendental analysis) is irrefragable, as philosophy it will
be exempt from opposition, and cease to be questionable only
when the soul of Aristotle shall have become one with the soul
of Plato, when the men of Talent shall have all passed into the
men of Genius, or the men of Genius have all sunk into men of
Talent. That is Graecis Calendis, or when two Fridays meet." 155/

When he first seriously began studying Kant he wrote in
a marginal note dated 1802, "...Kant and all of his school are
miserable Reasoners, in Psychology and particular morals - bad
analysts of aught but Notions, ...so much so indeed as often to
shake my Faith in their general System." 156/ And again later
on he wrote that it was a great error in Kant that he slighted
psychology, "and the weakest parts of his system are attributable
to his want of the habits and facts of Psychology." 157/

(This criticism of Kant calls to mind Leigh Hunt's description
of Coleridge as "a kind of unascetic Brahmin among us, one who
is always looking inwardly, and making experiments upon the
nature and powers of his soul.")
Chinol has come to the conclusion that the heavy reliance of Coleridge upon Kant in the MS \textit{Logic} and the \textit{Aids to Reflection} is to be explained by a return to the thought of Kant after the \textit{Biographia Literaria}, which Chinol described as being in the Schelling phase. However, this is not borne out by the notebooks, by the MS \textit{On the Divine Ideas} which he was preparing with J.H. Green and which was to form a section of his \textit{Magnum Opus}, nor by the marginalia. If anything, the thought of Coleridge moves further from the critical path toward the end of his life. The principles which formed the basis of his epistemology in the \textit{Biographia Literaria} remained unchanged, as indeed they had remained firm from the time he first formulated the distinction between the Reason and Understanding. Coleridge intended to move completely into the realm of ideas in his "larger work".\footnote{158/}

It was to be "a positive insight" into the true character of Reason, a pattern of "objective thinking", in which he proceeded "synthetically and genetically". It was, in fact, to depend on moral and intellectual intuition; the reader who did not possess these would be lost. In 1828 Coleridge wrote of the knowledge of the Understanding, both generals and particulars, whether facts of phenomena, learnt by observation and experience as inferior knowledge, and warned the student that to follow him he \textit{must} have fully mastered the principle, that in the Sciences of Freedom, subsisting in intellectual Intuitions, the Idea contains its necessity in its actual presence."\footnote{159/} The only return to Kant was for purposes of exposition; he never
returned to the principles of the critical philosophy which denied the possibility of the knowledge of God in a substitution of belief for knowledge. He did indeed reject the "positive" ideas of Schelling, as well as Plotinus and Boehme, as a dangerous pantheism resulting from a too close adherence to the intuitions of the intellect alone, and in the term which he usually used in reference to the acquisition of immediate knowledge, namely, "spiritual intuition", the moral and intellectual were combined. 160/ Mere intellectual apprehension of spiritual reality without the religious intuition of the personal God ultimately tended to deny the transcendence of God, and Coleridge classed Schelling with Spinoza among the pantheists, adding an explanatory paragraph to The Friend which amounted to a correction: "The inevitable result of all consequent reasoning in which the intellect refuses to acknowledge a higher or deeper ground than it can itself supply, and weens to possess within itself the centre of its own system - is Pantheism." 161/ But, as we noted from a statement of 1828 above, Coleridge did not for all that surrender the idea of an intellectual intuition which could apprehend at least the "hind parts" of God. By noting who it was Coleridge considered to be exponents of the "objective thinking" and "positive insights" we may gain some idea of the task he had set himself in the "larger work". In a note on Boehme, Coleridge crossed out a note previously written and inserted this correction: "The above note was written when I was but in the dim dawn of
knowledge - and wholly in the subjective Thinking - of course, incapable of coming near Behmen." 162/ In a note on Tennesmann, "It seems to me plain enough, that the Ground of the Plotinian Philosophy ... is a clear and positive exposition of Ideas. The doctrine rather hinted by Plato in his writings than set forth. Plato's principal object was to insinuate on every opportunity the insufficiency and alien nature of Conceptions formed by the Reflection (Verstand, Understanding, νοῦς
(as opposed to) Reason, νοῦς ) in relation to the proper objects of Philosophy ... viz. The Soul, Moral Freedom, God)- and this he effected by deducing contradictory results or absurdities from premises logically ... undeniable. If then neither the Conceptions formed by the Understanding from materials furnished by Sense, nor the Notions formed by the U. by reflection on its own processes were the proper Organs for the knowledge of supersensuous Truths, either such knowledge is impossible for men or there must exist other and higher Organs or Media. Plato assumed the latter and named these media Ideas - but gave little more than their negative character - i.e. what they were not. - Plotinus proposed to display their positive Being." 163/ Coleridge decided to name the "proper organ for the knowledge of supersensuous truth" Reason, and in his Magnum Opus proposed to display the positive being of "Divine Ideas".

8. Terms of Abuse.

It is correct that there is a decided difference between
the author's approach in the *Biographia Literaria* and the *Treatise on Logic*, written in 1823 and 1824, as well as the *Aids to Reflection*. It is obvious that Coleridge has at least turned toward the arguments and terminology of Kant. Kant was understandable; the mystics were not. In both *The Friend* and the *Biographia Literaria* Coleridge had laid himself open for charges of mysticism and metaphysics which in his common-sense age were almost wholly used as terms of abuse. In the *Statesman's Manual* Coleridge had complained that the mechanic philosophy is satisfied when it can explain the abstraction of the outward senses and "brands with the name of mysticism every solution grounded in life, or the powers and intuition of life." \[164/\]

He also wrote in the *Statesman's Manual* that it had been asked why "knowing myself to be the object of personal slander ... I furnish this material for it by pleading in palliation of so chimerical a fancy" as the possibility of knowledge of God through the divine power of Reason given to man. But he said he could not perjure himself and write otherwise. \[165/\] Coleridge was very sensitive to such charges made against his own work, not because he did not conceive himself to be in sympathy with the mystical tradition, nor because he was ashamed of his mystical attitude, but because he took so very seriously the capacity of man for knowledge of God. He considered that his work was to bring life to the philosophy of death, but in order to do this he had to acquire a following who could find meaning in what he had to say. However, having heard that he was a
"metaphysical babbler" people would refuse to listen, just as they would pay no heed to a madman. He wrote in 1830, "Give a dog a bad name; and you hang him. Worse, have him hunted with a black kitten at his tail - So has it been with me in relation to the black charge of Metaphysics."

Because of the charges of mysticism which had been made rather heavily after the publication of the Biographia Literaria and the Sybilline Leaves, Coleridge had reasons enough to conceal some of his mystical thought in the Aids to Reflection. Hazlitt damned Christabel as "nonsense verses". A concerted attack on all of Coleridge's work came from the Edinburgh Review. Kubla Khan "smells strongly of the anodyne," "a mixture of raving and drivelling." The Biographia Literaria was dismissed in a long article which ended, "Till he can do something better we would rather hear no more of him."

In an essay on Coleridge published in 1818, Hazlitt spoke of "the dark rearward abyss" of his thought, and pictured his mind as a world of vapours, unearthly and unsubstantial. In 1817 Peacock had published Melincourt in which he had pilloried Coleridge as Mr. Mystic, and in 1818 followed with Nightmare Abbey, in which Coleridge was nothing more than a metaphysical babbler. In 1819 Byron wrote of him in Don Juan,

And Coleridge too has lately taken wing
But like a hawk encumbered with his hood--
Explaining metaphysics to the nation--
I wish he would explain his explanation.

In the Biographia Literaria Coleridge followed Schelling so closely in Chapter XII that he found himself accused of
plagiarism from Schelling's works. When he had followed Schelling so closely it certainly should have been no surprise to Coleridge that he found his work branded as mysticism, for Coleridge himself in notes on Schelling complained: "... Schelling seems to be looking objectively at one thing, and imagining himself thinking of another. And after all this mysticism what is the result? Still the old questions return, and I find none but the old answers. This Ground to God, existence either lessens, or does not lessen his Power - in the first, it is in effect a co-existence God, evil because the ground of all evil - in the second, it leaves us, as before. With that 'before' my understanding is perfectly satisfied - and vehemently as Schelling condemns that theory of Freedom, which makes it consist in the primacy of the Reason over the Will, where does his own solution differ from this - except in ... expressing with ... mysticism the very same notion?"

That Coleridge became much more careful in his public pronouncements than he had been in the Biographia Literaria appears to be evident from the lectures he gave from December 1818 to March 1819 on the History of Philosophy in London, edited and published by Kathleen Coburn in 1949. In preparing these lectures he used Tennemann's Geschichte der Philosophie and made the usual marginal annotations. Coburn has dated the marginalia as no earlier than 1817; most of it was made in preparation for the lecture, and much of it follows the lecture
so closely that the editor was able to use the marginal comments for purposes of editing. But the treatment accorded Plotinus in the lectures and the notes on Tennemann is very diverse. In the marginalia he is enthusiastic about Plotinus; in the lectures he is very critical. Miss Coburn suggests that the treatment given Plotinus in the lectures supports her contention that he was no mystic. While it is true that in the marginal annotations Coleridge felt he must vindicate the work of Plotinus against the criticism of Tennemann, and that in the lectures he wished to show the superiority of Christian thought to that of Plotinus, it seems more likely that the great difference between the two statements is that of greater sensitivity to charges of mysticism. Although she does not elaborate, Coburn seems nearer the truth when she says, "He was glad, I think, of an opportunity to modify the position he took in the Biographia Literaria; perhaps he had learned something from the reviews of that work." The unusually adverse criticism of Plotinus in the *Philosophical Lectures*, as well as his dismissal of Schelling (whom he considered to have many similarities with Plotinus as well as Boehme) as a Neoplatonic "Roman Catholic pantheist" only a few years after borrowing heavily from his works, is very strange. A note made on Boehme in 1818 before the lectures began would lead one to think that in that year a great change came about in Coleridge's opinions. In the lectures he accused Boehme of a "disguised pantheism", but yet spoke very highly of
him and attempted to account for, if not excuse, his pantheism as the tendency of the age. In a note on Boehme dated 27 August, 1818, (the lectures began in December of that year), Coleridge wrote of his two great errors: "Thus the errors of this extraordinary man fall under two heads. The first, easily separable, as a mere scum, by the thoughtful Reader, and which calls only for a forgiving smile, is the occasional substitution of the accidents of his own peculiar acts of association (for instance, his exemplification of the language of Nature) for the laws and processes of the creaturely Spirit in universe. The second, componental and dissolved through the whole, which it requires a spiritual chemistry, and the addition of a new ingredient to decombine and precipitate - the confusion of the creaturely spirit in the great moments of its renascence ... through the Breath and Word of Comforter and Restorer for the deific energies in Deity itself. - He preposterizes the consequent of the Fall into the absolute First, and ignorant of the only sense in which it is other than an abstraction, he makes it a mere abstraction, and then by a second careless abstraction, that of Subject and Object from the idea of the Absolute, he identifies the former with God as Omneity, out of which the living Godhead evolves, as an eternal Birth, as the Creatures bud forth and individualize, each out of its pre-impregnated Nature. In the first instance his error is radically the same as that of Spinoza, and in both instances the same as that of Schelling and his followers. What
resemblance it may have to the system of Giordano Bruno, I have read too few of Bruno's writings to say, and read them at a time, when I was not competent to ask the question, but was myself intoxicated with the vernal fragrance and effluvia from the flowers and first fruits of Pantheism, unaware of its bitter root, pacifying my religious feelings meantime by the dim distinction, that tho' God was = the world, the world was not = God, as if it were a Whole composed of Parts, of which the World was one.

P.S. I earnestly intreat of whoever may hereafter chance to peruse this copy of Behmen's works, that if he should find in the marginal MSS notes, preceding or following the present Notes, any positions or opinions contradictory to it and partaking of the error now and here exposed, he will attribute them to the earlier date at which they were written."

At the beginning of Boehme's works, Coleridge conspicuously penned the following warning to the reader referring to the note quoted above: "I earnestly (intreat) of the Reader into whose possession and under whose perusal this copy of Jacob Behmen's writings should happen to fall, and who should feel disposed to peruse the numerous marginal annotations added by me in my own hand-writing, that he would first of all read over attentively the Note occupying the Margins of pages 125, 126 and 127 - lest perchance I should lead him into errors from which I have extricated myself. And may the Spirit and the Word with the Leading of the Father of Light enable him to know in himself the truth of the Truths
contained in these volumes, clarified from the Errors of the same - and to find within what he will in vain seek from without."  

Yet there is real difficulty in concluding that between the time of the *Biographia Literaria* and the *Philosophical Lectures* Coleridge had changed his mind about the worth of the "mystical Platonists" because of their inherent pantheism, and so had taken it upon himself to disparage their writings. In the case of Boehme, where Coleridge had testified that most of what Schelling had to say was found, Coleridge wrote that even Waterland himself, the great master of the exposition of the Trinity in the Church of England, might "have condescended to have been instructed by the humble Shoe-maker of Gorlitz." In 1826 he wrote that the "true Joanno-pauline doctrine of the Eucharist" was to be found in Boehme. In 1850 he affirmed that the account of the Fall in Boehme was the correct one, which is apparently in contradiction to his criticism of Boehme's handling of the Fall noted above. Also, granting the "abysmal ground of God" in Boehme which Coleridge rejected, it is difficult to see at exactly what point Coleridge thought his own intuitions differed from those of Boehme's. A note on Irving written no earlier than 1828, and perhaps later, is typical: "Would to heaven I could induce the high heart and vehement intellect of my friend, Edward Irving, to devote one quiet genial day of Spring or Autumn to the contemplation of God under
the form of Absolute Identity ... he will welcome the appropriateness, not shrink from the scholastic strangeness, of the Terms Ipseity, Alterity and Community, as Exponents of the eternal Distinctivities, in which God is the Father, the Son, and Spirit - the Subjective = the I AM, the Objective = the Jehovah; the Subjectively Objective = the Holy Ghost, or eternal Procession of Life and Love, communicant and communicated.

One practical conclusion he will not fail to deduce from the above, namely, never in any act to introduce any use of the Divine Tri-unity without a clear intuition of the co-presence of all - Will, Light, Life, Good, Truth, Wisdom. 181/

That Coleridge had in fact realized (long before the note of 1818) that Boehme could be given a pantheistic interpretation is evident from a letter of 1810 when he wrote, "The most beautiful and orderly development of this philosophy (which endeavours to explain all things by an analysis of consciousness, and builds up a world in the mind out of materials furnished by the mind itself), is to be found in the Platonic Theology of Proclus." 182/ And that Coleridge had diverged from the road of pantheism by the time of the Biographia Literaria is evident from the manner in which he tried to introduce a personal, transcendent God into the ideas of Schelling which he used, 183/ an attempt which is unexplainable unless he had decided even then that Schelling was a pantheist. And of the mystical thought of Boehme he said, "That the system is capable of being converted into an irreligious PANTHEISM, I well know. But at
no time could I believe, that in itself and essentially it is incompatible with religion, natural or revealed: and now I am most thoroughly persuaded of the contrary." 194/ The only explanation for the attitude of Coleridge in the note on Boehme as well as throughout the Philosophical Lectures is not that his opinions had changed, but that he had become extremely sensitive toward the charges of mysticism and metaphysics which could a priori imperil his campaign of renovation. He decided to emphasize by renunciation, if it were not possible by explication, his legitimate claim that he was not a mystical pantheist.

Thus we find that the sensitivity of Coleridge toward charges of mysticism is much greater in Aids to Reflection than it had been in the Biographia Literaria. In the Biographia Literaria Coleridge spent several pages defending Boehme, Fox, and Law, especially Boehme, and wrote, "... there exist folios on the human understanding, and the nature of man, which would have a far juster claim to their high rank and celebrity, if in the whole huge volume there could be found as much fulness of heart and intellect, as burst forth in many a simple page of George Fox, Jacob Behmen, and even of Behmen's commentator, the pious and fervid William Law." 185/ In discussing Schelling Coleridge noted that "Schelling has lately, and, as of recent acquisition, avowed that same affectionate reverence for the labours of Behmen, and other mystics, which I had formed at a
much earlier period. The coincidence of Schelling's system with certain general ideas of Behmen, he declares to have been mere coincidence; while my obligations have been more direct. He needed give to Behmen only feelings of sympathy; while I owe him a debt of gratitude."  

In the *Aids to Reflection*, however, Coleridge was not in the mood to acknowledge debts of gratitude. He noted that an objection to his work which was going to be entered often by men of talent and moderation was that of mysticism. His critics would say, "There is nothing new in all this! It is Mysticism, all taken out of William Law, after he had lost his senses, poor man! In brooding over the visions of a delirious German cobbler, Jacob Behmen." He denounced Boehme for the two reasons outlined in his note of warning to future readers on his works: "first, the mistaking the accidents and peculiarities of his own over-wrought mind for realities and modes of thinking common to all minds; and secondly, the confusion of nature, that is, the active powers communicated to matter, with God the Creator."  

In the next paragraph he went to some pains to disassociate himself from William Law, stating that although they may have used some of the same excerpts from the Gospel of John as well as the similar phrase "assimilation by faith" the whole dispute as to his indebtedness to Law was childish since the same phrase occurs in the same sense in many other writers, both Romish and Reformed; besides, his conclusions were different from those of Law. Mysticism he called an "opprobrious phrase", a "term of
abuse". Then, in a dialogue between "Nous" and "Antinous", Coleridge defined mysticism: "When a man refers to inward feelings and experiences, of which mankind at large are not conscious, as evidences of the truth of any opinion -- such a man I call a Mystic: and the grounding of any theory or belief on accidents and anomalies of individual sensations or fancies, and the use of peculiar terms invented, or perverted from their ordinary significations, for the purpose of expressing these idiosyncrasies and pretended facts of interior consciousness, I name Mysticism." By such phrases as "pretended"facts of interior consciousness" and "anomalies of individual sensations" Coleridge must, in his own mind, have excluded himself from his definition, for he emphatically asserted that the facts to which he appealed were not pretensions, nor individual sensations.

To assume that the opinions of Coleridge concerning the worth of the mystical tradition, or the closeness of his own "system" to this tradition, had changed in his assumed Kantianism and criticism of mysticism in the Aids to Reflection is wrong. The one great change was the rejection of the pantheistic tendencies of the mystics, but, having endorsed the theology of the "Word made flesh" of St. John, Coleridge simply fitted it into the earlier pattern of his thought. He did not discard the whole framework of his previous convictions. That Coleridge himself did not conceive that in rejecting the pantheism of the
Platonist mystical tradition he had also discarded its fundamental tenet, namely, that reality is spiritual, single, and knowable, a conviction which was the one great permanent factor in all of Coleridge's thinking all his life, is seen easily in two separate comments on Scotus Erigena who was himself so influential on the mystical thought of the Middle Ages. In 1805 Coleridge wrote, "I have received great delight and instruction from Scotus Erigena. He is clearly the modern founder of the school of Pantheism; indeed he expressly defines the divine nature as quae fit et facit, et creat et creatur; and repeatedly declares creation to be manifestation, the epiphany of philosophers." 190/ In 1827 Coleridge decided that the coincidence of Scotus' pattern of thought with his own was so close that he should make clear their conclusions were not alike: "... this Joannes Scotus Erigena I am inclined to think the most extraordinary man on the whole list of Scholars and Philosophers ... a bold, free, and original Thinker, who held the Pope and dogmata of the Priesthood in contempt and dared avow, that Faith was Fealty to Reason, and that any articles of faith that were not Ideas of Reason were jargon for Traitors to conjure with, and that Religion was but Philosophy contemplated principally in its influences on the Will - who taught the final Redemption (i.e. re-assumption into the Ideas of the only-begotten Son) of all men, and found no Hell but in the necessary consequences of a self-retarded Return into Deity- ... Because I learnt the great truths of my System from no one, because it rose on me in its own light, like the
Dawn, with no direct effort on my part, save that I blew away the fogs and mists and intervening abtrusions of the Fancy and the Understanding — therefore I took for granted, that there has been before me men actuated by the same pure love of Truth and impelled by the same necessity of Knowledge evolved from Principles, with minds disciplined by similar experiences, of the Roads that lead but in a circuit or to the brink of chasms and Precipices, and finally pursuing the same way of watchful yet calm abnegation; that it would be too sorrowful to suppose, that none of these men had recorded the Results of their Researches, or that their writings had all perished — and that in many Books of the old-Time I should recognize the same Ideas — even tho' I should no where meet with the same System or Method. — Originality in aught but the copula and transition (ωθος) of the materials I should regard as a strong presumption of the untruth of my convictions, as a ground of suspicion, that I had deluded myself and mistaken subjective vapors for forms of objective and universal Truth. — Nay, if I had found in any neglected work the same order and method in all essential points, the more should have I rejoiced and hastened to proclaim the fact, not as authority but as a proof of the solidity of the System — ... We must not, however, always infer the sameness of the Thought from the use of the same Words, where the Thought is fundamental. Thus Jo. Scotus Erigena ... says, quod Deus verus est absolute velle (tota igitur est voluntas — i.e. Will is the Essence not an accident
or attribute of God) and he names this Will *principalem
solamque omnium causam* - So says the methodic phil. - I
begin with the Identity or Prothesis - God is the Absolute
Will essentially causative of all Reality -. But Erigena
makes the World itself God, God is Nature with him, *Viz.
gemina Natura, quae fit et facit, generat et generatum*
and thus at one stroke destroys all proper causality.

Briefly, Erigena's System is avowed Pantheism, and as a
consequent Pantheist he denies the reality of Moral Evil, and
evades the question of God's personity, and leaves the origin
of a sensible universe of finite Beings, i.e. according to
his scheme why God incessantly makes himself in Time and
Space, an insoluble Riddle.

Now the very purpose of my system is to overthrow
Pantheism, to establish the diversity of the Creator from the
sum total of the Creatures, to deduce the personity, the I AM
of God, and in one and the same demonstration to demonstrate
the reality and originancy of Moral Evil, and to account for the
fact of a finite Nature. - Hence I conclude that tho' Joannes
Sootus Erigena and myself enunciate our first Principles in the
same or equivalent words, we must have attached a very different
import to them." 191/ The change in Coleridge's attitude to
Erigena is that he learned to interpret mystical experience
with Moses and St. John instead of with Plotinus and Spinoza.
The apprehension of a personal God, and the blending of the
Greek heritage with the Hebrew, is certainly a significant
development with Coleridge, and he wrote in 1830, "My mind can form no higher conception of blessedness in enjoyment, than to have a spiritual intuition of the union of the personality of God with his infinity and omnipresence!" But it was anything but a rejection of mystical thought in favor of the "critical way".

It is not at all my intention to attempt to discredit the *Aids to Reflection*, at least no more than Coleridge himself corrected and regretted portions of it, but it is necessary to draw attention to the fact that one is not on very solid ground in assuming that Coleridge was this or that on the basis of that work, nor, like Muirhead, very safe in determining Coleridge's use of Reason and Understanding from the MS *Logic* alone and rejection of the use of the distinction in his other works. The *Treatise on Logic* was written in just those years after Coleridge had learned his lesson from the *Edinburgh Review*; it is alluded to in letters of Nov. 27, 1820, Sept. 24, 1821 and Dec. 1822.

Reason, for Coleridge, was his name for the experience of one who found himself in the presence of that *mysterium tremendum et fascinans*. It was not a moral experience as opposed to an intellectual, but inclusive of both. But Reason, as an intellectual power, had nothing to do with logic or speculation, as he set it forth in the *Aids to Reflection*, nor had it anything to do with mathematics, as when, in *The Friend* he had stated that it was the power by which we become
possessed of both the eternal verities of Plato and the truths of mathematics. Reason was reserved for apprehension of the eternal verities of Plato only, and, as he noted Plotinus had done, he carried the intuition of ideas a stage further than Plato so that the distinction between subject and object, knower and known, disappeared in the subject-object synthesis. As a moral and intellectual power Reason was the organ of "spiritual intuition". Coleridge quaintly asked himself why he should deny the possibility of an intellectual intuition equal to "I see" if the Holy Spirit chose to grant it. And in a marginal note he wrote of the "simple doctrine of the Trinity, plain and evident simplici intuitu, and rendered obscure only by diverting the mental vision by terms drawn from matter and multitude. In the Trinity all the Hows? may and should be answered by Look! just as a wise tutor would do in stating the fact of a double or treble motion, as of a ball rolling northward on the deck of a ship sailing south, while the earth is turning from west to east. And in like manner, that is, per intuitum intellectualem, must all the mysteries of faith be contemplated; - they are intelligible per se, not discursively and per analogiam. For the truths are unique, and may have shadows and types, but no analogies.

Coleridge founded faith on knowledge, and faith in turn brought an increase of knowledge by increasing the capacity for spiritual apprehension. Faith was certain. To Kant, who separated the spheres of knowledge and
faith, revelation was the sensible support of a sort of religious morality. The agnosticism which was as inherent in Kant as had scepticism been in the Hume who had said our most holy religion is founded on faith, not on reason, had no back door in which to creep into the thought of Coleridge. Less than a month before he died Coleridge said, "You may not understand my system, or any given part of it; or by a determined act of wilfulness, you may, even though perceiving a ray of light, reject it in anger and disgust; but this I will say, that if you once master it, or any part of it, you cannot hesitate to acknowledge it as the truth. You cannot be sceptical about it." Coleridge's thought was a "dogmatism", not a "critical" philosophy. Just as had Augustine long before him, Coleridge could have learned very well from Plato himself to distinguish between that which pertains to the sense and that which pertains to the supersensible. Several times Coleridge implied that he had indeed learned it from Plato.

That the ding an sich, noumenon, was an unknowable reality was repugnant to Coleridge. He noted that it was a common principle of the philosophical systems of Descartes, Locke, Berkley, Hume and Kant that our "senses in no way acquaint us with Things, as they are in and of themselves;" and asked, "Do we perceive, or do we only deduce the existence of Things?" In 1827 he rejoiced that in the discovery of a two-fold self
he was able to simplify the "definition of Mind, as a pure active and proper Perceptivity; thus cleansing my system from the last adhesion of the Berkleian Passivity."

The thing-in-itself was cognizable. He said that in God's properties "we possess properties of things or rather the things in themselves, which are not only capable of being thought of, but which present the worthiest, nay the only worthy objects of thoughts of a wise man, in as much as all others if not directly or indirectly in reference to these as the ultimate aim, are vanity of vanities, the dreams of an individual or the dreams of a multitude." The "intuition" of Coleridge was not limited to objects representable in time and space; it was, in fact, not concerned with these objects at all, but was the power whereby spiritual truth was apprehended. God's existence was not merely deduced, but his "hind parts", at least, could actually be known. God was immanent as well as transcendent. The immanent God was the known God, and between the immanence and transcendence of God a middle course had to be steered. God would not be God if he could not be known, nor would He be God if He could be known completely.

Coleridge himself seems not to have entertained any suspicions that he would ever be called a Kantian, and, while it appears that he would much rather have been called a Kantian than a mystic, with which title he did suppose he would be tabbed, he had no doubt to which tradition he belonged. Analogous to his distinction between Reason and Understanding
he divided all men and philosophers into Platonists and Aristotelians, into which classes men belonged not by education, but by birth. He wrote in 1820: "...in the only accurate sense of the term there neither are, have been, or ever will be but two essentially different Schools of Philosophy: The Platonic, and the Aristotelian. To the latter, but with a somewhat nearer approach to the Platonic, Emanuel Kant belonged; to the former Bacon and Leibnitz and in his riper and better years Berkeley -- And to this I profess myself an adherent ...

He for whom Ideas are constitutive, will in effect be a Platonist -- and in those, for whom they are regulative only, Platonism is but a hollow affectation. Dryden could not have been a Platonist -- Shakespeare, Milton, Dante, Michael Angelo, and Rafael could not have been other than Platonists." 201/

In an Appendix to the Statesman's Manual Coleridge had written, "Whether ideas are regulative only, according to Aristotle and Kant; or likewise constitutive, and one with the power and life of nature, according to Plato, and Plotinus (ἐν λαέων φόντα, ἑώρων ἤψων ναὶ ναὶ ἡλίλης ἑων ἐν ἐντομαῖς ἐν ἐντομαῖς ἐν ἐντομαῖς ἐν ἐντομαῖς ἐν ἐντομαῖς τὸ ἔτοιμο ἔτοιμο ἔτοιμο ἔτοιμο) is the highest problem of philosophy, and not part of its nomenclature." 202/

When we remember that in the distinction between the Fancy and Imagination Milton was said to have had a "highly imaginative" mind, 203/ whereas Dryden wrote his poetry by means of the Fancy; and that in the distinction between Reason and Understanding Coleridge always maintained that Milton and Shakespeare fully
recognized this distinction, 204/ we realize from the men
listed in the two divisions that we have yet another glimpse
into an attempt to define an intangible quality of human nature
which in the end remained indefinable except by contrast. In
an early notebook Coleridge had divided the systems of
philosophy into those of Spinoza and Kant, "or 1. ontological
2. anthropological" 205/ In 1811 H.C. Robinson reported
Coleridge as saying that "all systems of philosophy might be
reduced to two, the dynamic and the mechanical." 206/ Knowledge
was constitutive, a part of reality, and while Coleridge
contended that God is knowable intellectually as well as
emotionally, he never changed his position that the heart must
have fed upon the truth before it can be possessed, and "that
deep thinking is attainable only by a man of deep feeling, and
that all truth is a species of revelation." 207/ In Coleridge's
concept of Reason he attempted to unify the moral and intellectual
conflict which had bothered him in his youth, giving each its
claims in a total act of the personality no longer bothered by
the logical claims of an "enlightened understanding".

However, because Coleridge never had any intention of
confining constitutive ideas merely to the realm of religion and
poetry, but declared them as necessary to all knowledge, he, of
course, made himself vulnerable to Byron and Peacock. For
Coleridge, who "ached to know something one and indivisible,"
it was inconceivable that men should be content to have knowledge
in bits and pieces after the school of Locke and Hobbes.

Coleridge viewed philosophy as a necessary stepping-stone to religion, and it was incomplete unless it ended there. "The term, Philosophy, defines itself as an affectionate seeking after the truth; but Truth is the correlative of Being." 208/ It is "neither a science of the reason or understanding only, nor merely a science of morals, but the science of Being altogether." 209/ True philosophy exists only when from philosophy "it is passed into that wisdom which no man has but by the earnest aspirations to be united with the Only Wise, in that moment when the Father shall be all in all." 210/ He had stated in The Friend, that "Religion is the ultimate aim of philosophy," 211/ and in a note on Solger in 1818 he wrote, "Philosophy is the spiritual Light in and by which we behold and affirm the Human in Man, the Natural in Nature, the Godlike in all: and God everywhere and over all. Add the consciousness of dependency, the conscience of imperfection: add Love ... add Prayer, as the unity of Thought and Act of Insight and Life: and Philosophy becomes Religion." 212/

Philosophy could so easily lead to religion for Coleridge because he conceived the basis of both to be the same, a position in which he found himself in agreement with Erigena in 1827. In order to reconcile the conditional and contingent it was necessary to presuppose an absolute and unconditioned source of being in a supersensuous essence which Coleridge viewed as "at once the ideal of the reason and the cause of the material
world," and, as such, the pre-establisher of the harmony in and between both. He reconciled the contradictions of the world which were brought out by the Understanding in reflecting and judging according to sense in a transcendent unity; the transcendent unity was itself Reason. The ground of both philosophy and religion was the unity of the intuitive Reason which combined the moral and intellectual aspects of man (or, in other words, the practical and the speculative) and was able to take the object of knowledge into itself, thus combining subject and object. In the Biographia Literaria Coleridge had stated that the test of the philosophic capacity was the "heaven descended KNOW THYSELF;" in the Aids to Reflection he upheld self-knowledge as the key to the casket of Christian knowledge; in the Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit self-knowledge was the test of the capacity for Christian knowledge. But it is wrong to take Coleridge's statement near the end of his life that it was impossible to know one's self as a repudiation of his position that self-knowledge was the key to all knowledge. He never thought it possible to know one's self exhaustively. But he thought it possible to have enough self-knowledge to become self-conscious, and the amount of self-consciousness that could be attained was the "test of philosophic capacity" because it was the condition of knowledge. If one was able, or as Coleridge put it in The Friend, if one "dared," to commune with "our very and permanent self,"
then the capacity for philosophy would be more than an Aristotelian brand in which ideas were merely regulative, for constitutive knowledge, the only true knowledge, was dependent upon the synthesis of subject and object, \textsuperscript{219} and the possibility of the identification of subject and object was found in self-consciousness, in the "Sum or I AM". \textsuperscript{220} In self-consciousness being and knowing will be found to be identical, because man is finite, yet infinite; he is at once subject and object because as subject he is able to contemplate himself as object. The act of self-consciousness Coleridge called the "intuition of absolute existence." \textsuperscript{221} This very self-knowledge whereby man knows himself as finite, yet feels himself to be also a partaker of infinity, created a situation in which the organ of Reason could be brought into play in the apprehension of spiritual reality. Coleridge stated in \textit{The Friend} that the intuition of existence led to a sort of philosophic crisis in which "not to be, then, is impossible; to be, incomprehensible", and that it was this crisis which had filled the nobler philosophic minds with a "sort of sacred horror". \textsuperscript{222} But through the unity of intuitive Reason Coleridge passed with certainty into that "true philosophy" which knowledgeably affirms God as the source of both being and existence. \textsuperscript{223} If Philosophy is viewed from the standpoint of the intuitive unity of Reason "the head will not be disjoined from the heart", nor will speculative truth be
alienated from practical wisdom. And vainly without the union of both shall we expect an opening of the inward eye to the glorious vision of that existence which admits of no question out of itself, acknowledges no predicate but the I AM IN THAT I AM." While the preceding quotation is from The Friend Coleridge went on in the Biographia Literaria to assert, "If a man be asked how he knows that he is? he can only answer, sum quia sum. But if (the absoluteness of this certainty having been admitted) he be again asked, how he, the individual person, came to be, then in relation to the ground of his existence, not to the ground of his knowledge of that existence, he might reply, sum quia Deus est, or still more philosophically, sum quia in Deo sum." Coleridge summed up his epistemology: "We begin with the I KNOW MYSELF, in order to end with the absolute I AM. We proceed from the SELF, in order to lose and find all self in God." Self-consciousness was "a kind of knowing." Whatever it is that Miss Coburn claims for the separation made by Coleridge between natural and "supernatural" philosophy, (she is not clear), it is nevertheless true that Coleridge claimed, and worked from, the principle that the "true system of natural philosophy places the sole reality of things in an ABSOLUTE, which is at once causa sui et effectus." In a marginal note made around 1817 or 1818, Coleridge wrote: "You followers of the dead Letter of your immortal Master Em. Kant, cannot even give a tenable definition of the word Philosophy."
In The Friend Coleridge had written that the knowledge arrived at by the Understanding, or abstract knowledge (knowledge arrived at by logic), was inferior to the knowledge of Reason, "that intuition of things which arises when we possess ourselves, as one with the whole, which is substantial knowledge".  

In a notebook in 1827 he entertained the same opinion.

In 1834 Coleridge criticized the "metaphysical disquisition at the end of the first volume of the Biographia Literaria" as "containing fragments of the truth" and not "fully thought out".

It seems that Coleridge must have criticized it because he thought it susceptible to a pantheistic interpretation even though he had tried his best to introduce the concept of a personal God into the portion of Schelling which he used.  

The "fragments of the truth" which it contained must have been the basic epistemology resulting from his distinction between Reason and Understanding; this remained the uniting and consistent element in his thought. From the time that he first formed the distinction between Reason and Understanding he never swerved from the assertion that "Reason alone is knowledge".


So it is, then, that when Coleridge spoke of Reason he never thought of it as a faculty. It was really not the property of man at all. "That which is rightly to be called our Reason is the presence of the one supreme substantial mind, the co-


eternal Logos, to all men - the Light which lighteth every
man that cometh into the world. This therefore is not
our own." And in another note: "And what is the Reason?
- The spirit in its presence to the understanding abstractedly
from its presence in the will, - nay, in many, during the
negation of the latter. The spirit present to man, but not
appropriated by him, is the reason of man." Mixed in
with his Kantian ideas, Coleridge gave a representative view
of the manner in which he thought of Reason in the Essay on
Faith, written sometime not long after the Aids to Reflection
were published. He said in 1825 that it was one of six
disquisitions ready for the press which were to supplement
the material in the Aids to Reflection, (which was often
merely his way of saying that he had given serious thought to
the writing of such a disquisition), and again in 1826 he
stated that the Essay on Faith was one of three essays which
would supplement the Aids to Reflection. It was not
published, however, until 1838-39 as a part of the Literary
Remains. The editor, H.N. Coleridge, numbered Coleridge's
attempts to define Reason:

"I. Reason, and the proper objects of reason, are wholly
alien from sensation. Reason is supersensual, and its antagonist
is appetite, and the objects of appetite the lust of the flesh.

II. Reason and its objects do not appertain to the world
of the senses, inward or outward; that is, they partake not of
sense or fancy. Reason is super-sensuous, and here its antagonist is the lust of the eye.

III. Reason and its objects are not things of reflection, association, discursiop, ... discourse in the old sense of the word as opposed to intuition; 'discursive or intuitive', as Milton has it ... Reason is not the faculty of the finite ... the reason is super-finite; and in this relation, its antagonist is the insubordinate understanding, or mind of the flesh.

IV. Reason, as one with the absolute Will ... and therefore for man the certain representative of the will of God, is above the will of man as an individual will ... The fourth antagonist, then, of reason, is the lust of the will."

This position is essentially the same as that set forth years before in The Friend in 1809-10 when he spoke of Reason as organ as being identical with its objects, and equated Reason with revelation. His position had not changed in the Aids to Reflection or elsewhere. In the notes on the copy of Leighton which he used in preparing the Aids to Reflection Coleridge noted that "tho' I do not question any man's Right to speak of his Understanding when enlightened by Reason, and applied to truths of Reason, as his Reason, meaning thereby his reasoning or reason-appropriating Faculty; or again to use the word, understanding, for the human mind integrally, or for the Man himself, especially contemplated as an intelligent Creature; yet I should hold it inexpedient to exercise that Right."
Although Coleridge made this note as a continuation of marginal notes on Leighton later incorporated into the *Aids to Reflection*, he noticeably omitted this passage. In the *Aids to Reflection* he himself used Reason as a reasoning power which decided negatively on the truths of theology as speculative Reason. He exercised a right which he himself thought inexpedient. But in his theology Coleridge never heeded his division of Reason into practical and speculative, and his references to the power of reasoning or thinking come under the term Understanding, just as they had in the *Statesman's Manual*. There Coleridge affirmed that "an understanding ... rationalized would lead to the admission of the general doctrines of natural religion, the belief of God, and of immortality; and probably to an acquiescence in the history and ethics of the Gospel. But still it would be a speculative faith, and in the nature of a theory; as if the main object of religion were to solve difficulties for the satisfaction of the intellect. Now this state of mind ... is the state of too many among our self-entitled rational religionists.... In religion there is no abstraction ... That which intuitively it (i.e. reason) at once beholds and adores, praying always, and rejoicing always - that doth it tend to become." The power given to the "rationalized understanding" in the *Statesman's Manual* was the same power given to the speculative Reason in the *Aids to Reflection* and then later clarified in a footnote as properly the "light of reason in the understanding". Also, it is
interesting to note the ideas of Coleridge on Reason in a note of 1827 made on the *Statesman's Manual* in which he attempts to clarify and justify his former division of Reason into practical and intellective. Reason is not called speculative, but intellective, and is not discursive in its intellective sense, but, like the practical reason, is intuitive. "...the reason, - as contra-distinguished from the understanding by logical processes, without reference to revelation or to reason *sensu eminenti*, as the self-subsistent Reason or Logos, and merely considered as the endowment of the human will and mind, having two definitions accordingly as it is exercised practically or intellectually, - is the ground of theology, or religious belief." 244/ In another note of 1827 Coleridge wrote, "Reason may or rather must be used in two different yet correlative senses, which are nevertheless in some measure reunited by a third. In its highest sense, and which is the ground and source of the rest, reason is being, the Supreme Being contemplated objectively, and in abstraction from the personality, The Word or Logos, is life, and communicates life; is light and communicates light. Now this light contemplated *in abstracto* is reason.

The second sense comes when we speak of ourselves as possessing reason; and this we can no otherwise define than as the capability with which God had endowed man of beholding, or being conscious of, the divine light, but as the life or indwelling of the living Word, which is our light; that is, a
life whereby we are capable of the light, and by which the light is present to us, as a being which we may call ours, but which I cannot call mine; for it is the life that we individualize, while the light, as its correlative opposite, remains universal." 245/ In 1834 he commented, "...there can no more be two Religions than two Reasons." 246/

Although he remained firm in his position from the publication of The Friend onward that Reason was not a faculty belonging to man as was the Understanding, he did, nevertheless, advance more and more toward the view that Reason was the name for the germinative seed of knowledge implanted by God in revelation, and that the Understanding was in fact the man himself who opposed this revelation. This is an advance from his view previously quoted from the note made on Leighton before the publication of the Aids to Reflection. In 1827 he amended the Statesman's Manual: "Perhaps the safer use of the term, understanding, for general purposes, is, to take it as the mind, or rather as the man himself considered as a concipient as well as percipient being, and reason as a power supervening. The want of a clear notion respecting the nature of reason may be traced to the difficulty of combining the notion of an organ of sense, or a new sense, with the notion of the appropriate and peculiar objects of that sense, so that the idea evolved from this synthesis shall be the identity of both. By reason we know that God is; but God is himself the
Supreme Reason. And this is the proper difference between all spiritual faculties and the bodily senses; - the organs of spiritual apprehension having objects consubstantial with themselves (κακοθέα), or being themselves their own objects, that is, self-contemplative.241/ After this forthright admission from Coleridge that his difficulty in gaining a clear definition of Reason lies in the fact that he has made Reason into a "new sense", an organ which perceives spiritual reality immediately, we find him, in 1830, still attempting to formulate the distinction between Reason and Understanding in keeping with the "positive" exposition of ideas he intended for his Opus Magnum. He wrote in a notebook, "What is now wanting to complete my exposition of the diversity of Reason and Understanding, is to translate the truths out of the language of Abstract or General Terms into that of Reality -- The first step is already secured in the establishment of the Identity of Reason and Being, and of both with the Eternal Word, the only-begotten-Son -- and in the necessity of the finite mind to distinguish the One -- Absolute Being into Person, the Manifestatine focal or Central Subsistence, and the Sphere, in which he is everywhere present operatively. - Hence Reason is the Sphere, the Light of the Son, the Light which the Son is -- and this the Light, that lighteth every man that cometh into the world --

Now the Understanding is the Man himself, contemplated as an intelligent creature -- and the Light shineth down into
his natural darkness (= blind instinct) and by its presence converts the vital instinct into Understanding -- and this Light of the Understanding, or the Understanding as modified by this Light -- may be distinguished from the Reason itself, as Lumen from Lux -- It is Lumen Humanum -- a Luce Divina -- and the implanted susceptibility of this illumination so that the Light is present as Light -- constitutes him a Man, and is truly the Image of God --

The Understanding then is the Man -- whose rationality consists in the innate susceptibility of the Lumen a Luce -- but the Reason is not the Man, but νοὴν ἐν ὑπάρχειν, which however, as far as he is a Spirit, might be named an attribute of his Humanity by the virtue of his perpetual presence of the never-setting Light and Sun -- but because he is a fallen Spirit -- the necessity of Sleep reminds him of his Fall by the periodical eclipse of the Light -- thro' the unfitness of his bodily organism to continue unintermittedly to be the Medium."

"Reason" said Coleridge, "can be applied to the Mysteries because they are reason." The Understanding could not. "The knowledge, the recognition of God is as alien from the Understanding as -- nay, More because in genera and not merely inspecie, than Music to the Smell." "The eye is not more inappropriate to sound, than the mere understanding to the modes and laws of spiritual existence. In this sense I have used the term; and in this sense I assert that the understanding or experiential faculty, unirradiated by the reason and the spirit,
has no appropriate object but the material world in relation to our worldly interests." 251/ 

11. Reason is not Rationalism.

In Coleridge's experience it had been logic which denied the eternal mysteries, the head reasoning on its own without taking into account the heart. Moreover, Coleridge decided that the logical faculty judging according to outward sense would always deny God through scepticism if not by avowed unbelief. By giving the Understanding the province of logic and making it a faculty, Coleridge made it responsible for unbelief and infidelity. It was only a part of the total experience of men, and, Coleridge felt, the least important part. God can be known, but not conceived, and when the Understanding usurps the place of Reason and maintains that all knowledge is reducible to conception men consequently deny God. Coleridge held the tradition of Locke responsible for such an attitude, and by his distinction between Reason and Understanding reaffirmed the important emphasis of medieval scholasticism and mysticism, namely, that God was known immediately. But this knowledge was given as well as immediate, and, because Coleridge knew it to be so from his own experience, he was, on the one hand, able to avoid the asceticism or quietism which usually accompanied such a scheme as his own, and, on the other, to realize the futility of demonstration and evidence outside of individual experience in attesting
to the truth. But while knowledge of God was ultimately given and not attained, yet in order for this truth to be given man had to "blow away the mists" from the Understanding and learn the use of Reason, and herein lay the moral appeal in Coleridge's theology. And because once man realized his "proper humanity" Coleridge thought it possible to demonstrate that no scheme other than the Christian was the truth, he was, from time to time, tempted toward that passion for systematization of which Maurice complained. Coleridge asked, "What more cogent proof (of the objective reality of the Ideas) can we have than that a man must contradict his whole human being in order to deny it?" 252/  
"...all lower Natures (i.e. those having understanding only) find their highest good in semblances and seekings of that which is higher and Better. All things strive to ascend, and ascend in their striving. And shall man alone stoop? Shall his pursuits and desires, the reflection of his inward life, be like the reflected Image of a Tree on the edge of a Pool, that grows downward, and seeks a mock heaven in the unstable element beneath it, in neighborhood with slimy water-weeds and cozy bottom — ... No! it must be a higher good to make you happy. While you labor for anything below your proper humanity, you seek a happy life in the region of Death. Well said the moral Poet -  
Unless above himself he can Erect himself, how mean a Thing is Man!" 253/  
And in a note on Nicolai he had written, "But tho' Kant justly denies a positive demonstrative force to the arguments
a posteriori, for the existence, of God, does he not admit that they are inducements of such strength that a man would... (dare not) be deemed man, who rejected them?" 254/ The "proper humanity" which was so dear to Coleridge was the life in Reason. His task of awaking this life was set forth in a note on Boehme, "...The toutoukosmore Professors of Christianity tell us, that the workings of the Spirit, the ingrafted Word, the Christ born within us, the Life that is the Light of every man, etc. etc., only mean the common sense and the acquired convictions of the Understanding. We on the other hand hold and teach, that the true common sense, the only real and effective convictions are the working of the spirit, the Christ born in our Hearts, the Word that was with God and God, the Life that is the Light, etc. They lower the divine into the ordinary human, we raise that, which is indeed and distinctively Human, into a participation of the divine." 255/

The divine mysteries which were apprehended by the Reason Coleridge called ideas. Ideas were distinguished from conceptions in that ideas were "not adequately expressible by words." This was the test and character of ideas, and "... were it not a contradiction in terms, it would not be an Idea - not a living Truth of the whole spiritual Man, a Ray from the convergence of the Will and the Reason, but either a Fact of the Sense, or a conception of the Understanding! And were it not an Idea, it would be no object of Faith ... this is the common character, the criterion and diagnostic of Ideas,
that they are expressible only by two positions that one of which affirms what the other denies ... Spiritual things can only be spiritually discerned, saith the inspired Philosopher of Tarsus..." 256/ "An idea can only be expressed (more correctly suggested) by two contradictory positions; as for example; the soul is all in every part." 257/ Or again he gave these examples; "Before Abraham was, I am.- God is a circle, the centre of which is everywhere, and circumference nowhere." 258/ But the negativation of one clause by the other was for Coleridge merely verbal. "This like every other Idea is in the verbal expression a Contradiction in terms, for Terms are the Artefacts of the Understanding, and this is a truth that passes all Understanding. The regenerate mind discerns it spiritually, is spiritually intuitive thereof; but we can no more understand it, than we can taste or smell a conception of the Understanding." 259/ Since every idea had to be reduced to the forms of the Understanding in order to be expressed, it was necessarily expressed in contradictory words because the Understanding was not capable of spiritual intuition and thus dealing with reality. Coleridge embraced the realist position, and exclaimed, "O grace of God! if only a believing mind were thoroughly purged from the refracting film of nominalism; if it could indeed be possessed by, and possess, the full Idea of the Reality of the Absolute Will, the Good!" 260/ But the "refracting film of nominalism" was always present in a mind held captive to Original Sin. The natural mind of man,
or mind of the flesh, was the Understanding, which, Coleridge constantly reiterated, Paul had called the "γνώσις", and, moreover, "he that doeth evil, so far from eschewing his understanding, idolizes it, as the faculty of selecting and adapting the means to his evil purposes." 262/

One of the purposes of Christianity was to raise man out of the world of the Understanding into the use of Reason, to recall "the drowsed soul from the dreams and phantom world of sensuality to actual reality." But "how has it been evaded!" The mysteries, the ideas, were turned into "mere metaphors, figures of speech, oriental hyperboles." 262/
"Rationalism is not Reason." "...the abuse of figurative interpretation is endless; - instead of being applied, as it ought to be, to those things which are the most comprehensible, that is, sensuous, and which therefore are the parts likely to be figurative, because such language is a condescension to our weakness, - it is applied to rot away the very pillars, yea, to fret away and dissolve the very corner stones of the temple of religion. O holy Paul! O, beloved John! full of light and love, whose books are full of intuitions, as those of Paul are books of energies, - the one uttering to sympathising angels what the other toils to convey to weak-sighted yet docile men:- O Luther! Calvin! Fox, with Penn and Barclay! O Zinzendorf! and ye' too, whose outward garments only have been singed and dishonoured in the heathenish furnace of Roman apostacy, Francis of Sales, Fenelon; - yea, even Aquinas and Scotus! - With what
astoundment would ye, if ye were alive with your merely human perfections, listen to the creed of our, so called, rational religionists! Rational!— they who, in the very outset deny all reason, and leave us nothing but degrees to distinguish us from brutes; ... Ol place before your eyes the island of Britain in the reign of Alfred, its unpierced woods, its wide morasses and dreary heaths, its blood-stained and desolated shores, its untaught and scanty population; behold the monarch listening now to Bede, and now to John Erigena; and then see the same realm, a mighty empire, full of motion, full of books, where the cotter's son, twelve years old, has read more than archbishops of yore, and possesses the opportunity of reading more than our Alfred himself; and then finally behold this mighty nation, its rulers and its wise men listening to —— Paley and to —— Malthus! It is mournful, mournful."

Reason is not rationalism; Reason is the light that lighteth every man. Reason is the source of ideas and ideas themselves. Reason is revelation. Reason is the source of being and the identification of being. It is the name for that total experience whereby spiritual reality becomes known, and a part of the knower. While few men had this experience all were capable of it had they but looked deep into their own souls.

