The working of parliamentary government in Pakistan, 1947 - 1958: with particular reference to the central government and major political trends

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"THE WORKING OF PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT IN PAKISTAN

1947 - 1958"

With Particular Reference to Central

Government and Major Political Trends

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The Chowdhury Mohammad Ali Cabinet

The fallout from the explosion of 92A rule in East Pakistan produced a blighting effect on the political health of that part of Pakistan. Suhrawardy till December 1954 had been at the Zurich Hospital. Haq volunteered himself to choose a life of a political recluse to fight shy of the central government's wrath. While Bhasani was away from Pakistan to avoid being 'shot at hand' by Gen. Mirza. And among the prominent leaders of the U.F. who were inside the country only Ataur Rahman was outside of jail.* In short, political incommunicability between leaders and rank and file of the U.F. during the 92A administration resulted in the stultification of that cohesive force that was the U.F. at the outset. And as politics were on the way back to Pakistan and the new Constituent Assembly was going to be convened following the judicial decisions the U.F. became again a determining factor in that half of the members of the proposed Constituent Assembly i.e. 40, would have to be elected by the U.F. dominated East Pakistan legislature. But the irony was that the U.F. instead of voicing with one accent its components became more inward-looking and tended to speak for the 21-Point Programme from

* Gen. Mirza the then Governor of East Pakistan explained Ataur Rahman's being outside of jail in the following lines - lines that will also demonstrate the General's approach towards politics and politicians following the independence: "I would have arrested him, but it is necessary to have one man out in the camp of the enemy to enable us to know the intentions of the enemy. This is an old trick of the now defunct political department of the old Government of India. It has worked in the past and so far I have no reason to grumble."
their respective party bases. The state of disarray was mainly caused by the entrance of personalities in the politics as the two tigers namely, Haq and Suhrawardy could not co-exist in the same jungle of the U.F. any more. At length, the A.L. quit the U.F. but not the 21 planks.

Away in Karachi the Prime Minister of the caretaker government was counting his days as the elections to the new Constituent Assembly drew on space. He needed a membership in the Constituent Assembly to ensure his political future. While the country had been gasping under constitutional crisis the Prime Minister kept mum leaving his law minister to undertake the onerous "task" of restoring parliamentary rule" once again in Pakistan. Now that storms were over and Suhrawardy was away in London discussing constitutional affairs with Sir Ivor, Mohammad Ali flew in tranquil weather to East Pakistan to pour his puckish mind into a secret alliance with Haq, the "traitor" for whose overthrow he had asked the nation to back him in 1954. The Prime Minister made a pre-emptive decision in that he restored parliamentary government in East Pakistan on 3rd June, 1955 entrusting Haq's nominee, Abu Hussain Sarkar (lately a member of the Governor General's Council) with the premiership.

Footnote continued from previous page.

Source: Governor's letter to the Governor General, D.O. No.111/PS, dated the 10th July, 1954 (Top Secret/Personal).


2. This was termed "shameless" by the Times of Karachi and "brazenfacedness of the Prime Minister" by the Morning News (Dacca). Both are quoted in Hindu, June 6, 1955.
This incident had "the elements of a constitutional coup", for the Prime Minister neither did ask the A.M.L. — by far the majority party in the legislature — to form the Cabinet, nor did he ask the U.F. to elect its own leader.* Now the U.F.'s taking over the governmental powers minus the A.M.L. gave an advance hint to the nature of the central government that was going to be formed shortly after the elections to the second Constituent Assembly.

The existing legislatures of both the wings of Pakistan elected members (21st June, 1953) to the Constituent Assembly II of which the results were the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M. L.</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>U.F.</strong></td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td>A.M.L.</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minorities</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan National Congress</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scheduled Castes Federation</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Progressive Party***</td>
<td>2†</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The Governor of East Pakistan resigned as he was not consulted by the Prime Minister in the restoration of parliamentary government. See Times, June 6, 1955. The Prime Minister had also disagreements with the then Governor of East Pakistan in April 1954 vis-a-vis 92A rule in East Pakistan. As a result the Governor had to quit giving way to Gen. Mirza. This was dramatically revealed in 1957 when the ex-Governor published his correspondence with the Prime Minister. This was indicative of the presence of parliamentary spirits against non-parliamentary ones. For the published letters see Dawn, September 2, 1957.

** K.S.F. + Nizam-e-Islam + G.D.

*** Congress dissident group.

† The rest of the members, i.e. 9, were elected from the tribal areas and frontier states by the Constituent Assembly II in July 1955.


Among the 13 existing ministers in the central government only 6 survived the elections. General Ayub did not seek membership in the Constituent Assembly II but his peer, General Mirza, contrary to his earlier avowal that "the army wishes to get out of politics" and "I hope you will not find me here (in the Cabinet) in 18 months' time", 6 entered the Constituent Assembly II through the M.L. ticket by rather adroit moves which saw the discomfiture of Noon (and his group), the then Chief Minister of the Punjab from the M.L. 7 For, he had opposed the Punjab M.L. parliamentary party's decision of entrusting the M.L. Central Parliamentary Board with the task of nominating members for the Constituent Assembly elections. And needless to say, that the handpicked Muslim leaguers of the Central Parliamentary Board treated the General by nominating him from the Punjab quota.

As soon as the elections were over, the A.M.L. working committee in a resolution demanded the resignation of the present government in view of the new elections to the Constituent Assembly II. Suhrawardy urged the Prime Minister to resign immediately "to restore people's confidence in democratic values". 8 He had already fired his first shot in a statement e.g. "The voting has clearly demonstrated that the only true and reliable party is the Awami league". 9 Given that

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* Noon got elected into the Constituent Assembly II independently, and among the 7 independents 3 belonged to the Noon-group.

there was no majority party in the central legislature the M.L. being the largest single party would have to switch for coalition government. And the question of Suhrawardy's heading the coalition government would not have been an unheard-of instance in parliamentary almanac.* Besides, the M.L. parliamentary party had no leader of all-Pakistan reckoning. Surely, Suhrawardy had marked himself out for a key post in the new constitutional set up; for, he had been a successful political catalyst in changing the stubborn attitudes of political parties for the greater interest of Pakistan. His painstaking persuasion course had borne fruit in that the East Pakistan A.M.L. Working Committee accepted the concept of parity in all matters between the two wings of Pakistan, as Bhasani openly recognised the principle of parity as a "compromise and gesture of goodwill",\(^\text{10}\) towards West Pakistan. This was followed by other parties' adhering to it. Suhrawardy's was the positive contribution of detaching the East Pakistanis from their former narcissistic habit of looking at the beauty of their population strength. He was heard in the Constituent Assembly II inculcating to his compatriots that "Democracy does not mean only numbers. In democracy you will have to give and take. Democracy means agreement between the people."\(^\text{11}\) Suhrawardy had in his mind the picture of a national con-

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* Ramsay MacDonald led the minority party in the coalition. And in undivided India the Unionists Ministry of Khisir Hyat Khan in the Punjab was a case in point.


stituency uppermost that was why his loyalty to the regional constituency i.e. East Pakistan, did not preclude him from undertaking an unpopular stand - a stand that had secured him a national stature. A leader of such a quality who was "thought to be the only member who can pilot a constitution through the Assembly", was assuredly tipped for the country's next Prime Minister ready to be sworn-in at any moment in early August 1955.

But things were disposed in a different way. Although Mohammad Ali had secured his membership in the Constituent Assembly II through Haq's cooperation, he later failed to obtain the leadership of the M.L. parliamentary party which was bestowed upon Chowdhury Mohammad Ali, the Finance Minister. So the Prime Minister resigned in keeping with the parliamentary convention. Significantly, this took place a day after General Mirza's elevation to the position of an acting Governor General as Golam Mohammad was ailing. That meant that the loss of Mohammad Ali as the Prime Minister who was popular in the eyes of Americans and a lubricant to the U.S. - Pakistan pacts and aid deals was replenished by General Mirza as the Governor General of Pakistan.

# Mohammad Ali again went back to the U.S. as the accredited ambassador of Pakistan, following resignation.


Despite Chowdhury Mohammad Ali's initial willingness* to act under an A.M.L. party-led Cabinet, he was commissioned by the Governor General to form a coalition government which he did with the U.F. eventually (11 August). As to the M.L.'s going back on its word in regard to head a coalition government of M.L.-A.M.L.,** it can be hypothesized that the M.L. leaders were apprehensive of Suhrawardy's success in the office which might 'seriously weaken' their influence among the people. Chowdhury Mohammad Ali, of late, and for that matter the M.L. parliamentary party might have been uncomfortable at the prospect of being governed by a Prime Minister of a minority party. This ambivalent position of the M.L. was, however, solved when the U.F. - now an uneasy alliance of rightist*** and leftist elements - acted like the proverbial dog in the manger by agreeing to work under the M.L. party provided Suhrawardy was not made the Prime Minister.***

But beneath these apparent reasons there was a telepathic communication between the M.L. and the K.S.P. -Nizam-e-Islam dominated U.F. as far

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* Gen. Mirza himself told the author that Chowdhury Mohammad Ali did not mind working under Suhrawardy. But Gen. Mirza told Chowdhury Mohammad Ali, the M.L. parliamentary leader that in case of his failure to form a government he would then ask the minority leader, Suhrawardy to do the same. Gen. Mirza also admitted to the author that as the prospect of Suhrawardy's becoming the Prime Minister was becoming imminent people like Col. Abid Hossain, M. Ali Qizilbash of the Punjab (prominent landlord-politicians) were constantly whispering to his ears in order to intercept Suhrawardy.

** K.S.P. and Nizam-e-Islam.

*** G.D.

as their Islamic predilections were concerned. The octogenarian Haq with one leg in his grave was more inclined to tell his beads and to give an Islamic bias to the ensuing constitution with the prospect of obtaining salvation in the day of judgment. And Chowdhury Mohammad Ali’s subsequent activities and his joining with the Nizam-e-Islam party clearly demonstrated his frame of mind. In other words, the formation of the M.L.-U.F. government was a victory for the modernist-Islamist groups. Suhrawardy’s A.M.L. could not intrigue with the M.L. as the former had a secular orientation and made no secret, particularly, of upholding the issue of a joint electorate instead of a separate one. That was why a foreign critic remarked that "what the constitution of Pakistan might have been had he (Suhrawardy) steered his own draft through the Assembly must remain one of the engaging ifs of history". It was, however, a pity that Pakistan’s first and foremost opposition party i.e. A.M.L. could not find a proper place in the coalition government.

It might appear that Chowdhury’s elevation to the premiership just formalized a ruling Punjabi triumvirate – Gulam Mohammad, General Mirza* and Chowdhury Mohammad Ali – which had dominated the Pakistan

* Although Gen. Mirza comes from the Murshidabad Nawab family, he had no connection with that part of Bengal except for the huge mango gardens he inherited there. He had all along been associated with the Punjabi group.

government in recent months. But in fairness, it could not be said that the Governor General acted unconstitutionally; for, he asked the M.L. to form a government after he had been told of U.F.'s support to Chowdhury.

However, the induction of Chowdhury Mohammad Ali in the office of the Prime Minister marked a new but positive phase in the parliamentary life of Pakistan. First, the State authority was restored in a Cabinet responsible to the new parliament. The coalition government was at advantage in that its components were also in charge of the governments of both wings of Pakistan i.e. the U.F. was in East Pakistan and M.L. in West Pakistan. Second, the M.L. was bound to share powers with other contenders after having monopolistically ruled the country for eight years. This demonstrated the modicum of mobility and free interplay of social and political forces - the requisites of democracy. There was a time when Mosca's "political class" and Michel's "iron law of oligarchy" were feared to have been parading the political plane of Pakistan. And, accordingly clichés such as "ruling coterie", "caucus", "vested interests", "oligarchy", etc., etc. were employed to characterise the ruling M.L. party. But the position of the well-entrenched oligarchical base in Pakistan was appreciably challenged by 'democratic, leveling and centrifugal forces', in that a new sense of representativeness and competitiveness entered the body politic of Pakistan. And precisely, the so-called "ruling coterie" was replaced yielding place to new categories of people which in Pareto's phraseology might be described as 'circulation of elites'. It is said that "the
greater the degree of constitutionalism in a society, the less the middle classes function merely as agents of the elite and the greater their personal independence, autonomy and security." and the recent triumph of constitutionalism in Pakistan gave an impetus to that direction as well. The recruitment process of the Cabinet bore testimony to that; for, it was largely middle class-oriented. Prior to Chowdhury Mohammad Ali the Prime Ministership happened to have been the preserve of the noble families. * Chowdhury Mohammad Ali who had been associated with the so-called ruling coterie climbed his way up from a middle-class base.

Third, the coalition Cabinet reflected a composite character in that it admitted minority parties into it — an admission of social realism. Although there was a minority minister ** representing the Scheduled Caste in the first Cabinet of Liaquat, in reality this was an act of political window-dressing. The inclusion of K.K. Dutta and A.K. Dutta as representatives of the U.P.P. and Scheduled Caste Federation respectively in Chowdhury's Cabinet was a genuine parliamentary recognition that in a new political cycle even the minorities could lay claim to a share in the distribution of powers — a topsy-turvy of earlier vogue when the Congressites were habitually accused by the ruling Muslim leaguers of disloyalty and Pro-Indianism. ***

* Liaquat, Nazimuddin and Mohammad Ali hailed from Nawab families.
** After J.N. Mandal's defection to India (1950) there was no minority minister in the central government till 1954.
Fourth, regional representations in the Cabinet fulfilled federal requirements. During the periods from Liaquat to Mohammad Ali the share of East Pakistanis in the central ministership had always been disproportionate to what they were entitled to. In the 11-man Cabinet of Chowdhury Mohammad Ali East Pakistan had 5 against West Pakistan's 6. But in the distribution of 3 Ministers of State East Pakistan claimed 2 giving 1 to her Western partner.¹⁹

Fifth, this period marked the institutionalisation of political opposition in that A.M.L. growing as it did from the electoral soil was entrusted with that job. The A.M.L. was now to the central government and provincial government of East Pakistan what the Congress had been in the days of the first Constituent Assembly. But the only fundamental difference between them was that while the former succeeded in narrowing the gap between the government and opposition to a position of tweedledum and tweedledee, the latter, despite its meaningful parliamentary services, its opposition was dismissed as the will-o'-the wisp.

Of course, the dynamic behind all these improvements registered during the second phase of parliamentary life was essentially the U.F. That was why we noted earlier that the U.F. had the potentiality

* We are talking about the spirit and achievements of the U.F. not its constituting parties which were gradually coming apart. The U.F. was not like the Alliance (Party) of Malaysia. It was formed for the realisation of limited objectives. Its final disintegration was natural in that the constituting parties faced with the new evolving realities of country's politics sought to realise their objectives in the light of new experiences.

of a movement. Without the victory of the U.F. in the 1954 general elections in East Pakistan, no tangible transformation of power structure would have taken place. It was quite a revolution initiated by the U.F.

However, amid all these new developments the coalition government mainly addressed itself to the task of framing a constitution which, according to the Prime Minister, was given the "highest priority". But constitution-making could not progress unless there was an agreed formula evolved placing both East and West Pakistan "on a footing of equality promoting a feeling of partnership". This was thought to be accomplished by reorganising the federal process not by adopting the unitary form of government which would be impolitic, since the main constituting units of Pakistan e.g. East and West Pakistan, were miles asunder and had intervening foreign territories (India) between them. In the new federalising process if the units of West Pakistan were aggregated into one parity on the quantum of representation in the parliament and distribution of powers finally agreed upon - on the shoals of these issues all previous constitutional proposals had foundered - the framing of the constitution would be greatly facilitated and there would neither be any ground for East Pakistanis being accusing of Balkanising the Western wing nor there ought to be monopolisation of any sort in any field by the West Pakistanis, as alleged,

once conflicts were resolved into constitutional clauses. Now the Constituent Assembly II was to thrash out the one-unit tangle — an event of great consequence and implications that could be ranked next to the very event of the creation of Pakistan itself.

It has been said that "the Punjabi, the Pathan, the Sindhi and the Bengali has each in his mind's eye an 'emerald isle,' set in a silver sea, a demi-paradise' ... this ... regional feeling has been a powerful ... factor in Pakistani public life." From the vedic, Mauryiya, Gupta and down to Harsa periods political integration in the Indian subcontinent was very loose. Centralisation was far from rooted in the soil. Clannish, tribal, Mandala and tributary systems were cases in point. It was only in the Moghul period that centralisation of power was effected, and subsequently pushed to its logical extent during the British regime. And as far as the areas of Pakistan are concerned they "remained largely independent for almost 1,500 years, from the death of Asoka in 232 B.C. to the rise of the Delhi Sultanate in the thirteenth century A.D." While the British governed India from a unitary base they did not really demolish the edifice of localism

* "We are all Bengalis, Punjabis, Sindhis, Pathans, Baluchis — a nation. But we have bye-nationalities, also". An M.C.A. echoed Dr. Spear's remark while opposing one-unit Bill in the Constituent Assembly II. See Dawn, September 9, 1955.


which was, however, shaken not insignificantly as "the rapid development of all means of communications" enabled the hitherto insular-minded Indians to have the 'feel' of a greater India. The British unitary system of government was superimposed on the already fragmented society of India. Hence, historically speaking, the accusation that Britain put Indians to thrall by taking recourse to Divide et Impera policy was without foundation.

Now at this juncture of Pakistan political chronology the most hidebound pro-one-unit politician, Mr. Daultana, revealed the truth in the Constituent Assembly II that the region of West Pakistan was culturally, economically, geographically and historically an "integrated whole" and the unification of West Pakistan was a logical corollary of Pakistan ideology and a culmination of irreversible acts of destiny.

The statement was, however, positive but the irony had it that Daultana, and for that matter the pro-one-unit group of politicians realised the truth that there was such a thing as underlying unity amid diversity in West Pakistan which had not occurred to their cognitive map before August 1947, that not only West Pakistan but the whole subcontinent had the element of an underlying unity-in-plurality admitted by historians and politicians-own-statesmen alike.* That transcending feeling of

* See V.A. Smith, The Oxford History of India (London: 1958), p. X.
underlying unity of the then India had been sacrificed at the altar of 'fear of Hindu domination', and the current sense of underlying unity in West Pakistan was born of both necessity and complacency now that Pakistan was a reality. In the quest for common identity among the various people of West Pakistan another protagonist of one-unit, Nawab Gurmani, claimed for them to have held, in keeping with Renan's dictum, "many things in oblivion". When the Prime Minister in his first official pronouncement in regard to the unification of West Pakistan had already laid the metaphysical foundation of underlying unity of Pakistan by reminding the nation "of one God, one prophet, one Quran". There is an illuminating reminder given by Professor K.W. Deutsch that the 'art of nation-building' also depends on the 'art of nation-limiting'; for, the nations should be limited "to a size manageable for ... integrative and decision-making capabilities". A state of non-manageability features in the integrative process when linguistic, racial, cultural, geographic and economic factors predominate. One knows how integrating process fizzled out in the West Indies Federation, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the Mali Federation and the Malaysian Federation. What was more the very birth of Pakistan was a burning instance in that the leadership of the subcontinent failed

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* Singapore came out of the Federation.


28. "National-Building", op.cit., p.X.
to mend the federalising process in the light of new experiences obtaining at that particular point of time. Even the Lahore Resolution which claimed to have been the basis of Pakistan envisaged an autonomous federal polity. The amalgamation of all Western units into one would amount to jettisoning the very scheme of Pakistan and incorporating a unitary structure in an already elaborate federal system based, evidently, on century-old cultural, linguistic and racial considerations.

However, the question was before the Pakistan statesmen whether political institutions were a means towards an end or an end-in-themselves — whether they should let institutions serve the society or worship them as sacrosanct for all time to come without enriching them with new awareness or experience. Nawab Gurmani while speaking on the one-unit Bill in the Constituent Assembly II struck a note of progressive politics: "Those who advocate ... retention of political boundaries on the basis of race or language do not seem to appreciate that making politics depend upon ethnographical or philological analysis, is allowing it to be borne upon a chimera. Racial differences do not divide human beings in the sense of rodents and filines. Human history is essentially different from zoology." 29

Reflecting on the Australian Federation J.D.B. Miller observed that "If the separate State governments were to disappear, it is difficult to see how any sense of separate community could survive

among the people living within the present state boundaries." 30 We are to analyse if the same situation obtained in West Pakistan i.e. whether or not political divisions were on sound foundations.

The provinces of the Punjab and N.W.F. were constituted into one province following the British conquest of the Punjab in 1849, but were separated by Lord Curzon in 1901 despite the protests lodged with the Secretary of State for India by the Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab, Sir Mackworth Young, on grounds of economy and administration. Decades later Sir Abdul Qayyum told the then Indian Legislative Assembly of the adverse effects on the N.W.F. following the separation of the provinces.* Sind was annexed by the British in 1843 and was adjoined to the Province of Bombay. It was maintained that "had the conquest of Sind followed and not preceded the conquest of the Punjab, Sind would have been incorporated into the Punjab, for the two are not only contiguous but are connected with a single river which is the most natural tie between them." 31 Since the time of Lord Dalhousie - he was the first to initiate the proposal of incorporating Sind into the Punjab Province - down to the viceroyalty of Lord Lansdowne (1888-94) the idea of including Sind within the Punjab was vainly

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* "Ever since the separation, the Punjabis have been passing from class to class ... while we are still in the infant class. Is it going to be forever?" Quoted in C.A.D. Vol. 1, September 15, 1955, p.790.

30. J. D. B. Miller, op.cit., p. 139.

pursued. 32 It would indicate that the idea of hammering the western units into one administrative whole had been in the air for quite a long time before the birth of Pakistan awaiting fulfilment.*

Similarly, the people comprising each unit were not homogeneous in character. For instance, the Punjab had large numbers of Pathans and Baluchis. The N.W.F.P. did not have all the Pathan populace except in the tribal areas. Baluchistan contained more Punjabis and Sindhis than Baluchis. In other words, people of the same origin instead of confining themselves in one geographic area allowed themselves to be dispersed in all regions of West Pakistan. Besides, the new demographic penetration i.e. refugees, demolished whatever homogeneity was left in certain areas, particularly Sind. Likewise, no single unit could communicate with the aid of one language. Urdu, Punjabi, Sindhi, Pushto, Brohi and Baluchi were the languages used in varying degrees. Also, beneath the apparent semantic differences there were elements of mutual intelligibility and similarity as far as those languages were concerned. In saying so, we do not suggest that political divisions did not have any support on account of separate community or socio-cultural distinctiveness which, indeed, had developed into micro-nationalities through ages of living apart. All we empha-

* "... had the British not conquered Baluchistan and had Lord Curzon not thought of carrying out the North-West Frontier Province out of the Punjab, we would have witnessed long ago the creation of Pakistan as an administrative unit." Dr. Ambedkar, op.cit., p.127.

32. See "Authentic Statements", loc.cit., p. 29.
size that the political divisions producing hyphenated Pakistanis i.e. Punjabi-Pakistan, Sindhi-Pakistan, Baluchi-Pakistan and Pathan-Pakistani had also, substantially speaking, a common frame of reference. The people of various units developed unconsciously a sense of togetherness having lived through centuries in a geographically compact area uninhibited by any natural barriers and protected by the rocks of the Himalayas and waters of the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea. That was why Sir R.E.M. Wheeler portrayed the entire West Pakistan as a geographic and cultural 'unit';

Economically speaking, the whole parts of West Pakistan were interlinked. And the question was in an age of 'rising expectations' to what extent existing federal arrangements were going to meet present requirements. Professor Laski pointed out the inadequacy of federal governments in matters of planning economic development and precisely, of bringing about a welfare state. Sir Ivor voiced the same feelings that federal system was both "extravagant and inefficient". This was anticipated by Dicey even in the 19th century that "A federation ... will always be at a disadvantage in a contest with unitarian states of equal resources." Operating under a federal system as it did, West Pakistan in spite of its being governed by same economic forces


could neither develop evenly nor cultivate its potentiality adequately. Natural resources were in a state of diffusion. Water resources happened to be confined in the north east area. Mineral wealth was located in the mountainous areas. Inter-provincial rivalries hindered the growth of say an hydro-electric project whose generation could have been used in an ample measure benefitting the less lucky areas. What was more provincial wisdom justified the hoarding of food or other commodities while famine stalked in neighbouring states. And it was a routine affair for money to be doled out yearly from the central coffer to the back-ward areas of West Pakistan for which richer provinces had to be taxed. The irrational part of it that despite the presence of both identical and complementary elements in the West Pakistan economy the existing political divisions suffered from an uneven level of economic development. For instance, in a basically agricultural economy the percentage of cultivation in different units was in varying proportions viz. the Punjab 81%, Sind 44%, N.W.F.P. 52%, while Baluchistan's share was negligible. Similarly, the per capita financial contribution of the respective units in the maintenance of their provincial establishment was equally dissimilar.36 Once units were amalgamated into one, their resources pooled together, and economies planned on an overall basis there would

36. The Punjab Rs. -/4/-; N.W.F.P. Rs. -/12/-; and Sind Rs. 1 (whereas East Pakistan's per capita share was only Rs. -/2/- due to its living under one administrative system. See: "Authentic Statements", loc.cit., p.12. Also Dawn, September 16, 1955.
be free flow of trade, commerce, capital, labour and entrepreneurial talents resulting in a speedy and balanced development. This economic mobilization in its turn would usher in social mobilization as was rightly maintained by Rupert Emerson that "Economic planning can be employed as a deliberate means of achieving a social mobilization which will draw people into the national community".37 And, as the growing economy would be co-extensive with developmental strides in the region of communications the hitherto marooned people of the backward ranges would have an opportunity of coming out of their narrow world. This economic cum social mobilization process would go a long way in the growth of urbanization, literacy, media consumption, voting habits and, above all, qualitative manpower.

Administratively speaking, it was both a case of efficiency and frugality. In the founding of the West Indies Federation, Nigeria, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, economy and efficiency of administration were stressed.38 This was equally applicable to West Pakistan; for Pakistan, at partition, was an heir apparent of an infinitesimal number of administrators nevertheless the provinces were bearing the astronomical costs of maintaining separate Secretariats, Ministries, Governors, Courts of law and services to make an


appearance. It was estimated that a financial advantage of the one-unit plan would be savings of $60,000,000 a year through elimination of administrative operating costs.\(^\text{39}\) Despite the fact that those units had a good deal of common political and administrative institutions developed from the time of the British rule, precise standardization of system could not be achieved due to both intrinsic and extrinsic factors. This was more obvious in the dispensation of justice. For instance, in the N.W.F.P. the highest judicial authority was the Judicial Commissioner's Court, whereas in the Punjab, Sind and Baluchistan there existed a High Court, the Chief Justice's Court and a Revenue and Judicial Commissioner respectively.\(^\text{40}\) In short, there were different levels of administration and dispensation of justice prevailing in West Pakistan. Once services were streamlined and standardized it was the neglected areas which would most benefit from it. And most of the senior administrators themselves thought that too much of "stress on federalism will encourage fissiparous tendencies in Pakistan".\(^\text{41}\)

Lastly, the concept of one-unit had the force of both idealism and realism. We have from the very beginning mentioned the efficacy of institution-building as a sure means for Pakistan's achieving political development. It has been also maintained that the nation-

\(^{39}\) See *New York Times*, November 20, 1954.

\(^{40}\) *Dawn*, January 11, 1955.

state position was nebulous at the creation of Pakistan; for, "by the accepted criterion of nationhood ... there was in fact no such thing as a Pakistani nation". Now that Pakistan came into being its survival lay in the political development which in the words of Lasswell would mean propounding of "explicit doctrines and formulas". The micro-nationalism or regional chauvinism must yield to 'constructive nationalism'. Robert E. Scott has pointed out that in the Latin American countries "unresolved social-cultural and psychological questions continue to slow down nation-building". This was true of Pakistan; for, she needed integrative institutions to instil the notion of a national identity i.e. Pakistan. The project of one-unit was a step towards fulfilling a condition of nation-building, which W. Myron would term as value-integration. That meant the particularistic values of the Punjabis, Sindhis, Pathans and Baluchis would dissolve into that universalistic value called Pakistan. If the raison d'etre of Pakistan's creation was the result of the demand of the then Indian Mussalmans on the basis of their being a nation then the predominantly Muslim population of West Pakistan ought to be the

42. Rupert Emerson, op.cit., p. 92.


44. R.E. Scott, "Nation-Building in Latin America", in Nation-Building, op.cit., p. 77.

instrument of Pakistanization not a hindrance. In other words, the one-unit project was also a test of Pakistan as a nation. That was why an M.C.A. maintained in the Constituent Assembly II that there was such a thing as Pakistan nationalism distinct from sub-nationalism the revival of which depended on the building of proper institutions. Continuing he said that "the integration of West Pakistan is the establishment of precisely such an institution".46 Surely, the one-unit concept was a choice between larger and petty loyalties.

Realistically, apart from the geographic, economic and administrative considerations which we have mentioned above, the one-unit Bill was destined to be enacted if the country was to have a constitution at all. Unequivocally, it was stated in the Constituent Assembly that "the establishment of one unit, amongst other things, was a deliberate attempt to meet the national demand of Bengal for provincial autonomy ... the most happy consummation of all will be that it will provide a solution ... to frame a constitution."47 We have already analysed earlier the constitutional angularities between East and West Pakistan. The Punjab-dominated West Pakistan would not let East Pakistan have provincial autonomy which it was not mentally prepared to give to the other units of West Pakistan, because that would have ensured Bengali supremacy. Since the governmental system in Pakistan was

performe to be federal in the long run due to bizarre geographic halves of Pakistan, the proposed one-unit Bill before the Constituent Assembly II envisaged a unitary structure of administration in the Western wing only to bring about a redesigned federal polity of two wings e.g. West and East Pakistan and also to institutionalise equi-liberal politics between them.

However, in the foregoing pages we have argued to establish a case for the integration of West Pakistan. Although political boundaries were irrational, nevertheless a mere lifting of the boundaries would not have been the end of 'separateness' born of historic forces. The edifice of supra-nationalism could not be erected on the mausoleum of localism, really. Perhaps this was behaviouristic anathema. As a matter of fact, one M.C.A. rang thuth in the Constituent Assembly II saying that "as charity begins at home similarly your patriotism must begin at home".48 That meant local culture, habits, traditions, etc., etc., ought to be accommodated respectfully before stamina for larger loyalties could be fostered. Neither the cantons of Swiss lost their individual flavour nor the Welsh and Scottish people theirs in the formation of Great Britain. In fact, the Council for administration of West Pakistan set up by the Governor General during the interregnum period for reorganising the adminis-trative set-up in the ensuing one-unit had this consideration of retaining cultures of the sub-societies in front of it; for, the

Chairman of the Council, M.A. Gurmani, himself maintained that "the regional languages and cultures will not only be protected but their further development will be encouraged. We want to develop West Pakistan as a garden where variety of flowers and trees and plants blend in harmony and enhance its beauty and grace." 49

The recommendations of the Council formed the basis of the One-Unit Bill which envisaged 50 districts to be grouped into 10 divisions. The Commissioners would be the pivots of the administration; when districts would form basic unit of administration under Deputy Commissioner. The States of Dir, Swat and Chitral and the tribal areas attached to the districts of Peshawar, Mardar and Hazara and the agencies of Malakand, Mohamand and Khyber were included in the Peshawar division. The tribal areas attached to the district of Dera Ismail Khan, Bannu and Kohat and the agencies of Khurram, North Waziristan and South Waziristan were included in the Dera Ismail Khan division. 50

There would be one Ministry, one Secretariat, one Revenue Board, one Legislature, one Public Service Commission and a single High Court of Judicature for the whole Province. But in all these new schemes of things the key point was the association of the people 'in an increasing measure with the administration at all levels', and maximum delegation of powers to the regions. Stressing the point the Prime Minister further added that "When I talk of decentralisation of authority, I do not mean merely decentralisation of bureaucrati


50. Times, October 14, 1955
authority. I, for one, would like to see a great extension of local self-government". The number of officers and other staff in the provincial quota of the one-unit secretariat as well as the procedure for new recruitment had been decided upon in the following manner. Decisions on this issue were, however, weighted in favour of the small units and backward areas (See Appendix VII). As far as representation in the legislature was concerned the Punjab volunteered itself to accept a representation of 40% for a period of 10 years although it constituted 56% of the entire population of West Pakistan. This act of generosity was shown to purge the minds of the non-Punjabi populace of West Pakistan of terror of that compendious and xenophobic term e.g. Punjabi.*

Now we must consider whether the various people of various units accepted the project. Or, had a proper climate of opinion been created before the Constituent Assembly II could raise its hand of benediction in the enactment of a Bill thought "revolutionary" and "far-reaching in significance".53

The straw of one-unit had been in the wind of Pakistan since 1948. Mr. Jinnah was quoted by Sardar Bahadur Khan ** to have wanted

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* "... in Bengal anybody who is a stranger and a person they do not like ... they call him a Punjabi. If a Pathan comes to Larkana, he is a Punjabi. If a man of Sukkur goes to Hazara, he is a Punjabi ... when we do not like a person, we say he is a Punjabi ..." See CAD, Vol. 1, August 31, 1955, p.356.

** Gen. Ayub's brother.


52. See Prime Minister's broadcast quoted in Dawn, December 2, 1954.

53. Prime Minister's broadcast, quoted in Dawn, April 2, 1955.
to implement one-unit in 1948 when some such programme had been placed before him by the latter.\textsuperscript{54} Members of the Constituent Assembly I had on many an occasion referred to it to contain provincialism. In 1949, Professor A.K. Sen had in a formal memorandum to the B.P.C. suggested integration of West Pakistan.\textsuperscript{55} In 1950, there was a national convention of all parties except the M.L. held at Dacca which in a resolution demanded East Pakistan as one region leaving the matter to the people of West Pakistan to decide upon what pattern of government they were in favour of.\textsuperscript{56} The issue did really surface palpably after the demise of the Nazimuddin government as a recipe for constitution-making. And it was the Punjabi leadership which was distinctly but notoriously associated with the issue, and which helped to create a public readiness for its general acceptance. But in fairness, except for the four provincial musketeers such as Abdul Gaffar Khan (N.W.F.P.), G.M. Syed (Sind), Abdul Majid Sindhi (Sind) and Abdur Samad Achkazai (Baluchistan), the integrative plan in principle had been acclaimed by all parties and relevant sections of the people till the inauguration of the Constituent Assembly II.

The N.W.F.P. Legislative Assembly was the first to come out with a resolution supporting one-unit on 25th November, 1954.\textsuperscript{57}


\textsuperscript{55} See Azit Kumar Sen, \textit{The Islamic State and Other Political Essays}, (Calcutta: 1950).

\textsuperscript{56} See \textit{Dawn}, November 23, 1954.

\textsuperscript{57} See \textit{Dawn}, November 26, 1954.
The Punjab Assembly did the same on 30th November, 1954. The Sind Legislature followed suit on 11th December, 1954. Fifty five members out of sixty of the Shahi Jirga of Baluchistan and Chitral's Advisory Council welcomed one-unit. Similarly, resolutions were adopted in the Legislative Council of Khairpur State, the Municipal Committee of Quetta, the Municipal Corporation of Karachi, the Council of Rulers of Baluchistan States, Union and Bahawalpur Legislative Assembly recommending the integration of West Pakistan. But despite the general unanimity as revealed through these resolutions when the One-Unit Bill came up for discussion before the Constituent Assembly II it was accorded the bitterest reception by the opposition, the A.M.L. A secret document came to light which opened the Pandora's box again. Sardar Abdur Rashid who as a Chief Minister of the N.W.F.P. had earlier moved a resolution backing one-unit discovered that the one-unit plan had been guided by a sinister "thesis". This document was given to him in the month of November, 1954 by the Prime Minister to help Sardar (Sb.) grasp the meaning of one-unit. Words like "clear the decks", "why uncork Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan, who has been safely closed in the bottle?" occurred in the document, which was both

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58. See "Authoritative Statements, loc.cit., p. 11.
60. See Dawn, November 29 and December 6, 1954.
63. Ibid.
scandalous and Machiavellian. But the most damaging and crucial part unfolded like this: "A final word about the role of the Punjab. At present we do not require too much noise in the Punjab ... Punjab must be kept quiet. The folly of our friends must be checked ... At a later stage Punjab will have to take the lead. At that time I hope an effective Punjab leadership will have been put in place at the centre and at Lahore." 64

The disclosure of the document gave the opposition a lever against the unification of one-unit; for, it was made to appear as though the constitutional arrangements were designed to provide a secure niche for the Punjabi leadership. Again, contrary to the council's recommendation the capital of the new one-unit province was earmarked for Lahore (capital of the Punjab) instead of somewhere near Peshawar (capital of the N.W.F.P.). And the A.M.L.'s attack on the Bill was the product of its growing apprehension under the circumstance lest the government should have violated the five fundamentals e.g. (1) full regional autonomy; (2) parity in all respects; (3) one-unit in the West with full regional autonomy with the approval of the people thereof; (4) Bengali and Urdu should be the two state languages; and (5) joint electorate agreed as the basis of future constitution in Murree prior to the convening of the Constituent Assembly II. 65 The A.M.L. was already obsessed by the flouting of

64. CAD, Vol. 1, September 6, 1955, pp.508-509. See Sardar Sb.'s speech.

65. See Dawn, August 11, 1955; also Ataur Rahman, op.cit., 95.
the convention (the spirit of parity) that the Governor General and Prime Minister should not represent the same wing.* Suspicious, Suhrawardy demanded that a clause for provincial autonomy to East Pakistan be included along with the one-unit Bill which was an agreed term. 66

But as far as the opposition's arguments vis-a-vis the one-unit Bill was concerned they were more related to the aspects of methodology than principle. Suhrawardy challenged the Prime Minister to face an investigation of his allegations before the Chief Justice of Pakistan that the members sent by the different legislatures of West Pakistan to the Constituent Assembly II to support the one-unit Bill were irregularly elected. For an instance, he chose Sind. Armed with evidence obtained from court records he cited dates, hours, names and places - "his assembly colleagues and the packed public gallery listened for two hours in pin-drop silence" 67 - to expose Khuhro, the Chief Minister that he had tampered with the Constituent Assembly II elections. ** True, Khuhro was congenitally capable of pursuing a policy of coercive politics. And an element of coercion would be a

* East Pakistan was not ready to accept Gen. Mirza as East Pakistani.

** Suhrawardy named Sindh politics after Khuhro: "Khuhroism is a new political philosophy. Khuhroism is striking terror into the hearts of members of the Sind legislature and causing them to return certain members to this house whose duty it is to support the one-unit plan." See GAD, Vol. 1, September 10, 1955, p.647.


possibility so long the whole of West Pakistan remained feudal in structure, let alone Sind. But when Suhrawardy himself was "prepared to accept the proposition that the elections* in Sind were generally fair", how could he explain that a freely elected legislature of 102 members ** would be simply coerced into underwriting power to Khuhro at the expense of their own Sindhi interest unless they had predilections for the political integration. Even the worst victim of Khuhroism, Mir Gulam Ali Talpur (ex Central Minister and lately the Speaker of Sind legislature) who characterised Khuhro's regime with the "reign of Halaku and Chengiz Khan" admitted that there was general consensus regarding one-unit among the 102 members of Sind legislature, and his group of 52 members despite "vicious propaganda" and "lot of misunderstanding" supported "integration of the provinces into one province". The truth, however, was that the various assemblies "had met and voted their approval with only the faintest flicker of overt opposition". Hence, it could not be maintained really that the climate of general integrative spirit prevailing in the country was purely engendered by engineering and coercion. Although, in the process of institution-building legalistic morals were bruised. Indeed, the dismissals of

* The last general elections which produced a new legislature in Sind.
** Out of 102 members only 4 voted against the one-unit resolution in Sind legislature.
68. CAD, Vol. 1, September 10, 1955, p.646.
70. Ibid., p. 842.
the N.W.F.P. Ministry and Sind Ministry on grounds of maladministration by the central government when they smelt anti-one-unit were cases in point. But then how one would pronounce political value judgments. Had not the same ministries earlier supported the Bill and then again conveniently gone back to their pledges to stay in power by tending regionalism?* Reflecting on the federal experiments in the Commonwealth Professor R.L. Watts observed that when leadership "has lacked vigour ... the process of constitution-making has proved more protracted and controversial". 72 And the piloting of the one-unit Bill was precisely that sort of vigorous leadership towards constitution-making. The state of mental ambivalence or shilly-shallying on the part of some leaders was but natural as they could not blue-print the future life under one-unit. Even the opposition leader himself (Suhrawardy) reiterated that "I ... do adhere to the principles of the Bill and considered and do consider that the unification of West Pakistan as a measure of integration was most desirable", but he insisted on the circulation of the Bill for eliciting public opinion as "the circumstances have changed". 73

But then, for a period of nine months i.e. since the announcement of the one-unit plan, there had been enough ventilation of informed opinion on this subject. Nawab Gurmani reeled off statistics that

72. R. L. Watts, op. cit., p. 60.
as many as 500 statements by prominent public figures were printed by the newspapers. Public bodies numbering 200 including political, cultural, commercial organizations, Bar associations and local self-government institutions passed resolutions on it. More than 370 editorials, 700 articles and letters were printed into the newspapers of Pakistan. More than 280 amendments to the Bill were received by the Constituent Assembly II secretariat.\(^74\) Besides, more than 21 days were devoted to the general discussion of the Bill, claimed the Prime Minister.\(^75\) It could be maintained that no measure of public policy had received so much public attention in Pakistan. And the balance of public opinion was overwhelmingly in favour of the integrative plan. The Bill was virtually opposed on principle by three M.C.A.s in the Constituent Assembly II. Mr. Fazlur Rahman an ultra rightist and lately a political Maverick thought that the one-unit project was an ill-omened phenomenon. Mian Sh. of the A.P.P. and Mahmood Ali of the G.D. voiced leftist sentiments in that they subscribed the view that the "multi-national states" as was Pakistan would always gather "strength and cohesion"\(^76\) in the existing system. But quantitatively speaking it was the 55% of the entire population.

\(^74\) "Authoritative Statements", loc.cit., p.32.
\(^75\) CAD, Vol. 1, September 15, 1955, p. 813.
\(^76\) See Dawn, July 19, 1955. Cf. the earlier leftist support of multilingualism (in language movement in East Pakistan) and the present support for multi-national states. It is to be recalled that the Muslim as a nation in the subcontinent was recognized by the Indian Communist Party, before the subcontinent was halved.
of Pakistan i.e. East Pakistan and the 56% of the entire population of West Pakistan i.e. the Punjab who were attuned to the integrative plan. That was why it was maintained that the Punjab favouring a unified West Pakistan and East Pakistan yearning provincial autonomy, "that produced the new 1956 constitution". And qualitatively speaking, the one-unit plan resulted in the major achievement of what was called the Bengali-Punjabi entente the absence of which had hitherto been a stumbling block to constitution-making.

Concerning the charge that Lahore was chosen as the capital of the new province, it was but a temporary arrangement due to the non-availability of a more suitable place. But the Chief Ministership of the new province was awarded unanimously to Dr. Khan even before the legal birth of the new province. Then the question relating to that controversial document that detonated. Granted that it was true, was it to bind the Punjabi posterity eternally? A conspiratorial legacy, if any, handed down by a decadent society of feudalism to the subsequent generations had the chance of being discarded, as the people of new society would grow in a progressive milieu by being already born into a larger community i.e. West Pakistan. Behind all the great achievements of mankind there lay ideas. The one-unit plan was such an idea born of social, political, economic and international forces.

* The demand for Pakhtoonistan in the N.W.F.P. was fuelled by Afghanistan. The integrative plan was also designed to contain separatist tendency of the Pakhtoons, led by Gaffar Khan. The announcement of the one-unit plan had its repercussions across international boarders. The Pakistan flag was hauled down from Pakistan Embassy building in Kabul by Afghans as a protest against the one-unit plan. See Prime Minister's speech, CAD, Vol. 1, September 15, 1955, p.818.

77. See R.L. Watts, op.cit., p.122.
It was a difficult but challenging task. It was the people in general and leaders in particular on whose abilities depended the survival of the institution i.e. one-unit. And as far as the A.M.L.'s opposition to the one-unit Bill was concerned it did the parliamentary duty of breaking the huge china vase of commissions and commissions of the one-unit Bill in the market place which held out a corrective warning to the would-be operators of the one-unit machinery. Thus after a marathon debate the one-unit Bill was passed on 30th September, 1955* "ending ravages of provincialism", 78 merging 310,000 square miles and integrating the 36,000,000 people of West Pakistan into a single province. 79

With the enactment of the one-unit Bill the last wrinkle on the Constitution Bill was ironed out, as far as the regional conflicts were concerned. Now it was the doctrinal part of the constitution awaiting resolution. We have commented earlier that the unconventional exit of the Nazimuddin government was the beginning of the entrance of the modernist-Islamist group. The consolidation of this group was finally consummated in the present coalition, the M.L.-U.F. The coalition government decided to attach some Islamic accretions to the constitution. But the opposition, A.M.L. was secular oriented. These secular forces

* The province of West Pakistan came officially into existence on 14th October, 1955 and the two wings of Pakistan were officially designated as West Pakistan and East Pakistan respectively.

78. See Times, October 15, 1955.
were released in the general elections of East Pakistan in 1954.*

The Constitution Bill submitted by the Prime Minister was pretentious, in that it envisaged Pakistan as an Islamic state a "venture ... to ... fulfil the high purpose for which Pakistan was established". 80

The pragmatist opposition leader, Suhrawardy, with clear vision, and cool logic argued back that there had never been such a thing as an Islamic state (a utopia yet to be achieved) but there were all Muslim states: "I say that you are deluding the people here by calling this an Islamic State. Never has there been such a precedent before. There have been other Muslim countries. Did we have a Daulate Islamia Abbasiya? Have you ever heard of Daulat-i-Islamia Muawia? Did we ever have Daulate-Islamia-Mughalia? Have we had in recent time Daulate-Islamia-Saudi Arabia?" Arguing on the efficacy of Islam in cementing the bonds of two wings of Pakistan he observed that this "is a very tenuous bond indeed"; for, after all, there were Muslim countries in the world and "to what extent are we part and parcel of the same states?" — he asked. He urged the coalition government to be oblivious of the so-called "compendious method of saying that we want a country in which the Muslims will predominate"; for, with the same logic the Hindus, Parsis, Christians and Buddhists would have pressed for their own nationalistic goals. Aware of the presence of great numbers of

* The preamble of the 21-point programme talked about the "fundamental" principles of Islam, though. But there was nothing particular about Islamic provisions in the preamble. (See Appendix IV).

80. Prime Minister's speech on the Constitution Bill, "Documents and Speeches, loc.cit., p. 311."
minorities in Pakistan he contended that "all of us residing within Pakistan ... are one nation ... irrespective of the provinces ... of the origin ... race ... tribe ... religion, caste or creed", and Islam could not be an acceptable bond between peoples living in Pakistan since its sociology was not conducive for it. The cementing bond of Pakistan nationhood, according to him, was "the realisation that neither part of Pakistan can live without the other ... there is the military reason; ... the economic reason; there is the fact that we have to live together: we realise that there cannot be any getting out of it." He welcomed, though, the broad principles and spirit of Islam with all its social, economic and political implications to be the guiding factor of the Pakistan polity, but was averse to the tendency of pinning down things unrealisable. But this unalloyed secularistic philosophy was not like throwing pearls before the swine, as that Pakistan Constitution remained substantially secular, though an Islamic facade had to be erected for giving continuity to a necessary myth that the concept of Pakistan had an ideological affectation.

But why did the framers have to graft an Islamic form on the Westminster system at all? It has been maintained, and rightly so, that "even eclecticism can be valid if it comes out of experience, felt needs and social realities". The framers of the constitution could not deny the existence of the force that was Islam in Pakistan

81. See Suhrawardy's speech on the Constitution Bill published in The Dacca Times, (Suhrawardy Supplment), May, 1964, pp.XVIII - XXXI.
society. They could not brush aside the Islamic slogan that was so effectively used during the Pakistan movement. It had to be kept as a token of 'national identity'. But while dyeing the constitution they took care of avoiding fast Islamic colours. For, after all, "every constitution must be a product of its environment". However, about the general Islamic provisions there were two stipulations in the constitution (Articles 197 and 198). It was envisaged in the constitution that there should be 'an organization for Islamic research' to assist in the reconstruction of Muslim Society on Islamic lines. Furthermore, it was laid down that "no law shall be enacted which is repugnant to the injunctions of Islam". And these provisions would not affect the personal laws of non-Muslims and Muslim sects other than the Sunnis. But in all these matters it was clearly stipulated that it was the Pakistan National Assembly which would pronounce the last verdict on them i.e. which was Islamic or which was not. This was far from the futile ecclesiastical arrangements made in the shape of the 'Mullah Board' during Nazimuddin's period. This was also the admission of the continuity of Ijtihad (reason) and institutionalisation of Ijma (consensus) in the legislature. Now it was the Pakistan National Assembly "representing the people which will, by deliberation and discussion, decide how to apply the principles of Islam to the needs

of the community in varying circumstances". 86 In other words, Pakistanis had "denied to the clergy and given to the people the right to interpret Islam". 87

About the non-secular stipulation that Head of the State must be a Muslim (Article 32 (2)) there was severe opposition. 88 The opposition was, however, successful in compelling the government to delete the provision of a vice president. 89 In doing so, they made room for the Speaker of the N.A. (National Assembly) — who was not required to be a Muslim — to officiate as acting president in case of the latter's sickness or death (Article 36(1)). The retention of the provision that the President ought to be a Muslim (Article 32(2)) could be rationalised as a symbolic provision, * though. And as far as the incorporation of religious values in the constitution was concerned Pakistan was not outside of the traditions of the modern constitutional governments. ** For, "there is hardly any human action ... that does not originate in some very general idea men have conceived of the Deity, of his relation to mankind ... and of their duties to their fellow creatures". 90 But apart from the apparent religious undertones+

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* The Danish King must belong to Evangelical-Lutheran Church (Art. 11:5); so must the Norwegian King (Art. 13-4); the Swedish King must adhere to Evangelical faith (Art. 2); the Spanish Regent or King must belong to Catholic Church (Art. 9); the King of Greece must belong to Eastern Orthodox Church (Art. 1); the English King or Queen must belong to the Church of England (3 Act of Settlement).

** South Africa; West Germany; Ireland; Argentina; Columbia; Costa Rica; Portugal; Thailand; Iraq; Jordan, etc., are examples.

+ The New York Times, dated 9th January 1956 in a leader remarked on the Islamic provisions of Pakistan constitution: "It will be readily agreed that the broad basis of Islamic ethics could properly become the foundation for a healthy legal state, just as the broad basis of Judio-Christian ethics has been the substructure of several Western legal buildings."

Footnote /Contd. over.
the 'legal character' of the State of Pakistan was, no doubt, a 'Federal Republic' and it is only its name that was Islamic Republic of Pakistan — claimed a famous Pakistan jurist, Mr. A.K. Brohi.

As to the granting of legal imprimatur to provincial autonomy it was remarked that the Pakistan constitution of 1956 "ostensibly assigned greater powers to the provincial governments". It was ostensible in the sense that the overall central control had been retained despite the presence of elaborate lists of distributive powers e.g. Federal, Concurrent and Provincial. For, the powers of the Federal list would take precedence over those on the concurrent list, and the powers on the concurrent list over those on the provincial list. The opposition accused the coalition government of such a climb down on the issue of autonomy. But in reality the coalition government reflected a greater sense of moderation and realism. Apart from the awareness of the inexorable tendency of the general government's growing powers in a federal polity owing to social and economic factors the coalition government scrupled to reduce the central government to

Footnote continued from previous page.


88. See Subrwardy's speech in the Constituent Assembly II quoted in Dawn, February 1, 1956.

89. See Dawn, February 21, 1956.


91. Ibid., p.740.


a position of a cipher on grounds of present-day international politics; for, how could a nation with a weak centre negotiate deals with other nation-states, let alone command respect. One of the chief architects of the U.F. and the 21-point programme, Haq came to grasp the truth that he had to secure for East Pakistan a more watered down version of provincial autonomy than he had been demanding. It would be rather too sweeping to hold a view that Haq relinquished his earlier active agitation for autonomy and became one among the lotus-eaters having entered the garden of Ministry. For, had East Pakistan been granted full autonomy except the three subjects e.g. Foreign Affairs, Currency and Defence, the gravitational pull of the eastern province with its distinctive language, culture and outlook would have been overwhelming compared to the heterogeneous West Pakistan just merged into a devised homogeneous polity i.e. one-unit. It was in the rolling of time that inter-wing climate of confidence would have been grown and further devolution of powers achieved. That was why Haq told the Constituent Assembly II that the "Draft constitution presented before the House is the result of our honest and sincere efforts"94 and on the implementation of full regional autonomy laid down in the 21-point programme he aspired to fulfil it in some auspicious future. But we have a strong hunch that beneath the obvious reason of strengthening the centre there lay a lurking confidence in the minds of the U.F. leaders of the coalition government that given that parliamentary democracy in

Pakistan was a going concern the relatively politically conscious region of Pakistan i.e. East Pakistan might have the prospect of dominating the centre in future.

But, in any case, the provincial powers envisaged in the Constitution were not all hoax. The draft Constitution recorded the progressive shrinking of federal and concurrent lists in favour of the provincial one. The following are the changes:

**Subjects:**

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<td>B.P.C.R. of 1952:</td>
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Besides, the draft Constitution bestowed residual powers on the provinces (Article 109). Again, the very first item of the 21-point programme was fulfilled in that Article 214(1) stipulated that 'the state languages of Pakistan shall be Urdu and Bengali'. It has been held that "the Constitution will flourish in so far as it reflects social and political development".95 Not long after the creation of Pakistan a state of mutual resentment between East and West Pakistan

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developed into a gnome in social discussion in that West Pakistani's presence in East Pakistan was viewed as the conquest of the barbarians by the civilized westwingers, whereas East Pakistanis' holding any positions in the West was equated to Attila's conquest of Rome. This sentiment did really grow out of the absence of equal participation in national activities. The Directive Principles of state policy incorporated into the Constitution Bill laid down that "People from all parts of Pakistan to participate in the Defence Services of the country" and "steps shall be taken to achieve parity in the representation of East Pakistan and West Pakistan in all other spheres of federal administration". Over and above, Article 118(1) envisaged the constitution of a National Finance Commission consisting of the Federal Finance Minister, and Provincial Finance Ministers to ensure that the Federal grants-in-aid and net proceeds of the taxes were rationally distributed between the provinces. In addition, there was the provision for the establishment of a National Economic Council (Article 199(1)) consisting of four Federal Ministers and three Ministers of each provincial government with the Prime Minister as the ex officio Chairman of the Council which would be in charge of advising the Federal and Provincial governments in matters of 'financial, commercial and economic policies' and ensuring that uniform standards were maintained in the economic development of all parts of the country. In all these arrangements the politicians adhered to the view that "All government —

indeed, every human benefit and enjoyment, every virtue and every prudent act — is founded on compromise and barter,\textsuperscript{97} on the one hand, and created appropriate institutions to take care of doctrinal and regional conflicts, on the other. They evolved machineries to put an end to the existence of so-called permanent winners and losers among Pakistanis. Did not the East Pakistanis show magnanimity in accepting parity in coming to terms with their western partners? Did not the Punjabis make a commendable concession to their neighbours in accepting 40% representation in the legislature?

Similarly, in the definition of parliamentary structure the framers of the constitution took a leaf from the book of their past disagreeable experiences in that "the supremacy of parliament had been established and the role of the executive scrupulously defined."\textsuperscript{98}

The President would appoint a Prime Minister from among the members of the National Assembly commanding the confidence of the majority of the members (Art.37:3). All Ministers were required to be members of the N.A. (Art.37:4). The Cabinets as a whole would be collectively responsible to the N.A. and the President was required to be satisfied before dismissing the Prime Minister that the latter had no command of confidence in the N.A. (Art. 37:6). And the President would be bound to act in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet (Art.37:7). Regarding the promulgation of Ordinances by the President when the N.A. was


\textsuperscript{98} H. Tinker, "India and Pakistan", \textit{op.cit.}, p. 80.
not in session they were made to be laid down before the N.A. and would cease to operate at the expiration of six weeks (Art. 69:2). Regarding the proclamation of assumption of power by the Federal government in case of failure of the constitutional machinery in any province the President was bound to lay the proclamation order before the N.A. The proclamation would be inane at the expiration of two months, but the N.A. might extend the Federal rule on the provinces and that, too, was limited up to six months (Art. 193:2). Although the Constituent Assembly II after a three-hour debate had to make provision for preventive detention but it was made clear that no person should be detained exceeding three months unless an appropriate advisory board reported before the end of this period that there was sufficient cause for such detention. The Constitution Bill ensured an independent judiciary, Election Commission, the justiciability of fundamental rights and finally the adoption of the British Cabinet system in both Federal and provincial governments. And the Bill was finally adopted on the 29th February, 1956.* It would, however, appear that the framers of the Constitution in many an affair gave habits and conventions - the ornaments of British parliamentary system - juristic force instead of letting them grow spontaneously. But

* It was announced on the 23rd March, 1956 to coincide with the date of the Lahore Resolution moved by Haq on 23rd March, 1940.

frailty that was the nature of the Pakistan politicians in the pre-1954 periods became the positive guidelines to the politicians of the post-1954 era. And it was the same past with a background of the longest deliberations on the institution-building that made it easier to drawing up a Constitution in the post-1954 era in the shortest possible time.* However, in writing a postscript on constitution-making there should be a mention of the role of the opposition. They had the credit of moving 670 amendments in the 245-clause Constitution Bill 100 and forcing a dozen divisions in the Constituent Assembly II, particularly the last two divisions on the 21st February, 1956 (47:22; 43:20) relating to the nomenclature of the Constitution and the question of the President being Muslim in which the minorities,** G.D.,† and Mian Sb.‡ supported the A.M.L. in the divisions. 101 But the opposition had never been obstructive, in essence. It had been working on a schedule based on an understanding that was given to the

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* The coalition government appointed a 16-man sub-committee to deal with the controversial matters vis-a-vis constitution. The Constitution Bill was announced on the 8th January, 1956, submitted to the Constituent Assembly II on the 16th January, 1956 for discussion and finally adopted on the 29th February, 1956.

** The Congress, U.P.P. and S.C.F. (Schedule Caste Federation) were supporters of the coalition government.

† The G.D. still a part of the U.F. and supporter of the coalition government supported the A.M.L. on all secular issues.

‡ Mian Sb. the leader of the then A.P.P. group of the Constituent Assembly I also supported the A.M.L. on all secular issues.


Prime Minister by Suhrawardy that all the readings of the Bill were to be finished by the end of February, 1956. If it had chosen dilatory tactics the passage of the Constitution would have been much more delayed. On this the *Dawn* had an editorial saying that "The cooperation of the leader of the opposition, Mr. H.S. Suhrawardy and his team alert and vocal front benchers should ... be acknowledged." Indeed, the Prime Minister himself praised the opposition and its leader.

If that was so, how could one account for the A.M.L.'s walking out of the Constituent Assembly II - the minorities, G.D. and Mian Sb. did the same - when the Constitution Bill was about to be adopted, in protest against the Islamic provisions and failure to accord sufficient provincial autonomy to East Pakistan. In the first place a 100% consensus was an impossibility, particularly in a country like Pakistan where language, religion and remoteness had good deal of influence on politics.* And the parliamentary system of party politics was superimposed on those existing cleavages. The A.M.L. though a rising national opposition party, had still to be nourished from its original base, East Pakistan. It gave the A.M.L. enough grist for its mill of opposition to have registered a protest against the

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* One knows how differences of languages have been a factor in the politics of say Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Finland, etc. and religions in the Netherlands, Yugoslavia, Germany (W), etc., etc.


103. *Dawn*, March 1, 1956, Editorial "Great day".

Constitution, thus proving that the Awami leaguers were more sympathetic to the cause of East Pakistanis and Hindus, as well. Similarly, the minorities could not be expected to be glib about a constitution that reduced them to a position of an implied plebeian class. But the opposition had a genuine cause for grumbling in that the coalition government contrary to the Murree Agreement of June, 1955 left the principle of the electorate undefined in the Constitution. That was why Suhrawardy had suggested to the Prime Minister for convening a round table conference of all parties for thrashing out difference and to have a more acceptable constitution to all and sundry. But the coalition government's failure to have shared the credit of constitution-making with others gave the opposition the pretext of dissociation from the constitution.

But the tenor of opposition to the Constitution was best illustrated in Suhrawardy's views on the ensuing Republic Day Celebrations "... our opposition to it will now take the form of constitutional attempts to amend it (Constitution) in such a manner that both the wings of Pakistan may feel satisfied ... As regards the emergence of Pakistan as a Republic there can be no two opinions that it is a red letter day* in the history of our country ... The ... Awami League ... has decided not to participate in any ... festive celebrations organized by the Government parties ... (but) ... ready to participate in functions organized on a State level."105 The latter events would prove that

* Writer's italics.

the A.M.L. did live up to its pronouncements and defend the constitution to the letter. Similarly, in our findings the minorities appeared less pungent in their attack vis-a-vis Islamic provisions than they were in the pre-1954 era. With all the ultimatums served on the coalition government by the Congress, U.P.P. and S.C.P. that they would withdraw support from the coalition government in case of Islamic provisions being incorporated in the Constitution, no minister had ever resigned from the Ministries prior to the passing of the Constitution or immediately thereafter. They appeared to have been more (psychologically) adjusted to the fait accompli, * Islamic Republic of Pakistan. ** While the Constitution Bill was at the anvil K.K. Dutta, the Central Minister, extolled that it "will make a welfare state", 106 though he remained silent on the Islamic provisions. Later on, he made an honest confession in the first session of the N.A. that "the problem of minorities is the most complex problem in a democratic state" and urged them to be "genuine Pakistanis". 107

Again, a new realisation was in evidence as far as the extreme rightists such as the Islamic fundamentalist and orthodox groups were

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** The West Pakistani minority M.C.A.s, namely C.E. Gibbon (Christian) and S Irual Kirpalidas (Hindu) abstained themselves regularly from voting against Islamic provision in all divisions forced by the opposition and minorities of East Pakistan.


concerned, in that they held out their grudging approval for the Constitution. Surprisingly, 26 Ulema including the influential Moulana Ehteshamul Haq thought the Draft Bill was on the whole "commendable", 108 as soon as it was announced. Mufti Mohammad Shafi, President of the Jamat-i-Ulema-i-Islam voiced his support, too. 109 And the holiest among the holier Ulema, Maulana Maudoodi, the President of the Jamat-i-Islam party reacted in the same way but also epitomised the genuine collective feelings of the rightist Ulema by having said that the Draft Bill contained many an unislamic provision and if left "unamended it would be unislamic". 110 In other words, the erstwhile aggressive Ulema were subdued by social and political forces and contented themselves with whatever Islamic provisions were promised in the Constitution of 1956. In sum, the constitution adopted on the 29th February, 1956 was based on the consensus of the overwhelming majority of the entire populace of Pakistan touching all shades of lives. It was an annus mirabilis for the coalition government and the country, as well. But having elected General Mirza as the first President of the Pakistan Republic in March, 1956,* the coalition government displayed its poor political foresight. However, innocuous the titular office had been rendered in the Constitution,

* The Opposition did not vote in the election as a protest against the infringement of the convention that both the Prime Minister and President should not come from the same wing.

110. Ibid., January 31, 1956; also see Ibid., January 12, 1956.
General Mirza's — whose bizarre democratic concept had gained so much notoriety lately, both at home and abroad — elevation to the Presidential Office was an ill-omen incarnate. He had already been the country's 'Regent' during the successive crises in the Governor General's health only to be elected country's first President, later on. This was an installation of a time-bomb. However, the President allowed himself to be mellow, in the beginning, on the workability of parliamentary democracy in Pakistan.

Meanwhile, the coalition government was running short of its political plums in that its components e.g. the U.F. and M.L. had ceased to be a force in their respective provinces. This was bound to be as the central parliament to which the centre owed its existence was indirectly elected by the provincial legislatures not directly by an independent electorate. It is to be recalled that how abruptly the U.F. Ministry was restored in East Pakistan by Mohammad Ali without asking it to elect its parliamentary leader and over the head of the A.M.L., the largest single majority party in the legislature. Since the formation of the U.F. government with the coalescence of the minorities at the head of Abu Hossain Sarkar it had been eking out a fugitive existence. It resorted to all kinds of shifts and avoided a straight vote of confidence in the legislature pending frantic attempts to get the centre to save the ministry from the fall. The Prime Minister was obliging to the U.F. lest his coalition Cabinet and still more, the constitution-making should come to naught. Now that the Constitution was ready and meant to be the starting point
for general elections based on a final political structure the East Pakistan legislature was required to pronounce its views on the electorate principle as its counterpart in West Pakistan had already done in favour of the separate electorate. Mr. Sarkar was in a dilemma i.e. being sandwiched between two opposite views of his coalition partners, namely the M.L. and N-I-P pressing for the separate electorate on the one hand, and the G.D., Congress, U.P.F. and S.C.P. for the joint electorate, on the other.* While the legislature remained unsummoned to clear the electorate issue, let alone the confidence issue, the A.M.L. steadily increased its popularity "not only in public but also among members of the Provincial Assembly".111 Admirably, the Prime Minister rose to the parliamentary occasion and in response to the opposition demand and to the detriment of his own coalition partner ** counselled Sarkar to face the legislature by 31st August, 1956, (the date on which the budget period would end) or else an alternate government would be formed.112 Needless to add, the Sarkar Ministry gave way to the A.M.L. in the first week of September, 1956.

The West Pakistan situation hit the coalition at the centre rather directly. On the appointment of Dr. Khan as the Chief Minister of West Pakistan Dr. Chowdhury held the view that "Iskander Mirza and

* See Times, February 19, 1956.

** All East and West Pakistan newspapers and informed opinion hailed it. See Dawn, 25 August, 1956.

111. Times, August 16, 1956.

Chowdhury Mohammad Ali, for some vested interests ... required the services of Dr. Khan Sahib at that moment, but to the Muslim League ... the Khan brothers were still not acceptable. 113 Obviously, General Mirza had a utilitarian affection for Dr. Khan dating back to his early life when he was the political agent to the then British India at the N.W.F.P. and might have backed Dr. Khan's appointment, but there was nothing on record to prove that the M.L. leaders had, at any time, let it be known that Dr. Khan was unacceptable to them. On the contrary they vied with each other in paying tributes and pledging support to Dr. Khan. The zeal for the solidarity of the one-unit project witnessed the elections to the West Pakistan legislature on a non-party basis. And the M.L. veterans like Daultana, Sardar Bahadur Khan and Khuwro were working as Ministers in Dr. Khan's Cabinet from October 14, 1955 to April 1, 1956 without any protest. What was more the top leaguers (particularly Daultana) had the Prime Minister make a statement (on March 29) in favour of Dr. Khan's retaining as the Chief Minister for greater interest. 114 But within a week's time, wrote Dr. Sayeed, after the issuance of the statement the M.L. asked Dr. Khan and his ministers to be catalogued as Muslim leaguers or quit the office. 115 Dr. Khan immediately returned the tit for tat by having created a new party called Republican which

113. See G.W. Chowdhury, op. cit., p. 111.
114. See Prime Minister's Statement, Dawn, September 9, 1956.
115. K. B. Sayeed, op. cit., p. 428.
signalled for a regular stampede in the M.L. ranks with large scale
defections in favour of the new party or ministerial bandwagon. This
provincial development had corresponding reflections at the national
level, in that a similar R.P. (Republican Party) was formed in the
N.A. with the dissident Muslim leaguers thus reducing the actual
number of the former M.L. to 10 only.

It was rather an over simplified opinion to hold that Pakistan
inner politics had been overlaid by manoeuvrings by the aspirants to
to power. We wish Dr. Sayeed had mentioned that there were certain
principles at work beneath the apparent contradictions in the polit-
cians' behaviour. The first Cabinet of Dr. Khan was a non-party,
caretaker government formed at a time when the exigencies of the
situation demanded a national rather than a partisan approach. With
the framing of the Constitution and coming into being of the provincial
legislature, the political perspective was substantially changed. A
shift of emphasis to parties, political programmes and aspirations was
natural. This was in keeping with parliamentary politics. On principle,
the position of the M.L. was unassailable. Here was a political
party concerned with its revitalisation and preparation for the general
elections. It could not but form a parliamentary party in the province.
East Pakistan was almost denuded of Muslim leaguers. At the centre
there was a coalition government. It was only in West Pakistan that
there existed an oasis for the M.L. Would it then make over charge
to a non-leaguer for the care of that oasis? The whole controversy
was born of two equally demanding situations. The parliamentary needs
i.e. the desire to form a M.L. legislature party at the head of a leaguer, were pitted against the equally important but non-parliamentary ones i.e. the retention of an hitherto apolitical Dr. Khan as the Chief Minister of West Pakistan in fulfilment of earlier unofficial commitments of the Muslim leaguers and placatory gestures to the frontier people. In the quest for a solution the M.L. broke but remained unbended. But it had a salutary effect in that it produced an opposition in the West Pakistan legislature and helped the winnowing process in politics. Bagehot maintained long ago that "parliamentary government is, in its essence, a sectarian government, and is possible only when sects are cohesive". \[116\] The act of differentiation occurred in the M.L. organisation which had gathered so much of non-cohesive elements in its fold. True, both the M.L. and R.P. were designed with the same fabric of feudalism, nevertheless both of them managed to remain apart till the end of parliamentary life in Pakistan even on matters of issues. It will be seen later on, that had not this sect of people distilled themselves out from the parent M.L. party and formed R.P. the electorate issue would have been bogged down and the tomb of dead constitutional issues disintered again.

Now that the number of M.L. members in the N.A. had dwindled to merely ten, the President of the M.L. party, Sardar Nishtar counselled the Prime Minister to resign from the coalition government and lead the

\[116.\] Bagehot, \textit{op. cit.}, p.231.
M.L. opposition in the N.A.\textsuperscript{117} For, the M.L. thought that by sitting in the opposition it could create a new image, particularly in the context of the coming general elections. But the newly formed R.P. pledged its support to the Prime Minister and the coalition government. Now the Prime Minister was placed in a position of riding two horses going in different directions. For the coalition government was legally composed of the M.L.-U.F. not R.P.-U.F. In following the counsel of the M.L. on whose back he had climbed to power the Prime Minister could switch over to the role of the opposition leader, alternatively, he could stay as Prime Minister by relying on the R.P. The Prime Minister received a vote of confidence (August 26) from the coalition parties, though the M.L. members did not attend the meeting as a protest against the presence of the R.P. members who to them were not a part of the coalition government and above all seceders. The M.L. members of the coalition such as Chundigar, Pir Ali Mohammad Rashdi, Amir Azam and Kayani resigned as they failed to persuade the Prime Minister to attend the M.L. parliamentary party meeting.\textsuperscript{118} The Prime Minister was still smarting under an injury caused by the M.L. leader's resiling from their early promise of support to Dr. Khan. The Prime Minister was a first class administrator by background and knack but lacked the flexibility of mind essential to politicians. He held — indeed correctly — that "the

\textsuperscript{117} See Manchester Guardian, September 9, 1956.

\textsuperscript{118} See Times, August 27, 1956; Dawn August 29 and September 6, 1956.
leadership of the country must be vested in parliament" and not be subjected to the caprice of "elements external to it".\textsuperscript{119}

But these 'external elements' were meant to be the M.L. organization whose Prime Minister he was. It did not occur to the Prime Minister that in the Westminster system parliamentary leadership was understood in terms of party politics. He could not govern Pakistan in 1956 in the face of his party's disapproval as he had wanted to act "as I think best in the national interest",\textsuperscript{120} any more than Harold Wilson could have governed Britain in 1969 as he had wished to by incurring T.U.C.'s wrath. The truth was that both the Prime Minister and M.L. failed to strike a working arrangement as far as the relationship between the parliamentary party and organizational leadership was concerned. What started as a mild difference of opinion in 1947 ended in the disassociation of the M.L. from the governing of Pakistan in 1956. On many occasions during the past eight years compromises had been made to stop the widening gulf between the M.L. and its parliamentary party. The latter's supremacy was always ensured, though.

Aware of the painful memory of the past when in the dismissal and appointment of ministries\textsuperscript{*} the M.L. had been used as a passive ratifying body, the M.L. was determined to reassert its position now and avoid

\textsuperscript{*} For instance Nazimuddin's dismissal and Mohammad Ali's appointment.


recurrence of extra-parliamentary influences on it. In the present situation, the Prime Minister could not even make a case that his government was on the brink of serving two masters, namely the M.L. and N.A.; for, even the M.L. parliamentary party went in favour of the M.L. organization leaving him to plough his lonely furrow. In the circumstances, the Prime Minister acted honourably if not correctly. He resigned his Premiership on 8th September, 1956* despite his holding the confidence of the majority, with R.P.'s support in the N.A. The President was evidently upset+ seeing the last vestige of bureaucracy leaving the Cabinet platform and refused to accept his resignation as he thought the Prime Minister still commanded the confidence of a majority of the N.A. 121 But Chowdhury Mohammad Ali having happened to derive some political education during the years chose to spurn the offer and hand down a much-needed tradition to Pakistan posterity that the office of Prime Minister was prestigious and crucial in the parliamentary scheme of government, not to be held by any trick. The very refusal augured an healthy precedent for the first time at the centre, in that the President called upon the opposition leader, **Simultaneously, he did resign from the M.L. organisation.***

* When trouble started brewing the President himself being a constitutional head visited Prime Minister's house on August 27, 1956 at 3.30 p.m. (See *Dawn*, August 28, 1956), and a day before Prime Minister's resignation talks were still going on at the initiative of the President to make the coalition parties agree to recognise Chowdhury Mohammad Ali as an independent leader and thus form the Cabinet in that capacity. Source: *Dawn*, September 8, 1956 and *Pakistan Observer*, quoted in *Dawn*, September 9, 1956.

121. See *Times*, September 10, 1956.
Suhrawardy, to form the Cabinet. And the *Times* (London) summed up
the whole development in a French phraseology Reculer pour mieux sauter indicating that it was a step back in order to have a better jump in the future. The continuing process of minority parties' forming governments had an ultimate healthy future; for, this was the inevitable result of parties' passing through the stage of regeneration and differentiation. The Mecca of parliamentary system, Great Britain had the same experiences during the period 1845–1852 when there was the transition from Whigs and Tories to Liberals and Conservatives and 1910–1931 when Labour displaced the Liberals as the second major party. Did not both the A.M.L. and R.P. come out of the original M.L.? Did not the R.P. replace the M.L. as the largest single party? Did not the A.M.L. now occupy the largest second position in the N.A.? What apparently appeared to be sheer factionalism was also a process towards final cohesion.

The Suhrawardy Cabinet

A coalition of the A.M.L. – R.P.* (including minorities) Ministry was sworn-in on the 12th September, 1956 at the head of Suhrawardy, who was rather on call for it since early 1955. Mr. Tamizuddin Khan (the ex-President of the Constituent Assembly I), now the President of

* The existing party position of the coalition Ministry was the following: R.P.: 30; A.M.L.: 13 and minorities (Congress: 4; S.C.F.: 3) 7, in the N.A. of 80.


the East Pakistan M.L., epitomized the country's general feelings vis-à-vis Suhrawardy's rise to Premiership in his comment that in Suhrawardy "the country has got a Prime Minister who has a political past and an undeniable political stature." He is a front door entrant to the portals of his high office, is not a propped up puppet and has had to fight every inch of his long and arduous way to power. 124

In the process of fighting democracy's battle the Suhrawardy Cabinet scored a substantial victory at the operational level of the parliamentary system of government. Suhrawardy with his resplendent record of political struggles, courage and resilience was raised to power through the "sheer force of democratic pressure" 125 not by the dark hand of patronage. ** Suhrawardy's coming to power was the driving of the last nail into the coffin of the M.L. Now the erstwhile opposition was to don the government's attire and the M.L. the opposition's.

The coalition Cabinet had one limiting qualification in that its main component, R.P. born of political exigency lacked the basis of broad electoral support. The Republicans were entirely drawn from the class of big landlords and had a generally conservative outlook. They were not supposed to support any drastic changes in agrarian reforms. They were mainly social Darwinians with leanings towards free enterprise on economic front. Whereas, the A.M.L. was committed to the

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** For the first time the opposition party almost simultaneously came to power both in East Pakistan and at the centre.

abolition of Zamindari and the nationalisation of key industries.

At best the coalition was conservative, at worst it could be potentially hazardous. The working definition of the present government should be that it was the coalition of centre-left (A.M.L.) and centre-right (R.P.) relying on mutual accommodation to stay in power. The Cabinet had one distinction — also the first of its kind — in that it was not peopled by any metamorphosed officials and came under the rubric of the *Times* (London) as "politicians are on the ascendancy"\(^{126}\) in Pakistan.

Suhrawardy took off from an invigorating atmosphere saying: "I have not diverted from the path which I set out for giving democracy a chance to function in Pakistan".\(^{127}\) Scarcey had he been sworn into the office than he said — *unlike his predecessors* — one of the important tasks of his government would be to re-establish confidence between the government and administration, on the one hand, and the people, on the other.\(^{128}\) With all these mottoes in front Suhrawardy ushered in an era of a new psychological climate both inside the country and outside. He flew to East Pakistan — *unlike his predecessors* — when his Cabinet was only 12 hours old to help dispel the mood of isolation and dejection that had been hovering around the mind of East Pakistanis since independence that they were scarcey visited

* The convention of parity in regards to the numbers of Ministers in the Cabinet was observed, viz. East Pakistan 5 (Cabinet Ministers); West Pakistan 5 (Cabinet Ministers) plus two Ministers of State each from one wing.

by the Prime Minister or Ministers. Equally unusually, in reflecting on the Kashmir problem he wondered if "... both India and ourselves could in friendly cooperation march with each other"\(^\text{129}\) — a sort of sound, however diplomatic, which was rarely heard from the earlier politicians. What was more, he asked the Indian government for a food loan to alleviate the acute shortage in East Pakistan — an attitude of mind which would have been invariably discarded by his predecessors on grounds of false vanity — of whose response was surprisingly followed within 24 hours by Nehru's sending 2,000 tons of cereals with a promise of a further supply.\(^\text{130}\) These, however, were the initial gestures of moderation in the course of his settling down in the office. But his leadership, sense of earthiness, drive and dynamism came in the limelight as soon as he grappled with the country's issues.

