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MCDougall's HORMIC THEORY AND ITS INFLUENCE ON SUBSEQUENT PSYCHOLOGICAL THOUGHT

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PART III

HOMIC THEORY, ITS IMPLICATIONS AND THE

IMPACT ON SUBSEQUENT PSYCHOLOGY
CHAPTER IX

FURTHER ANALYTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

1 Various Spheres Within The Concept of Hormé

It will serve the purpose to consider some more features of McDougall's hormic system. He repeatedly raised questions which, though different in wording, tend to be similar in nature. In all cases, however, the purport is to affirm a point or to clarify an issue. He asked, for example, "What are the nature and extent of the innate bases of the mind? What are the nature and extent of the conative bases?" (1) This may justify quoting Smith (1960a), the earnest critic (B. B. Wolman 1965), who has specified that, "The potential range of behaviour embraced within the system of McDougall's system is immense and, in consequence, the number of hypotheses suggested is large and many of them have proved to be testable." (3)

(1) An outline of Psychology, op cit, p 449

(2) Contemporary Theories and Systems in Psychology, New York, Harper and Raw, op cit, p 183

(3) Explanation of Human Behaviour, op cit, p 185
Smith's observation makes amply clear that the hormic theory is intended to be a theory of wide connotations. There is within its context a hierarchy of closely interrelated hypotheses which vary as to their closeness to observation, generality and the degree of confirmation. Subjects like mind-body relationship, animism and monadism, for example, constitute a difficult field which McDougall endeavoured to treat hormically. Being trained in the anatomy and physiology of the brain, McDougall actually attempted to formulate a psychophysiological creed that could provide the literature with concepts and hypotheses to account for a wide range of psychological insights. Such a step represents probably an important turning point in the history of modern psychology.

Fundamentally, the purposeful, hormic point of view is opposed to what McDougall called the "high and dry theorists" who hold that physiology and psychology must be kept strictly apart as independent disciplines. He seemed to have been of the opinion that psychological conceptions cannot and must not be replaced by neuro-physiological aspects, yet, to use Hebb's (1960) words, an inextricable liaison between the two universes of

(4) 'The Sources and Direction of Psycholo-physical Energy', Amer J Insanity, vol 69, (1913), p 861
discourse,\(^{(5)}\) ought to be maintained. In point of fact, McDougall substantially distinguished between the processes and functions of the brain, the matter, and mind, the abstract. In this connection, Hebb\(^{(6)}\) (1966), in his distinction between categories A and B of intelligence, appears to have much in common with McDougall. He is in complete agreement with McDougall's differentiation between brain as an hereditary and neural mechanism, on the one hand, and mind which is an abstract and the functioning of a brain, on the other. Mind reflects experiences, and in the hormic theory, mental phenomena are considered, to borrow a sentence from G W Shaffer and R S Lazarus (1952),\(^{(7)}\) as 'the result of interacting forces which are understood from a historical point of view', i.e., the current events are to be regarded as outcomes of past developments, both inherited and acquired.

Hormically, the most important feature of life is purpose in all its manifestations - wishing, being prompted, aspiring, expecting, hoping, planning, and so forth. Apparently,

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\(^{(5)}\) Presidential Address, *Amer Psychologist*, vol 15, pp 735-745

\(^{(6)}\) The Organisation of Behaviour, *Science* New York, 1st published in 1949, p 294

it was from such a viewpoint that McDougall (a) tended to look for behavioural activators inside the mind itself, and (b) from this belief, he carried on his early experiments (8) (1895), and wrote his early papers (9) (1899) and his *Physiological Psychology* (1905) (10), which in reality bore the first germs of hormatism. Evidently, he approached the whole issue from a certain position, namely, that human nature could be better understood by tackling it from two different aspects: from below by understanding the entangled complications of the nervous system, and from above, by studying the phenomena of mental activities such as, for example, attention.

All evidence shows that he was inclined to the view that to understand the secrets of human nature and constitution, there should be adequate physiological explanation and keen analysis of the evanescent stuff of direct experience. He was intent that mind is brim-full of purpose, therefore it cannot be reduced to the passive effects of mere experience. In this view, as well as on many others,

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(8) "On the Structure and Functions of the Alimentary Canal of *Daphnia*" *Proc Cambridge Philos Soc*, vol 8, pp 41-50


(10) London, Dent
he was supported by the self-styled purposive behaviourist, Tolman. Purpose in this sense can be detected as an outcome of the mental processes these may inappropriately be described without talking of 'more and less' terms, as L S Kubie (11) (1960) of Yale University has put it. It is from this particular point of view that, hormically considered, mental life is based on the doctrine of instincts for fulfilling certain ends. Again, it is from this special aspect that behaviour is to be explained in what H Hartmann (12) (1960) has called the economic viewpoint', i.e., behaviour is to be interpreted in terms of its energizing elements or energic cathexis to use an expression from psychoanalysis.

Hormically explained, the essential nature of mind is 'to govern present action by anticipation of the future' (13) in the light of experience. In this sense, effects always 'precede and determine their causes' (14). For example, the cat's movements


(12) 'Psychoanalysis As A Scientific Theory' in Psychoanalysis, ed. by Hook, S., op cit, p 12

(13) An outline of Psychology, op cit, p 195

(14) ibid, p 195
are not merely reflex responses to stimuli. Such movements are throughout directed by the purpose of obtaining the food. This involves some anticipation, however vague, of the goal sought after. This is so, because purposive activity is always a total reaction of the organism as a whole to all experience, both past and present. As such, the structure of the mind is a conceptual system that can be inferred from the data of two orders: (1) facts of behaviour, and (11) facts of introspection. This would mean that mind cannot be mechanically conceived. (15) In a word, the mind and its processes is not to be translated literally into any description of the structure and functions of the nervous system. As to how the mind operates, (16) this is normally explained in terms of the organisation and functioning of feeling, conation and intellect. The two former aspects are more intimately related to one another than either is to the intellect. Yet in the human mind, the organisation of feeling and conation are best discussed under


the one heading, namely, affective functioning. So the unity of consciousness or the psychical individuality,(17) is well maintained. Mind and consciousness are synonymous, and both are manifestations of horme, and the form and content of mental processes can be ascribed to the psychic being. The question is now what relation has the hormic mind to its nervous system. The latter is considered mainly as an apparatus through the mediation of which the things of the psychical world are borne upon the psychic being and it is through the nervous apparatus that the psychic being in turn affects the external environment. The general picture presented by such a hormic interpretation is that the Universe is not a strictly mechanical system, but a plastic and flexible one. Presumably, such a belief led McDougall to support Psychical Research (18) His whole approach, however, may be


(1) Under the same title see also the same journal vol XXXI, (1920), p 112

(11) A Review by McDougall of Multiple Personality An Experimental Investigation into the nature of Human Individuality, by Sidis, B and Goodhart, S P, London, (1905)

(18) 'Psychical Research as a University Study' in The Case for and against Psychical Belief, ed by Carl Murchison, Worcester, Mass Clark Univ Press, (1927), pp 149-162
described as 'dispositional', that is, he used "disposition concepts,"(19) to borrow A. Pap's (1960) expression

The proclivity to consider mental life and mental processes 'holistically' (W M O'Neil 1968)\(^\text{(20)}\) is basic to McDougall's hormic theory. The emphasis of both aspects is in fact associated with the stress placed upon self as an integrated whole which always aspires purposively. Within the context of hormé, purpose is regarded as a basic feature of all animal activity and self is treated as a distinctively central component of human character. The accentuation of self, as indicated before, had been actually characteristic of British act psychologists such as Ward and Stout. McDougall, the act psychologist, functionalist, vitalist, teleologist, purposive hormist, carried on the tradition, but he developed it further on scientific bases.

2 Some Monadic Views within the context of Hormé

McDougall attempted to advance as a scientific hypothesis the monadic theory of human nature or 'self'. Believing

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(19) On The Empirical Interpretation of Psychoanalytic Concepts
Psychoanalysis, op cit, p 284

in body-mind interactionism, he tried (1901, (21) 1906, (22) 1911 (23) 1920 (24)) to explain that self is 'a thinking conscious being', (25) an enduring monad - a term Leibnitz had used and mind is a realm of purpose and intention. Perhaps such a belief led McDougall to emphasise self-determination as distinct from external determination in behaviour. Out of this 'substance' or monad, elements of all things are composed. According to such a notion, things in Nature are in a state of pre-established harmony. (26)

Apparently, it occurred to McDougall that the flexibility of the hormic theory could assimilate such views, so long as the hormic activity can be exhibited by natural entities which have a certain

(21) 'On the Seat of the Psycho-Physical Processes' Brain, vol XXIV, part 4, pp 377ff


(23) Body and Mind A History and A Defence of Animism, London, Methuen

(24) Presidential Address to the Society for Psychical Research, published in Proc of the Soc, vol XXXI

(25) Body and Mind, op cit., pp 54, 53

(26)
complexity of organisation To such entities or organisms, McDougall found it appropriate to apply the term monad, hence monadism, which he fully re-enlivened and explained scientifically.

Most of the discussions and terminology which McDougall used in his *Body and Mind*, for example, were philosophical in character. True, he adopted the metaphysical doctrine of monadism. Yet his merit exists in his endeavour to modernise the term and attempted to show that it can be used in everyday life within the context of *horme*. This he tried to link with his special views on the functions of the nervous system and their anatomical organisation. Nevertheless, the attempt to understand what he was trying to do can be regarded as rewarding, simply because he made at least some major contributions toward the solution of a knotty problem – the body and its mind. He seemed to have attempted to treat the psycho-physical interactionism by pointing out, (1) that states of mind are different from states of other parts of the nervous system, (2) mind acts through the nervous system, (3) activities of the highest centres of the brain are associated with mental states and processes, (4) mind is not to be identified with brain.
The central point in McDougall's (1911) treatment is that the conscious unity of the personality is wholly independent of the spatial and functional unity of the brain. McDougall's statement here is, in large part, directed towards answering his question 'what is there in the nature or the activities of these various (brain) structures to suggest that they can in some way produce or generate the unique phenomena of consciousness? The question is in fact about four distinguishable features of the brain, namely, the cell body, the cell processes, the cell function, and the complex neural network. So his ingenious experiments (28) [Burt, 1968], which are referred to hereafter, on binocular fusion and the functions of the two hemispheres were to test scientifically the hypothesis of body-mind relationship. The various structures in the above question are perhaps what Sir Arthur Eddington (29) (1939), one of the leading physicists in this century, 

(27) *Body and Mind*, op cit., ch XIV, see also, chapters XII - XIII

(28) *Brain and Consciousness*, B J Psych, vol 59, part 1, pp 55-69

(29) *The Philosophy of Physical Science*, Being Tarnar lectures, Cambridge, at the University Press, p 150 see also, p 148
called 'group-structures which are to be found in consciousness', and by consistently insisting upon the dual relationship of body-mind, McDougall, in E D Adrian's (30) (1966) words, kept the flag of dualism flying. This in effect would indicate that McDougall had actually tackled a thorny problem which ever since inspired a considerable number of symposia (1957, (31) 1964, (32) 1965, (33) 1966 (34)) to be held, many books (35) to be written and numerous


(34) Brain and Conscious Experience, ed by Sir John C Eccles, op cit,

(35) see for example


papers\(^{(36)}\) to be published, the main purpose, however, has been, to quote Sir John Eccles\(^{(37)}\) (1966), to relate Psychology to what we may call the Neurosciences. The essential outcome of the detailed discussions and raging controversies is that, besides the events within the brain which provides the required conditions for conscious functions, there are other conditions which must be sought in the dispositional properties - cognitive, affective, and conative - of the hypothetical psychical component\(^{(38)}\) \(\text{\cite{Burt, 1968}}\).

This, in fact, is typical of McDougall's specific version in relation to the problem as a whole.

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\((36)\) See for example

\(\text{(1) Murphy, G, }\) Body-mind as a factor guiding survival research', \text{J Amer Soc Psych Res, vol 59, (1965) pp 148-155}


\(\text{(111) }\) 'The Structure of the Mind', \text{B J Statist Psych, vol 14, (1961b), pp 145-170}

\(\text{(1v) }\) Brain and Consciousness, \text{Bull of Brit Psych Society, vol 22, No 74, (1969), pp 29-36}

\(\text{cf Powell, J P, }\) 'The Brain and Consciousness A Reply to Professor Burt', \text{Bull of Brit Psych Society vol 22 No 74, (1969), pp 27-28}

\(\text{(37) Brain and Conscious Experience, op cit, Preface, p vii}

\(\text{(38) Brain and Consciousness }\) \text{B J Psych vol 59 op cit, p 68}
Another theme, strongly defended by McDougall, which is closely related to the above topics, is a dualistic hypothesis of animism and teleological vitalism. Four types of teleology can be traced throughout his arguments. (1) Dynamic teleology, which he also called 'initial teleology'. This seemed to him a better one than H. Driesch's 'static teleology'. However, according to the 'initial teleology', man is regarded as the most complex machine, though a machine capable of contemplative enjoyment. (2) External contemporary teleology, according to this viewpoint, events happen through unusual metaphysical causes. There seems to be no convincing argument supporting such a notion. (3) Interventional teleology, this seems to be cojoined with the former one. It leaves the inorganic world to mechanical causation. (4) Finally, mental

(39) See particularly
(1) Body and Mind, op cit,
(11) "Mechanism, Purpose and the New Freedom" J Philos, vol IX, No 33, (1934)
(111) Religion and the Sciences of Life, London, Methuen, (1934)
(iv) The Riddle of Life, London, Methuen, (1938)

(40) The History and Theory of Vitalism, translated by C K Ogden, London, MacMillan, (1914)
teleology which appears to have been McDougall's favourite. The inference is that all the varieties of teleology indicated suggest that they derive from man's experience of his own purposive actions and that these actions are causally efficacious in the world of natural events.

To McDougall, teleological vitalism, a theme pronounced in *Body and Mind* (1911) and elsewhere,\(^{(41)}\) is highly compatible with the law of the conservation of energy. To others such as, for example, H S Elliot\(^{(42)}\)\((1912a,1912b,1913a,1913b)\), vitalism was one of the ambiguous terms and "an obituary notice."

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\(^{(41)}\) (1) "Modern Materialism" *Bedrock*, vol 2, No 1, (1913)
(11) "Materialism, Scientific and Philosophic" *Bedrock*, vol 2, No 3, (1913)

\(^{(42)}\) (1) (1912a) *Modern Science and The Illusion of Professor Bergson*, London, Longmans. In this book the author attacked Bergson's vitalism which McDougall used to defend because it was based upon the principle of *élan vital*.

(11) (1912b) "Modern Vitalism" *Bedrock*, vol 1, No 3

(111) (1913a) "Scientific Materialism" *Bedrock*, vol 2, No 2

(1v) (1913b) "Vitalism - An Obituary Notice" *Bedrock*, vol 2, No 4
must be written of its situation. The essence of Elliot's view is that vitalism, like most of the philosophical conceptions, has no particular set of referents. Like McDougall, however, Elliot was a supporter of the law of "the conservation of energy", but unlike McDougall, he appeared to have adopted a mechanistic point of view. In his position, McDougall finds support in the writings of authors such as C Sherrington (1906), C A Mercier (1913), T P Nunn (1920), J A Thomson (1920), E S Russell (1923, 1945, 1951),

(43) An Integrative Action of the Nervous System, op cit,
(44) 'Vitalism and Materialism" Bedrock, vol 2, No 1, pp 352-357
(45) Education Its Data and First Principles, op cit,
(47) (1) (1923) 'Psychobiology' Proc Arist Society, vol XXIII
I Sheffler(48) (1959), J Canfield(49) (1964, 1965), H S Lehman(50) (1965) Like McDougall, these authors held fast to the doctrine of evolution and maintained that vitalism should not be distinguished from animism which must be in the focus of the psycho-physical domain.

The views held by McDougall and writers such as those mentioned above, tend to emphasize that, vitalistically conceived, mind is dynamic and has causal efficacy. A whole acts teleologically when its acts are determined by their own tendency to produce results affecting the whole. It could be indicated now that in stressing the reaction to total situations rather than conditioning to particular stimuli, the Gestalt psychologists were following the line of argument offered by McDougall. It is highly probable that

(48) 'Thoughts on Teleology" B J for the Philos of Science, vol IX, pp 265-284

(49) (1) (1964) "Teleological Explanation in Biology" B J Philos of Science, vol XIV, pp 285-295

(11) (1965) "Teleological Explanation in Biology" B J Philos of Science, vol XV, pp 327-331

(50) "Teleological Explanation in Biology" B J Philos of Science, vol XV, p 327 (Discussion)
this could be so, since many of McDougall's views were available 'long before Gestalt psychology existed' as K Koffka (51) (1935) had pointed out. Furthermore, in his analytical study of the Gestalt School, particularly K Lewin's system, Smith (52) (1960a) in fact has clearly brought into focus the striking similarities between their approach and hormicism. In the vitalistic, hormic explanation, as well as in the Gestalt interpretation, even the behaviour of the lower creatures such as insects and ants is described as 'illustrating organic purposiveness' (53) and 'organised endeavour' (54). By so explaining animistic Nature, McDougall was certainly edifying the continuity of evolution, and accordingly augmenting the Darwinian influence.

However, McDougall's hormic dynamism led him to adopt the view of animism. The pursuit of such a principle is perhaps the most arduous argument in his discussions. He tended to identify the idea of animism with emergent vitalism, which superseded what was called "substantial vitalism" (55) (G Murphy 1966)

(51) Principles of Gestalt Psychology, op cit, p 403
(52) Explanation of Human Behaviour, op cit., chapters VIII, pp 216-253, and IX, pp 254-323
By 'animism he meant a rigorously dualistic interactionism, with the emphasis perhaps on dualism. It is odd to find that while advocating such a dualism, he, on the other hand, condemned as monistic both 'epiphenomenalism and psycho-physical parallelism, which are both dualistic in nature. Such an obvious contradiction seems to have stemmed from the complexity and the entangled complications of the subject itself. Unquestionably, the whole issue is a hoary old topic yet McDougall appeared to have surveyed systematically its broad features and presented its salient aspects. The discussions put forward were intended to establish what may be called vitalistic animism' in the sense of life as an 'emerging organisation', (56) to borrow an expression from Murphy (1966). Life itself is reflected in mind which should not be conceived as a sensist tendency, but as a process of perceptual differentiation and specialisation of its powers (57) - powers of knowing, of feeling, of acting towards a goal. Mind is to be considered in its unity and planfullness and directionality of purpose', (58) as

(56) ibid, p 94

(57) McDougall, Wm, 'Men or Robots?' Psychologies of 1925, op cit, p 275

(58) Preface to McDougall's Body and Mind, p xv1
J S Bruner (1961) has indicated that the vitalism which McDougall adopted and fervently defended on hormic bases represents an organised concept of life, a concept which is not antithetical to modern biology.

3 Some other aspects of Mental Processes

The mind as being both hormically dynamic and purposive is in fact basic to McDougall's general doctrine. His observations on the nature of mind are still of current interest. He, for example, regarded the various degrees of insanity as disturbances of the mind. Equally fundamental is his broad conception of the mental disturbances as disorders of the highest cerebral centres. Such a doctrine overflows into various fields and finds expression, both directly and indirectly, in the writings of many writers interested in abnormal psychology such as, for example, C Shagass (1954) H J Eysenck (1955, 1957, 1963),

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(59) The Sedation Threshold EEG Clin Neurophysiol vol VI, pp 221-225
(11) (1957) Drugs and Personality J of Mental Science, vol 103, No 430, pp 119-131
and C Shagass and J Naiman \(^{(61)}\) (1955), G S Claridge and R N Herrington (1963) \(^{(62)}\)

It is difficult, however, to present every detail of the evidence reflecting McDougall's hormic influence upon the attitude of all present investigations who explored the field of abnormal studies, but a brief sketch in terms of some of the significant investigations made may be helpful here.

