The moral theology of Ian Ramsey: connections between theory and practice in the work of Ian Ramsey

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Kimmett Edgar

The Moral Theology of Ian Ramsey

The basic aim of this thesis is to explore the connections between theory and practice in the work of Ian Ramsey. The study itself proceeds from a theoretical consideration of philosophical bases of Ramsey's writings to his actual practice in meeting ethical dilemmas. In Chapter One the challenge of logical empiricism is described, as well as the reaction of philosophers of religion. Ramsey's own response is detailed in Chapters Two through Five. His key epistemological concept, disclosures, is examined in Chapter Two. Chapter Three describes Ramsey's linguistic concept, the qualified model, by which he attempts to analyse the odd logic of religious discourse. Ramsey's work in linguistics is linked to others in Chapter Four. In Chapter Five Ramsey's work in mapping religious experience is examined.

Chapter Six provides the theoretical background to Ramsey's ethics. Challenges to Christian ethics are set within the context of the relationship of God and ought. Ramsey's ethical methodology is examined in Chapter Seven as it emerges from dialogues with others. Here the empirical-exploratory method is central, a means by which Ramsey hopes to fruitfully apply theory to practice. The final section describes Ramsey's actual practice in social ethics--Chapter Eight demonstrates his approach to a range of social problems and Chapter Nine deals with euthanasia. The concluding chapter is intended to review and integrate various points made in the course of the thesis.
UNIVERSITY OF DURHAM

THE MORAL THEOLOGY OF IAN RAMSEY

Connections between Theory and Practice in the Work of Ian Ramsey

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Preface

I found the experience of working on this thesis very enjoyable. The task of writing it was made all the more pleasant by many with whom I associated. I greatly appreciate the financial assistance of the PHEAA in the form of a loan, and also the support of St. John's College and its Senior Tutor, Dr. Bruce N. Kaye. I would like to thank Jon Pye for his comprehensive bibliography of Ian Ramsey's published material and Roger Norris of the Archdeacon Sharp Library for his guidance. I am grateful for the patient support of friends, including Jon and Maggie, Judy, Dave, Rick, and others.

I received invaluable guidance and encouragement from Prof. Jerry H. Gill, to whom my debt of gratitude continues to grow. I am most grateful for the efforts of my supervisor, Dr. Ann L. Loades. I found the breadth of insights and guidance which Dr. Loades provided indispensable. More important to me was her enthusiasm for my work, which often surpassed my own. Although I am solely accountable for the flaws in the thesis, much that is of value is to the credit of Dr. Gill and Dr. Loades. Finally, I would like to thank my typist, Dorothy M. Edgar, and my proof-reader, John W. Edgar, for their love, patience, and kindness. To them I dedicate with love my firstfruits.

None of the material under my name in this thesis has been submitted for a degree in Durham University or any other University. The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published without his prior written consent and information derived from it should be acknowledged.
Philosophical Background

The rise of logical empiricism in the twentieth century has changed the face of philosophy, and radically altered philosophical method. Admittedly, some of its most forceful tenets have 'died the death of a thousand qualifications'. But the implications of empiricism for theology have been fortified by its more subtle articulation. A faithful response to this challenge is a continual task of theology; to clarify its odd logic, and to ground its discourse in experience. It was the theoretical mission of Ian Ramsey to do the 'under-labourer' work, to lay a firm foundation upon which a tighter theological method can build.

It is not necessary to examine the rise of the philosophical movement in great depth, nor is it possible to elucidate the positions of Moore, Russell, Ayer, Wittgenstein, and others in sufficient detail to do them justice. Further, Ramsey's own relation to empiricism is described in a number of works. Nonetheless, a quick sketch of Ramsey's view of the challenge will help to frame the philosophical foundation of his work.

Ramsey sets out the development of empiricism in four stages, broadly: (A) the reaction to Hegel; (B) logical positivism; (C) Wittgenstein; and (D) a further mellowing. He cites a passage from the neo-Hegelian, William Wallace, which could frighten the impressionable into taking a vow of silence:

The first part of Logic, the theory of Being may be called the theory of unsupported and freely floating Being ... the terms or forms
of Being float as it were freely in the air, and we go from one to another, or—to put it more correctly—one passes into another ... This being is immediate: i.e. it contains no reference binding it with anything beyond itself, but stands forward baldly and nakedly as if alone; and, if hard pressed, it turns over into something else ... The ether of 'Is' presumes no substratum, or further connexion with anything: and we only meet a series of points as we travel along the surface of thought.

The difficulties the early British empiricists had with such discourse were not at all of the kind expressed by Kierkegaard: There was no objection to the 'worship' of reason, nor—at first—to a systematic metaphysic. Rather, they objected to the grandiose high-sounding phrases, the empty verbiage, and the pleasure in raising contradictions of the neo-Hegelians. They responded by pressing for logical clarification. G. E. Moore continually demanded, "What do you mean?". In attacking the language used, he felt that what they said should be plainly expressed, or not said at all.

Moore relied upon common sense assertions such as 'there is a table' for his standard of precision. He felt that philosophy should turn from its concern for isolated concepts such as Time, Sensation, Implicit Beliefs, etc. to the analysis of common sense assertions. Ramsey's single example may suffice to expose the dangers in isolating ideas, and then developing them by reason alone: "We do think of Time"; therefore "There must be such a thing as Time"; therefore "Time is a fact". The difficulty with this logic becomes clear when we begin with, "We do think of unicorns"; therefore ... "philosophers ought not
to argue about the 'reality' of Time before they know in what common sense assertions their arguments are grounded."^4

Bertrand Russell brought his probing mathematical logic to bear upon the analysis of philosophical discourse. Among his insights into logic were: (A) Don't let grammatical structures deceive—logical structures vary with subject and object as well; (B) Don't ascribe any final absolute to the subject predicate form—'Dogs bark' ≠ 'Dogs exist'; (C) Adjectives and nouns do not necessarily describe things—'A candy house', 'a fictional servant'; (D) The language used of a class (e.g. humanity, colour, fruit) must be logically distinguished from language used of members (e.g. a man, blue, oranges). Ramsey gives the phrases 'I crossed the bridge' and 'I crossed the Equator' as an example of the logical entailed by confusing different logical types: While 'I crossed the bridge' means that I must have touched it, 'I crossed the Equator' requires no such conclusion. These logical rules totally disrupt the neo-Hegelian language game.

Russell's search for certainty carried him beyond the key-note, 'There is a table' of Moore. He held that one must build a molecular language structure, beginning with the atomistic terms of sense-data. These were the truly 'immediate' sensations: the colour, texture, smells, tastes, and sounds of things. He thought that one could build a reliable, unambiguous language, grounded in sense-data. This would be a more secure foundation than Moore's common sense 'table' assertion because, he argued, the
table must be inferred; it is the sense data which is immediate.

Ramsey is careful to point out that there was no direct attack upon theology thus far. Obviously much of the above criticisms of neo-Hegelian discourse could be applied—and devastatingly so—to much of the current theological language. Russell's 'sensibilia', for example—the idea that the universe is no more than the aggregation of observables—while basically part of his linguistic analysis, could easily be used against theology. This is because such a theory subsumes the universe under the empirical method. Based upon this assumption is the idea that science will one day, given the necessary data, explain all that theology claims as its private sphere of specialty. In other words, it could be used to demolish any theological explanatory hypotheses.

Then, too, the philosophy had its drawbacks. With necessary concepts like 'unsensed data'—reminiscent of neo-Hegelians themselves—Russell had substituted one complex metaphysical system for the other. For his part, Moore never stopped clarifying. The question, 'What do you mean?' was infinite—or, rather, ended in the absurd 'What do you mean by "mean"?';

With the publication of Language, Truth, and Logic the empiricist quest for meaning entered a new stage in Great Britain. The cornerstone of logical positivism, the verification principle, was there passionately propounded and developed by A. J. Ayer. But this is to anticipate.
The principle was itself a development of the verifiability criterion. This more rigorous criterion of meaning held that a proposition was meaningful if and only if it could be verified in experience. This was intended to set the bounds for efficient philosophical method.

Unfortunately, it was much too strict. What of those phenomena which might be called the 'as-yet-unknown'; that could be verified at some future date? (e.g.—at that time, the texture of the moon's surface). Hence the criterion became a principle: A proposition has meaning if and only if in principle it can be verified in sense experience. This again required modification: ... if and only if, in principle, sense data is somehow and in some way related to it.

But positivists also had to provide a place for mathematics. This was accomplished by widening the concept of reason to include 'significant tautologies'. Obviously, two plus three does not describe any facts. It is merely definitional, analytic; in Ayer's own terms, "it is true solely in virtue of the meaning of its constituent symbols, and cannot therefore be either confirmed or refuted by any fact of experience." This 'brings analytic statements in the back door': The verification principle now grants meaningfulness to propositions which are either analytic or empirically verifiable (in principle).

Ayer also distinguishes between 'strong' and 'weak' senses of verifiability. In his first edition, he argues that it is only the weak sense which is required by his position. Briefly, 'strong' verifiability demands that the
truth of a proposition could (in principle) be 'conclusively established' in experience. The weaker version merely requires that experience 'render it probable'.

Ayer returned to tighten the latter framework, insisting that it allowed meaning to any statement whatsoever. He then required that the statement must be more directly related to observation, and based upon other empirical or analytic propositions, without being deducible from these premises alone. This is itself dependent upon 'basic propositions' which can be conclusively verified. The subsequent development of the principle carries us beyond the scope of the background to Ramsey's response.

In any case, with Ayer's manifesto, we do have a direct attack upon theology. Jerry Gill sums up the challenge in a neat syllogism:

All cognitively meaningful language is either definitional or empirical.

No religious language is either definitional or empirical.

Therefore, no religious language is cognitively meaningful language.

Ayer applied his criticism with equal gusto to metaphysical philosophy. As metaphysics is neither definitional nor empirical, it, too, is non-sense. Like Hume before him, Ayer charges that in metaphysics, unlike science, problems raised cannot be resolved by the testing of hypotheses. Ayer distinguishes himself from atheism and agnosticism, claiming that theological discourse is not to be refuted—it is simply meaningless. In the same way, Ayer would see no opposition between the meaningful assertions
of empiricism (about predictable processes, observable
behaviour, etc.), and the meaningless waste of time which
he, like Hume before him, would 'commit to the flame'.

Following Russell, a more subtle attack on metaphysics can be found along the lines of the logical
diversity of language. If language does exhibit all kinds
of logical differences, "may not all so-called ultimate
problems arise from confounding these logical differences
and in this way misusing words? Confound logical differ-
ences and you will have pseudo-problems." 8

Although Ramsey's response to this challenge will be
elucidated below, his reaction to the verification prin-
ciple itself is more direct: (A) Theological language is
not 'flat' description of the evidence. A 'Seeing God' in
the sense of 'seeing grass' is simply bad logic. (B) On
the other hand, if theology should attempt to claim neces-
sity (or analytic status) it also wants to maintain its
significant (but non-empirical) object. Theological dis-
course fails to meet either of the rigid criteria of the
principle. Thus it is non-sense. Even if theological
facts are said to be of another world, they are not sense-
data.

But the verification principle also, significantly,
rules out ethics. Also, it is not without interior diffi-
culties: (1) If we now have two kinds of reason, (sense
datum and mathematics); why stop at two? If only one type
(empirical discourse) makes a tight case, it suffers from
being unworkable. But, once the step is taken to two, it
remains to be demonstrated that cognitively meaningful discourse is limited to the analytical and the empirical. (2) Where does this verification principle itself fit in? It is neither necessary, nor confirmed by sense data. Perhaps it is enough to assert, as did Wittgenstein, that the verification principle is nonsense; but that it is useful nonsense. Or it might be defended as definitional: its proponents are merely defining reasonable discourse. But certainly Ayer would like to claim more than that. To say it is tautological would mean that no one need accept such a definition. Because of such difficulties, the challenge of the verification principle should not be exaggerated.

The third stage described by Ramsey is, in many ways, like the second, the work of one man, Ludwig Wittgenstein. It is interesting that chronologically, the second and third stages overlap. But Wittgenstein was never as rigid as Carnap, Schlick, Ayer, and others in empiricism. He is seen as a separate phase in empiricism in Great Britain because in him the more harsh, circumscribed logical positivism begins to give way to a broader, more open attitude. For instance, a key difference between Ayer's opus and Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is Wittgenstein's acknowledgement of the mystical. Although his comments are rather allusive, e.g. "There is indeed the inexpressible. This shows itself; it is the mystical", they granted sufficient significance to the validity of the mystical to draw the criticism of those more positivistically inclined.
The verification principle, nonsense in itself, was not a hard and fast rule for Wittgenstein. Rather, it was a mnemonic, a slogan which helps to organize propositions relating to sense experience. It is a clue to the logical behaviour of precise discourse, "enabling us to formulate the clearest, most precise, and least ambiguous of languages, and it was valuable in so far as its talk about 'verification' and 'criteria' implied that we would only understand a word when we had elaborated a context of use."10

The principle elaborates only one such context, and Wittgenstein would not allow the dismissal of other contexts as meaningless. Other language games are more mystical, more in tune with THAT the world is than the empirical HOW the world is. Although he did not develop this mystical approach in depth, he did leave open the possibility of meaningful theological discourse. The diversity of language contexts eliminates the possibility of reducing meaningful discourse to statements for which scientific evidence will suffice.

Wittgenstein's later catch-phrase was: "Don't look for meaning; look for use." As an analysis of diverse language games, philosophy ought to map the logical behaviour of terms within their contexts rather than imprison itself within the notion of 'fact'. This rejects the so-called 'luggage-tag' theories of language which the early Wittgenstein had himself sponsored. He commented, "The meaning of a word is no longer for us an object corresponding to it."11 Words find their meanings in diverse
contexts; one term may find a variety of meanings in a number of contexts. Hence the possibility of Russell's molecular language must be rejected. Because of the great diversity of contexts and logical behaviour, "Every assertion has its own logic" replaces the verification principle. Wittgenstein had opened the door for theological and metaphysical discourse to claim meaningfulness. But he had neither rejected the precise language contexts of science and logic, nor had he obtained for theology a license to return to wooly assertions and empirical proofs for the existence of God.

The further mellowing is a development along the lines of Wittgenstein's linguistic broadening. Language is far more complex than the verification principle acknowledged. Sense-data as the basic stratum for unambiguous language collapses. In its place, the basis for reasonable discourse becomes ordinary language. Freed from the strictures of the positivists, philosophy begins to discern types of uses for words. R. M. Hare, for example, points to the type of use illustrated by the word 'good'. He writes that it is descriptive of a kind of behaviour, but it is also commendatory. Nowell-Smith comes to a similar conclusion about the word 'callous'. It, too, is descriptive and more; in this case it is disapproving.

As implications of the development of empiricism for theological language, Ramsey briefly mentions: (1) Don't look for objects as meanings of words—especially 'God', 'spirit', 'soul', etc. Do not approach such nouns with a
'luggage-tag' sense of their meaning. (2) Problem words must be set in context, and their logical behaviour studied. (3) Look for the empirical grounding of words. Look for the ways in which theological words are anchored in sense experience.

The first implication draws upon Russell. If the grammatical structure of straightforward discourse can deceive, this applies a fortiori to theological language. 'He hit me' and 'God saved me' should not be given like interpretations, despite their apparent similarities in grammar. Further, theological discourse must beware of simplistic semantic comparisons. To see 'God is loving' in flat descriptive terms risks making God just like everybody else. If it is taken in the ordinary sense: (1) one must ask, "But what of the terminal cancer patient?" (2) It is falsifiable in experience. Or to remove it from the empirical: (3) if it is not falsifiable, then what is it?

Ramsey mentions another instance in which the implications can be seen, viz. the issue of transmutation. Does consecration really change the bread? If one responds to the empiricist challenge by asserting that it is only its underlying substance which is changed, the empiricist asks, (quite rightly) "Can you apply 'change' to that which is non-spatio-temporal?"

If instead we make an attempt to ground theological discourse, we note that the above issue neglects Russell's guidance to examine the particular logic of the assertion in question. In this way, we can distinguish between the logic
of 'very loving' and 'infinitely loving', of 'brown bread' and 'consecrated bread'. Theology need not assume that it is descriptive, at least not in the flat sense of the positivists. "Somehow, in some way, we must contrive to show the kind of situation which illuminates theological discourse."

But this is not the only response theology can take to the logical positivist challenge. The strict separation between science and religion, between the empirical and the theological, can be enthusiastically adopted by theology. This position detaches theological assertions from ordinary language, from the basic 'there is a table' assertions. The context in which theological terms are set to determine their meaningfulness is limited to the faithful. But such a course risks a radical separation of science and religion and invites social schizophrenia.

But Ramsey doubts that theology wants to deny all sense-data. Admittedly finding a means to fit in even some significance to experience is problematic. Thus the important question is not so much whether or not to respond to the challenge, but to what extent do we respond? The possible theological approaches are, of course, broader than to accept the verification problem as is, and either deny it, or welcome it, and go about one's irrational business. Theology can attack, criticize, and qualify each step of the empiricist syllogism as sketched by Gill. The approach Ramsey chooses to take is suggested by his question: Where is ordinary language paradigmatic of theological discourse?
Before presenting Ramsey's response to the empiricist challenge to Christian theology, it is essential that the background be given further detail. The reactions from Christian theology and the philosophy of religion have been varied, both in terms of content and strength. One crucial issue is the amount of ground granted the empiricist position from the start. Only by setting out these divergent stances in some detail can we determine the merits and faults of Ramsey's position with respect to this important issue.

A strong case for approaching Christian discourse from within an avowedly empiricist stance is argued by Richard Braithwaite in his 1955 Eddington Memorial lecture, "An Empiricist's View of the Nature of Religious Belief". Ramsey included the lecture in Christian Ethics and Contemporary Philosophy, including a discussion by Schofield, Mackinnon, and Ramsey himself. As Ramsey's response draws upon his own position, I shall explicate Braithwaite's argument here without comment and refer to the lecture in my discussion of Ramsey's view of the meaning of religious assertions. Braithwaite began with Eddington's rendition of the verification criterion of science. "The meaning of a scientific statement is to be ascertained by reference to the steps which would be taken to verify it." He points out that the principle is consonant with current philosophy of science. But he is cautious about its application, adding that Eddington himself distinguished his use of the principle from that
of the positivists. He sees the criterion as a helpful tool within science, whereas the positivists apply it to all language. Braithwaite believes that a broader rendering of the principle will make it more applicable to religious language without departing significantly from the spirit of empiricism. A clue to the great success of the principle in science is its ability to sort useful hypotheses from those which are useless precisely because there are no means by which to test them. The verification principle helps to distinguish statements that conform to the methodological requirements of description, observation, prediction, measurement, etc. Braithwaite concludes that a more fundamental meaning of the verification principle would read: "The meaning of any statement is given by the way it is used."15

In his attempt to apply this broadened principle to religious discourse, Braithwaite finds a helpful parallel in moral language. It, too, has been notoriously difficult to fit into the confines of the verification principle. Much work has been done, however, to determine the uses of moral discourse. To some extent it is used to express an attitude. Not to express that the speaker has the attitude--this can be verified. But, more particularly, that he approves the moral assertion. But even this is not precise or basic enough for Braithwaite. He argues that to make a moral assertion is to express one's intention--to declare that, given the opportunity, one intends to act (or not to act) in accordance with the course he approves.
Certainly one does not always fulfill his intentions, but Braithwaite argues that a man who realizes he may not have the strength to carry out his intentions will not necessarily be insincere in his expression of them.

Braithwaite labels this the 'conative' theory of moral assertions. 'Smoking marijuana is wrong' is translated 'Given the opportunity, I intend to refrain from smoking marijuana.' But not all expressions of intention are moral in character. 'I ought to give Barbara the book' may mean no more than that she needs a book which I have. Braithwaite's requirement here is that the intention is fitted into a general policy of action or a general attitude. Under this criterion, it might be my general policy to give all the research students in my department my most recent publication. In which case, my intention to give Barbara the book is a moral one.

Braithwaite goes on to draw a profound parallel on the above basis, between religious and moral assertions. The view which I put forward for your consideration is that the intention of a Christian to follow a Christian way of life is not only the criterion for the sincerity of his belief in the assertions of Christianity; it is the criterion for the meaningfulness of his assertions. Just as the meaning of a moral assertion is given by its use in expressing the asserter's intention to act, so far as in him lies, in accordance with the moral principle involved, so the meaning of a religious assertion is given by its use in expressing the asserter's intention to follow a specified policy of behaviour.16

Braithwaite cites as an example, 'God is love', and maintains that this expresses the asserter's intention to pursue an 'agapistic' life-style. The assertion of this
moral intention exhausts the meaning of the religious claim, (at least as far as the broadened verification principle allows). Intentions are, after all, empirical. We can verify that a person did (or did not) intend to lie to us. Here, however, one may see a fault in Braithwaite's case. This framework would rule out the possibility of ever intending to do wrong. The assertion, 'Lying is wrong, but I intend to do it,' would be impossible, since, by Braithwaite's reckoning, it would be translated, 'I do not intend to lie, but I intend to lie.' Other weaknesses will be discussed in connection with those who have raised the objections.

One point is anticipated by Braithwaite, and is used to further refine his argument. If, under this scheme, religious assertions are all basically the expressions of the intention to follow a policy of love, what becomes of religious claims to exclusivism and distinctiveness? Braithwaite responds by claiming that the uniqueness is given in the particular stories around which each religion arranges its way of life. He appeals to Matthew Arnold, who used the terms 'parable' and 'fairy-tale' to illustrate Christianity's essential imaginative element. The point of such 'stories' is their capacity to nurture the desired ethical attitude rather than their veracity. These 'stories' range from the straightforwardly empirical, 'Jesus was buried in the tomb', to those which might be said to transcend history, 'He ascended and sitteth on the right hand of God.' Braithwaite comments: 'A man
is not, I think, a professing Christian unless he both proposes to live according to Christian principles and associates his intention with thinking of Christian stories; but he need not believe that the empirical propositions presented by the stories correspond to empirical fact."^{17}

Hence, in Braithwaite's view religious language has but two functions: (1) Parallel to moral language, religious language is used to express the intention to pursue a particular policy. (2) Religious language uses 'stories' to express a non-empirical event (not necessarily historical) which nurtures, inspires, motivates the life-style. Although other religious assertions can have different tasks, these statements fit in with the general framework of religious language's functions above. Further, such assertions, being non-empirical, depart from Braithwaite's conceptualisation of the verification principle and thus cut themselves off from the proper consideration under the philosophy of religion.

A philosopher of religious knowledge who grants the empiricists slightly less dominion is the heir of Wittgenstein, John Wisdom. Unfortunately, for reasons which (I hope) will emerge, Wisdom's insights will have to be presented in a somewhat disjointed fashion. This apology having been made, we can begin our discussion of Wisdom with Wittgenstein. In his *Investigations*, Wittgenstein arrived at a radically different interpretation of epistemology. In his now-famous 'duck-rabbit' he demonstrated that we do not simply 'see'; we 'see as'. His ambivalent
Wittgenstein argued that we see in terms of aspects. We might view his sketch from the aspect of rabbit, until someone whispers 'duck' and another aspect 'dawns' upon us, completely changing our recognition. Though a change has taken place, it is difficult for Wittgenstein to specify what it is that has changed. When two observers differ as to whether they are seeing a rabbit or a duck, there is no factual discrepancy; they are looking at the same thing. There is only one fact, yet paradoxically, two different interpretations.

Wittgenstein believes that 'seeing as' is not a part of perception, but a part of thought. If one is having the visual experience, one is also thinking of what one is seeing. It is when this insight is applied to one's view of the world in its totality that its significance for the issue becomes clear. Insofar as the metaphysician is trying to construct some kind of model, grid, or map to integrate the various, disjointed 'facts' of the world, he is here given a new justification for his work.

Drawing upon this key insight, Wisdom begins his consideration of religious knowledge and the validity of religious language with a well-known parable:

Two people return to their long-neglected garden and find among the weeds a few of the old plants surprisingly vigorous. One says to the other, 'It must be that a gardener has been coming and doing something about these plants'. Upon inquiry they find that no neighbour has ever seen anyone at work in their garden. The
first man says to the other, 'He must have worked while people slept.' The other says, 'No, someone would have heard him, and besides, anybody who cared about the plants would have kept down these weeds.' The first man says, 'Look at the way these are arranged. There is purpose and a feeling for beauty here. I believe that someone comes, someone invisible to mortal eyes. I believe that the more carefully we look the more we shall find confirmation of this.' They examine the garden ever so carefully and sometimes they come on new things suggesting that a gardener comes and sometimes they come on new things suggesting the contrary and even that a malicious person has been at work. Besides examining the garden carefully they also study what happens to gardens left without attention. Each learns all the other one learns about this and about the garden. Consequently, when after all this, one says, 'I still believe a gardener comes,' while the other says 'I don't' their different words now reflect no difference as to what they have found in the garden, no difference as to what they would find in the garden if they looked further and no difference about how fast untended gardens fall into disorder. At this stage, in this context, the gardener hypothesis has ceased to be experimental, the difference between one who accepts and one who rejects is now not a matter of the one expecting something the other does not expect. What is the difference between them? The one says, 'A gardener comes unseen and unheard. He is manifested only in his works with which we are all familiar', the other says 'There is no gardener' and with this difference about what they say about the gardener goes a difference in how they feel towards the garden, in spite of the fact that neither expects anything of it which the other does not expect.

In a sense, Wisdom, like Braithwaite, has allowed the empiricist attack much influence. He has acknowledged the point from Hume, Ayer, and company that God is not an experimental issue to be resolved by an empirical methodology. Already he has no doubt alienated many theists, and for diverse reasons. Some may object that he has denied God any place in experience (although Wisdom would deny this);
these would attempt to retain an empirically demonstrable proof of God's existence. Conversely, many would charge that Wisdom has made God too naturalistic; merely a matter of personal taste.

Wisdom's parable does serve to demonstrate Wittgenstein's insight into 'seeing as'. It shows that the question of the existence of God is no longer a matter of bringing to light new, unexpected facts, of gathering more and more empirical evidence to demonstrate another geographical area in which no God was found. Unfortunately, his parable was in many ways too strong, too effective at showing the empirical ambiguity of the question.

This idyllic neutrality was enthusiastically welcomed by philosophers who perceived points not exactly in favour of theism, nor (necessarily) intended by Wisdom. In *New Essays in Philosophical Theology*, Antony Flew used the parabolic garden to construct an impressive variation on the verification attack. Although the two explorers in Flew's rendition go to great lengths to verify the one's claim that an invisible gardener comes—e.g. they set up a barbed wire fence and patrol the grounds with bloodhounds—no new evidence of the gardener is forthcoming. Apparently, the brave explorers have already missed the point of Wisdom's garden. Still the faithful believer is not convinced. This behaviour leads perfectly into Flew's primary charge: "... it often seems to people who are not religious as if there was no conceivable event or series of events the occurrence of which would be admitted by
sophisticated religious people to be a sufficient reason for conceding, 'There wasn't a God after all', or 'God does not really love us then'. . . I therefore put the simple central question: 'What would have to occur or to have occurred to constitute for you a disproof of the love of, or of the existence of, God?'"

The charge, in contrast with the earlier verification issue, is that an assertion which is not in principle falsifiable, is not meaningful. Flew bases this point upon the tendency of apologists to defend their faith against the probing questions of the empiricists with increasingly dubious qualifications. What begins in Wisdom's parable as a comparison of the evidence, seems to degenerate into the evasion of the skeptic's questions by the believer. Flew says that this process of qualification comes to a halt at some point, but that it is not always stopped before the original asserter has completely demolished his own argument; 'the death by a thousand qualifications.'

Flew's point was picked up by the Oxford moral philosopher, Richard Hare. In his contribution to New Essays in Philosophical Theology, he offers an alternate view of beliefs. Hare concedes Flew's major premise, that it is the nature of religious beliefs that nothing can decisively undermine them in the believer. Religious views are simply a kind of outlook or interpretation of one's experience—but they are completely unverifiable and unfalsifiable. Hare invents the term 'blik' to cover this unquestioning attitude.
Hare gives an example of a man who fears that all professors are out to murder him. We take him to see professors in the hope that we can demonstrate to him how harmless most of them are. But those signs we take as perfect evidence for our case, he interprets to be due to the craftiness of those hoping to carry out their sinister purpose. Kindly professors notwithstanding, the man will hang onto his blik.

Hare points out that it is important to distinguish between right and wrong bliks. This man's blik is obviously an insane one, and ours is (presumably) sane. But no one has NO bliks. Hare cites as other examples of bliks: the blik that the steel frame of one's automobile will stay rigid and not fall to bits, the blik that everything happens by chance (Hare states that this is something that no evidence could verify or falsify--like the converse, the blik that nothing happens by chance). What is crucial is the behaviour such bliks foster. Obviously, someone with a paranoid blik about professors will take steps to defend himself as one approaches. It is not merely attitudinal because of such blik's effects upon the things which we do. In many ways, this argument parallels the conclusions of Braithwaite about religious language. Like Braithwaite, Hare's point is that beliefs are meaningful in virtue of the behaviour which they encourage. Unlike Wisdom's garden, beliefs are not a matter of idle speculation. But this is gained at the cost of conceding the empiricist's point that factual evidence counts neither for nor against the 'story' or the 'blik'.
Basil Mitchell continues the story-telling with the tale of the stranger and the resistance partisan. During a war, in an occupied country, a member of the resistance and a stranger meet and spend the night in conversation. The partisan is greatly impressed by the stranger who encourages him to have faith, and tells him that he, the stranger, is in fact the leader of the resistance. The partisan is completely convinced of the stranger's trustworthiness. Although they never get a chance to talk again, the partisan sees the stranger from time to time. He is sometimes seen helping members of the resistance, and the partisan gratefully proclaims his virtue to his friends. But at other times he is seen helping the occupying forces, and even turning over patriots. Then the friends cast aspersions upon his reliability, but the partisan remains faithful. He believes that the stranger knows best how to accomplish the goal. When the actions of the stranger are most suspect, the friends demand of the partisan, "What would it take for you to admit that you are wrong; that he is in fact on the other side?" But the partisan will not put the stranger to the test because of his trust in him.

Mitchell comments "The partisan of the parable does not allow anything to count decisively against the proposition, 'The stranger is on our side'. This is because he has committed himself to trust the stranger. But he of course recognizes that the stranger's ambiguous behaviour does count against what he believes about him. It is precisely this situation which constitutes the trial of his faith." 21
Mitchell further argues that 'God loves men' resembles 'the Stranger is on our side' in not being conclusively falsifiable. They can both be treated in at least three different ways: (1) as provisional hypotheses to be discarded if experience tells against them; (2) as significant articles of faith; (3) as vacuous formulae (expressing perhaps, a desire for reassurance) to which experience makes no difference and which makes no difference to life.

The Christian, once he has committed himself, is precluded by his faith from taking up the first attitude: "Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God. He is in constant danger, as Flew has observed, of slipping into the third. But he need not; and, if he does, it is a failure in faith as well as in logic." 22

All other factors aside, Mitchell's parable is perhaps the most fitting to the debate. In the first place, this is hardly a matter of idle speculation. The loyalties of the stranger are both ambiguous and extremely crucial. It is also a question of trust, rather than the empirically-slanted issue of existence. Finally, the facts are significantly different in two ways: (1) The evidence under consideration is not the kind with which empiricism is adept at describing, observing, predicting, and measuring. Nonetheless there is evidence, and it is agreed evidence. More important, (2) Mitchell's situation is one in which conclusive falsifiability can be asserted in principle. There will be an end to the war; the truth about the stranger will emerge.
Finally, we must consider one last parable built upon this second point. John Hick writes of two men travelling along a road. One believes it is the way to the Celestial City; the other does not believe that it has a destination. Neither has been along the road before, so that they cannot say what they will see at the end, or even around the next bend. The one comforts himself through adversity that this is the way to the City. During times of pleasure he realizes that these are encouragements for him to go on. The other sees their journey as an aimless ramble and simply takes what pleasure he can from the good times, and endures the bad. As in Wisdom's garden, the issue is not an experimental one; but it has nonetheless been a very real one. Although they do not see any different evidence nor expect to find anything different on the road, the ultimate answer, when they turn the last corner, means that one of them will be right and the other wrong. One of the traveller's expectations were true, and one's were false.

Hick has picked up what he feels to be a crucial claim of Christianity in relation to the verification/falsifiability debate. Although the mere survival of death would not conclusively decide the general question of theism, i.e. the 'after-world' might be as ambiguous as the present life, the after-life would conclusively decide the veracity (or falsifiability—and hence the meaningfulness) of Christian claims. This is because of the exactness of Christian eschatological beliefs. For the Christian, the after-life
will manifest the authority of Christ. One further aspect of this argument—and an odd one at that—is the assymmetrical character of the question with relation to the verification debate. As far as after-life in general, it is one expectation that can be verified but can never be falsified. If we survive death, we shall know it; but if we do not, we shall not know that we have not.

More attention will be given to both Hick and Wisdom below. Before going on to two rather different responses to the challenge, some integrating comments are in order. In this exchange of story-telling, we can see how far the issue has ranged from the primary charge of the positivists. Although the status of such imaginative discourse might be problematic (is it metaphysical, symbolic, are these stories meaningful, are they models?) it is certain that we are no longer within the rigid confines of the positivist boundaries for meaningful discourse. Although Ayer attempted to slide out from under the label 'atheist', Flew's argument obviously concedes significance to religious language, but it disputes its claim to an objective referent. In other words, he is not so much saying that non-empirical, non-analytic discourse is meaningless, as that the God of theism is himself meaningless by being qualified out of significance. (Along these lines, Hick writes in his Philosophy of Religion, "... the common core to the concepts of 'existence', 'fact', and 'reality', is the idea of 'making a difference'. To say that x exists or is real ... is to claim that the character of the universe differs in some
specific way from the character that an x-less universe would have".24)

More to the point is the significance granted the empiricist claim by the various philosophers of religion. Braithwaite and Hare both admit that the positivist attack on the fact claims of religious discourse must be conceded. Both turn to demonstrate the emotive, intentional, imaginative, and ethical significance of what is otherwise meaningless. We must reserve judgement on Wisdom and Hick, partly because neither position has been examined in enough depth. Although Wisdom has shown that it is not a difference in facts which divide the theist from the skeptic, both characters do use facts to argue their positions. At this point, then, Wisdom's full point remains a mystery. Hick, on the other hand, has gone a long way to answering the demand for verifiability in his Celestial City parable. But because his road, like Wisdom's garden, contains no disputed facts, his position, too, is in doubt. How does the ambiguous road relate to his insight into existence, viz. that the existence of x means that there is a difference between an x-influenced universe, and an x-less universe? Basil Mitchell is not so ambiguous. With his partisan parable, his position with respect to the positivists (and more tolerant empiricists) is quite strong indeed. In the first place, his parable gives us some insight into the kind of facts that come into question. They are facts concerning ambiguous behaviour; facts which demand a judgement despite the lack of conclusive evidence.
More significant is the condition of the partisan. First, Mitchell makes the point of the gravity of the question. If Wisdom's garden is the world, it is not so clear in his fable as in Mitchell's how significant the way in which one sees the world is, how crucial is what one 'sees the world as.' Secondly, as the stranger exists, our attention is drawn away from that question to the more important one—as James Richmond states it, our attention is drawn to the essential element of trust in the man-God relationship. This perfectly counters Flew's raising the frightening issue of theodicy.²⁵ The occurrence of evil is provided for by the ambiguous behaviour of the stranger, but it is partisan's trust which is decisive.

We must now explore another side of the responses to the verification positivist issue. This is a response from Alasdair MacIntyre and D. Z. Phillips.²⁶ Although they take different approaches, both argue that the verification/falsification issue is not applicable to religious language. Phillips develops Wittgenstein's concept of a language game to apply to a distinct domain of religious discourse. Taking the diversity of the tasks of diverse language games as his cue, Phillips holds that theological discourse is an autonomous game with its own rules. Like­wise no account of religious language which does not consider what the believer means to say will be adequate. But this is not to make the meanings of religious assertions subjective or private. Rather, the meaning must be seen within the total context of the language community. This
is to say that while assessment of assertions does take place within the community, no assessment of the total 'game' from another 'game' is logically possible. All criteria are internal to the language-using community. It is, for Phillips, unintelligible to demand the justification of one 'game's' criteria and rules by another. Nonetheless, and this is what makes his case difficult to scan, Phillips insists that religious language games are not isolated from life.

Like Phillips, Alasdair MacIntyre holds that the verification principle is inadequate, and that religious assertions must instead be checked against the community from which they rise. In an extended footnote, MacIntyre discusses the difficulties of applying tools of empirical or philosophical analysis to religious discourse: 27

To offer a philosophical analysis of religious utterances ... we must see how they are used in all the complexity and variety of the contexts in which they are used. And to do this is to see at once that what puzzles us about religious language is not so much individual utterances as the whole business of religion and the religious ways of talking.

MacIntyre is careful to point out that this autonomous language game does not necessitate no connection with ordinary language. In fact, religious discourse draws many of its key words from their ordinary usage; to praise, to love, to express awe. Likewise MacIntyre is careful to disassociate himself from interpretations of a radical separation. He denies, for instance, that the believer is able to understand assertions which are otherwise meaningless by the gift of grace. 'Mountain neither fire
red here' is no less non-sensical for the religious person.

Still, his thesis is closely tied to that of Phillips in his view of an autonomous language game. Central to his position, however, is the faith of the individual believer. In response to Flew, MacIntyre states that the religious philosopher faces an either-or in his response to the twin attacks of verification and theodicy. "Either the believer allows that the facts of evil count against his assertion or he does not concede this." To take the latter course (to say that the facts of evil do not undermine one's faith) is to ensure the meaningless of one's assertions under the falsification principle. But MacIntyre attacks the former position as compromising the nature of faith. He argues (against Crombie and Hick) that a cancer patient and a loving God cannot be resolved by a wonderful future.