In order to expedite the process of general elections, Suhrawardy picked up the unresolved electorate issue left by his predecessors. The former M.L.-U.F. ministry had enlisted support of the minority parties on a distinct understanding that along with other deals, namely parity, support for the one-unit, etc., the principle of joint electorate had to be incorporated into the Constitution.\(^\text{131}\) The M.L. being a communal party had slurred over the issue thinking that at an opportune moment it would be able to have the separate electorate

\(^{129}\) Christian Science Monitor, October 2, 1956.

\(^{130}\) Ibid.

\(^{131}\) See Dawn, October 11, 1956. (General Mirza told the writer that he was also aware of this fact.)
passed by the N.A. as it was still the largest single party in the House. The U.F., on the contrary, had contented itself with the status quo; for, it had not the courage to go in either direction of the electorate issue for fear of being hurt by the front lash of one of its components, N-I-P and backlash of the minority parties. Now that the M.L. was reduced to a non-malignant position in the N.A. and the A.M.L.-R.P. Ministry formed the secular forces were, perforce, to hold sway. It has been pointed out that "a good electoral system is not by itself a sufficient condition for the insurance of genuine representative government, it is nonetheless a necessary condition. We may not get what we need with even a good electoral system: we shall certainly not get it with a bad one."\textsuperscript{132} As far as Pakistan was concerned the very existing principle of electorate i.e. separate electorate appeared crude and insensitive to democratic forces. This was an unfortunate but unavoidable legacy of the past. In the history of the constitutional development of the subcontinent the demand for separate electorates had been a device required by a minority to seek the protection of its rights and interests against the majority. Speaking on the electorates question at the first Round Table Conference held in London in 1931, the present U.F. leader, Haq, had said:

"... Responsible government for India means that our Hindu friends will have 17 shillings in the pound ... all we want is that in the

three shillings that remain, we and the other communities will be
allowed to have our proper share."¹³³ And in the course of securing
that share the whole electoral system had degenerated into what we
tend to characterise as a polymorphic franchise systems, in that not
only were the Hindus and Muslims represented in the various legisla-
tures of the then undivided India through separate electoral devise
but also various business communities, landlords, educationists, etc.,
etc., as well.

Now that Pakistan had come into being and a democratic Consti-
tution was drawn up how could the communal system of separate electorates
be compatible with secular expectations and conducive to the growth
of Pakistan nationhood? If joint electorates were to be rejected and
Hindus, Christians, Parsis and Buddhists were made to be elected to
the legislatures on a proliferated electoral plane would not Pakistan
show greater kinship to the South African policy of racial segregation
as electoral apartheid would prevent both the Hindus and Muslims
from entering same polling booth? What was more, history did not
repeat itself as far as the electorate issue was concerned, since,
contrary to the earlier precedent of undivided India, it was the
minority who yearned for the joint electorates in Pakistan. Now Pakis-
tan was to resolve upon how she was going to build her electoral
institution — the most decisive one in nation-building.

¹³³ Speech quoted in The Pakistan Observer, April 27, 1962
On August 4, 1956 the West Pakistan Assembly had voted on a resolution recommending to the N.A. the principle of separate electorates for the coming general elections. Only the Awami Mahaz Party (A.M.P.) and the Hindu members were against the resolution. The Republican Chief Minister, Dr. Khan had acquiesced to it on sufferance; for, he was yet to wrench the members of the breakaway Muslim leaguers who had just formed R.P. into non-communal direction. That was why he did not say a word about the merit of the separate electorates while speaking on the motion which was subsequently termed as "interestingly enough" by the influential Dawn. We have no doubt in our mind that the passing of the resolution was treated by Dr. Khan as an ad hoc measure in a given situation pending a final verdict. For, as a former Congress man he had been a lifelong supporter of the joint electorates. Besides, he was aware that the R.P. had the potentiality of being developed into a non-communal organisation. It was a question of time. As soon as the liberal forces symbolising in the A.M.L's forming coalition government with the R.P. at the centre were on the rise Dr. Khan was emboldened and issued a statement in favour of the joint electorates when the Suhrawardy Cabinet was

* This party of G.M.Syed - he was mentioned in the first part of this dissertation in connection with the Sind politics - was progressive minded.

** The Christian members were in favour of the separate electorates. And their spokesman, C.E. Gibon fought tooth and nail in the N.A. against the introduction of the joint electorates. See his speech, N.A.D., Vol. II, April 22, 1957, pp.847-911.

just two days old. 135 And finally in a Republican party moot held on 28th September, 1956 Dr. Khan, the Chief of the R.P., succeeded in declaring his party to be a non-communal organization open to all communities for membership regardless of caste or creed. 136

As far as East Pakistan was concerned the A.L. coalition government had no difficulty in passing (October 1, 1956) by 159 votes to 1 the resolution recommending to the N.A. the joint electorates system. During the division 84 opposition members remained in the House which meant they were not essentially opposed to the resolution. The House then resounded with the voice of "Jukta Mirbachan Zindabad" long live (joint electorates), "Hindu-Muslim Ek ho" (Hindu-Muslim unite) and "Pakistan Zindabad" (Long live Pakistan). 137

Now that provincial verdicts were available Suhrawardy made a thrust on the electoral issue by introducing an electorate Bill in the Dacca session of the N.A. held in October, 1956. The electorate issue opened the Pandora's box of ideological controversies once again. The M.L. and the N-I-P regarded the system of separate electorates as an article of faith and thought it was inseparable with the concept of Pakistan. The arguments that were trotted out both for and against the respective electoral systems, namely joint and separate electorates unconsciously formed an illuminating literature for the inquiring students of politics. The respective contenders were in the

137. Large number of persons from the visitors' galleries booed the opposition and threw paper balls on them. See Dawn, October 2, 1956.
quest of national logic to give Pakistan a moral personality in order to sustain national boundaries. The votaries of separate electorates did not think that Pakistan was "the wages of a particular folly of a particular generation of a particular community; that ... had a particular portion of the people (Hindus) of India shown generosity ... then the ... Mussalmans would have (not) demanded a separate homeland for themselves."¹³⁸ That the Muslim nationhood was already there lying dormant in the subcontinent and the coming into being of Pakistan amounted to what in Miltonic diction would mean: "a puissant nation rousing herself like a strong man after sleep" (Areopagitica). And the system of separate electorates that had been in vogue in British India since 1909 worked as the vehicle of Muslim nationhood. The two-nation theory i.e. that the Hindus and Muslims were separate nations, basing on which India was divided was linked up with the system of separate electorates. The fact that the Muslims had to be represented separately in the legislatures of British India through separate electorates was also a recognition that Muslims were a separate nation. So, "Pakistan and separate electorate are two fruits of the tree that is the separate nationhood of Islam".¹³⁹ The institution, separate electorates, had fostered the growth of 'the community of feelings amongst the Muslims of India' of whose utility was still thought to be indispensable no matter Pakistan had been an accomplished

¹³⁹ N. A. D., Vol II, October 11, 1956, p. 293.
fact now. "Consider the two parts of Pakistan, one here, the other a thousand miles away, and with so much territory ... hostile, in between. And yet our hearts beat as one, for a common spirit gives them cohesion. Take away that spirit, that community of emotion, feeling and faith, and we must fall apart."140 So, to them, politically the existence of Pakistan hinged on the acceptance of separate electorates.

However, these self-indulgent fountain of arguments eventually rolled down into the ocean of transcendental values - a notorious tendency showed by the Muslim leaguers whenever they were called upon to define Pakistan. For example, it was held that "the method of representation is not a transient interest. It is the question of continuing or discontinuing a collective ego ... the Muslim nation has an enduring connotation. Leaving aside eschatological issue, there is no ideal below the blue sky which can be placed higher than the survival of the Muslim nation. This ideal is an end in itself. The state can be sacrificed for this end. Even curtailment of the homeland can be tolerated ... to save the person of the nation."141

It would appear from the above arguments that there lay a messianic character in the nationhood of Pakistan, in that the concept of Muslim Millat tended to be universalistic unconfined within the Pakistan territory. The Mullahs (religious group) echoed the same feelings

140. Ibid., October 10, 1956, p.186.
that Islam would be in jeopardy if separate electorates were not retained.\(^{142}\) Thirty five leaders of different political and religious parties* met at Sardar Nishtar's residence in Karachi and formed a 7-man Emergency Committee to fight for the cause of separate electorates. The members of the Committee flew to Dacca (capital of East Pakistan) by the P.I.A. special flight,\(^{143}\) to campaign for the electorate issue.** It was a virulent agitation against the Prime Minister's stand on the joint electorates. The campaign included street corner meetings, addressing Jumma congregation (Friday prayer in the mosque), strikes, selling and distributing of books on separate electorates, collecting signatures on scrolls, public meetings and processions with placards and slogans demanding separate electorates.\(^ {144}\) It was the last spasm of obscurantism and religious fanaticism suffered by the body-politic of Pakistan. That the principle of joint electorates would be tantamount to the negation of all values that were understood by the terms Pakistan and Islam.\(^ {145}\) And the Hindus and other minorities who could

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\(^*\) M.L., Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Pakistan, Jamiat-i-Ulem-i-Islam, Jamiat-i-Islami, Islam league, National Reconstruction Movement, etc., etc.

\(^{**}\) Interestingly enough, it was the solo performance of the West Pakistan leaders. East Pakistan leaders and for that matter the people responded to this fanatic movement very negligibly.


144. See *Manchester Guardian*, October 8, 1956; *Times*, October 8, 1956; *Dawn*, September 29, 1956; October 5, 1956 and October 7, 1956.

not be integrated into Muslim fraternity ought to be prevented from joining the main stream of politics through the device of separate electorates.

However, in the course of our research we felt jolted by a touch of an historic irony as far as Hindu-Muslim confluence or apartness were concerned. Around the year 1679, the then Mughal Emperor Aurunzeeb in his zeal for Islamization reimposed Jizya* tax on the Hindus, contrary to the policy of his great grandfather, Emperor Akbar. Apalled by the discriminatory measure, the then Maharastrian nationalist Shivaji wrote to draw the Emperor's attention to the following lines: "Your Majesty! if you believe in the true Heavenly book and word of God (i.e. the Quran) you will find there Rabb-ul-alamîn (God of all men), and not Rab-ul-Muslîman (God of Muslims only)." And the irony had it, the same sentiment of fear was expressed when the leader of the opposition S.G. Chattapadhyya cautioned the M.I. government on the floor of the parliament in the following lines: "Give up your two-nation theory. According to Quran there cannot be two nations. There is in the Quran this beautiful term "Rabb-ul-Alamin" i.e. Lord of the worlds." Then, would it mean that there had been no durable change in the dichotomy of Hindu-Muslim thinking during this gap of 272 years?

* The Hindus were charged with this tax — not Muslims — as they were protected by the army of Islam in the Mughal India.


Indeed, as far as Pakistan was concerned the thawing process of the Hindu-Muslim relationship had started with the U.P. movement of early 1954, and the present stand of the Prime Minister on electoral issue — an inevitable result of the U.P. victory of 1954 — was an illustration. What was more, the President of the East Pakistan A.L., Bhasani, himself a Maulana (religious scholar) of great repute now addressed himself to his fellow Muslims of Pakistan saying: "Do we really believe that Allah is 'Rabb-ul-alamin' and not 'Rabb-ul-Muslemin' and our great prophet is Rahmatul-lil-Alamin' not 'Rahmatul-lil-Muslemin'? ... Are we going to have a caste system ... and base our great religion Islam on hatred ...?" 148 The mill of human history of understanding and education ground slowly.

However, coming back to the electoral issue we find that the protagonists of the separate electorates were also influenced by other considerations, real or imaginary. They held that if joint electorates were put into motion in general elections Hindus would gain control over the political life of East Pakistan and through it become a decisive factor in the N.A. and national politics of Pakistan. The position of Hindus in different constituencies was analysed in relation to the number of members in the East Pakistan legislature. It was

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* Merciful of all mankind.
** Merciful of all Muslims.
+ 310 (300 general and 10 women).

submitted that the non-Muslims had more than 50 per cent votes in 14 constituencies, between 36.3 per cent to 49.19 per cent in 35 constituencies and 20 per cent to 35.45 per cent votes in 89 constituencies. And in four women constituencies non-Muslim votes ranged from 34 per cent to 39.7 per cent. Having reeled off the statistics they claimed that the Hindus under the joint electorates would capture as many as 142 seats whereas under the separate electorates they would be entitled to only 70 seats. This hypothesis was based apparently on the following beliefs: (a) that the 'pardah system' would stand in the way of Muslim woman's voting in the elections in great numbers; (b) that the Muslims were politically apathetic; (c) that the Muslims were prone to division during elections.

It seems to us that the argument advanced by the advocates of separate electorates had more relevancy to the condition of pre-partition India than post. According to the census report of 1941 the population of Muslims and non-Muslims comprising the areas which had been solely demanded for their inclusion in Pakistan was the following: Muslims 55.23 per cent and non-Muslims 44.77 per cent. This ratio of population was considerably changed in the Pakistan that came into existence and was further altered due to riots, and large scale migration. By 1949, 40,000,000 Muslims remained in India, forming about 11 per cent of her population and 13,000,000 non-Muslims had remained in Pakistan,

149. See Dawn, February 7, 8, 10 and 11, 1958 "The Electorate issue" - I, II, III and IV.
forming about 17 per cent of her population.\footnote{K. Davis, The Population of India and Pakistan, (Princeton University Press: 1951), p. 198.} Hence, the so-called percentages of Hindu voters in 142 constituencies quoted by the pro-separate electorates group were far from the actual ratio of Hindu populace. And as far as the probability of the Hindus securing more seats under joint electorates was concerned the existing facts would not support it. For instance, in a referendum held under joint electorates in 1947 to decide whether or not Sylhet district would form part of Pakistan or not Muslims voted solidly in favour of Pakistan despite the fact that the Hindus were placed at the higher echelon of the society.

The Prime Minister shattered his opponents' arguments by pointing the actual working of joint electorates and their current results at the local self-government level. In a district like Khulna where Muslims and Hindus were almost evenly distributed, the former had 8 seats in the East Pakistan legislature and the latter 7 under separate electoral arrangements. But the same district offered a different picture under joint electorates in that 28 Muslims and 2 Hindus were returned to form the District Boards of 30 members. In the same fashion, 32 Muslims and 4 Hindus were elected to the Faridpur District Board, and 21 Muslims and Hindus nil to the Dinajpur District Board.\footnote{See Prime Minister's speech, N.A.D., Vol. II, October 10, 1956, p. 171.} This proved that Muslim voting behaviour in joint electorates was different to what
had been apprehended by the advocates of separate electorates. It showed that Muslim voters did not act as passive agents to the "Hindu will" under joint electorates.

There was another dimension of this electoral issue, in that the individuality of the two wings of Pakistan came into sharp contrast. The main bulk of opposition to the joint electorates system originated from West Pakistan and precisely from the Punjab. It was observed by Tayasinkin that "the real threat to stability in Pakistan is more difficult of solution. It is Punjabi arrogance".\(^{153}\) We like to add another word to it i.e. fanaticism. Instead of appreciating the progressive, secular and democratic forces manifested in the desire of East Pakistanis living together as Pakistani nationals by obliterating the age-old distinction of Hindu-Muslim at the ballot box, the Punjabi-oriented West Pakistan leadership dubbed the electoral issue as "Bengali nationalism".\(^{154}\) And the Moulanas, particularly Maulana Maudoodi viewed joint electorates as a slide to Islamic perdition and Hinduism.\(^{155}\) This difference of approach of the two wings towards substantive issues of the state was always there in varying degree (indeed, it is still there) as the eastern part tended to be ahead of its western one in progressive thinking.

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155. For details see *Dawn*, October 24, 1956.
Historically speaking, the communalisation of the electorate system eventuated in the accentuation of differences and growth of an unhealthy political life. The Ceylonese had joint electorates since 1931 based on the Donoughmore Committee's findings. The Hilton Young Commission recommended the same common roll for the integration of Indians, South Africans and Europeans in Kenya. Even the Parliamentary Select Committee dealing with the constitutional reforms of 1935 vis-a-vis India regretted that they could not provide for the joint electorates in the scheme due to minority insistence. That the separate electorates could not be blotted out in British India was due to the failures of the leaders to devise a viable arrangement to safeguard minority rights. But the fact remained that all the top minority leaders in British India had, in essence, believed in the system of joint electorates. For example, Mr. Jinnah on March 20, 1927 was willing to accept joint electorates, provided his four conditions, namely (i) Sind should be made a separate province; (ii) the N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan should be modelled on other provinces; (iii) the Punjab and Bengal should be represented in their respective assemblies on the basis of population and (iv) the Muslim representation should be 33 per cent in the Central Assembly, were fulfilled. Even Moulana Mohammad Ali was willing to trust "the justice of joint territorial electorates". 156

What was more Jinnah, while addressing the Constituent Assembly I on

156. Dawn, January 12, 1956 (Article), Ghazanfar Ali Khan, "Joint Electorates and the Quaid-i-Azam".
August 11, 1947, sufficiently reflected his liberal mind when he observed "If you will work in cooperation, forgetting the past, burying the hatchet, ... in a spirit that every one of you, no matter to what community he belongs ... is first, second and last a citizen of this State with equal rights ... and obligations ..." Hence, the impregnability of the principle of separate electorates vis-a-vis Muslim nationhood could not be proved historically. Tennyson once composed a definition of a conservative: "He is the best conservative, who lops the mouldered branch away". The issue of separate electorates represented the 'mouldered branch' in Pakistan politics and the worst conservatives e.g. M.L., N-I-P, and Ulema objected to its lopping away.

Looking from another angle the electoral issue was linked up with the provisions of the constitution recently drawn up. It is to be recalled that East Pakistan had acceded to the principle of parity by sacrificing the advantage of population strength. If the separate electorates were to be continued the Muslim representatives of East Pakistan in the N.A. would be pitted against the Hindus coming from that part of the world; for, the Hindus would have a sizeable fixed quota under the separate electoral arrangement. The parity concept was expressly related to the two wings of Pakistan, not between Hindus and Muslims. Now, under the separate electorates East Pakistan would appear bi-polarized i.e. Hindus and Muslims in every sphere of life,

let alone politics. Though minorities did not constitute more than 10 per cent of the entire population of Pakistan at that point of time, their geographical distribution between wings had political implication, in that West Pakistan had minorities bordering around 2 per cent of its populace whereas in East Pakistan the quantum of minorities would be in the vicinity of 18 per cent. Beneath the apparent cry of support for the separate electorates on grounds of a two-nation theory the East Pakistanis could suspect that there lay a Punjabi trap to Balkanize East Pakistan on the psychological plane as they had been alleged to have tried to Balkanize West Pakistan regionally in the early fifties.

Implications apart, on forensic count the East Pakistanis could hold that parity could be logical only when the system of joint electorates was adopted, else they would go for parity representation between the Muslims of West Pakistan and of East Pakistan, on the basis of the two-nation theory or alternatively, representation on the population basis on general democratic principles. In other words, parity, one-unit and joint electorates were the inseparable issues and pillars on which the edifice of the constitution stood.

On the eve of the N.A. session at Dacca, the campaign of pressure was mounted against the passing of the joint electoral system to such an extent that the Republicans were evidently alarmed by the possible repercussions that it might have on their party in West Pakistan in future.

if they were to back Suhrawardy's stand fully, The President, General Mirza who had perennial contempt for fanaticism showed his best judgment and insight in regard to the electoral issue. The President dashed to Dacca and struck a compromise formula on the electoral issue - a joint electorate for East Pakistan and separate electorates for West Pakistan - after having had three hours' conference with the Republicans on whom he was widely rumoured to have great influence. This part of Presidential contribution was described by the Dawn in the following way: "... higher intervention has now saved the nation for the time being".159 We think that this incident was the first example in Pakistan political history that a Head of the State tried to help out a Prime Minister who was a popular politician.

In pursuance of the compromise formula Suhrawardy had the Electoral Bill passed by 48:19 votes in the N.A. on October 10, 1956.160 The passing of the Electoral Bill was not much of an eventful achievement - because of the dual electoral methods which were prescribed for the two wings of Pakistan represented duality of their attitudes - as much as was the Prime Minister's speech on the Bill itself. No Prime Minister before Suhrawardy had ever ventured to taunt the legend of the two-nation theory in Pakistan. The myth existed in the country by default. With cold blooded logic Suhrawardy asked the two-nation theorists to come down to earth from the ethereal plane. His was the submission


for precise territorial nationalism. He told the House that "the two-nation theory lost its force even for the Muslims" the moment the state was created. He continued that "the two-nation theory carried to its logical conclusion would have connoted total exchange of population, the creation of a completely Hindu nation in India and the creation of a completely Muslim nation in Pakistan". This could not have been done any more than all the Jews of the world could have done so by immigrating to the State of Israel. The separate electorates had never been meant to be a device to safeguard the interests of a majority populace. If the theory of two-nation, Suhrawardy maintained, "is still persisted in, it will logically lead to a partition of Pakistan and the creation of a state made up of contiguous areas where non-Muslims are in majority." To him Muslims had been a nationality in undivided India and were now citizens in Pakistan in which every citizen was a member of the Pakistani nation regardless of religious differences. He found nothing unislamic in the joint electorates and held out a stern warning to the Ulema class that "the final word as to what is Islamic or not rests with ... the National Assembly ... no one can take away from it that right."

The most daring portion of the speech was his bold soul-searching confession that "the Muslim demand for separate electorates is based

* As a matter of fact the Congress leader Mr. B. K. Das voiced the same feeling: "If you want to keep up two-nation theory give us a separate home". See M.A.D., Vol. II, October 10, 1956, p. 204.
on deep ... distrust and even hatred of the non-Muslim element". He asked his co-religionists "what have you done for them to get their loyalty? Are you not by keeping them in separate compartments insisting that Hindus must continue to be Hindus in the political and religious sense?" While realising the Hindu-Muslim scars caused by the partition of India which had yet to be healed he insisted that "the process of healing must begin now". This was, we consider, an audacious speech of the first magnitude in that it held up Muslim self-delusion to pragmatic scrutiny at a time when religious fervour could have been whipped up against his leadership to put an end to his political career.

Courage yielded him good dividends. His work was not over with the delivery of the speech. He accepted the challenge of a Member of Parliament to fight the issue in the seven by-elections that were pending in East Pakistan. This offered an opportunity for the trial of strength among all political parties of Pakistan vis-a-vis issues.

Suhrawardy made a whirlwind tour of the country campaigning for his party's policies. The by-elections were over by mid-December 1956.

* After the speech Suhrawardy received 2000 congratulatory telegrams from various cross sections of the people. What was more, some mild religious organisations such as Majlis-i-Tahafus-i-Islam, Anjuman Muhibban-i-Islam, Majlis-i-Millat-i-Islamia and Anjuman Muhibban-i-Pakistan also praised the Prime Minister. See *Dawn*, October 12, 1956 and October 20, 1956.


162. See *N.A.D.* Vol. II, October 11, 1956, p.279

163. See *Dawn*, October 31; November 26; December 3; December 4 and December 7, 1956.
and the A.L. swept the polls capturing 5 out of 6 Muslim seats, conceding one to N-i-P in Bhola North.* The election victory was a vindication of the A.L. policies.

As far as West Pakistan was concerned Suhrawardy did the same thing in explaining his policies to the people. Dr. Khan joined Suhrawardy in the same venture and in the Republican Workers Conference he held the brief for launching a joint electorate campaign as his party had already incorporated the one-nation theory in its Constitution.165 This eventuated in the R.P.'s capturing all 5 seats to the West Pakistan legislature in the by-elections held in the Jhang District in January 1957.166 As a sequel to the by-election results the R.P. in the N.A. unanimously decided along with its coalition partner, A.L. to bring in a substitution to Section 3 of the Electorate Act, 1956 providing elections to the N.A. and provincial Assemblies on the basis of joint electorates. This was also a tense moment what according to the Times: "steel-helmeted police guarded barbed-wire barricades outside the National Assembly in Karachi today as the Bill to do away with the separate electorate system in the province of West Pakistan was debated. Outside were gathered more than 1000 demonstrators."167 The Prime Minister struck the opposition dumb by suggesting what impact the two-nation theory would have on the Qadianis if separate electorates were retained in West Pakistan. He also attacked the opposition on

* This is an area viewed sarcastically as 'holy land' for its religious tone. Even the small boys who move around completely naked never forget to wear caps (religious signs) on their heads.

164. Dawn, 16 December 1956 (The 7th seat was concerned with the minority).
their own ground by saying that if they were so glib about early
general elections why did they remain so adamant on the separate
electorates issue as it offered more complexities in the delimitation
of constituencies. 168 The opposition attack was blunted considerably,
in that it registered its protest vote in a lost division (14:36)
only once during the three readings of the Bill. 169 The historic Bill
was enacted on April 24, 1957 culminating in the rejection of the time-
worn separate electorates and ushering in an era of secular and demo-
cratic trends.

Now, Suhrawardy was to give another crucial test of his leader-
ship on foreign policy. Though foreign policy did not formally feature
in the U.F.'s 21-point programme, nevertheless in the election cam-
paigns pro-western foreign policy was denounced. What was more, in
the opinion of some foreign newspapers one of the causes of the M.L.'s
failure in the elections was foreign policy. 170 The crescendo of
criticism against foreign policy was always on the increase, because
the people had no inkling of the government's foreign policy in the
shape of pacts nor had the latter had ever told the people about the
exact nature of its alliances. It was public ignorance allowed by the

Footnote continued from previous page.
165. See Dawn, October 30, 1956.
166. Ibid., January 23, 1957.
successive governments which made fears a mountain of a molehill vis-à-vis military pacts. Apart from Pakistan's signing the mutual defence Assistance Agreement with the U.S. and joining the S.E.A.T.O. in 1954, she also became a member of the Baghdad pact* in 1955. All this was done behind the people's back. The politically vigilant people of Pakistan namely, the East Pakistanis grew more restive about the conduct of foreign policy in a world whose politics were on the throes of great changes in approach in the mid 1950s.

This was the so-called 'Geneva spirit' - the denouement of the Geneva Conference of the big powers held in July 1955. The Dullesian containment strategy and Stalin's stonewalling tactics yielded place to "a welcome relaxation of tension in international affairs".171 Russian withdrawal from Austria, the invitation of Dr. Adenauer to Moscow, leniency to Turkey and the Krushchev-Bulganin tour of the U.K. preceded by deStalinisation speeches anticipated an age of detente. Krushchev wanted to live in peaceful coexistence and redefined Marxism-Leninism saying that socialism could be established all over the world without war, though admitting at the same time that the "economic basis for war will continue as long as capitalism exists, war is no longer inevitable".172 But Krushchev viewed peaceful coexistence as

* Consisting of U.K., Turkey, Iran and Iraq. The U.S. was not member but closely associated with it.


an appropriate weapon to fight "against imperialism in all its forms and manifestations". In other words, this was a new Soviet anti-western offensive in the non-aligned world of Afro-Asia in the garb of peaceful coexistence. Soviet Russia doled out economic and military aid unconditionally to the emerging countries and put her weight and prestige behind them whose political movements were in the realm of anti-colonialism. The Krushchev-Bulganin tour of the non-aligned world in late 1955 was demonstrative of Russian policy. Along with these new trends in international politics was the technological revolution which witnessed production of more lethal nuclear and thermonuclear weapons and longrange air power, missiles, rockets, etc., etc. This new situation challenged the existing importance of local bases in the case of a nuclear flare-up.

How then did all these new phenomena of world politics affect Pakistanis? Firstly, they saw that aid could be had without entering into pacts - non-aligned countries were the examples. Secondly, any sort of possible foreign bases in Pakistan under the pact system would be vulnerable to rocket attacks. The third consideration was rather of overriding importance, in that Pakistan still could not have the Kashmir problem solved in her favour, one of the cardinal reasons for which she had entered into western alliances. People found government facing difficulties in holding bilateral talks with

India vis-a-vis Kashmir since Pandit Nehru saw a qualitative change in the status quo of the Kashmir problem as soon as Pakistan became a party to military alliances sponsored by the U.S. The Kashmir issue could not be solved peacefully - held Nehru - as Pakistan military alliances brought about a "climate of war"\(^{174}\) in the subcontinent. So to the critics, Pakistan's association with the western world was apparently a hindrance rather than a help to the Kashmir cause.

Now we are to examine American position - Pakistan's chief ally. George F. Kennan, one of the architects of American post-war foreign policy had always doubts in regard to the adequacy of military association and particularly on the ground "whether the participation of smaller states can really add very much to the ability of the great powers to assure stability of international life"\(^{175}\). For the U.S., the late 1950s marked the beginning of a realisation of a doubt pertaining to the sheer adequacy of military alliances; for, "world affairs had ... largely left the quasi-military phase behind"\(^{176}\).

The germs of an American foreign policy shift were already there when Suhrawardy came to power in Pakistan. The same Eisenhower regime which was responsible for initiating all kinds of military pacts earlier in 1954 became more mellowed in its attitude toward the non-aligned world at the very end of its tenure. Neutralism which was dismissed

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by Dulles once as "immoral" now attained a modicum of respectability. This new American definition of neutralism was best illustrated by a study prepared for the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1959: "Neutrality in Asia is closely related to nationalism ... United States policy must recognise that most Asian States do not consider the struggle between the Soviets and the West nearly as important as their national problems of consolidating a stable government and achieving economic progress and social change."177 Based on this new realisation, the U.S. vied with the U.S.S.R. in giving generous aid to the neutrals - a wooing process. But with this new sense of urgency in giving economic aid to the developing countries so as to deter the spread of communism, the U.S. did not explain the compatibility of pursuing a contradictory dual policy. On the one hand, she was associated with the non-aligned world in terms of unconditional aid-giving - a symbol of detente - on the other, simultaneously she was equally associated with her militarily aligned colleague-nations in terms of conditional aid-giving - a symbol of belligerency. This was both anomalous and dangerous for a pact-signing country like Pakistan which was a neighbour of two giant communist countries e.g. Russia and Red China and also between two neutrals, India and Afghanistan. In brevity, this was the trend of international politics obtaining at that point of time in the light of which Pakistan foreign policy had to be dealt with by Suhrawardy.

Suhrawardy began by saying that Pakistan foreign policy meant 'friendship towards all and malice towards none'. He assured the country that "the government is fully alive to the changing international kaleidoscope and will do everything in its power to preserve the interests of Pakistan". He boldly embarked upon a State visit to Red China on October 16, 1956. Prior to this, the name Red China was a taboo in official pronouncement in Pakistan. The Chinese sojourn of the Prime Minister augured a refreshing change. The Chinese Prime Minister, Chou En Lai came to visit Pakistan in December, 1956 as a quid pro quo. While India's air had been ringing with the chantings of "Hindi-Russo bhai bhai" (Hindustan and Russia are brothers) "Hindi-Chini bhai bhai" (Hindustan and China are brothers) following the earlier visits of Krushchev, Bulganin and Chou En Lai in that country, the Pakistanis felt an acute sense of remoteness from the socialist world and jealous about India's new relationship with both socialist and non-socialist countries. This time the Pakistanis made up the deficiency by rending the sky even more vociferously with the cries of "Pakistan Chini bhai bhai" (Pakistan and China are brothers). All the big cities of Pakistan wore a festive look to accord reception to Chou En Lai. Even the fanatical people of the tribal areas of West Pakistan did not hesitate to treat the Red leader with their traditional gifts of lambs. Obviously, East Pakistan was more enthusiastic as Bhasani was the President of the East Pakistan A.L. - the party in power of that province. More than 100,000 people congregated to

listen to Chou in a meeting held at Paltan Maidan. Suhrawardy allowed people to participate in this new situation which had bearings on foreign relations in order to acclimatise the people to the new trends of Pakistan foreign policy in the perspective of changing world. Chou's visit was followed by his sending a Chinese Trade Delegation to Pakistan to pave the way for commercial transactions between the two countries. Regarding the U.S.S.R. Suhrawardy sent a Pakistan Parliamentary Delegation there and ultimately a trade agreement was signed between the two countries, the U.S.S.R. and Pakistan. As far as the Eastern Democracies were concerned the Pakistan Ambassadors in Moscow and Switzerland were accredited as Ministers to Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Austria and Poland. Burma was visited by the Prime Minister himself. Similar arrangements were made in regard to Indonesia, Ceylon and Afghanistan. In establishing various relations, cultural and commercial, with the neutral and communist countries the Prime Minister gave a new orientation to the country's foreign policy, in that it reflected the realism of international politics vis-a-vis Pakistan's.

Candidly, the Prime Minister interpreted the new approach of Pakistan foreign policy in the following speech: "It is true that in the adjustment of our way of life, we have more in common with those countries that are known as free democracies and which believe that it is possible for the nations of the world to live in accordance with their own lives ... that all of us are actuated by the motive of

advancing the welfare ... of our peoples, and yet with all this diversity, we should be able to live side by side in peace and harmony and cooperate with each other in the interest of our peoples and for the welfare of the world.\textsuperscript{180} Evidently, this new line of foreign policy short of Pakistan's coming out of the military pacts completely was not liked by the leftist elements of the country, least of all by the left wing elements of the A.L. We have mentioned in the first part of this thesis how in the formative phase of the A.L. many an 'unmarked' element managed to smuggle into the party. Bhasanî, the East Pakistan head of the A.L. was always a willing accomplice to this leftist group. Now that their party was in power both at the centre and East Pakistan they wanted Suhrawardy to declare an independent neutral foreign policy unattached to any bloc, east or west, whatever.

The inner pressure that had been brought to bear upon the Prime Minister by the A.L. leftwingers to change the foreign policy suddenly surfaced with all its fury as soon as Britain (a member of the Baghdad Pact), France and Israel attacked Egypt on account of Suez Canal in October 1956. It gave an impetus to the agitation as the victim of the Anglo-France attack was a Muslim country. A new dimension was added to the already overwrought atmosphere of anti-imperialism i.e. religious fervour. The whole populace of Pakistan, as it were, came out into the open streets of both part of Pakistan and performed all rituals meticulously which were associated with any kind of hostile

\textsuperscript{180} Dawn, February 23, 1957.
demonstration. Bhasani let loose his tongue-batteries in lashing out the "barbarous" and "treacherous" acts of aggression on the peace-loving Egyptian peoples by the imperialists. 181

The Pakistan government was embarrassed at Britain's involvement in the Suez adventure in that she had expected the British government to send an advance note to her indicating the British position. According to the President Mirza this came telegraphically at the eleventh hour facing the Pakistan government with a fait accompli. Having asked the Shah of Iran to arrange a meeting of the Muslim members of the Baghdad Pact at Teheran - the Prime Minister was away in China - President Mirza himself boarded his Viscount aircraft en route to Teheran.*

Returning home amid an anti-western climate the Prime Minister felt the country's pulse and condemned the Anglo-France action with cautious words but chose only Israel to be branded as an aggressor. (Since the days of the electoral controversy this was the second time that the President could see eye to eye with his Prime Minister on these two issues due to strange coincidences.) Immediately, the Prime Minister flew into Teheran to confer with his Muslim colleagues of the Baghdad Pact which resulted in the issuance of a unanimous statement on November 8, 1956 condemning Israel as aggressor and

* This information is based on an interview with the ex-President General Mirza by the writer.

asking Britain and France "to end hostilities immediately, to withdraw their forces from Egypt".  

Pakistan's role in the two London conferences on the Suez Canal crisis was notable, in that she helped to obtain recognition of Egypt's sovereign rights to nationalise the canal but at the same time she insisted on the freedom of navigation in Canal in keeping with the 1888 Convention which Egypt had to admit herself. Suhrawardy claimed on behalf of the Muslim Baghdad powers to have been a party to the withdrawal of the Anglo-French forces from the Egyptian territory and Anglo-French willingness to submit the issue to the U.N. It was both a very delicate and difficult situation for a Premier of a Muslim country to avoid being emotionally involved and to see things in proper perspective. But Suhrawardy's pragmatism stood him in good stead.*

With the Anglo-French troops withdrawn from Egypt and a Pakistan offer of troops to be stationed at the Middle East under the U.N. supervision indignantly rejected by Col. Nasser, the earlier opposition to the foreign policy begun to peter out. Suhrawardy who had all along been, rather tendentiously, advocating a strong decision-making U.N. saw in the recent emergence of the U.N.E.F. (United Nations Emergency Force) in connection with the Middle East crisis, a ray of hope for

* In the Conservative Party Conference at Brighton, Suhrawardy's statesmanship was quoted in the foreign policy debates. Dawn's correspondent in London, Nasim Ahmed, reported. See Dawn, October 12, 1957.


the solution of the Kashmir problem. As soon as the Indian government proposed to annex the disputed Kashmir valley into Indian territory, Suhrawardy immediately availed himself of the opportunity of pressing the matter into the Security Council of the U.N., so that some such U.N.E.F. should be sent to Kashmir pending the final plebiscite therein. A Resolution to that effect was voted upon on the 24th January, 1957 in the Security Council. Needless to say, the Resolution foundered on the rock of a Soviet veto. The Second Resolution made the best of a bad bargain in maintaining the status quo (voting highlights 10–0. The U.S.S.R. abstained.) in Kashmir. It was, however, the voting of the member-nations in the Security Council which mattered, for the time being, much more for Pakistan foreign policy than the actual results. In justification of his foreign policy Suhrawardy could now say that all the member-nations in the Security Council but Russia voted for Pakistan. It was just due to the generous use of the Russian veto which technically went in favour of India. But it could not be gainsaid that it was due to Suhrawardy's able handling of the foreign policy that the Kashmir issue was revived under the torch of world opinion which had been fossilized in the U.N. for a long time. The Pakistan reactions were best illustrated in the testimony given by an influential opposition M.P. in his speech in the N.A. which ran


in the following way. "In India they have burnt your effigy but remember that the day they were burning your effigy, the nation was deciding to raise your statue in every street of every town of Pakistan ... you have succeeded in arousing world conscience (behind Kashmir) to an extent never before achieved." 185

In this connection we want to add a footnote to an opinion shared by many that Suhrawardy relied more on the western powers in solving Kashmir issue and less on the good neighbourly relations to solve the same. Secondly, that the Prime Minister ought to have gone straight from the Security Council to the General Assembly to force a decision on India. 186 Since 1947 Suhrawardy, at the risk of his life, had worked for the closer relations of the two countries, India and Pakistan. He lost his Indian platform after the demise of Gandhi. Then, he lost his membership in the Constituent Assembly I on the ground that he was too much of an Indian working jealously to give effect to a document called the Charter of Minority Rights concerning both India and Pakistan. He believed fervently that the success of Indo-Pakistan relations would be the basis for the solution of mutual problems which in turn depended upon the attitudes both the countries would be willing to show to their respective minorities. To this direction, Suhrawardy's record was, no doubt, glorious. What was more, when the Kashmir issue was being hotly debated in the Security Council

* Suhrawardy.

Suhrawardy sent a delegation to India consisting of his closest followers - this delegation and its gift of a big jar of pure honey to Nehru came under scathing criticism in the N.A. - which resulted in the Indian's chanting Pakistan-Bharat bhai bhai (Pakistan and India are brothers). The Prime Minister defended it by saying that "this should be our attitude ... we are not at war with the Indian people. I do not want to create enmity ... between people and people, because we are contesting the Kashmir case in an international forum." 

As to the question of the Prime Minister's not going to the General Assembly Suhrawardy had this to say: "We must prepare the ground before we do so." He thought and perhaps correctly so, that despite the fact that Pakistan was overwhelmingly supported in the Security Council and outside as well, Pakistan could not take the risk of going into the General Assembly; for, the requisite number of votes might not have been there to back a resolution - a job which was to be done in the course of time and through intense lobbying.

However, Suhrawardy's handling of the Suez and Kashmir issues gave a booster to Pakistan's pro-western foreign policy and with that prestige behind the Prime Minister faced the East Pakistanis - the most critical people of his foreign policy. In a series of public and privately organised meetings in different parts of East Pakistan Suhrawardy vigorously defended his foreign policy and surprisingly rallied the largest sectors of public opinion behind his policy including those of the informed opinions, namely intelligentsia, students,

teachers, lawyers, etc., etc. The most memorable was his 65-minute extempore speech delivered in a student meeting held in the S.M. Hall - a graduate student residential hall proverbially credited with the glory of producing pupils who become, later on, leaders of science, economics, politics, administration and the academic world in Pakistan society. He told his audience that nations comprising of human beings were involved. Hence neutrality was at best a misnomer at worst 'a species of blackmail'. Neutrality did not save many a country in the 2nd world war. The pacts Pakistan entered into were defensive in nature and in accordance with the U.N. Charter (Art. 51), and Bandung Conference in which 29 Afro-Asian countries participated. He continued that Pakistan was weak both economically and militarily and could neither stay in isolation nor flourish without aid. He warned students not to be always gullible about cliches like western imperialism. The Russian hegemony over the so-called satellite countries such as Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Albania, Hungary, East Germany, and Poland, was a species of neo-imperialism. He refreshed his young audience's memories by citing the recent tragedy of Hungary. In a world where a 'balance of terror'** between two great rival powers.

* The writer remembers having sat down in the meeting with his student colleagues in order to shout down the Prime Minister with questions on the foreign policy. The meeting ended in giving a hearty applause to the Prime Minister.

** "A potential aggressor is 'balanced' at each level of violence if his objectives can be denied him at that level, if his costs of fighting at that level would be higher than his expectation of gain." Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense toward a theory of national security, (Princeton University Press: 1963), p. 48.
i.e. the U.S.S.R. and U.S. prevailed - the Prime Minister maintained - there was no possibility of Pakistan's being involved in a nuclear war as in the flare-up "there will be no victor, there will be no vanquished ... both will lie in the dust".\(^{189}\) He convinced his audiences that the current foreign policy of Pakistan was positive and met the terrestrial considerations.

This was an extraordinary feat in that the Prime Minister won the support of the student community and a large part of the previously hostile press - a critical sector which all his predecessors had been at pains to avoid - at a time when the whole country was demanding severance of its ties with the Commonwealth, the Baghdad and S.E.A.T.O. Pacts fuelled by a tide of popular sentiment in favour of Egypt. Even so, he succeeded in carrying for his party a series of 'hotly contested' bye-elections in East Pakistan by virtue of sheer democratic combativeness and energy "which have confounded his opponents and astonished his warmest admirers".\(^{190}\)

All governments have an inner urge for keeping their respective foreign policies above party politics since they are regarded as instruments of national interest. Difference in matters of emphasis within the framework of substantial agreement are tolerated among the party-oriented democratic governments, but the presence of fundamental

\(^{189}\) "Suhrawardy Supplement", op.cit., p. v.

\(^{190}\) Times, December 16, 1956.
discord as to what constitutes national interests vis-à-vis foreign policy among parties or among the composing members of a given party is a pregnant situation from which foreign policy cannot be separated from the country's internal politics. This was exactly the situation which Pakistan had reached.

The A.L. like the Labour Party of Britain, came to power after having remained in opposition for long years. While in opposition both these two parties found fault with the then existing governments and promised the millennium to the people if returned to power. When they did come to power and faced the reality of government the heritage of a host of irresponsible utterances or commitments made during the days of the opposition became somewhat embarrassing to them. So far as the A.L. was concerned almost all its members except Suhrawardy and a small handful of them had condemned the Pakistan pro-western foreign policy and military alliances while in opposition. Its party manifesto envisaged an independent foreign policy divorced from military alliances. The party was chary about military pacts lest they should encroach upon Pakistan's sovereignty. This was due to the fact that the party and for that matter the public in general had no inkling whatever in the nature of agreement Pakistan had entered into the pacts. It was a case of 'ignorance thy name is fear'. An amendment was incorporated into the existing party resolution in October, 1955 in the following terms that all the copies of the pacts and agreements should be placed before the parliament for the scrutiny
of the representatives of the people. If the pacts were found to be prejudicial to Pakistan sovereignty they would be repudiated.\textsuperscript{191}

This amendment took place after the Constituent Assembly II came into being.

On seeing the Prime Minister's growing success in the defence of his foreign policy Bhasani and his leftist lieutenants summoned an A.L. council meeting at Kagmari - Bhasani's home village. It was meant to be both an A.L. council meeting and a cultural conference. The Kagmari Conference was given such a wide publicity as though it was going to be a jamboree of all progressive elements - the first of its kind in Pakistan. The word Kagmari was on everybody's lips in Pakistan in February, 1957. New unmetalled roads were built up connecting all parts of East Pakistan to Kagmari. Soon, an expression like 'all roads lead to Kagmari' came into vogue - a leftist propaganda achievement. Beneath the apparent cover of a down-to-earth party meeting Kagmari was virtually converted into the headquarters of a new movement through immaculate and elaborate arrangements made by the dedicated leftists attached to the A.L. Huge gates paying homage to Marx, Lenin, Gorky, Bernard Shaw, Gandhi, Subhas Bose\textsuperscript{*} in the midst of decorative flags and buntins, were erected. Literary personages with leftist leanings from India were invited.\textsuperscript{**} Thousands of pigeons were caught to be let loose at the start of the meeting as a symbol

\textsuperscript{*} They were all Indian political and literary figures.
\textsuperscript{**} For instance, Monoz Bose, Tarasankar Bandhapadhya, Sukanta Roy, Pradvod Sanyal.

of peace. 192

What was the political message hidden in all this decorative ballyhoo? The Gates supposedly representing the most eminent people of the world, in fact, represented the socialist cum communist world as the number of gates, their sizes and art of placing would give a decisive proof to that end. Western statesmen were completely left out - Jinnah's gate had to be there, though ill-placed. * This was the second phase of the leftish movement that had once veered around the U.F. in 1954. **

Suhrawardy came to confront his party at Kagmari. Debates on the foreign policy continued for the whole night of 8th February, 1957. The split between the right and left wing of the party on foreign policy touched off another controversy, in that both the rival groups claimed endorsement for their respective stands by the Council. Mujibur Rahman (General Secretary, East Pakistan A.L.), Ataur Rahman (A.L. Chief Minister of East Pakistan) and Suhrawardy denied Bhasani's version and insisted that 98 per cent present in the Council meeting endorsed the government's foreign policy. 193

Meanwhile the repercussions of the Kagmari Conference produced another boon for Suhrawardy. To the rightist parties like the N.L., N-I-P, K.S.P., etc., etc., the Kagmari episode was an overdose of

* The writer vividly remembers all these as he was at Kagmari along with his other inquisitive friends.

** Again, Pakistan was featured in the psychological warfare of international politics. Both the Moscow and Peking radios gave an exclusive coverage of the Kagmari Conference the way they did in 1954 when the U.F. swept the general elections of East Pakistan. See H.H. Chowdhury's speech, N.A.D., Vol. I, February 23, 1957. P. 999.

Footnote (Contd. over.)
Communist and progressive ingredients difficult to digest. To them, the recent movements, overt or covert, manifested in the Kagmari Conference were signs of homage to both Communism and Bharat (India) — the worst enemies of Pakistan. The M.L. working committee, the Council of N.I-P and K.S.P. in their respective party resolution reinforced their support to the Prime Minister on foreign policy. Suhrawardy then brought the matter before the N.A. This was the first time in the history of Pakistan politics that a Prime Minister moved a motion in the House in regard to the approval of his foreign policy by having submitted the white paper on aid, copies of the Facts and documents of the U.S.—Pakistan Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement to the N.A. It was, however, not the case that the Prime Minister was committed to a dogged perseverance in the retention of the present policy for all time to come nor was he unresponsive towards the current leftist criticism against the foreign policy. It was a question of a fundamental nature i.e. under the Westminster system to what extent the party in power would be justified in rejecting foreign commitments given by the outgoing party. If the parties were to come to power in order to cancel each other's deeds frequently the country

Footnote continued from previous page.
192. See Dawn, February 8, 9, 13, 1957.
194. See Dawn, February 17, 1957 (Editorial) "Kagmari".
was bound to go down in international evaluation, let alone instability at home. That was why the Prime Minister reminded the House that "a continuity is maintained in foreign policy matters and transitions are gradual". He did not rule out the possibility of a change in foreign policy when "expediency may cause us to trim our sails", but the criterion of that change would be national interest as understood on the context of world politics. He had the clear vision of anticipation when he declared that "when the crucial time comes China will come to our assistance (Cheers)". Having reflected a new mood and approach in the application of foreign policy Suhrawardy had already demonstrated that Pakistan was capable of having terms for political, economic and strategic reasons, with all countries outside of free democracies without jeopardising her formal relation with the west, particularly the U.S. Judged from that angle Suhrawardy was as responsive to the genuine anxieties of the leftish critics as he was to the global politics.

However, defending the fruitfulness of joining the Pacts as he ably did, the Prime Minister's leadership seemed inadequate in one important area, in that he could not stem the tide of imbalance in the government priorities pertaining to the allocations of aid received

* This prophesy came true, perhaps not the way it was meant to be.
197. Ibid., P. 928.
through the pursuit of particular line of foreign policy. Was Pakistan not sacrificing the quality of its national life to the demands of a military establishment? Could he not help Pakistan as the way he did in many an affair prick the bubble of the fear of Indian aggression on Pakistan and siphon funds off from military expenditure into nation-building activities? Would it not prevent national values from being grotesquely distorted and add moral grandeur to Pakistan foreign policy? Who were the beneficiaries of the foreign policy in the final analysis, really? Was the expenditure on defence aid to Pakistan achieving anything like value for money? Would it not have been better to make Pakistan economically viable and let her spend money on armament according to her own real capability? A British M.P., John Dugdale, sighed that "Even if half the sum spent on defence aid in the last five years had been devoted to helping her develop her basic industries, it would have been a far better insurance against communism".199 But the Prime Minister could be excused on the ground of Pakistan psychology at the time; for, had he tried to curtail military expenditure it would have amounted to stoning at the hornet's nest. The night of October 1954 was still fresh in public memory.

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"when, with a general to the right of him and a general to the left of him, a half-mad Governor-General imposed upon a captured Prime Minister the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly." So, on that point he chose to remain on the tactical political level in not rationing the fodder of the sacred cow, the Army, when the general mood of the country was not in favour. His was the biding of time before acting which in turn depended on the holding of early general elections. It will appear from our subsequent pages that the more the Prime Minister pressed for general elections, the greater was his experience of resistance, both visible and invisible.

However, the Prime Minister's leadership in foreign policy was not dogmatic; for, he laid down all his cards on the table of the N.A. for the scrutiny of the people's representatives. The N.A. overwhelmingly sanctioned the country's foreign policy* (40:2) — only Mian Bari (Independent) and Mian Iftikheruddin (A.P.P.) voted against. 201

But the Prime Minister was still not out of the wood. Bhasani could not accept the parliamentary approval of the foreign policy with good grace. Nothing could please the A.L. leftwingers short of rejecting the pro-western foreign policy and walking out of the military alliances.

* The M.L. and K.S.P. abstained for party reasons. They did not because they disagreed with the Foreign Policy but because of its mode of handling.

200. Dawn, August 11, 1957 (Editorial) "Revolution".

The A. L. now lurched very close to open split. Bhasani threw down the gauntlet by resigning from the presidency of the All Pakistan A.L. on March, 1957. Now the Bhasani-Suhrawardy showdown within the party became inevitable. The Council Meeting of the A.L. was called in mid-June, 1957 to settle the foreign policy issue decisively and discuss Bhasani's resignation. Prior to the meeting Bhasani began a self-purifying fast Gandhian in style in sympathy for the common people who were facing rising prices. But tactically speaking, his choice of occasion could not be dissociated from the simultaneous holding of the council of the Baghdad Pact in Karachi.

However, the trial of strength went decisively in favour of the Prime Minister in that the Council approved the foreign policy by 800 to 25 votes. The right-wingers were distressed even at their victory that the two leaders, Bhasani and Suhrawardy should have clashed so openly. That was why they did not accept his resignation.

Obviously, there was no one to replace Suhrawardy at the national parliamentary level. Similarly, Bhasani's irreplacability in terms of his organising ability and mass contact was unthinkable to the party. It was a great political tragedy for the party - certainly, no less for the entire country as the subsequent events would testify

202. See *Times*, March 22, 1957; Also *Daily Telegraph*.
204. See *Dawn*, June 14, 1957; also *Manchester Guardian*, June 14, 1957.
205. See *Times*, June 17, 1957.
- that both Bhasani and Suhrawardy became so antithetic to each other on matters of foreign policy. What was once said of Adenaur (C.D.U.) and Dr. Schmacher (S.P.P.) in regard to their respective stands of foreign policy that "seldom has a country suffered such heavy political consequences from the antipathy between two men", could equally be said of Suhrawardy and Bhasani who chose to find foreign policy as their main ground of mutual disagreement. It was in the realm of foreign policy that a rapprochement between the two wings of the A.L. was warranted for the sake of national interest and ensuing general elections. But it could not work out as their respective attitudes were antagonistic to each other, stock, lock and barrel. This cleavage in the A.L., however, had one redeeming feature in that it punched the A.L. into a vigorous process of winnowing which had been rather overdue. The party would be now composed of members with like minded people of both the wings of Pakistan which in turn would give more cohesion to the organisation. In this connection we want to establish the most important point we have raised earlier regarding centre's clamping down 92A rule in East Pakistan in 1954 without giving a chance to the rightish elements to fight the leftists on political platform. If the fear of Communist takeover of East Pakistan was one of the reasons - indeed it was - that led the centre to freeze parliamentary machineries in East Pakistan, at the expense of the rightists, the events of late 1956 and

early 1957 proved without the slightest shadow of doubt that how wrongly the central government of 1954 had overestimated the leftist elements and underestimated the rightist ones. Did not Suhrawardy fight with all the armoury of parliamentary democracy, defeat the leftists on political platform and rally the nation overwhelming behind his foreign policy? It demolished the myth of 1954 that leftist-oriented politics deserved to be tackled administratively only, not politically. Apart from Suhrawardy’s establishing the parliamentary strength to resolve conflicts in favour of moderation, he restored the right to the N.A. to question the country’s foreign policy for the first time, and gave the people a sense of participation* in the stimulating public debates on foreign policy which were going on country-wide.

Now, we are to examine if the Suhrawardy Cabinet did make any headway towards putting into motion machinery for the holding of the country’s first general elections on which depended the full implementation of the 1956 Constitution. In fact, the post-1956 period should be viewed as a transitional period pending the general elections. We do not know on what basis Dr. Chowdhury – a Pakistan political

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* The writer distinctly remembers that in one of the Prime Minister's public meetings at Dacca in early 1957 an ordinary member of the audience stopped the Prime Minister in the midst of his speech saying politely with his hands folded if the Prime Minister would care to repeat some of the facts on Kashmir he had unfortunately missed due to his arriving late in the meeting. Moved, the Prime Minister smilingly repeated things he had covered earlier.
scientist - made an observation that "... no progress was made by the Suhrawardy Cabinet towards general elections". In our findings it was rather the opposite. There was once some talk of the A.L. 'making an issue' out of it and going out of office, if they could not keep their promise of holding the general elections earlier.

Contributing an article to the Dawn the Prime Minister reflected that "... estrangement between the governing and the governed, anxiety on the part of those in authority over their warrant and their tenure; sterility of Government resulting from a lack of confidence among those in authority as to their ability to tap the creative forces of public trust" were the factors of instability in Pakistan the cleansing of which depended, among others, greatly on the having of periodical elections. Since his assumption of the Prime Minister's office he laid great stress on that point and told people at home and abroad that the general elections were going to be held in February - March 1958.

It is to be recalled how a dual principle of electorate was enacted in the Dacca Session of October, 1956. It could be levelled

* Writer's italics.

207. G.W. Chowdhury, op.cit., p. 113.

208. See Dawn, October 1, 1957 (Editorial) "General Elections".


210. Dawn, December 18, 1956 (Editorial) "Prime Minister's Press Conference".
against the government as to why did they not push up other necessary legislation relating to the machinery of elections immediately after the passing of the Electoral Bill. The Prime Minister's preoccupation with foreign policy which first took him to China, then to Teheran, again to Baghdad and Ankara was pressing enough for continuing to keep the N.A. in recess. But the Prime Minister had also been creating the ground, at the same time, for having a uniform electoral principle in both parts of Pakistan. Evidently, the Prime Minister availed himself of the first opportunity of introducing the Electoral Rolls Bill* and the Representation of the People Bill in the N.A.** the moment he was sanguine of giving the nation a secular electorate system having the force of uniform applicability all over Pakistan. For instance, the Electorate Act of 1956 was amended on the 22nd April, 1957 to be followed by the passing of the Electoral Rolls Bill on 24th April, 1957.211 The Representation of the People's Bill was referred to the Select Committee on 20th April and finally passed on August 26th, 1957.212 These measures provided the Election Commission with a complete framework to work upon so that electoral preparations+ were completed

* April 9, 1957.
** April 15, 1957.
+ 100,000 of steel ballot boxes were already available in East Pakistan. Besides, the government placed an order for importing 3000 tons of steel of a particular specification to make an approximate number of 6 lakh ballot boxes. See Dawn, April 9, 1957.

in time and elections held at the target time. The franchise issue had already been solved in favour of the universal adult franchise requiring the male voters to possess an identity card with photograph, based on the Electoral Reforms Report. Meanwhile, the Delimitation Commission (Art. 142) which had already started demarcating the 155 constituencies in the N.A.* and the same in the Provincial Assembly from East Pakistan in November, 1956 virtually finished accomplishing the task by the 15th June, 1957. Suhrawardy asked the Governor of West Pakistan to be in top gear to set up things for general elections.

When the country was scheduled to have elections in the spring of 1958 the Supreme Court wanted to be sure of it by sounding the Elections Commission. To the chagrin of the Elections Commission the Supreme Court managed to have a programme of elections from them on July 25th 1957 which was different from that of the government.

* The N.A. would have 300 members - 155 each from the two wings - for 76 million people which would give an M.P. to represent every quarter million people. The Indian Lower House consisting of 500 members, the Upper House 250 - total 750 - for a population of 360 million meant representation of every half a million people by an M.P. Britain with 50 million people had an elected House of Commons of 630 members - that gave 13 seats per million people. If Pakistan took all the representatives of the Assemblies - national and provincial - the total number would be 900 seats for 76 million people - that gave 12 seats per million people. See Dawn, March 24, 1956 "Republic Day Supplement".

214. Ibid., November 11, 1956.
216. Ibid., May 1957.
217. For details see Ibid., July 26, 1957.
Having handed in the election programme to the Supreme Court the Commission thought it wise to reveal to the country that general elections were not possible in the spring of 1958, while the Prime Minister was in London emphasising his commitment to the holding of elections as announced earlier. The Electoral Rolls Bill was passed in April 1957 and the necessary Rules were notified on the 25th May, 1957, but, in spite of it the Election Commission could not find it convenient to start with the preparation of the Electoral Rolls before August 1st, 1957. What had really transpired between these intervening months that the Elections Commission could neither start working before August 1st nor find it appropriate to notify the government of its difficulties, if any? It was only due to the insistence of the Supreme Court that the people came to know that the Commission had been working on a schedule vastly different from that of the government. The Election Commission was a statutory body with autonomous powers but the major policy decision rested with the government and that decision was to have elections in the spring of 1958 on

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* A. Khaleque, an A.L. Central Minister who was so obsessed with the holding of early elections, gave his government's timetable in the following way:

1. 6 weeks for preparation of voters' lists;
2. 2 months for printing of voters' lists;
3. 1 month for receiving and hearing objections;
4. 2 weeks for printing of additions and alterations after hearing objections. That meant all necessary works could have been done by December, 1957.

See *Dawn*, August 2, 1957.

which direction the Commission was supposed to proceed. Could not the Commission await the Prime Minister's arrival from London before announcing its decision?

The Dawn in a leader observed that "somewhere there are still forces working to defraud people's right of access to the ballot box". Indeed it was true, otherwise how could one account for the Commission's inaction following the passage of the relevant laws from the N.A. Was it any Executive Authority at the centre or in the province acting as an incubus on the prospect of elections? Or was it the Election Commission itself which was to be brought to book? Obviously, the anti-election forces were those which could be identified in the words of Suhrawardy in the persons who had no warrant to rule but power to rule. They harboured in their minds fear of losing their jobs, status and influence before the ballot box symbolising the vox populi.

Elections to them by all intents and purposes meant Hara Kiri. Their activities were too clandestine to be detected openly.

Away in the year 1954 General Mirza poured out his mind in a letter addressed to the then Governor General, Golam Mohammad saying that "the introduction of adult franchise was the biggest crime against the integrity of Pakistan". Now he was the President of Pakistan.


should we suppose that General Mirza had already adjusted his early bizarre views to the democratic needs of the country during these periods? Indeed, he did talk about the efficacy of having a general election immediately after his escalation to the office of the Presidency. But that passed away as platitude. The zeal and enthusiasm he had shown in backing the Prime Minister in matters of foreign policy was conspicuous by its absence in matters of elections. He appointed Mr. F.M. Khan as the Chief Election Commissioner who eventually became a member of his first Council of Ministers after he had promulgated martial law in Pakistan in October, 1958. Nawab Gurnani, the Governor of West Pakistan who was lately showing signs of loyalty to the parliamentary system, was suddenly replaced by Mr. Akhtar Hossain, Secretary of the Ministry of Defence, as the Governor in what was termed by the Times as "surprise". Feudalistic in structure as was the West Pakistan society the election prospects as such were not particularly inspiring to those who would lose more through it than gain. No less a person than the Chief Justice Munir, who was also the Chairman of the Delimitation Commission, himself opined that the appropriate authorities in West Pakistan were reluctant to give him information relating to the delineation of constituencies when he was on the verge of completing the same in East Pakistan. This was

* A civil servant.

221. See Times, August 28, 1957.

222. See Dawn, May 9, 1957.
followed by a resolution passed in a meeting of the past and present Parliamentarians' Association, held at Karachi pointing out the "deliberate" attempts that were being made by some governmental quarters in West Pakistan to delay general elections in Pakistan. The appointment of the Defence Secretary, the post which the President himself had ornamented previously, as the new Governor was meaningful in that the President would be able to get his ideas carried out by Akhtar Hossain.* The way personnel were selected for the strategic jobs and the way those personages were rewarded subsequently, make us wonder whether the President was above being identified with the "anti-election forces".

Arriving back from London the Prime Minister immediately summoned the Chief Election Commissioner who told him that until sufficient progress had been made in the preparation of electoral rolls the exact date of the election could not be given. The Prime Minister called a Round Table conference on polls inviting all the political parties including the Chief Commissioner himself. The talks progressed rather haltingly as the politicians were not averse to the idea of having elections in the hot or rainy weather of July, 1958 while the Commission would not "countenance the idea". Although

* A civil servant.

223. Ibid., May 18, 1957.
225. See Dawn, August 28 and September 4, 1957.
226. Ibid., October 1, 1957.
the Commission had a point there, for the torrid heat of West Pakistan and the heavy rains of East Pakistan would have caused considerable inconvenience to the voters. Finally, the talks bore fruit in that all political leaders including the Chief Commissioner agreed to have elections in November, 1958. A consideration of further grant of Rs. 1.5 crores was given by the Cabinet. On top of it A. Khaleque - a central Minister of Labour - promised 10,000 workers from each wing of the country to help complete the works of the Commission. Hence, it is more appropriate to maintain like that of the Times that "he (Suhrawardy) has set in motion machinery for the general elections", than to say that he did not.*

The parliamentary system of government in Pakistan was a ship, as it were, launched in a sea of ruffled society. In order to make the ship float there needed constant corking in the holes, as one successful corking was followed by the uncorking of a couple. This is true of all developing countries; thus a Hansard Society report states that as the developing "pace quickens, success imposes increasingly onerous burdens". Such was the case with the Suhrawardy cabinet. The more Suhrawardy cleared his way through, the greater were the obstacles strewn in the way. This time he was confronted with the biggest crisis, and his nemesis, as well.

* "We do realise that the present government is anxious to hold general elections at an early date." - This was the remark of Mr. Y. Harun, the Secretary and the Chief Whip of the opposition party, the M.L. See N.A.D. Vol. III, August 22, 1957, p. 105.
227. Ibid., September 30, 1957.
228. Ibid., August 13, 1957.
229. Ibid., August 4, 1957
It has been mentioned earlier that four local leaders namely, G.M. Syed (Sind), Abdul Gaffar Khan (N.W.F.P.), Abdul Majid Sindhi (Sind), and Abdus Samad Achaksai were on principle opposed to the one-unit plan. None of them had been able to secure a seat in the Constituent Assembly II, but some of them and others belonging to the category of anti-one-unit group were able to secure seats in the West Pakistan legislature – though their numbers were negligible. After the formation of one-unit, an anti-one-unit front comprising of likeminded local parties was formed. Its activities were concerned with the propagation of anti-one-unit ideas. Its leaders such as Gaffar Khan and A.S. Achaksai were intermittently in the process of being arrested and released subsequently on ground of anti-State activities. Some local newspapers e.g. "Pashtu", "Paigam-i-jadid", "Nawa-i-watan" and "Al Wahid" were banned on the charge of being extremely parochial only to be revived again under judicial orders. The cumulative effects of this group's activities resulted in the merging of six political parties* of West Pakistan into one called P.N.P. (Pakistan National Party). A two-day convention – 17 and 18 November, 1956 – of the P.N.P. chalked out 6 principles of which

Footnote continued from previous page.

* Ajad Pakistan Party, Wrore Pashtoon, Khudai Khidmagars, Ostaman Gul, Sind Awami Mahaz and Sind Hari Committee.

232. For details see Dawn, January 24; February 1, 4, 9; June 15; July 23, 1956; Hindu, September 7, 1956; and Times, July 7, 1956.
were the pronounced ones on which basis the party was to work. We recall having already introduced Mian Iftikharuddin (Punjab), G.M. Syed (Sind), and A. Gaffar Khan (N.W.F.P.) as people of progressive and socialistic ideas. The former two politicians were always kept outside of power – though Mian Sh. was in the Punjab Cabinet in 1947 for a very brief period. The latter politician had always been a persona non grata to the Pakistan government due to his demand for Pakhtoonistan. They were all feudal lords in varying degrees, and to what extent they were genuinely interested in the cause of agrarian reform cannot be definitely ascertained. But the fact remains that this was for the first time that all the leftist groups in West Pakistan – not necessarily communists – were aggregated into one bloc, P.N.P. This was very significant in the context of West Pakistan politics where organized challenge to the status quo, social or economic, had never crystallised before. We like to call it the emergence of a budding movement on the Pakistan western horizon subject to florescence. The P.N.P. strategy was predicated upon the assumption that once the one-unit was dismantled in favour of the original political division, they would be able to work for social and economic reforms from their respective local bases simultaneously.

* (1) The elimination of feudalism and pursuit of independent foreign policy; (2) Economic, commercial and cultural relations with all countries on equal basis; (3) To strive for unity amongst the anti-imperialist nations especially Afro-Asian countries and their solidarity.

For, to the P.N.P. one-unit meant a union of reactionary elements against whose fortress of solidarity they were no match. In demanding the regrouping of one-unit linguistically the P.N.P. strategy had communistic undertones in that they were heading for what Professor Emerson would call a 'multilingual state' of Pakistan and the creation of an "autonomous base of national languages", namely Sindhi, Pushtoo, Punjabi and Baluchi. In this process, the P.N.P. had the instant advantage of playing upon what anthropologists would call people's dormant regional sentiments. However, the formation of the P.N.P. was followed by a P.N.P. parliamentary group in West Pakistan legislature consisting of 10 members.

Circumstantially speaking, the P.N.P. group was placed in a situation from where it could feather its own nest at the expense of the two major parties in the legislature, the M.L. and R.P. It has been shown earlier how the R.P. came into being and the Chowdhury Mohammad Ali Cabinet fell. The parties — the R.P. and the M.L. — were so divided that it was the marginal votes of the unattached groups or wavering members on which depended the fate of the R.P.

* Having quoted Stalin, Prof. Emerson argued that national languages were not a 'class matter' and served both 'bourgeoisie and proletariat' alike. Since language was one of the bases of self-determination the communists stood by it. Although, to the communists, it was a different matter when the formation of a one world language would follow mechanically with the emergence of communist society all over the 'globe'. (See R. Emerson, op.cit., pp. 134-137.)

government in West Pakistan. With the formation of the P.N.P., the lobbying for the disintegration of one-unit became intense inside the West Pakistan legislature. Soon, some politicians who had flourished in the local assemblies found themselves ineffectual in the larger arena of integrated legislature of West Pakistan. The anti-one-unit campaign gained further encouragement due to some irrational political steps taken by the M.L., the opposition party.

As luck would have it, the M.L., which was the chief architect of the one-unit scheme, found itself out of power in West Pakistan. It was already denigrated in East Pakistan. So, the M.L. was determined to cultivate its fullest possible potentialities in the soil of West Pakistan. Out of desperation, the M.L. entered into an ugly alliance with the P.N.P. to the end that if the former was supported in its bid to oust the R.P. government the new M.L. government would break up the one-unit province as a quid pro quo. As a result 4 resolutions for the purpose of breaking up one unit were moved by the opposition on 3rd March, 1957 but were talked out, as Dr. Khan was still enjoying the support of 164 members in a legislature of 305. But the moment 30 Republicans defected to the M.L. it was inevitable that the 17-month-old R.P. Ministry was bound to fall. Suddenly, the Governor prorogued the Assembly and central rule (Art. 193) was imposed in West Pakistan. The M.L. was not asked to form


a new government for the underlying fear "over the opposition's demand that West Pakistan be restored to its original status".237

What we wish to emphasize here is that the newly-formed P.N.P. in West Pakistan having a programme of drastic agrarian reform, an independent foreign policy and anti-imperialism combined with pro-Afro-Asianism, had to rely for its existence on the sub-nationalistic sentiments. Holding the balance of power, accidentally in the West Pakistan parliamentary government as it did, the P.N.P. was as much responsible in dangling a bait of provincial pall before the M.L. as was the M.L. in swallowing it. And this was not an isolated fact in that the same trend of movement was noticeable in East Pakistan where provincial slogans were pressed into service for various tactical purposes. Around the time the P.N.P. was making its mark on West Pakistan politics the leftish elements of the A.L. were warming up to the same position.

When the A.L. council was being held at Dacca to decide foreign policy and discuss Bhasani's resignation, at about the same time Bhasani telegraphed to M. Huq Usmani - ex-General Secretary, All Pakistan A.L.* - in West Pakistan to come to Dacca** along with Mian Sb.,

* Mr. Usmani was expelled by the A.L. Working Committee for a period of 5 years from A.L. membership for having criticized Suhrawardy's handling of foreign policy publicly. See Dawn, January 8, 1957.

** They did come to Dacca on the 16th June, 1957.

G.M. Syed and Mian Bari. 238 Thus, the holding of the A.L. session went parallel with this move of Bhasani. As a result Bhasani called an all-Pakistan democratic workers' convention at Dacca on the 25th and 26th July, 1957. 239 Meanwhile, the pro-Bhasanissites were expelled from the A.L. Working Committee including the organizing secretary of the A.L., Oli Ahad. 240 As many as 200 primary members resigned from the A.L. following Bhasani's exit. 241 The all-Pakistan Democratic Workers' Convention began with 1000 delegates from all over East Pakistan and 100 from West Pakistan, 20 East Pakistan M.L.A.s (Members Legislative Assembly) and two M.P.s under the Presidentship of Bhasani. All the P.N.P. prominent leaders were present. The outcome was the bringing into existence of a new political party, the N.A.P. (National Awami Party). The P.N.P. and G.D. of East Pakistan were merged into the N.A.P. The N.A.P. stood for, inter alia, an independent foreign policy, the abolition of zamindari, a welfare federal state and provincial autonomy. 242 The proximate effect of the formation of N.A.P. in terms of parliamentary strength was that nearly 35 M.L.A.s of East Pakistan, 21 of West Pakistan and 4 M.P.s*

* Two A.L. M.P.s, namely Mr. Akhand and F. Karim joined the N.A.P. parliamentary party in the N.A. reducing the A.L. strength from 13 to 11. Similarly, the N.A.P. parliamentary party in East Pakistan legislature was formed out of the former A.L. M.L.A.s. This was how the foreign policy issue exacted toll of the A.L.

239. Ibid., June 16, 1957.
240. Times, June 10, 1957; also Dawn, June 3, 1957.
242. For details see Dawn, July 26, 27, 28, 1957.
in the N.A. were able to form their respective N.A.P. parliamentary groups in both the provincial and the national legislatures. In national politics the emergence of the N.A.P. had greater import in that for the first time after the banning of the communist party in 1954 all the leftist elements with varying degrees of moderate and extreme socialist leanings found a legitimate nationwide platform on which to operate. Evidently it created a bridge between the two wings of Pakistan in having brought into being an alliance of interest against a background of certain programmes by overcoming the geographical hurdle. There was a time when the waves of the U.F. movement could not reach the Arabian coast of West Pakistan. Now in 1957, things came to such a pass that a portion of the people of both parts of Pakistan would be able to speak with same intonation, through the instrumentality of N.A.P. This was more relevant to the issue of agrarian reforms in West Pakistan. It was not, however, the question of the number of supporters the N.A.P. could count on either in legislatures or outside at that point of time, but it was the question of N.A.P.'s having an immense future as long as Pakistan society and for that matter other political parties remained unadjusted to the demands of social reforms. It was stronger than its actual numbers suggested since it offered a unified front when other major parties appeared less coherent in their approaches. While the N.A.P. received the attention of the critics as a political party which was responsible for the bringing about a topsy-turvy in Cabinet formation at the end
of 1958, it was never emphasized that the N.A.P. was also a major emerging force in Pakistan politics. Indeed, the N.A.P. was a distinct political force in Pakistan in this period and later.

Reinforced, the N.A.P. now went on in full swing to dismantle one-unit. Meanwhile, the R.P. Ministry was restored in West Pakistan at the head of Sardar Rashid – Dr. Khan was dropped but was still the head of the R.P. Because of the almost even parliamentary strength of both the government and opposition – the R.P. and M.L. – the N.A.P. support was vital to the retention of power. The R.P. government took a leaf from the book of M.L. and signed an agreement with the N.A.P. after a four hour discussion to this effect that the N.A.P. would support the Republicans in all matters involving confidence in the Ministry provided the Republicans would support a resolution in the West Pakistan legislature and in the N.A. for the replacement of one-unit in West Pakistan by a zonal Federation of West Pakistan composed of autonomous provinces on a linguistic and cultural basis.

As corollary to this, on 17th September, 1957, 170 members voted for such a resolution in a House of 305, subject to the final verdict of the N.A. It was less than two years since the integrated province came into being. Was a two-year period enough to pronounce a judgment

244. Times, September 15, 1957.
245. Ibid., September 18, 1957.
on a larger political experiment that was the one-unit? Could the people shake off localism born of centuries within the compass of two years? It was once said by Italy's Risorgimento after the national unification had been accomplished: "Fatta l'Italia, bisogna fare gli Italiani"—having made Italy, we must now make Italians. Although the dialects of Saxons and Franks were mutually intelligible to a great extent, it still took more than a century's effort for a Saxon Prince to become Henry I in Frankish attire "to symbolize the active integration of his people into the common State". The one-unit was not too unique an issue to be judged beyond the context of historic experiences that had been gained elsewherex.

It was rather a question of time. True, there were some initial frustrations. This was a question of acclimatization to a new situation. The 305-strong M.L.A.'s flocking from all over West Pakistan into Lahore to attend the legislative session could not find a ready made official residence to live in. They, along with thousands of secretariat staffs who came to work in the new unified Secretariat at Lahore, experienced, to their dismay, housing and gastronomical difficulties. Added to it were the genuine obstacles faced by the

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people living far away from the capital. In the pre one-unit period many a local office or court of justice could cater to the social and economic needs of the people, since they were within commuting distance. Now they were obliged to go, for certain matters, to a distant capital and for a frontier man to reach Karachi took about 36 hours. A journey from Baluchistan to Lahore was more tortuous as communications difficulties were more acute. Considering that there was such a thing as 'creature comfort', the initial disagreeable feeling towards one-unit was understandable. What was the really vexing problem said Sir Olaf Caroe, a former Governor of the N.W.F.P., 1946-47 — was that "with the accretions of representative government, the new province became top-heavy". Schemes were said to have been planned and executed by officialdom and the 11 divisional commissioners came to be regarded as powerful satraps who were given more powers on the pretext that problems would be solved locally. Similarly, departmental secretaries were given extensive powers — complained an M.L.A. in the legislature speaking on a cut motion on general administration.

One big reason for the administration becoming top-heavy was that the country was now governed from one central point. All the administrative machinery and for that matter political activity were

249. Times, June 19, 1956 (Article) Sir Olaf Caroe "The N.W.F.P. Revisited".

concentrated at the top to the impoverishment of the local bases. Particularly, the former minority provinces had a sense of remoteness from the centre, Lahore, no matter however efficient the local administrators were in remedying people's grievances. Local officials were not trained to become substitute politicians with an easy communion with the local people. In other words, there ought to be more radiation of power from the centre down to the bases, more participation of the people in the governmental scheme of things and a drive towards pulling up the hitherto neglected people. As many as 24 Ministers were appointed and they were given handsome travelling allowances for keeping in touch with the people throughout the country to evaluate their experiences in the new situation. In order to foster the growth of a mercantile community among the tribal people business licenses and permits were generously given. The politicians - Fiazda Abdus Sattar, Sardar Abdur Rashid - who had clumsily opposed the one-unit scheme earlier joined the West Pakistan Cabinet from the very start and were given the important portfolios of Finance, Industries and Law. What was more, the post of the Chief Ministership had been consistently retained by politicians coming from the minority areas. Besides, the politicians were willing enough to add to or subtract from the one-unit project in the light of new experiences.


that might accumulate. Virtually, a resolution proposing to set up a parliamentary committee to enquire into the economic, financial and administrative position of West Pakistan as influenced by the recent unification came up on the 18th February, 1957 before the N.A. for consideration. In short, no palpable evidence could be cited in this period to suggest that the one-unit project was conducted to the gross violation of its basic commitments. On the contrary, the bond of unification was further strengthened. The N.A.P. desire reflected in the recent resolution to dismantle one-unit as though the experiment had failed sounded to an M.P. like saying "that even the experiment of partition of Indo-Pakistan subcontinent was a bad experiment which has failed".

