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Mass communication and social change in Iraq: changing the attitudes of women

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MASS COMMUNICATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN IRAQ:

CHANGING THE ATTITUDES OF WOMEN

by

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TO MY COUNTRY, IRAQ

Abstract

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In this thesis I consider the possible role of
facilities for mass communication in the processes of social change
in contemporary Iraq. In particular I have undertaken a research
study of sample of Iraqi women in order to investigate whether
unconventional attitudes are associated with more interest in the
media. This research reported in Chapter Five contains a great deal
of interest descriptively as well as providing some good reasons for
believing that the mass media and in particular newspapers are
important in encouraging and legitimating new perspectives and
obligations on social rights amongst a disadvantaged group.

In the chapters preceding that concerned with the research
I first survey the academic literature on the role of mass communication
in process of modernization including some discussion of development. In
Chapter Three I discuss the nature of national development plans in
Iraq over the last ten years and the objectives of the revolutionary
government. I describe legislative provision for social development and
survey some features of Iraqi society that I considered relevant to the
changing status of Iraqi women. In the fourth chapter I present an
account of the system and facilities for mass communication in Iraq,
reviewing its institutional developments, plans and orientations and
how it functions to support development plans in the country.

It is an unfortunate fact that comparatively little has
been published in the English Language on social change in contemporary
Iraq. This thesis is an attempt to begin to repair that deficiency by
concentrating upon some of the ways in which technological innovations
can contribute to social reform.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The era of rapid decolonization throughout the world
since 1945 has meant that many people have attained
political freedoms that previously were denied them.
This has not meant, however, that economic inequalities
between industrialized and mainly peasant societies
have diminished. Indeed, economic inequality can be seen
to have worsened in these years. This is true not only
of inequalities between these countries but is also true,
in general, of inequalities within post colonial societies.
This has meant that the governments of newly independent
countries have faced pressing economic problems and have
felt the need to create governmental structures appropriate
to these problems and to the culture of their societies.

Social change in post colonial societies has not been
an even process nor has it taken a uniform path. Govern-
ments which have been forced to embark on programmes of
change have done so while being extremely sensitive of the
need to sustain their own legitimacy. A further burden
has been that part of the colonial heritage left to these
governments were deeply divisive structural inequalities,
such as an uneven development between town and country-
side, and unequal access to political and economic freedoms
between men and women, to give but two examples. The

form of development taken in each country has therefore been affected by the relevance of factors such as these to that country as well as the distinctive character of that country's economic resources in relation to trends in the pattern of world trade.

The ideology of national liberation and development in each country has therefore been distinctively different in order to adapt to these national conditions. It has also been seen as centrally important by the political leadership in order to mobilize the masses for the tasks of development and social change. It is against this background that tremendous developments in the scale and complexity of facilities of mass communication have spread to post colonial societies.

On the one hand these societies have been on the receiving end of a propaganda barrage from each of the main power blocks in the world. As well as messages transmitted in broadcast and publications, this barrage has also taken the form of attempting to export the technology of communication either as a commercial investment or as a programme of aid. It is not surprising, therefore, to find both within developed and developing societies, experts who are willing to endorse the importance of mass communication as an agency of social change.

In this thesis I consider the role of mass communications in relation to social changes taking place in Iraq. As I have said above, each country's path of development differs.

It is, however, true that Iraqi post colonial history
shares similar trends to that of many other countries
who were colonized by Britain. Thus it is possible that
the material reported in this thesis should have relevance
beyond the Iraqi experience. At the least it should suggest
possibilities for change in other Arab countries and
possibly for non-Arab countries as well.

In the next chapter I consider more closely the
academic literature on the role of mass communication
as an agency of social change. To put it in context I
have included a general discussion of development,
particularly that which most developing countries are
seeking and the institutional and individual changes that
accompany the process. The survey of the literature does
not claim to be exhaustive but should indicate some of
the positive and negative features of developments
utilizing mass communication, with particular attention
being paid to those theories and research studies concerned
with the individual and his or her use of the media.

In the third chapter I discuss some features of
recent history in Iraq and the character of national
development plans designed to facilitate social change.
I cannot hope to present an adequate picture of all the
changes that have taken place in Iraq in the last decade but
I will attempt to survey important features of those changes.
In particular I pay attention to the traditional status of

Iraqi women in Arab culture as it relates to my specific interest, which is social change in Iraq with reference to the position of women. I also review the legislative reforms which have been introduced by the government in order to improve this status. I have tried to make the thesis as topical as possible by giving the most recent projections. It should, however, be borne in mind when reading these statistics that figures for 1980 are projections and may not necessarily be accomplished in time.

In the fourth chapter the twin themes of communication in social development and the nature of social change in Iraq are to some extent brought together by a discussion of the organization of mass communication facilities in Iraq. I have concentrated upon production organizations and plans for development and have not included any material on audience size and/or taste. My reasons for doing this are that in Iraq we lack basic reliable statistics about audiences. The reasons for this are not unusual in societies undergoing rapid social change and, indeed, they provide one of the main justifications for the research work reported in Chapter 5. I am more generally aware that my account of mass communication in Iraq is less thorough than would be expected of an account of any western developed country, for example Britain.

This is true, even though I have exhaustively searched
all the published literature on communication in Iraq.
At this stage there is still an enormous amount of basic
information to be collected and this undoubtedly is the
major priority of communication specialists in Iraqi
universities and institutes.

These chapters provided an essential background for
the piece of original research reported in Chapter Five,
concerned with the attitudes of a sample of Iraqi women
correlated with their media use. I understand that the
research is not a sociological theory of development but
a specific concern with the possible importance of the
mass media in the life of women in a developing society.
It is worth saying at this stage why I used this research
design. It is an unfortunate truth that there are not
many empirical studies of social life of women in Iraq.
I did not, therefore, have a large body of knowledge to
draw upon in designing a research study. My hypothesis,
therefore, had to be very general, while at the same time
I wanted to gather as much information as I could given
the difficulties of working on my own with a limited time
span. I therefore chose to use a questionnaire framework
to ask a reasonable number of women from different
socio-economic backgrounds a standardized number of

questions. I realize the limitations of this research
design but feel that in this context it is likely to
generate information which could not be otherwise
available and may help to stimulate further research.

CHAPTER II

THE ROLE OF MASS MEDIA IN THE PROCESS

OF MODERNIZATION

Conceptions of Development and Modernization

Defining development or modernization is a matter of
great controversy between scholars. Until the late 1960's,
competing definitions of development centred around the
criterion of the rate of economic growth. The degree of
national growth and development at any given point in time,
was indicated by the Gross National Product (GNP), or the
per capita income when divided by the total population in
a nation.

The old paradigm of development stressed economic
growth through industrialization as the key to development.
This industrialization is dependent on a capital-intensive
technology. Hence, introducing technology to the less
developed countries would eventually make them develop.
Thus, what was quantified about development was usually
just growth measured in the aggregate or on a per capita
basis, and development policies in the 1950's and 1960's
paid little attention to the quality of development and
its benefits.[1]

According to Inkeles, development should not be
measured solely with reference to national growth in
terms of Gross National Product or per capita income.

He suggested that:

> "Development encompasses the idea of
> political maturation expressed in stable
> and orderly processes of government,
> resting on the expressed will of the
> people. And it also includes the attain-
> ment of popular education, the burgeoning
> of the arts, the efflorescence of
> architecture, the growth of means of
> communication, and the enrichment of
> leisure. Indeed in the end the idea of
> development requires the very transfor-
> mation of the nature of man - a
> transformation that is both a means
> to the end of yet greater growth, and
> at the same time one of the great ends
> itself of the development process."   (2)

However, our present definition of development is
not confined to analyzing the concepts, approaches and
models adopted by various scholars. Nor will we discuss
the **causes** of development. Our main concern is to
illustrate a general conception of the less controversial
core of development. Such a conception will require a
list of the elements found to be most relevant to the
discussion we are trying to bring about.

Henry Bernstein suggests that the movement for
development embodies a value judgement with which most
would agree:

> "It (Development) is the desirability of
> overcoming malnutrition, poverty, and
> disease which are the most immediate and
> widespread aspects of human suffering.
> In positive terms some advocate a
> commitment to development that transcends
> the limiting terms of economic growth, to
> embrace such features of social justice as
> equality of opportunity, full employment,
> generally available social services,
> equitable distribution of income and basic
> political freedom."   (3)

As we move towards a definition of development we
will notice that the process embodies two elements.
The first refers to social organization dealing with
the development of the social and economic institutions.
The second refers to the individual, and assigns
primacy to the human transformation which must come hand
in hand with the development of institution, to ensure
the individual's effective participation in the
developing society. In this respect Smith and Inkeles
define the term "modern" as a national state characterized
by a complex of traits, a high level of education,
industrialization, extensive mechanization, a high rate
of social mobility and the like. When applied to the
individual, the term refers to a set of attitudes,
values and ways of feeling and acting of the sort either
generated by or required for the individual's effective
participation in a modern society.[4]

In a similar definition Frey suggests that the term
"development", under any conception, refers to a process
of change that is repetitive and cumulative. The
beckoning end point of such change is variously seen
as a higher per capita income, greater control over the
environment, increased efficiency, greater national
prestige, heightened adaptability, increased differen-
tiation and complexity in the structure of social
institutions. The mechanisms of change run a wide
gamut from technological knowledge and complex

organization through capital formation, high energy
resources, and mechanical tools, to specialization,
mobility, participation, communication and so on.[5]
Furthermore, and according to Smelser, he suggests that
modernization is a conceptual cousin of the term
development but is more comprehensive in scope. It
refers to the fact that technical, economic, and
ecological changes ramify through the whole social
and cultural fabric. Developing societies are those
which are in a process of continuous collective
changes, political, economic and social. In any
emergent nation one may expect profound changes in
the political sphere, that is from a simple tribal
system of authority to a system of universal suffrage,
political parties, representation and civil bureaucracies.
In the educational sphere members of the society will
strive to reduce illiteracy, and increase economically
productive skills. In the religious sphere, secularized
beliefs begin to replace traditional religion. At the
same time at the level of the individual family, extended
kinship units lose their pervasiveness. Finally, the
geographical and social mobility which occur through
the process tend to break down the previously stable
ascriptive hierarchical system. All these changes begin
at different times, and proceed at different rates, in
the various developing nations.[6]

Social change may occur slowly in the ordinary
course of history by continuing contact with another
culture. It can also be enforced by a ruler or
conqueror. The type of change that developing countries
are seeking is neither of these:

> "It is intended to be faster than the
> measured rhythm of historical change,
> less violent than the process of
> enforced change. It aims at a
> voluntary development in which many
> people will participate and the better
> informed will assist the less. In
> place of force it prefers persuasion
> and the provision of opportunities;
> in place of the usual rhythm of
> acculturation a heightened flow of
> information."   (7)

Most developing nations do not seek merely economic
material advancement, but also the betterment of the
social condition of its individual members in terms of
standard of living, level of education, health, occupation
and so on. Rogers now describes this kind of development
as being a widely participatory process of change aiming
at bringing about both social and material advancement for
the people. This is achieved by allowing a better
realization of human values such as more equality in
economic standards, and greater freedom, and by facilitating
the people's control over their environment so that they can
use the outcome for their own advancement.[8]

Development is usually and rightly concerned with the
quantity of material resources and their allocation and
with the investment of these resources to gain economic

development through their return. However, it should be borne in mind that the supreme goal of development efforts is to help improve the quality of human life. The challenge for developing societies is to increase and upgrade their human resources so as to be able to contribute to innovative development.

Thus the truly innovative task of development in developing nations is to project a new vision of what the future society should be like. This implies new societal goals and new values in the management of human affairs by the polity. The aim is to provide a new and fruitful mutual relationship between the change in the individual and that in the collective institution. The system of a developing society can be rational only if it operates with a picture of its own future advancement in mind and with a programme for getting to that preferred state.[9]

Developing nations have differing goals for their national development, but most nations seek rapid goals that would apply, in a more or less modified form, to all of them. One such goal is economic development, the growth shown by the Gross National Product (GNP) or per capita income. This growth is fostered through the productivity of both the industrial and the agricultural sectors. However, this goal is only a means to an end - greater well-being for the members of that society. Thus, the purpose of economic development is firstly, to improve

the quality of life of the people; secondly, to reduce economic disparities by improving the well-being of the less-privileged through full employment, equitable distribution of services, and equitable access to the resources necessary for economic development.

Another goal is the creation of a sense of national identity within the different segments of the society and the different regions of the country. Such a national sense is very important to national survival, since no national governmental structure can survive indefinitely without at least the acquiescence of the people who are governed by it. National cohesion creates a state where the diverse elements of a society are interconnected so that they can communicate with each other and strive together to achieve the national goals set by their government.

Human development is yet another major goal in most developing countries. Such development includes increasing the level of knowledge through education, literacy training, skill training, health development and a better standard of living through the provision of adequate living facilities. This in turn motivates them to exercise their free choice to contribute to their economic development.[10]

Naturally such profound changes in all the major spheres of society tend to result in social disorganization and dislocation. For example, new social problems

continually develop due to different groups being thrown
together into a common framework. Similarly, the processes
of industrialization disrupt the older patterns of work
and production. The scope and functions of family
activities decreases and new types and patterns of
family relationship start to emerge. Moreover the
secularization of values undercuts belief in established
values and traditional authority. Obviously all these
social changes tend to create disorganization, social
unrest, and conflicts of interest amongst the groups
affected.[11]

The complexities of social change in any society
undergoing modernization have too often been reduced to
crude generalizations about the society in general, a
process I do not want to duplicate here. Modernization
is bound to generate problems and conflicts which can
sometimes be particularly disadvantageous to certain groups
in the society. An instance of social tension is the
economic position of women.

Without exploring the issue in depth at this point,
it can be argued that the removal of economic activities
from their traditional setting and the emergence of the
nuclear family as a basic economic unit of production in
industrialized countries has worked to the disadvantage
of women, and created new divisions of labour between males
and females. This is because women were recruited in the

early stage of industrialization for only the lowest-paid
and the least skilled industrial jobs. They were retained
as a pool of surplus labour whose rights as a labour force
were ignored. Engels saw the exploitation of women in
industry allied to the emergence of the nuclear family
as a process which increasingly made women and children
dependent on one man, and thus further intensified the
general subjugation of women in society.[12]

At the same time, women working in agriculture were
not on the whole in a better position. The introduction
of modern equipment into agriculture widened the gap
between male and female productivity, because men
monopolized such equipment by learning how to operate it,
while women are left with the old methods. Thus, female
productivity remained static compared to that of men and
this eventually undermined their economic position in
agriculture.[13]

Smelser also argues that the introduction of industry
deprived domestic workers, particularly women, of their
livelihood. This is because handicraft production and
cottage industry, which was performed mainly by women,
could no longer compete with the mass production of the
same items in factories and the cheap prices offered in
the market due to the abundancy of these items.[14]

Nevertheless, it has been suggested that these very
circumstances provided the setting for increased

consciousness among women and intensified the struggle for sex equality at work as well as at home.[15]   Black also suggests that as women gain more work opportunities and experience in addition to better education, new and different kinds of occupations will be open to them and eventually a sense of equality between the two sexes will emerge.[16]

Social change and the Individual

In modernizing societies individuals undergo changes appropriate to the particular institutional structure in which they find themselves. The change affects both people's personal activities and attitudes and also their orientation toward their own society and to the world in general.

Individual activities tend to be more differentiated and specialized in accordance with the various institutional structures. Recruitment to these institutions is not determined by any fixed ascriptive kinship, territorial cost, or estate framework. Admission to specialized roles is not determined by the ascribed properties of the individual, but rather by his personal merits and achievements. There is also separation between the various specialized roles played by any one individual. Such separation implies that the occupation of any given position within one institutional sphere does not

automatically entail the adoption of a similar role
in another sphere. Finally, within each institutional
sphere, one notices a development of distinctive units
that are organized around the goals specific to that
particular sphere and solely for that purpose; they are
thus not fused as in more traditional societies, with
other social groups, in a network based on family,
kinship and territory.[17]

However, an essential prerequisite for change in
human activity is a change in the individual's attitudes
and behaviour to suit the changing surroundings. Many
researchers have defined individual modernisation in
terms of particular attitudes and behaviour to be
expected from modern man which did not exist in his
traditional world. Some of the factors that determine
individual modernism according to Rogers, are literacy
and education, political participation, cosmopolitan
sophistication, social and economic aspirations, and
access and interest in impersonal means of communication.[18]

Although there is no single standard definition of
modern man that all accept and use, most students of
development would agree with Inkeles, who also describes
various attitudes and forms of behaviour which are
expected from modern man. These include a readiness
for new experience and an openness to innovation and
change, expressed, for example, in a willingness to

adopt a new drug or sanitation method. Modern man is willing to try a new fertilizer, or new seed, to ride on a new means of transportation, or to turn to new sources of news. Other characteristics of modern man are his disposition to form or hold opinions on a large number of problems and issues that arise both within his own environment and outside. He tends to be tolerant in his attitude towards opinions different from his own. Modern man is oriented to the present or the future rather than the past. He has a sense of timing and believes in planning and organizing as a way of handling life. He believes that man can learn to control his environment in order to achieve his purposes and goals. He has more faith in science and technology than men in traditional societies. Finally, modern man is aware of the dignity of others, especially women and children, and has a sense of distributive justice, that is, reward according to contribution.[19]

Inkeles and Smith, in addition to the previous characteristics, outline other attitudes that modern men possess. They do not only have opinions but are also more energetic in acquiring facts and information on which to base their opinions. Modern men also tend to value technical skills and have educational and occupational aspirations. They have more interest in, and place more value on, formal education than traditional

men. They see that science and technology benefit
mankind by providing solutions to human problems. In
addition, modern men would like to see their sons
acquiring occupations more associated with the new ways
of doing things.[20]

It should be borne in mind that these lists of
modern behaviour are not exhaustive; nevertheless one
may expect some of the elements to be related. It
seems reasonable to suppose that whatever it is that
changes men may affect each person differently. There
is no one ideal form of modern behaviour that would
apply to all members of modernizing societies, simply
because such societies differ in terms of social structure,
norms and values. The stage and nature of modernity
relevant to each society is related to the scale and
character of the transformation being undergone. Thus,
change in a society will be uneven and will be affected
by differences in sex, urban-rural residence and age,
for example. It is, therefore, unreasonable to expect
a uniformity of modernity, rather the measuring of
changing life-prospects and experiences must be found
in individual biographies and group circumstances.

Modernization in both its institutional and
individual dimensions, is an endless process. It does
not end even after a country is highly modernized,
because constant change will always exist in any

developing or developed country. Hornik declares that
at particular stages of industrial development,
societies have, for example, employed particular
technologies, and exhibited particular patterns in
occupational and social mobility. But these societies
vary in the rate of development, the moment in time
at which development takes place and their particular
cultural history, and so their modern institution will
also vary. What was and is common to all developed and
developing nations is the constant change in those
institutions.

Applying it to the individual, Hornik suggests
that a possible definition of individuals undergoing
a transitional state from traditional to modern might
be their growing to adapt to new knowledge and to handle
the increasingly different and complex surroundings.[21]

Lerner, in particular, believes that empathy, the
capacity to see oneself in anothers situation, is the
dominant characteristic that facilitates individual
transformation because it works as predisposing element.
Thus increasing empathetic skills in individuals should
be the starting point for individual transformation.
Empathy was explored by Lerner (1958) and became the
core of his study on individual modernization. He
attributes the emergence of empathetic potential to the
influence of the mass media which encourage people to
break away from traditional modes of thought and
behaviour.[22]

From the previous discussion we may conclude that
modernization or development is a continuous process
undergone in both developing and developed countries.
The common factor in the process is the constant change
in both the institutional structure of the society, and
the differentiated functions of these institutions.
The individual change that accompanies the institutional
change involves new roles and responsibilities, new
attitudes and patterns of life, assumed by the individual
to accord with the differentiated institutional structure.
Common to both institutional and individual modernization
is adaptability to the changing environment. Increased
adaptability is demanded as the society moves further
along the path of modernization. Nevertheless, it should
be pointed out that the model of individual modernity
provided above might not be applicable to societies where
individualism is not quite dominant, such as middle-eastern
one. The collective family structure of such society might
impose a different application of individual modernity.

Mass Media and Modernization

Referring the above discussion to mass communication,
it is obvious that modern communication systems are
uniquely a feature of modern societies, depending as they
do on technology and ownership. Their development has
accompanied rapid social change, technological innovations,
rising standard of living and personal income, and the
decline of the traditional forms of social control and
power.[23]

Basically, the term "mass communication" refers to the
large circulation press, public television and radio, and

the cinema, whereas by the term "mass media" is understood
the entire system of mass communication, within which
messages are produced, selected, transmitted and then
received by the public and responded to.