McDougall's \(^{(63)}\) (1903, 1926, 1929) consistent argument which now forms a corner-stone in many abnormal studies,

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(61) "The Sedation Threshold as an objective Index of manifest anxiety in Psychoneurosis" \(J\) Psychosom, vol I, pp 49-57

(62) 'Excitation - Inhibition and the Theory of Neurosis A Study of the Sedation Threshold' in \(Experiments\ with Drugs\), ed by H J Eysenck, \(op\ cit\), ch 3, see also Joyce, C R B, 'Drugs and Personality' in \(New\ Horizons\ in Psychology\), Pelican ed, (1966), ed by Foss, B M, ch 4

(63) (i) 'The Nature of Inhibitory Process In the Central Nervous System', Brain, vol XXVI

(ii) An outline of Abnormal Psychology, \(op\ cit\),

(iii) The Chemical Theory of Temperament Applied to Introversion and Extroversion', \(J\) Abnor and Social Psych, vol XXIV, No 3, pp 294ff
is that functional disorders are commonly expressions of sub-conscious purposes. Mental disturbances stem from disharmony of conflicting purposes which could be completely or partly sub-conscious. Now, Eysenck, for example, has conceded that the concept which permeates almost all his own writings 'has certain important similarities to one proposed almost about 30 years ago by William McDougall' (64). McDougall's (1929) over-all important version which Eysenck has taken as a starting point in all his dimensional schemes of personality is this: 'I suggest, wrote McDougall, 'that all personalities can be arranged in a single linear scale according to the degree to which this factor $\overline{X}$ is present in their constitution. A distribution of temperamental trait is most naturally explained by the influence of some one chemical factor generated in the body and exerting influence upon the nervous system in proportion to the quantity that is produced and liberated into the blood stream.' In the statement, the word 'factor', called $(X)$ by McDougall, was believed to be associated with certain secretions affecting introversion and extraversion. This $(X)$ was discerned by McDougall as 'a substance whose action upon the nervous system is very similar to that of alcohol (ether and chloroform)'.

(64) J Mental Science vol 103, (1957), p 120
Thus the view of introversion and extraversion McDougall put in physiological terms (1926)\(^{(65)}\) and again emphasised in (1929, \(^{(66)}\) 1932\(^{(67)}\)). The gist of McDougall's own interpretation (1926, 1929, 1932) is that the essential characteristic of the extreme introvert is a tendency to internal activity, particularly to an excess of those activities of the highest level in which 'self-conscious reflection' and control of lower level processes loom large. The distinctive mark of the extravert is "the ready passing over of the effective urge into action and expression." Cerebral processes of the highest level have in the extravert, little or no control over 'the effective urge.' The introverted or extraverted attitude of a person depends to a great extent on the speed with which the nervous impulses travel in the conceptual nervous system, especially in the higher centres. In the case of the extraverts, this rate of speed is considered to be low.

\(^{(65)}\) An outline of Abnormal Psychology, op cit.,

\(^{(66)}\) J Abnor and Social Psychology, vol XXIV, (1929)

\(^{(67)}\) The Energies of Men, op cit.
In introversion and extraversion, McDougall holds a prominent place, and whatever criticisms may be raised against him, they can hardly be considered fatal to his theory (Eysenck 1955(68)). Eysenck (1957, 1963) and others, (69) have emphasized that many of McDougall's observations concerning hysteria, neuroticism, manic-depression, introversion and extraversion, are still valid, and must be followed up. For example, Eysenck has stressed that he could verify the importance of McDougall's views and their relevance to clinical and therapeutic psychology by means of objective tests. In point of fact, Eysenck (1957) has regretted that such a viable position is neglected by some psychologists. To him personally, McDougall's theory of introversion - extraversion is "plausible, ingenious and extremely fruitful" (70). He found that 'personality differences between

(68) Dimensions of Personality, op cit, p 106

(69) (1) Hunt, J and Guilford, J P, 'Fluctuation of an ambiguous figure in Dementia Praecox and in Manic-Depressive patients', J Abnor and Social Psychol, vol 27, (1933), pp 443-452

(11) Shagass, C, EEG Clin Neurophysiol, (1954), vol VI, pp 221-225, op cit,

(70) J Ment Science, vol 103, op cit, p 121, see also Eysenck's Experiments with Drugs, op cit, pp 20-21
extraverts and introverts are mainly due to disturbances in the cerebral excitation of inhibition balance, i.e., strong reactive inhibition affects and produces extraverted behavioural patterns, whereas introverted behavioural patterns are affected by excessively weak reactive inhibition. Such a notion is entirely in keeping with McDougall's own interpretation of the whole position. In Eysenck's specific words, 'This finding is of course in line with McDougall's conception of the cortex as an inhibiting centre for lower level activities.' The inhibition or damage of an organ has precisely the effect' of McDougall's 'postulated factor X'.

McDougall's hormic approach to psychopathalogy and psychotherapy is considered as notable. J A Hadfield (1967),

(71) *J Ment Science*, vol 103, (1957), p 122
(72) ibid, p 122
(73) ibid, p 123
(74) ibid, p 123
(75) *Introduction to Psychotherapy*, London, George Allen, p 115
for example, has regarded the biological investigations made by McDougall as an eminently sound basis, not only for the study of human nature, but also for exploring 'Psychology in general. This is so, because all man's mental equipment, higher as well as lower, such as memory, intelligence, and reason (76) which serve the purpose of adjustment to life are inculcated in mind itself. Yet it is to be emphasised that McDougall's biology was flexible and, to quote Hadfield again, it is characteristic of British Psychology since it follows the tradition of the great biologists Darwin, Huxley, and others. (77) In McDougall's great work (C Spearman 1939(78), both the origin and the essence of his main scientific message reached a definite expression in this statement: 'I had come to see more and more clearly that the main defect of the psychologies with which I had struggled in the opening years of the century was their acceptance or their compromise with, the mechanistic biology, and their consequent neglect of the purposive or teleological aspect of all mental (79) life'.

(76) ibid, p 115
(77) ibid p 115
(78) The Life and Work of William McDougall in Character and Personality vol VII No 3 p 182
The notion embodied in the passage quoted above forms a recurrent theme in McDougall's hormic theory. To him, any view that ignored the nature of mental activity was doomed to sterility. The fundamental aim of psychology must be to establish the reality of purposive action as a form of causal efficacy distinct in nature from all mechanistic causations. Psychology must begin by recognizing the characteristic features of the facts that it deals with, and must defer, if necessary, the task of reconciling itself with the sciences of the inorganic domain. Apparently, McDougall was of the opinion that psychology must bring out the most essential character of life-processes, namely, the means-end oriented nature. It could be indicated that he wanted psychology to be broad in bases so that it can cover the numerous walks of life. This is perhaps why he insisted on hormic psychology, the psychology of purposiveness, the pursuit of goals within life itself. This is why, again, his dynamic approach to human life is considered as more specific than is advocated in Freud's libido theory. So McDougall's approach was not a "one-sided, namely, psychical position only, as some writers such as, for example, Allport tended to think.

(80) Hadfield, J A, Introduction to Psychotherapy, op cit, p 115
(81) The Person in Psychology, Beacon Press, Boston, (1968), pp 30, 105
Nevertheless, Allport explicitly acknowledged\(^{(82)}\) his indebtedness to McDougall who influenced him considerably.

Throughout his hormic discussions, McDougall consistently insisted upon the distinction between facts of mental structure and manifestations of mental activity. He was intent to distinguish between structure or enduring dispositions and systems of dispositions, on the one hand, and experiences or activities determined by structure, on the other. Within the context of such a differentiation, come sentiments which McDougall regarded as motivational elements of a hormic theory of behaviour. Seizing upon clues afforded by A F Shand's 'Character and Emotions'\(^{(83)}\) (1896), McDougall aptly elaborated.

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\(^{(82)}\) ibid, pp 32, 62, 384, 390


\(^{(83)}\) Mind, NS, vol V, No 18, op cit, pp 215ff.
a theory of sentiments* to which he joined the theory of character. In its primitive form, a sentiment involves an individual tendency to experience certain emotions and desires in relation to some particular object. In its most refined shape, a sentiment is described as 'an enduring conative attitude toward an object set up by the experience of the individual'. In the hormic system, sentiments represent the mechanism of socialization whereby the

* The term 'sentiment' seems to be rather a tricky word over which some writers are very much confused. In Mind, vol XIV, No 56, (1889), (p 536), H R Marshall, for example, used the word 'emotional' as descriptive of 'love', 'fear' and 'hate'. By doing so, he, of course, wrongly identified 'fear', which is an emotion, with the sentiments of love and hate. He also mistakenly referred to 'sentiment' as a best word which could be used for the three words discussed, i.e. he employed 'fear' in the sense of sentiment, which is an obvious mistake and contradiction.

(84) An outline of Psychology, op cit, p 419
(85) ibid, p 419
(86) Boden, Margaret, A., 'McDougall Revisited', J Personality, vol 33, No 1, (1965), p 10
child, for instance, appears to relinquish his instinctive urges
as he matures. At a later stage, the sentiments become more complex
As an organised system of emotional tendencies, a sentiment is
likened to a tree or bush which, springing from a few roots  may
grow very large and complex sending out many branches, twigs, and
leaves (87) The purpose of such a metaphor is to clarify a point,
namely, that the various parts of the growing cognitive system
continue to be dependent upon the conative - affective root buried
deeply in the instinctive levels of the personality

Conceived in this way, sentiments, like instincts, appear to have been regarded as having the threefold nature of
mental being, with the main difference, of course, that whereas
instincts are innate, sentiments are individually acquired
dispositions, grafted on to the innate affective phase of an
instinct. They form the basis of volitional life. They serve to
guide the individual's actions, and comprise the mental structure
The description of the various sentiments of love, contempt,
respect, moral sentiments, is far more elaborate and crowned by the
master sentiment of self-regard. It is this latter sentiment which,
when hierarchically interrelated and integrated, determines our
attitudes. Believing in the fundamentally motivating propensities

(87) Introduction to Social Psychology, op cit., p 438
that can be rivetted upon many objects, McDougall ably formulated
the plan of sentiments which G Murphy (1958) has described as of
great value (88) What is favoured most in McDougall's approach,
is his treatment of the derivation of feelings toward one's own
self. For example, one may love, hate, be bewildered at, be
amused at oneself. It is of such variegated responses that the
self-regarding sentiment is built up. Again, it is of this
sentiment that Allport (1968) wrote 'Much that Hartmann, Horney,
Erikson had later to say about the integrative ego functions was
resident in McDougall's self-regarding sentiment (89) It is in
this sentiment that Eysenck (90) has found that expressions of
introversion and extraversion reside. Indeed, many leading
psychologists such as, for instance, G W Allport (91) (1946), R B
Cattell (92) (1950, 1965), and others, are inclined to equate their

(88) Human Potentialities, New York, Basic Books, p 68
(89) The Person in Psychology, op cit, p 29
(90) The Dimensions of Personality, op cit, p 24, 37
(91) Symposium on Personality in B J Ed Psych, vol XVI
(92) (1) (1950) Personality A Systematic, Theoretical and
Factorial Study, New York, McGraw-Hill, pp 199ff
(11) (1965) The Scientific Analysis of Personality, Pelican ed
own treatment of sentiments with that of McDougall, so Allport (1968) could state that, 'in fairness to McDougall, it should be noted that his thoughtful treatment of the self-regarding sentiment had at least 30 years head start over neo-Freudian ego Psychology' (93) In such a favourable manner Cattell (94) (1959) has also viewed sentiments What he has called self-concept is, in point of fact, the self-regarding sentiment proper, which is considered as basic to a widely ramifying system of sentiments It 'subsidiates to almost all satisfactions, but particularly those of security and self-assertion (95)

In Cattell's (1950, 1959, 1965) discussions, however, a sentiment is considered as a major acquired, dynamic structure Within such a structure, various points are indicated which can be summarised thus (1) innately determined constituent of behaviour, (2) hereditary components of behaviour, (3) motivational aspects, both inherited and acquired, (4) explicit recognition of (a) instincts as essential impellents of behaviour, (b) sentiments

(93) The Person in Psychology, op cit, p 29


(95) ibid, p 301
as important and more stable factors of personality structure
It can be indicated, then, that McDougall's self-regarding
sentiment, which, as a matter of fact, is the highest
developmental phase of individuality, 'remains to this day one
of the most penetrating accounts of ego formulation available'.
M Sherif (96) 1963

In his treatment of personality, Allport (97) (1946, 1968) made it perfectly clear that he was in complete agreement
with McDougall's tendencies as indispensable postulates of all
Psychology' (1937) (98) He explained that he had no quarrel with
the concept of purpose which is based upon instincts as worked out
by McDougall In this paper (1937), McDougall emphasised that
such tendencies were and would remain of all importance in Psychology
The contents of the paper were welcomed by several writers,
particularly by Burt and Allport The latter author clearly pointed
out that he took tendencies as a guide in developing his own
concept of traits As he himself put it, the concept of trait

(96) 'Social Psychology, Problems and Trends', Psychology A Study
of Science, vol 6, op cit, p 63
(97) (1) (1946) BJ Ed Psych, vol XVI, op cit, p 58
(11) (1968) The Person in Psychology, op cit, pp 44, 47
(98) in Proceedings of the XI International Congress on Psychology,
pp 157-170
falls into this genre the genre of tendencies. Used in this sense, a trait can be identified with instincts and more widely with sentiments. Allport sometimes seemed to have been inclined to use it both ways. He stated that a trait 'always connotes an enduring tendency of some sort. To E L Walker (1964), it is employed in the sense of 'expectancy and 'goal-directedness which brings it in line with McDougall's own hormic notions. Yet Smith (1968) has his own reservations concerning traits. Recognising the fact that they can induce specific patterns of behaviour', Smith has expressed doubt as to whether traits have the same forceful power as instincts. Furthermore, Allport has claimed that his traits are 'really there, but Smith points to the lack of 'neurophysiological evidence' to confirm their existence. In Smith's opinion any empirical support for traits must at present come from statistical studies. Yet it may well come to pass that modern inserted electrode techniques and analysis of brain tissue for protein-synthesis following specific acts of behaviour, by modern molecular methods of analysis, will provide support for the trait in neuro-physiological terms.

(99) The Person in Psychology op cit, p 47, see also, p 44

(100) ibid, p 47

(101) 'Psychological Complexity as a basis for a theory of Motivation and Choice' Nebraska Symposium on Motivation

(102) 'Gordon Willard Allport, B J Psych, vol 59, part 2, op cit, p 102
Now it will be apparent that mind is conceived by McDougall and his supporters as an organisation of behaviour rather than as an entity only. Both mind and mental are used to refer to processes within the head, processes which determine the highly complex levels of organised behaviour. The word mind, for example, may be used variably: (a) it may be employed in the sense of a brain process, (b) it may be thought of as meaningless so long as it is intangible, or (c) it can be referred to as an immaterial, abstract agent which is used in relation to the more complicated mental processes. It was in this last meaning that McDougall utilised it. Again, it was in this final meaning that he talked of the structure of mind as being formed of sentiments which are equivalent to the monads. Actually, each sentiment can be regarded as a structural system comprising all knowledge of all affective tendencies directed upon some particular object. So the self emerges through the integration, partly through social conditioning of the instincts into sentiments, and eventually through the refined formation of the self-regarding sentiment as an overriding element. This, again, is reminiscent of the hormic general principle, namely, that the intelligent striving of the individual

is 'the creative activity to which evolution is due" (104)

Possibly, it was this, besides other statements that inspired many a writer such as, for example, William Brown (1928) who indicated that "the unity of the normal mind, although it is there from the beginning is a striving towards a more and more complete association, it constitutes an urge to a greater and greater degree of completeness of systematization and inclusiveness'. The general tendency, however, seems to be influenced by the all-pervading nature of the concept of purposive home. The main intention is to encourage a scheme in which there is a guiding unity from the outset. Within such a scheme, the purport should be aiming at building up wholes of behavioural activities in which every separate activity occurs in relation to the whole structure.

The theory of sentiments, as worked out by McDougall, culminates in the formation of character. To him, the basis of moral conduct is 'the maternal' instinct' which authors such as

(104) Introduction to Social Psychology, op cit., p 481

(105) 'The Mental Unity and Mental Dissociation', BJ Psych., vol. XVIII, part 3, p 243

(106) Introduction to Social Psychology, op cit., p 150
Thorndike (107) strongly endorsed In McDougall's treatment of character, roughly four stages are distinctive (1) the lowest stage (the instinctive), (2) next when the social influences have a vital role in modifying the instinctive impulses (the cognitive system), (3) in this third phase the cognitive dispositions correspond to different moral qualities, (4) finally, comes the 'self or the ego At this level emerges that complex disposition or system which is self knowledge, active in all thinking of the self' Conduct now is regulated by an ideal' In considering the genesis of moral conduct and character, McDougall was largely concerned with 'the empirical self as the clearest sense The successive stages of moral development and their intimate relation to instincts, are clarified by Smith (108) (1960a) in a diagrammatic manner (see Appendix I)

In McDougall's discussion, character can be identified with, for instance, conscience and will-power So in this sense, character in McDougall's view is the ground of self-control, consistency, of 'self-direction or autonomy', (109) (1923,

(107) Educational Psychology The Original Nature of Man, op cit, vol 1, pp 81ff

(108) Explanation of Human Behaviour, op cit, pp 182-183

1926, 1927, 1932) McDougall's own treatment of definition of character is "more promising" (110) because it emphasised the conative aspect of individuality. Various psychologists such as R O Filter (1922), (111) Allport and P E Vernon (1930) (112), A A Roback (1931), (113), H C Warren (1934), (114) appear to have been impressed by McDougall's treatment of the topic. Like McDougall, in their definitions, these authors covered numerous aspects of character as a conative tendency, the active quality of behaviour, persistence in directionability. In a word, character is presented as an enduring tendency inhibiting the primitive urges.

The theory of character, which owes much to British contributions, as well as the general theory of personality, as treated by McDougall, have come to gain wide acceptance both in Britain and abroad. The considerable body of evidence shows that


(111) "A Practical definition of Character", *Psych Rev.*, vol 29, pp 319-324

(112) "The Field of Personality" *Psych Bull*, vol 27, pp 677-730

(113) *The Psychology of Character*, New York, Harcourt Brace

(114) (ed) *Dictionary of Psychology*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin
such a recognition is largely due to McDougall's own writings and the way he treated the subject. For example, in the symposium on personality held in 1945-1947, all the symposiasts, Burt, Allport, Alan Maberly and Godfrey Thomson, clearly indicated that their consideration of personality was in line with McDougall's own hormic principles. Furthermore, in the writings of other people such as R G Gordon (1928), A A Roback (1931), G W Allport (1937, 1968), Kurt Lewin (1935, 1952), Alexander Murray (1949), H J Eysenck (1955, 1957, 1963), C S Hall and Gardner Lindzay (1957), M Rokeach (1960), E P Hollander and

(115) B J Ed Psych, vols XV, XVI, XVII
(116) Personality, London, Bradford Press
(111) (1952) Field Theory in Social Sciences, London
(118) Explorations in Personality, New York, Oxford University Press
(119) Theories of Personality, New York, John Wiley
(120) The Open and Closed Mind, New York, Basic Books
there is, in fact, consistent evidence and clear indications that McDougall's hormic theory of personality is continued in the expositions of these psychologists if not explicitly then implicitly


(122) (1) (1943) The Description of Personality, paper I, Psych Rev, vol 50, pp 559-594

(11) (1943) "The Description of Personality, paper II, J Abnor and Soc Psych, vol XXXVIII, pp 476-507

(111) (1943) 'Fluctuation of Sentiments and Attitudes as a measure of Character Integration and of Temperament Amer J Psych, vol 55, pp 195-216

(iv) (1944) 'A Note on Correlation Clusters and Cluster Search Methods' Psychometric, vol 9, pp 169-183

(v) (1945) 'The Principal Trait Clusters for Describing Personality' Psych Bull, vol 42, pp 129-161


American J Psych, vol 58, (1945), pp 69ff

Ed and Psych Measurement, vol 5, (1945), pp 131ff

J Ed Psych, vol 36, (1945), pp 474ff

J Nervous and Mental Disease, vol 102, (1945)
Indeed, in the discussions of the writers just mentioned, the 'psychometric predilections (Hollander and Hunt 1963, p 147) of personality are 'proceeding in essential continuity from McDougall's early (1908, 1923, 1937) personalistic formulations' True, McDougall, Freud and Jung (Smith 1960a, Hall and Lindzey 1957) could influence many leading psychologists such as, for example, Allport, regarding personalistic conceptions. McDougall's impact had and still has been tremendous, this is clearly reflected in the avowed acceptance by the majority of psychologists of the hormic standpoint. In fact, the theoretical arguments formulated by such psychologists represent their composite thinking of welcoming a neat theory acceptable to many of them, despite the fact of their diversified backgrounds. Apparently, McDougall's attempt to develop a dynamic conceptual system for the depiction of personality was a successful effort. His success, particularly in this field, can be measured against the fact that all those who were convinced of his position, determined to look for the individual's nature and behaviour at large by exploring the innately inner constructs of the brain, constructs which really direct and control the human being's activities. The question is now why McDougall could so convincingly impress other psychologists.