Having given to Reason a meaning practically the reverse of the ordinary usage of his time, (and ours), Coleridge was constantly forgiving writers with whose thought he was sympathetic for the misuse of the word. But in writers with
whom he had nothing in common, in authors who adhered to the conceptual power in their work and gave no credence to the mysteries, Coleridge claimed that they not only misused the word Reason, but had not mastered the distinction between Reason and Understanding. Thus of people like Luther, 265/Boehme, 266/Donne, 267/Hooker, 268/Field, 269/ and Leighton, 270/he merely complained that they used the word Reason in places where they meant Understanding, but of Jeremy Taylor, 271/Priestley, 272/Paley, 273/ and Edward Irving, 274/he lamented that their failure to appreciate the distinction was the cause of their many errors. Generally he spoke of the age of Hooker and the Seventeenth Century as having recognized the distinction, but confounded the words, while the divines since James II had not known the distinction. 275/

12. Muirhead's Coleridge.

Coleridge never heeded the scholastic use of ratio and intellectus. Aquinas sharply distinguished between ratio and intellectus, but ratio was the discursive power, while he gave to intellectus the intuitive power, making it for him the highest of the two. It will be noticed that Coleridge has practically reversed Aquinas' use of the terms by using Kant as a spring-board in formulating his idea of Reason. Hodges has noted, "Reason is what philosophers like Kant are thinking of when they say that the knowing mind constructs what it knows;
intellect is what Aristotle and S. Thomas are thinking of when they say that the knowing mind takes the form of the object into itself”. Thus intellect is intuitive and is the true glory of man. Hodges goes on to say in a note: "The German for reason is Vernunft, and for intellect or understanding Verstand. In some modern German writers such as Hegel, the relation between these two functions is presented in a different light. Verstand is taken to imply resting content with achieved apprehensions of truth, finite and partial though they may be, and Vernunft is made to imply a movement of the mind in search of wider connections. On this showing naturally, Vernunft can be presented as the nobler faculty of the two, and this view of the matter is characteristic of post-Kantian German philosophy." 276/ Coleridge went the full circle, gave to Reason the old intuitive meaning formerly given intellect, and, on this basis, made it the 'proper humanity'. Wellek has remarked, "Reason under Coleridge's hands returned to its old meaning of intellectual intuition, the limits between practical and theoretical reason are erased thereby and the whole flood of traditional metaphysics can again celebrate its triumphant entry." 277/ Wellek was perhaps wrong in allowing that "the whole flood" of traditional metaphysics could return in Coleridge's thought, because he moved the debate about proofs and evidences from the jurisdiction of the Understanding to the mystical organ of Reason, which cuts through and leaps
over the old arguments. Reason is its own evidence. But certainly Wellek realized the true nature of Coleridge's thought, and did not misrepresent it as had Muirhead the year before. Muirhead, who published his volume on Coleridge's philosophy in 1930, one year before Wellek's work in 1931, attempted to refute Wellek in 1934 in the article entitled Metaphysician or Mystic, published in the centenary study of Coleridge. Muirhead determined that Coleridge was no mystic. Well, be that as it may, depending upon which of the many criteria one picks to determine the content of mysticism, certainly Muirhead was wrong in determining Coleridge to be a follower of the 'critical way'.

The basis of Muirhead's misinterpretation of Coleridge is found in his attempt to make Coleridge's position agree with his own, namely, that "all truth in the end must be logical truth." This is very near the exact antithesis of Coleridge's own position. But Muirhead, with his own peculiar metaphysical logic, decided Coleridge was the founder and most distinguished representative of a voluntaristic form of idealism, and just as literary critics have regretted Coleridge's decay into metaphysics, Muirhead regretted Coleridge's lapses into a reconstruction of orthodoxy. Muirhead did some very precarious juggling in order to make Coleridge fit his scheme. On the distinction between Reason and Understanding made by Coleridge, Muirhead wrote, "If we
had merely the popular statement of the published works, we might suppose that it was merely an elaboration of the Platonic distinction between discursive and intuitive thought ... Whether there ever was a time when this was all that the distinction meant to Coleridge or when he took it to be all that Kant meant, there is no need to inquire. The manuscript on Logic makes it quite clear that by the time it was written he had arrived, by the aid of Kant, at a far deeper apprehension of the relation of sense to understanding, and of understanding to reason in its wider and truer meaning. In other words, after conceding that even in the Aids to Reflection, to say nothing of Coleridge's published marginalia or other works, the distinction of Coleridge between Reason and Understanding appeared to be that between discursive and intuitive, Muirhead chose to follow the most unrepresentative work of Coleridge, the MS Logic, and abandon without further ado the rest of Coleridge's statements on the Reason and Understanding both before and after the Treatise on Logic. He would have done well had he made an "inquiry" or two. Coleridge had much to say on Reason and Understanding, as well as intuitive knowledge, after the MS Logic was written; for instance, the note of 1827 quoted above on the organ of Reason as a "new sense". To see the un-Colidridgean nature of the MS Logic we need quote only one sentence which comes in a passage Chinol has shown to be parallel in thought and phrase to one in Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'.
"Now independently of the Sense we can have no intuition or intuitive knowledge." 283/ Thus, out of the symphonic unity of Coleridge's thought with its several themes Muirhead chose a discordant note on which to construct his variation on a theme and it simply does not blend. Muirhead writes of Coleridge's metaphysical method, "What was required in the case of the establishment of ... ultimate metaphysical truth was not to break away from fact and its logical implications and appeal to a non-logical intuition, but to give fuller recognition first to the actual fact (the reality of the moral law in man's mind), and secondly to what was logically implied in it (the existence of a moral law, and therewith of a Lawgiver, in the world at large)." 284/

But Muirhead has given only a caricature of the very systems of Clarke, Paley, Hume and the religious naturalists and Deists against whom Coleridge rebelled. In 1830 Coleridge advised all those who were accustomed to think of God as some sort of Universal Being or Wisdom of Nature or Impersonal Lawgiver to direct their thoughts to the "Jehova Word, the Son of God, who became the Son of Man." 285/ Nor does Muirhead recognize the seriousness of Coleridge when he proposed a Redemption in Christ as the only Redemption from sin, but alluded to his thought on Redemption as not fully developed. 286/ Of course, for Muirhead's idealist view of sin the mysterious Redemption is hardly demanded. Muirhead would have done well
to have quoted Coleridge's note on Wesley: "Because God brings good out of evil, we are too apt to forget that yet greater and more unmixedly good effects might, under the same Divine influence, have proceeded from a good cause, without the evil. That it would have been an evil for man not to have fallen from the original rectitude of his nature, is a tenet of certain sects, and of a few high-flying supralapsarian divines in the Church; but it is no doctrine of the Gospel." 287/

13. Reason is the Light that Lighteth every Man.

Coleridge decided to call the power of spiritual apprehension by the name of Reason after the usage of Kant who gave to the pure Reason a creative function in the act of knowledge, a function for which Coleridge had been contending without Kant's logic in his concept of the Imagination. The intensive study of Kant after his return from Germany is the dividing line between Coleridge's distinction between Fancy and Imagination and his distinction between Reason and Understanding. The concept of the Imagination passed easily into the concept of Reason, especially with the added impetus given by Kant when he called the power that dealt with noumenal world the practical Reason. But Coleridge only decided on the word Reason from his study of Kant. For similarities in the way in which Coleridge used it, it is necessary to go to the Platonist mystical tradition.
Coleridge used Reason as synonymous with Light, Logos, Word, Revelation. We have noted the very early acquaintance of Coleridge with Plotinus, a friendship which his notebooks reveal lasted all his life even though he refused to be an unquestioning disciple. Coleridge's concept of reason has features of the Θεός of Plotinus, where reality was constituted by the trinity in unity of the perceiving spirit (Φωτισμός), the spiritual world (ΑΙΣθησις), and the spiritual perception (νοημοσύνη) which united subject and object in one. For Plotinus "sensible reality" was only a shadow of reality. Only when νοημοσύνη - spiritual perception, or intuitive knowledge - was exercised were we ourselves completely real and in contact with reality. Moreover, Plotinus called this the highest faculty of our nature, a 'power which all possess but few use.' The discursive reason (διάνοια or λογισμός) Plotinus gave the function of separating, distributing and recombing the data of experience. But the νοημόσυνη beheld all things in their true relation in an active intuition without the need of the process of reflection and logic. Coleridge many times refers to Reason as νοήμοσύνη.

Coleridge's view of Reason as features of the Stoic λογισμονοματικόν. Reason, as the indwelling seed of Christ Himself, was seminal always, containing in itself germs which made possible the birth of life, the "proper humanity". That his view of Reason as the immanent link between man and God had a
Stoic heritage is shown from Coleridge’s use of a quotation by Seneca in the Aids to Reflection: “And here it will not be impertinent to observe, that what the eldest Greek Philosophy entitled the Reason (νοησία) and Ideas, the philosophic Apostle names the Spirit and Truths Spiritually discerned; while to those who in the pride of learning or in the overweening meanness of modern metaphysics decry the doctrine of the Spirit in Man and its possible communion with the Holy Spirit, as vulgar enthusiasm, I submit the following sentences from a Pagan philosopher, a nobleman and a minister of state—”Ita dico, Lucilli! Sacer intra nos spiritus sedet, malorum bonorumque nostrorum observator et custos. Hic prout a nobis tractatus est, ita nos ipse tractat. BONUS VIR SINE DEO NEMO EST.”

In The Friend Coleridge wished to have the venerable authority of Hooker for his use of Reason and Understanding, and used Hooker’s own expression when he said that the "understanding possesses two distinct organs, outward sense, and 'the mind's eye'”, but it was not quite fair to either of them to have used the quotation as he did, for it only muddled the distinction of Coleridge between Reason and Understanding, and misappropriated Hooker’s use of Reason. The same perversion of the thought of Jeremy Taylor, only to a much greater degree, happened in the Aids to Reflection. It was especially unfair of Coleridge to use Jeremy Taylor as an authority for his concept of Reason, since, unlike Hooker, Coleridge asserted in his marginalia that Taylor did not even
realize the distinction between Reason and Understanding.

But Coleridge himself confused the issue with his distinction between practical and speculative Reason, and it is noticeable that he quoted Taylor on the use of speculative Reason.

In a quotation from John Smith he found a true companion. The only explanation for the quotation being relegated to a footnote is that the Cambridge Platonists had in the age of rationalistic theology fallen into a mystical disrepute. It contains the closest parallel of Coleridge's view of Reason to be found in the whole volume. "While we reflect on our own idea of Reason, we know that our Souls are not it, but only partake of it; and that we have it αύτή αύτη and not ευπροσδοκημένη. Neither can it be called a Faculty, but far rather a Light, which we enjoy, but the Source of which is not in ourselves, nor rightly by an individual to be denominated mine." 292/ In the Cambridge Platonists, themselves in reaction against materialism, scepticism, and empiricism, Coleridge found a pattern of thought very close to his own. Yet, in light of the closeness of their thought, he is strangely silent toward any indebtedness or comparisons in the structures of their schemes. There are comparatively very few references in his writing to the Cambridge Platonists. It is very interesting, and perhaps informative, that the criticism which Coleridge directed against both Henry More and John Smith in his notes on their works are typical of those later aimed at
Coleridge himself. The critical attitude assumed by Coleridge in these marginal notes is very puzzling, for he criticizes positions which throughout his writing are his very own. 293/

In 1802 Coleridge had written, "My creed is very simple ... my confession of Faith very brief. I approve altogether and embrace entirely the Religion of the Quakers, but exceedingly dislike the sect, and their own notions of their own Religion. By Quakerism I understand the opinions of George Fox rather than those of Barclay." 294/ In 1808 he wrote in his notebook, "W. Law's Scheme of Religion founded on J. Behmen is that which is most convincing to my judgment - rather, let me say G. Fox in what he did not, he and Law in what they joined in believing." 295/

The equation of Reason with Light which Coleridge makes has a relation in the "inner light" of Fox. The experience of Coleridge in regard to the Reason as Light and Revelation closely resembles the experience recounted by Fox in his journal, when he realized "that Every Man was enlightened by the Divine Light of Christ, and I saw it shine through all; And that they that believed in it came out of Condemnation and came to the Light of Life, and became the Children of it; But they that hated it, and did not believe in it, were condemned by it, though they made a Profession of Christ. This I saw in the pure Openings of the Light, without any help of any Man, neither did I then know where to find it in the Scriptures, though afterwards, searching the Scriptures, I found it." 296/
In the *Aids to Reflection* Coleridge complained that Bacon, who had known the distinction between Reason and Understanding, had nevertheless confused the terms, and thus was compelled to adopt "fantastical and mystical phrases, for example, the dry light (lumen siccum), the lucific vision, and the like, meaning thereby nothing more than Reason in contra-distinction from the Understanding." Although Coleridge did not continue the paragraph in relation to the content he gave to the very common and ordinary word Reason, he could have gone on to say, (and have avoided much confusion later), that he himself preferred to take the term Reason and give it a strictly religious, and, at times, mystical content. In his marginalia he referred to Reason as both the *lumen siccum* and the *visio idealis*, and in his notebook had recorded that Reason and Sense are analogous: "*visio idealis* and *intuitive Sensibili.*" 298

Coleridge's greatest authority in his use of Reason as the Logos was, of course, the Gospel according to St. John. We will now turn to the theology of Coleridge, keeping in mind this note on Donne: "A religion of ideas, spiritual truths, or truth-powers, - not of notions and conceptions, the manufacture of the understanding, - is therefore *simplex et nuda*, that is, immediate; like the clear blue heaven of Italy, deep and transparent, an ocean unfathomable in its depth, and yet ground all the way. Still as meditation soars upwards, it meets the arched firmament with all its suspended lamps of light. 0, let
not the *simplex et nuda* of Gregory (i.e. Nazianzen) be perverted to the Socinian, 'plain and easy for the meanest understanding!' The truth in Christ, like the peace of Christ, passeth all understanding. If ever there was a mischievous misuse of words, the confusion of the terms, 'reason' and 'understanding', 'ideas' and 'notions', or 'conceptions', is most mischievous; a Surinam toad with a swarm of toadlings sprouting out of its back and sides."
CHAPTER II.

SIN AND REDEMPTION.

1. A Sense of Sin.

In a note on Swedenborg Coleridge wrote, "... the Power of Reason on the Conscience and the Light of Reason in the Understanding - these are the distinctive characters, or rather the proper constituents, of our Humanity - in one or all of these the Disease must be found; and as the disease, so the Remedy..." 1/ The phrase "as the Disease, so the Remedy" gives a much better insight into Coleridge's journey through Unitarianism to orthodox Christianity as embodied in the Church of England, of which he could write in 1815, "ESTO PERPETUAL", 2/ than does the idea that he discovered that an established Church better lends itself to the expedient political virtues of the learning and culture of the nation. While Coleridge could explain the "disease" with a Unitarian diagnosis, he could also accept their "remedy". But when he discovered that sin was the sort of disease which could be cured neither by education, personal resolve, nor a moral Gospel, the prescription for the "remedy" given by Unitarianism lost its hold. His growth from Unitarianism to the established Church was only secondarily for political and cultural reasons.

Between the time that the young, confident Coleridge, who thought that the evil in the world could be overcome by clear thinking, wrote in 1796, "guilt is out of the question...
(I) deny the possibility of it", 4/ and the time when he solemnly affirmed that moral guilt was over all, 4/ there were decisive years of failure and frustration. Coleridge had early followed the lead of Godwin and Hartley, for whom win was circumstantial and accidental. In the Conciones ad Populum of 1795 Coleridge attributed sin to ignorance amidst a flow of Godwinian language. 5/ As long as the Pantisocratic scheme was uppermost in Coleridge's mind his idea of sin as vice or folly carried only a horizontal connotation, as the inhumanity of man to man. While as early as 1797 he could write, "Thank Heaven! I abominate Godwinism", 6/ his rejection of Godwin was on the humanitarian ground that Godwin made "filial affection folly, gratitude a crime, marriage injustice, and the promiscuous intercourse of the sexes right and wise." 7/ The egocentric character of sin as rebellion against God found in the "I-Thou" relationship, or in man "coram Deo", Coleridge had yet to discover, Consequently, "as the Disease, so the Remedy". He wrote to his brother, "Of guilt I say nothing, but I believe most steadfastly in original sin; that from our mothers' wombs our understandings are darkened; and even where our understandings are in the light, that our organization is depraved and our volitions imperfect; and we sometimes see the good without wishing to attain it, and oftener wish it without the energy that wills and performs. And for this inherent depravity I believe
that the spirit of the Gospel is the sole cure; but permit me to add, that I look for the spirit of the Gospel 'neither in the mountain, nor at Jerusalem.' The sum and spirit of the Gospel was for Coleridge its high social morality. In another letter he wrote, "You ask me what the friend of the universal equality should do. I answer: 'Talk not politics. Preach the Gospel!' Christianity was a religion for democrats. "It certainly teaches in the most explicit terms the rights of man, his right to wisdom, his right to an equal share in all the blessings of nature; it commands its disciples to go everywhere, and everywhere to preach these rights; it commands them never to use the arm of flesh, to be perfectly non-resistant; yet to hold the promulgation of truth to be a law above law, and in the performance of this office to defy 'wickedness in high places,' and cheerfully to endure ignominy, and wretchedness, and torments, and death, rather than intermit the performance of it;" Sin was caused by ignorance; Christ was the teacher with the best set of moral teachings whereby ignorance might be alleviated.

But just as Coleridge's concept of sin was largely determinative of his concept of Christianity in his younger days, the same was true in his later life after he realized the horror of sin in the presence of a righteous and holy God. The suffering and miserable anxiety which in 1802 led to the composition of Dejection, an Ode formed the prelude to his
bitter discovery of sin as guilt. In March, 1802, he wrote to Godwin, "My imagination ... lies like a cold snuff on the circular rim of a brass candlestick, without even a stink of tallow to remind you that it was once clothed and mitred in flame ... The Poet is dead in me..." 10/ His marriage of convenience in order to implement the Pantisocratic venture was a failure, one of those

"habitual ills
That wear out Life, when two unequal Minds
Meet in one House and two discordant Wills..." 11/

That the great tragedy of Coleridge's life was indolence of will both Coleridge and his critics seem to have agreed upon. Carlyle wrote; "His cardinal sin is that he wants will. He has no resolution. He shrinks from pain or labour in any of its shapes." 12/ Coleridge could nod his assent. "The Will of my life is poisoned...", he complained in a notebook. 13/

Three years before he died he wrote, "From my earliest recollection I have had a consciousness of Power without Strength - a perception, an experience, of more than ordinary power with an inward sense of weakness..." 14/ The feeling of utter helplessness to control his efforts as an author formed a dark cloud over all his life. The number of projects which he contemplated, but never actually began, is startling in its length. It seemed that any conscious effort to engage upon a task which he had presented himself, or one which had even been contracted, met with defeat through his inability to act
from a sense of duty. Laudanum, which he had started using as early as his Cambridge days to soften the pain of rheumatism, began to serve as an opiate for the brain when taken in ever increasing quantities to compensate for the mental anguish suffered through his unfortunate marriage, his love of another than the one he married, and the loss of his shaping spirit of imagination. 15/

Although Coleridge had to confess that his will was poisoned, such was not the case with his conscience. "O what an awful Being is Conscience!" he cried, 16/ and in the conflict between his extraordinarily acute conscience and his indolent will he must have wished he had also perverted his conscience. But it became more demanding as the years went by. It taught him the nature of guilt. In 1814 he wrote to Cottle, "...for ten years the anguish of my spirit has been indescribable, the sense of my danger staring, but the consciousness of GUILT worse, far worse than all. I have prayed, with drops of agony on my brow, trembling not only before the justice of my Maker, but even before the mercy of my Redeemer. 'I gave thee so many talents, what hast thou done with them?'" 17/ Coleridge's realization of sin as personal guilt was forged in the workshop of his life when the "awful being of conscience" worked its misery over the mess he had made of his life and work.

Coleridge knew fully the truth of Luther's famous dictum that a "man becomes a theologian by living, by dying, and by being damned, not by understanding, reading, and speculating."
After the forfeiture of his affair with Mary Evans, and his marriage to Sarah Fricker in the interests of the Pantiscoratic venture which was itself doomed from the beginning, Coleridge wrote at the end of 1796, "My metaphysical theories lay before me in the hour of anguish as toys by the bedside of a child deadly sick." He wrote to George Fricker in 1806, "I am far from surprised that, having seen what you have seen, and suffered what you have suffered, you should have opened your soul to a sense of our fallen nature; and the incapability of man to heal himself. My opinions may not be in all points the same as yours; but I have experienced a similar alteration. I was for many years a Socinian; and at times almost a Naturalist, but sorrow, and ill health, and disappointment in the only deep wish I had ever cherished, forced me to look into myself; I read the New Testament again, and I became fully convinced, that Socinianism was not only not the doctrine of the New Testament, but that it scarcely deserved the name of a religion in any sense." Coleridge went on to quote from a previous letter relating how his views toward Unitarianism and his concept of Christianity had changed with his discovery of "the incapability of man to heal himself." "I fear that the mode of defending Christianity, adopted by Grotius first; and latterly, among many others, by Dr. Paley, has increased the number of infidels; - never could it have been so great, if thinking men had been habitually led to look into their own souls, instead of always looking out, both of themselves,
and of their nature. If to curb attack, such as yours on miracles, it had been answered:—Well, brother! but granting these miracles to have been in part the growth of delusion at the time, and of exaggeration afterward, yet still all the doctrines will remain untouched by this circumstance, and binding on thee. Still must thou repent and be regenerated, and be crucified to the flesh; and this not by thy own mere power; but by a mysterious action of the moral Governor on thee; of the Ordo-ordinans, the Logos, or Word. Still will the eternal filiation, or Sonship of the Word from the Father; still will the Trinity of the Deity, the redemption, and the thereto necessary assumption of humanity by the Word, who is with God, and is God, remain truths; and still will the vital head-and-heart FAITH in these truths, be the living and only fountain of all true virtue. Believe all these, and with the grace of the spirit consult your own heart, in quietness and humility, they will furnish you with proofs, that surpass all understanding, because they are felt and known; believe all these I say, so as that thy faith shall be not merely real in the acquiescence of the intellect; but actual, in the thereto assimilated affections; then shalt thou KNOW from God, whether or not Christ be of God. But take notice, I only say, the miracles are extra essential; I by no means deny their importance, much less hold them useless, or superfluous. Even as Christ did, so would I teach; that is, build the miracle on the faith, not the faith on the miracle."

But the climax in Coleridge's awful realization of the
state of man who is alienated from God came through his attachment to opium. In 1814 when he had been strongly reprimanded by his friend Cottle for excessive use of opium, he replied, "I feel, with an intensity unfathomable by words, my utter nothingness, impotence, and worthlessness, in and for myself. I have learned what a sin is, against an infinite imperishable being, such as is the soul of man!

I have had more than a glimpse of what is meant by death and outer darkness, and the worm that dieth not ... and that all the hell of the reprobate is no more inconsistent with the love of God, than the blindness of one who has occasioned loathsome and guilty diseases, to eat out his eyes, is inconsistent with the light of the sun. But the consolations, at least, the sensible sweetness of hope, I do not possess. On the contrary, the temptation which I have constantly to fight up against is fear, that if annihilation and the possibility of heaven were offered to my choice, I should choose the former." 20/

But in the Redemption in Christ Coleridge found the "sweetness of hope". He wrote, "And when too Satan the tempter, becomes Satan the accuser, saying in thy heart:-

'This sickness is the consequence of sin, or sinful infirmity, and thou canst not hope for salvation as long as thou continuest in any sinful practice, and yet thou canst not abandon thy daily dose of this or that poison without suicide. For the sin of thy soul has become the necessity of thy body, daily tormenting
thee, without yielding thee any the least pleasurable
sensation, but goading thee on by terror without hope.
Under such evidence of God's wrath how canst thou expect to
be saved?" Well may the heart cry out, 'Who shall deliver
me from the body of this death, —from this death that lives
and tyrannises in my body?' But the Gospel answers —'There
is a redemption from the body promised; only cling to Christ.
Call on him continually with all thy heart and all thy soul,
to give thee strength, and be strong in thy weakness; and
what Christ doth not see good to relieve thee from, suffer in
hope. It may be better for thee to be kept humble and in
self-abasement. The thorn in the flesh may remain and yet
the grace of God through Christ prove sufficient for thee.
Only cling to Christ, and do thy best. In all love and well-
doing gird thyself up to improve and use aright what remains
free in thee, and if thou dost aught aright, say and thank-
fully believe that Christ hath done it for thee.' O what a
miserable despairing wretch should I become, if I believed
the doctrines of Bishop Jeremy Taylor in his Treatise on
Repentance, or those I heard preached by Dr. Chalmers;* if I
gave up the faith, that the life of Christ would precipitate
the remaining dregs of sin in the crisis of death, and that
I shall rise in purer capacity of Christ; blind to be
irradiated by his light, empty to be possessed by his fullness;
naked of merit to be clothed with his righteousness!" 21/

* H.N. Coleridge omitted the name of Chalmers when
editing the notes on Luther's Table Talk.
In 1816, after years of wandering, Coleridge found a permanent home with the Gillman family of Highgate. There Coleridge found relative peace and contentment, and, although the opium habit was not entirely overcome, its use was regulated and controlled. Coleridge regained a certain amount of self-confidence and self-respect in a prayerful Christian struggle with the drug, but to a moral victory he laid no claim. His notebooks bear out H.N. Coleridge's remarks that at the last it was "mercy, not praise," for which he pleaded. 22

But in the fact of sin as guilt Coleridge found the "necessitating occasion" for a return to the orthodox faith which proclaimed the Biblical doctrine of Redemption. In the sixth Philosophical Lecture given in London in 1819, Coleridge applied the lessons learned through his own experience to the whole human race. "If I say to a man involved in habits of sin who sees the misery of his vice and yet still goes from bad to worse, 'Exert your will!' Alas! he would answer, 'that is the dreadful penalty of my crimes. I have lost my will.' ... I say of the whole human race they have lost their Will. There is not one that would dare put his hand on his heart and say, 'In all things I act and feel as I know I ought to do,' unless that man is the most degraded of the degraded..." 23

The will which must respond to revelation in an act of faith has by a prior negative act of denial rendered itself powerless. But for this act of negation the individual is alone responsible and, because responsible, guilty. That he is responsible,
and that it is only by the grace of God he can answer His call for repentance, the conscience testifies.

The position reached by Coleridge in regard to sin, and its importance for Coleridge in adhering to the Biblical idea of the divine action of God in Christ as a real Redemption from sin and its consequences, is found in a note written at the end of 1833, less than a year before his death. "O how inseparably, for the fallen Creature, is the Faith in a God linked to the faith and hope of a Mediator! ... I groan under my Sins - I acknowledge them with my whole being, as my sins I confess, that from God I have received whatever of Good I have or have had whatever capability of good there is in me, and from him good alone - to my own corrupt nature; to the mystery of the false and alienated Will; to the Fall from God which I know and for the guilt of which I know myself responsible, tho' that very Fall has rendered me incapable of comprehending it - ... and since my age of distinct consciousness, O how often not only to the corruption of my Nature, but to my sinful acquiescence, against a better light ... do I from my inmost soul attribute all Evil I find within me, and all the Consequences of Evil, Pain of Body, Heaviness of Soul, and Perplexity of Mind - But O my God! I yet strive forward to thee - I am a cripple - a palsy-stricken creature - of my own power I can only earnestly will to move toward thee and I abhor my sinfulness, that clings to me and is sinking me downwards into the quicksand which I am treading."
2. Original Sin.

In the *Aids to Reflection*, published in 1825, Coleridge described the "two great moments of the Christian Religion" as "Original Sin and Redemption; that the Ground, this the Superstructure of our faith." "Christianity and Redemption," he said, "are equivalent terms," and the "necessitating Occasion of the Christian Dispensation" is the fact of human sin.

Because of the importance of recognizing that human sin was a fact before any need would be felt for the Christian Redemption, the doctrine of Original Sin became the most fully expounded part of Coleridge's "system" in the *Aids to Reflection*.

In discussion of Original Sin Coleridge was in revolt against an extreme Augustinian interpretation of Original Sin as hereditary guilt as well as the Arminian reaction against Augustinian Calvinism which had reduced sin to so many acts of merit or demerit under the watchful eye of God. The latter extreme he found exemplified in Jeremy Taylor. Because of Coleridge's many praises for Taylor it is an easy matter to overestimate his indebtedness to Taylor, as Brinkley appears to have done, even to the point of stating that Coleridge gave to man a free will. He ranked Taylor with Milton, Shakespeare, and Dryden in his style and elegance of prose, but disagreed with him on almost every tenet. He thought him the more dangerous because he was able to couch his Arminian and Pelagian doctrine in such beautiful prose. He warned, "Let not the surpassing eloquence of Taylor dazzle you, nor his
The mistake of the Reformers, Coleridge wrote in a note on Taylor, was that while laying bare an "awful fact of human nature," they attempted to explain Original Sin in the relation of cause to effect. In this effort to explicate "what was certain, but incomprehensible" they "perverted original sin into hereditary guilt." "Good men and of active minds," such as Jeremy Taylor, were rightly shocked at this, but instead of going back to the assertion of the incomprehensible fact, they removed the fact of Original Sin in building a system which emphasized responsibility for acts determined through a free will. "The mistaken theorist (i.e. Reformers) had built upon a foundation, though but a superstructure of chaff and straw; but the opponents built on nothing. Aghast at the superstructure, these latter ran away from that which is the sole foundation of all human religion." Jeremy Taylor had reduced "the cross of Christ to nothing."

In the *Aids to Reflection* Coleridge pointed out how Taylor had fallen back into the same trap from which he was attempting to free himself. Appalled at explaining Original Sin as hereditary guilt, he evolved a system in which the corruption of human nature had no guilt at all. Original Sin was a disease consequent to, and resulting from, the fall of Adam. When Adam fell God withdrew the supernatural aids and graces to obedience, but continued the obligation to obedience.
Thus, in Taylor's scheme, Adam in disobedience handed down to mankind the curse of Original Sin, and "God on Adam's account was so exasperated with mankind, that being angry he would still continue the punishment!" 21/ Coleridge said that it was impossible to account for the fact of individual guilt in a view which regarded Original Sin as nothing more than a disease or calamity. One may regret a disease or calamity, but it was impossible to feel remorse.

Earlier in his life Coleridge had written a blank verse tragedy entitled Remorse and he always made much of the distinction between regret and remorse. Only remorse could lead to true repentance. He wrote to Southey in 1813, "By Remorse I mean the anguish and disquietude arising from the self-contradiction introduced into the soul by guilt, a feeling which is good or bad according as the will makes use of it. This is expressed in the lines chosen as the motto:--

Remorse is as the heart in which it grows;
If that be gentle, it drops balmy dews
Of true repentance; but if proud and gloomy,
It is a poison tree that, pierced to the inmost,
Weeps only tears of poison! Act. I. Sc. I.

And Remorse is everywhere distinguished from virtuous penitence. 32/

To establish the possibility of remorse in order to show that "there is no true hope but in and thro' Christ" was Coleridge's purpose in his remarks on Original Sin in the Aids to Reflection. He proposed to establish this possibility by a return to the mystery of Original Sin, a mysterious but true doctrine which had been perverted in attempts at explanation by
both Calvinists and Arminians. For the assertion that Original Sin is incomprehensible, and therefore unexplainable, Coleridge leaned on his distinction between Reason and Understanding. A corrupt will is not an object of the senses and must be intuitively perceived by Reason or not at all. As an object of Reason, Original Sin is an idea, and cannot be adequately stated in concepts without injury to its true nature. In a note on Baxter Coleridge wrote, "On these points I have come to a resting place. Let such articles, as ... sin or evil having its origination in a will; and the reality of a responsible ... will in man ... be vindicated from absurdity, from self-contradiction, ... and restored to simple incomprehensibility. He who seeks for more, knows not what he is talking of." 23/ In order to establish Original Sin as a mysterious fact containing the possibility of remorse, Coleridge asked only one postulate from his reader, that of a responsible will. "Refuse to grant this, and I have not a word to say. Concede this and you concede all." 24/ What is conceded is that the will is self-determined, and "that it is a power of originating an act or state." 25/ To this power of origination alone can sin be attributed. "A sin is an evil which has its ground or origin in the agent, and not in the compulsion of circumstances." 26/ Any evil which arises from circumstances over which the "agent" does not have ultimate control cannot properly be called sin; he may feel regret over such evil, but he cannot feel remorse. "... if it be sin, it must be original;
and a state or act, that has not its origin in the will, may be calamity, deformity, disease, or mischief; but a sin cannot be. "\(37\)" Moreover, before one can be found guilty, Reason, as the guide for determining the ultimate end, must be present as the condition of a responsible will or it is merely madness. But when the will under the conditions of freedom determines itself to an act whereby it forfeits its powers of self-determination, it becomes a corrupt will.

The mystery of Original Sin, Coleridge declared, was found in the fact that the grounds upon which an evil inherent in the will is affirms in the instance of any one man may be affirmed in every instance, and this "simply because he is a man." \(38\)" Moreover, every man who is willing to grant that he is a responsible agent will also know that he alone is guilty for originating his sinful nature, but he will be unable to refer "to any particular time at which it might be conceived to have commenced, or to any period of his existence at which it was not existing." \(39\)" In short, the will is not free because tainted with sin, yet it knows itself to be responsible for its loss of freedom. This paradoxical truth was an idea of Reason, a fact of experience, and a mystery to the Understanding. It was, said Coleridge, "the precise import of the Scriptural doctrine of Original Sin." \(40\)" It was impossible to penetrate deeper into the mystery with words. "The great articles of Corruption and Redemption are propounded to us as spiritual mysteries; and every interpretation that
pretends to explain them into comprehensible notions does by its very success furnish presumptive proof of its failure." 41/

3. The Origin of Evil.

Yet even in a fairly extensive treatment of Original Sin Coleridge refrained, as in most other subjects touched upon in Aids to Reflection, from speaking his whole mind. He omitted the discussion of the origin of evil. He distinguished between the origin of moral evil and that of original sin but said that the origin of evil was not properly a subject for reflection, and warned his readers that he could not go into the doctrine of the origin of moral evil because it demanded "a power and persistency of Abstraction, and a previous discipline in the highest forms of human thought, which it would be unwise, if not presumptuous, to expect from any, who require Aids to Reflection or would be likely to seek them in the present work." 42/ After this condescending excuse to his readers for not venturing into the origin of evil, he mentioned the doctrine only once more in the Aids to Reflection, assuring his readers that "the origin of evil, meanwhile, is a question interesting only to the metaphysician, and in a system of moral and religious philosophy." 43/ In a letter of 1825 Coleridge proposed dealing with this important topic in his "positive theology." 44/ In marginal notes written after 1828 Coleridge proclaimed that this very doctrine which he chose to omit in the Aids to Reflection was "most important for his theology," 45/ and called it the "hinge
There is no denying the great importance of Coleridge's idea of the origin of moral evil, since it determined his idea of the Redemption which Coleridge called Christianity itself.

The origin of evil Coleridge attributed to a meta-historical fall of the Spirits. Even a third time he teased his readers in the *Aids to Reflection*, saying that "I might have added to the clearness of the preceding views if ... I could have entered into the momentous subject of a Spiritual Fall or Apostacy antecedent to the formation of man - a belief, the scriptural grounds of which are few and of diverse interpretation, but which has been almost universal in the Christian Church." That he might have pulled together several loose threads purposely left dangling in his exposition of Original Sin had he "entered into the momentous subject of a Spiritual Fall" is no doubt true. He had failed to provide any hypothesis as to why it was that the evil nature into which men fall is the same in every man if it is of each individual's making. In one place he said that the origin of the evil ground, called original sin, could not be referred to the divine will, so it must be referred to the will of man, but on another page stated that when each man falls he subjects his will to nature (or St. Paul's law of the flesh) and receives an evil nature into himself. But that Coleridge could have added to the "clearness" of the doctrine of Original Sin for the "Paleyans," to whom he was
writing, by the addition of an even greater mystery is doubtful. His previous judgment, that the doctrine required too severe thinking on the part of his prosaic readers, was probably the better one.

After Coleridge had written the *Aids to Reflection* he reflected on the position he had laid down: "... the actuality of Sin, the exceeding Sinfulness of Sin - and its essential incommunicability - being my foundation stones and the conversion of Sin into Disease or Calamity the error of errors, against which I cry out." 50/ But Coleridge had not really "cried out" about the Christian idea of the "exceeding sinfulness of sin" in the *Aids to Reflection* as he had at times in his notebooks and marginalia, because he omitted the doctrine of the origin of evil, which Coleridge concluded gave to Christianity alone the positive statement of the "exceeding sinfulness of sin". Howard has noted that Coleridge followed Kant very closely in the *Aids to Reflection* in his belief that Original Sin is common to all religions, and, just as Kant, used the Brahmins as an illustration. 51/ Coleridge did indeed say in the *Aids to Reflection* that it was important to realize that the corrupt and sinful nature of the will was a fact acknowledged by "every religion that retains the least glimmering of the patriarchal faith in a God infinite, yet personal," 52/ and that it was a fact acknowledged in all ages, and recognized but not originating, in the Christian Scriptures; 53/ but in a notebook he wrote that Christianity "exclusively has asserted the
positive being of Evil or Sin, ' of Sin in the exceeding Sinfulness'. The two statements are not contradictory but reflect the distinction Coleridge made between Original Sin and the origin of evil. Original Sin was the condition manifested in the experience of men. The source of this condition was the evil which had its origin outside time and space. At the same time that he stated that Christianity alone asserted the "positive being of evil" he also wrote, "... with what contempt even in later years have I not contemplated the doctrine of a Devil! but now I see its intimate connection, if not as existent Person, yet as Essence and Symbol, with Christianity - and that so far from being identical with Manicheism, it is its surest Antidote..." From at least the time of this note in 1812, Coleridge realized that it was the peculiarly Christian limited dualism of good and evil which gave to each its "positive being." He said in 1830, "A fall of some sort of other - the creation, as it were, of the non-absolute - is the fundamental postulate of the moral history of man... The mystery itself is too profound for human insight." But Coleridge claimed a certain amount of insight into the nature of the original apostacy, even while he emphasized that the spiritual fall (as also the resultant chaos from which creation was the first act of Redemption) could not be either proved or disproved from Scripture. In a note on Boehme he said, "... the Mythos (i.e. in Genesis) speaks to the Catechumen and
to the Adept - To the Catechumen it states the simple Fact, viz. that Man fell and falls thro' the separation and insubordination of the Fancy, the Appetence, and the discursive Intellect from the Faith or practical Reason - To the Adept it conveys the great mystery, that the origin of moral Evil is in the Timeless, \( \varepsilon \nu \tau \omega \xi \chi \rho \o \nu \omega \lambda \)- in a spirit not comprehended within the consciousness - tho' revealed in the conscience of man.\(^{58}\) To interpret Original Sin with reference to the Biblical account of the fall of Adam was only to speak of one's birth as a consequence of Adam's existence and no more. This myth was not recorded with the intention of avoiding personal responsibility for Original Sin in the instance of Adam's descendents, but to express the fall of the "genus ... as well as the individual"\(^{59}\) in a representative figure and to portray simply that "what Adam did ... we all do. Time is not with things of the spirit."\(^{60}\)

4. Striving to Be.

After the *Aids to Reflection* were written, Coleridge's explanations of sin in relation to Redemption underwent a marked change of language. He adopted the "dynamic" language of the scholastic theological realism with which he had always been in sympathy. As early as 1806 he had written that "the human understanding never took an higher or more honorable flight, than when it defined the Deity to be *Actus purissimus sine potentialitate*,"\(^{61}\) and this much beloved definition
became successively more important in Coleridge's thought. It became the basis for the "positive" exposition of spiritual philosophy which he worked on with J.H. Green. On the basis of the definition "Deus est Actus Absolutus absque omne potentialitatem" Coleridge found the description of sin and Redemption most satisfactory to him. Because God alone was what God had willed himself to be, only He was actual. All other than God was potential, but was in a state of becoming actual, that is, in becoming what God had willed it to be. Thus, a person is born with the potentiality of becoming the righteous man God intended him to be, but the actuality is realized only when he has achieved fulness of Christian character; this, in turn, is achieved relatively as the man is \( \epsilon \nu \chi \rho \omicron \omicron \nu \gamma \phi \).

Coleridge had affirmed that goodness and knowledge are equivalent to being in all of his published works. That philosophy was a science of being was his basic premise. "In order to have an efficient belief in Christianity, a man must have been a Christian, and this is the seeming argumentum in circulo, incident to all spiritual Truths, to every subject not presentable under the forms of Time and Space, as long as we attempt to master by the reflex acts of the Understanding what we can only know by the act of becoming. 'Do the will of my Father, and ye shall know whether I am God.'" Goodness was the same as being in that a man was good only as he was what he was meant by his Creator to be. But Coleridge did not
discuss sin and Redemption dynamically in terms of "actual" and "potential" in the *Aids to Reflection*. If he had it could have led to greater misunderstanding in his emphasis on "the exceeding sinfulness of sin", for when he discussed sin in direct reference to God as the only actuality he could speak of sin as having no essential being and as a remediable accident.

Coleridge said in 1830 that the great principle of his system was that the ground of the potential is evil, and that the potential could never become actual except in degree only, for God alone was truly actual. In the MS. "On the Divine Ideas" Coleridge warned against taking "actual" and "potential" as equivalent to "real" and "unreal". The potential involved reality even though the "actual alone is absolutely real." Thus the origin of evil was attributed to the fall of spiritual beings outside, or above, time or space, in whom evil is potentially present, but actualized only by the will of man. It becomes an "actualized potential", thereby becoming Original Sin, by the fall of each individual man when he brings into time and space by an act of will (which is itself spiritual, and thus the interceptor of the ideas not confinable to time and space) the evil spirituality. In a note on Irving, Coleridge emphasized that the spiritual or original apostacy was not antecedent to creation or the fall of man in order of time, (as one could certainly construe it to be in the *Aids to Reflection*), but only in thought, "for this Fall at least could not be in
time, inasmuch as it was the origin of Time as contra distinguished from Eternity." 66/ Because God only was truly actual and only God was good, Coleridge denied that evil could have "essential being." 67/ He admitted, therefore, of no pure dualism. Only God could rightly make the self-affirmation entailed in the verb substantive, "I AM", and Satan was not to be thought of as a diabolical personality, but as an evil spirituality. Moreover, evil cannot be thought of as essential to, or inherent in, a Spirit created in the image of God. In a note made sometime after 1830 Coleridge wrote: "We cannot be made too sensible of the potential Evil, that not only is in, but which is, the ground of our creaturely Being. But then we are no less bound to know that without the divine Good this very Evil could never have assumed actual Being. Whatever actually exists, therefore exists, because Redemption hath begun in it, because it is within the conditions of redeemability. But alas! in order to the full insight into this great truth it is for the many necessary, that the superstitions and most erroneous notions respecting the true New Testament Sense of the Devil, and the Evil Spirits, should be cleared away." 68/ With his thinking anchored to the idea of God as the "actus purissimus" and life as a continual striving for actualized existence, Coleridge arrived in a note on Swedenborg, at deeper conception of the nature of guilt than that set forth in the Aids to Reflection: "But the doctrine of essential
evil in Angelic Spirits, i.e. Spirits in union with the Divine Spirit, requires contrary qualification not to be dangerously false. The Possibility of the velle proprium is indeed in every finite Spirit necessarily implied in the libero velle Deum; but as a possibility, it is a Good not an Evil. It is the everlasting Life in the eternal Love, the triumph in the Joy - as the feathered Warbler soars by beating the air beneath its wings. Now this is the origin and at the same time the Mystery of Evil, when the will determines to actualize this potentiality. But this is a Lie and a Delusion - The Devil was a Liar from the beginning - For from the eternal necessity of Being this potentiality cannot be passed into an actuality - only the potentiality becomes an actualized potentiality, still remaining a mere potential entity: The Actual sinks into the potential, instead of the Potential rising into the Actual. Hence the self-center is a mere phantasm, every instant destroyed and re-generated - a chaotic anguish of striving after that, which involves a contradiction in essence - And as the source, such the effluence, viz. a Life of lies, a false Life = Death, a Death = Life. Nam omne ens bonum, quoad vere ens. The Being of Guilt consists in the striving to be."

The anguish of guilt was found in the clash within a finite being who because of self-consciousness felt no stranger to infinity, and strove to actualize that which must forever remain potential as long as the fetters of finiteness remained.
As Coleridge remarked elsewhere, he strove to be "Absolute in the Non-Absolute." The "striving to be" in which the "potential" was "actualized" so as to become guilt was a repetition of the original Fall. "What is the apostasy, or fall of spirits? That that which from the essential perfection of the Absolute Good could not but be possible, that is, have a potential being, but never ought to have been actual, did nevertheless strive to be actual? - But this involved an impossibility; and it actualised only its own potentiality." 

The contradiction involved in the "chaotic anguish of striving" for being Coleridge expressed in what he called a "double self" or "twofold I." Being, or authentic existence, was relative to the state of the believer's existence "in Christ." Thus the "actual" self, the self willed by God, was realized insofar as it had put aside the phantom self of nature and become clothed with the spiritual self of God. In 1827 Coleridge wrote that he had been mistaken in his idea of the self as an independent entity, and that he now discovered a "twofold I," consisting of a "natural I," the "phantom I" which is the life of the flesh, and the "substantial I" which is the life of the spirit, both existing side by side and dependent in their existence upon the extent of the person's appropriation of the divine grace. He wrote in 1830, "From the mutually exclusive or suspensive duplicity of the 'I' in Man - a mystery which no words can communicate to another, but which to be known must be inwardly watched and listened to,
but which if thus observed will be found to present a curious
and most interesting instance of a double 'I' corresponding
to the double Will and Mind ... the Will and Mind of the Spirit,
and the Will and Mind of the Animal Life or Nature ( \( \alpha \nu \gamma \rho \eta \alpha \sigma a \phi \eta s \) ) ... which ... are necessarily in opposite states,
both co-existing, but A as actual and Z therefore potential -
or Z actual and therefore A potential. - But it being a living
Antithesis, incapable of any equilibrium, unless indeed a blank
Self-forgetting and utterabsence of mind might be supposed such
or the result thereof; with the Potential ever more or less
striving to displace and take the place of the Actual..." 74/
In this expression of the contradiction of "striving to be"
Coleridge uses "potential" and "actual" merely to describe the
predominant self, not equating the "potential self" with the
"evil or phantom self," and the "actual self" with the
"righteous or substantial self". The confusion in the
terminology from the notes quoted previously is due to Coleridge's
reluctance to refer to the "evil self" as a "phantasm" or
"phantom self". He wrote in 1829, "My Soul. My? - Yeast as
long as Sin reigns, so long must this 'My' have a tremendous
force, a substantial meaning. Every sin and thought of Sin
sink us back in upon the swampy rotten ground of our division
from God, make us participant and accomplices of the Hades." 75/
In his desire to express the truth of the "tremendous force" of
the sinful self and yet retain the truth of the greater power
of God as alone truly "actual" Coleridge never hit upon a
consistent terminology. Thus in later notes than these above he could again speak of the "phantom self" or the "actuality of sin", but his intention and meaning seem clear enough, and the phrases should not be forced. "...as the Self of the Flesh becomes an I by the fall of the Spiritual I, so the Spir. I becomes the Spirit by its Rise toward ... the Divine Will ... the Natural I ... striving to pass from the potential state to the actual grounded on truth." 76/ "But the aim of redeemed man must be goodness according to the idea of the good - and not according to the notion of his existing nature. For Man ought to acknowledge no permanent Self, but God, - to exist in God as the ground of his Being - his distinct Personality increasing in proportion as he quells and lays the phantom self of his Nature - i.e. the Ground, the Hades." 77/

Before Coleridge had realized so vividly the cosmic significance of the clash between the power of good and evil and had thus come to postulate a "twofold self" as the result of the possibility of appropriating two grounds for being, although one a false ground and one a true ground, he usually spoke of man striving to reach his "proper humanity". This was certainly his most poetic, and probably happiest, term for the "actual self." However, that it did not seem to fit the purpose when his ideas on the weakness of the self to the temptations of the "Evil One" and the dependence of the self upon the grace of God had changed is understandable. The following two passages illustrate the great change in Coleridge's
language in explaining religious growth. The first, previously quoted, was written before the *Aids to Reflection* of 1825, the second after. "...all lower Natures (i.e. animals) find their highest good in semblances and seekings of that which is higher and Better. All things strive to ascend, and ascend in their striving. And shall man alone stoop? Shall his pursuits and desires, the reflection of his inward life, be like the reflected Image of a Tree on the edge of a Pool, that grows downward, and seeks a mock heaven in the unstable element beneath it, in neighborhood with the slimy water-weeds and oozy bottom — ... No! it must be a higher good to make you happy. While you labor for anything below your proper humanity, you seek a happy life in the region of Death. Well said the Moral Poet —

"Erect himself, how mean a Thing is Man!"

"The Logos is the substantial Idea in whom all Ideas are contained and have Being; it is the Idea of God. The Divine Idea assumed the form of Man, and thus became the Idea of the Divine Humanity = Jehova — and then the Individuality = Θεότης. The Word was incarnate, and became the Divine Ideal of Human Kind in which alone God loved (or could love) the World. Above all, remember that the Potential can neither have Being nor worth except in relation to and by virtue of a co-existing Actual. Every self is progressive only as it approximates — has value therefore not in or for itself, but in its relation to another — but to what other? ... in the Word, in the
Jehova, in Christ, the Actual is perfected in all its forms, the Universal, the General, and the Individual - and therein and thereby the Human Race, and each individual Man, has a potential Reality, a relative Worth - The whole Church is thus in the most strict and philosophic use of the words the Body of Christ - for all Body is but the Potentiality of the Actual, i.e. the power of the property in actu, in each moment. 1. The Life is the Soul of the Body. 2. the Soul is the Life of the Man. 3. and Christ is the Life of the Soul, and the Soul is the Indifference of the Life and the Spirit, the Inter-Ens as it were, or Ens intermedium, as Heat is the Indifference of Light and Gravity. It is in this sense of the human Soul, as the Inter-ens and Particiipium (as it were) of the Life and of the Spirit, that we can understand the words 'even to the dividing of Soul and Spirit' -

Unless above himself he can Erect himself, how poor a thing is Man!" 72

As far as a person "actualized" the evil ground of being which was Hades, he lived in opposition to the will of God, and this could not properly be called human life. It was animal life, a life in death apart from the Spirit of God. But to the extent that a person was "in Christ" death itself was already overcome. On the postulate of the "double self" Coleridge found what he called the "rationale of death".