> "Mass communication comprises the institutions
> and techniques by which specialized groups
> employ technological devices (press, radio,
> films, etc.), to disseminate symbolic content
> to large heterogeneous, and widely dispersed
> audiences."   (24)

The function of mass communication as an institution
is to be a message carrier, capable of reaching thousands
or millions of people, possibly at the same time. But
it is beset by the problems normally faced by an institution
i.e. control, government restrictions, economic support,
etc. Although mass communication is aimed at wide
audiences, it is, in fact, selective. For example, radio
favours the less well educated while the print media are
more suited to a relatively sophisticated audience. Even
within one medium the public selects that which is most
in accord with its own tastes. Thus the selection process
acts on both the medium and the content.(25)

In advanced societies the development of mass
communication can be explained in terms of other social
and economic changes. Schramm suggests that the history
of developed countries is the result of a chain of
interaction in which education, industry, urbanization,
national income, political participation and the mass

media have all gone forward together. For example,
an efficient communication system makes industrial develop-
ment easier and vice versa. More and better newspapers
provide more reason to read and write, and a higher degree
of literacy encourages more and better newspapers. The
more that people feel able to take part in political
activities, the more they feel the need for education
and information. The more information they get, the
more they are interested in political development, and
the more education they have, the more they seek
information.[26]

The relationship between mass media and modernization
is close and interacting rather than causal. It is
difficult to quantify and define the precise role that
mass media play in modernization. However, this role is
found to be closely related to modernizing stimuli such
as length of schooling, literacy, cosmopolitanism, empathy
innovativeness and motivation. Thus although the media has
a part to play,

> "the extent of their direct contribution
> and whether they are cause and effect
> are all but impossible to define."   (27)

Correlation analyses of survey data in the literature of
mass media and modernization have not proved that mass
media caused modernization, but they have demonstrated a
certain degree of covariance between the two sets of
variables.[28]

According to Hagen:

> "Mass media are one of the steps in the
> development process, they do not start
> the process nor cause it. Increase in
> the scale of modern societies, the
> appearance of cities, literacy and modern
> communication are all steps in the
> transition to economic growth once
> it has begun rather than starting points
> or causes." (29)

Thus, the extent to which communication acts as a mover in the modernizing process remains an unresolved question, but one fact is established: a close connection exists.

Economic and social change in developing countries appears to be closely related to the development of mass communication, as is shown by the following facts. First, variation between countries in terms of the level of economic development expressed as per capita income is closely paralleled by variation in the degree of media availability. Second, the spread of mass media is highly correlated with other indices of development such as the literacy rate, urbanization, per capita income, and industrialization. Third, in developing countries there is evidence of a strong association between the consumption of mass media content and attitudes, behaviour, and the possessing of information relevent to social change. (30)

The Primacy of Information in Development

An important item in the development process in both developed and developing nations is the production of information. This factor is often

referred to as knowledge, education or human capital.
With adequate information, a society with much under-
utilized, and relatively unskilled, labour can develop
production techniques and take advantage of the available
labour.[31]

> "It is now generally understood that before
> there can be free and adequate information
> in any country, there must be an adequate
> system of mass communication. Therefore,
> all countries new or old, industrialized or
> not, highly developed or underdeveloped,
> are properly concerned with the develop-
> ment of their communication system."   (32)

It should be clear that if the developing countries
want to produce information via the mass media, they must
have the capacity to construct and maintain the necessary
items for producing mass media products. Such items
include: first, plant consisting of buildings, utilities,
and facilities; second, equipment for producing material
in books, newspapers, magazines, movies, radio, television,
and, in the future, even satellites; third, a corps of
communication, i.e. a substantial body of specialized
personnel in media production. This body would include
reporters, script writers, feature writers, actors,
printers, editors, publishers, producers, directors,
and so on.[33] Thus, before the construction of a
strategy for mass communication to help facilitate and
accelerate national development, there should be a develop-
ment in the communication system itself in order to help
in the whole process.

Before discussing the role of the mass media in
developing countries in terms of being agents of the
change aspired to, we would like to illustrate the nature
of mass media in less developed countries. Rogers
discovered that the media in these countries reach
smaller audiences than in more developed countries.
It was, however, found that in both developed and less
developed countries, certain elite audiences such as
university students and middle class urbanites have the
same level of exposure to the mass media. He also found
that in less developed countries the electronic media,
especially radio and films, reach a larger part of the
public than the print media. His fourth point was that
mass media messages in less developed countries are of
low interest and relevancy to villagers because of the
strong urban orientation of the mass media. Finally,
in these countries government control is greater,
especially of the electronic media, consequently they
have more development material.[34]

Mass Media in Developing Countries

Communication in developing countries is normally
used to provide general information, to motivate
politically the masses, to motivate the masses toward
self-development activities, to help in non-formal
education, and finally help shaping directly certain forms

of behaviour necessary in people in the development

process.[35] Thus students of development would seem:

> "increasingly convinced that mass
> communication is a catalytic agent
> in the modernizing process. A small
> but growing body of research in less
> developed nations indicates the
> crucial, integral role of mass media
> in modernization." (36)

Such an argument linking mass media with development

is mainly based on the fact that interpersonal channels,

though essential for reaching the huge peasant population

of less developed countries, are inadequate by themselves

and very costly if there are to be sufficient numbers of

local change agents for every village. Mass media

exposure can also result in a greater awareness of

political events, more knowledge of technical information,

and can help shaping more favourable attitudes toward

change and development. In addition, the increased

provision of radio, film, and other media facilities to

the villages means that information can reach larger

audiences.[37]

> "In the 1950's and 1960's large scale
> manufacture of inexpensive transistor
> radio receivers spread throughout the
> world, even among the poor, and the
> rural people of the least industrialized
> countries." (38)

However, other facilities must also be improved to help

in creating the effect needed for development programmes.

"Sociologists concerned with social and
economic development have attached much
importance to the mass media, continuing
a tradition which originated in the 1930's
with studies of the diffusion of new
farming practices (Rogers, 1962). The
mass media, especially radio and television,
have been looked upon as an efficient
instrument for spreading information, and
altering attitudes toward innovations and
later as a stimulus to change in developing
societies, encouraging personal consumption,
providing models of economic behaviour,
encouraging participation in political and
economic life, and the growth of nation-
hood. (Pye, 1963. Schramm, 1964, Learner,
1958). Such work has focused most centrally
on the way in which new means of communication
bring external influences to bear on
traditional ways of thought and behaviour." (39)

However, in conducting research to see the degree of

media effectiveness in promoting change in these areas it

was found that the typical effects are secondary rather

than primary. This is because they seldom work directly

upon their audiences. There are some factors that serve to

mediate the effects of mass communication. Media research

has shown that mass media content is not very likely to

change the existing attitudes of audience members,

especially if these attitudes are deep-rooted. Also

people tend to read, watch, or listen to communications

which are in accord with their existing views and interests.

Thus, mass media affects audiences directly only when they

(the audience) are favourably predisposed to some of the

views the media is presenting. Other factors that tend

to render mass communication a more likely agent of

reinforcement than change is the social groups to which the
individual audience member belongs and the norms of those
groups. In addition, there is the working of inter-
personal influence and, finally, factors involving the
economics of mass communication.[40]

Thus, in order for communication to be effective, a
considerable amount of attention should be devoted to
designing media content bearing in mind people's norms
and values. Designers must also be acutely aware of the
role of personal contact in the communication pattern of
rural communities in developing countries and the
importance of personal influence in the flow of
communication.[41]

> "Personal influence about an issue is often
> exercised unexpectedly as a side-line or
> marginal topic in a casual conversation.
> It therefore is more likely to 'get through'
> to the undecided or the opposed. Mass media
> messages, by contrast, are more often
> approached with an awareness of their
> purposefulness. Face-to-face contact is
> also more flexible and provides an
> immediate response to instantaneous feed-
> back. A person, unlike a mass medium, is
> likely to raise issues and arguments of
> immediate personal relevance to the listener.
> And finally, when someone yields to personal
> influence in making a decision the reward in
> terms of approval is immediate and personal." (42)

In advocating social change in any society, one must
consider two important factors. The first is the cultural
linkage, and the second is the social relationships that
exist within the society. In order to smooth the transition,
when bringing about change, it is much better to take

advantage of the cultural link rather than tear them apart.

Also, it is necessary to understand the whole pattern of

life of which the proposed change is a part. Understanding

social organization is equally important since it is the

individual who must change, and individuals live in

groups. The best method of advocating change may be

group participation in decision making, and any programme

lacking this may easily fail. A programme which takes

account of group relationships is likely to succeed,

because it involves the understanding of and participation

by the group and thus the change may not seem alien or

threatening to the group values and norms. Mass media,

when used to advocate social change, run the risk of being

ineffective and sometimes counterproductive if they are

used without adequate knowledge of the local culture where

they are being received. This is true of all types of

communication, whether personal or mass, but it is

particularly true of the mass media because they cover

large areas and operate from a distance, and consequently

get less feed-back from their audience. Therefore,

effective use of the mass media in social and economic

change implies that they should originate no further than

necessary from their audience. In addition, they should

be prepared by persons who understand the culture to

which they are speaking. Finally, means should be available

for the audience to report back. Provided these conditions

are satisfied, the mass media have a chance of advocating, and with time bringing about a change in attitudes and behaviour.[43]

In addition, the effectiveness of communication messages depends on its being attention-worthy. This can be made possible through the very credibility of the messages or by using a charismatic source such as prominent leaders in the country to deliver development slogans. Repetition, or the use of multiple channels for certain messages, such as Radio, Television, and Newspaper campaigns can also be effective, so that the same message can have a chance of reaching the largest possible number of people. Demonstrations and examples carried through firms, posters, slogans, slides, and the like, confirming the message and directed at the audience which it is desired to change, are a very useful part of many communication campaigns. Finally, providing the means to practice the new skills learned through communication is very important, as this imprints this newly learned behaviour. For example, people will regress to near illiteracy after finishing a literacy class if the reading material suitable for new literates is not available.[44]

In a broader prospective, the data relating to media use and the modernization of attitudes and practices of people in developing countries, seems

constant. The few studies done into this subject affirm
the strong correlation between mass media exposure and
individual modernity. One such study was done by
Inkeles and Smith to see the forces of individual
modernization in six developing countries. According
to their evidence they concluded that the mass media
was in the front rank along with the school, and the
factory, as indicators of individual modernity. They
also felt that mass media in general influence men to
become more modern. Not only do they provide information,
they also allow the individual to explore the opinions of
others. They act as an educational stimulus by revealing
the fascinating aspects of science and technology.
However, one troubling thought concerned them. It
is possible that only those individuals "who were more
modern in spirit to begin with" responded to the messages
provided by the mass media. Still their data confirmed
their belief that:

> "The greater modernity of those who were
> most often exposed to the mass media
> also resulted in good part from the
> effectiveness of the radio and newspaper
> as a teacher of modernization." (45)

Mass Media and National Integration

One of the roles the media hope to play in
developing countries is to contribute to national

integration, which means a sense of identification
with the larger whole, i.e. the national state. This
is very important for a developing independent country.
In addition, national integration also means, according
to the leaders of developing countries, that the people
will focus their loyalty on them and the legitimacy of
their rule, as well as respect, understand, and accept
their political institutions. Political regimes
concerned with development want the media to speak
of mobilizing political participation. This means
spreading the responsibility for decisions and
initiative to ever-widening circles. They want the
media to explain the policies of the government, and
to motivate the masses to take part in the political
process by, for example, participation in political
campaigns. Finally, they want the media to supply
the channels for complaints and criticism, but within
well-defined limits.[46]

Surveys in the Middle East confirm the view that
mass communication contributes to the creation of public
opinion, and thus to the provision of the essential base
for a participant political system. The mass media
provide stories and information outside the concern of

traditional people, so when these people start to have
opinions about many matters which in their isolation
did not concern them, they participate in the public
life of their country. By expressing these opinions via
the mass media people not only become participants in
public life but in the network of **public** communication
as well.[47]

Learner argues for the primacy of the medium in
affecting national integration. For example in the case
of television, the media provide insight into the
variegated structure of society. It creates a psychic
mobility which then serves as a substitute for physical
mobility. This in turn has important implications for
social integration. According to learner, the shared
experience of viewing the same programme is reminiscent
of the shared experience of partaking in a common ritual.
Robert Hornik also found in his study of adolescents in
El Salvador that those adolescents whose parents had
recently acquired a television set became less interested
in moving to the city.[48]

Naturally the mass media cannot fulfil the above-
mentioned promise of national integration unless certain
prerequisites are made possible. First, media material
must be available to the whole population. As far as
radio is concerned, nationwide coverage has been achieved
to a considerable extent, but in the case of television

it has hardly began. Second, a network must be established whereby at least certain broadcasts can be received simultaneously throughout the nation.

Radio programming for national integration must include information broadcasts plus other kinds of dialogue programmes where the audience declare their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the government. Covering sporting events can be very integrative and can create a strong feeling of solidarity. In addition television entertainment programmes are very important in that shared experiences are created by viewing the same programme. They give people shared heroes and villains characterized by certain values; shared metaphors and common topics for conversation for next morning.[49]

Thus, promoting national integration is only possible where there exists vigorous programming and very substantial resources for coverage beyond the urban concentrations. Besides this, there must be availability of personal contact and channels of two-way communication between the population and the communication network sponsor, i.e. the government in developing countries.

Mass Media and "Cultural Imperialism"

The problems that have been grouped under the general
heading of "cultural imperialism" in third world countries
stem from the inequality between them and the more developed
Western   countries with regard to media resources and
technology.

Industrial, scientific and technological development
in western countries have placed them in a highly
advantageous position in terms of developing both their
mass media resources and the technological skills to
operate them. Third world countries have lagged behind
in the development of their mass media systems, in part
because of their lack of financial resources with which
to acquire both communication technology and appropriate
skills. This makes them dependent on the west, which can
provide them with technological facilities, expert skills
and most of their content needs, thus creating a state of
cultural dependency which affects mass media content and
intrudes greatly on the indigenous culture of third world
countries. This is because in most cases the foreign
material is alien to the values and way of life of the
importing countries:

> "Considerable quantities of sophisticated
> media technology are imported into
> developing countries without the necessary
> operative skills at the national level.
> Western media products are injected into
> national information systems which
> encourage imitation of foreign life-

styles and discourage domestic creative
possibilities and innovations." (50)

It is resentment over this inequality in media resources
and technology that leads developing countries to challenge
their dependency upon western countries, to redress the
imbalance and free themselves from any sort of domination.

In this section an attempt will be made to investigate
the causes of this dependency. Some light will also be
shed on the issue of cultural imperialism being exercised
by the advanced industrialized countries. This can take
the form of professionalism, the flow of informational
news, and television material exports to the third world.
This discussion will also review briefly some of the steps
and suggestions being offered so far for remedying the
situation.

Mass media systems in Asia, Africa and Latin America
derive from the equivalent systems in industrialized
countries. France, Britain, and above all the United
States, developed their own sophisticated modes of
communication. These models were duplicated and exported,
leading to the standardisation of the structure of
communication systems across the world.(51) Therefore,
the structure and role of media systems in third world
countries reflects this international dependency.
Essentially the B.B.C. transferred its system largely,
though not exclusively, to countries which were British
colonies. The French model was exported to French

colonial territories, while the less centralized, more
commercial system developed in North America emerged
chiefly in Latin America and in other spheres of U.S.
influence.[52]

Because of rapid development in the functions of
communication systems in third world countries, they
have wished to both expand and make more indigenous their
broadcasting facilities. But due to the low status of
indigenous broadcasters and lack of executive experience,
they have had to rely on training schemes offered by
industrialized countries, in particular those from whom
their own system derived. For example most of the radio
services in ex-British territories were founded and run
by seconded B.B.C. staff who transplanted the B.B.C. style
of organization and programme-making. In addition, the
greater possibilities for training in Britain encouraged
overseas staff to train in Britain with the result that
they concentrated on the British model.

Naturally such activities draw the journalists and
programme makers of developing societies into a common
international media culture. In most cases these production
styles carry values and attitudes alien to the indigenous
culture.[53]

In addition, many professionals in this situation
compare their professional qualities with the sophistication
of the equipment and material with which they work. This

can lead them to forget their countries' priorities when

they demand the use of available finance for importing

capital intensive equipment. Such professionalism makes

heavy demands on a limited budget which is intended for the

communication of national goals.[54]

Thus, according to Peter Golding, media professionalism

in the third world can be viewed as an ideology that has

been exported much like media technology. Both are part

of a general stream of cultural dependence. He therefore

points to the necessity of establishing training courses

or permanent centres actually in the countries where the

trainee will work. He also suggests that these courses

and centres should be set up by expatriates within broad-

casting organizations or at universities under the

auspices of such bodies as Unesco or the International

Press Institute.[55]

Rita Cruise O'Brien suggests that in developing

countries the goals of training schemes must be considered

in the context of national priorities, and that:

> "Local broadcasting authorities themselves
> might initiate regional training courses
> which could have a very fruitful spinoff
> for encouraging professional interchange
> among countries. (56)

International newsgathering and dissemination

The dependency of many media systems in the world for

information news material on industrially advanced₄few

countries is due to the dominance of five major agencies.

These agencies control the process of selecting and
distributing international newsflow around the world.
Two are based in New York (AP and UPI). Reuters is in
London, while Agence France Press is in Paris, and Tass
in Moscow:

> "The agencies derive most of their revenues
> from western markets, and they therefore
> attend more to the news interests of these
> markets than those of other countries. This
> is reflected in the heavily disproportionate
> share of their organizational resources which
> are concentrated in the western markets, in
> their patterns of executive recruitment, and
> not least by the general composition of the
> news services which they feed both to western
> and non-western markets." (57)

Western news media are charged with dominating the
news flow - the content of dispatches to and from the
third world. The Western press mainly, on the whole, deals
with the third world's disasters, rarely with its
achievements, particularly in the economic sphere. It
is said that when reporting from the west the news
services generally carry news of interest chiefly to the
industrial powers:

> "reflecting the developed world's promotion
> of commerce and competition for support in
> East-West controversies." (58)

Thus, unfortunately, the selection, dissemination and
even the interpretation of news material is dominated by
those five agencies, while the rest of the world has no
alternative but to absorb what is available regardless
of its relevance.

Moreover, the interchange of news between countries
in the third world is structured by these agencies, i.e.

through them and not directly between the exchanging
countries:

> "In most cases it is still necessary for
> news copy or agency film material from
> one country in the third world to travel
> through the news capitals of Britain or
> America, etc., before it can reach an
> adjacent developing nation." (59)

In some cases the news may never reach the latter country
because its significance is determined by the major
agencies.

As far as television news material is concerned,
there is a similar pattern of dissemination in that there
are four film services that handle the process of
distribution - British (Visnews), half-British half-U.S.
(UPI-TN), the United States CBS-news film, and finally
West German (DPA-ETES). All other countries in the
world depend on these four. (60)

One step toward responsible and balanced reporting
of foreign news was the launching of the non-aligned
news agency pool in 1975. The statutes of the pool makes
it clear that the pool is not to become a supra-national
news agency and that individual member nations may not
attempt to limit the news flow or press freedom. Tanjug,
the Yugoslav agency, launched the collection and
distribution of news reports among the non-aligned
countries.

In 1977 more than 40 news agencies in Africa, Asia,

Latin America, and Europe were already contributing
actively to facilitate the flow of news between member
countries. Five news agencies were already functioning
as regional or multilateral collectors and distributors
of news reports and information from other agencies
participating in the pool. Interest in the pool has
also been shown by several news agencies and other
bodies concerned with information outside the non-
aligned world, where the pool is increasingly making
its presence felt in the mass media.[61]

Television material flow

The term "cultural imperialism" includes the huge
export of television material from Western countries,
mainly America, to the third world countries. Having
introduced the technology of television, developing countries
feel obliged to make use of it. This creates a dependence
on foreign programmes. This is because local production
in developing countries is very low due both to limited
funds and lack of experienced producers. More experienced
and wealthy American producers take advantage of this
opportunity and penetrate foreign television.[62]

Schiller argues that the problems preventing the
rapid expansion of domestically produced programmes in
less developed countries, plus the particular nature of
television's enormous appetite for material, lays open

the door to foreign programme suppliers. This process

is intensified by the programme suppliers willingness to

sell their product for a very low cost since profit has

already been made in the country of origin. Low prices

provide a temptation for less developed countries where

financial resources are limited and where local production

might be costlier than a foreign import. However, this

in turn discourages further domestic production.

Schiller says:

> "Once a developing society gets caught up in
> the impersonal imperative of television
> operations, its broadcast structure becomes
> a vehicle for material produced outside its
> territory with an outlook and a character
> generally irrelevant, if not injurious to
> its development orientation." (63)

The main supplier of television export material is the

United States. In 1970 the value of exported American

television programmes approached 100 million dollars a

year. Other main exporting coutries are Britain, France

and West Germany. Nevertheless, the U.S. is the leading

originator of television programmes and it dominates the

market in foreign sales.

At the other end, an examination of the percentage

of imported foreign material in some developing countries

indicates that one half of television programmes in Latin

American countries are imported. Asian countries, with the

exclusion of China and Japan, fall into two groups; the

first import a third or less, the second import more than

one half. In the near East 50% of the T.V. programmes
are imported. Some African countries like Zambia and
Nigeria import two thirds of their programmes. The bulk
of the material imported is entertainment. Three quarters
of the American material is of this nature, as is two
thirds of the British material. Thus, there are two
undisputed trends: firstly, television material flow is
one-way, from the big exporting countries, mainly the
U.S., to the rest of the world, and secondly, entertainment
material predominates in this flow.[64]

O'Brien, R. suggests that in third world countries
a consequence of this flow of T.V. material is the creation
of a passive audience. As a result the public fails to
respond to a medium of great potential for national
integration and development. Foreign material is
derived from another culture and reflects the values
and life-style of that culture. There is the
possibility that such imports and material will
encourage unrealizable aspirations amongst the
audiences, leading to frustration and social unrest
among the population.[65] Moreover, studies in the United
States have demonstrated that when American programmes
are used in a foreign setting they present alien values
of relationships between the sexes, parents and children,
and authority and the people. The overall impact of
these programmes on the feelings, thoughts and actions

of large numbers of different countries is substantial.[66]

Some steps are being taken to remedy the situation and to counteract the domination of exports from western countries. Some countries are trying to reduce the number of imported television programmes in their national networks. Also certain regional broadcasting unions are being organised and encouraged, such as The Arab State Broadcasting Union, which has begun to develop a closer regional interchange of programmes between the various member countries.[67]

I should note in passing that Iraq has not escaped these general problems. Indeed they have been intensified by the acquisition of sophisticated media technology and a shortage of qualified cadre in the country. Efforts are, however, now being made to decrease the percentages of foreign imported material. From personal observation it is apparent that non-Arabic imported material is now less than 25% while material from other Arabic countries has been encouraged instead. Similarly, domestic production has also been encouraged, a process helped by the emergence of newly qualified preformers. My personal observation also suggests that Iraq is adopting a selective policy by importing foreign material the content of which is more of documentary nature rather than an expression of foreign values. Iraq is also a member of the non aligned news agency pool and a member of the Arab State broadcasting union and has been a host of several conferences that have been held by these bodies to try to resolve the situation of imbalances in information flow.