In somewhat poetic fashion, MacIntyre paints rather than argues the second alternative. He cites the example of Wordsworth as one who came to faith through an experience of suffering at the hands of evil. "(Wordsworth) ... does not invoke belief in a better world to support an already held belief in a good God. He comes to believe in a better world because he encounters just the kind of thing that on the Verificationist view makes against belief in such a God".

Against Braithwaite, MacIntyre distinguishes between the man who accepts all the facts, and even adopts the
intention to live a Christian life, pursue a policy of 'agape', and a Christian who in some elusive way goes beyond all of that. His point is that the man lacks some deep and vital commitment. These 'stories' which Braithwaite describes go beyond encouraging intentions. Myths, imaginative literature, poetic symbolism incorporate central situations in human existence. Further, these attitudes, intentions, commitment, could not be maintained without thinking in some way that they were deeply true. The religious man becomes receptive to these stories by submission to authority. Only authority can justify Christian discourse—and this is why it is non-sensical to MacIntyre to justify religious assertions from outside the community of faith. If religious assertions are to be justified as explanatory hypotheses about the universe, they are bound to fail. Hence, only authority will suffice to justify religious assertions. After ruling out the Bible and the Pope as authorities, MacIntyre concludes that Christ is the final authority upon which religious language is justified.

MacIntyre and Phillips outline a position which is both a powerful rejection of the verification principle and a genuine alternative to the more empirical responses above. But one wonders if they have not succeeded in making faith less relevant and more meaningless in their attempt to defend its distinctive character. Phillip's point that a religious assertion cannot be fairly considered apart from an understanding of what the asserter
meant by it, is a strong reminder of the importance that 'seeing as' plays in the meaning of a statement. MacIntyre is certainly right to oppose Braithwaite in the latter's reduction of religious language to intentional functions. But although he is able to point to functions more characteristic of religion than the mere performance of good deeds, he is unable to fill out his insight. An in-depth discussion of religious discourse's function is still lacking. Still, the fact that one can conform to Christian behaviour and even accept certain Christian historical facts, but not necessarily be a Christian in terms of faith, must be kept in mind.
It would certainly be comforting (for me at least) to begin this discussion of Ramsey's response to the empiricist challenge with a nice short-hand label; e.g., 'at heart, Ramsey was an empiricist'; or, 'basically, Ramsey was an idealist after all'. Even 'Ramsey stood firmly between the empiricist and idealist traditions' would be helpful. Unfortunately, such a label should be a conclusion gained from a discussion, rather than a premise. In this case, however, I hope to show that any such label will be a distorting and ill-fitting tag when applied to Ramsey, whose ideas ranged over a broader spectrum than 'empiricist', 'idealist', or 'existentialist' might imply. This, too, remains to be shown.

Another temptation arising from a consideration of Ramsey's theoretical work—because it is so well integrated—is to present his major ideas: models, disclosures, logically odd discourse, empirical fit, etc. in one complete piece. The task of communicating the whole of his approach would be greatly eased if it could be shown whole, rather than presented in some disjointed order. There is little doubt, though, that it is his concept of disclosures which is primary. Indeed, Ramsey acknowledges this in his response to Braithwaite's criticisms of his Models and Mystery.¹ This being so, we shall begin with this concept. For the moment at least, we shall approach 'disclosure' as an epistemological concept. As such, it will provide a basis from which to explore his more methodological insights.
into models, his understanding of the logical peculiarities of religious assertions, and, further, the problem of the confirmation of religious knowledge, the role of commitment, and the possibilities for a rehabilitated metaphysics.

As David Edwards points out, Ramsey began his academic career lecturing along the philosophical tradition of Berkeley.² This is confirmed by an unpublished manuscript from this period (1949) entitled Experience and Personality. In his introduction, Ramsey acknowledges his debt to Berkeley, as well as Whitehead, Ward, Bradley, in their insistence on experience as an organic unity. It is 'idealistic' in character throughout. But, significantly, he remarks in the introduction that two of his objectives are: (1) to find a path between analytic and empirical philosophy: "No one, without courting disaster, could start even the least hopeful philosophical journey anywhere except at the twin towns of experience and language." But (2) "My main purpose is to point out that both Experience and Language are far more complicated than the simple piety of recent Logical Positivists would have us believe."

Over fifteen years later, recalling his intentions in Religious Language, Ramsey wrote that it "was written at a time when ... it was necessary to show (1) that religious language should not be read as if it were flat and altogether descriptive ... (2) that 'what there is' is not restricted to 'empirical facts' supposed to be solid, independent, utterly objective sense data."³
The similarity—across sixteen years—is hardly coincidental. Ramsey saw his task to be the clarification of the logic of religious discourse which would in turn serve to justify its meaningfulness; and which would break through the restrictive definition of experience advocated by the positivists. The concept of disclosure (absent from the 1949 work) provides a keystone around which Ramsey integrates his analytic and his empirical thoughts.

In contrast to the verificationists, and even the broader sense of the criterion of meaning we have seen in Braithwaite, Ramsey saw the meaningfulness of religious assertions as verified by their evocative capacity. In the concept of cosmic disclosures, the justification of religious assertions as reasonable and meaningful discourse is found. This is not to say that a disclosure allows the kind of verification possible for scientific assertions—far from it. Rather, the concept of disclosures serves to broaden the understanding of human experience. If the evocative function of religious assertions is to be taken as a criterion of their meaningfulness, the reductionist ontology of the positivists must be shown to be inadequate.

In Religious Language Ramsey demonstrates the inadequacy of the positivist position by reference to experience which presupposes, but goes beyond the descriptive, spatio-temporal, observable phenomena of science. Not that this was a prodigious feat; the stringent positivist criteria had been relaxed; there had been a progressive mellowing. Wittgenstein had always acknowledged experience beyond the
language of empiricism. His later work opened the lingu­istic possibilities of mapping the logic of assertions built upon this broadened empiricism.

But the epistemological difficulties were great. How could we be certain, how could we know HOW we knew of these wider experiences? Taking a clue from Butler's Analogy, Ramsey argued that it was reasonable to act decisively in situations of gravity when conclusive facts were lacking. Here is a first step towards the resolution of the problem. It is reasonable to make urgent decisions on the basis of relatively few assured facts, when they are all we have to go on. Ramsey's example was of a man walking along a river-bank alerted to a drowning child. Though the facts alone—the current, the depth of the river, the child's weight, the man's swimming ability, etc.—could never account for the reasons for making an attempt, Ramsey points out that we would think someone distracted who did not act to try to save the child.

Here is a situation in which human experience clearly goes 'beyond the empirical data'. Yet, in the example, we find more than a broadened view of experience. We find a means of accepting both religious and moral discourse as significant—for reasons which are both empirical and logical. Empirical, because in the moment of decision the man on the bank had experienced something beyond the 'flat facts'. Logical, because talk of such empirical situations could evoke response in its ability to disclose a moral duty.
Solidly anchored as it is in human experience, the concept of disclosures could be demonstrated in a broad spectrum of human life. Ramsey writes of disclosures in mathematics, e.g. $1, \ 1\ 1/2, \ 1\ 2/3, \ 1\ 3/4, \ 1\ 4/5, \ldots$ discloses ... $2^!$, in geometry and visual perception, e.g. these twelve lines looking like two squares with joined corners, suddenly take on depth and become a cube. (Note here the dependency upon Wittgenstein's seeing-as).

But the most fruitful for Ramsey's purposes were his examples of moral and personal disclosures. He describes the sort of disclosure given in learning someone's name:

We may have had a great deal of what Russell would have called 'knowledge by description'. We may first have known him as the man in the bowler hat who came to sit next to us in the train. He then appears opposite us for lunch, and we begin to see him regularly. We now know him as the man who invariably orders 'Double Diamond'; the man who does the Times crossword in fifteen minutes; and as the weeks pass we come to know him as the man who has a wife and three children; too much herbaceous border to weed in the evenings, too few vegetables left after the frost, too little money left at the end of the month. But one day he says, offering his hand: 'Look here--I'm Nigel Short.' At that moment there is a disclosure, an individual becomes a person, the ice does not continue to melt, it breaks. We have not discovered just one more fact to be added to those we have been collecting day by day. There has now been some significant 'encounter', which is not just a moving of palm on palm, no mere correlation of mouth noises, not just heads nodding in some kind of mutual harmony. 

With other examples of personal disclosure, he is able to draw together a number of loose strands. The connections between theological and ethical dimensions are
again brought home—as they were when the positivists dispensed with metaphysics, theology, and ethics. Further, Ramsey finds in moral disclosures fruitful situations for describing disclosures of religious significance, or 'cosmic disclosures'. Pointing out that Kant had identified the call of duty and religious claims, Ramsey argues that disclosures of morality within human experience also allow for an empirically legitimate religious disclosure.

Finally, in the mixing of ethical and religious discernment, Ramsey found yet another strength in his disclosure concept—one which is quite helpfully applied to a perpetual sore-point for empiricists. This was the disclosure of one's subjectivity. All three elements—the moral, the personal or subjective, and the religious—combine beautifully in the story of David and Nathan. In II Samuel 12.1-7 the prophet Nathan comes to David after the king had attempted a cover-up. Nathan's words are paraphrased by Ramsey:

There are ... two men in the city; 'the one rich and the other poor'. The rich man has many flocks and herds; the poor man has nothing save one little ewe lamb. Along come the guests; the rich man hesitates to kill his own cattle; takes the poor man's lamb and prepares it for his great dinner. Here is an 'objective' story. Faced with the situation David judges that the man who did this is 'worthy to die' and 'shall restore the lamb four-fold'. So far the story is one which might have been told in a Law Court, and David has given an objective judgement on it ... So far the prophetic mission of Nathan is not obvious. The characteristic touch only comes in verse 7: 'Thou art the man.' The penny drops; there is indeed a disclosure. David recognizes that the story is about none other than—himself. It is significant that at this point, when there has been
this disclosure, the language traditionally used for prophetic insight becomes at once appropriate currency; 'Thus saith the Lord.' (RL, p. 130)

The ethical disclosure—if we can divide a single event for our present purposes—is obvious. David's actions are condemned by his own judgement. Ramsey discusses the subjective disclosure at length in a number of writings. It is closely tied to his contributions to tracing the logic of first person assertions (see below). For the moment two related points need to be made; (1) in Religious Language and elsewhere, Ramsey closely ties the cosmic disclosure to a revealing commitment: "Whenever a cosmic disclosure occurs ... I respond with a commitment, a self-affirmation, I realize myself in that response."6 (2) This self-disclosure itself transcends the 'facts'. In following a duty, seeing deeper into the 'facts' about myself, in pursuing the elusive 'notion' of the one who is the subject of my first-person statements, I discern a 'paradigm of mystery', logically irreducible because 'I' is never exhaustively objectifiable.

In his idea of a cosmic disclosure, Ramsey believed that the subject (me) was necessarily matched by an objective reference. This claim is based on the discernment of being acted upon. "We may recall, for instance, that David in the presence of Nathan came to himself subjectively when there bore down upon him objectively, through the parable or model that Nathan used, a moral challenge".7 It is essential to grasp the directional balance Ramsey seeks to establish in his concept of disclosures. The
'objectivity' he is speaking of is not in the sense of empirical data—things and processes fit for scientific analysis—nor is it the 'objectivity' of statistics, social sciences, and unbiased reporting. "It is the objectivity of what declares itself to us—challenges us in a way that persons may do." When he is talking about the subjectivity given in a disclosure, Ramsey tends to speak in terms of one's own identity being disclosed (to himself). In speaking of the objective reference of disclosures, he talks of an active reference confronting the person. (It is perhaps noteworthy that, as far as the subject is concerned, Ramsey's terminology varied slightly from the relatively interchangeable 'discernment', 'disclosure', and 'insight' of his early works, Religious Language and Models and Mystery, to the virtually exclusive use of 'disclosure'—the most mentally passive of the three terms—in later works such as Models for Divine Activity, and 'Facts and Disclosures'.)

This, then, is the rough picture of the concept of disclosures. Although part of its strength lies in Ramsey's unspoken ambiguity in those hazy areas 'whereof one cannot speak', it is inevitable that one should feel the need for more detail. What—if it is fair to ask—is the content of disclosures? What exactly are they; insight, intuition, a leap, imagination, a notion?

A fuller understanding of the concept can be obtained by seeing the ways in which Ramsey aligns 'disclosures' with the work of others. One example is the comparison of 'disclosure' and Berkeley's 'notion' found in the
article, "Berkeley and the Possibility of an Empirical Metaphysics". For Berkeley all significant words stand for ideas, and ideas were either from without, through the senses, or from within, by the 'operations of the mind'. But he was puzzled by this concept of the operations of the mind. At first, in deference to Locke's rule for significant words, he was tempted to reject these operations outright. But this would require the elimination of many terms Berkeley wished to retain. The difficulty was that for Berkeley ideas impressed themselves upon a strictly passive mind; the concept of a passive idea of the mind's activity was scandalous.

Ramsey wants to argue that Berkeley introduced the concept 'notions' to cover these curious operations, but that he lacked the logical equipment to state his position clearly. Hence interest in this area, when 'notions' are not summarily dismissed as an accident or eccentricity, has centred upon notions of will, of loving, hating, etc., to the neglect of operations of the mind. Building upon Berkeley's own defence of notions against attacks charging him with metaphysical rubbish, Ramsey claims that 'notions' help to bring out the logical oddness of personal activity as contrasted with descriptive discourse about the content of ideas. Berkeley had stated that 'spirit' was not repulsive in the way the 'substance' was, precisely because it was an activity. 'Person', 'will', 'loving', etc. are all references to activity--notions are the notion each of us has of his own activity.
The parallel with Ramsey can be made by referring back to his concept of self-disclosure. We become aware of the notion of our personal mental activity when, around 'ideas', we come to our self in disclosure. An adequate empiricism has not only to include its 'objects' with typically descriptive language, but must also be able to characterize each of us in the epistemologically, logically, and existentially curious 'fact' of our self given in an experience of self-disclosure.

Indeed Berkeley comes very close to stating that every sentence will exhibit both a descriptive and a notional logic—not, of course, in equal proportion at all times. There will be statements whose logic on the face of it are wholly descriptive: "There is a table", or "That table is brown". There will be others whose logic seems to be purely notional: "How nice." Nonetheless (and here is a typically tantalising Ramsey statement): "Notions and ideas were mutually implicating elements of every genuine assertion." To follow the implications of such a comment (as I shall attempt to do below) would be to establish a personal activity in each and every statement, as Ramsey sets out in his discussions of strictly first person statements. It would be to establish a degree (however slight) of personal commitment in any empirical assertion. But Ramsey does not pursue this course.

A more recent thinker with whom the concept of disclosure has been discussed and defended is H. D. Lewis. In response to the question, "What do disclosures actually
disclose?", Ramsey argues that Lewis is concerned lest disclosures disclose nothing distinctively Christian, nothing transcendent. He writes that the primary aim of his talk of disclosures is "to indicate the kind of empirical grounding which a phrase or sentence may have when it does not work merely as a plain description ... (If it is a religious assertion), ... we shall only know what it means when inter alia a disclosure has occurred."10 Here we have further evidence that, to some extent, the concept of disclosures functions linguistically as a criterion of meaning. As the verification principle establishes the meaningfulness of empirical assertions, so a religious assertion is justified by its capacity to evoke a disclosure.

Secondly, Ramsey remarks that there is "a certain arbitrariness about the way in which we talk about what such a disclosure discloses ... talk about the object of a disclosure always comes within a contextual setting."11 The objective reference of cosmic disclosures is guaranteed, self-authenticating; while of course the language used to describe, refer to, communicate, praise the reference is not.

When a disclosure has occurred, we certainly cannot be mistaken about the objective reference, the objectivity which has been disclosed. We cannot be mistaken about that 'something' which is other than ourselves. But we certainly can be mistaken about the articulation of this which is objectively given. Indeed, I have been at pains to point out that there are no guaranteed articulations. In that sense, we can never be absolutely right about what a disclosure discloses.12

Certainly, as the context is widened, more and more models, more diverse articulations of what has been disclosed
are possible. But for Ramsey, the objective reference is a unity, some would say monolithic. Any diversity a religious language might exhibit is due to the multiplicity of contexts and models available, and not to its objective reference. This is a strange and difficult—because—subtle point. The undifferentiated quality of the referent is (depending on one's viewpoint, but clearly for Ramsey) a philosophical necessity. Any distinctions between various objects of cosmic disclosures would create havoc for the objectivity of what is disclosed. Further, the unity of the objective reference proves to have serious implications for the possibility of an empirical metaphysics. Diverse phenomena and experience can be integrated under a single comprehensive term such as the 'Absolute'. This integration would be impossible to accomplish under a many-faceted unifier.

This subtle relationship between diverse experience and a cosmic disclosure is further defined by reference to one final comment by which Ramsey hopes to allay Lewis' fears. He writes that the situations to which he appeals for the human experience which characterizes disclosure situations are not finite, for "in every disclosure the object can eventually bear the name 'God'." Whether or not it is the man's responsibility to translate his 'cosmic' experience into the name 'God', the corollary to this statement is that God discloses himself through human disclosure situations. Referring to a group discussion, Jerry Gill writes that Ramsey states, "quite emphatically that cosmic
disclosures, which give rise to talk about God and His activity, are mediated by means of more common disclosures. He defined a cosmic disclosure in terms of discerning something about total reality through the disclosures of everyday life.\textsuperscript{13}

One of the most illuminating (and intriguing) epistemological dialogues centred upon disclosures is found in Ramsey's contribution to \textit{Intellect and Hope}, a collection of essays on Michael Polanyi. Although his essay is concerned to link the epistemological insights of Polanyi with J. L. Austin's linguistic work, my immediate purpose is to trace the relationships between Polanyi's thought and Ramsey's concept of disclosure. (I shall pick up the Austin parallels in the linguistic discussion).

There are, from the very first, some extremely promising similarities between these two thinkers. As Ramsey points out, it was Polanyi's intention to highlight those features of epistemology most neglected by the positivist reductionism. Both see the need for a broadened empiricism. Polanyi's distinctive contribution to epistemology is to describe the activity of knowing (as opposed to knowledge in some static sense—whatever that might mean) as, "a personal participation of the knower in all acts of understanding."\textsuperscript{14}

Ramsey introduces Polanyi's example of the knowing activity in the case of a psychiatrist who showed his students a patient having a mild epileptic fit. The class was to decide if it was a genuine or a hystero-epileptic fit.
The psychiatrist concluded the discussion: "Gentlemen, you have seen a true epileptic seizure. I cannot tell you how to recognize it; you will learn this by more extensive experience."

The psychiatrist knew the disease, as shown by his ability to recognize a genuine fit, but he did not know how he did this. He recognized it, argues Polanyi, by attending to its totality while relying on a multitude of particular, unspecifiable clues. As he is only subsidiarily aware of these, he is not able to be explicit about them. There are no exactly specifiable criteria. But that he knows the disease is clear from his confident, and verified, assertion, "you have seen a true epileptic seizure."

In other words there is an awareness of particulars underlying our comprehension of some entity in some way distinct from its parts. Here we see an obvious parallel to the perceptual disclosure patterns offered by Ramsey. Like the twelve straight lines, or two squares with joined corners, which disclose depth and a cube, Polanyi takes the perception of a comprehensive whole as one of his examples. There is, however, a significant difference in the two thinkers' treatment of the epistemological phenomenon. Like Polanyi, Ramsey acknowledges his debt to 'Gestalt' psychology. But in contrast to Polanyi, who offers the evidence drawn from Gestalt to support his case, Ramsey includes a rather lengthy section, (in Religious Language) to anticipate any charges of mere psychology or 'subjectivism':
Let me remark in parenthesis that by giving Gestalt examples to afford a parallel to situations of religious discernment, I am not implying that religion is 'purely subjective' or a mere matter for psychology. I do not know what a 'purely subjective' experience is—all experience is of something; and as for psychology—certainly all religious situations may be said to be a matter for psychology since they are obviously owned by and experienced by religious men. But that is as true as it is trivial and unimportant. Certainly I am appealing to situations of which we may all become aware. But that does not make them 'subjective', and far from being a theological liability, I should have thought it was an asset for theological apologetic to be able to make some sort of empirical appeal. (pages 26-27)

Polanyi, on the other hand, quotes the findings of Gestalt at length to buttress his analysis:

Gestalt psychology has demonstrated that we may know a physiognomy by integrating our awareness of its particulars without being able to identify these particulars, and my analysis of knowledge is closely linked to this discovery of Gestalt psychology. But I shall attend to aspects of Gestalt which have been hitherto neglected. Gestalt psychology has assumed that perception of a physiognomy takes place through the spontaneous equilibration of its particulars impressed on the retina or on the brain. However, I am looking at Gestalt, on the contrary, as the outcome of an active shaping of experience performed in the pursuit of knowledge. This shaping or integrating I hold to be the great and indispensible tacit power by which all knowledge is discovered, and, once discovered, is held to be true. The structure of Gestalt is then recast into a logic of tacit thought, and this changes the range and perspective of the whole subject. The highest forms of integration loom largest now.15

Whereas Gestalt psychology furnishes Ramsey with a single incidental example, it forms something of an empirical foundation for Polanyi's epistemological explorations.
As the perceptual phenomena in Gestalt testify, a comprehension of some whole is possible apart from a specifiable knowledge of the parts. Polanyi sees a far broader application of this fact than Ramsey. As Polanyi states on the preceding page, the activity of integration occupies a central position in his interpretation of knowing. Although his theoretical debts do lie elsewhere, the parallels to Berkeley's notions of operations of the mind must be mentioned. The particulars stressed by the positivists are only the beginning of the act of knowing. Such particulars are clues, pointing the operations of the mind to the comprehension of a whole, pointing in Ramsey's terms to a disclosure.

Ramsey believes that the concept of disclosure is absolutely necessary for Polanyi's case, if he is to avoid charges that what he calls the central act of knowing is merely a psychological oddity. Polanyi gives the example of a performer's art and the difficulties involved in learning a new skill. The performer relies upon a tacit (unspecifiable) knowledge of the component muscular acts to perform the skill. Whether in sports such as cricket or swimming, or in arts like music or ballet, the artist depends upon 'indwelling' (or in sociologists' terms, 'interiorization'), i.e. an empathy or assimilation of an act's component parts. Polanyi writes that the learner "must try to combine mentally the movements which the performer combines practically and he must combine them in a pattern similar to the performer's pattern of movements.
Two kinds of indwelling meet here. The performer co-ordinates his moves by dwelling in them as parts of his body, while the watcher tries to correlate these moves by seeking to dwell in them from the outside. He dwells in these moves by interiorizing them. By such exploratory indwelling the pupil gets the feel of a master's will.\textsuperscript{16}

To again combine Ramsey's and Polanyi's terms, a tacit awareness of the component parts by indwelling is a prerequisite of the disclosure of the new skill.

Polanyi points out that any skill can be paralyzed by attending focally to its particulars. Although it will be beneficial in the long run, breaking a difficult passage of music into its components temporarily destroys its comprehensive significance. Breaking a statement into its component phonemes destroys the meaning of the whole; graphically: \texttt{a-t-t-e-n-d-i-n-g t-o e-a-c-h c-o-m-p-o-n-e-n-t}

The difference between Ramsey and Polanyi begins to tell at this point. And, to supply a clue for the following, the distinction I wish to draw arises in reference to the vectorial or directional bias of disclosure/comprehension. Polanyi's position can be more clearly established in his description of scientific discovery. Neither the empiricist nor rationalist traditions deal adequately with the epistemological problems of discovery. Polanyi is
fascinated by the problem set by Plato in his Meno: To search for the solution to a problem is absurd. If you do not know the solution, you do not know where to find it, and cannot expect to find anything. If you do know what you are looking for, then there is no problem. Plato's solution—if it can be called that—is that all knowledge is the remembering of past lives.

The answer for Polanyi lies in his concept of tacit knowledge. The discovery of new comprehensive entities is dependent upon the indwelling or tacit awareness of unspecifiable particulars. The 'hunch' is fed by what Polanyi has called 'heuristic cravings', the desire to integrate, to tie things together. "Only connect ... " (E. M. Forster). Our passion for an integration is in turn matched by intimations of an undisclosed coherence of previously unrelated things. This passion serves to nurture the heuristic connections necessary for the discovery of a new comprehensive entity.

Thomas Torrance has written of this process of discovery:

It is essentially an intuitive insight, the insight of a mind informed by intuitive contact with reality ... ('indwelling') ... What Polanyi intends by 'foreknowledge', then, is what the Greeks called prolepsis, a proleptic conception, an anticipatory glimpse, a tenuous and subtle outreach of the understanding with a forward thrust in cognition of something quite new. In the on-going process of inquiry it is an incipient knowing, in which the intimation of the coherence of hitherto not comprehended particulars...is at work: and therefore Polanyi can speak of it as a prior tacit knowing leading to explicit knowledge ... the foreknowledge with which scientific inquiry
operates is an intuitive anticipation of a hitherto unknown pattern...which arises compellingly in our minds under the surprising disclosure and intrinsic claim of the subject matter. It is an authentically heuristic act in which the understanding leaps across a logical gap in the attainment of a new conception, and then guided by an intuitive surmise evoked by that conception probes through deepening coherences to lay bare the structure of the reality being investigated.\(^\text{17}\)

In an article in *Religious Studies*, Jerry Gill has specified the differences between the act of integration and inference, although he confesses that there is some ambiguity here as witnessed by the opposing interpretations of Torrance and Harry Prosch. In contrast to the process of inference, integration is an act. This can be seen in two aspects: (1) As inference is a process, one can pursue it in steps, leaving it aside temporarily, etc. In contrast, the spontaneous integration is an act; it more closely corresponds to Ramsey's disclosures. (2) Because of its step-by-step process, inference can be reversed. One can retrace one's path, follow the logic, see how one got from A to B. Integration, however, is not reversible; or at least, not in the sense of the inferential process. It has the character of Ryle's 'got-it' verbs. It would be as if one would attempt to forget the disclosure and examine the situation anew, without the perspective of the disclosure. As Polanyi points out, when the perceptual 'disclosure' has been shown, it is irreversible. One cannot return to the 'innocence' of seeing the figure as only a duck, or as only twelve connected lines.

This is not to say that one cannot return to give explicit attention to the component parts—as the pianist
does when he or she slows a phrase down to indwell the fingering, or as the cricketer in the nets attends to the movements of his bat. Indeed, Polanyi writes about the oscillation between the objects of our awareness, our explicit attention. In literary criticism, for example, attending to minute detail obviously destroys the comprehensive meaning in an effort to examine more closely the particulars. But it also supplies us with more material with which to guide further comprehensive knowing. As the pianist returns to the whole piece his or her ability to interpret and communicate its aesthetic qualities will be helped by the dissection. As the cricketer returns to the pitch, his (or her) batting in all its comprehensiveness will be improved. But the point of the return to 'the basics', the particulars, is its role in the extension of the comprehension. In direct opposition to the thesis of the positivists, Polanyi writes, "The belief that, since particulars are more tangible, their knowledge offers a true conception of things is fundamentally mistaken."18

Polanyi has here hit upon something rather crucial to our current purpose. He has distinguished tangibility from 'a true conception of things', thereby casting doubt upon a basic—and mistaken—foundation of the positivists; one which, significantly, Ramsey shares with the positivists. The positivists founded their certainty upon the sense-data; their objectivity rests partly upon an incorrigible base in observable data. Ramsey attempts to broaden this restrictive certainty with his disclosure concept. It is,
for Ramsey, a disclosure which is the basis of certainty. As we have seen (particularly in his dialogue with H. D. Lewis), the disclosure is certain, while the articulation of that objective reference is never absolute, always relative to the context, always susceptible to faults.

In contrast, Polanyi's comprehension, his integrative acts, are always corrigible. Not all acts of integration are veridical; and indeed, those that are certain always bring with them unforeseeable implications—they come pregnant with possibilities to go beyond, to use the comprehended entity as a new particular of which we are focally aware as we once again turn our proleptic sights on discovery. Polanyi's integrations are corrigible; Ramsey's disclosures are not. Polanyi argues that all claims must vindicate themselves in shared experience. Recalling (for me at least) Ramsey's comment about Berkeley's notions: "Notions and ideas were mutually implicating elements of every genuine assertion", Polanyi writes that the personal participation in each assertion varies greatly, e.g. from the extremely personal, 'How nice!' to the relatively impersonal, 'There is a table!" We can distinguish in everything we know some relatively objective fact supporting a supervening personal fact." This is of course implied in Polanyi's attempt to define knowing in terms of a 'personal participation of the knower in all acts of understanding.' But either: (1) Polanyi had not expressed himself on the extent of the implications of personal knowledge, or (2) Ramsey did not sufficiently grasp these implications,
or (3) Ramsey disagreed with Polanyi on the issue of the foundations of objectivity.

Possibilities (2) and (3) are favoured by Ramsey's clearest statement of his difficulties with Polanyi. Quoting from a section on the role of the tacit awareness and the active foreknowledge of an undisclosed reality, Ramsey responds:

Here he seems to be giving us dubious psychology masquerading as metaphysics, and in a way which, to some degree, confuses logical and temporal sequence. What are these 'tacit powers' or this 'active foreknowledge of an unknown reality' or 'comprehensive entities'? My suggestion is that we can avoid these curious and perhaps puzzling phrases, we can avoid this puzzling mixture of psychology, epistemology, and metaphysics when we recognize that the point—or so I am suggesting—of all these remarks is that the disclosure which 'comprehension' involves may well precede, even if they more often follow, their spelling out in terms of some particular clues or features, and that this may often be the case in scientific discovery. Beyond this I do not think we need attach much importance to the temporal sequence.

Perhaps, then the only point at issue here is that a disclosure will not always have the spectacular character of a 'flash', it may just be a 'becoming aware' in some rather more decisive way, what Polanyi calls in a passage I have already quoted 'focally attending'. But nothing of this need suppose, I would say, a prior and tacit awareness. (pp. 182-183)

In this passage Ramsey seems to have confused Polanyi's necessary vectorial character of knowing with a logical (inferential) or temporal sequence. The point is really not so simple as the difference between a 'flash' or 'penny-dropping' and a gradual awakening, a 'light dawning', although it is at least that. But it is made
more difficult by their similarities: the light dawns by gradual comprehension relying on indwelling; the penny drops in moments of illumination, in the sudden act of integration.

But Ramsey does not see the necessity of subsidiary, unspecifiable particulars, tacit knowledge, to the active comprehension of a whole or a previously unknown reality. "It is when 'knowledge of particulars', attention to details or clues leads to a disclosure that comprehension occurs, something which is not 'merely' psychological, and something which by its disclosure character safeguards the objective reference of what discloses itself to us." (p. 183)

In short, while disclosure demands a response it is passive. While comprehension relies upon unspecifiable clues, it is active. Epistemologically, tacit knowledge fills out the picture of disclosure by describing in depth their basis in experience. But Ramsey must also accept the corrigibility of the disclosure (at least the non-cosmic variety). Further, there is here a broadening of Ramsey's own empiricism by the recognition of the variegation of the inexpressible. On the other hand, the disclosure concept, instead of providing a way for Polanyi's odd epistemology to find sympathy with the positivists—if such a thing were conceivable—fills out the passive elements of the knowing process. In more precise terms, Ramsey's insistence that persons and God disclose themselves to us, that we come to a disclosure in a realization of ourselves being acted upon, the 'objectivity of what declares itself to us',
corresponds nicely to Polanyi's more active view of the search for truth. That this degree of passivity is agreeable to Polanyi is given in his introduction to *The Tacit Dimension*. "I have shown that any attempt to avoid the responsibility for shaping beliefs which we accept as true is absurd; but the existentialist claim of choosing our beliefs from zero is now proved absurd too. Thought can live only on grounds which we adopt in the service to a reality to which we submit." 21

Before turning to the final dialogue in which the concept of disclosure can be illuminated (this time in an analytic sense), I shall briefly mention Ramsey's relationship to what some would see as the opposite extreme from the positivists. This is the attempt to stress my responsibility in the face of those who would evacuate knowing of any commitment, any morality, any personal involvement. As we have seen the positivist case is dependent upon empirical blinkers, eliminating shared human experience, and concentrating only upon the more tangible sense data.

Commenting on the 'correspondence theory' of truth, viz. that a belief is true when there is a corresponding fact and false when no such fact exists, Polanyi asserts that there is an obvious contradiction here because such a noncommital definition denies the commitment of the asserter to the very proposition. A similar theory of truth was attacked by the short-lived author, Johannes Climacus, in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript:
Whether truth is defined more empirically, as the conformity of thought and being, or more idealistically, as the conformity of being with thought, it is in either case, important carefully to note what is meant by being...If being ... is understood as empirical being, truth is at once transformed into a desideratum, and everything must be understood in terms of becoming; for the empirical object is unfinished and the existing cognitive spirit is itself in process of becoming. Thus the truth becomes an approximation whose beginning cannot be posited absolutely, precisely because the conclusion is lacking, the effect of which is retroactive.  

This perspective, that certainty cannot be defined empirically since the entity is always unfinished, and the ‘cognitive spirit’ is (inevitably) existing, holds that truth must correspond to existence, activity, thinking, living. Although this viewpoint is somewhat of a polar opposite to positivism, it is not something which Ramsey ignores; nor is the view unrevealing about the status of disclosures. The key area of commonality is to be found in the concept of self-disclosure. As we realize our selves in our responses to moral situations and in the commitment we make in reply to the disclosures, we approach that authentic existence prized by the existentialists.

In The Flies Jean-Paul Sartre caricatures a society whose people are barely existing because they have evaded all responsibility, all personal decision. The target of his satire is rather obviously Christianity, but it might as well have been the rigorous empiricists who seek to avoid any personal involvement by denying the importance of commitment and responsible decision in their discipline; and further, in life. The escape from ethical responsi-
bility, attacked by the existentialists, is as true of those theologians who hold a positivistic propositional view, with revealed commandments about tooth-brushing, as it is of those who try to deny decision any more significance than a 'mere matter of taste.' Those who worship at the pedestal of objectivity do so partly because they long for the burden of freedom and responsibility to be lifted. They have long ago given up the attempt to find a guaranteed 'ought' within their meagre and microscopic 'is'. This evasion of personal responsibility having failed, they can only (passionately) deny the existence--or significance--of the will, morality, and, oddly, of passion.

Although he would presumably not press the issue to this extent, the self-involvement claimed by a disclosure, the basic role of personal situations in his examples of disclosures, and (as we shall see in our discussion of models) the ways in which a disclosure can be seen as a personal appropriation of that which we believe all witness to the sympathies with existentialist thought in Ramsey's theoretical work. Nor are the constricting faults of the positivists left unmentioned. In an uncharacteristically ascerbic passage Ramsey writes:

... Not being content with an objective reference whose expression was problematical, those who have worshipped sense-data have not only sponsored a common sense dogmatism styled in the idiom of perception language, they have wanted the language to correspond with certainty to indubitable units of the universe. All we need do to reach the position of some theologians is to read for 'sense-data', 'God'.23
It is true that he spent far more time defending his position against charges of mere subjectivity than he did arguing for the subjectivity inherent in the empiricist's scientific commitment. But the existentialist element is revealed in such works as *Freedom and Immortality*, and 'The Systematic Elusiveness of "I"'.

When we turn to the analytic applications of his disclosure concept, we find Ramsey on much surer ground. In an address given to the Aristotelian Society in January, 1972, Ramsey examined the use of the word 'fact'. He begins by noting the difficulties between theology and philosophy which arise when philosophy wants to ask, "Is it or is it not a fact that Jesus ascended?" For their part, theologians sometimes speak of 'facts' as if there were two levels, ordinary and religious. For empiricists like Ayer this is nonsense: there are 'facts' about sense-data, and any other use of 'fact' is merely for convenience' sake.

Warnock, in elucidating Berkeley's position, argued that immediacy, certainty can be found only in the colours, shapes, sounds, etc. we perceive, as opposed to any inferences from these. He uses the example of seeing a book to claim that there is something more fundamental than seeing the book. The entire range of colours and shapes is more immediately sensed than the book. Future study might reveal that what I had seen was not a book, but it cannot be doubted that I saw the colours and shapes, etc. This recalls for Ramsey the search of Bertrand Russell for
something immediate, fundamental. This is the origin of
the phrase 'sense-data' in The Problems of Philosophy. In
'there is a table' the table itself is not known immediately
but must be inferred from the sense-data. In contrast,
J. L. Austin thinks such 'progressive hedging'—to go from
the ordinary statement 'there is a table' to some more basic
idiom—is incredible. He takes seriously the slogan of
taking ordinary language as his basis, and refutes the ten-
dency to find a more basic paradigm for all speech.25

At this point, Ramsey proposes that what is given
immediately is a disclosure of objectivity, an objective
reference. He points out that this is what Russell him-
self works for in his 'story' of the table. He points to
the table, invites us to come closer, to observe the tex-
ture, the shades of colour, the shape, closer and closer
until ... there is a disclosure. What Austin calls pro-
gressive hedging seems to Ramsey to be good philosophical
method.

But on the other hand, Ramsey refuses to push the
objective reference as far as Russell, Warnock, Ayer, and
others do. He takes Austin's point that we seek in vain
for an infallible language—one which corresponds with
certainty to indubitable units of the universe. This
view takes some statements as incorrigible accounts of an
objective reference. Against this Ramsey asserts that
this confounds the certainty of the objective reference,
the immediacy of the disclosure, with the relevant and
more reliable assertions. As we have seen he sees the
certainty as given only in the disclosure, and the articulation of it relative to context and often problematic.

To return this discussion to the term 'fact', any appeal to the 'fact x' refers to a situation in which some objective reference is given immediately, in a disclosure. In response, we are willing to take the assertion, $p$ as in 'as a matter of fact, $p$' as an accurate account of the sensible phenomena characterizing the situation in which the disclosure was given.