"...the words eternal Death are opposed to eternal Life, not as a more privative to a positive, as Shadow to substantive Body, but as two equally real states, can only be rendered
intelligible by the insight into the (opposition) of the Actual
and Potential ..." 80/ This "insight" Coleridge described
in another note: "Nothing can be more evident than that by
Life our Lord means something more than the animal Life for
this is expressly called Death. Who shall deliver me from the
body of this Death ... our Lord everywhere assumes that the Man,
as the Unity of which Soul and Body (i.e. the proper dynamic
Body, or Corpus Noumenon) are the two poles, ... and states,
is indestructible - save by God alone; but that by the Crisis,
of which the dissolution of the visible organismus is the result,
it is reduced from an actual to a merely potential state - in
which it must remain till the conditions are restored or supplied
of its actuation. Now Christ is that actuating condition." 81/

It should be noted that Coleridge did not view death as an evil
in itself but thought that it ought to be considered as a crisis
or change incident to a progressive being. Elsewhere he
compared it to the casting of the caterpillar's skin to make room
for the wings of the butterfly. 82/

Since Coleridge had had quite a few "black charges" of
universalism thrown at him, it is interesting to note his
position on this subject in a marginal annotation made sometime
after 1828. He concluded one marginal note with the words,
"...all Israel shall be saved," and then added a P.S. "It will
be against my will, and foreign to the intention of the con-
cluding sentence, of this Note, if the Ideas there advanced
should be understood as conveying my belief or judgement
respecting the state of the wicked after the dissolution of the Material Body. I am content to know, that the result of our mortal probation is that we shall either rise above time, or sink below it; that the former is the greatest Good that can be promised to a rational creature, the latter the greatest Evil that can be threatened... More than this it is my knowledge not to know; more than this it is my faith to withhold my thoughts from believing, and to walk humbly with the Lord my God. All the analogies from this life make it sufficiently clear, that there is a dying as well as a Death, and that from such as have been recovered from Drowning or Hanging we learn that in the lapses of a few seconds the soul may experience what it would take hours to narrate, enough of itself to alarm the indifferent and to scare the guilty. That Guilt is a perishing of the Soul on the one hand, and that the Soul is essentially imperishable on the other, both are truths; that therefore, in which alone they can be reconciled, must likewise be a Truth, and this is, that it is an endless Perishing." Although he was opposed to universalism as dogma, he could never surrender the hope that God would finally extend His mercy to all.

5. Redemption is Regeneration.

Just as it had been Coleridge's purpose in the Aids to Reflection to reduce the doctrine of Original Sin to a mystery for the Understanding in order to regain its proper significance,
so it was his purpose to accomplish the same task with the article of Redemption. Just as the doctrine of Original Sin had been perverted by attempts to make it comprehensible for the Understanding, so had the doctrine of Redemption. Perhaps it is well to repeat Coleridge's warning: "The great articles of Corruption and Redemption are propounded to us as spiritual mysteries; and every interpretation, that pretends to explain them into comprehensible notions, does by its very success furnish presumptive proof of its failure." 84/

Coleridge maintained that exactly this had happened when theologians interpreted the atonement explanations of Paul literally. Paul was the apostle to the Understanding and wrote metaphorically of the consequences of Redemption, using illustrations which were meant to be intelligible both to the whole Roman world and to those within his own Rabbinical tradition. Coleridge said the article of Redemption could be considered in a two-fold relation, "in relation to the antecedent, that is, the Redeemer's act as the efficient cause and condition of redemption; and in relation to the consequent, that is, the effects in and for the Redeemed." 85/ Paul had illustrated the consequences of Redemption with four principal metaphors. "1. Sin-offerings, sacrificial expiation. 2. Reconciliation, atonement. 3. Ransom from slavery, Redemption, the buying back again, or being bought back. 4. Satisfaction of a creditor's claims by a payment of the debt." 86/

When men interpreted the redemptive metaphors as the
reality, and in turn applied the metaphors as the transcendent cause of Redemption instead of using them as figurative language descriptive of the consequences of Redemption, as St. Paul used them, not only was God made to be a capricious, arbitrary, and even immoral Being, but the believer came to expect no real consequences of Redemption in his life. This Coleridge considered a subversion of Christianity.

However, the consequence of Redemption had been correctly expressed without metaphor, as far as it was expressible in words, in the Gospel of John, by the apostle of Reason. "It is a regeneration, a birth, a spiritual seed impregnated and evolved, the germinal principal of a higher and enduring life, of a spiritual life..." 87/ If John's words of life through rebirth are taken metaphorically instead of literally, the same results obtain as when Paul is understood literally. John is to be interpreted literally, Paul metaphorically. Coleridge decided that Redemption considered as consequent can be correctly described only as regeneration; considered as transcendent act, it is an opus - perfectum, "... a Fiat of the eternal." 88/

The year before he died Coleridge explained that in the Aids to Reflection he had been constrained to interpret the terms such as Sacrifice, Debt, and Satisfaction as metaphors, because he was standing on the same ground as those whose opinions he attempted to rectify and could not do otherwise without debasing the idea of God. He then decided that if the terms could be interpreted symbolically they could be understood literally. The implications of this proposal will be discussed later, but
it really was never more than a suggestion. The opinion of Coleridge voiced in the *Aids to Reflection* that Redemption could only mean regeneration, and that the atonement explanations "by their very success furnish presumptive proof of their failure" remained a fixed principle in his thought.

"As the Disease, so the Remedy." Because Coleridge's idea of the necessity of a radical Redemption was based on his experience of the radical nature of evil, he could correctly describe the origin of evil as the "hinge of his whole system" and "most important for his theology." ⁸² In a note on Donne he asked, "What is the consequence of the apostasy? That no philosophy is possible of man and nature but by assuming at once a zenith and a nadir, God and Hades; and an ascension from the one through and with a condescension from the other; that is, redemption by prevenient and then auxiliary grace." ⁹⁰

But the importance of the "primordial fall" to Coleridge was not limited to the fact that it made a Redemption from outside nature a necessity; it provided Coleridge with a basis for a truth which he said "next to the Idea of the Tri-une God is the most momentary, most radical, pregnant and concerning, of all truths"; namely, that Creation was the commencing act of Redemption. From the Apostacy came Chaos, and into the Chaos God entered with divine condescension to bring creative order with the resultant genesis of the finite, and time and space. Coleridge remarked that the doctrine of Chaos was not to be either proved or disproved from the Scriptural text of
Creation, and said that "it is not a declared character of the Mosaic or patriarchal Dispensation - ... nor, indeed, could it have been rendered intelligible, in the then state of men's spiritual or intellectual Insight." He considered it a necessary hypothesis as a result of the Fall of the Spirits.

There were, then, two acts of Redemption: Creation, which brought order from Chaos by placing man on earth in his proper state of existence in God, and the Incarnation, which was necessary as a consequence of the Fall of man in order to restore him to the proper ground of existence. But the Incarnation itself began with the first promise of a Saviour, for Coleridge insisted that with God the promise was the first act of fulfilment. "The Sufferings in the flesh, the Sufferings of the "man of Sorrows", the word 'made flesh', were of course consequent on the Incarnation; but the spiritual Cross and Passion, the 'passio Dei τον Μονογενος', we must date back as far as the third verse of the first Chapter of Genesis. In the creation from Chaos by the separation of the Light from the Darkness the Redemption Commenced - Christ, the Redeemer of the World - and in the consoling and clothing of our first parents it had its second commencement - Christ, the Saviour of Mankind." That the "imago dei" had not been completely obliterated by the fall of man was due to the fact that Redemption was synchronous with the Fall; "the redeeming arm caught man falling, broke his fall." The aim and end of God's grace was to prevent man from sinking into and being submerged in, the ground of Nature,
or Hades, or his animal life. But the work of Christ in
restoring man to the proper ground of his existence is "verily
and strictly a new Creation, not a mending," and in order to
see the great significance of Paul's exhortation to put on the
"new man, not the reformed man" Coleridge thought it necessary
"to have contemplated the 2nd v. of Gen. 1 as the product of
the original Faith, and v. 3, 4 as the commencing Act of the
Redemption." 25/ Coleridge followed closely the Johannine
gnosis in his scheme of Redemption. Salvation was by knowledge
which manifested itself in love and obedience.

Coleridge conceived the result of God's redeeming grace
to be the renewal of the capability of communion with God, and
when this was accomplished man was redeemed. "Whenever by
self-subjection to this universal light (i.e. of Reason), the
will of the individual, the particular will, has become a will
of reason, the man is regenerate; and reason is then the
spirit of the regenerated man, whereby the person is capable
of a quickening inter-communion with the Divine Spirit". 96/
But the greatest mystery of Redemption Coleridge thought to be
the possibility of such regeneration, and the importance of the
first chapter of Genesis to Coleridge in the article of
Redemption was that it stated the possibility of a communicative
"I-Thou" relationship between God and man. The importance
assigned by Coleridge to the second verse of Genesis I was that
in the Spirit of God, which was said to be moving over the
waters in creation, there was the first manifestation of the
Logos, which made possible from the very beginning communion with God through His own self-disclosure. The enunciation of this possibility in the second verse of Genesis was the "product" of the early Hebrew faith which knew God by immediate, personal, Revelation.

The reception of the living Word made possible life itself, or "actual being", through regeneration; failure to receive the life-giving Word resulted in what Coleridge described as a "living death", or mere "potential being" grounded on the forces of Hades instead of God. While it was true that each particular individual withdrew himself from God in Original Sin and partook of the "living death", yet in every man, because of the Spirit of God in all and over all, there was the possibility of inter-communion with the Divine Spirit once Reason had been awakened. Indeed, this very awakening was the work of the Spirit in grace. "If we may presume to accommodate the ways of man to express the transcendent thoughts and ways of the Eternal ... what was the motive for my first being, as a distinct subsistence, in the Fulness of the Logos?... The only self I had, was the Denial of any Self ... In the mystery of the Evil Will I sought or willed to have, a Self in myself ... to be Absolute in the Non-Absolute. I fell - into the Indistinction I became actually nothing - and nothing remained but the indestructible potential derived from the transcendency of this Eternal Will - I existed only as an evil ground of a future Being."
He awakened me into actual Being — and for what purpose? Once more to re-create me, to plant a seed of true life, a germ of godly truth in me that should transmute or precipitate the evil ground — in short, that I might be spiritually trans-substantiated to, and born again into, the Living Word as the Divine Humanity, the God Man!... yet he gave one Being in his compassionate Goodness — and he recalled me to actual Being in his infinite Mercy, when I was nothing but evil ... to imagine that I can redeem myself! — how base a fear, to despair of God!" 27/

The meta-historical fall of the Spirits and the consequent redemptive act of Creation were the first two great mysteries, but because the idea of Redemption did not jar either the moral feelings or the intellect as did the idea of the domination of the evil spirituality, Coleridge did not admit the second mystery to be so great as the first. "The Fall of the Spirit is the Mystery, and the first Mystery the Mystery of Iniquity — The Redemption of the captivated Soul by its Creator, in its originating Will, and that God, ... should manifest himself as a God who seeketh that which was lost, who called back to himself that which had gone astray — this, this is likewise a mystery, but only thro' the limitation of the Believer's Faculties, and the exercise of his spiritual powers thro' the dense ... medium of the animal life. But the truth itself is of Light, in Light, and Light — the trouble and perplexity of the visions in the Beholder's Eye. — This is a Truth, which is Fact: the former, viz. the Fall, the domination
of the Evil One, of a Spirit of Evil, is a Fact, and therefore but only therefore a Truth. The essential truth is confined to the eternal possibility of that which ought thro' eternity to have remained only possible. But the way - for Christ is the Way as well as the Truth - but the Redemption by the incarnation of the only-begotten Word - that God became man in order that for poor fallen man he might become the Resurrection and the Life - this is the third mystery, partaking the character of both the former - God's Light, and Man's Darkness - but of Man's Darkness shone into, and by grades of morning twilight displaced, transmuted by God's Light ..." 98/ The Incarnation itself was the means and basis of Redemption. The Incarnation was "generative". "In order to act on Man, ... God became Man, that as Man he might act on and in a Man ... Redemption therefore is essentially generative. It is Regeneration." 99/ The basis of Regeneration, and thus of Righteousness, was the implanted seed of Christ, a mystery in itself so profound as to be meditated on only by the most advanced in faith, and this "in the very silence of the Spirit." When Coleridge himself meditated on the implanted seed of Christ he always depended upon the "double I" or "double will", for his description of its planting and growth. The seed was the "diffusion of the divine Humanity thro' the fallen and corrupted, in order to be as it were a ferment, and a re-awakening of the potential and latent Life - but in this diffusion taking on itself the form ... of its imperfection, the consequences of the false will tho' with
the contrary Will as the Base.\textsuperscript{100} The seed of Christ transfers the ground of our being from that of evil to that of righteousness; in this transfer our sins are forgiven. "By the implanting of a living seed (of) Righteousness not our own, but which working as an organic Life in us stale transubstantial Beings changes the ground of our essential Being to itself, we are absolved... Now this working of Christ in the Elect, as a spiritual Germ, is the Holy Spirit given by and through Christ - and by Christ, as God, as the manifested only Begotten Son - and therefore in the order of the divine economy following and consequent on his ascension from his Individuality as a man the first act of his glorification, when he \textit{resumed} the Glory which he had with the Father before the World began..."\textsuperscript{101} Coleridge defended the concept of the New Birth by the implanting of the seed of Christ as the true doctrine; however, it may have been soiled by mystics or enthusiasts. "It is most true, and a truth of unspeakable consolation, that we cannot be saved by our own righteousness but only the already perfected Righteousness of the Son of Man - yet it is no less true, that the Son of God ... did according to the Will of the Father endow Man with the capability of being raised to the knowledge and Desire of the Creator as his ultimate End - and likewise in as many as are chosen an actual \textit{Capacity} of the Righteousness of Christ, a potensiation of the Will by the Leading of the Father... The Righteousness which is in Christ \textit{is} Christ; and therefore with strictest propriety,
however the phrase may have been soiled by Familists and Quakers, it may be spoken of under the analogy of Birth, as a newly born, an infant Christ." 102/

6. Coleridge and Luther. - The Justitia Dei.

The problem Coleridge wrestled with in all his descriptions of the "actual" and "potential" self was that of asserting real consequences of Redemption in the believer's life while yet recognizing that a complete Redemption must await full realization beyond the grave. The key concept of Redemption was the Johannine notion of rebirth. But as worked out by Coleridge the idea of rebirth was closely associated with the Pauline εὐχρήσται. Men were redeemed by union with Christ in which there was the mutual indwelling of the believer in Christ and Christ in the believer. Redemption was effected by dying and rising again with Christ. Coleridge used the idea of εὐχρήσται in St. Paul as closely related to the idea of εὐκρήσται not primarily related to an organic body of believers. It is a special idea in which the individual believer lives and from this indwelling idea the Church is derived. 103/

By insisting that the "infant Christ", or "seed of righteousness", was imparted and not merely imputed to the man who was "in Christ", Coleridge formed a synthesis between Protestant and Catholic views on grace and justification. But always Coleridge considered himself one who walked by the spirit of Luther, however he himself chose to contemplate the
article of Redemption. If he spoke of the "semper peecator, semper penitens, semper justus" of Luther in terms of the "double self", he yet had no doubts that Luther described Christian growth as dynamic and real and not just notional and forensic. Nor did he think that Luther meant to preclude a "making righteous" in the redemptive life simply because he insisted that the process was initiated with an "imputed righteousness". To be a disciple of Luther was not to follow the letter of his teaching in a changed historical setting but to follow the spirit. "The difference between a great mind's and a little mind's use of history is this. The latter would consider, for instance, what Luther did, taught or sanctioned; the former, what Luther, - a Luther, - would now do, teach and sanction." 104/

The relationship of Coleridge to Luther is a very interesting one. Luther was his greatest hero as well as his greatest theological authority. He told Sterling that Luther "is of all men the one whom I especially love and admire". 105/

This admiration lasted all his life. In The Friend of 1809-10 Coleridge first set down his praises for this "Christian Hercules, this heroic cleanser of the Augean stable of apostacy", and proclaimed him "as great a poet as ever lived in any age or country," a poet who did not write, but acted poems. 106/ But Coleridge's admiration for the heroic Luther became increasingly an admiration for the Luther who ran a very close second to John and Paul as an authority for the
Christian faith. He came to endorse the Articles and Homilies of the Church of England "insofar as they were Lutheran", and wrote in 1827 that he preferred the "scheme of Faith and Doctrine contained in the Liturgy, Catechism and Articles, because it is Lutheran in its spirit - and the Reformation in my belief fell back after Luther, instead of advancing." It was Coleridge's conviction that the passion for the systematization of the faith after Luther had taken away its life. In a notebook he wrote that after the heroic genius of Luther "the Restoration of the Christian Religion degenerated into a Reformation of the Latin Church - and of the Reformed Churches, Lutheran or Calvinist, Episcopalian, Presbyterian or Independent, the common character is the subordination of the Intuitive to the Discursive, in both forms of Intuition, sensuous and supersensual - as a Balloon rises above Earth yet is never the nearer to Heaven, so the genius of Protestantism leaves the images and idolatries of the spiritual Babylon behind, but never reaches the spiritual region, where the Ideas live such as John uttered to the Reason and Paul interpreted and accommodated to the understanding."

The remark of Rupp in his recent book on Luther that Coleridge's understanding of Luther was "a medley of profundity and misconception" is evidently made on the basis of Coleridge's marginal notes on Luther which do not adequately reflect the whole attitude of Coleridge toward Luther as a theologian nor his debt to Luther in the formation of his own
views. The notes on Luther were made over a period of years, and, while a few were corrected by Coleridge himself as his own views of the faith deepened, some apparently were not. Coleridge understood Luther very well; he simply chose not to be a disciple of the "letter" of Luther, but of the "spirit". He considered that the "great Luther - who, alas, left many partisans, but no successor, no Elisha", had left him his mantle. He would complete his thought.

Because Coleridge remained firm throughout his life that Reason was an immediate kind of knowing from which faith could not be separated, his concept of faith, if compared with the rest of his religious opinions, might seem to have undergone little change. In 1794 Coleridge made memoranda in a notebook for a sermon on faith which outlined his position at the time. He noted that Scripture nowhere used faith in contradistinction to Reason, that the knowledge of faith was superior in moral dignity and its moral effects to the knowledge gained from natural philosophy, and that faith correctly applied was reducible to fidelity. In 1812 he reperused the remarks he had made in 1794 and appended a compliment to his earlier thinking. "The above written hints were penned in this Book at the age of 24 and as I had never been prematures by Intercourse with Literary Men, I cannot help looking back on them as proofs of an original and self-thinking Mind." No doubt the compliment was most sincere; it must have been gratifying to one who had shifted the "superstructure" of his thought in the years between
the notes to look back and find that at least one of the stones in the foundation had been properly laid.

Coleridge had little to say on faith in the *Aids to Reflection*, but in 1825 or 1826 he wrote the *Essay on Faith* intended as a supplement to the *Aids to Reflection*. The *Essay* was first published in the *Literary Remains* in 1838-9. His opening sentence was, "Faith may be defined as fidelity to our own being-," and he continued, "Faith subsists in the synthesis of the Reason and the individual Will. By virtue of the latter, therefore, it must be an energy, and, inasmuch as it relates to the whole moral man, it must be exerted in each and all of his constituents or incidents, faculties and tendencies; -- it must be a total, not a partial -- a continuous, not a desultory or occasional -- energy. And by virtue of the former, that is, Reason, Faith must be a Light, a form of knowing, a beholding of Truth." This Light was at the same time the Life of men. 112/

Because of the reduction of faith to fidelity to our own being with emphasis on the categorical imperative, Chinol has used the essay as an example of Coleridge's return to Kant. If, however, the meaning Coleridge gave the word *Reason* is borne in mind, along with its relation to the religious life, the whole spirit of the essay is transformed. In a notebook Coleridge wrote, "Faith is the co-adunation of the individual Will and the Universal Reason," 113/ (not simply *Reason* as he had written in the *Essay on Faith*), and this by the submission
of the former to the latter. Coleridge voiced his dis-
satisfaction with the definition of faith given in his
essay in a memorandum made in a notebook in 1830; "to the
general definition of Faith as the submission of the individual
Will to, and consequent collapse with, the Universal Reason,
the Christian Faith adds the Spiritual reception of the
Universal Reason as Life, Person ... not the \( \tau \), \( \sigma \) of
Spinoza ... (but) ... the living self-subsistent Word, the
only-begotten Son of the Eternal I AM." 114/

Faith, then, as defined in the Essay on Faith, is the
resolve taken by the will (which Coleridge classed as an act
in itself) to adhere to immediate truth, which is given as
Revelation and apprehended as Reason. Since this truth, both
in its givenness and apprehension, is Reason, there could be
no conflict with faith. Faith includes Reason as one of its
factors. Faith rests on intuitive knowledge. He jotted in
a notebook: "Faith is the marriage of the Will and the Reason;
or shall I call it the offspring of that union? Where the
Reason is the Eye, and the Light of the Will, and the Will is
the Substance the Life of the Reason - there Faith is. How
is it possible that Faith, which includes Reason, should
contradict it?" 115/

However, even after having taken account of Coleridge's
terminology in the Essay on Faith it must certainly be said
that the essay does not by any means cover the full thought of
Coleridge on the redemptive faith, nor is it really representative
of his thought on the subject. It is quite true, however, that the moral, subjective, and unifying character of faith emphasized in the essay were vital elements in the thought of Coleridge, and had been for many years. In *The Friend* he had refuted the morals of Paley with an exposition of faith as the only "justifying principle", a "total act of the soul", and because it alone united the "intention and the motive, the warmth and the light, in one and the same mind", faith "alone is worthy to be called a moral principle". But by the time of the *Aids to Reflection*, faith had become primarily a religious principle in Coleridge's mind. The righteousness of God found in faith had at least begun to break in upon his thought as the only doctrine which contained hope for the sinner, and, in characteristic Coleridgean fashion, he mentioned its importance and promised an exposition of its importance elsewhere. He noted that there was a "righteousness of a higher strain" and quoted Leighton's definition of this righteousness. "A Righteousness that is not in him, but upon him. He is clothed with it." "This, reader!", Coleridge went on to comment, "is the controverted Doctrine, so warmly asserted and so bitterly decried under the name of 'IMPUTED RIGHTEOUSNESS'. Our learned Archbishop, you see, adopts it; ... the sense, however, ... in which I avow myself a believer in it, I shall have an opportunity of showing in another place." But Coleridge warned his reader, "...here, if anywhere, we are to seek the fine Line which, like stripes of Light in Light,
distinguishes, not divides, the summit of religious Morality from Spiritual Religion." 117/

In nearly all of Coleridge's comments upon Redemption made in his later life the subjective nature of faith, while retained, is considerably modified in terms of grace, and thought of in a much closer relation to the "being-in-Christ". This change of emphasis can be directly attributed to a heightened sense of sin which accompanied him in his Christian growth. In the theology of Luther, Coleridge found doctrines which he could unhesitatingly endorse as the truth of God in having met his need. Faith and righteousness are, like Reason, the gift of God and are appropriated ("assimilated" was usually the word Coleridge used although "appropriated" also had its share of use) by men by condescension of God in Christ. This change in Coleridge's thought is observed only by a rather attentive reading of the notebooks and marginalia, but it is very significant.

In a marginal note on Donne, Coleridge commended his exposition of faith and works "purified from the poison of the practical Romish doctrine of works" and stated, "To Donne's exposition the heroic Solifidian, Martin Luther himself, would have subscribed, hand and heart." 118/ In what is apparently a later note Coleridge wrote, "Donne rather too much plays the rhetorician... The faith and the righteousness of a Christian are both alike his, and not his - the faith of Christ in him, the righteousness in and for him. I am
crucified with Christ; nevertheless I live; yet, not I, but Christ liveth in me: and the life which I now live in the flesh I live by the faith of the Son of God, who loved me, and gave himself for me.' Donne was a truly great man; but, after all, he did not possess that full, steady, deep, and yet comprehensive, insight into the nature of faith and works which was vouchsafed to Martin Luther. Donne had not attained to the reconciling of distinctity with unity, - ours, yet God's; God's, yet ours." 119/

In 1829 in a note on Luther following Nota Bene, Coleridge corrected a previous note which was critical of Luther's position that faith was a free gift of God and in the law generated its own receptivity to the extent that man could claim no merit of will in its reception. Coleridge ended his early note by observing critically, "Every where a something is attributed to the will," but later added, "N.B. I should not have written the above note in my present state of light; - not that I find it false, but that it may have the effect of falsehood by not going deep enough. July, 1829." 120/

But the most incriminating of the notes on Luther as far as giving ground to the idea that Coleridge had "misconceptions" about Luther's theology stands uncorrected in the Luther marginalia, although explicitly corrected in a later note on Fenelon. In the note on Luther, the dispute between Luther and St. Austin over faith and righteousness he deemed a mere dispute about words; in the note on Fenelon Coleridge recanted. In
the Table Talk Luther was quoted as saying in opposition to the opinion of St. Austin that we are justified through regeneration, "I hold this, and am certain, that the true meaning of the Gospel and of the Apostle is, that we are justified before God gratis, for nothing, only by God's mere mercy, wherewith and by reason whereof, he imputeth righteousness unto us in Christ". Coleridge replied, "True; but is it more than a dispute about words? Is not the regeneration likewise gratis, only by God's mere mercy? We, according to the necessity of our imperfect understandings, must divide and distinguish. But surely justification and sanctification are one act of God, and only different perspectives of redemption by and through and for Christ. They are one and the same plant, justification the root, sanctification the flower; and (may I not venture to add?) transubstantiation into Christ the celestial fruit." 121/ In the note on Fenelon Coleridge wrote, "To many, - to myself formerly, - it has appeared a mere dispute about words; but it is by no means of so harmless a character, for it tends to give a false direction to our thoughts, by diverting the conscience from the ruined and corrupted state, in which we are without Christ. Sin is the disease. What is the remedy? What is the antidote? - Charity? - Pshaw! Charity in the large apostolic sense of the term is the health, the state to be obtained by the use of the remedy, not the sovereign balm itself, - faith of grace, - faith in the God-manhood, the cross, the mediation, and perfected
righteousness, of Jesus, to the utter rejection and abjuration
of all righteousness of our own! Faith alone is the restorative.
The Romish scheme is preposterous; - it puts the rill before the
spring. Faith is the source, - charity, that is, the whole
Christian life, is the stream from it. It is quite childish
to talk of faith being imperfect without charity. As wisely
might you say that a fire, however bright and strong, was
imperfect without heat, or that the sun, however cloudless, was
imperfect without beams. The true answer would be: - it is not
faith, - but utter reprobate faithlessness, which may indeed
very possibly co-exist with a mere acquiescence of the under-
standing in certain facts recorded by the Evangelists. But
did John, or Paul, or Martin Luther, ever flatter this barren
belief with the name of saving faith? No. Little ones!
Be not deceived. Wear at your bosoms that precious amulet
against all the spells of Antichrist, the 20th verse of the
2nd chapter of Paul's Epistle to the Galatians: - I am
crucified with Christ, nevertheless, I live; yet not I, but
Christ liveth in me: and the life, which I now live in the
flesh, I live by the faith of the Son of God, who loved me and
gave himself for me.

"Thus we see even our faith is not ours in its origin;
but is the faith of the Son of God graciously communicated to
us. Beware, therefore, that you do not frustrate the grace
of God; for if righteousness come by the Law, then Christ is
dead in vain. If, therefore, we are saved by charity, we are
saved by the keeping of the Law, which doctrine St. Paul declared to be an apostacy from Christ, and a bewitching of the soul from the truth. But, you will perhaps say, Can a man be saved without charity? - The answer is, a man without charity cannot be saved: the faith of the Son of God is not in him."

The important lesson Coleridge learned was that while justification and sanctification may very well make up "one and the same plant", it was just as imperative that the "root" be distinguished from the "flower" as it was that neither the "root" nor the "flower" be torn from the plant. It was vitally necessary if there was to be any real hope for the man who, although "in Christ by faith", was yet a sinner. As usual, Coleridge had learned his theological lesson experimentally, or, one might say, existentially. In 1819 Coleridge wrote, "I will here record my experience. Ever when I meet with the doctrine of regeneration and faith and free grace simply announced - 'So it is!' - then I believe; my heart leaps forth to welcome it. But as soon as an explanation or reason is added, such explanations, namely, and reasonings as I have anywhere met with, then my heart leaps back again, recoils, and I exclaim, Nay! Nay! but not so." The conflict in Coleridge between heart and head had reasserted itself in a strictly theological garb, the head demanding an explanation for truths to which the heart felt allegiance. He had looked for the explanation of Redemption in Christ in
Jeremy Taylor, but since Taylor had no sound doctrine of Original Sin upon which to build, he had no Redemption other than charity to offer. In a note on Baxter, after Baxter had charged that "Some have absolutely denied original sin, and so evacuated the cross of Christ,..." Coleridge wrote, "Bishop Jeremy Taylor doth. If ever book was calculated to drive men to despair, it is Bishop Jeremy Taylor's on Repentance. It first opened my eyes to Arminianism, and that Calvinism is practically a far, far more soothing and consoling system." 124/ At the end of Taylor's Treatise on Repentance Coleridge lamented, "In fine. I have written but few marginal notes to this long Treatise, for the whole is to my feeling and apprehension so Romish, so anti-Pauline, so unctuous, that it makes my very heart as dry as the desert sands, when I read it". 125/ The experimental dissatisfaction of Coleridge with the scheme of Taylor is best explained in his own words in a note on the Biographia Scotica: "I have at sundry times been disturbed and assaulted by the question, If it pleased God to restore me to health and strength, have I any sufficient ground of confidence, that the sense of the sinfulness of sin, of the unworthiness and baseness of the sins to which my constitutional softness, sensibility, and craving for sympathy, render me most prone, would either prevent or instantly suppress the workings of sin in my members, or secure me against temptations, and opportunities of indulgence? The inward conviction of my weakness forces me to forego all
hope of such a result from the power or strength of any principle or habit of will in myself, and to rest my only hope on the daily, hourly, nay, momently assistance of the free grace of the Spirit of Christ. And yet, according to Bp. Jer. Taylor (Tract on Repentance), less than such a Victory over Sin is delusion; and even Archbp. Leighton asserts the necessity of the same Holiness which the Redeemed have in Heaven, as the indispensable condition of our ever getting thither. Of Taylor's book, I have elsewhere avowed my opinion, that it partakes of the worst characters of Romanism, and the salvation by works. But Leighton was a Divine of a better school, and concerning his judgment I would remark - that if he means by Holiness, the Righteousness of Christ, what disciple of John and Paul would hesitate to receive it? But if by Holiness while yet in the perishable body, he means such a strength already united with the 'I', with the whole man, as to exclude all danger, so that Temptations no longer act as Temptations - then he seems to me to make the Cross of Christ, his blood shed for us, and the mediatorial efficacy of his perfected Righteousness of no effect - and the Redemption from the Body for which Paul prayed with such fervent groans and taught us to pray for, no deliverance at all, or a deliverance only from a few incommodities which to a soul fearing sin and feeling the root of weakness in himself, must appear nothing ... doubtless, there is great need of guarding the Believer against turning the grace of God into wantonness -
or imagining that we can be saved without such a hatred of sin as will make the Soul deliberately prefer any loss of temporal and bodily pleasure or advantage to a return under its tyranny. I trust that I sincerely and with my whole spirit pray to God through Christ, that he will preserve me in that state, in which the temptations are not greater than my strength - the state, in which the portion of Grace, which he has bestowed, shall be sufficient for me - though it should be a continuance in weakness and languor of body, and an incapacity of all the enjoyments of this world. Yet it would follow from Jer. Taylor's doctrine, that this very prayer, supposing me to die immediately after, would be a presumption, that I had perished! ... The Truth lies between the Judaizing Pelagian and the presumptuous Antinomian - hard to be expressed in words, that may not be understood, but easily found by a soul that seeks a Saviour in humility, and prays earnestly for the Spirit which is already given to whoever asks in faith by Christ." 126/

In the Aids to Reflection Coleridge granted that Leighton did indeed mean "the righteousness of Christ" when he spoke of "Holiness"; but exactly what sense Leighton gave to the doctrine of imputed righteousness Coleridge said, "I have not (I own) been able to discover". 127/ A marginal note reveals that Coleridge did not surrender his view that Leighton preached "the disheartening, cheerless, monkish, anti-Lutheran gloom and ascetic, or rather Manichean Morals". 128/ The inability
of Coleridge to account for Leighton's ascetic ideas of Christianity, if he really had adopted the doctrine of imputation, was most likely what led Coleridge to question Leighton's understanding of imputed righteousness in the *Aids to Reflection*. It was in *justitia Dei* as expounded by Luther that Coleridge found hope in his sinfulness: "Ay! this, this is indeed to the purpose. In this doctrine my soul can find rest. I hope to be saved by faith, not by my faith, but by the faith of Christ in me." He prescribed "the chapter on the Law and the Gospel in Luther's Table Talk, as the general antidote" to Jeremy Taylor. Whereas in his revolt against Jeremy Taylor's Arminianism he said he had found Calvinism *practically* a far, far more soothing and consoling system, he realized that the tenet of imputed righteousness is "often but most untruly made characteristic of the Calvinistic Scheme, and attributed exclusively to Calvin and his followers ... whereas if I dared connect this doctrine with any one name in particular, not as alone holding and teaching the same but as giving an especial prominence, and life and death importance thereto, as the very sign and condition *stantis vel cadentis ecclesiae*, it would be Luther." In fact, what Coleridge called "modern" Calvinism came to be a target for much of his scorn, because, like Lutheran orthodoxy, it had not followed the "intuitive" lead given by Luther. "The poison of modern Ultra-Calvinism" was that it had lost the Biblical idea of the *imago dei* in a doctrine of
total corruption. 132/ With this doctrine it had destroyed all personality wherein the *imago dei* was reflected, and made man into a "thing" instead of a "person". The correct doctrine of Luther that the will is in bondage to sin had been misconceived and the will had therefore been misrepresented as absolutely passive, "clay in the hands of a potter". 133/ Practically, the existence of a will itself had been denied.

These doctrines had in turn given rise to a false idea of Redemption. Justification and imputation were considered as exclusively forensic notions.

The Church of England was also infected. Coleridge recorded in 1827, "I can conceive nothing more hollow or unsatisfactory than the present orthodox notion . . . that the incarnation and cross of Christ acts only retrospectively — which they call Justification — by reinstating the sinner in a - real? not a legal and imputed Innocence - a mere wiping off of old Scores?" 134/ Justification had not only lost its dynamic quality whereby God's declaration of righteousness was the means of a real growth in sanctification, but Christ's garments of righteousness had been lost in a lifeless restoration to a legal innocence.

When Coleridge flew to the *justitia Dei* for hope and refuge from the sense of sinfulness which seemed to grow instead of lessen in proportion to his growing faith in Christ as Redeemer, he did so without falling into the pit of an antinomianism that could undermine all true morality and without
abandoning the hope of real sanctification. In attempting to follow the via media he clung to his belief that God not only declares man righteous, but makes him righteous, and did not find this to be at odds with the spirit of Luther if it was understood that the whole of redemptive life was by grace alone. In 1820 he wrote, "... no power can be redemptive which does not at the same time act in the ground of the life as one with the ground, that is, must act in my will and not merely on my will; ... Christ may become man, but he cannot become us, except as far as we become him, and this we cannot do but by assimilation; and assimilation is a vital real act, not a notional or merely intellective one". 135/ In the Aids to Reflection he defended his use of the phrase "assimilation by faith", claiming it was not merely a phrase used in the so-called mystic theology: "I should expose myself to a just charge of an idle parade of my reading, if I recapitulated the tenth part of the authors, ancient, and modern, Romish and Reformed, from Law to Clemens Alexandrinus and Irenaeus, in whose works the same phrase occurs in the same sense". 136/ The "assimilation" whereby Redemption became a "vital real act" Coleridge found in the "being-in-Christ". The man who was ἐὰν ἔστω εἰς ἐμέ also had Christ in him, and it was the Christ working in his will which made him righteous. It was not improper to say that we were then "robbed with the righteousness of Christ", even if it was not the whole story, for, although the unity of being found in the "being-in-Christ" leapt over the gulf between infinity and
finiteness, no permanent bridge could be erected across this gulf until death. In the unity there was distinctity. Thus, in the phrase, "ours, yet God's; God's, yet ours" there was both unity and distinctness, and, while the truth of imputed righteousness was found in the unity, the truth of imparted righteousness was found in the "distinctity". The word "ours" in the phrase, "God's, yet ours" had meaning. The meaning was found in the vital act of regeneration which accompanied the work of Christ in the will.

In 1833 Coleridge made a rather unusual adaptation of Luther's distinction between the Law and the Gospel to make his point: "To work on is not to work in, but a very different action - not a proper cause, but as occasion and condition of the in-working of a power not one with the occasioning and exciting agent - So the Light and Warmth of the Sun works on the Seed; but the **efficient cause** is the **Life** in the Seed. Herein (the initiate will see) consists the distinction between the Law and the Gospel; and in the Light of this Idea he will both comprehend and more and more venerate the great Luther - who, alas, left many partizans, but no successor, no Elisha!" The law works on the heart as an alien power from the outside. Christ, dwelling in the faithful, works from within the heart to produce righteousness, but only upon the basis of a prior condition of sinfulness brought to consciousness by the law. In an earlier note of 1830, Coleridge had said that the sections of the **Table Talk** on Law and Gospel "contain the very marrow of
Christian Theology - and yet much remains to be done for some future Luther;" Coleridge was doing his part by providing a mystical view of Redemption as "being-in-Christ" to complete a juridical explanation of Redemption as justification by faith. In regeneration "the height and the depth become one - the Spirit communeth with the spirit". He wrote in 1828, "It is most true, and a truth of unspeakable consolation, that we cannot be saved by our own righteousness but only by the already perfected Righteousness of the Son of Man - yet it is no less true, that the Son of God ... did according to the Will of the Father endow Man with the capability of being raised to the knowledge and Desire of the Creator as his ultimate End - and likewise in as many as are chosen an actual Capacity of the Righteousness of Christ, a potentiation of the Will by the Leading of the Father... In practical Divinity we are bound to insist on this, as the indispensable condition, and the means or medium of that spiritual immanence in the glorified Body of our Redeemer, as constituting for each of the elect and for the whole number the spiritual continuum between them and their Redeemer, by which, as Archbishop Leighton beautifully observes 'they shall rise by the communication and virtue of his Rising: not simply by his power - for so the wicked likewise to their grief shall be raised - but they by his life as their life'. And as I have had occasion to observe before, and it can scarcely be repeated too often, this is peculiar to the admirable Scheme of our faith, that the
Mediator between the Creature and the Creator is likewise himself the Medium between the Creature and Himself. He is 'the Way, the Life, and the Resurrection'. On the same principle derivatively depends the Communion of Saints: and it is not the least of the offences of the Papacy that it has perverted this beautiful and endearing faith into a sensual and (perilously neighboring on) idolatrous Worship of Dead Men."  

Coleridge did not, however, in his own estimation blend his own motif of regeneration into that of justification by faith with the result that neither was capable of identification. Regeneration was the motif of Reason; justification by faith that of the Understanding. Regeneration was dependent upon the Incarnation; justification by faith was dependent upon an atonement theory. Paul and Luther, remember, were apostles to the Understanding. Coleridge's idea of Redemption as a truth of Reason was not dependent upon an atonement theory, but only upon the fact of the Incarnation. Coleridge had no doubt that Luther and St. Paul meant to convey a dynamic view of Redemption in their language of the Understanding, but because it was possible to take the concepts of Luther and St. Paul statically he himself preferred the language of the Reason in discussing Redemption. If the vital, living, redemptive relationship to God in Christ was illustrated with language analogous to growth it was the language of Reason, the dynamic language of mystery. Christianity was regeneration, rebirth; the Incarnation was assimilated by faith. It must always be
noted whether the language of Reason or the language of Understanding is used in theology, otherwise men will accept the language of the Understanding as the literal truth instead of as the metaphorical truth designed for logic. Coleridge ventured that it was no light recommendation of his doctrine of Redemption that it presented "the only safe Mean between the reckless Antinomianism, which sacrifices the interests of morality to the exclusive efficacy of the cross... asserting justification without sanctification, preaching the Son without the Holy Ghost; and the proud and pitiless Legalism, which sacrificing the merits and the intercession of the perpetual Advocate to the pretended interests of Morality, demands as the only terms on which a Christian may hope to be saved, such a state of the whole man even previous to "the Redemption of the Body", as leaves nothing for God to forgive nor Christ to supply."  

Coleridge was the keenest and most partisan disciple of Luther on the issue of faith and works. Salvation was by faith. In rebounding from the Arminian and Unitarian schemes, Coleridge did not land in an antinomianism, nor did he consider that Luther was an antinomian, but in 1829 he was willing to admit that every true disciple of Paul and Luther must expect the charge of antinomianism. He had written in 1828 that when reading Luther, "Nine Readers out of 10 would, like Wesley, suppose they had been reading the works of a decided Antinomian whereas, it is impossible to conceive opinions more
sound, more humane, more genuinely the faith of Scripture and more accordant with the Light of Reason and the dictates of Conscience, than Luther's were on this very point. The cause of the contrary appearance is to be found in the tremendous effects of the doctrine of Good Works as enforced by Pope's shavelings, and which in Luther's age had curdled the very life-blood of Christendom." An example of the way Coleridge adapted the sola gratia of Luther to his own theology is seen in a note on Eichorn: "Christianity proposes and offers Regeneration - not the ruinous Adam repaired, but a new man born of the Spirit into Christ, and Medium and Mediator between God and Man... As the corollary to this - the crimes and vices which the Jew was to shrink back from for their illegality, the Christian is exhorted to rise above, and to leave behind him, on account of their now alien nature - but to attribute no merit to such negative duties, and no saving efficacy; which last must be sought for not in the doings, and not doings of the Living Soul, but in the power and presence of the life-making Spirit thro' faith, which is itself a gift and product of the Spirit. Such is the doctrine of the Apostles John and Paul; a doctrine which whoever preaches without caution must expect, and even with caution must be prepared for, the charge of Antinomianism. Thus Wesley with his skillet or shallow Scull-pan skimmed a portion of the Froth from the rocky Basin into which the impetuous Luther precipitately poured his waters ... mistakes it for the
rabid foam of Licentiousness and screams out, Poison! Madness! Blasphemy!" Coleridge insisted over and over again that although "ΜΕΤΑΦΟΡΑ and Sanctification differ only as the plant and the growth or growing of the plant", this difference was very important. "Surely, true sanctification is an effect, and a part of the Redemption, not a cause. Redemption is a free gift - not Wages, no, nor even Reward." To Jeremy Taylor's descriptions of repentance taken from the Old Testament Coleridge replied, "If Christianity, or the opus operans of Redemption, was synchronous with the Fall of man, then the same answer must be returned to the passages here given from the Old Testament as to those from the New; namely, that Sanctification is the result of Redemption, not its efficient cause or previous condition. Again: "Now the question is - 1. What is the cause of our New Birth? 2. What is the conditio sine qua non on our part? To the first St. Paul answers: the free Grace of God - to the second: a living Faith in that free grace, and in the means, by and in which it has chosen to manifest itself - that is, in the Cross and Resurrection of Christ. - To talk of a virtuous life being either cause or condition is absurd: if it be virtue indeed, pure stream from pure fountain, it is the effect, the new birth itself. The charge of antinomianism is absurd! 'They deny the necessity of good works - exclaims the triumphant Laodicean. - 'What? do they deny the necessity of Regeneration?' 'Oh, no!... that is all their creed.'
regeneration but the drying up of the old dirty Spring, and
the opening of a new one, salient from the Rock, first purging
the old channel, even to its compact bed and then flowing in in
it, pure stream from pure Fountains, as long as the Rock
remains..." 148/ Because Coleridge thought of faith as the
unifying activity of response in which head and heart became
one, it was necessarily the spring of action. It was no
oversight that Coleridge had little to say about ethics. A
"faith working through love" was the only acceptable ethical
principle he recognized, and his concern was with the faith.
If faith was present no set of ethics was necessary. We
recall his words from The Friend, "...that system of morality
is alone true and suited to human nature which unites the
intention and the motive, the warmth and the light, in one and
the same act of mind. This alone is worthy to be called a
moral principle. Such a principle may be extracted, though
not without difficulty and danger, from the ore of the stoic
philosophy; but it is to be found unalloyed and entire in the
Christian system, and is there called Faith." 149/

Muirhead wrote that the categorical imperative of Kant
was the basis of Coleridge's ethics. 150/ In 1817 Coleridge
wrote, "I reject Kant's stoic principle, as false, unnatural,
and even immoral, where in his Kritik der praktischen Vernunft,
he treats the affections as indifferent (αδιάδοξα) in
ethics, and would persuade us that a man who disliking, and
without any feeling of love for virtue, yet acted virtuously,
because and only because it was his duty, is more worthy of our esteem, than the man whose affections were aidant to and congruous with his conscience. In 1827 he wrote, "In the first heat of the Kantean School it was usual with the high flying Moralists to inveigh against the Christian Morality as an impure eudaemonism grounded on each Individual's hopes and fears of the lot to be bestowed or inflicted on him after death - and therefore essentially selfish. Every awakened Christian knows the practical falsehood of this charge. The basis of Coleridge's ethics was the faith of Christ, not the categorical imperative of Kant.

Faith was never without its works. In 1830 he wrote, "We are saved by Faith. Our works cannot save us. This is the Doctrine of the Gospel. What? By Faith alone? Answer. You deceive yourself by an equivocal term. Faith is never alone - even where outward works, or deeds observably are precluded, there must be the disposition, the spiritual Act... Faith, the moral Sun, (is) inseparable from its Rays, i.e. Acts of Obedience." And, "What," Coleridge asked, "is a lively Faith? To be one with Christ. To be in him as he is in his Father". Perhaps the best example of how Coleridge thought he was being true to the spirit of Luther's theology of grace, and while making room for both an imputed and imparted righteousness in rebirth and the "being-in-Christ", is found in a note on Swedenborg in which he attempts to reconcile the views of Luther and Swedenborg. Swedenborg, of course,
fancied that he was writing in direct opposition to justification by faith. Coleridge noted, "Faith, as demanded by Christ and taught by Paul is the Light of Love, or Love in the Light of Truth. The Soul so actuated knows that of itself alone it cannot even sincerely will, much less work out, its salvation; it strives to destroy its selfhood, and to be born again that as a Babe it may repose in its Father's Bosom, without a will save that of the Holy One - the sanctity flowing from this introsusception of his Will into the Will of God he declares to be God's not its own, and yet its own, because it is God's - again to the ineffable condescension of the Eternal Word in taking our Nature, and to the manifestation of the Divine Humanity in the Flesh, the Soul attributes the possibility of its New Birth - and to its entire acceptance in heart and mind of this means of salvation it refers the reality of the same... This was Luther's Doctrine, this is what the Fathers and Founders of the Church of Christ in England meant by justification by Faith: and to this Swedenborg could not object, for it is one with his own doctrine." 155/

In giving emphasis to the grace and glory of God in Redemption Coleridge stayed firmly in the Augustinian tradition and stressed the bondage of the will apart from grace. He agreed with Luther, who "considered the pretensions to Free-Will boastful, and better suited to the 'budge doctors of the Stoic Fur,' than to the preachers of the Gospel, whose great theme is the Redemption of the Will from Slavery; the
restoration of the Will to perfect Freedom being the end and consummation of the redemptive process, and the same with the entrance of the Soul into Glory, that is, its union with Christ." 156/ The bondage of the will was not the same as loss of the will. "If there be a servum arbitrium, then there must be an Arbitrium. Luther was zealous against the pretense of a free will in unregenerate man." 157/ The "modern Calvinism" as laid down by Jonathan Edwards, the Unitarian scheme as laid down by Priestley, and the Necessitarians, had all in different ways perverted the doctrine. He wrote, "It is of vital importance for a theological student to understand clearly the utter diversity of the Lutheran, which is likewise the Calvinistic, denial of free-will in the unregenerate, and the doctrine of the modern Necessitarians and of the later Calvinists, which denies the proper existence of will altogether. The former is sound, scriptural, compatible with the divine justice, a new, yea, a mighty motive to morality; and, finally, the dictate of common sense grounded on common experience. The latter the very contrary of these." 158/ In the Aids to Reflection, he warned, "...as the difference of a captive and enslaved Will, and no Will at all, such is the difference between the Lutheranism of Calvin and the Calvinism of Jonathan Edwards". 159/ And of Priestley he said, "The Lutheran leaves the free will whining with a broken back in the ditch; and Dr. Priestley puts the poor animal out of his misery!" 160/ He insisted, "Neither St. Augustine nor Calvin denied the
remanence of the will in the fallen spirit; but they, and Luther as well as they, objected to the flattering epithet 'free' will. (Free will) is the fruit and final end of Redemption, - the glorious liberty of the Gospel." ¹⁶¹/

We noted how Coleridge's idea of the bondage of the will was forced upon him by his own practical experience, but he also affirmed to Allsop that it was a speculative truth as well, "incompatible with omnipotence", and the immutable attributes of God. "Man is not to be saved without His saving grace." ¹⁶²/ There were no personality quirks in the human will which were able to upset the redemptive plan of God. Coleridge had deep horror of an Arminian contingency.