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CHAPTER III

SOCIAL CHANGE IN IRAQ

Background

Before the revolution of 1958, Iraq was ruled by an
autocratic, conservative and pro-Western monarchy. In
order to preserve the interests of the aristocratic
politicians, the tribal leaders and the landed merchants
families who dominated the political system, social,
economic, political and educational reform was extremely
slow. The vast majority of the population were kept out
of the political process, with the result that opposition
parties flourished among the masses.

The national economy depended mainly on the export of
oil, which accounted for 87% of the GNP in the fifties,
but which was controlled by a multi-national consortium.
Industrial progress was minimal. The few modern industries
of a consumer nature were owned by mercantile families who
supported the monarchy. Agriculture was backward as a
result of the semi-feudal system of land ownership: over
90% of the cultivable land was owned by a few sheikhs and
absentee landlords, while the peasants worked as serfs in
wretched conditions.

Social progress was slow and traditional customs were
maintained. Although the number of educational and health
facilities increased greatly, illiteracy and disease
prevailed. And there were few developments in the Civil
Rights laws.

From 1958 to 1968 there were four different regimes
so the political climate was unstable. They professed modern,

even revolutionary, ideals, but they proved somewhat ineffective. Certain laws were enacted to reform the system and achieve progress, such as the Agrarian Reforms, the nationalisation of large industries, and banks and the government take-over of the export-import trade. However, implementation of these policies was limited.

There were three main achievements during this period: (1) Political independence from foreign power, (2) Curtailing the power of the previous ruling classes - the mercantile and landed families and the tribal sheikhs - thus providing the lower classes with the opportunity of climbing the social ladder and sharing in the political and economic process, and (3) The spread of modern and revolutionary ideas among the Iraqi masses, including an awareness of women's rights and their need to organize themselves.

These changes set the stage for the Ba'ath Socialist revolution of 1968, when comprehensive programmes of political, social and economic reform were set in motion.[1]

Iraqi strategy for national development (1968-1980)

When the present government came to power in 1968 it immediately drew up a comprehensive long-term development plan for the country. This opened the way to rapid and balanced socio-economic development in Iraq, a process greatly assisted by the complete nationalisation of oil in 1973. The aim was national self-sufficiency and a fair

distribution of wealth throughout the country. Development
projects were to concentrate particularly on the poorer
areas outside the capital and the other urban centres.
Industry, both public and private, was to be expanded
and agriculture was to undergo a profound reform.[2]

The objectives of the plan were specified as:
(1) the development of industry and agriculture by injecting
science and technology into the production process,
(2) an increasingly productive labour force which
could adapt to this expanding material investment,
(3) the emergence of a politically and economically
conscious public which would participate actively in
the process of change and (4) economic and social growth
involving the raising of both national and per capita
incomes and the provision of a wide range of social
activities.[3]

Central planning was introduced, but the early 1970's
saw problems confronting strategic planning due to a lack
of experienced planners. There were also disagreements over
the philosophy of planning to be adopted. The various
sectors of government, not fully understanding the planners'
objectives, failed to co-ordinate their activities. Thus
progress was slow until the planning mechanism was developed.
Iraqi and foreign experts were brought in to train the
planning personnel and overhaul the planning machinery.[4]

National plans were intended to last for six years.

So far there have been two - 1970-75 and 1976-80. Over this time Iraqi dinar (I.D.)* 10207 million have been invested in all sectors of the economy. The following table indicates the investment allocation for each sector:[5]

Sector	(1970-1980) Investment allocation in millions I.D.	Percentages %
Agriculture	1732	17
Industry	3318	32.5
Transport, Communication	1412	14
Education, Services and Construction	1552	15
Others	2193	12.5
Total	10207	100

Over the decade the national income rose from I.D. 850 million in 1969 to I.D. 4479 million in 1976 (in current prices), which represents 26.8% annual growth. At the same time per capita income increased by 22.8% a year, from I.D. 92.3 to I.D. 387.2. In 1980 it is expected to reach I.D. 575.[6]

Economic development

Since 1968 the intention in Iraq has been to eliminate economic underdevelopment and to plan comprehensively. The economy was no longer to rely almost solely on the export

*Iraqi dinar equals 1.7 British pound.

of oil but was to become diversified "with a balanced
industrial and agricultural base that facilitates develop-
ment needs."[7]

The state itself is responsible for the economy of
the country, with the public sector the backbone of and
contributor to economic development. The private sector
works alongside the public sector, controlled by government
legislation. In 1968 the public sector provided 31% of
the total domestic production. By 1976 this had increased
to 75%. Investment in this sector similarly increased from
33% to 76%. The following table shows the proportional share
of the public sector in the main principal economic activities
1968-1976.[8]

Sector	1968 %	1976 %
Agriculture	1	29
Oil	0.4	100
Manufacturing Industries	41	51
Commerce	11	53

The following section investigates in more detail the
role of industry and agriculture in the economic and social
development of Iraq, since 30% of the population forms the
industrial labour force while 36% live on the land.

Industry

Nationalization of the major industries came in 1964. The main task of the post-1968 government has been to complete unfinished projects and to expand existing factories along with their output capacity.[9] The production of paper, sulphur, agricultural implements, artificial silk, cotton and silk and other consumer goods has been improved,[10] as have the oil and metallurgy industries. Small and medium-sized private projects have been encouraged, and also joint public-private schemes. Industrial administration has also been improved.[11]

The aim has been to make industry serve agriculture by producing tools, machinery and fertilisers, by supplying irrigation and drainage projects with their industrial requirements, and by processing agricultural raw materials and products. Local production is to replace imported goods in the home market. In addition, manufacturing industries must help to finance development investment.

However, industry has been plagued with high costs, under-production and low quality. Trained engineers, technicians and administrators, are lacking. The labour force is inadequate both qualitatively and quantatively. Many workers are illiterate and more lack industrial skills, so training and education have been essential.

Labour Law No. 151 was issued in 1970 to ensure the creation of a skilled and semi-skilled work force. The

General Establishment for the Employment and Training of
Labour was to educate workers technically and culturally.[12]
Other institutes were set up to help workers and farmers by
providing literacy and other courses, publications and other
cultural activities.[13] Such steps, plus the energetic
work of the trade unions, might result in the working
class playing a significant part in the political, economic
and social life of the country.

Agriculture

As a result of the highly exploitative policies adopted
by the Ottoman, British and Iraqi authorities, before 1958,
land was inefficiently utilized, agricultural productivity
was low and peasants drifted into the cities.[14] Peasants
were landless sharecroppers working for feudal landlords
for such a meagre share that they were perpetually in debt.
They were not allowed to find alternative employment until
they had a certificate of release showing that all debts
had been paid to the landlord.[15]

After the revolution of 1958 some attempts were made
to end exploitation and redistribute land. But it was only
after the Agrarian Reform Law (No. 117) of 1970 that
peasants were freed from their previous exploitation:
land is being systematically expropriated and redistributed.
By the end of 1976, 7563,738 Donums were distributed among
222,925 farmers. Rented land reached a figure of 3,679,292
donums distributed among 115,972 farmers.[15A] Instability
and political upheavals prevented the realization of this
task before the 1970s.

The development plans have given priority to schemes

to modernize Iraqi agriculture, such as mechanization, irrigation, land reclamation and training. The collectivization of farms began in 1968 and by 1976 there were 79 collective farms.

There were also 1900 co-operatives (up from 473 in 1968).[16]

The problem of salinity has held up development. Large areas, at present infertile, must be reclaimed and irrigated in order to increase agricultural output significantly, and this requires technology and trained human resources. This will take until the end of the century, although it is hoped that by the end of the next development plan an additional $3\frac{1}{2}$ million hectares will be cultivable. This will reduce food imports, which in 1978 accounted for 18% of total imports.[17]

The main social developments in rural areas have been the raising of living standards and programmes to eradicate illiteracy, about which more will be said throughout this chapter.

Social development

Iraqi society has been undergoing great social change during the past ten years, which affects the life of all segments of the population, including workers, farmers, students, women, youth and children. Social policies are basically oriented to improving and upgrading the quality of life of these segments with special attention given to:

(1) Eradication of illiteracy.

(2) Improvement and development of formal education.

(3) Special programmes to care for youth.

(4) Improvement and development of public services.

(5) Emancipation of women.

Illiteracy

The eradication of illiteracy is a major concern of
the present government since a high percentage of the
population between the ages of 15 and 45, especially in
the rural areas, is illiterate. The last census, in 1977,
estimated that illiterates between the above-mentioned ages
totalled 2,354,255 persons, 1,170,653 of whom lived in the
countryside. It was also found that illiteracy among
females is more frequent than among males. They constitute
68% of the total number of illiterates in the country: 52%
(836,311) female illiterates live in urban areas and 48%
(775,400) in the countryside.[18] The total population of
Iraq is 12,171,480 and the rural population is 4,389,085.[19]

The government realized that, with such large numbers
of illiterates, the progress needed by the country could not
be achieved. Illiteracy also has numerous side-effects,
such as low productivity, the existence of primitive and
traditional social values which impede social progress, and
low standards of health. Illiterates cannot fully under-
stand the progress and development needed in the country and
this does not help in mobilizing the human resources needed.

Finally, illiteracy undermines the role that the mass media could play in mobilizing the population to contribute to the development process.

Since 1947 illiteracy programmes have existed in the Iraqi constitution but implementation was very slow and inadequate. At the beginning of the 1970's more substantial efforts were made to encourage people to join literacy courses. In 1971 Law No. 153 was enacted under which a national high committee for the eradication of illiteracy was established to direct efforts in a more controlled and comprehensive manner. Many centres have opened all around the country to encourage people to join.[20] The number of these centres increased through the years to reach 2,446 in 1977, with a capacity of 150,000 persons.[21] Nevertheless, in spite of the effort devoted to this task, actual progress has remained a dream. There was no follow-up to courses and the drop-out rate was discouragingly high because participation was a voluntary matter.

It became evident that unless a compulsory and more comprehensive and serious campaign was carried out illiteracy could not be eradicated completely. Thus, a resolution was taken in the eighth regional congress in 1974 of the ruling Ba'ath Party, to implement a compulsory programme under the auspices of the Ministry of Education.[22] From then on, a great deal of time was devoted to the planning and preparation of a comprehensive and compulsory national illiteracy campaign.

Plans for the actual implementation were worked out and
hundreds of centres were prepared throughout Iraq. In
addition Iraqi educational experts joined forces with
other Arab and international specialists to discuss
teaching methods, textbooks, teacher training courses and
so on.[23]

In 1978 Law No. 92 for the national comprehensive
campaign for the compulsory eradication of illiteracy was
issued, guided by the governmental and party apparatus.
I.D. 66 million was allocated to pursue the campaign,
which is supposed to end in 1981.[24] The government also
stated that the cooperation and participation of all the
popular and vocational organizations, as well as of the
educated elites, is indispensable in preparing field
studies and follow-up programmes.[25]

The whole operation was set to take three years, during
which enrolment would be divided into three successive
periods (sessions). All illiterates in the country would
learn basic reading and writing skills and acquire a
basic cultural background. The first enrolment, which
started in October, 1978, comprised 350,000 males and
400,000 females. Priority was given to older people and
to those living in urban areas, especially those connected
with government services. Transport was provided for those
not living within walking distance. The second, seven
months later, was scheduled to absorb the same number, and
the third will take care of the remaining illiterates and
thus the programme will be completed.

The chosen teaching methods are a combination of spelling and syllabic learning. By Feb. 1979, 50,000 of the 70,000 teachers needed have been given special three-week training courses in methods of teaching illiterates. There is one teacher to 30 students and one superviser to 80 teachers. The classes take place in school-rooms, meeting halls, libraries, farm workers cooperatives, and even mosques. The courses involve two one-hour classes five days a week.[26] The study period which started in the academic year 1978-79 lasts 14 months and it is divided into two stages, each lasting 7 months. The first is called the basic (primary) stage, the second is the continuation (advanced) stage. At the end of each stage learners sit for an oral and written examination. It is estimated that after 14 months each learner will have attained the standard of Fourth-year primary education and can join such courses if he wishes.[27]

It has been affirmed that students must take the programme very seriously: truants will be subject to heavy fines or penalties but on the other hand rewards will be given to promising learners. Special attention will be directed towards young illiterates because they form the group that can contribute most to the country.[28]

Along with the illiteracy programme, compulsory education came into effect on September 1st, 1978, and it is predicted in Government plans that by 1980-81 illiteracy in Iraq will be non-existent. It is too early at this stage to say how successful these plans will be.

Education

It is education that should and will play a decisive
role in the social transformation process. During the last
ten years the government has consistently urged new
educational programmes at all levels from kindergarten
through to university. These programmes should be modified
and improved so that they will go hand in hand with the
development programmes. In the political report adopted
by the eighth regional congress of the Arab Ba'ath Socialist
Party in Iraq in 1974, it was stated that from 1968 up till
the mid 1970's the educational system underwent a considerable
change. However, this change was quantative rather than
qualitive. More schools, books, and equipment were provided,
the number of universities and technical schools was
increased but the intellectual and educational aspects
of education remained below the standard aspired to. Thus,
as time passed it was thought essential to concentrate on
developing the quality of the education provided. The
congress recognised the necessity of changing the old
educational programmes. Special attention had to be paid
to technical education because deficiencies here were
delaying development programmes.[29]

The educational policy for the following years was
designed to improve the quality of the education system
at all levels in accordance with the political, economic
and social transformation in the country. Also the

policy emphasized the importance of knowledge and skills relevant to life in a modern society. During the past few years a great deal of effort has been devoted to revising the system to make it more compatible with the development process. In 1977 the Ministry of Education revised and published 170 educational books in different subjects and a total of 25,000,000 books were distributed among students at all levels. In addition, particular attention has been given to vocational education which is divided into three specializations; industrial, agricultural and commerce, since there is a need for middle-rank cadres. In 1975 a vocational institution was established to train the vocational cadres in the country and to supervise all the vocational schools and training institutes. It is also to follow up recent scientific developments in the field by establishing mutual relations with similar Arabic and foreign institutions and exchanging experience, knowledge, staff and technicians.[30]

The following table illustrates the expansion of the educational system in numbers of schools and students for the period 1968-1978.[31]

Educational Stage	Academic Year				% of increase	
	1967-1968		1977-1978			
	School	Students	School	Students	School	Students
Kindergartens	128	15,553	306	56,347	139	262
Primary education	4,907	990,718	8,387	2,048,566	71	107
Secondary "	757	254,033	1,384	664,297	83	162
Vocational "	44	10,217	92	34,188	109	244
Teacher training courses and institutes	50	15,016	45	23,589	-	59
University education (institutes and colleges)	52	35,882	62	75,495	19	110

Below are indicated the no. and capacity of vocational training centres in 1976.[32]

Vocation	No. of Centres	Capacity
Agriculture	10	5,210
Oil	4	1,175
Manufacturing Industries	4	1,468
Electricity, Water and Gas	1	120
Construction and Building	1	80
Transport, Communication and Storage	7	4,145
Total	27	12,198

The 1976-1980 development plan aims to further
improve the intellectual aspects of education and to
expand the network of schools all over the country.
Education is free at all stages from kindergarten through
to university and compulsory education at the primary
level started in the academic year 1978-1979 (according
to Law No. 118 of 1976). It is planned to build 1,247
kindergartens, including 1,109 new ones, while 138 will
replace old ones. In elementary education 29,223 schools
are to be built among which 25,021 will be totally new
and 4,202 will replace old ones. The number of secondary
schools is expected to reach 14,236 in 1980. Finally,
225 vocational schools will be built during this period,
including 121 industrial, 67 agricultural, and 37
commercial and administrative schools. The estimated
number of students joining vocational schools is to reach
50,000 in 1980.

As for higher education, the 1976-1980 policy is to
increase the capacity of science colleges as well as the
humanities especially teaching training institutes.
Special emphasis is to be directed to post graduate
studies and research, especially scientific research,
both inside Iraq and abroad, in order to provide the
cadres needed for improving graduate studies and scientific
research in the country.[33] Around 54,924 students are
expected to graduate in 1980, of whom 68% (37,136) are

male and the rest are female.[34] So far the number of
engineers graduating has increased from 514 in 1968 to
2,251 in 1978, and is expected to increase further to
about 3,400 in 1980. The number of graduates from
technical institutes has increased from 340 in 1968 to
5,188 in 1978, and will rise to over 7,500 by 1980.
As for medical graduates the number has increased from
302 to 648 and is expected to reach 1,000 by 1980.[35]

Youth

The creation of a national youth movement and the
enriching of the mental and physical capacities of the
young constitute major and important social issues. These
goals have received considerable attention from the
present government because of its belief that youth can
play a vital role in the social transformations of the
coming years.

Fifty seven youth centres were established in 1977,
a vast improvement on 1968 when only five existed. Fifty
one new centres are being built in various parts of the
country with all the necessary sports, scientific, social
and entertainment facilities. Those with initiative and
special talents are given extra attention and a spirit of
scientific enquiry is encouraged among the young:

> "The government has devoted itself during
> the past ten years to providing youth with
> essential services in the fields of sport,

culture, information, and entertainment
to ensure the creation of a new
generation which will be capable of
undertaking its responsibilities and
playing a constructive role in the
social and political life of the country." (36)

In a census carried out in 1972, it was estimated that young people constituted 23.9% of the population. Youth is represented by the General Federation of Iraqi Youth, whose basic task is to distribute cultural and educational programmes among young people and to teach them the ruling party's ideology, through specialized Bureaux such as the Central Education Bureau and the Information and Publishing Bureau. These comprehensive educational and cultural schemes are directed by three youth sub organizations and include special courses and seminars throughout the year dealing with both broad scientific topics and the politics, culture and history of the world in general and the Arab world in particular. In addition, lectures, conferences, exhibitions and festivals are held periodically to discuss youth matters and methods of developing their creative potential. Spring and summer camps are organised specialising either in cultural or sporting activities, or both. Young people are also encouraged to participate in the production process during their summer holidays by working in factories or helping farmers in rural areas.

Two weekly magazines are published: one designed for

the young whose ages range between 9-14 years. The
other for those above twenty. There is also a weekly
newspaper and two television programmes, plus other radio
programmes.[37] The 1978-1980 development plan aims at
offering more guidance and attention to youth by building
more cultural, sports and entertainment centres.[38]

Public Services

There is a positive correlation between the provision
of improved public services and the economic and social
well being which eventually aids the growth of the country.
In Iraq it is the government which is responsible for
providing all public utilities. This is in line with its
social policy which focuses on improving the standard of
living of the population. Public services include the
provision of health services, housing, water, electricity,
maternity and social care services, transportation, etc.
Of these we will concentrate on the kind of services that
are closely connected with the social development process -
namely, public health services and social care services.

Public Health Services

During the past ten years more interest has been paid
to health care for Iraqi citizens, especially those in the
countryside and the poorer areas. In 1976 there were 194
hospitals with a total capacity of 23,324 beds. Health
institutions other than hospitals amounted to 2,047. Also

the medical staff increased by about 61% in the period
1968-1976. In 1976 the ratio of doctors was one to
2,200 of the population. In addition special concern
has been given to maternity and child care, especially
in the rural areas.[39]

Medical services are provided free, or at a token
price, to reduce the burden for the poorer and rural
population. The National Health Scheme supervised
by the General Establishment of Health covers almost the
whole country. This establishment runs all the main
health centres, which can care for around 20,000 patients,
the branch health services, which can treat 2,000-5,000
patients, and finally, 582 clinics as well as mobile teams.
All these units are distributed throughout the districts,
subdistricts and villages, and provide the following
services:

1 - The elimination of contagious diseases.

2 - Environment health services.

3 - Child-mother care services.

4 - Health education and guidance.

5 - School health services.

6 - Preventive and treatment services.

7 - Statistical services.

The health scheme devotes extra attention and efforts to
health in the rural areas. At present there is a special
office of rural health affairs in every administrative

region (<u>Muhafadha</u>), chaired by a general practitioner or a doctor who specialises in rural diseases. They supervise all the activities of the health teams working in the rural areas, such as mobile preventative treatment teams, and the health education and guidance teams. They also are responsible for carrying out the health policy of the General Establishment in the villages through the existing medical clinics and centres. In addition, the rural health offices conduct statistical surveys on health conditions in the rural areas with the intention of continuously improving these conditions.[40]

Social Care Service

The activities of the social care units are basically directed to helping the needy and underprivileged segments of the population in order to raise their social, economic, cultural and health standards, so they can participate more fully in society. Services are offered through the social care centres located in the different regions of the country, especially in the poorer quarters of the cities. In 1970 there were 23 centres which increased to 31 in 1975 then to 35 in 1978. Eighteen of them are located in Baghdad since it is the largest city in Iraq, both in space and in population.