Ramsey turns to the attempt of P. R. Strawson to clarify the meaning of 'fact' by distinguishing between 'facts' and 'things'. Strawson speaks of a cat on the mat who has mange, in which the cat is the thing, and the mange is a fact. He tries to separate what sentences are about from what they state. The sentence, 'The cat has mange' states the 'fact' of the mange. The sentence is about the 'thing' the cat. Strawson argues that while facts are states of affairs, or features, they are not things-in-the-world; they lack ontological independence. In direct opposition to the early Wittgenstein, Strawson comments, "The world is a totality of things, not facts." 26

Austin, in Unfair to Facts, thinks this is ridiculous. How can Strawson argue that the mange is not some 'thing-in-the-world'? "Phenomena, events, situations, states of affairs are commonly supposed to be genuinely in-the-world, and even Strawson admits they are so." 27 But this response conceals the question of reference
which Strawson wants very much to keep precise. Ramsey strikes a conciliatory position between them which turns out to be a necessary development of both their points.

He points out that talk of 'fact' necessarily involves some 'existential claim', by which I take him to mean that the asserter of a 'fact' appeals for agreement on some state of affairs, merely by using the word 'fact'. The 'thing' by virtue of its ontological independence, its being-in-the-world, needs no such validation. Things give sentences objective reference, whereas an appeal to 'fact' forms an existential claim to recognize some state of affairs, some features contingent upon things-in-the-world. Following this line of thought, it should not be difficult to see where disclosures fit in. Austin needs disclosures to ground his sentences which state features, matters of 'fact' states of affairs, in things-in-the-world, to tie 'facts' to their objective referents. The logic of fact discourse is to make a claim for objective reference.

But this requires some kind of minimum context, some state of affairs.

Hence, if existents, or things, are taken as everything which is particularized, individuated, then assertions about the things will, at some point, evoke a disclosure. This disclosure will provide Strawson with the objective reference his 'things' need. But Ramsey is not content to simply mediate. He attempts to develop the theological and metaphysical implications of this middle position between Austin and Strawson—to draw out the connections between disclosures and existents.
Strawson talks of persons and things as basic units of individuation. Around the bodily actions, observable behaviour of persons, an objective reference is disclosed. As I know myself—and even Russell talks about the direct acquaintance which one can have of himself—in moments of self-disclosure, we can take persons as an irreducible being-in-the-world. Ramsey goes further and argues that we can talk reasonably about acquaintance with other persons. A finite individuation is disclosed around thoughts, perceptions, actions—there is a disclosure of other persons' identities.

But, argues Ramsey, the same can hardly be said for things. How could a plurality of things disclose one existent, one objective reference? Hence, this referent has no easy characterizations, can never be articulated in the same flat descriptive manner as tables, cats, things-in-the-world. Like one's own person, it cannot be further specified.

My conclusion then is that the objective reference given in a disclosure to which, for example, stories about things, or universals have led, cannot be further characterized except as the One disclosed in and through the Many, or a 'reality' disclosed through 'appearance'. But for some it has been labelled Absolute, and for others, God, though these words only gain a meaning in use in so far as they hold together the different strands of discourse which provide the stories leading to a disclosure of the one individuation, the one objective referent...

It is in this sense, then, that we can understand this comment to H. D. Lewis, "in every disclosure the object can eventually bear the name God." It also brings together
two lingering questions. The experience of disclosure has seemed either too commonplace to disclose God or too exceptional to do justice to the whole of religious experience. Secondly, the 'objective referent' of the cosmic disclosure has seemed too monolithic. Even if a Christian does not want to talk in terms of disclosures of God's goodness, his righteousness, his love, etc., he will probably want to insist on disclosures of Father, Son, and Spirit.

Are disclosures not too odd, too rare, an experience to do justice to Christian experience? In the first place, this question has lost track of the original purpose of the disclosure concept. It is a means of establishing the meaningfulness of religious language by elucidating the epistemology of faith. But the question also fails to see the commonplace experience of 'the existential claim of facts' which is itself a disclosure. We see the fact of the cat's mange around the objective referent—the cat; we see that 'that dot on the post-card is where I live' in a disclosure of the object of my home, etc. The further problem, that disclosures are now too commonplace is the perpetual task of theological discourse: to so describe the commonplace that it 'comes alive', 'takes on depth'. Few would believe that a mangy cat could disclose the transcendent God—until in the hands of Christopher Smart 'Jeffrey' becomes an occasion for a celebration of God's presence.
As to the second question--is not the disclosure concept too monolithic?--the Austin/Strawson discussion is again helpful. As persons and things are different from states of affairs, so God is different from goodness, love, righteousness, etc. What is disclosed by the use of qualified models like 'omniscient', 'omnipresent', etc. is not the extent of God's knowledge or his spatial aspects, but God himself. In the same way, seeing 'Tom' giving a child a sweet is not a disclosure of 'Tom's' goodness--it is a disclosure of the person 'Tom' around the 'fact' of his goodness. This insight into religious language will have implications in the theological section to follow. The disclosure is of the referent 'God' around the 'facts' of his relations with us.29

Ramsey concludes with some sweeping statements of the applications of disclosures: The is/ought dichotomy, seen as the ways in which facts give rise to disclosures of values, allows room for disclosures to mediate. Value arises around facts and is, Ramsey argues, disclosure-given. Likewise the fact/interpretation dichotomy of historical studies is informed by the mediation of disclosures. Ramsey claims that the 'facts' are 'free', i.e. waiting to be organized in one way or another. Facts never include a guaranteed interpretative scheme of that which is objectively given. In relation to religious language, it must be seen as an endeavour to point to that which is more than the facts and features of the world. When a claim for objectivity occurs around a disclosure, we can speak
of a religious 'fact'. In so far as what is disclosed will always go beyond the facts and features, it is rightly called metaphysical. But through the concept of disclosures, Ramsey has grounded the metaphysical in the empirical, and extended the empirical to the vision of "something which stands beyond, behind, and within, the passing flux of immediate things, something which is real, and yet waiting to be realized, something which is a remote possibility and yet the greatest of present facts..."
Qualified Models

Closely tied to Ramsey's concept of disclosures is his interpretation of the use of models. The relations between the two are most comprehensively set out in Models and Mystery, presented in January, 1963 as the Whidden Lectures. His purpose is to establish the common uses of models in theology and science. He relies heavily upon the insights of Max Black, who distinguishes two types of models used in science. In what Black calls 'scale' models, our purpose is to reproduce, in a relatively manipulable or accessible embodiment, selected features of the original phenomenon. Ramsey refers to this type as a 'picturing' model, because ideally it is a replica, a copy, e.g., a model railway, or an architect's model. It enables us to bring the very large or small to a middle-sized and workable scale.

But beyond this picture model is another type, less workable, not as precise or descriptive, but nonetheless more appropriate to the mystery of the universe. This is not to imply that picture models are obsolete or have no advantages over the second type, which Black labels the 'analogue' model. Obviously picture models are more precise, allowing for clearer articulation. Secondly, being replicas, picture models reproduce important and relevant properties of the original phenomena. Hence such models are well-favoured by many scientists who seek exactness.

But such precise modelling can also be distortive. As Black points out too large a model of the common house-fly
will distort its aero-dynamics and the picture model will never get off the ground. But any 'luggage-tag' application of picture models (depending upon only one model for each phenomenon, applying model to original in a one-to-one correspondence) is equally precluded by the very diversity of models. There are, for example, two models of light: is it a wavelike phenomenon, or more like a flow of particles?

Turning to theological method, Ramsey wonders if theology has ever depended upon picture models exclusively. It is a matter for debate whether the early understandings of God as 'Father', 'Judge', 'Shepherd', 'King', etc. were flatly descriptive in the picturing sense of models. But as in science, the complementarity, the compatibility of models is essential. The only other alternative for theology seems to be silence, mysticism—witnessing to the inexpressible: for God is in heaven, and thou upon earth; therefore let thy words be few. (Eccl. 5:2)

But the possibility which Ramsey wants to sponsor is built around the second model concept of Black; the 'analogue' model. Where scale models rely upon identity, analogue models attempt to reproduce the structure, to draw parallels between models and original phenomenon by isomorphism. Black writes:

An analogue object is some material object system, or process designed to reproduce as faithfully as possible in some new medium the structure or web of relationship in an original ... The crucial difference between the two types of models is in the corresponding methods of interpretation..."
Ramsey prefers to use the term 'disclosure' models, arguing that the structural similarity, the isomorphism, the echo of the original—which denies exact picture reproduction—such similarity-with-a-difference evokes a disclosure, an insight, a situation where the 'light dawns'. Ramsey claims that it is disclosure models which science is increasingly dependent upon in its methodology. He supports this argument with three theoretical advantages of disclosure models: (1) It is characteristic of scientific models that they enable a theory, a deductive system, and/or a mathematical treatment to be given in respect to previously unmapped phenomena. (2) A theory may be so complex as to bewilder, making articulation difficult. In mathematical terms, such a theory can result in equations which do not easily admit of solutions. In this case a disclosure model, which focuses upon the fundamental notions of the insight into the phenomenon, helps to clarify the awkward articulation. (3) Sometimes a theory is required about a phenomenon too big, too far away, too small, etc., to be testable. In these cases models can usefully serve as representative of, or proxy for, such phenomena.

In either the picture model or the disclosure type, it is their articulation possibilities which are the criteria for good models. In contrast to the precision of the picture model, however, the disclosure models are necessarily tentative. Thus where exactness is highly valued, picture models are preferred. This attitude does not mean that, being more tentative, disclosure models
should be discarded. Leo Apostel argues that the function of models is to serve as a bridge between theory and observation. Ramsey points out that this bridge must be clearly seen as two diverse types. As bridges between theory and observation, picture and disclosure models serve separate and equally essential tasks.

Beyond precision, then, some criteria for the adequacy of models must be found. In part, this measure is related to the reference of each particular model. A model will be more reliable, the better it echoes, or chimes in with, the phenomenon it portrays. Models are born in some insight when the universe discloses itself. Models are best when they are isomorphic with the phenomena. Ramsey comments, "In this way the universe itself authenticates a model." Further, in scientific terms the model is best which is most prolific in generating deductions which are open to verification or falsification.

Here Ramsey draws a far-reaching parallel between theological and scientific uses of models. In theology, models can be seen as builders of discourse. In the diverse events and concepts surrounding the life of Jesus, models like Logos and Messiah emerged to focus subsequent discourse. Just as science uses models to clarify bewildering theories or mathematically difficult equations, theological models can be used to clarify logically awkward discourse, e.g., talk about atonement or grace, etc. Thirdly, models in theology can disclose what is otherwise inexpressible. Where knowledge by descriptive,
straightforward language eludes us, disclosure models often work effectively.

Likewise the criteria for models in science and theology are to some extent parallel. Theological models must chime in with the phenomena which gave rise to the insight or disclosure. In order to reasonably use the model of a loving father, the universe must disclose itself in a way characteristic of loving fathers. But in contrast to the ease with which scientific models can be applied to experimentation, a theological model is not to be judged by its capacity to generate testable, verifiable deductions or predictions. The distinguishing mark of theological models is that they are judged by their ability to cover a broad range of events, phenomena, situations by their capacity to consistently incorporate diverse aspects of life, rather than by the more precise criteria of scientific models. Such a model is not to find its value in experiment, but in 'harmonising whatever events are to hand'. Ramsey terms this broader sense of verification, 'empirical fit', because it is more like the fitting of a shoe than the more precise 'true' or 'false' of scientific method.

The concept of empirical fit will be given fuller attention below. Such a criterion would, of course, be completely unacceptable to those imprisoned within the circum­spect ontology of the positivists. If scientific methodology is taken as the norm for all of human existence, the tentativeness of such confirmation of models rules out the
possibility of theological, but also most disclosure models. Here is an aspect of his thought which clearly demonstrates the tight interweaving of Ramsey's theoretical bases. If empirical fit can stand as a fruitful criterion of disclosure models in theology, Ramsey's broader empiricism has a chance of being a reasonable approach to human existence. Complementing this, the broadened empiricism Ramsey has attempted to establish fully supports the less exact fitting of models he is defending.

In any case, a more general focus for parallels between theology and science can be found in the ontological commitment of their models. This is to hold that the model which is used accurately articulates in some way or other the phenomenon it is designed to disclose. Models in science not only lead to experiments; theological models not only lead to empirical fit; both methods rely upon models which rise out of, and become currency for, a moment of disclosure. Ramsey writes that those scientists who sought ontological commitment in the nineteenth century were on the right track. They were wrong only in seeking to find the accurate articulation in descriptive terms alone.

It is clear, however, that the ontological commitment must break down for those philosophers of science who degrade disclosure or analogue models in their quest for exactitude. Few have faced up to the impoverished, inadequate (and inaccurate) ontology exclusive reliance upon picture models would require. Ramsey mentions the viewpoint of the French physicist, Duhem, who writes of the electrostatic action
model of Faraday that such models were "not built for the satisfying of reason but for the pleasure of the imagination." Against such a view, Black argues for the need of imagination in science.

Ramsey wishes to go further to establish a genuine ontological status for models. Beyond the role of models to point to the need for insight and imagination, the ontological character of their reference calls for the recognition of greater status. In one sense they refer to the observable events in which they either are verified or find their empirical fit. But they also arise out of, and become currency for, the insight or disclosure. "The ontological commitment arises in a disclosure, and the model, whether in science or theology, provides us with its own understanding of, and its own inroad into, what the disclosure discloses." In other words, models are not so much picture miniatures or replicas, as pointers to mystery. With models, both science and religion attempt to reach out and understand in their distinct ways what is ultimately mysterious.

"The cost to the scientist is that he must be ready to allow an ultimately mysterious and elusive character to that which he essays to understand; the cost to the theologian is that he must be ready to live with and to make do with theological uncertainties."

Turning to the social science, Ramsey believes that the concept of disclosure models could serve as an 'eirenicon' between those who try to emphasize the human character of social sciences, and those who stress science and seek to model social science after the natural sciences. Here Ramsey
is especially dependent upon Peter Winch. Ramsey cites the view of Richard C. Atkinson, who advocates the supremacy of mathematical models for the social sciences. He begins by denying that the social sciences are distinct from the natural sciences because of their subject matter. Atkinson argues from three basic concepts: stimulus, response, and reinforcement. He believes that the proper, mathematical usage of these concepts in psychology could greatly benefit the social sciences by making them more precise. 'Stimulus' is conceived of as any environmental event acting upon an organism. 'Response' is the act or movement by which the organism being observed reacts. 'Reinforcement' is any environmental event which increases the likelihood of the response's being repeated.

But the critics of such an approach rightly show those things which the mathematical method neglects, those distinctions which it eclipses. To speak of a response as 'an act or movement', for example, is a crude equation of 'act' and 'movement'. To use the term 'act' implies participation of the actor; it implies intent, interpretation of the possible means to accomplish an intention, etc. This is quite distinct from 'movement' which is extremely appropriate for an observational study: movements can be observed, categorized, and to some extent, measured, predicted, even forced. But the term 'movement' does not itself distinguish human from rat. Likewise the word 'organism'. In psychology, this often stands for 'human being'. Taken together, the missed distinction between act
movement and the careless approach to the human subject as an 'organism', these mathematical model approaches attempt to destroy a fundamental disclosure at the heart of psychology, viz. the self-disclosure of the observing scientist. Presumably, while the observer watches for the muscular twitch of an organism which is being subjected to mild shocks, the observer is acting with the intent to study and understand the movements of an organism under a particular stimulus. There is no hint here of studying the eye-muscle reactions of the observing 'organism' in response to the stimulus provided by an acting human being, who is being subjected to shocks.

But perhaps Professor Atkinson would agree with all this. Perhaps he would claim that he as a psychologist is only interested in selected phenomena; those which he can efficiently observe, chart, measure, etc. Such a response from this particular 'organism-psychologist' is possible, but it underscores the inadequacies of Atkinson's own approach. In so far as his approach intentionally ignores the self-disclosure of the participant-subject-organism, it thereby shuts itself off from very significant experience. Without the self-disclosure corrective it is easy to fall into the 'organism' discourse which neglects the whole range of personal participation implied by the term 'act'; and worse, to begin to believe that because one's subject matter, observable movements, is more tangible that one's conclusions somehow offer a true conception of things.
Recalling his distinction between the two bridges which link theory with observation, Ramsey points to the logical discrepancy between that language which 'democratically' unites human beings with rats and frogs, and the insight given in self-disclosure which all psychological models presuppose. Models which arise from this disclosure, the disclosure of my subjectivity, can never adequately comprehend that which I refer to as 'I'. This is not only an observational difficulty, like watching oneself fumbling in the mirror in tying a tie is different from watching someone else making a bad attempt at it. This is a logical point. There cannot be the subject-object distinction of observer-organism without there existing a subject. More will be said about this below, but for Ramsey, "Here is the meeting place par excellence of models and mystery: In what to each of us is the disclosure of himself." (M and M, 28)

Peter Winch helpfully supplies us with a social corrective. An accurate account of the 'organism' in question cannot rest content with the picture given by the psychologist, but must fill this out with the social network in which the person exists. The sociologist can tell us of the ways in which our identity depends upon whatever social environment we find ourselves in to maintain our sense of self. "One can maintain one's self-identification as a man of importance only in a milieu that confirms this identity; one can maintain one's Catholic faith only if one retains one's significant relationship with the
Catholic community; and so forth." C. A. Mace speaks of a 'network of interlacing hierarchies' in considering the self in his broader social context, much like Wittgenstein wants to examine a word in its logical context.

Winch, too, is greatly influenced by Wittgenstein. Against those who wish that social science were more scientific, more mathematical, he demonstrates the ways in which the individual's responses are significantly more than the movements of 'organisms'. Contrasting a dog learning a trick with an individual learning a rule of language, Winch writes that the dog is learning a mere reaction to a cue, whereas the man is learning to understand a rule which fits into a complex social context—one in which the dog doesn't participate. Of course a man's observable behaviour is easily fit into mathematical models, but this ignores the very meaningful role of the person's understanding of reality in his social behaviour. Winch comments, "A man's social relations with his fellows are permeated with his ideas about reality. Indeed, 'permeated' is hardly a strong enough word: social relations are expressions of ideas about reality...A monk has certain characteristic social relations with his fellow monks and with people outside the monastery; but it would be impossible to give more than a superficial account of those relations without taking into account the religious ideas around which the monk's life revolves."8

When this approach is set in contrast to that of Durkheim, the reductionism of the latter is illuminated:
I consider extremely fruitful this idea that social life should be explained, not by the notions of those who participate in it, but by more profound causes which are unperceived by consciousness, and I think also that these causes are to be sought mainly in the manner in which the associated individuals are grouped."9

Winch is not saying that such a pursuit of what is called 'objectivity' is destructive or necessarily inaccurate. The view of the social phenomena such an approach will offer would most likely shake those who are involved in the social milieu being studied—say the monk in the religious community—from 'the complacent myopia which over-familiarity may induce.' But, he continues, "what is dangerous is that the user of these devices should come to think of his way of looking at things as somehow more real than the usual way."10 What is at issue here is not so much the veracity or verifiability of a given sociological model, as its comprehensiveness. Winch is arguing that the severely restricted picture models must be supplemented in the social sciences with more personal models. He agrees with Karl Popper in so far as he holds that models are not to be taken as absolute representations; we are not to look for some ghostly essence behind the model of the individual. But Winch wants models to do more justice to persons in relations. He thus argues for a greater ontological commitment than the instrumentalists who see models strictly under the criterion of their usefulness. Where Popper speaks of institutions as merely explanatory models which ultimately dissolve because the individual is the only reality, he ignores
the essential role of institutions in an individual's behaviour. "The ways of thinking embodied in institutions govern the way the members of the societies studied by the social scientists behave". Ramsey explains that there will be models whose 'observable facts' are not, strictly speaking, observable. Like empirical fit, these sociological models will be seen to be most efficient at handling a broad range of events.

But even with Winch's incisive extension of the range of models in the methodology of social sciences, we have not really gone far enough in drawing out the possible applications of disclosure models to human behaviour (although it is likely that we have gone as far as we can within the discipline of sociology). Winch offers an example of sociological models breaking down in the case of a social worker who is to befriend her clients while retaining her prior loyalty toward the policy of the agency by whom she is employed. Such a course makes a mockery of the very notion of friendship. But Ramsey points out that the situation need not distort the idea of friendship; it may merely require the addition of more models directed to the situation from different perspectives. He argues that both scientific and social models are needed here, and in the mixing of the two types we might perceive the emergence of a personal model. Both models directed to the descriptive aspects of the person--the movements of his body--and the more personal models associated with consciousness are demanded by the situation. By the
interweaving of models in such a way, the social sciences can point to the elusiveness of its topic. We are organisms as the descriptive models attempt to survey. But more, we are social units, as Winch argues. But more, we are what is disclosed to each of us in insights into our subjectivity, our selves. Both the sociologist and the psychologist must supply the corrective of their own self-disclosures. In cases where the social scientist is working with many models, the self-disclosing insight in which the models are fulfilled serves to integrate the various strands. In so far as Ramsey sees this integrating insight as given in disclosure, it is, (as we have seen) self-authenticating. In this way he claims to give greater cognitive significance to models than does Black.

Once again we return to the problem of objective reference. We have already seen the relationship of disclosures and objective reference in an analytic sphere. In addition, our discussion of models has touched upon the issue in the question of the ontological commitment associated with models. At this point, however, I would like to integrate these ideas with Ramsey's interpretation of models, and indicate the implications for theology.

The very use of models implies some familiarity with the reference; otherwise there would be no use in talking of distinctions between good and bad, ambiguous and accurate models. But rather than talking in terms of true or false models, Ramsey takes the more instrumentalist line of judging the success or failure of a model to disclose
the reference which is given in disclosure. But if the reference is known through disclosures, does this not mean that models are merely decorative? Perhaps models have an important psychological and even sociological function as tools, but no real ontological or epistemological significance?

First of all, Ramsey points out that such assumptions can be traced to a confusion of disclosure models with mere picture models, or with the more psychological term 'images'. He has taken 'model' deliberately because its connotations are logical rather than psychological. "I choose model then, because it is least likely to prejudice discussion and most likely to direct our attention to logical, epistemological, and ontological issues ..." 12

Just as there are no guaranteed religious assertions, so there are no self-authenticating models. Nonetheless the concept of a disclosure demands some experiential context. It is from these experiences, from these situations of cosmic disclosures, that discourse will be developed to articulate the objective reference. Such discourse will be developed along lines laid down by the models born in the moment of insight. As Ramsey responded to Ninian Smart, "Our discourse will be the more reliable the more models we have surveyed, and the better we have related the model-based articulation to the world so as to provide for what I have called 'empirical fit'". 13

Although Ramsey argues that only one individuation is required by a cosmic disclosure because of its all-
encompassing nature, the logical or methodological corollary is the need for many models. Models can never exhaust the mystery disclosed to us; so we will need to bring in new, better models; we will need to judge the effectiveness of our models, and search for what Ramsey labels 'super-models'. This brings us to the question of preference.

A model may have in some way generated a disclosure. More broadly, though, disclosures often 'just happen', and the event serves as the basis for subsequent models of the disclosure. In this second case, one model is to be preferred over others when it highlights a particular feature or the structure of the situation. To this degree, and only to this degree, Ramsey speaks of models in "Talking of God" as self-authenticating. In writing of theological models, Ramsey is using the term in a somewhat technical sense, since the inherent disclosure involved in our apprehension of the objective reference necessarily involves a model.

A theological model is a way of understanding what has been objectively disclosed in a cosmic disclosure; like all models it is never a perfect replica; but it is further and most importantly unlike ordinary 'picturing models' ... in that its objective reference is never given independently of the model. It is indeed what I have called a 'disclosure model'...\(^{11}\)

Like the role disclosure models play in science, in theology they are not mere pictures--in fact they are not pictures at all--but are essential to the evocation of the mystery. As there is only one cosmic objective reference, it is this that all models contrive in their separate
ways to articulate. Any model supplied by a particular
disclosure will have to be balanced against others. Each
model must be incorporated into the whole of religious
language. It will be judged by its articulation possibili­
ties in contrast with all other models, i.e. 'father' will
be tested for fit against 'judge', 'king', 'shepherd', etc.
Discourse from each model will necessarily be developed
with attention to other models and their respective lines
of discourse. Broader ranging, more comprehensive, more
flexible models will be preferred. Secondly, the criterion
of empirical fit is applied. Beyond the question of the
model's performance in the whole context of religious
language, each model is judged by its ability to fit the
diverse events and features of the universe. This 'fit'
must be applied in a pragmatic sense rather than a rigid
verificationist method.

Beyond these criteria, Ramsey speaks of 'super­
models', those which must prove their fertility in devel­
oping discourse and evoking disclosures. The models of
loving father, caring shepherd, righteous judge, and so
forth, can be integrated in the more comprehensive model
of personality. P. P. Strawson has called attention to
the logically peculiar status of persons: an individual
is both the subject of descriptive predicates, his physi­
cal movements for example, and predicates of character
and consciousness. This tendency towards the personal
should not be taken to exclude the non-personal, however.
The model of the call of duty, for instance, is both non-personal and comprehensive. Linguistically speaking, Ramsey reminds us that neither the personal nor the non-personal will ever replace the unique performance of the name 'God' in a sentence. Therefore the two kinds will be used in combination to better articulate the elusive character of what is disclosed. Nonetheless, we can see indications of the stratification of models Ramsey is speaking of when he talks of judging a model against others. (It is interesting that in the Riddell Lectures for 1963 he briefly mentions the possibilities of seeing 'power' or 'activity' as a super-model beyond, and integrating, the personal and non-personal models. However, in the Zenos Lectures of March 1966 there is a radical change on this point. Rather than argue for seeing activity as a comprehensive model, he sees it as the one aspect of a disclosure about which we can talk univocally, without analogy or equivocation. "Activity is that of which we can speak--even in relation to God--literally: it is for all our discourse a logical primitive."15 Although the theological difficulties--and they are manifold--will be discussed in a later chapter, it is clear that Ramsey has here removed assertions about divine activity from the question of models entirely, and wishes to find for it a completely different logical context.)

Given the capacity of theological disclosure models to evoke disclosures of their objective reference, Ramsey asks rhetorically, why call the reference by the name
'God'? His answer to this is itself indirect and analogical. Assuming that for some odd reason the Americans had not yet heard of the word 'circle', but knew, understood, and constantly used the concept given in the disclosure of a polygon with an infinite number of sides. Their geometry would be every bit as developed as their more articulate counterparts in Britain, their tins would be just as round; but where the British used 'circle', the Americans would always speak of an 'infinite polygon'. But one day, in interaction with the British, an American geometer hears his counter-part use the term 'circle'. This is what he and his fellow Americans have been talking about and using all these years!

In like manner, Ramsey has us suppose that we had never heard the word, 'God'. We might refer to the objective reference of our disclosures as the Absolute or the One in the Many, or the Transcendent, etc. But suppose we stumbled upon a black book which included many of the models we typically used to evoke disclosures of the reference and to speak of the reference to others. Models of a loving father, a powerful king, a righteous judge, etc., as well as non-personal models of all-knowing wisdom, duty, and order, etc. are used of this reference. Here in the book, however, the reference is called, 'God'. The name fits that which (or who) we already know. Because of its all-encompassing character, there is no need to search elsewhere for further names. Without some contextual setting the word 'God' is plainly meaningless. On the other
hand, a comprehensive enough context would include the whole universe. Thus Ramsey can argue that "the reference of any and every cosmic disclosure, i.e., a disclosure which is restricted to no finite pattern of spatio-temporal events as its centre, is the same; viz. God".16

The more linguistic side of Ramsey's conception of models is found in his third Whidden Lecture, "Models and Qualifiers: Understanding and Insight". It will provide a bridge between his understanding of models and his linguistic insights. His first Whidden Lecture spoke of models in the natural sciences. His second looked at the social sciences. Here in the third he turns to the relation of models to the arts and humanities. Max Black reminds us that like models metaphors arise when descriptive discourse fails. Both metaphor and simile have important similarities to those attributes Ramsey has been careful to establish for models. But whereas development from a simile is somewhat limited, metaphor is more prolific. Far from being mere ornament, metaphors in discourse perform like models in theory to disclose what cannot be seen by 'straight', descriptive language.

Ramsey turns to I. A. Richards to describe the workings of metaphor in more depth. Richards writes that metaphor borrows between two contexts or groups of language. A metaphor is a tangential intersection of contexts which benefits from common features or structures of both. In metaphors, 'A' language meets 'B' language in a single point which evokes a disclosure. "Electricity is flowing
through the wire"; "Jesus is the Christ". The first matches language about electricity with terms drawn from the context of water. 'Electricity' and 'wire' are straightforward enough, but to speak of 'flowing', to draw upon the context of water is metaphorical, intended to evoke a disclosure of the behaviour of one form of energy. The second draws a parallel between a man known by some who first heard the phrase uttered with the history of the concept of Messiah in Judaism.

Such tangible semantics are not to be despised for their eccentricity, but welcomed for the possibilities of enrichment they bring. The built-in provision of endless variation and development itself witnesses to the elusiveness and mystery of its subject. To say that 'a library is a powerhouse', for example, in its integration of language about volts and language about books, evokes a disclosure which is capable of further development. This linking of two contexts generates an unspecifiable number of disclosure possibilities. The two contexts are linked by the disclosure which comprehends them.

"Metaphors and models, both enabling us to be articulate about an insight, are thus the basic currency for mystery, and we can spend our lives elucidating ever more faithfully the mystery in which metaphors and models are born."17 Max Black writes that metaphor aids the imagination in such a way that a metaphor's translation will generally fall short. This failure of 'straight' discourse is not simply because of the aesthetic appreciation of a
metaphor. It is not merely because the translation seems prolix or banal in comparison. Black argues that a metaphor is able to give insight which cannot be expressed by 'flat' discourse. In using models, all disciplines are grounded in insight, imagination, visions of mystery. For Black, all disciplines rely upon imagination to a larger extent than many are willing to acknowledge. But Ramsey wants to go further, to give 'the imagination' greater cognitive significance, by grounding it in a disclosure of the objective referent.

The significance of Black's point for theology is clear: When theologians strive for such precision that they neglect the mystery at the heart of the discipline, their insight, imagination, vision suffers. Theology is born in mystery—in the insight into the universe's self-disclosure around events. Where the model is pedantically mistaken as a picture of the referent, this course must be counteracted by emphasizing the distinction between the model and the situation from which the model arose. If a particular father provides the occasion for a disclosure model of our heavenly Father, we must carefully stress the fact that 'father' is but a model. Otherwise theology falls into the traps of critics like Flew, who expect the reference of models to act and be observable in the same way as the models themselves.

In science, too, the neglect of the essential role of models leads to the stifling of imagination and insight. In science, however, Ramsey argues that this is compensated
for by the discipline's firm grounding in the empirical. Because it is concerned with verifiable facts, science has been able to stay reputable and useful. This line of thought, however, seems to miss the point. Black is arguing that neglect of models leads to the stifling of that imaginative element which is necessary for further development. And, as reliable and useful as attention to a precise methodology and tangible data can be, it cannot adequately account for discovery. Here again, the criticism of Michael Polanyi is more fitting. He argues that the imagination which is stifled by the debasement of it by science is recovered in the interests of discovery in quite another way. The neglect of insight is overcome by the systematic breaking of the rules of non-committal, non-imaginative, impersonal knowledge. The positivist debases the imagination while the working scientist depends upon it.

The imagination is evoked in the use of models. Logical eccentricity is not only the life-blood of theology, but of the imagination in general as well. But Ramsey points out that a plurality of models alone cannot sufficiently point us to a disclosure. Models require what he calls 'qualifiers'. To portray this need, he gives the example of a sign that simply says 'Exit'. This is adequate if the sign happens to be placed above a door, but if it is in the middle of a wall, some pointer is required. An arrow directing us from the sign to the exit itself is needed to make any sense of the symbol. Qualifiers direct the development of models towards a disclosure. Each
qualifier is fit to its own family of models. These qualifiers act as imperatives or directives to ensure that the model is not taken as a picture of its reference. Although he does not discuss them in these terms, models and qualifiers together nicely balance the elements of transcendence and immanence in Christian discourse. As the model echoes or chimes in with what is familiar to us, it functions in such a way as to stress immanence. The qualifier, on the other hand, makes the phrase logically odd, directs our attention to the elusiveness of the reference, and supplies the element of mystery and transcendence.

One of Ramsey's favourite examples here is that of 'infinitely loving'. The model of loving discloses to us a particular aspect of the given reference of a cosmic disclosure. The referent has a character which can be seen in the model of a loving father. But to safeguard the mystery, we cannot rest content with this model—without falling into logical webs. We must develop the model to work towards a disclosure beyond finite love. This is done by starting with fairly commonplace love, working through examples of those who are quite loving, very loving, exceptionally loving and so on, hoping that the light will dawn, the penny will drop. Geometrically, this can once again be seen in the disclosure which would result from seeing a sequence of a triangle, a square, a pentagon, a hexagon, a heptagon, an octogon... one need not go too far before the increasing number of sides evokes a disclosure, the penny drops, and the person sees that this
development of sides is leading to a circle. To return to our model of love, the qualifiers set the direction, hoping to evoke the disclosure of infinite love. Such a pattern can be observed in phrases like all-powerful, all-knowing, perfect wisdom, as well as in negative qualifiers like in-effable, un-changing, etc.

The model-qualifier form is sometimes disguised, however. The assertion, 'God is a necessary being' is one example. First of all this cannot be taken as straight description; it is a logical impropriety. The first task is to locate the model—in this case, 'being'. 'Being' can characterize anything from a melon to energy. The qualifier 'necessary' directs us to develop this model of 'being' from more to less contingent being. That the melon exists is clear; but it is not a very necessary being. One might argue that the table upon which the melon sits is less contingent, more necessary. 'There may not always be that melon on the table, but the table will be here'. More necessary than the table might be the dining hall itself, and beyond that, the existence of the college, the town the college is in, the county, and the country ... will be seen as more and more necessary. Ramsey mentions that if the disclosure stops at country for example, we shall get sentiments like "My country right or wrong", and patriotism will be turned into a religion. As national sentiment is fairly comprehensive in its scope, it may be quite difficult to force the development further, to
show that the necessary existence of one's country is not quite necessary enough, that the disclosure's reference is still not transcendent.\(^\text{18}\)

The religious man would claim that the ultimate reference for the model which the qualifier directs us to, is God. As the qualifier has directed us, we have moved by an 'informal inference' process, from the very contingent melon to the very necessary country, and perhaps to more necessary being, but I would misrepresent Ramsey were I to argue that he sees the development from melon to God to be one of 'informal inference'. The very notion of disclosure precludes this possibility, because of its passive character.

In so far as I have appealed to a disclosure, to something which breaks in on us, to a situation in which we pass beyond any and all models we have developed to date, when ... we 'jump to it', there is involved what might be called logical leap, just as there is logical leap between seeing '1 \(\frac{1}{2}\) \(\frac{1}{4}\) \(\frac{1}{8}\) \(\frac{1}{16}\) ...' and saying '2'. So, like Kierkegaard, and Lessing before him, I too can talk of a leap...\(^\text{19}\)

This lack of a straightforward inferential progression means that models, even fairly clearly qualified, directing one to mystery, might not work. This is, however, another way of saying that models are not self-guaranteeing. One reason the disclosure may not happen is that qualifiers are not often understood in the sense in which Ramsey sees them. The logical distinction between 'infinite' and 'very, very' is not that obvious, even to many in logic. Similarly the eccentricity of
theological models is often reduced to the relative rarity of shepherds with crooks; rather than a firm distinction being grasped between picturing models and the less direct 'analogue' types. Finally, as he points out in Religious Language, it is far too much to expect from a model to think that it will perform the 'semantic magic' required to develop a near-perfect model with a superb qualifier; and produce ... God. This thinking again falls into the approach of flat, descriptive language. What is not verbally odd is devoid of disclosure possibilities. But the alternative, to stress the indirect nature of model discourse is to force upon theology greater tentativeness in its proclamations than it has thus far shown.

This brings us conveniently into the area of logically odd discourse as the idiom for religious language.
Ramsey's insights into the logical oddness of religious discourse can be broken down into two subsections, each based upon a central article or lecture, and each seen in relation to a philosopher of language. The two fundamental articles are "The Systematic Elusiveness of I" and "Paradox in Religion". The discussion of the former will be related to the work of John Austin; the latter article will be related to John Wisdom.

Any attempt to deal with religious language must walk the fine line between intelligibility on one hand, and safeguarding the transcendence of the reference, the ineffable and incomprehensible nature of God, the wholly other. I have shown how Ramsey's concepts of model and qualifier co-operate to anchor religious assertions in experience by means of models, and to disclose the mystery of the reference by the use of a qualifier to point to the transcendent. The linguistic conclusion that Ramsey himself states in Models and Mystery is that what is verbally straightforward is devoid of disclosure possibilities. Logical oddness is a functional necessity; in order for religious discourse to perform its task of evoking cosmic disclosures, Ramsey argues, it must be odd.

But if religious language is to be odd to safeguard its disclosure possibilities, its oddness risks its claims to intelligibility. If paradox is to be taken as the idiom for religious language, the religious language community
may sever its ties with the larger society, may surrender any claims to factual assertions or to meaningful language. Ramsey's response is to look for 'facts' which are suitably odd to break the restrictive criteria of the empiricists, and to look for a case in ordinary language which can serve as a paradigm for religious discourse. He finds both of these needs fulfilled in the issue of personal identity and the language surrounding self-awareness.