It may, however, be asked why there was such violent agitation in Pakistan in the late 1960s in regard to the dismemberment of one-unit, when it was such a good project. The three chief architects of the one-unit in recent letters to the writer have offered the following causes. The ex-President of Pakistan, General Mirza, says that "the Punjabis have run the one-unit in such a selfish manner that there is great hatred of them in Sind, Frontier and Baluchistan." The ex-Prime Minister, Chowdhury Mohammad Ali, maintains that it was the

255. See Appendix VII. General Mirza's letter to the writer, dated 8. 3. 69. (Teheran).
cardinal point of the one-unit scheme that the administration should be decentralised to an extent "so that 99 per cent problems would be settled on the spot. This was not only not done; on the contrary, such decentralisation and devolution of powers as there was before was reversed." The ex-Governor of West Pakistan, Nawab Gurmani, holds the same view: "It is unfortunate that certain vested interests did not permit the full implementation of the various important parts of the scheme, such as the decentralisation of the administration, association of people's representatives with the administration at various levels, unification of laws, etc., etc. These factors caused resentment ... in certain parts of the Province."257

All these developments took place under the quasi-dictatorial regime of General Ayub - a decade of accumulated political frustrations which have now made the one-unit extremely unpopular. Had the one-unit been run, throughout, within the framework of parliamentary democracy there would have been no scope for its being totally unpopular, simply because the government linked as it would be to all democratic channels would not need to rely on insurgency to get clues to public grievances to mend its ways. Today, the one-unit scheme on the count of economic dimension "makes the developing world green with envy",258 but on the count of the non-economic dimension

256. See Appendix VIII, Chowdhury Mohammad Ali's letter, dated 2.6.69 (Lahore).
257. See Appendix IX, Nawab Gurmani's letter dated 30.3.69 (Muzaffargarh).
it does not arouse envy. However, in the preceding paragraphs we have tried to show that there was no positive evidence available to suggest that the one-unit scheme had failed. And the present N.A.P. resolution was based on different consideration.

Now the resolution itself was a potential quagmire for the Prime Minister as well as the country. The one-unit was one of the key pillars of the constitutional edifice. The Prime Minister had taken an oath to defend the Constitution. After more than seven years of birth-pangs the Constitution was finally delivered. Would not the Constitution be on the melting pot? Would not the East-West controversy surface again with unabated fury as the East Pakistanis might demand replacement of the parity formula in favour of a one-man-one-vote system in case the one-unit was disintegrated? Supposing a bill to that effect picked up the required two-thirds majority in the N.A. what would be the immediate effect on the electoral structure of the country, particularly in West Pakistan? Would not the Election Commission have to start de novo? On what basis were the redemarcated provinces of West Pakistan to be represented in the N.A., leaving aside the question of the delimitation of constituencies on a new basis? In other words, the country would be plunged into an abyssmal depth of political crisis once again i.e. what had been gained through years of perseverance would be lost by an act of de-merger and the

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country would be preyed upon by anti-democratic forces in the absence of general elections.

It is appropriate to mention here that the soup of provincialism was violently stirred in both the wings of Pakistan in the same period and within a short interval of time. In April, 1957, the A.L. government of East Pakistan had also passed a resolution in the legislature asking the central government to transfer to the province all powers except those relating to Defence, Foreign Affairs and Currency by incorporating needful amendments to the Constitution. This incident was usually quoted by critics to show how different had been Suhrawardy's views of things from that of his own party, A.L. But having studied the time sequence of the events that had taken place before the passing of the resolution we deeply feel that it was the potential members of the yet-to-be-born N.A.P. who were mainly responsible for it. As soon as the Kagwari episode boomeranged and public brows were furrowed at it, the leftish elements of the A.L. toned down their opposition to foreign policy. In lieu of foreign policy they devoted themselves to Bhasani's "Salam-0-Alaikum" theory of which semantic implication was full regional autonomy.

These elements took the challenge to the provincial legislature in order to expose the sober elements of the party on the sub-national

* The etymological meaning is: 'Peace be on you'. People say this to their friends while meeting or departing from them.

question. It was not very easy for the provincial government to say 'no' when the people at large had strong feelings on the question of autonomy. So, the East Pakistan A.L. Working Committee passed a resolution on 2nd March, 1957 asking its members in the legislature to support a non-official resolution in the forthcoming budget session recommending full autonomy. The M.L.A. - Mr. Moniuddin of Barisal - who moved the resolution became subsequently one of the veteran leaders of the N.A.P. And the group which took the main initiative in the matter left the A.L. en bloc in three months' time and formed what was now the N.A.P. Interestingly enough, resolutions with varying accents of regionalism were moved in the legislatures of both the provinces of Pakistan by the members of leftist persuasion who used regionalism like a shield to protect their other provocative programmes. In saying this, however, that the leftist elements of both parts of Pakistan were mainly responsible for initiating resolutions in their respective legislatures, we do not maintain that those 'moves' were just 'stunts' and did not reflect social desire in some way. What we assert is that the timing and tenor of those resolutions were far ahead of general public opinion. Of course, on the question of autonomy

* It also indicates that had the government been over-enthusiastic over the procedure for demanding autonomy, the Chief Minister could have himself moved it as government resolution.

the East Pakistanis had some viable points to make, perhaps more than could have been levelled against the one-unit Establishment in operation at that period of time by the West Pakistanis. Since both issues were vital to Pakistan politics we shall briefly deal with the causes prompting the demand for autonomy in East Pakistan as we have done in the case of the one-unit in West Pakistan.

It was said that the East Pakistani "grievance of being the victim of discrimination is as much psychological as material, and is essentially a negative, defensive emotion". 262 By and large, this is a true statement. At partition and until 1949-50 the share of manufacturing industries was the same in East and West Pakistan. 263 Since then the growth rate in every sphere of economic development was progressively higher in West Pakistan than in East Pakistan. As a result, regional disparities between East and West Pakistan widened in terms of per capita income, per capita consumption and availability of commodities, per capita electricity generating capacity, transport and road development, number of educational institutions and health and medical services. 264 There is no positive evidence to suggest that the economic structure of both the wings of Pakistan was fundamentally different so that, on intrinsic ground, disparity could be

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264. Tables showing discrepancies on these subjects are given in the see ibid., pp.10-14.
regarded as inevitable. True, there was a modicum of economic infrastructure existing in West Pakistan at independence. West Pakistan had an international seaport and airport at Karachi and a fairly developed railway system already in operation. But East Pakistan had the same potentiality, even though it had been a hinterland to Calcutta in the prepartition days.

Then who was to be blamed for this disparity? Clearly, disparity "had largely been due to the past policies of the central government".

Government policies relating to investment, credit facilities, licensing, aid and loan allocation had always favoured economic growth in West Pakistan. We have already mentioned in the first part how some economic powers were taken away by the centre from the provinces at the initial stage. This greatly affected the economy of East Pakistan.** Karachi being the metropolis all the headquarters of banks and economic institutions were situated there. The mercantile or industrial community grew around the fertile ground of these decision-making economic institutions. The instruments of economic development like P.I.D.C., P.I.C.C. and I.D.B. helped to develop industries mainly in West Pakistan.**

Dr. Sayeed wrote in his book that East Pakistan's...
"total revenue was less than one-third of the total provincial revenue of Pakistan". Continuing he maintained that East Pakistan had to depend on the centre for her economic development and the centre in its turn obliged her by giving shares of various taxes and duties and various other loans and grants to East Pakistan. And he ended his chapter quoting the central government's arguments - not his - vis-a-vis East Pakistani grievances that "the Federal bread could not be distributed on the basis of population along and that the Bengalis had contributed much less than their brethren in West Pakistan towards the making of this bread".

True, East Pakistan's contribution to the Federal exchequer was less compared to West Pakistan, but that argument was valid so far as land revenue was concerned since land revenue could not have been raised due to permanent settlement in East Pakistan. But one cannot slur over the fact of East Pakistan's huge earnings of foreign exchange through exports of raw materials, particularly of jute. On the East-West financial controversy, there had been the polemics of statistics and growth tables with the familiar economic conundrums to justify each other's stand. But as far as the Suhrawardy Cabinet was concerned, the Finance Minister in answering a question whether East Pakistan earned more foreign exchange compared to West Pakistan and got less foreign

exchange compared to West Pakistan he candidly said "yes".  

Foreign trade was a central government monopoly. It has been calculated recently by a Pakistan scholar that the East Pakistan balance of trade position in comparison with western part covering the periods from 1947 to 1961 was favourable to the extent of Rs. 473.7 crores.  

And since West Pakistan was importing more than her exports covered the surpluses of East Pakistan were used to cover up her deficits. Besides, a large portion of East Pakistan foreign exchange was spent in buying capital goods and services from abroad for West Pakistan industries. Hence, there had been no opportunity for East Pakistan to develop capital formation, though she should have. During the time of the non-devaluation of Pakistan's currency, she sold raw materials at the highest price abroad and bought capital goods for West Pakistan at a low price. When manufactured goods of West Pakistan industries were ready for export the currency was devalued to suit the new situation. So, East Pakistan missed the first chance of creating a pedestal for industrial edifice.

Perhaps, the most colossal deprivation from which East Pakistan suffered was her inability to derive benefits from central government expenditure. Of the total central government expenditure from 1947 to

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1961 East Pakistan claimed only 29 per cent. 272 "Government expenditure, taken by itself," says Samuelson, "... has a multiplier effect upon income just like that of a private investment. The reason is ... that a chain of responding is set into motion." 273 Until 1957, the central government spent slightly over Rs. 18 crores in East Pakistan on account of defence expenditure. In comparison, more than Rs. 400 crores were defrayed in West Pakistan. 274 In the defence perimeter of Pakistan, the western part appeared to have featured prominently as all the headquarters of Army, Navy and Air Force and industries or military complex were situated there. Whereas the raison d'etre which had dictated a military build-up i.e. to deter Indian aggression and communist infiltration had its minimal application in the area, East Pakistan, which according to official belief was more vulnerable to Indian and communist pressure and so ought to have received the maximum military attention. As a result of huge expenditure in West Pakistan on account of defence the multiplier impact boosted the pace of development there by providing more roads, industries and jobs.

(What would have been the effect on the left-wingers of the A.L. in East Pakistan relating to their attitude to foreign policy and coming out of the A.L. dramatically, had Suhrawardy succeeded in securing for East Pakistan the due share in what came as military aid from the U.S.

272. Ibid., p. 18.
and other matters peripheral to defence Establishment, was food for thought. In any case, there was never such a 'test' on that score.) Out of the total budget money of Rs. 915 crores in the 1947-58 period an amount of Rs. 530 crores was spent for the expansion of the metropolis, Karachi.275

All this huge investment of money in West Pakistan on account of different heads only helped build up social overhead capital for the westerners. East Pakistan did not obtain any economic benefit from it, since the bizarre geographic halves stood on the way of mobility in respect of labour, capital, technical staffs, entrepreneurial class between the two wings. It is said that "all development circles are vicious, some are more vicious than others".276 Perhaps Pakistan happened to be one of those vicious ones.

It was not, however, the question of economics alone, in the case of central services and army, the same story was repeated (See Appendix XIII)

In regard to the civil services, the central government maintained that at partition there was a scarcity of experienced civil servants among Bengali Muslims, and the non-Bengalis replenished the shortage. Regarding defence services Bengalis were told that they were not a martial race.* True, there were not enough experienced civil servants

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* Far back in 1948, Liaquat, the Prime Minister and Defence Minister of Pakistan said in the parliament in reply to a demand for more East Pakistan representation in the Army in the following way: "For the sake of numbers I shall not allow the efficiency of the Army to be undermined." See C.A.D., Vol. I, March 2, 1958, p. 138. Seventeen years afterwards the spokesman of the central government said the same thing on the floor of the N. A. rather contemptuously.
among the Bengali Muslims at the outset, but people from the provincial services could have been promoted to fill in the central jobs. Instead, those who came from West Pakistan to serve in East Pakistan developed an attitude which "was one at its best a sort of patronising ... and at its worst one of contempt". 277 As a result, the conflict of interest between West and East Pakistan turned out to be what Stanley Maron has characterised as "the conflict of interests between the elite and the masses" 278 - an anthropological dimension of Pakistan politics. Similarly, admitting that West Pakistan had some such preliminary defence structure at independence, but that should not have amounted to carrying coal to Newcastle on the ground that East Pakistanis were a non-martial race, a thesis which could be proved neither historically nor genealogically. Did it not wound the ego and self-respect of the East Pakistanis as they were substantially disassociated from the honour of defending the country? Did it not by implication relegate the East Pakistanis to a position of 'Zimmies' who were required to pay defence taxes for the protection they got from the government, Islamic style as understood by Emperor Aurungzeb

Footnote continued from previous page.
that the government was not prepared to "experiment with inferior human material". Quoted in Hindu, July 22, 1965.

275. Ibid., p. 53.
277. See Dr. Mahmood Hussain's speech, C.A.D., Vol. I, July 17, 1954, p. 1476; see also "Tidal Wave of Bengali anger not yet spent" Neville Maxwell, Times, March 26, 1970
in the 17th century India? Taking everything together, East Pakistan was, no doubt, the 'sick man' of Pakistan both economically and militarily, if not the 'world of William Hunter' that had given an account of the Muslim plight in the 19th century India.

East Pakistanis, however, were no less responsible for their own poverty which was rather self-perpetuating. There is a non-economic dimension to economic growth. Growth implies "far-reaching social changes. 'Social' in this context means all aspects of the relations of human beings to each other - political ... economic ... patterns of family life, education, and the ideals or values that determine what people strive for." In other words, social factors act as powerful incentives for the growth of an economy. Historically, Bengalees as a race produced a galaxy of notables in most branches of human life other than commerce or business. In the scheme of things, values relating to commerce, trade and finance were traditionally rated low. Famous Bengalees like Tagore, Dr. P.C. Ghose, Bhudeb Mukhapadhyya cried hoarse to draw Bengalees' attention to the realm of business. As a result, the Hindus were able to throw some commercial communities in the society. But the Muslim Bengalees did not show any tangible signs in this direction.

* Still, the word "Shanderpo" meaning son of a trader is used by the Bengalees to express contempt for the apparently ungenerous people.

At partition, East Pakistan was denuded of whatever commercial class there had been as the Hindus who were the main bulk of it made a clean pair of heels to West Bengal, India. East Pakistanis did not make a virtue of their weaknesses. They did not show a sense of purposefulness in this direction as the Japanese did after World War II, the Irish in the 18th century, and as the Chinese and Israelis are doing now. Instead, the loquacious East Pakistanis took the negative attitude of telling the world of their being wronged by the West Pakistanis without taking positive steps to right their own position by trying to evolve an entrepreneurial class or business-oriented community. It is interesting to note that the business community among the Muslims that had grown in undivided India was not Bengali by race. When they migrated to Pakistan their capital and large business connections stood them in good stead. But the only snag was this that they chose to pitch their main tents in West Pakistan as the zone was culturally more close to them. The central government showed more interest in the old business community that came to Pakistan than it did in the creation of a new one. Perhaps this was one of the contributing factors of economic disparity between East and West Pakistan.

* In the pre-partition Bengal both Hindus and Muslims used to blame the Marwari class for its economic domination over them. After partition, East Pakistanis blamed the Iranis, Isphahanis and Mevzons just for the same.
Hence, the resolution asking for full autonomy for East Pakistan is to be judged on this background. The East-West conflict in Pakistan was like that of the long standing conflict between the Northern Flemings and Southern Walloons of Belgium.* As Brussels, though a bilingual capital tended to be French, so Karachi in spite of its being the capital of the whole of Pakistan tended to be more West Pakistani. Suhrawardy's coalition government had to be tested against this drastic resolution. As a palliative to the commotion created by the resolution Suhrawardy dismissed the issue saying that it was "a stunt to show individualism", and next told in the A.L. Council in the presence of Bhasani that 98 per cent autonomy had been granted to the provinces of Pakistan and cautioned Bhasani about his Salam-o-Aliakum theory. Suhrawardy did not confine his arguments within the compass of party meetings alone, he faced public meetings at large on the topic and argued: "What is the significance of the cry for provincial autonomy? ... if autonomy means groundwork for something else, I will not have it ... if it cuts at the roots of Pakistan I am not for it ... We are Pakistanis first and Pakistanis last."  

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* It may be equally compared to the Sudanese position as far as the northern and southern parts are concerned.

281. Times, June 17, 1957.
It was not Suhrawardy alone, but the rank and file of the A.L. in East Pakistan also who stood by it. Sheikh Mujiboor Rahman, the G.S. (General Secretary) of the East Pakistan A.L. and a provincial Minister, interpreted the resolution as an embodiment of financial autonomy for East Pakistan not "political autonomy". Later on, he further elucidated the point that the East Pakistan legitimate financial claims could be met through the medium of the National Economic Council and the National Finance Commission. He had earlier admitted before the N.A. that the central government, for the first time, was showing interest in East Pakistan industries. Similarly, Ataur Rahman, the A.L. Chief Minister stated that the central government would set up a committee to study how far autonomy could be granted "without disturbing the integrity of Pakistan". In other words, the moderates at the head of Suhrawardy who far outweighed the extremists did not do anything that would have amounted to as an attack to the Constitution. We have already mentioned what had really occasioned the moving of the resolution. No sooner had the resolution been adopted than the saner leaders publicly reasserted their belief in the machineries envisaged in the Constitution to resolve conflicts - an act of strengthening constitutionalism and the institutions which

284. **Ibid.**, April 9, 1957.
were created earlier. They did not precipitate the issue at flash-point, on the contrary, they were agreeable to a constitutional remedy for their economic grievances. (Again, a question may be posed to explain the recent clamour for provincial autonomy in East Pakistan bordering on secession, when, according to our submission politicians of moderate persuasion were so well-meaning in the late 1950s. The answer is the same as has been suggested in connection with the one-unit. In both cases the problem is one of decentralisation of culture and economy and the task for solving the problem has been entrusted to a regime which is inherently incapable of doing so. Too much of authoritarianism and too little of politics which have been going on since October, 1958 is the proximate cause for the demand of full provincial autonomy in East Pakistan and the dismemberment of the one-unit in West Pakistan. In the absence of political freedom, the East-West bridge which was in the process of being durably built in the parliamentary era, is now coming apart. And the irony has it, that East Pakistaniis have come to regard the present political system as an instrument of West Pakistan domination over the East. Had democracy prevailed, East Pakistan would have much control over her political, economic and cultural affairs and thus reflected larger loyalty. Now, East Pakistan says she has been economically fleeced by the Western Pakistan, while the latter cries wolf of secession

\* Disparity between the per capita incomes of the two provinces has increased from £5.0-0 in 1959 to about £8.6-0 in 1967. See *Times*, June 25, 1968. "Pakistan's overall economy has grown by 5 per cent a year for the past five years. Yet East Pakistan's situation has probably declined during those years," Nicholas Tomalin,

Footnote /Contd. over.
in the jungle of East Pakistan. True or false, they did find one wolf of secession – Sheikh Mujiboor Rahman – in the shape of the 'Agartala conspiracy' in 1968 only to be let loose in January, 1969 on account of democratic pressures.)

However, the reason we have dealt at some length with the issues of provincial autonomy and dismemberment of the one-unit scheme is to show the varying general motivating forces of those demands in juxtaposition with the particular motives of the leftists vis-a-vis the rightists. We have so far postponed dealing with the situation arising out of the dismemberment resolution in West Pakistan legislature only to show how the shoals of leftist-inspired regionalism had also threatened to rock Suhrawardy's boat in the eastern part earlier and the prominent leaders thereof survived the test of the autonomy question without jeopardising the constitutional structure of the country. Now we go back to Suhrawardy's grappling with the more crucial issue, the anti-one-unit resolution.

Of leadership Professor Laski wrote that "its ability to use the issue for the purpose of making known its central philosophy is the real test of its quality, the proof of its power to take the offensive in party warfare." In Pakistan, Suhrawardy was an example.

Footnote continued from previous page.


He knew that his coalition government depended on the support of the Republicans, the party which had just entered into a sinister alliance with the N.A.P. to delete a vital piece of the constitution. Uninhibited by personal aspirations or considerations he immediately took the issue to the public bar. He stumped up and down in every part of West Pakistan explaining to the people the philosophy underlying the one-unit and urging them to rise above the level of their sub-societies in favour of a supra-society, the one-unit. He told the West Pakistanis: "I am not prepared for any measures which may delay the general elections ... We can have stability only if we have general elections. General elections must be held under the present constitution." The Prime Minister rose to the heights of true leadership unconcerned that the plank of Republican support could be withdrawn from under his feet. He could easily beguile his time as the Prime Minister and as an East Pakistani he could have indulged in an euphoria wishing a plague on the house of West Pakistan. He did not do that as he looked at Pakistan as one national constituency. He was both listened to and secured a response from the East Pakistan M.L. and the N-I-P which supported the Prime Minister.  

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290. For his massive campaigning see Dawn, September 25, October 4, 6, 7, 9, 1957.  
291. Ibid., September 24, 1957.  
Pakistan, M.L., Jamaat-e-Islam did the same and Daultana urged the ensuing M.L. Council meeting at Dacca "to take a categorical and clear decision to support one-unit." Also, the Press rallied round the Prime Minister's leadership.

It was alleged that Suhrawardy with an eye on the coming general elections found in the issue an opportunity for building up his party in West Pakistan by making it a rallying point for the parties opposing the break up. Chances were he might have visions of a sweeping victory for the A.L. in the general elections under his leadership and letting himself emerge as a national leader for all Pakistan.

Political ambitions per se are not evil, rather a virtue so long as they are compatible to the good of the country. Here the Prime Minister's alleged ambition was rather contributory than derogatory to national interest. However, the net result of Suhrawardy's counter offensive to the R.P.-N.A.P. move for calling a special N.A. session to undo one-unit bore fruit in that Dr. Khan declined to press for drastic amendments in the constitution before the general elections and pledged for the consolidation of the one-unit. But in doing so he avenged Suhrawardy's washing of Republican's dirty linen before

the public by withdrawing R.P. support from the coalition. As a sequel to R.P. withdrawal of support, the Prime Minister asked President Mirza to call a N.A. session on October 24, 1957 to test if he had still the confidence of the House.299 The President turned a deaf ear to this plea and the Prime Minister resigned in deference to the wishes of the former.300 Spontaneous protest rallies in both wings of Pakistan — including one complete Hartal (strike) in Dacca — were held criticizing the manner of Suhrawardy’s removal, demanding his recall and urging the convening of the N.A. Never had there been such protest rallies held in both parts of Pakistan in sympathy for an outgoing Prime Minister during the entire parliamentary history of Pakistan.301

Why did not the President launch a salvage operation for the Prime Minister who had so gallantly fought the battle of foreign policy and one-unit — issues in which General Mirza had the deepest commitments? There was a time when General Mirza on many an occasion maintained: "The Prime Minister and I will stick together. I regard him as the ablest man in Pakistan today."302 But they could not stick together. In politics, "where personality enters, capriciousness

299. Ibid., October 11, 1957.
301. For details see New York Times, 12 October, 1957; Times, October 14, 1957; Dawn, October 14, 15, 16, 1957.
begins", so was the case with Suhrawardy and General Mirza in Pakistan. They were poles asunder in their respective attitudes towards the art of governance. General Mirza would be willing to let Suhrawardy grow big but not big enough to eclipse him. Besides, "the President did not want a precedent under which the Assembly determined whether a Prime Minister enjoyed its confidence, to be established". On strict constitutional ground (Art. 37:3) the President was unassailable in that it was he who was competent to judge if the Prime Minister had a majority in the N.A. Evidently, the Prime Minister had no majority in the House the moment Republican support was removed.* The President's sense of arithmetic and legality was infallible but his sense of parliamentary ethics fell short of popular expectation as manifested in his spurning the request of the Prime Minister. Besides, he could have cried halt to all these developments in the first place, by having dissuaded the R.P. on which he was believed to have ample holds,** from deserting the coalition government. Instead, he "sent out of office the only available man with aptitude as a politician and giving reasonable promise of national leadership".  

* See *Times*, October 13, 1957.

** See *Dawn's leader*, September 25, 1957.


Suhrawardy reinforced the pattern of parliamentary politics that had taken an healthy turn since the inauguration of the Constituent Assembly II, and set the ball rolling for further regularisation and strengthening of the existing institutions. His regime witnessed the release of political prisoners and freedom of speech, press and political parties to operate. No less important on social, economic and political grounds was the question of the rehabilitation of refugees. Suhrawardy retained the refugee portfolio himself. As a result the pace of rehabilitation was quickened in his period – from 1947 to February 1957 6.8 million refugees were rehabilitated out of 8.48 million.*

On the realm of economy the performance was not happy. The State Bank's review of the year 1956-57 spoke of "serious strains" on the economy, a shortage of consumer goods, new materials and spare parts. The stoppage of the Suez Canal was partly responsible for this. But excessive expenditure on government's account, the import of 500,000 tons of wheat for West Pakistan and 800,000 tons of rice for the East, while defence ate up half the revenue were also some causes of economic difficulties. Though industrial growth was encouraging. In the past year industrial output was 35 per cent more than in 1955. Production of jute rose from 188,000 to 1,300,000 tons; sugar from 95,000 to


125,000 tons; cotton textiles from 453 million to 502 million yards. Output of cement and paper rose substantially. The P.I.D.C. claimed to have saved £60 million worth of foreign exchange. Karachi's new shipyards now could build and repair ships of 7,000 tons. Similar development was taking place at Chittagong, East Pakistan. It now had both cotton and jute mills. The most serious blemish in the national wealth was agricultural production which was 3½ per cent in 1956 below that of 1955.307

Pakistan's first 5-year plan was launched almost simultaneously with the inauguration of Pakistan as a Republic under the new Constitution - a common starting point served to inspire promise of a new and better future for the nation. Pakistan's National Economic Council (Art. 199) the supreme economic body in the country held its first meeting under the Chairmanship of Suhrawardy* on February 19, 1957, who emphasized uniform economic development in all parts of the country.308 Besides, the N.E.C. officially approved the draft 5-year plan together with its overall size at the revised figure of £771.4 million as against £828.5 million in the first draft. The most important aspect of Suhrawardy's economic leadership was his giving a strong bias to agriculture in what was called the "reorientation policy". 309 On the basis of this new emphasis the government

* This was also an act of consolidation of the institution.
308. Times, February 20, 1957.
spent £24 million on a "grow more food campaign" to include new irrigation and cleansing old canals of salinity.\textsuperscript{310} The interest Suhrwardy\textsuperscript{*} showed towards economic development was indicative of his having called the N.E.C. to session several times, \textit{viz}, January 29, February 19, April 10, July 27 and August 29, 1957.\textsuperscript{311} Actually, before Suhrwardy could break a new ground in the emphasis of economic planning and have a strong grip on the country's economy he had to go, no matter prudence dictated no change of horse in the midstream.

The Chundrigarh Cabinet

With the halo of martyrdom Suhrwardy now went back to the N.A. as the leader of the opposition, and I.I. Chundigar (M.L.) the then opposition leader was commissioned by the President to form a new Cabinet which he did with the alliance \textsuperscript{**} of the M.L., N-I-P, R.P. and K.S.P.\textsuperscript{**312} It was, no doubt, in accordance with parliamentary convention to ask the opposition leader to form the Ministry. The R.P. was insistent on getting the Prime Ministership,\textsuperscript{313} but the M.L. fastened a condition to this effect that the Republicans who were just 'deserters' from the M.L. must return to the parent body, the

\* Dr. Papanek - a Harvard teacher and economic adviser to Pakistan government - told the writer in 1966 at a gathering of international students, Harvard that Suhrwardy was very keen on economic development. He used to come to N.E.C. meeting well-studied and well-informed and was eager to discover the rationale of economic planning \textit{vis-a-vis} Pakistan.

\** The party position at this stage in the N.A. is the following: R.P. 26; M.L. 13; A.L. 13; N.A.P. 4; N-I-P. 3; Congress 4; So.C. 2; U.P.P. 1; K.S.P. 7 and independents 5 - two vacancies. The U.F. disintegrated the moment N-I-P left it. Hindu, October 12, 1957.

\*** Sarkar group of the K.S.P. not Hamidul Huq's.

Footnote /Contd. over.
compliance of which would have spelt suicide for the R.P.\(^{314}\) Having just sent out of office a liberal government the R.P. was now rather a fish out of water. The M.L.–R.P. coalition presented an interesting situation in that both parties may well have hoped to absorb each other ultimately. It was rather more in line with the M.L. mood of bringing back renegades into its fold once again as reflected in its recently held council meeting at Dacca. Evidently, there was one redeeming feature of the new coalition in that it held out the prospect of a solution of the long stalemate between the Republicans and M.L. in the West Pakistan legislature and the restoration of political normalcy in the province. Also, it would not be vulnerable to Na.P.'s pressure for disintegrating the one-unit against which Suhrawardy had fought so successfully a while ago and lost his office as a premium. Advantages apart, the Chundriger government on the whole, had a touch of Gresham’s law of economy in the political sense. It sought for the substitution for the joint electorates by separate ones.

Now that they staged a remarkable come-back to power they forged ahead with the task of undoing the joint electorate. And the 53-day old Chundriger Cabinet was singularly identified with the introduction

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310. See Observer, October 11, 1957.
312. See Dawn, October 18, 1957.
313. Times, October 14, 1957.
of fresh complications, electorate issue. Draft legislation to provide for separate electorates as the basis of the general elections were finalised and were ready to be placed before the Cabinet and moved in the N.A. The R.P. came back to itself and set up a fact-finding committee to assess public opinion vis-a-vis the electorate issue and cautioned the Chundigar government 'to go slow'. On the eve of the departure of the Fact-finding Committee to East Pakistan, the Karachi M.L., as an ancillary to its cause, managed a rowdy demonstration in front of the N.A. at session and smashed Suhrawardy's car. Chundigar himself addressed the crowd from the N.A. balcony. After a fact-finding orbit of the country the Committee came back to Karachi convinced that the people were in favour of the joint electorates.

The R.P. from the very beginning had been uncomfortable being with the M.L. in the coalition lest it should lose its own identity and finally the elections. The electorate issue knocked it into senses that it had some common grounds with the A.L. than with the M.L. It took the Republicans 53 days to realise that no love had been really lost between them and the Awami leaguers following

* This was the decision of the central organizing committee of the R.P. It also requested the coalition government not to do anything which would result in the postponement of the general elections. See Hsinhua News Agency, November 22, 1957.

316. Scotsman, November 30, 1957; also *Dawn*, November 30, 1957.
317. *Dawn*, December 9, 1957. The Committee visited 8 districts of East Pakistan, received 60 deputations, 2,700 telegrams, 500 postcards, 32 memoranda containing 300 pages and attended 16 public meetings.
Suhrawardy's ouster. Perhaps Suhrawardy himself, on the whole, did not mind being out of the Office prior to the elections as he might have thought it more tactical fighting elections from outside of office. So there occurred a rapprochement between these two parties in what was described as "a dramatic physical display of a new party grouping in one of the committee rooms of the National Assembly". They – the A.L. and Republicans – along with the Congress, U.P.P., So. C., N.A.P. and K.S.P. * offered to form a new government and pledged to hold elections by next November with a common voters' list. Chundrigar resigned on the 11th December, 1957 after having met a post-midnight – 3 a.m. – Cabinet meeting but was recommissioned by the President ** to form a new Cabinet if he could find like-minded people in favour of the separate electorates. Chundrigar returned the Commission to the President on the 13th December as he failed to get support of the majority of members of the N.A. on the basis of the system of separate electorates, but, at the same time, he advised the President to call upon, from amongst the members of the N.A., another person who was most likely to command the confidence of the majority of members.

* Hamidul Haq Group.

** The contrast of the Presidential behaviour is illuminating. He had earlier received the resignation of Suhrawardy and refused to call the N.A. session, but in Chundrigar's case he rather recommissioned him, though obviously he had no majority support.


320. Times, December 12, 1957; also Dawn, December 12, 1957.

The Firuz Khan Noon Cabinet

The ruling coalition was now formed by Noon (Republican) with the support of the A.L., Congress, N.A.P. and K.S.P. (Hamidul Huq group) whose total strength turned out to be a little over 50 in the N.A. The parties supporting Noon were chary of joining the Cabinet immediately,\(^{322}\) which prompted a comment from the opposition leader, Chundrigar to this effect that "effective powers would not thus reside in the Cabinet, but in a group of members who ... have refrained from participation in the government."\(^{323}\) In reality, Noon was neither a puppet nor subservient to the coalescing parties; for, he displayed, fairly remarkably, his independence and sense of constitutionality. He refused to grant Rs. 11,00,00,000 to the A.L. government of East Pakistan to tide over food and epidemic\(^{324}\) unscared by the fact that his government rested on the support of the A.L. Similarly, he refused to be dictated to by the K.S.P. in regard to the distribution of portfolios among its members.\(^{325}\) Also, he did not drop Messrs. K.K. Dutta and B.K. Das (Congress) from his Cabinet in favour of the Congress members of the A.L. government in East Pakistan as was demanded by the A.L.\(^{326}\) In short, he made his mark as the Republican Prime Minister of a coalition government.

\(^{322}\) *Times*, December 17, 1957.

\(^{323}\) *Dawn*, December 19, 1957.


\(^{325}\) *Manchester Guardian*, June 10, 1958.

\(^{326}\) *Dawn*, September 16, 1958.
About the question as to why the coalescing parties did not join the Cabinet straight away the answer, perhaps, could be found in their ambivalent positions i.e. whether, in the face of coming general elections, would they be better off by being inside the government or outside the government. Finally, the initial reluctance of the parties to join the Cabinet developed, later on, into a willingness to do so. As a result, the strength of the Pakistan Federal government rose to 26 by October 2, 1958, out of a N.A. of 80 members. In other words, one M.P. in three was a Minister. Parity was maintained in that the coalition government consisted of 8 Cabinet Ministers and 4 Ministers of State from West Pakistan, and 9 Cabinet Ministers and 4 Ministers of State from East Pakistan. A significant change did take place — though for a brief period — as, for the first time since the creation of Pakistan, an East Pakistani was entrusted with the portfolio of finance.

To all intents and purposes, the Noon government was born of the desire of the coalescing parties to held the elections under the common voters' list in no time. The Prime Minister himself reiterated that fact and told the nation that his Cabinet was going to stay until polls were held. A programme for general polls rehearsals was chalked out by the Election Commission by early January, 1958.

The Pakistan Delimitation Commission completed its task of delimitation of constituencies in West Pakistan on 9th April, 1958 — the same job was completed in East Pakistan on June 15, 1957. The Electoral Rolls for East Pakistan were published on May 11, 1958 to educate the voters — "the first concrete step towards holding elections". The election rules were published by Gazette extraordinary on June 17, 1958. The Prime Minister's belief in holding elections in November, 1958 was further reinforced by the Chief Election Commissioner's declaration on the 26th February, 1958 that the elections would be held as scheduled. Meanwhile, 15 Deputy Commissioners from East Pakistan made a representation to the Prime Minister to the effect that the holding of the general elections in November, 1958 would be unsuitable because the time clashed with the harvesting period in East Pakistan. Consequently, the Prime Minister called a National Election Conference on July 18, 1958. The Conference was attended by 41 leaders of various parties and it was unanimously decided that the elections would be held on the 15th February, 1959. Accordingly, the Election Commission published the final electoral rolls including West Pakistan on 22nd September, 1958.

331. Ibid., April 10, 1958.
334. Ibid., February 27, 1958.
335. Ibid., July 19, 1958.
Thirty-eight million voters were listed for the general elections. The total number of voters registered in East Pakistan was 2,19,51,086, of these the male was 1,17,53,386, the rest female. The voters in West Pakistan numbered 1,60,37,536, of these the male was 1,1,19,797 and the female 59,17,739. Therefore, the country after 11 years of patient waiting was now well poised for the holding of the general elections.

Suddenly, there was a bolt from the blue. Within a fortnight's time after the publication of the final voting lists, the President on October 7, 1958 promulgated martial law in the country and abrogated the constitution, dissolved the N.A. and provincial Assemblies, abolished political parties and dismissed the central and provincial government. He reasoned that "The mentality of the political parties had sunk so low that I am unable to believe that elections will improve the present chaotic internal situation and enable us to form a strong and stable government capable of dealing with the innumerable and complex problems facing us today."  

We shall now examine the precipitating and underlying causes which led to such a drastic measure.

As the year 1958 wore on Pakistan became economically beleagured. She suffered an adverse balance of payments deficit. Foreign exchange earnings – the life-blood of economic development of any underdeveloped

337. Ibid., September 23, 1958.

country - during the second half of the trade year, 1958 were nearly 200 million rupees less than those of the corresponding period in the previous year, i.e. Rs. 850,000,000.339 Yet, in 1957 Pakistan's export earnings were running below the level of expectation so much so that the trade year (July 1956 - June 1957) of 1957 ended with a balance of payments deficit to the tune of Rs. 26.66 crores - the largest since 1952-53 - and was in marked contrast with the 1955-56 surplus of Rs. 34.99 crores. The momentum of the 1955 devaluation was lost. The total foreign exchange earnings, which amounted to Rs. 208.97 crores in 1955-56, were Rs. 190.8 crores in 1956-57.340 And except for jute manufactures, every item of export showed reduced earnings which resulted in an adverse balance of trade, for the first five months of 1958, estimated to be about 11 crores of rupees.341

Compared with the low export earnings there was progressive rise in the spiral of the government's import bill - viz. 1954, Rs. 145 crores; 1955, Rs. 143 crores; 1956, Rs. 204 crores; 1957, Rs. 228 crores; 1958, Rs. 95 crores (first half-year).342 Since the adverse balance of payments for the year ended in June 30, 1958, was 20 per cent higher than in the previous year, the cumulative effects were that the gold, dollar and sterling reserves slumped to historic low e.g. £66 million, compared with £104 million three years

341. Ibid., October 27, 1958.
On the home front, the situation was not encouraging either. The internal revenue receipts dwindled to Rs. 99 crores in 1957-58, while the expenditure on collection charges rose from Rs. 2.50 crores to Rs. 3.18 crores in the same year. When a situation like this warranted draconian measures the country virtually slipped into prodigality. Expenditure on general administration rose from Rs. 8 crores to Rs. 17.5 crores. To crown everything, the country now had the largest ever number of provincial and central Ministers and a glut of Secretaries, Joint Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries to be maintained by the State's already hard-pressed purse. Consequently, money had to be created, to meet various expenditure, by an overdose of currency circulation. As a result, the money supply in the country soared from Rs. 390.64 crores in 1955 to a quantum exceeding Rs. 501.53 crores by the end of the year 1956. Since then, this trend was always on the increase. That meant the internal and external value of Pakistan "Rupee" touched a low point. And this sort of deficit financing surcharged the economy with inflation resulting in the increase of commodity prices, particularly of foodstuffs whose index of price registered 11 points higher in 1958 compared with the last year.

344. See Dawn, May 18, 1958 (Editorial) "While the sun shines - 1".
345. Ibid., January 8, 1958 (Editorial) "Our Currency". See also the statement of the Governor, State Bank of Pakistan, Dawn, July 3, 1957.
346. Ibid., September 10, 1958.
How did Pakistan economy come to such a pass? From the year 1956 down to the first half of 1958 Pakistan spent from her own foreign exchange resources 53.2 crores on account of food imports alone.347 This huge amount could have been added to the foreign exchange reserve to back up the currency and survive the vicissitudes of foreign trade, but for food imports* At the same time Pakistan could not sell her export materials at favourable terms. Raw jute prices fell during the first quarter of 1958 by 5 to 10 dollars a ton. Raw cotton prices fell more. Wool prices slumped by two to three dollars during the same period.348 So, Pakistan fell victim to the world depression in the commodity market. Besides, the government had ended the licensing of raw jute exports to the non-American account area far back in February, 1956.349 When the various pacts were laid down before the N.A. it was known that Pakistan, according to pact contracts, would not be entitled to sell her commodities "to the enemies of peace"350 i.e. the communist countries. In other words, Pakistan had no larger choice in the world commodity market to the end of getting a favourable price for her export materials. Despite American military aid the Pakistan government expenditure on defence averaged Rs. 77 crores - 1947-58. When the Finance Minister wanted to slash high figures on defence expenditure from the budget, he was told by the defence experts that no reduction would be possible.351

* To a query, the then Finance Minister, Syed Amjad Ali, told the writer that he did not borrow money to buy food because of the after-effect of deferred payment.

Of all the foreign aids received i.e. $839 million, only $186 million was used, constructively speaking, in the purchase of capital equipment and machinery and the rest was spent to keep the industries going* and import food. The debt-servicing charge for the loans, grants, etc., etc., cost Pakistan 8 per cent of her foreign exchange earnings. And the food subsidy** Pakistan had to pay America from 1956 to 1958 was Rs. 33 crores.352 Since Pakistan had weaker bargaining power she had to pay in subsidy perhaps no less than the sums received in aid. As one critic pointed out that "Rich societies do not generally lend or give money unless they can profit by doing so."353 These are the imponderables of economic aid to be faced by any developing countries, let alone Pakistan. They may suffer in not receiving aid, in as much as by receiving the same. As far as Pakistan was concerned she had certain intrinsic economic difficulties in that she had neither control on the natural calamities on which coprice depended largely the volume of export materials nor on the terms and conditions on economic aid flowing into the country.

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* These included payments for technical assistance, engineering services, industrial raw materials, spare parts and oil.

** The American price of rice and wheat was much higher than the international price.

348. Manchester Guardian, April 24, 1958; see also Times, 10 September, 1958.


The first Five Year Plan (1955-1960) was prepared in late 1955. Its first draft was published in 1956, and received official approval by the N.E.C. in April 1957. Usually, the central government was accused of belated production of the 5-Year Plan. Perhaps, the delay was uneconomic but, surely not undemocratic. Economic development "required the mobilization of the entire people both physically and emotionally", so that they develop a sense of national goals and a 'will to develop'. The participation of the people in Pakistan's economic activities was as legitimate as in political activities. The Planning Commission reflected the desire for popular participation so that the people could feel that "the plan embodies their hopes and aspirations". Accordingly, institutions such as Chambers of Commerce and industries, universities, trade unions, local self-governing bodies, cooperative societies and the press were sounded and their suggestions were carefully weighed before the plan was finally compiled. It is interesting to note that two major events, namely the creation of a political framework and the preparation of an economic framework for Pakistan took place in a climate of popular participation. The Plan being the first of its kind in Pakistan.

* The final version of the plan was released publicly in May, 1958.


reflected a passionate desire to have socio-economic development for Pakistanis on a just level. Apart from the moralistic tone "reflecting the philosophy of the Planning Board's first Chairman", the 652-page long plan was a major treatise on Pakistan social, economic, administrative and educational requirements. It has been a guide to subsequent planning.

The Plan envisaged an increase of 15 per cent in national income, in the face of a 1.4 per cent population growth, and a per capita income of 7 per cent. The private sector of the economy was recommended a share of 30 per cent of the funds, and the public sector 70 per cent. On matters of emphasis the Planning Board said: "Our immediate purpose in the Plan period is to accelerate the process of agricultural development." But at the same time it directed that "A balance must be maintained between industry and agriculture by stimulating agricultural progress rather than by curtailing industrial progress." But in the implementation of the Plan Pakistan committed the usual faux pas in neglecting agriculture, as it happened in many other underdeveloped countries which viewed at the giant industrial edifices as a symbol of status in the comity of nations. As a result, "Industries have been the pet

358. Ibid., p. 62.
360. Ibid., p. 16.
child of the central government ever since Pakistan was created.361 Industry had been pushed ahead faster than the resources of the country allowed, while less was done to counteract the annual loss of cultivable lands as a result of water-logging and to use thousands of acres of cultivable lands that had been lying untilled for years.362 This was virtually a case of planning trap. It was a pious hope that savings of foreign exchange on manufactures out of industrialisation would cancel out the increased need of import commodities. But in reality, the growth of industrial production stimulated the demand for imported commodities, namely raw materials for the new industries and food products needed to make up the decline in agricultural production. With outlays on capital goods running at a high level, the rate of spending abroad rose still higher. And the shortage of money compelled the government to take recourse to deficit financing without which developmental projects would have come to a standstill.

This lopsidedness of industrial growth - to the detriment of agriculture - 'the Cinderella of economic development' - was the main cause of economic malaise. This was understood by the Suhrawardy government and, accordingly gave an agricultural bias to development. But the result could not be spectacular as the growth in the agricultural sector was also related to the man-land ratio and the

362. Dawn, May 19, 1958 (Editorial) "While the Sun Shines - II"
agrarian systems the reform of which the 5-year Plan strongly advocated. This could not be effected as the Republicans happened to be big landlords. It was rather a matter of time. Suffice it to say that the government through experience now realised and admitted that "the first phase of industrialisation is over; we have neglected agriculture in the past and our emphasis should be entirely now on agriculture". This reorientation policy of development was also admitted by the Financial Times: "Thus Pakistan tended to curb industrialisation and emphasized on agriculture".

In retrospect, it can be now said that the works e.g. the Ganges-Kabadek Irrigation Project, Teesta Project, the Fertilizer Factory at Fenchuganj, the Guddu Barrage, the Taunsa Barrage, the Thal Development Project, etc., etc., which produced increased agricultural yield in the quasi-dictatorial period of 1960s, were started in the parliamentary period of 1950s. And, as far as the 5-year Plan was concerned, despite the political strains, bureaucratic and partisan intervention, a slower inflow of economic aid than anticipated and some bungles in financial management, it established a system of partially completed social overheads. Industrial production which was accelerating between 1950 and 1954, doubled again by 1960. Power


capacity tripled, roads were built, university enrollment rose from 3,900 to 7,400, and the number of graduating engineers increased from 274 to 400 and agricultural graduates totalled 180. And more than 2 million acres were brought under cultivation through irrigation.366 In short, the plan provided an infrastructure for further development.

However, in examining the government's handling of non-development expenditure and expenditure on general administration we find the government immediately adopted a stringent policy on imports of non-essential goods which were "cut to the bone".367 An Economy Committee consisting of M.P.s was formed far back in early 1957368 to look into the matter of colossal expenditure on the administration and some of its recommendations were heeded by the government. For instance, the Finance Minister told the House that "there was a reduction in some of the services" according to the Economy Committee's proposals, but at the same time he also told the truth that "vested interests once created cannot be easily eliminated".369 One knows that germs of economic malaise have the survival-value of a jellyfish and are no respecter of advanced or backward countries but bring down all to varying levels of crisis. The best thing a civilized nation can do is to face the challenge boldly and imaginatively. The economic

366. For details see "Pakistan", The Economist, December 2, 1961, pp. 923-940.
situation in Pakistan was, no doubt, going downhill, but the government did not panic nor succumb to the crisis. It took all the precautionary measures permissible under a parliamentary system of democracy to arrest the trend of economic deterioration — the reserves of gold and foreign exchange amounted to Rs. 88.4 crores i.e. Pakistan by 1958, did still meet the statutory requirement of a backing of 30 per cent in gold and foreign exchange for the note issue.\textsuperscript{370} Hence, the promulgation of martial law and the extermination of parliamentary government on grounds of the politicians' muddling with economy was more a pretext than a real cause.

On the political front, developments were described by Dr. Syeed in the following terms: "...during the last five years Pakistan has been very much like Hobbes' State of nature where there has been a war of every man against every man. The present martial law administration is the Leviathan ..."\textsuperscript{371} Then, what was there precisely in the latest political developments in Pakistan to inspire the arrival of the 'Leviathan'? Had there, in fact, a grave emergency existed? There was the allegation of instability of governments both at the centre and in the provinces. The latest example was the national government's undergoing frequent reshuffles, with the A.L. first

\textsuperscript{370.} Under the quasi-dictatorial rule, the reserves of gold and foreign exchange came down to Rs. 79 crores in June 1967 and the statutory provision had to be amended. Annual Report of the State Bank of Pakistan for 1966–67, quoted in Chowdhury Mohammad Ali, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 44.

\textsuperscript{371.} K. B. Syeed, "Formative Phase", \textit{op.cit.}, p. 437.
entering the Cabinet and then quitting the same four days later i.e. on the day of martial law.\textsuperscript{372} Equally true, was the M.L.'s launching of an aggressive electioneering campaign. Its bloodcurdling threat of crossing the ceasefire line of Kashmir to liberate Kashmiris from the yoke of India, the desire of employing volunteer armies (P.N.G.\textsuperscript{*}) in elections purposes and finally its constant threat of 'bloody revolution' "if Polls are put off"\textsuperscript{373} were cases in point. Similarly, the unfortunate incident that took place on the floor of the East Pakistan Legislative Assembly (September 25) where in a melee the Deputy Speaker received a blow from a stray missile and finally died in the hospital,\textsuperscript{374} presented a tense-creating situation in politics. On October 3, 1958 the ex-ruler of Kalat State proclaimed his intention to declare himself once again the ruler of the Kalat State, which had legally acceded to Pakistan long ago.\textsuperscript{375} Added to it were the M.A.P.'s ever increasing activities to mobilise mass support for the disintegration of the one-unit, the pursuit of a neutral foreign policy devoid of military alliances and agrarian reform. To crown all, it had been alleged that Pakistan political life was replete with corruptions and lack of principles and the fight over office, power and perquisites was endemic. Evidently, the facts mentioned

\* Pakistan National Guards.


\textsuperscript{373} See Qayyum's speech (M.L. President), \textit{Dawn}, July 4 and 15, 1958 and October 5, 1958.

\textsuperscript{374} \textit{Dawn}, September 26, 1958.

\textsuperscript{375} \textit{Ibid.}, October 4, 1958.
above were all true. A prima facie view of these facts will indicate that the situation was dangerous needing a preventive measure, unless we weigh carefully the premises of our reasonings. A closer look at the situation should reveal that the heavens were not really falling upon Pakistan as they perhaps appeared to be.

To begin with, we think the remark that Pakistan during the last five years of parliamentary life was in a Hobbesian state of nature i.e. nasty, brutish and short, is, perhaps a bit inexact. We, on the contrary, hold that the very last five years of Pakistan parliamentary life were rather creative, meaningfully productive and resilient. One has to take into account that amid the swirling dusts of chaos the cosmos of Pakistani political, economic and national consensus was also on the process of being formed. Was it not during these periods that all consensus-bound institutions were created? A broad-based consensus in matters of lingua franca, one-unit, the electorate issue, parity and conflict-resolving machinery relating to ideology of the state and federal economy was achieved and duly embodied in the country's supreme institution, namely the Constitution. All these developments were augmenters to the nation-state position of Pakistan. Their fruits could not be expected so easily in a span of 5 or 10 years of a national life, any more than corruptions in public life could be taken as moribund within the same period. About the so-called 'corruptions' Herbert Feldman had this to say: 

"Much has been said about malpractices in Pakistan's public life, but
although evils of this kind exist, they are not peculiar to Pakistan. It is to say the least, extremely doubtful whether the state of affairs in this regard, in Pakistan today, approaches the scope of evils of a similar kind that existed in the United Kingdom prior to the first Reform Bill. 376 A dynamic view of the situation will reveal that despite the sad incidents of somersaults and brazen-facedness on the part of the several politicians, in reality, nothing succeeded in deleting a comma or semicolon from the Constitution that had been framed through years of toil, political sufferings and patience. In fact, the institutions were further consolidated in the course of their weathering political storms. Influential leaders at the national level, who, of course, were not many, but mattered very much in terms of national politics, were not willing to bring about drastic changes in the Constitution before the general elections. Election planks in support of the one-unit and the joint electorate were retained by the A.L., the most powerful party in Pakistan. Similarly, the M.L. campaigned - so did other right wing parties - for the retention of the one-unit in accordance with the election manifesto as was adopted in its council meeting at Dacca far back in October 12, 1957. 377 What was most revealing was that these two major political parties in Pakistan during early 1958 and more so in the later part of the same

year reflected their general consensus on the basic issues of the state. Of course, the electorate issue was an apple of discord between them. But having examined the chronological developments of the M.L. election strategy, we get a clear impression that the M.L. leaders were soft-peddling on the electoral issue,* particularly after the exit of Chundigar from the central government. The speeches of the M.L. President, Qayyum Khan in mid 1958 at Dacca even held out an indirect suggestion of a possible M.L.–A.L. electoral alliance.378 In other words, the major parties did not stand poles asunder on issues at the face of approaching elections which should undermine basic consensus as embodied in the constitution and anticipate a chaotic future for the country.

Elucidating the question of the instability of the central government, it can be said, in the first place that its roots were traceable in the composition of the N.A. In view of the fact that there was no party holding a clear majority in the House, the governments since 1955 had to be formed as either minority or coalition.

In fact, the successive governments had all been coalition ones. Coalition or minority governments have had to be formed even in Great Britain,**

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* In an interview with Daulatana the writer was told that the M.L. eventually slurred over the issue of electorate in order to brighten the M.L. election prospects, particularly in East Pakistan.

** There were minority governments from 1839 to 1841, from 1846 to 1852, in 1852, from 1858 to 1859, from 1866 to 1868, from 1885 to 1886, in 1886, from 1886 to 1892, from 1910 to 1915, in 1924 and from 1929 to 1931. There were coalition governments from 1852 to 1855, from 1895 to 1905, from 1915 to 1922, and from 1931 to 1945. Jennings, "Cabinet Government", op.cit., pp. 30-31.

the cradle of the parliamentary system of government and elsewhere. In modern times, coalition governments are formed, as a rule, in West Germany, Italy and some of the Scandinavian countries. Coalition governments are usually said to be notoriously weak and hence they are given to instability. But they have their virtues as well, particularly when judged against the background of a pluralistic society having accents on religion, language and diverse cultures.

As far as Pakistan was concerned the cause of the rapid formation and break-up of Ministries could be traced in the massive political competitions that were taking place prior to martial law among the various political parties. To borrow a metaphor from Professor Morris-Jones this situation can be aptly described as 'market polity'. In a piercing article on the Indian post-election of 1967 Professor Morris-Jones used this metaphor in order to bring home to the squeamish critics the fact that the Indian democracy was not on the verge of collapse; for, "the truth is more complex". A "market polity" was visualised as "a system in which large number of decisions are taken by a substantial number of participants who stand in positions of both dependence on and conflict with each other. The decisions are reached by a process of bargaining; no one is strong enough to impose his simple will. Although the terms of trading fluctuate continuously, every outcome is some kind of compromise where what is hoped for gives way to what is practicable." 379 This description

conveniently fits the situation that obtained in Pakistan in the late 1950s. Though Pakistan did not have a general election like India in the country, nonetheless, after the general elections of East Pakistan (1954) she did experience a tangible change in the political structure the like of which occurred, rather progressively in India. While the Congress is still a powerful force in India, the M.L. in Pakistan had ceased to be so since 1954 onwards. The M.L. omnipresence, monopoly of power and narrow oligarchic base gave way to free political market open to all political entrepreneurs. As a natural corollary, political parties of various persuasions stepped into the market for shopping as well as for founding a base for future operations. Viewed from this angle the stigma of governmental instability should tend to be mitigated.

Competitive political culture is the spice of democracy. The interactions of faith and doubt, assent or dissent on the part of the political parties, groups and various public or private bodies create the real dynamics of progress. It is only by doing so the underdeveloped politics can further polish their political institutions, and the language of negotiation and compromise. In this process the key word is mutual tolerance among parties. But once a party starts taking recourse to unfair means to grasp power its rivals will follow suit; for, "it is not much use their being clean fighters if their rivals are dirty". 380 This will have a multiplier effect on the sinister

side. Risks there are many but there are challenges as well. It is only through experience and by going through the mill the peoples of the underdeveloped polities can learn the art of governing and being governed. There is no historic evidence that democracy was followed by first having fulfilled all its requirements. Instead, democracy and its sustaining requirements have grown organically— that is the western experience.

However, picking up the thread of Pakistan governmental instability we find that technically, there were 4 Prime Ministers in the last 5 years of parliamentary life. In substance, there were two Cabinet governments, namely Chowdhury Mohammad Ali's and Suhrawardy's. The 53-day old Cabinet of Chundrigar technically broke the continuity of Suhrawardy administration, else the Noon Cabinet was as good as Suhrawardy's, since both the governments were basically the outcome of the R.P.-A.L. coalitions. The only visible change was the swapping of Primeministership. The allegation that the Awami Leaguers got out of the Noon Cabinet after having accepted the job four days previously was a tissue of wicked publicity. They volunteered to go out of the Cabinet in the apprehension that the existing tussle over the allocation of portfolios that was going on might thwart the election schedule.

But they continued their support for the Noon government all the same. 381

381. See Suhrawardy and Mujiboor Rahman's statements, Daily Telegraph, October 8, 1958.
Most critics of Pakistan parliamentary politics have only shown the debit side of the picture not the credit one. Upon a closer examination of the ways in which the transition of power was effected during the last five years it will be seen that this period had some marked distinctions over the preceding years. Chowdhury Mohammad Ali was called upon to form a coalition government as a leader of the majority party, and relinquished the Prime-ministership voluntarily the moment he felt he no longer enjoyed the confidence of his own party – although he had the Presidential consent to continue in office. Conventionally, Suhrawardy as the opposition leader was asked to form the government. Ostensibly, he lost office as he had no majority support in the N.A. Again, the opposition leader, Chundrigar came to power, who having failed to acquire enough support for his government resigned, though he could have stuck to power with the Presidential backing. Finally, Noon became the Prime Minister as the parliamentary leader of the largest single majority party in the N.A., R.P. Habit formation in the right direction is considered as one of the guarantees of the Westminster system. Compared to the earlier period (1947-54) the latter one (1955-58) stood out in bold relief, in that the politicians neither stuck to power to the detriment of parliamentary canons, nor did they, on balance, offer themselves as guineapigs for the experiments of the head of the state's designs. Despite the existence of a multiplicity of parties in the N.A. there
had been no instance of stalemate in the Cabinet formation. The East Pakistanis had their proper share in the Cabinet as the minorities had theirs.

Then, what about other derogatory things that were taking place prior to martial law? With the run-up to the general elections imminent the "market polity" situation in Pakistan became more accentuated. The people were going to have general elections for the first time. Political bargaining became more acute in East Pakistan as some political parties who had no real 'grass root' support in the country and were afraid of being wiped out in the elections, desperately sought to have a share in power prior to elections. Talks of compromises and of forming all-party governments at the centre and provinces were there subject to fruition. Meanwhile, as luck would have it, the East Pakistan legislature witnessed the disgraceful act of rowdyism. The Speaker was not bludgeoned to death in cold blood. This was an obnoxious accident. Undignified things did or do take place on the floor of the legislatures of many a country. They are always deprecated. Bengal, among others, had always been, to use Professor Morris-Jones' word, a "difficult" province in the subcontinent. With the partition of Bengal, East Pakistan had had her share of difficulties. Perhaps the incident that took place in the legislature

* For eleven years (1922-1933) neither the left nor right wing parties of Sweden could overcome their differences to the point of forming a coalition. See D.A. Rustow, op.cit., p. 95.

** The Noon Cabinet had two Congress members.
had as much a social as a political expression. And if this incident was received by the politicians as 'shock treatment' "Deputy Speaker Shahid Ali will not have died in vain". Similarly, the aggressive election campaign launched by the M.L. screaming for war with India and promising the moon to the people if returned to power is to be judged in the light of the election fever that gripped the whole nation.

The M.L. hatred for India was historic. Making anti-India, and liberation of Kashmir the focal points of campaigning tactics, the M.L. tried to attract popular attention to it by playing upon mass emotion. The M.L. was concerned with the functional value of the slogan. If they were serious about war with India to solve Kashmir issue they would have done it in the heyday of the M.L. rule. Again, a good deal was made out of the M.L. desire to use the N.G. in election purposes. In the first place the volunteers - 60,000 thousands in number - army was not created off-hand. They were there already. What was more, the M.L.N.G. was used as an auxiliary to Pakistan movement itself.

Many illustrious persons - ladies included - were associated with it. As an heir-apparent to this organization, the M.L. wanted to employ its services for canvassing purposes. But the whole thing was

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* Is it not paradoxical that General Ayub who emerged in October 1958 to restore sanity to nation, himself went to war with India in 1965?


384. For details see *Dawn*, September 23, 1958.
finished when the Noon government totally banned this organization making its operation a non-bailable offence with 2-year jail sentence.\footnote{385} As a sequel to the ban when there was a big demonstration in Karachi, the M.L. President asked the people "to go home quietly".\footnote{386}

The rebellion of the Khan of Kalat was absolutely outside the periphery of politics. What did it matter really if a former ruler of a tiny princely state who was living on a privy purse sanctioned by the Pakistan government chose to be independent again? It was a quixotic feat. The people of this area namely Khaaranis, Bhugits, Marris and Mekhranis had nothing to do with the ruler's intention.\footnote{387} There was no iota of backing from the people. The Noon government just took action against the Khan who was duly stripped of his powers and vestiges. The ageing Khan was perhaps happy to be retired; for, his son Jan Khan (18) was appointed as his successor by the Pakistan government. So the situation was absolutely under control.\footnote{388} What did really contribute to a great extent to the coming of martial law was the emergence of N.A.P. on the Pakistan political spectrum. General Mirza knew how the leftist elements had worked so vigorously for the U.P. in the 1954 elections in East Pakistan. Members of the

\footnote{385. \textit{Times}, September 21, 1958.}
\footnote{386. \textit{Manchester Guardian}, September 24, 1958.}
\footnote{387. See \textit{Dawn}, October 4, 1958.}
\footnote{388. For details see \textit{Daily Telegraph}, October 7, 1958; \textit{Dawn}, October 7, 1958.}
banned communist party and other leftist oriented groups would now obviously marshal their forces behind the N.A.P. vis-a-vis the general elections. The government were aware of it. A report identifying communists in the fold of N.A.P. was compiled,\textsuperscript{389} and the N.A.P. leaders' activities particularly in West Pakistan were closely watched.\textsuperscript{390}

A tough election fight was anticipated in West Pakistan. Zamindari in East Pakistan had already been abolished, but it was still very much alive in West Pakistan. Whatever reforms that had taken place gave rather more impetus towards "tensions between the landlord and the tenant",\textsuperscript{391} each thinking that he was being dispossessed. The one-unit was born of one of the desire to bring about a uniform standard throughout West Pakistan, and this was true of uniform land reforms in the country the absence of which was causing "serious tensions".\textsuperscript{392} Bhasani was spitting fire. Now that he had a political platform in both parts of Pakistan he indulged himself in incessant election campaigning asking peoples to rise against social tyranny which had the smell of "class war".\textsuperscript{393} He, along with other N.A.P. leaders, toured the whole of West Pakistan threatening the landlords and capitalists with dire consequences as he had recently


\textsuperscript{390}. \textit{Ibid.}, November 14, 1957.

\textsuperscript{391}. "Five-year Plan", \textit{loc.cit.}, p. 317.

\textsuperscript{392}. \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{393}. \textit{Dawn}, September 29, 1958.
done in early 1969. The second threatening issue was the N.A.P.'s anti-unit drive. Khan A. Gaffar Khan threatened to launch a civil disobedience movement and boycott even the general elections unless the one-unit was restored to its original shape. While in West Pakistan the N.A.P. was more concerned with radical land reform and disintegration issues, the eastern N.A.P. having had no such immediate problems laid stress on the question of a neutral, independent foreign policy. It is to be recalled how Muslim fervour was aroused in Pakistan at the beginning of Suez crisis in 1956, and paled down later on. Now in July 1958 a sudden blow was dealt upon the Baghdad Pact, as one of its partners, Iraq became a Republic having killed the royal family through a military coup. Bhasani ended up his European and Middle eastern tour including one prolonged meeting with Colonel Nasser. Upon reaching Karachi he warned the government that the fate of the Pakistan leaders would be the same as those of Iraq unless they quit the Baghdad Pact. So, the N.A.P. found

* There is an illuminating contrast between the event of 1958 and 1969. In 1958, when the country was about to establish people's rule through general elections martial law was imposed. Similarly, in 1969 when the parliamentary democracy was within the reach of the people martial law was again clamped down. Apparently, in both cases, the imposition of martial law was preceded by the preachings of socialistic hyperboles on the part of the N.A.P.

** General Mirza told the New York Times correspondent, Elie Abel that Bhasani's making a direct contact with Nasser was tantamount to "high treason". See New York Times, October 9, 1958.


a new ground for pointing out the vulnerability of military pacts.

On all these issues the N.A.P. could talk freely and confidently because it had a balancing position in the legislatures of both East and West Pakistan. A parliamentary board consisting of 9 members was entrusted with the task of guiding and controlling the parliamentary parties in the central as well as the two provincial assemblies to keep in view, besides the other party objectives, 5 principles viz.: (1) joint electorate, (2) undoing one-unit, (3) independent foreign policy minus military pacts, (4) full regional autonomy and (5) fulfilment of 21-point programme. 396

Then, how did the N.A.P. programmes expedite the arrival of martial law? In the first place General Mirza and those who were in collusion with him did not believe in anything the N.A.P. stood for. General Mirza with his characteristic bluntness had told the Lahore Rotarians back in March that "those who wanted to undo one-unit were exactly those who wanted to wreck the country's foreign policy". 397

He developed doubts in the capacities of the R.P. and M.L. to hold one-unit together in the face of N.A.P.'s trickery. The eventual N.A.P. support for the A.L. coalition government in East Pakistan did not seem to have appeared well-meaning to the President. He could not afford to gamble on these two vital issues. The irony of foreign


policy was this that due to massive American military aid to Pakistan it became a vested interest with the army. To animadvert the foreign policy was amounted to bringing the army into hatred. That was why countries like South Korea, Formosa, Thailand, etc., permitted neither alternative governments nor growth of critical opinion in the legislatures. Military today is, by and large, a powerful class in modern society. But, in spite of military predominance in the western society (Russia, too) they are finally subject to civil authority. In essence, this was not true of the Pakistan situation. Besides, the agrarian character of Pakistan also placed the military in a peculiar position. Professor Lenski found that the military in agrarian societies was a powerful and dominant force. In the higher echelon of military cadre of Pakistan there were personnel who had a vested interest in agrarian matters. As the Economist pointed out that "Many of these officers come from landlord families, while those of humbler birth have acquired a landlord veneer ... They may be expected to offer strong support to a regime of efficiency and enlightened despotism." The army in Pakistan was basically a

398. An ordinance prescribing punishment for public statements likely or intended to criticize the armed forces was promulgated by General Mirza on June 9, 1958. The offence was cognizable and non-bailable. See Dawn, June 10, 1958.


401. The Economist, October 18, 1958.
conservative institution and had a vested interest in the retention of the status quo. Similarly, the army had a deep commitment to the maintenance of the one-unit.

It will now appear that the Army and its Supreme Commander in Chief - the President himself - had some anxieties over some of their favourite subjects for whose drastic changes the N.A.P. stood. Having toured Pakistan in early March, 1958 a British M.P. - John Dugdale - committed his impressions to an article saying that "There is, it is true, a distinct possibility that the National Awami Party, which some say is pro-communist and others simply neutralist, may gain a large number of seats at the forthcoming general elections." And the editorial view of the Hindu that it was against this movement towards drastic land reform and neutral foreign policy that the "revolution appears to have been primarily directed, rather than against the old gang of politicians", seems to us to have some validity.

The values of pro-western foreign policy in which the saner leaders of Pakistan believed in did consist of something more than...

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* That the N.A.P. was an emerging force was even recognised by Gen. Ayub, in that by having pursued a neutral line of foreign policy he neutralised the N.A.P. opposition to his quasi-dictatorial regime and thus thwarted the movement towards parliamentary government for a long time.

** Immediately after the martial law all the prominent N.A.P. leaders and workers were arrested. See Manchester Guardian, October 13, 1958; Daily Telegraph, October 13, 1958. They were all sentenced by the Martial Law Court. See Dawn, December 15, 1958.


403. See Hindu, November 6, 1958 (Editorial) "Pakistan Revolution."
combating communism. But the American hallucinative view of communists was too acute to permit other western values to flourish in the emerging countries. It has been shown in the first part how East Pakistan was viewed from the anti-communist strategic angle vis-a-vis South East Asia. We have also shown the possible impact of foreign policy on the doing away of the parliamentary government in East Pakistan in 1954. The Iraqi revolution which was thought to be Russian-backed alerted General Mirza and his associates to think of the position of Pakistan (West Pakistan was regarded as a link to the middle east) in the face of general elections. What the events in Iraq was not lightly taken could be seen from the American decision to send troops to both Jordan and Lebanon. Both America and Pakistan knew of the 'Rawalpindi Conspiracy' which crept up in 1951. There is no evidence to prove that America was behind the 1958 revolution, nor was there any to show that being an influential ally to Pakistan she had tried to prevent this calamitous step. The post-revolution comment of the New York Times was this: "Mirza is a firm ally of the West, looks down on his co-religionists, the Arabs, and holds Nasser in contempt." And the former American ambassador to Pakistan (1953-56) Mr. Hildreth away in the States felt relieved that "two ablest men in Pakistan is in control of situation". The official attitude of the U.S. government could be seen in its stepping up more


military and economic aid since martial law to such an extent that Pakistan financial calendar was changed to coincide with that of the Americans.\textsuperscript{406} In March 1959 Pakistan signed another bilateral agreement of cooperation with the U.S.\textsuperscript{407} The climax was reached in May 1960 when Pakistan incurred the ire of Krushchev for letting Gary Powers (U-2 crisis) take off from the Peshawar base for a reconnaissance flight over Russia. However, it was only Great Britain's - Canada's Prime Minister too* - Prime Minister, Mr. H. Macmillan who through the British ambassador, Mr. Alexander Squire, in Pakistan showed his concern for the scrapping of the parliamentary institutions to General Mirza. "I note that the continuance of martial law will be for the shortest period possible ..."\textsuperscript{408} was the assurance the British Prime Minister received through secret correspondence.

However, in maintaining that the N.A.P. was one of the factors in the abrogation of parliamentary institutions in Pakistan, we again reemphasize the point that General Mirza committed the greatest blunder like that of the Central government of 1954 vis-a-vis the imposition of 92-A in East Pakistan in not allowing the right wingers to fight the leftist elements politically.

* Mr. Diefenbaker said, "The middle class in Pakistan may be too strong for a permanent abrogation of democracy." Quoted in Hindu, November 21, 1958.


However, the N.A.P.'s prospect of making any headway in politics also depended upon the extent to which other parties were responding to social grievances. Two major parties e.g. the M.L. and A.L. were genuinely committed to agrarian reforms. Their approach to this end had to be both gradual and moderate on constitutional and party considerations. The peasants were aggrieved no doubt, but they were not Mao's peasants given to a revolutionary urge. When Bhasani who had trudged over the jungles of East Pakistan for ages could not raise an organized peasants' movement (true, even today) the question of West Pakistan did not arise at all. The peasants in Pakistan were and are basically conservative. They would, we believe, have leaned towards moderation. In other words, there would have been no spectacular election results in favour of the N.A.P. Interestingly enough, the N.A.P. itself towards the end was showing some moderation in that its high command refused to allow Gaffar Khan to launch a civil disobedience movement on the issue of one-unit. The way both the M.L. and A.L. were drawing huge crowds to their election meetings in both parts of Pakistan compared to the N.A.P. indicated which way the political wind was blowing. The right wing leader, Suhrawardy, had accepted the challenge of the N.A.P. far back in 1957. If bye-elections are a guide to the trends of public opinion vis-a-vis political parties, it can be said the A.L. was supreme in East Pakistan.


From 1954 till December 1957 it won 12 bye-elections out of 13. In the latest bye-elections held in Sirajgong, Madaripur, and Rangpur on December 3 and 22 respectively the A.L. defeated all its rivals including the N.A.P. which even forfeited its election deposit at the Rangpur constituency. 411 Similarly, in West Pakistan bye-elections were won either by the M.L. or R.P. 412 Allowances for 'swings' in the election results deducted, it could not be expected under any stretch of imagination that the N.A.P. would have come out from the general elections with whip in hand. The assumption that the N.A.P. was a potential force in terms of political influence has been made keeping in view of Pakistan society where there was no "average" Pakistani but "extremes - of wealth and poverty, of desert and jungle, educated and illiterate". 413 Its apparent egalitarian approach had an appeal so much so that other political parties had to adjust themselves to the social, economic and political requirements of the country. The

411. *Dawn*, December 4 and 23, 1957. See the voting analysis at the Rangpur bye-election:

- A. L. - 10,342
- M. L. - 9,502
- K. S. P. - 2,206
- N. A. P. - 2,126
- Ind. - 575

*Electorates 69, 513*  
*Votes cast 24, 751*  
*one vote found invalid.*


N.A.P.'s strength was 'relative' in that if the other major parties like the A.L. and M.L. could have come out with positive social ameliorative programmes the extremism of the N.A.P. would be of no avail. Its emergence was positive in the sense that it was offering a sort of socialist opposition to the country – a check against lopsidedness. The doings and intentions of the N.A.P. were either overestimated or intended to be overstressed by General Mirza and his co-plotters to add another point to their justification for the abrogation of parliamentary democracy.

However, in the foregoing pages we have dealt at some length with the economic and political situation showing the extent to which they could be taken as contributory to the abrogation of parliamentary democracy. Now, an examination of the Presidential demeanor will throw some more light on the so-called October revolution. General Mirza's meteoric rise on Pakistan political horizon had always been an ill-omened phenomenon. Here was a man egotistic in outlook, though not without some traits of sociability, intellectually unobtrusive but instinctively superb, unappreciative of music and the finer shades of life but deeply interested in sports, Narcissistic about his ideas but ready to listen to everybody only to make his views more intransigent, expert on Bridge as he was of gastronomy, ruse and certainly intrigue, as well. General Mirza, a Sandhurst graduate, whose long services in the political department of the late government of India groomed him to view a political situation as something to
be managed. Born with the bluest of blood of the Nawab family of Murshidabad he acquired an appreciation of a Mogul quality which has been described by Philip Woodruff as "the tactical use of power". 414 And from the Officers' Mess in Poona perhaps he learnt the "soldiers' traditional contempt for politicians". 415

President Mirza had not concealed his disapproval of the 1956 Constitution ever since its launching. Sir Ivor was said to have been asked "to draft a Constitution in which the American idea of an executive irremovable for four years was grafted on to a British system of representation". 416 This was rejected by the Constituent Assembly II on grounds of "suspicion". 417 As a result, the President and the Cabinet were removable under the existing system. The President did not have much over-riding power. He could rule by Ordinance but only for 6 weeks, after which period the N.A. was to approve his acts. Furthermore, in a subsequent 53-page unanimous judgment of the Pakistan Supreme Court on a reference case of the President whether or not he could dissolve any legislatures in Pakistan, it was maintained that the Article 234(2) of the Constitution did not provide the President with the power to dissolve any legislatures, national or provincial. 418

* Perhaps this was one of the reasons that the drastic action had to be taken by General Mirza e.g. the abrogation of the Constitution.

415. Ibid.
417. Ibid., p. 19.
That meant General Mirza who had an authoritarian disposition, could neither have the 'feel' of power nor reconcile himself to the position of a titular head as envisaged by the Constitution. Above all, he did not like the principle of decentralisation that was being adhered to in the central-units relationship. "This is where the Moguls let off. The Moguls were defeated because they gave too much authority to local Princes. Now we are starting at that point"419 - General Mirza told C.L. Sulzberger, the New York Times correspondent.

Before the ink of the Constitution could dry, the President on the eve of the Republic Day of March, 1957 described the British system of government in Pakistan as "malaise" and recommended the American system of administration with necessary modifications to the country.420 Indeed his sincerity of belief in the American system of government could not be doubted.* But nevertheless he was prostituting the Presidency for a purpose for which he had not sworn into the office. He could either gracefully submit to the will of the people or come out of the office to lead a movement for the Presidential system of government which perhaps appealed to him more as a powerful executive than any other considerations. No honourable course was followed. Instead, he emerged himself in the best tradition of Cardinal

* Writing a letter to the author from Iran in early 1969 General Mirza had this to say: "I for one do not believe that Westminster system of democracy will ever succeed in Pakistan. The 1956 Constitution nearly created a jungle. The American system with amendments required for conditions in Pakistan will be much more suitable". See Appendix VIII.

Richelieu in that General Mirza took recourse to all sorts of sly ruses to dethrone parliamentary politics and enthrone his brand of governance. Since 1954 there was a sort of public discourse going on between General Mirza and Suhrawardy in regard to the propriety of democracy in Pakistan. General Mirza's concept of 'controlled democracy' was publicly ridiculed by Suhrawardy. Whenever any political difficulty arose the President would say: "I am told by experts on democracy that these changes in government are ordinary processes inherent in the interplay of democratic forces ... I must take the liberty of disagreeing with them." 421 This was again repeated in early 1958. * He could venture to say all these and remain unscathed; for, in the presence of multiple parties in the parliament he could influence the formation of the coalition government by playing off one party against the others and at the same time making him more indispensable to them. Obviously, a part of the cause of governmental instability emanated from the Presidential cupidity.