The programmes of these centres include general education and illiteracy courses, basic industrial and agricultural instruction, health education courses,

family planning campaigns and domestic visits. Some of
these centres are primarily concerned with women and
they organise courses to teach special skills such as
typing, sewing and domestic industries, besides courses
of home economics and child care.[41]

Social care services also include reformatories for
delinquents and nursing homes and day-care centres for
fully and partially physically and mentally handicapped
people. There are 13 centres for the benefit of the
partially handicapped, with special schemes to teach them
vocational skills. The present development plan aims at
expanding the number of these centres to 80 in 1980,
with 36 new reformatories, and 82 nurseries.[42]

Women*

This section will attempt to trace the changes that
have occurred in the position of Iraqi women and to
discuss their present position. However, it will be
necessary to discuss briefly the situation of women since
the beginning of the twentieth century so that the
discussion of their present status will have some
significance.

Iraqi women have suffered from a legacy of backward
and primitive social customs and norms that kept them
repressed for a long time, besides depriving them of
basic rights such as education and work. This situation

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*The following discussion does not refer to rural women
unless otherwise mentioned.

remained stable from the beginning of the 20th century
until the 1930's, when the notion of education and work
began to spread more widely. During this period a secure
social and economic position never existed. Women were
governed by severely conservative and restrictive viewpoints
and were used to being considered inferior to men socially
and mentally. "Hostility to women's education was
characteristic in the Arab world in the nineteenth
century and resistance was broken down in the early part
of the twentieth century."[43]

This situation grew naturally from certain religious,
economic and social beliefs that accumulated through the
years with the result that women became victims, the
underprivileged segment of society. Although the spirit
of Islamic religion is not necessarily repressive towards
women, in practice different interpretation of the religion
in Islamic societies have placed women in the status of an
inferior caste. A practice that has been worsened by the
tendency of men to abuse their rights, especially in the
practice of polygamy and in having all the responsibilities
for the handling of family affairs.

Middle class women never acquired any economic independence
through work, which was held to be the domain of men. It was
considered a disgrace for the family if a woman wanted to
go out to work because her responsibility, when she married,
was for the house, caring for her husband and bringing
up the children. However, rural women worked in the
fields with men, and still do, but this work was
considered part of their domestic chores because in the
rural areas the whole family worked, and continues to work,

as one unit. Thus rural women's productivity remains
to this day a supplement to their husbands, and is never
considered independently.

In social terms women were brought up mainly to be
housewives and mothers; they were taught domestic
matters as a preparation for marriage, after which they
should obey their husbands blindly. Girls were rarely
consulted about their marriage, which was a family rather
than a personal matter, in which their fathers made the
final decision. Social life was very limited and did not
go further than visiting or being visited by other females.
Mixing with men was not common, even within their own
homes.[43] Thus, women's social life revolved around
activities in the home. Authority within the family
was determined by seniority and sex: father had absolute
authority over the activities of the members of the house-
hold, both within the confines of the house and outside.
Priority was given to the males within the family and the
birth of a boy remains a matter of celebration, since boys
are the carriers of the family names and tradition.[44]

Education was not encouraged among women and even if
it existed it never exceeded primary school. In 1919 the
first government girls' school was opened and in 1921 the
government opened two more. The number of pupils was
only 462. A year later there were 27 girls' schools and
by 1934-35 there were 107 schools with 15,273 girl pupils.

The first secondary school for girls was established in 1929-1930 with only 16 students and 2 female teachers. These numbers increased through the years to reach 6 schools in 1932-1933, with 26 female teachers and 417 students.[45] Thus in the 1930's a slight change in the position of women was starting to emerge, and an awareness of womens rights in education and work began to develop. In the year 1943-1944 there were 104 elementary schools in cities for girls with 18,394 female pupils and 949 female teachers. In the villages the number was 22 schools with 878 pupils and 55 teachers. There were also 17 intermediate girls' schools with 2,017 students and 3 secondary schools with 400 students.[46]

The belief began to spread that women's activities should be extended beyond the house and that women should be encouraged to contribute to social, economic, and political life along with men. These ideas were advocated by educated elements in society, and to a certain extent were effective in encouraging women to continue their education and to participate in society, mainly as teachers. There also developed general criticisms of old social customs and conservative norms. Thus, the generally extremely restrictive and conservative atmosphere for women began to be undermined.[47] I noted above, however, (pp.14-16) that emancipation is neither straightforward nor uniform across all social classes, but each social change throws up further problems.

In the 1950's the limited social position of women began to change gradually as more girls started to attend school and continue their education and some eventually got jobs in social work. This process gathered momentum over the years as women began to enjoy their new status and encouraged others. In 1949-1950 the number of women joining higher institutions of learning (universities and colleges) reached 866, compared to 47 in 1939-1940. In 1955-1956 there were 1,215 female students.[48] It should be borne in mind that this number does not include students in private institutions.

The present position of women in Iraqi society

The possibility of a breakthrough in women's status started to emerge in the sixties and particularly in the seventies, when educational opportunities to a greater extent and work opportunities to a lesser extent became more available for women. This possibility was due to variety of reasons, such as the dissemination of litracy among the masses, including women, and the structural changes accompanying industrialization. However, it should be borne in mind that facilitating factors like universal education and rising living standards do not necessarily ensure equal access, particularly in caste stratified societies. Signs of modernization do not always imply equal advantages for all segments in the society. Recognition must also be given to the endless struggle

of women's movements and its organisations, which started
in 1958, to call for the emancipation of women from social
inequality, oppression, and the indignities to which she
had been subjected for a long time.[49]

The present government support originates from the
ideology of the ruling party concerning women. This
calls for the liberation of Arab womemhood from their
antiquated economic, social and legal bonds. Such
liberation is based on the principle of providing equal
and balanced social opportunities for both men and women,
especially in work and education and the undertaking to
fight and reject all backward viewpoints which relegate the
role of women to a marginal and secondary place, and finally
to refute the narrow mental attitudes that consider women
as shadowy figures and feeble human beings.[50] For example,
there is a woman prosecutor now and there used to be a
cabinet minister of higher education during the early seventies.

Putting ideology into practice, however, is not an
easy task, when the social limitations that surround women
and the problems of a developing society are taken into
account. It is a social process that takes time and can
only be accomplished through comprehensive social
development that includes liberating the society from
all conservative attitudes and primitive practices, not
only those imposed on women. Thus women's emancipation
requires a balanced strategy that takes into consideration
all the conservative elements which hinder women's progress
in society. Designing such a strategy was the government's

duty and it is their concern to carry out a harmonious policy
for women along with other social developments in a frame-
work that takes into account the time element. The policy
adopted for emancipating Iraqi women has four aspects. First,
strengthening the economic position of women through equal
employment opportunities. The Labour Law of 1975, No. 90,
guaranteed equal work opportunities and employment benefits
for both sexes; second, providing equal opportunities in
education; third, enacting laws that change those social
practices which impede women's progress and frustrate them
mentally and physically, such as the amendment of personal
status law in 1978; and fourth, consistently encouraging
women to participate seriously and to prove their
capabilities by assuming responsibility. This support is
further emphasized through the informational system and
through the government's backing of the General Federation
of Iraqi Women.[51]

Other examples of laws passed to strengthen the woman's
position in society include the agrarian Reform Law (1958),
which alleviates the plight of peasants as mentioned earlier
and in which women were encouraged to enjoy the same right
as men to own plots of land.[52] The planning board also
decided in 1975 to give women priority in certain jobs more
traditionally associated with women, such as typing, nursing
and telephone operating. Here again emerges the non
uniformity of the benefit of modernization across all
social classes. Later came the decision to allow women
to join the armed forces.[53]

Finally, and most important of all, was the amendment

to the 1959 personal statute (1978). This Law (No. 21)
protects women's rights and freedom in marriage and
divorce where women were specifically addressed. Marriage
by force is prohibited and any marriage is considered
illegal unless contracted inside the civil court and with
the approval of both partners. Thus, marriages contracted
by religious authorities outside the court are now illegal.
Also divorce is granted to women by the courts, (in cases
when the husband insists on not divorcing her) provided
either that there is such an essential disagreement that
their life together cannot continue or that he is physically
incapable of performing his marital duties, or is sterile.
The wife can also obtain a divorce if he leaves the house
for more than two years. In addition, divorce is granted
to either partner on the grounds of adultery or because
their marriage is causing physical and psychological damage
to either of them. Custody of the children is given to the
mother up to the age of fifteen years, after which the child
can choose which parent to stay with. Before 1978 the
father was legally responsible for any child over 7 years
of age. Finally, the practice of polygamy was restricted:
in cases where it happens the approval of the previous wife
is necessary, otherwise she has the right to divorce her
husband. [54]

However, legislation and the provision of work
opportunities can not totally emancipate women from the

social bonds imposed on them by conservative viewpoints
that limit her mobility. It is true that a woman
nowadays can divorce her husband if she is unhappy, but
divorce is not encouraged by society and a woman
divorcee is disparaged, while a male divorcee is in a
much better situation. Also there are still some families
in the working class who will not allow their girls or
women to work along with men so a legal opportunity does
not make much difference. Thus, although legislation,
work and education may strengthen a woman's position and
support her struggle for emancipation, these developments
alone can never grant her social independence and freedom.
Therefore, mass culturalization (al-thaqafa al-Jamahiriya)
which is the enforcement of knowledge and certain values
through public pamphlets, brochures, the mass media, etc.,
as well as formal education, is an essential element
besides legislation so that the old conservative norms
can become less potent as time passes, and women can
gradually acquire independence in running their social
and family life.

The status of women in Education and Employment

By the beginning of the 1970's, Iraqi women were
beginning to acquire considerable attention in the
implementation of educational policy. This was due to
the increased number of women teachers and female school-
children. All the educational acts formulated by the
Ministry of Education emphasized the equality of educational

opportunity for male and female pupils and students and opposed any discrimination. Through the years girls were also encouraged to attend vocational schools in increasing numbers. A survey conducted by the Ministry of Planning on the numbers of female students at all stages for the period between the academic years 1968-1969 and 1976-1977 found that they increased from 379,000 in 1968-1969 to 915,000 in 1976-1977. It also found the following increases for both male and female enrolments:[55]

Type of Institution	Total Increase in Percentages	Male Increase In Percentages	Female Increase In Percentages
Primary schools	91	75	130
Secondary schools	94	81	132
Vocational education	167	230	53
Fine art institutes	420	335	844
Universities	107	91	156

Other statistics indicated that the number of female pupils in primary schools reached 607,253 in 1975, while the number in secondary school increased from 83,223 in 1968 to 172,763 in 1975, and in universities from 7,658 to 18,556 in the same period.[56]

Naturally the position of women in employment has changed with the spread of basic and higher education among

the female population with a consequential impact on the
distribution of occupations according to sex. Nowadays
more women occupy executive, administrative and professional
jobs. The number of women engaged in clerical employment
is rising, as is the number of nurses, chemists, doctors,
teachers, etc. There is also a large female labour force
employed in factories, cooperative and state farms and in
the catering and entertainment industry. A statistical
report on employment published in 1976 indicated that the
proportion of women working in education is 33.6%. In
pure science (chemistry and physics) the figure is 39%, in
medicine 33% and in accountancy, economics and statistics
it is 22%. The number of women working in factories in
                    (7.2%)   (4%)
1976 reached 20,000, [as compared with 7,000 [in 1968, and
in 1977 the total female work force in trade and industry
was 78,000.[57]

However, neither the percentage of the non-agricultural
female working force (10%), nor its productivity, is up to
the standard hoped for by women themselves. Nor is it
adequate for the country's needs. This issue was seriously
researched by the General Federation of Iraqi Women. A
synopsis was presented as a working paper to a conference
held in 1977 and attended by all the officials of the
relevant administrative institutes in the country. It was
stated and confirmed in this paper that the level of female
productivity is lower than that for men due to a

combination of factors.

Although they found women were hesitant and less capable of industrious and creative work, yet the cause of this situation is the inferior upbringing and the restricted environment of women. Other factors were the administrative structure of working institutions which adds to this problem by placing most women in secondary, marginal, and monotonous positions which do not demand decision-making. Despite the fact that the law provide equal opportunities in employment benefits for both men and women, there is discrimination in opportunities for specialized training as institutions tend to send men rather than women outside the country for training. Other factors that lower female productivity relate to society as a whole, including the lack of facilities which would release women from the home, such as the lack of nurseries for children. Due to a lack of cooperation within the family from the man's side she still carries most (if not all) of the burden of domestic affairs.

Thus, a resolution was passed calling for collective support from all working institutions to correct this situation. They were to encourage women to pursue their professional duties more industriously and to help them acquire the right qualifications to assume their responsibilities. Women were also to be relieved of some of their domestic duties through cooperation within the family. It was finally decided that women themselves have a basic responsibility to review their situation and to

exert more efforts to prove themselves with the assistance of the General Federation of Iraqi Women.[58]

The contribution of the General Federation of Iraqi Women to women's emancipation

The General Federation of Iraqi Women (G.F.I.W.) was established in 1968. It sprang initially from a movement called the Organisation of Republican Women, which was founded in 1958, but went underground for the period between 1958-1968, except for a brief period in 1963, due to the unstable political situation of the country. In 1968 the movement was born again as the G.F.I.W. and ever since it has been fighting for women's progress and emancipation in society, through enlightening and educating women and thus equipping them with the necessary means of changing their marginal status.[59]

By law the Federation is a "mass organisation of women regardless of their political, religious, or communal affiliation. It endeavours to develop the economic, social and cultural standard of women."[60] There are 18 branches of the federation, whose headquarters are in Baghdad, to deal with the 18 governarates of Iraq, plus 86 centres and 156 unionist sections covering all the country.

The organisational structure of the federation includes numerous secretariats specialising in different activities, such as information, research and studies, literacy, training and development, the development of rural women,

health activities, athletic, cultural and artistic
activities, foreign affairs and legal affairs. The
secretariats' activities range from providing information
to conducting research into the social problems facing
women. It was estimated that the average number of women
who received training in the years 1976-1978 amounted to
20,000 per annum.

The federation continuously tries to mobilize women
and enlighten them by organizing conferences and debates
held in each area. Special attention is given to rural
women who still do not have any economic or social power
in society. Federation officers frequently visit the
countryside to offer women social and health services, as
well as to organise general education and health campaigns.
Mobile groups also travel out to the more remote areas
for periods from one week to one month to teach subjects
such as hygiene, mother and child health and sex education.[61]

One of the major tasks of the Federation concerning
the rural areas, has been to encourage the formation of
agricultural co-operatives run entirely by women. A number
of these collective farms exist and one of them belongs to
the Federation and was founded in 1974 near Baghdad. The
co-operative started with 40 members between the ages of
17 and 60, and the number increased to around 150 in 1979.
The farm is autonomous in its administration and is managed
by a woman. The products are sold in the market and the

profit is divided between the workers. In addition housing
is provided by the government, as well as heavy machinery.
It is obvious that such activities are re-defining the
economic position of rural women who formerly never existed
independent of men.(62)

In conclusion, this section has been concerned with the
changing status of women in Iraq. These changes have been
made possible and necessitated by the economic development in
Iraq. It is still a fact that the change in women's
status has not included all women from different social classes
in the society. The change is only apparent in the urban
women who come from the middle and upper middle classes who
are getting more educated and making use of the opportunities
provided to them in the country. The power of the women who
come from the poorer classes is not yet developed and the
influence of social norms and conservative attitude is still
existent. This situation impedes women to enjoy the rights
that other women are beginning to enjoy in the society. Thus,
laws, legal rights and work opportunities, though generated,
might not in practice free women from their unprivileged
condition unless a change in attitude is established first.

I think that norms and attitudes are still the key element
in hindering womens emancipation in the Arab world in
particular, therefore more individual or collective work by
women themselves is needed to promote further the movement of
women emancipation supported with a progressive political
system. Education could play a vital role in the long run
because it increases womens power to stand for themselves and
demand their basic rights. I have not attempted to compare and
contrast Iraqi experience with that of other Arab countries
as space does not allow adequate discussion, but it is an
area of comparative research that should be developed in the
future. In particular research interest should be paid to
the extent to which emancipation can be achieved by
government legislation or whether it is dependent upon
more personal struggles in practical experience.

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CHAPTER IV

MASS COMMUNICATION SYSTEM IN IRAQ

The Iraqi Mass Communication System is directed and
controlled by the central government, which is based on an
ideological mass party. The only exceptions are
publications sponsored by two political parties, the
Iraqi Communist party (al-Hizb al-Shiu'iyi al-Iraqi) and
the Kurdish Revolutionary party (al-Hizb al-Thawri al-Kurdistani).
The personnel who manage and run the mass media are state
employees. In general the Iraqi mass media system is
similar to many of the systems in developing states which,
according to Wilcox, although not based on Marxist ideology,
conforms to the pattern of control of the mass media in
communist states. That is, the government assumes the right
to direct and regulate the press and the mass media in what
it considers to be the national interest.[1]

The main function of the Iraqi mass media is to serve
as a means of social agitation and national integration in
ways considered appropriate to Iraqi society by the
government. The media are the agencies used in explaining
and simplifying government's National development policies
for every sector within society, and also to generate
popular support and enthusiasm for these policies.

> "State communication is integrational
> when generally applied over the longer
> term. It promotes the reading of
> certain literature, the learning of
> particular vocations, the strengthening
> of specific cultural traditions, and
> the following or reinforcing of the
> national leadership."   (2)

Although the mass communication system is directed by the state, criticism of the administration can be tolerated if it is considered to be serving the public interest.

Institutional Development

In order for the communication system to be able to support a national development plan and to be effective in enforcing desired socio-economic changes, it must have reached a certain level of development:

> "There should be a determinate relation-
> ship between the socio-economic context
> and the development and nature of the
> communication system."   (3)

The Iraqi government is   seriously concerned to create an efficient communication system. During the last ten years major efforts have been made to develop the informational media, and to provide sufficient material and human resources. The leadership of the government and the party have continuously demonstrated their concern to develop mass media institutions to adequately communicate government and party objectives and policies to the Iraqi, as well as, the Arab population.

One of the major deficiencies in the mass media system has been the lack of qualified personnel and expertise. Thus, the development of human skills has been the main concern of the government and the Ministry of Information in particular. There is an urgent need to create a

highly qualified Iraqi media cadre such as writers,
producers, managers, as well as technical staff. Only
such specialized cadre would enable the mass media to
function effectively in the context of development programmes
in the country.[4] This is a problem faced by all the
developing countries. Governments realize that the mass
media, if adequately developed, could play a vital part in
the development process yet the lack of development means
that media systems in these countries can not fully function
within the context of development programmes. Realization of
this problem is, however, a step further to accelerate the
development of the information media in developing countries
by training cadre and adapting policies that could make
maximum use of the resources available.

In order both to meet the need for more manpower and to
raise professional standards of media personnel, the government
continuously arranges training courses supervised by knowled-
geable experts from inside and outside the country. Grants and
scholarships have been provided to send both students and media
personnel all over the world to gain experience and knowledge
in the field.[5]

Another instance of the government's concern for this area
was the expansion of the journalism department into a mass
communication department at the University of Baghdad in 1974.
The period of study is four years. The first two years consist
of introductory courses covering mass communication, sociology,
psychology, etc. In the last two years students specialize in
either journalism or the broadcasting media. This department
recruits professional and experienced personnel in the field of
communication, as permanent lecturers or as visiting staff.
Other steps being taken in this direction are the establishment
of specialized media centres and research institutes, such as
the training institute for radio broadcasting <u>Ma'had</u>
<u>al-Tadrib al-'Itha'i wal-Tilvizioni</u>, which was

founded in 1971-72; the Arab centre for audience research
al-Markaz al-Arabi Li Buhuth al-Mushahidiin wa al-Mustamiin
which was founded in 1977 in co-operation with the Arab
State Broadcasting Union. Both centres provide training
courses periodically and conduct media research and
surveys.

Further proposals in this field are being considered,
such as the expansion of the Department of Mass Communication
at the University of Baghdad, into an independent college
containing several departments dealing with different
mass media specializations. Also increasing the number
of scholarships and grants for study abroad offered to
those specializing in this field. Finally, to establish
a specialized mass media training institute for media
personnel.[6]

The technical side of the mass communication system
has also been a major concern. Modern equipment has been
brought to Iraq to fulfil the functions of media institutions.
In 1977, colour television was introduced, and Iraq has been
connected to the outside world with a microwave and telex
system. The Iraqi News Agency has been equipped with the
latest innovations in communication technology. [7]
Although many technical and professional cadres have been
created, there is still a shortage of those able to
maintain sophisticated equipment.

The media institutions have also received financial
support from the government which has enabled them to

mount extensive research projects and to enlarge their activities. In 1973 the Iraqi government doubled the budget allocated to all the mass media institutions. For example, the budget of the General Establishment for Radio and Television has increased from I.D. 650,000 in 1968 to I.D. 4 millions. The Iraqi News Agency budget became I.D. 900,000, from I.D. 135,000. In 1977, the budget for the General Establishment for Cinema and Theatre increased from I.D. 110,000 in 1968 to I.D. 500,000.

The print media have similarly benefited. The government established new publishing houses in 1977, such as al-Dar al-Wataniya and Dar al-Tadhamun, in addition to giving continuous backing and support, both technical and financial, to the main government publishing house in Baghdad, Dar al-Jamahir through which most of the newspapers and magazines are published.[8]

Saddam Hussein, the president of the Republic, and the chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, in one of his speeches, addressed to the Supreme Planning Board, emphasised that our mass communication is a means of enlightening and informing the people. Because its function is so important special attention should be given to it both by those directly responsible for it and by the government as a whole. It should be given the means to develop its potential, and guaranteed the full cooperation of the country's administrators.[9]

Political, Economic and Social tasks

The political task of the Iraqi mass media is mainly to transmit the promote the political ideology of the Ba'ath ruling party to the population. The media try to disseminate and explain the governments' views and policies, both regionally and internationally. They also project the personalities of the leaders as those able to introduce change so as to encourage the maximum commitment by the majority of the population.