In 1949 Gilbert Ryle published *The Concept of Mind* in which he discusses the category blunders growing out of the traditional Cartesian dualism of mind and body. He attacks the dogma of what he calls the 'ghost in the machine', the category mistake of supposing that the logic of the mind, and mental activities can be treated in the same category as the logic of bodily activity. Two points can be gained: (1) the self must not be seen as a ghost, as an entity behind or above all the activities of the body; and, from this point, (2) references to mental activity must be understood in relation to observable physical activity.

Ryle brings this to bear upon the problem of personal identity, a perpetual thorn in the empiricists' side. In his *Treatise of Human Nature*, Hume had set out the problem in terms of perceptions. He wrote there, that whenever he searched for his self, all he could find was some perception or other. It was obvious to Hume that reflection upon a train of past perceptions can disclose a sense of personal identity. But such an experience of identity could not be adequately dealt with by means of Hume's theory of
distinct ideas and impressions. Hume is conscious of the deficiencies of his account—to give an adequate picture of self-awareness or personal identity, more than perceptions in some way connected will be needed.

Ryle attempts to meet this problem with his concept of 'higher order actions'. These are actions upon actions--reactions, responses, retaliations, etc. This can be represented in diagram form: (B boxing C) or (Y selling Z) are first or lower order acts. A applauding (B boxing C), or X acting as the customer for (Y selling Z) are higher order actions. Highest order actions involve the thought of other actions. With any action comes the possibility of a higher order action. Being concerned with a past action of mine raises the possibility of an infinite series. With this in mind Ryle argues that self-elusiveness is systematic. Self-description is never complete, since the acting self must the next moment be described: I was describing myself describing myself describing myself ...

Ramsey's basic criticism applies equally to Hume and Ryle. Both of them assume that any object which becomes the subject of a highest order action is unchanged by the process. Hume made this assumption explicit in his search for the self strictly in terms of another perception. Ramsey confesses that Ryle never makes this assumption explicit; but he argues that it is a necessary presupposition as he has stated his position.

In "The Systematic Elusiveness of I" Ramsey approaches the idea that the object is unchanged in the process of
becoming the subject of a highest order action from two sides: (1) what becomes of the subject-object distinction, which is fundamental to much of epistemology; and (2) what account can we give of personal identity with this assumption? Regarding the first question, Ramsey asks us to consider a situation in which 'B is trying to solve a chess problem C', and A is trying to describe everything about B, except for the fact that A is describing B. Here is the lower order action (of B solving C), and the higher order action of A describing (B solving C). For A, there is nothing particularly odd here. A is describing chess problem C, and A is describing the slightly more complex (B solving C) in terms of observables—what A can know of B's mental activity by B's various attempts to solve C. All this is straightforward enough.

The question is radically changed when we try to explore the same situation (B solving C), from B's perspective—self-commentary—I describing (I solving C). This is obviously different, but Ramsey doubts that Ryle's discussion of its distinctiveness is sufficient. He uses the examples of an infinite series of pennies in a line, where we add another penny each time we count the line. Here would be a systematic elusiveness in Ryle's sense. Each time we run through the series of pennies we add another. This would seem difficult enough for some one who is asked for an exact count. But is it odd enough? If the relationship between A describing (B solving C) and I describing (I solving C) is not parallel, we have no right to include the second 'I' within
the brackets as we have done with 'B'. In order for this parallel to work, 'I' would have to be a matrix of some events it would have to be as 'objective' as 'B'. One of Ryle's own examples: "I was laughing at myself for being butter-fingered" itself shows that the distinction between 'I' and 'myself' precludes the possibility of such a straightforward substitution of 'I' within the brackets. In other words, there is a systematic, logical distinction between the two words. 'I' as subject is distinguished from 'myself' as object.

To neglect this linguistic distinction is to risk destroying the subject-object dichotomy. To break this distinction is to disrupt our criteria of logical thought and meaningful speech. The subject-object distinction becomes no more than a temporary device or worse, an illusion.

Here then is my first difficulty: If we assume that what eludes us now, becomes in the next minute wholly tractable, then since, at this next minute, an earlier situation has been completely objectified, what account can we then give of the subject-object distinction which is the permanent presupposition of all living and talking alike? What account can we give of our 'subjectivity' 'now'?2

Ramsey addresses himself to the second difficulty, that of personal identity, by reference to the assertion 'I am looking at the bus', portrayed as ('I r B'). From Ryle's perspective, all we need do to reach a highest order activity is add 'I r' outside the bracket: I r (I r B). But as he has demonstrated above, the 'I' within the bracket is problematic; for Hume the 'I' is a difficult object for 'I's' consideration, since, try as he will, Hume can never
observe anything but the perceptions. To treat the formula in this way, the terms within the bracket would all have to be objects \((I_n r_n C)\). It is impossible to treat \(I_n\) if it is no more than an infinite series of perceptions. Ramsey recommends that we take a hint from mathematical infinite series, and see that the logic of the infinite series cannot be the same as that of the terms of the series. In Ryle's terms, to treat the logic of the subject of any highest order action in the same way as that of the object of that highest order action is to commit a category blunder.

In "Biology and Personality", Ramsey refers to the work of C. D. Broad on personal identity. Broad is critical of the 'bundle' theories of self, because they confuse a 'unity of system' with a 'unity of centre'. As we have seen, for Hume, self is a bundle of loosely, if at all linked, connections of perceptions. For Broad the self is experienced as the centre unifier of experience rather than as the connections between events in a series. Typically eclectic, Ramsey brings out the Ramseyfications of Broad's insights. This 'unity of centre' is translated by Ramsey into a self-disclosure. By drawing upon enough events, and mapping them like points on the rim of a wheel, at some point or other a 'hub' or centre will disclose itself. The relation, the integration provided by the self-disclosure, is not so much the type that might be seen connecting event A to B, and B to C, and C to D, etc., but a unity at the centre of these events.
Given this ontologically odd 'fact', the common experience of personal identity, which Ramsey has thus explic­ated; how is it possible to speak of this elusive fact? (Here again Ramsey attempts to delicately balance opposing factors: To speak of 'facts' as elusive seems to many to be illogical. The very idea of 'facts which elude direct statement' is an attempt to 'broaden' the rigid confines of empiricism (or break them down), and at the same time to allow language to be flexible or suitably odd to disclose such 'elusive facts'.)

In order to show the ways in which such a 'fact' might be communicated Ramsey turns to five stories, although the examples could easily be multiplied. He talks about the self-awareness of Alice, who, despite all the 'observational' changes would be able to see a 'unity of centre' in her ex­periences. A more practical example is that of a stage mimic. Although all observables might be exactly alike to the audi­ence, the mimic himself would know who he was. In another writing, Ramsey asks his audience to imagine that by some freak occurrence, Ramsey disappeared and General Robert E. Lee of the Civil War appeared in his place. Certainly from the point of view of descriptive language his audience would be thrown into confusion, the identification of the speaker (R) by the audience (A) would be immensely compli­cated by Lee's sudden appearance. But Ramsey's point is, that no matter how confused his audience would be by this event, Ramsey himself (R) would at no time have any doubt who he himself was.
Armed with this concept of self-awareness, and the characteristic language of first-person assertions, Ramsey is able to break the rigid criteria of the empiricists, and present a persuasive argument for the need for sufficiently odd logic to deal adequately with self-awareness. He argues that this way of looking at personal identity, while certainly far from Hume's line of thought, would have solved his difficulties had he accepted it. Whatever 'I' stands for, it will not be a mere perception. But on the other hand, Ramsey wants to defend himself from charges that he has simply re-introduced the 'ghost in the machine'. For what there is behind the scenes--either in first person logic or in religious language--must not be taken as descriptive of another, shadowy world, of a transcendent self or soul inhabiting temporarily a 'sinewy container'. If religious language is to mean anything, it must be anchored in experience. It must be what is observed and more, not simply what is observed somewhere else. The logical diversity must not be assimilated or simplistically reduced to a sharp dichotomy in which religious language says nothing about the world; and language about myself says nothing about my physical activity.

Ramsey's interest in the logical intricacies of discourse about one's self-awareness is carried over in his discussions of the character of 'person words'. In a contribution to the Hibbert Journal, (April 1956), Antony Flew discussed the logical peculiarities of person words. He takes Ryle's point, that person words about walking, talking,
joking, etc. are not to be taken as synonymous with the logic of words about bodies. But, against Butler, Flew maintains that whatever distinctive person words refer to, walking, joking, smiling, etc. are all brought to an end by death. As the words relating to the butcher's person: thinking, frowning, etc., are not the same as those relating to his body; when the butcher dies, it is his body alone which is left. A person cannot witness his own funeral, nor even imagine witnessing his funeral. What I might imagine is the funeral of my body, but this is distinct from my funeral. Death, according to Flew, obliterates 'I'.

Ramsey, not surprisingly, rejects this interpretation of person words. He fully agrees that words about persons refer to behaviour; and that, once dead, such distinctive behaviour ceases. But he disagrees with Flew's claim that this is all person words refer to. As he has shown above, (i.e., as he had shown in "The Systematic Elusiveness of 'I'") while descriptive language makes meaningful assertions about my movements, it is doubtful that it effectively handles all that is there in my self-awareness of my own activity. Not that Flew can be caught within this tight ontology. He is not asserting that persons are bodies and nothing more. But, like Ryle, Flew is assuming that persons can be summed up in higher order explanations.

Against this view Ramsey is maintaining that characteristically personal situations can be evoked by suitably odd language. Negatively, this involves the claim that "it
is logically impossible to describe in straightforward perceptual language the kind of situations..." which are characteristically personal; those in which we become aware of a self-disclosure, or come to know intimately another person—the kind of knowledge that personal verbs like 'loving' (or 'hating') are currency for.

Ramsey brings out further aspects of the logical behaviour of 'I'-talk with reference to the argument of P. F. Strawson in Individuals. Strawson calls the word person a 'logical primitive'. By this he means that the concept is something of an irreducible posit for language. In the Austin/Strawson discussion over facts and things, Austin readily admits that we would not ordinarily refer to a person as a fact. The word 'person' can have the same sort of predicates we normally apply to blocks of wood, a table, or a building. They are tall or short, they are lying in the garden or somewhere in the kitchen, they weight ten or fifteen stone. But beyond these physical descriptives are all sorts of assertions we can only make of persons: he is thinking; she is smiling; he is solving the chess problem; or they believe in God. In the problem of knowing another self the question of 'fact' is once again raised. Like Ramsey, Strawson regards the 'facts' here as elusive, problematic. The very existence of the concept of person challenges us to broaden the meaning of the word 'fact'. Ramsey quotes from Individuals, "We may still want to ask what is it in the natural facts that makes it intelligible that we should have this concept?"6 Straw-
son goes on to mention the possibility of connecting these 'natural facts' with activity, recalling both Berkeley's notions, and Ramsey's suggestion that we take activity as a logical primitive.

But to pursue this in the direction of the ontology of personal identity would take us too far from the scope of this section, which is meant to be linguistic. When the issues of personal activity and linguistics are combined it is natural to think of another Oxford philosopher, John L. Austin. Ramsey explicates his relation to Austin in the contribution to Intellect and Hope, which I have presented in discussing the work of Polanyi.

The first section of Ramsey's contribution to Intellect and Hope was concerned to tie together Polanyi's insights into the process of knowing a comprehensive entity and Austin's difficulties in relation to Strawson's contributions to the reference problem. Both of these points were taken up in my discussion of the disclosure concept. The second theme of Ramsey's essay is an attempt to bring out the personal involvement inherent in knowing and speaking to which Polanyi and Austin, in very different ways, gave attention.

In his early work, Austin called attention to what he called 'performatives'. These assertions, or more properly, 'utterances', do not so much state a fact as they actually do something. Austin gives as examples: 'I bid one heart'; 'I sentence you to thirty days in gaol'; 'I promise to bring you a loaf of bread'. How are we to understand 'I bid one heart'? It is neither an explanation
of inner feelings, nor an assertion of a fact, nor an expression of intent, nor a command. It is an act.

Austin contrasted these 'performatives' with straightforward statements, assertions of facts, like 'there is a red barn'; 'there is a table'. These he called 'constatives' to distinguish them from 'performatives'. But Austin had difficulties in finding criteria to make the distinction work. An early attempt was the test provided by inserting 'hereby' into the utterance. "You are warned not to cross the tracks" could in this way be clearly seen as a performative in contrast to 'there is a red barn', which is constative. "You are hereby warned not to cross the tracks" makes sense, whereas, "There is hereby a red barn" is nonsensical.

But this and subsequent attempts to find suitable criteria broke down. Although this at first was taken to imply the failure of the performative theory, since the constative/performative distinction could not be maintained, Austin was able to adjust his position, opening the door to more fruitful approaches. Significantly, it was not that the performatives tended to merge into the constatives, but the reverse; constatives tended to collapse into performatives. Taking three utterances as examples: "There is a train coming"; "I guess a train is coming"; and "Watch out for the train that's coming"--the second is a guess, the third is obviously a performative in the sense that the speaker is not stating the fact that the train is approaching, but is acting, warning. But the
seemingly straightforward statement "There is a train coming" can just as easily be used as a performative. One need not preface one's warning with "Watch out" or "Look out" in order for one's utterance to serve as an act of warning.

In place of the performative theory Austin introduced the theory of illocutionary forces. Under this development all utterances could be seen as 'speech-acts' of one kind or another. Beyond the obvious 'physical' act of sound production, and the 'phatic' act of producing words that conform to basic rules of grammar so that the utterances should make sense, Austin distinguishes three kinds of speech-acts: (a) the 'locutionary act' which is an utterance with a fairly definite reference; (b) the 'illocutionary act'—that act which I perform in my locutionary act; and (c) the 'perlocutionary act' which is the act I might succeed in performing through the locutionary act. Within these categories, the locutionary force guarantees that the utterance have some relation to a thing or person--some objective reference, some descriptive force. The illocutionary force, besides acknowledging that all utterances are 'acts', helps to differentiate the many kinds of illocutionary force: asserting, warning, exclaiming, directing, commanding, promising, etc. While distinguishing different acts, the illocutionary force also serves to bring out a point Austin had made earlier in a paper, "Performatve Utterances". "What we need to do for the case of stating, and by the same token, describing and reporting,
is to take them a bit off their pedestal, to realize that they are speech-acts no less than all these other speech-acts that we have been mentioning and talking about as performatives.\(^3\)

The 'perlocutionary force' of an utterance is a measure of its success or failure to perform the speech-act. Has the person I warned moved off the tracks? Has my hint about a gift I would like resulted in my receiving it? But there is a lack of definiteness about the relationship of the illocutionary and the perlocutionary forces of a statement. Its consequences are loosely connected with the intentions of the speaker. My warning to get off the tracks might be quickly heeded. My assertion that the cat has mange might quickly be accepted as a fact. But the illocutionary force of 'Let's go, boys!' might fail entirely to inspire my side. My hint that the hat is ugly, "My dear, it's the Taj Mahal", might be far too subtle, fly over my wife's adorned head, and fail to prevent an exorbitant purchase destined to collect dust in the closet.

Although Ramsey does not mention the link in "Polanyi and J. L. Austin", where he is primarily concerned to bring out the implications of the illocutionary force, the concept of a 'perlocutionary act' provides helpful support for Ramsey's acknowledgement of the possibility of failure built into religious assertions' 'illocutionary force'--in Ramsey's terms, the evocative function of religious language should never be taken as self-guaranteeing; models and qualifiers may fail to evoke a disclosure. If an utterance
with as strong a 'locutionary force', (as direct a reference) as "There is a train coming" can fail in its 'perlocutionary act', the necessity of tentative theological assertions, with their mysterious and transcendent objective reference becomes obvious. When the locutionary force (or the reference) is indirect (by necessity) and the illocutionary force is as profound as the evocation of a cosmic disclosure, the perlocutionary act is bound to be problematic.

This ties in, in an interesting way, with a point Polanyi makes in *Personal Knowledge* about the amount of personal involvement in assertions. Taking 'p' to represent some assertion such as 'there is a red barn', Polanyi argues:

'p is true' declares that I identify myself with the content of the factual sentence p, and this identification is something I am doing, and not a fact that I am observing. The expression 'p is true' is therefore not itself a sentence but merely the assertion of an (otherwise unasserted) sentence, the sentence p. To say that 'p is true' is to underwrite a commitment or to sign an acceptance, in a sense akin to the commercial meaning of such acts. 9

In direct opposition to a fact-value dichotomy with its inherent distinction between 'objective' statements and 'merely subjective' assertions, Polanyi holds that all assertions have some degree of personal involvement. He argues that where the certainty of the expression is high, the participation of the asserter will be correspondingly lower than in the case of assertions of less certainty.

Returning to Austin, Ramsey asks if there are any utterances which are non-performatives, which are devoid of self-involvement. Like Polanyi, Ramsey readily grants that
our self-involvement in our utterances takes radically different forms. There is more participation, more commitment, a higher level of self-involvement in "I take thee to my wedded wife" than there is in "There is a red barn". Going beyond Austin, Ramsey insists that not only is 'I-talk' the logical paradigm for performatives, and a basic aspect of the illocutionary force of utterances, but that the person making the utterance, the 'I' is far more complex than Austin acknowledged. He sums up his point nicely, suggesting,

that because Austin was so critical of metaphysics of the old brand he did not see what was significant about performatives was their first-person logic, pointing to their grounding in self-disclosure, which then allows for and involves, I would say, some metaphysical claims in so far as the personal subjectivity given in self-disclosure and affirmed in performative utterances cannot be reduced to 'objects', to impersonal criteria.

Summing up, then, the relations between the linguistic insights of John Austin and Ramsey's ideas about religious language, I have argued that the 'perlocutionary force' of an utterance ties in nicely with Ramsey's insistence that theological language be tentative, that religious assertions are not to be taken as self-guaranteeing.

Secondly, as Austin's illocutionary act brings to mind Wittgenstein's concept of language games, so Ramsey's evocative function of religious language is the primary illocutionary act or language game of religious discourse. Both Austin's insights into the functions of language and Ramsey's explorations into the evocation of disclosures by
religious assertions are radically different from D. Z. Phillips' interpretation of Wittgenstein's language game concept. Ramsey and Austin follow Wittgenstein's lead to explore ways of doing things with words, whereas Phillips interprets language games along the lines of private contexts with logical sovereignty. Although the difference is subtle, I believe that 'each illocutionary force has its own logic' is truer to the language game concept than to say that religious speaking is independent of scientific speaking which is autonomous from other language contexts.

Against Ramsey, however, it can certainly be argued that he has neglected some of the more important 'illocutionary forces' of religious discourse, in his stress upon the evocative illocutionary act. Finally, the concept of the locutionary force of utterances is related by Ramsey in two writings to the Austin/Strawson controversy. Here, Ramsey argues that his disclosure concept provides a possible reconciling development of both positions. Equally revealing, however, is a comment he makes about the descriptive force, in an informal discussion in 1965.12 Ramsey there states that Austin's insistence that utterances have some descriptive force is in keeping with the evocative force of religious utterances, but that the evocative must be primary. Not that Austin would necessarily disagree: "I promise to bring a loaf of bread" does require the locutionary force, the descriptive element of loaves of bread; but its primary force is performative, making a promise. Likewise "Please pass the bread" needs
the reference to bread on the table, but it is primarily performative, the act of requesting bread.

Regarding religious assertions, Ramsey stated, I'm not saying that they are purely evocative and not descriptive at all. What I'm saying is that they have pre-eminently evocative force ... and unless this disclosure is evoked, we should look in vain for their meaning and significance. If we've got this, then we might begin to look for the kind of descriptive force that they have, which may be explicated in more descriptive ways ...

This ties in well with a comment he makes in the last of his Riddell Memorial Lectures for 1965. He stated that when talking of God, ordinary ways of speaking must be seen as models, i.e., they must be qualified. Their logic must be suitably odd. But they must also interlock with a particular context. To take the qualifier by itself is virtually to guarantee bogus dilemmas and logical webs. Without a model to provide empirical anchorage, in Austin's terms, without any locutionary force, religious assertions are empty. Ramsey warns us against assimilating the logic of 'God is up there' with 'John is up there' in flat, descriptive logic. "The sentence 'God is up there' is much more like a rule about operators such as \( \frac{d^2}{dx^2} = \frac{d}{dx} \frac{d}{dx} \) which all reference to what is being operated on is absent." CD 80

In other words, the sentence 'God is up there' is a qualifier without a model, a pointer devoid of empirical anchorage. It is an illocutionary act with no locutionary force; the evocative power is impaired.

Here Ramsey demonstrates his debt to Russell, which he discusses in "Contemporary Empiricism" and elsewhere.
Russell called attention to the distinction between verbal and logical form. 'Lions are real' and 'Lions are yellow' are verbally alike in form, but quite different in terms of logical behaviour. Russell elucidated the logical diversity, (in this case between the descriptive predicate, 'yellow', and the much more problematic question of existence, 'real') that apparently similar forms can disguise. Turning to religious language Ramsey uses this insight to describe the logical dissimilarity between 'the leaf is green' and 'the soul is immortal', in which 'green' is a simple descriptive predicate, 'immortal' is a qualified model; or between 'I believe there is a train coming' and 'I believe that Jesus is coming again' in which the illocutionary force of the former is the act of guessing, the latter, of stating a conviction.

Out of the challenge of the verification principle came many attempts to tie religious discourse to ordinary ways of talking about everyday experience. Much of theology, of course, either ignored the threat to the meaningfulness of its assertions, or simply accepted the conclusion that theology is non-cognitive. Having traced Ramsey's linguistic response, I shall here 'sandwich' his experiential reaction between two all-too-brief discussions. One, the work of a philosopher, John Wisdom; the other, an empiricist-theologian, John Hick. Fortunately we have already seen both thinkers' integrative parables; the 'garden' and the 'road to the celestial city'.

First, Wisdom. It was certainly disheartening to
many empiricist theologians to see what Antony Flew did with Wisdom's gardener. In brief, the poor omnipotent, omniscient horticulturalist died 'the death of a thousand qualifications'. Taking such characteristics in logical straightforward manner, Flew demonstrated that the theological community was forced to hedge its conceptual 'God' into virtual irrelevance. Thus, it must have been doubly disappointing to find Wisdom appreciative of Flew's development. "Flew presents clearly yet sympathetically the difficulty he finds in what is said by men of religion."13

The initial shock, however, is more than offset by a fuller understanding of Wisdom's position. D. A. T. Gasking, in his exposition of Wisdom's work, has traced four types of questions; taken together these illustrate Wisdom's inquiry into the nature of philosophy. These are: (a) empirical questions--these can be approached by an agreed method, either to verify or falsify some contention; e.g. is this material flammable? (b) logic questions--these are requests for an agreed definition or rule, a question of correct usage; e.g. if this burns under some conditions but not others, can we still call it 'flammable'? (c) conflict questions--these questions require a decision of some sort; there is no agreed-upon convention for reference; we are in the position of a judge who must weight the evidence; or rather, like the judge who faces a case with no legal precedent: however he decides helps to determine future interpretations; he makes the law by his decision; (d) paradox--here is a question the answer to
which is usually obvious from the standpoint of (a) or (b); such a question suggests a logical reform. Types (c) and (d) share the characteristic of initiating some logical or linguistic change in convention; (d) is a 'boundary-breaking' question.

Following the later Wittgenstein, Wisdom held that philosophical questions were of these last two types. In asking a philosophical question, you are not asking for some empirical confirmation, nor what the existing logical convention might be. "What you are asking for is a decision and the reasons for it in the sense in which reasons can be offered for a decision--by a council for the plaintiff and council for the defendant". In Paradox and Discovery, Wisdom explains that such philosophical questions were once thought to be in direct conflict with the empirical assertions of science. In actual practice, however, these paradoxical assertions are more like requests for precedent-setting decisions. A claim that a particular empirical assertion is false can be seen as just another 'move' on the 'chess-board' of empirical discourse, and can therefore be verified or falsified. A philosophical question, on the other hand, is a request for a decision about the rules of chess. It is as if to charge that the empiricist is no longer playing 'chess' on his board. A pedantic approach that takes the question as merely an eccentric move on the empirical chess-board misses the request's boundary-breaking force.
The core of Wisdom's 'garden' parable is actually a conflict question about the logic of religious assertions. His parable is a question of 'seeing-as': what kind of evidence would count for or against the assertion 'God exists'. In pointing out, as he did, the difficulties with the 'matter of fact' evidence traditionally supplied, Flew caught the gist of what Wisdom was saying. Religious assertions make poor moves on the empiricists' chess-board. Unfortunately in his inability to get beyond empirical data and descriptive logic—'gross bodies' as Butler would say—Flew also seems to have missed the paradox question. Flew seems to think that Wisdom's point is exhausted by raising insuperable problems of playing religious assertions on an empirical chess-board. That much is true: Wisdom comments, "The existence of God is not an experimental issue in the way it was."^{15} But Wisdom is hardly content to let it go at that.

The statement just quoted is itself a boundary-breaking response to the conflict question, one which he picked up in a later essay, "The Logic of God". Having thus disposed of questions of type (a) aimed at God, Wisdom posited a new rule for meaningfulness, one more sympathetic to religious assertions. "A question is a real meaningful question if either it can be answered by observation or it can be answered by demonstration from premises which are either self-evident or obtained by describing what we have observed."^{16} The clause 'or obtained by describing what we have observed' is the ground-breaker.
Wisdom then proceeds (in "The Logic of God") to take us on a magical mystery tour which unfolds the 'matters of great consequence' whose significance is underscored by Wittgenstein's seeing-as concept. Again the model of the law-court is ideal. The facts stand before the judge just as the garden stands before believer and non-believer alike. Unlike a clearing in a wilderness, the law-court is an everyday experience (at least for the judge); but, more important, it is not merely a 'matter of speculation'. There the judge is called (as we are called in other situations) to take an attitude, give a ruling, make a pronouncement. In paradoxical, precedent-setting situations it is not a matter of more facts; though it is a matter of much significance.

Wisdom offers one suggestion of the kind of evidence which would count for or against a religious assertion. He considers 'Christ was one with God' with reference to two different but related contexts: (a) Christ's alleged statement, "Neither pray I for these alone, but for them also which shall believe on me through their word; that they all may be one; as Thou, Father, art in me, and I in Thee, that they also may be one in us." (John 17.20, 21) and (b) "What it is about human beings which is referred to by one who says that they are not one with God but could become so and in what way it is alleged that Christ was different so that He was one with God and how this is consistent with those despairing words 'My God, my God, why hast Thou forsaken me,'"17 The first (a) is to
consider the linguistic contextualisation of the claim 'Christ was one with God'; the second (b) is its harmonisation with its (admittedly odd) state(s) of affairs.

All of which Wisdom encourages us (or those of us who are not tempted to pursue these claims with descriptive logic pedantry) to face as an imperative or as a situation calling for personal judgment. If we allow our mounting bewilderment to stifle our spirit of discovery we "half deny ourselves that view of the actual that power to place on the manifold of nature those phenomena which seemed anomalous, which a changing conception may give us."18 The new conception, the different 'seeing-as' approach, (the premises gained 'by describing what we have observed'), can be seen as a new appreciation of mystery. 'God created the heavens and the earth' is not a statement that is simply awaiting more facts, further insights of science--although these will not be irrelevant. Rather it is an assertion that calls us to reconsider the evidence, "in case it should happen that having eyes we see not, and having ears we hear not."19

If I may sum up my exposition of Wisdom's contribution in terms obviously directed to Ramsey's concept of 'empirical fit', Wisdom is predominantly concerned with the kind of approach we bring to questions about religious assertions. He is content to allow the empirical approach to stand as it is vis-à-vis its own subject matter. But he appeals to common enough human situations to bring out the inadequacies of such a method when applied to all
of life; especially matters of consequence calling for individual decision or 'participation'. He argues that these questions call for an understanding of meaningfulness which allows for the significance of eccentric questions that transform our perspective rather than the picture itself. His attitude towards currently inaccessible facts is much like Ramsey offers in a work not directly concerned with 'empirical fit'. In "On Understanding Mystery", Ramsey distinguishes between mystery in the sense of a lack of knowledge due simply to insufficient facts, and mystery in the sense of transcendence. Religious mystery in the latter sense refers to that transcendence which is logically, and not just practically, inaccessible. In Wisdom, this acceptance of mystery means that the questions will not be resolved by forthcoming facts, and therefore call for decision. The known facts are thus never irrelevant, but nor are they decisive. Our decision must be reasonable, it must fit the facts; but our judgment might change simply by considering the same facts in a different light.
Mapping Religious Experience

Ramsey's response to the verificationist challenge to find ways of matching religious assertions with observable events and common experience is given in his concept of 'empirical fit'. In the first lecture of Models and Mystery, Ramsey compares the realms and methods of science and religion. He uses the tool of models as the focal point of his discussion. A major point of contrast is the way models used in discourse match up to experience. A scientific model is to be evaluated partly by its ability to generate hypotheses which are verifiable by controlled observation. A theological model, on the other hand, is rather judged by its stability over the widest possible range of phenomena, by its ability to incorporate the most diverse phenomena not inconsistently ... As a model in theology is developed, it rather stands or falls according to its success (or otherwise) in harmonising whatever events are to hand ... The theological model works more like the fitting of a boot or a shoe than like the 'yes' or 'no' of a roll call. In other words, we have a particular doctrine which, like a preferred and selected shoe, starts by appearing to meet our empirical needs. But on closer fitting to the phenomena the shoe may pinch. When tested against future slush and rain it may prove to be not altogether water-tight or it may be comfortable—yet it must not be too comfortable. In this way, the test of a shoe is measured by its ability to match a wide range of phenomena, by its over-all success in meeting a variety of needs. Here is what I might call the method of empirical fit which is displayed by theological theorizing ...

For Ramsey theological discourse is not measured for meaningfulness by deducing scientifically verifiable predictions, but by its ability to 'map' a wide range of human
experience. This means, for example, that talk of God's love must comprehend evil and the suffering of the world as well as establishing links between God's love and commonplace experience of human kindness. The 'fit' of such a map is pragmatic in a broad sense, not scientific. Ramsey writes that this fit is much more like "the kind of fit which detectives look for between certain new clues and a 'theory' of the crime with which they are provisionally working." (CE, 134)

This example is reminiscent of Wisdom's law-court example, and hence avoids a major stumbling block of the 'garden' parable. In his discussions of empirical fit, Ramsey tries to avoid using phenomena for which scientific method is applicable and observational discourse is appropriate currency. Like Basil Mitchell's 'partisan parable', Ramsey writes of that process of thought by which one might choose an agent for a dangerous mission, or confirm that one is in love. "As we survey such facts about each person as are known to us, there may occur, about one of them, a sense that this is the man. There will have been a disclosure in response to which we have made our decision, our commitment." (CE, 198). Here, as with Mitchell, trust and commitment predominate, rather than strictly verifiable hypotheses.

Ramsey fills out the method of empirical fit with five criteria that we might bring to these decisions of commitment: (a) there must be some pro-factors to which we can point, to support our belief; (b) the possibility
of this particular belief's harmonising with what we already know of God (... of the stranger, of the agent, etc.) with other Christian claims must exist; but (c) contra-factors must be considered as well—e.g. taking the resurrection belief, the possibilities that the disciples stole the body, of historical distortion of the facts, or of psychological factors telling against the testimony cannot be ignored; hence, (d) a reasonable belief must also include the possibility that these contra-factors will cause us to reject our beliefs; (although there is no need to specify in advance the point at which this might occur); and (e) some of the original factors to which we appealed to support our belief may be undermined, and turn out to be contra-factors as well. But Ramsey points out that we can certainly accept these without necessarily abandoning a belief which has been reasonably established upon a broad enough scope. We might find that the agent's most spectacular mission was performed for personal motives of jealousy or greed, etc. But if our confidence in him or her is reasonably established, this new evidence will not necessarily mean that we ought to turn to another agent. Likewise a girl might find that the beard to which she was specially attracted was simply a cover for a double chin without such disappointing knowledge destroying a love and trust firmly established.

Such an explanation makes both religious faith and falling in love more a matter of reasonable judgment than many would feel able to accept. A faith that is reasonable
enough to be rejected if it becomes broadly untenable is far from that faith which is a mechanical reaction to irresistible grace. I find (d) most interesting in its reference to Flew's difficulties with religious belief. Flew had interpreted Wisdom's garden to mean that conclusive counter-vailing evidence is logically impossible for a perpetually qualified belief. Faith becomes irrelevant because there are no facts that could falsify it. Ramsey comments, "religious people have been far too inclined to grant their opponents' interpretations of such phrases as 'I will trust God though he slay me', as though religious belief could never entertain the possibility of critical contra-factors." (CE, 199). Yet Ramsey does not fall to Flew's reductionist scepticism because he refuses to see the question (of either the 'garden' or the resurrection) as merely a 'matter of fact'. There may be pro- and contra-factors behind my decision, but ultimately the decision is mine; with all the self-disclosure possibilities that such personal choice implies.

The final factor to be considered in Ramsey's links between religious assertions and human experience ably unites these diverse themes—of personal choice and commitment, of the 'odd' sort of facts to which one appeals, and the process of sifting pro- and contra-factors and harmonising the claim in question with other knowledge. It is the concept of 'probability' which Ramsey gained from Butler's Analogy. In that work, Butler distinguished three cases to which 'probability' might be
applied: (a) 'matters of speculation' where evidence is meagre or hard to obtain, but where the conclusion is, in any case, of little importance. A claim that Queen Elizabeth slept in such-and-such a house might be of this type. (b) 'matters of practice' in which we act upon that judgment which is the most reasonable. It is not simply a matter of interest—we are ready to act, cautiously, upon our judgment—but the aggregate evidence is biased in favour of our conclusion. Our resolve to act is proportional to the probability of our being correct in our judgment. (c) 'matters of great consequence' in which our moral decisiveness outstrips the import of the evidence. Here we may recall the example of the man walking along the riverbank. He hears the chatter of the children playing, sees the men fishing, the river flowing, etc. Then, a splash; the cries of the children; he turns and thinks that he sees a child in the water, about to drown. Here the facts are not irrelevant. He considers the strength of the current, the depth of the water, its temperature; he considers the possibility that what he glimpsed floating past is not in fact a child, his own swimming ability, and so on. From the standpoint of the bare facts, it is unlikely that this man will be able to perform the rescue; the probability is extremely low. And yet, "A man would be thought in a literal sense distracted who would not act and with great application." For Ramsey, following Butler, religious belief shares this 'probable' nature with moral actions. Like the
decision of the judge in Wisdom's law-court, theism is based on the available facts, but demands the personal backing of commitment. The theistic 'map' is a seeing-as, an interpretation of the world and human experience that is 'probable' enough to demand a 'reasonable' commitment. In Religious Language, Ramsey develops the parallels with moral commitment in response to duty, as well as parallels with other 'maps' to which we grant our personal backing. He writes of two kinds of commitment: the personal and moral commitment to spouses, causes, hobbies, etc., and the universal commitment exhibited by mathematics. Regarding the first, Butler's 'probability' demonstrates the reasonableness of such commitments, despite the lack of conclusive evidence. This is further supported by Ramsey's five criteria for the examination of such beliefs, and by the relatively loose manner in which 'empirical fit' encourages us to map the claims of these beliefs upon diverse experiences.

Turning to the mathematical model, Ramsey draws attention to the 'catholicity' of geometrical models: "what is true ... of a Euclidian triangle, is true in Oxford and Cambridge, Moscow and New York, Mars and the moon." (RL, 37). Religious commitment combines the personal intimacy of the first type with the comprehensiveness of the second. It is as personal as a commitment to a spouse, and as all-inclusive as mathematics. With these two kinds of commitment Ramsey balances the insights of Wisdom and Mitchell. Religious commitment partakes of the intense personal trust Mitchell's
partisan held for the stranger, thus avoiding the 'speculative' character of Wisdom's garden. But the theistic 'map' is as all-inclusive as Wisdom's microcosm of the world with all its manifold and ambiguous evidences.

John Hick's parable of the road to the celestial city and the key concept of eschatological verification have been presented above. In a recent article in Religious Studies, Hick surveys the two decades of comment and development of his basic argument. He sums up his earlier point, writing that

The theistic conception of the universe and of what is going on in human life is capable of experiential verification, although according to Christianity the verifying situation lies in the final fulfillment of God's purpose for us beyond this present life.

Hick begins his reconsideration by tracing the development (or regression) of the verifiability criterion. Although attempts to find a solid formula ' petered out at least a generation ago', Hick hopes to salvage their basic point, viz., that to exist is to make a difference. To say that $p$ is true is to say that a $p$-less universe would be different than this one with $p$. Phenomenal variety becomes the sole principle of verification. "Accordingly to say that $x$ exists or that $p$ is the case, but to deny that the existence of $x$ or the truth of $p$ makes any such in-principle-experiential difference, would be to speak in a way that is pointless or meaningless."

Hick begins his new response to this ameliorated criterion by distinguishing between simple and complex verification; depending upon what kind of evidence would count for or against ($x$) or ($p$).
He argues that 'there is a table in the next room' requires simple verification; 'John Smith is an honest man', complex. Whereas a straightforward empirical test is sufficient for the first, the latter assertion must be reached by an accumulation of less direct evidence. He further refines this response by pointing out that the meaningfulness of theistic assertions is not to be reduced to the verifiability of 'God exists'; rather, propositions directed to God's activities in terms of his effects on this (finite) world—in other words the whole complex theistic map of one's experience of this world as theistic—must be considered as one (verifiable and meaningful or not). This body of beliefs, Hick argues, stands or falls on the issue of eschatological verification. The assertion to be checked is thus confined to the view that the history of the universe is moving towards its completion in God.

In a footnote Hick also distinguishes between the question of the rationality of present Christian beliefs and the philosophical question of the meaningful status of Christian discourse. It is strictly the philosophical question that 'eschatological verification' is designed to resolve. He further refines the celestial road story by introducing the idea of a developing or maturing human personality of fuller God-consciousness, of "an experience of progressive sanctification ... accompanied by an increasingly powerful and pervasive sense of existing in the presence of an invisible transcendent power who knows us, who loves us, and who can be seen to be drawing us
towards a perfection in which we are to dwell in joyous communion with him."