In McDougall's hormic contentions, various factors appear to have been combined in the presentation of his theory of personality. Briefly these are (1) his hierarchical treatment of
the structure of personality. For example, he started with the innate bases (instincts), these with their accompanying emotions crystallize in the integration of the sentiments in a self-
consciously operative system. (2) With the variegated number of human sentiments, character is associated. Yet in McDougall's discussion, character is not the whole, but only a part of the individual's total personality. This is a point which can be considered as of utmost importance, chiefly because the general tendency now seems to be to identify character, with personality, or to use character in the sense of personality as a whole. A few points may clarify the position. Although character cannot be separated from personality, it can be validly distinguished from it. Dynamically considered, personality is a totality, whereas character is just one of its structures and components, mentioned below, and a component can at least theoretically be distinguished from its whole, unitary aspect. Personality or individuality is the final system of differentiated elements of which character is one. Still further, it is usual to ascribe such words as, for example, flexibility or rigidity to personality rather than to character which is one of its contents.

Within the context of hörme, character has its own distinguishing aspects (123) such as, for example, (a) it is to be

(123) McDougall, William, Of the words Character and Personality, Character and Personality, vol. I, (1932), pp 9, 10
distinguished from intellect, though it is regarded as a complementary side of developed personality, (b) it is not innate, yet it is a product of gradual development, (c) its units are the sentiments, this involves that it is a highly complex structure, (d) it is the apex of harmonized sentiments, this indicates that mere possession of disharmonized sentiments does not form character, (e) from this it follows that these are differences in character from one individual to another. (3) There are other factors (McDougall 1908, 1923, 1927, 1929, 1932, 1937) which operate to form the structure of personality, namely, temperament, disposition, temper, and taste. (4) The resultant of these elements - instincts - sentiments, character, intellect, temperament, disposition temper and finally taste - is personality or the whole individuality as a complex organisation. So it seems that it is this hormic, scientific approach of investigating the inner, subjective complexity of the individual's fundamentality, which attracted many a psychologist to adopt McDougall's own viewpoint.

4 Discussion and Some Comments

Of all the important problems that face the psychologist, none seemed to McDougall so urgent as that of the nature and extent

(124) See Appendix II
of the innate basis of human mental life. Regarding both the intellectual and moral characteristic, the question remained equivocal. However, the hortic psychology is meant to be strenuously anti-intellectual, anti-mechanistic and anti-materialistic. It refuted both the old associationist psychology so largely devoted to just cognitive content, as it also rejected the teaching of the new mechanistic viewpoint which attempts to explain behaviour in terms of reflexes. It is through hortic discussions that more and more biological concepts crept into the considerations of both animal and human behaviour. It was in the course of this intellectual ferment that the early animistic concepts were replaced by instincts as the dynamic urges moving the organism to different kinds of action. Some writers, such as, for instance Kuo, tended to vilify the concept of instinct on the ground that it has no effect in behaviour or mental processes. Yet others, such as, for example, A. Pap (1960) of Yale University, anxiously asks, "Why all this reluctance to speak of introspectively unobservable mental processes, mental processes which really occur and causally determine human behaviour, yet cannot be directly observed but only inferred?" *(125)*

*(125)* *On the Empirical Interpretation of Psychoanalytic Concepts* in *Psychoanalysis, op cit.*, p 290
Pap wonders why, for example, a physicist, 'without apology to positivists or operationists' can talk "of perceptually unobservable physical events", (126) whereas a psychologist is denied the right to do so. So McDougall hormically campaigned to introduce the concept of instinct with its newly acquired psychological and biological overtones, into the main stream of psychological theorising and practice. By doing so, he could leave behind a major influence discernable in the replacement of the static and descriptive psychology by that which has been both functional and dynamic. Behind all his position 'lay a purposive definition of instinctive activity', (127) as G Murphy has put it.

Campaigning on behalf of purposiveness, McDougall himself claimed to have achieved some success. In 1930 (128) he could state that, 'Fifteen years ago American Psychologists displayed almost without exception a complete blindness to the most peculiar, characteristic, and important feature of human and animal activity, this feature is, of course, the goal attainment. 'Happily' such an attitude was changed, McDougall claimed, and "the animal psychologists have begun to realise that any description of animal behaviour which ignores its goal-seeking nature is

(126) ibid, p 290
(127) Historical Introduction to Modern Psychology, op cit, p 405
(128) Psychologies of 1930, ed by C Murchison, op cit, p 3
futile. Apparently, by so clinching the point, McDougall had in mind (1) continuity of evolutionary process, (2) bases of behaviour are inherited, (3) behavioural processes are teleological in character.

Regarding (1), McDougall tentatively ascribed some sort of purposive and hormic tendency even to the inanimate world. His intention of doing so was to avoid violating the evolutionary continuity. Yet he was alive to the clear distinction between the two domains - the inorganic and the organic. The living being actively behaves, and his behaviour is both spontaneous and characterised by achieving an end. For instance, 'the human organism tends to become aware of any gross physiological imbalance and if the condition is a familiar one, something effective can be done about it, but even familiar needs are satisfied in ways influenced by the person's social context and the circumstances of the moment', (129) as Smith (1960a) has aptly interpreted the real issues of McDougall's position. As to the machine, it is made to serve a certain purpose, but its locomotion is caused by external forces imposed upon it, otherwise it remains inert. Some writers, such as D. Thompson (1966), (130) can argue that a machine can think, but the

(129) Explanation of Human Behaviour, op cit, p 184

(130) 'Can a Machine be conscious?' B J for the Philos of Science, vol 16, pp 33-49
question is whether its thinking is spontaneous, conscious, teleological, and whether it has a foresight of its own of what it is intending to fulfil. Furthermore Thompson's notion runs contrary to the most orthodox views held by McDougall and others who seem to support his arguments on this particular point. People such as G Negley (1951)(131), W Mays (1952)(132), R J Spilsbury (1952)(133), John Cohen (1955)(134), and A L Samuel (1960)(135), are all anti-machinists.

As to points (2 and 3) above, McDougall, in Smith's specific words (1960a), 'at all times adhered to a vitalistic position which stressed the purposive nature of animal behaviour' (136).

(131) 'Cybernetics and Theories of Mind', *J of Philos*, vol 42, pp 574-582
(132) 'Can Machines Think?', *Philos*, vol 27, pp 148-162
(133) 'Mentality in Machines', *Arist Soc*, vol 26, pp 1-86
(134) 'Can There be Artificial Minds?', *Analysis*, vol 16, pp 36-41
(135) 'Some Moral and Technical Consequences of Automation - A Refutation', *Science*, vol 131, pp 741-742
(136) *Explanation of Human Behaviour*, op cit., p 184
Behaviour requires and implies teleological explanations in the sense of evolving goals. Such an evolvement can be intelligibly conceived as mental one. Therefore foresight of goals, urges to action and the guiding of the hormic energies of the organism, would appear to have real causal efficacy in the life of the organism, i.e., hormically causal effectiveness, not "the strict" one against which Smith (1960a) has warned. By ruling out the rigidity from his hormic scheme, McDougall had in fact enhanced, to quote Smith again, "the problem of the value of his system in explaining behaviour" (138). This can be taken to mean that McDougall's psychology gave more definite form to teleological and hormic view of the human being. It provided what McDougall himself called 'a foundation which, though it will be improved in detail, will stand good in its general principles' (139). The objectives he was aiming at are numerous, and perhaps notable among them are (1) to develop a firmly established hormic theory, (2) to indicate that human conduct exhibits certain characteristics which are historically and biologically congruent with evolutionary continuity.

(137) ibid, p 184
(138) ibid, p 184
(139) 'Experimental Psychology and Psychical Research' Character and Personality, vol I, (1933), p 206
(3) to stress that the activities of both man and the other creatures are prompted from within by specifically inherited prime movers - instincts. So purposive behaviour may be understood as a final condition, \(^{(140)}\) (I Scheffler 1959) in which the behaving individual reaches a definite aim. Accordingly, the hormically teleological explanations of behaviour would imply (1) prediction of the goal attained, (ii) flexibility and modifiability of the behaviour, (iii) finality in securing the end desired.

The internally motivated action must have a purposive end. 'Every little action has a motive all of its own', \(^{(141)}\) to borrow H W Nissen's expression. To some extent, this can reflect McDougall's own position, who postulated that, "A purpose is a set for certain activity with foresight of the result of that activity', \(^{(142)}\)

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\(^{(140)}\) 'Thoughts on Teleology' B J for the Philos of Science, vol IX, pp 265, see also

\(^{(1)}\) Rosenblueth, A, Wiener, N and Bigelow, J, 'Behaviour, Purpose and Teleology' Philos of Science, vol X, (1943), pp 18ff


\(^{(141)}\) 'Instincts as seen by a Psychologist' Psych Rev, op cit, vol 60, (1953), pp 287ff

\(^{(142)}\) The Hormic Psychology' Psychologies of 1930, op cit, p 10
it is a voluntary striving, and the striving toward self-affirmation, is the secret of one's identity. (143) (R D Francis 1968) So Smith (1960a) appears to be justified in his statement that for the concept of horme there is a vast amount of evidence which is consistent with it. (144) Indeed, the considerable number of experiments and observations made by different ethologists and investigators, notably, N Tinbergen (145) (1952), K Lorenz (146) (1958), E H Hess (147) (1958), A D Hasler and J A Larsen (148) (1955), W C Dilger (149) (1962), F V Smith (150) (1968a), appear to be pointing

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(143) 'A Conative Hypothesis' Bull Brit Psych Society, vol 21, No 73, p 243
(144) Explanation of Human Behaviour, op cit., p 178
(146) The Evolution of Behaviour, Biological Psychology, op cit., pp 33-42
(147) 'Imprinting in Animals' Biological Psychology, op cit., pp 107-111
(148) 'The Homing Salmon' Biological Psychology, op cit., pp 21-23
(149) 'The Behaviour of Lovebirds' Biol Psychol., op cit., pp 45-52
(150) Imprinting, op cit., MS
to these facts (1) the theory of instincts is no longer in doubt
(2) Behaviour which is quite complex, is inherited in the genes of
the individual organism  (3) Differences in genetic constitution
lead to certain individual differences in the behaviour of the
organism  In fact, the term "releasers", which so often occurs in
Tinbergen's and Lorenz's discussions, is but McDougall's notion of
instincts as 'releasing mechanisms',(151) which he described as
"easily exploding containers of energy"  So he could speak of
"vitalistic", "purposive", instinctive' or "hormic' Psychology,
whereof he meant the Psychology that, "finds in our instinctive
constitution, the foundation or source of all our activities' (152)
The question still is in what way hormic Psychology differs from
that advocated by other psychologists  Among other things,
McDougall stressed (1) conscious purpose  (2) That hormic behaviour
is characterised by marks of its own so long as such marks are
manifested by the organism  (3) The hormically purposive behaviour
is activated from within  (4) The movements displayed by the
organism are the outcome of a spontaneous function aiming to
subserve an end

(151) An outline of Psychology, op cit , p 107
(152) An Introduction to Social Psychology, op cit , p 409
The hormic, monadic explanation, which McDougall adopted in some of his arguments, was intended to reconcile the facts of the unity of consciousness with the facts of disintegration of personality. In his approach to the question of personality as a whole, he tended to stay within the scientific terminology, i.e., he tried to discuss scientific facts and elements which constitute individuality, rather than talking about personality as an abstract. To him it was the person who really mattered, not the abstract personality. In his discussion of the subject, he attempted to abandon the descriptive aspect instead, he endeavoured to present the constructs and features which comprise personality. Actually, his is basically a motivational theory of personality.

Within the context of monadic explanation, McDougall insisted that life and consciousness are continuous. Both are regarded as manifestations of the same hormic energy. Naturally, it cannot be expected that his monadic views would have passed without objections being raised, but the scientific method on which he rested his contentions seems to have helped him to some degree. On the theoretical side, this can be regarded as a new contribution of no small importance. Here, and in his arguments throughout, he assumed a voluntaristic point of view and repudiated a deterministic approach. For this and other reasons, people such as, for example, F C S Schiller welcomed 'the psychological development of which
Professor McDougall has made himself the leader" (153)

A part of McDougall's hormic thesis was his deep conviction that the scientific or pragmatic criterion of truth is the only valid one. Such a belief led him to conduct a number of experiments which are now described as "excellent easy to carry out and mostly valid (Woodworth and H Schlosberg 1963 (154), R Thomson (155) 1968, P McKellar (156) 1968a and b, x P McKeller and H Tonn 1968 (157)) In a number of publications, carrying the results of experiments (1897, 1898, 1901, 1902, 1903,


(154) Experimental Psychology, London, Methuen, a revised ed, pp 560, 562, 761-762

(155) The Pelican History of Psychology, a pelican ed, p 177

(156) (1) (1968a) Experience and Behaviour, Pelican ed, pp 61-64

(11) (1968b) 'McDougall's Five Stamps An Experimental Study of Negative Hallucination' Bull B Psych Soc, vol 21, No 71, pp 114-115

(157) Reported in Experience and Behaviour, op cit, pp 63-64
1906, 1908, 1909, 1920, 1926), (158), McDougall tackled various aspects of man's life. The nature of these experiments is quite different from those in which he attempted to prove a Lamarckian heredity of characteristics. Many of the experiments this time were on muscular contraction, improvement of psychological methods, vision and the fading of visual impressions, attention, fatigue, learning and retention, inhibition and drainage. The inferences that can be made out of such a wide range of experiments are:

1. The introspective observations are invariably interpreted in physiological terms.
2. The experiments clearly indicate McDougall's deep interest in both neurological and the psychological approaches to the problems of mental life.
3. It cannot be gainsaid that his very first contributions of a psychological nature were directly concerned with problems of psycho-physical correlations. This would mean that a general exposition of the innate relation exists between the psychic aspect and the physical side, on such a relation he seemed to have built his theory of interactionism.
4. Such experiments clearly indicate that McDougall was not merely a theorist, but his hormic thought was scientific from the beginning and was shaped very early in his career of which

(158) See Appendix II
threads he 'never broke one" (159) (H S Langfield of Princeton University 1940)

Now most of McDougall's experiments have proved 'interesting, workable and 'much less difficult to explain (Woodworth and Schlosberg 1963, (160) C G Costello 1963 (161)) Basing his own views on his own experiments, which have been proved as valid, McDougall held that each individual possesses a perceptual capacity with its own intrinsic reality. The individual has a certain domain of perception characteristic of his own individuality, reflecting the influence of experience upon innate endowment. Normal perceptions represent a world of physical objects. The illusory and hallucinatory perceptions, unlike the normal ones, have no realistic quality, but can be genuine psychological events with an aetiology. The perceptual experiences depend upon brain states. Such a mode of interpretation is actually reflected with approval in the writings of the people mentioned above. Perhaps this can mean that most of his experiments as well as many of his arguments are well thought.

(159) 'Professor McDougall's contributions to the Science of Psychology" B J Psych, vol XXXI, part 2, p 112

(160) op cit, pp 562, 761-762

(161) Experiments with Drugs, ed by H J Eysenck, ch 7, op cit, pp 205-206
out, noteworthy and difficult to refute. Indeed, he hurled a challenge to all psychologists—a challenge embodied in the concept of horme'. Perhaps no one was or is still inclined to believe with him that human propensities are (18) in number as he suggested, but, as Allport stated, "his hormic insistence still challenges every worker in the field of motivation" (162). True, if psychologists carefully consider his writings, they will find in them, to quote R.B. Macleod (1963), "a rich store of keen observation and penetrating thought that will make many of our current discoveries appear somewhat less original" (163).

(162) The Person in Psychology, op cit., p 13


1 Some More Hormic Views Confirmed

In propounding his hormic thesis, McDougall was deeply convinced that a goal-oriented behaviour can only be understood in terms of the ends sought. Such an understanding can be fulfilled by adopting a dynamic teleological point of view. In McDougall's work, as Smith (1968a) has indicated, 'The persistent emphasis was upon an evolutionary continuity in behaviour between man and animals' (1). Smith's statement is based upon wide range of experiments and close observations which support a degree of consistency in behavioural patterns, both of human beings and brutes. Features such as, for example, parental care, construction, co-operation within society, "have suggested", writes Smith (1960a), (2) 'that there may be some form of evolutionary continuity throughout animal behaviour". Such a consistent continuity, Smith thinks is persistent 'particularly in regard to the important aspects of instigation and innate skills and

(1) *Imprinting, MS, op cit*, p 8

(2) *Explanation of Human Behaviour, op cit*, p 8
activities. None the less, Smith is aware of the intricacies of the subject and alive to the subtleties involved. His detailed discussion may be summarised in certain points:

1. There is the difficulty which is ascribable to anthropomorphism, where, for instance, feelings, foresight, and abilities are attributed to the lowest creatures, so that the matter becomes even more delicate.

2. The ferment of thought concerning the antagonistic theories of instincts and the heated, intellectual discussions of such an intricate topic. Within each theory there are certain views maintained regarding the circumstances which usually involve specific features of the organised perceptual system of the animal.

3. What is most important is perhaps what Smith has called 'physiological equilibrium', which in fact indicates all the major differences even amongst the one species.

Continuity, which Smith has pointed out, is predictable in terms of dynamic and purposive psychology. Both are emphatically stressed in the hormic theory. Yet both dynamism and purposivism are included in vitalism in the sense of the 'autonomy of life', to borrow an expression from Hans Driesch (1929).

(3) ibid, p 8

(4) ibid, pp 8-10

connected with the idea of an end in view. Indeed, it is thereby implied that the concept of teleology is extensively employed for activities of various kinds, yet it is restricted to the organic world in the first place. Teleology, in the McDougallian sense is used to describe any view which deals with the existence of purpose. Hormically, then, vitalism appears to have become a much wider problem, especially when it includes the question of the relation of the soul or mind to nature in the sense of life. However, all subsequent teleological purposivism and newly shaped hormicism are mainly indebted to McDougall. Even the traditional and the idealist systems were chiefly prompted by him to new reflection upon the basis of their methodology. His work in the several departments of Psychology can be readily discerned. As Robert Thomson (1968) has commented, McDougall's 'emphasis on the need for a dynamic psychology to account for the complex motivation of behaviour, and to take account of orectic factors, was influential in making psychologists aware of the weak spots in the new Behaviouristic theories (6).

Unquestionably, hormicism, as treated by McDougall, has brought change in basic concepts and in frames of references. Such a

change could influence many eminent psychologist, notably, Freud, Woodworth, and others already mentioned. Woodworth's Dynamic Psychology (1918), for example, bears evidence of McDougall's impact. Even so McDougall's promptitude spurred him to correct Woodworth's notion, namely, 'mechanisms may become drives'. Such a notion implies the autonomy of a motivational system, which is unacceptable to a hormic psychologist such as McDougall. Furthermore, a wrong impression may arise, viz., habits and skills might be thought of as being capable of engendering driving forces. An interpretation of this kind surely would be contrary to the most orthodox views. Apparently Woodworth's suggestion, cited above, attracted some psychologists, like John Dollard and Neal E. Miller (1950), who regard all 'human behaviour' as learned. The first

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(8) McKeller, P., Experience and Behaviour, op cit, pp 241-242

(9) Motives in the Light of Recent Discussions" Mind, N.S., vol XXIX, (1920), pp 277-293

factor involved in such acquired behaviour was drive, they thought. In this case drive is identified with stimulus. In other words, any stimulus can become drive. Anyhow, Woodworth's writings added to McDougall's persistent, systematic efforts could change the outlook in modern Psychology and, to quote Thomson once again, they offered a different orientation from the two leading systems of Behaviourism and Gestalt psychology in the 1920s and early 1930s. (11) The turning point could be realized in two ways at least: (1) an apparent gap between the early psychology and the emergence of personalistic theories in the 1930s and 1940s was filled. (11) Both authors could contribute to what Thomson has called system-building and theory-construction. (12)

However, various developments in psychology may be pointed out as of special interest in relation to McDougall's influence.