However, as in other points, Coleridge wished to "complete" Luther. While agreeing with Luther as far as he went, Coleridge wished to transfer the doctrine of the captive will to the language of Reason in order to clear away the mists of the Understanding in which it had been expressed by Luther. To do this it was necessary that the bondage of the will in the unregenerate man be brought under the idea of new birth and the "being-in-Christ". Then it could more easily be seen that the whole purpose of the Gospel was to bring to the enslaved will of unregenerate man a freedom in the regenerate man. On the Table Talk he wrote, "That Luther was practically on the right side in this famous controversy, (i.e. with Erasmus) and that he was driving at the truth, I see abundant reason to believe. But it is no less evident that he saw it in a mist,
or rather as a mist with dissolving outline; and as he saw the thing as a mist, so he ever and anon mistakes a mist for the thing." In a note on Field Coleridge stressed the need to "complete" Luther. "In short, Luther and Calvin are right so far. A creaturely will cannot be free; but the will in a rational creature may cease to be creaturely, and the creature, \( \alpha \nu \tau \sigma \tau \alpha \tau \omega \iota \iota \iota \), finally cease in consequence; and this neither Luther nor Calvin seem to have seen. In short, where omnipotence is on one side, what but utter impotence can remain for the other? To make freedom possible, the antithesis must be removed. The removal of this antithesis of the creature to God is the object of the Redemption, and forms the glorious liberty of the Gospel. More than this I am not permitted to expose." The reticence of Coleridge to reveal his stand on this point appears in another note also, and the only explanation for this mysterious attitude is that he contemplated flying off into his "positive" language for the explanation. Field wrote, "Of these five kinds of liberty, the two first agree only to God, so that in the highest degree \( \tau \delta \ \alpha \nu \tau \sigma \tau \alpha \tau \omega \iota \iota \iota \) that is, freedom of will is proper to God only; and in this sense Calvin and Luther rightly deny that the will of any creature is or ever was free". Coleridge added, "except as in God, and God in us. Now the latter alone is will; for it alone is \( \epsilon \nu \sigma \nu \sigma \epsilon \nu \sigma \iota \epsilon \) and here lies the mystery, which I dare not openly and promiscuously reveal." That the mystery Coleridge could not "promiscuously reveal" is that God is "actual" while man is in a state of
"becoming" is evident from a note on Swedenborg. "This is the final insight, to which all deep and pure Thinking with unprejudiced study of the H. Scripture on the human free-will will bring the mind: viz. that a free will does indeed exist in man, potentially, but exists really only as the Will of Man is in the will of God." But the "ens super ens" was only a part of the mystery, even if it was the mystery Coleridge was reluctant to reveal. The other part of the mystery, that man was "in God and God in us" only as men were "in Christ" through assimilation by faith, Coleridge was not so hesitant to reveal. The Christ who worked in the heart to bring about regeneration brought with the new birth a free will, a will still sinful, but no longer bound by sin because of the indwelling Christ. Herein consisted the "double will" the "actual" and the "potential" will. By the "being-in-Christ" Coleridge could explain man as simul justus et peccator but regard "justus" as the actual possession of man even as, and because, he actually possessed Christ. The fallen will was bound, but it was not lost; men did not become "things" but evil persons who in personality retained the imago Dei. As men were "in Christ" they were capable of receiving the truths of Reason to which the will was united in the synthesis of faith. Coleridge said: "By the phrase 'in Christ', I understand all the supernatural aids vouchsafed and conditionally promised in the Christian dispensation; and among them the Spirit of Truth, which the world cannot receive, were it only
that the knowledge of spiritual Truth is of necessity immediate and intuitive; and the World or Natural man possesses no higher intuitions than those of the pure Sense, which are the subjects of mathematical science. But aids, observe! Therefore, not by Will of man alone; but neither without the Will." 167/

Just as the bondage of the will to sin did not mean that the will was obliterated, so the "being-in-Christ" did not imply that the individual will lost its identity. In the new birth the ground of man's existence became entirely new, but existence itself retained its characteristic of sinfulness even though permeated by the righteousness of God. As long as sinfulness remained so did the finite, individual identity of the will. As long as sin remained it was only "my" will. Experience taught that there was no time in this life when sin was absent. In a note on Wesley Coleridge observed; "Assuredly my judgement is strong against the use of the word, and the profession of the state, perfection; which word, in its English meaning, does not correspond to the Greek words, τέλειος, τέλειος, of which it is pretended to be the translation; full growth, adult, are far nearer ... There is no point at which you can arrive in this life, in which the command, 'Soar upwards still', ceases in validity or occasion. How much opposition - nay, how much spiritual pride and vanity - might Wesley have prevented by calling his first class, mature believers, or adult Christians." 168/
In the life of Redemption Coleridge reversed his emphasis on self-knowledge. "In this, as in what not? Luther is the great model; ever reminding the individual that not he, but Christ, is to redeem him; and that the way to be redeemed is to think with will, mind, and affections on Christ, and not on himself. I am a sin-laden being, and Christ has promised to loose the whole burden if I but entirely trust in him. To torment myself with the detail of the noisome contents of the fardel will but make it stick the closer, first to my imagination and then to my unwilling will." While Coleridge depended upon the "heaven descended Know Thyself" as the means of awakening the capacity in man for the apprehension of spiritual truth in both The Friend and the Aids to Reflection, in his later years he came to the conclusion that it was really hopeless to know the self. In 1832 Coleridge wrote:

\begin{quote}
and is this the prime
And heaven-sprung maxim of the olden time! -
Say, canst thou make thyself? Learn first that trade;-
Haply thou mayst know what thyself hast made,
What has thou, Man, that thou darest call thine own?
What is there in thee, Man, that may be known?
Dark fluxion, all unfixable by thought,
A phantom dim of past and future wrought,
Vain sister of the worm, - life, death, soul, clod,
Ignore thyself and strive to know thy God!
\end{quote}

But it is incorrect to imply from this that there was a complete change of thought on the subject of self-knowledge. In his later life Coleridge's main concern was the possibility of transcending an evil self which he knew only too well, but his position remained identical with that implicit in the Aids to
Reflection. The knowledge of a sinful self was necessary for the need of Redemption to be recognized, but for Redemption itself one had to turn toward the Incarnation. In the *Aids to Reflection* Coleridge concentrated on the first part of the theme of Sin and Redemption, but afterward he began to give more of his attention to the second. So he asked in 1830, "And by what process can I be redeemed? by dwelling on the impotent and the evil - i.e. on Myself? Or not ... rather on the holiness, the love and the loveliness of my divine Redeemer, receiving glory by contemplation of Glory - Save by adoration of the essential Love." 171/ He had previously criticized Wesley for not fixing his gaze entirely on the redemptive Word, resulting in his constant references to "I, I, I, I," 172/ and decided that the Moravian doctrine of imputed righteousness would have been highly beneficial to his Christian thought. 173/

7. Faith and Belief.

In consequence of his distinction between Reason and Understanding Coleridge made a distinction between faith and belief. Faith was a total energy of the moral and intellectual being and a product of Reason. Belief was merely an intellectual activity and a product of the Understanding. Faith was the heart of religion and belief was the head. 174/ It was possible for faith and belief to exist separately one without the other. "In Nathaniel we have an instance of Faith without Belief - in
Nicodemus Belief without Faith." 175/ Because of his own experience, however, Coleridge thought it much more likely that faith would bring about belief, than that belief would bring about faith. "Faith does ordinarily imply Belief; but Belief is far, very far, from implying Faith - Nay, there may be a living Faith, which God sees and loves, even under the eclipse of a temporary and involuntary unbelief." 176/ Because faith was dependent upon Reason, not upon Understanding, it was an attitude of the whole man instead of only the discursive intellect. It could not possibly be opposed to Reason. "Faith lives by Reason." 177/ If the Understanding had usurped the place of Reason then it was necessary that faith as an act of will give back to Reason its rightful superiority. As an act of the will faith assented to Reason "on its own evidence without, and even against, the understanding". 178/ To equivocate faith and intellectual satisfaction was dangerous to the nature of faith, because faith had its roots in Reason and the will, not in the discursive intellect. 179/ Although Coleridge was not prepared to say that a faith not in harmony with the Understanding would yet be a faith which "God sees and loves", the proper faith and the highest type of faith was one in which the Understanding was enlightened and belief ensued. Nor was the Understanding simply to attain a state of acquiescence in certain doctrines, for this was not true faith. In the Aids to Reflection he called the faith of Thomas Browne Ultrafidianism, because he could answer all objections
"with the odd resolution he had learnt of Tertullian:

Certum est quia impossible est," and the type of faith in
which the intellect was given freedom to choose and reject
doctrine as it pleased was given the name of Minimifidianism.180/

Coleridge sought a happy medium between these two extremes
in the question of belief. "Belief of the truths essential
to the Faith in Christ is the necessary and consequent of the
Faith. Ex.gr. I cannot sincerely trust in Christ, and entirely
love the Lord Jesus, without at the same time believing, first,
that He is, and secondly, that He is most trust- and love-worthy.
But I can love Him, trust in Him, and earnestly desire to obey
his commands, without having even heard of the immaculate
conception of the Virgin Mary, or having troubled my head
respecting even her aeipartheny." 181/ The basis for Coleridge's
"latitudinarianism" (if it may be called that) is found in the
distinction between faith and belief, resulting, of course, from
the distinction between Reason and Understanding. Coleridge
justified doctrinal speculation by this distinction. "The
sublime and abstruse doctrines of Christian belief belong to
the Church, but the faith of the individual, centred in his
heart, is or may be collateral to them. Faith is subjective.
I throw myself in adoration before God, acknowledge myself his
creature - simple, weak, lost; and pray for help and pardon
through Jesus Christ, but when I rise from my knees, I discuss
the doctrine of the Trinity as I would a problem in geometry
in the same temper of mind, I mean..." 182/ The only doctrines
which Coleridge thought were binding on the Christian as an object of belief were those which were "necessary and consequent" to faith. These he reduced to two, Sin and Redemption. But these two doctrines had ramifications for Coleridge: 1. The moral responsibility of man, and the truths implied in this, either as presupposed or necessarily consequent. 2. The Personality and the Holiness of God. 3. The Pauline Ethics resulting from the admission of ... 1 and 2. 4. From the fact of moral Evil and No.3 the reality of original Sin. 5. The removal of this by the incarnation and cross of the Son of God, as the only possible Redemption, throu' Faith as the only possible means of appropriating the boon in each Individual redeemed ... I affirm that each of these five, and each in the full and literal sense of the words in which it is stated and that all five collectively, are essential to Christian Belief - and that no one point ... can be denied or doubted without the annulment of Christianity in toto." 187/

The most distinctive feature of Coleridge's concept of faith was its certainty. It was certain because it was founded on intuitive knowledge, on Reason, not on the Understanding. In a note made in 1810 Coleridge can be seen finding the explanation of the certainty of faith in the same way in which he formed his concept of reason: "Duns Scotus affirms that the certainty of Faith is the greatest certainty - this ... explained and proved by the dependence of the theorectic powers ... (on) the practical..." 184/ Coleridge criticized Hooker
for admitting that the assurance of the things of God are not as certain as that which we perceive by the sense. In a note on Lessing he wrote, "I far prefer Ricardus di St. Victord and the mystical Theologians, with whom join Luther, who difference proper Faith from Science by the sort and not by the degree of certainty." But Coleridge adopted the position of Scotus, in his concept of the theoretic powers being dependent on the intuitive, or, in Coleridge's language, the Understanding dependent upon Reason, in faith. Reason and Understanding differ in kind and each has a claim to knowledge, Reason gaining "substantial" knowledge, the Understanding gaining "abstract" knowledge. Yet the knowledge gained is to be separated only in relation to the object of knowledge, merely a formal separation. All knowledge is one. Belief ensues, or is necessary, only when the Understanding attempts to judge the supersensuous, the sphere of Reason only. So he wrote in a note on Asgill, "According to all usage of words, science and faith are incompatible in relation to the same object; while, according to Asgill, faith is merely the power which science confers on the will. Asgill says, -- What we know, we must believe. I retort, -- What we only believe, we do not know."

But not only is faith instigated by revelation, faith itself adds to knowledge. "In all things worth knowing our knowledge is in exact proportion to our faith." Coleridge constantly asserted that before a man could be made wiser, he
must be made better. 189/ "No opportunity however adequate, of acquiring a knowledge the most intimate of any scheme of Faith or Philosophy, will give a fair and thorough insight into and comprehension of the same to a man not pre-configured thereto -- and who has not prepared himself for it, by having its first principles in himself beforehand." 190/ At this point, of course, Coleridge has set forth a paradox. Men cannot become wiser until they have become better, yet they cannot become better until they have attained wisdom, i.e. self-knowledge. The paradox was resolved only in grace. The predisposition itself was the work of God. "All faith begins in a predisposition, analogous to instinct, inasmuch as the particular Will could not be awaked and realized into an actual volition but by an impulse and communication from the universal Will. This latter is the vital air, which the particular Will breathes, but which must have entered and excited the faculty as the previous and enabling condition of the first disposition to breathe, as well as of the power of drawing the Breath. It must be in us both to will and to do. And not only at the beginning but thro' the whole life do we need this prevenient grace." 191/

Because Coleridge considered that the apprehension of immediate truth was necessary for faith, it was his conviction that no one could be debated into faith. Words, as logic, were objects of the Understanding. The only evidence which could be brought for faith was that found within faith itself. But
there were steps which a man could himself take whereby Coleridge thought he might be brought to Reason and thus to faith. The first step was to heed the revelation in the law. In the law faith generated its own receptivity. (Coleridge did not differentiate between the law revealed at Sinai and the law written into men's hearts at creation. 192) Through law the conscience became the medium of faith and revelation. The first step necessary to ascend to the "proper humanity" found in faith was the consciousness of sin as guilt.

"Evidences of Christianity! I am weary of the word. Make a man feel the want of it; rouse him, if you can, to the self-knowledge of his need of it; and you may safely trust it to its own Evidence." 193 And how was this key of self-knowledge to be attained? Coleridge says, "... to those who are not in this state, first to preach the Law, its holiness and its terrors." 194 But the law could itself be resisted, and this resistance was itself the major stumbling block to faith. "Moral evil is over all, and the best men feel a will of the flesh opposing the Will of the Spirit. A source of Moral Evil, not accidental, but common to all men, is therefore a fact. If any man deny it, he must be referred to his own conscience for the confutation. If he has a sealed conscience, all argument is for him useless. He must be made a better man, before he can be made a wiser." 195 Or, in other words, men were ultimately dependent upon the grace of God.
Sin Coleridge called the ground of faith; Redemption the superstructure. Sin was a fact revealed immediately in the hearts of men by Reason acting on the conscience, but Redemption was revealed to the Understanding by the words of the Scripture. Therefore, knowledge that the Redeemer of Scripture presented to the Understanding was the truth of God had to be apprehended by the Reason, for Redemption as the "fiat of God" was an act outside the world of sense, yet presented to the senses through history. Knowledge of the indwelling Christ could be had only by trial. Coleridge thought it possible to show that such a truth could not otherwise be obtained, and "that done, the next step is -- Try therefore - it has been demonstrated that a, b, c, d, are not and cannot be the road to the Temple of the oracle -- that e is the only remaining Road - try it therefore, travel along it, trust in it and obey in all respecting the various guideposts, both at its entrance and those which you will find along it -- and this is the method, nay, this is from the nature of the thing the only possible method of converting your negative knowledge into direct and positive Insight and Possession." 

Coleridge called the highest faith one in which the total man is involved and the intellect is committed to belief. After many struggles in his marginalia and notebooks he finally decided rather emphatically that if one is not in any way conscious that he possesses faith it is for him non-existent.
The cause for his difficulty on this point was not only the morally repugnant thought of a gracious God accepting the faith in one and denying it another, but the more practical matter of whether or not it could be asserted that faith had corresponding reality in the emotions and moral nature. When he looked at the revolting state of the religious fanaticism which he saw around him as the result of the Methodist emphasis on "feeling" he was afraid to admit it to be true even though he had to wage a struggle with his own experience to deny it. In his struggle he naturally ended up with more distinctions—this time between enthusiasm and fanaticism, and the old traditional one of explicit and implicit faith.

In *The Friend* Coleridge spoke of restoring the true Christian enthusiasm, the basic meaning of which was, of course, vitally necessary for Coleridge's idea of Redemption. In the *Statesman's Manual* he also spoke highly of enthusiasm:

"For what is enthusiasm but the oblivion and swallowing-up of self in an object dearer than self, or in an idea more vivid?"

In a marginal note he attempted to justify his view of enthusiasm in contradistinction to fanaticism, "...the disease of the age is want of enthusiasm, and a tending to fanaticism ...

... Enthusiasm is the absorption of the individual in the object contemplated from the vividness of intensity of his conceptions and convictions; fanaticism is heat, or accumulation and direction, of feeling acquired by contagion, and relying on the sympathy of sect or confederacy; intense sensation with
confused or dim conceptions." 201/ He called the Field-
Methodists fanatics, "i.e. circa fana dense turba conoalefacti;
those who catch heat by crowding together round the same
Fane." 202/ But Boehme was a pure enthusiast. 203/ Although
Coleridge stated that he was attempting to recall the country
to a new enthusiasm in The Friend and praised enthusiasm in
the Statesman's Manual, in the Aids to Reflection he spoke of
enthusiasm in a derogatory manner and said that if anyone
called him an enthusiast he was a wilful slanderer. 204/ In
the Aids to Reflection he passed very quickly over a difficulty
which had absorbed much time in the marginalia, the consciousness
of assurance which accompanies faith. He mentioned it only in
a footnote. 205/ In the marginalia the problem of assurance
nearly always called forth a condemnation of the Methodists,
who had perverted assurance into fanaticism, yet Coleridge
refused to say that there was no consciousness of faith. His
own experience belied such a denial. In the Aids to Reflection
he dismissed the problem by denouncing the "so-called Evang-
elicals" and "Armenian Methodists" who watch for "signs and
sensible assurances" as being in opposition to the teaching of
the Christian Church in all ages. He affirmed the negative
position of Luther on the subject, but offered no positive
comment. 206/ Moreover, he said that the "immediate knowledge
or consciousness" of the presence of the gifts of the Spirit
was impossible. 207/ But in 1832 he wrote in a notebook that
"Faith, Grace, whatever comes from above, takes possession of
the entire, the total Man; ... and eminently therefore, his clear and distinct consciousness." 208/

The transition of his thought on the consciousness of faith is recorded in the notebooks. In 1830 he wrote, "It is the deep expression of this (life) that renders the complaining Psalms so affecting to me. If there be a spiritual Life, there must be a spiritual analogon of feeling, a sensation of Being. Restore unto me the Joy of thy Salvation..." Soon after the expression of this modified position he wrote, "I am aware, that the preceding note divides a boundary line between profound truths and sensual enthusiasm, that is most perilous. And till I can point out some distinctive mark and criterion of the spiritual Life, by which the personal Reason can be secured from the confusion of the same with mere excitement and perhaps morbid states of the nervous system; ... It must remain, assuming as I am disposed to assume, its truth, a secret of the Holy One to be possessed, not communicated... For the Church at least the Doctrine laid down in the Aids to Reflection, in which the Spiritual is ever defined as the exclusive antithesis of the Sensual and Sensational, is the only safe Doctrine in the present average of our religious advancement." 209/ But later he offered a hint as to how he would resolve the "analogon of feeling": "May not there be found a sufficient diagnostic (of feelings associated with the spiritual life) in the known characters of bodily sensations, appetites, impetities, and passions? If the pretended spiritual state of affection can
be explained into any of these, or shown to be indistinguishable from them, the proof of enthusiasm is given. Therefore, in the new Edition of the *Aids to Reflection* I hope to add a qualifying comment on this antithesis of Spirit to Sensation.\(^{210}\)

But it never found its way into the new edition.

Closely allied to Coleridge's difficulty over the consciousness of faith was the question in his mind concerning the debate over implicit and explicit faith.

There is quite an advance in his thought in this issue. In a note on Sherlock he wrote, "...without Christ, or in any other power but that of Christ, and (subjectively) of faith in Christ, no man can be saved; but does it follow, that no man can have Christian faith who is ignorant or erroneous as to any one point of Christian theology? Will a soul be condemned to everlasting perdition for want of logical acumen in the perception of consequences? -- If he verily embrace Christ as his Redeemer, and unfeignedly feel in himself the necessity of Redemption, he implicitly holds the Divinity of Christ, whatever from want or defect of logic may be his notion explicite."\(^{211}\) In 1825 he questioned these assumptions in a notebook, asking if an implicit Faith is a desirable State for any or if it is even a safe state. "Is it compatible with entire Love and Reliance on Christ to remain content with a Faith that is the creature of accident - accident of Birth, or Countr\textgreek{y}? - Lastly, even tho' it were granted, that such state is desirable for some, and safe for most, yet is it either desirable, safe, or becoming for a
Minister of the Gospel, appointed to divide the word -- I appeal to Paul for the answer." 212/

In 1830 he wrote in a marginal note, "And pray what does implicit faith lead men into? Transubstantiation and all the abominations of priest-worship. And where is the Scriptural authority for this implicit faith? Assuredly not in St. John, who tells us that Christ's life is and manifests itself in us as the light of man; that he came to bring light as well as immortality. Assuredly not in St. Paul, who declares all faith imperfect and perilous without insight and understanding; who prays for us that we may comprehend the deep things even of God himself. For the Spirit discerned, and the Spirit by which we discern, are both God; the Spirit of truth through and in Christ from the Father." 213/
CHAPTER III.
REVELATION AND HISTORY

1. The Certainty of Redemption through Revelation.

Although some of Coleridge's ideas on revelation and history must seem like not much more than another serving of Lessing, Coleridge's experience formulated his theology. When in the *Aids to Reflection* he stated that the necessitating occasion for the adoption of the article of Redemption was sin, this was but a statement of his own experience. Furthermore, the sort of Redemption which Coleridge envisaged as the only possible remedy for sin demanded the true divinity of Christ, which in turn meant the traditional Trinitarian Christianity.

Having tried an offshoot of Christianity, as well as most systems of speculative thought, he returned to orthodoxy. But it was not a return by a crucifixion of the intellect in order to satisfy his religious needs. Sometime around 1810 Coleridge wrote an estimate of the historical formation of the Christian Trinity which was also true biographically: "The doctrine of Sin and Redemption first authorized by practical necessity the doctrine of the Trinity - before that time it was a mere Philosophiam, tho' most beautiful and accurate". Speculatively the gown of the article of Redemption was tailored for Coleridge and ready to wear when the anguish of guilt made it imperative to don it. When Coleridge was denouncing the Church of England in a theological lecture delivered at Bristol in 1795, he stated very sarcastically that "from Plato they
learned their Trinity in Unity". He went on, "When Christians had permitted themselves to receive as Gospel the idolatrous doctrine of the Trinity, and the more pernicious dogma of Redemption, it is not wonderful, that an Episcopal Church should be raised, fit superstructure for such foundations. In the MS On the Divine Ideas written long after he had endorsed Trinitarian Christianity as his creed, Coleridge was still ready to repeat, after emphasizing that the Platonic and Christian Trinity were not to be identified, that the resemblance between the two was indeed striking.

The notes of Coleridge made during the period he was rejecting Unitarianism in favor of the "Tri-unity" are most instructive. He found the closeness of the Platonic "Trinity in Unity" to the Christian "Tri-unity" a source of consolation rather than a cause for scepticism. He complained about "...the ungenerous fears of modern Christians ... concerning the connection of the Christian tradition with those of Plato and the East. Which is more sublime ... to believe as of old that the whole world, barbarians and Greek were all refining and preparing the way for, this last greatest Epiphany... The necessary union of Philo and Christ, and the as necessary subordination of the former to the latter." "Remember Plotinus ... κύριος και υπέρφυσις and St. John - In the beginning was the Word, and the word was with God, and the word was God." "I suspect that Robinson had not studied Plato or Philo very profoundly. Horsley did not hesitate to
pronounce the agreement of the Platonic with the Christian
Trinity."

"The Platonic Fathers, instead of the Περαγγέλτων
and Ἀγων τῆς Εἰμί, used τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν ἡμῖν τῷ Λόγῳ τῷ Φυσικῷ
καὶ τῷ Ψυχῳ ἐν τῇ ἔργῳ Καίρῳ
Σωτήρ, ἀνέκπορυσθαν."

"Confining myself to the metaphysics
and radical theology of the lower Platonists ... I dare affirm
that their doctrines are strictly conformable with the true
meaning of Plato and harmonizable with the doctrines of the
orthodox Xstian." St. John furnished Coleridge with a
Logos attached to history as particular manifestation in Jesus
Christ in Whom there was Redemption. He accepted it gladly.
When Coleridge applied the philosophic doctrine of the logos
to Christ as John taught him, Christianity became more than
a philosophy because of the "word made flesh" and the philo­
sophic doctrine of the logos was to be interpreted by the light
of the truth in Christ and not vice versa. In the Incarnation
Coleridge found the uniqueness of Christianity. He found
himself asking "whether the plain purpose of John VI be not to
establish the specific difference between Christ and all other
deleates from Heaven, before and after him, that the faithful
believe them, i.e. receive their doctrines as true and of divine
authority, but they are not only to believe Christ, but to
believe in Christ - He is at once the Teacher and the Doctrine,
the Giver and the Gift - yea, and if Scriptures do not mock our
common sense, and the plainest words are not to be interpreted
into the most outrageous metaphors for the most commonplace
truisms ... he is at once (he, not merely his moral precepts)
he is at once the Feast and the Master of the Feast". 10/
The specific difference between Christ and other delegates
from heaven such as Philo and Plotinus was that He not only
taught the immanence of the Logos in the world, He was the
Logos. It was the Incarnation and the consequent Redemption
which raised Christianity above other religions and philosophies.
But Coleridge was emphatic in asserting that because Christianity
was raised above other religions and philosophies by virtue of
the Incarnation, this did not mean that other religions did not
contain a portion of the truth of God. The year before he
wrote the *Aids to Reflection* Coleridge stated that St. John
and Philo differed "as the Truth and nothing but the Truth
from the same Truth in connection with sundry impertinences,
and without any complemental accessories". 11/ There was but
one God, and therefore there could be only one truth, and to
this truth all men of Reason had testified according to the
amount of revelation they had received, Plato as well as Luther,
Boehme as well as St. Paul. In 1828 Coleridge gave "...the
true answer to the objection that I confound the Holy Spirit
with a holy spirit. I cannot confound what never had any
essential difference. There is but one holy spirit - and no
creature is holy but in consequence of his presence, as
Sanctitude et Sanctificator... And consequently in whatever
man, be it Plato, the evangelizing Philosopher, or John, the
philosophic Evangelist, the Light of Truth appears, there must
the Life of the Word be an indwelling presence." 12/ The
common denominator among all peoples was the intuitive Reason by which the light of truth and the life of the Word became an indwelling presence. If anyone used the "word, Reason... (as Ideas, or the source of Ideas) ... and if his Ideas are more than high words, or vague fancies, the creatures of a drowsy Eye, half sight half dream; there can be no dispute between us. He expresses in Platonic Language the same convictions which the Spiritual Christian conveys in the language of John and Paul. He must know, that Reason in this unusual sense is not, and cannot be, a merely speculative or intellective faculty..." 13/

With his idea of Reason Coleridge approached the doctrine of Redemption in the same manner in which he approached the doctrine of sin. They were both ideas apprehended immediately in the revelation made in Reason. His conviction that the ideas of Christianity were found in a not fully developed form in the philosophers of Reason made Christianity the crown of revelation. It became for Coleridge the only "philosophy". In 1810 he wrote, "Had the Christians failed, a kind of Christianity would and must have prevailed. Compare Julian with even the Antonines - much more with Scipio or Augustus, Plotinus and Porphyry with Cicero or with Plato himself. Metaphysics ceased to be a science of speculation: It had already become an art of life, a discipline, a religion!" 14/ The Incarnation was anything but a \( \sigmaκενθαλον \); in his late years Coleridge said, "...if the New Testament were proved to
be a lie, he should not abate one jot of his faith in God's power and mercy through some manifestation of His being towards man, either in time past or future, or in the hidden depths where time and space are not". 15/ 

Upon this basis of a religious and philosophic certainty Coleridge built the doctrine of Redemption expounded in the *Aids to Reflection*. The doctrine of Redemption as stated there, with the exhortation that it must be tried to be known, has a relationship to Biblical history which must be described as more a matter of convenience than an essential. The truth of the doctrine of Redemption is in the first instance not delivered mediately by historical witnesses of an event, but is delivered immediately to all men who are given grace to blow away the mists from the distinction between Reason and Understanding. Although Coleridge kept referring his readers to the Gospel of John for the idea of Christianity in its purest form, it was to the Fourth Gospel as confirmative and not revelatory that the appeal was made. At least at the time of the *Aids to Reflection* in 1825 the revelation in Christ had no unique relation to Scripture. The Bible was the history of revelation, not revelation per se. So also in *Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit*, completed by 1827: "Christianity is fact no less than truth. It is spiritual, yet so as to be historical; and between these two poles there must likewise be a midpoint, in which the historical and spiritual meet. Christianity must have its history - a history of itself, and likewise the history of
its introduction, its spread, and its outward-becoming; and, as the midpoint above-mentioned, a portion of these facts must be miraculous, that is, phaenomena in nature that are beyond nature. Furthermore, the history of all historical nations must in some sense be its history; - in other words, all history must be providential, and this a providence, a preparation, and a looking forward to Christ."  

2. The Use of History.

The attitude of Coleridge toward revelation and history was the result of his emphasis on ideas, and it was fashioned directly in reaction to the attitude of his contemporaries. He complained, "...every age has, or imagines it has, its own circumstances which render past experience no longer applicable to the present case; that there will never be wanting answers, and explanations, and specious flatteries of hope to persuade a people and its government that the history of the past is inapplicable to their case. And no wonder, if we read history for the facts instead of reading it for the sake of the general principles, which are to the facts as the root and sap of a tree to its leaves."  

But in order that history may be read as something besides a collection of facts Coleridge recognized that some sort of crisis must ensue, whether religious or political. Men must "hunger and thirst" for principles. "It is with nations as with individuals. In tranquil moods and peaceable times we are quite practical.
Facts only and cool common sense are then in fashion. But let the winds of passion swell, and straitway men begin to generalize; to connect by remotest analogies; to express the most universal positions of reason in the most glowing figures of fancy; in short, to feel particular truths and mere facts, as poor, cold, narrow, and incommensurate with their feelings."

Within Coleridge's insistence that "all history must be providential, and this a providence, a preparation, and a looking forward to Christ," he found a special place for Biblical history, not by making a distinction between secular and sacred history, but by distinguishing between general and special history. If historical facts were interpreted by a spiritual principle (and, indeed, history was valuable only insofar as this was done) then "it would be inconsistent even with the name of believers not to recur with pre-eminent interest to events and revolutions, the records of which are as much distinguished from all other history by their especial claims to divine authority, as the facts themselves were from all other facts by especial manifestation of divine interference."

The glory of Biblical history was that it was written before the age of Locke and the Understanding, and had recorded symbolically the persons and events of an age when men used Reason to apprehend the mysteries of God. "...in nothing is Scriptural history more strongly contrasted with the histories of highest note in the present age, than its freedom from the hollowness of abstractions. While the latter present a
shadow-fight of things and quantities, the former gives us the history of men, and balances the important influences of individual minds with the previous state of the national morals and manners, in which, as constituting a specific susceptibility, it presents to us the true cause both of the influence itself, and of the weal or woe that were its consequents. How should it be otherwise? The histories and political economy of the present and preceding century partake in the general contagion of its mechanic philosophy, and are the product of an unenlivened generalizing understanding. In the Scriptures they are the living educts of the imagination; of that reconciling and mediatory power, which incorporating the reason in the images of the sense, and organizing (as it were) the flux of the senses by the permanence and self-circling energies of the reason, gives birth to a system of symbols, harmonious in themselves, and consubstantial with the truths of which they are the conductors. Hence, by a derivative, indeed, but not a divided, influence, and though in a secondary yet in more than a metaphorical sense, the Sacred Book is worthily entitled the Word of God. Hence too, its contents present to us the stream of time continuous as life and a symbol of eternity, inasmuch as the past and the future are virtually contained in the present. According therefore to our relative position on the banks of this stream the Sacred History becomes prophetic, the Sacred Prophecies historical, while the power and substance of both inhere in its laws, its promises, and its comminations. In
the Scriptures therefore both facts and persons must of necessity have a two-fold significance, a past and a future, a perpetual, a particular and a universal application. They must be at once portraits and ideals." 21/


The Bible is entitled to be called the Word of God not because it contains the words of God, but because it is symbolic history. Coleridge's use of things and events as symbolic is the important key to his concept of history and revelation. "A hunger-bitten and idea-less philosophy naturally produces a starveling and comfortless religion. It is among the miseries of the present age that it recognizes no medium between literal and metaphorical. Faith is either to be buried in the dead letter, or its name and honors usurped by a counterfeit product of the mechanical understanding, which in the blindness of self-complacency confounds symbols with allegories. Now an allegory is but a translation of abstract notions into a picture-language, which is itself nothing by an abstraction from objects of the senses; the principal being more worthless even than its phantom proxy, both alike unsubstantial, and the former shapeless to boot. On the other hand a symbol (οὐδὲν ἀληθεῖς τὸν τὰς θεοτοκίας) is characterized by a translucence of the special in the individual, or of the general in the special, or of the universal in the general; above all by the translucence of the eternal through and in the temporal. It always partakes of the reality which
it renders intelligible; and while it enunciates the whole, abides itself as a living part in that unity of which it is the representative." 22/

The meaning of a symbol for Coleridge is related to the Platonic doctrine of ideas in which the visible world is significant as a copy of the invisible realities which lie behind it. The eternal ideas are embodied and manifested in the sensual world, or, in Coleridge's language, noumena is manifest in phenomena. By virtue of this the thing or event which is symbolic in the world of phenomena partakes of the reality which it signifies. But Coleridge was not interested in claiming any pure Platonic authority for his understanding of symbolism. He urged that the meaning which he gave to a symbol was precisely that of St. John; it was his authority he claimed. 23/

But, as with most of his ideas, Coleridge had evolved his concept of the symbolic character of things and events long before he began to take the Fourth Gospel itself as the dividing line between life and death. In an early poem, while still within the bounds of Pantheism, he had written:

For what is freedom, but the unfettered use
Of all the powers which God for use had given?
But chiefly this, him first, him last, to view
Through meaner powers and secondary things
Effulgent, as through clouds that veil his blaze.
For all that meets the bodily sense I deem Symbolical, one mighty alphabet
For infant minds; and we in this low world
Placed with our backs to bright reality,
That we may learn with young unwounded ken
The substance from its shadow. Infinite Love,
Whose latence is the plenitude of all,
Thou with retracted beams, and self-eclipse
Veiling, revealest thine eternal Sun. 24/
When Coleridge accepted the truth of the Johannine Redempton in Christ he still insisted on the universal application of the symbolic as an immediate apprehension of Reason in both history and nature. Coleridge's conception of the indwelling Reason necessary for the discovery of "the substance from the shadow" permitted his thought to be transferred to St. John without a gaping rupture. St. John did not separate the symbolic interpretation from the faith. In a note of 1828 Coleridge wrote, "Christ has been revealed in his identity with the Logos, i.e. as the substantial personal Reason in whom Life is - the universal communicative Reason who lighteth every man, and therein constitutes the proper Humanity. Christ is the True, is the Truth. If then Christ be Truth, self-subsistent tho' (and herein, Nota bene, consists the fundamental difference of the Gospel faith from Spinoism) not self-originant; living, (i.e. no accident, property or faculty, having its ground in another) and yet universal - then whatever is truth, (as distinguished from the mere facts or phenomena, which it manifests itself) must be Christ. What Postscript or Supplement can be imagined to this Revelation? What other can Men or Angels receive? It is a continuous, ever unfolding Revelation, which having once had its reality established as history and historic Fact, must for all future time have its manifestation and individual growths inwardly by communion, of the Spirit, or outwardly by the sight of Providence, whether in the Natural World symbolically, or in the moral world by evidence..."
of Fulfillment. Briefly, if Christ be Truth, whatever is known as true, must be of Christ." 25/

In his idea of a symbol apprehended by Reason Coleridge united the moral world of the self and the natural world of things and events, the eternal and the temporal. "Yet if Christianity is to be the religion of the world, if Christ be that Logos or Word that was in the beginning, by whom all things became; if it was the same Christ who said, Let there be light; who in and by the creation commenced that great redemptive process, the history of life which begins in its detachment from nature, and is to end in its union with God;—if this be true, so true must it be that the book of nature and the book of revelation, with the whole history of man as the intermediate link, must be the integral and coherent parts of one great work: and the conclusion is, that a scheme of the Christian faith which does not arise out of, and shoot its beams downward into, the scheme of nature, but stands aloof as an insulated afterthought, must be false or distorted in all its particulars." 26/

The phenomenal world of things and events, the "scheme of nature", does not of itself reveal. It is not symbolic. In the early poem "all that meets the bodily sense" was a "veil", a "shadow" without the use of the God-given powers, and in this position Coleridge became more firmly implanted. The power and organ of interpretation which could pierce the veil of phenomena was Reason. Until men realized the distinction between Reason and Understanding and thereby utilized intuitive Reason, eternal reality was veiled by phenomena, not manifested. Coleridge had gone on to complain in the same early poem:
But some there are who deem themselves most free
When they within this gross and visible sphere
Chain down the winged thought, scoffing ascent,
Proud in their meanness; and themselves they cheat
With noisy emptiness of learned phrase,

Untenanting creation of its God. 27/

Hence the seeds of Coleridge's position that the fact must
be interpreted by the idea, and not the idea by the fact, were
sown early in his life. An idol of his early years, Spinoza, had
himself written: "The truth of a historical narrative, however
assured, cannot give us the knowledge nor consequently the love of
God, for love of God springs from knowledge of him, and knowledge
of him should be derived from general ideas, in themselves certain
and known..." 28/ A symbol for Coleridge, whether in history
or nature, was dependent upon the application of Reason. J.H. Green
purported to speak in the words of Coleridge in his Spiritual
Philosophy when he wrote, "Facts of history are exponents or
symbols of a supra-natural or spiritual order of the universe
when interpreted by Ideas. Facts appealed to must be actual
occurrences, but they must be regarded as exponents of higher
truths which have spiritual evidence. We cannot attain to Ideas
by means of the fact, but we assure ourselves of the significance
of the Fact by the possession of the Idea. This must be if
facts are to be regarded as truths of Religion." 29/ It is
an adequate representation of Coleridge's position. The significance
of the fact is dependent upon prior possession of the idea.
History is symbolic, but only when interpreted by an existing
philosophic principle of interpretation. Biblical history is symbolic only when interpreted through Reason. Unless Scripture is read by an individual in whom Reason is already present it is nothing more than a "sundial read by moonlight". "Historical Facts are objects of Belief - which is a function of the Understanding." 30/ But when Reason was applied to history, historical facts became ideas and as such objects of faith. History became symbolic. This meant that an historical fact interpreted as a symbol by Reason confronts the interpreter with spiritual reality itself. Yet, Coleridge insisted, in a note, that because facts attain significance only by prior possession of the idea, the symbolic significance did not thereby cease to partake of the historical fact as well as of the idea. "...I do not recollect, in any work of an acknowledged Friend, a denial of the facts narrated by the Evangelists, as having really taken place in the same sense as any other facts of history. If they were symbols of spiritual acts and processes, as Fox and Penn contended, they must have been or happened; - else how could they be symbols?" 31/

The insistence of Coleridge that facts were significant only because of a previously existing principle of interpretation was another of his weapons in his feud with Paley. An intellectual assent given to the historical truth of a fact, or mere belief, made no one a Christian in itself. The truth in Christ had to be apprehended immediately so that it took possession of the whole man. Faith did not come through logic and facts presented to the Understanding, but by the intuitive Reason. The only evidence
which could be brought in behalf of faith was the nature of life itself, and because of this Coleridge never tired of saying that Christianity, itself a life, contained its evidence within itself. "Christianity is not a Theory, or a Speculation; but a Life; -- not a Philosophy of Life, but a Life and a living Process." 32/ "Make a man feel the want of it; rouse him, if you can, to the self-knowledge of his need of it; and you may safely trust it to its own Evidence." 33/ Paley was wrong as to the nature of religious belief: "...religious belief is an act, not of the understanding, but of the will. To become a believer, one must love the doctrine and feel in harmony with it, and not sit down coolly to inquire whether he should believe it or not." 34/

Coleridge wished to wean the faith from all external evidence, from its history as well as the marvellous contrivance of the spleen. In reference to Paley's use of miracles to prove the truth of Christianity, he wrote, "An able Vindication of the Miracles may prevent a man from becoming an Infidel - or it may puzzle an Infidel how the History of Christianity can be false; but it will not, cannot, make a man see and feel the truth of the Christian Religion - a truth, that comprehends the miracles themselves, and the conviction of which is one (and an indispensable) part of the evidence of their credibility." 35/ Having himself tried the Unitarian scheme of Christianity, Coleridge was ready to confess that his ideas must appear vague "to those whose Christianity, as matter of belief, is wholly external, and, like the objects of sense, common to all alike; - altogether historical,
From his own experience Coleridge concluded in the *Aids to Reflection* that "it was one of the great purposes of Christianity, and included in the process of our Redemption, to rouse and emancipate the soul from this debasing slavery to the outward senses." In *Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit* he asked that it be admitted "though but with the faith of a Seneca or an Antonine", that there is a Spirit which works within us in order that his ideas on the liberation of the outward senses might not appear vague. But he warned, "If you reject a priori all communion with the Holy Spirit, there is indeed a chasm between us, over which we cannot even make our voices intelligible to each other".

Coleridge remained steadfast in his attitude to Biblical history from the time of his rejection of Unitarianism onward. Scripture was anything but clear and simple. It was capable of an interpretation which was actually an undermining of Christianity. It would not do to proclaim the Bible as the religion of Protestants. However, the main consideration in his attitude to Biblical history was that religion on any foundation other than the immediate indwelling of the Spirit was not entitled to the name of religion. In 1810 Coleridge told Henry Crabb Robinson that it "is not advisable to ground the belief in Christianity on historical evidence."

In 1825 he wrote that it was his purpose to "wean an infant Faith from the *History* of the Revelation - its necessary and appropriate nourishment for a time - to the more nutritious Diet of the *Religion* itself." In 1829 he wrote that "it is
according to my feelings a meagre and comfortless sort of Christianity, the sole or even principal Pillar of which rests on the historical facts and written discourses." 41/


The only sort of communication from God to man to which Coleridge would be willing to apply the term "revelation" was that given the individual through the indwelling of the Spirit. All revelation for Coleridge was immediate; it could not be given mediately through history. History could, of course, as in the case of the Bible, or Boehme, or Luther, be a history of revelation which was given, but no more than that. All revelation was immediate and general, not mediate and special. Reason was "the light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world."

"...the first act of human Reason consisted in the receiv ing of a Revealed Law. By this process Man was taught to know ... that in Man there was a Light of Reason, ... the medium through which the supreme mind revealed itself to him, the Reason was the universal Principle of his Being, and the indispensable condition of his personality." 42/ Revelation came by Reason and not by the Understanding, which reflected and generalized on the objects of the sense. Evidence either for or against Christianity would always be brought "as long as the word Revelation is applied to any thing that can be bona fide given to the mind ab extra, through the senses of eye, ear or touch. Not all revelation is and must be ab intra; the external phaenomena can only awake, recall
evidence, but never reveal." 43/

Life since the beginning and in all lands had been a
school of revelation: "...the Creator of Man was likewise his
Parent and Instructor; ... he received his first human instruction,
the means and condition of his actual humanity ... in the School
of Revelation." 44/ However, revelation was given to man only
according to his capacity to apprehend it, a capacity determined
by the degree of self-knowledge attained and the resultant use of
Reason in distinction from Understanding. Revelation, as Reason,
was present to all men, but received only as men subjugated their
will and intelligence to the supreme will and intelligence. To
do this was an act of faith. Consequently, faith added to
knowledge. When men "have looked down steadfastly into the Law
of Liberty or Freedom in their own Souls (the Will and the
Conscience) they are capable of whatever God has chosen to reveal." 45/

Some men and races had excelled in this school, some had not.
The school demanded special qualities from its students. One
did not study in this school of revelation with the theoretic
intellect; it was not a school of mathematics where the truth of
equations could be demonstrated, nor was it a school of science in
which the evidence of effect could be used to determine the cause.
It was the school of life, of being, of immediate apprehension, with
no evidence for its conclusions but the conclusions themselves.
The Jewish race had been the best students. Personal revelation
had been a distinct privilege of the Hebrew faith, and Coleridge
asked, "What other nation or school ever combined the Unity, the
Personality and the omnipresence in their conception of God, as the Jewish did? God, as the "parent and instructor" of the human race, had brought them progressively higher and higher in His redemptive revelation since the creation, until, in the fullness of time, the Logos which had been dwelling in the hearts of men was made flesh in Christ in a human manifestation. Coleridge admitted of no such thing as a "natural theology".

Every truth had been revealed by the indwelling Spirit. There was no religion which did not rest on this revelation. If anyone spoke of "revealed religion" he was using a pleonasm. "I can never too often repeat, that revealed religion is a pleonasm. Religion is revelation, and revelation the only religion." Moreover, he was willing to admit that "every religion that teaches a first beginning of the human race supposes a revelation quasi ab extra, but then it is most safely represented as the historical condita sine qua non of the fitness of the man for the inward revelation ... as in order to walk we must be walked." Each religion, and all "learning", contains a degree of the truth, depending upon the capacity for receiving revelation. Its degree of truth is to be determined by its relative closeness to the Word made flesh, who apprehended fully and completely the revelation of God. Because of this the Bible is authoritative for belief even though it cannot properly be called revelatory.

In his Letters on the Inspiration of the Scriptures (Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit), Coleridge nowhere explicitly stated his ideas on revelation (the above quotations are all from
the notebooks and marginalia) but his plea for a "correct" idea of inspiration by distinguishing between inspiration and revelation rested on the assumption that all revelation was immediately given and intuitively apprehended. Revelation, or the idea of God and His will for men, could not be given intelligibly in words, since it was an idea. When we speak of inspiration in relation to the words of Scripture we must distinguish between the revealing Word and the inspiring Spirit. Printed words may indeed bear witness to inspiration of the Spirit and so be a record of the reception of revelation, but this can only be determined by their accordance with truths previously revealed and possessed by the reader. "In short whatever finds me, bears witness for itself that it has proceeded from a Holy Spirit, even from the same Spirit, which remaining in itself, yet regeneratest all other powers, and in all ages entering into holy souls maketh them friends of God, and prophets."42/

5. The "Objective Revelation".

Before Coleridge published the Aids to Reflection he had never taken seriously the position of those who rested their faith upon the Bible as the revealed words of God and thought of the Bible as a book of revelation differing from the revelation made to all men in Reason. It is very interesting that Coleridge reached a sort of crisis in his view of revelation and history after the Aids to Reflection were published, and apparently after the Letters on the Inspiration of the Scriptures had been composed.
A contributory factor to Coleridge's re-examination of his own ideas on revelation and history was his friendship with Edward Irving, who in his preoccupation with spiritual gifts and the millennium appealed to Scripture not merely as authoritative for the truths of an immediate revelation, but stood "flat-footed" on the words of Scripture in a literal rendering of its sentences as revealed truth. Such an attitude toward the Bible was precisely that against which Coleridge had inveighed, but, in his seriousness toward the Bible as authoritative for belief because it contained the history of the Incarnation, Coleridge began to examine its contents to see what could be made of the claims of Irving about spiritual gifts and the return of Christ. To his astonishment he found, even apart from the books of Daniel and Revelation, quite substantial belief in the coming of a kingdom which could not be described as wholly spiritual. So in 1827 he wrote that the temporal and literal interpretations of Old Testament prophecies often taken up by the New Testament writers nearly threw his scheme of faith overboard. He had absolutely no intuitive idea in which to incorporate the theme of a Messianic Napoleon which ran through Scripture. But "while I was reflecting on our Lord's Declaration respecting the Kingdom of God, the twofoldness of the Christian Dispensation, the perfect distinction of the two constituent parts in respect of the end proposed in each, emerged, as it were, from my perplexed thoughts, like the moon from a black cloud. - and with it the thorough conviction that however unequal in intrinsic worth and
dignity, each was the best possible ... and both equally necessary and both therefore equally worthy of the divine author. It is really delightful to remember, in what a different view all the passages etc., which had been as a thorny jungle to me, now appeared ... (I had come) to fear that the connection of the sublime and momentous Ideas of my Faith with the events and personages recorded in the Scriptures was an accident of coincidence." Coleridge was then able to talk about a "two-fold revelation," "objective" and "subjective". He had discovered "...the two-fold character of Christ, the two-fold constituency of the Revelation, the two-fold Kingdom, the two-foldness of each of the Sacraments, the two-fold character of the Scriptures, the two-foldness of the crucifixion of our Lord - these are the integral parts and materials of a one harmonious System, each part distinct and all interdependent." In the "twofoldness of the Christian Dispensation" Coleridge made room for the historical role of "Christendom". The temporal and earthly kingdom of God Coleridge resolved in the visible church. This gave a place in his theology for an historical revelation, a mediated revelation and for the church as the vehicle of the "objective revelation". His theology underwent no great change in emphasis, but he realized that while his own particular faith was dependent upon "subjective revelation", the faith of many who were able to use only their Understanding rested upon "objective revelation". In admitting an historical revelation into his theology, he provided an inn where the Christian
traveller could rest a night or two before continuing his journey. Such provision had long been demanded by Coleridge's steadfast refusal to condemn the smallest seed of faith as inadequate for salvation, as well as by his distinction between faith and belief. Also, such a provision did something, at least, to clear up the inherent difficulty in his argument in the *Aids to Reflection* and *Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit*. In the *Aids to Reflection* we can know the truth of Redemption in Christ only by trying it, but it is impossible to even try such a doctrine without the possibility of a revelation communicated to the Understanding through history; in *Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit* we are unable to know the truth of any statement in Scripture unless it coincides with a truth already possessed by us. But in an historical revelation Coleridge decided that we are bound to accept as articles of faith truths of which we may not have direct intuition, if there is sufficient authority to warrant admitting the articles as an immediate revelation made by God to men in the course of history and communicated to us through Scripture and the Creeds. These are not only authoritatively binding for dogmatic belief, but may be called an "outward revelation". The objective revelation consists of the unique Christian tenets. The objective or historical revelation is that "by which the whole Church is walled around and kept together (principium totalitatis et cohaesionis), and the subjective revelation, the light from the life (John 1:4), by which the individual believers, each according to the grace given, grow in faith. For the former, the Apostles Creed, in
its present form, is more than enough; for the latter, it might be truly said in the words of the fourth Gospel, that all the books which the world could contain, would not suffice to set forth explicitly that mystery in which all treasures of knowledge are hidden, reconduntur". 54/

Coleridge's theology now had a place for historical Christianity and for the printed word and administered sacraments as a means of grace, and it is no accident that on Christmas Day of 1827 he recorded that he had on that day participated in Holy Communion for the first time since his first year at Jesus College. 55/ The same year he had written in a letter, "...my faith has, I trust, become more duly proportioned to the objective and historical part of Christianity - to the Church Militant and to the Kingdom of Christ on earth, instead of dwelling with too exclusive a preference on the Subjective, Timeless, and individually Spiritual. Not that if my former opinions were stated to me now, I could find anything objectionable in the words; but the cast and tone of feeling was not right. And yet should I by God's Grace become fit to receive a clearer Light, a more compleat and satisfying insight, I shall still have reason to be grateful, that I had begun with St. John and St. Paul." 56/

6. A Symbolic Interpretation of Scripture.

Although Coleridge found a place for the historic form of Christianity within his theology (which he sometimes called "Christendom") it remained in his thinking "unequal in intrinsic
worth and dignity" when compared with the "subjective, Timeless, and individually spiritual", and it was still his judgment that it is a "meagre and comfortless sort of Christianity, the sole or even principal Pillar of which rests on the historical facts and discourses." He still believed it was his task to liberate Christianity from the historical chains into which Paley and the theology of evidence had cast it. In reference to the Magnum Opus he reminded J.H. Green in 1832 that "...the principle has ever been that Reason is subjective Revelation, Revelation objective Reason - and that our business is not to derive authority from the mythos of the Jews, and the first Christians (i.e. the O. and N. Testament) but give it to them - ... If I lose my faith in Reason, as the perpetual Revelation I lose my faith altogether. I must deduce the objective from the subjective Revelation or it is no longer a revelation, but a beastly fear and superstition." Coleridge explained in a note made after 1830 that his own personal nature contributed to his slight of institutional Christianity. "My position, insulated as it were, by all my habits both of study and of life, have drawn my attention too exclusively to the invisible church, to the communion of the individual with the Spirit of Truth, in short, to Christianity as a Spiritual Light and at the same time an indwelling Energy from above." 