In this game there were some politicians — General Mirza claimed to have a number of friends and supporters in the N.A. who did things as they were told by him "regardless of Party" 422 — who acted as accomplices to the President. In Pakistan political loyalties were

* "I am told democracy controls itself, but I have yet to see it controlling itself here." See Dawn, March 16, 1958.


divided between those who thought it unwise to tinker with a Constitution once it had been established and those who cared less for the Constitution but supported President Mirza on a personal basis in order to promote their own interests. The number of this latter group of politicians was insignificant, but their very presence was significant. The climate of West Pakistan politics bore resemblance to the 18th century politics of England where the influential landlord aristocrats used to pay lip service to the parliament. Similarly, some of the Republicans who were very big landowners (as well as big industrialists) who did not feel enthusiastic about empowering the parliament were "warm toward Mirza".\(^{423}\) Probably, the following politicians were confidants to the President: Col. Abid Hossain, Syed Amjad Ali,\(^{*}\) Mian Zaffar Shah, Gul Aurangzeb,\(^{**}\) Malik Jahangir Khan, Khan Jalaluddin,\(^{+}\) G.A. Talpur, etc.

In East Pakistan there were no big landlords but party jealousies abounded. General Mirza kept contact with Huq's K.S.P. and used it as a lever against the rising power of Suhrawardy's A.L.\(^{424}\) It was

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\(^{*}\) Central Finance Minister. He would always say in the N.A. prior to any announcement that he had "talks with the President", when Suhrawardy would correct him by saying that "such and such" was due to the results of the Cabinet decisions. See <\textit{N.A.D.}, Vol. I, February 13, 1957, p. 295.>  

\(^{**}\) Prince of the Swat State and son-in-law of General Ayub.  

\(^{+}\) Chairman of the so-called "National Congress for Presidential Cabinet", organised to amend the Constitution in the light of President Mirza's advice, See <\textit{Dawn}, April 7, 1957.>  

\(^{423}\) \textit{Ibid.}, April 9, 1958.  

\(^{424}\) K. B. Syeed, "Formative Phase", \textit{op.cit.}, p. 434.
strongly alleged by the ex-Chief Minister of East Pakistan that an 'influential' person was employed by the President to persuade Bhasani to leave Suhrawardy and as a reward the 'person' was given a partnership in a business farm of his friend. He also documented evidence that the Speaker of the East Pakistan Legislature whose intransigence finally resulted in rowdysm in the House had an understanding with the President to the effect that the A.L. government must be harrassed to the benefit of the K.S.P. What was more, to create dissension in the party, the President, on several occasions, allured the Chief Minister with the Primeministership of Pakistan, the way M. Qizilbash was offered the same when Noon was away in London. 425

However, General Mirza's greatest advantage was the bringing of the R.P. - the largest single party in the N.A. - under the sphere of his influence. This was done through Dr. Khan who was "like a father to him" - Iskander Mirza. As a R.P. leader he was the vital cog on which General Mirza sought to turn the support of the R.P. M.P.s towards him. He succeeded greatly in this venture, but up to a point. When Dr. Khan ceased to be the Chief Minister of West Pakistan he did not cease to be the right hand man of the President as the head of the R.P. Hardly a political trip in the country was made by the Head of the State without being accompanied by the silver-haired, venerable—

425. For details see Ataur Rahman, op.cit., p. 159.

When Dr. Khan talked about the setting of a "revolutionary council" to govern the country partyless which was followed by a massive wave of protests sweeping the whole country, the people took it as a trial balloon and projection of the ideas of the President. But suddenly the "Young Turks" of the R.P. "rallied for what is considered ... to be a revolt against their acknowledged political mentor, who is Mirza". This culminated in the R.P.'s withdrawing support from the Chundrigar Cabinet and forming their own with the support of the A.L. Dr. Khan, too, ceased to dance to the tune of the President. General Mirza always kept his powder dry. If he had commissioned Suhrawardy to form the government he did not forget to retain Chundrigar, the opposition leader, as partner of his Bridge. His channel of communication was ubiquitous. However, having failed to reinstate Chundrigar, General Mirza with the help of an influential M.L. leader, Daultana - a personal friend of his -

* Mr. Yussouf Haroon, the Chief Whip of the M.L. parliamentary party in the N.A. told the writer that the night when Chundrigar returned his Commission back to the President, the idea of setting "a revolutionary council" in Pakistan for 10 years without parties was suggested by General Mirza. Both Chundrigar and Daultana who were present there vehemently opposed the idea. However, interestingly enough, a week before this incident large-sized posters proclaiming that a 'Revolutionary Council' was in harmony with the dictates of Islam appeared in parts of Karachi. See Dawn, 7 December, 1957.

428. Ibid., August 10, 1957 (Editorial) "Revolution".
and a few other Republican elements who were leaning towards the M.L.,

tried to merge the R.P. into the M.L. 432

The idea of a merger in the face of the coming general elections

obviously intrigued some of the Muslim leaguers and some such drafts
to this end were tentatively drawn up in the presence of the President.

Daultana placing his loyalty to the President urged him to contact

Chundrigar with this saying that "till everything is agreed, I would

request that it may not be mentioned to others who saw and approved

of the drafts. Many people are quick to feel ignored ... I can only

humbly press the national necessity for definite decision and assured

action." 433 This did not work out for many other reasons. To name

only two, firstly, after the death of Nishtar - the M.L. President

- and the election of Qayyum Khan as the new President on 30th March,

1958, 434 the M.L. got a new lease of life and was confident of the

elections. Its President massively campaigned against the involvement

of the Head of the State in politics. 435 Secondly, Dr. Khan would

not buy the idea of breaking the R.P., come what may. 436 However,
on May 9, 1958 Dr. Khan was knifed to death. 437 The explanation of

his assassination was inadequate like that of Liaquat's. The immediate

effect of Dr. Khan's death was the R.P.'s being further alienated from

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433. See Appendix XV. Daultana's confidential letter to the President
dated 20.2.1958.
General Mirza. Noon (Prime Minister) himself became the Party head and Arbab Noor Mohammad Khan replaced Colonel Abid Hossain (President) as the General Secretary. \textsuperscript{438} Nawab Qizilbash, the Chief Minister of West Pakistan was already a strong Republican friend to Noon. That meant the consolidation of the politician's position and the A.L.-R.P. axis featured prominently on the eve of the elections.

That the Prime Minister Noon could act independently of General Mirza was amply demonstrated in his ousting the Governor of East Pakistan, the cotogenarian Haq - General Mirza's political hope in East Pakistan - who had resorted a hasty decision in dismissing the A.L. government.

Now, where did General Mirza stand during the closing period of 1958? To quote the \textit{New York Times}: "Mirza's tenure threatened ... politicians of most of the parties are making it clear that they think Mirza has shown too strong a taste for jumping into the political free-for-all instead of standing on the side-lines ... All this means that after November the road back to the Presidential palace will be rougher." \textsuperscript{439} The President played all the cards he had under his sleeves. His finesse worked up to a point. The politicians sinned along with him, but were not ready to commit the blackest ones beyond redemption; namely banishing democracy from the country. The politicians and politicians of the 1954–58 period were a good deal distilled and winnowed compared to the preceding periods. The days of Golam Mohammad

\textsuperscript{438} \textit{Times}, May 30, 1958.

\textsuperscript{439} \textit{New York Times}, April 9, 1958.
were stale in 1958. Despite "the rows", says the last Prime Minister, "and apparent instability, the country and our people were more alive and conscious than ever before". 440 Nothing could stop that trend save drastic measures.

General Mirza turned lukewarm towards holding the general elections since Noon was installed as the Prime Minister. He said to the Bar Association in December, 1957 that he was not "in a position to say if the election deadline can be maintained". 441 By March, 1958 he became clearer commenting that "elections by themselves were not the remedy". 442 The last Prime Minister records in his memoirs:

"I had known from the day I took on Prime Ministership that Iskander Mirza wanted to bring in 'controlled democracy'. He had suggested it to me on one or two occasions and asked if I would not say that a democratic form of government was not suited for our country and that I, therefore, would resign and hand over government to the President. When he realised that I was bent on carrying on to see the elections through, abrogation of the Constitution was the only way to dislodge me." 443

However, in the task of abrogating democracy the President now had to rely on the army. The army Chief, General Ayub, had always been imperceptibly in touch with the country's politics, and perceptibly

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443. Sir Noon op.cit., p. 299.
with the President as his supreme Commander in Chief.* General Ayub's
loyalty to the President at this time was unflinching. Here is an
extract from a letter written by General Ayub to the President six
months prior to the imposition of the martial law which will show
how loyal the former was to the latter: "Please allow me to con-
gratulate you on the decision you gave on the higher control set up
on the Defence Forces ... you ... have done the Defence Forces and
the country a great service. History will have a cause to be proud
of you. I personally am indebted to you for choosing me to shoulder
this responsibility. Let us hope that I shall come to you expecta-
tions. I can promise you my very best effort."444 (Author's italics).
However, in any case the President had the loyalty of the Commander
in Chief of the army prior to the imposition of martial law.

Of the view that the "U.S. aid programs aimed at the development
of the military ... can sometimes be politically destructive",445
Pakistan was a classic example. The American military assistance to
Pakistan was classified but its valuation in terms of money was
guess to the tune of $500 to $600 million dollars.446 The military
in Pakistan could now flex its muscle. A carefully planned manoeuvre

* General Mirza: "We have known each other for ages. He (Gen. Ayub)
was the only person I talked to." See Daily Mirror, October 9,
1958, "Revolution" by Patrick Sergeant.

444. See Appendix XVI. General Ayub's letter to General Mirza dated
2nd April, 1958.

445. "La Palambara & Weiner", op.cit., p. 434#

446. Amos A. Jordan, Jr., Foreign Aid and the Defense of South East
according to Noon's guess had taken place months earlier before the fatal night of October 7. The Prime Minister suspiciously complied with the Presidential request to send the heads of West Pakistan Intelligence and Police Departments to Teheran to help them organize their police. The West Pakistan Border Police was replaced by army personnel at General Mirza's insistence. The East Pakistan border was already closed by the army in the name of 'Operation Closed Door'. Hence, martial law came as a complete fulfilment of a pre-ordained plan methodically executed, and a surprise to the country.

The event was trumpeted as the 'October Revolution' which came like Deus ex Machina to save the country. And the regime that was born of that revolution had to be under the clutches of "one of the biggest and most bogus public relations operations the modern world has known". The net result of this event accounts for the loss of national consensus today which was largely achieved during the parlia-

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According to General Mirza's version to Elie Abel, New York Times correspondent, the actual planning started about 3 weeks earlier. Secret orders had gone out to redeploy army units for controlling possible civil disorder by courier. The capital was given a complete military reconnaissance a week before the martial law on the pretext that there might be political demonstration against the government decision banning M.L. N.G. See New York Times, October 9, 1958. This means that if planning had started so early the untoward events of September in the East Pakistan Legislature could not be the reason for martial law. Curiously enough, Gen. Ayub in his autobiography indirectly implied that Gen. Mirza was responsible for cooking up the revolt of the Kalat States' ruler to justify his action of martial law. See P.M. Ayub, *op.cit.*, p. 51.


Hence the so-called revolution of October 1958 was merely an anti-populist coup d'etat devoid of any popular upsurge. It was perpetrated by a small group of people who were situated on a vantage-ground of authority and had no sense of involvement or commitment to democracy. Neither General Mirza nor General Ayub could be compared with these personages and their mode of arrival on the political scene vis-à-vis General De Gaulle, Colonel Nasser, Brigadier Kashem or even Kemal Ataturk. Even the Burmese position where the Prime Minister U Nu had to call the army Commander in Chief to save the country from disintegration could not be cited in the Pakistan situation. General Mirza and his associates had either wrongly read the political realities of Pakistan or overreacted in their anxieties. The changes were that those with vested interests who included some people who happened to ride the hobby-horse of politics without ever facing the electorate, certain big industrialists who were afraid of socialistic restraints on their economic activities, and some senior bureaucrats — civil and military — who thought of outlawing politics for the good of the country were determined to seize power before the politicians could at last get mass backing and parliament become powerful and responsible through the general elections.

450. See Hindu, editorials dated October 17 and November 6, 1958.
The administration of the country functioned much better than in most Afro-Asian countries. The press* was vocal and free and the courts as usual were impeccable in issuing writs to set things on the right tracks. The consensus-bound institutions were built and more national consensus issues would have reflected in the parliament had there been an election. Leaders who were counted in terms of national politics displayed moderation and realism. Extremists like Bhasani demanding full provincial autonomy, and Gaffar Khan asking for the disintegration of the one-unit were not gaining the upper hand in the country. The former "lost much of his influence over the intelligentsia", while the latter "left the political scene because his demand ... has proved unpopular". Lord Birdwood's commentary that Pakistan failed to produce a workable "political machine and the men to work it" was perhaps made without evaluating the whole crystallisation process of Pakistan politics. Merely extraordinary people do not live anywhere. There are only great challenges that are faced by small men. There was no evidence to suggest that Pakistan could not

* Pakistan journalistic publications totalled 1106 in 1958. The breakdown is the following: 103 dailies, 21 bi-weeklies, 396 weeklies, 88 fortnightlies, 434 monthlies, 40 quarterlies and 24 other publications. Among publications 685 were in Urdu, 165 in English, 130 in Bengali and 126 in other regional languages as well as foreign languages. For details see Dawn, May 21, 1958; also General list of Newspapers and Periodicals published in Pakistan: Reference Series No. 1, (Ministry of Information: Government of Pakistan: 1958), pp. 1-41.

452. Hindu, October 9, 1958.
453. See Daily Telegraph, October 16, 1958 for Lord Birdwood's article.
have thrown appropriate leadership, given time and opportunity.
A decade after the October coup the Economist has this to maintain:
"Pakistan's first ten years of parliamentarism were not as merely
ciaotic as they have been made out in retrospect".\textsuperscript{454} The fact that
the people of 1958 had affection for, understanding in and commitments
to the Westminster system could not be denied under any pretext.
General Ayub's 10-year old straight-jacketed regime could not even
make people get used to what they were getting. The events of late
1968 and early 1969 bore eloquent testimony to people's urge for
parliamentary democracy. And the movement of 1969 "cannot be written
off", said a journalist while making an on-the-spot survey in Pakistan,
"merely as the work of a few hotheaded mal-contents or power-seekers.
The student offspring of the establishment are involved up to their
young necks. So are lawyers, writers, doctors, journalists, religious
leaders, some industrial workers."\textsuperscript{455} Hence, the parliamentary system
in Pakistan did not fail in 1958, it was, on the contrary, sabotaged
by a 'power elite' whose vested interests were endangered in the
flowering of democracy. The parliamentary system of government in
Pakistan since October 1958 has been the case one of suspended animation.

\textsuperscript{454} \textit{The Economist}, March 1, 1969, p. 17.

\textsuperscript{455} "Behind the tension in Pakistan", Harold Sieve, \textit{Daily
A caretaker Cabinet of 7 men at the head of Dr. Khan was sworn in October 14, 1955 - the day when all the former Provinces and states officially merged themselves into a single administrative unit e.g. West Pakistan. By virtue of the establishment of the West Pakistan Act, 1955 the Governor General ordered the holding of elections for an interim legislature of the new Province. The members to be elected were 310 in number. The members of the old legislative Assemblies of the Punjab, Sind, N.W.F.P. and Bahawalpur would form electoral colleges on a district basis to send representatives to the interim legislature. The old Khairpur Legislative Assembly would elect 4 members. In the N.W.F.P. tribal areas and states, Baluchistan and the Baluchistan States Union, the Jirgas (the Council of Elders) would elect the members. The non-official members of the Municipal Committee and Cantonment Board of Quetta would elect one member for Baluchistan. From Karachi, 13 members would be elected by the elected members of the Karachi Municipal Corporation and 1 by

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* The former Provinces and States were allotted seats in the legislature in the following way: The Punjab - 124; Sind - 57; the N.W.F.P. - 41; Tribal areas - 22; Karachi - 14; Bahawalpur 23; The N.W.F. States - 10; Baluchistan - 8; B.S.U. - 7; Khairpur - 4; Women-10; Non-Muslims - 10. See Dawn, August 9, 1955.


2. The Establishment of West Pakistan Act, 1955, sub-section (3) and (4) of Section II.
the Cantonment Boards of Karachi, Drigh Road, Malir and Manora. The method of single transferable votes would be the basis of the elections. Accordingly, the elections took place on the 19th January, 1956.

Apparently, the elections were held in an atmosphere of competition — there were 700 contestants in the field. But in essence, the circumscribed nature of the electorate and the vogue of indirect election took away much of the winds out of the sail of the one-unit's maiden voyage in the waters of Parliamentarianism. The limiting causes mainly emanated from the decision to make a stop-gap arrangement for a legislature pending general elections. The elections were fought on a tribe and caste basis rather than on rival socio-economic programmes. The elections assumed the character of factional warfare as the landlords who happened to be the dominant class, themselves were tribe or caste-oriented.

For instance, in the Northern districts of the former Punjab Province the tussle was between Arains and Jats, in the Multan division it was between Gardezi and Gilanis, the former being in the Daultana group and the latter on the Gurmani side. In Dera Ghazi Khan district, the Mazaris fought the Legharis. In former Bahawalpur, Hasan Mahmood group had rough brush with the Nizammudin's. In Sialkot, the Ghuman and Mall group were united to fight the


rest. In Sargodha, the Tiwanas and Qureshis were at daggers drawn, while in Attock the Malik线条 were opposed to each other. The former Sind province witnessed a bitter fight between the two main groups, namely Talpur and Khuhro, the former being aided by Syeds, Kavis and Pagora group to the disadvantage of the latter. The former N.W.F.P.* did not have much of a feudalistic fight. And due to the narrow base of electorate most of the members of the former legislative Assemblies swarmed into the interim legislature of West Pakistan to the loss of new blood. As a result neither did the complexion of the House alter nor did the politics of the Province undergo any positive change of direction. It was, however, too early to expect a real breakthrough in politics in the presence of marked social inequality in terms of honour, privilege and power which were associated with the agrarian economies of West Pakistan, namely landlordism. Professor Lenski having made an extensive survey of the Agrarian Societies held that "landownership ... was valued chiefly as a means to obtain prestige and economic security, while public office was used primarily for political and economic advancement". So the landlords of West Pakistan became ex officio members of a political elite and power holders of the body politic. The conclusion of Lasswell's comparative study on elites that "the power

* The Lundhkar and Khattak groups were prominent, but they could not do well in the elections.

5. See Dawn, January 8, 12, 14 and 17, 1956.

holders include the leadership and social formations from which leaders typically come", 7 was applicable to the situation in West Pakistan. For the power elite happened to be the 'top power class' namely the landlords who were disgorged from the existing social configuration. So politics was the preserve of the few and devoid of large scale mass participation.

But the interesting thing was that the landlords themselves were not united. In the course of their mutual quarrels or fights for supremacy, the landlords themselves had to enlist the support of the people at large, and paradoxically stand for social and economic programmes which strictly speaking were opposed to their own interests. In addition, some landlords were influenced in their political attitudes by the education they had received. The effects of the internecine conflicts among elites compelled the masses, otherwise uninterested, to participate in it and side with the warring elites according to their own propensities. Human nature is such that even the reactionary landlords had to create an 'audience' to justify their leadership. As a matter of fact, whatever agrarian reforms were achieved in West Pakistan were precisely the result of the interactions of the rival landlords on the one hand, and mass involvement manifested in their support for a particular group of elite who stood for social amelioration, on the other. Thus the masses had some scope for political participation and the implications were, that this tendency would have increased considering the fact that

their emerged some parties which desired to be mass-based.

However, going back to the groupings of elites in the interim legislature of West Pakistan we find that the Daultana group captured 90 seats out of 124 allocated to the former Province of Punjab. The Gurmani* group occupied 31 seats. The remaining 3 went to the minority members. In the former Province of Sind Mir G.A. Talpur triumphed over the Khuhro group. Also, three former Chief Ministers of Sind e.g. Kazi Fazrullah, Pirzada Satter and Pir Illahi Bakhsh were elected.8 From the former N.W.F.P. Dr. Khan, Sardar Bahadur, Sardar A. Rashid emerged. However, as soon as the M.L. High Command desired to form a M.L. Assembly Party in the legislature to give a partisan character to the government new complications arose.

Indeed, this was an orthodox approach towards the parliamentary system. But the Chief Minister turned anachronistic saying "I am above parties"9 and "my life is dedicated to the service of Pakistan".10 The statement was saintly but dangerously impracticable. There were two schools of thought, one believing that the "ablest leaders" should exercise powers of the government regardless of popular support, while the other maintained that the Chief Minister should be supported as widely as possible by the dominant party or parties. In any case

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* The Governor of the Province.
10. Ibid., April 8, 1956.
partyless government could have been suicidal in an already authoritarian society of West Pakistan. If more than half of Pakistan territory was to be governed without parties then there was no rationale to maintain all the trappings of the Westminster system. The Chief Minister, however, realized the truth with the formation of a M.L. Assembly Party* with Sardar Bahadur Khan as its leader who asked the Governor to commission him as the new Chief Minister. The shock tactics of the M.L. were answered by Dr. Khan with equal vigour in that a new political party was christened as the R.P. (Republican Party). Dr. Khan now admitted that the "formation of a political party at this stage is an absolute necessity to be able to serve the people". Much was said against the dubious origin of the R.P. that it was born inside the Assembly having no grass root support. Evidently, it was true. The legitimacy of the R.P. was its birth in response to a pressing challenge in what was described by the Times as "the beginning of two-party system ... with real swings of political life". This was obviously a healthy sign in the right direction. Actually, the potentiality for the formation of some such political grouping had been apparent since August 1955 and the coming of the R.P. was the fulfilment of this potential. Dr. Khan only occasioned its birth.

* This was done on the 2nd April, 1956.


13. Ibid., June 12, 1956.
Far back in August 4, 1955, Sir Noon the then Chief Minister of the former Province of Punjab along with 30 M.L.A.s quit the M.L. as a protest against the Central Parliamentary Board's decision to select Punjab M.C.A.s at the expense of the Punjab Provincial Parliamentary Board. Sir Noon did not participate in the election of the interim legislature as a protest against the use of a narrow electoral college. The Mamdot group was eliminated in the interim legislature. Both the Mamdot and the Noon groups which thought to have been wronged by the Muslim leaguers were waiting for a political platform to operate from outside, so they joined the R.P. with alacrity. From inside the legislature the Gurmani group of the former Punjab and a number of M.L.A.s from the former minority provinces formed the nucleus of the Republican Parliamentary Party.

However, the M.L. was quick to point out that the Governor had acted unconstitutionally in not asking its Parliamentary leader who claimed to have majority in the House to form the government. Apparently, it was true. But according to the Constitution (Art. 71(3)) the 'discretion' lay with the Governor in matters of appointing a Chief Minister who was mostly 'likely' to command the confidence of the majority of the legislature. The Governor had the power to invite

* The first Chief Minister of the former Punjab Province.


the M.L. to form a government, and there was no doubt that they would have succeeded in doing so; for, the members who were not previously elected to the legislature on a party basis would have the psychological tendency to join the bandwagon of a party which had the first opportunity to form a government. This was a great factor particularly in a society where politicians did not show much reluctance to succumb to the lure of office. It was a question of choice on the part of the Governor. He could either give the incumbent Chief Minister, who had just formed a new party the chance of showing his majority backing in the legislature, or ask the M.L. which came into being in the legislature on second thought to form the Ministry, repudiating the incumbent government. In allowing the incumbent Chief Minister to carry on the government till the legislature was summoned to judge his position, the Governor seemed not to have committed any flagrant violation of the Constitution. There was however no doubt that the Governor had sympathy for the Dr. Khan Ministry. When the legislature met on the 19th May, 1956 it appeared that the marginal vote of the smaller groups might dictate the fortunes of the two big protagonists in the struggle e.g. the M.L. and R.P. What a large 'margin' there was could be seen from the claims made by the M.L. and R.P. on the eve of the session. The R.P. leaders produced the signatures of 160 supporters, while the M.L. maintained that it had a solid 183 votes in its pocket. This meant that a few waverers were notoriously prudent enough to sign with
both hands and promise support to both sides pending some tangible signs as to which side would win in the end.\textsuperscript{17} As a result the first round of the fight on the floor of the House between the M.L. and R.P. in regards to the election of the Speaker – the M.L. nominated G.A. Talpur and R.P. M.A. Qizilbash\textsuperscript{18} – was the closest one, namely each side scored 148 votes and the tie was resolved in favour of the government by the conventional casting vote of the Presiding Officer.\textsuperscript{19} After this testing event, the stampede in party alignments followed in favour of the R.P. and the M.L., to their chagrin, found themselves in the opposition thus signalling the final dissociation of the M.L. from the governmental power all over Pakistan.

However, the second round of the parliamentary conflict erupted in early 1957 when the 17-month-old R.P. Ministry went out of office on March 21, giving place to central rule (Art. 193). This new situation was resulted from the process of realignments of political parties. The Awami Mahaz group of G.M. Syed and the A.P.P. were from the very beginning supporting Dr. Khan on the ground of his being secular minded and his past political record. As soon as these groups merged themselves into a new party called N.P. (discussed earlier) they switched their support over to the M.L. who were acquiescent to the N.P.'s genuine demand for the re-demarcation of

\textsuperscript{17} Hindu, May 22, 1956.
\textsuperscript{18} Dawn, May 20, 1956.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., May 21, 1956.
the one-unit on its former lines. Soon after the Assembly session began on March 21, the newly-won M.L. supporters took their seats on the opposition benches - 30 more Republicans who crossed the floor did the same. 20 When the House was discussing a cut motion on the government demand for grant for land revenue, the leader of the opposition rose to say that the government party had no majority and so had no right to continue discussions on the budget. He also moved that the censure motion against the government of which notice had been given be put to vote. But Dr. Khan instead of facing the confidence vote immediately advised the Governor to impose Section 193 of the Constitution on the Province. 21

Evidently, this was a clear case of violation of an important parliamentary convention, since an opportunity for the formation of an alternate government was denied by the application of Section 193. Again, one has to delve deep into the propriety of following a Parliamentary Convention in a given situation. If the Parliamentary Convention on that point was adhered to in the face of the professed motives of the opposition and in complete isolation of the substantive issues involved therein, there would have been the end of the Constitution. After all, the conventions were not an end in themselves. What was the position? Here was an interim legislature peopled by the members of the former Provincial Assemblies, which


was not truly representative. At no time was there a clear and coherent opposition majority. And the precarious alliance between the M.L. and N.P., which rendered the Republicans temporarily in the minority, had been secured through a pledge by the 'Leaguers' to dismantle the one-unit system. Far back in January 28 the 15-month-old Khan Ministry did survive a vote of no-confidence tabled by an Independent member — the voting result was 162-2. On March 8, it again survived a division on an amendment to the Development Fund cess Bill. Just 3 days before the Governor's rule i.e. on March 18, the government obtained 164-0 votes in a division on one of the budget demands — a clear majority in a House of 304. So, it would appear that the latest unholy alliance of the M.L.-R.P. and crossing of the floor on the part of few M.L.A.s disturbed the overall majority confidence hitherto enjoyed by the R.P. Ministry.

Presumably the Prime Minister got an understanding from the M.L. leaders to the effect that they would not sabotage the Constitution should they form the Ministry. Governor Gurmani was aware of it and lately showing signs of Constitutional restraint, in that he did not restore the R.P. government on July 2 and told Dr. Khan that his present number of supporters — 146 was short of required number for a majority. Daultana appealed to the central government

to give the M.L. an opportunity for showing their relevant parliamentary strength.  

26. The Prime Minister who was at London and had a long distance telephone conversation with Daultana wrote to the Governor to postpone the restoration of parliamentary government in West Pakistan till his arrival.  

27. If the M.L. could have shown its parliamentary strength convincingly and promised to slur over the issue of the disintegration of one-unit, Suhrawardy would have gone for the formation of the alternative government. This would have taken the edge off of some of the distasteful squabbles that were the political vogue of the day. But this line of action could not be pursued as the senior partners of the coalition government at the centre, namely the R.P. which had a strong feeling that the Prime Minister might prevent their return to power in West Pakistan restored the Republican administration on July 15 while Suhrawardy was out of the country.  

28. Subsequently, Governor Gurmani had to quit, making room for Akhtar Hossain.*

* However, when the R.P. administration was restored under the leadership of Sardar Abdur Rashid, who replaced Dr. Khan, there was a repetition of the earlier situation as far as the unhealthy alliances

were concerned. The R.P. government which was able to display majority support in the legislature which met on September 14 had in its turn to follow the footsteps of the M.L. The N.A.P. which was holding the balance between the two parties in the Assembly had to be wooed and an entente of R.P.-N.A.P. came into being exactly on the following lines as that of the erstwhile M.L.-N.P. one. The ramifications of the R.P.-N.A.P. alliance have been explained earlier. Suffice it to say that the main purpose of the alliance from the N.A.P.'s point of view did not fructify. Whereas, the Republican purpose was served; for, it ensured a parliamentary majority. However, from July 15, 1957 till October 7, 1958 there had been no tangible cases of trouble in the formation of any Ministry. Though there was a change of Chief Minister, in that Sardar Abdur Rashid joined the centre as the Foreign Minister making room for Sir M.A. Qizilbash whose Ministry duly survived a confidence vote on March 20, 1958 when it was only two-days old. The reasons for this temporary lull in an otherwise politically embroiled Province were apparently the following. The general elections were almost due. The M.L. having been frustrated in its bid to capture power chose to invest its energies in the consolidation of its electoral position. The same was true of the N.A.P. which, having flirted with both the parties e.g. the M.L. and R.P. to press their services

* The formation of the N.A.P. was also discussed earlier.

to the cause of anti one-unit found them utterly insincere. With the trust shaken in the unholy alliances the N.A.P. also cast its eyes upon the impending elections.

It is, however, worth bearing in mind that not only were the parliamentary institutions on trial but the new province itself was subjected to an ordeal. The politics of West Pakistan was now the politics of all the former provinces and states put together. Shortcomings were obvious, virtues hoped for. Initially, parliamentary politics of West Pakistan was bound to be complex, suspicious and strenuous. The proximate cause, however, which really bedevilled West Pakistan politics was not personal self-seeking alone but the unwillingness of the M.L. to reconcile itself to its position as an opposition party. Surely it was silly, unimaginative and undignified on the part of an old political party like the M.L. to have entered into a deal with the N.P. to undo a project of which it was the main architect. In retrospect, it can be said that the leaguers did not mean to undo the one-unit. But the fact remained that it was an unprincipled manoeuvre to capture power. Of course, they woke up when they found Republicans having the same arrangement with the N.A.P. As the leader of the M.L. Assembly Party was heard saying "All this is a dirty business and I must be the first to be condemned for it." As a matter of fact the one-unit issue had been genuinely a settled fact with both the major parties - the M.L. and R.P. - and

was used only to enlist support of the N.P./N.A.P. to retain or capture power. And because of the R.P.'s having a small edge over the M.L. in terms of parliamentary strength the latter had the underlying urge of tilting the balance in its favour. One, however, could have some sympathy for the M.L. as an old party having a history and a good deal of mass contact when contrasted with other parties which had recently mushroomed. Apart from its deal with the N.P., the M.L. in the course of fighting for its cause indirectly contributed to the country's democratic good. It fought on the party platform, in the N.A. for the revocation of the governor's rule from West Pakistan. Its great contribution was the legal fight it put up in the Supreme Court against the President's application seeking advice if the Provincial Governor was empowered to dissolve the Provincial Assembly.

The President's reference case had the significance of great constitutional import. The President's application was successfully controverted by Nishtar* and Nazir Ahmed, counsels for the leaders of opposition in the National Assembly and West Pakistan Assembly, so much so that the court pronounced its judgment that the Assemblies could not be dissolved before the general elections and directed the central government to pay Rs. 5,000 to the leaders of the opposition in the National Assembly and Provincial Assemblies as compensation.

* The President of the M.L.


These were the few laudable examples set by the M.L. which, though marginal in themselves, had a cumulative effect in changing attitudes and institutions.

However, the first thing which strikes one when comparing the period of 1947-1954 with the 1955-1958, is the fact that the politics of the latter period was conducted in an atmosphere of comparative freedom and competitiveness. There had been no gross example of political victimisation. The first thing the West Pakistan government did was the granting of amnesty to all political detainees.\(^{33}\)

Secondly, the parliamentary government in West Pakistan was disturbed by slightly over 3 months of Governor's rule during the entire period of 2 years, 11 months and 21 days of parliamentary life. Whereas in the days of the first Constituent Assembly Governor's rule was imposed on many an occasion on the former Provinces of West Pakistan and East Pakistan as well. For example, the parliamentary government of the former Punjab Province was suspended for 2 years and two months, Sind for 1 year and 3 months and East Pakistan for 1 year and 8 days.\(^{34}\)

Thirdly, in earlier periods Governor's rule was invariably imposed on the sole initiative of the central government under many a pretext in order mainly to make the provinces toe the line of the centre. Whereas for the first time in Pakistan Governor's rule was imposed

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on the advice of the Chief Minister which had an air of parliamentary convention. The section 193 was a contingency provision retained in the Constitution to take care of a political situation when a province could no longer be governed through normal parliamentary procedure. Even the Indian President under the same provision had to assume the administration of PEPSU in March 1953, Andhra in November, 1954 and Kerala on March 23, 1956. The power of this constitutional provision had, however, been abused in the past. But the present situation had some distinct features in that the central government within a month's time submitted the Presidential Proclamation to the N.A. for its approval* which the House endorsed after having debated the issue for a few days. What was more, the three-months budget which had to be certified by the Governor on account of the promulgation of 193 in the midst of the budget session was duly scrutinised, debated and passed by the N.A.** In other words, the constitutional mechanism was utilised (Sub-section (d) of Section 193 of the Constitution) so that M.P.A.s particularly those representing West Pakistan*** had the opportunity of seeing expenditure of public money duly authorised by the people's representatives - which had not occurred in earlier periods.

Fourthly, in the days of the first Constituent Assembly the

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* See N.A.D., Vol. II, April 11, p. 175.

** One redeeming feature of double membership.

*** See N.A.D., April 18 and 20, 1957, pp. 636-668 and 806-828 respectively.
formation of the Ministry and appointment of the Provincial Chief Ministers the central government which was indistinguishable from the M.L. had a deliberate role to play. Whereas, in the present context it was the provincial parliamentary party itself who always did the selecting of its leaders, Dr. Khan was replaced by Sardar Rashid who in his turn by Sir Qasim Rashid - all these changes took place without the direct intervention of the centre. That meant the centre compared to earlier days tended to be less involved in provincial politics. On the contrary provinces themselves showed tendency to enlist support of the national government to their respective causes. In sum, the provinces in the latter periods had some freedom of action.

The Legislature

The remarkable thing about the West Pakistan legislature was its containing a powerful and sizeable opposition - first of its kind. But in reality the legislature could be likened to a new 'power plant' which, though had huge potentiality was not exploited to its fullest capacity. For a great deal of valuable time was wasted in the wrangles of party politics. In addition there was some intrinsic difficulties the legislature had yet to survive. The West Pakistan legislature resembled the session of the United National General Assembly in miniature. The Dawn reported its impression of the

first session of the legislature: "The House wore a strange appearance since it was the first occasion that members from all regions of West Pakistan were seen sitting together... they could be recognized easily as they were sitting in groups, many of them in their typical dresses."37 Doubts, hesitancy, shyness, curiosity, the presence of unfamiliar faces, all these factors psychologically inhibited the M.L.A.s from shaking off the effect of the new environment and acting in collective unison within the House, based on programmes to the exclusion of particularistic approach. The M.L.A.s, as it were, were having a new orientation course in the West Pakistan legislature.

However, some impressions of the make-up of the legislature may be had by looking at the following figures which indicate a partial picture of the membership pattern of a large number of M.L.A.s:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lawyers</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Graduates</td>
<td>66*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zamindars</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Businessmen</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Ministers</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Chief Ministers</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Governors</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Speakers and Deputy Speakers</td>
<td>6; Total 234.38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The rest of the members of whose whereabouts were not available seemed to have come from the former states, Baluchistan and tribal areas.

* They may be equally found among the categories of Ministers, Governors, University Graduates, etc., etc.


The chances were that those members were not enlightened from a parliamentary point of view. The Assembly met in 1956 twice for 23 days, in 1957 thrice for 30 days and in 1958 twice for 25 days. During these periods e.g. 78 working days, it passed three budgets. Flood, the Governor's rule and the need to enable some of the M.L.A.s who were also M.P.s to attend the N.A. Session were some of the reasons that led to the curtailing of legislative sittings. Nonetheless, the legislative sittings were inadequate. Generally 6 days were given for the general discussion of the budget and 8 days for the voting of grants. Having examined the parliamentary reports it seems to us that the opposition - the M.L. strength in the House was never below the mark of 100 - put up a tough parliamentary vigilance. Usually during the budget sessions they directed their attacks against the government policies relating to taxation, general administration, food, refugee rehabilitation and lastly the one-unit. On the demand for a grant for general administration Syed Amir Hossain Shah pointed out the precarious position of the Ministers and people's representatives under the framework of the new administration. For, in the new situation the people's representatives became less visible. It was more so as the politicians were torn by internal strife making bureaucracy the "ultimate arbiter of people's destinies". This was a well-timed warning so that the government


could stem the tide of bureaucratization by decentralising and

polo giving more power to local government units and at the same time

making people's representatives more visible. The government at

least responded to the suggestion by allowing members free first

class railway tickets to visit any part of the Province to see

the conditions of the people themselves. The opposition within

the range of these 78 days reminded themselves and the government

the following: that there should be unity amongst themselves to

work out this new experiment of the one-unit; that there should be

more governmental activities suitable for bringing about psychological

integration among the people; that the promises given to the smaller

units ought to be fulfilled; lastly that there must be agrarian

reform, economy in the expenditure - a member vehemently objected to

Governor's spending Rs. 45,000 per months when a poor man's per

capita income was 5 annas only - and relief to taxpayers. Generally,

the budget sessions looked serious and sombre, but sometimes the

raising of frivolous points marred that atmosphere. For example,

the statement that "It is tragic when men create difficulties in

such circumstances to pursue their own ends in utter disregard of

the national interests" in a 1,000 word budget speech of the Finance

Minister witnessed an opposition walk-out; for, they thought it


applied to them. On the legislative side, the House enacted 79 Bills of which 4 were referred to the Select Committees. Most of the Bills passed were non-controversial in the sense that they were former provincial laws which had to be adjusted to the new situation. The opposition sought to prevent the government from hustling through Bills. A battle of wits between the R.P. and M.L. lasting for 3½ hours in the Autumn session of 1958 blocked the government bid to rush through Bills. Of the Bills passed 5 appeared to be quite important e.g. the West Pakistan (Adaptation and Repeal of Laws) Bill - this was of historic importance in that it took the notorious Bengal Regulations of 1818 off the Statute Book – the Development Fund Cess Bill, Members' Allowance Bill, Ministers' Salaries, Allowances and Privileges Bill and Members' Privileges Bill. The Members' Allowance Bill took a 6½ hours marathon session to pass. The Ministers' Salaries etc. Bill consumed 14 hours spread over 3 days including 1 division (130-75) to be enacted. The Development Cess Bill was debated for 3 days. The last 4-day session of 1958 - August 25 - August 28 - spent 33 hours exclusively to dispose of 11 Bills of which the passage of the Members' Privilege Bill was one.  

In regards to ventilation of grievances and putting a check upon the government through parliamentary machinery, the use of question hour apart, there were as many as 108* adjournment motions

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43. Calculated by the writer by going through the reporting of each Assembly sitting.

43. Ibid., March 10, 1957. Footnote /Contd. over.
on subjects like food, refugees, Algerian Muslims, the Pakhtoonistan flags on Afghan Consulate, Nehru's claim on Chitral, the ejection of tenants by landlords, seditious act of Red shirts, police coercion, etc., were proposed to be moved of which only 4 were debated. As usual the rest could not stand the rigours of rules. However, the Assembly rules (Number 12) permitted a half hour discussion on important issues at the end of each sitting, except when the House was discussing the budget. This was a good practice, indeed. The interesting thing was that the West Pakistan legislature showed its keenness to discuss things pertaining to India and International Muslim affairs - an area of central government's concern. The House obviously failed to discuss the pressing problems of ejections of tenants by the landlords, though it could find time to make a straw-man of Nehru's claim on Chitral and punch it for 3 hours in a special sitting.

The most unfortunate thing was the bad relationship between the Speaker and the opposition which impeded a good deal of parliamentary progress. It was obvious that the newcomers were not conversant with the parliamentary niceties as to how, where and when to raise a point. This was the Speaker's opportunity, and should have been his duty to assist the beginners with patience, respect and tact.

Footnote continued from previous page.
47. Ibid., May 29, 1956.
Instead, he appeared to be gruff and arrogant to the opposition members. As many as 33 adjournment motions were ruled out by the Speaker on the ground that it was a budget session, which actually was not true. 48 He would occasionally crack at a member "sit down", instead of saying "Please, sit down". Members were bodily removed from the House by the Sergeant-at-arms at the behest of the Speaker, 49 though he could have been lenient. Similarly, some fanatical members would show disrespect to the Speaker on the ground of his shaking hands with the women M.L.A.s while taking the membership oath and allowing them to sit in the House with their faces unveiled, which appeared to be unislamic to them. 50 On Balance, the Speaker appeared to be patronising and unsympathetic to the opposition. Eventually, the Speaker wrote to the leader of the opposition assuring improved behaviour. On that ground the opposition also forgave him in not pressing a division on a no-confidence motion against the Speaker which was debated for three consecutive days. 51

However, the House had some moments of truth when it showed its capability of debating on some of the issues of the country with decorum and dignity. The debates on a resolution on the electorate continued for four days followed by 2 divisions, on refugee rehabili-

49. Ibid., August 3, 1956; January 29, 1957; February 1, 1957.
50. Ibid., May 21, 1956.
51. Ibid., March 2, 3 and 4, 1957.
tation 5 hours followed by 1 division. Similarly, on the motion on parliamentary privilege, and resolution asking for a probe into assets of the people who had become suddenly rich after partition the debates of the House appeared serious. Messrs. S.M. Bennet and F. Tomney, British M.P.s who watched the proceedings of the budget session of 1957 appreciated the high level of debate. Members were capable of raising finer parliamentary points. For instance, Mr. Allana (M.L.) told the House, which was called into session after its prorogation in the midst of the budget session, by refuting the arguments of the Advocate General, who came to the House to define the legal position of the budget, that the budget consideration be taken de novo. He explained that three eventualities were contemplated in the presentation of the budget e.g. either the budget was to be rejected or accepted with amendments or passed as it was. This raising of point of order enabled the House to discuss the budget once again in a new situation.

On the count of what Professor Laski called 'the selective function of the House' the West Pakistan legislature produced quite a number of good parliamentarians e.g. Daultana, Bahadur Khan, Qayum Khan, Pirzada, Sardar Rashid, Allana, Rana G.M. Noon, Mian Md. Shafi etc. Of the women members Begum Zari Sarfraz of Mardan, Begum Tahira Agha of Hyderabad, Begum Fida Hossain* of the former Punjab proved

* They were made Parliamentary Secretary and Deputy Minister respectively.

53. Ibid., September 16, 1957.
Despite the existence of highly inflammable relationship between the government and opposition, there were instances when both the parties accommodated each other. In as many as 5 Bills the opposition cooperated with the government in passing them and the suggestions made thereto were appreciated by the government. Similarly, the Chief Minister himself on behalf of the government persuaded the opposition from the lobbies back to the House who had earlier walked out as a protest against the guillotining of the legislation, on a promise that the Assembly sittings of the Spring session of 1958 would be extended to 21 days with arrangements for midnight sittings.

Members were concerned about the misdemeanour on the part of their colleagues so far as the habit of floor-crossing was concerned. Quoting the example of the House of Commons which passed a resolution in 1695 forbidding any sort of misdemeanour on the part of the members, Mr. Allana impressed upon the House to emulate that example. What was more, an independent party within the Assembly was formed with a nucleus of 8 members led by Mir Balakh Sher Mazarî pledging themselves to act as "corrective influence" in the working of the parliamentary life of the country by steering clear of unhealthy party wrangles. By quoting this we do not point out their actual achievements but to say that the members were aware of their limitations which was a meaningful sign.

54. Ibid., June 6, 1956.
56. Ibid., March 26, 1957.
However, taking everything together it can be said that the West Pakistan legislature was fortunate to have a strong opposition which had the potentiality of forming an alternative government. One's impression is that had there been general elections there would have been no prospect for poly-partisan politics i.e. there would not have emerged a situation of competition among nearly equal parties. This assumption is made by making due allowances for the religious parties - at this point there was no religious party in the Assembly - which might enter the new legislature after the elections. This is precisely because the parties stood at the point in the political spectrum where their respective attitudes to issues overlapped, despite their distinctiveness. For instance, the R.P. resembled the N.A.P. on the broad issue of non-communalism, but stood apart on the agrarian point. Whereas, the M.L., though communal had more in common with the N.A.P. as far as the agrarian issues were concerned. This was a mitigating aspect of existing party cleavages. By all indications, the general elections would not have given an overwhelming majority either to M.L.* or R.P. in the legislature. A coalition government was inevitable. Considering the fact that there was no minority problem in West Pakistan, the N.A.P., whose number would have expectedly increased in the new legislature, might have chosen to join or back up a M.L.-led coalition government in West Pakistan ** after the

* No doubt, the M.L. would have a clear edge over the R.P. and for that matter any party in the elections.

** It is equally possible that the N.A.P. might have chosen to remain in the legislature as a socialist opposition - in the event the M.L. succeeded in developing a working relationship with the A.L.
elections. This was more probable on socio-economic consideration. Already a trend towards that direction was visible 7 months prior to the martial law. Disillusioned in their attempt to undo the one-unit through secret deals with both the M.L. and R.P., the N.A.P. entered into a pact with the M.L. based on a 16-point programme inside the legislature. They skipped over the ideological issues and concentrated on socio-economic issues. Nineteen M.P.s in a statement expressed surprise at it. This new line was clearly reflected in the West Pakistan legislature.57

And, as far as the essentially important aspect of West Pakistan politics was concerned i.e. to make the politics mass-based, accessible and humane, social revolution was the panacea. On that score we can only commit a foreign observer's opinion to paper: "Feudalism will go (by legislation or revolution) and a rural middle class with a stake in stability will be created. Already in that desert owner-peasants are being settled on reclaimed land; and in the towns there is a steady creation of an urban middle-class. The Services ... contribute to the formation of a middle-class; every Sergeant Major's son ... - and there are many - or every small landlord's son who becomes a lawyer or a veterinary surgeon is a pawn in the right direction. Even middle class girls are slowly becoming doctors and teachers ... The creation of a genuine middle-class is therefore only a matter of time."58

57. See Dawn, March 18, 19 and 25, 1958.
58. See Taya Zinkin's article, Manchester Guardian, January 10, 1955.
EAST PAKISTAN

The socio-political ecology of East Pakistan was in marked contrast with that of the western half. According to Lasswell, politics is the study of "who gets what, when and how" and it was in the analysis of the social stratification "which answers 'who gets what, when and how'". 59

The people of East Pakistan dragged themselves out from the slough of feudalistic order as soon as the feudal (also money-lending) class, the Hindus dashed to West Bengal (India) following the creation of Pakistan. This was rather an automatic social emancipation. Eventually, the government by a legislative act clinched the issue by abolishing landlordism. Dr. Nazmul Karim, a social scientist, University of Dacca who having done a survey of East Pakistan districtwise opined that quite a large number of districts were already for a long time middle-class-oriented, and the class consciousness based on nobility of birth or land was fast fading out. He continued that "the establishment of Pakistan meant the creation of a significant middle class among the Muslims of East Pakistan who have adopted the middle class way of living. As most of them have come from the masses of the people, they retain their connections with the latter who have also been trying to copy the aspirations and the

standards of living of the middle class."

This middle class was drawn from all classes. A merchant class recruited from all strata of society also came into being. As a result "The middle class and the merchant class are the two classes which are the most powerful ... of all classes in East Pakistani Society. The pretensions of 'nobility' ... classes have little or no value to these new classes who have risen to power and position not because of birth, but because of their merit and enterprise." 

So the very nature of the social configuration of East Pakistan compared to the Western half made politics broad based, accessible and involved. Besides, among the Provinces East Pakistan with 21.1 per cent had the best literacy figures - the average in West Pakistan was about 16 per cent. The middle class of East Pakistan was not urban in attitude as 95.6 per cent of the population lived in the rural area leaving only 4.4 per cent in urban areas. Firstly, the villages were the basic units of East Pakistan society. They survived the ravages of centuries. Secondly, the industrialisation process was not as rapid as it was in West Pakistan - the rate of urbanization, says the 1961 census, in West Pakistan is 22.5 per cent.


61. Ibid., "Social Stratification Patterns among Muslims", p. 149. See also A.K. Nazmul Karim, Changing Society in India and Pakistan (Oxford University Press, Dacca: 1956),

compared to East's 5.2 per cent. Thirdly, the industrial policy of the East Pakistan government was not precisely urban-oriented. That meant the values of village institutions which were not appreciably disturbed were bound to reflect in the legislature which was situated in the metropolis. More than 80 per cent of the people's representatives hailed from the rural surroundings which also had loyalties to local indigenous institutions. The dynamics of provincial politics were also connected with the dynamics of rural society. Apart from the positive aspects of local institutions there were 'village factions' in many a developing society. The term 'village factions' refers to "groups or sections of a society in relations of opposition to one another, interested in promoting their own objects rather than those of the society as a whole and often turbulent in their operations." The tradition of village factions from which most of the M.L.A.s of East Pakistan came was an added complication to the country's politics. Factionalism, caste recognition, village and kinship loyalties were all beginning to diminish but were still exerting what Karl von Voys called "pressures of anomie".

There was, however, a demographic significance of politics in that the population distribution of East Pakistan was pyramidal.


More than 51 per cent of Muslims, and Hindus were in the age-group of 10-39. Around 16 per cent of Muslims and Hindus were in the age structure of 40-59. This meant that the preponderance of young and middle-aged population in East Pakistan society was contributory towards surcharging political institutions with radical thoughts. It also meant that politicians themselves would have the psychological urge for higher expectations.

On the question of religion which was a great factor in the politics of Pakistan as a whole, East Pakistan, on balance, appeared more moderate. Hers was the Islamic faith just as an expression of simple piety, compared to the West Pakistan attitude to Islam which could, by democratic standards, appear as a reactionary political force. In other words, East Pakistan politics had secular contents. On linguistic, cultural and social considerations East Pakistan was distinctly a homogeneous national unit—save for some 385,000 hill tribes people in the Chittagong hill tracts.

Theoretically—and in comparison with West Pakistan—East Pakistan had democratic viability. It had a pervasive middle class, homogeneity, literacy,* secularity, political consciousness and a good deal of populist movements. But despite the presence of a

* The number of literates, says the Census Report of 1961, in East Pakistan was 17.6 per cent compared to West Pakistan's 13.6 per cent. Quoted in Report of the Commission on National Education (Government of Pakistan Press: 1960), p. 183.

viable resource base she fell a good deal short of expectation. The renaissance of independence set the people free, but did not give the restraint of reformation which was to come through a prolonged winnowing process. East Pakistanis till the advent of Pakistan did not relish "any real freedom or sovereignty. They have been in run ruled either by the caste Hindus, Moghals, Pathans or the British ... As such they have all the inhibitions of downtrodden races and have not yet found it possible psychologically to adjust to the requirements of their new-born freedom."66 Despite the sameness of race and culture East Pakistan society remained functionally fragmented for generations as the people had never been mobilized for a sustained unified action for a collective goal. Dr. Sen once gave an anthropological suggestion towards Bengalis' forming a common and collective outlook. He said rice was the staple food for Bengalis and in the process of cooking all together, one had to only press a few grains to determine if the rest were boiled properly — an example of unity. Whereas, the West Pakistanis, whose staple food was Roti had to make everyone separately — an example of individualism.67 It was no doubt an interesting suggestion, but the fact remains that the grains of rice stay always distinct and separate from each other, no matter how they are cooked together. That was why critics of Bengali

* A sort of flat round bread made of flour.

66. Karl von Vorys, op.cit., p. 299

behaviourism in the past rightly warned that the middle class of Bengal would destroy themselves mutually without outside help.

The people of densely populated East Pakistan - the population density varied from a high of almost 2,000 persons per square mile in several sub-divisions of East Pakistan to a low of one per square mile in Dalbandin Tehsil of Baluchistan in West Pakistan - with their eyes open, tongue let loose, and intellect emancipated came out into the open to push up their respective interests, grievances, ideas and beliefs. Groups and parties were formed along those lines. A unified political line of action, however, advisable, could not be pursued in the beginning because of existing pluralistic trends. Hence, East Pakistan assumed the form of a veritable 'market polity'.

It has been mentioned earlier how and in what way the then Prime Minister Mohammad Ali restored the U.F. government in East Pakistan headed by Sarkar in June, 1955. Personal considerations apart, the Prime Minister's entrusting the task of governance with the particular group of people had also the force of an underlying policy-logic that was consistently followed by the central government. Consumed with anxieties for possible communist subversion in East Pakistan which might act upon country's foreign policy the Prime Minister took a cautious line. The centre till then had nothing but suspicion and hatred for the U.F. General Mirza who had earlier given his "considered opinion that the United Front leaders are the enemies

68. Stanley Maron, op.cit., p. 11.
of Pakistan and cannot be trusted", 69 was now at the centre as the
Minister for Interior. His advice to the Prime Minister could not
be negligible.

Now that the restoration of parliamentary government was inevi-
table in East Pakistan a choice had to be made of the 'lesser evils'
from amongst the U.F. men to run the government. The strength of
the parties forming the U.F. was given on April 1, 1954 as A.L. 142,
K.S.P. 48, N-I-P 19, and Ganatantri Dal 15. 70 By mid-October, 1954
the party strength in the legislature was stated by T. Hossain (K.S.P.)
to be the following: A.L. 96, K.S.P. 86, N-I-P 24, G.D. 13 and
Independent 1. 71 There was always some discrepancy in the numbers
as each party had a tendency of claiming more than its actual number.
But the fact remained that A.L. had been always the largest single
majority party in the legislature.

Which party could be entrusted with the provincial administration
from centre's angle? Ordinarily, it ought to have been the A.L. to
form the coalition government. But this was a forbidding proposition
for the centre to take the A.L. into confidence, whose prominent
leaders like Bhasani and Ataur Rahman attended peace meetings in
Europe and Peking which appeared to be 'communist-inspired' in the

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* To the writer's knowledge the A.L. number should be 107.
** It seems the A.L. dissident group was added to the K.S.P. number.

69. Governor's letter to the Governor General, D.O. No. 101/FS
70. Dawn, April 2, 1954.
71. Ibid., October 20, 1954.
centre's eyes. Did not A. Rahman call a memorial meeting for Stalin in Dacca? So, the Prime Minister preferred the conservative K.S.P. to the progressive A.L. A few leaders of the K.S.P. had past associations with the Congress, Swarajist Party and Forward Bloc of Subhas Bose - a fact which was not particularly to the centre's liking. But their past histories were rationalised, so long they were found avowedly anticomunist. Whereas, an A.L. coalition government would let the communists c row over the head of the government. Another factor which seemed to have prompted the Prime Minister to hand over administration to the U.F. was the consideration that given Haq's immense prestige and popularity among the masses of the people the Prime Minister would be able to, with Haq's backing in the Constituent Assembly II, go down to history by giving to the country a Constitution. Besides, Haq's recruitment to the central government - Sarkar was nominated by Haq to form the U.F. coalition government in East Pakistan with the Congress, U.P.P. and Scheduled Caste Federation etc. - would assuage Hindu apprehension vis-a-vis constitution-making. For, Haq claimed to have "enjoyed the confidence of Hindu leaders for more than half a century". These are some of the motivating factors that led the Prime Minister to restore the Haq-oriented U.F. coalition government - it was indeed the Prime Minister's solo per-

73. Haq's speech in the Constituent Assembly II quoted in Dawn, January 24, 1956.
formance without the knowledge of the central cabinet, but we wonder if any other decision could have been taken by the Cabinet which was, on balance, anti-A.L.

The U.F. government was composed of people who had long political records to their credit. Most of them were now relatively elderly and incapable of giving a dynamic leadership. None had the charisma and elan of their leader, Haq, who was now placed at the centre. So the government had an intrinsic difficulty when contrasted with the opposition whose members were vigorous, enthusiastic and young.

Initially, the U.F. government had an invigorating start. For the first time 3 minority members were taken as Ministers. Mr. B.K. Das, leader of the Congress Party, was entrusted with the portfolio of finance - a meaningful gesture that was even hailed by Indian newspapers.74 As many as 500 political prisoners were released - there were no less than 1600 people who were in jail during the 92-A regime - and a general amnesty was granted to those so-called political offenders against whom legal or police proceedings were pending.75

But soon the government was engulfed with wrecking problems which in attempting to solve it showed more nervousness than steadiness of purpose. At the same time it was not inclined to relinquish office. The favourites of Ministers were made departmental heads which brought about disorganisation in the departments. When the

74. Times, September 8, 1955.

food crisis loomed large, huge quantities of rice were released from the government stores and permits were given to the party supporters to buy rice which was sold, to the detriment of common people, at a higher price in the market. This decision was taken by the government in the teeth of opposition by high officials who had years of experience in the fields. Industrial, educational and house building programmes were hampered. In the cultural field the Arts Council which had done so much in opening up a new vista for the youth was in a state of decadence. The Province's 40,000 policemen who had vainly hoped that the U.F. government would increase their salaries - their monthly salaries were very poor so much so that they were driven to take bribery as a rule - suddenly struck. The government in desperation arrested prominent M.L.A.s including 2 M.P.s on charges of collusion with the strikers and sent 600 policemen for trial. Similarly, 1200 class IV employees in all departments of the provincial secretariat struck. All these incidents made the people in general and youth in particular experience "a sense of frustration".

On parliamentary count, the legislature was not summoned - since it was elected the legislature had not the occasion to meet properly except for a day to elect its Speaker and Deputy Speaker and administer the oath to members - ever since the Sarkar Ministry was inducted

77. See Dawn, April 26 and 28, 1956 and Hindu, April 28, 1956.
78. Ibid., January 3, 1956.
into office. There were some excuses, no doubt; since, the Finance Minister including other M.L.A.s had to participate in the constitution-making i.e. to attend the sessions of the Constituent Assembly II. But this excuse could not be tenable when the Governor General made a two-month extension* in the deadline for the presentation of the provincial budget.79 He - General Mirza - did it precisely to save the U.F. Ministry from the ordeal of facing the legislature and to enlist the U.F. support for his election as the first President of the Republic of Pakistan. Even the octogenarian Haq was sent to East Pakistan in March, 1956 as Governor,80 as soon as the Constitution Bill was passed, to bolster up the U.F. government. Not only was the legislature not summoned but several bye-elections were not declared.

However, when the legislature at longlast met on 22nd May, 1956 the Speaker after 7 hours of debate on points of order raised by the opposition about the illegality of presenting the budget, barred the government from moving the budget. In his ruling the Speaker took the government to task for allowing only 5 days for general discussions on the budget and for voting on the demands for grants. Considering that the budget had to be passed by May 31, and that some holidays would intervene, the Speaker refused to go down in history by applying the guillotine only after 3 or 4 days of budget discussion, which would have meant that the legislature was not

* April, 1956 - May, 1956.
taken into consideration vis-a-vis country's financial proposals.\footnote{81}{See Times, May 23, 1956 and Dawn, May 23, 1956.} Indeed, the Speaker's ruling was an important milestone in asserting parliamentary conventions. As a result of the deadlock the Presidential rule was clamped in the province. The Presidential Proclamation was revoked within a week's time but the same Sarkar Ministry was restored. And when the Assembly was scheduled to meet in August the Governor suddenly prorogued the Assembly just a few hours before the budget meeting was due. The opposition member in a rump session adopted a resolution charging Governor's action aimed to help his provincial Ministry, which no longer commanded a majority.\footnote{82}{New York Times, August 14, 1956.}

Given the fact that East Pakistan was predominantly middle-class — even though it was weak by western standard — parliamentary politics could not be dictated upon by a ruling party capriciously for long. For, countervailing forces were operative. The Sarkar Ministry was a coalition born of a desire of following a minimum programme mutually acceptable. When the lowest common denominator was forgotten, the rationale of coalition government could no longer be sustained. Sarkar being the leader of the coalition government could neither soothe the N-I-P in pushing through a resolution in the legislature recommending separate electorates, nor could he convince the Congress of doing the same in the opposite direction, namely joint electorate. Similarly, he appeared circumlocutory to the G.D.'s 5-point demand of which unconditional release of all political prisoners, holding
of by-elections and summoning of the legislature, etc. were prominent. In short, he was a "bondless leader" incapable of undertaking things in which he himself believed. As a result, the G.D. quit the U.F. on 3rd January, 1956. The U.P.P. withdrew from the meeting of the U.F. parliamentary party on 9th of January, 1956 and the Congress on the same date served an ultimatum on the government. What was more, 2 Ministers belonging to the right wing component of the U.F. resigned as a protest to Governor's sudden prorogation of the Assembly. That the dissident A.M.L. was not happy with the U.F. could be understood in their leaders' - Abdus Salam Khan and Hashimuddin - leaving the Ministry in July, 1956. 83 It was almost sure that had there been a proper legislative session Sarkar would have met his Waterloo. And the interesting thing was this that some of the supporters of the U.F. government on many an occasion tried to bring pressure on Sarkar to call legislative session. They could not be very aggressive lest they should lose membership of the Legislature; for, Sarkar once threatened dissolution of the Assembly. The feeling that there was something undemocratic about the running of the U.F. government was there within the coalescing parties and splinter groups appeared accordingly. This was indicative in the sense that the U.F. itself, finally in a meeting on August 29, 1956, took the decision of asking its own leader to tender resignation. 84

83. See Dawn, January 4, 9, August 24 and July 14, 1956 respectively.
So far as outside pressure was concerned, the A.L. opposition being deprived of fighting the Sarkar government from inside the legislature took the matter to the people and successfully mobilized public opinion against the government. Food scarcity which was virtually out of the frying pan into the fire helped the A.L. enlist people's wrath against the administration. Students and hungry crowds stormed the residence of the Chief Minister. Even a K.S.P. called public meeting was abandoned when "screaming women rushed to the dais" accusing government mismanagement of the present food situation. The A.L. later insisted that the government should declare the province a famine area, when Bhasani went on a spectacular fast to hurt the government more on the food front. What was more, the A.L. observed general strike and protest meetings in both parts of Pakistan on August 27, 1956 against the Governor's prorogation of the Assembly. The situation became more charged in East Pakistan when police opened fire on a 'hunger march' in Dacca killing 4 people. The incident lent itself to the claim that the people were given bullets instead of food. It will appear that mounting pressures of various kinds and from various quarters were brought to bear upon

87. See Dawn, August 28, 1956.
the government to mend its ways. Even the centre — General Mirza, now the President, was chary about doing something unconstitutional at the very start of the Republic — turned its back to the Sarkar Ministry and advised constitutionalism.

Enough was enough, and the Sarkar Ministry relinquished office on August 30, 1956 thus culminating what was called "an inglorious regime". But, while departing Sarkar cultivated, to the embarrassment of the next government, the art of the political impresario. For, he announced a proposal to nationalise the jute industry, decisions to abolish the jute licence fee recoverable from jute cultivators and write off Rs.1,75,00,000 on agricultural rent, which was outstanding against cultivators of acquired estates. However, having exhausted his bag of tricks to keep the discredited U.F. Ministry in office, the Governor was now compelled by the forces of democracy to call the opposition parties to form an alternative government. Ataur Rahman (A.L.) on the 6th September, 1956 constructed a broad-based coalition with all the parties except the U.F. and M.L. — the name of U.F. which now consisted of only the K.S.P. and N-I-P** was retained as a political stunt, and the M.L. was voiceless in the House. This time two Caste Hindus were taken, of whom one M. Dhar was allotted the portfolio of Finance. The Cabinet was

* The A.L., Congress, part of U.P.P., Scheduled Caste Federation (S.C.F.) and the G.D.

** It finally severed ties with the U.F. on September 17, 1956. See Dawn, September 18, 1956.

89. G.W. Chowdhury, op.cit., p. 117.
young compared to its predecessor. It had an intense urge for doing something positive for the country.

How passionate was Rahman's vision of his country can be gauged from these following lines he wrote subsequently in his book:

"I was inspired. How often have I been conjuring up the golden land of Bengal in my reverie for the last twenty-five years of my life — sketching its grandeur on the canvas of my mind and building many a Taj Mahal in imagination. Much had I read about the legend of golden Bengal in epic, literature and rhapsody, heard the earth was so kind that she used to laugh with a harvest of gold whenever tickled with a hoe. Clusters of gold used to hang round those magic trees — and there the wind blew dusts of gold. The land of golden people — they exhaled pearls in their laughter, rubies in their tears." 91

With this zeal of bringing back the glory of the country, Rahman was said to have assumed the Chief Ministership. Unprecedented, the Chief Minister and his colleagues with bouquets of flowers went to the Zail Gate to receive political prisoners* — some of them were languishing in the prison for more than 7/8 years without trial — whom they had just released unconditionally. Having been swept into office under the most forbidding situation when the land was in the grip of famine, the A.L.-led coalition government ordered a general mobilisation of the entire government machinery for handling the food crisis.

* The U.F. government did not release all.

91. Translated into English from Bengali by the writer, Ataur Rahman op.cit., p. 98.
An urgent Food Conference was called in which the Prime Minister himself came all the way from Karachi. The party (A.L.) itself was not complacent now that it had captured power. For Bhasani warned his own government that unless at least 17 lakh maunds of rice was sent out to feed East Pakistan's 6,000 villages within a fortnight the government would not last more than 6 months. And it was to the credit of the government that it succeeded considerably in tackling the good problem and saving people from starvation.

Less than fortnight after its assumption of office the government called a regular session of the legislature and had the budget and the resolution recommending the joint electorates passed. Similarly, all the bye-elections were declared as promised in the 21-point programme. This told of the faith the government had in parliamentarianism. During its two-year stay in power the government had these achievements to its credit. The most ill-omened Public Safety Act which was virtually abused to silence political criticism and ensure rather the safety of the people who were already in power, was repealed. The age-long popular demand for the separation of the judiciary from the executive - the directive principles of the Constitution recognized such separation - was fulfilled. The executive magistrates would now deal with the preventive sections of the Criminal Procedure Code; and the judicial magistrates would

* First of its kind after the victory of the U.F. in the elections of 1954.

try all criminal cases, being directly responsible to sessions judges. Regarding land tenure, Zamindari had already been abolished. But it could not be done without compensation as the Constitution forbade it. Moreover, the infamous procedure of recovering arrears from the cultivators through the 'Certificate' system was abolished. With regard to jute it could not be nationalised for fear of repercussions in the international trade and domestic economy, but a Jute Marketing Corporation was established to ensure a fair price to the jute growers and stabilise the mercurial jute prices. To improve the irrigation system with which country's agriculture was linked a good many planned projects were set into motion. The services of Mr. Julius Croog and his troupe of specialists of the U.N. were enlisted to help prevent the yearly devastating floods that rendered millions homeless, killed cattle and destroyed crops. Croog's report was substantial and comprehensive.*

A new Ministerial department of Salt was set up to make the memories of Salt famine a thing of the past. The framers of the 21-point programme laid much stress on education, particularly primary education. The pay scale of the primary teachers was notoriously poor. It was raised, and primary schools were made the direct responsibility of the government. Strides of progress were made in other areas of education. A 200-year old religio-cultural institution e.g.

* It is a sad commentary that the full report of Croog has not been fulfilled up to now due to various reasons.
Madrassa-e-Alia was given a new orientation. What was referred to as 'Black laws' relating to Dacca and Rajshahi universities in the 21-point programme were deleted. To eradicate corruption in all its facets an anti-corruption department - independent of the police department - was set up under a Minister and an appropriate law was passed to this effect. Shahid Minar* was erected. February 21st was declared a public holiday.** Burdwan House was declared the seat of the Bengali Academy.

On the labour front a revolutionary Bill, called the Minimum Wages Bill was passed - the first of its kind in the province - fixing minimum wages for the labourers. To this end a Minimum Wages Board was founded. Salaries of policemen, nurses, clerks, IV Class workers in the offices were increased. The rate of court fees was lowered for the benefit of the poor masses. The Ministers themselves volunteered to accept a monthly salary not exceeding Rs. 1,000. To make local bodies more democratic and broadbased relevant acts were amended so that the main executives of the local self-government - there were 2000 Union Boards, 20 Municipalities and 3 District Boards - could be elected through a ballot system based on adult franchise for the first time in the political history of East Pakistan.

Hundreds of canals were dug as an adjunct to agricultural progress. A gigantic road building programme was launched. On the cultural side, to mention only one, the creation of the picturesque Botanical

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* Memorial for those who lost their lives in the language movement.
** The day when police opened fire on the students during language movement.
Garden, called 'Ramna Green' was admirable. Capital expenditure on development was always on the increase – for instance the capital expenditure on the year 1957-58 was shown as Rs. 34,55,00,000 as against Rs. 21,65,00,000 in the budget for 1956-57 – and to ensure an overall development of the country a Planning Board for East Pakistan, for the first time, was set up.94

The reason a few examples of government performance are cited above is to show that the government was progressive and programme-oriented. And the 21-point programme on whose basis they won the 1954 elections which was thought in many a circle to be negative and a stunt, was mostly fulfilled. Some were completely implemented, some partially and others in a modified way. That is why we have said earlier that the 1954 elections were in essence a movement. What was remarkable of this period was the unimpeded flowing of socio-cultural and political stream. Still remarkable was the minorities' being incorporated into the main stream of politics. The widespread belief in India that Hindus in Pakistan received the treatment that Hitler gave to Jews could no longer be substantiated. The minority and Finance Minister, Dhar claimed before a foreign journalist that the Hindus, after the passing of the joint electorates, were now 'first class citizens' of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.95


The ex-Finance Minister of Sarkar Ministry wrote in his book - the book is proscribed in Pakistan - that "with the proclamation of the martial law, the short-lived halcyon days for the minorities also disappeared". 96

The comment of the Constitution Commission (1961) that the early M.L. Ministry was less "unsatisfactory" compared to the Ministries coming afterwards 97 and Dr. Chowdhury's - an honorary adviser to the Commission - nostalgia for the good old days of Muslim "unity and solidarity" under the leadership of Jinnah manifesting in the achievement of Pakistan, which apparently threatened to fade out under the strain of partisan politics, 98 were perhaps the result of their lopsided and static way of looking at things. The early period witnessed monolithic politics, the latter one became polymorphic which degenerated into what was termed a 'market polity' from which there could not be, initially, any getting away till the dusts of factional politics settled themselves. The quantum of failure of the politicians of the latter period towards refining politics was, no doubt, great, but the cost of their not having tried, at all, towards that vein would have been still greater. Hence, we shall now delineate the 'market polity' situation which baffled the smooth progress the government was endeavouring to register.


98. Chowdhury, op.cit., p. 120.
Politics showed signs of baffling complexity and strains around March 1958. The formation of the N.A.P. (discussed earlier) hit the A.L. strength in the Assembly. The new party lost representation in the government and occupied their seats in the House separately on three front rows facing the Speaker. Still, the N.A.P.'s desire to support the A.L. government in what according to Haji Danesh, the party's Assembly leader would amount to the choice of lesser evil, seemed genuine throughout the period. But the initial dithering attitude of the A.L., quite understandable from the party's angle, to pay the price of the N.A.P.'s support i.e. the fulfilment of 5-point demand, caused the latter to assume an attitude of neutrality in the legislature which was bound to affect the government position in an atmosphere of shifting alliances of parties.

The K.S.P. - its number in the legislature dwindled to about 58, particularly after the defection of the Kafiluddin Chowdhury's group to the A.L. - which was still the second biggest Muslim party in the Assembly consisted of two internal blocs. The Sarkar group was resentful of the A.L. but the Youssouf Ali and Azizal Haq** group wanted to cooperate with the government in order to strengthen it against the alleged subversive forces. Talks continued along that line with Suhrawardy himself. The octogenarian Haq gave blessing to it.

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* Discussed earlier.

** A nephew to the octogenarian Haq, the Governor.


Even Azizul Haq replaced Sarkar as the opposition leader—a gesture to the A.L. This was a great opportunity for ensuring government stability and would have made up the possible loss of the N.A.P. support. The K.S.P.—A.L. coalition decision was scheduled to be announced on April 21, 1957, but 'due to unknown hitch' this did not materialise. This 'hitch' could be interpreted on many counts; but the main impediment was the opposition of the majority of the party's rank and file to K.S.P.'s inclusion in the government unless they formally joined the A.L. For the flourishing A.L. was confident of winning the general elections without the aid of the K.S.P. Having eaten the humble pie the K.S.P. patched up their internal rivalry, made Sarkar again the parliamentary leader and went hell for leather for the ousting of the A.L. government by hook or by crook.

The Congress was a part of the government. By early 1958 about 10 dissident Congressmen joined the opposition, thus reducing to some extent the government legislative strength. This episode needs a brief analysis to gauge minority politics. Dr. Chowdhury viewed the Hindu Congress as holding the balancing power and their ascendency in the A.L. Ministry was a "disquieting development" in "provincial politics". Similarly, the Constitution Commission (1961) held


that the Chief Minister in response to the pressure of the Hindu minority withdrew a number of criminal cases against some Hindu persons alleged to have passed information to India about East Pakistan "army manoeuvres". Also, the 'operation close door' which was stopping huge smuggling of goods, money and gold across the border had to be abandoned to soothe the minorities. 104 Again, we consider these statements devoid of whole truth. This is a question whether facts should support beliefs or vice versa.

At the outset, the very inclusion of the minorities was rather a 'disquieting factor' in many a quarter. The communal minded opposition members in the very first session decried the Hindu inclusion in the Cabinet. 105 A fanatical religious party, the Jamaat-e-Islam went round the country saying that Pakistan integrity was going to be jeopardised by the Congress. 106 The M.L. and N.I.P. distrust for the Hindus was proverbial. In the face of this reactionary propaganda, the A.L.'s allowing the minorities to have their say in the government was bold and realistic. A minority forming 22 per cent 107 of the provincial population could not be ignored. Did not some of the central European countries like Czechoslovakia and Poland have to pay the price for their inability to integrate minorities which

104. Constitution Commission, loc.cit., p. 11.
106. Ibid., April 7, 1958.
107. Census of 1951, loc.cit., p. 27.
had been rather 'national outposts'? So the lesson for Pakistan should have been to follow a positive minority policy which "would make it unnecessary ... for any of Pakistan's minorities to look clandestinely beyond the frontiers of the State". And this was precisely that positive policy the A.L. government was pursuing. It is ridiculous to think that a couple of Hindu ministers could rule the roost in a country of overwhelming Muslim population. The Hindu inclusion in the Cabinet did not point to a "disquieting" situation. On the contrary, the general political atmosphere was "disquieting". Again, it was not the Congress alone which was holding the balance of strength in the legislature. In essence, it was the N.A.P., which was predominantly Muslim. In short, it was the peculiar political situation that determined which party on what occasion was going to hold the crucial balance.

In regard to the allegation that some criminal cases against the Hindus were withdrawn, suffice it to say that these cases were both silly and bogus trumped up by the D.I.B. (Department of Intelligence Branch). The abandonment of the scheme, the operation close door, which was being conducted by the army to stop smuggling at the border needs a little elaboration. This is linked with the partition of Bengal. Reflecting on the partition of Bengal Sir J.N. Sarkar, a famous historian, commented that


109. For details see Ataur Rahman, op. cit., p. 127.
"the frontier question between the Indian union and Pakistan, as far as Bengal is concerned, is in no respect akin to the international frontier problem, like that between Poland and Russia, or between Greece and Albania. In Bengal, it is more like the legal partition of a landed estate between two brothers for ensuring more efficient and peaceful management ... the population is absolutely one by race, language and manner of life, they differ only in religion." 110

In prepartition days the upper and middle class Hindus of East Bengal were mostly concentrated in Calcutta, which being the capital city provided various opportunities. At partition almost every middle class family was bifurcated. Most of the families were joint ones with their family headquarters in East Bengal. As a result some became of necessity Indian nationals, while those who used to look after joint properties had to be Pakistan nationals. With partition, the family links and property links with West Bengal could not be sundered immediately. So some Hindu families clandestinely passed goods, money and gold over to the Indian border to their co-sharers of the joint properties. Firstly, this could have been stopped by interdominion arrangements relating to the bifurcated Hindu joint estate. Secondly, the increasing sense of belongingness to East Pakistan on the part of the Hindus would have, in time, prevented them from smuggling things to West Bengal.

But then the border smuggling was not confined in East Pakistan alone. It was equally widespread along the border of West Pakistan where there was no such scheme like the operation close door. Moreover, it was not the Hindus of East Pakistan alone who were involved in smuggling, in that the overwhelming majority of Muslim families residing the border areas took recourse to smuggling as a 'profession'. In some ways the border peoples were constrained to do this. The cultivators could not find 'Harnia' cattle for their requirements which were available across the border. Nor could the government cater to that need. The cultivators found it lucrative to sell their products say, betel nut, jute, etc., across the border when some such opportunities were not there in East Pakistan. The operation close door did some good work up to a point. But eventually the army let loose a reign of terror in the border areas. The cases of army tyranny, oppression, rape, flogging were cited in the adjournment motion on the operation close door. Massive military raids creating havoc were launched which resulted in many a case in the discovery of goods whose value was worthless. So the army operation on the border was replaced by other suitable arrangements. This was not solely the result of Hindu pressure. There was pressure


112. Smuggled goods valued at about Rs. 1.7 million were recovered. See *Dawn*, September 15, 1958.

inside the A.L. itself, for, after all, the A.L. could not afford to lose the votes of the border people in the coming elections. Besides, the Government realised that the scheme of the operation close door was nothing but a useful temporary arrangement, the permanent solution lay in the creation of marketplaces with communication facilities, so that the border people could sell their products profitably. 114

However, when the foregoing factors are taken into consideration it will be clear that neither were the Hindus particularly involved in border smuggling nor were they truly responsible for making the government abandon the scheme of the operation close door. It was also true that the Congress as a whole did not take advantage of its holding the balancing power in the legislature. The majority of the Congress e.g. the Dhar group stayed with the government, while the dissident Congress (10) belonging to B.K. Das group joined the opposition not only for the cause of 'army operation' at the border alone, but also for their not having good relations with their own comrades inside the party. That the majority of the Congress members were loyal to the government was manifest in its taking disciplinary action against the dissidents who did not vote with the government. 115

However, in the course of showing the diminishing strength of the coalition government we have purposely digressed to lift the fog of


some misunderstandings that were hovering around the Hindu minority. There might be some incorrigibles among the Hindus, but it would be unfair to ascribe motives to them as a whole. There was nothing particular about Hindu ascendancy in the government, any more than there was anything especially Hinduistic in the joining of the 10 Congressmen in the opposition — an incident which was quite representative of East Pakistan politics at that time. Now to return to the original theme, the position was that the government was also losing part of the Congress support.