Hick then turns to the issue of the hypothetical verification in heaven. If at that time we still lack firm observational data which verifies God's existence, would this invalidate the verifiability of Christian discourse? This brings the advantages (both theological and philosophical) of phrasing the question in terms of the theistic map as a whole rather than the existence of God per se. Theologically, Hick appeals to the book of Revelation to say that the heaven there depicted includes an 'intimate presence of God' as opposed to a visual confirmation in the sense in which one might verify that 'there is a table in the next room.' At such a point, the philosophical question of meaningfulness is answered by the eschatological verification of the theistic map. All else of the Christian picture having been validated, it would now be unreasonable to doubt the existence of God. The question of verifiability refers to questions in situations in which there is room for reasonable doubt, and answers in situations where rational doubt is excluded. Hick argues that given a heaven in the intimate presence of God continued atheism would be irrational.

Finally Hick replies to the charges of Nielsen and Tooley. They hold that Hick's celestial road shows no way of getting from ordinary ways of speaking to religious discourse; from non-theistic experience to theistic experience. In another footnote, Hick rejoins that such a view
is built upon an archaic concept of experience, that of the 'registering of bare sense data'. Hick is building from a broader view of human experience, though he is reluctant to be more specific in this article. 'Theistic experience' is a part of human experience which results in religious assertions, the verifiability of which is grounded on the 'map's' eschatological assertions. Although Hick allows the possibility that the theistic eschatological verification could in principle occur on this earth, he chooses to stand upon post-mortem experience. Life everlasting is one of the doctrines by which Christian faith stands or falls.

Hick's work has two major advantages over the positions of Wisdom and Ramsey. Unlike Ramsey's empirical fit, which is dependent upon a far broader concept of verification; and unlike Wisdom, who does not anticipate future conclusive facts, Hick's verification is much closer to the original sense-data framework. Conversely, by positing a verification strictly in the future, Hick has both put the matter out of the reach of scientific measurement and emphasized the essential Christian attitude of eschatological hope.

It is unfortunate that the full scope of Hick's thought cannot be considered within this thesis. There is much of value there, and taking eschatological verification in isolation is potentially disruptive. Nonetheless, from the standpoint indicated by Hick's reconsideration, it is apparent that, in comparison with Hick, Ramsey was no empiricist. Ramsey's criterion, empirical fit, depends upon an
alteration of the concept of verification; the theistic map must be seen to fit a wide range of experience. In contrast, Hick builds his case upon the anticipation of some conclusive 'facts' which will verify a key theme of that 'map' in a strict sense of verification. Secondly Ramsey attacks the meaning criterion as a linguistic problem—which is what it actually is—in so far as his empirical fit concept is not designed to counter rigid requirements for a meaningful statement. His linguistic response is to be found in his analytical insight into the 'evocative' logic of religious discourse. Hick is not an analytic philosopher. He is concerned to justify the religious experience of the world as theistic, as existing in the presence of God.

Yet there are difficulties with Hick's position that we do not find in Wisdom or in the gentler empiricism of Ramsey. Although he chides Nielsen and Tooley for their myopic view of experience, it is not clear that his own view of it is sufficiently broad. Despite his distinction between simple and complex verification, despite his argument for an intimate presence rather than visual verification, it is the experience of heaven that will confirm (or perhaps falsify) the theistic map.

This raises two problems: (a) whatever the tone of one's experience-concept, Hick's position merely postpones the problem rather than confronting the issue where it matters. The meaningfulness of the entire theistic 'map' hangs on this 'post-mortem proof'. Theologically,
such an eschatology, which can effectively evacuate this life of all meaning, is biblically questionable, to say the least.\textsuperscript{10} Certainly from an analytic perspective, Hick's move of basing the claims of religious discourse to cognitive status upon a verification beyond this world is difficult to defend. If Austin and Ramsey are on the right track, Hick's position confuses the performative force of religious assertions in one of two ways; either of which is lethal. If, on one hand, an eschatological assertion exhibits descriptive force, and thus be verified, then all religious assertions are subject to sensory verification. Alternatively, if Hick wishes to argue that the force of 'we shall see heaven' (for example), is different from that of, say, 'Christ is risen', he has introduced an impossible performative bifurcation into religious language. To divide religious assertions in this fashion he would have to posit some logical reason--other than a mere difference in tense--to provide for the distinctively descriptive force of eschatological statements. All of which can be avoided by a fruitful attack on the problem in the present; which is what Ramsey's analytic insights provide for religious language.

Thus (b) Hick's experience concept is inadequate. By grounding his religious epistemology on a rigid, almost sense-data concept of cognition, Hick denies the element of personal backing or commitment with which religious and moral experience and knowledge is inextricably bound. To allow the positivist conception of fact to stand as is, is
to guarantee a two-worlds theology, a rigid fact-value rift; it is to deny moral experience, and the elements of 'probability' and personal commitment inherent in religious and moral knowledge. Neither Ramsey nor Wisdom is happy with the anticipation of conclusive facts. For Wisdom, it is equally important what the facts are seen as: for Ramsey, the facts are pro- and contra-factors in experience dominated by 'probability' and personal backing.

From an epistemological perspective, then, Hick's position is constricted by his rigidly empirical view of cognition. Reasonable judgments are far more dependent upon facts, upon conclusive evidence than in either Ramsey or Wisdom. When moral judgments are seen as the discernment of a moral dimension through physical experience, an unnecessary bifurcation of experience develops. From this point, it is only too easy to fall into a non-cognitive, emotivist view of moral knowledge. Rather than providing for it, this actually rules out the possibility of religious knowledge in a way that Ramsey's 'broadened empiricism' is able to avoid. Where odd situations, disclosure experiences, are the empirical anchorage for religious language, the view of empirical evidence is broad enough to provide for a cognitive view of religious discourse.

In conclusion, there are some exciting links between these three thinkers. My brief sketch has presented the responses of each to the verification principle, and reasonable judgments about human experience. Wisdom's response defines meaningfulness in a way which allows for
the possibility of seeing what we have observed in a different light. His concern is for the paradoxical assertions that cause us to alter our outlook, to see the same phenomena in new ways. He is more willing than Ramsey to let the concept of fact stand as is; but, unlike Hick, does not look for the arrival of conclusive evidence to buttress his criterion of meaningfulness. But this means that his view of religious mystery is close to that of Ramsey. Both hold that religious mystery is distinct from the mystery of presently inaccessible facts. That of religion refers to the transcendence which is logically inaccessible.

Hick's response, on the other hand, dependent upon conclusive evidence not yet attained, is far less sympathetic to Ramsey's use of probability to justify the claims of religious assertions as a whole. Nonetheless, his formula—that an x-less universe must be different from one with x—fits nicely with Ramsey's empirical fit; once the former is qualified by Hick's distinction between simple and complex verification. Ramsey's five criteria (of pro- and contra-factors) provide for the reasonableness of the theistic map; but do so in a way that is not dependent upon some other-world confirmation. Like Hick, however, Ramsey is insistent that for x to exist, for p to be true, x or p must make a difference. Ramsey's empirical fit provides a method of verification more sensitive to situations of 'complex verification' and religious commitment than Hick's other-worldly intimate presence. Finally, Ramsey's empirical fit is more sympathetic to the metaphysical
nature of the Christian 'map' than is Hick's more rigid empiricism. It is Ramsey's defence of the metaphysical aspects of Christian discourse that I must now exposit.

Let us start with a list of self-descriptions:

(1) Although 'I' love rock music 'I' almost never go to concerts because of the crowds; (2) although 'I' love motorcycling, 'I' think a motorcycle club or gang negates the very essence of 'biking' pleasure; (3) although 'I' play French horn well enough to join an informal local orchestra, 'I' far prefer 'doodling' or improvising on the piano; (4) 'I' almost always take a book to read on the trains; (5) 'I' prefer swimming to jogging or team sports because of the tranquility one finds within the rhythmic breathing and body movement; (6) 'I' prefer a quiet pint in a pub to a drinks party; and so on.

Hopefully, it is becoming clear that these are hardly arbitrary. Through the purely descriptive assertions about books on trains, and the interpretive comments about this person's dislike of crowds at concerts, a higher level description begins to emerge like a Gestalt picture from the parts, or (Ramsey's example) like points on a rim begin to define a hub at the centre. These descriptions can be unified by a person 'I', who is clearly 'a loner'. Any of these descriptions can be interpreted in isolation in a way which denies this conclusion. (4) might testify to the very busy life this person leads; or the crowds at concerts might just be particularly noxious; perhaps he or she believes that cycling joy is to be found in hard and fast
cornering rather than streaming down a motorway en masse. But taken together, a pattern begins to emerge that is obvious to others as well as to his or her own subjectivity.

Here is one way of approaching Ramsey's insights into the integrating functions of 'I-talk'. 'The loner' is a descriptive integrator that unites the diverse self-descriptions above. Here, too, is an indication of the loose empirical fit required by metaphysical language games. If a friend adds that this person greatly enjoys public speaking, our unifying phrase will stand in need of some qualification. This might be accomplished by qualifying this particular integrating model, but it is more likely that this characterisation will be qualified by contextualising it with other integrating terms.

Perhaps it is more important to point out that there is a logical gap between the six descriptive phrases and the unifying 'loner'. One could list such facts indefinitely without the subject's being forced logically to infer that he or she is in fact the person who is the objective reference of these characterisations. This is another way of saying that the subjective awareness is disclosure-given. Conversely, for the speaker, 'I' functions as a reference term that applies to a self that is more than any of the descriptions, a subjectivity that is not (logically) exhausted by the descriptions. Hence David did not see himself in Nathan's characterisation until a disclosure occurred around the details.

Ramsey parallels the capacity of 'I-talk' to integrate diverse experiences with the 'mapping' functions of
models. He sees metaphysics as 'linguistic cartography'. By serving to unite diverse experiences and assertions, metaphysical terms map wider and wider contexts. Sensitive to the positivist critique of metaphysics, Ramsey's rendering is severely chastened, and is in no sense to be taken as a 'super-science'. To tie his hopes for metaphysics with the verification criterion, Ramsey points to the integrating functions of languages that are accepted as cognitively meaningful by the positivists: mathematics, logic, and scientific theorizing.

In geometry, for example, a term like 'sphere' unites talk of football, cherries, oranges, the earth, etc. Just as talk about squares unites talk of Trafalgar Square in London, Times Square in New York, and carpentry. In a linguistic context, logic serves to map diverse inductive sequences or to tie the commands of a general in the field to the logic of a chef's directions in a kitchen. But the integrative functions of both are limited.

In the context of strictly empirical assertions in science, Ramsey argues that the goal of a single integrative map of the universe within scientific discourse is logically impossible because the integrative process itself stands outside of science. He asks rhetorically,

Can the language of science give us a completely exhaustive map? The brief answer is, logically, no, ... Fragmentation ... is logically inescapable if we are to be mere scientists. As a scientist, a man is doomed to disappointment if his aim is an over-all scheme. Each generalisation, each theory, has a significance which is never wholly taken over by another. (CE, 155)
Faced with the inevitable fragmentation of strictly empirical discourse on one hand, and the groundless speculation of traditional metaphysics on the other, Ramsey attempts a two-pronged reconstruction of an empirical metaphysics. This is built upon his interpretation of Berkeley's concept of notions and Wittgenstein's puzzling over the logic of 'I-talk', with special emphasis on the latter. As I have shown, Ramsey interpreted Berkeley's 'notions' to refer to the elusive activities of the mind. Ramsey shared Berkeley's suspicion of abstract ideas. Ideas must be grounded empirically. But Ramsey denies that this must spell the end of metaphysics. He argues that 'unity' and 'wholeness' are notionally given. Such relations are products of the activities of the mind; the mind groups things together. If this activity can be demonstrated in mathematics and logic as well as in theories in science, a defence can be built for non-speculative metaphysical groupings as well.

In his discussions of Berkeley's 'notions', Ramsey explicitly ties this awareness of the activities of the mind to self-disclosures. Notions are disclosure-given. Thus when he looks for a logical paradigm for metaphysical mapping, for relating diverse empirical assertions, Ramsey turns to Wittgenstein's musings on the logic of first-person utterances. Wittgenstein discerned two ways in which 'I-talk' functions. The first is like third-person assertions in which the object is myself. When the bishop is asked who preached the sermon, he can legitimately reply
"the bishop did" or "I did". The logical force is unchanged. But much of first-person discourse carries a different weight. Discourse, moral and religious, to which I give my personal backing, as well as self-descriptions that taken together disclose 'a loner' or tie experiences together as memory does, has an eccentric logic. To some extent this is the same point Ramsey was making, contra-Hume, in locating the continuity among experiences not in the perceptions themselves, but in the elusive 'I' in the centre. Here then is the linguistic counterpart to the experience-integrating self-disclosure. In such a disclosure we see the unity linking our 'bundle of perceptions'. In 'I-talk' we tie together various strands of discourse—descriptive, moral, aesthetic, religious and other—in an increasingly broad context.

Further, Ramsey argues that our self-disclosure is matched by the single individuation, the objective referent given in an all-inclusive cosmic disclosure. 'God-talk' in this sense is a logical kinsman to 'I-talk' in that 'God' unites the various contexts: impersonal and personal, natural/empirical and ethical, etc. Theistic mapping ties the models of 'first cause', 'unity', and 'wholly other' with fatherly love, servanthood and obedience; discourse of molecular and organic chemistry in the context of creation with ethical discourse in terms of duty, etc.

Here again, Ramsey supports this claim by insisting that the disclosed reference is objective in that it
declares itself to us in activity as persons sometimes do. Hence the integrating characterisation, 'the loner' uniting various descriptions is not inferential, but based on the 'objective' disclosure of a person. Although I did not mention this in my preliminary comments on the logic of the 'loner's' self-description, it is significant that each of his or her characterisations are reports of activities; behaviour which, taken in isolation, might be exhausted by scientific observations. The integrating characterisation, however, is a disclosure-given image (or model) which can only be evoked (if at all) by considering a broad survey of a person's activity. Like any other model, the characterisation 'the loner' must find its empirical fit with a wide range of the person's activity, and thus provide a loose map of his personality.

Another link between 'I-talk' and 'God-talk' is the 'probable' nature of first-person assertions and religious claims about God. Such an assertion as 'I take a book to read on trains' includes both incorrigible and corrigible elements. These components can be divided: 'I exist' (incorrugible, disclosure-given), and '(He) takes a book to read on trains' (corrigible). Likewise 'God is infinitely good' includes 'God exists' (incorrugible) and 'goodness' (a corrigible model), subject to qualification and contextualising both empirical and among other models. 'God is infinitely good' is therefore 'probable' both in the sense of being partly corrigible, partly incorrigible, and in the sense of being an assertion to which we commit ourselves.
Turning to the theistic map, it is clear that Ramsey prefers those models which serve to bring together diverse strands of Christian discourse (and those models which link Christian discourse with that which is not distinctively theistic). This he makes explicit in a number of writings. "We shall know better 'what we are talking about'—in one sense of that phrase—the more our discourse, articulated around a dominant model, is integrated and unified." (CD, 87) To this criterion, as we have seen, Ramsey adds another: empirical fit.

Some of the middle ground between metaphysics and empirical fit comes from the (at first glance unlikely) sphere of personal freedom. Ramsey argues that in certain situations, without any qualitative difference in the causal background, an individual's personal backing gives to an action a dimension which is not articulated in object-description language. From this angle our approach to the integrating functions of models is radically transformed. The point of personal backing ought to recall the original function of model language; that role with which we began, but which critics of Ramsey tend to forget. In all the talk about empirical anchorage, tying discourse down to the disclosure situations from which it arises, and of articulation possibilities, qualifiers, and the metaphysical integration of diverse contexts by super-models, the original function of models is often left behind. Hence critics who concentrate their remarks upon the concept of models, or on the idea of empirical metaphysics, or the
problems of a single objective referent tend not to men­
tion that the basic, ubiquitous, and constant function of 
model language is the evocation of disclosures. Just as 
Ramsey argues that all experience is subject-object in 
structure, so he would argue that there is no such thing 
as an objective disclosure; if by that is meant a disclo­
sure without an individual to appropriate it, without a 
subject who is able to come to self-disclosure in his or 
her response of commitment.

Not that I agree with all of the above. For instance, 
one might argue that once metaphysics has been dethroned 
from its position as a super-science, and once it has been 
reduced to 'solipsism as the primitive metaphysics'—once 
the integrative 'glue' of metaphysics has been shown to be 
'personal backing'—it is then no metaphysics at all.¹³

Further, I am not sure of the direction in which this 
might be developed. One could argue, for instance, that 
the contextualising of models must be done by strict logic 
to an extent that would obliterate the disclosure-commitment 
basis of the theistic map. Alternatively if the integration 
of oranges, footballs, and cherries is possible only if 
there is a comprehending mind, one could read the begin­
nings of a reconstructed 'only Geist is real' Idealism. 
This suggestion may have been welcomed by the early Ramsey; 
and some would argue that it is another sign that the early 
Ramsey never really left. I am not suggesting that he did. 
But if we are to judge by his many-faceted apology for con­
temporary empiricism, it is difficult to conclude that he
would forget its lessons in so short a time. And, in any case, we are merely considering a hypothetical development of his 'empirical metaphysics'.

I would prefer to develop these personal-empirical metaphysics along lines for which he himself provided more fuel. In brief, its facets are: (a) that disclosure is a personal concept; it is a matching of activity upon (subjective) reception; (b) that the meaningfulness of religious language is judged by its evocative functions, by its ability to evoke a disclosure which I can appropriate; (c) that the personal response of commitment (in which I realise my self or not) is not a matter of inference from more and more data; but (d) probability is the very guide of life in that (1) the crucial 'seeing-as' or 'experiencing-as' perspectives one brings to life are 'grey areas' which must be loosely fit, and (2) such loose-fitting maps are highly determinative of our activity.

The importance of personal commitment to one or another loose-fitting map is brought out in the following passage from Frederick Ferré's *Language, Logic and God*. He points out that there are many maps which claim comprehensiveness, continued refinement, better fit, etc., but that one must choose:

There is no question of remaining aloof, taking no position on the character of reality. The poised and tentative posture is the natural one for cloistered thought; it is an impossible one for life. Every sane disposition for behavior is based on what is thought to be the case; every 'forced option' which life thrusts on one has profound implications for one's implicit (or explicit) choice of a model.
in terms of which to conceive the ultimately real. Agnosticism of the mind in these matters may be cultivated among a narrow group of would-be purists, but daily challenges to action—where even inaction may be a culpable choice—make agnosticism in life an absurdity.
"If God does not exist, everything is permitted"
(Ivan Karamazov)

"When a man submits God to moral judgment, he kills him in his own heart" (Albert Camus)

Although it is impossible to provide as full a reading of the intellectual climate that Ramsey faced in ethics, some background is necessary. Fortunately enough of this environment can be gained from examining the issues which arise from two critical articles in *Christian Ethics and Contemporary Philosophy*; one by Patrick Nowell-Smith, the other by Kai Nielsen. The concerns these help to focus are: the current status of deontological (or duty-oriented) ethics, the question of the autonomy of ethics, and the relationship of faith, religion, God to morality.

If it was not obvious in the discussion of Ramsey's work in the philosophy of religion, a fundamental weakness brought about by Ramsey's confinement in a stifling philosophical atmosphere becomes explicit in his ethical theory. Although we can see intimations of a struggle to break free of that environment, though the seeds that might have burst above the bog that is logical empiricism are there, Ramsey never follows them to their conclusion, preferring instead to develop a worn and outmoded model to a fine and subtle statement.

Ivan Karamazov's existential cry--picked up by Nietzsche--required a firm reply by way of a new basis for ethics. One such response, humanist ethics, is ably
represented in Ramsey's anthology on Christian ethics by Patrick Nowell-Smith and Kai Nielsen. Both contributions, ostensibly written to 'beat the dead horse' of deontological theological ethics, actually typify the difficulties in founding any ethics apart from God. On the whole Nielsen's is the more analytical; thus Nowell-Smith's, which I shall consider first, is the more fruitful. My initial concern will be the general relationship of religious and secular morality, and Nowell-Smith's critique of deontological ethics. I shall turn to more specific issues: the relationship of faith to morality, God and ought, and the logical status of theological terms in an ethical context, with reference to Nielsen's essay; although these themes will, of course, overlap.

Nowell-Smith builds a powerful argument to the effect that religious morality is infantile. As his case is built upon a parallel with Piaget's work in psychology, it is strengthened by the empirical anchorage of his evaluations. Nonetheless his caricature of Christianity is virtually unrecognizable. On the other hand, his use of Piaget provides an incisive critique of 'immature' ethics; probably moreso than Nowell-Smith himself intends.

Piaget found in an examination of child behaviour at the game of marbles three distinct stages of personality development. At the first stage there is no attention paid to the rules; but no point to the play, either. During the second stage, ages five through nine, the child begins to accept the rules. But any suggestion that the
rules be changed, even in the interests of improving the
game, or adapting it to countervailing circumstances, is
inconceivable. The rules are seen as absolutes; sacred
and inviolable laws. Piaget terms this attitude hetero-
nomous to mark the fact that the child sees the rules as
external, objective. The child knows what the rules are,
but cannot see beyond the rules to their intended result.
They are absolutes, intrinsically binding, inviolable
regardless of consequences. In the final stage it dawns
upon the child that the rules are only there to achieve
a purpose; namely the orderly playing of the game. The
rules are now seen to be provisional; upheld by mutual
consent for the purpose of accomplishing a specific
function.

Nowell-Smith closes his discussion of Piaget with
two points. Some of the children saw wrongdoing simply
in terms of quantity: breaking fifteen glasses acciden-
tally was seen as a worse transgression than breaking one
cup in trying to steal something. The second insight from
Piaget, which together with the first Nowell-Smith terms
'moral realism', is that the young children did not rec-
ognize an act as wrong unless it was punished. Nowell-
Smith sees great significance in the heteronomy exhibited
by both tendencies. One could just as easily interpret
the two points to refer to an over-simplification of
ethics to consequences alone. But the latter reading
does not seem to fit with Nowell-Smith's purposes.
Undoubtedly some of the implications for possible interpretations of some types of theological ethics are clear. Nowell-Smith, however, wishes to argue that a deontological attitude, with its accompanying heteronomy, is basic to the very idea of a religious ethics. He states that the moral act is held to be separate from the question of its rightness or wrongness. It is not the nature of the act, but that the act is disobedience, that makes it wrong. Likewise good acts are not good in themselves, but only insofar as they are obedience to God. Although the application to certain theological approaches is becoming obvious, I shall not attempt to defend every dubious theology against each attack. At this time I am only trying to give an exposition of the relevant material from Nowell-Smith's article.

Along with a deontological approach, Nowell-Smith perceives heteronomy inherent in religious ethics. Citing Abraham as an ideal, he comments that Christianity demands the absolute surrender of the will. He sees faith as essentially heteronomous; demanding unconditional, rather than reasoned trust in someone. The relationship of faith to morality will be explored more fully below. For the moment a reference to Romans 3.28: "For we reckon that a man is to be justified by faith apart from works of the law; should suffice to show that the relation of faith to morality is much more complex than Nowell-Smith implies.

Nowell-Smith's conclusion is that religious morality evacuates man of any responsibility, and is therefore infantile.
"To pass from childhood to adulthood is essentially to pass from dependence into freedom, and the price we pay is responsibility. As adults we must make our own choices and must accept their consequences... To many of us this is a life-long regret, and we search endlessly for a father-substitute. Surely 'they' will get us out of this mess; there ought to be a law; why doesn't somebody... (CE and CP, 107)

Although the reference to 'father-substitute' raises the question of the complex logic of 'father' in Christian discourse, the challenge is so direct that it is impossible to continue to evade its import. As J. R. Lucas points out, it is both intellectually dishonest and far too easy to deny that Nowell-Smith's criticisms have any connection with Christian ethics. Admittedly, his own application of Piaget and his 'mature' ethics is often weak (as demonstrated by his misunderstanding of faith). But while existentialists following Kierkegaard, and humanists like Nowell-Smith, and even a meta-ethicist like R. M. Hare have stressed the element of personal decision in ethics, it is clear that much of theological ethics has been oriented towards the virtual exclusion of the individual's will, volition, intentions, etc.

But Nowell-Smith is more than a little arrogant in pressing his point in so selective a manner. Certainly one can perceive two great traditions of 'radical deontology': the Roman Catholic reliance on principles and the Protestant 'sola gratia'. But one can trace two parallel strains of infantile heteronomy in non-theistic ethics: rationalism and empiricism. The former denies decision by positing the external certainty of an inferential path from premise to moral reaction. The latter either continues to grope for
a resurrected naturalist ethics; or follows the emotivist in washing his hands in despair of finding the 'ought' in the 'is'. The extent to which both mitigate human freedom—and hence responsibility—is, I think, obvious. But perhaps this only indicates the faults of heteronomy as applied to ethics.

Before returning to Nielsen I would like to complete my consideration of deontological ethics by touching upon W. G. Maclagan's book, The Theological Frontier of Ethics, as it was reviewed by Ramsey. As implied by the title, Maclagan attempts to find the boundaries between theology and ethics by pointing out the areas in which theology has usurped some of the realm of ethics. These are: (1) the doctrine of 'sola gratia', (2) religious talk of duty as 'God's will', and (3) the idea that God's grace is a necessity to do one's duty—that dutifulness is inadequate in itself. Briefly, the problem with the first is that, insofar as by this doctrine man is held accountable for what he cannot help but do, doubt is cast upon divine justice. The second makes duty, normally intrinsically binding, dependent upon God's command. Maclagan states "If we are not to use anthropomorphic concepts, the theory cannot be stated, and if we are to use them it cannot be defended; and one or the other we must do." As to the third, that God's grace is necessary to do one's duty, the first and second criticisms taken together make the straightforward understanding of this claim laughable. Because of original sin, we cannot do our duty, which is only our duty by arbitrary fiat,
except for grace, which irresistibly brings out a moral response to God's command. It is a logical equation; all it lacks is man.

In discussing the overlap of points two and three, Maclagan writes that talk of duty as God's command and as a moral demand conflates personal and impersonal logic. Talk of a moral response seems to demand a personal logic, while the deontological elements of moral demand and duty require impersonal logic. Maclagan sees a clear inconsistency here if theological discourse is taken in the logically straightforward sense demanded by the equation of God's will and duty, and preferred by 'radical deontologists'. But he argues that if theologians are more sensitive to the complex logic of their own discourse, the paradoxical relation of personal and impersonal logic can signal a 'lateral enrichment' of ethical contexts.

Two examples of this 'lateral enrichment' can be taken from the points of criticism above. After his scathing treatment of those who would assume that grace empowers man's moral actions like electric jolts stimulate muscle reactions in corpses (my example), it is surprising to find Maclagan return to resurrect the meaningfulness of grace. He sees the relationship of grace to moral response as 'environmental succour'. Likewise, he admits that moral experience, once left on its own, may reveal more than is ordinarily acknowledged; and that this 'more' might be of greater significance.

Although these more tolerant points might be taken as welcome relief from the stringency of his previous criticisms,
they can be used to illustrate methodological flaws in Maclagan's work. Rather than generously supplying us with the meagre possibilities for 'lateral enrichment', Maclagan has substantially undermined his original position with his qualifications. It now becomes apparent—with these two references to the moral experience—how restrictive his method has been to this point. It is both analytical—to the exclusion of personal experience—and strictly deontological: even deontological Judaism did not see God solely as law-giver supreme.⁶ (The seemingly straightforward suggestion of taking grace as 'environmental succour' disguises a subtle compromise of the autonomy of ethics, in bringing in external motivational elements.) These two points—that a strictly deontological approach misconstrues the relation of God and ought, and the reductionist tendency of analytical philosophy—can be brought out with reference to Kai Nielsen's article.⁷ Nielsen's basic aim is to set forth the traditional arguments which subsume morality under religion, and then demolish each position. Echoing Moore, Nielsen gives the stock response to those who would equate 'God wills X' and 'X is good'. Even if we can clearly establish that God does will X, it is nonetheless a sensible question to ask 'Is X good?'.⁸ Leaving aside the difficulties in clarifying what he means by the word 'good', it is at least clear that Nielsen has, from the start, made a fundamental category mistake in both his understanding of the word 'God' and his simplistic interpretation
of the verb 'to will'. As I have stressed throughout the thesis the logic of 'God' is exceedingly complex. It is clear that Nielsen does not even give 'God' the logical respect due to 'Kai', 'Patrick', 'Ian', or 'I'.

He naively assumes he is analysing the usage of a descriptive term, 'God'; or at least the descriptive uses of the term.

Although he does not understand the usage of the terms 'God', 'command', 'will', etc., Nielsen is very helpful in eliminating other misinterpretations of the words 'logical behaviour'. Brunner, for example, argues that the way the word 'good' is ordinarily used bears no relation to the meaning of the word in the mouth of a believer. In his knowledge of God he has perceived the true meaning of the word. Nielsen admits that there is no logical fallacy here, but charges that such a posture trivialises Christian moral discourse by actually proclaiming its irrelevance to ordinary language.

More important for Nielsen's case, Brunner's argument has still not shown how to derive an evaluative statement from a descriptive one. His point is based on the distinction between the descriptive and the evaluative, taking 'God exists' as typical of the non-moral, descriptive statement. His attempts to hold or suitably qualify this fundamental presupposition reveal its weaknesses. He introduces the possible response that 'God exists' must never be seen as merely descriptive. His attack is based on the claim that "a claim about what kind of beings there are in the universe is analytically distinguishable (though perhaps
not in fact separable) from the moral evaluation involved in religious language.\textsuperscript{10} (CE and CP)

As Braithwaite argues in his well-known address (also included in CE and CP), such an approach is untenable. Whatever the faults of that lecture in failing to do justice to the transcendent elements of religious assertions, Braithwaite does succeed in putting religious discourse in tight relation to moral language. Religious statements are at least expressions of the believer's intention to follow a particular moral policy. Braithwaite saw moral intention as a possible criterion of meaning for religious language. 'Jesus is Lord' can hardly be construed as a merely descriptive statement.

Nielsen actually makes this point but then demonstrates his incapacity to comprehend it. He argues that if we take away the evaluative force of the term 'God' and isolate its descriptive content, we must still come to an independent judgment about the moral status of the being in question. He raises the rhetorical point that we cannot separate the evaluative and the descriptive forces of the term, only to reply, "we can and we must if we are going to attain clarity in these matters". It is noteworthy that he has here dropped the qualifying phrase that these are analytically separable, 'though perhaps not in fact', so that clarity is to be obtained by ignoring the relationship of logic to reality! Here is the source of Nielsen's category blunder. Undoubtedly the phrase 'Prof Nielsen' has some descriptive force, but the
Professor would hardly consider it flattering to analytically distinguish his moral self, his acting self, his rational self, etc. Somehow, though, when we approach God we are to take the opportunity of slicing up analytically what is not in fact separable in order 'to attain clarity in these matters'.

There are numerous possible responses to Nielsen's 'clarity', some more refined, some more dangerous, than others. Patterson Brown, for example, argues that in our civilisation 'God' is a morally biased term such that to say 'God is good' is trivially true. For the Christian it is more crude logically than to say that saints are good. 'Saints are good' is a truism like 'murder is wrong'. But God is the criterion of good; therefore if Z is God, then by definition we are unconditionally obliged to do what God commands. The weakness of this statement is its partial dependence upon 'head-counting' definition. Presumably 'God is good' is not trivially true for unbelievers like Schopenhauer (Nielsen's example). Another possible criticism of this view is that talk of 'unconditional obligation to do what God commands' slips back into positing goodness as something objective, external to God. Finally, citing the 'Christian' meaning of the term 'God' tends towards the 'private language' position of Brunner.

In similar, but more refined, arguments D. A. Rhees and D. Z. Phillips argue that Nielsen's 'clarity' is a misinterpretation of the terms. Neither writer, however, wants to equate God's commands and goodness in any slipshod
fashion. Rhees states that 'X is good' and 'I ought to do X' are perfectly meaningful apart from God, but that 'God commands X' cannot be correctly understood without understanding 'I ought to do X', 'X is good'. Phillips argues from a carefully balanced position that the criterion of meaning is intrinsic to each language game—without allowing this to develop (degenerate?) into a private-language theory. He states that the logic of God the Father cannot be understood without obedience being good by definition. But while doing the will of God is good, and while duty is simply doing the will of God, Phillips maintains that this duty cannot be treated as a moral concept. The unethical duty of Abraham is the perfect expression of the paradoxical relation of faith and morality. No doubt Nowell-Smith would call this infantile heteronomy; and there is some support for this in Phillips' appeal to Camus' comment: "When a man submits God to moral judgment, he kills him in his own heart."\(^{11}\) Phillips uses the quote to support his position that religious assent is prior to moral judgment. "To reject God's claim is not to reject one of many competing claims in a way of life; it is to reject a way of life as such."\(^{12}\)

This differs somewhat from Camus' point; which can be seen by continuing the quotation: "When a man submits God to moral judgment he kills him in his own heart. And then what is the basis of morality? God is denied in the name of justice but can the idea of justice be understood without the idea of God? Have we not arrived at the absurd?"\(^{13}\)
Presumably, few would be content to follow Camus in The Myth of Sisyphus, and find a foundation for a Godless morality in the absurd. But Camus' ethics is at least genuinely autonomous as opposed to Nowell-Smith's naive trust in man or Nielsen's heteronomous dependence on reason. But again, perhaps heteronomy is not the absolute criterion of ethics Nowell-Smith builds it up to be in his attack on religion.

John Lucas provides a fruitful criticism of Nowell-Smith's application of the Piaget/Kantian concept. After agreeing with Nowell-Smith that much of Christian ethics is far too dependent upon external certainty in providing solutions to moral dilemmas, Lucas returns to consider the higher virtues by which Nowell-Smith believes that man stands above the rules—friendship, love, loyalty. Lucas writes, "It seems to me to be the essence of loyalty that one trusts the person one is loyal to beyond the limits of one's own knowledge." In this sense the uncritical obedience, which Nowell-Smith calls infantile, is also the loyalty transcending the rules which Nowell-Smith reveres. To commit oneself in faith to an obedient (or loyal) response is thus an example of that mature responsibility that Nowell-Smith advocates.

But is this a sufficient understanding of the paradoxical relation of faith and morality evinced by the story of Abraham? I don't believe it does full justice to the 'teleological suspension of the ethical' as 'Johannes de Silentio' unfolds it in Fear and Trembling. Knowing
that our absolute loyalty is to God and that there is no way that we can logically judge him, we can, by this view, ignore the mundane realm of ethics; thus dissolving the paradox by a direct, objective relationship to our sacred duty. But we cannot judge God (as did Russell, Nietzsche, 'Karamazov', etc.), because this would kill him in our hearts. In that this approach likewise makes nonsense of the question: 'God commands X, but ought I to do it?' it reaches a similar conclusion as Brunner; but by a very different path.

Nowell-Smith and Nielsen make this question nonsense because the first term 'God' is, in their hands, a descriptive, non-moral term which cannot affect the second term, the moral question. Phillips and Rhees makes the question nonsensical 'from above' as it were. Although they see more of the complexity of the question in interpreting both terms as meaningful, they trivialise ethics—though not to the extent that Nielsen charges—because God's will is what I ought to do. Both have their heteronomous elements; the humanists deify ethics, since their concept of X determines what they ought to do. Phillips and Rhees mitigate personal choice by identifying God and ought. Phillips goes far in allowing the logical autonomy of ethics, and in arguing that duty before God and morality are to be kept separate. But his use of Camus' dictum seems to me to indicate his resolution of the paradox and ultimate reduction of 'I ought to do X' to whatever God commands. This signals a return to a constricting deontology.
Perhaps my point can be demonstrated as follows:

(1) The man who does what is right cannot be faulted from deontological ethics, but Nowell-Smith is correct in seeing a certain immaturity in his evasion of responsibility.

(2) The man who is willing to sacrifice his principles to attain the good is in Nowell-Smith's terms responsible in exercising his judgment in the application of the rules. But in that he has still subjugated his judgment to an external (x), he still lacks maturity.

(3) The man of loyalty, who performs his duty before God, transferring his allegiance to the infinite is a responsible person of vision. He sees beyond the disclosure of a moral demand to the will to which he is ultimately obliged. As Phillips writes, he sees that in loving his fellow man, he is loving God. He sees doing (X) as doing the will of God.

But the knight of faith (4) arises when Nowell-Smith's responsibility (2) is brought into opposition with (3) the loyalty to the infinite. If one can maintain loyalty to the infinite and to morality by obeying the command to love one's neighbour, what then of Luke 14.26? ("If any man come to me and hate not his father and mother, and wife and children, and brothers and sisters, yea, and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple.")