In harmonizing the historic form of Christianity with its essential spirituality Coleridge had his concept of symbolism all prepared and ready for the job. "The lamb sacrificed from
before the foundation of the world - and that a Spiritual Truth
then first becomes a fact in time, when it is first revealed,
and the operative cause has been manifested in time (God mani­
fested in the flesh) - and consequently becomes an influence in
the minds of men as what hath been accomplished, and not only (as
with the Patriarchs) as a Promise - this, I presume, is the best
solution - if not the only way of harmonizing spiritual Christ­
ianity with the historical, John and Paul with Matthew, Mark and
Luke."

While the suffering of the "Man of sorrows" was a
necessary corollary of the Incarnation, it was but a symbol of the
Redemption which commenced with creation, a symbol of the spiritual
Cross and Passion, the Passio Dei γα και καικένσου. "As the
sacrament of the Eucharist is the epiphany for asmany as receive
it in faith, so the crucifixion, resurrection, and ascension of
Christ himself in the flesh, were the epiphanies, the sacramental
acts and phaenomena of the Deus patiens, the visible words of the
invisible Word that was in the beginning, symbols in time and
historic fact of the redemptive functions, passions, and procedures
of the Lamb crucified from the foundation of the world; - the
incarnation, cross, and passion, - in short, the whole life of
Christ in the flesh, dwelling a man among men, being essential
and substantive parts of the process, the total of which they
represented; and on this account proper symbols of the acts and
passions of the Christ dwelling in man, as the Spirit of truth,
and for as many as in faith have received him, in Seth and Abraham
no less effectually than in John and Paul! For this is the true
definition of a symbol, as distinguished from the thing, on the one hand, and from a mere metaphor, or conventional exponent of a thing, on the other." 62/

By deriving the significance of the cross from its symbolic nature in reflecting the eternal fiat of Redemption, Coleridge found a place for the cross in his theology. To a charge that he had lifted the cross out of history into the realm of idea, one could envisage Coleridge replying frankly, "Of course I have. If the cross is given great historical significance in a plan of Redemption you will find that men degrade the idea of God by all sorts of mechanical atonement explanations which assert the necessity of the vicarious suffering and death of a noble and righteous person. The Scriptural argumentum ad hominem will be taken literally instead of metaphorically." The traditional emphasis upon the cross as the reconciliation of God and man, together with the emphasis upon its necessity for the forgiveness of sin, had always been abhorrent to Coleridge. In 1834 he ascribed the ground of his Unitarianism to "a strong sense of the repugnancy of the doctrine of vicarious atonement to the moral being, and I thought nothing could counterbalance that. 'What care I,' I said, 'for the Platonisms of John, or the Rabbinisms of Paul? My conscience revolts!'" 63/ Coleridge never deemed the various atonement explanations any improvement upon the avowedly sensual religions of Greece or Rome if understood literally, and in his own conception of the cross as symbol found a place for it in his theology. It was the
identity of fact and idea, belonging both to time and eternity, yet attaining its true significance only as the inexpressible idea without a logic.

But Coleridge was misleading when he speaks in the same breath of the crucifixion and Resurrection. While Coleridge would have been happy enough to permit the cross, other than as the guarantee of a true Incarnation, to fall by the way, such was never the case with the Resurrection. In 1833 he wrote of "the essential indispensable Article, the denial of which extinguishes all claim to the name of Christian — viz, the fact of the Resurrection of Jesus." 64/

Many times Coleridge invoked the authority of St. Paul in declaring that it was unimportant (and for us even impossible) to know Christ "according to the flesh". While this declaration usually had reference to Paul's silence concerning the Virgin Birth it had much more significance than that. Since Coleridge rejected any sort of atonement doctrine which depended upon the vicarious humanity of God in Christ, and placed the emphasis on the Incarnation as itself the passio Dei and redemptive, the true humanity of Christ was important only insofar as it asserted a true Incarnation. In 1831 he wrote, "I am in this way like St. Paul, more than content not to know Christ himself ἀπ' αὐτοῦ. It is enough for me to know, that the Son of God became flesh, ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ ἐκ ναζαηθῆς, and more than this, it appears to me, was unknown to the Apostles, or, if known, not taught by them as appertaining to a saving faith in Christ." 65/ Because
of the very fact that the authors of the Gospels recorded in faith, and for faith, the act of God in Christ, it is impossible to recapture any adequate picture of the man Jesus. Yet it was important for salvation that Christ not be turned into some sort of tertium quid that never really became human. Donne asserted that Christ had "no original sin within to drive him", and Coleridge took issue. (There is no doubt that Donne and Coleridge meant something very different by the words "original sin", but it is characteristic of Coleridge's marginalia that he always accepts a challenge for disputation if he realizes that the connotations of a phrase place the author in opposition to himself, even though the two men may understand something very different by the given phrase or doctrine against which Coleridge writes). So he disputed with Donne: "How then is he said to have condemned sin in the flesh? Without guilt, without actual sin, assuredly he was; but and what can we mean by original sin relatively to the flesh, but that man is born with an animal life and a material organism that render him temptible to evil, and which tends to dispose the life of the will to contradict the light of the reason? Did St. Paul by ? ? ? mean a deceptive resemblance?" But in his conviction that Redemption could only come from an act of God Himself he saw the necessity of not dividing or severing the divinity of Christ from His humanity, "so that not the incarnate God, very God of very God, would have atoned for us on the cross, but the incarnating man; a heresy which either denies or reduces to an absurdity the whole doctrine
of redemption, that is, Christianity itself, which rests on the
two articles of faith; first, the necessity, and secondly, the
reality of a Redeemer - both articles alike incompatible with
redemption by a mere man." 67/

However, in Coleridge's symbolic view of the Incarnation
he came dangerously close to severing the humanity from the
divinity. The sensible, or phenomenal, body of Christ, Coleridge
deemed to be a symbol of that supersensible body in which salvation
had been effected. He found this view substantiated in John VI,
his Bible within the Bible. "The question is, what is meant in
Scripture, as in John VI, by Christ's body or flesh and blood.
Surely not the visible, tangible, accidental body, that is, a cycle
of images and sensations in the imagination of the beholders; but
his supersensual body, the noumenon of his human nature which was
united to his divine nature." 68/ The incarnate God in Christ
was the noumenon of which the visible body was a symbol. God in
the incarnation was not the Christ of the senses: "...Christ's
Body, as represented to the eye, was a Phaenomena - but the Body-
Noumenon, with which the Logos was united, so becoming incarnate,
was Human Nature - a mysterious thing, whose boundaries and laws
of individuation we know not; assuredly, as a Noumenon, it is not
bound to the conditions of Space..." 69/ God in Christ took
upon Himself human nature, not a phenomenal, sensual body. St.
John "had shadowed out the creation of all things by the Logos,
and the after union of the Logos with human nature, - that is,
with all men." 70/ When reading Robinson Coleridge commented,
"I don't know exactly how, it is, but so it is, that the same phrases which in the New Testament I read with awe and delight, yet introduced as they are in this paragraph and a thousand others of like kind in other writings, shock me with the grossness of the anthropomorphism. In the New Testament God assumes the Human Nature (νουμενον) - In paragraphs like these the author seems to turn God into man (εἰςνουμενον)." 71/ The fact of the Incarnation as an historical event had to be symbolically integrated with the idea which it manifested if it was to become accessible to faith and be assimilated into the believer's life as an indwelling energy.

In 1826 or 1827 Coleridge wrote, "I comprise and conclude the sum of my conviction in this one sentence. Revealed Religion (and I know of no religion not revealed) is in its highest contemplation the unity, that is, the identity or co-inherence, of Subjective and Objective." 72/ Again, about the same time, he wrote, "Now my fundamental Position is; Religion differs from Philosophy on the one hand, and from History on the other, by being both in one (= the identity of both, or the co-inherence of Philosophy in History, of History in Philosophy). All its truths are Facts; all its Facts eternal Truths. - And as my fundamental Position, such is my pervading Aim - viz. to give to the Truths of Religion the Life, Power, and Actuality of Historic Events, and to its historic facts the universality and evidence of philosophic Truths - to remove from them the imperfection of contingency and accidentality, and yet to retain the immanence of Will."
Now when you consider that the very contrary is the Plan adopted by Divines generally, that they have strived either to reduce Christianity to a System ... abstract Positions, and Deductions - ex.gr. the School - men and the (so-called) Systematic Divines in the second generation of the Reformers - or to convert the whole into a series of contingent actions and events under the common formula of, So it happened ... can you wonder, that the mass even of well-educated Readers find a difficulty in understanding (me) ..." \[73/74\]

It is rather easy for us to sympathize with both Coleridge and his readers, with Coleridge because he had many good things to say which needed to be said, with his readers because of the loftiness of some of his "spiritual ideas." He remained steadfast in his conviction of the essentially symbolic nature of the events connected with the Christian faith. In 1828 he wrote, "Religion is distinguished from Philosophy on the one hand, and from History on the other, by being both in one - all its Facts are intelligential Truth, all its Truths are Historical Facts - The two equally indispensable Factors of a Religion are Ideas and Facts manifesting ideas. Corollary - a Religion not revealed, or a Natural Religion, is a contradiction in terms." \[74/\]
And in 1833: "The Idea of the Trinity, the Fact of the Incarnation, and Redemption... The Fact and the Idea, always Idea and continually fact, are the Christian Faith - not articles of it, but the Truth, of which all the other Articles are but applications, manifestations, presentations...
Thesis  
Idea  

Antithesis  
Fact  

Mesothesis

The Idea in its perpetual transition into
Fact - the temporizing the Idea in the Fact,
the eternizing the Fact in the Idea - "  

The suspicions of Coleridge that the men of his time
would not understand his "spiritual philosophy", as well as his
own fears that his faith was not properly focused on the objective
revelation, led to quite a large effort in Biblical study. "I
begin to question much, whether the age can bear the whole truth
respecting the essential Spirituality of the Christian Faith, and
the necessity of keeping it constantly before our minds in the
interpretation of the historical Form. Now interpretation
requires that every historical Fact should be
symbolically integrated, and the critical point to be determined
is, how far the were delivered as thus integrated - and wherein the supplement in
completing consisted?" This explains rather well the purpose
of Coleridge in his attempts at Biblical criticism and interpretation.
The Scriptures were symbolically integrated when written, and if the
things and events recorded were to become the identity of fact and
idea for us, as they were for the writer, and which they must
become if we aspire to have a religion, it is necessary that an
attempt be made to recover the original . In his
idea of the symbolic, Coleridge attempted to bridge the chasm
between fact and idea, or at least to jump across the ditch left by
his revered Lessing."
CHAPTER IV

BIBLICAL INTERPRETATION AND CRITICISM.

1. The Superiority of the Fourth Gospel.

In the Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit Coleridge mentioned briefly that it was extremely important that the different writings which make up Scripture must be interpreted with due regard to the historical setting in which they were written, but said that "it forms no part of my present purpose to discuss the point historically, or to speculate on the formation of either Canon. Rather, such inquiries are altogether alien from the great object of my pursuits and studies, which is, to convince myself and others, that the Bible and Christianity are their own sufficient evidence." He was interested in separating the doctrines of inspiration and revelation, which had been identified and confounded, and did not believe it necessary to go into any of his views on Biblical interpretation and criticism. In fact, Coleridge has left record that because of his conviction of the spiritual truth of Christianity he was tempted to let his effort to unravel the original fall by the wayside. In 1827, when he was having difficulty interpreting the Synoptics, he wrote, "Why do I ever suffer myself even for a moment to forget, that respecting all of Christianity, in which I or any rightly informed Believers, have any spiritual, moral, or even rational interest, my conscience and my Reason are more than satisfied, and even my Understanding is convinced. When the Ideas rise up within me, as independent growths of my spirit, and I then turn to
the Epistles of Paul and John and to the Gospel of the latter, they seem a looking-glass to me in which I recognize the same truths, as the reflected Images of my Idea, - And when I begin with meditative Reading of these divine writings, then they become the objective completing and guaranteeing the reality of the subjective Truths in myself, - while then I possess these inestimable Writings, and see moreover that a more compact and architectural mass of history, and historical data respecting the first outward manifestation of the Word incarnate would have been injurious to the main constituents, the indispensable subjective revelation to each individual Believer, and have tended to warp the Soul from Faith and the proper objects of Faith. - ... why should I trouble myself with questions about the precise character, purpose and source of the supposed Matthew's, of Mark's, or even of the less difficult Gospel of Luke? The temptation not to trouble himself was resisted, however, and in the years from 1827 onward Coleridge made an exhaustive study of the Bible. Because his faith did not depend upon "evidences" Coleridge was able to undertake his Biblical study with a freedom of inquiry foreign to those who considered the Bible a dictionary of doctrine. Of a particular passage he could exclaim, "But why not consider this as a gloss introduced by the Editors... The authenticity of the Books would be no more compromised by such glosses than that of the Book before me by this Marginal Note of mine."

As guides for his critical study he had both Eichorn and Paulus, as well as Herder, Lessing, and Schleiermacher.
But they served him mostly by calling his attention to the problems. For his conclusions Coleridge depended upon his own keen literary sense, and his conclusions were sometimes in agreement and sometimes in disagreement with his guides. He had neither the materials nor the inclination to make a textual criticism of the Scriptures but felt his way along in a fashion comparable to the literary method of the later form critics, basing his judgment upon what he called "internal evidence".

In Scriptural interpretation Coleridge insisted that "it is a rule of infinite importance that the Scriptures always speak, not ad rem in seipsae, sed quoad hominem. It is a moral and religious, not a physical, revelation, and in order to render us good moral agents, not accurate natural speculators, to make us know ourselves and our relations to the present and future, not to make us knowing in nature without industry or intellectual excitation." 4/ Again, he observed, "Take any moral or religious book, and, instead of understanding each sentence according to the main purpose and intention, interpret every phrase in its literal sense as conveying, and designed to convey, a metaphysical verity, or historical fact:— what a strange medley of doctrines should we not educe? And yet this is the way in which we are constantly in the habit of treating the books of the New Testament." 5/

Especially in the instance of St. Paul was it imperative to recognize the "ad hominem" nature of his writing. Paul wrote in the language of his readers in order to attempt to rectify their
opinions. "Consequently, the premises of Paul, esp. in the
Ep. to Romans, must be taken as ad hominem - apparently granted,
not because they were true, but in order to deduce their falsehood." 6/
Coleridge noted that the Rabbinical attitude of Paul asserted
itself in his writing. He warned Irving that 'tho' we may rest
with unqualified confidence in the truth of St. Paul's Conclusions,
this is by no means universally the case with his Premises; these
being sometimes concessions, argumenta causa to his antagonists -
ex. gr. to the Rabbinical Doctors of his age." 7/ St. Paul, he
said, argued that the Rabbinical Doctors came to the wrong
conclusions from their premises. Because Paul used a "metaphysical
logic", Coleridge decided that he wrote particularly for the
dialectic understanding, and usually referred to him as the
"Apostle thro' the Understanding". 8/ In 1810, while he was still
having trouble interpreting Paul, he wrote that "to call St. Paul
a clear Reasoner, or luminous Logician, is raving Bigotry; yet
it does not follow, that he may not have been a deep Reasoner, an
accurate Logician ..." 9/ Not many years after this he did indeed
decide that Paul was a great master of Christian truth, and in
1833 he said, "I think St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans the most
profound work in existence..." 10/

However, St. Paul always came in second best to St. John.
St. John was the Apostle through the Reason. His was the
"Evangelium Ἐвангелио Ἑλληνικανά". 11/ In 1830 he said, "It is delight-
ful to think, that the beloved apostle was born Ἐπί Πλάτω. To
him was left the almost oracular utterance of the mysteries of
the Christian religion; while to St. Paul was committed the
task of explanation, defence, and assertion of all the doctrines,
and especially of those metaphysical ones touching the will and
grace; for which purpose his active mind, his learned education,
and his Greek logic, made him pre-eminently fit.12/ St. John
was "the beloved Disciple, who leaned on the Lord's bosom, the
Evangelist Ἡλικία, that is, according to the Spirit, the
inner and substantial truth of the Christian creed - John,
recording the Redeemer's own words, enunciates the fact itself."13/

Early in his life Coleridge had had difficulty in
interpreting Paul, but when he realized that Paul wrote for the
Understanding he wrote: "The coincidence substantively (of Paul)
with the ideas of John under so marked a diversity of Genius and
Color of Thought is one among the really weighty arguments in
support of the divine origin of the Revelation in Jesus. (But)
...our Defence-manufacturers and Evidence-wrights know it not."14/
But John, as the "Apostle of Reason", had a superior insight to that
of the "Apostle of the Understanding". In 1829 he noted, "As
Aristotle to Plato, so Paul to John. Paul's ideas were hidden
by the fertility of his understanding... One momentous point of the
superiority of John is his clear insight into the identity of the
Word and the universal Light, or the substantiality and personity
of Reason."15/

He described John's logic as oriental; it "consists
chiefly in position and parallel",16/ but his terminology was
"the language of the purest Greek Philosophy".17/ Coleridge
came to Christianity through the Gospel of St. John, and the Fourth Gospel remained his greatest authority. In the *Aids to Reflection* he agreed to rest his whole Christian thought on the answers to two questions, "Is the fourth Gospel authentic? And is the interpretation I have given, true or false?" ¹⁸/ In 1828 he made a note on Paulus: "What I said 20 years ago, I say now — Sept.1828 — This Philosophy (i.e. of the fourth Gospel) is true or false. If true why reject the faith in Christ grounded on it? If false, there can be no faith at all. Jesus must have been an enthusiast and his Disciples Dupes." ¹⁹/

Even with all of his statements about the impossibility of "outward evidence" in Christianity, Coleridge was much tempted to permit the one "evidence" of the Gospel of St. John. At the time he was writing the *Aids to Reflection* Coleridge confessed, "It would inflict a sharper pang than the loss of any other portion of outward Evidence, on my mind, were I compelled to entertain a doubt of the authenticity of the 4th Gospel — or that it was not bona fide, with the possible exception of the latter half of the last chapter, written by the beloved Disciple and not only like Matthew, according to him..." ²⁰/ In 1830 he said, "Were there no other evidence of the Christian Faith, the Gospel according to St. John would suffice for every receptive and well-disposed Mind." ²¹/ In 1827 Coleridge had written before beginning a thorough study of John, "I have for a long time been of the opinion, that the only formidable attack on the historic objectivity of the Christian Revelation, which can be imagined, would be a plausible Disproof of the Authenticity of the Gospel according to St. John. I thank
God that I have read nothing and that nothing has come across my own thoughts, which gives me the least ground for apprehension... And if I were a Paleyan, and rested my faith on the so-called Evidences, I cannot imagine a more welcome event than the removal of a rival Apostolic Testimony to St. John." When Coleridge finished his study of John's Gospel he thanked God for the internal evidence of its historic accuracy and its authenticity of authorship. "Let what will come of the remaining books, let my continued researches raise or lower them in my judgement, my faith moves onward in panoply... The Religion in and thro' Christ is here true in Idea, true in Practice, true in Fact. -

Son of God! thy Kingdom come! Son of Man! thy Kingdom come!"

(However, Coleridge hastened to add after the preceding note that his faith was not so exclusively attached to historical documents, even that of John, that it would fail if that gave way - but thought that it would be a cruel loss).

Coleridge found the coincidence of the fourth Gospel with the elder "logos philosophy" a great comfort and satisfaction. "The Harmony of John and Paul is a source of unspeakable delight and confirmation to my mind - and the perfect consonance of the Apollian Gnosis with both is a great satisfaction." Coleridge accepted readily the thesis that John and Philo used the term in a comparable manner. "St. John used the term technically. Philo-Judaeus had so used it several years before the probable date of the composition of this Gospel; and it was commonly understood amongst the Jewish Rabbis at that time, and
afterwards, of the manifested God." 25/ Yet because John had used the term retrospectively in reference to Jesus of Nazareth, an historical person, and Philo had prospectively used the term in description of a speculative truth, there was a difference in their thought. It was the difference between the whole truth and a fragment of the truth. "...if it be asserted that John and Philo differ as A. and B., I deny the assertion utterly ... if they affirm that John and Philo differ as ... Athanasius and Arius, I neither deny nor admit but wait for the proof and till then withhold my assent./ But if they mean that John differs from Philo, as the Truth and nothing but the Truth from the same Truth in connection with sundry impertinences, and without the comple-
mental accessories - to this I fully agree..." 26/

Within the Gospel of St. John Coleridge found the one section of Scripture which appealed to him the most - the sixth chapter. This chapter became the one to which he appealed for authority if he felt any of his doctrines or interpretations to be in doubt. On it he founded his whole view of Christianity. In the Aids to Reflection, when he was defending himself against the charges of mysticism which he knew his literal interpretation of the Gospel of St. John would call forth, he appealed not merely to the Fourth Gospel as a whole but to the sixth chapter specifically. (Underlying his plea for the correctness of his interpretation may be seen his very real conviction that John had faithfully recorded the very words of Christ.) "...that men, who with a clear and cloudless assent receive the sixth chapter of
this Gospel as a faithful, nay, inspired record of an actual
discourse, should take offence at the repetition of words which
the Redeemer himself, in the perfect foreknowledge that they would
confirm the disbelieving, alienate the unsteadfast, and transcend
the present capacity even of his own Elect, had chosen as the
most appropriate; and which, after the most decisive proofs, that
they were misinterpreted by the greater number of his hearers, and
not understood by any, he nevertheless repeated with stronger
emphasis and without comment as the only appropriate symbols of
the great truth he was declaring, and to realize which
that in their own discourses these men should hang back from all
express reference to these words, as if they were afraid or
ashamed of them, though the earliest recorded ceremonies and
liturgical forms of the primitive Church are absolutely inexplicable,
except in connexion with this discourse, and with the mysterious
and spiritual, not allegorical and merely ethical, import of the
same; ... this I may, perhaps, understand; but this I am not able
to vindicate or excuse." 27 Earlier in the Aids to Reflection
while denying charges of an allegorical interpretation of Scripture,
"the fond humour of the mystic divines", he wrote, "If I say that
the flesh and blood (corpus noumenon) of the Incarnate Word are
power and life, I say likewise that this mysterious power and life
are verily and actually the flesh and blood of Christ. They are
the allegorizers, who turn the 6th chapter of the Gospel according
to St. John, - the hard saying, - who can hear it?... which even
THE TWELVE were not yet competent to understand farther than that
they were to be spiritually understood; and which the chief of
the Apostles was content to receive with an implicit and anti-
cipative faith!—they, I repeat, are the allegorizers who moralize
these hard sayings, these high words of mystery, into a hyper-
bolical metaphor per catachresin, which only means a belief of
the doctrine which Paul believed, an obedience to the law,
respecting which Paul was blameless, before the voice called him
on the road to Damascus!" 28/

Although Coleridge never set forth exactly how it was
that the sixth chapter of John came to be so very important to him,
certain things are evident. First of all, the "mechanical
theology" surrounding Coleridge made its appeal to miracles and
signs. In the sixth chapter of John the futility of miracles as
the road to faith is shown; belief in the miracles is subsequent
to belief in Christ. But more important is the manner in which
John set out the Incarnation as something which had to be
apprehended by the spirit, not by the flesh. Here Coleridge found
the essential spirituality of the Gospel. The flesh and blood of
Christ were interpreted symbolically as more than an object of the
senses. They were, as Coleridge said, noumena, not phenomena.
The phenomena represented to the eye, John made quite plain, was
not the supporting noumenon with which the Logos was united and
in which believers were to place their trust; the flesh was of
no avail, the Spirit gave life. There is little doubt that it
was this which made John VI so important to Coleridge.

In 1816 he asked if one of the purposes of John VI was
not "to establish the specific difference between Christ and all other delegates from Heaven, before and after him, that the faithful believe them, i.e. receive their doctrines as true and of divine authority, but they not only are to believe Christ, but to believe in Christ. He is at once the Teacher and the Doctrine, the Giver and the Gift ... the Feast and the Master of the Feast." 29/ In 1825 he wrote that he saw more clearly "how all the Truths of my mind conspire toward the view that has been vouchsafed me, of the VI\textsuperscript{th} Chapter of St. John!" and in his evangelical zeal cried, "Oh! shall it have been vouch­safed in vain for myself, like a Torch in the hand of the Blind!" 30/ In 1830 he remarked while making yet another study of John: "John VI. Of this most profound chapter, which contains the very essence, the formative Soul, of the Christian Faith, I seem to understand (as the reward of many years meditation) the whole and in all its parts..." 31/ In his inordinate love for the Gospel of John Coleridge always insisted, rather naively at times, that John had recorded the actual words of Christ himself, but the Synoptics were not to be trusted so readily.

2. The Synoptics.

The antipathy of Coleridge toward the Synoptics was strong in his early life, and although he became reconciled to their right to exist in the Sacred Canon in his later life he was not so sure about this even at the time the Aids to Reflection was published. To the end of his life his description of the Synoptics remained
"the Gospels \( \gamma \eta \gamma \alpha \nu \) \( \sigma \varepsilon \kappa \alpha \tau \) (that is, according to the flesh), in distinction from St. John's or the Gospel \( \kappa \gamma \tau \alpha \nu \) \( \pi \nu \delta \iota \iota \mu \iota \) (that is, according to the Spirit)." 32/ Along with this title bestowed upon the Synoptics went the connotations which would be expected to accompany it in Coleridge's mind. For the Christian faith the Synoptics were definitely inferior. When he wrote to his brother in 1827 that his faith "had become more duly proportioned to the objective and historical part of Christianity" and that he had found that "the three Gospels ... form a distinct yet inseparable integral part of the Christian Volume," he stated that "yet should I by God's Grace become fit to receive a clearer light, a more compleat and satisfying insight, I shall still have reason to be grateful, that I had begun with St. John and St. Paul." 33/ And in 1830 he advised a friend, "Study John and Paul - and when you have learned from them what Christ was, and Christianity is, then read Matthew, Mark and Luke to know, what the first Jewish converts thought, fancied and reported of him." 34/

As could be expected, the point at issue for Coleridge in the diversity between the Synoptics and John was not the differences of time, place, and event which have worried harmonists, but the difference in tone and feeling. In commenting on the Synoptics he rarely failed to include one or two remarks concerning their inferiority to John and Paul, but he was comparatively reticent about using any ink to describe the cause for this inferiority. On the basis of his strong objections to the traditional explanations of the atonement it is easy enough to see why he should have had a
strong preference for the Gospel of John, but it is difficult
to see why he should have regarded the atonement concepts
expounded in Paul as more acceptable than those set forth in
the Synoptics. The key to his differentiation between Paul and
the Synoptics seems to be found in an early note on Kant in which
he complained, "He (i.e. Kant) has without any necessity adopted
St. Paul's metaphors of vicarious Sacrifice, Ransom, etc., as
the real doctrine; whereas they are evident metaphors, because
the customs from which they were drawn were perpetually before
his eyes, and because the doctrine expressed by them is taught
without them in the evangelists." In other words, Paul
knowingly and intentionally wrote metaphorically, but the
synoptists wrote believing their adaptations of Old Testament
atonement explanations to be the literal truth of the matter.
The same "literary sense" which convinced him that Paul merely
adopted certain premises of his readers in order to make himself
understood, being a Greek to the Greeks and a Hebrew to the
Hebrews, also convinced him that the synoptists intended that they
should be understood literally.

Coleridge ultimately resolved some of his difficulty
with the Synoptics through the static manner in which they adapted
Old Testament prophecy to their purpose of displaying Jesus as the
predicted Messiah. This was a part of the "Jewish drapery" in
which the Gospel was enshrouded, the historical form in which the
Gospel was given. An idea of the necessity of the historic form
was the light which dawned on Coleridge in 1827, enabling him to
accept an "objective revelation", but before this he had recorded that "the temporal and thus literal" interpretation of Old Testament prophecy made by the synoptists nearly threw his scheme of faith overboard. However, he decided that while "...

John's Gospel was written not to prove that Jesus was indeed the Christ in order that men might believe, but as an exposition of the truth in Christ for those who already believed in him ... the object ... of the three first was to bear witness to the fulfilment of the Prophecy in the Life, Death, and Resurrection of Jesus", or, in other words, to prove by the Scripture that Jesus was the Christ. The Synoptics were written to prove that Jesus was the Messiah on the basis of His having fulfilled the prophecies ascribed to the Messiah; because of this, Coleridge felt himself "disposed to conjecture that our Lord's exposition of the Prophetic Passages related chiefly to the necessity according to the Scriptures of his Death and Crucifixion".

Coleridge could only think of prophecy as dynamic and progressive, and the manner in which the synoptists used prophecy contributed to his disillusionment. He emphasized that "the main doctrines of Christianity were in substance asserted by the nobler minds before the Apostolic Age - at all events, independent of the Apostolic Preaching and so Paul everywhere seems to suppose. The ? is - was Jesus the Christ? - This being proved or admitted, then what Christ was viz. the Logos, the Pleroma etc. - he reasons on, as truths admitted by all the enlightened as to the inmost spiritual sense of the Scriptures. - But alas! it has long been
the tendency of the age to reduce the Mission of our Lord to a Teaching, a Revelation and to distrust and draw off the attention from the truer and far more concerning view - that it was a doing, a series of redemptive acts, realizing the doctrines long anticipated by faith. According to Paul the Patriarchs held the same doctrinal faith as we - they as Promises, we as Fulfilments. He exclaimed, "What a beautiful sermon or essay might be written on the growth of prophecy! - from the germ, no bigger than a man's hand, in Genesis, till the column of cloud gathers size and height and substance, and assumes the shape of a perfect man..." Prophecy was to be judged as to whether or not it was of God in relation to its fulfilment. "...God is a holy God as well as an omniscient - and ... a holy God will not give any but conditional prophecies - On this ground their spiritual fulfilment does, and their, however, remote literal fulfilment, whenever the conditions shall have been complied with, will fully and triumphantly vindicate their character, as divine Prophecies." Prophetic pronouncements are capable of varying fulfilments. "It is the essence of all genuine Prophecy ... that their oracles, their several sentences and clauses, admit of, nay, provoke a manifold yea almost endless application, fulfilling themselves, as by a Protean metempsychosis of the same idea, in an endless succession and multiplication of facts and incidents; and are thus the living copula, the inward interpretations, and meaning of History." Coleridge asserted that the sacred prophets of the Old Testament regarded "every contemporary Person and Event, which was the object of Praise or
Congratulation, as typical of the Shiloh, in whom all the Promises were to be fulfilled and consummated. Generally, therefore, tho' not perhaps with a distinct foresight the Penmen themselves intended the expressions prophetically, yet without interfering with the immediate and historical sense. In this sense it is that I have asserted - that the Bible is all Prophecy, and no Prognostication." The phrases "the Lord spake unto" and "thus saith the Lord" placed before the pronouncement of certain prophetic utterances should not be interpreted to mean that the prophet claimed a sensibly audible sound in his ears, but that he had been given such a certain "deep, and instantaneous intuition of its truth and accordance with the divine Wisdom and Goodness" that he wished to emphasize that this was no truth founded upon the learning of man, but a revelation from God.

Having himself an acute sense of the historic and dynamic nature of prophecy, Coleridge wrestled with the application of prophecy made in the Synoptics in relation to Jesus as the Messiah. The applications appeared to him to be "static", made by writers who were themselves never detached from many of the carnal concepts of the same Judaism which rejected Jesus as the Christ, because it was not prepared for the essential spirituality of His message. Because, for instance, he thought it clear that the Apostles expected a quick second personal coming of Christ, perhaps within their own lifetime, he wrote, "Evidently ... on some points we have clearer views and a
deeper internal evidence of our Faith than the Disciples
themselves, sufficient to balance their stronger evidence
of sense. Surely, a motive for Love and Thankfulness - not
a ground of Objection." 45/


The two main problems, then, which perplexed Coleridge
in the Synoptics, were those concerning the atonement and the
second coming of Christ. In the Aids to Réflexion he had
written on the principle of interpreting Scripture: "To
retain the literal sense, wherever the harmony of Scripture
permits, and reason does not forbid, is ever the honester, and,
nine times in ten, the more rational and pregnant interpretation.
The contrary plan is an easy and approved way of getting rid of
a difficulty; but nine times in ten a bad way of solving it." 46/

Coleridge tried his best to read his Bible in the literal
manner he suggested in relation to both the atonement and the
temporal Kingdom of the Messiah. He must, in fact, have tried
to read it in the very same way that his millenarian friend
Edward Irving read it, as leaflets dropped from heaven in which
there was no distinction made between different books nor
allowance made for the historical milieu of the writer or his
style of expression. A most interesting crisis in the
relationship of Coleridge's ideas on spiritual Christianity to
Scripture and Scriptural interpretation came about through his
friendship with Edward Irving, founder of the Irvingites, or, as
they preferred] to be called, the Catholic Apostolic Church. The sect was founded by Irving as a result of his expulsion from the Church of Scotland for asserting in a clumsy fashion the view of his master Coleridge, that if the Incarnation had any meaning at all it must mean that Christ was born into the humanity which we experience around us, a humanity in which the universal conditions of sin prevail. The relationship of Coleridge and Irving has not been investigated by the biographers of Coleridge, but, because of its importance in the lives of both, it has not deserved such obscurity.

Apparently, Coleridge first met Irving in 1823. He reported in July of that year, "...I was driven in and back by Mr. Gillman to hear the present idol of the world of fashion, the Rev. Mr. Irving, the super-Ciceronian, ultra-Demosthenic pulpiteer of the Scotch Chapel in Cross Street, Hatton Garden..." Again, in the same month, he wrote that Irving was "...certainly the greatest orator I ever heard ... a man of great simplicity, of overflowing affections, and enthusiastically in earnest..." As late as 1827 Coleridge found himself able to call Edward Irving a second "Luther", which was as great a compliment as it was possible for Coleridge to give. Yet the apocalyptic element had already entered the thought of Irving in 1826 to the extent that Henry Crabb Robinson had recorded in his diary that Irving had said in a sermon that the millennium would come in less than 40 years.

The cardinal tenets of Irving were the millennial
expectation, for which he found a basis mainly in Daniel and the Apocalypse, but also in the Synoptics and Epistles, and secondly the exercise of the apostolic spiritual gifts, directions concerning the cessation of which he could find nowhere recorded in Scripture. The attitude of Irving toward Scripture as a dictionary of revelation was, of course, completely foreign to the thinking of Coleridge, yet, after Coleridge had heard Irving preach and the two men had had some private conversations, Coleridge remarked that they both supported the same doctrine, the internal evidence of Christianity. To whatever lengths Irving went to convince Coleridge that he believed that Christianity had its evidence in itself, the fact was that Irving found the great "evidence" in a verbal and definitive revelation of dogma. But, on a point fundamental to the thought of Coleridge, Irving was prepared to go further than Coleridge himself, namely, the indwelling of the Spirit. Irving has been called a "mystic in fervent action" and the emphasis of Irving on the presence of the immanent God, together with his splendid oratorical ability, must have seemed especially promising to Coleridge. Irving had the genuine enthusiasm which Coleridge felt the churches lacked, and he ingratiated himself with Coleridge as an eager listener to his talk, assuming the attitude of a pupil sitting at the feet of Gamaliel.

In 1825 Irving published For Missionaries after the Apostolical School, a treatise designed to prove that the
spiritual gifts promised to the Apostles were still available to Christians. In 1827 he published a translation of *The Coming of Messiah in Glory and Majesty* by Emmanuel Lacunza, a converted Jew who used the pseudonym of Juan Josafat Ben-Ezra, and who supported the millennial scheme which Irving loved. In 1828 Irving published his own *Sermons, Lectures, and Occasional Discourses*. Irving presented the work of 1825 to "his dear friend and kind Instructor Samuel Taylor Coleridge". It was also dedicated to Coleridge, who had been "more profitable to my faith in orthodox doctrine, to my spiritual understanding of the Word of God, and to my right conception of the Christian Church, than any or all of the men with whom I have entertained friendship and conversation". The *Sermons, Lectures, and Occasional Discourses* of 1828 were presented to Coleridge as "my sage Counsellor and most honoured Friend". Coleridge indeed tried to "counsel" Irving. But Irving had a passage from Scripture ready to confront and answer every problem; his "counsellor" seems to have afforded Irving little more than undigested sermon material.

Robinson has recounted in his diary under the date of June 16, 1825, "He (i.e. Coleridge) talked on several hours without intermission. His subject the ever-recurring one of religion, but so blended with mythology, metaphysics, and psychology, that it required great attention sometimes to find the religious element. I observed that when Coleridge quoted Scripture or used well-known religious phrases, Irving was
constant in his exclamations of delight, but that he was silent at other times." Irving seems to have used his relationship with Coleridge more for the purpose of prestige than anything else. Nevertheless, Irving managed to gain the confidence of Coleridge to the extent that Coleridge attempted to read the Scriptures as Irving read them, until "a dearth and a dryness" came upon his spirit and he could do so no longer. In a note on Lacunza he wrote, "From motives of prudence - no selfish prudence either, but from the fear of giving offence to the weak in faith - I tried ... a plan of negative falsehood, concealing my doubts and my no doubts, but a dearth and a dryness came upon my spirit - difficulties, objections, scruples started up in every page almost of the Scriptures, even the most unsuspected - all of which vanished or sank into insignificance, as soon as I had liberated my mind from the thraldom of fear and again read my Bible in the breezy open air and sunshine of my nature: I no longer walked as through a juggle, with wicked whispers of unbelief haunting me. With Freedom came Love; and with Love and Freedom came Faith." But even after his liberation from the "letter" of Scripture he wrote in 1827, "...the dread of prejudicing the minds of men against my views of the material and moral (phenomenal and noumenal, and again inorganic and organic, and again irrational and rational) Worlds as one subject comprehended in one scheme of Redemption - and of particular Life beginning with detachment from Nature and to end in union with God - my view of Nature as the Ens non vere ens,
the opposite of God, as the Spirit of Chaos, but made Nature
by the Word (\(s^\prime \omega^\prime\) throu' the superinduction of a tendency
to supersede itself - the dread arising from my strong sense
of the vital importance of these views to the right under­
standing of, yea; to the right Faith in, the Gospel Dispensation -
is restraining me from publishing my convictions respecting the
three first Gospels, the 2nd Ch. of the Acts, the three Pastoral
Epistles, and the Book of Daniel and of the Revelation - and
generally of the true nature of Inspiration." 56/ But it was
through Irving that Coleridge was led to discover that an
eschatalogical hope was a most important element in Scripture; in
Coleridge, Irving found support for his "heresy" of the "sinful­
ness of Christ", an appropriation, in a schoolboyish way, of
Coleridge's idea of the Incarnation.

The seriousness with which Coleridge considered the
Scriptures binding for Christian belief is seen in his reaction
and struggle with the eschatology which he found through their
close perusal following his acquaintance with Irving. He wished to
find a complete refutation of Irving, but he found instead a
Messianic hope not incompatible with the view of Irving. It was,
however, incompatible with his own idea of the spiritual
Redemption offered in the Gospel. He wrote in a marginal note
on Irving, "(cutting all connections with Daniel and the
Apocalypse) I am inclined to think in the main with him and
Lacunza respecting the Second Coming of our Lord". 57/
In a
later note dated 12th April, 1827, he wrote, "Now so far in all
the deep and concerning points which Mr. Irving has most ably
maintained against the current dogmatics of both Churches, his
own and ours, in all the great moments of his warfare, I am his
fellow combatant and prepared to fight under his banner. Up to
this time he and I are one. Shall we differ then respecting
our Lord's Kingly office? Scarcely I trust. - Or of Christ's
2nd coming to possess his Kingdom? I have no foreboding of
dissension on this either. It is the personal coming, to the
coming of Jesus, and the erection of an earthly monarchy, an
imperial Theocracy under Jesus as the visible head and sovereign,
that my fear points. Fears that I shall find myself called on
to withstand him to attack his positions, and despoil him of
his Faith? No! No! No! But that I might not be able to
partake of it!... Daniel and the Apocalypse shall not part us."

A month later he wrote, "Finally, my judgement at this present,
17 May 1827, is that I can receive all the essential parts of
Lacunza's Belief, after I have removed every supposition grounded
on the misinterpreted (of, which I greatly doubt, canonical)
Books...Daniel and the Apocalypse. And high time it is, that
a clear Exposition should be given of the Second Coming of our
Lord and the Days of the Kingdom, as grounded wholly in the
prophets, evangelists, and the Epistles of Paul and Peter - and
the compatibility of the Result with Right Reason, and its
positive consonance with the most legitimate Interpretation of
existing Nature, physical and Moral, vindicated..."
reached as to what Christ Himself said about the coming of the Kingdom, it was clear how the Apostles had understood Him. Since the Evangelists had expressly adapted the Old Testament prophecies which had reference to the Messiah who would rule the state of Israel in Righteousness to the personal return of Christ to the earth it was a most serious matter that Christians study these passages. "Either", he wrote in June, 1827, "the coming of the Messiah in glory preceded by a revolution scarcely less tremendous than that effected by the Deluge, is an article of faith; or the Prophets are merely Poets, and the Apostles and their converts a set of simpletons who mistake high-flying Odes for Divine Oracles." He stated that he did not know what Jesus meant in Mark 9:1 when He told His disciples that some would not taste of death before the kingdom of God came, but it was clear that His disciples and St. Paul understood Him literally. Again he wrote, "If any one contends that the kingdom of the Son of Man, and the re-descent of our Lord with his angels in the clouds, are to be interpreted spiritually, I have no objection; only you cannot pretend that this was the interpretation of the disciples. It may be the right, but it was not the Apostolic belief".

Further study persuaded Coleridge that the Apostolic expectation of a personal return of Christ in a short while after His ascension could not have been so widespread unless it had been founded upon the teaching of our Lord Himself. And if it was conceded that the accounts given in the Synoptics were fairly
accurate there seemed to be a change in the eschatological thought of Christ. While it could not be denied that in the early declarations of Christ, His hearers, even the Apostles, understood His words to mean a theocracy on earth, "if not an immediate restoration of the Davidical Kingdom, yet a kingdom which was not to be merely spiritual"; there seemed to be a difference toward the end of His great mission. "And," Coleridge continued, "supposing that Jesus had received clearer revelation as the hour of his conflict grew nearer, or had arrived at other conclusions by his own reflection, is there anything in such a change inconsistent with his character or degrading to his dignity? Is not the repugnance to such a supposition grounded in the habit of the Christian world since the Arian controversy of directing their thoughts so exclusively to the Son of God in his character of co-eternal Deity as to lose sight of the Son of Man, and to forget that the Son of Mary, in whom the word ἐποίησε (="tabernacled"), was still the Man, Jesus ... and that to imagine that our Lord in his ordinary application of the word, Ἰesus, as the Messiah, claimed or possessed the incommunicable attributes of an infinite and absolute Being, as omniscience, omnipresence and the like, is not only a bland contradiction to his own repeated declarations, but reduces the distinction, which the orthodox divines so constantly make in answer to the arguments of the Socinians - grounded on these texts, to utter no meaning." 63/

But although Coleridge was willing to concede the
appropriateness of solving the difficulties of the different senses in which Christ spoke of the coming of the kingdom by the above note, he himself preferred the interpretation that although Christ himself understood very well that the kingdom over which He would rule was not to be a theocracy, it was difficult for the Apostles to avoid misunderstanding the true nature of the kingdom because of the perverted Messianism which prevailed among the Jewish nation at the time of Christ. Thus in Luke 17: 20, 21, the kingdom is declared to be no subject of observation, since it is a state of the heart or Spirit, but in the latter part of Chapter 21 the coming of the Son of Man and the commencement of His kingdom is described by outward signs, and the disciples are commanded to observe them. Also, in Luke 21:32, Christ is purported to have told His disciples that their generation should not have passed away until the kingdom had come. Coleridge thought that "it is a difficult point; and the difficulties such, as (I frankly confess) I can see no other mode of accounting for but by attributing the ambiguity to the piecemeal manner in which the Evangelist acquired and picked up his materials, and to the fragmentary and imperfect character of the information ... if it come to the worst, there is an endless distance between the calamity of not believing in Redemption by the Word incarnate, and the unpleasantness of supposing Luke's Informants to have understood our Lord so imperfectly, that we cannot now ascertain what he said." To interpret the kingdom passages such as Luke 21:32 Coleridge
chose what he called "the most comfortable explanation", although he hastened to add that it could not be justified "by the letter"; this was that "the whole prophecy is addressed to the Disciples as to the outward and visible Church - and that the Kingdom of God means the establishment of Christianity as the acknowledged Religion of the Empire". This, in fact, was Coleridge's discovery of the "two-foldness" of Christianity mentioned in a later notebook, the same discovery which enabled him to write to his brother that his faith had become more duly proportioned to the place of the Synoptics in Scripture, and thus to historical Christianity, "to the Church Militant and to the Kingdom of Christ on earth." The Old Testament prophecies adapted in such a "carnal" way by the synoptists had been typical of the visible church, not of the spiritual and timeless Christianity, and their adaptation in historic form in the Synoptics was only justifiable on this basis. In December of 1827 Coleridge wrote of "the two-foldness of the Church, viz. the visible, having for its object the gradual extension of the opportunity, of the Light without as the indispensable outward condition of the inward irradiation, and as its proper fruits the innumerable multitude of the Called. Secondly, the spiritual Church, having the inward irradiation itself, the indwelling and the living light as its object, and the 'few chosen', the comparatively small but nevertheless great and glorious Company of the Elect, as the End. Now ... it is of the Church in the former sense, that the Events and principal Personages of the
Old Testament are typical..." 68/

When Coleridge had resolved in his own mind the significancen of in Christ's statements on the Kingdom, he did not hesitate to proclaim his sincere regret that the Apostles had partaken of the "carnal and traditional misconception of our Lord's Second Coming". "It seems to me," he wrote, "they had received no special revelation on this point, either from the Holy Ghost (if indeed in the common notion of revelation as direct information conveyed by words any such ever took place) or from our Lord previous to his ascension; but that what the Doctors of the Jewish Church had unanimously taught concerning the coming of the Messiah in Glory and Kingly Power, this they applied to Jesus - as a legitimate consequence of receiving him as the Messiah". 69/ He admitted, "It seems contrary to every sound principle of Interpretation to explain away the repeated assertions and exhortations of St. Paul respecting 'the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ', 'the day of our Lord J.C.', and the 'waiting' for the same, as meaning only the death of each individual. Yet on the other hand I find it difficult to discover any moral or spiritual duty or benefit derivable from the one which is not derived from the other. It certainly would not at all affect my conviction of the Truth in Christ..." 70/ Because the Apostles expected a quick second personal coming of the Messiah which did not materialize it is evident that on some points we have a clearer view than the Apostles. Coleridge
decided that the return of Christ in the flesh to establish an earthly kingdom was a Jewish garment which tended to hide the Gospel message that His kingdom was established on earth already in the hearts of the faithful and came finally and fully with the death of the individual.

He became convinced that the perverted Messianism of Israel, of which even the disciples of Christ had partaken, was not the main line of development in the religious thought in the Old Testament. With a bit of polemic exaggeration he said in 1830, "If the prophecies of the Old Testament are not rightly interpreted of Jesus our Christ, then there is no prediction whatever contained in it of that stupendous event - the rise and establishment of Christianity - in comparison with which all the preceding Jewish history is as nothing. With the exception of the book of Daniel, which the Jews themselves never classed among the prophecies, and an obscure text of Jeremiah, there is not a passage in all the Old Testament which favours the notion of a temporal Messiah. What moral object was there, for which such a Messiah should come? What could he have been but a sort of virtuous Sesostris or Buonaparte?"

To a note on Lacunza where he had written, "...the longer I think and the more I reflect on the subject, the more scriptural does the belief of Christ's reign on the Earth appear to me...", he appended the following note dated December 20th, 1827: "Since the above was written, the effect of Lacunza's Proofs has become weaker." He became very critical of
Irving. In 1830 after quoting John 14:3 where Christ said, "And when I go and prepare a place for you, I will come again and will take you to myself, that where I am you may be also", Coleridge wrote, "Compare the interpretation of this text given by the Millenarians, by my zealous but sadly mistaken friend, R.E.I. for instance, who look forward to a return of Jesus in the flesh, as an individual Man, a second more glorious David, with that received by the multitude of simple-hearted Christians, who on their Death-bed have cried, Come, Lord Jesus! receive me unto thyself! I can scarcely imagine a more forcible instance or illustration of the contrast of the spiritual and super-sensual with the mere historic." 73/

In a letter of 1827 he recounted how he was constrained to criticize Irving, "greatly against my inclinations, by a sense of duty, viz. a duty of friendship - The fact was Mr. Irving has been lately very much with Hartley Frere ... a pious and well meaning but gloomy and enthusiastic Calvinist, and quite swallowed up in the quicksands of conjectural prophecy - translating Ezekiel, Zachariah, Daniel and the Apocalypse into Journals and Gazettes for the year of our Lord 1827 - as the present year happens to be ... Mr. Irving ... mistook the vividness of the impression for the force of truth - and has been preaching immeasurable lengths of Sermons, to the serious detriment of his health; and the bewilderment of his Auditors, on the Millennium - and I know not what... I have not seen him for the last six weeks; but the last time, he was here, I
felt he was going wrong - and intreated him to beware, how standing as an Ambassador of Christ he interpolated his instructions by mere conjectures of his own fancy. I told him, that with the great activity and inventiveness of intellect, which I possessed in common with him, I should have been wrecked, had it not pleased the Almighty that it should meet with a Counter-check in my rooted aversion to the Arbitrary, and my solicitude to bring back all my positions to their Premises - to understand distinctly what I set off from. Now, Sir! (I continued) You assume the Apocalypse to contain a series of events in an historico-chronological A B C C Arrangement - not simply first, second, third and fourth - but A so many years, B so many - in short, not as the Prophets predicted but as the Annalist in the Books of Samuel, Kings, or Chronicles narrated - Nay, with an exactness not attempted even by the latter, but to be paralleled only in modern Chronicles. If so, then I ask you, from what date do you commence? and on what Authority do you fix it? I did not, however, press the point, conscious that I had never given that degree of attention to the Apocalypse which might have authorized (me) to deliver a settled opinion of its Contents..."  

The next year, 1828, Henry Crabb Robinson reported that Coleridge said he had silenced Irving by showing him how completely he had mistaken the sense of the revelation and prophecies, and that Irving had stayed away for over a year. This apparently refers to the incident related by Coleridge in the letter.
The notes of Coleridge on Irving's publications reveal a very critical, instead of complimentary, attitude after 1827. Irving, he said, had "a highly gifted but undisciplined and ideless mind." Because Irving did not understand his system, but yet repeated bits of it out of context, Coleridge commented, "I begin to fear that I ought to regret my intercourse with Mr. I. on his own account." Again he wrote, "I trust that I can affirm as sincerely as most men, that if only the Ventriloquist Truth makes her words audible, it is a matter of small anxiety to me whether the voice appears to proceed from my mouth or from that of another. But then it must be the whole Truth..." Throughout his marginal notes Coleridge remonstrated against the use of ideas which had come from him and had been used by Irving in a distorted manner, ideas of which Irving had not the slightest intuitive conviction. "Would to heaven," Coleridge wrote, "I could induce the high heart and vehement intellect of my friend, Edward Irving, to devote one quiet genial day of Spring or Autumn to the contemplation of God under the form of Absolute Identity..." Because of Irving's separation of Christ in his second personal coming from the work of His Holy Spirit in the believer's life by the sending of spiritual gifts, Coleridge said, "Mr. Irving's notion is tritheism - nay, rather in terms, tri-daemonism. His opinion about the sinfulness of the humanity of our Lord is absurd... Irving caught many things from me; but he would never attend to anything which he thought he could not use in
the Pulpit. I told him the certain consequence would be, that he would fall into grievous errors. Sometimes he has five or six pages together of the purest eloquence, and then an outbreak of almost madman's babble."  