There was tension within the A.L. party itself. It was strongly alleged that the Ministry was ignoring the party to which it owed its existence. Rahman having become the Chief Minister developed a non-partisan attitude towards administration. As a result, there appeared some schism in the government-party relationship. A few sensitive A.L. M.L.A.s left the party and for fear of not belonging to any group, they joined the opposition. The main cold war was going on between the Chief Minister and the A.L. Secretary Mujiboor Rahman. The latter suggested reconstruction of the Cabinet by dropping 3 Ministers who had failed to give a good account of themselves and the inclusion of certain Scheduled Caste Members in the Cabinet to strengthen the A.L. parliamentary party. M. Rahman resigned the Secretaryship but had to withdraw the same as the party and workers

wanted him very much. However, the internal hitch was subtle and did not assume an ugly form. But no doubt, the government suffered a bit due to Rahman-Mujib clash.

However, in this overall situation when the budget was presented in March, 1958 the government parliamentary strength was not overwhelming in the House. In view of the fact that the budget had to be passed within 31st March and members could not find much time to discuss the budget, the government decided to have an 'on account' budget authorising advance expenditure for three months ending June 30 passed by the House so that more members could participate in the budget discussion. Going fast on the road of democracy the government accepted the Assembly's proposal for the circulation of the Finance Bill to elicit public opinion – a most unusual procedure and against all precedents. During the session, however, the Ministry was showing diminishing majorities in divisions pressed by the opposition which was due mainly to N.A.P.'s ambivalence. This was the fatiguing month of Ramdan – the month of Muslim fasting – and the members by nature were hotheaded and coldfeeted. The cases of cholera and smallpox in the capital were reported so the Chief Minister asked the Governor to prorogue the session of the Assembly on the 31st March.

The Governor, Haq, refused to do that. Instead he dismissed the Rahman Ministry and hurriedly swore Sarkar in as the new Chief Minister and immediately prorogued the House which he had refused in

117. Ibid., April 6 and 7, 1958.
118. Times, April 2, 1958.
case of Rahman. Within few hours, the centre dismissed Haq and reinstated the former government on April 1st. 119 Sarkar was made an April fool, as it were. The Assembly session was immediately called which passed a confidence motion in Rahman by 157-0* in a House of 309 members, as the opposition walked out. 120 Dr. Chowdhury remarked that "The whole episode was an instance of interference by the central government in provincial politics." 121 We beg to differ on the ground that the central government had a supervisory role, which, indeed, was well performed. Haq, who had remarkable record of public services and whose name was still pronounced with the greatest possible reverence and affection by the masses of the people, was now virtually a victim to his age. His mental and physical faculties were at nadir; but, he was too conceited to admit. By virtue of his historic stature he could have been a sobering influence in political turmoil. Instead, his acute concern for the rehabilitation of himself reflecting in the K.S.P. became almost a pathological urge. That the Governor was determined to oust Rahman was known to the Prime Minister three days before the actual happening. 122 How could the centre ignore the fact of a ministry going out of office which was not defeated in the legislature? Even the writ petition of Sarkar was dismissed by the High Court. 123 The

* The N.A.P. voted with the government.

120. Dawn, April 4, 1958.
121. G.W. Chowdhury, op.cit., p. 119.
Speaker himself told the House that it "can make and unmake any Ministry. The Governor is the registering authority of the verdict of the House." 124

However, when the legislature again met in June to pass the remaining budget, the Rahman Ministry was defeated in a division (126-138). This was precipitated by the N.A.P.'s remaining neutral. Rahman resigned in line with parliamentary convention. 125 Now, Sarkar was again sworn in as the new Chief Minister. Within four days he was defeated in the House on a no-confidence motion (156-142)* which was debated for 4 hours. The highlight of the debate was the speech of Sarkar who -- considered to be one of the best heard on the floor of the House 126 -- remorsefully sobbed that the politicians were enmeshed in conflicts while the country was going to the dogs. However, the centre clamped Presidential rule (193) in East Pakistan.

How did all these happen? Both the A.L. and N.A.P. had for some time been wriggling in regard to the finding of a viable basis for their working parliamentary relationship. Prior to the meeting of the Assembly the N.A.P. Central Parliamentary Board met to discuss about supporting the Rahman Ministry. The N.A.P. Provincial Assembly Party decided by 16 votes to 6 to continue support for the government. But the Central Board under the pressure of the West Pakistan leaders

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* This time the N.A.P. voted with the opposition.
125. Ibid., June 19, 1958.
decided to discontinue support unless the 5-point was accepted by the A.L. Even Haji Dahesh's appeal to the Board for reconsideration was spurned.\textsuperscript{127} This was an irony that the stability of the government had to be disturbed, because the East Pakistan branch of the N.A.P. to soothe its counterpart in the West, which failed to make any headway in West Pakistan in terms of the 5-point and turned its vendetta on the A.L. government in the East, had to be agreeable to the Board's decision.

This, however, served as trauma to the parties, e.g. the A.L. and N.A.P. For the N.A.P. was not psychologically inclined to coalesce with the opposition, nor could the A.L. now dismiss the indispensibility of the N.A.P. So an understanding between the two party secretaries e.g. the A.L. and N.A.P. was reached with the blessing of Bhasani along the lines of the so-called 5-point.\textsuperscript{128} It was a distasteful necessity; for, the A.L. being a centre party had to keep its flanks covered against the extreme ones. By all signs, this was basically a working arrangement between the two parties pending general elections. That the East Pakistan A.L. was not essentially committed to the immediate change of foreign policy was amply illustrated when it passed a resolution condemning the execution order of Mr. Imre Nagy, the former Hungarian Prime Minister.\textsuperscript{129}

\textsuperscript{127} See *Manchester Guardian*, June 15, 1958; also *Dawn*, June 14, 15 and 16, 1958.

\textsuperscript{128} *Dawn*, June 21, July 6, August 27, 1958.

\textsuperscript{129} *Ibid.*, July 5, 1958. (The N.A.P. did not condemn Nagy's execution.)
This explains how the A.L. government was defeated and the subsequent passing of a no-confidence motion against Sarkar. It was not the intrinsic strength of the opposition that caused the dissolution and formation of Ministries in quick succession. The eager opposition, in fact, took advantage of the ruling government's temporary readjustment difficulties vis-a-vis the N.A.P. Perhaps this is one of the reasons why many a thinker on the Westminster system are today reluctant to judge seriously the confidence issue of a Ministry by a sheer snap vote of a division.

However, the A.L. fought again forcefully on the public platform for the restoration of parliamentary government. The Governor sent a report to the centre saying that the A.L. had a majority in the legislature.\textsuperscript{130} So at the expiry of 193-rule the Rahman ministry was again reinstalled on August 24, 1958.\textsuperscript{131} The first thing the Ministry did was the repeal of the Preventive Detention Ordinance, promulgated by the Governor on July 25 in order to ensure a free political atmosphere.\textsuperscript{132} The ruling government was further strengthened by the inclusion of Lutfur Rahman, a prominent K.S.P. leader who joined the A.L.\textsuperscript{133}

The K.S.P. now was like a panther heavily bruised and affronted. Each frustration brought in its wake a reinforced sense of vendetta.

\textsuperscript{130}Dawn, August 23, 1958.
\textsuperscript{131}Times, August 25, 1958.
\textsuperscript{132}Dawn, August 27, 1958.
\textsuperscript{133}Ibid., September 19, 1958. (This happened 40 hours before the Assembly was due to meet.)
for the A.L. Its sole purpose was now dedicated to the dishing out of the A.L. government. General Mirza whose grip on the central government and major political parties was fast loosening provided the necessary morale for the K.S.P. After the dismissal of Haq from the gubernatorial post in April, General Mirza came on a week's tour in East Pakistan, ostensibly to see the fallen Haq, who told him that he would enter politics again.134 And on May 14 he addressed public meeting in Dacca giving a hint of his entrance in politics.135

Haq was the last straw the drowning General Mirza could catch at, and the incessant audiences of the K.S.P. leaders with the President could not be just explained away as social visits. The presence of the charismatic Haq inside the party and a 'wink' from the President gave a new impetus to the K.S.P.'s fighting the final bout with the A.L. Ministry.

This time the fighting issue would revolve round the Speaker. Prior to the meeting of the legislature on September 20 an Ordinance was made public making some new qualifications to the Speaker's existing powers, viz. in matters of no confidence motions against the Speaker or Deputy Speaker they would have no option since the Secretary of the Assembly was authorised to enter the notice of the resolution in the list of the business. Also, the Speaker would not adjourn the House "unless the leader of the House agrees to such

134. See Times and Manchester Guardian, April 28, 1958
When the House met the coalition government tabled a no-confidence motion against the Speaker, which the latter turned down. The opposition sided with the Speaker. Rowdyism took place displaying all sorts of cultural philistinism. The Speaker showed a clean pair of heels from the rostrum. After the first phase of the affray was over, a relative calm prevailed. The last phase witnessed the Deputy Speaker's declaring that the no-confidence motion against the Speaker had been passed** (170-0). A 'moratorium' to rowdyism was agreed upon on the following day. In the absence of both the Speaker and Deputy Speaker, Azizul Haq (K.S.P.) whose name appeared first in the Panel of Chairman, presided and adjourned the House after the submission of the budget. But as luck would have it, on the 23rd September when the Deputy Speaker came to preside over the sitting a cacophony of angry shouts and yells from the opposition greeted him. He could hardly proceed when a missile hit his nose. He was rushed to the hospital to die a couple of days later. Presently, the Sergeant-at-arms and police burst inside the House to quell the rioting members. Twelve opposition members including prominent leaders of the K.S.P. were arrested+ on charges of rioting. And the budget demand was

* Dewan Mahboob (N.A.P.) moved the no-confidence motion.
** The writer himself was watching this unedifying incident from the public gallery.
+ They were released on bail on September 29. *Dawn*, September 30, 1958.


Footnote /Contd. over.
passed on the following day as the opposition boycotted the session.\footnote{\textit{Daily Telegraph}, September 25, 1958.}

The proximate cause of the violence was the Speaker's declaring 6 government partymen disqualified as M.L.A.s on the ground that they were holding offices of profit as government pleaders or prosecutors. His ruling was inadvertent in the sense that the central government on September 19, 1958 had already promulgated an Ordinance giving retrospective effect to the Bill passed by the N.A. during its autumn session. The Ordinance rectified an oversight of the N.A. which failed to give retrospective effect.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, September 20, 1958.} By virtue of this Ordinance the 6 M.L.A.s were no longer disqualified. The government pleaded with the Speaker that there were precedents in undivided India of such legislation as had been passed by the N.A. in respect of the disqualification of members and a law could be passed with retrospective effect.\footnote{\textit{Times}, September 21, 1958.} But the Speaker remained adamant. Then the government pressed for the no-confidence motion.

The importance of keeping the position of the Speaker clear of party strife is the sine qua non of the Westminster system. In East Pakistan the Speaker was brought to book for acting in defiance of the interests of the ruling coalition. The opposition attacked the

Footnote continued from previous page.
\begin{itemize}
\item[138.] \textit{Dawn}, September 22, 1958.
\item[140.] \textit{Dawn}, September 25, 1958.
\item[141.] \textit{Ibid.}, September 20, 1958.
\item[142.] \textit{Times}, September 21, 1958.
\end{itemize}
Deputy Speaker whom they apparently regarded as a traitor* to their side. Yet it was indispensable to the orderly conduct of the House that the rulings of the Speaker ought to have been implicitly accepted so long no malafides could be imputed to his decisions. The Speaker, Mr. A. Hakim Khan was a gifted person, and probably could be ranked best among the Speakers, national and provincial, on many a count. He had the poise and personality that aroused confidence in the House. He had a few excellent procedural rulings to his credit. But his greatest fault probably was his being a megalomaniac. The government thought him to be unsound in mind. The Dawn, in an editorial termed him as "erratic but not mad".143 He collided with the government as the latter could not afford to provide fund for his burgeoning Assembly Secretariat. Through overstaffing and quick promotions the inflated budget of the Assembly threatened the Finance Ministry. Besides, he approached the government and members individually for passing some such Bill that would make him an absolute Emperor of the Kingdom of the Assembly. The government would not go to that extent. So the Speaker was looking for an appropriate moment to hurt the government. Besides, the government feared that lately there had formed an axis between the Speaker and the President. The opposition had no particular liking for the Speaker, but it

* Mr. Shahid Ali was a former K.S.P., but having been elected as the Deputy Speaker he shunned from party politics.

143. See Dawn, September 25, 1958.
served their purpose to fence around the Speaker, so long this aided the anti-government cause.  

The Deputy Speaker was really a victim to his innocence.

However, beneath this apparent reason of violence lay the sinister design e.g. "President Mirza's deliberate divisive tactics designed to dislodge the Awami League Ministry and install another under the K.S.P."  

A cartoonist depicted the disgraceful incident of the legislature in a newspaper as a puppet show with the President pulling the strings.  

In the event the K.S.P. failed to capture power, the mere creation of chaos would have served the purpose of the President. The former Finance Minister of East Pakistan says in his book (proscribed in Pakistan):

"I know it for certain that the reason of disturbance in the East Pakistan Assembly as given out by the authorities is only a cover to hide the real truth behind the move of proclamation of the martial law. Even before the Assembly sat for its last session when the disturbance took place, the military generals had visited the central jails of East Pakistan only to ascertain the extent of accommodation there."  

The tragedy is that the opposition was unimaginative and myopic, who failed to see the shadow of nemesis and inadvertently allowed itself

144. For details see Ataur Rahman, op.cit., pp.294–297.  
146. Ibid., p. 91.  
as fuel to the fireplace of the President to give him warmth.

The Legislature

Dr. Rashiduzzaman holds that "The East Pakistan Assembly presented on the whole a better picture" despite some "unfortunate incidents". There was a sense of commitment on the part of the members to the legislature which could be discerned even in their deviations. The elections of 1954 transfused a complete new blood in the legislature. Unlike the West Pakistan counterpart it was solely composed of professional middle class people who were mostly in their thirties, though some were even below that level. The M.L.A.s consisted of trade unionists, professors, teachers, journalists, student leaders, petty landlords and a few Maulanas. But the main bulk belonged to the lawyers' class. The number of veteran parliamentarians in the House was far outweighed by the newly-christened parliamentarians who entered the Assembly with an inadequate background of administrative experience—a case of tabula rasa. But they were quite eager, aggressive and fairly literate.

The second legislature in its life met for only 79 days. Actually, it was with the coming of the A.L. to power in August, 1956


149. The members' list was published in Dawn, March 17, 1954. The Times commented that half of the members were under 30 years old. See Times, April 20, 1954.

that the legislature was called. The government called the House into session 6 times, namely once in 1956, twice in 1957 and thrice in 1958. Till March, 1958 the House worked productively and uninterrupted. To enable the members to grasp the budget in its full implication and in recognition of the cultural pride of the East Pakistanis the Chief Minister in the very first session of the Assembly delivered his budget speech in Bengali – first of its kind – which "created a sensation".\textsuperscript{151} This gave the members a sense of identity and an incentive to speak on the budget in their own vernacular instead of English. That the members were serious was evident in the 22-day budget session of March, 1957. More than 80 members took part in the general discussion of the budget, more than 300 cut motions were moved and as many as 13 divisions were forced.\textsuperscript{152} What was more, that all budget demands were passed without guillotine\textsuperscript{153} = first of its kind in whole of Pakistan, and a rare event in parliamentary history. The choice subjects of cut motions were usually excise duty, development, jail administration, police, administration of justice, education, etc. – the last item provoked about 90 cut motions on March 24, 1957.\textsuperscript{154} Participation was further encouraged when the Speaker ruled that government party members were also entitled to move cut motions.\textsuperscript{155}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{151} Financial Times, September 18, 1956.
\item \textsuperscript{152} Muneer Ahmed, op.cit., p. 64.
\item \textsuperscript{153} Dawn, March 31, 1957.
\item \textsuperscript{154} Ibid., March 25, 1957.
\item \textsuperscript{155} Ibid., March 28, 1958.
\end{itemize}
The number of adjournment motions pressed for discussion were many; but, as usual, the Speaker found almost all of them technically inadmissible. Only 4 appeared to have been discussed, of which two dealt with food and the economy, one with a police Lathi (big sticks) charge in a public meeting and the other with religious affairs.*

The highlight of the adjournment motions discussed was the opposition's forcing a division on the economic crisis (133-116) and demanding of closure motion on the food situation. The number of questions put and answered was not many, though the use of supplementary questions in the House was pronounced. A host of resolutions — mostly non-official — were tabled for discussion. As many as 40 were tabled for the September session only. A few resolutions were of important nature such as resolutions on the electorate system, removal of the central and provincial governments 60 days before the general elections, collecting of the personal assets of the M.L.A.s, provincial autonomy, adoption of the Bengali as the medium of education in every educational institution, foreign policy, etc., etc. However, not all the resolutions tabled could be discussed or adopted.

What have been cited earlier as achievements of the government were mostly done through legislative acts. The opposition extended

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* Attack on holy Prophet of Islam in an Indian publication, etc.


its cooperation with the government in matters of legislation, though it also fought bitterly any legislation which was thought to be going too far ahead of the popular mood. For instance, a heated debate ensued during the time of the first reading of a meaningful Bill relating to restrictions on the slaughter of cattle and meat control. For the opposition, mostly N.I.P. and M.L., described the Bill as "dangerous" and against the tenets of Islam. 158 However, in passing a few acts, which would have gone a long way towards consolidating the parliamentary institutions in the country, the East Pakistan legislature compared most favourable to that of its counterpart in West Pakistan. The passing of the East Pakistan Assembly Secretariat Bill was a substantial achievement for the legislators. 159 Similarly, the House in the Autumn session of 1957 sent the Assembly Members' Privileges Bill to a Select Committee of 17 members. 160 This was duly passed in April, 1958 by the House and received the President's assent in August, 1958. 161 Likewise, a Bill was passed to raise the M.L.A.'s salaries in September, 1957, to enable them to work with less economic worries. 162

How did the government and opposition comport themselves in the House? The Dawn said of the first session of the Assembly that

159. Ibid., October 4, 1956.
160. Ibid., September 22, 1957.
161. Ibid., August 9, 1958.
162. Ibid., August 9, 1958
there was a "stubborn parliamentary opposition" ranged against "the Awami league government, who ... emerged triumphant in every trial", eventually. On the whole, this assessment remained valid throughout the period. Both the government and opposition showed on many an occasion due parliamentary decorum, and their leaders felicitated each other. At the same time there were occasions when they were found wanting in observing what was considered to be de rigueur to the system. Debates could be punctuated by uproars, or marked by walks out. Sometimes parliamentary time was wasted on silly matters — a 90-minute debate filled the House on March 28, 1958 to determine if the N.A.P. had lost the right of criticizing the government on the ground of its being a government supporter. But on the whole, nothing could be cited — save that accidental but unfortunate incident of September, 1958 — during the entire period of the Assembly as ineradicable vice. They — the government and opposition — only talked themselves out loudly. The Legislature brushed up quite a number of talented parliamentarians, such as, to name a few, P.C. Lahiry, Rahman, Salam Khan, Hashimuddin, Mrs. Nellie Sen Gupta, B.K. Das, Dhar, D.N. Dutta, Latif Biswas, Farid Ahmed, F.K. Chowdhury, A. Mansur, Etc. Even the women members came

* The writer claims to have watched the session of the House from the Public Galleries each year and for days together.

163. Ibid., October 3, 1956.

up fairly well in parliamentary standard. Some of them Begum Anwara Khatun, Mrs. Daulatunnessa, Mrs. Badrun Nessa, Mrs. Razia Khatun, Mrs. Noorzahan were quite dashing, sharp-tonqued, eloquent and did not miss participating either in the question hour** or general debates.

However, taking everything together, what was more distinct about East Pakistan was its experiencing a sense of realism in politics. Politics was vibrant. The combined opposition, whose number was never below the level of 100, provided an effective check upon the government. It was the only province which witnessed an alternative government through parliamentary means. The government was programme-oriented. There was not any gross instance to suggest that the centre - except General Mirza - dictated provincial politics. The Section 193 was imposed only as a stop-gap and to certify budget without which administration could not have been run. The Governor's rule was never prolonged beyond 2 months maximum. Perhaps everything would have been all right had there been no obstacles in the A.L.-K.S.P. deal. It was mainly due to the problem of political rehabilitation of the K.S.P.*** that precipitated the situation. No less was the covert manoeuvring of some of the communists - after the banning of the Communist Party, they managed to reincarnate

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* Some were very active in party politics and held the post of parliamentary secretaries.

** On this count the West Pakistan women members generally appeared shy.

*** The K.S.P.'s main electoral hope was the charismatic Haq. But to the writer's knowledge, Haq's dwindling health would not have survived the rigours of a rustic electioneering campaign.
themselves in other parties, particularly the N.A.P. — contributory to the general political strain. On prognostication it can be said that a more viable multi-party system would have emerged from the general elections. Splinter groups and small parties would have been wiped out in the elections. All signs were indicative that the A.L. would have crystallised as the dominant party, if not the absolute majority party in the legislature. Under the joint electorate system, the existing plethora of minority parties would have no other alternative than to aggregate themselves with larger parties on the basis of socio-economic programmes. Already, the Congress addressed itself to the task of reorganization of the party in the face of changed situation i.e. joint electorate and general elections. So, the chances were that the A.L. would have formed a grand coalition with the moderate rightists leaving the N.A.P. to provide socialist opposition.

165. Dawn, April 8, 1957.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

Structure and Composition

The judgment of the Federal Court in 1955 (discussed earlier) saw the emergence of the Constituent Assembly II with similar scope, jurisdiction and powers to that of its defunct predecessor. The Constituent Assembly II was set up under the Governor General’s order No. 12, of May 28, 1955. The total strength of membership was fixed at 80. The agreed formula of parity governed the mode of representation replacing the previous basis of regional representation i.e. population. Each of the two recognized zones of Pakistan e.g. East and West Pakistan, was allotted 40 members to be represented in the Constituent Assembly. The regionalized allotments were the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>East Pakistan</th>
<th>40</th>
<th>West Pakistan</th>
<th>40</th>
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<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>(Punjab - Muslims</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minorities</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Minority</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>N.W.F.P.</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Sind - Muslims</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Minority</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tribal areas</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bahawalpur</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Karachi (Capital)</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Khairpur State</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Frontier States</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Baluchistan</td>
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<td>Baluchistan State</td>
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Seventy one members were elected to the Constituent Assembly by the provincial legislatures of East Pakistan, the Punjab, Sind, the N.W.F.P. and Khairpur State legislature. The rulers of the Princely States e.g. Bahawalpur, Frontier States and Baluchistan State, nominated 4, the tribal Advisory Council of the N.W.F.P. elected the tribal quota of 3, the Shahi Jirga and the non-official members of the Quetta Municipality elected 1 for Baluchistan and the Corporation of Karachi elected its single member. Two hundred and fifty eight candidates filed nomination papers for 71 seats in the Constituent Assembly II of which 120 withdrew and the rest i.e. 138 contested.\(^2\) Elections to the East Pakistan quota went in a democratic vein, though cases of irregularities and engineering were quoted in the case of feudalistic West Pakistan.\(^3\) However, having completed the primary task of drawing up the Constitution within a range of 83-day sittings, the Constituent Assembly II* metamorphosed itself in March, 1956 as the interim National Assembly (N.A.) of Pakistan pending the election of the new one under the Constitution. Despite the fact the N.A. was indirectly elected, it was more representative than its predecessor, the Constituent Assembly I. For, the legislatures which elected the N.A. were elected recently, particularly the East Pakistan one, and through universal adult franchise, the like of which was not true of the first Constituent Assembly.

* It was elected on June 21, 1955 and met its first session on July 7, 1955.
Parliamentary authority

Fundamentally, the powers and functions of the N.A. were in accordance with the Westminster system obtaining anywhere in the Commonwealth. Apparently it would appear that the N.A. was divested of some powers previously enjoyed by the Constituent Assembly I. True, a good many subjects and functions were transferred to provincial care. But this was done in response to federal requirements and strains. This, ipso facto, did not weaken the authority of the N.A. For, making due allowance for decentralisation, the N.A. in the final analysis was still powerful and had supervisory scope. As a supreme law-sanctioning body the N.A.'s was the final word. Even a hypothetical withholding of assent to the Bill on the part of the President could be got around by majority votes. What was more, the Constitutional suggestion towards Islamisation of laws was left to the discretion of the N.A. While in the realm of finance, it was the tax-granting body and the sole custodian of public moneys. Except for the sums charged upon the federal consolidated fund on account of salaries of the President, the judges of the Supreme Court, the Election Commissioners, the members of the Federal Public Service Commission, the Speaker, the Comptroller and Auditor General, so and so forth, - the N.A. could discuss them but not vote upon - the rest of the financial matters like raising and expending moneys were within the compass of the parliamentary authority.  

Though the President was the Head of the State and an integral part of the N.A., it was the latter which, forming an electoral college, elected him and had the legal authority to impeach him — again, a change from the earlier arrangements vis-a-vis the Head of State. In regards to the choosing of an executive the N.A.'s position was the same as it had been in the case of its predecessor. What was more distinct about the N.A. was its having the statutory right of sustaining the executive, who must be collectively responsible to it and ought to have majority support in the House\(^5\) to remain in power — an attempt to make good the early lapses. In short, the N.A. on paper, was the ultimate decision-making apparatus. However, when Mr. Amery could think of the British government operating "with the assent, but not under the direction, of parliament",\(^6\) one can only guess the extent of success a developing polity like Pakistan could score on that account.

**Rules and Procedure**

The rules and procedure, what are rightly described as "the alphabet of parliamentary business",\(^7\) followed in the N.A. were mainly patterned after the British. Though, the Constitution, in view of the past lapses and in reflecting the need of the country

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stipulated some procedural provisions. They were, inter alia, the following. That the N.A. was to hold at least 2 sessions in every year avoiding an intervention of 6 months between the last sitting of the Assembly and its first sitting in the next session (Art. 51). That there was to be at least one session of the N.A. in each year at Dacca (Art. 50. 1). A member remaining absent in the N.A. for 60 consecutive sitting days without leave was liable for disqualification (Art. 47). And the presence of 40 members was to constitute the quorum of the Assembly (Art. 55.2). However, the Constitution having laid down only a few rules left the N.A. itself to frame its comprehensive rules and procedure. The President was given a temporary power of amending the rules till the final ones were passed by the House. 8

Accordingly, during Suhrawardy's time a nine-man committee was formed with the Speaker as its Chairman to draft the rules and procedure of the N.A. in October, 1956. 9 The rules and procedure could not be framed so quickly despite the pressures from within the N.A. and from without, since party politics crept into the matter. The amendments made in the existing rules and procedure by the President (Art. 55) in April 1957 10 evoked severe criticism on the floor of the N.A., in the Press, in the Pakistan Bar Association and other

informed quarters. The amendments were feared to have curtailed the rights and privileges of the members in respect of interpellations, adjournment motions, resolutions and privileges motions. In short, the Dawn's leader viewed "such curbs derogate from the sovereignty of the House". The non-framing of rules by Rules of Procedure Committee came up as the Privilege Motion in the N.A. on August 22, 1957 and the discussions on it showed that both the government and opposition were equally concerned about the rules being chalked in no time. When the second privilege motion was moved by the opposition on that score in December 28, 1957, it was revealed by the government that the report of the committee was ready and going to be presented in the House within a few days' time.

Finally, the report was presented in the House on 5th January, 1958 and was adopted on 8th January, 1958 after a threadbare discussion. The passing of the rules and procedure of the N.A. was a parliamentary victory in the sense that the House henceforth would be governed by its own rules. In sum, the House had now a clear foundation of 'order, decency and regularity'. It appears to us that the time spent in the House in procedural brawls and the Speaker's

constant headache in straightening them were on the wane after the adoption of the N.A.'s rules. Emboldened, the Speaker now proclaimed in the N.A. that "In this House the Rules of Procedure are for each and every member of the House whether he is on the right or on the left", since the N.A. now "has framed its own Rules of Procedure". 16

**Speaker**

Traditionally, the Speaker of the N.A., Mr. Abdul Wahab Khan happened to be a lawyer of many years standing. He was a U.F. nominee and was elected unanimously; for, the A.L. candidate, on second thought, withdrew from the contest in order to render the office of the Speaker free of party political controversy. 17 Physically, Mr. Wahab with his most impressive white flowing beard produced such an impression in the House, as though he hailed from Olympus. But, in reality he lacked the fibre in his personality required for having a complete grip over the conduct of the House. Here lay the difference between Mr. Wahab and his predecessor in the Constituent Assembly I; During the time of the Constituent Assembly I the Speaker by virtue of his being also the President of the Constitution-making body had extra glamour and prestige. Though Mr. Wahab occupied the same position in the Constituent Assembly II, nevertheless the aura that had surrounded the office of the President of the Constituent Assembly I starting with Jinnah, by now was dim. This was due to the dissolu-

tion of the Constituent Assembly I and the consequent Constitutional litigation.

It has been said that immediately after the restoration of the English Monarchy in 1660, there was general disorder in the House of Commons and "the Speaker was openly mocked and laughed at whenever he attempted to bring some order into the proceedings of the House";\textsuperscript{18} for, the members were in 'high spirits'. Apparently, the coming into being of the Constituent Assembly II after the dissolution of its predecessor by the Cromwellian Governor General had the appearance of 'Restoration', in that Pakistan was again reverted to parliamentary democracy. Most of the Pakistani M.P.s were also in high spirits and were temperamentally averse to any curtailment of their freedom. Some of them were quite aggressive and resentful of the Speaker. For instance, one member rudely told the Speaker the following:

\begin{quote}
Member: "You are unfit to occupy that Chair. \\
Speaker: You withdraw that remark. \\
Member: I withdraw."\textsuperscript{19}
\end{quote}

Similarly, when the Speaker reminded a member "You are an advocate and therefore you seem to think that you can cross-examine the chair", the member immediately replied in mocking tone "You have the experience of a Munsif's Court more than myself and so can say what is done there."\textsuperscript{20} Actually, these remarks were hurled at the Chair when it


\textsuperscript{19} \textit{Times}, April 21, 1957.

\textsuperscript{20} \textit{N.A.D.}, Vol. II, April 12, 1957, p. 222.
gave rulings on procedural points to the disadvantage of certain members. This was an occupational hazard of the Speaker; for, he had to curb the raising of crops of points of order in the midst of parliamentary business and the consequent effete debates on them which were to be followed thereafter. Most of the points of order raised were not genuine and meant to score debating points or delay the proceedings of the N.A. Some points of order touching the infringement of the rights of the opposition were no doubt meaningful. For instance, the Speaker upheld an opposition point of order in the face of government protest by saying: "Order, Order ... I have already ruled that the member has the right to ask the leader of the House whether there is going to be a non-official day for discussing the food situation."21

The reason the N.A. had a sense of nausea about its Speaker was that Mr. Wahab was not only mediocre but also too compromising, hesitant and inclined to delay in giving rulings on procedural matters. A House consisting of high spirited members ought to have been presided over by a still more high spirited Speaker endowed with judicious firmness, tact and humanity. Having made his debut in the role of Speakership, Mr. Wahab lacked thorough knowledge of procedure and rules of the House. For instance, to the embarrassment of himself

* Perhaps a sense of insecurity was built-in in his personality; for, when he was a school boy he had the greatest trauma of seeing his parents and other members of his family cruelly killed by robbers. The writer knows this as he hails from the same district as Mr. Wahab.

and for that matter the House he once declared a privilege motion out of order which a member had earlier moved with his permission.  

Similarly, it was reported in a newspaper – this came up as a privilege motion before the House – that the Speaker gave a ruling on a point of order from a written text. Again, in an important issue like the hearing of the President’s reference case before the Supreme Court as to whether he could dissolve the legislature national or provincial before the general elections, the Speaker went all the way to Murree in this connection. But it was very unimaginative of him not to have appeared before the court and benefitted it with his opinion – an incident which evoked comment from the Chief Justice who asked the N.A.’s Secretary sarcastically: "How high is your Speaker, very high?" The M.P.s felt that Mr. Wahab’s performance in the House fell short of the requirements of the high office. As a result two notices of no-confidence were served against the Speaker, one in April, 1957 and the other in November, 1957. But in both cases the House showed restraint and did not press the no-confidence motion, as no malafides could be really attributed to the Speaker.

However, the most redeeming feature of the Speaker was his emptying the mind of bias in the conduct of the business of the House.

It was an admitted fact that the Speaker was a man of piety and belonged to the N-I-P. When Moulana Athar Ali, the President of the N-I-P himself pleaded for the admission of an adjournment motion on the demolition of a mosque the Speaker replied: "The rules and rulings prohibit admission of the adjournment motion, my personal sentiments in that matter, however strong are of no avail." 26 As a matter of fact, it was the N-I-P group in the N.A. which was mainly resentful of the Speaker for his not being particularly sympathetic to the party interest in the House. Ultimately, Mr. Wahab was expelled from the N.I.P. 27 However, Mr. Wahab's setting of an impartial standard in the dispensation of rulings was a positive contribution to the professionalization of the Speaker's Office, particularly in a Pakistan situation where Speakers tended to be punched into political controversies. Mr. Wahab was not a conceited person and made a virtue of his weakness. He embarked on copious travels to various lands having parliamentary institutions 28 and enlarged his capacities. He initiated Speakers' Conferences (twice only) and wrote articles on parliamentary issues. * Having examined the proceedings of the House carefully we maintain that, by 1958, the Speaker rose abreast fairly well above the level of parliamentary troubles. There was no no-confidence motion against him during the entire period of 1958.

* In a letter to the writer, the Speaker, who is now lying half-paralysed, told this information.

Deputy Speaker

Mr. C.E. Gibbon - a Christian - was a nominee of the minority community and was unanimously elected as the Deputy Speaker. Clearly, he made up some of the deficiencies found in the Speaker. Unlike the Speaker, he wore his gown in the House and assumed an assertive air. His rulings were prompt, sound and firm. He did not try to curry favour with the Treasury benches. When a member rose to point out the non-availability of answers to questions by the government, Mr. Gibbon's immediate reactions was to enquire the names of the defaulting Ministers and warned them: "I am not going to allow Ministers to flout the instructions and directions of this House and pay scant attention to orders." On another occasion he firmly warned the members "not to create practices and traditions which have no resemblance with the accepted practices and traditions of parliamentary institutions ... but to extend ... complete cooperation to the Chair in maintaining decorum in the House."

Similarly, he warned the Press Gallery not to give "sensational" appeal to the proceedings of the House in the newspapers other than faithfully and "impartial parliamentary reporting", otherwise "I shall take a serious view of an infringement, if any, in future."

Mr. Gibbon comported himself admirably on many a count. But the House did not nourish any spontaneous respect or affection for


him owing to twin reasons. His general attitude in the House was somewhat hectoring, which was not enjoyed by the members. For instance, he might imperiously direct a member to speak by just saying "carry on" without the use of polite prefixes. Once he had to tender an apology for the use of harsh words in the House. 31 But he was more vulnerable on a different count, in that he was identified with a major political issue, namely the electorate. When the Prime Minister Suhrawardy moved an amending Bill in April, 1957 to provide the system of joint electorates throughout the country Mr. Gibbon disallowed the motion on the ground that the provision of three days' notice for the introduction of Bill was not fulfilled by the government. 32 Though he had the discretion of allowing the motion, legally, his ruling was unassailable. But one could suspect his bias; for, when the debate took place, he, sitting on the opposition launched a nearly 5-hour marathon speech spreading over two days to block the Bill. He even threatened to take the issue to the United Nations. 33

It was, however, very difficult for Mr. Gibbon to remain neutral on a great issue like the electorate; for, that would have meant disenfranchisement of the people - the Christians - who elected him. Mr. Gibbon himself regretted his participation in the debate, as he


said that "it is most unfortunate that I, an officer of this House, should have to break through the conventions". The Speakers in Pakistan in general bore resemblances of some of the British Speakers of the 17th, mid-18th and early 19th centuries. The respect, dignity and impartiality which are accorded today to the Speaker's Office in the U.K. could have been only achieved in Pakistan through progressive development of its parliamentary institutions.

**Officers of the N.A.**

The Constitution directed the parliament to pass an Act to regulate the recruitment and conditions of Secretarial Staff of the N.A. Pending the passing of the law, the President in consultation with the Speaker would make rules governing the services of the N.A. Secretariat. Also, the salaries payable to the servants of the N.A. were charged upon the Federal Consolidated Fund - non-votable item. Even the control of the expenditure of the N.A. was given in charge of the Finance Committee - this was duly elected by the N.A. consisting of the Speaker as its Chairman and other members of the N.A. In other words, the domestic establishment of the N.A. compared to its predecessor was more independent. More people were recruited to cope with the growing tasks of the establishment. For more accommodation, a sum of Rs. 32,00,000 were sanctioned to extend

the existing building of the parliament. 38

During the entire life of the N.A. none among the officers was found guilty of inefficiency, partiality or corruption. It appeared the House on the whole was tolerant of its servants. The Secretary of the N.A. was the hold-over of the defunct Constituent Assembly I. His nearly eight years of experience as the Secretary to the Constituent Assembly I was a boon to the N.A., in that the new Speakers and M.P.s could draw on his experience in procedural matters. There were occasions when explosions in the House on procedural issues were readily put out by the Secretary's whispering something into the ears of the Speaker. Charges against the Assembly staff were made only 5 times during the life of the N.A. Three charges came up on a point of privilege, namely tampering with the records of the N.A., non-returning of the corrected speeches, and non-delivery of Assembly papers. 39 And two charges relating directly to the Secretary that he was 'corrupt' were mentioned during budget discussion. 40 But the interesting aspect of this affair was this that all these allegations were made by one M.P. alone, Mr. Farid Ahmed, and by all intents and purposes against the Secretary, Mr. B.M. Ahmed. In essence, the offences were both non-cognisable and non-culpable. The Prime Minister,

Noon, summed up the issue in the following words: "... this honourable gentleman ... in season and out of season ... has made it his responsibility to pick out ... the Secretary of the Assembly ... to attack him ... I tell him (Farid Ahmed) that he (Secretary) is not going to be removed. (Applause)." 41

The fact is that some members were fastidious and were not ready to stand any snag in the officials' performances. It did, however, serve the single purpose of putting the Secretariat of the N.A. on the alert through the Speaker, who would assure the House by saying "I am glad that the Honourable member has brought this matter to my notice and I have cautioned office to be more careful in the future." 42

Whips

It appears that the job of the Whips in the N.A. was less painstaking compared to their predecessors in the Constituent Assembly I. The House of 80 members had more than one party. And the Whips of the different parties found their task of surveillance over their respective small number of members much easier. In fact, the task of the Whips* would have greatly increased in the enlarged N.A. of 310 seats as envisaged by the Constitution, had there been a general

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* Actually, the activities of the Whips in the provincial legislatures were more pronounced, particularly in East Pakistan. There, the name of Abdul Zabbar Khaddar, the Chief Whip of the A.L. coalition government, was a by-word among the legislators, nay the public.

42. Ibid., March 9, 1958, p. 1110.
election. What was, however, distinct about the Whips was their prominent M.P.s who — Mr. Zahiruddin (A.L.), Mr. Youssouf Harun (M.L.), Mr. Farid Ahmed (U.F.) and Sardar Amir Azam (R.P.) — having made their marks in the parliamentary business became full fledged Ministers, eventually. It appears that, no matter whichever parties were in power, the Whips of the government and opposition were mostly cooperative and successful in chalking out the programme of business of the N.A. The Speaker was invariably found in each budget session telling the House that the Whips of the government and opposition parties had agreed about the list of speakers, the order of demands for grants to be taken and a tentative time limit of speeches.* The time-pressed Speaker was assured by the government Whip: "We will set up such number of members on each demand as would generally cover these hours allotted to either the opposition or the government benches." The Whips seemed accommodating both to each other and the members in general. To soothe an opposition member who insisted on speaking more, the government Whip, Mr. Zahiruddin, told the Speaker, "I can forgo my time in his favour." Similarly, the opposition Whip, Mr. Y. Harun had forgone his time in favour of the government Whip who recorded his gratitude to his colleague "for having given me

44. Ibid., p. 784.
an opportunity to speak for a few minutes." Whenever controversy arose in the House between the government and opposition on parliamentary business the Speaker first asked the House to thrash it through 'proper channel', meaning the Whips.

There was no evidence, however, to show that the Whips were flouted. On one occasion the Deputy Speaker drew the Whips' attention to this effect that "there are small group in the House who are not prepared to recognise the Chief Whips", of which reply Zahiruddin, said "We will discuss it in the chamber". The murmurs of the small group of independents or the undecided against the Whips were understandable on psychological ground. But on the whole the Whips had their share of contribution to the smooth conduct of the parliamentary business and lent a helping hand to the Minister of parliamentary affairs.*

Legislators

Members are the harbinger of change in parliamentary outlook. But "unfortunately", regrets Sir John Craik Henderson, "too little is known of the beliefs, training and background of the members of Commonwealth parliaments, their standing in their respective communities

* The writer had an exclusive interview with Mr. Y. Haroon at his London residence who recalled some of the activities of the Whips.

46. Ibid., March 5, 1958, p. 842.
47. Ibid.,
and their relationship to their constituents." In general, this was true of Pakistan. However, having gleaned information from various available sources we have framed a broad classification of the membership pattern, which is furnished below:

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>West Pakistan</th>
<th>East Pakistan</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Landlord</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law practitioner</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrialist</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctors</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalist/Writer</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educationist</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ulema</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>80 49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Commenting on the make-up of the N.A. Dr. Rashiduzzaman maintained that "with the change of political context, the temper of the House has also changed." The members of the first parliament were


49. See Appendix for details. (XVII)

mainly Muslim Leaguers, and as such were mainly drawn from the conservative, aristocratic and higher echelon of the populace. This was still true of the N.A. as far as the West Pakistan representation in it was concerned. But the dishing out of the M.L. in East Pakistan in the general elections of 1954 and the consequent springing up of 'green shoots' of people with new political ideas and alignments replaced the early drought period of M.L. orthodoxy in the N.A.

With the change of personnel reflected an altered outlook and manner in the House. In other words, there was a vein of seriousness in the activities of the M.P.s of the N.A., compared to the relative leisurely dilettantism of their predecessors in the Constituent Assembly I.

Though the members of the N.A. were indirectly elected, nevertheless they had some claim to a representative character for their being elected by an electoral college which, in turn, had been elected through universal adult suffrage.

However, the above chart of membership is not self-explanatory. In an agricultural society like Pakistan it was but natural that almost all the M.P.s had some plots of land and derived some incomes out of it. The 26 members were just landlords as a class. Among these landlords there were 5 Barristers* who having initially responded to the glamour of the Bar ultimately wound up their law profession.

Again, among the landlords two enlarged their occupational interests. Mian Iftikheruddin had a big newspaper industry.** And Pir Ali Mohammad

* They are not classified as practising lawyers.

** Not classified as industrialist.
Rashdi was virtually identified as an eminent journalist, editor and writer.* Among the lawyer class in East Pakistan there were many who first began their career as government servants or lecturers in the Colleges and Universities; but finally settled as law practitioners. Some of the lawyer M.P.'s (East Pakistan) had reputations as writers and journalists. The advocate H.H. Chowdhury was also a newspaper industrialist.** Abul Mansur had law degree, but he was opulently famous as a novelist, satirist, journalist and thinker. The two Ulema of East Pakistan were the antithesis of each other, viz. one belonged to the secular camp to the opposite of the other. Though there were no formal Ulema groups from West Pakistan; but titles, such as Pir, Mir, Syed, Gilani and Hajee were indicative that some of the M.P.'s hailed from religious families.

Generally speaking, the membership pattern of the N.A., unlike its predecessor, touched all the higher, middle and lower strata of the society. But the representation was lopsided - the landlord and lawyer class possessed the largest quota - as the professions like doctors, teachers, journalists, trade unionists, business, manual workers, etc., were inadequately reflected in the House. Arithmetically, and as a whole, the number of the middle-class-oriented M.P.'s were greater in the House. But that was due to East Pakistan members' going to the N.A. as a complete herd of middle class.

* Classified as a journalist.

** Not classified as an industrialist.
Whereas, West Pakistan as a zone was almost denuded of its middle and lower class representation in the N.A.; for, the landlords coming in the best tradition of the 18th century English feudalism had no difficulty in triumphing over their practically 'bought constituencies'. As many as 5 M.P.s were Nawabs - feudal barons.

In terms of ministerial, administrative and parliamentary experiences, a large number of members appeared to have them. Eighteen of the East Pakistan bloc had legislative experience* before the partition of India - 1 dating back from 1913, 2 - 1921, 2 - 1927, 3 - 1937 and 10 from 1946. The rest had made their parliamentary debut after the general elections of 1954. Though this group of 22 had meagre - they were comparatively younger - parliamentary background, despite the fact they had grown up in the tradition of politics. They braved through the hubbub of local government, student movements, trade unionism and party politics. As many as 9 of them were prominent leaders of their respective parties. As far as the administrative experience is concerned 6 out of 40 held responsible positions.

Three of them held Ministerial positions before partition - two of them were Chief Ministers of undivided Bengal and one held that office twice, while the other became the Prime Minister** of Pakistan in 1953. One was the Speaker of the Assamese legislature. And the rest became Ministers - one central and one provincial - after the

* Either in the central or provincial legislatures.
** He also held ambassadorial posts.
partition. The educational standards of the members were quite impressive.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degrees</th>
<th>Foreign Degrees</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>M.A. (Oxon) Bar-at-law;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B.C.L. (U.K.)</td>
</tr>
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<td>M.A. B.L.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>M. A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>B. A. (Hon.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>B. A.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>M. Sc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>M.B.B.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Moulanas (Madrasa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39*</td>
<td>Matriculate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another characteristic of the East Pakistan members that as many as 17 of them suffered jail sentences for political reasons. Some of them suffered for years together both before and after partition.

Spotlighting on the West Pakistan bloc, it is evident that 16 M.P.s had pre-independence legislative experiences either, in the centre or province. One entered the legislative arena in 1920, 1 - 1924, 1 - 1935, 1 - 1936, 4 - 1937, 1 - 1945 and 7 in 1946. Except for the nominated few members, the rest had, in varying degrees, parlia-

* Only Youssouf Ali Chowdhury did not hold any secondary degree.
mentary experience after Pakistan came into being. As many as 22 of them held various positions like Chief Ministership, Ministership, Governorship, Speakership and Ambassadorship. Eight were former Chief Ministers of provinces, * 3 Governors, ** 1 Speaker and 3 ambassadors. The rest of them served either in the centre or provinces as Ministers. General education of the M.P.s was not as wide as that of the East Pakistan group.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Degrees</th>
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<td>M.R.C.P. ‡‡</td>
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</table>

* One of them was Chief Minister before independence.

** One was both Chief Minister and Governor, and another was Governor shortly to become Central Minister.

† Aligarh University, India.

‡‡ For details see Appendix. XVII
It will appear that the number of foreign degrees acquired by the West Pakistan M.P.s was greater than their East Pakistan counterpart. Only the feudal wealth could afford to meet the educational expenses of Oxford and Cambridge. Even the Aligarh education was relatively costly. However, the significance of the presence of the 10 M.P.s having the Aligarh tradition of education was that they would tend to reflect in their general demeanour a mixture of Anglo-Islamic characteristics. Among the 40 M.P.s of West Pakistan bloc only 6 underwent very short period of jail life on political grounds.

However, taking everything together, the N.A. on the whole was composed of a competent body of people in the parliamentary sense. It was not a complete body of newcomers. Eighteen M.P.s were already the members — 10 from West and 8 from East Pakistan — of the Constituent Assembly I. But the old-timers like the seasoned and ripe parliamentarians such as Fazlul Haq, Suhrawardy, H.H. Chowdhury, K.K. Dutta, Noon, Khuho, etc., were assets to the N.A.'s conduct of business and served as nannies to the beginners. Lastly, the members of the N.A. were comparatively youthful, in that their average age was 49–65.51

Salaries and Privileges

A semblance of professionalism was added to the N.A. when the Members of the National Assembly (Salaries and Allowances) Bill was enacted on the 9th April, 1956. The Act granted concessions to M.P.s

in profusion relating to their travels and other matters. Under Clause 5, every member was provided with one free first class railway pass and one free first class steamer pass (without diet), which would entitle him to travel by any railway or steamer in Pakistan at any time, but nothing contained in this Section would affect the payment of any travelling allowance payable under any provision of this Act. Under Clause 3, a member was entitled to receive a salary of Rs. 400 per mensem during the whole of his term of office plus an allowance at the rate of Rs. 21 for each day during any period of residence on duty. In addition, a member was entitled to three first class return air travels in a year between Dacca and Karachi.52 The provisions of the Act were mainly modelled on the Members' Salary Bill of India.53 Thus, for the first time, the facilities of the members, particularly the provision of monthly salary were given statutory sanction. This was a good step in the right direction, in that the members coming from the middle and lower strata of the society would be more devoted to parliamentary works free of economic anxieties and "the members of the two wings would be able to move throughout the country freely and see the conditions in both the wings of the country".54

The privileges enjoyed by the members are actually contributory to the enhancement of parliamentary prestige. Sir John Henderson confesses: "... I can imagine no greater danger to parliament than

52. Dawn, April 10, 1956.
54. Ibid., p. 740.
that members could be arrested and detained without trial at the
instigation of the executive*. 55 During the period 1947–54 Khan
Abdul Gaffar Khan (M.C.A.) was almost constantly in the prison under
the Pakistan Preventive Detention Act. During the time of the
Constituent Assembly II two East Pakistan members* were arrested
by the Government when they were about to go to Karachi to partici-
pate in the constitution-making. The bizarre aspect of the event
was this that a communication was addressed to the Speaker to the
effect that "now an enquiry is being entered into for the purpose
of prosecuting the persons who were arrested". 56 This was the cause
of a heated debate in the Constituent Assembly II. 57 The matter
was referred to the Privilege Committee which found no breach of
privilege as the members could not claim privilege against arrest
for criminal offences, since they were arrested by the Pakistan
Public Safety Act. However, this incident had a salutary effect
upon the members, in that the Constituent Assembly II passed the
Constituent Assembly (Proceedings and Privileges) Act in 1955. What
was more, the Constitution itself stipulated certain fundamental
privileges of the M.P.'s (Art. 56, 1–5) which, like the proceedings
of the N.A. could not be questioned by any court of law. ** The Con-

* Mahmud Ali and Fazlul Karim (left wingers).
** Though the members would not have immunity from the Criminal laws.
55. Sir Alan Burns (edit.), op.cit., p. 93.
56. See Suhrawardy's speech of 31st January, 1956 quoted in
"Suhrawardy Supplement," loc.cit., p. XXVI.
stitution left the N.A. to determine its own privileges elaborately by Act of Parliament. However, during the entire period of the N.A. no M.P. was arrested by executive instigation. The Privileges Committee and the Members’ Allowance and Facilities Committee were duly constituted in October 8, 1956. In all, there arose 28 points of privilege in the N.A. of which 11 were thought to have been prima facie cases of breaches of privileges and were sent to the Privileges Committee. The rest were either disallowed by the Speaker on grounds of non-fulfilment of technical requirements or withdrawn by the members having been assured of remedies. Three reports of the Privileges Committee of the N.A. on the 11 privileges questions referred to it during April and August, 1957 were submitted to the House in November 28, 1957. One of the reports dealing with 5 privileges motions was preliminary, while the remaining 2 dealing with the 6 other motions were final, and recommended that no breach of privileges was involved in 3 cases, and the other 3 be dropped.

A Hansard Society publication maintains that affronts to parliamentary authority are “either clearly seen to be assessed in accordance with judicial standards, or else ignored as unworthy of notice”.

Perhaps, the Privileges Committee in one of its reports observed

* They were all brought up in the year 1957.

** They were ultimately dropped as well.


59. Dawn, October 9, 1956.

60. Ibid., November 29, 1957.

judiciously when it said: "We find no justification to suggest that a speech delivered by a Member of the Parliament cannot be the subject of criticism or comment ... a Member of the Parliament performing his duties as a Member is liable to be criticised in the performance of such duties ... every citizen has a right to offer fair criticism ... on a matter which is of public concern."62 However, looking into the pattern of the privileges issues one might remark that many of them were invoked on frivolous grounds. But apart from the question of embarrassing the government on this account, there is also a healthy side in that the members' parliamentary reflexes were alive, so much so that they raised points of privileges whenever they thought violation of privileges, flagrant or light, occurred. The privileges motions like the government issuing an Ordinance when the N.A. was about to meet,6* misreporting of the newspapers, non-framing of the rules of the N.A., the U.S. Ambassador's remark on the speech of an M.P., the selection of the leader of the opposition, etc., etc., were quite meaningful.

Legislature at Work: Budget

The Constitution directed (Art. 66) the introduction of a Bill in the N.A. to provide for the appropriation out of the Consolidated fund of all moneys required to meet expenditure. There were now four

* On this issue the House was divided, see N.A.D., Vol. II, April 9, 1957, p. 106.

stages of the budget, namely the presentation of the budget and the consequent general discussion on it, the demands for grants and the moving of cut motions, the introduction of the Finance Bill authorising the government to levy taxes to be followed by the members' expressing grievances on the tax proposals* and finally the introduction of the Appropriation Bill setting up the legal machinery - the last opportunity for the members to bring out most important or new points which might have been left out earlier. The break up of the days spent in disposing of the budgets is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Introduction</th>
<th>General Discussion</th>
<th>Demands for Grants</th>
<th>Fin. Bill</th>
<th>App. Bill</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1++</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 1956, 21 members took part in general discussion of the budget, and 39 cut motions and 15 amendments to the Finance Bill were moved. In 1957, the number of participants in general discussion was 19, and cut motions and amendments to the Finance Bill were 28 and 40 respectively. There were 28 cut motions and 39 amendments during the discussion of the budget for the year 1958.** Surely, the figures

* Based on the famous saying that 'no taxation without representation'.
** Calculated by the writer.
+ The budget of the year 1956–57 was presented in accordance with the India Act of 1935, due to technical reasons.
++ Calculated by the writer.
mentioned above are not impressive. The parties when in opposition were wrathful about the meagre budgetary time, but they could not appreciably alleviate the situation when promoted to the government benches. The thing was the N.A. was bedevilled by the system of double membership of which bad effect could have been avoided only by the holding of general elections. To circumvent the situation, the N.A. could have adopted the system of 'vote on account' as practised in the House of Commons. As a matter of fact, a member suggested the use of the Indian device of passing a minimum grant for 3 or 4 months by a Resolution of the House to enable the administration to carry on, so that the House could be "sitting continuously to examine the government expenditure carefully ... and then pass them ...".

However, compared to the first parliament the budget sessions of the N.A. consumed more time, in that the latter on many occasions and particularly during Suhrawardy's time, held sessions both in the mornings and afternoons. Almost 80 hours were utilized on the budget session of 1957. In 1956, the Presidential address to the N.A., made in the tradition of the Queen's speech in the British parliament to announce government policies, was separately debated and as many as 22 amendments were sought to be incorporated in the speech.

64. Dawn, February 28, 1957.
The numbers shown above as participants in general discussion of the budget do not reflect the actual volume of participation by the entire members had during the course of the four stages of the budget. For, it was the party bosses and senior members who, having been the opening batsmen of the general discussion of the budget, used to make broad and lengthy speeches. The number of cut motions moved during these three years compared favourably to that of the ones moved in the Constituent Assembly I. The time factor aside, there was a theoretical restraint on moving cut motions on subjects which had been transferred to the provincial list by the Constitution. Besides, there emerged qualitative change in the pattern of cut motions in respect of the N.A. One may conclude the early cut motions, that they strained at gnats while swallowing camels. The sample of the present cut motions is given below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Cut Motions</th>
<th>Usual Rs. 100</th>
<th>Drastic Rel</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industries, Commerce &amp; Economic Affairs</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign &amp; Kashmir Affairs</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food &amp; Agriculture</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interior</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railways</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ref. Rehabilitation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Calculated by the writer.

It will be seen that cut motions on such subjects as Cabinet, Industries, Commerce, Foreign Affairs, Interior, etc., in the Constituent Assembly I (Leg.) which were in middle and low position in order of preference, become more prominent in the N.A. The cut motions in the N.A. were essentially used as pegs to hang debates on government policies in the widest possible way. The defensive opposition of the early period never moved any cut motions on defence which had the greatest share of government expenditure. Whereas, in the first budget session of the N.A. 10 cut motions were moved. Similarly important subjects like Food and agriculture became the targets of cut motions for the first time.

However, the distinguishing feature of the budget was its being presented in a direct, frank, lucid and comprehensive manner in accompaniment with mass of information in the shape of an explanatory memorandum, statistical tables, an economic survey and white paper* which usually bulked more than 1500 pages.67 This enabled the members to bring about an informed discussion in the House on issues. Another feature was the continuity and consistency of the budget, in that, despite the changes of government, the Finance Minister remained the same person which according to a member gave them reliability and certainty of the economic "situation that is developing throughout the years".68 In respect of providing an effective brake or control

* This gave details about aid, public investment and expenditure.
on the country's finance, the House, which in practice meant the opposition - whoever filled that position - concentrated their attacks on those fundamental policies of the government which had economic implications. By so doing, they aired grievances in such a way as to attract public attention. This line of strategy was good against the background of coalition governments which were psychologically less complacent. A member's comment that "A budget is the reflection of the State of affairs in a country - economic, social, industrial, cultural, educational and otherwise", 69 appears in the Hansard as repeated by many others during the 3 budget sessions of the N.A. This was indicative of the members' seriousness manifesting itself in their budgetary speeches which were brutally frank, yet realistic, accusative yet factual, resentful yet constructive, clamorous yet representative, demanding yet responsible and bold yet courteous. For instance, talking on the urgency of removal of disparity between wings a member thundered "The ocean that divided England and America could not be dried up and so geography played its part and created history when politicians failed. In case of East Pakistan and West Pakistan I give the same warning." 70 Similarly, when Farid Ahmed accused the government of exterminating the middle class by indirect taxation he was invincibly armed with information and performed the miraculous feat of proving to the House that the taxation proposal

70. Ibid., March 22, 1956, p. 361.
would benefit only "32,000 people and their dependents".\textsuperscript{71} Again, F. Rahman, who was fiercely opposed to the government’s so-called anti-inflationary budget and heavy taxation on incomes, proved with the dash of an economic expert how anti-inflationary measures were not going to succeed due to tax evasion and offered constructive suggestions based on Professor Kaldar’s report on Indian Taxation system about the kinds and method of taxation to be followed.\textsuperscript{72} However, instances may be multiplied in support of the remark we have made above in regard to the tenor of the budgetary speeches, Also, the whichever parties came to power listened to the opposition and appreciated their contributions to the budget sessions in ample measure.\textsuperscript{73}

But with all these improvements, the question is whether the N.A. had complete control over the State’s Purse? It has been said of the parliamentary matriarch - House of Commons - that her financial control "for all practical purposes ... now appears to be mythological".\textsuperscript{74} In Pakistan situation it was still more mythological. The position was well described by a front bencher: "Sir, the system of parliamentary control that we have inherited from the British is based fundamentally upon this that the representatives of people are the watchdogs, the guardians of people who must see that every single pie

\textsuperscript{73} See Ibid.
is well-spent, spent to purpose, ... the responsibility of this
House ... is very very great in this matter; and yet ... no serious
attention is paid to one of the ways in which the House can discharge
its responsibilities viz. by scrutinising actual expenditure."75
Administration diversified during the years with its mounting cost,
financial involvements of the public corporations burgeoned, public
debts of the government swelled, all those and many others, on which
the House had no effective control. The extant machineries such as
the Public Accounts Committee to conduct a post mortem on government
expenditure, Standing Finance Committee (the British prototype of
Estimate Committee), Economy Committee, Taxation Enquiry Committee,
etc., etc., operated with varying degrees of success. But, for all
practical purposes, it was the Ministry of Finance of whose honesty,
integrity and efficiency were recognised by the House "controls the
expenditure".76

Whatever grip the members managed to have on the purse of the
nation was by having availed themselves of the opportunity of con-
tributing to the formulation of government economic policy by venti-
lating their points of view in the national forum. On this count
the N.A. was far more superior and effective than its predecessor.
The N.A. did not sanction money on the nod. It for the first time
concerned itself with the capital side of the budget. The Five Year
Plan was subjected to a searching analysis where the members reflected


76.  See Finance Minister's speech, ibid., Vol. II, March 11, 1958,
p. 1295.
on the growth pattern, the level of employment in industries, the capital outlays on defence services, and the relative efficacy of investments in the public or private sector in the Pakistan situation. In fact, the shift in government agricultural policy witnessed in 1957 was mainly due to members' resorting to ceaseless flow of arguments based on expert reports on agriculture by Lord Boyd-Orr, Colin Clark and W. Bell. Similarly, the government was forced to create a new branch - Investment Division - to the Finance Ministry to take into account the expenditure of the various public corporations. In sum, it was through the airing of government policies touching economic decisions pros and cons that the House tended to wield some control over the public finance.

Legislation

In regard to legislation the N.A. was mostly analogous to the first parliament. The only point of difference was that in the former case there was some display of parliamentary sovereignty in legislation and some sense of participation on the part of the members in legislation. Major bills were hardly passed through the House in the Scylla of general hostility and the Charybdis of members' non-cooperation.

Year | Bills passed | Bills sent to Select Committees | Bills discussed | Legislative Sittings | Ordinances converted into Acts
--- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---
1956 | 45 | 1 | 22 | 10 | 25
1957 | 48 | 5 | 30 | 31 | 18
1958 | 39 | 5 | 22 | 19 | 16
  | **132** | **11** | **74** | **60** | **59**

Total Bills Introduced 1956-1958 = 144

Of the Bills passed 55 belonged to the Ministries of Finance, Industries and Commerce, 22 to Law, 12 to Refugee and Rehabilitation, 16 to Defence and Parliamentary Affairs, 3 to Labour, 2 to Food and Agriculture and 1 to the Ministry of Education. Only 44 were new Acts - the rest were amending measures - of which 11 were claimed by the Ministries of Finance, Industries and Commerce, 16 by Law and Refugees and Rehabilitation (8 each), 6 by Parliamentary Affairs, 8 by Food and Agriculture, Health, Interior, Foreign Affairs (2 each) and 3 by the Ministries of Labour, Communications and Defence (1 each) respectively.

There were, however, some substantial and meaningful pieces of legislation during the period. The Members of the National Assembly (Salaries and Allowances) Act, the Leader of the Opposition (Allowances) Act, The Electorate Act and the Representation of the People's Act,

78. Calculated by the writer by having gone through the Hansard of the whole period and the newspaper, *Dawn*.

all of which contributed to the strengthening of the parliamentary institutions. On the count of Finance and Industries, the Small Industries Corporation Act which was motivated by the purpose of promoting the development of small industries to provide employment and earn foreign exchange, and the Pakistan Financial Year Commencement Act which would change the present financial year i.e. 1st April to 31st March to 1st January to 31st December, to enable the M.P.s to take their time in the budget discussion, to enable the East Pakistan government to utilize developmental funds unworried about the rainy season and, above all, to have trade years, Foreign Exchange and Financial Year on calendar basis, were Acts in the right direction. Similarly, The Agricultural Bank Act and the Agricultural Census Act and the Jute Act were passed to promote agriculture and to set up proper machinery to stabilise the price of jute, the main foreign exchange earner. On the labour front, The Employees Provident Fund Act and the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act were notable. The passing of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Bill in its effect on millions of refugees was "a substantial piece of legislation ... as a result of the passage of the Bill, very important adjustments ... will take place in the economy and the

The Unani, Ayurvedic and Homoeopathic Practitioners Act purged the medical profession of quacks. On the passing of the Pakistan International Airlines Corporation Bill - a step towards integrating the two wings physically in the cheapest and speediest way - an opposition member had this to say:

"Do not think I am waxing poetic ... when I say that P.I.A. plane is the only messenger of love that establishes daily contact between the two wings of Pakistan ... which like a pigeon-carrier takes a hop from Karachi and gets down at Dacca with daily messages."

As a general rule, Bills introduced by the governments regardless of which parties formed them at a particular point were passed by straight party votes. The opposition amendments were usually rejected, but occasionally accepted or withdrawn after Ministerial assurances. Evidently, the House did not devote enough time to discussing bills; on average it passed a little over 2 bills daily. On the last day of the first session of 1956 the N.A. passed 17 bills in a record time of about 4½ hours. Discussions on bills were sometimes telescoped when several amendments were put together and the opposition was asked to speak on them. Then there was the question of the

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85. Ibid., Vol. II, April 17, 1957, p. 590
86. Ibid., Vol. I, April 6, 1956, p. 582.
sheaves of Ordinances which were usually replaced by Acts of Parliament. They were comparable to British Orders in Council. Sir Cecil Carr posed a question, "Does not the law, in this age of prefabrication, come down, ready made, from above? ... are we not to take advantage of time saving gadgets in law making?"88 Surely it is prudent, that parliament should make some leeway for the executive to undertake legislative action to meet emergencies. Ordinances issued after the coming into being of the N.A. were fewer in number, non-controversial and mostly meant only to enable the government to take urgent action and steer clear of judicial writs. Concerning the passing of the rest of the Bills of which mostly were of amending nature, Daultana, sitting in the opposition, and in his moment of truth confessed to the House, "Sir, our legislation ... has always been of a somewhat technical and even of a frivolous nature. Every year Bills that we have been passing, have really been measures to remove one word from a clause or to extend the operation of a Bill that had been operating."89 This being the case, many a bill was allowed to be passed by the members without discussion, save the contentious ones. As a matter of fact, we find that all the new and contentious bills were discussed in the House in varying length of time and seriousness. Hence, the quantum of time allotted for legislation would appear less ridiculous


when the true nature of the volume of Acts was taken into consideration.

The passing of the controversial 119-Clause The Pakistan People’s Representation Bill took nearly 5 months. This was also an example of the triumph of the spirit of conciliation on the part of the members irrespective of party affiliations. The House virtually took 3 hours in enacting the Bill. The smooth and speedy passage of this Bill, which provided for the conduct of elections, qualifications and disqualifications of members, and allied matters was made possible by the cooperative, joint approach of the Treasury and opposition benches. Sixty five amendments were moved, 9 of which were either lost or withdrawn, and the remaining 55 were incorporated in the Bill. These amendments were jointly drafted by the government and opposition members. Another contentious Bill e.g. The Unani, Ayurvedic and Homoeopathic Practitioners Bill which was notoriously accused of "consuming the lives of six Health Ministers" previously was passed by the N.A. in a similar spirit after 4 days of debates in which lobbying and popular pressure was reflected. In sum, in almost all contentious legislation there were varying levels of discussions and partnership between the

* It was introduced in the House in April 15, 1957 and then referred to the Select Committee which submitted its report on August 22, 1957 and was finally passed on August 26, 1957.


government and opposition members. This was more true from the commencement of the second session of 1956 and onward.

The partnership between the government and opposition was more pronounced in the case of those bills which were sent to the Select Committees. Less controversial bills were also entrusted to subcommittees consisting of government and opposition members for vetting purposes. The opposition contribution to legislation was on many occasions appreciated by the government, as was the government's gesture by the opposition. Another feature of the legislative process was that prior to the passing of any substantive bills the relevant publics were consulted. Evidences, opinions and letters from various bodies like the trade unionists, refugee organizations, Bar associations, newspaper organization, Bank, Chamber of Commerce and Industries, etc., etc. were heard or received, as the case might be, by the Minister or Select Committees in charge of the bills, so that the opinions of those who would be likely to be affected by the proposed legislation were weighed before enactment.

The achievement of participation and partnership in matters of legislation whatever might be its scope and intensity was one of the best features of the work of the N.A.


Non-official business

Backbenchers are not mere 'lobby fodder'. They can realise their potential through the skilful use of non-official time. In the case of the N.A. it was already a struggle for parliamentary time in general. And the struggle for non-official time was, in particular, all the more acute. When the House adjourned for four days – during which time one non-official day fell – to enable the M.P.s to see a Horses and Cattle Show a member reacted, "It is nothing unusual for this Government to run after horses and to prefer horses to non-official business."

Truly speaking, the backbenchers or members themselves could not be exonerated from the charge of being apathetic to non-official business. Eight motions standing in the name of 8 different members were surprisingly not moved in the February session of 1958 when called by the Speaker.

During the whole life of the N.A. there were only 7 Private Members' day in which 7 resolutions and 8 Bills were moved. Among the Private Members' Bills only the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Bill was passed in the Autumn session of 1958. Professor Bromhead maintains (in Britain) that "Private Members' Bills are best when they deal with small and non-controversial problems."

* It is not 5 days as maintained by M. Ahmed. See M. Ahmed, op.cit., p. 128. The dates of the non-official days are the following: April 7, 1956; February 18, 1957; August 30, 1957; February 21, March 13, September 2 and 5, 1958.

Bills introduced were politically contentious and were moved by members of the A.L., M.L. and G.D.* when they were thrown into the opposition benches. The Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Bill was originally moved to assist the private interest of the 45 striking employees of the Remington Rand who were dismissed by the employers.\(^{100}\) When passed, the benefits accrued from the Act had general applicability over the entire field of employer-employee relationship in the Industries, in that proper tribunals were envisaged to look into the disputes. Virtually, it was due to the pressing need of some such measure and in recognition of Zahiruddin's** aggressive personality that the government did not oppose the Bill.

Sk. Mujiboor Rahman's The Pakistan Financial Year (Commencement) Bill\(^+\) was in substance passed, though technically not as a Private Members' Bill. The honour fell to the Finance Minister in piloting the Bill as the Minister successfully persuaded the Hon. member to disown the Bill which was thought to be a Money Bill — actually it was not — and was passed as a Public Bill under the name The General Clauses (Amendment) Bill.\(^{101}\) Mahmud Ali's (G.D.) The Security of Pakistan (Repeal) Bill, a very controversial measure, was finally

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* Later became the N.A.P.
** The mover.
+ Sent to the Select Committee


withdrawn in 1957 on the assurance by the Prime Minister that the
Act was going to die its natural death within a couple of months. 102

The rest of the Bills ran into political trouble. Mr. Khaleque's
(A.L.) The Forfeiture and Prevention of Illegally and Unfairly
Acquired Properties Bill which sought to take stocks of the properties
of all government officers and businessmen since 1943 was negatived. 103

This Bill was attempted to be moved in the Constituent Assembly I
(Leg.) by Messrs. Azizuddin Ahmed, G. Pathan and S. Haq, but to no
purpose. The pressures of the 'power elite' apart, the Bill could
not be enacted as it was thought to be difficult of execution and
would have given executors power without responsibility. The Con-
stitution (Amendment) Bill, and the Representation of the People
(Amendment) Bill which sought to prescribe disqualification as penalty
for members who dissociated from the party on whose ticket they were
elected to the N.A. or Provincial Assemblies were too contentious
to be enacted. 104

The Resolutions, except two* which were adopted, were either
talked out, withdrawn or ruled out of order. In sum, the Private
Members' Motions, Bills or Resolutions, served one purpose, namely

*  (1) The holding of general elections by November 1958;
   (2) The reconstruction of Pakistan's Agrarian Economy
important subjects or things which might be close to the minds of the public were discussed in the N.A., and discussed by members who otherwise could not have done so.

Committees

The pattern of the committees in the N.A. was repetitive of the first parliament. They (committees) functioned, on the whole, in the same vein. Usually, the Standing Advisory Committees attached to each Ministry were set up in each year, but they met only by fits and starts. It was only the Standing Committee on Finance which met frequently and worked actively. On the question of meetings of Standing Committees, "the Finance Minister is already true to his own Ministry. But the irregularity is about the other Ministries", commented a member. In regard to Select Committees their uses were not too many, but they worked more briskly and efficiently. The activities of the 11 Select Committees serving on Public Bills consisted in the examination of witnesses, the sifting of facts and the production of final reports were praised both inside and outside the House. Unlike the early situation the Committees met in various parts of Pakistan and incurred expenditure. Almost all the reports were unanimous, save the contentious Peoples' Representation Bill

* I belonged to the Private Members' Bill.

where two notes of dissent were appended to the report. The composition of the Committees was more representative in the sense that members of different parties sat in them, even disproportionate to their strength in the House. There were 3 new Select Committees in the N.A., namely the Press Gallery Committee, The Committee on Petition and the Expunging Committee. The first one undertook the conventions of the House of Commons to ensure that charges of mis-reportings were amicably settled between the parliament and the Press and to this direction the Committee "worked hard for the last two years". The second one was less busy as there were not enough public petitions to take care of. The Expunging Committee was set up to examine and strike off unparliamentary expressions from the Proceedings of the N.A., if any. The Committee having corresponded with Sir Edward Fellowes, Clerk to the House of Commons and other M.P.s of Canada and Newfoundland presented its report to the House, stating its inability to delete words from the Hansard unless the House itself considered the deletion desirable. The Privileges Committee operated in the N.A. for the first time and in full swing. The Select Committee on the Rules and Procedure did its job belatedly but comprehensively. The Library and House Committees - the House


Committee dealt with personal comforts and arrangements of members besides the Ministers functioned in a better way compared to the Constituent Assembly I (Leg.).

Here, a mention of a specialised Select Committee, the Public Accounts Committee may be made. Apparently, the Public Accounts Committee of the N.A. being the watchdog on behalf of the taxpayers to sit over the expenditure incurred by the various Ministries, appeared toothless. It is to be recalled that the P.A.C. (Public Accounts Committee) of the first parliament did the scrutinising of accounts only from 1947 to 1950. Work to this end could not proceed due to the serious constitutional crisis. To the credit of the P.A.C. of the N.A. which was constituted at the end of 1956, the outstanding accounts of the years 1950-51, 1951-52 and 1952-53 were examined and their reports were submitted in the House in November, 1957. The report of the accounts of the year 1953-54 was also presented before the House in September, 1958. The trouble was that the P.A.C. was all the time struggling to keep itself up-to-date with the accounts, and spent a great deal of time in post-mortem examination of the decomposed body of expenditure of bygone years. By the time it was ready to embark upon the post-constitutional period, again it was prevented by martial law. The reports, in the words of Dr. Muneer, were "penetrating studies into the budgeting and the

expenditure of the various Ministries".\textsuperscript{113} As to the question why they were not debated on the floor of the House there should not be much surprise, as in the House of Commons "few of its reports ever get debated".\textsuperscript{114} Although, the reports of the years from 1950 to 1953 were submitted for discussion in the House, the motion for consideration stood over as the members wanted them to be studied thoroughly before debate.\textsuperscript{115}

However, the main work of the P.A.C. was to communicate the omissions and commissions of the various Ministries and their officials in regard to defraying of public money. Bereft of executive power, the P.A.C. could wash the dirty linen of financial malpractices of the departments publicly - an implicit threat to the wrongdoers. This the members of the P.A.C. did fairly vehemently on any suitable occasion in the House. Subjects like over-expenditure, under-expenditure, refusal of officials to turn up before the P.A.C., reluctance to show relevant papers by the departmental heads, etc., were usually broached before the House during budget sessions.\textsuperscript{116} These then became the subject matters of 'leaders' in the newspapers. The P.A.C. was lucky in one respect, in that its Chairman, though still the Finance

\textsuperscript{113. Muneeber Ahmed, op. cit., p. 78.}


\textsuperscript{115. See N.A.D., Vol. IV, November 30, 1957, p. 109.}

\textsuperscript{116. For a sample see Farid Ahmed's speech, N.A.D., Vol. II, March 11, 1958, pp. 1293-1294.}
Minister, appeared to have been universally acclaimed as cooperative. "Let us give the devil his due. I must confess publicly ... the Finance Minister has gone out of his way in giving fullest support to our proposals. Not only that, at the cost of annoyance to officials, he sided with us. Every encouragement was given" 117 - remarked a member of the P.A.C.

However, some mention should be made of the Economy Committee - an specialised Select Committee. This Committee was appointed in May, 1957, and it submitted its report in October, 1957 making far-reaching recommendations as to the method of achieving frugality in administration. The government responded to the recommendations in varying degrees. In regard to economy in Foreign Office the government accepted almost all the recommendations, particularly the closing down of the office of the Purchasing Missions abroad was significant. On the home front, the government abolished the post of Industries Secretary and made one post of Secretary for both Industries and Commerce. A very senior civil servant was made Efficiency Improvement and Coordinating Officer to check against all sorts of red-tapism in the administration. Similarly, some departmental reorganizations and retrenchments were done in pursuance of the reports of the Economy Committee. 118 In sum, the workings of the Committees left


much to be desired. The House was, however, pulling itself up, in that it appointed a three-man committee to draw up rules governing committee system of all kinds, so that they become effective institutions. But the coming of martial law intercepted the process.