1. He helped to set the psychology of behaviour on a conational bases.
2. He endeavoured to solve the problem of the body-mind relation, as indicated before. In so doing, McDougall could improve the method of psychology by extracting it from its entanglements with the

(11) The Pelican History of Psychology, op cit, p 276
(12) Ibid, p 276
parallelistic philosophy of mind. He tried to restate its subject matter in a more intelligible relation to other natural sciences.

3 McDougall could indicate ways of escape from the solipsistic predicament which was almost dominating the sphere of thought prior to what may be described as the emergence of the hormic era', enunciated by himself. He managed to do so without dependence upon materialistic or mechanistic devices.

4 His approach to the questions of instincts, emotions, sentiments, temperament, tastes, and personality in general, led and prepared the way to psycho-analytic discussions more seriously than ever before.

5 He worked out a theory of perception embodied in the theory of instincts. The way he approached hormic motivation could keep most of British psychologists cautious against mechanistic issues. By so doing, McDougall influenced many psychologists to be aware of not converting to extreme mechanism.

6 He rejected the sensationism, the associationism, the exclusive use of introspectionism, and the analysis of consciousness. Instead, he favoured a vigorously functional and dynamic psychology.

7 McDougall repudiated the one-sided intellectualism in psychology, the assumption that all human conduct is rational and dependent.
on foresight of consequences. By so doing, McDougall abolished the dichotomy between the human beings and the brutes, and accordingly observed the continuity of evolution as worked out by Darwin.

He is credited with formulating a theory of the social sciences. Refuting the rough-and-ready psychology that had dominated these sciences before, McDougall introduced the doctrine of the Group Mind, incorporated in his book bearing the same title. By this doctrine, McDougall meant essentially that groups have mental characteristics analogous to those of the individual. So that the group mental characteristics are explicable on the basic issues of the individual's own behaviour and acquired experience.

Undoubtedly, then, McDougall could anchor social psychology, which is really a twentieth century discipline, on the foundation of the psychological motivation displayed by the individual, basic to all of this are instincts, sentiments, volition, taste. In this connection, certain points should be emphasised:

1) as explanatory principles underlying social psychology,

McDougall emphatically stressed the unlimited ability of man's potential in modification and learning.

2) He included both culture and lofty tradition as among the best means that form the foundation of social theory.
It was McDougall who first conveyed the notion of cognitive or perceptual phenomena exhibited by the individual to the field of the group in social psychology. This he managed to do on the ground of what may be designated as 'a hierarchical methodology', i.e., (a) philosophical approach, (b) the application of such an approach to the psychological problems, (c) the extension of the psychological questions to wider issues in life as a whole.

It can be said, however, that McDougall's hormic psychology could influence the whole situation, so that the swing of the pendulum in the direction of extreme mechanistic views could be reversed. The change is now reflected in a revival of interest in the problems of phenomenology and perception. His psychology, then, is different from many other psychologies in being both dynamic and hormic. 'It is dynamic', to quote Hadfield, in that it emphasises the drives in human nature. It is hormic in that it recognises that for peace and harmony of mind as well as for efficiency, it is necessary that these dynamic forces should be diverted from their natural ends and redirected towards the ends and aims of the personality as a whole. (13) It could be said, therefore, that McDougall could put hormicism 'in ultra modern dress'. (14) to use

(13) Introduction to Psychotherapy, op cit, p 120
(14) Preface to McDougall's Body and Mind, Beacon paperback, Boston, p xv
J S Bruner's (1961) expression Yet McDougall is not infrequently accused of leaning toward using metaphysical terms. Such an allegation may be valid but it so often occurs that most scientists, if not all of them, cannot, to cite Smith (1960a) once again, always suppress the tendency to have recourse to some metaphysical construct which in some way suggests how the observed conjunctions could occur as they do. Indeed, the fact is as R Thomson (1968) has stated that we can sift the wheat from the chaff and still find in his somewhat neglected writings — so far as academics are concerned — some conceptions which are worth re-examining.

It cannot be gainsaid that McDougall tried and teased out some of the hardest knots in psychology. In his view, psychology is concerned with the individual's cognitions as phases in the dynamic and goal-directed processes of adjustment. It is concerned with adjustment, not as a response to a stimulus, described in purely physical terms, but as a response to objects as they appear or as they are thought to be. He emphasised that psychology deals not with purely mental minds, but with individuals endowed with biological and physical characteristics. Through his arguments and research, he could lay down the foundations for a thoroughgoing biological approach.

(15) *Explanation of Human Behaviour, op cit.,* p 120

(16) *The Pelican History of Psychology, op cit.,* p 181
to psychology and for a psychological approach to biology. These problems should not be under-rated by psychologists and other writers concerned with the question of mental science. Even those who tend to show scanty respect for McDougall's work cannot entirely dispense with these problems. He tried to solve the knotty question by regarding the procedure of mental science as being strictly parallel to that of natural science, through such a parallelism and interactionism he thought that the study of mind would be made strictly scientific. His standpoint is that of an articulated interactionism, the most important contentions of which are those concerning the nature of mind mainly as an abstraction. Being conceived of as an abstract, mind is represented by feelings or emotions as they actually appear in consciousness. Hormically, psychology, then, is to be concerned mainly with the study of mind or of mental phenomena, the study of the higher functions of beings endowed with mind, or, to borrow C. A. Mace's terminology, embodied minds' (17).

Seen from the hormic standpoint, psychology is to set out systematically the laws and conditions determining the course of

the psychic life of individuals. It is assumed that psychic activity is no less real than physical and that psychic activity is always a forward striving towards some end. The psychic life, however, consists not in the sum of the separate data, states or occurrences, rather, it is characterised by the special kind of unity which persists both before and beyond the single psychical facts, and is entirely different in character from every unity in the world of material things. Thus there is mind in the sense of the unity of consciousness, not merely mental states and processes (The Energies of Men, 1932, The Riddles of Life, 1938).

In so presenting the science of mind, McDougall was bound to dispute and reject many psychological theories, as already indicated. Perhaps, if not certainly, this was one of the main reasons why he was involved in endless controversies over various topics. Hand in hand with his rejection of the atomic structure of mental life, the sensationist doctrine, the associationist view, or the theory of ideas, went his refutation of the logic on which they were based, no longer acceptable to him. Also was the mechanical course of interpretation of the mental process. He abandoned the mental mechanics and "mental chemistry" of earlier psychologists. The repudiation of the laxity of the inadequate discussions concerning mind and mental processes was exquisitely thought out. The psychical realm, for example, McDougall represented with a structure and
structural laws of its own. The teleological character of this structure, in particular, is pressed into the foreground of the picture. A study of the different forms of consciousness led him to the conclusion that consciousness varies with "the novelty of the combination of neural processes involved." (18) The most developed animal, to McDougall, is one whose nervous system affords the greatest possibilities of new adaptation, of new relations among nerve tracts, and so of the most complex and intense consciousness." (19) Such views, which can be judged as still valid, permeated much of McDougall's subsequent research.

The essential characteristic of psychic life, however, is its purposiveness; it is dominated through and through by conative factors, by instincts, by impulses, by volitions. It may be said without fear of exaggeration that the important discoveries prompted by McDougall in the psychological field will remain among the lasting services rendered to this discipline. It cannot be denied that psychological investigation has been to a high degree stimulated and fertilised thereby. As indicated, most of his discussions are still viable.

(18) 'A Contribution towards an Improvement in Psychological Method' MIND, N.S., vol VII, (1898), pp 15-33, 159-178, 364-387 op cit, see also McDougall's Presidential Address (1920), op cit.

(19) ibid
The different sides of the doctrine, then, may be grasped from one unifying point of view - it is the idea of solidarity which everywhere is forced to the front. The mental and spiritual is something primary and underivable from anything non-mental. Therefore, it must be supposed that there is a universal and eternal mind unfolding itself in a world of dynamic creatures which follow a particular order - that of hormic nature.

From the point of view of consciousness, there are various theories in the current. Of these may be noted (Chapters XXXIII and XXXIV of An Outline of Abnormal Psychology 1926), (1) Dualistic, (2) Monistic, of which later in McDougall's view there may be either (a) Dualistic Interactionism, (b) Physical Monism, and (d) Psychophysical parallelism. The main rivals in the field are psychical monism and dualistic interactionism. The prime solvent of the difficulty appears to be the theory of character, of the integration of personality. The whole hierarchical structure is underlied by a monadic assumption, namely, that 'a monad is an ultimate reality, a being that is active in its own right, that the normal human personality is essentially a society of such monads, living in harmonious co-operation in virtue of the integration of them all into one system.' This seems to be an emphasis of the views incorporated in Body and Mind (1911). The advantage of the monadic view of personality is that it did not commit him to any
one metaphysical theory. Without ignoring the shortcomings of the book (Abnormal Psychology), it is regarded as decidedly interesting and worthwhile as 'a series of studies in Psychogenic Disorders (H S Starr (20) 1927)

On the hormic view, no mental operation or event lacks altogether the conative factor. This idea seems to have been constantly held throughout McDougall's handling of abnormal psychology. Various developments seem to have permeated his treatment of the subject, in the main three notable stages can now be pointed out.

1. The first phase starts with the publication of An Outline of Psychology (1923),
2. The second phase begins with the writing of An Outline of Abnormal Psychology (1926),
3. The third stage comes with the publication of a series of papers appearing between 1920 and 1938 (21). The three phases, however,

(20) A Review of McDougall's Outline of Abnormal Psychology, Psych Bull, vol XXIV, p 608
(21) (i) Four cases of 'Regression' in Soldiers' J Abnor Psych, vol X, (1920), pp 136-156
were heralded by the publication of *An Introduction to Social Psychology* (1908), which can be regarded as a treatise on socio-psychological studies and, to borrow G W Allport's description, a remarkable event in that the infant (social Psychology) was christened some years before it was born (22) The thesis contained in the book in question was completed in *The Group Mind* (1920), which Allport favourably designated as 'a macro-book on social structure and dynamics' (23) It was from these two books particularly, as well as from McDougall's other seminars that Allport gained some historical insights and an exposure to purposivism (24) Of the different stages, it may be said

1 In the first stage, the attempt was to distinguish the principles which govern the growth of the structure of mind Two great aspects of the organisation of the mind are indicated, namely, the logical structure (25) and the historical structure (26) The former grows in two chief ways (a) by differentiation of original

(22) *The Person in Psychology, op cit*, p 28
(23) *ibid*, p 30
(24) *ibid*, p 32
(25 and 26) *An Outline of Psychology, op cit*, pp 41-42, 309
germs, relatively simple and innately given mental dispositions differentiations achieved and perfected by innumerable acts of analytic discrimination (b) by occasional synthetic fusions of such systems achieved by acts of synthetic apperception. The latter (the historical structure) is the aspect of the total organisation, it is the product of innumerable acts of association resulting in formation of associative links or bonds. It must be noted here that this scheme does not describe mind as made up of aggregations of atoms of sensations, of feeling, of any stuff of consciousness. Rather it describes the distinguishable units of structure as mental dispositions the ultimate nature and substance of which it leaves open. It is these mental dispositions which grow and undergo differentiations and different conjunctions, to form smaller and larger systems these systems become linked with one another by a multitude of links of association. The structure of the mind that McDougall had in view can be validly translated into terms of cerebral structure. The mental dispositions and systems of dispositions are regarded as functional groups of neurones. On this idea an assumption appears to have been built, namely, that the associative links between systems are represented in the brain-structure by neural paths of cross-connexion between one system and another. This notion necessarily enjoins another
assumption, namely, the mental dissociation involves some kind of impairment or blocking, partial or complete, of the cross-connections. The neural continuity which is the ground of the unity of consciousness can be regarded as the opposite assumption of the dissociative standpoint. By the unity of consciousness McDougall finally meant the continuity of the field of energy-changes going on in the brain at any moment." (27) This seems to be quite consistent with his definition of mind, whereby it is stated that The mind of the individual organism is that which expresses itself in his experience and in his behaviour." (28)

2 It seems that in writing An Outline of Abnormal Psychology (1926), McDougall was tending to serve a twofold purpose: (1) to interpret hormically the mental disorders and the personality dissociations, taking the monadic assumption as a basis of explanation (11) to hold the balance between two rival tendencies regarding the question of behavioural aberration. A third point may also be added, that is, to elaborate the task already commenced in An Outline of Psychology (1923), namely, the functional relation between various

(28) An Outline of Psychology, (1923), op cit, p 35
parts of the total structure of mind, a theme which he had virtually ignored in the earlier volume. The essence of the undertaking is this: there obtain in the normally functioning mind, relations of dominance and subordination, these relations make of the total structure a unity in a further and higher sense, in a word, a hierarchical system. It is the due maintenance and functioning of these relations of self-regard or self-assertion and submission which integrate the whole organisation and make of it a truly harmonious working unity. This bipolar assumption, if it is correct to call it thus, seems to have been maintained by McDougall in order to match the Freudian concept of the ambivalence of love and hate respectively.

Now it is time to say something about (11). With regard to the explanation of mental disorders, there had been two diametrically opposed schools of thought. Of course, it can confidently be claimed that there had been as many distinctive schools of psycho-analysis as there had been psychological systems, but it appears that McDougall, although he concerned himself with all the views on mental disturbance, tried to assume a middle ground between what he called 'the Harvard school' and the Freudian concepts. The

(29) 'The Relations Between Dissociation and Repression'
Brit J Med Psychol, vol XVII (1938), p 141
former comprised notable psychologists like William James, Munsterberg, Morton Prince, and others. To the members of this school, the term 'Dissociation' was the master principle for all psycho-pathology. Sigmund Freud's key word, on the other hand, was 'Repression', which meant a process that seems to lie behind many neurotic symptoms and seems to be fundamental in many forms of disorder. In favouring the concept of dissociation, the members of the former school seem to have been influenced by Pierre Janet who lectured at Harvard University in 1906 on "Major Symptoms of Hysteria". These two schools, McDougall tended to reconcile and to take an eclectic attitude between the two terms. This is shown throughout An Outline of Abnormal Psychology. He gave due recognition and weight to both dissociation and repression, he also recognised and emphasised important relations between them. Repression is treated as a dynamic factor which in many cases prepares the way for and leads to/or causes dissociation. In either case, however, the relation is seen either in terms of neural or cerebral structure, as already indicated or, on the other hand, it can be viewed in the light of dynamic relations, which are essentially moral, or mental relations. For this reason, he intended to describe the structure of mind as

(30) ibid, p 141
composed of monads, each monad he conceived of as a mental unit, a relatively independent psychic being on this view, the integration of the human personality is regarded as consisting above all in the maintenance in one harmonious whole of the system of dynamic relations of self-assertion and submission. The logical and historical structural relations are looked on as instrumental aids to the unitary functioning of personality as a whole. This may be justified by quoting Spearman who rightly stated that "in no field have his (McDougall's) contributions been more fundamental than in that of character and personality." (31)

The way in which McDougall organised abnormal psychology in terms of the hormic principle appears to have impressed several authors. Notable among them are Freud, Morton Prince, Lundholm, a colleague of McDougall and a research officer to the McClean Mental Hospital in Massachusetts, and others. (32) In his later writings Freud seemed to

(31) 'The Life and Work of William McDougall' Character and Personality, vol 7, No 3, (1939), op cit, p 175
(32) See
(1) B J Med Psych, op cit, vol XVII, (1938)
(11) Hearnshaw, L S, A Short History of British Psychology, op cit, pp 191-193
have come nearer towards McDougall's teachings. Most of Freud's later discussions, which were tinged with a McDougallian quality, have been given special attention by his daughter Anna Freud. (33) Morton Prince (1854-1929), who already had been influenced by An Introduction to Social Psychology, was a thoroughgoing exponent of the hormic psychology. Lundholm seems to have whole heartedly accepted the fundamentals of McDougall's hormic psychology. In spite of the adverse criticisms, Lundholm presented regarding some of McDougall's explanations, he, in the main remained receptive to many of the essential issues. (35) It seems that McDougall could

(33) Inkeles, Alex, 'Psychoanalysis and Psychology" in Psychoanalysis, ed by Hook, Sidney, (1960), op cit, p 122


(11) Prince, Morton, Clinical and Experimental Studies in Personality, N Y, (1929), pp 123, 127

(iii) Allport, G W, Personality, N Y, Holt, (1937), op cit, Ch 12

(iv) Rapaport, David, Emotions and Memory, op cit, (1961), p 168

(35) see in particular Lundholm's works

(1) The Manic-Depressive Psychosis' Duke University Psychological Monographs, No 1, (1931)


(iii) Laboratory Neuroses Character and Personality, vol II, No 2, (1933)
treat the branch of abnormal psychology so ably, that he could leave a deep impression on such prominent researchers as Freud and Prince. The situation must be as seen by D B Klein (1951), of the University of South California, who has said that, It is enough to recall the way in which McDougall organised the field of abnormal psychology in terms of the hormic principle. More recently J A Hadfield (1966, 1967), once one of McDougall's students at Oxford (1900) and much influenced by him, clearly explained that, in his description of the instincts he (McDougall) presents us with a sound biological background for our study of the psycho-neuroses and psychotherapy. Hadfield accepts without

(36) 'Abnormal Psychology' in Theoretical Foundations of Psychology, ed by Helson, H, op cit, p 729


(11) (1967) Introduction to Psychotherapy, op cit, p 113

any reservation, McDougall's warning against the proclivity in the general thinking to consider mental functions as things. Having accepted such an admonition, Hadfield appears to have confounded the issue to some extent. The conflict stems from his statement that, If we are to avoid confusion, we must remember that all mental life is a process, a functioning (39). His argument would have been more tenable, had he rejoined that the mental functions are but indicative of a thinking mind as a conscious individual. To talk only of mental processes or mental states as abstracts, may convey nothing, unless such processes are related to a certain source—a mind.

3 The third period seems to represent a confirmation of views already expressed. The main thing to McDougall seemed to be to recognize the reality of a double system of relations between the parts of mental structure. (1) the associative links which maintain communications between all parts, (2) the dynamic relations of dominance which alone can secure integration of all mental functions. The emphasis is that dissociation is imperfection of the associative mechanism or structure. Conflict and repression are

(39) Dreams and Nightmares, op cit., p 57
affairs of the dynamic or moral relations between units. When this latter system of dynamic relations breaks down, the result will be 'disintegration', rather than dissociation. Without overlooking certain minor pitfalls, in its most detailed character, McDougall's theory of psycho-pathology seems to be sound, to some leading psychologists and psychoanalysts, as indicated, it fell on receptive ground. Lundholm, for example, made it a chief factor of his theories of confusional insanity and of the depressive psychosis.

In its application to the problems of education, the hormic Psychology is evidently quite viable. It was already accepted by some authoritative educators both in Britain and elsewhere. The theme expounded by McDougall appears to have opened up vistas and revitalised many aspects of educational theory. Through such a channel, McDougall's hormic influence on 'both the theory and the practice of teaching must have been incalculable' (40). Cyril Burt, 1939. Actually broad marks of the hormic teaching, as interpreted by McDougall, now find clear expression in the works of many notable educationalists, such as, for example, Nunn, who suggested

(40) *William McDougall* An Appreciation *B J Ed Psych*, vol IX, part I, p 6
the nomenclature of horme, Godfrey Thomson, F J Schonell,* Thorndike and Burt dealing with various social and educational problems, such as delinquency (1944), mental backwardness (1946), the subnormality of the mind (1955), Burt, for instance, took the inherited instinct as a basic principle of classification.