This task is not, however, restricted to Iraq itself, but extends to other Arab countries. It is equally important to the ruling Ba'ath party that its ideology should attract adherents particularly within Arab states, but also internationally. The party considers Arabs to be one people. Its chief goals are Arab unity, social justice and liberation from colonial influence. Our main concern in this section, however, deals with mass media practices and orientations within Iraq and the part they play in enhancing and supporting national development policies. The main duty of the mass media is to stimulate interest in the precise political, economic and social goals of the National Development plan. They (the media) should pave the way for the economic and social changes in order to achieve the growth and progress aspired to by the government.

> "The basic ideology (strategy) of the mass
> media in Iraq is to support and back the
> processes of political, economic and
> social changes being undergone in the
> society."
>
> (10)

In the sphere of economic development their major role is to inform the people of the objectives of the national development plans and to convince them of the soundness of these objectives in achieving the economic and social growth required in the nation-building process. The media also try to interpret and explain in detail the stages of the development plan and the strategies set for each stage as well as the short- and long-range goals of these strategies.[11] In this way the media attempt to link the development plan closely with the masses of the Iraqi population and consequently to make them understand fully the objectives and the nature of the economic and social growth needed in the country. Via the media, the people will realize that they must contribute collectively and effectively in order to bring about their own economic and social development.

The media contribute to this process by specifying and explaining what and how each sector should contribute to the society through its daily activities; and by making the working population realize that their contribution, if correctly applied, can hasten and positively assist economic development. The media is intended both to encourage the masses and to instruct them on how to apply their mobilized resources in the best way possible, outlining and projecting the specific roles of various sectors in the society.[12]

It is essential, therefore, that the mass media should participate in this task in its totality. Each medium

should endorse the same message through its own specialization. Naturally the role of television and radio is vital here due to the privileges both media enjoy in their potential for reaching wider audiences, and because they do not require special skills to be understood.

The social and cultural tasks of the mass communications media in Iraq are mainly oriented to developing the quality of life of individuals in the society, that is by improving social, cultural and educational conditions. The present Iraqi government came to realize the importance of human factor achieving any kind of social or economic growth:

"The mass media is fundamentally committed
to serving the economic development plan
and primarily to human development." (13)

The function of the media in this sphere involves projecting, supporting and encouraging social changes being undertaken. Their social task centres around the following:

(1) participating in the eradication of illiteracy,

(2) supporting the process of formal education (3) supporting the emancipation of women, (4) supporting and participating in the process of "mass culturalization" (al-Thaqafa al-Jamahiriya) which aims at creating a solid cultural base for all the population that will increase their level of awareness, politically, economically and socially, as well as deepening and ensuring the continuity of the indigenous culture of the Arab people.

The participation of the media in eradicating illiteracy and supporting formal and informal education is particularly evident in television. One of the two available channels is devoted to educational and cultural concerns. At present it broadcasts educational programmes which back up courses at all levels of secondary school for two hours daily (between 5 and 7 p.m.) during the academic year. Also, since the comprehensive illiteracy campaign started in 1978 there has been a daily half-hour literacy programme (between 8.30 and 9.00 p.m.) on both television channels.*

Previously, educational and literacy programmes were not programmed daily but were broadcast as special series. For example, between 1st October, 1972, and 30th August, 1973, academic courses and lessons for secondary schools accounted for 65 hours, while the literacy classes accounted for 96 hours for the same period.[14] The new regular broadcasts indicate first, serious determination to raise educational standards and to eradicate illiteracy in the country, and second the active participation of the media in this process.

Cultural programmes are presented on both radio and television; they deal with the history of Arabic culture and literature, as well as contemporary Arabic literature and Iraqi folklore. Nowadays an average of ten hours television broadcasting a week deals with these topics.

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*The categories used to group content in this section are based on personal observation and experience.

Such programmes are shown within prime time viewing hours.

The portrayal of women in the mass media is arranged both through special television and radio programmes aimed mainly at the female audience, and through other general programmes of a general nature that also concern women. The main emphasis in these programmes is on the new roles women should play in contemporary Iraqi society and their equal rights and duties with men. This includes a bi-weekly television programme entitled Majalat al-Mar'a (Women's Journal) prepared by the General Federation of Iraqi women. On the radio, broadcasting intended for women includes bi-weekly programmes for rural women and a daily programme about family life, plus a weekly family programme. In addition, women are also portrayed indirectly in the media, particularly television, through Iraqi staged plays and others imported from Arab countries. In the local plays women are encouraged on issues such as choice of marriage partner, the right to work and the choice of profession, etc.

However a study of the portrayal of women in the broadcasting media in 1975 revealed that the percentage of specialized women programmes on television constitutes only 0.6% of material presented in each month and 0.5% in radio, which suggests an insignificant amount of time. The study also indicated that the language most commonly used in these programmes was classical Arabic, which may decrease

the effectiveness of these programmes due to the low

level of education of much of the female population.*

It was also noted that the contemporary roles of women

in society are not sufficiently emphasized and that men

still view women in their traditional roles. As a result,

the study suggested that more time should be devoted to

women's programmes and also that more modern and

contemporary subjects should be portrayed.[15]

As for the participation of the written media in

these social tasks, articles on women, education and

culture are common in newspapers and magazines. In

addition, there are specialized magazines for every

sector of society, e.g. women, workers, farmers, etc.

To ensure the maximum participation of the mass media

in the developmental process certain recommendations have

been made by Iraqi media exports. First the use of simple,

mainly colloquial Arabic language in the media should be

encouraged. This is specially true of the material

directed to less educated audiences, mainly the

rural population, the majority of whom are illiterate.

Second, the messages should **make use of the**

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*There is a distinct difference between colloquial
Arabic and classical Arabic, particularly in vocabulary.
While colloquial Arabic is the language of everyday social
intercourse at all levels of society, classical Arabic
is used for everything that is written and for formal
speeches. This includes news and informational programmes
and much of the drama broadcast on radio and television.

attitudes and orientation of the particular audience
to whom they are directed: values, norms and background
of the audience cannot be ignored. Third, the information
given should always be substantiated with real figures
and should avoid generalization. These measures are
particularly important in the broadcast media since a
large part of the population is uneducated.

A final suggestion is that programming for the broad-
casting media should be supervised by special research
committees that would watch over the validity and
appropriateness of the contents for the receiving
audience. Academics, experts independent of media
institutions although specialized in mass media, should
co-operate with media personnel in setting up programmes:
this in addition to being consultants in media institutions.[16]

Institutional Relationship

Some experts believe that an adequate social
communication policy should be based on community
participation which means the participation of the
different sectors of society:

> "Social communication should be subject
> to coherent and global planning aimed at
> social change and integral development
> and open to wide community participation." (17)

Community participation is of crucial importance because
only wide social participation can guarantee adequate planning
and implementation of alternative models that would contribute

in serving the needs of the majority of the population.

Parker and Mohammadi suggest that the greater the
level of participation in the communication system the
faster the pace of development is likely to be; this
participation of the different social sectors in the
communication system will bind the entire nation in a
shared interconnected system of communication and the
people would come to feel that they are part of a larger
whole in which they participate.[18]

Katz and Weddle believe that the performance of the
mass media in the field of development depends on two
factors - the amount of attention given to development
problems by the mass media and the extent to which these
development efforts are linked with agents of change
in the field.[19]

In Iraq it is fully appreciated that the mass media
cannot play an influential role in social and economic
development without the full participation of all sectors
of society through their local associations, unions, and
other organizations, such as those representing the farmers,
workers, women, and students. These organizations are
guaranteed full access to utilize any medium of mass
communication to provide their audiences with the needed
information related to their own sector. It is hoped that
this will result in the involvement of the whole community
in development plans.[20] Each of these constituent

organizations has its own communication committee which, either in cooperation with media personnel or on their own, can broadcast and publish material to their audience. Together they organize specialized programmes for television and radio aimed at improving the general standards and skills. For example, they promote new methods in farming and cultivation, as well as instructions in the use of new machinery. Other programmes aim at teaching workers new skills and how to use them to increase their productivity. In addition the media regularly stage debates between members of the different sectors and government officials or experts discussing achievements, problems and recommendations.

Finally each union and organization has its own periodicals such as Sawt-al-falahin (the voice of the peasants), the magazine published by the Peasants' Union, Sawt al-'Ummal (voice of the Workers), the magazine of the Workers Union, and al-Mar'a (Women's Journal) published by the General Federation of Iraqi women. These organizations also function as intermediaries between their audiences and the officials responsible for the development planning in media institution, providing feedback and the responses of the public. These organizations usually hold meetings and arrange visits to the rural areas and to factories, collect data and feed-back to the needs of their audiences so that media content can be modified to suit these needs.[21]

Organizational Features

Radio

The first Radio broadcasting station in Iraq, Itha'at Baghdad, was established in 1936. Since then the Iraqi Radio Broadcasting Service has been steadily expanding. In 1970 another radio station with a powerful transmitter was established, also in the capital, called Sawt-Al-Jamahir, (Voice of the Populace). Both stations attempt to reach the Iraqis, as well as the Arab, audiences.[22] The average length of transmission of both stations is about 20 hours a day and their performances and content are basically similar, including a mixture of political and ideological information. The following table illustrates the kind of content in a weekly transmission of both stations by minutes and percentages.[23]

Type of Programme	Itha'at Baghdad		Sawt-Al-Jamahir	
	Weekly transmission in minutes	Percentage	Weekly transmission in minutes	Percentage
Information	1437	16.6	1521	17.7
Cultural	443	0.1	668	7.8
Entertainment	4612	53.4	5220	61
Programmes for special audiences	1693	19.6	570	6.6
Advertisement	313	3.6	266	2.6
Unidentified programme	147	1.7	363	4.3
Total	8645	100	8568	100

Television

The first television station in the Arab world was
inaugurated in Baghdad in 1957.[24] In 1972 a second
channel started operating in Baghdad. Between 1966 and
1975 five other television stations were set up to serve
the various parts of the country. Although broadcast
individually most of their programmes are supplied by
the General Establishment of Radio and Television in
Baghdad. In 1977 the whole country was connected with
a microwave system, the five local stations were linked
to the central transmitters in the capital and thus
were synchronized with the main station in Baghdad. At
present the regional station operates only for a limited
time each day, broadcasting local news and sometimes they
also broadcast local programmes on special occasions.

It is estimated that the average daily time for
television broadcasting is about 7.5 hours. Television
programmes fall into six categories: political, economic,
cultural, social and domestic, educational, entertainment
and programmes for special audiences (farmers, workers,
women).

The following table illustrates how programming time was allocated in 1975.[25]

Programmes	Weekly transmission in minutes	Percentage of Total Transmission
Entertainment	2020	67.1
Cultural and education	375	12.4
Informational	300	10
Developmental	160	5.5
Other	145	1.5
Total	3000	100

Newspapers and Magazines

In conclusion I list the main newspapers and magazines currently published in Iraq, noting for each one the sponsoring organization or Government Department.

Publications in Iraq*

a. Daily Newspapers:

al-Thawra newspaper	Organ of the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party.
** Tariq al-Sha'b	Organ of the Iraqi Communist Party.
al-Iraq	Organ of the Kurdish Democratic Party.
al-Jamhuriyya	
Baghdad Observer	English daily newspaper.

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*All publications are sponsored by the Ministry of Information and Culture unless otherwise mentioned.

**Ceased to be published early in 1979.

b. Weekly publications:

Alif Ba magazine

* al-Fikr al-Jadid   Published by the Iraqi Communist Party.

Sawt al-Fallah   The General Union of Peasants.

Wa'i al-'Ummal   The General Union of Workers.

Sawt al-Talaba   National Union of Iraqi Students.

Haw Kari newspaper   Published in Kurdish.

Yurd newspaper   Published in Turkish.

al-Itha'a Wa al-
  Talavisiun

al-Mizmar   Children weekly.

al-Riadhi   Published by the Ministry of Youth.

Iraq Today   Bi-weekly published in English.

Baghdad La bonion   Bi-weekly published in French.

c. Monthly periodicals

Afaq 'Arabiya

al-Aqlam

** al-Thaqafa al-Jadida   The Iraqi Communist Party.

al-Thaqafa

al-Shabab   Published by the Ministry of Youth.

al-Naft Wa al-Tanmiya   Published by Dar al-Thawra

al-Naft Wa al-'Alam   Published by the Ministry of Oil.

al-Hukm al-Thati   Published by the Executive Council
                               of the Autonomous Northern Region.

al-Tali'a al-Adbiya   Young literature.

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*Ceased to be published early in 1979.

**Ceased to be published early in 1979.

Majaliti	Childrens Magazine.
al-Turath al-Sha'bi	
al-Mar'a (Women)	Published by Iraqi Womens Federation.
al-Ajyal	Published by the Teachers Union.

d. Quarterly periodicals

al-Mawrid

al-Adib al-Mu'asir	Published by the Iraqi Writers Federation.

I have attempted to survey certain features of the Iraqi communication system, especially its structure and orientation in relation to the development programmes being undertaken. It is not possible for a country like Iraq whose information system is still developing, as well as burdened by shortages, to fully realize its potential within the context of the development plans. This system is, however, trying to pave the way for social development such as advocating the illiteracy campaign and in portraying the kind of social changes needed so that the public might be predisposed for the changes expected. The nature of material presented in this chapter has been descriptive rather than analytical due to lack of research and detailed information available. Audience research is also rare in Iraq and is only just beginning to be undertaken, especially by the Arab centre for audience research.

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CHAPTER V

MASS MEDIA AND THE ATTITUDE CHANGE
OF WOMEN: A RESEARCH STUDY

5.A. General Outline of the Study

The research project was designed to find out whether
the mass media are contributing to the growing awareness
of Iraqi women towards their social rights and emancipation.
From a review of women's position and development in a
previous chapter it became evident that Iraq is under-
taking a certain policy for women which might initiate
a process of continual change in their social and
economic opportunities.

With education and employment becoming available in
addition to a relatively freer hand in arranging their
personal life, Iraqi women are being given the chance of
being transformed from their traditional role as house-
wives to more independent and productive roles, both
domestically and socially.

The general outcome of this is more awareness amongst
women of their individual rights and more independence
and freedom in starting to enjoy these rights. Thus the
number who are socially emancipated is gradually
increasing. More women hold and practice attitudes
which are considered "modern" compared to the "traditional"
domestic orientations of previous generations.

I am using the terms "modern" and "traditional" in a
manner that relates to Iraqi women. The scale of modernity

used here does not necessarily represent a particular
pattern experienced elsewhere, though it may relate to
some Arab countries where women share similar culture
and status in society.

At present the attitudes defined as "modern" in
relation to Iraqi women are factors which involve or
imply some kind of independence, freedom and emancipation
both domestically and socially. For example choosing a
marriage partner instead of a planned or arranged marriage,
deciding the number of children, the use of contraceptives,
sharing decisions with the husband, seeking divorce in
case the marriage does not work. Outside the home,
involvement in political activities and securing a job
to gain economic independence. These attitudes are
considered progressive and modern compared to what is
generally practiced by "traditional" Iraqi women; that
is the complete submission to men, lack of social freedom,
lack of education and work.

Moreover, as I am an Iraqi myself I have been able to
observe and evaluate the changes in the status of women
over the last decade. In particular, because I am a woman,
I have experienced these changes for myself and can
appreciate the force of these general changes on other
women. It is the degree of spread of (liberal) modern
attitudes that I wanted to explore in a limited sample of
Iraqi women of different social and economic backgrounds,
and to observe the nature of relationship that exist

within this particular group and the attention given to
the mass media.

The research was designed to find out whether the
mass media are more important to those women characterized
as "modern" in terms of attitudes and life-styles. If
they seek and are more interested in the mass media than
the "traditional" women, and in which media are they
more interested.

The Respondents

The number of women who were interviewed totalled 100;
divided into two main groups. The city (urban) group
numbered 60 respondents and the village (rural) group
numbered 40. The reason for including both urban and
rural women is to have a broader spectrum of Iraqi women,
and to be able to trace the effect of the mass media more
clearly since the Iraqi rural population is much less
developed economically, politically, and socially. Thus
initially I considered the village group "traditional"
and the city group as "modern".

The urban women were chosen at random from the cities of
Mosul and Baghdad with various levels of education and working
conditions. The villagers were chosen by random from different
villages surrounding the city of Mosul in the north of Iraq, in
which the broadcasting media were available in almost every
household. All the women were married, since the
questionnaire included their attitudes towards the use

of contraceptives, sharing decisions with husband, divorce, and other questions that concern marital life, and the only way for a woman to live with a man legitimately and publicly in this society is within marriage.

The respondents age ranged between 20-40 years, which is the period of maturity when supposedly they have passed the changes of adolescence and are more settled in their attitudes and beliefs. These women also grew up when the mass media studied here were becoming available in the society.

The City Group

The bulk of the women among the city group were working. They were all government employees who held various positions according to their educational attainment and personal qualifications. They were of different educational levels, divided into two main categories: first, college diploma holders, and second, non-college (which includes elementary and secondary school levels). Most of them had children. Their social class varied and was classified according to the annual earnings of the family. They fell under three social classes: upper, middle and lower class. The majority of the respondents were of the middle class with an average income of about I.D. (1000-1500). The annual income of the upper class is between I.D. (2000-3000), while the lower class annual earning averaged between I.D. (500-850).*

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*This classification was based on the fact that per capita income in Iraq was 387 in 1976 and is expected to be 576 in 1980 (p.53, Chapter 3), the figures here are based on family annual income.

The Village Group

The village (rural) group have similar economic and
social conditions. The women dressed in the same fashion,
covering their head with a dark scarf and wearing long and
colourful dresses. Each of the villages visited consisted
of around 50 households. Their houses looked almost the
same and were built simply with bricks and mud, and
sometimes of cement blocks. A single house contained two
or three rooms depending on the size of the family, with a
front yard. The villages had electricity and most of
the houses visited had television and tape recorders.
All had radio. Also, about half of the households had
acquired refrigerators and electric fans.

The village community seemed so friendly and
hospitable. Once I had visited a house at random it
was fairly easy to get introduced to the rest of the
community because they knew each other well. Their
generosity and warmth was so instinctive and genuine
that one would feel quite at ease after a short casual
conversation, even though my urban style was very apparent.

The majority of the rural women were illiterate,
only 5 knew basic reading and writing. Most of them were
married and some were the second wives of the same husband
and living together. Only 18 women were working outside the
house, but merely helping their husbands in cultivation.
Thus, their productivity was under the direction of their
male partners and not an individual experience. This is
because the nature of economic activities in the rural

area is in the direction of family unit. They expressed
no resentment at staying at home to take care of domestic
affairs if money was not needed. Finally, the majority
of rural women belonged to the lower class.

It was clearly apparent that most of these women
shared the same views and held similar attitudes towards
most of the issues I discussed with them, even though they
came from different village communities. This is largely
due to the consistent life experience in rural areas in
Iraq, with people sharing similar social tradition,
customs and beliefs.

In contrast to urban women, the rural women seemed
happy in their roles as mothers and housewives. They did
not seem to miss education or aspire to change their style
of life. Most of the major decisions which concerned the
welfare of the family were made by the men. Sharing
decisions is a kind of deliberation between the two, and
those who did not, accepted it as a matter of fact.
The majority did not seem to know how much their husbands
earned and the men usually handled the provision of food,
clothes and most of their female needs.

Rural women are conditioned to accept the practice
of polygamy by their men, and it seemed to be common among
them. Again they seemed to accept it without question.
They stated that if they tried to reject it, they would
be threatened with divorce. Divorce is viewed as a big
scandal in the village, the woman is often blamed and

could well be considered an immoral person. Therefore,
a woman would continue her marriage under all difficult
circumstances. In addition the use of contraceptives
is viewed as anti-religious so that most of the women
were against any form of family planning and often said:
"Children are gifts of God and who dare to refuse such
a gift".

Generally speaking, I felt a discrepancy between
the city group and the villagers. This discrepancy is
further complicated by virtue of the fact that the sample
was characterized by urban women from the middle and
upper income bracket and rural women from the lower bracket.
However, I noticed some awareness of the advantages of
education and most of the mothers were keen to keep their
daughters in school, to finish elementary grades at least.
Others stated that they would encourage their daughters to
continue education. This is a departure from the old
practice which prevented girls from going to school,
either not at all or only for a few years.

Moreover, I noticed a change of attitudes among the
younger generation, whose age ranged between 12-15 years.
They are more aware of their social backwardness and are
determined to decide their own future. All of them were
very enthusiastic to start their compulsory illiteracy
classes. These youngsters stated that when watching
television they feel so ignorant. One said: "I will
continue my education and probably have a job one day",
and another said: "I will never be forced to marry, even

if I had to run away".

Thus, a gradually increasing awareness is spreading through the community, but it will take some time to overcome obstacles such as illiteracy, poverty, etc.

The Questionnaire

The questionnaire consists of three different parts. The first deals with basic facts and conditions of the respondents, which includes age, marital situation, educational attainment, employment, and annual income of the family.

The second part is designed to measure the degree of autonomy the women wish to exercise in organising their lives and attaining their rights. The questions deal with attitudes towards marital life, attitudes towards work and their views about the importance of work, attitudes towards politics and their personal interests and commitments. Finally, the women were asked to state their views about some of the contemporary social trends in Iraq, such as mixed socialization, their evaluation of women's progress for the last decade. Also, their thoughts about the latest amendments to the Personal Statue Law, in 1977, concerning women, as has been explained earlier.

The third part of the questionnaire deals with the attention given to the mass media by the respondents, namely exposure and time spent with each medium - radio,

television, newspapers and magazines. It also includes their preferences in the contents of each medium.

The interviews were carried out individually and privately in a friendly conversational manner. Each session lasted about 30 minutes. The interviews of the city group were conducted in factories, schools, or other public institutions, where I interviewed each woman privately. The urban housewives were visited with a previous notice to ensure privacy. The reason of privacy is to enable the woman to state her views freely and to eliminate any outside influence or pressure, especially from relatives or husbands.