Questions

The practice and rules governing Q.T. (Question Time) were mostly the same in the N.A. as were prevalent in the first parliament. It was, however, on the qualitative side that the questions put in the N.A. had a clear edge over the earlier ones. The following table will give an estimate of the questions submitted each session:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Session</th>
<th>Starred Questions Answered</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Supplementary</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Un-starred Questions Answered</th>
<th>Q.T. Time Answered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>24.22</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>II</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>15.50</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>457</td>
<td>28.56</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>33.25</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>V</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>16.77</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>VI</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5.50</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>VII</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>9.33</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>VIII</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21*</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IX</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>548</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>27.42</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>33</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>2100**</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* We have counted those days as Q.T. when oral questions were put in the House. The numbers of starred, unstarrred and short

Footnote /Continued over.
The subject analysis of starred questions is as follows: Economic Affairs 483; Communication 249; Services 223; Refugee 114; Foreign Affairs 100; Works 78; Education 82; Food and Agriculture 79; Interior 59; Information 38; Health 38; Frontier 43; Labour 27 and Law 16. The Q.T. appeared better organized in that individual Ministries were, by rotation, fixed up for questioning on a particular day of the week. On a random perusal of the Hansard it appears to us that most of the questions put were couched in precise and direct language, and based on appropriate subject matter. The volume of questions that sauntered aimlessly in the first parliament was scarcely traceable in the N.A. And the early monopolization of two members in questioning was transformed into a situation where a large number of members in the N.A., particularly the backbenchers participated in the Q.T. Another feature of the Q.T. was the presence of vivacity, as it was a duel among equals, namely the government and the opposition, no matter which parties were in power or out.

The types of questions put were as varied as their purposes were. They were meant to expose scandals, accidents, abuses of power,

Footnotes from table on previous page continued.

notice questions received in the N.A. Secretariat were 2,020, 379 and 252 respectively. See Munir Ahmed, op.cit., p. 74.

** Conservative estimates.

+ Calculated by the writer from the Hansard.
to gather information, publicise grievances, extract promises, browbeat the government, force an action, so and so forth. As one member confessed bluntly: "We know answers to many questions. We put them as the nation has a right to know what is happening." In this venture, the members had a kick out of the Q.T. fairly effectively. There were lots of instances when members swooped down upon the reluctant Ministers with supplementaries and made them part with information. And then another member with a touch of masochism would say, "Sir, I think that should serve the purpose. The whole thing has come out." In respect of cut and thrust atmosphere in the Q.T. the N.A.'s was an improvement upon its predecessor. When the opposition members were pressing hard with supplementaries to ascertain Pakistan's fishing resources the Minister charged the questioners of converting the House into a fish market. "It is the most unkindest cut of all coming from a responsible Minister that when information of fish is sought he is trying to give me a smell of fish in the House (laughter)"—retorted back the member.

Instances of this abound in the Hansard.

It is held that unsatisfactory answers to questions on the part of the Ministers have often become themes of adjournment motions.

123. Ibid., Vol. II, March 5, 1958, p. 814.
in the House of Commons. For the first time, 9 adjournment
motions were moved in the N.A. whose causes were either unsatisfactory
replies to questions or refusals to reply. The Minister of Comмуni-
cation was asked on April 13, 1957 whether it was a fact that the
government was contemplating the transfer of railways to provincial
responsibility as it was clear in the speech of the President published
in the newspapers. Much heat was generated in the House through
supplementaries, as the Minister failed to assure the House that
the Presidential speech had the concurrence of the Cabinet. This
sparked off the moving of three adjournment motions on April 15,
1957 to this effect whether or not the Head of the State under the
Westminster system could say anything on controversial political
issues without the sanctions of the Cabinet. The motions were ruled
out, though after an illuminating and successful debate. Similarly,
the question regarding massing of Indian troops in Chad Bed became
the theme of an adjournment motion later, and was successfully dis-
cussed in another motion e.g. Kashmir problem. The rest of the
motions were withdrawn after the members had been assured by the
government of proper actions. This shows the extent of seriousness
with which the members viewed at the Q.T. and also their doggedness

on matters about which they had strong feelings. Similarly, there is nothing tangible to quote that all the four governments did ever try, by volition, to ride roughshod over the Q.T. ¹²⁹

The number of deferred and repetitious questions was very little in the N.A. There was one interesting thing, in that a few members seemed to be interested in and specializing in certain types of questions. For instance, Muzaffar Ahmed was mostly interested in labour questions, as was Y. Harun in business and commercial affairs and Tarkabagish in the 4th Class employees of the government. Likewise, a left wing M.P., F. Karim would always hurl questions either to assess the number of political detainees or the number of political parties banned by the government, only to embarrass the government by putting supplementaries as to why the Communist Party was banned.¹³⁰

However, while, the qualitative side of the questions in the N.A. improved, the quantitative one fell below the early mark of the first parliament. In the present situation the average number of oral questions reached the House per day was about 23. In the experience of the House of Commons it is found that "as the number of supplements increased, the number of starred questions reached decreased".¹³¹ In Pakistan situation, the M.P.s for the first time showed an increasing knack for putting supplementaries. There were

instances that questions were held over for supplementaries on the next day. The tempo was maintained by allowing some latitude for supplementaries. In answer to a member's query whether supplementary questions could be prepared beforehand in writing, the Speaker ruled: "Procedure is that supplementary questions arise out of answers, be it in writing or be it read, I do not care."\textsuperscript{132} As a result the progress in the disposal of questions was very slow. According to a member "We do not finish even 10 questions a day."\textsuperscript{133} So, on conservative estimate the average supplementaries put in a day was about 30. But in neither ground i.e. the rate of oral questions or supplementaries was Q.T. very remarkable. The only point is that the early pattern was broken. One plausible reason can be advanced on the count of the small rate of questions which were coming up in the N.A. namely, the members had more communicating links with the parties in power and opportunities to raise issues on parliamentary forum, the like of which was not possible in the early periods.

\textbf{Adjournment motions}

Perhaps this was some sort of a record that so many adjournment motions were discussed in the N.A. in such a short period of less than three years. The scarcity of the first parliament in respect of discussing adjournment motions became a question of abundance in


\textsuperscript{133} \textit{Ibid.}, Vol. III, September, 5, 1958, p. 465.
The subjects of the motions were varied and not lopsided like the pattern of the Constituent Assembly I (Leg.) on foreign affairs. The subjects discussed were widely distributed, in that food and economic matters claimed 5, constitutional and parliamentary affairs 6, foreign 3, strikes in colleges and telegraph office 3, railways 2, and flood, refugees, labour, detention and administrative lapses claimed 1 each.

Interestingly, the 22 motions which were not pressed or withdrawn as the government held out promises of remedies were also mostly discussed at some length. Sometimes, the business of the House was threatened by the onrush of motions in what appeared to be "unnecessary resolutions for adjournment motions" if not "frivolous". The coalition governments whichever in power, on the whole, appeared generous to the opposition's moving of adjournment motions, if they were urgent, recent and of public importance. On the adjournment motion concerning the strike of Dow Medical College Students, the government welcomed the motion by saying that "it is a very important matter and everyone of us is really concerned about the welfare of our youths".

* Calculated by the writer from the Hansard.

Similarly, the government could not be charged of turning a deaf ear to the adjournment motions when on September 2, 1958, the Speaker declared that almost all the 30 to 40 motions were hit 'by the rule of anticipation'; for, the government itself volunteered to have debates on foreign and economic affairs - the main themes of the adjournment motions. We neither agree with Mr. Mustaq Ahmed's submission that the motion of the ejection of 200 refugee families living in Sultanabad was rejected by the Speaker on "flimsy grounds", nor do we find Mr. Ahmed exact in his version that the Speaker ruled that unsatisfactory replies to questions by Ministers could not form the basis of adjournment motions. In the first case, the Speaker gave a convincing ruling that orders passed in the ordinary course of law by any constituting authority could not be a subject of an adjournment motion. Even the mover was satisfied: "Mr. Speaker, I most ... humbly bow to your decision." On the second case the Speaker's ruling, in essence, was that the adjournment motion could be moved on the basis of the subject matter of the answer given by the Minister and not on the basis of its being just merely unsatisfactory.

In reality, the ruled out motions failed to survive the rigors

* The refugee issue was virtually discussed on the motion, Evacuee Property.
of rules* governing adjournment motions. Also, some of the motions could be appropriately moved as privileges motions or discussed on the Finance Bill which provided wider scope. But the fact remains, that so many important subjects were allowed to be discussed in the time-pressed House gave eloquent testimony to government's responsiveness, on the one hand, and the Speaker's leniency, on the other.

Parliamentary Time

The time spent in the conduct of the business of the N.A. was still deplorably inadequate. Within the span of 2½ years the N.A. sat for only 100 days and held 10 sessions. The average days of meetings of the N.A. per year was 40. The total time spent was 467 hours and 36 minutes. In other words, the average consumption of parliamentary time per day was 4 hours 40 minutes and 30 seconds.**

This was, no doubt, an improvement upon the previous record of the Constituent Assembly I (Leg.). There was also a qualitative change in the allotment of time, in that more time was given for the discussion of the budget. For instance, 48 hours 15 minutes, 66 hours 28 minutes and 48 hours were taken in the disposal of the budgets of 1956, 1957 and 1958 respectively. That the budget of 1957 claimed comparatively more time was due to the presence of more opposition members and the government being accommodating. The N.A. had one

* The rules were mostly the same as that of the first parliament.

** Calculated by the writer.
session in a day when it met at 3 o'clock in the afternoon and continued till 8 o'clock in the night with usual recess of 1 hour for prayers. When it met in the morning, the House held two sessions, both morning and afternoon interspersed with short breaks. On one occasion the House held a marathon session discussing the electoral bill both day and night for 14 hours and 35 minutes. Similarly, on important issues like food the N.A. in October, 1956 debated for 5½ hours. The debates on foreign policy in 1957 claimed 13 hours 10 minutes in a range of 2 days and 16 hours 30 minutes in 1958.

In 1958, on the Security Bill and economic condition of the country the N.A. devoted 5 hours and 6 hours 32 minutes respectively in discussing them. Evidently, parliamentary time was rationally distributed in terms of priority of issues.

What was most significant and contrary to the habit of the first parliament was the N.A.'s holding a session in East Pakistan once in a year – a fulfilment of a constitutional obligation and a response to political reality in matters of dividing parliamentary time. Also, the N.A. met frequently – twice in 1956, 5 times in 1957 and thrice in 1958 – though for a short time. In regard to the paucity of parliamentary time, the Minister for Parliamentary Affairs had this to say: "When we will have 300 members, I am quite sure, the time given will be more than what has been given now." 140

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Debates

On the question of parliamentary procedure recorded in the official reports, a foreign observer put his views on the following lines: "A nation accustomed to dealing with issues on the floor of the national legislature in full and free debate is already on the road to democracy." Herbert Feldman's comments were also in the same vein: "... despite the occasional expunging of certain remarks from the proceedings, the level of debate was sound and ... many members drew upon considerable intellectual resources." Smugly, an M.P. once reminded his colleagues in the N.A. of the seriousness of the debate: "the discussions that we have on several motions were such that literatures have been written by some of the ablest constitutionalists of other countries."

A line of difference, however, can be drawn between the debates of the first parliament and the N.A., in that the proceedings of the latter were more businesslike, earthly and sharp. The early tradition of member's deployment of metaphors and allegories in didactic strain and salting of their speeches with Islamic classics was on the wane. Quaranic quotations were scarce. Metaphors or similes were now more natural, akin to culture and slyly appropriate. For instance, an M.P. would delineate the vulnerability of the Speaker in disciplining a subordinate official of the House for alleged misconduct by saying

142. Herbert Feldman, op.cit., p. 95.
"Oha Hoyechay au jaigai, ojha hoccay mama shashur." 144 *

However, the first thing to be noticed about the debates is that the great issues of the country such as electorate principle, foreign policy, economic situation, etc., were for the first time debated in the N.A. freely and comprehensively. Secondly, the standard of the debates was mostly of the forensic order, and the speeches stood out in logical candour. The great debate on the electorate issue which raged fiercely throughout the day and night in the N.A. was a spectacular occasion. The Dawn recorded the event in the following lines:

"...Despite occasional demands for a 'closure', no one seemed fagged out and even the visitors in the Public Gallery remained glued to their seats till the last moment. Many of the members, as well as the Speaker, developed hoarse throats. Yet the debate rolled on, sometimes bitter but always sharp and spectacular. It was perhaps, the longest sitting of the national parliament on record. Speakers on both sides of the House rose to great heights as disclosures, explanations and accusations flew think and fast across the floor." 145

The same epithets apply to the debates on foreign policy, the economic situation, to budget speeches and debates on some of the bills in varying degrees.

As master parliamentary debaters awards should go to Suhrawardy, Hamidul Haq Chowdhury, Daultana, Iftikheruddin, Fazlur Rahman, K.K. Dutta, Pir Rashid1, Khuho and Chundrigar. Suhrawardy had a magnificent voice and an ear for finer rhythms of phonetics, and to this was

* "The abscess is in an undesirable part of the body of a girl and the physician is her maternal uncle."

145. See Dawn, October 13, 1957.
added his final auxiliary, namely cool oratorical skill. Mian Iftikheruddin's Philippic against the government was always extemporaneous and, as a rule, cruel. But he could disguise his venom beneath mild utterances, and yet, could produce the same effect. For instance, talking on the question of the admissibility of a privilege motion arising out of an alleged misreporting of proceedings of the House in a newspaper, the Prime Minister Suhrawardy in jocular mood posed a question to Mian Sh. "Does Mian Iftikharuddin threaten us with misreporting in his newspaper?" "I plead guilty, Sir. Some papers with which I have some connection, I am sorry to say, have been at times misreporting — grievously misreporting — when they have been praising democracy which then appeared to be democratic actions of the present Prime Minister." \(^{146}\) snapped back Mian Iftikharuddin. Daultana's was a copious vocabulary. One can only see in the following lines how his acrid eloquence bubbled down like molten lava on the electorate:

"They have, whale-like, swallowed hook line ... both the two-nation theories. They have brought about a political 'copernican' revolution. Two nations in West Pakistan one nation in East Pakistan ... Do not tell me that any one of you is responsible for this miracle of finesse — you are either too honest or not intelligent enough. But I think I can detect the subtlety of mind, the sophistry of rationalization, the ruthlessness of objective, the evilness of intention that could have waylaid you all into this monstrosity. The masterminds have won all the rounds so far. But it is my faith that there is a final round which only the people can win (opposition applause). As they say, the mills of Allah grind slowly but they grind exceedingly fine. So help us all God." \(^{147}\)


\(^{147}\) Ibid., Vol. II, October 10, 1956, p. 190.
Similarly, Pir Rashdi excelled in raillery, sarcasm and witty sallies. Virtually, he was all epigrammatic. He told Suhrawardy the then Prime Minister on foreign policy debate that "You are not the Columbus alone to find America. This ... was found when the Muslim League was here". Or, he might say in mock-sombre tone that there were two movements in the country. The first one was the Prime Minister's being "not moved, he has his own difficulties (laughter)." Hamidul Haq Chowdhury and Chundigar were agile, but their dialectical gifts manifested themselves in the icy, methodical and legalistic handling of the debates. Democracy could not produce the standardized Pakistan M.P. So, the many had to be held captive by the brilliance of the few.

But it is equally tenable that among the parliamentary debuts some of them displayed promise of great parliamentary abilities. Farid Ahmed, young in his early thirties, proved his mettle. "First of all I must pay a tribute once again to the zeal and industry which Mr. Farid Ahmed always puts in his work as a parliamentarian" – commented the Finance Minister. So were Zahiruddin, Khaleque, Dilber, Abul Mansur, Amir Asam, Haroon, Jaffar Shah, Fazlul Karim, etc., coming up to the mark.

149. **Ibid., p. 1017.**
150. **Ibid., February 17, 1957, p. 636.**
151. See Speaker's comment, **ibid., Vol. II, March 4, 1958, p. 771.**
Finally, a mention should be made of the salesmanship of the parliament and its proceedings. Sir Alec Douglas Home once described the Press Gallery as "a very important part of our modern parliament". Pakistan was fortunate on that count, in that most of the major newspapers had parliamentary reporters and covered proceedings of the House in detail and, sometimes with disagreeable comments. The newspapers had also parliamentary cartoonists whose pseudonyms were "Manna", "Musafir" and "Do-Pajja". The government-Press relationship was rather bitter-sweet. But on the whole the Press was indulged. The government once appealed to the Speaker "to forget and forgive" a journalist who was earlier declared persona non grata "to allow him to come back". The N.A.'s Secretariat was equally efficient and prompt in having parliamentary proceedings published. The first budget speech was duly broadcast. The government also spent a huge amount of money to make an appearance of the N.A. whenever it had to be met at Dacca; for, the East Pakistanis were to be given to understand that the national parliament arrived at their doorsteps. In short, the peoples felt the presence of that supreme institution, the N.A. of Pakistan.

152. Quoted in T.F. Lindsay, Parliament from the Press Gallery (MacMillan: 1967), p. 120.
155. The October session of the N.A. held at Dacca in 1956 cost government 20 lakhs of rupees. See Dawn, October 19, 1956.
The Government and the Opposition

Within the span of 1152 days there were four ministries. The make-up and numerical strength of the parties forming government and opposition in the N.A. are illustrated in the Appendix (XVIII). The average strength of the four coalition Ministries in the N.A. was 52 and the opposition 28. And the average duration of each government was 288 days. The major incidence of party structure was the formation of the R.P. at the expense of the M.L. and the final breaking of the alliance, the U.F. into the former party lines. The small additions and subtractions that were made in the membership of these three parties e.g. the R.P., A.L.* and M.L.** were the cumulative effects of bye-elections, floor-crossing and Independent M.P.s joining parties. The K.S.P. was divided into Sarkar and Haq groups on electoral issue. In fact, frequency of floor-crossing was negligible. The parliamentary group of Chowdhury Mohammad Ali was formed in late 1957 consisting of five Independents giving an organized front of the Independents. And some of the M.P.s who catalogued themselves, later on, as Independents were temporarily aggrieved members sitting on the fence for an appropriate moment to stage a comeback, either to their parent parties or choose a new party or stay neutral. Leaving aside the case of a few floating members,

* The A.L.'s addition was Azizuddin Ahmed's winning the bye-election.

** The M.L.'s number was virtually reduced to 10 when the R.P. was formed, but gained in strength later on. In the November session of 1957 three Independent M.P.s - Malik Zubargir Khan, Malik Wazir and Mir Balakh Sher Mazari - joined the M.L. See Dawn, December 3, 1957.
the rest, in substance, stuck to their own parliamentary parties.

It is held that "responsible government involves the responsibility of the executive as well as that of the legislature. The executive must be responsible to the legislature, but in an equal measure the legislature must be responsible for the government." Unlike the first parliament which was subjected to the mercy of the overwhelming majority of the M.L., the N.A. registered a working pattern of relationship and unity of purpose between the government and the opposition. What was more, the N.A. for the first time enacted a Bill giving statutory recognition to the leader of the opposition and allowances to enable him to fulfil public duties without pesterimg for money. The N.A. wielded more "control over policy and administration ... This was true of ordinary, financial and constitutional legislation and other major issues." This was possible as the opposition was both effective and responsible as was the government itself responsive. The government and the opposition had respect for each other. As soon as the A.L. formed the government one of its spokesmen reflected the correct mood of the period: "While in the opposition ... I once said that ... 'Ayes' and 'Noes' are so close to each other that one cannot do without the other. Sir, to be more scientific I must also say that the parliament of a democratic country is like a power house.


This power house cannot produce any electricity without the mating of negative and positive. We stand here as the positive ... they (opposition) are negative, but, their attitude is very constructive." 159

Similarly, the opposition was also appreciative of right governmental actions. 160 Interestingly, the early A.P.P. leader, Mian Sh. now learnt to speak in a more responsible way in the N.A. as the parties were beginning to compel recognition. In the present situation the opposition was more forceful, participating and pungent, yet responsible and collected. The opposition attack on the taxation proposals of the 1957–58 budget was vehement enough to compel responsiveness on the part of the government to withdraw them. 161 Likewise, in the following year the government did not find it reasonable to withdraw some taxation proposals, but had to apologize to the opposition with future assurances when the latter rising on a point of order threatened to prevent the passage of the Finance Bill as it incorporated provisions which contravened the Clause (1) of Article 58 of the Constitution. 162 Hence, the keynote of the N.A. was its possession of an efficacious and vigilant opposition of which the parties in power could not be oblivious.  

* There were no less than 2 dozens of divisions called in the N.A.

However, in the foregoing pages and headings we have brought the N.A. into sharp contrast with that of its predecessor and tried to suggest that the latter period registered improvements in various aspects - a protoplasmatic beginning of parliamentarianism. Nevertheless, we do not suggest that the sovereignty of the N.A. was complete; for the political sovereignty residing with the electorate was yet to reflect in the legislature with true fidelity. Besides, it has been mentioned elsewhere how antidemocratic forces were operating at the expense of parliamentarianism. In recent discussions on the power of parliament to control the executive, parliament has been dismissed as an 'anachronism'. Book like "What's wrong with Parliament?" have been published. Professor Crick holds that "Parliament ... is still the agreed arena in which most of the continuous election campaign is fought." The power of parliament is on the wane. The apostles of this creed are many, such as Professor J.P. Mackintosh, Mr. Richard Crossman, Mr. Humphrey Berkeley, etc. Those who disagree their numbers are not negligible either. However, the factors and circumstances which have contributed to this feeling in U.K. that Parliament is no longer a controlling institution cannot be, really, applied to the situation in Pakistan. What was eating up the vitals of parliament in Pakistan is different phenomenon. If the N.A. of Pakistan did not, in essence, succeed in wielding State's power, surely, it did succeed in exposing the anti-democratic power

structure and its 'hide-off' on the floor of the House, while the electorate listened to it.

Footnotes continued from previous page.


POLITICAL PARTIES

The growth of stable and mass parties is the sine qua non of the Westminster system of government. Parties contribute to the emergence of an effective participating political community in a given country. The importance of political parties is still greater, for those countries which come under the rubric of 'developing societies'. A Princeton University publication, "Political parties and Political development", has dwelt at some length on the efficacy of political parties with an emphasis on the help they give to developing societies to achieve national integration, political participation, legitimacy and the management of conflict.1 The functions of the political parties are not, however, confined to those mentioned above alone. The political parties are the articulate political agents of a society acting as what Lord Bryce termed as 'brokers' of state-policies, and, as such, they are the great intermediaries which link "social forces and ideologies to official governmental institutions and relate them to political action".2 They provide a 'simulacrum' of national identifications as the "aristocrats, intellectuals, white collar employees, and workmen can find in certain parties an ... all-embracing


2. Ibid., Sigmund Neumann, "Toward a Comparative Study of Political Parties", p. 352.
institutions through which the common good can be sought".3

Parties act as a check against people's alienation from the government and vice versa; for, they maintain a two-step flow of communications by disseminating governmental policies to the people, on the one hand, and bring people's ideas, wishes and aspirations to the notice of the government, on the other. Mass organizations provide for tapping of new leadership in the country, and for that matter, the recruitment of new public leaders. And, particularly under the British system of polity, they offer "an excellent preliminary training for parliamentary candidature and eventual entry into Parliament".4 What, however, appears to be more important in the context of developing societies is the role that the mass parties can play by spreading to the farthest reaches of society through an elaborate network of party functionaries designed to mobilise, integrate and agglutinate shifting social forces, interests and cleavages into one consensus-bound and cohesive party.5 And, Pakistan being one of the developing polities, required nothing less than the emergence of mass-based, programme-oriented stable parties.

The Muslim League (M.L.)

The coming into being of Pakistan was coeval with the institutionalisation of one-party rule, that of the M.L. This was the consequence of the triumph of the ideology of the winning group, the M.L., which claimed to have avenged the downfall of the Muslim empire in the Indian sub-continent by achieving Pakistan in 1947. Instances abound that at independence emergent countries' governments were automatically handled by the parties of erstwhile national Independence movements - the Congress of India, the C.P.P. of Ghana, the KANU of Kenya, the TANU of Tanganyika (now Tanzania). This has been a perplexing situation on the part of the single party states in the developing areas in matters of responding to "participatory demands long before they have had a reasonable opportunity to institutionalise party government". Governance under a single party system at the initial period is thought in some quarters to be conducive of particularly on account of rapid economic development. This, fundamentally, depends upon the innate strength of the party concerned, still more on the general acquiescence of the masses of the people of a given country. What was the status of the M.L.? The M.L. was a movement par excellence. The Muslims of the the then India with diverse persuasions suspended their mutual differences in a truce and entered

into a marriage de covenance under the banner of the M.L. to achieve Pakistan. The galvanising force that the M.L. once was in unifying the Muslims of undivided India and brought to a successful conclusion its struggle for Pakistan, was no longer true after partition of India had taken place. Why?

The Mussalmans of undivided India became politically conscious only in direct response to Congress activities. The Congress with its gigantic party apparatus tended to be all-pervasive in the then India. It grew roots even in the remotest villages laying the foundation of democracy by contact. The full zest for Pakistan movement under the leadership of the M.L. started from 1939, and the M.L. was obtrusive in those areas of British India where Congress was dominant and "it existed by reaction". The Congress was less powerful in those areas which now formed Pakistan. And the Muslims of what now constitutes Pakistan voted for the M.L. only at the eleventh hour. This was one of the reasons that when Pakistan was born, viable local M.L. leadership could not be found. Furthermore, the main strongholds of M.L. were in the urban areas, whereas the basic unit of Pakistan sociology was village.

After the conference of the All India M.L. held in Karachi in December, 1947, the Pakistan M.L. parted with its parent body -

* Except the N.W.F.P.


a logical consequence. It was alleged that there were "old guards'' of the M.L. who maintained that the M.L. died a natural death after the creation of Pakistan and were horrified at the idea of the M.L. being a 'Government Party'. Jinnah was thought to be lukewarm to the idea * and, later on, he himself relinquished the office of the M.L. Presidentship. Though he himself told once the Dacca gatherings that the M.L. was the 'guardian angel' of the community and warned them by implication, as though, the opposition were fifth columnist and saboteurs. 11

However, a new constitution was drawn up by the Pakistan League Council on February 26, 1948 and Chowdhury Khaliqazzaman was elected organizer of Pakistan M.L., who in turn dissolved all provincial M.L. organizations in order to reorganise them afresh. In doing so, he made the error of appointing provincial presidents and secretaries who had ceased to hold office in the League, as provincial organizers - an example of the retention of old people to the exclusion of the new ones. In April, 1949 he was elected the first President of the reorganised All Pakistan M.L. He was weak, unappealing and lack-lustre; and could not survive the screaming demonstrations of the Mahajirs. ** He resigned saying that he did not like to be the "cause

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* Mr. Isphahani, Raja of Mahmudabad and Y. Haroon revealed this to the writer.

** Refugees.


of any breach of peace or loss of life in the capital city". The M.L. now fell on evil days. The 'party-charisma' was fast dwindling after the demise of Mr. Jinnah. Among the leaguers Liaquat (Prime Minister) was the only person who had the dynamism and prestige of long association with the father of the nation, Jinnah, and the old organization, thought to be the healing balm for the M.L. The M.L. now was wrenched into a momentous decision. It made Liaquat its President having amended the party constitution - previously public office holders were debarred from becoming office-bearers of the League. However, the Prime Minister's holding the League Presidentship was vehemently opposed by a prominent M.L. leader of the Punjab on the ground that it would mean 'the end of democracy in Pakistan', but he was weight-lifted outside the meeting by the M.L. national guards.

Liaquat identified the M.L. with the state and held that "If the Muslim League is not made strong and powerful and the mushroom growth of parties is not checked immediately, Pakistan will not survive." This was characterised as "an unfortunate doctrine", and Pakistan, in the words of Suhrawardy, was heading for a "police state". Increasingly, the M.L. governments, central and provincial, turned highly intolerant of opposition parties, and their leaders and workers were thrown into prison under one pretext or another.

* "I never regarded myself as the Prime Minister chosen by the members of the Constituent Assembly" - see Dawn, October 9, 1950.

12. Ibid., August 14, 1950.
15. Ibid., October 10, 1950.
After the assassination of Liaquat the M.L. assumed a sort of Messianic character under the Presidentship of Nazimuddin who, - "he is known to be sustained by a deep religious faith and spiritual strength" - viewed the M.L. as a "continuous movement" aimed at fulfilling a "mission", e.g. "to demonstrate to the world the Islamic way of living". In his initial enthusiasm he did, indeed, show some evidence of purpose. In response to the peculiar federal situation of Pakistan state Nazimuddin brought in parity of representation between East and West Pakistan in Central League Council, increased the number of East Pakistan's quota to 5 in the Central Parliamentary Board, held the M.L. Council session for the first time in Dacca to give a sense of belongingness to that Province, gave provincial status to the Karachi M.L. and appointed ad hoc committees under Giasuddin Pathan to reorganize leagues in Bahawalpur, Baluchistan and Karachi. But in October, 1952, the M.L. Council while electing Nazimuddin the President of the M.L. for the second time changed the party constitution again, to make room for the triennial election of office-bearers of the party, banishing the system of annual election. This did away the earlier healthy system of yearly election which involved the whole process of membership enrolment, elections to the primary leagues, district, tehsil leagues and finally

17. Dawn, November 20, 1951 (Editorial) "New League President".
18. Ibid., March 10, 1952 (Editorial) "A new deal for the League".
the all-Pakistan League Council - a check against the formation of 'coteries'. The manifest destiny of the M.L. as envisaged by Nazimuddin could not work out due to his sudden ouster from the Premiership by the Governor General. The M.L. now entered into its most inglorious period under the next President, Mohammad Ali, for, "the circumstances were unusual in that the locus of political power had changed from the political leaders of the Muslim League to the 'official group' dominated by the Governor General". 21

As this juncture i.e. by the end of 1954, the M.L.'s position was at its lowest ebb both in terms of party organization and overall influence over the country. Why?

At the outset, the M.L. was quite strong and popular in East Pakistan. But the publication of the interim report and the B.P.C. report under Liaquat and Nazimuddin respectively, the economic malady of the province, the shooting upon the unarmed students of Dacca on account of language and exodus from the League followed by resignations and expulsions virtually shattered the image of the party in power. 22 In the Punjab, the league sway over the people was still solid as the landlords were the party bosses. But the province became the cockpit of intrigues, manoeuvres and mutual wranglings among the leaders which immobilized the party. In pre-partition days, a number


22. See Statesman, January 20, 21; November 8, 9, 1951; Dawn, December 25, 1952, etc.
of Muslim organizations such as Ahrars, Unionists, Khaksars, Mominis, Blue shirts, etc., were antagonistic to the M.L. At independence, they made their chief abode in Lahore and were operating clandestinely to hurt the M.L., as some did not choose to surface while the others were banned by court orders. The central government also participated to promote its clientship in the organizational disputes. All these harmed the cause of the party and drove some of the leaders away from it.

In Sind, the pattern was same as that of the Punjab - rivalries among Messrs. Kuhro, Mir G.A. Talpur, Kasí Fazíullah, Pirzada Satter, Y. Haroon, etc. The extreme case was the formation of 'Kuhro League', named after Kuhro, which fought against the M.L. in Sind election. But the Sindhi disaffection with the league was different from the Punjab in one respect, in that Sind thought itself to have been let down by the central government, particularly the loss of Karachi without adequate compensations. The N.W.F.P. League was weakened by the departure of prominent leaders like Pir of Manki Sharif, Pir of Zakari Sharif, Khan of Lundkhar, etc., from it, due to the high-handedness of the government in matters of civil liberties. Still then, the Frontier league was torn by the rival groups of


24. See Statesman, March 17, 1949; July 25, August 18, September 11, 1950; Hindu, November 5, 1953, etc.

Qa'yyum and Khan of Jhagra. The conditions of the M.L. in Bahawalpur, Khairpur, Karachi and Baluchistan did not present a happier picture either.

The most serious malady arose out of organisational decay. At independence, the best people become ministers and diplomats representing Pakistan abroad. Some left the organisation on principle, while a few others could not overcome disappointments following the distribution of what might be called "loaves and fishes". Those who were in charge of the high offices became engrossed in the affairs of day to day administration. Most of them were primarily concerned in maintaining "the monopoly of an individual or a group of persons".

The primary leagues were the fountain heads of all goodies and baddies of the entire organisation; for, had they been strong and uncorrupt they would bring about better organisation in the higher branches. Instead, the primary leagues were influenced by the "monopolistic urge". The M.L. turned callous to annual enrolment, annual elections in wards, villages, cities, districts and provinces. Annual conferences were held by fits and starts. The two "crowns", namely the Premierships of the State and Presidentship of the M.L. were combined with an apparent good intention of maintaining a liaison between the

26. See *Times*, April 30, 1951; *Statesman*, July 14, 1951; *Dawn*, February 12, 1953; etc.

27. See *Dawn*, November 25, 28, 1951; March 4, 1952; etc.,

28. See *Dawn*, March 11, 1952 (Editorial) "A new deal for the League".

government and the party. Soon this example was followed by the lower echelons of the league command, in that the provincial Chief Ministers also became the league presidents of the provincial M.L.s. Since the effective power rested with the governments they had no difficulty in nominating or electing, as the case might be, their henchmen in the 'trunk, branches, leaves and tendrils' of the M.L.

Till the time of Liaquat, policies and programmes of the government were placed before the M.L. Council for approval. The vogue died of atrophy, as the Council itself became packed-up with the 'yes-men' of the 'official majority' and subservient to the government — the best example was the Council's electing Mohammad Ali, a government manufactured leaguer as the President of the League after the dismissal of Nazimuddin. The trends were fatal to the party, and the once national organization was reduced to a position of a mere tool in the hands of, to borrow Duverger's term, a "caucus" i.e. the long entrenched system of political bosses who ruled the roost and deprived the M.L. of mass contacts. 30 And the M.L. had been running the country exclusively for 7 years — 1947 — 1954 — by cashing its past reputation, like the one proverbial Ford car which ran for some time without an engine fueled by previous prestige — commented the Dawn with sarcasm. 31

30. For details see Dawn, October 22, 1953 (Editorial) "Lights and Shadows"; December 24 (Editorial) "The League's Government or the Government's League"; New York Times, December 26, 1953; Dawn, October 27, 1954, (Editorial) "After the fourth night of crisis"; etc.

31. Dawn, January 30, 1956 (Editorial) "The Muslim League".
However, the M.L. tended to be aroused into new consciousness at the end of 1953, and more so after its defeat in the East Pakistan general election and the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly - the last two incidents acted as shock therapy. Qazi Mohammad Isa on principle did not let Mohammad Ali go uncontested in the election of the league presidency. In his defeat - voting 258-36 - he asked the Councillors, "Is there none among the 7 crores of Muslims of Pakistan who can be found to shoulder the responsibilities of this office other than the Prime Minister?" Again, when Mohammad Ali with his incomplete working committee dissolved the provincial leagues of the Punjab, Sind and Baluchistan and allowed the Provincial Chief Ministers a free hand in reorganising them, the non-ministerial groups of those provinces challenged the Prime Minister of his unconstitutional act. This was solely to retain central government favourites who lost the confidence of the local leagues, in provincial governments. The East Pakistan Councillors joined their brethren of West Pakistan in procuring 100 signatures for requisitioning a M.L. council meeting, the highest forum. This was the first time since 1936 that a council meeting was requisitioned to decide an issue. The Prime Minister Mohammad Ali rescinded his decision, later on.

The Leagues throughout the country called for revitalisation of the

32. Ibid., October 19, 1953.

organization, and suggestions were dropped to this effect of making Miss Jinnah - Mother-e-Millat* - the President of the M.L. and Nawab of Bhupal the General Secretary.\textsuperscript{34} The East Pakistan M.L. President Moulana Akram Khan openly asked Mohammad Ali to resign the Presidentship. The demand for calling league convention and council meeting had been persistent since the beginning of 1954, but the Prime Minister took to dilly-dallying and shilly-shallying tactics. At long last, Mohammad Ali resigned in September, 1955.\textsuperscript{35}

The Council of the Pakistan M.L. met in January, 1956, elected unanimously Sardar Nishtar, a veteran leaguer, its President, passed two important resolutions and brought about consequential amendments in the Constitution. The tasks for organizing a new provincial M.L. for the newly created province of West Pakistan, drawing up a clear cut manifesto and a programme of mass contact, fresh enrolment of members, fresh elections and the re-establishment of new branches of the organization were undertaken. Among the changes incorporated in the Constitution, the significant one was the banning of the holding of M.L. offices by Ministers and Deputy Ministers and persons who had not been members of the M.L. for at least one year. The new President immediately appointed his working committee to proceed with.\textsuperscript{36}

\textsuperscript{*} Mother of the nation (Mr. Jinnah's sister).

\textsuperscript{34} \textit{Dawn}, September 23, October 19, 1954; also \textit{Times}, October 4, 1955.

\textsuperscript{35} \textit{Dawn}, September 30, 1955.

\textsuperscript{36} For details see \textit{Times}, January 29, 1956; \textit{Dawn}, January 30, 31, 1956.
No sooner had Nishtar become the President than he ordered the formation of a pure M.L. parliamentary party in West Pakistan, the consequence of which was the formation of the R.P. The M.L. in this new psychological climate chose to sit in the opposition benches and purged itself of disloyal members by expulsion, rather than compromised with principles. The prominent M.L. members of the central Cabinet resigned after the formation of R.P. rather than sticking to power, the like of which was ever shown by any leaguer before, whatsoever. Karachi being the stronghold of the M.L., the President appointed a 90-man organizing committee and a 15-member sub-committee of women to organize the M.L. in the capital city. Bureaus of grievances were set up at different headquarters of the league. By September, 1956 the basic principles of the M.L. manifesto were made public. The strength of the M.L. national guards, the party militia rose to 100,000 by November, 1956. A successful M.L. Workers' Conference with four thousand delegates in West Pakistan culminating in a record breaking procession with the President bespoke of the league regenerations. In that Conference an enquiry committee was set up to "prepare a comprehensive report

on the causes of the downfall of the M.L."\(^{42}\), which was later submitted by Manzare-Alam. A vigorous enrolment campaign was launched in early December, 1956 with an intention to finish primary league elections by March 31, city and district league elections by April 10, provincial leagues by May 10, and the Pakistan M.L. elections by May 31, 1957.\(^{43}\) The veteran old leaguers like Qayyum Khan, Fazlur Rahman and Abul Hashim who had earlier left the league flabbergasted rejoined again.

After the demise of Nishtar, Qayyum Khan became the next President on 30th March, 1958. Compared to his predecessor, he was more dynamic - a former L.S.E. student - aggressive and ruthless. Upon becoming the President the first thing he uttered was "revolution, if evolution fails".\(^{44}\) The M.L. gained strength further under Qayyum's leadership. At this time, the M.L. was so pronounced on matters of party ideology and discipline that it did not hesitate to expel Khuhro of Sind, the most powerful person on grounds of his being a political turncoat.\(^{45}\)

The M.L. now offered to be constituted of only the purest of its adherents. There is no denying the fact that the period from 1954 to 1958 and precisely from the time of Nishtar onward, was a period

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of remarkable recovery and consolidation. Party meetings and league councils were regularly held in this period. The large number of crowds the league President Qayyum was attracting in his meetings in both parts of Pakistan, which led the East Pakistan M.L. to decide to give a 32-mile long welcoming procession to Qayyum, 46 was an index of the existence of the party. The M.L. regained its traditional support from the capital city, in that it won 60% of the seats of the Karachi Municipal Corporation in the elections held in April, 1958. In the Dacca, Chittagong - the main cities of East Pakistan - Municipal elections the M.L. also received the lion's share of seats. 47 It only failed to win seats in the bye-elections of East Pakistan legislature, though it was successful in West Pakistan. And this was understandable, as the main base of the M.L. was in West Pakistan trying to extend its influence once again in the Eastern part.

Organizational Structure

By nature the organization of the M.L. was restrictive in that its membership was not open to all communities. Hence, it bore some resemblances to the 'cadre' type of party. Only the Muslims who cared to abide by the M.L. ideology, pay a subscription of two annas and completed 18 years of age were eligible for membership.* The

* For the sample of the M.L. membership card, see Appendix. (XIX)


47. See Dawn, May 1, August 30, 1958.
exclusive character of the M.L. was the negation of the concept of equality of citizenship and political rights. Similarly, by this very policy of restriction it deprived itself of the support of the vast multitude of people professing different religions.

However, the constituents of the All Pakistan M.L. were unions, Thana/Tehsil, sub-divisions, districts, cities and provinces. They collectively elected the Council of the M.L. - the highest forum. The strength of the Council was 654 in 1952, equally divided between the two wings.48 The number was reduced to 360 - 180 members each from both wings - in January, 1956.49 The Presidents and Secretaries of the provincial leagues were ex-officio members of the Council. The President of the national league had authority to nominate some members to provide representation to special interests like labourers, women, youth, etc. The Council was originally required to meet once a year, but in 1956 it was changed to twice a year. A 75-member petition could requisition a meeting within a month's time. Its power consisted mainly in formulating the aims and objects of the M.L., framing rules, ratifying decisions, etc., etc.50

The executive power of the party rested with the central working committee, which consisted of the national president and 22 members

* Formerly it was 15.


49. Ibid., January 31, 1956.

who would be appointed by the party chief himself. Usually, prominent party leaders were chosen.* The President had the power of hiring and firing the members of the working committee.\textsuperscript{51} Being the chief executive organ, the working committee was virtually responsible for running the main show of the organization and doing things empowered by the Council. Any violations of rules by the working committee particularly by the President, could always be referred to the Council for remedy. The M.L. had also a Central Parliamentary Board consisting of 12 members — 6 members each for both wings — of whose ex-officio chairman was the President himself. Its main job was to select candidates for election to the legislatures and 'coordinate the activities' of the other provincial parliamentary parties. Then there was the Central Finance Committee which took care of the party's annual budget accounts, sanctioned all payments, and in short, was in control of financial matters.\textsuperscript{52}

In sum, the M.L. was anxious to show that its party apparatus was democratic. Indeed, it was so apparently, It had the basis of a written Constitution stipulating elections for all party office-bearers and providing checks and balances to discourage concentration of power. But what Duverger thought of party-pattern generally that "authoritarian and oligarchic methods generally develop without

\* Namely, vice-President, General Secretary, Joint Secretary, Treasurer, etc., of the M.L.

\textsuperscript{51} \textit{Dawn}, January 31, 1956.

\textsuperscript{52} For details see Muslim League Constitution,\textit{loc.cit.}
constitut:~.onal warrant", 53 was true of the league. Though the M.L. had a democratic Constitution with the power derived from the base through the league primaries in order of union, Thana, subdivision, district, city and province, there had been "in practice a great, although varying, degree of central control at the top". 54 So, the M.L. was a highly centralised party having vertical links with the base.

Programmes

The M.L. stand was an ideological one - modernist Islamic. Its aim was "to build Pakistan into an Islamic welfare state" and "to ensure that the Muslims of Pakistan are enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and the Sunnah". 55 It relied on the dynamic interpretation of Islam and stressed on the reason d'etre of the creation of Pakistan. The basic principles of the party manifesto adopted in the Council Session in October, 1957 were the following: restoration of the separate electorate, retention of the one-unit, far-reaching agrarian reforms by abolishing feudalism and jagirdari in West Pakistan, an independent foreign policy and the gradual nationalisation of key industries and public utility services. The manifesto was equally generous on

55. See "Constitution of the Muslim League", loc.cit., p. 3.
repressive laws, Kashmir, the refugee problem, food, labour, etc., etc. The M.L. leadership had always been emphatic on the electorate and one-unit issues. On the question of agrarian reforms its leadership was less spectacular. The recommendations of the M.L. Agrarian Reforms Committee of 1949 were fairly progressive, but they could not be implemented due to the resistance of the powerful landlords of West Pakistan which comprised the nucleus of the M.L. leadership. When Z.H. Lari in the last Council session of the M.L. at Dacca in August, 1958 brought an amendment to the broad principle of land reforms by suggesting that ceilings of 450 acres for the landlords and 75 acres for cultivators be made, the amendment was lost by 57:42 votes. However, the abolition of the Zamindari system in East Pakistan and some minor land reforms in West Pakistan were credited to the M.L. leadership.

Swept out of power the M.L. lately talked about an 'independent foreign policy', which euphemism, in essence, meant less dependence on the western countries in favour of seeking more cooperation from the Muslim states in solving the Kashmir problem - the cornerstone of the M.L. foreign policy. As a matter of fact, the M.L., during the year 1958, created a significant stir on the question of ideology and Kashmir in the country, particularly in West Pakistan.

Supporters, Activists and Financial Resources

The main bulk of the M.L. adherents was located in the Western region of Pakistan. The refugee-infested Federal Capital was the city of the M.L. In Karachi in 1953, there were 130,000 two-anna members of K.M.L.\(^{58}\) In 1952, the league President claimed over 60 lakhs\(^*\) of membership for the All Pakistan M.L.\(^{59}\) The league paper also boasted of having "a paid membership of several millions".\(^{60}\) A women's section in the league organization was formed at the insistence of Begum Shahnawaz and Begum Tassaduq Hossain of the Punjab — both were social welfare workers and political personalities — who helped 34,00,000 Muslim women enrol themselves as voters for the Punjab Assembly elections of 1950.\(^{61}\) The President of the All Pakistan Women's Association was Begum Liaquat Ali herself. Understandably, the M.L. had a large share of women supporters in West Pakistan. Besides, the M.L. had ideological auxiliaries in the country, in the form of associations like Khilafat-e-Rashida, Hiz-bullah of Sarsina, Jamiat-e-Ulema-i-Pakistan, Jamiat-e-Ulema-i-Islam, Islam League, etc., which supported the cause of the M.L. Again, the army of voluntary corps e.g. M.L.N.G. could be counted as

\(^*\) 1 lakh = 100,000.

58. See *Dawn*, September 2, 1953.

59. *Ibid.*, October 14, 1952 (Editorial) "The League President's Call".

60. *Ibid.*, October 24, 1952 (Editorial) "The Muslim League".

activists among the M.L. workers. The M.L. was mainly peopled by the middle, upper-middle and aristocratic classes.

Among the parties in Pakistan the M.L. was the most solvent one. At his death, Jinnah left Rs. 8,400,000 (£646,000) of public funds of which the largest share went to the M.L. Finally, the Pakistan M.L. took over the money set aside for the Indian Union M.L. and created a trust fund plan to utilise the money for the education of deserving refugee students in Pakistan. Officially speaking, the main sources of organizational income were the subscriptions of membership and the interest accruing from the capital invested by the M.L. The party incomes and expenditure were hardly made public in Pakistan. It was once brought out in public that the income of the M.L. for the year 1951-52 was only Rs. 46,000 whereas the expenditure was Rs. 143,000. Deficits were obviously off-set by other means. The chances were the business community like Adamjees, Ispahans, Khojas, etc., who immigrated to Pakistan and were given succour in many a way by the M.L. government initially, used to foot M.L.'s bill considerably - also the landlords - else out price subscription of 4 annas could not account for huge expenditure.

Image-building exercise

The party propaganda or party-public relationship was performed in several ways. In a league party meeting an elaborate programme used to be drawn up e.g. physical display, Razakar Rally, mock battle, *Moshaira* of poets, etc. Usually, annual conferences or M.L. Council sessions became the main instrument of mass-contact and publicity. National and international issues were discussed at such meetings, and the delegates of both wings of Pakistan came in first hand contact with each other reinforcing the national identity. Conferences were cast in a giant setting. For instance, the Punjab M.L. Conference of 1952 lasted for 3 days in which attendance in the conference pandal averaged at 2 lakhs per session and the press booked nearly 100,000 words by telegram and telephone.65 By observing 'workers' fortnight', celebrating the birthday anniversary of the founder of the nation, holding organization's Golden Jubilee Convention and staging impressive marchpasts of the M.L.N.G.,66 the commodities of the M.L. were pushed up in the Pakistan political market. Technically, the M.L. could boast of effective communications of its programme and activities, in that two big English newspapers namely, "The Dawn" and "The Morning News" with the largest interwing circulations, supported the M.L. And the historical Bengali vernacular daily e.g.

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* Poetry reading.

65. See *Dawn*, November 9, 1952.

"The Azad" was the M.L. mouthpiece in East Pakistan exclusively. And these papers received Rs. 10 laks in 1952 on account of fostering "cultural unity through newspapers and publishing houses" in Pakistan. Whereas, "The Pakistan Standard" was officially owned by the M.L.

The Awami League *(A.L.)*

People who could not be evangelised to the M.L. dogma, politicians who could not be accommodated to the M.L. organization and a considerable portion of refugees who felt let down and exploited by the M.L. leaders formed the initial constituents of a potential opposition. Pir of Mank1 Sharif, Ghulam Md. Lunákhór of the N.W.F.P. - the former was an influential religious figure who contributed immensely to the M.L. cause in the frontier referendum of 1947 - clashed head-on with the Frontier Premier in regard to his enrolment and the reorganization method of the M.L. The Pir's following was harrassed by the Premier due to the alleged discriminating procedure of M.L. enrolment. The League differences could not be ironed out even through the good offices of Sardar Nishtar. Meanwhile, 6 M.L.A.s including the Pir of Zakori, the Nawab of Tonk and the Sultan of Boi were expelled from league membership on the issue of agrarian reforms. The Pir took advantage of the defections and founded the Awami Muslim

* The People's League.
68. See Gaffar Khan's statement in the Court quoted in *Dawn*, April 9, 1952.
League (A.M.L.) Party in May, 1949, with himself as the President.

Away in East Pakistan stringent methods were applied by the provincial league Chief, Moulana Akram Khan in enlisting members. Particularly, the eager generation of younger men who had fiercely canvassed for the M.L. cause earlier and now wanted to get into the organisation to work from within the proposed reorganised party felt disappointed. Moulana Akram Khan opined that for the purity of the organisation all and sundry people would not be welcomed. A delegation went to Karachi to persuade the Chief Organizer, Khaliquzzaman to relax the league admission rules, but to no purpose. 71 Meanwhile, Moulana Bhasani, the influential old leaguer who had earlier galvanized Muslim support in favour of Pakistan in the Sylhet referendum came from Assam to East Pakistan and joined the anti-league forces. In a convention of a portion of the M.L. workers coming from various parts of the country held at Golap Bag, Dacca on the 23rd and 24th June, 1949 there was formed a new political party called the Awami Muslim League. 72 Suhrawardy, a dynamic and resourceful politician but a political maverick at this time was touring India and Pakistan back and forth with a peace mission for the ensurance of safe living for the minorities of both countries.

There was a move in the A.M.L. circles of the N.W.F.P. to extend its activities to the whole of Pakistan i.e. the establishment of branches

71. For details see Ataur Rahman, op.cit., pp. 25-33.
in the West Punjab, Baluchistan and Sind, as the A.M.L. was already functioning in the N.W.F.P. and East Pakistan. Consequently, the All Pakistan M.L. workers’ convention at Lahore which was attended by 1,500 delegates from all parts of Pakistan, decided to form the All Pakistan A.M.L. Suhrawardy’s services were commissioned, in that he was made the convenor of the newly proposed party. Suhrawardy was empowered to appoint an organizing committee and a committee to draft the party’s manifesto and constitution. This move was telegraphically congratulated by many prominent leaders of both wings. From now onward, Suhrawardy showed a promethean urge towards building a viable All Pakistan opposition party.

The Nawab of Mamdot, the first Chief Minister of the West Punjab left the league and formed the Jinnah Muslim League at the end of 1950. This party coalesced with the A.M.L. to fight the Punjab election of 1951, which ultimately led to the amalgamation of these two parties with a new name, e.g. Jinnah Awami League (J.A.L.)

The next big incident was the East Pakistan A.L.’s being affiliated with the J.A.L. in a 3-day convention held at Lahore in December, 1952, through the instrumentality of Suhrawardy. In West Pakistan the J.A.L. was now operating in the N.W.F.P., Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan, Bahawalpur, Karachi and even in Azad Kashmir in varying degrees of

success. In April, 1953, Suhrawardy appointed a central working committee consisting of members from both wings\textsuperscript{77} to facilitate party unification. The Nawab of Mamdot did not particularly like the East Pakistan unit's affiliation with the J.A.L. because of its radical views on land reforms,\textsuperscript{78} and was expelled by the J.A.L. working committee. The Mamdot-ouster was a temporary upset and the Punjab branch of the J.A.L. was duly reorganized by a 3-man organizing committee headed by Nawab Zada Nasrullah.\textsuperscript{79} The J.A.L. braved its way through the heaviest odds to build an opposition party from the bottom up. At regular intervals its party leaders and workers—save Suhrawardy, though restrictions on his movements were imposed on several occasions—were gaol ed, offices sealed and searched, meetings prohibited and party papers banned by the M.L. governments.\textsuperscript{80}

Apart from its struggle for growth through processes permissible under democratic framework, the J.A.L. like the early conservative party of British politics profited in the splits of its opponents and absorbed disgruntled politicians in its fold. Suhrawardy compelled gestures from prominent people like Nawab of Mamdot, Pir Ellahi Bux, Major General Akbar Khan, Lundkhar, Pir of Manki Sharif, etc., for,

\textsuperscript{77} \textit{Dawn}, April 6, 1953.
\textsuperscript{78} \textit{Hindu}, April 12, 1953; also \textit{Dawn}, July 22, 1953.
\textsuperscript{79} \textit{Hindu}, July 27, 1953.
\textsuperscript{80} See \textit{Statesman}, December 24, 29, 1951; \textit{Dawn}, May 17, 1953 (Editorial); September 23, 1954; etc.
as an illustrious Barrister he fought in the law courts and had them released from the charges of the N.L. government. He did this in countless cases—a unique way of political recruitment. Those politicians who had suffered long terms of imprisonment and become "prison graduates" joined the J.A.L. at their release. By evaluating the J.A.L. activities "throughout the provinces" in late 1953, the New York Times saw "the first semblance of an organized opposition to the Pakistan Muslim League". 81

Firstly, the J.A.L. had the distinction of being born outside of legislative arena i.e. in the country at large. Secondly, it reflected its electoral strength in the legislatures by fighting the elections. In the Punjab elections of March, 1951, the J.A.L. won 31 seats in the legislature and won 18.3 per cent of popular votes. 82 In the N.W.F.P. elections in the same year it captured 4 seats, and later on the Pir of Manki Sharif, the party President won a bye-election with an overwhelming majority. 83 In the Sind election of 1953, it fought through an electoral alliance called the 'Awami Mahaz Front' which won 7 seats in the legislature. In the general elections of East Pakistan in 1954, it emerged as the largest single party in the legislature. 84* In the elections of the Constituent

* Due to election peculiarity, it had only 3 members in the Provincial Assembly of newly created West Pakistan.

83. Dawn, August 31, 1953.
84. See Ibid., May 19, 1953 and April 1, 1954.
Assembly II in 1955 it captured 13 seats and remained a dominant, well-knit parliamentary party therein. It became the first official opposition in the central parliament and East Pakistan legislature, and eventually was able to form coalition governments on both counts. The J.A.L. record spoke for itself.

"Every Party," said Professor Laski, "is, to some degree a federation of interests to which, as best it can, it will seek to accommodate its policy." This was particularly true of the Pakistan situation. Like the Australian party structure also, to some extent like the parties of the Swiss Cantons - the J.A.L. was primarily organized at the provincial level, and only secondarily did it aspire to operate at the national level to fight effectively in the N.A. This was, no doubt, in keeping with the federal pattern of Pakistan polity. Geography, cultural variety and regional peculiarities of problems gave some individuality to parties of different areas. This was more true of the J.A.L. of West Pakistan and its sister party in the Eastern wing. Bhasani told the East Pakistan Party's Council session that "if anybody wants to interfere with our programme, then we shall be compelled to reconsider the question of our affiliation with the central body." Similarly, the Western J.A.L. in the beginning was not enthusiastic about its Eastern partner's programmes of making Bengali one of the state

86. See J. D. B. Miller, op.cit., pp. 64-92.
87. See Dawn, July 11, 1953.
languages, sweeping land reforms, more autonomy, etc. But eventually, these differences were allowed to prevail only in terms of emphasis on the broad lines of party policies agreed upon. Suhrawardy was a great catalyst, composer of differences and a cementer of party bonds. Gradually, his leadership of moderation became well established in the party, as the extremists were winnowed out of the party. The exodus of the leftist elements of both the wings of the party on foreign policy was, no doubt, a quantitative loss, but also was an ultimate qualitative gain, as the party became moderate and its mutual differences were reduced to a minimum. On the issue of one-unit the party finally was unanimous, as the Pir of Manki Sharif recanted his early opposition to the one-unit issue. It can be categorically maintained that by the year 1958, the party had become more notable for its unity than its differences.

However, in the course of the party's evolution the most shining example of maturity, realism, adaptability and innovation was displayed by its decision to open roll to all communities regardless of faith, hue and colour. This was to "pave the way", wrote the New York Times correspondent, "for 10,000,000 Hindus to associate themselves politically for the first time with a popular political organisation". This was a piece of bold leadership, But its

88. Dawn, April 14, 1953.
89. See Ibid., July 2, 1956.
political pragmatism stood it in good stead. The decision was East Pakistan's which was accepted by the Central Working Committee. Henceforth, the party dropped the words, "Jinnah" and "Muslim", and gave itself a non-communal nomenclature e.g. Awami League.

As far as the A.L.'s organisational strength in West Pakistan was concerned it was not as powerful and pervasive as was in the case of its sister party in East Pakistan. In 1954 Suhrawardy had been in Zurich Hospital for treatment for a long time. The Acting Convenor, the Pir of Manki Sharif could not make up Suhrawardy's absence, although an enrolment campaign was carried on in all parts of the country.91 The organizational work did not receive undivided attention even after Suhrawardy's return due to the serious constitutional crisis. Serious party work began after the establishment of the Republic and amalgamation of West Pakistan. The reorganisation committee formed a 6-man sub-committee to draft a party Constitution and manifesto.92 The long awaited A.L. convention was postponed, explained Suhrawardy, only to make it more representative "in later stage".93 The General Secretary, Inayatullah Hassan dissolved all A.L. units in West Pakistan "with a view to reorganizing the Party in West Pakistan in the context of one-unit".94 At long last, the

91. See Dawn, January 17, March 4 & 27, June 2, September 1 and November 7, 1955.
92. Ibid., January 10, 1957.
reorganization job was completed in April, 1958, and in the May Convention of 1958 a unified A.L. for West Pakistan with a party manifesto and Constitution was born for the first time.95

Mr. Ahmed maintained that A.L. membership in West Pakistan would be a little over 100,000.96 The circumstantial evidence suggests a greater number. A foreign critic, Collin Jackson, believed that Suhrawardy cultivated tremendous mass response for his party in West Pakistan.97 The A.L. in the N.W.F.P. had a solid following. In Karachi the A.L. ward leagues were coming up. The A.L. stand on the one-unit issue would have compelled some favourable responses from the Punjab. The Bahawalpur A.L. was "comparatively strong".98 Besides, influential personalities and landlords counted very much in West Pakistan politics. The A.L. had some share of these. The Pir of Manki Sharif, Zakori Sharif - they had solid Murids* - and Khan of Lundkhar of the N.W.F.P., Pir Ilahi Bakhs - a former Sind Premier - of Sind, Waliyat Ali Khan - son of Liaquat, the first Prime Minister of Pakistan - Chowdhury Abdus Salam, M.P., of Bahawalpur, Nawab Zada Nasrullah, Raja Hassan Akhtar, Khwaja Abdur Rahim, Sahib Zadi Mahmouda (woman), Mir Abid Hossain, Malik Ghulam Nabi of

* Religious disciples.

the Punjab and Major General Akbar Khan, etc., were all names to be reckoned with. But the fact remains, the A.L. in West Pakistan was not as deep rooted as was the M.L.

So far as the East Pakistan A.L. was concerned, it marched from strength to strength from its birth. During the period 1957-58, it won all the bye-elections but one for the legislative seats. Its membership roll mounted to a sizeable figure,* 1.8 million.99 A prominent opposition leader, Mian Iftikharuddin, confessed in the N.A. in the following words: "The Awami League to my mind in East Pakistan is the only organized party of the country; indeed it is the only best organized party in the whole country."100 The M.L. parliamentary leader Chundrigarh told the House in the same vein in the following year.101 Hence, we maintain that by 1958 the A.L. was a viable party with its main root anchored in East Pakistan and unfolding its branches - the opposite of the M.L. - in the western part. And the judgement of M. Ahmed that the A.L. was the "All-Pakistan party which never came into existence",102 was unjustified.

* Sheik Mujibboor Rahman, the party Secretary, claimed still more during an interview with the writer.


Organisational Structure

The A.L. organisation did not possess the highest national forum, a Central Council like that of the M.L. At the national level was the central executive committee alone which, being appointed by the Convenor, Suhrawardy, functioned as a coordinating machine and took decisions on national issues. The 34-member central executive committee consisted of the prominent A.L. leaders of both the wings. This body frequently met, usually at Karachi. Apparently the organisational solar system of the A.L. revolved round the Sun of Suhrawardy's personality. One could suspect the existence of "bossism", American style in the party. But in essence, there was a good deal of "inner democracy" within the organization. By virtue of being the party's national convenor Suhrawardy enjoyed plenary power in some party matters. But nothing in our findings provides grounds for accusing Suhrawardy of committing the party to an action concerning which he was not sure of carrying the organization with him. That was his leadership. If he had preached "parity formula" or "pro-Western foreign policy" the party voted its endorsement later. It cannot be said that the party ratified its leader's actions thinking them to be a fait accomplis; for, after all the largest branch of the A.L., i.e. the E.P.A.L., remained always under popular control as understood in party sense. The dissentients on foreign policy

* The provision for a national council was envisaged in the Constitution when President Ayub revived party politics in 1964. See Constitution of All Pakistan Awami League (published by Mr. Shaflul Alam, 15, Purana Paltan, Dacca), n.d.
of both parts of Pakistan were expelled by the appropriate bodies, e.g. the Central Working Committee and the East Pakistan Working Committee, respectively. Bhasani left the party on his own accord.

The Central Working Committee authorised Suhrawardy in August, 1955 to take whatever steps he considered necessary in the interest of Pakistan in regard to the one-unit Bill. In December of the following year the central committee in a 3-day meeting had no scruple in expressing "full confidence" in its leader. Similarly, the working committee after 10 hours' heated discussion prevailed upon its leader to withdraw his earlier order disaffiliating the N.W.F.P.'s League headed by the Pir of Manki Sharif. In spite of its being wholly appointed by Suhrawardy the Central Working Committee functioned in a democratic spirit where dissent was tolerated; for, Suhrawardy being the chief aggregator of party interests of both the wings showed discretion in his conduct. In passing resolutions on major issues the committee, in the absence of a central council subjected them to ratification by a convention of East Pakistan-West Pakistan Awami Leaguers. For instance, it was done on the electorate issue.

103. See Times, June 10, 1957; Dawn, January 8, 1957.
Situated at the apex the committee also did the valuable job of resolving from time to time internal party conflicts in different regions. The bringing about of rapprochement between the two rival Awami Leaguers - the Pir of Manki Sharif and Khan of Lundkhar - in the N.W.F.P., the A.L. stronghold in West Pakistan was done through the central committee's good offices. 108 Besides the Central Working Committee there was a Central Parliamentary Board consisting of some A.L. M.P.s, party leaders and the convenor as its ex-officio chairman which functioned in a fashion similar to that of the M.L.

It was, however, the edifice of the East Pakistan A.L. which was erected upon a complete and sound organisational base.

The components of the East Pakistan A.L. were the following: the Council, the Working Committee, the Parliamentary Party, the Parliamentary Board and the district, sub-divisional, city, ward, thana, municipality, union or Panchayat leagues as recognized by the East Pakistan A.L. The Party officers were the President, 3 vice-presidents, the general secretary, 6 departmental secretaries, and a treasurer. At the top was the Council the strength of which membership was 876. 109 A prescribed number of elected Councillors from all the district and city leagues constituted the Council, which in turn elected the office-bearers. In marked contrast to the provincial council of the M.L. which admitted the Presidents and

general secretaries of district and city leagues as automatic members of the Council, the character of the A.L. council was essentially elective. It was only in the case of a district or city league’s failure to send up elected councillors in time, that the Working Committee through co-option or nomination could fill in the gap temporarily. The Council being the highest forum having an appellate jurisdiction sat in judgment twice a year regularly over the entire activities of the organization and gave policy directives. The residual power was vested in the council. What really distinguished the A.L. Council from that of the M.L.'s was that the former was more animated, assertive and democratic.

The functions of the Working Committee were similar to that of the M.L.'s. But the A.L. Committee was so constituted that unlike the M.L. custom the President of the A.L. could appoint only 25 members in his discretion in a committee of 37 members; for, as many as 12 party office-bearers would become the compulsory members - a check against the President’s filling the Committee with yes-men. The 11-man Parliamentary Board while being entrusted with the job of selecting parliamentary candidates was required to weigh the opinions of the respective constituency parties from where the


111. See *The Constitution of East Pakistan Awami League*, (Published by Habiboor Rahman, Publicity Secretary, Shulekha Press, Dacca - 1), n.d., pp.4-5.

candidates were to be chosen. And as far as the Provincial Parliamentary Party was concerned it was made responsible to the Working Committee so that 'party faith' was not violated\textsuperscript{113} - a potential area of party conflicts. The Constitution forbade members to hold party offices and public offices at the same time - a directive which was not violated.*

The organizational superiority of the A.L. over others, however, lay in its creation of a sound and viable base i.e. the local party organisations. On paper most of the parties were keen to show that all the districts, subdivisions, cities, unions, etc., were dotted with their party branches. But in reality they were not what they were made out to be. The \emph{Dawn} being a M.L. paper had to admit that extensive membership drive of the A.L. reached "the innermost parts of the province". The organizers of the union leagues - the smallest unit of the A.L. hierarchy - worked with the objective of enrolling at least half of the electorate or one-eighth of the total population of their unions. And no union league was recognized by the A.L. executives until it had enrolled at least 500 members. Ladies' committees were formed in every union to catalogue women membership.\textsuperscript{114} These primary units formed the pyramidal base of the organization

* Some of the office bearers who joined the coalition government in 1956 did so with the permission of the Working Committee. Later on, they resigned party offices.

\textsuperscript{113} Awami League Constitution, \textit{loc.cit.}, p. 19.

\textsuperscript{114} See \textit{Dawn}, May 10, 1954.
which met in an hierarchical order at the apex. In this hierarchical ladder each higher rung was constituted by the ingredients of its immediate lower ones. So the top echelons relied on their subordinates for support as the latter looked for incentives and patronage from the higher levels. The link between the two poles e.g. the top and the bottom was officially maintained by the District Leagues. In the Afro-Asian situation it has been found that parties well-established in power reached a phase in which "the basic cells begin to atrophy", through alienation. As the A.L. was not well-established in power it did not develop such complacency to indulge in neglect for the primary units. The District Leagues as an intermediary organ between the base and the top coordinated the activities of the branches which fell within their jurisdiction. Besides the lines of communication at all levels of the party were kept alive in that through dissemination of information the Chief Party Organ always kept its subordinates posted up-to-date. Hardly a single A.L. meeting on an important issue held in the capital city went without its reverberations being heard in the shape of similar A.L. meetings across the country. Besides, party leaders like Suhrawardy, Bhasani and Sheikh Mujiboor Rahman had great passion for public communication, and it can be said without fear of contradiction that the caravan of A.L. stalwarts did cover all the tiny sectors of the organization through their periodic visiting and speaking engagements. Visits by the lesser

leaders to the primary leagues had always been constant. Again, big party conferences and particularly council meetings were generally held in the rural areas of different parts of the country. The panorama of debates, resolutions, elections, ovations, slogans, songs, etc., gave an aura of pride where the humblest Awami Leaguer could feel enthusiastic, having been a part of the whole creative movement. If Suhrawardy instilled reason and Bhasani emotion to the party, Sheikh Mujiboor Rahman, the General Secretary, put steel in the organization. Here was a man who almost dedicated his whole life to the building of a mass party and had the distinction of resigning from a ministerial job for the interest of party work.116 These were some of the factors that might have prompted Mr. Ahmed to say that the A.L. "attained a high degree of organisation and cohesion and intimate touch with the people and intelligentsia".117

As to the locus of power, it seemingly manifested itself, in both personal and collective leadership. Major decisions were invariably taken collectively in the highest forum, the Council. For instance, on the question of opening the doors of the A.L. to non-Muslims the Subjects Committee in the Council having failed to arrive at a decision empowered Bhasani to have the final word on it.118 He, nevertheless, decided the matter in favour of the non-

communalisation of the party with the help of a joint meeting of the Working Committee and the Presidents and Secretaries of district and sub-divisional Awami Leagues; but the decision was again submitted for ratification to the Council meeting the following year. Almost the same procedure was followed on the electorate issue. After the exit of Bhasani, the personal leadership of Suhrawardy at the provincial and national level had the acquiescence of the party. The incidence of participation in the collective decision-making by the leaguers was fairly encouraging as the number of attendants of the Council sessions of these four years will indicate - 1953, 721; 1955, 675; 1956, 650 and in 1957, 846.

On the crucial question of relationship between the party and its parliamentary representatives a veteran British parliamentarian maintained that "The Government must keep the principles of the party in mind ... and party must understand the difficulties of Government." Since the A.L. savoured the taste of governmental power for the first time in 1956 there arose some heartburning between the A.L. Assemblymen and the Party. The causes were more psychological and party-promotional in nature than ideological. The political position of the salaried Assemblymen occasioned some jealousies among the outside leaguers. The party workers and

120. See Ibid., 17 November, 1953; October 22, 1955; May 29, 1956 and Times, June 14, 1957.
supporters needed some government patronage to keep up their party morale now that they had a government of their own. 122 The temporary resignation of the party Secretary was interpreted to be the cause of the existing tension between the organization and the government. 123 But the fact remains that the leaders concerned never slanged themselves in public and swallowed their differences in silence. And the basic relationship between the government and the party always remained sound.

The degree of organizational maturity achieved by the East Pakistan A.L. cannot, however, be claimed for the Western bloc. In fact, a unified West Pakistan A.L. with a full-fledged constitution and party manifesto came into being in May, 1958 where the A.L. Convention elected Nawabzada Nasrullah the President of West Pakistan A.L. and Khan of Lundhor the General Secretary, including 6 vice-presidents, 6 joint secretaries, 2 organizing and publicity secretaries, 1 treasurer, 1 11-man parliamentary Board and a 3-man election tribunal. 124 Finally, it is also to be mentioned here that the A.L. was a non-restrictive and direct organization where any one of 18-years old could become a member after paying a token one anna.

Programmes

Compared to the M.L. the A.L. was at bottom a secular organization.

It was a centrist party with a left of the centre thrust. To provoke attractiveness it had some idealistic programmes, but in practice the A.L. remained pragmatic with a deep sense of constitutionality. It stood for progressive democratic leadership. From the very beginning it fought for the restoration of civil liberties and allowance of free play to democratic processes. "Mine is going to be a constitutional path" — a word of significance which was constantly repeated by Suhrawardy. Upon becoming the Prime Minister his was the emphasis on the "ensurance of the rule of law". A sense of legalism and constitutionalism was thus a part of the A.L. tradition.

Its secularism manifested itself in the first item of the election manifesto published before the general elections of East Pakistan which clearly opposed making Pakistan an Islamic state. Suhrawardy unlike the M.L. did not consider 'religion' as the basis on which "The two wings can live together". Shattering the myth of religion the Deputy leader of the A.L. parliamentary party told the Constituent Assembly II that "we are going to frame one state out of two countries; one nation out of two people", and the basis of harmony between the two wings depended on political and economic

125. See Dawn, October 3, 1956.
understanding. So regional autonomy and parity between the two halves of Pakistan in every sphere were the two main pillars of the A.L. programmes and recipe for Pakistan problems. And the establishment of the system of joint electorate was another example of the party's secular leadership.

The years preceding the party's sharing governmental power saw the development of the A.L.'s foreign policy. In the initial periods the A.L. was officially averse to the idea of Pakistan's entering into pacts with the western countries. In the Council session of 1955 it resolved that all pacts must be placed before the N.A. for endorsement. While in opposition it urged the ruling parties in vain to place the international pacts and alliances for ratification. The early "theoretical" approach of the A.L. towards foreign policy was, however, revised when it returned to power and became "emphatically" identified with a pro-western foreign policy. The foreign policy differences of emphasis between the M.L. and the A.L. were that the former was more mindful of the Muslim world in the scheme of things, while the latter, though not unmindful of them, found the pan-Islamism as "strings of zeroes". And the A.L. had the unquestionable distinction of bringing 'democratic control' over the country's foreign policy.

On social policy the party appeared more emphatic but not

radical. It stood for abolition of feudalism without compensation. But the A.L. government in East Pakistan could not withhold compensation due to constitutional difficulties. But it did touch on others peripheral to the land system. At the centre it was inhibited by its reactionary coalition partner from bringing about agrarian reforms in West Pakistan. But the A.L. made bold to incorporate a land reform formula for West Pakistan in its election manifesto duly approved by the West Pakistan A.L. convention. Unlike the M.L., it fixed a definite ceiling on land holding - 23,000 units* as a maximum and 25 acres as the minimum - risking the support of the party's landlord-group. The rise of population in geometrical progression in Pakistan was, no doubt, a social problem, the Suhrawardy government for the first time ventured to introduce measures for family planning in a conservative society like Pakistan supported by a budget allotment.

On the economic side both the M.L. and A.L. believed in a mixed economy. The A.L. also envisaged the nationalisation of key industries. By and large the A.L. seemed to have been in favour of government intervention in the economic sector when the public interest warranted

* The unit is a scale fixed on the basis of the produce index. 23,000 units, in terms of measurement of land would vary from region to region. In the former Punjab it would come to about 300 acres and in the former N.W.F.P. to about 175 acres.

For the benefit of the common consumers the A.L. stood for the stabilization of prices through the introduction of price-support schemes by the government.\textsuperscript{136} After assumption of office it enacted a bill providing for price control and regulation of trade and commerce between the provinces only to ensure benefits of the consumers.\textsuperscript{137} The A.L. Commerce and Industries Minister wanted to contain the vested interests of the business community in one area of vital importance namely, the coastal trade between East and West Pakistan. He proposed to establish a public shipping corporation as private monopoly and selling of shipping space in the black-market vitiated the situation. One can easily understand the hold the business magnates had on the politicians since the start of Pakistan as in 1949 the Prime Minister refused to have a Public Shipping Corporation, on Indian lines, and at the same time would not give reasons to his "questioner" in the Parliament for its non-feasibility.\textsuperscript{138} A famine of oil and salt gripped East Pakistan, whereas West Pakistan abounded in them. The shipping magnates flourished over human miseries.\textsuperscript{139} Before the A.L. could demolish this vicious monopoly of the business community Suhrawardy had to quit the office and the plan for a public corporation was shelved.


\textsuperscript{139} See \textit{Dawn}, November 3, 1951 (Editorial) "Salt, Oil and Shipping".
for good. However in East Pakistan the A.L. government established a Jute Marketing Corporation instead of nationalising the jute industry. Agriculture, cottage industries, village and development received more attention in Suhrawardy's time than before.

The labour movement in Pakistan, which Weatherford saw as "an expression of the age-old dependent status of the workers of the subcontinent", featured prominently in the A.L. programmes. It stood for the growth of genuine and healthy trade unionism. The Employees' Provident Fund Act, and the Workmen's Compensation Act were passed during the Suhrawardy administration. Despite the Pakistan government's acceptance of the ILO conventions trade unions were not recognised automatically. The A.L. Labour Minister publicly announced that he was preparing a Bill for the compulsory recognition of trade unions. But the party fell from power before it could implement its plan. But it set up a labour Wages Board to advise on wages to labour. And a Private Bill, The Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act passed by the N.A. was A.L. sponsored. While in power

145. Ibid., May 27, 1957.
at the centre, it allocated Rs. 1,00,00,000 to mine owners to be advanced as loans on convenient terms for providing free housing accommodation to the mining force. 146 It was, however, the A.L. government in East Pakistan which promulgated the Trade Unions (Recognition) Ordinance, 1958 for compulsory recognition by the employers of representative trade unions. 147 The author of the Minimum Wage Act was also the A.L. government of East Pakistan. It was, however, the A.L. government of East Pakistan which could implement some of its programmes touching on various fields.*

Supporters, activists and Financial Resources

Because of its non-communalistic, secular and middle-of-the-road stand, the A.L. drew its supporters, though in different proportion, from all sections of society and people of all age-groups. No doubt, the party attracted the attention of the younger generation more prominently. As many as 150 accredited representatives of trade unions, controlling over 60,000 organised industrial workers in the Federal Capital area joined the A.L. formally, led by Mr. J.H. Shirajul, a member of the executive committee of the Pakistan

* For detailed A.L. programmes see the 41-point manifesto adopted in the 1953 Council session at Mymensingh published in Dawn, November 19, 1953. Also for revised one see East Pakistan A.L. Manifesto (Vernacular), published by T. Ahmed (Glory Printers, Dacca, 1969).


147. Ibid., January 30, 1958.
Confederation of Labour, the only recognized labour organization.\textsuperscript{148}

It appeared that the A.L. "would assume the role of a Labour Party"\textsuperscript{149}, British style. In East Pakistan the Party also enjoyed support of some of the trade unions. Abdur Samad, a prominent Trade Unionist was the Secretary of the A.L.'s labour department. Moulana Tarkabagish - an M.P. and later became the President of the E.P.A.L. - was the President of the East Pakistan Association of IV Class Government Employees. Similarly, A. Khaleque and Qamaruddin - prominent Awami Leaguers - were associated with other unions. Among the millions of refugees who fled to Pakistan the A.L. could hope to muster some support, as well. In fact, Suhrawardy himself was a refugee in the technical sense. Mr. Zahiruddin, an immigrant, was a Central Minister during Suhrawardy's time. Mr. Walyat Ali Khan, the son of the first Prime Minister became a prominent Awami Leaguer in West Pakistan.

Suhrawardy himself had the portfolio of refugee and rehabilitation. There was a refugee functionary in the A.L. organization solely entrusted with the refugee problems.\textsuperscript{150} Suhrawardy's long services to the cause of minorities had an invariable begetting side. The student community's support to the A.L. was channelled through the East Pakistan Student's League\textsuperscript{151} - the most powerful student organ.