The knight of faith arises in a courageous response to the paradoxical tension of moral claims:

... for in this duty, the Individual as Individual is held in an absolute relation to the absolute. And when, in this connexion, it is said that it is a duty to love God, the statement means something different from the one
which is made here; for if this duty were absolute, ethics would be reduced to relativity. It does not, however, follow from this that ethics should be abolished, but it receives an entirely different expression: so that, for example his love for God may cause the knight of faith to give his love for his neighbour an expression contrary to his duty in the eyes of ethics.¹⁹

I have quoted this at length to stress the intention of the writer that the paradox not be reduced, resolved, or (his term) 'mediated'. To reduce the good to God's will, as Barth, Brunner, and others have done is to destroy the paradox, resolve the tension, and reduce the courage of faith to a question of loyalty or preference. I realise that these theological points take us out of the context of ethics. I would hope, however, that this rather extensive--some might say excessive--discussion has indicated the ways in which the autonomy of ethics is in some sense in the interests of Christian faith; but equally the insights drawn from Camus imply ways in which the logical autonomy of ethics is an over-simplification of the relationship between faith in God and 'ought'. The man who knows that to judge God is to risk killing him is loyal to God in a responsibility un glimpsed by those whose ideal of mature ethics is summed up in an infantile heteronomy of teleological ethics. The knight of faith is he who trusts in God beyond and through the ethical judgment of his social sense of morality. The teleological suspension of the ethical cannot be understood as the annihilation of the ethical without destroying the paradox, mitigating the passion that is faith, and reducing God's
will to the commands of an objective, cosmic Sergeant-Major.16

Nonetheless annihilate the ethical and posit an objective theological ethics is what much of contemporary theology has attempted to do; thereby assuring its irrelevance. While many Christians have joyfully followed their theological shepherds—to the delight of 'cultured despisers' like Nielsen and Flew--the radical divorce from reality has seemed a bit extreme to many ethicists, Christian and non-Christian. A. C. Ewing, for example, argues for the autonomy of ethics, by which he means that ethical terms are distinctive and cannot be reduced to descriptive terms (biological, sociological, psychological, etc.), or to metaphysical or to theological terms. If my above analysis is on the right track there is no reason why we should reject this interpretation of the autonomy of ethics.

Unfortunately the predilection of much of Christian moral theology to interpret this autonomy as a threat to the theological basis of Christian morality requires that a more critical approach be applied to the claims of 'theological' ethics. Whatever his faults, Maclagan has at least shown us the logical difficulties in relating God and ought directly. My discussion of the complex relation of faith to morality has, I hope, fortified this rejection of 'radical deontological ethics'. To see God simply as a mechanistic will, (Paley's cosmic clock-maker, Wisdom's gardener, or Kesey's 'Big Nurse')17 is to
debase faith. It reduces a living relationship of persons to a harsh political/legal code to which we are obliged to conform. For one who has received the unmerited gift of incomprehensible agape the idea of such legalistic duty and zombie response is repulsive. After Christ comes to an individual only the Grand Inquisitor could have the temerity to reintroduce deontology as his basis of ethics.

This is not an area in which we can afford to mince words or utter platitudes about ecumenism. Nor can we assert our power over words and twist gospel into law. I would have thought that all of this would go without saying; but despite the New Testament both Protestants and Roman Catholics have managed to identify Christian ethics with deontological ethics; for, as John Lucas writes, "... most professing Christians are in fact practising Pharisees, all Christ's own teaching to the contrary notwithstanding."¹⁸ A deontological ethics depends upon reducing the person of God to propositions, twisting the justice of the Kingdom into totalitarian repression, mutating love into legalism.¹⁹

This said, I hasten to add that man is not an individual; certainly not in the strict Kierkegaardian sense, where the individual completely transcends 'the universal'. Insofar as man is essentially social, deontological elements can find their way into any ethics. They certainly have their place, despite legal positivism, in the boundaries between law and morality. In more empirical terms, man is a social animal; his self is realised in relations
with other selves in social intercourse. Perhaps the orderly co-operation of men and women inherent in the survival of society is the kernel of truth in the concept of natural law. The social self is, in any case, strong empirical anchorage for these theories; if it is all that remains of the edifice, however, it is a reasonable question to ask if the theory still deserves to be called natural law. In any case this brief discussion must suffice to raise the key problems—the question of the autonomy of ethics, the status of deontological ethics, the criticism of religious ethics as heteronomous, etc.—that comprise the background perspective to Ramsey's ethics.
Ian Ramsey's Ethics

"Blest are those whose blood and judgment are so well commingled that they are not a pipe for fortune's finger to sound what stop she pleases" (Hamlet)

Typically, much of Ramsey's work in ethics is found in his dialogues with other thinkers. Despite the constant effort to tie his work to others, Ramsey's 'chastised deontological ethics' exhibits highly original insights. In discussing his methodology, I shall first pick up his analytical/linguistic insights from his review of Maclagan's book, and his development of Hare's position. Second, I shall consider the place of natural law in his ethics. Then the 'empirical anchorage' will be examined, both in ethical theory and in social ethics. Finally I shall attempt to bring out the elements of his ethics which seem to me to be bursting at the seams of deontological ethics: the relationship of duty to human freedom. After exploring Ramsey's ethics, I shall try to further support these non-deontological elements with a superseding model.

To recall Maclagan's criticisms, he rejects the three ways in which doctrines compromise the autonomy of ethics: the doctrine of 'sola gratia', with its 'causal' understanding of the relation of grace to the moral response; talk of duty as God's will, which compromises the intrinsically binding nature of duty; and the idea that God's grace is necessary to do one's duty. Further, Maclagan
allows for 'lateral enrichment' of ethical experiences if, for example, grace is seen as 'environmental succour'.

Ramsey raises two caveats which must be recalled in reconstructing ethics upon such a conservative base: (1) The 'lateral enrichment' must not be applied in 'causal terms' without compromising duty once again; (2) Talk of God, his commands, his will, etc., cannot be taken in straightforward logic, but must be seen as a 'manner of speaking', or in Ramsey's terms, qualified models.

(From this point in his article Ramsey turns to consider briefly the points raised by Nowell-Smith and Nielsen by reference to the responses of Patterson Brown and Dom Illtyd Trethowan. For a number of reasons he does not mention his own unique contribution to the problem: Picking up point two above, Ramsey might have brought his concept of qualified models to bear on the relation of God and goodness. To say that God is the criterion of goodness, as Patterson Brown does, is to make him an objective standard, and to miss the logical relation of 'good' to God. If, on the other hand, 'goodness' is qualified by 'infinite' we are less likely to enter into the logical webs which amount, in one way or another, to judging God--commending or condemning.)

This said, Ramsey's contribution, a 'lateral enrichment' of R. M. Hare's 'universal prescriptivity' is extremely fruitful. Ramsey takes what he needs from Hare in two paragraphs. He writes that prescriptivity expresses the element of personal commendation in moral judgments.
If we believe that an action \((A)\) is good, it means that, given similar circumstances, we intend to follow \((A)\). The 'objective' element is supplied by the universalizability of prescriptives. Not only do we commit ourselves to \((A)\), but we see it as exemplary of a general principle which we commend universally—the 'quasi-factual' nature of ethical judgments when in like situations *ceteris paribus*, we expect all reasonable persons to share our judgment.

Ramsey's characteristic enrichment begins from arguing that the descriptive element of the moral situation is not sufficient to explain the concept of prescriptivity. The 'more' to which Ramsey appeals is the 'claim-possessing' aspects of the situation. Before I can prescribe a course of action \((A)\) for you, (to say nothing of universalizing it) \((A)\) must have in some way claimed me. Or, in terms recalling his issue with Ryle, Hare has conflated the logic of other-prescriptivity and self-prescriptivity; when in fact the discrepancies between the logic of the two are particularly revealing. While a prescriptive assertion seems to account for my prescribing an action \((A)\) for another person, it does little to explain how I arrived at this judgment in the first place. Further, because the person to whom I commend \((A)\) must discern the claim as I have done, it is not really adequate to explain moral commitment at all. "To be clearer about moral judgment we must make evident the prior claims to which the moral judgment is a response, the claim which arises out of and around the facts of the situation which are considered relevant." (CE and CP, pages 164-165)
Ramsey holds that an account of moral judgments which includes the descriptive elements, as well as the logical character of moral assertions, is nonetheless in need of expansion in the direction he has indicated. Moral assertions are only prescriptive because they are responsive to a prior moral claim. But the question instantly arises: does this account not compromise the autonomy of ethics? To speak of the moral claim as a duty which is disclosure-given is suspiciously close to sneaking God back into the ethical experience.

Ramsey argues that there is no threat to the 'autonomy' of ethics as it is generally stated: the logical distinctiveness of the context of ethical language. His lateral enrichment does not provide entailing reasons for a moral judgment—the claim remains, in this sense, intrinsically binding. If one perceives God in the value-claim, if the situation takes on depth, mediates an 'undercurrent', this is only a legitimate theological development of a duty which would be binding without such an interpretation.

It is not clear, however, that Ramsey has successfully defended his 'enrichment' against this charge. To speak of a disclosed duty is to raise two problems. Insofar as it is disclosed, it requires a discloser. If this discloser is not God, then it must be the situation itself; a conclusion which is perilously close to the naturalist fallacy. More important, however, is the compromise of ethics in the very idea of a value-claim. If the facts, in some way or other, do exert a claim, do disclose a duty
which is intrinsically binding, then the element of personal decision, the judgment basic to Hare's prescriptives, is lost. One way out, of course, is to follow Tillich's theonomous ethics. But this carries with it problems of its own theologically, to say nothing of its philosophical legitimacy. While I can agree with Ramsey in saying that such 'enrichment' does little to compromise the logical autonomy of ethics as Ewing presents it, his experiential concept of a claim-possessing situation and the response of commitment breaks the bounds of a strictly analytical approach to ethics. Rather than compromising ethics on Ewing's terms, this throws the very concept of autonomy into grave doubt; a concept born in the clinical environment of analytical philosophy and dashed against the rocks of experience.

Still, when one considers the ways in which theology has tried to 'usurp some of the realm of ethics' by inferring a 'radical deontology' from exegesis, Ramsey's earnest attempt to maintain ethics' autonomy is more than understandable. It is laudable. Ethicists--both Christian and non-Christian--do far too much 'direct' talking of God's commands in ways which assimilate the logic of 'God-talk' with the logic of persons with disastrous results. Ramsey mentions that Richard Robinson seems to assume that the logic of God the Father is no different from that of human fathers. Similarly Patterson Brown falls into saying things like "There is a God, and he commands y", and "... one can infer by means of reason
alone, i.e. via the Natural Law, what God would command."
(CE and CP, page 170) To these Ramsey’s reply is that
whatever else we may know about religious language, we
know that the logic of God is such that 'God' cannot simply
be substituted for Headmaster or Sergeant-Major in "The
Headmaster wants all the children to do x" or "The Sergeant-
Major commands x".

In the concluding essay in Christian Ethics and Con­
temporary Philosophy, Ramsey picks up on an attempt by
Professor H. L. A. Hart to resuscitate the concept of
natural law. Admittedly Hart’s version is extremely con­
servative in its claims for the rules of conduct discover­
able by reason alone. His single presupposition is that
the end of man is survival. From this he draws five
reasonable principles:

a. Law and morality have to restrict the use
of violence in killing or assault.
b. There must be a system of mutual forbear­
ance and compromise—both legal and moral.
c. There must be a measure of human altruism
(this would not be needed if men were an­
gels, nor possible were men devils).
d. Because of earth’s limited resources, there
must be some minimal form of property.
e. Sanctions are needed; not as a motive, but
simply so that those who are voluntarily
good are not at a loss to those who are not.
(CE and CP, pages 387-388, paraphrased).

Ramsey tries to secure Hart’s claim that survival be
taken as a basic assumption given by reason. He argues
that survival must be a moral necessity; that is, that my
survival be naturally good—that my eating and resting be
naturally good for me as they are oriented towards my sur­
vival. Disregarding the problems with the very word
'natural' Ramsey continues that perhaps the moral necessity of survival is itself a disclosure; and again, in the recognition of this moral claim is the possibility of self-disclosure/self-realization.

Ramsey sees in this rendering of natural law parallels with Christian ethics. Like natural law, he writes, Christian ethics builds certain ideas from key themes. But unlike the natural law theory—where pluralism threatens its claims to fundamental ideas—the diversity of Christian themes is actually an advantage. Certain key ideas—redemption, incarnation, love, servanthood, and so on—will be present to some extent in virtually any matching of moral situation and Christian commitment. It is clear that Ramsey envisages a developing, open-ended code growing out of such a method. Any resulting code would never ossify because it would arise from, and be constantly checked against, concrete situations.

Ramsey concludes that Christian ethics can be seen to be identical with natural law; or, it can be seen to be in fundamental agreement, but to supplement it; or, it can be seen as antagonistic to it. Ramsey takes the middle position, though such a supplementary relation is far from simple. It remains a difficult task to consider the guidance of natural law or Christian themes, and make a moral decision when the occasion arises. If the method is only seen as a guide, Ramsey believes it will skirt the notorious difficulties with the natural law theory in the past; as well as avoid the charge of heteronomy, since the final
decision is not external to the actor. The principles arrived at are never incorrigible, nor to be taken as absolute rules of behaviour. As each arose out of a concrete call, the matching of each principle to each situation discloses a claim in response to which we can realize ourselves as persons.

Obviously I cannot pretend to do justice to the issue of natural law in a brief paragraph. But it is true that the concept of natural law was hardly central to Ramsey's ethics. Nonetheless, it is possible to mention criticisms which spring to mind in the light of Hart's five principles. The first is, of course, that this is not what is meant by natural law; that in this form, the concept has 'died the death of a thousand qualifications'. Secondly, the argument is based on drawing conclusions from 'nature'. The "naturalistic fallacy" aside, the inherent ambiguity of the term 'natural' should suffice to keep anyone interested in clarity from entering into its web. 4 By it one can certainly not mean the 'order' of the universe--or the biosphere--for, as Charles Darwin wrote: "What a book a devil's chaplain might write on the clumsy, wasteful, blundering and horribly cruel works of Nature". 5 Finally, each of Hart's prescriptions--for they are prescriptions rather than principles reasoned from 'survival'--can be criticized for varying degrees of moral bias. They depend on a view of reason which is heteronomous in any case, and in theological terms is dependent upon the view that reason was not involved in the fall. Those who do not follow Thomas on
this often conclude that reason has fallen—or at least that it is a mere tool which can be used for immoral as easily as moral ends. This is clear in Hart's fourth principle. On the one hand property can be seen as support for healthy order; but it can as easily become a means of totalitarian oppression; a bulwark of injustice.

Ramsey's suggestions for a rehabilitated natural law do, however, demonstrate the methodological approach that he would bring to ethics—and this is his forte in ethical theory. In an article written in 1957, "Ethics and Reason" (CE, pages 48-56), Ramsey attempted to bring out the lessons for theological ethics in a marriage of empiricism and rationalism celebrated by Morris Ginsberg. Ginsberg raises four questions which are often applied to any assertion 'X is good'. (1) How far does X gather together certain instincts, attitudes, feelings, etc.? (2) How far does X arise from a direct and immediate apprehension centred on the particular situation in mind? (3) How far does the moral assertion ('X is good') follow from general principles which are either self-evident or have been intuited in some way? (4) How far has the assertion been reached by reasoned argument—about both the means and the ends themselves?

Ginsberg points out that rationalists tend to concentrate on the latter two questions, whereas empiricists give more attention to one and two. This follows from the fact that one and two are concerned with experiential aspects of the situation, and three and four are directed
towards ratiocination. Of course, no moral philosopher is entirely rationalist or empiricist. Russell, for example, concentrated on one and two above, but maintained that it is possible to build a science of ethics upon the verification of ethical assertions in the same way as scientific propositions are built up. This mixing of empiricist and rationalist method brings Ramsey to the 'is'-'ought' dichotomy. He asks, "Does not every situation have both its 'facts' and its 'values', so that no matter how differently these can be talked of or treated, there must, since they belong to the one situation, be some kind of connection between them?" (CE, page 50) If they are not ontologically distinct, why should there not be logical ties? Here then is Ramsey's response to Nielsen's overzealous use of the 'descriptive/evaluative' dichotomy.

But this is not to deny Hume his helpful point. Rational enquiry cannot create morality or derive the moral from the non-moral rationally. But if there is some sort of connection ontologically, then either the empiricist's 'pure is', or the sure-fire inference from the premises of the rationalist, or perhaps both, must be judged as inadequate to explain morality. Ramsey comments:

In short, I have myself never been over-awed by Hume's claim which was the outcome of an empirical theory of knowledge where 'facts' were supposed to be no more than cosmic tiddly-winks with 'values' housed somewhere else if (and the alternative is significant) housed anywhere at all. To separate 'facts' from 'values' may lead to a high view of ethics: it may equally lead to no ethics at all. (CE, page 50)
Ramsey's own position, then, is less concerned with bridging the 'is-ought' dichotomy than it is with bridging the empiricist-rationalist dichotomy. We have already seen the ways in which he sees situations as value-laden; duty is disclosed in and around 'the facts' of the situation. Here is an empiricist's sense of duty. Thus the ethicist's task is to bridge the instincts, attitudes, feelings, etc., arising from a disclosure in the situation with the general principles and reasoned argument about the suitable means etc., of the rationalist. Ethics must bring the rational to the empirical 'facts' without expecting a moral response to follow by deductive logic.

The empirical anchorage is essential. But given this, Ginsberg argues that ethics must be sufficiently ordered, its methodology must be rational enough, to find some pattern, some conformity in the varying situations, by which we can mark out the good (X) that is common to all of them. He provides five suggestions for this methodological reasoning: Any morality is the better:

a. ... the more it sees goodness as self-sustained and independent of external sanctions;
b. ... the more it can be universalized;
c. ... the more it allows for comprehensiveness, flexibility—higher systems allow for greater spontaneity;
d. ... the more it belongs to a system exhibiting coherence, systematic connections; and
e. ... the more it shows the capacity for self-criticism and self-direction.

Further, reasoning has at least three functions with relation to ideals. Reason must clarify and define ideals, elucidate their relations to one another, and formulate
the conditions under which they can be realised. Ginsberg points out that the third has already begun to move in the direction of empiricism. Thus Ginsberg looks to the marriage of reasoned approach and empirical anchorage to develop and criticize ethical principles which can be brought to bear on problem situations.

Before going on to Ramsey's own application of Ginsberg's argument, some comparisons must be drawn to the foregoing discussions. In the first place, we see here a non-theological empirical-rational method much like that of which Ramsey spoke in his consideration of natural law. Ginsberg's insistence on the place of reason in clarifying the good, in integrating the insights gained in a comprehensive and universalizable ethics gives careful enough attention to general principles to free his approach from being based upon the situation. On the other hand, his empirical concerns allow him to be sensitive to the complexities of the situation.

Secondly the five criteria above must not be thought to favour one particular approach. Each ethical method will be stronger in some areas than in others; in fact strengths in one area often militate against high marks in others. Taken together, the five criteria match well with much of contemporary ethics. Ensuring that goodness be kept free of external sanctions, and recognizing that higher systems allow for greater spontaneity comes close to the responsible ethics that Nowell-Smith advocates. Likewise the capacity for an ethics to be universalizable
parallels Hare's meta-ethical insights. The question which Ramsey must face is: Can a Christian ethics meet these criteria in sufficient strength to avoid the charge of infantile heteronomy; or of subjectivity; or lack of coherence; or ethnocentricity (lack of universalizability)?

Ramsey replies in the affirmative, and expands Ginsberg's position to provide a distinctive Christian ethical method. Though he does not dispute the autonomy of ethics in the sense of a unique language game, he does agree with Ginsberg that the distinctiveness of ethics can be overstressed as well; ethics can be set too far from the empirical data or it can deny the possibility of 'lateral enrichment'. Thus Ramsey feels compelled to add to Ginsberg's five criteria: (1) The necessary anchorage in empirical data; and (2) that the ethical judgment depends upon more than the empirical information. A moral situation will exhibit the familiar 'descriptive data—and more'.

Here again, Ramsey stretches the case of the other member of his manufactured dialogue. While agreeing with Ginsberg that any rational ethics will conclude that given the same empirical data the same ethical judgment should follow, Ramsey takes this one step farther. He argues that, given the same moral judgment, it does not follow that the same moral response will emerge. Here again his 'lateral enrichment' actually compromises the autonomy of ethics (assuming ethics is taken to include more than simply the distinctive language game—assuming it considers
not only the judgment, but the intentions, motivations, consequences and so on that also make up the ethical situation). He suggests that a Christian ethics "might well inform moral behaviour with that power which enables appropriate action, moral responses, to follow moral judgments." (CE, page 55) If ethics is merely a cognitive pursuit—which stress on the moral judgment implies—then it is difficult to see how ethics could fail to be autonomous. Ivan Karamazov's cry 'everything is permitted' must then be taken as madness. But to bring in the account of the moral response, in whatever terms, breaks down the claims for ethical autonomy by including both the discernment, the decision, and the act. I take the fact that Ramsey did not press these points, and in fact held to the 'autonomy of ethics' as he did, as evidence of his inability to break out of the constricting bounds of analytical philosophy.

In like manner, his expectation that a claim of duty should arise from a matching of general principles and empirical data can be cited as an indication of his confinement within the deontological model of ethics; despite his subtle, empirically based rendering of it. Although he is careful to safeguard the autonomy of ethics from an exegetical-deductive approach, and thus keep the good free of external sanctions, Nowell-Smith's linking of deontological ethics and heteronomy remains a strong criticism of his ethics. One who writes that any rational ethics must expect that, given the same 'facts' any two
people will intuit the same value-claim certainly cannot be accused of situationalism; but the charge of infantile heteronomy can easily be applied to such dependence on the empirical data and upon reason to make one's moral decisions. Equally, the intrinsically binding duty disclosed through and around the facts seriously impinges upon human freedom. Not that Ginsberg, Nowell-Smith, or Nielsen, et al., are in any better shape in this regard. In fact, Ramsey's insistence on moral discernment, moral response, and self-realization in the action itself shows some signs of breaking free of the deontological model. Nonetheless duty, obligation to rules, principles, laws, remain his dominant motifs.

In applying this ethical method to Christian social ethics, Ramsey contrasts his method with the simplistic 'linear-systematic' or 'exegetical-deductive' approaches. The latter depends upon an over-simplification of the data upon which a rough categorization is superimposed. Ramsey writes that the method takes key doctrines or verses, and develops by deduction some generalization which is then taken to be the Christian approach to the social problem. One example he offers is original sin; from which is deduced 'Whatever you do makes things worse', and hence, an extremely negative attitude towards social reform. Another key doctrine might be Natural Law, from which virtually anything might be deduced.

Ramsey attacks both the grounds of such moral theorizing, and the foolhardy logic by which such grounds are
developed. To take a particular verse or doctrinal position which seems appropriate is to fragment the diverse totality of the Christian biblical thought and history. The faults of treating the logic of religious discourse in straightforward interpretations has already been made clear. Ramsey's criticisms are summed up in three points:

1. Theological over-simplification: in selecting some principles, perhaps only one, and taking even these in a limited context.

2. Carelessness in argument—confounding inference and psychological association, or inference and mere consistency, or even supposing lack of clear inconsistency to be the same as positive implication.

3. Empirical over-simplification—of the situation to be judged.  

Obviously this is an anti-type; though it is a sobering thought how much of Christian ethics falls under its scope. In contrast to the 'linear-systematic' approach Ramsey offers his 'empirical-exploratory' method. This involves four steps: (1) Beginning with an actual problem situation, all the information which can be gained from the social sciences will be helpful in providing an empirical base from which to work. The interdisciplinary nature of Ramsey's method is emphasized in that this first step is the realm of 'the experts'. It is futile to search for biblical expertise in genetics in making a decision about social engineering or abortion, for example. (2) The language and situations brought to light by 'the experts' will hopefully echo biblical and theological themes, doctrinal positions,
social situations in Christian history, etc. The theologians' task is to be expert in their own field, and to draw upon these themes. The theological input is thus legitimated by its empirical anchorage in past situations in Christian history. (3) Hopefully, this matching of themes and situations will show itself in some insight, some disclosure. As with theological models, the matching is never guaranteed to produce a disclosure, but any insight will show itself in some ethical judgment. The decision will be a Christian response by virtue of its grounding in Christian themes and insight. (4) This is a never-ending process. A moral judgment will transform the situation, which will in turn raise its own problems, its own sociological data. This will again echo biblical and theological themes ... In this way a genuine spirit of exploration is maintained by the continuous generation of moral responses.

Ramsey sees the inherent tentative nature of this method as a benefit; making the Christian social ethics more sensitive to the complexities of contemporary moral dilemmas. Further, it avoids the fragmentation and reductionism of approaches which would subsume all Christian answers under one basic theme. In this way he differs from both Hart's Natural Law, with his sole basis of human survival, and 'situation ethics' with its absolute integrating concept of love. With the latter he shares the concern for the complexities of the actual situation. But his method of matching the social problem with parallel empirical grounding in Christian history, giving rise to a disclosure of duty is unique, and distinctively Christian.
I have indicated ways in which Ramsey's ethics was stifled by both the analytical philosophy and the deontological model under which he worked. It is time that these points were given fuller attention. Fortunately the points at which Ramsey's ethics seem to warrant expansion can be brought out with reference to Ramsey's reflections on the relation of freedom and duty in *Freedom and Immortality*, the Forwood Lectures of 1957. In his discussion of freedom, Ramsey points out that much of the debate has taken place within the scope of observable behaviour. Those who believe that freedom is an essential part of human nature generally point to more features of the behaviour in question to illustrate the actor's freedom. Those who favour the deterministic viewpoint to more and more causal factors behind the act in question.

Ramsey relies upon his 'broadened empiricism' to provide a new approach to the old problem. He argues that the freedom that many perceive and try to point to is not to be found by adding more facts to the account of the action, but by drawing attention to the 'and more' exhibited by such situations. Here is where arguments for free will are to find their empirical anchorage. Among others, he gives the example of a duty-bound ticket clerk at a British Rail window. The man is bound to the routine ticket sales until one day the face at the window, asking for a single to King's Cross, happens to be a man wanted by the police for questioning, say, in a murder case. In a moment the routine selling of tickets takes on
depth, the situation 'comes alive'. As we have seen, Ramsey argues that a duty is disclosed: the civic duty to report the man. This is the sort of 'and more' to which we should point if we want to talk reasonably about free will. Whereas we would not want to call the routine sales of tickets 'decisive activity', the ticket clerk's response to this particular customer is ontologically peculiar. There may be nothing in the observable facts to indicate this; in fact, for the clerk's safety, it would be best if he could show no sign of recognition. But there is nonetheless a response by the clerk that demonstrates his free decisive activity.

Ramsey comments that the free response to a challenge of duty such as this one, is backed personally; it is a response demanding a personal commitment to a particular course of action. It goes beyond 'observables' in two senses: the objective claim of the situation is disclosure-given; secondly the subjective response and the self-awareness given in it are not limited to the describable 'facts'. But more important, the 'and-more' is a disclosure of the freedom of the individual in the decision to meet the challenge. Although there are empirical bases for the decision, these cannot account in any causal sense for the action of the individual.

As sensitive to human experience as this discussion may be, there is not one word thus far about logical behaviour, evaluative force, or universalizability. But if the foregoing discussion is not confined to analytical
philosophy, it is quite close to other, diverse approaches to ethics. Sartre, for example, writes that responsibility means "consciousness (of) being the incontestable author of an event or of an object". The ticket clerk, in responding to the moral claim of the situation realizes, to some extent, his 'authorship' of the events that follow. If he lets the man go, he will get on the train, travel to London, and perhaps escape. If he acts prudently, he will be able to alert the authorities in time to apprehend the man. Certainly Ramsey would not go as far as Sartre in claiming that I am responsible for everything, including the definition of my own nature, and, by extension, human nature. Ramsey is too sensitive to the environmental conditions into which we are thrust. In his Ethics Bonhoeffer writes that we do not create the conditions to which we respond. In this sense the moral agent is dependent upon the concrete man in the concrete situation. His conduct is not pre-established.

Probably the strongest parallels can be found between the moral freedom, demonstrated in the case of the ticket clerk, of Ramsey's ethics, and H. Richard Niebuhr's 'responsible self'. Niebuhr writes that whereas the teleological ethicists approach a situation asking 'What is the goal or end of this action?', and deontologists ask 'What is the rule or principle involved?', the responsible self asks 'What is going on? What is the fitting act in this situation?' To ask first what is going on closely coincides with Ramsey's 'empirical-exploratory' approach.
Crudely fit into the previous example, we might say that the goal of the situation at the ticket counter is for the travellers to get to their destinations. The rule or duty is for the ticket agent to sell them tickets. But when the empirical 'facts' present themselves, when it is clear that 'what is going on' is an attempted escape; then the 'fitting' action is one which is not given in the rules, not covered by the 'goals' of the ticket window, and not reducible to the observable 'facts' of the situation.

But if the 'fitting act' is God's will; can we not speak of the fitting act as our duty? This is certainly the way that Ramsey would see it; but with his characteristic warnings about guarding the odd logic of the assertions made. God's will must be seen as 'lateral enrichment' of the logic of the duty claim. In other words, the duty would remain with or without its theological basis. Ramsey gives three examples of the ways in which we can create these duty-disclosing situations (echoing the above quotation from Sartre): Moral obligations can arise out of ordinary, every-day interaction. In making a commitment we obligate ourselves to fulfill our commitments. Bonhoeffer writes of 'deputyship' that here the image of the isolated individual as the primitive of ethics is shattered. The basis of ethics is not the individual in his isolation, but the responsible person in all of his or her deputyships. He cites as three helpful examples: fatherhood, statesmanship, and the role of teacher.
This coincides with Niebuhr's stress on the social solidarity intrinsic in any ethics. Sociology has demonstrated the social basis of the self. The ethical self, no less than the aesthetic or consumer self, must be taken from the start as a social being. Niebuhr writes: "To be a self in the presence of other selves is not a derivative experience, but primordial. To be able to say I am I is not an inference from the statement that I think thoughts nor from the statement that I have a law-acknowledging conscience. It is, rather, the acknowledgment of my existence as the counter-part of another self." This social solidarity provides the deontological elements of responsible ethics in further elucidating the conditions which are 'given'; those to which, and from which, we must act.

Ramsey's second example is promise-making and promise-keeping. Once he has promised his son to buy the new Dinky toy when it comes out, Ramsey states that he has opened himself up to a duty. This duty will be disclosed when the new toy is displayed in the shop window (or possibly when there is a tug at his coat pocket.) Here Bonhoeffer is helpful at drawing out the ethical implications of the primary status of man in ethics. He argues that the end of things (and ideas) must always be man; that when ideas, such as scientific knowledge, are directed towards some other end, not only man, but the object itself (science) is ruined. Thus ideals like goodness, honesty, integrity, beauty, etc. should never be exalted. They are most revered when their fundamental subservience
to man is respected. Referring back to Ramsey's example of promise-keeping, his duty is not to his promise, but to his son.

Finally, Ramsey mentions the self-disclosing possibilities of conflicting duties. Free will arises, as Ross points out, in situations of conflicting prima-facie duties. My promise to buy my child a new toy may be succeeded by my responsibility in my deputyship as father to provide the child with food or new shoes. But the very fact of conflicting duties demonstrates the inadequacy of the deontological model.

Bonhoeffer writes of the law of being inherent in every entity, every being. Responsibility demands attention to these laws; but as the scale of complexity increases, the capacity for the law to exhaust its character is dramatically reduced. Bonhoeffer states:

The more closely the particular thing with which we are concerned is connected with human existence, the clearer it will become that the law of its being does not consist entirely in a formal technique, but rather that this law renders all technical treatment questionable.

Sartre, building upon the fundamental dictum "existence precedes essence", argues that man is indefinable because he defines himself as he goes along. Man appears on the scene, and only later does he define his essence. To say this is only to say that man has a greater dignity than a stone or a table. Man's freedom both requires and provides for an ethics built upon responsibility rather than deontological or teleological ethics. Freedom
requires it because laws are laws of human behaviour; they are based upon predictable, observable behaviour—and this is their helpful function in any ethics. Freedom provides for an ethics of responsibility by man's capacity to act creatively.

Michael Polanyi writes of the greater depth of knowing a person as opposed to the knowledge of a stone:

Persons and problems are felt to be more profound, because we expect them yet to reveal themselves in unexpected ways in the future, while cobblestones evoke no such expectation. This capacity of a thing to reveal itself in unexpected ways in the future I attribute to the fact that the thing observed is an aspect of a reality, possessing a significance that is not exhausted by our conception of any single aspect of it. To trust that a thing we know is real is, in this sense, to feel that it has the independence and power for manifesting itself in yet unthought of ways in the future. I shall say, accordingly, that minds and problems possess a deeper reality than cobblestones, although cobblestones are admittedly more real in the sense of being tangible.¹²

This corresponds nicely with Niebuhr's preference to talk of accountability rather than consequence when examining the moral act. Whereas consequences are observable, strictly physical, to speak of accountability means that we make moral decisions in light of expected responses to our own response. An action which concentrates on the duty or the goal to the exclusion of the anticipation of the others' responses is, in this sense, not the 'fitting act'. In like manner Bonhoeffer writes: "Responsibility differs from violence and exploitation in that it recognizes the other man as a responsible agent."¹³
All of which seems to have left the deontology of Ramsey behind. But has it not left Ramsey behind entirely? I think not. In Freedom and Immortality Ramsey emphasizes the moral response as nowhere else. Although he still wants to talk of morality in terms of duty and the moral law, he is equally if not more so, concerned to bring out the personal element. Recall that he spoke of the free response to a duty claim as one which demands 'personal backing'. Likewise, in speaking of one's response to the Moral Law, Ramsey comments, "The logic of 'My action is determined by the Moral Law' is much more like 'I am responding to his love and affection' than it is like 'I am reacting to his stimuli and his treatment'." Further, in discussing the relationship of human freedom and divine omnipotence, Ramsey writes, "To the 'all-powerfulness' of God, as to obligations of duty, we respond 'freely'. Our response has our personal backing." (F and I, page 59)

In these ways, then, I believe that both the empirical and the personal emphases in Ramsey's ethics can be seen as indications of a theoretical approach more sensitive to the 'responsible self' ethical model than the analytical and deontological structures within which he worked. This is not to deny that the deontological model was the dominant, integrating term of his ethics. But I am suggesting that his ethical theory was stifled within this framework. Although there is no possibility of doing justice to the implications of the supercession of the
deontological model by the responsible self, I must at least try to tie this conclusion to that of previous sections, and summarise the discussion of his ethical theory.

It is obvious how tightly integrated his theological viewpoint and his philosophical background are with his ethical theory. Here again, the concept of disclosure is central. Just as cosmic disclosures are mediated through other disclosures so that every disclosure can eventually bear the name God, ethical disclosures are as common as the obligation to fulfill a promise or to tell the truth. Likewise the religious self-disclosure given to David in the moral condemnation by the prophet Nathan is here matched by the subjective disclosure evoked by the objective disclosure of duty. I have tried to indicate the ways in which this view of self-realization through decisive action exhibits sympathy with the ethics of existentialists.15

But there are other connections as well. In discussing the disclosure concept I emphasized the essentially passive nature of the concept as opposed to the more active 'comprehension' built upon tacit knowing by Michael Polanyi. Here again, although the 'active element', the moral response is given careful consideration, it is the disclosure-given duty which predominates. As the ethics are dependent upon disclosures of duty, it leaves little or no room for man's active role in ethics: in perceiving injustice, in defining values, in the freedom of his response. Certainly Ramsey would not agree with Sartre's conclusion, "(Ontology)
must reveal to the moral agent that he is the being by whom values exist."16

This ethics, essentially passive despite its extremely active aspects, is in line with both deontological ethics and theological views of revelation. It is, for these very reasons, unable to give God and man the primary status within it which ethicists like Niebuhr and Bonhoeffer stress. I believe that the reason for this is to be found within its excessive dependence upon both analytic philosophy and deontology.

As I have already made clear, I see the experiential and the personal aspects of Ramsey's ethics as the strong points. But far too much of the personal features of moral relations (with man and with God) are neglected by restricting ethics to the legal model. This said, it is of course easier to do logical/analytical 'under-labouring' on the legal model than either the teleological or the responsible models.

In Freedom and Immortality, Ramsey uses a mathematical model to demonstrate that 'God' has a more comprehensive scope in ethics than 'duty'. Thus, like he saw the term 'God' in Christian discourse as a central integrating term, he sees 'God's will' as a more comprehensive way of speaking about ethics than 'duty'. This, however, seems inconsistent with the analytical talk of 'God's will' as 'lateral enrichment'. Whatever else it is, 'lateral enrichment' which in no way compromises the autonomy of ethics can hardly be called 'central'. Far more central, it seems,
is the disclosure of duty. The method Ramsey applies to this, the 'empirical-exploratory' approach, is equally sensitive to the complexities of moral situations and distinctively Christian. But again, the central aspects of the method are to match as complete as possible a knowledge of the empirical data with Christian themes in the hope of generating a disclosure of one's duty. Again 'God' seems to be relegated to 'lateral enrichment'.

The autonomy of ethics, as he has defined it, is a strong concept; contradicting as it does so much irrelevant theological ethics. But by stifling those aspects of his ethics more sensitive to the personal element in moral responses, this analytical insight was far more restrictive than necessary. By bringing out the personal elements, and emphasizing the experiential basis, Ramsey might have accomplished an empirically based and God-centred ethics. Likewise I do not question the propriety of using deontological motifs in a Christian ethics dominated by the model of response to God through the concrete situation. But such motifs are provided by the sensitivity to the empirical data. Niebuhr writes:

"When I view my life from its existence in responsibility I am not so much aware of law in the form of demand as of the action of other beings upon me in anticipated and predictable ways".17 Here natural law drifts inevitably into treating God's will like that of the Headmaster or the Sergeant-Major. I do not believe that Ramsey reduced 'God and ought' to the will of the Sergeant-Major or the
Nurse; his ethics certainly exhibit a struggle to break out of a duty-bound legalism:

The logic of 'My action is determined by the Moral Law' is much more like 'I am responding to his love and affection' than it is like 'I am reacting to his stimuli and his treatment'. (F and I, page 38-39)
Social Ills

Ramsey's work in ethics took him into two areas which might be loosely connected: social unrest and Britain's penal system. There is a wealth of published material which evinces Ramsey's views and methods in these areas. Ramsey addressed the House of Lords with speeches on subjects like social problems in Southern Africa, violence in contemporary society, and prison sentences. Further, Ramsey co-chaired a committee under the Church Assembly Board for Social Responsibility which produced a publication, *Punishment*, in 1963.