Delinquency as a bio-psycho-social phenomenon, has been the concern of many psychological, social and educational professions. In treating such a thorny phenomenon, Burt, whose work directly or indirectly has now tremendous influence on others such as J Bowlby (1951), A Cohen (1956)

* see Backwardness in the Basic Subjects, Edinburgh, Oliver and Boyd, (1942)

(41) The Young Delinquent, op cit, 4th ed, 1st published in 1925

(42) The Backward Child, op cit, 2nd ed, 1st published in 1937

(43) The Subnormal Mind, op cit, 1st published in 1935

(44) Maternal care and Mental Health, 1st ed, Geneva (World Health Organisation Monograph Series, No 2), then published in a Pelican ed

T C N Gibbens (1961), Harriett Wilson (1962), has basically taken 'inheritance as the sole and central key' to the problem Burt's firm belief has been that every action is generally thought to reside in some inherited psycho-physiological mechanisms, which are common to all individuals of the species. Such a trend of thinking, which is traceable back to Darwin via McDougall's specific emphasis and amplification, implies the notion that the tendencies inherited impel each child, from the earliest time of his life, to behave in certain ways. The impelling factors to such a type of behaviour are instincts, and the list that Burt relied upon is the one worked out by McDougall in particular, and 'An instinct, as Woodworth wrote, may be thought of as a basic motive to action, even when the action itself is learned.


(47) Delinquency and Child Neglect, London, George Allen and Unwin

(48) The Young Delinquent, op cit, p 29

(49) ibid, p 426

(50) Psychology A Study of Mental Life, op cit, p 221
The question that is bound to be asked is the relation of instincts to juvenile aberrations or what Burt has called the petty delinquencies of the modern city child. It can be said with T C N Gibbens that delinquency may be considered as the result of the individual's failure to cope with his internal controls or his external social controls, or both but the difficulty implied in such a notion is that it has not specified sufficiently what the internal motives are, which really motivate young individuals to offend against society. Still further, delinquency ranges from the most trivial piece of behaviour to the most serious conduct which can be described as a real crime, such as murder. In each case, however, the bio-psycho-social problems involved are so complicated that it is hard to isolate one factor from another. Burt is apparently aware of such a question when he decided to relate the whole issue of delinquency to a basically inherited element, namely, instinct, without, of course, excluding the other factors such as the environment, the social involvements, the bad company which might induce the young to misbehave or encourage a formerly convicted one to be recidivist. It is all important to

(51) The Young Delinquent, op cit, p 421

(52) Trends in Juvenile Delinquency, op cit, p 22
realise what Smith (1968a) has called 'the social context of adult behaviour' and how complicated it may be. This is particularly so, because of the early impressions to which the young individual is first exposed. Judging from his own experiments and observations, as well as from others' works, Smith (1968a) has stated that, "there is evidence that the type of attachment achieved in early life and indeed the failure to achieve an attachment, may have important consequences for the subsequent normality of the individual. (55) Considering, of course, the 'intense biological interest', and 'the differences in evolutionary development between the various species, Smith (1968a) has clarified an essential point by writing that it is natural that many people concerned with delinquency and the impaired emotional and intellectual development of children, should look to studies with other species and particularly mammalian species, for possible cues for insight and research. (56)

Thus, believing in instincts as strong impulses to action, Burt reached his general formulation that, 'The commoner

(53) Imprinting, MSS, op cit, p 101

(54) see for example, W H Thorpe, Learning and Instinct in Animals, op cit, pp 129-30, 281-2, 409

(55) Imprinting, op cit, p 5

(56) ibid, pp 5-6
delinquencies committed by the young are apparently either the
direct expression of a few primitive and universal impulses which
seem to have been handed down to us as part of our instinctive
equipment, or else modified reactions elaborated out of, but still
ultimately springing from, these cruder males of emotional
response' (57) The instinctive acts, particularly in human beings,
are invariably accompanied by their own characteristic feelings or

(57) op cit , p 22

see also

(1) Erikson, E H , Childhood and Society, Pelican ed ,
(1965), pp 252-253, 298-299

(11) Winnicott, D W , The Child, the Family, and the Outside
World, Pelican ed , (1965), chapter 15,
"Instincts and Normal Difficulties ,
chapter 34, 'Aspects of Juvenile
Delinquency' and chapter 35, 'Roots of
Aggression

(111) Sandstrom, C I , The Psychology of Childhood and
Adolescence, Pelican ed , (1966),
pp 211-212, 225-226

(iv) Miller, W B , 'Lower Class Culture as a Generating
Milieu of Gang Delinquency ', in
Children's Behaviour Disorders, ch 5,
ed by Quay, H C , Insight Books,
D Van Nostrand, Princeton (1968)
emotions, which Burt has defined as the conscious aspects of curtailed instincts (58). Burt's generalisation above is based on his specific studies in which he found that 59.4% of the delinquents he dealt with were motivated by specific instincts. High emotionality among such delinquents was 48.2% against only 11.7% of non-delinquents.

The significance of the above discussion was to show that in its insistence on the recognition of instinct, the hormic Psychology was trying to indicate the real, explanatory reasons behind any bit of behaviour. The essential point is that hormic Psychology concerned itself with both the form of activity and the outcome that follows from the activity performed. This can enable the hormic theory to claim that it is really a many-sided one so that it can assimilate a large scale of behavioural patterns. So the whole question is not as N S Sutherland (59) (1958), has stated that, it is usually the results of a person's behaviour which we are interested in rather than the exact form of the behaviour. Quite contrary to what Sutherland has maintained,

(58) The Young Delinquent, op cit., p 423
(59) Motives as Explanations Mind, N S, vol LXVIII, No 270, p 158, cf A R White
'The Language of Motives Mind, N S, vol LXVII, (1957), No 266, pp 258-263
hormic Psychology, at which basis comes instinct, takes the results of behaviour as chief criteria for identifying the prime urges which underlie that particular behaviour So in the aberrations of the young delinquent, it is instincts and the sentiments deriving from them which are to be looked for as the main tendencies behind the crimes committed It is the directions, in which such impulses are the chief motivating factors, that are to be considered, and the remedy would be far easier, once the intrinsic cause is identified

Like the psychologist, the psychiatrist and the social worker, the educator, too, finds in hormic Psychology a great help for resolving many educational problems To the educator, to quote D Kennedy-Frazer, 'it is sufficient to know that instinctive

(60) see for example, T Percy Nunn's Education Its Data and First Principles, (1920) In fact, Nunn's reputation as an educator is largely attributed to his adoption of McDougall's hormic principle based on instincts (J W Tibble 1961, 'Sir Percy Nunn 1870-1944' in Brit J Ed Studies, vol X, No 1, pp 58-75, The Study of Education, (1967), London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, ch I, pp 11-12, 13-14) As already indicated, other well known psychologists and educators such as, for example, Charles Spearman, Godfrey Thomson, were tremendously influenced by McDougall and adopted his position
tendencies are inherited, and they are subject to control and
modification (61) The importance of instincts has been realised
by the educator, because 'they are the chief incentives to action,
and consequently to learning, in the child' (62) It is now fully
realised that the growth of behaviour, in its biologically
essential forms, 'tends to go in an orderly, cumulative way', (63)
as Arthur Gates (1933) indicated. By 'cumulative way', apparently
Gates meant the experience gained in the individual's life-time,
and this is maturation which, as Hadfield (1962) conceives it, is
'the development of innate patterns in ordered sequence'; (64) this
in turn is based on instincts which Hadfield (1967) has defined
as 'innate potentialities of response'; (65) and prime activators to
action. The significance of the whole argument however, implies
what Mary L Northway (1940) called scheme (66) which is usually
displayed in the pattern of behaviour, and strength of purpose. (67)

1st published in 1923, p 39

(62) Ibid, p 39

Co, p 137

(64) Childhood and Adolescence, Pelican ed, p 29

(65) Introduction to Psychopathology, London, George Allen and Unwin,
op cit, p 115

(66) 'The Concept of the Schema Psych, vol XXXI, part I, pp 34ff

(67) 'The Relationship of Occupation to Personality BJ Psych,
vol XXXI, part 4, p 298
to use an expression by M D Vernon (1941) In education, the ultimate aim is the insightful plan to activity and the determination to fulfill an action spontaneously. Such a position seems to be constantly maintained.

The paramount importance of instinctive dispositions is to provide the main motive power in the individual's mental equipment. An interesting analogy, which strikingly reflects McDougall's exact notion, is given by Kennedy-Frazer, (68) who wrote, 'If a human being be for the moment compared to a ship at sea, then the currents of the sea and the trade winds may represent the traditions and customs of the society in which he lives, while the engines and propeller of the ship would represent the instincts which serve to drive or urge him on, and finally the captain on the bridge and the steering mechanism might represent his intellect.' Thus, Kennedy-Frazer concludes his paragraph, "the chief purpose of the instinctive tendencies is to supply the primary motive power in the mental life of the individual.

(68) *The Psychology of Education, op cit*, p 39
The related question now is what relation instincts have to the educative process. As is well known, there is a strong connection between education and heredity, for, to quote Smith (1968a), 'wherever in nature there is an issue of survival, evolutionary development has made more than adequate or at least, more than minimum provision and instinct, as an hereditary unit, represents an evolutionary continuity and a measure of economy. Education constantly emphasised certain aspects in the process of learning and teaching, namely, hereditary factors, past experience, present and future adjustment to given situations. Still further, intellectual aspects, the perceptual elements, and the emotional ingredients are highly emphasised in any educational consideration. Such items as these are all involved in any instinct. An instinct, as McDougall's classical definition implies, is comprised of a threefold natural tendency - a tendency to pay attention to and perceive certain objects to be instigated about the objects perceived, and

(69) Imprinting, MSS, p 51

(70) see for example


(11) Hirst, P H, Educational Theory', The Study of Education, op cit, ch II

accordingly to perform certain specific movements profitable to the individual and the species. This is one of the vital imports that education normally stressed.

Once the instinctive dispositions are understood by the teacher, for example, none of them can be regarded as an interfering factor thwarting his efforts. Both in learning and teaching processes, instincts should be given their proper outlet in the child's activities, and not deprived of the appropriate channelization. It is almost always emphasised in the educative process that the formation of habits is of utmost importance in teaching, but it must be remembered that habits, in fact, are born of instinctive tendencies. It may be argued that the habit of smoking, for instance, satisfies a sort of craving, but a hormist such as McDougall would persistently insist upon deeper inquiry. The hormist would contend that the habit is initiated because it serves some aspect of an inborn tendency, so an acquired habit is always sustained by an innate factor. So when it happens that a child starts smoking, such a habit can be explained as an expression of self assertion or self-display, which, in effect, is one of the inherited instincts. Good habits, then, can be inculcated in the young learner, if his instinctive dispositions are fully understood. Another example is that the hoarding instinct can well be utilized for educational purposes such as, for instance,
in the study of geography. A child who shows an interest in collecting material like stamps or butterflies and the like can be encouraged to develop such a good tendency which could directly and indirectly help the process of learning.

A third example may be given now, namely, the instinct of curiosity can be properly used as one of the greatest incentives to the intellectual performance. Such a natural curiosity is not to be repressed, but to be allowed its normal outlet, indeed, here the teacher can employ this channel so that he can lead the child to learn as much as possible by his own. Furthermore, the instinct of curiosity is not to be treated as an item by its own, with it there are other instincts blended, for instinctive mechanisms, as described by McDougall, are not sharply separated as it might mistakenly be concluded from his arguments. In point of fact, McDougall's hormic discussions of instincts in many ways confirmed and correctedelan vital, which Nunn(71) made the basis of his hromic education, the instinctive mechanisms have also been corrective to the more nebulous libido principle. Evidently, Smith(72) (1960a) has this in view when he has stated that, "it would be difficult to isolate curiosity as a separate tendency from the

(71) Education Its Data and First Principles, (1920), op cit

(72) Explanation of Human Behaviour, op cit., p 150
manifestation of the instincts of Escape, Reproduction, Self-Assertion, the Gregarious and the Parental Instincts. The difficulty still is, to quote Smith again, to distinguish the operation of the Instinct of Pugnacity, the Instinct of Acquisition, the Gregarious Instinct and the Instinct of Construction from the Instinct of Self-Assertion. True, long familiarity with the individual within fairly consistent situations might improve the reliability of the observer's classifications Smith 1960a, p 151 yet there are certain complications or what Smith (1960a) has called 'the masking effect of pathological developments which have to be considered. Such complications as over-compensation or displacement of the affect may render the task more difficult (Smith 1960a, p 151). Such an array of instincts inherent in the individual's constitution can well be exploited in his education. The driving forces or the hormic urges are to be given the first priority in education so long as they are the deeply-rooted factors of the mental activity.

The views that have just been explained now are explicitly maintained by other notable authors such as Godfrey H. Thomson

(73) ibid, pp 150-151

(74) Instinct, Intelligence and Character, reprinted in 1946, op cit, pp 13ff, 16ff, 28ff
(1924), M W Keatinge\(^{(75)}\) (1924) of Oxford University, J Drever\(^{(76)}\) (Snr , 1931), C W Valentine\(^{(77)}\) (1942), Charles Fox\(^{(78)}\) (1955) of Cambridge University, and others \(^{(79)}\) All of them recognised the over-riding importance of the inherited tendencies and urged that they should be used as good educational tools.


\(^{(76)}\) Introduction to the Psychology of Education, London, Edward Arnold, \(\text{op cit}\), pp 56ff, 93ff, 212ff

\(^{(77)}\) The Psychology of Early Childhood, London, Methuen, pp 1-2, 35, 108, 128


\(^{(79)}\) See for example


Some writers such as, for example, T Raymont (1922), William Boyd (1930), K S Cunningham (1938), J Hemming (1948), consider education in the light of the emphasis it lays on the methods it uses as techniques which allow the child's active movement and make him utilize his own initiative. Such an attitude is, in fact, traceable back to the nineteenth century, if not earlier, when the climate of thought in Britain resulted in what was called 'the Renaissance of the Child' (84). This eventually led to what has come to be called the 'child-centred' movement in education rather than the teacher-centred era.

(81) Towards a New Education, London
(82) Education for complete Living, London
(83) Teach them to Live, London
(84) T Raymont, op cit., p 67
(85) (1) The New Era, vol 38, No 4, (1957), p 63
The whole notion seems to be based on the psychological emphasis, namely, the child must feel security and must be treated as a developing creature rather than as a mature adult. Consequently, the curriculum is expected to be organised on a freer basis, with some more allowance for the child's interests and mental motors and capacity. Such a tendency appears to find much support now in McDougall's hormic explanations, chiefly via the emphasis of educators such as Nunn, Burt and others. As a matter of fact, the publication of Nunn's *Education Its Data and First Principles* (1920), which is both indicative of McDougall's influence and reflective of his hormic position, gave, in J W Tibble's (1967) specific words, the 'new' movement in education 'an academic underpinning and justification and lifted the 'principles of education' out of its dreary preoccupation with school management and methods.


In his Presidential Address, Seth (1968) has drawn attention to 'a genuinely biological way of thinking, in which the fundamental importance of the fact of transmission will be adequately acknowledged. In the second place, Seth has invited consideration of the recognition that the study of man as a social organism, far from permitting ignorance or neglect of biology, most properly demands a biological starting-point and a continuing biological frame of reference in order to achieve a full understanding of the facts of cultural evolution at the human level. Seth, however, seems to be concerned about stressing 'values' which he regards as 'matter for psychological interest and enquiry so long as these values directly affect human behaviour. To him these values are facts, and in so far as they are held and striven for by human beings, they are facts that influence, in part determine, behaviour. In fact, Seth's

(87) Dissonance and Stress in the Teaching of Psychology Some Reflections of the Accidental Psychologist Presidential Address delivered at the Annual Conference of the British Psychological Society at Sheffield 1968, p 152

(88) ibid, p 150

(89) ibid, p 150
observations are reminiscent of McDougall's scale of values (1932) as determiners of man's behaviour. Four levels of such a valuative scale McDougall depicted briefly, they are, (1) the level of "untamed native tendencies" This lowest level of behaviour is the expression of valuation characteristic of childhood (2) Next comes the level of the values of sentiments rivetted on concrete objects, such as the family or the country (3) At the third level follows the values of sentiments for abstract things, such as justice, for example (4) At the highest level man is most of the time led by values which by reflection and experience give him guidance in all sorts of behaviour

Indeed, the special consideration that McDougall gave to instincts, emotions, habits, sentiments, tastes, values, and the like, are regarded as the essential preliminaries to a full treatment of educational and social psychology and the moral issues in relation to such disciplines The recognition by McDougall of, for instance, a wide range of emotions as the

(90) The Energies of Men, op cit, pp 305-6
accompaniments of instincts has its value in education as well as in ethics. In doing so, McDougall's work is evaluated by H. Rashdall (1921) as of the greatest originality. Rashdall was impressed by McDougall's sponsoring of emotions, because he believed, with McDougall, that the origin of the actual moralities is to be found in the extended range of the emotions. He therefore regarded McDougall as the exponent of emotionalism in Ethics.\(^{(93)}\)

In the foreground, however, of most of McDougall's discussions comes the problem of motivation and behaviour at large. While it is stressed that the ultimate source of all mental energy is to be traced to a limited number of innate biological impulses, an equal emphasis is placed on the effects of personal experience.

\(^{(91)}\) See for example

(1) Drever, J (Snr), *Introduction to the Psychology of Education*, *op cit*, pp 93ff, 212ff

(11) Kennedy-Fraser, *Psychology of Education*, *op cit*, pp 40ff


\(^{(92)}\) "Is Conscience An Emotion?" *The Hibbert Journal*, vol XIX, No 3, (1921), p 450 cf McDougall's article of the same title and in the same volume of this Journal, pp 279-295

\(^{(93)}\) ibid, p 450, see also, p 449
and environmental impacts. This seems to be so because, to cite Seth (94) again, the very word 'behaviour' implies a context, an environment in which the organism 'behaves', and with which it interacts, and not merely a stimulus or set of stimuli to which the organism 'responds'. With that end in view, the behaviour of man is sought to be interpreted in terms of dynamic concepts within the context of the environment to which Seth has referred. Of course, the purposive nature of man is the central core in McDougall's hormic system. Perhaps the single most important aspect of McDougall's viewpoint, to quote Cofer and Appley (1965), for motivation, is his continued insistence on the purposive and striving, or impulse-driven, character of behaviour (95). This hormic side as herein indicated, led later investigations, such as Hull, Tolman, Woodworth and others to stress in their writings certain concepts of motivations, especially the concept of drive (96). It is in this sense that the vitalistic and teleological ideas

(94) Presidential Address, op cit, p 152

(95) Motivation Theory and Research, op cit, p 40

(96) (1) Peters, R S, Brett's History of Psychology, op cit, pp 665-66

(11) Cofer, C N and Appley, M H, Motivation Theory and Research, op cit, pp 39-41
emphasise the all-importance of the activity of the organism as a
spontaneously active individual. In such a stress, the vitalistic,
purposive views 'have kept alive and made of central importance
the viewpoint that organisms are active rather than passive
participants in their interactions with the environment. This
active participation is due to innate, impulsive forces which
figure significantly in survival and development.' (97) (Cofer and
Appley, 1965) This again clearly reflects McDougall's concern
about maintaining the evolutionary point of view which is
accentuated in the writings of many recent authors, namely,
J Bronowski (98) (1961), Frank A Beach (99) (1966), Smith (100) (1960a,
1968a), Seth (101) (1968)

(97) Motivation Theory and Research, op cit, p 40
(98) Introduction In Banton, M, (Ed), Darwinism and the Study of
Society, pp ix-xx, London, Tavistock Publications, also referred to by G Seth Presidential
Address, Bull B Psych Soc, (1968), op cit, p 153
(99) The Perpetuation and Evolution of Biological Science Amer
Psych, vol XXI, pp 943-949, also referred to by Seth as above, p 153
(100) (1) Explanation of Human Behaviour, op cit, pp 8, 21, 122, 180,
185
(11) Imprinting, MSS
2 Discussion and Some Conclusions

Perhaps Smith is right in observing that 'The history of Psychology does not reveal the same impressive step-like progression which is apparent in Physics as one hypothesis is clearly displaced by another which is more defensible in view of the evidence available.' (102) Smith's cautiousness is based upon the notion that it is difficult, if not impossible, to isolate the psychological factors, which directly affect behaviour, from other elements such as genetics', 'bio-chemistry', endocrinology, history and tradition and so forth (103) Despite all this, however, the subject matter of Psychology, does not appear to have changed fundamentally. Psychology was and is still meant to deal with any range of human behaviour and experience, extending even to the mode of acquisition and the functioning of human value-systems, as Seth has explained. In point of fact, McDougall (105) (1905, 1912),

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(102) *Explanation of Human Behaviour*, op cit, p 5
(103) ibid, p 5
(104) *Bull B Psych Soc*, vol 21, (1968), op cit, p 150
(105) (1) *A Primer of Physiological Psychology*, op cit,
(11) *Psychology: The Study of Behaviour*, op cit,
already defined psychology as the study of behaviour, whereof he meant the positive conduct of the human being as determined by form or purpose and desire. By so defining behaviour, McDougall definitely differentiated it from a materialistic view of life conceived just in terms of stimulus-response mechanisms and conditioned reflexes.