\textsuperscript{148} Dawn, January 6, 1956.


\textsuperscript{150} Dawn, April 4, 1955.

\textsuperscript{151} \textit{Report of the Commission on Students' Problems and Welfare} (Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Education), 1966, p. 9
Its counterpart in West Pakistan did the same. As many as 30 university professors, and teachers were thought to have been actively associated with the party. Similarly, leading women Awami Leaguers like Mrs. Sulaiman Akhtar, Begum Anwara Khatoon, Mrs. Sarwar Murshed, etc., were also conspicuous in social service activities and women's organisations — a fact that had the subtlety of recruiting more women adherents to the organization.

Above all, there was an army of more than 500 full time, dedicated and fighting workers ready to be mobilized for party work by a snap of the fingers of Sheikh Mujiboor Rahman, who was so dearly enthroned in the hearts of the workers. Most of them were quite educated and young. They had a will to work for the party. For example, when the A.L. took over the administration of East Pakistan in 1956 in an utter famine condition, the workers helped the government procure and distribute food in the remotest part of the country. In some areas they provided for 'gruel kitchen' to feed the hungry. In the so-called operation closed door period in East Pakistan border, these workers volunteered to work as border officers to stop smuggling across the border. Such was

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* The writer was told by the Party's General Secretary.

** Affectionately called by people as "Mujib-bhai", meaning 'brother Mujib'.


the zeal of the workers for raising the image of the party. Among the activists were the A.L. Mujahed Bahini* maintained by the party of which job was to render social services.154

The financial position of the party was weaker than the M.L. Officially, it lived on the varied scale of subscriptions realised, monthly or yearly, from different categories of party members, plus the earnings from the sales of party publications. There was a provision in the Constitution which says of "at a time donation", but by whom was not explained. No doubt, the top leaders who were mostly middle class lawyers made frequent donations out of their hard-won money. But as the business community was eager to establish links with any party having potentiality for capturing power, the A.L. also had had its share of donations from the former class. Particularly, Sadr Ispahan who maintained his business headquarters in East Pakistan maintained regular financial contributions to the A.L.**

** Image building exercise

On this count the A.L. was in the same tradition as that of the M.L. The only difference was that the party being newer the oarsmanship of its boat of mass campaigning remained always active.

Having remained in the opposition for a long time it had constantly to observe strikes, protest meetings, processions, fastings, prisoners'
day wearing black badges, etc. Through all these instrumentalities the party projected its image before the public as the party of sufferers for the popular cause. Unlike the M.L. Conference which smacked of martial grandeur, the A.L. ones seemed more political in matters of internal proceedings and outside displays. The Bengali Dailies, e.g. "Ittafaq"* and "Millat",** and the weekly "Morning Star" in West Pakistan were the party's main communicating organs.

The Republican Party (R.P.)

The R.P. was born in April, 1956 first within the precincts of West Pakistan legislature, and then it sought to extend its activities to the country. In the words of the party's General Secretary, the Republicans were "the renegades of the Muslim League and are proud of the fact".156 The R.P. was drawn 'almost entirely' from the class of big landlords and big industrialists.157 Looking at the political lineage of the top R.P. leaders - save Dr. Khan - it can be safely maintained that the party arose from the ashes of the old Unionist Party which governed the Punjab for a long time on a non-communal basis in the pre-partition days of India. The political significance of the party lay in its giving a transient support for secular leadership which culminated in the country's having a joint

* In the fifties it had the largest circulation in the province.
** Originally a M.L. paper but transferred its support to the A.L.
electorate system. The intrinsic value of the emergence of the R.P. was that it stressed the non-communal aspect of Pakistan politics, when the powerful, conservative M.L. in West Pakistan was going in the opposite direction. Judged on that point the R.P. was liberal. But as a mass-party the R.P. had the slightest chance of success in either wing.

In the September Convention of 1956 the R.P. opened its doors to all people, regardless of religious faith, who were at least 18 years old. The Constitution provided a national convention comprising members of the provincial conventions and of the Parliamentary Party in the N.A. including candidates set up by the party for elections in the constituency concerned provided they were members of a primary or ward R.P. The Executive Committee consisted of 21 members, all elected by the convention except the leader of the party in the N.A. who was an ex-officio member. A central organising committee was formed to constitute the R.P. at the following levels: provincial, district, constituency, city, primary, etc. The enrolment campaign continued from 15th January, 1957 to March 15, 1957. On March 2, 1957 a press release from Republican House claimed that R.P. membership had risen to 1 million and a further 200,000 membership forms were despatched to different party Headquarters.

158. For details see *Dawn*, September 28, 29, 30, 1956.
No one could verify the authenticity of the claim, but the fact remains that the R.P.'s existence remained essentially on paper.

The election manifesto adopted in the September Convention of 1958 sought for united nationhood, a realistic independent foreign policy, civil liberties, self-determination in Kashmir, maximum production under the free enterprise system and exploitation of natural resources, etc., etc. On agrarian reforms it did not fix any ceilings on maximum holdings. On the contrary, promises for the consolidation of minimum holdings and conversion of uneconomic units into economic holdings by further allocation of land were held out. On the one-unit issue, the manifesto stayed non-committal: giving freedom to its members to contest the first general elections on either a pro or anti one-unit slogan 160 – an opportunistic device. Except on these two issues, the R.P. had more similarity with the A.L. than any other parties. But as the R.P. was evasive on many issues it had no future in the election. It had no roots whatsoever in East Pakistan, saye Abdul Alim, M.P., who was elected previously on the U.P. ticket and a political non-entity therein. Perhaps, the R.P. should be considered a camouflaged interest group of landlords and industrialists rather than a party in political sense. For its survival, a plan of merger with the A.L. was being considered a few days before the martial law. 161

160. See Dawn, September 27, 28 and 29, 1958.

The Krisak Sramik Party* (K.S.P.)

In the prepartition days of Bengal the Krisak Proja Party** was a dominant political organization. In terms of age the K.S.P. in Pakistan was junior only to the M.L. Around the year 1915 it started as the peasant movement under the leadership of the octogenarian Haq. In the historic Proja Conference of Dacca in 1924 it emerged as a political party. Mr. Haq struck a note of bold romanticism in his Presidential speech: "Providence has placed in our hands the noblest of ploughs. We will drive the blade deeper in the confident hope that on the furrows we may raise, the sands of time will germinate the seeds of national regeneration." The party worked for the abolition of zamindari and amelioration of the peasants. The Bengal Tenancy Amending Act of 1928 was greatly credited to its endeavour. The party was non-communal having both Hindu and Muslim leaders prominent in it. It had an effective newspaper, the Nawabozuk† edited by the famous and rebel poet Kazi Nazrul Islam. Under the India Act of 1935, the party formed a coalition government in Bengal in 1937 with Mr. Haq as the Prime Minister and was in power till 1943. During this period The Debt Settlement Board, the Money Lenders' Act and the Bengal Tenancy Act were amended.

* The Peasants and Labourers Party.
** Peasant Tenants' Party.
† The new era.


to give succour to the teeming peasantry of Bengal under the initiative of Mr. Haq—a record of achievements which "will be enshrined in our memory, in the memory of our children and children's children, till eternity."\textsuperscript{164}

But the vagaries of politics and the new balance of political forces which emerged from the partition of India at independence witnessed an eclipse of the old party. After the birth of Pakistan Mr. Haq was chafing his hands at enforced political idleness. And it was not until July 30, 1953\textsuperscript{165} when clamour against the M.I. government had become ubiquitous that Mr. Haq revived his party again. This time the party underwent a slight nomenclatural change in that the term 'Proja' was deleted in favour of 'Sramik' to capture the interest of the labourers of Pakistan's growing industries. The K.S.P. was a part of the U.F. and was the second largest parliamentary group in East Pakistan Legislative Assembly and fourth in the N.A., but had no members in the West Pakistan legislature. Nevertheless, its future was hardly encouraging, for several reasons.

Firstly, the K.S.P. was notoriously callous to organisational work, and had a thin footing in East Pakistan— and none at all in

\* The organisational structure of the party on paper was almost similar to that of the foregoing ones mentioned already. It had a 200-member Council and 37-man working committee (\textit{Dawn}, November 3, 1955), but the elections of the office bearers were mostly irregular and undemocratic.

\textsuperscript{164} \textit{The Holiday}, "Sher-E-Bangla Supplement", April 28, 1968, p.III.

\textsuperscript{165} \textit{Hindu}, July 31, 1953.
West Pakistan. Mr. Haq's endeavour to merge his party with that of the West Pakistan minor party, the Kishan Maqdoor Party* proved a flop.\[166\] Secondly, the organization was denuded of invigorating leadership. Traditionally, it basked under the sunshine of Haq's immense popularity, the party's patriarch. Being dismissed from office (the Governorship) he called the K.S.P. Council meeting, was elected as its President and volunteered himself to campaign in the coming election.\[167\] The chances were that he would neither have survived the strain of an election campaign in his late eighties nor mesmerised the voters by his 'charmed' name. Besides, the party was divided into two camps e.g. Haq** and Sarkar,\[168\] while the ablest Hamidul Haq Chowdhury was left to plough his lonely furrow. Thirdly, the party was more conservative than its name implied. The causes and interests of the peasants and labourers with which the K.S.P. was literally identified were in practice taken up by the A.L. more efficiently and still more aggressively by the N.A.P., whose leader Bhasani, in the words of the Times, "snatched mass popularity-two years ago from Fazlul Haq" so far as the "poverty-stricken peasantry" was concerned.\[169\] Fourthly, it did not enjoy support from the influ-

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* Peasants' and Labourers' Party.

** The nephew of the octogenarian Haq.


entia1 student community, nor to a significant extent from labour. There was nothing like party paper,* tangible financial resources, workers worth naming and distinguishing programmes save the composite 21-point programme.

These were the basic reasons which would have acted adversely against the K.S.P.'s future. Perhaps the general election would have ensured a hand-to-mouth existence of the party, had it been held. That was why an attempt was made by some K.S.P. leaders in early 1958, in vain, to come to terms with the A.L. with which they had common grounds. 170

The National Awami Party (N.A.P.)

Actually, the formation of the first opposition party in Pakistan was leftist inspired. And, in the emergence of the N.A.P. witnessed a high water-mark of leftist consolidation. At Karachi, on the 9th May, 1948 the All-Pakistan People's Party was formed under the Presidentship of Khan A. Gaffar Khan, known as the 'Frontier Gandhi'. Its Convenor was G.M. Syed. Mr. Khan was a veteran Congressman and Mr. Syed ** a nationalist Muslim. One of the main aims of the party was to secure for various cultural and linguistic units in Pakistan

* "The Pakistan Observer" an English daily - though, owned by the K.S.P. leader, H.H. Chowdhury, who personally enjoyed some fringe benefits from owning a paper, remained above being identified with the K.S.P.

** He joined the M.L. at the last moment of the struggle for Pakistan movement.

full and unimpaired autonomy.\textsuperscript{171} The provincial undertone apart, they party repudiated two doctrines, the one-party state and the communal character of the political party. The party, however, could not get off the ground.

Having been expelled from the M.L. in April, 1950 Mian Iftikharuddin in a convention held at Lahore in November, 1950 announced the formation of a political party named Azad Pakistan Party (A.P.P.)\textsuperscript{172} Mian Sb. did not spend much of his political life in the M.L.* but in the radical section of the Congress, where he was at times denounced as a 'crypto-communist'.\textsuperscript{173} Himself a big landlord, Mian Sb. was endowed with a bourgeois knack of combining pleasure with business in his 'interminable trips' to communist countries of East Europe and China. Unlike the foregoing one, the A.P.P. was more aggressive, and loud in its aims and activities. It stood for the abolition of zamindari, civil liberties, confiscation of foreign capital, a planned economy and the renunciation of pro-western foreign policy including leaving the Commonwealth.\textsuperscript{174}

The pre-partition field cadre of the communist Kisan workers from the districts of Lahore, Guzranwala, Shikarpur and Mianwali of the Punjab province flocked to the fold of the A.P.P. which by

\* He joined the M.L. only in 1945.

174. For details see Statesman, November 11, 1950 and Dawn, November 20, 1952.
December, 1952 attracted people's attention for its approach to the politico-economic question. The prophet of this movement was a poet, Faiz Ahmed Faiz, who was a colonel in the Army during the 2nd World War. On constitutional matters it had a definite secular programme in propagating which Mian Sb. was quite an effective speaker in the Constituent Assembly I. The sprightly English daily "The Pakistan Times" projected the image and activities of the party before the country. It fought the Punjab legislative elections singly, won 1 seat and obtained only 2 per cent of the popular votes, while in the Sind and Frontier elections the A.P.P. was a flop.

The A.P.P. had no platform in East Pakistan. Mian Sb. perhaps thought of affiliating his party with Suhrawardy's as the former toured East Pakistan many a time with the latter and attended the A.L. Council sessions. At length, Mian Sb.'s political telepathy produced some response in East Pakistan in that a 3-day convention of peasants and trade union workers formed a new leftist party, the Ganatantri Dal (G.D.). The convention also empowered the working committee of the G.D. to negotiate for the setting up of a joint party machinery with the A.P.P. for formulating policies on


** Democratic Party.


matters which were of all-Pakistan interest. The economic, national and international policies of the G.D. were similar to those of the A.P.P., except that the former stressed the issue of autonomy, based on the Lahore resolution of 1940. 177 So an East-West leftist communicating link was established through these parties, the A.P.P. and G.D. The G.D. according to government intelligence "is the Communist Party under a different name", so was its ally, the Youth League, "the recruiting base and the 2nd front" 178 of the Communist Party (C.P.). The G.D. was a part of the U.F. and in the general elections of East Pakistan where the workers of the A.P.P. also participated, it won a few seats in the legislature and 1 in the N.A. later on.

When the one-unit scheme was effected the 6 political parties, viz. A.P.P., Wore Pashtoon, Khudal Khidmatgars, Ostaman Gal, Sind Awami Mahaz and Sind Hari Committee which had been operating in the regions of the Punjab, Baluchistan, the N.W.F.P., tribal areas and Sind for a long time for ensuring justice to the underdogs and more autonomy for the respective regions, finally made a giant stride in amalgamating themselves into one party, called the Pakistan National Party (P.N.P.), on the basis of six programmes of which disintegration of the one-unit, elimination of feudalism, independent foreign policy and maintenance of unity amongst the anti-imperialist

177. Hindu, January 21, 1953; also Dawn, January 21, 1953.
nations were the most prominent. This was an overt demonstration of leftist concord in West Pakistan. In East Pakistan leftist elements like Wali Ahad, Ali Aksad, F. Karim, Abdur Samad, K. Illius, etc., were masquerading as Awami Leaguers under Bhasani's protection. When the A.L. Council endorsed overwhelmingly Suhrawardy's pro-western foreign policy, Bhasani came out from the A.L. with his army of leftwingers. What was left now was the final agglutination of the East-West leftists. The G.D. was already there. So at Bhasani's initiative a convention was called at Dacca with the P.N.P. leaders that saw the emergence of the N.A.P. Broadly speaking, the N.A.P. embodied the confluence of the leftist elements of Pakistan. But there was also some heterogeneity of the composing members of the party in that they did not have a shared background and political antecedents. The only binding element was the common programme.

The N.A.P. had great potentiality in an inequalitarian society like Pakistan where there was enough scope for radical agitation. The Manchester Guardian commented that "The N.A.P. is proving the cleverest of all" - a trait that was shown by the party's having held an accidental balance of power in all the legislatures of Pakistan. But the significance of the rise of the N.A.P. as such was appreciated

179. See Hindu and Dawn, November 18 and 19, 1956.
without any illusion by Qayyum Khan (President of the M.L.) who commented: "The left is united and they have formed a party with a definite programme." Those who believe in the present foreign policy are at loggerheads on minor issues and unless they decide to get together and sink their differences, it will be difficult to withstand the onslaught of the N.A.P." Similarly, the N.A.P.'s appeal to the peasants and labourers was fascinating. Above all the provincial slogan was still more intriguing. That is why we have maintained earlier that the N.A.P. was one of the contributing factors towards bringing in a martial law regime. And the authorities in their anxiety over-reacted to the situation. What was the position of the N.A.P.? There was no revolutionary tradition among the Muslim peasants of East Pakistan and West Pakistan. The old dialectical fiction of the Chinese Communists pertaining to peasant leadership did not apply in Pakistan. And apparently Professor Saul Rose was right pointing "the inability of a socialist party to flourish in a Muslim environment". But one should be cautious about a pithy saying; for, Confucianism in China, Roman Catholicism in Italy and Hinduism in India - all conservative faiths - failed to contain leftist movements in their respective countries. So here the N.A.P. had a long range hope, but not an immediate one. Although trade unionism in Pakistan "compares favourably with that in other Asian

* Writer's italics.


countries", the N.A.P. could not claim to be the labourers' sole mentor; for, in general trade unionism in Pakistan was apolitical - almost like AFL/CIO of America - and, above all, the labourers and workers formed a very small"part of the electorate". This was the position of the peasants and labourers - the main constituencies of the N.A.P. Besides, the N.A.P. was not all cohesive and unified internally as its outward projection appeared to be. The West Pakistan N.A.P. was more preoccupied with the disintegration of the one-unit when its counterpart in the East emphasized more the party's other national and international policies. Even the Punjab branch of the N.A.P. in West Pakistan appeared less enthusiastic towards the anti-one-unit plan. At one stage Gaffar Khan threatened to come out of the party but for Bhasani, and on another G.M. Syed thought of separating the West Pakistan N.A.P. from the East. So, a palpable electoral success of the N.A.P. was likely to be impaired by various intrinsic factors. Above all, its political future was contingent upon one main factor i.e. the extent of which the rest of the parties were responding to the country's socio-economic needs. And the A.L. as one of the major political parties was able, to a considerable extent, to undercut the attraction of the N.A.P.

Organisational structure

Organisationally, the N.A.P. was secular and any citizen of Pakistan of the age of 16 or above - a device to attract young people, not followed by other parties - who would sign the party pledge and pay an annual subscription of four annas became eligible for membership of the primary unit of the party. Until October, 1958, the N.A.P. did not have any central council like the M.L. At the apex was the 40-man central organizing committee (C.O.C.) consisting of equal numbers from both wings with Bhasani as Chairman and M.H. Usmani of West Pakistan as General Secretary. This committee functioned as a central executive committee like that of the M.L. and A.L. and coordinated and supervised activities of the provincial organizing committees which were also set up to consolidate the party throughout Pakistan. Decisions over issues of national importance reached by any regional N.A.P. were taken up by this high-command for ratification. The C.O.C. appointed a 9-man Central Parliamentary Board (C.P.B.) whose main job was to guide and control the N.A.P. Parliamentary parties in the central as well as the two provincial Assemblies under the immediate direction of the C.O.C. From July 26, 1957 until October 7, 1958 these two organs of the N.A.P. exercised more powers than any of their counter-

191. Ibid., September 13, 1958.
parts in other parties. For, the C.O.C. was composed of the purist elements of the party who were also (mostly) simultaneously the rank and file of their respective regional parties; and, since some overlapping of membership occurred at the central and provincial levels of the party structure the C.O.C.'s dictation entailed deference reasonably well from below.

The organisational arrangements at the provincial level were similar to those of the other parties mentioned above. However, in one respect the provincial executive committee appeared more elective in that, compared to the M.L. and A.L., almost all the members were elected by the Provincial Council, the highest forum. In West Pakistan the spirit of disintegration of the one-unit scheme dictated the whole pattern of party structure therein vis-à-vis each region of the pre-one-unit period had had its separate party machinery independent of each other — in contrast to the East Pakistan N.A.P. which functioned as a unified bloc. Though there was a provision for a regional council for the whole of West Pakistan to be formed with the prescribed number of representatives of various linguistic zones in order to deliberate issues of common interest, there is no evidence if that forum ever came into being.

In short, the N.A.P., national or provincial, in a 13-month period was more preoccupied with day-to-day politics than real


organisational work. It was still at an organising stage when the martial law was declared. In East Pakistan the party was organized only in few districts and cities e.g. Dinajpur, Sylhet, Barisal, Dacca and Chittagong, etc. While in West Pakistan the personal influences of Gaffer Khan, G.M. Syed, A.S. Achakzai and Master A. Karim made it possible to organize the party in some parts of the N.W.F.P., Sind, Punjab, Baluchistan, Khairpur, etc. The N.A.P. was yet to establish at the grass-root level and implement an organizational structure that really worked from the base upward.

Programmes

The N.A.P. convention of July, 1957 maintained that it aimed at developing Pakistan into a fully independent sovereign and welfare federal state on the basis of two autonomous units of East and West Pakistan. While the N.A.P.'s ultimate aim was to bring about a "socialistic state for Pakistan" it never did raise the bogey of class-war in Pakistan. On three points the N.A.P. stood poles asunder from the rest of the parties in Pakistan e.g. (1) an independent foreign policy which euphemism meant total severance from the western alliances and closer relation with the socialistic and so-called anti-imperialistic bloc, (2) the confiscation of zamindari

197. For details see The ideals, aims and objectives of the Pakistan National Awami Party (Bengali Publication) published by Dewan Mahboob, Sheba Printing Press, Dacca, 1968, pp. 1-12.
without compensation and redistribution of lands among the landless and (3) restoration of West Pakistan into its pre-one-unit state with full regional autonomy for both wings of Pakistan leaving defence, foreign affairs and currency to the centre's care. The first and the last item received the greatest attention of the party. Its other programmes on civil rights, refugee rehabilitation, education, housing, etc., were not spectacularly radical or different from other political parties. The N.A.P., of course, favoured more state intervention in economic activities, but it did not rule out the scope of private enterprise. Its innate xenophobia discouraged investment of foreign capital to the advantage of the local capital. Its labour policy was emphatic, on the implementation of I.L.O. convention. On contrast, the non-communal policies of the N.A.P. were as good as the A.L.'s; and, it was only on socio-economic and foreign policies that the latter differed with the former in terms of methodology and also, in some cases, on principle.

Supporters, activists and financial resources

With a leftist orientation the N.A.P. tended to be secretive and did not announce its membership strength. Apparently, the N.A.P. seemed to be reluctant to embark on rapid recruitment for fear of

198. See *The Round Table*, XLVII (1956-1957), pp. 396-397.
200. See the N.A.P. High Command's resolution on labour, *Dawn*, June 3, 1958.
being sabotaged from within. For example, when a section of the K.S.P. and Congress wanted to join the N.A.P. the East Pakistan organizing committee having deliberated the matter for 5½ hours experienced ideological difficulties in accepting them. However, the N.A.P. adherents were chiefly drawn from the working, peasant, labour and low middle class. In the N.W.F.P. the membership was estimated to be 41 lakhs. There were as many as 20,00,000 Haris* in Sind whose sole party, the Hari Committee was one of the components of the N.A.P. The locally based Awami Jamhoor party of the former Punjab and Bahawalpur formed to fight landlordism therein was a natural ally to the N.A.P. In East Pakistan Bhasani was the President of the East Pakistan Peasants' Association, and Peasants' Conferences were held under his leadership at Bogra, Sylhet and Dacca. Despite the comfortable position of the East Pakistan peasants compared to their opposite numbers in West Pakistan in regard to land system, and the A.L.'s identification with their causes, Bhasani held sway over the peasants of the North Bengal areas. On the labour front, Bhasani was already the President of the two powerful trade unions, the East Pakistan Railway Employees' 

* A Sindhi word means landless peasant.

** The intermediary rights of land were acquired legally by the A.L. government in January, 1957 - a further relief to the peasants.

201. See *Dawn*, March 14, 1958.
League and the Adamjee Jute Mills Mazdoor* Union. In the year 1958, the N.A.P. was one of the main contenders for supremacy in the labour field. And in complete departure from the past traditions of the political parties, the N.A.P. organized its labour front in the shape of the East Pakistan Mazdoor Federation in March 1958 and entrusted its prominent leaders with the task of organizing labour movement.205 The former G.D. leaders were already enmeshed with trade union activities. In West Pakistan the N.A.P. sympathiser, Fais Ahmed Fais was the vice-President of the most militant trade union organisation e.g. the Pakistan Trade Union Federation. And as far as the support of the student community was concerned it was channelled through the E.P.S.U.** - the counterpart of the N.A.P.206 - and E.P.S.S.+ Leftist intellectualism had its own elegance and the N.A.P. drew some support from the university and colleges, too, as the names of Professor Muzaffar Ahmed and Professor Ashanddin confirm.207 Besides, the N.A.P. was the only party which had a number of promising Hindu parliamentarians as its members. Concerning party activists it can be safely said that those who had formed the "workers' camp" under the Presidentship of Bhasani during the time

* Labourers.

** East Pakistan Students' Union.

+ East Pakistan Satri (Women Students) Sangha (Organisation).


206. Commission on Student Problems, etc., loc.cit., p. 9.

207. See Dawn, August 27, 1957.
of the East Pakistan general elections would mostly become the N.A.P. activists in East Pakistan.

The financial resources of the party were, no doubt, weak. Its methods of raising money were similar to those of other parties mentioned above. Because of the N.A.P.'s avowed association with the trade union activities it was likely that the industrialists might have also obliged the party monetarily. The N.A.P. also, in a novel way, raised money openly from sympathisers in public meetings sponsored by it. 208

**Image-building activities**

In this matter, the N.A.P. fell in line with the activities of other parties quoted above. But being a late comer in the political field the projection of the party image throughout the country left much to be desired. The N.A.P., however, was blessed with some effective communication facilities to project its views before the public. The Bengali vernacular daily, the 'Sangbad'* under the editorship of Zahur Hossain Chowdhury acted as the mouthpiece of the party. In addition, the well-known, *Times of Pakistan,** the Urdu daily "Imroze" and weekly illustrated magazine, Lail-o-Nahar of West Pakistan emphasized leftist policies unhesitatingly²⁰⁹—a boon to the N.A.P. cause.

* News.

** Its founder was Mian Iftikharuddin himself, the N.A.P. leader.

208. Rs. 10,000 were raised in Karachi meeting of the N.A.P., see *Dawn*, November 12, 1957.

The Communist Party (C.P.)

The Communist movement in Pakistan was clandestine, fragmentary and at a preparatory stage. The peasantry was steeped in orthodoxy - a bulwark against a possible growth of communist ideology. The communists' fermentation of troubles, in the early period, among scheduled castes in Khulna district, among Nankar tenants in a part of Sylhet and among Hajangs in the tribal area of Mymensingh - all in East Pakistan border areas - proved ineffective. They had only a small but growing industrial population to work on. In West Pakistan the abortive 'Rawalpindi Conspiracy' further blunted the edge of communist activities there, as suspected communists in the newspapers, trade unions, Kishan party and Hari Committee were arrested, including the Chief of the Pakistan C.P., Syed Sajjad Zaheer. Essentially, the C.P. was an urban party which drew its strength from petty bourgeois, and proletarian elements, together with a small number of quasi-intellectuals, students and some white-collar employees.

The C.P. in Pakistan operated under different organisational layers. On the surface it had an official party organisation which was hardly distinguishable from the structure of other democratic parties. This external layer stood for all democratic causes, and


feigned acquiescence to parliamentary procedure. Meanwhile the second stratum was entrusted with the building up of crypto-organizations, infiltrations into existing political parties and institutions, and the creation of a phoney conflict between those parties and structures that sought for democracy. The third layer was in charge of selecting and training the leaders and workers, and the fourth stratum provided the guidance and supervision of the authoritarian leadership. Until the middle of 1953 the C.P. was a moribund organization politically. Its main attention was focussed on the capture of Workers' Trade Unions. Most of the office-bearers of the following trade unions, The Adamjee Jute Mills Mazdoor Union, L.N.C.* Mills Workers' Union, Home Transport Workers' Union, Printing Press Workers' Union, the East Pakistan Railway Employees' League, etc., were prominent C.P. members. The East Pakistan Federation of Labour claiming the support of 100 trade unions with a membership of 1,86,258 workers did not completely shift its position to the right even after the hard-bound communist leaders had left it officially in 1948. The general elections of East Pakistan offered the C.P. a golden opportunity of achieving

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* Laxmi Narayan Cotton.

212. See the provocative article of the then Head of the department of political science, University of Dacca, *Dawn*, March 11, 1953, "Observations on leftist or totalitarian tendencies", by Dr. K. G. Newman.

213. Governor's Letter, *loc.cit*.,

mass contact. It successfully infiltrated the following political organizations, The Karmi Sibirs,* A.M.L., G.D. and the Y.L. (Youth League) — the components of the U.F. The C.P. fought the elections individually and won a few seats having contested a number of selected constituencies.** But when the central government outlawed the C.P., the red movement was again pushed into the invisible arena of underground activities. The hard core of the communist elements in both parts of Pakistan was imprisoned. But this was not the end of the matter. About the East Pakistan communists imprisoned the Governor General Mirza wrote "The communist prisoners detained in the various jails have drawn up a code of conduct for themselves and are following it systematically. Study classes, cultural classes and discussions are held where Marx–Lenin–Stalinist philosophy is discussed. Physical exercise has not been overlooked. Attempts to establish link between security prisoners in jail and comrades outside continue".215 Most of these prisoners were released when the A.L. came to power. In West Pakistan, despite the banning of the C.P. underground work continued. Reporting in December, 1955 the Dawn described Lahore as the main centre of the communist activities which were visible in every district headquarter, smaller towns and Tehsils. The number

* The Workers' Camp.

** In the Punjab elections of 1951 the C.P. got only .1 percentage of popular votes, see "The Punjab election report", loc.cit., Appendix X-XII.

215. Governor's Confidential Letter, loc.cit.
of active and confirmed communists on the C.I.D.* list was estimated to be five hundred. 216 If the communist strategy of working in an established organization is true, there can hardly be any doubt that they were heart and soul with the N.A.P., the fellow-travellers of the communists. In sum, the communist movement in Pakistan was a flop and episodic.

The Socialist Party (S.P.)

The All-Pakistan S.P. was a lame-duck organization which had hobbled into a standstill by 1957. The S.P. was affiliated with the Asian Socialist Conference and attended its second general session held in November, 1956 at Bombay under the Chairmanship of Ba Swe, the Burmese Prime Minister. The party's activities were mostly confined to the cities of Karachi, Lahore and Dacca. Only four times did the socialists hold their annual conference, the last being in February, 1957. 217 In the early period it showed some activities. For example, in the first party convention (3-day) held in February, 1948; a socialist constitution for Pakistan was envisaged and recommended to the Constituent Assembly I. 218 On foreign policy, the S.P. stood for severance from commonwealth and the establishment of an independent third bloc in collaboration

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* Civil Intelligence Department.

with Asian and African countries. It was the first party in Pakistan which asked for the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly on ground of its unrepresentative character. The S.P. had a strong base in the Pakistan Mazdoor Federation (P.M.F.), the second largest labour organization; for Mubarik Saghir, the S.P. Chief became the President of the P.M.F. in 1951. However, the S.P. could never project itself into the political limelight. It had no members in the legislatures, national or provincial except Professor Pulin Dey of the East Pakistan legislature, who finally joined the N.A.P. Youssouf Khan fled to India and became the guest of Mr. B.S. Mahadev Singh, the Indian Proza Socialist leader.

And the other prominent socialist leaders like Mubarik Saghir, Munshi Ahmed Din, Moulana Shamsuddin, Abdullah Khan, etc. were gradually pushed into the doldrums. And the so-called Revolutionary Socialist Party which was only East Pakistan-based died in 1950 when its office in Narayangong was ransacked and leader Nepal Saha arrested by the police.

* The rightist All Pakistan Confederation of Labour (APCOL) was the largest.

219. See the General Secretary, Youssouf Khan's Press Conference at Hyderabad (India), Hindu, February 21, 1953.


221. K. Mahmad, op.cit., p. 49.


The Nizam-i-Islam Party* (N.I.P.)

The N.I.P. was a politico-religious party which stood in between the modernist-Islamic M.L. and the extreme fundamentalist-Islamic Jamat-i-Islami. Like the M.L. it aimed at establishing 'a progressive, democratic, welfare state for Pakistan' based on Islam 'as enunciated in the Holy Quran and Sunnah'. But while the N.I.P. appeared to be more emotive and enthusiastic on the Islamic front the M.L. remained rational and pragmatic. This party was formed in East Pakistan by Moulana Athar Ali, fought the general elections therein in 1954 being a component part of the U.F. and won a few seats in the legislature and, later on, in the N.A. The N.I.P. was fortunate to have an able parliamentarian in the person of Farid Ahmed who never neglected a single parliamentary opportunity in the N.A. to expose Islamic deviation in Pakistan. Sometimes this endeavour bordered on the ridiculous. For, the N.I.P. M.P. in his zeal for Islam urged upon the government to replace the words "Red" and "Cross" of the Pakistan Red Cross Society with the words "Green" and "Crescent", as neither the word "Red" nor "Cross" was soothing to Islamic ears. The N.I.P. however, had no counterpart in West Pakistan till 1957.

Chowdhury Mohammad Ali having resigned the Premiership of Pakistan and M.L. membership formed a 5-member parliamentary group

* The Organisation of Islam.


with the independents in the N.A. in November, 1957 and in the same month created a political party, named Tahrik-1-Istehkam-1-Pakistan (T.I.P.)* Mr. Chowdhury opined that "secularisation is disintegration ... the only relation that binds the people of the two wings is religion". He appeared suspicious of 'disloyal Hindus' and 'Pro-Bharat forces' operating in the country, and expressed a view that if his party could recruit 10,000 selfless honest people to work with Pakistan political calamity could be avoided.226 In May, 1958 this party merged with the N.I.P. and formed the All Pakistan N.I.P. with Mr. Chowdhury as its Chief.227 In Mr. Chowdhury the N.I.P., no doubt, found a widely respected person and an economist with shining administrative qualities. But his leadership quality was as lacking as was the party's hold in either parts of Pakistan. In East Pakistan where it had a longer spell of activities it could not form any viable organisational base and as such there was no evidence to suggest that it could have gained more than a few seats in the general elections, had it been held. That was why the N.I.P. entered into an electoral alliance with the Jamat-i-Islami Party in August 1958,228 which had as much electoral prospect in West Pakistan as its ally had in East Pakistan. Nevertheless, the

* The movement for the stability of Pakistan.

228. Ibid., August 9, 1958.
alliance was a step towards consolidating party interests of both
parts of Pakistan.

Structurally, the N.I.P. was fashioned on the pattern of the
M.L. Membership was restricted to the Muslim community alone.
An 18-year old Muslim was qualified for membership, provided he took
the oath of membership which was different from the M.L. in that the
N.I.P. enjoined upon the members to conform to Islamic way of life.*
However, whatever organizational structure was detailed in the party
constitution remained mostly as bookwork, as the All Pakistan N.I.P.
was at budding stage. It was only in East Pakistan that a modicum
of party structure was evident.

In regard to programmes, the N.I.P. had a good deal in common
with the M.L. The party outlined its aims and objectives in a 40-
point election manifesto published in May, 1958. It advocated
collective, or alternatively cooperative farming for solving agrarian
problems and boosting food production. In keeping with the Islamic
law of inheritance it recommended the distribution of the produce of
the land among the inheritors rather than of the land itself.
Agrarian reforms,** distribution of land to landless peasants,
limiting holdings and progressive taxation on larger holdings were

* See Appendix (XX) for the N.I.P. membership card.

** The total abolition of Zamindari system was not suggested in
the manifesto.

229. For details see, The Constitution of Pakistan Nizam-1-Islam
Party, 2nd edition (Bengali Publication, printed at Shahin Press,
Dacca, 1967).
stressed. The N.I.P. did not find any "conflict between science and Islam, of the kind that developed in the West". So services of modern technology for production purposes were found Islamic. The private enterprise system was clearly preferred to government intervention, in economic activities. To eliminate monopoly and bring about economic democracy the N.I.P. found the structure and functions of joint stock companies, where ownership was divorced from management, both appropriate and Islamic.

The education policy of the party envisaged improvement of Madrassah education, compulsory teaching of the Holy Quran including learning of Arabic and adoption of the core of Islamic studies at the higher level so that scholars would be able to guide Pakistan's social, economic and political order in the light of Islam. The N.I.P. policy on foreign affairs and electorate issues was as good as the M.I.'s. On the one-unit issue the party appeared more emphatic: "The one-unit was a rock. Whosoever will make an attempt to raze it will be inviting death-on-him."  

The Jamat-ı-Islami Party* (J.I.P.)

Compared to the N.I.P. the J.I.P. was the most militant, dedicated, rightist politically-religious party and had no basic similarity

* The Congregation of Islam.


231. Ibid., p. 29.

232. See the detailed programme in Dawn, May 3, 1958.
with the modernist-Islamic concepts represented in the M.L. This organization was founded in the pre-partition days of 1941 and was vehemently opposed to the concept of Pakistan on the ground that Islam did not believe in territorial nationalism. At independence it recanted its earlier views and saw in the creation of Pakistan a potential Dar-Ul-Islam.* With the passing of the Objectives Resolution in March, 1949, the J.I.P. Chief Moulana Maudoodi got a new impetus. In a convention held at Karachi in 1951 he wanted to usher in an era of complete "renaissance of Islam". He declared: "We want that Islam should be established de novo as the system of government which could dominate thoughts and ideologies, education, politics and economy. The impact of western civilization divided the Muslims ... we want to raise a counter storm of Islam to oppose it. For this purpose I am organizing a party of carefully selected individuals".233 Accordingly, a new constitution** was framed for the J.I.P. in August 26, 1952.234 Basically, the J.I.P. acted as the propeller of the Islamic revivalist movement.

Its ultimate aim was to establish Islamic polity i.e. "Kingdom of God" in Pakistan. It would be "a divine democratic government, because under it the Muslims have been given a limited popular

* The home of Islam.
** In India, it remained with a new name, Jamat-i-Islami Hind.

234. Ibid., August 27, 1952.
sovereignty under the Suzerainty of God."\textsuperscript{235} Moulana Maudoodi, a distinguished Islamic scholar, a powerful pen wrote prolifically books, essays, pamphlets, treatises to give a learned exposition of Shari'ah\textsuperscript{*} and to prove that the concept of statehood was immanent in the Quran and Sunnah\textsuperscript{**} which could be fitted into the modern context through enlightened elaboration. Moulana Sh. would not call the Islamic polity a theocratic government; for, "the Islamic State ... is not ruled by a particular religious class but by the whole community of Muslims including the rank and file".\textsuperscript{236} At a time when the other Ulema groups while emphasizing the supremacy of Shari'ah were also insistent upon their being recognized institutionally – the coincidence of "ideal and self-interest"\textsuperscript{237} – the J.I.P. was the only religious party which laid the greatest emphasis upon the supremacy of Shari'ah consistently. Obscurantism apart, the J.I.P. compelled admiration from many a quarter for its showing a dogged, single-minded and ruthless sense of purpose, when the N.I.P. and other minor religious parties appeared less aggressive and organized on Islamic issues.

However, the most forbidding aspect of the J.I.P. was its readiness to achieve the "ideal it believes not only in propaganda

\textsuperscript{*} Islamic law.

\textsuperscript{**} The traditions of the Prophet Mohammad.


but in the acquisition of political control by constitutional means and where feasible by force.\textsuperscript{238} In its attempt to get into the legislatures the J.I.P. fought all the provincial elections of West Pakistan, and succeeded only in capturing 1 seat in the Punjab legislature having obtained 4.4 per cent of the popular vote.\textsuperscript{239}

Till the dismissal of the Nazimuddin Cabinet all the energies of the J.I.P. were set into motion to bring pressure upon the Constituent Assembly I to draw up a full-fledged Islamic Constitution. The fanatical belligerency of the J.I.P. was amply demonstrated in its being enmeshed in the anti-Qadiani riots of 1953,\textsuperscript{240} which it euphemistically characterised as "people's demands.\textsuperscript{241} (Its Chief was awarded a death sentence by the Martial Law Court only to be shown mercy later on. The party itself was banned by the Ayub regime in 1964 only to be revived again by court order.) However, since the ouster of the Nazimuddin government the J.I.P. militancy was on the wane. Even the government was said to have sent a circular forbidding civil and defence employees to study J.I.P. literature and attend their meetings.\textsuperscript{242} It had no viable base anywhere in Pakistan except among some sections of people in the

\textsuperscript{238} The Munir Report, \textit{loc.cit.}, p. 243.

\textsuperscript{239} Election Report, \textit{loc.cit.}, Appendix-XII.

\textsuperscript{240} Munir Report, \textit{loc.cit.}, pp. 243-250.


\textsuperscript{242} See Maudoodi's complaint against the government, \textit{Dawn}, May 15, 1958.
Punjab, Bahawalpur and Karachi. The party's social services stood it in good stead in that in the Karachi Municipal election of 1958 it won a few seats on the Council.* But the fact remains, the J.I.P. had not much political significance as it had little support from the populace. 243 What was more, it was incapable of undercutting people's attraction to the modernist-Islamic M.L. and secular A.L. — the two major parties of Pakistan.

The organizational structure of the party was taut, to the point of totalitarian fascist or communist parties. For the sake of ideological purity the J.I.P. did not aspire to be a mass party. The party consisted of tried members who might be called 'picked of the picked'. Unlike the N.I.P., the membership requirements of the J.I.P. were more demanding and rigorous, in that full-fledged membership was granted after "a long probationary period" and when the prospective members had been duly "observed at study group meetings, in social welfare projects and at prayer". 244 In a way, the J.I.P.-members had no liberty to lead any life independent of the party. The party was reduced to a chaste monastic environment without undermining the ecstasy of the members. In 1951 the member-

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* Moulana Maudoodi told the writer that the J.I.P. entry into the corporation was an added cause towards expediting Martial Law, as General Mirza was as much against the leftist rise as the rightist.

** See Appendix (XXI) for the J.I.P. membership form.


244. Binder, op.cit., p. 80.
ship strength was 661 with about another 1,000 labelled as sympati-

hisers. In early 1954 it rose to 999 and in 1957, 1,271.

As far as the party offices were concerned they appeared "well
organized and their accounts well-kept". Apparently, the struc-
tures of the J.I.P. and their functions were no different from those
of other parties, save that they were given arabic names and were
stipulated in great detail. The distinguishing mark, however, was
the people who would work out the organizational machineries. And,
in the case of J.I.P. only people possessing the qualities of Sir
Galahad* could pilot the organization. The highest forum was the
50-man Muslish-e-Shura ** to be elected from different party units.
The Amir *** was to form a 12-man Amir-e-Jamat+ from the above body
to assist him in party work. The Amir could appoint a Naeb-e-
Jamaat++. There was another functionary called Qayum-e-Jamat,+++
who along with the Amir was to be elected by the Muslish-e-Shura.
Besides these, mention of other functionaries and departments was

* Metaphorically used.
** The Central Council.
*** The Party Chief.
+ The Working Committee.
++ The Deputy Chief.
+++ General Secretary.

248. Binder, op.cit., p. 79.
made in the Constitution. The party claimed to be "consultative" in nature, but it appears that the locus of power rested with the Amir who was given wide discretionary power. The Muzlîsh-e-Shura was the chief policy-making and directive institution and could depose the Amir by 2/3 votes, but the Amir could always impose himself on the organization through selecting the influential members from the Muzlîsh-e-Shura to form the Amir-e-Jamaat, the chief executive organ. 249 After all, a party which was so dogmatically oriented could not have 'inner democracy' whatever structural facades were retained. Its structure could only facilitate assent not dissension.

Monetarily, the J.I.P. appeared quite well-off. The budget of the party for 1956-57 was to the tune of Rs. 2,000,000 of which half the amount was earmarked for social services in the fashion of free medical service, financial succour to students, refugees, etc. 250 This act of philanthropy was particularly productive to win support from the workers and lower middle class people. Interestingly, the year 1958 saw the J.I.P. as one of the contenders for labour support. It did not believe in class conflict or trade union movement as such, but by forming labour welfare committees at Lahore, Karachi, Rawalpindi and Hyderabad, etc., the J.I.P. identified with the welfare of the workers and became active particu-


larly in the Karachi Industrial area. The party activities were duly propagated in the Daily Urdu, Tasnim – the semi-official organ of the J.I.I. The sources of party income were varied. The members contributed half of their incomes to the party fund as a rule. This was the only party which earned a substantial amount of money through Islamic publications. Contributions from the so-called God-fearing Muslim businessmen came as a Zakat. The hides and skins of the animals sacrificed at the Muslim festival of Eid-el-Azha were collected and sold by the party – another source of income.

Spotlighting on the 24-page party manifesto on which basis the J.I.P. wanted to contest the never-held general election of 1959, it can be said that the real message of the programmes was 'to establish the sway of Islamic ideology over the entire scheme of human life'. The monetary policy consisted in the gradual elimination of interest in all its forms and abolition of all those sources of revenues which were forbidden in Islam. Reformulation of taxation policy, proper organization of 'Zakat', 'Sadaqat' and 'Awkaf' and utilisation of funds in line with the Shari'ah so

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* An Islamic tax on wealth.

** From an influential quarter the writer heard that by far the largest source of income of the J.I.P. was the King of Saud-e-Arabia's donations.

+ Voluntary contribution.

++ Muslim trusts.

collected, were emphasized. Private enterprise in industrialisation was envisaged. On education the manifesto stood for inoculation of the Islamic spirit, the abolition of coeducation, making of Arabic a compulsory language, the moral and religious training of government staff, the inoculation of the spirit of Jihad fi sabillah. On the question of agrarian reforms the J.I.P. policy was remarkably reactionary. It would only abolish those land holdings without compensation which were not rightful ownership in the eyes of Shari'ah and which were more than 200 acres of irrigated and 400 acres of unirrigated land. But it remained conveniently uncommitted in regard to which of the vast landed properties of the zamindars of West Pakistan were confiscable according to Shari'ah. Here lay one of the big contradictions of the 'Jamat policy. It failed to reconcile the creed of private ownership it believed in with social justice. While it blew cold air from one nostril so far as state intervention in economic activities were concerned, but on the other it breathed hot in that the J.I.P. would harness "all the resources of the State" to Islamise "our national life".

Minority parties

Constituting 14.1 per cent of the entire population of the country and 23.2 per cent in East Pakistan alone, the minorities

* Crusade Islamic style.

** Minorities in West Pakistan was only 2.8 per cent of the population. See 1961 Census Report, Bulletin No. 2, p. 19.


Footnotes /Continued over
in Pakistan had to organize themselves into parties which essentially behaved as "interest groups". The Hindus — they were divided into Caste Hindus and Scheduled Caste Hindus — formed the largest minority followed by the Christians, Buddhists and Parsis. Among the minority parties the most vocal and organized was the Pakistan National Congress (P.N.C.) — the remnant of old Congress of undivided India — which, grounded in East Pakistan solely, represented not only Hindus but also other minorities. Its constitution aimed at the realization of peace, property rights and freedom of individuals in the sovereign state of Pakistan by keeping firm in the path of truth and non-violence and by methods of service, education and persuasion and securing for all citizens irrespective of caste, creed and sex, justice and rights — social, economic and political. The P.N.C. was composed of (a) primary members, (b) village, union, ward, town, Thana, subdivision and district Congress Committees, (c) provincial Congress Committees, (d) the Executive Council of the P.N.C. and (e) any other committee and the annual session organized by the P.N.C.

Footnotes continued from previous page.

Also, The Objectives and Prospects of the Jamat-ı-Islami (A. J.I.P. publication, Forward Printing Works, Dacca) n.d.


256. The Census of Pakistan, 1951, Vol. I.

257. A. Behroze, Minorities in Pakistan (Thesis), University of the Punjab, n.d., p.44.

258. Ibid.
In theory, it was a non-communal organization but in practice it transpired as a communal one. In West Pakistan the Hindus had no organized political parties. The Congress had its splinter groups in that K.K. Datta walked out of the Congress party and formed a new party, the Gana Samity* which in alliance with the Socialist Party (a portion) and Abayasram fought the general election of East Pakistan and later on merged themselves into a new party, United Progressive Party (U.P.P.). The next big minority organization was the East Bengal Scheduled Castes Federation — the descendent of an old federation first formed by Dr. Ambedkar in 1935. Like the Hindus, the depressed classes of West Pakistan had no such political organization. The Christians had many organizations, but the All Pakistan Christian League claimed to be the most representative. Its political significance was nil due to rivalry among the Protestants and Catholic sections. The Buddhists also had many organizations the important one being the Buddhist Kristi (Culture) Prachar Sangha (Publicity Organization).

Minorities had their proper representatives in all the legislatures, national and provincial and wielded, after 1954, more political influence than their numbers would have justified. And as far as their parties were concerned they were all united on one objective which in the words of D.N. Datta, a minority leader, was this: "We want our political ... social and economic safeguards".259

* The People's Organization.

On the positive side of politics, it can be said that the minority parties fought for the secularisation and de-Islamisation of Pakistan. In this respect, the role of the P.N.C. was emphatic, particularly during the initial periods. However, the existing minority parties had transient value and they were bound to wither gradually; for, in the context of a common electoral roll they had to reorient their narrow, communal basis of party politics and identify themselves with parties having a broad, national outlook. As a matter of fact, the P.N.C. felt the need "to reorganize the Congress with the changed situation i.e. joint electorate". 260

Finally, what really emerges from our foregoing discussions on political parties in Pakistan? Apparently, a lot can be said about the parties' being immature, weak and inadequate. One critic even borrowed Duverger's words to place Pakistan in the 'prehistoric era' of politics. 261 To our findings the parties appeared to have suffered no more than the "teething troubles attendant to their initial growth period. Professor Weiner is right to maintain that "there is in fact inherent leadership instability in all political organisations in a society where modern political organizations are relatively new". 262 The emergence of a plethora of political parties would not appear capricious once Pakistan sociology was taken

into account. Sigmund Neumann in his Modern Political Parties accounted for the raison d'être of a multi-party system which according to him would develop in a country "whenever ... cleavages in social structure ... exist because of differences in nationalities, regions, religion or class..." 263 And, initially Pakistan had the diverse forces in her womb to give birth to a multi-party system. Thus Pakistan projected herself into a competitive pluralistic party atmosphere which was inherently creative in that a scope for free interplay of party thoughts and ideas existed. Enamoured of the successes of certain one-party states in Afro-Asian and Latin American countries R. Niebuhr recommended "one-party democracies, who do not suppress parliamentary and civil liberties" 264 for developing countries. But the single unifying party which could accommodate conflicting demands of religious, ethnic, urban, rural, traditional and modernising groups of people did not emerge. The M.L. of Pakistan could not be put into the same category. Then, what was the pattern of party position really emerging that could be taken as an index towards political development?

The strength of a given government is derived "from the support," says Professor V.O. Key, Jr., "active or passive, of a coalition of elements of society. That support may be rooted in interest, consent,

263. Quoted in Comparative Politics, op.cit., p. 355.

fear, tradition or a combination of these and other factors in proportions that vary from society to society". While the party system becomes the instrument "for the organization of support in societies", it also, in the eyes of Professor G.A. Almond "aggregates interests and transforms them into a relatively small number of alternative general policies". The trends towards 'organization of support' or 'aggregation of interest' were noticeable in Pakistan society. We have seen earlier how the A.I. was first locally formed and then snowballed into a major organization having enlarged its aggregative capacities nationwide. The N.A.F. also was formed as a result of the aggregation of the interests of several parties. The merger of the T.I.P. with the N.I.P. which later entered into electoral alliance with the J.I.P. was symptomatic of the same movement. On the one hand, the merger process shrank the number of political organizations and accomplished varying degrees of success in the organization of 'interests', on the other, it established an inter-wing bridge for political communication - a contributory factor in national integration. However, in order to label Pakistan political parties and to comprehend their respective future placed in the total political structure we want to evaluate them in the light of three different categories of parties mentioned by Professor Almond.

266. Ibid., p. 219.
They are (1) secular, pragmatic parties, (2) ideological parties and (3) particularistic or traditional parties. 268

In the first category of parties, which are 'multivalue oriented' having high 'aggregative potential', falls the A.L., N.A.P., R.P. and K.S.P. Among these parties, the A.L. undoubtedly proved itself as the major party and succeeded in drawing the maximum popular support. The N.A.P. was new in the field. But being one of the chief contenders of popular support on the basis of secular and leftist programmes it was yet to overtake the A.L. on any direction. The R.P. and K.S.P. had no future * and they were likely to be absorbed by the A.L. The M.L., N.I.P. and J.I.P. could be classified in the second type. Despite their being classified together there ought to be some qualifiers to indicate their individual approaches to scheme of things. The M.L.'s emphasis on ideology was great, in the case of N.I.P. it was greater but the J.I.P.'s was the greatest. What distinguishes the M.L. from the rest of the ideological parties was its willingness to give dynamic and modern orientation to Islam vis-a-vis statecraft. The M.L. being the oldest and modernist-Islamic party having an existing party structure throughout the country was already a major party and the J.I.P. with an absolute 'value-orientation' like Nazism and Fascism had no chance of launching a successful Islamic movement in the face of the M.L. And the N.I.P.


* As a matter of fact, they ceased to exist after 1958.
whose socio-economic programmes were mostly similar to that of the M.L. could not hope, under any political conjuring, to outbid the latter. While the minority organizations we have mentioned earlier fit into the third pattern of particularistic parties which have "limited aggregative potential" and functionally they behave like "the interest groups". So did the minority parties of Pakistan, initially, but lately they were in the throes of psychological change as the era of the common electoral roll was rung in.

From the above discussion it will appear that despite the presence of a multiplicity of parties, practically there emerge two major parties e.g. the M.L. and A.L. Actually, the position was that the secular A.L. with its strong foundation in East Pakistan was spilling over into the western wing, whereas the ideological M.L. with its main station in West Pakistan was extending its influence in the eastern part. A trend towards the development of two major political parties with distinct policy orientations was clearly visible and could be taken as an index towards political development.

In reading the clues of political developments prior to martial law we can hazard a prediction that the M.L. and A.L. would have emerged as the two major parties from the general election had it been held. But the nub of the issue is that any sort of coalition governments formed whether at the centre or provinces, either of these two major parties would have become the decisive and basic political partner in the formation of a Cabinet, like, for instance, the Mapai party.

269. Almond and Coleman, op.cit., p. 44.
of Israel, the Social Democrat of Sweden (26 years since 1932), the
Christian Democrats of West Germany (till 1969) and the M.R.P. of
the French Fourth Republic. Even a possibility of coalition
government of M.L.-A.L. at the centre could not be ruled out. After
all, the M.L.'s ideological content was not so rigid as to deter a
working relationship with the A.L. The A.L. had already accepted the
broad Islamic principles of the Constitution. The facade of
communalism, the two-nation theory, and Islamism were retained by
the M.L. perhaps to emphasize its unique individuality. Apart from
this, the A.L. and M.L. had a broad similarity of purpose. In the
course of time, the M.L. might tone down its ideological content
just as, in the words of Professor Mackenzie, the British Labour
party did. What Sir Ivor thought of British Labour and Conservative
parties as having "fundamentally" the same policies where their
"differences are emphasized and even exaggerated" to facilitate
competition for power could have been well applied to the M.L.-A.L.
position in the course of time, had the political process continued
without interruption.

270. See Amital Etzioni, "Alternative ways to Democracy: The
example of Israel" in Messrs. Apter & Eokstein (edit.)

p. 13.
THE SERVICES

In eulogium of some of the public servants of Pakistan in connection with the 1953 Ahmadya riots the Munir report observed: "A strong administrative service is God's own boon to people - a boon unto government also, if the government is that of the people."¹

This strong administrative service was the facsimile of the British administrative system of the pre-independence India usually known as the Indian Civil Service (I.C.S.). The competence of the I.C.S. was a by-word which did develop into a cult of fetishism. Lord Dufferin, the then Viceroy of India (1884-1888) held that "There is no service like it in the world. For ingenuity, courage, right judgement, disinterested devotion to duty, endurance ... loyalty to one another and their chiefs, they are, to my knowledge, superior to any other class of Englishmen."² But on one vital point the pre-independence bureaucracy of Indo-Pakistan subcontinent was not in chime with the spirit of the British Public Service as envisaged under the Westminster system. For the I.C.S. did not act merely as an executive agency under the direction of a 'Parliamentary Chief', but some members of it also were Governors of Provinces, members of Executive Councils and of Legislative Councils.³ Thus the orthodox

3. Ibid., pp. 158-159.
line of demarcation between policy formulation and policy execution was ignored.

On the context of modern government's burgeoning activities "the separation of policy formation from policy execution in any hard and fast way is probably as untenable as the old politics-administration dichotomy itself". Even in today's Britain, apart from policy implementation the civil servants "are unavoidably involved in the formulation of policy at all levels of nearly every government project". This is, however, a question of degree, propriety and immediacy. But the bureaucratic vogue of the then British India was sui generis in that the I.C.S. obtrusively combined in itself both the agencies e.g. the executive and policy making. However, in the last four decades of British rule, there occured a general democratisation of the administration, and the authority of the I.C.S. was "progressively whittled away; but, nevertheless, it retained its premier position when power came to be transferred to Indian hands in 1947."

However, making allowances for the inadequacies of Colonial bureaucracy of which Pakistan was an heir apparent, there can be no doubt about the integrity, efficiency and serviceability of the old I.C.S. cadre. And Professor H. Tinker was apt in his remark

that the administrative machinery inherited by Pakistan (also India) "does provide mechanism to execute the public will, such as many other countries envy and desire to emulate". This, however, is tenable only up to a point; for, the heritage of Colonial bureaucracy was denuded of the component of popular consent. For centuries prior to independence in 1947 the mode of governance was imposed upon the people of the subcontinent by right of conquest. And the British regime was only a final phase of a long record of this character. The weakness inherent in the Colonial administration was the alienation between administration and popular aspiration. Administration devoid of a sense of accountability to popular aspiration is unimaginative: 'at best it tends to be sterile at worst it becomes coercive'. The essence of good government is the continuance of "dialogue between actuality and aspiration, between administrative authority and political leadership - a dialogue that can take place only when each side understands the other and feels kinship rather than distrust" - maintained Suhrawardy in one of his provocative articles. Addressing himself to politicians and administrators alike he continued: "new habits of mind have to be substituted for old. Administration must unlearn its scorn of politics. Politics must overcome its hostility to administration. Only in this way can a government and the people governed communicate confidence to each other and learn that they can count on each other."

So, a new shift from the old values associated with Colonial rule was required of the services—also politicians—with the coming of independence. It was now a question of the extent to which the services were able or willing to display a reorientation in outlook, dynamism, adaptability and administrative leadership required of a modern independent country.

The classical features of bureaucracy such as (1) specialized, differentiated administrative roles, (2) recruitment based on achievement rather than ascription, (3) placement, transfer, and promotion based on universalistic rather than particularistic criteria, (4) tendency on the part of public servants towards professionalism and careerism and (5) administrative decision making within a framework of rationality, hierarchy, responsibility and discipline were evidently retained in the Pakistan administrative services. The Civil Service in Pakistan was not a unified establishment in that various services were operative under independent arrangements. Broadly, there were four categories of services e.g. (a) The All Pakistan services, (b) The Central Services, (c) The Provincial Services and (d) The Specialist Services. "The All Pakistan Services" meant the services common to the Federation and Provinces. There were 10 types of service such as the Civil Service of Pakistan (C.S.P.), the Police Service of Pakistan (P.S.P.), etc., which belonged to this

category. Whereas the Central Services of Pakistan* such as the Pakistan Foreign Service, the Pakistan Military Accounts Service, and the Pakistan Audit and Accounts Service,** were absolutely reserved for federal purposes. The Provincial Services included those services such as the Civil Service, the Police Service, the Health and Medical Service, etc. which were in care of those subjects granted to the provinces under the Constitution. The specialist services included those services which were entrusted with the technical jobs, say in the Meteorological, engineering, agricultural research and economics departments.

In terms of power, position and responsibility the C.S.P. was in the limelight followed by the foreign and police services. By all practical purposes, the C.S.P. was the prototype of the early I.C.S. people who were the eyes and ears of British Indian government, the symbols of "authority-bounty" or "authority-privatization" and the "Mai-bap" syndrome,11 to the teeming millions and were practically responsible for carrying out the whole gamut of the government. This C.S.P. cadre formed the Corps d'elite of the Pakistan administrative services which, subject to ministerial and parliamentary direction, were responsible for the execution of public policies and governance

* The Central Service of Pakistan was again divided into Class I, II, III and IV services.

** There were 14 types of services classified as Class I services under it.

+ "Father-Mother".

of the country. The C.S.P.s were not only the executives and departmental heads, but also acted in an advisory capacity to the central and provincial governments in matters of policy formation. The Foreign Service of Pakistan (P.F.S.) catered to the need of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in respect of providing officers, diplomats and staff. The P.F.S. remained mostly urbane and aristocratic in outlook which had some resemblance to the early political service of British rule. The Police Service of Pakistan (P.S.P.) belonging to the All Pakistan service served both the centre and provinces. But unlike the C.S.P. the P.S.P. did not hold many posts at the centre, but at the district levels in the provinces.

The main nerve centre of the administrative system of Pakistan was the Secretariat, the abode of the C.S.P. people who helped the government in policy formation and thereafter its implementation through the operative departments. The Central Secretariat housed as many as 18 Ministries which were again subdivided into a number of 'departments'. At the summit of each Ministry and its attached departments stood the political chief, the Minister and immediately below him stood the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry, the head of the pyramid of public servants. (The Provincial Secretariats were mostly fashioned after the central one.) The top officers of the Secretariat navigated the direction of the Secretarial business, helped to draft new legislations, circulars and budgets, rendered councils to Ministers and briefed them with information in the
conduct of their affairs in the parliament hustings. Since various Ministries and their departments in the Secretariat functioned independently the divergent range of governmental activities required coordinating machinery to reconcile them into a unified government policy. So, the heterogeneity of government functions was brought into homogeneity through the coordinating instrumentality of the Cabinet Secretariat, which also performed other routine duties appertaining to the Cabinet Secretariat, as well. The Establishment Division of the Cabinet Secretariat was entrusted with the task of recruitment of officers to the Central Services, the formulation of recruitment policy itself, training the C.S.P. cadre, together with their transfer and promotion and deciding disciplinary matters in respect of central services.

Appointments to posts of the various services were made by the Federal or Provincial Public Service Commissions – autonomous bodies – as the case might be. The usual method of entry into service was by open competition which comprised written examination and viva voce. The officers of the Superior Services were recruited through competitive examinations of persons between 21 to 24 years of age. The recruitment to the Central Services was made on the basis of equal quotas between the two provinces of Pakistan, with a reservation of

* The Head of the Cabinet Secretariat was the Secretary General of Pakistan himself.

** Similarly, the Establishment Department was headed by high ranking C.S.P. officer.

+ This did not mean the end of the competitive method. The 40 per cent intake of civil servants for each province was still based on merit applying to that area.
20 per cent posts to be filled in on the basis of merit. Usually, qualified public servants were required to undergo two phases of training, the first being the apprenticeship training during the probationary period and the second in-service training. The C.S.P. being the Premier Service there was an elaborate arrangement for the training of its members who compulsorily were made to undergo a 9-month course in the Pakistan Civil Service Academy* - the manufacturing institution of "generalising minds" or "intelligent amateurs". Similarly, the P.F.S. people were sent at government expense abroad to study at approved universities of the U.S., U.K. and Paris for 18 months. And as far as the P.S.P.s were concerned they were to undergo a tough course of training at the Police Training College at Sardah, East Pakistan.

In regard to administrative purposes the provinces were divided into divisions, and divisions into districts. Below the districts in East Pakistan were sub-divisions, which were under the sub-divisional officers. In West Pakistan districts were divided into tehsils - under the Tehsilders - of which the nearest counterparts in East Pakistan were 'circles' - under the circle officers. These Tehsils and Circles were again sub-divided into units variously called. At the head of the division was the Commissioner who, in the maintenance of civil administration and law and order of his region had the assistance of the Deputy Inspector General of Police

* The Colombo Plan Scheme also enabled the Pakistan C.S.P.s to receive training from England, as well.
(D.I.G.P.) responsible for the police administration of the Division. The Commissioner's job consisted in supervising and coordinating the entire administrative activities of the districts which comprised a division. While the district under the Deputy Commissioner (D.C.) formed the basic geographic unit of Pakistan administrative system. The D.C., in essence, projected the government into the field and transmitted back to the authority the reactions of the people to government policies. In the maintenance of law and order he was to be assisted by the Superintendent of Police (S.P.), responsible for the police administration in the district. Briefly, these are the salient features of the Pakistan services and their organisational set up. And to use Dr. Syyed's metaphor "The government of Pakistan may be described as a pyramid carved out of a single rock ... the Civil Servants have captured the apex of the pyramid. Below the apex are several layers of authority descending downwards from the Secretariat level to the base of the pyramid, the district administrators." Elaborating on the question of bureaucratic rigidity Lipset cautioned that "the problem becomes crucial ... when a new political movement takes office and proposes to enact reforms that go beyond the traditional frame of reference of previous governmental activity...

12. Most of the information of the foregoing pages is based on M.S. Haq, Public Administration in Pakistan (Sharada Press: Barisal, 1957); Sir E. Franklin, Careers in the Pakistan Central Superior Services (Karachi: 1954) and Ten Years of Pakistan (Pakistan Publications, Karachi, 1957).

or which upset the existing set of relations within the bureaucracy. This was true of the Pakistan situation. Upon independence the shift of emphasis from regulating the life of the community to positive action for promoting its welfare was clear. The existing public administration was admirably suited to the task of collection of revenue, the administration of justice and maintenance of law and order. But it was inadequate to the purposes of implementing a planned programme of economic development, the symbol of rising expectations of the new state. What was more its "unavowed attitude ... regards development work as being of secondary importance". Also, in regard to organisational structure of the services some anomalies or defects were pointed out for reform.

In the scheme of Pakistan administrative system the Secretariats which operated in both central and provincial Ministries with attached functional or technical departments played the pivotal role and gravitated all powers within their folds. This Secretariat system which separated policy-making from policy implementation was criticised by Professor Egger and Mr. Gladieux on the ground that the specialists who were in charge of the implementation of projects had no say in policy matters, as they were administratively under the generalist C.S.P.'s directing policies at the top of the Secretariats. Particularly, in terms of economic or technological develop-


ment the substitution of the informed opinion of specialists for "superficial knowledge" of the generalists having "breadth without depth in terms of experience in development subjects" was thought to be counter-productive. This ruined the inherent link of mutuality between policy formation and execution. Also, there followed the discomfort of talented technicians who could never cherish the idea of becoming Secretaries - the sole preserves of the C.S.P.s. The main argument in favour of giving the Civil Servants overriding powers over the technicians was based on the consideration that the C.S.P.s with a vast reservoir of practical field experience in the districts and departments could bring to the task of policy making in the Secretariat. But in practice these C.S.P. officers could not claim to pile up enough experience from the districts, provinces and departments. The practice of the then British India was that the I.C.S. officers were assigned to various provinces, and they were brought to the centre in accordance with the requirements of the central government. Some efficient officers were selected from all the provinces of India who used to go to the centre and work right from Deputy Secretaries upwards. But in the course of the last 10 years - 1947-58 - the C.S.P. officers hardly stayed long enough in the field to cultivate depth of experience. Frequent transfers, promotions multiplication of senior appointments were the practice of the day. The goal of every C.S.P. officer was

to short-circuit their way up to the Central Secretariat within a minimal period of time, and never to go back to the field. So the experience of the C.S.P. officers was too far behind their predecessors to justify their monopoly of administrative talent.

Besides this, the gradation and classification of services that prevailed in the prepartition days which in the words of Professor Tinker was the embodiment of "Hindu Caste system and British class system" became also the burden of criticism, since, at partition, there was no change in the status quo. The distinction between the C.S.P. officers and P.C.S. officers was one of patricians and plebians, as it were. The offices of the D.C.s were manned mostly by the C.S.P.s and the P.C.S. officers could climb the higher ladder only by ageing. The Civil Servants of IV Class category were recruited on the principles on which, commented the Pakistan Pay Commission (1949) "beasts of burden" could be hired. Artificial distinctions in the service position of the Central Superior Services abounded. Reforms could not be easy as the Public Service Commissions, both federal and provincial performed only advisory functions but not the function of Public Service management.

Then there were the questions of red-tapism, arrogance, corruption and inefficiency in the administration. Bureaucracy and red-tapism do resemble the correlativity of fish and chips. In

* Provincial Civil Service.

Pakistan this was a deep-rooted administrative rut. Projects could not be implemented, cases could not be disposed of quickly because of red-tapism. There was too much of "noting" on files, and it began right at the bottom when the "dealing clerk" or some such functionary put down his views on a profound scheme. Then the file progressed upwards at snail's pace—on the desks of the Assistant Secretary, Under Secretary, Deputy Secretary, Joint Secretary and Secretary. By this time the file became a bulkier one with stereotyped notings like "as proposed" or "so and so may see". The file might have to go to another Ministry on an interdepartmental jaunt, to be further noted upon by another hierarchy. When it entered the dreaded precincts of the Finance Ministry for financial sanction a new kind of super punditry began. It could be the end of the project or its mutilation.19 The fact is that the time between the initiation of a project and a decision on it was so tortuously long that the author of the project tended to be oblivious of it. It was a case of Gresham's law—the creative work was sacrificed at the altar of routine. The 50-page report on the working of the Punjab administration opens with these sentences: "The state of affairs in various districts is simply disgraceful. Speedy disposal is a story of ages gone by not known to the present government servants. Bribery is rampant in every department. Nepotism, favouritism, carelessness and inefficiency are order of the day."20

The revenue records built up during the past century — an administrative treasure left by the British — were rendered to a shapeless mass. The Report did not make uncertain reference to "perpetual highhandedness and bossing by the police and the consequent demoralisation among the magistracy of the province". Writing the fortnightly letter in 1954 from East Pakistan to the Governor General, the Governor, General Mirza, recorded that the D.C.s did not worry about touring, "never did court work, criminal or revenue. How they got to know their districts is an enigma to me. The calibre of the officers too is extremely low. In British days the majority would not have risen beyond a Deputy Magistrate." In regard to police administration he commented in another letter, "It will take time to get the Police Force of 40,000 men to a reasonable state of efficiency... Habits of high Police Officers are bad. They expect lavish entertainments from their subordinates when on tour. Naturally the subordinates expect entertainment from villagers and in the end the hard pressed peasant pays." Arrogance or an overbearing manner on the part of the civil servants in the newly independent countries make people look upon them as "neo-colonialists" black or brown as the case may be.

21. Ibid., November 7, 1951 (Editorial) "Punjab Administration".
This is, no doubt, the result of the elitist backgrounds inherited by the Civil Servants from the Colonial urban setting. Alienation between the public servants and the people in Pakistan also took place as the former tended to be paternalistic as they believed that "the seat of authority imparts to its occupant superhuman wisdom".  

In regard to administrative corruption the screening of a large number of officials at the advent of martial law in 1958 speaks for itself - the second martial law of 1969 rounded up 1,700 officials for corrupt charges and finally 303 high-ranking officials were dismissed. Even the contagion of communalism among the administrators was seriously alleged.  

The pre-independence administrative institutions of which Pakistan was an inheritor might be non-egalitarian and non-constructive to present context of Pakistan, but those who had peopled the institutions in the old days were never accused of inefficiency, corruption, partiality, nepotism and communalism. Degeneracy could not ooze inside what Lloyd George called the "steel frame" of bureaucracy. At partition the qualities of the administrators degenerated and on this count the system was 'bamboo-framed'. That

there was something wrong in the system the various reports like the Pay Commission of 1949 and 1950, the Administrative Enquiry Committee of 1950, 1951 and 1953, the Rowland Eggar Report of 1953 and the Bernard Gladieux Report of 1955 would amply bear testimony. The last two reports were withheld even from public view like the Pay Commission Report under the Ayub regime. Despite the reports, the administration did not respond favourably to reform requirements, as the inertia and complacency of the Establishments generated enough power to resist change. The foregoing pages, however, have accounted for the debit side of the administration: to point out the major weaknesses of the system vis-a-vis new requirements.* This is not to suggest that the administrative institutions were beyond the pale of redemption or that the administrators were incorrigible. As a matter of fact the input side of the administrative leadership particularly in the initial period was remarkable. Perhaps, the Planning Commission's judgment on it was discreet, when it observed: "While conscious of the deterioration that has taken place since independence we are of the opinion that the Public Services of Pakistan have their share of the attributes of a true Public Service ... But, when all is said and done, these virtues are of passive character, representing the absolute minimum." 28


28. **Planning Commission, loc.cit.,** p. 121.
We now address ourselves to the questions of the relationship between the bureaucracy, politicians and parliament. Was Public Service amenable to political control? Were political neutrality and anonymity on the part of the public servants maintained? Did partnership between the public servants and politicians develop into a success? Under the Westminster type of government what Professor Laski called 'a system of integrated powers', the nexus between the executive and legislature is a cardinal fact. The British model demands that the executive arm e.g. the public servants must be amenable to their political bosses, the Ministers who, in turn, will be responsible to the parliament. Upon independence the survival value of the country was given first preference over these fine points of Westminster system. The politicians — very many of them were novices in the art of governance — were not equal to the problems engulfing the country. The post-natal care of the newly-born nation was largely performed by a group of less than 100 I.C.S. — I.P.S. * people — the total strength of the C.S.P. the prototype of former I.C.S. was still a small number in 1955 i.e. 270 only ** who opted for Pakistan in 1947. This group of people mostly U.P. ** and Punjab men together with 5 or 6 officers of the Audit and Accounts Service of former India, the elite corps of

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* Indian Political Service.

** United Provinces, now in India.


finance administration helped enormously in the construction of the new nation and reorganization of administrative set up which was upset at partition.\(^\text{31}\) Conscious of this the Finance Minister (Audit and Accounts) told in the Constituent Assembly I (Leg.) "with the ablest Ministers and with the still abler members of this Assembly unable to keep the fabric of administration intact for the last three years, but for the very loyal and devoted services of the members of these services" (Applause),\(^\text{32}\) When the politicians were groping in search for national consensus, when the country was in a welter of 'atomistic groupings', ideological and regional cleavages the services acted as a 'vital cement' to the maintenance of national entity. Apart from the earlier contributions of the services towards placing the country on a viable footing economically and administratively, the administrative support for the consolidation of West Pakistan into one unit, which to our mind was a risky but a major step toward integrating Pakistan into a modern nation-state, was equally invigorating. As many as 8 Secretariats had to be integrated. Various provincial services with varying standards, terms and conditions were to be consolidated, the tasks of which fell upon the Services.\(^\text{33}\)

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33. G.S. Birkhead, op.cit., p. 192.
At the start, the reliance of the politicians on the services was great. The first Finance Minister who was so credited for building the Pakistan finance was a civil servant. So was the next Finance Minister. Jinnah appointed 3 British I.C.S. officers as Governors of 3 provinces. The provincial governments were controlled by the centre through the instrumentality of top civil servants posted therein. At the centre, the Secretary General himself was the Secretary of the Cabinet Secretariat. Currency gained ground that the Services were on the upper hand, and the opposition contended in the parliament that "Our Cabinet must be one of the most official-ridden Cabinets of the world." However, it can be said that till the assassination of Liaquat Ali, the politicians had clear edge over the civil servants in terms of balance of power. This situation was reversed at the entrance of Nazimuddin Cabinet.

"It has to be the Minister," says H. Morrison, "for it is he, and neither parliament nor the public, who has official control over his civil servants." We have earlier portrayed the fragile leadership of Nazimuddin and particularly his hesitating approach towards handling the Qadiani issue which threatened to tear the country apart on religious fanaticism. The nervous Nazimuddin

was greatly initiated to take action in the anti-Qadiani riots by the top civil servants, particularly the then defence secretary, General Mirza. Earlier, it was Nazimuddin who had taken Choudhury Mohammad Ali, the Secretary General of the Services inside his Cabinet as Finance Minister to replace Golam Mohammed who was catapulted to the position of the Governor General. From the end of 1951 and till the Constitution of the second Constituent Assembly in 1955 there occurred unusual events like the dismissal of Ministries, both central and provincial, the formation of an official-dominated central Cabinet and the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly I. Evidently, all these acts were interpreted as the machinations of the top civil servants who worked through the Governor General. By this time, some leading figures of different services like Golam Mohammad (A. & A.),* Chowdhury Mohammad Ali 'A. & A.), General Mirza (former I.P.S.),** General Ayub (Army C-in-C), Abdur Rashid (P.S.P.), Qarban Ali (P.S.P.), Aminuddin (Judiciary), etc., etc. metamorphosed themselves as politicians,37 and were holding important political offices like the Governor Generalship, Governorship, Chief Ministership, Ministership, etc. All these developments prompted an M.B. to coin a new word, e.g. "officocracy" to describe the Pakistan political system.38

* Audit and Accounts.
** Indian Political Service.

37. See Manchester Guardian, October 27, 1954; also, South China Morning Post, October 27, 1954.

Apparently, there was overwhelming evidence to suggest that the services got the better of the politicians during this period and sabotaged parliamentary institutions. But it will be indiscreet to hold that the Services as a whole were in collusion in a conspiracy against the politicians. Perhaps the nearest truth was that the few old, experienced and hide-bound civil servants who were brought up in the early administrative tradition grew restive at the slothful process of political development and wanted to inject efficiency and discipline. They entered the political arena by virtue of merit and serviceability. "I, Sir, am not politician.* I am only a technician who was called to the service of the country to assist in dealing with financial and economic problems,"39 said the Finance Minister, Golam Mohammad far back in 1949. The policy of civil servant recruitment for political jobs actually was founded on that criterion. Not all the intakes were a success. The embittered Dawn in a leader held: "If you play about with eugenics freak offspring often result; similarly if power tries artificial insemination** with democracy, democratic institutions can become freaks."40 But then, all the alleged omissions and commissions on the part of the Services, particularly the dismissal of Nazimuddin and the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly I were not unalloyed

* Writer's italics.
** Meaning hiring of civil servants to promote efficiency in political works.