The rural women were visited at random. It seemed impossible to sit with one woman alone since the villagers live in a communal-style. Nevertheless, efforts were made to conduct the interviews without males being present.

The rural women, though interviewed collectively, showed a great deal of confidence and courage in expressing their attitudes, especially towards love, marriage and polygamy, which is quite common among them. It was surprising to hear that some of the women declared bluntly that they were forced to be married and others who loved their husbands before marriage. Even more surprising, some stated openly that they loved already married men and are living now with the first wife. Generally, the

atmosphere in the villages was more informal than that of the city. The interview was a form of a social gathering amongst rural women. This is because the actual situation on which the interviews were conducted differed among the two groups.

5.B. – Tabulated Responses of the Respondents

As stated earlier, the questionnaire consists of three parts. The first deals with basic conditions, including: (1) Marital status (2) No. of children (3) Employment (4) Level of education (5) Annual Income.

Table 5.B.1.

Tabulated Responses of basic conditions

Questions	The City						The Village					
	Yes	(%)	No	(%)	Total	(%)	Yes	(%)	No	(%)	Total	(%)
Are you married	60	(100)			60	(100)	40	(100)			40	(100)
Do you have any children?	45	(75)	15	(25)	60	(100)	30	(75)	10	(25)	40	(100)
Do you work?	44	(73.3)	16	(26.6)	60	(100)	18	(45)	22	(55)	40	(100)

	The City								The Village				
What is your level of education?	Elementary	(%)	High School	(%)	College	(%)	Total	(%)	Illiterates	(%)	Elementary	(%)	Total	(%)
	13	(21.6)	33	(55)	14	(23.3)	60	(100)	35	(87.5)	5	(12.5)	40	(100)

	The City								The Village				
*What is the annual income of the family? (Social class)	Upper	(%)	Middle	(%)	Lower	(%)	Total	(%)	Middle	(%)	Lower	(%)	Total	(%)
	19	(31.6)	33	(55)	8	(13.3)	60	(100)	15	(37.5)	25	(62.5)	40	(100)

*Social class is classified according to the figures given earlier.

It is apparent that Table 5.B.1. demonstrates a
great discrepancy between the two groups (urban and
rural) in relation to education, work, and social status.
Work experience did not differ merely in number but also
in nature. The villagers worked irregularly and as
helpers to their husbands, with no independent wage,
while the urban women were paid government employees.
Although variation in social class is apparent, I did
not consider it of central importance for the study,
though the income differential can be seen as a further
factor that would distinguish the two groups of women.
Differences in income did not appear to affect aquisition
of the media and the attention given to them by the
respondents. Primarily these differences, along with
the differences I noticed in general living conditions,
provided convincing reasons to treat the two groups
separately when cross tabulating attitudes of the
respondents by media use. Nevertheless I wanted to test
this idea further by tabulating the responses to the
attitude questions and then make a final decision.

Tabulated Responses of Attitudes

The second part (attitude questions) is divided into
three main categories - marriage, work and politics.
The remaining part deals with certain social practices
and contemporary issues that clarify and indicate the
level of social awareness and enthusiasm of these women.
The tabulated responses of attitudes, both rural and
urban, are as follows:

Table 5.B.2. - Marital Life Attitudes

Questions	The City						The Village					
	Yes	(%)	No	(%)	Total	(%)	Yes	(%)	No	(%)	Total	(%)
Did you have a love marriage?	20	(33.3)	40	(66.7)	60	(100)	18	(45)	22	(55)	40	(100)
Do you recommend love marriage?	53	(88.3)	7	(11.7)	60	(100)	-		-		40	(100)
Do you use contraceptives?	52	(86.7)	8	(13.3)	60	(100)	9	(22.5)	31	(77.5)	40	(100)
Do you decide number of children yourself?	26	(43.3)	34	(56.7)	60	(100)	-		-		40	(100)
Do you share decisions with your husband?	53	(88.3)	7	(11.7)	60	(100)	18	(45)	22	(55)	40	(100)
Would you seek divorce if the marriage did not work?	25	(41.7)	35	(58.3)	60	(100)	4	(10)	36	(90)	40	(100)
Do you support the latest statue law concerning womens right for divorce?	57	(95)	3	(5)	60	(100)	28	(70)	12	(30)	40	(100)
Do you think divorce is easily practiced nowadays?	47	(78.3)	13	(21.7)	60	(100)	-		-		-	

Table 5.B.3. - Work Attitudes

Questions	The City			The Village		
	Yes (%)	No (%)	Total (%)	Yes (%)	No (%)	Total (%)
Are you working?	45 (75)	15 (25)	60 (100)	18 (45)	22 (55)	40 (100)
Would you like a better job?	44 (73.3)	16 (26.7)	60 (100)	-	-	-
Should a woman work after marriage?	44 (73.3)	16 (26.7)	60 (100)	-	-	-
Should a woman work at all?	55 (91.7)	5 (8.3)	60 (100)	4 (10)	36 (90)	40 (100)

Table 5.B.4. - Political Attitudes

Questions	The City			The Village		
	Yes (%)	No (%)	Total (%)	Yes (%)	No (%)	Total (%)
Are you interested in politics?	15 (25)	45 (75)	60 (100)			
Do you think women are capable of assuming administrative responsibilities?	42 (70)	18 (30)	60 (100)			

Table 5.B.5. - General Attitudes

Questions	The City			The Village		
	Yes (%)	No (%)	Total (%)	Yes (%)	No (%)	Total (%)
Are you in favour of mixed socialization?	49 (81.7)	11 (18.3)	60 (100)	8 (20)	32 (80)	40
Do you think womens progress in Iraq is fast enough?	54 (90)	6 (10)	60 (100)			

The previous results illustrate the gap in attitudes and practices between the city and village groups. Firstly, in attitudes towards marital life the difference is clearly shown in the use of contraceptives and willingness to divorce. Even though some villagers would divorce they seemed reluctant to admit it, while urban women stated their views more confidently. It is worth mentioning here that children in the Iraqi family are very important to both parents and normally - the woman in particular - would continue an unsuccessful marriage for the sake of the children. Many women in the city group declared their wish to be divorced if it were not for the children. For others, it was unthinkable, no matter what circumstances they passed through.

Divorce implies a very miserable situation for both groups of women. Among the villagers a divorced woman suggests a rejected woman of bad immoral character and limited economic opportunity to sustain herself. In the city, divorce places women in a very uncomfortably restrictive atmosphere, bearing a great deal of social, mental and physical frustrations. Even in towns, a divorced woman would have a poor chance of re-marrying and her mobility would be watched and suspected. She would also be characterized as divorcee first and foremost. Women, therefore, still try to avoid divorce as much as possible, except those who are ready to challenge these ridiculous conditions. Ironically, men do not suffer

as much in the circumstances, at least a divorced man is always encouraged to re-marry and his divorce does not impinge on his character or his social freedom.

Views towards the use of contraceptives differed distinctively between the two groups; villagers considered it an anti-religious practice and were personally against it, while urban dwellers who did not use contraceptives were mainly following their husband's wish. Other issues about marital life among villagers demonstrated no particular trends except on sharing decisions with husbands.

Secondly, rural women did not seem to value the experience of work while the majority of urban women thought that work was crucial for their economic and social independence, even amongst those who did not work. Of course, the nature of agricultural work is maybe an important factor in this case. Thirdly, amongst the city group some were actually active politically and the rest were aware of political situations both internationally and regionally. Villagers, on the other hand, were not knowledgeable, interested, or concerned about politics. They only knew basic information, namely the presidents, the vice president, and some prominent personalities. This may also be due to the nature of their social reality.

Finally, the city group showed greater enthusiasm for mixed socializing than the villagers. It should be mentioned that inter-marriage between relatives is commonly practiced in the rural communities, and most of

the women interviewed were married either to their first
or second cousins. Thus, their usual type of socialization
is mainly family gatherings. If there were any socializing
with strangers, it would be strictly segregated.

The contrast in attitudes between the city and
village groups had become clearer. It seemed necessary
at this stage to treat the two groups as separate
entities in relation to attitudes and attention given
to the mass media so as to have an accurate picture of
the relationship between attitude change and the mass
media. Thus, Sections 5.C. through 5.G. will deal with city
women only.

Tabulated Responses of Media Use

The final part of this section deals with the respondent's
habits of media use in terms of exposure, time spent, and
preferences. Exposure to the broadcasting media was assumed
to be daily since both groups owned television and radio.
The print media was cheaply and easily accessible in the
city. Because the villagers were generally illiterate
questions about the print media were omitted. In addition,
newspaper and magazines are not easily available in the
villages.* Daily listening to broadcasting media is set
into three ranges - first, 3-4 hours, 1-2 hours, and never.
The frequency of newspaper reading is grouped as every day,
2-3 times a week, and never, while for magazines it is 1-2
a week, 1-2 a month, and never. It was decided to use the
terms "lots", "some" and "never" for these categories

*This differential was indicated in p.22, Chapter 1.

indicating heavy, medium, and nill exposure.

Respondents were also requested to state their preferences in the content of each medium, although further analysis did not find any important patterns in these preferences. The general tabulations are set out in Appendix I.A, I.B, and I.C.

Table 5.B.6. - Media Exposure

Questions	The City						The Village					
	Yes	(%)	No	(%)	Total	(%)	Yes	(%)	No	(%)	Total	(%)
Do you watch T.V.?	57	(95)	3	(5)	60	(110)	26	(65)	14	(35)	40	(100)
Do you listen to Radio?	36	(60)	24	(40)	60	(100)	21	(52.5)	19	(47.5)	40	(100)
Do you read Newspapers?	31	(51.7)	29	(48.3)	60	(100)						
Do you read magazines?	46	(76.7)	14	(23.3)	60	(100)						

Table 5.B.7. - Media Amount of Use

Questions	The City								The Village							
	Lots	%	Some	%	Never	(%)	Total	%	Lots	%	Some	%	Never	%	Total	%
How often you watch Television?	14	(23.3)	43	(71.7)	3	(5)	60	(100)	10	(25)	16	(40)	14	(35)	40	(100)
How often you listen to Radio?	7	(11.7)	29	(48.3)	24	(40)	60	(100)	2	(5)	19	(47.5)	19	47.5	40	100
How often you read a Newspaper?	22	(36.7)	9	(15)	29	(48.3)	60	(100)								
How often you read a Magazine?	24	(40)	22	(36.7)	14	(23.3)	60	(100)								

It appears that the city respondents are generally
enthusiastic audiences, particularly for television and
magazines. Heavy watching of television is thought to
be related to some social factors. For example, most of
the city group are full-time employees, the time they
spend at home is usually in the evening when television
viewing dominates other media. In addition the type of
family socializing which is indoors usually implies a
gathering around the television. These factors decrease
exposure to the radio and make it marginal in the
respondents' lives. Generally speaking, the print media
seem to generate genuine interest amongst urban dwellers,
particularly newspapers. This is illustrated by the fact
that 36.6% of the respondents read lots of newspapers and
40% read "lots" of magazines, while 23.3% viewed "lots"
of television and 11.6% listened to "lots" of radio.

Finally, there seems to be little enthusiasm amongst
villagers for the broadcasting media actually available
in their houses. This fact could be related to their
illiteracy because they do not tend to understand classical
Arabic which is the language of broadcasting, and secondly,
it might be related to the recent arrival of television
sets to most of the villages within the last three years.

5.C. - <u>Attitudes by Attitudes of City Women</u>.

The next stage in sorting out responses to the questionnaire was a process of cross tabulation. This process consisted of the following steps:

First, I selected key questions which divide the sample into roughly equal sized groups and which indicate a clear division of opinion on matters traditionally seen to relate to the process of modernization. The second reason for concentrating on these questions is that their subject matter seems to be importantly related to the freedom of women. Four main attitude questions seem appropriate:

(1) Would you divorce if your marriage did not work out?

(2) Are you interested in politics?

(3) Do you decide number of children yourself?

(4) Did you have love marriage rather than arranged one?*

It will be apparent that three of these questions concern domestic matters. Although the second question, dealing with interest in politics, has only a small number of positive responses, it did seem important to retain one question that concerns matters outside the home.

Some questions on attitudes were omitted from the

*For the rest of this chapter these questions will be referred to in the following ways: (1) divorce; (2) politics; (3) no. children; and (4) love marriage.

cross tabulation process because the respondents did
not demonstrate through their pattern of answers in the
interviews a firm grasp of the issues and are therefore
considered a measure of the respondent's general knowledge
on certain issues, such as her evaluation of women's
progress in Iraq, and her attitudes towards the latest
amendment of Personal Status Law which gives more rights
for women in terms of divorce and custody of the child.
Moreover, attitude questions relating to work were also
restricted in possible use because not all the city group
were working, therefore they would not be able to evaluate
the importance of the subject matter from personal
experience.

Finally, I would like to note that attitude questions
other than the ones chosen to be used in this report, were
cross tabulated with each other to see the general pattern
of responses among city women. These tables do not yield
further information than that available here and have not
therefore been included.

Tables 5.C.1.-5.C.6.

Attitudes by Attitudes

5.C.1. - Divorce by politics

Divorce

		Yes	(%)	No	(%)	Total	(%)
Politics	No	16	(64)	29	(82.8)	45	(75)
	Yes	9	(36)	6	(17.2)	15	(25)
	Total	25	(100)	35	(100)	60	(100)

P < 10%

5.C.2. - Divorce by love marriage

Divorce

		Yes	(%)	No	(%)	Total	(%)
Love marriage	No	11	(44)	29	(82.9)	40	(66.7)
	Yes	14	(56)	6	(17.1)	20	(33.3)
	Total	25	(100)	35	(100)	60	(100)

P < 1%

5.C.3. - Divorce by No. of children

Divorce

		Yes	(%)	No	(%)	Total	(%)
No. children	No	10	(40)	24	(68.5)	34	(56.7)
	Yes	15	(60)	11	(31.5)	26	(43.3)
	Total	25	(100)	35	(100)	60	(100)

P < 5%

5.C.4. - Politics by love marriage

Politics

		Yes	(%)	No	(%)	Total	(%)
Love Marriage	No	7	(46,7)	33	(73.3)	40	(66.7)
	Yes	8	(53.3)	12	(26.7)	20	(33.3)
	Total	15	(100)	45	(100)	60	(100)

P < 10%

5.C.5. - Politics by No. children

Politics

		Yes	(%)	No	(%)	Total	(%)
No. Children	No	5	(33.3)	29	(64.5)	34	(56.7)
	Yes	10	(66.7)	16	(35.5)	26	(43.3)
	Total	15	(100)	45	(100)	60	(100)

P < 5%

5.C.6. - Love marriage by No. children

Love Marriage

		Yes	(%)	No	(%)	Total	(%)
No. Children	No	9	(45)	25	(62.5)	34	(56.7)
	Yes	11	(55)	15	(37.5)	26	(43.3)
	Total	20	(100)	40	(100)	60	(100)

Inspection of these tables shows a strong pattern of association between each of these questions. I was aware that this was not a randomly selected sample and therefore a conventional test of statistical distribution would not be appropriate. I decided to use Oppenheim's suggestion of Nomographs for the Testing of Statistical Significance of Differences between Percentages.[1] Using this test we can see that divorce is significantly related to the other three questions, although least strongly with an interest in politics. The latter question is also less strongly associated with love marriage, although it is strongly related to number of children. Surprisingly, although the distribution of percentages between "love marriage" and "number of children" is consistent, these differences are not statistically significant using this test. Despite those minor variations, these tables lead us to believe that the questions are related to a common interest although possibly an interest in politics is somewhat marginal to the other three questions.

5.D. - Education and work by 4 key attitudes of city women

I have already discussed some reasons why Iraqi women could not take advantage of educational opportunities or pursue independent careers in the past. As these restrictions on women have lessened in the last ten years it seemed worthwhile to pay attention when analysing these responses to those women who have had extensive educational training and/or are pursuing a career although they are married. It seemed to me that if educational and occupational experience are the signs of being liberated in traditional society and if the four questions discussed in the previous section are actually concerned with female liberation, then those women who have had this experience should be more likely to say yes to these questions than the rest of the sample. Therefore it seemed that holding educational and occupational experience constant should provide a test of the importance of the four questions on attitudes that I have selected.

Tables 5.D.1.-5.D.8.

Education and Work by four Key Attitudes

5.D.1. - Education by Divorce

Education

		College	(%)	Non-College	(%)	Total	(%)
Divorce	No	6	(42.9)	29	(63)	35	(58.3)
	Yes	8	(57.1)	17	(37)	25	(41.7)
	Total	14	(100)	46	(100)	60	(100)

5.D.2. - Education by politics

Education

		College	(%)	Non-College	(%)	Total	(%)
Politics	No	10	(71.4)	35	(76.1)	45	(75)
	Yes	4	(28.6)	11	(23.9)	15	(25)
	Total	14	(100)	46	(100)	60	(100)

5.D.3. - Education by No. children

Education

		College	(%)	Non-College	(%)	Total	(%)
No. children	No	5	(35.7)	29	(63)	34	(56.7)
	Yes	9	(64.3)	17	(37)	26	(43.3)
	Total	14	(100)	46	(100)	60	(100)

$P < 10\%$

5.D.4.- Education by love marriage

Education

Love Marriage		College	(%)	Non-College	(%)	Total	(%)
	No	6	(42.9)	34	(74)	40	(66.7)
	Yes	8	(57.1)	12	(26)	20	(33.3)
	Total	14	(100)	46	(100)	60	(100)

P< 5%

5.D.5.- Work by Divorce

Work

Divorce		Yes	(%)	No	(%)	Total	(%)
	No	24	(54.5)	11	(68.8)	35	(58.3)
	Yes	20	(45.5)	5	(31.2)	25	(41.7)
	Total	44	(100)	16	(100)	60	(100)

5.D.6. - Work by Politics

Work

Politics		Yes	(%)	No	(%)	Total	(%)
	No	30	(68.2)	15	(93.8)	45	(75)
	Yes	14	(31.8)	1	(6.2)	15	(25)
	Total	44	(100)	16	(100)	60	(100)

P< 5%

5.D.7. - Work by No. children

Work

No. Children		Yes	(%)	No	(%)	Total	(%)
	No	25	(56.8)	9	(56)	34	(56.7)
	Yes	19	(43.2)	7	(44)	26	(43.3)
	Total	44	(100)	16	(100)	60	(100)

5.D.8. - Work by Love Marriage

Work

Love Marriage		Yes	(%)	No	(%)	Total	(%)
	No	28	(63.6)	12	(75)	40	(66.7)
	Yes	16	(36.4)	4	(25)	20	(33.3)
	Total	44	(100)	16	(100)	60	(100)

Once again the inspection of the percentages of the
tables shows a clear pattern of association between
further educational holding and more modern attitudes,
but the significance of these differences are again
being tested by the same measure used in the previous
section. An interesting difference emerges at this stage,
that educational experience is strongly associated with
a positive response to the three questions concerning
domestic liberation, but shows no association with the
question asking about interest in politics. Conversely
whether the respondent is now working or not is positively
associated with an interest in politics but is not
significantly associated with a positive response to the
three questions concerned with domestic freedom. This
began to suggest to me that being "modern" for my respondents
in contemporary Iraq is not a unitary attitude but has at
least two dimensions. One is being particularly concerned
with freedom at home or in personal relationships, the
other being concerned with possibly more "masculine"
concerns, with work and political freedom. Of
course this distinction between types of modernity
can only be tentative based on a survey of this size,
but it does seem that any investigation of the
relationship between attitude and media use will have
to hold educational and occupational experiences constant.

5.E. - Media use in General of city women

In a previous section (5.B.) I have tabulated the
responses of these ladies to questions about their interest
in, and consumption of, the mass media. Following the same
pattern I used when analysing the question on attitudes,
it seemed to me relevant to discover whether attention
to one medium is associated with use of other media.
For example, we might suspect that people who either
cannot, or are reluctant to, read print media would be
more attracted to broadcast media.

Tables 5.E.1-5.E.6.
Media Use in General.