On 12 February, 1969, Ramsey spoke to the House of Lords on the subject of 'Violence in Contemporary Society'. Violence is a complex issue; one which, in itself, is probably too broad to be appropriate for the abstract treatment of a discussion in the House of Lords. Ramsey's own speech suffers from a dangerous ambivalence. In his attempt to be sensitive to social realities and theological values, Ramsey makes several points; any one of which might have been effectively developed and advocated. But they are impossible to hold together without a confusing and muddled end product.

At first Ramsey presents a strong case against violence. He searches for a broad, agreed definition. "As we all know violence means unreasonable force, the exercise of which inevitably converts persons into things." Within the context of Ramsey's insights into personality his point is comprehensible in a way impossible to fill out within the limitations of a speech. In an academic lecture Ramsey would
have been able to elucidate his point by arguing that persons are realised in subjective disclosures in response to a moral or religious claim. Violence, however, crushes any possibility for personal responsiveness by destroying rather than creating, by forcing rather than reasonably persuading. Hence, Ramsey argues, it leads to "irrationality, oppression, disorder, anarchy, nihilism, death." Further, violence often leads members of groups to act in ways which no single individual would consider.

After establishing this firm critique of the use of violence, Ramsey attempts a sudden turnabout in order to justify those who must resort to violence. Drawing upon the documents of the 1968 Lambeth Conference to which he had contributed, Ramsey describes institutionalised violence:

Knowledge and power can be used to oppress, and to satisfy human greed or pride. In political or economic matters, excessive deference has been paid to conventional wisdom and outdated institutions. Man is in danger of losing his human dignity and becoming depersonalised. Often he feels himself limited and voiceless in a world where others make the decisions that affect his daily life.

Thus Ramsey asks the noble Lords to consider a situation in which the oppression is so institutionalised that recourse to violence becomes justifiable; in fact, a Christian duty. Although Ramsey proceeds to qualify this stance by denying that such use of violence can ever be creative, he holds that in extreme cases violence might be the only way to break the oppressive stranglehold of tyranny. Further, Ramsey implies that violence might be
an inherent aspect of social reality; one to be faced boldly and honestly rather than to be glossed over by abstract ideals.

The ambivalence noted above has become explicit. Ramsey cannot afford to combine his able case against the use of violence with this firm justification of it. His attempt to do so diffuses the persuasive power of both arguments. In theological terms Ramsey has exposed the sinful character of violence in its tendency to injustice and inhumanity. Likewise to see violence as an unfortunate but intrinsic aspect of social change is to tie it to a broad understanding of original sin. To turn from this critique to the advocacy of violence is not so much sensitivity to concrete situations as it is contradictory theology. It is a betrayal of Christian non-violence, of the redeeming way of the cross. By trying to remain sensitive to the complexity of the situation Ramsey succeeds only in presenting a confusing and muddled speech.

Despite this flaw, Ramsey's practical suggestions are helpful. He argues that violence is a symptom of more basic social ills. Needs of individuals are being neglected. Institutions, instead of providing persons with opportunities for self-fulfillment, are proving to be static and oppressive. Law and order which gives some a sense of security is for others absolutely oppressive. In these conditions outbreaks of violence witness to our social failure to provide for the spiritual needs of persons. Finally unemployment creates a frustrating feeling
of impotence; one for which violence is an imposing, though ultimately specious, anodyne. Ramsey asks, "What can we do constructively, beyond making the criticism of violence which undoubtedly must be made? Violence will be eradicated only when we have institutions which better develop and satisfy the spirit of man."^{4}

Aligned with the problems of violence in society are those created by political injustice. From mid-1969 through 1971 Ramsey took an outspoken stance on Southern Africa and British policy in that region. His speeches and activities directed towards issues arising in this area contradict any charges of ambivalence, or of the lack of any sharp directive produced by the empirical-exploratory method. The issues demonstrate a major advantage of his method in its capacity for avoiding lofty, but unworkable goals. Rather than following ideals and principles to spectacular but unrealizable goals, Ramsey allows the 'harsh facts' to serve as a limiting factor for the pragmatic application of his ethical insights.

Two events form helpful foci for an explanation of Ramsey's work in the political unrest in Southern Africa. These are his speech to the House of Lords in December, 1971, on the subject of the settlement proposals for Rhodesia, and his work as chairman of the Co-ordinating Committee Against Arms for South Africa. In beginning his comments on them, Ramsey voiced his opposition to the settlement proposals:

I honestly look in vain for concrete evidence of a radical change of heart on the part of
the Rhodesian Government. Yet, in my opinion, without that change of heart, the proposals before us are bound to be stultified. Indeed ... they embody many vague phrases and qualifications which are as sinister as they are plausible, so that initial uncertainties and doubts which necessarily belong to a situation as unpromising as this was, and the recent history of which is so depressing, are deepened rather than removed.5

Ramsey supports his criticisms by drawing attention to the disparities between optimistic readings of the proposals and the grim realities of the actual conditions. He refers to one of the loftiest phrases in the First Principle, which promises to maintain and guarantee "unimpeded progress to majority rule". Ramsey contrasts this with the social, educational, economic, and vocational needs of the Africans. He argues that programmes directed towards these needs will be meaningless unless they are accompanied by real progress towards integration; an integration which the proposals are designed to neatly side-step. In like manner Ramsey attacks a section on employment, (for which colour was still a major factor), land rights, (which, while impressive, can be wiped out at the stroke of a pen), and a section granting some powers to the Africans, except for considerations of 'an over-riding character', (a phrase which leaves enormous legal loop-holes.)

Ramsey states that such harsh words for proposals that bring some hope to a grim situation did not come easily to him. He makes it clear that he appreciates the labours of those committed to peaceful solutions in Rhodesia. But in grounding his ideal solutions for the problems in the facts of the situation, Ramsey sought some guarantees of a
change of heart away from the separate development ideology. He found only evasive phrases which made it necessary for him to expose the practical loop-holes within the theoretically promising proposals.

Far from a continuing academic interest, Ramsey saw the injustices of Southern Africa as a crisis, a call for firm Christian response. Thus when Mr. Heath's Government considered the sale of helicopters to the Union of South Africa in 1969, Ramsey was one of the leaders of the political opposition to the move. On 25 August, 1969, The Co-ordinating Committee Against Arms for South Africa was officially formed, with Ramsey as chairman. Despite a diary crammed with speaking engagements in the States and elsewhere, bishop's duties, and publishing deadlines, Ramsey's contribution was far from that of a figurehead. Soon after the announcement of the committee the Prime Minister was approached about the possibility of discussing the situation with a delegation. At the same time, the committee began to organise a Trafalgar Square demonstration opposing the sale of arms.

The committee sought to organise the many political groups who opposed the move for one reason or another. There were thirteen supporting organisations backing up the three-fold purpose of the Co-ordinating Committee Against Arms for South Africa:

1. To demonstrate the width of opposition to the proposal and to broaden its basis.

2. To maintain a lobby of moderate opinion which will enable the Government to reconsider the proposal free from party acrimony.
3. To develop a more powerful impact by co-ordinating their activities.

On 7 November, 1969, a delegation led by Ramsey met with the Prime Minister. In a statement to the press, Ramsey voiced the committee's objections to the sale of arms. "It is bound to be interpreted as a measure of approval for the South African Government--if not for apartheid, certainly for the injustice and oppression by which apartheid is maintained." The committee also suggested that the sale of arms might further alienate African Christians in its seeming support for apartheid.

The stance of the delegation on an issue as controversial as this was not universally acclaimed. Ramsey's notes include many letters which counsel him to confine his efforts to the religious responsibilities of a bishop. Another, more sarcastic, suggests that he go to join the freedom fighters as a 'gorilla priest' (sic). Still others evince a desire to discuss the situation reasonably, despite strong differences in opinion. Ramsey's response to one of these last provides a good summation of his application of the empirical-exploratory approach to the problem:

My own argument against the sale of arms to South Africa does not at all rely on, while it does not ignore, arguments of a legal, economic, or strategic kind. It is basically a moral argument, for I see the sale of arms as a symbolic action which would declare our support for a government which not only practises a policy of apartheid, but supports this policy by the most unjust oppression and restriction.

In a speech to the House of Lords in 1972, Ramsey contrasts his method with that of the South African élite. He
charges that the attempt to justify racist practices depends upon biblical ethics that are illogical, morally shameful, and politically disastrous. In words which echo his attack on the 'linear-systematic method' Ramsey states:

By choosing highly advantageous texts, perhaps I need not say from the Old Testament, and by combining that partial selectivity with the crudest of all ideas of revelation, against that most unpromising background the permanent subordination of the native Africans to be hewers of wood and drawers of water and the exclusive domination of the white man is supposed to be given a Christian justification.iii

Ramsey's response to the political situation in Southern Africa is sensitive to both the facts of the social climate and Christian ideals. Further, it demonstrates that his method is capable of yielding pointed moral directives. Unfortunately, this example does little to illustrate a third advantage of the empirical-exploratory method, i.e., its capacity to generate new ethical questions emerging from a changing social environment. This aspect can best be seen in Ramsey's response to the question of the abolition of the death penalty.

On 17 December, 1969, the House of Lords considered the Murder Act of 1965, in order to decide whether or not to retain the death penalty. Here again, Ramsey responds to the situation by demonstrating the complexity of the issue. In this case, unlike his speech on violence, Ramsey's sensitivity results in an eloquent consideration of the total situation. Far from the isolated treatments of hanging an individual for murder, Ramsey's speech directs our attention to:
the motives and responsibility and behaviour of the offender, the circumstances and reactions of the victim's family, the intricate court proceedings as a means of establishing justice in these cases, what actually is involved in terms of the prison setting, the preliminaries, the hanging, the post-mortem details, the effect on prison staffs and prisoners.\textsuperscript{12}

Ramsey begins with the broad, and hence more readily agreeable, area of the reaction of society to violence in general and murder in particular. Society, Ramsey argues, is rightly shocked at cold and malicious killings of policemen, prison officers, bank clerks, or old ladies. Such crimes obviously demand a stiff penalty in order to fully register society's disapproval, even revulsion. While the demand for capital punishment can be authoritarian, intolerant, and vindictive, Ramsey agrees that it is more properly called 'vindicative', in so far as it is evidence of the moral revulsion to murder that demands a counterbalance, demands appropriate moral condemnation.

Likewise it is agreed that it is natural to react to murder with the determination that everything will be done to prevent its reoccurrence. Here the deterrent capabilities of the death penalty are brought under consideration. Ramsey includes in this context the statistics available on popular opinion: 84\% (or thereabouts) in favour of the retention of the death penalty. By regarding this statistic as a sign of society's moral revulsion to murder, Ramsey cleverly breaks down the potency of the statistic, which could otherwise be taken as a clear prescription for the retention of capital punishment in the interests of 'will-of-the-people' democracy.
With this firm foundation of common agreement set, Ramsey is able to develop his more debatable points. It is here that his sensitivity to the broad situation comes to fruition. While hanging undoubtedly expresses unequivocal condemnation, its other effects—not often considered—are often deleterious. What, for instance, is the effect on prison officers? On other prisoners? Ramsey quotes from the Board for Social Responsibility booklet to argue that the prison officer might be called to suppress any human sympathy, any sensitive imagination that he might have. More generally, the conditions for all concerned during the two weeks before the hanging, and on the last day itself are hardly likely to add weight to arguments advocating this form of punishment.

What if there are features just like those which we see in our wider society; violence, not necessarily better for being done in cold blood; insensitivity; the degrading of personality which, outside that prison, all of us would condemn?13

The broader features of the situation become more significant in considering the deterrent argument, though Ramsey treats them in a paradoxical way. If deterrence is the aim of hanging, then it would perform this function all the better were everyone informed more fully of all the gruesome details.

One possible logical extension of the deterrent argument would be the reinstatement of public executions. "Yet", Ramsey quotes from Punishment, "public executions were stopped partly because they proved to be morally offensive and called forth more sympathy for the hanged than moral
condemnation of his crime. Executions are offensive in public, but their deterrent function is limited when they are conducted privately. More disastrous for the deterrent case is the question why a private hanging should be considered morally desirable while public executions are offensive. Certainly there are aspects of human intercourse that are moral when done in privacy but immoral in the marketplace. But it is doubtful that punishment should qualify under these considerations. Whether one takes a retributive stance or sees punishment as primarily directed towards deterrence, or a combination, the penalties are no more moral for being enforced in private. If hanging is retributive, it is society which is responsible for the 'vindicative' disapprobation. It may salve our consciences to have our will executed within the prison walls, but we are no less responsible for the means of punishment. As for the deterrence argument, the effectiveness of private hangings has already been disputed. Certainly from a moral standpoint society could find less destructive means of deterring others from murder.

Finally, Ramsey considers a more common approach in the case against capital punishment: the possibility of error by an imperfect judicial process. Society, as well as individuals, can make faulty judgments resulting in retrospective regret. Subjecting an innocent individual to long years of imprisonment would be most unfortunate. But only one who has a naive belief in a perfect system of justice invulnerable to error, could countenance such a
chillingly irrevocable penalty. "Even one mistake, one person being hanged in error, when hanging has to be set in the context in which I have tried to set it, seems to me far too high a price to pay, when that price is measured in terms of a human life...."\textsuperscript{15}

Thus while Ramsey demonstrates full sympathy with the moral revulsion and the desire for just retribution that murder inspires, he believes that capital punishment is "negative, inconsistent, and entirely devoid of creative possibilities". It encourages that authoritarian intolerance, that insensitivity and devaluation of personality which can only obstruct attempts to reform the criminal and develop a humane society.

Ramsey is not content to rest with his firm criticism of the penal system. In a sense the problems only begin with the end of capital punishment. Ramsey relates an incident in Durham in which the then chief constable, Mr. Alec Muir, stated that he would prefer 'quiet liquidation' to consigning convicts to long terms of imprisonment. While others expressed outrage at his seeming insensitivity, Ramsey perceived that Mr. Muir had raised a key problem for those who would see hanging abolished. If society discontinues executions, an alternative means of expressing appropriate moral condemnation must be found. Ramsey argued that those who vote to end the death penalty face the difficult task of devising means of punishment more suitable to the complex social situation.
In his theoretical work in ethics, Ramsey had claimed that each solution to social ills raises new problems to pick up, new difficulties to be faced. Soon after the fight to abolish the death penalty was, for the time being, won, Ramsey began to attack the fresh problems that arose. He concentrated his attention upon a likely consequence of the abolition of hanging: the problems raised by an influx of long-term prisoners. He drafted a Motion for Papers to provide a forum for practical suggestions and criticisms of lengthy imprisonment. Unfortunately, the motion was postponed and delayed, so that over a year elapsed until the matter could be given the attention of the House of Lords.

On 17 February, 1971, Ramsey delivered a long and carefully considered paper to introduce the topic "Long-Term Prison Sentences". He draws upon a wealth of material published after the abolition of hanging to illuminate the plight of 'Category A' and 'Category B' prisoners. Ramsey appeals to an article in New Society by Stanley Cohen and Laurie Taylor. Its chief concern is a research project into long-term prisoners' sense of time, but the article mentioned the fear of deterioration shared by these prisoners. The inmates realise that such deterioration would occur gradually, creep up on them; and thus they are constantly on the look-out for signs. They are greatly concerned about the possibility of becoming obsessional; they want to guard against "becoming like the old sexual offender who spent hours merely cleaning and filling the tea-pot."16
Ramsey is aware that some, however, would argue that prisons are hardly meant to be vacation spas; that long sentences would be a better deterrent were the conditions in prisons better publicised. In response Ramsey appeals to the publication People in Prison to argue that the loss of liberty and the prison régime are punishment enough—prisons would be unlikely to deter any better if the rack or the treadmill were re-introduced. Such barbarous views deny the prisoner any human dignity or self-respect, and hence stand in the way of any effective reform or rehabilitation. Although he does not quote directly from it, Ramsey has a letter to The Times from a former prisoner, Jack Jacobs, who writes that he has had no experience of anyone being reformed by inhumane punishment or intolerable conditions. But Jacobs has seen many respond favourably to humane conditions and enlightened treatment; and emerge rehabilitated and aware of their responsibilities in society.

Ramsey points out that while punishment represents the moral condemnation of the convict's crime, society must ensure that the means of punishment are not morally repugnant. The imprisonment demanded by society must both register moral protest and uphold the value of the prisoner's personality. A horrid spell under a brutal prison régime may serve to exercise society's retribution, but it negates the possibility of personal reform in the prisoner and in this sense fails to deter the prisoner from returning to crime. Ramsey argues that what is needed is first to provide the best security against escape and then to make the
conditions inside as conducive to the development of personality as possible. "People are sent to prison as a punishment, not for punishment. They are sent to prison for restoration." But the high security brings its own costs in terms of prisoners' mentality. When the cage into which the person is placed is smaller than those for animals in the zoo, the human spirit is inevitably degraded. The continual locking, unlocking, and re-locking of barred doors is psychologically oppressive. Ramsey comments, "When I saw in one prison room two budgerigars in a cage, I dared not ask whether the birds were ever allowed the freedom to fly around the room."

Thus Ramsey turns to the prisoners' state of mind with the aim of doing everything possible, within the security restrictions, to mitigate the psychological oppression. He argues that to prevent deterioration and disintegration the prisoner must both have opportunities to relate creatively with others, and to find his or her own identity. Ramsey begins his practical suggestions with the challenge of finding better means of regulating visiting. The importance of a visit to a long-term prisoner cannot be over-emphasised. Without visitors the chances of finding creative relationships with members of society are meagre. Obviously, since many of the visitors have criminal records themselves, tight security precautions are required. But it would be morally reprehensible to deprive prisoners of the only friends they have for this reason. Ramsey points to the case of a woman prisoner
who was unable to visit her husband, himself a prisoner, because ironically, she was not serving a long enough sentence. If security could be tightened up in other ways, visitations could be more relaxed.

But the primary difficulties in establishing healthy attitudes towards social relationships lie within the prison walls. To place high security wings within general prisons create problems by the stratification of inmates. This division, however, occurs also within the long-term prisoners themselves. Ramsey quotes from an article in the TV Times, in which a former prisoner, Jimmy O'Connor, talks about the special treatment given to offenders against children. O'Connor writes of the brutalities to which these offenders are subjected. He is likely to receive a sly kick in the groin in the van before he even arrives at the prison.

Once inside, O'Connor writes:

he'll know his fate when he gets that first cup of cocoa. There will almost certainly be salt in it, or someone's spittle. A taste of what they think of him, and what they are going to do to him; a surly overture to 14 years of viciousness and degradation ... 20

Ramsey comments that this raises a nest of problems around effective and just distribution of prisoners and about the building of prisons. Recalling his suggestions for inter-disciplinary approaches to moral ideas, Ramsey asks, "How far ... when prisons are built are there round-table discussions between architects, prison staffs, social workers, and the rest?" 21
Ramsey turns to the question of prisoners' work. He gives a fair stratification of work drawn from discussions with prisoners themselves. He lists as preferred: "handicraft, decorative iron-work, cooking, the study of symbolic logic, and not least a service for society in providing Braille books." Laurie Taylor and Stanley Cohen, in the New Society article referred to above, comment:

It is not much use hoping that a man in Parkhurst's 'tag-shop' will become involved in his job of sticking metal ends into the length of green string which keep files together. It is even less reasonable to expect a man facing 20 years in jail to become enthusiastic about repairing a sewing machine.

But Ramsey is after more than simply finding interesting things for men to do to fill their 20 years. He demands a planned programme for each individual prisoner into which his jobs can be fitted. Merely giving the prisoners manifold hobbies to stave off boredom in a sentence which is indeterminate actually undermines any reform. Ramsey states that it tends to break down the man's moral fibre, reporting that a long-term prisoner had told him just that.

Two final issues centreing round the life of the prisoners draw Ramsey's attention. Recognising the role of religious beliefs in providing the prisoner with a sense of purpose, Ramsey finds the fact that top security prisoners are denied any religious services scandalous. Characteristically, Ramsey frankly confesses that Durham Prison once had a top-security wing chapel, but that it was smashed by the prisoners and never refurbished. But
he confidently proposes that the men who want a chapel should be allowed—even encouraged—to furnish one for themselves. At the very least high security prisoners should be allowed to go to the general chapel; under tight guard, and perhaps only once every month. But their freedom to worship should in all events be given more respect.

The second problem deals particularly with the prisoner's sexuality; and, more generally, with the need to treat each prisoner as an individual. Two men with identical crimes, sentences, backgrounds, etc., can react to their imprisonment in totally different ways. Ramsey prescribes a much more thorough study of each case, in terms of a total programme, in terms of vocational as well as non-vocational education, and, not least, in terms of his or her sexuality.

Ramsey illustrates the kind of pressures that are brought to bear upon one returning from long isolation from society with his own experience upon emerging from eight months in hospital during his undergraduate years. "I can still recall what a profound shock it was for the first few weeks to return to the normal interchange of common life. How much more shock to a man after 10 years in prison?" Within this context, Ramsey is disturbed at the statistics reporting that out of 45 prisoners, only one marriage seemed to survive the enforced separation. Here is a demand that hostel schemes be enlarged. Ramsey goes so far as to suggest that here might be a use for all the redundant vicarages.
Ramsey concludes with four broad strokes. First, the need to educate the public is raised. A change of attitude towards prisons and prisoners is needed. The security walls are a practical necessity, but unfortunately they also aptly symbolise the tendency of society to salve its conscience by hiding its 'social failures'. Secondly, Ramsey suggests a reconsideration of staffing prisons. It would be better for all concerned if links between society—social workers, legislators, clergymen, etc.—and prison staffs could be strengthened. Thirdly, Ramsey suggests that this might prompt the inter-disciplinary approach he has advocated, at various centres which could co-ordinate diverse inputs to solve some of the more pressing problems. Finally, Ramsey comments that there are few truly new ideas, but that there is a singular tendency to stop short of fulfilling these ideas in practice. Thus he raised the question before the House partly in hopes of hearing practical suggestions that could be expected to be carried through.

Although there is no time to provide an up-date on the state of prisoners and prisons since this 1971 speech, some criticism of Ramsey's views on the penal system must be attempted. Neither his attack upon capital punishment nor comments on long-term prisoners is subject to the ambivalence of his reflections on violence. He is much more forceful against hanging, but perhaps this is because the issue is that much more pointed. Also, many of his points against hanging are novel, or applied in a new fashion. For example, although various facets are bound to arise in
any discussion within the general area of capital punish-
ment, Ramsey stresses the necessity of granting the ques-
tion a broad context. It cannot be reduced to an effi-
ciency question about deterrence, because it is a moral
question as well. It cannot be exhausted by discussing the
victim and the condemned man, or by debating the relative
merits of various means of killing murderers, because
hanging involves the courts, who are acting on behalf of
the public, and the total prison environment—including
officers, administration, and prisoners—in short, as it
is society that seeks retribution and protection, as it
is society who condemns, the question cannot be isolated
from the total social environment.

Secondly, rather than vascillating between abstract
ideals and actual data, Ramsey tends to concentrate on the
data. This means that his theoretical moral insights are
generally implied or tacit rather than explicitly stated.
However, his handling of the actual data leaves little am-
biguity about his moral commitments. His insights into
personality provide critical tools to apply to the treat-
ment of prisoners. In his numerous comments about the
degradation of locking and unlocking, of caging human beings,
of restricting their opportunities (both vocational and non-
vocational), as well as their relationships (in general,
and in particular their sexual relationships)—in all these
points can be discerned a real commitment to human freedom.
Ramsey sees freedom as a pre-requisite to moral, respons-
able existence. Further, the morality of punishment demands
that the offender be treated as a person; and not a
guinea pig, a mindless machine, an animal, a number, or
a statistic.

Finally, Ramsey's speech is not lacking in practical
suggestions: educating the public, drawing up consulta­
tive committees to study problems specific to this area,
provide for the religious and sexual needs of inmates, as
well as work to ease the transition back into community
life, to name a few.

But Ramsey seems to come under the scrutiny of his
own criticisms of other suggestions. How realisable are
such suggestions as using old vicarages as hostels and
allowing top-security prisoners to attend chapel? In both
cases Ramsey has underestimated the security demands of
Category A prisoners. It is, however, equally unreason­
able to argue that Category A prisoners have rejected and
will reject religion. Despite the incident at Durham
Prison's security wing chapel, the argument treats indivi­
duals as a statistic and is difficult to square with the
facts. One final criticism: Ramsey's dependence upon
commissions and committees to provide answers is difficult
to defend--at least to the lengths that Ramsey takes it.
It would be difficult to reckon the optimum number of such
committees in each decade; one each year would seem too
frequent, because the sort of problems that could arise in
that span can be handled without resort to a 'high-powered
inquiry'; perhaps twice in that ten year period would be
about right, but then one could not depend much on the
administrative help provided by such commissions. I am not ruling out his suggestion—as far as it goes it is helpful at bringing together diverse approaches. But merely from the perspective of time, while the commission meets for two weeks per decade, the crucial day-to-day running of prisons by administration and staff on hand must continue throughout the ten years. For this fundamental task commissions are simply too bulky, too comprehensive. As a result, most commissions—like Ramsey's own committee on punishment—are much more adept at raising inconclusive questions than providing general guidelines, let alone crucial, on-the-spot decisions.

On the whole, however, Ramsey's treatment of the problems of punishment deserves praise for its unyielding confidence and positive vision in the midst of Ramsey's ability to stare most facts in the face. On one side Ramsey avoids falling into liberal optimism by insisting on the retributive aspects of punishment, and by stressing the need for tight security. But his suggestions battle against the pessimistic tendency to treat prisoners in a dehumanising manner by emphasising the moral treatment due to all persons. He is neither drawn in by this pessimism, nor imprisoned by its reductionism.
Euthanasia

Few issues in social ethics commanded Ramsey's continuous involvement as did euthanasia. He contributed to both pamphlets of the Church Assembly Board for Social Responsibility published a decade apart, (1965 and 1975). He chaired the committee for the second of the two publications (On Dying Well) until his death. He also spoke on the subject, addressing medical, academic, and political audiences.¹

There is neither the space nor the necessity of expositing the two Board for Social Responsibility publications. Much of the legal discussion and case studies would do little to aid our understanding of Ramsey's ethical method in this area. Nonetheless a few helpful points of both similarities and differences between the two must be considered. Decisions about Life and Death (henceforth Life and Death) begins by introducing the moral problems directly. Questions are raised such as: How far is medicine expected to go to prolong life? To what extent is sympathy for the patient compromised by learning from the patient's illness while maintaining his existence by extreme measures? Who ought to make such a decision to bring about the end of a patient's life?

In contrast, On Dying Well (1975) begins by narrating four cases which seem to advocate legal tolerance of voluntary euthanasia. For the ethicist, this procedure lessens the tendency to deal with the issue in the abstract. True
to Ramsey's empirical-exploratory ethics the approach is firmly grounded in experience before moving onto any critical analyses. For the layman, the approach has the advantage of drawing him or her into the problems without alienating or intimidating the layman with sophisticated questions distilled from lengthy analyses of principles and data.²

A second difference between the two is manifested in the ethical approaches used to answer the questions raised. Life and Death is sensitive to the difficulties then current with ethics themselves. In a time of competing values, Life and Death considered euthanasia from a traditional Christian approach, from a Utilitarian approach, and then provided some constructive criticism of both. In On Dying Well, however, this ambivalence is gone and the method is firmly tied to the empirical-exploratory method. The difference in moral approach is largely due, no doubt, to a changing philosophical atmosphere (from 1965 to 1975) in which religious ethics was less subject to the stifling criteria of empiricist claims. In any case, for the layman, On Dying Well provides a more secure stand by eliminating the philosophical battles of an earlier era.

Despite these contrasts, the positions taken on euthanasia by the two committees are essentially uniform. Life and Death indicates two values to be preserved: 1. the value of human life, and 2. the value and dignity of human death. Life and Death holds that the withdrawal of extreme means to maintain the life of the cerebrally
dead, or the denial of antibiotics to a hopelessly coma­tose patient might enhance the value of death. But these measures are seen as passive co-operation. *Life and Death* explicitly rejects the possibility of actively aiding the process of dying. Whereas, *Life and Death* claims, a Utilitarian would find it reasonable to aid the process when recovery was deemed impossible, the Christian is forced to draw the line between passive co-operation and deliberate activity to end the patient's life. ³

This position is refined in *On Dying Well*. After reviewing the legal situation, *On Dying Well* states its objection to the phrase 'right to die'. ⁴ *On Dying Well* pinpoints three distinct situations to which this might refer: ¹. that the patient has the right to decide when to live and when to die; and if he chooses to die he has the right to enlist the aid of the medical profession in that aim; ². that doctors should be enabled to end the life of a patient when control of pain is no longer possible; and ³. that (a) a patient in extremis should not be subjected to distress-causing treatments which cannot restore health, but merely prolong existence, and (b) doctors can use pain-killing drugs even at the risk of shortening life. The objections raised by the committee to 'the right to die' expose the vague meaning of the phrase. (1) involves a greater scale of deliberate killing than (2). (3), however, does not involve deliberate killing. *On Dying Well* argues that in (3b) the doctor is practicing indirect euthanasia but not strictly voluntary euthanasia.
Life and Death drew a contrast between the Utilitarian approach which assumes that humanity has the responsibility of deciding when to live and when to die, and the Christian view which holds that life is a gift from God. On Dying Well further clarifies the position of Life and Death by arguing that human responsibility is not to be denied, but that in the specific case of the process of dying the burden of choice is too great. As in the case of suicide, a decision for voluntary euthanasia would be closer to defiance of God than acceptance of his grace. Insofar as death signifies man's absolute dependence upon God, dying ought to be passively accepted.

It is at this point in the line of thought that On Dying Well departs radically from Life and Death. Whereas Life and Death used an occasional example to illustrate a point, On Dying Well uses case histories as a platform or foundation for the discussion. Thus On Dying Well returns to the case studies to make suggestions about actual situations. Each of four cases which seem to demand voluntary euthanasia out of compassion is reconsidered for positive alternatives. The committee writes that a comment like "I wish I were dead" often makes a plea that one's living situation be improved. Hence a series of further case histories--equally hopeless, but with better care, and a more positive approach--seem to confirm the moral guidelines set out by the committee for passive cooperation with the process of dying.
Certainly the committee can be accused of 'stacking the deck', of contriving the sequence of case histories. But the examples do not seek to prove the point; rather, they serve as the empirical platform for discussion. Both groups of examples are open to points which oppose or support voluntary euthanasia. Also, the number of examples allows the committee to acknowledge the exceptional cases in which voluntary euthanasia would be morally justifiable. Yet these cases do not occur in sufficient number to warrant the legalisation of voluntary euthanasia. *On Dying Well* concludes:

1. such cases are very few, and would be fewer still if medical, and in particular hospital, practices were sounder;

2. a change in the law would reduce the incentive to improve these practices;

3. the legalisation of euthanasia would place some terminal, and even non-terminal, patients under pressure to allow themselves to be put away—a pressure which they should be spared;

4. it would also, in practice, be likely to result in recourse to euthanasia in cases in which it was far from morally justifiable, and performed for unsound reasons;

5. in the rare cases (if such there are) in which it can be justified morally, it is better for medical men to do all that is necessary to ensure peaceful dying, and to rely on the flexibilities in the administration of the laws which even now exist, than to legalise euthanasia, (which would have to be subject to rigid formalities and safeguards) for general use;

6. although there may be some patients whose relationship with their doctor would not suffer, we believe that for
the great majority of patients their confidence in doctors would be gravely weakened. (p. 62)

In reviewing the legal situation, On Dying Well pointed out that the relevant bills were rejected in 1936 and 1969. The major difference between the two bills is that the 1969 bill allows the individual to declare in advance a desire for voluntary euthanasia if he or she had an illness which caused distress or rendered the patient incapable of rational existence, AND was thought to be incurable. The 1969 bill had added the phrase 'or rendered him incapable of rational existence' to the wording of the 1936 criteria. Likewise the term 'incurable' signified a shift from the 1936 bill, which required that the disease be thought to be 'fatal'.

In his 1969 speech to the House of Lords on euthanasia, Ramsey addressed his comments specifically to the written declaration of a desire for voluntary euthanasia. Ramsey's objection to the provision is that while it might seem appropriate in the 'cool hour at Westminster' the legal declaration would create more problems than it would solve in different circumstances. Here again Ramsey adroitly tempers the theoretical optimum with harsh reality. He searches by this means for a path that is less spectacular theoretically, but more promising from a practical viewpoint; and ultimately, a course which is more fruitful.

His greatest concern is about the ways in which such legislation might be applied. While the provision is
intended to allow for those who might want to make a declaration of their wishes in the event of incurable illness, Ramsey fears that the legalisation of some action is often seen as encouragement, indeed, as the prescription of a duty. A second concern involves the discrepancy between the individual's state of mind at the time of signing the declaration, and at some later time when debilitating illness sets in.\textsuperscript{5}

Beyond the pressures on individuals, Ramsey points to the burden such a declaration would place on the medical profession. The patient might demand that the doctor act at a time which the doctor feels is premature; or the relatives might plead with the doctor not to honour the wishes of the patient. Regardless of circumstances, suspicions would be an inherent factor. Yet another concern voiced by Ramsey is that most often it would be the nurse who would be called upon to administer the drug.

Ramsey closes his speech to the House of Lords with four positive suggestions: 1. He points to the need for education about drugs and terminal illnesses. 2. Likewise there is a great need to improve the care of the old and those with terminal illnesses. Attacking this problem, Ramsey believes, will greatly lessen the number of those who wish for voluntary euthanasia. 3. Medical education ought to give greater attention to the medical social problems for which there should be training. 4. If there is any doubt about the legality of indirect euthanasia (the withdrawal of extreme measures or choosing pain-
killing over life-extending drugs) this confusion ought to be clarified.

In an address delivered to the British Medical Association in April 1972, Ramsey explicitly traces the application of his ethical method to euthanasia. Such moral dilemmas are the medical type of a more general social problem: How to provide moral direction for powerful technology when morality is itself under attack? As he does with other issues, Ramsey begins with the empirical data—in this case medical techniques, new experiments, progress in understanding, etc. From his examination of prima facie medical concerns, Ramsey filters out the moral pre-suppositions, the ideals, the principles involved.

As an example Ramsey considers the principle of respect for life. The principle must be defined as clearly as possible. Obviously, only respect for human life is relevant to this issue. The principle can be defined further by specifying that we mean by human something more than a biologically functioning unit of the species Homo Sapiens Sapiens. Here one's interpretation of personality becomes significant.

Likewise the meaning of 'life' can be explained in more depth. The question of when life ends becomes important. Here Ramsey demonstrates his sensitivity to developments in medical understanding by suggesting that a multi-parameter approach be applied to the question. Rather than talk of pulse, or respiration as isolated
indicators, Ramsey suggests a numerical measure based on scores on five standards: (a) cerebral (EEG), (b) cardiac (ECG), (c) character of reflex actions, (d) respiratory behaviour, and (e) circulation details. The concept requires more work, but it does provide an improved estimation of the survival possibilities of borderline patients. It is, in a preliminary way, an answer to the question of life or death which Life and Death had raised seven years earlier. At the very least these suggestions of Ramsey demonstrate ways of clarifying key principles.

But in approaching euthanasia Ramsey is not content to rest with the clarification of key principles. He explains that in some situations this would be all that would be needed for clear moral direction. Other situations require a number of principles. But a few are problematic; and for these the empirical-exploratory method is ideally suited. In these cases the prima facie pre-suppositions conflict. A basic example in the dilemma of euthanasia is the delicate balance between the respect for life and a sense of an honourable and dignified death. While the prolongation of life is a worthy pursuit, it must be matched with an admonition against using desperate measures which neglect the personal needs of the patient.

Here the distinctive Christian attitude towards death is raised by Ramsey. The idea of a death in which one finds the grace of God means that death is not something to be avoided at all costs. Rather, it is consistent with the
created order; something for which we can, and ought to, prepare. But Ramsey concedes that if we did believe that death annihilates all, we might choose to prolong life whatever the costs, whatever the quality of that life.

Euthanasia focussed for Ramsey the moral problems raised by developing technology. Certainly it demonstrates his empirical-exploratory method to its best advantage. In euthanasia Ramsey finds a problem especially suited to an approach which is grounded in empirical data and human experience. The method handles euthanasia with sensitivity rather than with ease. It shows that the problem is knotty, but capable of yielding answers to reasonable approaches.

On the other hand, euthanasia reveals certain weaknesses of the method. Although it is sensitive and reasonable, one searches in vain for a direct 'yes' or 'no' to a closely defined question of voluntary euthanasia. Ramsey's personal opposition to a deliberate ending of a patient's life can be gleaned from his comments to the House of Lords and the British Medical Association. But the method itself grants too much—many would charge—to empirical details and competing principles. It is significant that On Dying Well ignores the question of the exact moment of death, without detracting from the handling of euthanasia. Ramsey, on the other hand, becomes involved in multi-parameter criteria and technical medical procedure. This over-sensitivity to empirical data results in a digression from the major questions of euthanasia which obscures the crucial moral priorities.
Likewise many would object to his concessions to competing principles. Some would argue that the layman requires sharp direction rather than the intricate mazes a professor might devise for his students. In this sense, Ramsey's consideration of the logical ramifications of the belief that death is final is misleading and unnecessary. If we are to approach euthanasia from a Christian standpoint, the pre-supposition that death is final would seem to be excluded.