He told Robinson, "I consider Irving as a man of great power, and I have an affection for him. He is an excellent man, but his brain has been turned by the shoutings of the mob. I think him mad, literally mad."  

However, in 1833 Coleridge was not so sarcastic toward Irving's "opinion about the sinfulness of the humanity of our Lord". Coleridge himself spoke of "Christ's having put on all innocent imperfections of Humanity", but the rather subtle and important meaning for the "sage Counsellor" in the phrase "innocent imperfections" could in the hands of the fumbling student Irving, who did not grasp Coleridge's idea of the Incarnation, become the cause for an indictment of heresy. So Coleridge defended him in 1833 saying that he could not understand the attitude of the Scotch Kirk toward Irving. Irving's expressions in regard to the body of Christ were ill judged, inconvenient, in bad taste, and perhaps false in terminology. But, nevertheless, Coleridge thought his apparent meaning was certainly orthodox. "Christ's body - as mere body, or rather carcass (for body is an associated word) - was no more capable of sin or righteousness than mine or yours - that his humanity had a capacity of sin, follows from its own essence. He was of like passions as we, and was
tempted. How could he be tempted, if he had no formal capacity of being seduced?" 32/

4. The Atonement.

Coleridge's difficulty in harmonizing the eschatology of Scripture with his own ideas concerning the essential spirituality of the Gospel was of slight duration and importance when compared with his lifelong difficulty with the atonement. After considering in all seriousness for many years the Biblical explanations of the atonement, the same moral objections which caused his estrangement from the Church of England in his younger days kept presenting the repugnancy of the doctrine of vicarious atonement to the moral being, 34/ and in a marginal note he wrote, "God forgive me, - or those who first set abroad this strange Æíôà €ìî øòúö, this debtor and creditor scheme of expounding the mystery of Redemption, or both! It is to this gross perversion of the sublime idea of the Redemption by the cross, that we must attribute the rejection of the doctrine of redemption by the Unitarian, and of the Gospel in toto by the more consequent Deist." 35/ He was never able to accept the atonement explanation literally and had to adopt the "contrary plan" of "getting rid of a difficulty". But even after relegating the atonement to metaphor, he could not rid himself of "difficulty", because he was unable to deceive himself into thinking that none of the Biblical writers had intended to be understood
literally. He did not overlook the fact that all the Biblical writers including John had asserted the necessity of the cross of Christ for Redemption nor was he ever deluded into believing that Paul and John meant no more by "Christ crucified" than he himself was willing to attach to the phrase. Coleridge's theology had never allowed any significant place to the cross, but had been an acquiescence in the cross as symbolic of the "lamb slain from the foundation of the world".

Coleridge was not blind to the major gap in his theology and to the end of his life worked and puzzled over a solution which would at once be true to his conviction that it would not do to attribute man's understanding of justice and forgiveness to an act of God, as well as his conviction that Scripture was authoritative for the faith. In 1826 he wrote, "And that God's mercy consisted in suffering men to be punished as monarchs are wedded, by Proxy. But tho' not a few, who like myself, cannot degrade the Divine Justice into a fatal appetite for the infliction of Pain, strive in vain to discover the possibility of a redemptive process, of an opus operans, in this, co-extensive with Human Nature under the conditions of Faith, and yet rendering Faith itself possible. And yet no less than this (viz. a redeeming Power, an atoning Energy...) John and Paul claim for our Lord's Cross and Passion! ... God grant an increase of Light thro' faith and love!" 36/ In 1829 he stated that "...the most striking example of Apostolic Reasoning, and that which requires the greatest effort of courage to interpret
aright, and reduce to its true value as arguments *causa pro concessis assumptu* - is the reasoning on the necessity of the Death of Christ, as a shedding of Blood - or the necessity of Christ's Death from the supposed sacrificial necessity of Blood. But if to evolve the truth out of this, to expound the true meaning and how far any part of it applies to born Christians, aloof from Judaism, requires *courage*, the practical vital importance of doing it supplies proportionately strong motives and makes the attempt an urgent duty."

Coleridge was not so certain in 1829 that the *ἐνδεικτικόν* in Paul's Epistle to the Romans could be taken figuratively. Although he still believed that it was a "great universal idea conveyed in the husk of Judaic analogies," he was not so positive that Paul meant it to be read in this way and decided he would have to search the rest of Paul's epistles to ascertain whether it should be taken figuratively or literally. Moreover, he complained in 1830, "The whole subject of Sacrifice is at present a *Terra incognita* to me. God, I doubt not, will give me Light, when it is needful for me." The predisposing idea with which Coleridge advocated that Scripture must be read if it was, to more than a "sun-dial read by moonlight" had not arisen. "The subject of Sacrifice is too protrusive, the sacrificial ordinances occupy too large a space, too prominent a position, in the Canonical Writings, to allow being passed by with an indifferent careless *nescio* - with a painless resignation to my darkness. But how shall I set about the
investigation? - Shall I begin with the first - and so proceed to the Mosaic - endeavouring in each to discover its ground, object, and symbolical meaning - and then seek after some character common to all? - I fear as to a successful result from this process. Hitherto, the Light has always begun with the Idea and increased by evolution out of the Idea. And this, alas, has not arisen, nor even dawned on my mind." 22/

In 1833 he still had his troubles: "I will - God vouchsafing grace and strength - bring my present conceptions of the redemption in especial relation to the Word incarnate, to Jesus Christ, to a strict test - namely, the 53rd Ch. of Isaiah. If these conceptions give, or are supported by, a fair interpretation of the successive verses of this and the preceding Chapter. Well! if not I must pray again and again and strive and strive for light. The main: is- Is my Idea of Redemption compatible with the doctrine of atonement by the sufferings of Jesus Christ? Does my System give a distinct causativeness, a direct efficiency, to "the stripes by which we are healed? - If not, I am prepared to declare it imperfect and by omission at least false - Much, I foresee, will depend on the right understanding of the Symbolic, as Real, and vice versa of a reality, that is nevertheless a symbol." 21/

Earlier in his life Coleridge had adopted the objective reconciliation in II Corinthians 5:19 as his view of the cause or "antecedent" of Redemption. Southey in his Life of Wesley criticized William Law's rejection of the atonement: "Law
alleges that St. Paul, when he speaks of Redemption, says, 

\textit{God was in Christ, reconciling the world to Himself.} Now, he adds, had the Almighty required an atonement, the converse of this proposition would have been the truth, and the phrase would have been \textit{reconciling Himself to the world.} Coleridge wrote in the margin, "And (be it Behmen's, be it W. Law's) is this a whimsy? I put the question earnestly, solemnly. I can condeive nothing more to the purpose, or more home, than this citation from Paul." 22/

The true significance, Coleridge said, of the "eternal fiat" of Redemption was AT-ONE-MENT. Irving, in his Sermons, Lectures, and Occasional Discourses, picked up this meaning from his Master and wrote, "(I)...who understand atonement in its only scriptural sense, of at-one-ment, or reconciliation between the Holy Creator and the unholy creature..." Coleridge commented, "It is strange, that I, the originator of this sense of atonement should have publicly ... re-canted it as a grave Pun; and that Mr. I. should have wedded himself to this cast-off Dalilah!" 22/

When Coleridge had discarded reconciliation as being a no more satisfactory explanation of an atonement than ransom or satisfaction or sacrifice he was left without a Biblical illustration upon which to rest. He was, however, able to return to John, who had in the idea of a new birth, or regeneration, set forth the mystery of the consequence of Redemption as far as it could be conveyed in words. Also, Coleridge
consoled himself with the knowledge that Redemption was a truth of Reason, and all attempts to render this mystery in atonement concepts aimed at pacifying the Understanding must ultimately fail. But it vexed him that it was impossible for him to feel completely in harmony with Scripture, and in the study of Isaiah 53 in 1833 Coleridge said he thought he saw "new light" on Christ's atonement, but, instead of elaborating on this "new light" vouchsafed him, he only referred back to an earlier note which we shall have to take as a final pronouncement. Coleridge proposed to solve his difficulty with the atonement by his idea of symbolism. "In the Aids to Reflection I was standing on the same ground with those, whose opinion I strove to rectify - and consequently, took the terms, sacrifice, vicarious sacrifice, Debt, Satisfaction, Atonement, etc. with ... the conceptions, which those, I was addressing, had formed, from the facts and usages of the World. To apply these, therefore, to the Deity, to the relation of the Father to the co-eternal Son ... without debasing the Idea of the Divine, I was constrained to interpret them per metaphoram. Far otherwise will it be if beginning from the ideas I move descen­sively, tracing the Light into the Darkness in its diminutions, refractions and turbid stains. Then these very terms would become Symbols, having the reality of their relation in the divine acts, of which they are the first appropriate representa­tives - and in this cause I should be among the first and most strenuous assentors of their literal truth, of their being the
proper expressions of the Ideas signified." 24/

This proposed solution is a desertion of Coleridge's assertion that a symbol "must have been or happened" 25/ or it would not be a symbol. He proposes to begin with the idea and never move into history at all, but only into other ideas expressed metaphorically. But it never amounted to more than a suggestion. Coleridge died the next year after a lifetime in which he regarded atonement explanations as figurative only.


(a) The Old Testament.

Coleridge's strong desire to be completely in harmony with Scripture led him to a thorough critical examination of the texts to see if any explanation of the atonement had to be accepted as kerygma, or if they were all a part of the drapery which surrounded and veiled the kerygma. Unable to reconcile the necessity of the cross to his thinking he reluctantly decided all explanations of its necessity belonged to the drapery. In a note on Irving he wrote rather scornfully (yet, also, one feels, a bit jealously), "I will not, the sense of truth will not permit me to, deny, that a Jew of the Apostolic Age could hardly fail to understand the sentences here cited (i.e. from the First Epistle of Peter) as asserting the doctrine of vicarious suffering and Sin by proxy; and this being the case, the presumption is that the Writer of this Epistle, likewise by birth and education a Jew, intended to be so understood... For
Mr. Irving then, the question is put at rest. Scripsit
Petrus; ergo, demonstratum est." 26/

The Epistle to the Hebrews, of course, was a great thorn in Coleridge's flesh. In a note in Eichhorn he wrote, "Singular!
that a work (i.e. Hebrews) written for the purpose of elevating
and spiritualizing the gross conceptions of the Jews should have
been (as yet it has been) the chief occasion and means of
literalizing and debasing those of the Christians!" 27/ In a
long note on Irving Coleridge summed up the manner in which the
Epistle to the Hebrews must be interpreted. It is worth quoting
in full because it is typical of how Coleridge thought all of
Scripture must be interpreted. His approach to the unveiling
of the kerygma is clearly enunciated. "There is," he wrote,
"perhaps no book in the whole New Testament which in so great a
degree as the Epist. to the Hebrews demands on the part of the
Commentator and Interpreter the union of sound Learning, sober
judgement, and that rare gift of imagination which enables the
possessor to think, feel, and reason in the form and character of
a distant Age under circumstances the most diverse from his own...
For instance - I select a passage from this Epistle, and I con-
sider 3 points - first, what is the particular truth, of which
the Writer endeavours to convince his intended Reader? secondly,
to what sort of Reader the Writing was specially addressed?
Thirdly, how, by what illustrations, by what manner of inferences
and deductions, the legitimacy of which was previously an
allowed and familiar principle in the Reader's mind, was he
most easily to be convinced? - Then I would take the same truth, and instead of Apollos reasoning with a Jew whose learning consisted almost exclusively in his acquaintance with the Laws and Institutes of Moses, the history of his own Nation, the Hymns, Oracles, and Aphorisms of its inspired Teachers, together with the comments of the Lawyers and the Traditions of the Doctors, in highest repute at the given period - I would suppose St. Paul in Arabia labouring to make the same truths intelligible and convincing to a Sheik or Nomad Chief in his Tent with his Camels, Flocks, and Sheep-dogs, basking on the sands before him, who had never seen a Temple, or led a victim to the Altar- Again, I would suppose the Apostle Thomas essaying to impress the same truth on the mind of a Brahmin who held the shedding of Blood in abhorrence, and placed the seat of Life exclusively in the Nervous System. Then I should enable myself to distinguish that which appertained to the substances from that which belonged to the Drapery. But on the other hand neither would I forget, that some Drapery the Truth, which is the substance, must have in all cases, and that to the Truths of an instituted Religion, which has an historic pole as well as an ideal or spiritual, and in which the Historic is as essential a constituent as the other, tho' it may be of subordinate dignity as being for the sake of the other; there must be an adherent Drapery, undetachable from the Substance; and that in the institution of the Christian Faith, and of the Church in Christ, the Hebrew History and the prior
Dispensation to the Hebrew People supplied the adherent Drapery." 28/

The opinions of Coleridge in his somewhat haphazard survey of the Biblical documents stand up remarkably well, especially when it is remembered that Biblical criticism as a special field of research was only in its infancy in Coleridge's time. But, even so, Coleridge felt that Biblical criticism was well enough established so that the notion of a verbal dictation or plenary inspiration of the Scriptures had, in fact, already been surrendered, implicitly if not explicitly. The question for his day was to define in what sense the Scriptures should, or could, be called the Word of God. This was his purpose in the Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit, although he avoided the historical questions related with interpreting the different Biblical documents. But in his notebooks he avowed that the use of Biblical criticism was necessary to determine the historical milieu in which the books were written, not merely so they could be interpreted correctly, but so they could be interpreted as the Word of God. In a tract, written by a member of the Church of England, Coleridge lamented, "Alas! but a previous step was wanting - viz. the calm and dauntless tho' humble attempt to ascertain what God's Word is; and on what grounds he receives the 57 Books bound up in one or two Volumes, and called the Bible as the Word of God or even as Words dictated by God. This is confessedly no self-evident Proposition - Nay, in the present day and since
Biblical Criticism has been raised into a distinct study, the most convinced and orthodox Inquirers, even those who retain the hypothesis of an especial inspiration of the sacred Pen men, confine this superhuman influence to the substance, and reject as not only untenable but as dangerous, the notion of a verbal dictation or infusion. If then the purpose and the truths intended to be conveyed are alone attributable to the Infallible Spirit, by what rules is our search to be directed? What are the canons of Interpretation? ... is it not evident, that no logical deductions can be drawn from this or that word or phrase in either? ... What is to be done? Plainly, this: From the whole of two Testaments draw forth all the passages, that are compatible and susceptible of being arranged in connection and dependency - and then seek from the Spirit of Truth that insight into the great scheme of Revelation which will enable the Man of Faith to determine what the words mean by a previous knowledge of what the writers must have meant. Every Book worthy of being read at all must be read in and by the same spirit, as that by which it was written. Who does not do this, reads a Dial by moonshine." 22/

I can only present briefly some of the conclusions reached by Coleridge in his attempts at Biblical criticism. The book of Genesis, and even its individual chapters, he said, "has the appearance of having been compiled out of several different documents." 100/ The second and third chapters of Genesis he considered to be an older document than the first chapter and
thought it was probably written in Egypt before the Exodus. At first he accepted the hypothesis that an editor in the time of Samuel or David had given the Pentateuch its present form as a Book, and thought that neither Moses nor a contemporary could possibly have been the author of a large part of it in its present form, as, for example, the first eleven or twelve chapters of Exodus. But because of his great love for the figure of Moses Coleridge came to believe in an essentially Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, saying that "...not only the component chapters, but the order and sequence were the work of Moses himself". Although there were undoubtedly editorial glosses, he emphasized that neither these glosses nor a late compilation of the documents detracted from the essential antiquity or genuineness of the documents themselves.

He regarded Adam and Eve as representing the first race of mankind, was inclined "to consider Noah a homo representativus," and also thought the names of Shem, Ham and Japhet had a "mythical air about them". But the tone and feeling of the story changed after the introduction of Abraham and then seemed to become historical. He decided that the sacrifice of Isaac, "unless I might consider the whole as taking place in a vision, and even so yet it is to be received as exemplary - is the most difficult passage in the sacred Scriptures. The moral difficulty is - what right had Abraham to conclude that it was God? The best solution, that I have found, is - that 1. it was the Faith, the unqualified Fealty
that is exemplary; and 2. Abraham's numerous prior
Experiences of intercourse with God, confirmed by the
Results. " But he also said elsewhere that the experience
of Abraham was not analogous to any shared with the ordinary
Christian. The division between responsible morality and
universal ethics, in which Abraham had adhered to the former
while yet not voiding the latter, was a unique experience in
religious history, not to be blithely toyed with, as exemplary
for the religious experience which lifts one out of the plane
of universal ethics and into the sphere of religious morality.

For many years Coleridge regarded the account of Creation
in the first chapter of Genesis as a Morning Hymn, to be
interpreted symbolically; that is, not as narration of
past facts, but as conveying a perpetual truth. But when he
came to accept it as a document written by Moses himself and
realized that "the first Chapter involves all the germinal
Ideas (to speak in the language of Philo) in the Word, as the
Pleroma or Sum and Copula of all the divine Ideas, the
in whom were begotten inclusively all the ...", he agreed to the account of creation in the first chapter of
Genesis as the literal (i.e. historic) truth which had been
revealed to Moses. But the second and third chapter, of "far
higher antiquity", having "the air of being translated into
words from graven stones", were evidently symbolical. So
also with Adam and Eve and the story of the Fall. It was not
to be interpreted literally, but as a true myth. "...if an
historical interpretation be any way practicable, it must still be as mythic history." 114/ Of Joshua, he wrote, "That Joshua ... alone led the children of the Expulsed from Egypt into Canaan is doubtless an instance of the typical character of all biblical history." 115/

Some rather odd inconsistences in Coleridge's view of the Pentateuch popped up after he had ascribed the authorship to Moses. He became convinced that only Moses, who was not merely a genius, but a genius by the condescension of God, could have written documents with the godly wisdom of the Pentateuch. It was Moses who had brought his people back to the faith in the I AM, or persoeity of God, when in Egypt they had been tempted to think of God as no more than a Divine Principle. 116/ Moreover, Moses upheld the unity of God; he abhorred idolatry; he proclaimed the reception of immediate and direct revelation; he was strong in morality. Coleridge thought Moses to be by far the greatest figure in the Old Testament and his love for Moses led him into interpretations hardly consistent with his other insights into the character of the "mosaic documents". For instance, he decided that the accounts of the ages of pre-diluvian man were literal and saw no sufficient reason against belief in the fact. He cited the following supports: "1. Moses so understood it. 2. the definiteness in the number of years assigned to each Individual. 3. instances of people in the last thousand years who have lived three times the ordinary life-span, thus nothing in
organic structure of Humans against it. 4. The unknown changes brought about by the Deluge, climates, soil, Atmosphere, etc. 5. the universal Tradition. 6. the absence of reasons for withholding belief from the sacred Historian." 117/

Coleridge was very impressed by the repetitious references to the crossing of the Red Sea in the Old Testament as a means of confirming and strengthening the faith of Israel. In Biblical study it was this fact which was important, not the miracle itself, which could with no loss of importance have been a natural occurrence. 118/ He affirmed that Esther and Ecclesiastes were probably the latest books of the Hebrew Canon. 119/ He thought that the first two chapters of Job gave an excellent opportunity of showing how fallacious a dictation theory of inspiration could be, 120/ and in the Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit used the book in this manner. 121/ He considered Job to be an Arab poem which had its importance in the fact that the personality of God was vividly impressed. 122/

The Psalms were deeply loved by Coleridge. He said they appealed to his inmost yearnings and necessities. 123/ In 1830 he wrote, "For a man in whom the moral sense had been duly developed, the Psalms alone would supply all the evidence of the truth of a revealed Religion, that is compatible with the nature of Faith - all that would not preclude it by rendering the unbelief impossible." 124/ Coleridge's suggestion for classifying the Psalms contained little novelty. He thought that the Psalms should be divided into four portions: "1. All
those positively by David. 2. All those perhaps by David. 3. Those with authors traditionally known. 4. Those of unknown authors." 125/

Coleridge was certain that the Book of Isaiah was not the work of one author and wrote, "Were proofs wanting, that the Chapters from the XLth are Isaian not Isaiah's, the frequent, introduction and repetitition and the elaborateness of the arguments against Idolatry, resting on its palpable absurdity, and extreme foolishness, rather than on its wickedness, and displaying it as an object of contempt and laughter rather than of abhorrence, would be sufficient evidence that these oracles were composed and delivered during the captivity and where Idolatry was the religion of the State and the natal religion of the People..." 126/

Daniel and Revelation were the most troublesome books of the Bible for Coleridge. They led astray his friend Irving into millennialism and almost Coleridge himself. Irving had grounded his millennial beliefs mainly on these two books and Coleridge decided that such thinking as was found in Daniel had greatly contributed to the Jewish misconception of the Messiah as a temporal ruler. "...woeful and verily judicial is the blindness of the Jews who degrade the patriarchal Desire of Nations into a Jewish Napoleon. And most unhappily even Christian Divines have been seduced by the spurious Daniel, and this too grossly misinterpreted, into favouring this gross and base superstition of the Jews." 127/ But Coleridge's slight
of Daniel was not popular, and he cried, "The state of the English Church is ... heavy upon me!- that Book of Daniel, which every learned Christian ought to have conspired and removed from the sacred Canon, and how large a majority would deny me bread, water, and fire for expressing a doubt." Coleridge did not believe Daniel to be the result of revelation given to its author, and therefore the book was not rightfully a part of the Canon. Since the Apostles were so reluctant to quote from Daniel and adapt its prophecies, it showed quite plainly that they knew Daniel did not stand on the same plane as the other prophets. He decided that Daniel was in the same class with the pseudonymous apocalyptic literature which invaded the Hebrew world when prophetic inspiration was thought to have come to an end, and that "the two lofty and insuperable Walls that prevent all progress of the Interpreting of Daniel and Apocalypse are first, their own deep-rooted prepossession by a false assumption that the Apocalyptic Vision contains a series of particular Predictions nowhere else to be found in the Scriptures, by the decyphering of which they expect to prognosticate; and secondly, their utter want of all poetic Genius, and all Eye, Taste and Tact for Poetry generally, with a total ignorance of the character and canons of Symbolic Poesy in species. Hence, they forget - if men can be said to forget what they had never learnt, that the Apocalypse is a Poem, and a Poem composed by a Hebrew Poet, after the peculiar type of Hebrew Poesy."
(b) The New Testament.

Coleridge accepted the prevalent view of his time on the priority of Luke in the formation of the Gospels. "...I regard it as certain that the Facts asserted and related by the Apostles in their character as Eye-witnesses, as Fulfilments of the Prophecies and consequently Proofs to the Jews that Jesus of Nazareth was the Messiah, were severally committed to writing by one or other of the converted Auditors - and I regard it as little less than certain that in the first instance the Apostles promulgated these facts in a Body - Peter probably being the spokesman of the Twelve. - (and I believe they had) received instruction from the Lord himself - as to the Facts which from the multitude and variety of Christ's Miracles, and other passages of his life from the Baptism of John to the Resurrection they should select, and which all and each were to insist on. The notes of these ... formed the first karygma. As soon as Churches were formed, the Sayings of our Lord, and especially his Parables, would be related by the Apostles and other Eye and Ear witnesses - sometimes with the occasions, sometimes without, as the occasion required or the memory of the Preachers served - and a collection of these invaluable notes we have preserved in Luke's Gospel." The karygma notes had first been edited by Luke, then as a Hebrew Gospel for the Jews of Palestine, then as a Gospel for the "ex-Palestine Jews" which became our Gospel according to Mark. The Gospel according to Matthew was based on the lost
Hebrew Gospel, our version consisting of a Greek version of the original Hebraic after the editing of Matthew. But he considered that there was yet an earlier document upon which both the Hebrew Gospels were based, and that this accounted for the similarity of Matthew and Mark. From Luke's account of the First Calling of the Apostles, he said that "...we need only turn to the corresponding passages in Matthew IV:18 and Mark I:16 to see at once, that Matthew and Mark (the compilers, I mean, of the Gospels so called) have followed the same document, and Luke another." But while there certainly appeared to be two, or at the most three, documents from which the Evangelists had drawn their material for their biographies, he scolded Schleiermacher for imagining that there were more. "If I am right (and I am persuaded, that I am) in my premise, that the first Discourses of the Apostles, whether held in the ordinary Synagogues or to assemblages of Jews and Jewish converts consisted mainly in the collation of Passages from the Old Testament which the Jewish Church had before the Birth of Christ agreed to interpret of the Messiah, with the gradual addition of other passages in which the Apostles themselves discovered this prophetic Bearing - the collation of these with the Acts and incidents of the Life of Christ, each with each, yet so that all converged and found a focal fulfilment in Jesus, Schleiermacher's theory of a multitude of detached unconnected Narratives must appear alike improbable and unnecessary. Indeed, the very notion of Jewish
or other Converts so shortly after the death of Christ undertak­ing each on his own impulse and each taking a different road, set pedestrian tours thro' Palestine for the purpose of collecting anecdotes of Christ, strikes me as so grossly arbitrary and improbable that I scarcely know which most to wonder at, (i.e. in a writer of Schl's Learning and Genius) the strangeness of the hypothesis itself, or the slightness of the grounds on which it is rested, — the occasional presence, to wit, and the conjectured omission, of apparent introductory sentences to the various supposed separate collections. Could no other account be given of those sentences of this kind that actually do exist in Luke's Gospel, it would be enough to reply — that such is the character of inartificial narration... But in the way, in which I believe the material of the three Gospels to have originated, it could not have been otherwise. On this supposition too, we can at once understand the tendency to increase, and the insertion or addition of Traditions grounded on Mystic Hymns, or suggested by other verses of the Prophets, or by Legends of other extraordinary men (i.e. Elijah's fast of 40 days). Hence would arise the necessity of revision and selection: and those would of course be preferred which the Writers declared to have heard from an Apostle or Apostolic Man. The one was according to Matthew, another according to Mark, the companion of St. Peter and supposed to have been himself one of the Seventy. This 'according' appears to me the same with the — in the Preface or Dedication of Luke. On this theory
then can be no reason of doubt that the third Gospel is 
authentic, in the proper sense of the word, i.e. revised by 
Luke - and of these Revisions, I doubt not, the first in time. --
But here it behoves us to remember, that the Revisers of our 
Matthew and Mark may, on the strongest grounds of internal 
evidence, be referred to a later date than Luke - they were 
not improbably revised by the Bishops of Jerusalem, or some 
other of the earliest Jewish Churches (το Καπετα Μαρθα) perhaps, 
by a Bishop of Alexandria-) and then we ought to take our 
Ignatius (if any parts be genuine), Justin Martyr, and above 
all Tertullian, in hand in order to form a correct notion, 
what sort of men these Bishops were - fervent, pious, and holy 
men, but neither Critics nor Philosophers, accustomed too to 
value the question of Fact by its bearings on Doctrine. The 
analogy of Faith was the Test, on which the primitive church 
relied - and compared with which Documents, Autographs, and 
the et cetera of Historical Research stood a small honour -
Lastly, this view, ws εν οικτι, is capable of suggesting 
the motives that impelled the Evangelist John to compose a 
Gospel κατα Πτεζων; not so much to correct Matthew, Mark 
and Luke, as to counteract the carnalizing passion for biograph­
ical anecdotes of Jesus.- And what of the acquaintance with a 
number of these άνευ οικτι, and a perception of the 
undue importance attached to them, had given an additional 
emphasis to St. Paul's resolve not to know Christ himself 
after the Flesh. We cannot, however, be too thankful to
Providence, that the Revisions of Matthew and Mark are such as they are— with so much of inestimable worth, and with so little dross. And both this, and the confinement of the choice to these, may fairly be attributed to the priority and known authenticity of Luke.\footnote{134/}

In the New Testament, Coleridge worked from the first with a prejudiced opinion about the applicability of certain passages and books to the Christian faith because of their too heavy Jewish drapery. He wrote in 1826 of one of his objects in Biblical criticism: "I am sure, that I shall deserve thanks—and yet a higher meed would be my due, could I affix, ecclesia consentienta, the asterisk of spuriousness to the last Ch. or the latter half of the last chapter of St. Mark, and the two discrepant Evangelia Infantiae in Matthew and Luke, and the Digit of suspicion to the first Epistle of Timothy—or perhaps to all those of the Pastoral Letters—What one article of the Christian Creed in its most comprehensive form would be touched? Of the faith preached by Luther at least not one, except the very point, I am now agitating—viz. the inexplicable tenet of the inspiration or rather the revelation of every sentence, word and syllable of the Bible from Genesis to the Apocalypse.\footnote{135/}

He was convinced that where the first three Gospels and the Fourth Gospel gave varying interpretations, authority must always lie with John. John, the beloved disciple, had himself lived and walked with Christ. But although Coleridge could,
when discussing the superiority of John, write that the test of canonicity, and thus, the authoritativeness, of a book must rest in its comparative freedom from glosses and the life relationship of its author to Christ, yet when upholding the authority of Paul he could reverse his argument and explain the superiority of a New Testament book simply by pointing out its harmony with Reason plus Paul's own testimony that he was taught in the desert by the direct revelation of Christ. Also, Coleridge could be quite arbitrary concerning passages to be explained away as glosses.

On the basis of "internal evidence", namely Matthew's exposition of prophetic passages which related to the necessity of the death and crucifixion of Christ, Coleridge did not accept Matthew as authoritative. In 1828 he wrote, "...hold up your head, Master Coleridge, alias Esteesy = STC, 126/ and speak up like a man ... that I do not receive the first Gospel in its existing form as the work of the Apostle Matthew or even of the Apostolic Age, and that tho' I do place unqualified reliance on the veracity of Luke and of Luke's informants, yet I think myself bound to make a difference between a faithful account of what was reported and commonly believed among the first converts ... and the recorded testimony of an Apostle, and of an Apostle who had been the constant attendant and beloved Disciple of our blessed Redeemer." 127/ In 1829 he conceded that while the First Gospel was most likely written in the Apostolic Age, it was still a great source of comfort.
to him that it had not been written by a companion of Christ, who could have little excuse for so confusing the Judaic Messiah with the Redeemer; he again expressed his joy and comfort at the authenticity of John. 138/

Coleridge thought the Gospel of Luke the most authoritative of the Synoptics because of its supposed priority and closer affiliation to the Fourth Gospel in spirit. He said, "...select the incidents common to our first and third Gospel and compare them, one by one, Luke's with Matthew's - and ... in almost every instance that of Matthew's is found amplified, and with the marvellous brought out, and more prominent..." 139/

But even Luke could be an "injurious error" like Matthew and Mark if not interpreted in the light of Paul and John. He proposed that Scripture should be marked according to its authoritativeness. "...it would be no easy matter to tell what the Faith in Christ would lose, tho' this Gospel (i.e. Mark) had been lost like the G. according to Egyptians and many others, unless it be a loss for the Harmonists to have 3 or 4 Dissonances the less to exercise their ingenuity upon, and finally, that the first and third, in the received sense, are injurious errors, the tendency of which is to place the Believer with his Back toward the only true source of Illumination (= the contemplation of the Ideas themselves which are the object of Faith, and the meditation thereon in the Understanding, in the Light from the Ideas, shining downward into the Understanding) and to divert the attention from the Spirit that maketh alive to the Letter
that killeth - (the prevention of which justified the wisdom of the over-ruling Providence for the different, in some instances even diverse, wordings of the same Saying of our Lord in the different Evangelists - i.e. for the absence of any supernatural dictation - errors that according to the different characters and predispositions of the minds on which they act, afford food for superstition and Cabbalistic Frippery to one class, and pretexts for Infidelity to another. Whatever Deeds or Sayings of our Lord are recorded in the two first Gospels exclusively - and are not found in Luke's Gospel beginning with the Baptism of John, and in the Gospel of John may be safely left to their own internal evidences - and where this is wanting, the legitimate interests of Christianity dictate that such passages should be marked with Asterisks, as of inferior authority, and probably grounded on vague Hearsays of the 2nd or 3rd generation. This is what might be replied to the sarcasm of the Romanist - but who will dare so reply? - The Reformed Church reminds me of a Scotch-man, who to get rid of the Itch had annointed himself with Brimstone and Hog's Lard, and even burnt his Coat and Waistcoat, but kept on him his old under flannel shirt for fear of catching cold!" 140/

He debated with the "barrister" who wished to relegate the Epistles to a position inferior to that held by the Gospels. "And Whence has the Barrister learnt that the Epistles are not equally binding on Christians as the four Gospels? Surely, of St. Paul's at least, the authenticity is incomparably
clearer than that of the first three Gospels; and if he give up, as doubtless he does, the plenary inspiration of the Gospels, the personal authority of the writers of all the Epistles is greater than two at least of the four Evangelists. Secondly, the Gospel of John and all the Epistles were purposely written to teach the Christian Faith; whereas the first three Gospels are as evidently intended only as memorabilia of the history of the Christian Revelation, as far as the process of Redemption was carried on in the life, death and resurrection of the divine Founder." 141/ Moreover, Coleridge was willing to assert that "the New Testament itself contains no evidence that either Christ or the Apostles ever contemplated the formation of a New Testament as Scriptures in the same sense and rank as those of the Law and the Prophets... I venture to affirm, that the best Christian Scriptures, and of the most edification for Christians of all classes and in all states and duties, are the Books of the Old Testament read and studied in the light of Christianity - and having Christ and the Church in Christ as their both object and subject from Genesis to Malachi, (Ezra, Nehemiah, Esther, Daniel and Ecclesiastes excepted) ... add only, that the Gospel according to John and the Epistles of Paul be annexed, as inspired comments and Interpretations!" 142/

While Coleridge never doubted the authenticity of the Fourth Gospel, he did think it likely that "the latter half if not the whole of the last chapter of John's Gospel, was
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added - by the Apostle's successor in the age of Ephesus, probably." 143/ John was partially in debt to Paul for his clearer insights into the character of the Christian faith. "It is the unvarying uncontradicted tradition of the Church that the Gospel of John was written the latest ... and I cannot help thinking that the St. John of the year 80 was a greatly improved man as compared with the John of the Acts of the Apostles - and of St. Paul's Epistles - and that Paul himself had been a means of this... Where would the harm be if we supposed that the enlarged views of St. Paul and the evidence of the divine sanction in the splendid success of his Preaching had occasioned John to recollect discourses of his beloved Lord at once confirming Paul's Doctrine, and by it disclosed to his mind in their true import. Something similar must have taken place in Peter, whose first and undoubtedly genuine Epistle is Pauline throughout, and surely on a different tone from that in which the Cephas Party ... had been accustomed to hear the Heads of the Church at Jerusalem preach." 144/ Again he wrote in 1830, "...nothing can be more evident than that the true conception of our Lord's Person and Office dawned on them (i.e. the disciples) gradually, and by a succession of hard conflicts with and conquests over the rooted and obstinate prejudices of a carnal Judaism ... I hold it no heresy to think it probable that even John could not have written his sublime Gospel, in the first year after the Resurrection..." 145/
Coleridge was strongly persuaded that the last eleven verses of Mark's Gospel were an addition of a later age, "for which St. Luke's Acts of the Apostles misunderstood supplied the hints." Coleridge always maintained that all the Gospels properly began with the baptism of Christ, and that to both Matthew and Luke the "Evangelium Infantiae" was added, probably by someone who wished to see prophecy literally fulfilled. The doctrine of the Virgin Birth was especially repugnant to Coleridge, and he made much of the silence of St. Paul on the subject. As a literal application of prophecy wrongly interpreted, the "Christopaedia" were to be understood as "Symbolic Hymns." Thus he wrote, "...read again the dedicatory superscription, 1:1-4; (i.e. in Luke's Gospel) and so pass immediately to Ch.III- and it seems to me impossible not to feel that this is the original Beginning of Luke's Gospel, and that the Evang. Infantia I. II, is a whole of itself that had been prefixed to this Gospel... Indeed, the introductory verses of the Acts of the Apostles... prove by evident implication that Luke's Gospel began as all the Gospels originally did, with the Baptism of John..." He preferred the interpretation that "those Gospels of the Infancy were originally symbolical Hymns - or impersonations, allegorical Substantiations, as it were, of the various passages in the Psalms, and the Prophets, that were considered as Messianic, or to be interpreted of Christ... As Swedenborg would say - They are Histories of Events that took place in the..."
Spiritual World." But while Coleridge was willing to play fast and loose with what he considered to be textual glosses, or with doctrines which appeared to him to be a "carnal" understanding of the Gospel, (he usually attempted to combine the two), his notes on Paulus' *Das Leben Jesu* reveal the horror with which he regarded the attempt of Paulus to "de-psychologize" the supernatural elements in the Gospels. He did not think Paulus understood that the writers of the Gospels intended that the miracles attributed by them to Jesus should be thought of as historical incidents. He had warned his contemporaries many times that miracles were not "evidence" for faith, but he warned Paulus that such may not have been the case for the Jews: "Miracles may have a subjective propriety as causes of, if not as grounds for, faith in the personality of God... for the miracles, as fulfilments of prophecy, were appropriate evidences to the Jews... the Contemporaries of Jesus, that He was indeed the Shilo, the Jehovah man, promised from the beginning." He asked Paulus, "What criterion of historic Truth in Falsehood would be left to us" if his de-psychologizing of the Third Gospel were accepted? In a burst of indignation he derided Paulus for reducing the whole account of Luke into a "symbolical Christopedia", and defended Luke as the "Historian."

Coleridge's criticism of Paulus, seemingly inconsistent with many of Coleridge's own statements, is a noteworthy example
of his recognition that however much the Gospel may be wrapped
in Jewish mythology, there is a kernel of history which cannot
be tampered with unless the right to be called Christian is
surrendered and the objective Christian truth destroyed. The
attempt of Paulus to "de-psychologize" the faith in Christ he
considered altogether different from an honest attempt to "de-
mythologize" the Scriptures, and Coleridge recognized that both
the premise and conclusion of such an attempt was a dangerous
subversion of the New Testament faith. It could, in fact, lead
to a loss of the unique character of Christ, and, along with
that, the statement of supernatural Redemption set forth in
the Scriptures. So Coleridge admonished Paulus, not "a Son of
God; but the Son, the only begotten Son of God, was the name
and peculiar attributes of our Lord; who commanded his
Disciples, Call no man Master; yet said, Ye call me Master,
and rightly, I am your Master." 154/ He summed up the work
of Paulus: "Delusion justified and explained by Delusions -
Dreams dotingly mistaken or knavishly passed off for red
herrings... And the Doctrine of the World grounded on Fancies,
and Prejudices that would disgrace an Old Clothes Man! And on
this foundation we are required by Professor Paulus of Heidelberg
to rest our consolation in this Life, and our Hopes in the Life
to come - Dr. Paulus is a philosophico-psychological Theologian.
Yea, and verily, O dear learned Germany! Common sense is not
among thy attributes!" 155/

Schleiermacher had fallen into practically the same error
as Paulus. He had represented the biographers of Jesus as poets, who had blended with the history in their narratives a "poetic fiction". But Coleridge maintained that the "poetic fiction" in the Gospels was nothing more than a sincere representation of the historical milieu; the Gospels must be "de-mythologized", not "de-psychologized". He professed to be shocked as Schleiermacher's ideas: "I cannot repress the indignation which the perusal of this and the two preceding pages has excited. Better, a thousand times better, reject the three Gospels altogether as the spurious patchwork of the 11th Century- The worst, that could happen then, would be, the want of any certain and authentic History of 'Christ according to the Flesh'. We should have the Faith and Religion of Christianity without knowing the particular incidents which accompanied the first * Revelation - further than the Creed and unvarying Tradition had preserved for us - a great Loss indeed, but not a mortal injury. But these imaginations of Schleiermacher, the very sources of the Christian Religion, while he represents the Eye-witnesses, the chosen Apostles and Preachers of the Faith, the only competent Recorders of the Actions and Doctrines of Christ, as men capable of blending Facts and Fictions, without leaving any clue to the Labyrinth. I dare affirm, that it is impossible - one or the other of three cases must be supposed. Either all is fiction; or all is fact; or the former is not Apostolic. Even in reading the Par. Reg. of

* Coleridge has crossed out 'first'.
Milton, and most oppressively in reading the Messiah of Klopstock, tho' both are avowed Poems, the juxta-position and immediate neighbourhood of what we know to be fictitious with facts, incidents and discourses which we had received as truths with a deeper and more passionate Faith, than mere History, even the most authentic, can inspire, shocks our moral sense as well as offends our Taste and Judgement - and by the violence of the contrast gives to poetic fiction the character and quality of a Lie. The more than historic faith in the one, prevents us from yielding even a poetic faith to the other. How impossible then must it appear, that the chosen companions of our Lord, Eye-witnesses of his wonderful Acts, many of which were worked for their sake, and in order that they might deliver them to all nations, could for a moment endure to hear, much less themselves to relate, to record, known falsehoods, or truths magnified and fantastically refracted into falsehoods, in close connection with and under the immediate impression of actions and events, that lived on their very eyes, and fitted their souls with Love, Joy, Reverence, affectionate grief and devoted Loyalty even to Death! 156/

In a note on Irving Coleridge ventured that "the time is not yet come, for men to believe what they would actually find in Luke's Acts of the Apostles if they looked at the contents with the Naked Eye..." 157/ He nowhere stated what it was men would find when they looked into Acts with the naked eye, but, from various hints scattered about by Coleridge, it
is evident that it was the same things in Acts which repelled him in the latter part of the last Chapter of Mark, namely, the miraculous spiritual gifts given to believers when they had received the Holy Ghost. His revulsion was caused not only by his experience with the use of "spiritual gifts" by Irving, but also by his conviction that there was something alien to the spirit of the Gospel to be found in the first few chapters of Acts. The emphasis on signs and wonders, which were alleged to have accompanied the first preaching of the Gospel, did not at all seem to accord with the spirit of later chapters, which recounted the missionary exploits of Paul. Too, these chapters did not seem to fit into the epistolary accounts of Paul's preaching written by Paul himself. Coleridge noted that from Acts II:5 to Chapter VI "we have a few anecdotes of Peter and John, and a brief account of the enthusiasm of the recent converts, and the measure adopted by them, with an extraordinary incident that took place in consequence, - in short, a few insulated facts respecting the Church of Jerusalem very remotely or rather not at all connected with the spread of the Gospel generally - and all the rest of the work is a biographical memoir of St. Paul..." 158/ He called attention to the anachronism in the speech attributed to Gamaliel and the moral problem connected with the story of Ananias and Sapphira. Although the Apostles were supposed to have obtained full illumination on the day of Pentecost, events afterward upheld the fact that "the illumination of the Apostles even after the day of Pentecost was
"gradual and progressive", proved by the imprudent idea of a community of property in their "carnal and mistaken notion of our Lord's all but immediate return personally". However, he thought that Acts 1:1-11:5 formed a natural connection with Luke's former work and a necessary introduction to his history, and that Stephen's most singular speech ... from its very inappropriateness to an audience so perfectly familiar with the facts is a strong internal evidence of its having been delivered. He decided that the portion of Acts from Chapter II:5 to Chapter VI was not written by Luke.

Of the Epistles Coleridge said, "I entirely agree with Eichorn and Schleiermacher in rejecting the first Epistle to Timothy from the list of the genuine writings of St. Paul; and in more than doubting the authenticity of all three of the so-called Pastoral Epistles. They appear to me mere Cantos of Pauline Phrases by some Bishop of the Age succeeding the Apostolic..." "Paul", he said, "could not have written Hebrews", and Luther's idea that it was written by Apollos was as good as any.

Late in his life Coleridge described himself as "a man who has attained to a view of the Christian Faith freed from the Costume of popular Judaism, as it existed in its motley Egypto-Graeco-Persian Tags and Embroideries at the Christian Era."
CHAPTER V

PRAYER, TRI-UNITY, AND SACRAMENT.

1. Prayer.

One of Coleridge's great dissatisfaction with Unitarianism was the manner in which prayer was reduced to nothing more than reflection and auto-suggestion. In 1796 he wrote to the Rev. T. Edwards, a unitarian Minister, "...I know you do not altogether approve of direct Petitions to Deity ... but in case there should be any efficacy in them, out of pity to the Guts of others pray for the Brains of your friend..." 1/ In 1798 he wrote to J.P. Estlin, a Unitarian minister, "...I find true joy after a sincere prayer; but for want of habit my mind wanders, and I cannot pray as often as I ought. Thanksgiving is pleasant in the performance; but prayer and distinct confession I find most serviceable to my spiritual health when I can do it." 2/

In an early poem of 1794 Coleridge had said that God was a "Spirit-
Of whose omniscient and all-spreading Love,
Aught to implore were impotence of mind.

In the Second Edition of the poems in 1797 he added the footnote: "I utterly recant the sentiment ... my human reason being convinced of the propriety of offering petitions as well as thanksgivings." 2/ Sometime around 1807 he told De Quincey that this same "sentiment" he condemned so unqualifiedly that "on the contrary ... the act of praying was the very highest energy of which the human heart was capable; praying, that is, with the total concentration of the
faculties; and the great mass of worldly men, and of learned men, he pronounced absolutely incapable of prayer. With his deep conviction of frailty in regard to opium and his overpowering sense of sin, the heart of Coleridge demanded that his prayers for forgiveness and strength be heard while his head insisted there was no one there to hear, or with the Unitarians, insisted that prayer had no efficacy. Coleridge's heart demanded that prayer be no less than a means of grace; the Unitarians said prayer could be no more than a resolve formed by reflection to grab one's own bootstraps and start pulling toward the image of Jesus. Coleridge turned in all his fury on the Unitarians when he had himself discovered prayer as efficacious. "Unitarianism is, in effect, the worst of one kind of Atheism, joined to the worst of one kind of Calvinism, like two asses tied tail to tail. It has no covenant with God; and looks upon prayer as a sort of self-magnetizing - a getting of the body and temper into a certain status, desirable *per se*, but having no covenanted reference to the Being to whom the prayer is addressed." He advised a friend, "He ... is a God that heareth prayers, abundant in forgiveness, and therefore to be feared, no fate, no God as imagined by the Unitarian, a sort of, I know not what law-giving Law of Gravitation, to whom prayer would be as idle as to the law of gravity, if an undermined wall were falling upon me; ... but 'a God that made the eye, and therefore shall He not see? who made the ear, and shall He not hear?' who made the heart of man to love Him, and
shall He not love the creature whose ultimate end is to love Him? ... a God who seeketh that which was lost, who calleth back that which has gone astray; who calleth through His own Name; and who became man that for poor fallen mankind he might be (not merely announced but be) the Resurrection and the Life ... 'Come unto me, all ye that are weary and heavy-laden, and I will give you rest!' Oh, my dear Miss Lawrence! prize above all earthly things the faith. I trust that no sophistry of shallow infra-socinians has quenched it within you, ... that God is a God that heareth prayers."

Coleridge took prayer very seriously. Before he became reconciled to the Church and Sacraments he considered prayer to be the "sole instrument of Redemption". In 1808 he wrote in a notebook, "The habit of psychological analysis makes additionally difficult the act of true Prayer. - yet as being a good gift of God it may be employed as a guard against Self-delusion, tho' used creaturely it is too often the means of Self-delusion. But I am not speaking now of what my understanding may suggest but of that which the Fact reveals and for me - it does make Prayer, the sole instrument of regeneration, very very difficult ... 0 those who speak of Prayer, of deep, inward, sincere prayer, as sweet and easy, if they have the Right to speak thus, 0 how enviable is their Lot!" He heaped scorn on Kant for turning prayer into a mere wish. He rebuked Schleiermacher for saying prayer affected our own minds only. He considered prayer the most difficult act of life, because true repentance
must ensue before true prayers could be uttered. Not only that, but whereas faith required intellectual assent or belief in order to become Scriptural faith, or faith in its highest sense, prayer by its very nature demanded the highest faith as conditional; "prayer is faith passing into act; a union of the will, and the intellect realising in an intellectual act. It is the whole man that prays." Coleridge admitted no other meaning for prayer; anything less than a total act of the soul was not prayer. He mentioned in several places that he found no difficulty as great as that of prayer. He called it "the great Test of Progress in a Christian Life."

2. The "Tri-unity".

The great importance assigned to prayer by Coleridge, who in his ever-increasing awareness of sinfulness and weakness knew the necessity of a divine deliverance, played an important role in rescuing him from his pantheistic tendency as well as Socinianism. Prayer was grounded on an anthropomorphic God who could answer prayer and be worshipped; it was, as he wrote in a notebook, grounded on the "I AM", "the God who made the Eye and shall he not see? Who made the Ear and shall he not hear?"

In 1834 Coleridge said, "I owe, under God, my return to the faith, to my having gone much further than the Unitarians, and so having come round to the other side." From the naive anthropomorphic attitude of the Unitarians, who had "forgotten that Incomprehensibility is as necessary an attribute
of the First Cause as Love ... or Intelligence", Coleridge passed into pantheism and so came "round to the other side". In 1802 he wrote that "some of the Unitarians make too much of an Idol of their one God. Even the worship of one God becomes Idolatry in my convictions, when, instead of the Eternal and Omnipresent, in whom we live and move and have our Being, we set up a distinct Jehovah, tricked out in the anthropomorphic attributes of Time and successive Thoughts, and think of him as a Person, from whom we had our Being. The tendency to Idolatry seems to me to lie at the root of all our human vices ... it is our original Sin. When we dismiss three Persons in the Deity, only by subtracting two, we talk more intelligibly, but, I fear, do not feel more religiously ... for God is a Spirit, and must be worshipped in spirit." In 1803 he wrote to Matthew Coates, "You were the first man from whom I heard that article of my faith enunciated which is the nearest to my heart ... the pure fountain of all my moral and religious feelings and comforts, I mean the absolute Impersonality of the Deity." In 1805 Coleridge wrote in a notebook, "...it burst upon me at once as an awful Truth what 7 or 8 years ago I thought of proving with a hollow Faith and for an ambiguous purpose, my mind then wavering in its necessary passage from Unitarianism (which as I have often said is the Religion of a man, whose Reason would make him an Atheist but whose Heart and Conscience will not permit him to be so) thro' Spinosism into Plato and St. John/ No Christ, no God! - This I now feel with all its
needful evidence of the Understanding; would to God my
Spirit were made confirm thereto - that no Trinity, no God!
... that this conviction may work upon me and in me/ and that
my mind may be made up as to the character of Jesus, and of
historical Christianity, as clearly as it is of the Logos and
intellectual or spiritual Christianity - that I may be made to
know either their especial and peculiar union, or their absolute
disunion in any peculiar Sense." 18/

In another notebook he wrote, "An idea has just occurred
to me - it seems important. Is not Sin, or Guilt, the first
thing that makes the idea of a God necessary, instead of ἡ ἔκ
- therefore is not the incarnation a beautiful consequence and
revelation of the ἡ ἔκ first revealing itself as ὁ ἔος?" 19/

Coleridge asserted his "idea" with certainty: "The doctrine of
Sin and Redemption first authorized by practical necessity the
doctrine of the Trinity - before that time it was a mere Philo-
osophem, tho's most beautiful and accurate." 20/ The doctrines
of sin and Redemption demanded a God who could, and would,
answer prayer. The personality of God was dependent upon the
Trinity. "No man in his senses," he wrote in a marginal note,
"can deny God in some sense or other, as anima mundi, causa
causarum, &c., but it is the personal, living, self-conscious
God, which it is so difficult, except by faith of the Trinity,
to combine with an infinite and irresistibly causative.