So it can be said, then, that McDougall endeavoured to bring the science of Psychology 'closest to the humanities', to employ S. Koch's (1961) specific expression. He tried to transfer psychology from its mere descriptive and mechanistic phase to the stage of being concerned with the dynamic problem of human activity, and dynamic psychology cannot be satisfied with the overt explanations of behavioural repertoire, but it delves behind the real issues of motivation. When in the early 1920's he was invited by Watson to lecture to his class in Psychology, McDougall's final words to the class were, "If then you must be behaviourists, I beg that you will be purposive behaviourists" (107).

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(106) 'Psychological Science versus the science-humanism Antinomy Intimations of a significant science of Man, Amer Psych., vol XVI, pp 629-639, also referred to by G Seth, Bull B Psych Soc, vol 21 (1968), p 149.

Without being inclined to reject introspection, McDougall stressed the importance of objective methods. Yet he never limited himself entirely and rigidly to objective observations. In doing so, he intended to stave off any mechanical view that might over-ride the animal's behaviour in general. Perhaps this is why McDougall's work has been credited with considerable influence in this respect, as Woodworth (1965) has remarked. With the publication of *Introduction to Social Psychology* (1908) and McDougall's other persistent arguments, there was introduced order and a true basis for the interpretation of behaviour. A psychological foundation for the social sciences was also provided. To quote Woodworth once again, "Up to that time, the psychologists had made no serious attempt to provide such a foundation but had left each historian or economist or sociologist to improvise a psychology for his own use." (109)

To the question of aim or end-oriented behaviour, the reply is implied in the powerful motives and their variety which lead to securing the desired goal. A motive, as McDougall defined, is a tendency working upon the level of self-conscious reflective


(109) ibid, p 338
action (110) In hemic psychology, he advocated, among other words, the terms tendency, 'striving, and conation as most suitable terms because they subserve the necessary similarities between the lower and the higher forms of activity. He tried to avoid the usage of the word impulse since it implies the notion of 'sudden brief activity' (111) In a purposively motivated behaviour, then, there must be a conscious aim, even if that aim is vaguely conceived. McDougall "did at least develop a system of terms appropriate for a description and explanation of human actions", as R S Peters (1958) has put it. In his remark, Peters is referring to propensity', ability', 'trait' (this is mainly used by Allport), 'character', temperament' and some other terms.

However, the essential importance of man's motives in the explanation of behaviour had been recognised by many authors, such as, for example, Ward, Shand, Lloyd, Morgan, Stout, and others Yet it never occurred to those thinkers to make motivation a popular or central principle, and this is where McDougall, again, could be credited. As R C Bolles (1967) of Washington University has observed

(110) The Energies of Men, op cit, p 135
(111) ibid, p 136
The importance which McDougall attached to active or dynamic principles in human behaviour was all the more remarkable because he had little precedent for it. The obvious answer as to why a human being acts in a particular way is to find the end towards which an activity is directed and to seek the rules according to which it functions. It is for such a mode of hormic thinking, perhaps, that B.B. Wolman (1965) has recorded that psychology has to give credit to McDougall for his searching spirit and for his daring effort to understand human behaviour. His emphasis on emotional and irrational elements in human behaviour introduced a refreshing breeze in psychological research. His idea of purposeful behaviour was taken up by G. Allport and many outstanding behaviourists such as Hull and Tolman.

Appreciating McDougall's hormic position, Wolman added further, 'Although not too many contemporary psychologists are McDougall's disciples, very many are indebted to him for the wealth of ideas and problems that he has introduced in contemporary psychology.'

It can be said that there seems to be a tendency towards revitalising McDougall's hormic theory of motivation. From the

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(113) Theory of Motivation, op cit., p 89

(114) Contemporary Theories and Systems in Psychology, op cit., p 184

(115) Ibid, p 184
flood of literature which has been written recently, there appears to be a deep interest in its vivification. This may be justified by citing once again what Bolles (116) has stated. It would seem, he writes, 'that McDougall made what may have been an indispensable contribution to the development of our thinking about motivation. As it is usually maintained by the mentalistic psychologists such as Sully, Stout, and others, behaviour is to be explained (1) in terms of the reasons assigned for selecting the things to be done, or (11) the factors which affect the question of choice of the activity. McDougall was capable of combining both elements, so that the motivational theory would have been different had he not expounded and zealously defended it. It seems possible that motivation theory would bear little resemblance to its current form if McDougall had not held the theoretical position he did, nor written as insistently and persistently as he did about this position', (117) as Bolles has written. This hormic stand could be regarded as proving valid and defensible, particularly if it is borne in mind that McDougall was writing at a time when (1) Psychology (118)

(116) Theory of Motivation, op cit, p 90
(117) ibid, p 90
(118) See Bolles, op cit, p 90
was almost entering a materialistic phase where teleology and mental life were rarely accounted for, (11) the physiological conditioning and methodology were forming a central issue in psychological theory and (111) above all, when behaviourism was at its peak, Amid all this welter, it was McDougall who reminded us that man can be characterised by his purposiveness, and his emotional life, (119) to quote Bolles again.

The real issue is that many of the modern schools of psychology are dynamic in their approach. They emphasise the fact that personality in particular and the individual in general contain their own innate potentialities. Freud in his libido, Jung in his collective unconscious and archetypes, Adler in his urge to power, Janet in his psychic energy, and many other individual writers such as H A Murray who borrows heavily from McDougall, are all dynamic (120). Among them, McDougall's approach is especially

(119) *ibid*, p 90

(120) See

(1) Hadfield, J A, *Introduction to Psychotherapy*, *op cit*, p 113

(11) *Dreams and Nightmares*, *op cit*, p 42


credited with (1) his distinction between tastes and sentiments. In doing so, McDougall showed what R S Peters (121) (1958) has described as, indicating much more conceptual clarity than is displayed by modern hedonists. By "modern hedonists", Peters presumably meant Freud and his disciples, on the ground of their treatment of the limited number of instincts and their relation to motivation. (2) In his hormic dealings, McDougall clearly classified the main sorts of goals. (3) In his inclination to use the principles of 'conative unity', (122) and 'conative persistence', McDougall showed that activities are to be interpreted in terms of an all-important end.

In his hormic theory, McDougall always reminded his readers that behaviour cannot be analysed into pieces, like his more methodologically sophisticated follower, Tolman. (123) Peters, McDougall insisted that purposive behaviour was irreducible. Despite this 'rather ambitious theory of instincts', and in spite of pushing the purposive model too far' in ascribing foresight even

(121) The Concept of Motivation, op cit, p 150
(122) An outline of Psychology, op cit, p 277, see also
Peters, The Concept of Motivation, op cit, pp 50ff
(123) The Concept of Motivation, op cit, p 150
to the lower animals, McDougall is regarded as being much more on the right lines than many modern theorists of motivation, (124) Behaviour as a whole is chiefly due to motivating energies which urge the individual towards certain aims to be achieved. In McDougall's scheme, the rule-following purposive method is basic in explaining the human acts. The term purpose represents a unique relation between the behaving subject and the object sought after, it represents a relation of conative and conscious striving. A purposefully motivated action is an action which is desired from within. For McDougall, a purpose is a desire accepted and approved after self-conscious deliberation. In its fullest sense, it is the enduring consequence of an act of volition, (125)

Within the context of hormé, a definite trend of psychology has been offered in which motivation is given a certain direction. Purpose and teleology have an essential role in the activities of both the animals and man in the domain of mental events. Hormic functions exist in all manifestations of life, both conscious and unconscious. Hormic functionalism, to cite

(124) ibid, p 150
(125) The Energies of Men, op cit, p 137.
W M O'Neil (1968), is concerned with mind in action with a person coping with his surroundings responding to them and working on them so that he might survive in them" (126) Vitalistically and hormically considered, there is more life in the organism's behaviour, and the history of life is to be regarded as a continuation of activity for some purpose. The conceptions of the adaptability of the individual and the unique unity of the whole organism, both stressed by Darwin, have become the central core of hormic functionalism. This would suggest that hormically purposive psychology is strongly blended with biological flavour McDougall, 'whose influence upon British Psychology has been considerable' (127) (W Sluckin 1960), insisted that psychological methods such as objective observations, physiological considerations, mentalistic concepts and the like, should all be accounted for Thus the commodity of the hormic theory is reflected Within the dynamically hormic concept, purposivism is regarded as basic to behaviour, which is considered as an expression of mental life. Springs of motivation at large are to be looked for

(127) Minds and Machines, Pelican ed, p 204
The motivating factors are both physiological and psychical in character yet in their distinctive feature, such energizing motives are mental. To use O'Neil's specific words, these mental activators are seeking not pushing.

Interestingly, McDougall intended to anchor his hormic theory on inherently directing predispositions which are flexible enough to allow for self-regulated acts. In doing so, he could provide broad bases for different kinds of activities. A justification can be found in Smith's (1960a) own words whereby he has stated that, "The fertility of the system (McDougall's system) in providing reasons for all types of behaviour in this way and the ease with which the architectural conception lends itself to presentation have probably contributed to its great vogue." (129)

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(128) *op cit*, p 138

(129) *Explanation of Human Behaviour, op cit*, p 127
CHAPTER XI

SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS AND GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

1 Certain Elements indicated

It must be noted that the concept of horme, which is basic to the whole system of McDougall, is one of the major theoretical forerunners of the current dynamic perceptual psychology. In its modern logic, the hormic theory owes its establishment and development to McDougall. He was able to make the logical foundation of the exact hormic psychology a matter of enquiry. Through his arguments and discussions, the whole area of this province was subjected to a thoroughgoing systematization. It can be said that he made an epoch in the history of hormic psychology, not only as regards the new methodical foundations of the subject, but also in respect of the vast extension of its field of work. Such an extension and variability are presented in his wide intellectual range which is reflected by his polemical books, numerous articles, papers, and many experiments— all represent a phase of a long conflict between opposing schools of thought. Tentatively judged, however, it could be stated that McDougall endeavoured to build a system which will remain, denoting one of the most articulate efforts of hard thinking and
protracted experimentation, the purport of which is to find an acceptable explanation to the real reasons underlying the behaviour of the animals and to solve, if possible, the enigma of human identity, as a certain writer\(^1\) has put it recently (1968)

There seem to be various elements that contributed in one way or another to prepare the background of the hormic theory (1) On the negative side, materialism may be mentioned. According to this doctrine, nature was ultimately explicable in physical terms. To this McDougall was opposed on the ground that nature, which is life in the proper sense, cannot be explained merely in terms of physical phenomena, and it should not be subject to mechanistic causations. Hormically conceived, nature is life and purpose.

(2) Extreme neo-Darwinism was another dogma that McDougall was obliged to re-think certain possibilities, if not acceptable to every psychologist, they could at least fall on the receptive ground of his disciples and supporters. The essence of his own contentions is that as function derives from the purposive activities of organisms, purposive striving, then, they must have a role in the formulation of evolution. Vitalistically explained, in McDougall's discussions, function appears to have been used in what H. Driesch\(^2\)

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\(^1\) Williams, Emlyn, *Beyond Belief*, World Books ed, p 51

\(^2\) The Science and Philosophy of the Organism, *op cit*, p 134
(1929) the 'proper' and the 'harmonious' sense. The former means that the function of any organic cell is that which it immediately performs. The latter indicates the effect of the performance of that cell upon the organism as a whole. Presumably, such an outlook, among others mentioned before, motivated McDougall to urge a new look at the Lamarckian hypothesis. The flavour of his Lamarckianism, however, led him to some arbitrary experiments and those experiments are interesting for the fundamental issues they raised.

(3) A third factor that seems to have determined McDougall's hormic position was the issue regarding the interpretation of behaviour. Two main views were in the field—nativism and empiricism. The argument was whether to explain behaviour in terms of innate dispositions, or whether to understand it in terms of the impact of past experience and the outcomes of adaptability. Viewed from the broader aspect of his basic approach, it will be apparent that McDougall was very much favouring nativism. Within the scope of hormicism, nativism is regarded as a part of mentalism and innate dispositions (instincts) are considered as manifestations of the stuff of mind. No wonder then that he formulated his neat theory of instincts, and the word 'teleology', implying that behaviour is directed toward ultimate goals, became his epithet. It was within the frame of such a tendency that McDougall's purposive hormic psychology was
shaped

Yet there were some frustrations and McDougall felt them bitterly. Such frustrations were due to various factors: (1) His intellectual 'arrogance', (2) to which he himself admitted, combined with a tendency to scepticism, led him to stand against many theories. Consequently he found himself in opposition to certain currents. This normally compelled him to play for the most part the role of a lone fighter. (3) At the time he was trying to contribute to the advancement of Psychology at Oxford, he was invited to lecture in America. There he found himself combating behaviourism which was at the height of its popularity. He therefore could not find ample time to concentrate on real psychological issues. (4) Perhaps McDougall's hormic psychology was not especially associated with a particular method or a certain technique of investigation. He himself at times felt very keenly the absence of a recognised band of followers who fervently accepted the main principles he had laid down.

Despite all the difficulties, however, McDougall was able to produce an orderly scheme for the understanding of orectic life from its simplest to its most complex manifestations. The scheme, which has been adopted wholly or partially by many other authors, he could ably use in all his subsequent writings and

(3) History of Psychology in Autobiography, vol I, op. cit., p 204
emphasised throughout. So his hormically broad system may in retrospect attain the status of a highly established school of thought. Perhaps he did not realise the full degree of the influence he was exerting and which lasted after him. The incompatibilities between himself and others such as the Freudians, the Gestalt School, and the Behaviourists, both old and new, (Smith (4) 1960a) might in certain cases and with some reflection reveal possibilities of bridging the gap between his views and those of others.

A theme with which hormic Psychology dealt repeatedly and with thoroughness is that of innate dispositions (instincts), which is basic to McDougall's motivational system. The consistency of behaviour of both human beings and animals led McDougall to postulate instincts as the major activators of activity. On this view, the most fundamental feature of all human activity is goal-searching, the simplest form of which is to be found in instincts. The question, however, amounts to whether or not, or to what extent McDougall really had insisted that all human conduct should be hinged to a particular instinct or to a constellation of instincts. As a matter of fact, he had an extensive superstructure for his system. (5)

(4) Explanation of Human Behaviour, op cit, part I, chapters VI-X, part III, chapters XI-XIV

(5) ibid, p 213
Such a broader basis would permit him to draw upon other issues such as, to quote Smith (1960a), "The striving after receding ideals and the subjugation of other wants are definitely consistent with his notion of the Ethical Self and the assumption of the hormic or purposive nature of all human behaviour." (6) Yet the instinctive action, which McDougall stressed almost throughout, seems to be purposive. It is teleological, and not rigidly stereotyped, it is flexible, adaptable to a degree corresponding with the degree of intelligence of the creature. It was McDougall who first drew attention to, and emphatically stressed such a (7) relation. To neglect such goal-directedness of behaviour is considered as an error in hormic psychology since (i) the concept of instinct insists that the human being is endowed with inborn tendencies, and (ii) the theory of such innate dispositions allows for their classification under a number of specific headings. In McDougall's system, then, instincts form useful tools for describing human behaviour.

(6) ibid, p 213

A question which McDougall himself raised(8) was whether the instinctive dispositions are inherited as 'simple unit factors', or, again, whether they are predisposed by heredity to become organised and common to all men. When talking about the organised instincts, McDougall naturally meant the sentiments broadly, in their restricted sense they are now called by some writers, namely, F V Smith, 'attachments'. Such wonders, McDougall restated in a broader way: 'What is the innate basis of the special intellectual aptitudes which distinguish one man from another and often seem to run in families and to crop out in various members of successive generations?'(9) he asked. Two points are now to be indicated (1) The above questions are not to be interpreted as reflective of doubts that McDougall had in mind about the issues he was discussing rather they should be explained as an extension of further emphasis (2) It is obvious that an evolutionary position is maintained, according to which position, the innateness of instincts is preserved throughout the successive generations'.

In hormic Psychology, the purposive action can properly be called so in the fullest sense only when it is characterised by a

(8) An outline of Psychology, op cit, p 449
(9) ibid, p 450
definite hormic fixation on the goal. In the doctrine of horme, it is persistently postulated that mind is constituted by the sum of the innate tendencies, and that the mental forces which form the source of energy are capable of setting the ends and sustaining all activities. An activity prompted by the hormic urge moves from one step to another, until finally the biological goal is reached, and then the train of action ends in satisfaction. This is why, as it seems, McDougall attempted to rectify and clarify the conception of instincts and make it the native basis of the mind, and to explain the relation of instinct to mental forces. In human activity, for example, the hormic principle finds parallels to all the simpler forms of activities displayed by other animals. An important distinction, however, is to be made. It is true, that hormic psychology requires the recognition of instinct as a basic concept. Yet it never insists that all human acts are instinctive in character. Nor does it insist that the outward behaviour is exclusively the expression of any particular instinct, for the accountability of human experience and other social influences may force man to behave according to certain norms in society. Taking these factors into account, hormic psychology, accordingly, does not necessarily assert that all human actions are entirely instinctive.

What the hormic psychology stresses is that in all human activities, there is a dynamic factor which is a resultant of an
instinctive urge. The position is that, to quote Smith (10)(1960a), McDougall conceived of many forms of human conduct which could not be associated with the specific energy of a particular instinct, but derived their sustaining energy from the general fund of energy available to the person and its specific direction from the experience and acquired attitudes or philosophy of the person. So, besides instinct, there are other factors, some of which are enumerated in Smith's statement, which motivate man to behave in certain ways within society. Yet the basic driving power derives from an instinctive source common to the human species. This is why hormic Psychology has made instinct come at the basis of its fundamental teachings. It may be contended, however, that there is an apparent contradiction here. In point of fact, there is no conflict whatsoever between the two views. Insistence upon the recognition of instinct as a vital factor of purposive behaviour is totally dissimilar to the view that not all human acts which are, to use Allport's term, functionally autonomous, (11) instinctive. In actual fact, it is called hormic Psychology because of its major emphasis on purposeful striving at the basis of which comes instinct. For such distinction and emphasis McDougall can be credited. His main position was to stress neglected facts and to

(10) Explanation of Human Behaviour, op cit., p 213

(11) ibid., p 213
point to empirical adequacy in stating those facts. "His goal, first, last and always, wrote D.K. Adams (1939), "was to make a science of psychology, and it was clear to him that no collection of unrelated explanations, whether in terms of 'reflexes' or 'oedipus complexes' could constitute such a science." (12)

It will be apparent that in his fundamental position, McDougall was more concerned with working out special problems than with erecting a system, though this has now come to be generally acknowledged. In his doctrine of instincts, for instance, he unquestionably added a whole new area to the frame of hormic psychology in particular and to all psychology generally. He was able to see that there was an important scientific problem, and he was the first to include it in the province of science as a problem which had been almost neglected or dealt with inadequately. It can be stated with certainty that all enquiries into and discussions of the theory of instincts take their real start today from McDougall. However far other arguments may depart from his own standpoints, subsequently they are indebted to him for anchoring such a delicate theory on a firm ground. It may be argued, however, that his doctrine of instincts was no new province to explore, such an argument may be agreed to, but it can be equally contended that in this field

(12) *William McDougall* *Psych Rev.*, vol 46, No 1, p 4
nobody before McDougall did cultivate anew. In point of fact, this
d doctrine, which rarely can be called so before McDougall, had been
touched upon \text{} intensively by the classical representatives of
different views, whose framework was unshapely, until McDougall was
able to utilise it fully.