But not everyone would agree with these criticisms—some would, in fact, see some of these points as actual strengths of the method. There are some situations for which a single principle provides sharp moral direction; and, in fact, there are situations for which the empirical-exploratory method gives sharp direction. But the complexities of the euthanasia problem exclude any easy, direct approach. The empirical data, and human experience, is too multi-faceted; and too many key principles are in conflict. Because of his concern for the empirical data, Ramsey's conclusions are conservative rather than spectacular. But they are both reasonable: (being developed through a systematic method) and capable of being put into practice (as they are developed with actual experience in mind). Likewise Ramsey's tolerance of divergent pre-suppositions is actually cautious, lest a valid principle be unjustly ignored. This makes the process a difficult rather than a direct one. But it is more likely to gain sympathy in medical, academic, political bodies,
and other social arenas not characterized by specifically Christian pre-suppositions. Certainly one might follow the method and conclude that voluntary euthanasia was morally justifiable. But at least the empirical-exploratory approach would build some common ground from which to examine the theoretical and experiential terrain crossed in reaching such a conclusion.
Conclusion

My copy of Religious Language is a fairly well-thumbed paperback which I bought in 1976. There was a stack of them, equally worn, in Haslam's New and Used Books back in the section for used religious books. I suppose it might be reading too much into that pile of paperbacks to infer that the book, its thesis, even its author, are considered passe by the current theological and philosophical communities. But it is a haunting image and a sad evaluation of the book's worth. It is certainly true that particular aspects of Ramsey's work were directed towards now-defunct philosophical issues. One purpose of this thesis has been to distinguish these elements of Ramsey's work from his contributions of enduring value to Christian ethics.

In the theoretical section above, key concepts were isolated for examination under epistemological, experiential, linguistic, and ethical categories. While this fragmentation may have been analytically helpful, it was also potentially distortive. Here some attempt at integration is necessary. Studying disclosures as an epistemological concept can be a sharp critical approach, but it can also divert our attention from the point of the concept in the whole of Ramsey's scheme. This example reveals a basic difficulty in trying to analyse any particular concept: Ramsey was an apologist. His description and usage of basic concepts must be seen in relation to
his specific audience. His remarks about religious discourse or theological methodology will exhibit a different point when addressed to 'cultured despisers' from that addressed to theologians. Likewise, the specific use Ramsey intended for a concept in each context must be considered. In this sense what he meant by disclosures in a discussion of religious experience is somewhat different from his intended meaning of the term in a linguistic or ethical context. I am not implying that Ramsey was inconsistent, but stressing the importance of the particular audience and context he was addressing for any examination of his work. In what follows then, I will briefly review Ramsey's contributions in terms of their significant functions in specific contexts. I will conclude with some integrative comments about Ramsey's insights into Christian ethical methodology.

As I have argued above if we approach the concept of disclosures from an epistemological perspective, it is empty; it is too vague. Secondly, when applied to religious experience it has seemed either too common or too rare. Regarding the first criticism, endless examples of disclosures will not suffice to clarify their epistemological functions. The concept stands in need of the support which I have suggested might be supplied by Michael Polanyi. Polanyi's concepts of indwelling and tacit knowing provide a much-needed experiential foundation for Ramsey's disclosures. Both Ramsey's disclosures and Polanyi's comprehension exhibit a strong empiricist bias
as both rely upon an experiential backdrop. Although Ramsey disputes the vectorial character of Polanyi's tacit knowing, the complementary aspects of their work form a fruitful marriage in the field of religious epistemology.

The second criticism, however (that disclosures are either too common or too rare), is self-contradictory. Here the disclosure concept has the advantage of being particular enough to apply to a learning situation like finding the right piece in a jig-saw puzzle, or coming to know a person. Yet, it is universal enough to provide insights into epistemology in general. As Butler's probability extended from matters of speculation to those of great consequence, so disclosures can be as trivial as solving a puzzle or as profound as a cosmic disclosure.

Such epistemological criticisms, however, tend to obscure the theoretical point of the disclosure concept, viz., to draw attention to the kinds of human experiences that give religious language its point, its claim to meaningfulness. The disclosure experience is the key link in Ramsey's explorations towards a fruitful criterion of meaning for religious language. Thus, the disclosure concept was not intended as a complete epistemology of faith, but as a cog in a linguistic criterion of meaning.

From another perspective, a theological one, the concept of disclosures has important implications for doctrines of revelation. When the epistemological disclosure concept is applied to this doctrine, Ramsey stands in stark contrast to traditional views of revelation such as
those that flatly reject natural theology or those that view revelation from a propositional perspective. Considered in relation to these, the firm empirical grounding of disclosures is original. As I have argued this grounding supplies a large area of commonality for communicating the disclosure or revelation experience to persons without a theistic world-view. Yet the empirical elements are not so great as to reduce faith to a knowledge of spatio-temporal phenomena. The facts of the situation are neither conclusive evidence for, nor irrelevant to, a reasonable commitment of faith.

In terms of religious experience, disclosures are meant to be mentally receptive—passive rather than active. Because a disclosure is dependent on some external, objective certainty, the concept is both fitting in the theological context of revelation and extremely sensitive to the empiricist tradition. However, while the concept is both helpfully passive and firmly anchored in experience, it does not sell out to an outmoded fact-value dichotomy. His five criteria for reasonable commitment and his interpretation of religious language along the lines of the 'evocative function' evince a concern for a sufficiently broad range of human experience—a scope that defies the constrictions of the verification criterion. Thus the disclosure concept is a cornerstone of an understanding of our apprehension of the 'beyond in the midst' far preferable to those views that distinguish empirical fact from religious value.
Nonetheless, in his five criteria for reasonable commitment, Ramsey exhibits similarities to Hick's formula (x must make a difference); the two are closer than many would suppose. Although not all pro- and contra-factors involved in a decision of faith are measurable, verifiable, or even fully describable, religious experience and commitment are never entirely devoid of such phenomena. Hick, however, remains within the confines of strict empiricism insofar as the difference implied by his formula is empirically defined. Further, this difference provides for Hick conclusive evidence in support of some commitment. This framework rules out a realm of experience for which empirical data, while not insignificant, are hardly conclusive. Ramsey, like Wisdom and Mitchell, is more concerned with mapping this experiential area in which the difference made by x is not reducible to empirical terms. He is less intimidated by boundaries marked by inadequate verificationist criteria of meaning. Ramsey's contribution to our understanding of religious experience gives proper significance to the kinds of experience which are better characterised by choice and commitment than by accumulated data and statistical probabilities.

When we turn to consider the articulation of religious experience, Ramsey's strengths as an analytical philosopher shine, but so do his limitations as a theologian. As a post-positivist philosopher of religious language, Ramsey was a pioneer. His insights into the logic of religious discourse exhibit a fine balance between visions of
transcendent mystery and empirical anchorage. Theologians who ignored the challenge of empiricism would find Ramsey's explorations too conservative, too confined by an oppressive definition of meaningfulness. Radical empiricists, on the other hand, would find his understanding of religious language reckless. But, at the very least, his mapping of the evocative logic of religious assertions provides a firm foundation for future theological discourse.

The cornerstone concept, the qualified model, is a sharp analytical tool for unravelling the webs of religious discourse. It is the linguistic counterpart to his balanced view of experience. Further, in his concentration on the evocative functions of models, Ramsey's own practice is remarkably consistent with his theory. In his own use of models throughout Religious Language and elsewhere, Ramsey is chiefly concerned to evoke in the reader an appropriation of some insight; whether into experience, method, language, or ethics. Here again, the model concept is aimed at the articulation of experience marked by commitment rather than conclusive data.

Ramsey's understanding of religious language along the lines of the qualified model results in his call for a tentative approach to theologising. Here he is far more a theological technician than a systematic theologian. As a philosophical point, the necessarily tentative character of religious discourse is commendable. It is the consistent application of his claim that there are no guaranteed articulations of disclosures to his understanding
of religious language. But its theological ramifications give cause for concern. The basic problem is the way that this understanding distances Ramsey from the ordinary believer. Ramsey sees religious assertions as 'evocative'; the ordinary believer sees them as descriptive statements of fact. Although Ramsey is certainly correct in his claim that to speak descriptively of God is bound to result in talk that is blasphemous, this does not solve the problem of the breach between analytic philosopher and believer in the pew. However, the rift is mitigated by a better understanding of Ramsey's position. He does not deny descriptive force to religious assertions entirely, but stresses the key logical force of them, i.e., as the evocation of disclosures. Theologically this is close to that understanding of revelation which finds objective certainty in the Word of God, which is distinguished from human articulation of that revelation.

A second theological shortcoming—one in which I believe Ramsey was too cautious—is that his advocacy of the evocative function neglects other important forces carried by religious discourse. Praising, for example, is one religious language game which is not primarily descriptive, but whose logical force can be misunderstood if approached from Ramsey's logical analysis. That there may be some evocative force is not in doubt, but to analyse "Thine is the kingdom, the power, and the glory" from an evocative perspective before all others is potentially distortive. Perhaps this is because evocation, like
description, can be best mapped from within an epistemological context. But though epistemology might have been an appropriate arena for Ramsey's battle with the verificationists, there are more suitable contexts for mapping religious language games which are not primarily evocative. Praise, like supplication, confession, and other games, is not primarily epistemological, but personal, spiritual, emotional. Perhaps all that is needed is to approach these diverse games from an evocative perspective which is not epistemologically weighted. But Ramsey does not take such a course.

This said, however, an evocative analysis of religious language is far preferable to flat, descriptive interpretations. Though his interpretation may seem narrow in its reliance on one logical force, it is a fruitful methodological tool in tracing logical paths through confusing claims to a more lucid articulation of Christian beliefs. Ramsey humbly summed up his work in religious language:

It may seem that I have only stressed the obvious, and in one sense I grant that what I have said is something whose conclusions everybody knew all along. But what I have tried to do as a frontiersman, constantly challenged to give a reason for the faith that is in me, is to give such an account of the language we habitually use as makes it appear to the unbeliever less of a jungle of criss-crossed verbiage than it is wont to do. What I have tried to do has been to try to show better how we have been talking when we have been talking theologically and to suggest points where it would have been better if we had stopped. And here, for the moment, I do. (CE, p. 97).

Turning to Ramsey's work in ethics, we find a curious mix of revolutionary methodology and antiquated schemes.
Although his explorations into the autonomy of ethics and his deontological framework may seem outdated, Ramsey's writings in these areas are not without their value for current theological ethics. As I noted in the ethics section above, Ramsey develops deontological ethics to a fine statement—one which is extremely sensitive to the empiricists' demand for meaningful discourse. Here the concept of disclosures proves to be a valuable tool in the metaethical inquiry into the sources and operations of moral insight. When the disclosure of a moral duty is aided by Butler's concept of probability, the resulting ethical methodology is both reasonable and consistent with empiricism. It is reasonable because, like Ramsey's five criteria for reasonable commitment, 'probability' demonstrates the need for decisive action despite a lack of conclusive evidence. It is consistent with empiricism because Ramsey's disclosure of a moral duty exhibits the same drive for external certainty in ethical experience as the empiricist seeks in spatio-temporal phenomena.

Ramsey's discussion of the autonomy of ethics provides some interesting views of the relationship between Christian faith and moral insight and activity. From a metaethical perspective, faith, and seeing moral duty as God's will, is merely 'lateral enrichment'; not an integral part of ethical method, but an optional broadening of the picture. The linguistic counterpart is again Ramsey's model concept—to speak of a moral duty as God's will is to use a qualified model with the eccentric logic
characteristic of religious language games. Here, however, a dangerous discrepancy develops within Ramsey's work. In his attempt to reconstruct an empirically chastened metaphysics, Ramsey stressed the integrating functions of certain models; metaphysics is used to categorise and integrate experience. Turning to religious language, Ramsey stressed the integrating functions of 'God'. But though the integrating work of ethics is acknowledged in the function of principles, the theological input is seen as mere 'lateral enrichment', an optional broadening. Perhaps in ethics the term, 'God', must be seen as an integrating term for social norms. But it is more likely that Ramsey was unable to apply his insights into the integrating functions of God-talk in metaphysics to ethical discourse. Thus he found it necessary to accept the claim of philosophy that morality is independent from religion. His advocacy of the autonomy of ethics—itsel itself a fairly defunct philosophical issue—is one element of his work in ethics which is clearly passé.

This said, Ramsey's analytical explorations into the relationship of God and ought, of God's will and the discernment of a moral claim, are far preferable to those radical deontologists who conflate the two and run slipshod over the logical distinction advocates of the autonomy of ethics were concerned to establish. What can be salvaged from his analytical work in ethics is his sharp critique of the simplistic logic often employed by moral theologians in their identification of God's will
and duty. The positive value that might be gained by an application of his concept of the qualified model to ethical discourse is left by Ramsey for some one else to draw out. If the eccentric evocative logic of religious moral discourse were elucidated, it could provide logical mapping of a theological ethics which would not jeopardise the logical distinctiveness of ethical discourse, would not conflate duty and God's will.

Turning from the analytical, meta-ethical aspects to Ramsey's own ethical methodology, his value as a Christian ethicist becomes clear. To assess his work in the connections between theory and practice is to assess Ramsey's 'empirical-exploratory' method. Here his insights into religious experience, his disclosure concept, and his linguistic expertise crystallise into a powerful and highly original ethics. Originally, in beginning my research, I had planned to present Ramsey's doctrinal positions, to offer a sketch of his systematic theology. After having set this out, I would have demonstrated his method of applying these doctrinal positions to ethical issues. This would have been a straightforward tracing of the connections between theory and practice. But then the empirical-exploratory approach asserted itself as the centre of the thesis. Such a straightforward linking of theory and practice as I had envisioned is not Ramsey's way of doing moral theology, of applying his faith.

Basic to Ramsey's ethical method is the ethical disclosure. Just as other disclosures—and especially cosmic
ones—are comprised of a matching of the objectivity of that which declares itself to us with the subjective response of commitment, so an ethical disclosure is marked by a moral claim and a matching commitment to a moral response. Certainly Ramsey, as a chastened deontologist, is more comfortable in the context of the objective disclosure of a duty; while I am more concerned to emphasise the existential elements inherent in the moral response. But this is not to imply that Ramsey has nothing to offer in the latter context. Indeed, in Freedom and Immortality Ramsey stresses the ways in which the individual can 'author' a moral claim.

But whether one stresses the objective disclosure of a moral claim or the personal elements in a committed response, the distinctive mark of Ramsey's ethics is his sensitivity to the empirical anchorage of ethical situations. Ramsey refuses to do ethics in a theoretical vacuum. He recognises that it is when principles are developed rationally, without granting due significance to the facts of the situation, that the meaningless verbiage despised by the empiricists results. His ethical method is an activity that begins with a full account of the facts, then moves to ethical reasoning. This reasoning is itself limited by the empirical elements to ensure the practicality of resulting prescriptions. Finally, ethical activity is continuous, characterised by a return to the actual situation rather than enthusiastic rational development of a given solution. The metaphysical aspects serve
as a helpful guide, a map of terrain already traversed, to be used to generate further disclosures in actual moral dilemmas. These meta-physical elements are not intended to be a 'super-science' or a warehouse of ready-made solutions. Regarding the empirical side—the 'facts' of the situation—I must underscore the point made in the ethical section of the thesis that, for Ramsey, a comprehension of the facts of the situation is never value-free. His view of experience eliminates the possibility of examining a 'pure is' before attempting to posit an 'ought'.

Some implications for Christian ethics are clear: while I have charged that Ramsey was stifled within a deontological approach, his distance from radical deontologist theologians is obvious. He excoriates those who believe that their direct linking of preferred doctrines or verses to moral prescriptions is legitimate ethical method. Likewise, his insistence that God's will is to be found in the disclosure to those sensitive to the actual situation is far from those who rely upon the 'timeless ethical truths' of God's commandments (whatever a 'timeless ethical truth' might be). But perhaps the biggest contrast to too much of theological ethics is that Ramsey's empirical-exploratory approach is practical. Because of his systematic sensitivity to the empirical data, Ramsey's method is bound to be efficient at generating workable proposals for meeting ethical dilemmas.
While its grounding in empirical data (in the 'harsh facts' of the situation) make it an effective method, I believe the method has more significant implications for moral theology. Because the moral directive is contingent upon a moral disclosure, and the moral response upon personal involvement, ethics is not merely a matter of logically applying ideals or rationally inferring prescriptions from principles. Rather, ethics done by the empirical-exploratory method is an activity demanding discernment, commitment, and an involvement within the situation that draws the disclosure from the matrix of principles and empirical data, beliefs and facts, theory and practice. This means that a distinction between moral knowledge and moral practice is mistaken in the sense that moral knowledge is an activity. It prompts greater involvement within the social context being considered ethically as opposed to 'cool-hour objectivity'.

As it is not directly inferential, the empirical-exploratory method is to be welcomed in that no contribution is to be despised off-hand for being irrational. 'Rational' proposals might in fact be rejected for being unworkable, out of touch with the practicalities of the situation. A distinct advantage of the method is its inter-disciplinary basis, including the insights of the social sciences as well as incorporating biblical exegesis, Christian history, and systematic theology. Further, there is an explicit demand for contributions from non-academics. This inter-disciplinary approach is not
designed to further muddle an intricate process, but to generate proposals which are sensitive to the actual situation and are practical.

One final question remains: How consistently did Ramsey apply his theory to his practice? How closely does Ramsey's own work in social problems match his theoretical insights into ethical methodology? Certainly my own bias regarding the question is clear. The examples of social issues above were chosen partly for their success in demonstrating Ramsey's ethical method in actual practice. Each illustrates his initial concern for establishing a clear picture of the whole situation, as well as his continuing involvement in assessing the practicality of proposals. Some examples show his openness to contributions from all quarters, while others emphasise his anticipation of future developments. No evaluation of his contribution to Christian ethics could pretend to be final. Ultimately his worth as a thinker and a steward does not depend upon our judgment. We, like Ramsey, can only appropriate the prayer of the Psalmist as our own:

Establish thou the work of our hands upon us; yea, the work of our hands, establish thou it.
Appendix


ITR Notes Ramsey's personal note-folders, including both published and unpublished materials, available in the Archdeacon Sharp Library, the Library of Durham Cathedral.


OD On Dying Well, Church Information Office, 1975.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter One

1. There is a wealth of material in this area. See the bibliography, as well as the specific works cited in this chapter. For Ramsey's relation to the issue, see especially Jerry H. Gill, Ian Ramsey: To Speak Responsibly of God, London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1976.

2. This discussion of the development of empiricism if drawn from "Contemporary Empiricism", and "Facts and Disclosures", both in Jerry H. Gill, ed., Christian Empiricism, London: Sheldon Press, 1974, (henceforth CE). Also helpful was a lecture series given by Ramsey in Copenhagen, "Empiricism in England", which can be found in Ramsey's personal notes, (henceforth ITR Notes).


4. CE, p. 4.


10. CE, p. 6.


12. Ibid., p. 12, (in italics in the original).


14. CE + CP, p. 53.
15. CE + CP. p. 58, see further the footnote.

16. Ibid., pp. 61, 62.

17. Ibid., p. 68.


20. R. M. Hare, "Theology and Falsification", in Flew and MacIntyre, New Essays in Philosophical Theology, pp. 99-103.


24. Ibid., p. 96.

25. Obviously this issue must be dealt with in further depth. For the moment, however, Mitchell's parable illustrates a fundamental dichotomy: for the non-believer evil is a good reason not to believe. For the believer, it is an interesting issue because of its possible inroads into knowledge of God. For the non-believer it is a helpful tool in the destruction of claims for the existence of God; for the believer it is a challenge to his fundamental trust, as opposed to a denial of affirmed doctrines.


28. MacIntyre, Metaphysical Beliefs, p. 182.

29. In literature, this case is argued by Ivan Karamasov in Fyodor Dostoyevsky, The Brothers Karamasov, in the chapter, "Rebellion".

30. MacIntyre, Metaphysical Beliefs, p. 183.
Chapter Two


5. RL, pp. 28-29.


7. ITR, "On Understanding Mystery", *CE*, p. 66.


11. Ibid., p. 227.

12. ITR, "Facts and Disclosures", *CE*, p. 171.


16. Ibid., pp. 29-30.
17. Professor T. F. Torrance has kindly supplied me with a copy of this unpublished address, "The Place of Michael Polanyi in the Modern Philosophy of Science", p. 7.


19. See note 9, above, (this chapter).

20. Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, p. 36.


24. The address, "Facts and Disclosures", from which the following discussion is drawn, is published in CE, pp. 159-176.


29. See the discussion of the relationship of God and goodness below, chapters 6 and 7.


Chapter Three


4. Ibid., p. 19.

5. Ibid., p. 20.

6. Ibid., p. 21.


10. ITR, M + M, p. 34.

11. Ibid., p. 37.

12. ITR, "Talking of God: Models, Ancient and Modern", in CE, p. 120, n. 2.


15. ITR, MDA, p. 61.

16. ITR, CD, p. 82.

17. ITR, M + M, p. 53.

18. See further Paul Tillich, The Dynamics of Faith, New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1957, in which he speaks of faith in terms of 'ultimate concern'. Citing patriotism as a false 'ultimate concern', he points out that nationalist faith can be dislodged only by a more ultimate object of faith. It is interesting that Tillich here defends the ultimacy of God along lines very similar to ITR's defense of disclosures. For Tillich 'ultimate concerns' eventually break down because of their incapacity to get beyond an object of worship to a subject of activities directed towards man. Compare ITR's insistence that the objective reference is guaranteed by our awareness of being acted upon.

Chapter Four


2. ITR, "The Systematic Elusiveness of 'I'", CE, p. 22.


4. See R. B. Braithwaite's criticisms of Models and Mystery, and ITR's response in Theoria to Theory, vol. 1 1967, pp. 263-269. See further Robert C. Coburn's comment, quoted by ITR in "On Understanding Mystery", CE, p. 61: "It is 'far from obvious' claims Coburn, that 'the notion of facts which elude direct statement' makes sense."


6. ITR quotes Strawson in "Biology and Personality", CE, p. 34.

7. The 'hereby' test fails in the case of an utter­ance like "I state that I am a citizen of Great Britain". Here is a constative that makes sense in the 'I hereby state' form. See further the discussion of Austin's lin­guistic work and its implications for religious language in James Wm. McClendon, Jr., and James M. Smith, Understanding Religious Convictions, Notre Dame, IN (USA): University of Notre Dame Press, 1975. In the Intellect and Hope contribution ITR offers a possible criterion the transformation of performatives to first person in­dicative. "You are hereby warned" becomes "I am hereby warning you". Although this produces fruitful parallels with ITR's insights into first person logic, it, too, fails as a criterion, as "I hereby state that I am a citizen of Great Britain" demonstrates.

8. J. L. Austin, Philosophical Papers, p. 236.
My discussion of Austin follows closely that of McClendon and Smith, Understanding Religious Convictions, chapter 3.

From ITR, "Polanyi and Austin", Langford and Poteat, op. cit, p. 192. See further the Berkeley quotation empha­sised above, chapter 2, p. 46: "Notions and ideas were mutually implicating elements of every genuine assertion".
10. Here ITR refers the reader to W. Zuurdeeg, An Analytical Philosophy of Religion, London: 1959, also Nashville (USA): Abingdon, 1958. Briefly, Zuurdeeg sees convictional language as a distinct set, not reducible to indicative or emotive interpretations. In his review of the book (Hibbert Journal, vol. LVIII, no. 2, January 1960, pp. 192-193) ITR judged It to be an excellent attempt to grapple with the problems of the inter-relations of conviction sets. Zuurdeeg's attempt, which analytically examines the situational context surrounding convictional assertions, avoids "the pitfalls of imagined objectivity or convictional bias and apologetic".


12. Jerry Gill has kindly supplied me with a transcript of this discussion which took place in Seattle, WA (USA), 20 July, 1963—questions put to ITR by Dr. Gill.

13. Wisdom, Paradox and Discovery, p. 43.


18. Ibid., p. 126.


Chapter Five

1. ITR, M + M, pp. 16-17.

2. Just such a situation is depicted in Jean-Paul Sartre's play, "Dirty Hands". A member of a resistance party is suspected of accomplishing a difficult mission purely for reasons of personal jealousy. Ironically, though, he is vindicated, the party's treatment of the agent causes him to reject his original faith in the party.

3. ITR discusses this concept in RL, pp. 15 et seq., and also in Joseph Butler 1692-1752: Some Features of
his Life and Thought, Friends of the Dr. Williams Library Lecture no. 23, London: Dr. Williams' Trust, 1969.

4. ITR, quoting Butler, RL, p. 18.

5. The implications for ITR's metaphysics will be discussed in this chapter, while the links with his ethics will be picked up below, chapter 7. At this point I am chiefly concerned to describe the kind of commitment involved in faith and how it serves to connect theological assertions with human experience generally and personal experience in particular.


7. Ibid., p. 190.

8. Ibid., p. 192.

9. Ibid., p. 196.


11. It is true that ITR chides Wisdom (perhaps unfairly) for misconstruing the logic of Elijah's prayer. When Wisdom comments, "The existence of God is not an experimental issue in the way it was," ITR takes this to be an unfounded jibe at the work of science. Although Wisdom stresses that the facts are not irrelevant, this is not as sympathetic to the insights of science as ITR would urge. ITR can hold his position without sliding into a dichotomy of science and religion because he is more adept at illuminating the metaphysical aspects of science. Likewise his own metaphysics is supported by a science-affirming empirical anchorage. On the other hand, it is apparent that ITR has missed the boundary-breaking significance of Wisdom's insights into 'what kind of evidence counts for or against the existence of God'. This discussion, however, should not obscure my basic point: that ITR and Wisdom share the affirmation of mystery in showing ways of seeking to understand it without relying upon the future arrival of conclusive evidence.

12. Although Hick argues that his verification could occur on this earth, an intimate awareness of God's presence which excludes rational doubt is sufficiently foreign to this existence to make the verification conditions
other-worldly; and hence his meaningfulness criterion remains meaningless in this context.

13. ITR can be accused of a similar distortion in his discussion of natural law; (see below, Chapter 7).


Chapter Six


2. For a helpful discussion of the logical difficulties in relating goodness and God's will, see G. Stanley Kane, "The Concept of Divine Goodness and the Problem of Evil", Religious Studies, 1975, vol. 11, no. 1.

3. Against this charge of heteronomy, Tillich argues that obedience to the moral demand of the will of God is not heteronomous in that it is true to the inner law of our being. Obedience to this law is thus both internal and intrinsically binding. Hence Tillich claims that the moral demand is unconditional but not heteronomous. There are interesting parallels to ITR's subjective disclosure matched by an objective claim. See further, Paul Tillich, Theology of Culture, NY (USA): Galaxy Book, 1964.


6. These points are brought out from a different perspective by Brian A. Davies in "God and Language--Some Comments on the Meaningfulness of Theism", Downside Review, 1975, vol. 93, pp. 27-38. Davies argues that Maclagan's analytical criticisms of the application of words like 'will', 'command', etc. depend on the words' having a more precise meaning than they actually exhibit.

8. Nielsen appears to believe that he is being generous in allowing us to be clear about what God wills, (if God wills X), but he is actually assuming more than many theologians would allow. Such a direct revelation of God's will ignores the odd logic due to God's inscrutability and commits us to a deontological understanding of God and ought. If Nielsen cannot make this assumption his argument is wasted. Here ITR's insights into disclosures—that the articulation of a disclosure is never guaranteed, that cosmic disclosures are mediated through more direct disclosures—should cast doubt upon Nielsen's fundamental premise. That many Christians would accept this premise leaves them to sort out the logical webs that Nielsen is able to construct.

9. For a discussion of ITR's insights into the logical oddness of first-person utterances see above, ch. 5.

10. The quotation is from CE + CP, p. 144, emphasis mine. Stanley Kane argues in the above-mentioned article against those who understand 'God wills X' in any way that makes goodness external to God. He helpfully elucidates the logical complexity of 'God wills X' while denying the 'objective' interpretations of Brunner, Barth, Calvin, et al.

11. Des l'instant ou l'homme soumet Dieu au jugement moral, il le tui en lui-meme." (l'homme revolte, Gallimard, 1951, p. 83). Albert Camus, The Rebel, trans. by Anthony Bower, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1971, p. 57. Camus echoes the existentialist/nihilist tradition summed up in Stendhal's phrase, "The only excuse for God would be for him not to exist", which proclaims the ultimate failure of all theodicies. Camus' purposes are, however, somewhat different, as I shall try to show.


14. CE + CP, p. 130. J. R. Lucas' suggestion has the additional benefit of moving our discussion out of the constricting deontological perspective: But the fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, longsuffering, gentleness, goodness, faith, meekness, temperance: against which there is no law. (Gal. 5.22,23).


16. A. Of course the possibility remains that the individual, in judging God, will kill him in his heart,
and fall from courageous faith to unbelief. But faith must not be thought to make no demands on the passion (Kierkegaard) or courage (Tillich) of the intellectually honest. Compare criterion (d) of ITR's five criteria for reasonable commitment, CE, p. 198, above, ch. 5, pp. 124-125.

B. It may, however, be objected that the idea that man might judge God from human morality or justice is absurd. (See above, note 13). It is certainly not logical. But the judgment, the evaluation, is more a matter of attitude—loyalty, betrayal; trust, suspicion—than it is a question for ratiocination. It is an operation of the 'reasons of the heart'. The individual who has come this far will not secure his faith by the reasonable reflection that man has no place to stand from which to judge God good. Camus knew this much. A fundamental distrust will find such logic an evasion, as it begs the question. Rather, the individual might strengthen his faith in a reconsideration of his commitment along the lines of ITR's five criteria; or perhaps the paradox of God's will and the ethical will reawaken the passion of his original commitment.

17. "The Big Nurse tends to get real put out if something keeps her outfit from running like a smooth, accurate, precision-made machine. And she don't relax a hair till she gets the nuisance attended to—what she calls 'adjusted to surroundings' ... she wields a sure power that extends in all directions on hair-like wires too small for anybody's eye but mine; I see her sit in the centre of this web like a watchful robot, tend her network with mechanical insect skill ... What she dreams of there in the centre of those wires is a world of precision efficiency and tidiness like a pocket watch with a glass back." Ken Kesey, One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest, London: Picador, 1973, p. 27.


19. "It looks as though the way out from the confusing multiplicity of possible decisions is the path of duty. What is commanded is seized upon as being surest. Responsibility for the command rests upon the man who gives it and not upon him who executes it. But in this confinement within the limits of duty there can never come the bold stroke of the deed which is done on one's own free responsibility, the only kind of deed which can strike at the heart of evil and overcome it. The man of duty will end by having to fulfill his obligation to the devil," Ethics, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, London: SCM Press, Ltd., 1955. See also, "After Ten Years" in Letters and Papers from Prison, London: SCM Press, Ltd., 1953.

20. Two of the many sources that might be consulted are: S. Strauss, ed. The Social Psychology of George
Herbert Mead, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956; and Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1966. In the latter work Berger and Luckmann speak of 'reality-maintenance' by which they refer to the consistent, conventional background that sustains the subjective sense of reality and against which the self develops.

Chapter Seven

1. I believe that this is partly to be explained by the topic which focuses the relationship between God and ought on commands thus emphasising the deontological elements of religious ethics. ITR does attack the problem in Freedom and Immortality in the form: Is X my duty because it is God's will, or is it God's will because it is my duty. His response is that it is, in fact, a pseudo-question, since talk of God's will is 'lateral enrichment' and hence a more comprehensive way of saying the same thing. Although similar to Patterson Brown, it is more logically precise and thus avoids the difficulties raised by Kane. (See note 10 in ch. 6 above).

2. (See note 3, ch. 6 above).


4. See further, H. P. Owen, "Nature and Morality" in G. R. Dunstan, ed., Duty and Discernment, London: 1975. Owen offers an excellent discussion of the logical possibilities for interpretations of the relations between nature and morality. Owen's conclusions are far more sympathetic to natural law theories than I am; but perhaps this is due to the analytical character of his approach to the issue.


6. I shall pick up the relation of freedom to duty below in my discussion of Freedom and Immortality.


15. As such labels as 'empiricist' or 'rationalist' are limited in their application to ITR's philosophical foundation, so his ethics exhibits features which cannot be termed 'deontological'. (See Chapter Two, p. 37, above).


Chapter Eight


2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., col. 463.

4. Ibid., col. 465.


6. These aims were released to the newspapers along with the announcement of the formation of the committee. The statement of purposes in the form given here can be found in ITR Notes: Race Relations in South Africa, (Packet 2).

7. In addition to Bishop Ramsey, the delegation included: The Archbishop of York, Sir Robert Birley, Neil Wates, Sir Anthony Buzzard, and Mr. Alex Lyon, M. P. for York. Mr. Alex Lyon had a large share in the organisation of the committee and the delegation. Sir Anthony Buzzard, former director of naval intelligence, had
written to The Times advocating the strategic advantages of withholding arms from the Union of South Africa.

8. From ITR Notes, ("Race Relations in South Africa")

9. According to correspondence, this point was strongly suggested in a letter to Bishop Ramsey from the Archbishop of Canterbury.

10. From ITR Notes, a letter to T. W. Barnes, 9 January 1971.


13. Ibid., col. 1152.


17. ITR is here drawing upon a letter of Group Capt. G. H. Tebboth to The Times, 14 November 1970. Tebboth writes, "It seems to be forgotten by some of your contributors that most ... prison inmates are there because they volunteered to be there--no one compelled them to rob a bank, commit an assault, or embezzle." (p. 13).


19. Ibid., col. 595.

20. Ibid., col. 597. (a copy of Jimmy O'Connor's article in TV Times is contained in ITR Notes: Punishment)

21. Ibid.


23. This point was suggested to Archbishop Ramsey by a Roman Catholic woman who had worked in prisons and was discouraged by the failure of the church to speak out on the situation.

Chapter Nine

1. ITR was also involved in the 1959 publication of the Church Assembly Board for Social Responsibility, Ought Suicide to be a Crime? London: Church Information Office. Also relevant is an address "Moral Problems Facing the Medical Profession at the Present Time", the Inaugural Lecture at the 15th Annual Meeting of the British Medical Association, Nicosia, Cyprus, 12 April 1972. See further his speech to the House of Lords, Hansard, 25 March 1969, cols. 1179-1185.

2. The significance of the layman's involvement will be clarified in discussing his speech to the House of Lords, below, p. 223.

3. Church Assembly Board for Social Responsibility, Decisions about Life and Death, (henceforth L & D), London: Church Information Office, 1965. L & D allows the possibility of prescribing pain-killing drugs which may shorten the life of the patient as a side effect, but stops short of condoning voluntary, active euthanasia.

4. The use of the word 'right' brings the moral discussion of 'active' or 'passive' cooperation into a context which is more directly legal.

5. One of the more powerful examples in OD is of a man who, already ill, declared his wish to die when he degenerated to the point of a patient who was in the next bed. Yet doctors stated that the man's will to live survived long after he had reached the condition of the other patient.

6. "Moral Problems Facing the Medical Profession at the Present Time".

7. ITR gained this insight from correspondence with Dr. Vincent I. Collins, Director of the Division of Anesthesiology, Cook County Hospital, Chicago, IL (USA) (Included in ITR Notes: Euthanasia).

Chapter Ten

1. See Chapter 2, p. 37ff above.

2. See Chapter 2, pp. 56-60, above.

Selected Bibliography of Ian Ramsey's Published Works


Review of K. Barth, Church Dogmatics II (Doctrine of God Part I) Modern Churchman, NS, vol. 1, no. 4, April 1958, pp. 254-256.


Ian Ramsey played a major part in the group which produced the Report The Family in Contemporary Society (1958) one of the preparatory reports for the 1958 Lambeth
Conference. This working party was officially sponsored by the Church of England Moral Welfare Council which was at that time in the process of integration into the Board of Social Responsibility.


Religion and Science: Conflict and Synthesis (first given in 1960 as the fourth in the series of Annual Theological Lectures arranged by the Church of Ireland in the Queen's University, Belfast), SPCK, London, 1964.


Models and Mystery (reply by Ian Ramsey to a discussion by R. B. Braithwaite, J. Millar and T. Bastin), *Theoria to Theory*, vol. 1, 1967, pp. 263-269.


*Joseph Butler 1692-1752, Some Features of his Life and Thought* (Friends of the Dr. Williams' Library Lectures 23), Dr. Williams' Trust, London, 1969.

'Pop and Revelation', *New Directions*, vol. 1, no. 1, 1969.


'On Not Being Judgemental', (the 3rd Margaret Allen Memorial Lecture delivered in Edinburgh to the Scottish Pastoral Association, November 1969), *Contact,*


The Miners' Gala 1971 (copy of the speech made by I. T. Ramsey at the Miners' Gala, Durham, 17 July 1971), *The Bishoprick*, vol. 46, no. 4, August 1971, pp. 52-60.


'Moral Problems Facing the Medical Profession at the present Time', Inaugural Lecture at the 15th Annual Meeting of the British Medical Association, Nicosia, Cyprus, 12 April 1972.

'Crisis of Faith' (an address to the Church Leader's Conference in Birmingham, September 1972), *Theoria to Theory*, vol. VI, 1972, pp. 23-38.


Ian Ramsey participated in committees under the Board of Social Responsibility. These produced the following pamphlets, published by the Church Information Office, London:

Ought Suicide to be a Crime, 1959.


Abortion, 1965.

Decision about Life and Death, 1965.


In addition to the published works above, there is a wealth of unpublished material in the care of the Library of Durham Cathedral. The following list of selected note folders includes those cited in the footnotes:

"Abortion"

"Empiricism in England" (1960 Lecture tour in Copenhagen)

"Experience and Personality" (1949 unpublished manuscript)

"Euthanasia"

"Fact, Metaphysics and God" (unpublished manuscript)

"The Family" (prepared for Lambeth, 1968)

"The Fourth R" (details of commission on religious education)

"Industrial Relations"

"Lecture Notes" (a number of academic notes from Oxford)

"Punishment"

"Race Relations I, II, and III"

"The Zenos Lectures"
Bibliography

Secondary Sources Cited


-- an unpublished transcript of a discussion between Dr. Gill and Ian Ramsey 20 July 1963, in Seattle, WA (USA).


Torrance, T. F., "The Place of Michael Polanyi in the Modern Philosophy of Science" (Unpublished address).