ηο ἐν ἀνάμνησις is the first dictate of mere human philosophy.

Hence almost all the Greek philosophers were inconsistent
Spinozists." 21/

In the *Biographia Literaria* Coleridge confessed, "For a very long time, indeed, I could not reconcile personality with infinity; my head was with Spinoza, though my whole heart remained with Paul and John." 22/

Coleridge finally reconciled "personality with infinity" in the "Tri-unity" of God and united his Greek heritage with the self-conscious, anthropomorphic God-Father of the Hebrews. In the "Tri-unity" of God Coleridge found the "personity" of the Father and the personality of the Son. He used the word "personity" in relation to the Father to guard against a naive anthropomorphic attitude toward God, and the term "Tri-unity" to express his belief in one God. Trinitarianism was not "Tritheism". The Unitarians had no monopoly on their name. "Go and ask the most ordinary man", Coleridge said, "a professed believer in this doctrine (i.e. the Trinity) whether he believes in and worships a plurality of Gods, and he will start with horror at the bare suggestion. He may not be able to explain his creed in exact terms; but he will tell you that he *does* believe in one God, and in one God only - reason about it as you may." 23/ He addressed the Unitarians, "...what do you mean by exclusively assuming the title of Unitarians? As if Tri-Unitarians were not necessarily Unitarians, as much (pardon the illustration) as an apple-pie must of course be a pie! The schoolmen would, perhaps, have called you Unicists; but your proper name is Psilanthropists - believers in the mere
human nature of Christ." Again he wrote, "I regret it, however; (i.e. the use of the term Unitarian) first, because it is a blundering use of the term, which implies the contrary opinion, i.e. a plurality united, and differs from the Trini - that is, Tri-unitarian only by leaving the number of the hypostatic properties ... indefinites, and 2ndly, it is calumnious in its intent, most uncharitably attributing to the great body of the Church of Christ horrid heresy, of even a denial of the Unity of the Godhead, or an acknowledgment that there is more than one God - which we openly denounce and abhor. Adiaphorites, or uni-personalists, or better still Psilanthropists, are the proper names of the modern Socinians."  

In the "Tri-unity", in which personality was reconciled with infinity, the Son only should be referred to as Person. "In the Scripture Doctrine of the Trinity the Son alone is the Person of the Godhead." Again he insisted, "In the right and strict use of the Word, the Son, is alone the Person." Coleridge's doctrine of the indwelling Logos as the revealing Word and his redemptive emphasis on Christ as the "Lamb slain from the foundation of the world" prompted him to write, "I know few points in Scripture, which it more concerns a Christian to bear in mind than that Christ as the Logos Ωρα ηθήνας was the Jehovah of the Old Testament."  

The transcendent Father, known through the Incarnation, contained personality through His Son, but it was safer to refer to His "personeity". He was a personal God, but not as
the Unitarians imagined. One prayed to the Father only through the Son; He was incomprehensible except as He had revealed Himself as Jehovah and Son. "The Father cannot be revealed except in and through the Son, his eternal exegesis. The contrary position is an absurdity. The Supreme Will, indeed, the Absolute Good, knoweth himself as the Father: but the act of self-affirmation, the I Am in that I Am, is not a manifestation ad extra, not an exegesis." 29/

The title Coleridge gave to the Father in his self-conscious"personity" was "I AM". God, as the "I AM", was "the eternally self-affirmant self-affirmed". 30/ In the eternal act of self-affirmation He begets the Son, the Jehovah, the manifestation ad extra. There is little doubt that the "personity" of the "I AM" embraced by Coleridge in the "Tri-unity" was directly related to the account of the revelation given Moses in the third chapter of Exodus. In a note book Coleridge commented that "the preserving of the primeval faith in the personity of the Supreme, in connection with his infinity and omnipresence ... was among the chief ends and objects both of the patriarchal and the Mosaic Revelations." 31/

In 1827 he advised, "Remember that the Personality of God, the living I AM, was the distinctive privilege of the Hebrew Faith - and personal Revelations, a connected series of their privilege." 32/ And in a marginal note he said, "I cannot well imagine a clearer revelation, certainly no one more sublime, than (that given) ... to Moses, 'I AM' hath sent thee." 33/
In an interesting note on Lessing Coleridge declared, "I know one who from a Socinian became a Deist, or rather a Pantheist - and then from his increased and enthusiastic admiration of the character of Moses, considered merely as a law-giver or Solon, with rejection of all inspiration and miracle, was gradually led back to a Belief in Revelation, and after intense study declared he could conscientiously subscribe all the doctrinal Articles of the Church of England." And in 1830 Coleridge confided in his notebook, "Yes! for us - for minds formed and directed as mine has been, and those of the generality of men who having enjoyed a religious classical education, and whose first serious notions of Theology have been acquired from such Books as Dr. Sam. Clark's Works, Durham, Paley, Hartley, etc., with a few contraband dealings with Shaftesbury, Hume, Voltaire and above all with the unsuspected works of the religious Naturalists - Deists who do not attack, but are supposed to receive Christianity, - and only omit and thus tacitly condemn, all its peculiar doctrines - Yes, for us accustomed to contemplate God almost exclusively as the Universal Being, the "mens agitans molem", and to think of him as a sort of impersonal Law, a Wisdom of Nature or at best in Nature - the difficulties in the 4 last Books of the Pentateuch are many and great... But how much of this difficulty would remain, if our habitual Thoughts of the Deity were directed to his personal attributes - if instead of the universal Being we fixed our faith on the Jehova Word, the Son of God, who
became Man? (and) ... contemplated the whole scheme of Redemption including the Creation as a series of divine Condescensions?...the internal evidence, from the character of Moses, its simplicity, and almost annihilation of all Self is a mighty Bulwark of Strength...”

In 1830 Coleridge wrote, "My mind can form no higher conception of blessedness in enjoyment, than to have a spiritual intuition of the union of the personality of God with his infinity and omnipresence!" The same year Coleridge recorded his own "spiritual intuition" of the union of personality with infinity in the essay entitled *Formula Fidei de Sanctissima Trinitate*. The essay reads as if it were nothing more than a lot of garbled nonsense, but for Coleridge it had deep meaning. It was a cry of triumph, a monument to his victory over the "painted atheism" of pantheism and Unitarianism. "I lift up my heart in awe and thankfulness", he wrote in 1830,"while I bless the hour when it was first given to me to see the universal fundamental all-containing Idea - Gausa sui - the Absolute Will essentially causative of all reality - and therefore of its own - whose eternal act of Self-affirmation is the I AM - and with this the co-eternal Generation of the Supreme Mind."

The *Formula Fidei de Sanctissima Trinitate* is a representative summary of Coleridge's thinking language in respect to the "Tri-unity", an idea of such importance to Coleridge and which absorbed so much of his interest that perhaps it is worth
quoting in full. Coleridge considered the work of Bull and Waterland on the Trinity to have been masterly, but it had been "a negative" and "logical" competence. As much as Coleridge praised their "logic", a "positive" exposition of the idea was lacking, for the Trinity, like all the mysteries of faith, must be contemplated "per intuitum intellectualem". The Trinity was an idea of intuitive Reason, founded on the fact of sin and the need for Redemption. Coleridge complained, "...that great truth, in which are contained all treasures of all possible knowledge, was ... opaque even to Bull and Waterland; because the idea itself, that Idea Idearum, the one substantive truth which is the form, manner, and involvent of all truths, - was never present to either of them in its entirety, unity, and transparency. They most ably vindicated the doctrine of the Trinity, negatively, against the charge of positive irrationality. With equal ability they showed the contradictions, nay, the absurdities, involved in the rejection of the same by a professed Christian. They demonstrated the utterly un-Scriptural and contra-Scriptural nature of Arianism, and Sabellianism, and Socinianism. But the self-evidence of the great Truth, as a universal of the reason, - as the reason itself - as a light which revealed itself by its own essence as light - this they had not vouchsafed to them." He exclaimed, "Oh, if Bull and Waterland had been first philosophers, and then divines, instead of being first, manacled, or say articulated clerks of a guilt; - if the clear free intuition of the truth had led them
to the Article, and not the Article to the defence of it as not having been proved to be false, — how different would have been the result!" 40/ Again he lamented, "...in how many pages do I not see reason to regret, that the total idea of the 4=3=1, — of the adorable Tetractys, eternally self-manifested in the Triad, Father, Son, and Spirit, — was never in its cloudless unity present to him.— (i.e. Waterland)...I affirm, that the article of the Trinity is religion, is reason, and its universal formula." 41/

Coleridge set out his essay on the "Tri-unity" in the form of the "adorable Tetractys":

THE IDENTITY.

The absolute subjectivity, whose only attribute is the Good; whose only definition is — that which is essentially causative of all possible true being; the ground; the absolute will; the adorable τὸ τέταρτον, which whatever is assumed as the first, must be presumed as its antecedent; ἔλεος, without an article, and yet not as an adjective. See John 1.18. Ὁ Θεός εὑρεθήκε τινος ὁ λόγος as differenced from ib. 1. καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ Θεός ἐστιν λόγος. But that which is essentially causative of all being must be causative of its own, causa sui, ἀναγράφω. Thence

THE IPSΕΙΤY.

The eternally self-affirmant self-affirmed; the 'I Am in that I am,' or the 'I shall be that I will to be;' the Father; the relatively subjective, whose attribute is, the Holy One; whose definition is, the essential finific in the form of the infinite; dat sibi fines. But the absolute will, the absolute good, in the eternal act of self-affirmation, the Good is the Holy One, co-eternally begets
THE ALTERITY.

The supreme being; the supreme reason; the Jehovah; the Son; the Word; whose attribute is the True (the truth, the light, the fiat); and whose definition is, the pleroma of being, whose essential poles are unity and distinctly; or the essential infinite in the form of the finite; - lastly, the relatively objective, deitas objective in relation to the I Am as the deitas subjectiva; the divine objectivity.

N.B. The distinctities in the pleroma are the eternal ideas, the subsistential truths; each considered in itself, an infinite in the form of the finite; but all considered as one with the unity, the eternal Son, they are the energies of the finific; ΠΑΝΤΑΣ ὑπὲρ ἑαυτοῦ  ἐν οἷς ἐντάξει ΠΑΝΤΕΣ Εἰδομέναι John I, 3, 16.

But with the relatively subjective and relatively objective, the great idea needs only for its completion a co-eternal which is both, that is relatively objective to the subjective, relatively subjective to the objective. Hence

THE COMMUNITY.

The eternal life, which is love; the Spirit; relatively to the Father, the Spirit of Holiness, the Holy Spirit; relatively to the Son, the Spirit of truth, whose attribute is Wisdom; sancta sophia; the Good in the reality of the True, in the form of actual Life.

Holy! Holy! Holy! 42/ 

3. The Sacraments.

(a) Baptism.

Even though Coleridge himself considered that he had returned to Trinitarian Christianity, and this at least as early as the time of the writing of the Biographia Literaria in 1815, the Sacraments were unable to have any significant place in his theological thinking until after the visible, organized Church had real significance. As we have seen, this did not come
about until his discovery of the "two-foldness" of the Christian dispensation in 1827. But when the Church had been recognized as "two-fold", "visible", and "spiritual", Coleridge could seriously consider the Sacraments as means of grace; the institutionalized Church became the historic means of the realization of the redemptive act. Significantly, Coleridge received the Sacrament in December of 1827 for the first time since his days at Cambridge.

However, the Sacraments were a means of grace not simply because they were "effective", but because they were "valid". Coleridge became convinced that the visible Church was founded and envisioned by Christ himself. He related the "two-foldness" of the Church to the "two-foldness" of the Incarnation: "Christ, who having taken the Humanity into his Divinity, became Flesh, and dwelt among men, a man, and thus founded the outward and visible Church as the witness and the representative of his Incarnation; and Christ, the Spirit of Truth, dwelling in the Faithful, and constituting the spiritual and invisible Church, the center of which, even Christ, is over all by virtue of his omnipresence... or, more briefly, 'Christ, who dwelt among men, and his visible Church; and Christ, who dwelleth in the Faithful, and the invisible Church'". When Coleridge could think of the visible Church as the witness and representative of the Incarnation, he could think of Baptism as the first act of the regeneration effected by the Eucharist and of the Eucharist as properly an "extension" of the Incarnation.
By 1828 Coleridge had come a long and tortuous road from the time he rejected the Sacramental rites, because he could not reconcile them with his intellect, and wrote to Godwin that they felt much the same about Baptism. He had, in fact, advanced considerably beyond the *Aids to Reflection*. He wrote in 1828, "I see the necessity of greatly expanding and clearing up the Chapter on Baptism in the *Aids to Reflection* - and of proving the substantial accordance of my scheme with that of our Church." In that work Coleridge had done not much more than defend infant Baptism. He stated that nothing conclusive could be drawn from the New Testament to confirm either adult or infant Baptism. Since there existed no sufficient proof as to whether infant Baptism was or was not the practice of the Apostolic age, he proposed that the argument should be conducted on other grounds than historical or Biblical.

Strangely enough, the same Coleridge who considered himself the scourge of utilitarianism proposed that the question of Baptism should be decided on just this ground. Baptism as a real Sacrament did not enter into his discussion. The rite of Baptism had two purposes as Coleridge saw it. One was the idea of Baptism as initiation into the visible communion of believers; the other was to mark out and set apart the one baptized as deserving of the special disciplinary love of the Church. The effect produced on the consciousness of the congregation at the moment of Baptism could intime be produced on the mind of the baptized in repentance and belief. By the
baptizing of infants the effect could most easily be obtained in the baptized; that is, one could acquire the one essential of Christianity, the same Spirit that was in Jesus Christ, more easily by means of initiation into the loving care of believers while an infant. Then Baptism might be a means to repentance and faith instead of merely the result. In the rite of Confirmation the Church of England provided the same opportunity for testimony and dedication which the Baptists provided at Baptism. 47/

Coleridge was also concerned in the *Aids to Reflection* with denouncing those "superstitions" about Baptism which had been introduced into the Church as a result of the perversion of the doctrine of Original Sin. The water of Baptism contained no magic ingredient which washed away hereditary sin. Moreover, it was impossible to say that Baptism had any spiritual operation whatsoever in an infant. 48/ Baptism was not the regeneration which is the goal of life. 49/

Some of Coleridge's hints of "clearing up the Chapter on Baptism" in the *Aids to Reflection* were published in the 1843 Edition as a footnote to Coleridge's observations on Baptism. They were, however, merely hints. His final view of Baptism, as well as the Eucharist, lacks any definitive statement. When editing the *Notes on English Divines*, published in 1853, Derwent Coleridge remarked in a footnote, "The Editor is unable to say what precise spiritual efficacy the Author ultimately ascribed to Infant Baptism; but he was certainly an advocate for the
practice..." However, it is obvious from Coleridge's few remarks on Baptism after the *Aids to Reflection* that his ideas had become more attuned to the sacramental grace bestowed in the act. In 1828 he said he agreed with the Church when it declared "that before the time of the Baptism there is no authority for asserting, and that since the time there is no authority for denying, that gift and regenerative presence of the Holy Spirit, promised by an especial covenant to the Members of Christ's mystical Body." Also, after confirming his view that the communication of the Spirit to an unconscious agent by an officiating minister had no Scriptural warrant, he remarked, "Still less do I think lightly of the Graces which the child received as a living part of the church, and whatever flows from the communion of Saints, and the *παρεκκλήσις* of the Spirit." Whereas in the *Aids to Reflection* Coleridge had said that Baptism was no essential of the faith whereby one is saved and had denied differing opinions on the doctrine as a ground for schism, he had second thoughts in 1834: "My doubt is, whether baptism and the Eucharist are properly any parts of Christianity, or not rather Christianity itself; the one, the initial conversion or light - the other, the sustaining and invigorating life; both together the *δόξα καὶ Εἰρήνη*, which are Christianity." It seems certain that in "expanding and clearing up" the section on Baptism in the *Aids to Reflection* in order to be more in line with the scheme of the Church, Coleridge would have dwelt on phrases used in the section but
given no prominence, namely, Baptism as one of the "effectual signs of grace" and a "sign of regeneration or new birth". In his later remarks on Baptism he emphasized the movement of God to man, thinking of the Sacrament in closer affinity to the traditional experience of the Church. That he felt himself to be in harmony with the belief of the Church in speaking of the Sacraments as "light" and "life" is clear from a note on Taylor: "...the primitive Church called baptism λόγος, light, and the Eucharist ὑπόθεσις, life. Baptism, therefore, was properly the sign, the precursor, or rather the first act, the intimum, of that regeneration of which the whole spiritual life of a Christian is the complete process; the Eucharist indicating the means, namely, the continued assimilation of and to the Divine Humanity. Hence the Eucharist was called the continuation of the Incarnation." 55/

The seriousness with which Coleridge considered the Sacrament of Baptism is brought out most clearly and touchingly in a letter written to a godchild only eleven days before he died. The letter also contains Coleridge's last Confessio Fidei.

My dear Godchild,
I offer up the same fervent prayer for you now, as I did kneeling before the altar, when you were baptized into Christ, and solemnly received as a living member of his spiritual body, the Church.
Years must pass before you will be able to read with an understanding heart what I now write; but I trust that the all-gracious God, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, the Father of mercies, who, by his only-begotten Son (all mercies in one sovereign mercy!) has redeemed you from the evil ground, and willed you to be born out of darkness, but into light - out of death, but into life - out of sin, but into righteousness, even into the Lord
our Righteousness; I trust that He will graciously hear the prayers of your dear parents, and be with you as the spirit of health and growth in body and mind.

My dear Godchild! you received from Christ's minister at the Baptismal font, as your Christian name, the name of a most dear friend of your father's, and who was to me even as a son, the late Adam Steinmetz, whose fervent aspiration and ever-paramount aim, even from early youth, was to be a Christian in thought, word and deed — in will, mind, and affections.

I too, your Godfather, have known what the enjoyments and advantages of this life are, and what the more refined pleasures which learning and intellectual power can bestow; and with all the experience which more than threescore years can give, I now, on the eve of my departure, declare to you (and earnestly pray that you may hereafter live and act on the conviction) that health is a great blessing, — competence obtained by honorable industry a great blessing, — and a great blessing it is to have kind, faithful and loving friends and relatives; but that the greatest of all blessings, as it is the most ennobling of all privileges, is to be indeed a Christian. But I have been likewise, through a large portion of my later life, a sufferer, sorely afflicted with bodily pains, languor, and bodily infirmities; and, for the last three or four years, have, with few and brief intervals, been confined to a sick-room, and at this moment, in great weakness and heaviness, write from a sick-bed, hopeless of a recovery, yet without prospect of a speedy release; and I, thus on the very brink of the grave, solemnly bear witness to you that the Almighty Redeemer, most gracious in his promises to them that truly seek him, is faithful to perform what he hath promised, and has preserved, under all my pains and infirmities, the inward peace that passeth all understanding, with the supporting assurance of a reconciled God, who will not withdraw His Spirit from me in the conflict, and in His own time will deliver me from the Evil One!

Oh my dear Godchild! eminently blessed are those who begin early to seek, fear, and love their God, trusting wholly in the righteousness and mediation of their Lord, Redeemer, Saviour, and everlasting High Priest, Jesus Christ.

Oh preserve this as a legacy and bequest from your unseen Godfather and friend,

S.T. Coleridge. (July 14, 1834)

(b) The Eucharist.

"Christmas Day. (1827) Received the Sacrament for the
first time since my first year at Jesus College. Christ is gracious to the Laborer that cometh to his vineyard at the Seventh hour - 33 years absent from my Master's Table - Yet, I humbly hope, that Spiritually I have fed on the Flesh and Blood the Strength and the Life of the Son of God in his divine Humanity, during the latter years." 57/

In 1825 Coleridge reported that he had a disquisition on the Eucharist ready for the press which was to follow the section on Baptism in the Aids toReflection; 58/ also, a note was appended to the Aids to Reflection announcing the author's intention of publishing an exposition of the Eucharist in a supplementary volume. 59/ However, the exposition was never published.

H.N. Coleridge published notes made on the Book of Common Prayer in 1838 which contained a very short essay on the Eucharist, with the suggestion that this might be a portion of the uncompleted supplementary volume. 60/ But this essay is dated 14th December, 1827, and apart from the claim by Coleridge that a disquisition was ready for the press in 1825, the fragmentary nature of the notes (even more so than usual) and the fact that the essay is primarily advice on preparation for the partaking of Holy Communion suggest this is not the disquisition Coleridge intended to publish. It is, however, of much biographical interest, since we know Coleridge received Holy Communion on Christmas Day for the first time since his Cambridge days, eleven days after this note was penned. We may think of the essay as
a record of his own preparation for Holy Communion. "The best preparation", he said, "for taking this sacrament, better than any or all of the books or tracts composed for this end, is, to read over and over again, and often on your knees - at all events with a kneeling and praying heart - the Gospel according to St. John, till your mind is familiarized to the contemplation of Christ, the Redeemer and Mediator of mankind, yea, of every creature, as the living and self-subsisting Word, the very truth of all true being, and the very being of all enduring truth; the reality, which is the substance and unity of all reality; the light which lighteth every man, so that what we call Reason, is itself a light from that light." 61/

While Coleridge chose not to present his views on the Eucharist in the Aids to Reflection, he did remark that he held the same views as Bucer, Peter Martyr, and presumably Cranmer. 62/ The one work always referred to elsewhere as authoritative, however, was Bucer's exposition of the Eucharist printed as an appendix to Strype's Life of Cranmer. There is no doubt that the great attraction of that work was the idea that the body and blood set forth in Holy Communion was not that of the crucifixion, for Coleridge framed his opinion on the doctrine of the Eucharist against the background of his realist idea of the Incarnation. 63/ Before he read Strype, he had claimed to have deduced his doctrine of the Eucharist from Scripture. 64/ In 1833 he said that for a time he had been afraid his view was original. 65/

The formative influence in Coleridge's idea of the Eucharist
was his phenomenal and noumenal concept of the Incarnation. It was abhorrent to him that the body and blood offered in the Sacrament should be thought of as having reference to the broken body and blood of the cross. This was the phenomenal body of the senses. But the body which had effected our salvation was the noumenal body, that to which the Logos was united, and the Eucharist, as an extension of the Incarnation, was instituted as an exhibition and giving of that body and blood in which there was Redemption. The Scriptural appeal of Coleridge for his view of the Eucharist was always to John VI. "The question is, what is meant in Scripture, as in John VI. by Christ's body or flesh and blood. Surely not the visible, tangible, accidental body, that is, a cycle of images and sensations in the imagination of the beholders; but his supersensual body, the noumenon of his human nature which was united to his divine nature." He was convinced that "Christ, both in the institution of the Eucharist and in the sixth chapter of John, spoke of his humanity as a noumenon, not of the specific flesh and blood which were its phænomena at the last supper and on the cross." He found full authority in the Gospel of John for his realist position. The whole sixth chapter of John had the "manifest object ... to reveal to us that spiritual Things differ from objects of sense by their greater reality, by being more truly and more literally living substances - ex. gr., that the Flesh and Blood of Christ, which his Redeemed must eat and drink, are far more properly Flesh and Blood, than the
phaenomena of the visible Body so called.

When Coleridge first began thinking about the Eucharist, he highly favored the Roman doctrine of transubstantiation, saying he "was half converted to Transubstantiation by Tillotson's common senses against it; seeing clearly that the same grounds totidem verbis et syllabis would serve the Socinian against all the mysteries of Christianity." He remonstrated against criticism wrongly directed at Rome, for the Papists did not pretend that the phenomenal bread and wine were changed into the phenomenal flesh and blood. Because Rome had retained the mystery in the Eucharist, and asserted that the noumena of the phenomenal bread and wine were the same as the noumena of the body and blood of Christ, Coleridge much preferred the Roman doctrine to that of the Sacramentaries who had turned the mystery into a mere practical metaphor by employing the Eucharist as a simple act of remembrance, "just the same as when Protestants drink a glass of wine to the glorious memory of William III!" Hence he wrote in a notebook, "...not indeed that Transubstantiation is a Doctrine of Scripture, but that it is a mistaken conception of a true doctrine, far more the truth than the dogma of Zwinglius who reduces the whole into an arbitrary cold inoperative sign of commemoratio, adding nothing to him who independently of it recalls the Death of Christ to his mind." Yet while he made the statement early in his life that he deemed transubstantiation "a frantic superstition, but not Idolatry," his mature conviction was that the error of Rome was in con-
densing the Eucharist into an idol, even as the Sacramentaries
had volatilized it into a metaphor. 74/ Rome had converted a
symbol "i.e. a representative instance of a perpetual Act and
Fact into the Act and Fact in toto". 75/

Coleridge could defend Rome against what he felt to be
unjust criticism from those who attacked a crude transubstantiation
of a localized, phenomenal presence which Rome did not teach, but
nevertheless, the fact that Rome also identified the "Body spoken
of (Hoc est corpus meum) with the carnal, material body, nailed to
the Cross" 76/ made their doctrine of transubstantiation dangerous.
The Roman doctrine made its appeal to the senses; by doing this
it became an idol. How different, Coleridge thought, was the
Johannine doctrine of "spiritual transubstantiation", "and the
Romish Idol worshipped under that name". 77/ Coleridge liked to
say that he held to transubstantiation in the Gospel sense, in
that he retained "the truth symbolized, so as to guard the Symbol
from being rarified into a Metaphor". 78/ He thought this was
accomplished by thinking of the Eucharist as a timeless act. The
body and blood consecrated in the Eucharist could be said to be
identified with the body broken on the cross, but only as symbol
to symbol. The Incarnation, and the Eucharist as an extension
of the Incarnation, were symbolic representations of that timeless
fiat of Redemption, the actual passion and acts of Redemption
which extended through all of created time of which Christ's
body is the noumenon.

As the Eucharist has direct reference to a symbolic event
it has in it an element of remembrance. As an act of remembrance
participated in through faith and belief it can be of much spiritual support and benefit. However, it is an effectual means of grace because as a symbol it effects regeneration. Regeneration is effected by the Eucharist when the communicant assimilates in faith the actual body and blood of the incarnate Logos, the noumenal body of Christ by whom we have been Redeemed. So, following his interpretation of John VI, he regarded the Eucharist both as symbol and instance, but primarily and effectually as symbol. 72/

Having rejected the identification of the Eucharist with the phenomenal event of the cross or any metaphorical atonement statements, and considered it as an extension of the Incarnation, it is presumable that Coleridge could have spoken of the Sacramental presence in direct relation to the Incarnation. The presence of Christ in the Sacrament through his body and blood differed from the omnipresent immanent Word not in mode but, because of its incarnational, symbolic relationship to history, differed in degree and intensity. Coleridge was emphatic in rejecting any explanation of the mode of the presence. "The assimilation of the spirit of a man to the Son of God, to God as the Divine Humanity, - this spiritual transubstantiation, like every other process of operative grace, is necessarily modeless." 81/ It was on this ground that he disagreed with Luther in Eucharistic doctrine, the only time he thought Luther had sounded entirely the wrong note. Coleridge told Sterling, "He (i.e. Luther) is great, even where he is wrong, - even in the sacramental contro-
versy, the most unhappy in which he engaged; for his idea of Christ's body becoming infinite by its union with the godhead is entirely wrong!" Coleridge had as early as 1811 criticized Luther on the ubiquity of the Body of Christ upon which Luther based his doctrine of the Eucharist, because it "allows of no peculiarity in the sacramental elements, but applies equally to every morsel of food taken by Man and Beast throughout the universe." However, when Coleridge himself came to depend upon what was nothing more than a modified form of the idea of ubiquity, his criticism of Luther's position was much the same as that directed against Rome; Luther, while rightly contesting for the mysterious nature of the Sacrament, had been too persistent in identifying the real presence of Christ in the bread and wine with the crucified Christ, instead of the "caro noumenon", or symbolical body. But it pained Coleridge to have to disagree with his beloved Luther, and he went to considerable effort to show that if "real" was correctly used in antithesis to "phenomenal" he could endorse the real presence for which Luther contended. And he commented with considerable pleasure, "if we may trust the Table Talk Luther himself taught at last the true Christian doctrine of the Sacrament -- Christus est spiritualiter in sacramento quo modo, non nobis est penscrutori nemo credimus; modum nescimus." However, he seemed to have known then that there was no justification for such a view and said so later.

For Coleridge, then, the Eucharist was a symbol, not a
sign. It partakes of that which it represents, namely, the noumenal body of Christ. The noumenal body was the only permanent and redemptive body, for it was at once the lamb slain from the foundation of the world and the risen body of Christ which dwells within the faithful. It was the body which was manifest in phenomena at the Incarnation and which had proclaimed and obtained Redemption. The Sacraments were, therefore, the true instruments of Redemption. Of his view of the Eucharist Coleridge wrote, "That the preceding hints verge to Swedenborgianism, I am well aware; but what remarkable Enthusiast can be mentioned whose doctrines, when examined, will not be found to originate in twilight glimpses of awful Truths misapprehended by the unequal intellect of the Beholder, and strangely mixed with the shapings of his own fancy?"
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>CCS</td>
<td>On the Constitution of the Church and State according to the idea of each. Ed. H.N. Coleridge. 2nd Ed. 1839.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Early Rec.</td>
<td>Early Recollections, chiefly relating to the late Samuel Taylor Coleridge, during his long residence in Bristol. By Joseph Cottle. 2 vols., 1837.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ED</td>
<td>Notes on English Divines. Ed. Derwent Coleridge. 2 vols., 1853</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EF</td>
<td>Essay on Faith. Published in Bohn's Edition of Aids to Reflection, 1913.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IS</td>
<td>Inquiring Spirit: A New Presentation of Coleridge from his Published and Unpublished Prose Writings. Ed. K. Coburn, 1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life</td>
<td>The Life of S.T. Coleridge. By James Gillman. (only 1 vol., published) 1838.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Notes Theological, Political, and Miscellaneous.
Ed. Derwent Coleridge, 1853.

The Philosophical Lectures of Samuel Taylor Coleridge.

By Joseph Cottle, 1847.

Diary, Reminiscences, and Correspondence of Henry Crabb Robinson.

The Statesman's Manual. Published with On the Constitution of the Church and State according to the idea of each and the 2nd Lay Sermon, Blessed are Ye that Sow beside all Waters. 2nd Ed.
Ed. H.N. Coleridge, 1839.

The Table Talk and Omniank of Samuel Taylor Coleridge. 1917.


MANUSCRIPTS.


British Museum. MS Egerton 2800 "Literary Remains".

British Museum. MS. Egerton 2801 "Philosophical Remains".

Henry E. Huntington Library. (San Marino, Calif.) MS. 8195 "On the Divine Ideas".

Victoria College, Toronto. MS. "Bristol Theological Lectures".

The Unpublished marginalia identified by author and book title are in the British Museum.
INTRODUCTION - NOTES.


6. Coleridge himself confessed several instances where he confided his thoughts only to his notebooks and marginalia. For instance, in a note on Lacunza he wrote, "Mr. Irving has here set me an example, and in fact has shamed me in my own eyes. I have long entertained the same conviction, viz. that the Church doctrine of the Holy Spirit is true, indeed included (implicita) in the philosophical idea of The Trinity and legitimately deducible from sundry passages in the Holy Scriptures; but not to be found in them explicitly or as the proper and primary import of the words. But tho' I have long entertained this opinion and have recorded it in my MSS Daybooks, I have lacked courage to make known and promulgate the same." (MS. note) (Lacunza y Diaz, M. The Coming of Messiah in Glory and Majesty. By Juan Josafat Ben-Ezra, a converted Jew. Translated from the Spanish, with a preliminary Discourse. By the Rev. Edward Irving. 1827. Vol.I. p.CV) (unpub.)


8. Brinkley has published a fresh transcript of the marginal notes on Donne in Coleridge on the Seventeenth Century. The following are some examples of H.N. Coleridge's editing. On Luther's Table Talk Coleridge wrote, "...as if, for instance, Jack's crepitus were followed by a flash of lightning, which should strike and precipitate the ball on St. Paul's cathedral. This would be a miracle as long as no causative nexus was conceivable between the antecedent, the noise and odor of the crepitus, and the consequent, the atmospheric discharge." In NTP (p.5) the note reads, "...as if, for instance, Jack's shout were followed by a flash of lightning, which should strike and precipitate the ball on St. Paul's cathedral. This
would be a miracle as long as no causative nexus was conceivable between the antecedent, the noise of the shout, and the consequent, the atmospheric discharge."

Again on the Table Talk Coleridge wrote, "Now I should require a good thumping miracle..." The phrase was edited so that in NTP (p.10) it reads, "Now I should require strong inducements..." Also, in the notes on Luther, Coleridge made several references to sin as disease which were omitted by the editor since he knew this was not in harmony with the annotator's later opinions. Typical of notes omitted in the editing as too daring for the age is one not included in the notes on Jeremy Taylor. Coleridge wrote, "Taylor has not ventured to tell half the Truth. The 11 last verses of Mark are all by a later hand; the whole Ev. Inf. from the 4th verse of Luke to Ch.III does not belong to the Gospel - the latter half if not the whole of the last chapter of John's Gospel, was added - by the Apostle's successor in the see of Ephesus, probably. The first Ep. to Timothy, certainly; and all three of the pastoral Epistles probably are Post-pauline, and only written in his name - etc., etc." (Poetical Discourses, Third Edition. 1674. p.966).
CHAPTER I.

REASON AND UNDERSTANDING.


4. TT., p. 94.


11. NB. 35, p. 8. (unpubl.).

12. NB. 35, p. 9 (unpub.)

13. NB. 36, p. 47 (unpub.)

14. NB. 38, p. 25 (unpubl.)

15. MS. Note Blomfield, C.J. A Charge delivered to the Clergy of his Diocese. 1830. p. 22 (unpub.)

16. TT., p. 144.

17. NB. 54, p. 18. (unpub.)

18. NB. 37, p. 76. (unpub.)
Since Coleridge was primarily interested in asserting a Redemption wholly of grace, anyone who flirted with Armenianism opened himself to the title of "Socinian". Hence Jeremy Taylor was "half a Socinian in heart. The Romish Church has produced many such devout Socinians". (TT.pp.110-11) Chillingworth, by rejecting the Trinitarian authority of the Church, Coleridge thought in "some sense a Socinian". (TT. p.144).
36 Aids., p.272.


38 L., Vol.I., p.16.


40 Life., p.23.


42 NB.18, p.69 (unpub.)


44 ibid., p.169.

45 In 1794 Coleridge wrote, "I go farther than Hartley, and believe the corporeality of thought, namely, that it is motion". (L.Vol.I., p.133)

46 See BL., Vol.I. (Intro.) p. XXX.


48 Life., p.25.


50 ibid., p.68.

51 TT., p.308.

52 BL., Vol.I., p.252


54 MS. *Bristol Lectures* (unpubl)


56 Early Rec., p.178.


58 UL., Vol.I., p.86.

Coleridge's idea of the "moral Gospel" is set forth in a letter of 1794: "...after a diligent, I may say an intense, study of Locke, Hartley, and others who have written most wisely on the nature of man, I appear to myself to see the point of possible perfection, at which the world may perhaps be destined to arrive. But how to lead mankind from one point to the other is a process of such infinite complexity, that in deep-felt humility I resign it to that Being 'Who shaketh the Earth out of her place, and the pillars thereof tremble', ... Who hath said, 'that violence shall no more be heard of; the people shall not build and another inhabit; they shall not plant and another eat;" 'the wolf and the lamb shall feed together'. I have been asked what is the best conceivable mode of meliorating society. My answer has been this: 'Slavery is an abomination to my feeling of the head and the heart. Did Jesus teach the abolition of it? No! He taught those principles of which the necessary effect was to abolish all slavery. He prepared the mind for the reception before he poured the blessing'. You may ask me what the friend of universal equality should do. I answer: "Talk not politics. Preach the Gospel!" (L. Vol.1., p.105).

The principle of "faith" as the only basis of morals in uniting the motive and the desire was formed early in Coleridge's life. He wrote in 1796, "Doubtless I could fill a book with slanderous stories of professed Christians, but those very men would allow they were acting contrary to Christianity; but, I am afraid, an atheistic bad man manufactures his system of principles with an eye to his peculiar propensities, and makes his actions the criterion of what is virtuous, not virtue the criterion of his actions. Where the disposition is not amiable, an acute understanding I deem no blessing. ...He who thinks and feels will be virtuous; and he who is absorbed in self will be vicious, whatever may be his speculative opinions'. Believe me, Thelwall, it is not his atheism that has prejudiced me against Godwin, but Godwin who has, perhaps, prejudiced me against atheism". (L., Vol.1., p.167)

In answering the contempt of Thelwall for the "Christian Religion" in Dec. of the same year, Coleridge wrote, "Morals to the Magdalen and Botany Bay". Now, Thelwall, I presume that to preach morals to the virtuous is not quite so requisite as to preach them to the vicious. 'The sick need a physician'. Are morals which would make a prostitute a wife and sister, which
would restore her to inward peace and purity; are morals which would make drunkards sober, the ferocious benevolent, and thieves honest, mean morals? Is it a despicable trait in our religion, that its professed object is to heal the broken-hearted and give wisdom to the poor man? It preaches repentance? Tears and sorrow and a repetition of the same crimes? No, a 'repentance unto good works;' a repentance that completely does away all superstitious terrors by teaching that the past is nothing in itself, that, if the mind is good, that it was bad importa nothing." (L., Vol.I., p.200)

Whalley, T. The Bristol Library Borrowings of Southey and Coleridge, 1793-8. 1949. Coleridge borrowed Cudworth in 1795 (p.120) and again in 1796 (p.124).


L., Vol.I., p.64.
Religious Musings, lines 42-46; 135-137; 139-140.
NTP., p.267.
McKenzie, T. Organic Unity in Coleridge. 1939. p.5.
ibid., p.59.
ibid., p.60.
ibid., (Intro.) pp. XI-LXXXIX.
Richards, I.A. Coleridge on Imagination. 1934.
ibid.
In 1796 Coleridge wrote, "The 'capability of being stimulated into sensation'... is my definition of animal life." (L., Vol. I., p. 211).
Also see Aids., pp. 144 ff., where Coleridge uses Huber's observations and experiments with ants to show that the Understanding in man is analogous to instinct in animals.
I have called attention only to the most discerning estimates of Coleridge's theology made during the period. There were others less discerning and justifiable. In the Theological and Literary Journal in 1849 (Vol.I., pp.631 ff.) David N. Lord published an article entitled Coleridge's Philosophy of Christianity, an Atheistic Idealism. Lord wrote from the standpoint of a millenarian. He said, "...like the German rationalists, from whom he drew his religion as well as his philosophy, he was nothing more than an atheistic idealist, or ideal pantheist; his system being a mixture of Swedenborgianism and Spinozism, as the
one was modified by Kant, and the other by Hegel."
(p.636) Lord said that Coleridge's basic error was
the same as that of Kant, namely, the denial of the
possibility of demonstrating God's existence, and
predicted that the visible return of Christ to reign
upon the earth would wipe out such atheists, pantheists,
and deviationists as Coleridge.

In an article entitled The Relation of Philosophy to
Theology and of Theology to Religion published in The
Eclectic Review in Jan., 1851, Coleridge was called the
"father of the Puseyites". The article consists mostly
of quotations from Coleridge's work, and attempts to
show the identification of philosophy and theology.

In the British Quarterly Review for Jan., 1854, (Vol.XXXVII,
pp.112 ff) a criticism was made of Coleridge's attempt to
unite philosophy and theology in one system. The
distinction between Reason and Understanding was said to
come straight from Kant; "This, as well as much else of
the intelligible in Coleridge, is borrowed pure and simple
from Kant". (p.134) But Coleridge's ideas were all so
vague because they were seen through the "colouring media
of Platonic and mystical ideas". (p.158) (This article
contains the substance of Rigg's criticism of 1857)


122 Howard, op.cit., p.100

123 Muirhead, op.cit., p.117.

124 ibid., p.107.


126 ibid., p.67.

127 Muirhead, J.H. "Metaphysician or Mystic", Coleridge -
Studies by Several Hands on the Hundredth Anniversary
of His Death. 1934. p.195.

128 PhL., (Intro.) p.39.

129 Coleridge always testified that his first principles were
evolved independently of his German idealist contempo-
raries. In 1817 he wrote, "As my opinions were formed
before I was acquainted with the schools of Fichte and
Schelling, so do they remain independent of them, though
I con- and pro-fess great obligations to them in the
development of my thoughts, and yet seem to feel that
I should have been more useful had I been left to evolve
them myself without knowledge of their coincidence". (L., Vol.II, p.681) In 1804 Coleridge had written, "In the preface of my metaphysical works, I should say - 'Once for all, read Kant, Fichte, &c., and then you will trace, or, if you are on the hunt, track me'. Why, then, not acknowledge your obligations step by step? Because I could not do so in a multitude of glaring resemblances without a lie, for they had been mine, formed and full-formed, before I had ever heard of these writers, because to have fixed on the particular instances in which I have really been indebted to these writers would have been hard, if possible, to me who read for truth and self-satisfaction, and not to make a book, and who always rejoiced and was jubilant when I found my own ideas well expressed by others— and, lastly, let me say, because (I am proud, perhaps, but) I seem to know that much of the matter remains my own, and that the soul is mine. I fear not him for a critic who can confound a fellow-thinker with a compiler". (AP., p.106) In the BL he insisted that "all the main and fundamental ideas, were born and matured in my mind before I had ever seen a single page of the German Philosopher; and I might indeed affirm with truth, before the more important works of Schelling had been written, or at least made public". (BL., Vol.I., pp.102-3) He told Robinson in 1812 that from "Fichte and Schelling he has not gained any one great idea", and again the same year told him that all Schelling had said he had either thought himself or found in Jacob Boehme. (Robinson, Vol.I., pp.198,202) And in 1825 he wrote, "Of the three schemes of philosophy, Kant's, Fichte's, and Schelling's (as diverse each from the other as those of Aristotle, Zeno, and Plotinus, though all crushed together under the name Kantean Philosophy in the English talk) I should find it difficult to select the one from which I differed the most...I can not only honestly assert, but I can satisfactorily prove by reference to writings (Letters, Marginal Notes, and those in books that have never been in my possession since I first left England for Hamburgh, etc.) that all the elements, the differentials, as the algebraists say, of my present opinions existed for me before I had even seen a book of German Metaphysics, later than Wolf and Leibnitz, or could have read it, if I had. But what will this avail? A High German Transcendentalist I must be content to remain." (L., Vol.II., p.735) Coleridge's marginalia, notebooks, letters, etc., do in fact bear testimony that his thought was nurtured by the likes of Plato, Plotinus, Seneca, Boehme, and Luther; perhaps the greatest influence over Coleridge was the Bible. As early as 1802 Coleridge wrote, "This (i.e. imagination) the Hebrew poets appear to have possessed beyond all
others, and next to them the English. In the Hebrew poets each thing has a life of its own, and yet they are all our life. In God they move and live and have their being; not had, as the cold system of Newtonian Theology represents, but have... If there be any two subjects which have in the very depths of my nature interested me, it has been the Hebrew and Christian Theology, and the Theology of Plato."

(L., Vol.I., p.401) The interest of Coleridge in these two "subjects" became greater and greater as the years went by.

130 Broad, C.D. *Five Types of Ethical Theory*. 1930. p.11.

131 Aids, p.277.

132 ibid., p.154. The latter part of the note reads:

"Reason...either predetermines Experience, or avails itself of a past Experience to supersede its necessity in all future time; and affirms truths which no sense could perceive, nor experiment verify, nor experience confirm.

Yea, this is the test and character of a truth so affirmed, that in its own proper form it is inconceivable. For to conceive is a function of the Understanding, which can be exercised only on subjects subordinate thereto. And yet to the forms of the Understanding all truth must be reduced, that is to be fixed as an object of reflection, and to be rendered expressible. And here we have a second test and sign of a truth so affirmed, that it can come forth out of the moulds of the Understanding only in the disguise of two contradictory conceptions, each of which is partially true, and the conjunction of both conceptions becomes the representative or expression (the exponent) of a truth beyond conception and inexpressible. ...If this appear extravagant, it is an extravagance which no man can indeed learn from another, but which, (were this possible,) I might have learnt from Plato, Kepler, and Bacon; from Luther, Hooker, Pascal, Leibnitz, and Fenelon."

133 PhL. (Notes) p.425.

134 BL., Vol.I. (Intro.) p. XLVIII.

135 ibid., (Notes) p.246.

136 NB.20. p.20 (unpub.)
340

137 NB.32. p.47 (unpub.). Coleridge spoke of Don Quixote as a man of pure Reason, and Sancho as the man of the Understanding. He also called Panagruel the Reason and Panurge the Understanding. (IS. pp.146-7)

138 Aids, p.96.

139 SM. (Appendix B). (Note) pp.264-5.


141 MS. note. Behmen. ibid., p.10 (unpub.)

142 MS. note. Aids to Reflection. 1825. BM.C.126.d.3 Front fly-leaf. (The MS. note was added by Coleridge to the summary of the distinction between Reason and Understanding later published as Appendix A (Aids, p.277) but the note was omitted from publication).

143 NB.53. p.7 (unpub.)

144 NB.20, p.21 (unpub.)

145 NB.51, p.5 (unpub.)

146 NB.51, p.10 (unpub.)

147 MS. note. Rhenferd, J. Opera Philologica. 1722. p.204 (unpub.)


151 Robinson, p.198.


154 BL., Vol.I, p.99. L.I. Bredvold has aptly remarked, "For, although Kant may have been the Moses who led philosophy out of the wilderness of empiricism, he did certainly not, in Coleridge's opinion, succeed in returning himself to the Promised Land." (CXVII:G Intro., p.XXXIV)

During his later years when he was living with the Gillman family at Highgate, Coleridge worked rather steadily with J.H. Green on the Magnum Opus. J.H. Green was introduced to Coleridge by Ludwig Tieck in 1817. (Charpentier, Coleridge the Sublime Somnambulist, pp. 300 ff). At his death Coleridge left all his papers to Green and gave him sole power over his literary remains. Coleridge made rather exaggerated claims for his Magnum Opus. In 1821 he said that when it was completed it "will revolutionise all that has been called Philosophy or Metaphysics in England and France since the era of the commencing predominance of the mechanical system at the restoration of the Second Charles". (Life, p. 247)
In 1831 he claimed, "My system, if I may venture to give it so fine a name, is the only attempt, I know, ever made to reduce all knowledges into harmony. It opposes no other system, but shows what was true in each..." (TT., p. 157)
Green's attempt to complete the work of Coleridge was published in "Spiritual Philosophy, founded on the teaching of the late S.T. Coleridge" in 1865; This work itself was seen through the press by J. Simon after Green's death. F.D. Maurice had lost confidence in Green's ability to do justice to Coleridge's philosophy by 1853. (Sanders, Maurice as a Commentator on Coleridge, p. 235) Traill, (Coleridge "English Men of Letters", 1889, p. 185) deplored the work of Green in the "Spiritual Philosophy" but Muirhead (Coleridge as Philosopher - Appendix B) defended the work of Green as trustworthy. Certainly Coleridge himself never lost faith in the ability of Green. In 1830 Coleridge noted that Green had made some fine improvements in his thought in certain places, (NB. 46, p. 4) and the same year wrote, "Well may I look forward with delight to the conjunction of our names and with a pardonable pride of heart indulge my fancy in the conceit, that the System of evolving all the truths and central facts of moral and physical Science, all the constitutive principles of the Fine Arts, and all the spiritual verities of Religion out of one Postulate, to which no man can refuse his assent but by a perverse exercise of the very power, the existence of which he denies - that this bold, but at all events meritorious attempt may be known to the World under the name of the Cloro-estesian Philosophy, or connected disquisitions concerning God, Nature, and Man, by J.H. Green, and S.T. Coleridge." (NB. 44, p. 74)
In a letter of 1832 (UL. Vol. II, p. 442) Coleridge warned Green not to deviate from this "closed system" of intuitive Reason on which all was to be based, but showed no lack of confidence in his ability.

MSS. which were to have formed parts of the Magnum Opus are in the British Museum, Toronto, Canada, and San Marino, Calif. After a reading of the MS. On the Divine Ideas from the Huntington Library in San Marino I can find no essential difference between the "ideas" of the MS. and the "ideas" of J.H. Green in the Spiritual Philosophy. The MS. was, of course, dictated to Green by Coleridge, and it is possible that Green himself contributed to its contents. Coleridge has recorded in his notebooks that Green came up with good "ideas" from time to time, but there is no doubt that Coleridge had the authoritative voice in deciding the contents of the MS.

159 NB. 37, p. 44 (unpub.)
160 See BL. Vol. I. (Intro.) pp. LXVIII-LXXII.
163 PhL. (Notes) p. 426.
164 EM (Appendix D) p. 288.
165 EM (Appendix B) p. 275.
167 Carpenter, op. cit., p. 309.
168 Byron, G.G. Don Juan. Canto I, Dedication II.
Coleridge has not only been accused of plagiarism from Schelling, but also from Herder, Schiller, Lessing and Schlegel. See Haney, J.L. The German Influence on Samuel Taylor Coleridge, 1902; Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, Vol.XLVII, March, 1840; BL. VOL.I. pp.243-4; Intro. to Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit Pickering 1849; Intro. to Biographia Literaria 1847.