5.E.1. - Radio use by Newspaper use

Radio Use

		Lots (%)	Some (%)	Never (%)	Total (%)
Newspapers Use	Never	–	1 (4)	2 (8.3)	3 (5)
	Some	5 (71.4)	23 (79)	15 (62.5)	43 (71.7)
	Lots	2 (28.6)	5 (17)	7 (29.2)	14 (23.3)
	Total	7 (100)	29 (100)	24 (100)	60 (100)

5.E.2. - Radio use by Newspaper use

Radio Use

		Lots	(%)	Some	(%)	Never	(%)	Total	(%)
Newspapers Use	Never	3	(42.8)	15	(51.8)	11	(45.8)	29	(48.3)
	Some	2	(28.6)	2	(6.9)	5	(20.8)	9	(15)
	Lots	2	(28.6)	12	(41.3)	8	(33.3)	22	(36.6)
	Total	7	(100)	29	(100)	24	(100)	60	(100)

5.E.3. - Radio use by Magazine use

Radio Use

		Lots	(%)	Some	(%)	Never	(%)	Total	(%)
Magazines Use	Never	1	(14.3)	7	(24.1)	6	(25)	14	(23.3)
	Some	4	(57.1)	8	(27.6)	10	(41.7)	22	(36.7)
	lots	2	(28.6)	14	(48.3)	8	(33.3)	24	(40)
	Total	7	(100)	29	(100)	24	(100)	60	(100)

5.E.4. - Television use by Newspaper use

Television Use

		Lots	(%)	Some	(%)	Never	(%)	Total	(%)
Newspapers Use	Never	4	(28.6)	23	(53.4)	2	(66.7)	29	(48.3)
	Some	3	(21.4)	5	(11.7)	1	(33.3)	9	(15)
	Lots	7	(50)	15	(34.9)	0	-	22	(36.6)
	Total	14	(100)	43	(100)	3	(100)	60	(100)

5.E.5. - Television use by Magazine use

Television Use

		Lots	(%)	Some	(%)	Never	(%)	Total	(%)
Magazines Use	Never	1	(7.1)	11	(25.6)	2	(66.7)	14	(23.3)
	Some	5	(35.8)	16	(37.2)	1	(33.3)	22	(36.6)
	Lots	8	(57.1)	16	(37.2)	0	-	24	(40)
	Total	14	(100)	43	(100)	3	(100)	60	(100)

5.E.6. - Newspaper use by Magazine use

Newspaper Use

		Lots (%)	Some (%)	Never (%)	Total (%)
Magazine Use	Never	1 (4.5)	1 (11.1)	12 (41.4)	14 (23.3)
	Some	6 (27.3)	4 (44.4)	12 (41.4)	22 (36.7)
	Lots	15 (68.2)	4 (44.4)	5 (17.2)	24 (40)
	Total	22 (100)	9 (99.9)	29 (100)	60 (100)

It is interesting that the tables do not support this hypothesis. For example, although interest in the two print media newspaper and magazine Table 5.E.6. is positively associated, i.e. reading a lot of one is likely to indicate reading a lot of another, the same pattern of association is true of television watching with reading print media. Tables 5.E.4. and 5.E.5. show a positive association between television and both newspaper and magazine reading. In view of these findings it is perhaps more surprising that in the first three tables of this section 5.E.1.-5.E.3. we do not find that interest in the radio is either positively or negatively associated with interest in the other three media and this perhaps confirms that radio is marginal to this audience. These tables suggest that cross tabulating responses of attitude questions with media use show a stronger pattern in relation to television and print media than in relation to radio.

5.F. - Media use by 4 key attitudes of city women

In this section the four attitude questions have been cross tabulated with the four questions concerning amount of consumption of radio, television, newspapers and magazines.

Tables 5.F.1.-5.F.16 - Media use by 4 key attitudes

5.F.1. Divorce by Radio Use

Divorce

Radio Use		Yes	(%)	No	(%)	Total	(%)
	Never	6	(24)	18	(51.4)	24	(40)
	Some	16	(64)	13	(37.2)	29	(48.3)
	Lots	3	(12)	4	(11.4)	7	(11.7)
	Total	25	(100)	35	(100)	60	(100)

5.F.2. Divorce by Television Use

Divorce

Television Use		Yes	(%)	No	(%)	Total	(%)
	Never	3	(12)	0	-	3	(5)
	Some	12	(48)	31	(88.6)	43	(71.7)
	Lots	10	(40)	4	(11.4)	14	(23.3)
	Total	25	(100)	35	(100)	60	(100)

5.F.3. - Divorce by Newspaper use

Divorce

		Yes	(%)	No	(%)	Total	(%)
Newspaper Use	Never	7	(28)	22	(62.9)	29	(48.3)
	Some	3	(12)	6	(17.1)	9	(15)
	Lots	15	(60)	7	(20)	22	(36.7)
	Total	25	(100)	35	(100)	60	(100)

5.F.4. - Divorce by Magazine use

Divorce

		Yes	(%)	No	(%)	Total	(%)
Magazine Use	Never	4	(16)	10	(28.5)	14	(23.3)
	Some	10	(40)	12	(34.3)	22	(36.7)
	Lots	11	(44)	13	(37.2)	24	(40)
	Total	25	(100)	35	(100)	60	(100)

5.F.5. - Politics by Radio use

Politics

		Yes	(%)	No	(%)	Total	(%)
Radio Use	Never	4	(26.7)	20	(44.4)	24	(40)
	Some	8	(53.3)	21	(46.7)	29	(48.3)
	Lots	3	(20)	4	(8.9)	7	(11.7)
	Total	15	(100)	45	(100)	60	(100)

5.F.6.- Politics by Television use

Politics

Television Use		Yes	(%)	No	(%)	Total	(%)
	Never	1	(6)	2	(4.4)	3	(5)
	Some	11	(73)	32	(71.1)	43	(71)
	Lots	3	(20)	11	(24.4)	14	(23)
	Total	15	(100)	45	(99.9)	60	(100)

5.F.7. - Politics by Newspaper use

Politics

Newspaper Use		Yes	(%)	No	(%)	Total	(%)
	Never	3	(20)	26	(57.7)	29	(48.3)
	Some	2	(13)	7	(15.6)	9	(15)
	Lots	10	(66.6)	12	(26.7)	22	(36.7)
	Total	15	(100)	45	(100)	60	(100)

5.F.8. - Politics by Magazine use

Politics

Magazine Use		Yes	(%)	No	(%)	Total	(%)
	Never	1	(6.6)	13	(28.9)	14	(23.3)
	Some	4	(26.6)	18	(40)	22	(36.7)
	Lots	10	(66.6)	14	(31.1)	24	(40)
	Total	15	(99.8)	45	(100)	60	(100)

5.F.9. - No. children by Radio use

No. Children

Radio Use		Yes	(%)	No	(%)	Total	(%)
	Never	8	(30.8)	16	(47)	24	(40)
	Some	15	(57.7)	14	(41.1)	29	(48.3)
	Lots	3	(11.5)	4	(11.8)	7	(11.7)
	Total	26	(100)	34	(99.9)	60	(100)

5.F.10 - No. children by Television use

No. Children

Television Use		Yes	(%)	No	(%)	Total	(%)
	Never	1	(3.9)	2	(5.9)	3	(5)
	Some	17	(65.3)	26	(76.5)	43	(71.7)
	Lots	8	(30.8)	6	(17.6)	14	(23.3)
	Total	26	(100)	34	(100)	60	(100)

5.F.11. - No. children by Newspaper use

No. Children

Newspaper Use		Yes	(%)	No	(%)	Total	(%)
	Never	3	(11.5)	26	(76.5)	29	(48.3)
	Some	9	(34.6)	0	—	9	(15)
	Lots	14	(53.9)	8	(23.5)	22	(36.7)
	Total	26	(100)	34	(100)	60	(100)

5.F.12. - No. children by Magazine use

No. Children

Magazine Use		Yes	(%)	No	(%)	Total	(%)
	Never	1	(3.8)	13	(38.2)	14	(23.3)
	Some	13	(50)	9	(26.5)	22	(36.7)
	Lots	12	(46.2)	12	(35.3)	24	(40)
	Total	26	(100)	34	(100)	60	(100)

5.F.13. - Love marriage by Radio use

Love Marriage

Radio Use		Yes	(%)	No	(%)	Total	(%)
	Never	6	(30)	18	(45)	24	(40)
	Some	13	(65)	16	(40)	29	(48.3)
	Lots	1	(5)	6	(15)	7	(11.7)
	Total	20	(100)	40	(100)	60	(100)

5.F.14. - Love marriage by Television use

Love Marriage

Television Use		Yes	(%)	No	(%)	Total	(%)
	Never	0	—	3	(7.5)	3	(5)
	Some	12	(60)	31	(77.5)	43	(71.7)
	Lots	8	(40)	6	(15)	14	(23.3)
	Total	20	(100)	40	(100)	60	(100)

5.F.15 - Love marriage by Newspaper use

Love Marriage

		Yes	(%)	No	(%)	Total	(%)
Newspaper use	Never	5	(25)	24	(60)	29	(48.3)
	Some	5	(25)	4	(10)	9	(15)
	Lots	10	(50)	12	(30)	22	(36.7)
	Total	20	(100)	40	(100)	60	(100)

5.F.16 - Love marriage by Magazine use

Love Marriage

		Yes	(%)	No	(%)	Total	(%)
Magazine Use	Never	2	(10)	12	(30)	14	(23.3)
	Some	6	(30)	16	(40)	22	(36.7)
	Lots	12	(60)	12	(30)	24	(40)
	Total	20	(100)	40	(100)	60	(100)

I have not attempted to measure the statistical sig-
nificance of the variations in distribution within these
tables as education and work have to be held constant. But
even within the whole city sample a certain pattern of
findings emerges. Firstly, for each attitude question there
is a strong association between a positive response and
reading lots of newspapers. Secondly, television use is

similarly positively associated with holding "modern"
attitudes, except for the question concerning interest
in politics. Thirdly, reading magazines is not consistently
related to a positive answer to these questions and
listening to the radio seems generally unrelated, confirming
the suggestion in the previous section that radio listening
is a marginal activity for these women. We therefore seem
to have preliminary grounds for believing that there
is some support for my initial hypothesis that attitude
change is likely to be associated with an interest in the
impersonal media of communication. In order to test the
strength of this support I have to bear in mind the
previously established strong association between college
education and holding liberal attitudes. I therefore cross
tabulated both education and work with the four questions
on media use.

<u>Tables 5.F.17.-5.F.24.</u>

<u>Education and Work by Media Use</u>

<u>5.F.17 - Education by Radio Use.</u>

Education

		College	(%)	Non-College	(%)	Total	(%)
Radio Use	Never	5	(35.7)	19	(41.3)	24	(40)
	Some	9	(64.3)	20	(43.5)	29	(48.3)
	Lots	0	-	7	(15.2)	7	(11.2)
	Total	14	(100)	46	(100)	60	(100)

5.F.18 - Education by Television use

Education

		College	(%)	Non-College	(%)	Total	(%)
Television Use	Never	0	—	3	(6.5)	3	(5)
	Some	8	(57.1)	35	(76.1)	43	(71.7)
	Lots	6	(42.)	8	(17.4)	14	(23.3)
	Total	14	(100)	46	(100)	60	(100)

5.F.19. - Education by Newspaper use

Education

		College	(%)	Non-College	(%)	Total	(%)
Newspapers Use	Never	0	—	29	(63)	29	(48.3)
	Some	4	(28.6)	5	(10.9)	9	(15)
	Lots	10	(71.4)	12	(26.1)	22	(36.7)
	Total	14	(100)	46	(100)	60	(100)

5.F.20. - Education by Magazine use

Education

		College	(%)	Non College	(%)	Total	(%)
Magazine Use	Never	0	—	14	(30.4)	14	(23.3)
	Some	3	(21.4)	19	(41.3)	22	(36.7)
	Lots	11	(78.6)	13	(28.3)	24	(40)
	Total	14	(100)	46	(100)	60	(100)

5.F.21. - <u>Work by Radio use</u>

Work

		Yes	(%)	No	(%)	Total	(%)
Radio Use	Never	17	(38.6)	7	(43.75)	24	(40)
	Some	23	(52.3)	6	(37.5)	29	(48.3)
	Lots	4	(9.1)	3	(18.75)	7	(11.7)
	Total	44	(100)	16	(100)	60	(100)

5.F.22. - <u>Work by Television Use</u>

Work

		Yes	(%)	No	(%)	Total	(%)
Television Use	Never	3	(6.8)	0	-	3	(5)
	Some	31	(70.5)	12	(75)	43	(71.7)
	Lots	10	(22.7)	4	(25)	14	(23.3)
	Total	44	(100)	16	(100)	60	(100)

5.F.23. - <u>Work by Newspaper Use</u>

Work

		Yes	(%)	No	(%)	Total	(%)
Newspaper Use	Never	20	(45.5)	9	(56.25)	29	(48.3)
	Some	4	(9)	5	(31.25)	9	(15)
	Lots	20	(45.5)	2	(12.5)	22	(36.7)
	Total	44	(100)	16	(100)	60	(100)

5.F.24.- <u>Work by Magazine Use</u>

Work

	Yes	(%)	No	(%)	Total	(%)
Never	9	(20.5)	5	(31.25)	14	(23.3)
Some	13	(29.5)	9	(56.25)	22	(36.7)
Lots	22	(50)	2	(12.5)	24	(40)
Total	44	(100)	16	(100)	60	(100)

Magazine Use (left axis label)

As expected we find that having a college education is positively associated with watching television and particularly with reading print media, while interestingly current occupational experience is only positively associated with reading newspapers. Since we now know that those who are better educated generally hold more modern attitudes and we also know those who hold more modern attitudes read more newspapers, I have to investigate the hidden question of whether those who have not had the advantage of college education, but who still hold more modern attitudes, read more newspapers than their peers. The same question will have to be asked for other types of media use and work.

5.G.   Attitudes by education and work by media use of city women

In this last section I present tables showing the relationship between three variables.   In the first set education by attitude questions by media use, and then in the second set occupation experience by attitude questions by media use.

Tables 5.G.1.-5.G.16

Attitudes by education by media use

5.G.1. - Divorce by Education by Radio Use

Divorce

		Yes 25			No 35				
		College	(%)	Not	(%)	College	(%)	Not	(%)	Total	(%)
Radio Use	Never	3 (37.5)		3 (17.6)		2 (33.3)		16 (55.2)		24 (40)
	Some	5 (62.5)		11 (64.8)		4 (66.7)		9 (31)		29 (48.3)
	Lots	- -		3 (17.6)		- -		4 (13.8)		7 (11.7)
	Total	8 (100)		17 (100)		6 (100)		29 (100)		60 (100)

5.G.2. - Divorce by Education by Television Use

Divorce

Television Use		Yes 25				No 35					
		College	(%)	Not	(%)	College	(%)	Not	(%)	Total	(%)
	Never	-	-	3	(17.6)	-	-	-	-	3	(5)
	Some	3	(37.5)	9	(53)	5	(83.3)	26	(89.7)	43	(71.7)
	Lots	5	(62.5)	5	(29.4)	1	(16.7)	3	(10.3)	14	(23.3)
	Total	8	(100)	17	(100)	6	(100)	29	(100)	60	(100)

5.G.3. - Divorce by Education by Newspaper use

Divorce

Newspaper Use		Yes 25				No 35					
		College	(%)	Not	(%)	College	(%)	Not	(%)	Total	(%)
	Never	-	-	7	(41.1)	-	-	22	(75.9)	29	(48.3)
	Some	3	(37.5)	-		1	(16.7)	5	(17.2)	9	(15)
	Lots	5	(62.5)	10	(58.9)	5	(83.3)	2	(6.9)	22	(36.7)
	Total	8	(100)	17	(100)	6	(100)	29	(100)	60	(100)

5.G.4.- Divorce by Education by Magazine use

Divorce

Magazine Use		Yes 25				No 35					
		College	(%)	Not	(%)	College	(%)	Not	(%)	Total	(%)
	Never	-	-	4	(23.6)	-	-	10	(34.4)	14	(23.3)
	Some	2	(25)	8	(47)	1	(16.7)	11	(38)	22	(36.7)
	Lots	6	(75)	5	(29.4)	5	(83.3)	8	(27.6)	24	(40)
	Total	8	(100)	17	(100)	6	(100)	29	(100)	60	(100)

5.G.5. - Politics by Education by Radio use

Politics

Radio Use		Yes 15				No 45				Total	(%)
		College	(%)	Not	(%)	College	(%)	Not	(%)		
	Never	2	(50)	2	(18.1)	3	(30)	17	(48.6)	24	(40)
	Some	2	(50)	6	(54.6)	7	(70)	14	(40)	29	(48.3)
	Lots	0	-	3	(27.3)	0	-	4	(31.4)	7	(11.7)
	Total	4	(100)	11	(100)	10	(100)	35	(100)	60	(100)

5.G.6. - Politics by Education by Television use

Politics

Television Use		Yes 15				No 45				Total	(%)
		College	(%)	Not	(%)	College	(%)	Not	(%)		
	Never	-	-	1	(9)	0	-	2	(5.7)	3	(5)
	Some	2	(50)	9	(81.9)	6	(60)	26	(74.3)	43	(71.7)
	Lots	2	(50)	1	(9)	4	(40)	7	(20)	14	(23.3)
	Total	4	(100)	11	(99.9)	10	(100)	35	(100)	60	(100)

5.G.7. - Politics by Education by Newspaper use

Politics

Newspaper Use		Yes 15				No 45				Total	(%)
		College	(%)	Not	(%)	College	(%)	Not	(%)		
	Never	0	-	3	(27.3)	0	-	26	(74.3)	29	(48.3)
	Some	1	(25)	1	(9)	3	(30)	4	(11.4)	9	(15)
	Lots	3	(75)	7	(63.7)	7	(70)	5	(14.3)	22	(36.7)
	Total	4	(100)	11	(100)	10	(100)	35	(100)	60	(100)

5.G.8. - Politics by Education by Magazine Use

Politics

Magazine Use	Yes 15				No 45				Total (%)
	College	(%)	Not	(%)	College	(%)	Not	(%)	
Never	-	-	1	(9)	-	-	13	(37.1)	14 (23.3)
Some	-	-	4	(36.4)	3	(30)	15	(42.9)	22 (36.7)
Lots	4	(100)	6	(54.6)	7	(70)	7	(20)	24 (40)
Total	4	(100)	11	(100)	10	(100)	35	(100)	60 (100)

5.G.9. - No. Children by Education by Radio Use

No. Children

Radio Use	Yes 26				No 34				Total (%)
	College	(%)	Not	(%)	College	(%)	Not	(%)	
Never	3	(33.3)	5	(29.4)	2	(40)	14	(48.3)	24 (40)
Some	6	(66.7)	9	(52.9)	3	(60)	11	(37.9)	29 (48.3)
Lots	-	-	3	(17.7)	-	-	4	(13.8)	7 (11.7)
Total	9	(100)	17	(100)	5	(100)	29	(100)	60 (100)

5.G.10. - No. Children by Education by Television Use

No. Children

Television Use	Yes 26				No 34				Total (%)
	College	(%)	Not	(%)	College	(%)	Not	(%)	
Never	-	-	1	(5.9)	-	-	2	(6.9)	3 (5)
Some	6	(66.7)	11	(64.8)	2	(40)	24	(82.8)	43 (71.7)
Lots	3	(33.3)	5	(29.4)	3	(60)	3	(10.3)	14 (23.3)
Total	9	(100)	17	(100)	5	(100)	29	(100)	60 (100)

5.G.11. – No. Children by Education by Newspaper Use

No. Children

Newspaper Use		Yes 26				No 34				Total (%)	
		College	(%)	Not	(%)	College	(%)	Not	(%)		
	Never	–	–	3	(17.7)	–	–	26	(89.7)	29	(48.3)
	Some	4	(44.4)	5	(29.4)	–	–	–	–	9	(15)
	Lots	5	(55.6)	9	(52.9)	5	(100)	3	(10.3)	22	(36.7)
	Total	9	(100)	17	(100)	5	(100)	29	(100)	60	(100)

5.G.12. – No. Children by Education by Magazine Use

No. Children

Magazine Use		Yes 26				No 34				Total (%)	
		College	(%)	Not	(%)	College	(%)	Not	(%)		
	Never	–	–	1	(5.9)	–	–	13	(44.9)	14	(23.3)
	Some	3	(33.3)	10	(58.8)	–	–	9	(31.0)	22	(36.7)
	Lots	6	(66.7)	6	(35.3)	5	(100)	7	(24.1)	24	(40)
	Total	9	(100)	17	(100)	5	(100)	29	(100)	60	(100)

5.G.13. – Love Marriage by Education by Radio Use

Love Marriage

Radio Use		Yes 20				No 40				Total (%)	
		College	(%)	Not	(%)	College	(%)	Not	(%)		
	Never	3	(37.5)	3	(25)	2	(33.3)	16	(47)	24	(40)
	Some	5	(62.5)	8	(66.7)	4	(66.7)	12	(35.2)	29	(48.3)
	Lots	0	–	1	(8.3)	–	–	6	(17.7)	7	(11.7)
	Total	8	(100)	12	(100)	6	(100)	34	(100)	60	(100)

5.G.14 - <u>Love Marriage by Education by Television Use</u>

Love Marriage

		Yes 20				No 40				Total	(%)
		Col-lege	(%)	Not	(%)	Col-lege	(%)	Not	(%)		
Television Use	Never	O	—	O	—	O	—	3	(8.8)	3	(5)
	Some	5	(62.5)	7	(58.3)	3	(50)	28	(82.4)	43	(71.7)
	Lots	3	(37.5)	5	(41.7)	3	(50)	3	(8.8)	14	(23.3)
	Total	8	(100)	12	(100)	6	(100)	34	(100)	60	(100)

5.G.15. - <u>Love Marriage by Education by Newspaper Use</u>

Love Marriage

		Yes 20				No 40				Total	(%)
		Col-lege	(%)	Not	(%)	Col-lege	(%)	Not	(%)		
Newspaper Use	Never	O	—	5	(41.7)	O	—	24	(70.6)	29	(48.3)
	Some	1	(12.5)	4	(33.3)	3	—	1	(2.9)	9	(15)
	Lots	7	(87.5)	3	(25)	3	—	9	(26.5)	22	(36.7)
	Total	8	(100)	12	(100)	6	(100)	34	(100)	60	(100)

5.G.16. - <u>Love Marriage by Education by Magazine Use</u>

Love Marriage

		Yes 20				No 40				Total	(%)
		Col-lege	(%)	Not	(%)	Col-lege	(%)	Not	(%)		
Magazine Use	Never	O	—	2	(16.6)	O	—	12	(35.3)	14	(23.3)
	Some	1	(12.5)	5	(41.7)	2	(33.3)	14	(41.1)	22	(36.7)
	Lots	7	(87.5)	5	(41.7)	4	(66.6)	8	(23.6)	24	(40)
	Total	8	(100)	12	(100)	6	(100)	34	(100)	60	(100)

I have organized these tables to facilitate
comparison within two educational levels, in that
I am particularly interested in that group of women
who have not had the advantage of college education.
Firstly, because they have not been exposed to liberal
teaching, and secondly because they are less educated
they might be less interested in sophisticated arguments,
particularly in print. It is for these reasons that the
pattern of finding that emerges in these tables is so
very interesting. It stands out very clearly that
amongst those who have not been to college giving a
positive response to these questions is very positively
associated with reading lots of newspapers. The
exception to this generalization is the question concerned
with "Did you choose your husband freely?" It is possible
that the explanation of this difference is that this
particular question is not concerned with attitudes
towards the future but in fact in the past, although these
facts must have been based on a liberal attitude. The
strong relationship between newspaper reading and liberal
attitudes is not repeated either so strongly or so
consistently in relation to other types of mass media
(television and radio).