Nor should it be assumed that the doctrine of instincts
was readily accepted with no havoc being wrought about it in
psychology. It was ruthlessly scrutinised. The controversy seems
to be chiefly due to some deep-seated tendency to reify any topic
or word that appears to be unpopular. Variably used by different
writers, instinct is sometimes thought to be a portmanteau word
for which it would be hard to find an equivalent. Most of its
critics appear to have misunderstood its essential part in the life
of the organism. Of course, no value judgements should be imported
into the argument, as if instincts have some a priori standing or
merit. Yet there does seem a possibility that greater knowledge
in their mechanisms could reduce the sum of difference in opinion.
Indeed, until \text{(13) 1941} (about three years after McDougall's death),
instincts had only hypothetical status. The concept of instincts
passed through various crises. Judged from the different

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(13) 'Is the Doctrine of Instincts Dead?' Symposium, \text{B J Ed Psycho,}
vols XI, XII, XIII, (1941-1943), \text{op cit},
contributions to the literature generally, and to the Psychological Review particularly, the year 1923, for instance, was the most critical in the history of the concept of instinct.

When McDougall introduced his theory of instincts, certain criticisms were launched against it. Most serious perhaps was what his critics asked about the scientific utility of instinct as an explanatory concept. This inevitably led to extensive studies, both experimentally and observationally. In a wide scale study, F V Smith (1968a) has recorded that 'Up to the time of his death in 1938, there was no convincing evidence in support of McDougall's hypothesis of specific neurological correlates underlying

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(14) See for example


(111) ________, 'The Nature of Instinct Psych Bull, vol 20, (1923), pp 200ff


the separate instincts (15) Now the evidence in favour of McDougall's views is considerable, so that Smith has rejoined his former statement by writing this 'The notion of different 'neurological correlates' mediating specific type' of purposeful behaviour, which had no more than hypothetical status in McDougall's day, is now on much surer ground' (16)

Smith's observations above are based upon a wide range survey of the relevant literature, and are consistent with what he has stated elsewhere (1960a), namely, that many of the observations and experimental findings could be regarded as affording support to McDougall's position (17) One big difference is to be noted in Smith's tone here In 1960 he had recourse to the cautious way implicit in his usage of 'could be regarded', whereas now his judgement that 'is now on much surer ground' is clearer than ever The implication underlying all this is that the concept of instinct is now gaining more support and it is anchored on firm ground

The position McDougall held, which was eventually to prove valid, is that both biological and the...
motivations are innate, and that behaviour should be explained in terms of events happening in the mind. In other words, instinctive forces are at the basis of behavioural forms. Ethology, represented by two of its leading exponents, Lorenz and Tinbergen, appears to offer specific evidence endorsing McDougall's arguments. The results of the ethologists' enquires, particularly those of Lorenz (18) and Tinbergen (19), indicate certain points.


(11) (1939), Comparative Study of Behaviour' _idem_, pp 239-263

(111) (1952), 'The Past Twelve Years in the Comparative Study of Behaviour' _idem_, pp 288-310

(iv) (1950), The Comparative Method of Studying Innate Behaviour Patterns, Symposium in Society for Experimental Biology, vol 4, pp 221-268, _op cit_


(19) (1) (1952), The Study of Instinct, _op cit_.

(11) (1953), Social Behaviour in Animals, _op cit_.

(111) (1939), with D J Kuenen, 'Releasing and Directing Stimulation Situations in Feeding Behaviour in Young Thrushes' in Instinctive Behaviour, ed by Schiller, Claire H, (1957), pp 209-238
behaviour of the species studied cannot be ascribed to learning
(2) Such a sort of attachment is in some cases irreversible once
the animal is imprinted this point finds support in Smith's
(1968a) experimental researches (3) Nevertheless, this
flexibility in the behaviour of the chicks lasts for a limited
period of time (4) Evolutionarily speaking, man, like the rest
of animals, is a biological organism, and accordingly he must
possess instincts (5) Scrutiny of instincts generally, and a
study of them in man provides a scientific foundation for a
reasonably sound theory of motivation The general picture,
however, is that instinct rests entirely on the whole structure
of the individual, and that it is not mechanical It is determined
by purpose of which it is not altogether independent In view of
this, hormic Psychology is fundamentally concerned to see how
important it is to get the organism on the move and to insist on
the directional aspect of its movement Both man and the animals
are motivated by variously powerful instincts or propensities Yet
in man they are more organised and therefore he is provided with a
variety of dispositions and tempers In animals, the instincts act
at appropriate times In either case, however, such energizing

(20) Imprinting, MSS, op cit.
factors have their varying chemical background upon which they draw.

Undoubtedly, there are some writers such as, for example, J.B. Eggan (1926), E.B. Holt (1931), P.T. Young (1936), and others, who disagree with what most ethologists and experimentalists have observed and found. On the other hand, impressive feats of instinctive activities and orientations are reported in the works of other researchers, such as A. Ginsberg (1952), F.A. Beach (1955), E.H. Hess (1962), Smith (1961, 1965).


(27) Smith's papers are already referred to above, see also Imprinting, MSS, op cit., pp. 40, 43, 44, 48, 65, 66, 89ff, 119ff
1966,1968a), Smith\textsuperscript{(28)} et al (1962,1964,1965,1966) The conclusions reached by these investigators and others tend to validate the concept of instinct as an explanatory factor of behavioural patterns in the animal kingdom, behaviour is a network of instincts \textsuperscript{(29)} L and M Milne 1965\textsuperscript{/} Led by a wide range of observations, the Milnes have stated that, 'A bat which migrates year after year between Newfoundland and Georgia with no known reliance upon visual cues has a brain scarcely larger than the eraser on a lead pencil. The nervous system of a monarch butterfly could be balanced by a millet seed. The control centres of a fruit fly would scarcely cover the period at the end of this sentence. Yet these creatures are all capable of complicated actions. They have survived just as long and just as well as we. Their adaptability moreover, seems limitless. Every time a man builds a better mousetrap, the surviving mice build better mice.'\textsuperscript{(30)} It can be argued that man's survival is contingent upon his complicated nervous system and high degree of intelligence, yet to the Milnes, whose views seem to be

\textsuperscript{(28)} Smith's papers are already referred to above, see also Imprinting, MSS, op cit, pp 40,43,44,48,65,66,89ff,119ff

\textsuperscript{(29)} The Senses of Animals and Men, Pelican ed p 176

\textsuperscript{(30)} ibid, p 276
shared by others such as Lorenz (31) (1968), Size alone, of course, is no measure'. (32) In man, birds and all other creatures, however, there is an inherited capacity for perception and guidance, there is rhythmic repetition of spontaneous activity, in all cases, to quote the Milnes again, 'An innate preference is evident' (33)

The energizing mechanism at work within the organism, then, is instinct as described by McDougall. It differs markedly, for example, from Jung's idea of the archetypes. 'Both are universally transmitted potentialities', (34) in J A Hadfield's (1966) own words but instincts are inherited units directly motivating behaviour, whereas the archetypes consist of images. Therefore it is hard to accept Woodworth's (35) (1965) premise that McDougall's theory of instincts would not be seriously affected if he yielded to admit that almost all behavioural patterns are acquired by learning. Had McDougall accepted Woodworth's notion, it would have been entirely irrelevant with the dynamic concept of instinct, because, the instincts are determined essentially by finding out what actions

(31) On Aggression, op cit, pp 211, 223, 184-6
(32) The Senses of Animals and Men, op cit, p 276
(33) Ibid, p 233
(34) Dreams and Nightmares, op cit, p 42
(35) Contemporary Schools of Psychology, 9th ed, op cit, p 346
occur most frequently or regularly in the actual life of the individual or of a group of like individuals', (36) as Lewin (1935) indicated. In most of his conceptions, Lewin seems to be quite agreeable to McDougall's Aristotelian position (already indicated) he, like many other psychologists, appears to have been attracted by McDougall's hormic explanation of animal behaviour, so that, as Smith (1960a) has specified, All of Lewin's devices in explanation require all of McDougall's assumptions in regard to instigation in order that they may function at all (37) As a matter of fact, Lewin's vectors and 'valences are but McDougall's notion of instincts and purposes, hormically regarded. In Lewin's specific words 'The instincts are the sum of those vectors conditioned by predispositions which it is thought must be ascribed to an individual' (38) The word 'conditioned' can be translated as modified, which is in line with McDougall's own view. It is difficult therefore to reconcile Woodworth's special suggestion, mentioned above, with the purposive requirements which are both functional and dynamic, and which take the concept of man as a starting-point

(37) Explanation of Human Behaviour, op cit, p 246
(38) op cit, p 36
It was from the outset that McDougall distinguished between a motive and a pattern of behaviour. Instinct is used in two different senses: (1) it refers to an innate behavioural unit with its emotional-impulsive core, and (2) it refers to the core alone. In speaking of instincts as being combined into sentiments, McDougall was certainly referring to the cores rather than to the behavioural patterns as such. An instinct is not a mechanical affair like, say, a reflex or a chain of reflexes. It is rather a spring of action.

McDougall's general assumption evidently was that there must be a number of motivating factors which are both natural and hereditary. These inherited elements he called "instincts." In the course of the individual's experience other motives may be derived from the primary ones, but the basic issue is that the innate driving forces are already there. A native ability is displayed in the nest-building, which is a typical instinctive action shown by the wasp, for example. The wasp builds a characteristic nest without ever having a chance to learn the form of the nest. By acting so, the wasp in fact works, according to a native propensity, characteristic of its own species. The human being has what may be called the innate prompters which are conjoined by experience and intelligent capacities. What is required is that as an hereditary unit instinct is to be considered as an
established fact so long as it forms the basis of innate behaviour, the neglect of which is regarded as a vulnerable weakness (39) in psychology. Now specifically reinforcing evidence is offered by the ethological approaches, psychological experiments and observations, and neuro-physiological studies.

Undoubtedly, the lists of instincts drawn up by various authors are numerous and different. Nevertheless, this does not justify the rejection of the whole theory as illusory. The fact is that an intelligible form of better understanding of instincts can flourish only by refining and classifying them, and not by merely condemning the notion as a whole. The differences in opinion hinged about instincts seem to be due to a sort of confusion regarding the nature of instinct and how it is to be understood. Yet another source of confusion, and perhaps a great one, arises from the way of grouping together, as expressions of one instinct, various activities that subserve the same biological function. Such a type of classification would surely involve alienating the psychological aspect as an important criterion. It often happens that the instinct of, say, food-seeking, disgust, escape and combat are grouped together.

(39) Behaviour Paperbacks ed, London, Methuen
as self-preservative in character. Such a sort of confounding is not infrequently encountered in the literature. This would accordingly mean that the list could be indefinitely lengthened or shortened as any writer may wish hence the source of confusion.

However, in spite of all the raging controversies, instinct is now widely recognised as a valuable biological concept in the scientific vocabulary. It has, of course, behind it its long history with its own vicissitudes, overtones and subtleties as to what it really meant, but now even those who one day wanted to discard it were at last unable, in one way or another, to dispense entirely with its important features, the most fundamental of which perhaps is covered by the expression internally prime motivator or mover. Instinct is now considered as an indispensable motivational concept and it is well defined, so that psychologists such as E. R. Hilgard (1960), for example, wishing to defy the common assertion that instinct is poorly defined.

In the present context of knowledge, human instincts are so essential.

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(40) see for example:

1. Wilm, E. C., The Theories of Instinct, (1925), op. cit.,


and are regarded of 'great importance,'(42) as inborn activators. Such an outlook has its own merits, largely because it represents an important development of realising the vital role of instinct, furthermore, it is not inconsistent with the broad biological picture which clearly indicates that certain types of behaviour have been built in by evolution originally, and this is particularly implied in Broadbent's view (1968) that, 'the study of instinctive behaviour shows that quite complex actions may be necessary to the animal just as primary physical needs are.'(43) Indeed, such a tendency in the trend of thinking represents an all-important difference between, on the one hand, the hormist who takes his start from man and deeply believes that the organism as a whole is purposive and directionally orientated with its functions internally and voluntarily activated in order to achieve a desired end, and, on the other hand, say, the behaviourist whose utmost aim is to explain the organism's acts in


(43) Behaviour, op cit, p 181
terms of S - R bonds alone. Now the general tendency, however, among psychologists, ethologists and physiologists, in their respective domains, regarding the nature of behaviour, both animal and human, is that it is neural, internally organised, of inherited directiveness, and extremely purposive in character. By behaving so, the organism is revealing two essential aspects: (a) it expresses its own vitality and principal characteristic, namely, because it is an organism, (b) the organism’s activities are underpinned by and indicative of instincts which (1) are enduring innate dispositions, (2) each instinct is understood as a unit in the Mendelian sense, (3) generally they generate impulses and energize to activities, (4) their fruitfulness lies in their cognitive disposition which is operative in perception, (5) with their hormic energy, instincts are regarded as the main spring of human conduct and the chief activators of any individual’s spontaneous action.

(44) See, for example


(111) Smith, F V, Imprinting, MS, op cit, (1968a)

It ought to be indicated, however, that not every piece of human conduct should imperatively be related to instinct. This point, which may be regarded as essential, must be calculated for the flexibility of the hormic psychology. The question is whether or not the instincts form the function of the hormic psychology. The answer is surely in positive terms. This question may entail another, that is, what about the endless controversies regarding the nature of instinct? The answer is that almost all the discussions involved in respect of instinct and instinctive action have affirmed its existence and indispensability, in spite of the fact that their number is still a matter upon which opinions widely diverge. However, the remedy of solving the problem of instinct may be (i) in a more acceptable re-grouping (ii) avoidance of confusing statements and terms in relation to instincts (iii) a wider recognition of instinct by the majority of psychologists will serve better the purpose of psychology, since it is no longer any mystery, (iv) so long as the secret of its variability lies deeper in the very nature of the living organism itself, instinct must be treated as part and parcel of the energetic behaviour of the individual organism.

At any rate, the most challenging aspect in McDougall's hormic theory is perhaps his insistence that instincts are the powerful driving forces of human conduct. In his view, directly or
indirectly they are essential movers of all human activity, not precluding the intellectual. Purposive striving toward a goal is the great fundamental category in Psychology. No doubt much of McDougall's hormic psychology met with certain criticisms, some of those criticisms were intended to be constructive, others were unjustifiably destructive, yet have not harmed the theory or the system at large. In spite of all this, a great deal of the hormic position has in fact become part of contemporary psychology, as Hearnshaw has stated. The explanatory bases are instincts which, as Cofer and Appley (1965) have put it, are very much with us. Doubtless they form the most abstruse topic and involved him in arduous confrontation, but he was determined that 'he could get no further until he studied the motivations of individual behaviour and these he found in the human instincts', as Hadfield (1967) has written. The primary instincts and their effect on human life have now been much realised and have come to bear upon present day psychology. To cite Hadfield (1967) again, 'McDougall made a most notable contribution to psychotherapy, to mental health and indeed to ethics, when he demonstrated that the primary instincts could be

(45) A Short History of British Psychology, (1964), op cit, p 191
(46) Motivation Theory and Research, op cit, p 106
(47) Introduction to Psychotherapy, op cit, p 115
diverted from their original aims and re-directed towards new objects, and into channels more in keeping with social demands (48). McDougall's interpretation is preferred to Freud's sublimation on the ground that the latter's 'idea was very limited' (49). Freud also associated sublimation (i) with the instinct of sex only (11) he did not clarify how the sex instinct can really be sublimated, (111) he related it only to individuals of artistic aptitude, (iv) Freud's notion is chiefly hedonistic in character whereas 'McDougall described the process of re-direction with much greater precision and showed how in each primary instinct it could affect the whole of our social life」. In Hadfield's words, 'Unlike other authors such as, for example, Sully, Stout, James and Tolman, who sought to explain bits of behaviour in terms of instincts, McDougall's position was wider in scope. He intently maintained that all human behaviour is based upon an instinctive origin. This is compatible with his mentalistic teleology which, to quote Cofer and Appley (1965), implies that knowledge of purpose or ends determines the course of actions or of developments, (51) i.e., the effects precede their causes and determine them. If McDougall had not firmly adhered to

(48) ibid, p 118  (49) ibid, p 118
(50) ibid, p 118  (51) Motivation Theory and Research, op cit, p 38
such a position, 'how else was one to defend the idea of motivation, emphasise the idea of psychological energy and force in human conduct, and explain the apparent purposive character of behaviour except by promoting the instinct doctrine?' Bolles (1967) has wondered.

So in McDougall's hormic position, instincts can be usefully regarded as 'innate plans', purposive actions can be considered in terms of TOTE - Units, and ordered behaviour may be related to an over-all Image, a self-ideal largely responsible for initiating and ordering the specific plans — M A Boden 1965 — Hormically, purposive acts form a continuously graded series. Such a perpetuation commences with the tiniest creature such as the amoeba and goes through up to man's moral struggle in life. This is clearly summed up in McDougall's evolutionary scale of purposive striving and therefore of character, namely

(52) Theory of Motivation, op cit, p 92

* The term quoted by Margaret A Boden, was originally coined by G A Miller, E Galanter and K H Pribram (1960) in their book Plans and the Structure of Behaviour, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc, this term, which stands for 'Test-Operate-Test-Exit', has the sense of flexibility. It is a formula which describes the individual's handling of a problem that might face him.

(53) McDougall Revisited, J Personality, vol 33, No 1, op cit, p 17

(54) An outline of Psychology, op cit, pp 448-449
1. The vague phase during which the almost undifferentiated striving of the animalcule in pursuit of its prey takes place.

2. The strivings of animals in which instincts are sharply differentiated and directed toward specific goals that are vaguely anticipated by the creature.

3. The strivings of instinctive desire at this stage, appear the strivings of primitive man toward goals more fully anticipated.

4. The strivings of men prompted by desire for instinctive goals, but directed also to goals which are conceived and desired only as means to the instinctive goal.

5. Conduct of the lower level, whereby the instinctive desire is regulated and controlled by anticipation of rewards and punishments.

6. Conduct of the middle level at this phase instinctive impulses are controlled by social impact.

7. Conduct of the higher level at this level there anticipated is the higher standard of moral conduct, influences of a highly organised society embodying a moral tradition are realised and observed so long as they have their direct effect upon the individual.

A further note is desirable in respect of (4), it is not altogether clear as to what is meant by its wording. It is rather confusing. As to stages 5 and 6, they are so near to each other, so
they may be detailed together since the choice of means and goals are the characteristics applicable to either. Nevertheless, an interesting point may emerge in this connection with the stages just enumerated, namely, these seven phases seem to coincide with and match the seven marks of purposive behaviour given by McDougall. There seems to be an affinity between the two sets and every individual item in each set appears to balance with its opposite number. This may show the consistency which McDougall maintained throughout his contentions, and one of his main concerns was to explain the nature and the extent of the innate basis of mind.

3 Further Illustrative Comments

The heart of the matter is that if we relate his (McDougall's) basic convictions as to the efficacy of purposes and consciousness to his philosophical concepts of 'soul' and 'monad', and to his psychological concepts of 'instinct', 'sentiment', 'dissociation' and 'personality', we shall be better able to appreciate the systematic nature of his psychology and its relevance to present-day thought. In McDougall's system, there is a rich source of many explanatory ideas for which he appeared to have been on the look-out. His system

(55) J. Personality, vol 33, op cit., p 18
provides 'an interesting attempt to illuminate human behaviour and
the structure of personality' [Boden 1965, pp17-18] The constant
recurrence of certain arguments clearly show that various topics
were of his main concern, chief among them, however, are (1) to
indicate that the concept of purpose is fundamental to any adequate
psychology, in this general matter he seems to have achieved certain
success, judged by the big number of leading psychologists that
followed in his steps (2) To demonstrate the causal efficacy of
conscious states, this, too, appears, as indicated, to have been
accepted as adequate by many notable psychologists (3) His emphatic
stress on the directional functions of the 'self was and is still
being maintained in the field of notable personalistic theories,
namely, by what Boden (1965, pp 17-18) has called 'the Third Force
psychologists - ego psychology, the Adlerian Creative self, and
Allport's proprium'

Viewed from the aspect of his embracing of a multitude
of various theoretical approaches and experimental investigations,
McDougall's hormic theory is surely a major systematic effort based
on a clear comprehension of the subjects studied. It is now almost
a generally recognised fact that the hormic theory, as worked out by
McDougall, has influenced present day psychology tremendously and
'provided just what was required' (L S Hearnshaw 1964, p 195) No
doubt, some of his hypotheses and experiments were sterile, but most
of his theories included in the context of hormé were and are still of great value. Unquestionably, to quote Smith (1960a), there have been definite fluctuations in the support for McDougall's position or indeed for the role of instinct in any form in human behaviour and in animal behaviour (56). The fluctuation indicated by Smith is the resultant of two different sources, (1) it comes from those who for one reason or another had not the bent to recognise instinct as a prime mover of human conduct and animal behaviour, (2) the uncertainty emerges from the writings of some authors who were not exactly sure of the position of instinct in relation to hormic psychology and its applicability in the field of behaviour. However, in spite of the shortcomings spotted in the hormic theory as a whole, yet its many systematic plans based upon wide vision and deep discernment into a considerable number of essentially important psychological problems have strengthened the position of the theory, enabled it to be in the vogue, so that it could bring about many corrections and amendments to numerous psychological views, in addition to the original ideas that the hormic theory itself initiated and innovated.