PhL. (Intro.) p.56 (Notes on Jennismann, pp.425-8). (Lectures pp.241-3, p.295). Coburn is particularly anxious to proclaim that Coleridge was no mystic. In the Inquiring Spirit she wrote, "His position was Platonic, owing something both to Plato and the Cambridge Platonists, in that he defended the objectivity and authority of the idea with a capital I; it was Kantian and critical in that he wished to clarify the limits of knowledge... He displays a kind of metaphysical reasoning now in disrepute, but it is wrong to call him vague or mystical." (p.115) Again, (p.377), she insists that he was not, "as is sometimes suggested, a religious mystic". But she has nowhere given reasons why Coleridge should not be called a "religious mystic". I am unable to agree that Coleridge wished "to clarify the limits of knowledge". The whole purpose of his work was to extend the limits of knowledge. He did, in fact, extend the frontier of knowledge to the point where a "frontier" could exist no longer. Apart from and beyond the knowledge which takes its form in abstraction, concepts, and logic, Coleridge claimed by means of direct intuition a real knowledge of supernatural reality, which knowledge itself takes possession of the being of man in redeeming and purifying it. If this is not some form of religious mysticism, even though it be no more than the very mystical experience necessary for religion, it is difficult to see what meaning the word "mystic" retains. Even the little Pocket Oxford Dictionary defines mystic as "concerned with direct communion of the soul with God; seeking absorption into God or the infinite; believing in the spiritual apprehension of truths intellectually incomprehensible". Nor, it might be added, does she use "critical" in relation to Kant's philosophy as Kant used it. Kant described his philosophy as a "critical philosophy" which was to be distinguished from a "dogmatic philosophy". In a dogmatic philosophy, faith rests upon knowledge. Kant, in his critical philosophy, sought to separate the provinces of faith and knowledge. The essence of the critical philosophy was that it distinguished between knowledge and faith. Coleridge made no separation between knowledge and faith, but founded
faith on a mystical knowledge, on Reason. Moreover, it is difficult to conceive of Coleridge being a follower of both the "critical way" and Platonism, for Kant explicitly classed Plato with the "dogmatists". In a note on Tennemann, Coleridge himself attributed to the "true Mystic Philosophy" his own ideas. "The true Mystic Philosophy may be divided into three parts - first, the introductory and purifying, which Gerson rightly describes as consisting of abnegation, or a watchful repelling and setting aside the intrusive images of Sense, and the conceptions of the Understanding, both these generalized from the Data of the Senses or formed by reflection on its (the Understanding's) own processes." The first part of the "true Mystic Philosophy" conforms to Coleridge's statement of 1827 that the truths of his system were learned from no one, "because it rose on me in its own light, like the Dawn, with no direct effort on my part, save that I blew away the fogs and mists and intervening obtrusions of the Fancy and the Understanding." (NB.35, p.23)(unpub.) The note on Tennemann continues, "Secondly, the contemplation of the Ideas, or Spiritual truths, that present themselves, like the Stars, in the silent Night of the Senses and the absence of the animal glare. To these solemn Sabbaths of contemplation we must add the work-days of Meditation on the interpretation of the Facts of Nature and History by the Ideas; and on the fittest organs of Communication by the symbolic use of the Understanding, which is the function of the Imagination." (See my chapter on "Revelation and History" and the conclusion to the BL for identical opinions voiced as Coleridge's own.) The note continues, "Now these two parts comprise the actual attainments of the true Mystic, as what in a greater or less degree he holds it not boastful to say, he possesses. The third part he hopes and waits for - confident only, that it will exist for the spirit after he has been delivered 'from the body of this death', but yet willing to believe it neither impossible, nor out of the analogy of the ways of God with man, that even in this life certain antepasts, and Foretastes of the marriage feast may be vouchsafed to the pure in heart." (See my chapter on "Sin and Redemption".) (Note pub. in CXVII:C, p.692)

In another note on Tennemann, Coleridge identified his idea of Reason with the mystical idea of Contemplation. "Gerson's and St. Victor's Contemplation is in my System = Positive Reason." (pub. in CXVII:C, p.693) And again, "What C. calls Contemplation is what I call Positive Reason, Reason in her own Sphere, as distinguished from Negative or merely formal Reason, Reason in the sphere of the Understanding." (pub. in CXVII:C, p.693)
172 ibid., p.56
173 ibid., p.390.
176 ibid., Vol.I. Front fly-leaf (unpub.)
179 ibid., Vol.II, p.142 (unpub.)
180 NB.44, p.13 (unpub.)
185 ibid., p.98.
186 ibid., p.103.
187 Aids, p.258.
188 ibid., p.258
189 ibid., p.261.
190 L. Vol.I., p.423.
191 NB.35, pp.23 ff. (unpub.)
192 NB.45, p.20 (unpub.)
Wellek. op.cit., p. 81. Coleridge adapted Luther's idea of the visible and invisible Church to fit his own idea of the distinction between Reason and Understanding, and added, "Permit me to notice, that the Understanding stands here in contra-distinction from Reason, or in the language of the Apostles Paul and John the Power of spiritual discernment, the Light, by which we are made cognizant of supersensual truths, the Light of the Word which lighteth every man that cometh into the world." (MS. 2800, f. 99) (unpub.)

In 1820 Coleridge modified the position given in the SM. Since a mystical and poetical nature was given by birth, not acquired by effort, Coleridge was willing to grant the subjective and individual truth of a philosophy which considered ideas as regulative only if it accorded to the full experience of its propounder but yet did not deny the possibility of constitutive ideas for another. "... whether the Ideas are regulative only, as Aristotle and Kant teach, or constitutive and actual as Pythagoras and Plato, is of living interest to the Philosopher alone. Both systems are equally true, if only the former abstain from denying universally what is denied individually." (UL. Vol. II, p. 264) Yet this letter portrays an unusual and condescending attitude on the part of Coleridge.

A note on Tennemann is explanatory: "Divide mankind into two very disproportionate parts, the few who have, and who have cultivated, the faculty of thinking speculatively - i.e., by reduction to principles - and the many who, either from original defect or deficiencies, or from want of cultivation, do not in this sense think at all; and you may then, according to my belief, subdivide the former class, the illustrious minority, into two species, scarcely less disproportionate in the comparative number of individuals contained in each - viz., the born conceptionists, the spiritual children of Aristotle, and the born idealists or Ideatae, the spiritual children of Plato. The former system is comprehended in the latter, and therefore of admitted truth in all it
affirms, and false, if false by denial only, of the
distinctive tenets of the latter. The Aristotelian,
therefore, is completely intelligible to the Platonist,
while the Platonist is mere sound - vox et praeterea
nihil - to the Aristotelian. The Ideatae are but
somniloquent Ideatae. The difference being innate,
all controversy is hopeless; and could it be ascert-
tained in any particular instance, useless. Supposing,
however, that the Platonist is in the right, he alone
is the philosopher, and the men of thought might be
divided into philosophera and philologists." (Pub. in

204  CIS., p.346.
209  ibid., p.174.
210  PhL., p.226.
211  Friend, p.211.
      1817. p.299. (unpub.)
213  Friend, p.328.
215  ibid., p.175.
216  Aids, p.XIX.
217  CIS. p.319
218  Friend, p.71.
219  ibid., p.174.
221  Friend, p.362 (also BL., Vol.I, p.183)
Read has described Coleridge's philosophy as a form of existentialism. (Coleridge as Critic, 1949)

"...writing before Kierkegaard was born, Coleridge had already formulated the terms of an existentialist philosophy - the Angst or sacred horror of nothingness, the Abyss or 'chasm which the moral being only ... can fill up,' the life in the idea which 'may be awakened, but cannot be given,' the divine impulse, 'that the godlike alone can awaken.' (p. 30) But it seems incorrect to describe Coleridge as an existentialist in any other sense than, for instance, Luther, and the other writers who down through the centuries have pointed out the paradox of human existence. It is significant that the two authors who have called attention to the existential character of Coleridge's thought, Read (op. cit.) and Raine (Coleridge 1955, p. 29) have both used as the illustration of his "existentialism" the passage from The Friend, p. 362. (see note 222 above) The small similarity of thought, language, and feeling in Coleridge and Kierkegaard could no doubt be traced to its root in Schelling, but if the title "existentialist" is to retain any "Kierkegaardian" heritage at all it should not be applied to the theology of Coleridge.

However, it must definitely be admitted that if Tillich has any right to the title of existentialist which he is so fond of claiming, then Coleridge has done much more than simply "formulate the terms of an existentialist philosophy". There is little to be found in Tillich that cannot be found in Coleridge. The idea of sin as man's estrangement from the ground of being and from himself; the idea of being and non-being, actual and potential; the idea of the New Being in a non-historical salvation; the idea of salvation through revelation, are all prominent in Coleridge's thinking. The similarity of the two men is interesting; both wish to construct a gigantic "system" of faith cognizant of all fields of knowledge; both are very absorbed in psychology; both wish to reconcile essence and existence; both go about their task with a similar language which gives a ponderous vagueness to their work.

Friend, p. 365.
ibid., p. 186.
ibid., p.187. In Friend (p.367) Coleridge wrote, "But let it not be supposed that it is a sort of knowledge; No! it is a form of being, or indeed it is the only knowledge that truly is, and all other science is real only as far as it is symbolical of this."

See PhL. (Intro.) p.40.

BL., Vol.I, p.187. In 1830 (NB.44, p.74) Coleridge spoke with pride of his "System of evolving all the truths and central facts of moral and physical Science, all the constitutive principles of the Fine Arts, and all the spiritual verities of Religion out of one Postulate." (See note No.158 above)

PhL. (notes) p.427.

Friend, p.366.

NB.37, p.44 (unpub.)

TT., p.311.

See BL., Vol.I. (Notes) p.269; (Intro.) pp.LXX and LXXX.


MS. notes. Strype, J. Memorials of the most Reverend Father in God, Thomas Cranmer, 1694. p.126 (unpub.)

ED., VOL.II, p.124.


ibid., p.366. (The other two disquisitions were on Prayer and the Eucharist).

EF., p.341.


See Aids, pp.142-144, for the substance of the marginal notes on Leighton, op.cit., p.71, which were incorporated into the Aids to Reflection.

SM., p.281.

SM., p.270.

SM., p.245. In 1826 Coleridge made a memorandum in his notebook concerning the "highest Reason". "Mem. to
enforce and expound the distinction between the Systematic Unity, which the Understanding made intelligent by the Light of Reason strives after and the Identity in all Alterity, or absolute Unity, peculiar to Reason in its own Sphere - to Reason as opposed to Understanding and distinct from even the Light of Reason in the Understanding ... this most important Principle of the essential difference of Reason and Understanding cannot be presented to the Mind of the Pupil in too great a detail of instances, examples and illustrations. 'Tis in the circle of Wicks in an Argand's Lamp, if any one takes light, it kindles all the rest. So any one instance of the diversity of the R. and U. clearly apprehended and thoroughly mastered (and which of the number may be successful one depends so much on the accident of constitution and experiences in the individual Pupil's Mind that it cannot be known beforehand) all the other instances will become luminous on each side, till the whole blend in a circle of Light." (NB.26, p.8)(pub. in CXVII:C, p.691)

In the MS. "On the Divine Ideas" Coleridge wrote, "Reason in that highest sense, in which the speculative is united with the practical ... presents the Idea to the individual mind, and subjective intellect, which receives and employs it to its own appropriate ends, namely to understand thereby both itself and all its objects - receives it I say, uncomprehended, by it to comprehend the universe, the world without and the yet more wonderful world within." (p.249)(pub. in CXVII:C, p.649)

Coleridge set forth the philosophic result of Reason in its "highest sense". It is noteworthy that Coleridge explicitly relates his use of Reason in its "highest sense" with the mystic philosophy. The Reason he suggests as the "higher and deeper Presence" is the only meaning Reason finally came to have for Coleridge. "We have hearts as well as Heads. We can will and act, as well as think, see and feel. Is there no communion between the intellectual and moral? Are the distinctions of the Schools separates in Nature? Is there no Heart in the Head? No Head in the Heart? Is it not possible to find a practical Reason, a Light of Life, a focal Power from the union or harmonious composition of all the Faculties? Lastly, there is, it is admitted, a Reason, to which the Understanding must convert itself in order to obtain from within what it would in vain seek for without, the knowledge of necessary and universal
conclusion of that which is because it must be, and not because it had been seen. May there not be a yet higher and deeper Presence, the source of Ideas, to which even the Reason must convert itself? Or rather is not this more truly the Reason, and the universal Principles but the gleam of Light from the distant and undistinguished community of Ideas - of the Light in the cloud that hides the Luminary? O! let these questions be once fully answered, and the affirmative made sure and evident - then we shall have a Philosophy that will unite in itself the warmth of the mystic, the definiteness of the Dialectician, and the sunny clearness of the Naturalist, the productivity of the Experimental and the evidence of the Mathematician." (MS.2801, f.101)(pub. in IS., pp.126-7)

246 NB.55, p.5 (unpub.)

247 SM., pp.264-5.

248 NB.47, p.22 (pub. in CXVII:C, p.692) In MS.2801 there is an attempt of Coleridge to "translate the truth out of the language of Abstract or General Terms into that of Reality", The attempt is undated, but from his handwriting and language, it was undoubtedly written sometime after the Aids to Reflection and probably as late as 1830. "Reason = 1. Essentials Light? 2. Intuitive Being? 3. To Sive To Proven To Viol To Is. To Esse To Seire, me esse scientem? the identity or co-immanence of Being and Knowing? So far, good: only that in the tentative definition No.3 I find a surreptitious term, a "me" that has crept in, without giving any account of itself, whence and how it came there. Reason is a sense of Being, an affirmation of Reality. But likewise it is Being - it is the reality of whatever is affirmed. Consequently, the former, i.e. the Sense, must be an act, not a being acted on. (Actus Passion) for were it a Passion, there must be, it should seem, some other Being or Reality, which is not Reason, but by which the Reason is acted on - but this is contrary to the assumption, is precluded in the Definition. I find it therefore truly a Verb Substantive, but as long as I insulate the idea and contemplate the idea fixedly, singly, exclusively, a verb substantive in the third person Est. Affirmatur. Hitherto at least I can discover no reflective act, nor am able to conceive any source of reflection. Reason, considered in and by itself, is the absolute object - objective Being, objective Knowledge...

Let us look back then, and re-consider our definition - whether it was not too narrow? Perhaps we may enlarge
it, or find some idea implied therein by evolving which we may enrich the former and truly so it proves. For whether I try the subject defined by some other attribute, or meditate on the definition itself, the result is the same in both cases. In the first, I see clearly that Reason is not only the identity or co-inherence of Being and of Knowing, and likewise the identity of Unity and of Distinction. ... In the second case, I see no less clearly that the latter is implied in the former - for a Knowing in which nothing is distinguished is an absolutely indistinct Knowledge, i.e. no knowledge at all and in like manner is the Unity involved in the Being/ for, first, as by the definition Reason is the identity of Being and Knowing, if the latter = 0, the former = 0/ and secondly, if the Unity were denied, there would be an indeterminable number of practical Reasons, each of which would be the identity of Being and not being...

f.41. Still, I say, we are not out of the wood, We have arrived at the fact indeed, but by no means into an insight into the fact. Reason must be subjective. But how do we come at this subject. - In reason considered singly, is absolutely objective - and if Reason be the first, without any affirmable antecedent, all expectation of finding what we want elsewhere must be abandoned, for from the absolutely objective the objective alone can be derived even tho' it were not as in this instance it is the case, that this Absolute Object comprehends all Being." (MS.2801, f. 39-41)(unpub.)

NB.37, p.38 (unpub.)

NB.44, p.17 (unpub.)

SM., p.264.


MS. Note. Leighton. op.cit., Vol.II., p.56 (pub. in Aids, p.75)

MS. Note. Nicolai, C.F. Weber meine geleherte Bildung,etc. 1799. p.20 (unpub.)

MS. Note. Behmen. op.cit., Vol.III., p.6 (unpub.)

NB.34, p.12 (unpub.)

258 Aids, p.154.
259 NB.44, p.36 (unpub.)
260 NB.55, p.14 (unpub.)
262 NB.47, p.133 (unpub.)
263 Aids, p.273.
265 ibid., p.28.
266 MS. Note. Behmen. op.cit., Vol.III, p.33 (unpub.)
268 ibid., p.18.
269 ibid., p.60.
270 Aids, p.143.
272 NB.18, p.107.
273 NB.43, p.25.
277 Wellek. op.cit., p.108.
279 ibid., p.117.
280 ibid., p.255.
281 ibid., p.66.
282 SM., pp.264-5 (See Note 247 No. 247 above)
MS. Logic. Vol. II., pp. 414-16; Chinol. op. cit.,
Appendix (E.I) p. 127. Sometime in 1825 or after
Coleridge wrote in a note on Davison, "By Ideas I
Many more illustrations could be given.

284 Muirhead. op. cit., p. 111.
285 NB. 43, p. 20 (unpub.)
286 Muirhead. op. cit., p. 244.
289 Aids, p. 96.
290 Friend, p. 102.
291 Aids, p. 228.
292 ibid., p. 168.
293 See ED., Vol. I, pp. 128 ff. for notes on H. More, and
pp. 351 ff. for notes on John Smith. The only
explanation for Coleridge's censorious attitude in
these notes is his desire to disassociate himself
from the "mystical" connotations which in his age
accompanied references to the Cambridge Platonists.
It will be seen that certain positions of which he
is critical are not essentially different from his
own.
295 NB. 13, p. 51 (unpub.)
296 Fox, G. Journal. 1694. p. 22.
297 Aids, p. 142.
298 NTP., p. 6; NB. 34, p. 144.
CHAPTER II.

SIN AND REDEMPTION.

1. MS. Note. Swedenborg, E. De Coelo et ejus Mirabilibus et de Inferno, ex Auditis & Visis. 1758. p.54 (unpub.)


4. MS. note. Miller, J. Sermons intended to show a sober application of Scriptural Principles to the Realities of Life. 1830. p.43.

"Moral evil is over all and the best men feel a will of the flesh opposing the Will of the Spirit. A source of Moral Evil, not accidental, but common to all men, is therefore a fact." (unpub.)


7. ibid., p.241.

8. ibid., p.105.

9. ibid., p.200. The quotation is from a letter of 1796.

In 1803 Coleridge explained and defended his visionary "democratic" ideas as the privilege of youth. "I was retiring from Politics, disgusted beyond measure by the manner and morals of the Democrats, and fully awake to the inconsistency of my practise with my speculative Principles. My speculative Principles were wild as Dreams - they were 'Dreams linked to purpose of Reason'; but they were perfectly harmless - a compound of Philosophy and Christianity. They were Christian, for they demanded the direct reformation and voluntary act of each Individual prior to any change in his outward circumstances, and my whole Plan of Revolution was confined to an experiment with a dozen families in the wilds of America; they were philosophical, because I contemplated a possible consequent amelioration of the Human Race in its present state and in this world; yet Christian still, because I regarded this earthly amelioration as important chiefly for its effects on the future State of the Race of man so ameliorated ... For what is the nature and the beauty of Youth? Is it not this - to know what is right in the abstract, by a living feeling, by an intuition of the uncorrupted Heart? To body forth thro' abstract right in beautiful
Forms? And lastly to project this phantom-world into the world of Reality, like a catoptrical Mirror? Say rather, to make ideas and realities stand side by side, the one as vivid as the other... But my relations, and the Churchmen and 'Aristocrats', to use the phrase of the Day - these too conceited my phantoms to be substances/only what I beheld as Angels they saw as Devils..." (Letters, Vol.II, p.999)


Dejection an Ode. lines 243-5.


NB.20, p.35 (unpubl)

NB.50, p.17 (unpubl) Coleridge explained and admitted his indolence in a letter to Godwin in 1802. "You appear to me not to have understood the nature of my body and mind. Partly from ill-health, and partly from an unhealthy and reverie-like vividness of Thoughts, and (pardon the pedantry of the phrase) a diminished Impressibility from Things, my ideas, wishes, and feelings are to a diseased degree disconnected from motion and action. In plain and natural English, I am a dreaming and therefore an indolent man." (Letters. Vol.II, p.782)

In a notebook Coleridge assigned all his trouble to "dread". "It is a most instructive part of my life the fact, that I have always preyed on by some Dread, and perhaps all my faulty actions have been the consequences of some Dread or other on my mind (from fear of Pain or Shame, not from Prospect of Pleasure)- so in my Childhood and Boyhood the horror of being detected with a sorehead, afterward imagining the fears of having the itch in my Blood-, then a short-lived fit of Fears from sex - then horror of Duns, and a state of struggling with madness from an incapability of hoping that I should be able to marry Mary Evans (and the strange passion of fervent tho' wholly imaginative and imaginary Love uncombinable by my utmost efforts with any regular Hope- (possibly from deficiency of bodily feeling, of actual ideas connected with the image) had all the effects of direct Fear, and I have lain for hours together awake at night, groaning and praying. Then came that stormy time and for a few months America really inspired Hope, and I became an exalted Being - and then came Rob. Southey's alienation (my marriage - constant dread in my mind respecting
Mrs. Coleridge's Temper etc. - And finally stimulants in the fear and prevention of violent Bowel-attacks from mental agitation, then almost epileptic night horrors in my sleep/ and since then every error I have committed has been the immediate effect of the Dread of these bad most shocking Dreams - anything to prevent them and all this inter-woven with its minor consequences, that fill up the interspaces." (NB. 21, p.127) (unpub.)

NB.15, p.120 (unpub.)


BL., (Intro.) Vol.I, p.XVIII (A similar confession is in AP., p.3)

Letters. Vol.II, pp.1188-9. Having received a critical reply from Fricker concerning his specifically Christian doctrinal belief in the portion of the letter quoted, it is interesting to note Coleridge's condescension in the use of the common theological language in his own reply to Fricker. "I fear you rather misunderstood one part of my letter-. I by no means gave that extract as containing the whole of my Christian Faith; but as comprising such doctrines as a clear Head and honest heart assisted by divine Grace might in part discover by self-examination and the light of natural conscience and which efficiently and practically believed would prepare the way for the peculiar doctrine of Christianity, namely salvation by the Cross of Christ. I meant these doctrines as the skeleton, to which the death and mediation of Christ with the supervision of the Holy Ghost were to add the Flesh and Blood, muscles, nerves, and vitality. God of his goodness grant, that I may arrive at a more living faith in these last, than I now feel. What I now feel is only a very strong presentiment of their Truth and importance, aided by a thorough conviction of the hollowness of all other systems. Alas! my moral being is too untranquil, too deeply possessed by our lingering passion after an earthly good withheld, and probably withheld by divine goodness, from me, to be capable of being that, which its own "still small voice" tells me even in my dreams, that it ought to be, yet of itself cannot be. Indeed I am at times on the brink of obdurate despair, and am kept from it often by the wish of warning others - I hope to converse with you shortly, if God spare my Life." (UL., Vol.I, p.351)


NTP., pp.29-30.
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<td>23</td>
<td>PhL., pp.224-5.</td>
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<td>24</td>
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<td>25</td>
<td>Aids, p.206.</td>
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<td>46</td>
<td>ibid., p.357 (unpub.)</td>
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48 ibid., p.192.
49 ibid., p.190.
50 NB.20, p.32 (unpub.)
51 Howard, op.cit., p.94.
52 Aids, p.188.
53 ibid., p.191.
54 NB.17, p.99 (Pub. in AP., p.259)
55 ibid., p.99
56 TT., p.182.
57 NB.41, p.82 (unpub.)
59 Aids, p.194.
62 BL., Vol.II, p.216
63 NB.43, p.8 (unpub.)
64 MS. "On the Divine Ideas" pp.49-50 (unpub.)
65 ibid., p.25 (unpub.)
67 MS. "On the Divine Ideas" p.141 (unpub.)
68 MS. note. Miller. op.cit., p.25 (unpub.)
69 MS. note. Swedenborg. De Coelo et ejus Mirabilibus et de Inferno. 1758. p.266 (unpub.)
70 NB.44, p.31 (unpub.)
72 NB.35, p.48; NB.36, p.2. (unpub.)
73 NB.46, p.26 (unpub.)
Coleridge does not ordinarily speak of eternity as "endless time" as in this quotation. The "endless Perishing" to which he refers is the result of "sinking below time", which is the greatest evil. "Rising above time" to be with God in "timelessness" is the "greatest good". He always insisted that "eternity" must be the opposite of time, the negation of time.
Coleridge's idea of union with God, for which he appealed to the Fourth Gospel as his authority, is much the same as that found in the Gospel by C.H. Dodd. See The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel, pp.187 ff.


The quotation continues, "It is singular, (Coleridge said), how all men have agreed in assigning to Luther the heroic character; and indeed it is certainly most just. Luther, however wrong in some of his opinions, was always right in design and spirit. In translating his ideas into conceptions, he always understood something higher and more universal than he had the means of expressing. He did not bestow too much attention on one part of man's nature to the exclusion of the others; but gave its due place to each, - the intellectual, the practical, and so forth."

Friend, p.91.


114 NB.47, p.18 (unpub.)
115 NB.30, p.14 (unpub.)
116 Friend, p.225.
117 Aids, p.73.
119 ibid., p.91.
120 NTP, p.32.
121 ibid., p.31.
122 ibid., pp.127-8.
123 ibid., p.35.
126 NTP., pp.162-3.
127 Aids, p.73.
128 MS. note. Leighton. op.cit., Vol.IV, p.396 (unpub.)
129 NTP., p.35.
132 MS. note. Miller. op.cit., p.45 (unpub.)
133 Aids, p.104.
134 NB.35, p.30 (unpub.)
136 Aids, p.259.
137 NB.54, p.17 (unpub.)
138 NB.48, p.23 (unpub.)
Coleridge insisted that Swedenborg had imposed a meaning upon faith and works which he wrongly imputed to Protestant doctrine. "The point, I least like in Swedenborg, and which (I reluctantly confess) seems to me to detract considerably from the character of his mind as well as from the theological value and philosophical merit of his writings, is his evident disposition and constant efforts to interpret the phrases of the Churches, to whose tenets he opposes his own, into meanings of the greatest possible difference that might be conveyed in these words, and then burdening them with consequences which they disclaim, and which (as in the doctrine of Faith and Works common to the Lutherans and Calvinists) do not appear in their lives..." (ibid., Vol. II Front Fly-leaf) (unpub.)

In another note he again defended Swedenborg's idea of faith as correct, being exactly the same as that against which Swedenborg thought he was writing. "An enlightened
Church of England Minister who interprets the Scriptures in coincident with the framers of the Church Liturgy, Articles and Homilies would believe, that Sw. either imposed on himself δ'α ἀναλλοίως ἐπίθετο, εὑρον οὖν ἐν ἀπειρίκτους, or had been deluded by erroneous Spirits in the spir. world. Who but a few mad men among the few Antinomians have ever otherwise distinguished Faith and Charity but as the Trunk and the Branch, or rather Faith as the living Root, out of which charity necessarily springs as Trunk and Branches? Who ever dreamt of Faith without charity, or Fire without Heat? No! but in opposition to a Pagan and Popish delusion, it is asserted by the Evangelical Divines, and will, I trust, continue to be asserted that true Christian Charity does not exist without Faith; but that as a lively Faith implies charity, so a genuine Christian Charity supposes Faith. And who, I pray, ever asserted this more strongly than Emanuel Swedenborg himself?" (ibid., p.570)(unpub.)

156 Aids, p.105.


158 NTP., p.21.

159 Aids, p.106.


162 TT., p.431.

163 NTP., p.20.


165 ibid., p.57.


167 Aids, p.104.


171 NB.44, p.31 (unpub.)
In a note on The Doctor of Southey, Coleridge wrote, "Truth and evidence are distinct terms, the latter implying the former, but not vice versa. Truths equal in certainty, may be of very unequal evidence... Would that Southey could be induced to see that the light from metaphysics - that lumen fatuum, at which he so triumphantly scoffs- is better than the recollections of the legends and technical slang of commonplace sermons! and then, instead of 'the light of mere reason', he would have said, 'the inferences of the sensual understanding, imperfectly enlightened by reason. There is something shocking to a thoughtful spirit in the very phrase, 'mere reason'. I could almost as easily permit my tongue to say 'mere God'.'" (pub. in Blackwood's, Jan. 1882 Vol. CXXXI, p.110)
What is the Law of Conscience a mere arbitrary assumption? Kant appeals to a fact: those who find that fact in their moral reason cannot deny the deduction, for those who cannot find it, Kant has not written. Such men must be made better, before they can become wiser, men.
212  NB.20, p.31 (unpub.)
CHAPTER III

REVELATION AND HISTORY.

1. NB.18, p.106 (unpub.)
2. MS. Bristol Lectures, p.106 (unpub.)
3. ibid., p.109 (unpub.)
4. MS. On the Divine Ideas, p.151 (unpub.) The passage reads, "It has indeed been long familiar with the learned to affirm or deny the identity of the supposed Platonic Trinity with that of the Christian Church and if it were reasonable to found a decision on so momentous a subject on a single fragment of Speusippus, and this comprised in one short sentence, I should be inclined to the affirmative." Coleridge went on to say on p.153 that the resemblance between the Christian Trinity and that of Plato was no more than verbal. But on p.161 he called Speusippus "the most faithful organ of original Platonism", and in a note stated his Trinity which Coleridge thought to be very like the Christian. "The order of the Hypostases, in the Godhead according to Speusippus was , the One as the source of Unity and Ground of all Being, , and ."

Plotinus and Proclus made their mistake in making their first principle of the Trinity the idea of the Good instead of the idea of Will (pp.161, 169, 171). The greatest fault Coleridge found with Plotinus was that he refused to attribute will to God. (unpub.)

5. NB.18, p.105 (unpub.)
6. NB.18, p.122 (unpub.)
7. NB.18, p.119
8. NB.17, p.20 (unpub.)
9. NB.17, p.22 (unpub.)
10. NB.18, p.125 (unpub.)
11. NB.30, p.27 (unpub.)
12. NB.37, p.66 (unpub.)
In a note on Stillingfleet, Coleridge complained, "And why is Philosophy for ever to be set up as the Rival rather than the Friend and natural Companion of Christianity? What is Christianity but a divine and pre-eminent Philosophy? A stream in whose depths the Elephant may swim, and in whose practical and saving Truths the Lamb may ford? Besides, who shall dare say of your river, such and such a wave came from such a fountain? What Scholar (and by scholars the vulgar are taught) shall say - Such a conviction, such a moral feeling, I received from St. John, such and such from Seneca, or Epictetus?" (MS. note, Stillingfleet, E. Origine Sacrae, or a Rational Account of the Grounds of Christian Faith, as to the Truth and Divine Authority of the Scriptures, etc. 1675, pp. 438-9) (pub. in the Athenaeum, March, 27, 1875, reprinted at the expense of Wm. A. Smith., p.12)

Coleridge wrote, "The reading of histories may dispose a man to satire; but the science of history, history studied in the light of philosophy, as the great drama of an ever-unfolding Providence, has a very different effect. It infuses hope and reverential thoughts of man in his destination." (CCS., p.44) Coleridge did not find history devoid of progress and development toward an increasingly more Christian society. In the optimism with which he discovered timeless and eternal truths of God working beneficently in historical fact he is perhaps furthest removed from the thought of today which is apt to find nothing in historical principles but fuel to feed the fires of pessimism. But, while Coleridge in his optimistic ideas on progress and development can be readily identified with the nineteenth century, Coleridge's idea of progress should not be confused with the humanitarian ideas of that century which envisaged a man-constructed heaven-on-earth. His idea of progress and development must be tempered with his idea of sin and grace, from which they were never separate. In MS.2801 there is a note to this effect: "As far, therefore, as a firm faith in a redemptive process, never suspended, tho' not always apparent, may be called optimism, so far I shall remain an optimist. But that the progress consists in a moral and intellectual progression of the Mass of
Mankind, or of the whole people or Nation - this no longer appears to me so clear a point as it did during that period of Life when the Head took the Heart for its chief Counsellor, and when whatever of Good was stirring within me I supposed myself to have in common with all men. But I have since then been made to reflect..." (MS. cut off at "reflect", f.258) (unpub.)

If one is willing to grant that C.H. Dodd has correctly interpreted the symbolic nature of the Fourth Gospel, it would be difficult to say that Coleridge misconstrued the "ideas" of St. John. Dodd has written, "To a writer with the philosophical presuppositions of the evangelist there is no reason why a narrative should not be at the same time factually true and symbolic of a deeper truth, since things and events in this world derive what reality they possess from the eternal Ideas they embody.

Thus the very nature of the symbolism employed by the evangelist reflects his fundamental Weltanschauung. He writes in terms of a world in which phenomena - things and events - are a living and moving image of the eternal, and not a veil of illusion to hide it, a world in which the Word is made flesh." "The symbol is absorbed into the reality it signifies." (Dodd, C.H. The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel. 1954 pp.142-3; See the whole chapter on Symbolism, pp.133 ff)


The Destiny of Nations. Lines 27-31; 35.


NB.37, p.6 (unpub.)


ibs., p.134.

ibid., p.272.


EF., p.334.

ibs., p.273.

CIS., p.316.

Robinson, p.161


NB.41, p.13 (unpub.)

NB.26, p.39 (unpub.)


NB.26, p.39 (unpub.)

NB.17, p.118 (pub. AP., p.258)


NB.30, p.26 (unpub.)

CIS., p.295.

See Chapter IV, pp.247 ff.

ibs., pp.252 ff.

NB.36, p.41 (unpub.)
See Chadwick, H., Ed. *Lessing's Theological Writings* 1956. p.31. Also see the 1849 edition of *Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit* where J.H. Green defends Coleridge against charges of plagiarism from Lessing.

Some of Coleridge's notes on Lessing are interesting. They show his awareness of the consequences when Lessing has divorced the accidental fact from the necessary idea. Coleridge himself drove the same wedge between historical truth and the truth of Reason in his earlier life, but spent his latter years attempting, not altogether unsuccessfully, to withdraw the wedge by an analysis of the Jewish drapery which surrounded the original kerygma. In a note critical of Lessing, Coleridge wrote, "Year after year I have made a point of reperusing the *Widere Schriften*, as masterpieces of style and argument. But in the *Reasoning from 115 to 125* I feel at each reperusal more and more puzzled how so palpable a miss could have been made by so acute a mind. He ought to have denied in the first instance and under all circumstances the possible consequences of a speculative conviction from a supposed miracle, having no connection with the doctrine asserted; ex.gr. a man cut a grindstone in half with his thumb. I saw it with my own eyes. Therefore, there are three and only three self-subsisting Persons in the Unity of the Deity. But L. having conceded this, it is absurd to affirm that the most unquestioned and unquestionable historic evidence (ex.gr. that George the third was not the Son but the Grandson of George the Second, to me who live under George the 4th) is in no degree a substitute for the evidence of my own senses - that the conviction produced by such best possible confluences of Testimony bears no proportion to the conviction produced in me by the recollection (i.e. testimony of my memory) of my own experience." (Lessing, *Sämtliche Schriften*, 1796 Vol.5-6, Flyleaf, pp.115-126) (pub. in Chadwick, op. cit., p.32)

Again Coleridge wrote, "I cannot see the consequentness of all this reasoning. If (as Lessing admits) the sight of a Miracle as the present fulfilment of a known prior prophecy would be the sufficient ground of implicit faith in the assurances of the Prophet and Thaumaturge, the Belief of such an occurrence on the strongest possible historical evidence must be the ground of a proportional belief in these assurances. Less indeed and less impressive, but yet a ground." (op.cit., p.122) (unpub.)

It will be noted that Coleridge finds fault in Lessing
21 NB.47, p.34 (unpub.)
22 NB.34, p.16 (unpub.)
23 NB.36, p.71 (unpub.)
24 NB.41, p.33 (unpub.)
25 TT., p.43.
26 NB.30, p.27 (unpub.)
27 Aids, pp.259-60.
28 Aids, p.212.
29 NB.18, p.25 (unpub.)
30 NB.19, p.35 (unpub.)
31 NB.49, p.12 (unpub.)
32 Aids, p.242.
34 NB.48, p.34 (unpub.)
36 NB.36, p.41 (unpub.)
37 NB.41, p.25 (unpub.)
38 NB.37, p.53 (unpub.)
39 NB.41, p.41 (unpub.)
40 TT., p.295.
41 NB.36, p.32 (unpub.)
42 NB.51, p.22 (unpub.)
43 NB.37, p.25 (unpub.)
44 NB.45, p.36 (unpub.)
45 NB.41, p.14 (unpub.)
46 Aids, p.56.
48 ibid., p. 726.
52 Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics. Ed. J. Hastings. Irving and the Catholic Apostolic Church. The appeal of the enthusiasm of Irving for Coleridge is set forth plainly in a fragment in MS. 2601. Coleridge wrote of Irving, "I have no faith in his prophesying; small sympathy with his fulminations; and in certain peculiarities of his theological system as distinct from his religious principles, I cannot see my way.
But I hold withal, and not the less firmly for these discrepancies in our moods and judgements, that Edward Irving possesses more of the spirit and purposes of the first Reformers, that he has more of the Head and Heart, the Life, the Unction, and the genial Powers of Martin Luther, than any man now alive; yea than any man of this and the last Century. I see in Edward Irving a Minister of Christ after the order of Paul; and if the points, in which I think him either erroneous, or excessive and out of bounds, have been at any time a subject of serious regret with me, this regret has arisen principally or altogether from the apprehension of their narrowing the sphere of his influence, from the too great probability that they may furnish occasion or pretext for withholding or withdrawing many from these momentous truths, which the age especially needs, and for the enforcement of which he hath been so highly and especially gifted!" (f.206-7) (partially pub. in IS., p. 298)
53 MS. note. Irving, E. Sermons, Lectures, and Occasional Discourses. 1828. Vol. I. Front fly-leaf. The full Dedication of For Missionaries after the Apostolical School (pp. VII-IX) is worth printing in full. It not only gives a picture of Irving's character and his relationship with Coleridge, but also hints at the disdain and contempt Coleridge had aroused in his contemporaries by his attacks on the "mechanical" theology.
"My Dear and Honoured Friend. Unknown as you are, in the true character either of your mind or of your heart, to the greater part of your countrymen, and misrepresented as your works have been, by those who have the ear of the vulgar, it will seem wonderful to many that I should make choice of you, from the circle of my friends, to dedicate to you these beginnings of my thoughts upon the most important subject of these or any times. And when I state the reason to be, that you have been more profitable to my faith in orthodox doctrine, to my spiritual understanding of the Word of God, and to my right conception of the Christian Church, than any or all of the men with whom I have entertained friendship and conversation, it will perhaps still more astonish the mind and stagger the belief, of those who have adopted, as once I did myself, the misrepresentations which are purchased for a hire and vended for a price, concerning your character and works. You have only to shut your ear to what they ignorantly say of you, and earnestly to meditate the deep thoughts with which you are instinct, and give them a suitable body and form that they may live, then silently commit them to the good sense of ages yet to come, in order to be ranked hereafter amongst the most gifted sages and greatest benefactors of your country. Enjoy and occupy the quiet which, after many trials, the providence of God hath bestowed upon you, in the bosom of your friends; and may you be spared until you have made known the multitude of your thoughts, unto those who at present value, or shall hereafter arise to value, their worth.

I have partaken so much high intellectual enjoyment from being admitted into the close and familiar intercourse with which you have honoured me, and your many conversations concerning the revelations of the Christian faith have been so profitable to me in every sense, as a student and a preacher of the Gospel, as a spiritual man and a Christian pastor, and your high intelligence and great learning have at all times so kindly stooped to my ignorance and inexperience, that not merely with the affection of friend to friend, and the honour due from youth to experienced age, but with the gratitude of a disciple to a wise and generous teacher, of an anxious inquirer to the good man who hath helped him in the way of truth, I do now presume to offer you the first fruits of my mind since it received a new impulse towards truth, and a new insight into its depths, from listening to your discourse. Accept them in good part, and be assured that however insignificant in themselves, they are the offering of a heart which loves your heart, and of a mind which looks up with reverence to your mind.

Edward Irving."
TT., p.76. In a notebook Coleridge wrote, "Gen.Ch.XXVIII, 10-17. If no other parts of the Bible had been of similar import, and these passages stood alone, it would seem to me scarcely possible that any candid mind could deny the existence of a distinct pre-diction and promise of a Saviour of Mankind - and awful and verily judicial is the blindness of the Jews who degrade the patriarchal Desire of Nations into a Jewish Napoleon. And most unhappily even Christian Divines have been seduced by the spurious Daniel, and this too grossly misinterpreted, into favoring this gross and base superstition of the Jews." (NB.42, p.55)(unpub.)
In 1827 Coleridge decided that his close association with Irving might be understood as implying common beliefs, and thought it prudent to leave a record of his differences. "It may be not amiss that I should leave a record in my own hand, how far, in what sense, and under what conditions, I agree with my friend, Edward Irving, respecting the second coming of the Son of Man. I. How far? First, instead of the full and entire conviction, the positive assurance, which Mr. Irving entertains, I even in those points in which my judgement most coincides with his, profess only to regard them as probable, and to vindicate them as nowise inconsistent with orthodoxy. They may be believed, and they may be doubted, salva Catholica fide. Further, from these points I exclude all prognostications of time and event; the mode, the persons, the places, of the accomplishment; and I decidedly protest against all parts of Mr. Irving's and of Lacunza's scheme grounded on the books of Daniel or the Apocalypse, interpreted as either of the two, Irving or Lacunza, understands them. Again, I protest against all identification of the coming with the Apocalyptic Millennium, which in my belief began under Constantine. II. In what sense? In this and no other, that the objects of the Christian Redemption will be perfected on this earth; that the kingdom of God and his Word, the latter as the Son of Man, in which the divine will shall be done on earth as it is in heaven, will come; and that the whole march of nature and history, from the first impregnation of Chaos by the Spirit, converges toward this kingdom as the final cause of the world. Life begins in detachment from Nature, and ends in union with God. III. Under what conditions? That I retain my former convictions respecting St. Michael, and the ex-saint Lucifer, and the Genie Prince of Persia, and the re-institution of bestial sacrifices in the Temple at Jerusalem, and the rest of this class. All these appear to me so many pimples on the face of my friend's faith from inward heats, leaving
it indeed a fine handsome intelligent face, but certain not adding to its comeliness. Such are the convictions of S.T. Coleridge, May, 1827." (ED., Vol. II, pp. 335-7)


83 TT., pp. 266-7.

84 TT., p. 308.


86 NB. 26, p. 73 (unpub.)

87 NB. 41, p. 41 (unpub.)

88 NB. 41, p. 5 (unpub.)

89 NB. 44, p. 72 (unpub.)

90 NB. 44, p. 78 (unpub.)

91 NB. 53, p. 11 (unpub.)


94 NB. 53, p. 7 (unpub.)


99 MS. note. Eternal Punishment proved to be not Suffering, but Privation; and immortality dependent on Spiritual Regeneration. By a Member of the Church of England. 1817. p. VIII. (unpub.)

100 NB. 42, p. 44 (unpub.)
"So I think, who take Gen. I literally and geologically; and so did I think when I interpreted the Chapter as a Morning Hymn, in which the Creation is represented under the analogy of the daily emergence of visible Nature out of Night thro' all the successive appearances till full Sun rise..." (unpub.)
Coleridge loved the play on his initials with the Greek "στέφω." In 1802 he wrote to Sotheby, "στέφω signifies 'he hath stood,' which, in these times of apostasy from the principle of freedom or of religion in this country, and from both by the same persons in France, is no unmeaning signature, if subscribed with humility, and in the remembrance of 'Let him that stands take heed lest he fall!' However, it is, in truth, no more than S.T.C. written in Greek, Es tee see." (L., Vol.I, p.401) E.H. Coleridge pointed out that "στέφω" signifies 'he hath placed,' not 'he hath stood.' (Ibid.) But, of course, the play on the initials would have been lost had not Coleridge done a bit of twisting.

142 NB. 36, p. 67 (unpub.)


144 NB. 39, p. 11 (unpub.)

145 NB. 47, p. 26 (unpub.)


Coleridge wrote, "The last verses of Mark's Gospel by internal and external evidence are by all the later school of Biblical Criticism asterisked as spurious - manifest echoes of misunderstood passages in the Acts of the Apostles." (unpub.)

Before a note on Irving in which he stated he could not be expected to have any interest in the Virgin Birth he wrote, "My active and positive Belief commencing where, I am persuaded, the Gospels in their first form commenced, from the Baptism of John; and assured that Paul, John and Peter, whose amanuensis and Interpreter Mark was, either were ignorant of the traditions prefixed to Luke's Gospel and conccorporated with the Greek Edition of the Gospel of the Hebrew Church attributed to Matthew, or did not regard them as necessary parts of a Christian Faith; ... I cannot be supposed to feel much interest in these somewhat startling speculations of my friend," (Irving, E. Sermons, Lectures, and Occasional Discourses. 1828. Vol. 1, p. 39)(unpub.)

In a note on Waterland Coleridge wrote, "But I will go further, and confess my belief that the (so-called) Ebionites of the first and second centuries, who rejected the Christopaedia, and whose Gospel commenced with the baptism by John, were orthodox Apostolic Christians, who received Christ as the Lord, that is, as Jehovah manifested in the flesh." (ED., Vol. II, p. 208)

148 In 1826 Coleridge wrote with reference to the Virgin Birth, "...surely facts, of which Paul probably was, and certainly wished to be, ignorant, have but little claim to rank as articles of Faith at the present day." (Schleiermacher, F. A Critical Essay on the Gospel of Luke. 1825. p. 37)(unpub.) A year or so after he wrote the Aids to Reflection Coleridge said, "My inward Creed, as a Christian, remains without subtraction or addition as it stands in the Aids to Reflection... My outward
Creed is the Apostles as expanded in the Nicene — save only with regard to the former, I find a difficulty in receiving as an essential of Faith the words "born of the Virgin Mary" — seeing that there is not even an allusion to any such Belief as taught or required by the Apostles in any part of the New Testament—" (NB.20, p.33)(unpub.) In a note on Waterland he commented, "Non nude hominem — not a mere man do I hold Jesus to have been and to be; but a perfect man and, by personal union with the Logos, perfect God. That his having an earthly father might be requisite to his being a perfect man I can readily suppose; but why the having an earthly father should be more compatible with his perfect divinity, than his having an earthly mother I cannot comprehend. All that John and Paul believed, God forbid that I should not!" (ED., II, p.210)
TT., p. 42.

CHAPTER V.

PRAYER, TRI-UNITY, AND SACRAMENT.

1. UL., Vol.I, p.48


4 De Quincey, T. Recollections of the Lake Poets. 1948. p.36.

5 TT., p.173.


7 NB.13, p.50 (unpub.)


10 NTP., p.86.

11 TT., p.109; NB.13, p.50.

12 NB.40, p.10 (unpub.)

13 NB.47, p.8 (unpub.)

14 TT., p.308.

15 UL., Vol.I, p.48. Sometime between 1797-1801 Coleridge decided, "As we recede from anthropomorphism we must go either to the Trinity or Pantheism. The Fathers who were Unitarians were anthropomorphites." (AP., p.14) Coleridge first went to Pantheism and then to the Trinity.


17 ibid., p.444.


19 PhL. (Notes) p.420.

20 NB.18, p.106 (unpub.)
23 TT., p. 77.
24 ibid., p. 172.
26 NB. 42, p. 40 (unpub.)
28 NB. 42, p. 61 (unpub.)
30 NTP., p. 395.
31 NB. 45, p. 27 (unpub.)
33 MS. note. Lessing, G.E. Sammtliche Schriften. 15 vols. 1796. Vols. 5-6, p. 54 (unpub.)
34 MS. note. ibid., Vols. 17-18; p. 296 (unpub.)
35 NB. 43, p. 20 (unpub.)
36 NB. 45, p. 20 (unpub.)
37 NB. 48, p. 32 (unpub.)
39 ibid., p. 183.
40 ibid., p. 185.
41 ibid., p. 179.
42 NTP., p. 395.
In a note on Burnet's History of the Reformation Coleridge wrote, "In the Appendix to Strype's Life of Cranmer is to be found an excellent paper of Bucer's on the Eucharist, in a spirit very superior to the metaphysics of his age. The result is that the Body and Blood are the Corpus, or actual and substantial body, and therefore spiritual; not the Corpus. And that in the former or universal sense the doctrine of the real (as opposed to phenomenal) presence is agreeable with reason, and to Scripture (MTP., p. 72)."
"The Reading of Arnold's great work did not shake but rather confirm the opinion, I had deduced from the Scripture, and have since then found in Bucer's Exposition printed in the Appendix to Strype's Life of Cranmer. But if I had known another scheme of the Eucharist but that of Transubstantiation, and the scheme of Bishop Hoadly and the modern Sacramentaries, I could not have hesitated in preferring the former, spite of its logical unstateability. I take the earliest Fathers, and find no graduation in the terms by which the Eucharist is described. From the very first it is ἡ μυστήριον τερωτικόν - the tremendous Mystery. Grant that the expressions were metaphorical; yet the number of metaphors, all possessing a common character of struggle and striving, and the constant use of figurative language, prove irrefragably a something meant that overfilled and stretched the writer's mind, and by its transcendence suspended the function of the logical Faculty." (unpub.)

"I find, not without some pleasure, that my own view of it, (i.e. the Eucharist) which I was afraid was original, was maintained in the tenth century, (Erigena?) that is to say, that the body broken had no reference to the human body of Christ, but to the Caro Noumenon, or symbolical Body, the Rock that followed the Israelites."

"I can easily believe that a thousand monks and friars would pretend, as Taylor says, to 'disbelieve their eyes and ears, and defy their own reason,' and to receive the dogma in the sense, or rather in the nonsense, here ascribed to it by him, namely, that the phenomenal bread and wine were the phenomenal flesh and blood. But I likewise know that the respectable Roman Catholic theologians state the article free from a contradiction in terms at least; namely, that in the consecrated elements the noumena of the phenomenal bread and wine are the same with that which was the noumenon of the phenomenal flesh and blood of Christ when on earth."

"This Bread is my Flesh: and this Wine is my Blood. Such is the Position. Now either the emphasis is to be laid on the pronoun my: and then the words might signify. These to me are the same as Flesh and Blood are to men in general - which again might be interpreted, I as the co-eternal Word, or Son, have, in myself and properly, neither Flesh or Blood, but in reference to you whatever sustains and nourishes you in body or in soul, are my flesh and blood. Thus it might refer to what some of the Fathers deemed the first incarnation of the Logos, the creation of the universe of things finite - and the use of the words would be to instruct the Apostles that his Body, as a phaenomenon, was transitory like theirs, and that the Breaking on the Cross was itself symbolical - while the real Passion and Acts extended thro' creation, of all which (as far as it 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Pound of Tea at Turners, and the second is the Coat, which my Taylor will have made by that time.

Or lastly, it is more than remembrances— a commemorative and means— that spiritual Support, and Benefit which is effected for mankind in general by the breaking of my Body and the shedding of my Blood shall be present and communicated to each in particular who shall in faith break bread and drink the Wine in imitation of the former.— Thus a Sovereign might promise protection to every man, who drank his Health.

The third may be believed exclusively— the 4th con­jointly with the third, as a concomitant — and both may be combined with the first.— I myself am inclined to adopt the first, involving the 4th, and admitting the third as an occasional Use. Thus a letter, which I was ordered to deliver, may remind me of the letter, and of its various contents and connexions." (pub. CXVII:0, pp. 304-6)

80 MTP., p. 39-40. "The Ceremonial sign, namely, the eating the bread and drinking the wine, became a symbol, that is, a solemn instance and exemplification of the class of mysterious acts, which we are, or as Christians should be, performing daily and hourly in every social duty and recreation. This is indeed to recreate the man in and by Christ. Sublimely did the fathers call the Eucharist the extension of the Incarnation: only I should have preferred the perpetuation and application of the Incarnation."


83 NB=18, p. 125 (unpub.)

84 In a marginal note Coleridge wrote, "But thank God in holding with a firm grip the doctrine of the Real Presence they (i.e. the Reformers) did not forget that our Saviour had warned them that his words on this Subject were Spirit and that in all things the Spiritual is the only reality. To say that the real flesh and blood of Christ is taken in the Eucharist is to contra­dict the presence of the phaenomenal — i.e. the F.& B. of the senses." (Lacunza, ibid., Vol. I, p. 40)(unpub.) In a note on Strype he commented, "Papistic Syllogism. What God does or commands to be done cannot contradict Scripture. The Mass is God's own doing and his command. Ergo: the Mass does not contradict Scripture.
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