Turning to the second set of tables in this section,
the focus of the analysis will be slightly different.

Rather than concentrating upon those who <u>have not</u> had

college education, in these tables I will be concentrating

on those who <u>are</u> <u>working</u>. The reasons for this are partly

pragmatic - in this way the number of respondents does not

get too small, and partly because if occupational

experience is liberating then we should be particularly

interested in those who are currently at work.

<u>Tables 5.G.17.-5.G.32</u>

<u>Attitudes by Work by Media Use</u>

<u>5.G.17.</u> - <u>Divorce by Work by Radio Use</u>

Divorce

		Yes 25				No 35				Total	(%)
		Work ing	(%)	Not	(%)	Work ing	(%)	Not	(%)		
	Never	5	(25)	1	(20)	12	(50)	6	(54.6)	24	(40)
	Some	14	(70)	2	(40)	9	(37.5)	4	(36.3)	29	(48.3)
	Lots	1	(5)	2	(40)	3	(12.5)	1	(9.1)	7	(11.7)
	Total	20	(100)	5	(100)	24	(100)	11	(100)	60	(100)

Radio Use (row label at left)

<u>5.G.18.</u> - <u>Divorce by Work by Television Use</u>

Divorce

		Yes 25				No 35				Total	(%)
		Work ing	(%)	Not	(%)	Work ing	(%)	Not	(%)		
	Never	3	(15)	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	(5)
	Some	8	(40)	4	(80)	23	(95.8)	8	(72.8)	43	(71.7)
	Lots	9	(45)	1	(20)	1	(4.2)	3	(27.2)	14	(23.3)
	Total	20	(100)	5	(100)	24	(100)	11	(100)	60	(100)

Television Use (row label at left)

5.G.19. - Divorce by Work by Magazine Use

Divorce

Magazine Use	Yes 25				No 35				Total (%)	
	Working	(%)	Not	(%)	Working	(%)	Not	(%)		
Never	3	(15)	1	(20)	6	(25)	4	(36.4)	14	(23.3)
Some	7	(35)	3	(60)	6	(25)	6	(54.6)	22	(36.7)
Lots	10	(50)	1	(20)	12	(50)	1	(9)	24	(40)
Total	20	(100)	5	(100)	24	(100)	11	(100)	60	(100)

5.G.20. - Divorce by Work by Newspaper Use

Divorce

Newspaper Use	Yes 25				No 35				Total (%)	
	Working	(%)	Not	(%)	Working	(%)	Not	(%)		
Never	3	(15)	4	(80)	17	(70.8)	5	(45.5)	29	(48.3)
Some	3	(15)	-	-	1	(4.2)	5	(45.5)	9	(15)
Lots	14	(70)	1	(20)	6	(25)	1	(9)	22	(36.7)
Total	20	(100)	5	(100)	24	(100)	11	(100)	60	(100)

5.G.21. - Politics by Work by Radio Use

Politics

Radio Use	Yes 15				No 45				Total (%)	
	Working	(%)	Not	(%)	Working	(%)	Not	(%)		
Never	4	(28.6)	1	(100)	13	(43.3)	6	(40)	24	(40)
Some	8	(57.1)	-	-	15	(50)	6	(40)	29	(48.3)
Lots	2	(14.3)	-	-	2	(6.7)	3	(20)	7	(11.7)
Total	14	(100)	1	(100)	30	(100)	15	(100)	60	(100)

5.G.22. - Politics by Work by Television Use

Politics

| Television Use | Yes 15 | | No 45 | | Total (%) |
	Working (%)	Not (%)	Working (%)	Not (%)	
Never	1 (7.1)	- -	2 (6.7)	0 -	3 (5)
Some	10 (71.4)	1 (100)	21 (70)	11 (73.3)	43 (71.7)
Lots	3 (21.4)	- -	7 (23.3)	4 (26.7)	14 (23.3)
Total	14 (99.9)	1 (100)	30 (100)	15 (100)	60 (100)

5.G.23. - Politics by Work by Newspaper Use

Politics

| Newspaper Use | Yes 15 | | No 45 | | Total (%) |
	Working (%)	Not (%)	Working (%)	Not (%)	
Never	3 (21.4)	- -	17 (56.6)	9 (60)	29 (48.3)
Some	2 (14.3)	- -	2 (6.7)	5 (33.3)	9 (15)
Lots	9 (64.3)	1 (100)	11 (36.6)	1 (6.7)	22 (36.7)
Total	14 (100)	1 (100)	30 (99.9)	15 (100)	60 (100)

5.G.24.- Politics by Work by Magazine Use

Politics

| Magazine Use | Yes 15 | | No 45 | | Total (%) |
	Working (%)	Not (%)	Working (%)	Not (%)	
Never	1 (7.1)	- -	8 (26.7)	5 (33.3)	14 (23.3)
Some	4 (28.6)	- -	9 (30)	9 (60)	22 (36.7)
Lots	9 (64.3)	1 (100)	13 (43.3)	1 (6.7)	24 (40)
Total	14 (100)	1 (100)	30 (100)	15 (100)	60 (100)

5.G.25.- No. Children by Work by Radio Use

No. Children

Radio Use		Yes 26			No 34			Total	(%)
		Working	(%)	Not (%)	Working	(%)	Not (%)		
	Never	6	(31.6)	2 (28.5)	11	(44)	5 (55.5)	24	(40)
	Some	12	(63.2)	3 (43)	11	(44)	3 (33.3)	29	(48.3)
	Lots	1	(5.2)	2 (28.5)	3	(12)	1 (11.1)	7	(11.7)
	Total	19	(100)	7 (100)	25	(100)	9 (100)	6	(100)

5.G.26. - No. Children by Work by Television

No. Children

Television Use		Yes 26			No 34			Total	(%)
		Working	(%)	Not (%)	Working	(%)	Not (%)		
	Never	1	(5.2)	- -	2	(8.3)	- -	3	(5)
	Some	14	(73.7)	3 (43)	17	(70.8)	9 (90)	43	(71.7)
	Lots	4	(21.1)	4 (57)	5	(20.8)	7 (10)	14	(23.3)
	Total	19	(100)	7 (100)	24	(99.9)	9 (100)	60	(100)

5.G.27. - No. Children by Work by Newspaper Use

No. Children

Newspaper Use		Yes 26			No 34			Total	(%)
		Working	(%)	Not (%)	Working	(%)	Not (%)		
	Never	3	(15.8)	- -	17	(68)	9 (100)	29	(48.3)
	Some	4	(21.1)	5 (71.5)	-	-	- -	9	(15)
	Lots	12	(63.2)	2 (28.5)	8	(32)	- -	22	(36.7)
	Total	19	(100)	7 (100)	25	(100)	9 (100)	60	(100)

5.G.28. - No. Children by Work by Magazine Use

No. Children

		Yes 26				No 34				Total	(%)
		Work ing	(%)	Not	(%)	Work ing	(%)	Not	(%)		
Magazine Use	Never	1	(5.2)	-	-	8	(32)	5	(55.5)	14	(23.3)
	Some	7	(36.8)	6	(85.7)	6	(24)	3	(33.3)	22	(36.7)
	Lots	11	(58)	1	(14.3)	11	(44)	1	(11.1)	24	(40)
	Total	19	(100)	7	(100)	25	(100)	9	(99.9)	60	(100)

5.G.29. - Love Marriage by Work by Radio Use

Love Marriage

		Yes 20				No 40				Total	(%)
		Work ing	(%)	Not	(%)	Work ing	(%)	Not	(%)		
Radio Use	Never	6	(37.5)	0	-	11	(39.3)	7	(58.3)	24	(40)
	Some	10	(62.5)	3	(75)	13	(46.4)	3	(25)	29	(48.3)
	Lots	0		1	(25)	4	(14.3)	2	(16.7)	7	(11.7)
	Total	16	(100)	4	(100)	28	(100)	12	(100)	60	(100)

5.G.30. - Love Marriage by Work by Television Use

Love Marriage

		Yes 20				No 40				Total	(%)
		Work ing	(%)	Not	(%)	Work ing	(%)	Not	(%)		
Television Use	Never	-	-	-	-	3	(10.7)	-	-	3	(5)
	Some	12	(75)	-	-	19	(67.9)	10	(83.3)	43	(71.7)
	Lots	4	(25)	4	(100)	6	(21.4)	2	(16.7)	14	(23.3)
	Total	16	(100)	4	(100)	28	(100)	12	(100)	60	(100)

5.G.31. - Love marriage by work by newspaper use

Love Marriage

Newspaper Use		Yes 20		No 40		Total (%)
		Working (%)	Not (%)	Working (%)	Not (%)	
	Never	3 (18.7)	2 (50)	17 (60.7)	7 (58.3)	29 (48.3)
	Some	4 (25)	1 (25)	- -	4 (33.3)	9 (15)
	Lots	9 (56.3)	1 (25)	11 (39.3)	1 (8.3)	22 (36.7)
	Total	16 (100)	4 (100)	28 (100)	12 (99.9)	60 (100)

5.G.32. - Love marriage by work by magazine use

Love Marriage

Magazine Use		Yes 20		No 40		Total (%)
		Working (%)	Not (%)	Working (%)	Not (%)	
	Never	1 (6.25)	1 (25)	8 (28.6)	4 (33.3)	14 (23.3)
	Some	6 (37.5)	3 (75)	7 (25)	6 (50)	22 (36.7)
	Lots	9 (56.25)	0 -	13 (46.4)	2 (16.7)	24 (40)
	Total	16 (100)	4 (100)	28 (100)	12 (100)	60 (100)

The first thing to note is that the finding from the previous
tables is repeated in these, in that amongst those who are
working expressing a positive response to these questions is
strongly associated with reading lots of newspapers, except
for love marriage, where the relationship is not so clear-cut.
In these tables some other forms of media use are associated

with positive responses, for example Tables <u>5.G.18</u> and <u>5.G.24</u>).
But the general finding stands that an interest in
newspapers is considerably more likely to be associated
with holding more modern attitudes among these women than
any other measure of media use.

5.H. <u>Attitudes by Attitudes of Village Women</u>

When I decided to separate the sample into two sub-
samples, those women resident in the city and those resident
in rural villages, I commented on the unreliability of
some of the responses of the village women to these questions.
When we turn to their response to questions about attitudes,
we find that their responses are in general more uniform than
city women and that in relation to questions about work, the
nature of village life means that the response cannot be
taken as an indication of womens independence (the responses
to these questions were cited in Section 4.B. of this
chapter). Only two questions on attitudes divide the sample
of village women reasonably equally and seemed perhaps to be
genuine indicators of changing attitudes. These were:
(A) Did you marry your husband by free choice?
(B) Do you share in decision-making with your husband?
Interestingly, when the responses to these questions were
cross tabulated, we do not find that a positive response
to one is correlated with a positive response to the other.

Table 5.H.1.

Attitudes by attitudes of village women

Love Marriage

		Yes	(%)	No	(%)	Total	(%)
Share decisions with husband	No	10	(55.6)	12	(54.5)	22	(55)
	Yes	8	(44.4)	10	(45.5)	18	(45)
	Total	18	(100)	22	(100)	40	(100)

This suggests that the responses to these questions are
not an indication of the same sort of attitudes which I
found among city women. This deduction is reinforced by
my impression of their understanding and appreciation of the
questions when being interviewed. I had the feeling then
that their responses were affected by factors quite different
from those operating in urban residence. For example,
free choice in marriage is not an indication of
emancipated practice but rather a practice which is
commonly practiced and accepted among village communities,
since endogamus marriage is dominant in these villages.

When we turn to the tabulated responses to questions
on media use in Section B.4, we find they are equally
unsatisfactory. As virtually all village respondents

were illiterate the questions on print media were obviously
irrelevant and the questions on use of broadcast media
do not indicate any great enthusiasm for either the radio
or television. It was therefore not very surprising
that when the two attitudes questions were cross tabulated
by media use, I did not find such a strong pattern of
association between positive response and interest in
the media.

Tables 5.H.2.-5.H.5.

Attitudes by media use of village women

5.H.2. - Love marriage by Radio use

Love Marriage

Radio Use		Yes	(%)	No	(%)	Total	(%)
	Never	7	(39)	12	(54.5)	19	(47.5)
	Some	10	(55.5)	9	(41)	19	(47.5)
	Lots	1	(5.5)	1	(4.5)	2	(5)
	Total	18	(100)	22	(100)	40	(100)

5.H.3. - Love Marriage by Television Use

Love Marriage

		Yes	(%)	No	(%)	Total	(%)
Television Use	Never	5	(27.8)	9	(40.9)	14	(35)
	Some	8	(44.4)	8	(36.4)	16	(40)
	Lots	5	(27.8)	5	(22.7)	10	(25)
	Total	18	(100)	22	(100)	40	(100)

5.H.4. - Share Decisions by Radio Use

Share Decisions

		Yes	(%)	No	(%)	Total	(%)
Radio Use	Never	7	(39)	12	(54.6)	19	(47.5)
	Some	11	(61)	8	(36.4)	19	(47.5)
	Lots	0	-	2	(9)	2	(5)
	Total	18	(100)	22	(100)	40	(100)

5.H.5. - Share Decisions by Television Use

Share Decisions

		Yes	(%)	No	(%)	Total	(%)
Television Use	Never	4	(22.2)	10	(45.4)	14	(35)
	Some	8	(44.4)	8	(36.4)	16	(40)
	Lots	6	(33.3)	4	(18.2)	10	(25)
	Total	18	(99.9)	22	(100)	40	(100)

There was some slight support in these tables for my
argument that the question concerning sharing decision-
making with their husband is a more genuine indication
of changing attitudes than whether the husband is
freely chosen in that in Tables 5.H.4. and 5.H.5., the
pattern of correlation between positive response and
media use is more pronounced than in Tables 5.H.2. and 5.H.3.
Even so, the figures are rather inconclusive and
considerably more research is needed before we can
begin to explore the process of attitude change in the
village. This is in addition to the fact that the income
differentials may also be a factor.

Conclusion

I would now like to try to summarise the main
findings of this piece of research. I will organise
this conclusion around three main points.

The first is concerned with the initial hypothesis
that attitude change amongst women in a developing
society will be related to media use. In order to test
this hypothesis I decided earlier that I would have to
divide my sample of one hundred women into separate
samples of urban and rural residents restricting my
remarks to the urban sub-sample. I think it has been
shown that the hypothesis has received some support. This
is despite the fact that the income differentials within
my sample might also institute an important factor. In
particular there seems strong evidence that newspaper
reading is particularly associated with independent views.
This is very interesting as in some respects newspapers
may appear less fashionable or sophisticated than the
technologies of broadcasting, but my results suggest that
both literacy and access to newspapers are important steps
on the path of development. Of course, from a survey like
this I cannot determine the course of the relationship
between attitudes and media but in the context of this
and other studies of attitude change we can be confident
about the significance of the mass media in supporting
rapid social change.

As would be expected, I did not find that the mass
media were important in isolation from other social
factors, and in particular I found education to be closely
entangled with more liberal attitudes. It was, however,
less predictable that I would find some indication that
independent attitudes are not necessarily closely related
to each other. For example, my belief that there may be
a difference between independence in matters relating to
the home and a more political independence. If this
difference truly exists it may relate to experience of
work outside the home but at this stage any comment on
this point can only be tentative.

Finally I would like to make some comment on why
the result from the interviews with village women were
less conclusive. I have stressed the lack of literacy
amongst these women and it may be that literacy is crucial
as a base upon which other social changes can be built.
Secondly, the fact that the majority of village women
occupied the lower income bracket level may be a further
indication of obstacle to social change. Thirdly, it
would be noted that television has only recently spread
to rural Iraq and we should not therefore expect its
impact to be immediately apparent. Fourthly, it is
also relevant that the majority of television broadcast
is in classical Arabic, a form not understood by the
village women.

Finally, my later doubts about the appropriateness of some of the questions used to elicit attitudes suggest to me that future research will have to be very carefully phrased so as to address significant aspects of social change in rural experience. This was clearly seen by the fact that for many of the questions village women did not seem to be able to provide an answer. A situation which may be the result of the very nature of a questionnaire geared primarily to individualistic type of society. (See page 21, Chapter 2).

In conclusion, therefore, I feel that this piece of research has been justified as an exploration of an area not previously studied in Iraq, but I am aware that this is a very preliminary piece of work and that future research studies will have to investigate all these themes more thoroughly.

References: Chapter V

1. Oppenheim, A.N.,   Questionnaire Design and Attitude
   Measurement, London, Heinemann, Appendix III.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

In the course of this thesis I have tried to relate the literature on mass communication and social change to the specific history of Iraq of the last ten or more years. In particular I have focused throughout on the implications for women of rapid social change and the possible relevance of the mass media for this particular audience. In the preceeding chapter these themes were brought together in an original research study of the role of the mass media in the lives of a hundred Iraqi women. Concluding this thesis I do not want to repeat points I have made above and therefore I shall only briefly note one or two implications of my work.

The first is the significance of the differences in experience between city and village women, not only do these differences mean that the path of social change will be very different for these groups, but they also mean that the emancipatory potential of the mass media will have a differential impact.
For example, my finding in the research study that programmes that are popular with village women are not at all popular in the city and vice versa, suggest that programme makers cannot expect a single set of programmes to have the same impact throughout the country. It therefore seems to me that those responsible for planning

communication strategy will have to be very sensitive to the special needs of different audiences.

The second set of comments relate to the slightly unexpected lack of impact of television compared to newspapers. One reason for this may be that - to continue the point made in the previous paragraph - programme planners have not paid sufficient attention either to the needs of women and/or the times when broadcasts could usefully be made. A second explanation is that audiences in general have such firmly fixed expectations about television as a medium of entertainment, particularly when compared to newspapers, that however well intentioned the messages of plays or documentaries, they do not really make an impression. It may be, therefore, that heavy investment in television facilities as a medium of social change is inappropriate in **developing societies, especially** those lacking capital resources.

Finally, I believe the research study to have partly directed our attention to the persistent gap in societies such as Iraq between formal and informal emancipation. By this I mean a gap between legal provisions for increased social mobility and cultural obstacles which operate to prevent women taking full advantage of their formal opportunities. This gap between possibility and practice is something that can only be studied through time and

therefore requires a different type of research strategy
to the one reported in this thesis. Closing the gap,
however, will be effected by a variety of actions, amongst
which I would like to include the process of social
research. I know that the preparation and writing of
this thesis has contributed to my own understanding of
the struggles still to be undertaken by Iraqi women in
general and I hope that my own work, if only by directing
attention to a previously neglected area of study, will
contribute to helping those women reach a comparably
fuller understanding.

Appendix I.A.

Preference of Respondents in Television Programmes

Programmes	The City				The Village			
	No.of Women	(%)	Total	(%)	No.of Women	(%)	Total	(%)
Arabic Drama	53	(92.9)	57	(100)	21	(80.7)	26	(100)
Arabic Series	52	(91.2)	57	(100)	14	(53.8)	26	(100)
Foreign Drama	43	(75.4)	57	(100)	5	(19.2)	26	(100)
Foreign Series	30	(52.6)	57	(100)	-	-	-	-
Pure Music	23	(40.3)	57	(100)	21	(80.7)	26	(100)
Games and Variety	14	(24.5)	57	(100)	-	-	-	-
News broad-casting	25	(43.8)	57	(100)	12	(46.1)	26	(100)
Political	8	(14)	57	(100)	-	-	-	-
Cultural	26	(45.6)	57	(100)	-	-	-	-
Scientific	21	(36.8)	57	(100)	1	(3.8)	26	(100)
Women and Family	7	(12.2)	57	(100)	1	(3.8)	26	(100)
Sports	15	(26.3)	57	(100)	2	(7.6)	26	(100)
Religious	2	(3.5)	57	(100)	2	(7.6)	26	(100)
Development	9	(15.7)	57	(100)	1	(3.8)	26	(100)
Rural Programmes	3	(5.2)	57	(100)	20	(76.9)	26	(100)

Appendix I.B.

Preference of Respondents in Radio Programmes

Programmes	The City				The Village			
	No.of Women	(%)	Total	(%)	No.of Women	(%)	Total	(%)
News broad-casting	23	(63.8)	36	(100)	14	(66.6)	21	(100)
Drama	16	(44.4)	36	(100)	8	(38)	40	(100)
Women and Family	22	(61.1)	36	(100)	2	(9.5)		(100)
Pure Music	35	(97.2)	36	(100)	21	(100)		(100)
Religious	6	(16.6)	36	(100)	2	(9.5)		(100)
Cultural	9	(25)	36	(100)				
Rural	-		-		7	(33.3)		(100)

Appendix I.C.

Preferences of the City Group in Newspapers and Magazines

Newspapers

Contents	No. of Women	(%)	Total	(%)
National and Arab News	31	(100)	31	(100)
Domestic local news	12	(38.7)	31	(100)
International news	24	(77.4)	31	(100)
Varieties	23	(74.1)	31	(100)
Cultural News	5	(16.1)	31	(100)

Magazines

Contents	No. of Women	(%)	Total	(%)
Political Articles	12	(26)	46	(100)
Cultural	7	(15.2)	46	(100)
Social domestic articles	46	(100)	46	(100)
Scientific articles	8	(17.3)	46	(100)
Artistic articles	16	(34.7)	46	(100)
Varieties	11	(23.9)	46	(100)

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