40. Dawn, May 24, 1956 (Editorial) "This madhouse".
events in that prominent political leaders were explicitly or implicitly involved in them (discussed earlier). If some of the public servants overacted their parts not conducive to the cause of Westminster system, the politicians also could be accused of both pampering and interfering with the administration.

To immunize administration completely against politics is an ideal yet to be fulfilled anywhere. Political parties, interest groups and private individuals all vie with each other for administrative services. Politicians are concerned with the political aspect of administration. The success or failure of their programmes determine their winning the elections. So parties in power are interested in strategic appointments and transfers of personnel. In Pakistan, the politicians did interfere in administration and transfer personnel, rather imprudently. Evidently, the practice seemed more frequent as there were short-lived Ministries in power and each incoming Ministry was prone to do the same thing for its interest. The use of civil servants by the politicians for their self-aggrandisement figured more prominently in West Pakistan than in East. In the Punjab election of 1951 the M.L. politicians were alleged to have used the officials. The legend of Khuhro of Sind was replete with stories of ill-use of officials.\(^{41}\) The Leghari Report of the Sargodha District Board elections of 1953 held that

elections in 33 out of 47 constituencies were illegal and perverse as "the Daultana Ministry (Punjab) had drawn up a plan of winning the local bodies elections by hook or by crook," through the instrumentalities of the officers. 42 The Chief Minister of the N.W.F.P. suspended the D.C. of Mardan for having refused to reject the nomination papers of a member of the opposition. 43 A remarkably wholesale transfer of top officials, particularly of P.S.P. officers took place under the Cabinet of Dr. Khan of West Pakistan what was thought to have been politically motivated. 44

The civil servants were not automatons, they were human too. They could not sit quietly outside the ring and watch this pulling and hauling. Some of them also acted as panders to the politicians' penchant for political advantage. For, after all, they had their Service interests too, and used the Ministers to their benefit on a mutual basis. 45 In this situation, it was inevitable that some officials were also identified with particularly political parties, the development of which was, no doubt, a slur upon the tradition of dispassionate, neutral and anonymous public servants. But to lay blame squarely on the politicians for degenerating the executive agencies as the Constitution Commission (1961) did 46 would be as

44. See *Ibid.*, May 1, 1956.
45. See *Ibid.*, May 18, 1958 (Editorial) "While the Sun Shines - 1".
rash a judgement as to suggest that the civil servants were cold-blooded usurpers of the politicians' domain. Political interference in administration and vice versa were closely related and "which of the two parties first started", as is rightly maintained by Dr. Muneer, "the vicious circle ... when and in what circumstances" could not be ascertained.

In regard to relationship between the politicians and public servants it drew analogy of a marriage that was not marked all with happiness but also anxiety. But the fact was the relationship did not fail irretrievably. Professor Morris-Jones seized upon the main psychology of the politicians' attitude towards the Services - "a relic of the past ... which put in prison a large number of those who are now the leading politicians". The Pakistan politicians were sub-consciously haunted by the ghost of old memories. But it seems to us that the disposition of the older class of public servants did not mellow down, either. The sheaves of the fortnightly letters written by General Mirza (I.P.S.) to the Governor General (A. & A.) are an important dossier which represent, among others, General Mirza's disagreeable disrespect for some of the most respected and popular politicians of East Pakistan. Here is the sample how he evaluated the standard of politicians: (1) Mr. Fazlul Haq: "Corrupt, unreliable and out and out enemy of Pakistan"; (2) Bhasani:


"A mob leader par excellence ... out and out an enemy of Pakistan and the kindest thing I can suggest for him is that he be shot out of hand"; (3) **Mr. Azizul Haq**: "...is a man of doubtful integrity"; (4) **Mr. Ataur Rahman**: "... His provincialism is so intense that he can never be a good Pakistani"; (5) **Mr. Abdul Latif Biswas**: "... is a chameleon, i.e. changes his colour quite often ... Nobody can depend on him"; (6) **Moulvie Ashrafuddin Chowdri**: "... I don't think he believes in Pakistan"; (7) **Mohan Mian**: "Politics is his main profession in life and the sole idea is to feather his own nest"; (8) **Abdur Salam**: "A man of doubtful integrity"; (9) **Shaikh Mujibur-Rahman**: "... Has guts. Holds extreme views in politics ... A dangerous gentleman who is best in jail"; (10) **Abu Hossain Sarkar**: "... Loyalty to Pakistan doubtful". 49 These remorseless remarks about politicians, at best were highly controvertible, at worst biased. But, to our mind, these do represent the inner feelings of the hoary public servants towards politicians.

Apparently, the politician had always been suspicious-and-censorious of the public servants. Some carefree politicians traduced the bureaucracy with gay abandon. But it should be said to the credit of the politicians that despite the strain of their inherited attitude towards administrative establishments they did not fail themselves in observing parliamentary decorum vis-a-vis the Services.

The Ministers throughout the period took in hand all the responsibilities for any act of omission on the part of the public servants, and defended them in the parliament to ensure their anonymity. The Premier Nazimuddin in 1952 defended and took upon himself all the blame for which a central civil servant was heavily brought to book in the parliament. On a cut motion in respect of Cabinet when the C.S.P. as a class was being seriously goaded in the House for some lapses, a leading opposition leader put the discussions in proper perspective by saying: "After all there may be some corrupt officers as there are some corrupt politicians, some corrupt businessmen; ... But to say that they (C.S.P.) are as a class corrupt is something which nobody can understand. It is not a good taste to say this ... pointedly when officers are not in a position to defend themselves in the House." In 1958, while again defending the activities of the Services the Prime Minister Noon gave one of the cogent reasons as to why the officials were frequently criticised. He said, "Unfortunately, in our country a feeling has arisen that so far as the public servants are concerned, they only work under government and the opposition members seem to think that these servants are not their servants, nor the servants of parliament." Again, when the opposition came to power they, as a rule, defended

* Writer's italics.
the Services. But the fact remains, that despite the presence of a seemingly uneasy relationship between the politicians and public servants they were not essentially punitive to each other. The officials on the whole remained responsible to their political bosses as the latter were kindred to the former.

However, in one sense, the amenability of the public servants to their political chiefs may appear as merely a ritual, once the inadequate parliamentary control over the services is taken into account. The administrative institutions and precisely the higher civil services i.e. the C.S.P., were well-entrenched and well-protected by the Constitutional provisions.\(^5^3\) The Ministers could, at best, transfer, suspend and withhold promotions of the officials, not fire them. The whole idea was to immunise bureaucracy from political influence, which led Goodnow to comment that "to protect competence, responsiveness was sacrificed".\(^5^4\) The Constitutional protection enjoyed by the Services would not have mattered so much had the legislative organ been a powerful institution. Legislatures both national and provincial had been dethroned by either dissolution or suspension for one reason or another - factors which prevented them from consolidating their positions and holding sway

over political life of the country. The Ministers could not keep
the officials 'on their toes' as the central parliament suffered
occasional enforced recesses. While the different ruling parties
commanded little authority over the permanent establishment of the
government as they could not dispense large-scale patronage.*
The result was while the top floor of the edifice of the government
was often dismantled or repaired with the change of Cabinet, the
main structure of the government remained unchanged.55 All these
developments led one critic to say that in Pakistan 'The legislature
is intermittent and administration is continuous'.

This does not, however, mean that the permanent establishment
was unbridled and the parliament beguiled in its impotency. In
the period 1947-54, when the opposition was very weak the Congress
managed to move 10 cut motions in respect of Cabinet to animadvert
the working of the Services. They seized upon every opportunity
the parliament provided to expose excesses of the officials. There
were instances where parliamentary criticism was responsible for
setting aside questionable decisions of the C.S.P. officers.56 Even
the reports of the Public Accounts Committee dwelt at length on the
lacunae of financial management of the Services. The fact is that
under the Pakistan political system the Services, however well
safeguarded they were, could not but suffer some palpitations of

* Due to closed system of the Services.
the heart when their omissions were exposed in the parliament. The officials were given to know through criticism what the Public was not going to swallow. After the Constitution of the second Constituent Assembly, the politicians, undoubtedly, showed greater vigilance on the executive branch. As many as 22 cut motions in respect of Cabinet were moved in the N.A. where administrative institutions, and activities were discussed in some detail. When Suhrawardy's Cabinet was installed the Times commented "politicians regain upper hand". This was largely true.

Yet, it cannot be held that the parliament had an effective control over the Services as the politicians and political parties were yet to act as an equipoise against the 'institutionalised' Services. The politicians still felt about the top C.S.P. cadre what had been felt by the Social Democrats and Republicans about the Prussian Civil Service in Germany. The bureaucratic dominance came to be more pronounced in West Pakistan, particularly after the amalgamation of provinces. Talking on the administration of the one-unit an M.P. observed in the N.A.: "There is one Governor dealing with a population of four crores. Can he grant interview to him? The Governor being the representative of the President, can the victim approach your President? Can, Sir, he approach the Prime Minister? At what level is he to come across his own representatives? Freedom has given the people the right to be

* A supposed aggrieved person.

governed ... by their own chosen people; at what point are the unfortunate victims of West Pakistan bureaucracy to come face to face with their own representatives, within the framework of his new administration? If that consummation has now become impossible then you cannot but arrive at the conclusion that these four crores of people in West Pakistan today are at the mercy of bureaucracy."59

But this was not the machinations of the bureaucracy, but the corollary of the accomplishment of the one-unit scheme - essentially a political objective. Proper administrative reforms could always be fashioned after democratic requirements. But the fact remains, that the social ecology of West Pakistan was such that democratic control over bureaucracy was a difficult task as the latter held "the concentrated revenue and capital resources of the community".60

And the landlords who were also leading politicians in league with the officials virtually ruled the masses of the people. It was only strong, resourceful, mass-based political parties which could act as countervailing power against the officialdom. And the most redeeming feature in an otherwise baffling situation was described in the words of the Manchester Guardian: "In West Pakistan the Muslim League is slowly but firmly coming up"61 - a submission we


61. See Manchester Guardian, August 17, 1958.
have also made elsewhere.

Unlike West Pakistan the bureaucratic sway in East Pakistan was not unchallenged. Contrary to the areas of West Pakistan which were marked during British regime as non-regulated provinces, Bengal was a regulated one. And the Permanent Settlement Act largely freed the people from depending upon the officials in respect of revenue matters. The passing of the State Acquisition Act (1951) was followed by further alleviation of the distress of the East Pakistan peasantry and their gaining more socio-political and economic freedom. The East Pakistanis from an early period had been accustomed to participating in the politics of local self-government. At independence, they demonstrated an added interest in politics. Bureaucratic rule could not prosper for long if democratic institutions were allowed a free play in East Pakistan. There had always been mass-backed political parties in East Pakistan to counterbalance the permanent services. If the once popular party, the M.L. had vanished into thin air its place was duly filled in by another popular organization, e.g. the A.L. The Chief Secretary Mr. N.M. Khan could not stay in the province to the displeasure of the U.F. Chief Minister - a reverse example when the first Finance Minister of East Pakistan had to quit his office for which the then Secretary, Mr. Aziz Ahmed had positive contribution.* Under the A.L. Admini-

* The writer was told by the ex-Minister himself.

62. O'Malley, op. cit., p. 60.
stratification (1956-58) the Services were well kept under political control. There could not be any temptation on the part of the officials to offend a popular government having "grass-root" foundations. The Chief Minister even went far enough to decree that the officials were prohibited from hobnobbing with party politicians to promote their interests and vice versa. The record of the politician-civil servant partnership during this period was fairly healthy.\(^\text{64}\)

What then has really emerged from all our foregoing discussions? The Services reacted slowly to change. The contributions of the Services towards building the nation, particularly at the embryonic stage of Pakistan was commendable. But the administration also sagged under the strain of corruption, inefficiency and complacency. The vulnerable side was the relationship between the public servants and politicians. But on balance the former rendered themselves accountable to their political chiefs – save a number of aristocratic, egocentric, seniormost civil servants – as the latter had also working rapport with the former. There is no foolproof evidence to suggest that the Services deliberately sabotaged the growth of parliamentarianism. But some of the practices of the administration were prejudicial to the growth of the parliamentary personality of

\(^{64}\) For an illuminating discussion in regards to bureaucratic behaviour vis-a-vis politicians in Pakistan in general and East Pakistan in particular, see A. Rahman, op. cit., pp.113-177.
the country. The D.C.s continued the earlier practice of deciding as to which political party was to hold a public meeting or take out a procession. There were a good many instances when the D.C.s withheld permission to such political exercises. And the maintenance of the huge establishment of the C.I.D. at the cost of large sums of money of which could not be scrutinized by the parliament mainly to watch potential enemies of Pakistan was also an incubus for the politicians; for, it was mostly they who were rightly or wrongly dogged after to be charge-sheeted later on. And in the absence of effective parliamentary control over the Services "during the decade after partition, the inner I.C.S. -oriented bureaucracy reassembled, consolidated and enlarged its forces".67

But, side by side, the political development was also encouraging in that two major, mass-based political parties, the N.L. and A.L. from both parts of Pakistan were in the offering to act as the counter-balancing power against the permanent establishment of the government. Then there was the judiciary which was ever willing "to rebuff the bureaucracy" in its excesses. What has been described as 'multiple foci of power and influence' vital to a democratic system were also


developing. The private sector of the economy, the intelligentsia class outside of bureaucracy, various organized interest groups were also coming up to balance the bureaucratic sinews of power. The Press was equally a great pointer to bureaucratic deviations and trespasses. But by far the greatest assurance could be obtained from the public servants themselves as they had the educational and intellectual capacity to fit themselves into the given requirements of the country. After all the socio-economic background of the majority of the public servants - including the C.S.P. cadre - were middleclass and as such, according to Dr. G.A.N. Khan, "It is, therefore, but natural that this class should almost always be inclined to throw in its weight on the side of constitutional methods," i.e. the respect for the values of parliamentary system of government was bound to endure eventually.


THE ARMY

Hobbes' saying that "covenants without swords are but words" is a bitter truth in a political society. It is a crucial problem for any political government to bring military force under control. It is still crucial for the underdeveloped polities where political culture is at a low ebb. Like the civil bureaucracy, the military establishments were also farewell gifts of the departing British power. Perhaps it is no more safe to emphasize that soldiers once trained in British tradition tend to be non-political, particularly on the context of present surroundings of the Commonwealth countries. Apart from the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857 and the Naval Revolt in Bombay in 1946 the loyalty of the military force to the British regime had been unsullied and unimpeachable. A martial atmosphere had nourished the Muslims of the subcontinent for centuries, and the British, conscious of this Muslim attribute had built a powerful fighting army - also a Navy and Air Force during the 2nd World War - and more than 60 per cent of its men came from areas which now formed West Pakistan. This fighting machine gave a creditable account of itself in all the theatres of the two world wars and compelled admiration from the Kaiser, Rommel, Montgomery and Wavell.

At independence, the army was split up like the country itself. But the reception accorded to the army by the partitioning countries i.e. India and Pakistan was psychologically significant. The army was dispassionately treated by the Indian politicians who, perhaps had Lord Salisbury's aphorism in mind: "If you believe the doctors, nothing is wholesome; if you believe the theologians, nothing is innocent; if you believe the soldiers, nothing is safe. They all require to have their strong wine diluted by a very large mixture of insipid commonsense." But in Pakistan the army was passionately idolised. Observers could see that in any national festivities in Pakistan there was hardly any display of industrial or agricultural accomplishments, nor a beauty parade. But an elaborate military parade was an imperative ritual. Crowds would, while watching, rain flower petals on the infantry, the sailors and even armoured cars that roared by. What national resources Pakistan had might not be known to a sizeable portion of the populace, but any casual pedestrian or housewife would tell anybody that they had the army, the biggest asset. The battalions were named after the religious warriors of early centuries of Muslim history. Foreign observers were a little baffled at some non-military slogans by the soldiers, viz. "Allah-o-Akbar", "Ya Ali" - a deterrent against Communism, thought an

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American newspaper - when they would come to a combat position. But hidden lay the atavistic historical reality i.e. the essentially martial nature of the Pakistanis.

Another immediate consideration was the psychopathic fear of Indian aggression - the Kashmir Issue, too was another factor - which prompted Pakistan to regard the army as the protector of the nascent nation. In the budget session of 1949 the Finance Minister was on record as saying: "The requirements of defence had to be accorded precedence over all other expenditure, and no defence scheme of any importance was allowed to be affected by reasons of finance." This policy was continued uninterruptedly throughout the period from 1947 to 1958. The Defence Secretariat was considered the most important and influential of the entire Pakistan government. The defence of the country ate up more than half of the budget money every year. At partition there were 3,374 army officers of which 584 were British who were retained to train the army. By 1951 the army became "the most efficient and closely integrated organisation in the country". The nationalisation of the army was complete by May, 1951. The breeding institution of army officers was the Military Academy at Kakul modelled after Sandhurst. The Pakistan adoption of a positive foreign policy of involvement was a wholesome signal to the military forces in that the army was the greatest

* The writer tends to apply this mainly to the West Pakistanis.

8. Ibid., January 18, 1951.
beneficiary. The massive dose of American Military Aid resulted in the army's being further retrained and rearmed with modern weapons. And in the last but one session of the parliament before martial law a complacent M.L. M.P. assured the House with these words: "as far as the Defence Forces are concerned, you may have spent a lot, but every penny that you have spent has given you the value of a pound. It is a fact that it is one of the finest - one of the most patriotic, one of the most efficient, one of the most determined, and one of the technically expert armies in the world. (Applause)."9

The use of superlative degrees of the quoted statement apart, the fact remains that the army had become the most powerful, well-organized and well-kept institution holding an independent power base in society.

The question whether the army was politicised or non-political is to be approached cautiously, particularly in the face of instances like the abortive army coup of 1951 and the final army take over of the government. The abortive army coup of 1951 was one of the greatest events of the country's short history in that some of the most high-placed persons and families were concerned. The secret trial which lasted many months resulted in the conviction of 11 important army officers. The record of the case comprised 4,000

pages including 1,000 pages containing the judgment and as many as 1,300 important documents were produced before the tribunal. But the salient point was that many of the questions asked at the time of disclosure of the plot remained unanswered. Was it believable that the army officers were akin to communism? What had the plot to do with Kashmir? Had the Russians a finger in the conspiracy? But the most enlightened guess would be that the driving cause of the abortive plot was mostly shared by a tiny minority of army officers who were completely cut off from the main stream of thought of the army as a whole, which was, no doubt, loyal to the political government. Gradually but imperceptibly the early loyalty of the army to the civilian government tottered as the latter showed various weaknesses in sharp contrast to the former's tight cohesion and ever-increasing firepower.

Actually, the force of various circumstances both national and international placed the army to the fore in Pakistan. In India the way the army was organized and allotted a place in the scheme of national activities by the politicians made it difficult for the army to develop extra-military ideas. Besides, the Indian "anti-militaristic" and "non-aligned" foreign policy also muzzled the inherent bellicosity of an army. Quite the contrary was the case with Pakistan. Unlike the Indian army, the Pakistan army,


11. See *Manchester Guardian*, January 6, 1953 (Editorial) "Pakistan trial".
though sharing the same origin, coursed through a different path following the partition of the subcontinent. The powerful military lobby always had the gullible politicians on its side, even in matters of broad policy, apertaining to military issues. Right from the start the army was given to understand that the civil administration would collapse if the former did not come to the rescue of the latter. The army had to be called in to tackle the avalanche of refugees that followed immediately after the independence. Was not the army there to quell the religious thuggery (1953) of anti-Ahmadyanism? Did not the army cater to the needs of the flood victims of East Pakistan in 1954? Did it not distribute food among the people of East Pakistan in 1956 when famine broke out? Who carried out the operation closed-door at the eastern border in 1957, but the Army? There was, however, nothing disagreeable about the army's being obliging to promote certain national causes in emergency when called upon to do so. But here also lay the germs of Caesarian ambitions. For military seizure of power does not occur all on a sudden, but as the climax of its growing involvement in the domestic scene when "the military can blackmail governments out of existence".  

In the Pakistan situation the employment of army services for internal affairs was ingenious – in all cases but the first one mentioned above the army involvement was largely initiated by

General Mirza — and the people could not discern the underlying message of it. Apparently, the impression gained ground among the people that the army was trusted to perform some of the functions which normally ought to have been done by the civil administration. The army, however, was clearly drawn into politics when the army C-in-C, General Ayub, became the Minister of Defence in 1954 following the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly I. The dissolution of the Constituent Assembly I brought in its wake a first rate political crisis in the country, and the army support in the shape of General Ayub in the Cabinet was deliberately engineered by the bureaucrats-cum-politicians who were at the helm of affairs. The natural politicians had no other choice than to make the best of a bad bargain in a given situation. In fairness, the natural politicians had never used the army for partisan political purposes. The much-publicised offer of an army takeover of the country's administration — if there was such an offer in reality, at all — which was allegedly made by the Governor General in 1954 and the Prime Minister in 1956 against the redoubtable refusal on the part of General Ayub was the act of two metamorphosed politicians who wanted to inject efficiency and discipline into the Pakistan body politic. With the emergence of the second Constituent Assembly and the Constitution, General Ayub duly bowed out of the visible side of the arena of politics. But the irony was that "the pattern of government in

Pakistan, with the Governor General - later the President - playing from the beginning an overt political role, worked to enlarge the implicit political significance of the military.14 Because, the Governor General - later the President, General Mirza himself being an old member of the British armed services* felt spiritually kin to it, and, no doubt, harboured the desire of pulling his chestnuts of troubles out of the fire by the army, whenever such an occasion should arise.

This was precisely the case when martial law was declared in October, 1958 by General Mirza. One of the most baffling questions is why did the army comply with the Presidential decree, and having done so, why did it have the President eased out of the country, shortly afterwards? Was the so-called revolution a deliberate outcome of General Mirza's machinations or the usual pattern of army seizure of power that had been taking place in the Afro-Asian and Latin American countries with rapid frequency, particularly in 1958? We have the strongest impression that the declaration of martial law was chiefly initiated by the President himself independently of army pressure; ** for, according to General Mirza "General Ayub is the greatest coward in uniform"+ - a remark that is not without some validity. Sir P. Griffiths went to the heart of the

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* He joined the I.P.S. later on, though.
** Though, the C-in-C was surely kept in touch.
+ The writer was told by General Mirza himself.

14. Times, February 28, 1968 (Leader) "Must the military intervene in India?", Neville Maxwell.
matter when he penned an article saying "Two revolutions have taken place in three weeks ... the first of them was the less significant ... the first few days the administration was entirely civilian in character ... Gradually the army began to take a more active part in the business of government. At all levels an army officer was put in parallel with the civilian official, and day to day affairs began to be more and more controlled by inexperienced army officers ... The disappearance of General Mirza diminished this hope."*15

General Mirza's love for the army was utilitarian. As the supreme C-in-C of Pakistan armed forces he decreed martial law and the army's obedience was the fulfilment of a legal platitude in its apparent sense. General Mirza wanted to reinforce his political position under the glare of military forces and to convince the politicians how essential he was in the scheme of things. Once he could have managed to have his way, he would have immediately withdrawn martial law and restored the country to normalcy - the letter he wrote in reply to the British Prime Minister, Mr. McMillan corroborates this point of his willingness to withdraw martial law sooner. General Mirza himself showed anxiety for his legal position by a reference to the Chief Justice of Pakistan, who in an act of a last salvation

* Writer's italics.

15. Sunday Times, November 8, 1958 (Leader) "Pakistan Revolutions", Sir Percival Griffiths; see also Manchester Guardian, October 10, 1958 - General Ayub called the regime as "Presidential-cum-military".
operation and presumably to contain the powers of the chief martial law administrator – General Ayub – opined that, despite the abrogation of the Constitution General Mirza "remains the country's lawful President". Moreover, within three days of the so-called revolution the jurisdiction of all courts of law was restored. Like a hero of a western film General Ayub proved himself the 'fastest gun' and struck General Mirza before he could unfold his designs. For once martial law was proved a success. General Ayub could no longer play second fiddle to the President being the C-in-C of the army, as his concept of democracy was as good as that of Mirza's differing only in methodology. So he crowned himself on a second thought and governed the country for a period of well-nigh 4 years with martial law before he could invent a convenient facade of democratic institution to legitimise his regime.

This we say only to emphasize that the army takeover in Pakistan had an individualistic orientation rather than collective in that the army as a whole was not committed to the design in the sense that the politicised and indoctrinated soldiers of some of the Afro-Asian and Latin American countries rationalized their usurping the governmental rein as an input side of political or economic development. Then why did the Pakistan army concur with a design it did not subscribe to collectively? That is precisely the point. In the


first place the rank and file of the army were kept completely
in the dark about the plot save three general Staff Officers.
Even, were they in the know it would not have mattered much. Firstly,
the sociology of the army was distinctly homogeneous. The East
Pakistanis were insignificantly represented in the army because
of their alleged nonmartial nature. In regard to the Sindhi people
the current saying was that "they are just good enough to bite off
the noses of their wives when they catch them with another man -
but soldiers never". 18 As a result the armed forces were preeminently
comprised of the Punjabis, Pathans and some Baluchis, and devoid of
heterogeneous elements. And the elite corps i.e. the top brass
army officers mainly hailed from the higher reaches of the Punjab and
Pathan environment - an intake of Bengali officers would have incorp-
orated middle class values into the armed forces. This homogenous
character of the army greatly facilitated the unity of action.
Secondly, the British tradition of military discipline and respect
for hierarchical order left an indelible mark upon the Pakistan army.
The dictum that 'the orders from the top down and obedience from
the bottom up' was imbued in Pakistan tradition of soldiery. The
validity of such an assertion is the fact that till now there has
been no rise of "young Turks" among the army rank and file. The
C-in-C was the symbol of the army and was obeyed by it unhesitat-
ingly. This is to say the participation on the part of the army

18. Manchester Guardian, January 8, 1955 (Leader) "Pakistan in
Transition" II, Taya Zinkin.
as a whole in the so-called revolution was mechanical not intellectual. In other words, the army as a whole was not policed or indoctrinated. It lent support mechanically to the High Command which brought about a revolution motivated by indigenous and promiscuous causes, personal, regional or class, etc., rather than positive ones. When we say the army intervention of 1958 had no positive content we mean that its authors did not add any new values to the input side of political development, other than nuisance. Even a conservative evaluation should not dismiss Pakistan of 1958 as a society where, what according to Professor Finer's general diagnosis of military intervention "a crude order of political culture" prevailed so as to prompt the 'men on the horseback' to ride on to the Pakistan political arena.

The army came to power as it was strong and held fire power. Its entry into power did not even fit Hobbes' dictum about "clubs (army) being trumps in politics whenever no other card is agreed upon",19 as substantial consensus on national issues was achieved. It did not take advantage of its political position to bring about some meaningful changes in the social system to the benefit of the greatest number of the people like the land reform for whose purpose the parliamentary system of government was, by nature, hamstrung.

The much-vaunted land reforms under martial law did not palpably change the pattern of ownership of the cultivated area — only 0.7 million acres were transferred to the ownership of tenants on payments in instalments out of 2.3 million acres which were acquired by the government. The land reforms were of little value when high ceilings on holdings were considered. And the worst part of it was that contrary to the recommendations of the Land Reforms Commission, state lands were distributed among the high officials, civil and military on liberal terms, at the expense of the peasant proprietors. As a result, "a new class of absentee landlords has been created ... and ... landlordism as an institution has been strengthened and has struck deeper and firmer roots in the bureaucracy and in the seats of political power". In sum, it was a case of Gresham's law of army intervention in Pakistan politics; and whatever form of government came into being as a result of that, at best it continued the work of the parliamentary regime in the socio-economic field with an aura of publicity, at worst, it clogged the life blood of freedom and creativity from circulating the body politic of Pakistan.

Then what were the sum total effects of the army intervention upon the future of parliamentary democracy in Pakistan? It did, no doubt, put a stop to the continuity of parliamentarianism.


But it was only a temporary phase. The post - 1958 periods bear out this fact. Perhaps, this has been a period of army education. The country was demilitarized in 1962 when the new constitution was put into motion. The system of government offered by General Ayub was not accepted by the country with universal glee. The regime was still 'suspect' to the people's eye and under the pressure of popular demands many parts of the Constitution were democratised, till at last in 1969 General Ayub completely surrendered to the popular demand i.e. the restoration of the Westminster system in Pakistan. Even the army during this surge of popular demand for restoration of democracy felt scruples over shooting down the political demonstrators. It did not bail out its former chief from his political troubles, as the army chief General Yahya refused to be drawn into politics. When General Yahya imposed martial law (March 26, 1969), in the country General Ayub had to go in circumstances comparable to those associated with the exit of General Mirza. The declaration of the second martial law was qualitatively different, though not on the ground that the second dictator was bound to be a weaker one.


23. Daily Telegraph, March 27, 1969 (Leader) "Army 'busted' Ayub in deal to save Pakistan", Harold Sieve.

24. Ibid,
The second army intervention was again denuded of any doctrinaire content, and unlike General Ayub, General Yahiya did not threaten to usher in a new system of government which he thought would be understandable to the people. On the contrary, he edited dismemberment of the one-unit system and representation in the parliament on a population basis the two most violently important popular demands since the dawn of the first martial law. In addition, he announced general elections for October, 1970 - steps towards the formation of a Constituent Assembly, a Constitution and subsequent making over power to civilian authority.

These are attempts, we believe, on the part of General Yahiya towards the honourable disengagement of the army from politics and the reestablishment of army neutrality, honesty and reputation in the minds of the people. This is essentially in keeping with the upbringing of the army and Pakistan political culture; for the army in Pakistan with an enviable professional standard, both of living and of social position is neither politicized, revolutionary and doctrinaire in character with an axe to grind, nor has it the moral claim, like the armies of Burma, Spain, Algeria and Turkey which laid the foundation of their states, to be the arbiter of national issues other than a stabilizing factor.


CONCLUSION:

The pre-independence constitutional developments in the Indian sub-continent during the British regime provided a political infrastructure from which the new states, namely India and Pakistan were to take-off, when powers were handed over to them. The British, at the outset, did not introduce representative institutions in India to the full requirements of the Westminster system, since the sub-continent was devoid of a viable, participant political community. In the words of Dr. Spear, the British accomplished a series of "enabling" plans in the sub-continent to organise its economic and political lives. Prior to independence, India did undergo and experience various crucial tests of political nature desiderative to self-government.

The principles of parliamentary institution were put into motion in India by 'Convention, precedents and statutes'. They were percolated through the filter of political evolution rather than developed in a moment. The effects of the constitutional developments initiated by a host of Acts, such as those of 1853, 1861, 1892, 1909 and 1935,* coalesced into the body politic of the sub-continent. Those statutes were the political landmarks towards


* Particularly the last three measures were of immense value.
the flowering of responsible parliamentary government in the subcontinent. This witnessed a palpable change in the ecology of society, the emergence of a solid middle class, business community, increasing literacy and an ever-rising political consciousness. The building up of political structure necessary for successful parliamentary government, on the eve of independence was quite commendable. The educated middle class, the business and student community, the intelligentsia and the legal profession demonstrably developed a sense of belonging to the Westminster system.

The graceful transfer of power in the subcontinent was unique in colonial history. The political legacy of India pertaining to Self-Government within the framework of the Westminster system agreeably coincided with the transfer of power.\(^2\) India has maintained the parliamentary tradition, so far, though not ideally. But why was the parliamentary situation topsy-turvyed in Pakistan?

The Muslim political consciousness in India was a belated one - it surfaced in the last quarter of the 19th century. The Muslim landlords and the westernised middle and upper classes formed the

nucleus of the Muslim nationalist movement which culminated in the formation of the All-India Muslim League in 1906. But the main activities of the M.L. clustered around the solitary goal i.e., the advancement of Muslim rights and privileges, rather than mastering the art of Self-Government. From 1937 onward, the M.L. was smarting under the psychic fear of Hindu dominion and wrenched its activities towards demanding a separate land for Muslims in India, meaning Pakistan.3

What was the position of the Muslim majority provinces in India which later comprised the territory of Pakistan? The M.L. in 1937 was not a mass party the way the congress was. The elections in 1937 — under the Act of 1935 — in Bengal were fought by the M.L. in an atmosphere of disunion among the Muslim leaders. In fact, the M.L. won only 40 seats out of 119 Muslim seats.4 Mr. Haq formed a coalition government. * Because of Haq's coming closer to the M.L. there was some fleeting moment of Muslim solidarity and stability in the Ministry. Soon Haq incurred the displeasure of the M.L. After the resignation of Haq in 1943, Sir Nazimuddin (M.L.) formed a new Ministry only to be defeated himself in the House in March 1945, and

* With the Krisak Posa, the scheduled caste, non-congress caste Hindus.


Governor's rule was imposed. In the 1946 elections the M.L. captured 116 out of the 119 Muslim seats and Suhrawardy (M.L.) formed the new Ministry. Soon personal rivalries crept up, and Sir Nazimuddin became the leader of the M.L. Assembly party and later the new Chief Minister of East Bengal when the partition of Bengal took place in 1947.

In the Punjab Assembly the Unionist Party was dominant - the M.L. won only two seats in the elections of 1937. In the elections of 1946, the M.L. secured 79 out of 86 Muslim seats, but the Unionist party with the support of the Congress formed a coalition government. The M.L. took recourse to civil disobedience movements and the Unionist Ministry succumbed to violence in March 1947. Sind became a brand-new province only under the India Act of 1935. The Sind legislature had 34 Muslim seats out of a total of 60 members. Sind was the sink of personal rivalries among the Muslim landlords. The rival political dramatis personae were Sir Hidayatullah, Allah Baksh, Bande Ali Khan, G.M. Syed and I. Khuhro. When the M.L. obtained 29 seats out of 34 Muslim seats the basic political situation did not improve as the Ministry remained notoriously unstable throughout.5

The N.W.F.P. until 1902 had different administrative arrangements compared to other provinces which had been subjected to constitutional reforms from time to time. Since the election of 1937 the Congress was dominant in the province. In the elections of 1946, Dr. Khan

came out victorious and a Congress Ministry was formed. Eventually, the province voted overwhelmingly for Pakistan on a referendum which took place in July 1947. And finally the Congress Ministry was dismissed in August, 1947 by Mr. Jinnah. British Baluchistan was ruled by the tribal Jirga system. The states of Kalat, Makran, Las Bella and Karan did not experience any political reforms in their regions. The princely states such as, Khairpur, Bahawalpur, Chitral, Amb, Dir and Swat, which acceded to Pakistan after independence, had no iota of experience in the art of responsible government. In short, the Muslim majority areas of the then India which formed the geography of Pakistan on balance did not have much training in the art of parliamentary system of government.

Prior to 1940, the Muslims of the sub-continent did not have mass-based political parties. The elections of the Muslim majority provinces were fought on personal and communal lines rather than on political programme. When the Muslim political awareness reached to its zenith around 1945-1946 it was fundamentally orientated towards one transcending cause, namely the carving out of the sub-continent a haven for the Muslim community. The vision of Pakistan captured the mind of the Muslim leaders and for that matter the masses and the M.L. became the "nationalistic-coalition" of heterogeneous Muslim groups. The M.L. leadership did not envisage in detail a full social, economic, political and ideological programme for the future state, Pakistan. The Muslim leadership was solely engrossed in the struggle
for achieving Pakistan, rather than in the art of self-government, and all other considerations, vis-a-vis the potential new state, were left to the future. So, when Pakistan came into being in August, 1947 it had the marginal characteristics of a developed polity. If we are to judge the working of the parliamentary system in Pakistan, 1947-1958 we should also take into account the inherited limitations with which Pakistan began her political career. Judged from a purely formalistic — legalistic criterion, the Pakistan political system was not operating after the fashion of Westminster. But when considered on a broader socio-psychological approach to the concept of political development, we should grant that Pakistan during the period 1947-1958, registered tangible improvements characteristic of a developed polity.

The first significant index of political development was Pakistan's achieving a general ideological consensus and resolution of regional cleavages in the country. During the period 1951-1954 three successive formulas were presented by the B.P.C. of the Constituent Assembly I. But disagreements among regional leaders frustrated the emergence of national consensus. Nevertheless, the years 1947-1954 were not altogether barren. They paved the way for future developments, as the errors of 1947-1954 were not repeated by the Second Constituent Assembly. The period 1954-1958 was definitely an improvement upon the preceding one, 1947-1954. The former period was creative and productive.
On the question of integrative institution-building, the amalgamation of all units of West Pakistan into one unified province was a political landmark. The formula of parity between the two wings in all matters and the machineries for implementing it were duly incorporated in the constitution. Proper machinery for deciding disputes over secular versus Islamic issues were also envisaged by the constitution. In sum, the Constitution of 1956 laid the foundation of Pakistan nationhood.

The period 1956-1958 witnessed further strengthening of institutions which were created. The one-unit scheme was further solidified. The edges of centrifugal forces were blunted, and the grievances of the former smaller units of West Pakistan were attended to. The regionalism of East Pakistan, comparatively speaking, was dwindling. The controversy over the definition of the Pakistan state, whether it would be secular or Islamic was also finally solved with the ushering of a joint electorate system. It can be thus maintained that within the period 1954-1958, the regional and ideological cleavages were greatly resolved paving the way for a 'Common value orientation'—the desideratum for a developed polity.

Apart from this, there occurred a significant change in the political system, in that the early domination of the Services was on the wane. The Hindus which were looked upon with jaundiced eye in the early period were given a sense of partnership with the majority community in the use of political power. Important national
leaders developed a national outlook far above the level of sub-nationalism. The political development was also visible in another direction, in that various groups of people with different interests took an associational character to push forward to their causes - a moving away from the anomalistic representation of grievances.

Similarly, the parliament in the period 1956-1958 made some headway towards the right direction. What is more, the trends were identifiable in that, the two parties namely, the M.L. and A.L. were emerging as the two major political parties of Pakistan. We have a hunch that if general election could have taken place in early 1958, the popular support for the two major parties would have been reflected in the legislatures of the country which might have acted as deterrent to army take-over. However, despite all these achievements towards political development, Pakistan could not retain the parliamentary apparatus on the Westminster model, not because she was incapacitated by any built-in causes or intrinsically dis-orientated toward parliamentary institution, but because some small group of people who happened to have their fingers on the triggers of power, had no commitment to democratic institutions. This small group of people who veered round the President Mirza sabotaged the working of the parliamentary government in Pakistan. We do not subscribe to the view that the parliamentary system of government failed in Pakistan - an extreme view which cannot be substantiated by facts which are more complex - but it is a case one of suspended animation.

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Ayub Kuhro - Chief Minister of Sind (Several Times),

Ambrose, Sir Dandris - Inspector General, Frontier Corps, (1945-47), Sometimes acting Governor of the N.W.F.P.

* Bourne, Sir Frederick - Governor of East Bengal (1947-50)

Begum Liaquat - The wife of the first Prime Minister of Pakistan.

Begum Taz - Wife to the A.D.C. of the Governor General of Pakistan, Ghulam Mohammed.

Bhutto Zulfikar Ali - A leader of the Sindhi Youth Front, (Later Central Foreign Minister under Ayub's regime)

**, Chowdhury Mohammad Ali - The Prime Minister of Pakistan (1955-56)

Chowdhury G.W. - Head, Department of Political Science, University of Dacca, now a Central Minister.

Daultana Mamtaz - Chief Minister of the Punjab (1951-53)

*Dewan Mahboob - A prominent N.A.P. Leader.

Ezaz Ahmed - A high ranking C.S.P. officer.

*Gurmani M. Ahmed - Governor, West Pakistan (1955-57)

Hamidool Haq Chowdhury - Member Constituent Assembly I (1947-54), M.P. (1955-58), East Pakistan Finance Minister (1947-49), and a prominent K.S.P. leader.

Haq, Dr. Mazaharul - An advisor to the State Bank of Pakistan.

Ispahani, Hasan - A diplomat, politician, writer and an industrialist.

**, Lady V. Noon - Wife to the last Prime Minister of Pakistan, Sır Feroz Khan Noon
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Role/Position</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>#</strong> Mudie, Sir Francis</td>
<td>Governor of Sind (1946–47) and the Punjab (1947–49)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mujibboor Rahman</td>
<td>A prominent leader of the Awami League (General Secretary)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mustaq Ahmed Khondakar</td>
<td>A Leader of the Awami League (Vice-President)</td>
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<td><strong>Mirza Iskander</strong></td>
<td>President of Pakistan (1956–58)</td>
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<td>Noon, Sir Feroze</td>
<td>Prime Minister of Pakistan, (1957–58).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Raja of Mahmoodabad</td>
<td>A prominent old time Muslim Leaguer, a close associate to Mr. Jinnah.</td>
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<td>Sultanuzzaman, M.</td>
<td>A high ranking C.S.P. officer</td>
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<td><strong>#</strong> Snelson, Sir Edward</td>
<td>Secretary, Government of Pakistan, Ministries of law and of parliamentary affairs, (1951–58)</td>
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<td>Shoobert, Sir Harold</td>
<td>Secretary, Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Health (1949), and Ministry of Communication (1950–51)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Syed Amjad Ali</td>
<td>A diplomat, politician and industrialist. Central Finance Minister (1955–58)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wahiduzzaman</td>
<td>Member, Constituent Assembly of Pakistan I (1947–54), later a Central Minister under the regime of Ayub.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Youssouf Haroon</td>
<td>A diplomat, politician and industrialist.</td>
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<td>Central Foreign Minister of Pakistan, (1947–53).</td>
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* One asterisk indicates that the writer corresponded with them only, whereas two asterisks indicate that the writer had both interviews and correspondences with them.
My dear Harun,

I have received your letter of November 24 and shall try to answer your questions briefly. There are many things happening here these days and I am kept rather busy.

(1) As a rule Cabinet meetings were held once a week, but if the need arose, two or three meetings were also held. This was particularly the case in the early days of Pakistan when sometimes meetings were held every day. The mode of arriving at a decision was one of discussion until a general concensus was reached. I do not remember a single occasion when it was necessary to take votes. The Cabinet Secretariat was responsible for preparing the agenda and for submitting well-prepared memoranda on the subjects under discussion. The memoranda was of course prepared by the Ministry concerned after such consultation as was necessary with other Ministries. The general pattern followed was that of the British Parliamentary system. There were no significant variations except such as arise in any body of men meeting in a committee for purposes of consultation and decision. The British Cabinet is a much bigger body than the Pakistan Cabinet was at any time; therefore there was no need for an inner cabinet. Cabinet Committees dealing with various specialised subjects were a different matter but their reports were considered by the whole
Cabinet. Although Ministers of State were not formally members of the Cabinet, they were usually present.

(2) Parliamentary institutions did provide useful training for younger politicians. Deputy Ministerships were expressly created to provide such training, that is, they were not really needed for the transaction of business but they provided useful training ground. Party meetings afford another occasion for training. Those who were too shy or inexperienced to speak in the parliament found it useful experience to speak in party meeting where the atmosphere was informal and friendly. To give one example of a politician who benefitted by such training, when Moulvi Farid Ahmed who is today universally acknowledged to be an outstanding parliamentarian came to the Constituent Assembly for the first time in 1955, he was under thirty and fairly raw and inexperienced. Within a few years he had matured considerably.

(3) The stock comment about pre-1958 politics is the result of ten years of one-sided propaganda by an authoritarian government which controls the press, the radio and all means of publicity and has used them ruthlessly to denigrate the pre-1958 regimes in order to justify its own mode of coming into existence and to glorify its achievements, whatever they are, by contrast. Not that there were no set-backs to democratic ideals and institutions during that time, but on any fair reckoning the achievements far outweigh the evils. The fact that there were a number of Parties is by itself not as great an evil as is usually imagined. The testing-time for these parties was due when the elections scheduled for February 1959 under
the 1956 Constitution would have been held. It is only then that the 1956 Constitution would have come fully into operation and the public would have the opportunity to pass judgement on the various parties. A process of winnowing would have taken place. The present regime has taken the Country back at least fifty years.

(4) The institutions for the operation of democracy are (i) a sound constitutional structure having the free and willing support of the Country, (ii) free elections in an atmosphere of freedom of press and speech and association, (iii) patriotic political parties. All these requisites were present in 1958. The 1956 Constitution had been freely accepted by both East and West Pakistan: the fundamental rights of freedom of the press etc., had been made justiciable and none of the Political Parties there in existence could have been accused of lack of patriotism. Universal literacy is not an essential condition for the working of democratic institutions as the example of India shows. It is desirable but not essential.

Yours sincerely,

Mohammed Ali
APPENDIX II

TOP SECRET
PERSONAL

D.O. No. 52/PS

GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN
Ministry of Defence

KARACHI, the 26th February, 1953.

My dear Prime Minister,

After considerable heart searching I have come to the conclusion that it is my duty to give you my views for what they are worth, on the present condition of the country and the rapidly deteriorating situation.

2. The problems created by your personal enemies including Mullahs, if not dealt with firmly and now will destroy the administration and the country. Lately I have been sending my own Intelligence men to meetings etc. in Karachi – the abuses hurled on you and the Government are of such a violent and offensive nature that the prestige of the Government in Karachi today is at its lowest ebb. What the feeling is in the capital to-day will be the feeling in the whole country to-morrow. Such a thing as loyalty and team work does not exist in your Government, both in the Centre and the Provinces. By want of action and Government directive encouragement is being given to all disloyal elements and selfish and dishonest careerists.

3. Though I am not a very religious man, I have the greatest respect for your religious beliefs and realize your hesitation and dislike for vigorous action against those persons who are working against you in the garb of religion. But is it religion to destroy the very
foundation of the administration of the premier Muslim State. In Cairo Sir Zafrullah Khan is being received with the utmost honour and respect. He is also meeting the heads of all the Arab countries where he has a very high reputation. Whereas in Karachi he is being abused in public meetings and his photographs are being spat upon. Last night he has been cartooned with a Donkey's body. Can anybody say all this is not being reported to all the Foreign Capitals? What then is the position of Pakistan to-day internationally and you can imagine the disgust created by all this.

4. There is a school of thought which believes in the doctrine of Masterly inactivity. This school harps ad nauseam on our economic situation, on the dangers of wholesale rising, the food crisis etc. etc. No administration can exist on basis of fear specially if it has got to rule Muslims.

5. Don't think for a moment that you have no friends. There are people who will stand by you till the last. I guarantee the Armed Forces will carry out any directive you may choose to give. For God's sake become a courageous leader and take decisive action. Once you do this, the whole country with the exception of rascals will rally round you and the prestige of Pakistan will go up. The country will be saved.

Yours sincerely,

(Iskander Mirza)

The Hon'ble Alhaj Khawaja Nazimuddin, Prime Minister of Pakistan, K A R A C H I.

Source: Private Papers.
APPENDIX III

PRIME MINISTER
PAKISTAN

Karachi.
January 22, 1952.

My dear Yusuf Haroon,

It is with much regret that I have learnt of your desire to resign your appointment for urgent reasons of a personal nature. My efforts to induce you to change your mind have unfortunately not proved successful and I have no other course open to me than to accept your resignation. In doing so, I wish to place on record my high appreciation of the loyal and devoted service which you have given to the State since, at the cost of considerable personal inconvenience, you undertook to represent our country as High Commissioner to Australia, a sphere of much and growing importance.

I thank you on my own behalf and on that of the Government of Pakistan, and I know that the people of Australia will share my regret that you will be giving up an appointment in which you have so greatly distinguished yourself.

Yours very sincerely,

(Khawja Nasimuddin)

His Excellency Mr. Yusuf Haroon,
High Commissioner for Pakistan to Australia,
SYDNEY.

Source: Private Papers.
APPENDIX IV

The United Front Party, if voted to power will fulfil the following programme within the next five years of its regime:

There will be no enactment in the House which is repugnant to the fundamental principles of Holy Quran and Sunnah, and provisions will be made for the citizens to live their lives on the basis of Islamic equality and brotherhood;

1. To make Bengali one of the state languages of Pakistan;

2. To abolish without compensation all rent receiving interest in land and to distribute the surplus lands among the landless cultivators and bring down the rent to a fair level and abolish the certificate procedure for realising rent;

3. To nationalize jute trade; to make arrangements for giving to jute-growers fair price of jute and to investigate into the jute-bungling during the Muslim League regime, to punish those who will be found responsible for the bungling and to forfeit all their properties earned thereby;

4. To introduce co-operative farming and to improve the conditions of cottage industries and manual works;

5. To start salt industries, both cottage and big, in order to make East Pakistan self-sufficient in the supply of salt;

6. To immediately rehabilitate all refugees, particularly those who are artisans and technicians;

7. To improve the irrigation system and save the country from flood and famine;
8. To industrialize East Pakistan and to guarantee the economic and social rights of industrial labour, according to the I.L.O. conventions;

9. To introduce free and compulsory primary education and to arrange for a just pay and allowance for the teachers;

10. To reorient the entire secondary education system by abolishing the discrimination between Government and private schools, and to introduce only the mother tongue as the medium of instructions;

11. To do away with all the reactionary black laws of Dacca and Rajshahi Universities and to make them autonomous institutions;

12. To make an all-out curtailment of the administration and to rationalize the pay scale of high and low-paid Government servants; United Front Ministers shall not accept more than Rs 1,000 as their monthly salary;

13. To eradicate corruption, nepotism, and bribery and with this end in view, to take stock of the properties of all Government Officers and businessmen for the year 1940 onward and forfeit all unexplained properties;

14. To release all security prisoners who are detained in jail under various public safety acts and ordinances, and to guarantee freedom of the Press, speech and associations;

15. To separate the executive from the judiciary;

16. To convert Burdwan House for the present into a students' residence and afterwards to a research institute of Bengali language and literature;
17. To erect a martyrs' monument to commemorate the sacred memory of those who gave their lives for the Bengali language and literature;

18. To declare February 21 as "Shahid Day" and to observe it as a public holiday;

19. In accordance with the historic Lahore Resolution, to secure full and complete autonomy and bring all subjects under the jurisdiction of East Pakistan, leaving only defence, foreign affairs and currency under the jurisdiction of the center, even in the matter of defence, arrangement shall be such as to have the headquarters of Army in West Pakistan and the headquarters of Navy in East Pakistan and to establish ordnance factories in East Pakistan, with a view to make East Pakistan self-sufficient in the matter of defence and also to convert the present Ansars into full-fledged militia;

20. United Front Cabinets shall on no account extend the life of the Legislature and the Ministry shall resign six months before the general election and shall arrange for a free and fair election through the agency of an Election Commissioner;

21. All casual vacancies in the Legislature shall be filled up through by-elections within three months of the date of the vacancies, and if the United Front nominees are defeated in three successive by-elections, the Ministry shall voluntarily resign from office.

Source: Dawn, April 4, 1954.
APPENDIX V

The Communist Party Election Manifesto
as published on December 3, 1953

1. To establish autonomy in East Bengal. All matters except Defence, Foreign Policy and Currency will be under the control of the Provincial Government.

2. To make Bengali as one of the State languages.

3. Abolition of Zamindari system without compensation and distribution of land to the cultivators (with arrangements for the maintenance of small zamindars when this step is taken).

4. To save the indigenous industry from the foreign competition and to arrange for its expansion.

5. To increase the pay and allowances of labourers, middle class employees and Primary Teachers and to stop retrenchment.

6. To arrange for payment or reasonable price of the jute and other cash crops to the cultivators.

7. Reduction of 50% of the rent of debt, remission of arrears rent, introduction of the system of Tebhaga (1/3rd of the product instead of Adhī Bargah (1/2 of the produce), (consideration of the cases of poor landlords at the time of reforming the right of Adhīars to the land and introducing Tebhaga system.)

8. To increase the wages of the peasants.

9. To develop cottage industry and render help to the artisans.

10. To give freedom to every person for following religion according to his conscience.
11. Removal of differential treatment to the religious minority and granting them equal right like other people and to introduce the joint electorate system.

12. To make special arrangement for the education and betterment of the Scheduled castes and tribal people.

13. Abrogation of the Safety Act and all repressive laws, release of all political prisoners, guarantee of freedom of speech, Press and physical security.

14. To arrange for bread, employment and residence for refugees and facility for education for them through the medium of their mother tongue.

15. To supply commodities for daily consumption and food at cheap price.

16. To arrange for extensive free primary and compulsory education and improvement of the educational system.

17. Employment or allowance for the unemployed.

18. To construct buildings in towns and hospitals in the countryside.

19. Excavation of rivers and canals and the arrangement for irrigation.

20. To improve the roads of the towns, water supply etc., and to make a number of new roads in the villages.

21. To oppose the Pak-U.S. Military Pact, to demand quitting of the British Commonwealth by Pakistan, to follow the principle of peace
in respect of foreign policy, to demand Pak-Bharat amity and cancella-
tion of Pak-Bharat Passport cum-visa system.

22. To arrange for free and fair plebiscite in Kashmir for peaceful solution of problem outside the influence of the imperialists.

Source: Private Papers.

APPENDIX VI
(True Copy)

The Def. Secretary is to be commended for a very frank and realistic assessment of the situation as it existed when this letter was written, that while professing full loyalty and support he warned the P.M. of the dangers inherent in "flirting" with the fanatical elements in the country — goes to show that he was actuated by a high sense of patriotism & devotion to duty. He tried to make the then P.M. to see "the writings on the wall" & exhorted him, very correctly, to fight the subversive activities of the mullahs which was threatening the safety & security of Pakistan.

Our country is safe, so long as we can count on such selfless devotion to duty and loyalty of an officer like the Def. Secretary.

Md. Ali
6/8/53

Source: Private Papers.
APPENDIX VII

(Secretariat)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Punjab</th>
<th>Sind</th>
<th>N.W.F.P.</th>
<th>Other areas</th>
<th>Total Posts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secretaries</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asst. Secretaries</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superintendents</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asst. Superintendents</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerks</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stenographers</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX VIII
(True Copy)

C/o. H.E. Aroleshir Zahidi,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Tehran, Iran.

8. 3. 69.

My dear Haroon,

I got your kind letter of Feb. 12 a few days ago. Many thanks. I could not reply earlier as Khanum suddenly developed Appendicitis & had to be operated upon. The operation was not an easy one & I had a very worrying time. She is thanks God taken a turn for the better, but will have to be in hospital for some days more.

I have been reading of the troubles in Pakistan with utmost feelings that farce of Basic Democracy had to go, but the complete breakdown of all administration & law and order is a dangerous augury for the future of the country. Before respect for Govt. is established there is going to be lot of troubles & loss of valuable lives. Again there are some ... parties in the opposition, are they going to unite on some firm basis? There is a demand for a Federation of East & West Pakistan. Will this not being a demand for the break up of the one unit system in West Pakistan. Frontier, Baluchistan & Sind are not viable States ... Federated States or United States. Presuppose that any state is viable. The Punjabis have run the one-unit in such a selfish manner that there is great hatred of them in Sind, Frontier and Baluchistan. If you break up there is no course left but to rejoin India as a Suppliant - a terrible eventuality.
Your next President should also be carefully selected. I for one do not believe the Westminster type of Democracy will ever succeed in Pakistan. The 1956 Constitution nearly created a jungle. The American system with amendments required for conditions in Pakistan will be much more suitable. There must be a very strong centre with complete plenary powers in the matters of Foreign Policy, Defence & Finance, & the President must not be a Show boy. Pay the President well so that he regards Financial probity a sine qua non. Amongst Muslims there is a fuss to hanker after the Khalafat a Rashida. There were four Khalips in this period. Two were murdered ... & the Khalips were complete autocrats. In fact if you all sincerely want the Muslim way of life you must accept complete autocracy.

I hoped to return by the middle of March but owing to Khanum's illness this is not possible.

Hope you are well & happy ... the climate here is very healthy & I am very well. Iran's progress is fantastic ...

Yours sincerely,

Iskander Mirza.

(The letter has not been edited by the Writer).
My dear Harun,

I am afraid my answers to your questions are going to be extremely brief. I am leaving for Karachi day after tomorrow and partly for this reason am very busy. However, here they are for what they are worth.

(1) The economic situation in 1958 was not bright but it was not at all as dark as was painted by the Martial Law regime which never cared much for truth. I am sending you by separate post my pamphlet - An Appraisal of Pakistan's Economic Development - which gives the true facts.

(11) During 1958 there was a vigorous political fight going on in both the West Pakistan and East Pakistan Provincial Assemblies - in the former between the Republican and the Muslim league and in the latter between the Awami league and K.S.P. together with its affiliates. The fight was undifying to a degree. Its sole object was to gain control of the provincial administration so as to be able to rig the forthcoming elections. No scruples were observed and no holds were barred. The injury to the Deputy Speaker which resulted in his death was accidental, but there is no question that a scuffle was going on between the two contending factions. In West Pakistan, the Republicans and the Muslim leaguers were so evenly matched that they were prepared to do anything to win the support of the tiny N.A.P. which in this situation accidentally held the balance of power and exploited it to its own advantage. It too had no scrupple as to which side it allied itself. To complicate the situation crossing of the floor was a daily spectacle. It is impossible to say which Parties would have come out successful in the elections if they had been held. There was little likelihood of any one party having the
majority if the elections had been fair and free — but this is a big and extremely doubtful if, since the main contestants in East and West Pakistan were determined not to have fair and free elections. Hence the desperate character of the struggle to have the administrative machinery under one's control before and during the elections. This is not a pleasant picture, but truth is sometimes bitter.

(3) I have not the slightest doubt that if elections under the 1956 Constitution had been held and East Pakistan Politicians had control of economic development in that province as provided in that Constitution, there would not have been the movement towards secession which stemmed fundamentally from a denial of democratic political rights. There would still have been many grievances and much noise and agitation because of the ‘revolution of rising expectations’. Indeed, no underdeveloped country with a democratic set up can be immune from agitational politics, but that is the only way in which the people can be educated politically; and it is only over a period of time that they can be made to understand fully the economic realities of the situation. To some extent this is true of every democracy, developed or developing.

(4) The fundamental cause of discontent with the one-unit is the maladministration and centralisation of Ayub Khan's regime for which people fasten the blame on the one-unit. It was an essential part of the concept of one-unit that administration would be decentralised to the maximum extent so that 99 per cent problems could be settled on the spot. This was not only not done; on the contrary, such decentralisation and devolution of powers as there was before reversed, and no decision could be taken without the Governor's and sometimes the President's approval. Personal dictatorship are always characterised by the exercise of personal power and patronage. Then there was the appalling corruption, the grant of lands to high officials, the autocratic behaviour of the Deputy Commissioners and others each of whom become in his turn a little dictator. All this was laid at the door of the one-unit.
(5) Justice Shahabuddin who was Chairman of the Constitution Commission 1961 is a highly esteemable person and he and his colleagues tried their best to produce a democratic Constitution subject to one limitation. They knew that Ayub Khan's mind was made up in favour of the Presidential and against the Parliamentary system; and that unless they worked for a Presidential system - of course with all the checks and balances which are an essential feature of it in the U.S.A., there was not the slightest chance of their recommendations being accepted by Ayub Khan. But since Ayub Khan wanted an authoritarian system under cover of a Presidential system he rejected their main recommendations all the same.

I have so strong an aversion to writing about myself that even the few references to my role as Secretary General in the early years of Pakistan were inserted at the insistence of the Columbia University Press who published my book - 'The Emergence of Pakistan' which I imagine you have seen. I am sorry I cannot help you there.

With best wishes for the completion of your work.

Yours sincerely,

Mohammad Ali.
Dear Mr. Harun,

I regret the delay in answering your letter as I had to collect the required information. For your convenience I have had the Authoritative statements on the subject printed in a booklet and this took some time. I am sending you the booklet entitled 'The unification of West Pakistan' under separate cover. I hope that you will find the answers to your many queries therein. The Prime minister who initiated the proposal for the unification of West Pakistan in his Broadcast speech on November 22, 1954 was Mr. Mohd. Ali of Bogra who hailed from East Pakistan. You will perhaps find it useful to go through the Debates of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on the Integration of West Pakistan bill for the months of September & October 1955. These should be available in the library of the Pakistan High Commission as also in the British Museum. You will find all the arguments for or against the proposal in the Debates & will be able to draw your own conclusions. To my mind the Integration of West Pakistan Act was the corner stone of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan framed in 1956 by the second constituent Assembly of Pakistan.

It is unfortunate that certain vested interests did not permit the full implementation of the various important parts of the scheme such as the decentralisation of the administration, association of people's representatives with the administration at various levels,
unification of laws etc. etc. Some important promises made at the time of integration were also not implemented and these factors caused resentment and lack of faith in certain parts of the province. One important fact over which the framers of the Scheme had little control was the abrogation of the constitution in 1958 and the consequent political vacuum that followed. Had the scheme been faithfully implemented the results would have been very different. I have no doubt that even now if the scheme is fully implemented and certain modifications are made therein in the light of experience gained, it should be an unqualified success. The economic development which has taken place as a result of unification is amazing and the overall progress made in the social & economic fields, especially in the smaller regions is phenomenal. I am collecting the necessary information in this regard and will let you have it as soon as it become available in a tabulated form. As regards your question about the Republican Party, I think it was the outcome of an unfortunate split between two groups of the Muslim League resulting from tussle for power. Since elections to the legislature had been unduly delayed it was perhaps, inevitable that the only dominant political party at the time of the attainment of independence namely, the Muslim League which had championed the Muslim Freedom Movement, should split into various splinter groups and factions under different names. Most of them were in the nature of parliamentary groups with hardly any ramifications in the country. Many of these 'Political Parties' have not progressed beyond the stage of having met in an adhoc
preliminary meeting styled as ‘Convention’ and having a self styled convenor and a small body of persons nominated by him as the Party Executive. The remedy lies in direct & periodical elections to the legislatures and local bodies held at regular intervals, which will give a sense of reality to political activity and facilitate the proper growth of political parties as has been the case elsewhere. I shall be glad if I can be of any further assistance to you.

Best wishes,

Yours sincerely,

(MUSHTAQ AHMAD GURMANI)
**APPENDIX XI**

Central Government Development outlay in East and West Pakistan,
1947-48 - 1960-61 (Rs. in crores)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>East Pakistan</th>
<th>West Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Investment</td>
<td>Rs. 172</td>
<td>430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans</td>
<td>Rs. 184</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grants-in-Aid</td>
<td>Rs. 76</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Private Account of Machinery through Central Government Licensing (1951-60) (Rs. in crores)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>East Pakistan</th>
<th>West Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rs. 64.1</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>162.4</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Regionwise Breakdown of Allocation of Foreign Aid and Loans (up-to June 30, 1960) (Rs. in crores)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>East Pakistan</th>
<th>West Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Development Aid</td>
<td>Rs. 93.89</td>
<td>335.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Commodity Aid</td>
<td>Rs. 129.00</td>
<td>262.00</td>
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</table>

Regional Allocation of Import Licences for raw materials and spare parts (1951-1958) (in thousand of Rupees)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<th>West Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>52,400</td>
<td>88,981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>42,579</td>
<td>1,37,468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>45,525</td>
<td>82,242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>43,227</td>
<td>1,04,608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>51,072</td>
<td>1,44,201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Value</td>
<td>Another Value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>84,782</td>
<td>84,178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>94,123</td>
<td>94,854</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>84,832</td>
<td>87,266</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### APPENDIX XII

**Surplus and Deficit in Foreign Trade, Pakistan. (In Thousand Rupees)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>West Pakistan</th>
<th>East Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1947-48</td>
<td>+ 344,208</td>
<td>+ 137,441</td>
<td>+ 206,767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948-49</td>
<td>- 501,491</td>
<td>- 648,269</td>
<td>+ 146,778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949-50</td>
<td>- 103,005</td>
<td>- 347,048</td>
<td>+ 244,043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-51</td>
<td>+ 933,559</td>
<td>+ 176,421</td>
<td>+ 758,138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951-52</td>
<td>- 228,788</td>
<td>- 551,961</td>
<td>+ 323,173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952-53</td>
<td>+ 126,236</td>
<td>- 149,882</td>
<td>+ 276,118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953-54</td>
<td>+ 167,987</td>
<td>- 183,319</td>
<td>+ 351,306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954-55</td>
<td>+ 119,692</td>
<td>- 291,660</td>
<td>+ 411,352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955-56</td>
<td>+ 458,561</td>
<td>- 222,044</td>
<td>+ 680,605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956-57</td>
<td>- 726,984</td>
<td>- 817,817</td>
<td>+ 90,833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957-58</td>
<td>- 628,316</td>
<td>- 880,750</td>
<td>+ 252,435</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Plus indicates surplus and Minus indicates deficit.)


Also *The Pakistan Observer*, (Dacca) April 27, 1963.
### APPENDIX XIII

(1947-58)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>West Pakistan</th>
<th>East Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secretaries</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Secretaries</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Secretaries</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under Secretaries</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: op.cit., Dr. Aleem Al-Razee, p. 29.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>West Pakistan</th>
<th>East Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Generals</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major-Generals</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadiers</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonels</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Colonels</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majors</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Officers</td>
<td>693</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air force Officers</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Dear Mr. President,

I have been asked to send you the following personal message from the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom:

"I thank you Mr. President for your message received through the United Kingdom High Commissioner in Karachi. You may be confident of the close and continuing interest of the Government of the United Kingdom in the prosperity and progress of Pakistan. I note that the continuance of Martial Law will be for the shortest period possible and I am glad to have your assurance that Pakistan will continue to honour all her commitments and to remain loyal to the free world."

Yours sincerely

Alexander Squire

Source: Private Papers.
My dear general Sahib,

I believe Mr. Chundrigar is also going to Lahore on Saturday namely the 23rd. If it is not possible to talk with him to day, perhaps you can direct him to meet you in Lahore. But this suggestion may duly come from you.

Till everything is agreed, I would request that it may not be mentioned to others who say & approved of the drafts. Many people are quick to feel ignored & left out.

I am leaving for Lahore tonight at 9 a.m. I shall be most grateful if I can have an opportunity to meet you this evening for a few minutes.

I can only earnestly press the national necessity for definite decision and assured action.

My own personal loyalty may please be considered, I beg you, beyond the slightest doubt.

With deepest respects & love,

Yours always

Mumtaz

Source: Private Papers.
APPENDIX XVI

(True Copy)

President's House,
Karachi.

2nd April, '58.

My dear President,

Please allow me to congratulate you on the decision you gave on the higher control set up of the Defence Forces. In doing so you have shown tremendous courage, and wisdom, and have done the Defence Forces and the country a great service. History will have a cause to be proud of you. I personally am indebted to you for choosing me to shoulder this responsibility. Let us hope that I shall come up to your expectations. I can promise you my very best effort.

Once again, I thank you and the Khanam for your kind hospitality during my stay here. As usual, I have been very comfortable.

With respects,

Yours sincerely,

M. A. Khan.

Source: Private Papers.
APPENDIX XVII

Members of the National Assembly
(East Pakistan)

1. Ataur Rahman
   Lawyer (M.A.B.L.), Political Prisoner in 1952, elected to the East Pakistan legislature in 1954, Provincial Minister for sometime and one of the founders of the Awami League.

2. Abul Mansur Ahmed

3. Adeluddin
   Businessman (B.A.), entered the Provincial legislature in 1954.

4. Abdul Aleem
   Served as Manager Tagore Estate for many years, (M.A.B.L.) entered the Provincial legislature in 1954.

5. Abdul Latif Biswas
   Lawyer (M.A.B.L.), entered Bengal legislative Assembly in 1946.

6. Abdus Satter
   Serviceman (B.A.), entered the Provincial legislature in 1954, Political Prisoner (1952)

7. Abdul Wahab Khan
   Lawyer (B.A.B.L.), entered Bengal Legislative Assembly in 1937, Chairman, District-Board of Barisal for many years.

8. Abdul Karim

9. Abdur Rahman Khan
   Lawyer (B.A.B.L.), entered the Provincial Assembly in 1954, associated with local Self-Government in the district of Bangpur for many years. Political Prisoner (1950)

10. Abdul Khaleque
    Lawyer (M.A.B.L.), entered the Provincial legislature in 1954, associated with trade union movement for many years. Political Prisoner (1954)
11. A.K. Das
Educationist (B.A.), entered Bengal legislature in 1946.

12. B.K. Das
Lawyer (M.A.B.L.), entered Assam legislature in 1921, was the Speaker of the Assamese legislature for many years, imprisoned many a time in the Pre-independence days on political count.

13. B.K. Dutta
Politics as vocation, (B.A.) entered Bengal legislature in 1946, Political Prisoner both before and after independence.

14. C. Burman
Educationist (B.A.), entered the Provincial legislature in 1946.

15. Zeldar Ahmed
Lawyer (B.A.B.L.), entered the Provincial legislature in 1954 and was Political Prisoner in the same year.

16. Fazlul Huq
Lawyer (M.Sc.B.L.), entered Bengal legislature in 1913, Minister (1924), Chief Minister of Bengal (1937-43), Chief Minister of East Pakistan, Mover of the historic Lahore Resolution (1940), the founder of the K.S.P.

17. Fazlur Rahman

18. Farid Ahmed
Lawyer (M.A.B.L.), was University lecturer for sometime, joined the Provincial legislature in 1954.

19. Gour Chandra Bala
Politics as vocation (Matriculation), entered Bengal legislature in 1946.

20. Hamidul Huq Chowdhury

21. K. K. Dutta
Lawyer (M.A.B.L.), entered Bengal Provincial Assembly in 1937, the Constituent Assembly I of Pakistan (1947-1954), Served jail sentences many times before independence on political ground.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Occupation and Additional Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>Lutfur Rahman</td>
<td>Lawyer (B.A.B.L.), entered Bengal legislature in 1946.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.</td>
<td>Mohammad Ali</td>
<td>Politics as vocation (B.A.(Hon.)), joined Bengal legislature in 1937, Finance Minister (1946), ambassador in Burma, and the U.S.A., the Prime Minister of Pakistan (1953-55), was also the member of the first Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. Associated with many years with the administration of Bogra District Board.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.</td>
<td>Muzaffar Ahmed</td>
<td>Trade Unionist (M.A.), joined the provincial legislature in 1954, was Political Prisoner both before and after independence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.</td>
<td>Mahfuzul Huq</td>
<td>Lawyer (B.A.B.L.), entered the Provincial legislature in 1954.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31.</td>
<td>Peter Paul Gomez</td>
<td>Serviceman (B.A.), entered Bengal legislature in 1946.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32.</td>
<td>Rasa Raj Mandal</td>
<td>Politics as vocation (B.A.) entered Bengal legislature in 1946.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
33. **Suhrawardy H.S.**
Barrister (M.A. Oxon., B.C.L.), joined Bengal legislature in 1921, Minister (1943–44), Chief Minister of Bengal (1946–'47), the founder of the A.L. Party.

34. **Sheikh Mujiboor Rahman**
Politics as vocation (B.A.), joined the Provincial Assembly in 1954, imprisoned many times (1949, 1950, 1952, 1954) on political ground. Was one of the founders of the A.L. Party.

35. **Syed Mesbahuddin**
Lawyer (B.A.B.L.), entered the Provincial Assembly in 1954.

36. **S. K. Sen Dr.**
Medical Profession (M.B.B.S.), entered the Provincial Assembly in 1954.

37. **Sardar Fazlur Karim**
Educationist (M.Sc.), entered the Provincial Assembly in 1954, served jail sentences quite a few times after independence on political count.

38. **Tarkabagish, Moulana**
(Madrassa education), associated with trade union movement, entered the provincial legislature in 1954.

39. **Youssouf Ali Chowdhury**
Politics as vocation. Held no formal educational degree, entered Bengal legislature in 1946. Associated with Faridpur District Board administration for a long time.

40. **Zahiruddin**
Lawyer (B.A.B.L.), entered the provincial legislature in 1954, was political prisoner in 1948.
1. Alamgir H. Gilani  
Landlord (B.A.), entered the Punjab Legislative Assembly in 1950, served in various parliamentary committees, Director Multan Central Cooperative Bank.

2. C.M.H. Chatta  
Landlord.

3. Chowdhury Azizuddin  

4. Chowdhury A.G. Gunman  
Landlord.

5. Chundrigar I.I.  


7. Dir Ali  
Manual labourer.

8. Sardar A.H.K. Dastl  

9. Feroz (Sir) Khan Noon  
10. Gurmani Nawab

Landlord, held no formal educational degree. Elected to district Board of the Punjab at the age of 21, entered the Punjab legislative arena in 1924, again returned to the same legislature in 1937. Parliamentary Secretary (1937-42), Prime Minister, Bahawalpur Princely State (1946), M.C.A. of Pakistan (1947-54), Minister, Central Government (1947-1952).

11. G.E. Gibbon

Businessman, (B.A.) entered the Punjab Legislative Assembly in 1951, veteran minority leader.

12. Gulam Ali Talpur

Landlord (M.A. Aliq.), Political Prisoner (1954), entered Sind Legislative Assembly in 1937, Central Minister (1954-'55).

13. Haji M.B. Samroo

Landlord (Sind)

14. Jalaluddin Khan


15. Khan of Kalabagh


16. Khuhro, I.


17. Kayani M.R.


18. Khan Saheb Dr.

Medical Practitioner (U.K. degree), (also landlord), Served Iraq during the World War I, entered frontier legislature in 1937, also elected to the Indian Central Legislature in 1935, Chief Minister, N.W.F.P. (1937-'39) and 1946-47), Political Prisoner several times before and after Independence.

19. Khan Bahadoor Mahsood

Landlord (Khairkpur)
20. Khan of Mamdat

21. Makdoomzada
Landlord, entered Bahawalpur State legislature in 1952, Minister, Bahawalpur (1952).

22. Mumtaz Daultana

23. Mirza Iskander (Major General).
Serviceman (Sandhurst Graduate), Secretary for Defence (1947-1954), Governor, East Pakistan (1954), Central Minister (1955).

24. Mian Abdul Bari

25. Mir B.S. Mazari

26. Mian Iftikheruddin

27. Mian Jaffar Shah

28. Malik Jahangir Wazir
Landlord.

29. Pir of Makhad
Landlord and Pir.

30. Pir A.M. Rashdi
Veteran journalist (also landlord) Writer and intellectual, (M.A. Alig.) entered Sind legislature in 1953 Minister Sind (1953).
31. Qizilbash (Sir) M. Ali (Nawab)  
Landlord (B.A. Camb., Bar-at-law) entered the Punjab legislature in 1936, Minister, Punjab (W) 1953-54.

32. Syed A. Hossain (Col.)  
Landlord, (B.A.), Served in the army (World War II), associated with the District Board of Jhang, elected to the Central legislature of India (1945), elected to the Punjab (W) legislature (1951), Central Minister, (1954-1955).

33. Sardar Amir Azam  

34. Soofi Abdul Hamid  
Landlord.

35. Sirmool Kirpaldas  
Business (B.A.), entered Sind legislature in 1946.

36. Sardar Abdur Rashid  

37. Syed Amjad Ali  
Industrialist (M.Com.), elected to the Punjab legislative Assembly in 1937, held many important parliamentary posts, elected member of the Constituent Assembly of India (1946), Pakistan Ambassador to the U.S.A. (1953-1955)

38. Syed M. Lal Badshah  
Landlord.

39. Youssouf Harun  
Industrialist (B.A. Cambridge), member central legislature of India (1937), Chief Minister, Sind (1950), Pakistan High Commissioner in Australia (1951).

40. Nawab Mir Bai  
Landlord.

## APPENDIX XVIII

Government (August 11, 1955 – September 12, 1956) opposition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M.L.</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.F.</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.N.G.</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.C.F.</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.P.P.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(September 12, 1956 – October 18, 1957)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Seats</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R.P.</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.L.</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.N.G.</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.C.F.</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.P.P.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chowdhury Mohammed Ali Group</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(October 18, 1957 – December 16, 1957)

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R.P.</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.L.</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K.S.P.</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.I.P.</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chowdhury Mohammed Ali Group</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Independents 2

Chowdhury Mohammed Ali group

Independents 2
Government (December 16, 1957 - October 7, 1958)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R.P.</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. L.</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.N.C.</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.A.P.</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.C.F.</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.P.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K.S.P.</td>
<td>3 (Haq group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chowdhury Mohammed Ali Group  
N.I.P.  
K.S.P.  
S.C.F.  
U.P.  
K.S.P.  

Source: *Dawn* June 23, 1955; September 14, 1956; December 3 and 24, 1957; March 5, 1958.
APPENDIX XIX

The M.L. Membership 'Form'

I .................

S/o .................

Resident of ............

do Solemnly affirm that I will be loyal to the Pakistan Muslim League and will abide by its constitution, rules, bye-laws, regulations and directions and that I will do my best to achieve the aims and objects of the organisation.

I further affirm that I am not a member of any other Political or unlawful party or organisation.

Signature ..........

..................................................
Signature of the person in whose presence the 'Form' was signed.

Place .................

Date .................

Source: The Constitution of the Muslim League,
APPENDIX XX

1. I .... do solemnly take the oath of membership that I

(a) Shall try my level best to realise the aims and objectives of the Nizam-1-Islam Party and subject myself to the organizational discipline;
(b) Shall not maintain connections with other political parties;
(c) Shall devote at least two hours a week to the cause of the party and thereby the people;
(d) Shall not seek out party offices;
(e) Shall follow the cult of unassuming philosophy of public service based on the teaching and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and the Sunnah;
(f) and shall not default in paying the annual membership fee.

Signature............
Date ...............

Source: The Constitution of the Nizam-1-Islam Party,
(Translated from Bengali into English by the writer)

APPENDIX XXI

I .... S/o ...... do hereby swear in the name of Allah, the almighty the oath of membership of the Jamat-1-Islami Party that I

(1) Shall lay the greatest emphasis on my loyalty to Allah and His Messenger, the prophet Mohamed and pay the strictest adherence to their behests and sayings;
(2) Shall subject myself unhesitatingly to the rules and regulations and above all, the discipline of the Jamat;
(3) Shall on no account absent myself from the Jamat meetings except on grounds of "Shariat";
(4) Shall ever remain steadfast to my conscience and sense of righteousness in putting forward my views uninhibited by any considerations;
(5) Shall endeavour to point out any failings in the organisation and work for their removal.

I beseech Allah, the omnipotent to give me prudence and strength to fulfil the above mentioned undertakings, Amen!

Signature ..................

Date .........................

(Translated from Bengali into English by the writer)