The foregoing survey and discussions will have indicated the nature of the hormic theory which cannot be lightly dismissed.

(56) *Explanation of Human Behaviour*, *op cit*, p 132
to use an expression from Smith (57) (1960). As worked out by McDougall, the hormic principle is worthy of consideration. Particularly does it deserve the attention of all branches of psychology, both applied and pure. He was essentially concerned with mind in relation to nature as a whole. His advance was based on a broad front whereof he was able to clarify much vagueness. He could amalgamate his own originality with the assimilated views in historical perspectives, so that he could emerge as a pervasively influential psychologist. His impact 'upon human life and activity', (58) as judged by F C Bartlett (1940), is the most powerful compared with other contemporary psychologists. (59) So it may be quite possible now to talk of 'The Hormic School' instead of merely designating it as a hormic principle or theory.

In addition to purposiveness, McDougall took into consideration freedom in behaviour, as against rigid determinism. (60) For him, the most important part of psychology is that which is concerned with why a person wants to act in a certain way. It is not sufficient to explain the individual's acts just in terms of his idea of the activity. The teleological side of his viewpoint is

(57) *Explanation of Human Behaviour*, op cit, p 178
(58) *The Dictionary of National Biography*, p 572
(59) *ibid*, p 572
that no activity can occur without the participation of instincts
without which man would be inert. Hence the end-oriented behaviour.
He clearly defined the types of man's goals and motives. 'The
positive side of McDougall's system', writes R Thomson (61) (1968),
'is that he classifies the general kinds of goals towards which much
intelligent means-end behaviour is directed.'

Suffice it is to say that McDougall's position and the
way in which it was presented has enriched psychology, both during
his time and after. He was able to encompass within one context
various issues of paramount importance. Perhaps his most impressive
achievement is the presentation in a single picture, topics of
major significance for Psychology. This may be justified by means
of a quotation from Spearman, (62) who wrote that McDougall revelled
in 'large systems of ideas, which is each in itself closely
connected, highly developed, and deeply rooted.' A distinctive feature
in McDougall's hormic treatment is to approach effectively the problems
of human nature from a dynamic point of view. From this aspect,
he attacked descriptive and analytic psychology of consciousness
"The value of the system, however, may be further assessed
by considering the justification for" his 'several assumptions'.

(61) The Pelican History of Psychology, op cit, p 178

(62) (1) Character and Personality, vol 7, (1939), op cit, p 182 see
also
(11) Abilities of Man, London, (1932), 2nd ed, pp 114, 123, 135, 176,
308, 321
For McDougall, the essential task of psychology is to achieve an understanding of human activity as will make possible a more effective guidance and control of the energies of Men. By energy he meant, of course, the psycho-physical or the hormic energy in the broadest sense. His system is almost architectural in its simplicity and if the lavish number of initial and implied assumptions are granted, is capable of providing reasons for almost any form of behaviour which may be observed. The way he handled his discussions regarding the large number of hypotheses, made his arguments valuable so that they are now required and needed to extricate current psychology out of a situation far more precarious than is usually suspected. Hormic ideas helped save psychology from wading into mere excessive shallowness, so now, 'There can be no doubt that the system had

(63) Explanation of Human Behaviour, op cit,
(64) The Energies of Men, op cit,
(65) Explanation of Behaviour, op cit,
(66) The Life and Work of William McDougall Character and Personality, vol 7, No 3, op cit,
(67) ibid, p 183
a decisive and in the main beneficial effect upon the development of
the subject"(68) - matter of Psychology [Smith 1960a, p 180/.

Opposition to McDougall's hormic teachings, however,
was at times violent. This is so particularly when it is understood
that he did not show that reconciliatory spirit which is ready to
mediate between contrasting schools of thought. So the hormic
Psychology which he pioneered had to prove its soundness and
validity as a viable scheme and as an acceptable system. In this
he seems to have achieved success. Such a judgement is based upon
evidence drawn from two main sources, notably, (1) McDougall's
sustained effort reflected in his wide range of publications
(2) Appendix II (2) Seen through the contemporary eyes, the long-
standing conflict, with which McDougall's hormic discussions met,
ended with the affirmation of the hormic Psychology which owes its
triumphant establishment to its protagonist, William McDougall.
Furthermore, if the hormic ideas never met with the required
recognition they deserve during the life-time of their founder, surely
they are now widely and generally acknowledged. This has come to be
so, because McDougall 'has given us a systematic treatment of
conation and effect, and in completeness and in thoroughness is

(68) Explanation of Human Behaviour, op cit.
without rival\(^{(69)}\) Flugel 1951, p 222

In a broader sense, and hormically speaking, McDougall could produce a system which is so fertile and embraces so many distinctive features, so that now he has had far wider influence even amongst those who disagreed with him, than they would admit\(^{(70)}\) Hadfield 1967, p 114

The hormic views have their prodigal impact upon today's psychology, so the effect is perhaps more than McDougall could have realised. His ideas were and are still being widely cited, but some writers appear to quote him and merely indicate, 'Psychologists say', as he once complained to Hadfield 1967, p 114\(^{(71)}\)

In view of McDougall's great hormic contributions to human psychology in particular, and to the vast field of psychology in general, the present study, however, can no better be concluded than by quoting Major Greenwood and May Smith (1941) who, appreciating McDougall's hormic position in current psychology, have recorded that, a future generation may marvel at the neglect of lines of advance he has suggested, while a good deal that he did has become incorporated in the general body of

\(^{(69)}\) A Hundred Years of Psychology, op cit,

\(^{(70)}\) Introduction to Psychotherapy, op cit,

\(^{(71)}\) ibid
knowledge (72) Indeed, the basic frame of reference of motivational psychology in particular and the whole field of psychology in general, has found in McDougall a truly enthusiastic, skilful and dogged exponent who by anchoring its innate foundations so capably has provided the most extensive and viable of psychological systems.

CHAPTER XII

RETROSPECT

Now it will have become apparent that the hormic theory, which has had a tremendous influence upon present-day psychology, owes its success and validation to two major factors (a) a philosophical mode of thinking preserved in a long traditional past, (b) McDougall's pioneering efforts and emphasis. There is no doubt that he could present in a single picture a scheme characterised by both depth and broadness, so that the net outcome has been a highly successful hormic psychological creed.

The philosophical trend displayed an almost unbroken chain of thought. Each philosopher, from Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Hartley upward to James Mill, the father, John Stuart Mill, the son, and A. Bain, sought new inspirations from his predecessors. These and other philosophers concerned themselves with problems intimately related to human life, namely, mental phenomena. They worked out what they variably called 'Associationism', 'Empiricism' or 'Empirical Associationism'. This, however, never implied, from those philosophers' points of view, that philosophy should be departmentalized into separate chambers or chopped into small fragments in 'unrelated manner. For them, to philosophize was to
fling the net of interest widely so as to cover various yet collated topics. In doing so, they made philosophy to be concerned with everyday life rather than concentrating only upon metaphysical issues.

Philosophically discussed therefore, the mind was conceived as a set of dispositional feelings operating in accordance with psychological laws. The underlying assumption, of course, was based upon associationism and empiricism, both were kept alive during the XVIIth, XVIIIth and throughout XIXth centuries mainly through the enthusiasm of the great thinkers just mentioned, and whenever any reference is made to the British empiricists, they are usually called the British associationists because the whole argument was built up chiefly upon the principle of the association of ideas.

Unquestionably, controversy among the associationists was evident, and the psychology of thinking was then a philosopher's territory. Approaching the fundamental problem of mental life from different aspects, the thinkers in question were able to form a coherent system of philosophical psychology which later on inspired psychological theorization. Yet they never failed to emphasise in their discussions the essential differences between the senses as tools of perceiving what is happening in the milieu, the experience
of the sensations such as colour, heat, etc., which are identified by the organs concerned, and finally the object, such as, for example, the table, the pen, which are the sources of the sensations.

Fundamentally, the trend of thinking never remained stagnant nor was it merely a philosopher's province. Through the assiduous and prodigious efforts of H. Spencer, Charles Darwin, F. Galton, G. J. Romanes, Lloyd Morgan, and others, the emphasis, without breaking away from the tradition, shifted tremendously to the investigation of the nature of man on biological lines. The long philosophical past thus gave impetus to the newly dawning scientific era of biological and laboratory psychology.

Darwin's influence in particular was remarkable. He especially dedicated his *Origin of Species* (1859)* to specifically biological issues. His proposed mechanism, involved in natural selection, natural variation and inheritance, for the first time focussed attention upon certain biological consequences which never before had been fully appreciated. For example, the structures and processes in the organism's life were interpreted as being inextricably linked with its striving for survival. As a field

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*Being based upon Darwin's *The Voyage of the Beagle* (1831-36)*
observer, Darwin greatly stressed the behavioural resultants which are observable and considered as assets associated with the animal's structure. He emphasised in particular, instinctive behaviour as a major contributor in the whole operation of survival. Instincts, as innate units of behavioural patterns, Darwin regarded as irrevocable evidence of evolutionary continuity. So too, the biological discoveries he made have come to have their definite impact upon various areas of modern psychology, notably in the field of individual differences, animal psychology, and in particular comparative psychology, where the causal aspects of human behaviour for the first time could be associated with the biological past.

Offering biological and physiological means of dealing with the individual's environment, Darwin's specific interpretations eventually led to justifications supporting functional psychology, act psychology and a teleological way of thinking, it was also to highlight the hormic theory. The four areas mentioned - functional, act, teleological and hormic psychology - were characteristically British innovations which were predominant both in this country and very much influenced the psychological thought abroad. The innovation, however, was largely initiated by people such as Sully, Ward, Stout, S Alexander, Nunn and, above all, McDougall, the true
founder of the hormic theory. In their unceasing efforts, these authors, particularly McDougall, were able to reduce much of the intellectual quibblings in psychology, and it is McDougall who was to be credited with the anchoring of recent motivational psychology upon potentially firm explanatory concepts.

McDougall's creed of hormé, which has now greatly affected the whole realm of psychology, has its origins deeply rooted in a rich background. The theory itself is traceable to Plato and mostly to Aristotle, but not until McDougall dressed it in its ultra modern fashion, has it come to be so influential in the numerous fields of psychology. Undoubtedly a definitive piece of research is supposed to settle certain questions. Yet when the elements involved are examined, it becomes quite clear that the domain explored is far more complicated than had been expected. So McDougall in fact was confronted with a number of difficulties which stemmed from (1) the nature of the subject itself, for it was quite a novel problem to be dealt with so emphatically and defended hormically (1) The antagonism with which the new hormic explanations were met. No sooner was a complete story or a new question settled by the data available, than other objections were raised. Nevertheless, like any other author engrossed in scientific matters, McDougall felt that his efforts must have to provide
convincing answers to the questions raised. Furthermore, the paradoxical nature of the scientific subject itself appears to have inevitably created further questions hence the whole topic became so extended farther than perhaps it was presupposed to be. However, judged by the vast fields to be covered, the wide issues to be dealt with, the intricacy and complexity of the subject in its details, McDougall apparently had to touch upon some points just lightly, to write in a popular way about others, yet most of them, the most important ones, were emphatically stressed. Both breadth and depth therefore are essential characteristics of most of the subjects he discussed. Although he had to deal with many directions at once, he was able to co-ordinate and integrate many points which became assimilated into one main body, the hormic theory in its present form.

Judged in the light of today's literature, it can be readily stated that the hormic principle, as worked out by McDougall, is an episode of intellectual and practical importance in the whole history of modern psychology. Again, it is now frequently encountered in the literature that Darwin's and McDougall's names are mentioned together, the former for his impressive evolutionary achievements, the latter for the distinctively novel views in psychology. Both authors, each in his own capacity and way of thinking, could really advance human scientific thought.
in no small manner McDougall's major contribution to present-day psychology is now taking on such an importance. When first put forward, the hormic ideas raised storms of opposition, but the basic principles have now been thoroughly verified and their impact on the science of psychology today has grown profoundly. It is all through McDougall's own vision and diligence that it has now become apparent to look for the nature of the individual's motivation within the behaving individual himself.

It was within the context of horme that McDougall endeavoured to tease out a number of difficult topics like, for example, instinct, mental processes, body-mind relationships, the monadic nature and aspects of personality as a whole. Among the many subjects he discussed, no more difficult controversy did he face than that of the doctrine of instincts.

McDougall's unshaken belief was that instincts are to be understood as innately inherited biological units in the Mendelian sense, each instinct being mediated by its own neurological correlates. The ideas espoused in connection with instincts were criticised, sometimes severely, some of the strictures launched, however, mounted even to the denial of the existence of instincts at all. Nevertheless, ethological, neurological, physiological and observational studies as well as modern techniques have supported McDougall's position, namely, that
the doctrine of instincts is valid and is an essential concept in explaining behavioural phenomena, both human and animal. The accumulated evidence has now moved more in favour of McDougall's trenchant views that (1) it is inherently inculcated in the individual's constitution to strive towards particular ends, (2) it is through a process of cognitive-conative-affective activity that a goal can be attained. This, in any case, would entail (a) that instincts involve complex behavioural patterns, (b) in any instinctive action, movements are highly co-ordinated, (c) instinctive acts are usually instigated by complex situations to which the creature responds so that it inherently tends to pay attention to certain objects, and it is disposed to pursue such objects both with perseverance and intelligence, so the concept of instincts can now provide an inspiring theme for more profitable studies which would cast much more light upon the internal nature of the individual concerned.

However, in its present structure and applicability, the hormic theory now enjoys considerable support and finds full expression in the numerous fields of psychology, particularly in the writings of such prominent scholars as J. Drever (Snr), G. Allport, R. B. Cattell, Godfrey Thomson, T. P. Nunn, Charles Spearman, E. C. Tolman, C. Burt, N. Tinbergen, K. Lorenz and many others, whose works
clearly reflect McDougall's influence on the turning point in psychology from merely mechanistic contentions to hormically motivational yet voluntary psychology

* * *

Viewed objectively and in retrospect, the style of much of McDougall's writing had something of the peremptory quality of the grand figure who assumed the role of doyen of the developing literature and wrote into animal and human nature as assumptions, many features which he intuitively felt to be appropriate. But fortunately, his biological background was wide enough to ensure that his intuitions were related to biological reality. His fundamental hypothesis of innate patterns of behaviour mediated by inherited perceptual organisation has received considerable support, more in fact than any other in the history of psychology, and even if he did borrow heavily from Shand, Stout and others, it could only have been because he appreciated the necessity of a continuity between man's individual and biological nature and the moulding effect of social training and responsibility. His 'Introduction to Social Psychology' (1908) was in this sense a true introduction and as Allport emphasised, introduced and gave standing and foundation to this aspect of Psychology.
The large number of other systematists who did in fact use many of his assumptions and indeed much of his basic plan (vide Allport, Lewin and Tolman) is some evidence of the relevance of his approach.

It is hardly profitable to argue that the development of Psychology would have maintained its known direction subsequent to Wundtian laboratory psychology, without McDougall. Too many suppositions would be involved. The historical fact is that in 1908 McDougall's basic thesis was known and was maintained virtually unchanged until his death. No other work in the history of Psychology has had such vogue (25 editions and several reprintings) to date — and An Outline of Psychology (1923) and The Energies of Men (1932) were but restatements of the thesis. If it is difficult to argue for a causal influence upon the history of Psychology, it is defensible to point to a correlation between McDougall's output and much that followed.
PART IV

APPENDICES
APPENDIX I

A SYNOPSIS OF MCDougall'S SYSTEM

AS ENVISAGED BY SMITH, F V
SYNOPSIS OF McDougall’s System

Basic concept is hormé the urge or will to live which permeates all behaviour

1. Some minor instincts (p 77) — such as those which prompt to walking and crawling — and (p 397) some minor reaction tendencies which seem to occupy a position between the reflexes on the one hand and instinctive responses on the other. The chief of them are the tendency to scratch an itching spot, coughing, sneezing, yawning, urination and defecation.

2. The Non Specific Innate Tendencies — not classified as instincts on the ground that the emotional excitement which is specific in the case of the instincts is with them (p 77) — rather of a many sided and general character. These tendencies are
   - Sympathy or the sympathetic induction of emotions
   - Suggestibility
   - Imitation and Play

3. Instincts of a less well defined emotional tendency These include
   - Gregariousness
   - Construction
   - The Instinct of Laughter is added
   - Acquisition
   - Reproduction
   - in a supplementary chapter

4. The Seven Primary Instincts — each associated with a basic or primary emotion. The criteria of primacy of the emotions are:
   1. They are clearly displayed by higher animals
   2. Exaggerated in abnormal states e.g. Elation-Subjection in the manic depressive psychosis

   The operation of 3 and 4 are described in the definition of instinct (p 25) — An inherited or innate psycho physical disposition which determines its possessor to perceive or pay attention to objects of a certain class to experience an emotional excitement of a particular quality upon perceiving such an object and to act in regard to it in a particular manner or at least to experience an impulse to such action

As indicated in the definition the instinctive process consists in three phases

- Cognitive (Knowing)
- Affective (Emotion)
- Conative (Purposive Action)

(The cognitive and conative phases are modifiable by experience. A man can be made angry by a greater variety of situations and can manifest that emotion in a greater variety of ways than for example a dog.)

Primary Instinct
- Escape
- Curiosity
- Combat
- Repulsion
- Self Assumption
- Self Abasement
- Parental

Basic Emotion
- Fear
- Wonder
- Anger
- Disgust
- Elation or Positive Self feeling
- Subjection or Negative Self feeling

Blending of Basic Emotions gives
- Fused Emotions e.g. Awe
- Scorn
- Admiration

Both Basic and Fused Emotions when focused about an object give
- SENTIMENTS

The organisation of a person’s sentiments would depend upon his capacity for experience and environmental influence both of the sustained and incidental type.

Integrating all and thus involved in acts

[The space devoted to innate endowment and environment does not necessarily reflect their relative importance]

THE SELF REGARDING SENTIMENT — (roughly described)

The conception of oneself as one would have oneself

Based upon McDougall Wm An Introduction to Social Psychology Methuen & Co London — all references are to the 23rd Edition 1916 — by kind permission of the publishers.
APPENDIX II

A COMPLETE BIBLIOGRAPHY OF

WILLIAM MCDougALL
Biographical Note

William I S McDougall (1871-1938), was born at Chadderton, Lancashire, 22nd June 1871. After attending a private school in Lancashire, he proceeded to the Queens College, Manchester, where he first studied language, history, and mathematics, but influenced by the works of H. Spencer, C. Darwin and Thomas Huxley, he soon turned to biology. In 1890 he went with a scholarship to St. John's College, Cambridge. In 1894 he joined St. Thomas's Hospital with the purpose of obtaining a degree in medicine, where he carried out experiments in the laboratory of (Sir) C. S. Sherrington. In 1897 he was elected into a fellowship at Cambridge, and began to make a systematic study of comparative psychology. Between 1902 and 1904 McDougall lectured on Psychology at University College, London. In 1903 he was elected Wilde reader in mental philosophy at Oxford and opened an experimental research laboratory. During the war of 1914-1918, he served as a major with the Royal Army Medical Corps and was fully occupied with the study and treatment of nerve cases among soldiers. In 1920 he went to Harvard University as Professor of Psychology. He left Harvard in 1927 in order to become Professor of Psychology at Duke University, North Carolina. Long before this time, in 1912 he was elected F.R.S., and a fellow of Corpus Christi College, Oxford. He received the
honorary degree of D Sc from Manchester University in 1919, and was elected an honorary fellow of St John's College, Cambridge, in 1938 (1)

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